Intro to Global Terrorism

Classic Typology of Terrorism

Terrorists

Are Not

Dummies

Marie Hallion, PhD.

Judith Vandegriff, M.A.

©Vandegriff Research, 2014

United States Legal Definitions of Terrorism -

US State Department definitions are based on US Code and are accepted by the US legal community as enforceable definitions.

Terrorism: According to the US legal Code, the term terrorism means premeditated, politically motivated violence perpetrated against noncombatant targets by sub national groups or clandestine agents, usually intended to influence an audience.  Involves groups operating in and targeting the United States without foreign direction.

International Terrorism: Groups that operate primarily across international borders and/or have foreign connections. Foreign Intelligence surveillance Act (FISA) defines International Terrorism the same way replacing primarily with totally.

22 USC, Chapter 38, Section 2656f.

Transnational Terrorism: Violent acts intended to affect civilian populations or governments and occurring mostly outside the United States or transcending international boundaries.

18 USC, Chapter 113B, Section 2331. For the purposes of the US Code Chapter 113B of the Code, entitled "Terrorism”:

Federal Bureau of Investigation, U.S. Department of Justice.

The FBI divides terrorism into 2 categories:

Domestic - involving groups operating in and targeting the United States without foreign direction;

International - groups that operate across international borders and/or have foreign connections.

Definition of Terrorism: The unlawful use of force or violence against persons or property to intimidate or coerce a Government, the civilian population or any segment thereof, in furtherance of political or social objectives.

FBI Policy and Guidelines: FBI Denver Division: Counterterrorism. 12/2013. Retrieved from the web, 1/1/2014.

aka al-Qa'ida in the South Arabian Peninsula; al-Qa'ida in Yemen; al-Qa'ida of Jihad Organization in the Arabian Peninsula; al-Qa'ida Organization in the Arabian Peninsula; Tanzim Qa'idat al-Jihad fi Jazirat al-Arab; AQAP; AQY

Description: Al-Qa'ida in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) was designated as a Foreign Terrorist Organization on January 19, 2010. In January 2009, the leader of al-Qa'ida in Yemen (AQY), Nasir al-Wahishi, publicly announced that Yemeni and Saudi al-Qa'ida (AQ) operatives were working together under the banner of AQAP. This announcement signaled the rebirth of an AQ franchise that previously carried out attacks in Saudi Arabia. AQAP's self-stated goals include establishing a caliphate in the Arabian Peninsula and the wider Middle East, as well as implementing Sharia law.

On September 30, 2011, AQAP cleric and head of external operations Anwar al-Aulaqi, as well as Samir Khan, the publisher of AQAP's online magazine, Inspire, were killed in Yemen.

Activities: AQAP has claimed responsibility for numerous terrorist acts against both internal and foreign targets since its inception in January 2009. Attempted attacks against foreign targets include a March 2009 suicide bombing against South Korean tourists in Yemen, the August 2009 attempt to assassinate Saudi Prince Muhammad bin Nayif, and the December 25, 2009 attempted attack on Northwest Airlines Flight 253 from Amsterdam to Detroit, Michigan. AQAP was responsible for an unsuccessful attempt to assassinate the British Ambassador in April 2010, and a failed attempt to target a British embassy vehicle with a rocket in October of that year. Also in October 2010, AQAP claimed responsibility for a foiled plot to send explosive-laden packages to the United States via cargo plane. The parcels were intercepted in the United Kingdom and in the United Arab Emirates.

AQAP took advantage of the pro-democracy demonstrations that swept the Middle East in 2011 when similar demonstrations took place in Yemen. The demonstrations quickly turned violent in Sanaa; and as a result, the Yemeni government focused its attention away from AQAP and towards suppressing the upheaval in the capital. This allowed AQAP to carry out numerous attacks, including multiple attempts to disrupt oil pipelines, attacks on police and government personnel that killed approximately 60 people, and the October assassination of the head of the counterterrorism police force for Abyan Governorate. AQAP was also able to seize small amounts of territory in southern Yemen.

Strength: Although it is difficult to assess the number of AQAP’s members, the group is estimated to have close to one thousand members.

