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168 SECTION VI

GOSNELL HAROLD -

32. URBAN POLITICAL MACHINES

d disadvalltages of the Gosllell captures the advant~ge~a;1 classic description of old style machine politiCS9~~s. I Many of the functions Chicago politics 111 tbe 1 I cies since the days of the

d b '//lIe/Ita age ll h Id P

Periorme Y govel/ ,if' 'entl)1 by teo 0-I' dl d qUite eu lCI b New Dealzvere ball e , ptain could usually e I ' TI e precmct ca d d ' litical mac JIIIes,} . Ifare and foourmg

de/leIIded on for johs, houshm g " wdeay ~f urban political . . s In t e Jey .

had economIC tllne . h t ntieth century, a S/11- machines in the first half of t e. we not even holdi11g an

I·, I ,t hoss-sometImes gle po ItIca pm Y . d' {, mal processes of gov- I . if.' dommate t Je l0r e ectzve o"Ice- d h ildi11g personal loy-

emment hy c011tl'Olli11g johs an d: . ess leaders alike. alt I b I doi11g favors for voters an usm .' I Adho:gh the pure po/~icfIl~machiJ1JLor.ga11!&atJ.o11a~ st~f.~ has virtuall)1 disappeared /11 urhan_A:nertca~ Its slgm.1 ca11ce. i11 America11 politIcal-party history IS well ple- served in Gos11ell's work.

THE ROLE OF URBAN POLITICS

What is the balance sheet of machine politics in an urban center such as Chicago during a period of economic crisis? On the credit side of the ledger should be placed the success of the bosses in softening class conflicts. By grant- ing petty favors to various nationalistic and local groups, by taking advantage of the subsidies offered by the national government, by keeping the attention of the voters distracted by factional quarrels and sham disputes, the party ma- chines have kept minor party movements from gaining any headway. From the standpoint of the business leaders, this function of parties has been very use- fu!' Some of the submerged groups may not be so appreciative; but the fact re- ~ains that duri.ng the years 193.0-36 the city was comparatively free from VIOlent labor disputes, hunger rIots, and class warfare. The decentralized, chaot!c, and inadequate character of the governmental organization of the cit)' has discouraged far-reaching demands upon local authorities.

SOllrce: From Harold F. Gosnell, Machi/Ie port' . Ch' " 9' (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press 193) IC5. lcago Model, Chapter 9, pp. 18)-.1 Press. All rights reserved. Reprinted by per' . . ). COPYrIght © 1938 The University of Chicago

miSSion.

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PO LIT ICAL PART I ES 169

During the depress ion th " " " .. e mac hine I

rhe \anous governmental agencie h" las also acted as a k" d f b H f Eviction cases, emergencv hung s w Ich have had to d;al' "Ihn h

O d " u er °d

r

" d f "' er cases and ' Wit t e Istresse . sometlllleS ca re " "o r In " the first in sta ~~e b emergency clothing shortages were teemen. The rehef acti Vities of the . y the ward and precinct commit-

e d " " party work course, wer nor ISlnterested but h ers were not systematic and of d b . " " ' t ey were d "d f ' aske no em a rras Ing question d eVOI 0 red tape. Ward heelers

rhey could. The dema nds of the pS, an d they supplied at once any material aid

Id h efl O were su h h h cou not ope to meet mOre tha ll " _ c t at t e party orga niza tions " h a mll1ute tr " - h rhe impreSSio n t a t they knew th action ot t em, bur they did leave

The stability of the mac hine e r~pes of the relief game. " " " was reassurll1g t "

setting mnovatlo ns would be tri ed" I I 0 va n ous groups that no up- ular showed an amazi ngly low t 111 OCa government. Ward leaders in partic-

urnover conside " h d " that accompanied the economic " " S' " nng t e stresses an strallls cn slS. USliless " I" d Id leaders bankers and labor ch " f k men, Journa IStS, un erwor

. ' , " Ie s new that they co Id h I I machme to do busll1ess in the old wa "" u count upon t e oca in the role of the nationa l overnm y/ n spl~e of changes that had taken place

I d "f . g ent. Inefficiency 111 local government could

be to erate I It meant reSistance to the exte " f h I I b " " I

"d " I" nSlon 0 t e oca pu hc services. The argest m ustna IStS, newspaper propriet b k d bl" k" -"d " ors, an ers, an gam IIlg IIlgs dl not want a state IIlcome tax a modern tax II " " f .. I " ' -co ectlon system, or an expan- SIOn 0 mumclpa serVICes and budgets Party bosses b I k "

h h " . " . were a u war agalllst

such c anges. T ose citizens who might have benefited from such modifica- ti~ns of ~he role of local government were indifferent, deficient in promotional skills, misled by the press, and disillusioned by the failure of reform waves to leave many permanent traces.

" ~hi!e the d~pression h~s not eliminated the influence of the spoils tradi- tIOn III City hall, It has drastically purged one of the major party organizations. The economic crisis greatly reduced national and local incomes and made the burden of taxation relatively much greater than it had been in the prosperous twenties. A city can support more than one political machine when real estate values are rising and incomes are going up. During such times the taxpayers are not so tax conscious as in lean times, and the general public is more indif- ferent to graft exposures and wasteful expenditure of public funds. In a period of economic depression there is graft enough for onl one machi e. The law of the pendulum in democratic countries operates against the party which is in power when the economic deprivations are first being felt . Those major party factions which were in power at the time of the stock market crash were swept from the public offices. There has undoubtedly been a <:Jecrease in the total amount of political grafting iI!. the city during the past eight ears. Relative to the opportunities ava ilable, there may not be any great decrease; b.u~ there are fewer political mouths to feed out of the public crib, since local p.Qlttlcal .power

has been concentrated in a sin Ie or aniz<!Ia.ll" lJ.l..- Under prm ure from t e financial interests the politic~1 bosses have ~een

compelled, in the last few years, to make drastic economies. Tax collectIo~s have b . ff" t the local governmental expenses, and the unpaid een msu IClent to mee

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[70 SECTION VI

I P olitica l machine. The hanks have

I 0 • grc°Jt °1sset to t le d Public emp oree IS not a .' I Il oc expenditures were re uced. I d ' unless rota pu 1 I ' ffo 0 been unwilling to cn nlOne} 0 d governmental e IClency, and

o I °lVe not IInprove I \'V'hile many of the econolllies 1. 0 d spoils there have )een some ' I IJ of p°ltronage .111 ,

there are stillman), strong 10 s '1 0 0 0 I b 'ses with less patronage. Greater h

o I I left the po mc.1 os - d h improvements, w Ie 1 \a.ve d II tiOOI1S has loosenc t e strangle d

o l1ents an co ec • publicity regar IIlg tax assess.' h d r a lucrative source of campaign

o I I i"tlcnns once a ove .· 0 0 hold whlc 1 t 1e corrupt po I. °d d h n ovement for the consolidation

I d d f conolllY has al etC I 0 0 0 f 0 funds. T le eman or e 0 f official responslhllity or fls- of overlapping authorities and the concentration 0

cal affairs. 0 d 0 0 0 tI re have been a number o f develop- In the field of pubiJc a ministratiOn le 0 fl f 01 Th o h d d lessen the 111 uence 0 SpOI s. ere

ments in recent years which 0 ave ten e ot~ I e local tax authorities, and has been a trend toward stricter sup~rvl s lo~ ofotol - Th 111 0 0 I

o I - t political abuses. e 1I100S sa es the newer forms of taxation are ess open 0 - .- f-,---- 0 • h 0 h tax obJoectionable as it is from the theoretica l POll1t 0 vlew

d , IS a tax Wh O Ihc h

can , 0 0 I 10 leJ k ge The avances w IC ave

be administered With comparative y ...!!!- ea a. ' .

b d ol fO Id f publloc welfare administration have made the social een ma e Ir1 t 1e Ie 0 • •

o 0 0 0 f tile precinct committeemen more and more unnecessary. service activIties 0 0 0 0 d 0 0 There have been fewer occasions when the party offlCwls can step 111 an n:1t1- gate the harshness of the law. The growth of sucoh services as parole, probation, community case work, rehabilitation and public employ~ent bureaus has ~e­ duced the impor~al1~e of the p~cil}ct..captaill-.asJ'Lcommul1lty ag=-nt. These gams have been achieved for them ost part through the efforts of dle state and na- tional governments. The most that can be said for the local machine is that it has furnished no effective opposition to these innovation~ .

(The depression has also brought greater recognition for the ment system in the municipal service. In Chicago the civil service rules were extended to certain park districts by the new Park District Law, to the Sanitary District by legislation in 1935, to the employees of the county assessor by the new taxa- tion legislation, and to some of the other county employees by administrative action. While the Illinois civil service legislation has been reasonably sound, the practical application of the rules has left much to be desired. The spirit of the merit system has been violated by an excessive number of temporary employees, by a vicious system of waivers which nullifies the function of pro- motional examinations, by the old-fashioned practice of "framing" efficient em- ployees, by the retention of inefficient political employees by means of legal chicanery, and from time to time by outright bribery and corruption. Leaders of both of the major parties have sinned against the civil service command- ments. A pre-depression mayor of one party was frankly hostile to the merit

system. Post-depress~o~ mayo~s of another party have given lip service to the system but have admInIstered It as politicians.

o On~ might expect that, when hard times brought a great relative increase In the sIze of the tax burden the taxpayers would de d . d I 0 ' man greater servIce an revo t agaInst the perversion of government by spoilsm Th d ( f b-I" h d h O 0 en. e eleat 0 esta IS e mac Ines In New York and Philadelphia since 1929 . h b . d mIg t e mterprete

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PO LITI CAL PART I ES 171

in su.:h rerl11s. On rhe other h· I h . . Chicago no reSI)ire f b " .Inll, r '" d"'pn.·ssion has given to the citizens of

. . rOI1l oss ru "'. Econol11l d ' . . rhe polltl.:al SVStelll ' Ch' b c epnvauun have faded to break

• 111 Icago ecause of f . . lack of leadershl'p d h h • an un .avorable press situatiOn, a . , an t '" C aracrer of th d' . . . . the depress ion.... e party IVl slon ar the begll1nll1g of

Those concerned wirh att"lCk ' h I' . ested in a nUl11be f I " '. II1g r e po Itlca l l11achine should be inter-

ro c langt: s 111 rhe electlo I d h ' d . . . The long ballot th I . I' . . n aws an t elr a I11l11lsrratiOn. , e I11U tip IClty of elections th II ' f hI ' \. precincts and th I k f d ' e sl11a size 0 r e e ectlon

h · h I.' d ' e ac 0 a eq uate sa feguards aga inst fraud are all factors

w IC pay Irec tl y II1to the ha 1d - f h I" I h . • I SO t c po !tIca bosses. The e trappings of an arc alc rura l democr-Ic)' I ' h ·d I ' . . . f ' ,w llC assume t 1e eX istence of omnICompetent

CItizens unction badl . th . . . . Y 111 e great metropolitan centers such as Chicago New York, and Philadelpl ' III ' . h . I . . ' • lIa . 1I10lS as a lung e ballot· and It IS no wonder that the Voters get lost t . k . d . .' . rYll1g to mar It, an are wdlll1g to be led by the suave representatives of the pol ' t ' I b - I k h . I Ica osses w 10 ta e t e time to show them sample ballots and to explain th . f hI ' . . e mysterIes 0 t e s ate. One of the best Illustrations of cul.tural lag 111 the field of politics is the slow pace at which positive law is catchtng up wlt.h the unanimous recommendations of political sc ientists, over several generations, with reference to the short ballot. A shorter ballot in ~hicago w?u.l~ .make it much more difficult for the political machine to dodge Its responsibilItIes, and the agitation to secure such a change would build up the antimachine elements.

"Divide and rule" is an old saying in politics. It applies with par.ticular em- phasis to American municipal politics. The old-fashioned city council elected by wards ~s based on the principle that, if spoils are divided into_small enough unit-s,a great many inAiy idy-aLcit.izens can be put under personal obligations to the machine. Thousands of citizens will not vote against the dominant machine because the local ward boss has done such favors for them as fixing their curbs, collecting their garbage, fixing the street lights, or aiding them in securing some governmental service. That ward organization which delivers the most votes is entitled to the biggest share of the spoilsJ rauduleIlt registration in the form of colonization, ballot-box stuffing, alteration of ballots, and falsification of elec- tion returns are practices which benefit warci !,ollticiai1s\ In order to increase the controlled votes they can cornman , they put all sorts of pressure upon their precinct workers, appoint criminals as members of precinct boards of

election, and organize gangs of floaters and ballot tricksters. Electoral corruption and petty graft weaken the faith of the masses in dem-

ocratic methods, and consequently it is necessary to minimize their use if it is desired to strengthen democratic ideology. If e1ec~ion precincts :-vere made larger, the total number of election officials-would be reduced and It would b:

ha-rder(oLtlie-po :mcal-bosses to mampu ~te e.ac my um 0 tee ecrorate. fn Great Britain there are no precinct captams, m part because the .votes are not

counted by small districts but by large areas incl~ding around ~Ifty thousand voters each. In some parts of the United States fairly large precmcts are used,

and in a number of cities ballots are centrally counted.

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172 SECTION VI

the election boards could hines have over , I 'h '

The control which the party ma,c . ' It 1111 t e preCll1ct be reduced by abolishin th , 1 " For many years the city of

, I dOJnluan p.lCncs, 'f f' d ' and of re resen anon ot Uf tWCl.J , ' ', I the baSIS 0 Itness an 111- :..:..:..:~:....:..:=.:..::.;:..o.~ , .' I (Jon offJCl<l s on ,." I . Detroit has appoJllted preclflct e ec k rsons with CrJI11lna records

, ' d" h I been able to eep pe ,I' , tegrity. Other Juns KtlonS a\e , " ery-c_d.iff.U?~11r JJ1 many areas to , b d In Chicago It IS v h I off the precinct election oar s: , " h' recincts to serve on tee ec-

get properly ..9,ualified persons !Jv~vlthJll t e.J.J" ~tatiOn has not prevented bi- d h . nt of p'uty represe , , tion boards an t e reqlureme <, f ds While the positive law

, , ' trate election rau . I ' I partisan conspiracies to perpe , ' d 'ff _ It because some of the egis ators remedy is well known, its adoption IS b

l :~~~ited from its defects and do not chosen under the present system have e .

k h ' chances of reelection. want to wea en t elr own f ' aJ representation for the present Th b ' , of a s stem 0 proportIOn e su StlW JOn " -;;-ups ~o combine more effectively. Pro-

d plan would ena e the antJmac JIle gr ' I I ' war ' Id ' I the selection of city counel ors-at- arge 111 porrioualrepresentatJon- wou JIlVO ve , fl ' ' h h

, h I h' h uld secure a city councd re ectJllg Wit mat e- accordance Wit a pan w IC wo Th d I '

, h h f the groups in the electorate. e un er ylng ra-mancal exactness t e strengt 0 , f ' .. f h , I f h' ' the desl're to prevent the exclusIOn 0 mJllonties rom t e nona e 0 t IS system IS , 'h ' h

benefits of the state-a rationale based on the democratic pr~mlse t at, In t , e ~b- sence of some means of protection, minorities may be explOlte~ by the m,aI Onty. tP~oDal regresentatiOliwoul~ _do_away with gerr~m~nder~ng and chlcaner~ 'frfconn;ction with the determlnatToliof ward boundarIes, and It would automat ically take care of any shifts in the population, thus eliminating such a rott~n, b?r- ough as the First Ward in the city of Chicago. Election at r e ,",:ould mlnl~lze organizational elements, since it would lessen the power of the prImary relatIOn- ships established by the ward heelers and magnify the importance of secondary contacts. Thus it would be possibk1or-re.fonn groups lect candidates of their own by means of press_and.radi~uch methods are not feasible in ward battles, inasmuch as neither a metropolitan newspaper nor a broadcasting station can give as much attention to fifty local contests as to a city-wide struggle. Cincinnati, Toledo, and Hamilton, Ohio, have shown that proportional represen- tation can be used to defeat machine control.

If democracy is to survive in troublesome times like the present, it will have to have a firmer foundation than the cohesive power of public plunder. Too often the methods employed by party machines to finance their various activities have given rise to the charge that our democracy is a demagogic plu- tocracy. As long as the parties rely upon contributions from business men who are, see~ing special favors, criminal elements which are seeking protection against Interference on the part of the law-enforcing authorities and office- holder~ who regard their loyalty to the party above that to the st~te, cynicism regardIng the electoral process will be widespread.

The power of money in American municipal politics could be regulated to a much greater e~tent than it is at present. The floodlight of puh!i.ciry, be- f?re and aft~r elections, regarding the sources of campaign funds and elec- tion expenditures has wea~ ul' . '

, ~ .• -~ ~6SS-I: e..!ILa..number of states and cities.

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POLITI CAL PARTl I' S dd ' , ' 173 In a ItlOn, the regulat ' f

f IOn 0 cerr ' o party workers and watch am types of expelldl't h' ers On I ' ures su h h I c lI1e vote where it ha b , e ectlon day ha d ,c as t e liring

, < seen tr d • . , s re uced tI '. practices acts and IIIi " Ie , lvlany of the Stat h . le Size of the ma-

f ' nOIS IS one of h ,es ave lI1 adeql use 0 mo ney in electi t e States which I ' late corrupt- J-ega l reg' ul at' ons, las no law regulating the

- _" Ions are necessar ' , are, not sufhclent, The Ameri y In the, fIght against the soil

to ,lI1c~l~a~e, a lega li stic modec~~ t~~~~~~utl~nal system is suc~ th ,:;~;~~~~;~~:~ naive alt 111 the power of legislation g a out S?clal problems, We have had a chan~,e o~lr habits and keep us good ~onstltutlonal, statutory, and local-to ment ,with the constitutional prohibi he colossal failure of the " noble ex peri - po~tatlon of alcoholic beverages has tlon of the manufacture, sa le, and trans- whICh run contrary to the < f' to some extent, shattered this faith . Laws

I b mores 0 an 1m I can on y e enforced at as' I ' Portant e ement of the population I I d ' OCla Cost whICh h'b ' , a ega eVlCe designed t ' f " , IS pro I Itlve, On the other hand

d ' h 0 pun y POittlCS IS k bl I ' , cerne Wit seeing that it d wor a e on y If someone is con- , oes work If mad ' d 'd Important appointing off h' " 11l1e can I ates are elected to the " I' Ices, t ey WIll fInd m th d f ' CIVI servICe laws Even th f e 0 s or cIrcumventing the

lated by unscrup~lous p ~ ~?st perhectly drafted election law can beJD,anipu- < 0 ItIClans w 0 are not car f II h-d Th

ositive law can do is to I I feu y watc e. e best that r-?---r'-:,- create a ega ramework h' h k ' o pu IIc office for ' ,- , , W IC ma es t e perversIon civic points of view.PrIvate profIt rISky and whIch facilitates the expression of

If the struggle ag' h ' , , , all1s,t t e p~~ty machIne IS to be successful, more demo-

crat,.c methods fO,r fmancmg political campaigns must be devised, local parties ~Icated to the Ideal of voluntary precinct work must be organized, and the cltiz:ns m~be_educa.ted to demand services of the government rather than spe~lal ~avors from the politicians. That all of these things are possible to achle~e m the present generation has been demonstrated by a number of cities AmerIcan and European. The will to achieve has been lacking in some places-' high places as well as low places.

Looking at the problem of urban democracy in the United States from a long-run point of view, the picture does not appear as gloomy in all aspects as Thomas Jefferson painted it one hundred and fifty years ago. In the past seventy-five years or so, machine voters have been recruited for the most part from the ranks of the unadjusted foreign-born groups, the unassimilated mi- grants from rural areas, the transient workers, and other such elements. The sinews of campaign warfare came from the robber-bar?ns of American indus- try, particularly the real estate and the utility magnates.\ W.i!h the cutting-off of immigration, the slowing-up of the migration from the farms to the cities, the declining of the birth-rate of the newer immigrant groups, the maturation of the industrial revolution in the country, the growing socialization of the poli- cies of the over t.,-f)ar.ti.c.ular.!y the national government, th~ machines WI have fewer and fewer persons to draw upon as the years go byl That sec- tion of the electorate w IC rea s no daily newspapers, which depends upon petty handouts from politicians, and which is deficient in formal civic training

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174 SECTION VI

. he end of the next seventy-five y will grow less and less. It may be that at t I' . ears . . I ' tht· great metropo Itan centers . the problem of building' up CIVIC" mora e 111. h I' . \VIii

I I 't was or as some WOlve In h not seem so hopeless as Jefferson t lOUg 1t I , t e twentieth cenrury now think it is.

THE AMERICAN POLITI CAL SCIENCE ASSOCIATION

33. RESPONSIBLE PARTY GOVERNMENT

Political parties offer the best vehicle through which voters can influence public policy. Recognizing that American political parties have generally tended to be decentralized organizations with weak ideologies, the American Politi- cal Science Association's Committee on Political Parties urged in 1950 that the parties be strengthened so that they could be more responsible. Advocates of responsible party government bdieLJ.e-thauacb..p.o.liticai arty is obli- gated to provide a clear vision offfie direction 0 future f1i.iEi, tC po icy decisions. Then, by picking candidates from the party whose views most closely resemble their own views, voters are capable of controlling at least the broad directions of governmental policy.

SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS

AND PROPOSALS

PART I. The Need for Greater Party Responsibility

1. THE ROLE OF THE POLITICAL PARTIES

1. The Parties and Public Policy

Popular government in a nation of more than 150 million people requires political parties which provide the electorate with a proper range of choice

Source: From American Political Science Association, "Toward a More Responsible Two-Parry System: A Report of the Committee on Political Panies," American Political Science Relllfll' (September 1950). Reprinted by permission of Cambridge University Press.

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POLITI CA L PART I E 175

between alternatives of ac tion I d . . n Or er to k h . Onsider the relati ons betweell I eep t e parties apart, one must c . eac 1 and II" I' f h rowing emphasIs o n public p I" PU) IC po IC y. The reasons or t e g 0 ICy In pa rty 1"' b II . the very operations of mod . po ItlCS are to be found , a ove a ,

111 ern government.

2. The New Impo rtance of Program

The crux of public affa irs lies in th . I r : d e necessIty for more effective formulation of

ge~e~a po ICles an programs and for better integration of all of the far-flung activities of modern government It is in ter . f h J" I . . ms 0 party programs t at po mca leaders can attempt to consohdate public attitudes toward the work plans of government.

3. The Potentialities of the Party System

The potentialities of t.he two-party system are suggested, on the one hand, by the fact that for all pract/cal purposes the major parties monopolize elections; and, on the other, by the fact that both parties have in the past managed to adapt them~e1ves t~ ~he demands. made upon them by external necessities. It is good practical pohtlcs to reconsider party organization in the light of the changing conditions of politics. Happily such an effort entails an application of ideas about the party system that are no longer unfamiliar.

2. WHAT KIND OF PARTY SYSTEM Is NEEDED?

The party system ~hat is needed must be democratic, responsible and effective.

I. A Stronger Two-Party System

1. The Need for an Effective Party System An effective party system requires, first, that the parties are able to bring forth programs to which ther_c_QIDlIlit- themselves and, second, that the parties possess sufficient internal cohesion to carry out these programs. Such a degree of unity within the parties cannot be brought about without party procedures that give a large body of people an opportunity to share in the development of the party program.

2. The Need for an Effective Opposition Party The fundamental requirement ~ountability is a two-party system in ~h~ch the oPPositi?n party a~ts as the ~f the party in power, developing, def~l1I~g and p~esentln~ the p.o~lcy alter-

natives which are necessary for a true chOIce In reach mg. pubhc decl~lons. The OPposition most conducive to responsible government IS an orgal1lzed party OPposition.

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176 SECTION VI

II. Better Integra ted Pa rties

1. The Need for a Party System with Creater Resistance .!5!.-f'!essure There is little to suggest that the phenomenal growth 0 Interest o rga J1l za tions 111 recent decades has come to its end. The whole development ma kes necessa r}' a rein_ forced party system that ca n cope with the multiplied orga l~i zed pressures. Compromise among interests is compatible with the a ims of a free oc ietyonl y when the terms of reference reflect an openly acknowledged concept of the

public interest.

2. The Need for a Party System w ith Sufficient Party Loyalty Needed clarifi- cation of party policy will not cause the parties to..diHe~ fundamentally or more sharpl y than they have in the past. Nor is it to be assumed that in- creasing concern with their programs will cause the parties to erec t between themselves an ideological wall. Parties have the right and duty to announce the terms to govern participation in the common enterprise. The emphasis in all consideration of party discipline must be on positive measures to crea te a strong and general agreement on policies. A basis for party cohesion in Con- ?ress ~ill be established as soon as the parties interest themselves sufficiently III their congressional candidates to set up strong and active campaign organi- zations in the constituencies.

III. More Responsible Parties

1. The Nee~ (~r Parties Respo~sible to the PulzliE Party responsibility means t~e responsibIlity of. b,o,th parties to the general public, as enforced in elec- tIOns. Party responsibIlity to the public, enforced in elections, implies that t~ere, b,e more tha,n one party, for the public can hold a art responsible o~IY If It has, a chOice. As a means of achieving responsibility, the clarification o party po 10' also tends to keep public debate on a mo I" I I /' " h ' , , re rea IStic eve re- straining t e inclination of party spokesmen to make b ' d' ments and charges. unsu stantiate state-

2. The Need for Parties Responsible to Th ' M includes also the res onsibilit of art Ie ~lr embe.rsJ>arty responsi,bility enforced in primanes caucuse Pya ers to the party membershl ,as . ,s an co ' , nal klllds of party responsibTt d ' . e externa an the Inter- minimized if it is generally I I Y ne~ ~othconfhc~. I!ltraparty conflict will be leaders have a common res reco~bn,ll~e t at national, state allillocal party

ponSI I Ity to th " I party leaders have a legitim t ' . e party membership. Natlona

d 'd a e mterest m the " , I can I ates. nommatlon of congresslOna

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3. THE INADEQU \ " f e y 01-' T HI-' E '

I. Begllll1l1lg Transition ' XISTI Ie PARTY SYSTEM

1. Change and Self-E . ' of American soc iep -h", a Il1111a/io ll Marked cl .. ' I . . i ave ne ' 1allges III the c Imate ot self-exa ', , cessa ril y affn . d h structure and proces es

, mlnatlon .. cr(' t (' pa t parry system give p , as w('11 as the Cllr r y SVstem. The prevailing

OInt to " rent tendenc' d II1Qlllries like rI ' les lowar change in the 1M represented by our report.

2. Burden of the Past F substantially h ' onTIal party orga '- ' . , main trends 7 Aat It was before the Civil ~zatl~n In Its main features i still

o mencan politics have tende~ r~ nder these cIrcumstances the o outflank the parry system.

II. Some Basic Problems

1. The Federal Basis Th . . I e two parties are 'd liQIla ancLstate party or " organIze on a federal basis. The na- . h gal1lzatlons are la I . d d Wit out appreciable comm ' rge y 111 epen ent of one another

on approach to bl' ' egy. The real issue is not over th f pro ems ot party policy and strat- right balance of forces within this e edertl form of organization but over the of federalism now express d' h type 0 orgal1lzatlon. A corollary of the kind

e 111 t e party system is ' ternal separatism. an excessIve measure of in-

2. The Location of Leader I 'p P ,. h

. . S 11 (\ <1 arty organIzation does not vest leadership of r e party as a whole 111 either a ~inolL .. . -:' p.e.rson or a committee. There IS at pres- ent 0 centra~ . or organ which could claim authority to take up party problems, poliCies and strate .

3. The Ambiguity of Membership No understandings or rules or criteria exist with respect to membership in a party. Those who suggest that elections should deal with personalities bur nor with programs suggest at the same time that

party membership should mean nothing at all.

III. Specific Deficiencies

1. National Party Organs The National Convention, as at present constituted and operated, is an unwieldY0!!!Lepr entative and less than responsible body. The National Committee is seldom a generally influential body and much less a

working body. House and Senate campaign committees do not always have a good working relationship with the National Committee. Although interest in

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178 SECTION VI

h ational party organs a re not So c 10 h s grown, ten. on. questions of party po ICy a k 0 imple for them to pay enough att

d o d s to n a e It s en.

stituted nor SQ.-com! m.1te a - tiOn to these questions.

o b the parties a e.-ddined so badly that 0 I ,. Iternatlve etween - °d d olt 2. Party P at arms 0 h h election has deci e even III broad

is often difficult to determldne w f

at th ewriting and adoption of national par est Th . 01

0 proce ure or te o ty terms. e prevcu mg f m the process by which actual de 0 o hod nd.too. remote ro CI·

platforms IS toO u[ne _a · f the whole party and the electora o d mand the respect 0 te

T Slohns al refma ehto clodm

be the end product of a long search for a working agree:

e p at orm s ou ment within the party.

3. Intraparty Democracy Too little consideroatia 0 has been given to ways and

f b oo bout a constructive relatIOnship between the party and its

means 0 nngmg a 0 0 0 h f b I k

o the most of popular partiCipatIOn, t e per ormance of mem ers. n rna mg American parties is very unsatisfactory.

4. Party Research A party stands as much in need of research as does business enterprise or the government itself.

4. NEW DEMANDS UPON PARTY LEADERSHIP

I. The Nature of Modern Public Policy

1. Broad Range of Policy The expanding responsibilities of modern govern- ment have brought about so extensive an interlacing of governmental action with the country's economic and social life that the need--foJ:cQordinated a~ coh egislative as well as administrative, has become para-

ount. In a democracy no general program can be adopted and carried out without wide public support.

2. Impact on the Public In a predominantly industrial society, public policy tends to be widel inclusive, involving in its objectives and effects very large segments 0 the public or ven the whole country.

3 .. C:0ve~nmental Program Machinery On the side of government, in the ad- ~Intstratlve and the legislative spheres, the twin needs for program formula- tion and for program machinery have long been recognized. The governmental advance toward program formulation needs now to be paralleled in the political sphere proper-above all, in the party system.

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II Rise of Nation-Wide Pol ' . ICy Issues

POLITICAL PAKTI ES 179

1. An Historic Trend The ch. , I f h anges In th

rhe resu t 0 C anges in the So ' I e nature and sco f b ' , 5 res. Cia structure and' h pe 0 pu Itc poltcy are ta tn t e economy of the United

2. Past and Present Factors Th h _I:~" nf <: 'I' ere as been ' ~ectl~na Ism. Party organizat' d I~ recent decades a continuing de-

I f t ' I ' Ion eSlgned d I ' , , yO ume 0 na lona ISsues must giv 'd to ea with the tncreaslI1g e WI e range t h '

o t e national party leadership.

3. New Interest Groups in Politics Th ' reduced the weight of sectionalism h e eClonomlc and social factors that have new type of interest groups bUI'It avela so resulted in the development of a

, upon arge memb h' ~ h extent than in the past, they operate as if th ers .. ~. a a mu,c l?reater one or the other party. ey were auxtllary orgamzatlons of

5. THE QUESTION OF CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT

1. A Cabinet System? A responsible cabinet system makes the leaders of the majority collectively accountable for the conduct of the government.

2. Strong Parties as a Condition To amend the Constitution in order to create a responsible cabinet system is not a practicable way of getting more effective parties.

3. Adaption within the Constitution The parties can do much to adapt the us- ages under the Constitution to their purposes.

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I I

r80 SECTIO N VI

JVI O RRI S F I O RINA

34. THE D ECLINE OF RESPONSIBLE PARTY GOVERNMENT

Political scientist Morris P. Fiorina laments the declinc o( "responsible party" governmcllt, arguing that strong parties o((er the best or ollly way (or voters to par~lCIpate meaning(ully in the governing process. Echo/l1g the American Political Sciellce Association's statement on respollsible party government issued 30 years earlier, Fiorina maintains that the consequences (or American politics o( our seriously weakened political parties include a decline in the ability o( political leaders to act deci- sively, an increase in the importance o( single-issue poli- tics, and a growing alienation o( Americans (rom their political system.

Fiorina 's plea (or more disciplined political parties 0(- (ering coherent programs to the voters was heeded by the Republicans in 1994. The midterm congressional elections that year resulted in major gains for the Republicans. In (act, not since 1954 had the Republicans gained control of both the House and Senate. During the campaign, Repub- lican Representatives Newt Gingrich and Dick Armey per- suaded hundreds of Republican congressional candidates to sign what they called a "Contract With America," in which the signers promised to vote for ten major policy initiatives during the first hundred days of the 1 04th Con- gress. The commitment of so many congressional candi- dates of one party to an explicit party platform was an unusual expression of the classic "responsible party" model articulated by the American Political Science Asso- ciation and supported by many political scientists such as Morris Fiorina. Speaking with one voice, the Republicans were telling the voters: Elect us and we will carry out our part of the contract by enacting the measures we have pledged to enact. In the "responsible party " model, the voters could then reward or punish the Republicans two years later.

SOItree: "The Decline of Collective Responsibility in American Politics" from Daedaills, Vol. 109, No . . 3 (Summer 1 ?80), p. 25-46. © 1980 by the American Academy of Arts and Sciences. Reprinted by permission of MIT Press Journals. Footnotes have been renumbered.

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~ . '7 0" F ;~

,

Included ' POLITI CAL PARTI ES .8 L t 111 the .. axes, amend tl . Contract"

budget and to ,1e COnstitution t Were pledges to cut 1l1'l/Jose t . 0 requir I gress, refonn tJ r. erm limit e a Jalanced

b k 1e ,eder, I ' s on memb , f

ac 0 1/1' streets .. a crll1linal la . ers 0 Con- , 'I ' , and Will orde t .. k CIVI lustice restore .. I' 0 ta 'e

, system t / " common .. makmg the /0 ' Jy lI11/tinv p " sense to the I , , Sl/'lg pa t' 0 Imltlve dm ' Itlgation I' y 1/'1 a civil' nages and

Afth . 1 Sllit pay the costs of , Oug 1 Speak ' .

these p' p er Gmgrich d 'd . 10 osals before the H I place nearly all of most were passed by the R ouse of Representatives and was much less resp , elJlIblrcan l11aiorit)' th , S OI1SlVe and r. ' e enate

,ew were enacted into law

Though the founding fathers b I' d ' . . I e levI" In th ' natlo~a gov~rnl~lent, they took great ain I" necessIty of establishing a genuinely do thmgs to Its cItizens; what gove p s .to deSIgn one that could not lightly

d h f . rnment mIght dr. ' ire to t e unctions of what we k 0,01' ItS citizens was to be lim-

d now now as th" h

Faun ers composed the constitutional litan e. watc man state." Thus the created a federal system they dist 'b d Ydfamlhar to every schoolchild: they

[ d II I ' n ute an blended ' h' the Ie era eve s, and they encoura d h powers wit In and across k d b I

ge t e occupants of th ' , , chec an a ance each other by st " e vanous positions to ambitions would be likely to confl~uctunhng IhnCentives so that one officeholder's

ICt WIt ot ers' The re It' f ' , tutional arrangements predictably hampe ff' d

SU Ing system 0 1I1Stl-rs e orts to un e t k ,,','

and favors maintenance of th rae maJor initiatives e status quo. Given the historical record faced by the Fou d h ' h' , " n ers, t elr emp aSls on con-

strammg government IS understandable. But we face a later historical record one tha,t ,shows two hundred years of increasing demands for government t~ ~ct posl~lvely. ~or~over, developments unforeseen by the Founders increas- mgly raIse the hkehhood that the uncoordinated actions of individuals and groups will inflict serious damage on the nation as a whole. The by-products of the industrial and technological revolutions impose physical risks not only on us, but on future generations as well. Resource shortages and interna- tional cartels raise the spectre of economic ruin. And the simple proliferation of special interests with their intense, particularistic demands threatens to render us politically incapable of taking actions that might either advance the state of society or prevent foreseeable deteriorations in that state. None of this is to suggest that we should forget about what government can do to us-the contemporary concern with the prope~ scope a~d methods of gov- ernment intervention in the social and economIC orders IS long overdue. But

, the modern age demands as well that we worry about our ability t,o make

govern k (. s The problem is that we are gradually losmg that ment wor ,or u . 'f ' ability, and a principal reason for this loss is the steady erosIon 0 responsI-

bility in American politics. ' " ) h Wh d I b this important quality, responslblhty. To say t at

s at 0 mean, y " bl for a state of affairs is to assert that he or Orne person or group IS responsl e , 'or im act on that

they have the ability to take legitimate acttons that have a mal p

..

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182 SECTION VI

I"S responsible, we know h someone " colloquia lly, w en state of affaIrs. More " h

I "bTt in a democracy IS matc ed whom to b ame"l" . ;he importance of responsl I I" Y d" vidual responsibility suf-

Unfortunate y, " I autocracy, 10 I "bT " h b the difficulty of attainin~ It. ~ a~ " d"viduallocates responsl I tty 10 t at fi~es" the location of powe~ I"n a SlOg e 10 :bilit is insufficient whe~ever mare " d" ' "d I well But indIvidual respons " y WI can hold a parttcular Con- 111 IVI ua as . I authonty. we h b " than one person shares govern~enta ersonal transgression suc as" :Ibe- gressman individually responsible "for n~ fndividually responsi?le fo r ml~ltary taking. We can even hold a preside the citizenry with a falt accompli. But moves where he presents Congress and "b"l"ty is difficult ro assess. If one

. " d" "d al responsl I I on most national Issues 111 IVI U Democratic congressman, and

h" randomly accost a M were to go to Was 1I1gton, f" fl"1 "magine the response. are 20 t rate 0 111 atton, , berate him about a -percen If 'they' had done what I ve advo-

than likely it would run, "Don't bl~me mde. " h" uld be f1l1e to ay... . " I cated for x years, t 1I1gs wo k thl"s kind of game-plaYIng al too " " " " I structure ma es "

Amencan 1I1stttuttona I h dl"t or blame for nattonal con-"t we must ay t e cre easy. In order to overcome Id h d" bringing them about: some form of ditions on all those who ha any an 10

II (" sponsibility is essential. " " co ec we re II " sl"bility has ever existed, and can eXist given The only way co ectlve respon " " . " I"

" " " "through the agency of the poltttcal party; In Amencan po l-our 1I1stttuttons, IS " " Id I " b b tics responsibility requires cohesive parties. ThiS IS an 0 c aim to ~ su"re, ut "t ' ge does not detract from its present relevance.' In fact, the contInumg de- I sa " . ff "f " th I" " bl"c esteem for the parties and contInUIng e orts ro re orm em c 1I1e 111 pu I "bT out of the political process suggest that old arguments for party responsl I I~y have not been made often enough, or, at least, convincingly enough, so I Will make these arguments once again in this essay. " . " "

A strong political party can generate collective respons,blltty by creatmg incentive for leaders, followers, and popular supporters to think and act in col- lective terms. First, by providing party leaders with the capability (e.g., control of institutional patronage, nominations, and so on) to discipline party mem- bers, genuine leadership becomes possible. Legislative output is less likely to be a least common denominator-a residue of myriad conflicting proposals-and more likely to consist of a program actually intended to solve a problem or move the nation in a particular direction. Second, the subordination of indi- vidual officeholders to the party lessens their ability to separate themselves from party actions. Like it or not, their performance becomes identified with the perfo"rmance ~f ~he collectivity to which they belong. Third, with individ- ~al"c~ndldate vanatt~n greatly reduced, voters have less incentive to support mdlVlduals a~d more mcentive to suppOrt or oppose the party as a whole. And fourth, th"e Circle" close~ as party-line voting in the electorate provides party leaders with the mcentlve to propose pol,"c,"es that "II h f

" "" WI earn t e support 0 a natIOnal maJonty, and party back-benchers wI"th th I " " " hi" e persona IOcent,ve to co-operate Wit eaders 10 the attempt to comp"1 d d f

whole. I e a goo recor or the party as a

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POLITI P In the American Conte L RTIIoS 183

. ' F' Xt, Stron , . ' 1 tWO wa)s. Ir t , the\' a ll . g partie h II . Ow Cit ' a\'e trad' . when rhe government is un 'lf' d Ilens to as es Itlonall y c1a rifi rd politics

Ie wi ' h re po 'b'I' P artY meant 111 0 re tha n it d ' llC it IllOr f nSI I It )' ea il y. at lea t

' . d . Oes tad . 1 · e a ten wa ' I' ~ " onomlC, an mternational . a). Clti len d In ea r ler eras when ,\. . ' cond . nee a ni I S ian for or aga m t change Th Itlons th e>, obs . )' eva uate the soc ial . ey d en eand k ' .'

tlJrion• urba n, a nd defense I" a not need to d 'd ma e a Simple deCi' h

po ICles d eC I e wheth h . superior to r ose ad\'oca ted b ' C a Vaca ted by their co er t e energy, 111 -

The second wa\' in whi h) arter-were any of th ngressman wo uld be . f' ' . . c strong p ' . em to be enacredl tram the Irst. \X hen Cltl le artles clanfv A ' .. '

b h ns assess res 'b' . ' mencan polIti cs follow

Parry mem ers ave per ona l . . pa n I tllty on th . h I' I . InCentives t e party as a whole The}" ave Itt e to ga m fro m ' 0 see the pa rt' · I d f ' . . f guttlllg their . , ! eva uate avorably. r3ckIOg him o r lack of leadership the ne .preS ldent s program one day and at- fare \ 'hen voters do no r diffe rentl'a te xt

h ,. Slllce they hare in the president 's

'b'I " d Wit In th SpO~SI I Ity proVI es pa rty members with a e party. Put s impl y, party re- performance. personal stake 111 their collecti ve

Admittedly, pa rty responsibility' bl . d · I . h IS a Unt IIlst Th me late y ari ses t a t pa rty respon 'b'I' ntment. e objection im-. Sl I It )' cond ' . .

senratlves to suffer electo ra lly for an ' t'I ' emns Junior Democratic repre- . . . m anon they Id d I' I

unhappv slruatlOn, true but unless . cou a Itt e to affect . An • , we accept It C e1ecroral retribution for an inflation th Id h' ongress as a whole escapes

'b ' i" ey COIl ave done h' ff Responsl I Ity reqUIres acceptance of both d ' . samet mg to a ect. . can mons The ch' . b blunt mstrument or none at a ll. . OIce IS etween a

Of course, the United Sta tes is not Great Britain \V! h . h h' . . h d ' . . we ave nelt er t e mstl- tutlons nor tetra mons to suppOrt a British b d f 'bl

d . ran 0 responsl e partv gov-

ernment, an I do not see either the possibili ty or the . f • h . . necessItY or sue a system III America. In the past the United States has enjoyed e~as in which party was a m~ch stronger .force than today. And until recently-a generation, ~oughly-partles have proVided an " adequate" degree of collective responsibil- Ity. ~hey ~ave done so by connecting the electoral fates of party members, via preSidential coattails, for example, and by transforming elections into refer- enda on party performance, as with congressional off-year elections.

In earlier times, when citizens voted for the party, not the person, parties had incentives to nominate good candidates, because poor ones could have harmful fallout on the ticket as a whole.3 In particular, the existence of presi- dential coattails (positive and negative) provided an inducement to avoid the nomination of narrowly based candidates, no matter how committed their supporters. And, once in office, the existence of party voting in the electorate provided party members with the incentive to compile a good party record. In particular, the tendency of national midterm elect!ons to serve as referenda on the performance of the president provided a clear IIlduceme~t for congr~ssmen to do what they could to see that their president was perceived ~s a sohd per- form B . I' I I phenomena such as coattail effects and

er. y sttmu atmg e ectora I b" . r"d f d d ee of persona am mon 1I1to ... 1 term referenda, party trans orme some egr

concern with collective performance ....

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SECTION VI

THE

F PARTY DECLINE 0

NTINUIN G I:: D STATES HF UNIT ,

IN T ' II' - 'tted op.ani za tions ' d f comp l.< '"

vers a rnul{ltlI eo, set of party orga niza_ , I_ I 'rill Ihal co - -tely as t 1e - 'If

Party is :t slInp e l 'f ' ' elf Inost cOIlt;re I It manifests Itse mOSt _ ,- It IlYlnl est ItS I 10Cl i \eve s, h '

and pro t~S l ,S , ,' " II ' at the state an' .' I f the citizen, Somew ere 111 tioll - that ('Xlst pnncll p.

I .> I presence in the min,' 0, nanifestation of party as

' I -)' 'ho ogl .. a f' 0 I S t 1e I , I ' duslve )' :ts a ps .. f 't'on of the Ifst tW , , will hold to t 11 tradi- -d p:trtl r a une I "this seC{lon ,

between. all . _.. The di SC USSion In f party have Important a force in government", I I _ t the three aspects 0 ' ;ional schema. though It IS (' ear t 13 interconnections,

PARTY ORGAN IZATIONS d d" nally meant sta te and local , .. ' n ha tra 1tI0 f d

I the United States. parry orgalllz atlo ally has been a loose con e eraey

n , , ' I party gener, , f Party organization, The n.ltIona , ' n for a brief penod every our years, . , h - 'ngs mto actio h' fl of subnational lIll1tS t at S\~I d d ite the somew at greater 111 u-

" ams true to ay, esp , 4 Th h h This charactenzatlon rem f h t' nal organizations. oug sue d f ' sot e na IO ence and augmente unction 'I there is general agreement that the

things are difficult to measure precdls e

y, e a secular decline since their peak , ' ns have un ergon

formal party orga~lzatlo h The prototype of the old-style organiza- at the end of the I1Inetehe~t cefntumrY'approximated today only in Chicago. , the urban mac me a or ,

tlon ;:~;rallong-term trend~ have served to undercut old-style ~arty orgal11za- 'h t m has been steadily chopped back slllce passage of nons, T e patronage sys e , f h ' h h C' 'I S ' A t of 1883 The social welfare functlOns 0 t e parties ave t e IVI ervlCe c . d I

d to the government as the modern welfare state developed. An , ess passe , ' " 'I concretely, the entire ethos of the old-style party orgal11z,atlon IS IIlcr~aslllg y at odds with modern ideas of government based on rational expertise. These long-term trends spawned specific attacks on the old party organizations. In the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries the Populists, Progressives, and asserted other reformers fought electoral corruption with the Australian Ballot and personal registration systems. They attempted to break the hold of the party bosses over nominations by mandating the direct primary. They at- tacked the urban machines with drives for nonpartisan at-large elections and nonpartisan city managers. None of these reforms destroyed the parties; they managed to live with the reforms better than most reformers had hoped. But the reforms reflected changing popular attitudes toward the parties and accel- erated the secular decli?e in the influence of the party organizations.

T~e ~ew Deal penod temporarily arrested the deterioration of the party ~rg~?~zar:?ns, ~~ least on ,the Democratic side. Unified party control under a

po, Itl~a ~resl ent pr?vlded favorable conditions for the state and local or- gamzatlOns. But fol/oWIng the he d f h because of governme t , yay 0 t e New Deal (and ironically, in part,

, n assumptIOn of subn t' I " ' d clme COntinued. a lona parties functIOns) the e-

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PO llTiCA P In the 1970s two s ' L ARTIES J 85 erIes of f

d " re anize parties 111 America ' arms furth . g. d I'b ' n natl ' I er weak d ' changes e I erately Intended Ona politics Th ~lIe the Influence of or-

, I " to less> . e fIrst \ ,. ' dentla noml11atl11g process [ I en organi- d ' \,IS a senes of legal

d h ' . n tIe D ze party I fI . capture t e national party emocratic " n uence In the presi-

designed to "open lip" th apl?~ratus and il1l pand y, New Politics" activists

I e po ItlCS f pose a sen> f I C:l n party- ong more amate 0 presidential , ~s 0 ru es changes , ' Ur and nOllllnatlo Th Rbi' \\'e:lker versions of the Demo , open than the De ' ns. e epu I-

I I era tIC rul h mocratlc part ' d d st:lte electora aws to confo es c anges. In add ' , ,}-:-a , opte d I ' rm to the D Iflon, modIfIcatIOns of rhe fe era court~ ) stimulated Republ" emocratic rules changes (enforced b

A second Series of 1970s ref lean rules changes as well y 'h d orms lesse d I ' , . . zations 111 t e con UCt of politl'cal ne t Ie role of formal party 0 ' 'f campai . TI ' rgam-

groWlI1g Ollt 0 the ~ederal Election Ca~ns:, lese are financing regulations 1974 and 1976. In thiS case the ref palg~ Act of 1971 as amended in , f' " f·, orms were al d I ' 10 the 1I1ancll1g 0 campaIgns' th' ff me at c eanll1g up corruption

, d' , , elr e ects on th ' though many In IVldllals accuratel d' e partIes were a by-product

'd ,< y pre Icted its . S ' " ' candl ates are now publicly financ d Th naturc. cnous presIdential

Party to spend two Cents per eligl'bl e

. ough the law permits the national , e VOter on behalf f h ' , obliges the candidate to set up a fl'n ,0 t e nommee, If also

ance commIttee se f h ' Party. Between this legally mandat d ' parate rom t e national , e separation and fear of ' I'd' limits or accountIng regulations for example th I h hVlofaftlng spen mg

, h d'd k " , e aw as tee ect of encour- agmg t e can I ate to eep hiS party at arm's I th

The ultimate results of such reforms are eaSe)~tgo p' . 'd: A I I . .. " re ICt. esser party ro e 10 t~e nomlOatlOg ~nd flOanclOg of candidates encourages candidates to or- gamze and conduct IOdependent campaigns, which further weakens the role of parties. Of course, party is not the entire story in this regard. Other modern day changes contribute to the diminished party role in campaign politics. For one thing, party foot soldiers are no longer so important, given the existence of a large leisured middle class that participates out of duty or enjoyment, but that participates on behalf of particular candidates and issues rather than par- ties. Similarly, contemporary campaigns rely heavily on survey research, the mass media, and modern advertising methods-all provided by independent consultants outside the formal party apparatus. Although these developments are not directly related to the contemporary reforms, ,t~eir effect i,s the sam~: the diminution of the role of parties in conducting political campaIgns. And If parties do not grant nominations, f~nd their cho~ces, an~ work for them, why should those choices feel any commitment to their party.

PARTY IN THE ELECTORATE , , takes the form of a psychological attachment.

In the citizenry at large, party b I'k I t identify with one or the Th' . d" ally has een ley 0

e typical Ameflcan tra ltlon , 'f' 'ns are transmitted across gen- h f . ' Such Identl Icatlo at er 0 the two major partIes. . d' 'd al they tend to be fairly sta-

, d .t! in the In IVI U • . . eratlons to some degree~ an ~I 1 the basis of identification lies 111 the ble.6 But there is mountmg eVidence that

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186 Sf ION VI

" through famil y and social ' d Vlca rrouS, f _ , ' , - (direct a ll arty system, 0 l Ourse IS ' d ' 'd I'- " pe rrellCl's - 0 -urrent P< ,

rn IVI U3 ~ t , ' I ' 1'1 the PiISt. ur l , I 1(1 the New Dea l attelnpts ) ' I the PUtl('S , perro( al groups Wit 1 , ' " If the Depre Sion , f those wh o ex perienced b, d ' h dISloc:lt10IlS ( II po rtion 0 _ , , , :lse 0.11 t el , Though onlY:l ma prOd he genera l o urill1es of Citizen to alleViate t It nt, , ' ~ voters to ay, t , ,

I, tl y 'Ire altl Vt bl' I d " t th at tlllle, the Depression l Irec , . hose esra IS le ,. L 'd . 'f' 'atl'ons much resemble t h tellt of citizen a ttachments to p'lrty I ('1It1 re. b I' th at t e ex I

. A ' there is reason to e le ve < I' f 0 111 a late nineteent 1 . century ga rn, I dec lIle r < ' d' h'

' ' has undergone a ong-term h' 'e been a period Llrlng w Ich p.lrtles , D ' I . ppea rs to a\ ' h d I' h' h SA d 'lg'Wl the New ea a 'I ed But agall1 , t e ec me of Ig . n .. , . ra rr y revers . • the dedine was arre~ ted , ~ve ll te ;l;j~s(. . . . ., , part}' h'IS reasserted Itself 111 the ( ble distribution of CItizen party

< ( h heretoro re sta d As the 1960s wore 0 11 , t e, h I directi on of wea kene attach_ ,-. ' b h3nge 111 t e genera b dl d f' identlhca tlons ega n to cO , dl976 independents, roa y e med,

ments to the parties , Betweell 196.tn th ~ n a third of the vo ting-age pop- df I• I 'lna quartertomore < h ' d b increase rom ess t l~, ' ' d f Ii htly more than a t Ir to a out a ulation. Strong identrhers dedll1e rom s g

quarter of the populati~n. '1' . I has declined in recent years. Why? To I d ' bl pa rty 111 t le e ectora te ", n Isputa y, . I d I' Its from the organtzatlonal declll1e. Few h electora ec lI1e resu

some extent t e, I have the tangible incentives to turn out the arty organrzatrons any onger . ' d p , h ' I , It Candidates run II1dependent campaigns an faithful and assure t elr oya y. I deemphasize their partisan ties w~enever t~ey see an~ short-ter~ e, ectoral

' , d ' If party is increasll1gly less Important 111 the nom illatIon and gam m omg so. . , . " d' , election of candidates, it is not surprlsll1g that such dlmlntshe Importance IS reflected in the attitudes and behavior of the voter.

Certain long-term sociological and technological trends also appear to work against parry in the electorate. The population is younger, and younger citizens traditionally are less attached to the parties than their elders. The pop- ulation is more highly educated; fewer voters need some means of simplifying the choices they face in the political arena, and party, of course, has been the principal means of simplification. And the media revolution has vastly ex- panded the amount of information easily available to the citizenry. Candidates would have little incentive to operate campaigns independent of the parties if there were no means to apprise the citizenry of their independence. The media provide the means.

Finally, our present parry system is an old one. For increasing numbers of citizens, parry attachments based on the Great Depression seem lacking in rel- ~vanc~ to the problems of the late twentieth century. Beginning with the racial Issue 111 the 1960s, proceeding to the social issue of the 1970s and to the en-

' , ~rgy, envl~onme,nt, and in~ation issues of today, the parties have been rent by mternal dIssenSIOn. SometImes they failed to take stands, at other times they t?ok the wrong o~es from the standpoint of the rank and file, and at most ~I~~ t~ey ha~e faIled to solv~ the new problems in any genuine sense. Since A ,t e partIes have done lIttle or nothing to earn the loyalties of modern mertcans.

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POLITI CAL PARTIES 187

PARTY IN GOVERNMF. T

If the organiz ,1tion 'd " b 'l" f I ' .1 -1- ,'. , -' . clpa I Itles 0 t 1C parties have weakened, and their psy- c 10 oglLal ties to the voters have loosened, one would expect predictable con- sequences for rI " , " ,

, _ ' 1e p.ut) 111 government. In partICular, one would expect to see :\11 IIlcrt'asll1g degree of split party control within and across the levels of Amer- Ican government. The evidence on thi s point is overwhelming.

At the state level, twenty-seven of the fifty governments were under divided party control a fter the 1978 election. In seventeen states a governor of one party ?pposed a legislature controlled by the other, and in ten othns a bicameral leg- Islature was split between the parties. By way of contrast, twenty years ago the number of states with divided party control was sixteen.

At the federal level the trend is similar. In 1953 only twelve states sent a senator of each party to Washington. The number increased to sixteen by 1961, to twenty-one by '1972, and stands at twenty-seven today. Of course, the senators in each state are elected at different times. But the same patterns emerge when we examine simultaneous elections. There is an increasing ten- dency for congressional districts to support a congressman of one party and the presidential candidate of the other. At the turn of the century it was extremely rare for a congressional district to report a split result. But since that time the trend has been steadily upward. We may well be heading for a record in 1980 as a vulnerable Democratic president runs with 250-odd not-so-vulnerable Demo- cratic congressmen ....

The increased fragmentation of the party in government makes it more difficult for government officeholders to work together than in times past (not that it has ever been terribly easy) . Voters meanwhile have a more difficult time attributing responsibility for government performanc~, and this ?~I~ f~rther fragments party control. The result is lessened collective responslbtllty III the

system ....

SOME CONSEQUENCE OF THE DECLINE

OF COLLECTIVE RESPONSIBILITY

Th k · f party has contributed directly to the severity of several of

e wea elllng 0 h h h

' t problems the nation faces. For some of these, suc as t e gov- t e Importan h ' b '

,. b'l' t deal with inflation and energy, t e connectIOns are 0 VI- ernment s lila I Ity 0 , ' f ' I '

f h blems such as the growlllg Importance 0 slllg e-Issue

ous But or ot er pro, .' , h ' .' , d h 'ng alienation of the Amencan cJttzenry, t e connections

pohncs an t e growl are more subtle.

IMMOBILISM , ' . d endence of the party in government declines, Its abtl-

~s the e1ect l ora

d l IIltl~re:PIf responsibility can be shifted to another level or to

Ity to act a so ec III .

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188 !:>l -II)N \ I , k one's own neck out in an

" to stlC d'ff' I h , Ip s incen(l\e nes more I ICU t, t e ever_ h f ' h Id h 're IS ' h' beco

l .lnot t'r 0 !let· I) er. I t hi Leaders Ip .... ore pronounced and ' ro el11, b -omes ... , .IttCI1IPI ro soke a given p . solution e~

I I -hort-It'rm I ns .' pres<:nt bi.1 IOwa H t Ie ~ , b\em esse ", . I d " d , ' , glwn pro stltutlona or er IS In an tht' po sibilitv ot olvlIlg an} American con " ' h ' -

No ontO s'<:rinusly believes that the de Gaulle waltll1g 111 t e \~lI1gS ) , But t' II (ollJ'c,' rt'linh' we have no ' I hort run costS ordll1anly w1l1 re-ger 0 co apse" " ', ental s - ' I

I" I ' b'l'tv «1 take action that cannot contlllUa Iy depend on po IIIca ilia I I 1 , I run-we, , , , sull in much hight'r costs In the ong A 'can immobllism cannot be dls-

, ' h resent men d the technological fiX, So t ePA rican people appear to un erstand d I , th3t the me , I d mis ed lighlk The sa t lIIlg IS . d I ast in prinCip e, appear prepare to

the depth of ~ur present problems an , at e d But they will not have an 0ppor- s.Krifice in furtherance of the long-run gOO h' long-term plans. Although both tunity to choose between tWO or mOl,re sucn the present state of our politics , h ' ble po ICles, I ' parties pr0llllse roug , equlta neither can deliwr.

51 G LE-ISSUE POLITICS

b h I , ' I analysts and politicians have decried the in-

In recem years ot po mca 'I" S 'f , f ' I ' ps in Amencan po ItiCS, ome 111 act crcased IInportance 0 smg e-Issue grou , , , would claim that the present immobilism in our politic~ owes more to the nse of single-issue groups than to the decline of party. ,A 1i~le thoug~~, however, should reveal that the twO trends are connected. Is smgle-Issue politics a recent phenomenon? The contention is doubtful; such groups have always been active participants in American politics, The gun lobby already was a classic example at the time of President Kennedy's assassination. And however impressive the antiabortionists appear today, remember the temperance movement, which succeeded in getting its constitutional amendment. American history contains numerous forerunners of today's groups, from anti-Masons to abolitionists to the Klan-singularity of purpose is by no means a modern phenomenon. Why, then, do we hear all the contemporary hoopla about single-issue groups? Prob- ably because politicians fear them now more than before and thus allow them to pl,ay a larger role in our politics, Why should this be so? Simply because the par~les are too weak to protect their members and thus to contain single-issue politics.

In earlier times single-issue groups were under gr t h d

' , ea er pressures to reac accommo atlons With the parties. After all the pa t' 'd d'd f' d d ' , r les nommate can I ates, mance can Idates, worked for candidates and h ' party voting protected d 'd Wh ' , per aps most Important,

can I ates. en a conte ' I . threatens to "get" an off' h Id h h mporary smg e-Issue group

Ice 0 er, t e treat b k ' h group can go into his distrl'ct ' , must e ta en senously. T e

, recrUit a pnmary 0 I I ' or both, and bankroll that c' a d 'd E ' r genera e ectlon challenger,

n I ate ven If th ' group is not the majority sentiment 'of th , e, sentiment espoused by the the thought of a strong well f' d e dlstnct, few officeholders relish

, - mance opp Th' strong parties existed Party I d onent. mgs were different when

. ea ers controll d h " d e t e nommatlOn process an

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Id f ' I ' POLITI C. I. Pi\\{"I I [ IS"

wOU Ig It to lllalJ1t,' I - 7 I

, <1111 t 1at to ga vanlze the part ' < Control. An ' , y Into actio outsldc challe Issue group repr('sent('d I n to protect ' < nge would merely se rve

II ' t 1e dOlJ1' Its prerog ' 0

011 contro II1g the p' Inant Scnti ' atlves, nly if a sin"le-arty o rg , ment 111 ' \ ' <> that ar('a. anl zation itself . d ' given area could it count

N ' an thereh I at only did th y e eClOral politic in

, (' party org , , ISSU(' pr('ssur('s at the elec an lZat lon have . rea ' , ability to COntrol th(' . toral I('vel, but the p g d (' r ability to resist si ngle-

I agenda a d h . arty 111 gove rnm I d

pO icy-making leve l ,-; I <, < n t er('by Conta i ' I ' ent 1a greater agony over feder I . b oeay we s(,em condel < IldS

lI1g e-Issue pr ssures at th('

a a Ortlon f d ' nne to go th I both sides would 'f un II1g, There ' I' I d roug 1 an annual

I I d pI e er to reach som IS Itt C nubt that politicians on tee eve an settle the issue. But in (' r('~ sonable comprom ise at the commit- way to put the lid on, In COntrast htoday s d('c(' ntrali zed Congress there is no ~entury a ,large portion of the Re' u~~~onans ten us that in the late nineteenth 111 the tanff and other quest ' p f Ican constituency was far less interested

h h G ' Ions 0 nation I ' w et e,r er~an Immigrants should be a economIc development than in guage m their local schools d h permitted to teach thei r native lan-

" h Id b ,an wether Cath I' d " I' , tants s au e permitted t 0 ICS an IturglCal Protes- national agenda of the period~ cdonsudme alcohol.9 Interestingly, however the

IS eVOI of such' A d h ' up on the state level the exc ' Issues, n w en they do show

d 'k' ' eptlons prove the rule' th d '

an stn mg defeats for the part h '11 ' ey pro uce party splits I y t at a owed them to surface n sum, a strong party that is held acc bl f . , ..

nation-state has both the bT d h ,ount~ e or the government of a pressures. It controls no ~ I ~ty an I t ~ IJ1centlve to contain particularistic " m,manons, e ecnons, and the agenda, and it collec-

nvely realIzes that small mmorities are small ' " h ' h ' mlJ10nnes no matter ow IJ1tense t ey a~e. But as the partIes decline they lose control over nominations and campaIgns, they ,lose the loyalty of the voters, and they lose control of the agenda. Party offIceholders cease to be held collectively accountable for party perf?rm,ance, but they become individually exposed to the political pressure of mynad ~nterest grou~s. The decline of party permits interest groups to wield greater mf\uence, theIr success encourages the formation of still more interest groups, politics becomes increasingly fragmented, and collective responsibility

becomes still more elusive.

