Only Exceptional Proff
Finding Economic Power: An Introduction to the Ideas of John Kenneth Galbraith
By
Smart Student
Econ 500: History of Economic Thought A long time ago in a far away place
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Archibald Galbraith, a Canadian schoolteacher, once climbed onto a platform atop a
steaming pile of manure to address a group of Liberal party voters before the coming Ontario
elections.
“Before I begin,” he said, “I must apologize for speaking from the Tory platform.”
Later on, his teenage son, John Kenneth, would congratulate him on the dig, to which he
[Archibald] would respond, “It was good. But it didn’t change any votes.” (Arthur Scheslinger,
1984, p. 7) So, from an early age, John Kenneth Galbraith was between the world of politics and
pragmatism.
John Kenneth Galbraith was born in 1908. His father’s involvement in politics had a
profound impact on the young John Kenneth, politicizing him at an early age. He originally
studied Agricultural Economics at the Ontario Agricultural College, but would eventually say
that he took his first “real” economics course at UC Berkeley, and that the economics instruction
in Canada was “very poor” (Dunn, 2002, p. 350). As a graduate student at UC Berkeley, he
continued his study of agricultural economics and worked as a research assistant for a “very zany
old man by the name of Edwin Voorhies” (Kreisler, 1986). He stated that it was his study of
agricultural economics that left him with a strong feeling that “social science should be tested by
its usefulness,” an idea inspired by Veblen’s dichotomy between exoteric knowledge (knowledge
that is valuable and applicable) and esoteric knowledge (knowledge that has no practical
application, but because of that, is considered more “prestigious”). Galbraith believed that social
sciences should be exoteric, not esoteric. In his book Economics and The Public Purpose,
Galbraith develops this idea further, saying, “The ultimate test of a set of economic ideas is
whether it illuminates the anxietes of the time” (Galbraith, 1973, p.198).
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In the 1930’s, while Galbraith was studying to receive his Ph. D, it was clear that
economic theory was not addressing the anxietes of the time. Economists were struggling to
explain how free markets had led the United States to economic ruin. One in four Americans
were jobless. Production had all but ground to a halt. Obviously, there were egregious errors in
the accepted dogma, which stated that free markets left to their own devices would bring about
efficiency and employment. Galbraith said that his method of coming to an understanding was to
“for years…start with [Alfred] Marshall, see the world as it is, and make the requisite
modifications” (Dunn, 2002, p. 351). Upon graduating, Galbraith traveled to Washington D.C.
and took a position assisting with the implementation of the Agricultural Adjustment Act, before
taking a position as a tutor at Harvard. At Harvard, he made speeches supporting the reelection
of Roosevelt, cementing his initial ties with the Democratic party. Not long after, he was offered
a fellowship at Cambridge, where the discussions centered around Keynes, who had just
published his General Theory of Employment, Money, and Interest (Dunn, 2002, pp. 350-355).
Galbraith returned from England to his tutor position at Harvard a confirmed Keynesian.
He spent a few more years tutoring at Harvard (where he met John F. Kennedy) and then took a
job as resident economist for the American Farm Bureau Federation in Washington. Galbraith’s
observation of the farm industry solidified his belief in the power of government to move
industries forward. In 1930, farm households accounted for a quarter of the population, whereas
today they account for only 1% of the population and yet on the whole, they now produce more
than they did in 1930. This is due to strong government support of the farming industry. That
national planning could “transform a weak, disorganized, and poverty prone sector of the
economy into America’s most spectacular productive success…preserved his political concerns”
(Arthur Schlesinger, 1984, p. 8). Galbraith became head of the Office of Price Administration in
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1941 during World War II, and at the same time began his long career as a ghostwriter, penning
speeches for Samuel Rosenman and Robert Sherwood (Arthur Schlesinger, 1984, p. 8).
Galbraith then became editor of Fortune magazine, where he worked directly for Harry
Luce, founder of Time Inc., whom he called “one of the most ruthless editors I have ever known,
or anyone has ever known” (Kreisler, 1986). Galbraith has credited Luce with dramatically
improving his writing via ruthless editing. Galbraith credited Fortune with giving him a
“marvelous introduction to the corporate mind,” because the focus of the magazine at the time
was “the anatomy of the big corporations” (Dunn, 2002, p. 353). The decision making processes
of major corporations would be a recurring phenomenon that he would write about in many of
his publications.
