Week 2 - Assignment: Appraise the Merits of Using the Qualitative Method

SAGE Research Methods

The Handbook of Social Research Ethics

Author: Joshua W. Clegg, Brent D. Slife

Pub. Date: 2013

Product: SAGE Research Methods

DOI: https://dx.doi.org/10.4135/9781483348971

Methods: Research ethics, Ethical codes, Vulnerable groups

Keywords: modernism, tradition, knowledge, law, social science

Disciplines: Anthropology, Business and Management, Criminology and Criminal Justice, Communication

and Media Studies, Counseling and Psychotherapy, Economics, Education, Geography, Health, History,

Marketing, Nursing, Political Science and International Relations, Psychology, Social Policy and Public Policy,

Social Work, Sociology

Access Date: January 5, 2023

Publishing Company: SAGE Publications, Inc.

City: Thousand Oaks

Online ISBN: 9781483348971

© 2013 SAGE Publications, Inc. All Rights Reserved.

Research Ethics in the Postmodern Context

Joshua W.Clegg and Brent D.Slife

Discussing a topic as broad and as frequently misunderstood as postmodernism requires some organizing

principle, some general definition. Yet postmodernism makes such broad generalizations problematic at the

outset. From the postmodern viewpoint, any definition of anything, including the definition of postmodernism

itself, is a value judgment, with ethical and even political implications. Another problem in defining postmod-

ernism is that postmodernists (whoever these undefined entities are) resist the closed “totalizing” conceptions

of things. They view such conceptions as inappropriate reductions of the real—stereotypes of the rich experi-

ence of whatever is being conceived or defined.

Postmodernism is not, then, best understood in conceptual terms at all; it is perhaps best understood by en-

gaging in practices that are postmodern, rather than conceptualizing things as postmodern. Consequently,

this entire chapter (and perhaps this entire volume) could be construed as the modernist project of summariz-

ing the unsummarizable, and thus conflicting with the very spirit of postmodernism. Any conception of post-

modernity would have to be pluralistic, rarely unitary, and perhaps even poetic. Still, we remain committed to

making this chapter understandable to the modern thinker and coherent within the underpinnings of this book,

which implies some dedication to a clear organization.

Consequently, we begin by outlining some of the major movements and figures in postmodern philosophy. We

follow this with a discussion of four postmodern ethical/philosophical commitments, which we frame not as

conceptual foundations but as Wittgensteinian (1953/2001) “family resemblances.” These four resemblances,

which include the particular, the contextual, the value laden, and the other, are then contrasted with modernist

commitments. True to the rich, particular, and contextualized values of postmodern theorists, we illustrate and

explicate these contrasting commitments in terms of particular examples from existing research traditions.

Much of this discussion will appropriately concern what would traditionally be considered “methodological” is-

sues. However, we caution the reader that one of the primary lessons of a postmodern approach to research

ethics is that every research activity is an exercise in research ethics, every research question is a moral

dilemma, and every research decision is an instantiation of values. In short, postmodernism does not permit

the distinction between research methods and research ethics.

SAGE

© 2009 by SAGE Publications, Inc.

SAGE Research Methods

Page 2 of 25 The Handbook of Social Research Ethics

The Postmodern Context

Postmodern thought is something of an antithesis to the thesis of modernism—different sides of the same

coin. Some of the specific characteristics of both modernism and postmodernism are outlined below, but in

general, this dichotomy centers on the dialectic between a generally naturalistic, positivistic, and realist world-

view (modernism) and its antithesis in a critical, constructivist, or interpretivist worldview (postmodernism). In

its historically explicit form, this dialectic is essentially a 20th-century phenomenon, but its roots reach back

into the Enlightenment and perhaps before.

Of the most essential modernist themes, naturalism, probably boasts the oldest pedigree. Naturalism, or the

notion that the world and everything in it can be explained in terms of natural, material, and narrowly empirical

processes, had advocates among the pre-Socratic philosophers (e.g., Democritus). There were, of course,

any number of antinaturalist philosophers in the Western intellectual tradition, particularly among the mystical

or hermetic and early Christian philosophers. It was not until the Enlightenment, particularly in the 18th and

19th centuries, that the theme of naturalism was wedded to a broader intellectual and cultural positivism, or a

general belief in the social, empirical, and theoretical power of science to ask and answer the basic questions

of reality. This marriage permitted the modernist worldview to be fully forged as a culturally powerful antithesis

to various premodern mystical, feudal, or otherwise centralized worldviews.

However, the rise of an unambiguously naturalistic worldview was not unopposed by influential thinkers. Near-

ly every major philosopher of the Enlightenment era was interested in and supported the development of a

naturalistic philosophy, but there were many who also advocated a kind of metaphysical counterpoint to strict-

ly empirical or material accounts. Descartes (1641/ 1996), for example, produced an elaborately mechanistic

(and naturalistic) account of the human organism while also postulating a purely metaphysical realm of the

mind (res cogitans). Even in Britain, the home of the most stridently empiricistic philosophers, thinkers in the

tradition of Berkeley (1710/2004) or Reid (1764/2005) cast doubt on the unproblematically realist approach to

philosophy.

Notwithstanding these currents of dissent, the postmodern view as a whole could not develop until modernism

itself was fully fledged by the dramatic successes of the industrial age, or what Polkinghorne (2005) called

“technification” (p. 5). Modernism as a generally dominant Western worldview reached its zenith only in the

late 19th and early 20th centuries, and this is precisely when the forces of postmodernism began to gath-

er. The successes of industrial technology began to meet its excesses, and the positivist worldview received

SAGE

© 2009 by SAGE Publications, Inc.

SAGE Research Methods

Page 3 of 25 The Handbook of Social Research Ethics

both the praise and the blame. Philosophers and scientists began to question the monolith of materialistic and

naturalistic science, and that dissent would eventually be labeled (not unproblematically) “postmodernism.”

The gathering force of postmodern philosophy was, in some sense, the natural dissenting extension of the

modernist worldview and so, like Western philosophy in general, is typically divided into an Anglo-American

tradition and a Continental European tradition.

Anglo-American Postmodernism

In the Anglo-American tradition, the primary thematic contexts for postmodernism have been philosophy of

language and philosophy of science. Philosophy of language in the 20th century made a radical “shift from a

focus on meaning as reference to a focus on meaning as use,” and this was “a change revolutionary enough

to mark the shift from modern to postmodern in philosophy of language” (Murphy, 1997, p. 23).

