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N I N T H E D I T I O N

Jonathan R. White Frederik Meijer Honors College Grand Valley State University

Terrorism and Homeland Security

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Dedicated to:

Gabe and Sam, my buddies for life,

Do not repay evil for evil or abuse for abuse; but, on the contrary, repay with a blessing. It is for this that you were called—that you might inherit a blessing. 1 Peter 3:9

With love, Paw Paw

ABOUT THE AUTHOR

JONATHAN WHITE is professor of Interdisciplinary Studies in the Frederik Meijer Hon- ors College of Grand Valley State University, Allendale, Michigan. He also served as an instructor in the Bureau of Justice Assistance, State and Local Anti-Terrorism Training program for 15 years. He has lectured in the FBI Academy, in the Depart- ment of State Anti-Terrorism Assistance program, in all branches of the U.S. Armed Forces, and in law enforcement agencies throughout the world. The Founding Direc- tor of GVSU’s School of Criminal Justice and former Dean of Social Science, he holds a PhD in Criminal Justice and Criminology from Michigan State University and a Master of Divinity from Western Theological Seminary.

PA R T 1 Terrorism in Historical and Social Contexts 1 1 The Shifting Definition of Terrorism 2

2 Practical Criminology, Radicalization, and Types of Terrorism 25

3 Terrorist Financing and Money Laundering 52

4 Terrorism and the Media 78

5 Force Multipliers, Gender Roles, and Tactics 101

PA R T 2 International Terrorism: National and Ethnic Movements 123

6 Long-Term Separatist Terrorism 124

7 Nationalistic and Endemic Terrorism 148

8 Background to the Middle East 173

9 Terrorism in Israel and Palestine 196

PA R T 3 International Terrorism: Ideological and Religious Movements 223

10 Revolutionary and Counterrevolutionary Terrorism 224

11 Jihadist Networks 250

PA R T 4 Domestic Terrorism and Homeland Security 279 12 Domestic Terrorism 280

13 An Introduction to Homeland Security 302

14 Organizing Homeland Security 328

15 Homeland Security and Constitutional Issues 353

16 Law Enforcement, Homeland Security, and the Future 375

BRIEf CONTENTS

vii

CONTENTS

P R E FA C E x v i i

PA R T 1 Terrorism in Historical and Social Contexts 1

1 The Shifting Definition of Terrorism 2 Difficulties with Definitions 3

Definitions Influenced by Social Context 3 The Importance of Defining Terrorism 4

Attempts to Define Terrorism 5 Definitions and Policy 5 An Insurmountable Problem? 6

Shifts of Meanings in History 7 The Origins of Terrorism in Western History 8 The French Revolution 9 Guerrillas and the Spanish Peninsula 9

1848 and the Radical Democrats 9 Socialists 11 Anarchists 12 Violent Anarchism 12 Anarchism and Nationalism 13

Terrorism and Revolution in Russia, 1881–1921 15 The People’s Will 15 Czar Nicholas and the Revolutions of 1905 and 1917 16 Lenin and Trotsky 17

Selective Terrorism and the Birth of the Irish Republic 17 The Early Irish Republican Army 19 The Easter Rising 20 The Black and Tan War, 1920–1921 21 Selective Terror 21

Emphasizing the Points 22 Summary of Chapter Objectives 22 Key Terms 24

viii ConTEnTs

2 Practical Criminology, Radicalization, and Types of Terrorism 25 The Criminology of Terrorism 26

Differences Between Criminals and Terrorists 27

Radicalization 29 Practical Criminology and Radicalism 29 The Process of Radicalization 30 Testing Radicalization with Recent Case Studies 32 Other Cases of Radicalization 34 Commonalities in Radicalization 36 Individual Journeys 37

Two Views of Prison Radicalization 38 The Process of Radicalization in Prison 38 Questioning Prison Radicalization 39

Rejecting the Term 41 Types of Terrorism 42

Lone Wolves 43 Small Groups and Urban Terrorism 44 Guerrillas and Large Group Terrorism 47 Response to Differing Types of Terrorism 49

Emphasizing the Points 49 Summary of Chapter Objectives 50 Key Terms 51

3 Terrorist financing and Money Laundering 52 Financial Flows 53

Money Laundering 53 Terrorist Financing 56 Comparing Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing 57 Toward a Theory of Terrorist Financing 58

Efforts to Control Terrorist Financing 59 Regulation and Enforcement 60 Efforts by the United Nations 61

Financial Information as an Investigative and Intelligence Tool 63

Illegal Funding Methods 64 Legal Methods of Raising Funds 66

Underground Networks and Systems 66 The Hawala System 68 Hezbollah as an Example 69

The Political Economy of Terrorism 70 Narcoterrorism 72

The Link Between Drugs and Terrorism 73 Narcoterrorism Controversies 74

ConTEnTs ix

Emphasizing the Points 75 Summary of Chapter Objectives 75 Key Terms 77

4 Terrorism and the Media 78 The New Media Environment 79

Defining the New Media 79 Characteristics of the New Media 80 The New Media and the Internet 81 Other Aspects of the Internet 82

Trends in Research 85 A Set of Empirical Findings on Twitter 85 Televised Gender Stereotypes 86

The Media and Socially Constructed Reality 86 News Frames and Presentations 87 Types of Frames 87 Ambiguous Stories and News Frames 88 Neglecting the Domestic Front 88 Terrorism and Television 89 End of the Western Monopoly on the Old News Media 91

Issues in the Media 92 Biases in the Old Media 92 Creating Critical Reflection in the Audience 95

Censorship Debates 97 Emphasizing the Points 99 Summary of Chapter Objectives 99 Key Terms 100

5 force Multipliers, Gender Roles, and Tactics 101 Tactics and Force Multipliers 102 Technology 103

Cyberterrorism 104 WMD: Biological Agents 105 WMD: Chemical and Radiological Weapons 106

Nuclear Terrorism 109 Economic Targeting and Transnational Attacks 111

Tourism 111 Energy 112 Transportation 113

Suicide Attacks: Conflicting Opinions 114 A Theory of Suicide Terrorism 114 Other Research on Suicide Bombing 116 Models for Suicide Bombing 117

Tactical Misunderstandings and Gender 117

x ConTEnTs

Tactical Roles and Organization 118 Tactical Considerations 119 Overlooking Female Terrorists: A Tactical Mistake 119

Emphasizing the Points 121 Summary of Chapter Objectives 121 Key Terms 122

PA R T 2 International Terrorism: National and Ethnic Movements 123

6 Long-Term Separatist Terrorism 124 Ethnic and Nationalist Separatist Movements 125

Characteristics of Ethnic and Nationalist Terrorism 125 Three Cases of Ethnic and Nationalist Separatism 126

Modern Terrorism in Northern Ireland 127 The IRA and the Modern “Troubles” 128 The Army and Overreaction 129 Unionist Terrorism 131

Negotiating a Peace Settlement in Ireland 132 Negotiating with Terrorists 132 Rational Political Goals and Negotiated Settlements 133

The Basque Nation and Liberty 133 Background 134 The Spanish Civil War 135 Twentieth-Century Basque Nationalism 135 The ETA Turns to Terrorism 136 ETA Tactics and Spanish Death Squads 137 Reframing the Conflict 138

The Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam 139 The Origins of Tamil Dissatisfaction 140 Sri Lanka and the Tamil Tigers 141 LTTE Tactics 141 Fighting Renewed 143 Government Repression after Victory 144

Emphasizing the Points 145 Summary of Chapter Objectives 145 Key Terms 147

7 Nationalistic and Endemic Terrorism 148 Nationalistic Terrorism 149

Cyprus, 1955–1959 149 The Battle for Algiers, 1954–1962 151 The Mau Mau in Kenya, 1950–1960 153

Turkey 155 Turkey’s Struggle with Terrorism 155

ConTEnTs xi

The Kurdistan Workers’ Party and Its Alter Egos 156

China’s Problems in Xinjiang 160 Sikh Separatism in India 162 Endemic Ethnic Terror in Sub-Saharan Africa 162 Conditions in Nigeria 163 Boko Haram and Ansaru 165

Al Shabab’s Regional Jihad 167

Emphasizing the Points 171 Summary of Chapter Objectives 171 Key Terms 172

8 Background to the Middle East 173 Defining the Middle East 174 A Brief Introduction to Islam 175

The Centrality of Mohammed’s Revelation 175 Creating the Muslim Community at Medina 176 The Shi’ite–Sunni Split 176 The Golden Age of Arabs 178

Synopsis of Traditional Middle Eastern Issues 180 Three Sources of Violence in the Middle East 181 The Early Zionist Movement in Palestine 182 World War I and Contradictory Promises 183 The Birth of Israel 184 Arab Power Struggles and Arab–Israeli Wars 185 The Return of Terrorism 188

Iran 189 Uniquely Persian 189 British Influence and Control 190 Prelude to the 1979 Revolution 190 The Revolution 191 The Call to Karbala 193

Emphasizing the Points 194 Summary of Chapter Objectives 194 Key Terms 195

9 Terrorism in Israel and Palestine 196 Messy Definition 197

Fatah and the Six-Day War 197 The 1982 Invasion of Lebanon 200

Factionalism in Palestinian Terrorism 200 Major Groups 201

Hezbollah: Local and International 204 The Origins of Hezbollah 204 Hezbollah’s Operational Capabilities 209

Hamas and the Rise of Sunni Religious Organizations 212

xii ConTEnTs

An Overview of Hamas 212 Struggles for Leadership 212 The al Aqsa Intifada 213 Seeking Election 213 Hamas Versus Fatah 214 Rockets and Operation Cast Lead 215 Unity? 215

Fatah Restructured: The al Aqsa Martyrs Brigades 216 Effective Tactics 216 Leadership of the Martyrs Brigades 217 Beginning a Network 217

Controversial Counterterrorist Policies 219 Bulldozing 219 Invading Lebanon 220 The Wall 220 Selective Assassination 220

Emphasizing the Points 221 Summary of Chapter Objectives 221 Key Terms 222

PA R T 3 International Terrorism: Ideological and Religious Movements 223

10 Revolutionary and Counterrevolutionary Terrorism 224 Revolutionary Terrorism 225

Revolutionary and Counterrevolutionary Terrorism Defined 225 Modeling Revolutionary Terrorism: Uruguay’s Tupamaros 226 Urban Guerrillas 228 Counterrevolutionary Terrorism 229 Early Successes 229 Tupamaro Organization 230 Influencing Modern Terrorism 232

Examples of Modern Revolutionary Terrorism 233 FARC 233 The ELN 236 The MeK 238

Maoist Revolutionary Terrorism 239 Peru’s Shining Path 240 Naxalites of India 241 The New People’s Army 244

Death Squads and Counterrevolutionaries 245 Emphasizing the Points 248 Summary of Chapter Objectives 248 Key Terms 249

ConTEnTs xiii

11 Jihadist Networks 250 Jihadi Salafism 251 Militant Scholars and Strategists 252

Taqi al Din ibn Taymiyya 252 Mohammed ibn Abdul Wahhab 253 Sayyid Qutb 253 Abu Musab al Suri 254 Abu Bakr Naji 254 When Do Jihadi Salafists Become Devout? 255

Al Qaeda from Inception to 9/11 256 Osama bin Laden, Ayman al Zawahiri, and al Qaeda 256 Declaring War on Americans, Jews, and Crusaders 259

Al Qaeda: Degraded, Transformed, and Franchised 259 Major Franchises Swearing Fealty to al Qaeda Core 261 Conflict in the Franchise: Jabhat al Nusra and ISIS 265 The Islamic State of Iraq 266 ISI Reborn 267 Jabhat al Nusra 267 ISIS 268 ISIS and the Caliphate 268 Conflict within the Jihad 269 Foreign Fighters 269

A Survey of Other Groups 270 Lashkar-e-Taiba 270 The Pakistani Taliban 271 Thailand 273 Jihadi Salafism in Indonesia 274 Jihadi Salafism in the Philippines 275

Emphasizing the Points 276 Summary of Chapter Objectives 276 Key Terms 278

PA R T 4 Domestic Terrorism and Homeland Security 279

12 Domestic Terrorism 280 The Meaning of Domestic Terrorism 281

Growing Clarity 281 Extremism Versus Terrorism 282 Categorizing Domestic Terrorism 282

Racism and Terrorism 284 Violent White Supremacy Movements 284 American’s Most Successful Terrorist Group 286

Violent Right-Wing Extremism 286 Antigovernment Extremism 287 Sovereign Citizens 287

xiv ConTEnTs

Contemporary Right-Wing Behavior, Beliefs, and Tactics 288 The Turner Diaries and Hunter: Blueprints for Revolution 289 Resurgent Violent Right-Wing Extremism 290

Shifting from Left-Wing Violence to Single Issues 291 The Demise of the Left 291 The Rise of Single Issues 292 Ecoterrorism, Animal Rights, and Genetic Engineering 292 Antiabortion Violence 294

Homegrown Jihadists 296 Emphasizing the Points 299 Summary of Chapter Objectives 300 Key Terms 301

13 An Introduction to Homeland Security 302 Many Meanings of Homeland Security 303

Defining and Evaluating a Mission 303 Security Missions 304

Agencies Charged with Preventing and Interdicting Terrorism 305

The Department of Homeland Security 305 The Department of Justice 307 The Department of Defense 307 The Intelligence Community 308 State and Local Law Enforcement 309

Building Intelligence Systems 309 The Intelligence Process 309 National Security and Criminal Intelligence 310 A Checkered Past 311 Domestic Intelligence Networks 313 Fusion Centers 314 Fusion Center Intelligence 315 U.S. Attorneys and JTTFs 316

Issues in Homeland Security 317 Law Enforcement’s Special Role 317 The Role of Symbols and Structures 318 Planning for Homeland Security 319 Creating a Culture of Information Sharing 320

Intelligence Reform 322 Moving in the Right Direction? 322 Redirecting the Focus of Reform 323 Target-Based Analysis 324 The Need for Reform Questioned 324

Emphasizing the Points 325 Summary of Chapter Objectives 325 Key Terms 327

ConTEnTs xv

14 Organizing Homeland Security 328 Bureaucratic Complexity 329

The Impact of Bureaucracy 329 The Numbers Problem 329 Reforming Bureaucracy 330

Bureaucratic Problems 331 Federal Rivalries 331 FBI Versus Locals 331 Local Control and Revenue Sources 332 Legal Bureaucracy 332

Bureaucratic Solutions 333 Preparing for Successful Law Enforcement Processes 334 New Approaches to the Law Enforcement Mission 335

Bureaucracies Against Terrorism 336 Intelligence and Bureaucracy 336 State and Local Law Enforcement Bureaucracies 338

Border Protection 340 Policy Disputes 341 The Immigration Debate 342 Border Security: Critique and Reform 344

Infrastructure Protection 346 Private Versus Governmental Partnerships 346 The Need for Private Partnerships 347 Government Partnerships 347 The Federal Mission 348 Expanding Local Roles 348 Thinking Internationally 349

Responding to Disasters 350 Emphasizing the Points 350 Summary of Chapter Objectives 351 Key Terms 352

15 Homeland Security and Constitutional Issues 353 Security and Civil Liberties 354 Security and Civil Liberties Trade-Offs 355

Human Rights and Civil Liberties 356

Domestic Intelligence Law 357 The USA PATRIOT Acts of 2001, 2005, 2006, 2011, and 2015 357 Debate and the 2006 Law 358 Extending Provisions in 2011 359 Controversy Continued 359 Debate in 2015 360 The USA FREEDOM Act of 2015 361

xvi ConTEnTs

Terrorism and the Constitution 361 Separation of Powers 362 Terrorism and the Bill of Rights 362 Fear of Law Enforcement Power 363 Increased Executive Powers 364 Executive Power and the Courts 366

Civil Liberties and Police Work 367 Controversies in Law Enforcement 367 National Security and Crime 368 Intelligence, Networks, and Roles 369 Emerging Critiques in the Academic Community 371

Emphasizing the Points 372 Summary of Chapter Objectives 373 Key Terms 374

16 Law Enforcement, Homeland Security, and the future 375 Homeland Security and Community Policing 376

Support for Homeland Security through Community Policing 377 Shifting Police Roles 378 Community Partnerships and the Future 380 The Style of Future Policing 380

Militarization and Police Work 381 The Problem of Militarization 381 Obtaining Military Equipment 383 Militarization and the “War on Drugs” 384

Future Information Sharing 385 Multilevel Communication and Sharing 385 Overcoming Barriers to Sharing 386 The Private Industry Problem 387

Future Terrorist Tactics 390 Swarming and Multiple Attacks 390 Blending Criminal and Terrorist Networks 392 Other Tactical Trends 393

Emphasizing the Points 396 Summary of Chapter Objectives 396 Key Terms 398

GlossARy 399

WoRks CiTEd 419

indEx 455

xvii

PREfACE

I began work on the first edition of this book 30 years ago and have reworked it several times to describe constant changes in causes, groups, tactics, and issues. Ter- rorists constantly employ new methods of murder and destruction as the face of ter- rorism changes. Yet, no matter how terrorism mutates, one aspect remains constant. Technology provides the means for a relatively small group of violent people to ter- rorize nation-states, including superpowers.

Professors who have used previous editions of this book have asked for changes and updates to this text. In addition, they have offered valuable critiques, suggestions for new material, and corrections of factual errors. Many of them asked me to reduce historical coverage and to increase discussions of trends and future directions. I hope this new addition meets their expectations, although I do utilize historical discussions to place contemporary events and probable future issues in context.

While this is a new edition, the purpose of the book remains the same. It is de- signed to introduce criminal justice and other social science students to the field of terrorism and homeland security. The book is also meant to provide a pragmatic background for the law enforcement, intelligence, and military communities. It is a basic, practical introduction for people who will or already do face the threat of terrorism. Many theories, polemics, and models are summarized and compared, but readers will find no grand theory. The purpose is to expose readers to a vast array of issues, campaigns, theories, and opinions.

As stated in the previous editions, issues surrounding terrorism are emotionally charged. Therefore, the information in this text is presented from a variety of posi- tions. The purpose is to explain various points of view without taking sides. Students are exposed to differing interpretations of issues that have spawned heated contro- versies. Hopefully, the text presents enough information to allow students to make informed decisions.

Overview This text is designed to provide readers with basic information. The purpose is to provide the background for understanding terrorist movements in many parts of the world. Part I focuses on practical criminology. It begins with a chapter on definitional and historical issues. This is followed by a discussion of criminology, processes of radicalization, and various types of terrorism. Chapter 3 is now completely devoted to the financial aspects of terrorism at the request of multiple professors throughout the United States. It also discusses virtual economies. Chapter 4 has new information about the media and terrorism. One of the foremost changes is an examination of research on the new types of media that are influencing terrorist behavior. Chapter 5 has an enhanced discussion of gender roles and the increasing involvement of women in terrorism. It also discusses tactics and force multipliers.

xviii PREFACE

The remainder of the book builds on the information in Part I. Part II focuses on international terrorism motivated by ethnicity and nationalism. I have included pre- sentations on Boko Haram and al Shabaab in Chapter 7 of Part II even though they claim to be part of a larger jihadist movement. I believe they are more motivated by tribal and familial issues than religion, but these discussions would have fit equally well in the chapter about jihadist violence. Part III examines international ideological and religious terrorism. The final section deals with domestic terrorism and home- land security.

New to This Edition There are several new items in the ninth edition. Here is a summary of the major additions and updates.

In Every Chapter:

More focus on current activities and future projections Hypothetical examples used to illustrate major points General chapter summaries and specific summaries of new chapter objectives

Chapter 1:

Updated examples of terrorist activities Analysis of comparative definitions Review of impact of definitions on policy Streamlined historical material highlighting major events

Chapter 2:

Updated criminology with a new emphasis on the value of practical criminology for law enforcement and security forces

Added emphasis on the importance of recognizing terrorist behavior for state and local law enforcement

Discussion of lone wolf attacks Updated cases related to recent terrorist events and new case studies Enhanced discussion of radicalization processes Expanded examination of prison radicalization Added summary of the debate about the existence of radicalization

Chapter 3:

Refocused exclusively on terrorist financing Defined terrorist financing and money laundering Comparison of terrorist financing and money laundering Review of national and international efforts to control terrorist financing and money

laundering Discussion of underground economies Examination of private and virtual economies Expanded examination of the hawala network Discussion of gathering intelligence on financial terrorism

PREFACE xix

Chapter 4:

Analysis of social media Updated research findings on empirical and qualitative studies of media-terrorism Comparison of “old media” and “new media” Analysis of media biases when covering gender issues

Chapter 5:

Reorganization of chapter structure Examination of all subjects, including gender, within a tactical framework Summary of recent research on gender and terrorism Examination of stereotypes of femininity in Muslim women Analysis of the impact of terrorism and counterterrorism on Arab women Summary of research on gender and suicide bombing

Chapter 6:

Political analysis of separatist terrorism Role of negotiation in separatist terrorism Speculation about future potential areas of separatist terrorism

Chapter 7:

Description of nationalistic terrorism Reduced discussion of anticolonial historical material Addition of recent research findings Analysis of endemic violence in Nigeria Discussion of political situations in Somalia and Nigeria Addition of in-depth discussion of Boko Haram Analysis of African Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) Addition of new material on al Shabaab and its relation to endemic terrorism

Chapter 8:

Summary of the Syrian civil war Explanation of changes in international jihadist terrorism Summary of terrorism in Syrian civil war with reference to Muslim versus Muslim

fighting

Chapter 9:

Coverage of summer 2014 fighting in Gaza Summary of Hamas encounters with the Islamic State of Iraq and al Sham (ISIS) Impact of the Syrian civil war on the Hezbollah–Hamas relationship New analysis of the rise of Fatah and associated splinter groups Review of the future of Hamas–Palestinian Authority unity pledge Discussion of the issues from both Israeli and Palestinian views Updated assessment of al Aqsa Martyrs Brigades

xx PREFACE

Chapter 10: Discussion of United Self Defense Forces (AUC) in conjunction with death squad

terrorism Removal of dated material concerning Europe and Nepal Discussion of Bacrims Completely revamped section on the National Liberation Army (ELN) and the Revo-

lutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC), including peace negotiations Updated information on Naxalite violence in India

Chapter 11:

Introduction to twenty-first-century Jihadi Salafism Addition of modern jihadist ideologues Abu Bakr Naji and Abu Musab al Suri Review of material on A Call for Global Islamic Resistance and The Management of

Savagery Summary of al Qaeda core’s relationship with al Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) Analysis of the Islamic State of Iraq and al Sham (ISIS) Summary of current activities of ISIS Examination of Al Qaeda core’s split with ISIS Expanded discussion of al Qaeda franchise with new analysis, including al Qaeda

in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), Mokhtar Belmokhtar, Ansar al Sharia–Libya, Ansar al Sharia–Tunisia, Ansar Bayt al Maqdis, and al Nusra

Addition of material on new jihadist groups

Chapter 12:

Summary of political debates about the meaning of domestic terrorism Inclusion of background on Public Enemy Number 1 (PEN1) Examination of mass shootings Analysis of racial terrorism and new work on the Ku Klux Klan Addition of section on extremism versus terrorism Summary of updated information about domestic jihadist attacks Presentation of new empirical data on ecoterrorism

Chapter 13:

Analysis of emerging threats to the U.S. homeland Reorganization of chapter based on input from reviewers Questioning of the need of intelligence reform Review of methods of verifying intelligence assumptions

Chapter 14:

Inclusion of new RAND study on information sharing and homeland security Future analysis of homeland security needs

PREFACE xxi

Chapter 15:

Expiration of some provisions in the USA PATRIOT Act Summary of the impact of the USA FREEDOM Act Response by various stakeholders to the USA FREEDOM Act Critique of National Security Letters Examination of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court (FISA) Examination of bulk data gathering techniques

Chapter 16:

Examination of community policing and homeland security Evaluation of law enforcement militarization and use of military equipment Militarization of the “war on drugs” metaphor impact on community partnerships Review of law enforcement tactical units

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Online Test Bank. Each chapter’s test bank contains questions in multiple-choice, true false, completion, essay, and new critical thinking formats, with a full answer key. The test bank is coded to the learning objectives that appear in the main text and indicates the section in the main text where the answers can be found. Finally, each question in the test bank has been carefully reviewed by experienced criminal justice instructors for quality, accuracy, and content coverage.

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xxii PREFACE

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Acknowledgments This book was not produced in a vacuum, and I am grateful to many people. Fore- most is Marcia for understanding the many months of new research and writing. Senior Product Manager Carolyn Henderson Meier and Content Developer Christy Frame were wonderful and supportive. The copyeditor Sarah Wales-McGrath was amazing. Kailash Rawat was patient and helpful throughout the copyediting phase of the book. I am also grateful to academic colleagues who reviewed work and made valuable suggestions. They include:

Julie Baldwin, University of Arkansas at Little Rock Aaron M. Carver Sr., University of Mount Olive David Admire, Southern Utah University Keith E. Johnson, Mansfield University Magdalena A. Denham, Sam Houston State University

I ask that all of you accept my heartfelt gratitude.

Terrorism in Historical and Social Contexts

1 The Shifting Definition of Terrorism

2 Practical Criminology, Radicalization, and Types of Terrorism

3 Terrorist Financing and Money Laundering

4 Terrorism and the Media

5 Force Multipliers, Gender Roles, and Tactics

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The Shifting Definition of Terrorism

C H a P T e R 1

D uring World War II, soldiers on several fronts often executed prisoners. It was a routine event on the East- ern Front, and Japanese and Americans killed captives

on Guadalcanal. German SS troops executed more than 200 American captives during the Battle of the Bulge. We may call these actions murder today, but few people would use the term terrorism to describe them.

In the summer of 2014, the Islamic State of Iraq and al Sham (ISIS) (also known as the Islamic State, the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria, ISIL, and Daesh) released videos showing the beheading of American and British hostages. ISIS also filmed mass executions of Iraqi military prisoners. Most of the world’s leaders called these murders, and American political leaders frequently refer to ISIS as a terrorist nation/state.

The difference between these two examples might cause heated and passionate debate because terrorism is difficult to define. Both of these actions involved a form of terror, but the term terrorism is applied selectively. In addition, the meaning of terrorism changes over time. The term was originally used to describe the actions of the French government. It would be

Learning ObjecTiveS After reading this chapter, you should be able to:

44 explain the reason terrorism is difficult to define.

44 Summarize the impact of con- text on definitions of terrorism.

44 e x p l a i n t h e i m p o r t a n c e o f defining terrorism.

44 Outline contemporary attempts to define terrorism.

44 explain where the term ter- rorism originated and how the meaning changed during the history of the nineteenth century.

44 explain how socialism, anar- chism, and communism were mistakenly associated with terrorism.

44 Summarize the differing mean- ings of terrorism in Russia from the People’s Will through the rise of Lenin, Trotsky, and Stalin.

44 Summarize the early history of the Irish Republican army.

44 Define the term selective ter- rorism as used by Michael Collins.

FBI Headquarters, Washington DC

Chapter 1 • The Shifting Definition of Terrorism 3

applied to groups fighting against capitalism a few decades later and would be employed to describe both Russian revolutionaries and eventually the Soviet government. In the twentieth and twenty-first centuries, the term became syn- onymous with nationalistic, revolutionary, radical religious, and nihilist groups.

Defining the term is not an academic exercise. The definition helps to deter- mine policy, behavior, and international opinion. It becomes part of a nation’s application of military force and its criminal justice system. Defining terrorism can literally be a matter of life and death. This chapter will focus on the prob- lems of defining terrorism and offer a brief history of its shifting meaning.

Difficulties with Definitions Terrorism is difficult to define because it is not a physical entity that has dimensions to be measured, weighed, and analyzed. It is a social construct; that is, terrorism is de- fined by different people within shifting social and political realities (Schmid, 1992). The term has spawned heated debate because it is nebulous and pejorative. As a re- sult, there are many definitions of terrorism and no single accepted understanding.

Some scholars have opted for a simple definition stating that terrorism is an act or threatened act of violence against innocent people for political purposes (Laqueur, 1987, 1999). Some nations have criminalized terrorism, defining it as a violation of law (Mullendore and White, 1996). Alex Schmid tries to synthesize various posi- tions in an academic consensus definition (see Schmid and Jongman, 2005, pp. 1–38, 70–111). Schmid says most definitions of the term have two characteristics: (1) some- one is terrorized and (2) the meaning of the term is derived from the terrorists’ targets and victims. Many victims of government violence claim that repression is terrorism, while governments tend to define terrorism as subnational violent political opposition (Bady, 2003). There is no standard meaning of the term terrorism.

H. H. A. Cooper (1976, 1977b, 1978, 2001) first approached the problem by stat- ing that there is “a problem in the problem definition.” We can agree that terrorism is a problem, but we cannot agree on what terrorism is.

Definitions influenced by Social context The social context surrounding the term terrorism influences how it is defined. Con- sider the following examples and the differing meanings of terrorism:

A. In early 2010, a colleague of mine returned from the U.S. State Department’s Anti-Terrorism Assistance program in Jordan. He was working with 27 Jorda- nian police officers—12 Christians, 12 Muslims (all Sunnis), and three agnos- tics. They never argued about religion, but they were appalled when he outlined the operational methods of Hezbollah. The reason: The Jordanian police offi- cers vehemently stated that Hezbollah was not a terrorist organization. It was a militia fighting the Israeli Defense Forces. Hezbollah is a Shi’ite group, but that made no difference to the Sunni Muslim, Christian, and agnostic police officers. In their minds, Hezbollah was a legitimate militia resisting Israeli aggression.

B. In January 2015, three men claiming to belong to al Qaeda in the Arabian Pen- insula (AQAP) and influenced by ISIS attacked the offices of Charlie Hebdo, a French satirical magazine based in Paris. They murdered 13 cartoonists who had satirized Islam and then killed two police officers. They would murder four more people before they were killed a few days later. Every government in the

social construct: The way people view reality. Groups construct a frame- work around a concept, defining various aspects of their lives through the meanings they attribute to the construct.

academic consensus definition: A complex defi- nition based on the work of Alex Schmid. It com- bines common elements of the definitions used by leading scholars in the field of terrorism.

social context: As used in this book, the historical, political, and crimino- logical circumstances at a given point in time. It is the way people in a culture define actions and issues within a society’s general outlook on real- ity. The social context affects the way terrorism is defined.

4 PART 1 • Terrorism in Historical and Social Contexts

West and most governments around the world called this terrorism. More than 1 million people and 40 world leaders marched through Paris to show solidarity against terrorism. Yet, one Islamic leader asked why the world made so much ado over the deaths of 17 people when hundreds of Muslims were being killed around the world every day. He said Western deaths were considered to be the result of terrorism, but Muslim deaths passed unnoticed.

C. The definition becomes even more complicated in war zones. In Afghanistan, North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) forces are fighting two major enemies, a loose association of Central Asian fundamentalist Muslims called the Students, or the Taliban, and another terrorist group known as al Qaeda. News reporters, politicians, and military officers often lump the two organiza- tions into a single group of terrorists, but there are profound differences. Al Qaeda operates as an international terrorist group, while the Taliban forms divergent regional militias and uses selective terrorism to support guerrilla operations. More important the theological tradition of the Taliban differs from al Qaeda’s infatuation with a violent interpretation of a twentieth- century militant Egyptian theologian. Linking the two organizations under the single umbrella of terrorism results in a profound misunderstanding of the Afghan war (Christia and Semple, 2009).

D. On November 5, 2009, Nidal Malik Hasan went on a shooting spree at Fort Hood, Texas, killing 13 people. There were many reports that Hasan had em- braced radical Islam and that he had decided to attack soldiers at Fort Hood as part of a global jihad against the West (Simpson and Gorman, 2009). A former high-ranking intelligence officer immediately called this an act of terrorism, yet many government officials stated that it was the act of a mentally deranged sol- dier (Sherwell and Spillius, 2009). In this case, even the country that had been victimized by murder seemed unable to decide on a definition of terrorism.

E. There have been dozens of attacks by domestic right-wing extremists since a bombing in Oklahoma City in 1995. In addition, groups representing a violent interpretation of Christianity, anti-government groups, sovereign citizens, and members of the common-law court movement have killed more than 30 police officers in the past few years. When attacks against law enforcement officers occur, state, local, and federal authorities charge suspects with violations of statutory law. Neither the media nor the public routinely refer to those convict- ed of such crimes as terrorists, yet their actions are similar to attacks that are called terrorism overseas.

The importance of Defining Terrorism Aside from the social context, the term terrorism is difficult to define because it is pejorative. It is loaded with politically explosive meanings. Therefore, the manner is which terrorism is defined has political consequences. Only nation-states have the freedom to apply the label to their enemies, and the term dehumanizes the people who receive the label. When people are deemed to be terrorists, governments give their security forces expanded powers of investigation, search, and detention. In many cases, they utilize military force to kill opponents without thought of capture or ben- efit of trial. For example, the United States has employed missile attacks from drones that not only kill terrorists but also destroy innocent civilians in the surrounding area.

Terrorists are treated differently from criminals and other enemies of the state. They are atypical criminals entitled to neither human rights nor civil liberties. This is especially true when terrorists operate from foreign bases. Representatives of the

selective terrorism: A term used by Michael Collins during the Irish War of Independence (1919–1921). Collins did not launch indiscriminate terror attacks. Rather, he selec- tively targeted the British military, the police force it sponsored, and the people who supported the United Kingdom.

Nidal Malik Hasan: (b. 1970) an American sol- dier of Palestinian descent. Hasan was a U.S. Army psychiatrist who became self-radicalized and em- braced militant Islam. In November 2009, he went on a shooting spree at Fort Hood, Texas, killing 13 people and wounding almost three dozen oth- ers. He was wounded, arrested, and charged with several counts of murder.

Chapter 1 • The Shifting Definition of Terrorism 5

state may take actions outside the law because people supporting the state frequently believe that terrorists are somehow less than human. The state also has the power to look at all of its citizens and people from all parts of the world as potential terrorists. Therefore, governments can expand social control and limit civil liberties in response to terrorism (Cebeci, 2012).

Definitions of terrorism are also important because they impact policies. Haviland Smith (2008), a retired counterterrorist specialist from the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), believes the United States has been less than effective in countering terrorism because of the way the terms terrorism and insurgency are conflated. Political leaders have used the terms interchangeably, but terrorism, he says, is generally a law enforce- ment and intelligence issue, while insurgencies are primarily military matters. In ad- dition, the United States sends the wrong policy message to the world. If you are an insurgent against a repressive government that is friendly toward the United States, you can be called a terrorist. Conversely, if you are fighting against a government with an anti-American policy, you are a freedom fighter. This inconsistency has resulted in many poor policy decisions, according to Smith.

> Why is terrorism difficult to define? > What does Cooper mean by saying there is a problem with the problem definition? > What examples illustrate contextual meanings of terrorism?

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attempts to Define Terrorism Alex Schmid and Albert Jongman (2006, pp. 5–6) surveyed many scholars who spe- cialize in terrorism and looked for commonalities in the definitions they received. Not surprisingly, the use of force or violence appeared in 83.5% of the responses. Political activities were mentioned in 65% of the definitions, while fear appeared in 47%. About one-third of the definitions mentioned differences between victims and targets, planned actions, and tactical methods. Interestingly, only 6% of the respon- dents pointed to endemic criminal activity in terrorism despite the fact that almost all acts of terrorism involve violations of criminal law.

Definitions and Policy Ayla Schbley (2003) believes that it necessary to emphasize the criminal nature of terrorism and move the focus beyond debates about politics. If defined from a politi- cal perspective, justifying terrorism simply depends on a person’s viewpoint. This is wrong, he writes, because violence targeting defenseless symbolic victims can never be justified by any legal authority. Terrorism is a crime. Therefore, he defines terror- ism as any violent act upon symbolic civilians and their property.

Boaz Ganor (2002) sees attacks on civilians as the key element differentiating terrorists from legitimate revolutionaries. Ganor says that debates about the mean- ing of terrorism are centered in theory, but in the practical world, they need to be defined by terms that transcend theoretical issues. A clear definition is crucial for a nation’s policy and for international cooperation. If the world community is not clear about the meaning of terrorism, terrorists will continue to operate under the guise of legitimacy.

Ganor also argues that confusion arises because policymakers in the West use incorrect terms and phrases to describe terrorism. The reality of terrorism is glossed

6 PART 1 • Terrorism in Historical and Social Contexts

over with casual references to “guerrillas,” “the underground,” and “national libera- tion.” As a result, many Western governments get caught in a semantic trap and fail to develop a cohesive international policy against terrorism. Terrorists use the same labels to justify their activities.

The solution, Ganor believes, is to focus on noncombatant civilians. When civil- ians are the exclusive objects of attacks, the resulting actions are terrorism. Accord- ingly, he says that terrorism is the use or threatened use of violence against civilians or civilian targets to attain a political objective. Violence is the essence of terrorism, the aim is always political, and civilians are the targets. These features distinguish terror- ism from insurgencies and guerrilla wars.

By utilizing the terminology of conventional and unconventional wars, Ganor believes it is possible to differentiate among multiple forms of violence. For example, “soldiers” target military objectives, even though civilians are frequently killed in sub- sequent fighting. “War criminals,” however, target civilians, their prisoners, and other noncombatants. “Guerrillas” attack military and security forces as well as political leadership. Terrorists are different. They target civilians to send a symbolic message.

If Western governments would recognize the threat to civilians, several things could be accomplished, Ganor believes. Terrorism could be defined, and nations could craft international agreements for antiterrorist cooperation. In addition, legislation could be enacted, offensive action could be authorized, and punishment could be sanctioned. Nations that support terrorist groups could legitimately be identified and diplomatically isolated.

Eric Reitan (2010) approaches the problem differently. He argues that attacks on military and security forces can be acts of terrorism. Traditional definitions, he writes, do not distinguish terrorism from criminal violence or any form of war. Like Ganor, he recognizes the importance of the target, but he expands the victims beyond civilians. Civilians, security forces, and political leaders are a “Group Target,” he says. If forces outside the law attack them for political purposes, it is terrorism.

Sound policies, Reitan writes, demand that governments distinguish terrorism from all other forms of violence. The Group Target concept does that. For example, Timothy McVeigh parked a truck loaded with explosive fertilizer by the Murrah fed- eral building on April 19, 1995. One hundred and sixty-eight people were killed, including many toddlers in a daycare center. He did so because he hated the American government and its symbols. Anyone belonging to or associated with the U.S. govern- ment was McVeigh’s enemy, including any law enforcement or military personnel who happened to be in the building. Reitan believes that the Murrah building symbolized a Group Target to McVeigh.

Reitan concludes that group targeting is the distinguishing feature of terrorism. If an attack is launched against a target simply because it or its members belong to a particular group, the action is terrorism.

an insurmountable Problem? Defining terrorism is important and it impacts policy, but H. H. A. Cooper’s observa- tion remains: There is a problem with the problem definition. The problem causes some researchers to suggest that the definitional dilemma may be insurmountable. Other researchers, analysts, and practitioners say the definition of terrorism is irrel- evant. Some people even conclude that terrorism may be justified at times.

Jacqueline Hodgson and Victor Hodges (2013) write that defining terrorism is crucial because it identifies the people who are terrorists and it defines the specific acts that can be legitimately called terrorism. Yet, it is impossible to provide a precise

Group Target: A collection of a particular people who are attacked by terrorists simply because they be- long to a particular group.

Chapter 1 • The Shifting Definition of Terrorism 7

definition of terrorism. Three factors inhibit efforts to describe terrorism. First, if the definition is too narrow and excludes attacks on state officials, security forces, or mili- tary targets, any resulting law or policy will be of little practical value. Conversely, if the definition includes the state and its personnel, the government can use its power to label legitimate freedom fighters as terrorists.

Hodgson and Hodges conclude that when political leaders are given the power to apply the label, they make judgments they are not qualified to make. Labels are ap- plied inappropriately at times as a result, but the public must accept this because gov- ernments need antiterrorism policies and antiterrorism laws. Therefore, it is necessary to live with imperfection and to define the indefinable. As a result, enforcement will be discretionary and arbitrary, and at times, policies and actions will be unjust. They say there is no choice except to tolerate some form of injustice within policies, laws, and enforcement because doing so is necessary to take antiterrorist actions.

There is another approach. Nearly 30 years ago, Walter Laqueur (1987, p. 72) offered a simple definition of terrorism, and it is similar to the definition given by the RAND Corporation’s longtime counterterrorism expert Brian Jenkins. Terrorism is the use or threatened use of force against innocent victims for political purposes. (You may notice how closely this resembles Boaz Ganor’s definition. Ganor replaces innocent with civilian.) Yet, Laqueur seems not to worry about the definition. He adds a wry comment about the definition in a footnote. No doubt, he says, academ- ics will write volumes about the definition of terrorism in papers and maybe even entire books on the subject. Ironically, none of the publications will help anyone understand the topic.

The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (2011; accessed February 2015) has an interesting entry in its discussion of the definition of terrorism. There may be situa- tions where an action seems to be terrorism but is not. If terrorists can demonstrate that their actions will correct an evil action that is bad enough to justify stopping it with violence and the outcome is good enough to compensate for their actions, the perpetrators may not be committing an act of terrorism. This is true only if there is no other method for achieving the outcome and the targets are limited to military, se- curity, and political actors. No other people or properties may be attacked. (Laqueur might add that these points provide material for an interesting intellectual debate, but they do not add one iota to our understanding of terrorism.)

> What are the most common concepts in scholarly definitions of terrorism? > How does Ganor’s definition differ from other definitions? > Is the definition of terrorism important for national policy?

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Shifts of Meanings in History Entire nations change their approach to national security, intelligence, and law en- forcement based on the way they define terrorism. This can be demonstrated by recent changes in American defense and law enforcement policies in response to terrorism, and this U.S. experience does not represent a new trend. When the term terrorism was first introduced in Western history during the late eighteenth century, governments adjusted their policies based on the way they defined the threat. They continued to do so for the next two centuries.

8 PART 1 • Terrorism in Historical and Social Contexts

Terrorism did not begin in a vacuum. Many Americans became acutely aware of modern terrorism after the first World Trade Center bombing in 1993 and after the bombing of the federal building in Oklahoma City in 1995. Yet, modern terrorism be- gan decades, even centuries, before these events. Terrorism, at least from the Western perspective, grew from the French Revolution (1789–1799), and the word was origi- nally used to describe the actions of a government, not of a band of revolutionaries. Terrorism developed throughout the nineteenth century, changing forms and ideology. The meaning of terrorism changed in the twentieth and twenty-first centuries as well. As Christopher Hewitt (2003, pp. 23– 45) observes, the definition of terrorism and antiterrorist policies changes with political tides. The political atmosphere, in turn, changes with history.

The Origins of Terrorism in Western History The meaning of terrorism has changed with political tides in Western history. Terror- ism began as government repression in France, but the French transformed its mean- ing by referring to Spanish guerrilla tactics in the Napoleonic Wars. By the middle of the nineteenth century, the word was used to describe the actions of revolutionaries. Nationalists copied revolutionary tactics in the early twentieth century, and they were deemed to be the new terrorists. The meaning of terrorism came full circle when Communists in the Soviet Union used terrorism to subjugate the population. After World War II, terrorism appeared in anticolonial movements, political extremism, and religion. All the differing forms of revolution and violence resulted in changing definitions and multiple policies.

The birth and evolution of the Western democracies also gave rise to a paradox, the relationship between democracy and terrorism. F. Gregory Gause III (2005) points to a variety of studies about this relationship, and he comes to a depressing conclu- sion: Terrorist attacks occur more frequently in democracies than in countries with any other form of government. Citing U.S. State Department statistics between 2000 and 2003, Gause finds that of nearly 530 attacks, almost 390 occurred in countries practicing full or limited democracy. This democracy factor would come into play in the nineteenth century and continue into the twenty first century (see the following “Another Perspective: Terror and Democracy” feature).

anOTHer PerSPecTive

Terror and Democracy

Many terrorism analysts believe that terrorists need democratic states to function. Totalitarian states, they argue, make it impossible to engage in covert activities. Terrorists need freedom of speech, freedom of thought, and freedom of ac- tion. Jenny Hocking (2004) takes the opposite view. In reaction to a terrorist attack in Bali, Indonesia, in 2002, the Australian government followed the path of the United States, Hocking

says. Political rights have been trampled in the name of the war on terrorism. A counterterrorist network has invaded civil liberties in Australia, and the Australian Intelligence Security Service has been given permission to pry into the lives of law-abiding citizens. Terrorism is a threat, but overreaction to it also threatens democracies. The internment of terrorist suspects without charge or trial is a greater threat than terrorism.

