need report based on 7 and 8 chapters only

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StrategicManagementTextandCases9thEdition.pdf111.pdf

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GREGORY G. DESS University of Texas at Dallas

GERRY McNAMARA Michigan State University

ALAN B. EISNER Pace University

SEUNG-HYUN (SEAN) LEE University of Texas at Dallas

text & cases

ninth edition

STRATEGIC MANAGEMENT

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STRATEGIC MANAGEMENT: TEXT AND CASES, NINTH EDITION

Published by McGraw-Hill Education, 2 Penn Plaza, New York, NY 10121. Copyright © 2019 by McGraw- Hill Education. All rights reserved. Printed in the United States of America. Previous editions © 2016, 2014, and 2012. No part of this publication may be reproduced or distributed in any form or by any means, or stored in a database or retrieval system, without the prior written consent of McGraw-Hill Education, including, but not limited to, in any network or other electronic storage or transmission, or broadcast for distance learning.

Some ancillaries, including electronic and print components, may not be available to customers outside the United States.

This book is printed on acid-free paper.

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 LWI 21 20 19 18

ISBN 978-1-259-81395-5 (bound edition) MHID 1-259-81395-9 (bound edition)

ISBN 978-1-259-89997-3 (loose-leaf edition) MHID 1-259-89997-7 (loose-leaf edition)

ISBN 978-1-259-89994-2 (instructor’s edition) MHID 1-259-89994-2 (instructor’s edition)

Portfolio Director: Michael Ablassmeir Lead Product Developer: Kelly Delso Product Developer: Anne Ehrenworth Executive Marketing Manager: Debbie Clare Content Project Managers: Harvey Yep (Core), Bruce Gin (Assessment) Buyer: Susan K. Culbertson Design: Matt Diamond Content Licensing Specialists: DeAnna Dausener (Image and Text) Cover Image: ©Anatoli Styf/Shutterstock Compositor: SPi Global

All credits appearing on page or at the end of the book are considered to be an extension of the copyright page.

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

Names: Dess, Gregory G., author. | McNamara, Gerry, author. | Eisner, Alan B., author. Title: Strategic management : text and cases / Gregory G. Dess, University of Texas at Dallas, Gerry McNamara, Michigan State University, Alan B. Eisner, Pace University. Description: Ninth edition. | New York, NY : McGraw-Hill Education, [2019] Identifiers: LCCN 2017052281 | ISBN 9781259813955 (alk. paper) Subjects: LCSH: Strategic planning. Classification: LCC HD30.28 .D4746 2019 | DDC 658.4/012—dc23 LC record available at https://lccn.loc.gov/2017052281

The Internet addresses listed in the text were accurate at the time of publication. The inclusion of a website does not indicate an endorsement by the authors or McGraw-Hill Education, and McGraw-Hill Education does not guarantee the accuracy of the information presented at these sites.

mheducation.com/highered

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To my family, Margie and Taylor and my parents, the late Bill and Mary Dess; and Michael Wood

To my first two academic mentors—Charles Burden and Les Rue (of Georgia State University)

–Greg

To my wonderful wife, Gaelen, my children, Megan and AJ; and my parents, Gene and Jane

–Gerry

To my family, Helaine, Rachel, and Jacob

–Alan

To my family, Hannah, Paul and Stephen; and my parents, Kenny and Inkyung.

–Sean

DEDICATION

dedication

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Gregory G. Dess is the Andrew R. Cecil Endowed Chair in Management at the University of Texas at Dallas. His primary research interests are in strategic management, organization- environment relationships, and knowledge management. He has published numerous articles on these subjects in both academic and practitioner-oriented journals. He also serves on the editorial boards of a wide range of practitioner-oriented and academic journals. In August 2000, he was inducted into the Academy of Management Journal’s Hall of Fame as one of its charter members. Professor Dess has conducted executive programs in the United States, Europe, Africa, Hong Kong, and Australia. During 1994 he was a Fulbright Scholar in Oporto, Portugal. In 2009, he received an honorary doctorate from the University of Bern (Switzerland). He received his PhD in Business Administration from the University of Washington (Seattle) and a BIE degree from Georgia Tech.

Gerry McNamara is the Eli Broad Professor of Management at Michigan State University. His research draws on cognitive and behavioral theories to explain strategic phenomena, including strategic decision making, mergers and acquisitions, and environmental assessments. His research has been published in the Academy of Management Journal, the Strategic Management Journal, Organization Science, Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, the Journal of Applied Psychology, the Journal of Management, and the Journal of International Business Studies. Gerry’s research has also been abstracted in the Wall Street Journal, Harvard Business Review, New York Times, Bloomberg Businessweek, the Economist, and Financial Week. He serves as an Associate Editor for the Strategic Management Journal and previously served as an Associate Editor for the Academy of Management Journal. He received his PhD from the University of Minnesota.

ABOUT THE AUTHORS

about the authors

©He GaoPhoto provided by the author

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Alan B. Eisner is Professor of Management and Department Chair, Management and Management Science Department, at the Lubin School of Business, Pace University. He received his PhD in management from the Stern School of Business, New York University. His primary research interests are in strategic management, technology management, organizational learning, and managerial decision making. He has published research articles and cases in journals such as Advances in Strategic Management, International Journal of Electronic Commerce, International Journal of Technology Management, American Business Review, Journal of Behavioral and Applied Management, and Journal of the International Academy for Case Studies. He is the former Associate Editor of the Case Association’s peer-reviewed journal, The CASE Journal.

Seung-Hyun Lee is a Professor of strategic management and international business and the Area Coordinator of the Organization, Strategy, and International Management area at the Jindal School of Business, University of Texas at Dallas. His primary research interests lie on the intersection between strategic management and international business spanning from foreign direct investment to issues of microfinance and corruption. He has published in numerous journals including Academy of Management Review, Journal of Business Ethics, Journal of International Business Studies, Journal of Business Venturing, and Strategic Management Journal. He received his MBA and PhD from the Ohio State University.

©Seung-Hyun Lee©Alan B. Eisner

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PREFACE

Welcome to the Ninth Edition of Strategic Management: Text and Cases! As noted on the cover, we are happy to introduce Seung- Hyun Lee to the author team. Greg has known Seung since we both joined the faculty at the University of Texas at Dallas in 2002. Seung has developed a very distinguished publication record in both strategic management and international business/international management and he has made many important contributions in these areas in the present edition. In particular, his international expertise has been particularly valuable in further “globalizing” our book.

We appreciate the constructive and positive feedback that we have received on our work. Here’s some of the encouraging feedback we have received from our reviewers:

The Dess book comprehensively covers the fundamentals of strategy and supports concepts with research and managerial insights.

Joshua J. Daspit, Mississippi State University

Very engaging. Students will want to read it and find it hard to put down.

Amy Grescock, University of Michigan, Flint

Very easy for students to understand. Great use of business examples throughout the text.

Debbie Gilliard, Metropolitan State University, Denver

I use Strategic Management in a capstone course required of all business majors, and students appreciate the book because it synergizes all their business education into a meaningful and understandable whole. My students enjoy the book’s readability and tight organization, as well as the contemporary examples, case studies, discussion questions, and exercises.

William Sannwald, San Diego State University

The Dess book overcomes many of the limitations of the last book I used in many ways: (a) presents content in a very interesting and engrossing manner without compromising the depth and comprehensiveness, (b) inclusion of timely and interesting illustrative examples, and (c) EOC exercises do an excellent job of complementing the chapter content.

Sucheta Nadkami, University of Cambridge

The content is current and my students would find the real-world examples to be extremely interesting. My colleagues would want to know about it and I would make extensive use of the following features: “Learning from Mistakes,” “Strategy Spotlights,” and “Issues for Debate.” I especially like the “Reflecting on Career Implications” feature. Bottom line: the authors do a great job of explaining complex material and at the same time their use of up-to-date examples promotes learning.

Jeffrey Richard Nystrom, University of Colorado at Denver

We always strive to improve our work and we are most appreciative of the extensive and thoughtful feedback that many strategy professionals have graciously given us. We endeavored to incorporate their ideas into the Ninth Edition—and we acknowledge them by name later in the Preface.

We believe we have made valuable improvements throughout our many revised editions of Strategic Management. At the same time, we strive to be consistent and “true” to our original overriding objective: a book that satisfies three R’s—rigor, relevance, and readable. And we are

preface

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pleased that we have received feedback (such as the comments on the previous page) that is consistent with what we are trying to accomplish.

What are some of the features in Strategic Management that reinforce the 3 R’s? First, we build in rigor by drawing on the latest research by management scholars and insights from management consultants to offer a current a current and comprehensive view of strategic issues. We reinforce this rigor with our “Issues for Debate” and “Reflecting on Career Implications. . .” that require students to develop insights on how to address complex issues and understand how strategy concepts can enhance their career success. Second, to enhance relevance, we provide numerous examples from management practice in the text and “Strategy Spotlights” (sidebars). We also increase relevance by relating course topic and examples to current business and societal themes, including environmental sustainability, ethics, globalization, entrepreneurship, and data analytics. Third, we stress readability with an engaging writing style with minimal jargon to ensure an effective learning experience. This is most clearly evident in the conversational presentations of chapter opening “Learning from Mistakes” and chapter ending “Issues for Debate.”

Unlike other strategy texts, we provide three separate chapters that address timely topics about which business students should have a solid understanding. These are the role of intellectual assets in value creation (Chapter 4), entrepreneurial strategy and competitive dynamics (Chapter 8), and fostering entrepreneurship in established organizations (Chapter 12). We also provide an excellent and thorough chapter on how to analyze strategic management cases.

In developing Strategic Management: Text and Cases, we certainly didn’t forget the instructors. As we all know, you have a most challenging (but rewarding) job. We did our best to help you. We provide a variety of supplementary materials that should help you in class preparation and delivery. For example, our chapter notes do not simply summarize the material in the text. Rather (and consistent with the concept of strategy), we ask ourselves: “How can we add value?” Thus, for each chapter, we provide numerous questions to pose to help guide class discussion, at least 12 boxed examples to supplement chapter material, and three detailed “teaching tips” to further engage students. For example, we provide several useful insights on strategic leadership from one of Greg’s colleagues, Charles Hazzard (formerly Executive Vice President, Occidental Chemical). Also, we completed the chapter notes—along with the entire test bank—ourselves. That is, unlike many of our rivals, we didn’t simply farm the work out to others. Instead, we felt that such efforts help to enhance quality and consistency—as well as demonstrate our personal commitment to provide a top-quality total package to strategy instructors. With the Ninth Edition, we also benefited from valued input by our strategy colleagues to further improve our work.

Let’s now address some of the key substantive changes in the Ninth Edition. Then we will cover some of the major features that we have had in previous editions.

WHAT’S NEW? HIGHLIGHTS OF THE NINTH EDITION We have endeavored to add new material to the chapters that reflects the feedback we have received from our reviewers as well as the challenges today’s managers face. Thus, we all invested an extensive amount of time carefully reviewing a wide variety of books, academic and practitioner journals, and the business press.

We also worked hard to develop more concise and tightly written chapters. Based on feedback from some of the reviewers, we have tightened our writing style, tried to eliminate redundant examples, and focused more directly on what we feel is the most important content in each chapter for our audience. The overall result is that we were able to update our material, add valuable new content, and—at the same time—shorten the length of the chapters.

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Here are some of the major changes and improvements in the Ninth Edition:

· Big Data/Data Analysis. A central theme of the Ninth Edition, it has become a leading and highly visible component of a broader technological phenomena—the emergence of digital technology. Such initiatives have the potential to enable firms to better customize their product and service offerings to customers while more efficiently and fully using the resources of the company. Throughout the text, we provide examples from a wide range of industries and government. This includes discussions of how Coca Cola uses data analytics to produce consistent orange juice, IBM’s leveraging of big data to become a healthcare solution firm, Caterpillar’s use of data analytics to improve machine reliability and to identify needed service before major machine failures, and Digital Reasoning’s efforts to use data analytics to enhance the ability of firms to control employees and avoid illegal and unethical behavior.

· Greater coverage of international business/international management (IB/IM from new co-author). As we noted at the beginning of the Preface, we have invited Seung-Hyun Lee, an outstanding IB/IM scholar, to join the author team and we are very pleased that he has accepted! Throughout the book we have included many concepts and examples of IB/IM that reflects the growing role of international operations for a wide range of industries and firms. We discuss how differences in national culture impact the negotiation of contracts and whether or not to adapt human resource practices when organizations cross national boundaries. We also include a discussion of how corporate governance practices differ across countries and discuss in depth how Japan is striving to develop balanced governance practices that incorporate elements of U.S. practices while retaining, at its core, elements of traditional Japanese practices. Additionally, we discuss why conglomerate firms thrive in Asian markets even as this form of organization has gone out of favor in the United States and Europe. Finally, we discuss research that suggests that firms in transition economies can improve their innovative performance by focusing on learning across boundaries within the firm compared to learning from outside partners.

· “Executive Insights: The Strategic Management Process.” Here, we introduce a nationally recognized leader and explore several key issues related to strategic management. The executive is William H. McRaven, a retired four-star admiral who leads the nation’s second largest system of higher education. As chief executive officer of the UT System, he oversees 14 institutions that educate 217,000 students and employ 20,000 faculty and more than 70,000 health care professionals, researchers, and staff. He is perhaps best known for his involvement in Operation Neptune Spear, in which he commanded the U.S. Navy Special Forces who located and killed al Qaeda leader Osama bin Laden. We are very grateful for his valuable contribution!

· Half of the 12 opening “Learning from Mistakes” vignettes that lead off each chapter are totally new. Unique to this text, they are all examples of what can go wrong, and they serve as an excellent vehicle for clarifying and reinforcing strategy concepts. After all, what can be learned if one simply admires perfection?

· Over half of our “Strategy Spotlights” (sidebar examples) are brand new, and many of the others have been thoroughly updated. Although we have reduced the number of Spotlights from the previous edition to conserve space, we still have a total of 64—by far the most in the strategy market. We focus on bringing the most important strategy concepts to life in a concise and highly readable manner. And we work hard to eliminate unnecessary detail that detracts from the main point we are trying to make. Also, consistent with our previous edition, many of the Spotlights focus on two

PREFACE

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“hot” issues that are critical in leading today’s organizations: ethics and environmental sustainability—as well as data analytics in this edition.

Key content changes for the chapters include:

· Chapter 1 addresses three challenges for executives who are often faced with similar sets of opposing goals which can polarize their organizations. These challenges, or paradoxes, are called (1) the innovation paradox, the tension between existing products and new ones—stability and change; (2) the globalization paradox, the tension between global connectedness and local needs; and, (3) the obligation paradox, the tension between maximizing shareholder returns and creating benefits for a wide range of stakeholders— employees, customers, society, etc. We also discuss three theaters of practice that managers need to recognize in order to optimize the positive impact of the corporate social responsibility (CSR) initiatives. These are (1) Focusing on philanthropy, (2) Improving operational effectiveness, and (3) Transforming the business model.

· Chapter 2 introduces the concept of big data/data analytics—a technology that affects multiple segments of the general environment. A highly visible component of the digital economy, such technologies are altering the way business is conducted in a wide variety of sectors—government, industry, and commerce. We provide a detailed example of how it has been used to monitor the expenditures of federal, state, and local governments.

· Chapter 3 includes a discussion on program hiring to build human capital. With program hiring, firms offer employment to promising graduates without knowing which specific job the employee will fill. Firms employing this tactic believe it allows them to meet changing market conditions by hiring flexible employees who desire a dynamic setting. We also include a discussion of how Coca Cola is leveraging data analytics to produce orange juice that is consistent over time and can be tailored to meet local market tastes.

· Chapter 4 discusses research that has found that millennials have a different definition of diversity and inclusion than prior generations. That is, millennials look upon diversity as the blending of different backgrounds, experiences, and perspectives within a team, i.e., cognitive diversity. Earlier generations—the X-Generation and the Boomer Generation— tended to view diversity as a representation of fairness and protection for all regardless of gender, race, religion, etc. An important implication is that while many millennials believe that differences of opinion enable teams to excel, relatively few of them feel that their leaders share this perspective. The chapter also provides a detailed example of how data analytics can increase employee retention.

· Chapter 5 examines how firms can create strong competitive positions in platform markets. In platform markets, firms act as intermediaries between buyers and sellers. Success is largely based on the ability of the firm to be the de facto provider of this matching process. We discuss several actions firms can take to stake out a leadership position in these markets. In addition, we include a discussion of research outlining how firms can develop organizational structures and policies to draw on customer interactions to improve their innovativeness. The key finding from this research is that it is critical for firms to empower and incent front line employees to look for and share innovative insights they take away from customer interactions.

· Chapter 6 includes a section on different forms of strategic alliances and when they are most appropriate. In discussing the differences between contractual alliances, equity alliances, and joint ventures, students can better understand the range of options they

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have to build cooperative arrangements with other firms and the factors that influence the choice among these options.

· Chapter 7 explains two important areas in which culture can play a key role in managing organizations across national boundaries. First, we discuss situations in which it is best to not adapt one’s company culture—even if it conflicts with the culture country in which the firm operates. We provide the example of Google’s human resource policy of providing employees with lots of positive feedback during performance reviews. Why? Google feels that this is a key reason for its outstanding success in product innovation. Second, we address some of the challenges that managers encounter when they negotiate contracts across national boundaries. We discuss research that identifies several elements of negotiating behaviors that help to identify cultural differences.

· Chapter 8 identifies factors investors can examine when evaluating the risk of crowdfunded ventures. When firms raise funds through crowdfunding, they often have limited business and financial histories and haven’t yet built up a clear reputation. This raises the risks investors face. We identify some factors investors can look into to clarify the worthiness and risk of firms who are raising financial resources through crowdfunding.

· Chapter 9 discusses the increasingly important role that activist investors have in the corporate governance of publicly-traded firms. Activist investors are investors who take small but significant ownership stakes in large firms, typically 5 to 10 percent ownership, and push for major strategic changes in the firm. These activist investors are often successful, winning 70 percent of the shareholder votes they champion and have forced the exit of leaders of several large firms. Additionally, we discuss a corner of Wall Street where women dominate, as corporate governance heads at major institutional investors. These institutional investors hold large blocks of stock in all major corporations. As a result, these female leaders are in a position to push for governance changes in these corporations to make them more responsive to the concerns of investors, such as increasing opportunities for female corporate leaders.

· Chapter 10 discusses how firms can organize to improve their innovativeness. Often managers look to outside partners to learn new skills and access new knowledge to improve their innovative performance. We discuss research that suggests that efforts to look to create novel combinations of knowledge within the firm offer greater potential to generate stronger innovation performance. The key advantage of internal knowledge is that it is proprietary and potentially more applicable to the firm’s innovation efforts.

· Chapter 11 includes discussions of multiple firms that have changed their leadership and control systems to respond to challenges they’ve faced. This includes Marvin Ellison’s efforts to revive JC Penney after prior bad leadership, Target’s efforts to change its supply chain system to meet changing customer demands, and the decision procedures JC Johnson Inc. has put in place to improve its ability to lead its industry in sustainability efforts.

· Chapter 12 highlights the potential to learn from innovation failures. Too often, firms become risk averse in their behavior in order to avoid failure. We discuss how this can result in missing truly innovative opportunities. Drawing off research by Julian Birkinshaw, we discuss the need for firms to get their employees to take bold innovation actions and steps firms can take to learn from failed innovation efforts to be more effective in future innovation efforts. We also discuss research on the consequences of losing star innovation employees. Firms worry about the loss of key innovation personnel, but research shows that while there are costs associated with the loss of star

PREFACE

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innovators, there are also potential benefits. Firms that lose key innovators typically experience a loss in exploitation-oriented innovation, but they also often see an increase in exploration-oriented innovation.

· Chapter 13 provides an example of how the College of Business Administration at Towson University successfully introduced a “live” business case completion across all of it strategic management sections. The “description” and the “case completion checklist” includes many of the elements of the analysis-decision-action cycle in case analysis that we address in the chapter.

· Chapter 13 updates our Appendix: Sources of Company and Industry Information. Here, we owe a big debt to Ruthie Brock and Carol Byrne, library professionals at the University of Texas at Arlington. These ladies have provided us with comprehensive and updated information for the Ninth Edition that is organized in a range of issues. These include competitive intelligence, annual report collections, company rankings, business websites, and strategic and competitive analysis. Such information is invaluable in analyzing companies and industries. We are always amazed by the diligence, competence—and good cheer—that Ruthie and Carol demonstrate when we impose on them every two years!

· We have worked hard to further enhance our excellent case package with a major focus on fresh and current cases on familiar firms. · More than half of our cases are author-written (much more than the competition). · We have updated our users favorite cases, creating fresh stories about familiar

companies to minimize instructor preparation time and “maximize freshness” of he content.

· We have added several exciting new cases to the lineup including Blackberry and Ascena (the successor company to Ann Talyor).

· We have also extensively updated 28 familiar cases with the latest news. · Our cases are familiar yet fresh with new data and problems to solve.

WHAT REMAINS THE SAME: KEY FEATURES OF EARLIER EDITIONS Let’s now briefly address some of the exciting features that remain from the earlier editions.

· Traditional organizing framework with three other chapters on timely topics. Crisply written chapters cover all of the strategy bases and address contemporary topics. First, the chapters are divided logically into the traditional sequence: strategy analysis, strategy formulation, and strategy implementation. Second, we include three chapters on such timely topics as intellectual capital/knowledge management, entrepreneurial strategy and competitive dynamics, and fostering corporate entrepreneurship and new ventures.

· “Learning from Mistakes” chapter-opening cases. To enhance student interest, we begin each chapter with a case that depicts an organization that has suffered a dramatic performance drop, or outright failure, by failing to adhere to sound strategic management concepts and principles. We believe that this feature serves to underpin the value of the concepts in the course and that it is a preferred teaching approach to merely providing examples of outstanding companies that always seem to get it right. After all, isn’t it better (and more challenging) to diagnose problems than admire perfection? As Dartmouth’s Sydney Finkelstein, author of Why Smart Executives Fail,

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PREFACE

notes: “We live in a world where success is revered, and failure is quickly pushed to the side. However, some of the greatest opportunities to learn—for both individuals and organizations—come from studying what goes wrong.”* We’ll see how, for example, why Frederica Marchionni, the CEO that Land’s End hired in 2015, failed to spearhead the revival of the brand. Her initiatives geared toward taking the brand upscale turned out to be too much of a shock to the firm’s customer base as well as the firm’s family culture and wholesome style. As noted by a former executive, “It doesn’t look like Land’s End anymore. There was never the implication that if you wore Lands’ End you’d be on the beach on Nantucket living the perfect life.” We’ll also explore the bankruptcy of storied law firm Dewey & LeBoeuf LLP. Their failure can be attributed to three major issues: a reliance on borrowed money, making large promises about compensation to incoming partners (which didn’t sit well with their existing partners!), and a lack of transparency about the firm’s financials.

· “Issue for Debate” at the end of each chapter. We find that students become very engaged (and often animated!) in discussing an issue that has viable alternate points of view. It is an exciting way to drive home key strategy concepts. For example, in Chapter 1, Seventh Generation is faced with a dilemma that confronts their values and they must decide whether or not to provide their products to some of their largest customers. At issue: While they sympathize (and their values are consistent) with the striking workers at the large grocery chains, should they cross the picket lines? In Chapter 4, we discuss an issue that can be quite controversial: Does offering financial incentives to employees to lose weight actually work? We will explain a study by professors and medical professionals who conducted a test to explore this issue. And, in Chapter 7, we address Medtronic’s decision to acquire Covidien, an Irish-based medical equipment manufacturer for $43 billion. Its primary motive: Lower its taxes by moving its legal home to Ireland—a country that has lower rates of taxation on corporations. Some critics may see such a move as unethical and unpatriotic. Others would argue that it will help the firm save on taxes and benefit their shareholders.

· “Insights from Research.” We include six of this feature in the Ninth Edition—and half of them are entirely new. Here, we summarize key research findings on a variety of issues and, more importantly, address their relevance for making organizations (and managers!) more effective. For example, in Chapter 2 we discuss findings from a meta- analysis (research combining many individual studies) to debunk several myths about older workers—a topic of increasing importance, given the changing demographics in many developed countries. In Chapter 4, we address a study that explored the viability of re-hiring employees who had previously left the organizations. Such employees, called “boomerangs” may leave an organization for several reasons and such reasons may strongly influence their willingness to return to the organization. In Chapter 5, we summarize a study that looked at how firms can improve their innovativeness by drawing on interactions with customers but only if the firm empowers front line employees to lead innovative efforts and provides incentives to motivate employees to do so. In Chapter 10, we discuss research on firms in transition economies that found firms which learn from both external partners and by spanning boundaries within the firm can improve their innovation. However, learning between units within the firm produced higher innovation performance.

*Personal Communication, June 20, 2005.

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· “Reflecting on Career Implications. . .” We provide insights that are closely aligned with and directed to three distinct issues faced by our readers: prepare them for a job interview (e.g., industry analysis), help them with current employers or their career in general, or help them find potential employers and decide where to work. We believe this will be very valuable to students’ professional development.

· Consistent chapter format and features to reinforce learning. We have included several features in each chapter to add value and create an enhanced learning experience. First, each chapter begins with an overview and a list of key learning objectives. Second, as previously noted, the opening case describes a situation in which a company’s performance eroded because of a lack of proper application of strategy concepts. Third, at the end of each chapter there are four different types of questions/exercises that should help students assess their understanding and application of material:

1. Summary review questions. 2. Experiential exercises. 3. Application questions and exercises. 4. Ethics questions.

Given the centrality of online systems to business today, each chapter contains at least one exercise that allows students to explore the use of the web in implementing a firm’s strategy.

· Key Terms. Approximately a dozen key terms for each chapter are identified in the margins of the pages. This addition was made in response to reviewer feedback and improves students’ understanding of core strategy concepts.

· Clear articulation and illustration of key concepts. Key strategy concepts are introduced in a clear and concise manner and are followed by timely and interesting examples from business practice. Such concepts include value-chain analysis, the resource- based view of the firm, Porter’s five-forces model, competitive advantage boundaryless organizational designs, digital strategies, corporate governance, ethics, data analytics, and entrepreneurship.

· Extensive use of sidebars. We include 64 sidebars (or about five per chapter) called “Strategy Spotlights.” The Strategy Spotlights not only illustrate key points but also increase the readability and excitement of new strategy concepts.

· Integrative themes. The text provides a solid grounding in ethics, globalization, environmental substainability, and technology. These topics are central themes throughout the book and form the basis for many of the Strategy Spotlights.

· Implications of concepts for small businesses. Many of the key concepts are applied to start-up firms and smaller businesses, which is particularly important since many students have professional plans to work in such firms.

· Not just a textbook but an entire package. Strategic Management features the best chapter teaching notes available today. Rather than merely summarizing the key points in each chapter, we focus on value-added material to enhance the teaching (and learning) experience. Each chapter includes dozens of questions to spur discussion, teaching tips, in-class group exercises, and about a dozen detailed examples from business practice to provide further illustrations of key concepts.

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PREFACE

TEACHING RESOURCES Instructor’s Manual (IM) Prepared by the textbook authors, along with valued input from our strategy colleagues, the accompanying IM contains summary/objectives, lecture/discussion outlines, discussion questions, extra examples not included in the text, teaching tips, reflecting on career implications, experiential exercises, and more.

Test Bank Revised by Christine Pence of the University of California-Riverside, the test bank contains more than 1,000 true/false, multiple-choice, and essay questions. It is tagged with learning objectives as well as Bloom’s Taxonomy and AACSB criteria.

· Assurance of Learning Ready. Assurance of Learning is an important element of many accreditation standards. Dess 9e is designed specifically to support your Assurance of Learning initiatives. Each chapter in the book begins with a list of numbered learning objectives that appear throughout the chapter. Every test bank question is also linked to one of these objectives, in addition to level of difficulty, topic area, Bloom’s Taxonomy level, and AACSB skill area. EZ Test, McGraw-Hill’s easy-to-use test bank software, can search the test bank by these and other categories, providing an engine for targeted Assurance of Learning analysis and assessment.

· AACSB Statement. The McGraw-Hill Companies is a proud corporate member of AACSB International. Understanding the importance and value of AACSB accreditation, Dess 9e has sought to recognize the curricula guidelines detailed in the AACSB standards for business accreditation by connecting selected questions in Dess 9e and the test bank to the general knowledge and skill guidelines found in the AACSB standards. The statements contained in Dess 9e are provided only as a guide for the users of this text. The AACSB leaves content coverage and assessment within the purview of individual schools, the mission of the school, and the faculty. While Dess 9e and the teaching package make no claim of any specific AACSB qualification or evaluation, we have labeled selected questions within Dess 9e according to the six general knowledge and skills areas.

· Computerized Test Bank Online. A comprehensive bank of test questions is provided within a computerized test bank powered by McGraw-Hill’s flexible electronic testing program, EZ Test Online (www.eztestonline.com). EZ Test Online allows you to create paper and online tests or quizzes in this easy-to-use program. Imagine being able to create and access your test or quiz anywhere, at any time, without installing the testing software! Now, with EZ Test Online, instructors can select questions from multiple McGraw-Hill test banks or author their own and then either print the test for paper distribution or give it online.

· Test Creation. · Author/edit questions online using the 14 different question-type templates. · Create printed tests or deliver online to get instant scoring and feedback. · Create question pools to offer multiple versions online—great for practice. · Export your tests for use in WebCT, Blackboard, and Apple’s iQuiz. · Compatible with EZ Test Desktop tests you’ve already created. · Sharing tests with colleagues, adjuncts, TAs is easy.

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· Online Test Management. · Set availability dates and time limits for your quiz or test. · Control how your test will be presented. · Assign points by question or question type with drop-down menu. · Provide immediate feedback to students or delay until all finish the test. · Create practice tests online to enable student mastery. · Your roster can be uploaded to enable student self-registration.

· Online Scoring and Reporting. · Automated scoring for most of EZ Test’s numerous question types. · Allows manual scoring for essay and other open response questions. · Manual rescoring and feedback are also available. · EZ Test’s grade book is designed to easily export to your grade book. · View basic statistical reports.

· Support and Help. · User’s guide and built-in page-specific help. · Flash tutorials for getting started on the support site. · Support website: www.mhhe.com/eztest. · Product specialist available at 1-800-331-5094. · Online training: http://auth.mhhe.com/mpss/workshops/.

PowerPoint Presentation Prepared by Pauline Assenza of Western Connecticut State University, it consists of more than 400 slides incorporating an outline for the chapters tied to learning objectives. Also included are instructor notes, multiple-choice questions that can be used as Classroom Performance System (CPS) questions, and additional examples outside the text to promote class discussion.

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PREFACE

The Business Strategy Game and GLO-BUS Online Simulations Both allow teams of students to manage companies in a head-to-head contest for global market leadership. These simulations give students the immediate opportunity to experiment with various strategy options and to gain proficiency in applying the concepts and tools they have been reading about in the chapters. To find out more or to register, please visit www.mhhe.com/ thompsonsims.

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right in Blackboard. Whether you’re choosing a book for your course or building Connect assignments, all the tools you need are right where you want them—inside Blackboard.

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ACKNOWLEDGMENTS Strategic Management represents far more than just the joint efforts of the three co-authors. Rather, it is the product of the collaborative input of many people. Some of these individuals are academic colleagues, others are the outstanding team of professionals at McGraw-Hill, and still others are those who are closest to us—our families. It is time to express our sincere gratitude.

First, we’d like to acknowledge the dedicated instructors who have graciously provided their insights since the inception of the text. Their input has been very helpful in both pointing out errors in the manuscript and suggesting areas that needed further development as additional topics. We sincerely believe that the incorporation of their ideas has been critical to improving the final product. These professionals and their affiliations are:

The Reviewer Hall of Fame Moses Acquaah, University of North Carolina-Greensboro Todd Alessandri, Northeastern University Larry Alexander, Virginia Polytechnic Institute Thomas H. Allison, Washington State University Brent B. Allred, College of William & Mary

Allen C. Amason, Georgia Southern University Kathy Anders, Arizona State University Jonathan Anderson, University of West Georgia Peter H. Antoniou, California State University- San Marcos Dave Arnott, Dallas Baptist University

Marne L. Arthaud-Day, Kansas State University Dr. Bindu Arya, University of Missouri— St. Louis Jay A. Azriel, York College of Pennsylvania Jeffrey J. Bailey, University of Idaho David L. Baker, PhD, John Carroll University

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PREFACE

Dennis R. Balch, University of North Alabama Bruce Barringer, University of Central Florida Barbara R. Bartkus, Old Dominion University Barry Bayon, Bryant University Brent D. Beal, Louisiana State University Dr. Patricia Beckenholdt, Business and Professional Programs, University of Maryland, University College Joyce Beggs, University of North Carolina-Charlotte Michael Behnam, Suffolk University Kristen Bell DeTienne, Brigham Young University Eldon Bernstein, Lynn University Lyda Bigelow, University of Utah David Blair, University of Nebraska at Omaha Daniela Blettner, Tilburg University Dusty Bodie, Boise State University William Bogner, Georgia State University David S. Boss, PhD, Ohio University Scott Browne, Chapman University Jon Bryan, Bridgewater State College

Charles M. Byles, Virginia Commonwealth University

Mikelle A. Calhoun, Valparaiso University

Thomas J. Callahan, University of Michigan–Dearborn

Samuel D. Cappel, Southeastern Louisiana State University

Gary Carini, Baylor University

Shawn M. Carraher, University of Texas–Dallas

Tim Carroll, University of South Carolina Don Caruth, Amberton University

Maureen Casile, Bowling Green State University

Gary J. Castrogiovanni, Florida Atlantic University

Radha Chaganti, Rider University

Erick PC Chang, Arkansas State University

Tuhin Chaturvedi, Joseph M. Katz Graduate School of Business, University of Pittsburgh

Jianhong Chen, University of New Hampshire

Tianxu Chen, Oakland University

Andy Y. Chiou, SUNY Farmingdale State College

Theresa Cho, Rutgers University

Timothy S. Clark, Northern Arizona University

Bruce Clemens, Western New England College

Betty S. Coffey, Appalachian State University

Wade Coggins, Webster University-Fort Smith Metro Campus

Susan Cohen, University of Pittsburgh

George S. Cole, Shippensburg University

Joseph Coombs, Virginia Commonwealth University

Christine Cope Pence, University of California-Riverside

James J. Cordeiro, SUNY Brockport Stephen E. Courter, University of Texas at Austin

Jeffrey Covin, Indiana University

Keith Credo, Auburn University

Joshua J. Daspit, PhD, Mississippi State University

Deepak Datta, University of Texas at Arlington James Davis, Utah State University Justin L. Davis, University of West Florida David Dawley, West Virginia University Daniel DeGravel, California State University Northridge, David Nazarian College of Business and Economics

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Helen Deresky, State University of New York-Plattsburgh Rocki-Lee DeWitt, University of Vermont Jay Dial, Ohio State University Michael E. Dobbs, Arkansas State University Jonathan Doh, Villanova University Dr. John Donnellan, NJCU School of Business Tom Douglas, Clemson University Jon Down, Oregon State University Meredith Downes, Illinois State University Alan E. Ellstrand, University of Arkansas Dean S. Elmuti, Eastern Illinois University Clare Engle, Concordia University Mehmet Erdem Genc, Baruch College, CUNY Tracy Ethridge, Tri-County Technical College William A. Evans, Troy State University-Dothan Frances H. Fabian, University of Memphis Angelo Fanelli, Warrington College of Business Michael Fathi, Georgia Southwestern University Carolyn J. Fausnaugh, Florida Institute of Technology

Tamela D. Ferguson, University of Louisiana at Lafayette

David Flanagan, Western Michigan University

Kelly Flis, The Art Institutes

Karen Ford-Eickhoff, University of North Carolina Charlotte

Dave Foster, Montana State University

Isaac Fox, University of Minnesota

Charla S. Fraley, Columbus State Community College–Columbus, Ohio

Deborah Francis, Brevard College

Steven A. Frankforter, Winthrop University

Vance Fried, Oklahoma State University

Karen Froelich, North Dakota State University

Naomi A. Gardberg, Baruch College, CUNY

Joe Gerard, Western New England University

J. Michael Geringer, Ohio University

Diana L. Gilbertson, California State University–Fresno

Matt Gilley, St. Mary’s University

Debbie Gilliard, Metropolitan State College-Denver

Yezdi H. Godiwalla, University of Wisconsin–Whitewater

Sanjay Goel, University of Minnesota-Duluth

Sandy Gough, Boise State University

Amy Gresock, PhD The University of Michigan, Flint

Vishal K. Gupta, The University of Mississippi

Dr. Susan Hansen, University of Wisconsin–Platteville

Allen Harmon, University of Minnesota–Duluth

Niran Harrison, University of Oregon

Paula Harveston, Berry College

Ahmad Hassan, Morehead State University

Donald Hatfield, Virginia Polytechnic Institute

Kim Hester, Arkansas State University

Scott Hicks, Liberty University

John Hironaka, California State University–Sacramento

Anne Kelly Hoel, University of Wisconsin– Stout

Alan Hoffman, Bentley College

Gordon Holbein, University of Kentucky

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PREFACE

Stephen V. Horner, Pittsburg State University Jill Hough, University of Tulsa John Humphreys, Eastern New Mexico University James G. Ibe, Morris College Jay J. Janney, University of Dayton Lawrence Jauch, University of Louisiana-Monroe Dana M. Johnson, Michigan Technical University Homer Johnson, Loyola University, Chicago Marilyn R. Kaplan, Naveen Jindal School of Management, University of Texas–Dallas James Katzenstein, California State University– Dominguez Hills Joseph Kavanaugh, Sam Houston State University Franz Kellermanns, University of Tennessee Craig Kelley, California State University-Sacramento Donna Kelley, Babson College Dave Ketchen, Auburn University John A. Kilpatrick, Idaho State University Dr. Jaemin Kim, Stockton University Brent H. Kinghorn, Emporia State University

Helaine J. Korn, Baruch College, CUNY Stan Kowalczyk, San Francisco State University Daniel Kraska, North Central State College Donald E. Kreps, Kutztown University Jim Kroeger, Cleveland State University Subdoh P. Kulkarni, Howard University Ron Lambert, Faulkner University Theresa Lant, New York University Jai Joon Lee, California State University Sacramento Ted Legatski, Texas Christian University David J. Lemak, Washington State University–Tri-Cities Cynthia Lengnick-Hall, University of Texas at San Antonio Donald L. Lester, Arkansas State University Wanda Lester, North Carolina A&T State University Krista B. Lewellyn, University of Wyoming Benyamin Lichtenstein, University of Massachusetts at Boston Jun Lin, SUNY at New Paltz Zhiang (John) Lin, University of Texas at Dallas

Dan Lockhart, University of Kentucky John Logan, University of South Carolina Franz T. Lohrke, Samford University Kevin B. Lowe, Graduate School of Management, University of Auckland Leyland M. Lucas, Morgan State University Doug Lyon, Fort Lewis College Rickey Madden, PhD, Presbyterian College James Maddox, Friends University Ravi Madhavan, University of Pittsburgh Paul Mallette, Colorado State University Santo D. Marabella, Moravian College Catherine Maritan, Syracuse University Daniel Marrone, Farmingdale State College, SUNY Sarah Marsh, Northern Illinois University Jim Martin, Washburn University John R. Massaua, University of Southern Maine Hao Ma, Bryant College Larry McDaniel, Alabama A&M University Jean McGuire, Louisiana State University

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Abagail McWilliams, University of Illinois-Chicago Ofer Meilich, California State University– San Marcos

John E. Merchant, California State University–Sacramento

John M. Mezias, University of Miami

Michael Michalisin, Southern Illinois University at Carbondale

Doug Moesel, University of Missouri-Columbia

Fatma Mohamed, Morehead State University

Mike Montalbano, Bentley University

Debra Moody, University of North Carolina–Charlotte

Gregory A. Moore, Middle Tennessee State University

James R. Morgan, Dominican University and UC Berkeley Extension

Ken Morlino, Wilmington University

Sara A. Morris, Old Dominion University

Todd W. Moss, PhD, Syracuse University

Carolyn Mu, Baylor University

Stephen Mueller, Northern Kentucky University

John Mullane, Middle Tennessee State University

Chandran Mylvaganam, Northwood University Sucheta Nadkarni, Cambridge University Anil Nair, Old Dominion University V.K. Narayanan, Drexel University Maria L. Nathan, Lynchburg College Louise Nemanich, Arizona State University Charles Newman, University of Maryland, University College Stephanie Newport, Austin Peay State University Gerry Nkombo Muuka, Murray State University Bill Norton, University of Louisville Dr. Jill E. Novak Texas A&M University Roman Nowacki, Northern Illinois University Yusuf A. Nur, SUNY Brockport Jeffrey Richard Nystrom, University of Colorado– Denver William Ross O’Brien, Dallas Baptist University d.t. ogilvie, Rutgers University Floyd Ormsbee, Clarkson University Dr. Mine Ozer, SUNY-Oneonta Dr. Eren Ozgen, Troy University-Dothan Campus

Karen L. Page, University of Wyoming Jacquelyn W. Palmer, University of Cincinnati Julie Palmer, University of Missouri–Columbia Daewoo Park, Xavier University Gerald Parker, Saint Louis University Ralph Parrish, University of Central Oklahoma Amy Patrick, Wilmington University John Pepper, The University of Kansas Douglas K. Peterson, Indiana State University Edward Petkus, Mary Baldwin College Michael C. Pickett, National University Peter Ping Li, California State University-Stanislaus Michael W. Pitts, Virginia Commonwealth University Laura Poppo, Virginia Tech Steve Porth, Saint Joseph’s University Jodi A. Potter, Robert Morris University Scott A. Quatro, Grand Canyon University Nandini Rajagopalan, University of Southern California

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PREFACE

Annette L. Ranft, North Carolina State University Abdul Rasheed, University of Texas at Arlington Devaki Rau, Northern Illinois University George Redmond, Franklin University Kira Reed, Syracuse University Clint Relyea, Arkansas State University Barbara Ribbens, Western Illinois University Maurice Rice, University of Washington Violina P. Rindova, University of Texas–Austin Ron Rivas, Canisius College David Robinson, Indiana State University–Terre Haute Kenneth Robinson, Kennesaw State University Simon Rodan, San Jose State University Patrick R. Rogers, North Carolina A&T State University John K. Ross III, Texas State University–San Marcos Robert Rottman, Kentucky State University Matthew R. Rutherford, Gonzaga University Carol M. Sanchez, Grand Valley State University Doug Sanford, Towson University

William W. Sannwald, San Diego State University Yolanda Sarason, Colorado State University Marguerite Schneider, New Jersey Institute of Technology Roger R. Schnorbus, University of Richmond Terry Sebora, University of Nebraska–Lincoln John Seeger, Bentley College Jamal Shamsie, Michigan State University Mark Shanley, University of Illinois at Chicago Ali Shahzad, James Madison University Lois Shelton, California State University–Northridge Herbert Sherman, Long Island University Weilei Shi, Baruch College, CUNY Chris Shook, Auburn University Jeremy Short, University of Oklahoma Mark Simon, Oakland University– Michigan Rob Singh, Morgan State University Bruce Skaggs, University of Massachusetts Lise Anne D. Slattern, University of Louisiana at Lafayette

Wayne Smeltz, Rider University Anne Smith, University of Tennessee Andrew Spicer, University of South Carolina James D. Spina, University of Maryland John Stanbury, George Mason University & Inter-University Institute of Macau, SAR China Timothy Stearns, California State University–Fresno Elton Stephen, Austin State University Charles E. Stevens, University of Wyoming Alice Stewart, Ohio State University Mohan Subramaniam, Carroll School of Management Boston College Ram Subramanian, Grand Valley State University Roy Suddaby, University of Iowa Michael Sullivan, UC Berkeley Extension Marta Szabo White, Georgia State University Stephen Takach, University of Texas at San Antonio Justin Tan, York University, Canada Qingjiu Tao, PhD, James Madison University Renata A. Tarasievich, University of Illinois at Chicago

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Linda Teagarden, Virginia Tech Bing-Sheng Teng, George Washington University Alan Theriault, University of California–Riverside Tracy Thompson, University of Washington–Tacoma Karen Torres, Angelo State University Mary Trottier, Associate Professor of Management, Nichols College Robert Trumble, Virginia Commonwealth University Francis D. (Doug) Tuggle, Chapman University K.J. Tullis, University of Central Oklahoma Craig A. Turner, PhD, East Tennessee State University Beverly Tyler, North Carolina State University

Rajaram Veliyath, Kennesaw State University S. Stephen Vitucci, Tarleton State University– Central Texas Jay A. Vora, St. Cloud State University Valerie Wallingford, Ph.D., Bemidji State University Jorge Walter, Portland State University Bruce Walters, Louisiana Tech University Edward Ward, St. Cloud State University N. Wasilewski, Pepperdine University Andrew Watson, Northeastern University Larry Watts, Stephen F. Austin University Marlene E. Weaver, American Public University System Paula S. Weber, St. Cloud State University Kenneth E. A. Wendeln, Indiana University

Robert R. Wharton, Western Kentucky University Laura Whitcomb, California State University-Los Angeles Scott Williams, Wright State University Ross A. Wirth, Franklin University Gary Wishniewsky, California State University East Bay Diana Wong, Bowling Green State University Beth Woodard, Belmont University John E. Wroblewski, State University of New York-Fredonia Anne York, University of Nebraska- Omaha Michael Zhang, Sacred Heart University Monica Zimmerman, Temple University

Second, we would like to thank the people who have made our two important “features” possible. The information found in our six “Insights from Research” was provided courtesy of www.businessminded.com, an organization founded by K. Matthew Gilley, PhD (St. Mary’s University) that transforms empirical management research into actionable insights for business leaders. We appreciate Matt’s graciousness and kindness in helping us out. And, of course, our “Executive Insights: The Strategic Management Process” would not have been possible without the gracious participation of Admiral William H. McRaven, Retired who is presently Chancellor of the University of Texas System, and Jana Pankratz, Executive Director.

Third, the authors would like to thank several faculty colleagues who were particularly helpful in the review, critique, and development of the book and supplementary materials. Greg’s and Sean’s colleagues at the University of Texas at Dallas also have been helpful and supportive. These individuals include Mike Peng, Joe Picken, Kumar Nair, John Lin, Larry

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PREFACE

Chasteen, Tev Dalgic, and Livia Markoczy. His administrative assistant, Shalonda Hill, has been extremely helpful. Four doctoral students, Brian Pinkham, Steve Sauerwald, Kyun Kim, and Canan Mutlu, have provided many useful inputs and ideas. He also appreciates the support of his dean and associate dean, Hasan Pirkul and Varghese Jacob, respectively. Greg wishes to thank a special colleague, Abdul Rasheed at the University of Texas at Arlington, who certainly has been a valued source of friendship and ideas for us for many years. He provided many valuable contributions to the Ninth Edition. Gerry thanks all of his colleagues at Michigan State University for their help and support over the years. He also thanks his mentor, Phil Bromiley, as well as the students and former students he has had the pleasure of working with, including Cindy Devers, Federico Aime, Mike Mannor, Bernadine Dykes, Mathias Arrfelt, Kalin Kolev, Seungho Choi, Danny Gamache, and Adam Steinbach. Alan thanks his colleagues at Pace University and the Case Association for their support in developing these fine case selections. Special thanks go to Jamal Shamsie at Michigan State University for his support in developing the case selections for this edition.

Fourth, we would like to thank the team at McGraw-Hill for their outstanding support throughout the entire process. As we work on the book through the various editions, we always appreciate their hard work and recognize how so many people “add value” to our final package. This began with John Biernat, formerly publisher, who signed us to our original contract. He was always available to us and provided a great deal of support and valued input throughout several editions. Presently, in editorial, Susan Gouijnstook, managing director, director Mike Ablassmeir, senior product developers Anne Ehrenworth and Katharine Glynn (of Piper Editorial) kept things on track, responded quickly to our seemingly endless needs and requests, and offered insights and encouragement. We appreciate their expertise—as well as their patience! Once the manuscript was completed and revised, content project manager Harvey Yep expertly guided it through the content and assessment production process. Matt Diamond provided excellent design and artwork guidance. We also appreciate executive marketing manager Debbie Clare and marketing coordinator Brittany Berholdt for their energetic, competent, and thorough marketing efforts. Last, but certainly not least, we thank MHE’s 70-plus outstanding book reps—who serve on the “front lines”—as well as many in-house sales professionals based in Dubuque, Iowa. Clearly, they deserve a lot of credit (even though not mentioned by name) for our success.

Fifth, we acknowledge the valuable contributions of many of our strategy colleagues for their excellent contributions to our supplementary and digital materials. Such content really adds a lot of value to our entire package! We are grateful to Pauline Assenza at Western Connecticut State University for her superb work on case teaching notes as well as chapter and case PowerPoints. Justin Davis, University of West Florida, along with Noushi Rahman, Pace University, deserve our thanks for their hard work in developing excellent digital materials for Connect. Thanks also goes to Noushi Rahman for developing the Connect IM that accompanies this edition of the text. And, finally, we thank Christine Pence, University of California-Riverside, for her important contributions in revising our test bank and chapter quizzes, and Todd Moss, Oregon State University, for his hard work in putting together an excellent set of videos online, along with the video grid that links videos to chapter material.

Finally, we would like to thank our families. For Greg this includes his parents, William and Mary Dess, who have always been there for him. His wife, Margie, and daughter, Taylor, have been a constant source of love and companionship. His father, a career U. S. Air Force pilot took his “final flight” on May 22, 2015. Truly a member of Tom Brokaw’s “Greatest Generation,” he completed flight school before his 21st birthday and flew nearly 30 missions over Japan in World War II as a B-29 bomber pilot before he turned 23. His wife, five children, and several

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grandchildren truly miss him. Gerry thanks his wife, Gaelen, for her love, support, and friendship; and his children, Megan and AJ, for their love and the joy they bring to his life. He also thanks his current and former PhD students who regularly inspire and challenge him. Alan thanks his family—his wife, Helaine, and his children, Rachel and Jacob—for their love and support. He also thanks his parents, Gail Eisner and the late Marvin Eisner, for their support and encouragement. Sean thanks his wife, Hannah, and his two boys, Paul and Stephen, for their unceasing love and care. He also thanks his parents, Kenny and Inkyung Lee for being there whenever needed.

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A GUIDED TOUR

LEARNING OBJECTIVES Learning Objectives numbered L05.1, L05.2, L05.3, etc., with corresponding icons in the margins to indicate where learning objectives are covered in the text.

LEARNING FROM MISTAKES Learning from Mistakes vignettes are examples of where things went wrong. Failures are not only interesting but also sometimes easier to learn from. And students realize strategy is notjustabout “right or wrong” answers, but requires critical thinking.

STRATEGY SPOTLIGHT These boxes weave themes of ethics, globalization, and technology into every chapter of the text, providing students with a thorough grounding necessary for understanding strategic management. Select boxes incorporate crowdsourcing, environmental sustainability, and ethical themes.

a guided

tour

chapter

After reading this chapter, you should have a good understanding of the following learning objectives:

1 LO1-1 The definition of strategic management and its four key attributes. LO1-2 The strategic management process and its three interrelated and principal

activities.

LO1-3 The vital role of corporate governance and stakeholder management, as well as how “symbiosis” can be achieved among an organization’s stakeholders.

LO1-4 The importance of social responsibility, including environmental sustainability, and how it can enhance a corporation’s innovation strategy.

LO1-5 The need for greater empowerment throughout the organization. LO1-6 How an awareness of a hierarchy of strategic goals can help an

organization achieve coherence in its strategic direction.

Strategic Management Creating Competitive Advantages

©Anatoli Styf/Getty Images

What makes the study of strategic management so interesting? Things can change so rapidly! Some start-ups can disrupt industries and become globally recognized names in just a few years. The rankings of the world’s most valuable firms can dramatically change in a rather brief period of time. On the other hand, many impressive, high-flying firms can struggle to reclaim past glory or even fail. Recall just four that begin with the letter “b”—Blackberry, Blockbuster, Borders, and Barings. As colorfully (and ironically!) noted by Arthur Martinez, Sears’s former Chairman: “Today’s peacock is tomorrow’s feather duster.”1

Consider the following:2

• At the beginning of 2007, the three firms in the world with the highest market values were Exxon Mobil, General Electric, and Gazprom (a Russian natural gas firm). By early 2017, three high tech firms headed the list—Apple, Alphabet (parent of Google), and Microsoft.

• Only 74 of the original 500 companies in the S&P index were still around 40 years later. And McKinsey notes that the average company tenure on the S&P 500 list has fallen from 61 years in 1958 to about 20 in 2016.

• With the dramatic increase of the digital economy, new entrants are shaking up long-standing industries. Note that Alibaba is the world’s most valuable retailer—but holds no inventory; Airbnb is the world’s largest provider of accommodations—but owns no real estate; and Uber is the world’s largest car service but owns no cars.

• A quarter century ago, how many would have predicted that a South Korean firm would be a global car giant, than an Indian firm would be one of the world’s largest technology firms, and a huge Chinese Internet company would list on an American stock exchange?

• Fortune magazine’s annual list of the 500 biggest companies now features 156 emerging- market firms. This compares with only 18 in 1995!

To remain competitive, companies often must bring in “new blood” and make significant changes in their strategies. But sometimes a new CEO’s initiatives makes things worse. Let’s take a look at Lands’ End, an American clothing retailer.3

Lands’ End was founded in 1963 as a mail order supplier of sailboat equipment by Gary Comer. As business picked up, he expanded the business into clothing and home furnishings and moved the company to Dodgeville, Wisconsin, in 1978 where he was its CEO until he stepped down in 1990. The firm was acquired by Sears in 2002, but later spun off in 2013. A year later it commenced trading on the NASDAQ stock exchange.

Targeting Middle America, companies like Lands’ End, the GAP Inc., and J. C. Penney have had a hard time in recent years positioning themselves in the hotly contested clothing industry. They are squeezed on the high end by brands like Michael Kors Holdings Ltd. and Coach, Inc. On the lower end, fast-fashion retailers including H&M operator Hennes & Mauritz AB are applying pressure by churning out inexpensive, runway-inspired styles.

LEARNING FROM MISTAKES

4.3 STRATEGY SPOTLIGHT MILLENNIALS HAVE A DIFFERENT DEFINITION OF DIVERSITY AND INCLUSION THAN PRIOR GENERATIONS A recent study by Deloitte and the Billie Jean King Leadership Initiative (BJKLI) shows that, in general, Millennials see the con- cepts of diversity and inclusion through a vastly different lens. The study analyzed the responses of 3,726 individuals who came from a wide variety of backgrounds with representation across gender, race/ethnicity, sexual orientation, national sta- tus, veteran status, disabilities, level within an organization, and tenure with an organization. The respondents were asked 62 questions about diversity and inclusion and the findings demon- strated a snapshot of shifting generational mindsets.

Millennials (born between 1977 to 1995) look upon diver- sity as the blending of different backgrounds, experiences, and perspectives within a team—which is known as cognitive diver- sity. They use this word to describe the mix of unique traits that help to overcome challenges and attain business objectives. For Millennials, inclusion is the support for a collaborative environ- ment, and leadership at such an organization must be transpar- ent, communicative, and engaging. According to the study, when defining diversity, Millennials are 35 percent more likely to focus on unique experiences, whereas 21 percent of non-Millennials are more likely to focus on representation.

The X-generation (born between 1965 and 1976) and Boomer generation (born between 1946 and 1964) have a different take.

These generations view diversity as a representation of fairness and protection for all—regardless of gender, race, religion, ethnic- ity, or sexual orientation. Here, inclusion is the integration of indi- viduals of all demographics into one workplace. It is the right thing to do, that is, a moral and legal imperative to achieve compliance and equality—regardless of whether it benefits the business. The study found that when asked about the business impact on diver- sity, Millennials are 71 percent more likely to focus on teamwork. In contrast, 28 percent of non-Millennials are more likely to focus on fairness of opportunity.

The study’s authors contend that the disconnect between the traditional definitions of diversity and inclusion and those of Millennials can create problems for businesses. For example, clashes may occur when managers do not permit Millennials to express themselves freely. The study found that while 86 percent of Millennials feel that differences of opinion allow teams to excel, only 59 percent believe that their leaders share this perspective.

The study suggests that a company with an inclusive culture promotes innovation. And it cites research by IBM and Morgan Stanley that shows that companies with high levels of innovation achieve the quickest growth in profits and that radical innova- tion outstrips incremental change by generating 10 times more shareholder value.

Sources: Dishman, L. 2015. Millennials have a different definition of diversity and inclusion. fastcompany.com, May 18: np; and Anonymous. 2015. For millennials inclusion goes beyond checking traditional boxes, according to a new Deloitte-- Billie Jean King Leadership Initiative Study. prnewswire.com, May 13: np.

11.2 ENVIRONMENTAL SUSTAINABILITY, ETHICSSTRATEGY SPOTLIGHT FAMILY LEADERSHIP SUSTAINS THE CULTURE OF SC JOHNSON SC Johnson, the maker of Windex, Ziploc bags, and Glade Air Fresheners, is known as one of the most environmentally con- scious consumer products companies. The family-owned company is run by Fisk Johnson, the fifth generation of the family to serve as firm CEO. It is the 35th largest privately owned firm, with 13,000 employees and nearly $10 billion in sales. Over the decades, the firm has built and reinforced its reputation for environmental con- sciousness. Being privately owned by the Johnson family is part of it. Fisk Johnson put it this way, “Wall Street rewards that short- termism. . . . We are in a very fortunate situation to not have to worry about those things, and we’re very fortunate that we have a family that is principled and has been very principled.”

Fisk uses the benefits of dedicated family ownership to work in both substantive and symbolic ways. On the substantive side, he has implemented systems in place to improve its environ- mental performance. For example, with its Greenlist process, the firm rates the ingredients it uses or is considering using. It then rates each ingredient on several criteria, including biodegrad- ability and human toxicity, and gives the ingredient a score rang-

3 (better or best) from about 20 percent to over 50 percent from 2001 to 2016.

Fisk uses stories from decisions in the past as it acts to sustain its culture of environmental consciousness. In using stories to rein- force the environmental focus within the firm and to explain it to external stakeholders, Fisk Johnson draws on stories relating to decisions his father made as well as ones he’s made. Most promi- nently, he uses a story about a decision his father made to stop using chlorofluorocarbons in the firm’s aerosol products. “Our first decision to unilaterally remove a major chemical occurred in 1975, when research began suggesting that chlorofluorocar- bons (CFCs) in aerosols might harm Earth’s ozone layer. My father was CEO at the time, and he decided to ban them from all the company’s aerosol products worldwide. He did so several years before the government played catch-up and banned the use of CFCs from everyone’s products.” He goes on to say, “You look back on that decision today, in light of the strong laws that came in, and that was a very prescient decision.” This story is especially effective since it highlights his father’s willingness and ability to take actions that can lead both the government and industry rivals to change. A second story outlines the firm’s decision to remove chlorine as an ingredient in its Saran Wrap. In the late 1990s, regu-

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EXHIBITS Both new and improved exhibits in every chapter provide visual presentations of the most complex concepts covered to support student comprehension.

REFLECTING ON CAREER IMPLICATIONS This section before the summary of every chapter consists of examples on how understanding of key concepts helps business students early in their careers.

INSIGHTS The “Insights” feature is new to this edition. “Insights from Executives” spotlight interviews with executives from worldwide organizations about current issues salient to strategic management. “Insights from Research” summarize key research findings relevant to maintaining the effectiveness of an organization and its management.

industries? There are several reasons. With regard to the collection period, grocery stores operate mostly on a cash basis, hence a very short collection period. Semiconductor manu- facturers sell their output to other manufacturers (e.g., computer makers) on terms such as 2/15 net 45, which means they give a 2 percent discount on bills paid within 15 days and start charging interest after 45 days. Skilled-nursing facilities also have a longer collection period than grocery stores because they typically rely on payments from insurance companies.

The industry norms for return on sales also highlight differences among these industries. Grocers, with very slim margins, have a lower return on sales than either skilled-nursing facil- ities or semiconductor manufacturers. But how might we explain the differences between

Financial Ratio Semiconductors Grocery Stores Skilled-Nursing Facilities

Quick ratio (times) 1.9 0.6 1.3

Current ratio (times) 3.6 1.7 1.7

Total liabilities to net worth (%) 35.1 72.7 82.5

Collection period (days) 48.6 3.3 36.5

Assets to sales (%) 131.7 22.1 58.3

Return on sales (%)  24   1.1 3.1

Source: Dun & Bradstreet. Industry Norms and Key Business Ratios, 2010–2011. One Year Edition, SIC #3600–3699 (Semiconductors); SIC #5400–5499 (Grocery Stores); SIC #8000–8099 (Skilled-Nursing Facilities). New York: Dun & Bradstreet Credit Services.

EXHIBIT 3.10 How Financial Ratios Differ across Industries

Admiral William H. McRaven, Retired Chancellor, University of Texas System

BIOSKETCH University of Texas Chancellor William H. McRaven, a retired four-star admiral, leads the nation’s second largest system of higher education. As chief executive officer of the UT System since January 2015, he oversees 14 institutions that educate 217,000 students and employ 20,000 faculty and more than 70,000 health care professionals, researchers, and staff.

Prior to becoming chancellor, McRaven, a Navy SEAL, was the commander of U.S. Special Operations Command during which time he led a force of 69,000 men and women and was responsible for conducting counter-terrorism operations world- wide. McRaven is also a recognized national authority on U.S. foreign policy and has advised presidents George W. Bush and Barack Obama and other U.S. leaders on defense issues. His acclaimed book, Spec. Ops: Case Studies in Special Operations Warfare: Theory and Practice, has been published in several lan-

SEAL—helps young people move past self-imposed limits of physical and mental endurance and build confidence in themselves to lead others. The result is a person who is capable of leading in an environment of constant stress, chaos, failure and hardships. In fact, to me, basic SEAL training was a lifetime sampling of micro-challenges I would later face while leading people and organizations all crammed into six months.

Question 2. In leading Neptune Spear, what were the key leadership decisions you made to build an organization to accomplish this task?

The majority of the key leadership decisions that in past enabled us to accomplish this task began before I took command of the organization—but as a member of the

organization and its number 2 leader over a period of years, I had been an engaged student in the trial, error, and the ulti- mate development of what my old boss, General Stan McChrystal, called a “team of teams.” You see, our operational envi- ronment was changing at an incredibly rapid pace. Unlike any time in our history the rate of change was—and is—no longer

INSIGHTS from executives1.1

THE STRATEGIC MANAGEMENT PROCESS

Overview People often think that older workers are less motivated and less healthy, resist change and are less trusting, and have more trouble balancing work and family. It turns out these assumptions just aren’t true. By challenging these stereotypes in your organization, you can keep your employees working.

What the Research Shows In a 2012 paper published by Personnel Psychology, research- ers from the University of Hong Kong and the University of Georgia examined 418 studies of workers’ ages and stereotypes. A meta-analysis—a study of studies—was conducted to find out if any of the six following stereotypes about older workers—as compared with younger workers—was actually true:

• They are less motivated. • They are less willing to participate in training and

career development. • They are more resistant to change. • They are less trusting. • They are less healthy. • They are more vulnerable to work-family imbalance.

retain, and encourage mature employees’ continued involve- ment in workplaces because they have much to offer in the ways of wisdom, experience, and institutional knowledge. The alternative is to miss out on a growing pool of valuable human capital.

How can you deal with age stereotypes to keep older workers engaged? The authors suggest three effective ways:

• Provide more opportunities for younger and older workers to work together.

• Promote positive attributes of older workers, like experience, carefulness, and punctuality.

• Engage employees in open discussions about stereotypes.

Adam Bradshaw of the DeGarmo Group Inc. has sum- marized research on addressing age stereotypes in the workplace and offers practical advice. For instance, make sure hiring practices identify factors important to the job other than age. Managers can be trained in how to spot age stereotypes and can point out to employees why the stereo- types are often untrue by using examples of effective older workers. Realize that older workers can offer a competitive advantage because of skills they possess that competitors

INSIGHTS from Research2.1

NEW TRICKS: RESEARCH DEBUNKS MYTHS ABOUT OLDER WORKERS

Reflecting on Career Implications . . . This chapter discusses both the long-term focus of strategy and the need for coherence in strategic direction. The following questions extend these themes by asking students to consider their own strategic goals and how they fit with the goals of the firms in which they work or would seek employment.

Attributes of Strategic Management: The attributes of strategic management described in this chapter are applicable to your personal careers as well. What are your overall goals and objectives? Who are the stakeholders you have to consider in making your career decisions (family, community, etc.)? What trade- offs do you see between your long-term and short-term goals?

Intended versus Emergent Strategies: While you may have planned your career trajectory carefully, don’t be too tied to it. Strive to take advantage of new opportunities as they arise. Many promising career opportunities may “emerge” that were not part of your intended career strategy or your specific job assignment. Take initiative by pursuing opportunities to get additional training (e.g., learn a software or a statistical package), volunteering for a short-term overseas assignment, etc. You may be in a better position to take advantage of such emergent opportunities if you take the effort to prepare for

them. For example, learning a foreign language may position you better for an overseas opportunity.

Ambidexterity: In Strategy Spotlight 1.1, we discussed the four most important traits of ambidextrous individuals. These include looking for opportunities beyond the description of one’s job, seeking out opportunities to collaborate with others, building internal networks, and multitasking. Evaluate yourself along each of these criteria. If you score low, think of ways in which you can improve your ambidexterity.

Strategic Coherence: What is the mission of your organization? What are the strategic objectives of the department or unit you are working for? In what ways does your own role contribute to the mission and objectives? What can you do differently in order to help the organization attain its mission and strategic objectives?

Strategic Coherence: Setting strategic objectives is important in your personal career as well. Identify and write down three or four important strategic objectives you want to accomplish in the next few years (finish your degree, find a better-paying job, etc.). Are you allocating your resources (time, money, etc.) to enable you to achieve these objectives? Are your objectives measurable, timely, realistic, specific, and appropriate?

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PART 1 STRATEGIC ANALYSIS 1 Strategic Management: Creating Competitive Advantages 2

2 Analyzing the External Environment of the Firm: Creating Competitive Advantages 34

3 Assessing the Internal Environment of the Firm 70

4 Recognizing a Firm’s Intellectual Assets: Moving beyond a Firm’s Tangible Resources 102

PART 2 STRATEGIC FORMULATION 5 Business-Level Strategy: Creating and Sustaining Competitive

Advantages 138

6 Corporate-Level Strategy: Creating Value through Diversification 172

7 International Strategy: Creating Value in Global Markets 202

8 Entrepreneurial Strategy and Competitive Dynamics 236

PART 3 STRATEGIC IMPLEMENTATION 9 Strategic Control and Corporate Governance 266

10 Creating Effective Organizational Designs 300

11 Strategic Leadership: Creating a Learning Organization and an Ethical Organization 332

12 Managing Innovation and Fostering Corporate Entrepreneurship 360

PART 4 CASE ANALYSIS 13 Analyzing Strategic Management Cases 392

Cases C-1

Indexes I-1

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PART 1 STRATEGIC ANALYSIS

CHAPTER 1 Strategic Management: Creating Competitive Advantages . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .2

Learning from Mistakes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3

What Is Strategic Management? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 Defining Strategic Management . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 The Four Key Attributes of Strategic Management . . . . . . . 7

1.1 STRATEGY SPOTLIGHT

Ambidextrous Behaviors: Combining Alignment and Adaptability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9

The Strategic Management Process . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 Intended versus Realized Strategies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 Strategy Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 Strategy Formulation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 Strategy Implementation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13

1.1 INSIGHTS FROM EXECUTIVES

The Strategic Management Process . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .14

The Role of Corporate Governance and Stakeholder Management . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16 Alternative Perspectives of Stakeholder Management . . . . .17 Social Responsibility and Environmental Sustainability:

Moving beyond the Immediate Stakeholders . . . . . . . . . 18 1.2 STRATEGY SPOTLIGHT

How Walmart Deploys Green Energy on an Industrial Scale—And Makes Money at It . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .21

The Strategic Management Perspective: An Imperative Throughout the Organization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22

1.3 STRATEGY SPOTLIGHT

Strategy and the Value of Inexperience . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23

Ensuring Coherence in Strategic Direction . . . . . . . . 23 Organizational Vision . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24 Mission Statements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25 Strategic Objectives . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26

1.4 STRATEGY SPOTLIGHT

How Perceptual Limited Succeeded by Rallying Around the Founder’s Original Mission . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27

Issue for Debate . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28 Reflecting on Career Implications . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29 Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29 Key Terms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30 Experiential Exercise . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30 Application Questions & Exercises . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30 Ethics Questions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .31 References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .31

CHAPTER 2 Analyzing the External Environment of the Firm: Creating Competitive Advantages . . . . . . . . . . . . .34

Learning from Mistakes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35

Enhancing Awareness of the External Environment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36 The Role of Scanning, Monitoring, Competitive

Intelligence, and Forecasting . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37 2.1 STRATEGY SPOTLIGHT Ethics

Ethical Guidelines on Competitive Intelligence: United Technologies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39

SWOT Analysis. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40

The General Environment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41 The Demographic Segment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43 The Sociocultural Segment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43 The Political/Legal Segment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43

2.1 INSIGHTS FROM RESEARCH

New Tricks: Research Debunks Myths about Older Workers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44

The Technological Segment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45 2.2 STRATEGY SPOTLIGHT Ethics

The Conflict Minerals Legislation: Implications for Supply Chain Management . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46

The Economic Segment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46 The Global Segment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47

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Relationships among Elements of the General Environment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47

Data Analytics: A Technology That Affects Multiple Segments of the General Environment . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47 2.3 STRATEGY SPOTLIGHT Data Analytics

How Big Data Can Monitor Federal, State, and Local Government Expenditures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49

The Competitive Environment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50 Porter’s Five Forces Model of Industry Competition . . . . . 50

2.4 STRATEGY SPOTLIGHT

Apple Flexes Its Muscle When It Comes to Negotiating Rental Rates for Its Stores in Malls . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53

How the Internet and Digital Technologies Are Affecting the Five Competitive Forces . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55 2.5 STRATEGY SPOTLIGHT

Buyer Power in Legal Services: The Role of the Internet . . . . 58

Using Industry Analysis: A Few Caveats . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59 Strategic Groups within Industries . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .61 Issue for Debate . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63 Reflecting on Career Implications . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 64 Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65 Key Terms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65 Experiential Exercise . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 66 Application Questions & Exercises . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 66 Ethics Questions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 66 References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 66

CHAPTER 3 Assessing the Internal Environment of the Firm . . .70

Learning from Mistakes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .71

Value-Chain Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 72 Primary Activities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 73

3.1 STRATEGY SPOTLIGHT

Chipotle’s Efficient Operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .74

Support Activities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 75 3.2 STRATEGY SPOTLIGHT Data

The Algorithm for Orange Juice . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 77

3.3 STRATEGY SPOTLIGHT

Schmitz Cargobull: Adding Value to Customers via IT . . . . . . 78

Interrelationships among Value-Chain Activities within and across Organizations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 78

Integrating Customers into the Value Chain . . . . . . . . . . . . 78 Applying the Value Chain to Service Organizations . . . . . . 80

Resource-Based View of the Firm . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 81 Types of Firm Resources . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .81 Firm Resources and Sustainable Competitive

Advantages . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 83 3.4 STRATEGY SPOTLIGHT

Printed in Taiwan: Path Dependence in 3D Printing . . . . . . . 85

3.5 STRATEGY SPOTLIGHT

Amazon Prime: Very Difficult for Rivals to Copy . . . . . . . . . . 86

The Generation and Distribution of a Firm’s Profits: Extending the Resource-Based View of the Firm . . . . . 88

Evaluating Firm Performance: Two Approaches . . . 90 Financial Ratio Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 90 Integrating Financial Analysis and Stakeholder

Perspectives: The Balanced Scorecard . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 93 Issue for Debate . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 95 Reflecting on Career Implications . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 96 Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 96 Key Terms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .97 Experiential Exercise . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .97 Application Questions & Exercises . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 98 Ethics Questions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 98 References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 99

CHAPTER 4 Recognizing a Firm’s Intellectual Assets: Moving beyond a Firm’s Tangible Resources . . . .102

Learning from Mistakes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .103

The Central Role of Knowledge in Today’s Economy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 104 Human Capital: The Foundation of Intellectual Capital . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 107

4.1 STRATEGY SPOTLIGHT Environmental Sustainability

Can Green Strategies Attract and Retain Talent? . . . . . . . . . . 108

Attracting Human Capital . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 108 Developing Human Capital . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .110

4.1 INSIGHTS FROM RESEARCH

Welcome Back! Recruiting Boomerang Employees . . . . . . . . . 111

Retaining Human Capital . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .114

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CONTENTS

Enhancing Human Capital: Redefining Jobs and Managing Diversity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .115 4.2 STRATEGY SPOTLIGHT

Want to Increase Employee Retention? Try Data Analytics . . 116

4.3 STRATEGY SPOTLIGHT

Millennials Have a Different Definition of Diversity and Inclusion than Prior Generations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 118

The Vital Role of Social Capital . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 118 How Social Capital Helps Attract and Retain Talent . . . . .119 Social Networks: Implications for Knowledge

Management and Career Success . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .119 4.4 STRATEGY SPOTLIGHT

Picasso versus Van Gogh: Who Was More Successful and Why? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .122

The Potential Downside of Social Capital . . . . . . . . . . . . . 123

Using Technology to Leverage Human Capital and Knowledge . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 124 Using Networks to Share Information . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 124 Electronic Teams: Using Technology to Enhance

Collaboration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 125 Codifying Knowledge for Competitive Advantage . . . . . . 126

4.5 STRATEGY SPOTLIGHT

How SAP Taps Knowledge Well Beyond Its Boundaries . . . . .127

Protecting the Intellectual Assets of the Organization: Intellectual Property and Dynamic Capabilities . . . 128 Intellectual Property Rights . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 129 Dynamic Capabilities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 129 Issue for Debate . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .130 Reflecting on Career Implications . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 131 Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 131 Key Terms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .132 Experiential Exercise . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .132 Application Questions & Exercises . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .132 Ethics Questions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .132 References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .133

PART 2 STRATEGIC FORMULATION

CHAPTER 5 Business-Level Strategy: Creating and Sustaining Competitive Advantages . . . . . . . . . . 138

Learning from Mistakes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .139

Types of Competitive Advantage and Sustainability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 140 Overall Cost Leadership. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .141

5.1 STRATEGY SPOTLIGHT Environmental Sustainability Primark Strives to Balance Low Costs with Environmental

Sustainability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .143 Differentiation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 145

5.1 INSIGHTS FROM RESEARCH Linking Customer Interactions to Innovation: The Role

of the Organizational Practices. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .147 5.2 STRATEGY SPOTLIGHT Data Analytics Caterpillar Digs into the Data to Differentiate Itself . . . . . . . .148

Focus . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 150 5.3 STRATEGY SPOTLIGHT Data Analytics Luxury in the E-Commerce World . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 151

Combination Strategies: Integrating Overall Low Cost and Differentiation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 152 5.4 STRATEGY SPOTLIGHT Expanding the Profit Pool in the Sky . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .153

Can Competitive Strategies Be Sustained? Integrating and Applying Strategic Management Concepts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 155 Atlas Door: A Case Example . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 155 Are Atlas Door’s Competitive Advantages Sustainable? . . .156 Strategies for Platform Markets . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 158

Industry Life-Cycle Stages: Strategic Implications . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 159 Strategies in the Introduction Stage . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .161 Strategies in the Growth Stage . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .161 Strategies in the Maturity Stage . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 162 Strategies in the Decline Stage. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 163 Turnaround Strategies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 164

5.5 STRATEGY SPOTLIGHT How Mindy Grossman Led HSN’s Remarkable

Turnaround . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 165 Issue for Debate . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .166 Reflecting on Career Implications . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .166 Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .167 Key Terms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .167 Experiential Exercise . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .167 Application Questions & Exercises . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .168 Ethics Questions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .168 References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .168

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CHAPTER 6 Corporate-Level Strategy: Creating Value through Diversification . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 172

Learning from Mistakes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 173

Making Diversification Work: An Overview . . . . . . . 174 Related Diversification: Economies of Scope and Revenue Enhancement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 175 Leveraging Core Competencies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .175

6.1 STRATEGY SPOTLIGHT Data Analytics

IBM: The New Health Care Expert . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .177

Sharing Activities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .178

Enhancing Revenue and Differentiation . . . . . . . . . 178 Related Diversification: Market Power . . . . . . . . . . 179 Pooled Negotiating Power . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 179 Vertical Integration. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 179

6.2 STRATEGY SPOTLIGHT Environmental Sustainability

Tesla Breaks Industry Norms by Vertically Integrating . . . . .180

Unrelated Diversification: Financial Synergies and Parenting . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 182 Corporate Parenting and Restructuring . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 182 Portfolio Management . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 183 Caveat: Is Risk Reduction a Viable Goal of

Diversification? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 185

The Means to Achieve Diversification . . . . . . . . . . . 186 Mergers and Acquisitions. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 186

6.3 STRATEGY SPOTLIGHT Ethics

Valeant Pharmaceuticals Jacks Up Prices after Acquisitions but Loses in the End. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .189

6.4 STRATEGY SPOTLIGHT

The Wisdom of Crowds: When Do Investors See Value in Acquisitions?. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .190

Strategic Alliances and Joint Ventures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 192 6.5 STRATEGY SPOTLIGHT

Ericsson and Cisco Join Forces to Respond to the Changing Telecommunications Market . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 193

Internal Development . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 193

How Managerial Motives Can Erode Value Creation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 194 Growth for Growth’s Sake . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 194 Egotism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 195 Antitakeover Tactics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 195

Issue for Debate . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .196 Reflecting on Career Implications . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .197 Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .197 Key Terms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .198 Experiential Exercise . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .198 Application Questions & Exercises . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .198 Ethics Questions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .198 References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .198

CHAPTER 7 International Strategy: Creating Value in Global Markets . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 202

Learning from Mistakes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 203

The Global Economy: A Brief Overview . . . . . . . . . . 204 Factors Affecting a Nation’s Competitiveness . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 205 Factor Endowments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 205 Demand Conditions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 205 Related and Supporting Industries . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 206 Firm Strategy, Structure, and Rivalry . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 206 Concluding Comment on Factors Affecting a Nation’s

Competitiveness . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 206 7.1 STRATEGY SPOTLIGHT

India and the Diamond of National Advantage . . . . . . . . . . 207

International Expansion: A Company’s Motivations and Risks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 208 Motivations for International Expansion . . . . . . . . . . . . . 208 Potential Risks of International Expansion . . . . . . . . . . . . .210

7.2 STRATEGY SPOTLIGHT Ethics

Counterfeit Drugs: A Dangerous and Growing Problem . . . . 213 7.3 STRATEGY SPOTLIGHT

When to Not Adapt Your Company’s Culture—Even If It Conflicts with the Local Culture . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 214

Global Dispersion of Value Chains: Outsourcing and Offshoring . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .214

Achieving Competitive Advantage in Global Markets . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 216 Two Opposing Pressures: Reducing Costs and Adapting

to Local Markets . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .216 International Strategy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .217 Global Strategy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .219 Multidomestic Strategy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 220

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CONTENTS

7.4 STRATEGY SPOTLIGHT

Challenges Involving Cultural Differences That Managers May Encounter When Negotiating Contracts across National Boundaries . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .221

Transnational Strategy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 222 7.5 STRATEGY SPOTLIGHT

Panasonic’s China Experience Shows the Benefits of Being a Transnational . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 224

Global or Regional? A Second Look at Globalization . . . 224

Entry Modes of International Expansion . . . . . . . . . 226 Exporting . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 226 Licensing and Franchising . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 227 Strategic Alliances and Joint Ventures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 228 Wholly Owned Subsidiaries . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 229 Issue for Debate . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 230 Reflecting on Career Implications . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .231 Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .231 Key Terms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 232 Experiential Exercise . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 232 Application Questions & Exercises . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 232 Ethics Questions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 232 References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 233

CHAPTER 8 Entrepreneurial Strategy and Competitive Dynamics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 236

Learning from Mistakes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 237

Recognizing Entrepreneurial Opportunities . . . . . . 238 Entrepreneurial Opportunities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 239

8.1 STRATEGY SPOTLIGHT

Seeing Opportunity in the Bright Side . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 240

8.2 STRATEGY SPOTLIGHT Environmental Sustainability

mOasis Leverages Technology to Improve Water Efficiency for Farmers. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .241

Entrepreneurial Resources . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 242 Entrepreneurial Leadership . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 246

Entrepreneurial Strategy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 247 Entry Strategies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 247

8.3 STRATEGY SPOTLIGHT

Casper Sleep Aims to Be the Warby Parker of Mattresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 249

Generic Strategies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 250

8.4 STRATEGY SPOTLIGHT

Shakespeare & Co.: Using Technology to Create a New Local Bookstore . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 252

Combination Strategies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 252

Competitive Dynamics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 253 New Competitive Action . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 253 Threat Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 254 Motivation and Capability to Respond . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 256 Types of Competitive Actions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 256 Likelihood of Competitive Reaction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 258

8.5 STRATEGY SPOTLIGHT Ethics

Cleaning Up in the Soap Business . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 259

Choosing Not to React: Forbearance and Co-opetition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 259

Issue for Debate . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 260 Reflecting on Career Implications . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .261 Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .261 Key Terms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 262 Application Questions & Exercises . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 262 Ethics Questions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 263 References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 263

PART 3 STRATEGIC IMPLEMENTATION CHAPTER 9 Strategic Control and Corporate Governance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 266

Learning from Mistakes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .267

Ensuring Informational Control: Responding Effectively to Environmental Change . . . . . . . . . . . 268 A Traditional Approach to Strategic Control . . . . . . . . . . 268 A Contemporary Approach to Strategic Control . . . . . . . 269

Attaining Behavioral Control: Balancing Culture, Rewards, and Boundaries . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 270 Building a Strong and Effective Culture . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 270 Motivating with Rewards and Incentives . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .271

9.1 STRATEGY SPOTLIGHT

Using Pictures and Stories to Build a Customer-Oriented Culture . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .272

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9.1 INSIGHTS FROM RESEARCH

Inspire Passion—Motivate Top Performance . . . . . . . . . . . . . .274

Setting Boundaries and Constraints . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .275 Behavioral Control in Organizations: Situational

Factors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 276 9.2 STRATEGY SPOTLIGHT Data Analytics

Using Data Analytics to Enhance Organizational Control . . .277

Evolving from Boundaries to Rewards and Culture . . . . . 277

The Role of Corporate Governance . . . . . . . . . . . . . 278 The Modern Corporation: The Separation of Owners

(Shareholders) and Management . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 279 Governance Mechanisms: Aligning the Interests of

Owners and Managers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 280 9.3 STRATEGY SPOTLIGHT Ethics

How Women Have Come to Dominate a Corner of Finance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 284

CEO Duality: Is It Good or Bad? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 285 External Governance Control Mechanisms . . . . . . . . . . . 286

9.4 STRATEGY SPOTLIGHT

The Rise of the Privately Owned Firm . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 288

9.5 STRATEGY SPOTLIGHT Ethics

Japanese Government Pushes for Governance Reform . . . . . 289

Corporate Governance: An International Perspective . . . 290 Issue for Debate . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 292 Reflecting on Career Implications . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 293 Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 293 Key Terms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 294 Experiential Exercise . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 294 Application Questions & Exercises . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 294 Ethics Questions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 294 References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 295

CHAPTER 10 Creating Effective Organizational Designs . . . . . 300

Learning from Mistakes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .301

Traditional Forms of Organizational Structure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 302 Patterns of Growth of Large Corporations: Strategy-

Structure Relationships . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 302 Simple Structure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 304 Functional Structure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 304 Divisional Structure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 306

10.1 STRATEGY SPOTLIGHT

Whole Foods Centralizes to Improve Efficiency . . . . . . . . . . 307

Matrix Structure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 308 10.2 STRATEGY SPOTLIGHT

Where Conglomerates Prosper . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 309

International Operations: Implications for Organizational Structure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .310

Global Start-Ups: A Recent Phenomenon . . . . . . . . . . . . .312 10.3 STRATEGY SPOTLIGHT

Global Start-Up, BRCK, Works to Bring Reliable Internet Connectivity to the World . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 313

How an Organization’s Structure Can Influence Strategy Formulation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .313

Boundaryless Organizational Designs . . . . . . . . . . 314 The Barrier-Free Organization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .314

10.4 STRATEGY SPOTLIGHT Environmental Sustainability

The Business Roundtable: A Forum for Sharing Best Environmental Sustainability Practices . . . . . . . . . . . . . .316

10.1 INSIGHTS FROM RESEARCH

Where Employees Learn Affects Financial Performance . . . . 317

10.5 STRATEGY SPOTLIGHT

Cloudflare Sees the Need for Structure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .318

The Modular Organization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .318 The Virtual Organization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 320 Boundaryless Organizations: Making Them Work . . . . . . 321

Creating Ambidextrous Organizational Designs . . 324 Ambidextrous Organizations: Key Design Attributes . . . . 325 Why Was the Ambidextrous Organization the Most

Effective Structure? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 325 Issue for Debate . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 326 Reflecting on Career Implications . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .327 Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .327 Key Terms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 328 Experiential Exercise . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 328 Application Questions & Exercises . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 328 Ethics Questions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 329 References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 329

CHAPTER 11 Strategic Leadership: Creating a Learning Organization and an Ethical Organization . . . . . 332

Learning from Mistakes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 333

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Leadership: Three Interdependent Activities . . . . . 334 Setting a Direction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 335 Designing the Organization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 335

11.1 STRATEGY SPOTLIGHT

Marvin Ellison Attempts to Turn JC Penney Co. Inc. Around . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 336

Nurturing a Culture Committed to Excellence and Ethical Behavior . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 336 11.2 STRATEGY SPOTLIGHT Environmental Sustainability,

Ethics

Family Leadership Sustains the Culture of SC Johnson . . . . 337

Getting Things Done: Overcoming Barriers and Using Power . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 338 Overcoming Barriers to Change . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 338

11.3 STRATEGY SPOTLIGHT

Overcoming Supply Chain Limitations at Target . . . . . . . . . 339

Using Power Effectively . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 339 11.4 STRATEGY SPOTLIGHT

The Use of “Soft” Power at Siemens . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .341

Emotional Intelligence: A Key Leadership Trait . . . 341 Self-Awareness . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 342 Self-Regulation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 342 Motivation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 343 Empathy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 343 Social Skill . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 343 Emotional Intelligence: Some Potential Drawbacks and

Cautionary Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 344

Creating a Learning Organization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 344 Inspiring and Motivating People with a Mission

or Purpose . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 345 Empowering Employees at All Levels . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 345 Accumulating and Sharing Internal Knowledge . . . . . . . . 346 Gathering and Integrating External Information . . . . . . . 346 Challenging the Status Quo and Enabling Creativity . . . . 347

Creating an Ethical Organization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 348 Individual Ethics versus Organizational Ethics . . . . . . . . . 348

11.5 STRATEGY SPOTLIGHT Environmental Sustainability, Ethics

Green Energy: Real or Just a Marketing Ploy? . . . . . . . . . . . 349

Integrity-Based versus Compliance-Based Approaches to Organizational Ethics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 350

Role Models . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 351

Corporate Credos and Codes of Conduct . . . . . . . . . . . . . 352 Reward and Evaluation Systems . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 352 Policies and Procedures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 353 Issue for Debate . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 353 Reflecting on Career Implications . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 354 Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 355 Key Terms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 355 Experiential Exercise . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 356 Application Questions & Exercises . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 356 Ethics Questions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 356 References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 356

CHAPTER 12 Managing Innovation and Fostering Corporate Entrepreneurship . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 360

Learning from Mistakes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .361

Managing Innovation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 362 Types of Innovation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 362

12.1 STRATEGY SPOTLIGHT

MiO Drops Change the Beverage Game . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 363

Challenges of Innovation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 364 Cultivating Innovation Skills . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 365

12.2 STRATEGY SPOTLIGHT

Procter & Gamble Strives to Remain Innovative. . . . . . . . . . 366

12.3 STRATEGY SPOTLIGHT Environmental Sustainability

Fair Oaks Farms Sees the Power of Waste . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 368

Defining the Scope of Innovation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 368 Managing the Pace of Innovation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 369 Staffing to Capture Value from Innovation . . . . . . . . . . . . 369 Collaborating with Innovation Partners . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 370 The Value of Unsuccessful Innovation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 370

12.1 INSIGHTS FROM RESEARCH

You Can Adapt to the Loss of a Star Employee . . . . . . . . . . .371

Corporate Entrepreneurship . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 373 Focused Approaches to Corporate Entrepreneurship . . . .374

12.4 STRATEGY SPOTLIGHT

Big Firms Use NVGs and Business Incubators to Trigger Creativity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .375

Dispersed Approaches to Corporate Entrepreneurship . . .375 Measuring the Success of Corporate Entrepreneurship

Activities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 377

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Real Options Analysis: A Useful Tool . . . . . . . . . . . . 378 Applications of Real Options Analysis to Strategic

Decisions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 379 12.5 STRATEGY SPOTLIGHT

Saving Millions with Real Options at Intel . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 380

Potential Pitfalls of Real Options Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . 380

Entrepreneurial Orientation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 381 Autonomy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 381 Innovativeness . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 382 Proactiveness . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 383 Competitive Aggressiveness . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 384 Risk Taking . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 384 Issue for Debate . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 385 Reflecting on Career Implications . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 386 Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 386 Key Terms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 387 Experiential Exercise . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 387 Application Questions & Exercises . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 387 Ethics Questions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 387 References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 388

PART 4 Case Analysis CHAPTER 13 Analyzing Strategic Management Cases . . . . . . 392

Why Analyze Strategic Management Cases? . . . . . . . . . . . . 393 13.1 STRATEGY SPOTLIGHT

Analysis, Decision Making, and Change at Sapient Health Network . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 395

How to Conduct a Case Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 395 Become Familiar with the Material . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 396

13.2 STRATEGY SPOTLIGHT

Using a Business Plan Framework to Analyze Strategic Cases . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 397

Identify Problems . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 397 Conduct Strategic Analyses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 398 Propose Alternative Solutions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 400 Make Recommendations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 400

How to Get the Most from Case Analysis . . . . . . . . 401 Useful Decision-Making Techniques in Case Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 404 Integrative Thinking . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 404 Asking Heretical Questions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 406

13.3 STRATEGY SPOTLIGHT

Integrative Thinking at Red Hat, Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 406

Conflict-Inducing Techniques . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 407 13.4 STRATEGY SPOTLIGHT

Making Case Analysis Teams More Effective . . . . . . . . . . . . 408

Following the Analysis-Decision-Action Cycle in Case Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 411

13.5 STRATEGY SPOTLIGHT

Case Competition Assignment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .416

Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 417 Key Terms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 417 References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 417 Appendix 1 to Chapter 13: Financial Ratio Analysis . . . . . . . 418 Appendix 2 to Chapter 13: Sources of Company and

Industry Information . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .427

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CASES

1 ROBIN HOOD Hypothetical/Classic Robin Hood and his Merrymen are in trouble, as wealthy travelers are avoiding Sherwood Forest. This classic case is an excellent introduction to strategic management using a nonbusiness context. . . . . . . . . . C2

2 THE GLOBAL CASINO INDUSTRY IN 2017 Casino Industry The dominance of Las Vegas and Atlantic City in the global market has been challenged by the development of several casinos along a strip in the former Portuguese colony of Macau. More recently, this growth of casinos has spread to other locations across Asia-Pacific. All of these new locations are hoping to grab a share of the gambling revenues. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . C3

3 MCDONALD’S IN 2017 Restaurant Change is in the air at the world’s largest burger chain. Only 20% of millennials have even tried a Big Mac and McDonald’s is worried. It has removed high fructose corn syrup from its buns, changed from the use of liquid margarine to real butter, decided to use chicken that has been raised without antibiotics, and switched to cage- free eggs. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . C7

4 ZYNGA: IS THE GAME OVER? Mutimedia & Online Games Zynga not only struggled to remain relevant in the gaming industry but also fought to seem attractive to investors. During the past four years, the company had a new CEO almost every year. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . C13

5 QVC Retail QVC is finally beginning to see cracks emerge in a business model that has relied on impulsive purchases

by television viewers. The home shopping channel’s U.S. sales fell 6% during the last part of 2016, the first drop in seven years on its home turf. It was especially troubling that this decline extended into the crucial year-end holiday period. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . C19

6 MICROFINANCE: GOING GLOBAL . . . AND GOING PUBLIC?

Finance With the global success of the microfinance concept, the number of private microfinance institutions exploded and the initial public offerings for these institutions was on the rise. This transfer of control to public buyers creates a fiduciary duty of the bank’s management to maximize shareholder value. Will this be a good thing for these typically “do good” banks? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . C24

7 WORLD WRESTLING ENTERTAINMENT Entertainment 2017 offered new challenges for WWE’s potent mix of shaved, pierced, and pumped-up muscled hunks; buxom, scantily clad, and sometimes cosmetically enhanced beauties; and body-bashing clashes of good versus evil that had resulted in an empire that claimed over 35 million fans. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . C27

8 GREENWOOD RESOURCES: A GLOBAL SUSTAINABLE VENTURE IN THE MAKING

Natural Resources GreenWood manager Jeff Nuss narrowed the field from 20 possible investment sites to two strategic alternatives. Which tree plantation investment in rural China should Jeff proceed with? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . C32

9 FRESHDIRECT: HOW FRESH IS IT? Grocery FreshDirect, a New York City–based online grocer, claimed, “Our food is fresh, our customers are spoiled.” Recently, however, many consumers questioned the freshness of the food delivered. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . C46

10 DIPPIN’ DOTS: IS THE FUTURE FROZEN? Ice Cream Dippin’ Dots Ice Cream is faced with mounting competition for its flagship tiny beads of ice cream that are made and served at super-cold temperatures. Will their new distribution partners bring them in from the cold?. . . . C58

cases

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11 KICKSTARTER AND CROWDFUNDING Crowdfunding Crowdfunding allows ventures to draw on relatively small contributions from a relatively large number of individuals using the Internet, without standard financial intermediaries. KickStarter offers a platform for crowdfunding of new ventures, but the field is crowded. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . C68

12 EMIRATES AIRLINE IN 2017 Airlines Emirates faced its biggest challenge from the drop in oil prices and the growth in terrorist attacks that have led to a decline in demand. Many companies, particularly in the Middle East, have been cutting back on travel for their employees, reducing the premium revenue that Emirates has been generating from first and business class passengers. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . C75

13 CIRQUE DU SOLEIL Entertainment Cirque du Soleil’s business triumphs mirrored its high- flying aerial stunts, but poorly received shows over the last few years and a decline in profits have caused executives at Cirque to announce restructuring and refocusing efforts—shifting some of the attention away from their string of successful shows toward several other potential business ventures. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . C82

14 PIXAR Movies Disney CEO Bob Iger worked hard to clinch the deal to acquire Pixar, whose track record has made it one of the world’s most successful animation companies. Iger realized, however, that he must try to protect Pixar’s creative culture while also trying to carry that culture over to some of Disney’s animation efforts. . . . . . . . C86

15 CAMPBELL: HOW TO KEEP THE SOUP SIMMERING

Processed and Packaged Goods In 2017, Campbell Soup neared the boiling point with numerous challenges, the most important to remain attractive to health-conscious consumers. CEO Denise Morrison tried to turn the company focus toward fresh food categories, with its fresh food division called “Campbell Fresh.” However, the company still failed to accomplish an impressive comeback. . . . . . . . . . . . . C91

16 HEINEKEN Beer Heineken can lay claim to a brand that may be the closest thing to a global beer brand. But in the United States and Europe sales are relatively flat. Heineken owns more than 175 smaller or regional brands of beer. Would the move to launch Bintang, which is its biggest selling beer brand in Indonesia, into the UK and select European markets be successful? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . C102

17 FORD: NO LONGER JUST AN AUTO COMPANY?

Automotive Ford’s new CEO Mark Fields announced that Ford would focus not only on advanced new vehicles but on changing the way the world moves by solving today’s growing global transportation challenges. Are Fields and Ford up to the challenge? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . C107

18 GENERAL MOTORS IN 2017 Automotive GM has fallen from its dominant position in the domestic auto business, is dismantling operations in Russia, and is selling off its Opel unit in Europe to Peugeot. Will CEO Mary Barra be able to bring back the glory with a series of new investments such as in electric vehicles, ride sharing fleets, and driverless cars? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . C120

19 JOHNSON & JOHNSON Pharmaceuticals, Personal Care Products, Medical Devices CEO Alex Gorsky has been growing J&J by acquisition, while granting autonomy to the firms that it absorbs. While independence cultivates an entrepreneurial attitude, the units are not pursuing collaborative opportunities across units. How can J&J combine collaboration and autonomy without unraveling the J&J entrepreneurial spirit? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . C128

20 AVON: A NEW ERA? Cosmetics Rookie CEO Shari McCoy spun off 80% of Avon’s domestic business in an attempt save the firm. Can McCoy save the remaining business and return the iconic, direct selling company to profitable growth?. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . C133

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CASES

21 THE BOSTON BEER COMPANY: POISED FOR GROWTH

Beer The Boston Beer Company was facing a difficult competitive environment with direct competition from both larger and smaller breweries and from premium imported beers. While further growth would be beneficial in terms of revenue, growing too large could negatively affect the company’s status as a craft brewery and the perceptions of its customers. . . . . . . . . . . . C144

22 NINTENDO’S SWITCH Video Games In 2017 Nintendo launched a new gaming console system named Nintendo Switch. Would the new Joy- Con Controllers and flexible play features be enough to boost consumer numbers and investors’ confidence? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . C154

23 TATA STARBUCKS: HOW TO BREW A SUSTAINABLE BLEND FOR INDIA

Coffee Would Starbucks and Tata under new CEO Sumi Ghosh’s leadership finally be able to brew a new blend of success in the competitive and complex Indian café market? While management appeared proud of the joint venture’s early performance, some critical strategic choices would need to be made to ensure the long-term success of Starbucks in India. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . C165

24 WEIGHT WATCHERS INTERNATIONAL INC. Weight Loss Weight Watchers was reinventing weight loss for a new generation and hoping profits would jump off the scale. A new “Beyond the Scale” advertising campaign that featured the entrepreneur and talk show host, Oprah Winfrey, claiming that she had lost 40 pounds by using Weight Watchers program. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . C173

25 SAMSUNG ELECTRONICS 2017 Consumer Electronics Samsung rushed the Note 7 to market ahead of Apple’s anticipated iPhone 7. The tendency of the Note 7 to burst into flames from a poor battery design subsequently led Samsung to engage in one of its most extensive and costly recalls and to eventually kill the new product. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . C184

26 PROCTER & GAMBLE Consumer Products Procter & Gamble was the world’s largest consumer products conglomerate, with billion-dollar brands such as Tide, Crest, Pampers, Gillette, Right Guard, and Duracell. However, sales were down as consumers were coping with the economic downturn by switching to P&G’s lower-priced brands. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . C189

27 APPLE INC.: IS THE INNOVATION OVER? Computers, Consumer Electronics CEO Tim Cook had driven the stock price up 175% since the death of founder Steve Jobs. Yet Cook was criticized for being too cautious about entering new product categories, pursuing acquisitions, and driving employees to achieve stretch goals. Would Apple be able to innovative without Jobs? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . C195

28 JETBLUE AIRLINES: GETTING OVER THE “BLUES”?

Airline This airline’s start-up success story is facing new challenges as operational problems have surfaced and another new pilot is in the CEO’s seat. . . . . . . . . . . C208

29 UNITED WAY WORLDWIDE Nonprofit As a nonprofit organization, it was imperative for United Way Worldwide to get the necessary support at the local level in order to achieve its stated organizational goals. Would Gallagher’s various strategies be successfully implemented, or was the nonprofit’s very mission perhaps no longer relevant? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .C218

30 EBAY Internet The online auction pioneer was entering a critical period. There were questions of what was right for the company to increase shareholder value over the long term, as well as operational issues related to search engine optimization and online security. . . . . . . . . C227

31 JAMBA JUICE: MIXING IT UP & STARTING AFRESH

Smoothies/QSR After years of same-store declines, activist investors were pressuring CEO Dave Pace for a turnaround.

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Jamba has gradually expanded its product line over the past several years to appeal to a broader palate, but was the company biting off more than it could chew? . . C241

32 BLACKBERRY LIMITED: IS THERE A PATH TO RECOVERY?

Mobile Phones, Software Blackberry CEO John Chen was hired to get the former dominating smartphone producer back to profitability. However, Blackberry stock was trading for less than $7 a share, that is, only a fraction of the $139 price in 2008. Chen has to navigate the rumors of a sale to Samsung and hostile takeovers, while refocusing the firm. Will Chen and Blackberry survive? . . . . . . . . C250

33 ASCENA: ODDS OF SURVIVAL IN SPECIALTY RETAIL?

Retail, Women’s Fashion Ascena was just starting to digest Ann Taylor, its most recent acquisition in women’s apparel. However, 2017

was shaping up to be the worst year in apparel retail in a decade as ten major apparel retailers filed for bankruptcy and many others teetered on the brink. Could Ascena transcend the industry and drive sales forward or was this one acquisition too many? . . . . C263

Indexes

Company I-1

Name I-11

Subject I-27

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des13959_ch01_001-033.indd 1 01/04/18 10:03 AM

Chapter 1 Introduction

and Analyzing Goals and Objectives

Chapter 4 Assessing Intellectual

Capital

Chapter 2 Analyzing

the External Environment

Chapter 3 Analyzing

the Internal Environment

Chapter 13 Case

Analysis

Case Analysis

Strategy Formulation Strategy Implementation

Strategy Analysis

Chapter 5 Formulating

Business-Level Strategies

Chapter 8 Entrepreneurial

Strategy and Competitive

Dynamics

Chapter 6 Formulating Corporate-

Level Strategies

Chapter 7 Formulating International

Strategies

Chapter 9 Strategic

Control and Corporate

Governance

Chapter 12 Fostering Corporate

Entrepreneur- ship

Chapter 10 Creating Effective

Organizational Designs

Chapter 11 Strategic Lead-

ership Excel- lence, Ethics, and Change

The Strategic Management Process

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chapter

After reading this chapter, you should have a good understanding of the following learning objectives:

1 LO1-1 The definition of strategic management and its four key attributes. LO1-2 The strategic management process and its three interrelated and principal

activities.

LO1-3 The vital role of corporate governance and stakeholder management, as well as how “symbiosis” can be achieved among an organization’s stakeholders.

LO1-4 The importance of social responsibility, including environmental sustainability, and how it can enhance a corporation’s innovation strategy.

LO1-5 The need for greater empowerment throughout the organization. LO1-6 How an awareness of a hierarchy of strategic goals can help an

organization achieve coherence in its strategic direction.

Strategic Management Creating Competitive Advantages

©Anatoli Styf/Shutterstock

PART 1: STRATEGIC ANALYSIS

What makes the study of strategic management so interesting? Things can change so rapidly! Some start-ups can disrupt industries and become globally recognized names in just a few years. The rankings of the world’s most valuable firms can dramatically change in a rather brief period of time. On the other hand, many impressive, high-flying firms can struggle to reclaim past glory or even fail. Recall just four that begin with the letter “b”—Blackberry, Blockbuster, Borders, and Barings. As colorfully (and ironically!) noted by Arthur Martinez, Sears’s former Chairman: “Today’s peacock is tomorrow’s feather duster.”1

Consider the following:2

• At the beginning of 2007, the three firms in the world with the highest market values were Exxon Mobil, General Electric, and Gazprom (a Russian natural gas firm). By early 2017, three high tech firms headed the list—Apple, Alphabet (parent of Google), and Microsoft.

• Only 74 of the original 500 companies in the S&P index were still around 40 years later. And McKinsey notes that the average company tenure on the S&P 500 list has fallen from 61 years in 1958 to about 20 in 2016.

• With the dramatic increase of the digital economy, new entrants are shaking up long-standing industries. Note that Alibaba is the world’s most valuable retailer—but holds no inventory; Airbnb is the world’s largest provider of accommodations—but owns no real estate; and Uber is the world’s largest car service but owns no cars.

• A quarter century ago, how many would have predicted that a South Korean firm would be a global car giant, than an Indian firm would be one of the world’s largest technology firms, and a huge Chinese Internet company would list on an American stock exchange?

• Fortune magazine’s annual list of the 500 biggest companies now features 156 emerging- market firms. This compares with only 18 in 1995!

To remain competitive, companies often must bring in “new blood” and make significant changes in their strategies. But sometimes a new CEO’s initiatives makes things worse. Let’s take a look at Lands’ End, an American clothing retailer.3

Lands’ End was founded in 1963 as a mail order supplier of sailboat equipment by Gary Comer. As business picked up, he expanded the business into clothing and home furnishings and moved the company to Dodgeville, Wisconsin, in 1978 where he was its CEO until he stepped down in 1990. The firm was acquired by Sears in 2002, but later spun off in 2013. A year later it commenced trading on the NASDAQ stock exchange.

Targeting Middle America, companies like Lands’ End, the GAP Inc., and J. C. Penney have had a hard time in recent years positioning themselves in the hotly contested clothing industry. They are squeezed on the high end by brands like Michael Kors Holdings Ltd. and Coach, Inc. On the lower end, fast-fashion retailers including H&M operator Hennes & Mauritz AB are applying pressure by churning out inexpensive, runway-inspired styles.

To spearhead a revival of the brand, Lands’ End hired a new CEO, Frederica Marchionni, in February 2015. However, since her arrival, the firm’s stock price has suffered, same store sales declined for all six quarters of her tenure, and the firm kept losing money. It reported a loss of $19.5 million for the year ending January 29, 2016—compared to a $73.8 million profit for the previous year. (And, things didn’t get better—it lost another $7.7 million in the first half of 2016.)

LEARNING FROM MISTAKES

PART 1: STRATEGIC ANALYSIS

4 PART 1 :: STRATEGIC ANALYSIS

So, what went wrong? Lands’ End was always known for its wholesome style and corporate culture. Its founder, Gary Comer, who liked to dress casually in jeans and sweaters, had fostered a familial culture. However, things dramatically changed when Ms. Marchionni arrived. Prior to taking the position, she had struck a deal to only spend one week a month in Dodgeville—preferring instead to spend most of her time in an office in New York’s garment district. Also, unlike her predecessors, she had private bathrooms in both of her offices—such perks didn’t seem to fit well with the firm’s culture.

Given Marchionni’s background at high-end names like Ferrari and Dolce & Gabbana, she tried to inject more style into the maker of outdoorsy, casual clothes. She added slimmer-fits, stiletto heels and a new line of activewear. In presentations, according to those attending, she derided the company’s boxy sweaters and baggy pants as “ugly,” asking “Who would wear that?” A photo shoot for a line took place in the Marshall Islands—a very costly location, according to people familiar with the situation. She overhauled the catalog, hired celebrity photographers, and hired a Vogue stylist for input. She also added new price points—including the Canvas line which sells for as much as 30 percent more than the traditional Lands’ End collection.

At the end of the day, it appeared that Ms. Marchionni was never able to get Lands’ End employees to buy into her vision. And as losses piled up quickly, the board became concerned that she was trying to make too many changes too quickly. Perhaps, she was not given enough time to turn things around—but her approach to re-invent the apparel brand may have been too much of a shock for its customer base as well as the firm’s family culture and wholesome style. Maybe Lee Eisenberg, the firm’s former creative director, said it best: “It doesn’t look like Lands’ End anymore. There was never the implication that if you wore Lands’ End you’d be on a beach on Nantucket living the perfect life.” Marchionni resigned on September 26, 2016—underscoring, as noted by Fortune.com, how futile it must be to take such a Middle American brand upscale.

Discussion Questions 1. What actions could Ms. Marchionni have taken to improve Lands’ End’s prospects for success

in the marketplace? 2. Did Lands’ End make the right choice in selecting her for the CEO position? Why? Why not?

Today’s leaders face a large number of complex challenges in the global marketplace. In considering how much credit (or blame) they deserve, two perspectives of leadership come immediately to mind: the “romantic” and “external control” perspectives.4 First, let’s look at the romantic view of leadership. Here, the implicit assumption is that the leader is the key force in determining an organization’s success—or lack thereof.5 This view dominates the popular press in business magazines such as Fortune, Bloomberg Businessweek, and Forbes, wherein the CEO is either lauded for his or her firm’s success or chided for the organiza- tion’s demise.6 Consider, for example, the credit that has been bestowed on leaders such as Jack Welch, Andrew Grove, and Herb Kelleher for the tremendous accomplishments when they led their firms, General Electric, Intel, and Southwest Airlines, respectively.

Similarly, Apple’s success in the last decade has been attributed almost entirely to the late Steve Jobs, its former CEO, who died on October 5, 2011.7 Apple’s string of hit products, such as iMac computers, iPods, iPhones, and iPads, is a testament to his genius for devel- oping innovative, user-friendly, and aesthetically pleasing products. In addition to being a

romantic view of leadership situations in which the leader is the key force determining the organization’s success—or lack thereof.

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perfectionist in product design, Jobs was a master showman with a cult following. During his time as CEO between 1997 and 2011, Apple’s market value soared by over $300 billion!

On the other hand, when things don’t go well, much of the failure of an organization can also, rightfully, be attributed to the leader.8 Clearly, actions undertaken by Ms. Marchionni to move Lands’ End upscale backfired and hampered its performance. In contrast, Apple fully capitalized on emerging technology trends with a variety of products, including sophis- ticated smartphones.

The effect—for good or for bad—that top executives can have on a firm’s market value can be reflected in what happens when one of them leaves their firm.9 For example, look what occurred when Kasper Rorsted stepped down as CEO of the German packaged-goods firm Henkel in January, 2016 to become CEO of Adidas: Henkel immediately lost $2 billion in market capitalization, and Adidas gained $1 billion. On the other hand, when Viacom announced that executive chairman Sumner Redstone was stepping down, the firm gained $1.1 billion of market valuation in 30 minutes!

However, such an emphasis on the leader reflects only part of the picture. Consider another perspective, called the external control view of leadership. Here, rather than making the implicit assumption that the leader is the most important factor in determining organi- zational outcomes, the focus is on external factors that may positively (or negatively) affect a firm’s success. We don’t have to look far to support this perspective. Developments in the general environment, such as economic downturns, new technologies, governmental legisla- tion, or an outbreak of major internal conflict or war, can greatly restrict the choices that are available to a firm’s executives. For example, several book retailers, such as Borders and Waldenbooks, found the consumer shift away from brick-and-mortar bookstores to online book buying (e.g., Amazon) and digital books an overwhelming environmental force against which they had few defenses.

Looking back at the opening Lands’ End case, it was clear that Ms. Marchionni faced challenges in the external environment over which she had relatively little control. As noted, chains targeting Middle America such as Lands’ End were squeezed on both the higher end by brands such as Coach Inc. and on the lower end by Hennes & Mauritz AB. And as noted by an analyst, her potential for success was adversely affected by “the worst consumer soft goods market in eight years.”10

Before moving on, it is important to point out that successful executives are often able to navigate around the difficult circumstances that they face. At times it can be refreshing to see the optimistic position they take when they encounter seemingly insurmountable odds. Of course, that’s not to say that one should be naive or Pollyannaish. Consider, for example, how one CEO, discussed next, is handling trying times.11

Name a general economic woe, and chances are that Charles Needham, CEO of Metorex, is dealing with it.

• Market turmoil has knocked 80 percent off the shares of South Africa’s Metorex, the mining company that he heads.

• The plunge in global commodities is slamming prices for the copper, cobalt, and other minerals Metorex unearths across Africa. The credit crisis makes it harder to raise money.

• Fighting has again broken out in the Democratic Republic of Congo, where Metorex has a mine and several projects in development.

Such problems might send many executives to the window ledge. Yet Needham appears unruffled as he sits down at a conference table in the company’s modest offices in a Johannesburg suburb. The combat in northeast Congo, he notes, is far from Metorex’s mine. Commodity prices are still high, in historical terms. And Needham is confident he can raise enough capital, drawing on relationships with South African banks. “These are the kinds of things you deal with, doing business in Africa,” he says.

external control view of leadership situations in which external forces—where the leader has limited influence—determine the organization’s success.

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WHAT IS STRATEGIC MANAGEMENT? Given the many challenges and opportunities in the global marketplace, today’s managers must do more than set long-term strategies and hope for the best.12 They must go beyond what some have called “incremental management,” whereby they view their job as making a series of small, minor changes to improve the efficiency of their firm’s operations.13 Rather than seeing their role as merely custodians of the status quo, today’s leaders must be proac- tive, anticipate change, and continually refine and, when necessary, make dramatic changes to their strategies. The strategic management of the organization must become both a pro- cess and a way of thinking throughout the organization.

Defining Strategic Management Strategic management consists of the analyses, decisions, and actions an organization undertakes in order to create and sustain competitive advantages. This definition captures two main elements that go to the heart of the field of strategic management.

First, the strategic management of an organization entails three ongoing processes: analyses, decisions, and actions. Strategic management is concerned with the analysis of strategic goals (vision, mission, and strategic objectives) along with the analysis of the internal and external environments of the organization. Next, leaders must make strategic decisions. These decisions, broadly speaking, address two basic questions: What industries should we compete in? How should we compete in those industries? These questions also often involve an organization’s domestic and international operations. And last are the actions that must be taken. Decisions are of little use, of course, unless they are acted on. Firms must take the necessary actions to implement their strategies. This requires leaders to allocate the necessary resources and to design the organization to bring the intended strategies to reality.

Second, the essence of strategic management is the study of why some firms outperform others.14 Thus, managers need to determine how a firm is to compete so that it can obtain advantages that are sustainable over a lengthy period of time. That means focusing on two fundamental questions:

• How should we compete in order to create competitive advantages in the marketplace? Managers need to determine if the firm should position itself as the low-cost producer or develop products and services that are unique and will enable the firm to charge premium prices. Or should they do some combination of both?

• How can we create competitive advantages in the marketplace that are unique, valuable, and difficult for rivals to copy or substitute? That is, managers need to make such advantages sustainable, instead of temporary.

Sustainable competitive advantage cannot be achieved through operational effective- ness alone.15 The popular management innovations of the last two decades—total qual- ity, just-in-time, benchmarking, business process reengineering, outsourcing—are all about operational effectiveness. Operational effectiveness means performing similar activities better than rivals. Each of these innovations is important, but none lead to sustainable competitive advantage because everyone is doing them. Strategy is all about being differ- ent. Sustainable competitive advantage is possible only by performing different activities from rivals or performing similar activities in different ways. Companies such as Walmart, Southwest Airlines, and IKEA have developed unique, internally consistent, and difficult- to-imitate activity systems that have provided them with sustained competitive advan- tages. A company with a good strategy must make clear choices about what it wants to accomplish. Trying to do everything that your rivals do eventually leads to mutually destructive price competition, not long-term advantage.

strategic management the analyses, decisions, and actions an organization undertakes in order to create and sustain competitive advantages.

strategy the ideas, decisions, and actions that enable a firm to succeed.

competitive advantage a firm’s resources and capabilities that enable it to overcome the competitive forces in its industry(ies).

operational effectiveness performing similar activities better than rivals.

LO 1-1 The definition of strategic management and its four key attributes.

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The Four Key Attributes of Strategic Management Before discussing the strategic management process, let’s briefly talk about four attri- butes of strategic management.16 It should become clear how this course differs from other courses that you have had in functional areas, such as accounting, marketing, opera- tions, and finance. Exhibit 1.1 provides a definition and the four attributes of strategic management.

First, strategic management is directed toward overall organizational goals and objectives. That is, effort must be directed at what is best for the total organization, not just a single functional area. Some authors have referred to this perspective as “organizational versus individual rationality.”17 That is, what might look “rational” or ideal for one functional area, such as operations, may not be in the best interest of the overall firm. For example, opera- tions may decide to schedule long production runs of similar products to lower unit costs. However, the standardized output may be counter to what the marketing department needs to appeal to a demanding target market. Similarly, research and development may “overen- gineer” the product to develop a far superior offering, but the design may make the product so expensive that market demand is minimal.

As noted by David Novak, CEO of Yum Brands:18

I tell people that once you get a job you should act like you run the place. Not in terms of ego, but in terms of how you think about the business. Don’t just think about your piece of the business. Think about your piece of the business and the total business. This way, you’ll always have a broader perspective.

Second, strategic management includes multiple stakeholders in decision making.19 Stakeholders are those individuals, groups, and organizations that have a “stake” in the suc- cess of the organization, including owners (shareholders in a publicly held corporation), employees, customers, suppliers, the community at large, and so on. (We’ll discuss this in more detail later in this chapter.) Managers will not be successful if they focus on a single stakeholder. For example, if the overwhelming emphasis is on generating profits for the owners, employees may become alienated, customer service may suffer, and the suppliers may resent demands for pricing concessions.

Third, strategic management requires incorporating both short-term and long-term perspec- tives.20 Peter Senge, a leading strategic management author, has referred to this need as a “creative tension.”21 That is, managers must maintain both a vision for the future of the organization and a focus on its present operating needs. However, financial markets can exert significant pressures on executives to meet short-term performance targets. Studies have shown that corporate leaders often take a short-term approach to the detriment of creating long-term shareholder value.

Andrew Winston addresses this issue in his recent book, The Big Pivot:22

Consider the following scenario: You are close to the end of the quarter and you are faced with a project that you are certain will make money. That is, it has a guaranteed positive net present value (NPV). But, it will reduce your earnings for this quarter. Do you invest?

stakeholders individuals, groups, and organizations that have a stake in the success of the organization. These include owners (shareholders in a publicly held corporation), employees, customers, suppliers, and the community at large.

EXHIBIT 1.1 Strategic Management Concepts

Definition: Strategic management consists of the analyses, decisions, and actions an organization undertakes in order to create and sustain competitive advantages.

Key Attributes of Strategic Management

• Directs the organization toward overall goals and objectives. • Includes multiple stakeholders in decision making. • Needs to incorporate short-term and long-term perspectives. • Recognizes trade-offs between efficiency and effectiveness.

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A research study posed this question to 400 CFOs and a majority said they would not do it. Further, 80 percent of the executives would decrease R&D spending, advertising, and general maintenance. So, what occurs when you cut back on these investments to prop up short-term earnings every quarter? Logically, you don’t invest in projects with favorable paybacks and you underspend on initiatives that build longer-term value. Thus, your earnings targets in the future quarters actually get more difficult to hit.

Fourth, strategic management involves the recognition of trade-offs between effectiveness and efficiency. Some authors have referred to this as the difference between “doing the right thing” (effectiveness) and “doing things right” (efficiency).23 While managers must allocate and use resources wisely, they must still direct their efforts toward the attainment of overall organizational objectives. As noted by Meg Whitman, Hewlett-Packard’s CEO, “Less than perfect strategy execution against the right strategy will probably work. A 100% execution against the wrong strategy won’t.” 24

Successful managers must make many trade-offs. It is central to the practice of strategic management. At times, managers must focus on the short term and efficiency; at other times, the emphasis is on the long term and expanding a firm’s product-market scope in order to anticipate opportunities in the competitive environment.

To summarize, leaders typically face many difficult and challenging decisions. In a 2016 article in the Harvard Business Review, Wendy Smith and her colleagues provide some valu- able insights in addressing such situations.25 The author team studied corporations over many years and found that senior executives are often faced with similar sets of opposing goals, which can polarize their organizations. Such tensions or paradoxes fall into three cate- gories, which may be related to three questions that many leaders view as “either/or” choices.

• Do we manage for today or for tomorrow? A firm’s long-term survival requires taking risks and learning from failure in the pursuit of new products and services. However, companies also need consistency in their products and services. This depicts the tension between existing products and new ones, stability and change. This is the innovation paradox. For example, in the late 1990s, IBM’s senior leaders saw the Internet wave and felt the need to harness the new technology. However, the firm also needed to sustain its traditional strength in client-server markets. Each strategy required different structures, cultures, rewards, and metrics—which could not easily be executed in tandem.

