Assignment 1

Principles of Scientific Management, Frederick Winslow Taylor (1911)

Introduction

PRESIDENT ROOSEVELT, in his address to the Governors at the White House,

prophetically remarked that “The conservation of our national resources is only preliminary to

the larger question of national efficiency.”

The whole country at once recognized the importance of conserving our material

resources and a large movement has been started which will be effective in accomplishing this

object. As yet, however, we have but vaguely appreciated the importance of “the larger question

of increasing our national efficiency.”

We can see our forests vanishing, our water-powers going to waste, our soil being carried

by floods into the sea; and the end of our coal and our iron is in sight. But our larger wastes of

human effort, which go on every day through such of our acts as are blundering, ill-directed; or

inefficient, and which Mr. Roosevelt refers to as a lack of “national efficiency,” are less visible,

less tangible, and are but vaguely appreciated.

We can see and feel the waste of material things. Awkward, inefficient, or ill-directed

movements of men, however, leave nothing visible or tangible behind them. Their appreciation

calls for an act of memory, an effort of the imagination. And for this reason, even though our

daily loss from this source is greater than from our waste of material things, the one has stirred

us deeply, while the other has moved us but little.

As yet there has been no public agitation for “greater national efficiency,” no meetings

have been called to consider how this is to be brought about. And still there are signs that the

need for greater efficiency is widely felt.

The search for better, for more competent men, from the presidents of our great

companies down to our household servants, was never more vigorous than it is now. And more

than ever before is the demand for competent men in excess of the supply.

What we are all looking for, however, is the readymade, competent man; the man whom

some one else has trained. It is only when we fully realize that our duty, as well as our

opportunity, lies in systematically cooperating to train and to make this competent man, instead

of in hunting for a man whom some one else has trained, that we shall be on the road to national

efficiency.

In the past the prevailing idea has been well expressed in the saying that “Captains of

industry are born, not made”; and the theory has been that if one could get the right man,

methods could be safely left to him. In the future it will be appreciated that our leaders must be

trained right as well as born right, and that no great man can (with the old system of personal

management) hope to compete with a number of ordinary men who have been properly

organized so as efficiently to cooperate.

In the past the man has been first; in the future the system must be first. This in no sense,

however, implies that great men are not needed. On the contrary, the first object of any good

system must be that of developing first-class men; and under systematic management the best

man rises to the top more certainly and more rapidly than ever before.

This paper has been written:

First. To point out, through a series of simple illustrations, the great loss which the whole

country is suffering through inefficiency in almost all of our daily acts.

Second. To try to convince the reader that the remedy for this inefficiency lies in

systematic management, rather than in searching for some unusual or extraordinary man.

Third. To prove that the best management is a true science, resting upon clearly defined

laws, rules, and principles, as a foundation. And further to show that the fundamental principles

of scientific management are applicable to all kinds of human activities, from our simplest

individual acts to the work of our great corporations, which call for the most elaborate

cooperation. And, briefly, through a series of illustrations, to convince the reader that whenever

these principles are correctly applied, results must follow which are truly astounding.

This paper was originally prepared for presentation to The American Society of

Mechanical Engineers. The illustrations chosen are such as, it is believed, will especially appeal

to engineers and to managers of industrial and manufacturing establishments, and also quite as

much to all of the men who are working in these establishments. It is hoped, however, that it will

be clear to other readers that the same principles can be applied with equal force to all social

activities: to the management of our homes; the management of our farms; the management of

the business of our tradesmen, large and small; of our churches, our philanthropic institutions,

our universities, and our governmental departments.

Chapter One

The principal object of management should be to secure the maximum prosperity for the

employer, coupled with the maximum prosperity for each employee.

The words “maximum prosperity” are used, in their broad sense, to mean not only large

dividends for the company or owner, but the development of every branch of the business to its

highest state of excellence, so that the prosperity may be permanent.

In the same way maximum prosperity for each employee means not only higher wages

than are usually received by men of his class, but, of more importance still, it also means the

development of each man to his state of maximum efficiency, so that he may be able to do,

generally speaking, the highest grade of work for which his natural abilities fit him, and it further

means giving him, when possible, this class of work to do.

It would seem to be so self-evident that maximum prosperity for the employer, coupled

with maximum prosperity for the employee, ought to be the two leading objects of management,

that even to state this fact should be unnecessary. And yet there is no question that, throughout

the industrial world, a large part of the organization of employers, as well as employeee, is for

war rather than for peace, and that perhaps the majority on either side do not believe that it is

possible so to arrange their mutual relations that their interests become identical.