POPULAR ALIENATION FROM GOVERNMENT

For at least a decade political analysts have pondered the significance of survey data indicative of a steady increase in the alienation of the American public from the political process .... The American public is in a nasty mood, a cyn-

ical, distrusting, and resentful mood. The question is, Why? ... If the same national problems not only persist but worsen while ever-

greater amounts of revenue are directed at them, why shouldn't the typical

citizen conclude that most of the money must be wasted by incompetent offi- cials? If narrowly based interest groups increasingly affect our politics, why shouldn't citizens increasingly conclude that the interests run the government?

. ,

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190 SECTION VI

eady stream of promises but 10 ed to a st 0 0 o 0 ry has Isten h An increaslOg proPOrtion of

For fifteen years th~ Citizen . of follow-throug . difference, a fact tha has seen very little 10 the way h elections make ao 0 , t the electorate does not bel~eve t at t-1960 decline 10 votlOg turnout. largely explains the much-dls~ussed pO:ith the political process ~oseos several

Continued public disilluslOnmento t begets further disillusIOnment. o dO °lluslonmen h O I d d 0 real dangerso For one thmg, lSI 0 0 0 do not trust t elr ea ers an Will d Off

0 It If cltlzens 10 k I Of 0 0 Leadership becomes more I ICU 10 f °lure becomes more le y I C1£I- o f d bt Po ICY al

not give them the benefit 0 a ou . 0 es and government competence 10 f 01 Waste mcreas b d f zens expect the po ICY to al. I' 0 courages a lesser ree 0 person

o 0 dO ct for po ltlCS en b O 0 , b decreases as citizen Isrespe d " ment by a few Ig lJ1terests' e- o ment An govern 10 h ' 0 to make careers 10 govern 0 0 0 gly decide the c IC e IS true and

comes more than a cliche if citizens mcreasm

cease participating for that reason. hod disappointment with particu- Fo II h 0 th real danger t at contmue 0 0 0 0 lOa y, t ere IS e h 0 nto diSillUSIOnment with

la r government officials ultimately metamorp oses I 0 0 I 0 mbers of citizens believe that government IS government per se. ncreasmg nu f h b 0 f h

Old d b t perhaps incapable of any urt er etteflng 0 t e not simp y overexten e u 0 0 0 0 0 d 0 fl Id v nt lOS overextended mefflClency IS pervaSive, an me lec-wor . les, governme , 0

tiveness is all too common. But government is one of the few Instruments of collective action we have, and even those committed to selective pruning of government programs cannot blithely allow the concept of an activist govern- ment to fall into disrepute.

The concept of democracy does not submit to precise definition, a claim supported by the existence of numerous nonidentical definitions. To most peo- ple democracy embodies a number of valued qualities. Unfortunately, there is no reason to believe that all such valued qualities are mutually compatible. At the least, maximizing the attainment of one quality may require accepting mid- dling levels of another.

Recent American political thought has emphasized government of the peo- ple ~nd by th~ people. ~ttempts have been made to insure that all preferences ~ecelve a heanng, especI~lly through direct expression of those preferences, but If not, at least through faithful representation CIOtlOze p t o 0 0 0 h 0 o I . n ar IClpatlon IS t e relgn-109 va ue, and arrangements that foster widespre d 0 0 0 h 0 favor. a partiCipation are muc 10

Of late, however, some politic I whether contemporary thought lac

a como~entators have begun to wonder the people. In stressing partici:ati;~ ~~fflclent emph~sis on governmenot .r0~ Surely, we should be as concerned with ve we lost Sight of accountabtll~" how many participate. What go d 0 ~ohat government produces as With determine who merits their su 0 IS participation if the citizenry is unable to

P o 0 0 PP0rt. artlclpatlon and responsoblo . o I ltly are n t I 0 0 0

a degree of tenSion between the 0 oglcally mcompatible, but ther~ IS to extremes. PartiCipation m 0 ~o, an~ the quest for either may be carned

d O l aXlmlzers fmd h an vlrtua representation s hot emselves involved with quotas c emes, While re °b o 0 fO d

sponsl tiny maximizers can III

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POLITICAL PARTIES

themselves with a closed shop d

k h d un er boss r I 10 \yea en t e emocracy they supposedl uU e. ~oreover, both qualities can produces Hyde Amendments and im \.tderpln. Unfettered participation agenda power to thwart democratic d mo. I Ism. Responsible parties can use

. d eClslon-fo h mocratlc party use what COntrol' h d r more t an a century the De-

.' . . It a to sup h '. partICipatIOn nor responsibility sh Id b press t e racial Issue. Neither values, but that is what has happenoud . e

h pursu~d at the expense of all other

d d e Wit partlc .

past two eca es, and we now reap th IpatI~n over the course of the e consequences In our politics.

NOTES

1. This argument was expounded at the turn of the . Woodrow Wilson and A. Lawrence Lowell It enJ'oyed century by wrltders such as

h· k' f hi' a resurgence at ml -century m the t 10 109 0 sc 0 ars such as E E Schattschnel'der F h h . f h 'bT . . . or a t oroug exegesIs 0 t e party responsl I Ity argument,. see Austin Ranney, The Doctrine of Responsible Party Gover~ment (Urbana: UflI~erslty of Illinois Press, 1962). 2. Dunng the postwar penod the national government has experienced divided party control about half the tIme. In the precedmg half century there were only six years of divided control. . 3. At this point skeptics invariably ask, "What about Warren G. Harding?" The state- ment in the text is meant to express a tendency. Certainly, in the first sixty years of this century we did not see a string of candidates comparable to the products of the amateur politics of the past fourteen years (Goldwater, MacGovern, Caner, Reagan). 4. See Gerald Pomper, "The Dedine of the Pany in American Elections," Political Sci- el/ce Quarterly, 92( 1977): 21-41; John Kessel Presidential Campaigll Politics: Coalitioll strategies al1d Citizel1 Respollses (Homewood, Illinois: Dorsey, 1980), ch. 10; Ausnn Ranney, "The Political Parties: Reform and Decline," .in Anthony King (ed.), The New Americal1 Political System (Washington, D.C.: Amencan Enterprise Institute, 1978), 213-47. Both Kessel and Pomper have discussed the mcreased Importance of the na- tional party organizations in terms of maintenance of connnumg operanons.' ImpOSI- tion of national rules and standards on the local parnes, and so on. I belIeve WIth R h h . d in' all levels of the pany together, there has been a de-

anney, owever, tat, consl er g . I an a aratuses have grown more c1me in organizational strength even as the nanona p Y pp

mfluential. . d considerably during the New Deal era, the 5. Though federal empl?yment .mcreas~ d Th s the erosion of the patronage system proportion covered by CIvIl serv.lCe dechn~l~rs h~ve documented the political basis of Was temporarily halted. In addition,. s~h S Gavin Wright "The Political Economy New Deal spending and program deCl~lons. I e~ "Review of Economics and Statistics, of New Deal Spending: An Econometric Ana YSIS, 56( 1974): 30-38. . Voter (New York: Wiley, 1960), chs. 6, 7. 6. Angus Campbell, et aI., The AmerIca:~ . I'n American National ElectlOlls (New 7 S . . ' R pectIVe votmg . ee Morns FlOnna, etroS . ch. 5. . . Haven: Yale University Press, forthcommg)h' Critical Electiolls alld the Mamsprmgs 8 F . . Wi I Dean Burn am, . or a dISCUSSIon, see a ter 1970) 1'< r .

of American Politics (New York: Nor~on, . A S~cial Allalysis of Mid,llestem OltICS, 9. Paul Kle ner, The CrosS of CII tllre. 2 .. 1850-1900 ~~ew York: Free Press,1970), ~h. S 'stem, 1945-1979 (Washmgton, D.C.. 10. S .. E. Finer, The Ch~nging Br~/sh Par y Y All1encan Enterprise InStitute, 198 ).

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192 SECTION VI

35.

MAURICE DUVERGER

ELECTORAL BASIS Of THE TWo-PARTY SYSTEM

'dely among democratic Political party systems vary dWSlt tes have only two sig-

, S lIke the Ul1Ite a , J natIOns, ome, 'h 'I others Sl/C} as I,' I partIes I·/J Ie, nificallf large po Iflca h ' ny smaller parties.

I t ' e to ave ma France or Ita y Call 11111 , I ' , , ' D erger s c asslc ex- French political scientIst MaurIce b tlV d the different planation for these differences was ase, on . electoral systems fOl/lld ill these cOlmtrles. DI,,~e~ger as-

, ' I ' hi ' [ative oUICIals are serted that coulltnes m W J/C egIs II' elected by a simple plurality, whe~e only one representa- tive is elected in each district, WIll have only two large partie.s-:-Thls IS because there, is a g~eat illcen~ive for the various factions to unite behmd a smgle candIdate w~ell that is the best way to win more votes thall the other SIde. In a race for Congress, for instance, splinter groups bac~­ ing their own candidates have almost no chance to wm becallse the candidate who has evell one more vote than all the rest wins. By contrast, electoral systenls ill which parties receive a number 0 district representatives pro- portional to theIr party's vote ten to encourage small parties. Thlls, it is clear that any system of proportional representation that might be adopted in the United States would necessarily weaken the two-party system.

r • • l ,

It is not perhaps unnecessary to remind readers here that the descriptions given in this work are provisional and hypothetical in character, often being based on documentation too restricted and cursory to permit of definite con- clusions. Frequently we have had to draw imaginary lines to link the few shin- ing po~ts sc~ttered in ~he dark: the resultant patterns can give only a \~ry approximate Idea of reality. The development of the science of political parnes (it could perhaps be called stasiology) will no doubt lead to the revision of many of the patterns we have traced. None the less some general phenomena sdeem more or less established, and from them some general conclusions can be

rawn.

SOllrce: From Maurice Duverger, Political Parties. Their " ". Modrrll State (New York: John Wiley & Sons, Inc 1951)'R , OrgamUlllol/ al/d ACIIlI/I)' /II Ihe ,

. epnnted by permission of Armand Cohn,

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POLI T I ,\L I'ARTII·.s 193

The opponents of "party systems" will find much ammunition in this book. The organizatiun uf politic:ll parties is cert:linly not in conformity with ortho- dox notions of democracy. Their intern:ll struclllre is essentially autocr:ltic :lnd oligarchic: their leaders are not reall y appointed hy the members, in spite of ap- pearann's, blll co-opted or nominated by the centr:ll body; they tend to form a ruling class. isolated from the milit:lnts, :I c:lste that is more or less exclusive. In so far as they arc elected, the party o liga rchy is widened without ever becoming a democracy, for the election is carried out by the members, who :lrc a minoriry in comparison with those who give their votes to the party in general elections. Parliament:lry represent:Jtiv('s :Ire increasi ngly subject to the authority of the party inner circle: this means that the mass of electors i dominated by the small group of members and militants, itself subordinate to the ruling bodies of the party. The argument must be carried further: even supposing that parties were ruled by parliamentary representatives it would be an illusion to think them democratic. For elections themselves ill-interpret the true state of opinion. Par- ties create opinion as much as they represent it; they form it by (?ropaganda; they impose a prefabricated mould upon it: the party system is not only the re- flection of public opinion but also the result of external technicaUactors (like ballot procedure) which are imposed upon opinio;' (fh; P;;ty system is less a photograph of opinion than opinion is a projection of the party syste~

The general development of parties tends to emphasize their (leviation from the democratic regime. Growing centralization is increasingly diminish- ing the influence of members over leaders, while on the other hand strengthen- ing the influenceo fleaders upon members. Electoral processes are gradually losing ground in the appointment of leaders: co-option or nomination from above, which used to be modestly veiled, are now partially acknowledged in constitutions and sometimes loudly proclaimed as a sign of progress (in Fascist parties). The development of vertical linking and the watertight compartments which are the result restrict the freedom of action of the base and increase the sphere of influence of the apex; they make possible a close regimentation of party members that can prevent any move towards independence of the centre and can preserve strict orthodoxy. Discipline among members is tightened both by these material means and by an even greater effort of propaganda and persuasion which leads them to venerate the Party and its leaders and to believe in their infallibility: the critical attitude gives way to an attitude of ado- ration. Parliamentary representatives themselves are compelled to an obedi- ence which traflsformst em into voting machines controlled by the ~ers of ~. Thus there arise closed, disciplined, mechanized bodies, monolithic parties whose organization outwardly resembles that oLan a-r-my, but whose methods of regimentation are infinitely more adaptable and efficient, being based on a trainin of m ' ather than bodies. Their hold over men is strengthened: r becom~ totalit rian They require of their members closer adherence; they provi e comp ete and final philosophies of the universe. Zeal, faith, enthusiasm, and intolerance are the rule in these modern churches: party struggles turn into religious wars.

J

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194 SECTION VI

, h rties be more satisfactory? That is the real But would a system wit out pa d 'f dOdo , " b b tt r represente I can I ates were to present

question Would opmlOn e e e , h 'b' bl II k . 'd' 'd II b f the electorate WIt out It emg a e rea y to now themselves m IVI ua y e ore 'f h f'

, 'd) WIld I'b ty be better preserved I t e government ound Itself theIr attItu es. wOU I er d ' I" If ' 'I 'f 'ndividuals not groupe 10 po mca ormatlons) faced wIth on y a scatterIng 0 I , .

WI I' , completely artificial notIon of democracy forged by we are IVIng on a " "

I 0 the basis of eighteenth-century philosophICal Ideas. Government of

awyers n ' b' , the people by the people," "Government ,of the natIon, y,lts representatIves," these are fine phrases for arousing enthUSIasm and fashIonIng eloquent perora- tions. Fine phrases with an empty ring. No peopl~ has e~er, been kno~n ~o gov- ern itself and none ever will. All government is olIgarchIC: It necessarIly Implies the domination of the many by the few. Rousseau, whom his commentators have forgotten to read, was well aware of this: "In the strict sense of the term, no true democracy has ever existed and none will ever exist. It is contrary to the natural order for the majority to rule and the minority to be ruled." I The will of the people is profoundly anarchic: it wants to do as it pleases. It vaguely con- siders government as a necessary evil: its instinctive attitude towards it is hostil- ity. Alain has given a remarkable analysis of the natural conflict between the governors and the governed. All government implies discipline. All discipline is imposed from without: "self-discipline" is itself the result of education, which implies a prior external disclphne, and Is always very limited. Government and constraint are inseparable, but by definition constraint is external to the con- strained. A people does not constrain itself; it is constrained. It does not govern itself; it, is governed. To proclaim the identity of governors and governed, of constraIners and constrained is an admirable way of justifying the obedie~ of the latter to the former. It is pure abstraction and verbal juggling. "'--

, Tru~ democracy is something different, more modest but more real. It is defIned In the first place as liberty "for the people and for all sections of the peop.le," as the 1793 Constituents put it. Not only liberty for those privileged by bIrth fortune position 0 d ' b I I'b . ' , ',' , r e ucatlon, ut rea I erty for all and thIS Im- phes a certaIn standard f I' , , b ' , ' ,

, ,0 Ivmg, a certam aSlc education some kind of SOCIal equahty, some kInd of I" I 'I'b ' ' , I I'b ' po ItIca eqUl I num. The Marxist distinction between nomma I ertles and real I"b . , I political liberties reco n' I ertles IS on y p~rtly correct; it is true that the I 'f h g Ized by Western regImes remain a formality for a arge sectIon 0 t e masses for lack of d

quate education of ' I I' an a equate standard of living, of ade- , socia equa Ity or of an ade I" I 'I" Y,

they lay become reall'b ' h ' quate po mca eqUl Ibnum. et I ertIes: t ere IS no point' b ' . b ' them. Now the study of 10 egmnmg y suppressmg

contemporary pol" t" I h ' ous f t: in countries which h ' d I Ica p enomena reveals one obvl- , ave attame a certain d f ' I ' 'I'

tion and a certain standard of 1"' (E egree 0 matena CIVI Iza- and the white Dominions) lib IV 109 d ~rope, North America, Great Britain teenth century when eco~om~rty adn f' t e p.arty system coincide. In the nine- P " IC an manclal pl' f h ress, of technIques of informaf d owers a one dIsposed 0 t e ing the electorate, democracy d~odn an ~ropaganda and of a means of organiz-

k' I . I not eXist· the ' f' . t' wor mg-c ass parties has alone d : nse 0 parties and espeCially 0 ma e pOSSIble I d' . any rea an active cooperatIon

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POLITI CAL PAKTI ES 195

by the whole people in political affairs. Even totalitarian parties, like the Com- munist party, make a contribution in some countries to the {'xistem:e of democracy: their suppression in France and Italy would threaten to strengthen (for a time at least ) the conservative elements, and so to upset the equilibrium which ensures a minimum of liberty to every "section of the people" : the existence of more than one party is both the cause and the reflection of thi s equilibrium.

In countries where the standard of living and education of the people are still much inferior (Asia, Africa, South America) the coincidence no longer oc- curs. Here parties are formal in cha racter: rival factions struggle for power, using the voters as a soft dough to be kneaded as they will; corruption devel- ops and the privileged classes take advantage of the situation to prolong their control. Under certain circumstances, the single party may provide a first or- ganization of the masses, enabling them gradually to acquire some political training; the authoritarian regime it produces may suppress feudal systems of all kinds and conditions and create the economic and social conditions re- quired for the future development of political liberty. The structure of the tran- sitional regime must however be such that it will not destroy all hope of later liberal developments.

At the same time the system makes it possible to form a-I:uling class, sprung from the people, to replace the old. On this question~ pluralist and single-party regimes are at one. The deepest significance of political parties is that they tend to the creation of new elites, and this restores to the notion of representa- tion its true meaning, the only real one. All government is by nature oligarchic but the origins and the training of the oligarchs may be very different and these determine their actions. The formula "Government of the people by the peo- ple" must be replaced by this formula "Government Qf the people by an elite sprung from the people." A regime without parties ensures the permanence of ruling elites chosen by birth, wealth, or position: to secure admission to the governing oligarchy a man of the people must accomplish a considerable effort to rise above his initial position; he must also work his way up the ladder of middle-class education and lose contact with the class in which he was born. A regime without parties is of necessity a conservative regime. It corresponds to the property franchise or else to an attempt to cripple universal suffrage by im- posing on the people leaders who do not come from their ranks; it is further removed from democracy than the party regime. Historically speaking parties were born when the masses of the people really made their entrance into polit- ical life; they provided the necessary framework enabling the masses to recruit from among themselves their own elites. Parties are always more developed on the Left than on the Right because they are always more necessary on the Left than on the Right. To sup~hem would be an admirable way for the Right to paralyse the Left. The classic protests against their interference in political life, against the domination exercised by militants over deputies, by Con- gresses and committees over parliament take no account of the capital devel- opments of the last fifty years which have accentuated the formal character of

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196 SECTION VI

. exclusively the instruments he were once b'

ministers and parliaments. Where~s ~ y they have today ecome mstru· of private financial and economiC mteres

tS , h'ch the place of mass parties is

, . amongst wid ments in the hands of the parnes,. f mation represents an a vance

. . ' This trans or . I . If becoming II1creaslI1gly Important. . f 'ew the slOg e party Itse rep-. h' omt 0 VI of democracy, not a retreat. From t IS dP . h luralist systems but considered

'f' . ompare Wit p h" h . resents a progress I It IS not c . ' h' A dictators Ip wit a smgle . h' h f k to It dICtators Ip. d Wit 111 t e ramewor proper • r I ss is nearer to emocracy than

people's party tending to create a neW ru 109 ~ra type which strengthen the party-less dictatorships of the personal or ml Itary

feudal powers in .their control. r re ime but by present-da Democracy IS not threatened by the pa ty g I" h' Yf -,--_..:... . .-- il- . ' h danger does not Ie 10 t e eXistence 0

trends in party interna orgamzaTlOn: t e h' . ~-.--=t.: '1' I" . d totalitar;"D form t ey sometimes as-artles out 111 tile ml Itar , re IgIOUS, an ...... ' . . ' .

sume. Two further facts of importance must be emph~slz~d 10 thiS conne~tl~n. All parties have not adopted the same kind of orgamzano? In Gr~at BrItam, Canada, Australia, Northern Europe, the only groups to display thiS tendency are small and uninfluential. The same is true of the United States, where the development of RrimJlries..has-had the result of wt:akeI1ing party ~ganization rather than strengthening it. Closed totalitarian parties of the Bund type still remain the exception throughout the world: if evolution is to lead towards them, it has scarcely yet begun and many factors may check it or deflect it.

From another point of view certain features in these new party structures ensure an admirable training of the political leading strata as well as closer and ~ore faithful con.tact between the mass of the people and their ruling elites; Isolated from their context, these features might increase the democratic na- tur~ of parties .instead ?f destroyin~ it: ~he real way of protecting democracy agamst the toxms that It secretes wlthm Itself in the c f' d I d I

·· .. ourse 0 ItS eve opment oes not Ie m cuttmg It off from modern technique f .. h d

.. Ids or orgamzmg t e masses an recrUItIng ea ers-such an operation would k f . I

. h b' d' . rna eo It an empty vesse a vam s ow- ut m Ivertmg these to its use f th' ' tools capable no doubt of b . d f ,or ey are 10 the last resort mere use them is to refuse to act I~I~tg use or ghood as well as for evil. To refuse to

. were true t at dem . " 'b" h them, this would no doubt mean th d oc"ra~y IS mcompan Ie Wit conditions of the present day All th at ehmocracy IS mcompatible with the h ' d h' . e speec es upo th b f' s Ip an t e evils of industrialization din e ene Its of craftsman-

is done and that we live in an age of 0 not a ter the fact that the artisan's day I" d d mass-prod . a 1st an ecentralized cadre pani f h . UctlOn; regrets for the individu- . . h es 0 t e nmet h tlons agamst t e vast centralized d d" eent century and impreca-

the fact that the latter alone suit t~n Isclplined parties of today do not alter e structure of

contemporary societies.

1. Social Contract, Book III Ch , . IV.

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POLITICAL PARTIES 197

E. E. SCHATTSCHNEIDER

36. THE SOCIALIZATION OF CONFLICT

Picking up on tl th f . . .. Je eme 0 responsIble party govern- ment IS polItIcal scientist E. E. Schattschneider's realistic restatement of the role of political parties in democratic theory .. He emphasized that democracy is an inherently competItIVe political system where the contending lead- ers and organizations-political parties-define the al- ternat~ves of public policy. The public participates by choosmg among them.

Because he did not think it possible for Americans- or the citizens of any large country-to effectively partici- pate directly in political decision-making, Schattschneider emphasized the importance of the role that political par- ties have in defining choices for the voters.

If we assume that the people "govern," it follows that the governing majority ought to know more than any majority has ever known or ever could know. This is the reductio ad absurdum of democratic theory. We cannot get out of the dilemma by (1) making a great effort to educate everyone to the point where they know enough to make these decisions nor (2) by restricting participation to the people who do know all about these matters. The first is impossible. The second is absurd because no one knows enough to govern by this standard. The trouble is that we have defined democracy in such a way that we are in danger of putting ourselves out of business.

There is no escape from the problem of ignorance, because nobody knows enough to run the government. Presidents, senators, governors, judges, profes- sors, doctors of philosophy, editors and the like are only a little less ignorant than the rest of us. Even an expert is a person who chooses to be ignorant about many things so that he may know all about one.

The whole theory of knowledge underlying these concepts of democracy is false-it proves too much. It proves. not only that democracy is impossi?le; it proves equally that life itself is impossIble. Everybody has to accommodate hImself

E S h h eider "The Socialization of Conflict" from The SemisolJereig1l Peo- Source: From E. . 6coabtts~ ~ Schattschneider and renewed 1988 by Frank W. Schattschneider. pie. CopYright © 19 y .. & C n Reprinted by permission of Harcourt Brace ompa y.

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198 SECTION VI

o I lber of matters about which he o h °ncredlb e nun I f 10 0

to the fact that he deals Wit an I f life not mere Y 0 po IncSo o 0 f all aspects 0 , 0 0

knows very littleo ThiS IS true 0 0 0 the road to I\1samtyo k verythmg IS 0 dO 0 The compulsion to nowe d world by learl1lng to Istl11guish

o 0 he mo ern People are able to survive m t h hey do not need to knowo We get a

between what they must know and \~ at t begin to realize that it is not nec- clue to the solution of the probolem w e; w:n automobile or to be an Obstetri_ essary to be an automotive engmeer to ~y I depends on our ability to judge

o 0 d h b by Our surVlva clan 111 or er to ave a a - 0 0 blish relations of confidence and things by their results and our ability to esta f hat other people knowo \'Vi

°bOI O h can take advantage 0 w e responsl I Ity so t at we ' 0 0 dOd not lace confidence daily in a thou-could not live in modern society If we I POI

d Oh 0 t surgeons pilots bank clerks, eng1l1eers, p umbers, san ways 111 p armaCis s, " I h h 0 0 I 0 01 servants accountants, courts, te ep one operators, tec I1IClans, awyers, CIVI , f d h t f thers \VIe pass JOudgment on the most complex mech-cra tsmen an a os 0 0 . WI 0 0

anisms on the basis of the results they produce. Economists, try1l1g to explain the operation of the economy, use a political expression whelol they s~eoak of the "sovereignty of the consumer," precisely because they realize that It IS not necessary to know how to make a television set in order to buy one mtelli- gentlyo Democracy is like nearly everything else we do; it is a form of collabo- ration of ignorant people and expertso

Primitive democratic theorists never tire of telling us that democracy was designed to work in New England town meetings, not in a modern national state. The analysis is fatuous. We might as well attempt to return to a handi- craft economy. The crisis is a purely theoretical one because operating demo- cratic political systems have in fact already accomplished what is theoretically impossible and are doing it every day. It is only the theory that has broken down. The problem of modern democracy is the problem of learning to live in the modern world.

o We ca~ find our way through the maze if we learn to distinguish between d .. fferent kll1ds of knowledge, between what amateurs know and what profes- SIOnals know, between what generalists know a d h 0 10 k The o 0 0 n w at speCia Ists now. problem IS not how 180 million Aristotles can d b h e o 0 0 run a emocracy, ut ow w can orgamze a political community of 180 OIl" dO h 0 remains sensitive to their needs Thi 0 ml Ion or mary people sOo t ~t It alternatives and system f . o~ ~so a problem of leadership, orgamzatlO II, the role of leadership :n~ oresPo~sl !lIty

o and confidence. The emphasis is 00

rganlzatlon 111 a d h a- neous generation of something at h emocracy, not on t e spont from this side, it does not look 0 t e ~rbalss roots. If we approach the problem

o Impossl e Th h O 0 0 regime are tremendous, but the h b . e ac levements of the America retical illusions under which w Yh ave

l een brought about in spite of the theo-

Th l eave abored e peop ~ are involved in public o· 0 open up questions for public 0 ~ffalrs by the conflict system. Confllct~

bl O

10 0 I11terVentlon 0 f 0 t pu IC po ICY anse. Conflict 0 h o· ut 0 conflict the alternatives 0

hOI f 0 0 IS t e occasl f . 0 d- ers Ip. n a ree political syste 0 0 on or poIitlcal organization and lea

m It IS dOff 0 I Icult to avoid public involvement (\t

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POLITI CAL PARTI ES 199

conflict; the ordinar)1 I d

< , regu ar operations f h versy, an Controversy is cat h ' 0 t e government give rise to contro-

Th b . . c mg. e egmnmg of wisdom' d .

things the people can do d Ihn eh~ocratlc theory is to distinguish between the bl d ' , an t e t mgs th I e Isservlce that can b d e peop e cannot do. The worst possi-

l eone to the de . . .

pea mystical magl'c I ' mocratlC cause IS to attribute to the peo- , a Ol11ntpotence h' h k .

large numbers of peopl d w IC ta es no cogl1lzance of what very e cannot 0 by th h . h f

the common definition f des eer welg to numbers. At this point What 180 '11' 0 emocracy has invited us to make fools of ourselves

1111 Ion people ca d '. '" . not much more than I ~ 0 spontan~ously, on their own mltlatlve, is very rich man who is uana~~omotlve can do without rails. The public is like a lem is to 1 h e to s.upervise closely all of hiS enterprise. His prob-

Wh earn ow t? c~mpel hiS agents to define his options.

at we are saymg IS that fl ' . . . h con ICt, competition, leadership and organiza- tion are t e essence of d . I' . ' d . emocratlc po ItICS. Inherent in the operations of a

f emo.cracy are speCial conditions which permit large numbers of people to unction.

~he problem is how to organize the political system so as to make the best p.o~slble ~se. of ~he power of the public in view of its limitations. A popular de- CISion bn~gmg mto focus the force of public support requires a tremendous ef- fort to defme the alternatives, to organize the discussion and mobilize opinion. The government and the political organizations are in the business of manu- facturing this kind of alternatives.

What has been said here has not been said to belittle the power of the peo- ple but to shed some light on what it is. The power of the people is not made less by the fact that it cannot be used for trivial matters. The whole world can be run on the basis of a remarkably small number of decisions. The power of the people in a democracy depends on the importance of the decisions made by the electorate, not on the number of decisions they make. Since the adop- tion of the Constitution the party in power has been turned out by the opposi- tion party fourteen times, and in about six of these instances the consequences have been so great that we could not understand American history without taking account of them.

The most important thing about any democratic regime is the way in which it uses and exploits popular sovereignty, what questions it refers to the public for decision or guidance, how it refers ~h~m ~o the public, h?w the al- ternatives are defined and how it respects the lImitations of the. pUbl.lc. A g~od democratic system protects the public ag~inst t~~ d~mand .th~t It do ImpOSSible h · The unforgivable sin of democratic polItics IS to diSSipate the power of t mgs. . . d . f h h bl ' b " t to triVial uses What we nee IS a movement or t e t e pu IC y puttmg I . .

conservation of the political resources of the AmerIcan pe~ple. ., b h

· the people are powerless if the politIcal enterprISe IS not A ove everyt mg, ., h 'd h

.. I' h om petition of political organIzations t at provi es t e competItIVe. t IS t e c . h' .

I . h h opportunity to make a choice. Without t IS opportul1lty pop-

peop e Wit t e . ular sovereignty amounts to nothmg.

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200 SECTION VI b h rmless if it is properly un-

d f " " " n of democracy may Ie :isundersrood . It would be

The common e InItIO ommon y d " d h f

" that it is very c re actually OlOg are emo- dersrood but t e act IS h" we noW a " " f" " "

" '" " to say that some t lOgs d" " nal defiOitlOn . De 10itlons of more ImaginatIve f" h tra ItlO "

" though they do not It t e b made on the assumptIOn that cratIc even " I have een "" d " democracy since the time of Anstot e things that the one oes 10 a the "many" in a democracy do th~ same But obviously the shift from the

" f " d "n an anstocracy. f I " " monarchy and the ew 0 I h"n the number 0 peop e partlCl- "one" to the "many" is not m"erely a c a~:e ~ower is exercised. The 180 mil- pating in power but a c~ange In the tva; ;his is not because the 180 million lion cannot do what a Single ruler ~a"n ~." II impossible for 180 million to are stupid or ignorant but because It IS P YSlca y h "I f th I" " I " f I "t and t e surVlva 0 e po ltica act the way one acts. In the Interests 0 c an y , I'"

d d f ' , , f d mocracy that recogmzes the ImItatIOns that

system we nee a e InItlOn 0 e nature imposes on large numbers. , , ,

A working definition must capitalize on the 11I~ltatlOns of the peo~le as well as their powers. We do this when we say that hberty and leadershIp are the greatest of democratic concepts. Democracy is a competitive political sys- tem in which competing leaders and organizations define the alternatives of public policy in such a way that the public can participate in the decision- making process. The initiative in this political system is to be found largely in the government or in the opposition. The people profit by this system, but they cannot, by th~mselve~, do ~he ,work of the system. We have already had a great deal of ex,per,lence WIth thIS kmd of system. Is it not about time that we begin to recogntze ItS democratic implications?

Conflict, competition organizaf I d h' d , d' f " IOn, ea ers Ip an responsibility are the mgre lents 0 a workmg definition of d tern in which the people ha h ' emocracy. Democracy is a political sys-

ve a c olce among th I ' peting political organizations a did e a ternatlves created by com- over the traditional definition is ~h e~ ~rs. The ,advantage of this definition that actually happens. It describ at It ISh~peratlonal, it describes something

'bl d es somet 109 £ 'bl I POSSl e emands on the pub!' M " eaSI e. t does not make im- h

IC. oreover It d 'b concern ~ ose achievements are tremend' escn es a going democratic

, The mvolvement of the publ" o~~. kmd of co fl ' h IC 10 pohtlcs i

f h " , n I~t t at almost inevitably , , s a natural outgrowth of the

OtIS Sltuatlo b anses 10 a f ' essence of d n y responsible political I d ree SOCIety. The exploitation

emocracy· the ' I' ea ers and " ' h process ,SocIa lzation of fl" orgamzations IS t e . con ICt IS th' ' e essentIal democratiC

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208 SECTION VII

"

. NTHONY SUSAN B. A

38. WOMEN AND THE RIGHT TO VOTE

1906) as one of the first Susan B. Anthony (1820- ) U! ,. ht American feminists and the leading women s rlg

d s

advocate of the ninetee11th century. She was a SfOl;~ er in 1869 of the National American Women's ul/rage

. . ·zation to the present-AssociatIOn the precursor orgal1l , "I this speech she force-da)I League of Women voters. n . .

h d·· t agamst fully argues against all laws t at .lsCrimma e women. Whereas Charles Beard belreved that the Con- stitution reflects the interests of an economic elite, Susan B. Al1thony's argument suggests that because the fo~nd­ ing fathers were all males, the Constitution was written to further exclusively the interests of men.

Friends and fellow-citizens: I stand before you tonight under indictment for the alleged crime of having voted at the last Presidential election, without having a lawful right to vote. It shall be my work this evening to prove to you that in thus voting, I not only committed no crime, but, instead, simply exercised my citizen's rights, guaranteed to me and all United States citizens by the Na- tional Constitution, beyond the power of any State to deny ....

The preamble of the Federal Constitution says:

We, the people of the United States, in order to form a more perfect union, establish justice, insure domestic tranquillity, provide for the common de- fense, promote the general welfare, and secure the blessings of liberty to our- selves and our posterity, do ordain and establish this Constitution for the United States of America.

It was we, the people; not we, the white male citizens; nor yet we, the male citizens; but we, the whole people, who formed the Union. And we formed it, not to give the blessings of liberty, but to secure them; not to the half of our- selves and the half of our posterity, but to the whole people-women as well as men. And it is a downright mockery to talk to women of their enjoyment of the blessings of liberty while they are denied the use of the only means of securing them provided by this democratic-republican government-the ballot ....

For any State to make sex a qualification that must ever result in the disen- franchisement of one entire half of the people is to pass a bill of attainder, or an

SOl/ree: From Susan B. Anthony, "Speech in Defense of Equal Suffrage" (1873).

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ELECTION S AND VOTERS 209

eX post facto law, and is therefor 'I' bl ' f I'b e a VIO atlon f h it the essmgs 0 I erty are forever w'thh Id 0 t e supreme law of the land. By

rerity. To them this government ha I, e from women and their female pos- the governed. To them this govern s no ,lust powers derived from the consent of

d·, ment IS not ad, is an 0 IOUS aristocracy; a hateful r h emocracy. It IS not a republic. It ever established on the face of the ;llg~r~ y of,sex; the most hateful aristocracy govern the poor. An oligarchy of I 0 ,e, an ohgarchy of wealth, where the rich

earmng where th d d h ' rant, or even an oligarchy of race wher ' e e ucate g~vern r ~ Igno- endured; but this oligarchy of s~x h~ the Saxon rules the Afncan, might be

h I' h ' w Ich makes fathers brothers husband sons, teo Igarc s over the mother and sisters th 'f 'd d h' f ' h Id h ' h d' , e WI e an aug ters 0 every house 0 -w IC or ams all men sovereigns all b' 'd' , d' d d . , women su Jects, carnes IS-

senSlOn, Iscor an rebellion into every home of th t ' e na Ion .... , Webster, Wor~ester and Bouvier all define a citizen to be a person in the

Umted States, entitled to vote and hold office.

The only question left to be settled now is: Are women persons? And I hardly believe any of our opponents will have the hardihood to say they are not. Being persons, then, women are citizens; and no State has a right to make any law, or to enforce any old law, that shall abridge their privileges or immunities. Hence, every discrimination against women in the constitutions and laws of the several States is today null and void, precisely as is everyone against Negroes.

t ..

GEORGE WASHINGTON PLUNKITT

39. HOLDING YOUR DISTRICT

, , , d are scrutinized under a microscope and Pol,t,CIans t~ ay hical conduct-whether personal any suggestIOn of unet news and the lead story on or public-makes fro;t page The most obvious practices television news broa

l , ~aslts. achine-buying votes and

Id ' po Iflca m B of the 0 -tIme h 11 become uncommon. ut stuffing ballot boxes- a ef tting and keeping voters

h ' . t d means 0 ge 'f b ' more sop Istlca e b t d The practICes 0 rmg-, e una a e . d' ' I'n your camp contmu , congressional IstrICt,

II 'ns mto a d ing federal insta attO e campaign contr~butors, an

Providing access to lar g t

onstituents certamly have not . fl to protec c using In uence

disappeared.

• ..,,' . - ....I.~ ... k 'tt of Tamma/ly r/ll/l 'I Hall (New York: McClure Phillips,

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J •

212 SECTION VII " , t things runOln again. It, 'II they ge h S

I f them up tJ d polities. W a can tell ho\v clothes were burned up, ~n,( IX _mightY goa e the most grateful people

' , \ttles, (00 1"h poor ar 'h" philanthropy, but It s po , 1 'ng me? e friends 10 t elr neIghbor.

f h > fires )rI h e more many votes one 0 t esc they av I (ell YOU,

in the world, and, c( rn~ I 'rs k v it before the charitable ' I h e In (leI . (I 'nO\ hoods (han (he riC 1, a~ d'strict in wan h ground. I have a special

If there's a fanllly Indmy ~1en are first on t, ethat the poor look up to societies do, and me an my The conseque~ce IS ble-and don't forget him corps (0 look up such cas~s. ome (0 him 10 trOU George W. Plunk itt as a fat 1er, c , , luan I make it a point

I 'd ' f deservtn ,. on e ectlOn 3). et a job or a h I don't have a few Another thing, I can always:, ;eldom happens t at

h d' 't d' uhP

(0 kee on the track of jobs, an It i employer in t e ,1~tnC an In t e I p , d for use. I know every b ~ h habit of say 10 no to me when my s eeve rea y nd they ain't 10 t e

whole city, for that matter, a I ask them for a job. , s of the district! Do I ~orget them? Oh, no!

A d the children-the httle rose k v that a sIght of Uncle George n h nd they nov They know me everyone of t em, a f h are the best kind of vote-getters.

, h ' Some a t em h f h ' and candy means the same t 111? h Avenue rosebud, w ose at er IS a I'll tell you a case. Last year a, little, E~:;:~~ election day and said she wouldn't Republican, caught ,hold of hlsfwhlS And she didn't. let go till he'd promIse to vote or me.

JOE MCGINNISS

40. SELLING CANDIDATES As PRODUCTS

v. O. Key's argument that elections are meaningful be- cause voters are rational has not been universally ac- cepted. An alternative view of voters imagines them to be easily manipulated by advertising techniques, particu- larly on television. In the modern era of «spin doctors," media specialists who work to depict their candidate and political events in a favorable light, it is hard to remem- ber how shocking it was for many Americans to read Joe McGinniss's conclusion that elections were nothing more

Source: 10 : McGinniss, The Sel/in? of the President. Copyright © 1969 by Joe Mac, Inc. Reprinted by permiSSion of Janklow & Nesbit Associates.

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th d " ELECTIONS an a VeTtlSlng ca111p , AND VOTEkS 21 3

consumer prod algns sell" " Ucts A M II1g Pol"t ' , not so much Vote fo s cGinniss p' Ici~ns instead of Ical purchase of h ' r a candidate ut It, citizens d M G ' 1111 " I as rn k 0 c mniss describe h' n the ex a e a psycholog_ "handlers " UJork d ~ t e Way in '''h cehrpt that follows , e lit 1968 o.v Ic R' h '

tlOns of their cand 'd to rnanipul IC ard Nixon's image that remain ~ ate So as to ch ate public percep- Kennedy in the 19;0 frorn his carnpai ange h,s negative

race for the Wh ' gn agamst John F. , Ite House

politics, 10 a sense, has always b . Th A

' een a con e mencan Voter insist" game.

I, ' h ' h ' lng upon h' b I' his re IglOn, w 1C promises anoth b IS e lef in a higher d I' , h h er ett \'f or er, C lOgS to illUSIOn t at t e men he chooses to l:ad h,er I e; and defends passionately the

It has been traditional that th 1m are of finer nature than he d d h

e sUccessful r " . succee to ay, e must embellish it P , I po ,Itlclan honor this illusion. To

"Potential presidents are mea' adrtlcu ~rly If he wants to be President. d· G d Sure agamst an 'd I h ' of lea 109 man, 0, father, hero po k' , I ea t at s a combination

avenging Furies thrown in," an ad~ise;;~ ~~~ with ,maybe just ,a touch of the dum late in 1967. Then, perhaps aware th N~rd Nlxo~ ~rote 10 a memoran- discussed improvements that ld h at Ixon quahfled only as father, he

h ' , wou ave to be made-not upon Nixon him-

self, but upon t e Image of him that was received b th Th h

' d'fc y e voter. at t ere IS a I Ierence between the individual d h" . h , an IS Image IS uman

natur~ . Or Amen~an n~ture, at least. That the difference is exaggerated and explOited electromcally IS the reason for this book.

Advertising, in many ways, is a con game, too. Human beings do not need new automobiles every third year; a color television set brings little enrichment of the human experience; a higher or lower hemline no expansion of con- sciousness, no increase in the capacity to love.

It is not surprising, then, that politicians and advertising men should have discovered one another. And, once they recognized that the citizen did not so much vote for a candidate as make a psychological purchase of him, not sur-

prising that they began to work together. , The voter, as reluctant to face political reality as any ~ther klO~,. wa~

h dl '11'" "The deeper problems connected With advertlsmg, ar y an unwi 109 Victim. h I . . Th Image "come less from t e unscrupu ous- Daniel Boorstin has wntten 10 e I' . b' deceived less from the ness of our 'deceivers' than from our P easure 10 d

emg ,

d . h f h desire to be seduce ... . eSlfe to seduce t an rom t e ve misled ourselves ... about men . . . and

"In the last half-century we ha h We have become so accus- h b f d among t em .. ·· ow much greatness can e oun h for reality We demand them. And tomed to our illusions that we mistake t er h m bigg~r and better and more we demand that there be always more 0 t e ,

vivid." . xtension of our error. The Presidency seems the ultimate e

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I 214 SE n ON VII

II Pres ident since 1952, Whe " " " ,. oed openly to e f B B n

Advern 1I1g agenCle h:lH!n " " 1956 the agency a atton, arran " c - Il:"cnon In' hi " f" , Dwig,ht Ei cnhower r:l n ror re e . retai ner throug a u! lIS IrSt four

h" h h d beell 0 11 :I d H II " Durstine :lnd Osborn, w IC:l I CO ll nt , Leonar a, natIonal Re, " . " a regu a r ac h Yea rs an'epted hI ca mp:l lgn a • , d "d"He and your progra ms t e \Val' , " "d .. y I ellvour C.H1 I. , publica n chaIrman, :I I: ~L " " '\ busint·ss ell ir product, I rs ha been that, a technIcal so. • h asr twe \"e yea •

The only change over t e p. " " tion, The ad men were remoVed "" " ' " d has circum pec

PhlsrlC:H1 on ha 11Icrease , a . " " " a Lllte upsta Irs, ' , ' from the parlor but were gIven _ f young men attuned to the politi.

" h d b t himselt a group a , 0" NIxon ga t ere a ou , I " 'd by different routes. ne, William f I ' " Th " arrived at liS SI e h" I cal use 0 te enslon. e~ d E' I' I teacher in a suburban Ig l school

G " hIe \'e'lr-ol ng IS I " h ' avrn, was a t Iny-OI -, ' h~ Richa rd Nixon urgrng 1m to run "d h"1 d I h" " 196 when e wrote

outSI e P I a e p la 111 " ' , TV Gavin wrote on stationery bar- f P "d d b se hIS ca mpaIgn 0 11 • " or resl ent an a , . I " b cause he tho ught N ixon would

d f h U" t I of Pennsy va nIa e rowe rom t e mversl) . d b f m a college professo r, pay more attention if the letter seeme to e ro

Dear Mr, Nixon: " ' 19 vour plans for] 968? Mav 1 offer twO suggesTIons concernll ,

, " h' can happen ro vou politicallv speaking, that is 1 Run You can W1l1 • • a t 1I1g , J '" ' " , , h h h d to "au Orrega y Gasser rn hIS The Rel/olt of worse than w at as appene J' "' " f h "

I M "These I"deas are rhe onlv genu1l1e Ideas; the Ideas ate shlp-t Je asses savs: , k d All ~he rest is rheroric posruring, farce . He who does not really feel wrec e , , "ff " I " h "

himself losr, is losr wirhout remission , . ," You, m e ect, are ost; t at IS why you are the only polirical figure wirh rhe vision to see thrngs the way rh~y are and nor as Leftist or Rightisr kooks would have rhem be. Run. You WIll wm,

2. A tip for relevision: insread of those wooden performances beloved by politi- cians, insread of a glamorboy technique, insread of safety, be bold, Why not have live press conferences as your campaign on television? People will see you daring all, asking and answering questions from reporters, and not simply an- swering phony "questions" made up by your staff. This would be dynamic; it would be daring. Instead of the medium using you, you would be using the medium, Go on "live" and risk all. It is the only way to convince people of the rcurh: that you are beyond rhetoric, that you can face reality, unlike your op- ponents, who will rely on public relations. Television hurt you because you were not yourself; it didn't hurt the "real" Nixon. The real Nixon can revolu- tionize the use of television by dynamically going " live" and answering every- thing, the loaded and the unloaded question. Invite your opponents to this kind of a debate.

Good luck, and I know you can win if you see yourself for what you are; a man who had been beaten, humiliated, hated, but who can still see the truth.

A Nixon ~taff member had lunch with Gavin a couple of times after the letter was received and hired him.

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William Gavin Was b ELECTIONS uary of 1969. rOUght to the Wh' . AND VOTERS 215

Harry Treleaven h ' Ite Hous , d ' , Ired as eas aspe h

1967, Imme lately Went t creative d' ec writer in Jan-

Problems. One Was hi's I 0 work on th Irector of ad ' ack f hen Vertl ', "Can be corrected t 0 umor. 10re serious of ~Ing ~n the fall of

viouS about it. Romney'o a degree," Irel IXon s personality I s cornball eaven w

witty, et a pro write the w d attempts h rote, "but let's n b Treleaven also worr ' dor s." ave hun him. If we' ot e too ob-

b h ie abo N' re gOIng to be "he can e elped greatl' Ut IXon's I k y Inthi ac ~ words to say that will show ~,respect by how h:varmth, but decided that Buchanan wrote about RFK IS emotional' I IS handled ... , Give him

, h talk' Invo veme ' h That swat we have to in'e Ing about the s ,nt In t e issues., . , "He should be prese~t Cdt. : . . tarvlng children in Recife.

d ' Th" e In sOme k' d stu 10. e Situation should look In of 'situation' rath ' Some of the most effect' 'd unstaged even if it 's n "er than cold 111 a 'I . f Ive I eas bel d Ot.

editona wnter or the New YI k onge to Raymond K P , f d

. or Herald Ii 'b . nee, a ormer an most promInent speech ' , rt une, who became N' , b

h f h ' Wtlter In the c' Ixons est

muc 0 t e Inaugural address. ampalgn, Price later composed In 1967, he began with the '

. assumption that "Th reason IS to support prejudice not t' .' , e natural human use of I , h' , a arnve at OPinIons" Wh' hid C USlOn t at ratIonal arguments would "ani be " , IC e to the can-

to make the emotional leap or what th I y, effective If we can get the people . ' eo oglans call [the] 'I f f ' h ,,,

f t Pn~e s~~g~sted atta~ki~g ~he "personal factors" rather ~~;nOth:I'\istorical Ra~ horsd N": IC were t e aSls of the low opinion so many people had of JC ar Ixon.

"These tend to be more a gut reaction," Price wrote "unarticulated non- analytical, a product of the particular chemistry betw;en the voter a~d the image of the candidate. We have to be very clear on this point: that the re- sponse is to the image, not to the man. . .. It's not what's there that counts, it's what's projected-and carrying it one step further, it's not what he projects but rather what the voter receives. It's not the man we have to change, but rather the received impression. And this impression often depends more on the medium and its use than it does on the candidate himself."

So there would not have to be a "new Nixon." Simply a new approach to

television. f ' d f d' ~" "What, then, does this mean in terms of our uses a time an a me la.

Price wrote. , 'whatever time RN needs in order to "For one thing, it means IIlv

d estl

h n

g " of the nation's future that he

. h' in t at VIsion work out fi~m'y .. ~ IS .own ~, rucial. ... " " wants to be Identified With. ThiS IS C ears in public life, RIchard Nixon

So at the age of fifty-four, after.twent~ Y f fme to "work out firmly in his was stii, felt by his own staff to be III nee h

O t ~e wants to be identified with."

h 'on's future t a

own mind that vision of t e natl

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, I 216 SECTION VII

I take the time and the money ,, ' ggests t lat we • , , I ' "Secondly," Price wrote, It su er with film and televISIOn tec 1I1lQues,

to experiment, in a controlle~ m~I1I~ 'those controlled uses of the television h ' pIl1POll1tIl1g with particular emp aSIS on , e we want to get acro~s ' . :

medium that can best conve~' the /mag lement of distortIOn, 111 terms of its d ' ' If ntroduces an e 'h' h h ' "The TV l11e IUm Itse I bl ' ' al ways 111 w IC t e Image is , d f he often su 11111\1, ' ,

effect on the candIdate an ,0 t, partial image-thus ours IS the " 'bl S gOIl1g to convey a , h received. And It II1evlta Y I . I art that gets across IS t e part We

task of finding how to control ItS use so t le p

want to have gotten acrosS . . . , . II . t rested in making an effort to Un- "Voters are basic-lily lazy, baslcl y unp"~ e te "Reason requires a high . b " nce wro .

derstand what we're talkIl1g a out .... ~ s'on is easier. Reason pushes the , . I' f ntratIOI1' IInpres I' ,

degree of dlsClp II1e, 0 conce , d 'd that he agree or disagree; Impression viewer back, it assaults him, I,t en:an s k' < . n intellectual demand ....

h· ' ' I' 111 wIthout rna II1g a can envelop 1m, ~nvlt~ 11m d" d that he make the effort of replying. We When we argue wIth hlln we eman I th 's is the most difficult work seek to engage his, intellect, and for n:~ystr~~~~de cl~ser to the surface, more of all. The emotions are more eaSI, ,

malleable .... " 'd d" turation w'th So for the New Hampshire primary, Pnce recommen e sa I,

f'l " h' h h ndl'date can be shown better than he can be shown m a I m, 1\1 w IC t e ca h h b . be edl'ted so only the best moments are sown; t en a person ecause It can, " ,

'k arading of the candidate in the flesh so that the guy they ve gotten IntI-qUlc p I' , . mately acquainted with on the screen takes on a Ivmg presence-not saymg

anything, just being seen. . . . , "[Nixon] has to come across as a ~erson, larger t?~n hfe, the stuff of leg-

end. People are stirred by the legend, mcludmg the h~m~ legend, not by .t~e man himself. It's the aura that surrounds the charismatiC figure more than It IS the figure itself, that draws the followers. Our task is to build that aura .....

"So let's not be afraid of television gimmicks ... get the voters to like the guy and the battle's two-thirds won."

So this was how they went into it. Trying, with one hand, to build the illusion that Richard Nixon, in addition to his attributes of mind and heart, considered, in the words of Patrick K. Buchanan, a speech writer, "commu- nicating with the people ... one of the great joys of seeking the Presidency"; while with the other they shielded him, controlled him, and controlled the at- mosphere around him. It was as if they were building not a President but an Astrodome, where the wind would never blow, the temperature would never rise or fall, and the ball never bounce erratically on the artificial grass.

They could do this, and succeed, because of the special nature of the man. There was, apparently, something in Richard Nixon's character which sought this shelter. Something which craved regulation, which flourished best in the d~rkness, behind cliches, behind phalanxes of antiseptic advisers. Some part of hIm that could breathe freely only inside a hotel suite that cost a hundred dol- lars a day.

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ELECTIONS AND VOTERS 217 And it worked. As he

d moved sere I h was new ca ence to Richard N' , ,ne y t rough his primary campaign there h rt A d ' IXon s speech d ' ' ea . n, a new Image of him 0 an motion; new confidence in his

TV both reflected and ' n the television screen. h I k d I'k ,contrIbuted to h' e 00 ' e I e a winner on th IS strength. Because he was winning

h d ' e Screen. Becau h dd " on t e me lum he had f d h se e was su enly proJectIng well TI f eare e went ab h' h le one ed upon the oth b' '1 ' " o lit IS ot er tasks with assurance. R bl ' er, 1II dmg to ' h' epu Ican convention b d an astol1ls Ing peak in August as the , M" egan an he emerg d f h' I' I ' mg to laml not so much t b , " e rom IS rega ISO atlOn, travel- trolled, TV. 0 e nomInated as coronated. On live, but con-

WALTER DEA

41. CRITICAL REALIGNING ELECTIONS

American presidential elections have been classified ac- cording to which party wins and what coalitions of Americans identify themselves with those parties. Using these measures, elections may be "maintaining" (party loyalties remain stable and the majority party wins), "deviating" (basic party loyalties remain stable but the majority party loses), "converting" (the majority party wins but major shifts can be seen in who supports the party), and "critical" or "realigning" (the majority party not only loses the election but also loses its stand- ing as the majority party). Walter Dean Burnham's analysis of critical realigning elections suggests that major upheavals occur cyclically in the history of American politics and that each is associated with a significant increase in intensity in which large numbers of voters change their party identifications. It seems that the Democratic victory for Bill Clinton in 1992 did not represent the beginning of a cycle of realign- ment in sources of support for the parties, but rather a

S . F m Crl'tl"cal Elections and the Mainstream of American Politics by Walter Dean Burnham, ollree. ro U db " f W W N & Copyright © 1970 by W. W, Norton & Company, Inc. se y permIssIon 0 . . onon Company, Inc,

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218 SECTION VII

o R publican domillation of mere deviation /II the recent e the White House.

o . 11 recognized that American electoral For many decades It has been ?en~~ad y °te its apparent diverse uniformity

10 0 0 0" 11 of '1 pIece CSpI f h 0 pO ItICS IS ~ot qUIte a 0 • nt Ion .-range consequences or t e politi- Some electIons hav.c more I111porta d g "decide" substantive issues 10

I I I I rs an seem to n cal system as a w 10 etlan ot le, I eement among historians that I ' There has been ong ag

r a more c ear-cut wa). . • 96 d 1932 for example were funda the elections of 1800,1828, 1860, 18 A' an 0 el'ectoral")oliti~ s -

o 0 0 I Irse of mencan < t • mental turnmg pOInts m t le COL , 0 I 0 I "A Th o 0 1955 of V O. Key s semII1a artlc e, eory

S1I1ce the appearance 111 0: d O h 0 of Critical Elections," political sCIentIstS have mov~ to gIve t IS concept

, It lOW seems tIme to attempt at least quantitative depth and meanII1g. . . . I 0 ' 0 f 0 0

o 0 t of tile structure function, and ImplIcatIons 0 CrItIcal an II1tenm assessmen , ff 0 • I· f I A erican political process. Such an e ort IS motivated rea Ignment or t le m, < . . ' f f

. . I b I thor's view that crItIcal realIgnments are ° unda- 111 partICu ar y t le au < • • 0 II d "

I . t only to the system of polItIcal actIon ca e the menta Importance no American political process" but also to the cl.arificatioons of so~e aspe~t~ of its operation. It seems particularly important II1 a perIod of obvI~us poittlcal upheaval not only to identify these phenomena and place them II1 tIme, b~t to integrate them into a larger (if still very modest) theory of movement In

American politics. Such a theory must inevitably emphasize the elements of stress and abrupt

transformation in our political life at the expense of the consensual, gradual- ist perspectives which have until recently dominated the scholar's vision of American political processes and behavior. For the realignment phenomenon focuses our attention on "the dark side of the moon." It reminds us that poli- tics as usual in the United States is not politics as always; that there are discrete types of voting behavior and quite different levels of voter response to political stimuli, depending on what those stimuli are and at what point in time they occur; and that American political institutions and leadership, once defined (or redefined) in a "normal phase" of our politics, seem to become part of the very conditions that threaten to overthrow them ....

In its "ideal-typical" form, the critical realignment differs from stable alignment eras, secular realignments, and deviating elections in the following basic ways.

1. The critical realignment is characteristically associated with short-lived ?ut ver~ intense disruptions of traditional patterns of voting behavior. Major- Ity partIes b.e~ome minorities; politics which was once competitive becomes no?-COmpetltl~e or, alternatively, hitherto one-party areas now become arenas of mtense partisan competition; and large blocks of the active electorate-mi- norities, to be sure, but perhaps involving as much as a fifth to a third of the voters-shift their partisan allegiance.

2. Critical elections are characterized by abnormally high intensity as well.

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ELECT( h"" " ONS AND V a. T IS mtenslty typical! " OTERS 2.19

h· d" y spills 0 " I"ting mac mery unng th Ver Into th wr " f e uph e party . 'on behavIOr rom the integrat' ~ava l and resul . nominating and platform-

[I " . f " IVe no" ts In m' h' . cerna OCI 0 power In the m " fin as well . alor S ifts in conven- 111" 0 d" alOr pa L as In tr f . f realignment. r marily acce d rtY 100St heav'l fans ormatlons in the 0 " pte .. I I Y a fe d b rocesses, mstead of performin h "ru es of the game" cte y the pressures

~ontribute to polariza tion. g t elr usual integrative a;e flouted; the party's b. The rise in intensity is " Unctions, themselves

" I "" . associated' h logical po anzatJons, at first w" h" Wit a con sid bl " '.

h I " It In one 0 era e Increase In Ideo-between tern. Ssue distances betw r more of the mal'O " d " d " een the " r parties an then

eleCtIons ten to Involve highly s I' " parties are markedly " d d d b I' a lent ISSue- I Increase ,an tiona I an sym 0 IC overtones far m h c Usters, often with strongly emo-

I" " 0 " ' Ore t an I . [oral po ItICS. ne cunous property f . s CUstomary In American e1ec- f I" 0 establIshed I d h' " [he stress 0 rea Ignment seems to b ea ers Ip as It drifts into

" h" h " If e a tendency t b dogmatic, w IC itse contributes g I 0 ecome more rigid and reat y to the e I '" . realignment. . . . xp OSlve bursting stress" of

c. The rise in intensity is also nor II b " voter participation for the time Thl"sm~ ~f~o e ~ound In abnormally heavy

. slgm Icant inC . r" I b" lization is not always or uniformly present t b rea~e In ~o Itlca mo I-

I"" I " h ' 0 e sure. It IS particularly true of rea Igmng cyc es Wit a strong sectional thrust that th h" h d I e areas w IC are pro-pelle most strong y to one party or the other tend t b h " h" h

d " 0 e t ose In w IC turnout oes not Increase much, or even declines SI"ml"la I h"'" " " "" " . r y, W I e Increases In partICipatIOn du~mg the 1928~36 p~riod were very heavy in most of the coun- try, they were slIght or nonexistent In the South, because the restrictive struc- ture of local politics which had been created at the turn of the century was not disturbed until long after World War II. Moreover, the net effect of the New Deal realignment was to make the South even more lopsidedly Democratic than i[ had been before. With such exceptions, however, there has still been a general tendency toward markedly increased participation during realigning eras.

3. Historically speaking, at least, national critical realignments have not occurred at random. Instead, there has been a remarkably uniform periodicity

in their appearance. . . . " " " " 4. It has been argued, with much truth, that Ame~l~an political parties a~e

essentially constituent parties. That is to say, the pohtl~al-party "sub~ystem IS sited in a socioeconomic system of very great heterogeneity ~nd diverSity. For a variety of reasons (to be discussed in greater detaillat~r) thlsfP~rty sys~em hads

. . h rforming the functions 0 integration an tended to be preoccupied Wit. pe" d ft antagonistic subgroup- ~automatic" aggregation of highly dlv~rs~ an t o:ern for development of mgs in the population to the near exc USlon 0 c " . . . the European sense. modern" mass orgamzatIon ID" I f the dynamics of this constituent-

Critical realignments emerge dlre~~ y ~om and with implications which fu . . A . n polItics 10 ways "h " I nctlon supremacy ID menca '11 Iy note that SlOce t ey lOVO ve " I H we WI on " " Will be analyzed subsequent y. ere d e of the term, they are 1Ot!-

'. . . h broa est sens " I f ConstItutional readJustments ID t e formations m large c usters 0

d f Il wed by trans mately associated with an 0 0

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220 SECTION VII

d ' · I f md alternations in policy ad ' po licy. This produces correspon 11Ig Y pro Ol" < n In- . , ' ' I - of AmerIcan government. In h flut'nces the grand IIlstltutiona structures , Ot Cr

, I . tl'tllent acts: they arIse from eme words, realIgnments are themse YeS cons , , rgent , , , h ' I d tel)' controlled by the organlzatton Or tensIons 111 socIety w IC 1, not a equa , " OUt_

f' I' ' I ' I te to a fl 'lsh pomt· they a re Issue-orle puts 0 party po ttlCS as usua , esca a <', ' nted pht'nomena, centrally associated with, th~se ,t~n S lon s a,~d mure, o r less leading to reso lutio n adjustments; they result 111 slg l1lflGlnt transform atio ns 111 the gen- eral shape of policy; and they have relativel y profound afteref~~cts on the roles played by institutional elites. They are involved With red~ fll1ltt o n s of the uni- verse of voters, po litical parties, and the broad buundarres of the politically possible.