Alfred North Whitehead was one of the first who began to question a fully realist and objectivist philosophy

(i.e., meaning as reference). In his later writings, Whitehead (1925) asserted that “process rather than sub-

stance is the most basic reality. Substance, in fact, is an abstraction from the processes of experience” (p.

90). For Whitehead, the generalized categories of “existence” were not the fundamental realities but were

essentially perceiver dependent. In this way, Whitehead delineated a pivotal theme of postmodernism—its

rejection of the modernist division of the subjective and objective in favor of a perceiver-dependent or inter-

preted reality.

Ludwig Wittgenstein, another influential Anglo postmodern philosopher, claimed that “meaning depends on

the role language plays in a system of conventions, both linguistic and nonlinguistic, of practices, perfor-

mances, ‘forms of life’” (Murphy, 1997, p. 24), a claim that has had profound implications for postmodern phi-

losophy. In Wittgenstein's later work, language almost completely abandons its objective and rationalist roots

and replaces them with particular forms of everyday life. Again, meaning is viewed more as a particular social

function (“use”) than as a reference to an objective reality. Other philosophers in this tradition include Gilbert

Ryle (1900–1976) and J. L. Austin (1911–1960).

This shift from substance to process and from the abstract or universal to social convention and everyday life

was mirrored in the Anglo-American philosophy of science. Thomas Kuhn (1996), for example, asserted that

change in science was not the product of systematic empirical or rational progress but was, rather, the result

of radical paradigm shifts in scientific epistemology. For Kuhn, then, science had to be understood culturally

SAGE

© 2009 by SAGE Publications, Inc.

SAGE Research Methods

Page 4 of 25 The Handbook of Social Research Ethics

and socially. W. V. Quine (1908–2000) also eschewed a view of science founded entirely on a system of em-

pirical and rational facts. Philosophers such as Imre Lakatos (1922–1974) and Paul Feyerabend (1924–1994)

further elaborated this nonfoundationalist approach to the philosophy of science.

The Anglo-American tradition of postmodernism also included ethical philosophers such as Alasdair McIntyre

(1984)—who argued that ethics had to be understood within its social and historical context—and, to some

extent, philosophers in the American pragmatist tradition. American pragmatism, beginning with William

James (1842–1910), John Dewey (1859–1952), and Charles Sanders Peirce (1839–1914), was by no means

a unitary tradition, but in general, pragmatists replaced a realist picture of the world with one that centers

meaning in functional relations. This tradition was at least partly a postmodern one in that it undermined the

modernist worldview. As Richard Rorty (1991) argued, pragmatists believe that the epistemology that under-

lies science is not a “privileged method,” and they deny “that the results of the natural sciences suffice to give

meaning to our lives” (p. 75).

Generally, then, Anglo postmodernism reacts to Anglo modernism by emphasizing the interpreted and social

over the objective and rational. The modernist considers the objective and the rational to be essentially un-

interpreted and universal, whereas the postmodernist views even these “foundations” of modernism as con-

text and perceiver dependent. For many modernists, this sort of context and perceiver dependence raises

the specter of radical relativism, and some see chaos and nihilism as the eventual result (Capaldi & Proc-

tor, 1999). As we will see, however, this kind of relativism is not inevitable in postmodernism. The absence

of a modernist grounding of ideas, such as objectivism and foundationalism, does not mean the absence of

grounds altogether. As we will describe, postmodern grounds include, to name a few, the particular, the con-

textual, and the value laden.

Continental European Postmodernism

The Continental European strain of postmodernism began to take shape with a systematic reconceptualiza-

tion of subjectivity, beginning in the Austro-German tradition. Immanuel Kant (1781/1998) set the agenda for

this reconceptualization when he reaffirmed and systematized the subjective-objective dichotomy in terms of

the noumenal, or independent and unknowable reality, and the phenomenal, or the interpreted, knowable re-

ality. This reduction of human knowledge to human experience paved the way for what Wilhelm Dilthey (1883/

SAGE

© 2009 by SAGE Publications, Inc.

SAGE Research Methods

Page 5 of 25 The Handbook of Social Research Ethics

1988) would later call “human science” conceptions of knowledge.

The phenomenological tradition was perhaps the most prominent of these human science approaches. Hegel

(1770–1831) pioneered the philosophical investigation of the phenomenal, but it was Edmund Husserl (1900/

1999) who turned phenomenology into a systematic investigation of human experience. For Husserl, this was

a radical enterprise that explicitly undermined naturalistic conceptions of science. He claimed, following the

logic of his teacher Franz Brentano (1838–1917), that experience is always intentional—always an experi-

ence of something. This may seem like a deceptively simple premise, but it has radical implications. Unlike

the modernist notion of an independent and isolated “object,” this intentionality implies that experienced ob-

jects are irreducibly composed in both perceiver and perceived. Under Husserlian phenomenology, purely

objective (uninterpreted) reality is an incoherent notion.

The students of Husserlian phenomenology extended this basic logic into an elaborate and robust challenge

to the modernist worldview. Martin Heidegger (1927/1962), for example, argued that all meaning, including

the meanings of research findings, is fundamentally interpretive. All knowledge, in this sense, is developed

within a preexisting social milieu, ever interpreting and reinterpreting itself. This perspective, usually called

hermeneutics, was systematically applied to the social sciences by Hans Georg Gadamer (1960/1989). He

argued that because the social sciences (like other sciences) build their interpretive assumptions into their

methods (including their scientific methods), they necessarily reproduce their theoretical assumptions in their

professional treatments and empirical findings.

Other students of Husserlian phenomenology radically redefined the nature and scope of meaning, and thus

the human sciences. The analysis of Maurice Merleau-Ponty (1964), for example, demonstrated important

differences between the conventional category of “body” and the phenomenological meaning of embodiment.

He claimed, in fact, that all higher-order intellectual meaning was derivative of the concrete experience of our

embodiment. Jean-Paul Sartre (1943/1956) even more radically redefined all meaning in terms of the radical-

ly free human agent. Emmanuel Levinas (1961/1969) was another phenomenologist who redefined meaning,

this time in terms of the ethical. Later students of both phenomenology and hermeneutics—for example, Paul

Ricoeur (1913–2005), Charles Taylor (1931–)—further developed this tradition into a non-naturalistic and non-

positivist approach to research and the social sciences.

Another influential strain of Continental postmodernism emerged from France and was concerned primarily

with the deconstruction of social meanings, including institution, power, and politics. Jacques Derrida

SAGE

© 2009 by SAGE Publications, Inc.