Location/Area of Operation: Yemen

External Aid: AQAP's funding primarily comes from robberies and kidnap for ransom operations, and to a lesser degree donations from like-minded supporters.  

aka al-Qa'ida Group of Jihad in Iraq; al-Qa'ida Group of Jihad in the Land of the Two Rivers; al-Qa'ida in Mesopotamia; al-Qa'ida in the Land of the Two Rivers; al-Qa'ida of Jihad in Iraq; al-Qa'ida of Jihad Organization in the Land of The Two Rivers; al-Qa'ida of the Jihad in the Land of the Two Rivers; al-Tawhid; Jam'at al-Tawhid Wa'al-Jihad; Tanzeem Qa'idat al Jihad/Bilad al Raafidaini; Tanzim Qa'idat al-Jihad fi Bilad al-Rafidayn; The Monotheism and Jihad Group; The Organization Base of Jihad/Country of the Two Rivers; The Organization Base of Jihad/Mesopotamia; The Organization of al-Jihad's Base in Iraq; The Organization of al-Jihad's Base in the Land of the Two Rivers; The Organization of al-Jihad's Base of Operations in Iraq; The Organization of al-Jihad's Base of Operations in the Land of the Two Rivers; The Organization of Jihad's Base in the Country of the Two Rivers; al-Zarqawi Network; Islamic State of Iraq; al-Nusrah Front; Jabhat al-Nusrah; Jabhet al-Nusrah; The Victory Front; al-Nusrah Front for the People of the Levant

Description: Al-Qa'ida in Iraq (AQI) was designated as a Foreign Terrorist Organization on December 17, 2004. In the 1990s, Abu Mus'ab al-Zarqawi, a Jordanian-born militant, organized a terrorist group called al-Tawhid wal-Jihad to oppose the presence of U.S. and Western military forces in the Islamic world and the West's support for and the existence of Israel. In late 2004, he joined al-Qa'ida (AQ) and pledged allegiance to Usama bin Ladin. After this al-Tawhid wal-Jihad became known as al-Qa'ida in Iraq (AQI). Zarqawi traveled to Iraq during Operation Iraqi Freedom and led his group against U.S. and Coalition Forces until his death in June 2006. In October 2006, AQI publicly re-named itself the Islamic State of Iraq and has since used that name in its public statements. In 2012, AQI was led by Ibrahim Awwad Ibrahim Ali al-Badri, aka Abu Du'a, who was designated under Executive Order 13224 on October 4.

Since late 2011, AQI has also participated in the Syrian conflict through its alias, al-Nusrah Front, which has sought to portray itself as part of the legitimate Syrian opposition. A number of al-Nusrah Front’s leaders have been members of AQI and its facilitation network that operated in Syria and Iraq from 2004-2011. [In mid-April 2013, al-Nusrah leader Muhammad al-Jawlani publicly pledged al-Nusrah’s fealty to AQ and its leader, Ayman al-Zawahiri.] Al-Nusrah works with other U.S. designated terrorist organizations, such as Lebanon based Fatah al-Islam. Al-Nusrah Front’s base of operations is probably Damascus, but the group mirrors the organizational structure of AQI in Iraq, with regional military, administrative, and local media efforts. On December 11, 2012, the Department of State amended AQI’s designation to include al-Nusrah Front as an alias.

Activities: Since its founding, AQI has conducted high profile attacks, including improvised explosive device (IED) attacks against U.S. military personnel and Iraqi infrastructure, videotaped beheadings of Americans Nicholas Berg (May 11, 2004), Jack Armstrong (September 22, 2004), and Jack Hensley (September 21, 2004), suicide bomber attacks against both military and civilian targets, and rocket attacks. AQI perpetrates the majority of suicide and mass casualty bombings in Iraq, using foreign and Iraqi operatives.

Examples of high profile AQI attacks in 2011 included a series of bombings that spanned January 18-20 that killed 139 people in Tikrit. In August, AQI vowed to carry out “100 attacks” across Iraq, starting in the middle of the Ramadan, to exact revenge for the May 2011 death of Usama bin Ladin. On November 28, AQI killed 20 police officers, government employees, civilians, and children, and wounded 28 others in a suicide vehicle-borne IED attack in At Taji, Baghdad, Iraq. On December 27, nine car bombs, six roadside bombs, and a mortar round all went off in a two-hour period, targeting residential, commercial, and government districts in Baghdad. AQI later claimed responsibility for the attacks, which killed 70 and wounded almost 200.

