American History (Essay)

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Supplemental Readings/Gordon Wood, Radicalism of the American Revolution.doc

The Radicalism of the American Revolution

Gordon S. Wood

We Americans like to think of our revolution as not being radical; in​deed, most of the time we consider it downright conservative. It cer​tainly does not appear to resemble the revolutions of other nations in which people were killed, property was destroyed, and everything was turned upside down. The American revolutionary leaders do not fit our conventional image of revolutionaries-angry, passionate, reckless, maybe even bloodthirsty for the sake of a cause. We can think of Robes​pierre, Lenin, and Mao Zedong as revolutionaries, but not George Washington, Thomas Jefferson, and John Adams. They seem too stuffy, too solemn, too cautious, too much the gentlemen. We cannot quite ​conceive of revolutionaries in powdered hair and knee breeches. The American revolutionaries seem to belong in drawing rooms or legislative halls, not in cellars or in the streets. They made speeches, not bombs; they wrote learned pamphlets, not manifestos. They were not abstract theorists and they were not social levelers. They did not kill one an​other; they did not devour themselves. There was no reign of terror in the American Revolution and no resultant dictator-no Cromwell, no Bonaparte. The American Revolution does not seem to have the same kinds of causes-the social wrongs, the class conflict, the impoverish​ment, the grossly inequitable distributions of wealth-that presumably lie behind other revolutions. There were no peasant uprisings, no jac​queries, no burning of chateaux, and no storming of prisons.

Of course, there have been many historians-Progressive or neo-​Progressive historians, as they have been called-who have sought, as Hannah Arendt put it, "to interpret the American Revolution in the light of the French Revolution," and to look for the same kinds of internal violence, class conflict, and social deprivation that presumably lay behind the French Revolution and other modern revolutions.' Since the beginning of the twentieth century these Progressive historians have formulated various social interpretations of the American Revolution essentially designed to show that the Revolution, in Carl Becker's fa​mous words, was not only about "home rule" but also about "who was to rule at home.'" They have tried to describe the Revolution essentially as a social struggle by deprived and underprivileged groups against en​trenched elites.. . .

There should no longer be any doubt about it: the white American colonists were not an oppressed people; they had no crushing imperial chains to throw off.4 In fact, the colonists knew they were freer, more equal, more prosperous, and less burdened with cum​bersome feudal and monarchical restraints than any other part of man​kind in the eighteenth century. Such a situation, however, does not mean that colonial society was not susceptible to revolution.

Precisely because the impulses to revolution in eighteenth-century America bear little or no resemblance to the impulses that presumably account for modern social protests and revolutions, we have tended to think of the American Revolution as having no social character, as hav​ing virtually nothing to do with the society, as having no social causes and no social consequences. It has therefore often been considered to be essentially an intellectual event, a constitutional defense of American rights against British encroachments ("no taxation without representa​tion"), undertaken not to change the existing structure of society but to preserve it. For some historians the Revolution seems to be little more than a colonial rebellion or a war for independence. Even when we have recognized the radicalism of the Revolution, we admit only a political, not a social radicalism. The revolutionary leaders, it is said, were pe​culiar "eighteenth-century radicals concerned, like the eighteenth ​century British radicals, not with the need to recast the social order nor with the problems of the economic inequality and the injustices of strat​ified societies but with the need to purify a corrupt constitution- and fight off the apparent growth of prerogative power.” Consequently, we have generally described the Revolution as an unusually conservative affair, concerned almost exclusively with politics and constitutional rights, and, in comparison with the social radicalism of the other great revolutions of history, hardly a revolution at all.

If we measure the radicalism of revolutions by the degree of social misery or economic deprivation suffered, or by the number of people killed or manor houses burned, then this conventional emphasis on the conservatism of the American Revolution becomes true enough. But if we measure the radicalism by the amount of social change that actually took place--by transformations in the relationships that bound people to each other—then the American Revolution was not conser-vative at all; on the contrary: it was as radical and as revolutionary as any in history. Of course, the American Revolution was very different from other revolutions. But it was no less radical and no less social for being different. In fact, it was one of the greatest revolutions the world has known, a momentous upheaval that not only fundamentally altered the character of American society but decisively affected the course of sub​sequent history.

It was as radical and social as any revolution in history, but it was radical and social in a very special eighteenth-century sense. No doubt many of the concerns and much of the language of that pre-modern, pre-​Marxian eighteenth century were almost entirely political. That was because most people in that very different distant world could not as yet conceive of society apart from government.

The social distinctions and economic deprivations that we today think of as the consequence of class divisions, business exploitation, or various isms-capitalism, racism, etc.-were in the eighteenth century usually thought to be caused by the abuses of government. Social honors, social distinctions, perquisites of office, business contracts, privileges and monopolies, even excessive property and wealth of various sorts-all social evils and social depri​vations-in fact seemed to flow from connections to government, in the end from connections to monarchical authority. So that when Anglo-American radicals talked in what seems to be only political terms ​purifying a corrupt constitution, eliminating courtiers, fighting off crown power, and, most important, becoming republicans-they nevertheless had a decidedly social message.

In our eyes the American revolution​aries appear to be absorbed in changing only their governments, not their society. But in destroying monarchy and establishing republics they were changing their society as well as their governments, and they knew it. Only they did not know-they could scarcely have imagined ​how much of their society they would change. J. Franklin Jameson, who more than two generations ago described the Revolution as a social movement only to be roundly criticized by a succeeding generation' of historians, was at least right about one thing: "the stream of revolution, once started, could not be confined within narrow banks, but spread abroad upon the land."

By the time the Revolution had run its course in the early nineteenth century, American society had been radically and thoroughly trans​formed. One class did not overthrow another; the poor did not supplant the rich. But social relationships-the way people were connected one to another-were changed, and decisively so. By the early years of the nineteenth century the Revolution had created a society fundamentally different from the colonial society of the eighteenth century. It was in fact a new society unlike any that had ever existed anywhere in the world.

That revolution did more than legally create the United States; it transformed American society. Because the story of America has turned out the way it has, because the United States in the twentieth century has become the great power that it is, it is difficult, if not impossible, to appreciate and recover fully the insignificant and puny origins of the country. In 1760 America was only a collection of disparate colonies huddled along a narrow strip of the Atlantic coast-economically un​derdeveloped outposts existing on the very edges of the civilized world. The less than two million monarchical subjects who lived in these col​onies, till took for granted that society was and ought to be a hierarchy of ranks and degrees of dependency and that most people were bound together by personal ties of one sort or another. Yet scarcely fifty years later these insignificant borderland provinces had become a giant, al​most continent-wide republic of nearly ten million egalitarian-minded bustling citizens who not only had thrust themselves into the vanguard of history but had fundamentally altered their society and their social relationships. Far from remaining monarchical, hierarchy-ridden sub​jects on the margin of civilization, Americans had become, almost over night, the most liberal, the most democratic, the most commercially minded, and the most modern people in the world.

And this astonishing transformation took place without industrializa​tion, without urbanization, without railroads, without the aid of any of the great forces we usually invoke to explain "modern-ization." It was the Revolution that was crucial to this transformation. It was the Revolution, more than any other single event, that made America into the most liberal, democratic, and modern nation in the world.

Of course, some nations of Western Europe likewise experienced great social transformations and "democratic revolutions" in these same years. The American Revolution was not unique; it was only different. Because of this shared Western-wide experience in democratization, it has been argued by more than one historian that the broader social transformation that carried Americans from one century and one kind of society to another was "inevitable" and "would have been completed with or without the American Revolution." Therefore, this broader so​cial revolution should not be confused with the American Revolution. America, it is said, would have emerged into the modern world as a liberal, democratic, and capitalistic society even without the Revolu​tion. One could, of course, say the same thing about the relationship between the French Revolution and the emergence of France in the nineteenth century as a liberal, democratic, and capitalistic society; and indeed, much of the current revisionist historical writing on the French Revolution is based on just such a distinction. But in America, no more than in France, that was not the way it happened: the American Rev​olution and the social transformation of America between 1760 and the early years of the nineteenth century were inextricably bound together. Perhaps the social transformation would have happened "in any case," but we will never know. It was in fact linked to the Revolution; they occurred together. The American Revolution was integral to the changes occurring in American society, politics, and culture at the end of the eighteenth century.

These changes were radical, and they were extensive. To focus, as we are today apt to do, on what the Revolution did not accomplish ​highlighting and lamenting its failure to abolish slavery and change fun​damentally the lot of women-is to miss the great significance of what it did accomplish; indeed, the Revolution made possible the anti-slavery and women's rights movements of the nineteenth century and in fact all our current egalitarian thinking. The Revolution not only radically changed the personal and social relationships of people, including the position of women, but also destroyed aristocracy as it had been understood in the Western world for at least two millennia. The Revolution brought respectability and even dominance to ordinary people long held in contempt and gave dignity to their menial labor in a manner un​precedented in history and to a degree not equaled elsewhere in the world. The Revolution did not just eliminate monarchy and create re​publics; it actually reconstituted what Americans meant by public or state power and brought about an entirely new kind of popular politics and a new kind of democratic officeholder. The Revolution not only changed the culture of Americans-making over their art, architecture, and iconography-but even altered their understanding of history, knowledge, and truth. Most important, it made the interests and prosperity of ordinary people-their pursuits of happiness-the goal of so​ciety and government. The Revolution did not merely create a political and legal environment conducive to economic expansion it also released powerful popular entrepreneurial and commercial energies that few re​alized existed and transformed the economic landscape of the country. In short, the Revolution was the most radical and most far-reaching event in American history.

__MACOSX/Supplemental Readings/._Gordon Wood, Radicalism of the American Revolution.doc

Supplemental Readings/Paul Rahe, How Radical was the American Revolution.doc

How Radical was the American Revolution?

Dr. Paul Rahe

Paul Rahe, Ph.D., is the Jay P. Walker Professor of American History at the University of Tulsa. Dr. Rahe is internationally recognized and honored for his work in the history of the American government. He is the author of more than 50 scholarly articles, book reviews, and other publications, including the four-volume Republics Ancient and Modern. Dr. Rahe came to the College as part of the E.L. Wiegand Distinguished Visiting Lecturer Program, which was established to bring distinguished speakers to Thomas Aquinas College and St. John’s College. Following is our abridged version of his Presidents’ Day lecture he gave at the College on February 25, 1999.

Through much of the 17th and 18th centuries, the British colonial system was managed by men such as John Locke, who saw the potential for economic and technological development. In part, as a consequence of their efforts to encourage immigration, the American population grew at far too fast a rate to be compatible with the maintenance of traditional, comparatively uniform communities. In practice, subsistence farming was quite common and perhaps even predominant in the Northeast, but the same cannot be said for the South. Well before the Revolution, the colonies had become, in spirit and in fact, mostly what they were meant to be from the start: Dynamic, commercial societies, intimately tied by trade to the mother country.

Like their cousins on the other side of the Atlantic, especially the dissenters and Low-Church Anglicans, educated Americans tended to be familiar with the writings of John Locke. And those works confirmed their inclination towards an independence of mind in matters religious, moral, and political. No political work was to be found in more colonial libraries than Locke’s two treatises on government. In the sermons, pamphlets, and newspapers published in America during the decisive period stretching from 1760 to 1776, none was as often cited, quoted, paraphrased, plagiarized, and applied to the crisis that arose. Locke’s sly exploitation of religious rhetoric enabled unsuspecting clergymen throughout the colonies to present his novel political doctrine to their parishioners as the teachings of St. Paul.

If self-respect and a sense of their own dignity as Englishmen gave the colonists a powerful motive for resenting Parliament’s attempts to tax them without expressly securing their consent, the Lockean first principle, so visible in the political books they read, provided them with a theoretical framework justifying, by an appeal to nature and nature’s God, their conviction that the self-government and effective autonomy accorded them in the past were theirs – not by custom, charter, or royal grace – but simply and solely by right. In reading these works, the Americans also came across the schemes of political architecture pioneered during England’s Great Rebellion, by figures such as James Harrington, adapted under the restoration by Locke and his fellow Whigs, and further elaborated after the Glorious Revolution of 1687 and 1688 as a critique of the machinations of England’s court party by the radical Whigs and their successors.

John Adams discerned what was at stake from the outset. In 1765, right at the beginning, he demonstrated the American tendency to augur misgovernment at a distance and to sniff the approach of tyranny in every tainted breeze, when he sought to set the struggle with Parliament in the context of world history. Already at this point the Americans were thinking of themselves as transforming the world. Behind Parliament’s imposition of the Stamp Act, he discerned a direct, informal design to enslave all America.

He readily conceded that the Reformation, the Great Rebellion and the Glorious Revolution had left the alliance between designing clerics and the ambitious kings in Great Britain greatly mutilated. But he nonetheless contended that in this island kingdom, this wicked confederacy was not yet destroyed. To the forebears of his fellows colonists, Adams attributed an utter contempt of all that dark ribaldry of hereditary, indefeasible right, the Lord’s anointed and the divine, miraculous original of government, with which the priesthood had enveloped the feudal monarch in clouds and mystery and from whence they had deduced the most mischievous of all doctrines, that of passive obedience and nonresistance.

To his contemporaries, he addressed an appeal calling on them to abandon that timidity which made them afraid to think. “Let it be known,” he wrote, “that British liberties are not the grants of princes or parliaments, but original rights, conditions of original contracts, co-equal with prerogative and with government, that many of our rights are inherent and essential, agreed upon as maxims and established as preliminaries even before a Parliament existed.” And he called on his fellow colonists to search out the foundation of British laws and government in the frame of human nature, in the constitution of the intellectual and moral world. In short, Adams demanded that the colonists abandon respect for prescription and put asunder what the court Whigs and Edmund Burke had worked so hard to bring together. In effect he asked them to embrace one England and repudiate the other England – which, whether he then confessed it or not in 1765, was to call for a revolution.

Few, if any, among Adams’ contemporaries relished the prospect of the colonies severing their ties with the mother country. And they recognized the need for what they termed “a super intending power.” And so, while reasserting the radical Whig principles that establish popular self-government as a matter of right rather than revokable privilege, they grounded this right in nature as well as in the particular history of the English constitution and sought some expedient by which to reconcile their assertion of this right with an allegiance to Great Britain.

In the very first pamphlet, provoked by the Stamp Act crisis, James Otis of Boston took up the suggestion, advanced by Benjamin Franklin in 1754, that the Americans be given representation in Parliament, arguing that this body could then legitimately tax the colonists.

Otis’ proposal turned out to be unacceptable to both parties to the dispute. Many of the colonists entertained grave misgivings. It was common practice for a representative’s constituents to give detailed instructions to the man whom they elected to the assembly. And it was recognized that, in an age in which it took three months to sail from the New World to the Old, it would be extremely difficult to hold accountable representatives who resided at so great distance. Otis’ proposal was unacceptable to Parliament because it would have opened a can of worms. It would have undone the compromise worked out within Britain’s political class in the first quarter-century following the Glorious Revolution. And it would have dispelled the illusion of historical continuity and the sense of tradition that even those within Parliament most sympathetic to the Americans thought it essential to sustain. In the midst of the spirited campaign for parliamentary reform and a re-apportionment of seats carried on by John Wilkes and his radicals, it would have been totally impossible for Parliament to extend representation to the colonies overseas, while at the same time maintaining the rotten boroughs at home and denying representation to Manchester, Birmingham, Sheffield and other populous English localities which elected no members to Parliament.

The colonists ultimately judged the compromise suggested by Benjamin Franklin unworkable. As John Dickson would ultimately point out, the colonists could trust no one but their own duly-elected representatives. The money said to be taken from us for our defense, they said, may be employed for our injury. Finally in desperation, as colonial resistance provoked parliament to pass more coercive acts, figures such as Thomas Jefferson, John Adams, James Irondale and James Wilson sought another way out. They refused to acknowledge that Parliament had any right to legislate for the colonies at all. They asserted that the colonial assemblies were Parliament’s equals. And they contended that the Empire was held together by a common executive, by the King.