Galbraith returned to Academia in 1948, having spent five years as editor of Fortune. He
was nominated to a position teaching economics at Harvard. However, members of Harvard’s
board of overseers regarded him as a “dangerous Keynesian,” and as a result, “took the step,
almost unprecedented in modern times, of blocking the appointment” (Dunn, 2002, p. 353).
However, Galbraith had many political allies, and among them was Harvard’s president, James
B. Conant. Conant was such a fan of Galbraith that he threatened to resign unless the board of
overseers backed down. Eventually they did, and Galbraith became a tenured professor at
Harvard. It was then that he began work on his first major bestseller, American Capitalism: The
Concept of Countervailing Power.
Galbraith begins his discussion of capitalism in America by pointing out the following
conundrum: Mainstream economic theory asserts that in the case of monopoly, prices will rise,
business will screw consumers, fail to innovate, and as a result, the economy will be in bad
shape. He then notes the work of Joan Robinson in developing the idea of monopolistic and
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oligopolistic competition, noting that oligopolistic industries behave in the same way as
monopolies would, and through informal agreements can have the exact same effect. Then, using
the actual data collected by the American government, he shows that the majority of industries
are in fact oligopolistic. But he goes even further than that, saying that almost all industries will
eventually become oligopolistic for the following reasons: At the birth of an industry,
competetion is necessary and possible, as no firms have clear and significant advantages yet. But
over time, it will become increasingly difficult to enter the industry because of the barriers to
entry created by high capital requirements and increasing returns to scale. At the same time that
increasing returns to scale start to set in (as they inevitably do), existing firms will also gain the
advantage of experience and prior organization. The convergence of these factors leads, in most
cases, to an industry with a few power players and a larger but still relatively small number of
hangers-on, who exist by filling niches that aren’t worth the time of the large firms.
Galbraith poses a question in American Capitalism, and before getting to that question, it
is important to get a sense of the context in which he asks it. After World War II, America was
experiencing incredible prosperity. But underlying this prosperity was the fear of depression. The
Great Depression was still fresh in the collective consciousness, and the average man’s faith that
capitalism would bring about efficiency and full employment was shaken. And yet, as the years
after the war progressed, things were stable and employment was plentiful. It is also important to
note that the era of non-depression Keynesianism was beginning, and much to the chagrin of the
business community, government was becoming a much more participatory force in markets.
The business community was reacting violently against this expansion of government, claiming
that it was a complete disaster, wasteful to the very extreme and bound to cripple growth. The
state of the American economy in the 1950’s then was that of big government, near-ubiquitous
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monopoly or oligopoly, and an underlying fear of depression. Yet, by almost any measure, the
economy was a success.
The problem, according to Galbraith, was that, “in principle, the economy pleased no
one; in practice it satisfied most. Social inefficiency [government spending], unrationalized
power [monopoly and oligopoly], intrusive government [regulation], and depression were all
matters for deep concern. But neither liberal nor conservatives, neither the rich nor all but the
very poor, found the consequences intolerable” (Galbraith, 1954, p. 85). What fascinated
Galbraith was how an economy which was so flawed in theory could work so well in practice.
The question he asked was: Why are things so…well…good? Thus, he states that his aim in
American Capitalism is to “examine in turn the circumstances that have kept social inefficiency,
private power, government intervention, and unemployment from ruining us in the recent
present” (Galbraith, 1954, p. 85).
The first answer that he gives is that oligopoly is much more conducive to techonological
innovation than classical competetion. “There is no more pleasant fiction than that technical
change is the product of the matchless ingenuity of the small man forced by competition to
employ his wits to better his neighbor. Unhappily, it is a fiction,” he says. “Technical
development has long since become the preserve of the scientist and engineer” (Galbraith, 1954,
p.86). His argument is that due to the costliness of development, it can only be undertaken by a
firm with considerable resources. In highly competitive industries, no one firm has considerable
resources. Moreover, because innovations can easily be imitated, it is not economical for a small
competitive firm to bear the research and development costs for an entire industry.