Since November 2011, al-Nusrah Front has claimed nearly 600 attacks, ranging from more than 40 suicide attacks to small arms and IED operations in major city centers including Damascus, Aleppo, Hamah, Dara, Homs, Idlib, and Dayr al-Zawr. For example, on September 28, 2012, al-Nusrah Front claimed responsibility for two suicide car bombs at a military complex in Damascus that killed four and wounded 14, including civilians. On October 3, 2012, the group claimed responsibility for four bombings in Aleppo, including two suicide attacks that killed more than 50 people. Al-Nusrah Front followed up those attacks with an October 9 suicide bomb attack on a Syrian Air Force Intelligence compound in a Damascus suburb that killed and wounded at least 100, including civilians.

AQI was also active in Iraq in 2012. In a series of coordinated attacks in March, AQI struck Shia pilgrims in the city of Karbala, set cars on fire near a police headquarters in Kirkuk, and targeted security forces and government officials in Baghdad. In all, AQI struck eight cities in just under six hours, killing 46 people and wounding 200. July was the bloodiest month of AQI attacks in two years, with 325 people killed over the span of multiple bombings and attacks. In August, the Islamic State of Iraq, AQI’s political front, released a video detailing a sophisticated attack in March on five locations in Haditha and neighboring Barwana that included dozens of fighters dressed as police commandos. During the raid, AQI fighters killed 27 Iraqi policemen, including two police commanders. In November, at least 166 Iraqi civilians, police, and soldiers were killed in violence across the country, according to the Government of Iraq.

Strength: In Iraq, membership is estimated between 1,000 and 2,000, making it the largest Sunni extremist group in Iraq. Membership in Syria is unknown, though it is likely a small force within the larger Syrian armed opposition

Location/Area of Operation: AQI’s operations are predominately Iraq-based, but it has perpetrated attacks in Jordan. In Syria, al-Nusrah Front has claimed attacks in several major city centers. The group maintains a logistical network throughout the Middle East, North Africa, Iran, South Asia, and Europe.

AL-QA'IDA IN THE ISLAMIC MAGHREB (AQIM)

aka AQIM; Group for Call and Combat; GSPC; Le Groupe Salafiste Pour La Predication Et Le Combat; Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat

Description: The Salafist Group for Call and Combat (GSPC) was designated as a Foreign Terrorist Organization on March 27, 2002. After the GSPC officially merged with al-Qa'ida (AQ) in September 2006 and became known as al-Qa'ida in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), the Department of State amended the GSPC designation to reflect the change on February 20, 2008. AQIM remains largely a regionally-focused terrorist group. It has adopted a more anti-Western rhetoric and ideology and has aspirations of overthrowing “apostate” African regimes and creating an Islamic Caliphate. Abdelmalek Droukdel, aka Abu Mus'ab Abd al-Wadoud, is the group's leader.

Activities: Since 2007, when AQIM bombed the UN headquarters building in Algiers and an Algerian government building outside of Algiers killing 60 people, AQIM had been relatively quiet and focused on its kidnapping for ransom efforts. In 2011 and 2012, however, AQIM took advantage of the deteriorating security situation in northern Africa to plan and conduct operations. In 2011, AQIM targeted Mauritanian President Muhammad Abdel Aziz and detonated a vehicle-borne improvised explosive device (VBIED) in Nouakchott, injuring nine soldiers, and also claimed responsibility for multiple suicide bomb attacks against Algerian military and police targets, which killed at least 20 people and wounded almost 50 others. In January 2012, Algerian authorities disrupted an AQIM plot targeting U.S. or European ships in the Mediterranean Sea. Some militants with ties to AQIM were involved in the September 11 attack on U.S. facilities in Benghazi that killed J. Christopher Stevens, the U.S. Ambassador to Libya, and three staff members.

In addition to conducting attacks, AQIM also conducted kidnap for ransom operations. The targets are usually Western citizens from governments or third parties that have established a pattern of making concessions in the form of ransom payments for the release of individuals in custody. In September 2010, AQIM claimed responsibility for the kidnapping of seven people working at a uranium mine in Niger. AQIM released three of the hostages in February 2011, but at the end of 2012, four French citizens remained in captivity.

In January 2011, AQIM kidnapped two French civilians in Niamey, Niger. The kidnappers later killed both hostages during a failed rescue attempt. In February, AQIM conducted its first abduction of a foreigner in Algeria since 2003 when it kidnapped an Italian tourist in Alidena. In October, AQIM kidnapped two Spanish and one Italian aid worker from a refugee camp near Tindouf, Algeria. In November, AQIM was responsible for the November 26 killing of a German man in Mali and the abduction of three men from the Netherlands, South Africa, and Sweden in Mali.