• Do we stick to boundaries or cross them? Global supply chains can be very effective, but they may also lack flexibility. New ideas can emerge from innovation activities that are dispersed throughout the world. However, not having all the talent and brains in one location can be costly. This is the tension between global connectedness and local needs, the globalization paradox. In 2009, NASA’s director of human health and performance started an initiative geared toward generating new knowledge through collaborative cross-firm and cross-disciplinary work. Not too surprisingly, he faced strong pushback from scientists interested in protecting their turf and their identities as independent experts. Although both collaboration and independent work were required to generate new innovations, they posed organizational and cultural challenges.

• Whom do we focus on, shareholders or stakeholders? Clearly, companies exist to create value. But managers are often faced with the choice between maximizing shareholder gains while trying to create benefits for a wide range of stakeholders— employees, customers, society, etc. However, being socially responsible may bring down a firm’s share price, and prioritizing employees may conflict with short-term shareholders’ or customers’ needs. This is the obligation paradox. Paul Polman, Unilever’s CEO, launched the Unilever Sustainable Living Plan in 2010. The goal was to double the size of the business over 10 years, improve the health and well-being of more than a billion people, and cut the firm’s environmental impact in half. He

effectiveness tailoring actions to the needs of an organization rather than wasting effort, or “doing the right thing.”

efficiency performing actions at a low cost relative to a benchmark, or “doing things right.”

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LO 1-2 The strategic management process and its three interrelated and principal activities.

1.1 STRATEGY SPOTLIGHT AMBIDEXTROUS BEHAVIORS: COMBINING ALIGNMENT AND ADAPTABILITY A study involving 41 business units in 10 multinational compa- nies identified four ambidextrous behaviors in individuals. Such behaviors are the essence of ambidexterity, and they illustrate how a dual capacity for alignment and adaptability can be woven into the fabric of an organization at the individual level.

They take time and are alert to opportunities beyond the confines of their own jobs. A large computer company’s sales manager became aware of a need for a new software module that nobody currently offered. Instead of selling the customer something else, he worked up a business case for the new module. With man- agement’s approval, he began working full time on its development.

They are cooperative and seek out opportunities to com- bine their efforts with others. A marketing manager for Italy was responsible for supporting a newly acquired subsidiary. When frustrated about the limited amount of contact she had with her peers in other countries, she began discussions with them. This led to the creation of a European marketing forum that meets quarterly to discuss issues, share best practices, and collaborate on marketing plans.

They are brokers, always looking to build internal net- works. When visiting the head office in St. Louis, a Canadian plant manager heard about plans for a $10 million investment for a new tape manufacturing plant. After inquiring further about the plans and returning to Canada, he contacted a regional man- ager in Manitoba, who he knew was looking for ways to build his business. With some generous support from the Manitoba government, the regional manager bid for, and ultimately won, the $10 million investment.

They are multitaskers who are comfortable wearing more than one hat. Although an operations manager for a major cof- fee and tea distributor was charged with running his plant as effi- ciently as possible, he took it upon himself to identify value-added services for his clients. By developing a dual role, he was able to manage operations and develop a promising electronic module that automatically reported impending problems inside a coffee vending machine. With corporate funding, he found a subcontrac- tor to develop the software, and he then piloted the module in his own operations. It was so successful that it was eventually adopted by operations managers in several other countries.

A recent Harvard Business Review article provides some useful insights on how one can become a more ambidextrous leader. Consider the following questions:

• Do you meet your numbers? • Do you help others? • What do you do for your peers? Are you just their

in-house competitor? • When you manage up, do you bring problems—or

problems with possible solutions? • Are you transparent? Managers who get a reputation

for spinning events gradually lose the trust of peers and superiors.

• Are you developing a group of senior-managers who know you and are willing to back your original ideas with resources?

Sources: Birkinshaw, J. & Gibson, C. 2004. Building ambidexterity into an organization. MIT Sloan Management Review, 45(4): 47–55; and Bower, J. L. 2007. Solve the succession crisis by growing inside-out leaders. Harvard Business Review, 85(11): 90–99.

argued that such investments would lead to greater profits over the long term; whereas a singular focus on short-term profits would have adverse effects on society and the environment. His arguments were persuasive to many; however, there have been many challenges in implementing the plan. Not surprisingly, it has caused uncertainty among senior executives that has led to anxiety and fights over resource allocation.

Some authors have developed the concept of “ambidexterity” (similar to the aforemen- tioned “innovation paradox”), which refers to a manager’s challenge to both align resources to take advantage of existing product markets and proactively explore new opportuni- ties.26 Strategy Spotlight 1.1 discusses ambidextrous behaviors that are essential for success in today’s challenging marketplace.

THE STRATEGIC MANAGEMENT PROCESS We’ve identified three ongoing processes—analyses, decisions, and actions—that are central to strategic management. In practice, these three processes—often referred to as strategy analysis, strategy formulation, and strategy implementation—are highly interdependent and do not take place one after the other in a sequential fashion in most companies.

ambidexterity the challenge managers face of both aligning resources to take advantage of existing product markets and proactively exploring new opportunities.

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EXHIBIT 1.2 Realized Strategy and Intended Strategy: Usually Not the Same Realized Strategy

Emergent Strategy

Unrealized Strategy

D el

ib er

at e

St ra

te gy

Intended Strategy

Intended versus Realized Strategies Henry Mintzberg, a management scholar at McGill University, argues that viewing the strategic management process as one in which analysis is followed by optimal decisions and their subsequent meticulous implementation neither describes the strategic management process accurately nor prescribes ideal practice.27 He sees the business environment as far from predictable, thus limiting our ability for analysis. Further, decisions are seldom based on optimal rationality alone, given the political processes that occur in all organizations.28

Taking into consideration the limitations discussed above, Mintzberg proposed an alter- native model. As depicted in Exhibit 1.2, decisions following from analysis, in this model, constitute the intended strategy of the firm. For a variety of reasons, the intended strategy rarely survives in its original form. Unforeseen environmental developments, unanticipated resource constraints, or changes in managerial preferences may result in at least some parts of the intended strategy remaining unrealized.

Consider an important trend affecting law firms:

Many of the leading corporations have reduced their need for outside legal services by increasingly expanding their in-house legal departments.29 For example, companies and financial institutions spent an estimated $41 billion on their internal lawyers in 2014, a 22 percent increase since 2011. And a survey of 1,200 chief legal officers found that 63 percent of respondents are now “in-sourcing” legal work they used to send out to law firms or other service providers. In response, many large law firms have been forced to move away from commodity practices such as basic commercial contracts to more specialized areas like cross-border transactions and global regulatory issues.

Thus, the final realized strategy of any firm is a combination of deliberate and emergent strategies.

Next, we will address each of the three key strategic management processes—strategy analysis, strategy formulation, and strategy implementation—and provide a brief overview of the chapters.

Exhibit 1.3 depicts the strategic management process and indicates how it ties into the chapters in the book. Consistent with our discussion above, we use two-way arrows to con- vey the interactive nature of the processes.

strategic management process strategy analysis, strategy formulation, and strategy implementation.

intended strategy strategy in which organizational decisions are determined only by analysis.

realized strategy strategy in which organizational decisions are determined by both analysis and unforeseen environmental developments, unanticipated resource constraints, and/or changes in managerial preferences.

Source: Adapted from Mintzberg, H. & Waters, J. A., “Of Strategies: Deliberate and Emergent,” Strategic Management Journal, Vol. 6, 1985, pp. 257–272.

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EXHIBIT 1.3 The Strategic Management Process

Chapter 1 Introduction

and Analyzing Goals and Objectives

Chapter 4 Assessing Intellectual

Capital

Chapter 2 Analyzing

the External Environment

Chapter 3 Analyzing

the Internal Environment

Chapter 13 Case

Analysis

Case Analysis

Strategy Formulation Strategy Implementation

Strategy Analysis

Chapter 5 Formulating

Business-Level Strategies

Chapter 8 Entrepreneurial

Strategy and Competitive

Dynamics

Chapter 6 Formulating Corporate-

Level Strategies

Chapter 7 Formulating International

Strategies

Chapter 9 Strategic

Control and Corporate

Governance

Chapter 12 Fostering Corporate

Entrepreneur- ship

Chapter 10 Creating Effective

Organizational Designs

Chapter 11 Strategic Lead-

ership Excel- lence, Ethics, and Change

Before moving on, we point out that analyzing the environment and formulating strategies are, of course, important activities in the strategic management process. However, nothing happens until resources are allocated and effective strategies are successfully implemented. Rick Spielman, General Manager of the Minnesota Vikings (of the National Football League), provides valuable insight on this issue.30 He recalls the many quarterbacks that he has inter- viewed over the past 25 years and notes that many of them can effectively draw up plays on the whiteboard and “you sit there and it’s like listening to an offensive coordinator.” However, that is not enough. He points out, “Now can he translate that and make those same decisions and those same type of reads in the two and a half seconds he has to get rid of the ball?”

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Strategy Analysis

We measure, study, quantify, analyze every single piece of our business. . . . But then you’ve got to be able to take all that data and information and transform it into change in the organization and improvements in the organization and the formalization of the business strategy.

—Richard Anderson, CEO of Delta Air Lines31

Strategy analysis may be looked upon as the starting point of the strategic management pro- cess. It consists of the “advance work” that must be done in order to effectively formulate and implement strategies. Many strategies fail because managers may want to formulate and implement strategies without a careful analysis of the overarching goals of the organization and without a thorough analysis of its external and internal environments.

Analyzing Organizational Goals and Objectives (Chapter 1) A firm’s vision, mission, and strategic objectives form a hierarchy of goals that range from broad statements of intent and bases for competitive advantage to specific, measurable strategic objectives.

Analyzing the External Environment of the Firm (Chapter 2) Managers must monitor and scan the environment as well as analyze competitors. Two frameworks are provided: (1) The general environment consists of several elements, such as demographic and economic seg- ments, and (2) the industry environment consists of competitors and other organizations that may threaten the success of a firm’s products and services.

Assessing the Internal Environment of the Firm (Chapter 3) Analyzing the strengths and relationships among the activities that constitute a firm’s value chain (e.g., operations, mar- keting and sales, and human resource management) can be a means of uncovering potential sources of competitive advantage for the firm.32

Assessing a Firm’s Intellectual Assets (Chapter 4) The knowledge worker and a firm’s other intellectual assets (e.g., patents) are important drivers of competitive advantages and wealth creation. We also assess how well the organization creates networks and relation- ships as well as how technology can enhance collaboration among employees and provide a means of accumulating and storing knowledge.33

Strategy Formulation

“You can have the best operations. You can be the most adept at whatever it is that you’re doing. But, if you have a bad strategy, it’s all for naught.”

—Fred Smith, CEO of FedEx34

Strategy formulation is developed at several levels. First, business-level strategy addresses the issue of how to compete in a given business to attain competitive advantage. Second, corporate-level strategy focuses on two issues: (a) what businesses to compete in and (b) how businesses can be managed to achieve synergy; that is, they create more value by work- ing together than by operating as standalone businesses. Third, a firm must develop inter- national strategies as it ventures beyond its national boundaries. Fourth, managers must formulate effective entrepreneurial initiatives.

Formulating Business-Level Strategy (Chapter 5) The question of how firms compete and outperform their rivals and how they achieve and sustain competitive advantages goes to the heart of strategic management. Successful firms strive to develop bases for competitive advantage, which can be achieved through cost leadership and/or differentiation as well as by focusing on a narrow or industrywide market segment.35

Formulating Corporate-Level Strategy (Chapter 6) Corporate-level strategy addresses a firm’s portfolio (or group) of businesses. It asks: (1) What business (or businesses) should

strategy analysis study of firms’ external and internal environments, and their fit with organizational vision and goals.

strategy formulation decisions made by firms regarding investments, commitments, and other aspects of operations that create and sustain competitive advantage.

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we compete in? and (2) How can we manage this portfolio of businesses to create synergies among the businesses?

Formulating International Strategy (Chapter 7) When firms enter foreign markets, they face both opportunities and pitfalls.36 Managers must decide not only on the most appro- priate entry strategy but also how they will go about attaining competitive advantages in international markets.37

Entrepreneurial Strategy and Competitive Dynamics (Chapter 8) Entrepreneurial activity aimed at new value creation is a major engine for economic growth. For entrepreneurial initiatives to succeed, viable opportunities must be recognized and effective strategies must be formulated.

Strategy Implementation

“We could leave our strategic plan on an airplane, and it wouldn’t matter. It’s all about execution.”

—John Stumpf, CEO of Wells Fargo38

Clearly, sound strategies are of no value if they are not properly implemented.39 Strategy implementation involves ensuring proper strategic controls and organizational designs, which includes establishing effective means to coordinate and integrate activities within the firm as well as with its suppliers, customers, and alliance partners.40 Leadership plays a central role to ensure that the organization is committed to excellence and ethical behavior. It also promotes learning and continuous improvement and acts entrepreneurially in creating new opportunities.

Strategic Control and Corporate Governance (Chapter 9) Firms must exercise two types of strategic control. First, informational control requires that organizations continually moni- tor and scan the environment and respond to threats and opportunities. Second, behavioral control involves the proper balance of rewards and incentives as well as cultures and bound- aries (or constraints). Further, successful firms (those that are incorporated) practice effec- tive corporate governance.

Creating Effective Organizational Designs (Chapter 10) Firms must have organizational structures and designs that are consistent with their strategy. In today’s rapidly changing competitive environments, firms must ensure that their organizational boundaries—those internal to the firm and external—are more flexible and permeable.41 Often, organizations develop strategic alliances to capitalize on the capabilities of other organizations.

Creating a Learning Organization and an Ethical Organization (Chapter 11) Effective lead- ers set a direction, design the organization, and develop an organization that is committed to excellence and ethical behavior. In addition, given rapid and unpredictable change, lead- ers must create a “learning organization” so that the entire organization can benefit from individual and collective talents.

Fostering Corporate Entrepreneurship (Chapter 12) Firms must continually improve and grow as well as find new ways to renew their organizations. Corporate entrepreneurship and innovation provide firms with new opportunities, and strategies should be formulated that enhance a firm’s innovative capacity.

Chapter 13, “Analyzing Strategic Management Cases,” provides guidelines and sugges- tions on how to evaluate cases in this course. Thus, the concepts and techniques discussed in the first 12 chapters can be applied to real-world organizations.

In the “Executive Insights: The Strategic Management Process” sidebar we include an interview that the authors conducted with Admiral William H. McRaven, Retired. His distinguished career includes being commander of the U.S. Special Operations Command, and he led Operation Neptune Spear that led to the demise of al Qaeda’s leader, Osama bin

strategy implementation actions made by firms that carry out the formulated strategy, including strategic controls, organizational design, and leadership.

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Admiral William H. McRaven, Retired Chancellor, University of Texas System

BIOSKETCH University of Texas Chancellor William H. McRaven, a retired four-star admiral, leads the nation’s second largest system of higher education. As chief executive officer of the UT System since January 2015, he oversees 14 institutions that educate 217,000 students and employ 20,000 faculty and more than 70,000 health care professionals, researchers, and staff.

Prior to becoming chancellor, McRaven, a Navy SEAL, was the commander of U.S. Special Operations Command during which time he led a force of 69,000 men and women and was responsible for conducting counter-terrorism operations world- wide. McRaven is also a recognized national authority on U.S. foreign policy and has advised presidents George W. Bush and Barack Obama and other U.S. leaders on defense issues. His acclaimed book, Spec. Ops: Case Studies in Special Operations Warfare: Theory and Practice, has been published in several lan- guages. He is noted for his involvement in Operation Neptune Spear, in which he commanded the U.S. Navy Special forces who located and killed al Qaeda leader Osama bin Laden.

McRaven has been recognized for his leadership numerous times by national and international publications and organizations. In 2011, he was the first runner-up for Time magazine’s Person of the Year. In 2012, Foreign Policy magazine named McRaven one of the nation’s Top 10 Foreign Policy Experts and one of the Top 100 Global Thinkers. And in 2014, Politico named McRaven one of the Politico 50, citing his leadership as instrumental in cutting through Washington bureaucracy.

McRaven graduated from the University of Texas at Austin in 1977 with a degree in journalism and received his master’s degree from the Naval Postgraduate School in Monterey in 1991. In 2012, the Texas Exes honored McRaven with a Distinguished Alumnus Award. Source: www.utsystem.edu/chancellor/biography

Question 1. What leadership lessons did you take away from SEAL training and leadership of SEAL Team 3?

The foundation of effective leadership is being able to lead yourself. This may sound strange, but it is true. Most initial military training—perhaps no more note- worthy than in that training crucible to become a Navy

SEAL—helps young people move past self-imposed limits of physical and mental endurance and build confidence in themselves to lead others. The result is a person who is capable of leading in an environment of constant stress, chaos, failure and hardships. In fact, to me, basic SEAL training was a lifetime sampling of micro-challenges I would later face while leading people and organizations all crammed into six months.

Question 2. In leading Neptune Spear, what were the key leadership decisions you made to build an organization to accomplish this task?

The majority of the key leadership decisions that in past enabled us to accomplish this task began before I took command of the organization—but as a member of the

organization and its number 2 leader over a period of years, I had been an engaged student in the trial, error, and the ulti- mate development of what my old boss, General Stan McChrystal, called a “team of teams.” You see, our operational envi- ronment was changing at an incredibly rapid pace. Unlike any time in our history the rate of change was—and is—no longer linear, it is exponential.

The enemy I faced in Iraq, Afghanistan, Africa, Asia and across the world adapted quickly to our methods of warfare. Using technology, social media and global transportation, they presented tactical and operational problems that today’s special operations forces had never seen before. Consequently, our organizations

had to adapt to this rapidly changing threat. We had to build a flat chain of command that empowered the lead- ers below us. We had to reduce our own bureaucracy so we could make timely decisions. We had to constantly communicate so everyone understood the commander’s intent and the strategic direction in which we were head- ing. We had to collaborate in ways that had never been done in the history of special operations warfare. The team of teams we built enabled all of our organizations to derive strength from each other and work together to be successful. It required us to break away from the hierarchical structure—the command structure—that had defined the American military for hundreds of years.

We formed a formal and informal network of subject mat- ter experts bound together by a common mission, using technology to partner in new ways, brought together through operational incentives, and a bottom-up desire with top-down support to solve the most complex prob- lems facing our nation. Essentially, we structured our

INSIGHTS from executives1.1

THE STRATEGIC MANAGEMENT PROCESS

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organization and our processes to use our size, our talent and our operational diversity to achieve an unparalleled level of collaboration in pursuit of common goals.

Though leadership, effective processes, and a trust-based organizational culture had significant parts to play in the success of Neptune Spear, no one should forget it was the actions of well-trained, committed, confident and fiercely determined young Americans who were responsible for the positive outcome of that operation.

Question 3. What lessons have you taken from your military career as you lead a very different type of organization as Chancellor of the University of Texas?

Actually, the duties, responsibilities and organizational relationships are remarkably similar. I am still a servant leader, but instead of serving my country at the national level, I serve the people of Texas. For years as a flag offi- cer I had a frequent and direct relationship with the U.S. Congress; I now have a similar responsibility to inform and respond to the Texas Legislature. Instead of the Secretary of Defense and his staff, and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs and his staff, providing oversight and guidance, I have the Board of Regents. And the four- teen institutions for which I feel directly responsible are led by very mature professionals who expect a high level of empowerment and autonomy—much like the mature professionals of the large and diverse organizations I commanded over the last decade.

This does not mean, of course, that I approach situa- tions or lead our incredible System the exact same way as I led Special Operations Command—it simply means that I have a comfortable context for the relationships I must build and sustain. The lessons I bring from the military feed off of that—I may have context for these relationships, but I also realize this is a different environ- ment and I must first understand the conditions of the higher education environment before I go about making changes. Understanding the environment—specifically, conducting a strategic assessment—was the focus of my effort for the second half of my first year in office. I knew as the senior leader, I first needed to learn and appreciate the conditions under which we were operat- ing. Another lesson I brought was the importance of establishing relationships early by getting out as much as possible and seeing and listening to others—inside my organization primarily, but also reaching out to stake- holders who lie outside the System. Additionally, I knew from my time in the military that communication and

collaboration—and an organizational culture that rein- forces both those things—are critical keys to success.

The aforementioned concept of a “team of teams” was probably the single most valuable organizational change in the history of the modern military, and it continues and matures even today. Navy SEALs work with the Army Special Forces. The Special Forces work with the conven- tional infantry. The infantry work with the naval aviators. The pilots and crews work with the logisticians. We all work with the intelligence and law enforcement communi- ties and the locals on the ground. And every day we talk. We would look at a problem, and we were finding solu- tions at a speed unheard of in the past. In other words, everyone has to contribute their ideas—not just listen.

Here at the University of Texas System, I believe we can build our own “team of teams” and we are in the process of doing so. We will use our size, our talent and our diversity to collaborate on difficult issues, and in an environment of competing demands, we will prioritize our objectives so we do not waste effort on inconsequential goals. As the second largest university system in the United States we must apply our resources to those priorities and cut away where we are not effective. And much like my last organization, our rapidly changing environment requires us to constantly innovate to get ahead of our problems while never losing sight of our mission and our objectives.

Question 4. How did you see personal integrity and organizational ethics play out in your military career? Can you provide some examples of actions you took to build or sustain an ethical organization?

You always have to reinforce three main principles of a good organization. That is, all your actions must be moral, legal, and ethical. If you fail to comply with those foundational elements, you and your organiza- tion will fail. It all starts with your personal integrity. Maintaining your personal integrity is hard. Being good all the time is difficult. Making the right decisions in the face of temptation is challenging, but you quickly learn that bad decisions have consequences, consequences that are rarely worth the momentary lapse in judgment.

If you do the right thing, particularly when no one is watch- ing, you will be rewarded many times over. The only way to build and sustain an ethical organization is for you, the leader, to demonstrate the qualities you want the organi- zation to uphold. Everyone is watching you—whether you know it or not. The littlest actions and the smallest deci- sions are all closely observed. The culture begins at the top.

Laden. He recently became Chancellor of the University of Texas System. His experience as an effective leader in both military and university organizations provides valuable insights into the strategic management processes: analysis, formulation, and implementation.

Let’s now address two concepts—corporate governance and stakeholder management— that are critical to the strategic management process.

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THE ROLE OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND STAKEHOLDER MANAGEMENT Most business enterprises that employ more than a few dozen people are organized as cor- porations. As you recall from your finance classes, the overall purpose of a corporation is to maximize the long-term return to the owners (shareholders). Thus, we may ask: Who is really responsible for fulfilling this purpose? Robert Monks and Neil Minow provide a useful definition of corporate governance as “the relationship among various participants in determining the direction and performance of corporations. The primary participants are (1) the shareholders, (2) the management (led by the chief executive officer), and (3) the board of directors.”42 This relationship is illustrated in Exhibit 1.4.

The board of directors (BOD) are the elected representatives of the shareholders charged with ensuring that the interests and motives of management are aligned with those of the owners (i.e., shareholders). In many cases, the BOD is diligent in fulfilling its purpose. For example, Intel Corporation, the giant $58 billion maker of microprocessor chips, practices sound governance. Its BOD follows guidelines to ensure that its members are independent (i.e., are not members of the executive management team and do not have close personal ties to top executives) so that they can provide proper oversight; it has explicit guidelines on the selection of director candidates (to avoid “cronyism”). It provides detailed procedures for formal evaluations of directors and the firm’s top officers.43 Such guidelines serve to ensure that management is acting in the best interests of shareholders.44

Recently, there has been much criticism as well as cynicism by both citizens and the business press about the poor job that management and the BODs of large corporations are doing. We only have to look at the scandals at firms such as Arthur Andersen, Best Buy, Olympus, Enron, Volkswagen, and Wells Fargo.45 Such malfeasance has led to an erosion of the public’s trust in corporations. For example, according to the 2014 CNBC/Burson- Marsteller Corporation Perception Indicator, a global survey of 25,000 individuals, only 52 percent of the public in developed markets has a favorable view of corporations.46 Forty- five percent felt corporations have “too much influence over the government.” More than half of the U.S. public said “strong and influential” corporations are “bad” even if they are promoting innovation and growth, and only 9 percent of the public in the United States says corporate CEOs are “among the most respected” in society.

Perhaps, part of the responsibility—or blame—lies with boards of directors who are often not delivering on their core mission: providing strong oversight and strategic support for management’s efforts to create long-term value.47 In a 2013 study by McKinsey & Co., only

corporate governance the relationship among various participants in determining the direction and performance of corporations. The primary participants are (1) the shareholders, (2) the management (led by the chief executive officer), and (3) the board of directors.

LO 1-3 The vital role of corporate governance and stakeholder management, as well as how “symbiosis” can be achieved among an organization’s stakeholders.

EXHIBIT 1.4 The Key Elements of Corporate Governance Management

(Headed by the chief executive officer)

Shareholders (Owners)

Board of Directors (Elected by the shareholders to represent their interests)

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34 percent of 772 directors agreed that the boards on which they served fully comprehended their firm’s strategies. And only 22 percent claimed their boards were completely aware of how their firms created value. Finally, a mere 16 percent claimed their boards had a strong understanding of the dynamics of their firms’ industries.

One area in which public anger is most pronounced is the excessive compensation of the top executives of well-known firms. It is now clear that much of the bonus pay awarded to executives on Wall Street in the past was richly undeserved.48 Case in point, 2011 was a poor year for financial stocks: 35 of the 50 largest financial company stocks fell that year. The sector lost 17 percent—compared to flat performance for the Standard & Poor’s 500. However, even as the sector struggled, the average pay of finance company CEOs rose 20.4 percent. For example, JPMorgan CEO Jamie Dimon was the highest-paid banker—with $23.1 million in compensation, an 11 percent increase from the previous year. The firm’s shareholders didn’t do as well—the stock fell 20 percent.49

Of course, executive pay is not restricted to financial institutions. A study released in 2016 entitled “The 100 Most Overpaid CEOs” addressed what it viewed as the “fundamen- tal disconnect between CEO pay and performance.”50 It found that CEO pay grew 997 percent over the most recent 36-year period—a rate that outpaced the growth in the cost of living, the productivity of the economy, and the stock market. The lead author, Rosanna Weaver, argues that the latter point disproves “the claim that the growth in CEO pay reflects the ‘performance’ of the company, the value of its stock, or the ability of the CEO to do anything but disproportionately raise the amount of his pay.” And, a regression analysis con- ducted by HIP Investor that considered environmental, social, and governance factors came to a similar conclusion: 17 CEOs made at least $20 million more in 2014 than they would have if their pay had been tied to performance.

Clearly, there is a strong need for improved corporate governance, and we will address this topic in Chapter 9.51 We focus on three important mechanisms to ensure effective cor- porate governance: an effective and engaged board of directors, shareholder activism, and proper managerial rewards and incentives.52 In addition to these internal controls, a key role is played by various external control mechanisms.53 These include the auditors, banks, analysts, an active financial press, and the threat of hostile takeovers.

Alternative Perspectives of Stakeholder Management Generating long-term returns for the shareholders is the primary goal of a publicly held corporation.54 As noted by former Chrysler vice chairman Robert Lutz, “We are here to serve the shareholder and create shareholder value. I insist that the only person who owns the company is the person who paid good money for it.”55

Despite the primacy of generating shareholder value, managers who focus solely on the interests of the owners of the business will often make poor decisions that lead to negative, unanticipated outcomes.56 For example, decisions such as mass layoffs to increase profits, ignoring issues related to conservation of the natural environment to save money, and exert- ing excessive pressure on suppliers to lower prices can harm the firm in the long run. Such actions would likely lead to negative outcomes such as alienated employees, increased gov- ernmental oversight and fines, and disloyal suppliers.

Clearly, in addition to shareholders, there are other stakeholders (e.g., suppliers, custom- ers) who must be taken into account in the strategic management process.57 A stakeholder can be defined as an individual or group, inside or outside the company, that has a stake in and can influence an organization’s performance. Each stakeholder group makes various claims on the company.58 Exhibit 1.5 provides a list of major stakeholder groups and the nature of their claims on the company.

Zero Sum or Symbiosis? There are two opposing ways of looking at the role of stakeholder management.59 The first one can be termed “zero sum.” Here, the various stakeholders

stakeholder management a firm’s strategy for recognizing and responding to the interests of all its salient stakeholders.

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compete for the organization’s resources: the gain of one individual or group is the loss of another individual or group. For example, employees want higher wages (which drive down profits), suppliers want higher prices for their inputs and slower, more flexible delivery times (which drive up costs), customers want fast deliveries and higher quality (which drive up costs), the community at large wants charitable contributions (which take money from company goals), and so on. This zero-sum thinking is rooted, in part, in the traditional con- flict between workers and management, leading to the formation of unions and sometimes ending in adversarial union–management negotiations and long, bitter strikes.

Consider, for example, the many stakeholder challenges facing Walmart, the world’s larg- est retailer.

Walmart strives to ramp up growth while many stakeholders are watching nervously: employees and trade unions; shareholders, investors, and creditors; suppliers and joint venture partners; the governments of the United States and other nations where the retailer operates; and customers. In addition many non-governmental organizations (NGOs), particularly in countries where the retailer buys its products, are closely monitoring Walmart. Walmart’s stakeholders have different interests, and not all of them share the firm’s goals.

There will always be conflicting demands on organizations. However, organizations can achieve mutual benefit through stakeholder symbiosis, which recognizes that stakehold- ers are dependent upon each other for their success and well-being.60 Consider Procter & Gamble’s “laundry detergent compaction,” a technique for compressing even more cleaning power into ever smaller concentrations.

P&G perfected a technique that could compact two or three times as much cleaning powder into a liquid concentration. This remarkable breakthrough has led to not only a change in consumer shopping habits but also a revolution in industry supply chain econom- ics. Here’s how several key stakeholders are affected:

Consumers love concentrated liquids because they are easier to carry, pour, and store. Retailers, meanwhile, prefer them because they take up less floor and shelf space, which leads to higher sales-per-square-foot—a big deal for Walmart, Target, and other big retailers. Shipping and wholesalers, meanwhile, prefer reduced-sized products because smaller bottles translate into reduced fuel consumption and improved warehouse space utilization. And, finally, environmentalists favor such products because they use less packaging and produce less waste than conventional products.61

Social Responsibility and Environmental Sustainability: Moving beyond the Immediate Stakeholders Organizations cannot ignore the interests and demands of stakeholders such as citizens and society in general that are beyond its immediate constituencies—customers, owners, suppliers, and employees. The realization that firms have multiple stakeholders and that

Stakeholder Group Nature of Claim

Stockholders Dividends, capital appreciation

Employees Wages, benefits, safe working environment, job security

Suppliers Payment on time, assurance of continued relationship

Creditors Payment of interest, repayment of principal

Customers Value, warranties

Government Taxes, compliance with regulations

Communities Good citizenship behavior such as charities, employment, not polluting the environment

EXHIBIT 1.5 An Organization’s Key Stakeholders and the Nature of Their Claims

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evaluating their performance must go beyond analyzing their financial results has led to a new way of thinking about businesses and their relationship to society.

First, social responsibility recognizes that businesses must respond to society’s expectations regarding their obligations to society. Second, the triple bottom line approach evaluates a firm’s performance. This perspective takes into account financial, social, and environmental perfor- mance. Third, making the case for sustainability initiatives addresses some of the challenges managers face in obtaining approvals for such projects—and how to overcome them.

Social Responsibility Social responsibility is the expectation that businesses or individuals will strive to improve the overall welfare of society.62 From the perspective of a business, this means that managers must take active steps to make society better by virtue of the business being in existence.63 What constitutes socially responsible behavior changes over time. In the 1970s affirmative action was a high priority; during the 1990s and up to the present time, the public has been concerned about environmental quality. Many firms have responded to this by engaging in recycling and reducing waste. And in the wake of terrorist attacks on New York City and the Pentagon, as well as the continuing threat from terrorists worldwide, a new kind of priority has arisen: the need to be vigilant concerning public safety.

In order to maximize the positive impact of corporate social responsibility (CSR) initia- tives, firms need to create coherent strategies.64 Research has shown that companies’ CSR activities are generally divided across three theaters of practice and assigning the activities accordingly is an important initial step.

• Theater one: Focusing on philanthropy. Here, programs are not designed to increase profits or revenues. Examples include financial contributions to civic and charity organizations as well as the participation and engagement of employees in community programs.

• Theater two: Improving operational effectiveness. Initiatives in this theater function within existing business models to provide social or environmental benefits and support a company’s value creating activities in order to enhance efficiency and effectiveness. They typically can increase revenue or decrease costs—or both. Examples include sustainability initiatives that can reduce the use of resources, waste, or emissions—to cut costs. Or, firms can invest in employee health care and working conditions to enhance retention and productivity—as well as a firm’s reputation.

• Theater three: Transforming the business model. Improved business performance is a requirement of programs in this theater and is predicated on social and environmental challenges and results. An example would be Hindustan Unilever’s Project Shakti in India. Rather than use the typical wholesaler-retailer distribution model to reach remote villages, the firm recruited village women who were provided with training and microfinance loans in order to sell soaps, detergents, and other products door-to-door. More than 65,000 women were recruited and not only were they able to typically double their household’s income but it also contributed to public health via access to hygiene products. The project attained more than $100 million in revenues and has led the firm to roll out similar programs in other countries.

A key stakeholder group that appears to be particularly susceptible to corporate social respon- sibility (CSR) initiatives is customers.65 Surveys indicate a strong positive relationship between CSR behaviors and consumers’ reactions to a firm’s products and services.66 For example:

• Corporate Citizenship’s poll conducted by Cone Communications found that “84 percent of Americans say they would be likely to switch brands to one associated with a good cause, if price and quality are similar.”67

• Hill & Knowlton/Harris’s Interactive poll reveals that “79 percent of Americans take corporate citizenship into account when deciding whether to buy a particular company’s product and 37 percent consider corporate citizenship an important factor when making purchasing decisions.”68

social responsibility the expectation that businesses or individuals will strive to improve the overall welfare of society.

LO 1-4 The importance of social responsibility, including environmental sustainability, and how it can enhance a corporation’s innovation strategy.

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Such findings are consistent with a large body of research that confirms the positive influ- ence of CSR on consumers’ company evaluations and product purchase intentions across a broad range of product categories.

The Triple Bottom Line: Incorporating Financial as Well as Environmental and Social Costs  Many companies are now measuring what has been called a “triple bottom line.” This involves assessing financial, social, and environmental performance. Shell, NEC, Procter & Gamble, and others have recognized that failing to account for the environmental and social costs of doing business poses risks to the company and its community.69

Social and environmental issues can ultimately become financial issues. According to Lars Sorensen, CEO of Novo Nordisk, a $16 billion global pharmaceutical firm based in Denmark:70

If we keep polluting, stricter regulations will be imposed, and energy consumption will become more costly. The same thing applies to the social side. If we don’t treat employees well, if we don’t behave as good corporate citizens in our local communities, and if we don’t provide inexpensive products for poorer countries, governments will impose regulations on us that will end up being very costly.

The environmental revolution has been almost four decades in the making.71 In the 1960s and 1970s, companies were in a state of denial regarding their firms’ impact on the natural environment. However, a series of visible ecological problems created a groundswell for strict governmental regulation. In the United States, Lake Erie was “dead,” and in Japan, people died of mercury poisoning. More recently, Japan’s horrific tsunami that took place on March 11, 2011, and Hurricane Sandy’s devastation on the East Coast of the United States in late October 2012 have raised alarms.

Environmental sustainability is now a value embraced by the most competitive and suc- cessful multinational companies.72 The McKinsey & Company’s survey of more than 400 senior executives of companies around the world found that 92 percent agreed with former Sony president Akio Morita’s contention that the environmental challenge will be one of the central issues in the 21st century.73 Virtually all executives acknowledged their firms’ responsibility to control pollution, and 83 percent agreed that corporations have an environ- mental responsibility for their products even after they are sold.

For many successful firms, environmental values are now becoming a central part of their cultures and management processes.74 And, as noted earlier, environmental impacts are being audited and accounted for as the “third bottom line.” According to a recent corporate report, “If we aren’t good corporate citizens as reflected in a Triple Bottom Line that takes into account social and environmental responsibilities along with financial ones—eventually our stock price, our profits, and our entire business could suffer.”75 Also, a CEO survey on sustainability by Accenture debunks the notion that sustainability and profitability are mutually exclusive corporate goals. The study found that sustainability is being increasingly recognized as a source of cost efficiencies and revenue growth. In many companies, sustain- ability activities have led to increases in revenue and profits. As Jeff Immelt, the CEO of General Electric, puts it, “Green is green.”76 Strategy Spotlight 1.2 shows how Walmart is able to dramatically increase its use of renewable energy—and make money on it, as well.

Many firms have profited by investing in socially responsible behavior, including those activities that enhance environmental sustainability. However, how do such “socially respon- sible” companies fare in terms of shareholder returns compared to benchmarks such as the Standard & Poor’s 500 Index? Let’s look at some of the evidence.

SRI (socially responsible investing) is a broad-based approach to investing that now encompasses an estimated $3.7 trillion, or $1 out of every $9 under professional management in the United States.77 SRI recognizes that corporate responsibility and societal concerns are considerations in investment decisions. With SRI, investors have the opportunity to put

triple bottom line assessment of a firm’s financial, social, and environmental performance.

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1.2 ENVIRONMENTAL SUSTAINABILITYSTRATEGY SPOTLIGHT HOW WALMART DEPLOYS GREEN ENERGY ON AN INDUSTRIAL SCALE—AND MAKES MONEY AT IT. During a visit to Walmart’s store in Mountain View, California, then- President Barack Obama said, “More and more companies like Walmart are realizing that wasting less energy isn’t just good for the planet, it’s good for business. It’s good for the bottom line.”

Despite the good public relations that Walmart got from the visit, the $480 billion company is far too savvy to lose money on its renewable energy initiatives. Instead, the retailer has off-loaded its capital investment, along with all of the risk, onto partners such as SolarCity. This minimizes their exposure by benefiting from the federal government’s generous subsidies for alternative energy investments.

Walmart has installed 105 megawatts of solar panels on the roofs of 327 stores and distribution centers. That is about 6 percent of their locations and represents enough energy to power 20,000 houses. It has become the nation’s largest commercial solar genera- tor and it plans to double its number of panels by 2020.

How has Walmart cut its costs? The way it usually does— by using its tremendous power over its suppliers to risk their own capital in order to get what it wants. For example, it pro- vides  access to its roof space to SolarCity, or other installers, who install the panels (at a cost of about $1.2 million for the average store array). The supplier then sells the power gener- ated to Walmart under a long-term deal—at a price that is typi- cally cheaper than what the local electric utility would charge. Claims David Ozment, Walmart’s energy chief, “The value propo- sition is obvious. Why put up our own capital?”

As of 2015, Walmart was getting 26 percent of its worldwide power from green sources—including wind, solar, fuel cells and hydropower. Walmart’s longer-term goal is to use a combination of energy-efficient measures to source half of the company’s energy needs from renewable sources by 2025. This will also result in an estimated 18 percent emissions reduction from its operations.

Sources: Helman, C. 2015. Everyday renewable energy. Forbes. November 23: 66, 68; and Makower, J. 2016. Insider Walmart’s 2025 sustainability goals. www. greenbiz.com. November 4: np.

their money to work to build a more sustainable world while earning competitive returns both today and over time.

And, as the saying goes, nice guys don’t have to finish last. The ING SRI Index Fund, which tracks the stocks of 50 companies, enjoyed a 47.4 percent return in a recent year. That easily beat the 2.65 percent gain of the Standard & Poor’s 500 stock index. A review of the 145 socially responsible equity mutual and exchange-traded funds tracked by Morningstar also shows that 65 percent of them outperformed the S&P 500.78

Making the Business Case for Sustainability Initiatives We mentioned many financial and nonfinancial benefits associated with sustainability initiatives in the previous section. However, in practice, such initiatives often have difficulty making it through the conven- tional approval process within corporations. This is primarily because, before companies make investments in projects, managers want to know their return on investment.79

The ROIs on sustainability projects are often very difficult to quantify for a number of reasons. Among these are:

1. The data necessary to calculate ROI accurately are often not available when it comes to sustainability projects. However, sustainability programs may often find their success beyond company boundaries, so internal systems and process metrics can’t capture all the relevant numbers.

2. Many of the benefits from such projects are intangible. Traditional financial models are built around relatively easy-to-measure, monetized results. Yet many of the benefits of sustainability projects involve fuzzy intangibles, such as the goodwill that can enhance a firm’s brand equity.

3. The payback period is on a different time frame. Even when their future benefits can be forecast, sustainability projects often require longer-term payback windows.

Clearly, the case for sustainability projects needs to be made on the basis of a more holistic and comprehensive understanding of all the tangible and intangible benefits rather than whether or not they meet existing hurdle rates for traditional investment projects.

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For example, 3M uses a lower hurdle rate for pollution prevention projects. When it comes to environmental projects, IKEA allows a 10- to 15-year payback period, considerably longer than it allows for other types of investment. And Diversey, a cleaning products company, has employed a portfolio approach. It has established two hurdles for projects in its carbon reduc- tion plan: a three-year payback and a cost per megaton of carbon avoided. Out of 120 possible projects ranging from lighting retrofits to solar photovoltaic systems, only 30 cleared both hurdles. Although about 60 of the other ideas could reach one, an expanded 90-project portfo- lio, all added together, met the double hurdle. Subsequently, Diversey was able to increase its carbon reduction goal from 8 to 25 percent and generated a higher net present value.

Such approaches are the result of the recognition that the intangible benefits of sustain- ability projects—such as reducing risks, staying ahead of regulations, pleasing communities, and enhancing employee morale—are substantial even when they are difficult to quantify. Just as companies spend large fortunes on launching advertising campaigns or initiating R&D projects without a clear quantification of financial returns, sustainability investments are necessary even when it is difficult to calculate the ROI of such investments. The alterna- tive of not making these investments is often no longer feasible.

THE STRATEGIC MANAGEMENT PERSPECTIVE: AN IMPERATIVE THROUGHOUT THE ORGANIZATION Strategic management requires managers to take an integrative view of the organization and assess how all of the functional areas and activities fit together to help an organization achieve its goals and objectives. This cannot be accomplished if only the top managers in the organization take an integrative, strategic perspective of issues facing the firm and everyone else “fends for themselves” in their independent, isolated functional areas. Instead, people throughout the organization must strive toward overall goals.

The need for such a perspective is accelerating in today’s increasingly complex, intercon- nected, ever-changing, global economy. As noted by Peter Senge of MIT, the days when Henry Ford, Alfred Sloan, and Tom Watson (top executives at Ford, General Motors, and IBM, respectively) “learned for the organization are gone.”80

To develop and mobilize people and other assets, leaders are needed throughout the organization.81 No longer can organizations be effective if the top “does the thinking” and the rest of the organization “does the work.” Everyone must be involved in the strategic management process. There is a critical need for three types of leaders:

• Local line leaders who have significant profit-and-loss responsibility. • Executive leaders who champion and guide ideas, create a learning infrastructure,

and establish a domain for taking action. • Internal networkers who, although they have little positional power and formal

authority, generate their power through the conviction and clarity of their ideas.82

Top-level executives are key in setting the tone for the empowerment of employees. Consider Richard Branson, founder of the Virgin Group, whose core businesses include retail operations, hotels, communications, and an airline. He is well known for creating a culture and an informal structure where anybody in the organization can be involved in generating and acting upon new business ideas. In an interview, he stated: “If someone has an idea, they can pick up the phone and talk to me. I can vote, ‘Done, let’s do it.’ Or, better still, they can just go ahead and do it. They know that they are not going to get a mouthful from me if they make a mistake.”83

To inculcate a strategic management perspective, managers must create management processes to foster change. This involves planning, leading, and holding people accountable. At Netflix, leading people is not based on one’s position in the hierarchy, nor an individual

LO 1-5 The need for greater empowerment throughout the organization.

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1.3 STRATEGY SPOTLIGHT STRATEGY AND THE VALUE OF INEXPERIENCE Peter Gruber, chairman of Mandalay Entertainment, discovered that great ideas can come from the least expected sources. During the filming of the movie Gorillas in the Mist, his produc- tion company faced many problems. Rwanda—the site of the filming—was on the verge of revolution, the film needed to use 200 animals, and the screenplay required the gorillas to follow a script, that is, do what the script called for and “act.” If that failed, the fallback position was to use dwarfs in gorilla suits on a soundstage—a strategy that usually failed.

Gruber explains how the “day was saved” by someone with very limited experience:

We called an emergency meeting to solve these problems. In the middle of it, a young intern asked, “What if you let the gorillas write the story?” Everyone laughed and wondered what she was doing in the

meeting with experienced filmmakers. Hours later, someone casually asked her what she had meant. She said, “What if you send a really good cinematog- rapher into the jungle with a ton of film to shoot the gorillas, then you could write a story around what the gorillas did on film.” It was a brilliant idea. And we did exactly what she suggested: We sent Alan Root, an Academy Award–nominated cinematographer into the jungle for three weeks. He came back with phenomenal footage that practically wrote the story for us.

The upshot? The film cost $20 million to shoot—half the origi- nal budget. And it was nominated for five Academy Awards— including Sigourney Weaver for best actress—and it won two Golden Globe Awards.

Source: Gruber, P. 1998. My greatest lesson. Fast Company, 14: 88–90; and imdb.com.

LO 1-6 How an awareness of a hierarchy of strategic goals can help an organization achieve coherence in its strategic direction.

trait that is taught to people identified as “high potentials.”84 The expectation is that anyone can take initiative, make decisions, and influence others consistent with the firm’s strat- egy. Everyone gets—and receives—feedback from team members, supervisors, managers, and customers. As part of the overall system that emphasizes transparency, there is the shared belief at Netflix that good results depend on people providing their insights and perspec- tives. Getting alignment, direction, and obtaining results the right way is essential. Those who fail to achieve this are asked to leave the firm.

We’d like to close with our favorite example of how inexperience can be a virtue. It fur- ther reinforces the benefits of having broad involvement throughout the organization in the strategic management process (see Strategy Spotlight 1.3).

ENSURING COHERENCE IN STRATEGIC DIRECTION Employees and managers must strive toward common goals and objectives.85 By specifying desired results, it becomes much easier to move forward. Otherwise, when no one knows what the firm is striving to accomplish, individuals have no idea of what to work toward. Alan Mulally, former CEO at Ford Motor Company, stressed the importance of perspective in creating a sense of mission: “What are we? What is our real purpose? And then, how do you include everybody so you know where you are on that plan, so you can work on areas that need special attention.” 86

Organizations express priorities best through stated goals and objectives that form a hierarchy of goals, which includes the firm’s vision, mission, and strategic objectives.87 What visions may lack in specificity, they make up for in their ability to evoke power- ful and compelling mental images. On the other hand, strategic objectives tend to be more specific and provide a more direct means of determining if the organization is mov- ing toward broader, overall goals.88 Visions, as one would expect, also have longer time horizons than either mission statements or strategic objectives. Exhibit 1.6 depicts the hierarchy of goals and its relationship to two attributes: general versus specific and time horizon.

hierarchy of goals organizational goals ranging from, at the top, those that are less specific yet able to evoke powerful and compelling mental images, to, at the bottom, those that are more specific and measurable.

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Organizational Vision A vision is a goal that is “massively inspiring, overarching, and long term.”89 It represents a destination that is driven by and evokes passion. For example, Wendy Kopp, founder of Teach for America, notes that her vision for the organization, which strives to improve the quality of inner-city schools, draws many applicants: “We’re looking for people who are magnetized to this notion, this vision, that one day all children in our nation should have the opportunity to attain an excellent education.” 90

Leaders must develop and implement a vision. A vision may or may not succeed; it depends on whether or not everything else happens according to an organization’s strategy. As Mark Hurd, Hewlett-Packard’s former CEO, humorously points out: “Without execu- tion, vision is just another word for hallucination.”91

In a survey of executives from 20 different countries, respondents were asked what they believed were a leader’s key traits.92 Ninety-eight percent responded that “a strong sense of vision” was the most important. Similarly, when asked about the critical knowledge skills, the leaders cited “strategy formulation to achieve a vision” as the most important skill. In other words, managers need to have not only a vision but also a plan to implement it. Regretfully, 90 percent reported a lack of confidence in their own skills and ability to conceive a vision. For example, T. J. Rogers, CEO of Cypress Semiconductor, an electronic- chip maker that faced some difficulties in 1992, lamented that his own shortsightedness caused the danger: “I did not have the 50,000-foot view, and got caught.”93

One of the most famous examples of a vision is Disneyland’s: “To be the happiest place on earth.” Other examples are:

• “Restoring patients to full life.” (Medtronic) • “Our vision is to be the world’s best quick service restaurant.” (McDonald’s) • “To organize the world’s information and make it universally accessible and useful.”

(Google) • “To give everyone in the world the power to share and make the world more open

and connected” (Facebook)

Although such visions cannot be accurately measured by a specific indicator of how well they are being achieved, they do provide a fundamental statement of an organization’s values, aspirations, and goals. Such visions go well beyond narrow financial objectives, of course, and strive to capture both the minds and hearts of employees.

The vision statement may also contain a slogan, diagram, or picture—whatever grabs attention.94 The aim is to capture the essence of the more formal parts of the vision in a few words that are easily remembered, yet that evoke the spirit of the entire vision statement. In its 20-year battle with Xerox, Canon’s slogan, or battle cry, was “Beat Xerox.” Motorola’s slogan is “Total Customer Satisfaction.” Outboard Marine Corporation’s slogan is “To Take the World Boating.”

vision organizational goal(s) that evoke(s) powerful and compelling mental images.

EXHIBIT 1.6 A Hierarchy of Goals

Vision

Mission Statement

Strategic Objectives

General

Specific

Long Time Horizon

Short Time Horizon

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Clearly, vision statements are not a cure-all. Sometimes they backfire and erode a com- pany’s credibility. Visions fail for many reasons, including the following:95

The Walk Doesn’t Match the Talk An idealistic vision can arouse employee enthusiasm. However, that same enthusiasm can be quickly dashed if employees find that senior manage- ment’s behavior is not consistent with the vision. Often, vision is a sloganeering campaign of new buzzwords and empty platitudes like “devotion to the customer,” “teamwork,” or “total quality” that aren’t consistently backed by management’s action.

Irrelevance Visions created in a vacuum—unrelated to environmental threats or opportuni- ties or an organization’s resources and capabilities—often ignore the needs of those who are expected to buy into them. Employees reject visions that are not anchored in reality.

Not the Holy Grail Managers often search continually for the one elusive solution that will solve their firm’s problems—that is, the next “holy grail” of management. They may have tried other management fads only to find that they fell short of their expectations. However, they remain convinced that one exists. A vision simply cannot be viewed as a magic cure for an organization’s illness.

Too Much Focus Leads to Missed Opportunities The downside of too much focus is that in directing people and resources toward a grandiose vision, losses can be significant. It is analo- gous to focusing your eyes on a small point on a wall. Clearly, you would not have very much peripheral vision. Similarly, organizations must strive to be aware of unfolding events in both their external and internal environment when formulating and implementing strategies.

An Ideal Future Irreconciled with the Present Although visions are not designed to mir- ror reality, they must be anchored somehow in it. People have difficulty identifying with a vision that paints a rosy picture of the future but does not account for the often hostile environment in which the firm competes or that ignores some of the firm’s weaknesses.

Mission Statements A company’s mission statement differs from its vision in that it encompasses both the pur- pose of the company and the basis of competition and competitive advantage.

Exhibit 1.7 contains the vision statement and mission statement of WellPoint Health Network (renamed Anthem, Inc., in December 2014), a giant $79 billion managed health care organization. Note that while the vision statement is broad-based, the mission state- ment is more specific and focused on the means by which the firm will compete.

Effective mission statements incorporate the concept of stakeholder management, suggest- ing that organizations must respond to multiple constituencies. Customers, employees, sup- pliers, and owners are the primary stakeholders, but others may also play an important role. Mission statements also have the greatest impact when they reflect an organization’s enduring,

mission statement a set of organizational goals that identifies the purpose of the organization, its basis of competition, and competitive advantage.

Vision

WellPoint will redefine our industry: Through a new generation of consumer-friendly products that put individuals back in control of their future.

Mission

The WellPoint companies provide health security by offering a choice of quality branded health and related financial services designed to meet the changing expectations of individuals, families, and their sponsors throughout a lifelong relationship.

Source: WellPoint Health Network company records.

EXHIBIT 1.7 Comparing WellPoint Health Network’s Vision and Mission

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overarching strategic priorities and competitive positioning. Mission statements also can vary in length and specificity. The three mission statements below illustrate these issues.

• “To produce superior financial returns for our shareholders as we serve our customers with the highest quality transportation, logistics, and e-commerce.” (Federal Express)

• “Build the best product, cause no unnecessary harm, use business to inspire and implement solutions to the environmental crisis.” (Patagonia)

• “To be the very best in the business. Our game plan is status go . . . we are constantly looking ahead, building on our strengths, and reaching for new goals. In our quest of these goals, we look at the three stars of the Brinker logo and are reminded of the basic values that are the strength of this company . . . People, Quality and Profitability. Everything we do at Brinker must support these core values. We also look at the eight golden flames depicted in our logo, and are reminded of the fire that ignites our mission and makes up the heart and soul of this incredible company. These flames are: Customers, Food, Team, Concepts, Culture, Partners, Community, and Shareholders. As keeper of these flames, we will continue to build on our strengths and work together to be the best in the business.” (Brinker International, whose restaurant chains include Chili’s and On the Border)96

Few mission statements identify profit or any other financial indicator as the sole purpose of the firm. Indeed, many do not even mention profit or shareholder return.97 Employees of organizations or departments are usually the mission’s most important audi- ence. For them, the mission should help to build a common understanding of purpose and commitment to nurture.

A good mission statement, by addressing each principal theme, must communicate why an organization is special and different. Two studies that linked corporate values and mis- sion statements with financial performance found that the most successful firms mentioned values other than profits. The less successful firms focused almost entirely on profitability.98 In essence, profit is the metaphorical equivalent of oxygen, food, and water that the body requires. They are not the point of life, but without them, there is no life.

Vision statements tend to be quite enduring and seldom change. However, a firm’s mis- sion can and should change when competitive conditions dramatically change or the firm is faced with new threats or opportunities.

Sometimes a firm needs to shrink significantly. Such initiatives can enable a firm to regroup, redeploy, and restart profitable growth. Strategy Spotlight 1.4 explains how Perceptual Limited, an Australian investment and trustee group, recovered from financial decline by reducing oper- ating costs, eliminating noncore businesses, and rallying around its founder’s original mission.

Strategic Objectives Strategic objectives are used to operationalize the mission statement.99 That is, they help to provide guidance on how the organization can fulfill or move toward the “higher goals” in the goal hierarchy—the mission and vision. Thus, they are more specific and cover a more well-defined time frame. Setting objectives demands a yardstick to measure the fulfillment of the objectives.100

Exhibit 1.8 lists several firms’ strategic objectives—both financial and nonfinancial. While most of them are directed toward generating greater profits and returns for the own- ers of the business, others are directed at customers or society at large.

For objectives to be meaningful, they need to satisfy several criteria. An objective must be:

• Measurable. There must be at least one indicator (or yardstick) that measures progress against fulfilling the objective.

• Specific. This provides a clear message as to what needs to be accomplished. • Appropriate. It must be consistent with the organization’s vision and mission.

strategic objectives a set of organizational goals that are used to put into practice the mission statement and that are specific and cover a well- defined time frame.

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1.4 STRATEGY SPOTLIGHT HOW PERCEPTUAL LIMITED SUCCEEDED BY RALLYING AROUND THE FOUNDER’S ORIGINAL MISSION Perceptual Limited has enjoyed a long and storied history. It was established in 1886 to manage the trusts and estates of Australia’s wealthy families and led the market for most of its history. However, as it grew it lost its focus and began diversifying into several new business areas. By 2011, the firm was struggling—its share price had slid from a high of $84 to $24 in four years and profits were down almost 70 percent. Not surprisingly, shareholders were call- ing publicly for new leadership and a major repositioning of the firm. Enter Geoff Lloyd, Perceptual’s third CEO in twelve months.

Lloyd discovered that the firm had become internally com- petitive and had grown incredibly complex over time by entering many new businesses—and did not hold leadership positions in most of them. He was convinced that he needed to restore the company to its original core mission: the protection of Australia’s wealth. To do this, he realized he would need to make the firm “faster, more confident, and, above all, simpler.”

He quickly made many changes. He replaced 10 of 11 members of the management team with people who had no vested interest in the past decisions. He launched Transformation 2015—which

included several initiatives directed toward reducing complexity at all levels. These included: (1) reducing the number of businesses from 11 to three—asset management, high net worth advisory and trustee services, and corporate fiduciary services (after all, just two businesses were responsible for 95 percent of the profits!), (2) reducing real estate holdings by half, and (3) reducing headquar- ters staff by 50 percent. His team also found that Perceptual was using more than 3,000 computer systems and applications.

Along with all of the cutbacks, Lloyd and his management team focused on a plan to gain market share by investing in the firm’s core. He led town hall meetings to explain the company’s situation and to ignite interest for its core values. Key among his efforts was to get employees to refocus on the founding princi- ples of the company. During the process, Lloyd found something remarkable: Perceptual’s original trust business was so strong that it still had its first customer—125 years later.

Efforts by Lloyd and his management team led to a dramatic turnaround. Its stock price more than doubled within four years; employee engagement has significantly increased; the firm is gaining market share in its core markets; and net profits have increased over 16 percent each year from 2011 to 2015. Sources: Zook, C. & Allen, J. Reigniting growth. Harvard Business Review. 94(3): 70-76; www.perceptual2015. reportonline.com.au; and, www.perceptual.com.au.

Strategic Objectives (Financial)

• Increase sales growth 6 percent to 8 percent and accelerate core net earnings growth from 13 percent to 15 percent per share in each of the next 5 years. (Procter & Gamble)

• Generate Internet-related revenue of $1.5 billion. (AutoNation) • Increase the contribution of Banking Group earnings from investments, brokerage, and insurance from

16 percent to 25 percent. (Wells Fargo) • Cut corporate overhead costs by $30 million per year. (Fortune Brands)

Strategic Objectives (Nonfinancial)

• We want a majority of our customers, when surveyed, to say they consider Wells Fargo the best financial institution in the community. (Wells Fargo)

• Reduce volatile air emissions 15 percent by 2015 from 2010 base year, indexed to net sales. (3M) • Our goal is to help save 100,000 more lives each year. (Varian Medical Systems) • We want to be the top-ranked supplier to our customers. (PPG)

Sources: Company documents and annual reports.

EXHIBIT 1.8 Strategic Objectives

• Realistic. It must be an achievable target given the organization’s capabilities and opportunities in the environment. In essence, it must be challenging but doable.

• Timely. There must be a time frame for achieving the objective. As the economist John Maynard Keynes once said, “In the long run, we are all dead!”

When objectives satisfy the above criteria, there are many benefits. First, they help to channel all employees’ efforts toward common goals. This helps the organization concen- trate and conserve valuable resources and work collectively in a timely manner.

Second, challenging objectives can help to motivate and inspire employees to higher levels of commitment and effort. Much research has supported the notion that people work

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ISSUE FOR DEBATE

Seventh Generation’s Decision Dilemma A strike idled 67,300 workers of the United Food and Commercial Workers (UFCW) who worked at Albertsons, Ralphs, and Vons—all large grocery store chains. These stores sold natural home products made by Seventh Generation, a socially conscious company. Interestingly, the inspiration for its name came from the Great Law of the Haudenosaunee. (This Law of Peace of the Iroquois Confederacy in North America has its roots in the 14th century.) The law states that “in our every deliberation we must consider the impact of our decisions on the next seven generations.” Accordingly, the company’s mission is “To inspire a revolution that nurtures the health of the next seven generations,” and its values are to “care wholeheartedly, collaborate deliberately, nurture nature, innovate disruptively, and be a trusted brand.”

Clearly, Seventh Generation faced a dilemma: On the one hand, it believed that the strikers had a just cause. However, if it honored the strikers by not crossing the picket lines, the firm would lose the shelf space for its products in the stores it had worked so hard to secure. Honoring the strikers would also erode its trust with the large grocery stores. On the other hand, if Seventh Generation ignored the strikers and proceeded to send its products to the stores, it would be compromising its values and thereby losing trust and credibility with several stakeholders—its customers, distributors, and employees.

Discussion Questions 1. How important should the Seventh Generation values be considered when deciding what to do? 2. How can Seventh Generation solve this dilemma?

Sources: Russo, M. V. 2010. Companies on a mission: Entrepreneurial strategies for growing sustainably, responsibly, and profitably. Stanford: Stanford University Press: 94–96; Seventh Generation. 2012. Seventh generation’s mission—Corporate social responsibility. www.seventhgeneration.com, np; Foster, A. C. 2004. Major work stoppage in 2003. U.S. Bureau of Labor and Statistics. Compensation and Working Conditions. www.bls.gov, November 23: np; Fast Company. 2008. 45 social entrepreneurs who are changing the world. Profits with purpose: Seventh Generation. www.fastcompany, np; and Ratical. Undated. The six nations: Oldest living participatory democracy on earth. www.ratical.org, np.

harder when they are striving toward specific goals instead of being asked simply to “do their best.”

Third, as we noted earlier in the chapter, there is always the potential for different parts of an organization to pursue their own goals rather than overall company goals. Although well intentioned, these may work at cross-purposes to the organization as a whole. Meaningful objectives thus help to resolve conflicts when they arise.

Finally, proper objectives provide a yardstick for rewards and incentives. They will ensure a greater sense of equity or fairness when rewards are allocated.

A caveat: When formulating strategic objectives, managers need to remember that too many objectives can result in a lack of focus and diminished results:

A few years ago CEO Tony Petrucciani and his team at Single Source Systems, a software firm in Fishers, Indiana, set 15 annual objectives, such as automating some of its software functions. However, the firm, which got distracted by having so many items on its objective list, missed its $8.1 million revenue benchmark by 11 percent. “Nobody focused on any one thing,” he says. Going forward, Petrucciani decided to set just a few key priorities. This helped the company to meet its goal of $10 million in sales. Sometimes, less is more!101

In addition to the above, organizations have lower-level objectives that are more spe- cific than strategic objectives. These are often referred to as short-term objectives—essential components of a firm’s “action plan” that are critical in implementing the firm’s chosen strategy. We discuss these issues in detail in Chapter 9.

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Reflecting on Career Implications . . . This chapter discusses both the long-term focus of strategy and the need for coherence in strategic direction. The following questions extend these themes by asking students to consider their own strategic goals and how they fit with the goals of the firms in which they work or would seek employment.

Attributes of Strategic Management: The attributes of strategic management described in this chapter are applicable to your personal careers as well. What are your overall goals and objectives? Who are the stakeholders you have to consider in making your career decisions (family, community, etc.)? What trade- offs do you see between your long-term and short-term goals?

Intended versus Emergent Strategies: While you may have planned your career trajectory carefully, don’t be too tied to it. Strive to take advantage of new opportunities as they arise. Many promising career opportunities may “emerge” that were not part of your intended career strategy or your specific job assignment. Take initiative by pursuing opportunities to get additional training (e.g., learn a software or a statistical package), volunteering for a short-term overseas assignment, etc. You may be in a better position to take advantage of such emergent opportunities if you take the effort to prepare for

them. For example, learning a foreign language may position you better for an overseas opportunity.

Ambidexterity: In Strategy Spotlight 1.1, we discussed the four most important traits of ambidextrous individuals. These include looking for opportunities beyond the description of one’s job, seeking out opportunities to collaborate with others, building internal networks, and multitasking. Evaluate yourself along each of these criteria. If you score low, think of ways in which you can improve your ambidexterity.

Strategic Coherence: What is the mission of your organization? What are the strategic objectives of the department or unit you are working for? In what ways does your own role contribute to the mission and objectives? What can you do differently in order to help the organization attain its mission and strategic objectives?

Strategic Coherence: Setting strategic objectives is important in your personal career as well. Identify and write down three or four important strategic objectives you want to accomplish in the next few years (finish your degree, find a better-paying job, etc.). Are you allocating your resources (time, money, etc.) to enable you to achieve these objectives? Are your objectives measurable, timely, realistic, specific, and appropriate?

We began this introductory chapter by defining strategic management and articulating some of its key attributes. Strategic management is defined as “consisting of the analyses, decisions, and actions an organization undertakes

to create and sustain competitive advantages.” The issue of how and why some firms outperform others in the marketplace is central to the study of strategic management. Strategic management has four key attributes: It is directed at overall organizational goals, includes multiple stakeholders, incorporates both short-term and long-term perspectives, and incorporates trade-offs between efficiency and effectiveness.

The second section discussed the strategic management process. Here, we paralleled the above definition of strategic management and focused on three core activities in the strategic management process—strategy analysis, strategy formulation, and strategy implementation. We noted how each of these activities is highly interrelated to and interdependent on the others. We also discussed how each of the first 12 chapters in this text fits into the three core activities.

Next, we introduced two important concepts—corporate governance and stakeholder management—which must be taken into account throughout the strategic management process. Governance mechanisms can be broadly divided into two groups: internal and external. Internal governance mechanisms include shareholders (owners), management (led by the chief executive officer), and the board of directors. External control is exercised by auditors, banks,

analysts, and an active business press as well as the threat of takeovers. We identified five key stakeholders in all organizations: owners, customers, suppliers, employees, and society at large. Successful firms go beyond an overriding focus on satisfying solely the interests of owners. Rather, they recognize the inherent conflicts that arise among the demands of the various stakeholders as well as the need to endeavor to attain “symbiosis”—that is, interdependence and mutual benefit—among the various stakeholder groups. Managers must also recognize the need to act in a socially responsible manner which, if done effectively, can enhance a firm’s innovativeness. The “shared value” approach represents an innovative perspective on creating value for the firm and society at the same time. The managers also should recognize and incorporate issues related to environmental sustainability in their strategic actions.

In the fourth section, we discussed factors that have accelerated the rate of unpredictable change that managers face today. Such factors, and the combination of them, have increased the need for managers and employees throughout the organization to have a strategic management perspective and to become more empowered.

The final section addressed the need for consistency among a firm’s vision, mission, and strategic objectives. Collectively, they form an organization’s hierarchy of goals. Visions should evoke powerful and compelling mental images. However, they are not very specific. Strategic objectives, on the other hand, are much more specific and are vital to ensuring that the organization is striving toward fulfilling its vision and mission.

summary

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romantic view of leadership 4 external control view of leadership 5 strategic management 6 strategy 6 competitive advantage 6 operational effectiveness 6 stakeholders 7 effectiveness 8 efficiency 8

ambidexterity 9 strategic management process 10 intended strategy 10 realized strategy 10 strategy analysis 12 strategy formulation 12 strategy implementation 13 corporate governance 16 stakeholder management 17 social responsibility 19 triple bottom line 20 hierarchy of goals 23 vision 24 mission statement 25 strategic objectives 26

key terms

APPLICATION QUESTIONS & EXERCISES 1. Go to the Internet and look up one of these company

sites: www.walmart.com, www.ge.com, or www.fordmotor. com. What are some of the key events that would represent the “romantic” perspective of leadership? What are some of the key events that depict the “external control” perspective of leadership?

2. Select a company that competes in an industry in which you are interested. What are some of the recent demands that stakeholders have placed on this company? Can you find examples of how the company is trying to develop “symbiosis” (interdependence and mutual benefit) among its stakeholders? (Use the Internet and library resources.)

3. Provide examples of companies that are actively trying to increase the amount of empowerment in the strategic management process throughout the organization. Do these companies seem to be having positive outcomes? Why? Why not?

4. Look up the vision statements and/or mission statements for a few companies. Do you feel that they are constructive and useful as a means of motivating employees and providing a strong strategic direction? Why? Why not? (Note: Annual reports, along with the Internet, may be good sources of information.)

EXPERIENTIAL EXERCISE Using the Internet or library sources, select four organizations— two in the private sector and two in the public sector. Find their mission statements. Complete the following exhibit by identifying the stakeholders that are mentioned. Evaluate the differences between firms in the private sector and those in the public sector.

Organization Name

Mission Statement

Stakeholders (√ = mentioned)

1. Customers

2. Suppliers

3. Managers/employees

4. Community-at-large

5. Owners

6. Others?

7. Others?

SUMMARY REVIEW QUESTIONS 1. How is “strategic management” defined in the text,

and what are its four key attributes? 2. Briefly discuss the three key activities in the strategic

management process. Why is it important for managers to recognize the interdependent nature of these activities?

3. Explain the concept of “stakeholder management.” Why shouldn’t managers be solely interested in stockholder management, that is, maximizing the returns for owners of the firm—its shareholders?

4. What is “corporate governance”? What are its three key elements, and how can it be improved?

5. How can “symbiosis” (interdependence, mutual benefit) be achieved among a firm’s stakeholders?

6. Why do firms need to have a greater strategic management perspective and empowerment in the strategic management process throughout the organization?

7. What is meant by a “hierarchy of goals”? What are the main components of it, and why must consistency be achieved among them?

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ETHICS QUESTIONS 1. A company focuses solely on short-term profits to provide the greatest return to the owners of the business (i.e., the

shareholders in a publicly held firm). What ethical issues could this raise? 2. A firm has spent some time—with input from managers at all levels—on developing a vision statement and a mission

statement. Over time, however, the behavior of some executives is contrary to these statements. Could this raise some ethical issues?

1. Gunther, M. 2010. Fallen angels. Fortune, November 1: 75–78.

2. Colvin, G. 2015. The 21st century corporation. Fortune, November 1: 103–112; and, Anonymous. 2016. The rise of superstars. The Economist, September 17: 3– 16.

3. Kapner, S. & Lublin, J. S. 2016. Lands’ end CEO is pushed out after 19 months. The Wall Street Journal, September 27: B1; Anonymous. 2016. Lands’ End CEO Marchionni out after failing to take brand upscale. Fortune.com, September 26: np; and, Kapner, S. 2016. New Lands’ End CEO delivers high fashion—and a culture clash. www. wsj.com, May 6: np.

4. For a discussion of the “romantic” versus “external control” perspective, refer to Meindl, J. R. 1987. The romance of leadership and the evaluation of organizational performance. Academy of Management Journal, 30: 92–109; and Pfeffer, J. & Salancik, G. R. 1978. The external control of organizations: A resource dependence perspective. New York: Harper & Row.

5. A recent perspective on the “romantic view” of leadership is provided by Mintzberg, H. 2004. Leadership and management development: An afterword. Academy of Management Executive, 18(3): 140– 142.

6. For a discussion of the best and worst managers for 2008, read Anonymous. 2009. The best managers. BusinessWeek, January 19: 40–41; and The worst managers. On page 42 in the same issue.

7. Burrows, P. 2009. Apple without its core? BusinessWeek, January 26/ February 2: 31.

8. For a study on the effects of CEOs on firm performance, refer to Kor, Y. Y. & Misangyi, V. F. 2008. Strategic Management Journal, 29(11):1357–1368.

9. Colvin, G. 2016. Developing an internal market for talent. Fortune. March 1: 22.

10. Kapner, S. & Lublin, op. cit.

11. Ewing, J. 2008. South Africa emerges from the shadows. BusinessWeek, December 15: 52–56.

12. For an interesting perspective on the need for strategists to maintain a global mind-set, refer to Begley, T. M. & Boyd, D. P. 2003. The need for a global mind-set. MIT Sloan Management Review, 44(2): 25–32.

13. Porter, M. E. 1996. What is strategy? Harvard Business Review, 74(6): 61–78.

14. See, for example, Barney, J. B. & Arikan, A. M. 2001. The resource- based view: Origins and implications. In Hitt, M. A., Freeman, R. E., & Harrison, J. S. (Eds.), Handbook of strategic management: 124– 189. Malden, MA: Blackwell.

15. Porter, M. E. 1996. What is strategy? Harvard Business Review, 74(6): 61–78; and Hammonds, K. H. 2001. Michael Porter’s big ideas. Fast Company, March: 55–56.

16. This section draws upon Dess, G. G. & Miller, A. 1993. Strategic management. New York: McGraw-Hill.

17. See, for example, Hrebiniak, L. G. & Joyce, W. F. 1986. The strategic importance of managing myopia. Sloan Management Review, 28(1): 5–14.

18. Bryant, A. 2011. The corner office. New York: Times Books.

19. For an insightful discussion on how to manage diverse stakeholder groups, refer to Rondinelli, D. A. & London, T. 2003. How corporations and environmental groups cooperate: Assessing cross-sector alliances and collaborations. Academy of Management Executive, 17(1): 61–76.

20. Some dangers of a short-term perspective are addressed in Van Buren, M. E. & Safferstone, T. 2009. The quick wins paradox. Harvard Business Review, 67(1): 54–61.

21. Senge, P. 1996. Leading learning organizations: The bold, the powerful, and the invisible. In Hesselbein, F., Goldsmith, M., & Beckhard, R. (Eds.), The leader of

the future: 41–58. San Francisco: Jossey-Bass.

22. Winston, A. S. 2014. The big pivot. Boston: Harvard Business Review.

23. Loeb, M. 1994. Where leaders come from. Fortune, September 19: 241 (quoting Warren Bennis).

24. Ignatius, A. 2016. The HBR Interview: Hewlett Packard Enterprise CEO Meg Whitman. Harvard Business Review, 94(5): 100.

25. This section draws on: Smith, W., Lewis, M., & Tushman, M. 2016. “Both/and” leadership. Harvard Business Review, 94(5): 63–70.

26. New perspectives on “management models” are addressed in Birkinshaw, J. & Goddard, J. 2009. What is your management model? MIT Sloan Management Review, 50(2): 81–90.

27. Mintzberg, H. 1985. Of strategies: Deliberate and emergent. Strategic Management Journal, 6: 257–272.

28. Some interesting insights on decision- making processes are found in Nutt, P. C. 2008. Investigating the success of decision making processes. Journal of Management Studies, 45(2): 425–455.

29. Smith, J. 2014. Go-to lawyers are in-house. The Wall Street Journal, September 15: B6.

30. Machota, J. 2016. Job description varies for NFL QBs,” The Dallas Morning News. March 20: 4C.

31. Bryant, A. 2009. The corner office. nytimes.com, April 25: np.

32. A study investigating the sustainability of competitive advantage is Newbert, S. L. 2008. Value, rareness, competitive advantages, and performance: A conceptual-level empirical investigation of the resource- based view of the firm. Strategic Management Journal, 29(7): 745–768.

33. Good insights on mentoring are addressed in DeLong, T. J., Gabarro, J. J., & Lees, R. J. 2008. Why mentoring matters in a hypercompetitive world. Harvard Business Review, 66(1): 115–121.

REFERENCES

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34. Karlgaard, R. 2014. The soft edge. San Francisco: Jossey-Bass.

35. A unique perspective on differentiation strategies is Austin, R. D. 2008. High margins and the quest for aesthetic coherence. Harvard Business Review, 86(1): 18–19.

36. Some insights on partnering in the global area are discussed in MacCormack, A. & Forbath, T. 2008. Harvard Business Review, 66(1): 24, 26.

37. For insights on how firms can be successful in entering new markets in emerging economies, refer to Eyring, M. J., Johnson, M. W., & Nair, H. 2011. New business models in emerging markets. Harvard Business Review, 89(1/2): 88–95.

38. Fortune. 2012. December 3: 6. 39. An interesting discussion of the

challenges of strategy implementation is Neilson, G. L., Martin, K. L., & Powers, E. 2008. The secrets of strategy execution. Harvard Business Review, 86(6): 61–70.

40. Interesting perspectives on strategy execution involving the link between strategy and operations are addressed in Kaplan, R. S. & Norton, D. P. 2008. Mastering the management system. Harvard Business Review, 66(1): 62–77.

41. An innovative perspective on organizational design is found in Garvin, D. A. & Levesque, L. C. 2008. The multiunit enterprise. Harvard Business Review, 86(6): 106–117.

42. Monks, R. & Minow, N. 2001. Corporate governance (2nd ed.). Malden, MA: Blackwell.

43. Intel Corp. 2007. Intel corporation board of directors guidelines on significant corporate governance issues. www.intel.com

44. Jones, T. J., Felps, W., & Bigley, G. A. 2007. Ethical theory and stakeholder- related decisions: The role of stakeholder culture. Academy of Management Review, 32(1): 137– 155.

45. For example, see: The best (& worst) managers of the year, 2003. BusinessWeek, January 13: 58–92; and Lavelle, M. 2003. Rogues of the year. Time, January 6: 33–45.

46. Baer, D. A. 2014. The West’s bruised confidence in capitalism. The Wall Street Journal, September 22: A17; and Miller, D. 2014. Greatness is gone. Dallas Morning News, October 26: 1 D.

47. Barton, D. & Wiseman, M. 2015. Where boards fall short. Harvard Business Review, 93(1/2): 100.

48. Hessel, E. & Woolley, S. 2008. Your money or your life. Forbes, October 27: 52.

49. Task, A. 2012. Finance CEO pay rose 20% in 2011, even as stocks stumbled. www.finance.yahoo.com, June 5: np.

50. Rosenberg, Y. 2016. This CEO got $142 million more than he deserved. finance.yahoo.com: February 17: np.

51. Some interesting insights on the role of activist investors can be found in Greenwood, R. & Schol, M. 2008. When (not) to listen to activist investors. Harvard Business Review, 66(1): 23–24.

52. For an interesting perspective on the changing role of boards of directors, refer to Lawler, E. & Finegold, D. 2005. Rethinking governance. MIT Sloan Management Review, 46(2): 67–70.

53. Benz, M. & Frey, B. S. 2007. Corporate governance: What can we learn from public governance? Academy of Management Review, 32(1): 92– 104.

54. The salience of shareholder value is addressed in Carrott, G. T. & Jackson, S. E. 2009. Shareholder value must top the CEO’s agenda. Harvard Business Review, 67(1): 22–24.

55. Stakeholder symbiosis. 1998. Fortune, March 30: S2.

56. An excellent review of stakeholder management theory can be found in Laplume, A. O., Sonpar, K., & Litz, R. A. 2008. Stakeholder theory: Reviewing a theory that moves us. Journal of Management, 34(6): 1152– 1189.

57. For a definitive, recent discussion of the stakeholder concept, refer to Freeman, R. E. & McVae, J. 2001. A stakeholder approach to strategic management. In Hitt, M. A., Freeman, R. E., & Harrison, J. S. (Eds.), Handbook of strategic management: 189–207. Malden, MA: Blackwell.

58. Harrison, J. S., Bosse, D. A., & Phillips, R. A. 2010. Managing for stakeholders, stakeholder utility functions, and competitive advantage. Strategic Management Journal, 31(1): 58–74.

59. For an insightful discussion on the role of business in society, refer to Handy, op. cit.

60. Stakeholder symbiosis. op. cit., p. S3. The Walmart example draws on: Camillus, J. 2008. Strategy as a wicked problem. Harvard Business Review, 86(5): 100– 101.

61. Sidhu, I. 2010. Doing both. Upper Saddle River, NJ: FT Press, 7–8.

62. Thomas, J. G. 2000. Macroenvironmetal forces. In Helms, M. M. (Ed.), Encyclopedia

of management (4th ed.): 516–520. Farmington Hills, MI: Gale Group.

63. For a strong advocacy position on the need for corporate values and social responsibility, read Hollender, J. 2004. What matters most: Corporate values and social responsibility. California Management Review, 46(4): 111–119.

64. Rangan, K., Chase, L., & Karim, S. 2015. The truth about CSR. Harvard Business Review, 93(1/2): 41–49.

65. Bhattacharya, C. B. & Sen, S. 2004, Doing better at doing good: When, why, and how consumers respond to corporate social initiatives. California Management Review, 47(1): 9–24.

66. For some findings on the relationship between corporate social responsibility and firm performance, see Margolis, J. D. & Elfenbein, H. A. 2008. Harvard Business Review, 86(1): 19–20.

67. Cone Corporate Citizenship Study, 2002, www.coneinc.com.

68. Refer to www.bsr.org. 69. For an insightful discussion of the

risks and opportunities associated with global warming, refer to Lash, J. & Wellington, F. 2007. Competitive advantage on a warming planet. Harvard Business Review, 85(3): 94– 102.

70. Ignatius, A. 2015. Leadership with a conscience. Harvard Business Review, 93(11): 50–63.

71. This section draws on Hart, S. L. 1997. Beyond greening: Strategies for a sustainable world. Harvard Business Review, 75(1): 66–76; and Berry, M. A. & Rondinelli, D. A. 1998. Proactive corporate environmental management: A new industrial revolution. Academy of Management Executive, 12(2): 38–50.

72. For a creative perspective on environmental sustainability and competitive advantage as well as ethical implications, read Ehrenfeld, J. R. 2005. The roots of sustainability. MIT Sloan Management Review, 46(2): 23–25.

73. McKinsey & Company. 1991. The corporate response to the environmental challenge. Summary Report. Amsterdam: McKinsey & Company.

74. Delmas, M. A. & Montes-Sancho, M. J. 2010. Voluntary agreements to improve environmental quality: Symbolic and substantive cooperation. Strategic Management Journal, 31(6): 575–601.

75. Vogel, D. J. 2005. Is there a market for virtue? The business case for corporate social responsibility. California Management Review, 47(4): 19–36.

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76. Esty, D. C. & Charnovitz, S. 2012. Green rules to drive innovation. Harvard Business Review, 90(3): 120– 123.

77. Chamberlain, M. 2013. Socially responsible investing: What you need to know. Forbes.com, April 24: np.

78. Kaahwarski, T. 2010. It pays to be good. Bloomberg Businessweek, February 1 to February 8: 69.

79. This discussion draws on Kuehn, K. & McIntire, L. 2014. Sustainability a CFO can love. Harvard Business Review, 92(4): 66–74; and Esty, D. C. & Winston, A. S. 2009. Green to gold. Hoboken, NJ: Wiley.

80. Senge, P. M. 1990. The leader’s new work: Building learning organizations. Sloan Management Review, 32(1): 7–23.

81. For an interesting perspective on the role of middle managers in the strategic management process, refer to Huy, Q. H. 2001. In praise of middle managers. Harvard Business Review, 79(8): 72–81.

82. Senge, 1996, op. cit., pp. 41–58. 83. Kets de Vries, M. F. R. 1998.

Charisma in action: The transformational abilities of Virgin’s Richard Branson and ABB’s Percy

Barnevik. Organizational Dynamics, 26(3): 7–21.

84. Worley, C. G., Williams, T. & Lawler, E. E. III. 2016. Creating management processes built for change. MIT Sloan Management Review, 58(1): 77–82.

85. An interesting discussion on how to translate top management’s goals into concrete actions is found in Bungay, S. 2011. How to make the most of your company’s strategy. Harvard Business Review, 89(1/2): 132– 140.

86. Bryant, A. 2011. The corner office. New York: St. Martin’s/Griffin, 171.

87. An insightful discussion about the role of vision, mission, and strategic objectives can be found in Collis, D. J. & Rukstad, M. G. 2008. Can you say what your strategy is? Harvard Business Review, 66(4): 82–90.

88. Our discussion draws on a variety of sources. These include Lipton, M. 1996. Demystifying the development of an organizational vision. Sloan Management Review, 37(4): 83–92; Bart, C. K. 2000. Lasting inspiration. CA Magazine, May: 49–50; and Quigley, J. V. 1994. Vision: How leaders develop it, share it, and sustain it. Business Horizons, September–October: 37–40.

89. Lipton, op. cit.

90. Bryant, A. 2011. The corner office. New York: St. Martin’s/Griffin, 34.

91. Hardy, Q. 2007. The uncarly. Forbes, March 12: 82–90.

92. Some interesting perspectives on gender differences in organizational vision are discussed in Ibarra, H. & Obodaru, O. 2009. Women and the vision thing. Harvard Business Review, 67(1): 62–70.

93. Quigley, op. cit. 94. Ibid. 95. Lipton, op. cit. Additional pitfalls are

addressed in this article. 96. Company records. 97. Lipton, op. cit. 98. Sexton, D. A. & Van Aukun, P. M.

1985. A longitudinal study of small business strategic planning. Journal of Small Business Management, January: 8–15, cited in Lipton, op. cit.

99. For an insightful perspective on the use of strategic objectives, refer to Chatterjee, S. 2005. Core objectives: Clarity in designing strategy. California Management Review, 47(2): 33–49.

100. Ibid. 101. Harnish, V. 2011. Five ways to

get your strategy right. Fortune, April 11: 42.

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chapter

After reading this chapter, you should have a good understanding of the following learning objectives:

2 LO2-1 The importance of developing forecasts of the business environment. LO2-2 Why environmental scanning, environmental monitoring, and collecting

competitive intelligence are critical inputs to forecasting.

LO2-3 Why scenario planning is a useful technique for firms competing in industries characterized by unpredictability and change.

LO2-4 The impact of the general environment on a firm’s strategies and performance.

LO2-5 How forces in the competitive environment can affect profitability, and how a firm can improve its competitive position by increasing its power vis-à-vis these forces.

LO2-6 How the Internet and digitally based capabilities are affecting the five competitive forces and industry profitability.

LO2-7 The concept of strategic groups and their strategy and performance implications.

Analyzing the External Environment of the Firm Creating Competitive Advantages

©Anatoli Styf/Shutterstock

PART 1: STRATEGIC ANALYSIS

Analyzing the external environment is a critical step in recognizing and understanding the opportunities and threats that organizations face. And here is where some companies fail to do a good job. The fact is that few things really “sell themselves”—especially if they are new to the market. According to Booz & Company, 66 percent of new products fail within two years, and, according to the Doblin Group, an astonishing 96 percent of all innovations fail to deliver any return on a company’s investment.1

Consider the example of Salemi Industries and the launch of its product, Cell Zone, in 2005. Although it tried to carefully analyze its potential market, it misread the market’s demand for the product and paid a steep price for its mistake.2 Mobile phone usage was sharply increasing, and its founder observed that patrons in places such as restaurants would be annoyed by the chatter of a nearby guest having a private (but loud!) conversation. Salemi Industries interpreted this observation as an opportunity to create the Cell Zone: a “commercial sound resistant cell phone booth that provides a convenient and disturbance-free environment to place and receive phone calls . . . with a design feature to promote product or service on its curvilinear outer shell,” according to the firm’s website.

Salemi Industries’ key error was that it failed to take into consideration an emerging technology— the increasing popularity of text messaging and other nonvoice communication technology applications and how that would affect the sales of its product. In addition to this technology shift, the target locations (restaurants) thought the price ($3,500) was too steep, and they were not interested in or willing to give up productive square footage for patrons to hold private conversations. Not surprisingly, the firm has sold only 300 units (100 of them in college libraries), and Salemi Industries has lost over $650,000 to date.

Discussion Questions 1. What is the biggest stumbling block for Cell Zone? 2. Are there other market segments where Cell Zone might work?

“We built a better mousetrap but there were no mice” (commenting on his firm’s development of blue windshield glass for the automobile industry).3

Gary W. Weber, PPG Industries

Successful managers must recognize opportunities and threats in their firm’s external envi- ronment. They must be aware of what’s going on outside their company. If they focus exclu- sively on the efficiency of internal operations, the firm may degenerate into the world’s most efficient producer of buggy whips, typewriters, or carbon paper. But if they miscalcu- late the market, opportunities will be lost—hardly an enviable position for their firm. As we saw from the Cell Zone example, misreading the market can lead to negative consequences.

In Competing for the Future, Gary Hamel and C. K. Prahalad suggest that “every man- ager carries around in his or her head a set of biases, assumptions, and presuppositions about the structure of the relevant ‘industry,’ about how one makes money in the industry, about who the competition is and isn’t, about who the customers are and aren’t, and so

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on.”4 Environmental analysis requires you to continually question such assumptions. Peter Drucker, considered the father of modern management, labeled these interrelated sets of assumptions the “theory of the business.”5 One could attribute much of the failure of Ms. Marchionni’s tenure at Lands’ End to her efforts to re-invent the apparel brand in a way that was in conflict with both its customer base as well as the firm’s family culture and whole- some style—as we discussed in in the opening case in Chapter 1.

A firm’s strategy may be good at one point in time, but it may go astray when man- agement’s frame of reference gets out of touch with the realities of the actual business situation. This results when management’s assumptions, premises, or beliefs are incorrect or when internal inconsistencies among them render the overall “theory of the business” invalid. As Warren Buffett, investor extraordinaire, colorfully notes, “Beware of past per- formance ‘proofs.’ If history books were the key to riches, the Forbes 400 would consist of librarians.”

In the business world, many once-successful firms have fallen. Today we may wonder who will be the next Blockbuster, Borders, Circuit City, or Radio Shack.

ENHANCING AWARENESS OF THE EXTERNAL ENVIRONMENT So how do managers become environmentally aware?6 Ram Charan, an adviser to many Fortune 500 CEOs, provides some useful insights with his concept of perceptual acuity.7 He defines it as “the ability to sense what is coming before the fog clears.” He draws on Ted Turner as an example: Turner saw the potential of 24-hour news before anyone else did. All the ingredients were there, but no others connected them until he created CNN. Like Turner, the best CEOs are compulsively tuned to the external environment and seem to have a sixth sense that picks up anomalies and detects early warning signals which may represent key threats or opportunities.

How can perceptual acuity be improved? Although many CEOs may complain that the top job is a lonely one, they can’t do it effectively by sitting alone in their office. Instead, high-performing CEOs are constantly meeting with people and searching out information. Charan provides three examples:

• One CEO gets together with his critical people for half a day every eight weeks to discuss what’s new and what’s going on in the world. The setting is informal, and outsiders often attend. The participants look beyond the lens of their industry because some trends that affect one industry may impact others later on.

• Another CEO meets four times a year with about four other CEOs of large, but noncompeting, diverse global companies. Examining the world from multiple perspectives, they share their thinking about how different trends may develop. The CEO then goes back to his own weekly management meeting and throws out “a bunch of hand grenades to shake up people’s thinking.”

• Two companies ask outsiders to critique strategy during their board’s strategy sessions. Such input typically leads to spirited discussions that provide valued input on the hinge assumptions and options that are under consideration. Once, the focus was on pinpointing the risk inherent in a certain strategy. Now, discussions have led to finding that the company was missing a valuable opportunity.

We will now address three important processes—scanning, monitoring, and gathering competitive intelligence—used to develop forecasts.8 Exhibit 2.1 illustrates relationships among these important activities. We also discuss the importance of scenario planning in anticipating major future changes in the external environment and the role of SWOT analysis.9

LO 2-1 The importance of developing forecasts of the business environment.

perceptual acuity the ability to sense what is coming before the fog clears.

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The Role of Scanning, Monitoring, Competitive Intelligence, and Forecasting Environmental Scanning Environmental scanning involves surveillance of a firm’s external environment to predict environmental changes and detect changes already underway.10,11 This alerts the organization to critical trends and events before changes develop a discern- ible pattern and before competitors recognize them.12 Otherwise, the firm may be forced into a reactive mode.13

Experts agree that spotting key trends requires a combination of knowing your business and your customer as well as keeping an eye on what’s happening around you. Such a big- picture/small-picture view enables you to better identify the emerging trends that will affect your business.

Leading firms in an industry can also be a key indicator of emerging trends.14 For exam- ple, with its wide range of household goods, Procter & Gamble is a barometer for consumer spending. Any sign that it can sell more of its premium products without cutting prices sharply indicates that shoppers may finally be becoming less price-sensitive with everyday purchases. In particular, investors will examine the performance of beauty products like Olay moisturizers and CoverGirl cosmetics for evidence that spending on small, discretion- ary pick-me-ups is improving.

Environmental Monitoring Environmental monitoring tracks the evolution of environmen- tal trends, sequences of events, or streams of activities. They may be trends that the firm came across by accident or ones that were brought to its attention from outside the organi- zation.15 Monitoring enables firms to evaluate how dramatically environmental trends are changing the competitive landscape.

One of the authors of this text has conducted on-site interviews with executives from sev- eral industries to identify indicators that firms monitor as inputs to their strategy process. Examples of such indicators included:

• A Motel 6 executive. The number of rooms in the budget segment of the industry in the United States and the difference between the average daily room rate and the consumer price index (CPI).

• A Pier 1 Imports executive. Net disposable income (NDI), consumer confidence index, and housing starts.

• A Johnson & Johnson medical products executive. Percentage of gross domestic product (GDP) spent on health care, number of active hospital beds, and the size and power of purchasing agents (indicates the concentration of buyers).

Such indices are critical for managers in determining a firm’s strategic direction and resource allocation.

environmental scanning surveillance of a firm’s external environment to predict environmental changes and detect changes already under way.

environmental monitoring a firm’s analysis of the external environment that tracks the evolution of environmental trends, sequences of events, or streams of activities.

EXHIBIT 2.1 Inputs to Forecasting

Forecasts

Environmental scanning

Environmental monitoring

Competitive intelligence

LO 2-2 Why environmental scanning, environmental monitoring, and collecting competitive intelligence are critical inputs to forecasting.

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Competitive Intelligence Competitive intelligence (CI) helps firms define and understand their industry and identify rivals’ strengths and weaknesses.16 This includes the intelligence gathering associated with collecting data on competitors and interpreting such data. Done properly, competitive intelligence helps a company avoid surprises by anticipating competi- tors’ moves and decreasing response time.17

Examples of competitive analysis are evident in daily newspapers and periodicals such as The Wall Street Journal, Bloomberg Businessweek, and Fortune. For example, banks con- tinually track home loan, auto loan, and certificate of deposit (CD) interest rates charged by rivals. Major airlines change hundreds of fares daily in response to competitors’ tactics. Car manufacturers are keenly aware of announced cuts or increases in rivals’ production volume, sales, and sales incentives (e.g., rebates and low interest rates on financing). This information is used in their marketing, pricing, and production strategies.

Keeping track of competitors has become easier today with the amount of information that is available on the Internet. The following are examples of some websites that compa- nies routinely use for competitive intelligence gathering.18

• Slideshare. A website for publicly sharing PowerPoint presentations. Marketing teams have embraced the platform and often post detail-rich presentations about their firms and products.

• Quora. A question-and-answer site popular among industry insiders who embrace the free flow of information about technical questions.

• Ispionage. A site that reveals the ad words that companies are buying, which can often shed light on new campaigns being launched.

• YouTube. Great for finding interviews with executives at trade shows.

At times, a firm’s aggressive efforts to gather competitive intelligence may lead to unethi- cal or illegal behaviors.19 Strategy Spotlight 2.1 provides an example of a company, United Technologies, that has set clear guidelines to help prevent unethical behavior.

A word of caution: Executives must be careful to avoid spending so much time and effort tracking the actions of traditional competitors that they ignore new competitors. Further, broad environmental changes and events may have a dramatic impact on a firm’s viability. Peter Drucker, wrote:

Increasingly, a winning strategy will require information about events and conditions outside the institution: noncustomers, technologies other than those currently used by the company and its present competitors, markets not currently served, and so on.20

Consider the failure of specialized medical lab Sleep HealthCenters.21 Until recently, patients suffering from sleep disorders, such as apnea, were forced to undergo expensive overnight visits to sleep clinics, including Sleep HealthCenters, to diagnose their ailments. The firm was launched in 1997 and quickly expanded to over two dozen locations. Revenue soared from nearly $10 million in 1997 to $30 million in 2010.

However, the rapid improvements in the price and performance of wearable monitoring devices changed the business, gradually at first and then suddenly. For one thing, the more comfortable home setting produced more effective measurements. And the quick declines in the cost of wearable monitoring meant patients could get the same results at one-third the price of an overnight stay at a clinic. By 2011, Sleep HealthCenters’ revenue began to decline, and the firm closed 20 percent of its locations. In 2012, its death knells sounded: Insurance companies decided to cover the less expensive option. Sleep HealthCenters abruptly closed its doors.

Environmental Forecasting Environmental scanning, monitoring, and competitive intel- ligence are important inputs for analyzing the external environment. Environmental forecasting involves the development of plausible projections about the direction, scope,

competitive intelligence a firm’s activities of collecting and interpreting data on competitors, defining and understanding the industry, and identifying competitors’ strengths and weaknesses.

environmental forecasting the development of plausible projections about the direction, scope, speed, and intensity of environmental change.

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2.1 ETHICSSTRATEGY SPOTLIGHT ETHICAL GUIDELINES ON COMPETITIVE INTELLIGENCE: UNITED TECHNOLOGIES United Technologies (UT) is a $65 billion global conglomer- ate composed of world-leading businesses with rich histories of technological pioneering, such as Otis Elevator, Carrier Air Conditioning, and Sikorsky (helicopters). UT believes strongly in a robust code of ethics. One such document is the Code of Ethics Guide on Competitive Intelligence. This encourages managers and workers to ask themselves these five questions whenever they have ethical concerns.

1. Have I done anything that coerced somebody to share this information? Have I, for example, threatened a supplier by indicating that future business opportunities will be influenced by the receipt of information with respect to a competitor?

2. Am I in a place where I should not be? If, for example, I am a field representative with privileges to move around

in a customer’s facility, have I gone outside the areas permitted? Have I misled anybody in order to gain access?

3. Is the contemplated technique for gathering information evasive, such as sifting through trash or setting up an electronic “snooping” device directed at a competitor’s facility from across the street?

4. Have I misled somebody in a way that the person believed sharing information with me was required or would be protected by a confidentiality agreement? Have I, for example, called and misrepresented myself as a government official who was seeking some information for some official purpose?

5. Have I done something to evade or circumvent a system intended to secure or protect information?

Sources: Nelson, B. 2003. The thinker. Forbes, March 3: 62–64; The Fuld war room—Survival kit 010. Code of ethics (printed 2/26/01); and www.yahoo.com.

speed, and intensity of environmental change.22 Its purpose is to predict change.23 It asks: How long will it take a new technology to reach the marketplace? Will the present social con- cern about an issue result in new legislation? Are current lifestyle trends likely to continue?

Some forecasting issues are much more specific to a particular firm and the industry in which it competes. Consider how important it is for Motel 6 to predict future indicators, such as the number of rooms, in the budget segment of the industry. If its predictions are low, it will build too many units, creating a surplus of room capacity that would drive down room rates.

A danger of forecasting is that managers may view uncertainty as black and white and ignore important gray areas.24 The problem is that underestimating uncertainty can lead to strategies that neither defend against threats nor take advantage of opportunities.

In 1977 one of the colossal underestimations in business history occurred when Kenneth H. Olsen, president of Digital Equipment Corp., announced, “There is no reason for indi- viduals to have a computer in their home.” The explosion in the personal computer market was not easy to detect in 1977, but it was clearly within the range of possibilities at the time. And, historically, there have been underestimates of the growth potential of new telecom- munication services. The electric telegraph was derided by Ralph Waldo Emerson, and the telephone had its skeptics. More recently, an “infamous” McKinsey study in the early 1980s predicted fewer than 1 million cellular users in the United States by 2000. Actually, there were nearly 100 million.25

Obviously, poor predictions about technology change never go out of vogue. Consider some other “gems”—predicted by very knowledgeable people: 26

• (1981) “Cellular phones will absolutely not replace local wire systems.” Inventor Marty Cooper

• (1995) “I predict the Internet will soon go spectacularly supernova and in 1996 catastrophically collapse.” Robert Metcalfe, founder of 3Com

• (1997) “Apple is already dead.” Former Microsoft CTO Nathan Myhrvold. • (2005) “There’s just not that many videos I want to watch.” Steve Chen, CTO and

co-founder of YouTube, expressing concerns about the firm’s long-term viability.

LO 2-3 Why scenario planning is a useful technique for firms competing in industries characterized by unpredictability and change.

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• (2006) “Everyone’s always asking me when Apple will come out with a cell phone. My answer is ‘Probably never.’” David Pogue, The New York Times

• (2007) “There’s no chance that the iPhone is going to get significant market share.” Steve Ballmer, Microsoft

Jason Zweig, an editor at The Wall Street Journal, provides an important cautionary note (and rather colorful example!) regarding the need to question the reliability of forecasts: “Humans don’t want accuracy; they want assurance . . . people can’t stand ignoring all pre- dictions; admitting that the future is unknowable is just too frightening.”27

The Nobel laureate and the late Stanford University economist Kenneth Arrow did a tour of duty as a weather forecaster for the U.S. Air Force during World War II. Ordered to evaluate mathematical models for predicting the weather one month ahead, he found that they were worthless. Informed of that, his superiors sent back another order: “The Commanding General is well aware that the forecasts are no good. However, he needs them for planning purposes.”

Scenario Analysis Scenario analysis is a more in-depth approach to forecasting. It draws on a range of disciplines and interests, among them economics, psychology, sociology, and demo- graphics. It usually begins with a discussion of participants’ thoughts on ways in which societal trends, economics, politics, and technology may affect an issue.28 Scenario analysis involves the projection of future possible events. It does not rely on extrapolation of historical trends. Rather, it seeks to explore possible developments that may only be connected to the past. That is, several scenarios are considered in a scenario analysis in order to envision possible future outcomes.

Consider PPG Industries.29 The Pittsburgh-based producer of paints, coatings, specialty materials, chemicals, glass, and fiberglass has paid dividends each year since 1899. One of the key tools it uses today in its strategic planning is scenario analysis.

PPG has developed four alternative futures based on differing assumptions about two key variables: the cost of energy (because its manufacturing operations are energy-intensive) and the extent of opportunity for growth in emerging markets. In the most favorable scenario, cost of energy will stay both moderate and stable and opportunities for growth and differentiation will be fast and strong. In this scenario, PPG determined that its success will depend on having the resources to pursue new opportunities. On the other hand, in the worst case scenario, the cost of energy will be high and opportunities for growth will be weak and slow. Such a scenario would call for a complete change in strategic direction.

Between these two extremes lies the possibility of two mixed scenarios. First, opportunity for growth in emerging markets may be high, but the cost of energy may be volatile. In this scenario, the company’s success will depend on coming up with more efficient processes. Second, cost of energy may remain moderate and stable, but opportunities for growth in emerging markets may remain weak and slow. In this situation, the most viable strategy may be one of capturing market share with new products.

Developing strategies based on possible future scenarios seems to be paying off for PPG Industries. For the five years ending in 2016, PPG’s stock has enjoyed a compounded growth rate exceeding 17 percent.

SWOT Analysis To understand the business environment of a particular firm, you need to analyze both the general environment and the firm’s industry and competitive environment. Generally, firms compete with other firms in the same industry. An industry is composed of a set of firms that produce similar products or services, sell to similar customers, and use similar methods of production. Gathering industry information and understanding competitive dynamics among the different companies in your industry is key to successful strategic management.

One of the most basic techniques for analyzing firm and industry conditions is SWOT analysis. SWOT stands for strengths, weaknesses, opportunities, and threats. It provides “raw material”—a basic listing of conditions both inside and surrounding your company.

scenario analysis an in-depth approach to environmental forecasting that involves experts’ detailed assessments of societal trends, economics, politics, technology, or other dimensions of the external environment.

SWOT analysis a framework for analyzing a company’s internal and external environments and that stands for strengths, weaknesses, opportunities, and threats.

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The Strengths and Weaknesses refer to the internal conditions of the firm—where your firm excels (strengths) and where it may be lacking relative to competitors (weaknesses). Opportunities and Threats are environmental conditions external to the firm. These could be factors in either the general or the competitive environment. In the general environ- ment, one might experience developments that are beneficial for most companies, such as improving economic conditions that lower borrowing costs, or trends that benefit some companies and harm others. An example is the heightened concern with fitness, which is a threat to some companies (e.g., tobacco) and an opportunity to others (e.g., health clubs). Opportunities and threats are also present in the competitive environment among firms competing for the same customers.

The general idea of SWOT analysis is that a firm’s strategy must:

• Build on its strengths. • Remedy the weaknesses or work around them. • Take advantage of the opportunities presented by the environment. • Protect the firm from the threats.

Despite its apparent simplicity, the SWOT approach has been very popular. First, it forces managers to consider both internal and external factors simultaneously. Second, its emphasis on identifying opportunities and threats makes firms act proactively rather than reactively. Third, it raises awareness about the role of strategy in creating a match between the environmental conditions and the firm’s internal strengths and weaknesses. Finally, its conceptual simplicity is achieved without sacrificing analytical rigor.

While analysis is necessary, it is also equally important to recognize the role played by intuition and judgment. Steve Jobs, the legendary former chairman of Apple, took a very different approach in determining what customers really wanted:30

Steve Jobs was convinced market research and focus groups limited one’s ability to innovate. When asked how much research was done to guide Apple when he introduced the iPad, Jobs famously quipped: “None. It isn’t the consumers’ job to know what they want. It’s hard for (consumers) to tell you what they want when they’ve never seen anything remotely like it.”

Jobs relied on his own intuition—his radarlike feel for emerging technologies and how they could be brought together to create, in his words “insanely great products, that ultimately made the difference.” For Jobs, who died in 2011 at the age of 56, intuition was no mere gut call. It was, as he put it in his often-quoted commencement speech at Stanford, about “connecting the dots, glimpsing the relationships among wildly disparate life experiences and changes in technologies.”

THE GENERAL ENVIRONMENT The general environment is composed of factors that can have dramatic effects on firm strat- egy.31 We divide the general environment into six segments: demographic, sociocultural, political/legal, technological, economic, and global. Exhibit 2.2 provides examples of key trends and events in each of the six segments of the general environment.

Before addressing each of the six segments in turn, consider Dominic Barton’s insights in response to a question posed to him by an editor of Fortune magazine: What are your client’s wor- ries right now? (Barton is global managing director of McKinsey, the giant consulting firm.)32

“They’re pretty consistent around the world. The big one now is geopolitics. Whether you’re in Russia, China, anywhere the assumed stability that was there for the past 20 or so years—it’s not there. The second is technology, which is moving two to three times faster than management. Most CEOs I talk to are excited and paranoid at the same time. Related to that is cyber security: the amount of time and effort to protect systems and look at vulnerabilities is big.

LO 2-4 The impact of the general environment on a firm’s strategies and performance.

general environment factors external to an industry, and usually beyond a firm’s control, that affect a firm’s strategy.

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EXHIBIT 2.2 General Environment: Key Trends and Events

Demographic

• Aging population • Rising affluence • Changes in ethnic composition • Geographic distribution of population • Greater disparities in income levels

Sociocultural

• More women in the workforce • Increase in temporary workers • Greater concern for fitness • Greater concern for environment • Postponement of family formation

Political/Legal

• Tort reform • Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) of 1990 • Deregulation of utility and other industries • Increases in federally mandated minimum wages • Taxation at local, state, federal levels • Legislation on corporate governance reforms in bookkeeping, stock options, etc. (Sarbanes-Oxley Act of

2002) • Affordable Care Act (Obamacare)

Technological

• Genetic engineering • Three-dimensional (3D) printing • Computer-aided design/computer-aided manufacturing systems (CAD/CAM) • Research in synthetic and exotic materials • Pollution/global warming • Miniaturization of computing technologies • Wireless communications • Nanotechnology • Big Data/Data Analysis

Economic

• Interest rates • Unemployment rates • Consumer price index • Trends in GDP • Changes in stock market valuations

Global

• Increasing global trade • Currency exchange rates • Emergence of the Indian and Chinese economies • Trade agreements among regional blocs (e.g., NAFTA, EU, ASEAN) • Creation of WTO (leading to decreasing tariffs/free trade in services) • Increased risks associated with terrorism

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“A fourth trend is the shift in economic power, with 2.2 billion new middle-class consumers in the next 15 years, and it’s moving to Asia and Africa. Do you have the right type of people in your top 100? Are you in those markets? Those are the four big ones we see everywhere.”

The Demographic Segment Demographics are the most easily understood and quantifiable elements of the general envi- ronment. They are at the root of many changes in society. Demographics include elements such as the aging population,33 rising or declining affluence, changes in ethnic composition, geographic distribution of the population, and disparities in income level.34

The impact of a demographic trend, like all segments of the general environment, varies across industries. Rising levels of affluence in many developed countries bode well for bro- kerage services as well as for upscale pets and supplies. However, this trend may adversely affect fast-food restaurants because people can afford to dine at higher-priced restaurants. Fast-food restaurants depend on minimum-wage employees to operate efficiently, but the competition for labor intensifies as more attractive employment opportunities become prev- alent, thus threatening the employment base for restaurants. Let’s look at the details of one of these trends.

The aging population in the United States and other developed countries has important implications. Although the percentage of those 65 and over in the U.S. workforce bottomed in the 1990s, it has been rising ever since.35 According to the Bureau of Labor Statistics, 59 percent of workers 65 and older were putting in full-time hours in 2013, a percentage that has increased steadily over the past decade. And, according to a 2014 study by Merrill Lynch and the Age Wave Consulting firm, 72 percent of preretirees aged 50 and over wanted to work during their retirement. “Older workers are to the first half of the 21st century what women were to the last half of the 20th century,” says Eugene Steuerle, an economist at the Urban Institute.

There are a number of misconceptions about the quality and value of older workers. The Insights from Research box on pages 44 and 45, however, debunks many of these myths.

The Sociocultural Segment Sociocultural forces influence the values, beliefs, and lifestyles of a society. Examples include a higher percentage of women in the workforce, dual-income families, increases in the number of temporary workers, greater concern for healthy diets and physical fit- ness, greater interest in the environment, and postponement of having children. Such forces enhance sales of products and services in many industries but depress sales in others. The increased number of women in the workforce has increased the need for business clothing merchandise but decreased the demand for baking product staples (since people would have less time to cook from scratch). The health and fitness trend has helped industries that manufacture exercise equipment and healthful foods but harmed industries that produce unhealthful foods.

Increased educational attainment by women in the workplace has led to more women in upper-management positions.36 Given such educational attainment, it is hardly surprising that companies owned by women have been one of the driving forces of the U.S. econ- omy; these companies (now more than 9 million in number) account for 40 percent of all U.S. businesses and have generated more than $3.6 trillion in annual revenue. In addition, women have a tremendous impact on consumer spending decisions. Not surprisingly, many companies have focused their advertising and promotion efforts on female consumers.

The Political/Legal Segment Political processes and legislation influence environmental regulations with which indus- tries must comply.37,38 Some important elements of the political/legal arena include tort

demographic segment of the general environment genetic and observable characteristics of a population, including the levels and growth of age, density, sex, race, ethnicity, education, geographic region, and income.

sociocultural segment of the general environment the values, beliefs, and lifestyles of a society.

political/legal segment of the general environment how a society creates and exercises power, including rules, laws, and taxation policies.

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Overview People often think that older workers are less motivated and less healthy, resist change and are less trusting, and have more trouble balancing work and family. It turns out these assumptions just aren’t true. By challenging these stereotypes in your organization, you can keep your employees working.

What the Research Shows In a 2012 paper published by Personnel Psychology, research- ers from the University of Hong Kong and the University of Georgia examined 418 studies of workers’ ages and stereotypes. A meta-analysis—a study of studies—was conducted to find out if any of the six following stereotypes about older workers—as compared with younger workers—was actually true:

• They are less motivated. • They are less willing to participate in training and

career development. • They are more resistant to change. • They are less trusting. • They are less healthy. • They are more vulnerable to work-family imbalance.

After an exhaustive search of studies dealing with these issues, the investigators’ meta-analytic techniques turned up some interesting results. Older workers’ motivation and job involvement are actually slightly higher than those of younger workers. Older workers are slightly more willing to implement organizational changes, are not less trusting, and are not less healthy than younger workers. Moreover, they’re not more likely to have issues with work-family imbalance. Of the six investigated, the only stereotype sup- ported was that older workers are less willing to participate in training and career development.

Why This Matters Business leaders must pay attention to the circumstances of older workers. According to the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, 19.5 percent of American workers were 55 and older in 2010, but by 2020 25.2 percent will be 55 and older. Workers aged 25 to 44 should drop from 66.9 to 63.7 percent of the workforce during the same period. These statistics make clear that recruiting and training older workers remain critical.

When the findings of the meta-analysis are considered, the challenge of integrating older workers into the work- place becomes acute. The stereotypes held about older workers don’t hold water, but when older workers are sub- jected to them, they are more likely to retire and experi- ence a lower quality of life. Business leaders should attract,

retain, and encourage mature employees’ continued involve- ment in workplaces because they have much to offer in the ways of wisdom, experience, and institutional knowledge. The alternative is to miss out on a growing pool of valuable human capital.

How can you deal with age stereotypes to keep older workers engaged? The authors suggest three effective ways:

• Provide more opportunities for younger and older workers to work together.

• Promote positive attributes of older workers, like experience, carefulness, and punctuality.

• Engage employees in open discussions about stereotypes.

Adam Bradshaw of the DeGarmo Group Inc. has sum- marized research on addressing age stereotypes in the workplace and offers practical advice. For instance, make sure hiring practices identify factors important to the job other than age. Managers can be trained in how to spot age stereotypes and can point out to employees why the stereo- types are often untrue by using examples of effective older workers. Realize that older workers can offer a competitive advantage because of skills they possess that competitors may overlook.

Professor Tamara Erickson, who was named one of the top 50 global business thinkers in 2011, points out that mem- bers of different generations bring different experiences, assumptions, and benefits to the workforce. Companies can gain a great deal from creating a culture that welcomes workers of all ages and in which leaders address biases.

Key Takeaways • The percentage of American workers 55 years old

and older is expected to increase from 19.5 percent in 2010 to 25.2 percent in 2020.

• Many stereotypes exist about older workers. A review of 418 studies reveals these stereotypes are largely unfounded.

• Older workers subjected to negative stereotypes are more likely to retire and more likely to report lower quality of life and poorer health.

• When business leaders accept stereotypes about older workers, they lose out on these workers’ wisdom and experience. And by 2020 employers may have a smaller pool of younger workers than they do today.

• Solutions include creating opportunities for younger and older workers to work together and having frank, open discussions about stereotypes.

INSIGHTS from Research2.1

NEW TRICKS: RESEARCH DEBUNKS MYTHS ABOUT OLDER WORKERS

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Apply This Today The stereotypes people often hold about older workers are largely unfounded. Let’s face it: The labor force is aging, and astute companies can gain a great deal by attracting and retain- ing these valuable employees. Train your employees to accept colleagues of all ages—and the entire organization will benefit.

Research Reviewed Ng, T. W. H. & Feldman, D. C. 2012. Evaluating six com- mon stereotypes about older workers with meta-analytical data. Personnel Psychology, 65: 821–858. We thank Matthew Gilley, PhD, of businessminded.com for contributing this research brief.

reform, the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) of 1990, the repeal of the Glass-Steagall Act in 1999 (banks may now offer brokerage services), deregulation of utilities and other industries, and increases in the federally mandated minimum wage.39

Government legislation can also have a significant impact on the governance of corpora- tions. The U.S. Congress passed the Sarbanes-Oxley Act in 2002, which greatly increases the accountability of auditors, executives, and corporate lawyers. This act responded to the widespread perception that existing governance mechanisms failed to protect the interests of shareholders, employees, and creditors. Clearly, Sarbanes-Oxley has also created a tre- mendous demand for professional accounting services.

Legislation can also affect firms in the high-tech sector of the economy by expanding the number of temporary visas available for highly skilled foreign professionals.40 For example, a bill passed by the U.S. Congress in October 2000 allowed 195,000 H-1B visas for each of the following three years—up from a cap of 115,000. However, beginning in 2006 and continuing through 2015, the annual cap on H-1B visas has shrunk to only 65,000—with an additional 20,000 visas available for foreigners with a master’s or higher degree from a U.S. institution. Many of the visas are for professionals from India with computer and soft- ware expertise. In 2014, companies applied for 172,500 H-1B visas. This means that at least 87,500 engineers, developers, and others couldn’t take jobs in the United States.41 As one would expect, this is a political “hot potato” for industry executives as well as U.S. labor and workers’ rights groups. The key arguments against H-1B visas are that H-1B workers drive down wages and take jobs from Americans.

Strategy Spotlight 2.2 discusses recent U.S. legislation that requires companies to dis- close metals in their supply chain that are connected to war-torn regions.

The Technological Segment Developments in technology lead to new products and services and improve how they are produced and delivered to the end user.42 Innovations can create entirely new industries and alter the boundaries of existing industries.43 Technological developments and trends include genetic engineering, Internet technology, computer-aided design/computer-aided manufac- turing (CAD/CAM), research in artificial and exotic materials, and, on the downside, pollu- tion and global warming.44 Petroleum and primary metals industries spend significantly to reduce their pollution. Engineering and consulting firms that work with polluting industries derive financial benefits from solving such problems.

Nanotechnology is becoming a very promising area of research with many potentially useful applications.45 Nanotechnology takes place at industry’s tiniest stage: one-billionth of a meter. Remarkably, this is the size of 10 hydrogen atoms in a row. Matter at such a tiny scale behaves very differently. Familiar materials—from gold to carbon soot—display star- tling and useful new properties. Some transmit light or electricity. Others become harder than diamonds or turn into potent chemical catalysts. What’s more, researchers have found that a tiny dose of nanoparticles can transform the chemistry and nature of far bigger things.

technological segment of the general environment innovation and state of knowledge in industrial arts, engineering, applied sciences, and pure science; and their interaction with society.

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2.2 ETHICSSTRATEGY SPOTLIGHT THE CONFLICT MINERALS LEGISLATION: IMPLICATIONS FOR SUPPLY CHAIN MANAGEMENT In 2010, the United States Congress enacted Section 1502 of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act. The law requires companies to disclose whether any tin, tantalum, tungsten, or gold in their supply chain is connected to violent militia groups in the Congo or nine surrounding coun- tries, including Angola, Rwanda, and Sudan.

In a recent year, U.S. companies spent about $700 million and 6 million staff hours in efforts to comply with the rules to disclose “conflict minerals” in their supply chains, according to a study by Tulane University and Assent Compliance, a New York consulting firm. And, as of 2015, companies were required to hire outside auditors to evaluate their results.

With huge financial resources and manpower to conduct thorough examinations of their supply chains, several major technology firms including Microsoft, Apple, and Intel topped the list in terms of compliance with the law and in providing addi- tional information on their processes. But even Microsoft and Apple stated that they were “conflict indeterminable” last year. Intel claimed that its products were “conflict free”—and sent

employees to 90 mineral smelters around the world to gather that information.

Consider challenges associated with tracking tantalum—the hard blue-gray metal that is essential to firms’ ability to build smaller and lighter cellphones, laptops, hard drives and other devices. According to the U.S. Geological Survey, 12 percent of the world’s supply is in the Congo. However, to track the origin of the mineral, companies often have to dig four or five layers deep into their supply chain, as the mineral travels across the globe to various parts manufacturers.

The difficulty in complying with the legislation is further (and colorfully!) depicted by Chris Bayer, a consultant who studied recent reports filed with the SEC. Think about the challenges associated with tracking materials from more than 2 million small-scale or “subsistence” miners in the Eastern Congo who smelt small amounts of metals—and determining their links to guerrilla operations! He asserts, “It’s a herculean task [like trying to] apply modern supply-chain logistics to the equivalent of the 1849 California gold rush.”

Sources: Chasan, E. 2015. U.S. firms struggle to trace “conflict minerals.” www. wsj.com, August 3: np; Browning, L. 2015. Companies struggle to comply with rules on conflict materials. www.nytimes.com; and Shirodkar, S. M. & Ritter, S. E. 2016. Supply chain management and the conflict materials rules—action items for 2016. www.dlapiper.com, February 16: np.

Another emerging technology is physioletics, which is the practice of linking wearable computing devices with data analysis and quantified feedback to improve performance.46 An example is sensors in shoes (such as Nike+, used by runners to track distance, speed, and other metrics). Another application focuses on people’s movements in various work settings. Tesco’s employees, for instance, wear armbands at a distribution center in Ireland to track the goods they are gathering. The devices free up time that employees would oth- erwise spend marking clipboards. The armband also allots tasks to the wearer, forecasts his or her completion time, and quantifies the wearer’s precise movements among the facility’s 9.6 miles of shelving and 111 loading bays.

The Economic Segment The economy affects all industries, from suppliers of raw materials to manufacturers of finished goods and services, as well as all organizations in the service, wholesale, retail, government, and nonprofit sectors.47 Key economic indicators include interest rates, unem- ployment rates, the consumer price index, the gross domestic product, and net disposable income.48 Interest rate increases have a negative impact on the residential home construc- tion industry but a negligible (or neutral) effect on industries that produce consumer neces- sities such as prescription drugs or common grocery items.