To recapitulate, then, era s of critical rea lignment are marked by short, sharp reorganizations of the mass coalitional bases of the maJo r parties which occur at periodic intervals on the national level; are often preceded by major third-party revolts which revea l the incapacity of "politics as usual" to inte- grate, much less aggregate, emergent political demand; are closely associated with abnormal stress in the socioeconomic system; are marked by ideological polarizations and issue-distances between the major parties which are excep- tionally large by normal standards; and have durable consequences as con- stituent acts which determine the outer boundaries of policy in general though not necessarily of policies in detail. '

KATHLEEN HALL JAMIESON

42. DIRTY POLITICS

~/though it, n:ay ~/ways have been an accurate descrip- tIOn of pobtlcal lIfe, Kathleen Hall Jamieson's concise sta~ement that ':what is known is not necessarily what is belreved, u:hat,ls ,shown is not necessarily what is seen, and what IS sard IS not necessarily what is heard" had by the 1 ~80s an~ ! 990s become the guiding principles for Amerzcan pobtlcal campaigns,

!amieson re~ounts how the Republicans used dra- matIc ~nd qU,estlO~able political spots to blame the De- • mocratlc preSIdentIal candidate, Massachusetts Governor

SOl/rce: From Dirty Politics' Deception D' , Copyright © 1993 by Kathl~en H II J " Istractlon, and Democracy by Kathleen Hall Jamieson,

a amleson Reprinted b " f " p , y permIssIon 0 Oxford Umverslt)' ress,

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M ' I ELECT' • Ie Jael DUkakis ON~ AND VOT ERS Wltlfte Hurto ' (or allut ' , ' II, to re ' Vlng a, ,

'-all 1/'111 fl ed k 'd cClve a IVe k (Col/vlC/ed d I " I /lap and e 'end p, _ II/U~ erer

te elllSIOIl s/Jot the a rape, J II a no l~s ellIring which 17; that Bush b I' I/llOuneer _ IU (all'IUIIS 30 I e leVes il ~ays OVer -seculld

p Ja to of DUkakis I I the death /Jel I a photo o( Blish Po - , tl d ' rJe sa)1 tJ la ty N , ~e 7e eath PIs 1at not / " e.tt, Over a d ' ena ty b on y du , D egree 111urde ' /.it as "OV es lIkakis o/J-.. , rers to h <> erl/or he" 1/ I ,7en, Oller a I ' ' I aVe lUeekend p a OlUed (irst-

llugs Jot ( " asses I , an/louncer say "0 0 WIllie Hort ,rom /lYISOII . .. dered a bo " s, /Ie IIlan lUas W'II?n, a black man, the

, _ y III a robbe " Ie Horton I a lite sentence H ry, stabbing him 19 ' , IV 10 mllr- Prison Ho t ' (l orton receilled 10 k tl/n,es. Despite . r On d k' lUee 'el d he, 'Idnapp d 1 passes (rom t e ~~n O1~d repeatedly rapinge ha YOI//~g cou/J/e, stabbing

7e Pictures and ' IS gtr Irtend . .. were d ' SCrtpt of the d

eSlgned to create th a, campaign clearly Duk~kls Was personally res e perceptIon that Governor conVIcts who C01111111'tt d ponslble for furloughing 268

I 'I e acts of 'I w 11 e out of prison I VIa ence, even murder d 'd . n COntrast of ' can I ate George B h ' COurse, Republican

, us Was to b crl111e and C0111pass ' e seen as tough on lonate tOward ' , spot was produced and b VIctIms. Because the , run y Am' £ mdependent group th t ertcans ,or Bush, an B h a was not formally p f h us campaign, he could and d'd ' art ate while at th ' I tech111cally dIsavow it Both Ho t e sa111~ tl

h 111e benefiting from its subtle racism

, r on an t e television spot became dam' . fisu~ throughout the 1988 presidential campaig~~a~: or orton, he went back to prison, where he told re- por~ers that ,Bush "111ay just be a cheap political Oppor- tUntst. I ,can t help but question his moral judgment. "

ja"!,eson's analysis of this successful Republican cam.~Qlgn spot raises serious ethical issues and troubling poftttcal questions regarding the increasingly sophisti- cated art of manipulating public perceptions of political candidates.

22'

William Horton and Michael Dukakis are now twinned in our memory. The fact that the memories are factually inaccurate does not diminish their power. Dukaki~ did not pardon Horton nor did the furloughed convict kill.

Although it does recount the facts of the Horton case, this chapter is not one more rehash of who did what to whom in the 1988 campaign. Instead, it sets a Context for the book by examining how voters and reporters came to know what they know of politics. It argues that, i~ politics ,as in life, what, is known is not necessarily what is believed, .what IS ~hown IS not necess~nly what is seen, and what is said is not necessanly what IS heard. It then exammes

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222 SECTION VII

h . I . d he psychological quirks that ow 10 the Horton case consultants exp olte t characterize humans. .

Th . k . I d k I'k tendency to gather up and mterrelate ese qUlr s mc u e a pac -rat Ie. h 'bl d . . f . f ' d" . n to welg accessl e, ramatlc 10 ormation rom vanous places, a ISPOSltlO . . d h · . . I' f mation and a predtlectlon for ata more eavlly than abstract statlsnca m or , I . . "f t" ettmg fears shape perception of what consntutes ac.. .

At the same time we have conventionalized journaltstlc norms that reward h ' . I' vl'sual and take the form of messages t at are dramatic, persona, conCise, '. .

narrative. In 1988, the psychological dispositions. of the pu~ltc coupled wtt.h the news norms to produce an environment in which an a~yplCal but dra~atlc personification of deep-seated fears would displa~e other Issues ~nd domtn~te the discourse of the campaign. That dramatic, visual, personaltzed narrative told the "story" of William Horton.

VOTERS ARE PACK RATS

The role that ads, Bush rhetoric, news, and audience psychology played in transforming William Horton's name for some into a symbol of the terrors of crime and for others of the exploitation of racist fears shows the powerful ways in which messages interact and the varying responses they evoke in individu- als. Like pack rats, voters gather bits and pieces of political information and store them in a single place. Lost in the storage is a clear recall of where this or that "fact" came from. Information obtained from news mixes with that from ads, for example.

Although Bush had been telling the tale on the stump since June, in the second week in September 1988, the Horton story broke into prime time in the form of a National Security Political Action Committee (NSPAC) ad. The ad tied Michael Dukakis to a convicted murderer who had jumped furlough and gone on to rape a Maryland woman and assault her fiance. The convict was black, the couple white.

The ad opens with side-by-side pictures of Dukakis and Bush. Dukakis's hair is unkempt, the photo dark. Bush, by contrast, is smiling and bathed in light. As the pictures appear, an announcer says "Bush and Dukakis on crime." A picture of Bush flashes on the screen. "Bush supports the death penalty for first-degree murderers." A picture of Dukakis. "Dukakis not only opposes the death penalty, he allowed first-degree murderers to have weekend passes from prison." A close-up mug shot of Horton flashes onto the screen. "One was Willie Horton, who mu.rdered a boy in a robbery, stabbing him nineteen times." A blur.ry bla~k-and-whIte photo of Horton apparently being arrested appears. "Despite a Itfe sentence, Horton received ten weekend passes from prison." The wo;ds ."kidnapping," "stabbing," and "raping" appear on the screen wirh Horton s plc~ure as the announcer adds, "Horton fled, kidnapping a young couple, stabbmg the man and repeatedly raping his girlfriend." The final pharo

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gain shows Michae l DUkaki a , '" s. The Dukakls on erllne. announc" "r nOtes "~

When the Bli sh C<ll1lpaig , " . eekend prison passes. d H n s rev I ' 5 viewers rea Orton frOI1l th p 0 Vlng dOor" , d b

a~d-white B~sh ad opened Withe btc ad into the fU:luu ~~an to air on October O f convicts clrcllllg through a eak Prtson scenes I gh ad. ThIS stark black-

revolvi . t t en cut t . II'ving rooms. By carefully I'u ng gate and ma h' 0 a processIOn Xtapo ' . rc IIlg to d h " false inference that 268 first-d Slllg words and pict . whar t, e natIOns

d k ' d egree murd ures, t e ad IIlvlted the rape an I nap. As the bleak ' I erers were furloughed b D k k' k' h d d VISua saY u a IS to Duka IS a vetoe the death I ppeared, the anno 'd h . , pena ty and . uncer sal t at

murderers not eltglble for parole Wh 'l gIven furloughs to "first-d 'd . I e out egree kidnappmg an rape." , many committed other crimes like

The furlough ad contains thr f I Th ee a se stateme t d ' , inference. e structure of the ad ,n san IIlVltes one illegitimate

I, 'bl f prompts Itsteners t h " f' derers not e IgI e or parole" as th d 0 ear Irst-degree mur- whom committed crimes? First_deg

e antece

d ent referent for "many." Many of

ree mur erers n t I' 'bl f of whom went on to commit crimes I'k k'd ~ e Igl e or parole. Many

I e I napplIlg d ) F' d murderers not eligible for parole. an rape. Irst- egree

But many unparoleable first-degree murde d'd f h d ', rers I not escape. 0 the 268

furloug e convIcts who Jumped furlough dur' D k k' , f' h d mg u a IS s Irst two terms, only four a ever been convicted first-degree murderers not eligible for pa- role. O~ t?ose four not "many" but one went on to kidnap and rape. That one was WIlham Horron. By flashing "268 escaped" on the screen as the an- nouncer speaks of "many first-degree murderers," the ad invites the false in- ference that 268 murderers jumped furlough to rape and kidnap. Again, the single individual who fits this description is Horton. Finally, the actual number who were more than four hours late in returning from furlough during Dukakis's two and a half terms was not 268 but 275. In Dukakis's first two terms, 268 escapes were made by the 11,497 individuals who were given a total of 67,378 furloughs. In the ten-year period encompassing his two com- pleted terms and the first two years of his third term (1987-88), 275 of 76,455 furloughs resulted in escape. .

This figure of 275 in ten years compares with ~?9 who e,scaped m the three years in which the program was run by Dukakls s Repubhcan predeces-

sor, who created the furlough p~ogram. I . d Aft the Bush campaign's Still the battle of drama ag.amst data c~~~n~:lf 'wee~~, in the third week of

furlough ad had been on. the aIr f~r ~o ~f Horton began airing. One showed October, PAC ads. feat~rmg the vlct;:sed b the furloughed Horton. "Mike the man whose fIancee had been d ~. es forever," said Cliff Barnes, Dukakis and Willie Horton change ~ur IV

II 'fe term without the possibility . "H was servlOg a' b k

speakmg in tight close-up. e . h'm a few days off. Horton co e D kakls gave I . d M

of a parole when Governor u b t n slashed and terrorize. y .' h I was ea e , , . k k' Into our home For twelve ours, h' I'b ral experiment failed, Du a IS

. . d When IS I e WIfe, Angie, was brutally rape .

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224 SECTION VII

simply looked away. He also vetoe~ the death penalty bill. ~egardless, 0:, the election, we are worried people don t know enough about MI~e Dukakls.

The second ad was narrated by the sister of the teenager ktlled by Horton. "Governor Dukakis's liberal furlough experiments failed. We are all victims. First, Dukakis let killers out of prison. He also vetoed the dea~h penalty. Willie Horton stabbed my teenage brother nineteen times. Joey dIed. Horton was sentenced to life without parole, but Dukakis gave him a furlough. He never returned. Horton went on to rape and torture others. I worry that peopl~ here don't know enough about Dukakis's record." The words that recur In the two ads are: "liberal," "experiment," "rape," worry that "people don't know enough about Dukakis," "vetoed the death penalty."

Taken together the ads created a coherent narrative. Dukakis furloughed Horton (PAC ads), just as he had furloughed 267 other escapees (Bush revolv- ing door ad). Horton raped a woman and stabbed her fiance (crime-quiz and victim PAC ads). Viewers could infer what must have happened to the victims

of the other 267 escapees.2 The narrative was reinforced by print and radio. The "get out of jail free

courtesy of Dukakis" card reappeared in 400,000 fliers mailed by the Bush campaign to Texans. "He let convicted rapists, murderers and drug dealers out of prison on weekend passes," said the flier. "And even after-while out on furlough-they raped and tried to kill again. "3

ALAMO PAC, a political action committee based in San Antonio, Texas, produced one ad that paralleled the claims of the furlough ad but focused on drugs. While showing a drug dealer at a high school, the ad noted that Dukakis had vetoed mandatory prison terms for convicted drug dealers, had fought the death penalty for drug "murderers," and supported weekend fur- loughs for drug convicts. A second ALAMO PAC ad showed a burglar, pre- sumably freed under a furlough program, creeping into a darkened bedroom.

Clips from Bush's speeches that appeared in the news reinforced the Horton-Dukakis link. In Xenia, Ohio, in early October, Bush talked in what the New York Times described as "vivid detail ... about the notorious case of Wi~lie Ho~ton." Press accounts vivified the case by supplying details and occasIOnal pIctures of Horton. The New York Times described Horton as "the murderer who left the Massachusetts prison system on a weekend fur- lough, only to be c,aug~t"a year later ~fter he ,raped a Maryland woman and brutally beat her ftance. 4 At a rally m Medma, Ohio, Bush referred to the Massachusetts g~vern~r ~s "the ~urlough king." In Trenton, New Jersey, Bush note? that the vlcttms of cnme are given no furlough from their pain and suffermg." 5

, The sister of one of Horton's victims and the man Horton had assaulted ~hIle on furlo~gh, began holding press conferences just as PAC ads featuring t em were be?mnmg to air. In Texas, newspapers devoted front-page space to Donna Fourmer Cuomo h ld b k'll d dr · , w ose seventeen-year-o rother Horton supposedly ;h e , an C Iff Barnes, then the fiance of the woman the escapee had raped,

e press tours were underwritten by a two-million dollar fund raised by the

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ELE,CTIONS

C O1[1lirree for the Presiden AND VOTERS 225

o d h .. " cy, the p onsore t e Victim" ads rO-Bush I) I' ,

sp 1988 b d' a Itlcal A ' In , roa cast news . Ctlon COmmitt · 6 h ' f . Stones II ' ee t at

VI congenes 0 Images Th a led se (Ie f f I h d . e ads in I gments fro h photOS 0 ur oug e convict \V"lr c uded clips f m tree ads to create dorton "murdered," and th hi lam Horton cI rom the furlough ad still fl d h e usband f ' ose-ups of th' ' 'Ictims an t e murdered teen . a a Wom H e Sister of a man v d Th ager's s' an Orto d .AcClure an omas Patters' ISter recOunted th ' n rape . Horton's IV' h On s pia' elr stori S' R b nd neWS, we ave known th ' neenng study f h es. II1ce 0 ert a at VleWe ' ate rei at h' f d

other/ .a phenomenon McClure and rs ImpOrt segments of on Ions Ip 0 a s ThiS phenomenon is well I Patterson call "meltdo ~, story II1to an-

Mulholland. "I think during the exp

am.ed by former NBCwpn. 'd R b d ' campaign th resl ent a ert tie confuse . I m expecting any day n e average viewer starts to get a lit- S f h ow to see WIt" H jeans ... , ome 0 t e ads start to I k I"k I Ie Orton endorse a line of

length, 30 seconds .... Television ,00 .. e news stories, they're the same b h ' . IS not lust se d . viewer etween t IS IS news this . . parate In the minds of the

. . II f ' IS commerCial a d h' . Sometimes It a gets uzzed up becau . II ,n t IS IS entertainment. . I' f se It a comes i t h h h same 1m e piece 0 glass."8 not e orne t rough the

The "melting down" of these ima es ex I . . the Bush campaign's use of Willi H

g P ams the controversy surroundmg

d am orton. In late fall 1988 a rising chorus of

Democrats can emned George Bush and h'ls Rbi' h dl '11' H "d . . epu Ican an ers for the "WI Ie orton a. Felgnmg cherubic innocence B h' , d . f ' us s surrogates pOinte out that no picture 0 the black murderer and rapist Horton had ever appeared in a Bush-sponsored ad.

From Bush strategist Lee Atwater to Bush media advisor Roger Ailes, Bush's aides were telling the literal truth. The scowling convict's mug shot ap- peared only in the ads of presumably independent political action committees. But the psychological impact was similar. In his stump speeches, Bush rou- tinely raised the case of the furloughed convict without mentioning his race. But once a viewer had seen the PAC ad or a news clip about it, the images of Horton, his victims, and the circling convicts were likely to meld into a coher- ent narrative reinforced almost daily by Bush's recounting of it in his campaign

speeches.

NOT ALL INFORMATION

IS CREATED EQUAL

. k' b th opposed the death penalty and fa- Democratic nominee Michael Duka IS h 0 . chosen by the Republicans to vored furloughs. It is no accident that t e Ima~as a black male. By explaining symbolize the Massachusetts furlough system

bl k but because he "slashed" a

h b e he was ac I d d t at they used Horton not ecaus, h R blicans tacitly acknow e ge M h · f cee t e epu d h ' aryland man and raped IS lan, h d first-degree mur erer-w lte the atypicality of the case. No other fUhr.l~ugu; During the primaries a double Or black-either murdered or raped w leO .

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.., "

•

226 SECfION VII

ht and returned . As one of th ' I h hut was caug· .' h e

d rer did ,'lImp tur ollg E I _ TribIllle s senes notes, t e Bush mur e M ' . -husetts _ag e . d " ,\Uthors of the Lawrence, .\ SS .I~ I ' '-rimin'll had It wante. We did a . I . 'I'Cl,d a w lite L "H .' . t' campaign .:ould lave Sf t t: .. II Sue Forrest. e W.lS a ormer cop

I . rderer reca s f I h P'lg'e I story on a w lite mil' tor)' on five ur oug cases. FOur ' , d M ' lIeagues wrote a s d TI ' , who was turlollghe. }' co· ,. F trooper Arman )errem killed

. "'f I Horton. orlller 987 h . were willte. Th,' h t \ was , . 01 December 11, I ,e lumped . , d ·\ policeman. I bl' d his buslIless partner .\n . t red The Repu Ica ns opte for a

. . I I, t r he was recap u · I f work detail. A mont) .\ e , d bl ck villain over t le story 0 a white , . . I ' trang'ers an a a . h B h street cnme !llYO vll1g s . ' . d - . rance money. Smce t e us cam-

d h k' lI d a fnen tor msu . h cop-gone-ba w 0 ' I e ' . f " formation on the furloug program, paign relied on the Eagle-Tril}//Ile or Its 10

it presumably knew of these cases. . ' "e of the furlough program. Nor . presentative II1stanL

Horton was not a re . . I United States, where murder, assault, were his crimes tYPICa l of cnme 111 t le ' I 110t interracial.

I · f rapes are II1traraCla , and near )' I\Ille out 0 ten b' that the Horton case had "come b I 0 ber Bush was 0 servlOg

Yet y .He cto , tely I believe-the misguided outlook of . b I" e 'md represent-accura , '.

to s)'m 0 IZ .• h ' t crime,,9 In my judgment, a slOgle aberrational mv opponent w en It comes o· h bl' b ' . " d k b the Republicans the press, and t e pu IC to e typIcal lOCI ent was ta en y , . f h f'l f '. d D k k' , h' ndling of it seen as symptomatic 0 teal ures 0 ot Crime, an u a IS sa. . h

liberalism because dramatic, personalized evidence carnes more wel~ t psy-

h I ' II , than do statistics. Moreover, the Horton case played both mto the c 0 oglca } " f ." d' h widely held presupposition that Democrats are so t on cnme an mto t e conventions of network newS.

NEWS NORMS FOCUS ON DRAMA,

STRATEGIC INTENT, AND EFFECT

The Horton narrative fit the requirements of news. Unlike the "soft" news found in feature stories of the sort pioneered by Charles Kuralt on television, hard news is about an event that treats an issue of ongoing concern. Because violent crime is dramatic, conflict ridden, evokes intense emotions, disrupts the social order, threatens the community, and can be verified by such official sources as police, it is "newsworthy." 10 If one believed Bush's version of the facts, a convicted murderer who should have been executed had been fur- loughed to rape, torture, and murder again. In newscasts, the villain Horton appeared incarnated in a menacing mug shot. To personalize and dramatize, the news camera showed him in close-up; the less inflammatory visuals in the controversial PAC ad were shot mid-screen. Appearing in tight close-ups both in n~ws ~nd in the ads, the sister of the teenager Horton allegedly killed and the fIance and now husband of the woman he raped told of their torment and urged a vote against the second villain in the story, Michael Dukakis.

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E LEe-n ONS , I The story structure of AND \ OTERS 227

" " news I I "iolenr CrIme IS Committed b " ends itself t \ "d ) One " d" " 0 repor " a proragomst a n an antagonist in In "Ivldual aga inst :ng that personalizes" A disorder agaInst the fo rce of la ' T thIS case a viII " thers. A good Stor)' has

"d " .... , w. he " " aIn and ," , ically to I enn. ) a problem to d " tYPIcal news " a \"ICtlm, the forces of

h " , escnb " ' Story IS 0 " d C'lre t e protagonISts and S he It In a nar " , rga l1lze dramat-, , et t e ratlve ot " " " iorervle\\ s) , and to create Son m against each h rISIng action. to 10-

ro data, and it ma kes an I'te le SOrt of resolution ThOtf er (usually in short ma St " . IS Orm " h likelv to gain and ho ld an a d" Ory In the mOSt lit I at gIves co erence

: h R " u lence." II Th era sense, a Story that is media by t e epubhcans met th " e Horton story off d h

The first network Storv t eSe criteria. ere to t e news " . a air On th H

1987) uses IntervIews to set OUt h e Orton case (CBS 0 b 2 ' t e Contour f • ecem er ,

rime cnme show. "The man who d So what could have been a prime- ' f mur ered 1974 was given a urlough " rep D my seventeen-year_old brother in

, Orts onna Cu " " pie deserve a second chance to g h omo. To thlllk that these peo-

, et OUt t ere and " h they're not gOIng to do something t b We lust ave to hope that

: 0 some od\' else ' "' ,. , UVing to get Massachusetts to ban h fl ' IS-It s crazy. Cuomo IS • suc ur ough h prompts her activity? Horton wh h s, notes t e reporter. What

given a furlough. " He en)'oyed hom, s edassume,s was her brother's killer, was , e en)ove tOrturlllg pi " h h b d of the woman raped by Horta "Th ' h eop e,' says t e us an

r d h ' " n. , , ere, t ere, all the begglllg and pleading re- all) egge ,t IS guy ?n. ~uk,akIs IS quoted saying that after the Horton case, the state tIghtened ItS gUldelm,es. But that's not good enough for the woman raped by_ the furloughed conVict. Commenting on the claim that the Massa- chusetts turlough system has a 99.9 percent success rate, she says, "If 99.9 per- cent are proven good and there's 1 % that's bad, then that tells me the system does not work. I'm a human being and my life has almost been destroyed, and I almost lost my life, not only my husband's life. " There is someone who shares her view. " For the Maryland judge who sentenced Horton," says the corre- spondent, " a furlough or even a return to Massachusetts was unthinkable." "The man should never breathe a breath of free air again," says the circuit court judge. " He is devoid of conscience and he should die in prison."

As the news reports unfold the story, ~ersonal det~ils give textur~ to th~ identities of the victim while Horton remaInS a menaCIng mug shot. 1 don t think any of you can understand what it's like to be ti~d up in a basement and I, " b' vI'olated and beaten " says ClIff Barnes (CBS, July 20, Isten to your wile emg , 88 "H 1988) "He's a big guy " says the rape victim (NBC, January 21 , 19 ); e

. , ed me in the face with a gun and he k,nocked me to overpowered me and slugg 'd b k" " It was like a mghtmare, you the groun~ and . he tied me be~m h;Xid ~~ joey is out on furlough and he .is know, seemg thiS man after W at h I ses" says Donna Cuomo. And In

just free to go to a mall or ~h~tev~: I:\~_;~d-~rder judge who finally locked the backdrop of the narrative IS t thing about their [Massachusetts'}

., "I' don't know any I h Horton up for Ine. Just , b on furlough or paro e or w atever system 1 have no assurance that he wohnt e rs" (NBC January 21,1988).

. f 0 or tree yea , the devil it is in the matter a tw

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228 SECTION VII

o 0 bill outlawing furloughs for cases like After Apri' whell Dubkls sIgns thle, The victims revive the storyline

o 0 to pro) ems. k O A R Horron's the narratIve rtlllS III 0 I ")' from Duka IS. epublican_ ' 0 1 0 k°]l'toranapoo"" II and hence news IJItt'rl'st ) as II co I 0 equest wall ( attract Coverage

o I . res that t lelr rOd 0 0 0 " . sponsored natlona tour ensu I Dllkakls a J1lJJ1lstranon, sa}'S o 0 , d frolll t le • "My wife and I ha\Oe never lear I, ' to LIS for what happened to Us." Barnes "There's never been even an aPBo 0, g) lIed on Dukakis to apologize to ' . d t" us 1 ca "111 Ohio," adds the correspon en'd °c mistake" (ABC, No.vember 7

o 0 f . he calle a tragI d" ' the vICtims or a progr.llll I 'y to what happene to us, says I b even °In apo og 0 1988). "There las never een " 't' been accused of beJJ1g an aberra_

Barnes. "Whenever it's been broug It up I S hOcll is a blatant lie." Note that 01 0 ful system, WI.

tion or one fal ure JJ1 a success 0 I t tlleirs is not an isolated case his 0' ut eVIdence t la 0' when Barnes asserts Wit 10 I 0 0 s the chorus faultJJ1g Dukakis for

claim goes unchallenged. Then Bus 11 to°GIOIn lor never acknowledged that his I 0 0 "A f I know t le oven

not apo ogIZJJ1g. s ar as 0 0 " NBC October 7, 1988). In the cam- furlough program was a tragIC mlstakoe ( d' crying the Dukakis record in a paign's final weeks, Barnes reappears Ibn news e, h d and terrorized and my

o d "F I I I was eaten s as e , , synoptic a. or twe ve lours '0 b 28 1988) lI d" has (NBC cto er, .

wife Angie owas bru~a y rape, e s Yo 'ndbite after another. "Willie Into thIS narrative context, Bush fIts one sou . 0

o 0 01 f d gUIOlty by a lOury of hIS peers for murdermg a Horton was JJ1 lal, oun 0 0 0 Id k Od fter torturing him" (There IS no dIrect eVIdence that seventeen-year-o ' I a . 0

H k 011 d F 0 Nor \vas there evidence of torture. But neither of those orton I e ourl11er. . . . 0 facts will be brought out in network news.) "What dId the D.emocr~tlc gover- nor of Massachusetts think he was doing when he let convIcted fIrst-degree murderers alit on weekend passes?" asked Bush. "In no other state owo~'d a cold-blooded murderer like Willie Horton have been set free to terronze mno- cent people" (CBS, June 26, 1988). . 0 •

Whenever a soundbite about Horton made ItS way 1I1to news, the requIre- ment that reporters create a context evoked the whole Horton story. As a result, it was told and retold. "Dukakis accused the Bush campaign of exploiting the case of Willie Horton," noted Chris Wallace, adding "the Massachusetts pris- oner who brutalized a couple while on furlough" (NBC, October 19, 1988). "The literature," which Dukakis is dismissing as "garbage," says, "quote: 'All the murderers and rapists and drug pushers and child molesters in Massachusetts vote for Michael Dukakis,'" notes ABC's Sam Donaldson (October 19, 1988). "And it refers to Willie Horton, the Massachusetts prisoner who brutalized a Maryland couple while our on furlough .... " "The Bush campaign has scored big with TV ads on crime," says CBS's Bruce Morton, "especially on a Massachusetts furlough program under which murderer Willie Horton on fur- lough CO~~itted rape and assault" (October 21, 1988) . . . T~e VIVId language in which reporters recounted the "Horton story" mag-

mfJed Its recall; by framing his rebuttal in statistics about the effectiveness of

the f~r1ough program, Dukakis used abstractions against tangible, visual, per- sonaiJzed thr~at.. Because they prompt visualization and create conceptual hooks on which mformat ' b h. dOl)'

< Ion can e ling, evocative words are more rea I

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hEc-t'IONS embered than mOre abst AND VOTERS 229

rem I' ract on d to capsu Ize Bush's ch es, The viv'd

lise f c arges Co I I , conc re iotS 0 rererence to repOrters' Up ed With te nature of the words

pO .' h f wOrds 111 el1l One f ,hIS IS t e case, Or exam I' s 0 ads add visual

atedly has attacked Dukak' P e, when Broka\\i '

pe . IS on th . says "Th V' ) , loUgh program, speCIfically ace ISSue of the Mas e Ice I reSIdent re- ~acked a man and a woma Sonvlcted killer 0 f salchusetts pnson fur-

a.. ,n . Ol1le n ur ough h b II A study out today says that mo new perspective on th w 0 ruta y were granted last year to fiftY-thr~: :~~n two h~ndred tho:~al~~U~ut~:~~h~~ rhat there were few problems The d usand pnsoners in thl's g d . stu y s h Country an furlough success rate of ninety-nine oin a~s t at Massachusetts reported a 1988). Concrete language is more P t nine percent" (NBC October 12

H 'f f evocative th ..' , Posed to orton s ace or weeks b h an statIstIcal abstractions. Ex-h · y t e saturatIon I I p>A C ers nOW saw t e conVICts through the stor 0 - eve l"\ campaign, view-

In news and ads, the Dukakis y ~ Horton. d d · campaIgn did as B k h d d respon e to evocatIve narrative with l"f I '. ro aw a one-

paign accused Bush of exploiting a trag ~ e ,~ss statls~lcs. "The Dukakis cam- claimed the Governor has a tough ant~ y~ notes ldlsa Myers. "A spokesman

f· . -cnme recor with more cops th beat, Ive times as many drug offenders beh' db' d ?n . e h d 13 " In ars, an overall crime III Massac usetts own percent (NBC, October 7, 1988)

But the overall thrust of the coverage was uncove" " d "'11" f1ng strategIc IIltent an effect. If WI Ie Horton IS a central issue in October of 1988 " ' . , comments syn- dicated colummst Mark ShIelds, "then Michael Dukakis's chances of a man- date for 1989 are pretty limited" (CBS, July 20, 1988). "What if the big word at the end of October is not Willie Horton but drugs," asks lesley Stahl of a Democratic consultant. "We win," he responds. "And so," she adds, "the Re- publicans will keep pushing the Horton line. Bush intends to keep up the pressure, which might even include a campaign commercial starring Willie Horton's victims." The power of the underlying story of violence and victim- ization is intensified as the piece closes. It is the victim who seems to be sum- marizing the story.

Angela Barnes: "I'm so mad at this justice. There's none. There's no justice."

Lesley Stahl: "lesley Stahl. CBS. Atlanta."

In the final weeks of the campaign, Dukakis gained so~e contro~ over the . h' . offered reporters a strategy peg ex-

Horton narrative when IS ca.mp~lgn h D 'd Brinkley show Dukakis's I " h RbI' , otlvatlOn On t e aVI , p ammg t e epu Icans m '1 ' f Horton was racist. But here

. II d h the Repub Ican use 0 runnmg mate a eg~ . t at .' of the narrative. "Yesterday on ABC, too the charge ehclted recItations . d h thinks there is an element of Dukakis running mate Lloyd Bents.en .sal f ~i1Iie Horton, now the star of

. . h' t 'nued cItation 0 h'l f raCIst appeal 10 Bus s con I h d a white woman w I e on ur- television ads. Horton, a black ~an,: wA~~a~ctober 24, 1988). The Repub.li- lough from a Massachusetts pnson ( , about black murder convIct

. I . t in TV spots . cans "also denied any racla IOten

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230 ECTI ON VII

d l ~ n :lnd st:lbbcd her husband, hOth d M:lryhn WOIl.. C \X illie Horwll, who rapt' . a "f M:lssachuserrs" (A B , October 2S

' 1 II rlOll" h rolll ' , whitl~, whilt' on prlsun "

1988) , ' l' 'J \en nature of the Horton case eased it The pl'rson:ll, dramath:, .:onl Id-rl l s 'lbt.rred by the fact that it spok

' 19S!; The pru.:ess W:l , " e into network news 111 • , . . d -oule' be communICated ll\ tele_ h ~rII11e-an L to an ongoing news t elll ~ As NBC's Ken Bode exp,lained, "Bush's tough graphIC SOllnd and slghtbm s., f _ , I t most Ca lifo rnwns see on theIr news talk on crime works because It Its W la

each day" (NB ,O.:tober 28, 1988): 'lte with voters, its place in the news O H . "lse began to re son, . , nee orton S L" I ' ed the perception that Bush Wa

I, > Th hct 01 Horton exp all1 s lI1eup was se~un: . e, d ' So for example, after indicating that h ' ne reasone rt'porters. , ' f h

toug on, crn " I' h sed the Horton case even I e weren't .. Bush's aides say they wou ( ave u , b b ' "A k black " ~isa Myers closes a story late in the campaIgn ,y, 0 servll1g, , ey

, , . h b en to drive up negative Opll110nS of Dukakls, to part hof Bu. sh S,sbtrate,g)T' Ilalst st~ategy clearly has worked and senior Bush aides cast 1m as a I er ,I . • • 'h' '

h h Illuch Dukakis whines about It t ey aren t gOing to say t at no matter ow change now" (NBC, October 24, 1988) ....

THE PSYCHOLOGY OF THE

BUSH USE OF HORTON

Did the Horton case, while atypical and inflammatory, tell a larger psycholog- ical truth? Is it possible to lie-by claiming that Horton murdered on furlough when he did not, inviting false inferences about the number of Horton-like in- stances that had occurred in Massachusetts, and encouraging unwarranted fears about blacks raping and murdering whites-and still tell a psychological truth? No. Had he been a federal prisoner, the death penalty that Bush favored for drug kingpins would not have executed Horton. Under the terms in effect under the Reagan-Bush administration, Horton would have been eligible for furlough.

To reporters who called him in his Maryland prison during the campaign, Horton claimed, as he had at his trial, that he did not stab the youth he and two others were convicted of killing. Indeed, one court official indicated that another of the threesome had confessed to being the killer; the confession was disallowed because the suspect had not been read his Miranda rights. Under Massachusetts' felony rule, the prosecution did not have to ascertain which of the three committed the murder, only that all three were in some way involved. ~orton claimed to have been in the getaway car. The prosecutors didn't know If. Horton had held the knife; there was "reasonable doubt"; but, by virtue of hiS presence at the scene, they did know he was an accomplice. As parties to the robbery that occasioned the murder, all would be convicted.

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d El.ECTIONS Had a eath penalty AND VOTERS 23 1 I d State h der that e to Horton's Co ' ,andled the '

d Th nVICtlo' eVlden been execute. e reason ' , n In Mass h Ce on the robb d 782, 797 (1982)j, the U S SiS slIuple. In 198~c , Usetts, Horton w~~tdan mhur-

h II . . uprem C In £Ilm d not ave a case t at para eled the 0 ' e Oun had' ,till v. Florida [458 U S , h d b ne In M Invahda d . .

question a een an accesso assachusetts L'k te a death sentence in f ry to a bb . I e H a person party to a elony th ro ery. Und h Orton, the convict in

b at result ' er t e doct' h if it cannot e proven that h s In a murd' , nne t at said that d e comm' er IS. gUilty of h capital mllr er. Invoking the Ei Itted it, Enmund ha t e murder even

punishment, the Supreme C ghth Amendment' b d been convicted of Those who see releva O~rt set aside the deathS an on disproportionate

, nce In the Horto sentence. would appomt to the high COUrt' , n case argue that a I'b I D criminals than of the accused Andlll,stiches more disposed to pro;e etrath e,mhocratf

Th . In t at ar c e rig ts 0

Horton case. e rollback of the ' h gument resides the final irony of th C Id rig ts of th e

Supreme ourt cou ultimately mean that th e ~c~used under the conservative Horton'S colleague might have bee d d e ongtnal confession obtained from but not a Dukakis court Horton n ,eehme acceptable. Under the rules of a Bush

II ' mig t not have b ' d murder at a . And hence he would h been conVlcte of first-degree sooner than he was under the "Iibe I" ave ,een o~ the streets permanently,

ra court s reqUirements.

All narrative capitalizes on the human ' d d' , , . A' capacity an ISpOSltion to con- struct stones. compellmg narrative such as the H t I' 'f ' or on saga contro sour 111- terpretatlon. a data b~ offenn~ a plausible, internally coherent story that resonates With the audience while accounting causally for otherwise discor- dant or fragmentary information. 12

When news and ads trace the trauma and drama of a kidnapping and rape by a convicted murderer on furlough, the repetition and the story structure give it added power in memory. Visceral, visual identifications and appositions are better able to be retrieved than statistical abstractions.

Repeatedly aired oppositional material carries an additional power. Mate- rial aired again and again is more likely to stay fresh in our minds. The same is

true for attacks. Cognitive accessibility is upped by tho~e message traits that characterize

th R bl ' , f Horton' the dramatic the personally relevant, the fre-

e epu Icans use 0 . , h' I' '

I d' I'm 13-the menacing mug sot, Clrc mg convicts,

quent Y, rep~a~e toplcdor c ai, I ncaring perpetrator-the Massachusetts empathiC victims-an seemmg y u

governor. . ' ton our quirks as consumers of political When it came to WIlham Ho\, d against the Democrats. In our

information worked for the Repub Ic~ns an ter power and influence than psychic equations., something nasty ~sl gtr.emaull' " negative information car-

I . "socia s I, , '

something nice. When eva uatl~g ,14 Additionally, negattve mforma- , . . formatIOn. , 15 d ' '

f1es more weight than pOSitive mi' t'ng impreSSIOns an IS easier " to a ter eXls 1 , n

tion seems better able than pOSItive . . ative emotion result m better reca to recall.16 Televised images that ehclt neg

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23 2 SECTION VII

I Ir 'ntacks are bencr rcmen) 17 As a reSl ,', '" . k' posi tive ones, fidate. IN And (hSS~HlSfled, dis.

than those that evO C in" for a callt I' I h ' " reasollS for vat t> t their pol II1g pace t an their bered than POSJ[lVC • . likely to appear a

a provi ng voters arc 1110re , , . p ~ to, I 'ghbors. IY d' sposi tion to scnHlIllze thcm for more sans le( nel, f pen our I , I

,. "S tInt induce fear (am l 011SI'11g personal IIl.VO vement and jVlessag~ . , lear ar· f ' I gl'c When the message IS I '1 1U In the language 0 cognitive gaps 111 0 • 'c eva uanol . ,

interest in it minimize system:HI " ffect such as fear may ovcrrldc cogni. I I f 11e,'a n ve a I I "fLj 'lrge eve sOt> psyc 10 ogy, .

tive processing. ,,21 "f f crime, identifies that fear with a,'n.£les ear 0 , f B

The Horton story m.? f ' II viating thc anxiety-vote or ush. , fl fire way 0 .1 C , 'f Dukakls and 0 lers a sure I f rrative share IS a capacity to ocus ' f ~ 1pea an( na . ,

What successful use 0 ear a~ • f 'I'ty while rendering others Impfausi. , etatlOn 0 re.) I , b h ' audiences on one IIlterpr. , ' o'vs 12 simple autonomiC e aVlOrs , d attentIOn n.1I'r • , ,

ble. When fear IS arouse " £'II d es inhibited,23 and creative thought are facilitated, complex, effort- I e on

dampened. 14

t communication can affect our proba- h d ' d ed by exposure 0 T e moo m uc I I d Tversky25 asked college students to read

b'l ' 'd ts as wei Jo 1I1son an , f I ItY,lU, gmen . bl d as if they were newspaper stones. A ter read- ~escnpnons t~alt Where assde~~ts \v;re asked to estimate how frequently those II1g the matena , t e stu 'f' d (f'

, . f 50 000 eople would experience speci IC angers e.g., Ire, wlthm a group 0 , p , d Wh h" " leukemia, traffic accidents) within a one-year peno. en ~ e newspaper

d 'b d h 'I t death of a male undergraduate, the estimates these col-escn e t e VIO en , lege students offered increased for all of t?e ris,ks, inclu~1I1g those that were fundamentally dissimilar to the type descnbed 111 the article. When the stO? concerned a happy event that occurred to a young man, the frequency esti- mates decreased.

Here is the answer to the question Peter Jennings put to Michael Dukakis near the end of the campaign. Why, wondered Jennings, for those we talk to across America, is "Willie Horton" so powerful an image (ABC, November 4, 19BB)? The answer is that the fear the story inspired minimized the likelihood that it would be evaluated analytically and its atypicality noted; repetition of its riveting details in ads and news invited us to generalize from it. So, when the Bush furlough ad stated "many first-degree murderers" as the phrase "268 escaped" appeared on the screen, the inference that 268 "Willie Hortons" had been released to kidnap and rape was all but inevitable.

The power of the Horton mini-series was magnified as it unfolded soap- opera-like in news and ads; broadcasts that focused On the tale's strategic in- tent, an? effect co~ldn't effectively challenge its typicality. And since statistics don t displace stones nor data, drama, the native language of Dukakis didn't summon persuasive visions of the cops he had put on the street or the murders and rapes that hadn't been committed in a state whose crime rate was down.

Abet~~d by ~ews report~, amplified by Republican ads, assimilated through the ;~gnJtJve qUIrks of audiences, William Horton came to incarnate liberalism'S faIlures and voters' fears.

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NOlES 1 I have compiled these fi or't of the Furlough Proggures frOIll "T'abl p ralll "M I; e 4

233

1991. ' assachu' p, 15, of "19 2, Those who read newspaper ac setts Departmen~: Annual Statistical Re-

\\rJS the only furlo ughed Massach COUnts of the f f Correction, January crime, Most furloughed esc a Usetts first d urlough pro C'lpees hadn't escaped at a ll ~pedehs cOllllllitted egree Illurdere;~ahm learned that Horton , h f I h S n ad aUto th f v a Comm' d (rom t e ur oug , ee Kathl returned I I' t, A qUa Irte a violent

the Worst Ever," Washil1gtol1e~n Hall Jalllieso:o,,~ntarily but m~;: t~t the reported es- 3. Dave McNeel y, "Bush D kOs~,. OCtober 30' 19 Or TeleVised Me d an two hOllrs late

AIiStill Americal1-Statesm~'1 ~ a ~ COlllmerci~1 :8, C 1, C2, n amy, ThiS Year Is 4, Maureen Dowd, "BUsh Por~:~ se~25, ]988, ~3,ecoming HOttest Campaign Isslle"

York T/lnes, October 8, 1988 9 Y IS OPPonent S ' 5_ Gerald M, Boyd, "Bush's' A' k as ympathetic to Criminals" N

Times, October 11, ] 988 12 ttac on Crime Appe I ' ew M'k H 'I ' - a s to the E . 6, leal ey, "Crime Victillls C motions," New York

October 11, 1988, B3, ondellln DUkakis "A ' I J P , ustm Ame' S 7, See a so: , . Robinson D D ' rlcal/- tatesman,

I "N H ,. aVIS H S h' Te eVlslon ews: ow Alert Is th A 'd" a Ill, and T. O'Tool "C . Education in Journalism, Boston ; 98uO lence?" Paper presented ~~ th o~prehenslon of

S. "MacNeiVLehrer NewSHour''' N . e SSOClation for 9. "Top Democrats Accuse Bu~h C ovem~er 8, 1988.

Times, October 24, 1988, 10. ampalgn of Inflaming Racial Fears," New York 10. One study found that crime was the th ' d I papers. Sanford Sherizen, "Social Creat' Ir a?~st category of news covered by news- Print," in Deviance and Mass Media ed IO~h 0 I r~.e ,News: All the News Fitted to 20S,215. ' . ar es IllIck (Beverly Hills: Sage, 1978),

11. Kathleen Hall Jamieson and Karlyn Kohrs C b II I Advertising, Politics and the Mass Media 3rd edam(CeI~ ' ntec'PI/,a

f y ~L ldnf/uence: News,

33. ' . ant, a I .: wa sworth, 1992),

12. Cf. Ha~den White, "The yalue of Narrativity .in t~e Representation of Reality, n in On Na!"ratlVe, e~. W. J. T. MItc~ell (Chicago: UniverSIty of Chicago Press, 1981),23; Pau~ Rlcoeur, Time and NarratIVe, trans. Kathleen McLaughlin and David Pellauer (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1984-86), Vol. 1, 74ff.; Jerome Bruner Actual Minds, Possible Worlds (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1986). i do not wish to imply that narrative is an illegitimate way of knowing or that narrative neces- sarily works in service of our predispositions and fears. As Bennett and Edelman note, "If stories can be constructed to wall off the senses to the dilemmas and contradictions of social life, perhaps they also can be presented in ways that open up the mind t? cre- ative possibilities developed in ways that provoke mtellectual stru~le, the resolutIon of contradiction, and the creation of a more worka~le ~uman order (w. L Bennett and M. Edelman, "Toward a New Political NarratIve, Journal of CommUlllcatlon 35

[1985J, 161-62). . 'f arrative see W. R. Fisher, Human Com- For a discussion of rhetoncal fun,ctIOnS? n , f 'South Carolina Press, 1987);

rnunication as Narrative (Columbia: Umver~l~ ~onstruction of Public Morality,'" C. M. Condit, "Crafting Virtue: The ~;e;~~I~ G. Kirkwood, "Storytelling and Self Quarterly Journal of Speech 73 (1987), -S' . 'es " Quarterly JOllrnal of Speech 69 C f C nication trategl , d h R on rontation: Parables as ommu " St ry' Narrative Form an t e eagan (1983),58-74; W. F. Lewis, "Telling Amenc;3s (1~87), 280-302; M. C. McG~e and Presidency" Quarterly Journal of spee,ch t .. Journal of ComntlllllcatlOl/ 35, J ' , P bhc Argumen , . S. Nelson, "Narrative Reason III u

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l

Sf ION VII 234 " , rhe Narrari ve Parad igm: Three

I I "On Lil11 l(1n

8 g 9

) 39- 54; V. W. Turner, "Social CDast - R Row :In( • I 56 (19 . 4 I 6H B W , ra (198 -) 139- 5 ; . ' M O ~r<IP IS ' 7 (1 980). I - ; . arnlck ~lh '

Srud ie;" () /II/IIlIlIiCd/i?~11 v~~ - rili(,JI InQllllrYj m w l of Speech 73 (1987), 172-8) e • , b It I 1<:: 111 . Q rler )' 01 f P ' , <-mas and Stunt'S a VI h Srorv." I/(J b:l rdi .. Nature () rlllllllg Effecr . d' . Anot er , d \XI Lom . , ' M son N.Jrrati ve P:t r:1 ,Igm. J A B~lrgh , an ' J . I 10g)l: t e(J rlllIlg . em ory. and Cog ,

13. S('e E. T. Higgins. 'I t', E X/~erilllenf(/11 ~Y( I}IOex plored in S. POpklll, The Reasonnl. , ' "jOUflt<1 0 · " Isv we . Ing :ttt·gonza tion. Th' heuris(lc IS a 99 1 )

lioll II (19.S5 ) .. 59-'::;s ity l ~f Chicago p~ess~ \ .. p~litica l Behavior 4 (1982 ), 353-77. Voler (ChK a.¥o. Urn , in Pohtic:.1 Per~ep(lo~h crs in political BehavIOr, " Arner; , 14. R. Lau. Neg:Jtl Vlty , for Negarl vlty e can R. Lau. "Two Explanations -) I 19- 38. " f ' , I '

( p, /" I Science 29 (198) • d Irs Implica tions o r 100tla hlteractlon " Jourllal o O ltl((J "TI . N :1 ri vity Effec t an , 15. K. Kellermann. 1C eg 1984),37-55. , " . C ' all'o ll MOllo~mp"5 5 1 ( I d "Attention to TeleVISion. Psychologic I On/II/IIIII( v , d J Sl:h eu er" >' { f. . a 16. B. Reeves, E. Thorson, .In . es" in PerspectIVes on Media E" ects, eds. j. Bryant Theories :lnd Chronomerrlc Me.:lt~~r~nce Erlbaum, 1986 ),25 1-79. , and D. Zillm:lnn (HillSide, N:j. . "Emorion and Memory Resp"onse fo r Negative Politi. 17. J. ewhagen and B. Reeves, 1988 Presidential Campalg~. Paper presented to the cal Advertising: A Study of rhe I' d Mass CommUOIcatton, Washmgton DC Association for Education 111 Journa Ism an , . .,

1989. . J R ' "Comparing Positive and Negative Political Ad· 18. fvI' A:. Shapi ro and R. ~. . ;~~e~'nternational Communicatio n Association, San vertlSlI1g. · Paper preselnre tos hi der M McCombs, and W. Wanta, "Inside the F ' 0 1989 See a so J. c eu , . N P , , ra nClsc, , p' . H Political Advertising and TV ews nme VIewers to

Agenda Setting rocess. ow d h A ,. f Ed ' Th ' k Ab I d Candidates " Paper presente to t e SSOClatlon or ucatlon 10 • out ssues an . . D C 1989 in Journalism and Mass Communica!ion, Washmg~on, '. ". . . 19. S. Kernell , "Presidential Populanty and Negative .Votl~g. An ~Iternat!ve Expl,a?a. rion of the Midterm Congressional Decline of the PreSIdent S Party, Amertcan Polztlcal Science Review 71 (1977),44-66. 20. Christopher Jepson and Sh,elly Chaiken,. "C,hron!,c !ssue-Specifi~ Fe,ar Inhibits, Sys- tematic Processing of PersuasIve CommuOlcatlons, In CommUniCatIOn, CognItIon, and Anxiety, ed. Melanie Booth-Butterfield (Newbury Park, Calif.: Sage, 1990),61-84. 21. A. Lang, "Involuntary Attention and Physiological Arousal Evoked by Structural Features and Emotional Content of TV Commercials," Communication Research 17 (1990),275-99.

In processing messages we rely not on statistically warranted inferences but on rules of thumb, or heuristics, that have certain predictable biases. These rules of thumb carry nonprobab!istic presupp~sit~~ns about how things work. Even after explanations show, the o~eratlon and unrelIabIlIty of a heuristic, we continue to apply it. Under- standmg theIr f?r"? and mode of operation has become an important concern of schol- ars of commUnIcatIOn.

h ' ~o7~~~ers, dby contralst, ~ely on algorithms. An algorithm is a solution procedure w IC ,I 0 owe correct y, YIelds a correct answer

The rule of thumb most relevant t ' . ' Ease of retrieval increases th I'k I'h °d my concerns here is the availability heUrIstIC. event occurring. Because air ~ I e I o~ that we will misjudge the probability of the group at one time for exam~tne c~as I es are presented in vivid detail and kill a large than reports of h~ndreds of e, a SIng e plane crash is likely to be better remembered I d h " passenger car accid t F h' . kin-cue t at It IS safer to ride in h en s. rom t IS, some mlsta en Y co

the availability heuristic eval a

car t ..a~ to fly. In the words of Tversky and Kahneman, event~ . .' . by the ease with ~hr~h \ e fre~uency of classes or the probability of HeUrIStIC for Judging Freq re evant ISsues come to mind" (" Availability: A 207-232, at 207.). uency and Probability," Cognitive Psychology 5 [19731,

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ELECTIONS ... ND VOTERS 235

A Easterbrook, "The Effect of Emotion on the Utilization and the Organization Jl· J. '. r" psychologICal Reulew 66 (\ 959), \ 83-20 \. ~ n~haVIO , S · I F '1' . ~ of.,.. B Zajonc," oCla ao ItatlOn, Sciellce 149 (1965), 269-74. ~ l3. R· ]' Neweth, "DIfferential Contributions of Majority and Minority Influence, 24. C. I~ ical Reuiew 93 ( 1986), 23-32. . . " ps),cho] Johnson and A. Tversky, "Affect, Generalization, and the Perception of RIsk, 25. E. I' of PersOIzality alld Soczal Psychology 45 (1983),20-31. joJlrlla

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236 SECTION VII

.... • SECTION VII

REVIEW QUESTIONS

that because the founders were all B A hony's argument- h 1. Does Susan . nt d men the right to vote-suggest t at even

men, they found it rational to ery ~~ . Is cannot or do not adequately repre today it might be true that electe bO I tela;l Would this be a good argument fo-

h' h they do not e ong. ." r sent groups to w IC . system;l For affirmative action in var some type of group-~ased :e~resentatlon . - ious sectors of Amencan hfe.

. .' f h "to hold your district," can you identify 2. From his ~escnpptllon k~ , o~ w of "human nature"? Is he right? Does he George Washmgton un Itt s vie .' h b d bl"

h ;l A pie capable of actmg m t e toa er pu IC Interest

overstate t e case. re pe? ;l ;l if it conflicts with their pnvate mterests. Are you.

3. Joe McGinniss's explicit recognition that political campaigns are basi.cally like advertising campaigns to sell soap or cere~l shocked ma~y Amencans when it appeared in 1969. Were political campaigns eve: anythmg e.lse? Have politicians simply become more sophisticated? What IS so offenSive ~bout McGinniss's thesis anyhow? Don't you learn a great deal about candidates

from political advertising?

4. What are the four types of elections in Walter Dean Burnham's classifica- tion scheme? Did the 1992 election of Bill Clinton mark a cycle of realign- ment? Did the ensuing series of scandals have an impact on that cycle?

5. After reading Kathleen Hall Jamieson's account of the use of the Willie Horton case in the 1988 presidential campaign, do you think that the Repub- licans acted unethically? Was the Willie Horton campaign nothing but a way of "selling" a candidate? How fair or unfair was the Horton campaign? If a ce- real company attacked a competing cereal company's product as accurately/in- accurately as the Republicans depicted Governor Dukakis' role in the Horton case, would you find that to be "acceptable" advertising?

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IX

MASS MEDIA

2.59

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• ,.. ...:. 4,_ ..... ~ ~ .. ~_._

-.~-~'

260 SECTION IX

GE ORWELL GEO R _

47. LANGUAGE AND POLITICS

olitical "spin doctors " who In the modern era of P . of political can-

. I br perceptIOnS work to mampu ate pu IC . . t think that such didates and political events It IS easy 0 0 II' {.

. ' I 'act George rwe s ILI- chicanery is of recent orzgm. n I" I d d I

. . d I uage conc u e ong ago mous essay on PO/ztICS an ang d k I' . d igne to ma e les that "Political language . . . IS es " I h sound truthful and murder respectable. nasmluc als

. I't ' s almost exc uSlVe y Americans experzence po I IC . h h h d f po/,'tical leaders and the descrzp-t roug t e wo~ s 0 . f I't' I nts by reporters and commentators, tlOn 0 po I Ica eve .,

the use of language continues to playa cruczal role m determining who wins and loses electIOns and how Americans will define political events at home and abroad. Orwell's classic recognition that "The great enemy of clear language is insincerity " remains as sig- nificant today as when he wrote it. The public z:'.ould be well advised to heed Orwell's message that polztlcallan- guage always has as its goal persuasion rather than clar- ity, and that "political chaos is connected with the decay of language. "

In our time it is broadly true that political writing is bad writing. Where it is not true, it will generally be found that the writer is some kind of rebel, ex- pressing his private opinions and not a "party line." Orthodoxy, of whatever color, seems to demand a lifeless, imitative style. The political dialects to be found in pamphlets, leading articles, manifestos, White Papers and the speeches of undersecretaries do, of course, vary from party to party, but they are all alike in that one almost never finds in them a fresh, vivid, home-made turn of speech. When one watches some tired hack on the platform mechanically re- peating the familiar phrases-bestial atrocities, iron heel, bloodstained tyranny, free peoples of the world, stand shoulder to shoulder-one often has a curious feeling that ~ne is not watching a live human being but some kind of dummy: a feelmg whICh suddenly becomes stronger at moments when the light catches the speaker's spectacles and turns them into blank discs which seem to

SOUTce: Excerpt from "Politics and the English Language" b G 0 II C . ht © 1946 by Sonia Brownell Orwell and renewed 1974 by Sonia OrweYl1 Reorge drwf e . hoPytllg e Shool' . EI h d Olh E . eprmte rom IS vo urn mg an ep ant an er ssays by permission of H B arcourt race & Company.

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have no eyes behind th A 0 0 uses th o,t kO d to I elll . nd thl.s IS not a ltogether fa nciful. A spea ker who

" In 0 p lraseol I 0 0 0 • into am hO Th ogY las gone sOllle distance towards turnll1g hllnselt

b oo ac me. e appropnate noises a re coming out of hi s larynx bur hi s ram IS not II1volved 0 I 0 ' If th h h

0 as It wou d be If he were choosing hi s words for himself. e speec e IS Illak 0 0 I 0 . h 109 IS one t lat he IS accustomed to make over and over

agam, e may be almost 0 f h I 0 0 0 h h

unconscIOUS 0 w at le IS sayll1g as one IS w en one utters t e responses in h I A d I 0 ' 0 of o dO b 0 c urc 1. n t liS reduced state of conSCIOusness, I not 111 Ispensa Ie, IS at any rate favorable to political conformity. d t In our time, political speech and writing are largely the defence of the in -

e enslble. Thmgs like the continuance of British rule in India, the Russian purges and deportations, the dropping of the atom bombs on Japan, can in- deed be defended, but only by arguments which are too brutal for most people to face, a.nd which do not square with the professed aims of political parties. Thus political language has to consist largely of euphemism, question-begging and sheer cloudy vagueness. Defenceless villages are bombarded from the air, the II1habltants driven out into the countryside, the cattle machine-gunned, the huts set on fire with incendiary bullets: this is called pacification. Millions of peasants are robbed of their farms and sent trudging along the roads with no more than they can carry: this is called transfer of population or rectification of frontiers. People are imprisoned for years without trial, or shot in the back of the neck or sent to die of scurvy in Arctic lumber camps: this is called elimina- tion of unreliable elements. Such phraseology is needed if one wants to name things without calling up mental pictures of them. Consider for instance some comfortable English professor defending Russian totalitarianism. He cannot say outright, "I believe in killing off your opponents when you can get good re- sults by doing so." Probably, therefore, he will say something like this:

"While freely conceding that the Soviet regime exhibits certain features which the humanitarian may be inclined to deplore, we must, I think, agree that a certain curtailment of the right to political opposition is an unavoidable concomitant of transitional periods, and that the rigors which the Russian peo- ple have been called upon to undergo have been amply justified in the sphere of concrete achievement."

The inflated style is itself a kind of euphemism. A mass of Latin words falls upon the facts like soft snow, blurring the outlines and covering up all the de- tails. The great enemy of clear language is insincerity. When there is a gap be- tween one's real and one's declared aims, one turns as it were instinctively to long words and exhausted idioms, like a cuttlefish squirting out ink. In our age there is no such thing as "keeping out of politics." All issues are political is- sues, and politics itself is a mass of lies, evasions, folly, hatred and schizophre- nia. When the general atmosphere is bad, language must suffer. I should expect to find-this is a guess which I have not sufficient knowledge to verify-that the German, Russian and Italian languages have all deteriorated in the last ten or

fifteen years, as a result of dictatorship. But if thought corrupts language, language can also corrupt thought. A bad

usage can spread by tradition and imitation, even among people who should

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262 SECTI ON IX

I I have been discuss ing is in and do know better. The debased language t Jar t '~/'able assumption, leaves

, h I'k a not un/us If' h ' h some ways very conventent. P rases I e a consideration W IC we much to be desired, would serve no good purpose, mptation, a packet of as- should do well to bear in mind, are a conttnu~u~ ~e essay and for certa in you pirins always at one's elbow. Look back thr?ug

d th IS Y f~ ults I am protesting

will find that I have again and again comI~lItte t e ve~let dealing with condi- against. By this morning's post I have recelve~';efr~~P elled " to write it. I open tions in Germany. The author tells me that he h PI . "[The Allies] have

h f' tence t at see. it at random, and here is almost t e Irst sen f tl'on of Germany's , h" dical trans orma

an OppOrtuntty not only of ac levtng a ra 'd r' onalistic reaction in social and. political structure in s~ch a waY,as to avtun~:~~ns of a co-operative Germany Itself but at the same time of laytng the 0 , £ I bl

' "£ I ' II d" to wnte-Iee s, presuma y, and unified Europe." You see, he ee s Impe e I'k I h d h ' ords I e cava ry orses an-that he has something new to say-an yet IS w 'h f 'I' d

' I' II into t e amI lar reary pat-swenng the bugle group themse ves automattca Yd ' " " , d b d d phrases (Jay the 'oun atzons tern. ThIS mvaslOn of one's mm y rea y-ma e , f' ,

, , I. ' ) I b evented if one IS constantly on achIeve a radIcal transformatIOn can on Y e pr , d h h naesthetizes a portion of one's guard agatnst them, an every suc p rase a

brain. I said earlier that the decadence of our language is probably curable.

Those who deny this would argue, if they produced an argument at all~ that language merely reflects existing social conditions, and that we cann~t mflu- ence its development by any direct tinkering with words and constructIOns. So far as the general tone or spirit of a language goes, this may be true, but it is not true in detail. Silly words and expressions have often disappeared, not through any evolutionary process but owing to the conscious action of a mi- nority. Two recent examples were explore every avenue and leave no stone un- turned, which were killed by the jeers of a few journalists. There is a long list of flyblown metaphors which could similarly be got rid of if enough people would interest themselves in the job; and it should also be possible to laugh the not un- formation out of existence, to reduce the amount of Latin and Greek in the average sentence, to drive out foreign phrases and strayed scientific words, and, in general, to make pretentiousness unfashionable. But all these are minor points. The defence of the English language implies more than this, and perhaps it is best to start by saying what it does not imply.

