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Telford2CJ.2CCosgrave2CJ.2C26Houghton2CR.28200629.JointevaluationoftheinternationalresponsetotheIndianOceantsunami.SynthesisReport..pdf
Joint Evaluation2006:1
John Telford
John Cosgrave
Joint Evaluation of the International Response to the Indian Ocean Tsunami Synthesis Report
Joint Evaluation 2006:1
Authors: John Telford, John Cosgrave, contributions from Rachel Houghton.
The views and interpretations expressed in this report are the author and do not necessarily reflect those of the Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency, Sida, Tsunami Evaluation Coalition (TEC) Actionaid, AusAID, BMZ CIDA, Cordaid, Danida,Dara, Irish Aid, DFID, FAO, IFRD, Federal Min for Economic Cooperation and Development Germany, JICA, Min des Affaires Étrangères France, Min des Affaires Étrangères Luxembourg, Norad, NZAID, DEZA, UN, UNDP, UNFPA, Unicef, Usaid, WFP, WHO, World Vision.
Commissioned by Sida, TEC, Actionaid, BMZ, CIDA, Coraid, Danida, Dara, Irish Aid, DFID, FAO, IFRD Federal Min for Economic Cooperation and Development Germany, JICA, Min des Affaires Étrangères France, Min des Affaires Étrangères Luxembourg, Norad, NZAID, DEZA, UN, UNDP, UNFPA, Unicef, Usaid, WFP, WHO, World Vision.
Copyright: The authors and the organisations commissioning the evaluation.
Date of Final Report: July 2006
Published by: Edita
Art. no. SIDA61330en
This publication was originally published by Tsunami Evaluation Coalition (TEC) and can be ordered from:http://www.alnap.org or [email protected]
This digital edition is a special version only published in Sida’s publication data base and can be downloaded from: www.sida.se /publications.
12
Tsunami Evaluation Coalition: Synthesis Report
Acronyms and abbreviations
ADB Asian Development Bank
ADPC Asian Disaster Preparedness Centre, Thailand
AIDMI All India Disaster Mitigation Institute (formerly DMI)
ALNAP Active Learning Network for Accountability and Performance in
humanitarian action
BAKORNAS National Disaster Management Board, Indonesia
BAPPENAS Badan Perencanaan dan Pembangunan Nasional (Ministry of Planning),
Indonesia
BPDE Badan Pengelola Data Elektronik Electronic Data Management Body
BPS Badan Pusat Statistik BPS-Statistics Indonesia (Central Statistics
Board)
BRIMOB Indonesian paramilitary police
BRR Aceh and Nias Rehabilitation and Reconstruction Agency
CARE Cooperative for Assistance and Relief Everywhere
CBO community based organisation
CDC Centres for Disease Control
CERF Until 2006, the Central Emergency Revolving Fund, now the Central
Emergency Response Fund
CIDA Canadian International Development Agency
CIESIN Centre for International Earth Science Information Network
CM-COORD Civil–military Coordination
CMG Core Management Group of the Tsunami Evaluation Coalition
CRC Canadian Red Cross
CRED Centre for Research on the Epidemiology of Disasters
DAC Development Assistance Committee
DAD Development Assistance Database
Danida Danish International Development Assistance
DDPM Department for Disaster Prevention and Mitigation, Thailand
DEC Disasters Emergency Committee, UK
DFID UK Department For International Development
13
Tsunami Evaluation Coalition: Synthesis Report
DIPECHO disaster preparedness ECHO
DRC Danish Refugee Council
DRR disaster risk reduction
EAC Evaluation Advisor and Coordinator
EC European Commission
ECHO European Commission’s Humanitarian Office
FAO Food and Agriculture Organisation (of the United Nations)
FTS Financial Tracking System
GAM Gerakan Aceh Merdeka (Free Aceh Movement)
GBP British pounds sterling
GDP Gross Domestic Product
GHD Good Humanitarian Donorship initiative
HC Humanitarian Coordinator
HIC Humanitarian Information Centre
HPG Humanitarian Policy Group at the Overseas Development Institute
HRR Humanitarian Response Review
IASC Interagency Standing Committee
IAWG Interagency Working Group
ICMH International Centre for Migration and Health
ICRC International Committee of the Red Cross
ICVA International Council of Voluntary Agencies
IDP internally displaced person
IDRL international disaster response law
IFI international financial institution
IFRC International Federation of the Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies
ILO International Labour Organisation
INGO international non-governmental organisation
IOM International Organisation for Migration
IRCS Iranian Red Crescent Society
ISDR International Strategy for Disaster Reduction
JBIC Japan Bank for International Cooperation
JICA Japan International Cooperation Agency
LRRD linking relief, rehabilitation and development
MDG Millennium Development Goals
MDTFANS Multi-Donor Trust Fund for Aceh and Northern Sumatra
MoU Memorandum of Understanding
MSF Médecins sans Frontières (Doctors without Borders)
NDMC National Disaster Management Centre
NGO non-governmental organisation
NRC Norwegian Refugee Council
OCHA Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
ODA official development assistance
OECD Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development
PTWC Pacific Tsunami Warning Center
RC Red Cross and Red Crescent (Movement)
RC (UN) Resident Coordinator
RC/HC (UN) Resident Coordinator/Humanitarian Coordinator
RDC Researcher and Deputy Coordinator
SDC Swiss Development Corporation
14
Tsunami Evaluation Coalition: Synthesis Report
Sida Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency
SME small and medium-sized enterprise
TAFREN Presidential Task Force for Rebuilding the Nation (Sri Lanka)
TEC Tsunami Evaluation Coalition
TICA Thai International Cooperation Agency
TLC temporary living centre
TNI Indonesian military (Tentara Nasional Indonesia)
ToR terms of reference
UN United Nations
UNCT UN Country Team
UNDAC UN Disaster Assessment and Coordination
UNDGO UN Development Group Office
UNDP United Nations Development Programme
UNESCO United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisation
UNFPA United Nations Population Fund
UNHAS UN Humanitarian Air Services
UNHCR United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
UNICEF United Nations Children’s Fund
UNIFEM UN Development Fund for Women
UNJLC United National Joint Logistics Centre
UNORC United Nations Office of the Recovery Coordinator
USAID United States Agency for International Development
USD United States dollar
WFP World Food Programme
WHO World Health Organisation
15
Tsunami Evaluation Coalition: Synthesis Report
Strait of Malacca
India
Indonesia
Thailand
Malaysia
Myanmar
Kuala Lumpur
Khao Lak
U-tapao
Aceh
Meulaboh Medan
Colombo
Male
Sri Lanka
Maldives
Bay of Bengal Andaman
Sea Gul f o f
Tha i land Nicobar Islands (to India)
Andaman Islands (to India)
Bangkok
I N D I A N O C E A N
Chennai
Map 1. Countries affected by the tsunami
INDIA
BANGLADESH
SRI LANKA
MALAYSIA
MADAGASCAR
SOUTH AFRICA
SEYCHELLES
SOMALIA
KENYA
TANZANIA
YEMEN
MYANMAR (BURMA)
THAILAND
INDONESIA
MALDIVES
I N D I A N O C E A N
Detail above
33
See sources p159.
2.1 Immediate effects of the disaster
At 07.58 Aceh time on 26 December 2004, the biggest earthquake for 40
years struck off the west coast of Northern Sumatra. The earthquake led to
the most destructive series of tsunamis in recorded history, which radiated
through the Indian Ocean at speeds of more than 500km/h. The waves,
while not very big in deep water, slowed down and grew in size as they
reached shallower water near land. In the worst cases the waves reached
over 20m high at landfall in parts of Aceh; in other locations they spread
3km inland, carrying debris and salt water with them. The retreating waters
eroded whole shorelines.
The tsunamis killed people in 14 counties around the Indian Ocean. In
terms of lives lost and people missing, Indonesia, Sri Lanka, India and
Thailand were the hardest hit. By the end of January 2005, 40 other
countries had reported that their citizens were among the dead and 12
more reported that their citizens had been in the area and were feared
dead.22 Germany and Sweden were the worst affected counties outside the
region and lost more citizens (over 500 each) than all but the four most
affected counties.
The tsunami gripped the world’s attention, though news of the extent of the
tsunami emerged only slowly (Figure 2.1). The published death toll was
The disaster: an overview
2Chapter two
Country Number lost
Indonesia 167,540
Sri Lanka 35,322
India 16,269
Thailand 8,212
Somalia 289
Maldives 108
Malaysia 75
Myanmar 61
Tanzania 13
Seychelles 2
Bangladesh 2
Yemen 2
South Africa 2
Kenya 1
Total 227,898
Table 2.1. Numbers of
people lost (dead or
missing)21
21 Sources for tables and base data and sources for charts are presented in Annex G. Please refer to the page reference provided at the foot of each table or figure. 22 Table 3.1 gives details of those lost from outside the region. The numbers given in Table 2.1 include tourists from other countries who were killed or went missing in the affected countries.
34
Tsunami Evaluation Coalition: Synthesis Report
See sources p153.
See sources p153.SourcesSourcesSourcesSourcesSources BBC, Channel AsiaNews, Agence France-Press, and The Guardian.
300
200
100
Figure 2.1. Changes in death toll (including missing) over the first month
Thousands dead or missing
0
26 D
ec
2 Ja
n
9 Ja
n
16 Ja
n
23 J
an
30 J
an
Figure 2.2. Age-specific tsunami mortality at five locations
(plus one historic disaster)
SourcesSourcesSourcesSourcesSources Figure 2.2a Doocy et al, 2006 (based on 291 deaths); Figure 2.2b Nishikiori et al, 2006 (based on 456 deaths); Figure 2.2c Birkmann et al, 2006 (based on 94 deaths); Figure 2.2d Guha-Sapir et al, 2006 (based on 231 deaths); Figure 2.2e Maldives Disaster Management Centre and Maldive 2000 Census data (based on 104 deaths); Figure 2.2f Chowdhury et al, 1993 (based on 1,206 deaths).
10%
5%
0%
Figure 2.2b. Ampara (Sri Lanka)
Age (years)
15%
20%
Mortality rate (%)
50+15–490–14
10%
5%
0%
Age (years)
15%
20%
Mortality rate (%)
50+15–490–14
Figure 2.2a. Aceh (Indonesia)
5%
0%
Figure 2.2c. Batticalao (Sri Lanka)
Age (years)
10%
Mortality rate (%)
60+11–590–10
5%
0%
Figure 2.2d. Tamil Nadu (India)
Age (years)
10%
Mortality rate (%)
50+15–490–14
1%
0%
Figure 2.2e. The Maldives
Age (years)Mortality rate (as % of population)
50+15–490–14
2%
10%
5%
0%
Figure 2.2f. Bangladesh storm
surge mortality (Bay of Bengal, 1991)
Age (years)
15%
Mortality rate (%)
50+15–490–14
See sources p152.
35
Tsunami Evaluation Coalition: Synthesis Report
12,000 on 26 December 2004, and it was only on 30 December that it went over
the 100,000 mark. By the end of January 2005 the death toll stood at 286,000 only
to fall back by over 50,000 when Indonesia reduced its estimate for numbers
missing on 7 April.
The raw death toll tells only part of the story. Disproportionate numbers of the
most vulnerable people died. In the Maldives those aged 65 or over, though
comprising only 3.1 per cent of the population, accounted for 17.3 per cent of the
deaths, or five-and-a-half times the proportional level. Elsewhere the tsunami
typically claimed more of the under-15s and the over-50s, although countries
varied as to which of these two groups had the highest mortality rates (Figure 2.2).
More women than men died. This was highlighted early on when Oxfam
announced that, in the villages it had surveyed, there were three times as many
adult male survivors as female ones (Oxfam, 2005a). This was a very small
sample, however, and the ratio may have been due to specific factors in fishing
villages. Figure 2.3 shows the relative risk for females compared with males: a
value of 1 here would indicate equal risk of death for females and males, but the
data show that the relative risk varied from 1.2 (1.2 times as many women died) to
2.1. There were wide variations for individual villages.
The increased risk that flood events like the tsunami pose for children, the elderly
and, in this context, women is highlighted by historical data from the storm surges
in the Bay of Bengal in 1970 (Sommer and Mosley, 1972) and 1991 (Bern et al,
1993; Chowdhury et al, 1993). All of these instances show a realtively low
mortality rate for 15–49-year-olds and increased mortality rates for children and
older people.
The examples also show higher mortality rates for adult females compared with
adult males. The reasons given for the gender and age differences in survival rates
in these disasters are usually related to strength and stamina, and the ability to
swim or climb trees. One study in Tamil Nadu found that women who were able to
swim were more than twice as likely to survive (Guha-Sapir et al, 2006). However,
it is clear that factors such as location also play a role in determining survival.
See sources p154.SourcesSourcesSourcesSourcesSources Various. NoteNoteNoteNoteNote Some data points refer to relative mortality rather than relative risk.
A value of 2 indicates that women were twice as likely as men to be killed by the tsunami
1.0
0.5
0
1.5
2.0
1.0
0.5
0
1.5
2.0
B a n d a
A c e h
B a n d a
A c e h
A c e h
W e st
C o a st
A c e h
B a ra
t
M e u la
b o h
A c e h
E a st
C o a st
O th
e r
A c e h
A m
p a ra
D is
tr ic
t
G a ll e
B a tt
ic a la
o
Ta m
il N
a d u
Figure 2.3. Tsunami mortality risk for females compared with males
36
Tsunami Evaluation Coalition: Synthesis Report
The succession of tsunamis manifested differently in different locations. In Aceh
the tsunamis were walls of mud and debris, but by the time they reached the
Maldives they were more akin to a storm surge with a swell sweeping over the
islands. The ratio of dead to injured varied with location. While the ratio of
tsunami fatalities to injuries in Aceh seems to have been over 6:1,E3 the ratio was
1.53:1 in Sri Lanka (WHO, 2005) and 0.28:1 in Tamil Nadu (Guha-Sapir et al, 2006).
2.2 Media coverage
In late December, many factors combined to make the tsunami a key news story
that generated enormous media coverage: the lack of other news stories; the time
of year; the involvement of Western tourists; the geographical range of the
tsunami; the daily climbing death toll; the availability of dramatic amateur footage
of the waves hitting shore; and the celebrities who perished or survived.E4 The
tsunami was probably the most reported disaster up to that date.23
As shown in Figure 2.4, press coverage of the tsunami in the first six weeks was
more than the combined total coverage for the previous year for 10 key
humanitarian ‘stories’E5 selected by an expert panel (Jones, 2005). The tsunami
dominated the internet as well.24 All of this media attention, together with the time
23 The tsunami occurred prior to Hurricane Katrina, which also generated enormous media coverage. 24 A search for the phrase ‘Indian ocean tsunami’ on 5 April 2006 on Google indicates that there are 1,380,000 documents on the web bearing this phrase. The phrase ‘tsunami disaster’ returns nearly six million hits.
See sources p155.