No one in Parliament would have been willing to concede to the monarch the capacity to act contrary to the wishes of Parliament in any sphere at all. And George III knew better than to think that he could get away with the attempt. The only expedient that might have worked was the one suggested by Edmund Burke. Parliament might have continued to take for granted its own supremacy. The colonists, in their turn, might have continued in their presumption that an assembly, in no way accountable to them, could in no way pretend to speak for them or represent their interests. And the peace between them could nonetheless be maintained as it had been before 1763, but this would have been possible only if Parliament had practiced restraint.

Americans grasped the nettle which the British had refused in 1688 and 1689 and they embarked on a journey. As they approached the fateful decision, Thomas Payne published his famous pamphlet, “Common Sense,” encouraging them with the thought that their cause was, in great measure, the cause of all mankind, that their struggle for independence marked the birthday of a new world and that it was in their power to begin the world all over again. This they came to believe. For when they selected a design for the great seal of the United States of America, which is inscribed on the back of the dollar bill, they made its principle theme the assertion that 1776 marked the beginning of a “new order of the ages.” And in the aftermath, they began to renumber the years, not from the birth of Christ, but from the American Revolution.

No one ever spoke more eloquently of the revolutionary implications of America’s Declaration of Independence than the man who had drafted the pertinent document. Not long before the fiftieth anniversary of its adoption and signing, Thomas Jefferson received an invitation asking that he journey from Monticello to Washington, D.C., to join the festivities held to commemorate the event. Though weakened by disease, the statesman marshaled his meager physical resources and in his last surviving letter he described the choice made on the Fourth of July, 1776, in language echoing the words of the Whig martyr William Russell for the role he had played in the Rye House plot: “May it be to the world what I believe it will be, to some part sooner, to others later, but finally to all, the signal of arousing men to burst the chains under which monking ignorance and superstition had persuaded them to binding themselves and to assume the blessings and security of self-government. That form, which we have substituted, restores the free right to the unbounded exercise of reason and freedom whereby all eyes are opening or are opened to the rights of man. The general spread of the light of science had already laid open to every view the palpable truth that the mass of mankind has not been born with saddles on their back, nor a favored few booted and spurred, ready to ride them by the grace of God.”

Thomas Paine had been correct when he asserted that America’s cause was in great measure the cause of all mankind. By stepping in where their Anglo forebearers had feared to tread, the Americans set an example that would, they fully hoped and expected, set the world on fire. And it still does.

-- Qtrly Newsletter, Spring 2000

__MACOSX/Supplemental Readings/._Paul Rahe, How Radical was the American Revolution.doc

Supplemental Readings/Howard Zinn, Chapter 5 A Kind of Revolution.doc

Chapter 5: A Kind of Revolution

The American victory over the British army was made possible by the existence of an already- armed people. Just about every white male had a gun, and could shoot. The Revolutionary leadership distrusted the mobs of poor. But they knew the Revolution had no appeal to slaves and Indians. They would have to woo the armed white population.

This was not easy. Yes, mechanics and sailors, some others, were incensed against the British. But general enthusiasm for the war was not strong. While much of the white male population went into military service at one time or another during the war, only a small fraction stayed. John Shy, in his study of the Revolutionary army ( A People Numerous and Armed), says they "grew weary of being bullied by local committees of safety, by corrupt deputy assistant commissaries of supply, and by bands of ragged strangers with guns in their hands calling themselves soldiers of the Revolution." Shy estimates that perhaps a fifth of the population was actively treasonous. John Adams had estimated a third opposed, a third in support, a third neutral.

Alexander Hamilton, an aide of George Washington and an up-and-coming member of the new elite, wrote from his headquarters: ". . . our countrymen have all the folly of the ass and all the passiveness of the sheep... . They are determined not to be free.. . . If we are saved, France and Spain must save us."

Slavery got in the way in the South. South Carolina, insecure since the slave uprising in Stono in 1739, could hardly fight against the British; her militia had to be used to keep slaves under control.

The men who first joined the colonial militia were generally "hallmarks of respectability or at least of full citizenship" in their communities, Shy says. Excluded from the militia were friendly Indians, free Negroes, white servants, and free white men who had no stable home. But desperation led to the recruiting of the less respectable whites. Massachusetts and Virginia provided for drafting "strollers" (vagrants) into the militia. In fact, the military became a place of promise for the poor, who might rise in rank, acquire some money, change their social status.

Here was the traditional device by which those in charge of any social order mobilize and discipline a recalcitrant population-offering the adventure and rewards of military service to get poor people to fight for a cause they may not see clearly as their own. A wounded American lieutenant at Bunker Hill, interviewed by Peter Oliver, a Tory (who admittedly might have been looking for such a response), told how he had joined the rebel forces:

I was a Shoemaker, & got my living by my Labor. When this Rebellion came on, I saw some of my Neighbors got into Commission, who were no better than myself. I was very ambitious, & did not like to see those Men above me. T was asked to enlist, as a private Soldier ... I offered to enlist upon having a Lieutenants Commission; which was granted. I imagined my self now in a way of Promotion: if I was killed in Battle, there would be an end of me, but if any Captain was killed, I should rise in Rank, & should still have a Chance to rise higher. These Sir! were the only Motives of my entering into the Service; for as to the Dispute between Great Britain & the Colonies, I know nothing of it. ...

John Shy investigated the subsequent experience of that Bunker Hill lieutenant. He was William Scott, of Peterborough, New Hampshire, and after a year as prisoner of the British he escaped, made his way back to the American army, fought in battles in New York, was captured again by the British, and escaped again by swimming the Hudson River one night with his sword tied around his neck and his watch pinned to his hat. He returned to New Hampshire, recruited a company of his own, including his two eldest sons, and fought in various battles, until his health gave way. He watched his eldest son die of camp fever after six years of service. He had sold his farm in Peterborough for a note that, with inflation, became worthless. After the war, he came to public attention when he rescued eight people from drowning after their boat turned over in New York harbor. He then got a job surveying western lands with the army, but caught a fever and died in 1796.

Scott was one of many Revolutionary fighters, usually of lower military ranks, from poor and obscure backgrounds. Shy's study of the Peterborough contingent shows that the prominent and substantial citizens of the town had served only briefly in the war. Other American towns show the same pattern. As Shy puts it: "Revolutionary America may have been a middle-class society, happier and more prosperous than any other in its time, but it contained a large and growing number of fairly poor people, and many of them did much of the actual fighting and suffering between I775 and 1783: A very old story."

The military conflict itself, by dominating everything in its time, diminished other issues, made people choose sides in the one contest that was publicly important, forced people onto the side of the Revolution whose interest in Independence was not at all obvious. Ruling elites seem to have learned through the generations-consciously or not-that war makes them more secure against internal trouble.

The force of military preparation had a way of pushing neutral people into line. In Connecticut, for instance, a law was passed requiring military service of all males between sixteen and sixty, omitting certain government officials, ministers, Yale students and faculty, Negroes, Indians, and mulattos. Someone called to duty could provide a substitute or get out of it by paying 5 pounds. When eighteen men failed to show up for military duty they were jailed and, in order to be released, had to pledge to fight in the war. Shy says: "The mechanism of their political conversion was the militia." What looks like the democratization of the military forces in modern times shows up as something different: a way of forcing large numbers of reluctant people to associate themselves with the national cause, and by the end of the process believe in it.

Here, in the war for liberty, was conscription, as usual, cognizant of wealth. With the impressment riots against the British still remembered, impressment of seamen by the American navy was taking place by 1779. A Pennsylvania official said: "We cannot help observing how similar this Conduct is to that of the British Officers during our Subjection to Great Britain and are persuaded it will have the same unhappy effects viz. an estrangement of the Affections of the People from . . . Authority . . . which by an easy Progression will proceed to open Opposition . . . and bloodshed."

Watching the new, tight discipline of Washington's army, a chaplain in. Concord, Massachusetts, wrote: "New lords, new laws. The strictest government is taking place and great distinction is made between officers & men. Everyone is made to know his place & keep it, or be immediately tied up, and receive not one but 30 or 40 lashes."

The Americans lost the first battles of the war: Bunker Hill, Brooklyn Heights, Harlem Heights, the Deep South; they won small battles at Trenton and Princeton, and then in a turning point, a big battle at Saratoga, New York, in 1777. Washington's frozen army hung on at Valley Forge, Pennsylvania, while Benjamin Franklin negotiated an alliance with the French monarchy, which was anxious for revenge on England. The war turned to the South, where the British won victory after victory, until the Americans, aided by a large French army, with the French navy blocking off the British from supplies and reinforcements, won the final victory of the war at Yorktown, Virginia, in 1781.

Through all this, the suppressed conflicts between rich and poor among the Americans kept reappearing. In the midst of the war, in Philadelphia, which Eric Foner describes as "a time of immense profits for some colonists and terrible hardships for others," the inflation (prices rose in one month that year by 45 percent) led to agitation and calls for action. One Philadelphia newspaper carried a reminder that in Europe "the People have always done themselves justice when the scarcity of bread has arisen from the avarice of forestallers. They have broken open magazines- appropriated stores to their own use without paying for them-and in some instances have hung up the culprits who created their distress."

In May of 1779, the First Company of Philadelphia Artillery petitioned the Assembly about the troubles of "the midling and poor" and threatened violence against "those who are avariciously intent upon amassing wealth by the destruction of the more virtuous part of the community." That same month, there was a mass meeting, an extralegal gathering, which called for price reductions and initiated an investigation of Robert Morris, a rich Philadelphian who was accused of holding food from the market. In October came the "Fort Wilson riot," in which a militia group marched into the city and to the house of James Wilson, a wealthy lawyer and Revolutionary official who had opposed price controls and the democratic constitution adopted in Pennsylvania in 1776. The militia were driven away by a "silk stocking brigade" of well-off Philadelphia citizens.

It seemed that the majority of white colonists, who had a bit of land, or no property at all, were still better off than slaves or indentured servants or Indians, and could be wooed into the coalition of the Revolution. But when the sacrifices of war became more bitter, the privileges and safety of the rich became harder to accept. About 10 percent of the white population (an estimate of Jackson Main in The Social Structure of Revolutionary America), large landholders and merchants, held 1,000 pounds or more in personal property and 1,000 pounds in land, at the least, and these men owned nearly half the wealth of the country and held as slaves one-seventh of the country's people.

The Continental Congress, which governed the colonies through the war, was dominated by rich men, linked together in factions and compacts by business and family connections. These links connected North and South, East and West. For instance, Richard Henry Lee of Virginia was connected with the Adamses of Massachusetts and the Shippens of Pennsylvania. Delegates from middle and southern colonies were connected with Robert Morris of Pennsylvania through commerce and land speculation. Morris was superintendent of finance, and his assistant was Gouverneur Morris.

Morris's plan was to give more assurance to those who had loaned money to the Continental Congress, and gain the support of officers by voting half-pay for life for those who stuck to the end. This ignored the common soldier, who was not getting paid, who was suffering in the cold, dying of sickness, watching the civilian profiteers get rich. On New Year's Day, 1781, the Pennsylvania troops near Morristown, New Jersey, perhaps emboldened by rum, dispersed their officers, killed one captain, wounded others, and were marching, fully armed, with cannon, toward the Continental Congress at Philadelphia.

George Washington handled it cautiously. Informed of these developments by General Anthony Wayne, he told Wayne not to use force. He was worried that the rebellion might spread to his own troops. He suggested Wayne get a list of the soldiers' grievances, and said Congress should not flee Philadelphia, because then the way would be open for the soldiers to be joined by Philadelphia citizens. He sent Knox rushing to New England on his horse to get three months' pay for the soldiers, while he prepared a thousand men to march on the mutineers, as a last resort. A peace was negotiated, in which one-half the men were discharged; the other half got furloughs.

Shortly after this, a smaller mutiny took place in the New Jersey Line, involving two hundred men who defied their officers and started out for the state capital at Trenton. Now Washington was ready. Six hundred men, who themselves had been well fed and clothed, marched on the mutineers and surrounded and disarmed them. Three ringleaders were put on trial immediately, in the field. One was pardoned, and two were shot by firing squads made up of their friends, who wept as they pulled the triggers. It was "an example," Washington said.

Two years later, there was another mutiny in the Pennsylvania line. The war was over and the army had disbanded, but eighty soldiers, demanding their pay, invaded the Continental Congress headquarters in Philadelphia and forced the members to flee across the river to Princeton- "ignominiously turned out of doors," as one historian sorrowfully wrote (John Fiske, The Critical Period), "by a handful of drunken mutineers."

What soldiers in the Revolution could do only rarely, rebel against their authorities, civilians could do much more easily. Ronald Hoffman says: "The Revolution plunged the states of Delaware, Maryland, North Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia, and, to a much lesser degree, Virginia into divisive civil conflicts that persisted during the entire period of struggle." The southern lower classes resisted being mobilized for the revolution. They saw themselves under the rule of a political elite, win or lose against the British.

In Maryland, for instance, by the new constitution of 1776, to run for governor one had to own 5,000 pounds of property; to run for state senator, 1,000 pounds. Thus, 90 percent of the population were excluded from holding office. And so, as Hoffman says, "small slave holders, non- slaveholding planters, tenants, renters and casual day laborers posed a serious problem of social control for the Whig elite."

With black slaves 25 percent of the population (and in some counties 50 percent), fear of slave revolts grew. George Washington had turned down the requests of blacks, seeking freedom, to fight in the Revolutionary army. So when the British military commander in Virginia, Lord Dunmore, promised freedom to Virginia slaves who joined his forces, this created consternation. A report from one Maryland county worried about poor whites encouraging slave runaways:

The insolence of the Negroes in this county is come to such a height, that we are under a necessity of disarming them which we affected on Saturday last. We took about eighty guns, some bayonets, swords, etc. The malicious and imprudent speeches of some among the lower classes of whites have induced them to believe that their freedom depended on the success of the King's troops. We cannot therefore be too vigilant nor too rigorous with those who promote and encourage this disposition in our slaves.

Even more unsettling was white rioting in Maryland against leading families, supporting the Revolution, who were suspected of hoarding needed commodities. The class hatred of some of these disloyal people was expressed by one man who said "it was better for the people to lay down their arms and pay the duties and taxes laid upon them by King and Parliament than to be brought into slavery and to be commanded and ordered about as they were." A wealthy Maryland land- owner, Charles Carroll, took note of the surly mood all around him:

There is a mean low dirty envy which creeps thro all ranks and cannot suffer a man a superiority of fortune, of merit, or of understanding in fellow citizens-either of these are sure to entail a general ill will and dislike upon the owners.

Despite this, Maryland authorities retained control. They made concessions, taxing land and slaves more heavily, letting debtors pay in paper money. It was a sacrifice by the upper class to maintain power, and it worked.

In the lower South, however, in the Carolinas and Georgia, according to Hoffman, "vast regions were left without the slightest apparition of authority." The general mood was to take no part in a war that seemed to have nothing for them. "Authoritative personages on both sides demanded that common people supply material, reduce consumption, leave their families, and even risk their lives. Forced to make hard decisions, many flailed out in frustration or evaded and defied first one side, then the other. .. ."

Washington's military commander in the lower South, Nathanael Greene, dealt with disloyalty by a policy of concessions to some, brutality to others. In a letter to Thomas Jefferson he described a raid by his troops on Loyalists. "They made a dreadful carnage of them, upwards of one hundred were killed and most of the rest cut to pieces. It has had a very happy effect on those disaffected persons of which there were too many in this country." Greene told one of his generals "to strike terror into our enemies and give spirit to our friends." On the other hand, he advised the governor of Georgia "to open a door for the disaffected of your state to come in... ."