SAGE Research Methods

Page 6 of 25 The Handbook of Social Research Ethics

(1930–2004), Jean-Francois Lyotard (1924–1998), and Michel Foucault (1926–1984) are some of the more

prominent figures in this tradition. In postmodern approaches to the human sciences, Foucault (1972) is espe-

cially influential, given that many of his works deal explicitly with the institutions of psychology and psychiatry.

This tradition of deconstructing power has also been influential in much of postmodern feminist psychology.

Feminist theorists such as Jane Flax (1990) or Evelyn Fox-Keller (1982) have drawn on the rhetoric of power

relations developed in the French tradition.

In general, then, like Anglo-American postmodernists, Continental postmodernists reject an objectivist and

rationalist view of science. For thinkers in the Continental tradition, the “objective” categories of science are

objects of human experience and thus depend on the values, perspectives, and context of the researcher.

For these reasons, Continental postmodernists move away from general and abstract conceptions of science

and move toward particular research contexts and concrete researcher-participant relationships.

Family Resemblances: Research Ethics in the Modern and the Postmodern

As noted in the introduction, we are committed to some degree of organization and clarity in this chapter,

but we are also wary of an overly systematic presentation of postmodern philosophy. Consequently, Ludwig

Wittgenstein's (1953/2001) notion of family resemblances will serve as a fairly malleable “organizing principle”

for our discussion of postmodern ethics. Wittgenstein used the analogy of apparent similarities among mem-

bers of the same family to describe a unity that does not necessarily depend on a coherent, universal under-

lying structure. Likewise, we employ the notion of family resemblance because there is no coherent, unitary

tradition that could be called postmodern and yet there is a general set of similarities that, though they often

derive from entirely different logics, nevertheless characterize a general ideological trend that could be called

postmodern. It is our hope that this approach to the topic will be true to the nonreductive, nontotalizing spirit

of postmodernism, while at the same time providing accessibility to those readers unfamiliar with it.

Of the many candidates for postmodern family resemblances, we selected four that we will treat below: partic-

ular, contextual, value laden, and other focused. These four were selected for two reasons. First, we judged

them to be those most directly related to social science research and, second, they provide instructive con-

trasts with modernist research ethics. However, these resemblances do not lead to a set of postmodern ethi-

cal guidelines per se. Such an outcome would be inconsistent with the nonreductive, nonfoundationalist sen-

SAGE

© 2009 by SAGE Publications, Inc.

SAGE Research Methods

Page 7 of 25 The Handbook of Social Research Ethics

sibilities of the postmodernist. Postmodern thought provides us not with clear-cut answers to the problems of

research ethics but, rather, with challenging, instructive, and transforming dialogues that help us think about

the ethical implications of research.

Our discussion of family resemblances will also extend beyond the boundaries of what have been traditionally

(i.e., in the modernist tradition) considered ethical issues. Research ethics from the postmodern perspective

is not separated from the goals and procedures of the research enterprise itself (like it often is in modernist re-

search). For this reason, we discuss postmodernist themes as they apply not just to conventional (modernist)

ethics but also to research practices in general. In drawing comparisons between the research practices of

modernists and postmodernists, we hope to illuminate many of the hidden values of both approaches to in-

quiry. We also hope to make clear some of the ethical implications of a postmodernist approach to research

without reducing these to a set of ethical principles or guidelines.

Particular

Modern

From the traditional modernist worldview, the primary function of research is not to discover findings that per-

tain only to the particular (situation or population) but to uncover the generalizable, if not universal, laws (or

principles). Examples of this span the history of psychology: 19th-century psychophysicists sought the uni-

versal laws of perception; behaviorists, perhaps the quintessential modernist psychologists, sought the expla-

nation of all “psychological” phenomena in terms of a single, basic mechanism—for example, operant con-

ditioning; even movements such as Gestalt psychology, whose antagonism to reductionistic psychology was

explicit, still understood psychological science as the pursuit of universal, general principles. The Gestaltist

Kurt Lewin (1931/1999), for example, characterized a mature (or “Galilean”) psychology as one that recog-

nizes that “every psychological law must hold without exception” (p. 52).

To discover the universal and unchanging, the methods of the social sciences have properties intended to

reveal these laws and principles, such as replication, standardization, and reliability. For the modernist, psy-

chological law and its principles must hold in every situation, and thus we need not take the particulars of the

situation into account. The particular case is considered an instance of the universal law, and likewise, the

particular individual is essentially a concrete instance of general abstract phenomena, such as law, principle,

SAGE

© 2009 by SAGE Publications, Inc.

SAGE Research Methods

Page 8 of 25 The Handbook of Social Research Ethics

and theory. For the modernist, the individual, or individual case, is of interest only in its relation to these ab-

stractions and not as a particular or unique phenomenon.

This insistence on abstract universals is chronicled in Jerome Kagan's (1998) book Three Seductive Ideas. In

it, Kagan asserted that many psychologists do not find it

terribly important to specify the agent being studied, whether rat, monkey or human, or the context

in which the subject acts, whether laboratory, natural habitat, work-place, or home, because broad

conclusions can be drawn regardless of the agent and context. (p. 1)

The modernist focus on the general is evident in essentially every subdiscipline of 20th-century psychology

(Slife, Reber, & Richardson, 2005), but a particularly clear instance of this phenomenon is the theory and

research on intelligence, a topic Kagan treats at length. According to Kagan (1998), there has been little em-

pirical success in substantiating the notion of a universal concept that could be labeled “intelligence.” Nev-

ertheless, the undifferentiated and unspecified term is employed at all levels of psychological discourse. As

Kagan argued, “The descriptor ‘intelligent’ is frequently found in sentences that are indifferent to the age and

background of the person (or sometimes the animal species) or the evidential basis for the assignment” (p.

52).

Not surprisingly, the modernist focus on abstract generalizations has migrated into the general discussion on

research ethics. The very term research ethics suggests a generalized set of rules for dealing with the ethi-

cal implications of research. In the social sciences, we often approach the question of research ethics in an

essentially bureaucratic manner, developing handbooks, professional guidelines, and review boards whose

purpose is to engender, if not legislate, adherence to general codes of conduct. In modernist research, re-

search ethics is not a particular set of concrete dilemmas but a general set of rules meant to apply to all (or

at least most) research situations.

Postmodern

From the postmodern perspective, we do not live in the realm of the abstract and general, hence their rele-

vance to us is limited. We live instead in the concrete and particular—a particular place at a particular time,

SAGE

© 2009 by SAGE Publications, Inc.