Chapter 1 • The Shifting Definition of Terrorism 9

The French revolution The term terrorism appeared during the French Revolution (1789–1799). It began with political and economic unrest in 1787, and the government was toppled in 1789. The revolutionary committee that controlled the government executed the king in 1793, beginning a series of mass executions that lasted until the summer of 1794. Edmund Burke, a noted British political philosopher of the eighteenth century, used the word to describe the situation in revolutionary Paris. He referred to the violence as a Reign of Terror, and he used the word terrorism to describe the actions of the new government.

Members and associates of the Committee of Public Safety were called terrorists by French nobles, their families, and sympathizers. They were responsible for 17,000 legal executions. Some scholars estimate that there were 23,000 additional illegal ex- ecutions (Tilly, 2004).

guerrillas and the Spanish Peninsula In the Napoleonic Wars, the meaning of terrorism started to undergo a subtle trans- formation. Napoleon invaded Spain in 1807, and his army would face a type of threat that it had not experienced up to that point. Small bands of Spanish partisans began to attack French troops. Frequently armed and supported by the British Army, the partisans attacked the French in unconventional manners. They could not gather and face a French corps on a battlefield, but they could murder off-duty soldiers, attack supply columns, and engage in hit-and-run tactics. The Spanish called the partisans patriots, but the French referred to them as terrorists. Thus, the meaning of terrorism shifted away from governmental repression to the resistance of some people to gov- ernments. This transformed definition would be maintained through the nineteenth century (Tamas, 2001).

Guerrilla warfare did not originate in Spain, but it was particularly savage there. It served as an asymmetrical method of resisting the French Revolutionary Army. It be- gan a decade before the invasion of Spain when armed citizens loyal to the king fought against the French Revolution. It continued in Spain, and David Bell (2007) says that it came to full fruition when the 1812 French invasion of Russia failed. Russian guerrillas decimated the massive French Army during its retreat from Moscow during the winter of 1812–1813. Few armies could resist Napoleon in the field, but groups of disbanded soldiers and armed citizens were another matter. Bell believes that this signaled an ideo- logical transformation in the meaning of war. Whether his thesis is correct, one aspect of his argument is certain: These guerrilla movements helped set the stage for terrorism.

Spain in 1807: The Pen- insular War (1808–1814) began when Spanish and French forces divided Por- tugal in 1807. Napoleon, whose army entered Spain in 1807, attempted to use his forces to capture the Spanish throne in 1808. British forces under Sir Arthur Wellesley, later Duke of Wellington, joined Spanish forces loyal to the king of Spain and Span- ish partisans to fight the French.

> Do you think there is a relationship between terrorism and democracy? > What did the term terrorism first signify in France? > How did the meaning of terrorism change from the French Revolution through

the Napoleonic Wars?

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1848 and the radical Democrats The meaning of the term terrorism changed in Western minds essentially because of the nature of European violence in the 1800s. The French Revolution did not bring democracy; it brought Napoleon. The Napoleonic Wars continued until 1815, and then a new international order emerged. Although democracy continued to grow in the United States and in the United Kingdom, royalists reasserted their power in

Reign of Terror: The name given to the repressive period in France (1794– 1795). The revolutionary government accused thou- sands of French nobles and clergy of plotting to restore the monarchy. Executions began in Paris and spread throughout the countryside. Large mobs attacked and terror- ized nobles in rural areas. Summary executions (executions on the spot without a trial) were quite common.

10 PART 1 • Terrorism in Historical and Social Contexts

the rest of Europe. Under the surface, however, democratic ideas continued to grow. These ideas led to further political struggles and demands for freedom.

The democrats of the early 1800s were not united. Most of them believed in middle-class democracy, and they were reluctant to take to the streets if a legislative process was available. They believed that they could create constitutional monarchies and evolve into a system of democracy as the United States had done. The main objec- tive of most European middle-class democrats from approximately 1815 to 1848 was to obtain constitutions to ensure liberty. Several of the German states began writing constitutions, but they were thwarted by monarchal forces and decisively defeated between 1848 and 1849. Austrian and Russian monarchs simply controlled all gov- ernmental processes. In the wake of failure, disgruntled democrats began to speak of nonlegislative avenues for change.

Radical democrats demanded immediate and drastic change. They were not only interested in developing constitutions but also wanted to distribute evenly the wealth created by trade and manufacturing. Many Socialists, including a group of Social- ists called communists, argued for centralized control of the economy. Anarchists, sometime allies and sometime foes of the Socialists, sought to reduce or eliminate centralized government. The wealthy owners of industry, known as capitalists, were politically powerful, and many people from the middle class prospered when capital- ist enterprises expanded. The capitalists opposed all forms of socialism and anarchy. Radical democrats felt that the capitalists were little better than the royalists. The radical democrats wanted all people to be equal, and they argued that democracy should be based not only on freedom but also on economic equality. This meant that the class structure and distribution of wealth had to be reorganized. This frightened the newly emergent capitalist and middle classes in the same way the French Revolu- tion had scared European royalty. The radical democrats called for class revolution.

The revolution came in 1848. The conservative system established by govern- ments after the Napoleonic Wars was antidemocratic. As constitutional movements failed in many countries, people grew restless. Parisians took to the streets in February 1848, and they overthrew the government. Many people in other European capitals followed suit, and by autumn, almost every major European country had experienced unrest or revolution. In some cases, as in Berlin—which was the capital of Prussia at the time—the army came to restore order. In other cases, such as France, a new re- public was proclaimed. The middle class saw some gains, but most workers did not.

Governmental control was slowly restored in Europe between 1848 and 1849, but new class awareness and unrest emerged. The 1848 revolutions fostered work- ing-class distaste for the distribution of wealth and power. George Woodcock (2004, p. 81) says that the 1789 French Revolution ushered in a new class structure, but it also resulted in a new economic system—capitalism—and a centralized state. The 1848 revolutionaries fought against the economic system. They lost and went underground.

This action, Michael Burleigh (2007) writes, signaled the beginning of modern terrorism. It started with the nation-state and the French Revolution, and organized governments used terrorism far more effectively than revolutionary groups. Yet, Bur- leigh says, secretive revolutionary groups formed the nexus of modern terrorism after 1848, a transformation that took place in Western Europe. Claudia Verhoeven (2009), on the other hand, moves the point of origin further east. She argues that modern ter- rorism began in Russia. Though Russia experienced its first terrorist campaign in the 1870s, several small groups organized individual cells a decade earlier. This, she con- cludes, represents the origin of modern terrorism. Regardless of geographical location, Burleigh and Verhoeven make the same point: When groups went underground after 1848, terrorism as it is known today came into its infancy.

radical democrats: Those who tried to bring democ- racy to all classes. They sought a more equitable distribution of wealth throughout all economic classes, believing that concentrated wealth and class inequities prevented societies from becoming truly democratic.

communists: Socialists who believed in a strong centralized economy con- trolled by a strong central government. Their ideas were summarized in The Communist Manifesto, written by Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels in 1848.

anarchists: Those in the nineteenth century who advocated the creation of cooperative societ- ies without centralized governments. There were many forms of anarchy. In the popular understanding of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, anarchists were seen as violent Socialist revolu- tionaries. Today, antiglo- balists calling themselves anarchists have little re- semblance to their earlier counterparts.

Socialists: Radical demo- crats who sought wealth equality in capitalist societies. Some Socialists sought governmental guar- antees of living standards. Others believed that the state should control in- dustry and divide profits among all members of society. Others believed that people would form cooperative relationships on their own with no need of a government.

Chapter 1 • The Shifting Definition of Terrorism 11

Socialists Three strains of radical democrats coalesced after the failed revolutions of 1848: communists, socialists, and anarchists (Figure 1.1). Socialists wanted to completely democratize society and assume control of industrial production. They believed that a strong state would ensure that profits from industry were distributed in an egalitarian manner. Communism represented a particular form of socialism, one that advocated a strong centralized government, the elimination of all classes except the working class, and a complete state monopoly over all forms of industrial and agricultural production. Socialists and communists agreed that wealth was not a private entitle- ment. It belonged to all workers. Although many socialists embraced communism, communists denounced socialists who failed to advocate for strong state controls. Many socialists emphasized democracy over the centralized power of communism (see Levin, 2003). The radical democrats believed political power should be held in common. Their concept of socialism was especially popular among some groups of displaced workers. Unfortunately, the upper and middle classes frequently believed terrorism and socialism were the same thing (A. Roberts, 2002).

One of the chief spokespersons and intellectuals in the socialist camp was the founder of communism, Karl Marx (1818–1883). He finished a Ph.D. in philosophy

Mikhail Bakunin Russian revolutionary. His ideas will inspire the People's Will.

Pierre Joseph Proudhon French anarchist. He is appalled by violence and believes humans can live without governments in ideal communities.

Karl Heinzen German radical. He flees to the United States after failed 1848 revolutions. His writings include a justification for political murder.

Johann Most German American radical. He advocates revolution in a New Jersey–based newspaper called Freiheit (Freedom).

Emma Goldman Russian American socialist. Full of fiery rhetoric, she leaves the United States for Russia after the Revolution and returns disillusioned with communism.

Nikolai Morozov Russian revolutionary. He is a leader of the People's Will.

Karl Marx Founder of communism. With Friedrich Engels, he develops the theoretical basis of communism in a three-volume critique of capitalism.

A T L A N T I C O C E A N

USA

RUSSIA

GERMANY

FRANCE

FIGuRe 1.1 anarchists and Socialists

12 PART 1 • Terrorism in Historical and Social Contexts

in 1841 and moved to Paris shortly thereafter. He met Friedrich Engels and formed a lifelong friendship. He outlined theories of socialism in several writings, including a three-volume critique of capitalism. Marx believed that social structure is arranged by the material circumstances surrounding human existence. People shape the envi- ronment through work and even produce more than they need. Marx referred to this extra production as surplus. In medieval societies, nobles controlled the surplus pro- duction of peasants, but control shifted to capitalists with the end of the Middle Ages. Marx and Engels claimed that the capitalist economic system exploited the lower classes for the benefit of others. They called for a change in the system.

Despite the many labels applied to him and the derogatory statements of his en- emies, Karl Marx was not a terrorist. Marx referred to “revolutionary” change, but he never clarified what he meant by revolution. Further, he did not advocate political bomb- ing or assassination. In fact, on most occasions, he publicly condemned it. He believed socialism was to be a reflection of democracy, not violence. A massive seizure of power by the general population might be justified, but individual acts of murder were not.

The process of democratization was slow, however, and some of the radical demo- crats began to feel violent revolution was the only possible course of action. A few radical democrats went underground, choosing subversive violence as a means to challenge authority. They became popularly known as terrorists because they hoped to achieve social revolution by terrorizing the capitalist class and its supporters.

anarchists Anarchists shared many ideas with socialists about the egalitarian nature of society, but they disagreed on the function of the state. The term anarchy was not new. It originated several hundred years earlier, when Greek philosophers spoke of elimi- nating governments, but the nineteenth-century anarchists were also concerned with the distribution of wealth. This frightened the upper classes, which already associ- ated socialism with terrorism. Pierre Joseph Proudhon (1809–1865) was one of the advocates of modern anarchism. His political activities eventually landed him in a French prison, but Proudhon was not a man of violence. He called for the extension of democracy to all classes, to be accomplished through the elimination of property and government. Property was to be commonly held, and families living in extended communes were to replace centralized government.

Proudhon disagreed with Karl Marx and other socialists about the role of gov- ernment. Most socialists saw centralized government as a necessary evil. Like the democrats, the socialists believed government had to exist to protect the individual rights of citizens. Communists took the role of the state further, insisting on a strong central government. Proudhon, on the other hand, believed that all government was evil. Proudhon had revolutionary ideals, but he was a man of peace. He believed that anarchy would develop peacefully as people learned about the structure of govern- ments and the capitalist economy. Not all of Proudhon’s disciples were of the same peaceful bent. They came to see themselves as revolutionaries, and they would have growing influence on terrorism in the second half of the nineteenth century.

violent anarchism Despite the rhetoric, both the socialists and anarchists engaged in more talk than action after the 1848 revolutions. Both groups debated the efficacy and morality of violence, and most of the people who called for revolution spoke of mass action, not individual violence. Walter Laqueur (1999, p. 12) says that the socialists and

Chapter 1 • The Shifting Definition of Terrorism 13

anarchists rejected terrorism on practical and theoretical grounds. Practically, terror- ism could not promise strategic success, and many of the revolutionary theorists re- jected violence in general. Marxists and anarchists favored strikes, demonstrations, and other mass actions.

Richard Jensen (2004) also believes that the initial calls in history for revolution cannot be associated with terrorism. Even though socialists and anarchists disagreed about the path for creating a new society, they avoided violence. Those who advo- cated violence usually did so only rhetorically; however, this changed in the 1880s as anarchists began assassinating heads of state. The media sensationalized anarchist events, leading people to conclude that anarchism was a vast international conspiracy of terror. By 1880, the press and politicians had collapsed all forms of socialism into the generic term anarchism, and anarchists were deemed terrorists in popular opinion.

How did this change occur? Jensen says that several factors merged to create a cul- ture of terrorism among some members of the anarchist movement. He outlines some of the reasons, and other researchers have identified a number of factors ( Laqueur and Alexander, 1987; Laqueur, 1999; Epstein, 2001; Woodcock, 2004; Clutterbuck, 2004; Grob-Fitzgibbon, 2004). Taken together, these factors reveal a pattern in the transformation of some anarchists from rhetoric to violence.

Another factor influencing the adoption of violent action was the invention of dynamite. Alfred Nobel blended explosive material with chemicals, cotton, and re- fined clay to produce an explosive 20 times more powerful than black powder. To be sure, the power of dynamite was often overestimated. One anarchist claimed that 10 pounds of it could sink a battleship. But dynamite gave an individual or small group a psychological edge. For the first time in history, a small group had a techno- logical force multiplier that allowed it to launch a major attack. Rhetoric gave birth to propaganda by the deed, but dynamite fostered the philosophy of the bomb.

anarchism and nationalism If the 1800s witnessed the growth of anarchism, it also saw the growth of national- ism in the West. As anarchists called for an end to government, nationalistic organiza- tions demanded the right to self-government. Many nationalists adopted the tactics of the anarchists to fight the foreign powers occupying their lands. Nationalistic groups throughout Europe turned to the philosophy of the bomb, and nationalist terrorists began to follow the pattern set by the violent anarchists.

Nationalistic groups did not view themselves as terrorists. They believed that an- archists were fighting for ideas. Nationalists believed that they were fighting for their countries. Anarchists were socially isolated, but nationalists could hope for the pos- sibility of greater support. Governments labeled them terrorists, but nationalists saw themselves as unconventional soldiers in a national cause. Nationalists believed that they were fighting patriotic wars. They adopted only the tactics of the anarchists, not their ideology.

The nationalistic Irish Republican Army (IRA) grew from this period. Unlike an- archists, the IRA did not reject the notion of governmental control; rather, the IRA wanted to nationalize it. The IRA believed Ireland was entitled to self-government. Their weakness relative to the government’s power caused them to use the terrorist tactics fostered by the anarchists. In the twentieth century, other nationalistic groups in Europe followed the example of the IRA.

Though two distinct positions had emerged, it is not possible to completely sepa- rate nineteenth-century anarchism and nationalism. Grant Wardlaw (1982, pp. 18–24) sees a historical continuity from anarchism to nationalistic terrorism. Richard

14 PART 1 • Terrorism in Historical and Social Contexts

Rubenstein (1987, pp. 122–125) makes this point by looking at contemporary an- archist and nationalistic groups. Rubenstein says that the stages terrorists must go through to employ violence are similar for both types of terrorism; the moral justifica- tion for anarchist and nationalistic terrorism is essentially the same.

Terrorism in the modern sense came from violent anarchists in the late 1800s. The anarchists were based in Western Europe, but they carried their campaign to other parts of the world. The most successful actions took place in Russia before the 1905 and 1917 revolutions. Anarchist groups assassinated several Russian officials, including the czar. Anarchism also spread to the United States. In America, it took the form of labor violence; American anarchists, usually immigrants from Europe, saw themselves as linked to organized labor. The anarchist movement in America did not gain as much strength as in Europe, and American anarchists were generally relegated to industrial areas. Right-wing extremism was not part of the anarchist movement, but by the mid-twentieth century, right-wing groups began to imitate the tactics of violent anarchists.

anOTHer PerSPecTive

Noam Chomsky Examines Terrorism and Morality

Noam Chomsky (2002) approaches terrorism with two critical questions: (1) How should ter- rorism be defined? and (2) What is the proper response to it? He says that the problem of de- fining terrorism is complex, but there are many straightforward governmental responses. Almost all of these definitions cast terrorism within a moral framework; that is, terrorism becomes a criminal act where innocents are victimized. These circumstances require a government to act; yet, the response frequently evokes a paradox. Governments define terrorist acts as immoral, but they tend to respond by acting outside the bounds of morality. They justify their actions by citing the original immoral act of a terrorist group.

Chomsky finds this approach unacceptable. The same moral framework that allows a society to define an illegal act as terrorism requires that the response to terrorism be conducted within the bounds of morality. Terrorism, Chomsky says, is something “they” do to “us,” and it is never

about what “we” do to “them.” Citing just-war doctrine, Chomsky says the response to terrorism cannot be terrorism. A moral truism states that any illegal activity is immoral no matter how a state wishes to justify its response to an event.

The definition of terrorism provides a moral constant. For example, if an official definition states that terrorism is the use of violence against innocent people to change political behavior, a state is morally obligated to live within the bounds of this definition. It cannot use violence against innocents to force its political will. If ter- rorism is a crime, the response to it must not be criminal if the response is to be morally legiti- mate. The contradiction comes, Chomsky con- cludes, because the United States operates within a moral definition of terrorism only when its own interests are served. As a result, oppression, violence, and illegal actions are rarely defined as terrorism when they are condoned by the United States or its allies.

> Describe the various schools of revolutionary thought in the mid-nineteenth century. > What impact did dynamite have on modern terrorism? > Explain the surprising relationship between nationalism and anarchism.

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Chapter 1 • The Shifting Definition of Terrorism 15

Terrorism and Revolution in Russia, 1881–1921 The historiography of the Russian Revolution and the fighting that took place after- ward have changed drastically since the collapse of the Soviet Union. Histories writ- ten during the Cold War tended to be either pro- or anti-communist. As documents and archives became available to Western writers after the collapse of the Soviet Union views of Russia changed, and new histories and biographies emerged. Sheila Fitzpatrick (2001) views the revolution from a perspective that begins with revolt and ends several years after the rise of Communism as Joseph Stalin (1878–1953) purged and executed his enemies in the 1930s. Robert Service (1995) concludes a three-volume biography of Vladimir Lenin (1870–1924) with a picture of a ruthless man who forged policy by force of will. Service’s Lenin is a man who was not inter- ested in power for its own sake and who genuinely wanted to create a better socialist state. Confrontations forced him to compromise in the end. Katerina Clark (1998) presents the tremendous cultural shifts from 1913 to 1931 by focusing on St. Peters- burg from late czarist times until Stalin consolidated power. Christopher Read (1996) divides this era into two periods—the collapse of czarist Russia and the building of the new socialist order. Service (2005) brings another perspective, completely rewrit- ing the history of Russia from the fall of the czar to the rise of Vladimir Putin.

At the time of the revolution, however, the West viewed the communist state with horror. They equated communism with anarchism and revolution. Class revolution became a reality in Russia, and the West feared that Russia would export revolu- tion through terrorism. Late nineteenth-century Russia differed significantly from the other great powers of Europe. Class distinctions between nobles and peasants were virtually the same as they had been before the French Revolution, and Russian peas- ants were beset by poverty. Industry had come to some of Russia’s cities, but Russia’s economic and governmental systems were not adequate to handle the changes. Czar Alexander II (ruled from 1855 to 1881) vowed to make changes in the system, but when he attempted to do so, he found himself in the midst of revolutionary terrorism.

The People’s Will Three groups in Russia after 1850 felt that they could reform and modernize the Russian state, but they disagreed about how to do it. One group, whose views Czar Alexander shared, wanted to modernize Russia from the top down. Another group, the intellectuals, wanted Russia to become a liberal Western democracy. Violent an- archists took another path. They believed that Russian problems could be settled through revolution. Narodnaya Volya (the People’s Will) advocated violent socialist revolution. When it launched a campaign of revolutionary terrorism in the 1870s, it faced confrontation with conservative elements such as the church, police, and mili- tary. Members of the People’s Will came to believe that it was necessary to terrorize these conservative organizations into submission.

The motivations behind the People’s Will evolved from Russian revolutionary thought. According to Laqueur (1999, pp. 15–16), the philosophy of anarchist terrorism in Russia was embodied by Mikhail Bakunin and Sergey Nechaev. Their revolutionary thought developed separately before they met each other in the 1860s, when they formed an intellectual union. Both spoke of revolt against the czar, and both endorsed violence as the means. Yet, even in the nation that would experience a violent anarchist campaign and eventually a communist revolution, Bakunin and Nechaev basically stuck to rhetoric.

Although they were ideologically linked to anarchism in western Europe, they were distinct from their Western supporters. Russian anarchists were writing for a

Joseph Stalin: The dicta- tor who succeeded Lenin. Stalin solidified Com- munist control of Russia through a secret police organization. He purged the government of all sus- pected opponents in the 1930s, killing thousands of people.

Vladimir Lenin: The Rus- sian revolutionary who led a second revolution in October, bringing the Communists to power. Lenin led the Communists in a civil war and set up a dictatorship to enforce Communist Party rule in Russia.

Vladimir Putin: (b. 1952) a former KGB (Soviet secret police) officer and second president of the Russian Federation from 1999 to 2008. He served as Russia’s prime minister after his second presiden- tial term and return to the presidency in 2012.

16 PART 1 • Terrorism in Historical and Social Contexts

general population in the hope of sparking a democratic revolution. Laqueur says that their significance lies in their influence on later revolutionaries and the violence and assassinations those later revolutionaries committed. They were not radical revo- lutionaries in Laqueur’s view.

Sheila Fitzpatrick (2001, pp. 19–21) presents a different view. Russian economic progress dominated the last part of the nineteenth and early part of the twentieth cen- turies. The problem was the attitudes of peasants and industrial workers. According to Marx, agrarian peasants did not have enough motivation to join the proletariat in revolution, but Fitzpatrick says that Russia was different. Revolutionary sympathy was high among the peasantry, giving them a closer relationship with many urban workers. Revolutionary rhetoric and writings had touched the lower classes, but Rus- sian economic prosperity had not. The lower classes were receptive to revolution, although as Christopher Read (1996, p. 294) illustrates, no single theme dominated the revolutionaries until it was imposed by the state under Lenin.

Regardless of the debate, the writings of the Russians were powerful. Nechaev (reprint 1987, pp. 68–71) laid down the principles of revolution in the “Catechism of the Revolutionary.” His spirit was reflected in writings of the late twentieth century. Rubenstein (1987) compared the “catechism” to Carlos Marighella’s The Minimanual of the Urban Guerrilla and found no essential differences. Both Laqueur and Rubenstein believe that Nechaev’s influence lives on. Bakunin (1866, pp. 65–68) believed that the Russian government had been established on thievery. In “Revolution, Terrorism, Banditry,” he argues that the only way to break the state’s hold on power is revolt. Such rhetoric did not endear Nechaev and Bakunin to the czar, but it did make them popular with later revolutionaries. Laqueur (1999) concludes that such revolutionary pronouncements correctly belong with Russian expressionist literature, not terrorist philosophy.

These philosophies guided the People’s Will. They murdered the police chief of Moscow and went on a campaign of bombing and killing. In May 1881, they suc- ceeded in striking their ultimate target: They killed Czar Alexander II. Ironically, this brought about their downfall. The People’s Will was eliminated, Alexander III (ruled from 1881 to 1894) ended all attempts at reform, and revolutionaries went under- ground. Nicholas II (ruled from 1894 to 1917), who succeeded Alexander III, was a man who would be toppled by revolutionary forces.

czar nicholas and the revolutions of 1905 and 1917 Nicholas faced his first revolution in 1905, after his army lost a war to Japan. In addition to losing the war, Russia was consumed with economic problems and bu- reaucratic inefficiency. A group of unemployed workers began demonstrations in St. Petersburg, and some enlisted men in the Russian navy mutinied. Their actions were brutally suppressed by Nicholas’s army and police forces, feeding the spirit of revolution that burned below the surface. Russian revolutionaries needed another national disaster to create the atmosphere for revolution. It came in 1914, when Russia entered World War I (1914–1918).

By 1917, the Russian people were tired of their economic woes and their czar. In February, a general strike in St. Petersburg turned into a revolution. Unlike in 1905, the Russian Army joined the workers, and a new Russian government was formed. They envisioned a period of capitalist economic expansion that would save the beleaguered Russian economy. Workers councils (or soviets) were established in major Russian cities.

The primary mistake of the February revolutionaries was that they kept Russia in the war, a decision that was unpopular with the Russian people. This had two

workers councils (or soviets): The lowest- level legislative body in the Soviet Union following the October Revolution. Soviet is the Russian word for “council.”

Chapter 1 • The Shifting Definition of Terrorism 17

immediate ramifications. It created unrest at home, and it inspired the Germans to seek a way to remove Russia from World War I. The Germans found their answer in Vladimir Ilyich Lenin who orchestrated a second revolution in October 1917 and removed Russia from the war.

Lenin and Trotsky The Russian Revolution utilized terrorism in a new manner, and this had an impact on the way people viewed terrorism in the twentieth century. Lenin and one of his lieutenants, Leon Trotsky (1879–1940), believed that terrorism should be used as an instrument for overthrowing middle-class, or bourgeois, governments. Once power was achieved, Lenin and Trotsky advocated terrorism as a means of controlling in- ternal enemies and as a method for coping with international strife. Russia was very weak after the revolution. It faced foreign intervention and was torn by civil war. By threatening to export terrorism, Lenin and Trotsky hoped to keep their enemies, pri- marily Western Europe and the United States, at bay.

With their threat, Lenin and Trotsky instilled the fear of Communist revolution in the minds of many people in the West. To some, terrorism and Communism became synonymous. Though the Russians, and later the Soviets, were not good at carrying insurrection to other lands, Western leaders began to fear that Communist terrorists were on the verge of toppling democratic governments. Despite Lenin and his succes- sor, Joseph Stalin, having the most success with another form of terror—murdering their own people—fear of Communist insurrection lasted well into the twentieth cen- tury, and some people still fear it. Even as the Soviet Union tottered into dissolution, Western analysts still saw terrorism through the lens of Western–Soviet confronta- tion (see Livingstone and Arnold, 1986; Sterling, 1986). Former CIA analyst Michael Scheuer (2006, pp. 20–23) believes that this perspective hinders the ability to compre- hend terrorism today.

In fairness to analysts of the Cold War, Lenin’s victory and subsequent writings have inspired terrorists from 1917 to the present. Although Communist terrorism was not part of an orchestrated conspiracy, it did influence behavior. Some terrorists scoured the works of Lenin and Trotsky, as well as other Russian revolutionaries, to formulate theories, tactics, and ideologies. Although not a simple conspiracy of evil, this influence was real and remains today.

Leon Trotsky: A Russian revolutionary who led for- eign affairs in Stalin’s gov- ernment and later became the commander of the Red Army. He espoused terrorism as a means for spreading White revolu- tion. He was thrown out of the Communist Party for opposing Stalin and was assassinated by Com- munist agents in Mexico City in 1940.

> How did revolutionary thought develop in czarist Russia? > Describe the two revolutions under Nicholas II. > How did Lenin and Trotsky influence the direction of revolutionary thought?

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Selective Terrorism and the birth of the irish republic In August 1969, the British Army was ordered to increase its presence in Northern Ireland in an effort to quell a series of riots. Although the army had maintained bases in Northern Ireland for some time, rioting in Londonderry and Belfast was suddenly far beyond the control of local police and the handful of British regular soldiers sta- tioned in the area. On August 18, 1969, British Army reinforcements began arriving,

18 PART 1 • Terrorism in Historical and Social Contexts

hoping to avoid a long-term conflict. Their hopes were in vain. The meaning of ter- rorism in Ireland changed with history. Unlike revolutionary France, Europe in 1848, and the differing forms of terrorism in Russia, terrorism in Ireland developed over a number of centuries (Lee, 1983).

The Irish have never ruled their island as a single political entity, and they have experienced some type of foreign domination since a series of Viking incursions in 800 CE (Costigan, 1980; Cahill, 2003). The Vikings were driven out in the eleventh

Outdated History? Michael Scheuer (2006, pp. 20–23), former director of the CIA’s bin Laden unit, be- lieves that the focus on history is often misplaced. There are two types of terrorist “experts,” he contends—retired governmental and military officials and informed commentators. The latter group is made up of academics and journalists. Scheuer believes that these people are far from experts because not only do they fail to understand history, but they are also stuck in a time frame. Media consciousness about terrorism developed and grew in the 1970s. Two issues dominated terror- ism at that time: the Cold War and violence around Israel and Palestine. Expertise about terrorism came from studying both the emergence of theory, with its roots in the West, and the anticolonial movements associated with the early part of the Cold War. Terrorism was a historical phenomenon, an outcome of confrontations that grew from the influence of Western history. Ideological groups such as the Baader-Meinhof Gang and the Red Brigades came from political battlefields. Na- tionalistic groups such as the Puerto Rican Armed Forces of National Liberation (FALN) and the Basque Nation and Liberty (ETA) were motivated by patriotism, but they adopted leftist agendas and the tactics of leftist terrorists.. The anti-West- ern attitude of Palestinian groups like Hezbollah and the Abu Nidal Organization was tinged with a left-wing philosophy and a style of operation similar to their counterparts in ideological and nationalistic movements. Western expertise was honed over two decades, from 1970 to 1990, Scheuer says, and it has very little to do with terrorism today.

Jihadist terrorism comes from a different tradition. It does not rely on politi- cal and theoretical developments in the West, and although jihadists frequently embrace the cause of the Palestinians, they do not seek to establish an independent Palestinian state or replace a destroyed Israel with a new Arab country. They come from a religious tradition dating from the twelfth century in the Western calendar, and they operate in a manner far different from terrorist groups in the late twen- tieth century. Expertise on the old-style groups is not applicable to the jihadists, Scheuer concludes. So-called terrorism experts are outdated. They are stuck in the past and examine modern terrorism through a perspective “yellowed with age.”

Consider these issues in terms of future developments:

• Unlike most criminals, terrorists study the past to develop tactical models. Is there merit in studying the history of terrorism? If so, what is the time frame for beginning such study?

• Does the history of terrorism teach lessons across cultures? Are there certain aspects of terrorism that remain constant across time and location?

• How is the form of twenty-first-century terrorism different from its previous manifestations? How is it similar?

Chapter 1 • The Shifting Definition of Terrorism 19

century, only to be replaced by invading Normans in the twelfth century (Simms, 2000). England began to colonize the northern part of Ireland in the late 1500s. This not only brought conflict between the colonizers and the colonized, it created a di- rect collision between Protestants and Catholics (Bradshaw, 1978; O Corrain, 2000; Curtis, 2000, pp. 16–18, orig. 1936; Herren and Brown, 2002). Finally, after the United Kingdom was formed in 1801, Ireland was literally absorbed by Great Britain (see Cronin, 1984; Foster, 2001, pp. 134–172). This last act created a new type of Irish person, the Republican, a citizen who wanted to be free of the British in a Republic of Ireland.

The early irish republican army By the twentieth century, the struggle in Ireland had become a matter of divisions between Unionists, people who wanted to remain in the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland, and Republicans, people who wanted independence. A host of other conflicts were associated with this confrontation, but the main one was the Unionist–Republican struggle. The Unionists often had the upper hand because they could call on support from the British-sponsored police and military forces. The Re- publicans had no such advantage, and they searched for an alternative.

Costigan (1980) believes that the Republican military solution originated when the Irish Republican Brotherhood (IRB) formed in the 1850s. Support came from ex- iles and emigrants around the world. Irish Catholics had emigrated from their home- land to the United States, Australia, Canada, and New Zealand, but they never forgot the people they left behind. Irish immigrants in New York City created the Fenian Brotherhood as a financial relief organization for relatives in the old country. After the U.S. Civil War, some Irish soldiers returning from the U.S. Army decided to take the struggle for emancipation back to Ireland. Having fought to free the slaves, they believed that they should continue the struggle and free Ireland. They sponsored a failed revolt in 1867, and others launched a dynamite campaign in London a decade and a half later. Although the IRB pledged to work peacefully, it gradually evolved into a revolutionary organization.

J. Bowyer Bell (1974) has written the definitive treatise on the origins and devel- opment of the Irish Republican Army (IRA). He states that it began with a campaign of violence sponsored by the IRB in the late 1800s. Spurred on by increased national- istic feeling in the homeland and the hope of home rule, the IRB waged a campaign of bombing and assassination from 1870 until 1916. Its primary targets were Unionists and British forces that supported the Unionist cause. Among their greatest adversaries was the British-backed police force in Ireland, the Royal Irish Constabulary (RIC).

The activities of the IRB frightened Irish citizens who wanted to remain united with Great Britain. For the most part, these people were Protestant and middle class, and they lived in the northern counties. They gravitated toward their trade unions and social organizations, among them the Orange Lodges, to counter growing IRB sympathy and power. They enjoyed the sympathy of the British Army’s officer corps. They also controlled the RIC.

The Fenians of the IRB remained undaunted by Unionist sentiment. Although Irish Unionists seemed in control, the IRB had two trump cards. First, IRB leadership was dominated by men who believed each generation had to produce warriors who would fight for independence. Some of these leaders, as well as their followers, were quite willing to be martyred to keep republicanism alive. In addition, the IRB had an organization. It not only served as a threat to British power, it also provided the basis for the resurgence of Irish culture.

Royal Irish Constabulary (RIC): The police force established by the United Kingdom in Ireland. It was modeled after the Lon- don Metropolitan Police, but it represented British interests. After the Free State was formed, the RIC became the Royal Ulster Constabulary (RUC). In turn, the RUC gave way to the Police Service of Northern Ireland (PSNI) as part of Irish and British attempts to bring peace to Northern Ireland after 1995.

20 PART 1 • Terrorism in Historical and Social Contexts

The easter rising At the turn of the twentieth century, no person embodied Irish culture more than Patrick Pearse (1879–1916). The headmaster of an Irish school, Pearse was an in- spirational romantic. He could move crowds to patriotism and inspire resistance to British policies. He was a hero among Irish Americans, and they sent hundreds of thousands of dollars to support his cause. He told young Irish boys and girls about their heritage, he taught them Gaelic, and he inspired them to be militantly proud of being Irish. He was also a member of the Supreme Council of the IRB. When the pos- sibility of home rule was defeated in the British parliament, Republican eyes turned to Pearse.

By 1916, the situation in Ireland had changed. The British had promised home rule to Ireland when World War I (1914–1918) came to an end. Whereas most peo- ple in Ireland believed the British, Unionists and Republicans secretly armed for a civil war between the north and the south. They believed a fight was inevitable if the British granted home rule, and each side was determined to dominate the govern- ment of a newly independent Ireland. Some Republicans were not willing to wait for home rule.

With British attention focused on Germany, leaders of the IRB believed that it was time for a strike against the Unionists and their British supporters. On Easter in 1916, Patrick Pearse and James Connolly (1868–1916) led a revolt in Dublin. Pearse believed that the revolt was doomed from the start, but he also believed that it was necessary to sacrifice his life to keep the Republican spirit alive. Connolly was a more pragmatic socialist who fought because he believed a civil war was inevitable.

The 1916 Easter Rising enjoyed local success because it surprised everyone. Pearse and Connolly took over several key points in Dublin with a few thousand armed followers. From the halls of the General Post Office, Pearse announced that the revolutionaries had formed an Irish republic, and he asked the Irish to follow him. The British, outraged by what they saw as treachery in the midst of a larger war, sent troops to Dublin. The city was engulfed in a week of heavy fighting.

Whereas Pearse and Connolly came to start a popular revolution, the British came to fight a war. In a few days, Dublin was devastated by British artillery. Pearse rec- ognized the futility of the situation and asked for terms. Bell (1974) points out the interesting way Pearse chose to approach the British: He sent a message using a new title for himself, commanding general of the IRA, to the general in charge of the Brit- ish forces. The IRB had transformed itself into an army: the IRA.

If Connolly and Pearse hoped to be greeted as liberators, they greatly misjudged the mood of Ireland. Had the British played to Irish sympathy, they might have stopped violent republicanism. Their actions, however, virtually empowered Sinn Fein. The British handed down several dozen death sentences for the Easter Rising. Hundreds more people received lengthy prison sentences. Pearse became an Irish legend. Stand- ing in front of a firing squad, he gave an impassioned plea for Irish independence. Connolly, who had been badly wounded, was tied to a chair and placed before a firing squad. Public sympathy shifted to the rebels.

Two important people managed to escape the purge. Eamon de Valera (1882–1975) received a prison sentence instead of death because of questions about his national- ity. He had been born in New York City and was brought to Ireland at an early age. Michael Collins (1890–1922), who was in a cell where prisoners slated for execution were being segregated from those selected for internment, walked to the other side of the cell and found himself among the internment group. It saved his life. De Valera would emerge as a revolutionary and political leader, and Collins would become the leader of the IRA.

Supreme Council of the IRB: The command cen- ter of several Republican terrorist organizations, including the Irish Repub- lican Army, the Official Irish Republican Army, and the Provisional Irish Republican Army. The name was transposed from the Irish Republican Brotherhood.

Sinn Fein: The political party of Irish Republicans. Critics claim it represents terrorists. Republicans say it represents their political interests. Despite the de- bate, Sinn Fein historically has had close connections with extremism and vio- lence.

Chapter 1 • The Shifting Definition of Terrorism 21

The black and Tan War, 1920–1921 Sinn Fein, the political party of Irish republicanism, continued its activities in spite of the failure of the Easter Rising. When World War I ended, many of the Republicans were released. There were several moderates in Ireland, represented by the Parliamen- tary Party, and they sought to reopen the issue of home rule. They believed that this was the only nonviolent way to approach the Irish question. Bew (1999) says that the moderates were also willing to cede the northern province, Ulster, to the Protestants who wished to remain united with Great Britain. If the Protestants were forced into a united Ireland, they reasoned, violence would continue.

Bew believes Sinn Fein took advantage of the moderate position and championed the cause of a united Ireland. The ideologues of republicanism expressed themselves in extremist terms. They not only rejected home rule but demanded a completely Free State devoid of any British participation in Irish politics. For Sinn Fein, anything but a united Ireland was out of the question. The British government also vacillated. Conservatives, especially the military officer corps, were reluctant to abandon the north either to home rule or to an independent Ireland, whereas others sought to solve the Irish problem with some sort of home rule. Bew argues that Sinn Fein moved into the arena by discrediting the Parliamentary Party. Moderation fell by the wayside as extreme republicanism increased.

Selective Terror Michael Collins was appalled by the amateur tactics of the Easter Rising. Revolution, he believed, could be successful, but it would not develop from a popular uprising. It needed to be systematic, organized, and ruthless. After being released from prison as part of a general amnesty, Collins studied the tactics of Russia’s People’s Will and the writings of earlier anarchists and terrorists. Collins developed a strategy called selec- tive terrorism. Devising a plan that would later influence terrorists as diverse as the proto-Israeli group Irgun Zvai Leumi and Ernesto “Che” Guevara’s Communist revo- lutionaries in Cuba, Collins reasoned that indiscriminate terror was of no value. Ran- dom or large-scale attacks would alienate public opinion. Conversely, launching an attack and waiting for the population to spontaneously rise to rebellion was equally

anOTHer PerSPecTive

State Repression

Edward Herman (1983) says terrorism should be defined in terms of state repression. During the Cold War, the United States supported several Latin American dictatorships because the dic- tatorships were anti-communist. These govern- ments, which had some of the worst human rights records in history, routinely jailed, tortured, and executed political opponents. The United States not only ignored the repression, it also funded the activities and trained the repressive military

and police forces. When the amount of human suffering from these dictatorships is compared to violence caused by insurgent terrorism, the pain caused by modern terrorism shrinks to insignifi- cance. The “real terror network,” Herman argues, is found in repressive government. University of Virginia sociologist Donald Black (2004) sum- marizes the paradox evident in Herman’s earlier work. Counterterrorism, he says, is more violent than terrorism.

Free State: The given to the newly formed Repub- lic of Ireland after Irish independence.

22 PART 1 • Terrorism in Historical and Social Contexts

futile. To be effective, terrorism had to selectively and ruthlessly target security forces and their symbols of authority.

After months of planning, recruiting, and organizing, Collins launched a new form of the IRA. He began by gathering intelligence, learning the internal work- ings of British police headquarters, and obtaining a list of intelligence officers. The first attacks were devastating. Using the information from the extensive preparation, Collins’s men ambushed off-duty police and intelligence officers and murdered them. They then began attacking police stations. IRA terrorists would emerge from a crowd- ed sidewalk, throw bombs and shoot police officers, then melt back into the crowd before authorities could respond. A master of strategy, Collins continued a campaign of terror against Unionists and the RIC.

The British responded by sending a hastily recruited military force, called the Black and Tans because of their mismatched uniforms, and Ireland became the scene of a dreadful war. Each side accused the other of atrocities, but both parties engaged in murder and mayhem. The conflict became popularly known as the Tan War or the Black and Tan War. It was a fierce struggle between the IRA’s selective terrorism and British repression. It ended with independence for the southern provinces and Brit- ish control of Northern Ireland. Failure to win freedom for the entire republic cost Michael Collins his life. It also served as the main source of terrorism directed at the United Kingdom through most of the twentieth century.

> How did the IRB evolve toward militancy? > How did the Easter Rising impact republicanism? > What is the meaning of “selective terror,” and how did Collins employ it?

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Emphasizing the Points The United States has changed national security and law enforcement policies based partially on the way it defines terrorism. This is a situational definition, however, because the meaning of terrorism has changed through history. The ideas behind modern democracies were contained in the Enlightenment, giving birth to revolutions in the American colonies and in France. Terrorism was a product of the class-based revolution in France, and the term described the actions of the government. It would go through many changes in meaning until it once again was used to describe gov- ernment repression. Many of the chapters in Part 2 will summarize recent regional histories to show how the definition continues to fluctuate.

Summary of Chapter objeCtiveS

• Terrorism is difficult to define because it is a social construct and not a physical entity. Furthermore, the term is pejorative because it evokes a variety of politi- cally charged responses. The way terrorism is defined often has life or death consequences.

• The term terrorism is defined within social and political contexts, and it means different things in different time periods. The meaning even changes within a historical time frame as contexts change. This is the primary reason that no single definition of terrorism will ever be successful.

Chapter 1 • The Shifting Definition of Terrorism 23

• Definitions of terrorism are important because they guide policy, but there are differing frameworks for definitions. Some approaches emphasize the criminal nature of terrorism. Others focus on the types of targets that terrorist select. While many academics offer definitions, they are probably not as important as policy definitions.

• Terrorism originated during the French Revolution. It described the actions of the government. In the nineteenth century, the French applied it to guerrillas in Spain, and it was used to describe the actions of radical democrats in the 1848 revolutions. By the century’s end, it was used as a label for anarchists and nationalists.

• Socialism refers to controlling an economy by direct democracy and utilizing economic profits to ensure the well-being of citizens. Anarchism is a philosophi- cal concept that originated in ancient Greece. In the eighteenth century, anar- chists generally disavowed the power of national governments. Some anarchists were violent, engaging in bombing and assassination. Communism in its ideal form is socialism with economic production and profits being owned and dis- tributed by workers.