The majority of these men believe that the fundamental interests of employeee and

employers are necessarily antagonistic. Scientific management, on the contrary, has for its very

foundation the firm conviction that the true interests of the two are one and the same; that

prosperity for the employer cannot exist through a long term of years unless it is accompanied by

prosperity for the employee, and vice versa; and that it is possible to give the workman what he

most wants--high wages--and the employer what he wants--a low labor cost--for his

manufactures.

It is hoped that some at least of those who do not sympathize with each of these objects

may be led to modify their views; that some employers, whose attitude toward their workmen

has been that of trying to get the largest amount of work out of them for the smallest possible

wages, may be led to see that a more liberal policy toward their men will pay them better; and

that some of those workmen who begrudge a fair and even a large profit to their employers, and

who feel that all of the fruits of their labor should belong to them, and that those for whom they

work and the capital invested in the business are entitled to little or nothing, may be led to

modify these views.

No one can be found who will deny that in the case of any single individual the greatest

prosperity can exist only when that individual has reached his highest state of efficiency; that is,

when he is turning out his largest daily output.

The truth of this fact is also perfectly clear in the case of two men working together. To

illustrate: if you and your workman have become so skilful that you and he together are making

two pairs of shoes in a day, while your competitor and his workman are making only one pair, it

is clear that after selling your two pairs of shoes you can pay your workman much higher wages

than your competitor who produces only one pair of shoes is able to pay his man, and that there

will still be enough money left over for you to have a larger profit than your competitor.

In the case of a more complicated manufacturing establishment, it should also be

perfectly clear that the greatest permanent prosperity for the workman, coupled with the greatest

prosperity for the employer, can be brought about only when the work of the establishment is

done with the smallest combined expenditure of human effort, plus nature’s resources, plus the

cost for the use of capital in the shape of machines, buildings, etc. Or, to state the same thing in a

different way: that the greatest prosperity can exist only as the result of the greatest possible

productivity of the men and machines of the establishment--that is, when each man and each

machine are turning out the largest possible output; because unless your men and your machines

are daily turning out more work than others around you, it is clear that competition will prevent

your paying higher wages to your workmen than are paid to those of your competitor. And what

is true as to the possibility of paying high wages in the case of two companies competing close

beside one another is also true as to whole districts of the country and even as to nations which

are in competition. In a word, that maximum prosperity can exist only as the result of maximum

productivity. Later in this paper illustrations will be given of several companies which are

earning large dividends and at the same time paying from 30 per cent. to 100 per cent. higher

wages to their men than are paid to similar ,men immediately around them, and with whose

employers they are in competition. These illustrations will cover different types of work, from

the most elementary to the most complicated.

If the above reasoning is correct, it follows that the most important object of both the

workmen and the management should be the training and development of each individual in the

establishment, so that he can do (at his fastest pace and with the maximum of efficiency) the

highest class of work for which his natural abilities fit him.

These principles appear to be so self-evident that many men may think it almost childish

to state them. Let us, however, turn to the facts, as they actually exist in this country and in

England. The English and American peoples are the greatest sportsmen in the world. Whenever

an American workman plays baseball, or an English workman plays cricket, it is safe to say that

he strains every nerve to secure victory for his side. He does his very best to make the largest

possible number of runs. The universal sentiment is so strong that any man who fails to give out

all there is in him in sport is branded as a “quitter,” and treated with contempt by those who are

around him.

When the same workman returns to work on the following day, instead of using every

effort to turn out the largest possible amount of work, in a majority of the cases this man

deliberately plans to do as little as he safely can--to turn out far less work than he is well able to

do--in many instances to do not more than one-third to one-half of a proper day’s work. And in

fact if he were to do his best to turn out his largest possible day’s work, he would be abused by

his fellow-workers for so doing, even more than if he had proved himself a “quitter” in sport.

Underworking, that is, deliberately working slowly so as to avoid doing a full day’s work,

“soldiering,” as it is called in this country, “hanging it out,” as it is called in England, “ca canae,”

as it is called in Scotland, is almost universal in industrial establishments, and prevails also to a

large extent in the building trades; and the writer asserts without fear of contradiction that this

constitutes the greatest evil with which the working-people of both England and America are

now afflicted.