In general, throughout the states, concessions were kept to a minimum. The new constitutions that were drawn up in all states from 1776 to 1780 were not much different from the old ones. Although property qualifications for voting and holding office were lowered in some instances, in Massachusetts they were increased. Only Pennsylvania abolished them totally. The new bills of rights had modifying provisions. North Carolina, providing for religious freedom, added "that nothing herein contained shall be construed to exempt preachers of treasonable or seditious discourses, from legal trial and punishment." Maryland, New York, Georgia, and Massachusetts took similar cautions.

The American Revolution is sometimes said to have brought about the separation of church and state. The northern states made such declarations, but after 1776 they adopted taxes that forced everyone to support Christian teachings. William G. McLoughlin, quoting Supreme Court Justice David Brewer in 1892 that "this is a Christian nation," says of the separation of church and state in the Revolution that it "was neither conceived of nor carried out. .,. Far from being left to itself, religion was imbedded into every aspect and institution of American life."

One would look, in examining the Revolution's effect on class relations, at what happened to land confiscated from fleeing Loyalists. It was distributed in such a way as to give a double opportunity to the Revolutionary leaders: to enrich themselves and their friends, and to parcel out some land to small farmers to create a broad base of support for the new government. Indeed, this became characteristic of the new nation: finding itself possessed of enormous wealth, it could create the richest ruling class in history, and still have enough for the middle classes to act as a buffer between the rich and the dispossessed.

The huge landholdings of the Loyalists had been one of the great incentives to Revolution. Lord Fairfax in Virginia had more than 5 million acres encompassing twenty-one counties. Lord Baltimore's income from his Maryland holdings exceeded 30,000 pounds a year. After the Revolution, Lord Fairfax was protected; he was a friend of George Washington. But other Loyalist holders of great estates, especially those who were absentees, had their land confiscated. In New York, the number of freeholding small farmers increased after the Revolution, and there were fewer tenant farmers, who had created so much trouble in the pre-Revolution years.

Although the numbers of independent farmers grew, according to Rowland Berthoff and John Murrin, "the class structure did not change radically." The ruling group went through personnel changes as "the rising merchant families of Boston, New York or Philadelphia ... slipped quite credibly into the social status-and sometimes the very houses of those who failed in business or suffered confiscation and exile for loyalty to the crown."

Edmund Morgan sums up the class nature of the Revolution this way: "The fact that the lower ranks were involved in the contest should not obscure the fact that the contest itself was generally a struggle for office and power between members of an upper class: the new against the established." Looking at the situation after the Revolution, Richard Morris comments: "Everywhere one finds inequality." He finds "the people" of "We the people of the United States" (a phrase coined by the very rich Gouverneur Morris) did not mean Indians or blacks or women or white servants. In fact, there were more indentured servants than ever, and the Revolution "did nothing to end and little to ameliorate white bondage."

Carl Degler says ( Out of Our Past): "No new social class came to power through the door of the American revolution. The men who engineered the revolt were largely members of the colonial ruling class." George Washington was the richest man in America. John Hancock was a prosperous Boston merchant. Benjamin Franklin was a wealthy printer. And so on.

On the other hand, town mechanics, laborers, and seamen, as well as small farmers, were swept into "the people" by the rhetoric of the Revolution, by the camaraderie of military service, by the distribution of some land. Thus was created a substantial body of support, a national consensus, something that, even with the exclusion of ignored and oppressed people, could be called "America."

Staughton Lynd's close study of Dutchess County, New York, in the Revolutionary period corroborates this. There were tenant risings in 1766 against the huge feudal estates in New York. The Rensselaerwyck holding was a million acres. Tenants, claiming some of this land for themselves, unable to get satisfaction in the courts, turned to violence. In Poughkeepsie, 1,700 armed tenants had closed the courts and broken open the jails. But the uprising was crushed.

During the Revolution, there was a struggle in Dutchess County over the disposition of confiscated Loyalist lands, but it was mainly between different elite groups. One of these, the Poughkeepsie anti-Federalists (opponents of the Constitution), included men on the make, newcomers in land and business. They made promises to the tenants to gain their support, exploiting their grievances to build their own political careers and maintain their own fortunes.

During the Revolution, to mobilize soldiers, the tenants were promised land. A prominent landowner of Dutchess County wrote in 1777 that a promise to make tenants freeholders "would instantly bring you at least six thousand able farmers into the field." But the farmers who enlisted in the Revolution and expected to get something out of it found that, as privates in the army, they received $6.66 a month, while a colonel received $75 a month. They watched local government contractors like Melancton Smith and Mathew Paterson become rich, while the pay they received in continental currency became worthless with inflation.

All this led tenants to become a threatening force in the midst of the war. Many stopped paying rent. The legislature, worried, passed a bill to confiscate Loyalist land and add four hundred new freeholders to the 1,800 already in the county. This meant a strong new voting bloc for the faction of the rich that would become anti-Federalists in 1788. Once the new landholders were brought into the privileged circle of the Revolution and seemed politically under control, their leaders, Mclancton Smith and others, at first opposed to adoption of the Constitution, switched to support, and with New York ratifying, adoption was ensured. The new freeholders found that they had stopped being tenants, but were now mortgagees, paying back loans from banks instead of rent to landlords.

It seems that the rebellion against British rule allowed a certain group of the colonial elite to replace those loyal to England, give some benefits to small landholders, and leave poor white working people and tenant farmers in very much their old situation.

What did the Revolution mean to the Native Americans, the Indians? They had been ignored by the fine words of the Declaration, had not been considered equal, certainly not in choosing those who would govern the American territories in which they lived, nor in being able to pursue happiness as they had pursued it for centuries before the white Europeans arrived. Now, with the British out of the way, the Americans could begin the inexorable process of pushing the Indians off their lands, killing them if they resisted, in short, as Francis Jennings puts it, the white Americans were fighting against British imperial control in the East, and for their own imperialism in the West.

Before the Revolution, the Indians had been subdued by force in Virginia and in New England. Elsewhere, they had worked out modes of coexistence with the colonies. But around 1750, with the colonial population growing fast, the pressure to move westward onto new land set the stage for conflict with the Indians. Land agents from the East began appearing in the Ohio River valley, on the territory of a confederation of tribes called the Covenant Chain, for which the Iroquois were spokesmen. In New York, through intricate swindling, 800,000 acres of Mohawk land were taken, ending the period of Mohawk-New York friendship. Chief Hendrick of the Mohawks is recorded speaking his bitterness to Governor George Clinton and the provincial council of New York in 1753:

Brother when we came here lo relate our Grievances about our Lands, we expected to have something done for us, and we have told you that the Covenant Chain of our Forefathers was like to be broken, and brother you tell us that we shall be redressed at Albany, but we know them so well, we will not trust to them, for they [the Albany merchants] are no people but Devils so ... as soon as we come home we will send up a Belt of Wampum to our Brothers the other 5 Nations to acquaint them the Covenant Chain is broken between you and us. So brother you are not to expect to hear of me any more, and Brother we desire to hear no more of you.

When the British fought the French for North America in the Seven Years' War, the Indians fought on the side of the French. The French were traders but not occupiers of Indian lands, while the British clearly coveted their hunting grounds and living space. Someone reported the conversation of Shingas, chief of the Delaware Indians, with the British General Braddock, who sought his help against the French:

Shingas asked General Braddock, whether the Indians that were friends to the English might not be permitted to Live and Trade among the English and have Hunting Ground sufficient to Support themselves and Familys.... On which General Braddock said that No Savage Should Inherit the Land.. . . On which Shingas and the other Chiefs answered That if they might not have Liberty to Live on the Land they would not Fight for it....

When that war ended in 1763, the French, ignoring their old allies, ceded to the British lands west of the Appalachians. The Indians therefore united to make war on the British western forts; this is called "Pontiac's Conspiracy" by the British, but "a liberation war for independence" in the words used by Francis Jennings. Under orders from British General Jeffrey Amherst, the commander of Fort Pitts gave the attacking Indian chiefs, with whom he was negotiating, blankets from the smallpox hospital. It was a pioneering effort at what is now called biological warfare. An epidemic soon spread among the Indians.

Despite this, and the burning of villages, the British could not destroy the will of the Indians, who continued guerrilla war. A peace was made, with the British agreeing to establish a line at the Appalachians, beyond which settlements would not encroach on Indian territory. This was the Royal Proclamation of 1763, and it angered Americans (the original Virginia charter said its land went westward to the ocean). It helps to explain why most of the Indians fought for England during the Revolution. With their French allies, then their English allies, gone, the Indians faced a new land-coveting nation-alone.

The Americans assumed now that the Indian land was theirs. But the expeditions they sent westward to establish this were overcome-which they recognized in the names they gave these battles: Harmar's Humiliation and St. Glair's Shame. And even when General Anthony Wayne defeated the Indians' western confederation in 1798 at the Battle of Fallen Timbers, he had to recognize their power. In the Treaty of Grenville, it was agreed that in return for certain cessions of land the United States would give up claims to the Indian lands north of the Ohio, east of the Mississippi, and south of the Great Lakes, but that if the Indians decided to sell these lands they would offer them first to the United States.

Jennings, putting the Indian into the center of the American Revolution-after all, it was Indian land that everyone was fighting over-sees the Revolution as a "multiplicity of variously oppressed and exploited peoples who preyed upon each other." With the eastern elite controlling the lands on the seaboard, the poor, seeking land, were forced to go West, there becoming a useful bulwark for the rich because, as Jennings says, "the first target of the Indian's hatchet was the frontiersman's skull."

The situation of black slaves as a result of the American Revolution was more complex. Thousands of blacks fought with the British. Five thousand were with the Revolutionaries, most of them from the North, but there were also free blacks from Virginia and Maryland. The lower South was reluctant to arm blacks. Amid the urgency and chaos of war, thousands took their freedom-leaving on British ships at the end of the war to settle in England, Nova Scotia, the West Indies, or Africa. Many others stayed in America as free blacks, evading their masters.

In the northern states, the combination of blacks in the military, the lack of powerful economic need for slaves, and the rhetoric of Revolution led to the end of slavery-but very slowly. As late as 1810, thirty thousand blacks, one-fourth of the black population of the North, remained slaves. In 1840 there were still a thousand slaves in the North. In the upper South, there were more free Negroes than before, leading to more control legislation. In the lower South, slavery expanded with the growth of rice and cotton plantations.

What the Revolution did was to create space and opportunity for blacks to begin making demands of white society. Sometimes these demands came from the new, small black elites in Baltimore, Philadelphia, Richmond, Savannah, sometimes from articulate and bold slaves. Pointing to the Declaration of Independence, blacks petitioned Congress and the state legislatures to abolish slavery, to give blacks equal rights. In Boston, blacks asked for city money, which whites were getting, to educate their children. In Norfolk, they asked to he allowed to testify in court. Nashville blacks asserted that free Negroes "ought to have the same opportunities of doing well that any Person ... would have." Peter Mathews, a free Negro butcher in Charleston, joined other free black artisans and tradesmen in petitioning the legislature to repeal discriminatory laws against blacks, hi 1780, seven blacks in Dartmouth, Massachusetts, petitioned the legislature for the right to vote, linking taxation to representation:

... we apprehend ourselves to be Aggreeved, in that while we are not allowed the Privilege of freemen of the State having no vote or Influence in the Election of those that Tax us yet many of our Colour (as is well known) have cheerfully Entered the field of Battle in the defense of the Common Cause and that (as we conceive) against a similar Exertion of Power (in Regard to taxation) too well known to need a recital in this place.. ..

A black man, Benjamin Banneker, who taught himself mathematics and astronomy, predicted accurately a solar eclipse, and was appointed to plan the new city of Washington, wrote to Thomas Jefferson:

I suppose it is a truth too well attested to you, to need a proof here, that we are a race of beings, who have long labored under the abuse and censure of the world; that we have long been looked upon with an eye of contempt; and that we have long been considered rather as brutish than human, and scarcely capable of mental endowments. ... I apprehend you will embrace every opportunity to eradicate that train of absurd and false ideas and opinions, which so generally prevails with respect to us; and that your sentiments are concurrent with mine, which are, that one universal Father hath given being to us all; and that he hath not only made us all of one flesh, but that he hath also, without partiality, afforded us all the same sensations and endowed us all with the same facilities. ..

Banneker asked Jefferson "to wean yourselves from those narrow prejudices which you have imbibed."

Jefferson tried his best, as an enlightened, thoughtful individual might. But the structure of American society, the power of the cotton plantation, the slave trade, the politics of unity between northern and southern elites, and the long culture of race prejudice in the colonies, as well as his own weaknesses-that combination of practical need and ideological fixation-kept Jefferson a slaveowner throughout his life.

The inferior position of blacks, the exclusion of Indians from the new society, the establishment of supremacy for the rich and powerful in the new nation-all this was already settled in the colonies by the time of the Revolution. With the English out of the way, it could now be put on paper, solidified, regularized, made legitimate, by the Constitution of the United States, drafted at a convention of Revolutionary leaders in Philadelphia.

To many Americans over the years, the Constitution drawn up in 1787 has seemed a work of genius put together by wise, humane men who created a legal framework for democracy and equality. This view is stated, a bit extravagantly, by the historian George Bancroft, writing in the early nineteenth century:

The Constitution establishes nothing that interferes with equality and individuality. It knows nothing of differences by descent, or opinions, of favored classes, or legalized religion, or the political power of property. It leaves the individual alongside of the individual. ... As the sea is made up of drops, American society is composed of separate, free, and constantly moving atoms, ever in reciprocal action ... so that the institutions and laws of the country rise out of the masses of individual thought which, like the waters of the ocean, are rolling evermore.

Another view of the Constitution was put forward early in the twentieth century by the historian Charles Beard (arousing anger and indignation, including a denunciatory editorial in the New York Times). He wrote in his book An Economic Interpretation of the Constitution:

Inasmuch as the primary object of a government, beyond the mere repression of physical violence, is the making of the rules which determine the property relations of members of society, the dominant classes whose rights are thus to be determined must perforce obtain from the government such rules as are consonant with the larger interests necessary to the continuance of their economic processes, or they must themselves control the organs of government.

In short, Beard said, the rich must, in their own interest, either control the government directly or control the laws by which government operates.

Beard applied this general idea to the Constitution, by studying the economic backgrounds and political ideas of the fifty-five men who gathered in Philadelphia in 1787 to draw up the Constitution. He found that a majority of them were lawyers by profession, that most of them were men of wealth, in land, slaves, manufacturing, or shipping, that half of them had money loaned out at interest, and that forty of the fifty-five held government bonds, according to the records of the Treasury Department.

Thus, Beard found that most of the makers of the Constitution had some direct economic interest in establishing a strong federal government: the manufacturers needed protective tariffs; the moneylenders wanted to stop the use of paper money to pay off debts; the land speculators wanted protection as they invaded Indian lands; slaveowners needed federal security against slave revolts and runaways; bondholders wanted a government able to raise money by nationwide taxation, to pay off those bonds.

Four groups, Beard noted, were not represented in the Constitutional Convention: slaves, indentured servants, women, men without property. And so the Constitution did not reflect the interests of those groups.

He wanted to make it clear that he did not think the Constitution was written merely to benefit the Founding Fathers personally, although one could not ignore the $150,000 fortune of Benjamin Franklin, the connections of Alexander Hamilton to wealthy interests through his father-in-law and brother-in-law, the great slave plantations of James Madison, the enormous landholdings of George Washington. Rather, it was to benefit the groups the Founders represented, the "economic interests they understood and felt in concrete, definite form through their own personal experience."

Not everyone at the Philadelphia Convention fitted Beard's scheme. Elbridge Gerry of Massachusetts was a holder of landed property, and yet he opposed the ratification of the Constitution. Similarly, Luther Martin of Maryland, whose ancestors had obtained large tracts of land in New Jersey, opposed ratification. But, with a few exceptions, Beard found a strong connection between wealth and support of the Constitution.

By 1787 there was not only a positive need for strong central government to protect the large economic interests, but also immediate fear of rebellion by discontented farmers. The chief event causing this fear was an uprising in the summer of 1786 in western Massachusetts, known as Shays' Rebellion.