• Modern revolutionary terrorism is closely associated with a series of revolu- tionary activities that began with the People’s Will and continued through the Russian Revolution. After the Communists seized power, they returned to the practice of the French revolutionaries and used terrorism to maintain political power.

• Irish revolutionaries fought for independence for several centuries. The Irish Republican Brotherhood was created in the mid-nineteenth century. They soon adopted the tactics of the 1848 revolutionaries, waging a campaign of terror that culminated in the Black and Tan War.

• After the failure of the Easter Rising, Michael Collins used the term selective terrorism. His intention was to target specific government officials and supporters. He sought to terrorize them until they accepted IRA terms.

LOOkInG InTO THe FuTuRe

If past behavior is the best predictor of future behavior, as psychologists frequently argue, then the definition of terrorism will remain elusive. Aside from confusion sur- rounding the term and multiple agencies using a variety of meanings, there are im- portant international repercussions due to the lack of an internal agreement on a standard definition of terrorism. This will continue to remain problematic and com- plicate international relations. The main reasons are that it will allow murderous sub- national groups to operate with impunity in some parts of the world, and it will give repressive governments additional legitimacy.

In the first case, assume that Country A suffers an attack on innocent civilians by a subnational group wishing to change Country A’s political policies. The citizens of Country A call this an act of terrorism. The group responsible for the attack is based in Country B, but when diplomats from Country A complain, the leaders of Country B respond by saying the group represents a legitimate political organization. While this may result in an incursion into Country B’s sovereign territory and may even led to war, there is no international legal standard to delegitimize the subnational group.

The second case is similar. Assume that a repressive dictator controls Country C. The people suffer under the dictator’s hands, and there is no hope of peaceful political

24 PART 1 • Terrorism in Historical and Social Contexts

change. All forms of dissent are severely punished. The only hope of liberation can come from a revolution. As a result, a small group forms and begins to grow. It engages the government’s forces and leaves citizens alone. The dictator calls this action terror- ism, and the international community lacks a legal standard to contradict this logic.

For the foreseeable future, international diplomats and UN representatives will talk about the problems created by the lack of a standard definition of terrorism. That is probably all they will do. There seems to be little hope of agreeing on a standard definition in the near future.

key TeRMS

Social construct, p. 3 Academic consensus

definition, p. 3 Social context, p. 3 Selective terrorism, p. 4 Nidal Malik Hasan, p. 4

Reign of Terror, p. 9 Spain in 1807, p. 9 Radical democrats, p. 10 Socialists, p. 10 Anarchists, p. 10 Communists, p. 10

Joseph Stalin, p. 15 Vladmir Lenin, p. 15 Vladmir Putin, p. 15 Workers’ Councils (or

Soviets), p. 16 Leon Trotsky, p. 17

Royal Irish Constabulary, p. 19

Supreme Council of the IRB, p. 20

Sinn Fein, p. 20 Free State, p. 21

Learning Objectives After reading this chapter, you should be able to:

44 Explain the value of practical criminology for law enforce- ment and security forces.

44 List the differences between t e r r o r i s t s a n d o r d i n a r y crim inals.

44 Explain the importance of rad- icalization and alienation.

44 Summarize two recent case studies of radicalization.

44 Describe opposing views about prison radicalization.

44 Summarize the controversy re- garding the use of the concept of radicalization.

44 Identify three different types of terrorism.

44 Define lone wolf terrorism.

44 Explain the ways small and large groups use terrorism.

44 Describe the manner in which guerrillas and insurgents use terrorism.

O n Sunday August 5, 2012, Wade Michael Page walked into a Sikh temple in Oak Creek, Wisconsin. He began shooting. Six worshipers were killed inside the temple.

Three other Sikhs, including the temple president, were in- jured trying to stop him. He then followed fleeing people into the parking lot, where he killed two more victims. As police responded, he shot and wounded one of the officers. The po- lice were able to stop him by shooting and killing him. No one knows why he did it.

This was one of many mass-shooting events in the past de- cades. Each murderer had a unique background and access to firearms. As details emerged, investigators found that Page had a background in violent racist music. He was a neo-Nazi involved in the white supremacy movement, and he played in a variety of bands. While not on tour, he spent a lot of time surfing white supremacy websites.

The Southern Poverty Law Center (2012) reported that Page began his path to violent racism while serving in the U.S.

Practical criminology, radicalization, and types of terrorism

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26 PART 1 • Terrorism in Historical and Social Contexts

Army in the 1990s. He gravitated toward hate music and eventually identi- fied with the white supremacy movement. He expressed a vitriolic hatred of Muslims after the September 11, 2001, attacks, and perhaps he thought he was attacking a mosque. Wearing colorful turbans over uncut hair as part of their religious tradition, Sikhs are sometimes confused with Muslims. Yet, Page made no threats and left no statement about his motive.

Even though investigators could not find the reason for Page’s actions, one aspect was clear. He had traveled down an ideological path that ended with murder. He had acted alone and ended the lives of his victims as a lone at- tacker. Some researchers and analysts have a name for Page’s journey to hate and murder. They call it radicalization. They also use a special term to describe such attacks. It is lone wolf terrorism.

the criminology of terrorism There are two branches of criminology in the practical world of criminal justice. When using the word criminology in an academic setting, images of psychological and sociological theories appear in the minds of researchers and teachers. This is clas- sic criminology, which traces its origins to Cesare Beccaria and uses the most modern theories of individual and group behavior. When the word is mentioned in a law enforcement agency, a different image appears. Practical criminology focuses on the common actions of lawbreakers. Police officers are not as concerned with theories of criminality as they are with the practical aspects of criminal behavior. They want to know what criminals do so that they may deter them from committing a crime or catch them after the crime is committed.

The purpose here is to consider this second branch of criminology, the applied actions in crime prevention and apprehension. This distinction is important because although terrorists commit crimes as they struggle for a cause, they differ from or- dinary street criminals. Terrorists have organizational structures, belief systems, and motivational values that separate them from ordinary criminals. The behavioral dif- ferences are even more pronounced during political insurrections. When guerrillas employ terrorism, they usually do so within the context of a political and military strategy. Law enforcement personnel should recognize the differences between typical criminal behavior and terrorist activity if they want to prevent crime and apprehend criminals. Law enforcement officials are frequently the first governmental agents on the scene of a terrorist incident. If they fail to recognize that the scene may be some- thing more than an ordinary crime, they may well miss the point of the investigation.

For example, should malicious destruction of property always be classified as a simple misdemeanor or felony? If someone unlawfully enters a farm, destroys cages, and frees the animals, is this simply malicious destruction? Many law enforcement officers would answer yes; but consider the Animal Liberation Front (ALF). In instruc- tions to members and sympathizers, the ALF advocates the systematic destruction of farms that produce fur for clothing. Their website gives potential recruits tactics for the most effective destruction of mink farms. (See http://www.animalliberationfront .com/index.html.) If a deputy sheriff or state trooper happens on such an attack, it will probably be classified as malicious destruction of property, even though it may well be part of a larger operation.

In terms of terrorism, law enforcement agencies, intelligence organizations, and military forces need to take a practical criminological approach to terrorism. This is

Cesare Beccaria: (1738– 1794) One of the found- ers of the discipline of criminology. His work Of Crimes and Punishments (1764) is the classic En- lightenment study of the discipline.

Chapter 2 • Practical Criminology, Radicalization, and Types of Terrorism 27

especially true for state and local agencies because individual officers are usually the first people to arrive on the scene of a terrorist incident, and if terrorists are active, they frequently have unexpected encounters with law enforcement prior to and after an incident. Troopers, deputies, patrol officers, and investigators will be more effec- tive if they develop practical criminological skills. Recognizing the characteristics of terrorist behavior improves prevention and investigation.

Differences between criminals and terrorists Terrorist investigations do not follow the pattern of most criminal investigations be- cause terrorists seldom behave like normative street criminals. D. Douglas Bodrero (2002), the former commissioner for the Department of Public Safety in Utah and a former member of the International Association of Chiefs of Police Committee on Terrorism, offers a comparative analysis between terrorist behavior and that of ordi- nary criminals. Bodrero argues that typical criminals are opportunistic. This means that criminals tend to be impulsive. Most street criminals do not plan their crimes ex- tensively, and they react to easy opportunities on the spur of the moment. Criminals are usually not committed to a cause. Even career criminals do not believe in crime as an ideology or religion. Crime is just a method for obtaining goods. Because of this lifestyle, criminals tend to be self-centered and undisciplined. Except for a small proportion of career criminals, ordinary street criminals are untrained. Their goal is to obtain cash or goods and get away.

Bodrero and most police officers base crime prevention and apprehension strate- gies on these assumptions about street criminals for one simple reason: They work. By protecting (or hardening) targets, denying opportunity, and conducting aggressive pa- trols, many ordinary street crimes like burglary can be suppressed (W. Harris, 1998). In addition, making police an extension of the community can reduce crimes that seem to defy suppression, such as domestic violence (Trojanowicz et al., 1998). By using criminal intelligence files to keep track of known felons, criminal associations,

FIgurE 2.1 theory vs. practice

One of the issues that has dominated the discipline of criminal justice over the past few decades is the debate about the academic function of the discipline. Some scholars favor a theoretical approach to the field, while others believe that professors with previous professional experience are better suited to address the discipline. This debate takes place not only on college campuses but in the worka- day world of criminal justice as well.

Here are some examples of the differences between practitioners in the field and theoretical social scientists:

Professionals—tend to focus on criminological findings that will result in crime fighting and solutions for community problems.

Professionally oriented social scientists—tend to conduct studies that will help professionals reduce crime.

Theoretically oriented social scientists—tend to focus research on increasing the body of scientific knowledge regardless of application.

In reality, all three approaches are necessary and valued. Each “type” of criminology has a valid purpose.

28 PART 1 • Terrorism in Historical and Social Contexts

and crime patterns, police suppress criminal activity. Police search for hangouts of local criminals, they know their friends and family, and they maintain sources of in- formation about suspicious activity. These procedures not only serve as the basis of community policing, they are the essence of criminal investigation.

Bodrero (2002) says terrorist behavior differs from standard patterns of crimi- nal behavior because terrorists are highly motivated and loyal to a particular cause. Whereas ordinary criminals are opportunistic, terrorists are focused. They may select targets of opportunity, but the targets have symbolic value. Terrorists use crime to make a symbolic statement about a political cause.

If criminals are uncommitted and self-centered, terrorists find strength in a cause and the ideology or religion behind the cause. They are supported by an organiza- tion and sent on a mission. They are team oriented even when they act as individuals. For example, suicide bombers do not act alone; their preparation involves teamwork. Being part of something greater than themselves becomes the basis for action. Even in the case of lone wolves, the ideology is all-consuming. They might act alone, but deep-seated beliefs cause loners to feel that their actions are part of the vanguard of a movement. Terrorism is an organizational process, whether support is real or implied through ideology (Schweitzer, 2000; Khashan, 2003; Kaplan et al., 2005; Azam, 2005).

Ideology and religion are not limited to suicide bombers; they also influence in- dividuals who will become terrorists for a single event. For example, Buford Furrow entered a Jewish daycare center in August 1999 and began shooting people. He was a lone wolf. He had no extensive logistical network or support organization. Yet, Furrow was consumed by an ideology of hate and a religion that demonized Jews. He was not an uncommitted opportunistic criminal acting alone. He was an agent of an ideology on a divine mission. Again, as Bodrero (2002) indicates, this is not the pattern of typi- cal criminals. Bodrero says that criminals are undisciplined, untrained, and oriented toward escape. Terrorists are exactly the opposite. They have prepared for their mis- sion, they are willing to take risks, and they are attack oriented. Lone wolves might be untrained, but they are prepared and attack oriented.

In summary, terrorists and criminals exhibit practical behavioral differences. These include:

1. Criminals are unfocused. Terrorists focus their actions toward a goal. 2. Criminals may live in a criminal underworld, but they are not devoted to crime

as a philosophy. Terrorists are dedicated to a cause. 3. Criminals will make deals to avoid punishment. Terrorists rarely cooperate with

officials because they do not wish to betray their cause. 4. Criminals usually run when confronted with force. Terrorists tend to attack. 5. Criminals strike when the opportunity to do so is present. Terrorists strike

symbols after careful planning. 6. Criminals rarely train for crime. Terrorists prepare for and rehearse their

operations.

These differences influence the ways criminal intelligence is gathered and the pro- cess of criminal investigations. Terrorism investigations involve long-term observa- tion, informant development, and evidence collection. They usually involve a lengthy process of piecing together elements of a complex criminal conspiracy (see Lee, 2005; Dyson, 2008).

The significance of Bodrero’s argument can be measured in the investigative re- sponse to terrorism. When investigating a crime, police officers can take advantage of the behavioral characteristics of typical criminals. The most hardened criminals will usually act in their own self-interest, and they will make deals to receive a lesser

Chapter 2 • Practical Criminology, Radicalization, and Types of Terrorism 29

radicalization John Horgan (2009) argues that many psychological approaches have mistakenly focused on the root causes of terrorism. Such studies miss the point. Rather than searching for the “roots of terrorism,” Horgan believes researchers should search for the routes to terrorism. In other words, Horgan is concerned with the psychological processes that lead people to terrorist groups, the issues that keep them in groups, and support mechanisms for people who want to leave.

The process of becoming a terrorist involves three distinct phases. In the first phase, a person must decide to become a terrorist, and this is followed by a decision to remain in a terrorist group. Both of these decisions return to the arguments about justi- fying violence, but there are points where people decide that they can no longer accept terrorism. Horgan believes this leads to a third process, disengagement—the behavior of people who decide to abandon terrorism. Horgan believes these pathways to ter- rorism are more important than searching for a definitive profile of terrorist behavior.

If Horgan is correct, his research suggests that a more effective approach to profil- ing is to identify actions and policies that may help prevent the desire to join or remain in a group. It also suggests a need to understand and support the factors involved in deciding to leave a group. Horgan asks researchers to focus on the process of radical- ization rather than methods to prevent it.

Practical criminology and radicalism Radicalization involves the processes that change a person’s socially acceptable be- havior into terrorism. John Horgan (2009, p. 155) states that it is unrealistic to as- sume that programs or policies can prevent radicalization. He also notes that most of the people who hold radical views are not violent. Violent radicalization is the problem of terrorism, Horgan believes. Movement toward violence is a social and psychological process influenced by peer groups and terrorist causes. Brian Jenkins (2009) believes that since it is a process, people moving toward violent radicalization exhibit observable signs. Family members, peers, and people closely associated with an individual may witness the behavioral changes. If this is true, others may observe them, too.

The term radicalization is used by law enforcement, intelligence, military, and other agencies. Popular media employ it frequently. Yet, there is not complete agree- ment about the meaning of the term. Some people even question its existence (Porter and Kebbell, 2011). However, if researchers like John Horgan and Brian Jenkins are talking about radicalization, it has an applied meaning. In terms of practical criminol- ogy, radicalization can be seen as a process that causes violence.

sentence. When searching for a fleeing felon, law enforcement officers find it produc- tive to question known associates and keep family and friends under surveillance. These tactics do not work in countering terrorism. Law enforcement, military, and security officials need to focus on ideology, group and individual behavior, and shar- ing information over broad geographical regions to successfully investigate terrorism.

> What is “practical criminology”? > Why does law enforcement focus on practical interpretations of criminology? > What are the differences between terrorists and criminals?

s e l f - c h e c k

routes to terrorism: As used by John Horgan, refers to the psychologi- cal and social factors that motivate people to join and remain in terrorist groups.

radicalization: As used in this context, refers to the psychological process of adopting extremist positions.

violent radicalization: Refers to the process of adopting extremist positions and engaging in violence based on a new set of beliefs.

30 PART 1 • Terrorism in Historical and Social Contexts

Radicalization is believed to cause terrorism when the motivation for political change combines with the process of developing deep-seated doctrines that lead to- ward violent action. It occurs on an individual level when a person decides to join a group and on a group level when an organization decides to employ terrorism ( Tsintsadze-Maass and Maass, 2014). Peter Neumann (2007), who heads an orga- nization designed to study radicalization in the United Kingdom, says that such an approach allows the examination of the political, economic, and social factors that underpin political violence.

Another concept closely associated with radicalization is alienation, a term used in several branches of the social sciences, as well as in other disciplines such as theol- ogy. Many sociologists define alienation as a process by which an individual or group becomes separated from the values, norms, and mores of the dominant social world. This leads to self-estrangement. The concept was initially popularized by Karl Marx’s work on economic alienation, and many sociologists of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries expanded his approach, focusing on concepts like social isolation, lack of meaning, and normlessness.

Many terrorism analysts began looking at radicalization and alienation in the first part of the twenty-first century; their focus tended to be on individuals attracted to Islamic extremism. Some researchers found that individual decisions were less im- portant than the social-psychological patterns of an entire group. Members of groups became radicalized together. A clique of friends moved collectively toward terror- ism, and individual identities were absorbed and redefined when the clique joined a terrorist movement (Borum, 2004; Sageman, 2004, pp. 152–156; Horgan, 2005, pp. 80–105). Further analysis indicated that paths to radicalization developed differ- ently for different causes and different types of groups. Ethnic, nationalistic, political, and religious terrorists were radicalized in a multitude of ways (Post, 2007).

the Process of radicalization A number of researchers believe that members of terrorist groups go through de- cision-making processes while they are being violently radicalized (Sageman, 2004, pp. 152–156; Borum, 2004; Ryan, 2007; Post, 2007; Hoffman, 2009; Rinehart, 2009; Kershaw, 2010; Ganor, 2011). Research in the area has been expanding over the past decade, and there are many emergent findings. One position maintains that radical- ization can be understood as a process of socialization: It is the result of learning to engage in radicalized violence (Wilner and Dubouloz, 2011). Case studies provide rich data to determine individual paths (Ganor, 2011; Vidino, 2011). Another area of growing research is the process of de-radicalization. Although more data is needed, some preliminary findings suggest that if a person can go through a process of radi- calization, the person can reverse the path and become de-radicalized (Gunaratna and Ali, 2010; Horgan and Braddock, 2010). Empirical evidence is still emerging, how- ever, and our knowledge of radicalization is incomplete (Dalgaard-Nielson, 2010).

Marc Sageman (2004) was one of the first analysts to suggest that radicalization could be modeled and observed. Sageman presents radicalization as a six-step frame- work. It starts with alienated young men who find other groups of alienated young men. They “discover” religion as a way of giving meaning to their lives. Terrorism enters the equation if the newfound religious orientation turns to violence. Regardless, it remains difficult to join a terrorist group. These young men must meet a broker, an activist who knows actual terrorists, and be accepted by an actual terrorist group.

Sageman’s framework applies to groups of males, but radicalization also occurs among women. Some recent research suggests that women are attracted to religious

alienation: Happens when an individual or group becomes lost in the domi- nant social world. A per- son or group of people is alienated when separated from the dominant values of society at large.

Chapter 2 • Practical Criminology, Radicalization, and Types of Terrorism 31

study groups as a social outlet in traditional cultures in which they are not given the same opportunities as men. The group gives them a means of social expression and acceptance apart from the male-dominated culture. Radicalization depends on the nature of the study group and the beliefs of dominant males in their lives. If these groups and dominant males emphasize militancy, the women in a study group may become radicalized toward religious violence (Ali, 2007; International Crisis Group, 2009). Paradoxically, women who struggle against a male-dominated culture may reject radicalization as an expression against a male-dominated ultraconservative re- ligious culture (King, 2009).

Johnny Ryan (2007) maintains that there are behavioral commonalities as groups move toward violence. Radicalization is the result of “Four Ps”: persecution, prec- edent, piety, and perseverance. He believes that these four concepts present a single interpretive framework that can be used to understand militant rhetoric and violent behavior. Ryan does this by comparing militant Islamic groups with Irish Republican militancy. He argues that both types of groups feel they have been persecuted and that both groups have experienced this over an extended period of time. The history of persecution presented a precedent for resisting the persecutors. Violence became a righteous or almost sacred action of devotion for both Republicans and Islamic mili- tants. Ryan believes both ideologies have continued over time, and each generation is called upon to make new sacrifices.

The message of radicalization is recognizable and based on experience. Ryan says that al Qaeda and its associated networks explain revolutionary theory in an ideologi- cal manner similar to the IRA. Both Republican and Islamic militants present histori- cal grievances to prove that revolutionary violence is the only alternative to an unjust system. He believes that radicalization cuts across cultures. It can be understood by the formula of heroes and martyrs, grievances against the superior power, and utopian goals that are articulated in the revolutionary message. It is an observable process and can be used to explain violence.

Other researchers have come to the conclusion that there is no single process of being radicalized, but that radicalization can occur in a variety of ways. John Horgan (2009) finds that radicalization occurs as individuals make decisions within the group. These observable points can be found when an individual decides to join a terror- ist group, when the group moves from rhetoric to violence, and when an individual makes the decision to either stay with or leave the group.

Michael King and Donald Taylor (2011) say that radicalization is a process that is not specifically applicable to any national, political, religious, or ideological group.

FIgurE 2.2 Summarizing Sageman’s Model

STEP 1 Alienated young man

STEP 2 Meets other alienated young men and forms bond

INTERIM They become a “Bunch of Guys”

STEP 3 Groups gravitate toward religion

INTERIM They outdo each other in zeal to express love for the group

STEP 4 Religion interpreted in militant terms

INTERIM Most groups stop at this point

STEP 5 Militant group meets terrorist contact

STEP 6 Militants join terrorists as a group decision

32 PART 1 • Terrorism in Historical and Social Contexts

They examine several models in an attempt to find commonalities in research findings. Beginning with Marc Sageman and Sageman’s subsequent work with the New York City Police Department, King and Taylor believe that some form of deprivation or alienation takes place in the initial steps of the model. Steps toward radicalization are a logical response to feelings of alienation.

King and Taylor also believe that three other models dominate the research field in radicalization. The first model focuses on social and economic deprivation and the resentment resulting from it. Deprivation leads to blaming an outside group for the group’s situation, and the outside group is demonized. This provides an opportunity for violent radicalization.

The second model is based on long-term learning. As in the previous model, a group feels that it is victimized. In other words, the people in the group feel deprived because they can never hope to live as well as the group that is victimizing them. Some members of the group eventually seek to understand the reason they are deprived. The answers lead to resentment, and the process is exacerbated when the group has religious goals or is seeking a religious explanation for deprivation. In this model, a group’s orientation is refocused, and radicalization is learned over a period of time.

A third model maintains that radicalization is the result of psychological inter- pretations of events. Individuals in deprived economic circumstances gravitate toward one another and generally resent the position of a superior group. They develop op- tions to attack what they see as unfair treatment. Aggression eventually emerges if the group becomes morally outraged and develops a solidified sense of injustice. Once the group takes a terrorist action, the radicalization process is completed.

King and Taylor combine all the models to suggest three areas for further study. The first area is to seek to understand how people react to relative deprivation. A sec- ond factor involves understanding how a group interprets its identity. This means that researchers need to locate and describe social processes involved in creating subjective reality. The final area involves personality types. King and Taylor believe it is necessary to understand why people exposed to the same social environment react in different ways—most of them do not engage in terrorism.

Hussein Solomon (2014) examines radical Islam in South Africa. Increasing vio- lence in Africa makes him fear the rise of violence in his own nation. He argues that the sources of radicalism are to be found in militants who misinterpret religion. They are located in mosques, missionary organizations, and religious schools. He believes that charismatic militant religious figures are also potential sources of violent extremism. His work is basically a call to action. There is little evidence to support or rebuke his fear because radicalization in South Africa has not been studied sufficiently. Solomon implores researchers and security personnel to look at experiences from other coun- tries and apply their methodologies and findings to South Africa.

testing radicalization with recent case studies Two recent case studies shed light on the process of radicalization. Etri Tsintsadze- Maass and Richard Maass (2014) examined radicalization in the Weather Under- ground, a violent domestic extremist group that conducted a number of bomb attacks from 1969 to 1975. Elena Masters and Rhea Siers (2014) look at the topic through the lens of one individual. They examine the radicalization of Omar Hammani, a young American who left Alabama to join a terrorist group in Somalia.

Tsintsadze-Maass and Maass say that most research on radicalization assumes that people adopt a violent extremist ideology through a rational thought process. It is based on the idea that actors analyze their own personal goals, the reasons they can no longer

Chapter 2 • Practical Criminology, Radicalization, and Types of Terrorism 33

tolerate the current political situation, the need to resort to violence, and the probabili- ties of success. Groups move to terrorism because they think violent action will correct political injustice. The decision to engage in violence is logical, according to most stud- ies of terrorism. But Tsintsadze-Maass and Maass object to this way of thinking.

The decision to engage in terrorism is irrational, they believe. Logical thinking sug- gests that actors adopt behaviors because they think doing so will allow them to achieve their goal. There are times when terrorists select violence in a most illogical manner, and they pursue a course of mayhem and destruction when they have no chance of beating or even changing the system. Such behavior is the result of groupthink.

Five issues are common to groupthink scenarios. First, an external issue creates stress within the group. Second, the group is isolated from other groups or actors. Third, group members have similar backgrounds and believe systems. Fourth, mem- bers believe that bias leadership is normal. Finally, the group lacks a systematic meth- od for making decisions. Tsintsadze-Maass and Maass test their theory or irrational decision making by conducting a historical study of an American terrorist group.

The Weather Underground formed in 1969 when a small group of potentially violent people broke away from a larger anti-war and social justice student move- ment known as the Students for a Democratic Society (SDS). The SDS had more than 100,000 members on college campuses throughout the nation, and their numbers gave them a voice in discussions of economic justice, problems of racism, and foreign policy. Social activism and multiple demonstrations gave the SDS the power to influ- ence political behavior.

Tsintsadze-Maass and Maass argue that the rational choice for anyone wishing to change the direction of American society would have been to strengthen the SDS. Logically, to gain political power, people would have increased membership, expand- ed peaceful public demonstrations, and used voter activism. If the power of the SDS diminished, its relevance would suffer. Extremist political positions espousing violent rejection of social norms are frequently unattractive to potential followers when the majority of people are satisfied with the social system. Therefore, breaking away into a smaller group to espouse more radical views would be illogical and irrational. Yet, this is exactly what the Weather Underground chose to do.

Leadership in the Weather Underground believed that violence was necessary to overthrow the U.S. government. Its members agreed. They came from similar back- grounds, they thought alike, and they acted alike. They called for a massive militant demonstration and expected large numbers of students to join them. When this failed to happen, leaders of the Weather Underground failed to understand that their mes- sage did not appeal to the majority of activists who were working for greater social and economic justice. Instead of recognizing the futility of their position, the small group launched a bombing campaign in the hope of inspiring a revolution. Their goal was illogical and unattainable. Tsintsadze-Maass and Maass argue this situation was the result of groupthink.

groupthink: A mode of problem solving based on consensus. It occurs when members of a group value agreement about the way a problem will be solved rather than solving the problem. Once the mem- bers agree on a course of action, they follow it even when there is no chance of success.

Weather Underground: A left-wing domestic terrorist group operated from 1969 to 1975.

FIgurE 2.3 Conditions Leading to groupthink

1. Group pressured from external political, economic, and social forces

2. Group isolated from other interpretations of reality

3. Group members develop and think alike

4. Believe that leader’s biases are factual and normal

5. Lack of structured decision-making process

34 PART 1 • Terrorism in Historical and Social Contexts

The Weather Underground did not engage in critical thinking. No alternative paths were accepted. Members of the group wanted to support one another. They wanted to think alike. They created a common stereotype of the enemy. They believed their actions expressed a moral absolute. Bombs failed to change political behavior; in fact, they actually increased external threats to the group. Yet, group members never questioned either their extremist views or their violent actions. Members of the Weather Underground dismissed public criticism and rejected any form of self-doubt. They continued to engage in violence, even though it was obvious to everyone else that they could not be successful. All these factors led to further bad decisions, but group members accepted the illusionary world they had created. None of this was logical. Tsintsadze-Maass and Maass conclude that groupthink is responsible for ir- rational terrorism.

Elena Masters and Rhea Siers (2014) study rationalization by looking at a young Alabama man who chose a path of violent religious extremism. Omar Hammami, discussed further in the section on al Shabab in Chapter 7, grew up with a Christian mother and a Muslim father. He converted to Islam from Christianity when he was a teenager, but he fell away from orthodox religion after bitter differences with his father. He became increasingly militant, eventually leaving college and becoming the American face of terrorism in Somalia.

Masters and Siers followed Hammami’s path to see if there was some type of systematic manner of radicalization. Hammami went through many differing experi- ences on a complex journey of self-discovery. His motivations followed several paths with virtually no order. At times, he sought adventure. At other times, he wanted pub- lic praise or self-fulfillment. Much of his behavior was teenage rebellion. Personal con- flict with his father made him determined to do something his father would never do. His indoctrination was far from systematic, and he moved from one form of religion to another. He finally settled on militancy. Masters and Siers could find no systematic pattern in his behavior.

Hammami simply made decisions the way most people make decisions, except that he chose violence in the end. Despite his choice, he never totally committed to terrorism. He was more interested in his personal views and his interpretation of the world. Although he was the face of Somali terrorism on the Internet and was known by many young Somalis in America for his militant rap videos, he broke with the lead- ers of his group in 2013. By September of that year, the leaders killed him and ended his eclectic journey into violent radicalization.

Other cases of radicalization Concrete examples provide illustrations of radicalization. Bruce Hoffman (2009) and Boaz Ganor (2011) have used case studies to explain radicalization in Europe. Indi- vidual cases in the United States may also be used. Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab tried to destroy a Northwest airliner as it entered American airspace after a six-hour flight from Amsterdam on Christmas 2009. He attempted to detonate explosives hidden in his underwear. Passengers noticed Abdulmutallab’s suspicious behavior as the plane neared Detroit, and he was subdued after trying to light the explosives. An American intelligence official assessed the incident by concluding that local issues in the Middle East had driven Abdulmutallab to a global act of terrorism (Dickey, 2010).

Abdulmutallab’s story illustrates the complexity of radicalization. He would seem to have been a poor candidate to fall under the influence of Arabian militants. Born to a wealthy Nigerian family, he received an elite education and went to the United King- dom to complete boarding school and college. Yet, he felt alone and isolated. Raised

Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab: (b. 1986) according to a federal indictment, smuggled a chemical bomb and chemi- cal igniter in a syringe onto a Northwest flight from Amsterdam to Detroit on December 25, 2009. He was born into a family that practiced Islam but became radicalized while attending school in the United Kingdom. He was allegedly trained by terrorists in Yemen, who supplied the explosive compound.

Chapter 2 • Practical Criminology, Radicalization, and Types of Terrorism 35

with a set of tolerant Islamic values, his experience in London challenged his concept of right and wrong. He was alienated. He eventually found solace on militant websites and gravitated toward radicalism. Falling under the influence of a militant preacher, Abdulmutallab eventually joined a militant group in Yemen and began the attempted suicide mission (Hosenball, Isikoff, and Thomas, 2010; New York Times, 2010).

In another instance, James W. von Brunn walked into the U.S. Holocaust Memo- rial Museum in Washington, D.C., on a summer day in 2009. He began shooting, sending frightened tourists scrambling for cover. He was wounded by security guards, but not before he fatally wounded Stephen T. Johns, one of the officers trying to stop him. It was not the first time von Brunn had encountered law enforcement. He had tried to take the Federal Reserve Board hostage in 1981 and was sentenced to prison for the attempt. Von Brunn wanted to wage war on the federal government.

Von Brunn’s radical development did not take place in a vacuum. He had a long history of being a loner and a white supremacist. According to news reports, he con- sumed information from neo-Nazi groups, and he believed that Jews were in league with nonwhite races to destroy white Americans and Europeans. Von Brunn devel- oped antigovernment, racist, and anti-Semitic views over decades, and he maintained a hate-filled website after his release from prison. He attacked the Holocaust Museum as a final act of rage (Stout, 2009; Wilber, 2010).

James von Brunn’s life had the makings for success. Born in the Midwest, he was strong, good-looking, and educated. He entered military service in World War II and returned to enter advertising in New York City. He married into an established East Coast family in 1951 and seemed to be on his way to a successful career. Unfortu- nately, there was another side to von Brunn. He hated Jews with a militant passion. His hatred abated during the war, but it increased after moving to New York City. He began writing about his views, growing increasingly bigoted against both Jews and nonwhites. It eventually cost him his marriage but not his deeper journey into anti- Semitism (Ruane, 2009).

The reasons for von Brunn’s radical descent into hatred are not clear, but there were influences in his life that seem to have spawned an individualized journey into bigotry. He belonged to a German–American friendship group in the late 1930s that served as a front for the Nazi Party. After his divorce, according to the Washington Post, he traveled a path into deeper paranoia and virulent anti-Semitism. This even- tually led to his attempted attack on the Federal Reserve Board in 1981. After be- ing released from prison, he developed even stronger beliefs and began writing and managing a website. Two years before the museum attack, the only son from his first marriage committed suicide. In 2009, he apparently decided he had had enough and that the government and the Jews were going to pay (Ruane, 2009).

Downtown Boston was busy on April 15, 2013. The streets were crowded with runners, and the sidewalks were jammed with spectators. It was the Boston Mara- thon, and runners were crossing the finish line. Suddenly, cheering was replaced with screams of pain and cries of horror. A bomb had exploded on the sidewalk. A second bomb detonated a few moments later, increasing casualties and confusion. Three peo- ple were killed, and 260 were wounded. As the story unfolded, two young immigrants from Kyrgyzstan, Dzhokhar and Tamerlan Tsarnaev, seemed to be responsible for the attack.

Tamerlan was killed in a shootout with the police a few days later, and Dzhokhar, although wounded, was taken into custody. According to federal prosecutors (United States of America v. Dzhokhar Tsarnaev [2013]), Tsarnaev stated that Muslims were all one people, the West was killing them, and Muslims were going to strike back. He was radicalized because the two brothers believed the United States was at war

James W. von Brunn: (1920–2010) an American white supremacist and anti-Semite. He entered the Holocaust Museum on June 10, 2009, and began shooting. He killed a secu- rity officer before he was wounded and subdued. He died in federal custody while awaiting trial.

Dzhokhar Tsarnaev: (b. 1993) and Tamerlan Tsarnaev (1986–2013): two brothers who were members of an immi- grant family in Boston. Dzhokhar was a natural- ized American citizen. They believed the West was at war with their reli- gion and decided to strike back by bombing the 2013 Boston Marathon. Law enforcement officers sub- sequently killed Tamerlan. Dzhokhar was wounded and taken into custody.

36 PART 1 • Terrorism in Historical and Social Contexts

with his faith. The Internet reinforced this belief, and the government claimed that Tsarnaev had learned to make the bomb from a radical online magazine.

According to the federal indictment, the brothers built the bombs inside a pres- sure cooker, which increased the explosive power. Their acts demonstrated the ability of individuals to conduct a terrorist attack on their own.

commonalities in radicalization In the examples of Abdulmatallab, von Brunn, and Hammami, there are several com- mon forms of behavior. First, it is interesting to note that the three men all came from well-to-do, middle-class environments. The New York Times reports that most inter- national attacks against the United States in the twenty-first century have come from well-educated terrorists from the middle class (Mackey, 2010). Gerald Post (2007) argues that such regularities are common to the radicalization process. All three men became deeply angered and filled with moral indignation. This was reinforced by identifying with a victimized group and the desire to violently redress grievances. They were alienated from mainstream thought as they expressed anger, and they sought to address their situations by doing something meaningful. Finally, there was some type of event that triggered their decision to take violent action.

Recall that Brian Jenkins (2009) believes there are common behavioral patterns associated with radicalization. These patterns may be observed by family members, friends, and other associates. If Jenkins is correct, this would suggest that there is some merit in identifying the behaviors associated with radicalization and in training security personnel to search for and recognize them. This is not to suggest that the National Counterterrorism Center is incorrect in its proposal that security and law enforcement agencies have a broader mission than counterterrorism and that indica- tors may be valuable to such agencies.

For example, assume that you are the chief of a midsize American police agency of 120 personnel. Your officers have recently been trained in the six-step model gleaned from Sageman: (1) alienated youth, (2) join other alienated youths, (3) they seek ori- entation in religion, (4) their religion is militarized, (5) they encounter an actor who knows terrorists, and (6) the actor introduces them to the terrorists and they join. Because there are differing paths to radicalization, there are more models, but we will use this model for illustration.

Assume the training has taken place, and your officers are looking for these be- havioral patterns during investigations and routine patrol operations. If this happens, you would soon be receiving field contact information and reports that identify alien- ated young people and the groups they join throughout your jurisdiction. This would help identify potential problems in schools, communities, and other organizations. It would also help identify potentially harmful directions in which alienated young people could move, such as gangs or other criminal groups. Although the original purpose was to gather information on terrorism, the overall result produces a more comprehensive picture of your community. It is part of a concept known as Total Criminal Intelligence.

With 120 personnel, department budgets, and community safety concerns, you have many problems in your jurisdiction. The probability of terrorism in your juris- diction may be low, but if it happens, its impact will be critical. In addition, after the event has occurred, the media, citizens, and elected officials will ask you what you did to prevent it. By training officers to recognize the signs of radicalization, you will have taken a proactive step before an incident and have another tool that allows for better

Chapter 2 • Practical Criminology, Radicalization, and Types of Terrorism 37

deployment of resources because the process gives you a more strategic view of the community (see Saupp, 2010).

Empirical research suggests that even though radicalization resembles other forms of behavior, there are some distinct issues involved. In religious radicalization, people exhibit distinctive forms of behavior, and these may appear in any sequence (Gartens- tein-Ross and Grossman, 2009). They adopt rigid, literalist interpretations of religion. They trust only selected radical sources of theological information, and they tolerate no deviance from their interpretation. These patterns can be seen across many reli- gions (White, 2010).

When Islam is involved, there are other behavioral indicators. People being radi- calized accept the idea of the “clash of civilizations,” and they believe that the West is at war with Islam. They selectively interpret government actions to prove the point. They also aggressively and vehemently attempt to convert other Muslims to their point of view and publicly denounce those who will not follow them. They either break away from mainstream mosques or join an organization that supports their interpretation of religion. Finally, they begin adopting traditional forms of dress (Gartenstein-Ross and Grossman, 2009).

Eli Berman’s (2009, pp. 30–35) suggestion about violent groups is also worth not- ing when security forces are dealing with terrorism. The number of terrorist groups is rather small, while the number of radicalized people is very large. The key to coun- terterrorism is to focus on radicalized individuals when they try to join the militant group. John Horgan (2009, p. 155) complements this idea with another tactic: It is virtually impossible to control all the factors that may radicalize a person, but there are points when terrorists want to leave the organization. It is important to know how to extricate people. They might always be radicalized, Horgan points out, but if they are not engaged in violence, they are not terrorists.

individual journeys There is evidence to suggest that radicalization is not always a group process, or at least that it involves individual reflection whether a group plays a role or not. Post’s (2007) research shows that individual psychological and sociological factors create the framework for interpreting reality. The influence of social structure serves as the major background for interpreting reality for most individuals. Post says that ideol- ogy is transferred from generation to generation within this framework, and he be- lieves that traditions of radicalization are passed in this manner.

Earlier research by Martin van Creveld (1991) and Thomas P. M. Barnett (2005) reinforces the pattern presented by Post. Radicalization tends to happen with indi- vidual interpretation of larger actions. The probability of individual radicalization increases when a relatively weak group feels that its existence is threatened and that it has been victimized by a superior power. Feelings increase if the superior group dominating the threatened group is believed to be morally depraved. These situations create the social and psychological conditions for a person to become radicalized. All social conventions pass and the radicalized victim comes to believe that terrorism is the only weapon for the weak to use against the strong.

> What are the three key questions about radicalization, according to Horgan? > How does groupthink reinforce radicalization? > What common patterns of radicalization appear in case studies?

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38 PART 1 • Terrorism in Historical and Social Contexts

two views of Prison radicalization As demonstrated by the previous section, several scholars and practitioners in the field of terrorism believe radicalization is the beginning of a process that may lead to extremist views and political violence. This discussion has overflowed into studies of prison systems. Many people believe that prisons are academies for crime; that is, less experienced inmates learn how to become more effective criminals from older in- mates. A similar argument is applied to terrorism. Terrorists must be separated from the general population. Otherwise, they will convert inmates from the general popu- lation and transform them into fellow terrorists. In other words, prisons run the risk of becoming schools for terrorism.

Many scholars are leery of such simple generalizations, but they do believe that prisons present opportunities for radicalization. Excellent researchers, such as Mark Hamm (2007 and 2009) have uncovered processes and stages for conversion to, im- mersion in, and acceptance of violent radical philosophies or religions within prison walls. Such research is more sophisticated than generalizations about terrorist schools. However, other scholars and practitioners find little or no evidence for prison radi- calization.

the Process of radicalization in Prison Recent reports suggest that groups are being radicalized in prison, and Mark Hamm (2007) has conducted a definitive study of prison radicalization in the United States. The process in prison usually involves a charismatic leader who gathers a number of individuals in an entourage. A leader will often target selected prisoners for a group or will dominate new inmates, intimidating them until they join the group. Hamm maintains that this recruitment is similar to procedures used by street gangs.

Terrorists also use recruiters who are not incarcerated. This is most frequently as- sociated with religion, and the person who recruits and radicalizes potential terrorists may be a visiting chaplain. A chaplain has access to prisoners and may claim freedom of religion while delivering a radical message. Hamm says militant chaplains also dis- tribute radical literature in the form of religious works.

Most of the people who enter prison have to adjust psychologically to the loss of freedom, constant monitoring, and threatened violence from other prisoners. This frequently leaves a new inmate, especially someone in prison for the first time, in a state of crisis. Recruiters for a radical cause often recognize differing types of crises, and they try to bring individuals to the radical cause with strategies that match the psychological state of the person they hope to entice.

Hamm found five common patterns of converting people to violent radical causes. The first contains people in crisis, who will respond to religious overtures for emotion- al support. A second involves people seeking protection in the prison environment. These people will convert because the radical group offers safety. The third group of potential converts—Hamm calls these people searchers—have had little exposure to religion, and they are fascinated by both the multiplicity of religious expressions inside prison and the feeling of belonging among members of the group. The fourth involves a personality that is common in prison—manipulating people for personal gain. Finally, Hamm classifies chaplains from the outside as free-world recruiters.

Behind almost every conversion, according to Hamm, lies a friendship or kinship link, but sometimes, a new inmate simply meets somebody in the yard and converts to a new faith. Radicalization tends to take place among two factions and three ma- jor groups. The first faction involves various Muslim groups who use cut-and-paste

Chapter 2 • Practical Criminology, Radicalization, and Types of Terrorism 39

versions of the Quran, and the second group centers around white supremacy. This results in three major groups: (1) Islamic extremists, (2) Christian extremists who use selected biblical passages to justify their views, and (3) white supremacists who have adopted the Norse pantheon of Odin, Thor, Frida, and the other gods and goddesses (Martin, 2007; Hamm, 2009).

Patterns of prison radicalization in other countries seem to follow patterns simi- lar to those uncovered by Hamm, but the level of the threat they represent varies. In Central Asia, the prison systems are deteriorating, and it is difficult to monitor outside religious leaders who make visits to inmates. Militant Islamic missionaries use this situation as an opportunity to radicalize individuals. Militant converts are growing inside Central Asian prisons, threatening to further disrupt correctional operations. In addition, individuals seek to join other militant groups outside the prison after they are released. Prison radicalization is a growing threat in Central Asia (International Crisis Group 2009).

The United Kingdom, on the other hand, has experienced growing prison radi- calization, but it does not present as great a problem as in Central Asia (Gartenstein- Ross, 2009). At this point, researchers know that radicalization takes place inside prisons, but there is not enough evidence to indicate how dangerous the threat is.

Questioning Prison radicalization Other research studies point in a different direction. Richard Pickering (2012) says the Prison Service in the United Kingdom has developed a program to prevent radi- calization. Officials monitor the behavior of outside chaplains, move to isolate and counter inmates who champion radical ideas, search for the presence of radicaliza- tion in prison, and continue searching during the management period for released inmates. Although he maintains that these activities are important, the Prison Service has little evidence that radicalization occurs in British prisons.