SAGE Research Methods

Page 9 of 25 The Handbook of Social Research Ethics

which is our primary nexus of meaning making. This means that the personal and narrative are valued over

the abstract and universal. Abstract principles (e.g., concepts, ideas) are still important, but concrete particu-

lars are more fundamental. Postmodernists do not seek a universal set of truths, nor do they subscribe to an

independent or objective knowledge-advancing tradition. To the postmodernist, science is one of many cultur-

al objects that “are not only enrooted in the incontrovertible presence of this perceived world” but are “also the

achievement of a cultural activity, of a cultural life of which science, considered subjectively as human work,

is a part” (Ricoeur, 1965, p. 168).

The primary methodological implication of the postmodern denial of objectivity and universality is that while

“the mainstream tradition has focused almost exclusively on problems of standardization” (Mishler, 1986, p.

233), psychological research inspired by postmodern traditions has focused more on the understanding of

particular lives. These traditions have focused on particular stories because, as Taylor (1992) argued, “we

grasp our lives in a narrative. … In order to have a sense of who we are, we have to have a notion of how we

have become” (p. 47).

Within the contemporary social sciences, there are innumerable interpretive investigations whose intent is to

narrate particular lives, but let us consider one especially rich example. In an article in Qualitative Inquiry,

Arthur Bochner (1997) narrated an event from his own history as a way of illuminating multiple levels of psy-

chological knowledge. He told of being awakened in a hotel room and informed of his father's death. In the

article, Bochner narrated his actions, thoughts, and feelings following this revelation. He used this narrative to

discuss grief and dying, psychological method and theory, and the method of personal narrative itself. When,

for example, he compared psychological literature on death and dying with his own experience, he concluded

that the academic world is “long on conceptualizations and short on details; long on abstractions, short on

concrete events; long on analysis, short on experience; long on theories, short on stories” (p. 424).

From within a very particular context, Bochner (1997) drew a number of conclusions about social science

methods, and this practice reflects the postmodern approach to “data.” As Bochner put it,

We do not turn stories into data to test theoretical propositions. Rather, we link theory to story when

we think with a story, trying to stay with the story, letting ourselves resonate with the moral dilemmas

it may pose, understanding its ambiguities, examining its contradictions, feeling its nuances, letting

SAGE

© 2009 by SAGE Publications, Inc.

SAGE Research Methods

Page 10 of 25 The Handbook of Social Research Ethics

ourselves become part of the story. (p. 436)

From this postmodern perspective, the notion of “generalization” in inquiry is more from concrete parts to con-

crete wholes rather than from concrete instances to abstract generalities.

Bochner's (1997) story also highlights another ethical tension between modernist and postmodernist ap-

proaches to research. Insofar as a tradition holds to “a reverent and idealized view of science that positions

science above the contingencies of language and outside the circle of historical and cultural interests” (p.

422), research practices themselves will meet with little broader social control. Under the modernist world-

view, the special status of the “scientific” easily leads to that circumstance where “psychologists too often use

their warrant of expertise not only to manipulate variables but also to manipulate people and their lives” (p.

422). There is a kind of monolithic power inherent in the universalism of the scientific mythos, and a postmod-

ern understanding of research ethics would likely begin in the deconstruction of that power.

Practical Implications

Again, the practical implications of a postmodernist conceptualization of research would likely never be put

into simple guidelines or an ethical code. However, the postmodern “family resemblance” of emphasizing the

particular does imply, as opposed to modernist research, greater emphasis on what is unique in each sit-

uation and the individual. As such, the postmodernist would likely move away from testing thin theoretical

propositions and move toward the richer and thicker accounts encompassed in a narrative. Similarly, the in-

strumental use of science—where universals, power, and expertise are viewed as the means to various social

ends—would be eschewed in favor of less certainty and more humility about knowledge and its use. If we

take the particular as a fundamental research value, ethical research has less to do with an attempt to reason

about ethical research practices and more to do with an uncertain researcher perpetually struggling with the

obligations and responsibilities of a particular situation, to a particular community, and to a particular partici-

pant.

SAGE

© 2009 by SAGE Publications, Inc.

SAGE Research Methods

Page 11 of 25 The Handbook of Social Research Ethics

Contextual

Modern

Because generalizable principles and laws are the telos of modernist research, traditional theory and method

have attempted to remove all possible contingency from both theoretical models and particular research find-

ings. In modernist methods, “truth was to be found through method, by following general rules of method that

were largely independent of the content and context of the investigation. Any influence by the person of the

researcher should be eliminated or minimized” (Kvale, 1996, p. 61).

Theories and findings are thus only considered universally valid if they are free from any contingent context.

In this sense, when the modernist is attempting to discern general social science principles, much of culture,

history, relation, and subjectivity are primarily sources of error variance.

The acontextual nature of modernist theory is explicit and unambiguous in most contemporary psychological

traditions. Personality theory has nearly always sought to describe the psyche as an abstract and context-less

type; learning researchers obsessively attempted to remove all contextual factors in their animal research

(e.g., using rats from the same genetic stock, raised in the same environment, and subjected to precisely

identical conditions). Indeed, the modern symbol of the scientist—the laboratory—is significant because of its

context-less representation of the modern subject of science. The justification for such context-independent

research procedures lies in the modernist notion that general knowledge comes from predictable events and

that this predictability can only be ensured in the absence of all confounding contextual factors.

Because context-less results were so fundamental to psychological research in the 20th century, a great

many programs of research could be employed as exemplars. Here, we will consider the research of Daniel

Kahneman and Amos Tversky—work widely considered to be one of the great successes of contemporary

social science research. Tversky and Kahneman (1983) summarized the basic conclusion drawn from a large

portion of their work: “People do not normally analyze daily events into exhaustive lists of possibilities or eval-

uate compound probabilities by aggregating elementary ones. Instead, they commonly use a limited number

of heuristics, such as representativeness and availability” (p. 294). The language used in this statement is

instructive in its reflection of the acontextual ideal of modernist research. First, this statement represents a

SAGE

© 2009 by SAGE Publications, Inc.

SAGE Research Methods

Page 12 of 25 The Handbook of Social Research Ethics

conclusion about “people” outside of any special context, as if this extra-contextual condition actually occurs

and is possible. Second, reduction to a “limited number” of heuristics in “common use” would be pivotal to

any research program, because reduction to context-less fundamentals is the sine qua non of modernist in-

vestigation. There is little discussion here, for example, of the changing use of heuristics depending on the

context or situation involved. Indeed, the ability to talk without (or at least across) contexts is an essential goal

of modernist research. It is that very ability that qualifies the statement as knowledge (possibly even truth).