AQIM continued its kidnapping operations in 2012. In May, AQIM killed a German hostage in Nigeria during a military raid. AQIM was also believed to be behind the December kidnapping of a French engineer in northern Nigeria, an operation that resulted in the death of two Nigerians.

Strength: AQIM has under a thousand fighters operating in Algeria with a smaller number in the Sahel. It is attempting to take advantage of the volatile political situation in the Sahel to expand its membership, resources, and operations.

Location/Area of Operation: Northeastern Algeria (including but not limited to the Kabylie region) and northern Mali, Niger, and Mauritania.

External Aid: AQIM members engage in kidnapping for ransom and criminal activities to finance their operations. Algerian expatriates and AQIM supporters abroad -- many residing in Western Europe –may also provide limited financial and logistical support.

JEMAAH ISLAMIYA (JI)

aka Jemaa Islamiyah; Jema'a Islamiyah; Jemaa Islamiyya; Jema'a Islamiyya; JemaaIslamiyyah; Jema'a Islamiyyah; Jemaah Islamiah; Jemaah Islamiyah; Jema'ah Islamiyah; Jemaah Islamiyyah; Jema'ah Islamiyyah; JI

Description: Designated as a Foreign Terrorist Organization on October 23, 2002, Jemaah Islamiya (JI) is a Southeast Asia-based terrorist group co-founded by Abu Bakar Ba'asyir and Abdullah Sungkar that seeks the establishment of an Islamic caliphate spanning Indonesia, Malaysia, southern Thailand, Singapore, Brunei, and the southern Philippines. More than 400 JI operatives have been captured since 2002, including operations chief and al-Qa'ida (AQ) associate Hambali. In 2006, several members connected to JI's 2005 suicide attack in Bali were arrested; in 2007, JI emir Muhammad Naim (a.k.a. Zarkasih) and JI military commander Abu Dujana were arrested; and in 2008, two senior JI operatives were arrested in Malaysia and a JI-linked cell was broken up in Sumatra. In September 2009, JI-splinter group leader Noordin Mohammad Top was killed in a police raid. Progress against JI continued in February 2010, when Indonesian National Police discovered and disbanded an extremist training base in Aceh in which members of JI and other Indonesian extremist groups participated. The police raid resulted in the capture of over 60 militants, including some JI operatives, and led authorities to former JI leader Dulmatin, one of the planners of the 2002 Bali bombing. In March 2010, Dulmatin was killed outside of Jakarta. In June 2010, wanted JI commander Abdullah Sunata was captured while planning to bomb the Danish Embassy in Jakarta. In January 2011, JI member Umar Patek was captured in Abbottabad, Pakistan, and put on trial in Indonesia, where he was convicted and sentenced to 20 years in prison in June 2012 for his role in the Bali bombing.

Activities: In December 2001, Singaporean authorities uncovered a JI plot to attack U.S., Israeli, British, and Australian diplomatic facilities in Singapore. Other significant JI attacks include the 2002 Bali bombings, which killed more than 200, including seven U.S. citizens; the August 2003 bombing of the J. W. Marriott Hotel in Jakarta, the September 2004 bombing outside the Australian Embassy in Jakarta, and JI's October 2005 suicide bombing in Bali, which killed 26, including the three suicide bombers.

On July 17, 2009, a JI faction led by Noordin Mohammad Top conducted the group’s most recent high-profile attacks, when two suicide bombers detonated explosive devices at the J.W. Marriott and Ritz-Carlton hotels in Jakarta, killing seven and injuring more than 50, including seven Americans. The Philippine military announced it had killed two JI members in separate incidents in the south of the country in late 2012, including one of the group’s senior-most representatives to the Philippines

Strength: Estimates of total JI members vary from 500 to several thousand.

Location/Area of Operation: JI is based in Indonesia and is believed to have elements in Malaysia and the Philippines.

External Aid: Investigations have indicated that JI is fully capable of its own fundraising through membership donations and criminal and business activities. It has received financial, ideological, and logistical support from Middle Eastern contacts and non-governmental organizations.

Excerpt from: U.S. Department of State, Country Reports on Terrorism, Chapter 6, Foreign Terrorist Organizations, April 2014.

The Rise of ISIS

In late 2004, Abu Mus'ab al-Zarqawi, a Jordanian-born terrorist, joined al-Qa'ida (AQ) and pledged allegiance to Usama bin Ladin. From this point on, al-Zarqawi’s group, al-Tawhid wal-Jihad, became known as al-Qa'ida in Iraq (AQI). Zarqawi traveled to Iraq during Operation Iraqi Freedom and he led his group against U.S. and Coalition Forces until his death in June 2006. In October 2006, the successor to Zarqawi, Abu Ayyub al- Masri, re-named AQI the Islamic State of Iraq and subsequently the group used that name in its statements. In April 2010, upon the death of Masri, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi took over leadership of AQI.