Infectious disease
Colombia
Nepal
HIV/AIDS
Haiti
Chechnya
DRC conflict
West Africa
Northern Uganda
Sudan War
Tsunami (6 weeks)
0 10 20 30 40
Press citations (thousands) from 200 English language media sources from around the world
Figure 2.4. Tsunami press citations (for 12 months to February 2005)
37
Tsunami Evaluation Coalition: Synthesis Report
See sources p159.NoteNoteNoteNoteNote D&L = damages and losses
Indonesia Sri Lanka India Maldives Thailand
Demographic impact
Population (million) 214.7 19.2 1,064.40 0.293 62
Population loss (incl. missing) 167,540 35,322 16,269 108 8,212
Population loss (incl. missing)
as % of total population 0.077% 0.184% 0.002% 0.037% 0.013%
Population loss in the
most affected province 2.3% 2.7% n/a n/a 1.5%
Economic impact
GDP per capita, US$ 970 950 564 2,440 2,306
Calculated GDP US$billion 208.3 18.2 600.3 0.7 143.0
Total D&L from tsunami, US$m 4,451 1,454 1,224 603 2,198
Total D&L from tsunami, % of GDP 2.0% 7.6% 0.2% 83.6% 1.4%
Most affected province D&L
as % of GDP of that province 97.0% 90.0% 4.0% 8.0%
Pre-disaster GDP growth rate 2005 5.4% 6.0% 7.2% 7.5% 6.0%
Revised GDP growth rate 2005 5.2% 5.4% 7.2% -1.7% 5.7%
Damage and losses
Damage, US$m 2,920 1,144 575 450 508
Damage, % of total D&L 65.6% 78.7% 47.0% 74.6% 23.1%
Losses, US$m 1,531 310 649 153 1,690
Losses, % of total D&L 34.4% 21.3% 53.0% 25.4% 76.9%
Losses, % of GDP 0.7% 1.5% 0.1% 21.3% 1.0%
Sectoral % of total damage
Housing 47.9% 36.0% 33.6% 20.9% 4.3%
Physic infrastructure 21.8% 23.9% 13.6% 27.3% 5.3%
Social sectors 9.5% 7.2% 1.9% 7.3% 1.8%
Productive sectors 12.1% 31.8% 46.1% 28.4% 88.6%
Other 8.8% 1.1% 4.9% 16.0% 0.0%
Remittances (for comparison only)
Remittances in US$bn (2004 est.) 4.6 1.3 23.0 1.6
As % of GDP (by calculation) 2.2% 7.1% 3.8% 1.1%
Remittances as % of D&L 103.3% 89.4% 1,879.1% 72.8%
Table 2.2. Demographic and economic impact of the tsunami25
of year, the level of association with those affected and familiarity with some of the
affected countries, prompted an unprecedented flood of both official and private
funding and of material assistance.
25 Please note the comments on the accuracy of this table in the text.
38
Tsunami Evaluation Coalition: Synthesis Report
The coverage in the Western press was not balanced, however. For example, in a
survey of press coverage of humanitarian disasters, CARMA (2006) found that 40
per cent of the tsunami articles that dealt with the impact of the tsunami on people
looked at Western tourists (who accounted for just over 1 per cent of the
casualties). Partly as a result of all this media attention, hundreds of international
humanitarian agencies and military forces from nearby descended on the affected
counties in what some referred to as the ‘second tsunami’ (Brochard, 2005). The
result, as shown by examples throughout this report, was a largely muddled relief
operation in which ‘information circulated badly and coordination at times
appeared non-existent’ (IFRC, 2005b, p81).
The tsunami disaster threatened development. Economic, infrastructural and
human development losses, both actual and projected, were originally estimated at
some US$9.9bn across the affected region. This has to be contrasted with
international funding of at least US$13.5bn (See Section 3.6 below, on funding).
This does not represent 40 per cent over-funding as it may first appear, however,
as the US$13.5bn includes the cost of the international relief effort, some parts of
which were quite expensive (the US military services cost US$0.25bn alone). Also,
the figure for loss and damage does not include costs of transitional shelter or
livelihood support, all of which have to be borne by the response. Some initial cost
estimates (such as for housing) have proved optimistic, and some components of
the response have wasted money.26
Indonesia has borne the brunt of the losses, accounting for almost half of the total.
However, in terms of impact relative to the overall size of the economy the
Maldives was worst affected, with damage and losses equivalent to 83.6 per cent
of GDP (BRR and World Bank, 2005).
Table 2.2 shows both sustained and projected losses in five of the most affected
countries: India, Indonesia, the Maldives, Sri Lanka and Thailand. This table
should be interpreted with caution as it presents initial estimates of loss and
damage. Estimates of GDP growth were later revised and the figures for projected
losses were probably pessimistic. The economic impacts of disasters are dynamic
and complex (Benson and Clay, 2003), and the lumping together of damage (the
capital cost of rebuilding assets) with losses (expected lost income) is
problematic.E6
Despite the magnitude of the economic losses it is noticeable that, except for the
case of the Maldives, the loss and damage from the tsunami is not much more
than the value of remittances in 2004 for Sri Lanka and Thailand, slightly less than
2004 remittances to Indonesia, and only about 6 per cent of remittances for India.
In line with experiences from other disasters, remittance flows can be expected to
increase to the region following the tsunami (World Bank, 2006, p99). The data for
remittances are included in Table 2.2 not to suggest that remittance flows can
replace international assistance, but merely to highlight the relative size of these
flows compared to the tsunami impact.
26 For example, the wholly unsuitable fishing boats supplied by Kuwait via the Kuwaiti Red Crescent Society that were unfit for use in Aceh (Schulze, 2005, pp14–15).
39
Tsunami Evaluation Coalition: Synthesis Report
Economic data need to be considered at the provincial level, and not just at the
national level. Total damage and economic losses in Aceh alone are estimated at
some US$4.5bn – equal to almost the entire GDP of Aceh (BAPPENAS and World
Bank, 2005). The extent of this localised devastation reveals the real magnitude of
the disaster as it has affected local populations.
The overall impact of the tsunami should also be understood in terms of the type
of damage suffered: How many houses were lost? To what extent was the water
supply damaged? What happened in the productive sectors of fishing and
agriculture? Answers to these questions give some indication of the likely time –
and resources – required for recovery.
The sector that experienced most damage in Indonesia has been housing and
human settlements: 141,000 houses were destroyed, which accounts for 47.9 per
cent of the total damage (BRR & World Bank, 2005). Over 600,000 people in Aceh
lost their livelihoods (in some cases for only a few months) including all those in
the fishery sector and 30 per cent of those in agriculture (Government of
Indonesia, 2005). Different countries had different contexts, different economic
histories, and were under different economic stresses at the time of the tsunami.
Fisheries were hardest hit in India, but tourism was the worst affected sector in
Thailand and the Maldives (BRR and World Bank, 2005).E7
The devastation has reached far beyond lives lost and economic damage caused,
however. Disasters are increasingly recognised as having psychological and social
consequences (Mattock, 2005). This will necessarily affect the speed and nature of
the recovery and is proving a challenge to agencies designing livelihoods
programmes. The tsunami has also had an environmental impact. Land has been
contaminated by salt water, forests damaged and ecosystems disturbed.
The affected countries were already dealing with problems such as chronic
poverty, environmental degradation, displacement, poor governance, inequality,
overly bureaucratic administration systems, caste, conflict and weak respect for
human rights. Whole sections of populations were already marginalised, many as
a result of several different causes. It is these poorest groups, including the sick
and the elderly, those in remote locations, migrant workers and the landless – in
some cases all living within armed conflict areas – that have been the hardest hit
by the effects of the tsunami (TEC Capacities Report, 2006).
40 3.1 Pre-disaster risk reduction and early warning
Six months before the 2004 tsunami, the UN’s Intergovernmental
Oceanographic Commission warned that the ‘Indian Ocean has a significant
threat from both local and distant tsunamis’ (Revkin, 2004). Risk reduction
and preparedness prior to a disaster event can reduce fatalities. The Indian
Ocean region is at risk from natural hazards, including tropical cyclones,
tidal surges and earthquakes. Yet little attention was paid to these tsunami
risks as they were not considered to be a major hazard27 – even though
tsunamis killed many in Sumatra and Java following the Krakatoa eruption
in 1883.E8
Unlike the tsunami warning system in the Pacific, set up after a tsunami
killed 159 people in Hawaii in 1946, no tsunami warning system had been
installed in the Indian Ocean.28 And while the Hawaii Pacific Tsunami
Warning Center (PTWC) issued a bulletin to its regular circulation list29 in
the Pacific basin informing that a tsunami watch was advised within 15
minutes of the December 2004 earthquake, it did not warn affected
countries (which were all outside the Pacific Ocean) of the possibility of a
tsunami.
The response
3Chapter three
27 A 2004 publication from ADPC lists Indonesia as facing a low relative intensity of tsunami hazards and does not even include tsunamis in the table of nine hazards in the South East Asia region (Abarquez and Murshed, 2004, p137). 28 An interim tsunami warning system for the Indian Ocean is expected to be operational by the end of July 2006. 29 Anyone can join the circulation list by submitting their email address via a link on the PTWC site: www.prh.noaa.gov/ptwc.
41
Tsunami Evaluation Coalition: Synthesis Report
Despite the absence of a formal system, some life-saving warnings were
given – mostly by ordinary people. Traditional knowledge helped to save
tribes on India’s Andaman and Nicobar Islands from the worst of the
tsunami (Bhaumik, 2005). Phonecalls to family members in India advised
them to evacuate (IFRC, 2005b, p16) and a 10-year-old British tourist
recognised the signs of a tsunami from her geography class. This led to
more than 100 people evacuating a beach and hotel (BBC, 2005a).
There were reports that a warning to the mainland from the Indian military
in the Nicobar and Andaman Islands went unheeded. Apparently, the
Indian meteorological service sent a warning fax to a former minister of
science rather than the incumbent (Singh, 2004). In Thailand, the head of
the Meteorological Service was sacked because he had decided not to issue
a warning (Associated Press, 2005; Watts, 2005).
These warnings were far from generalised, however. While parts of
Indonesia were struck within 20 minutes, Thai officials discussed the
earthquake and tsunami risk an hour before the waves struck but decided
against causing a panic (Financial Times, 2005). It was more than an hour-
and-a-half before Sri Lanka was hit, ample time for a warning to circulate. In
the Maldives, 108 people were killed when the tsunami struck three hours
after the earthquake. Wider knowledge of the nature of tsunamis, the ability
to swim,E9 or simple systems for communicating warnings could have saved
many lives. Media organisations could, for example, have issued warnings for
India and Sri Lanka had they been better educated about the phenomenon.
Better construction would also have saved lives and property lost due to
both the tsunamis and the earthquake.30 Better disaster preparedness would
Box 3.1. The nature of disasters
Disasters can be defined as: ‘A serious disruption of the functioning of society, causing widespread human,
material or environmental losses which exceed the ability of affected society to cope using only its own resources’
(DHA, 1992, p27). The ability or capacity to cope is a key aspect of impact and response to a disaster, and the
assistance provided by national or international responses is intended to alleviate this shortfall in capacity.
Clearly a society (which can be a community, a province or a whole country) with greater capacity to cope with
the impact of any disaster event is less vulnerable to the effects of that disaster. Some disasters exceed the local
capacity but fall within the national capacity and need no international assistance.
There is a significant difference in the pattern of need for external assistance between the cases of sudden-onset
and slow-onset disasters (Figure 3.1).
Rapid-onset disasters, like the tsunami, have a very high initial need for relief assistance, which may be followed
by a second peak for recovery assistance. Slow-onset disasters have a slowly building requirement for external
assistance. The timescale over which assistance is needed depends on the extent of the disaster and the
complexity of the affected infrastructure.
30 No separate death toll is available for the earthquake as the tsunamis followed within 20 minutes. However, the relatively light damage from the earthquake suggests that the death toll was probably no worse than for the earthquake of 28 March 2005 – that is, fewer than 1,000.
42
Tsunami Evaluation Coalition: Synthesis Report
have made the response more effective and efficient. Disaster risk reduction (DRR)
and preparedness receive a relatively small portion of international aid. Developing
a community’s capacity to deal with disasters (be it a storm or a tsunami) is
normally a cost-efficient approach (IFRC, 2005b, p46). Moreover: ‘It may pay more
to prepare our national counterparts than to invest in our own readiness to
intervene forever’ (TEC Needs Assessment Report, 2006, p63).
3.2 Emergency
3.2.1 Survival and safety
The tsunami was a sudden-onset natural disaster, and local people did most of the
search and rescue and life saving. Survivors were rescued by their neighbours
and by other survivors using whatever means were at hand. Surviving doctors,
nurses and paramedics rendered first aid in makeshift or remaining health
facilities. While the fatalities and missing made world headlines, initially it was the
survivors who were of most concern locally. The recovery of bodies and, where
possible, dignified burial and mourning came later.
In Indonesia, 91 per cent of those interviewed by the Fritz Institute (2005c, p4)
reported that they had been rescued by private individuals. In Sri Lanka and
Thailand, life-saving and immediate relief during the first two days was led almost
entirely by the general public from adjacent areas (TEC Capacities Report, 2006).
The first few flights to Aceh were jammed with volunteers and official teams from
all over Indonesia and the national military played a key role in the initial rescue.
In Sri Lanka damage was limited to the coastal strip so local health services did all
the main medical work.
The TEC Capacities Report (2006, p23) notes:
Some 4 per cent of the population of Aceh province was killed in the tsunami.
An estimated 60 senior leaders of civil society... 5,200 staff from local
authorities and 3,000 civil servants died and another 2,275 were reported
missing. Despite the scale of the disaster and loss of government leadership,
communities coped effectively on their own in the first days after the disaster.
Survivors sought refuge at higher altitudes and lived on fruits and coconuts in
Aceh Jaya, or were taken in by family and neighbours in urban settings in
Aceh Besar. Depending on the proximity to the capital and the scale of the
destruction, it took aid workers between one (for Banda Aceh) and 10 days (for
Krueng Sabee) to reach the affected communities. The Indonesian Marines
provided immediate response to remote Aceh Jaya district, which was cut off
by road, while Special Operations and TNI (Indonesian army) reached Banda
Aceh by road.
Teams formed spontaneously, the skilled and unskilled, rich and poor, one
ethnicity or class side-by-side with another. Some uncovered, others cleaned and
Figure 3.1. General
patterns of need
imposed by rapid- and
slow-onset disasters
Time
Rapid-onset disaster
Slow-onset disaster
43
Tsunami Evaluation Coalition: Synthesis Report
See sources p155.
Box 3.2. The multi-layered relief response
The response to the tsunami disaster had many components – from the
affected population, provincial and national authorities and the military, to
international agencies and international military. All of these components layer
together to provide the overall response. The contribution that any component
can make to the response depends on both its mobilisation time and its
resource base. Traditionally, local and national components bring context-
specific knowledge and international components bring technical skills and
financial resources.