Other economic indicators are associated with equity markets. Perhaps the most watched is the Dow Jones Industrial Average (DJIA), which is composed of 30 large industrial firms. When stock market indexes increase, consumers’ discretionary income rises and there is often an increased demand for luxury items such as jewelry and automobiles. But when stock valuations decrease, demand for these items shrinks.

economic segment of the general environment characteristics of the economy, including national income and monetary conditions.

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The Global Segment More firms are expanding their operations and market reach beyond the borders of their “home” country. Globalization provides both opportunities to access larger potential mar- kets and a broad base of production factors such as raw materials, labor, skilled managers, and technical professionals. However, such endeavors also carry many political, social, and economic risks.49

Examples of key elements include currency exchange rates, increasing global trade, the economic emergence of China, trade agreements among regional blocs (e.g., North American Free Trade Agreement, European Union), and the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) (lowering of tariffs).50 Increases in trade across national boundaries also provide benefits to air cargo and shipping industries but have a minimal impact on service industries such as bookkeeping and routine medical services.

A key factor in the global economy is the rapid rise of the middle class in emerging coun- tries. The number of consumers in Asia’s middle class is rapidly approaching the number in Europe and North America combined. An important implication of this trend is the dramatic change in hiring practices of U.S. multinationals. Consider:

Thirty-five U.S.-based multinational firms have recently added jobs faster than other U.S. employers, but nearly three-fourths of those jobs were overseas, according to a Wall Street Journal analysis. Those companies, which include Wal-Mart Stores Inc., International Paper Co., Honeywell International, Inc., and United Parcel Service, boosted their employment at home by 3.1 percent, or 113,000 jobs, at roughly the same rate of increase as the nation’s other employers. However, they also added more than 333,000 jobs in their far-flung—and faster growing—foreign operations.51

Relationships among Elements of the General Environment In our discussion of the general environment, we see many relationships among the vari- ous elements.52 For example, a demographic trend in the United States, the aging of the population, has important implications for the economic segment (in terms of tax policies to provide benefits to increasing numbers of older citizens). Another example is the emer- gence of information technology as a means to increase the rate of productivity gains in the United States and other developed countries. Such use of IT results in lower inflation (an important element of the economic segment) and helps offset costs associated with higher labor rates.

The effects of a trend or event in the general environment vary across industries. Governmental legislation (political/legal) to permit the importation of prescription drugs from foreign countries is a very positive development for drugstores but a very negative event for U.S. drug manufacturers. Exhibit 2.3 provides other examples of how the impact of trends or events in the general environment can vary across industries.

Data Analytics: A Technology That Affects Multiple Segments of the General Environment Before moving on, let’s consider Data Analytics (or, alternatively “Big Data”). Data analytics has been a leading and highly visible component of a broader technological phenomenon— the emergence of digital technology.53 Such technologies are altering the way business is being conducted in a broad variety of sectors—government, industry, academia, and commerce.

Corporations are increasingly collecting and analyzing data on their customers, includ- ing data on customer characteristics, purchasing patterns, employee productivity, and physi- cal asset utilization. These efforts, commonly referred to as “Big Data,” have the potential

data analytics The process of examining large data sets to uncover hidden patterns, market trends, and customer preferences.

global segment of the general environment influences from foreign countries, including foreign market opportunities, foreign- based competition, and expanded capital markets.

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Segment/Trends and Events Industry Positive Neutral Negative

Demographic

Aging population Health care ✓

Baby products ✓

Rising affluence Brokerage services ✓

Fast foods ✓

Upscale pets and supplies ✓

Sociocultural

More women in the workforce

Clothing ✓

Baking products (staples) ✓

Greater concern for health and fitness

Home exercise equipment ✓

Meat products ✓

Political/legal

Tort reform Legal services ✓

Auto manufacturing ✓

Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA)

Retail ✓

Manufacturers of elevators, escalators, and ramps

Technological

Genetic engineering Pharmaceutical ✓

Publishing ✓

Pollution/global warming Engineering services ✓

Petroleum ✓

Economic

Interest rate decreases Residential construction ✓

Most common grocery products

Global

Increasing global trade Shipping ✓

Personal service ✓

Emergence of China as an economic power

Soft drinks ✓

Defense ✓

EXHIBIT 2.3 The Impact of General Environmental Trends on Various Industries

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2.3 STRATEGY SPOTLIGHT HOW BIG DATA CAN MONITOR FEDERAL, STATE, AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT EXPENDITURES Open The Books is a new initiative that uses big data to make the work of city, state, and the federal government more trans- parent. It was founded in Illinois by Adam Andrzejewski, a big- data expert. He and his team have amassed the computing power to capture a great share of the federal checkbook’s ven- dor spending in the United States, as well as more than 48 states and many local governments.

Open The Books can also trace public salaries, pensions, and donations to political campaigns. Perhaps not too surprisingly, donors and subsidy recipients frequently turn out to be one of the same! Open The Books has created an app that can be quite revealing—the beauty school that receives more than 100 times in grants and student loans what it charges in tuition, and the $1.67 million in federally guaranteed loans received by the brother of a former Illinois director of agriculture.

Let’s take a closer look to see what Andrzejewski has uncovered in his study of expenditures by the state of Illinois. He found that it has been two years since Illinois state govern- ment had a full-year budget and more than 70,000 vendors are owed $8.2 billion. However, despite a deadlock by the legisla- ture and apparent fiscal insolvency, more than $50 billion has

been paid to providers and other entities during the 2016 fiscal year. Who are some of these recipients?

• Comptroller Leslie Munger paid a lobbyist $50,000 out of her budget. The lobbyist, Shea, Paige and Rogal, has garnered more than $370,000 in payments since 2009. A key executive is the chairman emeritus of the Republican Party.

• Since 2005, J. Walter Thompson (JWT), one of the world’s largest advertising agencies, has received $178.1 million.

• The Illinois Department of Transportation (IDOT) employs 1,133 civil engineers and 1,155 engineering technicians. Given this bank of talent, one might question why civil engineering firms such as ESI Consultants were paid $3.7 million, as well as other firms at large hourly rates.

• One could claim that IDOT engages in political patronage. On August 31, 2016, Munger paid $4.1 million in “performance bonuses” to 1,230 IDOT employees— members of the Teamsters. However, it may hardly be called a “performance bonus” because one of every two employees qualified for the pay enhancement.

As noted by Andrzejewski, “The Illinois credit ranking is the lowest of all 50 states. But the public patronage machine rolls on.”

Sources: Shales, A. 2015. Pulling down state credit ratings. Forbes, November 2: 52; and Andrzejewski, A. 2016. The $50 billion Illinois favor factory hums along. www.forbes.com, August 31: np.

to enable firms to better customize their product and service offerings to customers while more efficiently and fully using the resources of the company. For example, Pepsi used data analytics to develop an algorithm that lowers the rate of inventory stockouts and has shared the algorithm with its partners and retailers. Similarly, Kaiser Permanente collects petabytes of data on the health treatments of its 8 million health care members. This has allowed Kaiser to develop insights on the cost, efficacy, and safety of the treatments pro- vided by doctors and procedures in hospitals.

A recent survey by consultants NewVantage Partners has found that the number of U.S. firms using big data in the past three years has jumped to 63 percent. And 70 percent of firms now say that big data is of critical importance to their firms, a huge increase from 21 percent in 2012. Clearly, this is one of the fastest tech-adoption rates in history. Meanwhile, the title of chief data officer (the C-Suite executive of big data) did not exist until recently. Now, it is found in 54 percent of the firms that were surveyed.

Companies that are taking the lead in the analytics revolution see it as an important source of competitive differentiation. Recently, the MIT Center for Digital Business, along with research sponsor Capgemini Consulting, completed a two-year study. More than 400 compa- nies participated with the goal of determining which companies were attaining a “digital advan- tage” over industry peers with their use of analytics, social media, and mobile and embedded devices. The study found that companies that do more with digital technologies—and support such investments with leadership and governance mechanisms—are 26 percent more profitable than their industry peers, and outperform average industry performance by 6 to 9 percent.

Spotlight 2.3 is an example of how data analytics can play a key role in monitoring spend- ing in the public sector of the economy.

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THE COMPETITIVE ENVIRONMENT Managers must consider the competitive environment (also sometimes referred to as the task or industry environment). The nature of competition in an industry, as well as the profitability of a firm, is often directly influenced by developments in the competitive environment.

The competitive environment consists of many factors that are particularly relevant to a firm’s strategy. These include competitors (existing or potential), customers, and suppliers. Potential competitors may include a supplier considering forward integration, such as an automobile manufacturer acquiring a rental car company, or a firm in an entirely new indus- try introducing a similar product that uses a more efficient technology.

Next, we will discuss key concepts and analytical techniques that managers should use to assess their competitive environments. First, we examine Michael Porter’s five-forces model that illustrates how these forces can be used to explain an industry’s profitability.54 Second, we discuss how the five forces are being affected by the capabilities provided by Internet technologies. Third, we address some of the limitations, or “caveats,” that managers should be familiar with when conducting industry analysis. Finally, we address the concept of stra- tegic groups, because even within an industry it is often useful to group firms on the basis of similarities of their strategies. As we will see, competition tends to be more intense among firms within a strategic group than between strategic groups.

Porter’s Five Forces Model of Industry Competition The “five forces” model developed by Michael E. Porter has been the most commonly used analytical tool for examining the competitive environment. It describes the competitive envi- ronment in terms of five basic competitive forces:55

1. The threat of new entrants. 2. The bargaining power of buyers. 3. The bargaining power of suppliers. 4. The threat of substitute products and services. 5. The intensity of rivalry among competitors in an industry.

Each of these forces affects a firm’s ability to compete in a given market. Together, they determine the profit potential for a particular industry. The model is shown in Exhibit 2.4. A manager should be familiar with the five forces model for several reasons. It helps you decide whether your firm should remain in or exit an industry. It provides the rationale for increasing or decreasing resource commitments. The model helps you assess how to improve your firm’s competitive position with regard to each of the five forces.56 For example, you can use insights provided by the five forces model to understand how higher entry barriers discourage new rivals from competing with you.57 Or you can see how to develop strong relationships with your distribution channels. You may decide to find suppliers who satisfy the price/performance criteria needed to make your product or service a top performer.

Consider, for example, some of the competitive forces affecting the hotel industry.58 Airbnb, a room-sharing site, offers more rooms than even Marriott. Online travel agencies take a hefty cut of hotel bookings; and price-comparison sites make it difficult to raise room rates. Growing supply may make it harder still. Steven Kent of Goldman Sachs expects that the supply of new rooms in the next two years will outpace the previous five. Already, the previous growth of American occupancy rates has begun to slow.

The Threat of New Entrants The threat of new entrants refers to the possibility that the profits of established firms in the industry may be eroded by new competitors.59 The extent of the threat depends on existing barriers to entry and the combined reactions from existing

Porter’s five forces model of industry competition a tool for examining the industry-level competitive environment, especially the ability of firms in that industry to set prices and minimize costs.

LO 2-5 How forces in the competitive environment can affect profitability, and how a firm can improve its competitive position by increasing its power vis-à-vis these forces.

competitive environment factors that pertain to an industry and affect a firm’s strategies.

industry a group of firms that produce similar goods or services.

threat of new entrants the possibility that the profits of established firms in the industry may be eroded by new competitors.

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competitors.60 If entry barriers are high and/or the newcomer can anticipate a sharp retali- ation from established competitors, the threat of entry is low. These circumstances discour- age new competitors. There are six major sources of entry barriers.

Economies of Scale Economies of scale refers to spreading the costs of production over the number of units produced. The cost of a product per unit declines as the absolute volume per period increases. This deters entry by forcing the entrant to come in at a large scale and risk strong reaction from existing firms or come in at a small scale and accept a cost disad- vantage. Both are undesirable options.

Product Differentiation When existing competitors have strong brand identification and customer loyalty, product differentiation creates a barrier to entry by forcing entrants to spend heavily to overcome existing customer loyalties.

Capital Requirements The need to invest large financial resources to compete creates a barrier to entry, especially if the capital is required for risky or unrecoverable up-front adver- tising or research and development (R&D).

Switching Costs A barrier to entry is created by the existence of one-time costs that the buyer faces when switching from one supplier’s product or service to another.

Access to Distribution Channels The new entrant’s need to secure distribution for its prod- uct can create a barrier to entry.

Cost Disadvantages Independent of Scale Some existing competitors may have advantages that are independent of size or economies of scale. These derive from:

• Proprietary products • Favorable access to raw materials • Government subsidies • Favorable government policies

economies of scale decreases in cost per unit as absolute output per period increases.

product differentiation the degree to which a product has strong brand loyalty or customer loyalty.

switching costs one-time costs that a buyer/supplier faces when switching from one supplier/buyer to another.

Sources: From Michael E. Porter, “The Five Competitive Forces That Shape Strategy,” Special Issue on HBS Centennial. Harvard Business Review 86, No. 1 (January 2008), 78–93. Reprinted with permission of Michael E. Porter.

EXHIBIT 2.4 Porter’s Five Forces Model of Industry Competition

Threat of substitute products

or services

Threat of new entrants

Bargaining power of buyers

Bargaining power of suppliers INDUSTRY

COMPETITORS

Rivalry among Existing Firms

SUPPLIERS

SUBSTITUTES

BUYERS

POTENTIAL ENTRANTS

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Managers often tend to overestimate the barriers of entry in many industries. There are any number of cases where new entrants found innovative ways to enter industries by clev- erly mixing and matching existing technologies. For example, companies, medical research- ers, governments, and others are creating breakthrough technology products without having to create any new technology.61 Geoff Colvin, a senior editor at Fortune, calls this “the era of Lego Innovation,” in which significant and valuable advances in technology can be achieved by imaginatively combining components and software available to everyone. Such a trend serves to reduce entry barriers in many industries because state-of-the-art technology does not have to be developed internally—rather, it is widely available and, Colvin asserts, “we all have access to a really big box of plastic bricks.” Consider a few examples:

MIT’s Media Lab has created robots powered by Android smartphones. After all, those devices can see, hear, recognize speech, and talk; they know where they are, how they’re oriented, and how fast they’re moving. And, through apps and an Internet connection, they can do a nearly infinite number of other tasks, such as recognize faces and translate languages. Similarly, teams at the University of South Carolina combined off-the-shelf eye- tracking technology with simple software they wrote to detect whether a driver was getting drowsy; any modern car has enough computing power to handle this job easily.

The Bargaining Power of Buyers Buyers threaten an industry by forcing down prices, bar- gaining for higher quality or more services, and playing competitors against each other. These actions erode industry profitability.62 The power of each large buyer group depends on attributes of the market situation and the importance of purchases from that group com- pared with the industry’s overall business. A buyer group is powerful when:

• It is concentrated or purchases large volumes relative to seller sales. If a large percentage of a supplier’s sales are purchased by a single buyer, the importance of the buyer’s business to the supplier increases. Large-volume buyers also are powerful in industries with high fixed costs (e.g., steel manufacturing).

• The products it purchases from the industry are standard or undifferentiated. Confident they can always find alternative suppliers, buyers play one company against the other, as in commodity grain products.

• The buyer faces few switching costs. Switching costs lock the buyer to particular sellers. Conversely, the buyer’s power is enhanced if the seller faces high switching costs.

• It earns low profits. Low profits create incentives to lower purchasing costs. On the other hand, highly profitable buyers are generally less price-sensitive.

• The buyers pose a credible threat of backward integration. If buyers either are partially integrated or pose a credible threat of backward integration, they are typically able to secure bargaining concessions.

• The industry’s product is unimportant to the quality of the buyer’s products or services. When the quality of the buyer’s products is not affected by the industry’s product, the buyer is more price-sensitive.

At times, a firm or set of firms in an industry may increase its buyer power by using the services of a third party. FreeMarkets Online is one such third party.63 Pittsburgh-based FreeMarkets has developed software enabling large industrial buyers to organize online auc- tions for qualified suppliers of semistandard parts such as fabricated components, packag- ing materials, metal stampings, and services. By aggregating buyers, FreeMarkets increases the buyers’ bargaining power. The results are impressive. In its first 48 auctions, most par- ticipating companies saved over 15 percent; some saved as much as 50 percent.

Strategy Spotlight 2.4 discusses why Apple, Inc., has such powerful bargaining power when they negotiate rental space in malls.

bargaining power of buyers the threat that buyers may force down prices, bargain for higher quality or more services, and play competitors against each other.

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2.4 STRATEGY SPOTLIGHT APPLE FLEXES ITS MUSCLE WHEN IT COMES TO NEGOTIATING RENTAL RATES FOR ITS STORES IN MALLS Not all stores in a mall are created equal. Apple’s enormous gravitational pull on mall traffic distorts the market for mall rents and helps win the iPhone maker sweetheart deals. Apple draws in so many shoppers that its stores can single-handedly lift sales by 10 percent at the malls in which they operate, according to Green Street Advisors, a real estate research firm. In fact, Apple accounts for as much as 33 percent of total sales in some of the New England malls in which it operates.

Apple has used its bargaining power to pay no more than 2 percent of its sales a square foot in rent. That compares very favorably with a typical tenant, which pays as much as 15 percent, according to industry executives. In addition to paying a lower

percentage of sales for rent, Apple does not pay additional rent if their sales exceed a particular level—a luxury not afforded other retail tenants.

Apple opened its first two retail stores in 2001 at Tysons Corner Center in McClean, Virginia, and in the Glendale Galleria in Glendale, California. As of 2016, it had more than 450 stores in the United States and more than 18 other countries. In addi- tion, it plans to open 25 new stores in China by 2017, bring- ing its total to 40 in that country. Although the stores account for about only 12 percent of Apple’s total revenues, they draw about 1 million visitors a day. Fun fact: That is more than all of the Disney theme parks in the world combined!

Sources: Kapner, S. 2015. Apple stores upend the mall business. The Wall Street Journal, March 11: B1 and B4; and Farfan, B. 2016. Apple computer retail stores global locations. www.the balance.com, October 12: np.

The Bargaining Power of Suppliers Suppliers can exert bargaining power by threatening to raise prices or reduce the quality of purchased goods and services. Powerful suppliers can squeeze the profitability of firms so far that they can’t recover the costs of raw material inputs.64 The factors that make suppliers powerful tend to mirror those that make buyers powerful. A supplier group will be powerful when:

• The supplier group is dominated by a few companies and is more concentrated (few firms dominate the industry) than the industry it sells to. Suppliers selling to fragmented industries influence prices, quality, and terms.

• The supplier group is not obliged to contend with substitute products for sale to the industry. The power of even large, powerful suppliers can be checked if they compete with substitutes.

• The industry is not an important customer of the supplier group. When suppliers sell to several industries and a particular industry does not represent a significant fraction of its sales, suppliers are more prone to exert power.

• The supplier’s product is an important input to the buyer’s business. When such inputs are important to the success of the buyer’s manufacturing process or product quality, the bargaining power of suppliers is high.

• The supplier group’s products are differentiated, or it has built up switching costs for the buyer. Differentiation or switching costs facing the buyers cut off their options to play one supplier against another.

• The supplier group poses a credible threat of forward integration. This provides a check against the industry’s ability to improve the terms by which it purchases.

The formation of Delta Pride Catfish is an example of the power a group of suppliers can attain if they exercise the threat of forward integration.65 Catfish farmers in Mississippi historically supplied their harvest to processing plants run by large agribusiness firms such as ConAgra and Farm Fresh. When the farmers increased their production of catfish in response to growing demand, they found, much to their chagrin, that processors were holding back on their plans to increase their processing capabilities in hopes of higher retail prices for catfish.

bargaining power of suppliers the threat that suppliers may raise prices or reduce the quality of purchased goods and services.

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What action did the farmers take? About 120 of them banded together and formed a cooperative, raised $4.5 million, and constructed their own processing plant, which they supplied themselves. ConAgra’s market share quickly dropped from 35 percent to 11 percent, and Farm Fresh’s market share fell by over 20 percent. Within 10 years, Delta Pride controlled over 40 percent of the U.S. catfish market. Recently, Delta Pride changed its ownership structure and became a closely-held corporation. In 2014, it had revenues of $80 million, employed 600 people, and processed 80 million pounds of catfish.

The Threat of Substitute Products and Services All firms within an industry compete with industries producing substitute products and services.66 Substitutes limit the potential returns of an industry by placing a ceiling on the prices that firms in that industry can prof- itably charge. The more attractive the price/performance ratio of substitute products, the tighter the lid on an industry’s profits.

Identifying substitute products involves searching for other products or services that can perform the same function as the industry’s offerings. This may lead a manager into busi- nesses seemingly far removed from the industry. For example, the airline industry might not consider video cameras much of a threat. But as digital technology has improved and wire- less and other forms of telecommunication have become more efficient, teleconferencing has become a viable substitute for business travel. That is, the rate of improvement in the price–performance relationship of the substitute product (or service) is high.

Consider the case of hybrid cars as a substitute for gasoline-powered cars.67 Hybrid cars, such as the Toyota Prius, have seen tremendous success since the first hybrids were introduced in the late 1990s. Yet the market share of hybrid cars has been consistently low—reaching 2.4 percent in 2009, rising to 3.3 percent (the peak) in 2013, and declining to only 2 percent in 2016. Such results are even more surprising given that the number of models more than doubled between 2009 and 2014—24 to 51. That’s more choices, but fewer takers. While some may believe the hybrid car industry feels pressure from other novel car segments such as electric cars (e.g., Nissan Leaf), the primary competition comes from an unusual suspect: plain old gas combustion cars.

The primary reason many environmental and cost-conscious consumers prefer gasoline- powered over hybrid cars is rather simple. Engines of gasoline-powered cars have increasingly challenged the key selling attribute of hybrid cars: fuel economy. While hybrid cars still slightly outcompete modern gasoline cars in terms of fuel economy, consumers increasingly don’t see the value of paying as much as $6,000 extra for a hybrid car when they can get around 40 mpg in a gasoline car such as the Chevrolet Cruz or Hyundai Elantra.

The Intensity of Rivalry among Competitors in an Industry Firms use tactics like price competition, advertising battles, product introductions, and increased customer service or warranties. Rivalry occurs when competitors sense the pressure or act on an opportunity to improve their position.68

Some forms of competition, such as price competition, are typically highly destabilizing and are likely to erode the average level of profitability in an industry.69 Rivals easily match price cuts, an action that lowers profits for all firms. On the other hand, advertising bat- tles expand overall demand or enhance the level of product differentiation for the benefit of all firms in the industry. Rivalry, of course, differs across industries. In some instances it is characterized as warlike, bitter, or cutthroat, whereas in other industries it is referred to as polite and gentlemanly. Intense rivalry is the result of several interacting factors, including the following:

• Numerous or equally balanced competitors. When there are many firms in an industry, the likelihood of mavericks is great. Some firms believe they can make moves without being noticed. Even when there are relatively few firms, and they are nearly equal in size and resources, instability results from fighting among companies having the resources for sustained and vigorous retaliation.

threat of substitute products and services the threat of limiting the potential returns of an industry by placing a ceiling on the prices that firms in that industry can profitably charge without losing too many customers to substitute products.

intensity of rivalry among competitors in an industry the threat that customers will switch their business to competitors within the industry.

substitute products and services products and services outside the industry that serve the same customer needs as the industry’s products and services.

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• Slow industry growth. Slow industry growth turns competition into a fight for market share, since firms seek to expand their sales.

• High fixed or storage costs. High fixed costs create strong pressures for all firms to increase capacity. Excess capacity often leads to escalating price cutting.

• Lack of differentiation or switching costs. Where the product or service is perceived as a commodity or near commodity, the buyer’s choice is typically based on price and service, resulting in pressures for intense price and service competition. Lack of switching costs, described earlier, has the same effect.

• Capacity augmented in large increments. Where economies of scale require that capacity must be added in large increments, capacity additions can be very disruptive to the industry supply/demand balance.

• High exit barriers. Exit barriers are economic, strategic, and emotional factors that keep firms competing even though they may be earning low or negative returns on their investments. Some exit barriers are specialized assets, fixed costs of exit, strategic interrelationships (e.g., relationships between the business units and others within a company in terms of image, marketing, shared facilities, and so on), emotional barriers, and government and social pressures (e.g., governmental discouragement of exit out of concern for job loss).

Rivalry between firms is often based solely on price, but it can involve other factors. Consider, for example, the intense competition between Uber Technologies Inc. and Lyft Inc., which are engaged in a fierce, ongoing battle in the taxi industry:70

The bitter war between Uber and Lyft has spilled into dozens of cities where they are racing to provide the default app for summoning a ride within minutes. The two rivals are busy undercutting each other’s prices, poaching drivers, and co-opting innovations. These actions have increasingly blurred the lines between the two services.

The potential market for these firms may stretch far beyond rides. Investors who have bid up the value of Uber to over $69 billion in August 2016 are betting that it can expand into becoming the backbone of a logistics and delivery network for various services—a type of FedEx for cities.

The recruitment of drivers is the lifeblood for the services as they attempt to build the largest networks with the fastest pickup times. For example, many Uber drivers are motivated to poach Lyft’s drivers in order to get a bounty—$500 for referring a Lyft driver and $1,000 for referring a Lyft “mentor,” an experienced Lyft contractor who helps train new drivers.

In June 2014, another shot over the bow took place when both companies unveiled similar carpooling services within hours of each other. Lyft Line and Uber Pool let passengers ride with strangers and split the bill—lowering the cost of regular commutes. Lyft claims that it had been developing the carpooling model for several years and acquired a team to lead the effort months ago, according to John Zimmer, Lyft’s president. He adds, “I think it’s flattering when other companies look at how we’re innovating and want to do similar things.”

Exhibit 2.5 summarizes our discussion of industry five-forces analysis. It points out how various factors, such as economies of scale and capital requirements, affect each “force.”

How the Internet and Digital Technologies Are Affecting the Five Competitive Forces The Internet is having a significant impact on nearly every industry. Internet-based and digi- tal technologies have fundamentally changed the ways businesses interact with each other and with consumers. In most cases, these changes have affected industry forces in ways that have created many new strategic challenges. In this section, we will evaluate Michael Porter’s five-forces model in terms of the actual use of the Internet and the new technologi- cal capabilities that it makes possible.

The Threat of New Entrants In most industries, the threat of new entrants has increased because digital and Internet-based technologies lower barriers to entry. For example,

LO 2-6 How the Internet and digitally based capabilities are affecting the five competitive forces and industry profitability.

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Threat of New Entrants Is High When: High Low

Economies of scale are X

Product differentiation is X

Capital requirements are X

Switching costs are X

Incumbent’s control of distribution channels is

X

Incumbent’s proprietary knowledge is

X

Incumbent’s access to raw materials is

X

Incumbent’s access to government subsidies is

X

Power of Buyers Is High When: High Low

Concentration of buyers relative to suppliers is

X

Switching costs are X

Product differentiation of suppliers is

X

Threat of backward integration by buyers is

X

Extent of buyer’s profits is X

Importance of the supplier’s input to quality of buyer’s final product is

X

Power of Suppliers Is High When: High Low

Concentration relative to buyer industry is

X

Availability of substitute products is

X

Importance of customer to the supplier is

X

Differentiation of the supplier’s products and services is

X

Switching costs of the buyer are X

Threat of forward integration by the supplier is

X

Threat of Substitute Products Is High When: High Low

Differentiation of the substitute product is

X

Rate of improvement in price– performance relationship of substitute product is

X

Intensity of Competitive Rivalry Is High When: High Low

Number of competitors is X

Industry growth rate is X

Fixed costs are X

Storage costs are X

Product differentiation is X

Switching costs are X

Exit barriers are X

Strategic stakes are X

EXHIBIT 2.5 Competitive Analysis Checklist

businesses that reach customers primarily through the Internet may enjoy savings on other traditional expenses such as office rent, sales-force salaries, printing, and postage. This may encourage more entrants who, because of the lower start-up expenses, see an opportunity to capture market share by offering a product or performing a service more efficiently than existing competitors. Thus, a new cyber entrant can use the savings provided by the Internet to charge lower prices and compete on price despite the incumbent’s scale advantages.

Alternatively, because digital technologies often make it possible for young firms to pro- vide services that are equivalent or superior to an incumbent, a new entrant may be able to serve a market more effectively, with more personalized services and greater attention to

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product details. A new firm may be able to build a reputation in its niche and charge premium prices. By so doing, it can capture part of an incumbent’s business and erode profitability.

Another potential benefit of web-based business is access to distribution channels. Manufacturers or distributors that can reach potential outlets for their products more effi- ciently by means of the Internet may enter markets that were previously closed to them. Access is not guaranteed, however, because strong barriers to entry exist in certain industries.71

The Bargaining Power of Buyers The Internet and wireless technologies may increase buyer power by providing consumers with more information to make buying decisions and by lowering switching costs. But these technologies may also suppress the power of tradi- tional buyer channels that have concentrated buying power in the hands of a few, giving buy- ers new ways to access sellers. To sort out these differences, let’s first distinguish between two types of buyers: end users and buyer channel intermediaries.

End users are the final customers in a distribution channel. Internet sales activity that is labeled “B2C”—that is, business-to-consumer—is concerned with end users. The Internet is likely to increase the power of these buyers for several reasons. First, the Internet provides large amounts of consumer information. This gives end users the information they need to shop for quality merchandise and bargain for price concessions. Second, an end user’s switching costs are potentially much lower because of the Internet. Switching may involve only a few clicks of the mouse to find and view a competing product or service online.

In contrast, the bargaining power of distribution channel buyers may decrease because of the Internet. Buyer channel intermediaries are the wholesalers, distributors, and retailers who serve as intermediaries between manufacturers and end users. In some industries, they are dominated by powerful players that control who gains access to the latest goods or the best merchandise. The Internet and wireless communications, however, make it much easier and less expensive for businesses to reach customers directly. Thus, the Internet may increase the power of incumbent firms relative to that of traditional buyer channels. Strategy Spotlight 2.5 illustrates some of the changes brought on by the Internet that have affected the legal services industry.

The Bargaining Power of Suppliers Use of the Internet and digital technologies to speed up and streamline the process of acquiring supplies is already benefiting many sectors of the economy. But the net effect of the Internet on supplier power will depend on the nature of competition in a given industry. As with buyer power, the extent to which the Internet is a benefit or a detriment also hinges on the supplier’s position along the supply chain.

The role of suppliers involves providing products or services to other businesses. The term “B2B”—that is, business-to-business—often refers to businesses that supply or sell to other businesses. The effect of the Internet on the bargaining power of suppliers is a double-edged sword. On the one hand, suppliers may find it difficult to hold on to customers because buyers can do comparative shopping and price negotiations so much faster on the Internet.

On the other hand, several factors may also contribute to stronger supplier power. First, the growth of new web-based business may create more downstream outlets for suppliers to sell to. Second, suppliers may be able to create web-based purchasing arrangements that make purchasing easier and discourage their customers from switching. Online procure- ment systems directly link suppliers and customers, reducing transaction costs and paper- work.72 Third, the use of proprietary software that links buyers to a supplier’s website may create a rapid, low-cost ordering capability that discourages the buyer from seeking other sources of supply. Amazon.com, for example, created and patented One-Click purchasing technology that speeds up the ordering process for customers who enroll in the service.73

Finally, suppliers will have greater power to the extent that they can reach end users directly without intermediaries. Previously, suppliers often had to work through intermediaries who brought their products or services to market for a fee. But a process known as disinterme- diation is removing the organizations or business process layers responsible for intermediary

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58 PART 1 :: STRATEGIC ANALYSIS

2.5 STRATEGY SPOTLIGHT BUYER POWER IN LEGAL SERVICES: THE ROLE OF THE INTERNET The $276 billion U.S. legal services industry, which includes about 180,000 firms, historically was a classic example of an industry that leaves buyers at a bargaining disadvantage. One of the key reasons for the strong bargaining position of law firms is high information asymmetry between lawyers and consumers, meaning that highly trained and experienced legal professionals know more about legal matters than the average consumer of legal services.

The Internet provides an excellent example of how unequal bargaining power can be reduced by decreasing information asymmetry. A new class of Internet legal services providers tries to accomplish just that and is challenging traditional law services along the way. For instance, LawPivot.com, a recent start-up backed by Google Ventures and cofounded by a former

top Apple Inc. lawyer, allows consumers to interact with law- yers on a social networking site. This service allows customers to get a better picture of a lawyer’s legal skills before opening their wallets. As a result, information asymmetry between law- yers and consumers is reduced and customers find themselves in a better bargaining position. Another example is LegalZoom. com, a service that helps consumers to create legal docu- ments. Customers familiar with LegalZoom.com may use their knowledge of the time and effort required to create legal docu- ments to challenge a lawyer’s fees for custom-crafted legal documents.

Sources: Anonymous. 2016. The size of the U.S. legal market: Shrinking piece of a bigger pie: An LEI Graphic. www.legalexecutiveinstitute.com, January 11: np; Jacobs, D. L. 2011. Google takes aim at lawyers. Forbes, August 8: np; Anonymous. 2011. Alternative law firms: Bargain briefs. The Economist, August 13: 64; and Anonymous. 2014. Legal services industry profile. First Research, August 25: np.

steps in the value chain of many industries.74 Just as the Internet is eliminating some business functions, it is creating an opening for new functions. These new activities are entering the value chain by a process known as reintermediation—the introduction of new types of inter- mediaries. Many of these new functions are affecting traditional supply chains. For example, delivery services are enjoying a boom because of the Internet. Many more consumers are choosing to have products delivered to their door rather than going out to pick them up.

The Threat of Substitutes Along with traditional marketplaces, the Internet has created a new marketplace and a new channel. In general, therefore, the threat of substitutes is height- ened because the Internet introduces new ways to accomplish the same tasks.

Consumers will generally choose to use a product or service until a substitute that meets the same need becomes available at a lower cost. The economies created by Internet technologies have led to the development of numerous substitutes for traditional ways of doing business.

Another example of substitution is in the realm of electronic storage. With expanded desktop computing, the need to store information electronically has increased dramatically. Until recently, the trend has been to create increasingly larger desktop storage capabilities and techniques for compressing information that create storage efficiencies. But a viable substitute has emerged: storing information digitally on the Internet. Companies such as Dropbox and Amazon Web Services are providing web-based storage that firms can access simply by leasing space online. Since these storage places are virtual, they can be accessed anywhere the web can be accessed. Travelers can access important documents and files without transporting them physically from place to place.

The Intensity of Competitive Rivalry Because the Internet creates more tools and means for competing, rivalry among competitors is likely to be more intense. Only those competi- tors that can use digital technologies and the web to give themselves a distinct image, create unique product offerings, or provide “faster, smarter, cheaper” services are likely to capture greater profitability with the new technology.

Rivalry is more intense when switching costs are low and product or service differen- tiation is minimized. Because the Internet makes it possible to shop around, it has “com- moditized” products that might previously have been regarded as rare or unique. Since the Internet reduces the importance of location, products that previously had to be sought out

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in geographically distant outlets are now readily available online. This makes competitors in cyberspace seem more equally balanced, thus intensifying rivalry.

The problem is made worse for marketers by the presence of shopping robots (“bots”) and infomediaries that search the web for the best possible prices. Consumer websites like mySimon seek out all the web locations that sell similar products and provide price com- parisons.75 Obviously, this focuses the consumer exclusively on price. Some shopping info- mediaries, such as CNET, not only search for the lowest prices on many different products but also rank the customer service quality of different sites that sell similarly priced items.76 Such infomediary services are good for consumers because they give them the chance to compare services as well as price. For businesses, however, they increase rivalry by consoli- dating the marketing message that consumers use to make a purchase decision into a few key pieces of information over which the selling company has little control.

Using Industry Analysis: A Few Caveats For industry analysis to be valuable, a company must collect and evaluate a wide variety of information. As the trend toward globalization accelerates, information on foreign markets as well as on a wider variety of competitors, suppliers, customers, substitutes, and potential new entrants becomes more critical. Industry analysis helps a firm not only to evaluate the profit potential of an industry but also to consider various ways to strengthen its position vis-à-vis the five forces. However, we’d like to address a few caveats.

First, managers must not always avoid low-profit industries (or low-profit segments in profitable industries).77 Such industries can still yield high returns for some players who pursue sound strategies. As an example, consider WellPoint Health Network (now Anthem, Inc.), a huge health care insurer:78

In 1986, WellPoint Health Network (when it was known as Blue Cross of California) suffered a loss of $160 million. That year, Leonard Schaeffer became CEO and challenged the conventional wisdom that individuals and small firms were money losers. (This was certainly “heresy” at the time—the firm was losing $5 million a year insuring 65,000 individuals!) However, by the early 1990s, the health insurer was leading the industry in profitability. The firm has continued to grow and outperform its rivals even during economic downturns. By 2016, its revenues and profits were over $80 billion and $2.5 billion, respectively.

Second, five-forces analysis implicitly assumes a zero-sum game, determining how a firm can enhance its position relative to the forces. Yet such an approach can often be shortsighted; that is, it can overlook the many potential benefits of developing constructive win–win relationships with suppliers and customers. Establishing long-term mutually beneficial rela- tionships with suppliers improves a firm’s ability to implement just-in-time (JIT) inventory systems, which let it manage inventories better and respond quickly to market demands. A recent study found that if a company exploits its powerful position against a supplier, that action may come back to haunt the company.79 Consider, for example, General Motors’ heavy-handed dealings with its suppliers:80

In 2014, GM was already locked in a public relations nightmare as a deadly ignition defect triggered the recall of over 2.5 million vehicles.81 At the same time, it was faced with another perception problem: poor supplier relations. GM is now considered the worst big automaker to deal with, according to a new survey of top suppliers in the car industry in the United States.

The annual survey, conducted by the automotive consultant group Planning Perspectives Inc., asks the industry’s biggest suppliers to rate the relationships with the six automakers that account for more than 85 percent of all cars and light trucks in the U.S. Those so-called “Tier 1” suppliers say GM is their least favorite big customer—less popular than even Chrysler, the unit of Fiat Chrysler Automobiles that had “earned” the dubious distinction since 2008.

The suppliers gave GM low marks on all kinds of measures, including its overall trustworthiness, its communication skills, and its protection of intellectual property. The suppliers also said that GM was the automaker least likely to allow them to raise prices to

zero-sum game a situation in which multiple players interact, and winners win only by taking from other players.

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recoup unexpected materials cost increases. In return, parts executives have said they tend to bring hot new technology to other carmakers first—certainly something that makes it more difficult for GM to compete in this hotly contested industry.

Third, the five-forces analysis also has been criticized for being essentially a static analy- sis. External forces as well as strategies of individual firms are continually changing the structure of all industries. The search for a dynamic theory of strategy has led to greater use of game theory in industrial organization economics research and strategy research.

Based on game-theoretic considerations, Brandenburger and Nalebuff recently introduced the concept of the value net,82 which in many ways is an extension of the five-forces analysis. It is illustrated in Exhibit 2.6. The value net represents all the players in the game and analyzes how their interactions affect a firm’s ability to generate and appropriate value. The vertical dimension of the net includes suppliers and customers. The firm has direct transactions with them. On the horizontal dimension are substitutes and complements, players with whom a firm interacts but may not necessarily transact. The concept of complementors is perhaps the single most important contribution of value net analysis and is explained in more detail below.

Complements typically are products or services that have a potential impact on the value of a firm’s own products or services. Those who produce complements are usually referred to as complementors.83 Powerful hardware is of no value to a user unless there is software that runs on it. Similarly, new and better software is possible only if the hardware on which it can be run is available. This is equally true in the video game industry, where the sales of game consoles and video games complement each other. Nintendo’s success in the early 1990s was a result of its ability to manage its relationship with its complementors. Nintendo built a security chip into the hardware and then licensed the right to develop games to outside firms. These firms paid a royalty to Nintendo for each copy of the game sold. The royalty revenue enabled Nintendo to sell game consoles at close to their cost, thereby increasing their market share, which, in turn, caused more games to be sold and more royalties to be generated.84

We would like to close this section with some recent insights from Michael Porter, the orig- inator of the five-forces analysis.85 He addresses two critical issues in conducting a good indus- try analysis, which will yield an improved understanding of the root causes of profitability: (1) choosing the appropriate time frame and (2) a rigorous quantification of the five forces.

complements products or services that have an impact on the value of a firm’s products or services.

EXHIBIT 2.6 The Value Net

SUBSTITUTORS

SUPPLIERS

CUSTOMERS

THE COMPANY COMPLEMENTORS Interactions between

players on the horizontal axis

Transactions between players on the vertical axis

Source: Adapted from “The Right Game: Use Game Theory Shape Strategy,” by A. Brandenburger and B. J. Nalebuff, Harvard Business Review July–August 1995.

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• Good industry analysis looks rigorously at the structural underpinnings of profitability. A first step is to understand the time horizon. One of the essential tasks in industry analysis is to distinguish short-term fluctuations from structural changes. A good guideline for the appropriate time horizon is the full business cycle for the particular industry. For most industries, a three- to five-year horizon is appropriate. However, for some industries with long lead times, such as mining, the appropriate horizon may be a decade or more. It is average profitability over this period, not profitability in any particular year, which should be the focus of analysis.

• The point of industry analysis is not to declare the industry attractive or unattractive but to understand the underpinnings of competition and the root causes of profitability. As much as possible, analysts should look at industry structure quantitatively, rather than be satisfied with lists of qualitative factors. Many elements of five forces can be quantified: the percentage of the buyer’s total cost accounted for by the industry’s product (to understand buyer price sensitivity); the percentage of industry sales required to fill a plant or operate a logistical network to efficient scale (to help assess barriers to entry); and the buyer’s switching cost (determining the inducement an entrant or rival must offer customers).

Strategic Groups within Industries In an industry analysis, two assumptions are unassailable: (1) No two firms are totally dif- ferent, and (2) no two firms are exactly the same. The issue becomes one of identifying groups of firms that are more similar to each other than firms that are not, otherwise known as strategic groups.86 This is important because rivalry tends to be greater among firms that are alike. Strategic groups are clusters of firms that share similar strategies. After all, is Target more concerned about Nordstrom or Walmart? Is Mercedes more concerned about Hyundai or BMW? The answers are straightforward.87

These examples are not meant to trivialize the strategic groups concept.88 Classifying an industry into strategic groups involves judgment. If it is useful as an analytical tool, we must exercise caution in deciding what dimensions to use to map these firms. Dimensions include breadth of product and geographic scope, price/quality, degree of vertical integration, type of distribution (e.g., dealers, mass merchandisers, private label), and so on. Dimensions should also be selected to reflect the variety of strategic combinations in an industry. For example, if all firms in an industry have roughly the same level of product differentiation (or R&D intensity), this would not be a good dimension to select.

What value is the strategic groups concept as an analytical tool? First, strategic groupings help a firm identify barriers to mobility that protect a group from attacks by other groups.89 Mobility bar- riers are factors that deter the movement of firms from one strategic position to another. For example, in the chainsaw industry, the major barriers protecting the high-quality/dealer-oriented group are technology, brand image, and an established network of servicing dealers.

The second value of strategic grouping is that it helps a firm identify groups whose com- petitive position may be marginal or tenuous. We may anticipate that these competitors may exit the industry or try to move into another group. In recent years in the retail department store industry, firms such as JCPenney and Sears have experienced extremely difficult times because they were stuck in the middle, neither an aggressive discount player like Walmart nor a prestigious upscale player like Neiman Marcus.

Third, strategic groupings help chart the future directions of firms’ strategies. Arrows ema- nating from each strategic group can represent the direction in which the group (or a firm within the group) seems to be moving. If all strategic groups are moving in a similar direc- tion, this could indicate a high degree of future volatility and intensity of competition. In the automobile industry, for example, the competition in the minivan and sport utility segments has intensified in recent years as many firms have entered those product segments.

LO 2-7 The concept of strategic groups and their strategy and performance implications.

strategic groups clusters of firms that share similar strategies.

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Fourth, strategic groups are helpful in thinking through the implications of each industry trend for the strategic group as a whole. Is the trend decreasing the viability of a group? If so, in what direction should the strategic group move? Is the trend increasing or decreasing entry barriers? Will the trend decrease the ability of one group to separate itself from other groups? Such analysis can help in making predictions about industry evolution. A sharp increase in interest rates, for example, tends to have less impact on providers of higher- priced goods (e.g., Porsches) than on providers of lower-priced goods (e.g., Chevrolet Cobalt), whose customer base is much more price-sensitive.

Exhibit 2.7 provides a strategic grouping of the worldwide automobile industry.90 The firms in each group are representative; not all firms are included in the mapping. We have identified five strategic groups. In the top left-hand corner are high-end luxury automakers that focus on a very narrow product market. Most of the cars produced by the members of this group cost well over $100,000. Some cost over twice that amount. The 2017 Ferrari California T starts at $210,843, and the 2017 Lamborghini Huracan will set you back $210,000 (in case you were wondering how to spend your employment signing bonus). Players in this market have a very exclusive clientele and face little rivalry from other strategic groups. At the other extreme, in the lower left-hand corner is a strategic group that has low-price/quality attributes and targets a narrow market. These players, Hyundai and Kia, limit competition from other strategic groups by pricing their products very low. The third group (near the middle) consists of firms high in product pricing/quality and average in their product-line breadth. The final group (at the far right) consists of firms with a broad range of products and multiple price points. These firms have entries that compete at both the lower end of the market (e.g., the Ford Focus) and the higher end (e.g., Chevrolet Corvette).

The auto market has been very dynamic and competition has intensified in recent years.91 For example, some players are going more upscale with their product offerings. In 2009, Hyundai introduced its Genesis, starting at $33,000. This brings Hyundai into direct competition with entries from other strategic groups such as Toyota’s Camry and Honda’s Accord. And, in 2010, Hyundai introduced the Equus model. It was priced at about $60,000 to compete directly with the Lexus 460 on price. To further intensify competition, some upscale brands are increasingly entering lower-priced segments. In 2014, Audi introduced

Note: Members of each strategic group are not exhaustive, only illustrative.

EXHIBIT 2.7 The World Automobile Industry: Strategic Groups

Chery Geely

Tata Motors

Hyundai Kia

HighLow

High

Low

Ferrari Lamborghini

Porsche

Mercedes BMW Audi

Toyota Ford

General Motors Chrysler Honda Nissan

Breadth of Product Line

Price

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ISSUE FOR DEBATE

Purdue University’s Innovative Idea: Income Share Agreements During the past decade, the cost of higher education in the United States has outpaced growth in personal income as well as cost of living increases. This has resulted in a rapid rise in student indebtedness, which many experts view as a looming crisis. Purdue University has responded to this crisis in an innovative way—allowing students to enroll in return for a fixed percentage of their future income.

Purdue University rolled out the “Back a Boiler” program in 2016, using a concept known as an income-share agreement, or ISA, that is available to rising juniors and seniors. The awards will begin at $5,000 and take into consideration a student’s cumulative debt. It is different from a typical loan because students would repay the debt based on a fixed rate linked to their expected income. In a sense, it may be viewed as a gamble that could save them thousands of dollars as compared to traditional loans. But it could also cost them far more if they land high-paying jobs.

To illustrate, a senior majoring in chemical engineering could sign a contract for $10,000 and pay 2.68 percent of her income over seven years, according to Purdue’s online calculator. On the other hand, a student planning to work in a less lucrative field such as comparative literature would shell out a larger portion of her paycheck with contracts lasting no longer than nine years. This is shorter than the federal-aid 10-year repayment plan that stretches out much longer if a borrower falls behind. And Purdue caps repayment at 2.5 times the value of the contract with the objective to plow returns into helping future students. As noted by Purdue University’s President Mitch Daniels, “Clearly there is an explosion in student debt and the default rate is a concern. That got me seriously thinking about this, not as replacement (for federal loans) but as a new option.”

A concern might be that only poor performing students would be more likely to be interested. However, Purdue’s plan to offer contracts tailored to individuals will help the school recoup the investment. Another issue is whether ISAs can compete with federal programs such as Pell Grants. One potential positive outcome: If the program takes off, students looking at contracts would see data on predicted earnings—thus, they may be inclined to choose majors that tend to produce more value.

Purdue structured the income shares to be similar to other forms of unsecured consumer debt. However, it has the added protection that has been extremely difficult to obtain with student loans: bankruptcy discharge. The foundation has put protections in place to account for hardship such as not requiring payments for graduates who earn less than $20,000 a year. However, if someone makes about that amount but fails to make payments—they will be pursued through debt collection.

Discussion Questions 1. Would you be interested in taking out an ISA? Why? Why not? 2. In general, what do you see as the main advantage (or disadvantage) of such a program? 3. Do you think it will become successful? And, if so, do you foresee a market for truly private

ISAs in the future?

Sources: Anonymous. 2016. The other debt-free college idea. The Wall Street Journal, April 17: np; Douglas-Gabriel, D. 2016. At Purdue, student aid based on future earnings could revolutionize college debt. www.washingtonpost.com, April: np; Belkin, D. 2015. Seeking options, college students sell their futures. Dallas Morning News, August 6: A3; and Anonymous. Income share agreements. www.purdue.edu undated.

the Q3 SUV at a base price of only $32,500. And BMW, with its 1-series, is another well- known example. Such cars, priced in the low $30,000s, compete more directly with prod- ucts from broad-line manufacturers like Ford, General Motors, and Toyota. This suggests that members of a strategic group can overcome mobility barriers and migrate to other groups that they find attractive if they are willing to commit time and resources.

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64 PART 1 :: STRATEGIC ANALYSIS

Our discussion would not be complete, of course, without paying some attention to recent entries in the automobile industry that will likely lead to the formation of a new stra- tegic group—placed at the bottom left corner of the grid in Exhibit 2.7. Three firms—China’s Zhejiang Geely Holding Company, China’s Chery Automobile Company, and India’s Tata Motors—have introduced models that bring new meaning to the term “subcompact.”92 Let’s take a look at these econoboxes.

Chery’s 2013 QQ model sells for between $6,083 and $8,170 in the Chinese market and sports horsepower in the range of only 51 to 74. Geely’s best-selling four-door sedan, the Free Cruiser, retails from $5,440 to $7,046. The firm has gone more upscale with some offerings, such as the GX7, a sports utility vehicle with a price starting at $14,910.

For low price-points, India’s Tata Motors has everyone beat by the proverbial mile. In January 2008, it introduced the Nano as the “World’s Cheapest Car,” with an astonishing retail price of only $2,500. It is a four-door, five-seat hatchback that gets 54 miles to the gallon (but this economy originally came with a 30 horsepower motor). Initially, it was a big hit in India. However, after sales peaked at about 80,000 units in 2011–2012, they crashed to only 21,000 units in 2013–2014. As noted by Girish Wagh, the man behind the Nano, “People started looking at Nano not as a low-cost innovation, but as a cheap car. This, among other factors, also hurt the chances.” Needless to say, Tata has made many attempts to make the car more upscale, with a correspondingly higher price.

Not surprisingly, some automakers have recently entered the Indian market with more desirable offerings. Several have offerings that are called compact sedans, but they are actually hatchbacks with a tiny trunk tacked on. These models include Suzuki’s Dzire, Honda’s Amaze, and Hyundai’s Xcent. Prices start at around $8,000, and with the added cachet of a sedan silhouette that adds only a few hundred dollars, these models have become very popular with Indian buyers. This niche is one of the few car segments that soared, while the country’s overall car market shrunk.

Reflecting on Career Implications . . . This chapter addresses the importance of the external environment for strategic managers. As a strategic manager, you should strive in your career to benefit from enhancing your awareness of your external environment. The questions below focus on these issues.

Creating the Environmentally Aware Organization: Advancing your career requires constant scanning, monitoring, and intelligence gathering not only to find future job opportunities but also to understand how employers’ expectations are changing. Consider using websites such as LinkedIn to find opportunities. Merely posting your résumé on a site such as LinkedIn may not be enough. Instead, consider in what ways you can use such sites for scanning, monitoring, and intelligence gathering.

SWOT Analysis: As an analytical method, SWOT analysis is applicable for individuals as it is for firms. It is important for you to periodically evaluate your strengths and weaknesses as well as potential opportunities and threats to your career. Such analysis should be followed by efforts

to address your weaknesses by improving your skills and capabilities.

General Environment: The general environment consists of several segments, such as the demographic, sociocultural, political/legal, technological, economic, and global environments. It would be useful to evaluate how each of these segments can affect your career opportunities. Identify two or three specific trends (e.g., rapid technological change, aging of the population, increase in minimum wages) and their impact on your choice of careers. These also provide possibilities for you to add value for your organization.

Five-Forces Analysis: Before you go for a job interview, consider the five forces affecting the industry within which the firm competes. This will help you to appear knowledgeable about the industry and increase your odds of landing the job. It also can help you to decide if you want to work for that organization. If the “forces” are unfavorable, the long-term profit potential of the industry may be unattractive, leading to fewer resources available and—all other things being equal— fewer career opportunities.

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Managers must analyze the external environment to minimize or eliminate threats and exploit opportunities. This involves a continuous process of environ- mental scanning and monitoring as well as obtaining competitive intelli gence on

present and potential rivals. These activities provide valuable inputs for developing forecasts. In addition, many firms use scenario planning to anticipate and respond to volatile and disruptive environmental changes.

We identified two types of environments: the general environment and the competitive environment. The six segments of the general environment are demographic, sociocultural, political/legal, technological, economic, and global. Trends and events occurring in these segments, such as the aging of the population, higher percentages of women in the workplace, governmental legislation, and increasing (or decreasing) interest rates, can have a dramatic effect on a firm. A given trend or event may have a positive impact on some industries and a negative, a neutral, or no impact on others.

The competitive environment consists of industry- related factors and has a more direct impact than the general environment. Porter’s five-forces model of industry analysis includes the threat of new entrants, buyer power, supplier power, threat of substitutes, and rivalry among competitors. The intensity of these factors determines, in large part, the average expected level of profitability in an industry. A sound awareness of such factors, both individually and in combination, is beneficial not only for deciding what industries to enter but also for assessing how a firm can improve its competitive position. We discuss how many of the changes brought about by the digital economy can be understood in the context of five-forces analysis. The limitations of five-forces analysis include its static nature and its inability to acknowledge the role of complementors. Although we addressed the general environment and competitive environment in separate sections, they are quite

interdependent. A given environmental trend or event, such as changes in the ethnic composition of a population or a technological innovation, typically has a much greater impact on some industries than on others.

The concept of strategic groups is also important to the external environment of a firm. No two organizations are completely different nor are they exactly the same. The question is how to group firms in an industry on the basis of similarities in their resources and strategies. The strategic groups concept is valuable for determining mobility barriers across groups, identifying groups with marginal competitive positions, charting the future directions of firm strategies, and assessing the implications of industry trends for the strategic group as a whole.

SUMMARY REVIEW QUESTIONS 1. Why must managers be aware of a firm’s external

environment? 2. What is gathering and analyzing competitive

intelligence, and why is it important for firms to engage in it?

3. Discuss and describe the six elements of the external environment.

4. Select one of these elements and describe some changes relating to it in an industry that interests you.

5. Describe how the five forces can be used to determine the average expected profitability in an industry.

6. What are some of the limitations (or caveats) in using five-forces analysis?

7. Explain how the general environment and industry environment are highly related. How can such interrelationships affect the profitability of a firm or industry?

8. Explain the concept of strategic groups. What are the performance implications?

summary

perceptual acuity 36 environmental scanning 37 environmental monitoring 37 competitive intelligence 38 environmental forecasting 38 scenario analysis 40

SWOT analysis 40 general environment 41 demographic segment of the general environment 43 sociocultural segment of the general environment 43 political/legal segment of the general environment 43 technological segment of the general environment 45 economic segment of the general environment 46

key terms

global segment of the general environment 47 data analytics 47 industry 50 competitive environment 50 Porter’s five-forces model of industry competition 50 threat of new entrants 50 economies of scale 51 product differentiation 51 switching cost 51 bargaining power of buyers 52

bargaining power of suppliers 53 threat of substitute products and services 54 substitute products and services 54 intensity of rivalry among competitors in an industry 54 zero-sum game 59 complements 60 strategic groups 61

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EXPERIENTIAL EXERCISE Select one of the following industries: personal computers, airlines, or automobiles. For this industry, evaluate the strength of each of Porter’s five forces as well as complementors.

Industry Force High? Medium? Low? Why?

1. Threat of new entrants

2. Power of buyers

3. Power of suppliers

4. Power of substitutes

5. Rivalry among competitors

6. Complementors

APPLICATION QUESTIONS & EXERCISES 1. Imagine yourself as the CEO of a large firm in an

industry in which you are interested. Please (1) identify major trends in the general environment, (2) analyze their impact on the firm, and (3) identify major sources of information to monitor these trends. (Use Internet and library resources.)

2. Analyze movements across the strategic groups in the U.S. retail industry. How do these movements within this industry change the nature of competition?

3. What are the major trends in the general environment that have impacted the U.S. pharmaceutical industry?

4. Go to the Internet and look up www.kroger.com. What are some of the five forces driving industry competition that are affecting the profitability of this firm?

ETHICS QUESTIONS 1. What are some of the legal and ethical issues involved

in collecting competitor intelligence in the following situations?

a. Hotel A sends an employee posing as a potential client to Hotel B to find out who Hotel B’s major corporate customers are.

b. A firm hires an MBA student to collect information directly from a competitor while claiming the information is for a course project.

c. A firm advertises a nonexistent position and interviews a rival’s employees with the intention of obtaining competitor information.

2. What are some of the ethical implications that arise when a firm tries to exploit its power over a supplier?

1. Nanton, N. & Dicks, J. W. 2013. Every entrepreneur’s biggest mistake (and how to avoid it!). www.fastcompany.com. May 21: np.

2. Schneider, J. & Hall, J. 2011. Can you hear me now? Harvard Business Review, 89(4): 23; Hornigan, J. 2009. Wireless Internet use—Mobile access to data and information. www.pewinternet.org, July 22: np; and Salemi Industries. 2012. Home page. www.salemiindustries.com, December 20: np.

3. Weber, G. W. 1995. A new paint job at PPG. BusinessWeek. November 13: 74-75.

4. Hamel, G. & Prahalad, C. K. 1994. Competing for the future. Boston: Harvard Business School Press.

5. Drucker, P. F. 1994. Theory of the business. Harvard Business Review, 72: 95–104.

6. For an insightful discussion on managers’ assessment of the external environment, refer to Sutcliffe, K. M. & Weber, K. 2003. The high cost of accurate knowledge. Harvard Business Review, 81(5): 74–86.

7. Merino, M. 2013. You can’t be a wimp: Making the tough calls. Harvard Business Review, 91(11): 73–78.

8. For insights on recognizing and acting on environmental opportunities, refer to Alvarez, S. A. & Barney, J. B. 2008. Opportunities, organizations, and entrepreneurship: Theory and debate. Strategic Entrepreneurship Journal, 2(3): entire issue.

9. Charitou, C. D. & Markides, C. C. 2003. Responses to disruptive strategic innovation. MIT Sloan Management Review, 44(2): 55–64.

10. Our discussion of scanning, monitoring, competitive intelligence, and forecasting concepts draws on several sources. These include Fahey, L. & Narayanan, V. K. 1983. Macroenvironmental analysis for strategic management. St. Paul, MN: West; Lorange, P., Scott, F. S., & Ghoshal, S. 1986. Strategic control. St. Paul, MN: West; Ansoff, H. I. 1984. Implementing strategic management. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall; and Schreyogg, G. & Stienmann, H. 1987. Strategic control: A new perspective. Academy of Management Review, 12: 91–103.

11. An insightful discussion on how leaders can develop “peripheral vision” in environmental scanning is found in Day, G. S. & Schoemaker, P. J. H. 2008. Are you a “vigilant leader”? MIT Sloan Management Review, 49(3): 43–51.

REFERENCES

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12. Elenkov, D. S. 1997. Strategic uncertainty and environmental scanning: The case for institutional influences on scanning behavior. Strategic Management Journal, 18: 287–302.

13. For an interesting perspective on environmental scanning in emerging economies, see May, R. C., Stewart, W. H., & Sweo, R. 2000. Environmental scanning behavior in a transitional economy, Evidence from Russia. Academy of Management Journal, 43(3): 403–427.

14. Bryon, E. 2010. For insight into P&G, check Olay numbers. Wall Street Journal, October 27: C1.

15. Tang, J. 2010. How entrepreneurs discover opportunities in China: An institutional view. Asia Pacific Journal of Management, 27(3): 461–480.

16. Walters, B. A. & Priem, R. L. 1999. Business strategy and CEO intelligence acquisition. Competitive Intelligence Review, 10(2): 15–22.

17. Prior, V. 1999. The language of competitive intelligence, Part 4. Competitive Intelligence Review, 10(1): 84–87.

18. Hill, K. 2011. The spy who liked me. Forbes, November 21: 56–57.

19. Wolfenson, J. 1999. The world in 1999: A battle for corporate honesty. The Economist, 38: 13–30.

20. Drucker, P. F. 1997. The future that has already happened. Harvard Business Review, 75(6): 22.

21. Downes, L. & Nunes, P. 2014. Big bang disruption. New York: Penguin.

22. Fahey & Narayanan, op. cit., p. 41.

23. Insights on how to improve predictions can be found in Cross, R., Thomas, R. J., & Light, D. A. 2009. The prediction lover’s handbook. MIT Sloan Management Review, 50(2): 32–34.

24. Courtney, H., Kirkland, J., & Viguerie, P. 1997. Strategy under uncertainty. Harvard Business Review, 75(6): 66–79.

25. Odlyzko, A. 2003. False hopes. Red Herring, March: 31.

26. Szczerba, R. J. 2015. 15 Worst tech predictions of all time. www.forbes. com. January 5: np; and, Dunn, M. 2016. Here are 20 of the worst predictions ever made about the future of tech. www.news.com.au. March 8: np.

27. Zweig, J. 2014. Lessons Learned from the year of shock. The Wall Street Journal, December 31: C1–C2.

28. For an interesting perspective on how Accenture practices and has developed its approach to scenario planning, refer to Ferguson, G., Mathur, S., & Shah, B. 2005. Evolving from information to insight. MIT Sloan Management Review, 46(2): 51–58.

29. The PPG example draws on: Camillus, J. C. 2008. Strategy as a wicked problem. Harvard Business Review, 86(5): 98-106; www.ppg.com; and, finance.yahoo.com.

30. Byrne, J. 2012. Great ideas are hard to come by. Fortune, April 7: 69 ff.

31. Dean, T. J., Brown, R. L., & Bamford, C. E. 1998. Differences in large and small firm responses to environmental context: Strategic implications from a comparative analysis of business formations. Strategic Management Journal, 19: 709–728.

32. Colvin, G. 2014. Four things that worry business. Fortune, October 27: 32.

33. Colvin, G. 1997. How to beat the boomer rush. Fortune, August 18: 59–63.

34. Porter, M. E. 2010. Discovering—and lowering—the real costs of health care. Harvard Business Review, 89(1/2): 49–50.

35. Farrell, C. 2014. Baby boomers’ latest revolution: Unretirement. Dallas Morning News, October 19: 4P.

36. Challenger, J. 2000. Women’s corporate rise has reduced relocations. Lexington (KY) Herald- Leader, October 29: D1.

37. Watkins, M. D. 2003. Government games. MIT Sloan Management Review, 44(2): 91–95.

38. A discussion of the political issues surrounding caloric content on meals is in Orey, M. 2008. A food fight over calorie counts. BusinessWeek, February 11: 36.

39. For a discussion of the linkage between copyright law and innovation, read Guterman, J. 2009. Does copyright law hinder innovation? MIT Sloan Management Review, 50(2): 14–15.

40. Davies, A. 2000. The welcome mat is out for nerds. BusinessWeek, May 21: 17; Broache, A. 2007. Annual H-1B visa cap met—already. news.cnet. com, April 3: np; and Anonymous.

Undated. Cap count for H-1B and H-2B workers for fiscal year 2009. www.uscis.gov: np.

41. Weise, K. 2014. How to hack the visa limit. Bloomberg Businessweek, May 26–June 1: 39–40.

42. Hout, T. M. & Ghemawat, P. 2010. China vs. the world: Whose technology is it? Harvard Business Review, 88(12): 94–103.

43. Business ready for Internet revolution. 1999. Financial Times, May 21: 17.

44. A discussion of an alternate energy— marine energy—is the topic of Boyle, M. 2008. Scottish power. Fortune, March 17: 28.

45. Baker, S. & Aston, A. 2005. The business of nanotech. BusinessWeek, February 14: 64–71.

46. Wilson, H. J. 2013. Wearables in the workplace. Harvard Business Review, 91(9): 22–25.

47. For an insightful discussion of the causes of the global financial crisis, read Johnson, S. 2009. The global financial crisis—What really precipitated it? MIT Sloan Management Review, 50(2): 16–18.

48. Tyson, L. D. 2011. A better stimulus for the U.S. economy. Harvard Business Review, 89(1/2): 53.

49. An interesting and balanced discussion on the merits of multinationals to the U.S. economy is found in Mandel, M. 2008. Multinationals: Are they good for America? BusinessWeek, March 10: 41–64.

50. Insights on risk perception across countries are addressed in Purda, L. D. 2008. Risk perception and the financial system. Journal of International Business Studies, 39(7): 1178–1196.

51. Thurm, S. 2012. U.S. firms add jobs, but mostly overseas. wsj.com, April 27: np.

52. Goll, I. & Rasheed, M. A. 1997. Rational decision-making and firm performance: The moderating role of environment. Strategic Management Journal, 18: 583–591.

53. Our discussion of data analytics draws on a variety of sources. These include: Kiron, D. 2013. From value to vision: Reimagining the possible with data analytics. MIT Sloan Management Review (Research Report), Spring: 3–19; Malone, M. S. 2016. The big-data future has arrived. The Wall Street Journal, February 23: A17; and Porter, M. E. &

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Heppelmann, J. E. 2015. How smart, connected products are transforming companies. Harvard Business Review, 93(10): 96– 114.

54. This discussion draws heavily on Porter, M. E. 1980. Competitive strategy: chap. 1. New York: Free Press.

55. Ibid. 56. Rivalry in the airline industry is

discussed in Foust, D. 2009. Which airlines will disappear in 2009? BusinessWeek, January 19: 46–47.

57. Fryer, B. 2001. Leading through rough times: An interview with Novell’s Eric Schmidt. Harvard Business Review, 78(5): 117–123.

58. Anonymous. 2015. No reservations. The Economist. November 21: 63.

59. For a discussion on the importance of barriers to entry within industries, read Greenwald, B. & Kahn, J. 2005. Competition demystified: A radically simplified approach to business strategy. East Rutherford, NJ: Portfolio.

60. A discussion of how the medical industry has erected entry barriers that have resulted in lawsuits is found in Whelan, D. 2008. Bad medicine. BusinessWeek, March 10: 86–98.

61. Colvin, G. 2014. Welcome to the era of Lego innovations (some assembly required). Fortune, April 14: 52.

62. Wise, R. & Baumgarter, P. 1999. Go downstream: The new profit imperative in manufacturing. Harvard Business Review, 77(5): 133–141.

63. Salman, W. A. 2000. The new economy is stronger than you think. Harvard Business Review, 77(6): 99– 106.

64. Mudambi, R. & Helper, S. 1998. The “close but adversarial” model of supplier relations in the U.S. auto industry. Strategic Management Journal, 19: 775–792.

65. Stevens, D. (vice president of Delta Pride Catfish, Inc.). 2014. personal communication: October 16; and Fritz, M. 1988. Agribusiness: Catfish story. Forbes, December 12: 37.

66. Trends in the solar industry are discussed in Carey, J. 2009. Solar: The sun will come out tomorrow. BusinessWeek, January 12: 51.

67. Edelstein, S. 2014. Could U.S. hybrid car sales be peaking already—and if so, why? greencarreports.com, June 16: np; Naughton, K. 2012. Hybrids’ unlikely rival: plain old cars. Bloomberg Businessweek, February 2: 23–24; Cobb, J. 2016. April 2016 dash board. www.hybridcars.com, May 4: np.

68. An interesting analysis of self- regulation in an industry (chemical) is in Barnett, M. L. & King, A. A. 2008. Good fences make good neighbors: A longitudinal analysis of an industry self-regulatory institution. Academy of Management Journal, 51(6): 1053–1078.

69. For an interesting perspective on the intensity of competition in the supermarket industry, refer to Anonymous. 2005. Warfare in the aisles. The Economist, April 2: 6–8.

70. Macmillan, D. 2014. Tech’s fiercest rivalry: Uber vs. Lyft. online.wsj.com, August 11: np; Divine, J. 2016. Uber IPO: Losing luster after a $1.2 billion loss. www.usnews.com, August 29: np.

71. For an interesting perspective on changing features of firm boundaries, refer to Afuah, A. 2003. Redefining firm boundaries in the face of the Internet: Are firms really shrinking? Academy of Management Review, 28(1): 34–53.

72. Time to rebuild. 2001. The Economist, May 19: 55–56.

73. www.amazon.com. 74. For more on the role of the Internet

as an electronic intermediary, refer to Carr, N. G. 2000. Hypermediation: Commerce as clickstream. Harvard Business Review, 78(1): 46–48.

75. www.mysimon.com; and www. pricescan.com.

76. www.cnet.com; and www.bizrate.com. 77. For insights into strategies in a low-

profit industry, refer to Hopkins, M. S. 2008. The management lessons of a beleaguered industry. MIT Sloan Management Review, 50(1): 25–31.

78. Foust, D. 2007. The best performers. BusinessWeek, March 26: 58–95; Rosenblum, D., Tomlinson, D., & Scott, L. 2003. Bottom-feeding for blockbuster businesses. Harvard Business Review, 81(3): 52–59; Paychex 2006 Annual Report; and WellPoint Health Network 2005 Annual Report.

79. Kumar, N. 1996. The power of trust in manufacturer-retailer relationship. Harvard Business Review, 74(6): 92–110.

80. Welch, D. 2006. Renault-Nissan: Say hello to Bo. BusinessWeek, July 31: 56–57.

81. Kelleher, J. B. 2014. GM ranked worst automaker by U.S. suppliers— survey. finance.yahoo.com, May 12: np; and Welch, D. 2006. Renault-Nissan: Say hello to Bo. BusinessWeek, July 31: 56–57.

82. Brandenburger, A. & Nalebuff, B. J. 1995. The right game: Use game theory to shape strategy. Harvard Business Review, 73(4): 57–71.

83. For a scholarly discussion of complementary assets and their relationship to competitive advantage, refer to Stieglitz, N. & Heine, K. 2007. Innovations and the role of complementarities in a strategic theory of the firm. Strategic Management Journal, 28(1): 1–15.

84. A useful framework for the analysis of industry evolution has been proposed by Professor Anita McGahan of Boston University. Her analysis is based on the identification of the core activities and the core assets of an industry and the threats they face. She suggests that an industry may follow one of four possible evolutionary trajectories— radical change, creative change, intermediating change, or progressive change—based on these two types of threats of obsolescence. Refer to McGahan, A. M. 2004. How industries change. Harvard Business Review, 82(10): 87–94.

85. Porter, M. I. 2008. The five competitive forces that shape strategy. Harvard Business Review, 86(1): 79–93.

86. Peteraf, M. & Shanley, M. 1997. Getting to know you: A theory of strategic group identity. Strategic Management Journal, 18 (Special Issue): 165–186.

87. An interesting scholarly perspective on strategic groups may be found in Dranove, D., Perteraf, M., & Shanley, M. 1998. Do strategic groups exist? An economic framework for analysis. Strategic Management Journal, 19(11): 1029– 1044.

88. For an empirical study on strategic groups and predictors of performance, refer to Short, J. C., Ketchen, D. J., Jr., Palmer, T. B., & Hult, T. M. 2007. Firm, strategic group, and industry influences on performance. Strategic Management Journal, 28(2): 147–167.

89. This section draws on several sources, including Kerwin, K. R. & Haughton, K. 1997. Can Detroit make cars that baby boomers like? BusinessWeek, December 1: 134–148; and Taylor, A., III. 1994. The new golden age of autos. Fortune, April 4: 50–66.

90. Csere, C. 2001. Supercar supermarket. Car and Driver, January: 118– 127.

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91. For a discussion of the extent of overcapacity in the worldwide automobile industry, read Roberts, D., Matlack, C., Busyh, J., & Rowley, I. 2009. A hundred factories too many. BusinessWeek, January 19: 42–43.

92. McLain, S. 2014. India’s middle class embraces minicars. The Wall Street

Journal, October 9: B2; Anonymous. 2014. Geely GX7 launched after upgrading: Making versatile and comfortable SUV. www.globaltimes. ch, April 18: np; Anonymous. 2014. Adequate Guiyang Geely Free Cruiser higher offer 1,000 yuan now. www.wantinews.com, February 20: np; Anonymous. 2013. Restyled Chery

QQ hit showrooms with a US$6,083 starting price. www.chinaautoweb. com, March 4: np; and Doval, P. 2014. Cheapest car tag hit Tata Nano: Creator. economictimes.indiatimes. com, August 21: np.

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chapter

After reading this chapter, you should have a good understanding of the following learning objectives:

3 LO3-1 The primary and support activities of a firm’s value chain. LO3-2 How value-chain analysis can help managers create value by investigating

relationships among activities within the firm and between the firm and its customers and suppliers.

LO3-3 The resource-based view of the firm and the different types of tangible and intangible resources, as well as organizational capabilities.

LO3-4 The four criteria that a firm’s resources must possess to maintain a sustainable advantage and how value created can be appropriated by employees and managers.

LO3-5 The usefulness of financial ratio analysis, its inherent limitations, and how to make meaningful comparisons of performance across firms.

LO3-6 The value of the “balanced scorecard” in recognizing how the interests of a variety of stakeholders can be interrelated.

Assessing the Internal Environment of the Firm

©Anatoli Styf/Shutterstock

PART 1: STRATEGIC ANALYSIS

When Twitter first burst upon the scene in 2006, there was almost immediate buzz about the firm and its platform. Having the ability to send out text messages to a circle of friends or followers seemed like a great idea. At the same time, in the words of Evan Williams, one of Twitter’s creators, “With Twitter, it wasn’t clear what it was. They called it a social network, they called it microblogging, but it was hard to define, because it didn’t replace anything. There was this path of discovery with something like that, where over time you figure out what it is.” Still, it took off. Growing from only 16,000 users at the end of 2006 to 4 million in 2008 and to 54 million by the end of 2010, it seemed to be on the path to great success.

But the situation has changed since then. Twitter’s growth quickly flattened out. The number of users hit 284 million in the third quarter of 2014 but had only grown to 317 million two years later. In fact, the firm experienced a decline in the number of users in the United States in late 2015. Twitter’s growth pales in comparison to some of its closest rivals. Over the same two-year period, Snapchat saw its user base grow by 154 percent, while Instagram jumped by a whopping 284 percent. With its flat growth, investors have become quite pessimistic about the firm’s value. Its stock price declined by 59 percent from December 2014 to 2016.1

Why the quick decline in growth? There just isn’t anything terribly unique about Twitter and its core products are not difficult to copy. Facebook created a similar messaging app and has seen its user base grow to 1 billion individuals. WhatsApp, which is owned by Facebook, has also grown to 1 billion users. Instagram has over 500 million users. Twitter also faces strong competition as it tries to expand its global reach since messaging apps that focus on specific geographic regions have also popped up. For example, the Japanese chat app, Line, has 220 million users.

It is unclear whether Twitter can turn it around in this increasingly competitive messaging app market as a standalone firm. The firm appeared to be open to being acquired by a firm that could integrate its messaging app into a larger platform of services. While rumors swirled that Salesforce, Disney, or Alphabet, the parent company of Google, might be interested in buying Twitter in the fall of 2016, no formal offers came. Apparently, these firms just didn’t see much value in Twitter. As Marc Benioff, the CEO of Salesforce, stated, “We walked away. It wasn’t the right fit for us.” Thus, the future for Twitter is unclear.

Discussion Questions 1. Why did Twitter go from an exciting, growing firm to a firm with a flat user base so quickly? 2. What could the firm have done to avoid this situation? 3. What options does the firm have to get back on a path to success?

LEARNING FROM MISTAKES

In this chapter we will place heavy emphasis on the value-chain concept. That is, we focus on the key value-creating activities (e.g., operations, marketing and sales, and procurement) that a firm must effectively manage and integrate in order to attain competitive advantages in the marketplace. However, firms not only must pay close attention to their own value- creating activities but also must maintain close and effective relationships with key orga- nizations outside the firm boundaries, such as suppliers, customers, and alliance partners.

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Although Twitter experienced tremendous growth early, it was quickly challenged by other applications that effectively mimicked what Twitter offered. Twitter’s resource set and market positioning just was not very difficult to copy.

We will begin our discussion of the firm’s internal environment by looking at a value- chain analysis. This analysis gives us insight into a firm’s operations and how the firm cre- ates economic value.

VALUE-CHAIN ANALYSIS Value-chain analysis views the organization as a sequential process of value-creating activities. The approach is useful for understanding the building blocks of competitive advantage and was described in Michael Porter’s seminal book Competitive Advantage.2 Value is the amount that buyers are willing to pay for what a firm provides them and is measured by total revenue, a ref lection of the price a firm’s product commands and the quantity it can sell. A firm is profitable when the value it receives exceeds the total costs involved in creating its product or service. Creating value for buyers that exceeds the costs of production (i.e., margin) is a key concept used in analyzing a firm’s com- petitive position.

Porter described two different categories of activities. First, five primary activities—inbound logistics, operations, outbound logistics, marketing and sales, and service— contribute to the physical creation of the product or service, its sale and transfer to the buyer, and its ser- vice after the sale. Second, support activities—procurement, technology development, human resource management, and general administration—either add value by themselves or add value through important relationships with both primary activities and other support activi- ties. Exhibit 3.1 illustrates Porter’s value chain.

To get the most out of value-chain analysis, view the concept in its broadest context, without regard to the boundaries of your own organization. That is, place your organization within a more encompassing value chain that includes your firm’s suppliers, customers, and alliance partners. Thus, in addition to thoroughly understanding how value is created within the organization, be aware of how value is created for other organizations in the overall sup- ply chain or distribution channel.3

Next, we’ll describe and provide examples of each of the primary and support activities. Then we’ll provide examples of how companies add value by means of relationships among activities within the organization as well as activities outside the organization, such as those activities associated with customers and suppliers.4

LO 3-1 The primary and support activities of a firm’s value chain.

EXHIBIT 3.1 The Value Chain: Primary and Support Activities

Inbound Logistics

Operations Outbound Logistics

Marketing and Sales

Service

Primary Activities

• General Administration

• Human Resource Management

• Technology Development

• Procurement

Support Activities

Adapted from Competitive Advantage: Creating and Sustaining Superior Performance by Michael E. Porter, 1985, 1998, Free Press.

value-chain analysis a strategic analysis of an organization that uses value-creating activities

primary activities sequential activities of the value chain that refer to the physical creation of the product or service, its sale and transfer to the buyer, and its service after sale, including inbound logistics, operations, outbound logistics, marketing and sales, and service.

support activities activities of the value chain that either add value by themselves or add value through important relationships with both primary activities and other support activities, including procurement, technology development, human resource management, and general administration.

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Primary Activities Five generic categories of primary activities are involved in competing in any industry, as shown in Exhibit 3.2. Each category is divisible into a number of distinct activities that depend on the particular industry and the firm’s strategy.5

Inbound Logistics Inbound logistics is primarily associated with receiving, storing, and distributing inputs to the product. It includes material handling, warehousing, inventory control, vehicle scheduling, and returns to suppliers.

Just-in-time (JIT) inventory systems, for example, were designed to achieve efficient inbound logistics. In essence, Toyota epitomizes JIT inventory systems, in which parts deliv- eries arrive at the assembly plants only hours before they are needed. JIT systems will play a vital role in fulfilling Toyota’s commitment to fill a buyer’s new-car order in just five days.6 This standard is in sharp contrast to most competitors that require approximately 30 days’ notice to build vehicles. Toyota’s standard is three times faster than even Honda Motors, considered to be the industry’s most efficient in order follow-through. The five days repre- sent the time from the company’s receipt of an order to the time the car leaves the assembly plant. Actual delivery may take longer, depending on where a customer lives.

Operations Operations include all activities associated with transforming inputs into the final product form, such as machining, packaging, assembly, testing, printing, and facility operations.

Creating environmentally friendly manufacturing is one way to use operations to achieve competitive advantage. Shaw Industries (now part of Berkshire Hathaway), a world-class competitor in the floor-covering industry, is well known for its concern for the environ- ment.7 It has been successful in reducing the expenses associated with the disposal of dangerous chemicals and other waste products from its manufacturing operations. Its envi- ronmental endeavors have multiple payoffs. Shaw has received many awards for its recycling efforts—awards that enhance its reputation.

LO 3-1 The primary and support activities of a firm’s value chain.

inbound logistics receiving, storing, and distributing inputs of a product.

operations all activities associated with transforming inputs into the final product form.

EXHIBIT 3.2 The Value Chain: Some Factors to Consider in Assessing a Firm’s Primary Activities

Inbound Logistics

• Location of distribution facilities to minimize shipping times. • Warehouse layout and designs to increase efficiency of operations for incoming materials.

Operations

• Efficient plant operations to minimize costs. • Efficient plant layout and workflow design. • Incorporation of appropriate process technology.

Outbound Logistics

• Effective shipping processes to provide quick delivery and minimize damages. • Shipping of goods in large lot sizes to minimize transportation costs.

Marketing and Sales

• Innovative approaches to promotion and advertising. • Proper identification of customer segments and needs.

Service

• Quick response to customer needs and emergencies. • Quality of service personnel and ongoing training.

Source: Adapted from Porter, M. E. 1985. Competitive Advantage: Creating and Sustaining Superior Performance. New York: Free Press.

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74 PART 1 :: STRATEGIC ANALYSIS

3.1 STRATEGY SPOTLIGHT CHIPOTLE’S EFFICIENT OPERATIONS Peak hours at restaurants create real challenges that must be addressed. Otherwise, business may be lost and, worse yet, custom- ers may never come back. Lines snaking out the doors have long been a bottleneck to growth at U.S. burrito chain Chipotle. However, the company has a plan—actually a four-step plan, to be exact.

The chain managed to accelerate service by six transactions per hour at peak times during a recent quarter (which is a signifi- cant increase over the mere two transactions per hour the previ- ous quarter). “We achieved our fastest throughput ever,” claims Steve Ells, co-CEO. However, some of Chipotle’s fastest restau- rants run more than 350 transactions per hour at lunchtime— more than three times the chainwide average.

How are such remarkable increases in productivity attained? By what the company calls “the four pillars of great throughput.” These are:

• Expediters. An expediter is the extra person between the one who rolls your burrito and the one who rings up your order. The expediter’s job? Getting your drink, asking if your order is “to go,” and bagging your food.

• Linebackers. These are people who patrol the countertops, serving-ware, and bins of food, so the ones who are actually serving customers never turn their backs on them.

• Mise en place. In other restaurants, this means setting out ingredients and utensils ready for use. In Chipotle’s case, it means zero tolerance for not having absolutely everything in place ahead of lunch and dinner rush hours.

• Aces in their places. This refers to a commitment to having what each branch considers its top servers in the most important positions at peak times. Thus, there are no trainees working at burrito rush hour.

Although sales for the firm dropped in late 2015 in response to food safety concerns, its long-term performance has been very impressive. From its founding in 1993, Chipotle has grown to be the largest Mexican quick service restaurant chain in the world.

Sources: Ferdman, R. A. 2014. How Chipotle is going to serve burritos faster, and faster, and faster. www.qz.com, January 31: np; Zillman, C. 2014. 2014’s top people in business. Fortune, December 1: 156; and statista.com.

Efficient operations can also provide a firm with many benefits in virtually any industry— including restaurants. Strategy Spotlight 3.1 discusses Chipotle’s rather novel approach to improving its operations.

Outbound Logistics Outbound logistics is associated with collecting, storing, and distribut- ing the product or service to buyers. These activities include finished goods, warehousing, material handling, delivery vehicle operation, order processing, and scheduling.

Campbell Soup uses an electronic network to facilitate its continuous-replenishment program with its most progressive retailers.8 Each morning, retailers electronically inform Campbell of their product needs and of the level of inventories in their distribution centers. Campbell uses that information to forecast future demand and to determine which prod- ucts require replenishment (based on the inventory limits previously established with each retailer). Trucks leave Campbell’s shipping plant that afternoon and arrive at the retailers’ distribution centers the same day. The program cuts the inventories of participating retail- ers from about a four- to a two-weeks’ supply. Campbell Soup achieved this improvement because it slashed delivery time and because it knows the inventories of key retailers and can deploy supplies when they are most needed.

The Campbell Soup example also illustrates the win–win benefits of exemplary value- chain activities. Both the supplier (Campbell) and its buyers (retailers) come out ahead. Since the retailer makes more money on Campbell products delivered through continuous replenishment, it has an incentive to carry a broader line and give the company greater shelf space. After Campbell introduced the program, sales of its products grew twice as fast through participating retailers as through all other retailers. Not surprisingly, supermarket chains love such programs.

Marketing and Sales Marketing and sales activities are associated with purchases of prod- ucts and services by end users and the inducements used to get them to make purchases.9

outbound logistics collecting, storing, and distributing the product or service to buyers.

marketing and sales activities associated with purchases of products and services by end users and the inducements used to get them to make purchases.

CHAPTER 3 :: ASSESSING THE INTERNAL ENVIRONMENT OF THE FIRM 75

They include advertising, promotion, sales force, quoting, channel selection, channel rela- tions, and pricing.10,11

Consider product placement. This is a marketing strategy that many firms are increas- ingly adopting to reach customers who are not swayed by traditional advertising. Mercedes- Benz is a firm that has aggressively pushed for product placement in Hollywood movies. In 2015, Mercedes products appeared in nine of the top 31 blockbuster movies. For example, when the villains in the James Bond movie, Spectre, showed up in the desert to pick up Bond, they arrived in a fleet of Mercedes AMGs.12

Service The service primary activity includes all actions associated with providing service to enhance or maintain the value of the product, such as installation, repair, training, parts supply, and product adjustment.

Let’s see how two retailers are providing exemplary customer service. At Sephora.com, a customer service representative taking a phone call from a repeat customer has instant access to what shade of lipstick she likes best. This will help the rep cross-sell by suggesting a match- ing shade of lip gloss. Such personalization is expected to build loyalty and boost sales per cus- tomer. Nordstrom, the Seattle-based department store chain, goes even a step further. It offers a cyber-assist: A service rep can take control of a customer’s web browser and literally lead her to just the silk scarf that she is looking for. CEO Dan Nordstrom believes that such a capabil- ity will close enough additional purchases to pay for the $1 million investment in software.

Support Activities Support activities in the value chain can be divided into four generic categories, as shown in Exhibit 3.3. Each category of the support activity is divisible into a number of distinct value activities that are specific to a particular industry. For example, technology development’s dis- crete activities may include component design, feature design, field testing, process engineer- ing, and technology selection. Similarly, procurement may include activities such as qualifying new suppliers, purchasing different groups of inputs, and monitoring supplier performance.

service actions associated with providing service to enhance or maintain the value of the product.

General Administration

• Effective planning systems to attain overall goals and objectives. • Excellent relationships with diverse stakeholder groups. • Effective information technology to integrate value-creating activities.

Human Resource Management

• Effective recruiting, development, and retention mechanisms for employees. • Quality relations with trade unions. • Reward and incentive programs to motivate all employees.

Technology Development

• Effective R&D activities for process and product initiatives. • Positive collaborative relationships between R&D and other departments. • Excellent professional qualifications of personnel. • Data analytics

Procurement

• Procurement of raw material inputs to optimize quality and speed and to minimize the associated costs. • Development of collaborative win–win relationships with suppliers. • Analysis and selection of alternative sources of inputs to minimize dependence on one supplier.

Source: Adapted from Porter, M.E. 1985. Competitive Advantage: Creating and Sustaining Superior Performance. New York: Free Press.

EXHIBIT 3.3 The Value Chain: Some Factors to Consider in Assessing a Firm’s Support Activities

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Procurement Procurement refers to the function of purchasing inputs used in the firm’s value chain, not to the purchased inputs themselves.13 Purchased inputs include raw materi- als, supplies, and other consumable items as well as assets such as machinery, laboratory equipment, office equipment, and buildings.14,15

Microsoft has improved its procurement process (and the quality of its suppliers) by pro- viding formal reviews of its suppliers. One of Microsoft’s divisions has extended the review process used for employees to its outside suppliers.16 The employee services group, which is responsible for everything from travel to 401(k) programs to the on-site library, outsources more than 60 percent of the services it provides. Unfortunately, the employee services group was not providing suppliers with enough feedback. This was feedback that the suppliers wanted to get and that Microsoft wanted to give.

The evaluation system that Microsoft developed helped clarify its expectations to suppli- ers. An executive noted: “We had one supplier—this was before the new system—that would have scored a 1.2 out of 5. After we started giving this feedback, and the supplier understood our expectations, its performance improved dramatically. Within six months, it scored a 4. If you’d asked me before we began the feedback system, I would have said that was impossible.”17

Technology Development Every value activity embodies technology.18 The array of technol- ogies employed in most firms is very broad, ranging from technologies used to prepare doc- uments and transport goods to those embodied in processes and equipment or the product itself.19 Technology development related to the product and its features supports the entire value chain, while other technology development is associated with particular primary or support activities.

Techniq, headquartered in Paris, France, with 40,000 employees in 48 countries, is a world leader in project management, engineering, and construction for the energy industry.20 Its manufacturing plant in Normandy, France, has developed innovative ways to add value for its customers. This division, Subsea Infrastructure, produces subsea flexible pipes for the oil and gas industry. Its technology innovations have added significant value for its customers and has led to operating margins 50 percent higher than those for the company overall.

Its traditional services include installing, inspecting, maintaining, and repairing pipes in locations around the world, from the Arctic to the Arabian Gulf. However, the company now goes much further. In collaboration with oil services giant Schlumberger, Techniq has developed intelligent pipes that can monitor and regulate the temperature throughout an oil pipeline—important value-added activities for its customers, large oil producers. Fluctuating temperatures pose a major problem—they cause changes in pipe diameter, which makes the flow of oil more variable. This compromises drilling efficiency and is a significant source of costs for Techniq’s customers. Using intelligent pipes not only keeps temperatures steadier but also reduces the complexity of subsea drilling layouts and shortens pipe installation times.

Strategy Spotlight 3.2 discusses how Coca-Cola has developed data analytic technologies to produce orange juice that meets the taste demands of a global customer base.

Human Resource Management Human resource management consists of activities involved in the recruiting, hiring, training, development, and compensation of all types of person- nel.21 It supports both individual primary and support activities (e.g., hiring of engineers and scientists) and the entire value chain (e.g., negotiations with labor unions).22

Like all great service companies, JetBlue Airways Corporation is obsessed with hiring superior employees.23 But the company found it difficult to attract college graduates to commit to careers as flight attendants. JetBlue developed a highly innovative recruitment program for flight attendants—a one-year contract that gives them a chance to travel, meet lots of people, and then decide what else they might like to do. It also introduced the idea of training a friend and employee together so that they could share a job. With such employee- friendly initiatives, JetBlue has been very successful in attracting talent.

procurement the function of purchasing inputs used in the firm’s value chain, including raw materials, supplies, and other consumable items as well as assets such as machinery, laboratory equipment, office equipment, and buildings.

technology development activities associated with the development of new knowledge that is applied to the firm’s operations.

human resource management activities involved in the recruiting, hiring, training, development, and compensation of all types of personnel.

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3.2 STRATEGY SPOTLIGHT THE ALGORITHM FOR ORANGE JUICE Making orange juice sounds simple enough. Squeeze the juice out of some oranges, and there you have it. But making orange juice is not so simple if you are Coca-Cola. The firm is the largest orange juice producer in the world, accounting for 17 percent of the juice sold in the world’s top 22 markets, producing under the Minute Maid, Simply Orange, and Del Valle brands. Staying on top is a challenge since the firm has to respond to a range of variables, including weather conditions, differing customer preferences across markets, the flow of product over 12 months when the prime growing season lasts three months, and volatil- ity in demand.

To meet customer expectations on a daily basis and continue to lead the market, Coke has turned to data analytics. As a first step in the process, Coke leverages an algorithm it has devel- oped, called Black Box. Black Box contains detailed data on more than 600 flavors that can be used to make the orange juice customers expect to taste. Coke then matches the characteris- tics of each batch of raw juice to the algorithm to determine how

to mix together different batches of juice to produce the exact taste it wants to produce. Black Box considers multiple attributes of each batch of juice, including sweetness, acidity, and other taste attributes. Coke also uses the algorithm to evaluate sat- ellite imagery of growing regions. The algorithm allows Coke to consider other factors, such as current demand and prices, weather patterns, and crop yields to maximize the efficiency of the process while producing the quantity and taste of juice to meet the market needs. But if conditions change, such as the emergence of a hurricane or the threat of a freeze in a growing region, Coke can go back to the algorithm and produce a new plan in five to ten minutes. Bob Cross, a consultant who helped Coke develop Black Box, commented that it “is definitely one of the most complex applications of business analytics. It requires analyzing up to one quintillion decision variables to consistently deliver the optimal blend, despite the whims of Mother Nature.”

Sources: Sanders, N. 2016. How to use big data to drive your supply chain. California Management Review. Spring: 26–48; Stanford, D. 2016. Coke engineers its orange juice–with an algorithm. bloomberg.com. January 31: np.

In their efforts to attract high-potential college graduates, some firms have turned to “program hiring.” Facebook, Intuit, AB InBev, and others empower their recruiters to make offers on the spot when they interview college students, without knowing what specific position they will fill. These firms search for candidates with attributes such as being a self- starter and a problem-solver, and make quick offers to preempt the market. Later, the new employees have matching interviews with various units in the firm to find the right initial position. The firms may lose out with some candidates who dislike the uncertainty of what their role will be, but they believe the candidates who are open to this type of hiring will be a better fit in a dynamic, creative workplace.24

General Administration General administration consists of a number of activities, includ- ing general management, planning, finance, accounting, legal and government affairs, quality management, and information systems. Administration (unlike the other support activities) typically supports the entire value chain and not individual activities.25

Although general administration is sometimes viewed only as overhead, it can be a pow- erful source of competitive advantage. In a telephone operating company, for example, negotiating and maintaining ongoing relations with regulatory bodies can be among the most important activities for competitive advantage. Also, in some industries top manage- ment plays a vital role in dealing with important buyers.26

The strong and effective leadership of top executives can also make a significant contri- bution to an organization’s success. As we discussed in Chapter 1, chief executive officers (CEOs) such as Jack Ma and Mark Zuckerberg have been credited with playing critical roles in the success of Alibaba and Facebook.

Information technology (IT) can also play a key role in enhancing the value that a com- pany can provide its customers and, in turn, increasing its own revenues and profits. Strategy Spotlight 3.3 describes how Schmitz Cargobull, a German truck and trailer manufacturer, uses IT to further its competitive position.

general administration general management, planning, finance, accounting, legal and government affairs, quality management, and information systems; activities that support the entire value chain and not individual activities.

LO 3-2 How value-chain analysis can help managers create value by investigating relationships among activities within the firm and between the firm and its customers and suppliers.

DATA

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3.3 STRATEGY SPOTLIGHT SCHMITZ CARGOBULL: ADDING VALUE TO CUSTOMERS VIA IT Germany’s truck and trailer manufacturer, Schmitz Cargobull, mainly serves customers that are operators of truck or trailer fleets. Like its rivals, the company derives a growing share of revenue from support services such as financing, full-service contracts for breakdowns and regular maintenance, and spare-parts supplies.

What sets the company apart is its expertise in telematics (the integrated application of telecommunications data) to moni- tor the current state of any Schmitz Cargobull–produced trailer. Through telematics, key information is continually available to the driver, the freight agent, and the customer. They can track, for instance, when maintenance is done, how much weight has been loaded, the current cargo temperature, and where the vehicle is on its route. Therefore, Schmitz Cargobull custom- ers can better manage their trailer use and minimize the risk of breakdowns. The decision to introduce telematics, not surpris- ingly, derived from management’s belief that real-time sharing of data would bind the company more closely to customers.

In applying its telematic tools in its products, Schmitz Cargobull is providing clear, tangible benefits. It uses informa- tion technology only where it makes sense. On the production line, for example, workers implement statistical quality controls manually, rather than rely on an automated system, because the company found manual control improves engagement and job performance.

That strategy has helped Schmitz Cargobull become an industry leader. In 2013, the company controlled 82 percent of the sales of semitrailer reefers (refrigerated trailers) in Germany, and its market share in Europe was about 50 percent. Further, its results for the fiscal year ending March 2014 are most impres- sive: sales increased by 7.5 percent and pretax profit soared 66 percent.

Sources: Anonymous. 2014. Schmitz Cargobull AG announces earnings and production results for the year ending March 2014. www.investing.businessweek. com, July 31: np; Anonymous. 2014. Premiere at the IAA Show 2014: Increased I-beam stability and payload. www.cargobull.com, September: np; and Chick, S. E., Huchzermeier, A., & Netessine, S. 2014. Europe’s solution factories. Harvard Business Review, 92(4): 11–115.

Interrelationships among Value-Chain Activities within and across Organizations We have defined each of the value-chain activities separately for clarity of presentation. Managers must not ignore, however, the importance of relationships among value-chain activities.27 There are two levels: (1) interrelationships among activities within the firm and (2) relationships among activities within the firm and with other stakeholders (e.g., custom- ers and suppliers) that are part of the firm’s expanded value chain.28

With regard to the first level, Lise Saari, former Director of Global Employee Research at IBM, provided an example by commenting on how human resources needs to be inte- grated with the other functional areas of the firm. She put it this way: “HR [must be] a true partner of the business, with a deep and up-to-date understanding of business realities and objectives, and, in turn, [must ensure] HR initiatives fully support them at all points of the value chain.”

With regard to the second level, Campbell Soup’s use of electronic networks enabled it to improve the efficiency of outbound logistics.29 However, it also helped Campbell manage the ordering of raw materials more effectively, improve its production scheduling, and help its customers better manage their inbound logistics operations.

Integrating Customers into the Value Chain When addressing the value-chain concept, it is important to focus on the interrelationship between the organization and its most important stakeholder—its customers. Some firms find great value by directly incorporating their customers into the value creation process. Firms can do this in one of two ways.

First, they can employ the “prosumer” concept and directly team up with customers to design and build products to satisfy their particular needs. Working directly with custom- ers in this process provides multiple potential benefits for the firm. As the firm develops

interrelationships collaborative and strategic exchange relationships between value-chain activities either (a) within firms or (b) between firms. Strategic exchange relationships involve exchange of resources such as information, people, technology, or money that contribute to the success of the firm.

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individualized products and relationship marketing, it can benefit from greater customer satisfaction and loyalty. Additionally, the interactions with customers can generate insights that lead to cost-saving initiatives and more innovative ideas for the producing firm. In dis- cussing this concept, Hartmut Jenner, CEO of Alfred Karcher, a German manufacturing firm, stated:

In the future, we will be talking more and more about the “prosumer”—a customer/producer who is even more extensively integrated into the value chain. As a consequence, production processes will be customized more precisely and individually.30

Second, firms can leverage the power of crowdsourcing. As introduced in Chapter 2, crowdsourcing occurs when firms tap into the knowledge and ideas of a large number of customers and other stakeholders, typically through online forums. The rise of social media has generated tremendous opportunities for firms to engage with customers.31 In contrast to prosumer interactions, which allow the firm to gain insights on the needs of a particular customer, crowdsourcing offers the opportunity to leverage the wisdom of a larger crowd. Many companies have encouraged customers to participate in value-creating activities, such as brainstorming advertising taglines or product ideas. These activities not only enable firms to innovate at low cost but also engage customers. Clearly, a marketer’s dream! At the same time, crowdsourcing has some significant risks.

Understanding the Perils of Crowdsourcing  While crowdsourcing offers great promise, in practice such programs are difficult to run. At times, customers can “hijack” them. Instead of offering constructive ideas, customers jump at the chance to raise concerns and even ridi- cule the company. Such hijacking is one of the biggest challenges companies face. Research has shown about half of such campaigns fail. Consider the following marketing-focused crowdsourcing examples:

• In 2006, General Motors tried a “fun” experiment, one of the first attempts to use user-generated advertising. The company asked the public to create commercials for the Chevy Tahoe—ads the company hoped would go viral. Unfortunately, some of the ads did go viral! These include: “Like this snowy wilderness. Better get your fill of it now. Then say hello to global warming. Chevy Tahoe” and “$70 to fill up the tank, which will last less than 400 miles. Chevy Tahoe.”

• McDonald’s set up a Twitter campaign to promote positive word of mouth. But this initiative became a platform for people looking to bash the chain. Tweets such as the following certainly didn’t help the firm’s cause: “I lost 50 lbs in 6 months after I quit working and eating at McDonalds” and “The McRib contains the same chemicals used to make yoga mats, mmmmm.”

Research has identified three areas of particular concern:

• Strong brand reputation. Companies with strong brands need to protect them. After all, they have the most to lose. They must be aware such efforts provide consumers the opportunity to tarnish the brand. Strong brands are typically built through consistent, effective marketing, and companies need to weigh the potential for misbehaving customers to thwart their careful efforts.

• High demand uncertainty. Firms are generally more likely to ask for customer input when market conditions are changing. However, this often backfires when demand is highly uncertain, because customers in such markets often don’t know what they want or what they will like. For example, Porsche received a lot of negative feedback when it announced plans to release an SUV, but it went ahead anyway, and the Porsche Cayenne was a great success.

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• Too many initiatives. Firms typically benefit from working repeatedly with the same customers. Often, the quality, quantity, and variety of inputs decrease as the frequency of engagement increases. A study of the Dell IdeaStorm program (in which customers were encouraged to submit product or service ideas) discovered that the same people submitted ideas repeatedly—including submitting ones for things the company already provided. And customers whose ideas were implemented tended to return with additional ideas that were quite similar to their initial suggestions.

Applying the Value Chain to Service Organizations The concepts of inbound logistics, operations, and outbound logistics suggest managing the raw materials that might be manufactured into finished products and delivered to custom- ers. However, these three steps do not apply only to manufacturing. They correspond to any transformation process in which inputs are converted through a work process into outputs that add value. For example, accounting is a sort of transformation process that converts daily records of individual transactions into monthly financial reports. In this example, the transaction records are the inputs, accounting is the operation that adds value, and financial statements are the outputs.

What are the “operations,” or transformation processes, of service organizations? At times, the difference between manufacturing and service is in providing a customized solu- tion rather than mass production as is common in manufacturing. For example, a travel agent adds value by creating an itinerary that includes transportation, accommodations, and activities that are customized to your budget and travel dates. A law firm renders ser- vices that are specific to a client’s needs and circumstances. In both cases, the work process (operation) involves the application of specialized knowledge based on the specifics of a situation (inputs) and the outcome that the client desires (outputs).

The application of the value chain to service organizations suggests that the value-adding process may be configured differently depending on the type of business a firm is engaged in. As the preceding discussion on support activities suggests, activities such as procurement and legal services are critical for adding value. Indeed, the activities that may provide support only to one company may be critical to the primary value-adding activity of another firm.

Exhibit 3.4 provides two models of how the value chain might look in service industries. In the retail industry, there are no manufacturing operations. A firm such as Nordstrom adds value by developing expertise in the procurement of finished goods and by displaying

EXHIBIT 3.4 Some Examples of Value Chains in Service Industries Retail: Primary Value-Chain Activities

Engineering Services: Primary Value-Chain Activities

Partnering with

vendors

Purchasing goods

Managing and distributing inventory

Operating stores

Research and development

Engineering Designs

and solutions

Marketing and sales

Marketing and

selling

Service

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them in its stores in a way that enhances sales. Thus, the value chain makes procurement activities (i.e., partnering with vendors and purchasing goods) a primary rather than a sup- port activity. Operations refer to the task of operating Nordstrom’s stores.

For an engineering services firm, research and development provides inputs, the trans- formation process is the engineering itself, and innovative designs and practical solutions are the outputs. The Beca Group, for example, is a large consulting firm with about 3,000 employees, based in 17 offices throughout the Asia Pacific region. In its technology and innovation management practice, Beca strives to make the best use of the science, tech- nology, and knowledge resources available to create value for a wide range of industries and client sectors. This involves activities associated with research and development, engi- neering, and creating solutions as well as downstream activities such as marketing, sales, and service. How the primary and support activities of a given firm are configured and deployed will often depend on industry conditions and whether the company is service- and/or manufacturing-oriented.

RESOURCE-BASED VIEW OF THE FIRM The resource-based view (RBV) of the firm combines two perspectives: (1) the internal analy- sis of phenomena within a company and (2) an external analysis of the industry and its competitive environment.32 It goes beyond the traditional SWOT (strengths, weaknesses, opportunities, threats) analysis by integrating internal and external perspectives. The abil- ity of a firm’s resources to confer competitive advantage(s) cannot be determined with- out taking into consideration the broader competitive context. A firm’s resources must be evaluated in terms of how valuable, rare, and hard they are for competitors to duplicate. Otherwise, the firm attains only competitive parity.

A firm’s strengths and capabilities—no matter how unique or impressive—do not neces- sarily lead to competitive advantages in the marketplace. The criteria for whether advan- tages are created and whether or not they can be sustained over time will be addressed later in this section. Thus, the RBV is a very useful framework for gaining insights as to why some competitors are more profitable than others. As we will see later in the book, the RBV is also helpful in developing strategies for individual businesses and diversified firms by reveal- ing how core competencies embedded in a firm can help it exploit new product and market opportunities.

In the two sections that follow, we will discuss the three key types of resources that firms possess (summarized in Exhibit 3.5): tangible resources, intangible resources, and orga- nizational capabilities. Then we will address the conditions under which such assets and capabilities can enable a firm to attain a sustainable competitive advantage.33

Types of Firm Resources Firm resources are all assets, capabilities, organizational processes, information, knowledge, and so forth, controlled by a firm that enable it to develop and implement value-creating strategies.

Tangible Resources Tangible resources are assets that are relatively easy to identify. They include the physical and financial assets that an organization uses to create value for its customers. Among them are financial resource (e.g., a firm’s cash, accounts receivable, and its ability to borrow funds); physical resources (e.g., the company’s plant, equipment, and machinery as well as its proximity to customers and suppliers); organizational resources (e.g., the company’s strategic planning process and its employee development, evalua- tion, and reward systems); and technological resources (e.g., trade secrets, patents, and copyrights).

LO 3-3 The resource-based view of the firm and the different types of tangible and intangible resources, as well as organizational capabilities.

resource-based view (RBV) of the firm perspective that firms’ competitive advantages are due to their endowment of strategic resources that are valuable, rare, costly to imitate, and costly to substitute.

tangible resources organizational assets that are relatively easy to identify, including physical assets, financial resources, organizational resources, and technological resources.

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Tangible Resources

Financial • Firm’s cash account and cash equivalents. • Firm’s capacity to raise equity. • Firm’s borrowing capacity.

Physical • Modern plant and facilities. • Favorable manufacturing locations. • State-of-the-art machinery and equipment.

Technological • Trade secrets. • Innovative production processes. • Patents, copyrights, trademarks.

Organizational • Effective strategic planning processes. • Excellent evaluation and control systems.

Intangible Resources

Human • Experience and capabilities of employees. • Trust. • Managerial skills. • Firm-specific practices and procedures.

Innovation and creativity • Technical and scientific skills. • Innovation capacities.

Reputation • Brand name. • Reputation with customers for quality and reliability. • Reputation with suppliers for fairness, non–zero-

sum relationships.

Organizational Capabilities

• Firm competencies or skills the firm employs to transfer inputs to outputs. • Capacity to combine tangible and intangible resources, using organizational processes to attain

desired end.

EXAMPLES:

• Outstanding customer service. • Excellent product development capabilities. • Innovativeness of products and services. • Ability to hire, motivate, and retain human capital.

Sources: Adapted from Barney, J. B. 1991. Firm Resources and Sustained Competitive Advantage. Journal of Management, 17: 101; Grant, R. M. 1991. Contemporary Strategy Analysis: 100–102. Cambridge, England: Blackwell Business; and Hitt, M. A., Ireland, R. D., & Hoskisson, R. E. 2001. Strategic Management: Competitiveness and Globalization (4th ed.). Cincinnati: South- Western College Publishing.

EXHIBIT 3.5 The Resource-Based View of the Firm: Resources and Capabilities

Many firms are finding that high-tech, computerized training has dual benefits: It devel- ops more-effective employees and reduces costs at the same time. Employees at FedEx take computer-based job competency tests every 6 to 12 months.34 The 90-minute computer- based tests identify areas of individual weakness and provide input to a computer database of employee skills—information the firm uses in promotion decisions.

Intangible Resources Much more difficult for competitors (and, for that matter, a firm’s own managers) to account for or imitate are intangible resources, which are typically embed- ded in unique routines and practices that have evolved and accumulated over time. These include human resources (e.g., experience and capability of employees, trust, effectiveness

intangible resources organizational assets that are difficult to identify and account for and are typically embedded in unique routines and practices, including human resources, innovation resources, and reputation resources.

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of work teams, managerial skills), innovation resources (e.g., technical and scientific exper- tise, ideas), and reputation resources (e.g., brand name, reputation with suppliers for fair- ness and with customers for reliability and product quality).35 A firm’s culture may also be a resource that provides competitive advantage.36

As an example of how a firm can leverage the value of intangible resources, we turn to Harley-Davidson. You might not think that motorcycles, clothes, toys, and restaurants have much in common. Yet Harley-Davidson has entered all of these product and service markets by capitalizing on its strong brand image—a valuable intangible resource.37 It has used that image to sell accessories, clothing, and toys, and it has licensed the Harley-Davidson Café in New York City to provide further exposure for its brand name and products.

Social networking sites have the potential to play havoc with a firm’s reputation. Consider the unfortunate situation Comcast faced when one of its repairmen fell asleep on the job—and it went viral:

Ben Finkelstein, a law student, had trouble with the cable modem in his home. A Comcast cable repairman arrived to fix the problem. However, when the technician had to call the home office for a key piece of information, he was put on hold for so long that he fell asleep on Finkelstein’s couch. Outraged, Finkelstein made a video of the sleeping technician and posted it on YouTube. The clip became a hit—with more than a million viewings. And, for a long time, it undermined Comcast’s efforts to improve its reputation for customer service.38

Organizational Capabilities Organizational capabilities are not specific tangible or intangi- ble assets, but rather the competencies or skills that a firm employs to transform inputs into outputs.39 In short, they refer to an organization’s capacity to deploy tangible and intangible resources over time and generally in combination and to leverage those capabilities to bring about a desired end.40 Examples of organizational capabilities are outstanding customer service, excellent product development capabilities, superb innovation processes, and flex- ibility in manufacturing processes.41

In the case of Apple, the majority of components used in its products can be characterized as proven technology, such as touch-screen and MP3-player functionality.42 However, Apple com- bines and packages these in new and innovative ways while also seeking to integrate the value chain. This is the case with iTunes, for example, where suppliers of downloadable music are a vital component of the success Apple has enjoyed with its iPod series of MP3 players. Thus, Apple draws on proven technologies and its ability to offer innovative combinations of them.

Firm Resources and Sustainable Competitive Advantages As we have mentioned, resources alone are not a basis for competitive advantages, nor are advantages sustainable over time.43 In some cases, a resource or capability helps a firm to increase its revenues or to lower costs but the firm derives only a temporary advantage because competitors quickly imitate or substitute for it.44

For a resource to provide a firm with the potential for a sustainable competitive advantage, it must have four attributes.45 First, the resource must be valuable in the sense that it exploits opportunities and/or neutralizes threats in the firm’s environment. Second, it must be rare among the firm’s current and potential competitors. Third, the resource must be difficult for competitors to imitate. Fourth, the resource must have no strategically equivalent substi- tutes. These criteria are summarized in Exhibit 3.6. We will now discuss each of these crite- ria. Then we will examine how Blockbuster’s competitive advantage, which seemed secure a decade ago, subsequently eroded, causing the company to file for bankruptcy in 2011.

Is the Resource Valuable? Organizational resources can be a source of competitive advan- tage only when they are valuable. Resources are valuable when they enable a firm to for- mulate and implement strategies that improve its efficiency or effectiveness. The SWOT framework suggests that firms improve their performance only when they exploit opportuni- ties or neutralize (or minimize) threats.

organizational capabilities the competencies and skills that a firm employs to transform inputs into outputs.

LO 3-4 The four criteria that a firm’s resources must possess to maintain a sustainable advantage and how value created can be appropriated by employees and managers.

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Is the resource or capability . . . Implications

Valuable? • Neutralize threats and exploit opportunities

Rare? • Not many firms possess

Difficult to imitate? • Physically unique • Path dependency (how accumulated over time) • Causal ambiguity (difficult to disentangle what it is or

how it could be re-created) • Social complexity (trust, interpersonal relationships,

culture, reputation)

Difficult to substitute? • No equivalent strategic resources or capabilities

EXHIBIT 3.6 Four Criteria for Assessing Sustainability of Resources and Capabilities

The fact that firm attributes must be valuable in order to be considered resources (as well as potential sources of competitive advantage) reveals an important complemen- tary relationship among environmental models (e.g., SWOT and five-forces analyses) and the resource-based model. Environmental models isolate those firm attributes that exploit opportunities and/or neutralize threats. Thus, they specify what firm attributes may be con- sidered as resources. The resource-based model then suggests what additional characteris- tics these resources must possess if they are to develop a sustained competitive advantage.

Is the Resource Rare? If competitors or potential competitors also possess the same valu- able resource, it is not a source of a competitive advantage because all of these firms have the capability to exploit that resource in the same way. Common strategies based on such a resource would give no one firm an advantage. For a resource to provide competitive advan- tages, it must be uncommon, that is, rare relative to other competitors.

This argument can apply to bundles of valuable firm resources that are used to formulate and develop strategies. Some strategies require a mix of multiple types of resources— tangible assets, intangible assets, and organizational capabilities. If a particular bundle of firm resources is not rare, then relatively large numbers of firms will be able to conceive of and implement the strategies in question. Thus, such strategies will not be a source of competi- tive advantage, even if the resource in question is valuable.

Can the Resource Be Imitated Easily? Inimitability (difficulty in imitating) is a key to value creation because it constrains competition.46 If a resource is inimitable, then any prof- its generated are more likely to be sustainable.47 Having a resource that competitors can easily copy generates only temporary value.48 This has important implications. Since man- agers often fail to apply this test, they tend to base long-term strategies on resources that are imitable. IBP (Iowa Beef Processors) became the first meatpacking company in the United States to modernize by building a set of assets (automated plants located in cattle-producing states) and capabilities (low-cost “disassembly” of carcasses) that earned returns on assets of 1.3 percent in the 1970s. By the late 1980s, however, ConAgra and Cargill had imitated these resources, and IBP’s profitability fell by nearly 70 percent, to 0.4 percent.

Groupon is a more recent example of a firm that has suffered because rivals have been able to imitate its strategy rather easily:

Groupon, which offers online coupons for bargains at local shops and restaurants, created a new market.49 Although it was initially a boon to consumers, it offers no lasting “first-mover” advantage. Its business model is not patentable and is easy to replicate. Not surprisingly, there are many copycats. For example, there was a tremendous amount of churn in the industry in 2012. The number of daily deal sites in the United States rose by almost 8 percent (142 sites), according to Daily Deal Media, which tracks the industry. Meanwhile, globally, 560 daily deal sites closed over the same period!

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3.4 STRATEGY SPOTLIGHT PRINTED IN TAIWAN: PATH DEPENDENCE IN 3D PRINTING The world’s largest producer of 3D printers for consumers in 2016 wasn’t HP, Canon, Brother, or any other widely known printer manufacturer. It was XYZprinting, a Taiwan-based computer com- ponent manufacturer. XYZprinting, a subsidiary of the New Kinpo Group, produced 19 percent of the 3D printers sold in 2016. While the 3D printer market is just emerging, Simon Shen, New Kinpo Group’s CEO, aims to draw on the firm’s infrastructure and experi- ence to build a dominant position as the low-cost leader in the 3D printer market. The firm’s da Vinci printer, which can be found in BestBuy, in Toys R Us, and on Amazon.com was honored with the 2016 Editors’ Choice Award at the Consumer Electronics Show.

Shen sees three key resources the firm can draw on to build a sustainable advantage. First, the firm has built an efficient supply chain and manufacturing system to produce a range of electronic products that can be leveraged to build 3D printers. Second, it has developed internal control systems to minimize cost in order to thrive in Taiwan’s notoriously thin-margin elec- tronics industry. Third, the firm has developed competencies in the R&D of electronic products. Their R&D knowledge and manufacturing skills apply directly to 3D printing since, while the

firm is not well known, it is actually one of the world’s largest producers of 2D printers, producing them as a contract manu- facturer to the world’s leading printer companies. With their own manufacturing capabilities and supply chain connections along with their mechanical engineering experience, XYZprinting was able to introduce some of the lowest priced systems on the mar- ket. As Wendy Mok, an analyst with IDC, stated, “they have the manufacturing background, they know the difficulty of R&D.”

Shen sees all of this providing a set of competencies that later movers will find hard to imitate. In his words, “If you don’t have a 2D background, it’s difficult to catch up.” They are also looking to expand their competencies by extending into more expensive industrial machines to meet specific needs. For exam- ple, they are working with a local university to develop the ability to print dental implants. As the market matures, Shen believes they are developing a set of resources and competencies that late movers will find hard to match.

Sources: Einhorn, B. 2016. Made-in-Taiwan used to mean PC, now it’s 3D. bloomberg.com. April 27: np; Molitch-Hou, M. 2016. How XYZprinting is conquering 3D printing & why you might move to Taiwan. 3dprintingindustry.com. January 5: np; Anonymous. 2016. XYZprinting forms several new retail partnerships to offer 3D printing solutions to consumers nationwide. prnewswire.com. December 6: np; Connery, C. 2016. 3D printers: Desktop market still growing but metal printers prop up struggling industrial segment in 1H. 2016. tctmagazine.com. December 6: np.

Clearly, an advantage based on inimitability won’t last forever. Competitors will eventu- ally discover a way to copy most valuable resources. However, managers can forestall them and sustain profits for a while by developing strategies around resources that have at least one of the following four characteristics.50

Physical Uniqueness The first source of inimitability is physical uniqueness, which by defi- nition is inherently difficult to copy. A beautiful resort location, mineral rights, or Pfizer’s pharmaceutical patents simply cannot be imitated. Many managers believe that several of their resources may fall into this category, but on close inspection, few do.

Path Dependency A greater number of resources cannot be imitated because of what economists refer to as path dependency. This simply means that resources are unique and therefore scarce because of all that has happened along the path followed in their develop- ment and/or accumulation. Competitors cannot go out and buy these resources quickly and easily; they must be built up over time in ways that are difficult to accelerate.

The Gerber Products Co. brand name for baby food is an example of a resource that is poten- tially inimitable. Re-creating Gerber’s brand loyalty would be a time-consuming process that competitors could not expedite, even with expensive marketing campaigns. Ashley furniture has found that controlling all steps of its distribution system has allowed it to develop specific com- petencies that are difficult to match. It has developed specially designed racks in its distribution centers and proprietary inventory management systems that would take time to match. It has also tasked its truck drivers to be “Ashley Ambassadors,” building relationships with furniture store managers and employees. Both these operational and relational resources have built up over time and can’t be imitated overnight.51 Also, a crash R&D program generally cannot rep- licate a successful technology when research findings cumulate. Strategy Spotlight 3.4 outlines how XYZprinting is using its R&D and manufacturing experience to build a path-dependent

path dependency a characteristic of resources that is developed and/or accumulated through a unique series of events.

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3.5 STRATEGY SPOTLIGHT AMAZON PRIME: VERY DIFFICULT FOR RIVALS TO COPY Amazon Prime, introduced in 2004, is a free-shipping service that guarantees delivery of products within two days for an annual fee of $79. According to Bloomberg Businessweek, it may be the most ingenious and effective customer loyalty pro- gram in all of e-commerce, if not retail in general. It converts casual shoppers into Amazon addicts who gorge on the gratifi- cation of having purchases reliably appear two days after they order. Analysts describe Prime as one of the main factors driving Amazon’s stock price up nearly 300 percent from 2008 to 2010. Also, it is one of the main reasons why Amazon’s sales grew 30 percent during the recession, while other retailers suffered.

