Final Reflection
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SUS350Feb4thCommonPoolResourceManagementW20.pptxCommon Pool Resource Management
Kim Townsend
SUS 350 Sustainable Communities
Key Features of Common Pool Resources
Goods that are difficult or costly to exclude users from
Subtractability-use of a resource by one person means it is not available to another
Core resource-a measure of the stock which must be retained to provide non-declining future stock
Fringe units-extractable units where availability is a function of the relative productivity of the core resource and rate of harvest
Marine Fisheries CPR Example
Used by multiple individuals through time and at the same time.
Subtractable—over-fishing reduces availability of stock for other users.
Core—total number of fish in a specific population required to sustain the population through time.
Fringe—number of fish that can be harvested without reducing the ability of the population to sustain itself through time.
Water
Subtractability-use of a resource by one person means it is not available to another
Core?
Fringe?
We must consider both quantity and quality of water in a system
Why is water quantity/quality important?
Narrative created by Garrett Harden, a renowned ecologist, in a 1968 Nature paper
Is this model too simplistic? Which assumptions can be questioned?
Elinor Ostrom: Sustainable Development and the Tragedy of the Commons
Elinor "Lin" Ostrom (born Elinor Claire Awan;[2] August 7, 1933 – June 12, 2012) was an American political economist [3] [4] [5] whose work was associated with the New Institutional Economics and the resurgence of political economy.[6] In 2009, she shared the Nobel Memorial Prize in Economic Sciences with Oliver E. Williamson for "her analysis of economic governance, especially the commons".[7] To date, she remains the only woman to win The Prize in Economics.
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Elinor Ostrom’s Cooperative Management Conditions
Dr. Ostrom studied thousands of locally self-governed CPR systems all around the world
to determine what the sustainable systems had in common, and what the failures had in common.
Ostrom developed a set of design principles associated with sustainable local community governance of small-scale CPRs.
Ostrom’s Cooperative Management Conditions (1/2)
Clearly defined boundaries
Who gets access, who doesn’t
Resource boundaries
Congruence
Costs ≈ Benefits of cooperating
Appropriation rules are fair and sensible, locale-specific
Argues against “one rule system fits all” approach.
Collective-choice arrangements
Most individuals affected have a voice in changing the rules
Monitoring
Monitors are the cooperative members
Ostrom’s Cooperative Management Conditions (2/2)
Graduated sanctions
Punishment scaled to the offence
Sanctions administered by the cooperative
Conflict-resolution mechanisms
Access to low-cost, rapid, local way to resolve conflicts
Recognition of Rights to Organize
Community’s right to organize not challenged by government
Nested Enterprises
All of the above are organized in multiple layers of nested enterprise
Layering of governance structures matches the interdependence and complexity of CPR systems.
The Deschutes River Conservancy
Founded by Environmental Defense Fund, Confederated Tribes of the Warm Springs, local irrigation districts
Mission: restore stream flow and improve water quality in the Deschutes Basin
The vision of the Deschutes Water Alliance is simple: uses of water resources in the Deschutes Basin are balanced to serve and sustain agriculture, urban and ecosystem needs.
The mission of the DWA, intended to achieve this vision, contains three elements:
Move stream flows toward a more natural hydrograph while securing and maintaining improved instream flows and water quality to support fish and wildlife
Secure and maintain a reliable and affordable supply of water to sustain agriculture
Secure a safe, affordable, and high quality water supply for urban communities
Deschutes Water Alliance Water Bank
Matches buyers who need water and must mitigate for their water use with sellers
Buyers can purchase permanent in-stream credits or use a temporary lease
DRC’s Four Program Areas
Water conservation
Water rights transfers
Water rights leasing
Water management planning and monitoring
Water Conservation
Nearly 90% of the flow of the Deschutes in Bend is diverted through irrigation canals
Piping/lining canals
On-farm efficiency
Water Rights Transfers and Leases
First in time, first in right
Fair market purchase of existing water rights
Transfer: Permanently dedicated for in-stream or mitigation purposes
Lease options
5 year opt out lease - water rights are leased for 5 years. The lessor can opt out of the lease each year 30 days prior to start of the irrigation season.
1 year standard lease - water rights are leased for one irrigation season in-stream.
Split season lease - water rights are used for part of a season and leased for part of a season in the same year.
Water Rights Transfers and Leases
Overall Results
To date, the DRC’s programs have restored nearly 250 cubic feet per second (cfs) to the Deschutes River and its tributaries
Groundwater Mitigation Bank
Premise: groundwater and surface water are linked in Central Oregon
Groundwater withdrawals may affect surface water withdrawals
State enacted groundwater withdrawal limits and required mitigation
Users must mitigate for groundwater withdrawals by purchasing or leasing instream or mitigation credits
Water Management Planning and Monitoring
The Upper Deschutes Basin Study- $1.5 million effort to create a plan to meet water needs for the next 50 years
Climate change analysis included to ensure planning for future conditions
Strategic Plan created for 2015 to 2025 http://www.deschutesriver.org/Strategic%20Plan%20-%202015%20Mar%2031%20-%20FINAL.pdf
Questions?
Elinor Ostrom’s Cooperative Management Conditions
Dr. Ostrom studied thousands of locally self-governed CPR systems all around the world
to determine what the sustainable systems had in common, and what the failures had in common.
Ostrom developed a set of design principles associated with sustainable local community governance of small-scale CPRs.
Ostrom’s Cooperative Management Conditions (1/2)
Clearly defined boundaries
Who gets access, who doesn’t
Resource boundaries
Congruence
Costs ≈ Benefits of cooperating
Appropriation rules are fair and sensible, locale-specific
Argues against “one rule system fits all” approach.
Collective-choice arrangements
Most individuals affected have a voice in changing the rules
Monitoring
Monitors are the cooperative members
Ostrom’s Cooperative Management Conditions (2/2)
Graduated sanctions
Punishment scaled to the offence
Sanctions administered by the cooperative
Conflict-resolution mechanisms
Access to low-cost, rapid, local way to resolve conflicts
Recognition of Rights to Organize
Community’s right to organize not challenged by government
Nested Enterprises
All of the above are organized in multiple layers of nested enterprise
Layering of governance structures matches the interdependence and complexity of CPR systems.