In the western towns of Massachusetts there was resentment against the legislature in Boston. The new Constitution of 1780 had raised the property qualifications for voting. No one could hold state office without being quite wealthy. Furthermore, the legislature was refusing to issue paper money, as had been done in some other states, like Rhode Island, to make it easier for debt-ridden farmers to pay off their creditors.

Illegal conventions began to assemble in some of the western counties to organize opposition to the legislature. At one of these, a man named Plough Jogger spoke his mind:

I have been greatly abused, have been obliged to do more than my part in the war; been loaded with class rates, town rates, province rates, Continental rates and all rates ... been pulled and hauled by sheriffs, constables and collectors, and had my cattle sold for less than they were worth.... . . . The great men are going to get all we have and I think it is time for us to rise and put a stop to it, and have no more courts, nor sheriffs, nor collectors nor lawyers.. . .

The chairman of that meeting used his gavel to cut short the applause. He and others wanted to redress their grievances, but peacefully, by petition to the General Court (the legislature) in Boston,

However, before the scheduled meeting of the General Court, there were going to the court proceedings in Hampshire County, in the towns of Northampton and Springfield, to seize the cattle of farmers who hadn't paid their debts, to take away their land, now full of grain and ready for harvest. And so, veterans of the Continental army, also aggrieved because they had been treated poorly on discharge-given certificates for future redemption instead of immediate cash-began to organize the farmers into squads and companies. One of these veterans was Luke Day, who arrived the morning of court with a fife-and-drum corps, still angry with the memory of being locked up in debtors' prison in the heat of the previous summer.

The sheriff looked to the local militia to defend the court against these armed farmers. But most of the militia was with Luke Day. The sheriff did manage to gather five hundred men, and the judges put on their black silk robes, waiting for the sheriff to protect their trip to the courthouse. But there at the courthouse steps, Luke Day stood with a petition, asserting the people's constitutional right to protest the unconstitutional acts of the General Court, asking the judges to adjourn until the General Court could act on behalf of the farmers. Standing with Luke Day were fifteen hundred armed farmers. The judges adjourned.

Shortly after, at courthouses in Worcester and Athol, farmers with guns prevented the courts from meeting to take away their property, and the militia were too sympathetic to the farmers, or too outnumbered, to act. In Concord, a fifty-year-old veteran of two wars, Job Shattuck, led a caravan of carts, wagons, horses, and oxen onto the town green, while a message was sent to the judges:

The voice of the People of this county is such that the court shall not enter this courthouse until such time as the People shall have redress of the grievances they labor under at the present.

A county convention then suggested the judges adjourn, which they did.

At Great Barrington, a militia of a thousand faced a square crowded with armed men and boys. But the militia was split in its opinion. When the chief justice suggested the militia divide, those in favor of the court's sitting to go on the right side of the road, and those against on the left, two hundred of the militia went to the right, eight hundred to the left, and the judges adjourned. Then the crowd went to the home of the chief justice, who agreed to sign a pledge that the court would not sit until the Massachusetts General Court met. The crowd went back to the square, broke open the county jail, and set free the debtors. The chief justice, a country doctor, said: "I have never heard anybody point out a better way to have their grievances redressed than the people have taken."

The governor and the political leaders of Massachusetts became alarmed. Samuel Adams, once looked on as a radical leader in Boston, now insisted people act within the law. He said "British emissaries" were stirring up the farmers. People in the town of Greenwich responded: You in Boston have the money, and we don't. And didn't you act illegally yourselves in the Revolution? The insurgents were now being called Regulators. Their emblem was a sprig of hemlock.

The problem went beyond Massachusetts. In Rhode Island, the debtors had taken over the legislature and were issuing paper money. In New Hampshire, several hundred men, in September of 1786, surrounded the legislature in Exeter, asking that taxes be returned and paper money issued; they dispersed only when military action was threatened.

Daniel Shays entered the scene in western Massachusetts. A poor farm hand when the revolution broke out, he joined the Continental army, fought at Lexington, Bunker Hill, and Saratoga, and was wounded in action. In 1780, not being paid, he resigned from the army, went home, and soon found himself in court for nonpayment of debts. He also saw what was happening to others: a sick woman, unable to pay, had her bed taken from under her.

What brought Shays fully into the situation was that on September 19, the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts met in Worcester and indicted eleven leaders of the rebellion, including three of his friends, as "disorderly, riotous and seditious persons" who "unlawfully and by force of arms" prevented "the execution of justice and the laws of the commonwealth." The Supreme Judicial Court planned to meet again in Springfield a week later, and there was talk of Luke Day's being indicted.

Shays organized seven hundred armed farmers, most of them veterans of the war, and led them to Springfield. There they found a general with nine hundred soldiers and a cannon. Shays asked the general for permission to parade, which the general granted, so Shays and his men moved through the square, drums hanging and fifes blowing. As they marched, their ranks grew. Some of the militia joined, and reinforcements began coming in from the countryside. The judges postponed hearings for a day, then adjourned the court.

Now the General Court, meeting in Boston, was told by Governor James Bowdoin to "vindicate the insulted dignity of government." The recent rebels against England, secure in office, were calling for law and order. Sam Adams helped draw up a Riot Act, and a resolution suspending habeas corpus, to allow the authorities to keep people in jail without trial. At the same time, the legislature moved to make some concessions to the angry farmers, saying certain old taxes could now be paid in goods instead of money.

This didn't help. In Worcester, 160 insurgents appeared at the courthouse. The sheriff read the Riot Act. The insurgents said they would disperse only if the judges did. The sheriff shouted something about hanging. Someone came up behind him and put a sprig of hemlock in his hat. The judges left.

Confrontations between farmers and militia now multiplied. The winter snows began to interfere with the trips of farmers to the courthouses. When Shays began marching a thousand men into Boston, a blizzard forced them back, and one of his men froze to death.

An army came into the field, led by General Benjamin Lincoln, on money raised by Boston merchants. In an artillery duel, three rebels were killed. One soldier stepped in front of his own artillery piece and lost both arms. The winter grew worse. The rebels were outnumbered and on the run. Shays took refuge in Vermont, and his followers began to surrender. There were a few more deaths in battle, and then sporadic, disorganized, desperate acts of violence against authority: the burning of barns, the slaughter of a general's horses. One government soldier was killed in an eerie night-time collision of two sleighs.

Captured rebels were put on trial in Northampton and six were sentenced to death. A note was left at the door of the high sheriff of Pittsfidd:

I understand that there is a number of my countrymen condemned to the because they fought for justice. I pray have a care that you assist not in the execution of so horrid a crime, for by all that is above, he that condemns and he that executes shall share alike. . . - Prepare for death with speed, for your life or mine is short. When the woods are covered with leaves, I shall return and pay you a short visit.

Thirty-three more rebels were put on trial and six more condemned to death. Arguments took place over whether the hangings should go forward. General Lincoln urged mercy and a Commission of Clemency, but Samuel Adams said: "In monarchy the crime of treason may admit of being pardoned or lightly punished, but the man who dares rebel against the laws of a republic ought to suffer death." Several hangings followed; some of the condemned were pardoned. Shays, in Vermont, was pardoned in 1788 and returned to Massachusetts, where he died, poor and obscure, in 1825.

It was Thomas Jefferson, in France as ambassador at the time of Shays' Rebellion, who spoke of such uprisings as healthy for society. In a letter to a friend he wrote: "I hold it that a little rebellion now and then is a good thing.... It is a medicine necessary for the sound health of government.... God forbid that we should ever be twenty years without such a rebellion.. . . The tree of liberty must be refreshed from time to time with the blood of patriots and tyrants. It is its natural manure."

But Jefferson was far from the scene. The political and economic elite of the country were not so tolerant. They worried that the example might spread. A veteran of Washington's army, General Henry Knox, founded an organization of army veterans, "The Order of the Cincinnati," presumably (as one historian put it) "for the purpose of cherishing the heroic memories of the struggle in which they had taken part," but also, it seemed, to watch out for radicalism in the new country. Knox wrote to Washington in late 1786 about Shays' Rebellion, and in doing so expressed the thoughts of many of the wealthy and powerful leaders of the country:

The people who are the insurgents have never paid any, or but very little taxes. But they see the weakness of government; they feel at once their own poverty, compared with the opulent, and their own force, and they are determined to make use of the latter, in order to remedy the former. Their creed is "That the property of the United States has been protected from the confiscations of Britain by the joint exertions of all, and therefore ought to he the common properly of all. And he that attempts opposition to this creed is an enemy to equity and justice and ought to be swept from off the face of the earth."

Alexander Hamilton, aide to Washington during the war, was one of the most forceful and astute leaders of the new aristocracy. He voiced his political philosophy:

All communities divide themselves into the few and the many. The first arc the rich and well-horn, the other the mass of the people. The voice of the people has been said to be the voice of God; and however generally this maxim has been quoted and believed, it is not true in fact. The people are turbulent and changing; they seldom judge or determine right. Give therefore to the first class a distinct permanent share in the government. .. . Can a democratic assembly who annually revolve in the mass of the people be supposed steadily to pursue the public good? Nothing but a permanent body can check the imprudence of democracy.. ..

At the Constitutional Convention, Hamilton suggested a President and Senate chosen for life.

The Convention did not take his suggestion. But neither did it provide for popular elections, except in the case of the House of Representatives, where the qualifications were set by the state legislatures (which required property-holding for voting in almost all the states), and excluded women, Indians, slaves. The Constitution provided for Senators to be elected by the state legislators, for the President to be elected by electors chosen by the state legislators, and for the Supreme Court to be appointed by the President.

The problem of democracy in the post-Revolutionary society was not, however, the Constitutional limitations on voting. It lay deeper, beyond the Constitution, in the division of society into rich and poor. For if some people had great wealth and great influence; if they had the land, the money, the newspapers, the church, the educational system- how could voting, however broad, cut into such power? There was still another problem: wasn't it the nature of representative government, even when most broadly based, to be conservative, to prevent tumultuous change?

It came time to ratify the Constitution, to submit to a vote in state conventions, with approval of nine of the thirteen required to ratify it. In New York, where debate over ratification was intense, a series of newspaper articles appeared, anonymously, and they tell us much about the nature of the Constitution. These articles, favoring adoption of the Constitution, were written by James Madison, Alexander Hamilton, and John Jay, and came to be known as the Federalist Papers (opponents of the Constitution became known as anti-Federalists).

In Federalist Paper #10, James Madison argued that representative government was needed to maintain peace in a society ridden by factional disputes. These disputes came from "the various and unequal distribution of property. Those who hold and those who are without property have ever formed distinct interests in society." The problem, he said, was how to control the factional struggles that came from inequalities in wealth. Minority factions could be controlled, he said, by the principle that decisions would be by vote of the majority.

So the real problem, according to Madison, was a majority faction, and here the solution was offered by the Constitution, to have "an extensive republic," that is, a large nation ranging over thirteen states, for then "it will be more difficult for all who feel it to discover their own strength, and to act in unison with each other.... The influence of factious leaders may kindle a flame within their particular States, but will be unable to spread a general conflagration through the other States."

Madison's argument can be seen as a sensible argument for having a government which can maintain peace and avoid continuous disorder. But is it the aim of government simply to maintain order, as a referee, between two equally matched fighters? Or is it that government has some special interest in maintaining a certain kind of order, a certain distribution of power and wealth, a distribution in which government officials are not neutral referees but participants? In that case, the disorder they might worry about is the disorder of popular rebellion against those monopolizing the society's wealth. This interpretation makes sense when one looks at the economic interests, the social backgrounds, of the makers of the Constitution.

As part of his argument for a large republic to keep the peace, James Madison tells quite clearly, in Federalist #10, whose peace he wants to keep: "A rage for paper money, for an abolition of debts, for an equal division of property, or for any other improper or wicked project, will be less apt to pervade the whole body of the Union than a particular member of it."

When economic interest is seen behind the political clauses of the Constitution, then the document becomes not simply the work of wise men trying to establish a decent and orderly society, but the work of certain groups trying to maintain their privileges, while giving just enough rights and liberties to enough of the people to ensure popular support.

In the new government, Madison would belong to one party (the Democrat-Republicans) along with Jefferson and Monroe. Hamilton would belong to the rival party (the Federalists) along with Washington and Adams. But both agreed-one a slaveholder from Virginia, the other a merchant from New York-on the aims of this new government they were establishing. They were anticipating the long-fundamental agreement of the two political parties in the American system. Hamilton wrote elsewhere in the Federalist Papers that the new Union would be able "to repress domestic faction and insurrection." He referred directly to Shays' Rebellion: "The tempestuous situation from which Massachusetts has scarcely emerged evinces that dangers of this kind are not merely speculative."

It was either Madison or Hamilton (the authorship of the individual papers is not always known) who in Federalist Paper #63 argued the necessity of a "well-constructed Senate" as "sometimes necessary as a defense to the people against their own temporary errors and delusions" because "there are particular moments in public affairs when the people, stimulated by some irregular passion, or some illicit advantage, or misted by the artful misrepresentations of interested men, may call for measures which they themselves will afterwards be the most ready to lament and condemn." And: "In these critical moments, how salutary will be the interference of some temperate and respectable body of citizens in order to check the misguided career, and to suspend the blow meditated by the people against themselves, until reason, justice, and truth can regain their authority over the public mind?"

The Constitution was a compromise between slaveholding interests of the South and moneyed interests of the North. For the purpose of uniting the thirteen states into one great market for commerce, the northern delegates wanted laws regulating interstate commerce, and urged that such laws require only a majority of Congress to pass. The South agreed to this, in return for allowing the trade in slaves to continue for twenty years before being outlawed.

Charles Beard warned us that governments-including the government of the United States-are not neutral, that they represent the dominant economic interests, and that their constitutions are intended to serve these interests. One of his critics (Robert E. Brown, Charles Beard and the Constitution) raises an interesting point. Granted that the Constitution omitted the phrase "life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness," which appeared in the Declaration of Independence, and substituted "life, liberty, or property"-well, why shouldn't the Constitution protect property? As Brown says about Revolutionary America, "practically everybody was interested in the protection of property" because so many Americans owned property.

However, this is misleading. True, there were many property owners. But some people had much more than others. A few people had great amounts of property; many people had small amounts; others had none. Jackson Main found that one-third of the population in the Revolutionary period were small farmers, while only 3 percent of the population had truly large holdings and could he considered wealthy.

Still, one-third was a considerable number of people who felt they had something at stake in the stability of a new government. This was a larger base of support for government than anywhere in the world at the end of the eighteenth century. In addition, the city mechanics had an important interest in a government which would protect their work from foreign competition. As Staughton Lynd puts it: "How is it that the city workingmen all over America overwhelmingly and enthusiastically supported the United States Constitution?"

This was especially true in New York. When the ninth and tenth states had ratified the Constitution, four thousand New York City mechanics marched with floats and banners to celebrate. Bakers, blacksmiths, brewers, ship joiners and shipwrights, coopers, cartmen and tailors, all marched. What Lynd found was that these mechanics, while opposing elite rule in the colonies, were nationalist. Mechanics comprised perhaps half the New York population. Some were wealthy, some were poor, but all were better off than the ordinary laborer, the apprentice, the journeyman, and their prosperity required a government that would protect them against the British hats and shoes and other goods that were pouring into the colonies after the Revolution. As a result, the mechanics often supported wealthy conservatives at the ballot box.

The Constitution, then, illustrates the complexity of the American system: that it serves the interests of a wealthy elite, but also does enough for small property owners, for middle-income mechanics and farmers, to build a broad base of support. The slightly prosperous people who make up this base of support are buffers against the blacks, the Indians, the very poor whites. They enable the elite to keep control with a minimum of coercion, a maximum of law-all made palatable by the fanfare of patriotism and unity.