A government-sponsored study in the United Kingdom found that many terrorists have been in prison, but there is scant evidence that they were radicalized within the walls. Pickering believes that radicalization has multiple causes, and it is difficult to differentiate the ways people develop violent extremist views. Further, radicalization is a nebulous concept and hard to quantify. The best preventive approach, he concludes, is standard inmate monitoring. A person is shocked upon entering prison. Pickering

FIgurE 2.4

PRISON RADICALIZATION—Mark Hamm’s research for the National Insti- tute of Justice concludes that inmates are recruited and radicalized in a number of ways:

Crisis Convert—joins a radical group as a result of a personal crisis

Protection-Seeking Convert—seeks a group out of fear

Searching Converts—have been exposed to religion, but seek deeper meaning while in prison

Manipulating Converts—are controlled by a strong member inside a group

Free-World Converters—result from chaplains outside of the system who spread literature and preach radicalization

Source: Hamm, 2007.

40 PART 1 • Terrorism in Historical and Social Contexts

says radicalization may be possible, but it is more important to ensure that a new inmate does not withdraw into self-isolation.

Louise Porter and Mark Kebbell (2011) examined 21 male inmates convicted of terrorism in Australia and found that they shared several commonalities. Exposure to radical theology was the most common denominator in their decision to engage in violence, and almost all of them expressed religious intolerance. Sixteen of the men adapted radical views from exposure to the Internet. Most of the subjects had close family ties, but they were not connected with their respective communities. Interest- ingly, they tended to separate themselves from the local Muslim community and their mosques as their extremist views increased. All claimed a desire to seek revenge for a perceived injustice or attack on their faith. The men did not turn to violent theology because they were isolated. They became isolated after they turned to extremism. A final important point: They taught theology to themselves.

Although the 21 subjects shared these characteristics, Porter and Kebbell point out that the remainder of their social behavior was similar to the rest of the popula- tion. They tended to be older than terrorists in other countries, but most of the men were married, had children, and were employed. Two of them were professionals with advanced education, and only one was a committed felon before he became radical- ized. Some of them claimed to have trained with terrorist groups in other countries, but the researchers doubted these claims. Each of the attacks that led to their ar- rest and conviction for terrorism had been unsophisticated. The attacks did not bear the marks of basic tactical training. Basically, they looked and acted like most other people, which led Porter and Kebbell to conclude that the men convicted of terrorism were just ordinary individuals. They had little influence in the prison community.

Clarke Jones (2014) reviewed cases from several Asian and Western countries. He say mainstream beliefs are that prisons housing terrorists are schools for recruit- ing and training new terrorist, and this fact means that terrorists should be separated from the general population to eliminate their influence. These concepts are based on limited research on radicalization.

The discussion of prison radicalization takes place in the media, government cir- cles, and academic settings. These portrayals overemphasize the existence of radical- ization. Jones is not suggesting that the process of developing violent extremist views is unimportant, but the ideas are misrepresented. Prison officials equate radicalization with the fear of Islam. Both staff and fellow prisoners treat many Muslim inmates poorly as a result. In addition, since Islam is perceived to be the problem behind radicalization, there is little differentiation between Muslim inmates in general and their radical counterparts. Both sets of people are lumped together. Ironically, Jones concludes, when convicted radicals are placed in the general population, peer pressure causes them to conform to the norm.

Bert Useem and Obie Clayton (2009) take the argument further. Their research found no statistical data to demonstrate massive radicalization in U.S. prisons, and the actual probability that it will occur is far less than popularly believed. Radicaliza- tion in prison is one of the most discussed and least understood subjects in modern American corrections. Prisons seem to inhibit radicalization for a number of reasons. Inmates are subjected to rigid, structured order, and there are social boundaries be- tween prisoners who hold extremist views and those who do not. The institution con- tinually emphasizes and reinforces a message of nonradicalization, rewarding inmates who behave accordingly. Most inmates in the United States have completed less for- mal schooling than the general population, making the abstract ideas in complicated radical ideologies difficult to understand. Useem and Clayton say that although they found no evidence of prison radicalization, it could happen. Vigilance is the key to preventing it, just as with most of the other problems in American prisons.

Chapter 2 • Practical Criminology, Radicalization, and Types of Terrorism 41

rejecting the term There is another position that is in opposition to both the acceptance of theories about the process of radicalization in general and prison radicalization. Some schol- ars question the value of the term radicalization. Others vehemently reject it. From the perspective of practical criminology, some practitioners believe that research in radicalization and alienation will produce valuable knowledge. The National Coun- terterrorism Center (2010c, p. 133), a federal agency created in 2004 to integrate information gathered on international terrorism, officially says that this type of infor- mation does not help analysts understand the process of radicalization. Indicators of radicalization reflect experiences and behaviors seen in all people. In addition, people who are radicalized are motivated by local issues, and radicalization is so diverse that its myriad sources are difficult to discern. Therefore, the so-called signs of radicaliza- tion are really only signs of human behavior. According to the National Counterter- rorism Center, there is little need to study the processes of radicalization.

Neither scholars nor practitioners are quite sure about the meaning of radicaliza- tion. It has been operationally defined, and most working definitions approach it as the process of adopting violent extremist views. Yet, as Mark Sedgwick (2010) notes, there is no consensus about the definition of radicalization. Many researchers use the term, but it is used in a variety of different contexts. Security experts see radicalization as a problem for law enforcement, while those concerned with eliminating relative economic deprivation seek to integrate minority groups into the dominant system. On a grander scale, foreign policy experts look at radicalization as a problem cre- ated by networks of groups, schools, and national or regional ideologies. All of these contexts are different, and each approach has its own set of assumptions and research agendas. Sedgwick believes that the term radicalization simply confuses everybody. He proposes a solution: Abandon the use of the word as an absolute, definitive concept.

Chetan Bhatt (2010) believes radicalization is associated with alienation. He looks at Muslim populations inside the United Kingdom and argues that Western governments seek to integrate and assimilate immigrant populations. This poses a problem because many immigrants choose to maintain their native identity, including political and religious affiliations. This does not represent a path toward political violence; however, it does indicate a rejection of Western norms. It is possible to argue that continued identification with traditional values is a form of purposeful alienation. The new country’s values and norms are rejected, while the old country’s ways are incorporated in a different society.

Bhatt compares Pakistani militia movements to the activities of Central Asian immigrants in northwest London. The issue does not appear to be alienation. Bhatt argues that the Muslim community is exposed to a wide array of militant thinking, and this thinking may impact the subsequent decisions of young people to support militant groups or to take violent action. Militant ideology is not the main source of the decision to engage in violence; rather, the growth of international organiza- tions that train paramilitary fighters is the source of militancy. The primary culprit is Pakistan’s intelligence agency. By supporting militant groups that use terrorist tactics, Pakistan has created new associations between international paramilitary groups and Muslim immigrants in the United Kingdom. Militancy is not a result of alienation; it is a conscious decision to maintain national identity and sacrifice for a greater cause.

Frazer Egerton (2011) states that the common perception of the Salafi–jihadist movement is related to alienation. Yet, writers in this field seldom define what they mean when they use the term alienation, and the term is generally undertheorized and over- applied. The discussion of alienation, he asserts, is intuitive but unsubstantiated. One of the common approaches, he argues, is to look at structure. It is commonly assumed

42 PART 1 • Terrorism in Historical and Social Contexts

that young Muslim males between the ages of 15 and 30 are alienated from social structures and as a result, they are frustrated and are attracted to violent ideologies.

In other versions of structural alienation, young males are seeking meaning, and they move toward religion to find that meaning. As a young man becomes more and more involved in religious activities, he moves toward radical interpretations of the religion and subsequently to violence. A variant of the religious journey involves the relationship between economic deprivation and terrorist violence. This version of structural alienation maintains that poor economic conditions alienate young men from society and lead them to take out their frustration in violence. Another popular version of structural alienation involves ethnic exclusion. Proponents of this theory maintain that when people are excluded from normative society due to their race or ethnicity, they respond with violence.

Egerton concludes that while such theories are attractive and are used to explain terrorist violence, they are overly generalized. For example, very few people respond to alienation with terrorist violence. In addition, most religious behavior, even fervent, intolerant religious beliefs, does not lead to terrorism. Egerton suggests that social scientists avoid referring to alienation. He says that the concept is nuanced and com- plex and linking it with alienation only makes things more confusing. Radicalization and alienation exist in degrees, and they are manifested in several different ways. To suggest that someone is alienated is to ignore the complexity of human behavior. Re- searchers will obtain more fruitful results by examining militant ideology and finding the concepts that attract followers.

Some researchers simply reject the term radicalization. Arun Kundnani (2012) says the use of the term radicalization has become normative in practical and schol- arly approaches to terrorism, but it distorts both perspectives. When it is used in the West, radicalization has become synonymous with Islam. It has been used by a host of scholars and self-proclaimed experts who claim that a process of de-radicalization can be created. Others believe they can intervene and prevent radicalization. The re- sult is that the whole Muslim community is potentially susceptible to the process and because of this, Islam is viewed with suspicion.

Kundnani may be correct, but in terms of practical criminology, security person- nel are served by looking at the behavioral characteristics of violent extremists. This may provide tools to counter violence. Radicalization is a broad term that has little practical value. Violent extremists, however, tend to have their own ways of talking and acting. These actions are unique to particular ideologies. Law enforcement, intel- ligence, and military units are best served by learning the behavior cues, jargon, and indicators of the particular type of terrorism they face.

> Why do some officials and scholars fear prison radicalization? > What evidence contradicts the concept of prison radicalization? > Why do some people reject the idea of radicalization altogether?

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types of terrorism Regardless of your interpretation of the radicalization process, terrorism is the result of extremists deciding to use violence. It may appear to be random, unorganized, and senseless. Yet, these common assumptions are incorrect because terrorism has a pur- pose. It is designed to frighten a targeted audience, coercing its victims to behave in a particular manner. While the greatest form of political violence is due to nation-states engaged in war or political repression, security forces often deal with lesser forms of

Chapter 2 • Practical Criminology, Radicalization, and Types of Terrorism 43

subnational conflict. Accordingly, law enforcement and related security operations are concerned with three types of terrorism: (1) individuals using terrorist tactics, (2) small groups using terrorism as a strategy, and (3) terrorist tactics used to support guerrilla warfare or insurgencies.

Lone Wolves William Pierce (MacDonald, 1989), the late white supremacist, wrote a series of magazine short stories that eventually evolved into a novel, Hunter. The book is a fictional account of a violent right-wing extremist who decides to launch a terror- ist campaign. The protagonist is fearful of sharing his plans with others lest he be betrayed. He decides to form an organization that cannot be penetrated by the police or an informant. This organization, in Pierce’s words, is the mind. The main character goes on a killing spree, targeting nonwhites, Jews, couples of mixed race, and white “race traitors.” He is a lone wolf.

Lone wolves represent the most basic form of terrorism. It requires only a person who is so aggrieved that he or she will engage in violent action to make a statement. Criminals and people in mental crisis may engage in serial bombings or single mass shootings, but lone wolves differ. Like other terrorists, they engage in purposeful vio- lence to impact a target audience. Their victims are not the audience they are seeking. They are addressing the people who see and/or hear about the attack.

Sometimes, lone wolves assume that their attack will result in their capture or death. They engage in an attack and become terrorists for a single event. Nidal Malik Hasan’s attack at Fort Hood, discussed in Chapter 1, falls in this category. In another example, Buford Furrow entered a Jewish daycare center in August 1999 and began shooting people. He had no extensive logistical network or support organization. Yet, Furrow was consumed by an ideology of hate and a religion that demonized Jews. He was not an uncommitted opportunistic criminal acting alone. He was an agent of an ideology on a divine mission.

At other times, lone wolves plan a campaign. In September 2014, Eric Matthew Frein allegedly attacked a rural Pennsylvania State Police post. According to media reports, he shot two troopers from a hidden position in the woods outside of a rural post, killing one officer and wounding another. News reports stated that he was an- gry about several issues in American society, and he wanted to commit mass murder. Multiple police agencies conducted an extensive search for many days, and Frein was captured before he could complete his plans.

Recently, some terrorist groups have called on individual sympathizers to take ac- tion on their own, and sometimes, individuals are motivated to follow the advice. At other times, an individual such as Eric Frein becomes so upset that no external group is necessary. Single issues also motivate individuals. For example, antiabortion activist Eric Rudolph planted multiple bombs and led investigators on a seven-year search due to his anger over a single issue. Some actions are planned, and terrorists train for the event. However, most attacks are amateurish. The variety of lone wolf attacks makes it difficult to categorize activities.

Lone wolves represent a special problem. As Pierce said, it is virtually impossible to infiltrate thought processes. Still, there are certain counteractions that are effective against them. When law enforcement officers have reasonable suspicion that a per- son is committing or is about to commit a crime, it is reasonable to gather and share intelligence about that individual (Carter, 2009). In addition, a police force that has its personnel deeply engaged in solving community problems and relating closely to people in the community will find that individual citizens will share information that might identify potential lone wolves (White, 2013).

44 PART 1 • Terrorism in Historical and Social Contexts

small groups and Urban terrorism The second type of terrorism involves groups operating without the support of an actual or de facto state. Previous research demonstrates that small groups tend to be weak, while larger groups have more staying power and sometimes have the re- sources to maintain a campaign. For the most part, small groups tend to last less than 18 months (Gurr, 1988a and 1988b; see also Damphousse and Smith, 2004). Small groups can create chaos, but they have little chance of overall victory. Their primary objective is to project an aura of power; that is, terrorism gives the illu- sion of strength. Small groups use terrorism as a strategy. Due to their relative weak- ness when compared to security forces, the only thing they do is create terror. Small groups follow an urban model of terrorism.

Frantz Fanon (1925–1961) inspired anti-imperial violence after World War II, and his influence remained with Western ideological groups in the 1960s and 1970s. Born on Martinique in 1925, Fanon studied medicine in France and became a psychiatrist. When Algeria revolted against French rule in 1954, Fanon went to Algiers to work in a mental hospital. His experiences there caused him to side with the rebels. Fanon believed the pressures caused by exploitative imperialism were the primary causes of mental illness in Algeria. He produced two works, The Wretched of the Earth (1982) and A Dying Colonialism (1965), as a result of his Algerian experiences. He died of cancer in 1961, a year before the Algerian War ended, and he was unable to play a leading role in revolutions; his thoughts, however, were strongly imprinted on Africa, Asia, and Latin America (see University of Singapore, 2007).

In The Wretched of the Earth, Fanon indicts colonial powers and calls on all the colonized to practice terrorism. He writes that Western powers have dehumanized

FIgurE 2.5 a Sample of Lone Wolf attacks

DATE ATTACK LOCATION

October 2014 Police officers attacked with hatchet New York City

October 2014 Suspected jihadist kills soldier then storms Parliament

Ottawa, Canada

September 2014 Workers attacked with knife; woman beheaded; suspected religious motivation

Oklahoma City, Oklahoma

May 2014 Jihadist kills four in Jewish museum Brussels, Belgium

May 2013 Soldier stabbed and killed by jihadists London, England

April 2013 Boston Marathon bombing: three killed, 260 wounded

Boston

March 2012 Seven people killed by al Qaeda–inspired man Toulouse, France

July 2011 77 people killed by right-wing extremist Oslo and Utoya Island, Norway

March 2011 Two U.S. airmen killed Frankfort, Germany

February 2010 Antigovernment extremist crashes plane into federal building

Austin, Texas

November 2009 13 killed in Fort Hood shooting San Antonio, Texas

June 2009 Jihadist kills U.S. Army recruiter Little Rock, Arkansas Source: Time (http://time.com/3533581/canada-ottawa-shooting-lone-wolf-terrorism/)

Chapter 2 • Practical Criminology, Radicalization, and Types of Terrorism 45

non-Western people by destroying their cultures and replacing them with Western values. Even when Westerners are not present, a native middle class embraces West- ern values and turns its back on the general population. Natives in the middle class abandon native intellectualism and their own culture and replace them with Western traditions. The masses end up suffering a perpetual identity crisis: To succeed, they are forced to deny their heritage. Fanon argues that the natives can follow only one course of action: revolution.

To be sure, Fanon was no Gandhi. His only argument was for violent revolt, in- cluding guerrilla warfare and acts of terrorism. He claimed that decolonization was destined to be a violent process because it involved replacing one group of powerful people with another group. No group would willingly surrender power. Therefore, according to Fanon, achieving freedom was inherently violent. Political action and peaceful efforts toward change were useless. Only when oppressed people recognized that violence was their only alternative would they be assured of victory. Fanon saw guerrilla warfare and individual acts of terrorism as tools of revolution. Guerrilla war was the initial method of revolt because third-world revolutionaries could not mount direct, conventional campaigns at the beginning of their struggles. Fanon’s concept of guerrilla warfare was based in rural revolution, but urban terrorism would become the major weapon rendering colonial administration impotent.

Terrorism was to be limited to specific acts. Fanon argued that terrorism should not be used against the native population in general. Like Communist Chinese revolu- tionary leader Mao Zedong, he believed doing so would alienate potential supporters. Instead, he proposed two targets for terrorism: white settlers and the native middle class. The purpose of terrorism was to terrorize Westerners and their lackeys into submission. Individual murders, bombings, and mutilations would force the white set- tlers to leave the country and frighten the native middle class away from their colonial masters. Brutality would be the example. It would bring on governmental repression, but this would only cause more natives to flock to the terrorist cause.

Fanon’s ideas flourished in Latin America, but they came with a twist. Beginning in Brazil, some revolutionaries believed cities would be the focus of Latin American revolution, and they embraced Fanon’s idea of urban terrorism. They felt a revolution- ary could create the context for an impromptu general uprising through the use of spontaneous violence. Directly reflecting Fanon, these revolutionaries believed terror- ism could communicate with the people and infuse them with the spirit of revolt. The foremost proponent of this idea in Latin America was Carlos Marighella (1911–1969; see O’Connor, 2007).

Marighella was a Brazilian legislator, a leader of the nationalistic Communist Party, and eventually a fiery revolutionary terrorist. Brazilian police killed him in an ambush in 1969. In two major works, For the Liberation of Brazil (1971) and The Minimanual of the Urban Guerrilla (1969), Marighella designed practical guides for small group urban terrorism. These books have had more influence on recent revolu- tionary terrorism than any other set of theories. Marighella wanted to move violence from the countryside to the city, and although his call to terrorism was politically motivated, his model was apolitical. He designed a method for organizing a campaign of terror that, for the past 40 years, has been employed by groups ranging across the political spectrum—from the Japanese Red Army to the Freemen of Montana.

Marighella believed the basis of revolution was violence. Violence need not be structured, and efforts need not be coordinated among groups. Violence created a situation in which revolution could flourish. Any type of violence was acceptable be- cause it contributed a general feeling of panic and frustration among the ruling classes and their protectors. Marighella’s most original concept was that all violence could

Carlos Marighella: (1911–1969) A Brazilian Communist legislator and revolutionary theorist. Marighella popularized urban terrorism as a meth- od for ending repression and eliminating U.S. domi- nation of Latin America. He was killed in a police ambush in São Paulo in 1969.

46 PART 1 • Terrorism in Historical and Social Contexts

be urban based and controlled by a small group of urban guerrillas. From Brazil, this concept of revolution spread throughout the world.

The hierarchy of Marighella has been replaced by uncoordinated activities in many groups, but Marighella might have been satisfied with this, since his four-stage model did not require coordination. Urban terrorism was to begin with two distinct phases: one designed to bring about actual violence and the other designed to give that violence meaning. The violent portion of the revolution was to be a campaign employing armed revolutionary cells to carry out the most deplorable acts of violence. Targets were to have symbolic significance, and although violence was designed to be frightening, its logic would remain clear with regard to the overall revolution. That is, those who supported the revolution would not need to fear terrorist violence themselves (see Moss, 1972, pp. 70–72; Marighella, 1969; Smith and Damphousse, 2002, pp. 6–13).

The terror campaign was to be accompanied by a psychological offensive to pro- vide peripheral support for terrorists. The psychological offensive would not only join students and workers in low-level challenges to governmental authority, it would also be used to create a network of safe houses, logistical stores, and medical units. In es- sence, the supporting activities would carry out standard military support functions.

A campaign of revolutionary terrorism in an urban setting could be used to desta- bilize governmental power. A psychological assault would convince the government and the people that the status quo no longer held. They would come to feel that the terrorists were in control. When this situation developed, Marighella believed, the government would be forced to show its true colors. With its authority challenged and the economic stability of the elite eroded, the government would be forced to declare some form of martial law. This would not be a defeat for terrorism but rather exactly what the terrorists and their supporters wanted. Governmental repression was the goal of terrorism at this stage.

This view might appear to be contradictory at first glance, but there was a method to Marighella’s madness. He believed the public supported governmental policies be- cause they did not realize the repressive nature of the state. The terrorist campaign would force the government to reveal itself, thereby alienating the public. With no place else to turn, the public would turn to the terrorists, and the terrorists would be waiting with open arms. As the ranks of the urban guerrillas grew with the rush of public support, Marighella believed, the revolutionaries would gradually abandon their terrorist campaign. Their efforts would focus more and more on the construction of a general urban army, one that could seize key governmental control points on cue. When the urban army had reached sufficient strength, all its forces would be launched in a general strike.

Marighella’s theory has only one weakness: It rarely works. Even so, several small terrorist groups have followed it, even unknowingly at times. Marighella writes that the purpose of the urban guerrilla is to shoot. Any form of urban violence is desirable because a violent atmosphere creates the political environment needed for success. Terrorism can be used to create that environment, and terrorism can be employed with minimal organization. Therefore, terrorism is to be the primary strategy of the urban guerrilla.

Marighella (1969) outlines the basic structure needed for an urban terrorist group in the Minimanual of the Urban Guerrilla. The main operational group of a terror- ist organization should be the firing group. Composed of four to five terrorists each, several firing groups are needed to construct a terrorist organization. They can join as needed to concentrate their power, but their small size ensures both mobility and secrecy. For Marighella, the firing group is the basic weapon of the urban guerrilla.

Chapter 2 • Practical Criminology, Radicalization, and Types of Terrorism 47

In a single theory, Marighella provides the justification for violence and the or- ganizational structure a small group needs to begin killing. Unlike Fanon, Marighella endorsed violence for the sake of violence. Terrorists operating in this way use terror- ism as a strategy. It is the only type of attack they can launch. Guerrillas are capable of other types of operations. Therefore, terrorism becomes a tactic for guerrillas. Glo- balization, modern communications, and new weapons technology allow subnational groups to wage another type of campaign, an insurrection. Some military theorists believe this is a third model of terrorism.

guerrillas and Large group terrorism Sometimes, large groups use terrorism, especially when they have external support or when they enjoy popular appeal from an indigenous population. These groups may have the ability to launch a revolution, lead an insurrection, or launch a guerrilla war. This leads to the final type of terrorism, tactical operations in subnational wars. In this case, terrorism is used as a tactic against specific enemies and their supporters, and guerrillas refuse to employ indiscriminate violence. Targets are selected with care.

Guerrilla war is an age-old phenomenon. Several nationalistic rebellions after World War II were based on guerrilla war, including the long campaign that toppled the Chinese government in 1949. Mao Zedong (1893–1976) inspired both fellow Communist and Nationalistic revolutionaries, but the Cuban Revolution from 1956 to 1959 captured the minds of left-wing ideologues. They came to view guerrilla war as a statement of struggle against capitalist powers, and terrorism had a special role in this revolution (see Wickham-Crowley, 1992, pp. 51–59).

The Cuban Revolution did not create guerrilla warfare, but it popularized it through- out the world. Although only one other guerrilla movement has succeeded in over- throwing an established government—the Nicaraguan Sandinistas in 1979—guerrilla

MEXICO

PANAMA

EL SALVADOR

GUATEMALA BELIZE

HONDURAS

NICARAGUA

COSTA RICA

DOMINICA MARTINIQUE

ST. VINCENT

GRENADA

ST. LUCIA BARBADOS

TOBAGO

BARBUDA ANTIGUA

THE BAHAMAS

Florida

CUBA

JAMAICA PUERTO RICO

VIRGIN ISLANDS

HAITI

DOMINICAN REP.

North Pacific Ocean

Atlantic Ocean

VENEZUELA

COLOMBIA

GUIANA

FIgurE 2.6 Central america and the Caribbean

48 PART 1 • Terrorism in Historical and Social Contexts

war is the preferred method of fighting among Latin American revolutionaries. Unlike the model for urban terrorism, the guerrilla model began with a successful structure and then moved toward a theory (see March, 2005; O’Connor, 2007).

The process began in the hills of Cuba. The Cuban revolutionary leader Fidel Castro tried to seize power in 1956, but he was soundly defeated. Retreating to the rural regions of Cuba, he surrounded himself with a ragtag group of revolutionar- ies, including a friend, Ernesto “Che” Guevara (1928–1967). Guevara was born in Argentina in 1928. After earning a medical degree at the University of Buenos Aires, he turned his attention from medicine to the plight of the poor. He believed poverty and repression were problems that transcended nationalism, and revolution was the only means of challenging authority. He served the regime of Guatemala in 1954 but fled to Mexico City when Communists were purged from the government. There he met Castro.

Guevara immediately impressed Castro, and the two worked together to oust the Cuban military dictator Fulgencio Batista (1901–1973). After failing to seize power in 1956, Castro began to meet secretly with rural partisans. Castro organized a com- mand-and-support structure, enlisted partisans, and formed regional guerrilla forces. As Castro’s strength grew, he moved to more conventional methods of warfare and triumphantly entered Havana in 1959. Throughout the campaign, Guevara had been at Castro’s side.

Inflamed with revolutionary passion, Guevara completed a work on guerrilla warfare shortly after Castro took power. Far from theoretical, it can be deemed a how-we-did-it guide. Translated copies of Guevara’s Reminiscences of the Cuban Revolutionary War appeared in the United States as early as 1961, but the book did not enjoy mass distribution until the end of the decade. It describes both Guevara’s evolution toward Marxism and the revolutionary process in Cuba, and it details the structure and strategy of Castro’s forces, as well as the guiding philosophy of the Cuban guerrilla war. Guevara also outlines the revolutionaries’ methods of operation and principles of engagement. With the advantage of hindsight, it makes a stirring description of how victory was achieved.

Guerrilla revolutions based on the Cuban experience are typified by three phas- es, each designed to progress from and complement the previous one. In phase one, Guevara-style revolution begins with isolated groups. In phase two, the isolated groups merge into guerrilla columns. The final phase brings columns together in a conven- tional army. The goal of the strategy is to develop a conventional fighting force, or at least a force that renders the conventional opponent impotent. Although Guevara’s work focused specifically on the Cuban experience, it had two important effects. In Latin America and to revolutionaries there, in particular, Guevara became an icon. In addition, guerrillas throughout the world studied the guide and copied the tactics used during the revolution (see Burton, 1976, p. 70; J. K. Clark, 1988; Asprey, 2002, pp. 698–710; Taber, 2002, pp. 25–37).

Terrorism plays a limited role in Guevara’s guerrilla framework. Although Guevara’s focus was on the countryside, he saw the need for small urban terrorist groups to wage a campaign of support. These actions, however, should be extremely selective; their purpose is to keep governmental forces off balance, terrorizing them in their “safe” areas, never letting them relax. The main purpose of terrorism is to strike at the government’s logistical network; a secondary purpose is to demoralize the gov- ernment. Terrorism is a commando-type tactic.

The theory of guerrilla war came after the appearance of Guevara’s work, which was popularized by a French socialist named Régis Debray. In Revolution in the Revo- lution? Debray (1967) summarizes his concept of Latin American politics. He writes

Ernesto “Che” Guevara: (1928–1967) Fidel Castro’s assistant and guerrilla warfare theorist. Guevara advocated guerrilla revolu- tions throughout Latin America after success in the Cuban Revolution. He was killed in Bolivia in 1967 while trying to form a guerrilla army.

Cuban guerrilla war: A three-step process as described by “Che” Guevara: (1) revolutionar- ies join the indigenous population to form guer- rilla foco, as Guevara called them; (2) small forces form columns and control rural areas; and (3) columns unite for a conventional offensive to overthrow government.

Chapter 2 • Practical Criminology, Radicalization, and Types of Terrorism 49

emphasizing the Points Criminologists seek to explain the reasons people commit crimes. When law enforce- ment, intelligence, and military personnel confront terrorism, it is helpful to move beyond criminology and confront the problem with practical approaches. Part of that process suggests that security personnel should recognize the behavior of people as they adopt violent extremism. Many researchers refer to the adoption process as radicalization, but the term is used in a variety of ways. Security forces probably cannot stop radicalization or de-radicalize extremists. They may, however, be able to recognize behaviors associated with violent extremism. Finally, three types of terror- ists confront governments: lone wolves, small groups, and large groups. Each type demands a specific response.

that the region has one dominating issue: poverty. Poverty threads through the entire fabric of Latin American life and entwines divergent cultures and peoples in a com- mon knot of misery. Poverty is responsible for the imbalance in the class structure, as the wealthy cannot be maintained without the poverty of the masses. Debray sees only one recourse: The class structure must be changed and wealth redistributed. Because the wealthy will never give up their power, revolution is the only method of change.

Debray’s prime target was the United States. Behind every power in the south stands the United States, according to his thesis. Debray held the United States re- sponsible for maintaining the inequitable class structure, and he shared the common Marxist belief that North American wealth caused Latin American poverty. It seemed quite logical, therefore, to target the United States.

As did Frantz Fanon, Debray continually talked of revolution. He saw little need for terrorism, however, and he minimized the role of urban centers in a revolt. Debray believed revolution was essentially an affair for poor peasants, and it could begin only in a rural setting with regional guerrilla forces. Terrorism had no payoff. At best, it was neutral, and at worst, it alienated the peasants needed for guerrilla support. Ac- cording to Debray, for a revolution to work, it needed to begin with guerrillas fighting for justice and end with a united conventional force. Terrorism would not accomplish this objective.

response to Differing types of terrorism Separating the types or forms of terrorism is not an academic exercise. It is practi- cal criminology. Each type of violent extremism calls for a different response. Lone wolves are best countered by routine law enforcement operations, especially when employing community policing. Small groups are also a law enforcement problem, although they require shared intelligence and regional task forces. Multiple law en- forcement agencies need to cooperate with each other when confronting small groups. Large groups may be associated with guerrilla wars or insurgencies. The police have a role, but their power should be augmented by military force. Guerrilla wars and insurgencies are primarily a military problem.

> What are the differences among the three types of terrorism? > How do small groups employ the urban or Marighella model? > How did Debray modify Guevara’s work on guerrilla warfare?

s e l f - c h e c k

50 PART 1 • Terrorism in Historical and Social Contexts

SuMMary oF ChaptEr objECtIvES

• Theories of terrorism are important, but law enforcement, intelligence, and mili- tary forces are also served by developing a practical understanding of the type of terrorism they are facing.

• Criminals tend be to unfocused opportunists with no loyalty to a group. Terror- ists are goal oriented, motivated by a cause, loyal to each other, and focused.

• Radicalization is the process of adopting violent extremist views and acting them out with terrorist actions. Many social scientists believe this is caused by alienation.

• A recent case study suggests that radicalized subjects do not make decisions ra- tionally. Another study of a radicalized individual revealed an eclectic pattern of decision points. Other case studies seem to indicate that there are multiple paths to radicalization.

• Many people believe that prisons are schools for radicalization. Some research- ers in the United States and Europe believe they have found patterns of radical- ization. Other research suggests that there is little radicalization in prisons.

• There is no single definition of the term radicalization, and some critics believe it is used to label Muslims in the West. Security forces are best served by learn- ing the common types of behaviors associated with violent extremists within a particular ideology.

• Three types of terrorism involve lone wolves, small groups, and large groups. Lone wolf violence seems to be increasing, and some groups encourage it.

• Lone wolf terrorism involves an individual taking action on his or her own initiative. Lone wolves may be trained or untrained. Many lone wolves launch only one attack, and they are captured or killed at its end.

• Small groups use terrorism to create an aura of false power. They follow an urban model that uses terrorism as a strategy. Large groups can use terrorism selectively and frequently employ it as a tactic.

• Guerrillas and insurgents are trying to win popular support against their en- emies. They do not use indiscriminant terrorism; rather, they select their targets with care.

LookIng Into thE FuturE

Debate about and interpretation of the Constitution is an ongoing process in the course of American political and legal life. It will continue as long as the United States is governed by the document.

This is the 1st Amendment to the United States Constitution: Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibit-

ing the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the government for a redress of grievances.

Think of examples of radicalization and try to define the term within the frame- work of the 1st Amendment. Examine your definition to see if it violates this amend- ment. It is legally acceptable to become a radical extremist about any social, political, or economic idea. Your definition of radicalization should conclude with some crimi- nal act if you want to practically apply it to law enforcement.

Chapter 2 • Practical Criminology, Radicalization, and Types of Terrorism 51

Your definition and many others will play a role in the future of terrorism. There is a fine line between accepting an unconventional view of reality and attempts to vio- lently impose that view on others. The key aspect is the point where the position leads to violence. This issue is at the base of democracy and it will continue to be.

kEy tErMS

Cesare Beccaria, p. 26 Routes to terrorism, p. 29 Radicalization, p. 29 Violent radicalization, p. 29 Alienation, p. 30

Groupthink, p. 33 Weather Underground,

p. 33 Umar Farouk

Abdulmutallab, p. 34

James W. von Brunn, p. 35

Dzhokhar Tsarnaev, p. 35 Carlos Marighella, p. 45

Ernesto “Che” Guevara, p. 48

Cuban guerrilla war, p. 48

ID 19

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Learning Objectives After reading this chapter, you should be able to:

44 Define money laundering.

44 Define terrorist financing.

44 Compare terrorist financing and money laundering.

44 Describe national and interna- tional efforts to control terror- ist financing.

44 Outline financial intelligence gathering and investigative efforts.

44 Summarize illegal and legal methods of terrorist funding.

44 Describe networks and sys- tems in informal economies.

44 Describe the Hawala system.

44 Summarize views on the politi- cal economy of terrorism.

44 Summarize the debate about narcoterrorism.

terrorist Financing and Money Laundering

T he Islamic State of Iraq and al Sham (ISIS), also known as the Islamic State, the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL), or Daesh, emerged from al Qaeda in Iraq.

In June 2014 in the midst of the Syrian civil war and the sec- tarian violence in Iraq, ISIS laid claim to territory and acted as if it were a nation-state. It was a different type of terrorist group and financed itself in an unusual manner. ISIS was large enough to take and hold geographical areas, including oil fields and economic centers in Iraq and Syria. This ability placed ISIS in the unique position of raising money by special “taxes” on people in conquered territory, taking possession of wealth by force, kidnapping for ransom, and most importantly, selling oil in an underground economy. According to ABC News (2014), ISIS made $3 million a day in the summer of 2014, making it the most well-funded terrorist group in history.

All terrorists need money, and as a group’s size and complexity increases, its need for income also grows. Large terrorist groups pay salaries to individual members and meet living expense for their leaders. Some groups even pay pensions to former members. Groups raise money in numerous

3C H a p t e r

The New U.S. $100 Bill

Chapter 3 • Terrorist Financing and Money Laundering 53

legal and often illegal ways. They run legitimate businesses, raise money through crime, accept donations, and engage in many other economic activities. This chapter will focus on the methods terrorists use to raise money, their participation in formal and informal financial systems, measures to stop terrorist financing, attempts to investigate groups and individuals, the structure of terrorist economic networks, and a debate about the existence of narcoterrorism.

Financial Flows When modern terrorism began to emerge after World War II, security forces fre- quently concentrated on investigative measures, law enforcement, and military force, to counter it. Counterterrorists emphasized tactical control of areas where terror- ists operated, and financing was frequently overlooked or ignored. This approach changed by the 1980s as security forces came to realize the crucial role that money played in terrorist operations. In Northern Ireland, for example, law enforcement officials and terrorism analysts realized that the IRA had made a Capone discovery; that is, it developed an organized crime network to finance its operations (Adams, 1986). A decade later, American analysts demonstrated that Middle Eastern terror- ists were raising funds in the United States through grocery coupon fraud (Kushner and Jacobson, 1998). Other investigators found legal businesses laundering millions of dollars for terrorist organizations (Navias, 2002). Many terrorist organizations used petty crime, money laundering, and the transfer of illegal contraband to finance operations (Hinnen, 2004).

Awareness of the importance of financing evolved slowly, partly because of the inherent contradiction in the cost of a single terrorist event when compared to the cost of a campaign. Stated simply, a terrorist operation usually does not cost a lot of money, but the overall budget for a campaign is quite high. The Economist (2003) reports that terrorism is cost-effective in terms of the causalities and destruction ter- rorist events cause. Events like the 1995 Oklahoma City bombing or the multiple bombing attacks on trains in Madrid in 2004 cost only a few thousand dollars. A single attack like the 2009 Fort Hood shootings might only cost a few hundred dol- lars. Yet, as Neil Livingstone and David Halevy (1986) explain, it takes a lot of cash to run a terrorist group for any length of time. For example, 9/11 was inexpensive, but holding al Qaeda together cost several thousand dollars per month (L. Wright, 2006, pp. 168–169). After 9/11, some analysts saw the importance of terrorist financing. They began research projects on fund-raising, money laundering, and the storage and transfer of funds (Jacobson and Levit, 2009).

Money Laundering It is popularly believed that the term money laundering first appeared in the 1920s. Organized crime families earned money through prostitution, distribution of illegal goods, robberies, burglaries, and other illegal activities. While this gave gangsters an abundant income, it also created a problem. They had to account for their assets without linking the source of the money to the crimes they committed. They wanted to move money from the informal underground economy where it could not be used to the formal economic system where they could spend it. They had to make their incomes appear to be legitimate. Organized criminal syndicates opened laundromats, funneled illegal money through them, and reported tremendous incomes. Illegal gains were transferred into legal profits, and both law enforcement agencies and the Mafia

Capone discovery: A term used by James Adams to explain the Irish Repub- lican Army’s entry into organized crime.

54 PART 1 • Terrorism in Historical and Social Contexts

called the process money laundering (Durrieu, 2013, p. 13). Both sides knew that these businesses probably could not make such profits, but forged business accounting records showed the money was “clean.” It could be used in the legitimate economy.

Roberto Durrieu (2013, p. 19) explains the process. Assume that three criminals make $3 million by smuggling drugs, and they divide it equally. When they do work, the odd jobs they perform pay far less than $1 million per year. They obviously want to enjoy it, but when the money is used in the legitimate economy, it becomes part of formal record keeping systems. Banks report large deposits, real estate transfers create multiple financial documents, and other transactions are taxed. The criminals know that any sudden change in lifestyle might bring attention from law enforcement. They may even know that when Al Capone was finally convicted, he was charged with income tax evasion.

The three criminals need to launder the money; that is, they need to give the illusion that their sudden increased income was derived legally. They must conceal the process by which they gained the money to enjoy the fruits of their illegal labor. Laundering allows them to do this.

Money is laundered in three steps. Placement involves putting criminal proceeds in the legitimate financial system. Placement can take place in a single action, such as showing the monetary gains as profits, or it may be laundered through repeated trans- actions to conceal its origins. This second process is called layering. The final step is integration. This involves assimilating illegally obtained money in the formal economy and giving funds the appearance of legitimacy (Tofangsaz, 2015).

It is hard to trace some money because it is hidden in underground networks or in informal transfers. The U.S. Department of the Treasury (2015) explains that orga- nized crime and drug networks use extensive money laundering systems. Criminal groups will launder money several times, converting illegal income to another form of funds and often further laundering it by other means.

Empirical research shows that terrorists do not usually engage in complicated laundering systems. While terrorists use the same networks and channels as organized criminals, they usually layer illegal money in one step, such as converting cash into a money order, buying prepaid charge cards, or wiring cash to a group’s financier. Terrorists also launder significantly less cash than organized crime or drug networks. One empirical study involving almost 200 money laundering techniques indicated that the maximum sum of money for organized criminals was $69 million, while the maximum amount for the terrorist cases involved $4.8 million.

One common method for laundering drug money from Colombia is known as the black market peso exchange. Terrorists, especially the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC), have used this network, although not as much as drug dealers. In the peso exchange, drug dealers sell their products in the United States and accumulate large amounts of U.S. currency. Unlike in terrorism investigations, law enforcement offi- cers are well versed in disrupting drug networks simply by following the path of such money. As a result, the dealers need to find a way to hide the cash. They do so by sell- ing the money to brokers in Colombia, who pay the dealers in Colombian pesos. This creates no financial record in the United States. Brokers purchase goods in the United States and smuggle them to importers in Colombia. These goods are marketed and sold in Colombia and in other countries at greatly inflated prices. The importers make

placement: Placing illegal monetary profits in the legitimate financial system.

layering: Concealing the source of illegal income in confusing, sometimes mul- tiple financial actions.

integration: Presenting ille- gally gained money in the formal economic system as if it were the result of a legal activity.

Placement Layering Integration

Figure 3.1 the process of Money Laundering

black market peso exchange: A method for converting illegal profits in U.S. currency to Co- lombian pesos in an effort to hide the illegal funds. Terrorists have frequently used the system, although they launder less money than organized crime or drug networks.

Chapter 3 • Terrorist Financing and Money Laundering 55

a profit, pay the excess pesos to the broker, and the broker, after taking a commission, sends the money to drug dealers in the United States Dealers convert seemingly legiti- mate pesos into dollars, and all the money looks legitimate (Zill and Bergman, 2014).

A variation of the peso exchange involves selling goods or services at inflated prices. For example, recall the three hypothetical drug dealers who are trying to

Purchase money order

Transfer funds

to laundered assets

Further laundering:

purchases or false

invoice

Criminal activity

Illegal income

Money Laundering Hidden Layers

Or step 3 Or step 4

Examples • Wire transfers • Insurance policies • Trusts • Off share banks • Goods and services

Figure 3.2 Money Laundering — Hidden Layers

The Black Market Peso Exchange

Drug traders in U.S. give U.S. currency to Colombian money brokers for Colombian Pesos

Brokers sell illegal dollars to Colombian businesses

Peso

Business

Businesses buy U.S. productsFrom U.S.A

Products exported and sold

Figure 3.3 the Black Market peso exchange

56 PART 1 • Terrorism in Historical and Social Contexts

account for a sudden influx of $1 million each. One of the subjects can “sell” his car worth $15,000 to his colleague for $30,000. After exchanging several more over- priced goods and producing bills of sale, the money begins to take on the appearance of legitimate profits (Tofangsaz, 2015). As with the peso exchange, this method can also be used to move cash globally and informally.

The importance of this process is obvious, but Roberto Durrieu (2013, pp. 19 and 98–119) says it took governments 50 years to begin taking legal action against money laundering. The first talk of anti-money laundering statutes began to appear in the United States in the 1970s, and it was finally outlawed in 1986, largely due to massive incomes derived from the sale of illegal drugs. The United Kingdom followed suit, and both nations began to support international efforts to stop money laundering in 1988.

terrorist Financing Terrorist financing refers to the methods terrorist groups use to raise the material needed to support operations and organizations. There are a variety of legal and ille- gal methods to meet income and other logistical needs (see the section entitled “Illegal Funding Methods”). Terrorists frequently engage in petty theft, robbery, kidnapping, selling illegal drugs, extortions, and any other economic crime. Terrorist financing also involves money from legitimate sources such as donations from a supporting dia- sporas, wealthy supporters, and gifts from charities (Freeman, 2012, p. 7; Derriueu, 2013, p. 69). According to the World Bank, terrorist financing refers to any money used to support terrorism, including people who support, plan, or engage in an act of terrorist violence (Durrueu, 2013, p. 68). Funds may also be delivered by a combina- tion of legal and illegal sources, and some groups are self-supporting or sponsored by states (Tofangsaz, 2015).