Galbraith then turns his keen eye to the idea of inefficiency. He deals with this issue by
asserting that America’s relative opulence shields us and is moreover a cause of such
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inefficiency. At the time that the classical economists were writing, an opulent economy had yet
to be observed. For Malthus and Ricardo, “inefficiency was, indeed, an evil thing. It denied
bread to the hungry and clothing to the naked” (Galbraith, 1954, p.102). The true power of
Galbraith’s insight is his ability to point out the obvious. He criticizes his fellow economists for
bringing the mentality of the nineteenth century, with all its poverty and degradation, to the
opulent twentieth century. Galbraith finds this error both amusing and absurd, saying, “He [the
mainstream economist] worries far too much about partially monopolized prices…for tobacco,
liquor, automobiles, and soap, in a land which is already suffering from nicotine poisoning and
alcoholism, which is nutritionally gorged with sugar, which is filling its hospitals and cemeteries
with those who have been maimed or murdered on its highways, and which is dangerously
neurotic about body odors” (Galbraith, 1954, p.102). His point is that these inefficiencies are in
fact a sign of the wealth of America. They are the symptom of a wealthy economy, and thus we
ought not to worry so much about them. He also discredits the idea of intrusive government,
noting that, “alarm over pending action by government on economic matters, which frequently
reaches almost pathological proportions when the decision is pending, almost invariably
evaporates completely once the action is taken. One of the profound sources of American
strength has been the margin of error provided by our well-being” (Galbraith, 1954, p.106).
But the most significant reason that monopoly has failed to capsize the American
economy, according to Galbraith is the exercise of what he calls countervailing power. The
assumption always made by economists, when they would consider the case of markets, was that
the check on an individual firm’s power wold come from the supply side of the industry.
Galbraith disagrees. He admits that the existence of monopoly power in a competitive market
does in fact encourage the entry of more producers to appropriate some of that power for
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themselves. “In other words,” he says. “Competition was regarded [and is] a self-generating
regulatory force” (Galbraith, 1954, p. 112).
But in a market that is not competitive, the incentive for some economic agent to
approptiate that power still exists. But it need not come from the supply side. That power is, in
practice, usually appropriated by strong buyers or coalitions of buyers, who can sometimes take
even more than their share. Because of the tendency of power to be organized in response to
existing power, “countervailing power is also a self-generating force” (Galbraith, 1954, p. 113).
According to Galbraith, it is the large retailers who, by way of their absolute power over
manufacturers, bargain for the consumer and protect the consumer from the high monopoly
prices that would otherwise result. Likewise, the considerable market power of large firms is
checked by trade unions for a simple reason, there is something to be bargained for Galbraith
notes that trade unions are most powerful in the least competitive industries. This is because the
surplus that a company derives from monopoly power acts as an incentive to unions. In the very
competitive industries, producers and workers are operating at bare minimum profit and the
incentives to organization insignificant.
These are the basic ideas laid out in American Capitalism. The book in many ways lays
the framework and tone for the books he would publish in the sixties and seventies. But while
American Capitalism was Galbraith’s first major bestseller, it was The Affluent Society that
skyrocketed him to fame. The Affluent Society builds on many of the concepts introduced in his
first book, but with several key differences. Though Galbraith could not suppress his urge to
social commentary, The Affluent Society is a much more prescriptive book, growing out of his
chapter on technical development in American Capitalism. To his original analysis he adds a
significantly moral component. The Affluent Society concerns itself with the policies that ought
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to be undertaken once the basic needs of the people have been met. Galbraith’s main argument is
that our ratio of private good (cars, televisions, automobiles) to public goods (schools, roads) is
inequitable and ridiculous. The premise of his argument is that once our basic desires such as
food, clothing, and shelter have been satisfied, large corporations employ advertising to concoct
new demand for products. The traditional economic and utilitarian argument for goods qua
goods falls on its face if consumer demand is not sovereign. What is really necessary is the use
of society’s productive resources in the public realm in juxtaposition with growth in the private
realm. He calls this idea “social balance,” saying, “the problem of social balance is ubiquitous,
and frequently it is obtrusive. As noted, an increase in the consumption of automobiles requires a
facilitating supply of streets, highways, traffic control, and parking spaces” (Galbraith, 1958, p.