It will be shown later in this paper that doing away with slow working and “soldiering” in

all its forms and so arranging the relations between employer and employee that each workman

will work to his very best advantage and at his best speed, accompanied by the intimate

cooperation with the management and the help (which the workman should receive) from the

management, would result on the average in nearly doubling the output of each man and each

machine. What other reforms, among those which are being discussed by these two nations,

could do as much toward promoting prosperity, toward the diminution of poverty, and the

alleviation of suffering? America and England have been recently agitated over such subjects as

the tariff, the control of the large corporations on the one hand, and of hereditary power on the

other hand, and over various more or less socialistic proposals for taxation, etc. On these subjects

both peoples have been profoundly stirred, and yet hardly a voice has been raised to call

attention to this vastly greater and more important subject of “soldiering,” which directly and

powerfully affects the wages, the prosperity, and the life of almost every working-man, and also

quite as much the prosperity of every industrial establishment in the nation.

The elimination of “soldiering” and of the several causes of slow working would so lower

the cost of production that both our home and foreign markets would be greatly enlarged, and we

could compete on more than even terms with our rivals. It would remove one of the fundamental

causes for dull times, for lack of employment, and for poverty, and therefore would have a more

permanent and far-reaching effect upon these misfortunes than any of the curative remedies that

are now being used to soften their consequences. It would insure higher wages and make shorter

working hours and better working and home conditions possible.

Why is it, then, in the face of the self-evident fact that maximum prosperity can exist only

as the result of the determined effort of each workman to turn out each day his largest possible

day’s work, that the great majority of our men are deliberately doing just the opposite, and that

even when the men have the best of intentions their work is in most cases far from efficient?

There are three causes for this condition, which may be briefly summarized as:

First. The fallacy, which has from time immemorial been almost universal among

workmen, that a material increase in the output of each man or each machine in the trade would

result in the end in throwing a large number of men out of work.

Second. The defective systems of management which are in common use, and which

make it necessary for each workman to soldier, or work slowly, in order that he may protect his

own best interests.

Third. The inefficient rule-of-thumb methods, which are still almost universal in all

trades, and in practicing which our workmen waste a large part of their effort.

This paper will attempt to show the enormous gains which would result from the

substitution by our workmen of scientific for rule-of-thumb methods.

To explain a little more fully these three causes:

First. The great majority of workmen still believe that if they were to work at their best

speed they would be doing a great injustice to the whole trade by throwing a lot of men out of

work, and yet the history of the development of each trade shows that each improvement,

whether it be the invention of a new machine or the introduction of a better method, which

results in increasing the productive capacity of the men in the trade and cheapening the costs,

instead of throwing men out of work make in the end work for more men.

The cheapening of any article in common use almost immediately results in a largely

increased demand for that article. Take the case of shoes, for instance. The introduction of

machinery for doing every element of the work which was formerly done by hand has resulted in

making shoes at a fraction of their former labor cost, and in selling them so cheap that now

almost every man, woman, and child in the working-classes buys one or two pairs of shoes per

year, and wears shoes all the time, whereas formerly each workman bought perhaps one pair of

shoes every five years, and went barefoot most of the time, wearing shoes only as a luxury or as

a matter of the sternest necessity. In spite of the enormously increased output of shoes per

workman, which has come with shoe machinery, the demand for shoes has so increased that

there are relatively more men working in the shoe industry now than ever before.

The workmen in almost every trade have before them an object lesson of this kind, and

yet, because they are ignorant of the history of their own trade even, they still firmly believe, as

their fathers did before them, that it is against their best interests for each man to turn out each

day as much work as possible.

Under this fallacious idea a large proportion of the workmen of both countries each day

deliberately work slowly so as to curtail the output. Almost every labor union has made, or is

contemplating making, rules which have for their object curtailing the output of their members,

and those men who have the greatest influence with the working-people, the labor leaders as well

as many people with philanthropic feelings who are helping them, are daily spreading this fallacy

and at the same time telling them that they are overworked.

A great deal has been and is being constantly said about “sweat-shop” work and

conditions. The writer has great sympathy with those who are overworked, but on the whole a

greater sympathy for those who are under paid. For every individual, however, who is

overworked, there are a hundred who intentionally underwork--greatly underwork--every day of

their lives, and who for this reason deliberately aid in establishing those conditions which in the

end inevitably result in low wages. And yet hardly a single voice is being raised in an endeavor

to correct this evil.

As engineers and managers, we are more intimately acquainted with these facts than any

other class in the community, and are therefore best fitted to lead in a movement to combat this

fallacious idea by educating not only the workmen but the whole of the country as to the true

facts. And yet we are practically doing nothing in this direction, and are leaving this field entirely

in the hands of the labor agitators (many of whom are misinformed and misguided), and of

sentimentalists who are ignorant as to actual working conditions.