To begin with it has nothing to do with archaism, with the salvaging of ob- solete words and turns of speech, or with the setting up of a "standard English" whi~h must never, be departed from. On the contrary, it is especially concerned WIth the scrapptng of every word or idiom which has outworn its useful~ess. It has nothing to do with correct grammar and syntax, which are of no Importance so long as one makes one's meaning clear 0 'th h 'd-

f " . , r WI t e avO! ance 0 Amencamsms, or WIth having what is called a "go d I "0 h d ' , 0 prose stye. n the other an It IS not concerned with fake simpll'cl'ty d th

. I' h · an e attempt to make wrttten Eng IS colloqUIal. Nor does it even impl . £ , d' Y In every case preler-

nng the Saxon wor to the Latm one though it does I' I ' h £ , mp y USIng t e Iewest

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------.- §'''' treT'rt6Y';, t -' '(@'T-r '

and shortest words that will c ' _ - let the mea ning I l over a il e s rncanlJlg, What is above a ll needed IS to c lOose t le \Va d I I I

th ' d - - r, ane nor t le other way abou t. In prose, t le worst mg o ne can 0 With d - f t b

' - - Wor s IS to surrender to them, When you think a a cancre e a Ject, you th IJl k dl I h

' h b - Wor ess y, and then, if you wa nt to describe the t mg you ave een vlsualizi b bl --

d h f - - ng you pro a y hunt about till you flJld th e exact

war stat seem to It It Wh I - k - _ I- d ' en you t lin of somethlJlg abstract you are mo re mC me to use words frOIll th d -- h - - e starr, an unless you make a consc Ious effort ro Prevent It t e eXisting dial -II h ' - -, " ect WI come rus IIlg III and do the Job for you, at the expense of blUffing or e I ' - - - b

ff ' ven c langlllg your mea nlllg, Probabl y It IS errer ro

Put a usmg words as long 'bl d ' - I , as POSSI e an get one s mea nlllg as c ear as one can through pictures or sensations, Afterwards one can choose-not simply accept-, the phrases that will best cover the meaning, and then switch round and deCide what Impression one's words are likely to make on another person, ThiS last effort of the mind cuts out all stale or mixed images, all prefabricated phrases, needless repetitions, and humbug and vagueness generally, But one can often be in doubt about the effect of a word or a phrase, and one needs rules that one can rely on when instinct fails, [ think the following rules will cover most cases:

(i) Never use a metaphor, simile or other figure of speech which you are used to seeing in print,

(ii) Never use a long word where a short one will do, (iii) If it is possible to cut a word out, always cut it out. (iv) Never use the passive where you can use the active. (v) Never use a foreign phrase, a scientific word or a jargon word if you

can think of an everyday English equivalent. (vi) Break any of these rules sooner than say anything outright barbarous.

These rules sound elementary, and so they are, but they demand a deep change of attitude in anyone who has grown used ro writing in the style now fashionable. One could keep all of them and still write bad English, but one could not write the kind of stuff that [ quoted in those five specimens at the be- ginning of this article.

I have not here been considering the literary use of language, but merely language as an instrument for expressing and not for concealing or preventing thought. Stuart Chase and others have come near to claiming that all abstract words are meaningless, and have used this as a pretext for advocating a kind of political quietism. Since you don't know what Fascism is, how can you struggle against Fascism? One need not swallow such absurdities as this, but one ought to recognize that the present political chaos is connected with the decay of lan- guage, and that one can probably bring about some improvement by starting at the verbal end. If you simplify your English, you are freed from the worst follies of orthodoxy. You cannot speak any of the necessary dialects, and when you make a stupid remark its stupidity will be obvious, even to yourself. Political language-and with variations this is true of all political parties, from Con- servatives to Anarchists-is designed ro make lies sound truthful and murder

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f solidity to pure wind. One cann . ppearance a 'h l' at respectable and to give an a ~t least change one s own a)lts and

' b tone ca n Phd ' change this all in a moment, u' f

'eers loudly enoug ,sen SOme Worn_ from time to time one can even~ I kObne ~ Achilles' heel, hotbed, melting POt our and useless phrase-some lac ' fa' of verbal refuse-into the dustbi~ acid test, veritable inferno or other ump where it belongs.

THEODORE H. WHITE

48. THE KENNEDy-NIXON TV DEBATES

Journalist Theodore H. White (1915-1~86) .wrote a se- ries of bestselling books describing presIdential elec~/ons from 1960 through 1972. His Making of the. Presld~nt books set a new standard for political reportmg, whIch had the juiciness of an inside story, the intimacy of a bi- ography, and the perspective of history. . .

This excerpt from the first in the serzes offers an In- sider's look at the first modern nationally televised presidential debates between Richard M. Nixon and John F. Kennedy. While Vice-President Nixon made the mistake of actually trying to debate, Senator Kennedy concentrated on style and on projecting the correct pres- idential image_ People listening to the debate on radio thought that Nixon had won, bllt Kennedy's style won him the television audience and the election. The lesson of Nixon's experience in 1960 has been learned by all presidential candidates who have followed: Look good on television or lose!

Both candidates had had representatives in the CBS studio from 8:30 in the morning of the day of the debate.

Mr. Nixon's advisers and representatives, understandably nervous since they could not communicate with their principal, had made the best prepara· tion they could. They had earlier requested that both candidates talk from a lecturn, standing-and Kennedy had agreed. They had asked several days

Source: From The Making of the President: 1960 by Theodore White. Copyright © 1961 by Atheneum Pu.bhshers. Repnnted by permission of Atheneum Publishers and the estate of Theodore Wh,te.

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c 7 c

earlier that the two cand ' d b h h .' II I I ates e sea ted fa rther aparr fro m each ot er t an ongma Y p anned-and that had been agreed on too. ow on the day of the debate they paid meticulo ' . ' . d b ' us attention to each detaIl. They were worne a out the deep eye shadows in N ' ' f . d . . .... Ixon s ace and they requested and adJuste twO tin y spothghts ( mkles" in television parlance) to shine directly into his eye wells and Illummate the darkness there; they asked that a table be placed in front of the moder~tor" and this was agreed to also; they requested that no shots be taken of Nixon s left prof tie during the debate, and this was also agreed to.

The Kennedy adVIsers had no requests' they seemed as cocky and confi- dent as their chief. '

Nixon entered the studio about an hour before air time and inspected the setting, let himself be televised on an interior camera briefly for the inspection of his advisers, then paced moodily about in the back of the studio. He beck- oned the producer to him at one point as he paced and asked as a personal favor that he not be on camera if he happened to be mopping sweat from his face. (That night, contrary to most reports, Nixon was wearing no theatrical make- up. In order to tone down his dark beard stubble on the screen, an adviser had applied only a light coating of "Lazy Shave," a pancake make-up with which a man who has a heavy afternoon beard growth may powder his face to conceal the growth.)

Senator Kennedy arrived fifteen minutes after the Vice-President; he in- spected the set; sat for the camera; and his advisers inspected him, then de- clared they were satisfied. The producer made a remark about the glare of the Senator's white shirt, and Kennedy sent an aide back to his hotel to bring back a blue one, into which he changed just before air time. The men took their seats, the tally lights on the cameras blinked red to show they were live now.

"Good evening," said Howard K. Smith, the gray and handsome modera- tor. "The television and radio stations of the United States ... are proud to pro- vide for a discussion of issues in the current political campaign by the two major candidates for the Presidency. The candidates need no introduction . ... "

And they were on air, before sevenry million Americans. Rereading now the text of the first of the great debates (and of the follow-

ing three also), one can find only a blurred echo of the emotions that rose from the performance, and the intense, immediate and dramatic impact of the de- bate on the fortunes of the two candidates.

This, the first of the debates, was committed to a discussion of domestic issues-an area in which the Democrats, by their philosophy and record, make larger promises and offer a more aggressive attitude to the future than the Republicans. Kennedy, opening, declared that the world could not endure half-slave and half-free, and that the posture of America in the world rested fundamentally on its posture at home-how we behaved to each other, what we did to move American sociery forward at home, this affected not only us, but the world too: "Can freedom be maintained under the most severe attack it has ever known? I think it can be. And I think in the final analysis it depends upon what we do here. I think it's time America started moving again."

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266 SECTION IX

. d OW in print, was one of good- s It rea s n d Nixon's opening statement, ad' all the goals Kenne y had OUt-

d . h Kenne Y tn willed difference: he agree WIt I ' h methods to reach those goa ls. He lined. He differed with Kennedy on y tn ted a half years of the Eisenhower

d d the seven an . lauded the progress rna e un er I' power gross natlonal product ... . I h' hays e ectnc, ,

admmlstratlOn-hosplta s, Ig w , h 'd never matched before in any growth rate, were all moving at a rate, e sal ,

administration. . b mbered only in rereading the Th I h h pemng can e reme e c ue to w at was ap . rks. "The final point that I I . f M Nixon's opemng rema . penu tImate passage 0 r. d h gested in his speeches that

Id I'k k . this· Senator Kenne Y as sug wou I e to rna. e IS . Id and for others that are unfortu- we lack compasSIOn fo~ the poor, for the 0 , I know that Senator Kenned nate .... I know what It means to be poor. . . . . Y f I d I b h blems

as I do but our dIsagreement IS not about ee s as eep y a out t ese pro , h hI"

the goals for America but only about the means to reac ~ ose goa s. . For Mr. Nixon was debating with Mr. Kennedy as If a b?ard o.f Judges

were scoring points; he rebutted and refuted, a~ he ~ent, the mconslstencies or errors of his opponent. Nixon was addresstng hImself to K~nnedy-but Kennedy was addressing himself to the audience that was the natIOn. In these debates, before this audience, there could be no appeal to the past or to the ori- gins of any ethnic group-there could only be an appeal, across the board, to all Americans and to the future. This across-the-board appeal to all Americans had been Mr. Nixon's strategy from the very beginning-a generalized pressure that would fragment the minorities coalition of the Democrats. Yet here, be- fore the largest audience of Americans in history, Nixon was not addressing himself to his central theme; he was offering no vision of the future that the Republican Party might offer Americans-he was concerned with the cool and undisturbed man who sat across the platform from him, with the personal ad- versary in the studio, not with the mind of America.

Ten questions followed from the panel of television reporters who sat be- fore the debaters: on the importance of a candidate's age· on the quality of de- cisi?? in presidentia.1 affairs; on farms; on taxes; on sch;ols; on congressional polltlcs; on subverSIOn; and on schools agal'n In each p' f h . . aIr 0 answers, t e same contrast repeated Itself: the Senator from Massach . . h d' .. " usetts, Ignormg t e 1- rect mqUlry when It sUIted him used each questl'on . b d f

I h · . ' as a spnng oar or an ap-

pea to t e mmd and the Imagination of th d' countless sets But the V' P'd . e au lence assembled before the . Ice- resl ent's mmd d . . . the studio. As one rereads th f' a? attentIOn were fIxed there 111

e text, one mds hIm 0 d . . excellently against the person I d . ,ver an over agam, sconng

a a versary m the h II b 'd h ' f f I of the need to score on the mind f h . a eSI e 1m, yet orget u . ate natIon he ho did

The defenSIve quality of Mr N" pe to ea . enunciation: "The things that Sen· tlXoKn s performance (evident from his first

. a or ennedy h 'd WIth .... I can subscribe completel h as sal many of us can agree

. y to t e sp" h S pressed tomght, the spirit that the U . d S Int t at enator Kennedy has ex- s~i11 b~ reconstructe~ from the tex~~~e w~ates should move ahead .... ") can vIsual Impact of the fIrst debate. at cannot be reconstructed is the

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MASS IvIED I;\ 267

For it was the sight of h ' There was f' d t e two men side by side that ca rried the punch,

, Irst an above II h d ", I side by side the a , t ecru e, overwhelmll1g Impress ion t lat

P opular imag' two seemed evenly matched-and thi s even matching in the

matlOn was fo K d " , opened on th S r enne y a malor victory. Until the ca meras under assault e denator and the Vice-President, Kennedy had been the boy enced N ban attack by the VICe-President as immature, young, inex peri -

. ow, 0 vlOusly m fl h d b h ' h '" I N I h

' es an e aVlOr e was the Vice-President s equa . ot on y t at but th

d '. ' e contrast of the two faces was astounding. Normall y

an m prtvate Ken d d ' . I h' k' ne y un er tenSIon flutters his hands-he adjusts hi s neck- tie, saps IS nee strok h' f T ' h h ' , es IS ace. IOl1Ig t e was calm and nerveless 111 ap- pearance. The Vice-P 'd b ' . resl ent, y contrast, was tense, a lmost frightened, at turns glowenng and ' II h d I ' " b ,~ Occaslona y, aggar - ooklllg to the pOll1t of sickness. Pro ably no pIcture III American politics tells a better story of crisis and epi- sode than that famous shot of the camera on the Vice-President as he half slouched, his "Lazy Shave" powder faintl y streaked with swea t, his eyes exag- gerate~ ~ollows ,of blackness, his jaw, jowls, and face drooping with strain .

It IS ImpossIble to look again at the still photographs of Nixon in his or- de.al and to recollect the circumstances without utmost sympathy. For every- thmg that could have gone wrong that night went wrong. The Vice-President, to begin with, suffers from a handicap that is serious only on television-his is a light, naturally transparent skin. On a visual camera that takes pictures by optical projection this transparent skin photographs cleanly and well. But a television camera projects electronically, by an image-orthicon tube, which is a cousin of the x-ray tube; it seems to go beneath the skin, almost as the x-ray photograph does. On television, the camera on Nixon is usually held away from him, for in close-up his transparent skin shows the tiniest hair growing in the skin follicles beneath the surface, even after he has just shaved. And for the night of the first debate, CBS, understandably zealous, had equipped its cam- era with brand-new tubes for the most perfect projection possible-a perfec- tion of projection that could only be harmful to the Vice-President. (In the later debates, Nixon was persuaded to wear theatrical make-up to repair the ravage TV's electronic tube makes of his countenance; but for this first debate he wore only" Lazy Shave. " )

The scene of the debate, the studio of WBBM, had, further, been tense all day long, as furniture, desks, lecterns, background, had been rearranged and then rearranged again for best effect. Nixon's TV advisers had been told that the background would be gray-scale five, a relatively dark tone; therefore they had urged their principal to dress in a light-gray suit for contrast. Yet the backdrop, when they saw it, was so markedly lighter than they had anticipated that they insisted, rightly, it be repainted. Several times that day it was repainted-but each time the gray tone dried light. (The background indeed was still tacky to the touch when the two candidates went On the air.) Against this light back- ground Nixon, in his.ligh~ suit, faded into a fuzzed outlin~, while ~ennedy in his dark suit had the cnsp pIcture edge of contrast. The NIxon adVIsers had, fur- ther, adjusted all lighting to a master lighting scheme for their candidate before

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2.68 SECTION IX

he went on the air; but in the last few minutes before the debate a horde of still photographers from newspapers and magazines were permmed on the set, and as they milled for their still pictures, they kicked over wires and displaced lights and television cameras from their marked positions.

There was, lastly, the fact that the Vice-President ha~ still not recovered from his illness and was unrested from the exertions of his first two weeks of intense campai~ning. His normal shirt hung loosely about his neck, and his re- cent weight loss made him appear scrawny. And, most of all, psychologically, his advisers now insist, he lacked the energy to project-for Nixon does best on television when he projects, when he can distract the attention of the viewer from his passive countenance to the theme or the me~sage he wants to give forth as in his famous "Checkers" appearance on teleVISIOn In 1952.

All this, however, was unknown then to the national audience. Those who heard the debates on radio, according to sample surveys, believed that the two candidates came off almost equal. Yet every survey of those who watched the debates on television indicated that the Vice-President had come off poorly and, in the opinion of many, very poorly. It was the picture image that had done it-and in 1960 television had won the nation away from sound to im- ages, and that was that.

The Vice-President was later to recover from the impression he made in this first debate. But this first debate, the beginning of the contest, was, as in so many human affairs, half the whole. The second debate concerned itself with foreign policy and ranged from Cuba's Castro through the U-2 and espionage to the matter of America's declining prestige, and closed on the first sharp clash of the series-the defense of Quemoy and Matsu.

The third debate resumed, like a needle stuck in a phonograph groove, with the subject of Quemoy and Matsu, hung there almost indefinitely, then broke away with Nixon's stern disapproval of President Truman's bad language, and went on to other matters such as bigotry, labor unions and gold outflow_ This, according to all sample surveys, was Nixon's best performance in terms of its impact on the audience. This was the debate in which Nixon spoke from Los Angeles while Kennedy spoke from New York, and it was as if, separated by a continent from the personal presence of his adversary, Nixon were more at ease and could speak directly to the nation that lay between them.

The fourth debate was the dreariest-both candidates had by now almost nothing new left to say, and they repeated themselves on all the matters they ha~ covered in t~e three previous debates. Curiously enough, the audience which had been highest for the first debate and dropped off slightly for the sec- ond and third, returned on the last debate to almost match the total of the first.

No accurate political measurement or reasonable judgment is yet possible on a matte~ as vast as t?e TV debates of 1960. When they began, Nixon was generally vle~ed. as bemg the probable winner of the election contest and Kennedy as fightIng an uphill battle; when they were over, the positions of the two contestants were reversed.

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-

No reporter can claim any acc uracy in charting the magic and mysteri ous flow of public opinio b h · . d hi · . n etwee n t e time a campaIgn starts an t e u tlmate tall~ offeelmgs at the polls; and so opinion seesawed back and fo rth fo r weeks, as It stili s~e saws back and forth now, long after the debates are over, as to w~at, specIfIcally, the debates achieved in shaping the ca mpaign and America n opmlon.

There were fragmentary and episodic achievements that no one could deny.

Any reporter who foll owed the Kennedy campaign remembers still the quantum lump m the size of crowds that greeted the campaigning Senator from the morrow of the first debate, the morning of Tuesday, September 27th, when he began to campaign in northern Ohio. His crowds had been growing for a full ~even days before the debates, but now, overnight, they seethed with en- thUSIasm and multiplied in numbers, as if the sight of him, in their homes on the Video box, had given him a "star quality " reserved only for television and movie idols .

Equally visible was the gloom that descended on Republican leaders around the country; they were angry with their own candidate, angry at his performance, angry most of all at his "me-too" debating style. At Nixon head- quarters in Washington, the telephones rang incessantly, demanding that some- one get to this "new Nixon" and convince him that only the "old Nixon" could win.

There were other measurable hard political results. On the evening of the first debate, the Democratic governors of the Southern states were gathered for one of their annual conferences at Hot Springs, Arkansas. Except for Governor Luther Hodges of North Carolina, they had until then viewed Kennedy with a range of emotions that ran from resigned apathy to whis- pered hostility. Watching him on TV that night, they too were suddenly im- pressed. We do not know whose idea it was to send Kennedy the telegram of congratulations which ten of the eleven signed that evening-but the enthusi- asm and excitement of the telegram was not only genuine but a tidemark in the campaign. The Southern governors were with him now; and if they were with him, it meant that the machinery of their political organizations would be with him, too.

lt is much more difficult to measure the debates in terms of issues, of edu- cation of the American people to the tasks and problems before them. For there certainly were real differences of philosophy and ideas between John F. Kennedy and Richard M. Nixon-yet rarely in American history has there been a politi- cal campaign that discussed issues less or clarified them less.

The TV debates, in retrospect, were the greatest opportunity ever for such discussion, but it was an opportunity missed. It is difficult to blame the form of the debates for this entirely; yet the form and the compulsions of the medium must certainly have been contributory. The nature of both TV and radio is that they abhor silence and "dead time." All TV and radio discussion programs are compelled to snap question and answer back and forth as if the

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270 SECTION IX

" ' t lIectual tennis match, Althou h Contestants were adversaries m an m e h h g every , d ' ' er knows t at t e most th oughtf I expenenced newspaperman an mqUir u and

, d 'ff' I stl'on come after long pause d responsive answers to any I ICU t que , ' an that the longer the pause the more illuminating the thought that follows It, nonethe_ less the electronic media cannot bear to suffer a ~ause of ,more than five sec_ onds; a pause of thirty seconds of dead time on air seems mtermlllable. Thus, snapping their two-and-a-half-minute answers back and forth , both candi_ dates could only react for the cameras and the people, they could not think, And, since two and a half minutes permit only a snatch of naked thought and a spatter of raw facts, both candidates, whenever caught out on a limb with a thought too heavy for two-minute exploration, a t?ought seemlllgly too bold or fresh to be accepted by the conditioned Amencan mmd, hastily scuttled back toward center as soon as they had enunciated the thought. Thus Kennedy's response to the first question on Quemoy and Matsu was probably one of the sharpest and clearest responses to any question of the debates; in that response, actually, Kennedy was tentatively fingering at one of the supreme problems of American statecraft, our relation with the revolution in Asia. Yet he was out too far with such a thought for a two-minute response and, in succeeding debates, in reply to succeeding questions, he fuzzed the dis- tinction between his position and Nixon's until it was almost impossible to tell them apart.

If there was to be any forum for issues, the TV debates should have pro- vided such a forum. Yet they did not: every conceivable problem was raised by the probing imagination of the veteran correspondents who questioned the candidates. But all problems were answered in two-minute snatches, either with certain facts or with safe convictions. Neither man could pause to indulge in the slow reflection and rumination, the slow questioning of alternatives be- fore decision, that is the inner quality of leadership.

If, then, the TV debates did little to advance the reasonable discussion of issues that is the dream of unblooded political scientists, what did they do?

What they did best was to give the voters of a great democracy a living portrait of two men under stress and let the voters decide, by instinct and emotion, which style and pattern of behavior under stress they preferred iO their leader. The political roots of this tribal sense of the whole go as far back as the Roman Senate, or the beer-blown assemblies of the Teutonic tribes that Tacitus descr,ib~s in his chronicles. This sense of personal choice, of leader has been mlssmg for centuries from modern civilization-or else lun: ited to such conclaves of deputized spokesmen of the whole as a meeting 01 Tammany Hall captains, a gathering of Communist barons in the Kremlin or the dinners of leaders of the English Establishment in the clubs of London. What the TV debates did was to generalize this tribal sense of participation, this emotional judgment of the leader, from the few to the multitude-for the salient fact of the great TV debates is not what the two candidates said, nor how t~ey behaved, but how many of the candidates' fellow Americans gave up thelf evenmg hours to ponder the choice between the two.

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M ASS MEDIA 271

DA I E L J . BOO R STIN

49. PSEUDO-EVENTS

Historian Daniel Boor t ' d

. S In uses the t d escrlbe nonspontaneous I erm pseu o-event to

"news" whose main pu p' panted, or manufactured rose IS to oain p bl" I. person or cause that d o· u IClty for the arrange the "e t " M d

American politicians hav b . ven. 0 ern h e ecome quite soph ' t ' d . orc estrating pseudo-events. 71 IS Icate In

"leaks" of h ' wo common examples are news to t e med,a, a strate {. d b

government om . I . gy often use y "t . I b II ICla s opposed to partIcular policies and

ria a oons," the "floating" of an idea to find out ~o,::, the publrc and other political leaders will respond

.efore a formal proposal is made. The modern presiden- t/al campatgn can be analyzed as one "pseudo-event" after another-as one candidate visits a flag factory and another rides in a tank to generate the free, as opposed to paId, TV tIme that puts them before the public.

The new kind of synthetic novelty which has flooded our experience I will call "pseudo-events." The common prefix "pseudo" comes from the Greek word meaning false, or intended to deceive. Before I recall the historical forces which have made these pseudo-events possible, have increased the supply of them and the demand for them, I will give a commonplace example.

The owners of a hotel, in an illustration offered by Edward L. Bernays in his pioneer Crystallizing Public Opinion (1923), consult a public relations counsel. They ask how to increase their hotel's prestige and so improve their business. In less sophisticated times, the answer might have been to hire a new chef, to improve the plumbing, to paint the rooms, or to install a crystal chan- delier in the lobby. The public relations counsel's technique is more indirect. He proposes that the management stage a celebration of the hotel's thirtieth anniversary. A committee is formed, including a prominent banker, a leading Society matron, a well-known lawyer, an influential p~eacher7 and an ".event" is planned (say a banquet) to call attention to the ~lstI~gUlshed servIce the hotel has been rendering the community. The celebratIOn. IS held, photog.raphs are taken, the occasion is widely reported, an~ the object IS accomphshed. Now th O . ' pseudo event and will Illustrate all the essential fea-IS occasIOn IS a -, tures of pseudo-events.

s .' .' f Scribner an imprint of Simon & Schuster Adult Pub- IOh".'ce: Repnnted with the perm.ss'

C on 'd to Pseudo-Events in America by Daniel J. Boorstin.

IS Ing Group from The Image: A /li e. d © 1989 C ' . nght renewe . opyright © 1961 by Daniel J. Boorsnn; copy

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l.7l. SI:.CTl ON IX

is somewhat-but not enti rely_ This l"clcbratiun, Wl' can see at the outset, un eI would no t have been ahle

. I I' ) bl I I· Ii ' rel :.tt1 ons co nil s cae IIlg, I resulll :l y t lC pU) ~ ~ . ' f tllC ho tel had no t actua ll v been , . c [lzens I ' to to rm hi s l'u rllmittee of pronllnent I h h r hand if the ho tel 's service . ' . On t e ot e , rcndl'rlllg scrvlce:' to the CO lll lllU!1Ity. . ublic relatio ns coun eI might not had hct'n all that important. U1stlga tJO n bYh~s been held , the celebra tion itself have been nCl"essa ry. OIKe the l"elebr.ltlOn .' . h d ' . . Th

II ' dlstlngulS e IIlStltutl on, e occa-

becomes ev idence that the hotel rea Y IS a . . d' . vhich It IS preten IIlg. sion actually gives the hotel the prestige to \ lb' h d . I f h a ce e ration to t e owners e-

It is obv iuu roo that the va ue 0 suc. . . ." h d d orted III newspapers, magazmes pends on ItS belllg photograp e an rep h ' h . ' . I .' It' the report t at g ives t e event Its newsreels, on radIO, and over te eVISlon. IS

f . ' f . I The power to make a reportable

orce III the I1llllds 0 potentia customers. . event is thus the power to make experience. One is remlllded of Na poleon's apocryphal repl y to hi s general. who objected that Circumstances were unfa- vorable to a proposed campaign: " Bah, I make circumstances! " The mo~ern public relations counsel-and he is, of course, only one of many twentleth- century creators of pseudo-events-has come close to fulfilling Napoleon's idle boast. "The counsel on public relations," Mr. Bernays explains, " not only knows what news value is, but knowing it, he is in a position to make lIews

happen. He is a creator of events." The intriguing feature of the modern situation, however, comes precisely

from the fact that the modern news makers are not God. The news they make happen, the events they create, are somehow not quite real. There remains a tantalizing difference between man-made and God-made events.

A pseudo-event, then, is a happening that possesses the following

characteristics:

(1) It is not spontaneous, but comes about because someone has planned, planted, or incited it. Typically, it is not a train wreck or an earthquake, but an interview.

(2) It is planted primarily (not always exclusively) for the immediate ~urpose of being reported or reproduced. Therefore, its occurrence IS ar:anged for the. convenience of the reporting or reproducing medl.a . It~ s~ccess IS measured by how widely it is reported. Time relations III It a~e c?mmonly fictitious or factitious; the an~ounce~ent IS given out in advance "for future release" and wrItten as If the event had occurred in the past Th '''I . r P'" I' h .' e question, s It ea. I~ ess Important tan, "Is it newsworthy?"

(3) Its relation to the underlying reart f h' . . interest arises largel f h ' I Y 0 t .e s~tuatIon IS ambiguous. Its

y rom t IS very ambigUity C . pseudo-event the question "Wh d . . oncernmg a

d . . Wh'l ,at oes It mean~" has a new Imenslon. I e the news interest ' . '

happened and in the real m a tram wreck is in what

I consequences the' . . . .

a ways, in a sense in wheth' II' mterest m an mtervlew IS

h b ' er It rea y happen d d ' h ' h

ave een the motives. Did th e an m w a t mig t e statement really mean what it sa id?

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Witho ut some of this amb o . . . ' • IgUlty a pseudo-event cannot be very IIlterestln g..

(4 ) Usually it is intended to b -· . If· t· If·ll · I I' . .. . . t ,1 se - u I IIlg prophecy. The lote s

thlrtieth -alllllVersary celebntion b . I I hi · . . . .. . " y saYlllg t lat t lC ote IS a dlstlllgLll shed II1Stlturio ll ~ctllally k . , .. , ma -es It one ....

. In the age of pse udo-events it is less the artificial simplification than the artifICial co mplJc;ltlon of experience that confuses us. Whenever in the public mind ~. pseudo -event competes for attention with a spontaneous event in the same held , the pseudo-event will tend to dominate. What happens on televi- sion ",iII overshadow what happens off television. Of course I am concerned here not with o ur private worlds but with our world of public affairs.

Here are some characteristics of pseudo-events which make them over- shadow spo nta neolls events:

( I) Pseudo-events are more dramatic. A television debate between candidates can be planned to be more suspenseful (for example, by reserving questions which are then popped suddenly) than a casual encounter or consecutive formal speeches planned by each separately.

(2) Pseudo-events, being planned for dissemination, are easier to disseminate and to make vivid. Participants are selected for their newsworthy and dramatic interest.

(3) Pseudo-events can be reported at will, and thus their impression can be reinforced.

(4) Pseudo-events cost money to create; hence somebody has an interest in disseminating, magnifying, advertising, and extolling them as events worth watching or worth believing. They are therefore advertised in advance, and rerun in order to get money's worth.

(5) Pseudo-events, being planned for intelligibility, are more intelligible and hence more reassuring. Even if we cannot discuss intelligently the qualifications of the candidates or the complicated issues, we can at least judge the effectiveness of a television performance. How comforting to have some political matter we can grasp!

(6) Pseudo-events are more sociable, more conversable, and more convenient to witness. Their occurrence is planned for our convenience. The Sunday newspaper appears when we have a lazy morning for it. Television programs appear when we are ready with our glass of beer. In the office the ne~t morning, Jack Paar's (or any other star performer's) regular late-l1Ight show at the usual hour will overshadow in conversation a casual event that suddenly came up and had to find its way into the news.

(7) Knowledge of pseudo-events-of what has been repor~,ed,. or what has been staged, and how-becomes the test of bemg. II1tormed." News magazines provide us regularly With qUIz questions concerning not what has happened but concerning "names in the news"-what

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274 SI:.CTION IX

, es Pseudo-events begin to h eWS mag

aZll1 . f Id f h' has been reported in t e n " which some 0 my 0 - as loned

" .. n discourse k Provide that com

mo ' h Great Boo s. f' d 111 t e " friends have hoped to In h pseudo-events 10 geometric

awn at er , I b (ll) Finally pseudo-events sp sciousness simp y ecause there

" h d minate our con progression. T ey 0 • a re more of them, and ever more.

, public life, counterfeit happenings . , h 'I of Amertcan 'Th" h By tim new Gres am s aw , f circulatIon. e rise In t e power

h ppeJ1lngs out ad' tend to drive spontaneous a , Iy to the broa elling powers of the 'd IS due not on f I' and prestige of the Presl ency " b t also to the rise 0 centra Ized news

office and the need for quick declslhons, u ase of the Washington press Corps , d t e IIlcre .

gathering and broadcasting, an ad more frequent, and more centralized ac. The President has an ever more re, l' ilar explanation helps account for the cess to the world of pseudo-events. f shim Congressional investigating commit-

, , ' ' recent years 0 t e flSlI1g promll1ence 111 'have virtually no legislative impulse, and tces. In many cases these committees, t But they do have an almost sometimes no intelligible legislative assign men . I ' h F d I

d d ed now by no one e se 111 tee era government

unprece ente power, possess h' b h P

'd k news Newsmen support t e committees ecause cxcept t e resl ent, to rna e· , h b· , h ' f d the newsmen· they live together 111 appy sym lOS IS. The t e committees ee· ,

b I f ong wlashingron agencies becomes a contest to dominate art e or power am w. ' I b the citizen's information of the government. This can most easl y e done by

fabricating pseudo-events. , , A perfect example of how pseudo-events can dom1l1ate IS the recent popu-

larity of the quiz show format. Its original appeal came less from the fact that such shows were tests of intelligence (or of dissimulation) than from the fact that the situations were elaborately contrived-with isolation booths, armed bank guards, and all the rest-and they purported to inform the public.

The application of the quiz show format to the so-called "Great Debates" between Presidential candidates in the election of 1960 is only another exam- ple. These four campaign programs, pompously and self-righteously adver· tised by the broadcasting networks, were remarkably successful in reducing great national issues to trivial dimensions. With appropriate vulgarity, they might have been called the $400,000 Question (Prize: a $100,000-a-year job for four years). They were a clinical example of the pseudo-event, of how it is made, whyn appeals, and of its consequences for democracy in America. , In ongll1 the Great Debates were confusedly collaborative between politi-

clan~ and news makers. Public interest centered around the pseudo-event itself: the hghtll1g, make-up, ground rules, whether notes would be allowed, etc. Far more II1terest was shown in the performance th ' h ·d The , an 111 w at was sal . pseudo-events spawned 111 turn by the Great D b b I P pie

h h d h h e ates were num er ess. eo w 0 a seen t e sows read about them the m 'dl d I' d gerlY for interpretations by news ore aVI y, an Istene ea ,

d " "h commentators. Representatives of both parnes mad ed' statements on t e probable effects of the debates. Numerous interviews an Iscusslon programs were br d I ' ' '

oa cast exp ormg their meaning. Oplmoo

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275

II kept us informed on the nuanc " f . pO s , I · I .. ' ~ s 0 o ur own and other people's reactions . . sot specu :Hl o n mu tlphcd fv · I . foPlc . . . m t 1e question whether there sho uld be a

fifth debate became fo r a whde a lively "i ss ue." The drama o f the Situation was I . I ' most y specIous, or at least had an extreme y

b· uous relevance to the m·lin (I f · . . .. 301 Ig . .. . .')ut orgorten) Issue: which participant was better qualified tor rhe Pn:sldency. Of course, a man's ability, while standing

d 'r klieg' lig,hts without notes tC) a . I If · . un C . ' , , nswer In two ane alai millutes a question kept secret until that n~Olllent, had only the most dubi ous relevance-if any at all-to hiS real quahflcatlons to make deliberate Presidential decisions on longstanding public questions after being instructed by a corps of advisers. fhe great PreSidents III our history (with the poss ible exception of F.D.R.) would have done miserably, bur our most notorious demagogues would have shone. A number of exciting pseudo-events were created-for example, the Quemoy-Matsu Issue. But that, too, was a good example of a pseudo-event: it was created to be reported, it concerned a then-quiescent problem, and it put into the most factitious and trivial terms the great and real issue of our relation to Communist China.

The television medium shapes this new kind of political quiz-show spec- tacular in many crucial ways. Theodore H. White has proven this with copious detail in his The Making of the President: 1960 (1961). All the circumstances of this particular competition for votes were far more novel than the old word "debate" and the comparisons with the Lincoln-Douglas Debates suggested. Kennedy's great strength in the critical first debate, according to White, was that he was in fact not "debating" at all, but was seizing the opportunity to ad- dress the whole nation; while Nixon stuck close to the issues raised by his op- ponent, rebutting them one by one. Nixon, moreover, suffered a handicap that was serious only on television: he has a light, naturally transparent skin. On an ordinary camera that takes pictures by optical projection, this skin photo- graphs well. But a television camera projects electronically, by an "image- orthicon tube" which has an x-ray effect. This camera penetrates Nixon's transparent skin and brings out (even just after a shave) the tiniest hair grow- ing in the follicles beneath the surface. For the decisive first program Nixon Wore a make-up called "Lazy Shave" which was ineffective under these condi- tions. He therefore looked haggard and heavy-bearded by contrast to Kennedy, who looked pert and clean-cut.

This greatest opportunity in American history to educate the voters by de- bating the large issues of the campaign failed. The main reason, as White points out, was the compulsions of the medium. "The nature of both TV and radio is that they abhor silence and 'dead time.' All TV and radio discussion programs are compelled to snap question and answer back and forth as if the Contestants were adversaries in an intellectual tenms match. Although every experienced newspaperman and inquirer knows that the most thoughtful and responsive answers to any difficult question come after long pause, and that the longer the pause the more illuminating the thought that follows .it, nonethe- less the electronic media cannot bear to suffer a pause of more than five seconds;

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276 SECTION IX

a pause of thirty seconds of dead time on air seems interminable, T'h , ' d I , If n'llite answers back and fortll b Us s plllg their two-an -a- 1.1 -I II ' ,oth ' nap

could only react for the cameras and the people, they could not thin~a~:didate; ever either candidate found himself roUC~llllg a thought too large 'f 'When. minute exploration, he quickly retreated. hnally the tclevlslon-Watchi~r tIVO. was left ro J'udge not on issues explored by thoughtful men, but On th g VOter

" f d I" e rei ' capacity of the twO candidates ro per arm un er te eVlslon stress, atlv, Pseudo-events thus lead to emphaSIS on pseudo-qualifications A '

'd 'I d'd b ' 'gain h self-fulfilling prophecy, If we test Presl entia can I ates y their tale t e , h P' d n ts on l'>,

quiz performances, we will, of course, c oose resl ents for preCisely th' v

qualifications In a democracy, reality tends to conform to the pseud eSe .. ..... '- o-event Nature Imitates art. '

\X1e are frustrated by our very efforts publicly to unmask the pseudo_ , I I' I' I k h d' , event \X1henever we descnbe ne Ig ltlllg, ne rna e-up, t e stu 10 settlllg th '

hearsals etc we simply arouse more interest, One newsman's interp'r e ,reo o. , " , ,etatlon

makes us more eager ro hear another s, One commentator s speculatio h , "f' k ' h n t at the debates may have little slgm Icance ma es us CUriOUS to ear whethe ran·

other commentator disagrees. Pseudo-events do, of course, increase our illusion of grasp on the world

what some have called the American illusion of omnipotence, Perhaps, IV; come to think, the world's problems can really be settled by "statements" b. "Summit" meetings, by a competition of "prestige," by overshadowin~ i~. ages, and by political quiz shows,

Once we have tasted the charm of pseudo-events, we are tempted to be· lieve they are the only important events. Our progress poisons the sources of our experience, And the poison tastes so sweet that it spoils our appetite for plain fact. Our seeming ability to satisfy our exaggerated expectations makes us forget that they are exaggerated.

MURRAY EDELMAN

50. POLITICAL SYMBOLS

To political scientist Murray Edelman, the central political activity is the manipulation of symbols, Inasmuch as the mass public experiellces the political world as a "passing parade o( symbols," public perception of political events necessarzly depends on communications about those

S F Th ' oflhe

ouree: rom e Symboltc Uses of Politics C 'h 1964 1985 b B d of TrllSrcos U ' ' fIll" . ' opyng t y oar mverSlty 0 InOlS, Used With permission of th U' , ' fIll' 'p e mvcrslty 0 tOOlS ress.

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M ASS M ED IA 277

events. Edelman argues that the president and other na- tIOna/leaders use symbols to cue the public as to how to react to world events-when to (eel threatened and when to feel reassured that all is 1.(Jell. Edelman was one of the (irst American political scientists to systematically analyze politics from a symbolic perspective.

Edelmarrs view is exempli(ied in the process of "spinning, " the term commonly used to describe how political leaders attempt to mani/mlate public percep- tions. Washington Post reporter Howard Kurtz's 1998 book, Spin Cycle, argues that the Clinton White House is "arguably the most successful team o( While House spin doctors in history. , .. Though earlier administrations were cognizant of the need to control the flow o( information to the public, produce appealing photo opportunities for reporters, and generally to manage perceptions of the president, by 1998 Bill Clinton was widely regarded as having elevated the art of spinning to a new level.

A civil lawsuit alleging sexual harassment filed against the president by Paula Jones and the ensuing reve- lation that he had engaged in an 18-month sexual liaison with a former White House intern, Monica Lewinsky, and lied about it under oath and to the American people, however, tested even Bill Clinton's ability to "spin " the story so as to minimize political damage. In his brief August 17, 1998, speech to the American people follow- ing his appearance before a grand jury investigating charges that he may have committed perjury, suborna- tion of perjury, and obstruction of justice in his efforts to cover up the Lewinsky affair, President Clinton took "complete responsibility" for all his actions.

Claiming to assume full responsibility is the classic tactic of a chief executive under fire. Richard Nixon em- ployed a similar approach when he first addressed the nation concerning the Watergate scandals in the spring of 1973 when he accepted full responsibility for the illegal actions of White House officials. Ronald Reagan simi- larly accepted full responsibility for the Iran-Contra Af- fair of 1986. Unlike Richard Nixon and Ronald Reagan, who were accepting responsibility for the actions of oth- ers, Bill Clinton was accepting responsibility for his own actions. But just like his predecessors: Bill Clinton's ac- ceptance of full responsibility was at heart symbolic- intended only to pinpoint where responsibility lay, not to suggest that he should be punished (or his transgressions.

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278 SECTI ON IX

, the political proccss is a dist' f

. b )Iic formS In " I " , , ' II1 C. Basic to the recognition 0 s)'nl ( t and pohtlca ac tivIty as utilIzed b

, , , ccrator spor . b f' f tI I )' rion between politics as a sp . 'f ' , ngible ene Its or lcmse ves, F " slle(1 IC, fa , ' I' I Or

organized groups ro get qUltc " ' ' ries of pICtures III t Ie mIne, plac 'd ' , litKS IS a se d I' .. ' e l110st l11en ll10st of the tllne po 'az ines an (ISCU SS lOns, The p' ' pel's mag. - , IC·

there hy tclevisioll news, newSp.l , ' I ce in a world the mass public I1Cv , 'I rnkJl1g p a ( ' Cr tures create a nlOvJl1g panoraJ11. . ro fear or cheer, 0 ten wIth passio

, " nbcrs come , . I n qlllte touches, yet one Its ll1el II of legisl atu res passing aws, fOrCig

, I ' Thc)' 'Ire to ( n and someti mes WIt 1 a([lOn . , if' 'trade agreements, wars starting and political figures thrcatclIlIlg 01 r~ ~:I:;~, or winning, decisions made to spend ending, candidates for puhllc office g

" " '0 to the moon. , unlmaglllable SUIllS 01 mone) ro g , .d'ate world in whIch people mak

1'1 ' I ther hand the Imme I. C lere IS, Oil tie 0 " I ' I vable consequences. In these activities and do things that have cllrect )' Olser • , st the consequences and men can check their acts and assumptions agalll

i f 'I d ' Icor.

, k S . 1 rela tI ve yew, are IIlVO ve III po Itlcs reet errors, There IS feedbac ' . ome J11el ,

in this direct way. d f b t bois t d Politics is for most of us a passing para eo a strac syn

l l I ' ye

f a para c

, I b a benevolent or m:1 evo ent orce that which our experience teac les us to e. , . b I ' t t Becallse politics does VISibly confer wealth, take can e c ose to omnlpo en . , " .

1,[" d f eople and rCI1resent a history WIth strong emotional lie, IInprlson an ree p , • '. and ideological associations, its processes become. easy obJects ulPon which to displace private emotions, especially strong anxIeties and hopes.. .,

But it could not serve as conveyor of these fears and aspirations If It were simply a tool or mechanism which we all had the power and knowledge to ma- nipulate for our own advantage. It is central to ItS potency as a symbol that It is remote, set apart, omnipresent as the ultimate threat or means of succor, yet not susceptible to effective influence through any act we as individuals can perform.

Research in a number of different sciences has pointed to the key function of remoteness as an influence upon symbolic meanings. One element involved here is the distinction between referential and condensation symbols. Every symbol stands for something other than itself, and it also evokes an attitude, a set of impressions, or a pattern of events associated through time, through space, through logic, or through imagination with the symbol. Students of this subject have noriced a fundamental distinction among symbols that groups them into two quite separate types. Referential symbols are economical ways of referring to the objective elements in objects or situations: the elements identi- fied in the sa me way by different people. Such symbols are useful because they help in logical rhinking about the situation and in manipulating it. Industrial aCCIdent statistics and cost figures In cost plus contracts are referential political symbols, though they may also be condensation symbols. Condensation sym- bols evoke the emotions associated with the situation. They condense into one symbolIc event, sIgn, or act patriotic pride, anxieties remembrances of past glories 0; humiliations, promises of future greatness: ~ome one of these Of all of rhem,-

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!II " '\\1 U I A 279

'X/herr (ondl'n,aliun symbuls ~ re I J ' , , , " Invu w Ihe h 'k f I 1-, Iia ll' ,'tlVI ron ITIl'1ll' I, ia.:king, A lraff " cun'lam ee 0 lIe III Illt{ I . ' t ' I ' I I ' IC pultcelllan al a busy corner may grow ance( t110lllcn ,m y Wit 1 l11n, elf ' I ' , .k ' etlH • fl " , I ' I , 01 11, Stl( as rcprc,entall ve uf rhe august

'CSlY" I Ie stalc a ll ( Itl ( ulgc In II I 11131 ff ' Ie uxury of arbilrary power perhaps bv

, 'ng tra IC 011 Olle , trcet· hi t I, I h ' " ' f:ll'ori . ' I k' 'I' I I Ie engl elling line uf ca rs in fronl of him

d soille Ir;'lte IOn ' Ing WI I Suon rCll, ' II ' I I " atl ", ' , In ( IIIll 11at Ie mUSI bce realtr y: drtvers d a pros:!I": chid "f po ltee, Thc " ' 'h .1 " 311 ' " • Ie IS IIU Slle (leek UII rhe lantasle, and c()n-

111 'litZltl" 01 tllO,e who neve r e' ~ 11 I " b' ' I ' " I erp , . " , " csr U I<'Cllve y rhelr cunVlC llon rhat tIe Overnll1ent and their hOllle !OWIl, abollnd I'll " d d d g ' . ' " comlllunist ,pies an upes an

Ihat John Birch svmboltzes re,lstallce to the threa t. lur is there rhe check of reality and feedback lIpOIl those to whom Adlai Stevenson or Barry Goldwaler or DWight Etsellhowl'f are symbols of reason. intelligence. and virtue in public policy. Concluslvc demonstrations that rheir heroes' pulicies may oftcn be fu - lile or Illisconceived are Impusslble simply because the link between dramatic polilical announcements and their impact on peuple is so lung and so tangled. These people may he fight or they may be wrong. The point is that there is no necessi ty, :1I1d often no possibility, of continuously checking their convictions against real conditions.

No example can ever be wholly free of either referential or of condensa- lion symbols; but the distinction between the two types of behavior is funda - mental in realistic political analysis.

Practically every politica l act that is controversial or regarded as rea ll y important is bound to serve in part as a condensation symbol. It evokes a qui- escent or an aroused mass respunse because it symbolizes a threat or reassu r- ance. Because the meaning of the act in these cases depends only partly or not al all upon its objective consequences, which the mass public cannot know, the meaning can only come from the psychological needs of Ihe respondents; and it can only be known from their responses,

One type of research that supports this view appears in the work of Smith, Bruner, and White, I who have explored the tie between personality and opin- ions. They conclude that political opinions serve three different functions for the personality. One of these, object appraisal, or help in understanding the world, can only be performed by those political opinions that are fairly realis- tic: opinions which, in our terms, are based upon referential symbols and are constantly checked against the objects to which they reier. An opinion that the chief function of a party platform is to attract votes and not to forecast public policy would presumably further object appraisal.

NOTES

I. Harold D. Lasswell, I'sychopathu/ogy and Politics .(New York. 1930),75- 76. 2. Edward Sapir, "Symbolism," in F.wyclopedlll of the SOCIlI/ SClellces (New York, 1934),492-495. , ' ' , 3 M Brc S" I J S BrUII"r and R W White. OPIIIlOIlS (llld Persolla/II)' (Ncw . . \\Ister Illlr " . , .. , . .' York , 1956). '

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.... .. SECTION IX

REVIEW QUESTIONS

1. What evidence does George Orwell offer [0 show that "political speech writing are largely the defence of the indefensible"? Do you think that hand

. 'h' bl) e IS correct? It so, is there any solution [0 t IS pro em.

2. Do televised debates between presidential candidates help to clarify the sitions of the candidates on major issues? How have presidential television ~o. bates changed since the Kennedy-Nixon debates of 1960? e·

3. How does Daniel Boorstin define a "pseudo-event"? Can you identify som recent political events that fit the definition? Can you identify a political even~ that Boorstin would agree was a "real" event?

4. How does Murray Edelman distinguish a "condensation" from a "referen. tial" symbol? Do you agree that most Americans most of the time have very lit. tle objective information about the consequences of political decisions and events? What are the implications of this perspective for democratic theory?

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X

THE CONGRESS

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i , ,

282 SECTION X

E D "I U N D BUR K E

51. - G THE NATION

REPRESEN nN

I elected member of COII- Thc basic problem of how (//" t'lC' 1I0ters cOlltillues to

I f I .. '/~rcscllt gress slu )// ( ICSt rl alollg with m embers .' I bscrt'ers pllz ~/c c()/lgrc>sJ()lIa a , 111'ttle sillce Edmund

I i l t 'IS C lallg('( thcmsc/I'cs. T lC (e)(/ C)( . ' ./ I'lrliamellt as a "con-.; , " I the Brill> 1 ( Burke ,mt Crltlc/~el r t alld hostile illter- gress of ambassadors from ( 1(erell of Bristol, Burke ests " III his spcech to the e ((tors J

. i' Itatilles sh()uld do more t 1an arglled tlhlt clcctel rep rc> el " d ate accord

d ' / ' dIstricts all 1I " -lIIerely COUllt heLl s /II t lelr d illgly. As Bllrke told his supporters, an electe re?rese,n-

, ,,' '. ullbtased Opll110n liS tatil'e oll'es his COllstltuellts lI, ,:, , I dl" 11'"htened conscIence. matllre ,udglllCllt, (//1 liS ell b , ,

III Burke's lIiew of representation, an elected offiCial should lise the kllowledge acquired on the ,ob /11 the leg- islatllre to cast 1I0tes that the represelltatillC belielles to be ill the best illterests of the nation. To Burke, elected leaders represellt best whell they work to educate and persllade their cOllstituents on questions of public pol- icy. Legislators must be carefit!, however, /1/ followmg Burke's advice. After all, mallY ex-members of Congress have been defeated because they insisted on votillg in the il/tercst of the natioll as a whole; their constitllents feit sufficiently betrayed to throw them alit of office!

Cerrainly, genrlemen, it ought to be the happiness and glory of a representative to live in the strictest union, the closest correspondence, and the most unre- served communication with his constituents. Their wishes ought to have great weight with him; their opinion, high respect; their business, unremitted ;Jtten- tion. It is his duty to sacrifice his repose, his pleasures, his satisfactions, to theirs; and abOl'e all, ever, and in all cases, to prefer their interest to his own. But his unbiased opinion, his mature judgment, his enlightened conscience, he ought not to sacrifice to you, to any man, or to any set of men living. These he does not derive from your pleasure; no, nor from the law and the constitution. They are a trust from Providence, for the abuse of which he is deeply answer- able. Your repr~sentatIve owes you, not his industry only, but his judgment; and he betrays, lIlstead of serving you, if he sacrifices it to your opinion.

SOl/ree: From Edmund Burke, "Speech to the Electors of Bristol on Being Elected" (November 1774).

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My worthy C(> lk: al;: u ~ s ' l y~ hi s \ ' II I I

' , ' , ' ' . VI oUl;:hr 1'0 he ,uh, ervic nr to yours, If that I ' ;111 , tIt: I' llllg IS 11 11 H H':C 111', If guv " " ' ' ,c I'thour llu csti h ' Cll1lllellt Were 3 m~lTer of will upon ::I ny , Ide, ,ours, w on. (l ug I' 1'0 he ' . ' I ' ' ) I' I ' SUpenor, 3m govnnlllenr and i<:gl siJtlon re matters 0 rCa SOI1:1n ludl'lll t: nr · I r ' ' r

;1 ' I ,' I ' I I '" , Mil nor 0 IIlciinatio f1' and what ,orr 0 , 3501'1 IS 1'1.11', III W li e 1 tl e del" , " , ' , , '

re. f " I 1'1 I:rnl1nallun precedes the di SC USS ion' In which one set 0 ' mell ll: I )eratl:. and ~nuthcr decide; and where those wh~ form the conclUsIOn arc perhaps rhrcc hundred mil es d' I' f h I I I , IS ant mm I' use w 10 lea r tIe argU1l1ents.

To deli ve r an opinioll is th· " I f II " , e ng 11' 0 a Illew that of constituents IS a ei.,hty and reSIJeo.:tahle olJi nioll I ' 'I ' , w 0 " W IK 1 a rep resentative ought always to re-

I'oice to hear; and which he ouglll ,!I\vays In st ' I 'd B , . " ' ' . o. senous y to consl er. ut all- t/Jontatllle Ulstructlons; lIIandates issued, whio.:h the member is bound blindly and 111lpliCIrly to obey. to vote, and to argue for, though contrary to the clea r- est conViCtiOn of hiS ludgillent and conscienct:,-these arc things utterl y un- known to the laws of thiS land, and which ar ise from a fund amental mi stake of the whole order and tenor of our constitution.

Parliament is not a congress of ambassadors from different and hostil e in - terests; which interests each must maintain, as an agent and advocate, against other agents and advocates; but parliament is a deliberative assembly of one nation, with one interest, that of the whole; where, not loca l purposes, not loca l prejudices, ought to guide, but the general good, resulting from the gen- eral reason of the whole. You choose a member indeed; but when you have chosen him, he is not a member of Bristol, but he is a member of parliament. If the local constituent should have an interest, or should form an hasty opinion, evidently opposite to the real good of the rest of the community, the member for that place ought to be as far , as any other, from any endeavor to give it ef- fect. I beg pardon for saying so much on this subject. I have been unwillingly drawn into it; but I shall ever use a respectful frankn ess of communication with you. Your faithful friend, your devoted servant, I shall be to the end of my life: a flatterer you do not wish for. On this point of instruction, however, I think it scarcely possible we ever can have any sort of difference. Perhaps I may give you too much, rather than too little, trouble.

From the first hour I was encouraged to court your favour, to this happy day of obtaining it, I have never promised you anything but humble and perse- vering endeavors to do my duty. The weight of that duty, I confess, makes me tremble; and whoever well considers what it is, of all things in the world, will fly from what has the least likeness to a positive and precipitate engagement. To be a good member of parliament is, let me tell you, no easy task; especially at this time when there is so strong a disposition to run into the perilous ex-, .' . treme of servile compliance or wild popularity. To ulllte cIrcumspection with vigour, is absolutely necessary; but it is extremely dIfficult. We are n~w mem- bers for a rich commercial city; this city, however, IS but a part of a nch com- mercial nation the interests of which are various, multiform, and intricate. We are members f~r that great nation, which however is itself bur part of a great empire, extended by our virtue and our fortune to the farthest limits of the east

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+"e I ... .... ·· iii"'." .... _--

, .' ' ad interests must be con~id c rcd· III and of the west. All the 'c \\'1 de-rs

pre , 'ble We arc members (or a rre~ U ~t be

d I - i led I paSS I . ' , COunt

compare ; must )e recollc ' l

chim: of a (rcc consfifution is no ' ry; d I II k that tIe ma Slll1pl an sure y w, e a 111.)\\", 1'- , ' ' S it i valuahle. We :1re Illclllb . .. ' e

h- b " " .. d as de leate ,I. , , Crs In t mg; ut:1S IIltrlC',He ,Ill, d ,·t preserve religiously the t a " d'" ./7)1':111 we IIlUS , rUe leg I

grc,lt all allclcnt m Ollarc , ' the ke -stone that hl/lcl s together the a right of the sovereign. which form "y nd our constitution . A COl ' ' nohle

d II d h o( our empIre a lsti\UIIO an we -con tructe arc , he a critical thing. As such I n made u of balanced powers must ever ' . _ '. mean to

p f - I . h . mes wlthm my reach. I know my Inability and I touch that part 0 It w lIC co , I I I II ' h f ' ' , . t'r In partICU ar s 1<1 aim at t e nendsh'

sh f pport from evcry quar c . Ip WI or su . d ')( the worthy colleague ' and shall cultivate the best correspon ence, ( you have

gIven I me. bl . f ther than once more to thank you all; you, genticll1en trou e you no ur ' . ', ' d I' b h' ,

f f h d 'dates for theIr temperate an po Ite e aVIOr' and

or your avours; t e can I " , f" h . ' the sheriffs, for a conduct which may give a model or a w 0 arc In public

stations.

JAMES MADISON

52. THE FRAMERS' VIEW OF REPRESENTATION

Critics of the Constitution argued that the House of Representatives was not large enough to include mem- bers of all social classes. Therefore. they believed that the views of the excluded classes would not be ade- quately represented in the newly created House of Rep- resentatives, But James Madison in Federalist, No, 35 dismissed the idea of "actual representation of all classes of the people. by persons of each class" as "altogether visionary, " While acknowledging that the newly created House would include mostly businessmen. profession- als. and landowners. Madison was convinced that these representatives. motivated by the need to win votes from all members of their districts. would adequately repre- sent the interests of all groups, In contrast to Burke's emphasis on representation of the national interest.

Source: From The Federalist. No. 35 (1788).

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T H E. CONG RESS 185

Madisoll asked "Is it I t d 'd ' 10 natural that h ' ca ll , I ate for the fallo f I a man w 0 IS a

care to illform hilnself :f~1 ~ , 1e))eOPle . .. should take tions?" Therefore th , ' 1en . ISP OS ItIOIIS and inc/ina-

d , , ' en concerns would find "th ' proper egree of IIIfluence Up c)n J ' d elr ?IS CO il II ct."

Let us now return to the examination of b' , " " 0 lectlons. One whICh, If we may ludge from the frc uenc ' , ,

to be relied on is th ' h H q y of Its repetition, seems Inost , , .H t e Ouse of R"'p " ff" I

f h 'f " resentatlves IS not su IClent y umerouS or t e reception 0 all th d'ff I n " ,e I erem c asses of citizens, in order to comb me the II1terests and feelmgs of every part f h ' d o t e commul1lty, an to pro- duce a due sympathy between the representatl've bod d ' . , ' . y an Its constituents. ThiS argument presents Itself under a very specl'ous and d ' f d ' , , se ucmg orm; an IS well calculated to lay hold of the preludlces of those to whom it is addressed. But when we come to dissect it with attention, it will appear to be made up of nothmg but falr-soundll1g words. The object it seems to aim at is in the first place, impracticable, and in the sense in which it is contended for: is unneces- sary. I reserve for another place the discussion of the question which relates to the sufficiency of the representative body in respect to numbers, and shall con- tent myself with examining here the particular use which has been made of a contrary supposition, in reference to the immediate subject of our inquiries.

The idea of an actual representation of all classes of the people, by persons of each class, is altogether visionary. Unless it were expressly provided in the Constitution, that each different occupation should send one or more members, the thing would never take place in practice. Mechanics and manufacturers will always be inclined, with few exceptions, to give their votes to merchants, in preference to persons of their own professions or trades. Those discerning cit- izens are well aware that the mechanic and manufacturing arts furnish the ma- terials of mercantile enterprise and industry. Many of them, indeed, are immediately connected with the operations of commerce. They know that the merchant is their natural patron and friend; and they are aware, that however great the confidence they may justly feel in their own good sense, their inter- ests can be more effectually promoted by the merchant than by the,mselves. They are sensible that their habits in life ha,"e not ~een such as to give them thos . d d nts wl'thout which m a dehberate assembly, the great-e acquire en owme , , , est I b 'I" f the most part useless; and that the mfluence and natura a I ltIes are or W ' h d . . ments of the merchants render them more equal elg t, an supenor acqUire , ' If' h . t . "h' h might happen to mfuse me mto t e public o a COntest With any spmt w IC "Th'd

'I h facturing and tradmg mterests. ese cons I - cou~C\ s, unfriendly to t e manu , be mentioned, prove, and experience ~~atl?nS, ~nd many. others tha::~~~~urers will commonly be disposed to be-

nflrms It, that artisans and m d h hom they recommend. We must Sto h' hants an t ose w h

W t elr votes upon mere h t ral representatives of all these classes t erefore consider merchants as t e na u

of the community.

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286 ECTI O N X

W I' I I I I cod )rofessions. lirrle need be observed· th "It 1 rega re ro t 1e carnt ." . ' ey t I . . . ' '.' , d '!Ccordlllg ro their Sl tuanOn d r~ \' forl11 no distiller IIIterest 111 SOC let) , an. '" d d I ' an talent '

. .. . . h b' f the con ti ence an C 10lce of ~ h s, wdl be IIldl SCfl l11l11atel)' teo leets 0 cac Other and of other parts of the C0l11111Ulll tr . " . . '

N h ' · . b t tile landed Inrerest; and thiS, 111 a political vi~ ot IIlg rema illS U· ( I ' d f cw, and . I I ' I ' I t,ke ro be peflect )' unite rOI11 thA parncu ar y 111 re anon ro taxes, .. '. c wealth.

iest landlord down ro the poorest tenanr. No tax can be laid on land Whi h f '11 ' f acres as well as the p . c will no t affect the proprieror 0 1111 Ions 0 , . . ' ropnetor of

single acre. Every landholder will therefore have a coml11on Inrerest to keep th: taxes on land as low as possible; and common Inrerest may always ?ereckoned upon as the surest bond of sympathy. Bur If we even suppose a dlstlJ1ction of interest between the opulent landholder and the 1llIddllllg farmer, what reaso is there ro conclude, that the first would stand a better chance of being dep~te~ to the national legislature than the last? If we. take fact as our gUide, and look into our own senate and assembly, we shall fllld that moderate proprietors of land prevail in both; nor is this less the case in the senate, which consists of a smaller number, than in the assembly, which is composed of a greater number. \Vhere the qualifications of the elecrors are the same, whether they have to choose a small or a large number, their votes will fall upon those in whom they have most confidence; whether these happen to be men of large fortunes, or of moderate property, or of no property at all.