By the end of 2015, Amazon had an estimated 60 to 80 million Prime members globally, up from 5 million three years earlier. They are practically addicted to using Amazon—and certainly don’t seem to mind the annual membership price boost to $99. Scot Wingo of Channel Advisor, a company that helps online sell- ers, estimates that people with Prime spend about four times what others do and account for half of all spending at Amazon.

Amazon Prime has proven to be extremely hard for rivals to copy. Why? It enables Amazon to exploit its wide selection, low prices, network of third-party merchants, and finely tuned distribution system. All that while also keying off that faintly irra- tional human need to maximize the benefits of a club that you have already paid to join. Yet Amazon’s success also leads to increased pressure from both public and private entities. For a long time, Amazon was able to avoid collecting local sales taxes because Amazon did not have a local sales presence in many

states. This practice distorts competition and strains already tight state coffers. Some states have used a combination of leg- islation and litigation to convince Amazon to collect sales taxes.

Moreover, rivals—both online and off—have realized the increasing threat posed by Prime and are rushing to respond. For example, in October 2010, a consortium of over 100 retail- ers, including Staples, Eddie Bauer, and Kay Jewelers, banded together to offer their own copycat $79, two-day shipping pro- gram, ShopRunner, which applies to products across their web- sites. As noted by Fiona Dias, the executive who administers the program, “As Amazon added more merchandising categories to Prime, retailers started feeling the pain. They have finally come to understand that Amazon is an existential threat and that Prime is the fuel of the engine.”

Finally, Prime members also gain access to thousands of movies, video games, ebooks, and HBO programming. Prime members may soon also be able to gain access to watch major sports through their Prime membership. As annoying as this might be to Netflix, it is not intended primarily as an assault on Netflix. Rather, CEO Jeff Bezos is willing to lose money on ship- ping and services in exchange for loyalty.

Sources: Anonymous. 2014. Relentless.com. The Economist, June 21: 23–26; McCorvey, J. J. 2013. The race has just begun. Fast Company, September: 66–76; Stone, B. 2010. What’s in the box? Instant gratification. Bloomberg Businessweek, November 29–December 5: 39–40; Kaplan, M. 2011. Amazon Prime: 5 million members, 20 percent growth. www.practicalcommerce.com, September 16: np; Fowler, G. A. 2010. Retailers team up against Amazon. www.wsj.com, October 6: np; Halkias, M. 2012. Amazon to collect sales tax in Texas. Dallas Morning News, April 28: 4A. Kim, E. 2015. These numbers explain why Amazon wants to give so much free stuff to Prime members. finance.yahoo.com. October 21: np; and Ramachandran, S. 2016. Amazon explores possible premium sports package with prime membership. wsj.com. November 22: np.

advantage in the 3D printing market. Clearly, these path-dependent conditions build protection for the original resource. The benefits from experience and learning through trial and error can- not be duplicated overnight.

Causal Ambiguity The third source of inimitability is termed causal ambiguity. This means that would-be competitors may be thwarted because it is impossible to disentangle the causes (or possible explanations) of either what the valuable resource is or how it can be re-created. What is the root of 3M’s innovation process? You can study it and draw up a list of possible factors. But it is a complex, unfolding (or folding) process that is hard to under- stand and would be hard to imitate.

Often, causally ambiguous resources are organizational capabilities, involving a complex web of social interactions that may even depend on particular individuals. When trying to compete with Google, many competitors, such as Yahoo and Twitter, have found it hard to match Google’s ability to innovate and launch new products. Most acknowledge this is tied to Google’s ability to hire the best talent and the culture of creativity within the firm, but firms find it very challenging to identify the specific set of actions Google took to build its image and culture or how to match it.

Strategy Spotlight 3.5 describes Amazon’s continued success as the world’s largest online marketplace. Competitors recently tried to imitate Amazon’s free-shipping strategy, but with

causal ambiguity a characteristic of a firm’s resources that is costly to imitate because a competitor cannot determine what the resource is and/or how it can be re-created.

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limited success. The reason is that Amazon has developed an array of interrelated elements of strategy which their rivals find too difficult to imitate.

Social Complexity A firm’s resources may be imperfectly inimitable because they reflect a high level of social complexity. Such phenomena are typically beyond the ability of firms to systematically manage or influence. When competitive advantages are based on social complexity, it is difficult for other firms to imitate them.

A wide variety of firm resources may be considered socially complex. Examples include interpersonal relations among the managers in a firm, its culture, and its reputation with its suppliers and customers. In many of these cases, it is easy to specify how these socially com- plex resources add value to a firm. Hence, there is little or no causal ambiguity surrounding the link between them and competitive advantage.

The Edelman Trust Barometer, a comprehensive survey of public trust, has found that trust and transparency are more critical than ever.52 For the first time in the survey’s history, Edelman found in its 2014 survey that impressions of openness, sincerity, and authenticity were more important to corporate reputation in the United States than the quality of prod- ucts and services. This means trust affects tangible things such as supply chain partnerships and long-term customer loyalty. People want to partner with you because they have heard you are a credible company built through a culture of trust. In a sense, being a great com- pany to work for also makes you a great company to work with.

Are Substitutes Readily Available? The fourth requirement for a firm resource to be a source of sustainable competitive advantage is that there must be no strategically equivalent valuable resources that are themselves not rare or inimitable. Two valuable firm resources (or two bundles of resources) are strategically equivalent when each one can be exploited separately to implement the same strategies.

Substitutability may take at least two forms. First, though it may be impossible for a firm to imitate exactly another firm’s resource, it may be able to substitute a similar resource that enables it to develop and implement the same strategy. Clearly, a firm seeking to imitate another firm’s high-quality top management team would be unable to copy the team exactly. However, it might be able to develop its own unique management team. Though these two teams would have different ages, functional backgrounds, experience, and so on, they could be strategically equivalent and thus substitutes for one another.

Second, very different firm resources can become strategic substitutes. For example, Internet booksellers such as Amazon.com compete as substitutes for brick-and-mortar booksellers such as Barnes & Noble. The result is that resources such as premier retail loca- tions become less valuable. In a similar vein, several pharmaceutical firms have seen the value of patent protection erode in the face of new drugs that are based on different produc- tion processes and act in different ways, but can be used in similar treatment regimes. The coming years will likely see even more radical change in the pharmaceutical industry as the substitution of genetic therapies eliminates certain uses of chemotherapy.53

To recap this section, recall that resources and capabilities must be rare and valuable as well as difficult to imitate or substitute in order for a firm to attain competitive advantages that are sustainable over time.54 Exhibit 3.7 illustrates the relationship among the four crite- ria of sustainability and shows the competitive implications.

In firms represented by the first row of Exhibit 3.7, managers are in a difficult situation. When their resources and capabilities do not meet any of the four criteria, it would be dif- ficult to develop any type of competitive advantage, in the short or long term. The resources and capabilities they possess enable the firm neither to exploit environmental opportunities nor to neutralize environmental threats. In the second and third rows, firms have resources and capabilities that are valuable as well as rare, respectively. However, in both cases the resources and capabilities are not difficult for competitors to imitate or substitute. Here, the

social complexity a characteristic of a firm’s resources that is costly to imitate because the social engineering required is beyond the capability of competitors, including interpersonal relations among managers, organizational culture, and reputation with suppliers and customers.

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Is a Resource or Capability . . .

Valuable? Rare? Difficult to Imitate?

Without Substitutes?

Implication for Competitiveness

No No No No Competitive disadvantage

Yes No No No Competitive parity

Yes Yes No No Temporary competitive advantage

Yes Yes Yes Yes Sustainable competitive advantage

Source: Adapted from Barney, J. B. 1991. Firm Resources and Sustained Competitive Advantage. Journal of Management, 17: 99–120.

EXHIBIT 3.7 Criteria for Sustainable Competitive Advantage and Strategic Implications

firms could attain some level of competitive parity. They could perform on par with equally endowed rivals or attain a temporary competitive advantage. But their advantages would be easy for competitors to match. It is only in the fourth row, where all four criteria are satis- fied, that competitive advantages can be sustained over time. Next, let’s look at Blockbuster and see how its competitive advantage, which seemed to be sustainable for a rather long period of time, eventually eroded, leading to the company’s bankruptcy in 2011.

Blockbuster Inc.: From Sustainable (?) Advantage to Bankruptcy Blockbuster Video failed to recognize in time the threat posed to its brick-and-mortar business by virtual services such as Netflix.55 At the time, few thought that consumers would trade the convenience of picking up their videos to waiting for them to arrive in the mail. Interestingly, Blockbuster had the chance to buy Netflix for $50 million in 2000 but turned down the opportunity. Barry McCarthy, Netflix’s former chief financial officer, recalls the conversation during a meeting with Blockbuster’s top executives: Reed Hastings, Netflix’s cofounder, “had the chutzpah to propose to them that we run their brand online and that they run (our) brand in the stores and they just about laughed us out of the office. At least initially, they thought we were a very small niche business.”

Users, of course, embraced the automated self-service of Netflix’s web-based interface technology that positioned the start-up to transition from mailing DVDs to streaming con- tent over the Internet. As technologies improved broadband speed, reliability, and adoption, Netflix transitioned in just a few years to a cloud-based service.

Blockbuster tried to follow each of Netflix’s strategic moves. However, it remained a perennial second in the winner-take-all market for new ways to distribute entertainment content. Blockbuster continued to lag, weighed down by the high labor costs and real estate costs of its once-dominant locations—assets that became liabilities. In 2011, after closing some 900 stores, the company declared bankruptcy.

In the end, Blockbuster’s assets were acquired for only $320 million by satellite television maverick Dish Networks, which was mainly interested in Blockbuster’s online channel and 3.3 million customers. Had Blockbuster sold out earlier, or found a way to shed the physical assets sooner, that price could have been much higher. In 1999, the year Netflix launched its online subscription service, Blockbuster was valued at nearly $3 billion—nearly 10 times what Dish ultimately paid. Netflix, on the other hand, had a market cap of $21 billion by the end of 2014.

The Generation and Distribution of a Firm’s Profits: Extending the Resource-Based View of the Firm The resource-based view of the firm is useful in determining when firms will create competi- tive advantages and enjoy high levels of profitability. However, it has not been developed to

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address how a firm’s profits (often referred to as “rents” by economists) will be distributed to a firm’s management and employees or other stakeholders such as customers, suppliers, or governments.56 This is an important issue because firms may be successful in creating competitive advantages that can be sustainable for a period of time. However, much of the profits can be retained (or “appropriated”) by a firm’s employees and managers or other stakeholders instead of flowing to the firm’s owners (i.e., the stockholders).*

Consider Viewpoint DataLabs, a subsidiary of software giant Computer Associates, that makes sophisticated three-dimensional models and textures for film production houses, video games, and car manufacturers. This example will help to show how employees are often able to obtain (or “appropriate”) a high proportion of a firm’s profits:

Walter Noot, head of production, was having trouble keeping his highly skilled Generation X employees happy with their compensation. Each time one of them was lured away for more money, everyone would want a raise. “We were having to give out raises every six months—30 to 40 percent—then six months later they’d expect the same. It was a big struggle to keep people happy.”57

Here, much of the profits is being generated by the highly skilled professionals working together. They are able to exercise their power by successfully demanding more financial compensation. In part, management has responded favorably because they are united in their demands and their work involves a certain amount of social complexity and causal ambiguity—given the complex, coordinated efforts that their work entails.

Four factors help explain the extent to which employees and managers will be able to obtain a proportionately high level of the profits that they generate:58

• Employee bargaining power. If employees are vital to forming a firm’s unique capability, they will earn disproportionately high wages. For example, marketing professionals may have access to valuable information that helps them to understand the intricacies of customer demands and expectations, or engineers may understand unique technical aspects of the products or services. Additionally, in some industries such as consulting, advertising, and tax preparation, clients tend to be very loyal to individual professionals employed by the firm, instead of to the firm itself. This enables them to “take the clients with them” if they leave. This enhances their bargaining power.

• Employee replacement cost. If employees’ skills are idiosyncratic and rare (a source of resource-based advantages), they should have high bargaining power based on the high cost required by the firm to replace them. For example, Raymond Ozzie, the software designer who was critical in the development of Lotus Notes, was able to dictate the terms under which IBM acquired Lotus.

• Employee exit costs. This factor may tend to reduce an employee’s bargaining power. An individual may face high personal costs when leaving the organization. Thus, that individual’s threat of leaving may not be credible. In addition, an employee’s expertise may be firm-specific and of limited value to other firms.

• Manager bargaining power. Managers’ power is based on how well they create resource-based advantages. They are generally charged with creating value through the process of organizing, coordinating, and leveraging employees as well as other forms of capital such as plant, equipment, and financial capital (addressed further in Chapter 4). Such activities provide managers with sources of information that may not be readily available to others.

Chapter 9 addresses the conditions under which top-level managers (such as CEOs) of large corporations have been, at times, able to obtain levels of total compensation that

* Economists define rents as profits (or prices) in excess of what is required to provide a normal return.

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would appear to be significantly disproportionate to their contributions to wealth genera- tion as well as to top executives in peer organizations. Here, corporate governance becomes a critical control mechanism. Consider shareholders’ reaction, in April 2012, to Citigroup’s proposed $15 million pay package for then-CEO Vikram Pandit.59 It was not positive, to say the least. After all, they had suffered a 92 percent decline in the stock’s price under Pandit’s five-year reign. They rejected the bank’s compensation proposal. In October 2012, the board ousted Pandit after the New York–based firm failed to secure Federal Reserve approval to increase its shareholder payouts and Moody’s Investors Service cut the bank’s credit rating two levels.

Such diversion of profits from the owners of the business to top management is far less likely when the board members are truly independent outsiders (i.e., they do not have close ties to management). In general, given the external market for top talent, the level of com- pensation that executives receive is based on factors similar to the ones just discussed that determine the level of their bargaining power.60

In addition to employees and managers, other stakeholder groups can also appropriate a portion of the rents generated by a firm. If, for example, a critical input is controlled by a monopoly supplier or if a single buyer accounts for most of a firm’s sales, this supplier’s or buyer’s bargaining power can greatly erode the potential profits of a firm. Similarly, exces- sive taxation by governments can also reduce what is available to a firm’s stockholders.

EVALUATING FIRM PERFORMANCE: TWO APPROACHES This section addresses two approaches to use when evaluating a firm’s performance. The first is financial ratio analysis, which, generally speaking, identifies how a firm is perform- ing according to its balance sheet, income statement, and market valuation. As we will discuss, when performing a financial ratio analysis, you must take into account the firm’s performance from a historical perspective (not just at one point in time) as well as how it compares with both industry norms and key competitors.61

The second perspective takes a broader stakeholder view. Firms must satisfy a broad range of stakeholders, including employees, customers, and owners, to ensure their long- term viability. Central to our discussion will be a well-known approach—the balanced scorecard—that has been popularized by Robert Kaplan and David Norton.62

Financial Ratio Analysis The beginning point in analyzing the financial position of a firm is to compute and analyze five different types of financial ratios:

• Short-term solvency or liquidity • Long-term solvency measures • Asset management (or turnover) • Profitability • Market value

Exhibit 3.8 summarizes each of these five ratios. Appendix 1 to Chapter 13 (the Case Analysis chapter) provides detailed definitions for and

discussions of each of these types of ratios as well as examples of how each is calculated. Refer to pages 418 to 427.

A meaningful ratio analysis must go beyond the calculation and interpretation of finan- cial ratios.63 It must include how ratios change over time as well as how they are interrelated. For example, a firm that takes on too much long-term debt to finance operations will see an immediate impact on its indicators of long-term financial leverage. The additional debt will negatively affect the firm’s short-term liquidity ratio (i.e., current and quick ratios) since

financial ratio analysis a method of evaluating a company’s performance and financial well- being through ratios of accounting values, including short-term solvency, long-term solvency, asset utilization, profitability, and market value ratios.

LO 3-5 The usefulness of financial ratio analysis, its inherent limitations, and how to make meaningful comparisons of performance across firms.

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EXHIBIT 3.8 A Summary of Five Types of Financial Ratios

I. Short-term solvency, or liquidity, ratios

Current ratio =  Current assets _______________ Current liabilities

Quick ratio =  Current assets – Inventory ______________________ Current liabilities

Cash ratio =  Cash _______________ Current liabilities

II. Long-term solvency, or financial leverage, ratios

Total debt ratio =  Total assets – Total equity _____________________ Total assets

Debt-equity ratio = Total debt/Total equity

Equity multiplier = Total assets/Total equity

Times interest earned ratio =  EBIT _______ Interest

Cash coverage ratio =  EBIT + Depreciation _________________ Interest

III. Asset utilization, or turnover, ratios

Inventory turnover =  Cost of goods sold _______________ Inventory

Days’ sales in inventory =  365 days ________________ Inventory turnover

Receivables turnover =  Sales _________________ Accounts receivable

Days’ sales in receivables =  365 days _________________ Receivables turnover

Total asset turnover =  Sales __________ Total assets

Capital intensity =  Total assets __________ Sales

IV. Profitability ratios

Profit margin =  Net income __________ Sales

Return on assets (ROA) =  Net income __________ Total assets

Return on equity (ROE) =  Net income __________ Total equity

ROE =  Net income __________ Sales

× Sales ______ Assets

× Assets ______ Equity

V. Market value ratios

Price-earnings ratio =  Price per share ________________ Earnings per share

Market-to-book ratio =  Market value per share ___________________ Book value per share

the firm must pay interest and principal on the additional debt each year until it is retired. Additionally, the interest expenses deducted from revenues reduce the firm’s profitability.

A firm’s financial position should not be analyzed in isolation. Important reference points are needed. We will address some issues that must be taken into account to make financial analysis more meaningful: historical comparisons, comparisons with industry norms, and comparisons with key competitors.

Historical Comparisons When you evaluate a firm’s financial performance, it is very use- ful to compare its financial position over time. This provides a means of evaluating trends. For example, Apple Inc. reported revenues of $234 billion and net income of $53 billion in 2015. Virtually all firms would be very happy with such remarkable financial success. These figures represent a stunning annual growth in revenue and net income of 28 percent and 33 percent, respectively, over Apple’s 2014 figures. Had Apple’s revenues and net income in 2015 been $150 billion and $30 billion, respectively, it would still be a very large and highly profitable enterprise. However, such performance would have significantly damaged Apple’s market valuation and reputation as well as the careers of many of its executives.

Exhibit 3.9 illustrates a 10-year period of return on sales (ROS) for a hypothetical com- pany. As indicated by the dotted trend lines, the rate of growth (or decline) differs substan- tially over time periods.

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EXHIBIT 3.9 Historical Trends: Return on Sales (ROS) for a Hypothetical Company

20%

10%

20172008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

Years 1, 2, 3

Yea rs 4

, 5, 6

Years 8 , 9, 10

Years 6, 7, 8, 9, 10

Year

Re tu

rn o

n Sa

le s

Years 6, 7, 8

Comparison with Industry Norms When you are evaluating a firm’s financial performance, remember also to compare it with industry norms. A firm’s current ratio or profitability may appear impressive at first glance. However, it may pale when compared with industry standards or norms.

Comparing your firm with all other firms in your industry assesses relative performance. Banks often use such comparisons when evaluating a firm’s creditworthiness. Exhibit 3.10 includes a variety of financial ratios for three industries: semiconductors, grocery stores, and skilled-nursing facilities. Why is there such variation among the financial ratios for these three industries? There are several reasons. With regard to the collection period, grocery stores operate mostly on a cash basis, hence a very short collection period. Semiconductor manu- facturers sell their output to other manufacturers (e.g., computer makers) on terms such as 2/15 net 45, which means they give a 2 percent discount on bills paid within 15 days and start charging interest after 45 days. Skilled-nursing facilities also have a longer collection period than grocery stores because they typically rely on payments from insurance companies.

The industry norms for return on sales also highlight differences among these industries. Grocers, with very slim margins, have a lower return on sales than either skilled-nursing facil- ities or semiconductor manufacturers. But how might we explain the differences between

Financial Ratio Semiconductors Grocery Stores Skilled-Nursing Facilities

Quick ratio (times) 1.9 0.6 1.3

Current ratio (times) 3.6 1.7 1.7

Total liabilities to net worth (%) 35.1 72.7 82.5

Collection period (days) 48.6 3.3 36.5

Assets to sales (%) 131.7 22.1 58.3

Return on sales (%)  24   1.1 3.1

Source: Dun & Bradstreet. Industry Norms and Key Business Ratios, 2010–2011. One Year Edition, SIC #3600–3699 (Semiconductors); SIC #5400–5499 (Grocery Stores); SIC #8000–8099 (Skilled-Nursing Facilities). New York: Dun & Bradstreet Credit Services.

EXHIBIT 3.10 How Financial Ratios Differ across Industries

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skilled-nursing facilities and semiconductor manufacturers? Health care facilities, in general, are limited in their pricing structures by Medicare/Medicaid regulations and by insurance reimbursement limits, but semiconductor producers have pricing structures determined by the market. If their products have superior performance, semiconductor manufacturers can charge premium prices.

Comparison with Key Competitors Recall from Chapter 2 that firms with similar strate- gies are members of a strategic group in an industry. Furthermore, competition is more intense among competitors within groups than across groups. Thus, you can gain valuable insights into a firm’s financial and competitive position if you make comparisons between a firm and its most direct rivals. Consider a firm trying to diversify into the highly profitable pharmaceutical industry. Even if it was willing to invest several hundred million dollars, it would be virtually impossible to compete effectively against industry giants such as Pfizer and Merck. These two firms had 2015 revenues of $49 billion and $39 billion, respectively, and both had R&D budgets of over $6.5 billion.64

Integrating Financial Analysis and Stakeholder Perspectives: The Balanced Scorecard It is useful to see how a firm performs over time in terms of several ratios. However, such traditional approaches can be a double-edged sword.65 Many important transactions— investments in research and development, employee training and development, and adver- tising and promotion of key brands—may greatly expand a firm’s market potential and create significant long-term shareholder value. But such critical investments are not reflected posi- tively in short-term financial reports. Financial reports typically measure expenses, not the value created. Thus, managers may be penalized for spending money in the short term to improve their firm’s long-term competitive viability!

Now consider the other side of the coin. A manager may destroy the firm’s future value by dissatisfying customers, depleting the firm’s stock of good products coming out of R&D, or damaging the morale of valued employees. Such budget cuts, however, may lead to very good short-term financials. The manager may look good in the short run and even receive credit for improving the firm’s performance. In essence, such a manager has mastered “denominator management,” whereby decreasing investments makes the return on investment (ROI) ratio larger, even though the actual return remains constant or shrinks.

The Balanced Scorecard: Description and Benefits To provide a meaningful integration of the many issues that come into evaluating a firm’s performance, Kaplan and Norton devel- oped a “balanced scorecard.”66 This provides top managers with a fast but comprehensive view of the business. In a nutshell, it includes financial measures that reflect the results of actions already taken, but it complements these indicators with measures of customer satis- faction, internal processes, and the organization’s innovation and improvement activities— operational measures that drive future financial performance.

The balanced scorecard enables managers to consider their business from four key perspectives: customer, internal, innovation and learning, and financial. These are briefly described in Exhibit 3.11.

Customer Perspective Clearly, how a company is performing from its customers’ perspec- tive is a top priority for management. The balanced scorecard requires that managers trans- late their general mission statements on customer service into specific measures that reflect the factors that really matter to customers. For the balanced scorecard to work, managers must articulate goals for four key categories of customer concerns: time, quality, perfor- mance and service, and cost.

LO 3-6 The value of the “balanced scorecard” in recognizing how the interests of a variety of stakeholders can be interrelated.

balanced scorecard a method of evaluating a firm’s performance using performance measures from the customer, internal, innovation and learning, and financial perspectives.

customer perspective measures of firm performance that indicate how well firms are satisfying customers’ expectations.

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Internal Business Perspective Customer-based measures are important. However, they must be translated into indicators of what the firm must do internally to meet customers’ expecta- tions. Excellent customer performance results from processes, decisions, and actions that occur throughout organizations in a coordinated fashion, and managers must focus on those critical internal operations that enable them to satisfy customer needs. The internal measures should reflect business processes that have the greatest impact on customer satisfaction. These include factors that affect cycle time, quality, employee skills, and productivity.

Innovation and Learning Perspective Given the rapid rate of markets, technologies, and global competition, the criteria for success are constantly changing. To survive and prosper, managers must make frequent changes to existing products and services as well as introduce entirely new products with expanded capabilities. A firm’s ability to do well from an innova- tion and learning perspective is more dependent on its intangible than tangible assets. Three categories of intangible assets are critically important: human capital (skills, talent, and knowledge), information capital (information systems, networks), and organization capital (culture, leadership).

Financial Perspective Measures of financial performance indicate whether the company’s strategy, implementation, and execution are indeed contributing to bottom-line improve- ment. Typical financial goals include profitability, growth, and shareholder value. Periodic financial statements remind managers that improved quality, response time, productivity, and innovative products benefit the firm only when they result in improved sales, increased market share, reduced operating expenses, or higher asset turnover.67

A key implication is that managers do not need to look at their job as balancing stake- holder demands. They must avoid the following mind-set: “How many units in employee satisfaction do I have to give up to get some additional units of customer satisfaction or profits?” Instead, the balanced scorecard provides a win–win approach—increasing satis- faction among a wide variety of organizational stakeholders, including employees (at all levels), customers, and stockholders.

Limitations and Potential Downsides of the Balanced Scorecard There is general agreement that there is nothing inherently wrong with the concept of the balanced scorecard.68 The key limitation is that some executives may view it as a “quick fix” that can be easily installed. If managers do not recognize this from the beginning and fail to commit to it long term, the organization will be disappointed. Poor execution becomes the cause of such performance outcomes. And organizational scorecards must be aligned with individuals’ scorecards to turn the balanced scorecards into a powerful tool for sustained performance.

In a study of 50 Canadian medium-size and large organizations, the number of users expressing skepticism about scorecard performance was much greater than the num- ber claiming positive results. A large number of respondents agreed with the statement “Balanced scorecards don’t really work.” Some representative comments included: “It became just a number-crunching exercise by accountants after the first year,” “It is just the latest management fad and is already dropping lower on management’s list of priorities as all fads eventually do,” and “If scorecards are supposed to be a measurement tool, why is it so hard to measure their results?” There is much work to do before scorecards can become a viable framework to measure sustained strategic performance.

internal business perspective measures of firm performance that indicate how well firms’ internal processes, decisions, and actions are contributing to customer satisfaction.

innovation and learning perspective measures of firm performance that indicate how well firms are changing their product and service offerings to adapt to changes in the internal and external environments.

financial perspective measures of firms’ financial performance that indicate how well strategy, implementation, and execution are contributing to bottom-line improvement.

EXHIBIT 3.11 The Balanced Scorecard’s Four Perspectives

• How do customers see us? (customer perspective) • What must we excel at? (internal business perspective) • Can we continue to improve and create value? (innovation and learning perspective) • How do we look to shareholders? (financial perspective)

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ISSUE FOR DEBATE

Even as malls around the country see store after store closing, online retailers, both large and small, have started exploring opening brick-and-mortar stores. Amazon has opened a physical bookstore in Seattle’s University Village and has plans to open 200 stores. Fabletics, an online athletic clothing retailer, opened six physical stores in the second half of 2016. Birchbox, an online beauty supply store, opened its first brick-and-mortar store in the trendy Soho District of New York City.

There are both potential benefits and pitfalls in opening these physical stores. These online firms are striving to grow the awareness of their brand and build their market position with these stores. They can leverage their customer databases to identify the markets with the greatest potential. Online retailers collect an enormous amount of data about their customers and can base their physical stores in areas where the local demographics suggest there is the greatest density of potential customers. Opening physical stores also offers them the potential to offer a richer experience to their customers. In stores, customers can try on or test the retailer’s products and can be brought in for promotional events and seminars related to the firm’s products—things that are much more difficult in the online space. Some online retailers, such as Bonobos and Blue Nile, use their stores solely as showrooms where customers try on clothing or jewelry and then order whatever they want online for home delivery. Finally, opening physical stores allows the firm to attract a new set of customers, those who do not regularly shop online.

There are also new challenges in opening physical stores. First, having physical stores requires a significant financial investment. The cost to rent and physically set up store locations can be quite steep, especially in high traffic areas such as New York City and Chicago—the most common targets for initial locations. Second, it can reduce the flexibility of the firm. Store leases typically last several years, leaving firms stuck if the location turns out to be less successful than expected. Also, housing inventory in a range of locations requires longer planning and greater investment than having an online-only model. Third, online store operators have to learn new competencies to compete with physical stores. Online retailers typically have limited experience in predicting consumer demand months ahead of time, a foremost skill needed by brick-and-mortar retailers to be able to stock products in stores. They also don’t have experience in staffing, training, and compensating the personnel needed in a physical store. In physical stores, the sales associate is a key asset, but online retailers are more adept at hiring and organizing work for IT, web- marketing, and logistics personnel. Fourth, the legal requirements for running physical stores are more complex. This can include taxation and permitting laws, but the most complex may be the myriad of employment and labor laws that retailers face when they operate in different cities or states.

Problems often occur in the balanced scorecard implementation efforts when the commitment to learning is insufficient and employees’ personal ambitions are included. Without a set of rules for employees that address continuous process improvement and the personal improvement of individual employees, there will be limited employee buy-in and insufficient cultural change. Thus, many improvements may be temporary and superficial. Often, scorecards that failed to attain alignment and improvements dissipated very quickly. And, in many cases, management’s efforts to improve performance were seen as divisive and were viewed by employees as aimed at benefiting senior management compensation. This fostered a “what’s in it for me?” attitude.

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Reflecting on Career Implications . . . The Value Chain: It is important that you develop an

understanding of your firm’s value chain. What activities are most critical for attaining competitive advantage? Think of ways in which you can add value in your firm’s value chain. How might your firm’s support activities (e.g., information technology, human resource practices) help you accomplish your assigned tasks more effectively? How will you bring your value-added contribution to the attention of your superiors?

The Value Chain: Consider the most important linkages between the activities you perform in your organization with other activities both within your firm and between your firm and its suppliers, customers, and alliance partners. Understanding and strengthening these linkages can

contribute greatly to your career advancement within your current organization.

Resource-Based View of the Firm: Are your skills and talents rare, valuable, and difficult to imitate, and do they have few substitutes? If so, you are in the better position to add value for your firm—and earn rewards and incentives. How can your skills and talents be enhanced to help satisfy these criteria to a greater extent? Get more training? Change positions within the firm? Consider career options at other organizations?

Balanced Scorecard: Can you design a balanced scorecard for your life? What perspectives would you include in it? In what ways would such a balanced scorecard help you attain success in life?

In the traditional approaches to assessing a firm’s internal environment, the primary goal of managers would be to determine their firm’s relative strengths and weaknesses. Such is the role of SWOT analysis, wherein managers

analyze their firm’s strengths and weaknesses as well as the opportunities and threats in the external environment. In this chapter, we discussed why this may be a good starting point but hardly the best approach to take in performing a sound analysis. There are many limitations to SWOT analysis, including its static perspective, its potential to overemphasize a single dimension of a firm’s strategy, and the likelihood that a firm’s strengths do not necessarily help the firm create value or competitive advantages.

We identified two frameworks that serve to complement SWOT analysis in assessing a firm’s internal environment: value-chain analysis and the resource-based view of the firm. In conducting a value-chain analysis, first divide the firm into a series of value-creating activities. These include primary activities such as inbound logistics, operations, and service as well as support activities such as procurement and human resource management. Then analyze how each activity adds value as well as how interrelationships among value activities

in the firm and among the firm and its customers and suppliers add value. Thus, instead of merely determining a firm’s strengths and weaknesses per se, you analyze them in the overall context of the firm and its relationships with customers and suppliers—the value system.

The resource-based view of the firm considers the firm as a bundle of resources: tangible resources, intangible resources, and organizational capabilities. Competitive advantages that are sustainable over time generally arise from the creation of bundles of resources and capabilities. For advantages to be sustainable, four criteria must be satisfied: value, rarity, difficulty in imitation, and difficulty in substitution. Such an evaluation requires a sound knowledge of the competitive context in which the firm exists. The owners of a business may not capture all of the value created by the firm. The appropriation of value created by a firm between the owners and employees is determined by four factors: employee bargaining power, replacement cost, employee exit costs, and manager bargaining power.

An internal analysis of the firm would not be complete unless you evaluate its performance and make the appropriate comparisons. Determining a firm’s performance requires an analysis of its financial situation as well as a review of how well it is satisfying a broad range of stakeholders, including

summary

Discussion Questions 1. Will online retailers, in general, experience a positive outcome in opening physical stores? 2. For what types of online retailers does opening stores make the most sense? Why? 3. Is it more challenging for traditional retailers to build an online space, or for online retailers

to build a physical store presence? Sources: Briggs, F. 2015. Shift of online brands to bricks & mortar stores set to create omni-channel experience for malls. forbes.com. August 11: np; Walsh, M. 2016. The future of e-commerce: bricks and mortar. theguardian.com. January 30: np; and Bensinger, G. & Kapner, S. 2016. Online stores embrace bricks. wsj.com. February 5: np.

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customers, employees, and stockholders. We discussed the concept of the balanced scorecard, in which four perspectives must be addressed: customer, internal business, innovation and learning, and financial. Central to this concept is the idea that the interests of various stakeholders can be interrelated. We provide examples of how indicators of employee satisfaction lead to higher levels of customer satisfaction, which in turn lead to higher levels of financial performance. Thus, improving a firm’s performance does not need to involve making trade- offs among different stakeholders. Assessing the firm’s performance is also more useful if it is evaluated in terms of how it changes over time, compares with industry norms, and compares with key competitors.

SUMMARY REVIEW QUESTIONS 1. SWOT analysis is a technique to analyze the internal

and external environments of a firm. What are its advantages and disadvantages?

2. Briefly describe the primary and support activities in a firm’s value chain.

3. How can managers create value by establishing important relationships among the value-chain activities both within their firm and between the firm and its customers and suppliers?

4. Briefly explain the four criteria for sustainability of competitive advantages.

5. Under what conditions are employees and managers able to appropriate some of the value created by their firm?

6. What are the advantages and disadvantages of conducting a financial ratio analysis of a firm?

7. Summarize the concept of the balanced scorecard. What are its main advantages?

value-chain analysis 72 primary activities 72 support activities 72 inbound logistics 73 operations 73 outbound logistics 74 marketing and sales 74 service 75 procurement 76 technology development 76 human resource management 76 general administration 77

interrelationships 78 resource-based view of the firm 81 tangible resources 81 intangible resources 82 organizational capabilities 83 path dependency 85 causal ambiguity 86 social complexity 87 financial ratio analysis 90 balanced scorecard 93 customer perspective 93 internal business perspective 94 innovation and learning perspective 94 financial perspective 94

key terms

EXPERIENTIAL EXERCISE Caterpillar is a leading firm in the construction and mining equipment industry with extensive global operations. It has approximately 114,000 employees, and its revenues were $47 billion in 2015. In addition to its manufacturing and logistics operations, Caterpillar is well known for its superb service and parts supply, and it provides retail financing for its equipment.

Below, we address several questions that focus on Caterpillar’s value-chain activities and the interrelationships among them as well as whether or not the firm is able to attain sustainable competitive advantage(s).

Value-Chain Activity Yes/No How Does Caterpillar Create Value for the Customer?

Primary:

Inbound logistics

Operations

Outbound logistics

Marketing and sales

Service

Support:

Procurement

Technology development

Human resource management

General administration

1. Where in Caterpillar’s value chain is the firm creating value for its customers?

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2. What are the important relationships among Caterpillar’s value-chain activities? What are the important interdependencies? For each activity, identify the relationships and interdependencies.

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Resource/Activity Is It Valuable? Is It Rare? Are There Few Substitutes? Is It Difficult to Make?

Inbound logistics

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Outbound logistics

Marketing and sales

Service

Procurement

Technology development

Human resource management

General administration

3. What resources, activities, and relationships enable Caterpillar to achieve a sustainable competitive advantage?

APPLICATION QUESTIONS & EXERCISES 1. Using published reports, select two CEOs who have

recently made public statements regarding a major change in their firm’s strategy. Discuss how the successful implementation of such strategies requires changes in the firm’s primary and support activities.

2. Select a firm that competes in an industry in which you are interested. Drawing upon published financial reports, complete a financial ratio analysis. Based on changes over time and a comparison with industry norms, evaluate the firm’s strengths and weaknesses in terms of its financial position.

3. How might exemplary human resource practices enhance and strengthen a firm’s value-chain activities?

4. Using the Internet, look up your university or college. What are some of its key value-creating activities that provide competitive advantages? Why?

ETHICS QUESTIONS 1. What are some of the ethical issues that arise when

a firm becomes overly zealous in advertising its products?

2. What are some of the ethical issues that may arise from a firm’s procurement activities? Are you aware of any of these issues from your personal experience or businesses you are familiar with?

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1. Lapowski, I. 2013. Ev Williams on Twitter’s early years, inc.com. October 4: np; Shen, L. 2016. Here’s why Twitter’s stock is plunging. fortune. com. October 15: np; Luckerson, V. 2016. This one chart explains why Twitter is in trouble. time.com. February 10: np; Covert, J. 2016. Twitter tanks as company struggles to find a buyer. nypost.com. October 10: np; Thomas, L. 2016. Twitter struggles to lure advertisers despite user growth. cnbc.com. July 26: np; statista.com.

2. Our discussion of the value chain will draw on Porter, M. E. 1985. Competitive advantage: chap. 2. New York: Free Press.

3. Dyer, J. H. 1996. Specialized supplier networks as a source of competitive advantage: Evidence from the auto industry. Strategic Management Journal, 17: 271–291.

4. For an insightful perspective on value- chain analysis, refer to Stabell, C. B. & Fjeldstad, O. D. 1998. Configuring value for competitive advantage: On chains, shops, and networks. Strategic Management Journal, 19: 413–437. The authors develop concepts of value chains, value shops, and value networks to extend the value- creation logic across a broad range of industries. Their work builds on the seminal contributions of Porter, 1985, op. cit., and others who have addressed how firms create value through key interrelationships among value-creating activities.

5. Ibid. 6. Maynard, M. 1999. Toyota promises

custom order in 5 days. USA Today, August 6: B1.

7. Shaw Industries. 1999. Annual report: 14– 15.

8. Fisher, M. L. 1997. What is the right supply chain for your product? Harvard Business Review, 75(2): 105– 116.

9. Jackson, M. 2001. Bringing a dying brand back to life. Harvard Business Review, 79(5): 53–61.

10. Anderson, J. C. & Nmarus, J. A. 2003. Selectively pursuing more of your customer’s business. MIT Sloan Management Review, 44(3): 42–50.

11. Insights on advertising are addressed in Rayport, J. F. 2008. Where is advertising going? Into ‘stitials. Harvard Business Review, 66(5): 18–20.

12. Sauer, A. 2016. Announcing the 2016 brandcameo product placement awards. brandchannel.com. February 24: np.

13. For a scholarly discussion on the procurement of technology components, read Hoetker, G. 2005. How much you know versus how well I know you: Selecting a supplier for a technically innovative component. Strategic Management Journal, 26(1): 75–96.

14. For a discussion on criteria to use when screening suppliers for back- office functions, read Feeny, D., Lacity, M., & Willcocks, L. P. 2005. Taking the measure of outsourcing providers. MIT Sloan Management Review, 46(3): 41–48.

15. For a study investigating sourcing practices, refer to Safizadeh, M. H., Field, J. M., & Ritzman, L. P. 2008. Sourcing practices and boundaries of the firm in the financial services industry. Strategic Management Journal, 29(1): 79–92.

16. Imperato, G. 1998. How to give good feedback. Fast Company, September: 144– 156.

17. Imperato, G., “How Microsoft Reviews Suppliers,” Fast Company, September 1998.

18. Bensaou, B. M. & Earl, M. 1998. The right mindset for managing information technology. Harvard Business Review, 96(5): 118– 128.

19. A discussion of R&D in the pharmaceutical industry is in Garnier, J-P. 2008. Rebuilding the R&D engine in big pharma. Harvard Business Review, 66(5): 68–76.

20. Chick, S. E., Huchzermeier, A., & Netessine, S. 2014. Europe’s solution factories. Harvard Business Review, 92(4): 111–115.

21. Ulrich, D. 1998. A new mandate for human resources. Harvard Business Review, 96(1): 124– 134.

22. A study of human resource management in China is Li, J., Lam, K., Sun, J. J. M., & Liu, S. X. Y. 2008. Strategic resource management, institutionalization, and employment modes: An empirical study in China. Strategic Management Journal, 29(3): 337–342.

23. Wood, J. 2003. Sharing jobs and working from home: The new face of the airline industry. AviationCareer. net: February 21.

24. Gellman, L. 2015. When a job offer comes without a job. Wall Street Journal. December 2: B1, B7.

25. For insights on the role of information systems integration in fostering innovation, refer to Cash, J. I. Jr., Earl, M. J., & Morison, R.

2008. Teaming up to crack innovation and enterprise integration. Harvard Business Review, 66(11): 90–100.

26. For a cautionary note on the use of IT, refer to McAfee, A. 2003. When too much IT knowledge is a dangerous thing. MIT Sloan Management Review, 44(2): 83–90.

27. For an interesting perspective on some of the potential downsides of close customer and supplier relationships, refer to Anderson, E. & Jap, S. D. 2005. The dark side of close relationships. MIT Sloan Management Review, 46(3): 75–82.

28. Day, G. S. 2003. Creating a superior customer-relating capability. MIT Sloan Management Review, 44(3): 77–82.

29. To gain insights on the role of electronic technologies in enhancing a firm’s connections to outside suppliers and customers, refer to Lawrence, T. B., Morse, E. A., & Fowler, S. W. 2005. Managing your portfolio of connections. MIT Sloan Management Review, 46(2): 59–66.

30. IBM Global CEO Study, p. 27. 31. Verhoef, P. C., Beckers, S. F. M.,

& van Doorn, J. 2013. Understand the perils of co-creation. Harvard Business Review, 91(9): 28; and Winston, A. S. 2014. The big pivot. Boston: Harvard Business Review Press.

32. Collis, D. J. & Montgomery, C. A. 1995. Competing on resources: Strategy in the 1990’s. Harvard Business Review, 73(4): 119– 128; and Barney, J. 1991. Firm resources and sustained competitive advantage. Journal of Management, 17(1): 99– 120.

33. For critiques of the resource-based view of the firm, refer to Sirmon, D. G., Hitt, M. A., & Ireland, R. D. 2007. Managing firm resources in dynamic environments to create value: Looking inside the black box. Academy of Management Review, 32(1): 273–292; and Newbert, S. L. 2007. Empirical research on the resource-based view of the firm: An assessment and suggestions for future research. Strategic Management Journal, 28(2): 121–146.

34. Henkoff, R. 1993. Companies that train the best. Fortune, March 22: 83; and Dess & Picken, Beyond productivity, p. 98.

35. Gaines-Ross, L. 2010. Reputation warfare. Harvard Business Review, 88(12): 70–76.

36. Barney, J. B. 1986. Types of competition and the theory of

REFERENCES

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strategy: Towards an integrative framework. Academy of Management Review, 11(4): 791–800.

37. Harley-Davidson. 1993. Annual report.

38. Stetler, B. 2008. Griping online? Comcast hears and talks back. nytimes.com, July 25: np.

39. For a rigorous, academic treatment of the origin of capabilities, refer to Ethiraj, S. K., Kale, P., Krishnan, M. S., & Singh, J. V. 2005. Where do capabilities come from and how do they matter? A study of the software services industry. Strategic Management Journal, 26(1): 25–46.

40. For an academic discussion on methods associated with organizational capabilities, refer to Dutta, S., Narasimhan, O., & Rajiv, S. 2005. Conceptualizing and measuring capabilities: Methodology and empirical application. Strategic Management Journal, 26(3): 277–286.

41. Lorenzoni, G. & Lipparini, A. 1999. The leveraging of interfirm relationships as a distinctive organizational capability: A longitudinal study. Strategic Management Journal, 20: 317–338.

42. Andersen, M. M. op. cit, p. 209. 43. A study investigating the

sustainability of competitive advantage is Newbert, S. L. 2008. Value, rareness, competitive advantages, and performance: A conceptual-level empirical investigation of the resource- based view of the firm. Strategic Management Journal, 29(7): 745–768.

44. Arikan, A. M. & McGahan, A. M. 2010. The development of capabilities in new firms. Strategic Management Journal, 31(1): 1–18.

45. Barney, J. 1991. Firm resources and sustained competitive advantage. Journal of Management, 17(1): 99–120.

46. Barney, 1986, op. cit. Our discussion of inimitability and substitution draws upon this source.

47. A study that investigates the performance implications of imitation is Ethiraj, S. K. & Zhu, D. H. 2008. Performance effects of imitative entry. Strategic Management Journal, 29(8): 797–818.

48. Sirmon, D. G., Hitt, M. A., Arregale, J.-L. & Campbell, J. T. 2010. The dynamic interplay of capability strengths and weaknesses: Investigating the bases of temporary competitive advantage. Strategic Management Journal, 31(13): 1386– 1409.

49. Scherzer, L. 2012. Groupon and deal sites see skepticism replacing promise. finance.yahoo.com, November 30: np; The dismal scoop on Groupon. 2011. The Economist, October 22: 81; Slater, D. 2012. Are daily deals done? Fast Company; and Danna, D. 2012. Groupon & daily deals competition. beta.fool.com, June 15: np.

50. Deephouse, D. L. 1999. To be different, or to be the same? It’s a question (and theory) of strategic balance. Strategic Management Journal, 20: 147–166.

51. Hagerty, J. 2015. A radical idea: Own your supply chain. Wall Street Journal. April 30: B1-B2.

52. Karlgaard, R. 2014. The soft edge. San Francisco: Jossey-Bass.

53. Yeoh, P. L. & Roth, K. 1999. An empirical analysis of sustained advantage in the U.S. pharmaceutical industry: Impact of firm resources and capabilities. Strategic Management Journal, 20: 637–653.

54. Robins, J. A. & Wiersema, M. F. 2000. Strategies for unstructured competitive environments: Using scarce resources to create new markets. In Bresser, R. F., et al. (Eds.), Winning strategies in a deconstructing world: 201–220. New York: Wiley.

55. Graser, M. 2013. Blockbuster chiefs lacked the vision to see how the industry was shifting under the video rental chain’s feet. www.variety.com, November 12: np; Kellmurray, B. 2013. Learning from Blockbuster’s failure to adapt. www.abovethefoldmag. com, November 13: np; and Downes, L. & Nunes, P. 2014. Big bang disruption. New York: Penguin.

56. Amit, R. & Schoemaker, J. H. 1993. Strategic assets and organizational rent. Strategic Management Journal, 14(1): 33–46; Collis, D. J. & Montgomery, C. A. 1995. Competing on resources: Strategy in the 1990’s. Harvard Business Review, 73(4):

118–128; Coff, R. W. 1999. When competitive advantage doesn’t lead to performance: The resource-based view and stakeholder bargaining power. Organization Science, 10(2): 119–133; and Blyler, M. & Coff, R. W. 2003. Dynamic capabilities, social capital, and rent appropriation: Ties that split pies. Strategic Management Journal, 24: 677–686.

57. Munk, N. 1998. The new organization man. Fortune, March 16: 62–74.

58. Coff, op. cit. 59. Anonymous. 2013. “All of them are

overpaid”: Bank CEOs got average 7.7% raise. www.moneynews.com, June 3: np.

60. We have focused our discussion on how internal stakeholders (e.g., employees, managers, and top executives) may appropriate a firm’s profits (or rents). For an interesting discussion of how a firm’s innovations may be appropriated by external stakeholders (e.g., customers, suppliers) as well as competitors, refer to Grant, R. M. 2002. Contemporary strategy analysis (4th ed.): 335–340. Malden, MA: Blackwell.

61. Luehrman, T. A. 1997. What’s it worth? A general manager’s guide to valuation. Harvard Business Review, 45(3): 132–142.

62. See, for example, Kaplan, R. S. & Norton, D. P. 1992. The balanced scorecard: Measures that drive performance. Harvard Business Review, 69(1): 71–79.

63. Hitt, M. A., Ireland, R. D., & Stadter, G. 1982. Functional importance of company performance: Moderating effects of grand strategy and industry type. Strategic Management Journal, 3: 315–330.

64. finance.yahoo.com. 65. Kaplan & Norton, op. cit. 66. Ibid. 67. For a discussion of the relative value

of growth versus increasing margins, read Mass, N. J. 2005. The relative value of growth. Harvard Business Review, 83(4): 102–112.

68. Our discussion draws upon: Angel, R. & Rampersad, H. 2005. Do scorecards add up? camagazine.com. May: np.; and Niven, P. 2002. Balanced scorecard step by step: Maximizing performance and maintaining results. New York: John Wiley & Sons.

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chapter

After reading this chapter, you should have a good understanding of the following learning objectives:

4 LO4-1 Why the management of knowledge professionals and knowledge itself

are so critical in today’s organizations.

LO4-2 The importance of recognizing the interdependence of attracting, developing, and retaining human capital.

LO4-3 The key role of social capital in leveraging human capital within and across the firm.

LO4-4 The importance of social networks in knowledge management and in promoting career success.

LO4-5 The vital role of technology in leveraging knowledge and human capital. LO4-6 Why “electronic” or “virtual” teams are critical in combining and

leveraging knowledge in organizations and how they can be made more effective.

LO4-7 The challenge of protecting intellectual property and the importance of a firm’s dynamic capabilities.

Recognizing a Firm’s Intellectual Assets Moving beyond a Firm’s Tangible Resources

©Anatoli Styf/Shutterstock

PART 1: STRATEGIC ANALYSIS

The 2012 bankruptcy of storied law firm Dewey & LeBoeuf LLP illustrates how even well- established firms can fail because of ineffective management of their talent. The failure of the firm is attributable to three major issues: a reliance on borrowed money, making large promises about compensation to incoming (called “lateral”) partners, and a lack of transparency about the firm’s financials.

Partnership in a major law firm, considered the brass ring in a legal career, once came with lifetime security, prestige, and entry into the 1 percent—and at times, the one-tenth of the 1 percent. However, the collapse of Dewey & LeBoeuf laid bare the increasingly Darwinian competition for lucrative clients that has afflicted even the highest ranks of the profession. Here was a firm that traced its roots to the 19th century and bore the name of a former Republican presidential candidate and New York governor, Thomas E. Dewey. The New York–based law firm once had 1,300 lawyers but filed for bankruptcy amid a huge exodus of talent and mounting debt. Few firms borrowed as much money as Dewey & LeBoeuf did—its credit line included a private bond placement of $125 million in 2010. And transparency did not seem to be one of Dewey’s strengths: Some only learned about this transaction when it surfaced in a news report. One former partner said: “I read about it in the papers. And I certainly didn’t sign off on it.”

In 2007, Dewey & LeBoeuf was formed in a widely hailed merger of insurance-and-energy- focused LeBoeuf, Lamb, Greene & McRae LLP, and Dewey Ballantine LLP. However, things soured quickly. The newly merged firm grew aggressively by making promises it ultimately couldn’t honor—guaranteeing new partners huge salaries, sometimes over $5 million a year. Legacy partners were definitely not happy that new hires were being treated better than they were and, of course, demanded pay pacts of their own. By the fall of 2011, roughly a third of the firm’s 300 partners had salary guarantees.

Large law firms sometimes woo big stars by promising to pay them a fixed amount for a year or two—regardless of the firm’s or their own financial performance. But most firms use such guarantees very sparingly. By all accounts, Dewey took this practice to an extreme and made compensation guarantees for multiple years. To make matters worse, it offered guarantees to lawyers who did not prove to be rainmakers. News of the widespread guarantees angered the rank-and-file partners at Dewey, many of whom left the firm. Dewey’s performance continued to suffer and after a round of failed merger attempts, the firm liquidated. This left thousands of staff and junior lawyers unemployed, and it became the largest law firm failure in U.S. history.

Elizabeth Sharrer, the chairwoman of 500-lawyer Holland and Hart LLP, said, “Leaders hopefully have learned a lesson that if you’re making someone a compensation deal you have to hide from our partners, it’s not a good deal.” Law firms can dissolve within weeks if spooked partners bail. Sharrer notes, “You can circle the drain really, really quickly.” Interviews with former partners, consultants, and others in the industry depict Dewey as a firm run by an insular coterie of attorneys and administrators who often withheld critical information from their partners, undermining their own credibility in the process. When the Great Recession of 2008 and 2009 hit and deep problems came to the surface, a sense of shared sacrifice and loyalty was in short supply!

LEARNING FROM MISTAKES

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Managers are always looking for stellar professionals who can take their organizations to the next level. However, attracting talent is a necessary but not sufficient condition for suc- cess. In today’s knowledge economy, it does not matter how big your stock of resources is—whether it be top talent, physical resources, or financial capital. Rather, the question becomes: How good is the organization at attracting top talent and leveraging that talent to produce a stream of products and services valued by the marketplace?

Clearly, Dewey & LeBoeuf failed in retaining top talent. The firm lacked transpar- ency and its partners were very resentful when they discovered that newly hired part- ners were provided with huge guaranteed pay packages. And, as noted, when major problems arose at the firm, there was very little goodwill among the legacy partners. Not surprisingly, many of them bolted and, as is frequently the case, took many of their clients with them.

In this chapter, we also address how human capital can be leveraged in an organization. We point out the important roles of social capital and technology.

THE CENTRAL ROLE OF KNOWLEDGE IN TODAY’S ECONOMY Central to our discussion is an enormous change that has accelerated over the past few decades and its implications for the strategic management of organizations.1 For most of the 20th century, managers focused on tangible resources such as land, equipment, and money as well as intangibles such as brands, image, and customer loyalty. Efforts were directed more toward the efficient allocation of labor and capital—the two traditional fac- tors of production.

How times have changed. In the last quarter century, employment in the manufacturing sector declined at a significant rate. Today only 9 percent of the U.S. workforce is employed in this sector, compared to 21 percent in 1980.2 In contrast, the service sector grew from 73 percent of the workforce in 1980 to 86 percent by 2012.

The knowledge-worker segment, in particular, is growing dramatically. Using a broad def- inition, it is estimated that knowledge workers currently outnumber other types of workers in the United States by at least four to one—they represent between a quarter and a half of all workers in advanced economies. Recent popular press has gone so far as to suggest that, due to the increased speed and competitiveness of modern business, all modern employees are knowledge workers.

In the knowledge economy, wealth is increasingly created by effective management of knowledge workers instead of by the efficient control of physical and financial assets. The growing importance of knowledge, coupled with the move by labor markets to reward knowledge work, tells us that investing in a company is, in essence, buying a set of talents, capabilities, skills, and ideas—intellectual capital—not physical and financial resources.3

LO 4-1 Why the management of knowledge professionals and knowledge itself are so critical in today’s organizations.

knowledge economy an economy where wealth is created through the effective management of knowledge workers instead of by the efficient control of physical and financial assets.

Discussion Questions 1. How could these problems have been avoided at Dewey & LeBoeuf? 2. What practices should firms such as Dewey & LeBoeuf implement to attract and retain top

talent?

Sources: Randazzo, S. 2015. Lessons from the Dewey debacle. The Wall Street Journal. October 20: B2; Stewart, J. B. 2014. The rise and fall of a rainmaker. nytimes.com. December 12: np; Longstreth, A. & Raymond, N. 2012. The Dewey chronicles: The rise and fall of a legal titan, reuters.com. May 11: np; and Frank, A. D. 2012. The end of an era. fortune.com. May 29: np.

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EXHIBIT 4.1 Ratio of Market Value to Book Value for Selected Companies

Company Annual Sales

($ billions) Market Value

($ billions) Book Value ($ billions)

Ratio of Market to Book Value

Microsoft 85.3 486.8 72.0 6.8

Apple 215.6 627.0 128.3 4.9

Alphabet (parent of Google) 75.0 564.9 120.3 4.7

Oracle 37.0 160.8 47.3 3.4

Intel 55.4 174.0 61.1 2.8

Nucor 16.4 19.3 7.4 2.6

General Motors 152.4 57.2 39.9 1.4

Note: The data on market valuations are as of January 13, 2017. All other financial data are based on the most recently available balance sheets and income statements.

Source: finance.yahoo.com.

Human capital is growing more valuable in virtually every business.4 This trend has been going on for decades as ever fewer workers function as low-maintenance machines— for example, turning a wrench in a factory—and more become thinkers and creators. Intangible assets, mostly derived from human capital, have soared from 17 percent of the S&P 500’s market value in 1975 to 84 percent in 2015, according to the advisory firm Ocean Tomo. Even a manufacturer such as Stryker gets 70 percent of its value from intan- gibles; it makes replacement knees, hips, and other joints that are, in essence, loaded with intellectual capital.

To apply some numbers to our arguments, let’s ask, Whats a company worth?5 Start with the “big three” financial statements: income statement, balance sheet, and statement of cash flow. If these statements tell a story that investors find useful, then a company’s market value* should roughly (but not precisely, because the market looks forward and the books look backward) be the same as the value that accountants ascribe to it—the book value of the firm. However, this is not the case. A study compared the market value with the book value of 3,500 U.S. companies over a period of two decades. In 1978 the two were similar: Book value was 95 percent of market value. However, market values and book values have diverged significantly. By January 2017, the S&P industrials were—on average—trading at 2.96 times book value.6 Robert A. Howell, an expert on the changing role of finance and accounting, muses, “The big three financial statements . . . are about as useful as an 80-year- old Los Angeles road map.”

The gap between a firms market value and book value is far greater for knowledge- intensive corporations than for firms with strategies based primarily on tangible assets.7 Exhibit 4.1 shows the ratio of market-to-book value for some well-known companies. In firms where knowledge and the management of knowledge workers are relatively important contributors to developing products and services—and physical resources are less critical— the ratio of market-to-book value tends to be much higher.

As shown in Exhibit 4.1, firms such as Apple, Alphabet (parent of Google), Microsoft, and Oracle have very high market value to book value ratios because of their high investment in knowledge resources and technological expertise. In contrast, firms in more traditional industry sectors such as Nucor and Southwest Airlines have relatively low market-to-book

* The market value of a firm is equal to the value of a share of its common stock times the number of shares outstanding. The book value of a firm is primarily a measure of the value of its tangible assets. It can be calculated by the formula Total assets – Total liabilities.

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ratios. This reflects their greater investment in physical resources and lower investment in knowledge resources. A firm like Intel has a market-to-book value ratio that falls between the above two groups of firms. This is because its high level of investment in knowledge resources is matched by a correspondingly huge investment in plant and equipment. For example, Intel invested $3 billion to build a fabrication facility in Chandler, Arizona.8

Many writers have defined intellectual capital as the difference between a firms market value and book value—that is, a measure of the value of a firm’s intangible assets.9 This broad definition includes assets such as reputation, employee loyalty and commitment, cus- tomer relationships, company values, brand names, and the experience and skills of employ- ees.10 Thus, simplifying, we have:

Intellectual capital = Market value of firm – Book value of firm How do companies create value in the knowledge-intensive economy? The general

answer is to attract and leverage human capital effectively through mechanisms that create products and services of value over time.

First, human capital is the “individual capabilities, knowledge, skills, and experience of the company’s employees and managers.”11 This knowledge is relevant to the task at hand, as well as the capacity to add to this reservoir of knowledge, skills, and experience through learning.12

Second, social capital is “the network of relationships that individuals have throughout the organization.” Relationships are critical in sharing and leveraging knowledge and in acquiring resources.13 Social capital can extend beyond the organizational boundaries to include relationships between the firm and its suppliers, customers, and alliance partners.14

Third is the concept of “knowledge,” which comes in two different forms. First, there is explicit knowledge that is codified, documented, easily reproduced, and widely distributed, such as engineering drawings, software code, and patents.15 The other type of knowledge is tacit knowledge. That is in the minds of employees and is based on their experiences and back- grounds.16 Tacit knowledge is shared only with the consent and participation of the individual.

New knowledge is constantly created through the continual interaction of explicit and tacit knowledge. Consider two software engineers working together on a computer code. The computer code is the explicit knowledge. By sharing ideas based on each individual’s experience—that is, their tacit knowledge—they create new knowledge when they modify the code. Another important issue is the role of “socially complex processes,” which include leadership, culture, and trust.17 These processes play a central role in the creation of knowl- edge.18 They represent the “glue” that holds the organization together and helps to create a working environment where individuals are more willing to share their ideas, work in teams, and, in the end, create products and services of value.19

Numerous books have been written on the subject of knowledge management and the central role that it has played in creating wealth in organizations and countries throughout the developed world.20 Here, we focus on some of the key issues that organizations must address to compete through knowledge.

We will now turn our discussion to the central resource itself—human capital—and some guidelines on how it can be attracted/selected, developed, and retained.21 Tom Stewart, former editor of the Harvard Business Review, noted that organizations must also undergo significant efforts to protect their human capital. A firm may “diversify the ownership of vital knowledge by emphasizing teamwork, guard against obsolescence by developing learning programs, and shackle key people with golden handcuffs.”22 In addition, people are less likely to leave an organization if there are effective structures to promote teamwork and information sharing, strong leadership that encourages innovation, and cultures that demand excellence and ethical behavior. Such issues are central to this chapter. Although we touch on these issues through- out this chapter, we provide more detail in later chapters. We discuss organizational controls (culture, rewards, and boundaries) in Chapter 9, organization structure and design in Chapter 10, and a variety of leadership and entrepreneurship topics in Chapters 11 and 12.

intellectual capital the difference between the market value of the firm and the book value of the firm, including assets such as reputation, employee loyalty and commitment, customer relationships, company values, brand names, and the experience and skills of employees.

human capital the individual capabilities, knowledge, skills, and experience of a company’s employees and managers.

social capital the network of friendships and working relationships between talented people both inside and outside the organization.

explicit knowledge knowledge that is codified, documented, easily reproduced, and widely distributed.

tacit knowledge knowledge that is in the minds of employees and is based on their experiences and backgrounds.

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HUMAN CAPITAL: THE FOUNDATION OF INTELLECTUAL CAPITAL

Take away my people, but leave my factories and soon grass will grow on the factory floors. . . . . Take away my factories, but leave my people and soon we will have a new and better factory.23

—Andrew Carnegie, Steel industry legend

The importance of talent to organization success is hardly new. Organizations must recruit talented people—employees at all levels with the proper sets of skills and capabilities coupled with the right values and attitudes. Such skills and attitudes must be continually developed, strengthened, and reinforced, and each employee must be motivated and his or her efforts focused on the organization’s goals and objectives.24

The rise to prominence of knowledge workers as a vital source of competitive advantage is changing the balance of power in today’s organization.25 Knowledge workers place profes- sional development and personal enrichment (financial and otherwise) above company loyalty. Attracting, recruiting, and hiring the “best and the brightest” is a critical first step in the process of building intellectual capital. As noted by law professor Orly Lobel, talent wants to be free:26

Companies like Microsoft, Google, and Facebook are so hungry for talent that they acquire (or, as the tech-buzz is now calling it, acq-hire) entire start-ups only to discard the product and keep the teams, founders, and engineers.

Hiring is only the first of three processes in which all successful organizations must engage to build and leverage their human capital. Firms must also develop employees to ful- fill their full potential to maximize their joint contributions.27 Finally, the first two processes are for naught if firms can’t provide the working environment and intrinsic and extrinsic rewards to engage their best and brightest.28 Interestingly, a recent Gallup study showed that companies whose workers are the most engaged outperform those with the least engaged by a significant amount: 16 percent higher profitability, 18 percent higher productivity, and 25 to 49 percent lower turnover (depending on the industry).29 The last benefit can really be significant: Software leader SAP calculated that “for each percentage point that our reten- tion rate goes up or down, the impact on our operating profit is approximately $81 million.”

These activities are highly interrelated. We would like to suggest the imagery of a three- legged stool (see Exhibit 4.2).30 If one leg is weak or broken, the stool collapses.

To illustrate such interdependence, poor hiring impedes the effectiveness of develop- ment and retention processes. In a similar vein, ineffective retention efforts place additional

LO 4-2 The importance of recognizing the interdependence of attracting, developing, and retaining human capital.

EXHIBIT 4.2 Human Capital: Three Interdependent Activities

Attracting Human Capital

Developing Human Capital

Retaining Human Capital

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4.1 ENVIRONMENTAL SUSTAINABILITYSTRATEGY SPOTLIGHT CAN GREEN STRATEGIES ATTRACT AND RETAIN TALENT? Competing successfully for top talent and retaining high- performing employees are critical factors in an organization’s success. Employee recruiting and turnover are, of course, very costly. Losing and replacing a top talent can cost companies up to 200 percent of an employee’s annual salary, according to Engaged! Outbehave Your Competition to Create Customers for Life.

Today, some 40 percent of job seekers read a company’s sustainability report, according to a survey commissioned by the Global Reporting Initiative (GRI). Prospective employees can also riffle through Google in seconds and unearth a myriad of sustainability news and accolades, including an Interbrand “Top 50 Global Green Brand” ranking. Further, a 2014 study by the nonprofit group Net Impact found that business school gradu- ates would take a 15 percent pay cut to:

• Have a job that seeks to make a social or environmental difference in the world (83%)

• Have a job in a company committed to corporate and environmental responsibility (71%)

Below, we discuss an example of a green initiative by a well- known company that helps attract and retain talent: • Intel’s “Green Intel” intranet portal, environmental

sustainability network, and environmental excellence awards are beginning to yield benefits for the company. “Intel’s employee engagement has resulted in increased employee loyalty, more company pride, and improved morale,” according to Carrie Freeman, a sustainability strategist at the firm. Intel managers expect the next organizational health survey will show increased levels of employee pride and satisfaction with their work, which are considered to be good predictors of employee retention.

Sources: Anonymous. 2015. Why a commitment to sustainability can attract and retain the best talent. grantthornton.com. April 30: np; Earley, K. 2014. Sustainabilty gives HR teams an edge in attracting and retaining talent. www. theguardian.com, February 20: np; Anonymous. 2010. The business case for environmental and sustainability employee education. National Environmental Education Foundation, November: np; Mattioli, D. 2007. How going green draws talent, cuts costs. Wall Street Journal, November 13: B10; and Lederman, G. 2013. Engaged! Outbehave your competition to create customers for life. Ashland, OR: Evolve.

burdens on hiring and development. Consider the following anecdote, provided by Jeffrey Pfeffer of the Stanford University Graduate School of Business:

Not long ago, I went to a large, fancy San Francisco law firm—where they treat their associates like dog doo and where the turnover is very high. I asked the managing partner about the turnover rate. He said, “A few years ago, it was 25 percent, and now we’re up to 30 percent.” I asked him how the firm had responded to that trend. He said, “We increased our recruiting.” So I asked him, “What kind of doctor would you be if your patient was bleeding faster and faster, and your only response was to increase the speed of the transfusion?”31

Clearly, stepped-up recruiting is a poor substitute for weak retention.32 Although there are no simple, easy-to-apply answers, we can learn from what leading-edge firms are doing to attract, develop, and retain human capital in today’s highly competitive marketplace.33 Before moving on, Strategy Spotlight 4.1 addresses the importance of a firm’s “green” or environmental sustainability strategy in attracting young talent.

Attracting Human Capital

In today’s world, talent is so critical to the success of what you’re doing—their core competencies and how well they fit into your office culture. The combination can be, well, extraordinary. But only if you bring in the right people.34

—Mindy Grossman, CEO of HSN (Home Shopping Network)

The first step in the process of building superior human capital is input control: attracting and selecting the right person.35 Human resource professionals often approach employee selection from a “lock and key” mentality—that is, fit a key (a job candidate) into a lock (the job). Such an approach involves a thorough analysis of the person and the job. Only then can the right decision be made as to how well the two will fit together. How can you fail, the

CHAPTER 4 :: RECOGNIZING A FIRM’S INTELLECTUAL ASSETS 109

theory goes, if you get a precise match of knowledge, ability, and skill profiles? Frequently, however, the precise matching approach places its emphasis on task-specific skills (e.g., motor skills, specific information processing capabilities, and communication skills) and puts less emphasis on the broad general knowledge and experience, social skills, values, beliefs, and attitudes of employees.36

Many have questioned the precise matching approach. They argue that firms can identify top performers by focusing on key employee mind-sets, attitudes, social skills, and general orientations. If they get these elements right, the task-specific skills can be learned quickly. (This does not imply, however, that task-specific skills are unimportant; rather, it suggests that the requisite skill sets must be viewed as a necessary but not sufficient condition.) This leads us to a popular phrase today that serves as the title of the next subsection.

“Hire for Attitude, Train for Skill” Organizations are increasingly emphasizing gen- eral knowledge and experience, social skills, values, beliefs, and attitudes of employees.37 Consider Southwest Airlines’ hiring practices, which focus on employee values and atti- tudes. Given its strong team orientation, Southwest uses an “indirect” approach. For exam- ple, the interviewing team asks a group of employees to prepare a five-minute presentation about themselves. During the presentations, interviewers observe which candidates enthu- siastically support their peers and which candidates focus on polishing their own presenta- tions while the others are presenting.38 The former are, of course, favored.

Alan Cooper, president of Cooper Software, Inc., in Palo Alto, California, goes further. He cleverly uses technology to hone in on the problem-solving ability of his applicants and their attitudes before an interview even takes place. He has devised a “Bozo Filter,” an online test that can be applied to any industry. Before you spend time on whether job can- didates will work out satisfactorily, find out how their minds work. Cooper advised, “Hiring was a black hole. I don’t talk to bozos anymore, because 90 percent of them turn away when they see our test. It’s a self-administering bozo filter.”39 How does it work?

The online test asks questions designed to see how prospective employees approach problem-solving tasks. For example, one key question asks software engineer applicants to design a table-creation software program for Microsoft Word. Candidates provide pencil sketches and a description of the new user interface. Another question used for design communicators asks them to develop a marketing strategy for a new touch-tone phone—directed at consumers in the year 1850. Candidates e-mail their answers back to the company, and the answers are circulated around the firm to solicit feedback. Only candidates with the highest marks get interviews.

Sound Recruiting Approaches and Networking Companies that take hiring seriously must also take recruiting seriously. The number of jobs that successful knowledge-intensive companies must fill is astonishing. Ironically, many companies still have no shortage of applicants. For example, Google, which ranked first on Fortune’s 2012 and 2013 “100 Best Companies to Work For,” is planning to hire thousands of employees—even though its hir- ing rate has slowed.40 The challenge becomes having the right job candidates, not the great- est number of them.

GE Medical Systems, which builds CT scanners and magnetic resonance imaging (MRI) systems, relies extensively on networking. GE has found that current employees are the best source for new ones. Stephen Patscot, VP, human resources, made a few simple changes to double the number of referrals. First, he simplified the process—no complex forms, no bureaucracy, and so on. Second, he increased incentives. Everyone referring a qualified candidate receives a gift certificate from Sears. For referrals who are hired, the “bounty” increases to $2,000. Although this may sound like a lot of money, it is “peanuts” compared to the $15,000 to $20,000 fees that GE typically pays to headhunters for each person hired.41 Also, when someone refers a former colleague or friend for a job, his or her credibility is on

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the line. Thus, employees will be careful in recommending people for employment unless they are reasonably confident that these people are good candidates.

Attracting Millennials The Millennial generation has also been termed “Generation Y” or “Echo Boom” and includes people who were born after 1982. Many call them impatient, demanding, or entitled. However, if employers don’t provide incentives to attract and retain young workers, somebody else will. Thus, they will be at a competitive disadvantage.42

Why? Demographics are on the Millennials’ side—within a few years they will outnumber any other generation. The U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics projects that by 2020 Millennials will make up 40 percent of the workforce. Baby boomers are retiring, and Millennials will be working for the next several decades. Additionally, they have many of the requisite skills to succeed in the future workplace—tech-savviness and the ability to innovate—and they are more racially diverse than any prior generation. Thus, they are better able to relate rapidly to different customs and cultures.

A study from the Center for Work-Life Policy sums this issue up rather well: Instead of the traditional plums of prestigious title, powerful position, and concomitant compensation, Millennials value challenging and diverse job opportunities, stimulating colleagues, a well- designed communal workspace, and flexible work options. In fact, 89 percent of Millennials say that flexible work options are an important consideration in choosing an employer.

Organizations often miss out on a potential source of talent—former employees! Not everyone who leaves an organization does so because they are unhappy or dissatisfied. Instead, many leave for what they think they believe is a new opportunity. The accompany- ing “Insights from Research” text box addresses the benefits of hiring former employees (called “boomerangs”) who are willing to come back.

Developing Human Capital It is not enough to hire top-level talent and expect that the skills and capabilities of those employees remain current throughout the duration of their employment. Rather, training and development must take place at all levels of the organization.43 For example, Solectron assembles printed circuit boards and other components for its Silicon Valley clients.44 Its employees receive an average of 95 hours of company-provided training each year. Chairman Winston Chen observed, “Technology changes so fast that we estimate 20 percent of an engi- neer’s knowledge becomes obsolete each year. Training is an obligation we owe to our employ- ees. If you want high growth and high quality, then training is a big part of the equation.”

Leaders who are committed to developing the people who work for them in order to bring out their strengths and enhance their careers will have committed followers. According to James Rogers, CEO of Duke Energy: “One of the biggest things I find in organizations is that people tend to limit their perceptions of themselves and their capabilities, and one of my challenges is to open them up to the possibilities. I have this belief that anybody can do almost anything in the right context.”45

In addition to training and developing human capital, firms must encourage widespread involvement, monitor and track employee development, and evaluate human capital.46

Encouraging Widespread Involvement Developing human capital requires the active involvement of leaders at all levels. It won’t be successful if it is viewed only as the respon- sibility of the human resource department. Each year at General Electric, 200 facilitators, 30 officers, 30 human resource executives, and many young managers actively participate in GE’s orientation program at Crotonville, its training center outside New York City. Topics include global competition, winning on the global playing field, and personal exam- ination of the new employee’s core values vis-à-vis GE’s values. As a senior manager once commented, “There is nothing like teaching Sunday school to force you to confront your own values.”

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Overview The common assumption is that turnover creates vacancy problems and expenses to be avoided at all costs. However, sometimes turnover just can’t be prevented. Employees who leave an organization aren’t always unhappy—some might be willing to come back if given the opportunity. Consider “boomerang” employees as a key recruiting pool to save time and money.

What the Research Shows Researchers at Texas Christian University, the University of Cincinnati, the University of Illinois, and the University of North Carolina recently published a study in Personnel Psychology that examines why employees leave an organiza- tion and why they may be willing to return. Using a sample of 452 employees who left and returned for employment, called “boomerangs,” and 1,187 who left but had no desire to return, known as “alumni,” the authors examined these employees’ motives.

Traditional thinking about employment views employee turnover as an end state, where those who leave never want to return. However, this study suggests that this needn’t be the case. There may be value in keeping in touch with employees who leave. These findings indicate that employ- ees’ willingness to return in the future is influenced by the reasons they left in the first place: Boomerangs were statis- tically more likely to leave initially for two main reasons. First, they experienced a negative life event, such as taking care of a sick parent that necessitated a change in employ- ment. Second, they received an alternate job offer deemed too good to turn down. The research did find, however, that boomerangs are more likely to accept those alternate jobs in the same industry. Alumni, on the other hand, were sta- tistically more likely to leave because they were dissatisfied with their jobs or because they wanted to change industries.

Not all employee turnover is bad. In fact, if business leaders understand the motivations for departures, turnover may create opportunities to bring valued employees back.

Why This Matters Employee turnover is expensive. Business leaders appropri- ate considerable resources trying to minimize employee turn- over. Despite best efforts, valued employees still leave the organization. It’s an inevitable part of working life. So, what can be done about it? This study indicates that understand- ing the reasons why employees leave might be beneficial in luring them back.

Boomerang employees are appealing because the train- ing and socialization required for them is quite less than

that of other newly hired employees. The implications of this research are that not all employee turnover is bad. In fact, if business leaders understand the motives for departure, turnover may create opportunities to bring valued employ- ees back. This research underscores the essential need for an exit-interview process with all departing employees. Whether conducted in person, online, or on the phone, the interview should assess why an employee is leaving and whether he or she would be willing to return in the future. Ideally, data from the exit interview would connect to a human resource management system with performance information, to allow for easy identification of those high performers leaving for reasons other than dissatisfaction who could be recruited as boomerang employees in the future. Maintaining an active alumni program and asking current managers to identify past employees who would be on their top 10 “hire-back” list are other ways to cultivate a worthy talent pool.

Understanding why employees leave could save your organization money in the long run by broadening the pool of potential hires for future job openings. However, this is not to suggest that you should give up trying to retain val- ued employees from the start. Maintaining and fostering employee satisfaction remains crucial for reducing turnover caused by dissatisfaction. As a manager, take the initiative to monitor and address employee satisfaction levels so you can prevent your top talent from leaving in the first place.

Key Takeaways Understanding why employees leave is essential information for company recruiting strategies. Employees are more likely to return and be productive assets if they leave for reasons other than dissatisfaction. Because unhappy employees are more likely to leave and never return, you should monitor and address employee satisfaction levels on an ongoing basis.

Rehiring former employees can save money and time. Make sure your company has exit interviews and alumni programs that track potential boomerang employees.

Apply This Today Employees are going to leave your organization—that’s a fact. Understanding why they leave, though, should be a top prior- ity. By determining the reasons for departure, managers may find that valuable employees are willing to return in the future.

Research Reviewed Shipp, A. J., Furst-Holloway, S., Harris, T. B., & Rosen, B. 2014. Gone today but here tomorrow: Extending the unfold- ing model of turnover to consider boomerang employees. Personnel Psychology, 67(2): 421–462.

INSIGHTS from Research4.1

WELCOME BACK! RECRUITING BOOMERANG EMPLOYEES

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Similarly, A. G. Lafley, Procter & Gamble’s former CEO, claimed that he spent 40 per- cent of his time on personnel.47 Andy Grove, who was previously Intel’s CEO, required all senior people, including himself, to spend at least a week a year teaching high flyers. And Nitin Paranjpe, CEO of Hindustan Unilever, recruits people from campuses and regularly visits high-potential employees in their offices.

Mentoring Mentoring is most often a formal or informal relationship between two people—a senior mentor and a junior protégé.48 Mentoring can potentially be a valuable influence in professional development in both the public and private sectors. The war for tal- ent is creating challenges within organizations to recruit new talent as well as retain talent.

Mentoring can provide many benefits—to the organization as well as the individual.49 For the organization, it can help to recruit qualified managers, decrease turnover, fill senior- level positions with qualified professionals, enhance diversity initiatives with senior-level management, and facilitate organizational change efforts. Individuals can also benefit from effective mentoring programs. These benefits include helping newer employees transition into the organization, helping developmental relationships for people who lack access to informal mentoring relationships, and providing support and challenge to people on an organization’s “fast track” to positions of higher responsibility.

Mentoring is traditionally viewed as a program to transfer knowledge and experience from more senior managers to up-and-comers. However, many organizations have rein- vented it to fit today’s highly competitive, knowledge-intensive industries. For example, con- sider Intel:

Intel matches people not by job title and years of experience but by specific skills that are in demand. Lory Lanese, Intel’s mentor champion at its huge New Mexico plant (with 5,500 employees), states, “This is definitely not a special program for special people.” Instead, Intel’s program uses an intranet and email to perform the matchmaking, creating relationships that stretch across state lines and national boundaries. Such an approach enables Intel to spread best practices quickly throughout the far-flung organization. Finally, Intel relies on written contracts and tight deadlines to make sure that its mentoring program gets results—and fast.50

Intel has also initiated a mentoring program involving its technical assistants (TAs) who work with senior executives. This concept is sometimes referred to as “reverse mentoring” because senior executives benefit from the insights of professionals who have more updated technical skills—but rank lower in the organizational hierarchy. And, not surprisingly, the TAs stand to benefit quite a bit as well. Here are some insights offered by Andy Grove (for- merly Intel’s CEO):51

In the 1980s I had a marketing manager named Dennis Carter. I probably learned more from him than anyone in my career. He is a genius. He taught me what brands are. I had no idea—I thought a brand was the name on the box. He showed me the connection of brands to strategies. Dennis went on to be Chief Marketing Officer. He was the person responsible for the Pentium name, “Intel Inside”; he came up with all my good ideas.

Monitoring Progress and Tracking Development Whether a firm uses on-site formal train- ing, off-site training (e.g., universities), or on-the-job training, tracking individual progress— and sharing this knowledge with both the employee and key managers—becomes essential. Like many leading-edge firms, GlaxoSmithKline (GSK) places strong emphasis on broader experiences over longer time periods. Dan Phelan, senior vice president and director of human resources, explained, “We ideally follow a two-plus-two-plus-two formula in develop- ing people for top management positions.” This reflects the belief that GSK’s best people should gain experience in two business units, two functional units (such as finance and marketing), and two countries.

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Other companies may take a less formal approach.52 Alcoa CEO Klaus Kleinfeld says that he brings “the whole executive team into a room for two days to discuss succession planning and the talent that should be developed. We call it Talent Marketplace. In reality it is a fight for great talent.” Executives discuss the best employees and candidates for impor- tant positions and decide who goes where. “It is not rare that you say, ‘Well, that person is ready to develop,’ and people are scribbling it down,” claims Kleinfeld. “You can bet that when you’re not looking, they’re already sending notes to the person: ‘Hey, we need to talk.’”

Evaluating Human Capital In today’s competitive environment, collaboration and inter- dependence are vital to organizational success. Individuals must share their knowledge and work constructively to achieve collective, not just individual, goals. However, traditional systems evaluate performance from a single perspective (i.e., “top down”) and generally don’t address the “softer” dimensions of communications and social skills, values, beliefs, and attitudes.53

To address the limitations of the traditional approach, many organizations use 360-degree evaluation and feedback systems.54 Here, superiors, direct reports, colleagues, and even internal and external customers rate a person’s performance.55 Managers rate themselves to have a personal benchmark. The 360-degree feedback system complements teamwork, employee involvement, and organizational flattening. As organizations continue to push responsibility downward, traditional top-down appraisal systems become insufficient.56 For example, a manager who previously managed the performance of three supervisors might now be responsible for 10 and is less likely to have the in-depth knowledge needed to appraise and develop them adequately. Exhibit 4.3 provides a portion of GE’s 360-degree leadership assessment chart.

360-degree evaluation and feedback systems superiors, direct reports, colleagues, and even external and internal customers rate a person’s performance.

Vision • Has developed and communicated a clear, simple, customer-focused vision/direction for the organization.

• Forward-thinking, stretches horizons, challenges imaginations. • Inspires and energizes others to commit to Vision. Captures minds. Leads by example. • As appropriate, updates Vision to reflect constant and accelerating change affecting the

business.

Customer/Quality Focus

Integrity

Accountability/Commitment

Communication/Influence

Shared Ownership/Boundaryless

Team Builder/Empowerment

Knowledge/Expertise/Intellect

Initiative/Speed

Global Mind-Set

Note: This evaluation system consists of 10 “characteristics”—Vision, Customer/Quality Focus, Integrity, and so on. Each of these characteristics has four “performance criteria.” For illustrative purposes, the four performance criteria of “Vision” are included.

Source: Adapted from Slater, R. 1994. Get Better or Get Beaten: 152–155. Burr Ridge, IL: Irwin Professional Publishing.

EXHIBIT 4.3 An Excerpt from General Electric’s 360-Degree Leadership Assessment Chart

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At times, a firm’s performance assessment methods may get in the way of team success.57 Microsoft is an example. For many years, the software giant employed a “stack ranking” sys- tem as part of its performance evaluation model. With this system, a certain percentage of any team’s members would be rated “top performers,” “good,” “average,” “below average,” and “poor,” regardless of the team’s overall performance. Perhaps, in some situations, this type of forced ranking works. However, in Microsoft’s case, it had (not too surprisingly!) unintended consequences. Over time, according to inside reports, the stack ranking created a culture in which employees competed with one another rather than against the firm’s rivals. And “A” players rarely liked to join groups with other “A” players, because they feared they might be seen as weaker members of the team.

Retaining Human Capital It has been said that talented employees are like “frogs in a wheelbarrow.”58 They can jump out at any time! By analogy, the organization can either try to force employees to stay in the firm or try to keep them from jumping out by creating incentives.59 In other words, either today’s leaders can provide the challenges, work environment, and incentives to keep pro- ductive employees and management from wanting to bail out, or they can use legal means such as employment contracts and noncompete clauses.60 Firms must prevent the transfer of valuable and sensitive information outside the organization. Failure to do so would be the neglect of a leader’s fiduciary responsibility to shareholders. However, greater efforts should be directed at the former (e.g., challenges, good work environment, and incentives), but, as we all know, the latter (e.g., employment contracts and noncompete clauses) have their place.61

Gary Burnison, CEO of Korn/Ferry International, the world’s largest executive search firm, provides an insight on the importance of employee retention:62

How do you extend the life of an employee? This is not an environment where you work for an organization for 20 years. But if you can extend it from three years to six years, that has an enormous impact. Turnover is a huge hidden cost in a profit-and-loss statement that nobody ever focuses on. If there was a line item that showed that, I guarantee you’d have the attention of a CEO.

Identifying with an Organization’s Mission and Values People who identify with and are more committed to the core mission and values of the organization are less likely to stray or bolt to the competition. For example, take the perspective of the late Steve Jobs, Apple’s widely admired former CEO:63

When I hire somebody really senior, competence is the ante. They have to be really smart. But the real issue for me is: Are they going to fall in love with Apple? Because if they fall in love with Apple, everything else will take care of itself. They’ll want to do what’s best for Apple, not what’s best for them, what’s best for Steve, or anyone else.

“Tribal loyalty” is another key factor that links people to the organization.64 A tribe is not the organization as a whole (unless it is very small). Rather, it is teams, communities of practice, and other groups within an organization or occupation.

Brian Hall, CEO of Values Technology in Santa Cruz, California, documented a shift in people’s emotional expectations from work. From the 1950s on, a “task-first” relationship— “Tell me what the job is, and let’s get on with it”—dominated employee attitudes. Emotions and personal life were checked at the door. In the past few years, a “relationship-first” set of values has challenged the task orientation. Hall believes that it will become dominant. Employees want to share attitudes and beliefs as well as workspace.

Challenging Work and a Stimulating Environment Arthur Schawlow, winner of the 1981 Nobel Prize in physics, was asked what made the difference between highly creative and less

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creative scientists. His reply: “The labor of love aspect is very important. The most success- ful scientists often are not the most talented.65 But they are the ones impelled by curiosity. They’ve got to know what the answer is.”66 Such insights highlight the importance of intrin- sic motivation: the motivation to work on something because it is exciting, satisfying, or personally challenging.67 As noted by Jeff Immelt, former chairman and CEO of General Electric, “You want people with the self-confidence to leave, but you want them to stay. That puts pressure on you to keep work interesting.”68

Lars Sorensen, CEO of Novo Nordisk, the huge Danish pharmaceutical firm, provides a poignant perspective on how to keep employees engaged: “. . . we bring patients to see employees. We illuminate the big difference we are making. Without our medication, 24 million people would suffer. There is nothing more motivating for people than to go to work and save people’s lives.”69

Firms can also keep highly mobile employees motivated and challenged through oppor- tunities that lower barriers to an employee’s mobility within a company. For example, Shell Oil Company has created an “open sourcing” model for talent. Jobs are listed on its intranet, and, with a two-month notice, employees can go to work on anything that interests them.

Financial and Nonfinancial Rewards and Incentives Financial rewards are a vital organiza- tional control mechanism (as we will discuss in Chapter 9). Money—whether in the form of salary, bonus, stock options, and so forth—can mean many different things to people. It might mean security, recognition, or a sense of freedom and independence.

Paying people more is seldom the most important factor in attracting and retaining human capital.70 Most surveys show that money is not the most important reason why peo- ple take or leave jobs and that money, in some surveys, is not even in the top 10. Consistent with these findings, Tandem Computers (part of Hewlett-Packard) typically doesn’t tell peo- ple being recruited what their salaries would be. People who asked were told that Tandem’s salaries were competitive. If they persisted along this line of questioning, they would not be offered a position. Why? Tandem realized a rather simple idea: People who come for money will leave for money.

Another nonfinancial reward is accommodating working families with children. Balancing demands of family and work is a problem at some point for virtually all employees.

Below we discuss how Google attracts and retains talent through financial and nonfi- nancial incentives. Its unique “Google culture,” a huge attraction to potential employees, transforms a traditional workspace into a fun, feel-at-home, and flexible place to work.71

Googlers do not merely work but have a great time doing it. The Mountain View, California, headquarters includes on-site medical and dental facilities, oil change and bike repair, foosball, pool tables, volleyball courts, and free breakfast, lunch, and dinner on a daily basis at 11 gourmet restaurants. Googlers have access to training programs and receive tuition reimbursement while they take a leave of absence to pursue higher education. Google states on its website, “Though Google has grown a lot since it opened in 1998, we still maintain a small company feel.”

Our discussion of employee retention would not be complete unless we discussed some of the innovations in data analytics that have provided significant benefits to many compa- nies. We address this issue in Strategy Spotlight 4.2.

Enhancing Human Capital: Redefining Jobs and Managing Diversity Before moving on to our discussion of social capital, it is important to point out that com- panies are increasingly realizing that the payoff from enhancing their human capital can be substantial. Firms have found that redefining jobs and leveraging the benefits of a diverse workforce can go a long way in improving their performance.

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4.2 STRATEGY SPOTLIGHT WANT TO INCREASE EMPLOYEE RETENTION? TRY DATA ANALYTICS We have all heard about management by the book. Perhaps, we should consider management by the algorithm. “People analytics” is rapidly emerging as an important tool in the perpet- ual war to attract and retain talent. Companies have begun hiring data scientists as well as building or buying software that helps predict who will leave and who will make the best vice president.

According to Josh Bersin, principal at Bersin by Deloitte, the HR group at the consulting giant, “It’s like Moneyball for HR, letting you make better decisions and this year it has really peaked.” He states that the percentage of firms using predictive HR analytics has doubled from 4 percent to 8 percent and last year investors poured $2 billion in companies making apps for hiring, performance management, and wellness programs.

Several companies such as Intel Corp., Twitter, and IBM are now using sentiment-analysis software to assess how employ- ees feel about everything from diversity efforts to their prospects for promotion. Such tools enable managers to analyze text such as internal comments on blog posts or responses to open-ended questions on surveys. The goal is to automatically sort through

hundreds or thousands of comments to get a feel of where man- agement can make changes that will improve the chances that employees will remain enthusiastic about the company—and ultimately stay there.

McKinsey & Company claims that one company reduced its retention bonuses by $20 million—and employee attrition by half!—because of its use of predictive behavioral analytics. Contrary to expectations, the company discovered that limited investment in management and employee training, and inad- equate recognition, were the main drivers of staff defections. In contrast, expensive retention bonuses, which the company had turned to in desperation, turned out to be an ineffective Band-Aid.

A key advantage of the new analytics techniques over tradi- tional approaches (such as exit interviews with departing employ- ees) is that they are predictive, rather than reactive. And they definitely provide more objective information than the more qual- itative findings that one would get with a one-on-one discussion.

Sources: Alsever, J. 2016. Is software better at managing people than you are? Fortune. March 15: 41-42; King, R. 2015. Companies want to know: How do workers feel? The Wall Street Journal. October 14: R3; and, Fecheyr-Lippens, B., Schaninger, B., & Tanner, K. 2015. Power to the new people analytics. mckinsey.com. March: np.

Enhancing Human Capital: Redefining Jobs Recent research by McKinsey Global Institute suggests that by 2020, the worldwide shortage of highly skilled, college-educated workers could reach 38 to 40 million, or about 13 percent of demand.72 In response, some firms are taking steps to expand their talent pool, for example, by investing in apprenticeships and other training programs. However, some are going further: They are redefining the jobs of their experts and transferring some of their tasks to lower-skilled people inside or outside their companies, as well as outsourcing work that requires less scarce skills and is not as strategically important. Redefining high-value knowledge jobs not only can help organiza- tions address skill shortages but also can lower costs and enhance job satisfaction.

Consider the following examples:

• Orrick, Herrington & Sutcliffe, a San Francisco–based law firm with nine U.S. offices, shifted routine discovery work previously performed by partners and partner-tracked associates to a new service center in West Virginia staffed by lower-paid attorneys.

• In the United Kingdom, a growing number of public schools are relieving head teachers (or principals) of administrative tasks such as budgeting, facilities maintenance, human resources, and community relations so that they can devote more time to developing teachers.

• The Narayana Hrudayalaya Heart Hospital in Bangalore has junior surgeons, nurses, and technicians handle routine tasks such as preparing the patient for surgery and closing the chest after surgery. Senior cardiac surgeons arrive at the operating room only when the patient’s chest is open and the heart is ready to be operated on. Such an approach helps the hospital lower the cost to a fraction of the cost of U.S. providers while maintaining U.S.-level mortality and infection rates.

Breaking high-end knowledge work into highly specialized pieces involves several processes. These include identifying the gap between the talent your firm has and what it requires; creating

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narrower, more-focused job descriptions in areas where talent is scarce; selecting from various options to fill the skills gap; and rewiring processes for talent and knowledge management.

Enhancing Human Capital: Managing Diversity A combination of demographic trends and accelerating globalization of business have made the management of cultural differ- ences a critical issue.73 Workforces, which reflect demographic changes in the overall popu- lation, will be increasingly heterogeneous along dimensions such as gender, race, ethnicity, and nationality.74 Demographic trends in the United States indicate a growth in Hispanic Americans from 6.9 million in 1960 to over 35 million in 2000, with an expected increase to over 59 million by 2020 and 102 million by 2050. Similarly, the Asian American population should grow to 20 million in 2020 from 12 million in 2000 and only 1.5 million in 1970. And the African American population is expected to increase from 12.8 percent of the U.S. population in 2000 to 14.2 percent by 2025.75

Such demographic changes have implications not only for the labor pool but also for cus- tomer bases, which are also becoming more diverse.76 This creates important organizational challenges and opportunities.

The effective management of diversity can enhance the social responsibility goals of an organization.77 However, there are many other benefits as well. Six other areas where sound management of diverse workforces can improve an organization’s effectiveness and competitive advantages are (1) cost, (2) resource acquisition, (3) marketing, (4) creativity, (5) problem solving, and (6) organizational flexibility.

• Cost argument. As organizations become more diverse, firms effective in managing diversity will have a cost advantage over those that are not.

• Resource acquisition argument. Firms with excellent reputations as prospective employers for women and ethnic minorities will have an advantage in the competition for top talent. As labor pools shrink and change in composition, such advantages will become even more important.

• Marketing argument. For multinational firms, the insight and cultural sensitivity that members with roots in other countries bring to marketing efforts will be very useful. A similar rationale applies to subpopulations within domestic operations.

• Creativity argument. Less emphasis on conformity to norms of the past and a diversity of perspectives will improve the level of creativity.

• Problem-solving argument. Heterogeneity in decision-making and problem-solving groups typically produces better decisions because of a wider range of perspectives as well as more thorough analysis. Jim Schiro, former CEO of PricewaterhouseCoopers, explains, “When you make a genuine commitment to diversity, you bring a greater diversity of ideas, approaches, and experiences and abilities that can be applied to client problems. After all, six people with different perspectives have a better shot at solving complex problems than sixty people who all think alike.”78

• Organizational flexibility argument. With effective programs to enhance workplace diversity, systems become less determinant, less standardized, and therefore more fluid. Such fluidity should lead to greater flexibility to react to environmental changes. Reactions should be faster and less costly.

Most managers accept that employers benefit from a diverse workforce. However, this notion can often be very difficult to prove or quantify, particularly when it comes to deter- mining how diversity affects a firm’s ability to innovate.79

New research provides compelling evidence that diversity enhances innovation and drives market growth. This finding should intensify efforts to ensure that organizations both embody and embrace the power of differences.

Strategy Spotlight 4.3 contrasts the views that Millennials have of diversity with those of other generations, and the implications of such differences for organizations.

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4.3 STRATEGY SPOTLIGHT MILLENNIALS HAVE A DIFFERENT DEFINITION OF DIVERSITY AND INCLUSION THAN PRIOR GENERATIONS A recent study by Deloitte and the Billie Jean King Leadership Initiative (BJKLI) shows that, in general, Millennials see the con- cepts of diversity and inclusion through a vastly different lens. The study analyzed the responses of 3,726 individuals who came from a wide variety of backgrounds with representation across gender, race/ethnicity, sexual orientation, national sta- tus, veteran status, disabilities, level within an organization, and tenure with an organization. The respondents were asked 62 questions about diversity and inclusion and the findings demon- strated a snapshot of shifting generational mindsets.

Millennials (born between 1977 to 1995) look upon diver- sity as the blending of different backgrounds, experiences, and perspectives within a team—which is known as cognitive diver- sity. They use this word to describe the mix of unique traits that help to overcome challenges and attain business objectives. For Millennials, inclusion is the support for a collaborative environ- ment, and leadership at such an organization must be transpar- ent, communicative, and engaging. According to the study, when defining diversity, Millennials are 35 percent more likely to focus on unique experiences, whereas 21 percent of non-Millennials are more likely to focus on representation.

The X-generation (born between 1965 and 1976) and Boomer generation (born between 1946 and 1964) have a different take.

These generations view diversity as a representation of fairness and protection for all—regardless of gender, race, religion, ethnic- ity, or sexual orientation. Here, inclusion is the integration of indi- viduals of all demographics into one workplace. It is the right thing to do, that is, a moral and legal imperative to achieve compliance and equality—regardless of whether it benefits the business. The study found that when asked about the business impact on diver- sity, Millennials are 71 percent more likely to focus on teamwork. In contrast, 28 percent of non-Millennials are more likely to focus on fairness of opportunity.

The study’s authors contend that the disconnect between the traditional definitions of diversity and inclusion and those of Millennials can create problems for businesses. For example, clashes may occur when managers do not permit Millennials to express themselves freely. The study found that while 86 percent of Millennials feel that differences of opinion allow teams to excel, only 59 percent believe that their leaders share this perspective.

The study suggests that a company with an inclusive culture promotes innovation. And it cites research by IBM and Morgan Stanley that shows that companies with high levels of innovation achieve the quickest growth in profits and that radical innova- tion outstrips incremental change by generating 10 times more shareholder value.

Sources: Dishman, L. 2015. Millennials have a different definition of diversity and inclusion. fastcompany.com, May 18: np; and Anonymous. 2015. For millennials inclusion goes beyond checking traditional boxes, according to a new Deloitte-- Billie Jean King Leadership Initiative Study. prnewswire.com, May 13: np.

THE VITAL ROLE OF SOCIAL CAPITAL Successful firms are well aware that the attraction, development, and retention of talent is a necessary but not sufficient condition for creating competitive advantages.80 In the knowledge economy, it is not the stock of human capital that is important, but the extent to which it is combined and leveraged.81 In a sense, developing and retaining human capital becomes less important as key players (talented professionals, in particular) take the role of “free agents” and bring with them the requisite skill in many cases. Rather, the development of social capital (that is, the friendships and working relationships among talented individuals) gains importance, because it helps tie knowledge workers to a given firm.82 Knowledge workers often exhibit greater loyalties to their colleagues and their profession than their employing organization, which may be “an amorphous, distant, and sometimes threatening entity.”83 Thus, a firm must find ways to create “ties” among its knowledge workers.

Let’s look at a hypothetical example. Two pharmaceutical firms are fortunate enough to hire Nobel Prize–winning scientists.84 In one case, the scientist is offered a very attrac- tive salary, outstanding facilities and equipment, and told to “go to it!” In the second case, the scientist is offered approximately the same salary, facilities, and equipment plus one additional ingredient: working in a laboratory with 10 highly skilled and enthusiastic scien- tists. Part of the job is to collaborate with these peers and jointly develop promising drug compounds. There is little doubt as to which scenario will lead to a higher probability of retaining the scientist. The interaction, sharing, and collaboration will create a situation in

LO 4-3 The key role of social capital in leveraging human capital within and across the firm.

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which the scientist will develop firm-specific ties and be less likely to “bolt” for a higher salary offer. Such ties are critical because knowledge-based resources tend to be more tacit in nature, as we mentioned early in this chapter. Therefore, they are much more difficult to protect against loss (i.e., the individual quitting the organization) than other types of capi- tal, such as equipment, machinery, and land.

Another way to view this situation is in terms of the resource-based view of the firm that we discussed in Chapter 3. That is, competitive advantages tend to be harder for competi- tors to copy if they are based on “unique bundles” of resources.85 So, if employees are work- ing effectively in teams and sharing their knowledge and learning from each other, not only will they be more likely to add value to the firm, but they also will be less likely to leave the organization, because of the loyalties and social ties that they develop over time.

How Social Capital Helps Attract and Retain Talent The importance of social ties among talented professionals creates a significant challenge (and opportunity) for organizations. In The Wall Street Journal, Bernard Wysocki described the increase in a type of “Pied Piper effect,” in which teams or networks of people are leav- ing one company for another.86 The trend is to recruit job candidates at the crux of social relationships in organizations, particularly if they are seen as having the potential to bring with them valuable colleagues.87 This is a process that is referred to as “hiring via personal networks.” Let’s look at one instance of this practice.

Gerald Eickhoff, founder of an electronic commerce company called Third Millennium Communications, tried for 15 years to hire Michael Reene. Why? Mr. Eickhoff says that he has “these Pied Piper skills.” Mr. Reene was a star at Andersen Consulting in the 1980s and at IBM in the 1990s. He built his businesses and kept turning down overtures from Mr. Eickhoff.

However, later he joined Third Millennium as chief executive officer, with a salary of just $120,000 but with a 20 percent stake in the firm. Since then, he has brought in a raft of former IBM colleagues and Andersen subordinates. One protégé from his time at Andersen, Mary Goode, was brought on board as executive vice president. She promptly tapped her own network and brought along former colleagues.

Wysocki considers the Pied Piper effect one of the underappreciated factors in the war for talent today. This is because one of the myths of the New Economy is rampant individualism, wherein individuals find jobs on the Internet career sites and go to work for complete strangers. Perhaps, instead of Me Inc., the truth is closer to We Inc.88

Another example of social relationships causing human capital mobility is the emigra- tion of talent from an organization to form start-up ventures. Microsoft is perhaps the best- known example of this phenomenon.89 Professionals frequently leave Microsoft en masse to form venture capital and technology start-ups, called “Baby Bills,” built around teams of software developers. For example, Ignition Corporation, of Bellevue, Washington, was formed by Brad Silverberg, a former Microsoft senior vice president. Eight former Microsoft executives, among others, founded the company.

Social Networks: Implications for Knowledge Management and Career Success Managers face many challenges driven by such factors as rapid changes in globalization and technology. Leading a successful company is more than a one-person job. As Tom Malone put it in The Future of Work, “As managers, we need to shift our thinking from command and control to coordinate and cultivate—the best way to gain power is sometimes to give it away.”90 The move away from top-down bureaucratic control to more open, decentralized network models makes it more difficult for managers to understand how work is actually getting done, who is interacting with whom both within and outside the organization, and the consequences of these interactions for the long-term health of the organization.91

LO 4-4 The importance of social networks in knowledge management and in promoting career success.

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Malcolm Gladwell, in his best-selling book The Tipping Point, used the term connector to describe people who have used many ties to different social worlds.92 It’s not the number of people that connectors know that makes them significant. Rather, it is their ability to link people, ideas, and resources that wouldn’t normally bump into one another. In business, connectors are critical facilitators for collaboration and integration. David Kenny, president of Akamai Technologies, believes that being a connector is one of the most important ways in which he adds value:

Kenny spends much of his time traveling around the world to meet with employees, partners, and customers. He states, “I spend time with media owners to hear what they think about digital platforms, Facebook, and new pricing models, and with Microsoft leaders to get their views on cloud computing. I’m interested in hearing how our clients feel about macroeconomic issues, the G20, and how debt will affect future generations.” These conversations lead to new strategic insights and relationships and help Akamai develop critical external partnerships.

Social networks can also help one bring about important change in an organization—or simply get things done! Consider a change initiative undertaken at the United Kingdom’s National Health Care Service—a huge, government-run institution that employs about a mil- lion people in hundreds of units and divisions with deeply rooted, bureaucratic, hierarchical systems. This is certainly an organization in which you can’t rely solely on your “position power”:93

John wanted to set up a nurse-led preoperative assessment service intended to free up time for the doctors who previously led the assessments, reduce cancelled operations (and costs), and improve patient care. Sounds easy enough . . . after all, John was a senior doctor and near the top of the hospital’s formal hierarchy. However, he had only recently joined the organization and was not well connected internally.

As he began talking to other doctors and to nurses about the change, he was met with a lot of resistance. He was about to give up when Carol, a well-respected nurse, offered to help. She had even less seniority than John, but many colleagues relied on her advice about navigating hospital politics. She knew many of the people whose support John needed and she eventually converted them to the change.

Social network analysis depicts the pattern of interactions among individuals and helps to diagnose effective and ineffective patterns.94 It helps identify groups or clusters of indi- viduals that comprise the network, individuals who link the clusters, and other network members. It helps diagnose communication patterns and, consequently, communication effectiveness.95 Such analysis of communication patterns is helpful because the configura- tion of group members’ social ties within and outside the group affects the extent to which members connect to individuals who:

• Convey needed resources. • Have the opportunity to exchange information and support. • Have the motivation to treat each other in positive ways. • Have the time to develop trusting relationships that might improve the groups’

effectiveness.

However, such relationships don’t “just happen.”96 Developing social capital requires interdependence among group members. Social capital erodes when people in the network become independent. And increased interactions between members aid in the develop- ment and maintenance of mutual obligations in a social network.97 Social networks such as Facebook may facilitate increased interactions between members in a social network via Internet-based communications.

Let’s take a brief look at a simplified network analysis to get a grasp of the key ideas. In Exhibit 4.4, the links depict informal relationships among individuals, such as

social network analysis analysis of the pattern of social interactions among individuals.

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communication flows, personal support, and advice networks. There may be some individu- als with literally no linkages, such as Fred. These individuals are typically labeled “isolates.” However, most people do have some linkages with others.

To simplify, there are two primary types of mechanisms through which social capital will flow: closure relationships (depicted by Bill, Frank, George, and Susan) and bridging relationships (depicted by Mary). As we can see, in the former relationships one mem- ber is central to the communication flows in a group. In contrast, in the latter relation- ships, one person “bridges” or brings together groups that would have been otherwise unconnected.

Both closure and bridging relationships have important implications for the effective flow of information in organizations and for the management of knowledge. We will now briefly discuss each of these types of relationships. We will also address some of the implica- tions that understanding social networks has for one’s career success.

Closure With closure, many members have relationships (or ties) with other members. As indicated in Exhibit 4.4, Bill’s group would have a higher level of closure than Frank’s Susan’s, or George’s groups because more group members are connected to each other. Through closure, group members develop strong relationships with each other, high levels of trust, and greater solidarity. High levels of trust help to ensure that informal norms in the group are easily enforced and there is less “free riding.” Social pressure will prevent people from withholding effort or shirking their responsibilities. In addition, people in the network are more willing to extend favors and “go the extra mile” on a colleague’s behalf because they are confident that their efforts will be reciprocated by another member in their group. Another benefit of a network with closure is the high level of emotional sup- port. This becomes particularly valuable when setbacks occur that may destroy morale or an unexpected tragedy happens that might cause the group to lose its focus. Social support helps the group to rebound from misfortune and get back on track.

But high levels of closure often come with a price. Groups that become too closed can become insular. They cut themselves off from the rest of the organization and fail to share what they are learning from people outside their group. Research shows that while managers need to encourage closure up to a point, if there is too much closure, they need to encourage people to open up their groups and infuse new ideas through bridging relationships.98

closure the degree to which all members of a social network have relationships (or ties) with other group members.

EXHIBIT 4.4 A Simplified Social Network

Bill

Frank

Fred

Susan

George

Mary

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4.4 STRATEGY SPOTLIGHT PICASSO VERSUS VAN GOGH: WHO WAS MORE SUCCESSFUL AND WHY? Vincent van Gogh and Pablo Picasso are two of the most iconoclastic—and famous—artists of modern times. Paintings by both of them have fetched over $100 million. And both of them were responsible for some of the most iconic images in the art world: Van Gogh’s Self-Portrait (the one sans the earlobe) and Starry Night and Picasso’s The Old Guitarist and Guernica. However, there is an important difference between van Gogh and Picasso. Van Gogh died penniless. Picasso’s estate was estimated at $750 million when he died in 1973. What was the difference?

Van Gogh’s primary connection to the art world was through his brother. Unfortunately, this connection didn’t feed directly into the money that could have turned him into a living suc- cess. In contrast, Picasso’s myriad connections provided him with access to commercial riches. As noted by Gregory Berns in his book Iconoclast: A Neuroscientist Reveals How to Think Differently, “Picasso’s wide ranging social network, which

included artists, writers, and politicians, meant that he was never more than a few people away from anyone of importance in the world.”*

In effect, van Gogh was a loner, and the charismatic Picasso was an active member of multiple social circles. In social net- working terms, van Gogh was a solitary “node” who had few connections. Picasso, on the other hand, was a “hub” who embedded himself in a vast network that stretched across various social lines. Where Picasso smoothly navigated multiple social circles, van Gogh had to struggle just to maintain con- nections with even those closest to him. Van Gogh inhabited an alien world, whereas Picasso was a social magnet. And because he knew so many people, the world was at Picasso’s fingertips. From his perspective, the world was smaller.

* Berns, G., Iconoclast: A Neuroscientist Reveals How to Think Differently. Boston, MA: Harvard Business Review Press, 2008.

Sources: Hayashi, A. M. 2008. Why Picasso out earned van Gogh. MIT Sloan Management Review, 50(1): 11–12; and Berns, G. 2008. Icononclast: A Neuroscientist Reveals How to Think Differently. Boston: Harvard Business Press.

Bridging Relationships The closure perspective rests on an assumption that there is a high level of similarity among group members. However, members can be quite heterogeneous with regard to their positions in either the formal or informal structures of the group or the organization. Such heterogeneity exists because of, for example, vertical boundaries (differ- ent levels in the hierarchy) and horizontal boundaries (different functional areas).

Bridging relationships, in contrast to closure, stress the importance of ties connecting people. Employees who bridge disconnected people tend to receive timely, diverse informa- tion because of their access to a wide range of heterogeneous information flows. Such bridg- ing relationships span a number of different types of boundaries.

The University of Chicago’s Ron Burt originally coined the term “structural holes” to refer to the social gap between two groups. Structural holes are common in organizations. When they occur in business, managers typically refer to them as “silos” or “stovepipes.” Sales and engineering are a classic example of two groups whose members traditionally interact with their peers rather than across groups.

A study that Burt conducted at Raytheon, a $25 billion U.S. electronics company and military contractor, provides further insight into the benefits of bridging.99

Burt studied several hundred managers in Raytheon’s supply chain group and asked them to write down ideas to improve the company’s supply chain management. Then he asked two Raytheon executives to rate the ideas. The conclusion: The best suggestions consistently came from managers who discussed ideas outside their regular work group.

Burt found that Raytheon managers were good at thinking of ideas but bad at developing them. Too often, Burt said, the managers discussed their ideas with colleagues already in their informal discussion network. Instead, he said, they should have had discussions outside their typical contacts, particularly with an informal boss, or someone with enough power to be an ally but not an actual supervisor.

Implications for Career Success Let’s go back in time in order to illustrate the value of social networks in one’s career success. Consider two of the most celebrated artists of all time: Vincent van Gogh and Pablo Picasso. Strategy Spotlight 4.4 points out why these two artists enjoyed sharply contrasting levels of success during their lifetimes.

bridging relationships relationships in a social network that connect otherwise disconnected people.

structural holes social gaps between groups in a social network where there are few relationships bridging the groups.

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Effective social networks provide many advantages for the firm.100 They can play a key role in an individual’s career advancement and success. One’s social network potentially can provide three unique advantages: private information, access to diverse skill sets, and power.101 Managers see these advantages at work every day but might not consider how their networks regulate them.

Private Information We make judgments using both public and private informa- tion. Today, public information is available from many sources, including the Internet. However, since it is so accessible, public information offers less competitive advantage than it used to.

In contrast, private information from personal contacts can offer something not found in publicly available sources, such as the release date of a new product or knowledge about what a particular interviewer looks for in candidates. Private information can give managers an edge, though it is more subjective than public information since it cannot be easily veri- fied by independent sources, such as Dun & Bradstreet. Consequently the value of your private information to others—and the value of others’ private information to you—depends on how much trust exists in the network of relationships.

Access to Diverse Skill Sets Linus Pauling, one of only two people to win a Nobel Prize in two different areas and considered one of the towering geniuses of the 20th century, attrib- uted his creative success not to his immense brainpower or luck but to his diverse contacts. He said, “The best way to have a good idea is to have a lot of ideas.”

While expertise has become more specialized during the past few decades, organiza- tional, product, and marketing issues have become more interdisciplinary. This means that success is tied to the ability to transcend natural skill limitations through others. Highly diverse network relationships, therefore, can help you develop more complete, creative, and unbiased perspectives on issues. Trading information or skills with people whose experi- ences differ from your own provides you with unique, exceptionally valuable resources. It is common for people in relationships to share their problems. If you know enough people, you will begin to see how the problems that another person is struggling with can be solved by the solutions being developed by others. If you can bring together problems and solu- tions, it will greatly benefit your career.

Power Traditionally, a manager’s power was embedded in a firm’s hierarchy. But when corporate organizations became flatter, more like pancakes than pyramids, that power was repositioned in the network’s brokers (people who bridged multiple networks), who could adapt to changes in the organization, develop clients, and synthesize opposing points of view. Such brokers weren’t necessarily at the top of the hierarchy or experts in their fields, but they linked specialists in the firm with trustworthy and informative relationships.102

Most personal networks are highly clustered; that is, an individual’s friends are likely to be friends with one another as well. Most corporate networks are made up of several clus- ters that have few links between them. Brokers are especially powerful because they connect separate clusters, thus stimulating collaboration among otherwise independent specialists.

The Potential Downside of Social Capital We’d like to close our discussion of social capital by addressing some of its limitations. First, some firms have been adversely affected by very high levels of social capital because it may breed “groupthink”—a tendency not to question shared beliefs.103 Such think- ing may occur in networks with high levels of closure where there is little input from people outside the network. In effect, too many warm and fuzzy feelings among group members prevent people from rigorously challenging each other. People are discouraged

groupthink a tendency in an organization for individuals not to question shared beliefs.

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from engaging in the “creative abrasion” that Dorothy Leonard of Harvard University describes as a key source of innovation.104 Two firms that were well known for their colle- giality, strong sense of employee membership, and humane treatment—Digital Equipment (now part of Hewlett-Packard) and Polaroid—suffered greatly from market misjudgments and strategic errors. The aforementioned aspects of their culture contributed to their problems.

Second, if there are deep-rooted mind-sets, there would be a tendency to develop dys- functional human resource practices. That is, the organization (or group) would continue to hire, reward, and promote like-minded people who tend to further intensify organizational inertia and erode innovation. Such homogeneity would increase over time and decrease the effectiveness of decision-making processes.

Third, the socialization processes (orientation, training, etc.) can be expensive in terms of both financial resources and managerial commitment. Such investments can represent a significant opportunity cost that should be evaluated in terms of the intended benefits. If such expenses become excessive, profitability would be adversely affected.

Finally, individuals may use the contacts they develop to pursue their own interests and agendas, which may be inconsistent with the organization’s goals and objectives. Thus, they may distort or selectively use information to favor their preferred courses of action or with- hold information in their own self-interest to enhance their power to the detriment of the common good. Drawing on our discussion of social networks, this is particularly true in an organization that has too many bridging relationships but not enough closure relationships. In high-closure groups, it is easier to watch each other to ensure that illegal or unethical acts don’t occur. By contrast, bridging relationships make it easier for a person to play one group or individual off another, with no one being the wiser.105 We will discuss some behavioral control mechanisms in Chapter 9 (rewards, control, boundaries) that reduce such dysfunc- tional behaviors and actions.106

USING TECHNOLOGY TO LEVERAGE HUMAN CAPITAL AND KNOWLEDGE Sharing knowledge and information throughout the organization can be a means of con- serving resources, developing products and services, and creating new opportunities. In this section we will discuss how technology can be used to leverage human capital and knowl- edge within organizations as well as with customers and suppliers beyond their boundaries.

Using Networks to Share Information As we all know, email is an effective means of communicating a wide variety of information. It is quick, easy, and almost costless. Of course, it can become a problem when employees use it extensively for personal reasons. And we all know how fast jokes or rumors can spread within and across organizations!

Email can also cause embarrassment, or worse, if one is not careful. Consider the plight of a potential CEO—as recalled by Marshall Goldsmith, a well-known executive coach:107

I witnessed a series of e-mails between a potential CEO and a friend inside the company. The first e-mail to the friend provided an elaborate description of “why the current CEO is an idiot.” The friend sent a reply. Several rounds of e-mails followed. Then the friend sent an e-mail containing a funny joke. The potential CEO decided that the current CEO would love this joke and forwarded it to him. You can guess what happened next. The CEO scrolled down the e-mail chain and found the “idiot” message. The heir apparent was gone in a week.

LO 4-5 The vital role of technology in leveraging knowledge and human capital.

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Email can, however, be a means for top executives to communicate information effi- ciently. For example, Martin Sorrell, chairman of WPP Group PLC, the huge $15 billion advertising and public relations firm, is a strong believer in the use of email.108 He emails all of his employees once a month to discuss how the company is doing, address specific issues, and offer his perspectives on hot issues, such as new business models for the Internet. He believes that it keeps people abreast of what he is working on.

Technology can also enable much more sophisticated forms of communication in addi- tion to knowledge sharing. Cisco, for example, launched Integrated Workforce Experience (IWE) in 2010.109 It is a social business platform designed to facilitate internal and exter- nal collaboration and decentralize decision making. It functions much like a Facebook “wall”: A real-time news feed provides updates on employees’ status and activities as well as information about relevant communities, business projects, and customer and partner interactions. One manager likens it to Amazon. “It makes recommendations based on what you are doing, the role you are in, and the choices of other people like you. We are taking that to the enterprise level and basically allowing appropriate information to find you,” he says.

Electronic Teams: Using Technology to Enhance Collaboration Technology enables professionals to work as part of electronic, or virtual, teams to enhance the speed and effectiveness with which products are developed. For example, Microsoft has concentrated much of its development on electronic teams (or e-teams) that are networked together.110 This helps to accelerate design and testing of new soft- ware modules that use the Windows-based framework as their central architecture. Microsoft is able to foster specialized technical expertise while sharing knowledge rap- idly throughout the firm. This helps the firm learn how its new technologies can be applied rapidly to new business ventures such as cable television, broadcasting, travel services, and financial services.

What are electronic teams (or e-teams)? There are two key differences between e-teams and more traditional teams:111

• E-team members either work in geographically separated workplaces or may work in the same space but at different times. E-teams may have members working in different spaces and time zones, as is the case with many multinational teams.

• Most of the interactions among members of e-teams occur through electronic communication channels such as fax machines and groupware tools such as email, bulletin boards, chat, and videoconferencing.

E-teams have expanded exponentially in recent years.112 Organizations face increasingly high levels of complex and dynamic change. E-teams are also effective in helping businesses cope with global challenges. Most e-teams perform very complex tasks and most knowledge- based teams are charged with developing new products, improving organizational processes, and satisfying challenging customer problems. For example, Hewlett-Packard’s e-teams solve clients’ computing problems, and Sun Microsystems’ (part of Oracle) e-teams gener- ate new business models.

Advantages There are multiple advantages of e-teams.113 In addition to the rather obvious use of technology to facilitate communications, the potential benefits parallel the other two major sections in this chapter—human capital and social capital.

First, e-teams are less restricted by the geographic constraints that are placed on face- to-face teams. Thus, e-teams have the potential to acquire a broader range of “human capital,” or the skills and capacities that are necessary to complete complex assignments. So e-team leaders can draw upon a greater pool of talent to address a wider range of

LO 4-6 Why “electronic” or “virtual” teams are critical in combining and leveraging knowledge in organizations and how they can be made more effective.

electronic teams a team of individuals that completes tasks primarily through email communication.