Second. As to the second cause for soldiering--the relations which exist between

employers and employeee under almost all of the systems of management which are in common

use--it is impossible in a few words to make it clear to one not familiar with this problem why it

is that the ignorance of employeers as to the proper time in which work of various kinds should

be done makes it for the interest of the workman to “soldier.”

The writer therefore quotes herewith from a paper read before The American Society of

Mechanical Engineers, in June, 1903, entitled “Shop Management,” which it is hoped will

explain fully this cause for soldiering:

“This loafing or soldiering proceeds from two causes. First, from the natural

instinct and tendency of men to take it easy, which may be called natural

soldiering. Second, from more intricate second thought and reasoning caused by

their relations with other men, which may be called systematic soldiering.

“There is no question that the tendency of the average man (in all walks of life) is

toward working at a slow, easy gait, and that it is only after a good deal of thought

and observation on his part or as a result of example, conscience, or external

pressure that he takes a more rapid pace.

“There are, of course, men of unusual energy, vitality, and ambition who naturally

choose the fastest gait, who set up their own standards, and who work hard, even

though it may be against their best interests. But these few uncommon men only

serve by forming a contrast to emphasize the tendency of the average.

“This common tendency to ‘take it easy’ is greatly increased by bringing a

number of men together on similar work and at a uniform standard rate of pay by

the day.

“Under this plan the better men gradually but surely slow down their gait to that

of the poorest and least efficient. When a naturally energetic man works for a few

days beside a lazy one, the logic of the situation is unanswerable. ‘Why should I

work hard when that lazy fellow gets the same pay that I do and does only half as

much work?’

“A careful time study of men working under these conditions will disclose facts

which are ludicrous as well as pitiable.

“To illustrate: The writer has timed a naturally energetic workman who, while

going and coming from work, would walk at a speed of from three to four miles

per hour, and not infrequently trot home after a day’s work. On arriving at his

work he would immediately slow down to a speed of about one mile an hour.

When, for example, wheeling a loaded wheelbarrow, he would go at a good fast

pace even up hill in order to be as short a time as possible under load, and

immediately on the return walk slow down to a mile an hour, improving every

opportunity for delay short of actually sitting down. In order to be sure not to do

more than his lazy neighbor, he would actually tire himself in his effort to go

slow.

“These men were working under a foreman of good reputation and highly thought

of by his employer, who, when his attention was called to this state of things,

answered: ‘Well, I can keep them from sitting down, but the devil can’t make

them get a move on while they are at work.’

“The natural laziness of men is serious, but by far the greatest evil from which

both workmen and employers are suffering is the systematic soldiering which is

almost universal under all of the ordinary schemes of management and which

results from a careful study on the part of the workmen of what will promote their

best interests.

“The writer was much interested recently in hearing one small but experienced

golf caddy boy of twelve explaining to a green caddy, who had shown special

energy and interest, the necessity of going slow and lagging behind his man when

he came up to the ball, showing him that since they were paid by the hour, the

faster they went the less money they got, and finally telling him that if he went

too fast the other boys would give him a licking.

“This represents a type of systematic soldiering which is not, however, very

serious, since it is done with the knowledge of the employer, who can quite easily

break it up if he wishes.

“The greater part of the systematic soldiering, however, is done by the men with

the deliberate object of keeping their employers ignorant of how fast work can be

done.

“So universal is soldiering for this purpose that hardly a competent workman can

be found in a large establishment, whether he works by the day or on piece work,

contract work, or under any of the ordinary systems, who does not devote a

considerable part of his time to studying just how slow he can work and still

convince his employer that he is going at a good pace.

“The causes for this are, briefly, that practically all employers determine upon a

maximum sum which they feel it is right for each of their classes of employeees

to earn per day, whether their men work by the day or piece.

“Each workman soon finds out about what this figure is for his particular case,

and he also realizes that when his employer is convinced that a man is capable of

doing more work than he has done, he will find sooner or later some way of

compelling him to do it with little or no increase of pay.

“Employers derive their knowledge of how much of a given class of work can be

done in a day from either their own experience, which has frequently grown hazy

with age, from casual and unsystematic observation of their men, or at best from

records which are kept, showing the quickest time in which each job has been

done. In many cases the employer will feel almost certain that a given job can be

done faster than it has been, but he rarely cares to take the drastic measures

necessary to force men to do it in the quickest time, unless he has an actual record

proving conclusively how fast the work can be done.

“It evidently becomes for each man’s interest, then, to see that no job is done

faster than it has been in the past. The younger and less experienced men are

taught this by their elders, and all possible persuasion and social pressure is

brought to bear upon the greedy and selfish men to keep them from making new

records which result in temporarily increasing their wages, while all those who

come after them are made to work harder for the same old pay.