The first relief response after the tsunami came from the affected
communities. (This is not shown in Figure 3.2 as there is no means of
estimating this, but it does fill up part of the white area shown in the figure.)
After the community capacities came the national military and civil capacities,
and later the international military and civil capacities (such as the UN, RC
Movement and INGOs).
It can be several weeks before international civilian response components are
fully in place. In Aceh this was complicated by the former exclusion of
international actors and the fact that it was two days after the tsunami before
the decision to open the province became widely known.
The peak need for rescue, food and medical assistance occurs in the first few
hours and days and these needs have to be met first from local and then from
national resources. Clearly, not all needs are met in this very first phase. It can
be seen that the mobilisation time for the international civilian response means
that international assistance may have only a limited impact on the acute
phase of a sudden-onset disaster.
The interplay of the various capacities making up the response is quite
complex. This interplay is not neutral but can be positive or negative in terms
of the overall response. The TEC Capacities Report (2006) found that cash
grants enabled people to use their skills and abilities in their own way. It also
allowed people to make good use of the economic resources held by the
international agencies in a synergistic way. The TEC Coordination Report
(2006) found that most of the international military contingents in Indonesia
had their tasks allocated by the Indonesian military, thus coupling the
immense foreign logistics capacity with detailed local knowledge.
Capacities can also interact negatively. The TEC Capacities Report (2006) found
that build-up of the international capacity may lead to the reduction of local
and national capacity through the poaching of staff and through the
marginalisation of local structures, or the recognition of only English-language-
based local capacities. Similarly, the capacity of the international response can
be reduced by delays in gaining access or through customs delays (TEC LRRD
Sri Lanka Case Study, 2006) or through a lack of policy coherence – as was the
case over the ‘buffer-zone’ policy about whether reconstruction should take
place near the sea (TEC LRRD Policy Study, 2006).
1234567890123456789012345678901212345 1234567890123456789012345678901212345 1234567890123456789012345678901212345 1234567890123456789012345678901212345 1234567890123456789012345678901212345 1234567890123456789012345678901212345 1234567890123456789012345678901212345 1234567890123456789012345678901212345 1234567890123456789012345678901212345 1234567890123456789012345678901212345 1234567890123456789012345678901212345
Figure 3.2. National and
international capacities
in Aceh (illustrative)
Time
Needs
12345 12345 12345 12345 International civil
International military
National military
National civil
Note: capacities are cumulative
44
Tsunami Evaluation Coalition: Synthesis Report
tended. Some carried, others drove. More gave water, covered, informed or
comforted. Local people, officials, the police and the military, the Red Cross/
Crescent, religious people, students, different associations, private companies,
political groupings – every component of society – responded with blankets,
transport, fuel, medicines, materials, equipment, removal machinery and labour.
Private and public vehicles and boats, offices, halls, schools, places of worship and
homes all became immediately available. In the Maldives, communities backed by
island and atoll authorities used boats to rescue those from islands that were
uninhabitable, housing them with host families or in community buildings.
Affected families on islands where there was partial damage were similarly re-
housed. Food was provided from local shops until external help arrived between
three and five days later (TEC Capacities Report, 2006).
Despite the importance of the local response the very definition of a disaster is
that needs exceed local capacities (Box 3.1). Outside assistance is necessary from
the provincial, national, or international levels, depending on the scale of the
disaster.
3.2.2 National institutional responses31
An influx from provincial and national capitals and beyond followed the immediate
local response. Roads were gradually opened and hospitals accessed. Technicians
pumped floodwaters, restored electricity and reconnected pipes, using
rudimentary tools and materials as well as ingenuity. For most victims, however,
this was achieved too late. Few if any international agencies could say they
managed to save significant numbers of lives. One actor, Médecins Sans Frontières
(MSF), recognised this reality honestly and early:
The reasons why MSF has lowered… its effort is [that] when MSF arrived in the
worst affected regions within 72 hours, the local relief effort was already well
underway. Capable national medical staff [had] covered many of the emergency
needs. Another reason is the absence of major epidemics or life-threatening
diseases except for tetanus. (Indonesia Relief, 2005b)
Both national and international responses were slowed by the time it took to form
a full picture of the extent of damage. This was particularly the case with Aceh,
where the destruction cut normal communications links. The Indonesian
government activated the ad hoc National Disaster Management Board
(BAKORNAS) on the afternoon of 26 December and the Vice-President was sent to
Aceh where all district disaster management secretariats and most other
government offices were severely effected. It was only on arrival in Aceh on 27
December that the Vice-President and his advisers fully understood the extent of
the damage. This led to the request for foreign assistance and the decision to allow
international agencies access to Aceh.
The Indonesia National Army (TNI) and BRIMOB (paramilitary police), present in
large numbers because of martial law, coordinated most of the search and
31 See the TEC Capacities Report on how capacities were used after the disaster.
45
Tsunami Evaluation Coalition: Synthesis Report
recovery work in Banda Aceh. They were aided in the recovery and burial work by
Muslim youth groups from all over Indonesia and with relief assistance from
military forces from (eventually) 17 countries.32
In the immediate aftermath of the tsunami the Sri Lankan government
reintroduced emergency regulations that increased the military’s role in the relief
phase. The armed forces of more nations assisted in the first phase of the relief
operations in Sri Lanka than in Indonesia, although the militarisation of relief
delivery was neither as extensive nor as visible as in Indonesia. The Presidential
Secretariat initially coordinated the relief effort, and created the Centre for
National Operations with staff from the public and private sectors to act as a de
facto National Disaster Management Authority (TEC Capacities Report, 2006).
In the Maldives, with no previous experience of a national disaster, the
government immediately established an ad hoc Ministerial Task Force which, in
turn, set up a National Disaster Management Centre (NDMC) to coordinate relief.
The Thai national response began with enabling the existing Civil Defence Act.
This allowed senior government staff to be delegated to affected districts, re-
directed existing government budgets for relief efforts, and brought the response
of different line ministries under the central coordination of the Ministry of the
Interior. The Department of Disaster Prevention and Mitigation’s Civil Defence
Committee managed international and domestic call centres and a public donation
centre and mobilised personnel and equipment, while the Ad Hoc Tsunami
Disaster Task Force (under the Ministry of Foreign Affairs) coordinated foreign
assistance (TEC Capacities Report, 2006).
3.2.3 Support for affected tourists
The numbers of tourists among the dead, missing and injured both increased
Western media interest and sparked emergency procedures in the tourists’ home
countries. It also most likely fed into the enormously generous global public
response. Insistent and vocal demands from the media and relatives put pressure
on governments to act fast and visibly, both in response to their own nationals’
needs and through aid for affected areas.
Foreign ministries and embassies mobilised, some more effectively than others.E10
Hotlines and task forces were set up, and emergency funds made available.
Search and forensic identification teams were dispatched, many continuing their
tasks for months. Donor state actors who would normally be dedicated uniquely
to the aid process were also tasked in relation to their own nationals, such as the
search for and identification and transport of mortal remains. Bitter public
frustration and acerbic media criticism of perceived weaknesses in accounting for,
repatriating and supporting their own nationals rapidly surfaced in some
countries.E11 In others the process was better managed (Grünewald et al, 2006).
32 It should also be noted that while the Singaporean (from 28 December), US, UK (from 2 January) and some other military were quick off the mark, the main Australian contingent came ashore only on 15 January. It was three weeks before the Russian field hospital arrived and four weeks before the Japanese deployed on 23 January. All these military forces were not, therefore, involved in immediate relief assistance.
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Tsunami Evaluation Coalition: Synthesis Report
33 Full details on the sources can be found in Annex G on data and sources.
See sources p155.
100500 150
UK costs for citizens affected by the tsunami compared with UK tsunami aid, US$m
Aid disbursements to September 2005
Aid commitments
Aid pledges
Consular costs to end 2005
Figure 3.3. Comparison of UK aid and UK expenditure on consular services
See sources p159.
Table 3.1. Numbers killed and missing from outside the affected
countries33
Killed Missing Total
ASIA-PACIFIC
Australia 26 26
China 3 7 10
Hong Kong 38 2 40
Japan 37 7 44
Philippines 8 8
New Zealand 5 5
Singapore 9 9
South Korea 17 3 20
Taiwan 3 3
Sub-total 146 19 165
AMERICAS
Argentina 2 2
Brazil 2 2
Canada 15 5 20
Chile 1 1
Colombia 1 1
Mexico 2 1 3
United States 18 13 31
Sub-total 41 19 60
AFRICA
South Africa 14 14
ALL AREAS
Grand Total 2,111 105 2,216
Killed Missing Total
EUROPE
Austria 74 74
Belgium 11 11
Croatia 1 1
Czech Rep. 7 1 8
Denmark 45 1 46
Estonia 3 3
Finland 171 7 178
France 95 95
Germany 537 15 552
Great Britain 149 1 150
Greece 2 3 5
Ireland 4 4
Italy 40 40
Luxembourg 2 2
Netherlands 36 36
Norway 84 84
Poland 4 5 9
Portugal 4 4 8
Romania 0
Russia 2 7 9
Sweden 527 16 543
Switzerland 106 5 111
Turkey 1 1
Sub-total 1,904 66 1,970
MIDDLE EAST
Israel 4 3 7
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Tsunami Evaluation Coalition: Synthesis Report
Looking after tourists has been very expensive. The total cost for the consular
operation for the UK was estimated at £42.5mn (US$77.5mn at the average
exchange rate for the period). Most of this (94 per cent) was for the UK police who
provided the emergency call service for families and then provided victim
identification services (National Audit Office and Foreign and Commonwealth
Office, 2005). Given that there were only 150 UK fatalities, this gives a total cost of
just over half-a-million dollars per UK fatality. By contrast, UK disbursementsE12
for tsunami relief to the end of September 2005 were US$130mn (Figure 3.3), with
total commitments running at US$149mn – just under twice the cost of the
consular operation (OECD/DAC, 2006b).
3.3 Stabilisation and relief
3.3.1 Assessing and informing
Estimation of fatalities, damage, losses and needs was very approximate in the
early stages. Initial assessments (and even later assessments) drew significantly
on media reports. The Christmas holiday season slowed reactions in some
countries. Gradually, international agencies responded. Teams were dispatched
from affected country or regional centres, or from head offices. Wherever
international agencies had a pre-tsunami presence the assessment of needs was
more comprehensive (TEC Needs Assessment Study, 2006), the response faster
(TEC Capacities Study, 2006) and more effective (TEC Coordination Study, 2006).
Many agencies and governments posted situation reports on their websites. In
Indonesia the government relief agency, BAKORNAS, produced 43 situation
reports between 26 December 2004 and the end of February 2005. The
government of India emitted 13 situation reports, credited with being timely and
effective. Daily situation reports were provided by the government of Sri Lanka
(TEC Needs Assessment Study, 2006). The United Nations Disaster Assessment
and Coordination (UNDAC) team report was one of the earliest formal
assessments, together with the UN Synthesized District Report in Sri Lanka.
Despite the wide range of such reports they were not very good guides for action:
‘Too often, situation reports and assessments served the interest or mandate of
the assessing agency more than those of the potential beneficiaries’ (TEC Needs
Assessment Report, 2006, p12). Assessments carried out by agencies for their own
programmes were used by agencies for their own decision making. The same was
not true of collective assessments. Despite some examples of successful and
influential assessments, the assessments overall did not fulfil their primary
function of guiding decision making.34
34 The TEC Needs Assessment Report (2006) provides evaluation ratings for the influence that different types of assessments had on decision making.
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Tsunami Evaluation Coalition: Synthesis Report
Assessments suffered from a number of weaknesses. Emergency needs
assessments by international actors were not geographically comprehensive. The
most geographically comprehensive assessments came later, supported by the
IFIs. Broad coverage reports included the UN Synthesized District Report in Sri
Lanka and the World Food Programme (WFP) Emergency Needs Assessment in Sri
Lanka and Indonesia (TEC Needs Assessment Report, 2006). Despite these good
examples, the UN’s constricting security rules and inadequate support hampered
the UN in many locations. While INGOs could contract helicopters quite quickly, it
was nearly four weeks before UNHAS had helicopters in Aceh.E13
Nor were reports comprehensive across aid sectors. Assessments prioritised
some sectors such as health and shelter over others such as water, sanitation and
livelihood recovery. Difficulties of access to some areas led to the most accessible
getting more aid than the less accessible. Centrally coordinated assessments
applying agreed criteria and methods, and covering most areas and most affected
people, were developed in none of the affected countries.
The most common and glaring deficiency in assessments was the non-
involvement of affected communities in either the collection or validation of
assessment data. This is a persistent problem that has been observed in many
natural disasters. Assessments were not shared with local communities or
officials after completion.E14 The lack of such feedback to communities was one of
the factors in the gap between the international perception of needs and the
perception by local communities and officials.
Agreed standards of assessment quality and common approaches were lacking
throughout the response. Common, countrywide information standards,
definitions, criteria and software (for collection, analysis, storage and
dissemination) were not established. An uncoordinated, duplicative scramble for
often ill-defined, rarely-to-be-shared35 data, resulted. Assessors used multiple
assessment forms of variable quality, methods and expertise, covering some areas
repeatedly and others not at all.
Under these circumstances it is hardly surprising that assessors failed to produce
an accurate description of needs, the capacities available to meet them, and the
priority gaps to be filled.36 The result was a mixed bag of usable and useful
knowledge, accompanied by unusable and useless information. Time was thus
wasted by those who collected information and, more importantly, by those who
patiently informed them (TEC Needs Assessment Report, 2006).
Reliable databanks were slow to be developed. At no time in any country was a
single, reliable, common census register or database of the affected population
established during the emergency phase.37 UN, governmental and INGO databases
were fragmented and duplicative. High quality and timely analysis to support
35 One example of good practice was the sharing of early livelihood assessments by Save the Children in India and Sri Lanka. However, such sharing was the exception rather than the rule. 36 Even though assessments did not identify gaps, the rising tide of assistance filled most gaps in any case. 37 The TEC Coordination Report (2006) recommends that the creation of a comprehensive beneficiary database should be an early priority in the initial phase of the emergency response.
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Tsunami Evaluation Coalition: Synthesis Report
decisions was rarely available. Over- and under-estimation of affected persons
resulted, in part, from the variety of definitions of who was a potential beneficiary
(in, for example, Sri Lanka). In other cases figures were adapted to suit
programmatic agendas.
Local coping processes were largely ignored in needs assessment (TEC Needs
Assessment Report, 2006). International agencies failed to recognise, map and
measure local capacities (TEC Capacities Report, 2006). Assessments of specific
groups were also lacking or poorly prepared. For example, contrary to international
policies, reliable vulnerabilities and gender data were rarely collected.
Notwithstanding, decisions were made – some considered, and some more
precipitous. Funding was allocated in what the EU’s aid commissioner Louis Michel
condemned as a donor ‘beauty contest’, with world leaders vying to announce
spectacular aid pledges regardless of the actual needs or capacities of affected
countries (AFP, 2005b).E15 However, the largest flow of funds was from private
sources, with funding based presumably on media coverage and agency appeals.