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problems since they are not constrained by geographic space. Once formed, e-teams can be more flexible in responding to unanticipated work challenges and opportunities because team members can be rotated out of projects when demands and contingencies alter the team’s objectives.

Second, e-teams can be very effective in generating “social capital”—the quality of rela- tionships and networks that form. Such capital is a key lubricant in work transactions and operations. Given the broader boundaries associated with e-teams, members and leaders generally have access to a wider range of social contacts than would be typically available in more traditional face-to-face teams. Such contacts are often connected to a broader scope of clients, customers, constituents, and other key stakeholders.

Challenges However, there are challenges associated with making e-teams effective. Successful action by both traditional teams and e-teams requires that:

• Members identify who among them can provide the most appropriate knowledge and resources.

• E-team leaders and key members know how to combine individual contributions in the most effective manner for a coordinated and appropriate response.

Group psychologists have termed such activities “identification and combination” activities, and teams that fail to perform them face a “process loss.”114 Process losses prevent teams from reaching high levels of performance because of inefficient interaction dynamics among team members. Such poor dynamics require that some collective energy, time, and effort be devoted to dealing with team inefficiencies, thus diverting the team away from its objectives. For example, if a team member fails to communicate important information at critical phases of a project, other members may waste time and energy. This can lead to conflict and resentment as well as to decreased motivation to work hard to complete tasks.

The potential for process losses tends to be more prevalent in e-teams than in traditional teams because the geographic dispersion of members increases the complexity of establish- ing effective interaction and exchanges. Generally, teams suffer process loss because of low cohesion, low trust among members, a lack of appropriate norms or standard operating procedures, or a lack of shared understanding among team members about their tasks. With e-teams, members are more geographically or temporally dispersed, and the team becomes more susceptible to the risk factors that can create process loss. Such problems can be exacerbated when team members have less than ideal competencies and social skills. This can erode problem-solving capabilities as well as the effective functioning of the group as a social unit.

A variety of technologies, from email and Internet groups to Skype have facilitated the formation and effective functioning of e-teams as well as a wide range of collaborations within companies. Such technologies greatly enhance the collaborative abilities of employ- ees and managers within a company at a reasonable cost—despite the distances that sepa- rate them.

Codifying Knowledge for Competitive Advantage There are two different kinds of knowledge. Tacit knowledge is embedded in personal experience and shared only with the consent and participation of the individual. Explicit (or codified) knowledge, on the other hand, is knowledge that can be documented, widely distributed, and easily replicated. One of the challenges of knowledge-intensive organiza- tions is to capture and codify the knowledge and experience that, in effect, resides in the heads of its employees. Otherwise, they will have to constantly “reinvent the wheel,” which

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4.5 STRATEGY SPOTLIGHT HOW SAP TAPS KNOWLEDGE WELL BEYOND ITS BOUNDARIES Traditionally, organizations built and protected their knowledge stocks—proprietary resources that no one else could access. However, the more the business environment changes, the faster the value of what you know at any point in time dimin- ishes. In today’s world, success hinges on the ability to access a growing variety of knowledge flows in order to rapidly replenish the firm’s knowledge stocks. For example, when an organization tries to improve cycle times in a manufacturing process, it finds far more value in problem solving shaped by the diverse experi- ences, perspectives, and learning of a tightly knit team (shared through knowledge flows) than in a training manual (knowledge stocks) alone.

Knowledge flows can help companies gain competitive advantage in an age of near-constant disruption. The software company SAP, for example, routinely taps the nearly 3 million participants in its Community Network, which extends well beyond the boundaries of the firm. By providing a virtual plat- form for customers, developers, system integrators, and service

vendors to create and exchange knowledge, SAP has signifi- cantly increased the productivity of all the participants in its ecosystem.

According to Mark Yolton, senior vice president of SAP Communications and Social Media, “It’s a very robust com- munity with a great deal of activity. We see about 1.2 million unique visitors every month. Hundreds of millions of pages are viewed every year. There are 4,000 discussion forum posts every single day, 365 days a year, and about 115 blogs every day, 365 days a year, from any of the nearly 3 million members.”

The site is open to everyone, regardless of whether you are a SAP customer, partner, or newcomer who needs to work with SAP technology. The site offers technical articles, web-based training, code samples, evaluation systems, discussion forums, and excellent blogs for community experts.

Sources: Yolton, M. 2012. SAP: Using social media for building, selling and supporting. sloanreview.mit.edu, August 7: np; Hagel, J., III., Brown, J. S., & Davison, L. 2009. The big shift: Measuring the forces of change. Harvard Business Review, 87(4): 87; and Anonymous. Undated. SAP developer network. sap.sys-con.com: np.

is both expensive and inefficient. Also, the “new wheel” may not necessarily be superior to the “old wheel.”115

Once a knowledge asset (e.g., a software code or a process) is developed and paid for, it can be reused many times at very low cost, assuming that it doesn’t have to be substantially modified each time. For example, Access Health, a call-in medical center, uses technology to capture and share knowledge. When someone calls the center, a registered nurse uses the company’s “clinical decision architecture” to assess the caller’s symptoms, rule out pos- sible conditions, and recommend a home remedy, doctor’s visit, or trip to the emergency room. The company’s knowledge repository contains algorithms of the symptoms of more than 500 illnesses. According to CEO Joseph Tallman, “We are not inventing a new way to cure disease. We are taking available knowledge and inventing processes to put it to better use.” The software algorithms were very expensive to develop, but the investment has been repaid many times over. The first 300 algorithms that Access Health developed have each been used an average of 8,000 times a year. Further, the company’s paying customers— insurance companies and provider groups—save money because many callers would have made expensive trips to the emergency room or the doctor’s office had they not been diag- nosed over the phone.

The user community can be a major source of knowledge creation for a firm. Strategy Spotlight 4.5 highlights how SAP has been able to leverage the expertise and involvement of its users to develop new knowledge and transmit it to SAP’s entire user community.

We close this section with a series of questions managers should consider in determin- ing (1) how effective their organization is in attracting, developing, and retaining human capital and (2) how effective they are in leveraging human capital through social capital and technology. These questions, included in Exhibit 4.5, summarize some of the key issues addressed in this chapter.

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Human Capital

Recruiting “Top-Notch” Human Capital

• Does the organization assess attitude and “general makeup” instead of focusing primarily on skills and background in selecting employees at all levels?

• How important are creativity and problem-solving ability? Are they properly considered in hiring decisions? • Do people throughout the organization engage in effective networking activities to obtain a broad pool of worthy potential employees?

Is the organization creative in such endeavors?

Enhancing Human Capital through Employee Development

• Does the development and training process inculcate an “organizationwide” perspective? • Is there widespread involvement, including top executives, in the preparation and delivery of training and development programs? • Is the development of human capital effectively tracked and monitored? • Are there effective programs for succession at all levels of the organization, especially at the topmost levels? • Does the firm effectively evaluate its human capital? Is a 360-degree evaluation used? Why? Why not? • Are mechanisms in place to ensure that a manager’s success does not come at the cost of compromising the organization’s core

values?

Retaining the Best Employees

• Are there appropriate financial rewards to motivate employees at all levels? • Do people throughout the organization strongly identify with the organization’s mission? • Are employees provided with a stimulating and challenging work environment that fosters professional growth? • Are valued amenities provided (e.g., flextime, child care facilities, telecommuting) that are appropriate given the organization’s

mission, its strategy, and how work is accomplished? • Is the organization continually devising strategies and mechanisms to retain top performers?

Social Capital

• Are there positive personal and professional relationships among employees? • Is the organization benefiting (or being penalized) by hiring (or by voluntary turnover) en masse? • Does an environment of caring and encouragement rather than competition enhance team performance? • Do the social networks within the organization have the appropriate levels of closure and bridging relationships? • Does the organization minimize the adverse effects of excessive social capital, such as excessive costs and “groupthink”?

Technology

• Has the organization used technologies such as email and networks to develop products and services? • Does the organization effectively use technology to transfer best practices across the organization? • Does the organization use technology to leverage human capital and knowledge both within the boundaries of the organization and

among its suppliers and customers? • Has the organization effectively used technology to codify knowledge for competitive advantage? • Does the organization try to retain some of the knowledge of employees when they decide to leave the firm?

Source: Adapted from Dess, G. G., & Picken, J. C. 1999. Beyond Productivity: 63–64. New York: AMACON.

EXHIBIT 4.5 Issues to Consider in Creating Value through Human Capital, Social Capital, and Technology

PROTECTING THE INTELLECTUAL ASSETS OF THE ORGANIZATION: INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND DYNAMIC CAPABILITIES In today’s dynamic and turbulent world, unpredictability and fast change dominate the busi- ness environment. Firms can use technology, attract human capital, or tap into research and design networks to get access to pretty much the same information as their competitors.

LO 4-7 The challenge of protecting intellectual property and the importance of a firm’s dynamic capabilities.

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So what would give firms a sustainable competitive advantage?116 Protecting a firm’s intel- lectual property requires a concerted effort on the part of the company. After all, employ- ees become disgruntled and patents expire. The management of intellectual property (IP) involves, besides patents, contracts with confidentiality and noncompete clauses, copy- rights, and the development of trademarks. Moreover, developing dynamic capabilities is the only avenue providing firms with the ability to reconfigure their knowledge and activi- ties to achieve a sustainable competitive advantage.

Intellectual Property Rights Intellectual property rights are more difficult to define and protect than property rights for physical assets (e.g., plant, equipment, and land). However, if intellectual property rights are not reliably protected by the state, there will be no incentive to develop new products and services. Property rights have been enshrined in constitutions and rules of law in many countries. In the information era, though, adjustments need to be made to accommodate the new realities of knowledge. Knowledge and information are fundamentally different assets from the physical ones that property rights have been designed to protect.

The protection of intellectual rights raises unique issues, compared to physical property rights. IP is characterized by significant development costs and very low marginal costs. Indeed, it may take a substantial investment to develop a software program, an idea, or a digital music tune. Once developed, though, its reproduction and distribution cost may be almost zero, espe- cially if the Internet is used. Effective protection of intellectual property is necessary before any investor will finance such an undertaking. Appropriation of investors’ returns is harder to police since possession and deployment are not as readily observable. Unlike physical assets, intellectual property can be stolen by simply broadcasting it. Recall Napster and MP3 as well as the debates about counterfeit software, music CDs, and DVDs coming from developing countries such as China. Part of the problem is that using an idea does not prevent others from simultaneously using it for their own benefit, which is typically impossible with physical assets. Moreover, new ideas are frequently built on old ideas and are not easily traceable.

Given these unique challenges in protecting IP, it comes as no surprise that legal battles over patents become commonplace in IP-heavy industries such as telecommunications. Take the recent patent battles Apple has been fighting against smartphone makers running Android, Google’s mobile operating system.117

In 2012, Apple and HTC, a Taiwanese smartphone maker, agreed to dismiss a series of lawsuits filed against each other after Apple accused HTC of copying the iPhone. While this settlement may be a sign that Apple’s new CEO, Timothy Cook, is eager to end the distractions caused by IP-related litigation, other patent battles continue, including one between Apple and Samsung, the largest maker of Android phones. This legal battle involves much higher stakes, because Samsung shipped almost eight times as many Android smartphones as HTC in the third quarter of 2012. However, Apple’s new leadership seems to be more pragmatic about this issue. In Mr. Cook’s words, “It is awkward. I hate litigation. I absolutely hate it,” suggesting that he is not as enthusiastic a combatant in the patent wars as was his predecessor, Steve Jobs, who famously promised to “destroy Android, because it’s a stolen product.”

Countries are attempting to pass new legislation to cope with developments in new phar- maceutical compounds, stem cell research, and biotechnology. However, a firm that is faced with this challenge today cannot wait for the legislation to catch up. New technological developments, software solutions, electronic games, online services, and other products and services contribute to our economic prosperity and the creation of wealth for those entre- preneurs who have the idea first and risk bringing it to the market.

Dynamic Capabilities Dynamic capabilities entail the capacity to build and protect a competitive advan- tage.118 This rests on knowledge, assets, competencies, and complementary assets and

intellectual property rights intangible property owned by a firm in the forms of patents, copyrights, trademarks, or trade secrets.

dynamic capabilities a firm’s capacity to build and protect a competitive advantage, which rests on knowledge, assets, competencies, complementary assets, and technologies. Dynamic capabilities include the ability to sense and seize new opportunities, generate new knowledge, and reconfigure existing assets and capabilities.

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technologies as well as the ability to sense and seize new opportunities, generate new knowledge, and reconfigure existing assets and capabilities.119 According to David Teece, an economist at the University of California at Berkeley, dynamic capabilities are related to the entrepreneurial side of the firm and are built within a firm through its environmen- tal and technological “sensing” apparatus, its choices of organizational form, and its col- lective ability to strategize. Dynamic capabilities are about the ability of an organization to challenge the conventional wisdom within its industry and market, learn and innovate, adapt to the changing world, and continuously adopt new ways to serve the evolving needs of the market.120

Examples of dynamic capabilities include product development, strategic decision mak- ing, alliances, and acquisitions.121 Some firms have clearly developed internal processes and routines that make them superior in such activities. For example, 3M and Apple are ahead of their competitors in product development. Cisco Systems has made numerous acquisi- tions over the years. Cisco seems to have developed the capability to identify and evaluate potential acquisition candidates and seamlessly integrate them once the acquisition is com- pleted. Other organizations can try to copy Cisco’s practices. However, Cisco’s combina- tion of the resources of the acquired companies and their reconfiguration that Cisco has already achieved places it well ahead of its competitors. As markets become increasingly dynamic, traditional sources of long-term competitive advantage become less relevant. In such markets, all that a firm can strive for are a series of temporary advantages. Dynamic capabilities allow a firm to create this series of temporary advantages through new resource configurations.122

ISSUE FOR DEBATE

Does Providing Financial Incentives to Employees to Lose Weight Actually Work? Assume your employer offered each of its staff $550 to lose weight, an amount that would be subtracted from their health insurance premiums the following year. Do you think it would work? Would it provide enough incentive for some of the employees to shed the pounds?

Approximately four out of five large employers in the United States now offer some type of financial incentive for employees to improve their health. And the Affordable Care Act has encouraged such programs by significantly increasing the amount of money, in the form of a percentage of insurance premiums, that employers can reward (or take away) to improve health factors such as body mass index, blood pressure and cholesterol, as well as for ending the use of tobacco.

Several professors and medical professionals decided to test whether or not incentives actually work. Employees were randomly assigned to two conditions: one group in which employees were offered the $550 incentive and another group—the control group—in which no incentive was offered. After one year the results were reported in the journal Health Affairs. The result: Employees assigned to the control group that received no financial incentive had no change in their weight. However, employees who were offered the $550 incentive also didn’t lose weight.

Discussion Questions 1. Why do you think the $550 incentive did not result in people losing weight? 2. Can you think of how incentives could have been structured to be more successful?

Source: Patel, M. S., Asch, D. A., & Volpp, K. G. 2016. Does paying employees to lose weight work? Dallas Morning News, March 20: 1P, 5P.

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Reflecting on Career Implications . . . This chapter focuses on the growing importance of intellectual assets in the valuation of firms. Since improved organizational performance occurs when firms effectively combine human capital, social capital, and technology, the following questions help students to consider how they can leverage their talents though relationships and technology.

Human Capital: Identify specific steps taken by your organization to effectively attract, develop, and retain talent. If you cannot identify such steps, you may have fewer career opportunities to develop your human capital at your organization. Do you take advantage of your organization’s human resource programs, such as tuition reimbursement, mentoring, and so forth?

Human Capital: As workplaces become more diverse, it is important to reflect on whether your organization values diversity. What kinds of diversity seem to be encouraged (e.g., age-based or ethnicity-based)? In what ways are your colleagues different from and similar to you? If your firm has a homogeneous workforce, there may be limited perspectives

on strategic and operational issues and a career at this organization may be less attractive to you.

Social Capital: Does your organization have strong social capital? What is the basis of your conclusion that it has strong or weak social capital? What specific programs are in place to build and develop social capital? What is the impact of social capital on employee turnover in your organization? Alternatively, is social capital so strong that you see effects such as “groupthink”? From your perspective, how might you better leverage social capital toward pursuing other career opportunities?

Social Capital: Are you actively working to build a strong social network at your work organization? To advance your career, strive to build a broad network that gives you access to diverse information.

Technology: Does your organization provide and effectively use technology (e.g., groupware, knowledge management systems) to help you leverage your talents and expand your knowledge base? If your organization does a poor job in this regard, what can you do on your own to expand your knowledge base using technology available outside the organization?

Firms throughout the industrial world are recognizing that the knowledge worker is the key to success in the marketplace. However, they also recognize that human capital, although vital, is still only a necessary, but not a sufficient,

condition for creating value. We began the first section of the chapter by addressing the importance of human capital and how it can be attracted, developed, and retained. Then we discussed the role of social capital and technology in leveraging human capital for competitive success. We pointed out that intellectual capital—the difference between a firm’s market value and its book value—has increased significantly over the past few decades. This is particularly true for firms in knowledge-intensive industries, especially where there are relatively few tangible assets, such as software development.

The second section of the chapter addressed the attraction, development, and retention of human capital. We viewed these three activities as a “three-legged stool”— that is, it is difficult for firms to be successful if they ignore or are unsuccessful in any one of these activities. Among the issues we discussed in attracting human capital were “hiring for attitude, training for skill” and the value of using social networks to attract human capital. In particular, it is important to attract employees who can collaborate with others, given the importance of collective efforts such as teams and task forces. With regard to developing human capital, we discussed the need to encourage widespread involvement throughout the organization, monitor progress and track the development of human capital, and evaluate

human capital. Among the issues that are widely practiced in evaluating human capital is the 360-degree evaluation system. Employees are evaluated by their superiors, peers, direct reports, and even internal and external customers. We also addressed the value of maintaining a diverse workforce. Finally, some mechanisms for retaining human capital are employees’ identification with the organization’s mission and values, providing challenging work and a stimulating environment, the importance of financial and nonfinancial rewards and incentives, and providing flexibility and amenities. A key issue here is that a firm should not overemphasize financial rewards. After all, if individuals join an organization for money, they also are likely to leave for money. With money as the primary motivator, there is little chance that employees will develop firm-specific ties to keep them with the organization.

The third section of the chapter discussed the importance of social capital in leveraging human capital. Social capital refers to the network of relationships that individuals have throughout the organization as well as with customers and suppliers. Such ties can be critical in obtaining both information and resources. With regard to recruiting, for example, we saw how some firms are able to hire en masse groups of individuals who are part of social networks. Social relationships can also be very important in the effective functioning of groups. Finally, we discussed some of the potential downsides of social capital. These include the expenses that firms may bear when promoting social and working relationships among individuals as well as the potential for “groupthink,” wherein individuals are reluctant to express divergent (or opposing) views on

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an issue because of social pressures to conform. We also introduced the concept of social networks. The relative advantages of being central in a network versus bridging multiple networks was discussed. We addressed the key role that social networks can play in both improving knowledge management and promoting career success.

The fourth section addressed the role of technology in leveraging human capital. We discussed relatively simple means of using technology, such as email and networks where individuals can collaborate by way of personal computers. We provided suggestions and guidelines on how electronic teams can be effectively managed. We also addressed more sophisticated uses of technology, such as sophisticated management systems. Here, knowledge can be codified and reused at very low cost, as we saw in the examples of firms in the consulting, health care, and high- technology industries.

In the last section we discussed the increasing importance of protecting a firm’s intellectual property. Although traditional approaches such as patents, copyrights, and trademarks are important, the development of dynamic capabilities may be the best protection in the long run.

SUMMARY REVIEW QUESTIONS 1. Explain the role of knowledge in today’s competitive

environment. 2. Why is it important for managers to recognize the

interdependence in the attraction, development, and retention of talented professionals?

3. What are some of the potential downsides for firms that engage in a “war for talent”?

4. Discuss the need for managers to use social capital in leveraging their human capital both within and across their firm.

5. Discuss the key role of technology in leveraging knowledge and human capital.

EXPERIENTIAL EXERCISE Pfizer, a leading health care firm with $52 billion in revenues, is often rated as one of Fortune’s “Most Admired Firms.” It is also considered an excellent place to work and has generated high return to shareholders. Clearly, Pfizer values its human capital. Using the Internet and/or library resources, identify some of the actions/strategies Pfizer has taken to attract, develop, and retain human capital. What are their implications? (Fill in the table at bottom of the page.)

knowledge economy 104 intellectual capital 106 human capital 106

social capital 106 explicit knowledge 106 tacit knowledge 106 360-degree evaluation and

feedback systems 113 social network analysis 120 closure 121 bridging relationships 122

key terms

Activity Actions/Strategies Implications

Attracting human capital

Developing human capital

Retaining human capital

APPLICATION QUESTIONS & EXERCISES 1. Look up successful firms in a high-technology

industry as well as two successful firms in more traditional industries such as automobile manufacturing and retailing. Compare their market values and book values. What are some implications of these differences?

2. Select a firm for which you believe its social capital— both within the firm and among its suppliers and customers—is vital to its competitive advantage. Support your arguments.

3. Choose a company with which you are familiar. What are some of the ways in which it uses technology to leverage its human capital?

4. Using the Internet, look up a company with which you are familiar. What are some of the policies and procedures that it uses to enhance the firm’s human and social capital?

ETHICS QUESTIONS 1. Recall an example of a firm that recently faced

an ethical crisis. How do you feel the crisis and management’s handling of it affected the firm’s human capital and social capital?

2. Based on your experiences or what you have learned in your previous classes, are you familiar with any companies that used unethical practices to attract talented professionals? What do you feel were the short-term and long-term consequences of such practices?

structural holes 122 groupthink 123 electronic teams 125

intellectual property rights 129

dynamic capabilities 129

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1. Parts of this chapter draw upon some of the ideas and examples from Dess, G. G. & Picken, J. C. 1999. Beyond productivity. New York: AMACOM.

2. Dekas, K. H., et al. 2013. Organizational citizenship behavior, version 2.0: A review and qualitative investigation of OCBs for knowledge workers at Google and beyond. Academy of Management Perspectives, 27(3): 219–237.

3. Stewart, T. A. 1997. Intellectual capital: The new wealth of organizations. New York: Doubleday/Currency.

4. Colvin, G. 2015. The 100 best companies to work for. Fortune. March 15: 109.

5. Stewart, T. A. 2001. Accounting gets radical. Fortune, April 16: 184–194.

6. Adams, S. & Kichen, S. 2008. Ben Graham then and now. Forbes, www. multpl.com/s-p-500-price-to-book, November 10: 56.

7. An interesting discussion of Steve Jobs’s impact on Apple’s valuation is in Lashinsky, A. 2009. Steve’s leave— what does it really mean? Fortune, February 2: 96–102.

8. Anonymous. 2007. Intel opens first high volume 45 nm microprocessor manufacturing factory. www.intel.com, October 25: np.

9. Thomas Stewart has suggested this formula in his book Intellectual capital. He provides an insightful discussion on pages 224–225, including some of the limitations of this approach to measuring intellectual capital. We recognize, of course, that during the late 1990s and in early 2000, there were some excessive market valuations of high- technology and Internet firms. For an interesting discussion of the extraordinary market valuation of Yahoo!, an Internet company, refer to Perkins, A. B. 2001. The Internet bubble encapsulated: Yahoo! Red Herring, April 15: 17–18.

10. Roberts, P. W. & Dowling, G. R. 2002. Corporate reputation and sustained superior financial performance. Strategic Management Journal, 23(12): 1077–1095.

11. For a study on the relationships between human capital, learning, and sustainable competitive advantage, read Hatch, N. W. & Dyer, J. H. 2005. Human capital and learning as a source of sustainable competitive advantage. Strategic Management Journal, 25: 1155–1178.

12. One of the seminal contributions on knowledge management is Becker, G.

S. 1993. Human capital: A theoretical and empirical analysis with special reference to education (3rd ed.). Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

13. For an excellent overview of the topic of social capital, read Baron, R. A. 2005. Social capital. In Hitt, M. A. & Ireland, R. D. (Eds.), The Blackwell encyclopedia of management (2nd ed.): 224–226. Malden, MA: Blackwell.

14. For an excellent discussion of social capital and its impact on organizational performance, refer to Nahapiet, J. & Ghoshal, S. 1998. Social capital, intellectual capital, and the organizational advantage. Academy of Management Review, 23: 242–266.

15. An interesting discussion of how knowledge management (patents) can enhance organizational performance can be found in Bogner, W. C. & Bansal, P. 2007. Knowledge management as the basis of sustained high performance. Journal of Management Studies, 44(1): 165–188.

16. Polanyi, M. 1967. The tacit dimension. Garden City, NY: Anchor.

17. Barney, J. B. 1991. Firm resources and sustained competitive advantage. Journal of Management, 17: 99–120.

18. For an interesting perspective of empirical research on how knowledge can adversely affect performance, read Haas, M. R. & Hansen, M. T. 2005. When using knowledge can hurt performance: The value of organizational capabilities in a management consulting company. Strategic Management Journal, 26(1): 1–24.

19. New insights on managing talent are provided in Cappelli, P. 2008. Talent management for the twenty-first century. Harvard Business Review, 66(3): 74–81.

20. Some of the notable books on this topic include Edvisson & Malone, op. cit.; Stewart, op. cit.; and Nonaka, I. & Takeuchi, I. 1995. The knowledge creating company. New York: Oxford University Press.

21. Segalla, M. & Felton, N. 2010. Find the real power in your organization. Harvard Business Review, 88(5): 34–35.

22. Stewart, T. A. 2000. Taking risk to the marketplace. Fortune, March 6: 424.

23. Lobel, O. 2014. Talent wants to be free. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.

24. Insights on Generation X’s perspective on the workplace are in Erickson, T. J. 2008. Task, not time: Profile of a Gen Y job. Harvard Business Review, 86(2): 19.

25. Pfeffer, J. 2010. Building sustainable organizations: The human factor. Academy of Management Perspectives, 24(1): 34–45.

26. Lobel, op. cit. 27. Some workplace implications for the

aging workforce are addressed in Strack, R., Baier, J., & Fahlander, A. 2008. Managing demographic risk. Harvard Business Review, 66(2): 119–128.

28. For a discussion of attracting, developing, and retaining top talent, refer to Goffee, R. & Jones, G. 2007. Leading clever people. Harvard Business Review, 85(3): 72–89.

29. Winston, A. S. 2014. The big pivot. Boston: Harvard Business Review Press.

30. Dess & Picken, op. cit., p. 34. 31. Webber, A. M. 1998. Danger: Toxic

company. Fast Company, November: 152–161.

32. Martin, J. & Schmidt, C. 2010. How to keep your top talent. Harvard Business Review, 88(5): 54–61.

33. Some interesting insights on why home-grown American talent is going abroad are found in Saffo, P. 2009. A looming American diaspora. Harvard Business Review, 87(2): 27.

34. Grossman, M. 2012. The best advice I ever got. Fortune, May 12: 119.

35. Davenport, T. H., Harris, J., & Shapiro, J. 2010. Competing on talent analytics. Harvard Business Review, 88(10): 62–69.

36. Ployhart, R. E. & Moliterno, T. P. 2011. Emergence of the human capital resource: A multilevel model. Academy of Management Review, 36(1): 127–150.

37. For insights on management development and firm performance in several countries, refer to Mabey, C. 2008. Management development and firm performance in Germany, Norway, Spain, and the UK. Journal of International Business Studies, 39(8): 1327–1342.

38. Martin, J. 1998. So, you want to work for the best. . . . Fortune, January 12: 77.

39. Cardin, R. 1997. Make your own Bozo Filter. Fast Company, October– November: 56.

40. Anonymous. 100 best companies to work for. money.cnn.com, undated: np.

41. Martin, op. cit.; Henkoff, R. 1993. Companies that train best. Fortune, March 22: 53–60.

42. This section draws on: Garg, V. 2012. Here’s why companies should give Millennial workers everything they ask for. buisnessinsider.com,

REFERENCES

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August 23: np; worklifepolicy.com; and Gerdes, L. 2006. The top 50 employers for new college grads. BusinessWeek, September 18: 64–81.

43. An interesting perspective on developing new talent rapidly when they join an organization can be found in Rollag, K., Parise, S., & Cross, R. 2005. Getting new hires up to speed quickly. MIT Sloan Management Review, 46(2): 35–41.

44. Stewart, T. A. 1998. Gray flannel suit? Moi? Fortune, March 18: 80–82.

45. Bryant, A. 2011. The corner office. New York: St. Martin’s Griffin, 227.

46. An interesting perspective on how Cisco Systems develops its talent can be found in Chatman, J., O’Reilly, C., & Chang, V. 2005. Cisco Systems: Developing a human capital strategy. California Management Review, 47(2): 137–166.

47. Anonymous. 2011. Schumpeter: The tussle for talent. The Economist, January 8: 68.

48. Training and development policy: Mentoring. opm.gov: undated, np.

49. Douglas, C. A. 1997. Formal mentoring programs in organizations. centerforcreativeleadership.org: np.

50. Warner, F. 2002. Inside Intel’s mentoring movement. fastcompany. com, March 31: np.

51. Grove, A. 2011. Be a mentor. Bloomberg Businessweek, September 21: 80.

52. Colvin, G. 2016. Developing an internal market for talent. Fortune. March 1: 22.

53. For an innovative perspective on the appropriateness of alternate approaches to evaluation and rewards, refer to Seijts, G. H. & Lathan, G. P. 2005. Learning versus performance goals: When should each be used? Academy of Management Executive, 19(1): 124–132.

54. The discussion of the 360-degree feedback system draws on the article UPS. 1997. 360-degree feedback: Coming from all sides. Vision (a UPS Corporation internal company publication), March: 3; Slater, R. 1994. Get better or get beaten: Thirty- one leadership secrets from Jack Welch. Burr Ridge, IL: Irwin; Nexon, M. 1997. General Electric: The secrets of the finest company in the world. L’Expansion, July 23: 18–30; and Smith, D. 1996. Bold new directions for human resources. Merck World (internal company publication), October: 8.

55. Interesting insights on 360-degree evaluation systems are discussed in Barwise, P. & Meehan, Sean. 2008.

So you think you’re a good listener. Harvard Business Review, 66(4): 22–23.

56. Insights into the use of 360-degree evaluation are in Kaplan, R. E. & Kaiser, R. B. 2009. Stop overdoing your strengths. Harvard Business Review, 87(2): 100–103.

57. Mankins, M., Bird, A., & Root, J. 2013. Making star teams out of star players. Harvard Business Review, 91(1/2): 74–78.

58. Kets de Vries, M. F. R. 1998. Charisma in action: The transformational abilities of Virgin’s Richard Branson and ABB’s Percy Barnevik. Organizational Dynamics, Winter: 20.

59. For an interesting discussion on how organizational culture has helped Zappos become number one in Fortune’s 2009 survey of the best companies to work for, see O’Brien, J. M. 2009. Zappos knows how to kick it. Fortune, February 2: 54–58.

60. We have only to consider the most celebrated case of industrial espionage in recent years, wherein José Ignacio Lopez was indicted in a German court for stealing sensitive product planning documents from his former employer, General Motors, and sharing them with his executive colleagues at Volkswagen. The lawsuit was dismissed by the German courts, but Lopez and his colleagues were investigated by the U.S. Justice Department. Also consider the recent litigation involving noncompete employment contracts and confidentiality clauses of International Paper v. Louisiana- Pacific, Campbell Soup v. H. J. Heinz Co., and PepsiCo v. Quaker Oats’s Gatorade. In addition to retaining valuable human resources and often their valuable network of customers, firms must also protect proprietary information and knowledge. For interesting insights, refer to Carley, W. M. 1998. CEO gets hard lesson in how not to keep his lieutenants. The Wall Street Journal, February 11: A1, A10; and Lenzner, R. & Shook, C. 1998. Whose Rolodex is it, anyway? Forbes, February 23: 100–103.

61. For an insightful discussion of retention of knowledge workers in today’s economy, read Davenport, T. H. 2005. The care and feeding of the knowledge worker. Boston, MA: Harvard Business School Press.

62. Weber, L. 2014. Here’s what boards want in executives. The Wall Street Journal, December 10: B5.

63. Fisher, A. 2008. America’s most admired companies. Fortune, March 17: 74.

64. Stewart, T. A. 2001. The wealth of knowledge, New York: Currency.

65. For insights on fulfilling one’s potential, refer to Kaplan, R. S. 2008. Reaching your potential. Harvard Business Review, 66(7/8): 45–57.

66. Amabile, T. M. 1997. Motivating creativity in organizations: On doing what you love and loving what you do. California Management Review, Fall: 39–58.

67. For an insightful perspective on alternate types of employee–employer relationships, read Erickson, T. J. & Gratton, L. 2007. What it means to work here. Harvard Business Review, 85(3): 104–112.

68. Little, L. 2016. Leadership innovation. Baylor Magazine. Winter: 31.

69. Ignatius, A. & McGinn, D. 2015. The best performing CEOs in the world. Harvard Business Review, 93(11): 63.

70. Pfeffer, J. 2001. Fighting the war for talent is hazardous to your organization’s health. Organizational Dynamics, 29(4): 248–259.

71. Best companies to work for 2011. 2011. finance.yahoo.com, January 20: np.

72. This section draws on Dewhurst, M., Hancock, B., & Ellsworth, D. 2013. Redesigning knowledge work. Harvard Business Review, 91 (1/2): 58–64.

73. Cox, T. L. 1991. The multinational organization. Academy of Management Executive, 5(2): 34–47. Without doubt, a great deal has been written on the topic of creating and maintaining an effective diverse workforce. Some excellent, recent books include Harvey, C. P. & Allard, M. J. 2005. Understanding and managing diversity: Readings, cases, and exercises (3rd ed.). Upper Saddle River, NJ: Pearson Prentice-Hall; Miller, F. A. & Katz, J. H. 2002. The inclusion breakthrough: Unleashing the real power of diversity. San Francisco: Berrett Koehler; and Williams, M. A. 2001. The 10 lenses: Your guide to living and working in a multicultural world. Sterling, VA: Capital Books.

74. For an interesting perspective on benefits and downsides of diversity in global consulting firms, refer to Mors, M. L. 2010. Innovation in a global consulting firm: When the problem is too much diversity. Strategic Management Journal, 31(8): 841–872.

75. Day, J. C. Undated. National population projections. cps.ipums.org: np.

76. Hewlett, S. A. & Rashid, R. 2010. The battle for female talent in emerging markets. Harvard Business Review, 88(5): 101–107.

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77. This section, including the six potential benefits of a diverse workforce, draws on Cox, T. H. & Blake, S. 1991. Managing cultural diversity: Implications for organizational competitiveness. Academy of Management Executive, 5(3): 45–56.

78. www.pwcglobal.com/us/eng/careers/ diversity/index.html.

79. Hewlett, S. A., Marshall, M., & Sherbin, L. 2013. How diversity can drive innovation. Harvard Business Review, 91(12): 30.

80. This discussion draws on Dess, G. G. & Lumpkin, G. T. 2001. Emerging issues in strategy process research. In Hitt, M. A., Freeman, R. E., & Harrison, J. S. (Eds.), Handbook of strategic management: 3–34. Malden, MA: Blackwell.

81. Wong, S.-S. & Boh, W. F. 2010. Leveraging the ties of others to build a reputation for trustworthiness among peers. Academy of Management Journal, 53(1): 129–148.

82. Adler, P. S. & Kwon, S. W. 2002. Social capital: Prospects for a new concept. Academy of Management Review, 27(1): 17–40.

83. Capelli, P. 2000. A market-driven approach to retaining talent. Harvard Business Review, 78(1): 103–113.

84. This hypothetical example draws on Peteraf, M. 1993. The cornerstones of competitive advantage. Strategic Management Journal, 14: 179–191.

85. Wernerfelt, B. 1984. A resource- based view of the firm. Strategic Management Journal, 5: 171–180.

86. Wysocki, B., Jr. 2000. Yet another hazard of the new economy: The Pied Piper effect. The Wall Street Journal, March 20: A1–A16.

87. Ideas on how managers can more effectively use their social network are addressed in McGrath, C. & Zell, D. 2009. Profiles of trust: Who to turn to, and for what. MIT Sloan Management Review, 50(2): 75–80.

88. Ibid. 89. Buckman, R. C. 2000. Tech defectors

from Microsoft resettle together. The Wall Street Journal, October: B1–B6.

90. Malone, T., The Future of Work. Boston, MA: Harvard Business School Press, April 2004.

91. Aime, F., Johnson, S., Ridge, J. W., & Hill, A. D. 2010. The routine may be stable but the advantage is not: Competitive implications of key employee mobility. Strategic Management Journal, 31(1): 75–87.

92. Ibarra, H. & Hansen, M. T. 2011. Are you a collaborative leader? Harvard Business Review, 89(7/8): 68–74.

93. Battilana, J. & Casciaro, T. 2013. The network secrets of great change agents. Harvard Business Review, 91(7/8): 62–68.

94. There has been a tremendous amount of theory building and empirical research in recent years in the area of social network analysis. Unquestionably, two of the major contributors to this domain have been Ronald Burt and J. S. Coleman. For excellent background discussions, refer to Burt, R. S. 1992. Structural holes: The social structure of competition. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press; Coleman, J. S. 1990. Foundations of social theory. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press; and Coleman, J. S. 1988. Social capital in the creation of human capital. American Journal of Sociology, 94: S95–S120. For a more recent review and integration of current thought on social network theory, consider Burt, R. S. 2005. Brokerage & closure: An introduction to social capital. New York: Oxford Press.

95. Our discussion draws on the concepts developed by Burt, 1992, op. cit.; Coleman, 1990, op. cit.; Coleman, 1988, op. cit.; and Oh, H., Chung, M., & Labianca, G. 2004. Group social capital and group effectiveness: The role of informal socializing ties. Academy of Management Journal, 47(6): 860–875. We would like to thank Joe Labianca (University of Kentucky) for his helpful feedback and ideas in our discussion of social networks.

96. Arregle, J. L., Hitt, M. A., Sirmon, D. G., & Very, P. 2007. The development of organizational social capital: Attributes of family firms. Journal of Management Studies, 44(1): 73–95.

97. A novel perspective on social networks is in Pentland, A. 2009. How social networks network best. Harvard Business Review, 87(2): 37.

98. Oh et al., op. cit. 99. Hoppe, B. 2004. Good ideas at

Raytheon and big holes in our own backyard. connectedness.blogspot.com, July 8: np.

100. Perspectives on how to use and develop decision networks are discussed in Cross, R., Thomas, R. J., & Light, D. A. 2009. How “who you know” affects what you decide. MIT Sloan Management Review, 50(2): 35–42.

101. Our discussion of the three advantages of social networks draws

on Uzzi, B. & Dunlap. S. 2005. How to build your network. Harvard Business Review, 83(12): 53–60. For an excellent review on the research exploring the relationship between social capital and managerial performance, read Moran, P. 2005. Structural vs. relational embeddedness: Social capital and managerial performance. Strategic Management Journal, 26(12): 1129–1151.

102. A perspective on personal influence is in Christakis, N. A. 2009. The dynamics of personal influence. Harvard Business Review, 87(2): 31.

103. Prusak, L. & Cohen, D. 2001. How to invest in social capital. Harvard Business Review, 79(6): 86–93.

104. Leonard, D. & Straus, S. 1997. Putting your company’s whole brain to work. Harvard Business Review, 75(4): 110–122.

105. For an excellent discussion of public (i.e., the organization) versus private (i.e., the individual manager) benefits of social capital, refer to Leana, C. R. & Van Buren, H. J. 1999. Organizational social capital and employment practices. Academy of Management Review, 24(3): 538–555.

106. The authors would like to thank Joe Labianca, University of Kentucky, and John Lin, University of Texas at Dallas, for their very helpful input in our discussion of social network theory and its practical implications.

107. Goldsmith, M. 2009. How not to lose the top job. Harvard Business Review, 87(1): 74.

108. Taylor, W. C. 1999. Whatever happened to globalization? Fast Company, December: 228–236.

109. Wilson, H. J., Guinan, P. J., Paris, S., & Weinberg, D. 2011. What’s your social media strategy? Harvard Business Review, 89(7/8): 23–25.

110. Lei, D., Slocum, J., & Pitts, R. A. 1999. Designing organizations for competitive advantage: The power of unlearning and learning. Organizational Dynamics, Winter: 24–38.

111. This section draws upon Zaccaro, S. J. & Bader, P. 2002. E-leadership and the challenges of leading e-teams: Minimizing the bad and maximizing the good. Organizational Dynamics, 31(4): 377–387.

112. Kirkman, B. L., Rosen, B., Tesluk, P. E., & Gibson, C. B. 2004. The impact of team empowerment on virtual team performance: The moderating role of face-to-face interaction. Academy of Management Journal, 47(2): 175–192.

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113. The discussion of the advantages and challenges associated with e-teams draws on Zaccaro & Bader, op. cit.

114. For a study exploring the relationship between team empowerment, face-to- face interaction, and performance in virtual teams, read Kirkman, Rosen, Tesluk, & Gibson, op. cit.

115. For an innovative study on how firms share knowledge with competitors and the performance implications, read Spencer, J. W. 2003. Firms’ knowledge sharing strategies in the global innovation system: Empirical evidence from the flat panel display industry. Strategic Management Journal, 24(3): 217–235.

116. This discussion draws on Conley, J. G. 2005. Intellectual capital management. Kellogg School of Management and Schulich School of Business, York University, Toronto, ON; Conley, J. G. & Szobocsan, J.

2001. Snow White shows the way. Managing Intellectual P02roperty, June: 15–25; Greenspan, A. 2004. Intellectual property rights. Federal Reserve Board, Remarks by the chairman, February 27; and Teece, D. J. 1998. Capturing value from knowledge assets. California Management Review, 40(3): 54–79. The authors would like to thank Professor Theo Peridis, York University, for his contribution to this section.

117. Wingfield, N. 2012. As Apple and HTC end lawsuits, smartphone patent battles continue. New York Times, www.nytimes.com, November 11: 57–63; and Tyrangiel, J. 2012. Tim Cook’s freshman year: The Apple CEO speaks. Bloomberg Businessweek, December 6: 62–76.

118. E. Danneels. 2011. Trying to become a different type of company: Dynamic

capability at Smith Corona. Strategic Management Journal, 32(1): 1–31.

119. A study of the relationship between dynamic capabilities and related diversification is Doving, E. & Gooderham, P. N. 2008. Strategic Management Journal, 29(8): 841–858.

120. A perspective on strategy in turbulent markets is in Sull, D. 2009. How to thrive in turbulent markets. Harvard Business Review, 87(2): 78–88.

121. Lee, G. K. 2008. Relevance of organizational capabilities and its dynamics: What to learn from entrants’ product portfolios about the determinants of entry timing. Strategic Management Journal, 29(12): 1257–1280.

122. Eisenhardt, K. M. & Martin, J. E. 2000. Dynamic capabilities: What are they? Strategic Management Journal, 21: 1105–1121.

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chapter

After reading this chapter, you should have a good understanding of the following learning objectives:

5 LO5-1 The central role of competitive advantage in the study of strategic

management and the three generic strategies: overall cost leadership, differentiation, and focus.

LO5-2 How the successful attainment of generic strategies can improve a firm’s relative power vis-à-vis the five forces that determine an industry’s average profitability.

LO5-3 The pitfalls managers must avoid in striving to attain generic strategies. LO5-4 How firms can effectively combine the generic strategies of overall cost

leadership and differentiation.

LO5-5 What factors determine the sustainability of a firm’s competitive advantage. LO5-6 The importance of considering the industry life cycle to determine a

firm’s business-level strategy and its relative emphasis on functional area strategies and value-creating activities.

LO5-7 The need for turnaround strategies that enable a firm to reposition its competitive position in an industry.

Business-Level Strategy Creating and Sustaining Competitive Advantages

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PART 2: STRATEGIC FORMULATION

A&P was the first traditional supermarket operator in the United States, with its roots going back to 1859. In its heyday, the firm operated over 4,200 stores. During the period from 1915 to 1975, A&P was the largest grocery retailer in the country. However it suffered a long, painful decline that led to multiple reorganization efforts as well as bankruptcies. In 2015, the long struggle to revive the firm came to an end when, as part of a bankruptcy filing, A&P sold off or closed its final 256 stores.1

What happened to this retailing icon? They were simply stuck in the middle. When it was on top, A&P provided a clear value proposition for its customers. It was one of the most cost-efficient retailers in the market while providing a wide array of products for its customers. As a result, it had both cost and differentiation advantages over its rivals. However, things started to turn in the 1950s. Rather than invest in, expand, and modernize its stores, its controlling owners distributed most of its profits to shareholders through large dividends. At the same time, new and aggressive competitors started to enter the market, and these competitors eroded A&P’s distinctive positioning. In the battle to win the business of cost-conscious customers, A&P faced stiff competition from massive general market retailers, most notably Walmart, as well as focused discounters, such as dollar stores and discount grocers, including Aldi. Customers looking for a higher level of service and specialty foods gravitated to grocery retailers that offered a higher level of service in larger stores, such as Wegmans, and newer high-end providers, such as Whole Foods, that offered gourmet foods and wider organic food product lines.

A&P was initially slow to respond to these challenges. When they finally did respond, as Jim Hertel, a grocery industry consultant stated, “They got caught in a downward spiral of sales declines that forced them to cut costs.” This resulted in challenges of hiring enough qualified staff and limited funds to update or upgrade stores. Even so, they were still at a cost disadvantage to both Walmart and Aldi. This left A&P with both higher prices than Walmart and other discounters and stores that felt old and dirty. In other words, the firm offered little in terms of value for its customers. After its initial bankruptcy, A&P attempted to modernize its stores and rebrand itself as a more upscale grocery retailer but lacked the financial resources to follow through on the change.

Discussion Questions 1. What decisions did A&P make when it was successful that led to its later failure? 2. How should the firm have responded to the new competitive challenges it faced? 3. What firm do you see today that faces similar challenges? How should this firm respond and

act to reinforce its strategic position?

LEARNING FROM MISTAKES

In order to create and sustain a competitive advantage, companies need to stay focused on their customers’ evolving wants and needs and not sacrifice their strategic position as they mature and the market around them evolves. Since A&P failed to invest in and reinforce its market position as the grocery industry matured and new entrants came into the market, it is not surprising that its market leadership eroded, and it was forced out of the market.

business-level strategy a strategy designed for a firm or a division of a firm that competes within a single business.

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TYPES OF COMPETITIVE ADVANTAGE AND SUSTAINABILITY

Michael Porter presented three generic strategies that a firm can use to overcome the five forces and achieve competitive advantage.2 Each of Porter’s generic strategies has the poten- tial to allow a firm to outperform rivals in their industry. The first, overall cost leadership, is based on creating a low-cost position. Here, a firm must manage the relationships through- out the value chain and lower costs throughout the entire chain. Second, differentiation requires a firm to create products and/or services that are unique and valued. Here, the pri- mary emphasis is on “nonprice” attributes for which customers will gladly pay a premium.3 Third, a focus strategy directs attention (or “focus”) toward narrow product lines, buyer segments, or targeted geographic markets, and they must attain advantages through either differentiation or cost leadership.4 Whereas the overall cost leadership and differentiation strategies strive to attain advantages industrywide, focusers have a narrow target market in mind. Exhibit 5.1 illustrates these three strategies on two dimensions: competitive advan- tage and markets served.

Both casual observation and research support the notion that firms that identify with one or more of the forms of competitive advantage outperform those that do not.5 There has been a rich history of strategic management research addressing this topic. One study analyzed 1,789 strategic business units and found that businesses combining multiple forms of competitive advantage (differentiation and overall cost leadership) outperformed busi- nesses that used only a single form. The lowest performers were those that did not identify with any type of advantage. They were classified as “stuck in the middle.” Results of this study are presented in Exhibit 5.2.6

For an example of the dangers of being stuck in the middle, consider the traditional supermarket.7 The major supermarket chains, such as Food Lion and Albertsons, used to be the main source of groceries for consumers. However, they find themselves in a situation today where affluent customers are going upmarket to get their organic and gourmet foods at retailers like Whole Foods Market and budget-conscious consumers are drifting to dis- count chains such as Walmart, Aldi, and Dollar General.

LO 5-1 The central role of competitive advantage in the study of strategic management and the three generic strategies: overall cost leadership, differentiation, and focus.

generic strategies basic types of business- level strategies based on breadth of target market (industrywide versus narrow market segment) and type of competitive advantage (low cost versus uniqueness).

EXHIBIT 5.1 Three Generic Strategies Competitive Advantage

Low Cost Position

M ar

ke ts

S er

ve d

Broad Target Market

Narrow Target Markets

Overall Cost Leadership

Cost Focus

Broad Differentiation

Differentiation Focus

Superior Perceived Value by Customer

Source: Adapted from Competitive Strategy: Techniques for Analyzing Industries and Competitors by Michael E. Porter, 1980, 1998, Free Press.

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Overall Cost Leadership The first generic strategy is overall cost leadership. Overall cost leadership requires a tight set of interrelated tactics that include:

• Aggressive construction of efficient-scale facilities. • Vigorous pursuit of cost reductions from experience. • Tight cost and overhead control. • Avoidance of marginal customer accounts. • Cost minimization in all activities in the firm’s value chain, such as R&D, service,

sales force, and advertising.

Exhibit 5.3 draws on the value-chain concept (see Chapter 3) to provide examples of how a firm can attain an overall cost leadership strategy in its primary and support activities.

One factor often central to an overall cost leadership strategy is the experience curve, which refers to how business “learns” to lower costs as it gains experience with production processes. With experience, unit costs of production decline as output increases in most industries. The experience curve, developed by the Boston Consulting Group in 1968, is a way of looking at efficiency gains that come with experience. For a range of products, as cumulative experience doubles, costs and labor hours needed to produce a unit of product decline by 10 to 30 percent. There are a number of reasons why we find this effect. Among the most common factors are workers getting better at what they do, product designs being simplified as the product matures, and production processes being automated and stream- lined. However, experience curve gains will be the foundation for a cost advantage only if the firm knows the source of the cost reduction and can keep these gains proprietary.

To generate above-average performance, a firm following an overall cost leadership posi- tion must attain competitive parity on the basis of differentiation relative to competitors.8 In other words, a firm achieving parity is similar to its competitors, or “on par,” with respect to differentiated products.9 Competitive parity on the basis of differentiation permits a cost leader to translate cost advantages directly into higher profits than competitors. Thus, the cost leader earns above-average returns.10

The failure to attain parity on the basis of differentiation can be illustrated with an exam- ple from the automobile industry—the Tata Nano. Tata, an Indian conglomerate, developed the Nano to be the cheapest car in the world. At a price of about $2,000, the Nano was expected to draw in middle-class customers in India and developing markets as well as bud- get conscious customers in Europe and North America. However, it hasn‘t caught on in either market. The Nano doesn’t have some of the basic features expected with cars, such as

overall cost leadership a firm’s generic strategy based on appeal to the industrywide market using a competitive advantage based on low cost.

experience curve the decline in unit costs of production as cumulative output increases.

competitive parity a firm’s achievement of similarity, or being “on par,” with competitors with respect to low cost, differentiation, or other strategic product characteristic.

Competitive Advantage

Differentiation and Cost Differentiation Cost

Differentiation and Focus Cost and Focus

Stuck in the Middle

Performance

Return on investment (%)

35.5 32.9 30.2 17.0 23.7 17.8

Sales growth (%) 15.1 13.5 13.5 16.4 17.5 12.2

Gain in market share (%)

5.3 5.3 5.5 6.1 6.3 4.4

Sample size 123 160 100 141 86 105

EXHIBIT 5.2 Competitive Advantage and Business Performance

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Support Activities

Firm Infrastructure

• Few management layers to reduce overhead costs. • Standardized accounting practices to minimize personnel required.

Human Resource Management

• Minimize costs associated with employee turnover through effective policies. • Effective orientation and training programs to maximize employee productivity.

Technology Development

• Effective use of automated technology to reduce scrappage rates. • Expertise in process engineering to reduce manufacturing costs.

Procurement

• Effective policy guidelines to ensure low-cost raw materials (with acceptable quality levels). • Shared purchasing operations with other business units.

Primary Activities

Inbound Logistics

• Effective layout of receiving dock operations.

Operations

• Effective use of quality control inspectors to minimize rework.

Outbound Logistics

• Effective utilization of delivery fleets.

Marketing and Sales

• Purchase of media in large blocks. • Sales-force utilization is maximized by territory management.

Service

• Thorough service repair guidelines to minimize repeat maintenance calls. • Use of single type of vehicle to minimize repair costs.

Source: Adapted from Porter, M. E. 1985. Competitive Advantage: Creating and Sustaining Superior Performance. New York: Free Press.

EXHIBIT 5.3 Value-Chain Activities: Examples of Overall Cost Leadership

power steering and a passenger side mirror. It also faces concerns about safety. In crash tests, the Nano received zero stars for adult protection and didn’t meet basic UN safety require- ments. Also, there were numerous reports of Nanos catching fire. Due to all of these factors, the Nano has simply been seen by customers as offering a lousy value proposition.11

The lesson is simple. Price is just one component of value. No matter how good the price, the most cost-sensitive consumer won’t buy a bad product.

Gordon Bethune, the former CEO of Continental Airlines, summed up the need to pro- vide good products or services when employing a low-cost strategy this way: “You can make a pizza so cheap, nobody will buy it.”12

Next, we discuss two examples of firms that have built a cost leadership position. Aldi, a discount supermarket retailer, has grown from its German base to the rest of Europe,

Australia, and the United States by replicating a simple business format. Aldi limits the num- ber of products (SKUs in the grocery business) in each category to ensure product turn, to

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5.1 ENVIRONMENTAL SUSTAINABILITYSTRATEGY SPOTLIGHT PRIMARK STRIVES TO BALANCE LOW COSTS WITH ENVIRONMENTAL SUSTAINABILITY Primark may be the most successful brand most Americans have never heard of. Though it didn’t open its first U.S. store until 2015, it has been one of the fastest growing fashion retailers in the world over the last several years—growing by 150 percent between 2008 and 2014. Though its growth slowed to 9 percent in 2016, it continues to expand into new markets and expects its growth to accelerate in 2017. The Irish-based retailer focuses on selling trendy clothes at astonishingly low prices. It emphasizes keeping its cost structure lower than any of its rivals by leverag- ing streamlined logistics, a very low marketing budget, and its large scale that helps it get bargain prices from its suppliers. It also marks its prices up above cost less than its major rivals. As a result, the average selling price of an article of women’s clothing at Primark was 60 percent less than H&M, one of its major rivals, in Britain. It aims to make up for low margins by selling at a higher volume than its rivals. For example, for every square foot, Primark generates 55 percent greater sales annually than H&M. Primark’s customers often buy a series of outfits, wear them a

few times, and then come back for a fresh set of outfits. Primark appears to be benefiting from the “Instagram effect,” where young fashion-conscious consumers feel the need to regularly post selfies of new outfits they just bought.

While it strives for low costs, the firm also tries to balance this with the need for sustainability. Primark developed the Primark Sustainable Cotton Program in partnership with the Self-Employed Women’s Association (SEWA) and social busi- ness CottonConnect. In this effort, they promote sustainable farming methods to female smallholder cotton farmers in India that provide economic opportunities for women; reduce the use of fertilizer, pesticides and water; and improve cotton yields. As a result of its efforts, Primark has been honored by Greenpeace with a Detox Leader Award and by the Chartered Institute of Procurement with a Best Contribution to Corporate Responsibility Award.

Sources: Anonymous, 2015. Faster, cheaper fashion. economist.com. September 5: np; Doshi, V. 2016. Primark tackles fast fashion critics with cotton farmer project in India. theguardian.com. September 30: np; McGregor, L. 2016. Can Primark really claim to be sustainable? sourcingjournalonline.com. October 17: np; Percival, G. 2016. Irish arm helps to drive 9% sales growth at Primark. irishexaminer.com. September 13: np.

ease stocking shelves, and to increase its power over suppliers. It also sells mostly private-label products to minimize cost. It has small, efficient, and simply designed stores. It offers limited services and expects customers to bring their own bags and bag their own groceries. As a result, Aldi can offer its products at prices 40 percent lower than competing supermarkets.13

Zulily, an online retailer, has built its business model around lower-cost operations in order to carve out a unique position relative to Amazon and other online retailers. Zulily keeps very little inventory and typically orders products from vendors only when custom- ers purchase the product. It also has developed a bare-bones distribution system. Together, these actions result in deliveries that take an average of 11.5 days to get to customers and can sometimes stretch out to several weeks. Due to its reduced operational costs, Zulily is able to offer attractive prices to customers who are willing to wait.14

A business that strives for a low-cost advantage must attain an absolute cost advantage relative to its rivals.15 This is typically accomplished by offering a no-frills product or ser- vice to a broad target market using standardization to derive the greatest benefits from economies of scale and experience. However, such a strategy may fail if a firm is unable to attain parity on important dimensions of differentiation such as quick responses to cus- tomer requests for services or design changes. Strategy Spotlight 5.1 discusses how Primark, an Irish clothing retailer, has built a low-cost strategy while also being seen as effectively addressing concerns about environmental sustainability.

Overall Cost Leadership: Improving Competitive Position vis-à-vis the Five Forces An over- all low-cost position enables a firm to achieve above-average returns despite strong competi- tion. It protects a firm against rivalry from competitors, because lower costs allow a firm to earn returns even if its competitors eroded their profits through intense rivalry. A low-cost position also protects firms against powerful buyers. Buyers can exert power to drive down prices only to the level of the next most efficient producer. Also, a low-cost position provides

LO 5-2 How the successful attainment of generic strategies can improve a firm’s relative power vis- à-vis the five forces that determine an industry’s average profitability.

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more flexibility to cope with demands from powerful suppliers for input cost increases. The factors that lead to a low-cost position also provide a substantial entry barriers position with respect to substitute products introduced by new and existing competitors.16

A few examples will illustrate these points. Zulily’s close attention to costs helps to protect the company from buyer power and intense rivalry from competitors. Thus, Zulily is able to drive down costs and reduce the bargaining power of its customers. By cutting costs lower than other discount clothing retailers, Primark both lessens the degree of rivalry it faces and increases entry barriers for new entrants. Aldi’s extreme focus on minimizing costs across its operations makes it less vulnerable to substitutes, such as discount retailers like Walmart and dollar stores.

Potential Pitfalls of Overall Cost Leadership Strategies Potential pitfalls of an overall cost leadership strategy include:

• Too much focus on one or a few value-chain activities. Would you consider a person to be astute if he canceled his newspaper subscription and quit eating out to save money but then “maxed out” several credit cards, requiring him to pay hundreds of dollars a month in interest charges? Of course not. Similarly, firms need to pay attention to all activities in the value chain.17 Too often managers make big cuts in operating expenses but don’t question year-to-year spending on capital projects. Or managers may decide to cut selling and marketing expenses but ignore manufacturing expenses. Managers should explore all value-chain activities, including relationships among them, as candidates for cost reductions.

• Increase in the cost of the inputs on which the advantage is based. Firms can be vulnerable to price increases in the factors of production. For example, consider manufacturing firms based in China that rely on low labor costs. Due to demographic factors, the supply of workers 16 to 24 years old has peaked and will drop by a third in the next 12 years, thanks to stringent family-planning policies that have sharply reduced China’s population growth.18 This is leading to upward pressure on labor costs in Chinese factories, undercutting the cost advantage of firms producing there.

• A strategy that can be imitated too easily. One of the common pitfalls of a cost leadership strategy is that a firm’s strategy may consist of value-creating activities that are easy to imitate.19 Such has been the case with online brokers in recent years.20 As of early 2015, there were over 200 online brokers listed on allstocks.com, hardly symbolic of an industry where imitation is extremely difficult. And according to Henry McVey, financial services analyst at Morgan Stanley, “We think you need five to ten” online brokers.

• A lack of parity on differentiation. As noted earlier, firms striving to attain cost leadership advantages must obtain a level of parity on differentiation.21 Firms providing online degree programs may offer low prices. However, they may not be successful unless they can offer instruction that is perceived as comparable to traditional providers. For them, parity can be achieved on differentiation dimensions such as reputation and quality and through signaling mechanisms such as accreditation agencies.

• Reduced flexibility. Building up a low-cost advantage often requires significant investments in plant and equipment, distribution systems, and large, economically scaled operations. As a result, firms often find that these investments limit their flexibility, leading to great difficulty responding to changes in the environment. For example, Coors Brewing developed a highly efficient, large-scale brewery in Golden, Colorado. Coors was one of the most efficient brewers in the world, but its plant was designed to mass-produce one or two types of beer. When the craft brewing craze started to grow, the plant was not well equipped to produce smaller batches of craft beer, and Coors found it difficult to meet this opportunity. Ultimately, Coors had to buy its way into this movement by acquiring small craft breweries.22

LO 5-3 The pitfalls managers must avoid in striving to attain generic strategies.

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• Obsolescence of the basis of cost advantage. Ultimately, the foundation of a firm’s cost advantage may become obsolete. In such circumstances, other firms develop new ways of cutting costs, leaving the old cost leaders at a significant disadvantage. The older cost leaders are often locked into their way of competing and are unable to respond to the newer, lower-cost means of competing. This is the position that discount investment advisors now find themselves. Charles Schwab and TD Ameritrade challenged traditional brokers with lower cost business models. Now, they find themselves having to respond to a new class of robo-advisor firms, such as Betterment, that offer even lower cost investment advice using automated data analytic-based computer systems.

Differentiation As the name implies, a differentiation strategy consists of creating differences in the firm’s product or service offering by creating something that is perceived industrywide as unique and valued by customers.23 Differentiation can take many forms:

• Prestige or brand image (Hotel Monaco, BMW automobiles).24

• Quality (Apple, Ruth’s Chris steak houses, Michelin tires). • Technology (Martin guitars, North Face camping equipment). • Innovation (Medtronic medical equipment, Tesla Motors). • Features (Cannondale mountain bikes, Ducati motorcycles). • Customer service (Nordstrom department stores, USAA financial services). • Dealer network (Lexus automobiles, Caterpillar earthmoving equipment).

Exhibit 5.4 draws on the concept of the value chain as an example of how firms may dif- ferentiate themselves in primary and support activities.

Firms may differentiate themselves along several different dimensions at once.25 For exam- ple, the Cheesecake Factory, an upscale casual restaurant, differentiates itself by offering high- quality food, the widest and deepest menu in its class of restaurants, and premium locations.26

Firms achieve and sustain differentiation advantages and attain above-average perfor- mance when their price premiums exceed the extra costs incurred in being unique.27 For example, the Cheesecake Factory must increase consumer prices to offset the higher cost of premium real estate and producing such a wide menu. Thus, a differentiator will always seek out ways of distinguishing itself from similar competitors to justify price premiums greater than the costs incurred by differentiating.28 Clearly, a differentiator cannot ignore costs. After all, its premium prices would be eroded by a markedly inferior cost position. Therefore, it must attain a level of cost parity relative to competitors. Differentiators can do this by reducing costs in all areas that do not affect differentiation. Porsche, for exam- ple, invests heavily in engine design—an area in which its customers demand excellence— but it is less concerned and spends fewer resources in the design of the instrument panel or the arrangement of switches on the radio.29 Although a differentiation firm needs to be mindful of costs, it must also regularly and consistently reinforce the foundations of its differentiation advantage. In doing so, the firm builds a stronger reputation for differentia- tion, and this reputation can be an enduring source of advantage in its market.30

Many companies successfully follow a differentiation strategy. For example, Zappos may sell shoes, but it sees the core element of its differentiation advantage as service. Zappos CEO Tony Hsieh puts it this way:31

We hope that 10 years from now people won’t even realize that we started out selling shoes online, and that when you say “Zappos,” they’ll think, “Oh, that’s the place with the absolute best customer service.” And that doesn’t even have to be limited to being an online experience. We’ve had customers email us and ask us if we would please start an airline, or run the IRS.

differentiation strategy a firm’s generic strategy based on creating differences in the firm’s product or service offering by creating something that is perceived industrywide as unique and valued by customers.

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Support Activities

Firm Infrastructure

• Superior MIS—to integrate value-creating activities to improve quality. • Facilities that promote firm image. • Widely respected CEO who enhances firm reputation.

Human Resource Management

• Programs to attract talented engineers and scientists. • Provision of training and incentives to ensure a strong customer service orientation.

Technology Development

• Superior material handling and sorting technology. • Excellent applications engineering support.

Procurement

• Purchase of high-quality components to enhance product image. • Use of most-prestigious outlets.

Primary Activities

Inbound Logistics

• Superior material handling operations to minimize damage. • Quick transfer of inputs to manufacturing process.

Operations

• Flexibility and speed in responding to changes in manufacturing specifications. • Low defect rates to improve quality.

Outbound Logistics

• Accurate and responsive order processing. • Effective product replenishment to reduce customer inventory.

Marketing and Sales

• Creative and innovative advertising programs. • Fostering of personal relationship with key customers.

Service

• Rapid response to customer service requests. • Complete inventory of replacement parts and supplies.

Source: Adapted from Porter, M. E. 1985. Competitive Advantage: Creating and Sustaining Superior Performance. New York: Free Press.

EXHIBIT 5.4 Value-Chain Activities: Examples of Differentiation

This emphasis on service has led to great success. Growing from an idea to a billion- dollar company in only a dozen years, Zappos is seeing the benefits of providing exemplary service. In Insights from Research, we see that firms are better able to improve their inno- vativeness when they leverage the value of customer interactions by providing incentives for employees to generate new ideas, build strong networks to share ideas and questions across organizational boundaries, and empower personnel to make bold decisions.

Strategy Spotlight 5.2 discusses how Caterpillar is using data analytics to differentiate the firm and sell new services.

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Overview Business leaders have many reasons to want to be innovative. Research has shown customer interactions are important to innovation, but the study discussed below proves that is not enough. Business leaders must organize all employees to leverage customer interaction via particular incentives, com- munication patterns, and empowerment efforts.

What the Research Shows Researchers from the Copenhagen Business School pub- lished a paper in Organization Science describing ways that companies use customer interactions to improve their inno- vation performance. The researchers used data from surveys of chief executive officers and other top managers in 169 of the largest Danish companies to determine the factors that improve innovation. The authors argue that merely inter- acting with customers isn’t enough; business leaders must organize employees in certain ways internally to impact inno- vation performance.

The researchers found that companies whose employees had high customer interaction—those who collaborated with customers on projects and communicated intensely with customers—had better innovation performance and profit- ability. They found that the more a company’s employees interacted with customers, the more its leaders delegated responsibility. As a result, in such companies, employees influenced their own jobs and often worked in teams.

Additionally, the researchers found that the more busi- ness leaders delegated responsibility, the more the compa- nies used knowledge incentives. That is, employees’ salaries were linked to improvement in skills as well as sharing and upgrading knowledge. This resulted in more communica- tion between functional departments and between manage- ment and employees.

The bottom line of this research is this: The link between interaction with customers and innovation perfor- mance is indirect, but is related to organizational practices that trigger individual knowledge growth and cross-unit communication.

Why This Matters It was already known that when employees interact with their users and customers, innovation often increases. But innova- tion doesn’t just happen. Specific organizational practices are necessary to make it happen. The way leaders leverage their employees’ customer interactions is through policies

about communication, incentives, and empowerment. For example, communication should be encouraged across departments and between managers and employees. Also, rewards for sharing ideas and knowledge should be in place. Finally, employees should be given leeway to make decisions on their own rather than having to deal with red tape.

When these practices are in place, customer interactions are more likely to lead to innovation. But some companies are more equipped than others to receive helpful feedback from their customers. The software company SAP provides an excellent example of how to benefit from customers’ ideas. The organization routinely taps more than 1.5 million participants in its Developer Network to post questions and receive quick responses on its virtual platform. Customers, developers, system integrators, and vendors help SAP increase productivity for all participants.

Key Takeaways • Innovative companies often have higher profits,

market values, market share, and credit ratings—and are more likely to survive.

• Interacting with customers can lead to innovation; in fact, many innovations are initiated by customers rather than manufacturers.

• This research also shows that customer interaction is not enough. To have these interactions spur innovative actions requires corporate leaders to enact specific organizational practices.

• Important practices for innovation include incentives to seek and share knowledge, the delegation of responsibility, and internal communication across departments and between managers and employees.

Apply This Today Employees’ interactions with customers have become vital to increasing innovative performance, but it is not enough. Communication between management and employees as well as across departments, incentives to get and share knowledge, and the delegation of responsibility can unleash the creativity of your workforce.

Research Reviewed Foss, N., Laursen, K., & Pederson, T. 2011. Linking cus- tomer interaction and innovation: The mediating role of new organizational practices. Organization Science, 22: 980–999.

INSIGHTS from Research5.1

LINKING CUSTOMER INTERACTIONS TO INNOVATION: THE ROLE OF THE ORGANIZATIONAL PRACTICES

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5.2 DATA ANALYTICSSTRATEGY SPOTLIGHT CATERPILLAR DIGS INTO THE DATA TO DIFFERENTIATE ITSELF When most people think about the Caterpillar Corporation, they think of big yellow tractors and heavy equipment used in construc- tion and mining. They don’t often think of technology and data ana- lytics. But this is an increasing emphasis in the firm. Caterpillar has been adding high-tech tools to its products for years. Cat excava- tors have been equipped with GPS and laser technology to help the driver set and maintain level digging and grading slopes. Cat has also built in systems to diagnose the ongoing health of the machine.

More recently, Caterpillar has looked to big data to help it grow its business. In an alliance with Uptake, a data analytics firm, they are now building systems to transmit data from machines to the cloud. This will allow Caterpillar to see how its machines are most commonly used, the tasks the machines struggle with, what triggers breakdowns, and when customers are likely to need to replace their machines. Cat itself can use this data to help it develop the next generation of machines—to assess the most common uses for its machines, to build better products, and

to predict customer needs. The plan is to use the data to bet- ter differentiate its products. But the company can also use the data to sell differentiated services to its business partners. For example, dealers could use the results of Cat’s data collection to predict upcoming repairs and parts needs. End customers would likely value data on machine usage to see if operators are sit- ting idle too much or if they are improperly using machines. End customers could also benefit from early predictions of possible failures and recommendations for preventative maintenance. For example, in a study of one malfunctioning machine owned by a large mining company, Cat concluded that the firm’s new tech- nology would have reduced repair costs from the $650,000 the mining company incurred to $12,000 by identifying an emerging problem before it did serious damage. Thus, Cat sees this tech- nology as allowing it to better serve both its customers and deal- ers, resulting in new sources of income for Cat as customers see value in buying ongoing data-access and software subscriptions. Sources: Mehta, S. 2013. Where brains meet brawn. Fortune. October 28: 72; Whipp, L. 2016. Caterpillar explores data mining with Uptake. ft.com. August 21: np.

Differentiation: Improving Competitive Position vis-à-vis the Five Forces Differentiation pro- vides protection against rivalry since brand loyalty lowers customer sensitivity to price and raises customer switching costs.32 By increasing a firm’s margins, differentiation also avoids the need for a low-cost position. Higher entry barriers result because of customer loyalty and the firm’s ability to provide uniqueness in its products or services.33 Differentiation also provides higher margins that enable a firm to deal with supplier power. And it reduces buyer power, because buyers lack comparable alternatives and are therefore less price-sensitive.34 Supplier power is also decreased because there is a certain amount of prestige associated with being the supplier to a producer of highly differentiated products and services. Last, differentiation enhances customer loyalty, thus reducing the threat from substitutes.35

Our examples illustrate these points. Porsche has enjoyed enhanced power over buyers because its strong reputation makes buyers more willing to pay a premium price. This less- ens rivalry, since buyers become less price-sensitive. The prestige associated with its brand name also lowers supplier power since margins are high. Suppliers would probably desire to be associated with prestige brands, thus lessening their incentives to drive up prices. Finally, the loyalty and “peace of mind” associated with a service provider such as Zappos makes such firms less vulnerable to rivalry or substitute products and services.

Potential Pitfalls of Differentiation Strategies Potential pitfalls of a differentiation strategy include:

• Uniqueness that is not valuable. A differentiation strategy must provide unique bundles of products and/or services that customers value highly. It’s not enough just to be “different.” An example is Gibson’s Dobro bass guitar. Gibson came up with a unique idea: Design and build an acoustic bass guitar with sufficient sound volume so that amplification wasn’t necessary. The problem with other acoustic bass guitars was that they did not project enough volume because of the low-frequency bass notes. By adding a resonator plate on the body of the traditional acoustic bass,

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Gibson increased the sound volume. Gibson believed this product would serve a particular niche market—bluegrass and folk artists who played in small group “jams” with other acoustic musicians. Unfortunately, Gibson soon discovered that its targeted market was content with the existing options: an upright bass amplified with a microphone or an acoustic electric guitar. Thus, Gibson developed a unique product, but it was not perceived as valuable by its potential customers.36

• Too much differentiation. Firms may strive for quality or service that is higher than customers desire.37 Thus, they become vulnerable to competitors that provide an appropriate level of quality at a lower price. For example, consider the expensive Mercedes-Benz S-Class, which ranged in price between $93,650 and $138,000 for the 2011 models.38 Consumer Reports described it as “sumptuous,” “quiet and luxurious,” and a “delight to drive.” The magazine also considered it to be the least reliable sedan available in the United States. According to David Champion, who runs the testing program, the problems are electronic. “The engineers have gone a little wild,” he says. “They’ve put every bell and whistle that they think of, and sometimes they don’t have the attention to detail to make these systems work.” Some features include a computer-driven suspension that reduces body roll as the vehicle whips around a corner; cruise control that automatically slows the car down if it gets too close to another car; and seats that are adjustable 14 ways and are ventilated by a system that uses eight fans.

• Too high a price premium. This pitfall is quite similar to too much differentiation. Customers may desire the product, but they are repelled by the price premium. For example, Duracell was told by the market that it charged too much for batteries.39 The firm tried to sell consumers on its superior-quality products, but the mass market wasn’t convinced. Why? The price differential was simply too high. At one CVS drugstore, a four-pack of Energizer AA batteries was on sale at $2.99 compared with a Duracell four-pack at $4.59. Duracell’s market share dropped 2 percent in a recent two-year period, and its profits declined over 30 percent. Clearly, the price/ performance proposition Duracell offered customers was not accepted.

• Differentiation that is easily imitated. As we noted in Chapter 3, resources that are easily imitated cannot lead to sustainable advantages. Similarly, firms may strive for, and even attain, a differentiation strategy that is successful for a time. However, the advantages are eroded through imitation. Consider Cereality’s innovative differentiation strategy of stores that offer a wide variety of cereals and toppings for around $4.40 As one would expect, once the idea proved successful, competitors entered the market because much of the initial risk had already been taken. These new competitors included stores with the following names: the Cereal Cabinet, The Cereal Bowl, and Bowls: A Cereal Joint. Says David Roth, one of Cereality’s founders: “With any good business idea, you’re faced with people who see you’ve cracked the code and who try to cash in on it.”

• Dilution of brand identification through product-line extensions. Firms may erode their quality brand image by adding products or services with lower prices and less quality. Although this can increase short-term revenues, it may be detrimental in the long run. Consider Gucci.41 In the 1980s Gucci wanted to capitalize on its prestigious brand name by launching an aggressive strategy of revenue growth. It added a set of lower- priced canvas goods to its product line. It also pushed goods heavily into department stores and duty-free channels and allowed its name to appear on a host of licensed items such as watches, eyeglasses, and perfumes. In the short term, this strategy worked. Sales soared. However, the strategy carried a high price. Gucci’s indiscriminate approach to expanding its products and channels tarnished its sterling brand. Sales of its high-end goods (with higher profit margins) fell, causing profits to decline.

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• Perceptions of differentiation that vary between buyers and sellers. The issue here is that “beauty is in the eye of the beholder.” Companies must realize that although they may perceive their products and services as differentiated, their customers may view them as commodities. Indeed, in today’s marketplace, many products and services have been reduced to commodities.42 Thus, a firm could overprice its offerings and lose margins altogether if it has to lower prices to reflect market realities.

Exhibit 5.5 summarizes the pitfalls of over- all cost leadership and differentiation strate- gies. In addressing the pitfalls associated with

Overall Cost Leadership

• Too much focus on one or a few value-chain activities. • Increase in the cost of the inputs on which the advantage is based. • A strategy that can be imitated too easily. • A lack of parity on differentiation. • Reduced flexibility. • Obsolescence of the basis of cost advantage.

Differentiation

• Uniqueness that is not valuable. • Too much differentiation. • A price premium that is too high. • Differentiation that is easily imitated. • Dilution of brand identification through product-line extensions. • Perceptions of differentiation that vary between buyers and sellers.

EXHIBIT 5.5 Potential Pitfalls of Overall Cost Leadership and Differentiation Strategies

these two generic strategies, there is one common, underlying theme: Managers must be aware of the dangers associated with concentrating so much on one strategy that they fail to attain parity on the other.

Focus A focus strategy is based on the choice of a narrow competitive scope within an industry. A firm following this strategy selects a segment or group of segments and tailors its strategy to serve them. The essence of focus is the exploitation of a particular market niche. As you might expect, narrow focus itself (like merely “being different” as a differentiator) is simply not sufficient for above-average performance.

The focus strategy, as indicated in Exhibit 5.1, has two variants. In a cost focus, a firm strives to create a cost advantage in its target segment. In a differentiation focus, a firm seeks to differentiate in its target market. Both variants of the focus strategy rely on provid- ing better service than broad-based competitors that are trying to serve the focuser’s target segment. Cost focus exploits differences in cost behavior in some segments, while differen- tiation focus exploits the special needs of buyers in other segments.

Let’s look at examples of two firms that have successfully implemented focus strategies. LinkedIn has staked out a position as the business social media site of choice. Rather than compete with Facebook head on, LinkedIn created a strategy that focuses on individuals who wish to share their business experience and make connections with individuals with whom they share or could potentially share business ties. In doing so, it has created an extremely strong business model. LinkedIn monetizes its user information in three ways: subscription fees from some users, advertising fees, and recruiter fees. The first two are fairly standard for social media sites, but the advertising fees are higher for LinkedIn since the ads can be more effectively targeted as a result of LinkedIn’s focus. The third income source is fairly unique for LinkedIn. Headhunters and human resource departments pay significant user fees, up to $8,200 a year, to have access to LinkedIn’s recruiting search engine, which can sift through LinkedIn profiles to identify individuals with desired skills and experiences. The power of this business model can be seen in the difference in user value for LinkedIn when compared to Facebook. For every hour that a user spends on the site, LinkedIn generates $1.30 in income. For Facebook, it is a paltry 6.2 cents.43

Marlin Steel Wire Products, a Baltimore-based manufacturing company, has also seen great benefit from developing a niche-differentiator strategy. Marlin, a manufacturer of commodity wire products, faced stiff and ever-increasing competition from rivals based in China and other

focus strategy a firm’s generic strategy based on appeal to a narrow market segment within an industry.

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5.3 DATA ANALYTICSSTRATEGY SPOTLIGHT LUXURY IN THE E-COMMERCE WORLD Traditionally, luxury retailers have relied on high levels of per- sonal touch in their stores as well as a sense of exclusivity in order to differentiate themselves from the mass retail markets. As a result, many luxury retailers have looked on the Internet retail market skeptically, thinking it didn’t fit their products and the needs of their customers. Rather than offering an indulgent and exclusive retail experience, the Internet promotes accessi- bility and efficiency. Yoox, an Italian firm, appears to have solved the mystery of how to turn e-commerce into a luxury experience. Yoox designs and manages online stores for nearly 40 luxury brands, including Armani, Diesel, Emilio Pucci, and Brunello Cucinelli. In 2015, the firm booked orders in 100 countries, gen- erating over $1 billion in sales and $19 million in net income.

How has Yoox translated the luxury retail experience to the online world? Its expertise at creating the right experi- ence cuts across the value chain. First, Yoox views itself as a craftsperson, designing each website specifically to the brand. Second, it focuses on the details. This includes training its

60 photographers to create images for each product that match the specific guidelines of each brand. For one clothing retailer, this included using flamenco dancers in its designer images, rather than fashion models. The attention to detail flows through to the packaging. Packers at Yoox’s five fulfillment centers are trained on the specific angle of the ribbons for a box contain- ing an Alexander Wang dress versus one containing a Bottega Veneta bag. Third, Yoox has developed innovative algorithms to predict which products will sell at which times and in which geo- graphic regions, allowing effective stocking to meet the needs of customers and providing guidance to retailers on optimal pric- ing. Finally, Yoox has insisted on exclusive contracts with luxury brands to ensure that it can control the brands’ images in the online retail space. These luxury brands have grown reliant on Yoox. About one-third of Yoox’s revenue derives from the cre- ation and management of the luxury brands’ websites, while the remainder comes from its order-fulfillment services. Sources: Fairchild, C. 2014. A luxe look for e-commerce. Fortune, June 16: 83–84; and Clark, N. 2014. Success draws competition for luxury e-retailer Yoox. nytimes.com, December 6: np.

emerging markets. These rivals had labor-based cost advantages that Marlin found hard to counter. Marlin responded by changing the game it played. Drew Greenblatt, Marlin’s presi- dent, decided to go upmarket, automating his production and specializing in high-end prod- ucts. For example, Marlin produces antimicrobial baskets for restaurant kitchens and exports its products globally. Marlin provides products to customers in 36 countries and, in 2012, was listed as the 162nd fastest-growing private manufacturing company in the United States.44

Strategy Spotlight 5.3 illustrates how Yoox has carved out a profitable niche in the online retailing world as a luxury goods provider.

Focus: Improving Competitive Position vis-à-vis the Five Forces Focus requires that a firm have either a low-cost position with its strategic target, high differentiation, or both. As we discussed with regard to cost and differentiation strategies, these positions provide defenses against each competitive force. Focus is also used to select niches that are least vulnerable to substitutes or where competitors are weakest.

Let’s look at our examples to illustrate some of these points. First, by providing a platform for a targeted customer group, businesspeople, to share key work information, LinkedIn insulated itself from rivalrous pressure from existing social networks, such as Facebook. It also felt little threat from new generalist social networks, such as Google +. Similarly, the new focus of Marlin Steel lessened the power of buyers since the company provides special- ized products. Also, it is insulated from competitors, which manufacture the commodity products Marlin used to produce.

Potential Pitfalls of Focus Strategies Potential pitfalls of focus strategies include:

• Cost advantages may erode within the narrow segment. The advantages of a cost focus strategy may be fleeting if the cost advantages are eroded over time. For example, early pioneers in online education, such as the University of Phoenix, have faced increasing challenges as traditional universities have entered with their own online programs that allow them to match the cost benefits associated with online delivery

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systems. Similarly, other firms have seen their profit margins drop as competitors enter their product segment.

• Even product and service offerings that are highly focused are subject to competition from new entrants and from imitation. Some firms adopting a focus strategy may enjoy temporary advantages because they select a small niche with few rivals. However, their advantages may be short-lived. A notable example is the multitude of dot-com firms that specialize in very narrow segments such as pet supplies, ethnic foods, and vintage automobile accessories. The entry barriers tend to be low, there is little buyer loyalty, and competition becomes intense. And since the marketing strategies and technologies employed by most rivals are largely nonproprietary, imitation is easy. Over time, revenues fall, profits margins are squeezed, and only the strongest players survive the shakeout.

• Focusers can become too focused to satisfy buyer needs. Some firms attempting to attain advantages through a focus strategy may have too narrow a product or service. Consider many retail firms. Hardware chains such as Ace and True Value are losing market share to rivals such as Lowe’s and Home Depot that offer a full line of home and garden equipment and accessories. And given the enormous purchasing power of the national chains, it would be difficult for such specialty retailers to attain parity on costs.

Combination Strategies: Integrating Overall Low Cost and Differentiation Perhaps the primary benefit to firms that integrate low-cost and differentiation strategies is the difficulty for rivals to duplicate or imitate.45 This strategy enables a firm to provide two types of value to customers: differentiated attributes (e.g., high quality, brand identification, reputation) and lower prices (because of the firm’s lower costs in value-creating activities). The goal is thus to provide unique value to customers in an efficient manner.46 Some firms are able to attain both types of advantages simultaneously.47 For example, superior quality can lead to lower costs because of less need for rework in manufacturing, fewer warranty claims, a reduced need for customer service personnel to resolve customer complaints, and so forth. Thus, the benefits of combining advantages can be additive, instead of merely involving trade- offs. Next, we consider four approaches to combining overall low cost and differentiation.

Adopting Automated and Flexible Manufacturing Systems Given the advances in manufactur- ing technologies such as CAD/CAM (computer aided design and computer aided manufactur- ing) as well as information technologies, many firms have been able to manufacture unique products in relatively small quantities at lower costs—a concept known as mass customization.48

Let’s consider Andersen Windows of Bayport, Minnesota—a $2.3 billion manufacturer of windows for the building industry.49 Until about 20 years ago, Andersen was a mass producer, in small batches, of a variety of standard windows. However, to meet changing customer needs, Andersen kept adding to its product line. The result was catalogs of ever-increasing size and a bewildering set of choices for both homeowners and contractors. Over a six-year period, the number of products tripled, price quotes took several hours, and the error rate increased. This not only damaged the company’s reputation but also added to its manufacturing expenses.

To bring about a major change, Andersen developed an interactive computer version of its paper catalogs that it sold to distributors and retailers. Salespersons can now customize each window to meet the customer’s needs, check the design for structural soundness, and provide a price quote. The system is virtually error-free, customers get exactly what they want, and the time to develop the design and furnish a quotation has been cut by 75 percent. Each showroom computer is connected to the factory, and customers are assigned a code number that permits them to track the order. The manufacturing system has been developed to use some common finished parts, but it also allows considerable variation in the final

combination strategies firms’ integrations of various strategies to provide multiple types of value to customers.

LO 5-4 How firms can effectively combine the generic strategies of overall cost leadership and differentiation.

mass customization a firm’s ability to manufacture unique products in small quantities at low cost.

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5.4 STRATEGY SPOTLIGHT EXPANDING THE PROFIT POOL IN THE SKY Commercial airlines find themselves in a very competitive market, facing a number of competitors, having high fixed costs, and expe- riencing demand that is largely driven by economic conditions. As a result, profits in the airline industry are typically fairly low and often negative. The challenges in this industry are evident in the 23 separate bankruptcies that have occurred in the U.S. airline industry since 2000. However, as anyone who has flown in recent years can attest, airlines have found new sources of profit to aug- ment their income beyond what customers are willing to pay when purchasing a ticket. The fees airlines have added on for ancillary services accounted for $36.7 billion in additional revenue for global airlines in 2015, up from a paltry $2.5 billion in 2008.

The range of revenue sources has expanded in recent years. The most obvious source of service revenue is baggage fees. However, airlines also generate revenue by charging book- ing fees and by selling premium economy seating, the right to assigned seats, exit-row seating, guarantees that family members can all sit together, earlier boarding of flights, pre- mium meals, pillow and blanket sets, Internet access on board, and the right to hold a reservation before making a purchase

commitment. Outside the flight experience itself, airlines are generating revenue by charging fees for credit cards, frequent- flyer programs, and access to airport lounges. The importance of these fees is staggering for some airlines. While Emirates Air relies on these service fees for less than 1 percent of its rev- enue, 22 percent of Ryanair’s revenue and 38 percent of Spirit Airlines’ revenue is accounted for by these fees.

By separating the value of the actual flight from the services associated with flying, airlines have greatly expanded the profit pool associated with flying. They have found that flyers may be very price-conscious when purchasing tickets but are willing to shell out more for a range of services. While this does increase their revenue, it may also provide benefits for at least some cus- tomers. As Jay Sorensen, CEO of IdeaWorks, notes, “It offers the potential for an airline to better tailor service to the needs of indi- vidual customers. They can click and buy the amenities they want rather than the airline deciding what is bundled in the base fare.”

Sources: Akasie, J. 2013. With a fee for everything, airlines jet toward a new business model. minyanville.com, October 1: np; Perera, J. 2014. Looking at airline fees in 2008 compared to 2014. chron.com, November 25: np; and Garcia, M. 2015. Airline fee revenue expected to reach nearly $60 billion in 2015. skift. com, November 10: np.

products. Despite its huge investment, Andersen has been able to lower costs, enhance qual- ity and variety, and improve its response time to customers.

Using Data Analytics As initially discussed in Chapter 2, corporations are increasingly collecting and analyzing data on their customers, including data on customer characteris- tics, purchasing patterns, employee productivity, and physical asset utilization. These efforts have the potential to allow firms to better customize their product and service offerings to customers while more efficiently and fully using the resources of the company. For example, Caterpillar collects and analyzes large volumes of data about how customers use their trac- tors. Since this data helps Cat better assess the uses and limitations of their current tractors, the firm can use data analytics to employ more focused and timely product improvement efforts. This allows the firm to simultaneously reduce the cost of new product development efforts and better differentiate their products.50

Exploiting the Profit Pool Concept for Competitive Advantage A profit pool is defined as the total profits in an industry at all points along the industry’s value chain.51 Although the concept is relatively straightforward, the structure of the profit pool can be complex.52 The potential pool of profits will be deeper in some segments of the value chain than in others, and the depths will vary within an individual segment. Segment profitability may vary widely by customer group, product category, geographic market, or distribution chan- nel. Additionally, the pattern of profit concentration in an industry is very often different from the pattern of revenue generation. Strategy Spotlight 5.4 outlines how airlines have expanded the profit pools of their market by adding fees for a variety of services.

Coordinating the “Extended” Value Chain by Way of Information Technology Many firms have achieved success by integrating activities throughout the “extended value chain” by using information technology to link their own value chain with the value chains of their

profit pool the total profits in an industry at all points along the industry’s value chain.

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customers and suppliers. As noted in Chapter 3, this approach enables a firm to add value not only through its own value-creating activities but also for its customers and suppliers.

Such a strategy often necessitates redefining the industry’s value chain. A number of years ago, Walmart took a close look at its industry’s value chain and decided to reframe the competitive challenge. Although its competitors were primarily focused on retailing— merchandising and promotion—Walmart determined that it was not so much in the retailing industry as in the transportation logistics and communications industries. Here, linkages in the extended value chain became central. That became Walmart’s chosen battleground. By redefining the rules of competition that played to its strengths, Walmart has attained com- petitive advantages and dominates its industry.

Integrated Overall Low-Cost and Differentiation Strategies: Improving Competitive Position vis-à-vis the Five Forces Firms that successfully integrate both differentiation and cost advantages create an enviable position. For example, Walmart’s integration of information systems, logistics, and transportation helps it to drive down costs and provide outstanding product selection. This dominant competitive position serves to erect high entry barriers to potential competitors that have neither the financial nor physical resources to compete head-to-head. Walmart’s size—with over $482 million in sales in 2016—provides the chain with enormous bargaining power over suppliers. Its low pricing and wide selection reduce the power of buyers (its customers), because there are relatively few competitors that can provide a comparable cost/value proposition. This reduces the possibility of intense head- to-head rivalry, such as protracted price wars. Finally, Walmart’s overall value proposition makes potential substitute products (e.g., Internet competitors) a less viable threat.

Pitfalls of Integrated Overall Cost Leadership and Differentiation Strategies The pitfalls of integrated overall cost leadership and differentiation include:

• Failing to attain both strategies and possibly ending up with neither, leaving the firm “stuck in the middle.” A key issue in strategic management is the creation of competitive advantages that enable a firm to enjoy above-average returns. Some firms may become stuck in the middle if they try to attain both cost and differentiation advantages. As mentioned earlier in this chapter, mainline supermarket chains find themselves stuck in the middle as their cost structure is higher than discount retailers offering groceries and their products and services are not seen by consumers as being as valuable as those of high-end grocery chains, such as Whole Foods.

• Underestimating the challenges and expenses associated with coordinating value-creating activities in the extended value chain. Integrating activities across a firm’s value chain with the value chain of suppliers and customers involves a significant investment in financial and human resources. Firms must consider the expenses linked to technology investment, managerial time and commitment, and the involvement and investment required by the firm’s customers and suppliers. The firm must be confident that it can generate a sufficient scale of operations and revenues to justify all associated expenses.

• Miscalculating sources of revenue and profit pools in the firm’s industry. Firms may fail to accurately assess sources of revenue and profits in their value chain. This can occur for several reasons. For example, a manager may be biased due to his or her functional area background, work experiences, and educational background. If the manager’s background is in engineering, he or she might perceive that proportionately greater revenue and margins were being created in manufacturing, product, and process design than a person whose background is in a “downstream” value-chain activity such as marketing and sales. Or politics could make managers “fudge” the numbers to favor their area of operations. This would make them responsible for a greater proportion of the firm’s profits, thus improving their bargaining position.

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A related problem is directing an overwhelming amount of managerial time, attention, and resources to value-creating activities that produce the greatest margins—to the detri- ment of other important, albeit less profitable, activities. For example, a car manufacturer may focus too much on downstream activities, such as warranty fulfillment and financing operations, to the detriment of differentiation and cost of the cars themselves.

CAN COMPETITIVE STRATEGIES BE SUSTAINED? INTEGRATING AND APPLYING STRATEGIC MANAGEMENT CONCEPTS Thus far this chapter has addressed how firms can attain competitive advantages in the mar- ketplace. We discussed the three generic strategies—overall cost leadership, differentiation, and focus—as well as combination strategies. Next we discussed the importance of linking value-chain activities (both those within the firm and those linkages between the firm’s sup- pliers and customers) to attain such advantages. We also showed how successful competi- tive strategies enable firms to strengthen their position vis-à-vis the five forces of industry competition as well as how to avoid the pitfalls associated with the strategies.

Competitive advantages are, however, often short-lived. As we discussed in the beginning of Chapter 1, the composition of the firms that constitute the Fortune 500 list has experi- enced significant turnover in its membership over the years—reflecting the temporary nature of competitive advantages. Consider BlackBerry’s fall from grace. BlackBerry initially domi- nated the smartphone market. BlackBerry held 20 percent of the cell phone market in 2009, and its users were addicted to BlackBerry’s products, leading some to refer to them as crack- berrys. However, the firm’s market share quickly eroded with the introduction of touch screen smartphones from Apple, Samsung, and others. BlackBerry was slow to move away from its physical keyboards and saw its market share fall to 0.1 percent by 2016.53

Clearly, “nothing is forever” when it comes to competitive advantages. Rapid changes in technology, globalization, and actions by rivals from within—as well as outside—the industry can quickly erode a firm’s advantages. It is becoming increasingly important to recognize that the duration of competitive advantages is declining, especially in technology-intensive industries.54 Even in industries that are normally viewed as “low tech,” the increasing use of technology has suddenly made competitive advantages less sustainable.55 Amazon’s success in book retailing at the cost of Barnes & Noble, the former industry leader, as well as cable TV’s difficulties in responding to streaming services providers like Netflix and Hulu, serve to illustrate how difficult it has become for industry leaders to sustain competitive advan- tages that they once thought would last forever.

In this section, we will discuss some factors that help determine whether a strategy is sus- tainable over a long period of time. We will draw on some strategic management concepts from the first five chapters. To illustrate our points, we will look at a company, Atlas Door, which created an innovative strategy in its industry and enjoyed superior performance for several years. Our discussion of Atlas Door draws on a Harvard Business Review article by George Stalk, Jr.56 It was published some time ago (1988), which provides us the benefit of hindsight to make our points about the sustainability of competitive advantage. After all, the strategic management concepts we have been addressing in the text are quite timeless in their relevance to practice. A brief summary follows.

Atlas Door: A Case Example Atlas Door, a U.S.-based company, has enjoyed remarkable success. It has grown at an average annual rate of 15 percent in an industry with an overall annual growth rate of less than 5 percent. Recently, its pretax earnings were 20 percent of sales—about five times the

LO 5-5 What factors determine the sustainability of a firm’s competitive advantage.

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industry average. Atlas is debt-free, and by its 10th year, the company had achieved the number-one competitive position in its industry.

Atlas produces industrial doors—a product with almost infinite variety, involving limit- less choices of width and height and material. Given the importance of product variety, inventory is almost useless in meeting customer orders. Instead, most doors can be manu- factured only after the order has been placed.

How Did Atlas Door Create Its Competitive Advantages in the Marketplace? First, Atlas built just-in-time factories. Although simple in concept, they require extra tooling and machinery to reduce changeover times. Further, the manufacturing process must be organized by product and scheduled to start and complete with all of the parts available at the same time.

Second, Atlas reduced the time to receive and process an order. Traditionally, when cus- tomers, distributors, or salespeople called a door manufacturer with a request for price and delivery, they would have to wait more than one week for a response. In contrast, Atlas first streamlined and then automated its entire order-entry, engineering, pricing, and scheduling process. Atlas can price and schedule 95 percent of its incoming orders while the callers are still on the telephone. It can quickly engineer new special orders because it has preserved on computer the design and production data of all previous special orders—which drastically reduces the amount of reengineering necessary.

Third, Atlas tightly controlled logistics so that it always shipped only fully complete orders to construction sites. Orders require many components, and gathering all of them at the factory and making sure that they are with the correct order can be a time-consuming task. Of course, it is even more time-consuming to get the correct parts to the job site after the order has been shipped! Atlas developed a system to track the parts in production and the purchased parts for each order. This helped to ensure the arrival of all necessary parts at the shipping dock in time—a just-in-time logistics operation.

The Result? When Atlas began operations, distributors had little interest in its product. The established distributors already carried the door line of a much larger competitor and saw little to no reason to switch suppliers except, perhaps, for a major price concession. But as a start-up, Atlas was too small to compete on price alone. Instead, it positioned itself as the door supplier of last resort—the company people came to if the established supplier could not deliver or missed a key date.

Of course, with an average industry order-fulfillment time of almost four months, some calls inevitably came to Atlas. And when it did get the call, Atlas commanded a higher price because of its faster delivery. Atlas not only got a higher price, but its effective integration of value-creating activities saved time and lowered costs. Thus, it enjoyed the best of both worlds.

In 10 short years, the company replaced the leading door suppliers in 80 percent of the distributors in the United States. With its strategic advantage, the company could be selective—becoming the supplier for only the strongest distributors.

Are Atlas Door’s Competitive Advantages Sustainable? We will now take both the “pro” and “con” positions as to whether or not Atlas Door’s com- petitive advantages will be sustainable for a very long time. It is important, of course, to assume that Atlas Door’s strategy is unique in the industry, and the central issue becomes whether or not rivals will be able to easily imitate its strategy or create a viable substitute strategy.

“Pro” Position: The Strategy Is Highly Sustainable Drawing on Chapter 2, it is quite evi- dent that Atlas Door has attained a very favorable position vis-à-vis the five forces of indus- try competition. For example, it is able to exert power over its customers ( distributors) because of its ability to deliver a quality product in a short period of time. Also, its domi- nance in the industry creates high entry barriers for new entrants. It is also quite evident

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that Atlas Door has been able to successfully integrate many value-chain activities within the firm—a fact that is integral to its just-in-time strategy. As noted in Chapter 3, such integration of activities provides a strong basis for sustainability, because rivals would have difficulty in imitating this strategy due to causal ambiguity and path dependency (i.e., it is difficult to build up in a short period of time the resources that Atlas Door has accumulated and developed as well as disentangle the causes of what the valuable resources are or how they can be re-created). Further, as noted in Chapter 4, Atlas Door benefits from the social capital that it has developed with a wide range of key stakehold- ers (Chapter 1). These would include customers, employees, and managers (a reasonable assumption, given how smoothly the internal operations flow and the company’s long- term relationships with distributors). It would be very difficult for a rival to replace Atlas Door as the supplier of last resort—given the reputation that it has earned over time for “coming through in the clutch” on time-sensitive orders. Finally, we can conclude that Atlas Door has created competitive advantages in both overall low cost and differentia- tion (Chapter 5). Its strong linkages among value-chain activities—a requirement for its just-in-time operations—not only lower costs but enable the company to respond quickly to customer orders. As noted in Exhibit 5.4, many of the value-chain activities associated with a differentiation strategy reflect the element of speed or quick response.

“Con” Position: The Strategy Can Be Easily Imitated or Substituted An argument could be made that much of Atlas Door’s strategy relies on technologies that are rather well known and nonproprietary. Over time, a well-financed rival could imitate its strategy (via trial and error), achieve a tight integration among its value-creating activities, and implement a just- in-time manufacturing process. Because human capital is highly mobile (Chapter 4), a rival could hire away Atlas Door’s talent, and these individuals could aid the rival in transferring Atlas Door’s best practices. A new rival could also enter the industry with a large resource base, which might enable it to price its doors well under Atlas Door to build market share (but this would likely involve pricing below cost and would be a risky and nonsustainable strategy). Finally, a rival could potentially “leapfrog” the technologies and processes that Atlas Door has employed and achieve competitive superiority. With the benefit of hindsight, it could use the Internet to further speed up the linkages among its value-creating activities and the order-entry processes with its customers and suppliers. (But even this could prove to be a temporary advantage, since rivals could relatively easily do the same thing.)

What Is the Verdict? Both positions have merit. Over time, it would be rather easy to see how a new rival could achieve parity with Atlas Door—or even create a superior competi- tive position with new technologies or innovative processes. However, two factors make it extremely difficult for a rival to challenge Atlas Door in the short term: (1) The success that Atlas Door has enjoyed with its just-in-time scheduling and production systems—which involve the successful integration of many value-creating activities—helps the firm not only lower costs but also respond quickly to customer needs, and (2) the strong, positive repu- tational effects that it has earned with its customers increases their loyalty and would take significant time for rivals to match.

Finally, it is important to also understand that it is Atlas Door’s ability to appropriate most of the profits generated by its competitive advantages that make it a highly successful company. As we discussed in Chapter 3, profits generated by resources can be appropriated by a number of stakeholders such as suppliers, customers, employees, or rivals. The struc- ture of the industrial door industry makes such value appropriation difficult: The suppliers provide generic parts, no one buyer is big enough to dictate prices, the tacit nature of the knowledge makes imitation difficult, and individual employees may be easily replaceable. Still, even with the advantages that Atlas Door enjoys, it needs to avoid becoming compla- cent or it will suffer the same fate as the dominant firm it replaced.

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Strategies for Platform Markets Before moving on to our discussion of industry life-cycle stages and competitive strategy, we introduce and discuss an emerging trend: two-sided or platform markets. In these markets, firms act as intermediaries between two sets of platform users: buyers and sellers. Firms that thrive in these markets often do not produce a product themselves. Instead, successful platform firms create a business that attracts a large range of suppliers and a wide popula- tion of customers, becoming the go-to clearinghouse that both suppliers and customers turn to in order to facilitate a transaction. In doing so, they typically successfully combine ele- ments of both cost and differentiation advantages.

These types of markets have been in existence for a long period of time. For example, VISA became the largest credit card company by signing up both the most merchants and the most customers in their card network. Retailers and restaurants now perceive the need to accept VISA credit and debit cards because millions of customers carry them. On the other side, when considering which credit card(s) to carry, most customers feel the need to carry a VISA card since it is accepted by so many merchants. As the VISA example illus- trates, the sheer number of buyers and sellers using a given platform provides the platform firm with a differentiated market position while simultaneously allowing it to become a cost leader due to the economies of scale it accrues as it becomes the largest platform.

While these types of markets have existed for decades, they have become increasingly com- mon in the 21st century. Whether it is Amazon in retailing, Facebook in social networks, Airbnb in short-term housing rentals, Uber in driver services, Spotify in streaming services, or Etsy in craft products, platform businesses have taken on increasing prominence in the economy.

But how do firms position themselves to succeed in these two-sided markets? It involves a combination of actions to build a strong position and facilitate optimal interactions between suppliers and users. In doing so, these firms strive to simultaneously limit costs to users and also provide differentiated service. The issues platform businesses need to master to suc- ceed include the following.57

• Draw in users. The key to success in platform models is to generate the best (and often biggest) base of suppliers and customers. Thus, firms must develop effective pricing and incentives for users to attract and retain them. This typically involves subsidizing early and price-sensitive users. For example, Adobe was able to emerge as the dominant pdf software partly because it allowed users to read and print documents for free. As it established itself as “the” pdf reader software, producers of documents and those who wished to edit documents became increasingly willing to purchase software from Adobe. Thus, Adobe provided the product at no cost to some users while differentiating itself in the eyes of other users. Successful platform providers also find ways to attract and retain “marquee” users. YouTube has done this by allowing users to set up their own channel and compensate them for the volume of traffic they bring in.

• Create easy and informative customer interfaces. Platform business providers need to make it easy for users to plug into the platform. For example, Quicken Loans strives to differentiate itself with its Rocket Mortgage product, arguing it is the easiest and quickest system for applying for a home mortgage—typically taking less than 10 minutes to complete the application. By developing an easy to use app that requires no lending officer interaction, Quicken Loans was also able to build a more cost-efficient lending system than traditional loan brokers. Uber similarly worked to differentiate itself with a simple app for users to connect with a driver and by providing updated information on the expected arrival time of the driver. On the supplier side, Apple strives to ease the process for software developers by providing the operating system and underlying library codes needed to develop new software.

• Facilitate the best connections between suppliers and customers. Platform businesses can learn a great deal about their suppliers and customers by observing their search

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and usage patterns. Successful platform firms leverage this data to figure out how to best fill their matchmaking role in bringing together suppliers and users. Google is notable in its ability to tailor advertising to the search patterns of its users in order to increase the success rates for its advertising. Similarly, Airbnb has worked to create systems that increase the likelihood that hosts will agree to offers from potential renters. The firm realizes that renters get frustrated if their rental offers are declined. Additionally, hosts will be dissatisfied if offers come from undesirable renters. Using data analytics, Airbnb analyzed when specific hosts accepted and declined offers and their satisfaction ratings of renters to develop profiles of preferred renter characteristics. Using the resulting algorithm for matching renter characteristics and host preferences, the company saw a 4 percent increase in its rate of converting offers into accepted rental matches.

• Sequencing the growth of the business. To maximize the chance of success, platform firms must consciously plan out the sequence of their businesses. This involves thinking in terms of both geographic and product market expansion. In planning out its geographic market expansion, Uber analyzed the supply and demand of the taxi markets in cities across the country and first entered cities with the greatest shortage of taxis. Since it started in markets with unmet demand, Uber was able to expand quickly in these markets to be as cost efficient as possible. It also heavily advertised its business in settings where taxis were likely to be in short supply, such as sporting events and concerts. Once Uber established itself in these markets and developed a brand image, it expanded into other markets. Platform firms also need to consider both the need and opportunity of expanding their product scope. For example, Facebook has looked to continually extend its differentiation by expanding the range of services it offers, and as a result, has been able to put the squeeze on narrow platform providers, such as Twitter. Similarly, Spotify expanded from music to video streaming services in a quest to be a more complete service provider.

If successful, a platform provider becomes the dominant player linking suppliers and cus- tomers. This success offers the firm great flexibility in pricing its services as the firm gains a near monopoly in its market.

INDUSTRY LIFE-CYCLE STAGES: STRATEGIC IMPLICATIONS The industry life cycle refers to the stages of introduction, growth, maturity, and decline that occur over the life of an industry. In considering the industry life cycle, it is useful to think in terms of broad product lines such as personal computers, photocopiers, or long-distance telephone service. Yet the industry life-cycle concept can be explored from several levels, from the life cycle of an entire industry to the life cycle of a single variation or model of a specific product or service.

Why are industry life cycles important?58 The emphasis on various generic strate- gies, functional areas, value-creating activities, and overall objectives varies over the course of an industry life cycle. Managers must become even more aware of their firm’s strengths and weaknesses in many areas to attain competitive advantages. For example, firms depend on their research and development (R&D) activities in the introductory stage. R&D is the source of new products and features that everyone hopes will appeal to customers. Firms develop products and services to stimulate consumer demand. Later, during the maturity phase, the functions of the product have been defined, more competi- tors have entered the market, and competition is intense. Managers then place greater emphasis on production efficiencies and process (as opposed to the product) engineering

LO 5-6 The importance of considering the industry life cycle to determine a firm’s business-level strategy and its relative emphasis on functional area strategies and value-creating activities.

industry life cycle the stages of introduction, growth, maturity, and decline that typically occur over the life of an industry.

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in order to lower manufacturing costs. This helps to protect the firm’s market position and to extend the product life cycle because the firm’s lower costs can be passed on to consumers in the form of lower prices, and price-sensitive customers will find the product more appealing.

Exhibit 5.6 illustrates the four stages of the industry life cycle and how factors such as generic strategies, market growth rate, intensity of competition, and overall objectives change over time. Managers must strive to emphasize the key functional areas during each of the four stages and to attain a level of parity in all functional areas and value-creating activities. For example, although controlling production costs may be a primary concern during the maturity stage, managers should not totally ignore other functions such as marketing and R&D. If they do, they can become so focused on lowering costs that they miss market trends or fail to incorporate important product or process designs. Thus, the firm may attain low-cost products that have limited market appeal.

EXHIBIT 5.6 Stages of the Industry Life Cycle

Unit Sales

Time

Sales/ Profits

Profits

Generic strategies

Market growth rate

Number of segments

Intensity of competition

Emphasis on product design

Emphasis on process design

Major functional area(s) of concern

Overall objective

Differentiation

Low

Very few

Low

Very high

Low

Research and development

Increase market awareness

Differentiation

Very large

Some

Increasing

High

Low to moderate

Sales and marketing

Create consumer demand

Differentiation Overall cost leadership

Low to moderate

Many

Very intense

High

Low to moderate

Production

Defend market share and extend product life cycles

Overall cost leadership Focus

Negative

Few

Changing

Low

Low

General management and finance

Consolidate, maintain, harvest, or exit

Stage

Factor Introduction Growth Maturity Decline

Time

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It is important to point out a caveat. While the life-cycle idea is analogous to a living organ- ism (i.e., birth, growth, maturity, and death), the comparison has limitations.59 Products and services go through many cycles of innovation and renewal. Typically, only fad products have a single life cycle. Maturity stages of an industry can be “transformed” or followed by a stage of rapid growth if consumer tastes change, technological innovations take place, or new develop- ments occur. The cereal industry is a good example. When medical research indicated that oat consumption reduced a person’s cholesterol, sales of Quaker Oats increased dramatically.60

Strategies in the Introduction Stage In the introduction stage, products are unfamiliar to consumers.61 Market segments are not well defined, and product features are not clearly specified. The early development of an industry typically involves low sales growth, rapid technological change, operating losses, and the need for strong sources of cash to finance operations. Since there are few players and not much growth, competition tends to be limited.

Success requires an emphasis on research and development and marketing activities to enhance awareness. The challenge becomes one of (1) developing the product and finding a way to get users to try it and (2) generating enough exposure so the product emerges as the “standard” by which all other rivals’ products are evaluated.

There’s an advantage to being the “first mover” in a market.62 It led to Coca-Cola’s suc- cess in becoming the first soft-drink company to build a recognizable global brand and enabled Caterpillar to get a lock on overseas sales channels and service capabilities.

However, there can also be a benefit to being a “late mover.” Target carefully considered its decision to delay its Internet strategy. Compared to its competitors Walmart and Kmart, Target was definitely an industry laggard. But things certainly turned out well:63

By waiting, Target gained a late-mover advantage. The store was able to use competitors’ mistakes as its own learning curve. This saved money, and customers didn’t seem to mind the wait: When Target finally opened its website, it quickly captured market share from both Kmart and Walmart Internet shoppers. Forrester Research Internet analyst Stephen Zrike commented, “There’s no question, in our mind, that Target has a far better understanding of how consumers buy online.”

Examples of products currently in the introductory stages of the industry life cycle include electric vehicles and space tourism.

Strategies in the Growth Stage The growth stage is characterized by strong increases in sales. Such potential attracts other rivals. In the growth stage, the primary key to success is to build consumer prefer- ences for specific brands. This requires strong brand recognition, differentiated products, and the financial resources to support a variety of value-chain activities such as marketing and sales, and research and development. Whereas marketing and sales initiatives were mainly directed at spurring aggregate demand—that is, demand for all such products in the introduction stage—efforts in the growth stage are directed toward stimulating selective demand, in which a firm’s product offerings are chosen instead of a rival’s.

Revenues increase at an accelerating rate because (1) new consumers are trying the product and (2) a growing proportion of satisfied consumers are making repeat purchases.64 In gen- eral, as a product moves through its life cycle, the proportion of repeat buyers to new pur- chasers increases. Conversely, new products and services often fail if there are relatively few repeat purchases. For example, Alberto-Culver introduced Mr. Culver’s Sparklers, which were solid air fresheners that looked like stained glass. Although the product quickly went from the introductory to the growth stage, sales collapsed. Why? Unfortunately, there were few repeat purchasers because buyers treated them as inexpensive window decorations, left them there, and felt little need to purchase new ones. Examples of products currently in the growth stage include cloud computing data storage services and ultra-high-definition television (UHD TV).

introduction stage the first stage of the industry life cycle, characterized by (1) new products that are not known to customers, (2) poorly defined market segments, (3) unspecified product features, (4) low sales growth, (5) rapid technological change, (6) operating losses, and (7) a need for financial support.

growth stage the second stage of the product life cycle, characterized by (1) strong increases in sales; (2) growing competition; (3) developing brand recognition; and (4) a need for financing complementary value- chain activities such as marketing, sales, customer service, and research and development.

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Strategies in the Maturity Stage In the maturity stage aggregate industry demand softens. As markets become saturated, there are few new adopters. It’s no longer possible to “grow around” the competition, so direct competition becomes predominant.65 With few attractive prospects, marginal competitors exit the market. At the same time, rivalry among existing rivals intensifies because of fierce price competition at the same time that expenses associated with attracting new buyers are rising. Advantages based on efficient manufacturing operations and process engineering become more important for keeping costs low as customers become more price-sensitive. It also becomes more difficult for firms to differentiate their offerings, because users have a greater understanding of products and services.

An article in Fortune magazine that addressed the intensity of rivalry in mature markets was aptly titled “A Game of Inches.” It stated, “Battling for market share in a slowing indus- try can be a mighty dirty business. Just ask laundry soap archrivals Unilever and Procter & Gamble.”66 These two firms have been locked in a battle for market share since 1965. Why is the competition so intense? There is not much territory to gain and industry sales were flat. An analyst noted, “People aren’t getting any dirtier.” Thus, the only way to win is to take market share from the competition. To increase its share, Procter & Gamble (P&G) spends $100 million a year promoting its Tide brand on television, billboards, buses, magazines, and the Internet. But Unilever isn’t standing still. Armed with an $80 million budget, it launched a soap tablet product named Wisk Dual Action Tablets. For example, it delivered samples of this product to 24 million U.S. homes in Sunday newspapers, followed by a series of TV ads. P&G launched a counteroffensive with Tide Rapid Action Tablets ads showed in side- by-side comparisons of the two products dropped into beakers of water. In the promotion, P&G claimed that its product is superior because it dissolves faster than Unilever’s product.

Although this is only one example, many product classes and industries, including con- sumer products such as beer, automobiles, and athletic shoes, are in maturity.

Firms do not need to be “held hostage” to the life-cycle curve. By positioning or reposi- tioning their products in unexpected ways, firms can change how customers mentally cat- egorize them. Thus, firms are able to rescue products floundering in the maturity phase of their life cycles and return them to the growth phase.

Two positioning strategies that managers can use to affect consumers’ mental shifts are reverse positioning, which strips away “sacred” product attributes while adding new ones, and breakaway positioning, which associates the product with a radically different category.67

Reverse Positioning This strategy assumes that although customers may desire more than the baseline product, they don’t necessarily want an endless list of features. With reverse position- ing, companies make the creative decision to step off the augmentation treadmill and shed prod- uct attributes that the rest of the industry considers sacred. Then, once a product is returned to its baseline state, the stripped-down product adds one or more carefully selected attributes that would usually be found only in a highly augmented product. Such an unconventional combina- tion of attributes allows the product to assume a new competitive position within the category and move backward from maturity into a growth position on the life-cycle curve.

Breakaway Positioning As noted above, with reverse positioning, a product establishes a unique position in its category but retains a clear category membership. However, with break- away positioning, a product escapes its category by deliberately associating with a different one. Thus, managers leverage the new category’s conventions to change both how products are consumed and with whom they compete. Instead of merely seeing the breakaway product as simply an alternative to others in its category, consumers perceive it as altogether different.

When a breakaway product is successful in leaving its category and joining a new one, it is able to redefine its competition. Similar to reverse positioning, this strategy permits the product to shift backward on the life-cycle curve, moving from the rather dismal maturity phase to a thriving growth opportunity.

maturity stage the third stage of the product life cycle, characterized by (1) slowing demand growth, (2) saturated markets, (3) direct competition, (4) price competition, and (5) strategic emphasis on efficient operations.

breakaway positioning a break in the industry tendency to incrementally improve products along specific dimensions, characteristic of the product life cycle, by offering products that are still in the industry but are perceived by customers as being different.

reverse positioning a break in the industry tendency to continuously augment products, characteristic of the product life cycle, by offering products with fewer product attributes and lower prices.

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Strategies in the Decline Stage Although all decisions in the phases of an industry life cycle are important, they become par- ticularly difficult in the decline stage. Firms must face up to the fundamental strategic choices of either exiting or staying and attempting to consolidate their position in the industry.68

The decline stage occurs when industry sales and profits begin to fall. Typically, changes in the business environment are at the root of an industry or product group entering this stage.69 Changes in consumer tastes or a technological innovation can push a product into decline. For example, the advent of online news services pushed the print newspaper and news magazine businesses into a rapid decline.

Products in the decline stage often consume a large share of management time and finan- cial resources relative to their potential worth. Sales and profits decline. Also, competitors may start drastically cutting their prices to raise cash and remain solvent. The situation is further aggravated by the liquidation of assets, including inventory, of some of the competi- tors that have failed. This further intensifies price competition.

In the decline stage, a firm’s strategic options become dependent on the actions of rivals. If many competitors leave the market, sales and profit opportunities increase. On the other hand, prospects are limited if all competitors remain.70 If some competitors merge, their increased market power may erode the opportunities for the remaining players. Managers must carefully monitor the actions and intentions of competitors before deciding on a course of action.

Four basic strategies are available in the decline phase: maintaining, harvesting, exiting, and consolidating.71

• Maintaining refers to keeping a product going without significantly reducing marketing support, technological development, or other investments, in the hope that competitors will eventually exit the market. For example, even though most documents are sent digitally, there is still a significant market for fax machines since many legal and investment documents must still be signed and sent using a fax. This mode of transmission is still seen as more secure than other means of transmission. Thus, there may still be the potential for revenues and profits.

• Harvesting involves obtaining as much profit as possible and requires that costs be reduced quickly. Managers should consider the firm’s value-creating activities and cut associated budgets. Value-chain activities to consider are primary (e.g., operations, sales and marketing) and support (e.g., procurement, technology development). The objective is to wring out as much profit as possible.

• Exiting the market involves dropping the product from a firm’s portfolio. Since a residual core of consumers exist, eliminating it should be carefully considered. If the firm’s exit involves product markets that affect important relationships with other product markets in the corporation’s overall portfolio, an exit could have repercussions for the whole corporation. For example, it may involve the loss of valuable brand names or human capital with a broad variety of expertise in many value-creating activities such as marketing, technology, and operations.

• Consolidation involves one firm acquiring at a reasonable price the best of the surviving firms in an industry. This enables firms to enhance market power and acquire valuable assets. One example of a consolidation strategy took place in the defense industry in the early 1990s. As the cliché suggests, “peace broke out” at the end of the Cold War and overall U.S. defense spending levels plummeted.72 Many companies that make up the defense industry saw more than 50 percent of their market disappear. Only one-quarter of the 120,000 companies that once supplied the Department of Defense still serve in that capacity; the others have shut down their defense business or dissolved altogether. But one key player, Lockheed Martin, became a dominant rival by pursuing an aggressive strategy of consolidation. During the 1990s, it purchased 17 independent entities, including General Dynamics’

decline stage the fourth stage of the product life cycle, characterized by (1) falling sales and profits, (2) increasing price competition, and (3) industry consolidation.

harvesting strategy a strategy of wringing as much profit as possible out of a business in the short to medium term by reducing costs.

consolidation strategy a firm’s acquiring or merging with other firms in an industry in order to enhance market power and gain valuable assets.

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tactical aircraft and space systems divisions, GE Aerospace, Goodyear Aerospace, and Honeywell Electro-Optics. These combinations enabled Lockheed Martin to emerge as the top provider to three governmental customers: the Department of Defense, the Department of Energy, and NASA.