The Constitution became even more acceptable to the public at large after the first Congress, responding to criticism, passed a series of amendments known as the Bill of Rights. These amendments seemed to make the new government a guardian of people's liberties: to speak, to publish, to worship, to petition, to assemble, to be tried fairly, to be secure at home against official intrusion. It was, therefore, perfectly designed to build popular backing for the new government. What was not made clear-it was a time when the language of freedom was new and its reality untested-was the shakiness of anyone's liberty when entrusted to a government of the rich and powerful.

Indeed, the same problem existed for the other provisions of the Constitution, like the clause forbidding states to "impair the obligation of contract," or that giving Congress the power to tax the people and to appropriate money. They all sound benign and neutral until one asks: tax who, for what? Appropriate what, for whom? To protect everyone's contracts seems like an act of fairness, of equal treatment, until one considers that contracts made between rich and poor, between employer and employee, landlord and tenant, creditor and debtor, generally favor the more powerful of the two parties. Thus, to protect these contracts is to put the great power of the government, its laws, courts, sheriffs, police, on the side of the privileged-and to do it not, as in premodern times, as an exercise of brute force against the weak but as a matter of law.

The First Amendment of the Bill of Rights shows that quality of interest hiding behind innocence. Passed in 1791 by Congress, it provided that "Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press. . . ." Yet, seven years after the First Amendment became part of the Constitution, Congress passed a law very clearly abridging the freedom of speech.

This was the Sedition Act of 1798, passed under John Adams's administration, at a time when Irishmen and Frenchmen in the United States were looked on as dangerous revolutionaries because of the recent French Revolution and the Irish rebellions. The Sedition Act made it a crime to say or write anything "false, scandalous and malicious" against the government, Congress, or the President, with intent to defame them, bring them into disrepute, or excite popular hatreds against them.

This act seemed to directly violate the First Amendment. Yet, it was enforced. Ten Americans were put in prison for utterances against the government, and every member of the Supreme Court in 1798-1800, sitting as an appellate judge, held it constitutional.

There was a legal basis for this, one known to legal experts, but not to the ordinary American, who would read the First Amendment and feel confident that he or she was protected in the exercise of free speech. That basis has been explained by historian Leonard Levy. Levy points out that it was generally understood (not in the population, but in higher circles) that, despite the First Amendment, the British common law of "seditious libel" still ruled in America. This meant that while the government could not exercise "prior restraint"-that is, prevent an utterance or publication in advance-it could legally punish the speaker or writer afterward. Thus, Congress has a convenient legal basis for the laws it has enacted since that time, making certain kinds of speech a crime. And, since punishment after the fact is an excellent deterrent to the exercise of free expression, the claim of "no prior restraint" itself is destroyed. This leaves the First Amendment much less than the stone wall of protection it seems at first glance.

Are the economic provisions in the Constitution enforced just as weakly? We have an instructive example almost immediately in Washington's first administration, when Congress's power to tax and appropriate money was immediately put to use by the Secretary of the Treasury, Alexander Hamilton.

Hamilton, believing that government must ally itself with the richest elements of society to make itself strong, proposed to Congress a series of laws, which it enacted, expressing this philosophy. A Bank of the United States was set up as a partnership between the government and certain banking interests. A tariff was passed to help the manufacturers. It was agreed to pay bondholders-most of the war bonds were now concentrated in a small group of wealthy people-the full value of their bonds. Tax laws were passed to raise money for this bond redemption.

One of these tax laws was the Whiskey tax, which especially hurt small farmers who raised grain that they converted into whiskey and then sold. In 1794 the farmers of western Pennsylvania took up arms and rebelled against the collection of this tax. Secretary of the Treasury Hamilton led the troops to put them down. We see then, in the first years of the Constitution, that some of its provisions-even those paraded most flamboyantly (like the First Amendment)-might be treated lightly. Others (like the power to tax) would be powerfully enforced.

Still, the mythology around the Founding Fathers persists. To say, as one historian (Bernard Bailyn) has done recently, that "the destruction of privilege and the creation of a political system that demanded of its leaders the responsible and humane use of power were their highest aspirations" is to ignore what really happened in the America of these Founding Fathers.

Bailyn says:

Everyone knew the basic prescription for a wise and just government. It was so to balance the contending powers in society that no one power could overwhelm the others and, unchecked, destroy the liberties that belonged to all. The problem was how to arrange the institutions of government so that this balance could be achieved.

Were the Founding Fathers wise and just men trying to achieve a good balance? In fact, they did not want a balance, except one which kept things as they were, a balance among the dominant forces at that time. They certainly did not want an equal balance between slaves and masters, propertyless and property holders, Indians and white.

As many as half the people were not even considered by the Founding Fathers as among Bailyn's "contending powers" in society. They were not mentioned in the Declaration of Independence, they were absent in the Constitution, they were invisible in the new political democracy. They were the women of early America.

__MACOSX/Supplemental Readings/._Howard Zinn, Chapter 5 A Kind of Revolution.doc

Supplemental Readings/Melissa Marsh, The Purest Patriotism.doc

The Purest Patriotism: The Domestic Sphere and the Ladies Association of Philadelphia

by Melissa A. Marsh

Abigail Adams always managed to pique her husband John’s interest. In her now famous letter dated March 31, 1776 in which she extols him to "Remember the Ladies," she also gave him a playful warning. If the men of government did not pay attention to women's rights, "we are determined to forment a Rebelion, and will not hold ourselves bound by any laws in which we have no voice, or Representation." But Abigail had no intention of calling upon colonial women to rise against the patriarchal society. Such jesting between husband and wife merely bespoke of their relationship. But in her correspondence, Abigail smoothly interjected the notion of women’s rights to induce John and the other founders to at least consider her point. Whether or not such rights qualified as important to the men as to the women remained to be seen, especially in trying to interpret John’s response: “…As to your extraordinary Code of Laws, I cannot but laugh…But your Letter was the first Intimation that another Tribe more numerous and powerfull than all the rest were grown discontented.”

The same political spirit Abigail Adams sought to explore and reveal within a male-dominated society could be seen in other colonial women as they found their roles changing during the Revolution. With the emergence of an event that encompassed the political, social, and domestic worlds of colonial America, women began to seek different avenues in which to become "more useful" to the world. Although women did not appear within the inner circles of Congress or in front of the ballot box, they began to use their unique talents to support the Revolution and express their changing role.

The women of Philadelphia especially took this notion to heart. Esther De Berdt Reed organized the Ladies Association of Philadelphia, active from 1780-1781, and effectively brought women together for the revolutionary cause. By creating a public place for women to congregate within the accepted boundaries imposed by eighteenth-century standards, the Ladies Association made a significant contribution to the war effort and also established a political agency that would impact future generations of women.

To fully understand the course taken by colonial women, it is crucial to delve into the realm of eighteenth-century femininity. According to Mary Beth Norton, "Uppermost in women's mind was the very fact of their feminine identity...Femininity formed their invariable point of reference." If a colonial woman wished to discuss education, she did so within the context of education for the female sex. Their entire identity became wrapped up in their gender. But what did their femininity encompass? A certain turn of phrase, mentioning their gender in private correspondence, and even assuming definitions of themselves all contributed to their unique way of viewing the female sex. Femininity, and everything associated with it, composed their identity. They did not view their lives or their circumstances as opposed to men, but to other women. The female gender existed within its own definition and did not step outside the boundaries and into those of men.

But instead of the Revolution bringing about a radical shift in this role, the years preceding it caused gender to become even more defined. "Changes in household work gendered the home in new ways. The time and labor commitment to housewifery expanded as women adapted to changes in cooking, the consumer revolution, and a rising standard of living." Due to these developments, women began to perform functions mostly within the home instead of helping their husband in the fields or other outside labor. Because women retreated to the home, it became further entrenched within their gender that domestic duties were the woman’s sphere. Although this differed in each household, it remained the basis for colonial society. As an example of these varying circumstances, widows or single women in Philadelphia would perform the duties of both sexes since the patriarchal element did not exist within their household. In married households, the man would most likely do the jobs attributed to his gender as the patriarchal society demanded. However, in Karin Wulf’s study of women in colonial Philadelphia, she argues that a significant amount of women lived in households in which the patriarchal system deviated from its traditional role. But “countervailing trends, including economic and demographic factors, dissenting theologies and political philosophies, sentiment, and the expansion of public culture, meant that a culture of household governance could develop quite differently in different places.” Philadelphia, one of the nation’s leading urban communities, undoubtedly contributed to this unique blend of public and private spheres.

How, then, did gender and the female identity figure into patriotism and political expression during the Revolution? Gender and political expression became irrevocably entwined. Women formed themselves into groups such as the Whig Association of the Unmarried Ladies of America in Lancaster, Pennsylvania. This association specifically relied on their gender to establish a pledge not to “give their hand in marriage to any gentleman until he had first proved himself a patriot.” Not only did this personify the domestic role of a woman fulfilling her gender’s obligations to become a wife, but it also established a political voice for women. In essence, they used their unique traits to advance their political views. But what were these traits? According to an article of the day, women were “much more pure, tender, delicate, irritable, affectionate, flexible, and patient” as well as “modest, chaste, cheerful, sympathetic, affable, and emotional: in brief, they displayed what was commonly termed ‘native female softness.’” In essence, they were the very opposite of the ‘harder’ male traits. Although they were sometimes allowed into the male arena of labor and business, politics still remained relatively within the grasp of men in the public sphere.

However, with the advent of the war, the public sphere of politics slowly but surely began to infiltrate the private and domestic sphere. Because of the overwhelming affect of the war in so many areas of life, women necessarily became involved with politics. Those who stayed behind while their loyalist husbands fled or who urged their husbands and sons to fight for the colonial cause exhibited such political notions. Those who expressed politics in a more forward manner were praised for them, but were, at the same time, viewed as having a “‘masculine’ quality of mind.” Superiority in the public political realm still belonged to men. Furthermore, as Mary Beth Norton argues, “In the process of thus praising specific females, their admirers thereby distinguished them from ordinary representatives of the “fair sex,” who suffered by the comparison.” Since the female identity, as argued earlier, was shaped by comparing one’s attributes to other women, those who expressed the superiority of having a ‘masculine’ mind effectively suppressed the female sex. Perhaps it was this attitude, then, that caused women to ask forgiveness for even thinking politically.

It is interesting to note the wide array of women’s written examples apologizing for their gender when speaking of politics. Ann Gwinnett, widow of the president of Georgia, wrote a warning to the Continental Army of possible traitorous activities in the ranks of the Georgia troops. At the end of her letter, she confessed, “These things (tho from a Woman, & it is not our sphere, yet I cannot help it) are all true.” Even those women who came from deeply political families made their apologies in discussing them. Sarah Livingston Jay and her sister Catherine were the daughters of the wartime governor of New Jersey. Yet in their correspondence, they, too, felt themselves inadequate when dealing in politics. “I’ve transgress’d the line that I proposed to observe in my correspondence by dipping into politicks,” Sarah wrote, “but my country and my friends possess so entirely my thoughts that you must not wonder if my pen runs beyond the dictates of prudence.” But there were also those few women who immersed themselves in politics and made no apologies for it. Mercy Otis Warren, a great friend of Abigail Adams, exemplified this attitude. She wrote not only satirical plays of the war, but also a three-volume history of the Revolution entitled History of the Rise, Progress, and Termination of the American Revolution. Politics, for her, saturated daily life.

Even though politics began to assert importance to the female gender, overt political declarations, usually reserved for men, were not welcomed. As Joan Gunderson points out, “The active participation of women in the Revolutionary War was effectively masked by the new domestic ideology.” Even though women began to mobilize for the patriotic cause, they did so in a domestic atmosphere where criticism of women in politics would not be nearly as likely. Since they stayed within their domestic sphere, they effectively avoided entering directly into the male sphere of male-oriented political action. Indeed, if women were given the right to exercise political power, “they might ‘destroy the peace of Families.’” Thus, women had to turn to other avenues. The Daughters of Liberty in Boston, a parallel to the Sons of Liberty, illustrates this notion. A Boston newspaper reported that “a party of some forty or fifty ladies, calling themselves the Daughters of Liberty, met at the home of the Rev. Mr. Morehead, where they amused themselves during the day by spinning ‘222 skeins of yarn, some very fine’.” These spinning bees became a definitive way of expressing political mobilization throughout the colonies without leaving the domestic sphere. Men undoubtedly did not dispute these gatherings simply because it did not tread outside of the women’s traditional role. Therefore, women used their gender to their advantage, relying on tried and true methods of femininity to pursue their political ideals.

Esther De Berdt Reed utilized her role as the wife of the governor of Pennsylvania to begin a popular woman’s organization during the War. A native Englishwoman, Esther determined herself an American patriot soon after she moved to Philadelphia with her American husband, Joseph Reed. During the autumn of 1774, she entertained some of the members of the First Continental Congress, among them George Washington and John and Samuel Adams. On this occasion, a delegate from Connecticut remarked that Esther was “a Daughter of Liberty, zealously affected in a good Cause.” Esther began to immerse herself in American politics and even corresponded with her brother, Dennis, back in England regarding the political situation of her adopted homeland. Invariably, she discussed her own political conclusions. One can see her transformation from an Englishwoman to an American patriot. “This preposition for independence would have alarmed almost every person on the Continent a twelve-month ago, but now the general voice is, if the Ministry and the Nation will drive us to it, we must do it, rather than submit, after so many public resolutions to the contrary.”

Even though Esther’s domestic role as wife and mother filled her days, she still acknowledged her feelings over the conflict and did not apologize for her views. In correspondence to both her husband and her brother, she openly expressed political thoughts and ideas. Esther was perhaps rare for her time as many women used their gender as an apologetic device to assure men, and perhaps other women, that they simply did not understand or regularly discuss politics. She apparently chose not to follow the traditional role of experiencing politics through the men around her. One could not be directly involved if not allowed to hold public office and sit in on Congress. This passion is revealed in a letter she wrote to her brother in which she discussed her concern with politics. “You may judge…how interesting politics are, when they employ so much of my thoughts and attention, [even though] now I am surrounded with family concerns; however, they are important to me, particularly as I have a share in both countries and am interested in the welfare of both.” Esther used her domestic role, as she did in entertaining the members of the Continental Congress, to further her own opinions and ideas about the Revolution. The couple shared their love of politics as Joseph soon became elected governor of Pennsylvania in 1778.

After the devastating fall of Charleston in 1780, Esther decided to organize a fundraising campaign. With morale at a perilous low among the Continental Army, Esther saw a need for colonial women to contribute to the Cause. The publication of her document, The Sentiments of an American Woman, on June 10, 1780, signaled the beginning of the women’s organizational movement in Philadelphia. The document asserted that American women needed to do more than just offer their good wishes to the troops. She proceeded to mention some of the great women activists in history, such as Joan of Arc, Elizabeth I and Catherine the Great. But Esther also realized how critical her statements were to women’s roles since it directly challenged the feminine sphere and, in effect, that sphere’s boundaries. But the document helped to broaden the private sphere by effectively spilling its ideas over into the public sphere. Before Sentiments, the display of political mobilization in conjunction with the Revolution itself had largely remained within the home. Supporting the men-folk and waving them off to war remained high on the list of exhibiting female patriotism. But before the first shots at Lexington, boycotting British goods had previously been a female activity. Such activity was needed again “to display the same sentiments which animated us at the beginning of the Revolution, when we renounced the use of teas.” In other words, distinctly feminine political consciousness needed to be shown. But it had to be demonstrated in a non-threatening manner, a manner unique to females and within their domestic role, both in public and in private.

Esther also knew the impact Sentiments might have on American males. In such a patriarchal society, those of the opposite gender might very well feel threatened. Therefore, she wisely worded her document. Since some men might perhaps “disapprove” of women taking an active role in a more political realm, she proclaimed that those who objected would simply not fit the role of a “good citizen.” Those men who understood the soldier’s needs could, she wrote, “only applaud our efforts for the relief of the armies which defend our lives, our possessions, our liberty.” Esther knew very well the role that women were expected to play and did not wish to upset the balance. But she also realized her statements might be seen as controversial since it directly challenged women to be and do more for the cause. Sentiments did more than perhaps even Esther envisioned. It effectively placed politics squarely within the domestic sphere and in so doing, sought to encourage women to become active through their domestic role. Instead of merely displaying “those softer domestic virtues,” those women who actively showed such virtues, as in collecting money for the Continental Army, would be the more ardent patriot.