3.3.2 Basic needs
The response moved rapidly from life-saving search and rescue and first aid to
protecting, relieving and comforting. Again, the affected populations provided
most and first.
It is probable that the opinions of affected people have rarely, if ever, been so
canvassed as they were in this disaster.38 In the past it has been less common for
affected populations to be asked for their opinions about the aid they have
received. This constant surveying of the views of the affected population may be
one of the most significant innovations of the tsunami response. The majority of
these surveys have not been carried out by implementing agencies seeking to
38 Three of the TEC studies (Capacities, LRRD and the Funding Response Local Study Overview) carried out their own affected-population surveys in at least two countries, and one of these included questions raised by the other two studies. Other evaluations have also conducted beneficiary studies. Many freestanding surveys have also been conducted (for example: Anderson, 2006; Dercon, 2006; Fritz Institute, 2005a; 2005b; 2005c; IOM, 2005a; 2005b; IPS, 2005; Lindgren et al, 2005; Mattock, 2005; TNS and UNICEF, 2005; UNORC, 2006b; Wall, 2005).
See sources p160.
293,740 BPDE (Badan Pengelola Data Elektronik) Aceh Province: 08 Sep 2005
70,308 BPS. District totals from provisional census totals as of 24 Oct 2005
192,055 SPAN. Number for Aug and Sep 2005 when fieldwork carried out.
For the Districts surveyed in the UN’s IDP Survey
252,179 BPDE (Badan Pengelola Data Elektronik) Aceh Province: 08 Sep 2005
59,328 BPS provisional census data of 24 Oct 2005
39,292 Garansi’s IDP census released in Dec 2005
Table 3.2. Varying estimates of the number of IDPs with host families in
Aceh
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Tsunami Evaluation Coalition: Synthesis Report
know how well they have done, but by third parties, for academic study or for
external evaluation. For example, the Sri Lanka ‘claim-holder’40 survey conducted
by the TEC Capacities Report (in which 1,055 respondents were asked about how
well their necessities had been provided for) indicates that nearly 30 per cent
responded ‘Good’. Asked how well their needs were provided for during the first
week after the tsunami, however, the ‘Good’ answers rose to almost 45 per cent.
The national response was supplemented by a flood of international aid.
Appreciation was given for outside aid and the generosity shown by outside
helpers. A United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF) survey (TNS and UNICEF,
2005, p48) found that 92 per cent of respondents in Aceh considered that aid
agencies had made the most significant contribution in the first year after the
tsunami.E16
Box 3.3. Host families
Host families provided the majority of the accommodation for internally
displaced persons (IDPs) in Indonesia in the first six months. Data on host
families are difficult to capture, as IDPs are dispersed and may regard
themselves as staying with relatives rather than being displaced. The lack of
hard information about host families is highlighted by the various official
estimates of the numbers of IDPs with host families, as shown in Table 3.2.
Host families play a part in almost all emergencies, but while there is a great
deal of literature on camps for the displaced there is very little on host
families. This reflects the undervaluing of local capacities by the international
aid community. One of the factors that made it difficult to identify the number
of IDPs is the mobility of the affected population, again emphasising that
affected persons are moving to take advantage of whatever resources they
have access to, rather than simply sitting in one place and waiting for
assistance.
One example of good practice was the small Swiss Development Cooperation
(SDC) project to support families hosting IDPs in Banda Aceh.39 Generally, little
assistance is targeted to IDPs staying with host families or at host families
themselves. The TEC Coordination Indonesia Case Study (2006, p17) noted
that, ‘Where the international response was largely driven by high-visibility
material inputs, little attention was given, for instance, to supporting host
families’. The same report identified this as being a persistent problem of the
aid system: there was much debate about how to target IDPs living with host
families, but a perennial lack of technical expertise among INGOs (and WFP
for food aid) in this respect.
39 A similar SDC cash-for-host-families project in Sri Lanka apparently had to be abandoned because it was not seen as being culturally appropriate there. 40 Adapted from the term ‘claimant’, claim-holder means somebody who holds the right (‘entitlement’) to make a claim (eg, to aid commitments or benefits) against a ‘duty-bearer’ (eg, a state or an aid agency).
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Tsunami Evaluation Coalition: Synthesis Report
Relatively timely, effective and competent aid, based on good quality technical
expertise, methods and resources was provided, if neither uniformly nor
continuously. Camps and sanitation facilities were established relatively rapidly
and health services were set up. Cases of severe malnutrition due to the tsunami
were not recorded (though such cases have been relatively rare in similar natural
disasters). Though water and sanitation proved a challenge in some places, major
water shortages or risks rarely existed. Community services and educational
materials, facilities and staff were made available.
Inappropriate aid was just as evident, however: ‘There were numerous instances
of duplication, as well as of the distribution of inappropriate goods’ (TEC LRRD Sri
Lanka Case Study, 2006, p9); ‘The women became very emotional when
explaining about the indignity of receiving old, inappropriate clothing as part of the
early relief’ (TEC LRRD Indonesia Case Study, 2006, p88).E17
There were some gaps and overlaps in the aid provided: ‘Despite the large
amounts of funding raised for the Tsunami response, important gaps in crucial
humanitarian sectors persist’ (TEC Funding Response/Government Funding/EC
Report, 2006, p7). However, there were far more reports about overlaps than
about gaps: ‘Overlaps and lack of coordination, like the cases mentioned in the
section on the provision of housing … can also be encountered in other sectors’
(TEC Funding Response/Local Response/Indonesia Report, 2006, p18).
Duplication and overlaps were a constant background to the relief effort, and
consumed valuable staff time: ‘The meeting was initiated by Oxfam out of concern
for numerous overlaps in livelihood activities in the district’ and ‘The overlap
between Canadian Red Cross (CRC) and Caritas Czech in Setiabakti has been
resolved’ (UNORC, 2006a, p2). The World Bank attributed some of the overlap to
the popularity of some high-visibility sectors: ‘Some donors prefer reconstructing
primary schools due to higher visibility and long-lasting nature of the support, but
overlapping is a problem’ (World Bank, 2005a, p75).
Easily accessible areas, not surprisingly, received most aid, and fastest.
Populations of some other areas remained unattended for more than a week41
while others received more than they required. As noted in the TEC Needs
Assessment Report (2006, p43):
Representatives of local government tell a very different story. Often
themselves victims and beneficiaries, when questioned about the needs of the
affected population the first reaction was one of profuse appreciation to the
overall international community. Then, after a brief pause, the tone would
change slightly, leaning toward criticism. One agent, when asked about needs
being met, said ‘of course the needs were met... even he who had no needs had
his needs met’.
Aid was sometimes provided regardless of actual needs (Government of Indonesia
and United Nations, 2005). As in most natural disasters, diseases were not a major
41 For example, parts of eastern Sri Lanka, parts of the west coast of Indonesia. Both national and international NGOs were slow to reach parts of the Andaman and Nicobar Islands due to obstacles raised by the Indian Government.
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Tsunami Evaluation Coalition: Synthesis Report
Box 3.4. Inappropriate aid
Inappropriate aid is a feature of all large emergencies. The media recorded
some dramatic examples of inappropriate aid in the tsunami response
including Viagra and ski jackets (The Guardian, 2005) and even Father
Christmas costumes (AFP, 2005c) as well as the usual expired drugs:
‘Indonesia Health Ministry on Wednesday destroyed some 75 metric tons of
expired medicines which had been part of humanitarian aid’ (Indonesia Relief,
2005c). Tinned pork was sent to staunchly Muslim Aceh (Schulze, 2005, p14).42
Expired food was also a problem: ‘expired food aid was being sorted out and
estimated will need another 4 trucks. Among the food destroyed is food that
already expired since 2003’ (Indonesia Relief, 2005a).
Much of the inappropriate aid may be due to ignorance, perhaps explaining
the mountain of clothing, including heavy sweaters, sent to southern India
(IFRC, 2005b). Some may have been due to a lack of concern with quality:
‘Nobody cared whether the second-hand clothes were culturally inappropriate
or of good enough quality. The presence of high-heeled shoes and female
swimming costumes in some relief packs went unquestioned’ (Fraser, 2005).
Inappropriate aid is not just worthless to the recipients; it has a negative
value. It occupies storage and transport space at the very time when this is
needed for real aid. It then requires special handling to dispose of – all an
additional burden on a response.
It is clear that inappropriate aid was a serious problem in the tsunami
response, whereas it was a minor issue in the response to the Bam
earthquake one year earlier (Chomilier et al, 2004, p24). In Indonesia,
unsolicited and inappropriate goods caused the Secretary General of the
Indonesian Red Cross to send a harsh letter to other RC Societies complaining
of the failure to adhere to guidelines on such donations. The issue was also
prevalent in India and Sri Lanka: ‘More than 60% of NGOs in Sri Lanka and
40% of NGOs in India reported that the receipt of unsolicited supplies had
been high’ (Fritz Institute, 2005b, p3).
It is not possible to quantify this problem, as even those agencies that
normally deal with donated goods in kind keep no special records of the level
of inappropriate assistance. As the proportion and significance of
inappropriate aid is unknown, so too is the proportion of appropriate aid. The
absence of tracking of inappropriate and appropriate aid is a telling weakness
among all actors in their accountability to affected populations and donors.
42 The issue was overcome through a fatwa declaring all aid food halal regardless of contents (AFP, 2005e).
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Tsunami Evaluation Coalition: Synthesis Report
threat. That did not inhibit governments, the media and agencies alike from
repeatedly raising the threat of diseases, or from delivering expensive,
unnecessary field hospitals and medical teams – which in the case of India were
not accepted (TEC Needs Assessment Report, 2006).E18
Box 3.5. Disasters and disease
One of the recurring myths of natural disasters is that outbreaks of disease
inevitably follow disasters (Noji and Toole, 1997, p367). Clasen and Smith’s
review (2005) of the drinking water response to the tsunami quotes Blake’s
(1989) survey of 40 years of natural disasters which found that such
outbreaks were rare, and Toole’s (1997) more recent reprise which found only
two outbreaks of waterborne disease and four other outbreaks of any kind in
a review of 38 natural disasters between 1970 and 1992.
The theoretical risk certainly exists, as Alexander (1993) demonstrates with
the aid of Blake’s tables, but a recent review of over 600 geophysical disasters
since 1985 found only three instances where such disasters led to epidemics
(Floret et al, 2006). This is hardly surprising as such disasters often lack the
aggregation of populations which Topley’s (1942) work suggests to be a factor
in the biology of epidemics.
As well as inappropriate aid and problems of gaps and duplication, there were also
problems with: poor quality plastic sheeting; badly constructed, under-ventilated
and under-sized ‘family’ tents; services (such as trauma counselling) provided by
under-qualified, inexperienced ‘experts’; and dabbling by agencies outside their
area of expertise. ‘The high number of NGOs failing to deliver on their
commitments or providing poor quality services (including housing, provision of
boats, psychosocial assistance) caused resentment locally’ (TEC Needs
Assessment Report, 2006, p46).
One key issue highlighted by different surveys was the importance placed by
affected communities on how they were treated: ‘Survey results from both India
and Sri Lanka strongly indicate that relief processes (the manner in which relief is
distributed) and content (the timeliness and substantive adequacy of assistance)
are both of high importance to aid beneficiaries’ (Fritz Institute, 2005a, p4). One
issue for communities was the lack of information about what agencies were
planning: ‘Lack of access to information is causing discontent within
communities, even spilling over into anger and resentment against implementing
agencies who are late in fulfilling promised infrastructure, livelihood and other
programmes’ (Eye on Aceh, 2006, p39).
The TEC LRRD Report picked up on this issue of the failure to inform
communities and the risk that this brought for future development: ‘[S]ome…
interventions may actually undermine future development… A lack of information
to affected populations about reconstruction plans greatly limits their capacity to
proceed with their own LRRD projects… Information is power, and the people
affected by the tsunami do not have much of either. This failure has led to distrust
toward aid providers and the government’ (TEC LRRD Report, 2006, p10).
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Tsunami Evaluation Coalition: Synthesis Report
Effective supplies management, logistics and distribution proved troublesome. The
sheer quantities involved overwhelmed many international agencies and national,
provincial and local actors. In the absence of comprehensive lists of either
supplies or affected people, distribution was often haphazard. Despite the heavy
logistics elements of the response, the field-proven SUMA Logistics Support
System developed by six UN agencies was not used.
Logistics operations in the tsunami response featured: choked airports;43
abandoned heaps of clothing (IFRC, 2005b); vehicles and containers blocking sea-
ports and customs areas (Jakarta Post, 2006); choked warehouses;44 expensive
materials and equipment deteriorating in the sun and rain (Belawan, 2005);
inadequate supplies software and too few data-entry clerks; poor logistics
reporting; and losses, theft or marketing of aid (Gunawan, 2005). While many of
these may have been ‘freak events’ they indicate the varied quality of supplies
management.
Despite major demands elsewhere for staffing (in Afghanistan, Iraq and sub-
Saharan Africa, for instance), most agencies were able to deploy personnel,
including a number of experienced managers, in a relatively short time. Some
personnel were shifted from other emergencies. Staffing inadequacies were also
evident, however. They included: excessive turnover, partly due to short-term
contracting but also attrition (health-induced, for example, leading to gaps due to
inadequate back-up staff); insufficient competent staff (Aglionby, 2005a), especially
in programme management and specialised positions; and a predominance of
inappropriate ‘Western’ profiles, with poor language skills and an inadequate
understanding of context and culture.45
Some aspects of the response generated enormous amounts of publicity, but the
reality is that it was a week before the international community began to operate
in significant strength in Aceh and three weeks before the international relief
effort was going at full speed.E19 The response in Sri Lanka was faster because
access was easier, but even there: ‘Larger national non-governmental
organizations (NGOs) were less nimble in getting out to villages, often arriving
after a week or later’ (Center for Peace Building International, 2006, p1).
Despite the weaknesses and delays in the response, the relief phase passed
rapidly and reasonably effectively thanks largely to local inputs. Alleviation of
transient poverty (temporary, tsunami-related destitution as opposed to longer
term, chronic poverty) was quite successful. ‘Progress has been rapid in
alleviating much of the transient poverty that was created by the tsunami’ (TEC
LRRD Report, 2006, p81). Emergency conditions and related suffering were rapidly
stabilised. The move from relief to intermediate solutions was also generally rapid.
“‘Much has been achieved this year” a statement from UN and other agencies said,
“[A]lmost 250,000 internally displaced people had been moved from emergency
camps to some 54,000 transitional shelters”.’ (BBC, 2005c).
43 The Australian Minister of Defence had to cancel his visit to Aceh on 8 January as the airport was too congested with 150 aid flights per day (Indonesia Relief, 2005b). 44 Sri Lanka decided to release aid to those not affected rather than let it rot (AFP, 2005f). 45 One agency, for instance, flew over 100 expatriates to Sri Lanka, many inexperienced in the region (TEC Capacities Report, 2006).