Beginning in late 2011, AQI participated in the Syrian civil war through its alias, the al-Nusrah Front, which sought to portray itself as part of the legitimate Syrian opposition. A number of al-Nusrah Front’s leaders were members of AQI and its facilitation network that operated in Syria and Iraq from 2004-2011. These operations continued through 2012-2013. In mid-April 2013, al-Nusrah leader Muhammad al-Jawlani publicly pledged al-Nusrah’s fealty to AQ and its leader, Ayman al-Zawahiri.

In April 2013, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, leader of al-Qa’ida in Iraq (AQI), acknowledged AQI’s operations in Syria, and announced the adoption of a new name to mirror the planned merger with al-Nusrah. The new name had varying translations: either the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) or Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL). Since the group maintained its al-Qaida affiliation, the U.S. Department of State to referred to them as al-Qa’ida in Iraq/Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (AQI/ISIL).

AQI/ISIL attacks in Iraq became more random and more deadly in 2013, averaging 24 deaths every day. Moreover, the attacks established the organization had the ability to plan and coordinate wide-ranging attacks. Among these attacks were simultaneous attacks against Taji and Abu Ghraib prisons during which over 500 AQI/ISIL prisoners were freed.

AQI/ISIL attacks included numerous sophisticated suicide bombings and vehicle-borne explosive device (VBIEDs) attacks on both Iraqi government and civilian targets. Many of these attacks sought to aggravate rising dissent among sectarian groups and ethnic minorities while challenging the Iraqi government’s governance. Among the targets were government facilities and the Iraqi Security Forces, Shia places of worship, funerals, schools, critical infrastructure, and venues including cafes and markets. AQI/ISIL also assassinated government officials, including police and judges, Sunni tribal leaders, and journalists. 

In 2013, as ISIL became increasingly engaged in the Syrian civil war, the organization became so entrenched that it set up secret prisons in northern Syria where opponents were tortured and killed.

Al-Qa’ida’s repudiation of ISIS

On February 3, 2014, Ayman al-Zawahiri repudiated ISIS after months of feuding between ISIS and the al-Nusrah Front. Zawahiri in his statement made it clear that ISIS “is not a branch of the al-Qa’ida group” and that al-Qaida “is not the group responsible for their actions.” The rejection signified that al-Qa’ida no longer has an official representation in Iraq, and it left al-Nusrah, the representative of al-Qa’ida in Syria. The al-Qa’ida announcement cited the hardline approach of ISIS, emphasizing the significance of “consultation” and “teamwork.”

The brutality of ISIS in northern Syria led al-Nusrah to join in early 2014 in a revolt against ISIS in northern Syria. However, ISIS was able to maintain control of the northeastern province of Raqqa, and part of Aleppo, along with many of the area’s resources, including oil fields.

The Caliphate

On June 29, 2014, ISIS proclaimed the Islamic State declaring Abu Bakr al Baghdadi to be the Caliph of all Muslims and the Prince of the Believers. Theoretically, a caliphate entails the representation of all Muslim Believers who are ruled by a caliph under Islamic law. (After the collapse of the Ottoman Empire, Mustafa Kemal Ataturk abolished the Caliphate and established the Republic of Turkey.) The Islamic State claims sovereignty in the areas under its control in Syria and Iraq. Baghdadi, who now has the name Caliph Ibrahim, has a sophisticated organization comprised of a cabinet of ministers, a war cabinet, a council of provincial governors, and a Shura council. It is reported that Baghdadi is not a micro-manager, leaving day-to-day governing to local officials. However, he has in the past demonstrated a paranoid obsession with personal loyalty. Baghdadi forges alliances with local tribal leaders. Former Iraqi Army officers and members of AQI personally vetted by Baghdadi have a prominent role as military commanders. As part of the ISIS global jihad, Abu Omar al Shishani, an ethnic Chechen, has a high profile role in Baghdadi’s caliphate. As another example of the ISIS global jihad, Abubakar Shekau, leader of the Nigerian group Boko Haram swore his “allegiance to the caliph of the Muslims on March 7, 2015.” A spokesman for ISIS responded on March 12, 2015, saying that IS had accepted the pledge of loyalty. ISIS often forces new recruits to join. In summer 2014 ISIS set up training camps in Aleppo and Raqqa. ISIS has also recruited child soldiers whom they call “cubs of the caliphate.” This ensures their survival into the next generation.