Tversky and Kahneman's (1983) approach to reporting their findings reflects and embodies this acontextual

ideal. In one study, the participants are considered fully described by the phrase “a group of 88 under-

graduates at UBC” (p. 297). Research subjects are discussed in terms of general categories—for example,

“naive” or “sophisti cated” (p. 300), and the behaviors of subjects are discussed only in general or aggregate

terms—for example, “the numerous conjunction errors reported in this article illustrate people's affinity for

nonextensional reasoning” (p. 308). Like the vast majority of modernist research, for Tversky and Kahneman,

essentially every statement that could be considered representative of general knowledge will not (and, in

fact, should not) contain any unique contextual content.

This way of valuing acontextual knowledge is clearly reflected in the modernist discourse about research and

research ethics (e.g., ethical principles). Just as ethical codes are designed to apply to all particular individu-

als (see the previous section), they are also constructed to apply across contexts (and not to take the unique-

ness of contexts into account). Just as modernists assume that there is some independent set of verifiable

facts, they also assume that there is some independent (though perhaps more difficult to define) set of ac-

ceptable ethical codes.

Postmodern

The postmodern perspective holds that meaning is always embodied, situated, and inseparable from its sur-

rounding context. For the postmodernist, the personal and the public are inseparable parts of the same whole,

and “any attempt rigorously to eliminate our human perspective from our picture of the world must lead to

absurdity” (Polanyi, 1974, p. 3).

SAGE

© 2009 by SAGE Publications, Inc.

SAGE Research Methods

Page 13 of 25 The Handbook of Social Research Ethics

For a postmodern researcher, then, procedures and findings are enriched by context and impoverished, even

misunderstood entirely, by laboratory sanitization and numerical representation. This approach to research,

most clearly embraced by the qualitative or interpretive traditions, asserts that “if participants are removed

from their setting, it leads to contrived findings that are out of context” (Creswell, 1998, p. 17). Even more, en-

riching contexts are considered integral elements of all research findings. Discussing interviews, for example,

Steinar Kvale (1996) asserted that “the interview takes place in an interpersonal context, and the meaning of

the interview statements depends on this context” (p. 44). Contexts, in this sense, are not just “variables” that

“interact” with the subject of interest; they are necessary for understanding the subject of interest itself. From

the postmodern perspective, even traditional biological laboratory science can be undermined by its focus

on inert bodies—with all their passive, inanimate connotations—and enriched by a focus on embodiment as

lived, contextualized, and animate (see Merleau-Ponty, 1964).

Phenomenological research is an example of a tradition that explicitly advocates and integrates a detailed

description of the research context into the results. In a study by Philip Welches and Michael Pica (2005),

for example, the authors provide a rich array of contextualizing information. Their article, which analyzes the

experiences of nine men who had been admitted to a psychiatric hospital for being a danger to self or others,

provides a detailed case study for each of the participants, including relevant personal details and excerpts

from the interview interactions themselves. The contexts of the interview situations as well as some of the

relevant behaviors of the participants are also described in a way that shows how integral they are to the un-

derstanding of the study's findings.

This sort of “thick” description also provides a necessary context for understanding and evaluating the conclu-

sions drawn by the researchers. The interpretive categories developed by Welches and Pica (2005), contrary

to most modernist research, served to “classify common themes” (p. 49) and not to draw general conclusions

about abstract psychological processes. As in most phenomenological research, the authors' goal was to de-

velop a general descriptive account of a specific kind of situation and not an abstract model of psychological

or social functioning.

We recognize, of course, that the modernist may see no way to build “general” knowledge from such contex-

tualized analysis. For the postmodernist, however, the contextualization of the subject matter situates it in the

whole of knowledge (e.g., the culture, the era) and thus provides knowledge transfer through context and not

SAGE

© 2009 by SAGE Publications, Inc.

SAGE Research Methods

Page 14 of 25 The Handbook of Social Research Ethics

through its elimination (as in the modernist tradition).

Practical Implications

The practical implication of the contextual for a postmodern research ethic is, in some sense, straightforward:

The researcher does not attempt to eliminate—whether through laboratory or control—context from the in-

vestigation or its results. Instead, the postmodern researcher values the importance of context (e.g., situa-

tion, history, embodiment, possibilities) for understanding the meaning of the results and for situating them in

the broader context of the discipline or culture. The postmodern researcher also values the uniqueness and

autonomy of research participants and is thus wary of removing contextual (including unique and personal)

factors through laboratory and procedural controls. For the postmodernist, the use and presentation of knowl-

edge is a primary ethical consideration—one in which the research participant is intimately concerned, and

so the modernist attempt to eliminate the unique contexts of research participants appears dangerously ego-

centric.

Value Laden (Interpretive, Perspectival)

Modern

The pursuit of natural or social laws also requires that knowledge claims be free from bias, prejudice, and per-

sonal or subjective values. For the modernist, “goods or ‘values’ were understood as projections of ours onto

a world which in itself was neutral” (Taylor, 1992, p. 53). It is for precisely this reason that, for the modernist,

“scientific statements ought to be value-neutral; facts were to be distinguished from values, and science from

politics” (Kvale, 1996, p. 62).

Traditional methods thus attempt to build impersonal, blinded, and mechanical procedures that minimize per-

sonal nuance, bias, or interpretive slant. For the modernist, bias is bad, and the “objective” world provides a

value-free picture of reality. As Howard Kendler (2004) phrased it, “Empirical results are value-free. Raw data

SAGE

© 2009 by SAGE Publications, Inc.

SAGE Research Methods

Page 15 of 25 The Handbook of Social Research Ethics

do not imply any moral judgment” (p. 122), and it is the role of science “to provide unbiased information” (p.

123). For the modernist, the scientific method provides a bridge between the subjective realm of the scientist

and the objective realm of nature and, thus, provides supposedly value-neutral, objective information about

the world.

This objectivist perspective has put the research of positive psychology in an interesting position. This move-

ment attempts to discern and promote “the highest qualities of civic and personal life” (Seligman, 1998), yet

the modernist philosophy of social science says that this seemingly value-laden task should be conducted in

a value-free manner. Indeed, the main leader of this movement, Martin Seligman (1998), considers positive

psychology to be a superior approach to other sources of optimal human functioning, because those oth-

er sources are “too subjective … dependent on faith or … dubious assumptions; they lacked the clear-eyed

skepticism and the slow cumulative growth that I (and Csikszentmihalyi) associated with science” (p. 7).