It is said to be necessary, that all classes of citizens should have Some of their own number in the represenrative body, in order that their feelings and inrerests may be the berrer understood and attended to. But we have seen that this will never happen under any arrangement that leaves the votes of the peo· pie free. Where this is the case, the representative body, with too few excep· rions to have an)' influence on the spirit of the government, will be composed of landholders, merchants, and men of the learned professions. But where is the danger that the interests and feelings of the different classes of citizens will not be understood or attended to by these three descri ptions of men? Will not the landholder know and feel whatever will promote or insure the interest of landed property? And will he not, from his own interesr in that species of property, be sufficiently prone to resist every attempt to prejudice or encumber it? Will not the merchant understand and be disposed to cultivate, as far as may be proper, the interest of the mechanic and manufacturing arts, to which his commerce is so nearly allied? Will not the man of the learned profession, who will feel a neutrality to the rivalships between the different branches of in' dustry, be likely to prove an impartial arbiter between them ready to promote either, so far as it shall appear to him conducive to the gen;ral interestS of the society?

If we take into the ~ccount the momentary humors or dispositions which may . happe~ to prevaIl In par~icular parts of the society, and to which a WIS~ adminIstratIon WIll never be Inattentive is the h . ation leads t. . ". ,man w ose SItu h r extensive inqUIry and Information less II'kel t b 'udge of t el y 0 e a competent I .e1 nature, extent, and foundation than one h b . d s nor rfav w ose 0 servatlon oe

d

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TilE CO NGRESS 287

d the circle of his neighbors ad · . I h beyon . . . . n acquaintances? Is It not natura t at a mall who IS a candidate for the favor of the people, and who is dependent on the suffrages of hiS fellow-citizens for the continuance of his public honors, should take care to mform h11nself of their dispositions and inclinations, and hould be willing to allow them their proper degree of influence upon his con- ~uct? This dependence, and the necessity of being bound himself, and hi s pos- teriry, by the laws to which he gives hiS assent, are the true, and they are the

rang chords of sympathy between the representative and the constituent. st . fhd '. There IS no part 0 t ea ministration of government that requires exten- ·ve information and a thorough knowledge of the principles of political econ- ~my, so much as the business of taxation. The man who understands those

rinciples best Will be least hkely to resort to oppressive expedients, or to sac- ~ifice any particular class of citizens to the procurement of revenue. It might be demonstrated that the most productive system of finance will always be the least burdensome. There can be no doubt that in order to a judicious exercise of the power of taxation, it is necessary that the person in whose hands it is should be acquainted with the general genius, habits, and modes of thinking of the people at large, and with the resources of the country. And this is all that can be reasonably meant by a knowledge of the interests and feelings of the people. In any other sense the proposition has either no meaning, or an absurd one. And in that sense let every considerate citizen judge for himself where the requisite qualification is most likely to be found.

WOODROW WILSON

53. CONGRESSIONAL GOVERNMENT

Before being elected president of the United States in 1912 Woodrow Wilson (1856-1924) had served as president of Princeton University and as president of th.e American Political Science ASSOCIatIOn. But It was h,s becoming the reforming governor of New Jersey in 191 .1 that made him a credible candidate for the DemocratIc Party's nomination for president in 1912. He then w?n

h 'd wI'th a plurality of the vote when the tn-t e presl ency . . cumbent Republican president, Wtll,am Howard Taft,

Source: From Woodrow Wilson, Congressional Gove",ment, 1885, Chapter 3.

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288 SECTION X

I , I " R P ,bll'can vote with form er Repllbli-sp 11 t 1e llra/onty e I h {,t I ' tl o ai' er OSIll Je cal/ president Theodore Roosevelt w , g " (, , I'ndependent on the Pro-nOllllllatlOn to Ta,t, rail as III , , "8 II M ose" Party ticket. Wrlson would

gresslVe or II 0 1921) d ld ' - an WOII serve two terms as president (1913 lead the nation throllgh World War I . ,

As a college professor, Wilson publrshed the now classic aCCOl/nt of the congressional legislatIVe proce~s, Congressional Government: A Study in AmerIcan Politics (1885). Wilsol/'s analysis describes how the vanous com- mittees, subcomlllittees, select committees, and confer- ence committees result in a complex and decentralrzed distribution of power. The influence of the standing com- mittees of the Congress cannot be overstated. As Woodrow Wilson declared more than a century ago, "I know not how better to describe our form of government in a single phrase than by calling it a government by the Chairmen of the Standing Committees of Congress. " Be- cause of the various subcommittees, select committees, and conference committees, overall authority "is perplex- ingly subdivided and distributed, and responsibility has to be hunted down in out-of-the-way corners." As a re- sult, Wilson wrote, in perhaps the most famous statement from Congressional Government, "Congress in session is Congress on public exhibition, whilst Congress in its committee-rooms is Congress at work." Despite periodic bursts of congressional reform, Wilson 5 insights continue to provide us with an amazingly accurate picture of what he termed the" dance of legislation . ..

Like a vast picture thronged with figures of equal prominence and crowded with elaborate and obtrusive details, Congress is hard to see satisfactorily and appreciatively at a single view and from a single stand-point. Its complicated forms and diversified structure confuse the vision, and conceal the system which underlies its composition. It is too complex to be understood without an effort, without a careful and systematic process of analysis. Consequently, very few people do understand it, and its doors are practically shut against the comprehension of the public at large. If Congress had a few authoritative lead- ers whose figures were very distinct and very conspicuous to the eye of the world, and who could represent and stand for the national legislature in the thoughts of that very numerous, and withal very respectable, class of persons who must think specifically and in concrete forms when they think at all, those persons who can make something out of men but very little out of intangible generalizations, it would be quite within the region of possibilities for the ma- jority of the nation to follow the course of legislation without any very serioUS

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confusion of th ought. I suppo h· I . ' h d h I

· sc t at:l most everybody who Just now gi ves :l ny ee to t e po IC Y of Gre:lt B . . . . h

· d I I'k . rttall1, With regard even to the refo rm of the fran- c Ise an or ler I -e Strtctl y I ,I . . h

. II I egis atlve questi ons, thinks of Mr. Gladstone and IS co eagues rat ler th:l n (f I H f

Th ' . ) . t 110' ouse 0 Commons. whose serv:lnts they a re.

e questi on IS not What ' 11 P I' . . ' , WI a r I:lment do ? bur, What wlil Mr. G ladstone do? And there IS even less do b I . " . ". u t t 1,It It IS easier :lnd more natural to look upon the leg'lslatlve deSigns of Ge . . I k db ' . . rmanY,ls oc e up ehllld Bismarck 's heavy brows than to thlllk of them as depe d h d " . h ' n ent upon t e etermlilatlons of the RclC stag, although as a matter of fact its consent is indispens:lble even to the plans of the ImperiOUS and domineering Chancellor.

But there is no great minister or mini stry to represent the will and being of Congress III the common thought. The Speaker of the House of Representa- tives stands as near to leadership as any one; but his will does not run as a for- mative and imperative power in legislation much beyond the appointment of the committees who are to lead the House and do its work for it, and it is, therefore, not entirely satisfactory to the public mind to trace all legislation to him. He may have a controlling hand in starting it; but he sits too still in his chair, and is too evidently not on the floor of the body over which he presides, to make it seem probable to the ordinary judgment that he has much immedi- ate concern in legislation after it is once set afoot. Everybody knows that he is a staunch and avowed partisan, and that he likes to make smooth, whenever he can, the legislative paths of his party; but it does not seem likely that all im- portant measures originate with him, or that he is the author of every distinct policy. And in fact he is not. He is a great party chief, but the hedging circum- stances of his official position as presiding officer prevent his performing the part of active leadership. He appoints the leaders of the House, but he is not himself its leader.

The leaders of the House are the chairmen of the principal Standing Com- mittees. Indeed, to be exactly accurate, the House has as many leaders as there are subjects of legislation; for there are as many Standing Committees as there are leading classes of legislation, and in the consideration of every topic of busi- ness the House is guided by a special leader in the person of the chairman of the Standing Committee, charged with the superintendence of measures of the par- ticular class to which that topic belongs. It is this multiplicity of leaders, this many-headed leadership, which makes the organization of the House too com- plex to afford uninformed people and unskilled observers any easy clue to its methods of rule. For the chairmen of the Standing Committees do not consti- tute a cooperative body like a ministry. They do not consult and concur in the adoption of homogeneous and mutually helpful measures; there is no thought of acting in concert. Each Committee goe~ its ow~ way as its own pace. It is im- possible to discover any unity or method III the disconnected and therefore un- systematic, confused, and desultory action of the House, or any common purpose in the measures which its Committees from time to time recommend.

And it is not only to the unanalytic thought of the common observer who looks at the House from the olltside that its doings seem helter-skelter, and

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.'

. . t once easy to understand them \Vh '11 Ilc' J( IS not a . b cn without comprehensl ) en,. I d 'lay through open seSSIOn y one who'

. . d ' h 'Ir Jarly lea \ . . d f IS they arc scrutinIZe In, t C 'I ,J member, enterrng ItS oors or the (ir

I T h . newly-e ecte d h h St in~idc the I ousc. c , ' I d" f itS rules an customs t an t e more in-

tilllC, :lnd with no more knoW c ge 0 I "'ys experiences great difficulty in ad . . ' . tS possess, J \"'. -tclllgent of IllS constltuCn 'd' f congressional Ide to the strange and

jllsting his preconceIved I ca,s 1 0

I e finds himself surrounded after he ha

I f , (" ' s b)' w lIC I 1 ..' s lInlookc, - or COJ1( Itlon t f the great legIslative machllle. Indeed

. J I I ecomc a p:lr 0 been sworn nl:ln 13~ ) . ' , • -ted with his career in Washington t II Y thmgs COli lice 0 there :lrc genera y mJn . the IleW member. In the first place h'

I I · .' .( r to 'Iggrreve ' IS

disgust aJl( ' .Isplrrt, I no ' I'm;o the federal capital. Possibly the mem- local reput:ltlOn does no

k t foll(~V n" and receive him into full fellowship; but no

bers (rom his own State ' IIOW n , . h

I k I . cept as an adherent of thIS or t at party, or as a new-

one e se . II()WS ]lin, ex .' . . . 'f' d h' . I

. I ' S · t He finds his station mSlgJ1l reant, an IS Iden- comcr (rolll t liS or t wt ra e. . .... . . d" I' t tlll'S social humiliation which he cxperIences m Circles IJ1

tlty n' ,stmet. )lI f d" . b . h

. h I reSSl11an does not of itself con er IstJllCtlOn, ecause It is w IC to lC a cong d . . only to be Olle among many, is probably not to be compa~e Wlt~ the chagnn and disappointment which come in company.wlth the I~evltable discovery that he is equally without weight or title to consideration m .the House ItSelf. No man when chosen to the membership of a body possessmg great powers and exal:ed prerogatives, likes to find his activity. repressed, and himself sup- pressed, by imperative rules and precedents which seem ~o have be~n ~r~med for the deliberate purpose of making usefulness unattamable by mdlVldual members. Yet such the new member finds the rules and precedents of the House to be, It matters not to him, because it is not apparent on the face of things, that those rules and precedents have grown, not out of set purpose to curtail the privileges of new members as such, but out of the plain necessities of business; it remains the fact that he suffers under their curb, and it is not until "custom hath made it in him a property of easiness" that he submits to

them with anything like good grace. Not all new members suffer alike, of course, under this trying discipline;

because it is not every new member that comes to his seat with serious pur- poses of honest, earnest, and duteous work. There are numerous tricks and subterfuges, soon learned and easily used, by means of which the most idle and ~elf-indulgent me~bers may readily make such show of exemplary diligence as Will qUite satisfy, If It does not positively delight, constituents in Buncombe. But the number of congressmen who deliberately court uselessness and coun- terfeit well-doing is. probably small. The great majority doubtless have a keen enough sense of thetr duty, and a sufficiently unhesitating desire to do it; and it may .sa~ely be ta~en for granted that the zeal of new members is generally hot and .lJlslste.nt. If It be not hot to begin with, it is like to become so by reaSon of fflctlon with th~ rules, because such men must inevitabl be chafed by the bonds of restramt drawn b h b' y f h H

a out t em y the mexorable observances ate ouse.

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r T H E Co GRESS

Often the new member goes t \X' h ' ticular line of policy, having bee 0 I as Ington as the representative of a par-n e ected t b trade, or as a champion of protect". '. '. may e, as an advocate of free tering on his duties ro seek iml1 Idon, and It IS naturally his first ca re upo n en-

' . 1e late 0PpOrt . f h . f ' vl'ewS and lI11medlate me~ 11 S of '. h unity or t e expression 0 hiS u giVing t d f . upon the attention of Congre H ' d ' em e Inlte shape and thrusting them when he finds both Opportuni:

s . . ~s ISappOll1tment is, therefore, very keen

bill' but that is all he can do . Ydah n

means dellled h1l11. He can introduce his , , an e must do th . I ' d .

P articular manner. Thi s he ' I"k I at at a partlCu ar time an 111 a .. IS ley to lea rn through I . 'f h b

ot cautiOUS to II1quire bef I d h . rue e experience, lee n h I ore lan t e details of practice. He is likely to make a ras start, upon t 1e SUPP OSition th~t C b

u ongress 0 serves the 0 d ' I f arliamentary practice t h ' h h h . r lI1ary ru es 0 PI b f '1' t h ' °h w IC . e as become accustomed in the debating c u s ami lar 0 IS your and 111 th . . H ' b'II ' d b I ,< e mass-meetll1gs known to his later expe-

nence. IS I IS O U tess ready fo . ' . . r presentation early 111 the sessio n and some day, taklllg advantage of a pause in the proce d ' h h ' . b e II1gS, w en t ere seems to be no busllless efore the House he rises to read 't d . d . B . ' ' I an move ItS a option. ut he flllds gettlllg the floor an arduous and precarious undertaking. There are certalll to be others who want it as well as he; and his indignation is stirred by the fact that the Speaker does not so much as turn towards him, though he must have heard hiS call, but recognizes some one else readily and as a matter of course. If he be obstreperous and persistent in his cries of "Mr. Speaker," he may get that gre~t functionary's attention for a moment,-only to be told, however, that he IS out of order, and that his bill can be introduced at that stage only by unanimous consent: immediately there are mechanically-uttered but emphatic exclamations of objection, and he is forced to sit down confused and disgusted. He has, without knowing it, obtruded himself in the way of the "regular order of business," and been run over in consequence; without being quite clear as to how the accident occurred.

Moved by the pain and discomfiture of this first experience to respect, if not to fear, the rules, the new member casts about, by study or inquiry, to find out, if possible, the nature and occasion of his privileges. He learns that his only safe day is Monday. On that day the roll of the States is called, and mem- bers may introduce bills as their States are reached in the call. So on Monday he essays another bout with the rules, confident this time of being on their safe side,-but mayhap indiscreetly and unluckily over-confident. For if he sup- poses, as he naturally will, that after his bill has been sent up to be read by the clerk he may say a few words in its behalf, and in that belief sets our upon his long-considered remarks, he will be knocked down by the rules as surely as he was on the first occasion when he gained the floor for a bnef moment. The rap of Mr. Speaker's gavel is sharp, immediate, and peremptory. He is curtly. in- formed that no debate is in order; the bill can only be referred to the appropnate

Committee. . . Th ' . . d d d ' h tenl'ng' it is his first lesson 111 committee government, IS IS, 111 ee , IS ear , .

and th ' d ts but the sooner he learns the prerogatives and powers e master s ro smar ;

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292 SECTION X

, I ner will he penetrate the mysteries of of the Standing CommIttees t le soo 'th their thorny side The "the

'd h ' f f ther contact WI . pnvlle rules and avol t e pam 0 ur ' d h d f I I ges I b 'nmg an teen 0 t le ru es B h of the Standing Committees are t le egm d h' b' b' Ot the

, d h S te con uct t elr usmess y what House of RepresentatIves an t e ena 'f " may f' 'I b ' rately be called an odd deVIce 0 dISIntegration Th' Iguranve y, ut not maccu, ' II ' " e House virtually both deliberates and legislates m sma sectIons. TIme would fail 'd' II h b'll b ught in for they every sessIon number thousand It to ISCUSS ate I S ro , , Sj

d " b d b d h ther even if time allowed, the ordl11ary processes of an It IS to e ou te we, , h ff f h h debate and amendment would suffice to Sift the c a rom r e w eat in the bushels of bills every week piled upon the clerk's desk. Accordl11gly, no futile at- tempt is made to do anything of the kind',The wor~ IS parceled out, most .of it to the forty-seven Standing Committees which constl~ute the regular organization of the House some of it to select committees appol11ted for specIal and tempo- rary purpose~ . Each of the almost numberless bills that come, pouring in on Mondays is "read a first and second time, "-simply perfunctordy read, that is, by its title, by the clerk, and passed by silent assent through its first formal courses, for the purpose of bringing it to the proper stage for commitmenr,-and referred without debate to the appropriate Standing Committee. Practically, no bill escapes commitment-save, of course, bills introduced by committees, and a few which may now and then be crowded through under a suspension of the rules, granted by a two-thirds vote-though the exact disposition to be made of a bill is not always determined easily and as a matter of course. Besides the great Committee of Ways and Means and the equally great Committee on Appropria- tions, there are Standing Committees on Banking and Currency, on Claims, on Commerce, on the Public Lands, on Post-Offices and Post-Roads, on the Judi- ciary, on Public Expenditures, on Manufactures, on Agriculture, on Military Affairs, on Naval Affairs, on Mines and Mining, on Education and Labor, on Patents, and on a score of other branches of legislative concern; but careful and differential as is the topical division of the subjects of legislation which is repre- sented in the titles of these Committees, it is not always evident to which Com· mittee each particular bill should go. Many bills affect subjects which may be regarded as Iymg as properly within the jurisdiction of one as of another of the Committees; for no hard and fast lines separate the various classes of business which the Committees are commissioned to take in charge Their jurisdictions over/a? at ~any points, and it must frequently happen that bills are read which cover,Just t~IS c?mmon ground. Over the commitment of such bills sharp and in· terestmg skirmishes often take place There I'S act' .. L them the , " . Ive competition lor , ordl?ary, qUl~t routme of ma~ter-of-course reference being interrupted by rival motions seekl,ng to give very different directions to the disposition to be made of them. To which Committee should a bill "to fix and establish the maximuJll rates of fares of the Umon Pacific and Central Pacific Railroads" be sent,-W the Committee on Commerce or to th C . Sh Id a bill which pr h'b' h 'I' e ommlttee on the Pacific Railroads? Oll

o I ItS t e mal mg of c t ' I ' I 0 to h C ' er am c asses of letters and clrcu ars g t e ommlttee on Post-Offices a d P R d 'I of

to the Committee on th J d" n b ost- oa s, because it relates to the mal s~ e u IClary, ecause it proposes to make any transgreSSiOn

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,.

TH E CONGR ESS 293

. prohibition a rime? What is the .. . of lIS 0 lie within two distinct c . proper disPOsition of any bill which Ihu seerns I . . ommlttee Jur LSdlClions ;

The fate of bill committed is generall . . . . ed is a bill doomed Wh · y not uncertain . As a rule, a bill

.... mltt . en It goes f h I k' . ,0'" . I· rom t e c er s desk to a commlttee- m It crosse a par lamentary brid, f · h

roO . ·11 Th ge 0 slg 5 to dim dungeons of silence b nce It WI neve r return. e mea d · . we . . ns an time of Its death are unknown but

. friends never see It again . Of COurse S d· . , lIS . If h f II no tan Ing Committee is privileged to

k upon Itse t e u powers of the H . ta e . . . .. ouse It represents, and formally and deciSively relect a bill referred to It · Its disapp I ·f · d· b . ' rova , I It Isapproves, must e reported to the Hou e In the form of a recomme d · h h b·11 "d . . nation t at tel 0 not

" But It IS easy and therefore c I . . pass. , ommon, to et the sessIOn pass Without king any report at all upon bills dee d b· . bl . ma . me 0 lectlona e or Unimportant, and

!O substitute for reports upon them a few bills of the Committee's own draft- ing; so that thousands of bills expire with the expiration of each Congress, not having been reJected, but haVing been simply neglected. There was not time to report upon them.

Of course it goes without saying that the practical effect of this Committee organi~ation of .the House is .to consign to each of the Standing Committees the enure direction of legislation upon those subjects which properly come to itS consideration. As to those subjects it is entitled to the initiative, and all leg- islative action with regard to them is under its overruling guidance. It gives shape and course to the determinations of the House. In one respect, however, its initiative is limited. Even a Standing Committee cannot report a bill whose subject-matter has not been referred to it by the House, " by the rules or other- wise"; it cannot volunteer advice on questions upon which its advice has not been asked. But this is not a serious, not even an operative, limitation upon its functions of suggestion and leadership; for it is a very simple matter to get re- ferred to it any subject it wishes to introduce to the attention of the House. Its chairman, or one of its leading members, frames a bill covering the point upon which the Committee wishes to suggest legislation; brings it in, in his capacity as a private member, on Monday, when the call of States is made; has it re- ferred to his Committee; and thus secures an opportunity for the making of the desired report.

It is by this imperious authority of the Standing Committee~ that the new member is stayed and thwarted whenever he seeks to ta~e .an active part m the business of the House. Turn which way he may, some pnvllege of the Commit- tees stands in his path. The rules are so framed as to put all busine.ss under their management; and one of the discoveries which the new member IS sure t~ make, albeit after many trying experiences and sobenn? adventures and as hiS first session draws towards its close, is, that under thelf sway freedom of d~­ bate finds no place of allowance, and that his .Ion~-delayed speech must ~emam unspok F I ressl· onal seSSIOn IS tOO short to afford time for en. or even a ong cong . a full co ·d . f II the reports of the forty-seven Committees, and de-

nSI eratlon 0 a hid d ·f bate b . ·dl t short if not altoget er exc u e ,I any

upon them must e rlgi Y cu, h h · h b f considerable part of the necessary business is to be gotten t roug Wit e ore

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I

I

SECTION X

_ which rhe House mllsr always - _ . , sub,ecrs ro _ I) - -. give

ad,-Ollrnmenr. There :He Solll< f' o rn rhe ConllTllfteCS o n rlllting and _ { > reporrs r I - . I - I on

Prompr attention: rhere!ort d I " are some su l,el rs ro w Ill' 1 ca reE I - fer· ·Jr1 r lert C ' f II Elecrions are :llwavs If1 ore " d d. rll ~ rcfore rhe Ol11nllrree 0 \~11'S' d b - a "or e, • -' "n (onsider:uion musr alw.l)'s e.' . -~rion s are clorhed wlrh exrraordin o . -. on Approprr.. - _ .. r)' ~leans and rhe Comn1lrtd.' I b-II n -w be reported. and Will ordll1arilv b

_ _ . ' . d supp V I S I " _ II 1- . . e prrnleges; and reH·nu.t an . I' 'Ire the onl)' specla y Icensed Cornnll-t - - B r rhese our. . ·onsidered. :U ;Iny [IIlle. u _ . fixed order as rhey are called on by th

, ke rhelr rurns rn - .- - . I f e rees. The resr musr r.1 - I ' ICII (' rumbs 01 rllne as la I ro m the ta - helves Wlr I Sl . . Speaker conrentlng r elllS -

• . ' - . - . , f hi ,hest preroganve ... , bles at rhe four COllllllfltrhee, 0, _ :r poinrs of the rules. They are full of com.

These a re some 0 r ep a In_ _ f - f - _ d f-' f ' to the uninlnared. and the con us IOns 0 practice are

P'e.xI tI· an 0 con USlon I d f b . . ' t' - f rhe rules. For rhe regu ar or er 0 usrness is grearer than rhe con USlons 0 . ' I - f'

I b - - t d bl- the introductIOn of reso unons 0 !ered "by

constanr y ell1g Inrerrup e ' _ " - f' h .. _. - .. d of bills let rn under a suspens ion 0 t e rules. Srrll unanUllOUS consent, an , '

- - -d h r rher~ I'S one principle which runs rhroug h every s tage 01 pro, It IS eVI enr r a • .' _ cedure. and which is never disallowed or abrogated,-. ~he prrnclple that the Committees shall rule wirhout let or hindrance. And thiS IS a prmclple of extra· ordinary formative power. Ir is rhe mould of ~ll legislati~n. In the first place, the speeding of business under rhe direction of the Committees determrnes the character and the amounr of rhe discussion ro which legisbrion shall be sub· jccred. The House is conscious rhat rime prcsscs. It knows that, hurry as it may, it will hardly gcr through with onc cighrh of rhe business bid our for the scssion, and rhat to pause for lengrhy debare is ro allow the arrears ro accumu· late. Besides, most of the members are individually anxious to expedire acrion on every pending measure, because each member of the House is a member of one or more of the Standing Committees, and is quite naturally desirous rhat the bills prepared by his Committees, and in which he is, of course, specially interested by reason of the parricular attention which he has been compelled to gll'e rhem, should reach a hearing and a I'ote as soon as possible. It must. therefore, rnvarrably happen thar the Committee holding the floor at any par· tlcular time IS rhe, Committee whose proposals the majoriry wish to dispose of as summarrly ,IS CIrCUmstances will allow, in o rder that the rest of the forry-twO undPrrhvll~ge. d Commltte:s to which the majority belong may gain rhe e~rlier an t e !alrer chance 01 a hea - A .

II I d b nng, reportrng Committee besides is gener·

a y as g a ro e pushed as th '. "1 b OIl d d - • e malom), are to push it. It probably has severa

I s mature , an Wishes ro see them dis . - oi opportunity are passed and gone. posed of before ItS brref hours

Consequently, it is the established for one hour to the member of the re Cu~tom of the House to accord rhe I~oor business under consideration- d h~ortrng ~ommittee who has ch:lfge ot rhe The reporringcommirree_ma ' a~ t <It.hour IS made the chief hour of debare: for his opening remarks. h n se om, II ever, uses the whole of the hour himself {b ' , e lIses pa rt of t d - £ r ror y undisputed privilDg . - h _ I ,an rerams ('oorrol of the rest 0 I. h fI • e If IS IS to d - 0

r e oor or nor. No amendn " ISpose of, whether he himself be L1PO lent IS rn order d - h -rot unng r ar hour, unless he COil>

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esentation; and he does not of c ' Id I ' , , rO irs pr , h k', ourse, yle liS time IIldiscriminately to oe who WIS es to spea ,He gives way II1deed ' f ' h h Id

~oy 0 II f ' d ' ' , as 111 alrness e s ()U , to , ltS as we as to nen s ot the d ' II OppOnCI . measure un er hiS charge; but genera y

e 'IS acco rded a share ot his tl'me \vl h b ' I h ' ' o 00 10 as not 0 talne( IS prevIous o rOlllise of the floor; and those who do speak must not run beyond the num- ~er of minutes he has agreed to allow them, He keeps the course both of de- bate and of amendment rhus carefully under hi s own supervision, as a good tactician, and befo re he fll1ally Yields the floor, at the expiration of his hour, he is sure to move the pre~lOu s question, To neglect to do so would be to lose all control of the busll1ess 111 hand; for unless the previous question is ordered the debate may run on at will, and his Committee's chance for getting its measures rhrough slip qUite away; and that would be nothing less than his disgrace, He would be all the more blameworthy because he had but to ask for the previous question to get It. As I have said, the House is as eager to hurry business as he can be, and will consent to almost any limitation of discussion that he may de- mand; though, probably, if he were to throw the reins upon its neck, it would run at large from very wantonness, in scorn of such a driver. The previous question once ordered, all amendments are precluded, and one hour remains for the summing-up of this same privileged committee-man before the final vote is taken and the bill disposed of.

These are the customs which baffle and perplex and astound the new member. In these precedents and usages, when at length he comes to under- stand them, the novice spies out the explanation of the fact, once so confound- ing and seemingly inexplicable, that when he leaped to his feet to claim the floor other members who rose after him were coolly and unfeelingly preferred before him by the Speaker. Of course it is plain enough now that Mr. Speaker knew beforehand to whom the representative of the reporting Committee had agreed to yield the floor; and it was no use for anyone else to cry out for recognition. Whoever wished to speak should, if possible, have made some arrangement with the Committee before the business came to a hearing, and should have taken care to notify Mr. Speaker that he was to be granted the floor for a few moments.

Unquestionably this, besides being a very interesting, is a very novel and significant method of restricting debate and expediting legislative action,-a method of very serious import, and obviously fraught with far-reaching consti- tutional effects. The practices of debate which prevail in its legislative assembly are manifestly of the utmost importance to a self-governing people; for that legislation which is not thoroughly discussed by the legislating body is practi- cally done in a corner. It is impossible for Congress itself to do wisely what it does so hurriedly; and the constituencies cannot understand what Congress does not itself stop to consider. The prerogativ,es of the Committee,s represent something more than a mere convenient diVISion of labor. There IS only one Part of its business to which Congress, as a whole, attends,-that part, namely, Which is embraced under the privileged subjects of revenue and supply. The House never accepts the proposals of the Committee of Ways and Means, or of

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the Committees only digest tile vanom III""", ..... ~:-----. ~J :"u.nuual mem_

b . . I . d ~fter thorough II1vesttgatton for th f' ers, and prepare It, Wit 1 care, ,111« . ' .' e Inal consideration and action of the House; but, 111 realIty, they dictate the COUrse to be taken, prescribing the ~eci~ions of the H.ouse not only, but measuring out, according to their own WII\S, Its opportulll.t1eS for debate a~d deliberation as well. The House sits, not for serious diSCUSSion, bu~ to sa~ctton the conclu_ sions of its Committees as rapidly as possible. It legislates 111 ItS committee_ rooms; not by the determinations of maj~rities, but by the resolutions of specially-commissioned minorities; so that It IS not f.ar from ~he truth to say that Congress in session is Congress on public exhibItIon, whIlst Congress in its committee-rooms is Congress at work.

GLENN R. PARKER AND ROGER H. DAVIDSON

POPULAR CONGRESSMEN AND UNPOPULAR CONGRESS

Americans paradoxically seem to love their OWII memo. ber of. Congress while th inking little of Congress as a wlrole. "Based on national survey data, Parker alld Davidson conclude that Americans lise one set of stall- dards for evaluating Congress and another for ellalllat- ing indillidual members of Congress. The slolUness of Congress along with dissatisfaction with the policy re- suits of congressional action lead to negatille ella IlIa- tions of the institution as a whole. 011 the other halld, individual members are rarely held accountable for f)ol- icy decisions of the Congress, bllt are ellaluated accord- 1ng to their IJersotlal qualities and level of service to constituents.

The past decade has witnessed the spread of public cynicism concerning estab- lished political institutions. The available evidence suggests that nlienation

Salt"':: From Glenn R. I'ark~r and Roger H. Davidson, "Why Do AmericlIls l.ove Their C(Jng~l;S ' men So Much More Than 1 hClr Congress?" LCKisiali/lc SI"r/iI's Q"fl/·llTi),. IV. I. Febru"r), () /9. ComparaTIve Legislative Research Celller. Reprinted by permission of the pllhlisher and lilt' authors.

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the IlolilY is :l fairly widesprend phtnolne ' II ' (rOIIi . I ' f ' non, pcnetratlng a countri es, II ringing to t l C ~ lIr ;:J LC fUlid amental (Iu" st 'l ' b hi ' , f It ), , , < - ons a olll'r c egltlmacy 0 po-

:u, I ilisrirurlOns ;l lld nlithol'ltIcs. htlC~ ' I ' , ,

A recurrtng t lcnH': In Cl'itlqIlCS of the Anlcr ' I" I ' h ' ' , , , Ican po Itlca system IS t e cm- , dismay ;lt the lJl :lbtl lty of rhe government to f ' d ' h

zen S " • 19(, 3 64 ' per a rm , an Impe Imcnt t at SeyJ11 0ur 1"lpsc t ( " ~ , ~p. -70) singles out as detrimental to poli tica l stabil- it y. Felix hankful tel (1930, p. 3) Lharact'Crtztd distrust of Dcpression-era gov- c(llll1ent :15 an Indication that pcople fclt that government was unable to satisfy Ihe needs of n Illodern SOUtty, In a later and presumably more benign era, Morris Roseni>e,rg (/ 951, p. 14) contended that 'Politics meant "very little to eople because It !t ter;l ll y docs !t tric fo r them, " and th at governmental action

P 'd d i u' I \~ conSI ere ly many as Irrc evant to their li ves" (1954, p. 364). Such a asture toward governlllent probably affects the public 's image of political of-

hcials . In fact, William C. Mitchell (1959, p. 693) has suggested that such officinls arc not Viewed as performing vital services because political functions Ihemselves are not conSidered as providing a societal contribution.

Publ ic assessments 'of governmental performance can be described i terms of three components: confidence, impact, and eva luation. Confiaence reflects the degree to which individuals have faith in the actions of their offi- cials and/or institutions. The extent to which governmental activity is perceived as nffecting an individual's life is a measure of the imp-act of governmental per- formance. Evaluatiolls are explicit judgments of t1ie value the individual as- signs to that impact. In this research note we focus on the last-mentioned component-the content of public evaluations of one political institution, the United States Congress.

Citizens' evaluations are certainly important in and of themselves. But in re- porting these assessments, we too often overlook the bases of their judgments- that is, the criteria individuals use in forming their evaluations. T~ he ob'ective of this analysis is to describe the standards used in appraising Congress and its membership and to examine response categories in an effort to gauge the likelihood that certain standards generate favorable evaluations.

The findings are based on opinion surveys administered to national popu- lation samples (Harris, 1968; U.S. House of Representatives, 1977). Of partic- ular interest are the responses elicited from two open-ended survey items concerning evaluations of Congress and the respondent's representative. In both surveys, individuals were f sr aSKed how thex-would evaluate e erfor- mance of Congress-excellent, pretty good, ~nly fa ir, or poor. ,Respond~nts were then queried about the criteria u on which they based their evaluation. Later in die interview sessions the-same questioning was used to ascertain re- SPOndent'~udgmenr of their r;presentativtl's performance in die U.s . ous,e of

epresentatives. The multiple-response narure of the ~pen-ended q~estlOn­ naire items allowed individuals the opporrunity to proVide as many dIfferent criteria as til d ' d Tile responses to the above items were then coded and

ey eSlre . d d 'f d' 'bl categorized h b ' f the criteria volunteere an, I Iscernl e, the f on t e aSls 0 I avorable or unfavorable nature of the responses.

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,

298 SECTION X

ANALYSIS

f t ly mentioned criteri on for evaluat'

, \' ' I' most requen 'I' 109 Domestic po ICy IS t 1e I trnlity of domestIc po ICY appears to h II 'I) All gh t 1e cen " ,aVe Congress (Ta) e ',t lOU 968' till is the most frequently cIted basis f

declined somcwhat Slllce late 1 , It s iated with domestic policy has ,or I ' C ' . The valence asso

C " a So cva uatlng onglcss, WI 'I" 1968 domestIc polIcy seemed to d'

I , I I ' I )'cars 11 c 111 1-change( 111 t 1e ast sevela ,< 'I t'sfied and dissatisfied with COn' 'd I .. 1.' , ., ally Into t lOse sa I "gres-

VI e t lC e cctOlatc equ" ' I d d'stinctly negatIve effect III 1977· 93 ' I " " -h IlolIc)' actions la a I ) slona ,l(.:tlons, su~ , '\" as a basis for their evaluations of Co

Ilcrccnt of those Cltll1g domestIC po ICY 'I f n-" nts of congresslona per ormance, gress were neg'Hive 111 theIr assess me ,

, I ' I , 196<8 I "I'etnam War's salience took Its toll on the popularity of' nate ,t1 .v , 'b ' f I '

G f I I 'ted foreign polIcy as a aSl s or eva uatlon, nearly ongress: 0 t lose w 10 CI , I ' d h d t-Ive evaluatl'ons Several years later, 111 the absence of two-t 1Ir s a nega " ,

major American involvement in a foreign war, few people mentioned foreign policy considerations in evaluating Congress. As tlle V.letnal~l War and other foreign ventures began to fade from media ~ttentIo~ and publI~ COnSCI?USneSs, domestic policy conflicts gained greater salIency WIth the publIc: The Ideolog- ical and partisan differences between those controllll1g the WhIte House and Congress served to exacerbate the natural conflicts that the "sharing of power" produces, The resulting policy statements generated negatIve evalua- tions of congressional performance: in 1977, three of every four mentions of legislative-executive relations as a basis for evaluating Congress were negative:

Another frequently mentioned basis for assessing Congress is the style and l pace of the legishtive process, In fact, there appears to be an increase in the saliency of the congressional environment as a basis for congressional evalua- tions: In 1977, one of every three responses made reference to the congres- sional environmcnt, and these references were distinctly negative. It seems clear that the congressional environment, like legislative-executive relations; tends to foster negative evaluatIons of Congress.

In light of the saliency of the various criteria, it is not too surprising that eval- u:1tions of Congress are often negative .. The range and volume of policies and prob- lems for whIch Congress IS hel~1 accountable-by the media and the public-create numerous opportul1mes for dIssatisfaction with congressional performance. ["he cu~bersome legIslative process, which often gives the appearance of delay and in' a~tlon, may be a necessary evil for the constitutional system, but it is not an at- tnb~lte that appeals to the public, Further, both domestic policy and the legislative envlronmcnt are frequcntly mentioned 'lS b'lses f I' C I sllort I ' , ',or eva uatll1g ongress, n , t 1e most salient conccrns ot the 1 II' I , . " IU) IC appear to le those that frequently generate

negative IInpreSSlOns of congressional perform , Th ' ' f ance,

I e""Ct:Jten~ or evahming Congress and those applied.in evaluating individ-

ua rCRrescntatlves show few par' " I E I ' . , < b b d : •. 1 e s, "va uanons of representatives tend to e ase upon constituency scrvic 'd >d I ' , • , ohncumbenrs (T;lblc ') II , e pr~vl e t le dls,trIct and the personal attnbures

I-louse mcmbers in a fa-)' ~I 'I~dton, these cnteria tend to place incllmbent , ,. vora e Ig 1t: most of what people hear (or retain) about

S can

n ed

b y C

am S

can n

ert

'"' ID ID

BAsES OF EVALUATION

Policy Domestic Foreign-Defense

Legislative-Executive Relations Presidential Support Presidential Opposition

Congressional Environment Congressional Style and Pace Congressional Ethics Congressional Self-Seeking

Group Treatment

Other

Repeat of Closed-Ended Question

Don't KnowlNot Ascertained

Total

P ERC ENT OF

ALL RESPONSES

(N = 1370)

51.8 46.3

5.5

6.5 3.1 3.4

16.0 10.2 2.4 3.4

4.2 6.4

12.0 3.0 --

99.9

t 968'

FAVO RABLE

54 35

72 56

38

66 27

U NFAVORABLE

46 65

28 44

62 100 100 34 73

P ERCENT OF

ALL R ESPONSES

(N=18t3)

30.8

19.6

37.1

1.4

8.4

2.8 100.1

30.1 0.7

19.6

23.1 4.9 9.1

1977"

FAVO RABLE

7 100

25

30

50 33

U NFAVORABLE

93

75

70 100 100

50 67

'Question: "How would you rate the job Congress did this past year in 1968-excellent, pretty good, only fair, or poor? Why do you feel this way? Any other reasons?"

b Question: "Overall, how would you rate the job Congress as a whole-that is the House of Representatives-has done during the past 2 or 3 years- would you say Congress has done an excellent job, a pretty good job, only a fair job, or a poor job? Why do you feel this way ? Any other reasons? "

J

S can

n ed

b y C

am S

can n

er

.... 0 0 TABLE 2 Bases of Evaluations of Members of Congress (in percentages)

1968'

P ERCEN T OF

A LL R ESPO N SES B ASES OF EVALUATION (N = 1258) FAVO R ABLE

Policy 11.2 Vague Reference 7.9 69 Specific Reference 3.3 46

Constituency Service 49.8 District Service 28.1 74 Constituent Ass istance 2.1 100 Direct Conditions 2.7 91 Informs Constituents 16.9 18

Persona l Attributes 26 .9 Personal C haracteri stics 16.5 84 Reputation 9.4 95 Persona l Acquaintance 1.0

Group Treatment 6.4 58

Other 0.3 50

Repeat of Closed-Ended Questio n 2.7

Do n't KnowlNot Ascertained 2 .7 , Total 100.0

P EKCENT OF

ALL R ESPONSE...<;

UNFAVO RA BLE (N = 1232)

3.0 3 1 1.5 54 1.5

37 .7 26 13.3

12 .6 9 3.7

82 8 .1

35.6 16 6.7

5 28 .9

42 3.7

50 10 .4

9. 7

100.1

1977'

FAVOR ABLE

100 100 100

82

100 67

100

57

U N FA\,O RABl E

100 100

18

33

43

a Q uestion: "How would you rate the se rvice your re presentative gives in looking afte r (his district in Was hingron-excel/cllt. pretty good, only f:lir. or roor? Why do you fed th is way? Any o ther reaso ns?" b Q uest io n: " Ov~ra \\ , h o w would your fatc the tob the congressma n w ho has hc('n n"presenti ng this a re:l d uring the IXls t 2 o r J Yt."'oJrs has d o ne- would .Hm s ay yo ur congre ssm :lll h a s d o ne a n exc elle n t io b . a p re tty goo d joh . a fair joh. or a po or jo b ? W hy d o yo u feel th is wa)'? A n., · o cher rt~.1 S0ns? ··

..

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TilE CONGltESS 3 01

bentS is favorable. In fact, the reputation of House members was the m ost , Ulll 'd " f . InC tl}' mentlone criterion o r eva luating the perfo rmance of incumbents: f £(uen fl· ' . , ~ 1"1170 percent 0 t 1e lesponses refer to some aspect of the IIlClimbents rC t 1" (; . nlO , ency service or personal attributes. oflsntu . ' , f '

C Policy actl~n s , In contrast, a re In requentl y c ited as criter ia fo r evalua tll1g

Presentati ve. 'ThiS may be a biesslllg to House members inasmuch as ref-[he re bl' I' , db' , " f flces to pu IC po IC} ten to e negative In content. T he II1frequen t use 0 ere I' , criteria a nd the emphasIS on p ersonal characteri sti cs and district service po IC} , , I' fl ' onote pOSitive eva ua tlons 0 t 1e II1 cumbent. Rarely are the latter elements pro 'ed in a negative light. In sum, evaluations of Congress and of individual vle~lbers are apt to differ in valence because of the disparate criteria that are nl

e lied to each. Congress is held responsible for policy and for management of

apP " 1'1 . d' 'd I I d' the legislanve envIronment, w 11 e 111 11'1 ua representatives are eva uate 111 terons of theIr personal characteristics or constituency service.

CONCLUSIONS

Clearly, quite disparate criteria are used in evaluating Congress and individual representatives. Furthermore, one's eva luative criteria influence the nature of one's appraisal : certain criteria are associated with positive evalll~tions, while other criteria are identified with negative appraisals. That is, the features of congressional activity that attract the concern and attention of individuals af- fect how congressional performance is evaluated. It also seems clear that eval- uations of representatives rest more on service to the district than on p o licy concerns; moreover, such service generally is perceived in a favorable light by constituents. It is no wonder, then, that members of Congress pay so much at- tention to constituency service-it generates a positive image. (2ongress, on the other hand, is assessed more in terms of its policy actions, which tend to pro- duce mixed (or negative) evaluations of the institution.

These findings cast new light on a paradox posed by Richard F. Fenno, Jr.: How can we account for the contrast in the popularity of Congress on the one hand, and individual representatives on the other? "If our congressmen are so good," he asks (1975, p. 278), "how can our Congress be so bad? If it is the in- dividuals that make up the institution, why should there be such a disparity in OUr judgments?"

One possible explanation for this disparity is tbat peoRle simp }' app~ 0:"1--- tgem standards of juagment to Congress as an institution and to individual

legislators. Fenno speculates (1975, pp. 278-280) that individual legislators are judged on the basis of personal style and policy views. Stylistically, we ex- pect OUr legislators to display a solicitous attitude toward constituents-to ap- pear frequently in the district, to maintain contact through the media, and to \York On local projects and individual cases. ~s for po lic}' views, we ask mere ly

'~~ar-our legislators not stray toO far from the norm as expressed by a majority COnStItuents.

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302 SECTION X

OUf data support Fenno's speculations, and they further ind' 'k I' ICate h much precedence stylistic considerations ta ' e over pO ICY concerns, No 0\1'

than 15 percent of our respondents, by the most generous reckonin I1lore policies in explaining how they rated their representative, Unless tl g, Cited

f d d 'I ' I' b 1ey We speci ic, t~ese policy references ten ~ to tl ~ ~n t 1e 1I1cum ems' favor, For re nately for I11cumbents, few voters vOice specific policy concerns-indeed tu- voice policy concerns of any kind-in evaluating members' performan ' fell' , ' , Ce,

For Congress as an institution, 111 contrast, citizens enunciate the t k resolving national problems. This is a far more hazardous assignment th:~ of izens set for individual representatives. Many problems are virtually insol ~~­ on a national scale; even if they were solved, would we be able to ascertain \ e fact? As we have seen, in assessing Congress, respondents mention policy ~ at tors more frequently than any other considerations. In the late I%Os dom a~-

, , ' estlc policy concerns tended to produce favorable assessments, whde foreign poli concerns yielded critical assessments by almost a two-to-one margin. A deca~ later, the valences were reversed. Legislative-executive relations also produce mixed reviews: some people expect Congress to fall into line behind the presi~ dent; others want it to resist White House initiatives and act as a watchdog, Fi- nally, ,what citizens read and hear of Capitol ~ill styl~ ~arries an overwhelmingly negative message_ Scandal and venality are highly vIsible features of legislative institutions; expertise or courage are less well publicized.

The present data, in short, give eloquent testimony to the reasons why we "love our congressmen so much" yet denigrate the institution of Congress_ Indi- vidual legislators are evaluated in terms of personal style and district service-- attributes upon which few voters are able to make comparisons with other legislators. But Congress-as-institution is evaluated largely on the basis of policies-which tend to be intractaole and divisive.

In view of the divergence we have found in the public's premises in assess- ing congressmen and Congress, incumbents are entirely rational in emphasiz- ing constituency service and equipping themselves with the necessary staff and perquisites to do the job. Members of the U.S. House have historically had a firm grassroots base, cultivated by constituency service as well as by loealist legislative roles. There is nothing novel about this: indeed, the House was de- signed to operate in this fashion (Wesberry v. Sanders, 1964). Yet, students of Congress agree that recently legislative roles have shifted perceptibly in the direction of constituency service. As Fiorina (1977, p. 61) puts it:

Congressmen are going home more, pressing the flesh, getting around. They are building a personal base of support, one dependent on personal contactS andJavors,

The present emphasis upon constituency errand-running, which appears to date from the mid-1960s, contrasts with at least some of the dominant House norms of the previous generation or two. " I

If the push toward errand-running is conceded, there remains a cnnca

issue of cause and effect. Put bluntly, the question is: In ere "ring r e achine!")'

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r TH E CONG RESS 303

, constituency communication and service d" . . (- their own re-electi on or did tl .' Id legi slators mainl y contrive to

05Ure ' ley Simp\.' re d h e ublic demanded? I Spon to w at they assumed the P I ' . '1

Perhaps t liS question WI I never be d ' . answere with t' A h 'e need to review carefully th ' cer aInty. t t every least, \\ gressional establishment C shequence of events that produced the pres- ot con < ,Wit special art ' h d d f h

e Survey data should be re- I ,_ d ennon to t e eca e 0 t e 19605, f . d d' h' . danaf} ze to determine legislators' and citizens'

SO mm urmg t IS perlO 0 tim h state , '. e, even tough such data are bound to : Id a fragmentar} and I11concluslve picture, )Ie f' d'

The present 111 mgs nonetheless leave little f db '

i

. , . f ' room or ou t concern ing he PublIc s expectatio ns or legislators' pedornla Th d . d' h t . . , . nee. e ata In lCate tat, whereas c~tlzens exp~c~atlons for Congress are vague and anchored to gener- alized policy an? stylIstic concerns, their expectations for their own represen- tatives are unmistakable. Legislators are judged very largely on the way they serve their distrIcts and commul11cate with them. Successful performance of this aspect of the re~r~sentative's job typically pays off handsomely, as indi- cated by mcumbents high rates of re-election. Yet such judgments on rhe parr of voters imply sanctions as well: legislators who lose touch or ~who seem pre- occupied with national issues may be disciplined by declining support or eve defeat. A few " lessons" of this type will suffice to persuade other legislators, who after a\l are politicians, to shift their job priorities,

Is it possible then that public expectation, rather than legislative connivance, is the cause of the bureaucratic establishment that supportS constituency-oriented policy making? If so, we may wish to modify the currently popular notion (Fiorina, 1977, p, 3) that congressmen are to blame for this state of affair~. iT~e public may ell be die Key to tlie Washington establishment, If the publIc did not create this establishment, they have inspired and sustamed It, and are apt to

continue to do so.

NOTES

d d on ress ional evaluation questions in the 1977 sun·ey I. The data for the open-en e c g . (1977) We have recoded these data . b' d f U S H se of Representatives . . Ilere 0 tame rom:. '. ' ou . . 1968 data in order to facilitate compansons

mto the categones utilized m codmg the I I' A description of the recoding d f 'ona eva uatlons. an sharpen patterns 0 congressl

scheme is available from the authors.

REFERENCES

h N d r Says Congress Is 'The Broken Fenno, Richard F. , Jr. , 1975 . " If, as~~lpCong~e~smen So tv\uch?n in Norman J.

Branch' How Come We LOI'e I t' alld Reform. New York: Praeger, , . CI a/lge' Eva /I 1011 Ornstein, ed., COllgress ZIl ) • . pp 277-7 87 f I Washingtoll Establlshmellt. New

F· . _ . Ke),stolle 0 t )e lorina , Morris P. 1977. Congress: Haven: Yale University PresS.

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I I

I r It l un«, I " 1'110. 11 I', , r1) C' r

• l 1'1 IUJ, " " . 19UO. O/lIr.l . " .J h) R"!:cr I I I Untllll" un ,U \ c:rl1 ll1l'Il I JI ,-u ld I l"'dl \ .... )a\'d\.4.rl .. "\i'f, " .

I I ... rrl~t l t'UI' \ \ ,~I JtC\ UII r.a It,.anl l rulll Ih

1('"" It. "h "un.1 . ""., I . I . rn 10' \ 1 1911 I I ,1111.,,1 \ 1"". 'e\\ ' urI.. : m hor Kook, . ~ hl,h II, \\ .111 rn I - I h mhl\ 1 .. 111 "oudl " ' ,lI l1'> "I Ihe Amerll)n P I

\\ ) / ,,, 1\'//11. ,,1 )"Jrt,/\ I I pi mllt'r. 19 I I: • 'i . ' " '" IdO:

l

~ \ lmB I I - I h ~ I<dnlll' 01 Po II III III ~ I J" '-"uel' ." ) " rl 1\ I t pm ' . I I ) - I

1'1 • UII I ' I rnllll ,lnI II r '''IIl ,d ( \\ /n l r, I 4 ): I _ Ibl> .

Krrn~·t" 11\ Ul1I l1 lI lUll un \I /nl.1I . II . I "" 'I - l-.l (

JIIlI nl !r,III\.., Rev.(·\\ . 197 Ih (Oll)(rc". 1" (" "Oll ): . ~"'"' Vol. 1,

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1111 CO:- l.RI" 305

••• • ECno X

Rr IE\XI Q E~T I N~

On ",h.1t h.IW, do c Ed mund Burke onc\ude that members of an clecte I \ ' I lti\ e bod y would hctter represent the vote rs bv reh'inl' on their own\'udo-I II . I ' , , 0 <'

• tit th.11l by mir roring t ie \ lew of their onstituents: Do \·ou wa nt yo ur 0

1 ber of o nl:\re 5 to fo llow Burke' advi e: '

tllrn1

Itl Feder,Ii, st ;-';0,- Ja mes ~bdison argue that the ner d to win \'o te wtll 2. ure th.1t all peupk Will he adequately repre ented in ongre - , Do ),Oll thmk j > r ha proven h lln right : \X hat group mi ht now a ~ f(T with hi opti -hl>to ' • "

t'l prediction abou t how rcpresenta tl\'es \\' uld bch~\'e' OIlS

3, Although there ha\ e heen m.l11 ~ reform in ongress iner \'1; il slln', book \1'<1 publi hed. d you thl!1k that on re ha really ch:lI1gcd '

t Do the fmdl!1l:\' of ,Ienn PJ rker Jnd R 'c r D.I"d<o n reflel' t y ur perrl'p- ' of on,'re, ,' I low do P.lrker ,lI1d DJ\ Id n c'pl.lln the ,Ipp.lrent ontr,l-

UOlb ,,'

d tori' V\(' W' held h) the pllht. , r~ ·.mlml! Indl\ I 11I.11 melllll'rs wr'lI the I , ogress as :In lI1 , tltlitlUn:

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XI

THE PRESIDENCY

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I

308 SECTION XI

, \MILTON AI.EXANDER H f

5 CREATING THE PRESIDENCY 5 .

. e WashillgtOll's aide and Alexallder Hamrltoll, Geor~ used Federalist No. 69 to first Secretary of the Treasl~r)~ ro IOsed ill the COII- defmd the powers of the Iilesldellt PI.

. . I . d tl at although executive powers StltlltlOlI He exp (//I1e I . f . . . 1 I d fa silwle cine executwe as were to be /11 t Ie Jail so" . . . . K· 1

1 1 d b . Groat Britaill the slI/IIlantles to 1111; t Ny la eell /11. , .. I h d d . 1 t tl e Ulllike the Bntls I 1I10llarc , George ell e ng I ler. Id b .

I I · · · d· He cou e 1111-the presidellt was severe Y mute '. . . 1 d r. t· 1 brl·bery alld other Crlllles and 1111S-peac Ie ,or leaSOI, • d b ·dd

1 . fl· latl·OIl COld e overrl en demeallors; liS veto a egis . by strong majorities in the Congress; and the president collid not even agree to a treaty without the advice and consent of the U.S. Sellate. Hamiltoll wanted It ullam- biguously IInderstood that the essentwl dlfferellce be- tween the Killg of Englalld and the proposed President of the United States was that "one can perforlll alone what the other call do ollly with the COIICllrrence of a branch of the legislatllre. "

I proceed now to trace the real characters of the proposed Executive, as they are marked out in the plan of the convention. This will serve to place in a strong light the unfairness of the representations which have been made in re- gard to it.

The first thing which strikes our attention is, that the executive authority, with few exceptions, is to be vested in a single magistrate. This will scarcely, however, be considered as a point upon which any comparison can be grounded; for if, in this particular, there be a resemblance to the King of Great Britain, there is not less a resemblance to the Grand Seignior, to the khan of Tartary, to the Man of the Seven Mountains, or to the governor of New York.

That magistrate is to be elected for fOllr years; and is to be reeligible as often as the peo~le of the United States shall think him worthy of their confi- dence. In these Circumstances there is a total dissimilitude between him and a king of Great Britain~ who is ?n hereditary monarch, possessing the crown as a patrImony descendible to hiS heirs forever; but there is a close analogy be- t\~e~~ him ~nd a governo~ of New York, who is elected for three years, and is reelIglble without IUl1Itanon or intermission. If we consider how much less

SOllree: From The Federalist, No. 69 (1788).

....

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- T i ll PI<I- ' I IJI N CY

time wou ld be requisite f " br ' ", tll ~ n I'o r e ' II ' I ' o r eSt;) IS,hlllg a da ngeruus mfiuence III a slllg ic Sta re, .. SLl ) IS 1 1 ng a I k . ' 1"1 _ ,I I I, I ," l In ucnce th ro u~ho l1t the United Stares, w<.: Ill ust Lo ne ue c t lat a l ura tl f r. .' , '

d " I' un 0 ,011 1' vea rs to r the C hief Magistra te of the Unio n I

a eglee u per ma nencv f I I d , ', ' ( I

. ' a r ess to x ' rcaded In tha t ofhee th an a d urati o n () t nee \'(' a rs tur a co rre - I' ff'" ' , , spone Illg 0 ICe m a slllgie state,

T he Pres ident oi the U ' ' I S ' , ' I d

" nltee tates wo ul d be li ab le to be Im peached , tri ce , an , upo n conVictio n ()f t n - b 'b I I ' I ' ' d re asun, rI ery, u r or ler 1'1' 1 crimes or mls e- mea no rs, removed fro m ff '" d II f ' ' , 0 Ice, an wou e a terwa rds be ha ble to prosecuti o n and pUlll shment in til e 0 d ' f I T I f I k ' - G , , , r Ina rv course () aw. lC perso n 0 t lC ' lIlg ot rca t Bnta lll IS sac red and inviolable; there is no constitutio na l tri buna l to which he is amena ble; no puni shment to which he ca n be subjec ted witho ut involving the Cri SIS of a na tio na l revolut ion. In this del ica te and impo rtant ci rcumstance ot perso n;] 1 respo nsibility, the President of Co nfederated America would sta nd upo n no better gro und tha n a governo r of New Yo rk , and upon wo rse gro un d than the governo rs of Ma ryland and Delawa re.

The President o f the United Sta tes is to have power to return a bill , which shall have passed the two branches of the legislature, fo r reconsidera tio n; and the bill so returned is to become a law, if, upon that reconsideratio n, it be ap- proved by two thirds of bo th ho uses. The king o f Great Brita in, o n hi s pa rt, has an absolute nega ti ve upon the acts of the two houses of Pa rli ament. The disuse o f tha t power fo r a considerable time past does not a ffect the rea lity of its existence; a nd is to be ascribed who lly to the crown's hav ing found the means o f substituting influence to autho rity, o r the a rt of ga ining a ma jo rity in o ne o r the o ther o f the two ho uses, to the necessit), o f exerting a preroga tive which could se ldo m be exerted witho ut haza rding some degree o f natio na l ag- ita tio n_ The qua lified nega ti ve of the President differs widel), from this abso lute negative o f the British sovereign . .. .

The Pres ident is to be the "commander-in-chief of the a rmy and navy of the United Sta tes, and of the mil iti a o f the severa l States, when ca lled into the actual service o f the United States. He is to have power to grant reprieves and pardo ns fo r o ffences aga inst the United States, except in cases of imlJeachmellt; to recommend to the considera tio n o f Congress such measures as he sha ll judge necessary a nd ex pedient; to co nvene, o n ex traordina r), occas io ns, both ho uses o f rhe legislature, o r either o f them, and, in case o f di sagreement be- tween them with respect to the time of adjournmellt, to adjo urn them ro such time as he shall think proper; to take ca re that the laws be faithfull ), executed; and to commi ss io n a ll officers of the United States. " In most o f these pa rti cu- lars, the power o f the Presiden.t will resemble equa ll y that o f the king o f G reat Brita in and o f the governo r ot New Yo rk. The most maten a l POlllts of differ- ence a re these:-First. The Pres ident will have o nly the occasio nal command o f such parr o f the militia o f the na tio n as by legislative provisio n may be called into the actua l se rvice o f the UnIOn. The klllg o f G reat Bnralll and the gover- no r of New Yo rk have a t a ll rimes the entire command o f a ll the miliria within their severa l jur isdictio ns. In this a rticle, therefo rt' , rhe power o f rhe Pres ident wo uld be inferio r to tha t o f either the mo na rch o r the governo r. Secolldly_ The

,

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I

:3 10 S[CrION XI

. · .f f the arm)' and nav), of the United . I . I . nder-lI1 -chl~ 0 . II I . h h I'reslll'nr IS to )(' COlnl11.1 . II I wnllna), t Ie same Wit t at f

. I ' . IntI' \roll ( )e I . . TI . 0 Sta tes. In Ihl s resped liS .llIt 10 . ch infenor to It. . . . Jlrdly. Th.

. . . . I . Ihsrance IIlL! . I e th e king 0 1 Great Bnt.lln, mt 111 SI I would extend to a I cases, except

. I . . Ject to part ons, . '11 l power (If the PreSI( Cllt , In rL 51 . Igr of thi s marrer, It WI )e neces_ I ( I The better to JUl ff f I Jose 0 illl/I(,d ( )11 11'111. • • • I C IStl'tllticJIl the 0 ence 0 treason I'S

I I' pose( 01 ' sary to re(olled, that, I)' tIL pm . 1St tes and adhering to their enemies . . I I ' I the Unlte( a . , ' . . ,

IlIlllte( "to l'Vylllg \\'.If UpOI .. I . I. , the law of New York It IS confined . . I . I J (,rt· '111(1 t 1.lt u)

glVlI1g t 1l'lll .lI l :11l (0111 ( , . I I)' " I 1t ('In o n I)' adjourn the national . I ' . '1 I I ' F trlhl), TIl' reSil el , .