“Under the best day work of the ordinary type, when accurate records are kept of

the amount of work done by each man and of his efficiency, and when each man’s

wages are raised as he improves, and those who fail to rise to a certain standard

are discharged and a fresh supply of carefully selected men are given work in

their places, both the natural loafing and systematic soldiering can be largely

broken up. This can only be done, however, when the men are thoroughly

convinced that there is no intention of establishing piece work even in the remote

future, and it is next to impossible to make men believe this when the work is of

such a nature that they believe piece work to be practicable. In most cases their

fear of making a record which will be used as a basis for piece work will cause

them to soldier as much as they dare.

“It is, however, under piece work that the art of systematic soldiering is

thoroughly developed; after a workman has had the price per piece of the work he

is doing lowered two or three times as a result of his having worked harder and

increased his output, he is likely entirely to lose sight of his employer’s side of the

case and become imbued with a grim determination to have no more cuts if

soldiering can prevent it. Unfortunately for the character of the workman,

soldiering involves a deliberate attempt to mislead and deceive his employer, and

thus upright and straightforward workmen are compelled to become more or less

hypocritical. The employer is soon looked upon as an antagonist, if not an enemy,

and the mutual confidence whichshould exist between a leader and his men, the

enthusiasm, the feeling that they are all working for the same end and will share

in the results is entirely lacking.

“The feeling of antagonism under the ordinary piece-work system becomes in

many cases so marked on the part of the men that any proposition made by their

employers, however reasonable, is looked upon with suspicion, and soldiering

becomes such a fixed habit that men will frequently take pains to restrict the

product of machines which they are running when even a large increase in output

would involve no more work on their part.”

Third. As to the third cause for slow work, considerable space will later in this paper be

devoted to illustrating the great gain, both to employers and employeee, which results from the

substitution of scientific for rule-of-thumb methods in even the smallest details of the work of

every trade. The enormous saving of time and therefore increase in the output which it is

possible to effect through eliminating unnecessary motions and substituting fast for slow and

inefficient motions for the men working in any of our trades can be fully realized only after one

has personally seen the improvement which results from a thorough motion and time study,

made by a competent man.

To explain briefly: owing to the fact that the workmen in all of our trades have been

taught the details of their work by observation of those immediately around them, there are many

different ways in common use for doing the same thing, perhaps forty, fifty, or a hundred ways

of doing each act in each trade, and for the same reason there is a great variety in the implements

used for each class of work. Now, among the various methods and implements used in each

element of each trade there is always one method and one implement which is quicker and better

than any of the rest. And this one best method and best implement can only be discovered or

developed through a scientific study and analysis of all of the methods and implements in use,

together with accurate, minute, motion and time study. This involves the gradual substitution of

science for rule of thumb throughout the mechanic arts.

This paper will show that the underlying philosophy of all of the old systems of

management in common use makes it imperative that each workman shall be left with the final

responsibility for doing his job practically as he thinks best, with comparatively little help and

advice from the management. And it will also show that because of this isolation of workmen, it

is in most cases impossible for the men working under these systems to do their work in

accordance with the rules and laws of a science or art, even where one exists.

The writer asserts as a general principle (and he proposes to give illustrations tending to

prove the fact later in this paper) that in almost all of the mechanic arts the science which

underlies each act of each workman is so great and amounts to so much that the workman who is

best suited to actually doing the work is incapable of fully understanding this science, without

the guidance and help of those who are working with him or over him, either through lack of

education or through insufficient mental capacity. In order that the work may be done in

accordance with scientific laws, it is necessary that there shall be a far more equal division of the

responsibility between the management and the workmen than exists under any of the ordinary

types of management. Those in the management whose duty it is to develop this science should

also guide and help the workman in working under it, and should assume a much larger share of

the responsibility for results than under usual conditions is assumed by the management.

The body of this paper will make it clear that, to work according to scientific laws, the

management must take over and perform much of the work which is now left to the men; almost

every act of the workman should be preceded by one or more preparatory acts of the

management which enable him to do his work better and quicker than he otherwise could. And

each man should daily be taught by and receive the most friendly help from those who are over

him, instead of being, at the one extreme, driven or coerced by his bosses, and at the other left to

his own unaided devices.

This close, intimate, personal cooperation between the management and the men is of the

essence of modern scientific or task management.