55
Tsunami Evaluation Coalition: Synthesis Report
See sources p160.
In some cases cash payments facilitated people’s move to intermediate
livelihoods. Cash was provided in a number of locations, through both cash for
work and cash entitlements or grants. Cash for work was criticised in some cases
as destroying traditional group-work mechanisms. The same criticism does not
apply to cash grants which were almost universally welcomed. These were
generally well received as flexible, easily managed mechanisms for people to
choose their own priorities.
3.3.3 Proliferation of international organisations
The number of international agencies involved in the response grew unabated.
Well-resourced agencies and very small ones, competent and incompetent, well-
prepared and unprepared, secular and faith-based, reputable and disreputable,
household names and unknown, ambitious and humble, opportunistic and
committed, governmental and non-governmental, national and international,
bilateral and multilateral, well-established and just-formed – they all turned up. In
one location in India: ‘[A]t least 150 NGOs/Donors registered… and almost an
equal number were working unregistered in Nagapattinam District alone. All of
them dip into the same basket of livelihood options… creating oversupply,
depressing both the market for trained labor and products’ (Alexander, 2006, p33).
Trying to build a picture of the number of international NGOs is difficult as reports
do not necessarily distinguish them from national NGOs. As well as traditional
NGOs there were people who came to help with their own money, or with donations
from friends and relatives. In Sri Lanka especially, several organisations were set up
by tourists who wanted to help.E20 In the case of Banda Aceh, in addition to the
cumulative number of registered agencies (Figure 3.4), there may have been as
many as 200 small international agencies that stayed only a few weeks.
With the exception of India, Thailand and inland parts of Aceh, governments gave
relatively free access to international agencies. In Aceh this access was conditional
and there were confusing signals from the government about whether agencies
would have to leave after three months. Uncertainty about which agencies would
be allowed to continue working after the first three months paralysed some
agency planning.E21 Little or no regulation and monitoring was applied nationally
Table 3.3. Timeline for selected elements of international assistance in Aceh
Date Since tsunami Event
2 Jan 05 7 days US aircraft carrier Abraham Lincoln arrives off the coast of North Sumatra
7 Jan 05 12 days US Marine expeditionary group arrives off Aceh
11 Jan 05 16 days Danish Portable Hospital opens
13 Jan 05 18 days Australian Navy Ship arrives of Banda Aceh but find nowhere to unload
15 Jan 05 20 days Australian Engineers get their equipment ashore
16 Jan 05 21 days ICRC hospital opens at Aceh airport
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Tsunami Evaluation Coalition: Synthesis Report
See sources p155.
or locally. An absence of relevant national legislation and capacity was a
contributing factor. The quality of the work that agencies did varied greatly. Newer,
inexperienced agencies were more commonly associated with inappropriate aid.
Proliferation was evident everywhere. For example, there were 22 medical NGOs
working in the health sector in one part of the west coast of Aceh (IFRC, 2005b),
95 international organisations working on shelter in Aceh in December 2005,46 and
more than 60 agencies claiming to be working in Aceh’s education sector in
December 2005 (World Bank, 2005a).
The Red Cross Movement response was enormous, as was the total funding it
received (see Section 3.6 below). There are 183 National Red Cross and Red
Crescent Societies in the world. Approximately half of these contributed to the
response with cash, goods or teams. When responding to an emergency they are
supposed to work through the National Society of the affected country and/or the
IFRC. Of the affected countries, only the Maldives had no National RC Society. The
capacities of the RC Movement in the affected countries varied, with the
Indonesian Red Cross being highly regarded.
The Indonesian and Sri Lankan National Societies soon had problems with
unwanted and inappropriate donations from other National Societies, despite the
RC Movement protocol that supplies should be sent only in response to specific
requests (Herson, 2005). Some National RC Societies took the opportunity to begin
their first international operations, using the vast funds they had raised.47 The
results of these operations showed that some National Societies did not have the
expertise for international operations. Dercon (2006) notes that a group of 25
agencies who had built only 500 houses from a total commitment to build 50,000,
included 10 Red Cross organisations which between them committed to building
21,000 houses in Aceh.
46 ‘Someone Else’s Utopia’, by Caroline Baum, Sydney Morning Herald, First Edition, 8 December 2005. 47 The Irish RC received over euro31mn from the Irish public and began operations in Sri Lanka. The Irish RC had little or no international operational experience, but did have a strategic plan to become operational. It has since also started operations in Niger.
80
40
0
120
160
200
Figure 3.4. Number of registered INGOs in Banda Aceh
26 Dec 2004 26 Mar 2005 24 Jun 2005 22 Sep 2004 21 Dec 2005 21 Mar2006
NoteNoteNoteNoteNote Based on news reports from Reuters, DPA, AFP, The Times, etc (430 local NGOs are also registered). Very small INGOs that arrived with a single donation or INGOs in other parts of Aceh are not included.
57
Tsunami Evaluation Coalition: Synthesis Report
Box 3.6. The costs of proliferation
Irrespective of its origin, proliferation has important implications for the
quality and cost of a response.
• Increased load on the affected populations, local authorities and
coordination structures, which try to understand, and navigate
between, the agencies and attend to their demands for information or
services. ‘Affected individuals felt “assessed to death”, too frequently
interviewed and yet not truly consulted’ (TEC Needs Assessment Report,
2006, p48). The authorities don’t know who’s who and need to talk to all
agencies in the hope of finding serious partners, rather than being in a
position to pre-select: ‘[T]here were simply too many actors involved, at
least in Sri Lanka and Indonesia. This posed huge additional challenges
for governments at all levels, as well as for OCHA. In Aceh scarce
management resources that should have been focused on reconstruction
have had to go into coordination’ (TEC Funding Report, 2006, p33).
• Increased costs due to replicated offices and overheads, as well as
the ways in which non-traditional actors, such as the military and
commercial entities, may use methods and resources that are not cost-
effective.
• Duplication and confusion of efforts, including assessments. ‘The
duplication between UN and Red Cross initiatives is counterproductive.
Over the first three weeks, 17 bilateral assessment teams reportedly
arrived in Aceh’ (TEC Needs Assessment Report, 2006, p56). The same
report found that: ‘The timeliness and quality of needs assessment by
Red Cross and NGOs varied from outstanding to poor. With a few
exceptions, those assessments were not widely shared with others.’
• Competition between agencies for projects, ‘clients’, facilities,
materials, staff and publicity. ‘High levels of funding led to heightened
competition both for partners and for areas in which to work’ (LRRD
Policy Study, 2006). The results were costly and damaging. Such
competition has a corrosive impact on accountability,E22 apparent in the
‘accountability reports’ issued by individual agencies on the anniversary
of the tsunami that focused more on brand promotion than on
accountability (Cosgrave, 2006).
• Increased risks of inappropriate aid, due to the time pressure that
competition and the rush for publicity introduce: ‘[M]any of the items
that were distributed were either inappropriate or unfamiliar to
beneficiaries. Several agencies gave the same items to the same people,
and even in October 2005, there were warehouses with large quantities
of relief items that had not yet been distributed’ (TEC LRRD Sri Lanka
Case Study, 2006, p70).
• Increased risk to the quality of the response and reputation of
the humanitarian community through the actions of inexperienced or
irresponsible agencies. The presence of new and inexperienced NGOs
‘that do not apply international humanitarian principles risks undermin-
ing community based approaches and the reputation of NGOs in general’
(TEC Funding Response/NGO Funding/Ireland Report, 2006, p15).
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Tsunami Evaluation Coalition: Synthesis Report
Some National Red Cross Societies went first to the Federation, and if the
Federation did not want what they had they then went to the National Society. If
that failed they would try to interest the respective government in what they had
to offer.
Typically, approximately 80 per cent of resources, capacity and activities were
concentrated among about 20 per cent of the aid agencies (TEC Coordination
Report, 2006). The greatest amount of funding to INGOS came mostly from the
public directly and did not pass though government or UN agencies. INGOs were
sometimes better prepared, fundedE23 and informed than the UN, to the point that
in some instances they supported functions traditionally associated with the UN.48
Within the UN there were differences between agencies like WFP or OCHA which
have a role in emergency response, and the UN development agencies.E24 Among
the UN agencies, UNDAC was a key actor. UNDAC deployed promptly and issued
the first cross-sectoral, albeit geographically limited, assessments (TEC Needs
Assessment Report, 2006). Its role was unclear and impact questionable, however:
• The combination of assessment and coordination within UNDAC’s ToRE25
complicated its role.
• The number, knowledge, and ‘skill sets’ of the UNDAC experts, and the
support provided to them reflected neither the magnitude of the tsunami
relief effort nor the specifics of certain countries.
• Certain donors and UN actors (who promote or fund UNDAC) either failed to
use its services or duplicated them by deploying their own assessment
teams.49
• The criteria for mobilising UNDAC teams (for instance to Thailand) are
unclear.50
• The value added by UNDAC was not evident to important actors.E26
The TEC Needs Assessment Report (2006, p53) found that: ‘UNDAC neglected the
actual analysis and compilation of information on needs… most NGO and many
UN interlocutors found UNDAC “very weak in the field”.’ The TEC Coordination
Report (2006, p36) added: ‘In all countries, questions arose over the utility of
UNDAC as a “common service” for assessment and coordination… The UNDAC
team was under-equipped with even the basics for communication, there was no
public information or civil–military liaison officer on the team, and no clear
administrative procedures for operating in an environment where quick purchase
decisions were required’.
48 Such as facilitating logistical capacity for the UN. 49 The UK sent an assessment team to Sri Lanka. This team collaborated with the UN and undertook a joint assessment of Ampara District. 50 The team had been requested by the UN’s Resident Coordinator and not by the Government of Thailand. The TEC Coordination Report (2006, p36) notes that: ‘The role of UNDAC in a middle- income country such as Thailand is questionable, especially where the team that did not request its services does not comprise sectoral specialists drawn from the skilled national resource base.’
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Tsunami Evaluation Coalition: Synthesis Report
United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR)’s participation in the
response (mainly in shelter) is a major step for the refugee agency. It made history
by appealing for and receiving large amounts of fundingE27 to respond to a natural
disaster, despite its unique mandate to provide international protection for
refugees. The agency’s withdrawal from (as a result of pressure from the
Indonesian government) and subsequent return to Aceh underlined the
complexity of working in areas of armed conflict. On its return UNHCR had a far
more modest target for providing shelter than it had before its withdrawal.
UNHCR reduced its plan to help build houses in Aceh from 35,000 to only 1,000
units (Indonesia Relief, 2005e).51 Other UN agencies also had their shortcomings.
For instance:
[T]he quality of the (WHO) assessment of needs for urgent medical care was
below expectations..... Despite the rapidly emerging evidence of an excessive and,
at times inappropriate, medical response in Indonesia, Sri Lanka and to a
lesser extent in other countries, there has been no effort to ascertain the
number of serious injuries, to register the incoming medical teams or hospitals
and their capacities, or to monitor their effectiveness or, for that matter, to
register the mortality occurring after the tsunami. (TEC Needs Assessment
Report, 2006, p101)
On Monday, UNICEF inaugurated the use of a temporary school building to
mark the new school year... The agency has committed to build 200 temporary
schools, and promised to complete as many of them as possible before the new
school year started. According to its contractor, IOM (International
Organization for Migration), only 3 temporary school buildings (are) completed.
(Indonesia Relief, 2005f)
In Indonesia in January 2005, WFP documented a laudable triangulation of
three methods to estimate the number of affected people. Although all three
defensible methods came up with roughly 700,000 people needing food,
allowance was made for one million people to feed for six months in terms
of budgeting in the WFP appeal. UN officials in September 2005 claimed that
while programmes ongoing in April 2005 were at their new maximum
(feeding over 550,000), attempts were still being made to reach those 1
million hungry people. (TEC Needs Assessment Report, 2006, p31)
Military resources – national, regional and from other countries – played a
‘prominent role’ (IFRC, 2005b, p86) and were ‘pivotal’ in filling capacity gaps (TEC
Coordination Report, 2006). Their role was particularly critical in Aceh. Annex F
lists the main logistics contributions from different countries.
Military capacity at times dwarfed that of the humanitarian sector. This is hardly
surprising when one considers that international humanitarian spending is
typically less than 1 per cent of global military spending, and that all Overseas
Development Assistance (ODA) is only about 10 per cent of global military
spending (Figure 3.5).
51 This was apparently a reflection of a change from providing temporary shelter to permanent housing.
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Tsunami Evaluation Coalition: Synthesis Report
See sources p156.
The US spends as much on the military as does the rest of the world put together
(SIPRI, 2005), and its contribution to the relief effort was on a similar scale. The US
relief operation was, for example, its largest operation in the region since the
Vietnam War, bigger even than Operation Sea Angel (GlobalSecurity.org, undated)
in the follow-up to the 1991 storm surge in Bangladesh.
The commitment of the US administration to the relief effort could be seen in the
sending of one of its first-line Carrier Strike ForcesE28 to the region, and the
diversion of a Marine expeditionary force bound for the Persian Gulf. A further
indication of commitment was the US agreement to operate unarmed when on
Indonesian soil – an unusual concession.
NGO–military relations, however, bordered on the hostile. The TNI was very
suspicious of NGOs as spies and supporters of Acehnese independence. NGOs
accused the TNI of distributing food unfairly (this was unfounded; Schulze, 2005,
p9). NGOs were also critical of the US intervention as being intended to assuage
Muslim opinion,E29 and of the Australian one as being intended to rebuild relations
with Indonesia after the damage done by the secession of East Timor. For their
part, the international military saw NGOs as ineffective and self-promoting
(Schulze, 2005, p9).
Despite this mutual suspicion, there were a significant number of joint military–
civilian endeavours including the assessment missions flown from the USS
Abraham Lincoln, the manning of the USS Mercy with civilian volunteers, and the
transport of 60 NGO personnel from Singapore aboard a helicopter landing ship.
The involvement of foreign military was relatively short-lived: the main US effort
wound down at the end of January and the majority of the other forces left Aceh
by the 26 March deadline set by the Defence Minister.52
Though competition for visibility was a feature of their work, the way in which the
foreign military contingents related and worked to the command structures of the
host nations – in particular, in recognising that the host nation is responsible for
0
400
800
US$ billions at 2004 values
Figure 3.5. Global spending on the military and on development
20 04
20 03
19 99
19 98
19 97
19 96
19 95
19 94
200
600
1000
0
400
800
200
600
1000
20 02
20 01
20 00
NoteNoteNoteNoteNote Data from OECD/DAC and SIPRI.
Military expenditure Development aid Relief aid
52 The one exception was the Malaysians, who had been told that the 26 March deadline did not apply to fellow ASEAN nations, but were subsequently asked to leave in April.
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Tsunami Evaluation Coalition: Synthesis Report
its population and leads efforts on its own soil – was a good example of
coordinated action (TEC Coordination Report, 2006). While military capacities
were necessary53 and generally effective, a number of important drawbacks exist.