There is no data evaluating the comparative sources for terrorist financing, and researchers are not clear on what types of sources have the most value. The impor- tance of financing depends on the size of the group, its type of operations, and its pur- pose. The value of a financial source also depends on the availability of resources, the particular needs of the group, and the ability to obtain resources (Tofangsaz, 2015). Terrorists usually do not seek personal wealth, and they usually obtain resources to support terrorist activities (Durrieu, 2013, p. 67). It is difficult to gather systematic information on the acquisition of money because groups or at least terrorist opera- tions must be funded, but methods for doing so are varied.

Hamed Tofangsaz (2015) believes that terrorists require three types of financing. He states that cash and entities that can be used as cash—such as cash cards, credit cards, and checks—are used for weapons, bribes, and myriad other activities. Tangible goods are also an aspect of terrorist financing, but they are not as important as cash. These items include the things that are needed for everyday life—food, accommoda- tions, clothing, travel, and anything else needed to carry out an operation. Finally, terrorist financing also involves intangible income. Groups need sanctuaries, training spaces, intelligence, and propaganda.

Tofangsaz argues that terrorist financing develops in distinct phases. Terrorists need to obtain money, transport and store it, and distribute it to the operational group. Obtaining money involves fund-raising, and as mentioned, this happens in a

Disbursing Funds

Securing Funds

Acquiring Funds

Figure 3.4 Stages of terrorist Financing

Chapter 3 • Terrorist Financing and Money Laundering 57

variety of manners. Fund-raising is followed by security. Terrorists must be able to move and hold their financial resources. The final stage is distribution. Resources must reach individual terror cells.

Sometimes, economic support for terrorism does not involve actual money. Goods and services may be substituted for cash. Victor Dostov and Pavel Shust (2014) sug- gest that support may also come from a rapidly growing sector of the legitimate econ- omy, customer loyalty programs. Airline miles, hotel and rental car points, and other customer bonuses can be traded for goods and services. These benefits can be used, in turn, to finance terrorism.

Customer loyalty rewards constitute a private economy, and programs have grown rapidly over the past 20 years. Awards of loyalty points from hotels, cash back rewards on credit cards, free rental cars, cash discounts for purchases, and frequent flyer miles have become a form of pseudocash. Reward programs have taken the character of surrogate payments in goods, services, and cash back incentives, making some of them act as private currency. International efforts to thwart terrorist financing do not have the resources to monitor the array of programs, according to Dostov and Shust, but terrorists may use them as income sources.

Loyalty programs do not fall in the realm of financial record keeping. However, Dostov and Shust point out that corporations keep extensive records on loyal custom- ers, records that reveal transaction histories, behaviors, preferences, and exchanges to third parties. Companies also monitor rewards closely to avoid fraud. Most customer reward transfers are electronic, so they automatically create a record. In addition, there are few technical problems in gathering and analyzing data. It is usually as simple as entering a customer’s name and reward identification number. Even though governments lack the capacity to investigate suspicious behavior, public–private part- nerships could become a valuable tool in preventing or stopping terrorist financing if rewards are being used to support terrorism.

Dostov and Shust use the money laundering model—recall that it is placement, layering, and integration—to analyze customer loyalty programs, and they find poten- tial risks. Terrorists may use points for purchases, rewards may be used across interna- tional borders, and customer loyalty awards are housed in an unregulated, decentral- ized private economy. If frequent flyer miles can be used for cash, cash cards, gifts of free flights, or private currency, they can be used to finance terrorism.

comparing Money Laundering and terrorist Financing As awareness of money laundering grew, law enforcement agencies and intelligence organizations began to realize that terrorist financing might be a separate process using differing methods. At first, many governments and agencies began to employ anti-money laundering techniques to investigations of terrorist financing. In fact, after 9/11, when anti-money laundering programs permeated international counter- terrorism efforts, many analysts equated terrorist financing with money laundering. Laws and operations that worked against laundering could be used to stop financing, or so many people believed.

Recently, financial analysts and economists have begun to question the logic of linking the two concepts. Approaching terrorist financing with anti-money laundering tools equates terrorism with organized crime. The two concepts are hardly identical. Organized criminals are in business to make money, and they launder illegal profits to enjoy their benefits. Terrorists fight for a cause, and when they reap profits, they only want to use them in support of that cause. Both organized crime and terrorism are based on money, but it is used differently in each case (Tofangsaz, 2015).

58 PART 1 • Terrorism in Historical and Social Contexts

Separating financing from laundering does not mean that terrorists do not laun- der money. When terrorists gain money illegally, they may need to hide its source. At other times, they may be using donors, charities, or some other entity where they avoid linking the money with its origin. For example, it is illegal to donate money to support terrorist groups in the United States. A donor may donate money to a front organization, and the recipient layers the money to give the appearance that it is being used for a purpose other than supporting terrorism. The donor’s crime goes unde- tected, and terrorists get the funds. In such cases, terrorist groups employ money laun- dering techniques (Durrieu, 2013, pp. 69–70). Many times, however—maybe most of the time—terrorists have no need to launder money.

Think of it this way. Organized criminals use money laundering to obtain money and spend it. They commit the crime before they get the money. When terrorists raise money, either legally or illegally, they usually commit the crime after they get the funds. Criminals seek resources to accumulate them, whereas terrorists want to dis- burse them. The difference between money laundering and terrorist financing is the direction of the flow of cash, goods, and services. This may mean that terrorist financ- ing should be attacked with methods other than anti-money laundering techniques. Researchers and analysts, who see terrorism as a distinct category of crime, tend not to believe that anti-money laundering is an effective weapon in the arsenal of counter- terrorism (Tofangsaz, 2013).

Terrorists and organized criminals move and store cash differently. To begin, much terrorist financing takes place in the legitimate economy. They can use banks, credit cards, check exchanges, and other legal economic transactions. When this is the case, there is no need to hide these activities from governments or law enforcement. Organized criminals begin with dirty money and must hide their initial transactions.

Similarities may come into play when using underground networks because terrorists and criminals move along the same routes. When terrorists use informal financial methods to move and store cash, they deal with the same people who move and store cash for criminals. Yet, funds are moving in opposite directions. Terrorists are moving money to commit a crime, while money launderers are moving away from a crime. Money laundering requires a criminal predicate, whereas, terrorism does not ( Tofangsaz, 2015).

Roberto Durrieu (2013, p. 70) points out that terrorists may need to make the money dirty. This process involves hiding the legal origin of money used to support terrorism. For example, in the United States, it is illegal to donate money to any des- ignated terrorist group. Assume that a hypothetical donor wants to send money to a group whose cause he avidly supports, and the group wants the money. Yet, neither they nor the donor wants the source of the funds to be identified because the donor could be arrested. The money has to be “dirtied.” Layering takes place when the donor gives money to a legitimate organization, say a charity, and that organization gives it to another legitimate organization outside the country such as a nongovernmental organization (NGO). The NGO engages in legitimate activity while supporting the outlawed group. Since the money has been dirtied, it can flow to the terrorists. The donor has been protected.

toward a theory of terrorist Financing Some analysts believe the primary reason that officials do not understand the financ- ing process is that they lack a theoretical framework. Graham Myres (2012) says that governments equate terrorist financing with money laundering because there is no theory of financing. Terrorism, he says, has been the target of social science studies but not financial research. Terrorists have financial strategies and disburse

Chapter 3 • Terrorist Financing and Money Laundering 59

funds. They acquire resources, fund operations, move money, and launder and dirty it. Myers concludes that analysts should create a theory to explain terrorist financing. It would enhance efforts to understand terrorism.

Michael Freeman (2012, pp. 3–12) of the Naval Post Graduate School is con- cerned about the lack of a theory to explain terrorist economies. He wants to place terrorist financing in some sort of framework. Without a theory, he argues, analysts cannot adequately explain how groups raise money, how money is budgeted, and how it is invested. Researchers also need to know how these processes change over time.

Freeman argues that researchers need a theory that accounts for the need for money, the amount of money needed, sources of income, and the interaction of these three factors with counterterrorist operations. He then proposes a framework to cap- ture information based on six criteria: (1) the quantity of money needed, (2) the need for legitimacy, (3) the security of assets, (4) the sources of income, (5) the ability to control the flow of resources, and (6) the simplicity of a group’s financial system. He says that all these factors will vary based on the importance of the criteria at a given point of time. As a group’s needs change, some factors become less important while others become more essential.

Freeman’s proposal can be explained by an example. Quantity and source of income would be crucial criteria for a group with few resources. In this situation, counterterrorist research and investigation should be directed toward the acquisition of funding. Another group might have an abundance of resources. This increases the importance of security and flow of funds. Such a theory, Freeman believes, enhances knowledge about operations.

Analysts do know that terrorist financing is critical because terrorists want as much money as possible. Freeman says that money is a force multiplier. Without it, a group is weakened. Groups with income can launch more attacks, maintain an infra- structure, provide goods and services, protect assets, and provide incentives to potential recruits. Good financing allows groups to build training camps, maintain logistical networks, travel, and purchase weapons. Money is important, and analysts need a theoretical framework to explain it.

> How is money laundered? > What are the differences between money laundering and terrorist financing? > How could a theory of financing increase our understanding of terrorism?

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efforts to control terrorist Financing The financial environment is important to terrorists. Fund-raising is a business activ- ity in the world of private corporations, and it is a business-like operation in terrorist organizations. Unlike corporations, terrorists are not in business to make money, but they need money to stay in business (Tupman, 2009). They also need a financial- friendly environment to flourish. Several countries in Asia, Europe, and North Amer- ica have taken formal action to make their economies less friendly to terrorists. They have enacted laws to ban terrorist fund-raising and to regulate the banking industry. This makes the business of funding terrorism more difficult. Many nations lack the will or capacity to oversee their economies. These unregulated areas are conducive to crime and terrorism (Petraeus and Amos, 2006, pp. 8–43). Even economically devel- oped regions are vulnerable to private currencies like Bitcoin and underground eco- nomic networks (Brantly, 2014).

60 PART 1 • Terrorism in Historical and Social Contexts

regulation and enforcement After its long experience with the Irish Republican Army, the United Kingdom was one of the first nations to address terrorist financing. The British developed several tools to fight it. Parliament passed four specific laws against terrorist fund-raising before the start of the twenty-first century. One law simply banned possession of ter- rorist funds. Another prohibited any effort to assist terrorist groups in fund-raising. A third measure criminalized concealment of funds if money was connected to ter- rorism. Finally, if law enforcement or intelligence officials can establish reasonable suspicion that funds are connected to a terrorist group or an act of terrorism, the government is empowered to freeze all financial assets of anyone involved and to impound them (Ridley and Alexander, 2012).

Several other countries have followed the United Kingdom’s lead, creating finan- cial intelligence units and financial investigative forces. Such units gather information on transactions and provide a means to enforce compliance with economic regula- tions. Their goal is to reduce money laundering and terrorist financing, and they work very well in the banking industry and other financial exchanges in a formal economy. They regulate the flow of funds, but they have limitations. Their effectiveness depends on a nation’s willingness and ability to regulate its financial system (Rashdan, 2012). Regulation works only in a formal, well-developed economy.

Nicholas Ridley and Dean Alexander (2012) examined regulations in the United States. Although in the past, the United States and United Kingdom led efforts against organized crime and money laundering, the United States did not pay too much atten- tion to terrorist financing until the aftermath of 9/11. President George W. Bush issued an executive order that enabled the government to seize funds associated with any group on the State Department’s designated terrorist list within days of the attacks. The USA PATRIOT Act further required financial institutions to report suspicious activity, develop anti-money laundering procedures, and to assess customers. President Barrack Obama strengthened regulatory power in 2010 by criminalizing efforts to aid or sup- port terrorist groups, even if actions take place outside of the country. In June 2010, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that material support of terrorism included not only economic support but also provision of expert advice, training, services, and personnel.

Ridley and Scott (2012) note that several federal agencies created financial enforcement and intelligence units. While the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) had a long-standing Criminal Investigative Division, the FBI created the Terrorism Financ- ing Operations Section (TFOS). The Department of the Treasury created the Office of Terrorism and Financial Intelligence, and after the start of the Iraqi insurgency, it formed a financial investigative unit to gather, analyze, and distribute intelligence on terrorist financial networks in Iraq. The Department of State opened the Counterter- rorism Financial Unit, and the Drug Enforcement Administration gathered intelligence on the nexus between terrorism and illegal drugs with the Office of Counternarcotics Enforcement.

Regulation, intelligence gathering, compliance, and enforcement increased, but Ridley and Alexander believe both Europe and the United States made a fundamental mistake. They equated terrorist financing with money laundering. European countries first recognized the mistake when they realized that efforts to stop the financing of al Qaeda were not working. Officials in the United States noticed this, too. It began to include efforts to uncover terrorist financing, expanding the tasks of investigative, and enforcement units.

Ridley and Alexander see this shift as a positive step, but they do not believe it has gone far enough. The United States needs to place more emphasis on terrorist financing. They also think that interagency squabbling over turf hinders intelligence

Chapter 3 • Terrorist Financing and Money Laundering 61

gathering activities, and they are dismayed that organizations continue to horde infor- mation rather than share it. They urge greater scrutiny of seemingly innocent transac- tions and believe that government agencies should cooperate more with the private sector to uncover terrorist financing.

The U.S. efforts to regulate and eliminate terrorist financing extend beyond its borders. In Asia and the Pacific, it encourages developed and developing nations to expand their economies and adopt anti-terrorist financing measures (APEC, 2013). In Europe, it participates in a joint European and American initiative, the Terrorist Finance Tracking Program (TFTP). The TFTP began as a secret American intelligence gathering program, and it eventually emerged as a formal regulatory agency in the European Union (Plachta, 2014). The United States also seeks to implement uniform anti-money laundering and terrorist financing regulations around the globe, in both developed and developing regions (FATF, 2014).

efforts by the United nations Terrorist financing and money laundering usually involve international funding, and they have become part of the global economy. At the urging of the United States and the United Kingdom, the UN General Assembly adopted the International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism in December 1999. It was later strengthened by the addition of provisions that criminalized terrorist financing, empowered governments to seize and freeze assets used by terrorists, and required financial institutions to report suspicious behavior (Thony and Png, 2007).

Another important action was the creation of the Financial Action Task Force on Money Laundering (FATF) a decade earlier and its subsequent strengthening in the twenty-first century. Its purpose was to bring the international financial community into harmony by strengthening regulations and introducing more uniform practices. FATF originally contained 40 recommendations, and it was strengthened when nine special recommendations that targeted terrorist financing were added between 2001 and 2006. The special recommendations called for more regulation, reporting suspi- cious activities to law enforcement, and moves against informal economic systems (Troutsoult and Johnson, 2012).

The nine special recommendations asked all member states to implement UN financial instruments. They also reinforced previous efforts to criminalize terrorist financing, asset seizure, and suspicious activity reporting. The fifth recommendation called for international cooperation in investigation and law enforcement efforts against terrorist financing. Later measures asked for stronger anti-money laundering standards, rules for wire transfers, monitoring NGOs, and measures against suspects transporting cash (Thony and Png, 2007; Othman and Ameer, 2014). On the surface, FATF appears to be very strong.

Critics and terrorism analysts note several weaknesses in FATF. The first has little to do with financing and reverts to the problem of defining terrorism. Debates about the meaning of terrorism allow funds to flow to terrorist groups. For example, a gov- ernment may consider a paramilitary group to be a terrorist organization, but another nation might see the same group as a legitimate revolutionary or liberation move- ment. The first nation outlaws the group because it practices terrorism, and the second nation supports the group as an ally. International prohibition of terrorist financing is impossible without a standard definition, and as W. A. Tupman (2009) notes, there is still no standard definition of terrorism, and nobody is close to providing one.

There are other shortcomings in FATF. Critics note a widespread absence of laws allowing the seizure of assets used to support terrorism. Much of FATF is aimed

Suppression of the Financ- ing of Terrorism: A 1999 UN resolution designed to thwart terrorist financ- ing. It was strengthened after 9/11 by provisions that criminalized terror- ist financing, empowered states to seize terrorist assets, and required finan- cial institutions to support suspicious activities.

Financial Action Task Force on Money Launder- ing (FATF): A resolution passed by the United Nations in 1990 and strengthened from 2001 to 2006 urging member states to adopt measures to hamper money launder- ing and terrorist financing. It contained 40 recom- mendations. Nine special recommendations were added to focus specifically on terrorist financing.

62 PART 1 • Terrorism in Historical and Social Contexts

at informal financial systems, but transactions in these markets take place in secret, where government regulations do not apply. Criminals using these markets are likely to keep informal networks secret, and the majority of people who use them have no criminal intention. They simply do not have access to institutions such as banks. Even when the formal system is discussed, many countries have neither the means nor the will to enforce the recommendations (Thony and Png, 2007).

Enforcement efforts aimed at underground networks are ineffective and often counterproductive in developing countries. In fact, informal systems may well be the thriving sector of an undeveloped nation, and its people may view them as normal and acceptable. Informal exchanges usually take place in cash so that there are few records, which makes transactions difficult to trace. Many people see FATF as an attempt to impose regulation of traditional economies, and the recommendations often violate cultural, social, and religious practices. FATF is ill suited for many areas of the world (Trautsolt and Johnson, 2007).

Critics also have concerns about due process. Assets can be seized and frozen based on the suspicion of terrorist activity. This means that a government may take action before prosecuting a suspect. It also implies that a person can lose assets because he or she is associated with a person or organization engaged in suspicious activity. For example, assume that a charity is financing a terrorist group. A large donor might have assets seized simply because he or she is associated with the charity. This could happen without formal charges or criminal prosecution (Plachta, 2014). The United Nations tried to remedy this by allowing individuals to petition the government for a formal hearing if assets are frozen (Thony and Png, 2007).

Despite criticism, supporters claim that FATF works well in economically devel- oped countries. It promotes risk assessment and transparency in the banking sector, maintains communications with nonprofits and NGOs, supports expansion of regula- tion, and seeks to improve efforts against money laundering and terrorist financing. It actively monitors states that are unaware of or supporting illegal monetary practices and maintains a list of noncooperative nations (FATF, 2015). Rick McDonell, the executive secretary of FATF in 2015, points out that a global anti-money launder- ing and terrorist financing is a complex, massive undertaking. FATF operates with- out treaties or enforcement powers, and it relies on peer pressure and diplomacy to achieve compliance. This means it cannot change established economic practices in a brief span of time. Regulation and reform of financial systems will evolve slowly over time, and laws based on FATF recommendations have produced financial intelligence that has led to prosecutions for terrorist financing. McDonell also points out that a top-level minister represents every nation that is involved in FATF (Millman, 2014).

Qualitative data also suggest that efforts like FATF are important. It is difficult to assess the effectiveness of anti-terrorist financing measures because researchers lack the data and means to create an accurate assessment of anti-terrorist financ- ing regulations. Simply studying conviction rates underestimates their effectiveness, and comparing convictions across international borders in varied economies produces misleading data. Current and former intelligence and law enforcement officials, how- ever, see the situation in a different light. Qualitatively, FBI agents believe that dozens of terrorist convictions have resulted, and several terrorist plots have been stopped because banks reported suspicious activity. Law enforcement agencies in Europe feel the same way. Intelligence agents believe that anti-money laundering and terrorist financing activities provide hundreds of leads. While critics are leery of regulatory measures, practitioners believe that regulations developed from FATF recommenda- tions can be used to stop terrorism (Jonsson, 2010).

Chapter 3 • Terrorist Financing and Money Laundering 63

The international economy is a morass of differing systems separated by curren- cies, traditions, cultures, mores, and a host of other issues. There are systems within systems, and the intermeshed international economy is susceptible to fraud, criminal behavior, money laundering, and terrorist financing. Any attempt to counter criminal financial operations is destined to be complicated. It may be easy to find the weaknesses with FATF, but it represents an effort—a massive effort—to counter money launder- ing and terrorist financing. The long-term focus is improvement of monetary systems, increased security, and compliance. Improvement over time will probably be the best measure of FATF’s effectiveness.

> What efforts has the United States made to combat terrorist financing? > What is the purpose of FATF? > What are the strengths and weaknesses of FATF?

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Financial information as an investigative and intelligence tool When security officials began to believe that money trails would be the best tool to use against terrorism, they equated terrorist organizations with drug gangs and organized crime. Conventional wisdom suggested that terrorist groups could be dismantled sim- ply by “following the money.” There were arguments for waging “financial warfare” by freezing assets and tracing the funds used by terrorist groups (Navias, 2002). The U.S. government endorsed this approach, arguing that counterterrorist investigations should focus on sources of financing and mechanisms to transfer money (National Strategy for Combating Terrorism, 2006, p. 7). These financial approaches supposed that attacks on terrorist financing with anti-money laundering tactics would reduce terrorism.

This approach was too simple. It assumed that terrorists would act only in the legal, formal economy. In reality, terrorists participate in underground criminal net- works that are relatively immune to financial regulations. So-called formal financial warfare would not be effective because underground economies operate under different rules (Basile, 2004). Experience in Canada suggests that conventional finan- cial investigations against terrorists are ineffective and that traditional measures do not work, at least on the surface (Montpetit, 2008).

As criticism of counterterrorist financial investigations increased in the media and among the public at large, security forces came to realize that the nature of money trails in terrorism was misunderstood. Many people assumed that terrorists operated like drug networks; but that was not the case (Giraldo and Trinkhunas, 2007, p. 293). Whereas, an intensive financial investigation of money laundering networks could result in the successful prosecution of an international drug ring, the same tactic did not work against terrorist groups. This was true even with large international networks. Counterterrorism specialists and investigators came to realize that financial investigations could be used as a tool in a process, but by themselves, investigations of the flow of funds would not stop terrorism.

Drug dealers and organized criminals require massive organizations to collect and launder large amounts of money. Terrorists do not operate like that. Terrorists do not launder money frequently; as noted earlier, it takes relatively little money to

64 PART 1 • Terrorism in Historical and Social Contexts

launch an individual terrorist operation (Liu, 2012). Traditional financial investiga- tions are not effective against terrorists because of the limited amounts of money required for a terrorist operation, but when financial transactions become one aspect of larger investigative or intelligence operations, they help to provide a comprehensive picture. Terrorists do need money, and they get it by both legal and illegal methods. If financial information is added to evidence gained by other investigative techniques, it can provide a more comprehensive picture of terrorist activities (Levitt and Jacobson, 2008, p. 15).

Terrorist networks operate much like a business franchise, although transactions frequently take place in the underground economy. Money is moved across interna- tional borders. Therefore, financial investigations are conducted internationally and require international agreements to stem the flow of money. As result, one aspect of counterterrorism involves tracing money and using the information in concert with other intelligence to produce a comprehensive picture of terrorist operations ( Williams, 2007, pp. 77–82; Levitt and Jacobson, 2008, p. 15).

John Cassara (2006) argues that the United States has been less than effective in its efforts to fight terrorism because law enforcement agencies have not used sufficient forensic accounting tools. It is possible to track terrorists’ money laundering, cash purchases, banking accounts, and stock and business investments. Cassara also says that tracking money can create better intelligence—criminal intelligence and national security intelligence. Mapping the financial activities of suspected groups and indi- viduals gives intelligence a comprehensive focus. Forensic accounting can be used to solve crimes and to gain information.

illegal Funding Methods Terrorists raise money by a variety of legal and illegal means. Some of the illegal methods include running criminal enterprises, engaging in the drug trade, conducting illegal business activities under a legal cover, smuggling money, illegally transferring money, and a variety of other methods. Middle Eastern terrorists engage in smuggling and document fraud. Document fraud raises money for terrorist organizations and provides terrorists with false identification. In Central Asia, terrorist organizations trade illegal arms, launder money, and distribute drugs. Latin American terrorism is tied to drug production and public corruption. In the United States, domestic terror- ists engage in fraud schemes and robberies to finance political violence (Mili, 2006).

Raising money for illegal operations is nothing new. The Brazilian terrorist-phi- losopher Carlos Marighella argued that “urban warfare” begins with a campaign of expropriation—that is, robbery (1969, 1971; see also Burton, 1976). Terrorists around the world use a variety of criminal methods to raise funds. Violent activi- ties involve kidnapping, extortion, and robbery. Less violent methods include fraud, larceny, smuggling, dealing in contraband, forgery, and counterfeiting (Nance, 2003; Williams, 2007, p. 77). Interpol estimates that counterfeiting and intellectual property theft is responsible for $200 billion annually in illegal profits in the United States alone, and the amount doubles to $400 billion when the international community is included. This involves pirated CDs and DVDs, counterfeit clothing, and stolen com- puter software (Noble, 2003). Counterfeiting and fraud are common practices among the American extremist right (Pitcavage, 1999a, 1999b, 1999c).

Domestic extremists are not the only violent fanatics who raise funds in the United States; international terrorists also engage in fraudulent activities in America. From approximately 1981 to 1986, the Abu Nidal Organization engaged in various criminal activities in Tennessee and the St. Louis metropolitan area to generate funds

Forensic accounting: An investigative tool used to track money used in illegal activities. It can be used in any crime involving the exchange, storage, or con- version of fiscal resources.

expropriation: A term used by Carlos Marighella for armed robbery.

Chapter 3 • Terrorist Financing and Money Laundering 65

(E. Harris, 1995). Hezbollah ran cigarettes from North Carolina to Michigan and used some of the profits to fund operations in Lebanon (United States of America v. Mohamad Youseff Hammoud, et al., 2002). There are a variety of schemes across the country that use baby formula. American baby formula is treasured throughout the world because of its nutritional value. Terrorists sometimes steal formula and use ille- gal distribution networks to raise money (Clayton, 2005). In Cincinnati, law enforce- ment officers broke a ring of convenience stores that were selling stolen goods to finance terrorist organizations (Coolidge and Prendergast, 2003). Police in Dearborn, Michigan, arrested two men for making false identification papers for Middle Eastern groups (U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, 2005).

The Internet has become a tool for fraud. Terrorists use online activity in identity theft and in gaining access to bank and credit card accounts. They also sell items at Internet auctions. Security fraud is another method of raising funds. For example, a group might buy a large amount of stock in a company that is fairly inactive. They then fill the web with stories of new products, new technology, or some other item that will cause the company’s stock to increase. As the stock value increases, terrorists sell the stock at an inflated price even though the company has seen no real increase in value. Before the stock drops back to its normal level, the terrorists make a huge profit. This process is known as pump and dump, and it is frequently used by dishon- est stock speculators and other criminals (Hinnen, 2004).

Terrorists use extortion and protection rackets to raise money. Terrorist organi- zations force legitimate businesses and other people to make payoffs to avoid being attacked. Loretta Napoleoni (2003, pp. 27–28) reports that the Shining Path of Peru taxed farmers for protection. Rebels and death squads in Colombia did the same. Zachary Abuza (2003b) says similar tactics are used in Southeast Asia. In essence, Abuza concludes, terrorists use the same fund-raising techniques that criminals have used for years, in addition to their unique methods of gathering money.

Stolen vehicles also play a role in fund-raising (Sallot, 2006). North American cars, especially SUVs, are attractive to terrorists. When used as car bombs, the large capacity of SUVs provides far more explosive power than smaller vehicles. They can also be used to raise cash. A stolen SUV can be sold in the Middle East or Central Asia for nearly $100,000.

Examples of illegal fund-raising extend to all forms of crime. At the heart of illegal activity is fund-raising, and terrorists have learned that crime can pay. Tradi- tional crimes, especially large embezzlement schemes in the global economy, represent a source of income for small groups as well as large organizations (Labeviere, 2000, pp. 54–55; Napoleoni, 2003, pp. 203–205; D. Kaplan, 2005). After raising funds, ter- rorists frequently spend them in underground networks to support operations.

Tobacco has become an important source of money for terrorist organizations. By 2012, al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) had become the primary source of income for the al Qaeda network (Rogers, 2012). AQIM achieved this prominent position by smuggling cigarettes. David Cid, former director of the Memorial Insti- tute for the Prevention of Terrorism, says that cigarettes are easy to buy and easy to smuggle. They can also be counterfeited. The Afghan Taliban produces millions of fake Marlboros and distributes them through Afghanistan and China. The Irish Republican Army raised an estimated $100 million over a five-year period by smug- gling cigarettes. The Kurdish Workers Party raises money by taxing cigarettes as they cross the border. Many of the drug smuggling routes in North America have been used for cigarette smuggling. Drug detection methods do no work against cigarettes, and penalties for illegally possessing cigarettes are much lighter than those for possessing drugs (Wilson, 1999).

66 PART 1 • Terrorism in Historical and Social Contexts

Legal Methods of raising Funds Terrorists do not limit their financial activities to underworld networks and illegal revenue sources. Many groups engage in legitimate business activities to raise and distribute money (Navias, 2002). Activities include soliciting contributions, operat- ing businesses, running nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), creating charities, using wire transfers, forming or using banks, and using informal money transfer sys- tems. Sometimes, people smuggle large amounts of money across international bor- ders. At other times, foreign workers send money back to organizations in their home countries. One terrorist group legally raises the money through normal employment (National Strategy, 2006; Levitt and Jacobson, 2008; and Montpetit, 2008).

According to several researchers (Emerson, 2002, pp. 183–219; Ehrenfeld, 2003, pp. 21–22; Napoleoni, 2003, pp. 111–179), charities have been involved in funding terrorism. Data from national and international law enforcement sources agree with these findings (Scott-Joynt, 2003; Isikoff and Hosenball, 2004; U.S. Department of State, 2004b). Many people who contribute to charities do not know they are sup- porting terrorist organizations. Others believe the efforts they are supporting are not terrorist operations; rather, they seem them as legitimate military operations. Zachary Abuza (2003b, p. 93) writes that terrorists often set up a phony charity or skim the proceeds from legitimate organizations. Either way, charitable funds are frequently diverted to terrorist groups.

> How do financial tools impact investigative and intelligence functions? > What are some of the common illegal methods of funding terrorism? > What types of legal activities fund terrorism?

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Underground networks and systems David Carter (2009) points to an important characteristic of terrorist organizations. When terrorists move goods, people, weapons, money, or contraband, they must do so through underground networks. It is not possible to build a network overnight; they develop only through long-term trust. This means, Carter concludes, that ter- rorists use existing criminal networks for logistics, including financing activities, and they are vulnerable to intelligence-gathering activities. Even researchers who disagree about the stability of networks see the importance of the underground economy (Biersteker and Eckert, 2007). Even if illegal economic routes are not stable, money still flows through a network. The examination of underground economic systems shows links among people and groups.

The FBI estimates that the global underground economy produces $500 billion per year. An underground economy requires secret institutions, and terrorists have found various enterprises for hiding money (Maier, 2003). Rachel Ehrenfeld (2003, pp. 10–30) says that terrorists run banks and create phony companies to launder or hide their funds. They also engage in secret transactions and form alliances with organized crime.

Friedrich Schneider (2002) says the underground economy and its ties to crime are so important to terrorists because all the transactions remain hidden. Organized criminal and smuggling networks have long had the means of hiding money through seemingly legal transactions. Terrorists take advantage of these networks. Schneider believes that terrorism has become a big business. Terrorists not only move funds but also smuggle stolen goods and contraband. As mentioned earlier, document fraud and forgery are money-raising activities.

Chapter 3 • Terrorist Financing and Money Laundering 67

Terrorism is linked to organized crime throughout the world, and in some cases, it is almost impossible to distinguish between terrorist and criminal activity. Tamara Makarenko (2002) says that Russian organized crime groups trade weapons for drugs in Colombia. She also finds that both terrorists and criminals take advantage of political instability in regions like Central Asia and the Triborder region in South America (around the common border of Argentina, Brazil, and Paraguay; Figure 3.5). In the Middle East and Southeast Asia, terrorists and criminals kidnap for profit. She believes that terrorist and criminal organizations have grown into global enterprises.

The globalization of crime and terrorism has created opportunities for vast profits in the diamond trade. African diamonds, or “conflict diamonds,” are obtained illegally and sold through an underground network. According to Global Witness (2003), a British human rights organization, al Qaeda spent 10 years moving into unregulated diamond trading in West Africa. In the early 1990s, it infiltrated legitimate trading centers to establish a base. After success in mainstream trading, al Qaeda slowly and quietly switched from legitimate trading centers to underground criminal networks. Then, taking advantage of weak governments and regulations in Africa, it established its own international trading network. The new system allowed al Qaeda and allied jihadist groups to make tremendous profits while providing a ready-made network to hide and launder money. It should be noted that the 9/11 Commission (2004, p. 171) examined claims about al Qaeda’s involvement in the diamond trade and came to a different conclusion. The commission found no evidence that diamonds were used to support al Qaeda. Global Witness disagrees and believes it has presented evidence of al Qaeda’s activities.

Triborder region: The area where Brazil, Paraguay, and Argentina join. The major city is Cuidad del Este.

globalization: A common global economic network that ideally unites the world through production and international trade. Proponents believe it will create wealth. Critics be- lieve it creates corporate wealth and increases the distance between the rich and the poor.

Figure 3.5 the triborder region

A T L A N T I C O C E A N

P A C I F I C O C E A N

BRAZIL

PARAGUAY

ARGENTINA

Ciudad del Este

Triborder region

68 PART 1 • Terrorism in Historical and Social Contexts

The Triborder region is the area in South America where Paraguay, Brazil, and Argentina have a common border. Quite a bit of criminal activity takes place in the region, and the Paraguayan city Ciudad del Este is particularly known for its law- lessness. The region is also home to more than 20,000 Middle Eastern immigrants. Hamas, Hezbollah, and other terrorist groups have been known to frequent the area.

the Hawala system Informal financial networks are hidden from public view, and transactions take place in a self-regulated, underground market. Probably the most well-known hidden financial exchange is an ancient trading network called the Hawala system. Many international criminals and terrorists funnel money through it. The system originated several hundred years ago in China under the name of Feng Chin, or “flying money.” Today, it is primarily used in Pakistan and India, though there are Hawala deal- ers around the world. It is a legitimate means of transferring money without using money or moving actual funds across international borders, although it may violate currency transfer regulations in some countries. It is a network based on long-term trust relationships and the knowledge that each dealer is impeccably reliable for all debts (see the section later in this chapter titled “Expanding the Concept: Advantages of the Hawala System”).

Several hundred years ago, Central Asian merchants were frequently robbed of the gold and silver they carried in caravans to pay for goods. They developed a system of noncash exchange as a result. Rather than carrying money, caravan leaders would visit merchants and pay for goods with a promissory note. When the caravan reached its destination, the leader sold his goods, and the distributors would pay the caravan leader with promissory notes. The leader returned home and presented the note, and the local chit dealer paid the debt. The system worked because the dealers honored the promises. As long as people trusted each other, each chit was worth silver or gold, and merchants, caravan leaders, and others could thus travel without money. The Hawala system is one version of this ancient practice (Jamwal, 2002; Schramm and Taube, 2002; Sharma, 2006).

Today’s Hawala system works much as the old system did (Figure 3.6). Imagine that Asadullah Kahn lives and works in Los Angeles. He is an American citizen, but his parents live in Peshawar, Pakistan. Asadullah wishes to assist his parents, so he regularly sends them money. It is difficult, however, to get funds into Pakistan, and it is even more difficult to move them across the North-West Frontier Province to Pesha- war. Postal service is frequently unavailable, and parcel services can take months to deliver a package. Therefore, Asadullah goes to a local jewelry store because he knows the owner is a Hawaladar, a Hawala dealer. Asadullah gives the Hawaladar $500 and tells him that he wants it delivered to his parents. The Hawaladar subtracts a small fee,

Hawala system: A system of exchanging money based on trust relation- ships between money dealers. A chit, or promis- sory note, is exchanged between two Hawaladars, and it is as valuable as cash or other traded com- modities because the trust between the two parties guarantees its value.

expanding tHe cOncept

advantages of the Hawala system: • Money moves with no record. • Money crosses international borders with ease. • it is based on trust, and long-term trusting relationships are in place. • Money can easily be bartered for contraband. • No tax records exist.

Chapter 3 • Terrorist Financing and Money Laundering 69

usually 1 or 2 percent, and sends word to a Hawaladar in Peshawar that Asadullah sends his parents the balance. Asadullah’s parents visit the Peshawar Hawaladar, and he pays them the promised money. No money actually moved from Los Angeles to Peshawar, but Asadullah’s parents received nearly $500. The system works because the Hawaladars in Peshawar and Los Angeles implicitly trust each other. They know the debt will be honored (see U.S. Department of the Treasury, 2003).

Change the imaginary scenario a bit, and the impact on terrorism can be dem- onstrated. In the revised situation, imagine that Asadullah is not a hardworking son seeking to support his parents but an operative for the Lashkar-e-Taiba, a Kashmiri terrorist group. Asif, Asadullah’s contact in Peshawar, needs $5000 to buy AK-47s. After raising funds in the United States, Asadullah visits the Hawaladar, hands over $5000, and asks the Hawaladar to get the money to Asif. The Peshawar Hawaladar gives Asif the money, not knowing its use. Asif buys the weapons and delivers them to contacts in the Lashkar-e-Taiba. There is no record of the transaction and no way to trace the flow of funds. The Hawala system was not established to support terrorism, but it hides transactions in the modern world of international banking (Sharma, 2006).

Hezbollah as an example Hezbollah can serve as an example of the complexity of terrorist financing (Levitt and Jacobson, 2008, pp. 65–68). The group is discussed in full later in this text, but for now, please understand that it is a political party, a social welfare organization, and a militant group. It uses all types of sources for funding, and it moves money in underground networks and laundering systems. Most of Hezbollah’s funds come from state funding, with Iran acting as the principal sponsor. Hezbollah receives an estimated $200 million per year from Iran. There are numerous Lebanese Shi’ites dispersed throughout the world, and Hezbollah receives quite a bit of money in direct

Figure 3.6 the Hawala System

LOANS

AR MS

MOVIETICKET 07345 STUB

Dealer smuggles arms to group

Group in Country A

wants weapons

Group member

gives money to Hawala dealer

Hawala dealer in B tells

arms dealer money is deposited

Hawala dealer gives receipt to

member Member mails receipt

to Hawala dealer in Country B

2 5

70 PART 1 • Terrorism in Historical and Social Contexts

donations from members of the Lebanese diaspora. Charities and other front organi- zations around the world also serve as a base for funding. One charity forwarded $50 million a year to Hezbollah before its activities were stopped by law enforcement.

Hezbollah also relies on criminal activities in Lebanon and in other countries. One of the main sources of illegal income inside Lebanon is an extensive protection racket. Legitimate businesses are forced to pay a “Hezbollah tax” to ensure that their property will not be damaged and that their personnel are not harmed. Hezbollah is also involved in narcotics trafficking and cigarette smuggling in North America and Africa. The organization is so complex that it even manages legitimate businesses, and it controls branch offices for international wire services. Finally, the group is so well funded that it is able to finance other terrorist organizations such as Hamas and the Palestinian Islamic Jihad (Levitt and Jacobson, 2008, pp. 65–68; Chalk, 2012).

> What impact do underground financial networks have on terrorism? > How does the Hawala system operate? > How does Hezbollah embody the complexity of terrorist financing?

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the political economy of terrorism The financial aspects of terrorism have influenced the changing nature of the inter- national economy. After the collapse of the former Soviet Union in 1991, the United States became the world’s only superpower. Promoting an economic system that emphasized international production, trade, and consumption, American economic policies focused on reducing the trade barriers between nation-states. Some countries have prospered under globalization of the world economy, but others have grown weaker and poorer. Globalization is based on the belief that international trade bar- riers should be removed so that commerce and industry can develop in an interna- tional free market. Terrorism has taken hold in some of the areas left behind in the rush toward globalization, and this has changed the nature of terrorist financing (see Barber, 1996, pp. 48–49).

Loretta Napoleoni (2003) examines this process, formulating a new theory about the financing of terrorism. Agreeing with Adams’s early findings and other studies that found links between organized crime networks and terrorism, Napoleoni goes far beyond a summary of the immediate circumstances. In Modern Jihad, she argues that terrorism has evolved as an economic entity. The fall of the Soviet Union and subsequent globalization have produced what she calls the new economy of terror- ism. Napoleoni says that the origins of the new economy of terrorism grew from the Cold War (1945–1991). As Bruce Hoffman (1998, pp. 43–65) says, colonial revolts began at the end of World War II, and Napoleoni (2003, pp. 11–28) sees this as the beginning of a macroeconomic shift. Western nations began to use underground methods to fund their struggles in the colonies, and revolutionaries sought their own sources of money. The origins of the new economy of terrorism can be traced to anti- colonial revolts.

To demonstrate the birth of this new economy, Napoleoni turns to France. After World War II, when France was still a colonial power in control of many foreign lands, nationalists revolted against French rule all over the world. In Vietnam, the revolutionary nationalists were called the Vietminh. Although they had international Communist backing, the Vietminh needed money. They muscled their way into opium production, sold the drugs, and used the profits to keep their guerrillas in the field.

new economy of terrorism: A term used by Loretta Napoleoni to describe the evolution of terrorist financing from the begin- ning strategies of the Cold War to the present. Eco- nomic support and antiter- rorist policies interact to form the new economy.

Chapter 3 • Terrorist Financing and Money Laundering 71

Ironically, France tried the same concept. When the war against the Vietminh became politically unpopular, the French government found it difficult to finance mili- tary operations. Napoleoni says the French took over opium profits and used them to finance the war. As a result, drug trafficking became one of the primary methods governments used to finance activities during the Cold War.

Napoleoni says that as the Cold War developed, the Soviet Union and the United States fought each other by proxy; that is, they did not fight each other directly. The Soviets used allies to attack countries loyal to the United States, and the United States used its friends to attack Soviet-backed countries. Napoleoni believes that modern terrorist groups evolved from these surrogate conflicts and that they looked for ways to become independent from both superpowers. The desire for autonomy led terrorist groups to join criminals in an underground economy.

Napoleoni cites several examples to support this idea. She says a radical Marxist group in Peru, the Shining Path, turned to the drug trade in northern Peru, regulating drug production to fund their activities. The Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colom- bia (FARC) went a step further and joined the Colombian drug trade. Militant Pales- tinians went in another direction, using robbery and extortion to raise funds. The IRA started diverting funds from American charities before turning to organized crime. Napoleoni says these sources of financing fueled most of the terrorist activities of the 1970s and early 1980s.

The ETA (separatist group in Spain) changed the structure of terrorist financing. Instead of seeking links to an underground economy, ETA tried to gain control of the economy. They forced Spanish businesses out of the Basque areas of northern Spain and weakened the entire state. The Basque region became a failed state, a place where Spain could no longer exert power. When this happened, ETA established an illegiti- mate economy in a shell state. It paid salaries to terrorists, provided for the families of fallen members, and even ran a pension system for retired terrorists. ETA was success- ful because the Spanish economy had failed in the Basque region, leaving the area in a hopeless political mess. ETA was strong enough to enforce stability.

The new terrorist economy can be understood from the example of ETA. Napoleoni believes that globalization has created pockets in the world where failed or weak states are left to govern with little economic or political power. Terrorists and criminal groups grow in such places, running their own underground economies and provid- ing some form of political stability because they are strong enough to resist the state. Illegitimate groups form a shell state, an organization that acts as a government in a place where the government is not strong enough to act.

As globalization increased, according to Napoleoni, it not only created economic vacuums where shell states could form but also fueled the growth of a global under- ground economy. It provided illegal trade routes for drugs, arms smugglers, contra- band dealers, and human trafficking. Terrorist groups funded themselves through these activities, and they could not exist without them.

Napoleoni believes that modern terrorism is an international force supported by groups in shell states that continually change both their organizational structures and political goals to maintain income from an international underground economy. They hide their economic views with religious rhetoric or patriotic slogans, but their most important objective is to raise funds. Without funding, a terrorist group cannot exist. The prime goal of a group, then, is to maintain its finances. Napoleoni concludes that powerful groups even become strong enough to invest in legitimate markets, and in some instances, they move so much money that they affect the global economy.

Complementing Napoleoni’s work is a model developed by Mario Ferrero (2002), who argues that modern radical Islamic groups use violent activity as a means of

failed state: An area out- side a government’s con- trol. Failed states operate under differing warlords, criminal groups, or com- peting governments.

shell state: A political situ- ation where a government nominally controls its own state but where large regions are either anarchic or under the control of others. A government is unable to enforce law or provide for other forms of social order in a shell state.