The women of Philadelphia soon showed their support and enthusiasm for Esther’s project and 36 of them met three days after the publication of Sentiments. Benjamin Franklin’s daughter, Sarah Franklin Bache, became instrumental in the Association’s formation. As the organization’s leaders included “the best ladies” of the patriot cause, publicity also became instrumental in spreading the word.

They did not devise a plan solely for the women of Philadelphia. Instead, their proposed draft would involve all the colonies in a nation-wide fund-raiser carried out completely through the efforts of patriotic women. As it stood, the ladies “proposed the mobilization of the entire female population. Contributions would be accepted from any woman, in any amount.” But they were quite careful to make sure the funds were well accounted for. A ‘Treasuress’ for each county oversaw the collection of money while keeping highly detailed records. In turn, a ‘Treasuress-General,’ the wife of the governor, headed each state’s county treasuresses. Martha Washington would ultimately receive the sum total and she in turn would use the funds to benefit the troops. The striking aspect of this plan is the single restriction the women placed on how the money would be spent. “It is an extraordinary bounty,” they wrote in Ideas, an appendix to the Sentiments document, “intended to render the condition of the soldier more pleasant, and not to hold place of the things which they ought to receive from the Congress, or from the States.” Women asserted their views once more in this simple statement. Knowing that Congress owed the Continental Army a good deal, they sought to provide something ‘really useful’ to the men out in the field. The plan proposed by Sentiments and Ideas also “paralleled the formal political institutions run by men.”

The Ladies Association revolved around their expertise in emulating their husband’s political mobilization. They had “organized a committee of correspondence, used newspapers for publicity, and tapped interstate social networks. Their system of treasurers made use of existing male political boundaries and assumed that wives of state leaders themselves had leadership duties.” Even though they were not dealing with legislative politics, they knew exactly how to undertake their venture into the realm of public politics.

Women instigated and formed their own political institutions and thus their own political identity. Indeed, “Western political theory had provided no context in which women might comfortably think of themselves as political beings.” But Philadelphia might have been rather unique in its treatment of women and politics before the Revolution. According to Karin Wulf in her book Not All Wives, “a close look…at the development of political culture within Philadelphia specifically shows that the political culture accommodated female political authority before mid-century.” But during the years during and following the Stamp Act Crisis, the political culture began to become more and more masculinized. As the concerns of the entire colonies began to overshadow local concerns in Philadelphia, “the gender of political culture was transformed.” In just one example, before the Revolution, the officials of Philadelphia wished to implement policies to distinguish “male independence from female dependence,” in the realm of urban poverty that catered to men. These policies dismissed the greater problem of women’s poverty. It became part of a growing trend. Thus, independent women, those who were unmarried or independent by law, “figuratively and literally disappeared from view.”

When the Revolution began, war emphasized the male role in new ways for colonial America. As Linda Kerber argues, military service, suffrage, and “their understanding of self, honor, and shame” all contributed to the idea of citizenship for men in relation to the republic. However, citizenship for women remained to be defined. Sentiments attempted to address this issue.

With the patriotic fervor of Sentiments to uphold them, the women of Philadelphia wasted no time in beginning their campaign. Traveling in pairs, they immediately began to solicit donations door to door. They also divided the city into ten equal districts and requested donations from “each woman and girl without any distinction.” Their higher social standing did much to elevate their cause. Esther, wife of the governor of Pennsylvania and Sarah Franklin Bache, daughter of one of the most well-known and prominent men in America, undoubtedly gave them more confidence in their quest.

Since the American army had just recently re-taken Philadelphia, the women found numerous loyalist families packing and preparing to leave. But they did not hesitate to knock on loyalists’ doors, producing mixed reactions. Loyalist Anna Rawle Clifford saw the women in quite a different light. She described them as “so extremely importunate that people were obliged to give them something to get rid of them.” Women also utilized their feminine charms to extract money as Linda Kerber states, “they were not above teasing and flirting to get contributions, reminding those who were unenthusiastic that it was rude to refuse anything to pretty women.” Indeed, Anna Rawle Clifford described the scene of seeing Sarah Franklin Bache and other women going about their duty. They “…paraded down the streets…some carrying ink stands; nor did they let the meanest ale house escape. The gentleman were also honoured with their visits. Bob Wharton declares he was never so teased in his life. They reminded him of the extreme rudeness of refusing anything to the fair sex; but he was inexorable and pleaded want of money, and the heavy taxes, so at length they left him, after threatening to hand his name down to posterity with infamy.” Although obviously biased from a Loyalist perspective, Clifford’s view illustrates the eighteenth-century mindset towards women. Using their ‘feminine charms’ to their advantage displayed their attunement with their identity. It was a unique part of women’s patriotism and they understood it fully. Whether the men did or not remained to be seen. George Washington himself had called female patriotism “the love of country…blended with those softer domestic virtues.” But Abigail Adams deemed the fund-raising event “a highly significant contribution to the war effort” and proceeded to notice the spirit of women’s patriotism sweeping through the country. “Read the Pensilvania papers,” she wrote in a letter to John Thaxter, “and see the Spirit catching from state to state.”

It appears the women exploited their “soft” virtues to their full advantage. By the end of the fund-raising campaign in early July, the women had collected more than $300,000 continental dollars. When converted to specie, it amounted to approximately $7500. But it was not merely residents of colonial America who responded to the call. General Marquis de La Fayette admired the model the Philadelphia ladies created, donating 100 guineas on behalf of his wife, the Marquess. In a letter accompanying the money dated July 25, 1780, the Marquis wrote, “In Admiring the New Resolution in which the fair ones of Philadelphia have taken the Lead, I am induced to feel for those American ladies who Being out of the Continent cannot participate in this patriotic measure…May I most humbly present myself as her Ambassador to the Confederate ladies, and solicit in her Name that Mrs President Be pleased to accept of her offering.”

The Ladies Association took their mission quite seriously. They meticulously recorded the names of those who donated and the amount. All in all, the women had collected from 1,645 residents of Philadelphia as well as the small communities surrounding it. Indeed, women even “sold jewelry and converted other trinkets into something more serviceable” in order to contribute.

To look at these statistics only illustrates women’s dedication in supporting the Continental Army. It also demonstrated patriotism in a way men had not. In a letter Esther Reed wrote to General Washington, explaining the amount of money collected, she states, “…although it has answered our expectations, it does not equal our wishes, but I am persuaded the money will be received as a roof of our zeal for the great cause of America and our esteem and gratitude for those who so bravely defend it.”

In considering the evidence of those who participated and those who recorded their reactions to the Association, it is evident these women held deep beliefs concerning the Revolution and wished to express their patriotism in a way appropriate to the domestic sphere. Such a fund-raising campaign might not have been as successful if men had undertaken the role. Indeed, their very gender contributed enormously to their success. Femininity was a powerful weapon in persuading Americans to give donations to the Cause. A Ladies Association participant wrote to her friend describing the patriotism expressed in the fund-raising campaign. In an anonymous letter dated July 6, 1780, she wrote, “It will suffice to inform you, that we have been witnesses of scenes of patriotism extremely affecting, and capable of inflaming the coldest minds with love of the public good; I have learned more than ever to respect my countrywomen, and there is no title in which I shall hereafter more glory than in that of an American woman (original emphasis).”

But as Mary Beth Norton points out, the fund-raising campaign in Philadelphia also had various other symbolic goals besides collecting money for the troops. One who participated in the fund-raising stated that the “canvassers hoped that the ‘general beneficient’ subscription would ‘produce the happy effect of destroying intestine discords, even to the very last seeds.’” This anonymous participant continued by saying they wished to give those ladies who had consorted with the enemy during the Occupation of Philadelphia a chance of “relinquishing former errors and of avowing a change of sentiments by their contributions to the general cause of liberty and their country.”

  During the British Occupation, women such as Rebecca Franks openly flaunted their Loyalist sympathies and became the reigning belles of Philadelphia during the party-like atmosphere of 1777-1778. But upon the American’s return to the city, the very same women were not ousted. Indeed, they continued to be invited to the parties of American commanders. Apparently the women of the Ladies Association sought to mend this rift that had appeared in Philadelphian society. They undoubtedly felt a return to republican virtue essential. Although this notion of republican motherhood manifested more towards the end of the war and in the years following, displaying virtue during wartime still became an important attribute of women. The Ladies Association sought to reinstate the notion of republican virtue to those women of Philadelphia who had blatantly consorted with the enemy during the Occupation.

With the Association focusing the majority of their fund-raising efforts on women by women, they effectively created a discourse for political discussion between females. Since they based much of their identity on their femininity, it only made sense to keep in step with this identity and rally colonial women to reflect upon their patriotism and their loyalty to or against their country. More importantly, the Ladies Association did not seek to just encourage this patriotism within Philadelphia alone. Instead, they sought to inspire women in other colonies to emulate their example.

Other colonies, including Maryland, New Jersey, and Virginia, organized women-driven fundraisers. In the course of twelve days, they raised more than $15,000. To exhibit the dedication of some of these women, it is fitting to mention the patriotic spirit of New Jersey native Mrs. Rhoda Smith Farrand who “rode around her part of the country in an oxcart, urging women to knit socks for the soldiers. She knitted as she rode and in a single week delivered to the American camp 133 pairs of socks.” The donations from these colonies’ fund-raisers was directly transmitted to George Washington to do with as he saw fit.

But Esther Reed had not relinquished the Association’s funds so easily. In their Ideas, the women placed a restriction on the money. She wrote to General Washington of their pledge to “render the condition of the soldier more pleasant.” After Washington received the letter stating the total amount of funds raised for the Army, he wrote back to Esther in a letter dated July 14, 1780, “If I am happy in having the concurrence of the Ladies, I would propose the purchasing of course Linnen, to be made into Shirts, with the whole amount of their subscription. A Shirt extraordinary to the Soldier will be of more service, and do more to preserve his health than any other thing that could be procured him; while it is not intended, nor shall exclude him, from the usual supply which he draws from the public. This appears to me, to be the best mode for its application, and provided it is approved of by the Ladies.”

Washington undoubtedly wished to use the money to purchase those articles that Congress should have provided simply because Congress had not provided them. As a measure of the conditions of the army during the winter encampment of 1779-1780 prior to the women’s fund-raising venture, it is important to look at the account of James Thacher, a surgeon in the Continental Army. “March. The present winter is the most severe and distressing which we have ever experienced…Our soldiers are in a wretched condition for the want of clothes, blankets and shoes; and these calamitous circumstances are accompanied by a want of provisions…The causes assigned for these extraordinary deficiencies, are the very low state of public finances, in consequence of the rapid depreciation of the continental currency…”

Through her husband Joseph, Esther became aware of the deplorable condition of the army. Washington had appealed to Joseph for help in May of 1780 in which he called the state of the country “in a state of insensibility” and “indifferent” to the crisis. With their close relationship, Joseph shared these developments with Esther and this undoubtedly inspired her to begin the Ladies Association. If Esther had not held such an open political discourse with her husband, it is doubtful she would have been compelled to organize the fund-raising campaign.

After a series of letters in which Esther and General Washington debated about the final use of the money, he launched onto the subject of what the soldiers would appreciate. “Soldiers woud not be so much gratified by bestowing an article to which they look upon themselves entitled from the public as in some other method which woud convey more fully the Idea of a reward for past Services & incitement to future Duty.”

Perhaps Esther believed such an argument spoke to Washington’s sense of women’s patriotism. In accepting money from the women of America, soldiers undoubtedly would be more inspired to defend their country. It also fell within the boundaries of a woman’s traditional role: the weaker sex in need of protection and loyalty from the men of America. She proposed to give each soldier two dollars to do with as he pleased. But at the same time, she also stressed she had no wish to challenge the authority of the general. “This method I hint only,” she added, “but would not be any means wish to adopt that or any other without your full approbation.” Once more Esther clung to her identity as the obedient female. But in merely suggesting this particular argument, she also revealed the way in which she, personally, had loosened the bonds of the patriarchal society. If Esther had not held such a relatively equal relationship with her husband, it is doubtful she would have protested the use of the money to fit the Association’s prescribed needs.

After several more letters between Esther and Washington in which she continually pressed her case regarding the funds dispersal, Esther received a letter from the general urging her to reconsider because the army was in strict need of shirts. Esther wrote to her husband in a letter dated August 22, 1780, of her acceptance of using the money for Washington’s purposes. “I received this morning a letter from the General, and he still continues his opinion that the money in my hands should be laid out in linen; he says no supplies he has at present, or has a prospect of, are any way adequate to the wants of the army.” However, the tone of his last letter to Esther exhibited far more formality than the others, suggesting his annoyance at being asked his opinion again on the proper distribution of the money. As Paul Engle writes, “It was unlikely that very many Americans of either sex asked the general to reconsider any decision.” After receiving this letter, Esther made the necessary arrangements to purchase the linen to make shirts for the soldiers. The Association soon began the monumental sewing task. It likely resembled the numerous sewing bees so prevalent in colonial society. It also was a distinctly feminine activity, harkening back to the domestic sphere of women. Unfortunately, even though the Association had tried to forge an independent path for women by organizing the nation-wide fund-raiser, they remained glued to the domestic sphere and became termed, as one historian said, “General Washington’s Sewing Circle.”

  But the woman who had envisioned and structured the entire organization died before she could see its completion. Already weakened by the birth of her last child, a bout with smallpox, and her anxieties over the war and her husband’s safety, Esther died of acute dysentery on September 22, 1780, a mere two weeks after the shirts began to be manufactured. Sarah Franklin Bache, Benjamin Franklin’s daughter, took over the Association and by early December, more than two-thousand shirts had been completed. A Frenchman, the Marquis de Chastellux, visited Sarah’s house and stated, “On each shirt was the name of the married or unmarried lady who made it.” The shirts were delivered to General Washington’s army in late December, just in time for Christmas.

Esther’s obituary exalted her. One passage mentioned her death might have occurred because she had “imposed on herself too great a part of the task” of the Ladies Association, but that “she is received into the paradise of female patriotism with supereminent distinction.” But the most noteworthy notation in the obituary mentioned a quality soon to be attributed to women on a far grander scale: virtue. Indeed, “the workmanship ‘of their own labour’ was truly ‘an effort of virtue.’”

But what is key to the symbol of virtue with women is its significance to their domestic abilities and their sphere within the home. The war did not lead women such as Abigail Adams or Esther Reed to “question the traditional model of women or to change their image.” What the war did do, however, was to reinforce the domestic role of women but add another dimension to its foundation. Thus, the new rhetoric of Republican Motherhood came into being and virtue threaded its way into the very fabric of its meaning. The Ladies Association of Philadelphia sought to find a way to help support the soldiers of the Continental Army, certainly. But they also sought to express their patriotic visions in a society where the declarations of politics by women were limited to the private sphere. Indeed, those women who wished to be a wife and mother as well as an independent political being “would need to persuade a hostile public that expressive political behavior did not threaten the traditional domestic domain.”

Republican Motherhood helped shape a new role that fit neatly within the context of all a woman represented. Linda Kerber points out in her essay “The Revolution and Women’s Rights” that “women would keep the republic virtuous by maintaining the boundaries of the political community” by keeping a steady and watchful eye on the political behavior of the men in their families.