Wit lin 511111 ar H)UI1l S. (JI . • . . • IJout the time of adjournment . . I . I . . f dl s'lgreelllent a .

legislature In t 1e slIlg e c.l S ~ (). I' Ive the P'Ir1iament The gov . . . I 'ue or even C ISSO " . er-

The British 1ll0llarC I ma)' promg I I . I t re of this State for a limit d nor of New )o rk Illa), al so prorogue t 1C egis al,u I d t . e

.' ..' . ns ma)' ue emp o),e 0 ver), ImpOrtant timc; a power which, 111 certain sltuatlo ,

purposes. . d f h S The President is to have power, with the adVice an consent 0 t e enate,

I. . . I d t thirds of the senators present concur. The klOg to Illa..:c treatlcs, proVIC e wo . h . . f G B · · , I I · d ~I)soillte representative of t e nation 111 all for-o rcat ntalll IS t Ie so c an <0 • . . H c~n of his own accord make treaties of peace, com-elgn transaCtiOIlS. e <0 • • m~rce, al/iance, and of ever), other description. It has been inSinuated, that his authority in this respect is not conclusive, and tha~ hiS conventions :-v!th for- eign powers are subject to the revision, and stand 1Il need of the ratl.fJcatlOll, of Parliament. But I believe this doctrllle was never heard of, until It was broached upon the present occasion. Ever), jurist of that kingdom,. and every other man acquainted with its Constitution, knows, as an establIshed fact, that the prerogative of making treaties exists in the crown in its utmost pleni- tude; and that the compacts entered into b)' the ro)'al authorit), have the most legal validity and perfection, independent of an)' other sanction. The Parlia- ment, it is true, is sometimes seen emplo)'ing itself in altering the existing laws to conform them to the stipulations in a new treat),; and this rna)' have possi- bly given birth to the imagination, that its cooperation was necessar), to the obligatory efficacy of the treat),. But this parliamentary interposition proceeds from a different cause: from the necessit), of adjusting a most artificial and in- tricate s),stem of revenue and commercial laws, to the changes made in them by the operation of the treat),; and of adapting new provisions and precau- tions to the new state of things, to keep the machine from running into disor- der. In this respect, therefore, there is no comparison between the intended power of the President and the actual power of the British sovereign. The one can perform alone what the other can do onl)' with the concurrence of a branch of the leglslat~re. It must be admitted, that, in this instance, the power of. the federal Executive would exceed that of any State Executive. But this arISes naturall), from the sovereign power which relates to treaties If the Con- federacy were to be dissolved it would become . h h ' h Exeell-. , a questIon w et er t e ' ~lves of the severa! States were not solely invested with that delicate and Important prerogative.

-

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' .

(

r..

t~ , j ,

~ .

.-~ ,--, ,,,,"=" ,, ~ ,~. • .

T ill I'KI,II)I '( Y 3 I I

. The Presi dent is a lso au ._ . ' .. mlill ste r . T hi s tl I ' tho n zed to recc lw amba ssador;, and ot her rllbll ~

, 10 u g 1 It ha b ' . . m arrer of dign itv th f ; S ern a nch thernl' uf dccl :Hlla ti o n. " morc it

. an () au th o I " . ' 11 I . I conseque nce in th . d ' . .nt )". t I;' a C1rCUI11Sta IKe whICh WI lC WI I lo ul . c a mlnlStratlun of th ,,.. . . d ' f · ' c()n -ve l1lent that it sl lei b . t gU\ lrnI11Cllt, ,In It was 31 l110re

; IOU e 'lrr'ln ' d ' I ' Id I nccess it\, of _ . ;; ge 111 t lIS 111 3nller, tha n that there shou )c it . l OllVenll1g the I· . ' I ..

a rr iv'll o f' ~ t" '. egis ature, or ont' o t Irs brallches, UpU Il eve ry , ; "orelgn mlili ste I h . d d

. r, t IOU); It we re merely to take the place of a de- pa rte pre ecessor.

The President is to ' . . . . nOl11ln<l[e, and, /Ult/; t/;e adllier alld CfJIISellt o( t/;e Sel/ -

ate, to appOll1t a mbassadors' ld I bl ' .. . I f I 5 C

. ; "I Otler pu Ie nlln l> ler • lut ges 0 t 1e upre mc o urt, a nd In genera l a ll o ff ', · . fl ' I 5 I ' I I d . ;, lLers 0 tIe Unltc( tates esta l lt shed Jy aw, a n

whose appOintments aro I ' 'd f . . . ' c no t o t le rWlse prov i ed or by the Cu nstltutlo n ... .

. H ence It appears that, except as to the concurrent autho rity of the President 111 the a rticle of trea ties, it would be difficult to determine whether th at magis- trate would In the aggrega te, possess more or less power than the governur of New York. And .It appears yet 111 0 re unequivoca ll y, that there is no pretence for the para llel whICh has been arrempted between him and the king uf G rea t Brtta ll1. BLit to render the contrast in thi s respec t stillmore striking, it may be of use to throw the principal circumstances of di ssimilitude inro a closer group.

The President of the United 5tates would be a n officer elected by the peo- ple for (ollr yea rs; the king of Great Britain is a perpetual a nd hereditary prince. The o ne would be amenable to persona l puni shment and disgrace; the person of the other is sacred a nd invio lable. T he one would have a quali(ied negative upo n the acts of the legislati ve body; the o ther has an absoillte nega- tive. The o ne would have a right to command the military and naval forces of the natio n; the o ther, in additio n 10 thi s right, possesses that of declaring war, and of raising and regulating fl eets and armies by his own authority. The o ne would have a concurrenr power with a branch of the legisla ture in the forma- tio n of treaties; the o ther is the sale possessor of the power of making trea ti es . The one would have a like concurrenr authority in appointing to offices; the other is the sole author of all appoinrments. The one can confer no privileges whatever: the o ther can make denizens of aliens, noblemen of commoners: can erect corpo rations with all the rights incident to corporate bodies. The one can prescribe no rules concerning the commerce or currency of the na- tion' the o ther is in several respects the arbiter of commerce, and in his capac-, ity can establi sh markets and fairs, can regulate weights and measures, can lay embargoes for a limited time, can coin money, can authori ze or prohibit the circulation of foreign coin . The one has no pa rticle of spi ritual juri sdiction; the other is the supreme head and governor of the national church! What an- swer shall we give to those who would persuade us that things so unlike re- semble each other? The same that o ught to be given to those who tell us that a government, the whole power of which would be in the hands o f the elective and periodical servants of the people, IS an ari stocracy, a mona rchy, and a

despotism.

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3 I 2 SECTION XI

ABRAHAM LIN CO LN

56. THE PREROGATIVE THEORY OF THE PRESIDENCY

. I' I' "p a <7ative ,. approach to President Abra Jam L/Ilco n s rer {> • • presidential powers luas first stated by E~lglish polttlcal theorist Jolm Locke in his Second Treatise of Govern- ment (1690)-that there must be "a latitude left to the exeClltive power to do mally things of choice which the laws do IIOt prescribe." In this letter to the editor of a Kentucky newspaper, Lincoln recognizes that his e1ec- tioll to the office of president of the United States did not automatically give him the authority to impose his strong personal opposition to slavery on the nation as a whole. On the other hal1d. haz!il1g...taken 411 oath "to preserve~ rotect uL.de{e1ld the Constillltjou of tkfJ Unite States," Lincoln believed that extraordinary steps were justtfied ill order to save the union. These steps in- cluded violating sOllie provisions of the Constitution if it was necessary to save the COUlltT')1 from being split apart over the issue of slavery. Lincoln believed that it would have been a breach of his oath of office not to have taken all necessary steps to save the llllioll. His claim that he could violate the Constitution in order to save the Constitution remains the strongest assertion of pres- idential power ever made by a U.S. president.

LEITER TO A. G. HODGES EXECUTIVE MANSION, APRIL 4, 1864

My dear Sir; ",,:ou ask me to put in writing the substance of what I verbally said the other day In your presence, to Governor Bramlett ~ d S D ' I

b f II un enator lxon. t

was a out as a ows: "I am naturally antislavery. If slavery is not wrong h" I

cannot remember when I did not so think and feel 'd' notllhn g

IS wrong.

d d h h 'd ,all yet ave never un-

erstoo t at t e presl ency conferred upon me a 'd ' n unrestncte nght to act

Source: From John Nicolay and John Hay, eds., The Complete Wor • (New York: Francis D, Tandy Co., 1894), pp. 65-68, This letter to 1s of Abraham Lincoln. Vol. 10 Frankfort, Kentuck y, CommollllJealth was used as a campa ' d lbert ~. Hodges. editor of the

Ign ocument 10 the election of 1864,

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THE PRESIDENCY 3 13

officially upo n this judgmel t d f' . Id h b f I an eelmg. It was in the oa th I took that I wou , to t e es t 0 nwabilit . .

. I U ' d S I . < y, preserve, protect, and defend the Constitutio n ot tIe nlte tates. could k I " . . . . I . no t ta e tIe of bee wlthom ta klllg the oa th . Nor was It illY view t l a t I Illight t k I .

. . I . a e an oat 1 to get power, and brea k the oath III usmg t Ie power. I understood I ' . . . .. . I .

I f b d ' too, t lat III Ordlllary clvd admllllstratlon t liS oat I even o r a e me to pra . II . d I . . . I · < Ctlca y III u gc Illy primary abstract Judgment on the mo ra question of slave r)' I I d II' I d . , d .

A d . la PU ) Ie y eclared thiS many tll11es, an 111 many ways. n I aver th 'n t I' d I I . . . d f b .' , 0 t liS ay, lave done no offICial ac t III mere e -erence to ill Y a stract Judgm d f I' .

. em an ee IIlg on slavery. I did understand , how- ever that Ill )' oa th to preserv tl C '. I I f b ' I'

' e Ie onstltUtlon to t Ie Jes t 0 my a I Ity imposed upon me the dutu of . b '. I . . .. preservlllg, y every IIldl spensa ble mea ns, t lat government-that natio n of I' h I C . . . I "Xf

. , w IIC t lat onstltutlon was the o rga llJc aw. , as it pOSSible to lose the nation and yet preserve the Constitution? By general law, hfe and hmb must be protected, yet often a limb must be ampmated to save a hfe; bur a life IS never Wisely given to save a limb. I felt that measures otherwise unconstitutional might become lawful by becoming indispensable to the preservation o f the Constitution through the preservation of the nation. Right or wrong, I assume this ground, and now avow it. I could not feel that, to the best of my ability, I had even tried to preserve the Constitution, if, to save slav- ery or any mino r matter, I should permit the wreck of government, country, and Constitution all together. When, early in the war, General Fremont at- tempted military emancipation , I forbade it, because [ did not then think it an indispensable necessity. When, a little later, General Cameron, then Secretary of War, suggested the arming of blacks, I objected because I did not yet think it an indispensable necessity. When, still later, General Hunter attempted mili- tary emancipation, I again forbade it, because I did not yet think the indis- pensable necessity had come. When in March and May and July, 1862, I made earnest and successive appeals to the border States to favor compensated emancipation, I believed the indispensable necessity for military emancipation and arming the blacks would come unless averted by that measure. They de- clined the proposition, and I was, in my best judgment, driven to the alterna- tive of either surrendering the Union, and with it the Constitution, or of laying strong hand upon the colored element. I chose the latter. In choosing it, I hoped for greater gain than loss; but of thiS,. I was not entirely confident. More than a year of trial now shows no loss by It 111 our ~orelgn relations , none m Our home popular sentiment, none in our white military force-no loss by It anyhow or anywhere. On the contrary it shows a gam of qUite a hundred and thirty thousand soldiers, seamen, and laborers. These are palpable facts, about

I . h f h can be no caviling We have the men; and we could not w llC ,as acts, t ere , . have had them without the measure.. .

"A diU 'on man who com pia illS of the measure test himself n now et any 01 ' . b II' b f

b " d . I' e that he is for subdumg the re e IOn y orce of y writing own III one III , d d I' I . h I is for taking these hundre an t lIrty t 101isand arms' and III the next, t at Ie h Id b b f h

' "d d placing them where t ey wou e ut or t e men from the UllIon Sl e, an d .. I b I If I not face his case so state ,It IS on y ecause Ie measure he condemns. Ie can

cannot face the truth. "

,

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uJ i.:sd-0 ~V\ ; ~50Ll1Lc{ j ~'ILUJJ\

, b I ( nversation. In telling this tale I

SECTION Xl

. 1. add a word whi ch was not In the ver a ,c I" t t ·) Il -lve cOlltr()11 d , ,_ ,' r ' I c ~lIm no l , e

attempt no comphment to my own sag.lel ). I N t tl _J f , I ' , . ' ltrollec me. ow, a Ie enu a

events, but confess plainl y that events 1.1\~ ~ Ol , I , " j " 'not what elt ler party, or any

three years struggle the nan on s comltlon IS 'I" d ' _ c , • I - 't Whit lcr It IS ten II1g seems

ma n, deVi sed or expected. God alone can c ;11111 I . d ' II I I f ' , f ng an - WI S a so t lat we 0

pia 111 , If God now Wills the removal 0 a great wro " I" - h I I II hirly for our COI11P IClty 111 t at the North, as well as you of the Sout 1, 5 la pay , d . h

' , I I ' 'II f- I I 'Ile\·v cause to attest an revere t e wrong, Imparna llstory WI IlIl t le rell1 ' justice and goodness of God. )'ollrs truly,

THEODORE ROOSEVELT

57. THE STEWARDSHIP THEORY OF THE PRESIDENCY

Preside1lt Theodore Roosevelt expressed his thoughts on the powers of the presidency in an alltobiography pub- lished after he left office. He forceflllly argued that the job of the president was to act as "a steward of the peo- ple" who cOllld do anything that wasn't "forbidden by the Constitlltion or by the laws. " According to Roosevelt, the president lIeeded to conslllt with Congress ollly when explicitly reqllired to do so IIl1der the Constitution. In all other cases-whether involving foreigll policy or allega- tions of wrongdoing within his administration-the pres- ident was empowered to act 011 his own. Roosevelt's view allowed the president to exercise flower so long as there was no clear constitutional prohibition on doing so. Note that Lincoln had gone evell fllrther and justified his exer- cising power even where the Constitlltion and laws pro- hibited him frollz doing so.

A. Lincoln

My view was that every executive officer, and above all every executive officer in high position, was a steward of the people bound actively and affirmatively to do all he could for the people, and not to content himself with the negative merit of keeping his talents undamaged in a napkin . I declined to adopt the view that what was imperatively necessary for the nation could not be done by

Source: From Theodore Roosevelt, The Autobiography of Theodore Roosevelt (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1913),

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1111 I' I<I' IIJI ' (. 1' ] 15

thl' Prc~idmt ullk ~, he cou ld f . ' , " ' I' f \\' \' th It 'It \1"\ I ' Ind ,OlnC specific aUl ho rJ l3t10n lO do It. j\l y he-Ie • J. • , Il ut On y h " I 1 ' , I

f h · t ' I ' I IS Il g lt Jut hl5 duty to do anyrhing rh at I he neeu

o t l n~ Ion (CmaiI C cd ulIl . I ' , ' I 1 1 d

e s >uc 1 ac tion was forbid den by the ConStitUti on or w tl e aws , n cr this illt , , d I d

' I ' trpretauon of executive power I did and ca u,e to 1e Olle l1l :1 ny t l ln !!,s nor " I

I I , ,I l)fe\ lOLlS y dUlle by rhe President and the heads of de-

partment" ( Iu not Usurp , .. I ' ' I I

PO\\lI, )Ut I did greatl y broaden the lise of executi ve power. n or lcr words I . d f I

II I ' f' II ,alte or t Ie public welfare I ac ted for the common

we - 1e lll g 0 a our peopl I ' ' I d I

e, IV lenever alld 111 wharever Illanner was necessa ry, LIn ess prcvellte )V direct c ' ' I " , ..

1 -1 ' on titUtiona or legislati ve prohd)ltlon . , . , le course I fo llowed f d' " ' h

,0 regar Ing the I: xecutl ve :IS suhl ecr unl y ro t e People. a nd. und er the Co ' , b ' ' I , . Il Stitutl on, ound to serve the peuple affirmati ve y 111 cases where the Const'lt ' I ' , " I , , utlun (oes Ilut ex plICitly fo rbid hlln tu render t le se rVICe, was. substantiall y the Course followed by both Andrew Jackson and Abraham Lll1coln Other 11 bl d II ' 'd h ' Ollora e an we -meanll1g Presl ents, uc as James Buchana~l , rook the opposite and, as it seems ro mc, narrowl y lega listic VICW that the I reSident IS the servant of Congress rather than of the people, and can do nothll1g, no matter how necessa ry it be to act unless the Constitu- tion explicitl y commands the ac tion, Most ~ble lawyers 'who are past middle age take thiS VIew, and so do large numbers of well-meaning, respectable citi- zens. My successor in office rook this, the Buchanan, view of the Presidem's powers and duties.

For example, under my administration we found that one of the favorite methods adopted by the men desirous of stealing the public domain was to carry the decision of the secretary of the interior into court, By vigorously op- posing such action, and only by so doing, we were able to carry out the policy of properly protecting the public domain. My successor not only took the op- posite view, but recommended to Congress the passage of a bill which would have given the courts direct appellate power over the secretary of the interior in these land matters .. .. Fortunately, Congress declined to pass the bill. Its pas- sage would have been a veritable calamity.

[ acted on the theory that the President could at any time in his discretion withdraw from entry any of the public lands of the United States and reserve the same for forestrv for water-power sites, for irrigation, and other public , , purposes. Without such action it would have been impossible to stop the activ- ity of the land-thieves. No one ventured to test its legality by lawsuit. My suc- cessor however, himself questioned it, and referred the matter to Congress. Again 'Congress showed its wisdom by passing a law which gave the President the power which he had long exercised, and of which my successor had shorn

himself. Perhaps the sharp difference between what may be called the Lincoln-

Jackson and the Buchanan-Taft schools, in their views of the power and duties

f h I) 'd y be best illustrated by comparmg the attitude of my suc-o t e resl ent, ma " ' d h S etary of the Imenor, Mr. Balllllger, when the latter was cessor rowar t e ecr , '

d f ' d Ict in office with my attitude toward my chiefs of de-accuse 0 gross mlscon l, ') , d I b dl

'nate officers, More than once while I was I resldem partment an ot ler su or h ff ' , ,

ff ' , I k d I)v Congress generally because t ese 0 IClals did my 0 ICla s were attac e I '

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316 SECTI O N XI

I case I srood by the official and re- their duty well and fearlessly. In every suel . • f re with me excepting by im- fu sed to recognize the right of Congress ro Illteor e tll P other hand wherever I

. . I nnner n c ' peachmenr or in other constl tutlOn:1 n . . I . love,1 him even althollgh . . . I prompt y len c , • found the officer unfit for hiS pOSition, I . . Th J k . . '" f>ln for liS retention. e ac Son- the most Influential men of Congress aug I d k sholiid be abl . . h ' f trot 0 goo wor e to LlI1coln view is that 3 PreSident w 0 IS I d b II f h b

I . bordin 'Hes 'ln ,3 ove a ,0 t e su -

form his o\\'n judgment as to liS o\\'n Sll "." I' h h' I

. I , I most II1tllllate rouc 1 Wit 1m ordin3tes standing highest am In c osest ,1m. d . , . b J' re responSible ro me, 3n I accepted Mv secreta rI es and their su or lI1ates we , f I

' . . . f II I . I I \ I g ~s the)' were sa tls actory to me I t 1e responslbtllt)' or a t 1elr teet S. f s on ., , d

. .. - ," 1~11t within or wlthollt Congress' stoo by them :lga ll1st every CrItll or ,lSS31" " ' and as for getting Congress to make up my mll1d for me about them, the thought \youid h:we heen inconceivable to me. My successor took the oppo- site, ~r Buchan:1I1, "iew when he permitted and requested Congress to pass judgment on the ch:uges made against Mr. Ballinger as an executive officer. These charges were made to the President; the President had the facts before him and could get at th em at any time, and he alone had power to act if the charges \\'ere true. However, he permitted and requested Congress to investi- gate Mr. Ballinger. The party minority of the committee that investigated him, and one member of the majority, declared that the charges were well-founded and that Mr. Ballinger should be removed. The other members of the majority declared the charges ill-founded. The President abode by the view of the ma- jority. Of course believers in the Jackson-Lincoln theory of the presidency would not be content with this town meeting majority and minority method of determining by another branch of the government what it seems the especial duty of the President himself to determine for himself in dealing with his own subordinate in his own department .. ..

WILLIAM HOWARD TAFT

58. THE LITERALIST THEORY OF THE PRESIDENCY

President William Howard Taft's "I't I'''' f 'd ' f I I era 1st view 0 pres- ~ ~nll~1 power offers a clear contrast with the views of

d ll1CtO n and Roosevelt. Taft feared that allowing presi- en s to act on behalf f tl I' a Je peop e m violation of the

SOllree: From William Howard Taft Ollr CI . f M . University Press, 1916), ,!Ie aglstrate alld His Powers (New York: Columbia

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T ill PI{I.'IDI.NC Y .3 17

Conslillliion o r LUi? slillliio . 'Id I ere 1/0 1 clearly prohibiled by Ihe COII-

II, ( all ead Ih , h d ' , , d , I ' I ell1 10 roa and II II 1111 I/Ied presl-UI la POwer and II I ' , _' " ' }a l CO li d reslIll ill "irrelll ediahle /lllu~ltee, Wherecr I ' I d '

bl ' ,, ' ~ - Illeo n all Roosel'dl /.(Iere cOIII(o rl -

a e III sel (lIIg /J O I b I , IVers 110 1 c early held alii o( Iheir g rasp y I Ie Consllllliion T' /-I . d I " ' , , Ja m glle 11al Ihe presldelll call ex ercise 110 IJol/I' I ' I el IV 71C ) ca ll1 lOl be (airly alld reasollably lraced to SOllie sIJeel'(I'c !l ,'a I (p ' I ' I ' I " I' II a ower or IIISI y IlIIp ICC .

While it is impo rtant to mark 0 t I I ' f' Id f ' ' d " f h ' U t 1C exc uSlve Ie 0 JUriS Ictlon 0 eac branch of the government L ' I ' E ' ' " ' , ' egis a tlve, xecu tl ve and JudICi a l, It sho uld be sa id that 111 the proper working' of th I ' b " ' f II e gove rnment t 1ere mu st e coope rati on 0 a branches a nd withollt 0 ' II ' t' h I I " , " WI II1gness 0 eac )ranc 1 ro perform Irs function, there wiB follow a hope less obstruction to rhe progress of rhe whole govern - ment. Neither branch ca n compel rhe other to affirmarive ac ri on, and each branch can greatly hinder the other in the arrainment of rhe objecr of its activ- ities and the exerCise o f its discrerio n.

The true view of the Execurive function s is, as I conceive it , thar the Presi - dent can exercise no power which cannot be fairly and reasonably traced to some spec ific grant o f power or justly implied and included within such ex- press grant as proper and necessa ry to its exercise, Such spec ific gra nt must be either in the Federa l Constitution or in an act of Congress passed in pursuance thereof. There is no undefined residuum of power which he can exe rcise be- cause it seems to him to be in the public interest, and there is nothing in the Neagle case and its definition of a law of the United States, or in other prece- dents, warranting such an inference. The grants of Executive power are neces- sarily in general terms in order not to embarrass the Executive within the field of action plainly marked for him, bur his jurisdiction must be justified and vin - dicated by affirmative constitutional or statutory provis ion, o r it does not exist. There have not been wanting, however, eminent men in high public office holding a different view and who have insisted upon the necessity for an unde- fined residuum of Executive power in the public interest . They have not been confined to the present generation. We may lea rn thi s from the compla int of a Virginia statesman, Abel P. Upshur, a stric t constructionist o f the old school, who succeeded Daniel Webster as Secretary of State under PreSident Tyler. H e was aroused by Story's commentaries o n .the Constitution to write a mo no- graph answering and criticizing them, and 111 the ,course of thiS he comments as follows on the Executive power under the Constitutio n:

The most defective part of the Constitution beyond all question, isrh3t which

I d h E e -utl've Department. It IS ImpOSSible to read that II1strument, re ate to t e xc , ' , h b' k with the loose and unguarded terms 111 which the powers Wit out ell1g struc , ' , d d

' f h P eSI'dent are pointed out. So far as the legislature IS con-an ulles 0 t e r , , d h I

, ' ' s of the Constitution, are, perhaps, as precise and strict as cerne t e 1J11ltallOn , ' , Id f I h' been made- bllt In rega rd to the Executive, the Conven-

they cou sa e y ave " d I ' , h d'ousil' selected such loose an genera expreSSions, as lion appears to ave Sill I .

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3 I 8 SECTION XI

would enable the President, by implication and construction either to neglect h' d ' ' W ' h ' I ~rd 'It gravely asserted III Congress IS utles or to enlarge hiS powers, \\'C ave le.. , ' , I h "I 'I' \'udiclar)' IS of course executive t lat w ,Hever power IS neither egis anve nor " " '

and, as such, belongs to the Pres ident under the Constitution, How far a ma- jority of that body would have sustained a doctrine so monstrous, and ,so utter,ly at war with the whole genius of our government, It IS ImpOSSible to sa}, but thiS, at least, we know, that it met with no rebuke from those who supported the particular ;lct of Executive power, in defense of which it W;lS urged, Be thiS as it may, it is a reproach to the Constitution that the Executive trust IS so Ill-deftned, as to leave any plausible pretense e\-en to the insane zeal of party devotion, for attributing to the President of the United States the powers of a despot; pOwers which are wholly unknown in any limited monarchy in the world.

The view that he takes as a result of the loose language defining the Execu- tive powers seems exaggerated. But one must agree with him in his condemna- tion of the view of the Executive power which he says was advanced in Congress. In recent years there has been pur forward a similar view by executive officials and to some extent acted on. Men who are not such strict constructionists of the Constitution as Mr. Upshur may well feel real concern if such views are to re- ceive the general acquiescence. Mr. Garfield, when Secretary of the Interior, under Mr. Roosevelt, in his final report to Congress in reference to the power of the Executive over the public domain, said:

Full power under the Constitution was vested in the Executive Branch of the Government and the extent to which that power may be exercised is governed wholly by the discretion of the Executive unless any specific act has been pro- hibited either by the Constitution or by legislation,

In pursuance of this principle, Mr. Garfield, under an act for the reclama- tion of arid land by irrigation, which authorized him to make contracts for irrigation works amI incur liability equal to the amount on deposit in the Recla- mation Fund, made contracts with associations of settlers by which it was agreed that if these settlers would advance money and work, they might receive certificates from the government engineers of the labor and money furnished by them, and that such certificates might be received in the future in the discharge of their legal obligations to the government for water rent and other things under the statute. It became necessary for the succeeding administration to pass on the validity of these government certificates, They were held by Attorney-General Wickersham to be illegal, on the ground that no authority existed for their issuance. He relied on the Floyd acceptances in 7th Wallace, in which recovery was sought in the Court of Claims on commercial paper in the form of acceptances signed by Mr. Floyd when Secretary of War and delivered to certain contractors. The Court held that they were void hecause the Secretary of War had no statu- tory authority to issue them. Mr. Justice Miller, in deciding the case, said:

The answer which at once suggests itself to one familiar with the structure of our government, in which all power is delegated, and is defined by law, con- stitutional or statutory, is, that to one or both of these sources we must resort in

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TH E PR ~' I D~NCY ]19

everv IIl stanee, \Xle have . ff. , no 0 leers I ' down ro rhe mosr sllbord ' , In r liS gOl'e rnmenr , from rh~ Pres idem

, I In ,He agent 'h d Wit 1 pres, ribrd duries a d I" • \\ 0 oes nor hold office unde r rhe law,

'd n IJnlted aurh ' Ad ' Presl em, the Legislarure and the ' , .onry, n , while some of rhese, as rhe ro rhe more general d~f' ~ , JUdiciary, exe rCise powers in some st'nse lefr , , ' InJ[lons nece ·1 " 'd In rhe onstlturion rhe I ssa n ) mCI enr ro fundalllcnral law fou nd

, , arger POrtiO fl . ' law, with duries "nd po n o r 1(' 111 are rht· crea tion of sr:Hurory ., Wers p 'b d ' resen e and limired by rhar law,

My judgment is that the view " , , an undefined residUlI f of Mr, Ga rfield and Mr. Roosevelt, ascnblllg , m 0 power to th P 'd ' , that it might lead lilld ,e resl f nt IS an lInsa fe doctrille and

, f r emergenCle t If ' , irremedi able inl' lIstic ' , s 0 resu ts 0 an arbitrary character, dOlllg

• e to pnvate nght Th " , ' the Executive is charged with r : , , e malllspnng of sllch a view IS that a general way, that he is to la esponslbillty for the welfare of a ll the people in

h' ' I ' diP, y the part of a Universa l Providence and set a ll t IIlgs n g 1[, an t lat an),thin h ' h' , h d ' , g t at III IS ludgment will help the people he

oug thto hO, lInles l s d

he IS expressly forbidden not to do it. The wide field of ac- tion t at t IS wou give to the Execlltl've h dl I' , one can ar y Imlt.

RI C HARD E, NEUSTAD T

59. THE PRESIDENTIAL POWER TO PERSUADE

While presidents have written about whell they should ex ercise power, scholars who observe presidents from a distance have tried to better understand h011l that power is exercised. The general debate has been between those who argue that the power of the president comes from the many roles associated with the office- commander in chief. legislative leader, chief exeClltive, foreign policy marker-and those who have argued that presidential pOlller is really Ilothing more thall the "power to per- suade" others to go alollg. Richard Neustadt's influell- tial book Presidential Power, first published ill 1960, advised presidellts that in order to accomplish anything, they must carefully lise the prestige of the Oval Office

S R ' d ' h 1 erm·,ssion of The Free Press, a division of Simon &: Schuster Adult Pub-ollree: eprlOte wit t 1e p 'd TJ v / " fL d I · I, h· G f P -· 1 f ' I VOiller alld fiJI' Modem Presl ellfs: !I' , 0 II/ CS 0 ea "'5 up from IS IIlg roup rom re;:,l{ elt ta ,-1 b ' h dEN d . R I ' b R' -h d E Neustadt, Copl'right iLl 1990 Y RIC 3r , ellsta I. All nghts ooseve t to Reagan y If.. ar. ~ . reserved.

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320 SECTION Xl

k '11 - to bargain with legis la- alld their OIV/I negotiating s 'I

d ' . . lessage is clear: The

t Nellsta t s II I' tors alld vllreallem s. d tl IJresidellt meall It- , ' I "mllte to Je f' I COIIStltllilO/1ll /loluers", de others to go a ong.

tic to a presidellt III/a vie to /Jers lla

of Our government. The constitu-. , I the structure The 11I11Its on comman( suggest I eated a government of "sepa- , 'f 7L>7' sed to lave cr • '

tiona I convention 0 loiS suppo I' I it created a government of d " I d'd · I ' 'of the sor t. "at ler, " rate powers. t I not 111lg .. f the legislative process"

d ' " I ' mvers I 1 am pa rt 0 , separate IIl stitutlons s J(/flllg p ., I f I ' eto 1 Congress the dis- , f' I' 1959 ' remlll( er 0 liS V. ,

Eisenhower 0 ten S;1I( III , as .1 ' of the administrative process. Fed- penser of authority ;1I1d funds, IS no less p.Ht 1. The Bill of Rights adds others. erahsm adds another set of separated II1Stltll[lOI sf' "

, I I I' , d by voluntary acts 0 private mstltu-Many public purposes can on y le ac lle\C ," b h f , " D I C ' J1hrase IS a fourth ranc 0 gov-[Ions; the press, tor one, III oug ass ater s, , ' ,

ernment. "3 And with the coming of alliances abroad, the separate ~nstItutlons of a London or a Bonn share in the making of American public policy.

Wha; the Consti~ution separates our political parties do not combine. The parties are themselves composed of separated organizations sharing pub,lic authority. The authority consists of nominating powers. Our national parties are confederations of state Jnd local party institutions, with a headquarters that represents the White house, more or less, if the party has a President in of- fice. These confederacies manage presidential nominations. All other public offices depend upon electorates confined within the state.4 All other nomina- tions are controlled within the states. The President and congressmen who bear one party's label are divided by dependence upon different sets of voters. The differences are sharpest at the stage of nomination. The White House has too small a share in nominating congressmen, and Congress has too little \~eight in nominating Presidents for party to erase their constitutional separa- tion. Party llilks are stronger than is frequently supposed, but nominating processes assure the separation.5

The separateness of institutions and the sharing of authority prescribe the terms on which a President persuades. When one man shares authority with another, but does not gam or lose his J'ob upon the othe' h' h' 'II' , r SWim, IS WI 111g- ness to act upon the urglllg of the other turns on wheth I 'h " , er Ie conceives t e ac- tion rIght for him. The essence of a President's per ' k ' . , suasive tas IS to conV111ce such men that what the White House wants of th ' I h h d f h · k' em IS w lat t ey aug t to 0 or t elr sa e and on their authority.

Persuasive power, thus defined amounts to h h Th h h ' ' more t an c arm or reasoned argument. ese ave t elr uses for a President b h

his resources. For the men he wo Id' d ,ut t ese are not the whole of u m uce to do what h d h .

own responsibility will need or fear some t b I' e wants one on t elr they share his authority he has so h ac ~ y 11m on hiS responsibility. If

. ' me s are 111 theirs P 'd . I " " may be mconclusive when a President d' res I entia powers com man s but I .

as he persuades. The status and auth . . I ' . a ways rema111 relevant I ' · onty 1111erent 111 h' ff ' . f h' oglc and hiS charm. IS a Ice re111 orce IS

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S ta t u~ .ldd s ~o lll ('t h in ' . I g to Pcr, u3SIV' , -- I ' II ' 11 \Vl I TrUln ,l l1 urgel I\'age dl"l n , ~ _ .' Ln l ; a Ul1 0nty <I( l" ~ tI more . ..v lell

I ". • gcs on h" ecrn t f C' 1 '1 I I W el allll lll l'te nl1~ the St' I ' 11 cary U .olllllll:fn: I\' 11 C t 1C a n Cf . ' le i n I s he j .

Illt'n rca ~o n ll i g wit h u nn I ' :l nl ccre tary ~aw)'er were no t ILi st t l\'O , anot le I' H ad I I I I nCl'cr kll'e ,l ~ re('d tu a 't T ',' . t ICY )een so , Sawyer prohah ll' \\'OLI (

• • L, rt lilla n s 5t I . .. , loya lty, or ,n Icas t an ent ' ' I . a rt l> gave 1I 1ll specia l ciJ lms to Sawye r

10 11. n \XI'l!rr B I ' I . cow argll L' O il hi s k nees, " Alth

u " , r .. agClOt s Cla rllllllg phra se "No ma n

men-.llld l'xcccding l ' f' C I ' ugh th ele IS no kneellllg III thiS country, few ) ell' a Jlnct off , · .

" I'es" to t he P rc~ i dc rlt f l ' I ce l ~-arc I III III line ro the Iln pulse to say , 0 t Ie Ullit ' I S , 1 "

thcl" a re ~eatcd in 11 ' I 'f ' Cl tatcS, t grows ha rde r ro ~ay "no w hcn . IS ova 01 IC ' a t I \"/1' , .

rcond fl oo r \V h ' r ' I ~. tIe ," lIt c Huusc, o r In hi S ~ tu d y o n the . ,t C a IllUst ta ng l hi y he );] I' k ~ , . f l · f l ' I . ' , I

I'oun d lllgs In S'lIV ' . 1 ta es 0 t 1e a llr.l u l l ~ p l ys lca sur-, , • ye r s case Illo r I I) . , . . " . , cover, tIe rCSldc llt pussessed lo rlll 31 author- ltv to Ill tcl ve lle III nn ny 11"1'1 ' , f T

'I ' , " ,. • - " tte lS 0 cu nce rn to the Secreta ry of Comille rce, lese 1ll .1rtcrs I.lllged IrOIll ' I" ' I I' , I

. I ' J ' . lurrsc let lo na c I s pu te~ a mo llg the defense agencies ro cgls anOIl pe n In g before C J '

I ' I' T I . . o ng ress a n , ultllll:ltciy, to the tenllre of the Sec-retan', 1I1ll se I . le re IS nu th ' " I d . :f' I I IIlg In t le recor ro sugges t tha t Tnllll :l n VO iced

spec i IC t 1rea ts \V l ell the)' ne" t ' d . " . . go la te over wage Increases, Bllt g iven hi S formal Powe rs a nd the ir releva nce to S 'I ' .. , awyer sot leI' Interests, It IS safe to ass ume that Truma n s ve ry a~vocacy of wage ac ti on conveyed an implic it th reat.

. A PreSident s autho rity and sta tus g ive him grea t adva ntages in dea ling With the men he would persuade. Each " power" is a va ntage po int fo r h im in the degree th a t o the r men have use fo r his autho rity, From the vero to appo int- ments, fro m publiCity to budgeting, a nd so down a long li st, the W hite Ho use now contro ls the most encompass ing array o f va ntage po ints in the America n po litical system . With ha rdl y an exception, the men who sha re in governing thi s country a rc awa re tha t a t some time, in some degree, the do ing of their jo bs, the furthering of their ambitions, may depend upon the President o f the United Sta tes, T heir need fo r presidentia l action, o r their fea r of it, is bo und to be recurrent if no t actuall y continuo us. Their need o r fea r is his adva ntage,

A Pres ident 's adva ntages a re grea ter th an mere li sting o f his "powers" might suggest . The m en with whom he dea ls must deal with him until the las t day of his te rm . Beca use they have continuing relatio nships with him , his fu- ture, w hile it last s, suppo rts his present influence. Even though there is no need or fea r o f him today, wha t he could do tomorrow may supply roday's adva n- tage. Continuing rela tio nships may convert any " power, " any aspec t o f his sta- tus, in to va ntage po ints in almost any case. When he II1duces o ther men to do wha t he wants d o ne, a Pres ident ca n trade on their dependence now alld la ter.

The Pres ident 's advantages a re checked by the adva ntages o f others,. Con- '. I ' h ' wl' ll pull in bo th directions. These a rc rela tionships o f tlllumg re a tlo ns II'S

I d d A P es idenr depends upon the men he wo uld persuade; he

mutua epen ence. r . h k

' h h ' d o r fear o f thelll. They toO will possess sta tus, o r as to rec o n Wit IS nee '. .' , . h I- I wo uld be o f little use to hllll . Their va ntage pOints

auth Ority, o r bo t , e se t ley .

f I ' . heir power tempers hiS. . con ront liS own, t S ' '11 be recalled did not respo nd B " , o -wav street. awyer, It WI , ersuas lOn IS '~ tw f ' ,. e inc reases at the stee l mills, O n the contra ry,

at once to Truma n s pla n o r \\ ag

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P2 SECTION XI I

I I I) ' 'lCquiesced when he was satisfied

I S I , I J I "'wce an( on . tIe CCI'c rary leS lr:He( an t ( ',' t' I _ ,'s ion Sawyer had some POillt I

' II I rheonuSO( LCI ' s r wr publicly he wou L nor lL'ar ' " "dential pressure. If he had

, III ' f ' 'hich ro ITSlsr pi es l . to 0 1 1';1I1rage a liS own 10111 II 'd t'S "s inl 'Hions of strength" " , " I'" 'n rhe Presl cn ' , reckon wlrh coerCII'C IInp Icatlons I I" derl)ling· Sawyer's plac

I I I , df I f th . il11l) IcHlOns lin '.' e as

so 1;1L Truman to )e I11ln u 0 L d ' ' Cabinet Sl)okesma f I I

' ,tnror an .15.1 , n Or ;1 departillent head, as stec at 11111115. " d ' ' I' I I ' , , " I 1-1 ' " nken on ;l Irr)' 10 ) In t le stee cnSls bUSlIlcss. 1.0I';1Itl' IS rec lproCl. ;ll' ln ,, ' , I I' I d I' ' " , I I lrr I3CSI( es, le la aut 10nty to do Saw\'('!' had srrong Cl;lIl11S ro 0)';' SUPP( " - I ' W'I I ' , " 11 '11 aftord Emu atlng I son, le might sO l11e rhings th:1I the Willre House cou ( I. . ,

I ' I ' I ,',' (tile 1''' III 0I''1 II)ower also works twO ways). Or emulat1l1g lave reslgneL In a Ill ' , '. 0 I ' 1 : 11 ' f\ ' ~ II I _ ' .1 I " declined to sign necessary orders. r, le might have - IS In.l, IL mig It 1.1Ie Id d d let ir he kn()lI'n puhlic'" th;H he deplored wh;u he was to to a an protested its doing. 1\1' following :1I1 y of thesc courses Sawyer almost surely would have strengthene~1 the position of l11anagel11ent, weakened th e positIOn of th.e White House, and embitTered th e union. But the whole purpose of a wage Increase was to enh;1I1ce \,\Ihitc House persuasiveness in urging settlement upon union :1I1d comp;,nies ;llike. Alrhough Sawyer's starus and authority did not give him the power ro prevent 3n increase outright, they gave him capability to under- mine its purpose. If his aurhority over wage rates had been vested by a statute, nor by rel'ocable presidential order, his power of prevention might have been cOl11plete. So Harold Ickes demonstrared in the famous case of helium sales ro Germany before the Second World War.6

The power to persuade is the power ro bargain. Status and authority yield bargaining advantages. Bur in a governmenr of "separated instirutions sharing powers," they yield them to all sides. With the array of vantage points at his disposal, a Presidenr may be far more persuasive than his logic or his charm could make him. But outcomes are not guaranteed by his advantages. There re- main rhe counrer pressures rhose whom he would influence can bring to bear on hllll , from vantage poinrs at their disposal. Command has limited utility; persuaSIOn becomes gIve-and-take. It is well that the White HOllse holds the vantage points it does. In such a business any President may need them all- and more.

NOTES

J. The reader willwanr ro keep in mind the d' r' , rhe word power is emplo)'ed Wilen I I diS II1ClIon between two senses in which

. lave use rhe 11'0 d ( . I I [ f mal consrirurional, srarurory or cusromary I ' " r ~r Irs p ura ) ro reler ro ar- rive "form31" or placed in g:lorarion m~ k aur ~,Orlty, It IS either qualified by rhe adjec- sense of effecrive influence upon the c~ ~ds as rower(s).," Where I have used it in the marks (and always in rhe singular). Whelre uft 0 others, It appears wirhout quotation subsrirured for "power" in the first sense cdarlty and convenience permit, aUlilorit)' is 2. See, for example, his press conference ~;J t~uellce for power in the second sense. Times, July 23, 1959. u Y 2, 1959, as reported in the New York 3. See Douglass Cater, Tile FOllrlil Brallcil of G . ' 1959.) ove/111l1elll (Boston: Houghton·Mifflln ,

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r ....

3 2 3

~ . \X' ili, th e exce l:Hi o n of th e VKc-Pre ' , " ;. See Dav,d B. rrllma n', illulll · . sld('nC), of com sc. . -rl C ' In anng stud y f ..' . ~rc", ,e Ollgress[(lI/a / Pa r l v N'c' v k '. o. pa rr y r(' ,"non hIps In th e 8 1 st Con- . 5 - I " W lor - ' W,, · 19- 0 . 6. As e~ re ta r v 01 tIC Interior in 19'9 H" l)', )' , c,pen, lI y chaps. 4, 6, alld S. lillll' to Cerm,lIw despite th e illS' .> , f .Hold Ickes rl'fu sed [0 "pprove th e sa le of he-

I . ,. IStcnee u th S · I) . id,'Ilt Roosew t. \V,tho llt the Scc . ' e , t.He cpa rrlllL'nt ,nd rh e IIrg l1lg of Pres -

5c" TiJe Seael Diaries of J-Iaro/d r2~r~ s.approva l, such sa les were forhidden hy st ' tllte. <,speci.lll y PI' . _39 1-393, 396-399 . 5 ~ > ~' i New York: S, mo n a nd Schuste r, 1954, Vo l. 2, vcrs"'" ill th e lorthcoming' c'sc b . kee .1 so MlChaci J Reaga n. "The Heiium Co ntrO-

, . "00 on c , I '1' . tieth Century hInd under th" ed ' . I d ' 1\ I - ml Itary reianons prepared for the Twen - . . ' • . Ifo na If " ( f!-I II .

III thIS Inst,lIKe the St,Huto . I . II Illll 0 am l SteIn . .:retio

ll , A Pres id_cnt is IInlikely r/o '}~~~,l~'? ran to r~le SccTetary as a maner of iJis di s-

sll.:h ,lLIt ho ntv, It the president d ·d ("net off,ce rs for rhe conSCIe nti o us exe rc Ise of

P ublicly a nd at the Capirol \ve I ISO, t lelr successors mi ght we ll be embarrassed bo th

. , re ney to reve rse I .... . I k f Pres ident s aut hor it y to set 'Is ·d . d ' .' «(lSIOII prevIo us y ta en. As o r a . ' I e Iscretlollary d , t , .' fl ' . ' f ' >xists at " II 0 11 shaky leg'll gr d I'k' e er l11mano ns 0 t lIS sort, It rests, I It " • , '. . o lin no t I e ly tid . If · . . 0 JC fro save 111 [l e g ravest 0 Sltll :1 (J o ns.

AARO ' B. WILDAVSKY

60. THE Two PRESIDENC IES

Presidelltswield cOllsiderably more power when Inaking deCISIOns 111 the area of foreign policy than ill domestic policy. After reviewing the exercise of presidential power 1/1 the post-World War II period, Aaroll Wildavsky COII- eluded that while the United States has one president, "it has two presidencies: one presidel1cy is or do ' ic a - (girs, and the other is cOllceme with defense alld foreigJ.1

policv.::. This observation, first published in 1966, continues

to describe a basic truth abollt the presidency, ;111I'resi- d,mts I / been able to exercise more powe 'n orei n t an domestic polic Becallse 0 the greater need or speed in dea ing with foreign policy problems, the

constitutionally mandated power of the president to command the anned forces, the lower level of pllblic IIn- derstanding about international problems, the general unwillingness of Congress to stand up to the president

SOllrce: From Aaron B. Wikbvsk)', -The Two Presidencies," TnlllS(lClioll 4, no. 2 (Dec('mher,

1966) . Reprod uced by permissio n of Transaction pubhshers.

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r

I

3 2 4 SECT ION Xl

f. ' / " s-all)' /7residellt is goillg to be all ,orelgll po IC), ISSlle , / '

f / ' f. ' tl,all domestic po ICy. II/orc SlIccess,lI /1/ ,orelgll

Th ' 'd b 't I ~s tWO presidencies' one preside e Unned States has one Presl ent, LIt I 1.., ' ,ncy

" I ' ' d I I ' 1cerned WIth defense and foreIgn p I IS tor l omcstJc affaIrs, an t 1e ot 1er IS COl ,0. icy. Since World War II, Presidents have had nll~ch greater :L1ccess 111 con~rolling the nation's defcnse and foreign policies th:-In In dOJ1lJJ1~tIn~ It~ domestIc poli· cies. Even Lyndon Johnson Iws seen his early record of vICtoneS 111 domestIc leg. islation dimini sh :-IS his concern with foreign :-Ifblrs grows.

What powers docs the President have to co~trol defense and for~ig~ poli. cies and so completely overwhelm those who J11lgh~ wIsh to thwart hIm. ~ Presidenl4-l1armal problem with dom~stIc polIcy , IS t? get con~s.

sJ.gn:-Il...supporr fo r the programs he prefers. In foreIgn a,ffalrs, I,n contrast, l1e can almost alwars get support for policies that he belIeves WIll protect the nation-but his problem is to find a viable policy.

Whoever they are, whether they begin by caring about foreign policy like Eisenhower and Kennedy or about domestic policies like Truman and Johnson, Presidents soon discover they have more policy preferences in do· mestic matters tholWo foreign policy:' The Repubilcan and Democratic par· ties possess a traditional roster of policies, which can easily be adopted by a new President-for example, he can be either for or against Medicare and aid to education. Since .existing do.Q!.estic policy usuallv changes in only small steps, Presidents find it relatively sim Ie to make minor adjustments. However, a tough any President knows e supports foreign aid ana-N ATO, the world outside changes much more rapidly than the nation inside-Presidents and their parties have no prior policies on Argentina and the Congo. The world has become a highly intractable place with a whirl of forces we cannot or do not know how to alter.

THE RECORD OF

PRESIDENTIAL CONTROL

__ It takes great crises, such ,as Roosevelt's hundred days in the midst of the de· p~esslOn, or die extraordll1ary majorities that Barry Goldwater's candidacy WIlled to Lyndon Johnson, for Presi ts to succ' II' d t'C . 111 contro II1g omes I poltc~. From the end of the 1930s to the present (\vh t II d , a may roug y e ca e the modern era), PreSIdents have often been frustrat d ' h' d . e 111 t elf omestIC pro· grams. From 1938, when conservatives regrouped h ' f h' f h

' d h ' t elr orces to t e tIme 0 IS eat ,Franklll1 Roosevelt did not get a singl' f' 'f' d .

I . I 'd e pIece 0 slgm Icant omesttC

.!gls atJon passe . Iruman lost out on most f h' . ,( -. h f

' 0 IS II1tense domestIc preler ences, except per aps or housll1g. Since Eise h d'd h d .

, I . I ' h d' n ower I not ask for muc 0 mesnc egIs atJon, e Id not meet consistent defeat ", eral

Policy of curtailing governm I ' ' yet he faIled 111 hIS gen " " enta commItments K d ' f faced great dIffIcultIes WIth domestic legislation. . enne}, 0 course,

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.. ~ T

r Alll E I Congressional Action on Pr' . eSldcntlal Proposals from 1948 to 1964 -

POll l " A IU A -Domestic policy (natural resources, labor, agriculture, taxes, etc.)

Defense po licy (defense, disarmament, manpower, mise )

Foreign policy

Immigration, refu gees

rreaties, general foreign relations, State Department, foreign aid

40.2

73.3

58.5

13.2

70.8

59.8

26.7

41.5

86.0

29.2

r U ~ IHI· I( 0 1

PRO /'O'", I ...