To start with, they can be hugely expensive. Military services can cost four to eight
times that of similar commercial services (Borton et al, 1996, p61).E30 The US
aircraft carrier used in the response probably cost US$3mn dollars a day.E31 Apart
from cost, there were other problems with the military involvement. Contextual
awareness was not always strong among foreign military personnel,54 and there
were accusations that the different militaries gave priority to home-country VIP
visits over aid (Schulze, 2005, p10). Proliferation among the military took the form
of many very similar logistics packages being offered by different countries.
Private companies also assisted in the tsunami response. Much went unrecorded
by the international aid system (such as by ReliefWeb), for example the
contributions of Rolls Royce, Coca Cola and the Indian multinational Tata Group.55
While their aid was generally welcomed and useful, questions arise regarding
their expertise, experience and cost-effectiveness. For instance, the Hong Kong
and Shanghai Banking Corporation spent $500,000 on a clinic built from five
recycled shipping containers in a project managed by Rolls Royce at Calang.56
Also, Rolls Royce was in charge of health services and clinics in one location.57 In
any ‘normal’ circumstances such specialised and potentially life-impacting tasks
would be restricted to agencies with specialist knowledge and skills.
The local business community also played a key role in recovery. In Sri Lanka,
local chambers of commerce worked to promote local recovery in Hambantota
and Ampara.
3.3.4 International coordination
One innovation in this response was the appointment of a very high-profile UN
special envoy, former US President Bill Clinton. This choice may have been
motivated by a desire to have an envoy who could shake loose the donor’s purse
strings (Clinton, 2006). Even though this proved unnecessary, the appointment of
such a high-profile figure proved successful when the focus changed to promoting
the effectiveness of the response, as the Special Envoy had the political clout to
persuade governments to participate in coordination forums such as the special
envoy’s Global Consortium on Tsunami Recovery.E32 Overall, the Special Envoy’s
53 As the logistics capacity the military brings is not available as quickly from civilian contractors. 54 This was illustrated by the US military mistakenly handing an aid shipment over to GAM rather than to the TNI. They became aware of this mistake only when they showed pictures of the handover to the Indonesian military (Xinhua News Agency, 2005). 55 Asia Media reports (http://www.asiamedia.ucla.edu/tsunami/1yearlater/india.asp) about the Tata Relief Committee (TRC): ‘The Tata Group’s huge presence in South India has also made it a key player in relief efforts’. A Tata Group media release of 4 January 2005 adds: ‘The TRC has undertaken relief and rehabilitation work in the tsunami affected area with the help of a 55- member team pooled from different Tata Group companies’ (http://www.tata.com/tata_sons/ releases/20050104.htm). 56 This gives a building cost of approximately US$3,500/m2 for a product that, because it will rust, is far inferior to a structure of bricks and mortar. 57 Responsibilities included not only rebuilding the clinic and accommodation, but also equipping it with drugs (OCHA: Indonesia Earthquake and Tsunami: Situation Report 37). Agencies typically had to operate clinics for a few months before the Ministry of Health could take over.
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Tsunami Evaluation Coalition: Synthesis Report
role was much appreciated by senior UN and government officials interviewed
during the TEC evaluation. UN officials were also very positive about the
appointment of Margareta Wahlstrom as UN Special Representative for the
Tsunami (TEC Coordination Report, 2006).
The establishment of a local Interagency Standing Committee (IASC) in Banda
Aceh became a focal point for interagency coordination for those who attended.
Principles, standards and policy in, for example, the construction of temporary
living centres (TLCs) was promoted through this body (TEC Coordination Report,
2006). In Sri Lanka, the UN decided to engage the government at both local and
provincial level rather than creating a new coordination structure.58
The large number of actors both significantly increased the costs of coordination
(as there were so many more agencies to coordinate with) and reduced the
effectiveness of coordination (as there were large numbers of agencies falling
outside any coordination mechanism). In general, large private funding permitted
INGOs and the RC Movement an unusual degree of flexibility and independence
from formal coordination structures. The need and (in some cases) the will for
INGOs to coordinate was consequently reduced.
Some of the NGOs – both INGOs and domestic NGOs who received external funds
– controlled significant funds: ‘[W]ith their own funding secure, they face few
incentives to improve coordination’ (Jayasuriya, Steele et al, 2005, p18). Many of
these organisations were ‘cash rich’ and keen to start their individual activities
with limited need and incentive to coordinate with local government or with other
actors (World Bank, 2005a).
Agencies have argued that this was in part due to the weak coordination provided
via formal mechanisms. Weaknesses in coordination existed, including
coordination of the transition from relief to recovery. This compounded problems
caused by proliferation, though in Somalia, where there were relatively few
organisations, coordination was still reported to have been weak (Vaux et al, 2005,
p26).
The reasons for this weak coordination were complex:
• The UN’s coordination role is one of coordination without having direct
authority over the other actors. Sometimes the authority for coordination
flows from the personality of the head of mission, in other cases it comes
from the need of partners to get access to common services such as air
transport or security advice. In the tsunami response the number of actors to
be coordinated combined with deep pockets meant that they had no interest
in common services, which made coordination a herculean task.
• Support and funding for coordination were often in short supply. While funds
for coordination were made available in the Flash Appeal, neither immediate
start-up nor subsequent (recovery phase) funds were guaranteed. More
importantly, weak and inadequate administrative systems and support led to
slow responses.
58 There had not been any local IASC equivalent in Sri Lanka prior to the tsunami.
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Tsunami Evaluation Coalition: Synthesis Report
• The lack of continuity, skills and experience among some senior UN
coordinators posed problems (for example, poor meeting management skills).
Their lack of personal authority denied OCHA the authority to coordinate.
• The fact that the UN Resident Coordinator (RC) and Humanitarian
Coordinator (HC) were the same person meant that humanitarian
coordination took a back seat to other issues.
• Coordinators were criticised for not taking a firm line with purveyors of
inappropriate aid (such as the large number of field hospitals) and with the
authorities on issues meriting joint-agency advocacy (be they mere
bottlenecks, such as customs clearances, or, more fundamentally, allegations
of human rights and other abuses).
• INGOs did not appoint special liaison officers to deal with the large number of
other agencies and the need to share information with them.
Further, NGOs were insufficiently represented in many coordination bodies and
coordinated poorly among themselves. The IASC, despite being replicated at field
level, did not sufficiently reflect, nor speak for, the huge diversity of NGOs,
including national NGOs. A recurring complaint from the deputy HCs was that
INGOs did not bring consistent consensus on important issues being discussed. In
April, the International Council of Voluntary Agencies (ICVA) proposed an NGO
Platform for Aceh that would become a focal point (and Secretariat) for NGO
coordination in the recovery phase. Gaining consensus around issues was next to
impossible because the members of the INGO community did not agree among
themselves on who had the right to speak on their behalf. It appears that ICVA
membership was neither able to agree the terms of reference for an NGO liaison
officer, nor to the establishment of some kind of NGO liaison office in Aceh (TEC
Coordination Report, 2006).
The earthquake of 28 March 2006, which badly affected the islands of Nias and
Simeulue, diverted resources and attention away from the tsunami response just
as the emergency phase ended and may have slowed the development of more
effective coordination. Several observers noted that the Nias and Simeulue
response was better coordinated than the initial tsunami response, possibly
because fewer agencies responded and there was a far smaller media presence
compared with the initial weeks of the tsunami response.
Coordination structures also presented problems. As a rule they were fragmented
into sectoral groups which, it is argued, inhibited integrated planning within any
specific geographical area.
Recently one of the larger NGOs constructed a number of houses in an area
where the community, working with another NGO, had developed a site plan
that located a road in the area where the houses where built. Lack of
coordination among donors working in the same area also ultimately weakens
local, community-based organisations. (BRR and World Bank, 2005)
This example also shows a failure by the two NGOs to coordinate effectively with
local authorities. Apart from inefficiencies in the response, poor coordination,
especially in the early stages, led to poor ‘lateral accountability’ among
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Tsunami Evaluation Coalition: Synthesis Report
implementing agencies. Opportunities to share assessments, valuable reports and
lessons identified were lost.
Another aspect of coordination that presents both efficiencies and weaknesses is
that of UN Humanitarian Common Services (HCSs).E33 Some of the services were
found to have been effective and efficient. A recurring problem was that certain
services (and the so-called ‘matrix’ approach adopted by the HCS) were either not
used or not known. The relationship of services and the host agencies (eg, WFP)
was unclear in terms of management, planning and budgeting. Finally, the HCS
could have been of greater benefit to promote among operational partners
common agreements on issues such as procurement, staff hire and rental charges.
Coordination within donors’ own administrative institutions showed advances on
previous crises (such as the 1991 Iraq, 1991–95 former Yugoslavia, and 1994–95
Rwanda crises). In many cases the humanitarian and development ‘wings’ of a
donor agency worked in very close cooperation. These included cross-functional
(relief-development, political and even administrative) taskforces (Grünewald et al,
2006). That said, coordination among donors, especially in the initial ‘funding
bidding match’, was notably poor in contrast to their commitments expressed
through the Good Humanitarian Donorship principles (GHD).59
There remains a persistent preference among donors for highlighting their own
individual contributions, and many operational agencies spend a disproportionate
amount of time writing separate reports covering individual contributions.
However, greater effort is needed, especially in the case of UN reports, to move
beyond general statements of performance to providing sufficient detail to satisfy
the monitoring requirements of donors (TEC Coordination Report, 2006).
3.3.5 Costs and efficiency
A question often posed by the donating public is: ‘How much money actually got
to the people?’ As Section 3.6 on funding shows, it is impossible to answer this on
the basis of the information available. Even the implication that all funds must be
given directly to people in order to benefit them is flawed. Investments in
administration and logistics are unavoidable, and the issue of surge capacity is a
continuing problem for aid agencies.E34 Additionally, better cost-efficiency may
mean reduced beneficiary choice60 (World Bank, 2005a). It is nonetheless
important to look at cost-efficiency.
Apart from gaps in reporting and differences in accounting definitions and
practices, few agencies have published transparently, in local languages and in
easily accessible formats, their detailed budgets and expenditures. It is usually
very difficult to get information on salaries,61 allowances, consultancy fees,
59 ‘[C]oordination among humanitarian donors lies at the heart of GHD’ (TEC Coordination Report, 2006, p26), eg General Principles 5, regarding collective obligation, and 10, regarding UN leadership and coordination (Good Humanitarian Donorship, 2003, p1). 60 Having a range of options is inherently more expensive for the provider that offering everyone a single standard option. 61 However, due to US tax law and Form 990, US NGOs have to publish details on their five highest-paid staff members other than board officers (all of whose salary details have to be given). This is a positive example of the impact of regulation on transparency.
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Tsunami Evaluation Coalition: Synthesis Report
international travel and capital costs. Oxfam, widely regarded as one of the leaders
among the INGOs, spent 16.6 per cent of its total budget on programme
management and planning, with another 2.6 per cent on advocacy and learning – a
total of US$16.2mn in the first 12 months (Oxfam International, 2005). While large,
these costs are typical of the real cost of managing complex programmes well.E35
Hundreds of agencies established and maintained staff and offices in affected
areas and in national and regional cities. Most were generously equipped and
staffed. As noted above, many costly assessments were duplicated and many
different agencies were present in the same locations.62 Repeated administrative
costs and overheads are also incurred (often without clarity), as funds pass down
the layers of sub-contracts.
The proliferation of agencies also renders information and coordination services
more expensive.63 Data about numerous agencies must be collected, stored and
updated. Coordination staff, space and services must be provided on a scale in
accordance with the number of actors. Coordination during the tsunami was
simultaneously more expensive in terms of staff time, and less effective in terms
of results.
62 Permata Hati Hospital got assistance from no less than 40 NGOs (Serambi Indonesia, 2005). 63 One hundred agencies may not sound like much, but this is over 16,000 bilateral relations between the agencies, and over one-and-a-half billion potential clusters of five agencies. 64 One of the authors worked for an INGO where the approximate figure for opening a new office was generally assumed to be US$250,000 in the early 1990s. 65 Estimated at about 5 per cent of an INGO’s cost in Sri Lanka.
Box 3.7. What does it cost to open an aid office for one year?
International agencies are not transparent about their operating costs, so
direct information is not available. An INGO office would typically need two
international managers with no project responsibility (typically the
representative and the finance and administration manager). The other costs
would include: renting an office and accommodation; buying or renting
vehicles; buying computers, phones, radios and satellite phones; employing
guards, drivers and other support personnel; and paying for flights. All of this
suggests a minimum cost of some US$200,000 to US$250,000 for a cost-
conscious INGO64 with modest pay rates. Given that there were 180 INGOs in
Banda Aceh in 2005, the total cost of all these offices was probably US$35mn
to US$45mn.
First, it is not suggested that all the work should have been done by one
super-agency, so not all these offices are duplicated. Second, this high cost has
to be set against the overall level of NGO spending in Aceh – probably of the
order of two-thirds of a billion dollars in the first year.E36 However the work
could have been done by fewer agencies, or by the same number of agencies
working together in consortia for joint implementation. It should be noted that
the cost of running a local partner NGO office is a small fraction of the cost of
running an INGO office.65
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The presence of multiple agencies drew multiple, expensive visiting delegations
and missions. International missions are unavoidable for international agencies
and donors. One assumes that some had a positive impact on affected people’s
lives, through subsequent decision making. The productive outcome of many of
these visits, however, remains a mystery, certainly to locals and in some cases to
field staff of the agencies concerned. While local transport and lodging might be
regarded as a field-level investment (for either fundraising or planning purposes,
albeit badly targeted), the cost in time, effort and services to local people and
administrations is incalculable.
3.4 Building back better: capacities for recovery
3.4.1 Achievements
Local recovery began straight after the tsunami and earthquake – although the
process will go on for years, and probably decades.66 A year later, recovery
activities had multiplied throughout the region, with mixed results. Notable areas
of activity include: construction and the production of boats and nets; agriculture
and fishing (including with support from cash grants) (TEC LRRD Report, 2006);
small and medium enterprises (SMEs) providing food, recreation and tourism
services; production of pickles, coir and jute bags; fish drying and marketing;
outboard motor and vehicle repair, service stations; carpentry, plumbing,
computing and electrical services.
It is undeniable that the quick response by NGOs and donors, despite some
concerns about the quality of the assets provided and sustainability of marine
resources, has helped a majority of active fishermen as both an important
psychosocial intervention as well as doubling up during the short term, enabling
them at least a minimal income stream and thus protecting their dignity and self-
respect (Alexander, 2006). Another significant success has been that damage and
loss assessments were more systematic and comprehensive, and better resourced
and coordinated, than were assessments of humanitarian needs.67
About 100,000 new homes have been built or are under construction today
across the tsunami-affected region. Thousands more are in the pipeline. Some
400 permanent schools are under construction and, with the work on
66 Recovery phases after hurricanes in Central America, earthquakes in Colombia, India, and Iran, and recurrent flooding in Bangladesh all indicate that it will be a long, uneven process. Apart from human fatalities and physical destruction, losses to livelihoods were devastating. (See Section 2, The Disaster, above in this report.) 67 These were not a main focus of the TEC evaluations, which concentrated on humanitarian actors. They are seen as possible models for comprehensive relief-phase assessments, as recommended in the TEC Needs Assessment Report.