72 PART 1 • Terrorism in Historical and Social Contexts

providing economic stability. Jihadist groups cannot keep outsiders away or fire slack- ers for being unproductive. Numerous recruits flock to training camps and meetings, including people who are less than totally motivated. The slackers threaten stability by using a group’s limited resources. To control this, jihadists increase rhetoric and violence to drive all but the most loyal members away from the group. This leaves enough resources to support the true believers.

Jeanne Giraldo and Harold Trinkunas (2007, pp. 7–11), of the U.S. Naval Post- graduate School, suggest that the political economy of terrorism is related to failed states and areas where governments cannot exert political control over their own territory. This has resulted in autonomous terrorist groups with their own funding sources. The terrorism generated by such groups is not related as much to a new style of terrorism or religious motivation as it is to their ability to generate funds. They control their economic circumstances, and funding creates violence.

Like Napoleoni, Giraldo and Trinkunas believe that the old Marxist groups were constrained by their sponsors. Unlike Napoleoni, they do not see the long emergence of a political economic system through the evolution of Cold War financing. They believe that the key is self-sufficiency. Financial and political autonomy allows terror- ists to operate without the constraints of a sponsor. Further, by participating in the global economy, they can function much like a government, controlling the flow of cash, goods, and services.

If these macroeconomic theories of terrorism are correct, they have meaning for the nature of counterterrorism. Many criminologists believe that crime can be reduced when potentially deviant groups have a vested interest in the economic structure of society. Macroeconomic theory suggests that counterterrorism policies should be aimed at providing the world’s peoples with economic stability, opportunity, and par- ticipation in the mainstream economy (see Barnett, 2005, p. 49). Economic policies to counter terrorism would thus involve supporting states in danger of failure, pro- viding opportunities for people to participate in and benefit from economic systems, and eliminating underground economic networks. When a state fails and a terrorist group creates its own shell state, the group has no incentive to participate in legitimate economic enterprises. As Benjamin Barber (1996, p. 299) says, when economic glo- balization threatens the ability of ordinary people to meet their needs, they will find other ways to survive. Indeed, this reflects Napoleoni’s thesis. Poverty does not cause terrorism, but economic and political failures may result in a shell state where terror- ism can be organized and funded.

> What is a macroeconomic theory? > How does it apply to terrorism? > What political assumptions must be made to see the logic of a macroeconomic

theory?

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narcoterrorism: A contro- versial term that links drugs to terrorism in one of two ways: Either drug profits are used to finance terrorism or drug gangs use terrorism to control production and distribution networks.

narcoterrorism A heated issue surrounding the discussion of terrorist financing is the relationship between terrorism and drugs. The term narcoterrorism refers to groups using either terrorist tactics to support drug operations or drug-trade profits to finance terror- ism. Rachel Ehrenfeld championed the concept of narcoterrorism in her early works,

Chapter 3 • Terrorist Financing and Money Laundering 73

and she expanded on the idea (Ehrenfeld, 2003). According to her research, terrorists are involved in the international production and distribution of drugs; indeed, she believes that the narcotics trade is one of their primary sources of money. The U.S. government tends to accept this position, but it is nonetheless extremely controversial.

the Link between drugs and terrorism Steven Casteel (2003), an executive with the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA), told a U.S. Senate committee that terrorism and the drug trade are inter- twined. Organized criminals, smugglers, and drug dealers naturally linked up with terrorist groups, he says, because all these organizations move in the same circles. Like Napoleoni, he believes that globalization has intensified this relationship. He says that the relationship between drugs and terrorism has been in place throughout history.

David Adams (2003), reporting for the St. Petersburg Times, says that Hezbollah and Hamas use the Latin American drug trade to raise funds. He writes that U.S. mili- tary units have tracked their activities in South America, and the military is concerned about the large amount of money involved. According to the U.S. Central Command, hundreds of millions of dollars have been raised in Latin America. The military’s prime concerns are the Triborder region, the Venezuelan island of Margarita, and the areas controlled by FARC in Colombia. The DEA agrees with this assessment. An official from the U.S. Department of State puts it succinctly: “Whether it is from Latin America or elsewhere, terrorist groups are financed through drugs. This is demon- strable, not debatable” (J. P. Walter, 2002).

Other governments also believe that terrorism and drugs are linked. The French Ministry of Defense issued a report stating that drugs are the primary currency used to finance international terrorism. The French government points to the Shining Path and FARC to show the influence of cocaine. The ministry claims that radical Islamic groups get most of their money through the drug trade in Central and Southeast Asia. Afghanistan is the primary source of heroin in Europe, and the profits from these drug sales fund all international Islamic terrorist groups (Chouvy, 2004). Officials in India believe that Lashkar-e-Taiba and al Qaeda have smuggled drugs and other contraband through Africa, Central Asia, and Eastern Europe (Times of India, 2003). According to many in the Indian government, militant Islamic groups are funded by the drug trade.

Joshua Krasna (1997) takes the argument to another level. He says that if people are willing to expand the definition of national security beyond the framework of mili- tary defense, drugs pose a security problem. Defining security as social safety, Krasna says that the drug trade threatens political and economic stability by disrupting society. The drug trade limits the ability of legitimate governments and increases the power of insurgent and terrorist groups. Terrorists, for their part, use drugs not only to exploit the social safety concerns of their enemies but also to fund terrorist activities.

Nothing illustrates Krasna’s point better than the unfortunate situation in Mexico. Seven major drug trafficking organizations dominate the political landscape in north- ern Mexico. Officially labeled drug trafficking organizations by the U.S. government, these drug cartels bring a high level of criminality to the U.S.–Mexican border. Vio- lence spills over into Arizona and Texas, and the cartels have directly influenced urban gang activity in Los Angeles, Chicago, New York, Dallas, and San Francisco. Another alarming trend is the link between one of the groups, Los Zetas, with Hezbollah. This has spawned concern over an emerging link between drug trafficking and terrorism. Los Zetas uses Hezbollah in West Africa to launder drug profits, while Hezbollah uses the payoffs from Los Zetas to finance terrorist operations. There is speculation about an even closer link between Los Zetas and Iran, as some analysts believe that the drug

74 PART 1 • Terrorism in Historical and Social Contexts

cartel may have been involved in an assassination plot against the Saudi ambassador to the United States in late 2011 (Chalk, 2012).

narcoterrorism controversies Not everyone accepts the link between drugs and terrorism. Some people argue that terrorists may use drugs as a source of income, but they also use several other illegal activities to raise money. Selling drugs is only one method, and the drug problem is not caused by terrorism. Other people believe that the use of the term narcoterror- ism is an attempt to take political advantage of the fear of terrorism. If drugs and terrorism come to mean the same thing, it will be easier to take actions against drug dealers. Critics believe that combining the drug problem with terrorism confuses two different issues.

The 9/11 Commission (2004, pp. 171–172) dismisses the idea that drugs were linked to al Qaeda’s attack on New York and Washington, D.C. There is no evidence, the commission writes, that indicates bin Laden used underground drug networks or narcotics trafficking to support the September 11 attacks. The Taliban used narcotics trafficking to support itself in Afghanistan, but bin Laden used a network of donors based in Saudi Arabia and the Gulf States.

In the same article in which he explains narcoterrorism, Adams (2003) acknowl- edges the critics. He points to skepticism about the military and DEA assessments of Latin America. Many critics believe these organizations have overstated the problem. Other people point to misunderstandings. Terrorists are not necessarily linked to the drug trade, even when they appear to be involved with drugs. Many Arabs live in the Triborder region, and they support Hamas and Hezbollah. Just because drug traders flourish in this region does not mean that either the Arabs or the terrorist groups are associated with drugs.

David Kaplan (2003) says the financing of militant Islamic groups has very little to do with the drug trade. Based on a five-month study for U.S. News & World Report, Kaplan blames Saudi Arabia for funding the spread of an intolerant form of Islam. Violent intolerance, he says, spawned the rise of terrorist groups, and the sect most sympathetic to an intolerant version of Islam comes from Saudi Arabia. Charities are responsible for the bulk of terrorist financing, he believes, and the money funds radical mosques, militant schools, and Islamic centers that support the jihadist movement. Saudi money can be traced to violence in Algeria, Bosnia, Kashmir, the West Bank, Gaza, Indonesia, Somalia, and Chechnya. The spread of militant Islam is not about drugs.

Pierre-Arnaud Chouvy (2004) does not agree with the position of the French military. He argues that the term narcoterrorism is too vague to describe either drug traffickers or terrorists, and it does not help address either problem. The problem with drugs involves supply and demand. Western Europe and North America provide ready markets for drug use. Typical Afghan farmers fight to survive. They produce opium, the base for heroin, because it is a cash crop. Western Europe has the demand, Chouvy says, and Afghanistan has the supply. Opium production has nothing to do with terrorism. Narcoterrorism is a convenient term for the French government to use, appealing to public emotions and giving the police more power.

Civil libertarians are especially critical of attempts to link terrorism and drugs (TalkLeft, 2003). Agreeing with Chouvy, they see the attempt to link narcotics and terrorism as a ploy by states. If terrorism were to disappear, the drug trade would remain. But if governments link drugs with terrorism, they can reinvent the mean- ing of crime. Drug dealers will become terrorists, and a frightened public will grant

Chapter 3 • Terrorist Financing and Money Laundering 75

the government expanded powers to combat drugs. In addition, courts more readily grant search warrants and wiretaps against terrorists. Civil libertarians often believe governments want to define drug pushers as narcoterrorist kingpins in an effort to increase their own power.

Michael Scheuer (2006, pp. 42–44) takes the middle ground in the debate over narcoterrorism. In an examination of Osama bin Laden, Scheuer writes that the analyses of al Qaeda’s use of heroin to finance jihad range from believable to fan- tastic accounts. Some reports of the narcotics connection are true, some are simply asserted without evidence, and a great deal of propaganda is obviously false. Never- theless, the narcotics trade in Afghanistan makes billions of dollars. It would be naïve, Scheuer concludes, to assume that bin Laden has not been able to take advantage of some of those funds.

> Define the two elements of narcoterrorism. > What arguments support the idea? > Why do some analysts reject the idea of narcoterrorism?

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emphasizing the points Money laundering is the process of converting the proceeds of crime into assets that can be used in the formal economy. Terrorist financing refers to illegal and legal methods of funding terrorism. For many years, analysts equated money laundering and terrorist financing, but today, the two processes are examined differently. Ter- rorists may also have a need to launder dirty money, such as NGO support of a mili- tant group. Even with the shift in analysis, it is difficult to assess the effectiveness of antilaundering and antiterrorist financing efforts. The most prominent international tools are FATF recommendations, but the effectiveness of FATF measures are subject to debate. The federal government has created financial law enforcement and intel- ligence units to counter money laundering and terrorists financing, and the United States and Europe have championed a host of anti-terrorist economic measures. Ter- rorists employ a variety of illegal methods to obtain resources and sometimes move assets in hidden networks. Terrorist financing remains complex because there is no single method or path for obtaining resources. Some analysts have concluded that one of the most lucrative ways of raising money is selling illegal drugs.

SuMMary OF CHapter OBjeCtiveS

• Money laundering is a term that was first used to describe the actions of orga- nized crime groups. They gathered money in a variety of illegal ways and claimed that their gains were profits generated by laundromats. It is the process of converting proceeds from crime into legitimate money.

• Terrorist financing refers to the methods used to fund terrorist groups or opera- tions. It is extremely complicated because terrorists employ a variety of legal and illegal moneymaking methods.

• After 9/11, governments in the United States and Europe increased anti-money laundering efforts, assuming that this action would reduce terrorist financing. Many analysts slowly recognized subtle differences. Criminals commit crime then launder the proceeds. Terrorists, by contrast, distribute funds to commit crimes.

76 PART 1 • Terrorism in Historical and Social Contexts

• The United States and Europe have sponsored international efforts to combat money laundering and terrorist financing, and the UN FATF recommendations are prominent among them. Critics contend that most nations do not comply with FATF recommendations and the regulatory system is ineffective. Support- ers counter by arguing that the complex system will take time to construct. They also point to increased arrest and conviction rates based on financial investigations and intelligence.

• Financial investigative and intelligence units permeate federal law enforcement agencies and the intelligence community.

• Terrorists raise funds by a number of legal and illegal methods. Illegal methods include robbery, counterfeiting, fraud, cigarette smuggling, extortion, kidnap- ping, and a variety of other criminal activities. Terrorists also raise money through legal operations. They divert funds to support terrorist operations. Charities and business operations are the most frequent legal activities.

• Funds are disbursed in an underground economy or through traditional money laundering activities. These include hidden money transfers such as the Hawala. They also smuggle cash, launder money, convert it to consumer products, or keep the money or goods within the organization.

• The Hawala system is based on an old method merchants used to exchange money without risking transport of actual cash. It is based on agents who exchange promissory notes. Today, some terrorists use this system to fund operations.

• The political economy of terrorism involves groups that have the ability to act autonomously in shell states and failed states. Becoming a de facto government power, they control the movement of money, goods, and services.

• There is a debate about the relationship between illegal drugs and terrorism. Proponents believe that terrorists use drugs to finance operations, and they use the term narcoterrorism to describe this activity. Opponents argue that govern- ments use the term to increase their own power by defining common criminals as terrorists.

LOOkiNg iNtO tHe Future

Rapid changes in global economic networks and exchange mechanisms suggest that traditional economic structures are fading. Private exchange systems like Bicoin and Pay Pal are growing, and most economic transactions are electronic. New and chang- ing economic systems provide opportunities for terrorists. They will also be vulner- able to terrorist attacks, especially when they are first introduced.

Forensic accounting will become crucial for effective national and international law enforcement agencies. U.S. law enforcement agencies will need to develop forensic accounting skills to face the future, but they probably will lag behind the capabilities of terrorists on the state and local levels. University trained accountants have many more lucrative employment opportunities when examining pay scales in state and local police agencies. Yet, there are alternatives. For example, partnerships with federal agencies can provide state and local forces with needed expertise. Teaching officers to recognize suspicious economic activity provides another path for future law enforce- ment. The U.S. Treasury Department’s Suspicious Activity Report represents a step in that direction. No matter how they accomplish it, future law enforcement officers must develop the tools to thwart economic crime to deal with the economics of terrorism.

A second future need in law enforcement involves cyber skills, and these tal- ents will be applicable to many forms of investigation and enforcement far beyond

Chapter 3 • Terrorist Financing and Money Laundering 77

counterterrorism. Police of the future will need to improve computer competency and form partnerships with experts to assist in investigations. The FBI has been increasing efforts in this area for the past decade, and the future will bring a greater demand for cyber skills. The future may also bring greater cooperation among forensic comput- ing experts in law enforcement, the military’s Cyber Command, and private industry.

key terMS

Capone discovery, p. 53 Placement, p. 54 Layering, p. 54 Integration, p. 54 Black market peso

exchange, p. 54

Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism, p. 61

Financial Action Task Force on Money Laun- dering (FATF), p. 61

Forensic accounting, p. 64

Expropriation, p. 64 Triborder region, p. 67 Globalization, p. 67 Hawala system, p. 68

New economy of terrorism, p. 70

Failed state, p. 71 Shell state, p. 71 Narcoterrorism, p. 72

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Learning Objectives After reading this chapter, you should be able to:

44 D e f i n e t h e n e w m e d i a environment.

44 Describe the characteristics of the new media.

44 Explain how the Internet has impacted terrorism.

44 Describe the way narrative can be presented in a hybrid frame.

44 Summarize research trends with respect to terrorism and the media.

44 Discuss the role of the media in constructing social reality.

44 Explain the tension between security forces and the media.

44 Describe how the media can be viewed as a weapon.

44 Explain how news frames are used to present a story.

44 Describe the special relation- ship between terrorism and television.

J ames Oliver Rigney Jr. (October 17, 1948–September 16, 2007), whose pen name was Robert Jordan, began publish- ing a massive fantasy series entitled The Wheel of Time in

1990. Sadly, he passed away in 2007, but Brandon Sanderson completed the 14-volume series masterfully. The books tell stories of a world where demons fly, women weave special powers from a mythical city called Tar Valon, young men and women seek their destinies, and good forces battle evil for con- trol of creation. Of course, the series is the product of Rigney’s imagination, yet the books contain quite a bit of truth about the human experience. One theme that occurs throughout the series is the way tales are passed by word of mouth. Readers are allowed to experience men and women struggling against evil through the eyes of the main protagonists. After the con- frontations, the story spreads through fictional kingdoms, and the stories change. By the time they are told for the fifth, sixth, and seventh times, the stories do not resemble the original narrative. This is the way human beings share stories, and not merely the product of entertaining fiction.

terrorism and the Media

4C h a p t E r

Social Media, the New Propaganda Tool

Chapter 4 • Terrorism and the Media 79

On May 2, 2011, commandos from the U.S. Navy’s elite counterterrorist SEAL Team landed in a compound north of Islamabad, Pakistan. Their target was one of the most infamous terrorists of all times, Osama bin Laden. The raid was successful. Shortly after the raid, President Barack Obama called President George Bush to give him the news. A few minutes later, Obama came on the major networks and announced that bin Laden was dead. Then the stories of the stories started to spread. Military experts and former commandos first ap- peared on cable television to give “authoritative” accounts of the raid. Network news broadcasts and nationally syndicated newspapers expanded stories of the raid the following day, complete with illustrations and graphics. The White House released an official version of the raid. A few days later, a SEAL publicly contested the official version, and television producers began focusing on docu- mentaries to explain what “really” transpired. Within weeks, there were several versions of the story about the death of the world’s most wanted terrorist. A year later, a firsthand account would be released in the book No Easy Day (Owen and Maurer, 2012). The narratives of bin Laden’s death were told and retold with slight variations in the different renderings.

Events become stories in literature and in day-to-day life. Most stories are for- gotten, but some of them are repeated. Twice-told stories evolve into sagas, and sagas change to legends. The Wheel of Time series demonstrates this process through literary fiction. The many versions of bin Laden’s death arose in the world of electronic mass-mediated information. Hybrid narratives spread from two sources, the older slower mass media of print, radio, and television and the newer instantaneous social media and Internet.

the new Media environment Terrorists frequently seek to tell stories to publicize a cause. This implies that terrorist groups have a special relationship with the news media, and as terrorism evolved into an ideological phase in the 1960s and 1970s, it became a drama made for television. Terrorism provided the spectacle, and television news networks became the medium. The symbiotic relationship seemed to be made to last, but journalists and reporters realized they were being manipulated. Security force managers also learned that they often were pictured heroically when responding to terrorist violence, so instead of avoiding the media, they sought to portray the positive actions of their personnel. Terrorists still tried to maintain control of the message. They used media reports to magnify fear, but as media editors and producers constructed the stories, terrorists lost control. They searched for a solution, and they found a new weapon in a media revolution in the early twenty-first century.

In the past few years, mass media transformed into virtual communities of chat rooms, e-zines, forums, websites, YouTube postings, Facebook communications, and Twitter’s social network. Not only did these forms of communication represent a new media, they gave terrorists the ability to completely control their message. The battle- field migrated from television to instant communication.

Defining the new Media The mass media of newspapers, radio, and television could be defined as mass com- munication. The new methods of interaction also involve communication, but they

80 PART 1 • Terrorism in Historical and Social Contexts

allow selective connections among communities. Communication scholars refer to these selectively controlled methods of interaction as the new media, and they define the concept broadly. John Amble (2012) says the new media refer to any virtual net- work where communication takes place. New media include blogs, multiple Internet postings, and any social network. They are innovative, they frequently involve two- way communication, and they are growing at an astonishing rate.

Amble states that terrorists were quick to understand the power of the new media. They began to employ it in the 1990s as the Internet expanded, and they increasingly relied on it after it grew exponentially in the twenty-first century. He points to the rapid expansion of the Internet between 2000 and 2011 as connections spread across the globe.

In this time period, it grew by 2,000 percent in the Middle East and by an astro- nomical 15,000 percent in Pakistan. As the Internet developed, terrorist narratives started to spread. Government officials and media elites no longer held a monopoly on message selection. Anybody could create a narrative and make it available to a mass audience.

Aside from network expansion, Amble says that other factors influenced the growth and impact of the new media. As technology developed, the price of network devices dropped. Cell phones, computers, and other devices were cheap and plentiful. They were in the hands of billions of consumers. Additionally, improved digital tech- nology increased the quality and quantity of communications. Devices became smaller and more powerful. Finally, increased bandwidth increased the ability of servers to process traffic. A communications revolution created a host of virtual communities.

Jytte Klausen (2015), the primary investigator on a National Institute of Justice (NIJ) grant studying the impact of social media on terrorism, led a team of researchers who were investigating Twitter. Her team collected and analyzed data from 59 West- erners who joined jihadist groups in the Syrian civil war from January through March 2014. She says that Twitter, the most popular form of electronic communication for the target group, plays an important role in the strategy of violent radicals. It provides instant communication straight from the front lines with user-controlled narratives.

Twitter is particularly powerful, according to Klausen. It legitimizes messages because it brings the perception of authenticity, and it is socially accepted. For example, reporters in the old media of newspapers, radio, and television frequently cite Twitter as a legitimate source of information. In addition, journalists, analysts, and schol- ars working in the field of terrorism frequently follow each other on Twitter. It is readily available and highly mobile because it is specifically designed for cell phones. Appearances of authenticity increase as postings (tweets) are augmented with pictures and videos. Once tweeted, postings can be linked to other platforms or forwarded to multiple users. They can also be embedded in websites. Consumers believe they are receiving authentic information as they are vicariously placed in battle zones.

characteristics of the new Media There are several distinguishing characteristics that differentiate the new and old media. Television, radio, and print, to a lesser extent, are relatively rapid in the scope of human history, but slower than the new media. The old media is controlled by small groups of elite stakeholders who distribute selective information to targeted audiences. It transmits one version of a story to many people, and while elites may interact with the sources of a narrative, the audience can only consume the informa- tion. Consumers cannot collaborate or participate in developing a story.

None of the characteristics of the new media apply to the old. John Amble (2012) points out that several consumers can engage a story in multiple fashions. They may

new media: Any virtual network that allows communication. It includes blogs, multiple Internet postings, and any social network.

Syrian civil war: A war that began in March 2011 in an attempt to over- throw President Bashir Assad. It is characterized by multiple groups fight- ing multiple enemies and has resulted in the deaths of thousands of people caught in the fighting. Opponents are divided along sectarian, ethnic, and political lines. It has attracted fighters from many countries, including nation states in Europe, North America, and Asia.

Chapter 4 • Terrorism and the Media 81

even become contributors, editing and commenting on stories they forward. In other words, Amble says, consumers become part of the stories they post. They control the message, interpret it as they wish, and forward it to selected audiences. If old media communication is characterized as one-way and one-to-many, new media is multipath and many-to-many.

the new Media and the internet In addition to the explosion of the new media, the Internet has a growing influence on the direction of terrorism. Metteo Vergani (2014) discovered this in a case study of an Italian convert to Islam who joined an al Qaeda-affiliated group in Syria. Vergani says that online experiences combine with actions, social ties, and the new media to allow potential terrorists to participate in a group. Physical proximity is not required, and virtual reinforcement of radical beliefs helps participants justify their extreme positions. Any participant can have access to propaganda and unfiltered news. Like- minded people can link across great distances, experimenting with new roles and identities. The new media and the Internet provide a platform for reinforcing polar- ization, violence, and hostility.

Jytte Klausen’s (2015) study of Twitter revealed that Syrian jihadists give the illu- sion that Western recruits freely communicate with their old social networks at home. However, this is far from the truth. In reality, Western recruits surrender all commu- nication devices when they arrive at a training camp, and they are threatened with death if they try to communicate with family and friends. While Twitter feeds give the illusion that messages are freely posted by a variety of fighters, only the most trusted recruits are allowed to post. The group controls the message. Vergani (2014) says the Internet takes over when the tweet stops.

In Vergani’s case study, al Qaeda controlled the original symbols and ideology to present a single image, which is just as Klausen found. The ability to communicate was limited and regulated, but once a story was posted, the dynamics of the Internet came into play. As consumers engaged the story, some of them chose to participate in it. Stories were recast on the Internet resulting in multiple narratives far beyond the control of the group who released an original grassroots story. Multiple consumers were free to transform and personalize narratives. There were no limits to the man- ner in which a story could be retold each time it was remixed. Stories circulated and grew in much the same way that stories are passed through communities and cultures. Vergani says that these findings are applicable to communication within the new me- dia and narratives evolve into hybrid stories more quickly than in the past due to the number of Internet platforms and their instant availability.

The subject of Vergani’s case study entered a Syrian al Qaeda-linked group through the standard jihadist narrative; that is, the West has oppressed Muslims by establishing puppet governments, and it is the duty of all real Muslims to fight both the puppets and the West. Muslims are called to either come to or create a war zone, and wage jihad. This represents the tightly controlled message of the terrorist group; however, the original story is told and retold. In Vergani’s study, the subject went to Syria to join a devoted brotherhood where jihadists are happily and willingly martyred for a cause. Yet, the narrative was retold on the Internet, and new elements of the story developed. Rebellious symbols were added with stories of adolescent angst. In turn, teenage unrest turned into revolutionary left-wing activity. One version of the tale combined jihadist martyrdom with Latin American Marxists, and contradictions continued to increase. Vergani’s subject was pictured with scantily clad young women allegedly praising him for jihad, images al Qaeda would consider pornographic. The religious fanaticism of

82 PART 1 • Terrorism in Historical and Social Contexts

Osama bin Laden was combined with the atheism of Che Guevara. Finally, a glorious Arab past was combined with an abstract history of Italian glory. The new grassroots story was a hybrid that differed greatly from the original.

Another combination of new media and Internet power can be seen in the emer- gence of propaganda e-zines, such as al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula’s (AQAP) Inspire. It is a slick publication that urges consumers to wage war on their own home ground. The first sections of each professional e-zine are designed to motivate read- ers and provide them with information from the jihad. The next section focuses on “Open Source Jihad.” It contains specific instructions for waging terrorism, for ex- ample, “Build a Bomb in the Kitchen of Your Mom.”

The precise nature of the instructions is problematic for two reasons. First, the information is frequently simple and correct. Although some ideas are far fetched, others are on target. Anyone wanting to engage in violence has the instructions for do- ing so. Second, the information is more likely to encourage violence. If you say, “Lose weight,” you are not likely to motivate an overweight person. If you say, “Here’s a one-month meal plan of 1,800 calories a day and a three-day-a-week exercise rou- tine,” your words are more likely to result in action. “Open Source Jihad” does not say things such as, “Come to Yemen and wage jihad” or “Form a terrorist cell.” However, it does tell potential terrorists how to take a standard pressure cooker, mix certain chemicals, and construct a workable fuse. This type of instruction is more likely to result in action (Lemieux et al., 2014). In fact, it actually did motivate bombers in Boston to attack the 2013 marathon with an exploding pressure cooker (Kahn, 2013).

Other aspects of the internet The Internet impacts news coverage of all events and often exceeds the ability of the established media to report an event. It is also used for communication, propaganda, reporting, recruiting, training, and as a tactical weapon. Either side can directly con- trol information or hack into opponents’ websites. Both sides can mine data and gather intelligence. The Internet can be a weapon, and either side may use it effec- tively. Terrorists have learned to use it on several levels.

Todd Hinnen (2004) says that the Internet is used most frequently as a commu- nication device and that sending unsecure email is the most common way terrorists use it. Unsecure email is easy to penetrate, and evidence from it is frequently used in criminal prosecutions. Hinnen cites charges against a Colombian terrorist group for arms trafficking based on evidence gathered from email. Terrorists, aware of the dan- gers of unsecure email, use a variety of methods to hide communications. One way, Hinnen writes, is to give an email account’s password to several members of a group. A member can then draft a message but never send it. Other members log on, read the draft, and then delete it after all have viewed it. Because the message is never sent, there is no email record. A second method involves setting up a secure website, such as TerroristGroup.com, with its own email server. All members of a terrorist group would receive an address, such as [email protected]. If email stays exclu- sively within the secure site, it is difficult to trace.

Terrorists understand the power of the Internet. They run their own websites, and they sometimes hack into existing sites to broadcast propaganda videos. Yassen Zassoursky (2002) says that these abilities enhance the power of terrorist groups, and he believes that the Internet’s communication capabilities give terrorist groups an op- portunity to attack the global community. Sonia Liff and Anne Sofie Laegren (2003) reinforce Zassoursky’s thesis by pointing to Internet cafés. They say that cybercafés enhance the Internet’s striking power because they make communication untraceable.

Chapter 4 • Terrorism and the Media 83

Steganography is frequently said to be one of the Internet’s greatest vulnerabilities in light of criminal and terrorist communication. The process refers to embedding hid- den information in a picture, message, or other piece of information. The process is not new. A Roman general once shaved the head of a slave, had a secret message tattooed on the slave’s head, and waited for the slave’s hair to grow back. When the message was covered, he sent the slave to the recipient with instructions to shave the slave’s head (Lau, 2003). Obviously, the Internet presents possibilities for faster communi- cation, and it does not present the risk of permanently displaying the message if the messenger goes bald! A steganographic message can be encrypted, placed in plain text in a hidden file, or sent via a covert channel (Westphal, 2003). There are numerous potential purposes for using steganography in terrorism. It could be used to hide com- munications, steal information from security forces or an organization within the criti- cal infrastructure, or provide opportunities for an electronic attack (Wingate, 2006).

There are two positions on the steganographic threat to the United States. Stephan Lau (2003) says one position claims that steganography is used by terrorist groups to communicate and launch cyberattacks. After 9/11, for example, media reports claimed that al Qaeda was hiding information in steganographic images. Some believe that it will be used in denial-of-service attacks or to deface websites. Lau takes a different position, claiming that fear of steganography is the stuff of urban legends. Although steganographic programs are readily available and difficult to detect or counter with security hardware, programs offering statistical analysis of data contained in any In- ternet transmission readily reveal irregularities and the location of any hidden image. Entrepreneurs are marketing these programs to corporations and governments, but Lau believes the threat is not in the hidden image. He says that there is no evidence to show that terrorists’ use of steganography is a threat. The real threat, Lau argues, is the American government’s enhanced ability to decipher private communications based on a threat that does not exist.

In the areas of propaganda, reporting, and public relations, the Internet has been a boon for terrorist groups. It allows terrorist groups to present messages and to portray images that will not appear in mainstream media. Paul Wilkinson (2006, pp. 144–157) says that terrorists have always used some medium for communication. In the past, it ranged from tavern gossip to handbills. Thus, it is logical to assume that the Internet serves the same purpose, now literally at the speed of light. Major terrorist groups run websites to present alternative views. For example, before its demise in 2009, the Liberation the of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) ran a news service formerly called the Eelam- Website Violent single-issue groups use websites for propaganda as well (see the sec- tion later in this chapter titled “Expanding the Concept: As Sahaab versus al Hurra”).

The Internet can also be used for recruitment and training. Abdul Bakier (2006b) finds Salafi jihadists using websites and email to make training manuals available. The Internet has become more important as more females join the Salafi movement. One blogger, who identifies herself as the mother of bin Laden, claims that the Internet gives women the opportunity to become mujahidat (female holy warriors). Bakier finds some sites are specifically aimed at recruiting or retaining females. Other sites encourage suicide bombings. Discussion groups examine tactics and provide basic weapons orientation, and some militant scholars provide in-depth theological apo- logias to justify religious violence. One site has an entire first-aid course to deal with battlefield wounds. Bakier says that more and more groups are using recruiting sites.

The Internet is also used in target selection, reconnaissance, and, sometimes, as a tool to support an attack. Maps, satellite imagery, and diagrams provide ready-made intelligence sources. Stephen Ulph (2006a) sees terrorists increasingly using Internet searches to find economic targets. He believes this trend is notable because terrorists

Steganography: Embedding a hidden encoded message on an Internet site.

Salafi movement: Used by orthodox Muslims to follow the Prophet and the elders of the faith. Militants narrow the use of the term and use it to justify violence. The Salafi movement refers to those people who impose Islam with force and violence.

84 PART 1 • Terrorism in Historical and Social Contexts

across the globe can unite and research a particular target in a matter of minutes. He also finds terrorist groups attracted to data mining. One terrorist training manual points out that it is possible to gather information on enemy targets simply by using the Internet. Ulph (2006b) also sees the Internet as a potential weapon. Terrorists want to take hacker warfare to their enemies. Groups post methods to steal passwords and instructions for breaking into secure areas. There are instructions on systems and denial-of-service attacks, as well. As a logistical tool, the Internet can also be used to assemble people for a violent action. Clearly, the Internet has become a weapon in many arsenals.

But there is another side to the story. Security forces also use new media, and they do so effectively. Researchers have access to databases, government reports, and other information. Security forces also monitor websites and chat rooms (Wright, 2008). New laws in a number of countries have given law enforcement and intelligence agencies the authority to monitor Internet content for criminal activity, although such surveillance is controversial in Western democracies (Brown, 2009). Law enforcement networks in the Regional Information Sharing System (RISS) have the ability to share criminal in- vestigative information, and they provide local, state, and federal law enforcement with secure communications. The Internet can thus be used to combat terrorism and other forms of criminal activity. Terrorism researchers and security specialists use Twitter to communicate, gather intelligence, and to follow select terrorists (McCants, c.2014).

expanDing the cOncept

as Sahaab Versus al hurra al Qaeda’s media campaign has proved difficult for the United States to counteract. al Qaeda’s underground video network, known as as Sahaab, wages an effective propaganda campaign using the Internet. Evan Kohlmann (2005), an NBC terrorism analyst, explains the process. Local camera operators film studio sequences of a propaganda statement or live-action footage of mujahedeen along the pakistan– afghanistan border. the footage is edited on a computer, dubbed or subtitled, and handed over to an Internet group called al Fajir, which posts links to the clip in arab chat forums. (Ironically, most of these forums are hosted in North america.) televi- sion networks pick up the broadcasts. Western networks heavily edit them, but, on networks like al Jazeera, they sometimes appear as full-length broadcasts, according to the Discovery times Channel (2005). In its own media offensive, the United States launched al hurra, an arabic-language 24-hour satellite station, in early 2004. the results have been disappointing. One prominent arab writer called the $62 million project the american Pravda, after the Communist news organization in the former Soviet Union (Cochrane, 2004). the Discovery times Channel agreed, stating that most arabic-speaking viewers distrust the news produced by al hurra. In essence, a few thousand dollars invested in website cams, pCs, and video software have made more of an impact than a multimillion-dollar television enterprise. the United States has yet to capitalize on the Internet for spreading propaganda. Sources: Kohlmann, 2005; Discovery Times Channel, 2005; Cochrane, 2004.

> What is the new media, and how can it be characterized? > How do the new media and the Internet interact? > Is the Internet a potential weapon for terrorism? Why or why not?

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Chapter 4 • Terrorism and the Media 85

trends in research Jeffery Ian Ross (2007) raises several important points about the need to research the relationship between terrorism and the old news media. In essence, many criminolo- gists and analysts discuss it, but there remains much to be learned. Studies tend to repeat one another, revealing little new material. Terrorism requires interdisciplinary research because it involves so many aspects of the human experience, and its rela- tionship with the media has not been fully explored. Ross concludes that the range of publications and research adds very little new knowledge.

Ross believes that there are several areas in need of new research, though we do know something about the relationship between the media and terrorism. First, mean- ings are socially created, and Ross demonstrates that reporting is part of the social construction of terrorism. Second, terrorists are aware of the power of the media and seek to manipulate their message through it. Third, while the media enhances the power of terrorism, it does not cause it. Finally, terrorists will increasingly use the Internet to communicate as the relationship between the media and terrorism grows stronger in the future.

a set of empirical Findings on twitter Jytte Klausen’s (2015) detailed empirical analysis of Westerners using Twitter in the Syrian civil war is a perfect answer to Ross’s call for more research. Her team’s findings demonstrate several aspects of the use of new media. The main purpose of terror media is to generate propaganda. Klausen says Syrian jihadists glorify martyrdom. We fighters are supreme, they say, and the enemy is worthless. Dead jihadists are frequently cleaned up before being photographed, and corpses may be posed with smiles as if the subjects died happily. Videos show comrades lovingly burying their dead, while enemy dead are gruesomely depicted. Many photographs and videos show executions to create fear in a psychological war. By mid-June 2014, one particularly violent Syrian-Iraqi group began posting pictures of cruci- fied victims. It also featured pictures of piles of severed heads and videos of victims being buried alive.

Frequency distributions of types of tweets revealed common categories from Syr- ian jihadists. In written communication, Klausen found that tweets centered around religious indoctrination, battle reports, interpersonal communication, everyday life, and delivering threats to the West. Religion dominated written communication, with four out of five tweets focusing on religious dogma. Klausen’s team originally believed they would find postings dominated by practical communication and discussions with friends back home. Instead, they found Twitter feeds presenting unsophisticated dog- matic religious statements.

Pictures and videos revealed a different pattern. The most common visual images emphasized combat and territory gains. Pictures depicting lifestyles were the next most common. They emphasized the glory of jihad. The final frequency-ranked video tweets focused on innocent victims murdered by enemies; portrayals of martyrdom followed, and the least common category included images of retribution (although Klausen did record 93 pictures and videos of retribution). An interesting spin-off re- vealed a growing gender role in religious violence. The next chapter of this text pres- ents evidence that females tend to play supporting roles in nationalistic and religious- based terrorist movements, but Klausen reveals a growing Western network of women who are playing an important role in jihadist communication. Wives and mothers of European jihadists are linking with their counterparts in Syria and Iraq.

86 PART 1 • Terrorism in Historical and Social Contexts

televised gender stereotypes Television also impacts the way women are viewed in terrorist organizations. Al- though women have played significant roles in modern terrorism and have frequently assumed positions of leadership, television tends to portray women as minor figures in a male-dominated occupation. Brigitte Nacos (2005) finds that television depicts female terrorists in a manner similar to the way women politicians are portrayed. The result is that women are cast in supportive and nurturing roles devoid of any per- sonality characteristics required for tough political action. Women are treated with typical gender clichés that are, in turn, captured and restated in television reporting. Television generates the same stereotypes for female terrorists and politicians.

Nacos presents several images created by television news frames. She discusses the “physical appearance” frame, which focuses on the way a woman looks in front of the camera. The “family connection” frame is used to create the appearance of a “typi- cal housewife.” The “terrorist for the sake of love” depicts a lovelorn female entering a life of terrorism due to her relationship with her male companion. The “women’s lib” frame paints a picture of a nontraditional woman seeking to define herself in a more masculine role, as does the “tough as men—tougher than men” news frame. Finally, news frames also depict women as bored, frustrated housewives who are out of touch with reality.

The result of such depictions, Nacos concludes, is that television misrepresents the threat of terrorism by misstating the dangerous role that female terrorists play. Instead of looking at the actual activities of women, television portrays them via gender ste- reotypes. The traditional method of framing female politicians has weakened in recent years, Nacos says, but the same is not true for the images of women terrorists. As a result, women are able to use their television-generated images to avoid detection. Gender-biased reports weaken our ability to respond to terrorism.

> Why is it necessary to gather empirical evidence about the media and terrorism? > What do Twitter postings reveal about Westerners fighting in Syria? > What biases appear from research on gender and reporting?

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the Media and socially constructed reality Communication and socially constructed images are part of human culture. Tra- ditionally, people told stories around campfires. The invention of writing radically changed communication, but oral traditions remained strong because most people were illiterate. The printing press revolutionized writing, and increased education added to its impact as literacy spread. Harnessing electricity allowed communication across great distances, but the invention of radio and television transformed images into symbols. New media represents another transmogrification. As the late Marshal McLuhan said, the medium is the message. Unless a person experiences terrorism, various media define it.

When a television report covers terrorism, it presents a number of images that represent reality. Newspaper articles frequently print photographs to enhance a re- port, and reality in a radio report becomes the images multiple listeners are creating with their minds. The same factors apply to new media. Consumers experience an event through the media, not by actual participation. It is important to remember that all of these interpretations do not represent objective reality. They are presented

Chapter 4 • Terrorism and the Media 87

within a social context and interpreted by individuals. Further, whether on television or Twitter, a report is framed and presented within a social context. The meaning of terrorism is socially constructed, and the media provides a large part of the interpreta- tion (Munson, 2008).

news Frames and presentations Although communication scholars debate the definition, David Levin (2003) says re- porting patterns are packaged in segments called news frames. The purpose of a news frame is to assemble words and pictures to create a pattern surrounding an event. The news becomes a symbolic representation of an event in which the audience is allowed to participate from a distance. Television and other media spin the event so that it can be translated into the understanding of popular culture. They use rhetoric and popu- lar images to set the agenda, and the drama becomes the hook to attract an audience.

News frames form the basis for communicating symbols. Karim Karim (2001, pp. 18–19) says the news frame creates a narrative for understanding a deadly drama. Characters are introduced, heroes and villains are defined, and victims of violence become the suffering innocents. The people who produce the frame provide their in- terpretation to the audience. Because the news frame exists within the dominant po- litical context of the producers, it is not necessary to expend a great amount of energy on propaganda. The audience has been indoctrinated by journalists and mainstream reporters who present governmental officials as protectors and terrorists as villains. The news frame provides the “correct” symbolism for the consumer.

Simon Cottle (2006) believes that news frames help “mediatize” the presentation of terrorism; that is, they shape the way an event is communicated. The news frame is used by all media, but it is especially applicable to television. The news frame, although intentionally used, is one of the least understood aspects of broadcast journalism be- cause its complexity goes unnoticed. Discussions of news frames usually focus on a specific story, or they involve reducing ideas to common elements. Actually, Cottle says, selecting from among the different styles of news frames presents an issue in a particu- lar fashion. The classic approach in television is the reporting frame. It is usually short and designed to provide the latest information. Although facts and figures are present- ed, the story fails to focus on context or background. It is superficial, reducing reality to violent actions and reactions, while the underlying causes of conflict are ignored.

types of Frames Other frames complement the reporting frame, according to Cottle. A dominant frame presents a story from a single point of view. An authority figure or institution defines the story in this type of frame. Closely related is the conflict frame, which presents a story frame with two views, each side having experts or witnesses to sup- port a position. A contention frame summarizes a variety of views, and investigative frames champion the role of the press as the protectors of democracy. Cottle identi- fies other frames designed to serve the community, enhance collective decision mak- ing, and enrich social understanding of an event (see the section later in this chapter titled “Expanding the Concept: Communication Frames”). Frames can also campaign for a single interpretation of an event or provide in-depth coverage beyond the shal- lowness of a reporting frame. Finally, Cottle says, television news presents a mythic frame, which reinforces deeply held values. This frame is frequently used to depict those people who have sacrificed their lives for a cause. The combination of all these communication frames complicates the presentation of the news on terrorism.

news frames: Visual, audible, or written pack- ages used to present the news. Communication scholars do not agree on a single definition, but news frames generally refer to the presentation of the news story. They contain a method for beginning and ending the story, and they convey the importance of characters and actions as the story is told.

reporting frame: The simplest form of a news frame. It is a quick, fact- driven report that summa- rizes the latest information about a story. It does not need to contain a begin- ning or an end, and it as- sumes that the consumer understands the context of the facts.

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ambiguous stories and news Frames News frames give the story a structured meaning, but sometimes a story defies struc- ture. The frame is centered on getting viewers’ attention, presenting information, and re- vealing the results. But what happens when the results are inconclusive? Frank Durham (1998) answers this question by looking at the crash of TWA Flight 800, a passenger airliner that exploded over the Atlantic Ocean shortly after taking off from JFK Airport in New York City in 1996. Durham believes that the news frame works when a report is based on sources with definitive explanations of an event. There were no solid answers in the TWA crash, however, and no authority emerged with a definitive story on the crash. Durham tracked reporting in 668 stories from the New York Times for one year following the explosion. Dominant news frames emerged, but all were proved incorrect.

Durham concludes that ambiguity destroys the ability to create a sustainable news frame. Reporters covering TWA 800 expected to find facts that would reveal a logical cause. They looked to terrorism, a missile strike, and finally mechanical error. In the first months following the crash, neither facts nor logical conclusions pointed to an answer. As a result, Durham says, the New York Times could not produce a news frame for the story.