But unfortunately, even though the Ladies Association did contribute greatly to General Washington’s army, their overall role in the way the female gender became viewed during and following the Revolution was not as successful. They had not yet earned the respect of being a fully functional, politically-minded human being – i.e. a man. In Washington’s “thank you” speech to the women, he said the women’s contributions put them on equal footing with “any of who have preceded them in the walk of female patriotism,” and, he continued, their “love of country is blended with those softer domestic virtues, which have always been allowed to be more peculiarly your own (original emphasis).” Even though Washington’s thank-you was sincere, he relied on the general concept of female patriotism evident during the eighteenth-century. Women did not figure into Enlightenment theory as “the major theorists of the Enlightenment, the Whig Commonwealth, and the republican revolution had not explored the possibility of including women as part of the people”

Therefore, women’s patriotic feminism could only be compared to other female patriotic feminism throughout history. Nowhere did Washington mention on an equal footing with patriotism itself. This idea simply did not yet exist. Women’s place remained within the home. Although they could express their patriotism outside the home, it had to be consistent with the identity of a woman and her domestic role.

The Ladies Association of Philadelphia did more than fund-raise. Their success lies within the determination of colonial women to support the Revolution by expressing their political views through a sphere acceptable to their identity. Women of patriarchal colonial America knew their place to be within the home and most did not challenge this notion. But what the Association did offer was an arena for women to safely express their views without questioning their domestic role. It also showed the sheer determination of women to become active participants in a Revolution that would eventually leave them with an independent nation. Although they broadened the domestic sphere, it would be some time before women took politics into the male-dominated arena. Even then, their roles would be challenged within society.

__MACOSX/Supplemental Readings/._Melissa Marsh, The Purest Patriotism.doc

Supplemental Readings/Peter Marshall, Radicals Conservatives the American Revolution.pdf

The Past and Present Society

Radicals, Conservatives and the American Revolution Author(s): Peter Marshall Source: Past and Present, No. 23 (Nov., 1962), pp. 44-56 Published by: Oxford University Press on behalf of The Past and Present Society Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/649947 Accessed: 21/09/2008 22:52

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RADICALS, CONSERVATIVES AND THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION

THE AGE OF REFORM, T0 EMPLOY PROFESSOR HOFSTADTER'S characterization of the United States between I890 and I940) saw the emergence of historical research as a professional activity, the systematic and rigorous investigation of the American past by scholars whose achievements were more influenced by contemporary developments outside their discipline than most cared to admit. Undoubted advances in the collection and analysis of sources overshadowed the assumptions and attitudes on which the new interpretations rested, but only recently has the widespread acceptance of these founding works of modern Revolutionary historiography been directly challenged. It would be entirely premature to announce that Andrews, Gipson, Beard, Becker, Jameson and Schlesinger are now discredited, for there are many historians who, with whatever qualifications and elaborations, regard the study of the Revolution as proceeding from their contributions. But it cannot be ignored that in the last ten years a distinct reaction has developed against uncritical acceptance of opinions and conclusions which had neared the category of established truths. While this querying of orthodoxy is varied and incomplete, composed of a series of individual dissents of a widely differing nature, it has achieved the salutary effect of stimulating debate on the causes and nature of the Revolution.

Since orthodoxy rests so commonly on tacit acceptance and announces itself most forcibly when specifically rejected, it is difficult, faced with the piecemeal criticisms recently offered and barely refuted, to provide a concise and impartial definition of the extensive and far from cohesive array of literature called in question. Two fundamental emphases, startling innovations when introduced, dubious commonplaces today, might be regarded as central to the present controversy. Andrews, Osgood, Gipson and their followers stressed the necessity of locating American development within the framework of the British Empire. Becker, Beard, Jameson, Schlesinger and their students rejected limited political and constitutional interpretations in favour of economic and social causes of revolution. Nineteenth-century historians such as George Bancroft, dwelling on the nationalist and constitutional roots of conflict, became outmoded, and later generations have tended, in uniting these two lines of approach, to acquire what might be

RADICALS, CONSERVATIVES AND THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 45

described, inevitably loosely, as a liberal international attitude to the American Revolution.

Disenchantment and opposition have proved the consequence of widely difering approaches and interests, to the extent that it is quite impossible to assume the existence of a rival school of interpretation. Time provides the sole unifying factor, removing the Progressive era to a distance at which its dominant beliefs, shared b many historians in those years, can be subjected to a cool and possibly disinterested scrutiny. Historians such as Beard, who drew no clear line between history and politics, commenting freely on both, and Arthur M. Schlesinger Sr., deeply committed to a liberal interpretation of the American past, have been subjected to exposure in a changed political and intellectual environment where their views no longer command universal respect. Liberalism in America has become a subject for analysis rather than celebration, and with this shift in emphasis there has developed a marked tendency to query the achievements of historians influenced by its assumptions. Richard Hofstadter, amongst the first to probe Beard's intellectua beliefs, has suggested that the American Progressive identified "reality" with a rough and sordid materialism. Beard's discovery of an economic motive for the making of the Constitution, and his attempt to prove that the dynamic force behind the Convention was the interest of personal property, and in particular the holders of public securities, can be aligned with the preoccupation of his contemporaries in locating concrete benefits concealed behind abstract principles. It seems reasonable to assume that a country emerging from a national preoccupation with its internal development, and racked with the economic and social strains born of bitter industrial conflict and unprecedented immigration, would wish, through its historians, to explore its origins in the light of the present. So Becker, Schlesinger and Beard stressed the disruptive tendencies in colonial society during the Revolutionary era, declaring that the struggle assumed dual aspects, to achieve home rule and decide who should rule at home, tracing the contributions and divisions of the colonial merchants in the growth of American resistance, and asserting that "the Constitution was essentially an economic document". To Andrews and Gipson, Whitehall became as important as Williamsburg, Fort William as significant as Castle William. Their achievement was to free the Revolution from historical parochialism.l

An understanding of the circumstances which lead a historian to his subject does not invalidate the exposition of his findings. It

46 PAST AND PRESENT NUMBER 23

would seem undeniable that the first generation of professional American historians bequeathed to their successors an altogether broader and deeper appreciation of the Revolution than had existed previously, and that the current tendency is to qualify severely the necessity) or even validity of this achievement. We have been led back to fundamental questions. Did the Revolution occur at all ? Thirty years ago, historians would not have troubled themselves with such a thought, but today the emphasis falls upon the limited causes and consequences ofthe Revolution. Professor Boorstin has declared that "it is my view that the major issue of the American Revolution was the true constitution of the British Empire, which is a pretty technical legal problem", and Professor Brown believes that it was "one of the unique (sic) revolutions in history - a revolution to preserve a democratic society rather than to acquire one, a revolution to prevent change rather than to promote it". The reduction of the Revolution to an upheaval which, whatever its ultimate origins and consequences, can be attributed by Professor Morgan immediately to the establishment of customs commissioners at Boston, and by Professor Clark to "a set of policies devised by the British Treasury and the methods by which those policies were enforced", illustrates the desire to emphasize the restricted and distinctive nature of the struggle for independence. Professor Palmer has felt it necessary to preface his discussion of events with the heading "The Revolution: Was There Any?", and, though finding that there was, posed a question that would have shocked and baffled many of his predecessors.2

The Revolution was limited, according to its recent interpreters, not only in its consequences, but also in its immediate scope, for it is generally agreed that social and economic conflicts have received undue attention. Brown's study of the political structure of eighteenth-century Massachusetts led him to conclude that the great majority of adult white males qualified for the vote, that democracy, based upon an easily fulfilled franchise qualification reflecting a condition of broad economic equality, was firmly established, and that the colony was politically and economically united in its struggle for independence. No major economic or social tensions are admitted to exist. Morgan, unable to maintain such an extreme denial of internal conflict, feels that historians have been misguided in exaggerating "the divisions among Americans during a period in which the most remarkable and exciting fact was union. The modern historian's awareness of the importance of class conflict in his own time has led him, I think, to project some exclusively modern social

RADICALS, CONSERVATIVES AND THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 47

antagonism into the eighteenth eentury". Professor Hartz argues that the laek of a feudal past has made it impessible for Ameriean politieal eontroversy to follow European patterns, for eonservatism has remained rootless and liberalism, while triumphant, has failed to define its ereed sinee its adversaries remained nebulous. The absenee of this eonfliet has led to "the master assumption of Ameriean politieal thought . . . the reality of atomistie soeial freedom". To Boorstin, "it has never been quite elear . . . why historians would not have found our revolution signifieant enough merely as a victory of eonstitutionalism". Professor MeDonald, rejecting Beard's economie interpretation of the Constitution, suggests that "in a sense, a key to the history of the period is the breakdown of the noblest ideal of the Revolution, the coneept of a government of laws, and its replaeement by a resort to government of expedieney, government whieh eould exereise unlimited power on behalf of the majority of the people. The Constitution reversed this trend..." It is not surprising to find that referenees to Baneroft have now beeome more frequent and flattering: Morgan believes "that the Whig interpreta- tion of the Ameriean Revolution may not be as dead as some historians would have us believe, that George Baneroft may not have been so far from the mark as we have often assumed..." Others have reaehed similar eonclusions.3

That Ameriea knew soeial and economie antagonisms in this period seareely seems a point requiring proof, exeept possibly to Professor Brown. The signifieanee of these eonfliets and their relation to the revolutionary eonfliet provide issues for protraeted discussion. Were internal tensions sharpened or dulled by the struggle for independenee ? Were patriotism and democracy inseparable ? Few historians would now eare to give short answers to such questions. Clearly, the radiealism of eighteenth-eentury America was limited in its politieal aims. Dr. Herbert Aptheker, whose recent general aeeount of the Revolution provides the first sustained Marxist interpretation, stresses the eolonial rather than the social nature of the eonflict, and marks the removal of obstacles from the path of a developing capitalism that was, for its period, progressive, as a fundamental achievement of independence. Professor Jensen notes the reeruitment of the revolutionary leadership from all social levels, the general acceptance of property rights, and admits that "the popular leaders in the eolonies showed no interest in internal politieal and soeial ehange". But both Jensen and Aptheker would surely aeeept Palmer's conclusion that C'the struggle, whatever men said, and whatever has been said sinee, was inseparable from a struggle

48 PAST AND PRESENT NUMBER 23

between democratic and aristocratic forces".4 There remains a clear and unbridged gulf between those who interpret the Revolution as involving a fundamental ideological conflict and those who have revived the theme of immanent nationhood.

The problem may be less that of choosing than of allocating precedence between aspects of the Revolutionary movement that at differing periods assumed varying importance. In the last fifteen years of British rule internal tensions are more prominent than intimations of nationality. It was not the absence but the steady growth of a graduated social structure that distinguished the last years of colonial status, while the recent rise of many to positions of superiority inhibited the acceptance of a fixed relationship between rich and poor and bred fear and resentment on both sides. Professor Bridenbaugh has suggested that by I760 the mercantile aristocracy had reached its peak, to be challenged from within its ranks in the next fifteen years by would-be equals, makers of fortunes during the French and Indian war, and from without by urban tradesmen and mechanics, restless under economic depression and political domination. Imperial policies added to the general discontent. The newly prosperous, uncertain of personal and social status, attached themselves to the growing body of British oicials in the colonies, and in consequence "long-festering class antagonisms could now be detected in daily social interchanges, religious activities, the pursuit of diversions, and even in taverns and round and about the towns". By I774 the choice between loyalty and rebellion was related to a willingness to assume the risks inherent in tlle support of democracy or a determination to maintain the guarantee of social protection offered by allegiance to the Crown.5 In the last years of British rule the American colonies were distinguished by internal conflicts, the Prendergast riots in New York and the Regulator movement in North Carolina; incessant disputes over provincial boundaries, New York and New Hampshire laying claim to Vermont, Connecticut settlers occupying the Wyoming valley to the fury of Penllsylvania, Virginia seizing control of the Pittsburgh region and on the verge of hostilities with Pennsylvanian adherents; an imperial administration in growing disrepute and of steadily lessening efficacy giving rise to conditions in which internal tensions could be readily revealed. It is possible that the Revolution, far from expressing national unity, emerged as an essential aid to its creation, turning a negative posture of resistance to imperial rule into a positive necessity to create a new nation for the defence of American liberty. Professor Brown would reject this suggestion, since he believes Massachusetts

RADICALS, CONSERVATIVES AND THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 49

to have been united in its resistance to imperial authority in the years before the Revolution. Whether the letters and despatches of imperial officials, which provide a great part of his evidence, can be accepted by any student of British imperial history as positive proof of the solidarity of the opposition to colonial rule is a matter of opinion and occasion.

The war years have been largely explored by historians concerned with the military fortunes and heroic infancy of the new nation. In consequence, social and economic issues have been largely ignored. The Loyalists have suffered the frequent fate of the defeated: indifference, displayed in equal measure by the descendants both of their enemies and of their always lukewarm British allies. With the exception of Dr. Yoshpe's study of Southern New York no systematic study has been published on the material consequences of the Loyalist emigration. Before the extent and effect of Loyalism can be assessed much more evidence is required. The destruction wrought by occupation of the seaports, the continual process of inflation that marked Continental finance, provide additional factors of economic disorder that make it seem certain that conditions favoured, even compelled, extensive social and economic change. These aspects of the war years have received little attention. Dr. East's study of business enterprise forms a valuable introduction to a subject which deserves and requires further investigation. Manufacturing, loosed from imperial restraints and rendered essential to the war effort has been almost totally neglected. Finance, banking, land speculation, attempts to regulate the war economy, are themes now attracting historians, but which are unlikely to be exhausted for many years.6

The apparent absence of internal conflict suggests that war, in one respect, proved less distracting than peace. Explanations of this period of relative harmony have turned on the disruption of dominant social groups; the ease with which potential spokesmen for discontent could be absorbed within the upper levels of a mobile society; the widespread distribution of property and a numerically overwhelming concentration upon agriculture; the elimination of the most deter- mined conservatives through adherence to the Crown, and sufficient constitutional advance to blunt the edge of political unrest. Jensen, who has extended and elaborated Becker's view of the Revolution as comprising both an internal and external struggle, has explained the absence of radical programmes after I776 as a consequence of ideological exhaustion. Conservatives regarded a form of union as imperative, radicals held that democracy was secure only within a limited political and territorial extent and were restricted to the

NUMBER 23 5o PAST AND PRESENT

maintenance of state sovereignty. Radicalism, achieving this ambition, became passive, while the conservatives, reluctant rebels in terms of domestic change, actively sought a form of government that would simulate imperial authority and check radical power in the States: political activity during the war was therefore predominantly, under a constitution designed to guard state sovereignty, directed towards modifications that would lead to a national government. 7

The difficulty of devising an effective political terminology by which factions can be divided and described is both indicative of the confusion and complexity of revolutionary motives and of the subordination of internal to external conflicts. Many American leaders were radicals in action and conservative in philosophy: Washington, Franklin, John Adams, even Jefferson defy precise allocation to either category. Professor Douglass finds that Jefferson, despite his democratic reputation, did not advance significantly popular control of government through his legislative proposals in the Virginian Assembly between I776 and I779, and suggests that the provisions of his bill for legal reform comprise "mute evidence of an ingrained conservatism which contrasts strongly with the liberalism of his personal papers".8 Figures prominent in the radical agitations of the colonial period, Patrick Henry, Samuel Adams, Alexander McDougall, decline as figures of importance as swiftly as they had risen to fame. A revolution that was reluctant, on the part of many of its supporters, to admit its justification as other than an attempt to restore old liberties to new citizens was unlikely to attempt a deliberate and radical break with the past. The Revolution was at best potentially radical: conservative elements, if denied security, maintained strict limitations on change.

Peace and independence relaxed the restraints on internal conflicts and compelled consideration of formidable economic problems and political differences. War finance, with its inflationary consequences, made trade ha%ardous. Loyalist claims and pre-war debts to British merchants required settlement, or so some thought. The exclusion of ftmerican commerce from British regulations and privileges presented both difficulty and opportunity. Politically, the main- tenance under the Articles of Confederation of a central government was feasible only by persuasion and voluntary agreement. Domestic tensions and a demand for national government grew more apparent. The belief that the Constitution rescued the new nation from the brink of anarchy has, however, been firmly denied by Jensen. Government under the Articles of Confederation, previously only intermittently defended, is concluded to be a considerable success.