Consequently, positive psychologists cannot draw from moral traditions or disciplines that discuss the nature

of a good or flourishing life. All they believe they can do is classify “the strengths that every major subculture

in America today values positively” (Seligman & Csikszentmihalyi, 2001, p. 90). In other words, their work is

an empirical polling of what other people think are “the highest qualities of civic and personal life.” The essen-

tial point here is that, even when studying human values, the modernist espouses a value-free approach to

research, and it is this very distinction between hard fact and subjective value that makes “research ethics” a

consideration separate from scientific knowledge.

Postmodern

For the postmodernist, the subjective and objective are inseparable and together constitute any given mean-

ing. In this sense, all meaning—all experience—is inherently and inescapably interpretive, and bias is not only

inevitable but also a basic element of all knowledge practices. H. G. Gadamer (1960/1989), in fact, argued

for the essential importance of prejudice in all research. As Richardson, Fowers, and Guignon (1999) framed

this argument,

Prejudices are not external impositions that constrain our ability to be free and rational subjects. On

SAGE

© 2009 by SAGE Publications, Inc.

SAGE Research Methods

Page 16 of 25 The Handbook of Social Research Ethics

the contrary, having a “horizon” or framework of prejudgments is what first makes it possible for us

to think and act in intelligible ways. (p. 230)

Bias and prejudice are often pejorative terms in our modernist culture, so the more common terminology in

postmodern philosophy is value or value laden. To say that all knowledge is biased is to claim that any mean-

ing-making activity is directed by values and interpretive contexts. Fact and value are inseparable because

the postmodernist sees a “fundamental moral orientation as essential to being a human interlocutor” (Taylor,

1992, p. 29). Taylor (1992) stated it even more strongly: “We cannot do without some orientation to the good”

(p. 33).

For the postmodernist, then, value and bias are fundamental and, indeed, the primary impetus for research

(e.g., the selection of a research topic). As such, bias and value should not be avoided or eliminated but made

as explicit and transparent as possible: “The important thing is to be aware of one's own bias” (Gadamer,

1960/1989, p. 269). Although full value transparency in research is perhaps impossible, the postmodern ideal

is to make one's own assumptions, historical context, and value stances explicit in reports of research find-

ings.

A study of working-class girls conducted by Sandra Jones (2001) should serve as an exemplar of this ap-

proach to research. Jones, who explicitly aligns herself with feminist and critical theory, observed, interviewed,

and analyzed biographical information concerning 10 female academics who grew up in the working class.

Her approach to this research included the assumption that “the researcher is the research instrument” (p.

147), and so, when evaluating interview data, it was “important to ask who is listening and what is the nature

of listener's relationship with the speaker” (p. 147).

To help identify her values as a researcher, Jones provided information about her own childhood context

among the working class and discussed some of the effects of her powerful position as researcher. Jones

also made explicit many of her research values. She talked about how she is sensitive to power relations

and so strove for equity in research situations. She discussed her belief that research participants should be

approached in dialogue, and so she provided participants with copies of transcripts and drafts of her interpre-

tations.

Finally, Jones incorporated her values and influence into the presentation of her research findings. When she

SAGE

© 2009 by SAGE Publications, Inc.

SAGE Research Methods

Page 17 of 25 The Handbook of Social Research Ethics

quoted the participants, she included her own dialogue in the excerpts. She also narrated her own reactions

to the included excerpts as well as how she came to her subsequent interpretations. The main point here is

that the author tried to make the values of her investigation as explicit and as integrated into the research

findings as possible, and this practice helps the reader understand how those values influenced the findings.

From the postmodern perspective, values are just as influential in modernist findings; they are just not ac-

knowledged. Researcher values are integral to all kinds of research, and the need to recognize and incor-

porate these influences is an ethical imperative. This is the reason, as mentioned at the outset, why there is

no hard distinction between research ethics and research per se. Even the most basic research activities are

situated within an evaluative context and carry very concrete ethical implications.

Practical Implications

The value-ladenness of social science research has many ethical implications from the viewpoint of a post-

modern. First, we need to recognize that there is no escape from this value-ladenness—the assumptions

and philosophies underlying research often involve values that frequently remain unexamined in modernist

research. Second, we should identify these values as much as possible before, during, and after engaging in

research. We do this to understand their potential impact and to be open to their replacement in the service

of the topic of study. Perhaps even more important, we do this to serve the particular individuals or groups

affected by the study. Third, such values are integral to the meaning and use of any study's results, so these

should be taken explicitly into account in presenting, reporting, or applying the research in question. In short,

values and their explicit discussion are of primary importance at every stage of social science research.

Other-Focus

Modern

The “other” of the social sciences is generally conceived of as an impersonal subject because the general-

SAGE

© 2009 by SAGE Publications, Inc.

SAGE Research Methods

Page 18 of 25 The Handbook of Social Research Ethics

ized, decontextualized, and unbiased ideal of modernist research requires a research participant whose val-

ues, projects, and idiosyncrasies do not interfere with the claims of science. The ideal subject is thus imper-

sonalized and reduced—an object in the sense of any other natural thing.

This notion of a manipulated, controlled, and objectified subject is fairly endemic to modernist research, and

the social science vocabulary for describing research participants well illustrates this phenomenon. Although

observer was the most frequently used participant term in late-19th- and early-20th-century psychology, the

increasingly objectivist inclination of (particularly American) psychology was accompanied by an increasing

use of the term subject. The historian of psychology, Kurt Danziger (1990), argued that this terminology was

borrowed from French psychiatry, where its earliest known use was to refer to corpses used for anatomical

dissection. The use of such a term makes sense from the modernist viewpoint because it implies a kind of

clinical distance and almost inanimate or passive status, much as any other “subject” matter (e.g., cells, struc-

tures).

In contemporary psychology, subject continues to be a common term. In fact, Henry Roediger (2004), while

president of the Association for Psychological Science, argued strenuously for a return to the exclusive use

of the “subject” terminology because it better fit his conception of the research subject. For him, “the college

student is the ideal experimental animal” (p. 46), an animal he compares with drosophila, the fruit fly that has

been the subject of so many genetic studies. It makes sense that he would prefer subject to participant be-

cause his research topics, like so many in psychology, concern presumed universal properties—learning and

memory—rather than unique, particular individuals.