Durham’s conclusion might have an interesting effect on understanding terrorism. If terrorism is reported in well-defined news frames, both the media and the consumer will assume that there is a political beginning, a violent process, and a logical end. If there is ambiguity about the story, however, the method by which reporters gather the story and present it becomes the story because there is no logical conclusion. Current- ly, most media outlets report terrorist events within the logic of a well-defined frame (see Althaus, 2002). When violence is ambiguous and continual, the frame loses mean- ing, and terrorism is reported as an endless cycle of violence. As Leon Uris (1977, p. 815) writes in Trinity, a novel about Anglo-Irish conflict in Ulster, there is no future in Ireland, just the cycles of the past. And cycles may not be amenable to news frames.

neglecting the Domestic Front Brigitte Nacos, Yaeli Bloch-Elkon, and Robert Shapiro (2008) do not question the media’s focus on counterterrorism, but they do suggest that the focus is improperly centered on overseas actions. While international events are important, domestic

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Communication Frames Simon Cottle (2006) says that news frames are complex because they are composed of a variety of communication frames. terrorism is reported within the following types of frames:

• reporting frames: superficial, short, and laced with facts • Dominant frames: one authority’s view • Conflict frames: two sides, with experts • Contention frames: a variety of positions • Investigative frames: exposure of corrupt or illegal behavior • Campaigning frames: the broadcaster’s opinion • reportage frames: in-depth coverage with background • Community service frames: information for viewers • Collective interest frames: reinforcement of common values • Cultural recognition frames: a group’s values and norms • Mythic tales frames: hero stories

Chapter 4 • Terrorism and the Media 89

terrorism is just as crucial. The problem is that the media has virtually ignored do- mestic security issues.

The public depends on the mass media for information about issues. In turn, pub- lic perceptions formed by news stories frequently set the agenda for political policies. There is a strong correlation between the issues that the public thinks are important and the actions taken by political leaders. Communication scholars argue that one of the most important roles of the free press in a democracy is to make sure that critical issues stay in the news. At the same time, heightened competition for audiences creates an atmosphere in newsrooms in which shocking and dramatic information trumps complex stories dealing with nonsensational issues. In other words, attacks against known terrorist leaders in Yemen or Pakistan draw more attention than mundane congressional hearings on port security.

Nacos and her colleagues looked at several hundred news accounts in the first decade of counterterrorist action after 9/11 and found that the American news media did not believe there was a need to focus on domestic security. The media’s main fo- cus was on perceived threats overseas. For example, the researchers examined all of the terrorism stories on ABC News, CBS News, and NBC News during a 39-month period. The three networks aired a total of 85 stories related to homeland security. During the same time frame, the networks ran 373 stories dealing with the threat of terrorism. Most of the stories about security were aired after some type of public security breach. The researchers believe their findings indicated television’s preference for sensational events.

The threat of terrorism is real, and it demands some type of response. While some scholars are quick to condemn any type of military action or the use of deadly force in response to political violence, Nacos and her colleagues did not question the necessity of acting with force. Their focus was on the national security agenda as portrayed by media reporting. There is a need to examine the threat, they argue, but the need for domestic security is just as important. By not analyzing the complex factors related to securing the American public, the media has deemphasized homeland security. The researchers conclude that this is a dangerous situation.

terrorism and television Benjamin Barber (1996, pp. 76–83) analyzes the problems of news frames and popu- lar images on television in Jihad vs. McWorld. The title suggests that he is examining the world of the jihadists, but, in fact, he is looking at global economic inequities and the resulting ideologies that drive people into different systems. Instead of moving people to discuss solutions to problems, Barber believes, the media flourishes on one overriding factor: entertainment. He humorously calls the 24-hour news networks the infotainment telesector.

The infotainment telesector is not geared for depth; rather, it is designed to cre- ate revenue. “News” becomes banter between a host and a guest, and debates de- volve into shouting matches between controversial representatives of various points of view. Issues are rarely systematically discussed. Hosts perpetually interrupt their guests or provide answers to their own questions. Many news talk shows feature debates between pleasing personalities who frequently have no grasp on the com- plexities of terrorism, yet they fill the airwaves with opinions. There are some excel- lent cable and network news shows, but there are also a host of news entertainment productions.

These contexts of the infotainment telesector and the desire to beat the other networks have a negative effect on homeland security. Documents are leaked, confi- dential plans are unveiled, and vulnerabilities are exposed. Terrorism is made more

infotainment telesector: A sarcastic term to describe cable news networks. It refers to news organiza- tions producing stories to entertain their audiences under the guise of present- ing objective information.

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horrific to create better drama. News film is constantly replayed, giving the illusion that attacks are repeated time and time again. News hosts spend time interviewing reporters from the field who speculate on the facts surrounding an event. This leads to a dilemma for policymakers. Freedom of the press is guaranteed in the First Amend- ment to the Constitution, but television coverage frequently becomes part of the story it is covering.

Over the years, several studies have pointed to the close relationship between ter- rorism and television. H. H. A. Cooper (1977a) was one of the first analysts to point to the issues, explaining that terrorist acts were made-for-TV dramas. Abraham Miller (1982) published one of the first books on the subject, pointing out that television brought terrorist events into our homes. More recently, Yassen Zassoursky (2002) says that television and the Internet give terrorists an immediate international audi- ence. Gadt Wolfsfeld (2001) says acts have become so graphic and sensational that they grab media attention. In one of the best standard-setting studies, Alex Schmid and Jany deGraaf (1982) say that the relationship between terrorism and the media is so powerful that Western democracies may need to take drastic action and even implement censorship.

David Levin (2003) says that the purpose of television news coverage is to keep the audience primed with emotion and excitement. News organizations use a standard drama pattern to accomplish this. It is designed to keep the viewer tuned to the sta- tion. The attention-getting theme is the essence of the drama.

A drama pattern is constant in any unfolding event. On-the-scene reporters send reports back to the anchor, who calmly sits at the desk gathering information, some- times asking urgent questions to clarify issues for the audience. The hidden meaning of the report intimates that the station has crucial information on “breaking news,” and members of the audience need to know it. The anchor is the authority figure who is able to process information for the viewers. Reporters are the researchers sending the latest information back from the scene. The overriding message of the drama is “stay tuned.” It is the pattern of Greek tragedy, and it works for television—whether covering the weather, terrorism, election results, or Football Night in America (see the following section titled “Expanding the Concept: TV Drama Patterns”).

expanDing the cOncept

tV Drama patterns What makes a good news drama?

Change: the situation is changing, and the outcome is unknown.

Information: the latest news and breaking news about the situation is on this station.

Stay tuned: You must keep watching; the best is yet to come.

Expertise: Only this station is qualified to explain the situation.

On-the-scene reports: reporters are there telling you what is happening, even when they do not know.

Control: the anchor controls the information from the studio, giving you a vicarious feeling of control.

Participation: You are allowed to vicariously participate in the event.

Money: the station breaks away to sponsors but promises even more drama after the commercial.

Chapter 4 • Terrorism and the Media 91

end of the Western Monopoly on the Old news Media Control of the drama pattern was held by a Western monopoly until recently. New networks such as al Jazeera and al Arabia have challenged the West’s—especially the American—hold on international news. If there is an effect from 24-hour cable news slanted toward a particular interpretation, new national perspectives influence it (Gilboa, 2005). In addition, localized networks present other perspectives and defini- tions of terrorism. Judith Harik (2004, pp. 160–161, 189) points out that Hezbollah has learned to do this by projecting a positive image on Lebanese national television. She says Hezbollah took advantage of al Manar television, Lebanon’s network, as the Israelis withdrew from Lebanon and again during the al Aqsa Intifada.

Al Manar television presented a sympathetic view of the al Aqsa uprising, and Hezbollah was quick to take advantage of al Manar’s 24-hour coverage. The method of reporting was the key to success. The news was interspersed with inspirational religious messages. Hezbollah was able to get al Manar to focus on Hezbollah’s role in the intifada and to run programs on its former glories. In an effort to demoralize the Israelis, al Manar broadcast pictures of Israeli casualties and ended with the question: “Who will be next?”

Power came in the form of visual images. Harik believes al Manar television helped elevate Hezbollah to heroic status. She cites one example whose effect swept through Lebanon: Faced with heavy fighting in a West Bank village, Israeli forces withdrew. The Israeli Defense Forces (IDF), using Israeli mass media, denied they had abandoned the village. But al Manar presented another view. When the Israelis withdrew, Hezbollah fighters entered the village along with Palestinian mujahedeen. Hezbollah raised its flag over the village, and someone took a picture. As the IDF was denying it had retreated, al Manar showed the village with the Hezbollah flag flying high overhead. Hezbollah achieved a media victory.

Television makes the viewing audience participants in a terrorist attack. Viewers have short- and long-term psychological damage after seeing terror attacks on televi- sion, and this damage shapes anxiety and attitudes. Anat Shoshoni and Michelle Sloan (2008) measured the reactions of 300 university students in Israel after they had been exposed to terrorist violence on television. Looking at levels of anxiety and anger, they wanted to see if attitudes and perceptions of the enemy and the willingness to accept negative group stereotypes would be affected. Unlike the immediate experiences of anxiety and anger, attitudes are generally formed over a long period of time.

The experiment began with a survey to measure anxiety and attitude. After the survey, students were shown two 7-minute video clips, one of a terrorist attack and the other of nonterrorist violence from the same group, and the researchers conducted a second set of measurements. As they had expected, Shoshoni and Sloan found that anger and anxiety increased, but they also saw that long-term attitudes changed within the same time frame. In other words, the violent vignettes not only increased short-term fear, they were also responsible for fear and anxiety long after the students viewed the videos.

Television seeks drama, and terrorism provides an unfolding dramatic event. Tyler Cowen (2006) argues that terrorism is a spectacle that has a focal point, various actors, and a storyline. Television news coverage works well with such spectacles. Dramatic moving shots can be played over and over, while in-depth analysis gives background to an eager audience. Terrorist leaders need the unfolding drama, too. It allows them to motivate followers and increase their control over an organization.

al Jazeera: An interna- tional Arabic television network.

al Manar: Hezbollah’s television network.

al Aqsa Intifada: An up- rising sparked by Ariel Sharon’s visit to the Temple Mount with a group of armed escorts in September 2000. The area is considered sacred to Jews, Christians, and Muslims. Many Palestin- ians were offended, and a new round of violence ensued.

> What various frames construct the multiple realities of terrorist events? > Why do terrorism and television have a special relationship? > How has the growth of non-Western media impacted interpretations of terrorism?

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issues in the Media The new media environment involves propaganda and persuasion. Nobody would claim that it is objective. The way issues are reported and framed in the old media is another matter. For example, Fox News claims to be “fair and balanced.” Critics maintain it is not, but supporters believe that it presents objective reports. National Public Radio (NPR) reporting is debated in the same manner, and conservative critics frequently believe that NPR has a liberal bias. Many critics also claim that MSNBC has become the mouthpiece for political liberals. Such debates are not easily resolved, and the arguments favoring one side or the other are frequently full of opinions rather than hard evidence. Before leaving the discussion of the media, it would be helpful to review some of these issues.

biases in the Old Media While some representatives of the old media admit their slanted perspectives, the U.K.’s Guardian for instance, many mainstream media claim to be objective when presenting information about terrorism. They know governments and terrorists are trying to manipulate news stories, so they seek an ideal—objectivity. Many report- ers believe that it is their job simply to tell the truth. They seek to be fair and bal- anced, as Fox News claims to be. These assumptions are naïve, according to former CBS employee Bernard Goldberg (2003, pp. 103–114). All news comes with a slant, and reporters are expected to create news frames reflecting their outlet’s orientation. For people outside the newsroom, the debate is intense. At one end of the spectrum, critics claim that the media has a liberal bias. Critics fume, claiming that print and electronic media are inherently anti-Western and anti-American (see Bozell, 2005; Anderson, 2005). These critics claim reporters are sympathizing with terrorism at worst or undermining the government at best.

Pundits and other nonscholars attack this position. They claim that the media has been taken over by conservatives. Conservative talk show hosts and guests ban- ter about pseudofacts, which reinforces right-wing ideology. Guests are invited on these programs only to be bombarded with conservative ranting. The critics claim that the news media is dominated by bullies and hatemongers who seek to silence any voice but their own. Reporting on terrorism cannot be objective in such a for- mat, as it is designed to create fear and limit individual freedom (see Anderson, 2005; Willis, 2005).

Is there bias in the coverage of terrorism? Some scholars think so, but it is much more subtle and complicated than the writers of popular diatribes believe. Rather than joining the debate by measuring the amount of conservatism or liberalism in news content, Daniel Sutter (2001) analyzes the economic aspects of news produc- tion. He asks, What incentives would generate a bias, and why would a profit-making entity risk losing an audience? One of Sutter’s answers comes in the form of an anal- ogy. Suppose the public is composed of 600 television news viewers who are liberal, moderate, or conservative. By statistical distribution, 300 viewers would fall in the middle, or moderate, category. The remaining 300 would divide equally between lib- erals and conservatives. A news organization, as a profit-making entity, has an incen- tive to attract the largest possible audience. If the news moved either to the right or left, it would be threatened with the loss of mainstream viewers. Sutter sees no incen- tive for a liberal or conservative bias. Or does the media have a bias that is neither liberal nor conservative? (See the following feature titled “Another Perspective: Media Ownership.”)

Chapter 4 • Terrorism and the Media 93

There is a caveat in his logic, Sutter admits, because some media organization owners are willing to sacrifice profit to stand for a political position. In addition, some journalists insert their own feelings into a story, even when these feelings do not reflect the owner’s position. These factors are countered by trends in the profit-driven media. First, if the entire media were to exhibit a bias, one owner would need to have a mo- nopoly on all media outlets. One company can afford to take a position, Sutter says, but the entire industry will not. Second, journalism is a profession. Work is reviewed and approved by editors and also reviewed by colleagues. Individual bias is readily identified, but each journalist or reporter thinks and presents news separately. This pro- cess prevents an overall bias in the industry. Third, as news organizations expand, there will be pressures for a bias to develop special audiences among liberals and conserva- tives. Yet, the media will remain market driven, and the entire industry will not take up the biases of a limited, specialized audience. Finally, news organizations are increas- ingly led by boards and groups of owners driven by the desire to make money. They do not have the incentive to introduce bias that alienates their mainstream viewers.

David Baron (2004) takes a different approach, suggesting that bias appears on two levels: the individual discretion of the reporter collecting information for a story and the public’s desire to watch or read the most captivating story. Small portions of a reporter’s individual bias may slip into the story, but the corporation presenting the news will limit it. The business wants the greatest number of viewers, hence revenue, it can attract; therefore, it keeps reporters focused on captivating issues. The organiza- tion also wants to tailor the report to the beliefs and values of the audience. Therefore, there is very little incentive for bias. The one exception deals with reporters’ salaries. Less objective news appealing to a specialized, politically biased audience can mean lower overall wages for reporters. Baron says that reporters who frame stories within a political bias do not need critical thinking and discernment skills. Therefore, station managers can pay them less and increase profits. There is a risk in this process, how- ever, because bias may lower consumption, resulting in less income and lower profits. News corporations want to avoid risk and will keep major biases out of their stories.

Tim Groseclose and Jeffrey Milyo (2005) come to a different conclusion, stat- ing that the American media has a liberal bias. Using multiple variables, Groseclose and Milyo selected a variety of media outlets, including newspapers, magazines, and television and radio news shows, to study. They limited their study to news items,

anOther perspective

Media Ownership Edward Herman (1999) focuses on the social construction of reality and political bias when he examines the media, but not from the perspective of most critics. The bias is economic, he says, and it is dominated by multinational corporations. The American media is part of a vast propaganda machine promoting the values and goals of business corporations. He conducts case studies examining advertising, ownership, and content to demonstrate the point. Stories affecting

corporate profits are manipulated in a positive way. Dictators are portrayed as moderate or benign when they favor corporate investments and profits, even as the same leaders repress or massacre their own citizens. Newspapers use catchphrases such as “free trade,” “third-world elections,” and other simplifications to hide the powerful economic forces behind political action. The political bias is neither liberal nor anti- American; it is based in its market orientation.

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eliminating editorials, commentaries, book reviews, and other opinion pieces from their study. They then selected think tanks and research organizations those media outlets used to provide information, guidance, and evaluation on governmental pro- grams and policies. Next, they divided Congress into liberal and conservative mem- bers and counted the number of times liberals and conservatives cited a think tank. Finally, they compared the number of times each selected news source cited the same think tank and compared this to the congressional numbers. They concluded that the news media cited the think tanks referenced by liberal members of Congress more than they cited the think tanks referenced by conservative members. Groseclose and Milyo concluded that the American news media has a strong liberal bias.

Fouzi Slisli (2000) is not concerned with a liberal or conservative orientation; in- stead, he focuses on the use of pejorative labels. He believes adjectives introduce bias into the news. Citing sensationalism and failure to conduct in-depth reporting, Slisli says that the American media is full of oversimplifications and stereotypes. The media plays to the lowest level of understanding among its viewers. Large groups of people are lumped together in news reports that have no intention of examining complexities. False categories are created to further simplify issues.

David Levin (2003) examines the reporting of peace processes, intimating that it has the problems of simplification, the inability of the audience to understand complexities, and a network’s desire to attract an audience. The news is aimed at particular audiences, and different organizations approach audiences in a variety of ways. Information and education stations approach the news differently than do 24-hour cable news networks that focus on entertainment and emotions. It is difficult to explain sufficiently well the nature of the conflict, the various political positions, internal fighting within govern- ments and terrorist organizations, and other issues surrounding attempts to bring peace to areas such as Sri Lanka, the Basque region of Spain, Israel and Palestine, and Ireland. Many people prefer simplicity and entertainment. Thus, many news programs and some networks search for an unreflective audience, playing to the most susceptible members of the audience. Some producers even attempt to find a supermarket-tabloid audience by searching for the lowest common denominator among them, that is, people who want to be spoon-fed and entertained. These shows exploit emotions, favor sensation over facts, fail to examine issues in depth, and place entertainment value above information.

Information networks approach the same issues with different objectives. They seek to educate their audiences. Their shows are thoroughly researched and focus on the complexity of information. Their purpose is to inform, and they seek an audience that wants to reflect, criticize, and analyze. They introduce the intricacies of compet- ing interpretations of information and accept ambiguity as normal. When trying to bring peace to an area plagued by political violence and terrorism, subtlety and com- plexity are the norm.

Richard Miniter (2005) shifts the argument to accuracy. He states that the media used to have a conservative bias, but now it has tilted toward liberalism. This is not the problem, however. The issue for the media is that it is spreading incorrect infor- mation about terrorism. He identifies 22 misconceptions about terrorism accepted as truth by most newspapers, magazines, and broadcasters. The myths come from a va- riety of sources, including honest mistakes in reporting, American and foreign govern- ment disinformation, and contrived leaks. Although the myths are accepted by much of the media and the public, they obfuscate terrorism because they are untrue (see the section later in this chapter titled “Another Perspective: Miniter’s Media Myths”). Miniter is an investigative journalist, and he cites many credible sources. However, other investigative journalists citing other credible sources disagree with some of his findings (for example, see Gordon and Trainor, 2006; Ricks, 2006).

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creating critical reflection in the audience Whether biased or not, superficial coverage in the old media will not create an in- formed electorate. There is another type of conservatism beyond popular definitions and classical political science definitions. Some institutions provide social stability and preserve the status quo of social structure (see Manning, 1976, pp. 102–103). The media may be playing this role far beyond exhibiting a liberal or conservative bias. Todd Fraley and Elli Roushanzamir (2006) say that the current conditions of subnational and supranational violence are shifting and distorting all media presen- tations of violence, including terrorism. They sadly conclude that the mass media is spreading more propaganda than news in a world dominated by media corpora- tions. The flow and amount of information, however, could serve to raise the aware- ness of news consumers, creating a new critical media consciousness. Yet, consumers frequently accept small snippets of events and move on to new ones in a never- ending stream.

Steven Chermak and Alexander Weiss (2006) found this to be the case when they examined community policing. News agencies projected positive images of law enforcement efforts and community responses. The same principle probably applies to security forces responding to a terrorist attack. Media coverage shows security officials on the scene restoring order and helping victims. These are positive images that work against terrorism. In stories on community policing, Chermak and Weiss found that after initial reports on successful community policing, reporters simply moved on to other stories. There were no attempts of critical in depth analysis in their study.

Whether in the new or old media, superficial narratives and constant flows of differing stories do not lend themselves to critical thinking. Fraley and Roushanzamir (2006) believe that news consumers need to develop analytical abilities that look beyond the news frame and examine the issues behind terrorism and other political events. If they do, the researchers believe, political freedom will expand throughout the world. If consumers remain at the current level of understanding, corporations will continue to remain in charge of mass media outlets, and emerging subnational and supranational groups—such as multinational terrorist organizations—will fight for control of emerging media. If the established media only stabilizes the existing social order, this will result in polarization with other forms of media, such as the Internet.

There is also quite a bit of controversy on the relationship between the media and violence with no clear results. Barrie Gunter (2008) conducted an in-depth historical study of the influence the media has on social aggression and violent behavior. Con- cern about the impact of images of violence began with movies in the 1920s, and it continues today. Gunter says a variety of researchers approach the topic with a multi- tude of methodologies, but there are problems inherent in the decades of study. Most models assume that media violence is linked to negative behavior. That model may be acceptable to policymakers, Gunter argues, but it is not acceptable to social scientists. And it is not conducive to critical reflection.

Research on media-induced violence is full of differing results due to a variety of factors. First, the causal variables are unknown. For example, if someone is exposed to revolutionary social media or left-wing stories in the old media and that person commits an act of terrorism, was it caused by exposure to the media or some other unknown social factor? Researchers do not know. Second, consumers may prefer me- dia violence as entertainment while never accepting violent behavior in everyday life. Finally, causal relationships are often oversimplified in casual reports.

critical media consciousness: The pub- lic’s understanding of the media and the way stories are presented. A critically conscious audience would not simply accept a story presented in a news frame. It would look for the motives for telling the story, how the story affect- ed social constructs and actions, and hidden details that could cause the story to be told in another way.

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Gunter concludes that studies of the relationship between behavior and media violence need to be longitudinal studies. They need to concentrate on multiple vari- ables and realize that the impact of the media does not take place in a vacuum. Despite the large number of studies, current evidence is not conclusive, and it is often couched in political catchphrases. If Gunter is correct, the contagion effect of the media on terrorism should be examined in the same framework. Currently, very little is known.

anOther perspective

Miniter’s Media Myths

Richard Miniter (2005) says that popular images, conservative and liberal views, and urban legends are popularized through the media. Many of these media-based “truths” cannot stand the test of inves- tigation. A selection of myths follows.

The Myth The Truth

In an email, Lt. Col. Oliver North allegedly warned Senator Al Gore about Osama bin Laden.

North was testifying to another senator about Abu Nidal, a Middle Eastern terrorist.

Former Soviet Union backpack nuclear devices were stolen by al Qaeda.

The weapons appear to be secure and are more difficult to steal than popularly believed.

Jihadists are most likely to infiltrate from Mexico.

Canadian media has little respect for the abilities of Canadian police and intelligence services, and jihadist sympathizers operate a strong lobby in Canada. Miniter says the evidence indicates that jihadists will come from the north.

Conservative media personalities argue that political correctness keeps us from using racial profiles to target terrorists who travel by air. If we could use racial profiles, we could identify terrorists.

Racial profiling does nothing to single out terror- ists within ethnic groups. Comparing air travel- ers with a comprehensive terrorist knowledge base would work, but civil libertarians, both liberal and conservative, prevent that.

Liberal media personalities claim that the defense contracting company Halliburton made tremen- dous profits in Iraq.

Halliburton has shown little profit from Iraq, both for investors and for conspiracy theorists.

A popular Internet and Arab-media myth states that Israeli intelligence warned Jews to avoid the World Trade Center on September 11, 2001.

Although the exact number is unknown, hun- dreds of Jews died in the 9/11 attacks, including five Israelis.

Miniter believes that all media serve as a source of disinformation. The primary reasons are sloppy reporting, editors who fail to check facts, and rumors that are accepted as truth. People gravitate to belief in conspiracies as a result.

Miniter says that the American government can help stop disinformation by making its reports readily available and by releasing the entire transcripts of officials’ interviews before items are reported in the news.

longitudinal studies: In social science, studies that involve examinations of the same subjects over long periods of time.

Chapter 4 • Terrorism and the Media 97

censorship Debates Debates over censorship arise because many people assume that acts of terrorism are induced by reckless media coverage and that media outlets provide terrorists with information. This again raises Barrie Gunter’s point about utilizing inconclusive selective evidence. Censorship tends to reflect the attitudes of the censors.

For example, recall that social scientists do not believe there is conclusive evidence about the behavioral effects of violence in the media. Yet, the leader of one media watch- dog group says that long-term exposure to media violence causes violent behavior and insensitivity toward victims. He says that the surgeon general, the American Medical Association, and the National PTA “know” this to be true (Klite, 2000). Although he advocates internal self-regulation, he argues that the media must be censored. After all, common wisdom “proves” that media violence causes violent behavior. If a legislative body granted censorship power to the watchdog group, presentation of media violence would probably reflect the mores and values of the group’s censors. In addition, the group would most likely lobby to extend censorship to the Internet and all forms of the new media. In the worst case scenario, they might even begin to monitor individu- als to ensure that nobody viewed any unapproved material. These issues illustrate the controversial nature of censorship and explain the rationale behind heated debates.

Many of the concerns about all forms of media and censorship are based on com- mon unproven assumptions or single examples. Yet, censorship already occurs regularly with no outcry and quite a bit of support. When terrorist organizations open websites or release propaganda videos on the Internet, intelligence agencies block and remove the offending items, frequently distributing copies for the exclusive use of security forc- es. These actions are generally supported in the West and they are rarely questioned.

Paul Wilkinson (1997) believes that governments face three choices when it comes to maintaining freedom of the press and combating terrorism. A popular position is to assume a laissez-faire attitude. This hands-off approach assumes that market forces

anOther perspective

Wilkinson’s Analysis of the Media

Paul Wilkinson (1997) argues that terrorists must communicate their efforts, and they use the media to do so. He concludes the following about the relationship between the media and terrorists:

• Terrorists and the media have an interdependent relationship. • Terrorist groups have an underground communication system, but they need the mainstream media

to spread their messages. • Mass media serve as the terrorists’ psychological weapon by creating fear and anxiety. • Terrorists may trap the media into spreading their message. • The media may inadvertently shift blame for an incident from terrorists to victims or governments. • Governments benefit when media sources portray the savage cruelty of terrorist groups.

> Why do some people assume the old media has biases? > What evidence points to political bias when covering terrorism? > Why should the old media produce a critical media conscious?

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will determine the norms. A second choice is censorship, meaning that a governmen- tal agency would have veto power over news reports. A final choice is to let the press regulate itself. Wilkinson says that reporters would not behave in an irresponsible manner if they knew what they could do to avoid aiding terrorists. He notes that gov- ernments and security forces seldom provide direction for news organizations (see the preceding feature titled “Another Perspective: Wilkinson’s Analysis of the Media”).

The arguments about censorship are heated and deal with core issues of democ- racy. At the center of the debate is the right to free speech and the question of whether free speech necessitates media access to information. The media answers in the af- firmative, claiming that the public has a right to know and reporters have the free- dom to inform. Critics respond that free speech does not imply unlimited access to information. There is a right to speak; there is no right to know. In another sense, the censorship debate also focuses on truth, or factual information. Because terrorists and governments understand that media images are important in terrorism, they both spend great amounts of energy trying to manipulate the media. Manipulating the me- dia and withholding information are very different from governmental control of the press (see Cram, 2006; Ross, 2007; Weimann and von Knop, 2008),

Looking at actions shortly after the United States started the Bush administra- tion’s war on terrorism, Doris Graber (2003) summarizes both sides of the argument. She argues that freedom of the press is crucial during times of national crisis, but that is when the media is most vulnerable. She believes that people who seek increased censorship do so by developing strategic arguments based on sloganeering and knowl- edge of select audiences. These efforts are attempts to manipulate people into sup- porting censorship by using verbal tactics to make arguments that it seems illogical to disagree with. Officials in the war on terrorism augmented this process by withhold- ing information and encouraging lower-ranking officials to do the same. Although the Obama administration abandoned the metaphor of war when approaching terrorism, the president continued many of the practices of his predecessor.

Graber says several arguments were used in favor of censorship. The first focused on national security, a powerful excuse when used in times of emergency. According to this position, information must be controlled to ensure the survival of the state. Another position was to claim that the public wanted the information withheld. A former democratic senator voiced his support for controlling information after 9/11, claiming that the American people overwhelmingly supported these governmental ef- forts. According to this logic, America was fighting a new type of war, and some form of censorship was required. Finally, limited censorship was justified under the banner of patriotism. Ultimately, governmental officials claimed that they were asking for trust, not censorship. They would release information when it was safe to do so.

According to Graber, it was mainly journalists who presented the anticensorship view. They cited a variety of governmental mistakes and misdeeds, all hidden under the cover of national security. They condemned governmental officials who fought against the Freedom of Information (FOI) Act. They also argued that terrorism was essentially a war of information. Instead of trying to silence sources, the government should focus efforts on getting out the facts. Finally, every governmental clampdown cast officials in a bad light. The anti-censorship camp reserved its harshest criticism for media outlets that decided to self-censor as a service to the government.

Graber concludes that arguments for and against censorship in times of crisis are as old as warfare. They will not be resolved in the current struggle with terrorism. However, she states, the United States is fighting for freedom and democracy, and only an informed public is capable of successfully defending liberty. Editors, she argues, should hold back information to protect citizens and security forces, but those deci- sions belong to the media, not the government.

Freedom of Information (FOI) Act: A law ensuring access to governmental records.

Chapter 4 • Terrorism and the Media 99

Gabriel Weimann (2008) argues that two issues come into play when debating government regulation, use of communication technology by terrorist groups and cy- berterrorism. Terrorists use the media, but they have access to their own forms of communication through the Internet and more recently social media. These forms of communication demand the attention of scholars and analysts, but Weimann main- tains that most efforts are aimed at cyberterrorism. The emphasis needs to shift to communication, he believes. The major problem with the Internet, Weimann says, is the way it is used every day. Terrorists maintain hundreds of websites and use the Internet for research and communication. Although his article was written before the popularity of social media, tools like Twitter have increased the power of communica- tion. Counterterrorism should be aimed at learning how terrorists use the Internet and devising methods to thwart their effectiveness.

Weimann says governments may be tempted to censor or regulate the media in the name of security, but this is a dangerous course of action. The foundation of Western democracy is based on free speech and communication. Censorship, regulation, and gathering data from communications threaten the basis of democracy. It does not take much imagination, he says, to see the harm that invasive government operations might have. In the end, censorship could do more to damage freedom than the terrorist at- tacks themselves.

> What factors influence the way a story is covered? > How is news simplified? > Why are both potential censors and reporters concerned about censorship?

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emphasizing the points Modern terrorism has been a media sensation, but this situation is changing. The new media environment gives all actors the power to participate in a narrative. This often produces multiple narratives with contradictory symbols. Although research has been improving, there is a need for more interdisciplinary research on the relationship between the media and terrorism. The media provides the backdrop for the social construction of terrorism, and news frames create images for social interpretation. This means that there is extensive competition to present a point of view and a news frame, which leads to charges of bias from all sides. This is especially true in televi- sion because terrorism is a made-for-television drama. Some scholars and analysts have called for limited censorship because the media is so powerful.

SUMMarY OF ChaptEr OBJECtIVES

• The new media environment refers to instantaneous communication through a variety of platforms. It includes social networks, web pages, e-zines, chat rooms, blogs, and similar forms of communication.

• The new media allows for vicarious participation in an event and opportunities for reframing narratives. It also provides tools for two way mass communication.

• An exponential expansion of the Internet has been the basis of the new media environment. Its power is multiplied because devices are available and powerful, and costs have been reduced.

10 0 PART 1 • Terrorism in Historical and Social Contexts

• Hybrid narratives appear as an original story is told and retold. Stories grow and take on new characteristics. Contradictory symbols frequently appear in hybrid narratives.

• Interdisciplinary research on the relationship between terrorism and the media is lacking. New research has revealed the importance of the new media environment. Research also shows that gender roles are shaped by the way terrorism is covered.

• Both the old and new media create images in the minds of consumers, which results in socially constructed reality. Most people participate vicariously in an event based on the common definitions derived from these images.

• News frames refer to the way narratives or video images are presented to con- sumers. They shape stories about terrorism.

• News frames set the stage for a story, introduce characters, give narratives of ac- tions, and either provide a conclusion or lead consumers to a variety of conclusions.

• There is a special relationship between terrorism and television. Terrorism has a close relationship with television because it provides an unfolding drama. Tele- vision news reports are often designed to entertain and excite audiences. Some critics maintain that television reporting focuses more on entertainment than information.

• New non-Western international outlets often provide sympathetic views of ter- rorism. Western media elites no longer have a monopoly on the old media.

• Some media commentators believe that there is a liberal bias in television news reporting. Others feel that conservative views dominate the airwaves. There are some networks on cable television that cater to particular political audiences, and they adjust their reports to match the opinions of their viewers. The power of media has prompted some security experts to call for censorship when reporting about terrorism.

LOOKINg INtO thE FUtUrE

The importance of the new media environment will probably expand rapidly in the near future. Newspapers have experienced a growing lack of readership, and this problem is getting larger. Young people increasingly rely on Internet platforms for news. This implies that many counterterrorist battles will take place on the Internet and in social media. As these areas grow, competition will become more complex. Terrorism may increase as isolated individuals see themselves as no longer separate from fellow ideologues. Virtual networks reinforce extremism and allow followers to participate in virtual groups. The faceless nature of many interactions exacerbates radical behavior. This may be a boon for counterterrorism efforts, however. Many web users and participants in social media incorrectly assume anonymity while com- municating. Twitter, Facebook, the Internet, and new technologies can continue to be an increasing source of intelligence for security forces.

KEY tErMS

New media, p. 80 Syrian civil war, p. 80 Steganography, p. 83 Salafi movement, p. 83 News frames, p. 87

Reporting frame, p. 87 Infotainment telesector,

p. 89 Al Jazeera, p. 91

Al Manar, p. 91 Al Aqsa Intifada, p. 91 Critical media

consciousness, p. 95

Longitudinal studies, p. 96

Freedom of Information (FOI) Act, p. 98

101

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Learning Objectives After reading this chapter, you should be able to:

44 Summarize the tactics of mod- ern terrorism.

44 Define force multipliers.

44 List and describe four force multipliers.

44 Outline the tactical impor- tance of female terrorists.

44 Explain the reasons research- ers and the public have ig- nored women in terrorism.

44 Define the types of threats p o s e d b y t e c h n o l o g i c a l terrorism.

44 Explain the effects of biologi- cal, chemical, and radiological weapons.

44 Characterize the possibility and possible outcomes of nu- clear terrorism.

44 Summarize transnational eco- nomic targeting in the tour- ist, energy, and transportation industries.

44 Summarize theories of suicide bombing.

44 Explain the reasons research- ers and the public have ig- nored women in terrorism.

44 Describe the roles women play in nationalistic, ideological, and religious groups.

T he Center for American Progress (Sofer and Addison, 2012) raised the alarm about an unaddressed problem in counterterrorism. The role of females in terrorist groups

is increasing around the globe, but the current U.S. strategy for countering terrorism makes no mention of the problem. In fact, the issue of women in terrorism is not even discussed. This is ironic because the number of female suicide bombers has been increasing in recent years, and terrorist groups are expanding recruitment efforts to attract women.

The Center says the threat is not new. Secular groups have been using females for decades, and the Kurdish Workers’ Party (PKK) used women in 76 percent of its attacks in the last two decades of the twentieth century. Religious terrorist groups soon followed suit. The first known female suicide bomber struck in April 1985 when a young Muslim woman drove a truck laden with explosives into an Israeli Army convoy. The Pakistani Taliban and al Qaeda formed female suicide cells after the first female suicide bomber struck in Pakistan in 2010.

It should be noted that the use of women in terrorist attacks does not constitute a tactical change. The same basic tactics

Force Multipliers, gender roles, and tactics

5C h a p t E r

Kurdish Guerrillas

102 PART 1 • Terrorism in Historical and Social Contexts

of bombing, ambush, robbery, assassination, kidnapping, and hostage-taking remain the same. The organizational structures are also relatively constant. The change is due to the expanding roles of females in terrorist organizations, espe- cially in male-dominated conservative movements. This shift is also impacted by stereotypes. Society at large casts women in nurturing roles and is often unwilling to see them performing nontraditional tasks in both legal and criminal organizations. Feminist criminologists have been aware of this problem for de- cades, but the idea is new to most of the media. As a result, when women strike, the attack receives greater attention, and the media becomes a force multiplier.

tactics and Force Multipliers While the term terrorism is difficult to define, the process of terrorism is not. Terror- ism is simply a way of fighting. In fact, Max Boot (2013) advances the argument that guerrilla warfare and terrorism dominate the history of warfare. Conventional war, he concludes, is not the normative method of fighting. Terrorists fight in the shadows, and security forces must be prepared to operate in that environment.

Brian Jenkins (1984, 2004a, 2004b) says that there are six tactics of terrorism: bombing, hijacking, arson, assault, kidnapping, and hostage-taking. Recently, the ar- senal of terrorism has grown to include threats from weapons of mass destruction (WMD), but the public does not clearly understand these threats. Technology has also modified bombing to include virtual attacks through computer systems (B. Jenkins, 1987; Brackett, 1996, p. 45; J. White, 1986, 2000; Parachini, 2003).

Jenkins says that the six tactics can be enhanced by force multipliers. In military terms, a force multiplier increases striking power without increasing the strength of a unit. Terrorists routinely use force multipliers because they add to their aura. All political terrorists want to give the illusion that they can fight on a higher, more pow- erful level.

Four force multipliers give terrorists more striking power (see the following feature titled “Another Perspective: Force Multipliers”). Researchers have known for many years that technology can enhance a terrorist group’s ability to strike (see Ketcham and McGeorge, 1986, pp. 25–33; Bunker, 1998; Linstone, 2003; Brookbank, 2006; Wright, 2008). Cyberterrorism and potential WMD attacks are examples of techno- logical force multipliers. Daniel Benjamin and Steven Simon (2002, pp. 365–382) demonstrate that media coverage and interpretation of terrorist events often serve as force multipliers. One incident can be converted into a “campaign” as electronic media

six tactics of terrorism: As defined by Brian Jenkins: (1) bombing, (2) hijack- ing, (3) arson, (4) assault, (5) kidnapping, and (6) hostage-taking.

force multipliers: A method of increasing striking power without increasing the number of combat troops in a military unit. Terrorists have four force multipliers: (1) technology to enhance weapons or attacks on technological facilities, (2) transnational support, (3) media cov- erage, and (4) religious fanaticism.

anOther PersPective

Force Multipliers

Transnational support increases the ability of terrorist groups to move and hide across a nation.

Technology allows a small group to launch a deadly attack.

Media coverage can make a minor group appear to be politically important.

Religion transcends normative political and social boundaries, increasing violence and decreasing opportunities for negotiation.

Chapter 5 • Force Multipliers, Gender Roles, and Tactics 103

exPanding the cOncePt

the Most Common tactic of terrorism although terrorist tactics change over time, the most common weapon of terrorism has been and is still the bomb. In 1848, anarchists talked about the “philosophy of the bomb,” meaning that the only way to communicate with the social order was to destroy it. In the late 1800s, militants used bombs to attack governments and busi- nesses. the Irish republican army (Ira) found the bomb to be their most important weapon after 1969, and by 1985, the organization was deploying extremely sophis- ticated ones. Groups in the Middle East, Sri Lanka, and eventually throughout the world found that bombs could be delivered by suicide attackers. hijackers first used bombs to take over planes, and then, on September 11, 2001, terrorists turned civilian airliners into bombs.

scramble to break the latest news. A frightening new force multiplier has been the introduction of religious fanaticism in terrorist activities (B. Hoffman 1995; Laqueur, 1999; Juergensmeyer, 1988, 2003; von Hippel, 2002; Stern, 2003b). The introduction of religion has introduced suicide attacks into the arsenals of terrorism.

Although terrorist tactics change over time, the most common weapon of terrorism has been and is still the bomb. In 1848, anarchists talked about the philosophy of the bomb, meaning that the only way to communicate with the social order was to destroy it.

Terrorists tend to increase their effectiveness in bombing by applying improved explosive technology to their weapons just as conventional military forces constantly improve the killing power of their munitions. In 2004, New Scientist reported that Middle Eastern terrorist groups were working on a two-stage military-style weapon called a mininuke. This type of explosive is designed to spread fuel in the air and then ignite it. Known as a thermobaric bomb, it actually explodes the air in the blast area. One analyst speculated that an attack on a Tunisian synagogue in 2002 used this tech- nology (Hambling, 2004).

Although the tactics are simple, they always represent a variation on a theme. Force multipliers enhance destructive power, whereas innovation is used to achieve shock and surprise. Again, this is nothing more than the tactics used by conventional military forces, but in terrorist attacks, they are used outside the rules of a war with front lines and a beginning and an end. This explains why terrorism is different from war, even though terrorists and military forces sometimes use the same tactics. Ter- rorist tactics, though simple, create terror because they are designed to exclusively attack civilians and symbolic targets. The only purpose of a terrorist attack is to send a message of chaos.

philosophy of the bomb: A phrase used by anarchists around 1848. It means that social order can be changed only through violent upheaval. Bombs were the first technological force multiplier.

thermobaric bomb: A two- stage bomb. The first stage spreads either a fuel cloud or finely ground powder through the air. The ex- plosive material mixes with the oxygen present in the atmosphere. The second stage detonates the explosive material, which explodes in all directions in a series of shock waves. The cloud can penetrate a number of barriers. A per- son breathing the material explodes from the inside out when the material is ignited.

> Describe the basic tactics of terrorism. > Define and describe force multipliers. > How do force multipliers affect the tactics of terrorism?

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technology Terrorism is influenced by technology. Some analysts believe that when the techno- logical impact is so great that it turns a tactic or weapon into a strategy, it is possible to look at the resulting activity as a specific type of terrorism (see Pape, 2003, 2005).

104 PART 1 • Terrorism in Historical and Social Contexts

Others believe that this technique confuses the issue and that types of terrorism re- fer only to tools any terrorist group could use (see Dyson, 2004). Striking a balance between these two positions, this section will examine four types of terrorism that are potentially powerful enough to transform the nature of terrorism. As stated ear- lier, these types may be different only in terms of the weapons used in terrorist at- tacks, but special types of terrorism have become so individualized they deserve a separate review.

cyberterrorism Cyberterrorism refers to the use of computers to attack technological targets or phys- ical attacks on computer networks. The National Conference of State Legislatures (2003) defines cyberterrorism as “the use of information technology by terrorists to promote a political agenda.” Barry Collin (2004), who coined the term in the early 1990s, believes it involves disrupting points where the virtual, electronic realm of computer networks and programs intersects with the physical world. Miami attorney Mark Grossman (1999) argues that the threat of cyberterrorism is real, and inter- national legal systems are not prepared to deal with it. Cyberterrorism is computer hacking with a body count, according to Grossman. The Council on Foreign Rela- tions (2004) defines cyberterrorism by the ways terrorists might use computers and information networks. The targets for cyberterrorism include computers, computer networks, and information storage and retrieval systems. Terrorists differ from hack- ers, the council argues, because their purpose is to launch a systematic attack for po- litical purposes. The most common tactic to date has been the defacement of websites.