2,4 99

90

655

129

445

~~~~~E : Congressio na l Quarterl y Service, COl/gress al/d the Natiol/ . 1945-1 964 (Washington ,

. In the realm of forei n polic there has not been a sin Ie ~i!ior issue on '.0llch Pres,de~ w en they were serious and determine have failed. The list of their victories is impressive: entry into the United N~ti~ns, the Marshall Plan, NATO, the Truman Doctrine, the decisions to stay out of Indochina in 1954 and to intervene in Vietnam in the 1960s aid to Poland and Yugoslavia , , the test-ban treaty, and many more. Serious setbacks to the President in con- trolling foreign policy are extraordinary and unusual.

Table 1, compiled from the Congressional Quarterly Service tabulation of presidential initiative and congressional response from 1948 through 1964, shows that Presidents have significantly better records in foreign and defense matters than in domestic policies. When refugees and immigration-which Congress considers primarily a domestic concern-are removed from the gen- eral foreign policy area, it is clear that Presidents prevail about 70 perceru.-ef ~huime in defense and foreign policy, compared with 40 percent in the do,-

~

WORLD EVENTS AND

PRESIDENTIAL RESOURCES

Power in politics is control over ~rnment I decision~. How does the Presi- dent manage his control of foreign and defense. poltcy .. The answer does not res'd' h titutional power 111 foreIgn affaIrs that PreSIdents have I em t e greater cons I' . h h po d · h f dl'ng of the Republic. The answer les m tee anges ssesse s1l1ce t e oun that have taken place since 1945. . '.

Th b f . - " .. ,;.h......uhich the Umted States has dlplomattc r

e num3r 0_ natto~ -~ 6i tions hasincreased fr'oo'!]l iL223.2i.!.!n~t'..::9~3~9:....t~0~t ;...13~in::...-t_9 _ _ . ut seer num ers 0 not

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326 S~cr l o N X\

, ' ' I become:l milch more lbngerolls place. H ' 1~lIl' lllll1 ~h; rh~ world h,lS ,1 so.s our government mllst :llw:lYs be aware ot

l l

-

CI'l' r rl'mote It 111.1 )' Sl'l' llI ,U tllnc , 11e possihilit y of lIuckar war. ' I ff ' I ' , f l're 'U powcrs Wit 1 ~ ~cnvc t lerll10nucl

Yct Ih~ llI~rl' l'x lSlelKC ° t:> ' , ' f ' ,ear , I f ' tself l"ISrl y lI1.:reasc Ollr r,ue ° II1tcraction 1 ' h

1\'("lPOIIS wOlild lIot, III ,Ill( () I , " , I " Vlt , I " W I , SC'~ ~Vl'llts ill Assam or Burunul :lS Import:lnt becau

Illost ot 1cr Il ,UIllIIS. \\l' , II d I . Ii ' se I f , I' 'r worldwld~ contcst, ca e t le co ( war, In whi I thcy :1re " so parr () ,1 ,Irbc f I' c I

" " I, f the conrrol or sllpport 0 ot ler n:1tlOns. Moreov greeu powns an: 111 ,1 S or " I 930 I I d er, I ' ' ' t III ' 1,I 'It 'lllt isobtHlIlism of t 1C I s las e to:l concern t 1l' n:aC!loll ,Ig;IIIlS l " "

, If ' ' I" tl 'It is worldwide in scope, We arc II1terested III whar hap WI! 1 Orl'I~1l po Il l' 1, - -" ',1,1__ - - I I, - . " , , ·th· - · . , ' ' I c.t.clL'IllULWIgerintere ens CI'C r)' \\' len: )CelliSt: \\ l Sll " ' ~s

, , ' ,'I 'I' , ,' t IIcnon 1I\\'o lvlll~, at till' 1I',)rst, the lOS" HI, Gil'ell t 1C (1\'~rm II1g bet th ou the world IS dallgerou s and that small causes

are pcrceil'cd to haw potentially grcat effects \I1"an un;,table world, It follows that Presidents IIlIiSt he interested 111 rebnvely small matters. So they give Azerbaij :lIl or Lebanon or Vietnam huge amounts of their tin:e. Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., wrote of Kennedy that "\11 the first two mon,ths of hiS adminis- treuion he probably spent more time on Laos than on anythll1g else." Fe~ ures in domestic policy, Presidents soon realize, could have as disastrous COnSeQIII'n(,!' s os 'wy one of dozens of mistakes in the international arena.

TI~e result is th ,;t foreign policy concerns tend to drive out domestic policy. Except for occasional questions of domestic prosperity and for civil ri!,;hts. for=- .e ign affairs h.llt cOilsistently bi\;,her priority for Presidents. Once, when trying to talk to President Kennedy about natural resources, Secretary of the Interior Stewart Udall remarked, " He's imprisoned by Berlin."

The importance of foreign affairs to Presidents is intensified by the in- creasing speed of events in the international arena, The event and its conse- quences follow closely on top of one another. The blunder at the Bay of Pigs is swiftly followed by the near catastrophe of the Cuban missile crisis. President< can no longer co II 1'1 [ 01'1 PJssing along their most difficult problems to their suc- ~ They must expect to face the consequences of their actions-or failure to act-while still in office.

Domestic policy-making is \lSlIolly I);)sed on experimental adjustmenlU9 an existing situation, Only a few decisions, such as those involving large dams, Irretrievably commit future generations. Decisiol'1& iR foreign affairs, however, g,re often ~ercei'l@d to be .irre-\l~ihlc...This is expressed, for example, in the fear of escalatIOn or the varIOUS "spiral" or "domino" theories of international conflict.

If decisions are perceived to be borh important and irreversible, there is every reason for Presidents to devote a great deal of resources to them. presi; dents have to be oriented tow r I fl' Jhe)' le use 0 t leI serve a Ixe term 111 office, and they cannot automatically count on suppor! from the populace, Congress, or the administrative apparatlls. They have to be careful, therefore, to husband their resources for pressi~g future needs. 1M

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beL'ausc the co n ~cq ue llcc s uf ,, ' '. . " rave fa >te r to Ill '] 'f I e\ ellt III fure lgn affa irs a rc potenti a ll y mo re "c " c III CSt t lerns I d tic affairs, Pre~ ident s are m e ves, an Ie s easil y reversible th an in do mes-

ore wtiltng to use up their resuurce;,

T H E POWE R TO A C T

Their forlll a l pOwers to ' , P

, I I ' comlllit resuurces In foreign affa irs and defense a re vast. 3 rtICli :l ey l!)lnQrtanr is th ' r d ' Ch' f

- _ ---, r - ' elr power as \Jl1:":ll;,:,n:..;l;:a:.;n;:.=.e;,:,r-..:.II;,:,l -.-:;:.:.;.;-:lc",-t:..;o",--,,m;--,-u_v_e ~, Faced With Situar' I'k h ' , -_ , , ' Ions l et e IIl vaSlon uf South Korea or the emplace- ment 01 ml ss ties in Cuba f " " h h ., ast action IS requ ired, Presidents possess bot t e fo rmal power to ac t and the kn owledge that eli tes and the g ncraLp"bljc ex- pect the III to act. Once they have cOlllmitted American forces, it is difficult fo r Congress or anyone else to alter the course of events, The Dominica n venture is a recent case in point.

, Pres idel ' I discretion in foreign affa irs also makes it diffi (though Ilo t ImpOSSible) for COllgress tG restrJcr t lelr actions, Presidents ca n use executi ve agreements in stead of trea ties, enter into tacit agreements in stead of written ones, and o therwise help create de (acto situations not eas il y reversed , Pres i- dents a lso have fat greater ability than anyone eI e to obtain infor a.rion o~ developments abroad through the Departments of State and Defense. The need ~or secre in some as ects ' n and defense olicy further restricts the ability of others to compete with Presidents, These things a re we ' nown, What is not so generall y appreciated is the growing presidentia l ability to lise informati on to achieve goa ls.

In the past Presidents were amateurs in military strategy. They could no t even get much useful advice outside of the milita ry. As late as the 1930s the number of people outside the military establishment who were professiona ll y engaged in the stud y of defense policy could be numbered on the fingers. Today there a re hundreds of sllch men, The rise of the defense inrcil ecCllOl s has given-thc President of the United States enhanced ability to contro l de- fense policY.. He is no longer dependent on the military for advice, He ca n chooseamong defense intellectuals from the resea rch corporations and the academies fo r alternative sOllrces of advice, He can install these men in hi s own office. He can play them off aga inst each other o r use them to extend spheres of coord ination, , ,

Even with these advisers, however, PreSidents and Secreta rres of Defense might still be roo bewildered by the complexity of nuciear situations to take action-unless they had an understandlllg of the doctrine and concepts of deter- rence. But knowledge of the doctrine about deterrence has been widely diffused; it can be picked up by any intelligent person who Will read books, or listen to cnough hours of conversation' ,Whether or not thc doctrlnc IS good IS a separate question; the point is that clvtilans ca n feel rhey understand wha t IS gOlllg on , d f I' n 1 ps the "lOft cvtrlord 1n -H )' featpre of preSidential acti QIl III e ensf' po ICy, !>[ 13

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328 SECTIO N XI

which the Commander-in- . . . . the de ree ru es F during the CubJn missile CriSIS WJS Ir 'even t lOV . [om

Chief of the Armcd ... h~ . . ' . , nt[O Idn , to the preci se words and ac- h i f b<nr IIlg, d h' . '1' the positionin u oi ships to the Illct ot so· '1 the President an IS CIVI Ian

'" . d"d lid ' rs and sal ors, tions to be taken by In IVI U:1 so Ie

advisers were in control. . foreign :1ffairs, the rivals do . I f power In Although Presidents havc r,,'a s or I I 'lI1 St' th ' ma ' have supe-

I not on lee. d b not usually succeed. PresidentS 1reV;1I . ts are weak, divide or e- I ' nti 'll 0 onen • . I 0 r resources bllt hl' '. use t lelr lote .' \" . , t us consider the potentia

Illi!e~ve~· !!t1~l;~1t...!t!h~ery~s~h~o~u~ld~n~o~t ~c~()~n~tr~o~1 ~t<~)I~'Ci,'lg;'I~l tPr°g-r(Kj'u}' e I Congress the military - , I ' ltcrest groupS, t le , , rivals-the general Citizenry, Spl'LI:1 II u

d h 5 te Department.

the so-c:1l1ed milit:1ry-industri:11 complex, an t e ta

COMPETITORS FOR CONTROL OF POLICY

THE PUBLIC

I d Presidents in foreign affairs The gener:11 public is much more (epen ent on . f' I . WI '1 I know about the Impact 0 socia th:1n in domestic matters. 11 e many peop e ., .

. . f k b I I'tl'cs in MalawI. So It IS not sur-security and Medicare, ew ' now a out t le po I . .' . prising that people expect the President to act III foreign affairs and .rewa.rd him with their confidence. Gallup Polls consistently show that pre~lde?ttal popularity rises after he rakes action in a crisis-whether. the aC~I~n IS d~s~s­ trous as in the Bay of Pigs or successful as in the Cuban missile crISI~. DeCISIve action, such as the bombing of oil fields near Haiphong, resulted III a sharp (though temporary) increase in Johnson's popularity.

The Vietnam situation illustrates another problem of public opinion in for- eign affairs: it is extremely difficult to get operational policy directions from the general public. It took a long time before any sizable public interest in the sub- ject developed. Nothing short of the large scale involvement of American troops under fire probably could have brought about the current high level of concern. Yet this relatively well developed popular opinion is difficult to interpret. While a majority appear to support President Johnson's policy, it appears that they could easily be persuaded to withdraw from Vietnam if the administration changed its line. Although a sizable majority would support various initiatives to end the war, they would seemingly be appalled if this action led to Commu- nist encroachments elsewhere in Southeast Asia. (See "The President the Polls and Vietnam" by Seymour Mart!n Lip.set, Tralls-actiOIl, Sept/Oct 1966.) ,

Although PreSidents lead op1l1lOn 111 foreign affairs, they know they will be held ac.countable for the c~nseque.nces. of their actions. President Johnson has mallltallled a large commitment III Vietnam. His popularit), sho t .

d .. h 'd f . 0 s up now ~n aga1l1 III t. e 1111 st 0 some Imposing action. But the fact that a body of cit- Izens do not lIke the war comes back to damage his overall po I .. \VI ,'11

. ' " h pu ant). we \\ I support your 1I1lttattves, t e people seem to say but we \ '11 h' I

• , VI reserve t e ng It to punish you (or your party) if we do not like the results.

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T H E PH ES lDtNCY }29

The hrm, a o r, business co ,covers II ma of COl ern..: 'd ' nservanon ve t ' 'I ' h ' groupS provi e c ues when ' ' eran, CIVI fig ts, a nd oth er Interest

identify with these groups n~a~r~d:sed policy affects rhem. Thus people wh o till' int;:r,esL' structure . ~t their Views. But In foreign ~olicrtterS many matters affecting Af ' IS wea unstable an 'Il. rather t an ~e. In

rica and ASia f I ' , , known interest groups. Wh'l h ' o r exa mp e, It IS hard to thll1k of weil-

I e ep emera I g , 'f ' , Port or protest particular I" roups arise rom tllne to time to sup-e po ICles they II d' " P

roblem is resolved In ' usua y Isappear wh en the Immediate , . COntrast, longer-last" , I' I'k h F ' Policv Association and C 'I _ , II1g e Ite groups let e orelgn

" ounci on Foreign R I'd f I of diverse views; refusal to take ' ,e atlons are compose 0 peop e condition of their conti 1 d 'bstl rong POSitions on controversial matters IS a

I ue via I Ity. The stron est interest rou b b I "s are pro abl the ethnic associations whose

n~em ers lave str.ong ties WIth a home and ... as in Poland or Cub; so they a re rare y activate Sim ultaneously on any specific issue. They are m'ost ef~ when most narrowly and inten I f d ' , ,- , se y Ocuse_ -as 111 the fierce pressure from Jews to recognize the state of Israel But the ' I' I II b I" h

· . 'f' , . Ir re atlve y sma num ers unitS t elr Sl III Ican 0 Presidents' hi ' ,

. , ,111 t e vast y. morL lmportant general fore,lPn Policy picture-as COntll1ue aid t h A b 'h ~ <>.:..:.. , . 0 t e ra COuntfies sows. Moreover, some @1mc groups may confhct on significant issues such as American acceptance of the Oder-Neisse hne separating Poland from what is now East Germany.

THE CONGRESS

Congressmen also exercise power in foreign affairs. Yet they are ordioMily notieriolls competirorr wirA the presideRr because they follow a self-denying ..Qrdll1an£t. They do not think it is their job to determine the nation's defense policies. Lewis A. Dexter's extensive interviews with members of the Senate Armed Services Committee, who might be expected to want a voice in defense policy, reveal that they do not desire for men like themselves to run the na- tion's defense establishment. Aside from a few specific conflicts among the armed services which allow both the possibility and desirability of direct in- tervention, the Armed Services Committee constitutes a sort of real estate committee dealing with the regional economic consequences of the location of military facilities.

The congressional appropriations power is potentially a significant re- Source, but circumstances since the end of World War II have tended to reduce its effectiveness. The appropriations committees and Congress itself might make their will felt by refusing to allot funds unless basIC poliCies were altered. But this has not happened. Whit Congress adltional small cuts in t~e military budget , - " ' ,hemselv ~~- gression empts to iru:utlsc speCltl10 )temS-StiH-fur~

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330 SECTION XI

, . f ' I to spcnd ha s nor been seri- " [Ion s rc US.l , I' 'd I I

l'lo -r of rhe rimc, thc adlllllll s tr ~1 I" () -c lsioll 5 whcn lilt IVI ua egis- 1\ s . I ' 11"l\"l' )(tn L J k ' ,

ousl)' dl'll1cngcd, HO\\'l'\"(o' r, t lCIC , 'fl ', I Sc n ~ltor HCllry ac son III hI S " I III ul'n[l,l - ' A ' E

hto rs o r committees h ~1\"c Kcn I 'Joint C Oll1llllttCC on tomlC n- • , ' f · II ' 'UC5 0ntlt -- , IS , cIminiI'll (with thc ;lId 0 co cag I I' hri s WC~lpOIlS S) stem ane enator . . '" " . , KC for t Ie (). h f I M h II erg)' ) wa s abl e to g~lIn acceptal ' d" nininl' th e s ape 0 tIe ars a ~ I ' I , 1'lrtln CtCl1 c- , f , 1'

Arthur H, V;1I1dcnberg P :1) CC .1 I· I ' re eXIJerr In de ense po ICY act, as f . ' , ·ssmen w 10 .1 ' 'I. h Plan a nd so on, Thc eW L<lIlgrc I II ,' -ts with the executive manc . It

, , I" 'el)' ;15 0) 1) IS I ' Sa muel p, HUlI[lngton S~I) S , .lI g . . ional experts to use (lelr re- , " I f , thcse u)ngress k

is app;Henrly Illore tnlltlu ()~ f ' I 'xecutive than to wor on other ' I I ("1 rill" rOIll t Ie c . sources III orc cr to ge t ~1 1. "

congrcssmen. . ' t of violence, it rakes a great When ;111 issue invol " lC " . follow IheJ'.residenr's lead~s

d I ' .~e&<;IH~· 11 not to - ~h I I ea to COI1\'II1C( .," I I t'. s'> policy iss ues from t e ate 1930s I ' . I I ' t torcl"n anl ( e en • Ro )lIlson s ta 1lI ;ltlon 0 ," ' fl ' -e b Congress in only one case out

to 196 1 (Table 2) shows domll1anr In UCIK ~ d force in Indochina. In of sen'll-the 1954 decision 1I0t to IIltervene wIth arme . '

, E' I deliberatel y so unded out congressIOnal that instance PresIdent Isen lower , ' h d'

, " ' d' d d not to II1tervene-agalllst tea vICe opinion and, fllldlll g It negative, eCI e , ff I'

f '\d ' I I' ~dford c11'1irman of the Joint CllIefs of Sta . T lIS attempt to o r 1I11ra ,.. " fA' , I d 'b'l' d 'd or sllcceed as the years 0 mencan IIlVO vement aban on responsl I Ity In. , •

demonstrate.

THE MILITARY

The ,outstanding feature of the military's " , , king defense pol- icy is their amazlIlg weakness .• Whether the policy decisions invo ve the size 0 the armed forces , the chOICe of weapons systems, the total defense budget, or its division into components, the militarv have not prevailed. let us take bud- getary decisions as representative Ofrile key choices to b;n;ade in defense pol- icy. Since the end of Wo the militarv has not been a e...to achi~e significant ( I Ion ollar) increases in appropriations by their own effur,ts, Under Truman and Eisenh;wer defense budgets were detern1fned by what Huntington calls the remainder method: the two Presidents estimated rey- enues, decided what they could spend on domestic matters, and the remainder was assigned to defense. The usual controversy was between some military and congressional groups supporting much larger expenditures while the President and his executive allies refused. A typical case, involving the desire of the Air Force to IIlcrease the number of groups of planes is described by Huntington in The Common Defense:

The FY Ifiscal yearl1949 budget provided 48 groups. After the Czech coup, the AdnlllllStranon YIelded and backed ']n Air Force . f 55 " ,

• 0 groups 111 Its spring rear- mament program. Congress added ']dd" I f d' ,

, " • Itlona un s to aId Air Force expansIOn to 70 groups. The AdminIstration ref d 'I'

, • use to utI Ize them howe\'er and in the gathering economy wave of the Slll11mer and fall of 1948 h A' F' "I " cut back agall1 to 48 groups In 1949 I ' t e Ir orce gO.l \\.IS

. t le House of Representatives picked up

S can

n ed

b y C

am S

can n

er

= so .. " Ah .,

T""LF 2 Congressional Involvement in Foreign and Defense Policy Decisions

C( )N (; R F~~ ll )NA L PR FD()r-.. lINANT I NV()LVF~ I FNT I N IT I AT( )1{ I N FI (lEN( I L I-(. i"l ' A l l(l :-.i (H{ VI()t l ,, ( 1 DI <.. i'dl )"! (HIGH, Low, (C()N(; RE .... ~ O R (CON ( ,K I ,~ OR R F .... l ) l lITIO:--J /\ ,-51 \h. 1 TI\" ( Lo""

b ,ul' NONE) EXECUTI VE) E X FC lIr, v F ) (Yo·, OJ< No) (Y h 'lK No) O l{ ~IHHU )

Neutra lity legislation, the 1930s High Exec Co ng Yes No LOllg Lend-lease, 194 1 High Exec Exec Yes Yes LOllg Aid to Russia , 194 1 Low Exec Exec No No Long Repeal of Chinese exclusion, 1943 High Cong Cong Yes No Lo ng Fulbright Resolution, 1943 High Cong Cong Yes No Long Building the atomic bomb, 1944 Low Exec Exec Yes Yes Long Foreign Serv ices Act of 1946 High Exec Exec Yes No Long Truman Doctrine, 1947 High Exec Exec Yes No Lung The Marshall Plan , 1947-48 High Exec Exec Yes No Long Berlin a irlift, 1948 None Exec Exec No Yes Long Vandenberg Resolution, 1948 High Exec Cong Yes No Lo ng North Atlantic Treaty, 1947-49 High Exec Exec Yes No Lo ng Korean decision, 1950 None Exec Exec No Yes Sho rr Japanese peace treaty, 1952 High Exec Exec Yes No Long Bohlen Nom ination, 1953 High Exec Exec Ye s No Long Indo-China, 1954 High Exec Cong No Yes Short Formosan Resolution . 1955 High Exec Exec Yes Yes l ong International Finance Corporation, 1956 Low Exec Exec Yes No Long Fore ign aid, 1957 High Exec Exec Yes No Long Reciproca l trade agreements, 1958 High Exec Exec Yes No Lo ng Monroney Resolution, 1958 High Cong Cong Yes No Long C uban dec ision , 196 1 Low Exec Exec No Yes Long

lH lH SUltrCe: ):.II11(,S A. Robinson. Co ngress and Foreign Pulicy-Making (Holllt'wood, 111. : Dorsl'y Press. 196 2 ).

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-'3 2 ~ ' l"ol\ X I

-s 1 'I" The I' rl'"d~ III jlllp',,",cicd rllt' dlJII~n!; ' " lid ,' pprul'rI ,II " J tUlld, '"r) , ).: r: ' " I - I A' " , , h ,d 41i )!ru liP' , r H~ II1 0Il y. 111 J Ullt' . IY"O. t ll' Ir ·on .. l •

, " , I I · , " r.' J",' .U:_JllOf' - lin ~ nd T he brc It Ill lT , hl' tldel ' )Ill I I ' , - ' ' I', , T he KOrl' :11l \X/ar rl's ll tel 111 an 'n -

l11 udlT Il tt',hnoil,,,v Ih ,1I1 tn rh e '11' , , f II ' I SI) lIrnik . d I ere,ISt' frOll1 _ ;,; 4-1 li 'Oil ;ll1d 1l11l(h o f the res! 0 ()W~l , I ' an (Ie

, , , - I - , tl"l:hllulugy :t il l Inte rll a tlonal hll"e ":llsrs o t I11l 's,k I' ro" ra ms, r Ill S '110 If ' d- L , L, - -f bu rl ""HC (ort' l 'n ;] air () 0 -C l fltct-p llh l,U e lld I() thl' o lle 111 ,'1" 1' d o rr to u ---.:::......

mL'sti ..: pow"" ro ugh the bud 'cr. " I d - ' , d ~ ' I r ' I ' re i)' r'll1f,es r lL' eCISlons ma e b), It ,:ll llIJ he .trgllt'L t 1at t 1C re, 'l ell! IllL ' "

, , " f I ' I' , 1/() r 'onl'ress were ulllted Jnd 111-till' millt ,II"\' ,md theil' a l""" I ' t 1l' 'nI 't:try .11ll '" , , ' 'f " I I " . I ' I· e difficult for Presidents to resist Slstt'IH o n de t"be po "cy. ,t wa ll l Ct'"a"l) ) , ,

these forces, But it is prcci sL'ly the di sllility of th e military that has character- ized the ent ire os, " , nl eCt. the Ill' ,t;]r, cen I e on .1l1ym-:ljo r Inan er 0 ( d ense po licy, T he apparent uniry of the Jo int C hiefs of Sr,lff turns our tu be illuso ry, The vast ma jority of their recommendatio ns ap- pear to be una nimous and a re accepted by the Secrcta ry of Defense and the President, Bur thi s facade of unity ca n o nl y be achieved by methods that vitiate the impact of the recommendations, Genuine disagreements are hidden by V.lgue language that commits no one to a nything. Mutually contradictory plans a re strung together so everyone appears to get something, but no thing is de- cided, Since it is impossible to agree on reall y important matters, all SOrts of trivia are brought in to make a record of agreement. While it may be true, as Admiral Denfield, a former Chief of Naval Operations, sa id, that "On nine- tenths of the matters that come before them the joint C hiefs of Staff reach agreement themselves," the vastly mo re important trurh is that "normally the Dilly dispures are on str;ltcgic concepts, the size and comp, ' tio n-of fo rces, alld budget matte~s, " '

MILITARy-INDUSTRIAL

But what about the fabled military-industrial complex? If the military alone is divided and weak, perhaps the giant industrial firms that are so dependent on defen se contracts playa large part in making policy,

First, there is an importanr distinction between the questions " Who will get a given contract?" and "What will our defense policy be?" It is apparent that different answers may be given to these quite different questions There are literally tens of thousands of defense conrractors, They may comp~te vig- or,o,usly for busll1ess, In the course of this competition, theynlay wine ana dine m.Jltary othcers, use rettred generals, seek intervention by their congressmen, place ads 111 trade lournals, and even conrribure to poll'tl'cal 'Th fa , campaIgns, e,- mous TFX controversy-sho uld General Dynalnl" ' s or B' I ' ) , , ~ oemg get t 1C expen-

sive contract. -IS a larger than hfe example of the pres b hI ' 1 . , sure roug t to )car \I search ot lucrative contracts,

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Till: PJU:SID ENCY 333

But neither the TFX case n I ' I j ' I I k' < or t Ie. usual vigorous competition (or contracts '- invo vee Wit I tIe ma ' l1lg of S l' ~' k I> , f I > I f u lStanllve defen se policy, Vital questions . C

he Size 0 tIt l e ense budg"t rI I ' ,, ' , , , 1' -t , Ie c WILe of strategic programs ma ss ll e rem I rion V5, ,I counter-City str'lteg , I I'k ' , ' - f a ~_ . ' , < ~,anl t Ie I -e were far beyond the poliCY allllS 0 ny compan y, nJuStnal-flrnl s tl f - , , 'I

:1 . , len, ( 0 not control slI c b dCClslons, nor IS t Jere - uch eVldcl1l:e that they 'ICtl ' II ' N ' , ' h I~ , . 1.1) try. 0 doubt J precipitous Jnd dm stlc rus to ,lis'lrm;Jmcnr would meet With opposition from indusrri;ll firm s among other 'Hcrcsrs. Howcver there has b · ' " (' I II , , never een a tlllle when any SlgJlI IC;lnt e ement , I the <To\'ernment conSidered 'I I' , ' , II t> • (IS.lrIllJmenr poliCY to he feaSible.

It Illa}' Jl)llear that indust ' I f' I I ' h , na Irms 1,le no speCial reason to concern t em- selres With the government's stance on defense because they agree with the national consensus on resls,tlllg comlllunislll, maintaining a large defen se es- tablishment, ;In,d reJectll~g Isolationism. However, this hypothesi s about the climate of opinion explallls everything and nothing. For ~ .worted or rel~cted CJn be explained OW;]}, on the grounds th~~r. ~mate of opllllon dICtated what happened, Did the United StJtes fail to inter- vene with armed force in VietnJm in 1954? That must be because the climate of opinion was Jgainst it. Did the United StJtes send troops to ViernJm in the 1960s? Tlwt must be becJuse the cold WJr c1imJte demanded it. If the United States builds more missiles, negotiates J test-bJn treaty, intervenes in the Do- minican Republic, fJils to intervene in a dozen other situJtions, all these ac- tions fit the hypothesis by definition. The Jrgument is reminiscent of those who defined the Soviet Union JS permJnentiy hostile and therefore interpreted increases of Soviet troops as menJcing and decreases of troop strength as equally sinister.

If the rowth of the militar ' e uated with in- creasia the extrJordinary wea ness of the ~nal seldi@F ,till reqllires explJnJtjon ,Huntington as written about how major military leJders were seduced in the Truman and Eisenhower years into believing that they should bow to the judgment of civiliJns thJt the econ- omy could not stand much brger militJry expenditures. «nce the size of the

JDilirary pie W;lS Jccepted AS a fixed constrajnt, the militJry services were com.: pelled to pm their l'Iujor energies into gU:1rrel~it-h-one...another oyer who should get the I;uger ,bner Given the n;]turJI rivJlries of the military Jnd their traditional acceptance of civilian rule, the President Jnd his :1dvisers-who could cbim responsibility for the broJder picture of reconciling defense and domestic policies-had the upper hand. There Jre, however, additional expla-

nations to be considered. The dominant role of the congressional appropriations committee is to be

guardiJn of the treasury. This is manifested in the pride of its members in cut- ting the President's budget. Thus it WJS difficult to g~t this cruci,al committee to recommend even a few hundred million increJse 111, d~fen~e; It was practi- cally impossible to get them to consider the several billion Jump that might really have made a difference. A related budgetary matter concerned the

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334 SECTION XI

. d etary system introduced by Secretary of planning, programmll1g, and bu g l d ' et contained 111. r ca t . that

F 'f I defense HI g , th Defense McNa mara. !2r I tie . f Defense CO li er. . . I . rhe Secretan 0 d . . . cn s . ' Ices, on )' f rOPfa m bu gerll1g, Its major

I b II nsequences 0 p '" .. , d' \X'hatever the other (e ata 1 e co , and hi s cIvIlian a visers. . to the secreta r) • . .,

consequence was to grant power, au h )ro ram h udgetm&-1S-Just ope The subordinati on of rh e I , of th " r.y, In rh e past decade the mil-

s mptom 0 a 1110re 'ener:11 k'lI rOIJri 'ne to the nuclear age, For . f ' d I k t" r lI ecnl"ll S ' I S app· h Itary las su tere a ac ' 0 111 e ' 'e with nuclea r war. So t e usual

d t ) direct expenenc . , no one has (a n no one wan s '1 I combat expe rience IS not very l ' I I ' peop e to lave military talk about Je lllg t 1e on ) ' f ssible future wars-in order

, ' I d I ' lla"in 'uive creation a po h ImpreSSive, nsrea ,r 1e II '''' ' . I ' I ' ty fo r abstract thoug t com- to avoid them-requires peop,le With a lI

b g \CapaCgl quantitative methods. West

bined with the ability to manipulate sym 0 s USIl1 Point has'not produced many such men.

TH E STATE D EPA RTM ENT , h S D ut their policies. Modern PreSidents expect t e tate e artme , , '

J h F · 1~t t~te was "in some particular sense hiS epart-

on, el "", I h ' h ment. " If a Secretary of State forgets this, as was apparent y t e case Wit James Byrnes under Truman, a Presiden~ mar find ano,ther man. B~t the State Department, especially the Foreign SerVICe, IS also a hlghl,y profeSSional orga- nization with a life and momentum of its own. If a PreSident does not push hard he may find his preferences some . r ISSI at 111 time. Art ur

chlesinger I s li S JOO' on Kennedy with laments about the ureaucratic inertia and recalcitrance of the State Department.

Yet Schlesinger'S own accollnt suggests that State could not ordinarily r~­ sist the president. At one point, he writes of "the President, himself, lI1creas- Ingly the day-to-day director of American foreign policy. " On the next page, we learn that "Kennedy dea lt personally with almost every aspect of policy around the globe. He knew more about certain areas than the senior officials at State and probably called as many issues to their attention as they did to his." The President insisted on his way in Laos. H e pushed through his policy on the Congo against strong opposition with the State Department. Had Kennedy wanted to et a reat deal more initiative our of the State Dep-art- ment, as c eSll1ger insists, he cou ave the ecre ary O"fSt'a~ manwho did not command special support-in the Democratic RartYOr .§. ._ Congre~. It may be that Kennedy wanted too strongly to run his own foreign p~licy. Dean Rus,k may have known far better than Schlesinger that the one thmg K.~nnedy did not want was a man who might rival him in the field of foreign affairs.

Schlesinger comes closest to the truth when he writes that " the white Hou~e could alwa~s, win any battle it chose over the [Foreign] Service; but the prestige and profiCiency of the Service limited the number of battles any white House would find it profitable to fight." ~hen the president knew

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T I-Il PR E> IDlNCY 335

nted he o t it. good ad vic e a nd f r e que n td ";-:-:i d:;-:n:-:o::t-'-'--, e":'t:':t:;'l:"a=t=. -;;B:::u~t:':t-:';";'e:'r e::':;'i s--'"-'n"'o"""'e'::v 1;'- l-e=-n=-cC:::-e t ha t the peop e on li S sta came lip with better I cas. T he rea l problem may have been a lack of good Ideas a nywhere. Kennedy undo ubted ly encouraged his staff to prod the Sta te Department. But the President was sufficientl y ca utio us no t to push so ha rd that he gOt his way when he was not certai n w ha t tha t way should be. In this Context Kenlle~ppears to have played his staff off aga inst elements 111 the Sta te Department.

The growth of a spec ia l White H ouse staff to help Presidents in foreign affairs expresses their need for assistance, their refu sa l to rely completely on the regula r executive agencies, and their ab ility to find competent men. The de- ployment of this staff must remain a presidential prerogative, however, if its members are to serve Presidents and not their opponents. Whenever critics do not like existing foreign and defen se po licies, they are likely to complain that the White House staff is screening out divergent views from the President 's at- tention. Naturally, the critics recommend introd ucing many mo re different viewpoints. If the critics could maneuver the President into counting hands a ll day ("on the one ha nd and on the other"), they would make it impossible fo r him to act. Such a viewpoint is also congenial to those who believe that action rather than inaction is the greatest presenu:langer in foreign..polic.y. Bur Presi-

dents reso lutely refuse to become prisoners of their advisers by using them as other people wo uld like_ presidents remain in control ekheir scaff as well as uf major foreign policy decisions. --

HOW CO MPLETE I S TH E CON TROL?

Some analysts say that the success of Presidents in controlling foreign policy de- cisions is largely illusory. It is achieved, they say, by anticipating the reactions of others, and eliminating proposa ls that would run into severe opposition. There is some truth in this objection. In olitics, where transacttons are based on a high degree of mutual interdependence, \ . other~ ma cio has to be . taken into account. But basing presidenttal success 111 foreIgn and defense poltc)' on ; nticipated reactions suggests a static situation which does not exist. For if Presidents propose o nly those poltcles that would get support 111 Congress, and Congress opposes them only when it knows that it can muster overwhelming strength, there would never be any conflict. Indeed, there mIght never be any

action. .. action" ex lain the conflict over polici

ow - . h ' h Marshall Plan and the test-ban treaty 111 W IC severe o~~~stnon was oveI-

I h s efforts' Furthermore, why doesn t anttClpated reac-Come on_): -v strenuou· h f - " k ' d . affairs' One would have to argue t at or some reason f10n wor 111 o mesttc · f"

ccess ul IS consIstently onfused r identia l

d - - d most alwa s accurate 0 0 'olic issues. on omestlC Issues an' d b - h - B h f

. - t d reactions" sho ul e greater 111 t e more taml la r Ut t e ro le 0 "antlclpa e

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336 SECTION XI

. . .kl 'of experi ence for forecastin g domcstic situations, which provide a b~IL °b ch as the Suez crisis or th~ I . f· I· . I )"el SilU ;Hlons Sll t Ian In o rel gn po ICY Wit I many 1H •

Rhodesian affair. I . ,I , i"IH refute the thesis of . . f· I . . I ' ·lmI1Ies w III 1 n 0 Arc there Slg1l1 Ica nt llsronca ex. · . I . . . F . . . I·) C . 'n aid mav ,1C J GIS' In pOIn!., or presldcnl1al control of fo reign po IC y. , orc lg~ · d .. b

. I' I ' t forclgn al appropriations e- n1:1ny years, PreSidents have strllgg ~( to be I .. v t se er~1 b·ll·

. . . . II . I' .ressiona opiniOn. Ie v" I lOll cause ot hostility from pli 1 IC am long ·d I . . I I ,I , d )ite the eVI ent unpopu anty of dollars ;] )'ear are approprlatel regll ;l1) eSI .. . ' ltrles like Poland and the program. In the ;ud progr;IIllS to , . I 'd

I . I fi Ctions to tIe al 1m resl-

Yu os ,Wla, tiC Congress attac 1 ' dents fin ways 0 bettini' ·lWlllHj.~t~hlf'e+lll+'l.- ..) .

\X!hat ahout the exa mple of recognition of COlll111U111St China. The senti- ment of the (Olintry always has heen against recognizing Red China or admit- ting it to the United Nations. But have Presidents wanted to recog111ze Red China and been hamstrung by opposition? The answer, I suggest, IS a qualified "no." By the time recognition of Red China might have become a serious issue for the Trunun administration, the war in Korea effectively precluded its con- sideration. There is no evidence that President Eisenhower or Secretary Dulles ever thought it wise to rccognize Red C hina or help admit her to the United Nations. The Kennedy administration viewed the matter as not of major im- portance and, considering the opposition, moved cautiously in suggesting change. Then came the war in Vietnam. If the advantages for foreign policy had been perceived to be much higher, then Kennedy or Johnson might have proposed changing American policy toward recognition of Red China.

One possible exception, in the case of Red China, however, does not seem sufficient to invalidate the ?eneral thesis ~hat Presidents do considerably bette£, m gettmg thClr way III foreign and defense policv thJn in domestic policie5.,..

THE WORLD INFLUENCE

The forces impelling :residents to be concerned with the widest ran e of for- eign and defense poliCies also affect the ways in which the calcufate their power stakes. As Kennedy used to say "D . . Y us; foreign policy can kill liS " ' _~StlC pobcy ... can only defeat

It no longer makes sense for Presidents to" I 1" ''' ' . defense policies. In the past P ·d . P ay po lUes With foreign and

. • , resl ents might ha I I h h lei gam by prolonged delay 0 I . . ve t 101ig lt t at t ey cou r )y not actmg at all Th bl .

or be passed on to their successo P .d " e pro em might disappear rs. res! eots mil t . h

costs themselves if the world SI·t .- d ,s now expect to pay the hlg . ' ' uatlon etenorat Th d lllg a polley that is viable in th Id I ' . es", e a vantages of pllrsll-

. f II e wor t lat Will bl . or their e ow Citizens far ollt . h ' not ow up on PreSidents d

. ,. welg any tempor I·' I accrue III supporting an initial I I. ary po IUca disadvantages

. P . I • Y unpopll ar pob C . . affaIrs, reslc ents e)l!!aged in \ Id 1". cy. ompared With domestiC

. . b vor po. nICS (Ire' I ._J With meeting pro lems on their Own ;e;;;;;:;v Immense y more conceolt:ll

ho suPPOrts and opposes a pobey,

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I ULI"h a ma rter of co nsider'lbl ' , I ' a r-t 1 '" , , • e Interest. dues nut assume the crucla Imp IKe tha t It d ues In do mestic aff ' - TI I ' , f ' ~ ' , Iso t3 , , ' aIr, 1e JeSt po lIcy Pres ldenrs ca n Inll IS .1

rhe best pulIttc , '

The fact th at there are . f ' I' ' ' ns . Ilumero us orel~n and defen se po IC), s lru a tt o , 11perin u to r a President's ' ~, , ' I ' . e l OI "' ", attentIon mea ns that It IS worthwhl e to o rga n . political JcttVIt)' In order to effec t his agenda. r o r it a re en pa)'s mo re

:lrtentIo l1 ro ce rta tn problems he ma)' develop difierenr preferences; he mal' seek and receive different advice; his new calculations mal' lead him to devote greater resources to seeking a SOlution. Interested congre~smen mti'- exert in- tluence not b)' dl.rectl determtnln < resldenttal ' . ' Il hill in Ireed y by 1113 ' 111 It co ' .' ' 1t to avo id reconsiderin • the basis for hi J lcrinn. For example, citizen groups, such as those concerned with a change in C hin a policy, ma)' have an impact simply by keeping their proposa ls o n the puhlic agenda. A President may be compelled to reconsider a problem even tho ugh he could not overtly be forced to alter the prevailing polic)'.

In for " a roaching the stage where kn ow ledge is E.£-wer.. There is a tremendous receptivity goo I eas I n a ' . ' O$t- anyone who can present a convincing rationale for dealing with a hard wo rld finds a ready audience. The best way to convince Presidents to follow a desired I!.0licy is to show that it might wo~ man lIke McNamara thrives be-caLise he performs; he comes up WIth answers he can defend. It is, to be sure, ex tremel y difficult ro devise good policies or to predict their consequences accuratel),. Nor is it easy to convince others that a given policy is superior ro other alter- natives. BlIt it is the way to influence with Presidents. Ear if they 'lee convinced that [be c urre pt poljc )' is best the likelihood of gajnine sufficient force to COID- ;e1 a chaos!: is 'Illite small. The man who can build better foreign po licies will find Presidents beating a path to his door.

UNITED STATES V . NIXON

61. EXECUTIVE PRIVILEGE

As is true o( most major question~ in Americail gove,,:- ment, the Supreme Court was (mally {arced to enter

h d b r Presidential power when Presldellt tee ate ave , Richard M. Nixon claimed that preSIdents have an ab-

, privilege-that they could determll1e soillte executIVe , Id I

I I t ill formatIon they Wall re ease to (or themse ves w la I'

• ' ,d Stales v. Nixoll ( 1974), SOllTce: U.S, Supreme Court, Umle

•

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338 SECTI O N XI

" Ily JIIade i/l Ihc \Y/ hite thc courl s, AI issuc /Vcre l a.pes sec~e r. ' so i/l Ihe Wil ter-

/lae(l ,01 II L /-louse I/;al /;ad bee/l subpoe , I Un ired Sra res v,

I I ' ' I Iru<ecul /U /I , /I \!lI tc S(([ /I( a crlllli/la ) - , I ' JI'sa" recd lUith c , C 'I 1I/1([III/IlOIIS' (I " Nixon t/;c Suprelllc 0 111 , / 1' /)" sc/)amtio /l of , ' tl ([ I .. /lel t )cr L Presidelll N IXOII . slal/ll8,) (,'J I · 1'1)1 of hi"h-Ievel

/ " d I I' CO/l,well iii I " pUl/ lcrs. 110 1' I)C 11(( U -Ial'll a /l ahsoillt e " ' / I /l orc call Sl/ , , ,

COIIIIIII/lllcalioIlS. 1(llt )()U I • , ' d' 'al/il'ocess 'J ' I ' 11(1)' {ro lll /11 ICI

llIlql/ali(icd. /lrcsw e/ ll{(7 1/1/11/11 , ~ , ' , II r. . d .. TI '- dCClSIOIl lilem v ,Olce ullder a/l circuIllSiall ces, )1' [; ' II

" r. da)ls la l cr- ecause JC t/;c resigllalioll uf N lxo/l a l ew . ' I

, ", 1/ I Nh:oll s IIlIpcac Jll1ent l([peS l{Jcre SU /IIC/'IIIIIIIiII/IIg )a . d . bv I/;e /-louse alld cDlwiciioll by Ihc SCllate seellle cel-

({;ill wil/; t/;eir rele([se.

Chief Jusrice BURGER delivers rhe opinion of rhe Courr.

IWJe rurn ro rhe claim rhar rhe subpoena should be quashed because it de- mands "confidential conversations between a PresIdent and hIS cl o~e adVIsors that it would be inconsistent with the pubhc IIlterest to produce. The first conrention is :1 broad claim that rhe separation o f powers doctrine precludes judicia l review of a President's claim of privilege. The second contention is that if he does not prevail on the claim of absolute privilege, the court should hold as a matter of constitutional law that the privilege prevails over the subpoena duces tecum.

In the perfo rmance of assigned constitutional duties each branch of the Government must initially interpret the Constitution, and the interpretation of its powers by any branch is due grea t respect from the others. The President's counsel, as we have noted, reads the Constitution as providing an absolute privilege of confidentiality for all Presidential communications. Many deci- sions of this Court, however, have unequivocally reaffirmed the holding of Marbury v. Madison, [1 Cr. 137 (] 803)J, that "lilt is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is. "

Our system of government "requires that federal courrs on occasion inter- pret the Constitution in a manner at variance with the constructi on given the document by another branch." Powell v. M cCormack , [395 U.S. 486 (1969)J. And in Baker v. Carr, [369 U.S. 186 (1962)], the Court stated:

"IDJeciding whether a matter has in any measure been committed by the Constitution to another branch of governmenr, or whether the action of that branch exceeds whatever authority has been committed, is itself a delicate ex- ercIse III conStitutIonal IIlterpretation and is a respo 'b'l' f h' C

I ' , , ' nSI I Ity 0 t IS ourt as u tIlnate Interpreter of the Constitution,"

Notwithstanding the deference each branch nlust d h h I w d' , flU ' accor t e ot ers t le IU 1-

cia! Power 0 tle mted States" vested in the federal courts by Art. III, §1, of the

..

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- Til L PR~"DI, NC\' 339

Constitutio n ca n no mo rt' b I . h ' f . t' e s 1ared With the Executi ve Branch than the C Ie

Executive, or exa mple I· . h C I

. ' ca ll s lare With the Judiciary the veto power, o r t e ong re S S lare with the J d " I · .

A h I · u ICla ry t le power to ove rride a Pre identlal veto. n)' or er cone u Ion 11'0 I lb · f I h I

u ( e COmrary to the ba sic concept of separ:Hlo n 0 powers anc t e c l eeks a . d b I . .

W I ' 11 . a anees that flow fro m the scheme of a tripa rtite govern ment. we therefor ff ' I " fl ' " e rea Irlll t la t It IS the pruvinee and duty 0 t liS Coun to say what the la · . ,' . I .. . d .' . , II' IS Wit 1 respect to the c1alln of privilege preseme In thiS case. Marbury v, Madisol/

In suppOrt of his c la im of ab~~ I'l;te privilege the Pres ident's counsel urges twO grounds o ne of whid . II ' f h ' I . .' 1 IS common to a governments a nd one 0 II' IC 1 IS

Peculiar to o ur system o f . . f . d ' h I'd . sepa ration 0 powers. The first groun IS t e va I need fo r protectio n of co mmunications between high Govern ment o ffici a ls and those who adVise and assist them in the performance of their manifo ld duties: the Impo rtance of thiS confidentiality is too plain to require further discussion. Human experIence teaches that those who expect public dissemination of their remarks may well temper candor with a concern for appearances and for their own Interests to the detriment of the decisionmaking process. Whatever the na- ture of the privilege of confidentiality of Presidential communications in the ex- ercise of An. II powers, the privilege can be said to derive from the supremacy of each branch within its own assigned area of constitutional duties. Certa in powers and privileges flow from the nature of enumerated powers; the protec- tion of the confidentiality of Pres idential communications has similar constitu- tiona I underpinnings.

The second ground asserted by the President 's counsel in support of the claim of absolute privilege rests on the doctrine of separation of powers. Here it is argued that the independence of the Executive Branch within its own sphere, Humphrey'S Executor I I. United States, 295 U.S. 602 (1935); Kilbourn v. Thompson, 103 U.S. 168 (1881), insulates a Pres ident from a judicial sub- poena in an ongoing criminal prosecution, and thereby protects confidential Presidential communications.

However neither the doctrine of separation of powers, nor the need for confidentialit~ of high-level communications, without more, ca~ sustain an ab- solute, unqualified Presidential privilege of Immumty from JudiCIal process under all circumstances. The President 's need for complete candor and obJectlv- 't f dvisers calls for great deference from the courts. However, when the I y rom a ff . d I ' fbi " . " 1 d d olely on the broad undi erentlate calm 0 pu IC IIlterest III prlVl ege epen s s , .. h f 'd' I't of such conversations, a confrontatIOn With other values t e con I entia I y '1' d ' I ' . .

. Ab I' of need to protect ml Itary, Ip omatIc, or senSItive na-anses. sent a calm h . I ' ve find it difficult to accept the argument t at even the tIona securIty secrets, \ . . . ' ' " .

. . t 'n confidentialIty of PreSidential commUlllcatIons IS slg-I'ery Important Interes I . '. . . 'f' d " . h d b oduction of such matenal tor //I camera IIl spectIon

III lCandy ImllllS e Y pr . bl ' d 'd . . h district court wIll be 0 Ige to proVI e.

With all the proteCtIon ~ at a absolute, unqualified privilege would place in the The Impediment t at an . nal duty of the Judicial Branch to do justice in

f h . ary constltUtIO . . way 0 t e prIm . Id lainly conflict with the funCtIon of the courts cnmIllal prosecutions wou p

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340 SECTIO N XI

G )\'ernJIleJlt :1nd dividing and ture of our ( I I' f under Art III In desi"ning the strUC 11:11 hr;lnches, tIe ' ramers 0 . " . <' • . lIl' three co-cq . I. .

alloc-HIIl!' the sOI'Crelgn pown .1111< g I 've System , hut t It: separate . ' " . .' I a compre lenSI . the Constitution sought to provil c. . I I lutc independence ....

I I 'nte Wit I :11S0 I I . , Powers were not intcill el to ope. . . I . s providing an a ) SO ute PrJVI- f I Presil ent .1

To read the Art. \I powers 0 I Ie f .. It of criminal statutes on no , , . ' . I to en orCCJ11t I " I' f lege as ;]gamst a suhpoena esse nll.1 II ' _' terest in confldentla Ity 0 non-

I, I I ' f the pu ) It: III , , II I more than a ge nera IZCl c :lIm 0 , Id pset th e conStltutlOna )a ance ' , , I · " I" 'slons wou U

nulitary and nOllllip omatlt: llSLUS I' ' th e role of the courts under ,. . . l 'r'we)' Impair of "a workable government anu g .

Art. Ill, , ' > eeds of the judicial process may S' I ·1 tl ~ t the legitimate n , , mce we conc Ul e I.. " Ive those competing 111-

' I " I t s necessary to reso outweigh Presidenlla prtVI ege, I I " I f -t' . ns of each branch The . h' 'ssentla unt: 10. ,

terests III a manner Ih:H preserves tee 'docs not free the Judiciary right and indeed thc dmy to resolve that question d b h If f th P

.. I nt"ltlon s rna e on e a 0 e res-from accordmg Iligh respect to tIe represe • ident United States I '. Bltrr, 14 Cr. (8 U,S,) 470 (1807)1. , ,

'1 'f P 'd · It to the confidentiality of hi S conversations TIe expect:Hlon 0 a res I el " " 'b ' d d I'k II e cl~I'ln of confidentiality of JudiCial deli eratlons, an correspon ence, I e I u ,

for e.xample, has all the values to which we accord deference for the prtvacy of II " d dded to those v~lues is the necessity fo r protection of the a cItIzens an ,a u , " , ,

pubiic interest in candid, objective, and even blunt or h,arsh opmlOns III PresI- dential decisionmaking. A President and those who assist 111m must be free to explore alternatives in the process of shaping policies and making de~isions and to do so in a way many would be unwilling to express except prtvately. These are the considerations justifying a presumptive privilege for Presidential communications, The privilege is fundamental to the operation of Government and inextricably rooted in the separation of powers under the Constitution. In Nixon v. Sirica, 159 U.S. App. D.C. 58 (1973), the Court of Appeals held that such Presidential communications are "presumptively privileged" and this po- sition is accepted by both parties in the present litigation. We agree with Chief Justice MARSHALL's observation, therefore, that" [iln no case of this kind would a court be required to proceed against the president as against an ordi- nary individual." United States v. BlIrr . ...

But this presumptive privilege must be considered in light of our historic commitment to the rule of law. This is nowhere more profoundly manifest than in our vi~w that "the twofold aim [of criminal justice] is that guilt shall not es- cape or mnocence suffer." Berger v. United States [295 U.S. 78 (1935)). We have, elected to e~ploy an adversary system of criminal justice in which the parties Contest all Issues before a court of Iau , The need t d I lilt

' , n. 0 eve op a re evan facts m the adversary system is both fundamental d h' Th

" , , • an com pre enslve. e ends of cnmmal JUStice would be defeated if J'udgme t b f d d

" n s were to e oun e on a partIal or speculative presentation of the facts TI ' , f h ' d' ' " ' . le very Integnty 0 t e JU 1-

clal system and public confidence in the system dep d f II d ' 1 f 11 ' h' en on u ISC osure 0 a the facts, Wit m the framework of the rules of ev'd"r I "

' , , ' , I ence. 10 ensure t lat Justice IS done, It IS Imperative to the function of COurts th I b at compu sory process e

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Til e I'IH "D LN CY 34 1

aV:1il3ble fo r the production of evid " " rhe defense" ence needed either by the prosecutio n o r b)'

Only recently rhe Court ' rest"ned th " " "

the context of :1 grand jUr ' in ". e anCIent proposition of I3w, a lbeit 111 > qUlry rather than a trial.

"that ' the public has " I ' " " a rtg 1t to CV " ' "d sons pro tec ted b ' "" erv Illan s l"VI ('IKe,' exce pt fo r rh ose per- y a constitution I

a , Cllllllllon-law, or slarUrOr)' privilege, " " " " The privileges referred to b th C "

" " "" Y e oun are deSIgned to protect weighty and le-gitimate competing IIlterests Th h '" " "

Provides that no 11 "h II' us, t e Fifth Amendment to the Constitution , 1an s a be Con II d " " " " gainsr himself." Ad " 1pe e 111 any crnnll1al case to be a wItness ~ ' I h h ~' generally, 3n attorney or a priest may not be required to , ISC ose w at as een revealed in professional confidence, These and other ;n~r~sts a;e ~cogntzed 111 law by privileges against forced disclosure, estab- IS e hill t 1e onstltUtlon, by statute, or at common law, Whatever their ori -

gillS, t ese exceptions to the de d f ' " " " man or every man s eVIdence are not Itghtl y

created nor expansIvely const d f h " " rue , or t ey are 111 derogatIon of the search for truth,

In thiscase the President challenges a subpoena served on him as a third party requiring the production of materials for use in a criminal prosecution on the clalln that he has a privilege against disclosure of confidential commu- nications" He does not place his claim of privilege on the ground they are mil- Itary or dIplomatic secrets, As to these areas of An, II duties the courts have traditionally shown the utmost deference to presidential responsibilities, No case of the Court, however, has extended this high degree of deference to a President's generalized interest in confidentiality, Nowhere in the Constitution, as we have noted earlier, is there any explicit reference to a privilege of confi- dentiality, yet to the extent this interest relates to the effective discharge of a President's powers, it is constitutionally based, , , ,

In this case we must weigh the importance of the general privilege of confidentiality of presidential communications in performance of his responsi- bilities against the inroads of such a privilege on the fair administration of criminal justice, The interest in preserving confidentiality is weighty indeed and entitled to great respect, However we cannot conclude that advisers will be moved to temper the candor of their remarks by the infrequent occasions of disclosure because of the possibility that such conversations will be called for in the context of a criminal prosecution,

On the other hand, the allowance of the privilege to withhold evidence that is demonstrably relevant in a criminal trial could cut deeply in~o the guar- antee of the process of law and gravely impair the" baSIC function of the courts, A President's acknowledged need for confidentlaltty III the commUlllcatlons of

h" ff'" I "n nature whereas the constitutional need for production IS 0 ICe IS genera I , """ " d " f I 'd"n a criminal proceedll1g IS speclhc an central to the faIr o re evant eVI ence I """ " " " d" d'" f t"cular criminal case 111 the admll1lstratlon of JustIce, a JU Icatlon 0 a par I "b I

W" h "fl"c facts a criminal prosecution may e tota Iy frus-It out access to specl " "' f "" " "d ' b d I" nterest in conhdentlaltty 0 commUlllcatlons will trated, The Prest ent s roa

...

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34 2 SF CT IOl'l XI

nor be vio lJ tco by disclosure of ;] lim ited number of conve rsa ti ons preliminar_ il y shown ro have SO Ill C bea ring on the pcndin~ crlJ1llna l cases.

We conclude that when the grollnd fo r asse rrJng pri vil ege as ro subpoe- n3ed mater ials sought fo r lise in a criminal trial is based on ly on the gcneral- ized inrerest ill confidenrialit v, it CJ nnot preva il ove r the fundJ menral demands of due process of IJW in the' fa ir 3dministration of criminal justicc. The gen- era li zed Jsse rri on of pri vil ege must yield to the demonstrJted, spec ific need for ev idence in a pending criminal rri al. We h:1I'e ea rli er determJlled that the District Coun did nor err in authori zing the issuance of the subpoena . If a pres idenr concludes that compliance with a subpoena would be injurious to the public inrerest he may properl y, as was done here, invo ke a claim of privi- lege on the rerurn of the subpoena. Upon rece iving a claim of privilege from the Chief Executi ve, it became the furrh er duty of the Distrier Coun to treat the subpoenaed material as presumpti ve ly privileged and to require the Special Prosecuror ro demonstrate that the presidential material was "essential to the justice of the Ipending criminal] case." United States v. Burr. Here the District Court trea ted the material as presumpti vely privileged, proceeded to find that the Special Prosecutor had made a sufficien t showing to rebut the presumption and ordered an in camera exa mination of the subpoenaed material. On the basis of our examination of the record we are unable to conclude that the Dis- trier Court erred in ordering the inspection. Accordingly we affirm the order of the District Court that subpoenaed material s be transmitted to that court. We now rurn to the important question of the District Court 's responsibilities in conducting the in camera examination of presidential materials or communi- cations delivered under the compulsion of the subpoena duces feCl/m.

It is elementa ry that in camera inspection of evidence is always a proce- dure cailing for scrupulous protection aga inst any release or publication of material not found by the court, at that stage, probably admissable in evidence and relevant to the issues of the trial for which it is sought. That being true of an ordinary situation, it is obv ious that the District Court has a very heavy re- sponsibility to see to it that Presidential conversa tions, which are either not relevant or not admissible, are accorded that high degree of respect due the President of the United States. Chief Justice MARSHALL, si tting as a trial judge in the Burr case was extraordinaril y careful to point out that

" Iiln no case of thi s kind would a coun be required to proceed against the president as against an ordinary individual. " .. .

MARSHALL's statement cannot be read to mean in any sense that a President is above the law, but relates to the singularly unique role under Art. II of a Presi- dent 's communications and activities related to the performance of duties under that Article. Moreover, a President's communications and activities encompass a vastly wider range of sensitive material than would be true of any "ordinary in- dividual." It is therefore necessa ry in the public interest to afford Presidential confidentiality the greatest protection consistent with the fair administration of justice. The need for confidentiality even as to idle conversations with associates

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T ill 1'10,11>1 N( y 343

ill which ca 11 ,, 1 reference ll'Ii ,I f

' g 1r be ITl'Ide ' ' , , ' I ' tht' COlllltr ), or o relvn Stat' . _ ' ., CO llcerlllng pullflca l kadn Wltlill

~ • CSIIlt'n IS t I ' \"I/e h:lVt' no do ubt th" t the D' ,', OU U )v IOIIS IU ca ll for further fl't'atm enr.

d I I , I I Isnllt Iud,· · w'll II ' ' I ' I reCor s t ut l lg 1 (egree of d , t' , . CIt I at a fIIn es accurd to Presl( erm:!

I 'II d ' I e t' rence su " - I ' U ' anC WI IS': l arge hi s res'p 'b.I' g.gc,tcc In IlIled Slal('s I '. Bllrr. sllpra

, , OIlSI I Ity t >' , CI:11 ProseCli lUr no 11/ callie ' 0 set' to It that unnl released to the Spc· , . 'ra marel'l a l ' " I d ' piles With even greater force ,, ' IS reVea e to anyone. TIllS burden ap ' . I ' to eXCised matel'l' I I d ", I eXCise, t 1(' maten al is resto . d ' , ' . a; once t 1(' enslon IS Ill ac e to

, re tu Its p ' l I under se,,1 to Its lawful Cllst d ' II VI egee status and should he return ed " 0 lans,

Sillce thi S matter ca me b, f I

P rosecutio n and on rep e ore t le COlirt during the pendency of a crim ina l

" resenranolls tI ' . f shall issue to rth with. lat tlille IS () the essence, the mandate

Affirmed.

WILLIAM J EFFE R SO V. PAULA CO RBI N

CL I NTON J ON E 5

62. SUING THE PR ES IDENT

I II w hat cOl,tld tum OllIla be aile of Ihe 111051 illlportalll m odem Supreme CalirI decisiolls abollllhe presidellcy, the V.S. SlIpreme CalirI ruled ill J 998 Ihal a sillillg pres· /del/t could be slled by a private cilizell seekillg mOlley dam ages in a civil suil for condllct alleged 10 have oc· curred before Ihe presidelll look office. President Clinlon urged the CalirI to delay Ihe suit lin Iii he lefl office, c1aimil/g that the chief execlltive should // 0 1 be bllrdened al/d distracted by hm/ing to defend against civil slIils ex· cept in ex ceptional circumstances. The sexllal harass - m el/t claim brought by Pallia jones, based on Clinlon's alleged conduct while serving as goverl/or of Arkansas years earlier wOllld I/ot, he argued, be such a suil.

Writing for the majority, justice john Paul Stevens rejected C1il/ton's argu/1/ellt and coneluded thaI it would be highly unlikely that illlowing Ihe jones case to pro· ceed would gel/erate a (lood of other suits against this or other presidents and, in any event, Slevens noted. Ihe lower collrt judge could illways defer s//ch a case where

S U S S C \ VF//,'(/m j effersoll Clill lOlI 1'. Hw /a Corbill j Ollrs ( 199 7),

Ollr((>; .. uprCIlH.' ourr. ,'I /II

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XII

THE SUPREME COURT

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354 SECT ION XII

ALEXANDER H A MIL TON

63. D EFENDIN G THE JUDIC IARY

. 8 Alexander Hamilton arglled 111 The Federalist, No. 7 , . d ' d ' . I branch of

I I I deslglle 11-1 ICIa thai illasllluc 1 as 11e new y . th I d . I II purse slrmgs liar e govenzment control e lIell ?er 1e . H

I 'ear its powers. e as- mililary, there was 110 reason a I' .' . I branch slIred skeptics thai the newly proposed !lldlCIa h of government wOllld be the "least dangerous to t e po- litical rights of the Constitlltion" and would not even be able to enforce its judgments without the assistance of

the executive branch. Hamilton's persuasive defense of the judiciary pro-

vided the theoretical basis for the doctrine of !lIdlCial re- view later announced by the Supreme COlat in Marbury v. Madison (1803). As stated in No. 78, the basic princi- ple was that the Constitution should be seen as " funda- mental law " and that the role of the courts ,vas to "ascertain its meaning, as well as the meaning of any particular act proceeding from the legislative body."

Although it took the words of Chief Justice John Marshall in Marbury to give legal effect to this idea, it was Hamilton who first clearly stated the view that the COllstitution as interpreted by the Supreme Court should prevail over any legislative enactment.

To the People of the State of New York: We proceed now to an examination of the judiciary department of the pro-

posed government. In unfolding the defects of the existing Confederation, the utility and ne-

cessity of a federal judicature have been clearly pointed out. It is the less nec- essary to recapitulate the considerations there urged, as the propriety of the institution in the abstract is not disputed; the only questions which have been raised being relative to the manner of constituting it, and to its extent. To these points, therefore, our observations shall be confined.

The manner of constituting it seems to embrace these several objects: 1 st. The mode of appointing the )udges. 2d . The ~enure by which they are to hold their places. 3d. The partition of the ludlclary authority between different courts, and their relations to each other.

SOllrce: from Tbe Federalisi. No. 78 (1788).

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TII ~ SU I'~I' M" C OUHT 355

First. As to the mode of appoin ting the judges; thi is the sa me with that of appointing the office rs of the Union in genera l, and has been a full y (lis- cussed in the two last numbers, that nothing can be sa id here which would no t be useless repetition.

Second. As to the tenure by which the judges a re to ho ld their places: this chiefly concerns thei r duration in office; the provisions for th eir support; th e precautions for their responsibility.

According to the plan of the ~onve ntion , all judges who may be appointed by the United States are to hold their offices dl/ring good behavior; which IS conformable to the most approved of the State constituti ons, and amo ng the rest, to that of this State. Its propriety having been drawn into questio n by the adversaries of that plan, is no light symptom of the rage for o bjectio n, which disorders their imaginations and judgments. The standa rd of good be- havior for the continuance in office of the judicial magisrracy, is certainl y one of the most valuable of the modern improvements in the practice of govern- ment. In a monarchy it is an excellent barrier to the despotism of the prince; in a republic it is a no less excellent barrier to the encroachments and oppressions of the representative body. And it is the best expedient which can be devised in any government, to secure a stead y, upright, and impartial administration of the laws.

Whoever arrentively considers the different depa rtments of power must perceive, that, in a government in which the)' are sepa rated from each other, the judiciary, from the nature of its functions, will always be the least danger- ous to the political rights of the Constitution; because it will be least in a ca- pacity to annoy or injure them. The Executive not on ly dispenses the honors, but holds the sword of the community. The legislature not only commands the purse, but prescribes the rules by which the duties and rights of every citizen are to be regulated. The judiciary, on the contrary, has no influence over either the sword or the purse; no direction either of the strength or of the wealth of the society; and can take no active resolution whatever. It may truly be sa id to have neither force nor will, but merely judgment; and must ultimately depend upon the aid of the executive arm even for the efficacy of its judgments.

This simple view of the marrer suggests several important consequences. It proves incontestably, that the judiciary is beyond comparison the weakest of the three departments of power; that it can never arrack with success either of the other two; and that all possible care is requisite to enable it to defend itself against their attacks. It equally proves, that though individual oppression may now and then proceed from the courts of justice, the generalliberry of the peo- ple can never be endangered from that quarter; I mean so long as the judiciary remains truly distinct from both the legislature and the Executive. For I agree, that "there is no liberty, if the power of judging be not separated from the leg- islative and executive powers." And it proves, in the last place, that as liberty can have nothing to fear from the judiciary alone, but would have every thing to fear from its union with either of the other departments; that as all the effects of such a union must ensue from a dependence of the former on the latter ,

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SECTI ON XII

, t 'on' that as, from the natural d :trent separa I , , notwithstanding a nominal an app. , ~ I J'eolJa rd y of bell1 g ove rpowered,

, , ' ' contlnu" I ' feebleness of the judicia ry, It IS ~n b' clles ' and th at as not ll11g ca n CO Il-

, " 'd n'n e Ian -, ' ff' I ' awed, or influenced by, ItS COO I I . inde endence as perma nency I,n 0 Ice, t 11 5 tri bute so much to ItS fir mness and dP n indispensable II1gl edlent In ItS

b ' I ega rde as a I I'" d I quality may therefore e Just y r , I iradel of the pu J IC Justice an t le " d ' , ,It measure, as t le c constlrutlon, an , lil a gle,

IJublic security. I ' ts of J'ustice is peculi a rl y essential ' d d e of t le cou I d I ' T he complete 111 epen enc , ' d C t 'tuti o n, I understan one w llch

, " " , B' a linllte ons I , ' h f . 111 a limited Constlrutl on. ) ' , I ' legislati ve auth o l'lty; suc , or 111-

, ' f ' d 'cel)[l ons to t Ie I d contains ccrrall1 speci K ex, , , ' der 11 0 ex-post-facto aws, an the I ' I II - 10 bill s at atra ll1 , stance, as t lat It s 1:1 P;ISS I b ' ed in prac tice no oth er way than

, ", C I ' k' d ("I n e presel v li ke. LlIllItati Ons 0 1 t liS 111 • f " 110se dut)' it must be to declare all

I, f ' 'ts 0 Justice, w . through the mc( Illlll 0 CO UI r of the Constituti on vo id. Without thi s, all ac ts contrary to the mal1lfest tenl o d" ,' Ieges would a mo unt to nothing. I ' f ,tlcul ar fi g n s an Pll\ I t Ie reserva ti ons 0 lXlI , , I 'I f he courts to pronounce legislative

Some perplexity respecting t le rig ltS 0 r 'f " I C nstiruti on has ari sen ro m an Imagll1a-acts void , because contrary to tIe 0 , .' , d' , I I 'I

' . Id' Iy a superI orIty of the JU ICia ry to t le egis a-tl on that the doctrll1e wou Imp , I f h ' I '· d th t the authorit), which can decl a re t Ie acts 0 anot er ti ve power. t IS UI ge a b did 'd

'd 'I be superior to the one whose acts may e ec are VOl . VOl mllst necessarI y " , A I' , d ' ' f grea t l'lllportance in all the Amencan constitutions, a ' s r liS octnne IS o · , brief discussion of the ground on which it rests cannot be unacceptable.

There is no positi on which depends on clearer prll1clples, th~n that every act of a delegated authority, contrary to the tenor of the commiSSIOn under which it is exercised, is void. No legislative act, therefore, contrary to the Con- stirution, can be valid. To deny this, would be to affirm , that the deputy IS greater than his principal; that the servant is above his master; that the repre- sentatives of the people are superior to the people themselves; that men acting by virtue of powers, may do not only what their powers do not authorize, but what they forbid.

If it be said that the legislative body are themselves the constitutional judges of their own powers, and that the construction they put upon them is conclusive upon the other departments, it may be answered, that this cannot be the natural presumption, where it is not to be collected from any particular provisions in the Constitution. It is not otherwise to be supposed, that the Constitution could intend to enable the representatives of the people to substi- rute their will to that of their constituents. It is far more rational to suppose, that the courts were designed to be an intermediate body between the people and the legislature, In order, among other things, to keep the latter within the limits aSSigned to their authorIty. The interpretation of the laws is the proper and peculiar province of the courts. A constitution is, in fact, and must be re- gard~d by the judges, as a fundamental law. It therefore belongs to them to as- certall1 Its meanll1g, as well as the meaning of any particular act proceeding from the legislati ve body. If there should happen to be an irreconcilable vari- ance between the two, that which has the Superior obligation and validity

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oughr o f course ro be f' d . . ' I 0 , . . pre erre ; or, III other words the ConstitUtion o ug H t be preferred to th e Sratl r I " ' ., f I ' r , I e, r le Intention of the people to the Intention 0 t le I agents.

Nor does rhis c I . b . . fl ' d ' . '. onc USlon )' any means suppose a superIorIry 0 t le JU 1- Clal to the legIslative pOwer. It only supposes rhar the power of th e people is superIo r to borh; and rhat where the will of rhe legislature, declared in irs sta tutes, stands 111 opposirion ro rhat of rhe people, declared in rhe Consri tu- tlon , rhe Judges o ughr to be governed by rhe latter rather than the former. They oughr to regulare rheir decisions by rhe fundamental laws, rarher rhan by rhose which are not fundamental.

This exerc ise of judicial discrerion, in derermining berween twO conrradic- tory laws, IS exemplified in a familiar insrance. It nor uncommonl y happens, rhat rhere a re rwo sratures exisring ar one rime, clashing in whole or in part wirh each orher, and neirher of rhem containing any repealing clause or ex- pression. In such a case, ir is rhe province of rhe courts to liquidate and fix rheir meaning and operarion. So far as rhey can, by any fair consrrucrion, be reconciled to each orher, reason and law conspire to dicrare rhar rhis should be done; where this is impracticable, it becomes a matrer of necessiry to give ef- fect to one, in exclusion of rhe orher. The rule which has obrained in rhe courts for determining rheir relarive validiry is, rhar rhe lasr in order of rime shall be preferred to rhe first. Bur there is a mere rule of consrrucrion, nor derived from any posirive law, but from rhe nature and reason of rhe rhing. It is a rule nor enjoined upon the courts by legislarive provision, but adopred by rhemselves, as consonant to rruth and propriery, for rhe direcrion of rheir conduct as inter- preters of rhe law. They rhoughr ir reasonable, rhar berween rhe interfering acrs of an equal aurhoriry, rhar which was rhe lasr indicarion of irs will should have the preference.