Kobani

On September 16, 2014, ISIS undertook an offensive on the Syrian city of Kobani on the Turkish border. Kurdish fighters and coalition airstrikes slowed the offensive. A little over four months later, on January 26, 2015, Kurdish forces drove ISIS fighters from Kobani.

Coalition Air Strikes in September 2014

On September 22, 2014, a coalition consisting of the United States, the Gulf States, Jordan, and Saudi Arabia carried out a series of aerial attacks against ISIS operations buildings and training camps in Syria including Aleppo and Raqqa. The attacks were also directed against the al-Qaida affiliate al-Nusrah, now referred to as the Khorasan Group. The air attacks were triggered when the U.S. had credible evidence that al-Qaida affiliates in Syria were in the final stages of launching attacks on U.S. and Western interests. The leader of the Khorasan (al-Nusrah) group, Mushin al-Fadhi (dubbed Ayman al-Zawahiri’s “Man in Syria”) was reportedly killed in the air strikes; however, as of early October 2014, this report was awaiting confirmation.

United Nations October 2014 Report on ISIS

On October 2, 2014, the U.N. Assistance Mission for Iraq and the Office of the U.N. High Commissioner for Human Rights issued a report that charged the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) committed a “staggering array” of human rights abuses and “acts of violence of an increasingly sectarian nature” in Iraq in 2014. The report detailed the atrocities perpetrated during a nine-week period in July, August, and September, after ISIS had gained control of significant portions of northern Iraq. The report listed “attacks directly targeting civilians and civilian infrastructure, executions and other targeted killings of civilians, abductions, rape and other forms of sexual and physical violence perpetrated against women and children, forced recruitment of children, destruction or desecration of places of religious or cultural significance, wanton destruction and looting of property, and denial of fundamental freedoms.” The report described these attacks as “systemic” and “widespread.” According to the report from January to September, 9,347 civilians have been killed and 17,386 wounded. The report noted that ISIS/ISIL “and associated armed groups intentionally and systematically targeted < Ethnic and religious minorities> communities for gross human rights abuses, at times aimed at destroying, suppressing or cleansing them from areas under their control.” (“Staggering array of gross human rights abuses in Iraq—UN Report,)” UN News Centre, retrieved October 7, 2014.)

Based on an excerpt from the U.S. Department of State, Country Reports on Terrorism, Chapter 6, Foreign Terrorist Organizations, April 2014 and articles appearing in the Wall Street Journal in August and September 2014, of special note are those appearing August 23-24 and August 28, September 3, September 6-7, September 24 and 30, 2014.

Jordanian Air Force Lieutenant Muath al-Kasasbeh

ISIS forces captured Lt. Kasasbeh on December 24, 2014, after his plane went down over northern Syria after a bombing mission. Lt. Kasasbeh belonged to a prominent Jordanian family. On February 3, 2015, ISIS released a 20-minute video that some described as having a video game quality. The horrific ending of the video showed the fiery death of Lt. Kasasbeh.

It was soon learned that ISIS had murdered the lieutenant on January 3, 2015, just ten days after his capture. Despite this fact, ISIS had conducted negotiations with Jordan during the month of January.

ISIS asked that Jordan exchange Sajida al-Rishawi, an Al-Qa’ida operative sentenced to death for her role in the 2005 bombing attacks at three Amman hotels. Jordan demanded that ISIS provide proof of life for Lt. Kasabeh. Within 24 hours of the release of the ISIS video, Jordan carried out the death sentence against Rishawi, along with another Al-Qa’ida operative.

The Amman Hotel Bombings

Al-Qa’ida in Iraq claimed responsibility for the triple bombings that hit three hotels on November 9, 2005. Jordanians call these attacks their “9/11” (the ninth day of the eleventh month). Al-Qa’ida in Iraq claimed the hotels were frequented by Israeli intelligence and American agents. It was for this reason they were targeted. At the Radisson SAS Hotel, several leading Jordanians were attending a wedding. Rishawi and her husband, Ali Hussein Ali al-Shamari, were the operatives who carried out the attack at the Radisson. When Rishawi’s bomb failed to detonate, Shamari pushed her out the door and detonated his device killing 38. In the end, there were three dead suicide bombers and one failed suicide bomber, Rishawi.