Examples of products currently in the decline stage of the industry life cycle include the video-rental business (being replaced by video on demand), hard disk drives (being replaced by solid-state memory and cloud storage), and desktop computers (being replaced by note- book and tablet computers).

The introduction of new technologies and associated products does not always mean that old technologies quickly fade away. Research shows that in a number of cases, old tech- nologies actually enjoy a very profitable “last gasp.”73 Examples include personal computers (versus tablet computers and other mobile devices), coronary artery bypass graft surgery (versus angioplasty), and vinyl records (versus CDs and digital downloads of music). In each case, the advent of new technology prompted predictions of the demise of the older technology, but each of these has proved to be a resilient survivor. What accounts for their continued profitability and survival?

Retreating to more defensible ground is one strategy that firms specializing in technologies threatened with rapid obsolescence have followed. For example, while angioplasty may be appropriate for relatively healthier patients with blocked arteries, sicker, higher-risk patients seem to benefit more from coronary artery bypass graft surgery. This enabled the surgeons to concentrate on the more difficult cases and improve the technology itself. The advent of television unseated the radio as the major source of entertainment from American homes. However, the radio has survived and even thrived in venues where people are also engaged in other activities, such as driving.

Using the new to improve the old is a second approach. Microsoft has integrated ele- ments of mobile technology into the Windows operating system to address the challenge of Google’s Android and Apple’s iOS.

Improving the price-performance trade-off is a third approach. IBM continues to make money selling mainframes long after their obituary was written. It retooled the technology using low- cost microprocessors and cut their prices drastically. Further, it invested and updated the software, enabling it to offer clients such as banks better performance and lower costs.

Turnaround Strategies A turnaround strategy involves reversing performance decline and reinvigorating growth toward profitability.74 A need for turnaround may occur at any stage in the life cycle but is more likely to occur during maturity or decline.

Most turnarounds require a firm to carefully analyze the external and internal envi- ronments.75 The external analysis leads to identification of market segments or customer groups that may still find the product attractive.76 Internal analysis results in actions aimed at reduced costs and higher efficiency. A firm needs to undertake a mix of both internally and externally oriented actions to effect a turnaround.77 In effect, the cliché “You can’t shrink yourself to greatness” applies.

A study of 260 mature businesses in need of a turnaround identified three strategies used by successful companies.78

• Asset and cost surgery. Very often, mature firms tend to have assets that do not produce any returns. These include real estate, buildings, and so on. Outright sales or sale and leaseback free up considerable cash and improve returns. Investment in new plants and equipment can be deferred. Firms in turnaround situations try to aggressively cut administrative expenses and inventories and speed up collection of receivables. Costs also can be reduced by outsourcing production of various inputs for which market prices may be cheaper than in-house production costs.

turnaround strategy a strategy that reverses a firm’s decline in performance and returns it to growth and profitability.

LO 5-7 The need for turnaround strategies that enable a firm to reposition its competitive position in an industry.

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• Selective product and market pruning. Most mature or declining firms have many product lines that are losing money or are only marginally profitable. One strategy is to discontinue such product lines and focus all resources on a few core profitable areas. For example, in 2014, Procter & Gamble announced that it would sell off or close down up to 100 of its brands, allowing the firm to improve its efficiency and its innovativeness as it focused on its core brands. The remaining 70 to 80 “core” brands accounted for 90 percent of the firm’s sales.

• Piecemeal productivity improvements. There are many ways in which a firm can eliminate costs and improve productivity. Although individually these are small gains, they cumulate over a period of time to substantial gains. Improving business processes by reengineering them, benchmarking specific activities against industry leaders, encouraging employee input to identify excess costs, increasing capacity utilization, and improving employee productivity lead to a significant overall gain.

Strategy Spotlight 5.5 provides an illustration of a turnaround effort by focusing on the dramatic strategic realignment that Mindy Grossman undertook at HSN (formerly the Home Shopping Network).

5.5 STRATEGY SPOTLIGHT HOW MINDY GROSSMAN LED HSN’S REMARKABLE TURNAROUND Mindy Grossman took over the helm of HSN, formerly known as the Home Shopping Network, in 2008, at a very trying time. The Home Shopping Network was falling behind the times as retailing technology changed rapidly in the digital age, and it was saddled with the reputation of being the home for C-list celebrities hawking relatively low-grade jewelry, fashion, and health and beauty prod- ucts to couch potatoes. The firm had experienced significant lead- ership turmoil, with seven CEOs in the prior 10 years. It was also facing some of the worst economic conditions since the 1930s. Not surprisingly, the firm experienced a multibillion-dollar loss in 2008.

However, things have changed dramatically since those dark days. HSN generated 169 million in profit on $3.7 billion in sales in 2015. The firm’s stock price, which traded as low as $1.42 in 2008, was trading at over $34 a share in late 2016.

At the center of HSN’s turnaround is Mindy Grossman, the firm’s CEO. She came to HSN after working for a number of clothing manufacturers, including Ralph Lauren, Tommy Hilfiger, and, most recently, Nike. Her recipe for the turnaround reflects a mix of hard business acumen combined with an ability to engage stakeholders in the firm to move the turnaround forward. With her changes, she’s moved HSN from being a dowdy cable TV channel to a retailer that meets the needs of busy women by providing them a place to shop wherever they are—at home through their TVs or while traveling for work or at their kids’ soccer games through their phones or tablets.

What are Grossman’s lessons for managing a turnaround? First, she found value in engaging with employees. Her first day at HSN, she chose to go through the same new-employee orienta- tion that all employees go through. She felt this humanized her in the minds of other employees. On her second day, she held a town-hall meeting so that she could directly introduce herself and

set the tone that she was accessible and that all employees were valued and could have a future at HSN. She also set up a policy to regularly have breakfasts and lunches with employees and says, “I learn more from those than from reading any report.”

Second, she got the lineup of employees right. She cat- egorizes workers into three categories. “Evangelists” are the employees who are truly enthusiastic about the company and try to rally others. The “Interested” are those who are invested in the firm’s success but have something of a wait-and-see atti- tude. The “Blockers” are toxic and work to limit the firm’s ability to change. She saw the need to rid the company of toxicity and pushed out the Blockers quickly. This allowed her to develop a management team, which largely stayed intact for several years, that reflected the strong skills and commitment she desired.

She tailored the company’s offerings to meet the changing needs of her customer base. In the deep days of the recession in 2008–2009, this meant shifting from offering high-priced jewelry and fashions to providing products and services that helped HSN’s customers save time and money. Later, this meant dramatically growing the company’s mobile platforms. Today, over half the new customers come to HSN through their mobile phones. One of the new services attracting them is HSN’s online arcade, where cus- tomers can play games that allow them to win HSN merchandise, which generated over 100 million plays in its first year.

Key to it all is staying focused on what HSN’s strategy is and who its customers are. In the words of Grossman, “We’re not trying to be Amazon, all things to all people. We have a highly specialized customer and want to give her the best experience somewhere she can trust.”

Sources: Goudreau, J. 2012. How Mindy Grossman is transforming HSN. forbes. com, August 29: np; Banjo, S. 2013. HSN enjoys a mobile-shopping rebirth in the digital age. wsj.com, July 5: np; and Snyder, B. 2014. How Mindy Grossman turned around HSN. gsb.stanford.edu/insights, June 5: np.

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ISSUE FOR DEBATE

Issue for Debate Shazz Lewis is aiming to shake up the beer business by entering with a brew aimed specifically at women. On its website, Chick beer is described as “the only beer brand designed for women, who drink 25 percent of all beer sold in the U.S.” Shazz got the inspiration for Chick beer when she was looking over the more than 400 beers sold in the liquor store that she and her husband owned. She concluded, “there was nothing that shouted out female.” Since women consume 700 million cases of beer a year, she saw this as a market that hasn’t received enough focus.

To best reach her target market of 21 to 35-year-old women, she crafted it to be low in calories (only 97) and have a “very mellow beer flavor” with a little less carbonation “so it doesn’t make you burp.” Still, she says this is not a weak beer. “It needed to be a stand-up beer—not fruity-flavored, as full-bodied as a light beer could be.” Turning to the look of the product, she designed the packaging to highlight the brand’s image. The cardboard carrier is hot pink and black in the image of a purse and includes the tagline “witness the chickness.” The bottle labels show the image of a little black dress on a hot pink background. This all has led Megan Gibson, a correspondent for Time magazine, to call the brand “patronizing.” Jennifer Litz, editor of Craft Business daily, commented that some beer drinkers may believe “it’s a bit too obviously pandering to create a beer specifically geared toward women.” When Lewis was questioned on the brand name and the packaging, she commented, “I happen to think all things chick are terrific. I came up with a slogan that was a little in your face. It was empowering to turn it on its head.”

Discussion Questions 1. Is the name and packaging of Chick beer patronizing to women, or is it empowering to turn

what has been, at times, a derogatory term on its head? 2. How effectively does Chick beer create differentiation to draw in female beer drinkers? How

successful do you think the brand could be? 3. What recommendations would you have for Shazz Lewis to enhance her chances of success

in the beer market?

Sources: Shockey, L. 2011. Chick beer founder Shazz Lewis dishes on making girly beer. villagevoice.com, September 1: np; Gibson, M. 2011. New ‘Chick’ beer is a lady-catered brew in a girly, pink package. newsfeed.time.com, September 7: np; Snider, M. 2016. Women to get their own beer. lsj.com, May 29: np.

Reflecting on Career Implications . . . This chapter discusses how firms build competitive advantage in the marketplace. The following questions ask you to consider how you can contribute to the competitive advantage of firms you work at as well as how you can develop your own differentiated set of skills and enhance the growth phase of your career.

Types of Competitive Advantage: Are you aware of your organization’s business-level strategy? What do you do to help your firm either increase differentiation or lower costs? Can you demonstrate to your superiors how you have contributed to the firm’s chosen business-level strategy?

Types of Competitive Advantage: What is your own competitive advantage? What opportunities does your current job provide to enhance your competitive advantage? Are you making the best use of your competitive advantage? If not, what organizations might provide you with better opportunities for doing so? Does your résumé clearly reflect your competitive advantage? Or are you “stuck in the middle”?

Understanding Your Differentiation: When looking for a new job or for advancement in your current firm, be conscious of being able to identify what differentiates you from other applicants. Consider the items in Exhibit 5.4 as you work to identify what distinguishes you from others.

CHAPTER 5 :: BUSINESS-LEVEL STRATEGY 167

Industry Life Cycle: Before you go for a job interview, identify the life-cycle stage of the industry within which your firm is located. You are more likely to have greater opportunities for career advancement in an industry in the growth stage than one in the decline stage.

Industry Life Cycle: If you sense that your career is maturing (or in the decline phase!), what actions can you take to restore career growth and momentum (e.g., training, mentoring, professional networking)? Should you actively consider professional opportunities in other industries?

How and why firms outperform each other goes to the heart of strategic management. In this chapter, we identified three generic strategies and discussed how firms are able not only to attain advantages over competitors

but also to sustain such advantages over time. Why do some advantages become long-lasting while others are quickly imitated by competitors?

The three generic strategies—overall cost leadership, differentiation, and focus—form the core of this chapter. We began by providing a brief description of each generic strategy (or competitive advantage) and furnished examples of firms that have successfully implemented these strategies. Successful generic strategies invariably enhance a firm’s position vis-à- vis the five forces of that industry—a point that we stressed and illustrated with examples. However, as we pointed out, there are pitfalls to each of the generic strategies. Thus, the sustainability of a firm’s advantage is always challenged because of imitation or substitution by new or existing rivals. Such competitor moves erode a firm’s advantage over time.

We also discussed the viability of combining (or integrating) overall cost leadership and generic differentiation strategies. If successful, such integration can enable a firm to enjoy superior performance and improve its competitive position. However, this is challenging, and managers must be aware of the potential downside risks associated with such an initiative.

We addressed the challenges inherent in determining the sustainability of competitive advantages. Drawing on an example from a manufacturing industry, we discussed both the “pro” and “con” positions as to why competitive advantages are sustainable over a long period of time.

The concept of the industry life cycle is a critical contingency that managers must take into account in striving to create and sustain competitive advantages. We identified the four stages of the industry life cycle— introduction, growth, maturity, and decline—and suggested how these stages can play a role in decisions that managers must make at the business level. These include overall strategies as well as the relative emphasis on functional areas and value-creating activities.

When a firm’s performance severely erodes, turnaround strategies are needed to reverse its situation and enhance its

summary

competitive position. We have discussed three approaches— asset cost surgery, selective product and market pruning, and piecemeal productivity improvements.

SUMMARY REVIEW QUESTIONS 1. Explain why the concept of competitive advantage is

central to the study of strategic management. 2. Briefly describe the three generic strategies—overall

cost leadership, differentiation, and focus. 3. Explain the relationship between the three generic

strategies and the five forces that determine the average profitability within an industry.

4. What are some of the ways in which a firm can attain a successful turnaround strategy?

5. Describe some of the pitfalls associated with each of the three generic strategies.

6. Can firms combine the generic strategies of overall cost leadership and differentiation? Why or why not?

7. Explain why the industry life-cycle concept is an important factor in determining a firm’s business- level strategy.

business-level strategy 139 generic strategies 140 overall cost leadership 141 experience curve 141 competitive parity 141 differentiation strategy 145 focus strategy 150 combination strategies 152

mass customization 152 profit pool 153 industry life cycle 159 introduction stage 161 growth stage 161 maturity stage 162 reverse positioning 162 breakaway

positioning 162 decline stage 163 harvesting strategy 163 consolidation strategy 163 turnaround strategy 164

key terms

EXPERIENTIAL EXERCISE What are some examples of primary and support activities that enable Nucor, a $19 billion steel manufacturer, to achieve a low-cost strategy? (Fill in the following table.)

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Value-Chain Activity Yes/No How Does Nucor Create Value for the Customer?

Primary:

Inbound logistics

Operations

Outbound logistics

Marketing and sales

Service

Support:

Procurement

Technology development

Human resource management

General administration

APPLICATION QUESTIONS & EXERCISES 1. Research Amazon. How has this firm been able to

combine overall cost leadership and differentiation strategies?

2. Choose a firm with which you are familiar in your local business community. Is the firm successful in following one (or more) generic strategies? Why or why not? What do you think are some of the challenges it faces in implementing these strategies in an effective manner?

3. Think of a firm that has attained a differentiation focus or cost focus strategy. Are its advantages sustainable? Why? Why not? (Hint: Consider its position vis-à-vis Porter’s five forces.)

4. Think of a firm that successfully achieved a combination overall cost leadership and

differentiation strategy. What can be learned from this example? Are the advantages sustainable? Why? Why not? (Hint: Consider its competitive position vis- à-vis Porter’s five forces.)

ETHICS QUESTIONS 1. Can you think of a company that suffered ethical

consequences as a result of an overemphasis on a cost leadership strategy? What do you think were the financial and nonfinancial implications?

2. In the introductory stage of the product life cycle, what are some of the unethical practices that managers could engage in to enhance their firm’s market position? What could be some of the long- term implications of such actions?

1. Gasparro, A. & Checkler, J. 2015. A&P bankruptcy filing indicates likely demise. wsj.com. July 20: np; Bomey, N. & Nguyen, H. 2015. A&P grocery chain files bankruptcy again. usatoday.com. July 20: np.

2. For a perspective by Porter on competitive strategy, refer to Porter, M. E. 1996. What is strategy? Harvard Business Review, 74(6): 61–78.

3. For insights into how a start-up is using solar technology, see Gimbel, B. 2009. Plastic power. Fortune, February 2: 34.

4. Useful insights on strategy in an economic downturn are in Rhodes,

D. & Stelter, D. 2009. Seize advantage in a downturn. Harvard Business Review, 87(2): 50–58.

5. Some useful ideas on maintaining competitive advantages can be found in Ma, H. & Karri, R. 2005. Leaders beware: Some sure ways to lose your competitive advantage. Organizational Dynamics, 343(1): 63–76.

6. Miller, A. & Dess, G. G. 1993. Assessing Porter’s model in terms of its generalizability, accuracy, and simplicity. Journal of Management Studies, 30(4): 553–585.

7. Gasparro, A. & Martin, T. 2012. What’s wrong with America’s supermarkets? wsj.com, July 12: np.

8. For insights on how discounting can erode a firm’s performance, read Stibel, J. M. & Delgrosso, P. 2008. Discounts can be dangerous. Harvard Business Review, 66(12): 31.

9. For a scholarly discussion and analysis of the concept of competitive parity, refer to Powell, T. C. 2003. Varieties of competitive parity. Strategic Management Journal, 24(1): 61–86.

10. Rao, A. R., Bergen, M. E., & Davis, S. 2000. How to fight a price war. Harvard Business Review, 78(2): 107–120.

11. Oltermann, P. & McClanahan, P. 2014. Tata Nano safety under scrutiny after dire crash test results. guardian. com. January 31: np.

REFERENCES

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12. Burrus, D. 2011. Flash foresight: How to see the invisible and do the impossible. New York: HarperCollins.

13. Corstjens, M. & Lal, R. 2012. Retail doesn’t cross borders. Harvard Business Review, April: 104–110.

14. Ng, S. 2014. Zulily customers play the waiting game. wsj.com, May 4: np.

15. Interesting insights on Walmart’s effective cost leadership strategy are found in Palmeri, C. 2008. Wal-Mart is up for this downturn. BusinessWeek, November 6: 34.

16. An interesting perspective on the dangers of price discounting is Mohammed, R. 2011. Ditch the discounts. Harvard Business Review, 89(1/2): 23–25.

17. Dholakia, U. M. 2011. Why employees can wreck promotional offers. Harvard Business Review, 89(1/2): 28.

18. Jacobs, A. 2010. Workers in China voting with their feet. International Herald Tribune, July 13: 1, 14.

19. For a perspective on the sustainability of competitive advantages, refer to Barney, J. 1995. Looking inside for competitive advantage. Academy of Management Executive, 9(4): 49–61.

20. Thornton, E. 2001. Why e-brokers are broker and broker. BusinessWeek, January 22: 94.

21. Mohammed, R. 2011. Ditch the discounts. Harvard Business Review, 89(1/2): 23–25.

22. Wilson, D. 2012. Big Beer dresses up in craft brewers’ clothing. Fortune. com, November 15: np.

23. For an “ultimate” in differentiated services, consider time-shares in exotic automobiles such as Lamborghinis and Bentleys. Refer to Stead, D. 2008. My Lamborghini— today, anyway. BusinessWeek, January 18:17.

24. For an interesting perspective on the value of corporate brands and how they may be leveraged, refer to Aaker, D. A. 2004, California Management Review, 46(3): 6–18.

25. A unique perspective on differentiation strategies is Austin, R. D. 2008. High margins and the quest for aesthetic coherence. Harvard Business Review, 86(1): 18–19.

26. Eng, D. 2011. Cheesecake Factory’s winning formula. Fortune, May 2: 19–20.

27. For a discussion on quality in terms of a company’s software and information systems, refer to Prahalad, C. K. & Krishnan, M. S. 1999. The new meaning of quality in the information age. Harvard Business Review, 77(5): 109–118.

28. The role of design in achieving differentiation is addressed in Brown, T. 2008. Design thinking. Harvard Business Review, 86(6): 84–92.

29. Taylor, A., III. 2001. Can you believe Porsche is putting its badge on this car? Fortune, February 19: 168–172.

30. Roberts, P. & Dowling, G. 2008. Corporate reputation and sustained superior financial performance. Strategic Management Journal, 23: 1077–1093.

31. Mann, J. 2010. The best service in the world. Networking Times, January: np.

32. Bonnabeau, E., Bodick, N., & Armstrong, R. W. 2008. A more rational approach to new-product development. Harvard Business Review, 66(3): 96–102.

33. Insights on Google’s innovation are in Iyer, B. & Davenport, T. H. 2008. Reverse engineering Google’s innovation machine. Harvard Business Review, 66(4): 58–68.

34. A discussion of how a firm used technology to create product differentiation is in Mehta, S. N. 2009. Under Armour reboots. Fortune, February 2: 29–33 (5).

35. Bertini, M. & Wathieu, L. 2010. How to stop customers from fixating on price. Harvard Business Review, 88(5): 84–91.

36. The authors would like to thank Scott Droege, a faculty member at Western Kentucky University, for providing this example.

37. Dixon, M., Freeman, K., & Toman, N. 2010. Stop trying to delight your customers. Harvard Business Review, 88(7/8).

38. Flint, J. 2004. Stop the nerds. Forbes, July 5: 80; and Fahey, E. 2004. Over- engineering 101. Forbes, December 13: 62.

39. Symonds, W. C. 2000. Can Gillette regain its voltage? BusinessWeek, October 16: 102–104.

40. Caplan, J. 2006. In a real crunch. Inside Business, July: A37–A38.

41. Gadiesh, O. & Gilbert, J. L. 1998. Profit pools: A fresh look at strategy. Harvard Business Review, 76(3): 139–158.

42. Colvin, G. 2000. Beware: You could soon be selling soybeans. Fortune, November 13: 80.

43. Anders, G. 2012. How LinkedIn has turned your resume into a cash machine. Forbes.com, July 16: np.

44. Burrus, D. 2011. Flash foresight: How to see the invisible and do the impossible. New York: HarperCollins.

45. Hall, W. K. 1980. Survival strategies in a hostile environment, Harvard Business Review, 58: 75–87; on

the paint and allied products industry, see Dess, G. G. & Davis, P. S. 1984. Porter’s (1980) generic strategies as determinants of strategic group membership and organizational performance. Academy of Management Journal, 27: 467–488; for the Korean electronics industry, see Kim, L. & Lim, Y. 1988. Environment, generic strategies, and performance in a rapidly developing country: A taxonomic approach. Academy of Management Journal, 31: 802–827; Wright, P., Hotard, D., Kroll, M., Chan, P., & Tanner, J. 1990. Performance and multiple strategies in a firm: Evidence from the apparel industry. In Dean, B. V. & Cassidy, J. C. (Eds.), Strategic management: Methods and studies: 93–110. Amsterdam: Elsevier-North Holland; and Wright, P., Kroll, M., Tu, H., & Helms, M. 1991. Generic strategies and business performance: An empirical study of the screw machine products industry. British Journal of Management, 2: 1–9.

46. Gilmore, J. H. & Pine, B. J., II. 1997. The four faces of customization. Harvard Business Review, 75(1): 91–101.

47. Heracleous, L. & Wirtz, J. 2010. Singapore Airlines’ balancing act. Harvard Business Review, 88(7/8): 145–149.

48. Gilmore & Pine, op. cit. For interesting insights on mass customization, refer to Cattani, K., Dahan, E., & Schmidt, G. 2005. Offshoring versus “spackling.” MIT Sloan Management Review, 46(3): 6–7.

49. Goodstein, L. D. & Butz, H. E. 1998. Customer value: The linchpin of organizational change. Organizational Dynamics, Summer: 21–34.

50. Kiron, D. 2013. From value to vision: Reimagining the possible with data analytics. MIT Sloan Management Review Research Report, Spring: 1–19.

51. Gadiesh & Gilbert, op. cit., pp. 139–158.

52. Insights on the profit pool concept are addressed in Reinartz, W. & Ulaga, W. 2008. How to sell services more profitably. Harvard Business Review, 66(5): 90–96.

53. statista.com/statistics/263439/ global-market-share-held-by-rim- smartphones/.

54. For an insightful, recent discussion on the difficulties and challenges associated with creating advantages that are sustainable for any reasonable period of time and suggested strategies, refer to D’Aveni, R. A., Dagnino, G. B., & Smith,

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K. G. 2010. The age of temporary advantage. Strategic Management Journal, 31(13): 1371–1385. This is the lead article in a special issue of this journal that provides many ideas that are useful to both academics and practicing managers. For an additional examination of declining advantage in technologically intensive industries, see Vaaler, P. M. & McNamara, G. 2010. Are technology-intensive industries more dynamically competitive? No and yes. Organization Science, 21: 271–289.

55. Rita McGrath provides some interesting ideas on possible strategies for firms facing highly uncertain competitive environments: McGrath, R. G. 2011. When your business model is in trouble. Harvard Business Review, 89(1/2): 96–98.

56. The Atlas Door example draws on Stalk, G., Jr. 1988. Time—the next source of competitive advantage. Harvard Business Review, 66(4): 41–51.

57. Eisenmann, T., Parker, G., & Van Alstyne, M. 2006. Strategies for two-sided markets. hbr.org. October: np; Bonchek, M. & Choudary, S. 2013. Three elements of a successful platform strategy. hbr.org. January 31: np; Anonymous. 2016. How Uber, Airbnb and Etsy attracted their first 1,000 customers. horbes. com. July 13: np; Ifrach, B. 2015. How Airbnb uses machine learning to detect host preferences. nerds. airbnb.com. April 14: np.

58. For an interesting perspective on the influence of the product life cycle and rate of technological change on competitive strategy, refer to Lei, D. & Slocum, J. W., Jr. 2005. Strategic and organizational requirements for competitive advantage. Academy of Management Executive, 19(1): 31–45.

59. Dickson, P. R. 1994. Marketing management: 293. Fort Worth, TX: Dryden Press; Day, G. S. 1981. The product life cycle: Analysis and application. Journal of Marketing Research, 45: 60–67.

60. Bearden, W. O., Ingram, T. N., & LaForge, R. W. 1995. Marketing principles and practices. Burr Ridge, IL: Irwin.

61. MacMillan, I. C. 1985. Preemptive strategies. In Guth, W. D. (Ed.), Handbook of business strategy: 9-1–9-22. Boston: Warren, Gorham & Lamont; Pearce, J. A. & Robinson, R. B. 2000. Strategic management (7th ed.). New York: McGraw-Hill; and Dickson, op. cit., pp. 295–296.

62. Bartlett, C. A. & Ghoshal, S. 2000. Going global: Lessons for late movers. Harvard Business Review, 78(2): 132–142.

63. Neuborne, E. 2000. E-tailers hit the relaunch key. BusinessWeek, October 17: 62.

64. Berkowitz, E. N., Kerin, R. A., & Hartley, S. W. 2000. Marketing (6th ed.). New York: McGraw-Hill.

65. MacMillan, op. cit. 66. Brooker, K. 2001. A game of inches.

Fortune, February 5: 98–100. 67. Our discussion of reverse and

breakaway positioning draws on Moon, Y. 2005. Break free from the product life cycle. Harvard Business Review, 83(5): 87–94. This article also discusses stealth positioning as a means of overcoming consumer resistance and advancing a product from the introduction to the growth phase.

68. MacMillan, op. cit. 69. Berkowitz et al., op. cit. 70. Bearden et al., op. cit. 71. The discussion of these four

strategies draws on MacMillan, op. cit.; Berkowitz et al., op. cit.; and Bearden et al., op. cit.

72. Augustine, N. R. 1997. Reshaping an industry: Lockheed Martin’s survival story. Harvard Business Review, 75(3): 83–94.

73. Snow, D. C. 2008. Beware of old technologies’ last gasps. Harvard Business Review, January: 17–18; Lohr, S. 2008. Why old technologies are still kicking. New York Times, March 23: np; and McGrath, R. G. 2008. Innovation and the last gasps of dying technologies. ritamcgrath. com, March 18: np.

74. Coyne, K. P., Coyne, S. T., & Coyne, E. J., Sr. 2010. When you’ve got to cut costs—now. Harvard Business Review, 88(5): 74–83.

75. A study that draws on the resource- based view of the firm to investigate successful turnaround strategies is Morrow, J. S., Sirmon, D. G., Hitt, M. A., & Holcomb, T. R. 2007. Creating value in the face of declining performance: Firm strategies and organizational recovery. Strategic Management Journal, 28(3): 271–284.

76. For a study investigating the relationship between organizational restructuring and acquisition performance, refer to Barkema, H. G. & Schijven, M. Toward unlocking the full potential of acquisitions: The role of organizational restructuring. Academy of Management Journal, 51(4): 696–722.

77. For some useful ideas on effective turnarounds and handling downsizings, refer to Marks, M. S. & De Meuse, K. P. 2005. Resizing the organization: Maximizing the gain while minimizing the pain of layoffs, divestitures and closings. Organizational Dynamics, 34(1): 19–36.

78. Hambrick, D. C. & Schecter, S. M. 1983. Turnaround strategies for mature industrial product business units. Academy of Management Journal, 26(2): 231–248.

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chapter

After reading this chapter, you should have a good understanding of the following learning objectives:

6 LO6-1 The reasons for the failure of many diversification efforts. LO6-2 How managers can create value through diversification initiatives. LO6-3 How corporations can use related diversification to achieve synergistic

benefits through economies of scope and market power.

LO6-4 How corporations can use unrelated diversification to attain synergistic benefits through corporate restructuring, parenting, and portfolio analysis.

LO6-5 The various means of engaging in diversification—mergers and acquisitions, joint ventures/strategic alliances, and internal development.

LO6-6 Managerial behaviors that can erode the creation of value.

Corporate-Level Strategy Creating Value through Diversification

©Anatoli Styf/Shutterstock

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For decades, Coca-Cola used independent bottlers to distribute Coke products to stores and restaurants. Coke would manufacture the concentrate used to make its soft drinks, but the actual bottling of the product and distribution to end retailers was handled by about 70 regional bottling firms. In 2010, Coca-Cola undertook a major initiative to buy its bottlers and create a national vertically integrated business operation, where Coke would not only manufacture the concentrate but also own its bottling and distribution system. The firm spent $12.3 billion to acquire Coca-Cola Enterprises, its largest bottling partner. Coke believed it could improve the operations of the bottling network by closing some bottling plants, modernizing others, and creating an integrated national manufacturing system. In doing so, the firm could achieve $350 million in annual cost savings while allowing the firm to nationally roll out new products more quickly. Coke could then also negotiate directly with large, national retailers. In short, the firm would be more efficient and more responsive to customer needs.

However, under pressure from investors, Coca-Cola reversed course in 2015—announcing that it would sell off all of its bottling operations. In the first step of this process, it agreed to sell nine production facilities to three bottling companies for $380 million. Additionally, Coke announced it would complete the process of selling off its remaining bottling plants and distribution facilities by the end of 2017.1

What happened to trigger this rapid change? Coke found that being in the bottling business didn’t help its financial performance. In the words of Jack Russo, an analyst at Edward Jones Investing, “bottling is a low margin, capital-intensive business.” Coke also found upgrading and streamlining its bottling networks was harder and was taking more time than expected. While it initially estimated it could close about one- third of its bottling plants to improve efficiencies, it ended up closing only one-tenth of the plants. As a result, Coke saw its operating margins fall from 20.7 percent in 2009 to 11.4 percent in 2014. Divesting the bottling operations allows Coke to again focus on the more profitable business of selling concentrates and syrups to independent companies that bottle and can drinks and then package and distribute them to stores and restaurants. Analysts expect the firm’s operating margins will rise by 50 percent.  Returning management of bottling and distribution to local partners will also allow bottling operations to better meet local market needs. Ultimately, Coke’s management came to the realization that running a capital- intensive manufacturing business didn’t really fit the capabilities of the firm. CEO Muhtar Kent told industry analysts that Coke could now focus on developing and managing brands: “That’s what we’re best at.”

Discussion Questions 1. What are the pros and cons of Coca-Cola owning its bottlers? 2. Why didn’t Coca-Cola’s acquisition of its bottlers lead to the improvements the firm expected? 3. Will this latest move serve as a clear strategy that will lead to long-term profitability, or is it just

a reaction to outside pressures the firm faced?

LEARNING FROM MISTAKES

Coca-Cola’s experience with its purchase of its bottlers is more the rule than the excep- tion. Research shows that a majority of acquisitions of public corporations result in value destruction rather than value creation. Many other large multinational firms have also failed to effectively integrate their acquisitions, paid too high a premium for the target’s common stock, or were unable to understand how the acquired firm’s assets would fit with their own

LO 6-1 The reasons for the failure of many diversification efforts.

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lines of business.2 And, at times, top executives may not have acted in the best interests of shareholders. That is, the motive for the acquisition may have been to enhance the execu- tives’ power and prestige rather than to improve shareholder returns. At times, the only other people who may have benefited were the shareholders of the acquired firms—or the investment bankers who advise the acquiring firm, because they collect huge fees up front regardless of what happens afterward!3

Academic research has found that acquisitions, in general, do not lead to benefits for shareholders. A review paper that looked at over 100 studies on mergers and acquisitions con- cluded that research has found that acquisitions, on average, do not create shareholder value.4

Exhibit 6.1 lists some well-known examples of failed acquisitions and mergers. Many acquisitions ultimately result in divestiture—an admission that things didn’t work

out as planned. In fact, some years ago, a writer for Fortune magazine lamented, “Studies show that 33 percent to 50 percent of acquisitions are later divested, giving corporate mar- riages a divorce rate roughly comparable to that of men and women.”5

Admittedly, we have been rather pessimistic so far.6 Clearly, many diversification efforts have worked out very well—whether through mergers and acquisitions, strategic alliances and joint ventures, or internal development. We will discuss many success stories through- out this chapter. Next, we will discuss the primary rationales for diversification.

MAKING DIVERSIFICATION WORK: AN OVERVIEW Clearly, not all diversification moves, including those involving mergers and acquisitions, erode performance. For example, acquisitions in the oil industry, such as British Petroleum’s purchases of Amoco and Arco, performed well, as did the Exxon-Mobil merger. MetLife was able to dramatically expand its global footprint by acquiring Alico, a global player in the insurance business, from AIG in 2010 when AIG was in financial distress. Since AIG was desperate to sell assets, MetLife was able to acquire this business at an attractive price. With this acquisition, MetLife expanded its global reach from 17 to 64 countries and increased its non-U.S. revenue from 15 to 40 percent.7 Many leading high-tech firms such as Google, Apple, and Intel have dramatically enhanced their revenues, profits, and market values through a wide variety of diversification initiatives, including acquisitions, strategic alliances, and joint ventures, as well as internal development.

LO 6-2 How managers can create value through diversification initiatives.

diversification the process of firms expanding their operations by entering new businesses.

EXHIBIT 6.1 Some Well-Known M&A Blunders

Examples of Some Very Expensive Blunders

• Sprint and Nextel merged in 2005. On January 31, 2008, the firm announced a merger-related charge of $31 billion. Its stock had lost 76 percent of its value by late 2012 when it was announced that Sprint Nextel would be purchased by SoftBank, a Japanese telecommunications and Internet firm. SoftBank’s stock price dropped 20 percent in the week after announcing it would acquire Sprint.

• AOL paid $114 billion to acquire Time Warner in 2001. Over the next two years, AOL Time Warner lost $150 billion in market valuation. • In 2012, Hewlett-Packard wrote off $9 billion of the $11 billion it paid for Autonomy, a software company that it purchased one year

earlier. After the purchase, HP realized that Autonomy’s accounting statements were not accurate, resulting in a nearly 80 percent drop in the value of Autonomy once those accounting irregularities were corrected.

• Similarly, in 2012, Microsoft admitted to a major acquisition mistake when it wrote off essentially the entire $6.2 billion it paid for a digital advertising firm, aQuantive, that it purchased in 2007.

• Yahoo purchased Tumblr for $1.1 billion in 2013 but had written off over 80 percent of this value by the middle of 2016. Commentators have noted that Yahoo’s repeated failures to extract value from acquisitions is one of the key reasons it was unable to survive as an independent firm.

Sources: Ante, S. E. 2008. Sprint’s wake-up call. businessweek.com, February 21: np; Tully, S. 2006. The (second) worst deal ever. Fortune, October 16: 102–119; Wakabayashi, D., Troianovski, A., & Ante, S. 2012. Bravado behind Softbank’s Sprint deal. wsj.com, October 16: np; and Kim, E. 2016.Yahoo just wrote down another $482 million from Tumblr, the company it bought for $1 billion. businessinsider.com, July 18: np.

corporate-level strategy a strategy that focuses on gaining long-term revenue, profits, and market value through managing operations in multiple businesses.

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So the question becomes: Why do some diversification efforts pay off and others pro- duce poor results? This chapter addresses two related issues: (1) What businesses should a corporation compete in? and (2) How should these businesses be managed to jointly create more value than if they were freestanding units?

Diversification initiatives—whether through mergers and acquisitions, strategic alliances and joint ventures, or internal development—must be justified by the creation of value for shareholders.8 But this is not always the case.9 Acquiring firms typically pay high premiums when they acquire a target firm. For example, in 2016, Microsoft offered to buy LinkedIn for $26.2 billion, 50 percent higher than LinkedIn’s value the day before. In contrast, you and I, as private investors, can diversify our portfolio of stocks very cheaply. With an intensely competitive online brokerage industry, we can acquire hundreds (or thousands) of shares for a transaction fee of as little as $10 or less—a far cry from the 30 to 40 percent (or higher) premiums that corporations typically must pay to acquire companies.

Given the seemingly high inherent downside risks and uncertainties, one might ask: Why should companies even bother with diversification initiatives? The answer, in a word, is syn- ergy, derived from the Greek word synergos, which means “working together.” This can have two different, but not mutually exclusive, meanings.

First, a firm may diversify into related businesses. Here, the primary potential benefits to be derived come from horizontal relationships, that is, businesses sharing intangible resources (e.g., core competencies such as marketing) and tangible resources (e.g., pro- duction facilities, distribution channels).10 Firms can also enhance their market power via pooled negotiating power and vertical integration. For example, Procter & Gamble enjoys many synergies from having businesses that share distribution resources.

Second, a corporation may diversify into unrelated businesses.11 Here, the primary potential benefits are derived largely from hierarchical relationships, that is, value creation derived from the corporate office. Examples of the latter would include leveraging some of the support activities in the value chain that we discussed in Chapter 3, such as information systems or human resource practices.

Please note that such benefits derived from horizontal (related diversification) and hier- archical (unrelated diversification) relationships are not mutually exclusive. Many firms that diversify into related areas benefit from information technology expertise in the corpo- rate office. Similarly, unrelated diversifiers often benefit from the “best practices” of sister businesses even though their products, markets, and technologies may differ dramatically.

Exhibit 6.2 provides an overview of how we will address the various means by which firms create value through both related and unrelated diversification and also includes a summary of some examples that we will address in this chapter.12

RELATED DIVERSIFICATION: ECONOMIES OF SCOPE AND REVENUE ENHANCEMENT Related diversification enables a firm to benefit from horizontal relationships across differ- ent businesses in the diversified corporation by leveraging core competencies and sharing activities (e.g., production and distribution facilities). This enables a corporation to benefit from economies of scope. Economies of scope refers to cost savings from leveraging core competencies or sharing related activities among businesses in the corporation. A firm can also enjoy greater revenues if two businesses attain higher levels of sales growth combined than either company could attain independently.

Leveraging Core Competencies The concept of core competencies can be illustrated by the imagery of the diversified corpo- ration as a tree.13 The trunk and major limbs represent core products; the smaller branches

LO 6-3 How corporations can use related diversification to achieve synergistic benefits through economies of scope and market power.

economies of scope cost savings from leveraging core competencies or sharing related activities among businesses in a corporation.

related diversification a firm entering a different business in which it can benefit from leveraging core competencies, sharing activities, or building market power.

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EXHIBIT 6.2 Creating Value through Related and Unrelated Diversification

Related Diversification: Economies of Scope

Leveraging core competencies • 3M leverages its competencies in adhesives technologies to many industries, including automotive,

construction, and telecommunications.

Sharing activities • Polaris, a manufacturer of snowmobiles, motorcycles, watercraft, and off-road vehicles, shares

manufacturing operations across its businesses. It also has a corporate R&D facility and staff departments that support all of Polaris’s operating divisions.

Related Diversification: Market Power

Pooled negotiating power • ConAgra, a diversified food producer, increases its power over suppliers by centrally purchasing huge

quantities of packaging materials for all of its food divisions.

Vertical integration • Shaw Industries, a giant carpet manufacturer, increases its control over raw materials by producing much

of its own polypropylene fiber, a key input to its manufacturing process.

Unrelated Diversification: Parenting, Restructuring, and Financial Synergies

Corporate restructuring and parenting • The corporate office of Cooper Industries adds value to its acquired businesses by performing such

activities as auditing their manufacturing operations, improving their accounting activities, and centralizing union negotiations.

Portfolio management • Novartis, formerly Ciba-Geigy, uses portfolio management to improve many key activities, including

resource allocation and reward and evaluation systems.

are business units; and the leaves, flowers, and fruit are end products. The core compe- tencies are represented by the root system, which provides nourishment, sustenance, and stability. Managers often misread the strength of competitors by looking only at their end products, just as we can fail to appreciate the strength of a tree by looking only at its leaves. Core competencies may also be viewed as the “glue” that binds existing businesses together or as the engine that fuels new business growth.

Core competencies reflect the collective learning in organizations—how to coordinate diverse production skills, integrate multiple streams of technologies, and market diverse products and services.14 Casio, a giant electronic products producer, synthesizes its abilities in miniatur- ization, microprocessor design, material science, and ultrathin precision castings to produce digital watches. These are the same skills it applies to design and produce its miniature card calculators, digital cameras, pocket electronic dictionaries, and other small electronics.

For a core competence to create value and provide a viable basis for synergy among the businesses in a corporation, it must meet three criteria:15

• The core competence must enhance competitive advantage(s) by creating superior customer value. Every value-chain activity has the potential to provide a viable basis for building on a core competence.16 At Gillette, for example, scientists have developed a series of successful new razors, including the Sensor, Fusion, Mach 3, and ProGlide, building on a thorough understanding of several phenomena that underlie shaving. These include the physiology of facial hair and skin, the metallurgy of blade strength and sharpness, the dynamics of a cartridge moving across skin, and the physics of a razor blade severing hair. Such innovations are possible only with an understanding of such phenomena and the ability to combine such technologies

core competencies a firm’s strategic resources that reflect the collective learning in the organization.

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6.1 DATA ANALYTICSSTRATEGY SPOTLIGHT IBM: THE NEW HEALTH CARE EXPERT Watson, the supercomputer IBM used to win a competition against the best players on the quiz show Jeopardy! is now working toward becoming Dr. Watson. Over the decades, IBM has developed strong competencies in raw computing power. With Watson, a computer named after IBM founder Thomas J. Watson, IBM engineers and scientists set out to extend IBM’s competencies by building a computing system that can process natural language. Their goal was to build a system that could rival a human’s ability to answer questions posed in natural language with speed, accuracy, and confidence. They took four years to develop the system and demonstrated its capabilities in beating two of the greatest champions of Jeopardy! in 2011.

Now IBM is aiming to leverage its competencies in the health care arena. In 2013, IBM introduced three applications, one which recommends cancer treatment options and two for reviewing and authorizing treatments and related insurance claims. IBM developed the cancer treatment application with Memorial Sloan-Kettering, one of the world’s premier cancer treatment clinics. IBM chose to work on cancer treatment since the volume of research on cancer doubles every five years. As a result, oncologists, the doctors treating cancer, can easily fall behind the cutting edge of research. As Dr. Mark Kris, chief of Memorial Sloan Kettering’s Thoracic Oncology Service, stated, “There has been an explosion in medical research, and doctors

can’t possibly keep up.” That is not a problem for Watson. IBM sees this massive volume of research as an opportunity to crowdsource knowledge to develop new, integrated insights. IBM regularly feeds massive amounts of data from medical stud- ies into Watson. In a one-year period, Watson absorbed and ana- lyzed more than 600,000 pieces of medical data and 2 million pages of text from 42 medical journals and clinical trials of can- cer treatments. IBM then adds the individual patient’s health history and current symptoms to the system. With its natural- language capabilities, Watson can easily process and codify all of the information fed into it. Doctors access the system, using an iPad, enter the patient’s symptoms, and within three seconds receive a personalized diagnosis and a prioritized list of recom- mended tests and treatment options.

While oncology was the first medical specialty for Watson, IBM has expanded the approach and is also providing guidance for the treatment of diabetes, kidney disease, heart disease, and many other areas of medicine. It has even created an entirely new business unit, IBM Watson Health, a cloud-based service selling diagnostic expertise to doctors, hospitals, and insurers.

Sources: Frier, S. 2012. IBM wants to put a Watson in your pocket. Bloomberg Businessweek, September 17: 41–42; Groenfeldt, T. 2012. IBM’s Watson, Cedars- Sinai and WellPoint take on cancer. forbes.com, February 1: np; Henschen, D. 2013. IBM’s Watson could be healthcare game changer. informationweek.com, February 3: np; ibm.com; and Claney, H. 2015. IBM’s new health care prescription: A standalone business unit. fortune.com, April 13: np..

into innovative products. Customers are willing to pay more for such technologically differentiated products.

• Different businesses in the corporation must be similar in at least one important way related to the core competence. It is not essential that the products or services themselves be similar. Rather, at least one element in the value chain must require similar skills in creating competitive advantage if the corporation is to capitalize on its core competence. For example, while we might think that film technology and beauty products have little in common, Fujifilm has found a link it could exploit. Fuji took expertise it had developed with collagen, a major component of both photo film and human skin, and used it to develop a new skin care product line, Astalift—a product line that produces over $80 million in sales.17 Similarly, as discussed in Strategy Spotlight 6.1, IBM is combining its competencies in computing technology with crowdsourced medical research knowledge to provide health care services.

• The core competencies must be difficult for competitors to imitate or find substitutes for. As we discussed in Chapter 5, competitive advantages will not be sustainable if the competition can easily imitate or substitute them. Similarly, if the skills associated with a firm’s core competencies are easily imitated or replicated, they are not a sound basis for sustainable advantages.

Consider Amazon’s retailing operations. Amazon developed strong competencies in Internet retailing, website infrastructure, warehousing, and order fulfillment to dominate the online book industry. It used these competencies along with its brand name to expand

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into a range of online retail businesses. Competitors in these other market areas have had great difficulty imitating Amazon’s competencies, and many have simply stopped trying. Instead, they have partnered with Amazon and contracted with Amazon to provide these services for them.18

Sharing Activities As we saw previously, leveraging core competencies involves transferring accumulated skills and expertise across business units in a corporation. Corporations also can achieve synergy by sharing activities across their business units. These include value-creating activities such as com- mon manufacturing facilities, distribution channels, and sales forces. As we will see, sharing activities can potentially provide two primary payoffs: cost savings and revenue enhancements.

Deriving Cost Savings Typically, this is the most common type of synergy and the easiest to estimate. Peter Shaw, head of mergers and acquisitions at the British chemical and phar- maceutical company ICI, refers to cost savings as “hard synergies” and contends that the level of certainty of their achievement is quite high. Cost savings come from many sources, including from the elimination of jobs, facilities, and related expenses that are no longer needed when functions are consolidated and from economies of scale in purchasing. Cost savings are generally highest when one company acquires another from the same industry in the same country. Shaw Industries, a division of Berkshire Hathaway, is the nation’s larg- est carpet producer. Over the years, it has dominated the competition through a strategy of acquisition that has enabled Shaw, among other things, to consolidate its manufacturing operations in a few, highly efficient plants and to lower costs through higher capacity utili- zation. Honda benefits by sharing small engine development and manufacturing across the more than 15 different types of power equipment it produces. Similarly, General Motors uses a shared engineering group and shared vehicle platforms across its Chevrolet, Buick, and GMC brands.

Sharing activities inevitably involve costs that the benefits must outweigh such as the greater coordination required to manage a shared activity. Even more important is the need to compromise on the design or performance of an activity so that it can be shared. For example, a salesperson handling the products of two business units must operate in a way that is usually not what either unit would choose if it were independent. If the compromise erodes the unit’s effectiveness, then sharing may reduce rather than enhance competitive advantage.

ENHANCING REVENUE AND DIFFERENTIATION Often an acquiring firm and its target may achieve a higher level of sales growth together than either company could on its own. For example, Starbucks has acquired a number of small firms, including La Boulange, a small bakery chain; Teavana, a tea producer; and Evolution Fresh, a juice company. Starbucks can add value to all of these firms by expanding their market exposure as Starbucks offers these products for sale in its national retail chain.19

Firms also can enhance the effectiveness of their differentiation strategies by means of sharing activities among business units. A shared order-processing system, for example, may permit new features and services that a buyer will value. As another example, financial ser- vice providers strive to provide differentiated bundles of services to customers. By having a single point of contact where customers can manage their checking accounts, investment accounts, insurance policies, bill-payment services, mortgages, and many other services, they create value for their customers.

As a cautionary note, managers must keep in mind that sharing activities among busi- nesses in a corporation can have a negative effect on a given business’s differentiation. For example, when Ford owned Jaguar, customers had lower perceived value of Jaguar

sharing activities having activities of two or more businesses’ value chains done by one of the businesses.

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automobiles when they learned that the entry-level Jaguar shared its basic design with and was manufactured in the same production plant as the Ford Mondeo, a European midsize car. Perhaps it is not too surprising that Jaguar was divested by Ford in 2008.

RELATED DIVERSIFICATION: MARKET POWER We now discuss how companies achieve related diversification through market power. We also address the two principal means by which firms achieve synergy through market power: pooled negotiating power and vertical integration. Managers do, however, have limits on their ability to use market power for diversification, because government regulations can sometimes restrict the ability of a business to gain very large shares of a particular market. For example, in 2016, in order to approve Anheuser-Busch InBev’s planned purchase of SABMiller, the Federal Trade Commission required InBev to divest all of SABMiller’s U.S. operations to keep InBev from getting too much market power in the U.S. beer market.

Pooled Negotiating Power Similar businesses working together or the affiliation of a business with a strong parent can strengthen an organization’s bargaining position relative to suppliers and customers and enhance its position vis-à-vis competitors. Compare, for example, the position of an independent food manufacturer with that of the same business within Nestlé. Being part of Nestlé provides the business with significant clout—greater bargaining power with sup- pliers and customers—since it is part of a firm that makes large purchases from suppliers and provides a wide variety of products. Access to the parent’s deep pockets increases the business’s strength, and the Nestlé unit enjoys greater protection from substitutes and new entrants. Not only would rivals perceive the unit as a more formidable opponent, but the unit’s association with Nestlé would also provide greater visibility and improved image.

When acquiring related businesses, a firm’s potential for pooled negotiating power vis- à-vis its customers and suppliers can be very enticing. However, managers must carefully evaluate how the combined businesses may affect relationships with actual and potential customers, suppliers, and competitors. For example, when PepsiCo diversified into the fast-food industry with its acquisitions of Kentucky Fried Chicken, Taco Bell, and Pizza Hut (now part of Yum! Brands), it clearly benefited from its position over these units that served as a captive market for its soft-drink products. However, many competitors, such as McDonald’s, refused to consider PepsiCo as a supplier of its own soft-drink needs because of competition with Pepsi’s divisions in the fast-food industry. Simply put, McDonald’s did not want to subsidize the enemy! Thus, although acquiring related businesses can enhance a corporation’s bargaining power, it must be aware of the potential for retaliation.

Vertical Integration Vertical integration occurs when a firm becomes its own supplier or distributor. That is, it represents an expansion or extension of the firm by integrating preceding or successive production processes.20 The firm incorporates more processes toward the original source of raw materials (backward integration) or toward the ultimate consumer (forward integra- tion). For example, an oil refinery might secure land leases and develop its own drilling capacity to ensure a constant supply of crude oil. Or it could expand into retail operations by owning or licensing gasoline stations to guarantee customers for its petroleum products.

Vertical integration can be a viable strategy for many firms. Strategy Spotlight 6.2 dis- cusses how Tesla is vertically integrating into battery production to ensure it has an ade- quate supply of batteries as it expands its production of vehicles.

Benefits and Risks of Vertical Integration Vertical integration is a means for an organi- zation to reduce its dependence on suppliers or its channels of distribution to end users.

market power firms’ abilities to profit through restricting or controlling supply to a market or coordinating with other firms to reduce investment.

pooled negotiating power the improvement in bargaining position relative to suppliers and customers.

vertical integration an expansion or extension of the firm by integrating preceding or successive production processes.

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6.2 ENVIRONMENTAL SUSTAINABILITYSTRATEGY SPOTLIGHT TESLA BREAKS INDUSTRY NORMS BY VERTICALLY INTEGRATING For decades, auto manufacturers vertically integrated and con- trolled all stages of the manufacturing process. By manufac- turing their own components, the auto firms could coordinate design of parts, ensure the quality of components, and also ensure that there was adequate production of the parts they needed. However, in recent decades, auto firms have sold off most of their suppliers. By allowing outside suppliers to compete for contracts, the auto firms found they were able to buy compo- nents for lower cost than if they had built them in-house.

In contrast to the direction the major auto firms have gone, Tesla is going all in on building a vertically integrated business model. In 2015, Tesla announced that it was building a “gigafac- tory” to supply all of the batteries they will need for their cars. Tesla sees at least three benefits from making its own batteries.

First, by taking on the $5 billion cost to build the factory, it is maximizing scale efficiencies in battery manufacturing that could result in a per unit cost reduction of 30 percent. Second, Tesla believes it will be able to better coordinate battery technol- ogy development as a vertically integrated firm. Third, if demand for electric vehicles takes off as Tesla expects, it will benefit from having an in-house supplier that can provide a steady supply of batteries rather than having to compete to buy batteries from outside suppliers. There simply isn’t enough battery production capacity in the world to provide the batteries needed for Tesla to hit its goal of selling 500,000 vehicles per year. But it is a big bet that will be very costly to Tesla if demand doesn’t grow as it expects or if new battery technology makes Tesla’s lithium-ion batteries obsolete. Sources: Gorzelany, J. 2014. Why Tesla’s vertical manufacturing move could prove essential to its success. forbes.com, February 27: np.; and Randall, T. 2017. Tesla flips the switch on the gigafactory. bloomberg.com, January 4.

However, the benefits associated with vertical integration—backward or forward—must be carefully weighed against the risks.21 The primary benefits and risks of vertical integration are listed in Exhibit 6.3.

Winnebago, the leader in the market for drivable recreational vehicles, with a 33.9 percent market share, illustrates some of vertical integration’s benefits.22 The word Winnebago means “big RV” to most Americans. And the firm has a sterling reputation for great quality. The firm’s huge northern Iowa factories do everything from extruding aluminum for body parts to molding plastics for water and holding tanks to dashboards. Such vertical integra- tion at the factory may appear to be outdated and expensive, but it guarantees excellent quality. The Recreational Vehicle Dealer Association started giving a quality award in 1996, and Winnebago has won it 20 out of 21 years since.

In making vertical integration decisions, five issues should be considered:23

1. Is the company satisfied with the quality of the value that its present suppliers and distributors are providing? If the performance of organizations in the vertical chain— both suppliers and distributors—is satisfactory, it may not, in general, be appropriate

Benefits

• A secure source of raw materials or distribution channels. • Protection of and control over valuable assets. • Proprietary access to new technologies developed by the unit. • Simplified procurement and administrative procedures.

Risks

• Costs and expenses associated with increased overhead and capital expenditures. • Loss of flexibility resulting from large investments. • Problems associated with unbalanced capacities along the value chain. (For example, the in-house

supplier has to be larger than your needs in order to benefit from economies of scale in that market.) • Additional administrative costs associated with managing a more complex set of activities.

EXHIBIT 6.3 Benefits and Risks of Vertical Integration

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for a company to perform these activities itself. But if firms are not happy with their current suppliers, they may want to backward integrate. For example, Kaiser Permanente, a health provider with 10.6 million subscribers, launched its own medical school to better train physicians to provide the integrated style of care Kaiser is striving to provide.24

2. Are there activities in the industry value chain presently being outsourced or performed independently by others that are a viable source of future profits? Even if a firm is outsourcing value-chain activities to companies that are doing a credible job, it may be missing out on substantial profit opportunities. Consider Best Buy. When it realized that the profit potential of providing installation and service was substantial, Best Buy forward integrated into this area by acquiring Geek Squad.

3. Is there a high level of stability in the demand for the organization’s products? High demand or sales volatility is not conducive to vertical integration. With the high level of fixed costs in plant and equipment as well as operating costs that accompany endeavors toward vertical integration, widely fluctuating sales demand can either strain resources (in times of high demand) or result in unused capacity (in times of low demand). The cycles of “boom and bust” in the automobile industry are a key reason why the manufacturers have increased the amount of outsourced inputs.

4. Does the company have the necessary competencies to execute the vertical integration strategies? As many companies would attest, successfully executing strategies of vertical integration can be very difficult. For example, Boise Cascade, a lumber firm, once forward integrated into the home-building industry but found that it didn’t have the design and marketing competencies needed to compete in this market.

5. Will the vertical integration initiative have potential negative impacts on the firm’s stakeholders? Managers must carefully consider the impact that vertical integration may have on existing and future customers, suppliers, and competitors. After Lockheed Martin, a dominant defense contractor, acquired Loral Corporation, an electronics supplier, for $9.1 billion, it had an unpleasant and unanticipated surprise. Loral, as a subsidiary of Lockheed, was viewed as a rival by many of its previous customers. Thus, while Lockheed Martin may have seen benefits by being able to coordinate operations with Loral as a captive supplier, it also saw a decline in business for Loral with other defense contractors.

Analyzing Vertical Integration: The Transaction Cost Perspective Another approach that has proved very useful in understanding vertical integration is the transaction cost perspec- tive.25 According to this perspective, every market transaction involves some transaction costs. First, a decision to purchase an input from an outside source leads to search costs (i.e., the cost to find where it is available, the level of quality, etc.). Second, there are costs associated with negotiating. Third, a contract needs to be written spelling out future possible contingencies. Fourth, parties in a contract have to monitor each other. Finally, if a party does not comply with the terms of the contract, there are enforcement costs. Transaction costs are thus the sum of search costs, negotiation costs, contracting costs, monitoring costs, and enforcement costs. These transaction costs can be avoided by internalizing the activity, in other words, by producing the input in-house.

A related problem with purchasing a specialized input from outside is the issue of t ransaction-specific investments. For example, when an automobile company needs an input specifically designed for a particular car model, the supplier may be unwilling to make the investments in plant and machinery necessary to produce that component for two reasons. First, the investment may take many years to recover but there is no guarantee the automo- bile company will continue to buy from the supplier after the contract expires, typically in one year. Second, once the investment is made, the supplier has no bargaining power. That is, the buyer knows that the supplier has no option but to supply at ever-lower prices because

transaction cost perspective a perspective that the choice of a transaction’s governance structure, such as vertical integration or market transaction, is influenced by transaction costs, including search, negotiating, contracting, monitoring, and enforcement costs, associated with each choice.

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the investments were so specific that they cannot be used to produce alternative products. In such circumstances, again, vertical integration may be the only option.

Vertical integration, however, gives rise to a different set of costs. These costs are referred to as administrative costs. Coordinating different stages of the value chain now internalized within the firm causes administrative costs to go up. Decisions about vertical integration are, therefore, based on a comparison of transaction costs and administrative costs. If trans- action costs are lower than administrative costs, it is best to resort to market transactions and avoid vertical integration. For example, McDonald’s may be the world’s biggest buyer of beef, but it does not raise cattle. The market for beef has low transaction costs and requires no transaction-specific investments. On the other hand, if transaction costs are higher than administrative costs, vertical integration becomes an attractive strategy. Most automobile manufacturers produce their own engines because the market for engines involves high transaction costs and transaction-specific investments.

UNRELATED DIVERSIFICATION: FINANCIAL SYNERGIES AND PARENTING With unrelated diversification, unlike related diversification, few benefits are derived from horizontal relationships—that is, the leveraging of core competencies or the sharing of activ- ities across business units within a corporation. Instead, potential benefits can be gained from vertical (or hierarchical) relationships—the creation of synergies from the interaction of the corporate office with the individual business units. There are two main sources of such synergies. First, the corporate office can contribute to “parenting” and restructuring of (often acquired) businesses. Second, the corporate office can add value by viewing the entire corporation as a family or “portfolio” of businesses and allocating resources to opti- mize corporate goals of profitability, cash flow, and growth. Additionally, the corporate office enhances value by establishing appropriate human resource practices and financial controls for each of its business units.

Corporate Parenting and Restructuring We have discussed how firms can add value through related diversification by exploring sources of synergy across business units. Now, we discuss how value can be created within business units as a result of the expertise and support provided by the corporate office.

Parenting The positive contributions of the corporate office are called the “parenting advan- tage.”26 Many firms have successfully diversified their holdings without strong evidence of the more traditional sources of synergy (i.e., horizontally across business units). Diversified public corporations such as Berkshire Hathaway and Virgin Group and leveraged buyout firms such as KKR and Clayton, Dubilier & Rice are a few examples.27 These parent compa- nies create value through management expertise. How? They improve plans and budgets and provide especially competent central functions such as legal, financial, human resource man- agement, procurement, and the like. They also help subsidiaries make wise choices in their own acquisitions, divestitures, and new internal development decisions. Such contributions often help business units to substantially increase their revenues and profits. For example, KKR, a private equity firm, has a team of parenting experts, called KKR Capstone, that works with newly acquired firms for 12 to 24 months to enhance the acquired firm’s value. The team works to improve a range of operating activities, such as new product development processes, sales force activities, quality improvement, and supply chain management.

Restructuring Restructuring is another means by which the corporate office can add value to a business.28 The central idea can be captured in the real estate phrase “Buy low and sell

LO 6-4 How corporations can use unrelated diversification to attain synergistic benefits through corporate restructuring, parenting, and portfolio analysis.

unrelated diversification a firm entering a different business that has little horizontal interaction with other businesses of a firm.

parenting advantage the positive contributions of the corporate office to a new business as a result of expertise and support provided and not as a result of substantial changes in assets, capital structure, or management.

restructuring the intervention of the corporate office in a new business that substantially changes the assets, capital structure, and/or management, including selling off parts of the business, changing the management, reducing payroll and unnecessary sources of expenses, changing strategies, and infusing the new business with new technologies, processes, and reward systems.

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high.” Here, the corporate office tries to find either poorly performing firms with unreal- ized potential or firms in industries on the threshold of significant, positive change. The par- ent intervenes, often selling off parts of the business; changing the management; reducing payroll and unnecessary sources of expenses; changing strategies; and infusing the company with new technologies, processes, reward systems, and so forth. When the restructuring is complete, the firm can either “sell high” and capture the added value or keep the business and enjoy financial and competitive benefits.29

For the restructuring strategy to work, the corporate management must have the insight to detect undervalued companies (otherwise, the cost of acquisition would be too high) or businesses competing in industries with a high potential for transformation.30 Additionally, of course, it must have the requisite skills and resources to turn the businesses around, even if they may be in new and unfamiliar industries.

Restructuring can involve changes in assets, capital structure, or management.

• Asset restructuring involves the sale of unproductive assets, or even whole lines of businesses, that are peripheral. In some cases, it may even involve acquisitions that strengthen the core business.

• Capital restructuring involves changing the debt-equity mix, or the mix between different classes of debt or equity. Although the substitution of equity with debt is more common in buyout situations, occasionally the parent may provide additional equity capital.

• Management restructuring typically involves changes in the composition of the top management team, organizational structure, and reporting relationships. Tight financial control, rewards based strictly on meeting short- to medium-term performance goals, and reduction in the number of middle-level managers are common steps in management restructuring. In some cases, parental intervention may even result in changes in strategy as well as infusion of new technologies and processes.

Portfolio Management During the 1970s and early 1980s, several leading consulting firms developed the concept of portfolio management to achieve a better understanding of the competitive position of an overall portfolio (or family) of businesses, to suggest strategic alternatives for each of the businesses, and to identify priorities for the allocation of resources. Several studies have reported widespread use of these techniques among American firms.31

While portfolio management tools have been widely used in corporations, research on their use has offered mixed support. However, recent research has suggested that strategi- cally channeling resources to units with the most promising prospects can lead to corpo- rate advantage. Research suggests that many firms do not adjust their capital allocations in response to changes in the performance of units or the attractiveness of the markets in which units of the corporation compete. Instead, allocations are fairly consistent from year to year. However, firms that assess the attractiveness of markets in which the firm competes and the capabilities of each division and then choose allocations of corporate resources based on these assessments exhibit higher levels of corporate survival, overall corporate performance, stock market performance, and the performance of individual business units within the corporation. These effects have also been shown to be stronger when firms com- pete in more competitive markets and in times of economic distress.32 These findings have shown that the ability to effectively allocate financial capital is a key competence of high- performance diversified firms.

Description and Potential Benefits The key purpose of portfolio models is to assist a firm in achieving a balanced portfolio of businesses.33 This consists of businesses whose prof- itability, growth, and cash flow characteristics complement each other and adds up to a

portfolio management a method of (a) assessing the competitive position of a portfolio of businesses within a corporation, (b) suggesting strategic alternatives for each business, and (c) identifying priorities for the allocation of resources across the businesses.

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satisfactory overall corporate performance. Imbalance, for example, could be caused either by excessive cash generation with too few growth opportunities or by insufficient cash gen- eration to fund the growth requirements in the portfolio.

The Boston Consulting Group’s (BCG’s) growth/share matrix is among the best known of these approaches.34 In the BCG approach, each of the firm’s strategic business units (SBUs) is plotted on a two-dimensional grid in which the axes are relative market share and industry growth rate. The grid is broken into four quadrants. Exhibit 6.4 depicts the BCG matrix. Following are a few clarifications:

1. Each circle represents one of the corporation’s business units. The size of the circle represents the relative size of the business unit in terms of revenues.

2. Relative market share, measured by the ratio of the business unit’s size to that of its largest competitor, is plotted along the horizontal axis.

3. Market share is central to the BCG matrix. This is because high relative market share leads to unit cost reduction due to experience and learning curve effects and, consequently, superior competitive position.

Each of the four quadrants of the grid has different implications for the SBUs that fall into the category:

• Stars are SBUs competing in high-growth industries with relatively high market shares. These firms have long-term growth potential and should continue to receive substantial investment funding.

• Question marks are SBUs competing in high-growth industries but having relatively weak market shares. Resources should be invested in them to enhance their competitive positions.

• Cash cows are SBUs with high market shares in low-growth industries. These units have limited long-run potential but represent a source of current cash flows to fund investments in “stars” and “question marks.”

• Dogs are SBUs with weak market shares in low-growth industries. Because they have weak positions and limited potential, most analysts recommend that they be divested.

EXHIBIT 6.4 The Boston Consulting Group (BCG) Portfolio Matrix

22%

20%

18%

16%

14%

12%

10%

8%

6%

4%

2%

0

10 X 4X 2X

Stars Question Marks

Cash Cows

In du

st ry

G ro

w th

R at

e

Dogs

1. 5X 1X

0. 5X

0. 4X

0. 3X

0. 2X

0. 1X

Relative Market Share

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In using portfolio strategy approaches, a corporation tries to create shareholder value in a number of ways.35 First, portfolio analysis provides a snapshot of the businesses in a cor- poration’s portfolio. Therefore, the corporation is in a better position to allocate resources among the business units according to prescribed criteria (e.g., use cash flows from the cash cows to fund promising stars). Second, the expertise and analytical resources in the corporate office provide guidance in determining what firms may be attractive (or unat- tractive) acquisitions. Third, the corporate office is able to provide financial resources to the business units on favorable terms that reflect the corporation’s overall ability to raise funds. Fourth, the corporate office can provide high-quality review and coaching for the individual businesses. Fifth, portfolio analysis provides a basis for developing strategic goals and reward/evaluation systems for business managers. For example, managers of cash cows would have lower targets for revenue growth than managers of stars, but the former would have higher threshold levels of profit targets on proposed projects than the managers of star businesses. Compensation systems would also reflect such realities. Managers of cash cows understandably would be rewarded more on the basis of cash that their businesses generate than would managers of star businesses. Similarly, managers of star businesses would be held to higher standards for revenue growth than managers of cash cow businesses.

Limitations Despite the potential benefits of portfolio models, there are also some nota- ble downsides. First, they compare SBUs on only two dimensions, making the implicit but erroneous assumption that (1) those are the only factors that really matter and (2) every unit can be accurately compared on that basis. Second, the approach views each SBU as a stand-alone entity, ignoring common core business practices and value-creating activities that may hold promise for synergies across business units. Third, unless care is exercised, the process becomes largely mechanical, substituting an oversimplified graphical model for the important contributions of the CEO’s (and other corporate managers’) experience and judgment. Fourth, the reliance on “strict rules” regarding resource allocation across SBUs can be detrimental to a firm’s long-term viability. Finally, while colorful and easy to compre- hend, the imagery of the BCG matrix can lead to some troublesome and overly simplistic prescriptions. For example, division managers are likely to want to jump ship as soon as their division is labeled a “dog.”

To see what can go wrong, consider Cabot Corporation.

Cabot Corporation supplies carbon black for the rubber, electronics, and plastics industries. Following the BCG matrix, Cabot moved away from its cash cow, carbon black, and diversified into stars such as ceramics and semiconductors in a seemingly overaggressive effort to create more revenue growth for the corporation. Predictably, Cabot’s return on assets declined as the firm shifted away from its core competence to unrelated areas. The portfolio model failed by pointing the company in the wrong direction in an effort to spur growth—away from its core business. Recognizing its mistake, Cabot Corporation returned to its mainstay carbon black manufacturing and divested unrelated businesses. Today the company is a leader in its field with $2.4 billion in revenues in 2016.36

Caveat: Is Risk Reduction a Viable Goal of Diversification? One of the purposes of diversification is to reduce the risk that is inherent in a firm’s vari- ability in revenues and profits over time. That is, if a firm enters new products or markets that are affected differently by seasonal or economic cycles, its performance over time will be more stable. For example, a firm manufacturing lawn mowers may diversify into snow- blowers to even out its annual sales. Or a firm manufacturing a luxury line of household furniture may introduce a lower-priced line since affluent and lower-income customers are affected differently by economic cycles.

At first glance the above reasoning may make sense, but there are some problems with it. First, a firm’s stockholders can diversify their portfolios at a much lower cost than a

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corporation, and they don’t have to worry about integrating the acquisition into their port- folio. Second, economic cycles as well as their impact on a given industry (or firm) are dif- ficult to predict with any degree of accuracy.

Notwithstanding the above, some firms have benefited from diversification by lowering the variability (or risk) in their performance over time. Consider GE, a firm that manu- factures a wide range of products, including aircraft engines, power-generation equipment, locomotive trains, large appliances, healthcare equipment, lighting, water treatment equip- ment, oil well drilling equipment, and many other products. Offering such a wide range of products has allowed GE to generate stable earnings and a low-risk profile. Due to its earn- ing stability, GE is able to borrow money at favorable rates which it then uses to invest in its own operations and to extend its portfolio even further by acquiring other manufacturers.

Risk reduction in and of itself is rarely viable as a means to create shareholder value. It must be undertaken with a view of a firm’s overall diversification strategy.

THE MEANS TO ACHIEVE DIVERSIFICATION We have addressed the types of diversification (e.g., related and unrelated) that a firm may undertake to achieve synergies and create value for its shareholders. Now, we address the means by which a firm can go about achieving these desired benefits.

There are three basic means. First, through acquisitions or mergers, corporations can directly acquire a firm’s assets and competencies. Although the terms mergers and acquisi- tions are used quite interchangeably, there are some key differences. With acquisitions, one firm buys another through a stock purchase, cash, or the issuance of debt.37 Mergers, on the other hand, entail a combination or consolidation of two firms to form a new legal entity. Mergers are relatively rare and entail a transaction among two firms on a relatively equal basis. Despite such differences, we consider both mergers and acquisitions to be quite simi- lar in terms of their implications for a firm’s corporate-level strategy.38

Second, corporations may agree to pool the resources of other companies with their resource base, commonly known as a joint venture or strategic alliance. Although these two forms of partnerships are similar in many ways, there is an important difference. Joint ventures involve the formation of a third-party legal entity where the two (or more) firms each contribute equity, whereas strategic alliances do not.

Third, corporations may diversify into new products, markets, and technologies through internal development. Called corporate entrepreneurship, it involves the leveraging and combining of a firm’s own resources and competencies to create synergies and enhance shareholder value. We address this subject in greater length in Chapter 12.

Mergers and Acquisitions The most visible and often costly means to diversify is through acquisitions. Over the past several years, several large acquisitions were announced. These include:39

• InBev’s acquisition of Anheuser-Busch for $52 billion. • AT&T’s acquisition of DirecTV for $67 billion. • Facebook’s acquisition of WhatsApp for $19.4 billion. • Marriott International’s purchase of Starwood Hotels for $13.6 billion. • Shire Pharmaceutical’s $32 billion acquisition of Baxalta.

Exhibit 6.5 illustrates the volatility in worldwide M&A activity over the last several years. Several factors influence M&A activity. Julia Coronado, the chief economist at the invest- ment bank BNP Paribas, highlights two of the key determinants, stating, “When mergers and acquisitions pick up, that’s a good sign that businesses are feeling confident enough about the future that they’re willing to become aggressive, look for deals, look for ways to

LO 6-5 The various means of engaging in diversification—mergers and acquisitions, joint ventures/strategic alliances, and internal development.

acquisitions the incorporation of one firm into another through purchase.

mergers the combining of two or more firms into one new legal entity.

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grow and expand their operations. And it’s also an indication that markets are willing to finance these transactions. So it’s optimism from the markets and from the businesses them- selves.”40 Thus, the general economic conditions and level of optimism about the future influence managers’ willingness to take on the risk of acquisitions. Additionally, the avail- ability of financing can influence acquisition activity. During boom periods, financing is typically widely available. In contrast, during recessionary periods, potential acquirers typi- cally find it difficult to borrow money to finance acquisitions.

Governmental policies such as regulatory actions and tax policies can also make the M&A environment more or less favorable. For example, increased antitrust enforcement will decrease the ability of firms to acquire their competitors or possibly firms in closely related markets. In contrast, increased regulatory pressures for good corporate governance may leave boards of directors more open to acquisition offers.

Finally, currency fluctuations can influence the rate of cross-border acquisitions, with firms in countries with stronger currencies being in a stronger position to acquire. For example, the U.S. dollar has increased in value from .72 to .95 euro from early 2014 to late 2016, making it relatively cheaper for U.S. firms to acquire European firms.

Motives and Benefits Growth through mergers and acquisitions has played a critical role in the success of many corporations in a wide variety of high-technology and knowledge-intensive industries. Here, market and technology changes can occur very quickly and unpredictably.41 Speed—speed to market, speed to positioning, and speed to becoming a viable company—is criti- cal in such industries. For example, in 2010, Apple acquired Siri Inc. so that it could quickly fully integrate Siri’s natural-language voice recognition software into iOS, Apple’s operating system.

Mergers and acquisitions also can be a means of obtaining valuable resources that can help an organization expand its product offerings and services. Cisco Systems, a computer networking firm, has undertaken over 80 acquisitions in the last decade. Cisco uses these acquisitions to quickly add new technology to its product offerings to meet changing cus- tomer needs. Then it uses its excellent sales force to market the new technology to its cor- porate customers. Cisco also provides strong incentives to the staff of acquired companies to stay on. To realize the greatest value from its acquisitions, Cisco also has learned to integrate acquired companies efficiently and effectively.42

Acquiring firms often use acquisitions to acquire critical human capital. These acquisi- tions have been referred to as acq-hires. In an acq-hire, the acquiring firm believes it needs the specific technical knowledge or the social network contacts of individuals in the target

EXHIBIT 6.5 Global Value of Mergers and Acquisitions ($ trillions)

0 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

1

2

3

4

5

6

$ Tr

ill iio

n

Source: Thomson Financial, Institute of Mergers, Acquisitions, and Alliances (IMAA) analysis.

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firm. This is especially important in settings where the technology or consumer preferences are highly dynamic. For example, in 2014, Apple purchased Beats Electronics for $3 billion. While Apple valued the product portfolio of Beats, its primary aim was to pull the found- ers of Beats, Jimmy Iovine and Dr. Dre (aka Andrew Young), into the Apple family. With Apple’s iTunes business having hit a wall in growth, experiencing a 1 percent decline in 2013, Apple wanted to acquire new management talent to turn this business around. In addi- tion to their experience at Beats, Iovine and Dr. Dre both have over 20 years of experience in the music industry, with Iovine founding and heading InterScope Records and Dr. Dre being a hip-hop pioneer and music producer. With this acquisition, Apple believes it brought in a wealth of knowledge about the music business, the ability to identify music trends, up-and- coming talent, and industry contacts needed to rejuvenate Apple’s music business.43

Mergers and acquisitions also can provide the opportunity for firms to attain the three bases of synergy—leveraging core competencies, sharing activities, and building market power. Consider some of eBay’s acquisitions. eBay has purchased a range of businesses in related product markets, such as GSI Commerce, a company that designs and runs online shopping sites for brick-and-mortar retailers, and StubHub, an online ticket broker. Additionally, it has purchased Korean online auction company Gmarket to expand its geographic scope. Finally, it has pur- chased firms providing related services, such as Shutl, a rapid-order-fulfillment service provider.

These acquisitions offer the opportunity to leverage eBay’s competencies.44 For example, with the acquisition of GSI, eBay saw opportunities to leverage its core competencies in online systems as well as its reputation to strengthen GSI while also expanding eBay’s abil- ity to work with medium to large merchants and brands. eBay can also benefit from these acquisitions by sharing activities. In acquiring firms in related product markets and in new geographic markets, eBay has built a set of businesses that can share in the development of e-commerce and mobile commerce systems. Finally, by expanding into new geographic markets and offering a wider range of services, eBay can build market power as one of the few online retailer systems that provide a full set of services on a global platform. Strategy Spotlight 6.3 highlights how Valeant Pharmaceuticals tried to leverage market power ben- efits from acquisitions but found the benefits both controversial and short-lived.

Merger and acquisition activity also can lead to consolidation within an industry and can force other players to merge.45 The airline industry has seen a great deal of consolidation in the last several years. With a number of large-scale acquisitions, including Delta’s acquisition of Northwest Airlines in 2008, United’s acquisition of Continental in 2010, and American’s purchase of US Airways in 2013, the U.S. airlines industry has been left with only four major players. In combining, these airlines are both seeking greater efficiencies by combining their networks and hoping that consolidation will dampen the rivalry in the industry.46

Corporations can also enter new market segments by way of acquisitions. As mentioned above, eBay, a firm that specialized in providing services to individuals and small busi- nesses, moved into providing online retail systems for large merchants with its acquisition of GSI Commerce. Similarly, one of the reasons Fiat acquired Chrysler was to gain access to the U.S. auto market. Exhibit 6.6 summarizes the benefits of mergers and acquisitions.

Potential Limitations As noted in the previous section, mergers and acquisitions provide a firm with many potential benefits. However, at the same time, there are many potential drawbacks or limitations to such corporate activity.47

• Obtain valuable resources, such as critical human capital, that can help an organization expand its product offerings.

• Provide the opportunity for firms to attain three bases of synergy: leveraging core competencies, sharing activities, and building market power.

• Lead to consolidation within an industry and force other players to merge. • Enter new market segments.

EXHIBIT 6.6 Benefits of Mergers and Acquisitions

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6.3 ETHICSSTRATEGY SPOTLIGHT VALEANT PHARMACEUTICALS JACKS UP PRICES AFTER ACQUISITIONS BUT LOSES IN THE END Valeant Pharmaceuticals figured it had found a way to improve its profit margins. Rather than emphasizing drug development, the firm undertook a series of acquisitions where it bought up existing drugs it believed were underpriced and then dramati- cally raised the prices of those drugs. For example, in February 2015, Valeant announced it was buying the rights to two life- saving heart drugs and immediately increased the list prices for the drugs—one by 212 percent and the other by 525 percent. Similarly, after it purchased Salix Pharmaceuticals, Valeant increased the price of a diabetes drug Salix produced, Glumetza, by about 800 percent. J. Michael Pearson, Valeant’s CEO, justi- fied the firm’s actions that they were just working to maximize shareholder value when he stated if “products are sort of mis- priced and there’s an opportunity, we will act appropriately in terms of doing what I assume our shareholders would like us to do.” Further, in a statement, Valeant defended its pricing actions, stating it “prices its treatments based on a range of factors,

including clinical benefits and the value they bring to patients, payers, and society.”

The strategy paid off for Valeant for quite a while. Its stock price rose from $15 a share in early 2010 to over $250 a share in July of 2015, but then it all crashed down. Its price increase triggered a great deal of scrutiny from regulators, and generic manufacturers jumped to create cheaper competitors to Valeant’s drugs, many of which either no longer had patent protection or were soon to lose patent protection. Thus, its ability to sustain high drug price rev- enue appeared questionable. Additionally, the firm had taken on $30 billion in debt to finance its acquisitions and would be unable to meet its debt obligations if it had to cut the prices of its drugs. Coupled with questions about the firm’s accounting practices, these concerns led investors to bail out, pushing the stock’s price down to $14 a share in December 2016. The turn in events also cost Mr. Pearson his position as firm CEO in April 2016.

Sources: Rockoff, J. & Silverman E. 2015. Pharmaceutical companies buy rivals’ drugs, then jack up the prices. wsj.com, April 27: np; Pollack, A. & Tavernise, S. 2015. Valeant’s drug price strategy enriches it, but infuriates patients and lawmakers. nytimes.com, October 4: np; and Vardi, N. 2016. Valeant Pharmaceuticals’ prescription for disaster. forbes.com, April 13: np.

First, the takeover premium that is paid for an acquisition typically is very high. Two times out of three, the stock price of the acquiring company falls once the deal is made public. Since the acquiring firm often pays a 30 percent or higher premium for the target company, the acquirer must create synergies and scale economies that result in sales and market gains exceeding the premium price. Firms paying higher premiums set the performance hurdle even higher. For example, Household International paid an 82 percent premium to buy Beneficial, and Conseco paid an 83 percent premium to acquire Green Tree Financial. Historically, paying a high premium over the stock price has been a poor strategy.

Second, competing firms often can imitate any advantages realized or copy synergies that result from the M&A.48 Thus, a firm can often see its advantages quickly erode. Unless the advantages are sustainable and difficult to copy, investors will not be willing to pay a high premium for the stock. Similarly, the time value of money must be factored into the stock price. M&A costs are paid up front. Conversely, firms pay for R&D, ongoing marketing, and capacity expansion over time. This stretches out the payments needed to gain new competencies. The M&A argument is that a large initial investment is worthwhile because it creates long-term advantages. However, stock analysts want to see immediate results from such a large cash outlay. If the acquired firm does not produce results quickly, investors often divest the stock, driving the price down.

Third, managers’ credibility and ego can sometimes get in the way of sound business deci- sions. If the M&A does not perform as planned, managers who pushed for the deal find their reputation tarnished. This can lead them to protect their credibility by funneling more money, or escalating their commitment, into an inevitably doomed operation. Further, when a merger fails and a firm tries to unload the acquisition, the firm often must sell at a huge discount. These problems further compound the costs and erode the stock price.

Fourth, there can be many cultural issues that may doom the intended benefits from M&A endeavors. Consider the insights of Joanne Lawrence, who played an important role in the merger between SmithKline and the Beecham Group.49

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• Takeover premiums paid for acquisitions are typically very high. • Competing firms often can imitate any advantages or copy synergies that result from the merger or acquisition. • Managers’ egos sometimes get in the way of sound business decisions. • Cultural issues may doom the intended benefits from M&A endeavors.

EXHIBIT 6.7 Limitations of Mergers and Acquisitions

6.4 STRATEGY SPOTLIGHT THE WISDOM OF CROWDS: WHEN DO INVESTORS SEE VALUE IN ACQUISITIONS? By some estimates, 70 to 90 percent of acquisitions destroy shareholder value. But investors do see value in some acquisi- tions. The question is, When does the wisdom of the investment crowd indicate there is value with acquisitions? Recent research suggests it rests in both the characteristics of the deal and the motivation of the acquiring firm.

The Characteristics of the Deal Research has identified several deal characteristics that lead to positive investor reactions. Not surprisingly, investors see greater value in acquisitions when the acquiring and the acquired (target) firm are in the same or closely related industries. This is consistent with there being greater potential for synergies when the firms are in similar markets. Second, investors see greater value potential when acquiring managers are seen as responding quickly to new opportunities, such as those provided by the emergence of new technologies or market deregulation. Third, investors have a more positive reaction when the acquiring firm used cash to buy the target, as opposed to giving the target shareholders stock in the combined firm. Acquiring firms often use stock to finance acquisi- tions when they think their own stock is overvalued. Thus, the use of cash signals that the acquiring firm’s managers have confidence in the value of the deal. Fourth, the less the acquiring firm relies on outside advisers, such as investment banks, the more investors see value in the deal. As with the use of cash, managers who rely

primarily on their own knowledge and abilities to manage deals are seen as more confident. Finally, when the target firm tries to avoid the acquisition, investors see less value potential. Defense actions by targets are seen as signals that the target firm will not be open to easy integration with the acquiring firm. Thus, it may be difficult to leverage synergies.

The Motivation of the Acquirer How much value investors see in the deal is also affected by the motivation of the acquirer. Interestingly, if the acquiring firm is highly profitable, investors see less value in the acquisition. The concern here is that strong performance likely leads managers to become overconfident and more likely to undertake “empire building” acquisitions as opposed to acquisitions that generate shareholder value. Second, if the acquiring firm is highly leveraged, having a high debt-equity ratio, investors see more value in the acquisition. Since the acquiring firm is at a higher risk of bankruptcy, managers of highly leveraged firms are likely to undertake acquisitions only if they are low risk and likely to generate synergistic benefits.

In total, the stock investors look to logical clues about the potential value of the deal and the motives of the acquiring firm managers to assess the value they see. Thus, there appears to be simple but logical wisdom in the crowd. Sources: McNamara, G., Haleblian, J., & Dykes, B. 2008. Performance implications of participating in an acquisition wave: Early mover advantages, bandwagon effects, and the moderating influence of industry characteristics and acquirer tactics. Academy of Management Journal, 51: 113–130; and Schijven, M. & Hitt, M. 2012. The vicarious wisdom of crowds: Toward a behavioral perspective on investor reactions to acquisition announcements. Strategic Management Journal, 33: 1247–1268.

The key to a strategic merger is to create a new culture. This was a mammoth challenge during the SmithKline Beecham merger. We were working at so many different cultural levels, it was dizzying. We had two national cultures to blend—American and British—that compounded the challenge of selling the merger in two different markets with two different shareholder bases. There were also two different business cultures: One was very strong, scientific, and academic; the other was much more commercially oriented. And then we had to consider within both companies the individual businesses, each of which has its own little culture.

Exhibit 6.7 summarizes the limitations of mergers and acquisitions. Strategy Spotlight 6.4 discusses the characteristics of acquisitions that lead investors to

see greater value in the combinations. Divestment: The Other Side of the “M&A Coin” When firms acquire other businesses,

it typically generates quite a bit of “press” in business publications such as The Wall Street Journal, Bloomberg Businessweek, and Fortune. It makes for exciting news, and one thing is for sure—large acquiring firms automatically improve their standing in the Fortune 500 rankings (since it is based solely on total revenues). However, managers must also carefully consider the strategic implications of exiting businesses.

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Divestments, the exit of a business from a firm’s portfolio, are quite common. One study found that large, prestigious U.S. companies divested more acquisitions than they kept.50

Divesting a business can accomplish many different objectives.* It can be used to help a firm reverse an earlier acquisition that didn’t work out as planned. Often, this is simply to help “cut their losses.” Other objectives include (1) enabling managers to focus their efforts more directly on the firm’s core businesses,51 (2) providing the firm with more resources to spend on more attractive alternatives, and (3) raising cash to help fund existing businesses.

Divesting can enhance a firm’s competitive position only to the extent that it reduces its tangible (e.g., maintenance, investments, etc.) or intangible (e.g., opportunity costs, man- agerial attention) costs without sacrificing a current competitive advantage or the seeds of future advantages.52 To be effective, divesting requires a thorough understanding of a business unit’s current ability and future potential to contribute to a firm’s value creation. However, since such decisions involve a great deal of uncertainty, it is very difficult to make such evaluations. In addition, because of managerial self-interests and organizational iner- tia, firms often delay divestments of underperforming businesses.

The Boston Consulting Group has identified seven principles for successful divestiture.53

1. Remove the emotion from the decision. Managers need to consider objectively the prospects for each unit in the firm and how this unit fits with the firm’s overall strategy. Issues related to personal relationships with the managers of the unit, the length of time the unit has been part of the company, and other emotional elements should not be considered in the decision.54

2. Know the value of the business you are selling. Divesting firms can generate greater interest in and higher bids for units they are divesting if they can clearly articulate the strategic value of the unit.

3. Time the deal right. This involves both internal timing, whereby the firm regularly evaluates all its units so that it can divest units when they are no longer highly valued in the firm but will still be of value to the outside market, and external timing, being ready to sell when the market conditions are right.

4. Maintain a sizable pool of potential buyers. Divesting firms should not focus on a single potential buyer. Instead, they should discuss possible deals with several hand- picked potential bidders.

5. Tell a story about the deal. For each potential bidder it talks with, the divesting firm should develop a narrative about how the unit it is interested in selling will create value for that buyer.

6. Run divestitures systematically through a project office. Firms should look at developing the ability to divest units as a distinct form of corporate competencies. While many firms have acquisition units, they often don’t have divesting units even though there is significant potential value in divestitures.

7. Communicate clearly and frequently. Corporate managers need to clearly communicate to internal stakeholders, such as employees, and external stakeholders, such as customers and stockholders, what their goals are with divestment activity, how it will create value, and how the firm is moving forward strategically with these decisions.

divestment the exit of a business from a firm’s portfolio.

* Firms can divest their businesses in a number of ways. Sell-offs, spin-offs, equity carve-outs, asset sales/dissolution, and split- ups are some such modes of divestment. In a sell-off, the divesting firm privately negotiates with a third party to divest a unit/ subsidiary for cash/stock. In a spin-off, a parent company distributes shares of the unit/subsidiary being divested pro rata to its existing shareholders and a new company is formed. Equity carve-outs are similar to spin-offs except that shares in the unit/ subsidiary being divested are offered to new shareholders. Dissolution involves sale of redundant assets, not necessarily as an entire unit/subsidiary as in sell-offs but a few bits at a time. A split-up, on the other hand, is an instance of divestiture where by the parent company is split into two or more new companies and the parent ceases to exist. Shares in the parent company are exchanged for shares in new companies, and the exact distribution varies case by case.

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Strategic Alliances and Joint Ventures A strategic alliance is a cooperative relationship between two (or more) firms.55 Alliances can exist in multiple forms. Contractual alliances are simply based on written contracts between firms. Contractual alliances are typically used for fairly simple alliance agreements, such as supplier, marketing, or distribution relationships that don’t require a great deal of integration or technology sharing between firms and have a finite, identifiable end time period. If the terms of the agreement can be clearly laid out in contracts, then contracts can be a complete and effective basis for the agreement. However, when there is uncertainty about how the alli- ance will proceed and evolve over time or if one firm is much larger than the other, firms will often form equity alliances. In an equity alliance, at least one firm purchases a minority owner- ship stake in the other. Equity ownership in alliances helps align the interest of the two firms since the firm that buys the ownership stake benefits both from increases in its own value and the value of the partner it now owns a part of. This can reduce concerns that one firm will benefit more from the alliance than the partner firm or take advantage of the partner firm as the alliance evolves. This can be an especially large concern when a very large firm allies with a small firm. By taking an equity stake in the smaller firm, the larger firm signals that it is link- ing its own money into the success of the smaller firm. Joint ventures represent a special case of alliances, wherein two (or more) firms contribute equity to form a new legal entity.

Strategic alliances and joint ventures are assuming an increasingly prominent role in the strategy of leading firms, both large and small.56 Such cooperative relationships have many potential advantages.57 Among these are entering new markets, reducing manufacturing (or other) costs in the value chain, and developing and diffusing new technologies.58

Entering New Markets Often a company that has a successful product or service wants to introduce it into a new market. However, it may not have the financial resources or the requisite marketing expertise because it does not understand customer needs, know how to promote the product, or have access to the proper distribution channels.59

Zara, a Spanish clothing company, operates stores in over 70 countries. Still, when enter- ing markets very distant from its home markets, Zara often uses local alliance partners to help it negotiate the different cultural and regulatory environments. For example, when Zara expanded into India in 2010, it did it in cooperation with Tata, an Indian conglomerate.60

Alliances can also be used to enter new product markets. For example, Lego has expanded its product portfolio by licensing the right to develop products built around characters and brands, such as Star Wars and Harry Potter. It also allied with the digital animation firm Animal Logic Pty Ltd and Warner Bros. to develop the Lego Movie.61

Reducing Manufacturing (or Other) Costs in the Value Chain Strategic alliances (or joint ventures) often enable firms to pool capital, value-creating activities, or facilities in order to reduce costs. For example, the PGA and LPGA tours joined together in a strategic alliance that allows them to save costs by jointly marketing golf, develop a shared digital media plat- form, and jointly negotiate domestic television contracts.62

Developing and Diffusing New Technologies Strategic alliances also may be used to build jointly on the technological expertise of two or more companies. This may enable them to develop products technologically beyond the capability of the companies acting indepen- dently.63 The alliance between Ericsson and Cisco discussed in Strategy Spotlight 6.5 aims to allow the two firms to jointly develop new, integrated telecommunication equipment to meet the evolving needs of firms like Verizon and Vodafone.

Potential Downsides Despite their promise, many alliances and joint ventures fail to meet expectations for a variety of reasons.64 First, without the proper partner, a firm should never consider undertaking an alliance, even for the best of reasons.65 Each partner should bring the desired complementary strengths to the partnership. Ideally, the strengths contributed

strategic alliance a cooperative relationship between two or more firms.

joint ventures new entities formed within a strategic alliance in which two or more firms, the parents, contribute equity to form the new legal entity.

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6.5 STRATEGY SPOTLIGHT ERICSSON AND CISCO JOIN FORCES TO RESPOND TO THE CHANGING TELECOMMUNICATIONS MARKET Ericsson AB and Cisco Systems are both giants in providing equip- ment for the telecommunications and Internet markets. Ericsson, a Swedish firm, is one of the world’s leading manufacturers of wireless equipment with $26 billion in sales. Cisco, based in the United States, has revenue of $49 billion and is the world’s larg- est manufacturer of Internet backbone gear. Even with their size and large market presence, they are facing strong challenges. First, they are finding that their telecommunications customers, such as Verizon and AT&T, are looking for complete solutions as they upgrade their technology to launch 5G networks. As part of this, these customers are replacing some special-purpose wireless and network equipment with computers equipped with software. This requires integrating technology that has been sold separately by firms like Ericsson and Cisco. Second, they are fac- ing stronger competition from rivals who can provide these inte- grated solutions. Chinese system provider Huawei has expertise in both the wireless and Internet equipment arenas and is pro- viding complete solutions for telecom firms. Additionally, Nokia, another leading wireless equipment provider, extended its ability to provide integrated systems when it acquired Alcatel-Lucent, an Internet equipment firm, in early 2016.

Rather than have one of the firms acquire the other, Ericsson and Cisco decided to address these competitive challenges by

allying with each other. They initially will work to integrate exist- ing equipment to provide complete solutions to telecom firms. As part of this, they will combine some sales and consulting efforts. As they move forward, they will jointly develop new hard- ware and services. Since technology is evolving so rapidly, the ultimate scope of the alliance remains somewhat unclear. The complexity of it all took a while to work through— negotiations about the alliance took 13 months, but they have signed a flex- ible agreement about sharing patented technologies and have a high degree of trust that this is the right course.

Why choose an alliance over the acquisition route that Nokia and Alcatel pursued? Chuck Robbins, Cisco’s CEO, made the case for avoiding an acquisition stating that “Neither Ericsson or Cisco really believe that these large mergers typically work.” Since the two companies come from different countries and are both large with strong corporate cultures, a full integration would have been a great challenge. Also, an acquisition of firms so large would likely have triggered significant anti-trust con- cerns and regulatory scrutiny. Hans Vestberg, Ericsson’s CEO, made an affirmative case for the alliance, stating, “This is a much more agile and efficient choice. We can start already tomorrow.” The firms anticipate that the alliance should increase sales by each firm by at least $1 billion annually.

Sources: Clark, D. & Hansegard, J. 2015. Ericsson, Cisco pool telecom, Internet savvy in wide-reaching alliance. wsj.com, November 9: np.; and Higginbotham, S. 2015. Why Cisco and Ericsson are teaming up for future growth. fortune.com, November 9: np.

by the partners are unique; thus synergies created can be more easily sustained and defended over the longer term. The goal must be to develop synergies between the contributions of the partners, resulting in a win–win situation. Moreover, the partners must be compatible and willing to trust each other.66 Unfortunately, often little attention is given to nurturing the close working relationships and interpersonal connections that bring together the part- nering organizations.67

Internal Development Firms can also diversify by means of corporate entrepreneurship and new venture develop- ment. In today’s economy, internal development is such an important means by which com- panies expand their businesses that we have devoted a whole chapter to it (see Chapter 12). Sony and the Minnesota Mining & Manufacturing Co. (3M), for example, are known for their dedication to innovation, R&D, and cutting-edge technologies. For example, 3M has developed its entire corporate culture to support its ongoing policy of generating at least 25 percent of total sales from products created within the most recent four-year period. While 3M exceeded this goal for decades, a push for improved efficiency that began in the early 2000s resulted in a drop to generating only 21 percent of sales from newer products in 2005. By refocusing on innovation, 3M raised that value back up to 33 percent in 2016.

Biocon, the largest Indian biotechnology firm, shows the power of internal development. Kiran Mazumdar-Shaw, the firm’s founder, took the knowledge she learned while studying malting and brewing in college to start a small firm that produced enzymes for the beer

internal development entering a new business through investment in new facilities, often called corporate enterpreneurship and new venture development.

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industry in her Bangalore garage in 1978. The firm first expanded into providing enzymes for other food and textile industries. From there, Biocon expanded on to producing generic drugs and is now the largest producer of insulin in Asia.68

Compared to mergers and acquisitions, firms that engage in internal development cap- ture the value created by their own innovative activities without having to “share the wealth” with alliance partners or face the difficulties associated with combining activities across the value chains of several firms or merging corporate cultures.69 Also, firms can often develop new products or services at a relatively lower cost and thus rely on their own resources rather than turning to external funding.70

There are also potential disadvantages. It may be time-consuming; thus, firms may forfeit the benefits of speed that growth through mergers or acquisitions can provide. This may be especially important among high-tech or knowledge-based organizations in fast-paced environments where being an early mover is critical. Thus, firms that choose to diversify through internal development must develop capabilities that allow them to move quickly from initial opportunity recognition to market introduction.

HOW MANAGERIAL MOTIVES CAN ERODE VALUE CREATION Thus far in the chapter, we have implicitly assumed that CEOs and top executives are “ratio- nal beings”; that is, they act in the best interests of shareholders to maximize long-term shareholder value. In the real world, however, they may often act in their own self-interest. We now address some managerial motives that can serve to erode, rather than enhance, value creation. These include “growth for growth’s sake,” excessive egotism, and the cre- ation of a wide variety of antitakeover tactics.

Growth for Growth’s Sake There are huge incentives for executives to increase the size of their firm. And these are not consistent with increasing shareholder wealth. Top managers, including the CEO, of larger firms typically enjoy more prestige, higher rankings for their firms on the Fortune 500 list (based on revenues, not profits), greater incomes, more job security, and so on. There is also the excitement and associated recognition of making a major acquisition. As noted by Harvard’s Michael Porter, “There’s a tremendous allure to mergers and acquisitions. It’s the big play, the dramatic gesture. With one stroke of the pen you can add billions to size, get a front-page story, and create excitement in markets.”71

In recent years many high-tech firms have suffered from the negative impact of their uncontrolled growth. Consider, for example, Priceline.com’s ill-fated venture into an online service to offer groceries and gasoline.72 A myriad of problems—perhaps most importantly, a lack of participation by manufacturers—caused the firm to lose more than $5 million a week prior to abandoning these ventures. Such initiatives are often little more than desperate moves by top managers to satisfy investor demands for accelerating revenues. Unfortunately, the increased revenues often fail to materialize into a corresponding hike in earnings.

At times, executives’ overemphasis on growth can result in a plethora of ethical lapses, which can have disastrous outcomes for their companies. A good example (of bad practice) is Joseph Berardino’s leadership at Andersen Worldwide. Berardino had a chance early on to take a hard line on ethics and quality in the wake of earlier scandals at clients such as Waste Management and Sunbeam. Instead, according to former executives, he put too much emphasis on revenue growth. Consequently, the firm’s reputation quickly eroded when it audited and signed off on the highly flawed financial statements of such infamous firms as Enron, Global Crossing, and WorldCom. Berardino ultimately resigned in disgrace in March 2002, and his firm was dissolved later that year.73

LO 6-6 Managerial behaviors that can erode the creation of value.

managerial motives managers acting in their own self-interest rather than to maximize long- term shareholder value.

growth for growth’s sake managers’ actions to grow the size of their firms not to increase long-term profitability but to serve managerial self-interest.

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Egotism A healthy ego helps make a leader confident, clearheaded, and able to cope with change. CEOs, by their very nature, are intensely competitive people in the office as well as on the tennis court or golf course. But sometimes when pride is at stake, individuals will go to great lengths to win.

Egos can get in the way of a “synergistic” corporate marriage. Few executives (or lower- level managers) are exempt from the potential downside of excessive egos. Consider, for example, the reflections of General Electric’s former CEO Jack Welch, considered by many to be the world’s most admired executive. He admitted to a regrettable decision: “My hubris got in the way in the Kidder Peabody deal. [He was referring to GE’s buyout of the soon- to-be-troubled Wall Street firm.] I got wise advice from Walter Wriston and other directors who said, ‘Jack, don’t do this.’ But I was bully enough and on a run to do it. And I got whacked right in the head.”74 In addition to poor financial results, Kidder Peabody was wracked by a widely publicized trading scandal that tarnished the reputations of both GE and Kidder Peabody. Welch ended up selling Kidder.

The business press has included many stories of how egotism and greed have infiltrated organizations.75 For example, consider Merrill Lynch’s former CEO, John Thain.76 On January 22, 2009, he was ousted as head of Merrill Lynch by Bank of America’s CEO, Ken Lewis:

Thain embarrassingly doled out $4 billion in discretionary year-end bonuses to favored employees just before Bank of America’s rescue purchase of failing Merrill. The bonuses amounted to about 10 percent of Merrill’s 2008 losses.

Obviously, John Thain believed that he was entitled. When he took over ailing Merrill in early 2008, he began planning major cuts, but he also ordered that his office be redecorated. He spent $1.22 million of company funds to make it “livable,” which, in part, included $87,000 for a rug, $87,000 for a pair of guest chairs, $68,000 for a 19th-century credenza, and (what really got the attention of the press) $35,000 for a “commode with legs.”

He later agreed to repay the decorating costs. However, one might still ask: What kind of person treats other people’s money like this? And who needs a commode that costs as much as a new Lexus? Finally, a comment by Bob O’Brien, stock editor at Barrons.com, clearly applies: “The sense of entitlement that’s been engendered in this group of people has clearly not been beaten out of them by the brutal performance of the financial sector over the course of the last year.”

Antitakeover Tactics Unfriendly or hostile takeovers can occur when a company’s stock becomes undervalued. A com- peting organization can buy the outstanding stock of a takeover candidate in sufficient quantity to become a large shareholder. Then it makes a tender offer to gain full control of the company. If the shareholders accept the offer, the hostile firm buys the target company and either fires the target firm’s management team or strips the team members of their power. Thus, antitakeover tactics are common, including greenmail, golden parachutes, and poison pills.77

The first, greenmail, is an effort by the target firm to prevent an impending takeover. When a hostile firm buys a large block of outstanding target company stock and the tar- get firm’s management feels that a tender offer is impending, it offers to buy the stock back from the hostile company at a higher price than the unfriendly company paid for it. Although this often prevents a hostile takeover, the same price is not offered to preexisting shareholders. However, it protects the jobs of the target firm’s management.

Second, a golden parachute is a prearranged contract with managers specifying that, in the event of a hostile takeover, the target firm’s managers will be paid a significant severance package. Although top managers lose their jobs, the golden parachute provisions protect their income.

Third, poison pills are used by a company to give shareholders certain rights in the event of a takeover by another firm. They are also known as shareholder rights plans.

Clearly, antitakeover tactics can often raise some interesting ethical—and legal—issues.

egotism managers’ actions to shape their firms’ strategies to serve their selfish interests rather than to maximize long- term shareholder value.

antitakeover tactics managers’ actions to avoid losing wealth or power as a result of a hostile takeover.

greenmail a payment by a firm to a hostile party for the firm’s stock at a premium, made when the firm’s management feels that the hostile party is about to make a tender offer.

golden parachute a prearranged contract with managers specifying that, in the event of a hostile takeover, the target firm’s managers will be paid a significant severance package.

poison pill used by a company to give shareholders certain rights in the event of takeover by another firm.

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ISSUE FOR DEBATE

Starbucks Moves Far Outside the Coffeehouse When you say Starbucks, most people instantly think of coffee, specifically coffee prepared by a barista just the way you want it—once you get the Starbucks lingo down. Starbucks is available in over 20,000 coffeehouses in more than 60 countries. Starbucks has experienced amazing growth over the last 30 years as it moved from a small chain of coffeehouses in Seattle to the global powerhouse that it is now. However, the firm faces more limited prospects for growth in its coffee business from this point forward. The coffee market is fairly mature, and Starbucks sees a limited number of new markets in which to expand.

In recent years, Starbucks has diversified into a number of new products and distribution channels to stoke up its growth potential. This has included diversifying into new products to sell through its cafes. Starbucks purchased La Boulange Bakery and now produces baked goods to sell in its cafes. Similarly, it purchased Teavana and is adding tea bars to its cafes. It also purchased Evolution Fresh juice company and now supplies the juices it sells in Starbucks coffeehouses. It is also test marketing additional new products in its cafes—beer and wine in Starbucks Evening concept stores and carbonated beverages in several markets. Starbucks is also making a major push in the grocery aisle. The firm has developed a “signature aisle” which features wood shelving that reflects the appearance of a Starbucks Café. The aisle’s desirable end cap (the high-traffic shelf area at the end of an aisle) attracts shoppers’ attention to products such as Starbucks’ bagged coffee, its single-serve K-cups, and its Via brand instant coffee. But selling coffee in grocery stores is just the first step. Starbucks aims to also distribute its La Boulange bakery products, Teavana teas, and Evolution Fresh juices in grocery stores. It has even been looking further afield as it developed Evolution Harvest snack bars for the grocery aisle and also crafted an alliance with Danone to produce and sell Evolution Fresh yogurt products in grocery stores. The grocery aisle business now accounts for about 7 percent of Starbucks’ business, but CEO Howard Schultz envisions the grocery aisle business producing half of the company’s sales.

While the growth potential is enticing, there are some potential pitfalls associated with Starbucks’ push into new arenas. The perceived differentiation of its coffee products could erode as they become a grocery aisle staple. Also, the growth of grocery sales could cannibalize the sales at cafes as people simply brew their K-cup coffee at home rather than swinging through the Starbucks drive-through on the way to work. In moving into noncoffee products, the question becomes whether or not Starbucks has the competencies to manage other businesses well. While Starbucks has mastered the management of the coffee supply chain and developed a distinctive product, it is not clear that the company has the competencies to produce bakery products, juice, tea, beer, and wine better than outside suppliers. Finally, managing all of these new businesses may distract Starbucks from its core coffee cafe business. The challenge for Starbucks is to know what its core competencies are and to focus on markets that allow it to best exploit those competencies.

Discussion Questions 1. What are Starbucks’ core competencies? Do the new businesses allow Starbucks to leverage

those competencies? 2. Do Starbucks’ diversification efforts appear to be primarily about increasing growth or

increasing shareholder value by sharing activities, building market power, and/or leveraging core competencies?

3. Where do you think Starbucks should draw boundaries on what businesses to compete in? Should it keep the new products in the corporate family? Should it continue to move into the grocery retailing space?

Sources: Levine-Weinberg, A. 2014. Starbucks has decades of growth ahead. money.cnn.com, November 19: np; Kowitt, B. 2013. Starbucks’ grocery gambit. Fortune, December 23: np; Strom, S. 2013. Starbucks aims to move beyond beans. nytimes.com, October 8: np; and starbucks.com.

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Reflecting on Career Implications . . . This chapter focuses on how firms can create value through diversification. The following questions lead you to consider how you can develop core competencies that apply in different settings and how you can leverage those skills in different value chain activities or units in your firms.

Corporate-Level Strategy: Is your current employer a single business firm or a diversified firm? If it is diversified, does it pursue related or unrelated diversification? Does its diversification provide you with career opportunities, especially lateral moves? What organizational policies are in place to either encourage or discourage you from moving from one business unit to another?

Core Competencies: What do you see as your core competencies? How can you leverage them

within your business unit as well as across other business units?

Sharing Infrastructures: Identify what infrastructure activities and resources (e.g., information systems, legal) are available in the corporate office that are shared by various business units in the firm. How often do you take advantage of these shared resources? Identify ways in which you can enhance your performance by taking advantage of these shared infrastructure resources.

Diversification: From your career perspective, what actions can you take to diversify your employment risk (e.g., doing coursework at a local university, obtaining professional certification such as a CPA, networking through professional affiliation, etc.)? In periods of retrenchment, such actions will provide you with a greater number of career options.

A key challenge for today’s managers is to create “synergy” when engaging in diversification activities. As we discussed in this chapter, corporate managers do not, in general, have a very good track record in creating value in

such endeavors when it comes to mergers and acquisitions. Among the factors that serve to erode shareholder values are paying an excessive premium for the target firm, failing to integrate the activities of the newly acquired businesses into the corporate family, and undertaking diversification initiatives that are too easily imitated by the competition.

We addressed two major types of corporate-level strategy: related and unrelated diversification. With related diversification the corporation strives to enter into areas in which key resources and capabilities of the corporation can be shared or leveraged. Synergies come from horizontal relationships between business units. Cost savings and enhanced revenues can be derived from two major sources. First, economies of scope can be achieved from the leveraging of core competencies and the sharing of activities. Second, market power can be attained from greater, or pooled, negotiating power and from vertical integration.

When firms undergo unrelated diversification, they enter product markets that are dissimilar to their present businesses. Thus, there is generally little opportunity to either leverage core competencies or share activities across business units. Here, synergies are created from vertical relationships between the corporate office and the individual business units. With unrelated diversification, the primary ways to create value are corporate restructuring and parenting, as well as the use of portfolio analysis techniques.

Corporations have three primary means of diversifying their product markets—mergers and acquisitions, joint ventures/strategic alliances, and internal development. There are key trade-offs associated with each of these. For example, mergers and acquisitions are typically the quickest means to enter new markets and provide the corporation with a high level of control over the acquired business. However, with the expensive premiums that often need to be paid to the shareholders of the target firm and the challenges associated with integrating acquisitions, they can also be quite expensive. Not surprisingly, many poorly performing acquisitions are subsequently divested. At times, however, divestitures can help firms refocus their efforts and generate resources. Strategic alliances and joint ventures between two or more firms, on the other hand, may be a means of reducing risk since they involve the sharing and combining of resources. But such joint initiatives also provide a firm with less control (than it would have with an acquisition) since governance is shared between two independent entities. Also, there is a limit to the potential upside for each partner because returns must be shared as well. Finally, with internal development, a firm is able to capture all of the value from its initiatives (as opposed to sharing it with a merger or alliance partner). However, diversification by means of internal development can be very time-consuming—a disadvantage that becomes even more important in fast-paced competitive environments.

Finally, some managerial behaviors may serve to erode shareholder returns. Among these are “growth for growth’s sake,” egotism, and antitakeover tactics. As we discussed, some of these issues—particularly antitakeover tactics—raise ethical considerations because the managers of the firm are not acting in the best interests of the shareholders.

summary

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EXPERIENTIAL EXERCISE AT&T is a firm that follows a strategy of related diversification. Evaluate its success (or lack thereof) with regard to how well it has (1) built on core competencies, (2) shared infrastructures, and (3) increased market power. (Fill answers in table below.)

SUMMARY REVIEW QUESTIONS 1. Discuss how managers can create value for their firm

through diversification efforts. 2. What are some of the reasons that many diversification

efforts fail to achieve desired outcomes? 3. How can companies benefit from related diversification?

Unrelated diversification? What are some of the key concepts that can explain such success?

4. What are some of the important ways in which a firm can restructure a business?

5. Discuss some of the various means that firms can use to diversify. What are the pros and cons associated with each of these?

6. Discuss some of the actions that managers may engage in to erode shareholder value.

corporate-level strategy 172 diversification 174 related diversification 175 economies of scope 175 core competencies 176 sharing activities 178 market power 179

pooled negotiating power 179 vertical integration 179 transaction cost perspective 181 unrelated diversification 182 parenting advantage 182 restructuring 182 portfolio management 183 acquisitions 186 mergers 186 divestment 191 strategic alliance 192 joint ventures 192

key terms

APPLICATION QUESTIONS & EXERCISES 1. What were some of the largest mergers and

acquisitions over the last two years? What was the rationale for these actions? Do you think they will be successful? Explain.

2. Discuss some examples from business practice in which an executive’s actions appear to be in his or her self-interest rather than the corporation’s well-being.

3. Discuss some of the challenges that managers must overcome in making strategic alliances successful. What are some strategic alliances with which you are familiar? Were they successful or not? Explain.

4. Use the Internet and select a company that has recently undertaken diversification into new product markets. What do you feel were some of the reasons for this diversification (e.g., leveraging core competencies, sharing infrastructures)?

Rationale for Related Diversification Successful/Unsuccessful? Why?

1. Build on core competencies

2. Share infrastructures

3. Increase market power

internal development 193 managerial motives 194 growth for growth’s sake 194 egotism 195

antitakeover tactics 195 greenmail 195 golden parachute 195 poison pill 195

ETHICS QUESTIONS 1. It is not uncommon for corporations to undertake

downsizing and layoffs. Do you feel that such actions raise ethical considerations? Why or why not?

2. What are some of the ethical issues that arise when managers act in a manner that is counter to their firm’s best interests? What are the long-term implications for both the firms and the managers themselves?

1. Kaplan, J. 2015. Coca-Cola to sell nine U.S. facilities to bottling companies. bloomberg.com, September 24: np; Esterl, M. 2016. Coke to step up North American restructuring. wsj.com, February 9: np; and Esterl, M. 2016. Coke tweaks its business model again. wsj.com, March 23: np.

2. Insights on measuring M&A performance are addressed in Zollo, M. & Meier, D. 2008. What is M&A performance? BusinessWeek, 22(3): 55–77.

3. Insights on how and why firms may overpay for acquisitions are addressed in Malhotra, D., Ku, G.,

& Murnighan, J. K. 2008. When winning is everything. Harvard Business Review, 66(5): 78–86.

4. Haleblian, J., Devers, C., McNamara, G., Carpenter, M., & Davison, R. 2009. Taking stock of what we know about mergers and acquisitions: A review and research

REFERENCES

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agenda. Journal of Management, 35: 469–502.

5. Pare, T. P. 1994. The new merger boom. Fortune, November 28: 96.

6. A discussion of the effects of director experience and acquisition performance is in McDonald, M. L. & Westphal, J. D. 2008. What do they know? The effects of outside director acquisition experience on firm acquisition performance. Strategic Management Journal, 29(11): 1155–1177.

7. Finance and economics: Snoopy sniffs an opportunity; MetLife buys Alico. 2010. Economist.com, March 13: np.

8. For a study that investigates several predictors of corporate diversification, read Wiersema, M. F. & Bowen, H. P. 2008. Corporate diversification: The impact of foreign competition, industry globalization, and product diversification. Strategic Management Journal, 29(2): 114–132.

9. Kumar, M. V. S. 2011. Are joint ventures positive sum games? The relative effects of cooperative and non-cooperative behavior. Strategic Management Journal, 32(1): 32–54.

10. Makri, M., Hitt, M. A., & Lane, P. J. 2010. Complementary technologies, knowledge relatedness, and invention outcomes in high technology mergers and acquisitions. Strategic Management Journal, 31(6): 602–628.

11. A discussion of Tyco’s unrelated diversification strategy is in Hindo, B. 2008. Solving Tyco’s identity crisis. BusinessWeek, February 18: 62.

12. Our framework draws upon a variety of sources, including Goold, M. & Campbell, A. 1998. Desperately seeking synergy. Harvard Business Review, 76(5): 131–143; Porter, M. E. 1987. From advantage to corporate strategy. Harvard Business Review, 65(3): 43–59; and Hitt, M. A., Ireland, R. D., & Hoskisson, R. E. 2001. Strategic management: Competitiveness and globalization (4th ed.). Cincinnati, OH: South-Western.

13. This imagery of the corporation as a tree and related discussion draws on Prahalad, C. K. & Hamel, G. 1990. The core competence of the corporation. Harvard Business Review, 68(3): 79–91. Parts of this section also draw on Picken, J. C. & Dess, G. G. 1997. Mission critical: chap. 5. Burr Ridge, IL: Irwin Professional.

14. Graebner, M. E., Eisenhardt, K. M., & Roundy, P. T. 2010. Success and failure in technology acquisitions: Lessons for buyers and sellers.

Academy of Management Perspectives, 24(3): 73–92.

15. This section draws on Prahalad & Hamel, op. cit.; and Porter, op. cit.

16. A study that investigates the relationship between a firm’s technology resources, diversification, and performance can be found in Miller, D. J. 2004. Firms’ technological resources and the performance effects of diversification. A longitudinal study. Strategic Management Journal, 25: 1097–1119.

17. Khan, N. & Matsuda, K. 2015. Fujifilm shifts focus to stem cells and ebola drugs. bloomberg.com, August 17: np.

18. Chesbrough, H. 2011. Bringing open innovation to services. MIT Sloan Management Review, 52(2): 85–90.

19. Levine-Weinberg, A. 2014. Starbucks has decades of growth ahead. money. cnn.com, November 19: np.

20. This section draws on Hrebiniak, L. G. & Joyce, W. F. 1984. Implementing strategy. New York: Macmillan; and Oster, S. M. 1994. Modern competitive analysis. New York: Oxford University Press.

21. The discussion of the benefits and costs of vertical integration draws on Hax, A. C. & Majluf, N. S. 1991. The strategy concept and process: A pragmatic approach: 139. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall.

22. Fahey, J. 2005. Gray winds. Forbes, January 10: 143.

23. This discussion draws on Oster, op. cit.; and Harrigan, K. 1986. Matching vertical integration strategies to competitive conditions. Strategic Management Journal, 7(6): 535–556.

24. Mathews, A. 2015. Kaiser Permanente to launch medical school. wsj.com, December 18: np.

25. For a scholarly explanation on how transaction costs determine the boundaries of a firm, see Oliver E. Williamson’s pioneering books Markets and hierarchies: Analysis and antitrust implications (New York: Free Press, 1975) and The economic institutions of capitalism (New York: Free Press, 1985).

26. Campbell, A., Goold, M., & Alexander, M. 1995. Corporate strategy: The quest for parenting advantage. Harvard Business Review, 73(2): 120–132; and Picken & Dess, op. cit.

27. Anslinger, P. A. & Copeland, T. E. 1996. Growth through acquisition: A fresh look. Harvard Business Review, 74(1): 126–135.

28. This section draws on Porter, op. cit.; and Hambrick, D. C. 1985. Turnaround strategies. In Guth, W. D. (Ed.), Handbook of business strategy: 10-1–10-32. Boston: Warren, Gorham & Lamont.

29. There is an important delineation between companies that are operated for a long-term profit and those that are bought and sold for short-term gains. The latter are sometimes referred to as “holding companies” and are generally more concerned about financial issues than strategic issues.

30. Casico, W. F. 2002. Strategies for responsible restructuring. Academy of Management Executive, 16(3): 80–91; and Singh, H. 1993. Challenges in researching corporate restructuring. Journal of Management Studies, 30(1): 147–172.

31. Hax & Majluf, op. cit. By 1979, 45 percent of Fortune 500 companies employed some form of portfolio analysis, according to Haspelagh, P. 1982. Portfolio planning: Uses and limits. Harvard Business Review, 60: 58–73. A later study conducted in 1993 found that over 40 percent of the respondents used portfolio analysis techniques, but the level of usage was expected to increase to more than 60 percent in the near future: Rigby, D. K. 1994. Managing the management tools. Planning Review, September–October: 20–24.

32. Fruk, M., Hall, S., & Mittal, D. 2013. Never let a good crisis go to waste. mckinsey.com, October: np; and Arrfelt, M., Wiseman, R., McNamara, G., & Hult, T., 2015. Examining a key corporate role: The influence of capital allocation competency on business unit performance. Strategic Management Journal, in press.