RADICALS, CONSERVATIVES AND THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 5 I

The defence of the Confederation creates the problem of the Constitution. If the development of the United States, as Jensen believes, was effectively undertaken in these years, why did the movement to reject the form of government succeed? It would seem that Jensen, while accepting Beard's analysis of economic differences in the years before the Constitution and agreeing that social and economic issues fundamentally divided the nation, is compelled to conclude that the opposition to the Articles of Confederation was primarily political. With Beard he records the victory of "a dynamic minority with a positive program", but depicts a campaign waged for political motives rather than, as Beard believed, ultimately ascribable to economic interests.9

It is almost fifty years since Charles Beard offered An Economic Interpretation of the Constitmtion and destroyed any belief in the Constitution as a selfless and timeless repository of political wisdom. After the protests of outraged conservatives had died away historians quietly accepted his conclusions and rendered them orthodox. Ove the last ten years the shift away from an emphasis upon economic factors, close scrutiny of Beard's assumptions and techniques, and a renewed respect for constitutional history have transformed opinions on the making of the Constitution. Three historians have subjected Beard's thesis to investigation. Brown, finding that Beard's account of Massachusetts differed entirely from his own conclusions, proceeded to convict Beard of deliberate mishandling of evidence in the interest of maintaining an untenable thesis. McDonald undertook the ambitious task of accepting Beard's approach, investigating all the sources used in the original interpretation, applying Beard's analytical methods, and then compared conclusions. He too, quite independently, concluded that no reliance could be placed on Beard's findings.l? While Brown's criticisms were contained within a largely controversial work, McDonald's enormous researches appeared to dispose ultimately of Beard's historical standing. His single aim had been to verify or reject Beard's interpretation and his judgement seemed both weighty and conclusive. Yet already the chorus of awed agreement has been shattered. In the wake of Brown and McDonald, Professor Benson can assert that "forty-seven years after Beard published his brilliant pioneering book, we still cannot confidently appraise his main hypothesis. At present, we can saa only that a convincing case has yet to be made, for or against it''. A controversy of great importance is under way.

There are no signs that it will be quickly resolved. Material must be assembled and the ground of debate defined. The apparent

52 PAST AND PRESENT NUMBER 23

lucidity of Beard's interpretation conceals, as Benson points out, a fundamental confusion between the economic interpretation of history and economic determinism. Beard regarded these concepts as interchangeable, though Edwin Seligman, whose writings Beard had drawn enthusiastically upon, had been at pains to distinguish between the environmental limitations imposed by the theory of economic interpretation and the fatalism implied in the, as he thought, fallacious doctrine of economic determinism. Benson argues that Beard's basic assumptions are therefore confused, but that by failing to recognize this difficulty Brown and McDonald have not accurately judged Beard's thesis. Their criticisms, erroneously based in the Erst instance, are vitiated by faults in methodology and argument, while Beard's pioneer role in extending historical techniques remains worthy of admiration. Benson, without asserting that Beard's interpretation remains wholly valid, refuses to accept the criticisms of Brown and McDonald as effective confirmation of error.

Clearly, it would be dangerous to offer more than an interim opinion on the merits of the case. There seems little doubt that damaging criticism has been levelled at Beard's distinction between the interests of real and personal property, and his assertion that the holders of public securities, representing a large proportion of the nation's personal property, were members of an economic interest that "must have formed a very considerable dynamic element, if not the prepond- erating element, in bringing about the adoption of the new system", will be much less readily accepted in future. The provision of a more satisfying explanation of the making of the Constitution remains to be undertaken.

Beard's critics do not deny that economic factors influenced the movement for a new Constitution. Brown feels, however, that it is impossible to differentiate groups on the basis of economic interest in a conflict that was not, in any case, very bitter; that the Constitution was a product of practical compromises reached in as democratic a fashion as could reasonably be expected, and that psychological influences should not be ignored. McDonald offers four pluralistic economic interpretations as possible hypotheses, seemingly favouring the suggestion that the making of the Constitution "was the expression of the prevailing popular ideology of the socially desirable or normal relationship between government and economy", which in practical terms involved the linking of mercantilist programmes long accepted by the colonies and States in a Union that still was limited by the general distrust of a strong political framework. Benson, inclined to extend rather than reject

RADICALS, CONSERVATIVES AND THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 5 3

Beardis interpretation) suggests that the existence and importance of non-economic influences on political behaviour should be given due recognitioIl, but that from the basic antagonism of commercial and agrarian communities, and their leanings towards a more effective national authority or the rigid limitation of central governmental powers, a social interpretation of the Constitution might emerge. All three agree that the process of ratification and the strength, composition and swaying of the popular vote require detailed investigation. 12

The political significance of the Constitution is also disputed, as historians fail to agree whether its introduction marks the triumph of a vigorous and alarmed minority, determined to erect economic and political safeguards against commercial chaos and democratic insurrection, or the recognitiorl, for the first time in effective institutional form, of American nationhood. Miss Cecelia Kenyon, in an article taking issue with Beard, has argued that the opponents of the Constitution were much more concerned with resistance to central power than in safeguarding democracy. "In a sense", she suggests, ;'the opponents of the Constitution were the conservatives of I787, and their opponents the radicals". Professor Morris finds "impressive evidence" to support this view, and McDonald agrees that the creation of a general government formed the only radical element of the Constitution. Although Morgan believes that tlle Constitution represented the confirmation rather than the forcible creation of national unity he holds that '<the most radical change produced in Americans by the Revolution was in fact not a division at all but the union of three million cantankerous colonists into a new nation''.l3 It seems evident that the radical aspect of the Revolution has been purloined by the nationalists. If this practice gains general acceptance we are left with the emergence of a nation as the central theme of a war of independence, which mustn it will be admitted) have involved certain social and economic dislocations. Was there a Revolution ?

Some historians are still conservative, radical or obstinate enough to hold that there was. Palmer points out that "certain Americans subverted their legitimate government, ousted the contrary-minded and confiscated their property, and set the example of a revolutionary program, through mechanism by which the people was deemed to act as the constituent power". This, in his opinion, amounts to a Revolution. Jensen and Aptheker attribute a wide variety of liberal and humanitarian reforms to the declaration of independence and equate the Revolution with a period of distiIlct democratic advance. 14

54 PAST AND PRESENT NUMBER 2 3

Politically it seems possible to stress either the conservative or thc radical aspects of the Revolution. The new nation was not seriously threatened with disintegration, but the change from colonial dependency to federal unity could not be achieved without disturbing and alarming conservative attitudes. The personal preferences of historians of the period may well decide which characteristic is emphasized. But if this problem is insoluble it is still possible to investigate the Revolution as a static or dynamic period. We do not know the extent or limits of change in the social and economic structure of America between I760 and I7go. Until some assessment has been made of the consequences of the Loyalist emigration, of the effects of the war on the American economy, of changed relations in international trade, of the removal of barriers to westward migration, it will remain impossible to estimate whether the period, irrespective of the hopes, fears and actions of political groups, saw a decisive development worthy of description as a revolution. Constitutionally it may remaill arguable that the events of I787 represented a revolution, a restoration or a logical development. Not until we are better informed of the significance or unimportance of the changes that occurred in tlle previous thirty years can we judge whetner these interpretations are distinguishable ol defensible. It is my guess that, after the work is done, we shall still have an American Revolution o our hands. Universirv of Bristol Peter Marshall

NOTES 1 Richard Hofstadter, "Charles Beard and the Constitution": First

published in I950 and reprinted in Charles A. Beard: An Appraisal, ed. H. K. Beale, (Lemington, I954), pp. 75-92. Carl Lotus Becker, The History of Political Parties in the Province of New York, [I909] (Madison, I960 edn.), p. 22. Arthur M. Schlesinger, The Colonial Merchants and the Americasz Revolution 1763-1776, [I9I8] (New York, I957 edn.). Charles A. Beard, An Econorstis Interpretation of the Constitution of the United States, [I9I3] (New York) T96I edn.) p. 324-

2 Daniel J. Boorstin, The Genius of American Politics, (Chicago, I953), p. 76. Robert E. Brown, Middle-Class Democracy and the Revolution in Massachusetts :1691-]780, (Ithaca, I955), p. 303. Edmund S. Morgan, l he Birth of the Republic 1/963-1789, (Chicago, I956), p. 36. Dora Mae Clark, The Rise of the British Treasury, (New Haven, I960), p. I. R. R. Palmer, The Age of tZle Democratic Revolution . . ., (Princetola, I959), p. I85.

3 Morgan, op. cit., p. I63. Lollis Hartz, The Liberal Tradition i?Z

America .... , (New York, I955), p. 62. E300rstin, op. cit., p. 68. Forrest

RADICALS, CONSERVATIVES AND THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 5 5

McDonald, We The People . . ., (Chicago, I958), p. 384. Edmund S. Morgan "The American Revolution: Revisions in Need of Revising", William and Mary Quarterl, 3rd Ser., xiv (I957), p. I3.

4Herbert Aptheker, The American Revolution 1iG3-1783, (London, I960), pp. 22, I26, 259-260. Merrill Jensen, The Articles of Confederation, (Second printing, Madison, I948), pp. Viii-iX. Merrill Jensen, "Democracy and the American Revolution", Huntington Library Quarterly, xx (I956-7), p. 327. Palmer, op. cit., p. 202. Professor Jensen, in the Preface to the Third Printing of The Articles of Confederation, (Madison, I959), p. XV, affirms his belief "that the war for independence was accompanied by a degree of democratization" though he concedes (pp. xx-xxi) that he would prefer to describe internal conflicts as occurring between "conservatives" and "popular leaders" rather than between "conservatives" and "radicals".

o Carl Bridenbaugh, Cities in Revolt? (New York, I955), pp. 28I-29I, 348-350. 6 Topics requiring fresh investigatlon are indicated by Frederick B. Tolles

"The American Revolution Considered as a Social Movement: a Re-evaluation" American Elistorical Review, lx (I954-5), pp. I-I2- Clarence L. Ver Steeg, "The American Revolution Considered as an Economic Movement", Huntington Library Qlxarterly, xx (I956-7), pp. 36I-372; and Edmund S. Morgan, "The American Revolution: Revisions in Need of Revising", William and Mary Quarterly, 3rd Ser*, xiv (I957), pp. 3-I5. Illustrations of the social and economic impact of the Revolution are to be found in Robert Abraham East Business Enterprise in the American Revolutionary Era, (New York, I938) particularly pp. 2I3-238; Oscar and Mary Flug Handlin, Commonwealth. . . Massachusetts 1774-1861, (New York, I947), pp. I-I9; Merrill Jensen, The New Nation . . ., (New York, I960), p. I83 ; and H. B. Yoshpe, Disposition of Loyalist Estates in the Southern District of the State of New York, (New York, I939). And see note on page 56.

7 Elisha P. Douglass, Rebels and Democrats . . ., (Chapel Hill, I955), pp. 3I7-3I9. Jensen, Articles of Confederation, passim.

8 Dollglass, op. cit., pp. 287-3I6. 9 Jensen, The New Nation, pp. I77, 260, 3I4, I94, 347-349. For a concise

historiographical account, see Richard B. Morris, "The Confederation Period and the American Historian", William and Mary Quarterly, 3rd Ser., xiii (I956),

pp. I39-I56.

10 Robert E. Brown, Charles Beard and the Constitution . . ., (Princeton I956). McDonald, op. cit., pp. 398-400.

11 Lee Benson, Turner and Beard . . ., (Glencoe, I960), p. I75. Jackson T. Main, "Charles A. Beard and the Constitution: A Critical Review of Forrest McDonald's We The People", William and Mary Quarterly, 3rd Ser., xvii (I960), pp. 86-I02 has attacked the accuracy and completeness of McDonald's research. In his view, the importance of economic divisions and the significance of holdings of public securities do not receive adequate attention or analysis. Therefore he concludes, "despite McDonald, it can be maintained that the Constitution was written by large property owners and that the division over its acceptance followed, to some extent, class lines" (pp. IOI- I02). McDonald replied with an admission of certain errors in detail, rejection of some points of criticism and a conclusion that "it seems to me even if I were as bad as Mr. Main makes out it remains a certainty that Beard's thesis cannot hold up", ibid., pp. I02-IIO.

12 Brown, Charles Beard, pp. I96-200. McDonald, op. cit., pp. 40I-4II. Benson, op. czt., pp. 2I5-226.

13 Cecelia M. Kenyon, "Men of Little Faith: The Anti-Federalists on the Nature of Representative Government", Williatn and Mary Quarterly, 3rd Ser., xii (I955), pp. 3-43. Morris, loc. cit., p. I56. McDonald, op. cit. p. 4I6. Morgan, Birth of the Republic, p. IOO.

14 Palmer, op. cit., pp. 232-235. Jensen, The New Nation, pp. I25-I48. Aptheker, op. cit., pp. 232-275.

56 PAST AND PRESENT NUMBER 23

NOTE ON SOME RECENT WORK

Two recent articles have continued the discussion on the extent and existence of the Revolution. Richard B. Morris, "Class Struggle and the American Revolution", William and Mary Quarterly, 3rd Ser. xix (I962), pp. 3-29 declares that "the nature of the American Revolution is still unsettled" considers that it "fails to qualify as a clear-cut class war", but concludes that "it must be recognized as a classic instance of a civil war". Professor Morris believes that great political reforms sternmed directly from the Revolution and that social and economic changes should be considered as "incidental though integral to the movement". Miss Cecelia M. Kenyon, "Republicanism and Radicalism in the American Revolution: An Old-Fashioned Interpretation" William and Mary Quarterly, 3rd Ser., xix (I962), pp. I53-I82 agrees that "in spite of generations of study, its [the Revolution's] essential nature remains obscure", and suggests that the terms "radical" and "conservative" have caused much confusion and should be used with great care, since the politics of the period were not marked by consistency in attitude. Miss Kenyon believes that "for all its pluralistic diversity, the American Revolution was still a revolution and it was radical", but later qualifies this to read "it was a limited revolution, and it was primarily a political movement. There were some social and economic repercussions ...." Awareness of the need to explore and explain neglected aspects of the subject may provide a means of escape from this central difficulty. Professor Morris, dissatisfied with the extent of our present knowledge in matters of social and economic mobility, has called for many detailed local studies. One such, Staughton Lynd, "Who Should Rule at Home ? Dutchess County, New York in the American Revolution", William and Mary Quarterly, 3rd Ser., xviii (I96I) concludes that war and property confiscation brought social and economic change to the county. Further investigations of this kind would be most valuable. The Loyalists are receiving attention. William Nelson, The American Tory, (Oxford I96I) and Peter Oliver's Origin and Progress of the American Rebellion: A Tory View, eds. Douglass Adair and John A. Schutz, (San Marino, Calif., I96I) are first fruits of a growing interest. Carl Bridenbaugh, Mitre and Sceptre, (New York, I962) provides fresh evidence in another neglected field. This study of the clash of Anglican and Dissenting interests in England and America between I690 and I775 stresses the contribution of religious issues to the growing sense of separ- ation in the colonies. It seems highly unlikely that interpretations of the Revolution will grow more amenable to reconciliation in the near future.

  • Article Contents
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    • p.45
    • p.46
    • p.47
    • p.48
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  • Issue Table of Contents
    • Past and Present, No. 23, Nov., 1962
      • Front Matter [pp.1-2]
      • The Failure of the French Medieval Estates [pp.3-24]
      • The Alienated Intellectuals of Early Stuart England [pp.25-43]
      • Radicals, Conservatives and the American Revolution [pp.44-56]
      • The Potato in Ireland [pp.57-71]
      • Review Article
        • The Background of Magna Carta [pp.72-83]
      • Notes and Comments [pp.84-86]
      • Back Matter

__MACOSX/Supplemental Readings/._Peter Marshall, Radicals Conservatives the American Revolution.pdf