ISIS in Libya

In summer 2014, ISIS leader al-Baghdadi (aka Caliph Ibrahim) sent emissaries to Libya to forge closer ties with local jihadists. They found a failed state, where two rival governments engaged in a bloody civil war.

The Islamic State found this chaos as an opportunity to exploit the nation’s oil resources and weapons arsenals.

ISIS decided to unify the fighting rival jihadists in Libya. The ISIS envoys were led by Abu Nabil al-Anbari. Anbari proceeded to forge ties with the jihadists many of whom came from the Egypt, Mali, and Tunisia. ISIS also sought to recruit in mosques, particularly in the port city of Derna. The recruits were sent to Syria for training. In December 2014 the central recruitment authority for IS changed the game plan and instructed the envoys in Libya to focus on domestic attacks.

The alliances forged resulted in the successful expansion of ISIS in Libya. One of the jihadists to respond was a leader of the Tunisian Islamist group Ansar al-Shariah. He shifted his alliance to IS after a visit to Raqqa.

Jihadists are finding these alliances as a practical power play. According to Professor Geoff Porter at the Combating Terrorism Center at West Point, “by allying with Islamic State, you also become part of the best company in the region.” ISIS is marketing its brand.

Tripoli Province of the Islamic State

The Libyan affiliate of the Islamic State called itself the IS Province of Tripoli. They undertook their first attack in January 27, 2015, when they stormed the Corinthia, a luxury hotel in Tripoli, killing nine including an American contractor. On February 3, the IS affiliate attacked a French-Libyan oil field near the town of Mabruk, killing nine guards. Libyan oil officials said that the attack bore the hallmarks of an experienced jihadist group.

The Tripoli Province released a video on February15, showing the death march and subsequent beheadings of 21 Egyptian Coptic Christians on the beach. Two-thirds of the 2.5 million migrant workers in Libya are Egyptian. Less than 24 hours after the release of the video, the Egyptian air force bombed IS targets near the city of Derna in retaliation for the beheadings. The airstrikes leveled the four-story Jabal Furniture Company building, where Islamic State had set up its headquarters. Other buildings throughout Derna were also destroyed.

Islamic State training camps and weapons depots were also hit during the raid. Omar al Sinki, interior minister for the Western-recognized Libyan government of Prime Minister Thinni confirmed that the Egyptian planes had hit seven targets in Derna. Minister Sinki confirmed that the strikes had been coordinated with the anti-IS forces based in eastern Libya under the command of General Khalifa Haftar. Haftar was in Cairo to coordinate the operation with Egyptian armed forces. Saqer al Joroushi, Libyan air force commander, was quoted on Egyptian state media that “at least 50” IS members were killed in the strike. Joroushi added that the “raid was carried out with full respect for Libya’s sovereignty.”

The Libyan Foreign Minister, Mohammed al Dairi, said the international community had left Libya as “prey” to the extremists by letting a security vacuum develop after the fall of Gadhafi in 2011.

BBC Interview with Juergen Todenhoefer

German politician, Juergen Todenhoefer, spent six days in the ISIS-controlled city of Mosul in Iraq, travelling there via Raqqa, in Syria in late 2014. He told a BBC interviewer that ISIS was stronger, more brutal and harder to confront than he had expected. Todenhoefer said he found ISIS followers highly motivated and supportive of the group's brutality.

"I thought I would meet a brutal terrorist group and I met a brutal country." He said he was impressed by their zeal and ambition to carry out “religious cleansing” and expand their territory. "There is an enthusiasm that I've never seen before in warzones. This is a one per cent movement with the power of a nuclear bomb or a tsunami.”

ISIS and “Lone Wolf” Terrorism

Online radicalization of youth from the West has raised the specter of “lone wolf” terrorism. The U.S. State Department estimates that 12,000 recruits have traveled to Syria from 50 countries to fight with various groups including ISIS. British authorities believe between 600 to 700 British citizens have traveled to Syria and Iraq since the Syrian civil war started in 2011.

Matthew Olsen, former Director of the National Counterterrorism Center observed in September 2014 that the Islamic State “operates the most sophisticated propaganda machine” of any terrorist group today. Mr. Olsen cautioned that an ISIS supporter could “conduct a limited, self-directed attack here at home, with no warning.”

On November 3, 2014, FBI Comey said that there is “no typical profile” in identifying Americans recruited to join ISIS and other extremists. Michael Steinbach, head of the FBI’s counterterrorism division, elaborated on the lack of a singular profile at a congressional hearing in late February 2015 saying “we find citizens, legal permanent resident aliens, some folks that are overstaying their visa. There’s actually quite a diversity.”