It will be shown by a series of practical illustrations that, through this friendly

cooperation, namely, through sharing equally in every day’s burden, all of the great obstacles

(above described) to obtaining the maximum output for each man and each machine in the

establishment are swept away. The 30 per cent. to 100 per cent. increase in wages which the

workmen are able to earn beyond what they receive under the old type of management, coupled

with the daily intimate shoulder to shoulder contact with the management, entirely removes all

cause for soldiering. And in a few years, under this system, the workmen have before them the

object lesson of seeing that a great increase in the output per man results in giving employment

to more men, instead of throwing men out of work, thus completely eradicating the fallacy that a

larger output for each man will throw other men out of work.

It is the writer’s judgment, then, that while much can be done and should be done by

writing and talking toward educating not only workmen, but all classes in the community, as to

the importance of obtaining the maximum output of each man and each machine, it is only

through the adoption of modern scientific management that this great problem can be finally

solved. Probably most of the readers of this paper will say that all of this is mere theory. On the

contrary, the theory, or philosophy, of scientific management is just beginning to be understood,

whereas the management itself has been a gradual evolution, extending over a period of nearly

thirty years. And during this time the employeee of one company after another, including a large

range and diversity of industries, have gradually changed from the ordinary to the scientific type

of management. At least 50,000 workmen in the United States are now employeed under this

system; and they are receiving from 30 per cent. to 100 per cent. higher wages daily than are paid

to men of similar caliber with whom they are surrounded, while the companies employing them

are more prosperous than ever before. In these companies the output, per man and per machine,

has on an average been doubled. During all these years there has never been a single strike

among the men working under this system. In place of the suspicious watchfulness and the more

or less open warfare which characterizes the ordinary types of management, there is universally

friendly cooperation between the management and the men.

Several papers have been written, describing the expedients which have been adopted and

the details which have been developed under scientific management and the steps to be taken in

changing from the ordinary to the scientific type. But unfortunately most of the readers of these

papers have mistaken the mechanism for the true essence. Scientific management fundamentally

consists of certain broad general principles, a certain philosophy, which can be applied in many

ways, and a description of what any one man or men may believe to be the best mechanism for

applying these general principles should in no way be confused with the principles themselves.

It is not here claimed that any single panacea exists for all of the troubles of the working-

people or of employers. As long as some people are born lazy or inefficient, and others are born

greedy and brutal, as long as vice and crime are with us, just so long will a certain amount of

poverty, misery, and unhappiness be with us also. No system of management, no single

expedient within the control of any man or any set of men can insure continuous prosperity to

either workmen or employers. Prosperity depends upon so many factors entirely beyond the

control of any one set of men, any state, or even any one country, that certain periods will

inevitably come when both sides must suffer, more or less. It is claimed, however, that under

scientific management the intermediate periods will be far more prosperous, far happier, and

more free from discord and dissension. And also, that the periods will be fewer, shorter and the

suffering less. And this will be particularly true in any one town, any one section of the country,

or any one state which first substitutes the principles of scientific management for the rule of

thumb.

That these principles are certain to come into general use practically throughout the

civilized world, sooner or later, the writer is profoundly convinced, and the sooner they come the

better for all the people.

Chapter Two

The writer has found that there are three questions uppermost in the minds of men when

they become interested in scientific management.

First. Wherein do the principles of scientific management differ essentially from those of

ordinary management?

Second. Why are better results attained under scientific management than under the other

types?

Third. Is not the most important problem that of getting the right man at the head of the

company? And if you have the right man cannot the choice of the type of management be safely

left to him?

One of the principal objects of the following pages will be to give a satisfactory answer to

these questions.

The Finest Type of Ordinary Management

Before starting to illustrate the principles of scientific management, or “task

management” as it is briefly called, it seems desirable to outline what the writer believes will be

recognized as the best type of management which is in common use. This is done so that the

great difference between the best of the ordinary management and scientific management may be

fully appreciated.

In an industrial establishment which employs say from 500 to 1000 workmen, there will

be found in many cases at least twenty to thirty different trades. The workmen in each of these

trades have had their knowledge handed down to them by word of mouth, through the many

years in which their trade has been developed from the primitive condition, in which our far-

distant ancestors each one practiced the rudiments of many different trades, to the present state of

great and growing subdivision of labor, in which each man specializes upon some comparatively

small class of work.

The ingenuity of each generation has developed quicker and better methods for doing

every element of the work in every trade. Thus the methods which are now in use may in a broad

sense be said to be an evolution representing the survival of the fittest and best of the ideas which

have been developed since the starting of each trade. However, while this is true in a broad

sense, only those who are intimately acquainted with each of these trades are fully aware of the

fact that in hardly any element of any trade is there uniformity in the methods which are used.