But in regard to rhe interfering acts of a superior and subordinare author- ity, of an original and derivarive power, the nature and reason of rhe rhing in- dicate the converse of that rule as proper ro be followed. They reach us that the prior act of a superior ought to be preferred to the subsequent acr of an in- ferior and su bordinate authority; and thar accordingly, whenever a particular statute contravenes the Constitution, it will be rhe duty of the judicial rribunals to adhere to the latter and disregard rhe former.

It can be of no weighr to say that rhe courts, on rhe prerence of a repug- nancy may substitute their own pleasure to rhe constiturional intentions of the legisl;rure. This might as well happen in the case of two contradictory statutes; or ir might as well happen in every adJudIcatIOn upon any sll1gle statute. The courts must declare the sense of the law; and If they should be dIsposed to ex- ercise will instead of judgment, the consequence would equally be the substitu- tion of their pleasure to that of the legislative body. The obser~ation, if it prove an I · Id rove that there ought to be no Judges dlStlllct from that . y t llllg, wou P , b~~ . .

If h h t of ,'ustice are to be conSIdered as the bulwarks of a IlIn-

, ten, t e cour s . h h' 'd ' . 't de " . st legislaove encroac ments, t IS consl eraoon wIll I e onsotutlOn agaIn '

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358 SECTION XII

, f J'uel ied offi ces, s ince I ' nenr rC IllU eo, ' I afford n srrong argLllllcnr for r le pcr lll .l 'd ' le1e nt spirit In t he JLl C ges

, , 'b -I ' I " ro rhnt JI1 epc I eI norhJJ1g w ill conrn ure so I11 UC 1 ,1S r liS " f SO '1I'e1 l1 0 Ll S a lIty. , ' I I t- - I f I \:rfo rma m:c 0 ' , wilieh l11usr be csscntl a to r le a ir 1 1I P , ' rc to " li a rd rhe Co nstltLl-, ' , lI y req llis l ,., , T his independence of the Judges IS eqll ,l ff t' t hose ill hUl11 ors, which

. " I' - I I I' rhe c ecrs 0 , tion and rhe rlghrs of lilt IVIC lI a s rom , ' I ' 11J'eerures sometimes - , - I ' f1 ot P:1J'tlCU a I co , ,

rhe arts ot des lgnll1g l11 \: n, o r r 1e In lI cnec _I I ' _I t hough rhey sp eedil y " I I I ' elves a m w lie 1,

dlssenllnarc a mong r 1e pcop e r lell1S 'I 1'1 . ' , 'cflec ri o n have a ten- , b ' f ' ' d l10 rc C e I lCI a re I , give phcc to cner In o rm atlOJ1, ,111 I , " 1 the govcrnment

' , ' I' 'e 'ous JI1n ova ti o ns II , dency, IJ1 rhe meantlllle, to OCC1SIon C ,1I1g I , ' ry T ho ugh I trust I , , ' Ill rhe comlllun i . and scrious oppressio ns of r lC Illlllo r pa l r) ' til I' rs enemies in

' ' . , II never conc llr WI , the fri ends o f t he proposed Constituti on \\ I I ' I d ' , ' I f' bl ica n government, w llC 1 a -

questioning th at funda menta l prlJ1Clp eo lep u , II ' I d C stitutio n " I I ' , I ohsh the esta ) IS l e o n , I11ltS rhe n ght of the peop e to a te r 01 a) , , b '

, " ' ' I I ' I , iness ye t It IS no t to e JJ1 -w henevcr th ey fin d It Inconsistent Wi t 1 t 1elr l app _ ' I ' , I ' o t the peopl e w lenever a ferred fro m this pnJ1c lple, that t le representa ti ves" ,',

, , ' I I I Id f a maJo nt)' of the ir co nstituents, momenta ry IJ1chnatlol1 lappens to ay 10 0, , , ' I incompati b le wi th the prov isions in the ex isting Constituti o n, wo uld , o n t l a t accounr, be justi fiable in a vio lation of th ose prov isions; o r that the courts would be under a grea ter obliga tion to connive a t II1 frac ti ons 111 thiS shape, than when they had proceeded who lly from the caba ls o f the representa tive body, Unril the people have, by some solemn and autho rita ti ve acr,annulled o r changed the established fo rm, it is binding upon themselves co llective ly, as we ll as individua lly; and no presumprion, or even knowledge, of their sentiments, can wa rrant their representatives in a departure from it, pri o r to such an ac t. But it is easy to see, that it would requi re an uncommo n p o rti on o f fo rtitude in the judges to do their duty as fa ithful guard ia ns o f the Constitutio n, w here leg- islati ve invasions of it had been instiga ted by the majo r vo ice o f the community.

But it is not w ith a view to infractio ns o f the Constitutio n only, tha t the in- dependence of the judges may be an essentia l safeguard aga inst the effects o f occasiona l ill humors in the society, These sometimes ex tend no farth er than to the injury o f the pri vate r ights of particula r classes o f ci ti zens, by unjust and pa rria llaws. H ere a lso the firmness o f the judic ia l m agistracy is o f vast impo r- tance in mitiga ting the severity and confining the o pera tio n o f such laws , It not onl y serves to modera te immediate mischiefs o f those w hich m ay have been passed , but it opera tes as a check upon the legisla tive b ody in pass ing them; who, percelvll1g tha t o bstacles to the success o f iniquito us intention a re to be expected from the scruples of the courts, a re in a manner co mpelled , by the very motives o f the II1Justice they media te, to qua lify the ir a ttempts. This is a c ircumsta nce calcul ated to have more influence upo n the cha racte r o f o ur gov- ernments, tha n bl~t few may be aware of. The benefits o f the integrity and modera tion of the Judlcl~ry have a lready been felt in m o re Sta tes tha n o ne; and tho ugh they may have di spleased those w hose sinister expect t' I

' - a Ions t l ey m ay have d isappo ll1ted, th ey must have commanded the es teenl a d I f II

' ' , , , n app ause 0 a the VirtuOUS and dlsll1terested , ConSIdera te men of everv eI " I

' I escrIptIo n , o ug It to

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Tm S PRt. \It ' O URT 359

prize w hatever wi ll tend b .' . b

to eget o r fOrtllv th :n teml e r III the cOur! ; ,IS no m:JII ca ll e Sure tha t he b . . . .' f " . . . m:.1V not e to-mo rrow the Victim of :.1 Sp irit 0 11I1us- (Ice, by w hich he l11 a" be ' . d f I I I . . ' ! a g,llner to ay. And even ' ma n must now ee . tl a t t 1e i\1ev ltab le tendencl' o f s h ' ... . ' ., bl' d .

" d . UC ,I SPirit IS to sap the fo unda ti ons 01 pu IC an Prl- \'ate COl nil . ence~ and to introduce in its stead uni l'e rsa l distrust a nd distress.

T 1a t Inflexible and '1' d l . - C . . '. " , unl a rm a 1(' rence to the rights 0 1 the onStitut lOn, and o t IIld lvld ua ls w ho I . . . . I f . ,IC \ we perceive to be Ind ispensable In t l e court a justice, ca n certai nlv no t b · d f . d I I Id I ' ff ' b ' . .. . e ex pecre ro m IU ges IV 10 10 t lelr a ICes ) a tempo ra ry commiSSio n. Periodical appointments, howe\'er regub ted, o r bl' whomsoever made, would , in some wav o r o ther. be fa ta l to their necessa ry in - dependence . If the power of making rI~em was committed ei ther to the Exec u- (lve o r legislature, there would be da nger of an im proper compbisa nce to the branch w h IC h possessed it ; if to both , there would be an unw ill ingness to haz- ard the displeasure of either; if to the people, o r to persons chosen bv them fo r the speCial purpose, there would be too grea t a disposition to consult popu lar- ity, to justify a reli ance that nothing would be consulted bur the Const itutio n and the laws.

There is yet a further and a weightier reason fo r the permanency of the judicia l o ffices, which is deducible from the nature of the qualifica ti ons they require. It has been frequentl y remarked, with grea t propriety, tha t a \'Olumi - nous code of laws is one of the inconveniences necessa rily connected w ith the advantages of a free government. To avoid an a rbitra ry discretion in the courts, it is indispensable that they should be bound down bv stric t rules and prece- dents, which serve to define and po int our their dury in every particula r case that comes before them; and it will readil y be conceived from the \'a riety of controversies which grow out of the folly and wickedness of mankind , thar the records of those precedents must unavoidablv swell to a ve ry considerab le bulk, and l11ust demand long and laborious study to acquire a competent knowledge o f them. Hence it is, that there can be bur few men in the soc iety who will have suffic ient skill in the bws to qualify them fo r the st:ltions of judges. And making the proper deductions for the ordinary deprav ity of human nature, the number must be still smaller of those who unite the requi - site integrity with the requisite knowledge. These considerations apprise us, that the government can have no great option between fit character; and tha t a tempo rary duratio n in o ffice, which would natura lly discourage such cha rac- ters from quitting a lucrati ve line of practice to accept a seat on the bench, would have a tendency to throw the administration of justice into hands less able, and less well qualified, to conduct it with urilitv and dignity. In the ~res­ em circumstances of this country, and 111 those 111 whICh It IS likely to be to r a

I · 1e the disadv'lntages on this score would be grea ter than thev ong time to can , ,. .'. .

t" . h ppear' but it must be confessed, that they a re far 11l trn o r to may at Irst slg t a . , . h h · h t themselves under the other aspects of the sublec t. t ose w IC presen . I '

U h I I , there can be no room to doubt that t 1e convention acrt'd

pon t e W 10 c, . . ' h' h h hi ' h . I ' . f the models 0 1 those constltllt1ons W 1( ave est a IS ed Wise y 111 copy1l1g rom

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360 SECTI ON XII

, "I ff ' s in point of duration; and f I 'r Judicia a Ice, I b ' good behavior as the tenure 0 r lei , heir plan would lave een 10-

, bl bl rhls accounr, r f d rhar so fa r from bell1g ama eon " ['lnr feature 0 goo govern- , " I I red rhls IInpor , h excusably defective, If Ir 13C wan " ff d illusrrious comment on t e

, G B ra In '1 or sa n mem. The experience of rea r rI , ' excellence of rhe insriturion.

MARBU RY v. MAD I SON

64. ESTABLISHING JUDICIAL REVIEW

III this lalldlllark decision, Chief Justice Johl1 Marshalfl declared that the Supreme Court had the power 0 judicial review, which is the power to declare actlOI1S of the presidellt, the COllgress, 0 1' al1Y other f!ov~1'I1ment agellcy at allY level to be illvalid or unconstitutIOnal. 111 the 1803 case of Marbury v. Madison the Court held that it was the duty of the judiciary to say what the law is, includillg expoulldillg alld interpreting that law. The law cOlltailled ill the COllstitution, Marshall said, was paramoullt, and laws repugnallt to its provisions must fall. He concluded that it was the provillce of the courts to decide when other laws were in violation of the basic law of the Cons titution alld, where this was found to a CCII r, to declare such laws null and void. This power of judicial review, first asserted in this case, has given the United States the most powerful judiciary in the world.

Chief Justice MARSHALL delivers the opinion of the Court.

At the last term on the affidavits then read and fil ed with the clerk a rule was granted in this cas~, requiring ~he secretary of state to show cause' why a mand~mus should. no~ Issue, dlrectll1g him to deliver to William Marbury his commission as a Justice of the peace for the county of Washington in the District of Columbia. '

No cause has been shown, and the present motion is for a mandamus The peculiar delicacy of this case, the novelty of some of its circumstances, and the

Source: U.S. Supreme Court, Marbury v. Madisoll ( 1803).

....

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, I difficulty attending the po ' I . ". . rc :l f h . - I Ints w llCh OCc ur III It reqUIre a complete expO- " n O t e prlllClpeso h' l " ' . Sino n w IC 1 the Oplllion to be given b)' the court I

founded. These princ iples have bee h 'd d

d ' n , o n t e Sl e of the applicant ve r)' abl )' a rgue a t

I bar. In ren erlllg the opi - f I ' -t le· _ ' nlon 0 t lC coun, there will be some depa rture III f rill tho ugh no t III substanc f I ' , o , "e, rOm t le POllltS stated III that argu ment.

In the o rder III which the coun has viewed this subject, the fo ll owing ques- tions have bee n conSidered and decided.

t st. Has the app lica nt a right to the commission he demands? 2d . If h e has a right, and that right has been vio lated, do the laws of hi s

countr), aftord him a remed)'?

3d. If the)' do afford him a remedy, is it a mandamus issuing from this court?

The first object of inquiry is,

1st. H as the applicant a right to the commission he demands? His right o riginates in an act of congress passed in February, t 80 1, con-

cerning the District of Columbia .

After dividing the district into two counties the II th sec tion of this law , enacts, " that there shall be appointed in and for each of the sa id counties, such number of discreet persons to be justices of the peace as the president of the United States shall, from time to time, think expedient, to continue in office for five years."

It appears, from the affidavits, that in compliance with this law, a commis- sion for William Marbury, as a justice of the peace for the county of Washington, was signed by John Adams, then President of the United States; after which the seal of the United States was affixed to it; but the commission has never reached the person for whom it was made our. . ..

Mr. Marbury, then, since his commission was signed by the president, and sealed by the secretary of state, was appointed; and as the law creating the of- fice, gave the officer a right to hold for fi ve years, independent of the executive, the appointment was not revocable, but vested in the officer legal rights, which are protected by the laws of his country.

To withhold his commission, therefore, is an act deemed by the court not warranted by law, but violative of a vested legal right.

This brings us to the second inquiry; which is, 2d. If he has a right, and that right has been violated, do the laws of this

country afford him a remedy? The very essence of civil liberty certainly consists in the right of every indi-

vidual to claim the protection of the laws, whenever he receives an injury. One of the first duties of government is to afford that protection. In Great Brita in the king himself is sued in the respectful form of a petition, and he never fail s to comply with the judgment of his court .. ..

By the constitution of the United States, the president is invested with cer- tain important political powers, in the exercise of which he is to use his Own discretion, and is accountable only to his country in his politica l cha racter and

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" I I ' orfurtnallc<: of th c~(' dutie ~, he i ~ au- ro hi, ()\I n COlhC lelll"l' : lu ,tid hllli 111 I le pc : I I I I f

: I 'I 111' hi S aU I lOrtty, am III Con or thol'l L~d to .Ippoi m Cert :111l o lllc<:r, . IV 10 .IL , - lIIit )' with hi l)rd~r, : ' ' I

I I ' I I ' t I Illd wh.treve r oplili on llI ay )c en ter-n , UC 1 .I ~e" IhClr .\( t, .tl C 11' :1( , . ' : I

:' I I I ,: . Ir>cre tlo ll ilia)' he used, ~ tlII there taliled 01 the 11I.lnller In whl C 1 l'xruHl ve ( I I T I _ I I ,

I I : 'Cl i tll 'lt dl scrcnun: lC su )Iccts arc 1)0-CXl>t" ant ca ll eX I'I , 11 0 pOI cr to C(l ilil . I I I : I I d l ,: I '11 ril.htS and hemg Intrusted to !ttlc" L They rc,pect Ihe Ihtrlun. 1101 In 1\ I( 11 .. <' I '

the execulil e, Ihc deci, IOII of Ihe execuli vc is c()!1l:luSlve, , , . I I I I " ~ 0 11 rlnt officer other duties: But II'hell the icgl>I.!!ure prucrcl ' to II11 PO,, ' I'

I :: II : II , I c"~ ll t a in '\C ts' when the ng,hts of IV le ll he IS dlrl'cled pere lll pton )' to per (I I III ,. ., I i ll dividu~ l s are depclldcm on the perform allce of th ose act; he IS so fa r the offic-er (If the 1.1Iv; i amenable to the law, fo r hi S co nduct; and ca nnot at hiS discretioll sport .Iway the ITstcd right s of others,

The conclusion fro m thi s reasolling is, that where the heads of depart- mellls arc the political or confide ntial agents of the executive, merely to exe, cute the wi ll of the president, or rather to :lct ill cases in which the executi ve posses es a constitutional or lega l discretion, nothing ca n be more perfecrl y clear th an that their acts are only politically exa minable, But where a specific duty is ass igned by bw. and indi vid ual rights depend upon the performance of that duty, it seems equally clear that the indi vid ual who considers himself in- jured. has a right to resort to the laws of his country for a remed y, , ..

It is, then, the opinion of the Court, 1st. That by signing the commission of Mr. Marbury, the President of the

United States appointed him a justice of peace for the county of Washington, in the District of Columbia; and that the sea l of the United States, affixed thereto by the secretary of state, is conclusive testimony of the verity of the signature, and of the completion of the appointment; and that the appointment conferred on him a legal right to the office for the space of five yea rs,

2d, That, hav ing this lega l title to the office, he has a consequent right to the commission; a refusa l to deliver which is a plain violation of that right, for which the laws of his country afford him a remedy.

It remains to be inquired whether, 3d. He is entitled to the remedy for which he applies, This depends on, I st. The nature of the writ applied for; and 2d. The power of this court. t st. The nature of the writ .. , , ITlo render the Inalldamlls a proper remedy, the officer to whom it is to be

directed, must be one to whom, on legal principles, such writ may be directed; and the person applYlllg for It must be without any other specific and legal remedy. , , .

The act to establish the judicial courts of the United States authorizes the Supreme Court "to issue writs of mandamlls in cases warranted by the princi- ples and usages of law, to any courts appointed, or persons holding office, under the authority of the United States."

The secretary of state, being a person holding an office under the authority of the United States, is precisely within the letter of the description, and if th is

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courr is not auth o ri zed to iss ues a writ of manda llllls ro such a n office r, it musr be becllIse the law is unconstitutional, and therefore abso lutely incapable of conferrin g rhe a urho riry, and assigning the duties which irs words purporr to conter and ass ign.

The consrirurion vests rhe whole judicial power of rhe Unired Srares in on e supreme court, and such inferi or courts as congress shall, from time ro rim e, ordalll and esrablish. This power is express ly exrended ro all cases a ri s ing under rhe laws of rhe United Sta tes; and, consequentl y, in some form, may be exe rCised over the present case; because the right claimed is given by a law of the United Sta tes.

In the di stribLltion of this power it is decla red that "the supreme coun shall have o riginal jurisdiction in all cases affecting ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, and those in which a state shall be a party. In all other cases, rhe supreme COUrt shall have appellate jurisdiction."

It has been in sisted, at the bar, that as the original grant of jurisdiction, ro the supreme a nd inferior courts, is general, and the clause, assigning original jurisdiction ro the supreme COllft, contains no negative or restrictive words, the power remains to the legislature, to assign original jurisdiction to that coun in other cases than those specified in the article which has been recited; provided those cases belong to the judicial power of the United States.

If it had been intended to leave it in the discretion of the legislature to ap- portion the judicial power between the supreme and inferior courts according to the will of that body, it would certainly have been useless to have proceeded further than to have defined the judicial power, and the tribunal s in which it should be vested. The subsequent part of the section is mere surplusage, is en- tirely without meaning, if such is to be the construction. If congress remains at liberty to give this court appellate jurisdiction, where the constitution has de- clared their jurisdiction shall be original; and original jurisdiction where the constitLltion has declared it shall be appellate; the distribution of jurisdiction, made in the constitLltion, is form without substance ....

To enable this court, then, to issue a mandamus, it must be shown to be an exercise of appellate jurisdiction, or to be necessa ry to enable them to exercise appellate jurisdiction.

It has been stated at the bar that the appellate jurisdiction may be exer- cised in a variety of form s, and that if it be the will of the legislature that a mandamus should be used for that purpose, that will must be obeyed. This is true, yet the jurisdiction must be appellate, not original.

It is the essential criterion of appellate jurisdiction, that it revises and cor- rects the proceedings in a cause already instituted, and does not create that cause. Although, therefore, a mandamus may be directed to courts, yet to issue such a writ to an officer for the delivery of a paper, IS 111 effect the same as to sustain an original action for that paper, and, therefore, seems not to belong to app llat b t to original jurisdiction. Neither IS It necessary 111 such a case

e e, u II '. d' , as this, to enable the court to exercise its appe ate JUrIS Ictlon. , ,

Th I , theret'ore given to the supreme court, by the act establish1l1g e aut lOrIty" " f the ' d ' , I . f the United Stares to Issue writs 0 mal/dall/lls to public JU ICla courts 0 '

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, tl'on' and it becomes neces- I b the consnru , '

officers, appears nO[ ro be wa rrantee Y f ' d all be exercised .... " ' ' d " 0 con el re c, . '

sarv ro IIlqllll'e whether a JUri S Icnon s ' I I' ll'ted and unl1l11lted powers . " , ' ment Wit 1 In ' ,

The dl stll1ctlon between a govel n , I sons o n who m they are Im- is abolished, if those lil11its do not conhnl e [led per o f eq ua l ob ligat io n. It is a

' f I ' b ' d I ctS al owe , arc posed, and I acts pro 11 Ite ane a ' d I lstitution controls any leg- , ' I 'b ted an ne CO l , ,

proposition roo p all1 ro e contes , ' I Y ~ Ite r the constitution by , I I legiS atu re ma " islative act repugnant ro It; o r, t lat t le

an ord inary act. "ddl 'oLlnd The constitution is ' I 10 1111 e gl . Between these alternati ves t lere IS I ablc b ' o rdin ary means, or it is on

either a superior paramount law, unchanglc'l I) ts is alterable when the , ' I ' I ' t and I <e ot ler ac, , a level With ordll1ary egis atlve ac s, ' ,

legislature sha ll please ro alter it.. . ,then a legislative act contrary If the form er pa rr of the a Itel nanve be n ue, I ' '

' f I I ' rt be true t l en wntten constitu- ro the constitution is not law: I t le attel pa " , ' '

I f I ople to 11I11It a power 111 Its own tions are absurd attempts, on t le part 0 t le pe ,

nature illimitable. . . I C . I II I 110 Ila\'e framed written constItutions contemp ate erra ll1 y a t lose W f h . d

, f dId lount law 0 t e nation an con-them as formll1g the un amenta an paran ' , sequenrly, the theory of every such governm~nt must be, that an act of the leg- islature, repugnant ro the constitution, IS VOId., " '

This theory is essentially attached ro a wntten constitution, and, IS conse- quently, ro be considered, by this court, as one of the fundamental pnncI~les of our society. It is not therefore to be lost Sight of 111 the further conSideration

of this su bject. If an act of the legislature, repugnant to the constitution, is void, does it,

notwithstanding its invalidity, bind the courts, and oblige them to give it ef- fect? Or, in other words, though it be not law, does it constitute a rule as oper- ative as if it was a law? This would be to overthrow in fact what was established in theory; and would seem, at first view, an absurdity roo gross to be insisted on. It shall, however, receive a more attentive consideration.

It is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is. Those who apply the rule ro particular cases, must of necessity expound and interpret that rule. If two laws conflict with each other, the courts must decide on the operation of each.

So if a law be in opposition to the constitution; if both the law and the constitution apply to a particular case, so that the court must either decide that case conformably to the law, disregarding the constitution' or con- formably to the constitution, disregarding the law; the court must determine which of these conflicting rules governs the case. This is of the very essence of judicial duty.

If, then, the co~rts are to regard the constitution, and the constitution is supenor to any ordll1ary act of the legislature tile " d t such , , constitution, an no ord111ary act, must govern the case to which they both apply.

Those, then, who controvert the principle tIl t tl ..' to be 'd d' a le constitution IS conSI ere , 111 court, as a paramount law are d d I 't)' of , re uce to t le necesSI

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" I tllP CO ll stl'tlltion, and ,ee lllaint:lIll1ng t la t co urts must cl ose their eves on , onl y rhe hlV, ' ,

This doctrine would sub ve rt the vcrI' foundarion of all wrinen constJru - , I Id d I I , ', I ' . ' les :JI1d rheory tI ? ns, r wou ec are r lar an act wh,ch, accordJllg to t le PrlllC1P ' J tor ', It

ot our government, IS entirely VO Id IS ye r, In practi ce, completel y oblig3 } I ' " f b 'dd . suCl would declare tha t if the legislature shall do what is express ly o r I ell ,

act, notwirh standing the express prohibirion, is in reality effecrual. Ir wo uld be given to rhe legisla ture a praerical and rea l omniporence, wirh the sa me breath which professes to res trier their powers within narrow limits. It is preSC rlblllg limits, and declaring that those limits may be passed a t pleasure.

That it thus reduces to nothing what we have deemed the greatest Im - provement on political institutions, a written constituti on, would of Itse lf be sufficient, in America, where written constitutions have been viewed WIth so much reverence, for rejecting the construction. But the peculiar express ions of tile constitution of the United States furnish additional arguments in favour of its rejection.

The judicial power of the United States is extended to all cases ari sing under the constitution.

Could it be the intention of those who gave this power, to say that in using it the constitution should not be looked into? That a case arising under the constitution should be decided without examining the instrument under which it arises?

This is too extravagant to be maintained. In some cases, then, the constitution must be looked into by the judges.

And if they can open it at all, what part of it are they forbidden to read or to obey?

There are many other parts of the constitution which serve to illustrate this subject.

It is declared that "no tax or duty shall be laid on articles exported from any state." Suppose a duty on the export of cotton, of tobacco, or of flour; and a suit instituted to recover it. Ought judgment to be rendered in such a case? Ought the judges to close their eyes on tile constitution, and only see the law?

The constitution declares " that no bill of attainder or ex post (acto law shall be passed."

If, however, such a bill should be passed, and a person should be prose- cuted under it; must the court condemn to death those victims whom the con- stitution endeavors to preserve?

"No person," says the constitution, "shall be convicted of treason unless on the testimony of two witnesses to the same overt act, or on confession in open court."

Here the language of the constitution is addressed especially to the COllrtS. It prescribes, directly for them, a rule of evidence not to be departed from. If the legislature should change that rule, and declare one witness, or a confes- sion out of court, sufficient for conviction, must the constitutional principle YIeld to the legislative act?

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]66 ~ I C liO XII

, I I I " ~ ,, 111'c ll rni .. IH be made it is appa r, I' ro lll r lese, clnd man y o r l er ,t: CC tl OIl S \. " . ' I I f f

". t ' llpl a red that Instrument as a rule ent. t l :H t le ramers () . rht: conStlflltl OIl Lon c1 ' • fo r rhe governme llt uf ('( lurts, as well .:15 of the legisi:Jture. . ) .

'\ ' hy o therwise dues it direct the ludges to take a n oa th to suppo rt It. This oa th certai nl y app lic ' in an especial manner, to th eir conduct III their official cha racter. H~w illllllo ra l to impOSt: it on th em, if they were to be used as the instruments. and the knowing instrulllents, fo r violating what they swea r to

support! The oath of office. too. imposed by the legis la ture, is completel y demon,

strati ve of the legislatiw opinion on this subj ect. It is in these words: "I do solemnl y swear that I will administer justice without respect to persons, and do eq ual right to the poor and to the rich ; and tha t I will faithfully and impar, ti a ll y discharge all the duties incumbent on me as , according to the best of Illy abilities and understanding agreeably to the constitution and

laws of the United States. " Wh y does a judge swear to discharge his duties agreeably to the constitu,

tion of the United St:ltes, if that constitution form s no rule for his government? if it is closed upon him, and ca nnot be inspected by him?

If such be the real sta te of things, this is worse th an so lemn mockery. To prescribe, o r to take this oath, becomes equally a crime.

It is also not entirely unworthy of observation, that in declaring what shall be the supreme law of the land, the constitution itself is first mentioned; and not the laws of the United States generally, but those only which shall be made in pursuance of the constitution, have that rank.

Thus, the particular phraseology of the constitution of the United States confirms and strengthens the principle, supposed to be essential to all written constitutions, that a law repugnant to the constitution is void; and that courts, as well as other departments, are bound by that instrument.

The rule must be discharged.

ASHWANDER V. TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY

65. DEFINING THE COURT'S JURISDICTION

Associate justice Louis Brandeis's concurring opinion in thIS case set forth a widely accepted view of when and how the Supreme COllrt should exercise its jurisdiction.

SOl/rce: U.S. Supreme Court, AshwOIlder v. Tellliessee Valle)· AI/thorit)' (1936).

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Bralldeis asserted that I . <titutioll I . t Je Court should 1I0 t dcnde C{) II - - a quest lOllS I I I . II I ' { 'IJO Id . / /II ess t Jey are a/Jso lutcly esselltlal , •. , U (// IOI( C -t ' .

{ O il, lfut lUllal questiulls i( "ther legal

groulI(. s C(/II be {a lii d F' I _I" Id I' I " . urt Jer. he argued that the Cuurt , lUll 1I0 t make a C . .

. d O/Istltutlollal mlillK broader t"all re- qUire tu decide the ' . I - .

pi Id I ca,e at Ja lld. 11J/5 particular case

u Je t Je CO IISt r t ' ( { . uc lOll a ( alliS alld the sellillg o( elec- tnc power b)· the r., { I ,eG era goverl/Illellt. Despite Bralldcis's effo rts to restra ' tl S I

/1/ Je IIpreme COl/rt hy adupting what 1alle becom e klluw A·I d . . II as S lW3n cr rules the OJl1StltU- tlo //al decisions o(tl {s· . . 1e iliac erll upreme CUllrt cOllt/lll/e to tOl/ch all alld (reql/ently dominate the lIIaior political qllestlOlls o( ol/r time.

Mr. Justice BRANDEIS, concurring .. . .

The Court developed, for its own governance in the cases confessedly with1l1 Its JUrIsdIctIOn, a series of rules under which it has avoided pass ing upon a large part of all the constitutional questions pressed upon it for deci- sion. They are:

I. The Coun will not pass upon the constitutionality of legislation in a friendly, non-adversary, proceeding, declining because to decide such ques- tions "is legitimate only in the last resort, and as a necessity in the determina- tion of real, earnest and vital controversy between individuals. It never was the thought that, by means of a friendl y suit, a party beaten in the legislature could transfer to the courts an inquiry as to the constitutionality of the legisla- tive act. " Chicago & Grand Trunk Ry. v. Wellman, 143 U.S. 339,345 ....

2. The Court will not "anticipate a question of constitutional law in ad- vance of the necessity of deciding it." Lillerpool, N. Y. & P. S. S. Co. II. Emi- gration Commissioners, I J 3 U.S. 33, 39; ... "It is not the habit of the court to decide questions of a constitutional nature unless absolutely necessa ry to a de- cision of the case." BI/rton v. United States. 196 U.S. 283, 295.

3. The Coun will not " formulate a rule of constitutional law broader than is required by the precise facts to which it is to be applied." Liverpool, N. Y. & P. S. S. Co. II. Emigration Commissioners, sl/pra . ...

4. The Court will not pass upon a constitutional question although prop- erly presented by the record, if there is also present some other ground upon which the case may be disposed of. This rule has found most varied applica- tion. Thus if a case can be decided on either of two grounds, one involving a consticutio'nal question, the other a question of statutory construction or general law, the court will decide only the latter. Stier II. Louswtlle & Nashllil/e R. Co .• 213 U.S. 175, 191; Light II. Umted States. 220. U.S. 523,538. Appeals from the highest court of a state challenging Its deCISIOn of a question under the Federal Constitution are frequently dislnIssed because the Judgement can

be S . d . d pendent state ground. Berea College II. KentHcky. 2 I 1 usta1l1e on an 111 e U.S. 45, 53 .

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5. The Court wi ll nor pa s upon rh e va li diry of a sraru re upo n complainr of one who fai ls ro show rhar he is inj ured by irs operanon. Tyler 11. The judges, 179 U . . 405; Helldrick 11. Marylalld, 235 U.S. 6 10,62 1 .. Among rh e many ap- plicari ons of rh is rul e, none is more srriking rh an rhe delli al of rh e fl ghr of chal- lenge ro one who lac ks a personal or properry righr. Thus, rhe chall enge by a public official inreresred onl y in rhe pe rfo rm ance of his officia l dury will nor be cnrertained .. . . In I:airchild /I. Hllghes, 258 U.s. 126, rh e Courr affirm ed rhe dismissa l of a suir broughr by a ci ri zen who soughr ro have rhe Ninereenth Aillendmcnr declared unconsriru rional. In Massa chusetts /I. Mellon, 262, U.S. 447, rhe challenge of rhe federal Marerniry Act was nor enrerra ined alrhough made by rhe Commonwea lrh on behalf of all irs cirize ns.

6. The Courr will nor pass upon rhe consritutionality of a statute at the in- stance of one who has ava iled himself of its benefits. Great Falls Mfg· Co. v. Attom ey Gelleral, 124 U.S. 581. . . .

7. "When the va lidity of an act of the Congress is drawn in question, and even if a serious doubt of constitutionality is ra ised, it is a ca rdinal principle rhat thiS Courr will first ascertain whether a construction of the statute is fairl y possible by whICh the quesnon may be avoided. " Cromwell v. Benson 285 U.S. 22, 62. '

E U GENE V . R OS T OW

66. THE D EMOCRATIC CHARACTER OF JUDICIAL R EVIEW

Think about it: The Congress or your state legislature passes a law that is signed by the presl'd t h A r. '. en or t e gover- nCor. s ,ew as fIVe appolIIted judges on the U.S. Suprem

ollrt can declare the I b " . e thereby v t ' I d . aw to e I/IlCOllstltutional,"

e omg t 1e eClslons of I public officials Is th ' r. Yotlr popu arly elected This question 'has t;~;'l~/::ro,oundly "undemocratic "? and the public at lar . Ameh"cans-both scholars public. ge-Sll1ce t e founding of the re-

Eugene Rostow's defense of ". d ' . the power of the 5, p C JU Ictal review," or

/ reme ourt to rule that the laws ,

SOll rce: From "The Democr' . Ch - I R

· \ ' I .\lIC aracter ot J d ' . _ti ll' CVleltl, 0 . 66, no. 2 (1952 • . U !Clai Rev iew," bv Eu . Reprill!ed bv permission f H ). Copynght ID 1952 b , h H ' gene V, RoslOw In H.IrI ·ard

. 0 arva rd L.aw School. ) t e arva rd L.aw Rev iew Association.

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decisiolls alld l ·t ( I . I . . I : . , ~ 5 ° e ected goverlllllelltal o((ICIa 5 arc III 1'1 0 <I I/Oil o( tl ' C . . ( I I . _ . ?C OIlStltl/t lOlI . stallds liS olle u t Je

c U,S IC statell/ellts ( I' I .' . . ° w 'Y SUC J a power IS q Ulle COIISIS- tell t /ll/ t" del . ' I .' . / ' . II OcmtlC t 1eory alld dell/ocra tlc {lu hllcs . \U, tO/l 1 argl/es th t ' . . ( a a COlIstltl/t lOn that ol/thlles the powers

o the guvemmCllt WU I/ld be meanillgless withol/t a II/ealls o( Idelltl'fY I' " (fl " . b . " IIg cases U COllldctmg actIO n Y eiI/ /erellt brall cIJe - /- . . II . ' u gouerllmellt o r cO lIslltllt lU na )' I/llal/thoru,edgovr> rl t I ' . . d " d I ..

. L I/uell a actloll aga /ll st /II IVI. lIa s. / 11 effect. he reasO IlS that i( elected o((icials collid sill/pi)' alter thc mealll',1 ( I C . . . b . . g o t Je Olls lltllt lO n at any tl/ne y their actIOns, the CO IIStitlltioll would /Jruvide 110 real Il/llltatlOl1 0 11 them at all. NOlletheless, euell i( one accepts the democratic legitimacy o( ;udicial review. the debate will rage 0 11 as to when and how Ihe SUjJreme COllrt should exercise this awesome power to limit ma;ority rule.

A theme o f uneasiness, and even of guilt, colors the literature about judic ia l review. M any o f those who have talked , lectured , and written a bo ut the Con- stitution have been troubled by a sense that judic ia l rev iew is undemocra tic . Why sho uld a majo rity o f nine Justices appo inted for life be permitted to o utlaw as unconstituti o na l the acts of elec ted offi cia ls or of o fficers controlled by elected offi cia ls? Judic ia l review, they have urged, is an undemocratic show o n an otherwise respectable tree. It sho uld be cut off, o r at least kept pruned a nd inconspicuo us. The attack has gone further. Reliance on bad po litica l doctr ine, they say, has produced bad po litica l results. The strength o f the courts has weakened o ther pa rts of the government. The judicia l censors a re accused o f causing laxness and irrespo nsibility in the state and natio na l legislatures, and politica l apa thy in the electorate. At the same time, we a re warned, the pa rtic i- pation o f the courts in this essentia lly po litica l functio n will inevita bly lead to the destructio n o f their independence and thus compromise a ll other aspec ts o f their wo rk.

The idea that judic ia l review is undemocratic is not an academic issue o f political philosoph y. Like most abstractions, it has fa r-reaching practical con- sequences. I suspect that fo r some judges it is the mainspring of dec isio n , in - ducing them in many cases to upho ld legislati ve and executive actio n which would o therwi se have been condemned. Particula rl y in the multiple opinio ns of recent yea rs, the Supreme Court's self-sea rching often bo ils down to a debate within the bosoms of the Justices over the appropriateness o t judic ia l review

itse lf. The a ttack o n judicia l review as undemocratic rests on the premise tha t

the Constitutio n sho uld be a llowed to grow without a judic ia l check. T he propo nents o f this view wo uld have the Constitution mea n wha t the Presidenr, the Co ng ress, and the sta te legis latures say It means . ...

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370 SECTION XII

It is ;1 grave oversimplification to contend that no society can be democra_ tic unless its legislature has sovereign powers. Thc socIal qua"t~ of democracy ca nnot be defined hy so rigid a formula. Governmcnt and PO"~ICS .are ~fter all the arms, not thc end, of social life. The purpose of the. Constitution .IS t~ as- sure the people a free and dcmocratic soc iety. The final a~m of that socle~y I~ as much freedom as possib le for the individual human bemg. The Cons.t1tutlOn provides soc iety with a l1l echani sm of government full y compe~ent to Its task, hur hy no mcans universa l in its powers. The power to govern IS parcelled out between the states and the nation and is further dividcd among the three main branches of all govcrnmental units. By custom as well as constitutional prac- tice, many vital aspccts of coml1lunity life are beyond .the direct reach of gov- ernment-for cxa mple, religion , the press, and, until recently at any rate, many phascs of educationa l and cultural activities. The separation of powers under the Constitution scrves the end of democracy in society by limiting the roles of the several branches of government and protecting the citizen, and the various parts of the state itself, against encroachments from any source. The root idea of the Constiturion is that man can be free because the state is not.

The power of constitutional review, to be exercised by some part of the government, is implicit in the conception of a written constitution delegating limited powers. A written constitution would promote discord rather than order in society if there were no accepted authority to construe it, at the least in cases of conflicting action by different branches of government or of consti- tutionally unauthorized governmental action against individuals. The limita- tion and separation of powers, if they are to survive, require a procedure for independent mediation and construction to reconcile the inevitable disputes over the boundaries of constitutional power which arise in the process of government ....

So far as the American Constitution is concerned, there can be little real doubt that the courts were intended from the beginning to have the power they have exercised. The Federalist Papers are unequivocal; the Debates as clear as debates normally are. The power of judicial review was commonly exercised by the courts of the states, and the people were accustomed to judicial con- struction of the authority derived from colonial charters. Constitutional inter- pretation by the courts, Hamilton said, does not

by any means suppose a superiority of the judicial to the legislative power. It only supposes that the power of the people is superior to both; and that where the will of the legislature, declared in its statutes, stands in opposition to that of the people, declared in the Constitution, the judges ought to be governed by the latter rather than the former. They ought to regulate their decisions by the fundamental laws, rather than by those which are not fundamental.

Hamilton's statement is sometimes criticized as a verbal legalism. But it has a~ advantag~ t?o. ~or muc~ of the discussion has complicated the problem Without c1anfymg It. Both Judges and their critics have wrapped themselves

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Till ~u 1'1( I ,\1 1 (() III

successfull y in the difficulric f ' SO ' I I ' ' .. 0 ,~o pJrtlcuiar cases th ar they h:lI'C bee n Jhlc to 1'3ck t le u tllna te I SS U~ posed In tl > F d ' I' e • le e ,13 I>r Papers

Whether 3nother method f f ' " , d I h , 0 en o rClIlg the Constitutiun cu uld h:lVe hee n

d Vise , t le s o rt answer IS th at I C h" . ' , I' , ' no suc 1 meth od has deve loped, T he a rg ulll enr vert c constltutl o na Ity uf Iud ' ,' . I . ' I ' b h ' o . ILI .l rev iew 13S long Sillce bee n ~ettl,d y 1, -

v The power a nd duty ot tI S ' tOr]' , . ', , le upreme Court to declare t:.'l tutes ur executive

-non ulK o nstitutio na l III apl) " , ' ' 3_ _ ,' rupn 3tc cases IS part of rhe li ving ConstitUti o n, "Tht:' co urse o t cunstltuti onal I ' " M " I llstory, r. Jusncc hankfurter rece nt y re- n1a rked , has cast resl)onsibilit 'lc I S " Id I " ' '' , s upon t 1(' upreme Court which It wou )e "stultifica tio n for It to eV'lde' TI . C ' ' d d ' ff . , '. 1(' o urt s power has hee n exercise I er- elld)' at different times' sOmetl'Il1 ' I kl " I ' , ' . es Wit 1 rec eS5 a nd doctrinaire r nr lUSla Ill; sometimes with great deference to the status and rc punsihiliries of other branches of the government; sometimes with a degree of weakness and timid - ity that comes close to the betraya l of trust. But the power exists, as an integra l parr of the proce~s of American government. The Court has the duty of inter- preting the Constitutio n III many of its most important aspects, a nd (' peciall y in those which concern the relations of the individua l and the state, The polit- ical propositio n underlying the survival of the power is that there a re some phases of American life which should be beyond the reach of any majority, save by constitutional amendment. In Mr, Justice Jackson's phra se, "One's right to life, liberty, and property, to free speech, a free press, freed o m of wor- ship and assembly, and other fundamental rights may not be submitted to vote; they depend on the outcome of no elections," Whether or not thi s was the intention of the Founding Fathers, the unwritten Constitution is unmista kable.

If one may use a personal definitio n of the crucial word, this way of po lic- ing the Constitution is not undemocratic. True, it employs appointed official s, to whom large powers are irrevocably delegated. But democrac ies need nor elect all the officers who exercise crucial authority in the name of the voters. Admirals and generals can win or lose wars in the exercise of their discretion, The independence of judges in the administration of justice has been the pride of communities which aspire to be free . Members of the Federal Reserve Boa rd have the lawful power to plunge the country into depression or inflation . The list could readily be extended. Government by referendum or town meeting is not the only possible form of democracy. The task of democracy is not to have the people vote directly on every issue, but to assure their ultimate responsibil- ity for the acts of their representatives, electeo ur appuinted. For judges decid- ing ordinary litigation, the ultimate responsibility of the, electorate has a special meaning. It is a responsibility for the quality of the Iudges and for the substance of their instructions, never a responsibility for theIr deCISions in par- ticular cases. It is hardly characteristic of law in democratic soci~ty to encour- age bills of attainder or to allow appeals from the courts 111 pa rticular cases to legislatures or to mobs. Where the judges are carrying out the function of con- stitutional review, the final responsibility of the peoplns appropriately guar- anteed by the provisions for amending the Constitution Itself, and by the

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372 SECfION XII

. . h h per o nnel o f courts. Given the benign influence of time, which c anges t e . d . . h I d I ere is nothlllg un emocratlC In av-possibilitv of ronstitutiona amen me nt, t 1 . . I d'

, I . d ct as impo rtant constltutlona me la -ing responsible and indepenc ent IU ges a , . k . h I to rs. Within the narrow limits of th eir capac ity to act, their g relat taks ' IS tO

f e p

. ' I'b . ' ··t The y can do muc 1 to eep It rom maintain :1 pluralist eqUi I rlUI11 111 socle y. b C h . . d b h I F deral Government y ongress or t e bell1g dOl11l11ate y t e states o r t 1e e . , ,

President by the purse o r the sword . . ' . I h'· . f tl ' cruc l' ~ 1 but delicate func tion , constitutional re-n t e executi on 0 liS . " ' ' . d ' b h h

view by the judiciary has an advantage th o ro ughl y recognize 111 or t eory and pr~ctice. The p~we r of the courts, however final: can only be asserted In the course of litigation. Advisory opinions are forbidden, and reefs of self- limitati on have grown up around the doctrine that the courts will determine constitutional questions onl y in cases of actual controversy, when no lesser ground of decision is available, and when the complallllllg party would be di- rectly and personally injured by the assertion of the power deemed unconsti- tutional. Thus the check of judicial review upon the elected branches of government must be a mild one, limited not only by the detachment, .in- tegrity, and good sense of the Justices, but by the structural boundanes Im- plicit in the fact that the power is entrusted to the courts. Judicial review is inherently adapted to preserving broad and flexible lines of constitutional growth, not to operating as a continuously active factor in legislative or exec- utive decisions ....

Democracy is a slippery term. I shall make no effort at a formal definition here. Certainly as a matter of historical fact some societies with parliamentary governments have been and are "democratic" by standards which Americans would accept, although it is worth noting that almost all of them employ sec- ond cham bers, with powers at least of delay, and indirect devices for assuring continuity in the event of a parliamentary collapse, either through the crown or some equivalent institution, like the presidency in France. But it would be scholastic pedantry to define democracy in such a way as to deny the title of "democrat" to Jefferson, Madison, Lincoln, Brandeis, and others who have found the American constitutional system, including its tradition of judicial re- view, well adapted to the needs of a free society. As Mr. Justice Brandeis said,

the doctrine of the separation of powers was adopted by the Convention of 1787, not to promote efficiency but to preclude the exercise of arbitrary power. The purpose was, not to avoid friction, but, by means of the inevitable fflctlon mCldent to the distribution of governmental powers among three de- partments, to save the people from autocracy.

It is error to insist that no society is democratic unless it has a government of unlimited powers, and that no government is democratic unless its legisla- ~ure has unlimited powers. Constitutional review by an independent judiciary IS a tool of proven use in the American quest for an open society of widely dis- persed powers. In a vast country, of mixed population with widely different regional problems, such an organization of society is ;he surest base for the hopes of democracy.

4

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THE SU PI! ~ME C O UIlT 373

ALEXANDER "1 . B I C K EL

67. TH E L EAST D ANGEROUS BRANCH INDEED

Alexander Bickel (1924-/ 974), aIle of the leading con- stItutIonal scholars of the twentieth celltury insisted that if the bas · fA · ' I

. . IS a mertcan gOl/emment rests on t 7e prmClple of majority YItle, then the power of judicial re- llIew requIres considerable justification. Bickers starting pomt was Alexander Hamilton's argument in Federalist No. 78 that the separation of judicial, executil/e, and leg- Islatllle powers in the American system virtually guaran- teed that "the judiciary, from the nature of its fun ctions, will always be the least dangerous to the political rights of the Constitution; because it will be least in a capacity to annoy or injure them. " Bickel believed that because the Supreme Court lacks any significant enforcement powers, "the Supreme Court's law could not in our sys- tem prevail . .. if it ran collnter to deeply felt poplliar needs or convictions. " For Bickel, the mere fact that the dem ocratically chosen branches of government accept and enforce the Court's rulings means that judicial re- view is consistent with democratic theory. In a later book, The Morality of Consenr (1975), Bickel strongly criticizes the Supreme Court for deciding cases more all the basis of expediency than principle.

THE COUNTER-MAJORlTARIAN DIFFICULTY

The root difficulty is that judicial review is a counrer-majoritarion force in our system. There are various ways of sliding over this ineluctable reality. Marshall did so when he spoke of enforcing, in behalf of " the people," the limits that they have ordained for the institutions of a limited governmenr. And it has been done ever since in much the same fashion by all toO many commenrators. Marshall himself followed Hamilton, who in the 78th Federalist denied that judicial re- view implied a superiority of the judicial. over the legislative power-denied,. in other words, that judicial review constituted conrrol by an unrepresenratlve

S AI d · M Sickel The Least Dallgerol/s Brallch (Indianapolis: Sobbs-Merrill

ol/ree' From exan er. , . S· k I R d db · · C · 62) C , . • he © by Josephine A. IC e. epro uce y permIssIon . ompan y Inc., 19 . op> ng

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374 ~ I T I ON X II

. . f I d .' "I I supposes" Hamilron went on, "that nlln onty 0 I n e cere malonty. t on y , . - . I - . ' I I· ' d th at where the wdl ot the legIS-t 1e power 0 1 the people IS supen o r ro Jot 1 , ,In '

I . . 1- . -ition to thJt of the people de-ature, dec lared III ItS statutes, st:ln(s In oppos . , cl a red in the Constitution, the judges ought to be governed by the larrer rather

tl I f " B I d "people" s' O used is :In abstractio n. ot neces-1an t 1e o rmer. ut t 1e wor . sa ril y J meaningless or a pernicious one by any mean s; always charged with emotion, but nonrepresenration:ll- an Jb traction obSCUring the reality that when the Supreme Coun declares unconstirutiona l a legislative acr or the action of an elected executi ve it thwarts the will of representatives of the actual people of the here and now; i; exercises control, not in behalf of the prevailing major- ity, but against ir. Th:\[, without lIlystic overrones, is what actuall y happens. It is :In altogether different kettle of fi sh, and it is the reJson the charge can be made that judicial review is undemocratic ....

It is true, of course, that the process of reflecting the will of a popular ma- jo rity in the legislature is deflected by various inequalities of representation and by all sorts of institutional habits and characteristics, which perhaps tend most 'often in favor of inertia. Yet it must be remembered that statutes are the product of the legislature and the executive acting in concert, and that the executive represents a very different constituency and thus tends to cure in- equities of over- and underrepresentation. Reflecting a balance of forces in so- ciety for purposes of stable and effective government is more intricate and less certain than merely assuring each citizen his equal vote. Moreover, impurities and imperfections, if such they be, in one pan of the system are no argument for total departure from the desired norm in another part. A much more important complicating factor-first adumbrated by Madison in the 10th Federalist and lately emphasized by Professor David B. Truman and others-is the proliferation and power of what Madison foresaw as "faction," what Mr. Truman calls "groups," and what in popular parlance has always been deprecated as the " interests" or the " pressure groups."

No doubt groups operate forcefully on the electoral process, and no doubt they seek and gain access to and an effective share in the legislative and executive decisional process. Perhaps they constitute also, in some measure, an impurity or imperfection. But no one has claimed that they have been able to capture the governmental process except by combining in some fashion, and thus capturing or constituting (are not the two verbs synonymous?) a ma- jority. They often tend themselves to be maioritarian in composition and to be subject to broader majoritarian influences. And the price of what they sell or buy in the legislature is determined in the biennial or quadrennial electoral marketplace. It may be, as Professor Robert A. Dahl has wrirren, that elec- tions themselves, and the political competition that renders them meaningful, "do not make for government by majorities in any very significant way," for they do not establish a great many policy preferences. However, "they are a crucial deVice for controlling leaders." And if the control is exercised by "groups of various types and sizes, all seeking in various ways to advance their goals," so that we have "minorities rule" rather than majority rule, it remains

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T H I:. SU I'I!E.\ I I:. Co KT 375

true nevertheless that 0 I , h '. '. d I te ' " . .• n ) t ose mtnorttles rule which can com man t le va s of a mal0rlty of tndividl ' I ' I I . d I of a .' . : " 1,1 S In t 1(' eglslat ure who can comman t le votes

malom y ot tndl vlduals ' hi' I b h ' th e . .' In r e e ecrorate. In one fa shI on or anot ler, ot In leglslan ve process and at I ' h . .. I ' . . e ecr lOns, t e Illtnorttles must coa esce tn ro a malor- It)'. Althoug,h as Mr D'1hl s· ,. . . f l ' bl ' ggesr . ' . '. .IYS, It IS as ll ona e In some quarrers ro su that everythtng belteved about democratic politics prior ro Wo rld Wa r I, and perhaps World War II , was nonsense" he makes no bones about his own belief that ··the radica l democrats who, U1;like Madison, insist upon the dec isive im- portance of the electi on process in the whole grand strategy of democracy are essennall y correct. '·

The insights of Professor Truman and other writers in ro the role th at groups play in our society and our politics have a bea ring on judicial rev iew. They tndlcate that there are other means than the elecroral process, though subordlllate and subsidiary ones, of making institutions of government re- sponsIve ro the needs and wishes of the governed. Hence one Illay in fe r that ju- dicial review, although not responsible, may have ways of being responsive. But nothing can fin ally depreciate the central function that is assigned in de- mocratic theory and practice to the electoral process; nor can it be denied that the policy-making power of representative institutions, born of the elecroral process, is the distinguishing characteristic of the system. judicial review works counter to this characteristic. .. .

Besides being a counter-majoritarian check on the legislature and the ex - ecutive, judicial review may, in a larger sense, have a tendency over time seri - ously to weaken the democratic process. judicial review expresses, of course, a form of distrust of the legislature. "The legislatures," wrote james Bradley Thayer at the turn of the century,

are growing accustomed to th is d istrust and morc and more readily inclined to justify it, and to shed the considerations of constitutional restra ints,--<:erta inly as concerning the exact ex tent of these restrictions,-turning that subject over to the courts; and what is worse, they insensibly fa ll into a habit of assuming that whatever they could constitutiona lly do they may do,- as if honor and fa ir dea ling and ~ommon honesty were not relevant to thei r inquiries. The people, a ll th is while, become ca reless as to whom they send to the legislature; too often they cheerfull y vote fo r men whom they would not trust with an im- po rtant priva te a ffair, and when these unfit persons are found to pass foo li sh and bad laws, and the courts step tt1 and disregard them, the people are glad tha t these few wise r gentlemen on the bench a re so ready to protect them against their mo re immediate representati ves .... lilt should be remembered that the exerc ise of it Ithe power of judicial rev iewl even whe~ unavoida ble~ is

I d d \v'lth a se rious evil , namely, that the correctton of leglslatt ve a ways atten e • . . . . . k froln the outSide and the people thus lose the poltttca l expe· mlsta es comes " . . .

. d h 10 ral education and sttmulus that comes fro m flghttng the rtence, ant e n ' .. . . h o rdinar}' wa}' and correcttng their own errors. The ten-questto n out tt1 t e • , ' . .

f nd easy resort to thiS grea t functton, now lamentably too dency 0 a common a . f hi d d . . . d f the political capaCIty 0 t e peop e, an to eaden ItS

commo n, IS to war . ' h' d h I 'bilit}' It IS no Itght t 109 to 0 t at. sense o f mo ra responsl .

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376 SECTION XII

, does Congress enact a mea- I I , ds of oCC<ISlons , f ' " To thi s day on huw many lune Ie d ' lsideratlon u Its constitUtlon-

" 'I ,' " cssaye COl b d h sure that it decms expedlcnt, la\ In" , ' "lCiple) unl y to a all all t e f ' , - rabillty a ll pIli' f ' , ality (th<1t is to S<1y, () ItS aCLcp· 1 C rt will correct errors a prll1CI-

, d - fd 'e rhartlcOu "fll attcmpt 111 the declarc cun I CIIL .d that ally 10wcIIIlg 0 r Ie evel , , II b ' I s been suggesrc , I ' d ' , I pie If any? It may we C, as la . , hcrOl's other t Ian IU ICla re-

, , " ,'bunble to man) , bl of legislative perfurm ~lnce IS atlll • I .' bserved remains observa e ... .

, 'd b rI 'H wh :H T laye l 0 f d I ' VICW. Yet there IS no Ull t 1.· t'OIl has been pur orwar . t IS .. I I I rehtcd conrcil I ' I h hllall y, anot leI', t lOug I ' , II ' unter to democratic t leary t at

h ' d" I ' . ns so fllnei-llllcnta ) co d ' ' I ' t at III ICla rev iew III • 1 that theu ry jll ICla review can- , ' I ' I ' II ther reSI)cCrs rests 01. , d'" In a society w llC I III a () , f grave inner contra Ictlon In

, ' I b t'f · ' , We I)'IY the pnce 0 a • not ulnm ~1te y e e CLtl\ e. ' I ' I 's an inconvenience and a dan-

b ' " I f 'government w lIC I I • the aSlc prlllClp e 0 0111 d' for when the great test comes, gerolls one;and in the end ro n~ goo P~II~~~~l~St arresting expression of this 11Idiciai review will be un equ,l to It. I f J dge Learned Hand a pas-

"f ' from a speec IOU · , . , thought IS 111 a amous passage " d b sa e Deall Eu rene V. Rostow has written, "of Brownll1gesque passlO~ a~ 0- • g: ,,' ,g "I , d pocal)'ptic view." Absent the II1stltution of SCUl'lty, VOlC1l1g a g oom) an a '

judicial review, Judge Hand said:

I do not think that anyone ca n say what will be left of those I fundamental principles of equity and fair play which our constitutions enshr1l1eJ; I do not know whether they will serve only as counsels; but thiS much I th111k I do know-that a society so riven that the spirit of moderation IS gone, no court can save; that a society where that spirit tlourishes, no court need save; that 111 a society which evades its responsibility by thrusting upon the courts the nur- ture of that spirit, that spirit in the end will perish ....

Such, in outline, are the chief doubts that must be met if the doctrine of ju- dicial review is to be justified on principle. Of course, these doubts will apply with lesser or greater force to various forms of the exercise of the power. For the moment the discussion is at wholesale, and we are seeking a justification on principle, quite aside from supports in history and the continuity of prac- tice. The search must be for a function which might (indeed, must) involve the making of policy, yet which differs from the legislative and executive functions; which is peculiarly suited to the capabilities of the courts; which will not likely be performed elsewhere if the courts do not assume it; which can be so exer- cised as to be acceptable in a society that generally shares Judge Hand's satis- faction in a "sense of common venture"; which will be effective when needed; and whose discharge by the courts will not lower the quality of the other de- partments' perf~rmance by denuding them of the dignity and burden of their own responslbtllty. It wtll not be possible fully to meet all that is said against j~dicial review. Such is not the w,ay with questions of government. We can only ftll the other Side of the scales With countervailing judgments on the real needs and the actual workll1gs of our society and, of course, with our own portions of faith and hope. Then we may estimate how far the needle has moved.

d

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T H E 5 PR b\l ~ Co uwr 377

The po int o f departure is . . .. h ·1_ . . . " trUIsm; perhaps It even rtses ro t e un a sa l

bl·ltty of a platttude. It IS tha t · 'cts. a .. man y actIons of government have twO as pe . heir \ITImedl 3te necessa ril}, · d d · . I _

t ' . IIlten e ,practt ca l effec ts, and theIr per laps un . tended o r unapprec Iated b . I d In . . eartng on va lues we hold to have mo re gene ra a n

ermanem Interest. It IS a p . d f Iff P . . remIse we educe not merely rom t le ac t a a ·Itten constttutlon but fro hi · . I

wr m t e llSto ry of the race and ulttma tely as a mo ra judgmento f the good society, that government shoL;ld serve no t o nl}' what we ·oncel ve fro m ttme to tlllIe to b . d · . b I .

C e our Imme late matert a l needs ut a so certa In d ring v·llues This· . I . B en u • . In pa rt IS w lat IS meant by government und er law. ut

such va lues do no t present themselves ready-made. They have a pas t a lways, ro be sure, but they must be Continually derived, enunciated, and seen in releva m appltcatton. And It remains to ask which instituti on of our gove rnmem-if any s\l1 gle one III partIcular-should be the pron ouncer and gua rdia n of such values.

Men in a ll wa lks of public life are able occasionall y ro perceive this sec- ond aspect of public questions. Sometimes they are also able ro base their de- cisions on it; that is one of the things we like t~ call acting on principle. Often they do not do so, however, particularl y when they sit in legislati ve assem- blies. There, when the pressure for immediate results is strong enough and emotions ride high enough, men will ordinarily prefer ro act on expediency rather than take the long view. Possibly legislarors-everything else being equal-are as capable as other men of following the path of principle, where the path is clear or at any rate discernible. Our system, however, like all secu- lar systems, calls for the evolution of principle in novel circumstances, rather than only for its mechanical application. Not merely respect for the rule of es- tablished principles but the creative establishmem and renewal of a coherem body of principled rules-that is what our legislatures have proven themselves ill equipped to give us.

Initially, great reliance for principled decision was placed in the Senators and the Presidem, who have more extended terms of office and were meam to be elected only indirectly. Yet the Senate and the Presidem were conceived of as less closely tied to, not as divorced from, electoral responsibility and the political marketplace. And so even then the need might have been felt for an institution which stands altogether aside from the current clash of interests, and which, insofar as is humanly possible, is concerned only with principle. We cannot know whether, as Thayer believed, our legislatures are what they are because we have judicial review, or whether we have judicial review and consider it necessary because legislatures are what they are. Yet it is arguable also that the partial separation of the legislative and judicial functions-and it is not meant to be absolute-is benefICIal III any event, because It makes It possible for the desires of various groups and interests concerning immediate results to be heard clearly and unrestrainedly In one place. It may be thought fitting that somewhere in government, at some stage In ~he process of law- making, such felt needs should find unambIguous expressIon. Moreover, and

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378 ECT IONX II

. . ies for dea ling with maners of mo re imporranrl v couns have ce rra tn c lpac tr J I I

. , . d no t possess. uc ges lave, Or pri ncip le th at legislaturcs and exec utl\"CS 0 . f II h .

. . d I . sul a tl o n ro 0 ow t e wavs ot sho uld have the leisure th e tralnll1g, a n n e 111 -' .. . I . .' : . ' f ' t 1 hiS IS crucla 111 so rtll1g Out the scho i:Jr III purSUIl1~ the ends 0 gavel nmen . ..,

. . c. I " t -o mething that IIlstituti o ns can do th e endurtn g va lues of a soc iety, anc It IS no s . d ' ff . . . . f· I lOSt pout wtrh a I erent set of well occaS ionall y, whde operating 0 1 n e n . ' . . . .

I II t· I I ' t· · · d ~ Ild for IIlldev la tlllg II1 stltuti o nal customs. gea rs. t ca s o r a la Jlt 0 I11ln , " . f" I I . I les tlo ns 0 prtnClp e never carry Ano ther adva ntage that courts lave IS t lat qL . .

the sa me aspect for them as they did for th e legisla ture or the executive, Statutes, after all , deal typically with abstrac t o r ?Imly foresee n problems. The couns are concerned with the fl esh and blood o t an actual case . ThiS tends to mod ify, perhaps to lengthen, everyone's view. It a lso provides an extremely s::dutary proving ground for all abstractions; it is conduci ve,. III a phrase of Holmes, to thinking things, not words, and thus to the evoluti on of prll1clple by a process that tests as it creates.

Their insulation and the marvelous mystery of time give courts the capac- ity to appeal to men's bener natures, to call forth their aspirations, which may have been forgotten in the moment 's hue and cry. This is what Justice Stone ca lled the opponunity for "the sober second thought. " Hence it is that the couns, although they may somewhat dampen the people's and the legislatures ' efforts to educate themselves, are a lso a great and highl y effective educational institution. Judge Gibson, in the very opinion mentioned ea rlier, highly critical as he was, took account of this. "In the business of government, " he wrote, "a recurrence to first principles answers the end of an observation at sea with a view to correct the dead reckoning; and, for this purpose, a written constitu- tion is an instrument of inestimable value. It is of inestimable value also, in ren- dering its principles familiar to the mass of the people .... " The educational institution that both takes the obse rvation to correct the dead reckoning and makes it known is the voice of the Constitution: the Supreme Court exercising JudiCial review. The Justices, in Dean Rostow's phrase, "are inevitable teachers in a vital national seminar." No other branch of the American government is nearly so well eqUipped to conduct one. And such a seminar can do a great deal to keep our society from becoming so riven that no court will be able to save It. <?f course, we have never quite been that society in which the spirit of moderation IS so nehly in flower that no court need save it.

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••• • ECTIO XII

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1111 ll'lI1\" ( otRI 39

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I n what bJ i ~ did I ' d 11 '1 k I . I, II . exa n <:' r - .11111 ton n ' (() per 1I .1 ( t' mCr/ La n, I • the ne, Iy created uprel11C COUrt po c I no th reJt to the people of th e nlt eo

t,He;;? Do )'O U th ink H3111ilton would .IPI rme () the c' uprcmc ( our! \ ro ll' "' contemporary mcri 3n life ? Wh y? \'(/h not.

2. Trace the rc.boning Df 'hid Ju Ii M.1r h.dl III ILir/Jl/ r )' I '. ' Ililso ll . \l h.lI i the iron y in th e () urr'~ d ( I\ IOn tt) stri ke um 11 th e PMllcul.Jr '>eC ll on of .In Act of o n !!-re~ th at W3 ilwolved 111 thl \ ~' 3 ' ?

3. X a Justicc Bra ndci • opinion in A S/III 'cl llder I '. T('ll lI e ce \ft tl/ey A II/ h o rt/ )I a ple3 for cxp.llldillg or lirnitillg th e ' upreme ,ourt ? In your op inion. if Ihe

ou n aClu311 y heli eve th :u :I gove rnm ent:11 :Inion is lII1Con<' litul iona l, I rh ere a good re:1 0 11 th e oun should not rule on this que<;tion l

4. Can you think of a respon e ro Euge ne Rostow' c!:Jil11 th at wi th uu t jud icia l review the Congress could simply change the on tiruti on at wi ll ? Did yo u know that thi is exactly how the British ystem work ? Is Brita in not a del11 o- cratic nation?

5. What does Alexander Bickel see as the " roOf difficulty" rega rding judi idl review ? How does he resolve the problem ?