On March 2, 2015, Director of National Intelligence James Clapper said 180 Americans have traveled to Syria to fight alongside ISIS and about 40 have come back. At the end of February the FBI and the Department of Homeland Security sent a bulletin to law enforcement warning of “the continuing trend of Western youth being inspired by ISIS to travel to Syria to participate in the conflict.” ISIS has relied heavily on social media to attract new recruits, especially the young. Twitter recently suspended more than 2,000 accounts related to ISIS, as the company does not allow its users to post violent threats. Karen Greenberg, director of the Center on National Security at Fordham Law School, observed that the youth factor is the most important part of this. There’s a tone of teenage rebellion in it.”

In October 2014, three teenage girls from suburban Denver, Colorado were stopped by police in Frankfurt, Germany on their way to join ISIS. They were recruited online. The U.S. is not the only nation facing this anomaly. According to Peter Neumann, the Director of the International Centre for the Study of Radicalization (ICSR), women make up one-fourth of all Westerners joining ISIS. Three British schoolgirls (two aged 15 and one aged16) flew From Gatwick to Istanbul on February 17, 2015. They were good students at an East London school and their family and school were unaware of their radicalization. British police believe they were able to cross into Syria to join ISIS. They say that at least 22 women reported missing in the last year are thought to have traveled to join ISIS.

The porous border between Turkey and Syria has enabled thousands of foreign fighters to join ISIS. The ability of the schoolgirls to evade detection, led to a blame game between London and Ankara. Turkey has now established risk-analysis units to stop militants upon their arrival. On March 14, 2015, three British male teenagers were stopped by Turkish authorities at Istanbul airport and escorted back to London. Scotland Yard alerted Turkish authorities about two of the teens on March 13 and the third was denied entry by one of the Turkish units.

ISIS: Looting and Destroying the Cultural Heritage of a Civilization

There is another war being waged in Iraq and Syria. It is the war to preserve the global inheritance of the cradle of civilization. For several months a group of art historians have worked undercover to save Syrian artifacts from antiquities smuggling by ISIS. According to Western intelligence officials, looting by ISIS has become the second-largest source of finance for the group after oil. Michael Danti, an archaeologist at Boston University, observed “what started as opportunistic theft by some has turned into an organized transnational business that is helping fund terror.” He added “it’s the gravest cultural emergency I’ve seen.”

One of the archaeologists in involved in the effort has said “The looting has become systematic, and we can’t keep up.” Heritage sites like Homs and Aleppo now are piles of rubble. Many Roman, Greek, Babylonian and Assyrian antiquities have been destroyed. ISIS condones the looting and destruction since their view is that the artifacts are idolatrous. In Raqqa, the Syrian capital of ISIS, ancient shrines have been looted.

In Iraq, ISIS took down a significant portion of the ancient city wall of Niveveh which stood for 2,700 years and was the capital of the Assyrian Empire. An Iraqi official says that ISIS has reaped $36 million from looting the region around al-Nabek, a Syrian city that has many early Christian sites famous for their icons and mosaics.

On February 26, 2015, ISIS released a five-minute video showing their militants demolishing with sledgehammers and power tools the monumental human-headed, winged bull deities dating from the ninth century B.C. that had stood guard at the entrance of the Assyrian king’s palace and that were now housed in the Mosul Museum. Earlier in the week, ISIS burned down the Mosul library, destroying thousands of rare books and manuscripts.

On March 8, 2015, Iraqi Minister of Tourism and Antiquities Adel al-Shershab said that ISIS had started bulldozing the 2,000-year-old city of Hatra. He said that this followed the ISIS destruction of what remained of the 3,000-year-old city of Nimrud. Haneen al-Qaddo, a parliamentarian from Nineveh province observed “ISIS aims to wipe out civilization in this country.”

Eric Gibson in an opinion piece in the Wall Street Journal Arts in Review on March 3, 2015, noted “Cultural heritage is more than tourist sites to visit on a vacation. It is at once a record of our shared past, a way of understanding ourselves and each other. The destruction of art and artifacts represents an attack on history, identity and civilization.”

Based on articles in the Wall Street Journal, February 11, 2015; March 2, 2015; March 3, 2015; March 7-8, 2015; March 9, 2015.

28

MHallionPhD, JVandegriffMA©Vandegriff Research 2014