Instead of having only one way which is generally accepted as a standard, there are in daily use,

say, fifty or a hundred different ways of doing each element of the work. And a little thought will

make it clear that this must inevitably be the case, since our methods have been handed down

from man to man by word of mouth, or have, in most cases, been almost unconsciously learned

through personal observation. Practically in no instances have they been codified or

systematically analyzed or described. The ingenuity and experience of each generation — of

each decade, even, have without doubt handed over better methods to the next. This mass of

rule-of-thumb or traditional knowledge may be said to be the principal asset or possession of

every tradesman. Now, in the best of the ordinary types of management, the managers recognize

frankly the fact that the 500 or 1000 workmen, included in the twenty to thirty trades, who are

under them, possess this mass of traditional knowledge, a large part of which is not in the

possession of the management. The management, of course, includes foremen and

superintendents, who themselves have been in most cases first-class workers at their trades. And

yet these foremen and superintendents know, better than any one else, that their own knowledge

and personal skill falls far short of the combined knowledge and dexterity of all the workmen

under them. The most experienced managers therefore frankly place before their workmen the

problem of doing the work in the best and most economical way. They recognize the task before

them as that of inducing each workman to use his best endeavors, his hardest work, all his

traditional knowledge, his skill, his ingenuity, and his good-will — in a word, his “initiative,” so

as to yield the largest possible return to his employer. The problem before the management, then,

may be briefly said to be that of obtaining the best of every workman. And the writer uses the

word “initiative” in its broadest sense, to cover all of the good qualities sought for from the men.

On the other hand, no intelligent manager would hope to obtain in any full measure the

initiative of his workmen unless he felt that he was giving them something more than they

usually receive from their employers. Only those among the readers of this paper who have been

managers or who have worked themselves at a trade realize how far the average workman falls

short of giving his employer his full initiative. It is well within the mark to state that in nineteen

out of twenty industrial establishments the workmen believe it to be directly against their

interests to give their employers their best initiative, and that instead of working hard to do the

largest possible amount of work and the best quality of work for their employers, they

deliberately work as slowly as they dare while they at the same time try to make those over them

believe that they are working fast.

The writer repeats, therefore, that in order to have any hope of obtaining the initiative of

his workmen the manager must give some special incentive to his men beyond that which is

given to the average of the trade. This incentive can be given in several different ways, as, for

example, the hope of rapid promotion or advancement; higher wages, either in the form of

generous piecework prices or of a premium or bonus of some kind for good and rapid work;

shorter hours of labor; better surroundings and working conditions than are ordinarily given, etc.,

and, above all, this special incentive should be accompanied by that personal consideration for,

and friendly contact with, his workmen which comes only from a genuine and kindly interest in

the welfare of those under him. It is only by giving a special inducement or “incentive” of this

kind that the employer can hope even approximately to get the “initiative” of his workmen.

Under the ordinary type of management the necessity for offering the workman a special

inducement has come to be so generally recognized that a large proportion of those most

interested in the subject look upon the adoption of some one of the modern schemes for paying

men (such as piece work, the premium plan, or the bonus plan, for instance) as practically the

whole system of management. Under scientific management, however, the particular pay system

which is adopted is merely one of the subordinate elements.

Broadly speaking, then, the best type of management in ordinary use may be defined as

management in which the workmen give their best initiative and in return receive some special

incentive from their employers. This type of management will be referred to as the management

of “initiative and incentive” in contradistinction to scientific management, or task management,

with which it is to be compared.

The writer hopes that the management of “initiative and incentive” will be recognized as

representing the best type in ordinary use, and in fact he believes that it will be hard to persuade

the average manager that anything better exists in the whole field than this type. The task which

the writer has before him, then, is the difficult one of trying to prove in a thoroughly convincing

way that there is another type of management which is not only better but overwhelmingly better

than the management of “initiative and incentive.”

The universal prejudice in favor of the management of “initiative and incentive” is so

strong that no mere theoretical advantages which can be pointed out will be likely to convince

the average manager that any other system is better. It will be upon a series of practical

illustrations of the actual working of the two systems that the writer will depend in his efforts to

prove that scientific management is so greatly superior to other types. Certain elementary

principles, a certain philosophy, will however be recognized as the essence of that which is being

illustrated in all of the practical examples which will be given. And the broad principles in which

the scientific system differs from the ordinary or “rule-of-thumb” system are so simple in their

nature that it seems desirable to describe them before starting with the illustrations.

Under the old type of management success depends almost entirely upon getting the

“initiative” of the workmen, and it is indeed a rare case in which this initiative is really attained.