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temporary facilities, children went back to school more quickly than I thought
they would. Tourist numbers are on the rebound in Thailand and in the
Maldives. In Sri Lanka, over 70 per cent of households are reported to have
regained a steady income. I am still frustrated that close to 50,000 people
remain in tents in Aceh, but I am pleased that the temporary shelter
construction has been moving much more rapidly. (AlertNet: Highlights of
Former President Clinton’s speech on disaster reduction, 30 March 2006)
In all countries children were back in school very quickly and health facilities and
services were partly restored and, in several cases, much improved. More than 80
per cent of damaged fish markets (in Sri Lanka), boats and fishing equipment were
rehabilitated (TEC Coordination Report, 2006). By month six in Aceh, some
500,000 people had a solid roof over their heads (albeit a majority in host families,
with some 70,000 still in tents). More than 1,000 new houses were being built each
month, and the pace of housing accelerated to 5,000/month in October 2005. In
Aceh, the reconstruction effort provided an opportunity to strengthen the peace
between the government and the Free Aceh Movement (GAM) by bringing entire
communities together to plan for their future (TEC Coordination Report, 2006).
Although the tsunami devastated the livelihoods of many it did not result in mass,
entrenched unemployment68 and so a potential livelihoods crisis was clearly
diverted. This was due to three factors:
1 the industrious efforts of the disaster-affected people (TEC LRRD Report,
2006);
2 the job opportunities created by the response, for example in the
construction industry;
3 the use of cash in the relief and recovery efforts.69
The international presence in Aceh probably had a positive effect on the peace
process there. While hard to quantify, local sources say that the international
presence gave them confidence that the peace agreement would be observed.
Some connected the international presence to the progress between the
Indonesian government and the GAM in achieving a Memorandum of
Understanding (MoU). One person said, ‘The international presence creates a
pitch for peace’ (‘pitch’, as in a playing field.) Others noted that the MoU was ‘in
part possible because of the international presence’ and that ‘the international
presence supports peace’ (Anderson, 2006, p13).
Civil figures were more positive than international actors, expressing
support for international engagement. This fits with a commonly expressed
Acehnese perspective that international involvement in Aceh’s political
problems will help resolve tensions between the region and the Jakarta-
based Government. The following positive impacts were mentioned:
68 In Sri Lanka an International Labour Organisation survey (ILO, 2005) already in April reported that 60 per cent of those who had lost their employment due to the tsunami were back at work. 69 Cash-for-work programmes were often quite limited in duration; however, several governments made direct cash payments to those affected by the tsunami, in addition to cash grants from agencies.
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• An economic boost which, if it continues, could become a ‘peace
dividend’.
• An international presence, which limits TNI abuses in particular.
• Greater accountability and reduced levels of corruption.
• More openness and increased confidence in government.
• Promotion of international experience, and encouragement of all
parties towards peace.
• The international presence means domestic civil society can do
more. (Burke and Afnan, 2005).
However, Schulze (2005, p23) notes that good progress on a settlement had
already been made prior to the tsunami, and that:
It is often assumed that there was a direct cause and effect relationship
between the tsunami and the Helsinki peace process – that the sheer
magnitude of this natural disaster ‘made’ the warring factions see sense and
‘instilled’ in them the desire to end the conflict. In the case of Aceh that view is
overly simplistic and neglects the dynamics and processes already underway
which paved the way for a return to the negotiating table.
The outcome in Sri Lanka has been far gloomier. Here, the conclusion of a series
of workshops on the impact of the tsunami was that:
In the short-run, the tsunami and aid promoted a pause in the civil war. In the
long-run, the tensions leading to war have been made worse… Most of the
post-tsunami response made no changes to the conflict or its resolution, while
grievances by the war-affected communities have increased. (Center for Peace
Building International, 2006, p6)
However, it should be clear that whatever, if any, impact the international
response to the tsunami has had on these two conflicts, this effect was
serendipitous rather than planned. In general, international agencies paid little
explicit attention to conflict-sensitive programming in either Aceh or Sri Lanka.70
3.4.2 Disenchantment among the affected
population
Surveys71 record a general satisfaction among affected populations for the
assistance received during the initial stages of the tsunami response. The general
satisfaction with the relief phase soon changed, however, as people’s expectations
moved from relief-item distribution to recovery opportunities and solutions. For
the recovery process, surveys show growing frustration with the speed, direction
and ownership, and not just with international programmes. For example, the
70 Eye on Aceh noted that many of the programmes examined by their study ‘appeared to lack a conflict-sensitive perspective’ (Eye on Aceh, 2006). 71 TEC and other surveys, such as those conducted by UNICEF (Lindgren et al, 2005; TNS and UNICEF, 2005).
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claim-holder survey in Sri Lanka indicated that affected communities felt that their
local leaders had failed them in ensuring equity and inclusion. The Fritz Institute
found that ‘85% of the affected families surveyed ranked international NGOs
highest in terms of quality, maintenance of dignity, and fairness in distribution of
aid’ (Fritz Institute, 2005c, p7).
One UNICEF survey in Indonesia found that, while 66 per cent of respondents
believed that national and local governments were responsible for ensuring that
the relief and recovery efforts were a success, 92 per cent considered that aid
agencies (mostly international ones) had made the greatest contribution to date.
The agency regarded as having made the most significant contribution overall was
the Indonesian Red Cross, mentioned twice as often as the second-placed agency
(Lindgren et al, 2005, p19).
The TEC Capacities survey of affected populations found that, at the five-month
mark, a little over 5 per cent of respondents answered ‘Good’ and 20 per cent
‘Somewhat Satisfied’ to a question about how well their needs had been met. This
contrasts with the more favourable opinions regarding the relief phase. While
expectations may have risen once people saw the aid potentially available, the
slow progress in livelihoods recovery and physical reconstruction has frustrated
many, with only one-fifth of the displaced in permanent accommodation 12
months after the tsunami (Oxfam, 2005b, p2).
UNICEF’s survey in Indonesia found that 91 per cent of respondents said that the
response was taking much longer than they had expected (Lindgren et al, 2005,
p19). The same survey found that fewer than half of respondents in Aceh had
seen a significant improvement in shelter compared with the first three months
after the tsunami (Lindgren et al, 2005, p41). Dercon (2006, pp1–2) reported that in
mid-February 2006, 15,000 people were still living in tents in Aceh. WFP was also
still providing emergency food relief in tandem with major reconstruction projects.
Surveys show that people’s main concern after the initial days was to get on with
their lives, and to recover as fast as possible. If not aid, they at least wanted – and
deserved – reliable information about recovery plans, resources and methods to
allow them take their own decisions. But evidence of misunderstandings, poor
communication and false hopes emerge from interviews in affected areas and
from media reports.E37 Many agencies controlled more funds than they could
reasonably use. This resulted in promises, real or perceived, that were simply
impossible to fulfil:
Early promises were made that tens of thousands of houses would be built in a
few months time… construction of transitional housing has been delayed and
insufficient, especially in Aceh. Disaster affected people have shown a
readiness to be patient in waiting for permanent housing, but they have been
angered by false promises and the failure to plan for an inevitably protracted
transitional period. This state of affairs is a reflection of how agencies’ struggle
for ‘turf’, by making grand promises, has superseded accountability to the
affected populations. (TEC LRRD Report, 2006, p10)
Some 25 agencies and donors have committed themselves to providing 50,000
housing units, and have started building only 500 collectively. This group includes
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Box 3.8. Impact on women
The most significant impact of the tsunami on women was in terms of
fatalities, as the tsunami killed 40,000 to 45,000 more women than men.E38 The
TEC claim-holder survey in Sri Lanka indicated that women were less satisfied
than their male counterparts with the tsunami response in all phases, feeling
that international agencies did less than they should have done to protect
women, especially in camps. There were, however, some notable exceptions.
Examples of good practice include the United Nations Development Fund for
Women’s (UNIFEM) work in Aceh fostering women’s leadership, posting
gender advisers in the Aceh and Nias Rehabilitation and Reconstruction
Agency (BRR), and forming a working group, in collaboration with the United
Nations Population Fund (UNFPA), to monitor Shari’a law and to develop a
code on violence against women.
Governments have not always recognised or advanced the property rights
of women. CBOs with a focus on women criticised inflexibility in
relocation, housing and livelihood strategies. The following are some
examples:
• Widows could not opt to rebuild their houses near relatives under the
’house for a house’ policy, which provided for rebuilding on the prior
location of the house or in a designated location.
• Women remained at a disadvantage in accessing livelihood and other
recovery programmes.
• In the Maldives, women with small businesses often had no official
registration and because they could not prove that they had lost their
livelihoods, they did not qualify for assistance.
• Women on a cash-for-work project in the Maldives were initially told to
stop work because they were said to be slower than men. (The INGO
responsible intervened in this case, and women were employed on
other activities.)
• Many of the livelihood projects offered to women, such as mat-weaving
and snack-making, were criticised by female claim-holders as too small
to providea living.
International agencies recognised many of these problems but the
pressure to spend was so great that much money went to easily dispensed
items, such as fishing boats for men, without corrective action to support
women’s status. (TEC Capacities Report, 2006, p33)
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about 10 members of the Red Cross Movement (planning 21,000 units), KfW/GTZ
and ADB, but also INGOs such as World Vision. Some of them are working where
access is difficult, but organisational bottlenecks and lack of expertise are often
the more serious reasons for delay (Dercon, 2006).
One of the most frequent themes raised by local people had to do with the
‘promises’ of NGOs. Many said that the NGOs make many promises that they do
not keep. One man told the story of having been promised credit three separate
times but, so far, ‘the only thing I have gotten is a bucket!’ One said, ‘I am very sad
about the lack of follow-through on promises.’ Another said, ‘We would prefer to
eat poison than promises.’ Others referred to a popular song that has the lyric
‘Promises, promises, all we are left with is promises’ as the way they see the work
of NGOs (Anderson, 2006, p11).
[B]eginning early October, Oxfam staff held meetings with the community in
Blang Oi, and promised 330 Type 36 houses. The community of Blang Oi had
been promised housing on two previous occasions, by the Indonesian NGO
Jenggala (recently renamed YPKI) who promised 100 houses, but built only 20
of such poor standard that nobody would live in them, and by World Vision
who did not even reach the stage of laying the foundations… In total, 273
people registered, and the list was submitted to Oxfam for the MoU to be
drafted – a process that would, according to Oxfam staff, take only 24 hours…
The local organising committee was only slightly surprised when, mid-
December, they received news that ‘Oxfam, with its limited budget next year,
will not be able to meet all of Blang Oi’s housing needs. (Eye on Aceh, 2006)
However, it should be clear that affected populations understood almost any
enquiry by NGOs to be an undertaking to do something about the issue raised. In
particular it is becoming clear that community consultations, while extremely
helpful, are not enough as a method of keeping communities informed. It is very
easy for misunderstandings to occur when exchanges are purely verbal, especially
when one party is an international working through a translator. Instances abound
of communities feeling that they have been made promises that have not been
fulfilled – whether or not the NGOs working with them consider that they have
even made such promises (Wall, 2005).
The local media served an active part in highlighting problems in the supply of aid
by both agencies and local government. For example, this is shown by an analysis
of coverage in the Ceylon Daily News (Table 3.4).E39
3.4.3 Moving to recovery
One of the most remarkable achievements of the tsunami response has been the
avoidance of the traditional funding gap between the relief phase and recovery. In
the tsunami response, agencies had access to so much money that recovery
projects started early. This is a major improvement over responses in many other
disasters.72 Despite this achievement, the perceived pressure to spend, competi-
tion for ‘beneficiaries’ and lack of expertise have resulted in shoddy results:
72 While the funding gap was avoided the problems of the relief-recovery transition were not.
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See sources p160.
• poor market research leading to inappropriate business models;73
• environmental damage to forestry, topsoil (Alexander, 2006) and fish stocks;
• poor access to credit;
• faulty or badly planned boat production;
• poor-quality reconstruction;
• inflation-inducing profligacy;
• poor anticipation of skills shortages and inadequate training, leading to
outsiders meeting the demand for labour;74
• poor targeting, leading to waste and social tensions (such as non-fishermen
receiving boats, sometimes more than one, while ‘real’ fishermen have been
left empty-handed – TEC LRRD Report, 2006);
• fragmented programming resulting in houses without connection to water
and sanitation, and schools where few or no children now exist, and fishing
boats and nets where there is neither cold storage nor potential buyers.
Topic Number of instances
Inappropriate Aid 86
Corruption 57
Individual grievance 31
Accounts of psychological trauma 28
Reports of protests or violence 22
Gender issues 20
Waste of resources 18
Lack of consultation with communities 17
Mistakes due to ignorance 13
Military related issues 9
Table 3.4. Press coverage of the tsunami in Sri Lanka
NoteNoteNoteNoteNote Tsunami response related reporting in the Ceylon Daily News
in the first three months after the tsunami. SourceSourceSourceSourceSource TEC Capacities Sri Lanka Country Report, 2006.
73 Such as the telephone booth project for tsunami-affected families, just as phone-call prices in India plummeted (Alexander, 2006). 74 ‘These [construction programmes] turned [out] to be largely, external, contractor-driven operations. In the case of housing, workers were imported from within the district, within the state and some [from] as far away as Orissa and Gujarat. A leading Christian relief agency even justified this import[ation of labour] on the grounds that these workers besides possessing house-building experience in major disaster settings were given “an opportunity to demonstrate solidarity”!’ (Alexander, 2006, p31).
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An estimated 40 per cent of the small boats distributed in Aceh are expected to be
unusable within 12 to 18 months (BRR and World Bank, 2005, p113). Poor quality
boat construction has created dangers for fishermen and has led to many boats
having already been abandoned in both countries. Poor quality assets have
included ‘fake’ rice seeds (TEC LRRD Report, 2006). Similarly, the application of
community-focused methods where no community exists (but, rather, collectives
of disparate individuals and families lacking common interests, backgrounds and
community cohesion) were ill-advised.
Complex livelihoods require complex solutions. Recovery and development are
inescapably political processes. Meaningful commitments to and linkages with
national, provincial and local development initiatives have been weak. Despite the
scale of resources at their disposal NGOs have still concentrated on micro rather
than macro interventions. Major employment investments have rarely been made
by NGOs despite having large funds available. For example, in Sri Lanka there are
many complaints that no assistance has been available for the larger, ‘multi-day’
boats that exploit different fish resources and provide employment and tax
revenues (TEC LRRD Report, 2006). The replacement or upgrading of
infrastructure such as roads and services has rarely been considered.