33. Goold, M. & Luchs, K. 1993. Why diversify? Four decades of management thinking. Academy of Management Executive, 7(3): 7–25.

34. Other approaches include the industry attractiveness–business strength matrix developed jointly by General Electric and McKinsey and Company, the life-cycle matrix developed by Arthur D. Little, and the profitability matrix proposed by Marakon. For an extensive review, refer to Hax & Majluf, op. cit.: 182–194.

35. Porter, op. cit.: 49–52. 36. Picken & Dess, op. cit.; Cabot

Corporation. 2001. 10-Q filing, Securities and Exchange Commission, May 14.

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37. Insights on the performance of serial acquirers is found in Laamanen, T. & Keil, T. 2008. Performance of serial acquirers: Toward an acquisition program perspective. Strategic Management Journal, 29(6): 663–672.

38. Some insights from Lazard’s CEO on mergers and acquisitions are addressed in Stewart, T. A. & Morse, G. 2008. Giving great advice. Harvard Business Review, 66(1): 106–113.

39. Coy, P., Thornton, E., Arndt, M., & Grow, B. 2005. Shake, rattle, and merge. BusinessWeek, January 10: 32–35; and Anonymous. 2005. Love is in the air. The Economist, February 5: 9.

40. Hill, A. 2011. Mergers indicate market optimism. www.marketplace. org, March 21: np.

41. For an interesting study of the relationship between mergers and a firm’s product-market strategies, refer to Krishnan, R. A., Joshi, S., & Krishnan, H. 2004. The influence of mergers on firms’ product-mix strategies. Strategic Management Journal, 25: 587–611.

42. Like many high-tech firms during the economic slump that began in mid-2000, Cisco Systems experienced declining performance. On April 16, 2001, it announced that its revenues for the quarter closing April 30 would drop 5 percent from a year earlier— and a stunning 30 percent from the previous three months—to about $4.7 billion. Furthermore, Cisco announced that it would lay off 8,500 employees and take an enormous $2.5 billion charge to write down inventory. By late October 2002, its stock was trading at around $10, down significantly from its 52-week high of $70. Elstrom, op. cit.: 39.

43. Sisario, B. 2014. Jimmy Iovine, a master of Beats, lends Apple a skilled ear. nytimes.com, May 28: np; and Dickey, M. 2014. Meet the executives Apple is paying $3 billion to get. businessinsider.com, May 28: np.

44. Ignatius, A. 2011. How eBay developed a culture of experimentation. Harvard Business Review, 89(3): 92–97.

45. For a discussion of the trend toward consolidation of the steel industry and how Lakshmi Mittal is becoming a dominant player, read Reed, S. & Arndt, M. 2004. The raja of steel. BusinessWeek, December 20: 50–52.

46. Colvin, G. 2011. Airline king. Fortune, May 2: 50–57.

47. This discussion draws upon Rappaport, A. & Sirower, M. L.

1999. Stock or cash? The trade-offs for buyers and sellers in mergers and acquisitions. Harvard Business Review, 77(6): 147–158; and Lipin, S. & Deogun, N. 2000. Big mergers of 90s prove disappointing to shareholders. The Wall Street Journal, October 30: C1.

48. The downside of mergers in the airline industry is found in Gimbel, B. 2008. Why airline mergers don’t fly. BusinessWeek, March 17: 26.

49. Mouio, A. (Ed.). 1998. Unit of one. Fast Company, September: 82.

50. Porter, M. E. 1987. From competitive advantage to corporate strategy. Harvard Business Review, 65(3): 43.

51. The divestiture of a business that is undertaken in order to enable managers to better focus on its core business has been termed “downscoping.” Refer to Hitt, M. A., Harrison, J. S., & Ireland, R. D. 2001. Mergers and acquisitions: A guide to creating value for stakeholders. New York: Oxford University Press.

52. Sirmon, D. G., Hitt, M. A., & Ireland, R. D. 2007. Managing firm resources in dynamic environments to create value: Looking inside the black box. Academy of Management Review, 32(1): 273–292.

53. Kengelbach, J., Klemmer, D., & Roos, A. 2012. Plant and prune: How M&A can grow portfolio value. BCG Report, September: 1–38.

54. Berry, J., Brigham, B., Bynum, A., Leu, C., & McLaughlin, R. 2012. Creating value through divestitures— Deans Foods: Theory in practice. Unpublished manuscript.

55. A study that investigates alliance performance is Lunnan, R. & Haugland, S. A. 2008. Predicting and measuring alliance performance: A multidimensional analysis. Strategic Management Journal, 29(5): 545–556.

56. For scholarly perspectives on the role of learning in creating value in strategic alliances, refer to Anard, B. N. & Khanna, T. 2000. Do firms learn to create value? Strategic Management Journal, 12(3): 295–317; and Vermeulen, F. & Barkema, H. P. 2001. Learning through acquisitions. Academy of Management Journal, 44(3): 457–476.

57. For a detailed discussion of transaction cost economics in strategic alliances, read Reuer, J. J. & Arno, A. 2007. Strategic alliance contracts: Dimensions and determinants of contractual complexity. Strategic Management Journal, 28(3): 313–330.

58. This section draws on Hutt, M. D., Stafford, E. R., Walker, B. A., & Reingen, P. H. 2000. Case study: Defining the strategic alliance. Sloan Management Review, 41(2): 51–62; and Walters, B. A., Peters, S., & Dess, G. G. 1994. Strategic alliances and joint ventures: Making them work. Business Horizons, 4: 5–10.

59. A study that investigates strategic alliances and networks is Tiwana, A. 2008. Do bridging ties complement strong ties? An empirical examination of alliance ambidexterity. Strategic Management Journal, 29(3): 251–272.

60. Fashion chain Zara opens its first Indian store. 2010. bbc.co.uk/news/, May 31: np.

61. Hoang, H. & Rothaermel, F. 2016. How to manage alliances strategically. Sloan Management Review, 76 (Fall): 69–73.

62. Anonymous. 2016. PGA TOUR and LPGA announce strategic alliance agreement. lpga.com, March 4: np.

63. Phelps, C. 2010. A longitudinal study of the influence of alliance network structure and composition on firm exploratory innovation. Academy of Management Journal, 53(4): 890–913.

64. For an institutional theory perspective on strategic alliances, read Dacin, M. T., Oliver, C., & Roy, J. P. 2007. The legitimacy of strategic alliances: An institutional perspective. Strategic Management Journal, 28(2): 169–187.

65. A study investigating factors that determine partner selection in strategic alliances is found in Shah, R. H. & Swaminathan, V. 2008. Strategic Management Journal, 29(5): 471–494.

66. Arino, A. & Ring, P. S. 2010. The role of fairness in alliance formation. Strategic Management Journal, 31(6): 1054–1087.

67. Greve, H. R., Baum, J. A. C., Mitsuhashi, H. & Rowley, T. J. 2010. Built to last but falling apart: Cohesion, friction, and withdrawal from interfirm alliances. Academy of Management Journal, 53(4): 302–322.

68. Narayan, A. 2011. From brewing, an Indian biotech is born. Bloomberg Businessweek, February 28: 19–20.

69. For an insightful perspective on how to manage conflict between innovation and ongoing operations in an organization, read Govindarajan, V. & Trimble, C. 2010. The other side of innovation: Solving the execution

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challenge. Boston: Harvard Business School Press.

70. Dunlap-Hinkler, D., Kotabe, M., & Mudambi, R. 2010. A story of breakthrough versus incremental innovation: Corporate entrepreneurship in the global pharmaceutical industry. Strategic Entrepreneurship Journal, 4(2): 106–127.

71. Porter, op. cit.: 43–59. 72. Angwin, J. S. & Wingfield, N. 2000.

How Jay Walker built WebHouse on

a theory that he couldn’t prove. The Wall Street Journal, October 16: A1, A8.

73. The fallen. 2003. BusinessWeek, January 13: 80–82.

74. The Jack Welch example draws upon Sellers, P. 2001. Get over yourself. Fortune, April 30: 76–88.

75. Li, J. & Tang, Y. 2010. CEO hubris and firm risk taking in China: The moderating role of managerial discretion. Academy of Management Journal, 53(1): 45–68.

76. John Thain and his golden commode. 2009. Editorial. Dallasnews.com, January 26: np; Task, A. 2009. Wall Street’s $18.4B bonus: The sense of entitlement has not been beaten out. finance.yahoo.com, January 29: np; and Exit Thain. 2009. Newsfinancialcareers. com, January 22: np.

77. This section draws on Weston, J. F., Besley, S., & Brigham, E. F. 1996. Essentials of managerial finance (11th ed.): 18–20. Fort Worth, TX: Dryden Press, Harcourt Brace.

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chapter

After reading this chapter, you should have a good understanding of the following learning objectives:

7 LO7-1 The importance of international expansion as a viable diversification

strategy.

LO7-2 The sources of national advantage; that is, why an industry in a given country is more (or less) successful than the same industry in another country.

LO7-3 The motivations (or benefits) and the risks associated with international expansion, including the emerging trend for greater offshoring and outsourcing activity.

LO7-4 The two opposing forces—cost reduction and adaptation to local markets—that firms face when entering international markets.

LO7-5 The advantages and disadvantages associated with each of the four basic strategies: international, global, multidomestic, and transnational.

LO7-6 The difference between regional companies and truly global companies. LO7-7 The four basic types of entry strategies and the relative benefits and risks

associated with each of them.

International Strategy Creating Value in Global Markets

©Anatoli Styf/Shutterstock

PART 2: STRATEGIC FORMULATION

What was supposed to be one of India’s hottest new shopping centers didn’t turn out that way. Dreams Mall, located in a Mumbai suburb, was built by Housing Development & Infrastructure Ltd. (an Indian real estate development company) to cater to the growing middle class of the world’s second-most populous nation. But four years after its grand opening, the “dream” has become, in essence, a retail nightmare. Now, the mall consists of a smattering of struggling stores on the ground floor along with a maze of dark hallways with mostly empty shops. Space that was intended for retailers is used by call centers. And abandoned corridors are rented out for wedding receptions.

Across India, many of the country’s more than 300 malls have suffered weak sales and high vacancy rates. This was not anticipated. Developers over the past decade have built more than 250 shopping centers to tap into India’s rapidly expanding consumer culture. Some analysts had estimated that India’s middle class would grow to more than 400 million people. However, only a sliver of them (less than 10 million by McKinsey & Company’s estimates) have sufficient disposable income to make them steady mall customers.

India did not get its first mall until the late 1990s. Developers started building many others after Spencer Plaza in Chennai and a few others were so successful. Some construction companies began building three or more malls right next to each other in some neighborhoods in New Delhi and Mumbai. As noted by Benu Sehgal, vice president at DLF Ltd., a big developer, “Everyone jumped into the mall business with little understanding of who they were actually targeting.” Govind Shrikhande, chief executive of one of India’s largest retailers, said, “Everyone was opening malls left, right, and center. The consumer was never at the center of the planning process.”

Even with high vacancy rates, some Indian malls are doing very well. For example, Select CITYWALK Mall in South Delhi is considered “India’s No. 1 mall.” Others that are highly successful in India’s highly competitive market include DLF Promenade, Ambience Palladium, Phoenix, Inorbit, and Marketcity. What makes these malls successful? They win in the marketplace because they have a sound knowledge of the market and make informed decisions at the right time. For example, Select CITYWALK focused on what is considered “premium” in its positioning in the market: a level lower than affordable luxury. Today the mall is moving toward the affordable luxury category. Also, Select CITYWALK has a nice collection of retailers, such as Zara, Nike, and H&M, a multiplex theater, and great food. As noted by Yogeshwar Sharma, chief executive of Select CITYWALK, “Mall operation is one of the easiest things, given you know the job. Every game has its own rules. If you follow the rules, you are successful, if you don’t you fail.”

Discussion Questions 1. What lessons can other multinational companies learn from the boom and bust of shopping

centers in India? 2. How can foreign retailers be successful in a country in which shopping centers are not attract-

ing enough customers?

Sources: Kulshrestha, A. 2016. India may attract $80 million PE investment in retail real estate, say JLL. artices. economictimes.indiatimes.com. April 14: np.; Rana, P. 2015. Empty dream at India’s malls. the Wall Street Journal. June 17: C1, C8; and, Batra, A. 2015. What makes Select CITYWALK India’s successful mall, reveals Yogeshwar Sharma. retail. economictimes.indiatimes.com. March 20: np.

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In this chapter we discuss how firms create value and achieve competitive advantage in the global marketplace. Multinational firms are constantly faced with many important decisions. These include entry strategies; the dilemma of choosing between local adaptation (in prod- uct offerings, locations, advertising, and pricing) and global integration; and others. We will address how firms can avoid pitfalls by developing a better understanding of the business environments of different countries as illustrated by the lukewarm response of Indian con- sumers to the new malls discussed previously. In addition, we address factors that can influence a nation’s success in a particular industry. In our view, this is an important context in determin- ing how well firms eventually do when they compete beyond their nation’s boundaries.

THE GLOBAL ECONOMY: A BRIEF OVERVIEW Managers face many opportunities and risks when they diversify abroad.1 The trade among nations has increased dramatically in recent years, and it is estimated that recently the trade across nations exceeded the trade within nations. In a variety of industries such as semicon- ductors, automobiles, commercial aircraft, telecommunications, computers, and consumer electronics, it is almost impossible to survive unless firms scan the world for competitors, customers, human resources, suppliers, and technology.2

GE’s wind energy business benefits by tapping into talent around the world. The firm has built research centers in China, Germany, India, and the United States “We did it,” says CEO Jeffrey Immelt, “to access the best brains everywhere in the world.” All four centers have played a key role in GE’s development of huge 92-ton turbines:3

• Chinese researchers in Shanghai designed the microprocessors that control the pitch of the blade.

• Mechanical engineers from India (Bangalore) devised mathematical models to maximize the efficiency of materials in the turbine.

• Power-systems experts in the United States (Niskayuna, New York), which has researchers from 55 countries, do the design work.

• Technicians in Munich, Germany, have created a “smart” turbine that can calculate wind speeds and signal sensors in other turbines to produce maximum electricity.

The rise of globalization—meaning the rise of market capitalism around the world—has undeniably created tremendous business opportunities for multinational corporations. For example, while smartphone sales declined in Western Europe in the third quarter of 2014, they grew at a 50 percent rate in Eastern Europe, the Middle East, and Africa.4

This rapid rise in global capitalism has had dramatic effects on the growth in different economic zones. For example, Fortune magazine’s annual list of the world’s 500 biggest companies included 156 firms from emerging markets in 2015, compared to only 18 in 1995.5 McKinsey & Company predicts that by 2025 about 45 percent of the Fortune Global 500 will be based in emerging economies, which are now producing world-class companies with huge domestic markets and a commitment to invest in innovation.

Over half the world’s output now comes from emerging markets. This is leading to a convergence of living standards across the globe and is changing the face of business. One example of this is the shift in the global automobile market. China supplanted the United States as the largest market for automobiles in 2009.

One of the challenges with globalization is determining how to meet the needs of custom- ers at very different income levels. In many developing economies, distributions of income remain much wider than they do in the developed world, leaving many impoverished even as the economies grow. The challenge for multinational firms is to tailor their products and services to meet the needs of the “bottom of the pyramid.” Global corporations are increas- ingly changing their product offerings to meet the needs of the nearly 5 billion poor people

LO 7-1 The importance of international expansion as a viable diversification strategy.

globalization a term that has two meanings: (1) the increase in international exchange, including trade in goods and services as well as exchange of money, ideas, and information; (2) the growing similarity of laws, rules, norms, values, and ideas across countries.

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in the world who inhabit developing countries. Collectively, this represents a very large market with $14 trillion in purchasing power.

Next, we will address in more detail the question of why some nations and their industries are more competitive.6 This establishes an important context or setting for the remainder of the chapter. After we discuss why some nations and their industries outperform others, we will be better able to address the various strategies that firms can take to create competitive advantage when they expand internationally.

FACTORS AFFECTING A NATION’S COMPETITIVENESS Michael Porter of Harvard University conducted a four-year study in which he and a team of 30 researchers looked at the patterns of competitive success in 10 leading trading nations. He concluded that there are four broad attributes of nations that individually, and as a sys- tem, constitute what is termed the diamond of national advantage. In effect, these attributes jointly determine the playing field that each nation establishes and operates for its indus- tries. These factors are:

• Factor endowments. The nation’s position in factors of production, such as skilled labor or infrastructure, necessary to compete in a given industry.

• Demand conditions. The nature of home-market demand for the industry’s product or service.

• Related and supporting industries. The presence or absence in the nation of supplier industries and other related industries that are internationally competitive.

• Firm strategy, structure, and rivalry. The conditions in the nation governing how companies are created, organized, and managed, as well as the nature of domestic rivalry.

Factor Endowments7,8

Classical economics suggests that factors of production such as land, labor, and capital are the building blocks that create usable consumer goods and services.9 However, companies in advanced nations seeking competitive advantage over firms in other nations create many of the factors of production. For example, a country or industry dependent on scientific innovation must have a skilled human resource pool to draw upon. This resource pool is not inherited; it is created through investment in industry-specific knowledge and talent. The supporting infrastructure of a country—that is, its transportation and communication systems as well as its banking system—is also critical.

Factors of production must be developed that are industry- and firm-specific. In addi- tion, the pool of resources is less important than the speed and efficiency with which these resources are deployed. Thus, firm-specific knowledge and skills created within a country that are rare, valuable, difficult to imitate, and rapidly and efficiently deployed are the fac- tors of production that ultimately lead to a nation’s competitive advantage.

For example, the island nation of Japan has little landmass, making the warehouse space needed to store inventory prohibitively expensive. But by pioneering just-in-time inventory management, Japanese companies managed to create a resource from which they gained advantage over companies in other nations that spent large sums to warehouse inventory.

Demand Conditions Demand conditions refer to the demands that consumers place on an industry for goods and services. Consumers who demand highly specific, sophisticated products and services force firms to create innovative, advanced products and services to meet the demand. This consumer pressure presents challenges to a country’s industries. But in response to these challenges, improvements to existing goods and services often result, creating conditions necessary for competitive advantage over firms in other countries.

diamond of national advantage a framework for explaining why countries foster successful multinational corporations; consists of four factors—factor endowments; demand conditions; related and supporting industries; and firm strategy, structure, and rivalry.

factor endowments (national advantage) a nation’s position in factors of production.

LO 7-2 The sources of national advantage; that is, why an industry in a given country is more (or less) successful than the same industry in another country.

demand conditions (national advantage) the nature of home-market demand for the industry’s product or service.

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Countries with demanding consumers drive firms in that country to meet high stan- dards, upgrade existing products and services, and create innovative products and services. The conditions of consumer demand influence how firms view a market. This, in turn, helps a nation’s industries to better anticipate future global demand conditions and proactively respond to product and service requirements.

Denmark, for instance, is known for its environmental awareness. Demand from con- sumers for environmentally safe products has spurred Danish manufacturers to become leaders in water pollution control equipment—products it has successfully exported.

Related and Supporting Industries Related and supporting industries enable firms to manage inputs more effectively. For example, countries with a strong supplier base benefit by adding efficiency to downstream activities. A competitive supplier base helps a firm obtain inputs using cost-effective, timely methods, thus reducing manufacturing costs. Also, close working relationships with sup- pliers provide the potential to develop competitive advantages through joint research and development and the ongoing exchange of knowledge.

Related industries offer similar opportunities through joint efforts among firms. In addi- tion, related industries create the probability that new companies will enter the market, increasing competition and forcing existing firms to become more competitive through efforts such as cost control, product innovation, and novel approaches to distribution. Combined, these give the home country’s industries a source of competitive advantage.

In the Italian footwear industry the supporting industries enhance national competitive advantage. In Italy, shoe manufacturers are geographically located near their suppliers. The manufacturers have ongoing interactions with leather suppliers and learn about new tex- tures, colors, and manufacturing techniques while a shoe is still in the prototype stage. The manufacturers are able to project future demand and gear their factories for new products long before companies in other nations become aware of the new styles.

Firm Strategy, Structure, and Rivalry Rivalry is particularly intense in nations with conditions of strong consumer demand, strong supplier bases, and high new-entrant potential from related industries. This competi- tive rivalry in turn increases the efficiency with which firms develop, market, and distribute products and services within the home country. Domestic rivalry thus provides a strong impetus for firms to innovate and find new sources of competitive advantage.

This intense rivalry forces firms to look outside their national boundaries for new mar- kets, setting up the conditions necessary for global competitiveness. Among all the points on Porter’s diamond of national advantage, domestic rivalry is perhaps the strongest indicator of global competitive success. Firms that have experienced intense domestic competition are more likely to have designed strategies and structures that allow them to successfully compete in world markets.

In the European grocery retail industry, intense rivalry has led firms such as Aldi and Tesco to tighten their supply chains and improve store efficiency. Thus, it is no surprise that these firms are also strong global players.

The Indian software industry offers a clear example of how the attributes in Porter’s “diamond” interact to lead to the conditions for a strong industry to grow. Exhibit 7.1 illus- trates India’s “software diamond,” and Strategy Spotlight 7.1 further discusses the mutually reinforcing elements at work in this market.

Concluding Comment on Factors Affecting a Nation’s Competitiveness Porter drew his conclusions based on case histories of firms in more than 100 industries. Despite the differences in strategies employed by successful global competitors, a common

related and supporting industries (national advantage) the presence, absence, and quality in the nation of supplier industries and other related industries that supply services, support, or technology to firms in the industry value chain.

firm strategy, structure, and rivalry (national advantage) the conditions in the nation governing how companies are created, organized, and managed, as well as the nature of domestic rivalry.

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EXHIBIT 7.1 India’s Software Diamond

Domestic rivalry

No regulatory barriers to entry or start-up; 800 firms, mostly small, in fierce rivalry; growing number of MNC software- development centers in India.

Large network of public and private educational institutions; weak but rapidly improving communications infrastructure; duty-free access to imported computers and software, following economic liberalization.

Large, growing market; sophisticated customers; cutting-edge applications.

Large pool of skilled labor; low salaries; English-language capability.

Related and supporting industries

Factor endowments

Domestic demand

conditions

U.S. demand

conditions

Dashed lines represent weaker interactions.

Source: From Kampur D. and Ramamurti R., “India’s Emerging Competition Advantage in Services,” Academy of Management Executive: The Thinking Manager’s Source. Copyright © 2001 by Academy of Management.

7.1 STRATEGY SPOTLIGHT INDIA AND THE DIAMOND OF NATIONAL ADVANTAGE The Indian software industry has become one of the leading global markets for software. The industry has grown to about $110 billion (in export) in 2016 and Indian IT firms provide soft- ware and services to over half the Fortune 500 firms. What are the factors driving this success? Porter’s diamond of national advantage helps clarify this question. See Exhibit 7.1.

First, factor endowments are conducive to the rise of India’s software industry. Through investment in human resource devel- opment with a focus on industry-specific knowledge, India’s uni- versities and software firms have literally created this essential factor of production. For example, India produces the second- largest annual output of scientists and engineers in the world, behind only the United States. In a knowledge-intensive industry such as software, development of human resources is funda- mental to both domestic and global success.

Second, demand conditions require that software firms stay on the cutting edge of technological innovation. India has already moved toward globalization of its software industry; consumer demand conditions in developed nations such as Germany, Denmark, parts of Southeast Asia, and the United

States created the consumer demand necessary to propel India’s software makers toward sophisticated software solutions.*

Third, India has the supplier base as well as the related industries needed to drive competitive rivalry and enhance competitiveness. In particular, information technology (IT) hard- ware prices declined rapidly in the 1990s. Furthermore, rapid technological change in IT hardware meant that latecomers like India were not locked into older-generation technologies. Thus, both the IT hardware and software industries could “leapfrog” older technologies. In addition, relationships among knowledge workers in these IT hardware and software industries offer the social structure for ongoing knowledge exchange, promoting further enhancement of existing products. Further infrastructure improvements are occurring rapidly.

Fourth, with over 800 firms in the software services indus- try in India, intense rivalry forces firms to develop competitive strategies and structures. Although firms like TCS, Infosys, and

*Although India’s success cannot be explained in terms of its home-market demand (according to Porter’s model), the nature of the industry enables software to be transferred among different locations simultaneously by way of communications links. Thus, competitiveness of markets outside India can be enhanced without a physical presence in those markets.

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Wipro have become large, they still face strong competition from dozens of small and midsize companies aspiring to catch them. This intense rivalry is one of the primary factors driving Indian software firms to develop overseas distribution channels, as pre- dicted by Porter’s diamond of national advantage.

Sources: Pai M. 2016. No, India’s software industry did not die on Friday. www .ndtv.com. October 16:np; Sachitanand, R. 2010. The new face of IT. Business Today, 19: 62; Anonymous. 2010. Training to lead. www.Dqindia.com, October 5:

np; Nagaraju, B. 2011. India’s software exports seen up 16–18 pct. in Fy12. www. reuters.com, February 2: np; Ghemawat, P. & Hout, T. 2008. Tomorrow’s global giants. Harvard Business Review, 86(11): 80–88; Mathur, S. K. 2007. Indian IT industry: A performance analysis and a model for possible adoption. ideas. repec.org, January 1: np; Kripalani, M. 2002. Calling Bangalore: Multinationals are making it a hub for high-tech research BusinessWeek, November 25: 52–54; Kapur, D. & Ramamurti, R. 2001. India’s emerging competitive advantage in services. 2001. Academy of Management Executive, 15(2): 20–33; World Bank. 2001 World Development Report: 6. New York: Oxford University Press; and Reuters. 2001. Oracle in India push, taps software talent. Washington Post Online, July 3.

continued

theme emerged: Firms that succeeded in global markets had first succeeded in intensely competitive home markets. We can conclude that competitive advantage for global firms typically grows out of relentless, continuing improvement, and innovation.10

INTERNATIONAL EXPANSION: A COMPANY’S MOTIVATIONS AND RISKS

Motivations for International Expansion Increase Market Size There are many motivations for a company to pursue international expansion. The most obvious one is to increase the size of potential markets for a firm’s prod- ucts and services.11 The world’s population exceeded 7.6 billion in early 2018, with the U.S. representing less than 5 percent.

Many multinational firms are intensifying their efforts to market their products and ser- vices to countries such as India and China as the ranks of their middle class have increased over the past decade. The potential is great. An OECD study predicts that consumption by middle-class consumers in Asian markets will grow from $4.9 trillion in 2009 to over $30 trillion by 2020. At that point, Asia will make up 60 percent of global middle-class con- sumption, up from 20 percent in 2009.12

Expanding a firm’s global presence also automatically increases its scale of operations, pro- viding it with a larger revenue and asset base.13 As we noted in Chapter 5 in discussing overall cost leadership strategies, such an increase in revenues and asset base potentially enables a firm to attain economies of scale. This provides multiple benefits. One advantage is the spread- ing of fixed costs such as R&D over a larger volume of production. Examples include the sale of Boeing’s commercial aircraft and Microsoft’s operating systems in many foreign countries.

Filmmaking is another industry in which international sales can help amortize huge developmental costs.14 For example, 77 percent of the $1.1 billion box-office take for Transformers: Age of Extinction came from overseas moviegoers. Similarly, the market for kids’ movies is largely outside the U.S., with 70 percent of Frozen’s $1.3 billion in box-office take coming from overseas.

Take Advantage of Arbitrage Taking advantage of arbitrage opportunities is a second advan- tage of international expansion. In its simplest form, arbitrage involves buying something where it is cheap and selling it where it commands a higher price. A big part of Walmart’s suc- cess can be attributed to the company’s expertise in arbitrage. The possibilities for arbitrage are not necessarily confined to simple trading opportunities. It can be applied to virtually any factor of production and every stage of the value chain. For example, a firm may locate its call centers in India, its manufacturing plants in China or Vietnam, and its R&D in Europe, where

LO 7-3 The motivations (or benefits) and the risks associated with international expansion, including the emerging trend for greater offshoring and outsourcing activity.

multinational firms firms that manage operations in more than one country.

arbitrage opportunities an opportunity to profit by buying and selling the same good in different markets.

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the specific types of talented personnel may be available at the lowest possible cost. In today’s integrated global financial markets, a firm can borrow anywhere in the world where capital is cheap and use it to fund a project in a country where capital is expensive. Such arbitrage opportunities are even more attractive to global corporations because their larger size enables them to buy in huge volume, thus increasing their bargaining power with suppliers.

Enhancing a Product’s Growth Potential Enhancing the growth rate of a product that is in its maturity stage in a firm’s home country but that has greater demand potential elsewhere is another benefit of international expansion. As we noted in Chapter 5, products (and industries) generally go through a four-stage life cycle of introduction, growth, maturity, and decline. In recent decades, U.S. soft-drink producers such as Coca-Cola and PepsiCo have aggressively pursued international markets to attain levels of growth that simply would not be available in the United States. The differences in market growth potential have even led some firms to restructure their operations. For example, Procter & Gamble relocated its global skin, cosmetics, and personal care unit headquarters from Cincinnati to Singapore to be closer to the fast-growing Asian market.15

Optimize the Location of Value-Chain Activities Optimizing the physical location for every activity in the firm’s value chain is another benefit. Recall from our discussions in Chapters 3 and 5 that the value chain represents the various activities in which all firms must engage to produce products and services. It includes primary activities, such as inbound logistics, operations, and marketing, as well as support activities, such as procurement, R&D, and human resource management. All firms have to make critical decisions as to where each activity will take place.16 Optimizing the location for every activity in the value chain can yield one or more of three strategic advantages: performance enhancement, cost reduction, and risk reduction. We will now discuss each of these.

Performance Enhancement Microsoft’s decision to establish a corporate research labora- tory in Cambridge, England, is an example of a location decision that was guided mainly by the goal of building and sustaining world-class excellence in selected value-creating activi- ties.17 This strategic decision provided Microsoft with access to outstanding technical and professional talent. Location decisions can affect the quality with which any activity is per- formed in terms of the availability of needed talent, speed of learning, and the quality of external and internal coordination.

Strategy&, the consulting unit of PWC, the giant accounting firm, produces an annual survey of the world’s 1000 most innovative companies.18 It found that in 2015, firms that spent 60 percent or more of their R&D budgets overseas enjoyed significantly higher operat- ing margins and return on assets, as well as faster growth in operating income, than their more domestically oriented rivals.

Cost Reduction Two location decisions founded largely on cost-reduction considerations are (1) Nike’s decision to source the manufacture of athletic shoes from Asian countries such as China, Vietnam, and Indonesia and (2) the decision of Volkswagen to locate a new auto produc- tion plant in Chattanooga, Tennessee, to leverage the relatively low labor costs in the area as well as low shipping costs due to Chattanooga’s close proximity to both rail and river transportation. Such location decisions can affect the cost structure in terms of local manpower and other resources, transportation and logistics, and government incentives and the local tax structure

Performance enhancement and cost-reduction benefits parallel the business-level strate- gies (discussed in Chapter 5) of differentiation and overall cost leadership. They can at times be attained simultaneously. Consider our example in the previous section on the Indian software industry. When Oracle set up a development operation in that country, the company benefited both from lower labor costs and operational expenses and from perfor- mance enhancements realized through the hiring of superbly talented professionals.

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Risk Reduction Given the erratic swings in the exchange ratios between the U.S. dollar and the Japanese yen (in relation to each other and to other major currencies), an impor- tant basis for cost competition between Ford and Toyota has been their relative ingenuity at managing currency risks. One way for such rivals to manage currency risks has been to spread the high-cost elements of their manufacturing operations across a few select and carefully chosen locations around the world. Location decisions such as these can affect the overall risk profile of the firm with respect to currency, economic, and political risks.19

Learning Opportunities By expanding into new markets, corporations expose themselves to differing market demands, R&D capabilities, functional skills, organizational processes, and managerial practices. This provides opportunities for managers to transfer the knowl- edge that results from these exposures back to their home office and to other divisions in the firm. Thus, expansion into new markets provides a range of learning opportunities. For example, when L’Oréal, a French personal care product manufacturer, acquired two U.S. firms that developed and sold hair care products to African-American customers, L’Oréal gained knowledge on what is referred to in the industry as “ethnic hair care.” It then took this knowledge and built a new ethnic hair care division in Europe and later began making inroads in African markets. More generally, research suggests that overseas expansion leads to valuable learning at home. One study found that, rather than distracting the firm in its efforts in its home market, overseas acquisitions led to substantial performance improve- ments, an average of a 12 percent increase, in home markets.20

Explore Reverse Innovation Finally, exploring possibilities for reverse innovation has become a major motivation for international expansion. Many leading companies are discovering that developing products specifically for emerging markets can pay off in a big way. In the past, multinational companies typically developed products for their rich home markets and then tried to sell them in developing countries with minor adaptations. However, as growth slows in rich nations and demand grows rapidly in developing countries such as India and China, this approach becomes increasingly inadequate. Instead, companies like GE have committed significant resources to developing products that meet the needs of developing nations, products that deliver adequate functionality at a fraction of the cost. Interestingly, these products have subsequently found considerable success in value segments in wealthy countries as well. Hence, this process is referred to as reverse innovation, a new motivation for international expansion.

As $3,000 cars, $300 computers, and $30 mobile phones bring what were previously considered as luxuries within the reach of the middle class of emerging markets, it is impor- tant to understand the motivations and implications of reverse innovation. First, it is impos- sible to sell first-world versions of products with minor adaptations in countries where the average annual income per person is between $1,000 and $4,000, as is the case in most developing countries. To sell in these markets, entirely new products must be designed and developed by local technical talent and manufactured with local components. Second, although these countries are relatively poor, they are growing rapidly. Third, if the innova- tion does not come from first-world multinationals, there are any number of local firms that are ready to grab the market with low-cost products. Fourth, as the consumers and govern- ments of many first-world countries are rediscovering the virtues of frugality and are trying to cut down expenses, these products and services originally developed for the first world may gain significant market shares in developing countries as well.

Potential Risks of International Expansion When a company expands its international operations, it does so to increase its profits or revenues. As with any other investment, however, there are also potential risks.21 To help companies assess the risk of entering foreign markets, rating systems have been developed to evaluate political and economic, as well as financial and credit, risks.22

reverse innovation new products developed by developed-country multinational firms for emerging markets that have adequate functionality at a low cost.

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Euromoney magazine publishes a semiannual “Country Risk Rating” that evaluates politi- cal, economic, and other risks that entrants potentially face.23 Exhibit 7.2 presents a sample of country risk ratings, published by AM Best. Note that the overall ratings range from 1 to 5, with higher risk receiving the higher score.

Next we will discuss the four main types of risk: political risk, economic risk, currency risk, and management risk.

Political and Economic Risk Generally speaking, the business climate in the United States is very favorable. However, some countries around the globe may be hazardous to the health of corporate initiatives because of political risk.24 Forces such as social unrest, military turmoil, demonstrations, and even violent conflict and terrorism can pose serious threats.25 Consider, for example, the ongoing tension and violence in the Middle East associated with the revolutions and civil wars in Egypt, Libya, Syria, and other countries. Such conditions increase the likelihood of destruction of property and disruption of operations as well as nonpayment for goods and services. Thus, countries that are viewed as high risk are less attractive for most types of business.26

Another source of political risk in many countries is the absence of the rule of law. The absence of rules or the lack of uniform enforcement of existing rules leads to what might often seem to be arbitrary and inconsistent decisions by government officials. This can make it difficult for foreign firms to conduct business.

For example, consider Renault’s experience in Russia. Renault paid $1 billion to acquire a 25 percent ownership stake in the Russian automaker AvtoVAZ in 2008. Just one year later, Russian Prime Minister Vladimir Putin threatened to dilute Renault’s ownership stake unless it contributed more money to prop up AvtoVAZ, which was then experiencing a significant slide in sales. Renault realized its ownership claim may not have held up in the corrupt Russian court system. Therefore, it was forced to negotiate and eventually agreed to transfer over $300 million in technology and expertise to the Russian firm to ensure its ownership stake would stay at 25 percent.27

political risk potential threat to a firm’s operations in a country due to ineffectiveness of the domestic political system.

rule of law a characteristic of legal systems whereby behavior is governed by rules that are uniformly enforced.

EXHIBIT 7.2 A Sample of Country Risk Ratings, August 22, 2017

Country Score Overall Country Rating Economic Risk Political Risk Financial System Risk

Norway 1 2 1 1

Canada 1 1 1 1

United States 1 2 1 1

Singapore 1 2 2 1

Hong Kong 2 2 2 1

South Korea 2 1 2 2

South Africa 4 3 4 3

China 3 2 3 3

Bahrain 4 4 3 3

Kazakhstan 4 3 3 4

Colombia 4 3 4 3

Russia 4 3 4 4

Argentina 5 3 4 5

Libya 5 4 5 5

Source: A.M. Best Company - Used by permission.

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Interestingly, while corporations have historically been concerned about rule-of-law issues in developing markets, such issues have also become a significant concern in devel- oped markets, most critically in the United States. In a 2012 World Economic Forum Global Competitive Report that examined the quality of governmental institutions and the rule of law, the United States fared poorly. Starkly, the United States was ranked among the top 20 countries on only 1 of the 22 measures of institutional quality the survey included. In line with these findings, the International Finance Corporation (IFC) found that governmental hurdles businesses face have become a greater challenge in the United States in recent years. The IFC compiles data annually on the burdens of doing business that are put in place by governments and found that the United States is one of only a few countries surveyed in which doing business has become more burdensome. In nearly 90 percent of countries, gov- ernmental burdens have eased since 2006, but the United States has bucked that trend and become a more difficult location in which to operate. As institutions deteriorate, the United States loses its luster as a place to base operations. This sentiment was reflected in a survey of business executives who are alumni of the Harvard Business School. When asked whether they had recently favored basing new operations in the United States or in a foreign location, an overwhelming majority, 84 percent, responded that they had chosen the foreign location. Thus, advanced economies, such as the United States, risk losing out to other countries if they fail to reinforce and strengthen their legal and political institutions.28

The laws, and the enforcement of laws, associated with the protection of intellec- tual property rights can be a major potential economic risk in entering new countries.29 Microsoft, for example, has lost billions of dollars in potential revenue through piracy of its software products in many countries, including China. Other areas of the globe, such as the former Soviet Union and some eastern European nations, have piracy prob- lems as well.30 Firms rich in intellectual property have encountered financial losses as imitations of their products have grown due to a lack of law enforcement of intellectual property rights.31

Counterfeiting, a direct form of theft of intellectual property rights, is a significant and growing problem. The International Chamber of Commerce estimated that the value of counterfeit goods exceeded $1.7 trillion in 2015, over 2 percent of the world’s total economic output. “The whole business has just exploded,” said Jeffrey Hardy, head of the anticoun- terfeiting program at ICC. “And it goes way beyond music and Gucci bags.” Counterfeiting has moved well beyond handbags and shoes to include chemicals, pharmaceuticals, and aircraft parts. According to a University of Florida study, 25 percent of the pesticide market in some parts of Europe is estimated to be counterfeit. This is especially troubling since these chemicals are often toxic.32 In Strategy Spotlight 7.2, we discuss the challenge of fight- ing counterfeiting in the pharmaceutical business and how Pfizer is attempting to fight this threat to its business.

Currency Risks Currency fluctuations can pose substantial risks. A company with opera- tions in several countries must constantly monitor the exchange rate between its own cur- rency and that of the host country to minimize currency risks. Even a small change in the exchange rate can result in a significant difference in the cost of production or net profit when doing business overseas. When the U.S. dollar appreciates against other cur- rencies, for example, U.S. goods can be more expensive to consumers in foreign countries. At the same time, however, appreciation of the U.S. dollar can have negative implications for American companies that have branch operations overseas. The reason for this is that prof- its from abroad must be exchanged for dollars at a more expensive rate of exchange, reduc- ing the amount of profit when measured in dollars. For example, consider an American firm doing business in Italy. If this firm had a 20 percent profit in euros at its Italian center of operations, this profit would be totally wiped out when converted into U.S. dollars if the euro had depreciated 20 percent against the U.S. dollar. (U.S. multinationals typically

economic risk potential threat to a firm’s operations in a country due to economic policies and conditions, including property rights laws and enforcement of those laws.

counterfeiting selling of trademarked goods without the consent of the trademark holder.

currency risk potential threat to a firm’s operations in a country due to fluctuations in the local currency’s exchange rate.

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7.2  ETHICSSTRATEGY SPOTLIGHT COUNTERFEIT DRUGS: A DANGEROUS AND GROWING PROBLEM Brian Donnelly has an interesting background. He’s both a cop and a pharmacist. He worked as a special agent for the FBI for 21 years, but he also has a PhD in pharmacology. Now he’s on the front lines of an important fight: keeping counterfeit drugs from the market. He works as an investigator for Pfizer, one of the world’s largest pharmaceutical companies, putting both his pharmacology and law enforcement skills at work to blunt the growing flow of counterfeit drugs. He is one of a small army of former law enforcement officers employed by the pharmaceuti- cal companies working for the same aim.

This is an important fight for two reasons. First, it is of economic consequence for the pharmaceutical companies. Counterfeit drugs are big business. In the United States alone, counterfeit drugs generated around $200 billion in revenue in 2015. They are enticing to customers. For example, while Pfizer’s erectile dysfunction pill, Viagra, sells for $15 per tab- let, fake versions sold online can be gotten for as little as $1 a pill. The sales of counterfeit drugs cut into the sales and prof- its of Pfizer and the other pharmaceutical firms. Second and more importantly, these fake drugs are potentially dangerous. The danger comes from both what they contain and what they don’t contain. Fake pills have been found to contain chalk, brick dust, paint, and even pesticides. Thus, they may be toxic, and ingesting them may cause significant health problems. On the other side, they may not contain the correct dose or even any of the active ingredients they are supposed to have. This may lead to severe health consequences. For example,

fake Zithromax, an antibiotic, may contain none of the neces- sary chemical components, leaving the patient unable to fight the infection. According to one estimate, counterfeit drugs contribute to the death of upward of 200,000 people a year globally.

The pharmaceutical firms are fighting back with Donnelly and his colleagues. They use a common law enforcement technique. The fake drugs are sold by local dealers in the United States, who typically sell through websites. These local dealers, called drop dealers, are the easiest to catch. From there, the investiga- tors try to gain information on the major dealers from whom the drop dealers order. If they can get to these folks, they try to take it back to the kingpins manufacturing the drugs. This typically takes them through multiple law enforcement agencies in mul- tiple countries, often back to manufacturing plants in China and India. To find the source, the pharmaceutical companies also use advanced technology. They determine the chemical composition of fake drugs they seize to search for common chemical signa- tures that point to the possible sourcing plant.

Pfizer is also fighting the fight from another angle. It is now tagging every bottle of Viagra and many other pharmaceuticals with radio-frequency identification (RFID) tags. Pharmacies can read these tags and input the data into Pfizer’s system to confirm that these bottles are legitimate Pfizer drugs. This won’t stop shady websites from delivering counterfeit drugs, but it will help keep the counterfeits out of legitimate pharmacies.

Sources: McLauglin, J. 2015. The United States isn’t immune to counterfeit drugs. lawstreetmedia.com, May 8: np; O’Connor, M. 2006. Pfizer using RFID to fight fake Viagra. RFIDjournal.com, January 6: np; and Gillette, F. 2013. Inside Pfizer’s fight against counterfeit drugs. Bloomberg Businessweek, January 17: np.

engage in sophisticated “hedging strategies” to minimize currency risk. The discussion of this is beyond the scope of this section.)

Below, we discuss how Israel’s strong currency—the shekel—forced a firm to reevaluate its strategy.

For years O.R.T. Technologies resisted moving any operations outside Israel. However, when faced with a sharp rise in the value of the shekel, the maker of specialized software for managing gas stations froze all local hiring and decided to transfer some developmental work to Eastern Europe. Laments CEO Alex Milner, “I never thought I’d see the day when we would have to move R&D outside of Israel, but the strong shekel has forced us to do so.”33

Management Risks Management risks may be considered the challenges and risks that managers face when they must respond to the inevitable differences that they encounter in foreign markets. These take a variety of forms: culture, customs, language, income levels, customer preferences, distribution systems, and so on.34 As we will note later in the chap- ter, even in the case of apparently standard products, some degree of local adaptation will become necessary.35

Differences in cultures across countries can also pose unique challenges for managers.36 Cultural symbols can evoke deep feelings.37 For example, in a series of advertisements aimed at Italian vacationers, Coca-Cola executives turned the Eiffel Tower, Empire State Building,

management risk potential threat to a firm’s operations in a country due to the problems that managers have making decisions in the context of foreign markets.

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and Tower of Pisa into the familiar Coke bottle. So far, so good. However, when the white marble columns of the Parthenon that crowns the Acropolis in Athens were turned into Coke bottles, the Greeks became outraged. Why? Greeks refer to the Acropolis as the “holy rock,” and a government official said the Parthenon is an “international symbol of excellence” and that “whoever insults the Parthenon insults international culture.” Coca-Cola apologized.

An important management challenge involves adapting to different cultures when a firm crosses national boundaries. As we discuss in Strategy Spotlight 7.3, however, if a firm’s culture is a key driver of its success, it should maintain and reinforce that corporate culture across different locations—even if it conflicts with local practice.

Global Dispersion of Value Chains: Outsourcing and Offshoring A major recent trend has been the dispersion of the value chains of multinational corpora- tions across different countries; that is, the various activities that constitute the value chain of a firm are now spread across several countries and continents. Such dispersion of value occurs mainly through increasing offshoring and outsourcing.

A report issued by the World Trade Organization described the production of a particu- lar U.S. car as follows: “30 percent of the car’s value goes to Korea for assembly, 17.5 per- cent to Japan for components and advanced technology, 7.5 percent to Germany for design, 4 percent to Taiwan and Singapore for minor parts, 2.5 percent to U.K. for advertising and marketing services, and 1.5 percent to Ireland and Barbados for data processing. This means

7.3 STRATEGY SPOTLIGHT WHEN TO NOT ADAPT YOUR COMPANY’S CULTURE—EVEN IF IT CONFLICTS WITH THE LOCAL CULTURE When companies instill a company culture that includes how people communicate, evaluate each other, and so on, they may often run into problems when they expand internationally. For example, the Dutch shipping company TNT has long emphasized task-oriented efficiency and egalitarian management. However, when it commenced operations in China, neither of those values fit with local norms. As expected, it began to conduct business in a more relationship-oriented and hierarchical manner, as its managers in Asia adapted their styles to attract local clients and motivate their employees.

The problem with such adaptation is that a company’s cul- ture can sometimes be a key driver of its success. That is, if you believe that your corporate culture is what made the com- pany great, you should consider maintaining it in all of your offices—even when it conflicts with local practice. This approach becomes particularly relevant for firms with a highly innovative product offering and relatively little local competition. If your cul- ture has led to significant innovation and there is not a strong imperative to understand local consumers, it may be best to ignore the local culture to help maintain the organizational core.

Consider Google. It believes that its culture is a key rea- son for its outstanding success. Part of this involves providing employees with lots of positive feedback, and the company’s performance review begins by instructing managers to “List

the things that this employee did reasonably well.” Only then does it state, “List one thing this person could do to have a big- ger impact.” At Google, products are always considered to be in Beta—and mistakes are praised. For example, before she became COO of Facebook, Sheryl Sandberg was a vice presi- dent at Google and her responsibilities included managing their automated advertising system. When she made a mistake that cost Google several million dollars, she admitted her error to co-founder Larry Page. His response was, “I’m so glad that you made this mistake because I want to run a company where we are moving too quickly and doing too much, not being cautious and doing too little. If we don’t have any of these mistakes, we’re just not taking enough risk.”

However, when Google moved into France, it found that positive words were used sparingly and criticism was provided more strongly. A French manager said, “The first time I used the Google form to give a performance review, I was confused. Where was the section to talk about problem areas? ‘What did this employee do really well?’ The positive wording seemed over the top.” However, Google’s strong corporate culture typi- cally supersedes local preferences. The French manager contin- ued, “After five years at Google France, I can tell you we are now a group of French people who give negative feedback in a very un-French way.”

Sources: Meyer, E. 2015. When culture doesn’t translate. Harvard Business Review 93(10): 66–72; Meyer, E. 2014. Navigating the cultural minefield. Harvard Business Review 92(5): 119–123; and Kim, J. 2013. 7 secrets of Google’s epic organizational culture. officevibe.com, September 30: np.

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that only 37 percent of the production value is generated in the U.S.”38 In today’s economy, we are increasingly witnessing two interrelated trends: outsourcing and offshoring.

Outsourcing occurs when a firm decides to utilize other firms to perform value-creating activities that were previously performed in-house.39 It may be a new activity that the firm is perfectly capable of doing but chooses to have someone else perform for cost or quality reasons. Outsourcing can be to either a domestic or foreign firm.

Offshoring takes place when a firm decides to shift an activity that it was performing in a domestic location to a foreign location.40 For example, both Microsoft and Intel now have R&D facilities in India, employing a large number of Indian scientists and engineers. Often, offshoring and outsourcing go together; that is, a firm may outsource an activity to a foreign supplier, thereby causing the work to be offshored as well.41

The recent explosion in the volume of outsourcing and offshoring is due to a variety of factors. Up until the 1960s, for most companies, the entire value chain was in one location. Further, the production took place close to where the customers were in order to keep trans- portation costs under control. In the case of service industries, it was generally believed that offshoring was not possible because the producer and consumer had to be present at the same place at the same time. After all, a haircut could not be performed if the barber and the client were separated!

For manufacturing industries, the rapid decline in transportation and coordination costs has enabled firms to disperse their value chains over different locations. For example, Nike’s R&D takes place in the United States, raw materials are procured from a multitude of countries, actual manufacturing takes place in China, Indonesia, or Vietnam, advertising is produced in the United States, and sales and service take place in practically all the coun- tries. Each value-creating activity is performed in the location where the cost is the lowest or the quality is the best. Without finding optimal locations for each activity, Nike could not have attained its position as the world’s largest shoe company.

The experience of the manufacturing sector was also repeated in the service sector by the mid-1990s. A trend that began with the outsourcing of low-level programming and data entry work to countries such as India and Ireland suddenly grew manyfold, encompassing a variety of white-collar and professional activities ranging from call centers to R&D.

Bangalore, India, in recent years, has emerged as a location where more and more U.S. tax returns are prepared. In India, U.S.-trained and licensed radiologists interpret chest x-rays and CT scans from U.S. hospitals for half the cost. The advantages from offshoring go beyond mere cost savings today. In many specialized occupations in science and engineer- ing, there is a shortage of qualified professionals in developed countries, whereas countries like India, China, and Singapore have what seems like an inexhaustible supply.42

While offshoring offers the potential to cut costs in corporations across a wide range of industries, many firms are finding the benefits of offshoring to be more elusive and the costs greater than they anticipated.43 A study by AMR Research found that 56 percent of companies moving production offshore experienced an increase in total costs, contrary to their expectations of cost savings. In a more focused study, 70 percent of managers said sourcing in China is more costly than they initially estimated.

The cause of this contrary outcome is actually not all that surprising. Common savings from offshoring, such as lower wages, benefits, energy costs, regulatory costs, and taxes, are all easily visible and immediate. In contrast, there are a host of hidden costs that arise over time and often overwhelm the cost savings of offshoring. These hidden costs include:

• Total wage costs. Labor cost per hour may be significantly lower in developing markets, but this may not translate into lower overall costs. If workers in these markets are less productive or less skilled, firms end up with a higher number of hours needed to produce the same quantity of product. This necessitates hiring more workers and having employees work longer hours.

outsourcing using other firms to perform value-creating activities that were previously performed in-house.

offshoring shifting a value-creating activity from a domestic location to a foreign location.

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• Indirect costs. In addition to higher labor costs, there are also a number of indirect costs that pop up. If there are problems with the skill level of workers, the firm will find the need for more training and supervision of workers, more raw material and greater scrap due to the lower skill level, and greater rework to fix quality problems. The firm may also experience greater need for security staff in its facilities.

• Increased inventory. Due to the longer delivery times, firms often need to tie up more capital in work in progress and inventory.

• Reduced market responsiveness. The long supply lines from low-cost countries may leave firms less responsive to shifts in customer demands. This may damage their brand image and also increase product obsolescence costs, as they may have to scrap or sell at a steep discount products that fail to meet quickly changing technology standards or customer tastes.

• Coordination costs. Coordinating product development and manufacturing can be difficult with operations undertaking different tasks in different countries. This may hamper innovation. It may also trigger unexpected costs, such as paying overtime in some markets so that staff across multiple time zones can meet to coordinate their activities.

• Intellectual property rights. Firms operating in countries with weak IP protection can wind up losing their trade secrets or taking costly measures to protect these secrets.

• Wage inflation. In moving overseas, firms often assume some level of wage stability, but wages in developing markets can be volatile and spike dramatically. For example, minimum wages set by provinces in China increased at an average of 18 percent per year in the 2010–2014 period.44 As Roger Meiners, chairman of the Department of Economics at the University of Texas at Arlington, stated, “The U.S. is more competitive on a wage basis because average wages have come down, especially for entry-level workers, and wages in China have been increasing.”

Firms need to take into account all of these costs in determining whether or not to move their operations offshore.

ACHIEVING COMPETITIVE ADVANTAGE IN GLOBAL MARKETS We now discuss the two opposing forces that firms face when they expand into global mar- kets: cost reduction and adaptation to local markets. Then we address the four basic types of international strategies that they may pursue: international, global, multidomestic, and transnational. The selection of one of these four types of strategies is largely dependent on a firm’s relative pressure to address each of the two forces.

Two Opposing Pressures: Reducing Costs and Adapting to Local Markets Many years ago, the famed marketing strategist Theodore Levitt advocated strategies that favored global products and brands. He suggested that firms should standardize all of their products and services for all of their worldwide markets. Such an approach would help a firm lower its overall costs by spreading its investments over as large a market as possible. Levitt’s approach rested on three key assumptions:

1. Customer needs and interests are becoming increasingly homogeneous worldwide. 2. People around the world are willing to sacrifice preferences in product features,

functions, design, and the like for lower prices at high quality. 3. Substantial economies of scale in production and marketing can be achieved through

supplying global markets.45

LO 7-4 The two opposing forces—cost reduction and adaptation to local markets—that firms face when entering international markets.

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However, there is ample evidence to refute these assumptions.46 Regarding the first assumption—the increasing worldwide homogeneity of customer needs and interests— consider the number of product markets, ranging from watches and handbags to soft drinks and fast foods. Companies have identified global customer segments and developed global products and brands targeted to those segments. Also, many other companies adapt lines to idiosyncratic country preferences and develop local brands targeted to local market segments. For example, Nestlé’s line of pizzas marketed in the United Kingdom includes cheese with ham and pineapple topping on a French bread crust. Similarly, Coca-Cola in Japan markets Georgia (a tonic drink) as well as Classic Coke and Hi-C.

Consider the second assumption—the sacrifice of product attributes for lower prices. While there is invariably a price-sensitive segment in many product markets, there is no indication that this is increasing. In contrast, in many product and service markets—ranging from watches, personal computers, and household appliances to banking and insurance— there is a growing interest in multiple product features, product quality, and service.

Finally, the third assumption is that significant economies of scale in production and marketing could be achieved for global products and services. Although standardization may lower manufacturing costs, such a perspective does not consider three critical and interrelated points. First, as we discussed in Chapter 5, technological developments in flex- ible factory automation enable economies of scale to be attained at lower levels of output and do not require production of a single standardized product. Second, the cost of produc- tion is only one component, and often not the critical one, in determining the total cost of a product. Third, a firm’s strategy should not be product-driven. It should also consider other activities in the firm’s value chain, such as marketing, sales, and distribution.

Based on the above, we would have a hard time arguing that it is wise to develop the same product or service for all markets throughout the world. While there are some exceptions, such as Boeing airplanes and some of Coca-Cola’s soft-drink products, managers must also strive to tailor their products to the culture of the country in which they are attempting to do business. Few would argue that “one size fits all” generally applies.

The opposing pressures that managers face place conflicting demands on firms as they strive to be competitive.47 On the one hand, competitive pressures require that firms do what they can to lower unit costs so that consumers will not perceive their product and service offerings as too expensive. This may lead them to consider locating manufacturing facilities where labor costs are low and developing products that are highly standardized across multiple countries.

In addition to responding to pressures to lower costs, managers must strive to be respon- sive to local pressures in order to tailor their products to the demand of the local market in which they do business. This requires differentiating their offerings and strategies from country to country to reflect consumer tastes and preferences and making changes to reflect differences in distribution channels, human resource practices, and governmental regulations. However, since the strategies and tactics to differentiate products and services to local markets can involve additional expenses, a firm’s costs will tend to rise.

The two opposing pressures result in four different basic strategies that companies can use to compete in the global marketplace: international, global, multidomestic, and trans- national. The strategy that a firm selects depends on the degree of pressure that it is facing for cost reductions and the importance of adapting to local markets. Exhibit 7.3 shows the conditions under which each of these strategies would be most appropriate.

It is important to note that we consider these four strategies to be “basic” or “pure”; that is, in practice, all firms will tend to have some elements of each strategy.

International Strategy There are a small number of industries in which pressures for both local adaptation and lowering costs are rather low. An extreme example of such an industry is the “orphan” drug industry. These are medicines for diseases that are severe but affect only a small

LO 7-5 The advantages and disadvantages associated with each of the four basic strategies: international, global, multidomestic, and transnational.

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number of people. Diseases such as Gaucher disease and Fabry disease fit into this cat- egory. Companies such as Genzyme and Oxford GlycoSciences are active in this segment of the drug industry. There is virtually no need to adapt their products to the local mar- kets. And the pressures to reduce costs are low; even though only a few thousand patients are affected, the revenues and margins are significant, because patients are charged up to $100,000 per year.

An international strategy is based on diffusion and adaptation of the parent company’s knowledge and expertise to foreign markets. Country units are allowed to make some minor adaptations to products and ideas coming from the head office, but they have far less independence and autonomy compared to multidomestic companies. The primary goal of the strategy is worldwide exploitation of the parent firm’s knowledge and capabilities. All sources of core competencies are centralized.

The majority of large U.S. multinationals pursued the international strategy in the decades following World War II. These companies centralized R&D and product develop- ment but established manufacturing facilities as well as marketing organizations abroad. Companies such as McDonald’s and Kellogg are examples of firms following such a strat- egy. Although these companies do make some local adaptations, they are of a very lim- ited nature. With increasing pressures to reduce costs due to global competition, especially from low-cost countries, opportunities to successfully employ an international strategy are becoming more limited. This strategy is most suitable in situations where a firm has distinc- tive competencies that local companies in foreign markets lack.

Risks and Challenges Below are some of the risks and challenges associated with an inter- national strategy.

• Different activities in the value chain typically have different optimal locations. That is, R&D may be optimally located in a country with an abundant supply of scientists and engineers, whereas assembly may be better conducted in a low- cost location. Nike, for example, designs its shoes in the United States, but all the manufacturing is done in countries like China or Thailand. The international

international strategy a strategy based on firms’ diffusion and adaptation of the parent companies’ knowledge and expertise to foreign markets; used in industries where the pressures for both local adaptation and lowering costs are low.

EXHIBIT 7.3 Opposing Pressures and Four Strategies

HighLow

High

Low

Pressures for Local Adaptation

Pr es

su re

s to

L ow

er C

os ts

Global strategy

International strategy

Transnational strategy

Multidomestic strategy

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strategy, with its tendency to concentrate most of its activities in one location, fails to take advantage of the benefits of an optimally distributed value chain.

• The lack of local responsiveness may result in the alienation of local customers. Worse still, the firm’s inability to be receptive to new ideas and innovation from its foreign subsidiaries may lead to missed opportunities.

Exhibit 7.4 summarizes the strengths and limitations of international strategies in the global marketplace.

Global Strategy As indicated in Exhibit 7.3, a firm whose emphasis is on lowering costs tends to follow a global strategy. Competitive strategy is centralized and controlled to a large extent by the corporate office. Since the primary emphasis is on controlling costs, the corporate office strives to achieve a strong level of coordination and integration across the various busi- nesses.48 Firms following a global strategy strive to offer standardized products and services as well as to locate manufacturing, R&D, and marketing activities in only a few locations.49

A global strategy emphasizes economies of scale due to the standardization of products and services and the centralization of operations in a few locations. As such, one advantage may be that innovations that come about through efforts of either a business unit or the corporate office can be transferred more easily to other locations. Although costs may be lower, the firm following a global strategy may, in general, have to forgo opportunities for revenue growth since it does not invest extensive resources in adapting product offerings from one market to another.

A global strategy is most appropriate when there are strong pressures for reducing costs and comparatively weak pressures for adaptation to local markets. Economies of scale become an important consideration.50 Advantages to increased volume may come from larger production plants or runs as well as from more efficient logistics and distribution net- works. Worldwide volume is also especially important in supporting high levels of investment in research and development. As we would expect, many industries requiring high levels of R&D, such as pharmaceuticals, semiconductors, and jet aircraft, follow global strategies.

Another advantage of a global strategy is that it can enable a firm to create a standard level of quality throughout the world. Let’s look at what Tom Siebel, former chairman of Siebel Systems (now part of Oracle), a developer of e-business application software, said about global standardization:

Our customers—global companies like IBM, Zurich Financial Services, and Citicorp—expect the same high level of service and quality, and the same licensing policies, no matter where we do business with them around the world. Our human resources and legal departments help us create policies that respect local cultures and requirements worldwide, while at the same time maintaining the highest standards.51

Risks and Challenges There are, of course, some risks associated with a global strategy:52

• A firm can enjoy scale economies only by concentrating scale-sensitive resources and activities in one or few locations. Such concentration, however, becomes a “double-edged sword.” For example, if a firm has only one manufacturing facility, it must export its output (e.g., components, subsystems, or finished products) to other

global strategy a strategy based on firms’ centralization and control by the corporate office, with the primary emphasis on controlling costs; used in industries where the pressure for local adaptation is low and the pressure for lowering costs is high.

Strengths Limitations

• Leverage and diffusion of a parent firm’s knowledge and core competencies.

• Lower costs because of less need to tailor products and services.

• Limited ability to adapt to local markets. • Inability to take advantage of new ideas and innovations

occurring in local markets.

EXHIBIT 7.4 Strengths and Limitations of International Strategies in the Global Marketplace

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markets, some of which may be a great distance from the operation. Thus, decisions about locating facilities must weigh the potential benefits from concentrating operations in a single location against the higher transportation and tariff costs that result from such concentration.

• The geographic concentration of any activity may also tend to isolate that activity from the targeted markets. Such isolation may be risky since it may hamper the facility’s ability to quickly respond to changes in market conditions and needs.

• Concentrating an activity in a single location also makes the rest of the firm dependent on that location. Such dependency implies that, unless the location has world-class competencies, the firm’s competitive position can be eroded if problems arise. A European Ford executive, reflecting on the firm’s concentration of activities during a global integration program in the mid-1990s, lamented, “Now if you misjudge the market, you are wrong in 15 countries rather than only one.”

Exhibit 7.5 summarizes the strengths and limitations of global strategies.

Multidomestic Strategy According to Exhibit 7.3, a firm whose emphasis is on differentiating its product and service offerings to adapt to local markets follows a multidomestic strategy.53 Decisions evolving from a multidomestic strategy tend to be decentralized to permit the firm to tailor its prod- ucts and respond rapidly to changes in demand. This enables a firm to expand its market and to charge different prices in different markets. For firms following this strategy, differ- ences in language, culture, income levels, customer preferences, and distribution systems are only a few of the many factors that must be considered. Even in the case of relatively standardized products, at least some level of local adaptation is often necessary.

Consider, for example, the Oreo cookie.54 Kraft has tailored the iconic cookie to better meet the tastes and preferences in different markets. For example, Kraft has created green tea Oreos in China, chocolate and peanut butter Oreos for Indonesia, and banana and dulce de leche Oreos for Argentina. Kraft has also lowered the sweetness of the cookie for China and reduced the bitterness of the cookie for India. The shape is also on the table for change. Kraft has even created wafer-stick-style Oreos.

Kraft has tailored other products to meet local market needs. For example, with its Tang drink product, it developed local flavors, such as a lime and cinnamon flavor for Mexico and mango Tang for the Philippines. It also looked to the nutritional needs in different countries. True to the heritage of the brand, Kraft has kept the theme that Tang is a good source of vitamin C. But in Brazil, where children often have iron deficiencies, it added iron as well as other vitamins and minerals. The local-focus strategy has worked well, with Tang’s sales almost doubling in five years.

To meet the needs of local markets, companies need to go beyond just product designs. One of the simple ways firms have worked to meet market needs is by finding appropriate names for their products. For example, in China, the names of products imbue them with strong meanings and can be significant drivers of their success. As a result, firms have been careful with how they translate their brands. For example, Reebok became Rui bu, which

multidomestic strategy a strategy based on firms’ differentiating their products and services to adapt to local markets; used in industries where the pressure for local adaptation is high and the pressure for lowering costs is low.

Strengths Limitations

• Strong integration occurs across various businesses. • Standardization leads to higher economies of scale,

which lower costs. • Creation of uniform standards of quality throughout the

world is facilitated.

• Limited ability exists to adapt to local markets. • Concentration of activities may increase dependence on a

single facility. • Single locations may lead to higher tariffs and

transportation costs.

EXHIBIT 7.5 Strengths and Limitations of Global Strategies

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7.4 STRATEGY SPOTLIGHT CHALLENGES INVOLVING CULTURAL DIFFERENCES THAT MANAGERS MAY ENCOUNTER WHEN NEGOTIATING CONTRACTS ACROSS NATIONAL BOUNDARIES When international companies cross borders, they often must deal with cultural differences. And culture has a strong influence on how one thinks, communicates, and acts. It also affects the types of transactions firms make as well as the negotiation pro- cess. Cultural differences, for example, between a Chinese pub- lic sector plant manager in Shanghai and the head of a Canadian division of a family company in Toronto can create barriers that may impede or completely disrupt the negotiating process.

Let’s look at an example that Erin Meyer provided in a recent Harvard Business Review article. An American working for a defense company located in the midwestern United States was well trained in basic negotiating techniques such as: Separate people from the process, focus on interests not positions, define your BATNA (best alternative to a negotiated agreement), and so on. He believed that his telephone call to Saudi Arabia was proceeding according to plan. After he had steered his would- be customer to accept the deal, he felt he had reached his goal. But then he made a fatal mistake: He then reviewed the agreement with the client in detail on who had agreed to what. Unfortunately, a soft but firm voice said, “I told you I would do it. You think I don’t keep my promises? That I am not good on my word?” Clearly, that was the end of the discussion—and the deal.

Research has shown that there are several elements of negotiating behavior that help to identify cultural differences that often arise during negotiations. The findings are based on a study of 400 people from twelve nationalities. An understanding of such differences can help managers understand their coun- terparts and anticipate possible misunderstandings. Three of these elements are summarized as follows.

First, negotiators from different cultures tend to view the purpose of the negotiation quite differently. Some look upon the goal as a signed contract, others view it as the development of a relationship. The survey found that 74 percent of Spanish respon- dents stated that their goal was a contract, while only 33 percent of Indian executives felt this way. Such a cultural difference may explain why Asian negotiators tend to give more time and effort to preliminaries, while North Americans typically want to rush through this first phase of deal making. Although the initial part of a negotiation can be critical in getting to know one another, it would seem less important if the goal is just to get a contract.

Second, based on cultural differences, some people appear to approach deal making with either a process in which both can gain (win-win) or a contest in which one side wins and the other side loses (win-lose). That is, the former sees it as a collabora- tive process and the other side sees it as confrontational. In the survey, 100 percent of the Japanese respondents stated that they viewed negotiations as a win-win process, whereas only 33 percent of the Spanish executives held that view.

Third, cultural factors can influence the sort of written agreement that is preferred. Americans prefer highly detailed contracts that serve to anticipate many possible circumstances that may arise, no matter how likely they may be. In contrast, Chinese respondents preferred a contract in the form of general principles instead of detailed rules because they believed that if unexpected circumstances arose, the parties should draw on the relationship, not the contract, to resolve differences. Among all the respondents in the survey, 78 percent preferred specific agreements, while only 22 percent desired general agreements. And as expected, there was considerable variation among respondents: While only 11 percent of the English respondents favored general agreements, 45.5 percent of the Japanese and the Germans claimed to do so.

As a cautionary note, one must recognize that cultural differ- ences often arise because when addressing cultural differences, managers frequently rely on stereotypes that can often be pejo- rative (for example, Portuguese are always running late). Such an attitude can distort expectations about one’s counterpart’s behavior as well as lead to costly misinterpretations.

Rather than rely on stereotypes, one should focus on prototypes—cultural averages on various dimensions of values and behaviors. For example, Japanese negotiators typically have more silent periods during negotiations compared to Brazilians. However, there remains a good deal of variation within each culture— meaning that some Brazilians speak less than some Japanese do. Therefore, it would be a mistake to expect a Japanese negotiator who you have never met to be reserved. However, if it turns out a negotiator is very quiet, you should consider her behavior in light of the prototype. Further, such awareness of your own cultural pro- totypes would aid you in anticipating how your counterpart would interpret your own bargaining behavior.

Sources: Shonk, K. 2016. How to resolve cultural conflict: Overcoming cultural barriers at the negotiation table. pon.harvard.edu, August 25: np; Meyer, E. 2015. Getting to Si, Ja, Hai, and Da. Harvard Business Review, 93(12): 74–80; Salacuse, J. W. 2004. Negotiating: The top ten ways that culture can affect your negotiation. iveybusinessjournal.com, October: np; and Livermore, D. 2015. 10 tips for managing across cultures. management-issues.com, May 11: np.

means “quick steps.” Lay’s snack foods became Le shi, which means “happy things.” And Coca-Cola’s Chinese name, Ke Kou Ke Le, translates to “tasty fun.”

When companies cross national borders, they typically encounter different cultures. Strategy Spotlight 7.4 addresses some of the challenges that managers may encounter when negotiating contracts and how they may be resolved—or, at least minimized.

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Risks and Challenges As you might expect, there are some risks associated with a multido- mestic strategy. Among these are the following:

• Typically, local adaptation of products and services will increase a company’s cost structure. In many industries, competition is so intense that most firms can ill afford any competitive disadvantages on the dimension of cost. A key challenge of managers is to determine the trade-off between local adaptation and its cost structure. For example, cost considerations led Procter & Gamble to standardize its diaper design across all European markets. This was done despite research data indicating that Italian mothers, unlike those in other countries, preferred diapers that covered the baby’s navel. Later, however, P&G recognized that this feature was critical to these mothers, so the company decided to incorporate this feature for the Italian market despite its adverse cost implications.

• At times, local adaptations, even when well intentioned, may backfire. When the American restaurant chain TGI Fridays entered the South Korean market, it purposely incorporated many local dishes, such as kimchi (hot, spicy cabbage), in its menu. This responsiveness, however, was not well received. Company analysis of the weak market acceptance indicated that Korean customers anticipated a visit to TGI Fridays as a visit to America. Thus, finding Korean dishes was inconsistent with their expectations.

• The optimal degree of local adaptation evolves over time. In many industry segments, a variety of factors, such as the inf luence of global media, greater international travel, and declining income disparities across countries, may lead to increasing global standardization. On the other hand, in other industry segments, especially where the product or service can be delivered over the Internet (such as music), the need for even greater customization and local adaptation may increase over time. Firms must recalibrate the need for local adaptation on an ongoing basis; excessive adaptation extracts a price as surely as underadaptation.

Exhibit 7.6 summarizes the strengths and limitations of multidomestic strategies.

Transnational Strategy A transnational strategy strives to optimize the trade-offs associated with efficiency, local adaptation, and learning.55 It seeks efficiency not for its own sake but as a means to achieve global competitiveness.56 It recognizes the importance of local responsiveness as a tool for flexibility in international operations.57 Innovations are regarded as an out- come of a larger process of organizational learning that includes the contributions of everyone in the firm.58 Also, a core tenet of the transnational model is that a firm’s assets and capabilities are dispersed according to the most beneficial location for each activity. Thus, managers avoid the tendency to either concentrate activities in a central location (a global strategy) or disperse them across many locations to enhance adaptation

transnational strategy a strategy based on firms’ optimizing the trade-offs associated with efficiency, local adaptation, and learning; used in industries where the pressures for both local adaptation and lowering costs are high.

Strengths Limitations

• Ability to adapt products and services to local market conditions. • Ability to detect potential opportunities for attractive niches in a

given market, enhancing revenue.

• Decreased ability to realize cost savings through scale economies. • Greater difficulty in transferring knowledge across countries. • Possibility of leading to “overadaptation” as conditions change.

EXHIBIT 7.6 Strengths and Limitations of Multidomestic Strategies

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(a multidomestic strategy). Peter Brabeck, former chairman of Nestlé, the giant food com- pany, provides such a perspective:

The closer we come to the consumer, in branding, pricing, communication, and product adaptation, the more we decentralize. The more we are dealing with production, logistics, and supply-chain management, the more centralized decision making becomes. After all, we want to leverage Nestlé’s size, not be hampered by it.59

The Nestlé example illustrates a common approach in determining whether or not to centralize or decentralize a value-chain activity. Typically, primary activities that are “down- stream” (e.g., marketing and sales, and service), or closer to the customer, tend to require more decentralization in order to adapt to local market conditions. On the other hand, pri- mary activities that are “upstream” (e.g., logistics and operations), or further away from the customer, tend to be centralized. This is because there is less need for adapting these activi- ties to local markets and the firm can benefit from economies of scale. Additionally, many support activities, such as information systems and procurement, tend to be centralized in order to increase the potential for economies of scale.

A central philosophy of the transnational organization is enhanced adaptation to all competitive situations as well as flexibility by capitalizing on communication and knowl- edge flows throughout the organization.60 A principal characteristic is the integration of unique contributions of all units into worldwide operations. Thus, a joint innovation by headquarters and by one of the overseas units can lead potentially to the development of relatively standardized and yet flexible products and services that are suitable for multiple markets. Strategy Spotlight 7.5 discusses how Panasonic benefited from moving from a global to a transnational strategy.

Risks and Challenges As with the other strategies, there are some unique risks and chal- lenges associated with a transnational strategy:

• The choice of a seemingly optimal location cannot guarantee that the quality and cost of factor inputs (i.e., labor, materials) will be optimal. Managers must ensure that the relative advantage of a location is actually realized, not squandered because of weaknesses in productivity and the quality of internal operations. Ford Motor Co., for example, has benefited from having some of its manufacturing operations in Mexico. While some have argued that the benefits of lower wage rates will be partly offset by lower productivity, this does not always have to be the case. Since unemployment in Mexico is higher than in the United States, Ford can be more selective in its hiring practices for its Mexican operations. And given the lower turnover among its Mexican employees, Ford can justify a high level of investment in training and development. Thus, the net result can be not only lower wage rates but also higher productivity than in the United States.

• Although knowledge transfer can be a key source of competitive advantage, it does not take place “automatically.” For knowledge transfer to take place from one subsidiary to another, it is important for the source of the knowledge, the target units, and the corporate headquarters to recognize the potential value of such unique know-how. Given that there can be significant geographic, linguistic, and cultural distances that typically separate subsidiaries, the potential for knowledge transfer can become very difficult to realize. Firms must create mechanisms to systematically and routinely uncover the opportunities for knowledge transfer.

Exhibit 7.7 summarizes the relative advantages and disadvantages of transnational strategies.

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7.5 STRATEGY SPOTLIGHT PANASONIC’S CHINA EXPERIENCE SHOWS THE BENEFITS OF BEING A TRANSNATIONAL Panasonic moved into China in the late 1980s, seeing it as a low-cost region in which to manufacture its products. Traditionally, Panasonic had used a global strategy in its opera- tions. It designed standardized products in Japan, manufac- tured them in low-cost markets, and sold its products primarily in developed markets. China simply served as a manufacturing location.

This worked well until the Chinese economy started to grow and mature. As the Chinese middle class began to emerge, local competitors, such as Haier, quickly jumped in with products designed for the Chinese market and outcompeted Panasonic in the growing market. This led Panasonic to radically change its way of competing in the global market.

Panasonic embraced the need to balance global inte- gration with local adaptation. It set up a Lifestyle Research Center in China. In this center, marketing and product devel- opment staff compiled and interpreted data on customer wants and needs. Their charge was to uncover hidden needs in the Chinese market and design products to meet those needs. At the same time, country managers emphasized the need for the center staff to design products that benefited from global integration. For example, staff members were told to regularly work with engineers in Japan to ensure that product designs used standard global parts in the Panasonic system and also leveraged technologies being developed in Japan. Over time, this built trust with the Japanese engineers, who began to discuss how to draw on their knowledge to help design products that could be sold in other markets. Thus, knowledge flowed in both directions: from Japan to China and from China to Japan and, by extension, the rest of the world. The system has worked so well in China that Panasonic has expanded its policies and built lifestyle research centers in Europe and India.

There are five key elements of Panasonic’s transnational ini- tiatives. Each allows Panasonic to manage the tension for global integration and local adaptation.

• Establish a dedicated unit. One organization should be devoted to embracing the tension. The aim of Panasonic’s China Lifestyle Research Center was to both understand Chinese consumers and draw on Panasonic Japan’s R&D capabilities.

• Create an on-the-ground mission. The unit’s mission should state explicitly how local adaptation and cross- border integration support company strategy. The lifestyle center’s mission was “data interpretation,” not just data collection, to ensure that insights led to viable product proposals that leveraged Panasonic’s technology assets.

• Develop core local staff. The unit should develop local staff who can engage in both localization and integration activities. At the lifestyle center, each staff member spent a year getting training and extensive coaching in fieldwork and proposal writing for products that leverage Panasonic’s technology to meet local needs.

• Extend the reach. The unit must constantly push to expand its influence. The lifestyle center’s leader ratcheted up communication and interaction between the center and engineers at Panasonic’s headquarters to broaden the organization’s scope and influence.

• Strengthen local authority. Sufficient authority should be given to overseas subsidiaries to enhance their autonomy while ensuring sound global integration. Seeing the early successes of the lifestyle center, Panasonic gave increasing authority to its Chinese operations for deeper local adaptation while also maintaining integrated working relationships between Japan and China.

Sources: Wakayama, T., Shintaku, J., & Amano, T. 2012. What Panasonic learned in China. Harvard Business Review, December: 109–113; and Osawa, J. 2012. Panasonic pins hopes on home appliances. wsj.com, March 25: np.

EXHIBIT 7.7 Strengths and Limitations of Transnational Strategies

Strengths Limitations

• Ability to attain economies of scale. • Ability to adapt to local markets. • Ability to locate activities in optimal locations. • Ability to increase knowledge flows and learning.

• Unique challenges in determining optimal locations of activities to ensure cost and quality.

• Unique managerial challenges in fostering knowledge transfer.

Global or Regional? A Second Look at Globalization Thus far, we have suggested four possible strategies from which a firm must choose once it has decided to compete in the global marketplace. In recent years, many writ- ers have asserted that the process of globalization has caused national borders to

LO 7-6 The difference between regional companies and truly global companies.

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become increasingly irrelevant.61 However, some scholars have questioned this per- spective, and they have argued that it is unwise for companies to rush into full-scale globalization.62

Before answering questions about the extent of firms’ globalization, let’s try to clarify what “globalization” means. Traditionally, a firm’s globalization is measured in terms of its foreign sales as a percentage of total sales. However, this measure can be misleading. For example, consider a U.S. firm that has expanded its activities into Canada. Clearly, this initiative is qualitatively different from achieving the same sales volume in a distant country such as China. Similarly, if a Malaysian firm expands into Singapore or a German firm starts selling its products in Austria, this would repre- sent an expansion into a geographically adjacent country. Such nearby countries would often share many common characteristics in terms of language, culture, infrastruc- ture, and customer preferences. In other words, this is more a case of regionalization than globalization.

Extensive analysis of the distribution data of sales across different countries and regions led Alan Rugman and Alain Verbeke to conclude that there is a stronger case to be made in favor of regionalization than globalization. According to their study, a company would have to have at least 20 percent of its sales in each of the three major economic regions—North America, Europe, and Asia—to be considered a global firm. However, they found that only 9 of the world’s 500 largest firms met this standard! Even when they relaxed the criterion to 20 percent of sales each in at least two of the three regions, the number only increased to 25. Thus, most companies are regional or, at best, biregional—not global—even today.

In a world of instant communication, rapid transportation, and governments that are increasingly willing to open up their markets to trade and investment, why are so few firms “global”? The most obvious answer is that distance still matters. After all, it is easier to do business in a neighboring country than in a faraway country, all else being equal. Distance, in the final analysis, may be viewed as a concept with many dimensions, not just a measure of geographic distance. For example, both Canada and Mexico are the same distance from the United States However, U.S. companies find it easier to expand operations into Canada than into Mexico. Why? Canada and the United States share many commonalities in terms of lan- guage, culture, economic development, legal and political systems, and infrastructure devel- opment. Thus, if we view distance as having many dimensions, the United States and Canada are very close, whereas there is greater distance between the United States and Mexico. Similarly, when we look at what we might call the “true” distance between the United States and China, the effects of geographic distance are multiplied by distance in terms of culture, language, religion, and legal and political systems between the two countries. On the other hand, although the United States and Australia are geographically distant, the “true” dis- tance is somewhat less when one considers distance along the other dimensions.

Another reason for regional expansion is the rise of trading blocs and free trade zones. A number of regional agreements have been created that facilitate the growth of busi- ness within these regions by easing trade restrictions and taxes and tariffs. These have included the European Union (EU), North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), and MERCOSUR (a South American trading block).

Regional economic integration has progressed at a faster pace than global economic integration, and the trade and investment patterns of the largest companies reflect this reality. After all, regions represent the outcomes of centuries of political and cultural his- tory that results in not only commonalities but also mutual affinity. For example, stretch- ing from Algeria and Morocco in the West to Oman and Yemen in the East, more than 30 countries share the Arabic language and the Muslim religion, making these countries a natural regional bloc. Similarly, the countries of South and Central America share the

regionalization increasing international exchange of goods, services, money, people, ideas, and information; and the increasing similarity of culture, laws, rules, and norms within a region such as Europe, North America, or Asia.

trading blocs groups of countries agreeing to increase trade between them by lowering trade barriers.

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Spanish language (except Brazil), the Catholic religion, and a history of Spanish colonial- ism. No wonder firms find it easier and less risky to expand within their region than to other regions.

ENTRY MODES OF INTERNATIONAL EXPANSION A firm has many options available to it when it decides to expand into international mar- kets. Given the challenges associated with such entry, many firms first start on a small scale and then increase their level of investment and risk as they gain greater experience with the overseas market in question.63

Exhibit 7.8 illustrates a wide variety of modes of foreign entry, including exporting, licensing, franchising, joint ventures, strategic alliances, and wholly owned subsidiaries.64 As the exhibit indicates, the various types of entry form a continuum ranging from export- ing (low investment and risk, low control) to a wholly owned subsidiary (high investment and risk, high control).65

There can be frustrations and setbacks as a firm evolves its international entry strategy from exporting to more expensive types, including wholly owned subsidiaries. For example, according to the CEO of a large U.S. specialty chemical company:

In the end, we always do a better job with our own subsidiaries; sales improve, and we have greater control over the business. But we still need local distributors for entry, and we are still searching for strategies to get us through the transitions without battles over control and performance.66

Exporting Exporting consists of producing goods in one country to sell in another.67 This entry strat- egy enables a firm to invest the least amount of resources in terms of its product, its orga- nization, and its overall corporate strategy. Many host countries dislike this entry strategy because it provides less local employment than other modes of entry.68

Multinationals often stumble onto a stepwise strategy for penetrating markets, begin- ning with the exporting of products. This often results in a series of unplanned actions to

LO 7-7 The four basic types of entry strategies and the relative benefits and risks associated with each of them.

exporting producing goods in one country to sell to residents of another country.

EXHIBIT 7.8 Entry Modes for International Expansion

HighLow

High

Low

Degree of Ownership and Control

Ex te

nt o

f I nv

es tm

en t a

nd R

is k

Exporting

Licensing

Franchising

Strategic Alliance

Joint Venture

Wholly Owned Subsidiary

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increase sales revenues. As the pattern recurs with entries into subsequent markets, this approach, named a “beachhead strategy,” often becomes official policy.69

Benefits Such an approach definitely has its advantages. After all, firms start from scratch in sales and distribution when they enter new markets. Because many foreign markets are nationally regulated and dominated by networks of local intermediaries, firms need to part- ner with local distributors to benefit from their valuable expertise and knowledge of their own markets. Multinationals, after all, recognize that they cannot master local business practices, meet regulatory requirements, hire and manage local personnel, or gain access to potential customers without some form of local partnership.

Multinationals also want to minimize their own risk. They do this by hiring local dis- tributors and investing very little in the undertaking. In essence, the firm gives up control of strategic marketing decisions to the local partners—much more control than they would be willing to give up in their home market.

Risks and Limitations Exporting is a relatively inexpensive way to enter foreign mar- kets. However, it can still have significant downsides. Most centrally, the ability to tailor the firm’s products to meet local market needs is typically very limited. In a study of 250 instances in which multinational firms used local distributors to implement their exporting entry strategy, the results were dismal. In the vast majority of the cases, the distributors were bought (to increase control) by the multinational firm or were fired. In contrast, successful distributors shared two common characteristics:

• They carried product lines that complemented, rather than competed with, the multinational’s products.

• They behaved as if they were business partners with the multinationals. They shared market information with the corporations, they initiated projects with distributors in neighboring countries, and they suggested initiatives in their own or nearby markets. Additionally, these distributors took on risk themselves by investing in areas such as training, information systems, and advertising and promotion in order to increase the business of their multinational partners.

The key point is the importance of developing collaborative, win–win relationships. To ensure more control over operations without incurring significant risks, many firms

have used licensing and franchising as a mode of entry. Let’s now discuss these and their relative advantages and disadvantages.

Licensing and Franchising Licensing and franchising are both forms of contractual arrangements. Licensing enables a company to receive a royalty or fee in exchange for the right to use its trademark, patent, trade secret, or other valuable item of intellectual property.70

Franchising contracts generally include a broader range of factors in an operation and have a longer time period during which the agreement is in effect. Franchising remains a primary form of American business. According to a survey, more than 400 U.S. franchisers have international exposure.71 This is greater than the combined totals of the next four larg- est franchiser home countries—France, the United Kingdom, Mexico, and Austria.

Benefits In international markets, an advantage of licensing is that the firm granting a license incurs little risk, since it does not have to invest any significant resources into the country itself. In turn, the licensee (the firm receiving the license) gains access to the trade- mark, patent, and so on, and is able to potentially create competitive advantages. In many cases, the country also benefits from the product being manufactured locally. For example,

licensing a contractual arrangement in which a company receives a royalty or fee in exchange for the right to use its trademark, patent, trade secret, or other valuable intellectual property.

franchising a contractual arrangement in which a company receives a royalty or fee in exchange for the right to use its intellectual property; franchising usually involves a longer time period than licensing and includes other factors, such as monitoring of operations, training, and advertising.

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Yoplait yogurt is licensed by General Mills from Sodima, a French cooperative, for sale in the United States. The logos of college and professional athletic teams in the United States are another source of trademarks that generate significant royalty income domestically and internationally.

Franchising has the advantage of limiting the risk exposure that a firm has in overseas markets. At the same time, the firm is able to expand the revenue base of the company.

Risks and Limitations The licensor gives up control of its product and forgoes potential revenues and profits. Furthermore, the licensee may eventually become so familiar with the patent and trade secrets that it may become a competitor; that is, the licensee may make some modifications to the product and manufacture and sell it independently of the licen- sor without having to pay a royalty fee. This potential situation is aggravated in countries that have relatively weak laws to protect intellectual property. Additionally, if the licensee selected by the multinational firm turns out to be a poor choice, the brand name and reputa- tion of the product may be tarnished.72

With franchising, the multinational firm receives only a portion of the revenues, in the form of franchise fees. Had the firm set up the operation itself (e.g., a restaurant through direct investment), it would have had the entire revenue to itself.

Companies often desire a closer collaboration with other firms in order to increase rev- enue, reduce costs, and enhance their learning—often through the diffusion of technology. To achieve such objectives, they enter into strategic alliances or joint ventures, two entry modes we will discuss next.

Strategic Alliances and Joint Ventures Joint ventures and strategic alliances have recently become increasingly popular.73 These two forms of partnership differ in that joint ventures entail the creation of a third-party legal entity, whereas strategic alliances do not. In addition, strategic alliances generally focus on initiatives that are smaller in scope than joint ventures.74

Benefits As we discussed in Chapter 6, these strategies have been effective in helping firms increase revenues and reduce costs as well as enhance learning and diffuse technolo- gies.75 These partnerships enable firms to share the risks as well as the potential revenues and profits. Also, by gaining exposure to new sources of knowledge and technologies, such partnerships can help firms develop core competencies that can lead to competitive advan- tages in the marketplace.76 Finally, entering into partnerships with host-country firms can provide very useful information on local market tastes, competitive conditions, legal mat- ters, and cultural nuances.77

Risks and Limitations Managers must be aware of the risks associated with strategic alliances and joint ventures and how they can be minimized.78 First, there needs to be a clearly defined strategy that is strongly supported by the organizations that are party to the partnership. Otherwise, the firms may work at cross-purposes and not achieve any of their goals. Second, and closely allied to the first issue, there must be a clear understanding of capabilities and resources that will be central to the partnership. Without such clari- fication, there will be fewer opportunities for learning and developing competencies that could lead to competitive advantages. Third, trust is a vital element. Phasing in the relation- ship between alliance partners permits them to get to know each other better and develop trust. Without trust, one party may take advantage of the other by, for example, withholding its fair share of resources and gaining access to privileged information through unethical (or illegal) means. Fourth, cultural issues that can potentially lead to conflict and dysfunc- tional behaviors need to be addressed. An organization’s culture is the set of values, beliefs, and attitudes that influence the behavior and goals of its employees.79 Thus, recognizing

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cultural differences, as well as striving to develop elements of a “common culture” for the partnership, is vital. Without a unifying culture, it will become difficult to combine and leverage resources that are increasingly important in knowledge-intensive organizations (dis- cussed in Chapter 4).80

Finally, the success of a firm’s alliance should not be left to chance.81 To improve their odds of success, many companies have carefully documented alliance-management knowledge by creating guidelines and manuals to help them manage specific aspects of the entire alliance life cycle (e.g., partner selection and alliance negotiation and con- tracting). For example, Hewlett-Packard developed 60 different tools and templates, which it placed in a 300-page manual for guiding decision making. The manual included such tools as a template for making the business case for an alliance, a partner evalu- ation form, a negotiation template outlining the roles and responsibilities of different departments, a list of the ways to measure alliance performance, and an alliance termi- nation checklist.

When a firm desires the highest level of control, it develops wholly owned subsidiaries. Although wholly owned subsidiaries can generate the greatest returns, they also have the highest levels of investment and risk. We will now discuss them.

Wholly Owned Subsidiaries A wholly owned subsidiary is a business in which a multinational company owns 100 percent of the stock. Two ways a firm can establish a wholly owned subsidiary are to (1) acquire an existing company in the home country or (2) develop a totally new operation (often referred to as a “greenfield venture”).

Benefits Establishing a wholly owned subsidiary is the most expensive and risky of the various entry modes. However, it can also yield the highest returns. In addition, it provides the multinational company with the greatest degree of control of all activities, including manufacturing, marketing, distribution, and technology development.82

Wholly owned subsidiaries are most appropriate where a firm already has the appro- priate knowledge and capabilities that it can leverage rather easily through multiple loca- tions. Examples range from restaurants to semiconductor manufacturers. To lower costs, for example, Intel Corporation builds semiconductor plants throughout the world—all of which use virtually the same blueprint. Knowledge can be further leveraged by hiring managers and professionals from the firm’s home country, often through hiring talent from competitors.

Risks and Limitations As noted, wholly owned subsidiaries are typically the most expen- sive and risky entry mode. With franchising, joint ventures, or strategic alliances, the risk is shared with the firm’s partners. With wholly owned subsidiaries, the entire risk is assumed by the parent company. The risks associated with doing business in a new country (e.g., political, cultural, and legal) can be lessened by hiring local talent.

For example, Wendy’s avoided committing two blunders in Germany by hiring locals to its advertising staff.83 In one case, the firm wanted to promote its “old-fashioned” qualities. However, a literal translation would have resulted in the company promoting itself as “out- dated.” In another situation, Wendy’s wanted to emphasize that its hamburgers could be prepared 256 ways. The problem? The German word that Wendy’s wanted to use for “ways” usually meant “highways” or “roads.” Although such errors may sometimes be entertaining to the public, it is certainly preferable to catch these mistakes before they confuse the con- sumer or embarrass the company.

We have addressed entry strategies as a progression from exporting to the creation of wholly owned subsidiaries. However, we must point out that many firms do not follow such an evolutionary approach.

wholly owned subsidiary a business in which a multinational company owns 100 percent of the stock.

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ISSUE FOR DEBATE

The Ethicality of Tax Inversions In June 2014, Medtronic, a Minneapolis-based medical device manufacturer, announced that it would join the tax-inversion acquisition parade. A tax-inversion acquisition occurs when a corporation acquires a target firm based in a lower-tax country and, as part of the transaction, moves its legal headquarters to the target firm’s nation. After making this move, the combined corporation’s taxes are based on the lower rate of its new home country. This move is perfectly legal according to U.S. law as long as the target firm’s shareholders own at least 20 percent of the combined firm. About 50 U.S. corporations have undertaken tax inversions over the last 10 years, but the rate of occurrence appears to be increasing.

Medtronic acquired Covidien, an Irish-based medical equipment manufacturer, in January 2015 for $49.9 billion, and moved its legal home to Ireland. Not much else changed. Medtronic kept its corporate headquarters in Minneapolis. But Medtronic benefits from the move in two primary ways. First, while the tax rate on profits of U.S. corporations is 35 percent, the tax rate on Ireland-based corporate profits is only 12.5 percent. Additionally, the United States is one of only six developed economies that tax the global profits of corporations. If a multinational corporation makes profits in a foreign country, the firm pays taxes on those profits to the foreign government at the rate the foreign country charges. For corporations based in most countries, that is the end of their tax obligations. However, if a U.S.-based firm wants to bring those profits back to its home country either to invest in new facilities or to distribute dividends to its stockholders, it has to pay income tax on the profits earned in foreign markets. The rate the firm pays is the difference in the tax rate in the foreign country and the U.S. rate. For example, if Medtronic earned income in Ireland and then repatriated the profits to the United States, it would face a 22.5 percent additional tax rate, the difference between the U.S. and Irish corporate tax rates. Since Medtronic has accumulated $13 billion in earned profits abroad, it could face $3.5 billion to $4 billion in taxes if it brought those profits home. Thus, corporations, such as Medtronic, undertake tax inversions to save on taxes and, by extension, benefit their shareholders by being able to invest more in the firm to help it grow and/or return higher levels of dividends to shareholders.

Critics, however, point out that these firms are choosing not to pay taxes at the U.S. rates even though they have benefited and will continue to benefit from being American corporations. While inverters change their legal residence, they typically keep their corporate headquarters in the United States and stay listed on a U.S. stock exchange. As a result, they benefit from America’s deep financial markets, military might, intellectual property rights and other legal protections, intellectual and physical infrastructure, substantial human capital base, and national research programs. For example, Medtronic won $484 million in contracts with the U.S. government in recent years and plans to complete these contracts even though it will no longer be an American company; it hires students from top-notch American universities; and it files patents for all of its new technologies in the United States. Critics see the decision to move to a lower-tax country as unethical and unpatriotic. Jack Lew, the former U.S. Treasury secretary, echoed this perspective when he stated, “We should prevent companies from effectively renouncing their citizenship to get out of paying taxes. What we need is a new sense of economic patriotism, where we all rise and fall together.”

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Discussion Questions 1. Was Medtronic justified in moving its legal home to Ireland? 2. How should firms balance the desire to limit taxes to maximize cash generation with the

need to be a good corporate citizen? 3. How should the U.S. government respond to the increasing frequency of tax inversions?

Sources: Vivanco, F. 2015. Medtronic completes acquisition of Covidien. www.newsroom.medtronic.com, January 25: np; Sloan, A. 2014. Positively un-American. fortune.com, July 7: np; McKinnon, J. 2014. Obama administration urges immediate action on “inversion.” wsj. com, July 15: np; Sahadi, J. 2014. When U.S. companies dodge taxes, is it unpatriotic? finance.yahoo.com, July 23: np; Anonymous. 2014. Medtronic’s tax inversion lesson. wsj.com, August 13: np; and Gleckman, H. 2014. The tax-shopping backstory of the Medtronic- Covidien inversion. forbes.com, June 17: np.

Reflecting on Career Implications . . . This chapter discusses the challenges and opportunities of international markets. The following questions ask students to consider how the globalization of business can create both opportunities and risks for their careers.

International Strategy: Be aware of your organization’s international strategy. What percentage of the total firm activity is international? What skills are needed to enhance your company’s international efforts? How can you get more involved in your organization’s international strategy? For your career, what conditions in your home country might cause you to seek a career abroad?

Outsourcing and Offshoring: More and more organizations have resorted to outsourcing and offshoring in recent years. To what extent has your firm engaged in either? What activities in your organization can/should be outsourced or offshored? Be aware that you are competing in the global marketplace for employment and professional advancement. What is the likelihood that your own job may be outsourced or

offshored? In what ways can you enhance your talents, skills, and competencies to reduce the odds that your job may be offshored or outsourced?

International Career Opportunities: Taking on overseas assignments in other countries can often provide a career boost. There are a number of ways in which you can improve your odds of being selected for an overseas assignment. Studying abroad for a semester or doing an overseas internship are two obvious strategies. Learning a foreign language can also greatly help. Anticipate how such opportunities will advance your short- and long-term career aspirations.

Management Risks: Explore ways in which you can develop cultural sensitivity. Interacting with people from other cultures, foreign travel, reading about foreign countries, watching foreign movies, and similar activities can increase your cultural sensitivity. Identify ways in which your perceptions and behaviors have changed as a result of increased cultural sensitivity.

We live in a highly interconnected global community where many of the best opportunities for growth and profit- ability lie beyond the boundaries of a company’s home country. Along with the opportunities, of course, there are many

risks associated with diversification into global markets. The first section of the chapter addressed the factors

that determine a nation’s competitiveness in a particular industry. The framework was developed by Professor Michael Porter of Harvard University and was based on a four-year study that explored the competitive success of 10 leading trading nations. The four factors, collectively termed the “diamond of national advantage,” were factor endowments, demand conditions, related and supporting industries, and firm strategy, structure, and rivalry.

The discussion of Porter’s “diamond” helped, in essence, to set the broader context for exploring competitive advantage at the firm level. In the second section, we discussed the primary motivations and the potential risks associated with international expansion. The primary motivations included increasing the size of the potential market for the firm’s products and services, achieving economies of scale, extending the life cycle of the firm’s products, and optimizing the location for every activity in the value chain. On the other hand, the key risks included political and economic risks, currency risks, and management risks. Management risks are the challenges associated with responding to the inevitable differences that exist across countries such as customs, culture, language, customer preferences, and distribution systems. We also addressed some of the managerial challenges and opportunities associated with offshoring and outsourcing.

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EXPERIENTIAL EXERCISE The United States is considered a world leader in the motion picture industry. Using Porter’s diamond framework for national competitiveness, explain the success of this industry. (Fill in the chart on page 233.)

Next, we addressed how firms can go about attaining competitive advantage in global markets. We began by discussing the two opposing forces—cost reduction and adaptation to local markets—that managers must contend with when entering global markets. The relative importance of these two factors plays a major part in determining which of the four basic types of strategies to select: international, global, multidomestic, or transnational. The chapter covered the benefits and risks associated with each type of strategy.

The final section discussed the four types of entry strategies that managers may undertake when entering international markets. The key trade-off in each of these strategies is the level of investment or risk versus the level of control. In order of their progressively greater investment/ risk and control, the strategies range from exporting to licensing and franchising, to strategic alliances and joint ventures, to wholly owned subsidiaries. The relative benefits and risks associated with each of these strategies were addressed.

SUMMARY REVIEW QUESTIONS 1. What are some of the advantages and disadvantages

associated with a firm’s expansion into international markets?

2. What are the four factors described in Porter’s diamond of national advantage? How do the four factors explain why some industries in a given country are more successful than others?

3. Explain the two opposing forces—cost reduction and adaptation to local markets—that firms must deal with when they go global.

4. There are four basic strategies—international, global, multidomestic, and transnational. What are the advantages and disadvantages associated with each?

5. What is the basis of Alan Rugman’s argument that most multinationals are still more regional than global? What factors inhibit firms from becoming truly global?

6. Describe the basic entry strategies that firms have available when they enter international markets. What are the relative advantages and disadvantages of each?

globalization 204 diamond of national advantage 205

factor endowments (national advantage) 205 demand conditions (national advantage) 205 related and supporting industries (national advantage) 206

key terms

firm strategy, structure, and rivalry (national advantage) 206 multinational firms 208 arbitrage opportunities 208 reverse innovation 210 political risk 211 rule of law 211 economic risk 212 counterfeiting 212 currency risk 212 management risk 213

outsourcing 215 offshoring 215 international strategy 218 global strategy 219 multidomestic strategy 220 transnational strategy 222 regionalization 225 trading blocs 225 exporting 226 licensing 227 franchising 227 wholly owned subsidiary 229

APPLICATION QUESTIONS & EXERCISES 1. Data on the “competitiveness of nations” can be

found at www.imd.org/research/publications/wcy/ index.cfm. This website provides a ranking on 4 main factors and 20 subfactors for 61 countries. How might Porter’s diamond of national advantage help to explain the rankings for some of these countries for certain industries that interest you?

2. The Internet has lowered the entry barriers for smaller firms that wish to diversify into international markets. Why is this so? Provide an example.

3. Many firms fail when they enter into strategic alliances with firms that link up with companies based in other countries. What are some reasons for this failure? Provide an example.

4. Many large U.S.-based management consulting companies such as McKinsey and Company and the BCG Group have been very successful in the international marketplace. How can Porter’s diamond explain their success?

ETHICS QUESTIONS 1. Over the past few decades, many American firms

have relocated most or all of their operations from the United States to countries such as Mexico and China that pay lower wages. What are some of the ethical issues that such actions may raise?

2. Business practices and customs vary throughout the world. What are some of the ethical issues concerning payments that must be made in a foreign country to obtain business opportunities?

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Domestic rivalry 1.

2.

3.

Related and supporting industries

1.

2.

3.

Factor conditions 1.

2.

3.

Demand conditions 1.

2.

3.

1. For a discussion on globalization by one of international business’s most respected authors, read Ohmae, K. 2005. The next global stage: Challenges and opportunities in our borderless world. Philadelphia: Wharton School.

2. Our discussion of globalization draws upon Engardio, P. & Belton, C. 2000. Global capitalism: Can it be made to work better? BusinessWeek, November 6: 72–98.

3. Sellers, P. 2005. Blowing in the wind. Fortune, July 25: 63.

4. Rivera, J. 2014. Gartner says sales of smartphones grew 20 percent in third quarter of 2014. gartner.com, December 15: np.

5. Anonymous. 2016. Why giants thrive. The Economist. September 17: 5–7.

6. Some insights into how winners are evolving in emerging markets are addressed in Ghemawat, P. & Hout, T. 2008. Tomorrow’s global giants: Not the usual suspects. Harvard Business Review, 66(11): 80–88.

7. For another interesting discussion on a country perspective, refer to Makino, S. 1999. MITI Minister

Kaora Yosano on reviving Japan’s competitive advantages. Academy of Management Executive, 13(4): 8–28.

8. The following discussion draws heavily upon Porter, M. E. 1990. The competitive advantage of nations. Harvard Business Review, March–April: 73–93.

9. Landes, D. S. 1998. The wealth and poverty of nations. New York: W. W. Norton.

10. A study that investigates the relationship between international diversification and firm performance is Lu, J. W. & Beamish, P. W. 2004. International diversification and firm performance: The s-curve hypothesis. Academy of Management Journal, 47(4): 598–609.

11. Part of our discussion of the motivations and risks of international expansion draws upon Gregg, F. M. 1999. International strategy. In Helms, M. M. (Ed.), Encyclopedia of management: 434–438. Detroit: Gale Group.

12. Anthony, S. 2012. Singapore sessions. Harvard Business Review, 90(4): np.

13. Eyring, M. J., Johnson, M. W., & Nair, H. 2011. New business models in

emerging markets. Harvard Business Review, 89 (1/2): 88–98.

14. Cieply, M. & Barnes, B. 2010. After rants, skepticism over Gibson bankability grows in non-U.S. markets. International Herald Tribune, July 23: 1.

15. Glazer, E. 2012. P&G unit bids goodbye to Cincinnati, hello to Asia. wsj.com, May 10: np.

16. This discussion draws upon Gupta, A. K. & Govindarajan, V. 2001. Converting global presence into global competitive advantage. Academy of Management Executive, 15(2): 45–56.

17. Stross, R. E. 1997. Mr. Gates builds his brain trust. Fortune, December 8: 84–98.

18. Anonymous. 2016. Why giants thrive. The Economist. September 17: 5–7.

19. For a good summary of the benefits and risks of international expansion, refer to Bartlett, C. A. & Ghoshal, S. 1987. Managing across borders: New strategic responses. Sloan Management Review, 28(5): 45–53; and Brown, R. H. 1994. Competing to win in a global economy. Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Commerce.

REFERENCES

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20. Capron, L. & Bertrand, O. 2014. Going abroad in search of higher productivity at home. Harvard Business Review, 92(6): 26.

21. For an interesting insight into rivalry in global markets, refer to MacMillan, I. C., van Putten, A. B., & McGrath, R. G. 2003. Global gamesmanship. Harvard Business Review, 81(5): 62–73.

22. It is important for firms to spread their foreign operations and outsourcing relationships with a broad, well-balanced mix of regions and countries to reduce risk and increase potential reward. For example, refer to Vestring, T., Rouse, T., & Reinert, U. 2005. Hedge your offshoring bets. MIT Sloan Management Review, 46(3): 27–29.

23. An interesting discussion of risks faced by Lukoil, Russia’s largest oil firm, is in Gimbel, B. 2009. Russia’s king of crude. Fortune, February 2: 88–92.

24. For a discussion of some of the challenges associated with government corruption regarding entry strategies in foreign markets, read Rodriguez, P., Uhlenbruck, K., & Eden, L. 2005. Government corruption and entry strategies of multinationals. Academy of Management Review, 30(2): 383–396.

25. For a discussion of the political risks in China for United States companies, refer to Garten, J. E. 1998. Opening the doors for business in China. Harvard Business Review, 76(3): 167–175.

26. Insights on how forensic economics can be used to investigate crimes and wrongdoing are in Fisman, R. 2009. The rise of forensic economics. Harvard Business Review, 87(2): 26.

27. Iosebashvili, I. 2012. Renault-Nissan buy into Russia’s aged auto giant. wsj. com, May 3: np.

28. Ferguson, N. 2013. Is the business of America still business? Harvard Business Review, 91(6): 40.

29. For an interesting perspective on the relationship between diversification and the development of a nation’s institutional environment, read Chakrabarti, A., Singh, K., & Mahmood, I. 2007. Diversification and performance: Evidence from East Asian firms. Strategic Management Journal, 28(2): 101–120.

30. A study looking into corruption and foreign direct investment is Brouthers, L. E., Gao, Y., & McNicol, J. P. 2008. Strategic Management Journal, 29(6): 673–680.

31. Gikkas, N. S. 1996. International licensing of intellectual property:

The promise and the peril. Journal of Technology Law & Policy, 1(1): 1–26.

32. Hargreaves, S. 2012. Counterfeit goods becoming more dangerous. cnnmoney.com, September 27: np.

33. Sandler, N. 2008. Israel: Attack of the super-shekel. BusinessWeek, Februrary 25: 38.

34. For an excellent theoretical discussion of how cultural factors can affect knowledge transfer across national boundaries, refer to Bhagat, R. S., Kedia, B. L., Harveston, P. D., & Triandis, H. C. 2002. Cultural variations in the cross-border transfer of organizational knowledge: An integrative framework. Academy of Management Review, 27(2): 204–221.

35. An interesting discussion on how local companies compete effectively with large multinationals is in Bhatacharya, A. K. & Michael, D. C. 2008. Harvard Business Review, 66(3): 84–95.

36. To gain insights on the role of national and regional cultures on knowledge management models and frameworks, read Pauleen, D. J. & Murphy, P. 2005. In praise of cultural bias. MIT Sloan Management Review, 46(2): 21–22.

37. Berkowitz, E. N. 2000. Marketing (6th ed.). New York: McGraw-Hill.

38. World Trade Organization. Annual Report 1998. Geneva: World Trade Organization.

39. Lei, D. 2005. Outsourcing. In Hitt, M. A. & Ireland, R. D. (Eds.), The Blackwell encyclopedia of management, Entrepreneurship: 196–199. Malden, MA: Blackwell.

40. Future trends in offshoring are addressed in Manning, S., Massini, S., & Lewin, A. Y. 2008. A dynamic perspective on next-generation offshoring: The global sourcing of science and engineering talent. Academy of Management Perspectives, 22(3): 35–54.

41. An interesting perspective on the controversial issue regarding the offshoring of airplane maintenance is in Smith, G. & Bachman, J. 2008. Flying in for a tune-up overseas. BusinessWeek, April 21: 26–27.

42. The discussion draws from Colvin, J. 2004. Think your job can’t be sent to India? Just watch. Fortune, December 13: 80; Schwartz, N. D. 2004. Down and out in white collar America. Fortune, June 23: 321–325; and Hagel, J. 2004. Outsourcing is not just about cost cutting. The Wall Street Journal, March 18: A3.

43. Porter, M. & Rivkin, J. 2012 Choosing the United States. Harvard Business Review, 90(3): 80–93;

Bussey, J. 2012. U.S. manufacturing, defying naysayers. wsj.com, April 19: np; and Jean, S. & Alcott, K. 2013. Manufacturing jobs have slid steadily as work has moved offshore. Dallas Morning News, January 14: 1D.

44. Wong, C. 2014. As China’s economy slows, so too does growth in workers’ wages. blogs.wsj.com, December 17: np.

45. Levitt, T. 1983. The globalization of markets. Harvard Business Review, 61(3): 92–102.

46. Our discussion of these assumptions draws upon Douglas, S. P. & Wind, Y. 1987. The myth of globalization. Columbia Journal of World Business, Winter: 19–29.

47. Ghoshal, S. 1987. Global strategy: An organizing framework. Strategic Management Journal, 8: 425–440.

48. For insights on global branding, refer to Aaker, D. A. & Joachimsthaler, E. 1999. The lure of global branding. Harvard Business Review, 77(6): 137–146.

49. Dawar, N. & Frost, T. 1999. Competing with Giants: Survival Strategies for Local Companies in Emerging Markets. Harvard Business Review , 77(3): 119–129.

50. Hout, T., Porter, M. E., & Rudden, E. 1982. How global companies win out. Harvard Business Review, 60(5): 98–107.

51. Fryer, B. 2001. Tom Siebel of Siebel Systems: High tech the old-fashioned way. Harvard Business Review, 79(3): 118–130.

52. The risks that are discussed for the global, multidomestic, and transnational strategies draw upon Gupta & Govindarajan, op. cit.

53. A discussion on how McDonald’s adapts its products to overseas markets is in Gumbel, P. 2008. Big Mac’s local flavor. Fortune, May 5: 115–121.

54. Einhorn, B. & Winter, C. 2012. Want some milk with your green tea Oreos? Bloomberg Businessweek, May 7: 25–26; Khosla, S. & Sawhney, M. 2012. Blank checks: Unleashing the potential of people and business. Strategy-Business.com, Autumn: np; and In China, brands more than symbolic. 2012. Dallas Morning News, November 27: 3D.

55. Prahalad, C. K. & Doz, Y. L. 1987. The multinational mission: Balancing local demands and global vision. New York: Free Press.

56. For an insightful discussion on knowledge flows in multinational corporations, refer to Yang, Q., Mudambi, R., & Meyer, K. E. 2008.

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Conventional and reverse knowledge flows in multinational corporations. Journal of Management, 34(5): 882–902.

57. Kidd, J. B. & Teramoto, Y. 1995. The learning organization: The case of Japanese RHQs in Europe. Management International Review, 35 (Special Issue): 39–56.

58. Gupta, A. K. & Govindarajan, V. 2000. Knowledge flows within multinational corporations. Strategic Management Journal, 21(4): 473–496.

59. Wetlaufer, S. 2001. The business case against revolution: An interview with Nestle´’s Peter Brabeck. HarvardBusiness Review, 79(2): 112–121.

60. Nobel, R. & Birkinshaw, J. 1998. Innovation in multinational corporations: Control and communication patterns in international R&D operations. Strategic Management Journal, 19(5): 461–478.

61. Chan, C. M., Makino, S., & Isobe, T. 2010. Does subnational region matter? Foreign affiliate performance in the United States and China. Strategic Management Journal, 31(11): 1226–1243.

62. his section draws upon Ghemawat, P. 2005. Regional strategies for global leadership. Harvard Business Review, 84(12): 98–108; Ghemawat, P. 2006. Apocalypse now? Harvard Business Review, 84(12): 32; Ghemawat, P. 2001. Distance still matters: The hard reality of global expansion. Harvard Business Review, 79(8): 137–147; Peng, M. W. 2006. Global strategy: 387. Mason, OH: Thomson South-Western; and Rugman, A. M. & Verbeke, A. 2004. A perspective on regional and global strategies of multinational enterprises. Journal of International Business Studies, 35: 3–18.

63. For a rigorous analysis of performance implications of entry strategies, refer to Zahra, S. A., Ireland, R. D., & Hitt, M. A. 2000. International expansion by new venture firms: International diversity, modes of entry, technological learning, and performance. Academy

of Management Journal, 43(6): 925–950.

64. Li, J. T. 1995. Foreign entry and survival: The effects of strategic choices on performance in international markets. Strategic Management Journal, 16: 333–351.

65. For a discussion of how home- country environments can affect diversification strategies, refer to Wan, W. P. & Hoskisson, R. E. 2003. Home country environments, corporate diversification strategies, and firm performance. Academy of Management Journal, 46(1): 27–45.

66. Arnold, D. 2000. Seven rules of international distribution. Harvard Business Review, 78(6): 131–137.

67. Sharma, A. 1998. Mode of entry and ex-post performance. Strategic Management Journal, 19(9): 879–900.

68. This section draws upon Arnold, op. cit., pp. 131–137; and Berkowitz, op. cit.

69. Salomon, R. & Jin, B. 2010. Do leading or lagging firms learn more from exporting? Strategic Management Journal, 31(6): 1088–1113.

70. Kline, D. 2003. Strategic licensing. MIT Sloan Management Review, 44(3): 89–93.

71. Martin, J. 1999. Franchising in the Middle East. Management Review, June: 38–42.

72. Arnold, op. cit.; and Berkowitz, op. cit.

73. An in-depth case study of alliance dynamics is found in Faems, D., Janssens, M., Madhok, A., & Van Looy, B. 2008. Toward an integrative perspective on alliance governance: Connecting contract design, trust dynamics, and contract application. Academy of Management Journal, 51(6): 1053–1078.

74. Knowledge transfer in international joint ventures is addressed in Inkpen, A. 2008. Knowledge transfer and international joint ventures. Strategic Management Journal, 29(4): 447–453.

75. Wen, S. H. & Chuang, C.-M. 2010. To teach or to compete? A strategic dilemma of knowledge owners in

international alliances. Asia Pacific Journal of Management, 27(4): 697–726.

76. Manufacturer–supplier relationships can be very effective in global industries such as automobile manufacturing. Refer to Kotabe, M., Martin, X., & Domoto, H. 2003. Gaining from vertical partnerships: Knowledge transfer, relationship duration, and supplier performance improvement in the U.S. and Japanese automotive industries. Strategic Management Journal, 24(4): 293–316.

77. For a good discussion, refer to Merchant, H. & Schendel, D. 2000. How do international joint ventures create shareholder value? Strategic Management Journal, 21(7): 723–738.

78. This discussion draws upon Walters, B. A., Peters, S., & Dess, G. G. 1994. Strategic alliances and joint ventures: Making them work. Business Horizons, 37(4): 5–11.

79. Some insights on partnering in the global area are discussed in MacCormack, A. & Forbath, T. 2008. Harvard Business Review, 66(1): 24, 26.

80. For a rigorous discussion of the importance of information access in international joint ventures, refer to Reuer, J. J. & Koza, M. P. 2000. Asymmetric information and joint venture performance: Theory and evidence for domestic and international joint ventures. Strategic Management Journal, 21(1): 81–88.

81. Dyer, J. H., Kale, P., & Singh, H. 2001. How to make strategic alliances work. MIT Sloan Management Review, 42(4): 37–43.

82. For a discussion of some of the challenges in managing subsidiaries, refer to O’Donnell, S. W. 2000. Managing foreign subsidiaries: Agents of headquarters, or an independent network? Strategic Management Journal, 21(5): 525–548.

83. Ricks, D. 2006. Blunders in international business (4th ed.). Malden, MA: Blackwell.

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chapter

After reading this chapter, you should have a good understanding of the following learning objectives:

8 LO 8-1 The role of opportunities, resources, and entrepreneurs in successfully

pursuing new ventures.

LO 8-2 Three types of entry strategies—pioneering, imitative, and adaptive— commonly used to launch a new venture.

LO 8-3 How the generic strategies of overall cost leadership, differentiation, and focus are used by new ventures and small businesses.

LO 8-4 How competitive actions, such as the entry of new competitors into a marketplace, may launch a cycle of actions and reactions among close competitors.

LO 8-5 The components of competitive dynamics analysis—new competitive action, threat analysis, motivation and capability to respond, types of competitive actions, and likelihood of competitive reaction.

Entrepreneurial Strategy and Competitive Dynamics

©Anatoli Styf/Shutterstock

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The disappearing photo app, Snapchat, experienced a meteoric rise. Started by a set of Stanford undergraduate students in 2011, the app had a user base in excess of 150 million and had reached 10 billion daily video views by 2016. As the app grew in popularity, CEO Evan Spiegel and CTO Bobby Murphy found themselves in a long-term battle with Reggie Brown, a Kappa Sigma fraternity brother of theirs who claimed he was the original creator of Snapchat. According to Brown, he shared his idea for an app that would allow users to share photos that would quickly self-destruct with Spiegel. They then recruited Murphy to do computer programming for the app. That first app, Picaboo, evolved into the widely used Snapchat. While the app became a success, the collaboration did not. Spiegel apparently decided that Brown wasn’t adding much to the team. He and Murphy locked Brown out of the company’s system and disavowed any claims that Brown was one of the firm’s founders or had any ownership rights to the company. In 2013, Brown sued, leading to an eventual confidential settlement in 2014. By that time, the overall firm was valued at about $20 billion. While the financial details of the settlement were never made public, Spiegel publicly admitted that Brown was central to the creation of the app, saying, “We acknowledge Reggie’s contribution to the creation of Snapchat and appreciate his work in getting the application off the ground.”

The Snapchat experience is not at all uncommon. Facebook, Twitter, Tinder, Beats Electronics, and others faced internal drama about who was responsible for the firms’ start and who should reap the substantial financial rewards of their success. Why is this so common? Entrepreneurial teams are often composed of friends and family, leading the participants to expect that they can trust their partners and have no need for a written contract or statement of ownership. Luan Tran, the attorney for Brown, put it this way, “You don’t think not to trust people you know a lot, and you don’t think they are going to screw you. It’s good to trust, but it’s much better to memorialize your trust in a document.” Amir Hassanabadi, another attorney who regularly works with start-up firms, recommends the following for founders on day one of their venture, “Go out to dinner. Settle who’s who and what’s what. Then put it in writing.”1

Discussion Questions 1. Why do you think that so many start-up firms have these disputes? 2. Why do founders often fail to work up formal written contracts about ownership and credit? 3. Would you feel comfortable having that conversation early on with a partner in a new busi-

ness? How would you initiate that conversation?

LEARNING FROM MISTAKES

The Snapchat case illustrates how important it is for start-up firms to formalize the roles of founders and set up formal contracts that lay out responsibilities and ownership rights if they want to avoid later drama.