Cyberterrorism is an attractive, low-risk strategy. Michael Whine (1999) claims that computer technology is attractive to terrorists for several reasons. Computers allow terrorist groups to remain connected, and they provide a means for covert dis- cussions and anonymity. Computer networks are also much less expensive and work intensive than the secretive infrastructures necessary to maintain terrorist groups. Bowers and Keys (1998) believe cyberterrorism appears to be a threat because of the nature of modern society. To function, Western society increasingly needs informa- tion and the flow of information, and cyberterrorists threaten to interrupt or confuse that flow of information. This leads Tiffany Danitz and Warren Strobel (1999) to re- mind policymakers that violent political activists also use the Internet as a command- and-control mechanism. They say there is no doubt that computers are vulnerable to crime, and terrorists do use and will continue to use them.

Enemies are preparing to launch cyberattacks. A group calling itself the Cyber Caliphate claimed to have hacked the headquarters of the U.S. military’s Central Command (Centcom) in January 2015. Although they actually invaded public social media, the attack symbolized their desire to strike the United States (Cooper, 2015). The most significant breach to date, in 2008, also involved Centcom. An infected flash drive was placed in a computer on a U.S. base in the Middle East. It entered both clas- sified and unclassified cyberspace from there, allowing access to operational plans and other secure data. Known as Operation Buckshot Yankee, the incident catalyzed the creation of a new military unit, the U.S. Cyber Command (Lynn, 2010).

The greatest fear is catastrophic or multiple failures from cyberterrorism. Both the public and private sectors are experiencing attacks on websites and computer systems. Some attackers simply wait outside the targeted system, gathering enough data to infiltrate and steal corporate or government secrets. Other attacks are more nefari- ous. The main fear is that a worm, virus, or some other type of weaponized computer signal will suddenly strike a target. Due to automation and the computerized control

cyberterrorism: Uses computers to attack other networks or to conduct physical attacks on computer-controlled targets. The most frighten- ing scenario involves an attack designed to create catastrophic failure in the economy or infrastructure.

Chapter 5 • Force Multipliers, Gender Roles, and Tactics 105

of large segments of the infrastructure, a massive failure at one point could cause a se- ries of failures that could lead to the closure of an entire support structure (Matusitz, 2010; Helms, Constanza, and John, 2012).

There are frightening scenarios for catastrophic failure. For example, if a terrorist organization could infiltrate the banking or investment sector of the economy, a pro- gram could conceivably start draining accounts. This would create an economic crisis. In another scenario, imagine a major switching station on the power grid of a large me- tropolis. If the computer program running the station were attacked, the station could be the source of a catastrophic failure. As other portions of the grid picked up the slack from the downed station, they would find circuits overloading and could begin shutting down. It is conceivable that a large segment of the country could be without power for days. Finally, suppose that a malicious program were to enter a nuclear power plant. It is possible that the offending virus could cause a meltdown and explosion. Technologi- cal societies are vulnerable to such cyberattacks (see Mallesh and Wright, 2011).

WMd: biological agents Terrorism by WMD presents a potential strategic scenario and even served as the United States’ excuse for invading Iraq in 2003. WMD include biological agents, or biological weapons, which have been used for centuries. Modern arsenals contain bacterial weapons and viral weapons, with microbes cultured and refined, or weap- onized, to increase their ability to kill. When people are victims of a bacterial attack, antibiotics may be an effective treatment. Antibiotics are not usually effective against viruses, although some vaccines issued before the use of viral weapons could be effec- tive (see Hinton, 1999; Young and Collier, 2002). Because bacterial agents are suscep- tible to antibiotics, nations with bacterial weapons programs have created strains of bacterial microbes that are resistant to such drugs. Viral agents are produced in the same manner, and they are usually more powerful than bacterial agents. Biological agents are difficult to control but relatively easy to produce. Terrorists may find them to be effective weapons.

There are four types of biological agents: (1) natural poisons, or toxins that occur without human modification; (2) viruses; (3) bacteria; and (4) plagues. The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) lists the most threatening agents as small- pox, anthrax, plague, botulism, tularemia, and hemorrhagic fever. Michael Osterholm and John Schwartz (2000, pp. 14–23) summarize the effect of each of these. Small- pox is a deadly, contagious virus. Many people were vaccinated against smallpox in their childhood, but these old vaccinations are no longer effective against the disease. Anthrax is a noncontagious bacterial infection, and plague is transmitted by insects. Botulism is a kind of foodborne illness, and other bacteria can be modified to serve as weapons. Hemorrhagic fevers are caused by viruses. One of the most widely known hemorrhagic fevers is the Ebola virus.

America has experienced two notable biological attacks since 1980. The first modern use of biological terrorism in the United States was engineered in 1984 by followers of a religious group in Oregon. The group spread bacteria in area salad bars in an attempt to sicken voters during a local election. Their intent was to elect their religious followers to local office (Miller, Engelberg, and Broad, 2001). Hundreds of people suffered food poisoning as a result.

The second attack involved anthrax and came in the wake of 9/11. It began in Florida when two workers from a news tabloid were infected by anthrax received through the mail. One of the victims died. In the following days, anthrax appeared again as NBC Nightly News received spores in its mail.

bacterial weapons: En- hanced forms of bacteria that may be countered by antibiotics.

viral weapons: Enhanced forms of viruses. The virus is “hardened” so that it can live for long periods and be enhanced for dead- lier effects.

10 6 PART 1 • Terrorism in Historical and Social Contexts

The situation grew worse in October. The office of former senate majority leader Thomas Daschle received its regular mail delivery after lunch on Friday, October 12. Fortunately, staff members were in a class that afternoon, learning how to recog- nize suspicious packages. When staffers returned to work on Monday, they opened Friday’s mail, and someone noticed a white powdery substance in a letter. Alerted by information from Friday’s class, the staffer who noticed the substance took immedi- ate action, perhaps saving many lives. The powder contained anthrax spores, and al- though there were no fatalities, legislative offices were closed in Washington, D.C., for several weeks. Mysteriously, other people died on the East Coast with no explanation of how the anthrax was spreading (Parker, 2002; Schoof and Fields, 2002). By the end of November 2001, the anthrax outbreak had claimed five lives. Cases were reported in Florida; Washington, D.C.; New York; New Jersey; and Connecticut. Two conclu- sions remain: (1) The public health response was poor and disorganized, and (2) The Department of Justice formally closed the case in 2010.

The United States planned to take massive steps to prevent biological terrorism after these anthrax attacks. Congress created a bipartisan commission to deal with the issue, but the effectiveness of all these efforts has been questionable (Commission on the Prevention of Weapons of Mass Destruction Proliferation and Terrorism, 2010). Security (2010) magazine reported that the commission conducted a review of the systems to prevent and respond to WMD attacks and found that preparations were lacking. Most important, in terms of bioterrorism, the commission concluded that the United States had no structure in place to respond to a biological attack. The commis- sion also criticized Congress for failing to properly clarify and oversee the missions of the Department of Homeland Security and for failing to create the education and training systems needed to prepare the next generation of national security experts.

WMd: chemical and radiological Weapons The massive power and heat from atomic bombs place nuclear weapons in a class of their own, but chemical and radiological attacks are basically similar. Radiological poisoning and “dirty” radioactive devices are forms of chemical attack. Chemicals are usually easier to deliver than biological weapons, and they act quickly. Radiologi- cal devices act more slowly than most chemicals, but their poison lasts longer and they can be spread like chemicals. Radioactive materials are also more resistant to heat than chemicals, so bombs or other heat-producing devices can be used to scatter them.

There are four types of chemical agents: nerve agents, blood agents, choking agents, and blistering agents (Table 5.1). Nerve agents enter the body through inges- tion, respiration, or contact. Blood and choking agents are usually absorbed through

Bioterrorism Report Card

Capability to Respond to Biological Attacks F

Control Containment Labs D+

Review Program to Secure Pathogens A

Strengthen Disease Surveillance C

Plan International Biological Weapons Convention B+

Develop Bioforensic Strategy A

Source: Commission on the Prevention of Weapons of Mass Destruction Proliferation and Terrorism (2010)

Chapter 5 • Force Multipliers, Gender Roles, and Tactics 107

the respiratory system, and blistering agents burn skin and internal tissue upon con- tact (Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, 2000; for a summary, see Federation of American Scientists, 2010).

Chemicals present an attractive weapon for terrorists because they are easy to control and, unlike biological weapons, the users can avoid the area they attack. Nonetheless, chemical weapons present four problems. First, terrorists must have a delivery mechanism; that is, they need some way to spread the chemical. The second problem is related to the first. Bombing is a popular tactic, but the heat of most ex- plosives incinerates the chemical agents. It takes a lot of chemicals to present a threat. Finally, weather patterns, air, and water can neutralize a chemical threat. Chemical weapons are most effective when used in a confined space, and they are difficult to use effectively in large outdoor areas.

Radiological weapons are closely related to chemical weapons. Exposure to radia- tion can produce short-term burns and long-term contamination and health problems. Radiological poisoning takes place when a contaminated material comes in contact with any source that conducts radiation. The contacted material, such as food, water, or metal, becomes a contaminated object that could poison humans. Small contami- nated pieces of matter can also become a means of spreading radiation through the air.

Some experts believe that terrorists will use radioactive material in a dirty bomb; that is, that a conventional explosive will be used to spread a radioactive agent around a large area. Unlike the incineration that takes place when chemicals are placed in a bomb, radiation is not affected by the heat of an explosion. It is affected only by the type of radiological agent that is used in the device and the dispersal pattern created by the explosion. Most dirty-bomb scenarios are based on the premise that a radio- logical agent will be used with a conventional explosive.

Countdown to Zero, a film by Lucy Walker, is a documentary about the dangers of nuclear war. She interviews experts and powerful heads of state in the movie, but one of her most frightening interviews, according to the Times of London (Goodwin, 2010), came in a jail cell in Tbilisi, Georgia. Her interviewee was a man sentenced to eight years in prison for trying to sell highly enriched uranium (HEU) to an undercover officer posing as a member of al Qaeda. In the film, he tells Walker that there is plenty of HEU available and that it is easy to obtain. HEU is so potent that not only could it be used in a dirty bomb, it could also be used to construct a nuclear device. The most frightening aspect of the scenario is that the culprit was a bumbling amateur. If he was able to obtain the material, determined terrorists would certainly be able to do the same.

Other analysts believe that the dirty-bomb scenario is misunderstood. Under most circumstances, P. Andrew Karam (2005) writes, the impact of the radiation from a dirty bomb would not be as disruptive as most people think. Terrorists can spread ra- dioactive material through a bomb, but lethality depends on the type of material used

tabLE 5.1 Chemical and radiological agents and their Effects Agent Common Entry Effect

Nerve Food, water, air, skin contact Convulsions, flood of body fluids

Blistering Skin contact, air Burns, choking, respiratory failure

Blood/Choking Breathing, skin contact Failure of body functions

Radiological Food, air, water Burns, long-term skin contact illness

Sources: Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, 2000; U.S. Congress, Office of Technology Assessment, 1995.

highly enriched uranium (HEU): Produced by a process that increases the proportion of a radioac- tive isotope in uranium (U-235), making it suitable for industrial use. The process can also be used to make nuclear weapons. Nuclear weapons are made from either HEU or plutonium.

108 PART 1 • Terrorism in Historical and Social Contexts

in the device. Spreading material through a conventional explosion is not the optimal means for distributing radiation. Most bombs would not cause radiation sickness or an upsurge of cancer rates. Karam believes that the primary danger of such a bomb is its psychological effects. The public, in turn, would be prone to panic if they heard about the detonation of a dirty bomb, and public safety officials might refuse to work in the blast area because they would not understand the nature of radioactivity. Many health experts are not trained to recognize symptoms of radiation poisoning, and they might refuse to respond to victims or treat patients.

Karam believes that it is possible to expose thousands of people to intense ra- diation but that it will probably not be the result of a dirty bomb. He suggests that prevention should focus on preparing for a response rather than trying to detect low amounts of radiation. This involves training public service and medical personnel. Response personnel should understand the low risks of poisoning in the areas af- fected by a dirty bomb. It is also important, he says, to remind emergency medical personnel and hospital staffs that patients suffering from radioactive poisoning are not contagious.

James David Ballard (2003) looks at the problem of nuclear terrorism another way. Congress has designated a site in Nevada as the repository for all the radioac- tive waste from America’s nuclear power plants, and all this material must be shipped across the country. Ballard wonders what would happen if terrorists seized some of this material. He points out that nuclear waste is a ready-made dirty bomb.

The power plants themselves, as well as other nuclear facilities, present another scenario. Since dirty bombs are less effective than popularly believed, an attack on a nuclear facility with conventional weapons presents a more tempting target. For ex- ample, a nuclear power plant could be attacked with a hijacked airplane or a strong explosive device. It could also be overrun in a terrorist attack. A meltdown of its core reactor would lead to the dispersal of concentrated radioactive material over a rela- tively large area surrounding the plant (Hagby et al., 2009).

radiation sickness: Caused by exposure to high doses of radiation over a short period of time. It is char- acterized by nausea, diar- rhea, headaches, and fever. High doses produce dizzi- ness, weakness, and inter- nal bleeding. It is possible to treat patients who have been exposed to doses of radiation, but higher doses are usually fatal. Other than the two nuclear bombs used in World War II, most radiation sickness has been caused by indus- trial accidents.

> How does technology impact terrorism? > Describe the ways cyberterrorists might operate. > Describe the effectiveness of differing types of WMD.

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Sources of Highly Enriched Uranium

Although constructing a nuclear bomb is a sophisticated process, terrorists could build a device with HEU without the assistance of a nuclear state. The United States Research Council has suggested that stocks of HEU be secured. Civilian industries around the globe have created more than 50 tons of HEU. It takes about 80 to 130 pounds to make a crude nuclear bomb. Terrorists could obtain HEU from nuclear reactors used for:

Power plants Production of medical isotopes Propulsion engines in ice breakers Power source for space vehicles and satellites Research facilities

Source: Nuclear Threat Initiative, 2009.

Chapter 5 • Force Multipliers, Gender Roles, and Tactics 109

nuclear terrorism The most fearful scenario related to WMD involves a nuclear explosion. A stolen atomic weapon conjures the worst images of mass destruction, and it is no secret that several terrorist groups would love to have a nuclear bomb. Nonetheless, it is much easier for terrorists to use a conventional weapon than it is to build a nuclear weapon. Nuclear weapons are also difficult to obtain and detonate. Difficulty has not hampered desire, though. One of Osama bin Laden’s former bodyguards told an Arab-language newspaper that al Qaeda wants to build or purchase a nuclear bomb. A top counterterrorism official in the United States confirmed the story (AFP, 2010). Fearing the worst, many governments have installed nuclear detection devices in ports of entry and cities that are attractive targets for terrorists (Daily News and Analysis, 2010).

There are two methods for constructing a nuclear device. The simplest method is to use HEU. Rarely used in military weapons today, it was this type of bomb that was used at Hiroshima, and it can be built without the assistance of a nuclear state. It involves placing two pieces of material in a tube and forcing them to collide to cause a nuclear reaction. The second method involves plutonium, and it is much more complicated. The principle behind a plutonium bomb involves compressing the metal until its density produces a nuclear reaction. Although HEU seems to represent the greatest danger in the hands of terrorists, security experts are not sure whether the worse threat comes from HEU or plutonium. An HEU device is easier to make, but it is far less effective than plutonium. Simen Ellingsen (2008) of the Department of War Studies at King’s College London suggests that terrorists prefer the HEU method, even though a homemade HEU device might produce fewer casualties than a conventional attack. He believes that the fear generated by a nuclear explosion would cause public hysteria, thus achieving the goal of terrorism.

The United States was aware of the possibility of a clandestine nuclear attack long before al Qaeda appeared. Micah Zenko (2006) says the American intelligence community has studied the issue for the past six decades not caring whether the attack might come from Russia, China, or some other source. The possibility of an attack is frighteningly real because nuclear weapons and bomb-grade material can be stolen with relative ease. American intelligence agencies believe that it would be rather sim- ple to smuggle a bomb into the United States undetected. Although the United States is woefully unprepared for a nuclear attack from terrorists, it is an ominous possibility made more threatening, Zenko concludes, by fanatics who believe it is their religious duty to obtain a nuclear bomb.

A group of Russian scholars agree with Zenko and expand on his thesis. While Zenko examined the threat to the United States, the Russian researchers believe that nuclear terrorism is a threat to every major country. International terrorists, they ar- gue, want to disrupt their enemies by destroying a large portion of London, Paris, Moscow, or any other international metropolis. However, two factors inhibit their ability to do so: the cost of obtaining a weapon and the technological skills needed to use it. Regardless, the ability of international terrorists to operate globally increases the chances that nuclear weapons will be added to their arsenals (Arbatov, Pikaev, and Dvorkin, 2008).

Scholars from Tel Aviv University suggest that the probability of nuclear terrorism is low (Schachter, Guzansky, and Schweitzer, 2010). The nuclear threat is based on the crime causation model: victim, opportunity to commit a crime, and the desire on the part of the criminal to commit the crime. Al Qaeda—the only nonstate group that has made an effort to obtain a nuclear device—has the desire to make any one of their

110 PART 1 • Terrorism in Historical and Social Contexts

enemies victims, but it has consistently lacked the opportunity to strike. Further, there is no evidence to suggest that al Qaeda has the ability to obtain a nuclear weapon or to construct one. No state has ever supplied a terrorist group with a nuclear weapon; even if Iran builds a nuclear arsenal, its religious differences with al Qaeda would negate the possibility of sharing one of its weapons with them. Nuclear terrorism, these scholars conclude, is equivalent to “crying wolf.” It diverts attention from actual threats, thus increasing the probability of their success.

Michael Levi (2007) steers a middle course in a comprehensive work entitled On Nuclear Terrorism. The book gives a balanced, straightforward analysis of the issue and the probability in nontechnical terms. Levi explores the possibility of an attack on the United States, concluding that the country is not ready to deal with it. Careful to avoid writing a “how-to” guide for terrorists, he discusses scenarios for attacks, methods for creating a defensive system, and policy changes needed to prepare for nuclear terrorism. Military experts such as Martin van Creveld (2008) conclude that this is one of the definitive works on nuclear terrorism.

Levi (2007, pp. 124–127) reiterates the opinions of others that the easiest method for utilizing a nuclear bomb is to build it. The theoretical homemade bomb would surely strike terror, but it has another major drawback. It is not as lethal as a military weapon. Yet, if terrorists were to obtain a military-grade weapon, it would also come with disadvantages. Nuclear devices have sophisticated security mechanisms that ter- rorists might not be able to overcome. Nations provide physical security for their arsenals, and they have the technology to detect military weapons. Sheer weight is also an issue. If terrorists were to obtain one of Pakistan’s devices, for example, they would find that the warhead is designed to fit on a missile, and it weighs more than a ton. Despite these limitations, Levi says, the possibility of nuclear terrorism is real, and the approach to deal with the problem should be equally realistic.

Levi (2007, pp. 140–142) suggests that the United States should approach nuclear terrorism in two ways. The first involves debunking popular myths about the subject. Policymakers and the public need to understand the basic aspects of nuclear security and must realize that it is never 100 percent effective. Further, irrational fears should be dealt with. For example, building a homemade bomb is complicated. A terrorist cannot go to the Internet, download the instructions, and build it in his or her backyard. Another irrational fear is the nuclear black market. It does not exist, Levi says. American officials currently base their possible scenarios on the worst case. Levi believes it is more logical to look at several realistic scenarios and aim preventive measures at high-probability

Overcoming Popular Misconceptions about Nuclear Terrorism

Michael Levi (2007, pp. 140–141) says that it is necessary to debunk the myths about nuclear terrorism and to understand the following:

1. Security is never 100 percent effective.

2. The nuclear black market does not exist.

3. Building a nuclear bomb is not a simple process.

4. Nuclear defense should be based on realistic, comprehensive scenarios.

5. We should create total intelligence pictures of terrorist groups beyond nuclear terrorism.

6. Total protection is not possible, but we can tip the scales in our favor.

nuclear black market: A nebulous concept referring to illegal or underground methods of obtaining or selling nuclear materials or weapons. For example, the Soviet Union collapsed in 1991, and this prompted many people to fear that a rogue general might secretly sell a weapon to a terrorist group. There is also fear that a country like North Korea might supply one of its nuclear weapons to another nation. These types of transactions would occur outside the public view, therefore, the term black market is used to describe them. Some experts do not believe a nuclear black market exists.

Chapter 5 • Force Multipliers, Gender Roles, and Tactics 111

targets. Finally, it is not enough to limit the focus to nuclear terrorism. Levi argues for a comprehensive approach to a particular terrorist group and all its activities. This would provide a better threat analysis than limited attention to nuclear terrorism.

The second response to nuclear terrorism is to revamp defense systems. Protection against any form of terrorism does not involve a single agency working against a single group. Defense involves a multitude of agencies and organizations at all levels of govern- ment and liaisons with private organizations. Levi argues that the current bureaucracy does not provide protection because agencies protect their own turf; that is, they do not share information, and administrations are confused and competitive. Oversight of de- fense systems needs to be clarified and streamlined, and agency managers should be rou- tinely evaluated on their ability to work with other agencies and to share information.

Reforming popular misconceptions and defensive systems will not prevent nu- clear terrorism. Levi, quite correctly, concludes that no security network is always effective; America can only tip the scales in its favor. This means that the United States needs to be able to recover from a nuclear explosion, and Levi adds that the country also needs a little luck.

> What two elements are used to construct nuclear bombs? > Explain two positions on the debate about the possibility of nuclear terrorism. > What must the country do to prepare for nuclear terrorism?

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economic targeting and transnational attacks Terrorists may use transnational support or transnational operations as a force mul- tiplier. As the world moves closer to a global economy, terrorists have found that striking transnational economic targets increases the effectiveness of operations. If governments run counterterrorist operations against underground networks and sources, terrorists turn the tables by striking the economic system. Some systems are tied closely to the international economy, and they present tempting targets to terror- ists. Three types of transnational attacks can be used to illustrate the issue: tourism, energy, and shipping.

tourism On the evening of October 12, 2002, several hundred people were gathered in a resort area of Bali in Indonesia. Many of the people were tourists at a nightclub, and most of the tourists were Australians. Late in the evening, according to an investigator

Levi’s Five Goals for Policymakers

1. Support international efforts to stop the proliferation of nuclear weapons.

2. Address nuclear terrorism in conjunction with all other terrorist threats.

3. Mandate nuclear threat analysis based on the most probable dangers.

4. Create a cooperative multiagency defense system.

5. Audit the defense system and reward cooperation.

Source: Levi, 2007, p. 142.

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from the Australian Federal Police, who asked to remain anonymous, Indonesians were quietly advised to leave the area around the bar. Shortly before midnight, a firebomb went off inside the bar, trapping the patrons. A second bomb ignited the ex- terior. Within minutes, more than 200 people had been killed. The perpetrators called themselves Jamaat Islamiyya, and they vowed to strike Indonesia’s tourist industry again. They would target hotels and resort areas. Leaders of Jamaat Islamiyya had multiple motives for targeting tourists. They wanted to create fear among foreign- ers and resented the presence of outsiders in Muslim lands. They also felt that theirs was a method of directly striking the West. One of the leaders claimed that as long as Western troops were in Afghanistan and Iraq, his group would continue killing West- erners in Indonesia. The leaders also felt that they were targeting economic interests (Abuza, 2006b).

There is a relationship between terrorism and tourism, but it is not simple. Terror- ism does not seem to have an impact on domestic travel. Terrorism most frequently affects international travelers. If a host country has had widespread media attention focused on a terrorist event, tourism may drop in selected areas (Sonmez and Graefe, 1998). However, the impact of terrorism on tourism is not always clear. Some re- searchers have found that low-level terrorism gradually reduces tourism over a period of time, while sudden, vicious attacks have an immediate negative impact (Drakos and Kutan, 2003). Other researchers believe that the frequency of violence is more impor- tant than the severity of terrorist attacks (Pizam and Fleischer, 2002). Regardless of mixed findings, one aspect is clear. Terrorism against tourists has a negative economic impact; attacks on tourists have economic consequences.

energy The economic relationship between energy and terrorism is clearer than the impact on tourism, and terrorists have a vested interest in disrupting oil and gas production. Fossil fuels present tempting targets for two reasons: They represent the power and strength of the industrialized world, and strikes against oil refineries or transfer fa- cilities have an economic impact on the West. Iraq serves as an example. U.S. forces invaded Iraq in the spring of 2003. An insurgency grew during the summer, and it was in full swing by November. The primary economic target of the insurgents was oil production. From June 2003 to February 2006, there were 298 attacks against oil-production facilities. The economic impact from the 26 percent reduction in oil production was devastating. The attacks resulted in $6.25 billion in lost revenue for 2005 (Daly, 2006a).

Al Qaeda noticed the impact of the oil attacks in Iraq. In January 2006, Osama bin Laden broke a 14-month silence to announce that the war against the United States would not be limited to Iraq. Saudi Arabia was a tempting target; bin Laden considered Saudi Arabia as nothing more than an American colony. Oil production at the time represented 40 percent of the country’s gross domestic product (Daly, 2006a). Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula, an offshoot of the original al Qaeda, began targeting Saudi oil facilities in 2003 with varied strategies. It sought to destroy production facilities; destroy transfer systems such as pipelines, storage facilities, and shipping; and target individual oil workers, especially foreigners. In an Internet post- ing, a spokesperson for al Qaeda said the Saudi attacks were designed to destroy the Saudi economy and create an energy crisis in the West. He also mentioned that attack- ing energy sources brought a good deal of press coverage (Bakier, 2006b). The lessons of Iraq have not been lost on al Qaeda.

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The Carnegie Endowment for International Peace (Grare, 2013) reports that Pakistan is experiencing a similar problem in the Balochistan province, which pro- duces 45 percent of the country’s natural gas. At issue are the tribal divisions inside Pakistan and the energy produced in Balochistan. The Pashtun tribe controls the cen- tral government in Islamabad, and it exploits the natural gas resources in Balochistan to support ethnic Pashtuns. But Balochistan’s major fields lie in the Bugti tribal area, and the Bugtis resent and resist Pashtun incursion into their native land. This has led to sharp fighting and a guerrilla war. John Daly (2006b) points out that the situa- tion has become more complicated because of the resurgence of the Taliban along the Afghan–Pakistan border. Some Bugtis, who previously had few ethnic or political links with the Taliban, have allied with the exiled Afghan Taliban as well as al Qaeda members who fled Afghanistan in the wake of the October 2001 American offensive. Daly says that the Taliban believes that the most effective way to destroy the Pakistani government is to attack economic targets. Attacks on gas facilities cripple production and serve as a force multiplier. These areas breed many forms of tribal and ethnic conflicts, including endemic terrorism.

Africa presents another set of endemic terrorism. For example, oil has played a crucial role in violence in Nigeria. Oil in the Niger Delta represents a different oppor- tunity for economic attack. It simultaneously funds terrorists and other violent groups while serving as a target for terrorism. In addition, dilapidated storage facilities and pipelines have become an ecological disaster for the impoverished local residents. The result is an environment that encourages subnational violence and that might serve as a base for international terrorism. Jakkie Cilliers (2003) notes that the energy environment in Africa represents an interesting paradox. According to Cilliers, if pov- erty, endemic terrorism, and criminalized politics are not addressed by the industrial world, areas with situations similar to those in the Niger Delta will evolve in two directions. They will become the base for the emergence of new international terrorist groups and thus provide excellent resources for training and eluding detection. At the same time, the energy resources in the delta will provide a target-rich environment for terrorists.

transportation Transportation systems also present a tempting economic target because attacks on them can produce mass casualties with minimal effort. Another benefit for ter- rorists trying to strike economic targets is that the costs of protecting transporta- tion are staggering. Transportation is a major concern of homeland security, and it will be discussed in Chapter 13. We restrict our discussion here to examining an economic attack on transportation as a force multiplier. Such attacks are quite effective.

After the September 11 attacks, the federal government immediately budgeted $4.8 billion to protect the aviation industry. In addition, it created a new federal agency, the Transportation Security Administration, with 30,000 employees (Hobijn, 2002). The global shipping industry is also affected by security costs. Indonesia, Malaysia, and Singapore have joined to protest insurance premiums on ships travel- ing through the Strait of Malacca, a passage way between Indonesia and Malaysia. Rates have soared because insurance companies believe terrorist groups might start cooperating with pirates (Raymond, 2006). Critics of homeland security policies, such as Stephen Flynn (2002, 2004a, 2004b), argue that ports remain unsecured because of the costs associated with increased protection. Although all of these

endemic terrorism: Terrorism that exists inside a political entity. For ex- ample, European colonial- ists created the nation of Rwanda by combining the lands of two tribes that literally hate each other. The two tribes fight to eliminate each other. This is endemic to political violence in Rwanda. The term was coined by J. Bowyer Bell.

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examples represent policy issues, the economic impact is clear. Attacks on aviation, shipping, and transportation facilities increase the cost of security. If terrorists wish to increase the economic impact of an attack, the transportation industry presents a tempting target.

> What is economic targeting? > How do terrorists strike economic targets? > Why are attacks on energy and transportation targets force multipliers?

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suicide attacks: conflicting Opinions Sacrifice in times of conflict is nothing new, and sometimes warriors are sent on mis- sions where they know their lives will be lost. At other times in history, people inten- tionally have sacrificed their lives for a greater cause. Diego Gambetta (2005) tracks incidents of suicide tactics and attacks since World War II. He believes there are three major types of suicide attacks: (1) suicide in warfare, (2) suicide for a principle with- out killing others, and (3) suicidal terrorism. Several scholars note that a suicide at- tack is not a method chosen simply to end one’s life. The social and psychological appeal is the idea of sacrificing one’s self for the betterment of the community; it is a freely given sacrifice in the form of altruistic suicide. Suicide terrorists may be fatalis- tic, they may be psychologically duped, or they may be wealthy with a bright future. One thing they have in common, however, is that they frequently believe that they are sacrificing their lives for a greater good (Pape, 2003, 2005, pp. 171–195).

Although common logic sometimes dismisses suicide terrorists as psychologi- cally unstable, and early studies suggested that suicide bombers were young, frus- trated males, data suggest that neither is true (Howard, 2004). Robert Pape (2003, 2005) presents an extensive empirical analysis of suicide terrorist attacks from 1980 to 2001, and he concludes that the attackers are so diverse it may not be possible to find a single profile.

a theory of suicide terrorism Instead of searching for related social or psychological factors, Robert Pape (2005) suggests that suicide terrorism can be considered a strategic tool. It is popular because it works, and although suicide attacks began as a form of religious violence, secular groups use the strategy because it is so effective. Suicide terrorism, Pape argues, gives a small group the power to coerce large governments. Suicide terrorists tend to be more lethal than those carrying out other types of attacks, they strike greater fear in the target audience, and each attack hints at future horrific violence. It is a strategy designed to multiply expectations of political victory.

Pape (2005) takes his empirical study of suicide bombing beyond a simple de- scription of how it happens and offers a theory of suicide terrorism. He believes three factors must be in place before a suicide terror campaign can take place. First, a na- tionalistic or ethnic group must be resisting the occupation of a foreign power. Second, the foreign power must have a democratic government whose voters will not routinely allow the indiscriminate slaughter and total repression of the people in the occupied area. Finally, there must be a difference in the religions of the occupying power and the people living under occupation. This is a key point in the theory. Such terrorism

altruistic suicide: The will- ingness of individuals to sacrifice their lives to ben- efit their primary reference group, such as a family, military unit, ethnic group, or country. It may involve going on suicide missions in combat, self-sacrifice without killing others, or self-sacrifice that kills others.

theory of suicide terrorism: A theory developed by Robert Pape that states that a group of people occupied by a democratic power is likely to engage in suicide attacks when there are differences be- tween the religions of the group and the democratic power and when the occu- pied religious community supports altruistic suicide.

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does not happen when the occupied and occupier share a single religion; it is caused by differences between the two religions.

Pape (2005, pp. 127–128) says that it is difficult to test this theory because there are so many different factors, but he argues that it might be possible to test it by fo- cusing on evidence from case studies. He does so by looking at the Israeli occupation of the Shi’ite areas of Lebanon, the Sinhalese (Buddhist) control of the Tamil (Hindu) region of Sri Lanka, the fighting between Sunni Kurds and Sunni Turks in eastern Turkey, and Sikhs in India.

The popular conception in Lebanon is that suicide operations are grounded in Islamic extremism; that is, militant Islamic theology causes suicide terrorism. Howev- er, Pape’s examination of bombings casts doubt on this conclusion. Of the 41 suicide attacks Pape studied, only eight involved the suicide of Islamic militants. Twenty- seven were conducted by Communists who followed no religion, and the remaining three were carried out by Christians. Although Iran supports Hezbollah, the group that first employed modern terrorist suicide attacks, terrorism is homegrown in Lebanon. Bombers come from local communities where self-sacrifice is glorified by religious leaders (Pape, 2005, pp. 128–139).

Sri Lanka presents an interesting scenario because the Hindu Tamil area has been occupied by two powers—native Buddhist Sinhalese and primarily Hindu Indian sol- diers. Again, the popular theory of suicide terrorism in Sri Lanka is that the Black Tigers, the suicide organization within the LTTE, brainwash their bombers. The LTTE Black Tigers have conducted more suicide bombings than any other group, and they have assassinated two political leaders—an Indian prime minister and a president of Sri Lanka. Yet, when Hindu Indian soldiers were stationed in Sri Lanka from 1987 to 1990, suicide bombings stopped (Pape, 2005, pp. 139–154).

Pape attributes the cessation of suicide bombings during the Indian occupation to the differences between the Sinhalese Buddhists and the Tamil Hindus. The Tamils believe their existence is threatened by the dominant Sinhalese government, and many of their religious leaders have demonized the Buddhists. Extremist Buddhists respond by dismissing Hinduism. This difference, Pape believes, is the primary cause of suicide terrorism in Sri Lanka. He does, however, note that there are exceptions; in 1991, former prime minister of India was assassinated by the Black Tigers when it appeared that Indian forces might return to Sri Lanka. Pape says that he is not proposing a rule that cannot be broken; rather, he is pointing out a trend.

This logic may also apply to Pape’s ideas about democracy. For example, a Christian Russia occupies Chechnya, which is populated by Sunnis with a strong Sufi influence. Russians believe Chechnya is a Russian state, but many Chechens believe they live in independent country. Although Russia has experienced the birth of some forms of democracy, the central Russian government has revoked many of the resulting democratic reforms. Chechens have used suicide operations to op- pose Russian occupation, including massive suicide attacks. Again, when consider- ing such a situation, Pape would probably not insist that the occupying power must be a full democracy; rather, he is pointing to a trend, and his evidence suggests that trends exist.

The Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) in eastern Turkey conducted 14 suicide at- tacks from 1996 to 1999, and overall, they were unique. They were the least deadly attacks in the course of modern suicide bombing, killing an average of two people per incident. They started when the popular leader of the PKK called for them, and they stopped at his command. Pape believes that the reason the attacks never became pop- ular is that the Sunni Kurd community identified with the Sunni Turks. Pape (2005, pp. 162–167) found the same trend in the Indian province of Punjab.

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Other research on suicide bombing Studies by many scholars and terrorism analysts confirm Pape’s findings. Journalist B. Raman (2003, 2004) says that terrorists favor suicide attacks because they are so intimidating. He points out that suicide bombers can penetrate secure targets with a good chance of success. Audrey Cronin (2003, pp. 9–11) gives several reasons for the popularity of suicide attacks. They generate high casualties as well as publicity for the attacking group. The nature of the attacks strike fear into an enemy, and the attacks are effective against superior forces and weapons. Suicide bombers give ter- rorist groups maximal control over attacks.

However, other studies bring Pape’s finding into question. Domenico Tosini (2009) notes the alarming increase of suicide attacks by terrorist groups and he examines the explanations presented in scholarly studies. Most examinations of suicide bombings are based on the idea of strategic logic; that is, studies assume that both the bomber and the supporting organization are rational actors seeking to accomplish goals. In fact, Tosini finds that almost all the literature focuses on rational choice. He argues that rational choice is not the only explanation for suicide bombing.

Tosini believes the link between suicide and religion has been disproved, given that secular terrorist groups have also employed the tactic. To be sure, religion re- mains a strong factor for many groups. Not only can it be used to justify attacks; it can also serve as a tool to recruit and retain terrorists. Yet, Tosini believes that rational choice and religion are secondary factors in suicide attacks. The major factor is the social structure and culture of the group engaged in suicide terrorism.

Tosini says that groups take actions inside social structures based on their un- derstanding of reality. This can create group dynamics that lead to suicide terrorism. The dynamic agents involved in a suicide bombing are the armed terrorist group, the group’s supporters, and the bombers. These three entities operate in social networks where decisions are made based on interpretations of situations. The decision to en- gage in suicide bombing is based on the interactions of terrorists, supporters, and at- tackers within a surrounding social network.

Moving beyond rational choice, Tosini argues that the social climate must readily accept suicide bombings. Supporters of a terrorist group have to embrace the idea and create social rewards for bombers and their relatives. Beyond this, the entire com- munity must accept violence as a normative response to social grievances and believe that suicide bombing is an acceptable expression of violence. Supporting groups need material and symbolic rewards, and attackers must have a deep attachment to ideal- ized representations of their communities. Tosini says that when altruism enters the equation, it produces a culture of martyrdom. This, in turn, combines with two com- mon military approaches to war—dehumanization and depersonalization of enemies.

Tosini’s research indicates that suicide bombing is not simply a strategic model based on rational choice. It also calls into question the relationship of religion and de- mocracy to suicide attacks. He argues that suicide terrorism develops when a culture accepts it as an expression of altruistic martyrdom and when terrorist groups within the culture embrace the tactic. A bomber consumed with dreams of becoming a mar- tyr can be launched against innocent people or military targets because enemies have been defined as something less than human. In Tosini’s view, suicide bombing takes place through a social process that endorses self-sacrifice as a legitimate expression of normal behavior.

Sara Jackson Wade and Daniel Reiter (2007) examined suicide bombings from 1980 to 2003, and their findings differ from Pape’s. Wade and Reiter argue that the form of government is not an important factor. In other words, suicide bombings are not used mainly against democracies. Their data show that differing forms of

Chapter 5 • Force Multipliers, Gender Roles, and Tactics 117

governments with strong religious minorities experience attacks more frequently than democracies, and they think that Pape missed this point because he used different variables in his research model.

In contrast to Pape, Wade and Reiter believe that Islam is an important factor in suicide bombings, but these are not simply attacks developed to use against the West. They found that Muslim states suffer more suicide attacks than Western states, and more Muslims are targeted in suicide attacks than any other group. A democracy occupying a foreign land with a different religion has little to do with these attacks, they argue. The presence of Islam is more important, and past experience with suicide bombing makes the tactic more acceptable and more likely.

Models for suicide bombing There is a debate about modeling attacks. Rohan Gunaratna (2000) suggests that it may be possible to model some precursors of suicide bombings. After examining suicide attacks between 1983 and 2000, Gunaratna sees three things that all attacks have in common: secrecy, reconnaissance, and rehearsal. He believes that local groups operate in secret to prepare the bomber and the target area. Because locals can blend in with the surroundings, they provide supplies and information. They also conduct the initial scouting or reconnaissance of the target. A support group far away from the target can rehearse the attack in secrecy; the better the rehearsal, the greater the chance of success. The bomber usually conducts the final reconnaissance during the operation, but he or she can detonate the bomb in case of discovery. These factors could serve as the basis for a model.

Another school of thought suggests that models may exist, but there are so many factors that a single set of precursors cannot exist. Audrey Cronin (2003, pp. 6–8) believes that different styles of bombings emerge from different places. The Hamas model, patterned after the actions of Hezbollah, uses a professional group to plan and execute the attack and a support group to prepare the attacker. For many years, researchers believed that this was the only model for suicide bombing (Institute for Counter-Terrorism, 2001).

Cronin finds, however, that different models have emerged over time. The LTTE trained suicide bombers from an early age. The PKK leadership coerced victims to take part in suicide bombings. The September 11 suicide attacks defied the previous models, and bombings in Chechnya represent a different combination of social and psychological factors. There is no single model for suicide bombing.

> Why is suicide used as a weapon? > What do empirical studies suggest about suicide terrorism? > How might suicide terrorism be stopped?

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tactical Misunderstandings and gender Criminologists frequently complain that females are often ignored in the study of crime, unless the study focuses on victimization. Researchers have said the same thing about the study of gender and terrorism (Oliverio and Lauderdale, 2005; Sjoberg, 2009). The main reason for this is a cultural stereotype that brackets women in tra- ditional roles. Many researchers and the general public do not envision women per- forming the “male” terrorist tasks (Neuberger and Valentini, 1996, pp. 28–36; see

118 PART 1 • Terrorism in Historical and Social Contexts

also Maleeha, 2012). These attitudes ignore reality. Women have been and remain active in terrorist causes, and their role is increasing. They increase the tactical effec- tiveness of terrorist groups and the complexity of counterterrorism efforts.

tactical roles and Organization Margaret Gonzalez-Perez (2008) found that the role of women in terrorist groups is more closely related to the political orientation of an organization than to its tactics. She examined 26 terrorist organizations that emerged in the decades after World War II. She separated these groups into those with an international focus and those that em- braced domestic issues. (Gonzalez-Perez uses the term international focus to refer to terrorist groups operating in multiple countries and the term domestic issues to refer to groups within a single country concerned with political or social problems.) Her findings indicate that political and social ideology is closely related to the roles women play in terrorist groups. She says that paternalism, religious traditions, and political orientation are the dominant influences in the process.

Gonzalez-Perez says that women are more attracted to domestic terrorist organi- zations than to international groups. The reason, she believes, deals with the purposes of the respective groups. Domestic organizations are focused on revolution and social change. Women are attracted to such groups because they have a chance to redefine their roles, and males and females welcome them because they want the same change. Some groups even have a feminist agenda. Women also have opportunities for leader- ship in revolutionary groups. International terrorists resist outside forces such as capi- talism and imperialism. They try to defend a traditional culture that limits the role of women. Yet, women also emerge in traditional organizations when there is a need to recruit personnel and when terrorism becomes a popular means of social expression.

Gathering data from a variety of geographical areas, Gonzalez-Perez offers a strong argument. After examining domestic and international terrorism in the Americas, Africa, the Middle East, Asia, and Europe, her data show that women in domes- tic groups gravitate toward combat and leadership. The same findings reveal that women in international groups are given more limited roles. International terrorists tend to employ women as supporters, sympathizers, and spies. They seldom receive combat or leadership positions. This pattern remains constant even in social systems that emphasize male dominance. For example, she says that one would think that the machismo influence in Central and South America would blunt female leadership and combat roles, but the opposite is true. Most Central and South American groups have a left-wing revolutionary focus. Women move into active roles because the groups are seeking to restructure their culture and political structure. Every geographical area that she studied produced a common trend: Domestic groups emphasized the role of women even when the group had no stated feminist agenda.

Cindy Ness (2005) offers a similar argument after examining the behavior of women in secular and religious terrorist groups. Using the groups Liberation Tigers of Tamil Ealam (LTTE), Hamas, and Islamic Jihad, Ness argues that modern terror- ism began around 1968. Females played an immediate role. Women were relegated to support and service in religious terrorist groups, but they developed combat and leadership positions in secular organizations. Ness argues that this has been fairly constant since the spread of ideological terrorism after 1968. She points to Ulricke Meinhof and Leila Khalid as examples of female participation in revolutionary terror- ism. Both women not only served as combatants, they were also leaders and served as inspiration for supporters. Unfortunately, Ness believes, most terrorism analysts have ignored the role of women in revolutionary groups.

international focus: Gonzalez-Perez uses the term international focus to refer to terrorist groups operating in multiple countries.

domestic issues: Gonzalez-Perez uses the term domestic issues to refer to groups within a country fighting to change the social or political structure of that nation.

Ulricke Meinhof: (1934–1976) co-created the German Red Army Faction with Andreas Baader in 1970. She was the co-leader of the group. Arrested in 1972, she com- mitted suicide in prison.

Leila Khalid: (b. 1944) was a member of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine. In 1969, she was part of a team that hijacked four aircraft that were de- stroyed after the passengers and crews disembarked. Arrested in 1970 after an- other attempted hijacking, she was released as part of a prisoner exchange.