While ‘build back better’ became a slogan, many actors lacked the capacity to
address complex poverty-related issues such as vulnerability reduction, asset
creation rather than merely asset replacement, infrastructural development (even
Box 3.9. Relief and recovery
Recovery poses a particular problem for relief agencies. Relief is intended to
save lives, alleviate suffering and maintain human dignity during and in the
aftermath of human-made crises and natural disasters. Recovery is post-
disaster development, typically with a goal of restoring a population to at least
its pre-disaster situation. Development is very contested, with little agreement
on what it is, or how to achieve it. Developmental approaches clearly differ
from relief ones. The tsunami response cannot be a magic bullet for recovery
from decades of conflict and under-development. Humanitarian and recovery
approaches, principles and standards differ, and so they probably should. One
result of this, though, is that the responses by humanitarian actors have not
always facilitated recovery.
Humanitarian actors take, by definition, short- or medium-term approaches.
Recovery is a longer term endeavour. For example, it was mid-April before the
recovery Master Plan or Blueprint was approved for Aceh.E40 While some
agencies (such as the IFRC) have committed themselves to multi-year plans,
not all did so. Despite recommendations, the DEC board has, for instance,
decided against increasing the DEC funding period from three to five years.E41
The need for time is as linked to gradual development processes as it is to
political and administrative realities. The saga of the ‘buffer-zones’, and the
related patience-sapping imposition, errors and confusion, are a case in point.
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on a small, local scale), seizing the opportunity for peace-building, gender-sensitive
policy change (including land titling and inheritance) and avoiding reinforcing local
elites. Many agencies simply did not have a sufficient understanding of the
dynamics of local poverty, or the skills to address it. Relief standards, such as
SphereE42 and the Red Cross Code of Conduct, were never intended for complex
economic, social and political recovery processes. The general, or ‘common’
Sphere standardsE43 are perhaps more relevant to recovery than the sector-specific
standards. Ironically, while the latter were often met by the more professional
agencies the former were often not met.
Participation in and support to national and local recovery implies an
understanding of and subtle involvement in local and national debates and
processes. Inevitably this involves political decisions. Humanitarian actors,
working to humanitarian principles,75 generally eschew this type of low-level
political engagement. International agencies and donors have shown a poor
understanding of the complexity of recovery and development, including the inter-
relationships among economics, politics, social structures and culture. As the TEC
LRRD Report (2006) termed it, their ‘arrogance and ignorance’76 have resulted in
false starts, waste and inappropriate aid.
Context insensitive, quick-fix, one-size-fits-all emergency approaches, based on
principles of independence and impartiality, have complicated recovery as much
as they have facilitated it (TEC LRRD Report, 2006). Recovery requires integrated
planning with long timeframes. Linkages among international agencies have also
been weak. While the tsunami response saw increasing cooperation between
members of some brand networks,77 there are relatively few examples of broader
consortia, trust funds or joint implementation, despite the proliferation of
agencies.
3.4.4 Inequities and accountability
Overall, with such generous funding available, most affected people seem to have
received some assistance. Many received more than they ever expected and have
been able to sell the surplus (TEC Donor Response/Local Response/Indonesia
Report, 2006). However, this does not necessarily mean that assistance has been
impartial or equitable. Inequalities in aid were evident: globally between
emergencies (eg, Darfur and Congo versus the tsunami); regionally among
tsunami-affected countries (eg, the Maldives versus Indonesia and Sri Lanka);
nationally (one zone to another, including between conflict and non-conflict areas);
sectorally (between fishing and other sectors); geographically (between more
accessible areas and the less accessible); and socially (between the poorest and
better off, owners and renters, and ordinary people and leaders).
75 Such as the Red Cross Code of Conduct, which includes principles of independence and impartiality. 76 In India, another report found that: ‘Most NGOs and donors are aware of the tourism options [for recovery] but do not know how to go about it and have not linked this with their housing programs’ (Alexander, 2006, p18). 77 Such as Oxfam International or the Caritas network.
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For example, in India fishing communities tended to be more organised and
therefore more successful at accessing aid. On the other hand a focus on asset
replacement has meant that poor labourers or those who dealt in fish, who had no
assets to replace, were left out. TEC studies found that in general the needs of
vulnerable groups (women, the elderly and children) tended to be overlooked or
were not met at the pace or scale expected (TEC Funding Response/Local
Response/Overview, 2006). More generally the need to push out money led to the
duplication of goods and services for some, and the abandonment of others.
Disparate shelter solutions were offered by different NGOs in the same community.
In terms of the rich often receiving more assistance than the poor, this was
evident in government compensation programmes; in aid to property owners
versus renters; to and through community leaders versus ordinary people; and
where fishers (and non-fishers) received boats while employees, casual labourers,
other self-employed and ‘fishwives’ were provided with few or no assets or even
credit to compensate for their losses. Important inequities were also evident, and
persist, between war-affected IDPs in both Sri Lanka and Aceh and people affected
by the tsunami. In Sri Lanka at least, these differences have been seen as fuelling
the sense of grievance of war-affected populations (Center for Peace Building
International, 2006, p6).
Accountability and complaints mechanisms were initially established in only a few
locations. In the Maldives, OCHA supported IDP information and complaints
committees. In Sri Lanka, Medair set up a complaints handling mechanism for
their large shelter project. In Indonesia, Transparency International and a local
anti-corruption movement have been in place for some months, while in Sri
Lanka, Aid Watch and two citizens’ commissions had just begun at the time of the
evaluation. In Thailand the mass media have been used to highlight issues of
accountability and corruption (TEC Capacities Report, 2006).
Despite these mechanisms, accountability and complaints mechanisms overall
were not commensurate with the scale of the funding. They were largely ineffective
in addressing the worst cases of inappropriate aid, wastefulness and negligence
among internationally, nationally and locally managed recovery programmes.
However, there is evidence that accountability has improved with time and
agencies are now paying more attention to the views of affected populations.
3.4.5 Accountability and support to affected people
As shown throughout this section, local and national capacities to save lives,
alleviate suffering, maintain human dignity and move toward recovery have been
impressive. India and Thailand decided to manage without massive international
aid.78 Despite their requests for international assistance, other affected states
were neither ‘failed’ nor among the world’s most impoverished. This conclusion
stands, even considering the weaknesses, gaps, abuses, violation of rights and
78 Some aid was provided, however, through international organisations already active in those countries (eg through UN agencies, the RC Movement and large NGOs involved in development programmes).
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Box 3.10. Local capacities and humanitarian standards
Most established aid agencies subscribe to standards and codes that enshrine
respect for, involvement of, and investment in, local capacities.
We shall attempt to build disaster response on local capacities… All people
and communities – even in disaster – possess capacities as well as
vulnerabilities. Where possible, we will strengthen these capacities by
employing local staff, purchasing local materials and trading with local
companies. (Steering Committee for Humanitarian Response and ICRC,
1994 [Red Cross Code of Conduct, principle 6])
Disaster-affected populations must not be seen as helpless victims, and
this includes members of vulnerable groups. They possess, and acquire
skills and capacities and have structures to cope with and respond to a
disaster situation that need to be recognized and supported. (Sphere
Project, 2004, p9)
perceived corruption of national and local authorities and representatives
(especially in conflict zones), as recorded in interviews with disaster-affected
people (Anderson, 2006).
International agencies made positive contributions at a local level in a number of
ways. The raising of awareness about, and provision of expert guidance on, the
rights and entitlements of IDPs is an example (TEC Capacities Maldives Country
Report, 2006). Working in partnership is another. International actors were more
effective and efficient when they built on sustained prior partnerships with local
actors. In Aceh, Oxfam’s NGO support network is a noteworthy example (TEC
Capacities Report, 2006).
In the Maldives, the Care Society, in association with an international agency,
formed a partnership with 25 island community-based organisations (CBOs) to
implement a joint tsunami response programme. This added to the momentum
that led to the nation’s first Civil Society Conference and concluded with the
drafting of a Civil Society Charter for the first time in the country’s history. Again,
though few gender-sensitive approaches were observed in the housing and
livelihood recovery programmes, both international agencies and local NGOs with
a specific women’s mandate have developed interesting pilot initiatives. These can
serve as models for improved women’s involvement in the reconstruction phase
(TEC Capacities Indonesia Country Report, 2006).
Notwithstanding such practices, the elaborate LRRD policies developed by many
agencies were rarely applied. The ‘LRRD gap’ has been more between
international agencies and local people and institutions than among international
agencies of differing cultures, policies and mandates. With, or despite, outside
assistance, people have proceeded with their own recovery. Linkages between
relief and development are better found in people’s own recovery activities, in
sectors most relevant to them, than in over-arching aid-agency plans and
policies. Shelter and livelihoods recovery were the sectors of greatest relevance
to most people.
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Despite the principles quoted in Box 3.10, local and national capacities have been
undervalued, poorly supported and often ignored by international agencies (TEC
Capacities Report, 2006). While international aid has benefited victims of the
tsunami (which they recognise) it has also been demanding of local people. The
impact of the ‘aid tsunami’ on affected communities has, on balance, not been
overwhelmingly positive. For example:
• Considerable time was given (generally uncomplainingly) by affected people
for assessments that frequently did not result in their preferences being
turned into action.
• Authorities received endless demands for demographic data, maps, water
and sanitation plans, etc, again without any counterpart commitment to
benefit the respective peoples or administrations.
• Meetings, interviews and ‘events’ and special arrangements for visiting
delegations, VIPs, senior managers, politicians, special representatives, the
media, monitors, auditors and evaluators absorbed time, space, transport,
fuel and even food.79
• Although some international agencies (notably in the Maldives) were
successful in seconding international staff to support public sector
institutions (TEC Capacities Report, 2006), high salaries in international
agencies resulted in a brain-drain of national and local talent.
• Funds passed through international agencies to national and local actors
without any tangible value being added. A cascade of sub-contracts may have
existed for a single donation, incurring repeated administrative costs. While
the ‘ownership’ of the funds remains with the international agency,
knowledge and skills are provided by nationals and locals.
• The constant turnover of international staff created difficulties for local
officials and communities in terms of maintaining relationships and getting
earlier promises implemented.
Agency preferences, interests and brands dominated their interventions. Few if
any agencies attempted to discover (or map) national or local response capacities –
this despite, in many cases, pre-tsunami presence in the respective countries.
Agency reports rarely noted local and national achievements and local support to
international efforts. Local contributions and remittances remained largely
invisible to the international system.E44
English was assumed to be the standard language of coordination and reporting,
thus marginalising and disenfranchising national and local officials, media
representatives and ordinary people.80 Authorities and the public alike were
involved more as adjuncts to international decision making than as protagonists
79 These visits sometimes interrupted the aid effort, as was the case when Jeb Bush and Colin Powell’s visit to Banda Aceh closed the airport to incoming relief flights for 4 hours in early January (Aglionby, 2005b). 80 However, having a single language for coordination and reporting does bring benefits for the international organisations.
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81 Jakarta Times, 26 December 2006 (Thang D Nguyen’s column). 82 The Disasters Emergency Committee in the UK, for example, has never released the full version of its tsunami evaluation report. The IFRC has published only the Synthesis Studies for their Real Time Evaluations but not the constituent country reports.
(through, for instance, no more than cursory consultations). Local recruitment
was also often based more on English-language skills than on technical skills or
other specific knowledge.
The issues of accountability and quality are closely linked. A lack of accountability
creates a situation in which poor quality projects can persist. There have been
quite a few instances of civil society organisations being discredited on counts of
poor quality of intervention, lack of transparency in financial dealings and not
being accountable to the community. The tensions and competition observed
among civil society organisations has also affected the quality, delivery and
efficacy of aid. Given that there is widespread awareness and information about
standards in humanitarian aid (for instance, the Sphere standards), it is
unfortunate that issues related to quality, participation and accountability still
continue to plague disaster response interventions (Srinivasan et al, 2005).
Reliable and timely information on programme criteria and content, planned
activities, beneficiary rights and entitlements, budgets, expenditure, staffing, office
location and accessibility and the expected duration of an agency’s presence was
rarely shared, despite having great potential impact on people’s lives. National
authorities, such as the Indonesian BRR, recognise that they do not demand such
detailed reporting nor exercise tight monitoring of international agencies,81
although there is recent evidence that this may be changing (Reuters, 2006).
National and local leadership and quality control of international efforts were
rarely fostered by the agencies. Despite this, national and local ownership and
leadership is recovering. Varied government structures have been created to
manage the response and, to a lesser degree, prepare for future disasters.
National and local leadership is reasserting itself, evident in demands for
fulfilment of agency commitments and for better reporting and accountability.
But still transparency and accountability to both funding publics and affected
people play second fiddle to agency brand promotion. One year on, a range of
media, governmental, parliamentary and agency reports were released. Some
were critical. Most, if not all, agency reports were self-laudatory or insubstantial,
however. At best, only minor failures, or those that can be easily explained away,
were noted. Some reports were not even officially released82 to the publics by
whom they were funded and in whose name funds were solicited. A voice from
the region sums up a reader’s frustration:
It is now fashionable for NGOs and donor agencies to claim or project that they
are totally transparent, accountable and very much a ‘learning organization’,
carrying out numerous ‘learning’ reviews and moderating workshops…
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Tsunami Evaluation Coalition: Synthesis Report
designed to discover what worked and what did not and why? Yet [among]
One-Year-After reports, only a handful are… prepared to actually… publicly
admit… at least some… minimal… failings[.] What bombards us instead are
‘sanitized’ reports containing usually a lot of hype, (empty) rhetoric combined
with (often misleading and meaningless?) statistics of aid delivery. Such
deliberate policies of concealment create an overall (mistaken?) impression that
their programs are unmitigated successes, free of controversies. (Alexander,
2006, p7)
While there have been some positive developments on accountability, such as
Oxfam publicly acknowledging a minor problem with fraud in one programme
(Oxfam, 2006), overall accountability was weak. Despite the problems with aid
identified in this report, no sanctions were applied, and few agencies had Oxfam’s
courage to deal openly with fraud or errors.
3.5 Disaster risk reduction
The ‘build back better’ motto has been used frequently, but applied with varying
results. While standards and laws have been set regarding the location and quality
of reconstruction, disaster risk reduction (DRR) has been generally poor. Early
warning initiatives have been mostly focused on high technology approaches
(such as ocean gauges, transmitters and communications systems). Comparatively
little has been achieved regarding more painstaking community-based reduction
of disaster risk – such as supporting communities to identify local risks and
developing collective mechanisms to reduce vulnerabilities and warn against and
respond to disasters.
International preparedness is similarly limited. National and local partnerships for
disaster preparedness are only rarely set up prior to disasters. Guidance
materials, training and tools emphasise managerial, material and technical
preparedness instead of preparedness to support response, map local capacities
and develop strategic alliances during disasters.
DRR has been set as a global priority, in accordance with the Hyogo principles for
action (see Box 3.11 below). In the tsunami response, an opportunity to build back
less vulnerable societies has so far been missed. This is despite international
policies and commitments to sustainable risk reduction.