Terms other than subject have begun to see significant use in the social sciences. In the last two versions of

the APA style manual, for example, the shift to participant has been explicitly encouraged. It could be argued

that the terminological shift to participant signals a kind of drift from the hard modernist worldview in American

psychology, and there may be some truth to this argument. However, Gary VandenBos (the executive director

of publications and communications for APA) describes this shift as largely political and legal: “‘Subjects’ im-

plies that these are people who are having things done to them, whereas ‘participants’ implies that they gave

consent” (Carey, 2004). There is really no suggestion that one treats a participant differently than a subject;

the change has more to do with legal consent. In any case, whether they are participants or subjects, the

ultimate goal of the modernist is to systematically control them and their values and context.

SAGE

© 2009 by SAGE Publications, Inc.

SAGE Research Methods

Page 19 of 25 The Handbook of Social Research Ethics

Postmodern

When postmodernists hear the kind of “control” discourse found in modernist research, they often consider it

a vocabulary of power and dominance, a consideration most notably connected with the work of the postmod-

ernist Michel Foucault. Modernity's instrumentalized and reduced research subject is understood more as a

means to solidify the power of those who conduct research than as a means to discern generalized principles.

For the postmodernist, in fact, all “disciplines constitute a system of control in the production of discourse”

(Foucault, 1972, p. 224), including any particular postmodernist discipline.

This sensitivity to power relations is a hallmark of many postmodern approaches to research, and it entails a

concomitant sensitivity to how researchers subject research participants to their projects. As Foucault (1972)

argued, “We must conceive discourse as a violence that we do to things, or, at all events, as a practice we

impose upon them” (p. 229). It is not surprising, then, that the status of the participant is extremely significant

to the postmodern researcher. The particularity of the valuing other is not a research confound but is, rather,

the starting place for all meaning-making activities. The values, projects, and idiosyncrasies of the research

participant constitute both an ethical imperative and the foundational knowledge relation. As such, a primary

imperative of postmodernist research is “to do research ‘with’ rather than ‘on’ people” (Burman, 2001, p. 260).

An excellent example of this approach to research is Michelle Fine's four-year study on the impact of a col-

lege-in-prison program at Bedford Hills Correctional Facility (Fine et al., 2001). The impact of an other-fo-

cused approach to research is immediately apparent in the author line of the book, where there are 11 names

listed. The multiplicity of authors stems from the fact that, in addition to graduate student researchers, Fine

recruited participant observers from among the female inmates she was studying. These women conducted

interviews, took field notes, and met as a research team every few weeks to compare findings. True to the

other-focused ideal, the research reports generated from this study are rich with participant narratives.

Fine's design made her project an essentially communitarian one, where research interpretations are not the

province of merely the privileged researcher but also of those for whom researchers presume to speak. These

kinds of methods aim to provide a research environment where “the respondents become active agents, the

creators of the worlds they inhabit and the interpreters of their experiences” (Marecek, Fine, & Kidder, 2001, p.

34). While many postmodernists recognize that asymmetrical power relations are perhaps inevitable in many

SAGE

© 2009 by SAGE Publications, Inc.

SAGE Research Methods

Page 20 of 25 The Handbook of Social Research Ethics

aspects of research, they nevertheless seek to make power relations as explicit as possible and reveal rather

than obscure the unique constructive contexts of research participants.

Practical Implications

The other-focus of the postmodernist has important ethical implications for researchers. The first is undoubt-

edly that we need to have greater sensitivity to the power relations of many research settings and relation-

ships. For many postmodernists, the subjectification and objectification of persons, and even animals, is a

kind of violence that should never be tolerated. The researcher should do research with people, including

making participants co-investigators, rather than on people.

Second, postmodernists recognize that data interpretation is unavoidable in any kind of research, regardless

of the methods used, and that such interpretation is the province, not simply of the “author” but also of a

community of researchers, participants, and readers. Philosophers of science have long understood how data

underdetermine these interpretations, allowing for alternative interpretations that usually go unmentioned in

research reports (Curd & Cover, 1998). For the postmodernist, reports and presentations should avoid mis-

leading language, such as “the data indicate,” and should discuss instead the many data interpretations avail-

able as well as the reasons for the interpretations favored by researchers and the participants producing the

data.

Conclusion

We have argued that the postmodern turn points toward a research tradition that is interpretive, particular,

contextual, value laden, and other focused—that is, in fact, thoroughly ethical in its character. Research meth-

ods are not essentially amoral—as in many modernist understandings, with ethics as a separate considera-

tion. Research from the postmodern perspective is rife with values, assumptions, and perspectives that need

to be identified and incorporated explicitly in the “findings.” There is no moment in the conceptualization,

design, execution, or presentation of research that is not inescapably and fundamentally ethical. As Kvale

(1996) argued, “Ethical decisions do not belong to a separate stage … but arise throughout the entire re-

SAGE

© 2009 by SAGE Publications, Inc.

SAGE Research Methods

Page 21 of 25 The Handbook of Social Research Ethics

search process” (p. 110).

Because the postmodernist sees research as an inherently ethical enterprise, the notion of a separate, post-

modern ethical code is problematic. If the postmodernist is to talk about research ethics, it could only be a

discussion about a kind of praxis or, perhaps, even a way of being: “Moral research behavior is more than

ethical knowledge and cognitive choices; it involves the person of the researcher, his or her sensitivity and

commitment to moral issues and action” (Kvale, 1996, p. 117). For the postmodernist, all research activity is

fraught with moral and ethical issues. As such, scientific investigations require not a set of general solutions to

such issues but a very particular commitment to both an insistent ethical self-examination and an unflinching

sensitivity to our relation with the other.

References

Berkeley, G. (2004). A treatise concerning the principles of human knowledge. Whitefish, MT: Kessinger.

(Original work published 1710)

Bochner, A. P. (1997). It's about time: Narrative and the divided self. Qualitative Inquiry, 3(4), 418–438.

Burman, E. (2001). Minding the gap: Positivism, psychology, and the politics of qualitative methods. In D.

L.Tolman & M. B.Miller (Eds.), From subjects to subjectivities: A handbook of interpretive and participatory

methods (pp. 259–275). New York: New York University Press.

Capaldi, E. J., & Proctor, R. W. (1999). Contextualism in psychological research? A critical review. Thousand

Oaks, CA: Sage.

Carey, B. (2004, June 15). The subject is subjects. The New York Times. Retrieved April 30, 2008, from

http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9501E5D61030F936A25755C0A9629C8B63

Creswell, J. W. (1998). Qualitative inquiry and research design: Choosing among five traditions. Thousand

Oaks, CA: Sage.