193). He also confronts the existence of poverty in an affluent society as being the result of
outdated nineteenth century attitudes. “A poor society,” he says, “had to enforce the rule that
someone who did not work could not eat. An affluent society has no similar excuse for such
rigor” (Galbraith, 1958, p. 251). But he admits that, “nothing requires such a society to be
compassionate. But it no longer has a high philosophical justification for its callousness”
(Galbraith, 1958, p. 251).
In the 50’s, America was in the midst of the cold war and attempts at engineering a better
society were very suspect. Galbraith throughout The Affluent Society understands the inherent
and ideological opposition to big government and social policy, but he is adamant in stating,
“that cities’ residents should have a nontoxic supply of air suggests no revolutionary dalliance
with socialism” (Galbraith, 1958, p. 191).
In fact, Galbraith eventually finds socialism and central planning to be in many ways
similar to the kind of capitalism that developed in America in the latter half of the 20th century.
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In The New Industral State, Galbraith focuses his effort on understanding what he calls the
“technostructure.” In an era when the division of intellectual labor is so overwhelming, the
management or even management team of a powerful corporation doesn’t actually make most of
the decisions. The decisions are instead made collectively by teams of experts. Galbraith coins
the term technostructure as, “embracing all who bring specialized knowledge, talent or
experience to group decision-making. This,” he says, “not the management, is the guiding
intelligence, the brain, of the enterprise” (Galbraith, 1967, p.71).
Many of Galbraith’s ideas resonate to this day. Unfortunately, most do not. It would be
tempting to end this essay optimistically, expounding poetically on the way Galbraith’s ideas
continue to influence national policy. In reality, although he was a well-respected and powerful
man, many of his ideas continue to be ignored by mainstream economists and politicians. Rarely
does one hear a contemporary economist talk about countervailing power, or reference the
“technostructure.” While as a society we owe much to Galbraith and his ideas, the discipline of
economics has for all intents and purposes laid his practical ideas by the wayside. But whether or
not his continued influence on economics is felt by the mainstream, his contribution to the
discipline remains poignant and accessible for those who choose to seek it out on their own.
Galbraith’s main contribution to economic thought was his tackling of the problem of
power. He was convinced that the most glaring, most significant, and most ignored problem in
the field of economics was the effect of power on economic activity. Understanding why
Galbraith was so affixed by this idea of power is actually quite simple; he was surrounded by it.
Through his political work, Galbraith knew not only Kennedy, but several other presidents and
all the most powerful officials in the democratic party. Through his work at Fortune he became
acquainted with the heads of the largest and most powerful corporations in the world. He saw,
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clearly, the extent to which the decisions of these men (and the technostructures supporting
them) affected the direction and performance of the economy of the whole. Given that he was an
astute man, for him to ignore the influence of power on economies, in order to advance a series
of aesthetically pleasing models and equations, would have been not only unthinkable but
dishonest. Galbraith wanted badly to be useful, to “change votes,” as his father would have said.
To him, sitting in a room concocting theories did not qualify as usefulness. He longed to be in
the thick of policy-making. Later in life, he wanted badly to avoid what he called “Belmont
Syndrome”1 Thus, his struggle to be relevant was not only ideological but moral.
John Kenneth Galbraith died peacefully at home in 2006. He left behind not only an
extensive body of economic work, but two novels. His first novel, The Triumph, written in 1969,
was about U.S. foreign policy disasters in Latin America. His second novel, A Tenured
Professor, written in 1990, was about an eccentric Harvard professor, and lampooned the elite
institution. He lived ninety-seven years, almost all of them (excepting the first few) were
preoccupied with upending the “conventional wisdom.” He remains one of the most famous and
controversial economists of the twentieth century, and a fine novelist.
1 Belmont Syndrome is the nickname for an attitude adopted by Harvard professors who want to travel from their comfortable Belmont homes to comfortable professorships at Harvard without having to question the underlying relevance of their work.
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