Under scientific management the “initiative” of the workmen (that is, their hard work, their

good-will, and their ingenuity) is obtained with absolute uniformity and to a greater extent than

is possible under the old system; and in addition to this improvement on the part of the men, the

managers assume new burdens, new duties, and responsibilities never dreamed of in the past.

The managers assume, for instance, the burden of gathering together all of the traditional

knowledge which in the past has been possessed by the workmen and then of classifying,

tabulating, and reducing this knowledge to rules, laws, and formulae which are immensely

helpful to the workmen in doing their daily work. In addition to developing a science in this way,

the management take on three other types of duties which involve new and heavy burdens for

themselves.

These new duties are grouped under four heads:

First. They develop a science for each element of a man’s work, which replaces the old

rule-of” thumb method.

Second. They scientifically select and then train, teach, and develop the workman,

whereas in the past he chose his own work and trained himself as best he could.

Third. They heartily cooperate with the men so as to insure all of the work being done in

accordance with the principles of the science which has been developed.

Fourth. There is an almost equal division of the work and the responsibility between the

management and the workmen. The management take over all work for which they are better

fitted than the workmen, while in the past almost all of the work and the greater part of the

responsibility were thrown upon the men.

It is this combination of the initiative of the workmen, coupled with the new types of

work done by the management, that makes scientific management so much more efficient than

the old plan.

Three of these elements exist in many cases, under the management of “initiative and

incentive,” in a small and rudimentary way, but they are, under this management, of minor

importance, whereas under scientific management they form the very essence of the whole

system.

The fourth of these elements, “an almost equal division of the responsibility between the

management and the workmen,” requires further explanation. The philosophy of the

management of “initiative and incentive” makes it necessary for each workman to bear almost

the entire responsibility for the general plan as well as for each detail of his work, and in many

cases for his implements as well. In addition to this he must do all of the actual physical labor.

The development of a science, on the other hand, involves the establishment of many rules, laws,

and formulae which replace the judgment of the individual workman and which can be

effectively used only after having been systematically recorded, indexed, etc. The practical use

of scientific data also calls for a room in which to keep the books, records, [2] etc., and a desk for

the planner to work at. Thus all of the planning which under the old system was done by the

workman, as a result of his personal experience, must of necessity under the new system be done

by the management in accordance with the laws of the science; because even if the workman was

well suited to the development and use of scientific data, it would be physically impossible for

him to work at his machine and at a desk at the same time. It is also clear that in most cases one

type of man is needed to plan ahead and an entirely different type to execute the work.

The man in the planning room, whose specialty under scientific management is planning

ahead, invariably finds that the work can be done better and more economically by a subdivision

of the labor; each act of each mechanic, for example, should be preceded by various preparatory

acts done by other men. And all of this involves, as we have said, “an almost equal division of

the responsibility and the work between the management and the workman.”

To summarize: Under the management of “initiative and incentive” practically the whole

problem is “up to the workman,” while under scientific management fully one-half of the

problem is “up to the management.”

Perhaps the most prominent single element in modern scientific management is the task

idea. The work of every workman is fully planned out by the management at least one day in

advance, and each man receives in most cases complete written instructions, describing in detail

the task which he is to accomplish, as well as the means to be used in doing the work. And the

work planned in advance in this way constitutes a task which is to be solved, as explained above,

not by the workman alone, but in almost all cases by the joint effort of the workman and the

management. This task specifies not only what is to be done but how it is to be done and the

exact time allowed for doing it. And whenever the workman succeeds in doing his task right, and

within the time limit specified, he receives an addition of from 30 per cent. to 100 per cent. to his

ordinary wages. These tasks are carefully planned, so that both good and careful work are called

for in their performance, but it should be distinctly understood that in no case is the workman

called upon to work at a pace which would be injurious to his health. The task is always so

regulated that the man who is well suited to his job will thrive while working at this rate during a

long term of years and grow happier and more prosperous, instead of being overworked.

Scientific management consists very largely in preparing for and carrying out these tasks.

The writer is fully aware that to perhaps most of the readers of this paper the four

elements which differentiate the new management from the old will at first appear to be merely

high-sounding phrases; and he would again repeat that he has no idea of convincing the reader of

their value merely through announcing their existence. His hope of carrying conviction rests

upon demonstrating the tremendous force and effect of these four elements through a series of

practical illustrations. It will be shown, first, that they can be applied absolutely to all classes of

work, from the most elementary to the most intricate; and second, that when they are applied, the

results must of necessity be overwhelmingly greater than those which it is possible to attain

under the management of initiative and incentive.

(Balance of chapter with examples not included in this copy.)