Curd, M., & Cover, J. A. (1998). Philosophy of science: The central issues. New York: W. W. Norton.

Danziger, K. (1990). Constructing the subject. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.

Descartes, R. (1996). Meditations on first philosophy (J.Cottingham, Trans.). Cambridge, UK: Cambridge Uni-

SAGE

© 2009 by SAGE Publications, Inc.

SAGE Research Methods

Page 22 of 25 The Handbook of Social Research Ethics

versity Press. (Original work published 1641)

Dilthey, W. (1988). Introduction to the human sciences (R. J.Betanzos, Trans.). Detroit, MI: Wayne State Uni-

versity Press. (Original work published 1883)

Fine, M., Torre, M. E., Boudin, K., Bowen, I., Clark, J., Hylton, D., et al. (2001). Changing minds. New York:

The City University of New York Graduate Center.

Flax, J. (1990). Thinking fragments: Psychoanalysis, feminism, and postmodernism in the contemporary

West. Berkeley: University of California Press.

Foucault, M. (1972). The archaeology of knowledge (A. M. S.Smith, Trans.). New York: Harper Colophon

Books. (Original work published 1969)

Fox-Keller, E. (1982). Feminism and science. Signs, 7(3), 589–602.

Gadamer, H. G. (1989). Truth and method (J.Weinsheimer & D. G.Marshall, Trans.). New York: Crossroad.

(Original work published 1960)

Heidegger, M. (1962). Being and time (J.Macquarrie & E.Robinson, Trans.). San Francisco: Harper Collins.

(Original work published 1927)

Husserl, E. (1999). Logical investigations (J. N.Findlay, Trans.). In D.Welton (Ed.), The essential Husserl:

Basic writings in transcendental phenomenology. Bloomington: Indiana University Press. (Original work pub-

lished 1900)

Jones, S. J. (2001). Embodying working class subjectivity and narrating self: “We were the hired help.” In D.

L.Tolman & M. B.Miller (Eds.), From subjects to subjectivities: A handbook of interpretive and participatory

methods (pp. 145–162). New York: New York University Press.

Kagan, J. (1998). Three seductive ideas. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

Kant, I. (1998). Critique of pure reason (P.Guyer & A.Wood, Trans.). Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University

Press. (Original work published 1781)

Kendler, H. H. (2004). Politics and science: A combustible mixture. American Psychologist, 59(2), 122–123.

Kuhn, T. (1996). The structure of scientific revolutions (3rd ed. ). Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Kvale, S. (1996). Interviews: An introduction to qualitative research interviewing. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.

SAGE

© 2009 by SAGE Publications, Inc.

SAGE Research Methods

Page 23 of 25 The Handbook of Social Research Ethics

Levinas, E. (1969). Totality and infinity(A.Lingis, Trans.). Pittsburgh, PA: Duquesne University Press. (Original

work published 1961)

Lewin, K. (1999). The conflict between Aristotelian and Galilean modes of thought in contemporary psychol-

ogy (D. K.Adams, Trans.). In M.Gold (Ed.), The complete social scientist: A Kurt Lewin reader(2nd ed. , pp.

37–66). Washington, DC: American Psychological Association. (Original work published 1931)

Marecek, J., Fine, M., & Kidder, L. (2001). Working between two worlds: Qualitative methods and psychology.

In D. L.Tolman & M. B.Miller (Eds.), From subjects to subjectivities: A handbook of interpretive and participa-

tory methods (pp. 29–41). New York: New York University Press.

McIntyre, A. (1984). After virtue (2nd ed. ). Notre Dame, France: University of Notre Dame Press.

Merleau-Ponty, M. (1964). Primacy of perception (W.Cobb, Trans.; J.Edie, Ed.). Evanston, IL: Northwestern

University Press.

Mishler, E. G. (1986). The analysis of interview narratives. In T. R.Sarbin (Ed.), Narrative psychology(pp.

233–255). New York: Praeger.

Murphy, N. (1997). Anglo-American postmodernity: Philosophical perspectives on science, religion, and

ethics. Boulder, CO: Westview Press.

Polanyi, M. (1974). Personal knowledge: Towards a post-critical philosophy. Chicago: University of Chicago

Press.

Polkinghorne, D. (2005). Practice and the human sciences: A case for a judgment-based practice of care.

Albany: SUNY Press.

Reid, T. (2005). Essays on the active powers of the human mind: An inquiry into the human mind on the prin-

ciple of common sense. Whitefish, MT: Kessinger. (Original work published 1764)

Richardson, F. C., Fowers, B. J., & Guignon, C. B. (1999). Re-envisioning psychology: Moral dimensions of

theory and practice. San Francisco: Jossey-Bass.

Ricoeur, P. (1965). History and truth (C. A.Kelbley, Trans.). Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press.

Roediger, R. (2004). What should they be called?APS Observer, 17(5), 46–48.

Rorty, R. (1991). Objectivity, relativism and truth: Philosophical papers I. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge Univer-

SAGE

© 2009 by SAGE Publications, Inc.

SAGE Research Methods

Page 24 of 25 The Handbook of Social Research Ethics

sity Press.

Sartre, J. P. (1956). Being and nothingness: An essay on phenomenological ontology (H.Barnes, Trans.). New

York: Philosophical Library. (Original work published 1943)

Seligman, M. (1998). President's column: Positive social science. APA Monitor, 29(4), 2–5.

Seligman, M. E. P., & Csikszentmihalyi, M. (2001). “Positive Psychology: An Intro duction”: Reply. American

Psychologist, 56, 89–90.

Slife, B. D., Reber, J., & Richardson, F. (2005). Critical thinking about psychology: Hidden assumptions and

plausible alternatives. Washington, DC: American Psychological Association Press.

Taylor, C. (1992). Sources of the self. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

Tversky, A., & Kahneman, D. (1983). Extensional versus intuitive reasoning: The conjunction fallacy in prob-

ability judgment. Psychological Review, 90(4), 293–315.

Welches, P., & Pica, M. (2005). Assessed danger to others as a reason for psychiatric hospitalization: An in-

vestigation of patients' perspectives. Journal of Phenomenological Psychology, 36(1), 45–73.

Whitehead, A. N. (1925). Science and the modern world. New York: Macmillan.

Wittgenstein, L. (2001). Philosophical investigations (E.Anscombe, Trans.). London: Blackwell. (Original work

published 1953)

https://dx.doi.org/10.4135/9781483348971

SAGE

© 2009 by SAGE Publications, Inc.

SAGE Research Methods

Page 25 of 25 The Handbook of Social Research Ethics