In this chapter we address entrepreneurial strategies. The previous three chapters have focused primarily on the business-level, corporate-level, and international strategies of incumbent firms. Here we ask: What about the strategies of those entering into a market or industry for the first time? In this chapter, we focus on strategic entrepreneurship—the actions firms take to create new ventures in markets. In Chapter 12, we focus on a related

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issue—how established firms can build or reinforce an entrepreneurial mindset as they strive to be innovative in markets in which the firm already competes.

Companies wishing to launch new ventures must also be aware that, consistent with the five-forces model in Chapter 2, new entrants are a threat to existing firms in an industry. Entry into a new market arena is intensely competitive from the perspective of incumbents in that arena. Therefore, new entrants can nearly always expect a competitive response from other companies in the industry they are entering. Knowledge of the competitive dynamics that are at work in the business environment is an aspect of entrepreneurial new entry that will be addressed later in this chapter.

Before moving on, it is important to highlight the role that entrepreneurial start-ups and small businesses play in entrepreneurial value creation. Small businesses, those defined as having 500 employees or fewer, create about 65 percent of all new jobs in the United States and also generate 13 times as many new patents per employee as larger firms.2

RECOGNIZING ENTREPRENEURIAL OPPORTUNITIES Defined broadly, entrepreneurship refers to new value creation. Even though entrepreneurial activity is usually associated with start-up companies, new value can be created in many dif- ferent contexts, including:

• Start-up ventures • Major corporations • Family-owned businesses • Nonprofit organizations • Established institutions

For an entrepreneurial venture to create new value, three factors must be present—an entrepreneurial opportunity, the resources to pursue the opportunity, and an entrepreneur or entrepreneurial team willing and able to undertake the opportunity.3 The entrepreneurial strategy that an organization uses will depend on these three factors. Thus, beyond merely identifying a venture concept, the opportunity recognition process also involves organizing the key people and resources that are needed to go forward. Exhibit 8.1 depicts the three fac- tors that are needed to successfully proceed—opportunity, resources, and entrepreneur(s). In the sections that follow, we address each of these factors.

LO 8-1 The role of opportunities, resources, and entrepreneurs in successfully pursuing new ventures.

entrepreneurship the creation of new value by an existing organization or new venture that involves the assumption of risk.

EXHIBIT 8.1 Opportunity Analysis Framework

Resources Entrepreneur(s)

Opportunity

Sources: Based on Timmons, J. A. & Spinelli, S. 2004. New Venture Creation (6th ed.). New York: McGraw-Hill/ Irwin; and Bygrave, W. D. 1997. The Entrepreneurial Process. In W. D. Bygrave (Ed.), The Portable MBA in Entrepreneurship (2nd ed.). New York: Wiley.

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Entrepreneurial Opportunities The starting point for any new venture is the presence of an entrepreneurial opportunity. Where do opportunities come from? For new business start-ups, opportunities come from many sources—current or past work experiences, hobbies that grow into businesses or lead to inventions, suggestions by friends or family, or a chance event that makes an entrepreneur aware of an unmet need. Terry Tietzen, founder and CEO of Edatanetworks, puts it this way, “You get ideas through watching the world and through relationships. You get ideas from looking down the road.”4 For established firms, new business opportunities come from the needs of existing customers, suggestions by suppliers, or technological developments that lead to new advances.5 For all firms, there is a major, overarching factor behind all viable opportunities that emerge in the business landscape: change. Change creates opportunities. Entrepreneurial firms make the most of changes brought about by new technology, sociocul- tural trends, and shifts in consumer demand.

How do changes in the external environment lead to new business creation? They spark creative new ideas and innovation. Businesspeople often have ideas for entrepreneurial ven- tures. However, not all such ideas are good ideas—that is, viable business opportunities. To determine which ideas are strong enough to become new ventures, entrepreneurs must go through a process of identifying, selecting, and developing potential opportunities. This is the process of opportunity recognition.6

Opportunity recognition refers to more than just the “Eureka!” feeling that people sometimes experience at the moment they identify a new idea. Although such insights are often very important, the opportunity recognition process involves two phases of activity— discovery and evaluation—that lead to viable new venture opportunities.7

The discovery phase refers to the process of becoming aware of a new business concept.8 Many entrepreneurs report that their idea for a new venture occurred to them in an instant, as a sort of “Aha!” experience—that is, they had some insight or epiphany, often based on their prior knowledge, that gave them an idea for a new business. The discovery of new opportunities is often spontaneous and unexpected. For example, Howard Schultz, CEO of Starbucks, was in Milan, Italy, when he suddenly realized that the coffee-and-conversation cafe model that was common in Europe would work in the United States as well. According to Schultz, he didn’t need to do research to find out if Americans would pay $3 for a cup of coffee—he just knew. Starbucks was just a small business at the time but Schultz began literally shaking with excitement about grow- ing it into a bigger business.9 Strategy Spotlight 8.1 tells how two brothers took the realization that many people wanted to wear their optimism and turned it into a growing business empire.

Opportunity discovery also may occur as the result of a deliberate search for new ven- ture opportunities or creative solutions to business problems. Viable opportunities often emerge only after a concerted effort. The search process is very similar to a creative process, which may be unstructured and “chaotic” at first but eventually leads to a practical solution or business innovation. To stimulate the discovery of new opportunities, companies often encourage creativity, out-of-the-box thinking, and brainstorming. While a deliberate search can aim to identify truly novel and creative entrepreneurial opportunities, it can also be more focused to look for “obvious” opportunities that others have failed to see. Experienced entrepreneurs discussing ways to look for new entrepreneurial opportunities identify several ways to undertake a structured search for entrepreneurial ideas:10

• Look at what’s bugging you. What are the frustrations you have with current products or processes? Search for ideas on how to address these annoyances to identify entrepreneurial opportunities. For example, Jeannine Fradelizio noticed that at parties she hosted, guests would set down their wine glasses and forget which one was their glass. This would lead them to either abandon that glass and get another or end up drinking from someone else’s glass which would sometimes lead to a minor dispute. In an effort to avoid these mix-ups Fradelizio tried having her friends write their names

opportunity recognition the process of discovering and evaluating changes in the business environment, such as a new technology, sociocultural trends, or shifts in consumer demand, that can be exploited.

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8.1 STRATEGY SPOTLIGHT SEEING OPPORTUNITY IN THE BRIGHT SIDE

People were craving something positive that focused on the good, instead of what is wrong with the world.

—John Jacobs

That simple inspiration was the insight that has driven the suc- cess of Life is Good T-shirts. Beginning in 1989, John Jacobs and his brother, Bert, had been selling T-shirts out of their van, scrap- ing out a living. They used their own artwork on the shirts and found an audience for their funky designs, especially on college campuses. But after five and a half years in the business, they had a whopping $78 in the bank.

Their business turned with a simple conversation. As John explained, “Then in 1994, we talked about how people seemed worn down by the media’s constant focus on the negative side of information.” They had a keg party at which they asked friends to comment on drawings they were considering for new shirts. The design that received the most buzz was a simple stick figure that smiled. They paired this design with a simple slogan, “Life is Good,” to offer a positive message. They printed up 48 shirts with the new design and sold out within an hour at a street fair. Their inspiration seemed correct. People craved a sense of positivity.

They started working with retailers to sell the shirts. The retailers liked the design but also started asking questions, such as, “Does the smiley guy eat ice cream? Does he roller-skate?” Bert and John responded by starting to draw designs that reflected what made life good. In Bert’s words, “Our concept was that optimism is powerful.” What they found out was that optimism is a powerful sales slogan. Their sales topped $250,000 within two years.

It’s been over 20 years since they had the simple but pro- found insight that people buy into a positive message. Life is Good now generates nearly $150 million in sales and distrib- utes its clothing through more than 4,500 retail stores in over 30 countries. The firm also has strategic alliances with Hallmark and Smucker’s that extend its message to additional products, and John and Bert see further opportunities in publishing and filmmaking with their message that life is good. The brothers have also set up a foundation that hosts festivals to benefit kids overcoming poverty, illness, and violence. Their goal is clear. As Bert stated, “We can be a billion dollar company driving positive social change, teaching, and reinforcing the values we think are most important in the world.” The message isn’t that life is great or life is perfect but that even in hard times, life is good.

Sources: Buchanan, L. 2006. Life lessons. inc.com, October 1: np; Eng, D. 2014. Life is good in the T-shirt business. Fortune, May 19: 39–42; and hoovers.com.

on their glasses with a marker but found that existing markers either didn’t dry quickly enough or wouldn’t wash off. She enlisted the help of a chemist and developed the Wine Glass Writer. Sales for the product have risen to over $1.5 million.11

• Talk to the people who know. If you have a general idea of the market you want to go into, talk to suppliers, customers, and front-line workers in this market. These discussions can lead to insights on how these stakeholders’ needs aren’t being met and can also open avenues to hear what they would like to see in new products and processes. For example, Precision Hawk, a company using drones to do aerial data analysis, reached out to Hahn Estate Winery so that Precision Hawk could better understand the needs of wineries in analyzing crop health and to develop the capabilities needed to meet those needs.12

• Look to other markets. One of the most powerful ways of finding new ideas is by borrowing ideas from other markets. This could involve looking at other industries or other geographic markets to identify new ideas. For example, in developing the idea for CarMax, the used-car superstore chain, Richard Sharp drew on his experience leading a major consumer electronics retailer to lay out the logic for his “big box” used-car lots, which allowed him to streamline operations and improve the efficiency of the used-car market. In essence, he decided to build the Best Buy or the Home Depot of the used-car market.

• Get inspired by history. Sometimes, the best ideas are not actually new ideas. Opportunities in industries can often be discovered by looking to the past to find good ideas that have slipped out of practice but might now be valued by the market again. For example, Sam Calagione, founder of Ancient Ales, developed an innovative line of craft beers by using ancient brewing techniques and ingredients that differ from modern brews.

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8.2 ENVIRONMENTAL SUSTAINABILITYSTRATEGY SPOTLIGHT mOASIS LEVERAGES TECHNOLOGY TO IMPROVE WATER EFFICIENCY FOR FARMERS The pervasive drought in California has had dire effects for farm- ers. At times, water usage restrictions have severely limited the water farmers can use. Even when they don’t face difficult water restrictions, farmers have found their water bills go up by as much as 600 percent in recent years. This has led them to look to drought resistant varieties, new fertilizers that reduce water demands, soil sensors that reduce the possibility of over- watering, and other actions to lower water needs.

A startup firm, mOasis, sees further opportunity with an environmentally friendly hydrogel. Farmers apply mOasis’s gel polymer to soil when preparing the land for planting.

The hydrogel particles are the size of a grain of sand but can soak up 250 times their weight in water. The hydrogel absorbs water during irrigation and releases it as the soil dries—ensuring the most efficient use of water possible. According to mOasis, farmers using the hydrogel can expe- rience up to 25 percent higher crop yields with 20 percent lower water use. The gel stays effective for about a year but then breaks down into byproducts that are not environmen- tally damaging in any way.

Sources: Wang, U. 2013. For drought-plagued farmers: A gel that can suck up 250 times its weight in water. gigaom.com, October 29: np; Fehrenbacher, K. 2015. How water technology can help farmers survive California’s drought. fortune. com, June 1: np; and, Vekshin, A. 2014. California water prices soar for farmers as drought grows. bloomberg.com, July 24: np.

Opportunity evaluation, which occurs after an opportunity has been identified, involves analyzing an opportunity to determine whether it is viable and strong enough to be developed into a full-fledged new venture. Ideas developed by new product groups or in brainstorming sessions are tested by various methods, including talking to potential target customers and dis- cussing operational requirements with production or logistics managers. A technique known as feasibility analysis is used to evaluate these and other critical success factors. This type of analysis often leads to the decision that a new venture project should be discontinued. If the venture concept continues to seem viable, a more formal business plan may be developed.13

Among the most important factors to evaluate is the market potential for the product or service. Established firms tend to operate in established markets. They have to adjust to market trends and to shifts in consumer demand, of course, but they usually have a cus- tomer base for which they are already filling a marketplace need. New ventures, in contrast, must first determine whether a market exists for the product or service they are contem- plating. Thus, a critical element of opportunity recognition is assessing to what extent the opportunity is viable in the marketplace.

For an opportunity to be viable, it needs to have four qualities:14

• Attractive. The opportunity must be attractive in the marketplace; that is, there must be market demand for the new product or service.

• Achievable. The opportunity must be practical and physically possible. • Durable. The opportunity must be attractive long enough for the development and

deployment to be successful; that is, the window of opportunity must be open long enough for it to be worthwhile.

• Value creating. The opportunity must be potentially profitable; that is, the benefits must surpass the cost of development by a significant margin.

If a new business concept meets these criteria, two other factors must be considered before the opportunity is launched as a business: the resources available to undertake it and the characteristics of the entrepreneur(s) pursuing it. In the next section, we address the issue of entrepreneurial resources; following that, we address the importance of entrepre- neurial leaders and teams. But first, consider the opportunities that have been created by the recent surge in interest in environmental sustainability. Strategy Spotlight 8.2 discusses how an entrepreneurial firm is responding to the California drought with an innovative, environmentally sustainable product that helps farmers use water more efficiently.

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Entrepreneurial Resources As Exhibit 8.1 indicates, resources are an essential component of a successful entrepreneurial launch. For start-ups, the most important resource is usually money because a new firm typi- cally has to expend substantial sums just to start the business. However, financial resources are not the only kind of resource a new venture needs. Human capital and social capital are also important. Many firms also rely on government resources to help them thrive.15

Financial Resources Hand-in-hand with the importance of markets (and marketing) to new venture creation, entrepreneurial firms must also have financing. In fact, the level of avail- able financing is often a strong determinant of how the business is launched and its eventual success. Cash finances are, of course, highly important. But access to capital, such as a line of credit or favorable payment terms with a supplier, can also help a new venture succeed.

The types of financial resources that may be needed depend on two factors: the stage of venture development and the scale of the venture.16 Entrepreneurial firms that are start- ing from scratch—start-ups—are at the earliest stage of development. Most start-ups also begin on a relatively small scale. The funding available to young and small firms tends to be quite limited. In fact, the majority of new firms are low-budget start-ups launched with personal savings and the contributions of family and friends.17 Among firms included in the Entrepreneur list of the 100 fastest-growing new businesses, 61 percent reported that their start-up funds came from personal savings.18

Although bank financing, public financing, and venture capital are important sources of small business finance, these types of financial support are typically available only after a company has started to conduct business and generate sales. Even angel investors—private individuals who provide equity investments for seed capital during the early stages of a new venture—favor companies that already have a winning business model and dominance in a market niche.19 According to Cal Simmons, coauthor of Every Business Needs an Angel, “I would much rather talk to an entrepreneur who has already put his money and his effort into proving the concept.”20

Thus, while the press commonly talks about the role of venture capitalists and angel investors in start-up firms, the majority of external funding for young and small firms comes from informal sources such as family and friends. Based on a Kauffman Foundation survey of entrepreneurial firms, Exhibit 8.2 identifies the sources of funding used by start-up busi- nesses and by ongoing firms that are five years old. The survey shows that most start-up funding, about 70 percent, comes from either equity investments by the entrepreneur and the entrepreneur’s family and friends or personal loans taken out by the entrepreneur.

angel investors private individuals who provide equity investments for seed capital during the early stages of a new venture.

venture capitalists companies organized to place their investors’ funds in lucrative business opportunities.

Capital Invested in Their First Year

Percentage of Capital Invested in

Their First Year Capital Invested in

Their Fifth Year

Percentage of Capital Invested

in Their Fifth Year

Insider equity $33,034 41.1 $13,914 17.9

Investor equity $  4,108   5.1 $  3,108  4.0

Personal debt of owners $23,353 29.1 $21,754 28.0

Business debt $19,867 24.7 $39,009 50.1

Total average capital invested

$80,362 $77,785

Source: From Robb, A., Reedy, E. J., Ballou, J., DesRoches, D., Potter, F., & Zhao, A. 2010. An Overview of the Kauffman Firm Survey. Reproduced with permission from the Ewing Marion Kauffman Foundation.

EXHIBIT 8.2 Sources of Capital for Start-Up Firms

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Once a venture has established itself as a going concern, other sources of financing become readily available. Banks, for example, are more likely to provide later-stage financ- ing to companies with a track record of sales or other cash-generating activity. According to the Kauffman Foundation study, after five years of operation, the largest source of funding is from loans taken out by the business.

At both stages, 5 percent or less of the funding comes from outside investors, such as angel investors or venture capitalists. In fact, few firms ever receive venture capital investments— only 7 of 2,606 firms in the Kauffman study received money from outside investors. But when they do, these firms receive a substantial level of investment—over $1 million on aver- age in the survey—because they tend to be the firms that are the most innovative and have the greatest growth potential. These start-ups typically involve large capital investments or exten- sive development costs—such as manufacturing or engineering firms trying to commercialize an innovative product—and have high cash requirements soon after they are founded. Since these investments are typically well beyond the capability of the entrepreneur or even a local bank to fund, entrepreneurs running these firms turn to the venture capital market. Other firms turn to venture capitalists when they are on the brink of rapid growth.

Venture capital is a form of private equity financing through which entrepreneurs raise money by selling shares in the new venture. In contrast to angel investors, who invest their own money, venture capital companies are organized to place the funds of private investors into lucrative business opportunities. Venture capitalists nearly always have high perfor- mance expectations from the companies they invest in, but they also provide important managerial advice and links to key contacts in an industry.21

In recent years, a new source of funding, crowdfunding, has emerged as a means for start-ups to amass significant pools of capital.22 In these peer-to-peer investment systems, individuals striving to grow their business post their business ideas on a crowdfunding web- site. Potential investors who go to the site evaluate the proposals listed and decide which, if any, to fund. Typically, no individual makes a very sizable funding allotment. Most inves- tors contribute up to a few hundred dollars to any investment, but the power of the crowd is at work. If a few thousand investors sign up for a venture, it can potentially raise over a million dollars. In addition to providing funding, Crowdfunding can also provide entrepre- neurs with valuable feedback that can be used to refine or further innovate the firm’s prod- ucts. Investors often comment and offer suggestions. Some entrepreneurs take this further, responding to comments from investors, triggering a new round of feedback.23

The crowdfunding market has taken off since the term was first coined in 2006. The total value of global crowdfunding reached $34 billion in 2015.24 Some crowdfunding websites allow investors to own actual equity in the firms they fund. Others, such as Kickstarter, don’t offer investors equity. Instead, they get a reward from the entrepreneurial firm. For example, Mystery Brewing Company gave its investors logoed bottle openers, tulip-shaped beer glasses, T-shirts, posters, and home-brew recipes.

While crowdfunding offers a new avenue for corporations to raise funding, there are some potential downsides. First, the crowdfunding sites take a slice of the funds raised—typically 4 to 9 percent. Second, while crowdfunding offers a marketplace in which to raise funds, it also puts additional pressure on entrepreneurs. The social network–savvy investors who fund these ventures are quick to comment on their social media websites if the firm misses deadlines or falls short of its revenue projections. Finally, entrepreneurs can struggle with how much information to share about their business ideas. They want to share enough infor- mation without releasing critical information that competitors trolling these sites can benefit from. They also may be concerned about posting their financials, since these statements give their suppliers and customers access to sensitive information about margins and earnings.

There are also some concerns that the loose rules in the regulation of crowdfunding could lead to significant fraud by firms soliciting investment. According to Stephen Goodman, an attorney with Pryor Cashman LLP, “The SEC has been extremely skeptical of this

crowdfunding funding a venture by pooling small investments from a large number of investors; often raised on the Internet.

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[crowdfunding] process.” Others have faith in the wisdom of the crowd to catch fraud. They point to the experience with Little Monster Productions, a video game developer. Little Monster was set to raise funds on Kickstarter, but the fund call was closed by Kickstarter when potential investors noticed and commented that Little Monster had stolen some of the images it was using in its game from another game site. Even with potential investors identifying glaring problems with some crowdfunding projects, the likelihood of success with crowdfunded projects is somewhat low. One study found that 75 percent of crowd- funded projects failed to meet their anticipated launch dates.25 Because the requirements for firms raising funds through crowdfunding are lax, investors need to do their homework. Here are some simple recommendations to keep from getting burned.26

• Financial statements. Be sure to closely review the corporate tax returns that firms are required to post. Better yet, have your accountant review them to see if anything looks fishy.

• Licenses and registrations. You should check to see if the company has current licenses and registrations needed to operate in its chosen industry. This can often be done through online checks with the secretary of state’s office or the state’s corporation department. Sometimes, it will take a phone call or two. This provides a simple check to see if the company is legitimate.

• Litigation. Check to see if the company has been sued. You can search online at the free site justia.com and the law-oriented information sites Westlaw and LexisNexis. Be sure to check under current and former names of the firm and its principals (top managers).

• Better Business Bureau. Check the firm’s BBB report. Does the firm appear to exist? What is the grade the BBB gives it? Is the firm a BBB member? All of this information gives insight into the firm’s current operations and its customer relations.

• Employment and educational history. This is a bit tricky because of privacy issues, but you can typically contact colleges listed on the filing forms and inquire if the principals of the firm attended and graduated from the schools they list. You can also search employment histories on the websites of the companies the principals used to work at as well as social network sites, such as LinkedIn and Facebook.

• Required disclosures. Read all of the documentation carefully. This includes the shareholder rights statement. This statement will provide information on how much of a stake in the firm you get and how this will be diluted by future offerings. Also, read statements on the company’s competition and risks it faces.

Human Capital Bankers, venture capitalists, and angel investors agree that the most impor- tant asset an entrepreneurial firm can have is strong and skilled management.27 According to Stephen Gaal, founding member of Walnut Venture Associates, venture investors do not invest in businesses; instead, “We invest in people . . . very smart people with very high integrity.” Managers need to have a strong base of experience and extensive domain knowl- edge, as well as an ability to make rapid decisions and change direction as shifting circum- stances may require. In the case of start-ups, more is better. New ventures that are started by teams of three, four, or five entrepreneurs are more likely to succeed in the long run than are ventures launched by “lone wolf” entrepreneurs.28

The ability of firms to extend their human capital base to outside partners is an especially important skill in the gig economy. Platform firms in this market will only succeed if they can deliver gig workers who deliver a high quality service. Urban professionals who go to Handy to find a contractor to do needed cleaning or painting will only return if the service provider follows through in a timely and professional way. Similarly, customers will only return to Fancy Hands for personal assistance if their first experience with a Fancy Hands

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assistant is good.29 Thus, platform firms in these markets need to develop effective systems to recruit and evaluate potential service providers. On the positive side, firms that use a gig economy model greatly reduce the financial resources needed to expand their businesses.

Social Capital New ventures founded by entrepreneurs who have extensive social contacts are more likely to succeed than are ventures started without the support of a social net- work.30 Even though a venture may be new, if the founders have contacts who will vouch for them, they gain exposure and build legitimacy faster.31 This support can come from several sources: prior jobs, industry organizations, and local business groups such as the chamber of commerce. These contacts can all contribute to a growing network that provides support for the entrepreneurial firm. Janina Pawlowski, cofounder of the online lending company E-Loan, attributed part of her success to the strong advisers she persuaded to serve on her board of directors, including Tim Koogle, former CEO of Yahoo!32

Strategic alliances represent a type of social capital that can be especially important to young and small firms.33 Strategic alliances can provide a key avenue for growth by entre- preneurial firms.34 By partnering with other companies, young or small firms can expand or give the appearance of entering numerous markets or handling a range of operations. According to the National Federation of Independent Business (NFIB), nearly two-thirds of small businesses currently hold or have held some type of alliance. Here are a few types of alliances that have been used to extend or strengthen entrepreneurial firms:

• Technology alliances. Tech-savvy entrepreneurial firms often benefit from forming alliances with older incumbents. The alliance allows the larger firm to enhance its technological capabilities and expands the revenue and reach of the smaller firm.

• Manufacturing alliances. The use of outsourcing and other manufacturing alliances by small firms has grown dramatically in recent years. Internet-enabled capabilities such as collaborating online about delivery and design specifications have greatly simplified doing business, even with foreign manufacturers.

• Retail alliances. Licensing agreements allow one company to sell the products and services of another in different markets, including overseas. Specialty products—the types sometimes made by entrepreneurial firms—often seem more exotic when sold in another country.

Although such alliances often sound good, there are also potential pitfalls. Lack of over- sight and control is one danger of partnering with foreign firms. Problems with product quality, timely delivery, and receiving payments can also sour an alliance relationship if it is not carefully managed. With technology alliances, there is a risk that big firms may take advantage of the technological know-how of their entrepreneurial partners. However, even with these potential problems, strategic alliances provide a good means for entrepreneurial firms to develop and grow.

Government Resources In the United States, the federal government provides support for entrepreneurial firms in two key arenas—financing and government contracting. The Small Business Administration (SBA) has several loan guarantee programs designed to support the growth and development of entrepreneurial firms. The government itself does not typi- cally lend money but underwrites loans made by banks to small businesses, thus reduc- ing the risk associated with lending to firms with unproven records. The SBA also offers training, counseling, and support services through its local offices and Small Business Development Centers.35 State and local governments also have hundreds of programs to provide funding, contracts, and other support for new ventures and small businesses. These programs are often designed to grow the economy of a region.

Another key area of support is government contracting. Programs sponsored by the SBA and other government agencies ensure that small businesses have the opportunity to bid on

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contracts to provide goods and services to the government. Although working with the gov- ernment sometimes has its drawbacks in terms of issues of regulation and time-consuming decision making, programs to support small businesses and entrepreneurial activity consti- tute an important resource for entrepreneurial firms.

Entrepreneurial Leadership Whether a venture is launched by an individual entrepreneur or an entrepreneurial team, effective leadership is needed. Launching a new venture requires a special kind of lead- ership. Research indicates that entrepreneurs tend to have characteristics that distinguish them from corporate managers. Differences include:

• Higher core self-evaluation. Successful entrepreneurs evidence higher levels of self- confidence and a higher assessment of the degree to which an individual controls his or her own destiny.36

• Higher conscientiousness. Entrepreneurs tend to have a higher degree of organization, persistence, hard work, and pursuit of goal accomplishment.

• Higher openness to experience. Entrepreneurs also tend to score higher on openness to experience, a personality trait associated with intellectual curiosity and a desire to explore novel ideas.

• Higher emotional stability. Entrepreneurs exhibit a higher ability to handle ambiguity and maintain even emotions during stressful periods, and they are less likely to be overcome by anxieties.

• Lower agreeableness. Finally, entrepreneurs tend to score lower on agreeableness. This suggests they typically look out primarily for their own self-interest and also are willing to influence or manipulate others for their own advantage.37

These personality traits are embodied in the behavioral attributes necessary for success- ful entrepreneurial leadership—vision, dedication and drive, and commitment to excellence:

• Vision. This may be an entrepreneur’s most important asset. Entrepreneurs envision realities that do not yet exist. But without a vision, most entrepreneurs would never even get their venture off the ground. With vision, entrepreneurs are able to exercise a kind of transformational leadership that creates something new and, in some way, changes the world. Just having a vision, however, is not enough. To develop support, get financial backing, and attract employees, entrepreneurial leaders must share their vision with others.

• Dedication and drive. Dedication and drive are reflected in hard work. Drive involves internal motivation; dedication calls for an intellectual commitment that keeps an entrepreneur going even in the face of bad news or poor luck. They both require patience, stamina, and a willingness to work long hours. However, a business built on the heroic efforts of one person may suffer in the long run. That’s why the dedicated entrepreneur’s enthusiasm is also important—like a magnet, it attracts others to the business to help with the work.38

• Commitment to excellence. Excellence requires entrepreneurs to commit to knowing the customer, providing quality goods and services, paying attention to details, and continuously learning. Entrepreneurs who achieve excellence are sensitive to how these factors work together. However, entrepreneurs may flounder if they think they are the only ones who can create excellent results. The most successful, by contrast, often report that they owe their success to hiring people smarter than themselves.

In his book Good to Great, Jim Collins makes another important point about entrepre- neurial leadership: Ventures built on the charisma of a single person may have trouble grow- ing “from good to great” once that person leaves.39 Thus, the leadership that is needed to build a great organization is usually exercised by a team of dedicated people working

entrepreneurial leadership leadership appropriate for new ventures that requires courage, belief in one’s convictions, and the energy to work hard even in difficult circumstances; and that embodies vision, dedication and drive, and commitment to excellence.

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together rather than a single leader. Another aspect of this team approach is attracting team members who fit with the company’s culture, goals, and work ethic. Thus, for a venture’s leadership to be a valuable resource and not a liability, it must be cohesive in its vision, drive and dedication, and commitment to excellence.

Once an opportunity has been recognized, and an entrepreneurial team and resources have been assembled, a new venture must craft a strategy. Prior chapters have addressed the strategies of incumbent firms. In the next section, we highlight the types of strategies and strategic considerations faced by new entrants.

ENTREPRENEURIAL STRATEGY Successfully creating new ventures requires several ingredients. As indicated in Exhibit 8.1, three factors are necessary—a viable opportunity, sufficient resources, and a skilled and dedicated entrepreneur or entrepreneurial team. Once these elements are in place, the new venture needs a strategy. In this section, we consider several different strategic factors that are unique to new ventures and also how the generic strategies introduced in Chapter 5 can be applied to entrepreneurial firms. We also indicate how combination strategies might benefit entrepreneurial firms and address the potential pitfalls associated with launching new venture strategies.

To be successful, new ventures must evaluate industry conditions, the competitive envi- ronment, and market opportunities in order to position themselves strategically. However, a traditional strategic analysis may have to be altered somewhat to fit the entrepreneurial situation. For example, five-forces analysis (as discussed in Chapter 2) is typically used by established firms. It can also be applied to the analysis of new ventures to assess the impact of industry and competitive forces. But you may ask: How does a new entrant evaluate the threat of other new entrants?

First, the new entrant needs to examine barriers to entry. If the barriers are too high, the potential entrant may decide not to enter or to gather more resources before attempting to do so. Compared to an older firm with an established reputation and available resources, the barriers to entry may be insurmountable for an entrepreneurial start-up. Therefore, understanding the force of these barriers is critical in making a decision to launch.

A second factor that may be especially important to a young venture is the threat of retaliation by incumbents. In many cases, entrepreneurial ventures are the new entrants that pose a threat to incumbent firms. Therefore, in applying the five-forces model to new ventures, the threat of retaliation by established firms needs to be considered.

Part of any decision about what opportunity to pursue is a consideration of how a new entrant will actually enter a new market. The concept of entry strategies provides a useful means of addressing the types of choices that new ventures have.

Entry Strategies One of the most challenging aspects of launching a new venture is finding a way to begin doing business that quickly generates cash flow, builds credibility, attracts good employees, and overcomes the liability of newness. The idea of an entry strategy or “entry wedge” describes several approaches that firms may take to get a foothold in a market.40 Several factors will affect this decision:

• Is the product/service high-tech or low-tech? • What resources are available for the initial launch? • What are the industry and competitive conditions? • What is the overall market potential? • Does the venture founder prefer to control the business or to grow it?

entrepreneurial strategy a strategy that enables a skilled and dedicated entrepreneur, with a viable opportunity and access to sufficient resources, to successfully launch a new venture.

LO 8-2 Three types of entry strategies—pioneering, imitative, and adaptive— commonly used to launch a new venture.

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In some respects, any type of entry into a market for the first time may be considered entrepreneurial. But the entry strategy will vary depending on how risky and innovative the new business concept is.41 New-entry strategies typically fall into one of three categories— pioneering new entry, imitative new entry, or adaptive new entry.42

Pioneering New Entry New entrants with a radical new product or highly innovative ser- vice may change the way business is conducted in an industry. This kind of breakthrough— creating new ways to solve old problems or meeting customers’ needs in a unique new way—is referred to as a pioneering new entry. If the product or service is unique enough, a pioneering new entrant may actually have little direct competition. The first personal computer was a pioneering product; there had never been anything quite like it, and it revolutionized computing. The first Internet browser provided a type of pioneering service. These breakthroughs created whole new industries and changed the competitive landscape. And breakthrough innovations continue to inspire pioneering entrepreneurial efforts.

The pitfalls associated with a pioneering new entry are numerous. For one thing, there is a strong risk that the product or service will not be accepted by consumers. The history of entrepreneurship is littered with new ideas that never got off the launching pad. Take, for example, Smell-O-Vision, an invention designed to pump odors into movie theaters from the projection room at preestablished moments in a film. It was tried only once (for the film Scent of a Mystery) before it was declared a major flop. Innovative? Definitely. But hardly a good idea at the time.43

A pioneering new entry is disruptive to the status quo of an industry. It is likely based on a technological breakthrough. If it is successful, other competitors will rush in to copy it. This can create issues of sustainability for an entrepreneurial firm, especially if a larger company with greater resources introduces a similar product. For a new entrant to sustain its pioneering advantage, it may be necessary to protect its intellectual property, advertise heavily to build brand recognition, form alliances with businesses that will adopt its prod- ucts or services, and offer exceptional customer service.

Imitative New Entry Whereas pioneers are often inventors or tinkerers with new technol- ogy, imitators usually have a strong marketing orientation. They look for opportunities to capitalize on proven market successes. An imitative new entry strategy is used by entrepre- neurs who see products or business concepts that have been successful in one market niche or physical locale and introduce the same basic product or service in another segment of the market. Strategy Spotlight 8.3 discusses how Casper Sleep is using an imitative strategy to shake up the mattress market.

Sometimes the key to success with an imitative strategy is to fill a market space where the need had previously been filled inadequately. Entrepreneurs are also prompted to be imita- tors when they realize that they have the resources or skills to do a job better than an existing competitor. This can actually be a serious problem for entrepreneurial start-ups if the imitator is an established company. Consider the example of Square.44 Founded in 2010, Square pro- vides a means for small businesses to process credit and debit card sales without signing up for a traditional credit card arrangement that typically includes monthly fees and minimum charges. Square provides a small credit card reader that plugs into a smartphone to users who sign up for its service. Users swipe the card and input the charge amount. Square does the rest for a 2.75 percent transaction fee. As of 2016, Square was processing $46 billion in transactions annually. But success triggers imitation. A host of both upstart and established firms have moved into this new segment. While Square has quickly established itself in the market, it now faces strong competition from major competitors, including Apple, Google, and PayPal. With the strong competition it faces and the thin margins in its business, Square has never been able to turn a profit. As a result, the firm’s value when the firm went public in November 2015 was only $2.9 billion, half of its estimated value only a year before.

pioneering new entry a firm’s entry into an industry with a radical new product or highly innovative service that changes the way business is conducted.

imitative new entry a firm’s entry into an industry with products or services that capitalize on proven market successes and that usually have a strong marketing orientation.

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8.3 STRATEGY SPOTLIGHT CASPER SLEEP AIMS TO BE THE WARBY PARKER OF MATTRESSES By taking a product that was typically sold in specialty stores with extremely high markups and, instead, allowing customers to order high quality products online at much lower prices, Warby Parker changed the eyeglass business. Casper Sleep aims to do the same thing in the mattress market. For decades, mattresses have been sold in large showrooms at specialty retailers and fur- niture stores with commissioned sales staff. Prices for a higher end king size mattress set could run up to $5,000. It was hard for anyone to enter this space using an online ordering system since customers had the expectation that they should lie down on a mattress before buying it. Additionally, delivery was a challenge since spring coil mattresses are big and bulky.

Casper Sleep, along with a few other competitors, saw an opportunity as potential customers who had transacted with online retailers for a range of products became more willing to buy furniture online as well. Additionally, latex and foam

mattresses are much easier to compress for cost efficient ship- ping. Casper developed a simple business model and jumped in. It aims to produce the best mattress possible at an attrac- tive price, sell a single model, and offer free delivery. Because the mattress is composed of memory foam and latex, Casper can compress the mattress and deliver it in a box the size of a dorm refrigerator. By all measures, it has been a success. Casper was able to generate $100 million in sales in its first full year of operation and received five star ratings from 81 percent of its customers on Amazon. The benefit for customers is clear. A king mattress on Casper’s website is $950, far cheaper than paying for a Temper-Pedic mattress at a local sleep store. Casper also lessens customer concerns about ordering a mattress online by offering a 100-day guarantee and free returns.

Sources: Welch, L. 2016. How Casper Became a $100 Million Company in Less Than Two Years. inc.com, March: np; Nassauer, S. 2016. Bed-in-a-box startups challenge traditional mattress makers. wsj.com, March 7: np; and Robinson, M. 2015. I just bought a bed from the ‘Warby Parker of mattresses’ and I will never buy one in stores again. businessinsider.com, June 9: np.

Adaptive New Entry Most new entrants use a strategy somewhere between “pure” imita- tion and “pure” pioneering. That is, they offer a product or service that is somewhat new and sufficiently different to create new value for customers and capture market share. Such firms are adaptive in the sense that they are aware of marketplace conditions and conceive entry strategies to capitalize on current trends.

According to business creativity coach Tom Monahan, “Every new idea is merely a spin of an old idea. [Knowing that] takes the pressure off from thinking [you] have to be totally creative. You don’t. Sometimes it’s one slight twist to an old idea that makes all the differ- ence.”45 An adaptive new entry approach does not involve “reinventing the wheel,” nor is it merely imitative either. It involves taking an existing idea and adapting it to a particular situation. Exhibit 8.3 presents examples of four companies that successfully modified or adapted existing products to create new value.

There are several pitfalls that might limit the success of an adaptive new entrant. First, the value proposition must be perceived as unique. Unless potential customers believe a new product or service does a superior job of meeting their needs, they will have little motiva- tion to try it. Second, there is nothing to prevent a close competitor from mimicking the new firm’s adaptation as a way to hold on to its customers. Third, once an adaptive entrant achieves initial success, the challenge is to keep the idea fresh. If the attractive features of the new business are copied, the entrepreneurial firm must find ways to adapt and improve the product or service offering.

Considering these choices, an entrepreneur or entrepreneurial team might ask, Which new entry strategy is best? The choice depends on many competitive, financial, and market- place considerations. Nevertheless, research indicates that the greatest opportunities may stem from being willing to enter new markets rather than seeking growth only in existing markets. One study found that companies that ventured into arenas that were new to the world or new to the company earned total profits of 61 percent. In contrast, companies that made only incremental improvements, such as extending an existing product line, grew total profits by only 39 percent.46

adaptive new entry a firm’s entry into an industry by offering a product or service that is somewhat new and sufficiently different to create value for customers by capitalizing on current market trends.

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Company Name Product Adaptation Result

Under Armour, Inc. Founded in 1995

Undershirts and other athletic gear

Used moisture-wicking fabric to create better gear for sweaty sports.

Under Armour generated over $4.5 billion in 2016 and is now the number-two athletic-clothing firm in the United States after Nike.

Mint.com Founded in 2005

Comprehensive online money management

Created software that tells users what they are spending by aggregating financial information from online bank and credit card accounts.

Mint has over 20 million users and is helping them manage over $3 billion in assets.

Plum Organics Founded in 2005

Organic baby food and snack foods for children

Made convenient line of baby food using organic ingredients.

Plum now has over 20 products, saw sales grow by 44% in 2015, and has over 7% market share in baby food segment.

Spanx Founded in 2000

Footless pantyhose and other undergarments for women

Combined nylon and Lycra to create a new type of undergarment that is comfortable and eliminates panty lines.

Spanx now produces over 200 products generating over $250 million in sales annually.

Sources: Bryan, M. 2007. Spanx Me, Baby! www.observer.com, December 10, np.; Carey, J. 2006. Perspiration Inspiration. BusinessWeek, June 5: 64; Palanjian, A. 2008. A Planner Plumbs for a Niche. www.wsj.com, September 30, np.; Worrell, D. 2008. Making Mint. Entrepreneur, September: 55; www.mint.com; www.spanx.com; www.underarmour.com; plumorganics.com; forbes.com/companies/plum-organics/; Germano, S. 2015. Under Armour Overtakes Adidas in U.S. Sportswear Market. wsj. com, January 8: np; Watson, E. 2015. Plum Organics sales surge 44% in 2015 as ‘food-forward’ formulations tap into needs of millennial shoppers. foodnavigator-usa. com, December 16: np; and blog.mint.com/credit/mint-by-the-numbers-which-user-are-you-040616/.

EXHIBIT 8.3 Examples of Adaptive New Entrants

However, whether to be pioneering, imitative, or adaptive when entering markets is only one question the entrepreneur faces. A new entrant must also decide what type of strate- gic positioning will work best as the business goes forward. The strategic choices can be informed by the guidelines suggested for the generic strategies. We turn to that subject next.

Generic Strategies Typically, a new entrant begins with a single business model that is equivalent in scope to a business-level strategy (Chapter 5). In this section we address how overall low cost, differen- tiation, and focus strategies can be used to achieve competitive advantages.

Overall Cost Leadership One of the ways entrepreneurial firms achieve success is by doing more with less. By holding down costs or making more efficient use of resources than larger competitors, new ventures are often able to offer lower prices and still be profitable. Thus, under the right circumstances, a low-cost leader strategy is a viable alternative for some new ventures. The way most companies achieve low-cost leadership, however, is typically differ- ent for young or small firms.

Recall from Chapter 5 that three of the features of a low-cost approach include operating at a large-enough scale to spread costs over many units of production (economies of scale), making substantial capital investments in order to increase scale economies, and using knowledge gained from experience to make cost-saving improvements. These elements of a cost-leadership strategy may be unavailable to new ventures. Because new ventures are typi- cally small, they usually don’t have high economies of scale relative to competitors. Because they are usually cash strapped, they can’t make large capital investments to increase their scale advantages. And because many are young, they often don’t have a wealth of accumu- lated experience to draw on to achieve cost reductions.

LO 8-3 How the generic strategies of overall cost leadership, differentiation, and focus are used by new ventures and small businesses.

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Given these constraints, how can new ventures successfully deploy cost-leader strate- gies? Compared to large firms, new ventures often have simple organizational structures that make decision making both easier and faster. The smaller size also helps young firms change more quickly when upgrades in technology or feedback from the marketplace indi- cate that improvements are needed. They are also able to make decisions at the time they are founded that help them deal with the issue of controlling costs. For example, they may source materials from a supplier that provides them more cheaply or set up manufacturing facilities in another country where labor costs are especially low. Thus, new firms have sev- eral avenues for achieving low-cost leadership.

Whatever methods young firms use to achieve a low-cost advantage, this has always been a way that entrepreneurial firms take business away from incumbents—by offering a compa- rable product or service at a lower price.

Differentiation Both pioneering and adaptive entry strategies involve some degree of dif- ferentiation. That is, the new entry is based on being able to offer a differentiated value proposition. In the case of pioneers, the new venture is attempting to do something strik- ingly different, either by using a new technology or by deploying resources in a way that radically alters the way business is conducted. Often, entrepreneurs do both.

Amazon founder Jeff Bezos set out to use Internet technology to revolutionize the way books are sold. He garnered the ire of other booksellers and the attention of the public by making bold claims about being the “earth’s largest bookseller.” As a bookseller, Bezos was not doing anything that had not been done before. But two key differentiating features— doing it on the Internet and offering extraordinary customer service—made Amazon a dif- ferentiated success.

There are several factors that make it more difficult for new ventures to be successful as differentiators. For one thing, the strategy is generally thought to be expensive to enact. Differentiation is often associated with strong brand identity, and establishing a brand is usually considered to be expensive because of the cost of advertising and promotion, paid endorsements, exceptional customer service, and so on. Differentiation successes are some- times built on superior innovation or use of technology. These are also factors that might make it challenging for young firms to excel relative to established competitors.

Nevertheless, all of these areas—innovation, technology, customer service, distinctive branding—are also arenas where new ventures have sometimes made a name for themselves even though they must operate with limited resources and experience. To be successful, according to Garry Ridge, CEO of the WD-40 Company, “You need to have a great product, make the end user aware of it, and make it easy to buy.”47 It sounds simple, but it is a diffi- cult challenge for new ventures with differentiation strategies. Strategy Spotlight 8.4 outlines how the Shakespeare & Co. is attempting to differentiate a new form of local bookstore.

Focus Focus strategies are often associated with small businesses because there is a natu- ral fit between the narrow scope of the strategy and the small size of the firm. A focus strategy may include elements of differentiation and overall cost leadership, as well as com- binations of these approaches. But to be successful within a market niche, the key strategic requirement is to stay focused. Let’s consider why that is so.

Despite all the attention given to fast-growing new industries, most start-ups enter indus- tries that are mature.48 In mature industries, growth in demand tends to be slow and there are often many competitors. Therefore, if a start-up wants to get a piece of the action, it often has to take business away from an existing competitor. If a start-up enters a market with a broad or aggressive strategy, it is likely to evoke retaliation from a more powerful competitor. Young firms can often succeed best by finding a market niche where they can get a foothold and make small advances that erode the position of existing competitors.49 From this position, they can build a name for themselves and grow.

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8.4 STRATEGY SPOTLIGHT SHAKESPEARE & CO.: USING TECHNOLOGY TO CREATE A NEW LOCAL BOOKSTORE With the challenge of discounted books from Amazon and the emergence of digital books, some wondered if there would still be a market for local bookstores. Some of the major chains, including Borders Books, went out of business. Others, like Barnes and Noble and Books-a-Million, faced financial chal- lenges and shrank in size. In spite of these challenges, the number of independent bookstores in the United States actually increased by 34 percent from 2010 to 2015.

Dane Neller saw opportunity in this market. In May 2015, he purchased a historic New York bookstore, Shakespeare & Co., and proceeded to shut the store—so that he could re-imagine the physical bookstore to meet the current needs of the market. “The old ways have to be reinvented. People want to hang out, they want to talk, they want intimacy. But the store has to be productive” said Mr. Neller. His new store dedicates 40 percent less space to displaying books. The focus is on carrying high demand books, leading to faster turn of the inventory on hand

and an overall increase in book sales. In addition to the books on hand, he added an Espresso Book Machine that can print any of seven million published books, including many that are no longer printed by book publishers, in less than five minutes. Customers can also self-publish their own books on the machine. Shakespeare & Co. offers self-publishing packages that range from $149 to $549. To make the store seem more like a destina- tion, he also added a café at the front of the store. He empha- sizes a friendly experience for his customers as well. Mr. Neller says, “My customer is here because they care about more than price. They want to be greeted. They want a sense of commu- nity, and they have a craving for culture.”

By providing a place to find the hottest books, the ability to print more obscure titles, and a service level that is rare in the Big Apple, Shakespeare & Co. is offering a differentiated expe- rience. It seems to be working well. Customer traffic has been robust, and sales per square foot have nearly doubled. Sources: Trachtenberg, J. 2016. New model for independent bookstores. wsj. com, April 19: np; and, Rosen, J. 2015. New Shakespeare & Co. owner envisions a national bookstore chain. publishersweekly.com, November 13: np.

Consider, for example, the “Miniature Editions” line of books launched by Running Press, a small Philadelphia publisher. The books are palm-size minibooks positioned at bookstore cash registers as point-of-sale impulse items costing about $4.95. Beginning with just 10 titles in 1993, Running Press grew rapidly and within 10 years had sold over 20 mil- lion copies. Even though these books represent just a tiny fraction of total sales in the $23 billion publishing industry, they have been a mainstay for Running Press.50 As the Running Press example indicates, many new ventures are successful even though their share of the market is quite small.

Combination Strategies One of the best ways for young and small businesses to achieve success is by pursuing com- bination strategies. By combining the best features of low-cost, differentiation, and focus strategies, new ventures can often achieve something truly distinctive.

Entrepreneurial firms are often in a strong position to offer a combination strategy because they have the flexibility to approach situations uniquely. For example, holding down expenses can be difficult for big firms because each layer of bureaucracy adds to the cost of doing business across the boundaries of a large organization.51

A similar argument could be made about entrepreneurial firms that differentiate. Large firms often find it difficult to offer highly specialized products or superior customer ser- vices. Entrepreneurial firms, by contrast, can often create high-value products and services through their unique differentiating efforts.

For nearly all new entrants, one of the major dangers is that a large firm with more resources will copy what they are doing. Well-established incumbents that observe the success of a new entrant’s product or service will copy it and use their market power to overwhelm the smaller firm. The threat may be lessened for firms that use combination strategies. Because of the flexibility of entrepreneurial firms, they can often enact combina- tion strategies in ways that the large firms cannot copy. This makes the new entrant’s strate- gies much more sustainable.

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Perhaps more threatening than large competitors are close competitors, because they have similar structural features that help them adjust quickly and be flexible in decision making. Here again, a carefully crafted and executed combination strategy may be the best way for an entrepreneurial firm to thrive in a competitive environment. Nevertheless, com- petition among rivals is a key determinant of new venture success. To address this, we turn next to the topic of competitive dynamics.

COMPETITIVE DYNAMICS New entry into markets, whether by start-ups or by incumbent firms, nearly always threat- ens existing competitors. This is true in part because, except in very new markets, nearly every market need is already being met, either directly or indirectly, by existing firms. As a result, the competitive actions of a new entrant are very likely to provoke a competitive response from companies that feel threatened. This, in turn, is likely to evoke a reaction to the response. As a result, a competitive dynamic—action and response—begins among the firms competing for the same customers in a given marketplace.

Competitive dynamics—intense rivalry among similar competitors—has the potential to alter a company’s strategy. New entrants may be forced to change their strategies or develop new ones to survive competitive challenges by incumbent rivals. New entry is among the most common reasons why a cycle of competitive actions and reactions gets started. It might also occur because of threatening actions among existing competitors, such as aggressive cost cutting. Thus, studying competitive dynamics helps explain why strategies evolve and reveals how, why, and when to respond to the actions of close competitors. Exhibit 8.4 identifies the factors that competitors need to consider when determining how to respond to a competitive act.

New Competitive Action Entry into a market by a new competitor is a good starting point to begin describing the cycle of actions and responses characteristic of a competitive dynamic process.52 However, new entry is only one type of competitive action. Price cutting, imitating successful prod- ucts, and expanding production capacity are other examples of competitive acts that might provoke competitors to react.

LO 8-4 How competitive actions, such as the entry of new competitors into a marketplace, may launch a cycle of actions and reactions among close competitors.

competitive dynamics intense rivalry, involving actions and responses, among similar competitors vying for the same customers in a marketplace.

LO 8-5 The components of competitive dynamic analysis—new competitive action, threat analysis, motivation and capability to respond, types of competitive actions, and likelihood of competitive reaction.

EXHIBIT 8.4 Model of Competitive Dynamics

New competitive

action

Types of competitive

action

Likelihood of competitive

reaction

Threat analysis

Motivation and capability

to respond

Sources: Adapted from Chen, M. J. 1996. Competitor Analysis and Interfirm Rivalry: Toward a Theoretical Integration. Academy of Management Review, 21(1): 100–134; Ketchen, D. J., Snow, C. C., & Hoover, V. L. 2004. Research on Competitive Dynamics: Recent Accomplishments and Future Challenges. Journal of Management, 30(6): 779–804; and Smith, K. G., Ferrier, W. J., & Grimm, C. M. 2001. King of the Hill: Dethroning the Industry Leader. Academy of Management Executive, 15(2): 59–70.

new competitive action acts that might provoke competitors to react, such as new market entry, price cutting, imitating successful products, and expanding production capacity.

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Why do companies launch new competitive actions? There are several reasons:

• Improve market position • Capitalize on growing demand • Expand production capacity • Provide an innovative new solution • Obtain first-mover advantages

Underlying all of these reasons is a desire to strengthen financial outcomes, capture some of the extraordinary profits that industry leaders enjoy, and grow the business. Some com- panies are also motivated to launch competitive challenges because they want to build their reputation for innovativeness or efficiency. For example, Toyota’s success with the Prius signaled to its competitors the potential value of high-fuel-economy cars, and these firms have responded with their own hybrids, electric cars, high-efficiency diesel engines, and even more fuel-efficient traditional gasoline engines. This is indicative of the competitive dynamic cycle. As former Intel chairman Andy Grove stated, “Business success contains the seeds of its own destruction. The more successful you are, the more people want a chunk of your business and then another chunk and then another until there is nothing left.”53

When a company enters into a market for the first time, it is an attack on existing com- petitors. As indicated earlier in the chapter, any of the entry strategies can be used to take competitive action. But competitive attacks come from many sources besides new entrants. Some of the most intense competition is among incumbent rivals intent on gaining strategic advantages. “Winners in business play rough and don’t apologize for it,” according to Boston Consulting Group authors George Stalk, Jr., and Rob Lachenauer in their book Hardball: Are You Playing to Play or Playing to Win?54 Exhibit 8.5 outlines their five strategies.

The likelihood that a competitor will launch an attack depends on many factors.55 In the remaining sections, we discuss factors such as competitor analysis, market conditions, types of strategic actions, and the resource endowments and capabilities companies need to take competitive action.

Threat Analysis Prior to actually observing a competitive action, companies may need to become aware of potential competitive threats. That is, companies need to have a keen sense of who their closest competitors are and the kinds of competitive actions they might be planning.56 This may require some environmental scanning and monitoring of the sort described in Chapter 2. Awareness of the threats posed by industry rivals allows a firm to understand what type of competitive response, if any, may be necessary.

Being aware of competitors and cognizant of whatever threats they might pose is the first step in assessing the level of competitive threat. Once a new competitive action becomes apparent, companies must determine how threatening it is to their business. Competitive dynamics are likely to be most intense among companies that are competing for the same customers or that have highly similar sets of resources.57 Two factors are used to assess whether or not companies are close competitors:

• Market commonality. Whether or not competitors are vying for the same customers and how many markets they share in common. For example, aircraft manufacturers Boeing and Airbus have a high degree of market commonality because they make very similar products and have many buyers in common.

• Resource similarity. The degree to which rivals draw on the same types of resources to compete. For example, Huawei and Nokia are telecommunications equipment providers that are based in different continents and have different histories, but they have patent rights to similar technologies, high quality engineering staffs, and global sales forces.

threat analysis a firm’s awareness of its closest competitors and the kinds of competitive actions they might be planning.

market commonality the extent to which competitors are vying for the same customers in the same markets.

resource similarity the extent to which rivals draw from the same types of strategic resources.

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Strategy Description Examples

Devastate rivals’ profit sanctuaries

Not all business segments generate the same level of profits for a company. Through focused attacks on a rival’s most profitable segments, a company can generate maximum leverage with relatively smaller-scale attacks. Recognize, however, that companies closely guard the information needed to determine just what their profit sanctuaries are.

In 2005, Walmart began offering low-priced extended warranties on home electronics after learning that its rivals such as Best Buy derived most of their profits from extended warranties.

Plagiarize with pride

Just because a close competitor comes up with an idea first does not mean it cannot be successfully imitated. Second movers, in fact, can see how customers respond, make improvements, and launch a better version without all the market development costs. Successful imitation is harder than it may appear and requires the imitating firm to keep its ego in check.

In designing its smartphones, Samsung copied the look, feel, and technological attributes of Apple’s IPhone. Samsung lost a patent infringement lawsuit to Apple, but by copying Apple, Samsung was able to improve its market position.

Deceive the competition

A good gambit sends the competition off in the wrong direction. This may cause the rivals to miss strategic shifts, spend money pursuing dead ends, or slow their responses. Any of these outcomes support the deceiving firms’ competitive advantage. Companies must be sure not to cross ethical lines during these actions.

Max Muir knew that Australian farmers liked to buy from family-firm suppliers but also wanted efficient suppliers. To meet both needs, he quietly bought a number of small firms to build economies of scale but didn’t consolidate brands or his sales force so that, to his customers and rivals, they still looked like independent family firms.

Unleash massive and overwhelming force

While many hardball strategies are subtle and indirect, this one is not. This is a full-frontal attack where by a firm commits significant resources to a major campaign to weaken rivals’ positions in certain markets. Firms must be sure they have the mass and stamina required to win before they declare war against a rival.

Unilever has taken a dominant position, with 65 percent market share, in the Vietnamese laundry detergent market by employing a massive investment and marketing campaign. In doing so, it decimated the market position of the local, incumbent competitors.

Raise competitors’ costs

If a company has superior insight into the complex cost and profit structure of the industry, it can compete in a way that steers its rivals into relatively higher cost/lower profit arenas. This strategy uses deception to make the rivals think they are winning, when in fact they are not. Again, companies using this strategy must be confident that they understand the industry better than their rivals.

Ecolab, a company that sells cleaning supplies to businesses, encouraged a leading competitor, Diversity, to adopt a strategy to go after the low- volume, high-margin customers. What Ecolab knew that Diversity didn’t is that the high servicing costs involved with this segment make the segment unprofitable—a situation Ecolab ensured by bidding high enough to lose the contracts to Diversity but low enough to ensure the business lost money for Diversity.

Sources: Berner, R. 2005. Watch Out, Best Buy and Circuit City. BusinessWeek, November 10; Stalk, G., Jr. 2006. Curveball Strategies to Fool the Competition. Harvard Business Review, 84(9): 114–121; and Stalk, G., Jr., & Lachenauer, R. 2004. Hardball: Are You Playing to Play or Playing to Win? Cambridge, MA: Harvard Business School Press. Reprinted by permission of Harvard Business School Press from G. Stalk, Jr., and R. Lachenauer. Copyright 2004 by the Harvard Business School Publishing Corporation; all rights reserved; Lam, Y. 2013. FDI Companies Dominate Vietnam’s Detergent Market. www.saigon-gpdaily.com.vn, January 22: np; Vascellaro, J. 2012. Apple Wins Big in Patent Case. www.wsj.com, August 25: np; and Pech, R. & Stamboulidis, G. 2010. How Strategies of Deception Facilitate Business Growth. Journal of Business Strategy, 31(6): 37–45.

EXHIBIT 8.5 Five Ways to Aggressively Attack Your Rivals

When any two firms have both a high degree of market commonality and highly similar resource bases, a stronger competitive threat is present. Such a threat, however, may not lead to competitive action. On the one hand, a market rival may be hesitant to attack a com- pany that it shares a high degree of market commonality with because it could lead to an intense battle. On the other hand, once attacked, rivals with high market commonality will be much more motivated to launch a competitive response. This is especially true in cases where the shared market is an important part of a company’s overall business.

How strong a response an attacked rival can mount will be determined by its strategic resource endowments. In general, the same set of conditions holds true with regard to resource similarity. Companies that have highly similar resource bases will be hesitant to launch an initial attack but pose a serious threat if required to mount a competitive response.58 Greater strategic resources increase a firm’s capability to respond.

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Motivation and Capability to Respond Once attacked, competitors are faced with deciding how to respond. Before deciding, how- ever, they need to evaluate not only how they will respond but also their reasons for respond- ing and their capability to respond. Companies need to be clear about what problems a competitive response is expected to address and what types of problems it might create.59 There are several factors to consider.

First, how serious is the impact of the competitive attack to which they are respond- ing? For example, a large company with a strong reputation that is challenged by a small or unknown company may elect to simply keep an eye on the new competitor rather than quickly react or overreact. Part of the story of online retailer Amazon’s early success is attributed to Barnes & Noble’s overreaction to Amazon’s claim that it was “earth’s biggest bookstore.” Because Barnes & Noble was already using the phrase “world’s largest book- store,” it sued Amazon, but lost. The confrontation made it to the front pages of The Wall Street Journal, and Amazon was on its way to becoming a household name.60

Companies planning to respond to a competitive challenge must also understand their moti- vation for responding. What is the intent of the competitive response? Is it merely to blunt the attack of the competitor, or is it an opportunity to enhance its competitive position? Sometimes the most a company can hope for is to minimize the damage caused by a competitive action.

A company that seeks to improve its competitive advantage may be motivated to launch an attack rather than merely respond to one. For example, a number of years ago, The Wall Street Journal (WSJ) attacked the New York Times by adding a local news section to the New York edition of the WSJ. Its aim was to become a more direct competitor of the Times. The publishers of the WSJ undertook this attack when they realized the Times was in a weak- ened financial condition and would be unable to respond to the attack.61 A company must also assess its capability to respond. What strategic resources can be deployed to fend off a competitive attack? Does the company have an array of internal strengths it can draw on, or is it operating from a position of weakness?

Consider the role of firm age and size in calculating a company’s ability to respond. Most entrepreneurial new ventures start out small. The smaller size makes them more nimble com- pared to large firms so they can respond quickly to competitive attacks. Because they are not well- known, start-ups also have the advantage of the element of surprise in how and when they attack. Innovative uses of technology, for example, allow small firms to deploy resources in unique ways.

Because they are young, however, start-ups may not have the financial resources needed to follow through with a competitive response.62 In contrast, older and larger firms may have more resources and a repertoire of competitive techniques they can use in a counterat- tack. Large firms, however, tend to be slower to respond. Older firms tend to be predictable in their responses because they often lose touch with the competitive environment and rely on strategies and actions that have worked in the past.

Other resources may also play a role in whether a company is equipped to retaliate. For example, one avenue of counterattack may be launching product enhancements or new product/service innovations. For that approach to be successful, it requires a company to have both the intellectual capital to put forward viable innovations and the teamwork skills to prepare a new product or service and get it to market. Resources such as cross-functional teams and the social capital that makes teamwork production effective and efficient repre- sent the type of human capital resources that enhance a company’s capability to respond.

Types of Competitive Actions Once an organization determines whether it is willing and able to launch a competitive action, it must determine what type of action is appropriate. The actions taken will be determined by both its resource capabilities and its motivation for responding. There are also marketplace considerations. What types of actions are likely to be most effective given a company’s internal strengths and weaknesses as well as market conditions?

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Two broadly defined types of competitive action include strategic actions and tactical actions. Strategic actions represent major commitments of distinctive and specific resources. Examples include launching a breakthrough innovation, building a new production facility, or merging with another company. Such actions require significant planning and resources and, once initiated, are difficult to reverse.

Tactical actions include refinements or extensions of strategies. Examples of tacti- cal actions include cutting prices, improving gaps in service, or strengthening marketing efforts. Such actions typically draw on general resources and can be implemented quickly. Exhibit 8.6 identifies several types of strategic and tactical competitive actions that illustrate the range of actions that can occur in a rivalrous relationship.

strategic actions major commitments of distinctive and specific resources to strategic initiatives.

tactical actions refinements or extensions of strategies usually involving minor resource commitments.

Actions Examples

Strategic Actions • Entering new markets • Make geographical expansions • Expand into neglected markets • Target rivals’ markets • Target new demographics

• New product introductions • Imitate rivals’ products • Address gaps in quality • Leverage new technologies • Leverage brand name with related products • Protect innovation with patents

• Changing production capacity • Create overcapacity • Tie up raw materials sources • Tie up preferred suppliers and distributors • Stimulate demand by limiting capacity

• Mergers/alliances • Acquire/partner with competitors to reduce competition • Tie up key suppliers through alliances • Obtain new technology/intellectual property • Facilitate new market entry

Tactical Actions • Price cutting (or increases) • Maintain low-price dominance • Offer discounts and rebates • Offer incentives (e.g., frequent flyer miles) • Enhance offering to move upscale

• Product/service enhancements • Address gaps in service • Expand warranties • Make incremetal product improvements

• Increased marketing efforts • Use guerrilla marketing • Conduct selective attacks • Change product packaging • Use new marketing channels

• New distribution channels • Access suppliers directly • Access customers directly • Develop multiple points of contact with customers • Expand Internet presence

Sources: Chen, M. J. & Hambrick, D. 1995. Speed, Stealth, and Selective Attack: How Small Firms Differ from Large Firms in Competitive Behavior. Academy of Management Journal, 38: 453–482; Davies, M. 1992. Sales Promotions as a Competitive Strategy. Management Decision, 30(7): 5–10; Ferrier, W., Smith, K., & Grimm, C. 1999. The Role of Competitive Action in Market Share Erosion and Industry Dethronement: A Study of Industry Leaders and Challengers. Academy of Management Journal, 42(4): 372–388; and Garda, R. A. 1991. Use Tactical Pricing to Uncover Hidden Profits. Journal of Business Strategy, 12(5): 17–23.

EXHIBIT 8.6 Strategic and Tactical Competitive Actions

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Some competitive actions take the form of frontal assaults, that is, actions aimed directly at taking business from another company or capitalizing on industry weaknesses. This can be especially effective when firms use a low-cost strategy. The airline industry provides a good example of this head-on approach. When Southwest Airlines began its no-frills, no- meals strategy in the late 1960s, it represented a direct assault on the major carriers of the day. In Europe, Ryanair has similarly directly challenged the traditional carriers with an overall cost leadership strategy.

Guerrilla offensives and selective attacks provide an alternative for firms with fewer resources.63 These draw attention to products or services by creating buzz or generating enough shock value to get some free publicity. TOMS Shoes has found a way to generate interest in its products without a large advertising budget to match Nike. Its policy of donat- ing one pair of shoes to those in need for every pair of shoes purchased by customers has generated a lot of buzz on the Internet.64 Over 3 million people have given a “like” rating on TOMS’s Facebook page. The policy has a real impact as well, with over 60 million shoes donated as of January 2017.65

Some companies limit their competitive response to defensive actions. Such actions rarely improve a company’s competitive advantage, but a credible defensive action can lower the risk of being attacked and deter new entry.

Several of the factors discussed earlier in the chapter, such as types of entry strategies and the use of cost leadership versus differentiation strategies, can guide the decision about what types of competitive actions to take. Before launching a given strategy, however, assess- ing the likely response of competitors is a vital step.66

Likelihood of Competitive Reaction The final step before initiating a competitive response is to evaluate what a competitor’s reaction is likely to be. The logic of competitive dynamics suggests that once competitive actions are initiated, it is likely they will be met with competitive responses.67 The last step before mounting an attack is to evaluate how competitors are likely to respond. Evaluating potential competitive reactions helps companies plan for future counterattacks. It may also lead to a decision to hold off—that is, not to take any competitive action at all because of the possibility that a misguided or poorly planned response will generate a devastating competi- tive reaction.

How a competitor is likely to respond will depend on three factors: market dependence, competitor’s resources, and the reputation of the firm that initiates the action (actor’s repu- tation). The implications of each of these are described briefly as follows.

Market Dependence If a company has a high concentration of its business in a particular industry, it has more at stake because it must depend on that industry’s market for its sales. Single-industry businesses or those where one industry dominates are more likely to mount a competitive response. Young and small firms with a high degree of market dependence may be limited in how they respond due to resource constraints.

Competitor’s Resources Previously, we examined the internal resource endowments that a company must evaluate when assessing its capability to respond. Here, it is the competitor’s resources that need to be considered. For example, a small firm may be unable to mount a serious attack due to lack of resources. As a result, it is more likely to react to tactical actions such as incentive pricing or enhanced service offerings because they are less costly to attack than large-scale strategic actions. In contrast, a firm with financial “deep pockets” may be able to mount and sustain a costly counterattack.

Actor’s Reputation Whether a company should respond to a competitive challenge will also depend on who launched the attack against it. Compared to relatively smaller firms

market dependence degree of concentration of a firm’s business in a particular industry.

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8.5 ETHICSSTRATEGY SPOTLIGHT CLEANING UP IN THE SOAP BUSINESS Consumer product companies Colgate-Palmolive, Unilever, Procter & Gamble (P&G), and Henkel compete with each other globally in the soap business. But as regulators found after a long investigation, this wasn’t true in France. The firms in this market had colluded to fix prices for nearly a decade. In the words of a Henkel executive, the detergent makers wanted “to limit the intensity of competition between them and clean up the market.” The Autorité de la Concurrance, the French antitrust watchdog, hit these four firms with fines totaling $484 million after completing its investigation.

The firms started sharing pricing information in the 1980s, but by the 1990s their cooperation got bolder, morphing into behavior that sounds like something out of a spy novel. In 1996, four brand directors secretly met in a restaurant in a suburb of Paris and agreed to coordinate the pricing of their soap prod- ucts. They agreed to prearranged prices at which they would sell to retailers and agreed to notify each other of any planned spe- cial offers. They gave each firm a secret alias: Pierre for Procter

& Gamble, Laurence for Unilever, Hugues for Henkel, and Christian for Colgate-Palmolive. From that point forward, they allegedly scheduled clandestine meetings four times a year. The meetings, which they called “store checks” in their schedules to limit any questioning they may have received, often lasted an entire afternoon. They would set complex pricing schemes. For example, P&G sold its Ariel brand as an upscale product and coordinated with Unilever to keep Ariel at a 3 percent markup over Unilever’s Skip brand. At these meetings, they would also hash out any complaints about whether and how any of the par- ticipants had been bending the rules.

The collusion lasted for almost 10 years until it broke down in 2004. Unilever was the first to defect, offering a 10 percent “D-Day” price cut without negotiating it with the three other firms. Other competitors quickly responded with actions that vio- lated the pricing norms they had set.

Sources: Colchester, M. & Passariello, C. 2011. Dirty secrets in soap prices. wsj. com, December 9: np; and Smith, H. & White, A. 2011. P&G, Colgate fined by France in $484 million detergent cartel. Bloomberg.com, December 11: np.

with less market power, competitors are more likely to respond to competitive moves by market leaders. Another consideration is how successful prior attacks have been. For exam- ple, price cutting by the big automakers usually has the desired result—increased sales to price-sensitive buyers—at least in the short run. Given that history, when GM offers dis- counts or incentives, rivals Ford and Chrysler cannot afford to ignore the challenge and quickly follow suit.

Choosing Not to React: Forbearance and Co-opetition The above discussion suggests that there may be many circumstances in which the best reac- tion is no reaction at all. This is known as forbearance—refraining from reacting at all as well as holding back from initiating an attack. The decision of whether a firm should respond or show forbearance is not always clear.

Related to forbearance is the concept of co-opetition. This is a term that was coined by network software company Novell’s founder and former CEO Raymond Noorda to suggest that companies often benefit most from a combination of competing and cooperating.68 Close competitors that differentiate themselves in the eyes of consumers may work together behind the scenes to achieve industrywide efficiencies.69 For example, breweries in Sweden cooperate in recycling used bottles but still compete for customers on the basis of taste and variety. Similarly, several competing Hollywood studios came together and agreed to cooperate on buying movie film. They negotiated promises to buy certain quantities of film to keep Kodak from closing down its film manufacturing business.70 As long as the benefits of cooperating are enjoyed by all participants in a co-opetition system, the practice can aid companies in avoiding intense and damaging competition.71

Despite the potential benefits of co-opetition, companies need to guard against cooperat- ing to such a great extent that their actions are perceived as collusion, a practice that has legal ramifications in the United States. In Strategy Spotlight 8.5, we see an example of crossing the line into illegal cooperation.

forbearance a firm’s choice of not reacting to a rival’s new competitive action.

co-opetition a firm’s strategy of both cooperating and competing with rival firms.

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Once a company has evaluated a competitor’s likelihood of responding to a competitive challenge, it can decide what type of action is most appropriate. Competitive actions can take many forms: the entry of a start-up into a market for the first time, an attack by a lower- ranked incumbent on an industry leader, or the launch of a breakthrough innovation that disrupts the industry structure. Such actions forever change the competitive dynamics of a marketplace. Thus, the cycle of actions and reactions that occur in business every day is a vital aspect of entrepreneurial strategy that leads to continual new value creation and the ongoing advancement of economic well-being.

ISSUE FOR DEBATE

Where Have the Entrepreneurs Gone? The United States has long been seen as the home of a vibrant entrepreneurial economy, but the statistics call this into question. From 1977 to 2011, the number of new start-up firms in the United States declined by 28 percent. More dramatically, relative to the size of the working population, the number of new start-ups has fallen by half. Even Silicon Valley has seen the rate of new business start-ups decline by 50 percent over the last three decades. Entrepreneurial actions have fallen most sharply among younger adults. People age 20 to 34 created only 22.7 percent of all new companies in 2013, down from 34.8 percent in 1996. This is an ironic change given that enrollment in college entrepreneurship programs has been growing.

This declining rate of entrepreneurship is setting off warning bells for many. It leads to less innovation in the economy and slower job opportunity growth. Over the long run, it would lead to lower living standards and stagnant economic growth.

Concerns on this issue have led to a discussion of the underlying causes of this change. The causes of this decline may be emotional or institutional. On the emotional level, it may be that the after-effects of the Great Recession have tilted society toward risk aversion. Additionally, many would-be entrepreneurs are saddled with significant student loan debt, leaving them less willing to take on the risk of entrepreneurship. Consistent with this view, Audrey Baxter, a woman who won a business proposal award as a student at UCLA, opted to take a corporate job when she graduated rather than pushing her small business forward. “Having a secure job with a really good salary was something to be considered carefully,” Baxter said.

It may also be that institutional factors are reducing people’s willingness or ability to start a business. Weakened antitrust enforcement may be playing a role. Firms have been able to grow and combine in a range of markets, leading to extremely large competitors that dominate markets, increasing the entry barriers for entrepreneurs. Also, lax antitrust enforcement has made it easier for large incumbent firms to respond very aggressively to newcomers, increasing the risk for entrepreneurs. Government red tape is another institutional barrier to entrepreneurs. For example, Celeste Kelly opened a business offering horse massage but had to shut down the business when the Arizona State Veterinary Medical Examining Board ordered her to “cease and desist” because it ruled she was practicing veterinary medicine without a license—even though no veterinarians in the area offered horse massage as a treatment. This may seem like an obscure example, but many businesses, including barbers, bartenders, cosmetologists, and even tour guides, are required to obtain licenses. Less than 5 percent of workers required licenses in the 1950s. That number is now 35 percent. According to economists Morris Kleiner and Alan Krueger, licenses increase the wage costs for a business by 18 percent.

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Discussion Questions 1. How concerned are you about the drop in the rate of entrepreneurship? 2. What do you think are the primary causes of the decline? 3. What actions should be taken to increase the rate of new business start-ups? How effective

will these actions be? 4. What factors influence your desire to work in an entrepreneurial firm versus an established firm?

Sources: Hamilton, W. 2014. A drop-off in start-ups: Where are all the entrepreneurs? latimes.com, September 7: np; Anonymous. 2014. Red tape blues: The best and worst states for small business. The Economist, July 5: 23–24; and Anonymous. 2014. Unshackle the entrepreneurs; America’s license raj. The Economist, July 5: 14.

Reflecting on Career Implications . . . This chapter focuses on the potential benefits and risks associated with entrepreneurial actions. You can enhance your career by looking for and leveraging entrepreneurial opportunities both in creating a start- up and in firms in which you work. The questions below allow you to explore these possibilities.

Opportunity Recognition: What ideas for new business activities are actively discussed in your work environment? Could you apply the four characteristics of an opportunity to determine whether they are viable opportunities? If no one in your organization is excited about or even considering new opportunities, you may want to ask yourself if you want to continue with your current firm.

Entrepreneurial New Entry: Are there opportunities to launch new products or services that might add value to the organization? What are the best ways for you to bring

these opportunities to the attention of key managers? Or might this provide an opportunity for you to launch your own entrepreneurial venture?

Entrepreneurial Resources: Evaluate your resources in terms of financial resources, human capital, and social capital. Are these enough to launch your own venture? If you are deficient in one area, are there ways to compensate for it? Even if you are not interested in starting a new venture, can you use your entrepreneurial resources to advance your career within your firm?

Competitive Dynamics: There is always internal competition within organizations: among business units and sometimes even individuals within the same unit. What types of strategic and tactical actions are employed in these internal rivalries? What steps have you taken to strengthen your own position given the “competitive dynamics” within your organization?

New ventures and entrepreneurial firms that capitalize on marketplace oppor- tunities make an important contri- bution to the U.S. economy. They are leaders in terms of implementing new technologies and introducing

innovative products and services. Yet entrepreneurial firms face unique challenges if they are going to survive and grow.

To successfully launch new ventures or implement new technologies, three factors must be present: an entrepreneurial opportunity, the resources to pursue the opportunity, and an entrepreneur or entrepreneurial team willing and able to undertake the venture. Firms must develop a strong ability to recognize viable opportunities. Opportunity recognition is a process of determining which venture ideas are, in fact, promising business opportunities.

In addition to strong opportunities, entrepreneurial firms need resources and entrepreneurial leadership to thrive. The resources that start-ups need include financial resources as well as human and social capital. Many firms

also benefit from government programs that support new venture development and growth. New ventures thrive best when they are led by founders or owners who have vision, drive and dedication, and a commitment to excellence.

Once the necessary opportunities, resources, and entre- preneur skills are in place, new ventures still face numerous strategic challenges. Decisions about the strategic posi- tioning of new entrants can benefit from conducting strategic analyses and evaluating the requirements of niche markets. Entry strategies used by new ventures take several forms, including pioneering new entry, imitative new entry, and adaptive new entry. Entrepreneurial firms can benefit from using overall low cost, differentiation, and focus strategies although each of these approaches has pitfalls that are unique to young and small firms. Entrepreneurial firms are also in a strong position to benefit from combination strategies.

The entry of a new company into a competitive arena is like a competitive attack on incumbents in that arena. Such actions often provoke a competitive response, which

summary

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may, in turn, trigger a reaction to the response. As a result, a competitive dynamic—action and response—begins among close competitors. In deciding whether to attack or counterattack, companies must analyze the seriousness of the competitive threat, their ability to mount a competitive response, and the type of action—strategic or tactical—that the situation requires. At times, competitors find it is better not to respond at all or to find avenues to cooperate with, rather than challenge, close competitors.

SUMMARY REVIEW QUESTIONS 1. Explain how the combination of opportunities,

resources, and entrepreneurs helps determine the character and strategic direction of an entrepreneurial firm.

2. What is the difference between discovery and evaluation in the process of opportunity recognition? Give an example of each.

3. Describe the three characteristics of entrepreneurial leadership: vision, dedication and drive, and commitment to excellence.

4. Briefly describe the three types of entrepreneurial entry strategies: pioneering, imitative, and adaptive.

5. Explain why entrepreneurial firms are often in a strong position to use combination strategies.

6. What does the term competitive dynamics mean? 7. Explain the difference between strategic actions and

tactical actions and provide examples of each.

entrepreneurship 238 opportunity recognition 239 angel investors 242

venture capitalists 242 crowdfunding 243 entrepreneurial leadership 246 entrepreneurial strategy 247 pioneering new entry 248 imitative new entry 248 adaptive new entry 249 competitive dynamics 253

key terms

APPLICATION QUESTIONS & EXERCISES 1. E-Loan and Lending Tree are two entrepreneurial

firms that offer lending services over the Internet. Evaluate the features of these two companies. (Fill in the table below.)

a. Evaluate their characteristics and assess the extent to which they are comparable in terms of market commonality and resource similarity.

b. Based on your analysis, what strategic and/ or tactical actions might these companies take to improve their competitive position? Could E-Loan and Lending Tree improve their performance more through co-opetition than competition? Explain your rationale.

2. Using the Internet, research the Small Business Administration’s website (www.sba.gov). What different types of financing are available to small firms? Besides financing, what other programs are available to support the growth and development of small businesses?

3. Think of an entrepreneurial firm that has been successfully launched in the last 10 years. What kind of entry strategy did it use—pioneering, imitative, or adaptive? Since the firm’s initial entry, how has it used or combined overall low-cost, differentiation, and/or focus strategies?

4. Select an entrepreneurial firm you are familiar with in your local community. Research the company and discuss how it has positioned itself relative to its close competitors. Does it have a unique strategic advantage? Disadvantage? Explain.

Company Market Commonality Resource Similarity

E-Loan

Lending Tree

Company Strategic Actions Tactical Actions

E-Loan

Lending Tree

new competitive action 253 threat analysis 254 market commonality 254 resource similarity 254 strategic actions 257

tactical actions 257 market dependence 258 forbearance 259 co-opetition 259

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ETHICS QUESTIONS 1. Imitation strategies are based on the idea of copying

another firm’s idea and using it for your own purposes. Is this unethical or simply a smart business practice? Discuss the ethical implications of this practice (if any).

2. Intense competition such as price wars are an accepted practice in the United States, but cooperation between companies has legal ramifications because of antitrust laws. Should price wars that drive small businesses or new entrants out of business be illegal? What ethical considerations are raised (if any)?

1. Konrad, A. 2014. Snapchat billionaires protect their stakes by settling with ousted cofounder Reggie Brown. forbes.com, September 9: np; Dave, P. 2015. Just getting started? Put it all in writing. Dallas Morning News, May 10: 4D; and statista.com.

2. http://web.sba.gov. 3. Timmons, J. A. & Spinelli, S. 2004.

New venture creation (6th ed.). New York: McGraw-Hill/Irwin; and Bygrave, W. D. 1997. The entrepreneurial process. In W. D. Bygrave (Ed.), The portable MBA in entrepreneurship (2nd ed.). New York: Wiley.

4. Bryant, A. 2012. Want to innovate? Feed a cookie to the monster. nytimes.com, March 24: np.

5. Fromartz, S. 1998. How to get your first great idea. Inc. Magazine, April 1: 91–94; and Vesper, K. H. 1990. New venture strategies (2nd ed.). Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall.

6. For an interesting perspective on the nature of the opportunity recognition process, see Baron, R. A. 2006. Opportunity recognition as pattern recognition: How entrepreneurs “connect the dots” to identify new business opportunities. Academy of Management Perspectives, February: 104–119.

7. Gaglio, C. M. 1997. Opportunity identification: Review, critique and suggested research directions. In Katz, J. A. (Ed.), Advances in entrepreneurship, firm emergence and growth, vol. 3. Greenwich, CT: JAI Press: 139–202; Lumpkin, G. T., Hills, G. E., & Shrader, R. C. 2004. Opportunity recognition. In Welsch, H. L. (Ed.), Entrepreneurship: The road ahead: 73–90. London: Routledge; and Long, W. & McMullan, W. E. 1984. Mapping the new venture opportunity identification process. Frontiers of entrepreneurship research, 1984: 567–590. Wellesley, MA: Babson College.

8. For an interesting discussion of different aspects of opportunity discovery, see Shepherd, D. A. & De

Tienne, D. R. 2005. Prior knowledge, potential financial reward, and opportunity identification. Entrepreneurship Theory & Practice, 29(1): 91–112; and Gaglio, C. M. 2004. The role of mental simulations and counterfactual thinking in the opportunity identification process. Entrepreneurship Theory & Practice, 28(6): 533–552.

9. Stewart, T. A. 2002. How to think with your gut. Business 2.0, November: 99–104.

10. Anonymous. 2013. How entrepreneurs come up with great ideas. wsj.com, April 29: np.

11. Garone, E. 2016. Whose glass is that? A startup has the answer. wsj. com, May 1: np.

12. Zaleski, A. 2016. Grapes of math. fortune.com, February 1: 28.

13. For more on the opportunity recognition process, see Smith, B. R., Matthews, C. H., & Schenkel, M. T. 2009. Differences in entrepreneurial opportunities: The role of tacitness and codification in opportunity identification. Journal of Small Business Management, 47(1): 38–57.

14. Timmons, J. A. 1997. Opportunity recognition. In Bygrave, W. D. (Ed.), The portable MBA in entrepreneurship (2nd ed.): 26–54. New York: Wiley.

15. Social networking is also proving to be an increasingly important type of entrepreneurial resource. For an interesting discussion, see Aldrich, H. E. & Kim, P. H. 2007. Small worlds, infinite possibilities? How social networks affect entrepreneurial team formation and search. Strategic Entrepreneurship Journal, 1(1): 147–166.

16. Bhide, A. V. 2000. The origin and evolution of new businesses. New York: Oxford University Press.

17. Small business 2001: Where are we now? 2001. Inc., May 29: 18–19; and Zacharakis, A. L., Bygrave, W. D., & Shepherd, D. A. 2000. Global entrepreneurship monitor—National entrepreneurship assessment: United States of America 2000 Executive

Report. Kansas City, MO: Kauffman Center for Entrepreneurial Leadership.

18. Cooper, S. 2003. Cash cows. Entrepreneur, June: 36.

19. Seglin, J. L. 1998. What angels want. Inc., 20(7): 43–44.

20. Torres, N. L. 2002. Playing an angel. Entrepreneur, May: 130–138.

21. For an interesting discussion of how venture capital practices vary across different sectors of the economy, see Gaba, V. & Meyer, A. D. 2008. Crossing the organizational species barrier: How venture capital practices infiltrated the information technology sector. Academy of Management Journal, 51(5): 391–412.

22. Our discussion of crowdfunding draws on Wasik, J. 2012. The brilliance (and madness) of crowdfunding. Forbes, June 25: 144–146; Anonymous. 2012. Why crowdfunding may not be path to riches. Finance.yahoo.com, October 23: np; and Espinoza, J. 2012. Doing equity crowd funding right. The Wall Street Journal, May 21: R3.

23. Stanko, M. & Henard, D. 2016. How crowdfunding influences innovation. MIT Sloan Management Review, Spring: 15–17.

24. crowdexpert.com/ crowdfunding-industry-statistics/.

25. Shchetko, N. 2014. There’s no refunding in crowdfunding. The Wall Street Journal, November 26: B1, B4.

26. Wasik, J. 2012. The brilliance (and madness) of crowdfunding. Forbes, June 25: 144–146; and, Burke, A. 2012. Crowdfunding set to explode with passage of Entrepreneur Access to Capital Act. forbes.com, February 29: np.

27. Kroll, M., Walters, B., & Wright, P. 2010. The impact of insider control and environment on post- IPO performance. Academy of Management Journal, 53: 693–725.

28. Eisenhardt, K. M. & Schoonhoven, C. B. 1990. Organizational growth: Linking founding team, strategy,

REFERENCES

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environment, and growth among U.S. semiconductor ventures, 1978–1988. Administrative Science Quarterly, 35: 504–529.

29. Anonymous. 2015. There’s an app for that. The Economist, January 3: 17–20.

30. Dubini, P. & Aldrich, H. 1991. Personal and extended networks are central to the entrepreneurship process. Journal of Business Venturing, 6(5): 305–333.

31. For more on the role of social contacts in helping young firms build legitimacy, see Chrisman, J. J. & McMullan, W. E. 2004. Outside assistance as a knowledge resource for new venture survival. Journal of Small Business Management, 42(3): 229–244.

32. Vogel, C. 2000. Janina Pawlowski. Working Woman, June: 70.

33. For a recent perspective on entrepreneurship and strategic alliances, see Rothaermel, F. T. & Deeds, D. L. 2006. Alliance types, alliance experience and alliance management capability in high- technology ventures. Journal of Business Venturing, 21(4): 429–460; and Lu, J. W. & Beamish, P. W. 2006. Partnering strategies and performance of SMEs’ international joint ventures. Journal of Business Venturing, 21(4): 461–486.

34. Monahan, J. 2005. All systems grow. Entrepreneur, March: 78–82; Weaver, K. M. & Dickson, P. 2004. Strategic alliances. In Dennis, W. J., Jr. (Ed.), NFIB national small business poll. Washington, DC: National Federation of Independent Business; and Copeland, M. V. & Tilin, A. 2005. Get someone to build it. Business 2.0, 6(5): 88.

35. For more information, go to the Small Business Administration website at www.sba.gov.

36. Simsek, Z., Heavey, C., & Veiga, J. 2009. The impact of CEO core self-evaluation on entrepreneurial orientation. Strategic Management Journal, 31: 110–119.

37. Zhao, H. & Seibert, S. 2006. The big five personality dimensions and entrepreneurial status: A meta- analytic review. Journal of Applied Psychology, 91: 259–271.

38. For an interesting study of the role of passion in entrepreneurial success, see Chen, X-P., Yao, X., & Kotha, S. 2009. Entrepreneur passion and preparedness in business plan presentations: A persuasion analysis

of venture capitalists’ funding decisions. Academy of Management Journal, 52(1): 101–120.

39. Collins, J. 2001. Good to great. New York: HarperCollins.

40. The idea of entry wedges was discussed by Vesper, K. 1990. New venture strategies (2nd ed.). Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall; and Drucker, P. F. 1985. Innovation and entrepreneurship. New York: HarperBusiness.

41. See Dowell, G. & Swaminathan, A. 2006. Entry timing, exploration, and firm survival in the early U.S. bicycle industry. Strategic Management Journal, 27: 1159–1182, for a recent study of the timing of entrepreneurial new entry.

42. Dunlap-Hinkler, D., Kotabe, M., & Mudambi, R. 2010. A story of breakthrough vs. incremental innovation: Corporate entrepreneurship in the global pharmaceutical industry. Strategic Entrepreneurship Journal, 4: 106–127.

43. Maiello, M. 2002. They almost changed the world. Forbes, December 22: 217–220.

44. Pogue, D. 2012. Pay by app: No cash or card needed. International Herald Tribune, July 19: 18.

45. Williams, G. 2002. Looks like rain. Entrepreneur, September: 104–111.

46. Pedroza, G. M. 2002. Tech tutors. Entrepreneur, September: 120.

47. Romanelli, E. 1989. Environments and strategies of organization start-up: Effects on early survival. Administrative Science Quarterly, 34(3): 369–387.

48. Wallace, B. 2000. Brothers. Philadelphia Magazine, April: 66–75.

49. Buchanan, L. 2003. The innovation factor: A field guide to innovation. www.forbes.com, April 21.

50. Kim, W. C. & Mauborgne, R. 2005. Blue ocean strategy. Boston: Harvard Business School Press.

51. For more on how unique organizational combinations can contribute to competitive advantages of entrepreneurial firms, see Steffens, P., Davidsson, P., & Fitzsimmons, J. Performance configurations over time: Implications for growth- and profit-oriented strategies. Entrepreneurship Theory & Practice, 33(1): 125–148.

52. Smith, K. G., Ferrier, W. J., & Grimm, C. M. 2001. King of the hill: Dethroning the industry leader.

Academy of Management Executive, 15(2): 59–70.

53. Grove, A. 1999. Only the paranoid survive: How to exploit the crisis points that challenge every company. New York: Random House.

54. Stalk, G., Jr., & Lachenauer, R. 2004. Hardball: Are you playing to play or playing to win? Cambridge, MA: Harvard Business School Press.

55. Chen, M. J., Lin, H. C, & Michel, J. G. 2010. Navigating in a hypercompetitive environment: The roles of action aggressiveness and TMT integration. Strategic Management Journal, 31: 1410–1430.

56. Peteraf, M. A. & Bergen, M. A. 2003. Scanning competitive landscapes: A market-based and resource-based framework. Strategic Management Journal, 24: 1027–1045.

57. Chen, M. J. 1996. Competitor analysis and interfirm rivalry: Toward a theoretical integration. Academy of Management Review, 21(1): 100–134.

58. Chen, 1996, op.cit. 59. Chen, M. J., Su, K. H, & Tsai, W.

2007. Competitive tension: The awareness-motivation-capability perspective. Academy of Management Journal, 50(1): 101–118.

60. St. John, W. 1999. Barnes & Noble’s epiphany. www.wired.com, June.

61. Anonymous. 2010. Is the Times ready for a newspaper war? Bloomberg Businessweek, April 26: 30–31.

62. Souder, D. & Shaver, J. M. 2010. Constraints and incentives for making long horizon corporate investments. Strategic Management Journal, 31: 1316–1336.

63. Chen, M. J. & Hambrick, D. 1995. Speed, stealth, and selective attack: How small firms differ from large firms in competitive behavior. Academy of Management Journal, 38: 453–482.

64. Fenner, L. 2009. TOMS Shoes donates one pair of shoes for every pair purchased. America.gov, October 19: np.

65. www.facebook.com/tomsshoes. 66. For a discussion of how the

strategic actions of Apple Computer contribute to changes in the competitive dynamics in both the cellular phone and music industries, see Burgelman, R. A. &

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Grove, A. S. 2008. Cross-boundary disruptors: Powerful interindustry entrepreneurial change agents. Strategic Entrepreneurship Journal, 1(1): 315–327.

67. Smith, K. G., Ferrier, W. J., & Ndofor, H. 2001. Competitive dynamics research: Critique and future directions. In Hitt, M. A., Freeman, R. E., & Harrison, J. S.

(Eds.), The Blackwell handbook of strategic management: 315–361. Oxford, UK: Blackwell.

68. Gee, P. 2000. Co-opetition: The new market milieu. Journal of Healthcare Management, 45: 359–363.

69. Ketchen, D. J., Snow, C. C., & Hoover, V. L. 2004. Research on competitive dynamics: Recent accomplishments and future

challenges. Journal of Management, 30(6): 779–804.

70. Fritz, B. 2014. Movie film, at death’s door, gets a reprieve. wsj.com, July 29: np.

71. Khanna, T., Gulati, R., & Nohria, N. 2000. The economic modeling of strategy process: Clean models and dirty hands. Strategic Management Journal, 21: 781–790.

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chapter

After reading this chapter, you should have a good understanding of the following learning objectives:

9 LO9-1 The value of effective strategic control systems in strategy

implementation.

LO9-2 The key difference between “traditional” and “contemporary” control systems.

LO9-3 The imperative for contemporary control systems in today’s complex and rapidly changing competitive and general environments.

LO9-4 The benefits of having the proper balance among the three levers of behavioral control: culture, rewards and incentives, and boundaries.

LO9-5 The three key participants in corporate governance: shareholders, management (led by the CEO), and the board of directors.

LO9-6 The role of corporate governance mechanisms in ensuring that the interests of managers are aligned with those of shareholders from both the United States and international perspectives.

Strategic Control and Corporate Governance

©Anatoli Styf/Shutterstock

PART 3: STRATEGIC IMPLEMENTATION

Just a few years ago, Tesco was a high-flying global retailer. Throughout the 1990s and early 2000s, Tesco grew to dominate the U.K. retailing market, attaining a 33 percent market share, and successfully expanded into new geographic markets. However, over the last several years, Tesco has faced increasing pressures at home and large struggles outside the U.K. This included a failed entry into the U.S. market and increasing pressure at home from hard-discounting competitors, most notably Lidl and Aldi. In recent years, Tesco has seen its stock price drop by nearly 40 percent, major investors including Warren Buffett bail out, and pressures from investors that forced the ousting of the firm’s CEO.

In September 2014, the situation for Tesco got much worse.1 After an employee alerted the firm’s general counsel of accounting irregularities, a full-blown accounting scandal erupted. Senior managers in the U.K. food business had been booking income early and delaying the booking of costs to shore up the financial performance of the firm. The firm was forced to restate its earnings for the first half of 2014, initially to the tune of $408 million, which was later increased to $431 million as the scope of the problem increased. The scandal led to the suspension or dismissal of eight senior executives at Tesco, the suspension of retirement packages for the firm’s prior CEO and CFO, and the eventual resignation of the chairman of the board of Tesco. It also triggered an investigation by the U.K.’s accounting watchdog, the Financial Reporting Council, into Tesco’s accounting practices for the years 2012, 2013, and 2014.

The scandal has triggered commentators to reassert some long-standing concerns about Tesco’s governance and also led them to point out some new concerns. Industry analysts have long been critical of Tesco’s board of directors, especially noting that the board lacks retail experience. This likely played a role in the scandal, since the board would have had limited ability to notice the arcane, retail-related accounting practices at the center of the accounting deception. Interestingly, four months before the scandal arose, Tesco’s auditor, PricewaterhouseCoopers, warned of the “risk of manipulation” in the accounting of promotional events, the areas that were manipulated, but the board appeared to take no action in its following meeting. The accounting irregularities also arose at a time of limited oversight within the firm. Laurie McIlwee, the firm’s chief financial officer, stepped down in April 2014, but her replacement didn’t take up the CFO position until December 2014. During that time, Tesco’s finances were managed by the CEO’s office. Thus, the firm did not have a senior executive whose primary task was to ensure the validity of the firm’s financial reporting. Finally, the most senior leadership of the firm was distracted by other tasks. The firm’s prior CEO was dismissed in July, and the new CEO took the reins in August 2014. Thus, Dave Lewis, the new CEO, was focusing on learning the business and the firm’s operations just as the scandal broke.

The scandal has been quite damaging to the firm, with Tesco’s already battered stock price plunging an additional 28 percent during the period the scandal unfolded.

Discussion Questions 1. What changes should Tesco make to avoid future similar scandals? 2. To what degree do you think the scandal at Tesco was related to how the firm had been

performing?

LEARNING FROM MISTAKES

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We first explore two central aspects of strategic control:2 (1) informational control, which is the ability to respond effectively to environmental change, and (2) behavioral control, which is the appropriate balance and alignment among a firm’s culture, rewards, and boundar- ies. In the final section of this chapter, we focus on strategic control from a much broader perspective—what is referred to as corporate governance.3 Here, we direct our attention to the need for a firm’s shareholders (the owners) and their elected representatives (the board of directors) to ensure that the firm’s executives (the management team) strive to fulfill their fiduciary duty of maximizing long-term shareholder value. As we just saw in the Tesco example, poor governance and control can lead to damaging scandals in firms.

ENSURING INFORMATIONAL CONTROL: RESPONDING EFFECTIVELY TO ENVIRONMENTAL CHANGE We discuss two broad types of control systems: “traditional” and “contemporary.” As both general and competitive environments become more unpredictable and complex, the need for contemporary systems increases.

A Traditional Approach to Strategic Control The traditional approach to strategic control is sequential: (1) strategies are formulated and top management sets goals, (2) strategies are implemented, and (3) performance is mea- sured against the predetermined goal set, as illustrated in Exhibit 9.1.

Control is based on a feedback loop from performance measurement to strategy for- mulation. This process typically involves lengthy time lags, often tied to a firm’s annual planning cycle. Such traditional control systems, termed “single-loop” learning by Harvard’s Chris Argyris, simply compare actual performance to a predetermined goal.4 They are most appropriate when the environment is stable and relatively simple, goals and objectives can be measured with a high level of certainty, and there is little need for complex measures of performance. Sales quotas, operating budgets, production schedules, and similar quantita- tive control mechanisms are typical. The appropriateness of the business strategy or stan- dards of performance is seldom questioned.5

James Brian Quinn of Dartmouth College has argued that grand designs with pre- cise and carefully integrated plans seldom work.6 Rather, most strategic change proceeds incrementally—one step at a time. Leaders should introduce some sense of direction, some logic in incremental steps.7 Similarly, McGill University’s Henry Mintzberg has written about leaders “crafting” a strategy.8 Drawing on the parallel between the potter at her wheel and the strategist, Mintzberg pointed out that the potter begins work with some general idea of the artifact she wishes to create, but the details of design—even possibilities for a different design—emerge as the work progresses. For businesses facing complex and turbulent busi- ness environments, the craftsperson’s method helps us deal with the uncertainty about how a design will work out in practice and allows for a creative element.

Mintzberg’s argument, like Quinn’s, questions the value of rigid planning and goal- setting processes. Fixed strategic goals also become dysfunctional for firms competing in highly unpredictable competitive environments. Strategies need to change frequently and opportunistically. An inflexible commitment to predetermined goals and milestones can prevent the very adaptability that is required of a good strategy.

strategic control the process of monitoring and correcting a firm’s strategy and performance.

LO 9-1 The value of effective strategic control systems in strategy implementation.

traditional approach to strategic control a sequential method of organizational control in which (1) strategies are formulated and top management sets goals, (2) strategies are implemented, and (3) performance is measured against the predetermined goal set.

LO 9-3 The imperative for contemporary control systems in today’s complex and rapidly changing competitive and general environments.

LO 9-2 The key difference between “traditional” and “contemporary” control systems.

EXHIBIT 9.1 Traditional Approach to Strategic Control

Formulate strategies

Implement strategies

Strategic control

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A Contemporary Approach to Strategic Control Adapting to and anticipating both internal and external environmental change is an integral part of strategic control. The relationships between strategy formulation, implementation, and control are highly interactive, as suggested by Exhibit 9.2. The exhibit also illustrates two different types of strategic control: informational control and behavioral control. Informational control is primarily concerned with whether or not the organization is “doing the right things.” Behavioral control, on the other hand, asks if the organization is “doing things right” in the implementation of its strategy. Both the informational and behavioral components of strategic control are necessary, but not sufficient, conditions for success. What good is a well-conceived strategy that cannot be implemented? Or what use is an ener- getic and committed workforce if it is focused on the wrong strategic target?

Informational control deals with the internal environment as well as the external strategic context. It addresses the assumptions and premises that provide the foundation for an organiza- tion’s strategy. Do the organization’s goals and strategies still “fit” within the context of the cur- rent strategic environment? Depending on the type of business, such assumptions may relate to changes in technology, customer tastes, government regulation, and industry competition.

This involves two key issues. First, managers must scan and monitor the external environ- ment, as we discussed in Chapter 2. Also, conditions can change in the internal environ- ment of the firm, as we discussed in Chapter 3, requiring changes in the strategic direction of the firm. These may include, for example, the resignation of key executives or delays in the completion of major production facilities.

In the contemporary approach, information control is part of an ongoing process of orga- nizational learning that continuously updates and challenges the assumptions that underlie the organization’s strategy. In such double-loop learning, the organization’s assumptions, premises, goals, and strategies are continuously monitored, tested, and reviewed. The ben- efits of continuous monitoring are evident—time lags are dramatically shortened, changes in the competitive environment are detected earlier, and the organization’s ability to respond with speed and flexibility is enhanced.

Contemporary control systems must have four characteristics to be effective:9

1. The focus is on constantly changing information that has potential strategic importance. 2. The information is important enough to demand frequent and regular attention from

all levels of the organization. 3. The data and information generated are best interpreted and discussed in face-to-face

meetings. 4. The control system is a key catalyst for an ongoing debate about underlying data,

assumptions, and action plans.

An executive’s decision to use the control system interactively—in other words, to invest the time and attention to review and evaluate new information—sends a clear signal to the organization about what is important. The dialogue and debate that emerge from such an interactive process can often lead to new strategies and innovations.

informational control a method of organizational control in which a firm gathers and analyzes information from the internal and external environment in order to obtain the best fit between the organization’s goals and strategies and the strategic environment.

behavioral control a method of organizational control in which a firm influences the actions of employees through culture, rewards, and boundaries.

EXHIBIT 9.2 Contemporary Approach to Strategic Control

Formulate strategies

Implement strategies

Strategic control

Informational control

Behavioral control

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ATTAINING BEHAVIORAL CONTROL: BALANCING CULTURE, REWARDS, AND BOUNDARIES Behavioral control is focused on implementation—doing things right. Effectively implement- ing strategy requires manipulating three key control “levers”: culture, rewards, and boundar- ies (see Exhibit 9.3). There are two compelling reasons for an increased emphasis on culture and rewards in a system of behavioral controls.10

First, the competitive environment is increasingly complex and unpredictable, demanding both flexibility and quick response to its challenges. As firms simultaneously downsize and face the need for increased coordination across organizational boundaries, a control system based primarily on rigid strategies, rules, and regulations is dysfunctional. The use of rewards and culture to align individual and organizational goals becomes increasingly important.

Second, the implicit long-term contract between the organization and its key employees has been eroded.11 Today’s younger managers have been conditioned to see themselves as “free agents” and view a career as a series of opportunistic challenges. As managers are advised to “specialize, market yourself, and have work, if not a job,” the importance of cul- ture and rewards in building organizational loyalty claims greater importance.

Each of the three levers—culture, rewards, and boundaries—must work in a balanced and consistent manner. Let’s consider the role of each.

Building a Strong and Effective Culture Organizational culture is a system of shared values (what is important) and beliefs (how things work) that shape a company’s people, organizational structures, and control systems to pro- duce behavioral norms (the way we do things around here).12 How important is culture? Very.

Collins and Porras argued in Built to Last that the key factor in sustained exceptional performance is a cultlike culture.13 You can’t touch it or write it down, but it’s there in every organization; its influence is pervasive; it can work for you or against you.14 Effective leaders understand its importance and strive to shape and use it as one of their important levers of strategic control.15

The Role of Culture Culture wears many different hats, each woven from the fabric of those val- ues that sustain the organization’s primary source of competitive advantage. Some examples are:

• Zappos and Amazon focus on customer service. • Lexus (a division of Toyota) and Apple emphasize product quality. • Google and 3M place a high value on innovation. • Nucor (steel) and Walmart are concerned, above all, with operational efficiency.

LO 9-4 The benefits of having the proper balance among the three levers of behavioral control: culture, rewards and incentives, and boundaries.

organizational culture a system of shared values and beliefs that shape a company’s people, organizational structures, and control systems to produce behavioral norms.

EXHIBIT 9.3 Essential Elements of Behavioral Control

Culture Rewards

Boundaries

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Culture sets implicit boundaries—unwritten standards of acceptable behavior—in dress, ethical matters, and the way an organization conducts its business.16 By creating a frame- work of shared values, culture encourages individual identification with the organization and its objectives. Culture acts as a means of reducing monitoring costs.17

Strong culture can lead to greater employee engagement and provide a common pur- pose and identity. Firms have typically relied on economic incentives for workers, using a combination of rewards (carrots) and rules and threats (sticks) to get employees to act in desired ways. But these systems rely on the assumption that individuals are fundamentally self-interested and selfish. However, research suggests that this assumption is overstated.18 When given a chance to act selfishly or cooperatively with others, over half of employees choose to cooperate, while only 30 percent consistently choose to act selfishly. Thus, cul- tural systems that build engagement, communication, and a sense of common purpose and identity would allow firms to leverage these collaborative workers.

Sustaining an Effective Culture Powerful organizational cultures just don’t happen over- night, and they don’t remain in place without a strong commitment—in terms of both words and deeds—by leaders throughout the organization.19 A viable and productive organizational culture can be strengthened and sustained. However, it cannot be “built” or “assembled”; instead, it must be cultivated, encouraged, and “fertilized.”20

Storytelling is one way effective cultures are maintained. 3M is a company that uses powerful stories to reinforce the culture of the firm. One of those is the story of Francis G. Okie.21 In 1922 Okie came up with the idea of selling sandpaper to men as a replacement for razor blades. The idea obviously didn’t pan out, but Okie was allowed to remain at 3M. Interestingly, the technology developed by Okie led 3M to develop its first blockbuster prod- uct: a waterproof sandpaper that became a staple of the automobile industry. Such stories foster the importance of risk taking, experimentation, freedom to fail, and innovation—all vital elements of 3M’s culture. Strategy Spotlight 9.1 discusses the power of pictures and stories in building a customer-centric culture.

The actions of leaders and culture warriors can also play a critical role in reinforcing a firm’s culture.22 For example, the culture team at Warby Parker, an online eyewear retailer, is respon- sible for planning company outings and themed luncheons that reinforce company ideals and build a stronger sense of connectedness among workers. The culture team is also involved in screening potential new employees to ensure the firm’s culture lives on as it grows. Corporate leaders can actively reinforce culture throughout the organization. Brent Beshore, CEO of adventur.es, a private investment firm, describes how he reinforces culture with personal contact:

I make a point of walking around the office every day and thanking people for their contributions. It could be something as small as, “I really appreciated the email announcement you crafted,” or something more substantive like, “Thanks for handling that tough situation a few days ago.” Thanking them reminds them to thank others and be appreciative of what we have.

Motivating with Rewards and Incentives Reward and incentive systems represent a powerful means of influencing an organization’s culture, focusing efforts on high-priority tasks, and motivating individual and collective task performance.23 Just as culture deals with influencing beliefs, behaviors, and attitudes of people within an organization, the reward system—by specifying who gets rewarded and why—is an effective motivator and control mechanism.24 The managers at Not Your Average Joe’s, a Massachusetts-based restaurant chain, changed their staffing procedures both to let their servers better understand their performance and to better motivate them.25 The chain uses sophisticated software to track server performance—in both per customer sales and cus- tomer satisfaction as seen in tips. Highly rated servers are given more tables and preferred schedules. In shifting more work and better schedules to the best workers, the chain hopes to improve profitability and motivate all workers.

reward system policies that specify who gets rewarded and why.

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9.1 STRATEGY SPOTLIGHT USING PICTURES AND STORIES TO BUILD A CUSTOMER-ORIENTED CULTURE Most firms tout that customers are their most important stakehold- ers. In firms that have value statements, these statements typically list the firms’ responsibilities to their customers first. But it is hard to build and maintain a customer-centric culture. Using visual imagery and stories can help firms put customers at the center of their culture.

The old saying is that “a picture is worth a thousand words.” This is certainly true when building a culture. A simple snapshot of a customer or end user can be a powerful motivating tool for workers to care about that customer. For example, radiologists rarely see patients. They look at X-rays from the files of patients, but these patients are typically faceless and anonymous to them. However, when pictures of the patients were added to their files, one study found that radiologists increased the length of their reports on the patients’ X-rays by 29 percent and improved the accuracy of their diagnoses by 46 percent. Other firms have found the same effect. Microfinance provider Kiva includes pic- tures of the entrepreneurs whom it is trying to fund, believing that potential donors feel more of a connection with an entrepre- neur when they have seen a picture of him or her.

Stories can also help build a customer-centric culture. Inside the firm, the stories that employees share with each other become imprinted on the organizational mind. Thus, as employ- ees share their positive stories of experiences with customers, they not only provide encouragement for other employees to better meet the needs of customers but also reinforce the sto- rytelling employee’s desire to work hard to serve customers. For example, at Ritz-Carlton hotels, employees meet each day

for 15 minutes to share stories about how they went the extra yard to meet customers’ needs. These stories can even be more significant for new employees, helping them learn about the values of the firm. With outside stories, firms can draw on the accounts of customers to reinvigorate their employees. These can be based on personal statements from customers or even from news stories. To test these effects, one researcher gave life- guards a few short news stories about swimmers who were saved by lifeguards on other beaches. The lifeguards who heard these stories reported that they found their job more meaning- ful, volunteered to work more hours, and were rated by their supervisors as being more vigilant in their work one month later.

Managers can help ensure that the stories told support the firm’s customer-centric culture by taking the following steps:

• Tell positive stories about employees’ interactions with customers.

• Share positive customer feedback with employees. • Tie employee recognition to positive employee actions. • Weave stories into the employee handbook and new

employee orientation. • Make sure that mentors in the firm know about the

importance of using stories in their mentoring efforts.

The “short story” here is that firms can help build and rein- force a customer-centric culture if they just keep the customer in the center of the stories they tell and make the customer person- ally relevant to workers. Sources: Grant, A. 2011. How customers rally your troops. Harvard Business Review, 89(6): 96–103; and Heathfield, S. 2014. How stories strengthen your work culture—or not. humanresources.about.com, December 29: np.

The Potential Downside While they can be powerful motivators, reward and incentive poli- cies can also result in undesirable outcomes in organizations. At the individual level, incen- tives can go wrong for multiple reasons. First, if individual workers don’t see how their actions relate to how they are compensated, incentives can be demotivating. For example, if the rewards are related to the firm’s stock price, workers may feel that their efforts have little if any impact and won’t perceive any benefit from working harder. On the other hand, if the incentives are too closely tied to their individual work, they may lead to dysfunctional outcomes. For example, if a sales representative is rewarded for sales volume, she will be incentivized to sell at all costs. This may lead her to accept unprofitable sales or push sales through distribution channels the firm would rather avoid. Thus, the collective sum of indi- vidual behaviors of an organization’s employees does not always result in what is best for the organization; individual rationality is no guarantee of organizational rationality.

Reward and incentive systems can also cause problems across organizational units. As corporations grow and evolve, they often develop different business units with multiple reward systems. These systems may differ based on industry contexts, business situations, stage of product life cycles, and so on. Subcultures within organizations may reflect differ- ences among functional areas, products, services, and divisions. To the extent that reward systems reinforce such behavioral norms, attitudes, and belief systems, cohesiveness is reduced; important information is hoarded rather than shared, individuals begin working at cross-purposes, and they lose sight of overall goals.

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Such conflicts are commonplace in many organizations. For example, sales and marketing personnel promise unrealistically quick delivery times to bring in business, much to the dismay of operations and logistics; overengineering by R&D creates headaches for manufacturing; and so on. Conflicts also arise across divisions when divisional profits become a key compensation criterion. As ill will and anger escalate, personal relationships and performance may suffer.

Creating Effective Reward and Incentive Programs To be effective, incentive and reward systems need to reinforce basic core values, enhance cohesion and commitment to goals and objectives, and meet with the organization’s overall mission and purpose.26 For exam- ple, Chesapeake Energy set a goal to improve workplace safety. To reinforce this, one year, it gave out over $8 million in “safety bonuses” to over 6,000 employees for following safe work practices.27

Effective reward and incentive systems share a number of common characteristics28 (see Exhibit 9.4). The perception that a plan is “fair and equitable” is critically important. The firm must have the flexibility to respond to changing requirements as its direction and objectives change. In recent years many companies have begun to place more emphasis on growth. To ensure that managers focus on growth, a number of firms have changed their compensation systems to move from a bottom-line focus to one that emphasizes growth, new products, acquisitions, and international expansion.

However, incentive and reward systems don’t have to be all about money. Employees respond not only to monetary compensation but also to softer forms of incentives and rewards. In fact, a number of studies have found that for employees who are satisfied with their base salary, nonfinancial motivators are more effective than cash incentives in building long-term employee motivation.29 Three key reward systems appear to provide the greatest incentives. First, employees respond to managerial praise. This can include formal recogni- tion policies and events. For example, at Mars Central Europe, the company holds an event twice a year at which they celebrate innovative ideas generated by employees. Recognition at the Mars “Make a Difference” event is designed to motivate the winners and also other employees who want to receive the same recognition. Employees also respond well to infor- mal recognition rewards, such as personal praise, written praise, and public praise. This is especially effective when it includes small perks, such as a gift certificate for dinner, some scheduling flexibility, or even an extra day off. Positive words and actions are especially powerful since almost two-thirds of employees in one study said management was much more likely to criticize them for poor performance than praise them for good work. Second, employees feel rewarded when they receive attention from leaders and, as a result, feel val- ued and involved. One survey found that the number-one factor employees valued was “man- agerial support and involvement”—having their managers ask for their opinions, involve them in decisions, and give them authority to complete tasks. Third, managers can reward employees by giving them opportunities to lead projects or task forces. In sum, incentives and rewards can go well beyond simple pay to include formal recognition, praise, and the self-esteem that comes from feeling valued.

The Insights from Research box provides further evidence that employees are motivated more when they feel a sense of purpose in their work and feel valued by their employers than when they are only monetarily rewarded for their work.

• Objectives are clear, well understood, and broadly accepted. • Rewards are clearly linked to performance and desired behaviors. • Performance measures are clear and highly visible. • Feedback is prompt, clear, and unambiguous. • The compensation “system” is perceived as fair and equitable. • The structure is flexible; it can adapt to changing circumstances.

EXHIBIT 9.4 Characteristics of Effective Reward and Incentive Systems

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Overview Often, managers approach and strive to motivate employ- ees with extrinsic rewards. These produce some results; however, employees tend to perform best when their intrin- sic needs are met. Think of ways to highlight the purpose of your employees’ work. Allow employees to work on projects that ignite their passions.

What The Research Shows Employees who are passionate about their jobs are more engaged in their jobs. And employees who are more engaged in their jobs perform them better, according to investigators from the University of Richmond, Nanyang Technological University, and Keppel Offshore and Marine Ltd. in Singapore. Their research, published in the Journal of Management Studies, utilized the performance appraisals of 509 headquarters employees of a large insurance company. The employees were given a survey to identify their attitudes toward their jobs. Using structural equations modeling, the researchers found a relationship between the employees’ passion for their jobs and their performance of their jobs. However, the effect was significant only when mediated by the employees’ absorption in their jobs.

Employees who had job passion identified with their jobs intrinsically and believed their work was meaningful. Therefore, they were able to feel passionate about their jobs while balancing that passion with other aspects of their lives that were also important to them. This resulted in an inten- sity of focus on and deep immersion in their tasks while they were working. When they were deeply engrossed in work, the employees were not distracted by other activities or roles in their lives. In turn, this job absorption resulted in superior performance on the job.

Why This Matters While many managers attempt to tap into their employees’ pas- sions to motivate them to perform their jobs, external incen- tives are not the best way to engender internal identification with work. Even positive feedback can become an external incentive if employees work toward receiving that recognition rather than working simply because they identify with and enjoy their jobs. A better way to nurture employees’ identifica- tion with their work is to provide them with a sense of owner- ship of their work and, more importantly, to help them see how meaningful their jobs are. For example, to help their employ- ees see the impact of their work on others, Cancer Treatment Centers of America in the Tulsa, Oklahoma, area recruits spouses of employees to form and run a nonprofit organization to raise money for cancer patients’ nonmedical expenses.

Kevin Cleary, CEO of Clif Bar and Co., says success is contingent upon an “engaged, inspired and outrageously committed team.” He breaks this down into these steps:

1. Engage your employees with the company’s mission and vision. If you don’t have a mission and vision statement, get employees’ contributions to create one you believe in.

2. Once people understand the mission and vision, trust your employees to work. Do not micromanage or assume they need a held hand.

3. Have a business model in which people come first, second, and third.

Cleary says exceptional talent is valuable only when employees believe in the organization’s mission.

Key Takeaways • Employees who are passionate about their jobs will

be more engaged and absorbed in them and will perform better.

• When employees like their jobs and view them as important, they will be more passionate about their work.

• Employees whose jobs are significant to their personal identities—relative to the other roles they play in their lives—will be more passionate about their jobs.

• When employees are passionate about their jobs, they become deeply engrossed in their job tasks and aren’t easily distracted by other activities.

• Although job passion must be voluntary and driven by employees’ internal identities, managers can encourage it by helping employees see the significance of their work.

Apply This Today Managers can fuel employees’ intrinsic motivation by help- ing them see the meaning in their tasks, the company, and its mission. If employees can find personal meaning and passion in their jobs, the company will be rewarded with sig- nificant improvements in performance. To learn more about motivating your employees, visit businessminded.com.

RESEARCH REVIEWED Ho, V. T., Wong, S. S., & Lee, C. H. 2011. A tale of passion: Linking job passion and cognitive engagement to employee work performance. Journal of Management Studies, 48(1): 26–47.

INSIGHTS from research

INSPIRE PASSION—MOTIVATE TOP PERFORMANCE

9.1

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Setting Boundaries and Constraints In an ideal world, a strong culture and effective rewards should be sufficient to ensure that all individuals and subunits work toward the common goals and objectives of the whole organiza- tion.30 However, this is not usually the case. Counterproductive behavior can arise because of motivated self-interest, lack of a clear understanding of goals and objectives, or outright malfea- sance. Boundaries and constraints can serve many useful purposes for organizations, including:

• Focusing individual efforts on strategic priorities. • Providing short-term objectives and action plans to channel efforts. • Improving efficiency and effectiveness. • Minimizing improper and unethical conduct.

Focusing Efforts on Strategic Priorities Boundaries and constraints play a valuable role in focusing a company’s strategic priorities. For example, in 2015, GE sold off its financial ser- vices businesses in order to refocus on its manufacturing businesses. Similarly, Pfizer sold its infant formula business as it refocused its attention on core pharmaceutical products.31 This concentration of effort and resources provides the firm with greater strategic focus and the potential for stronger competitive advantages in the remaining areas.

Steve Jobs would use whiteboards to set priorities and focus attention at Apple. For example, he would take his “top 100” people on a retreat each year. One year, he asked the group what 10 things Apple should do next. The group identified ideas. Ideas went up on the board and then got erased or revised; new ones were added, revised, and erased. The group argued about it for a while and finally identified their list of top 10 initiatives. Jobs proceeded to slash the bottom seven, stating, “We can only do three.”32

Boundaries also have a place in the nonprofit sector. For example, a British relief orga- nization uses a system to monitor strategic boundaries by maintaining a list of companies whose contributions it will neither solicit nor accept. Such boundaries are essential for maintaining legitimacy with existing and potential benefactors.

Providing Short-Term Objectives and Action Plans In Chapter 1 we discussed the impor- tance of a firm having a vision, mission, and strategic objectives that are internally consis- tent and that provide strategic direction. In addition, short-term objectives and action plans provide similar benefits. That is, they represent boundaries that help to allocate resources in an optimal manner and to channel the efforts of employees at all levels throughout the orga- nization.33 To be effective, short-term objectives must have several attributes. They should:

• Be specific and measurable. • Include a specific time horizon for their attainment. • Be achievable, yet challenging enough to motivate managers who must strive to

accomplish them.

Research has found that performance is enhanced when individuals are encouraged to attain specific, difficult, yet achievable, goals (as opposed to vague “do your best” goals).34

Short-term objectives must provide proper direction and also provide enough flexibility for the firm to keep pace with and anticipate changes in the external environment, new gov- ernment regulations, a competitor introducing a substitute product, or changes in consumer taste. Unexpected events within a firm may require a firm to make important adjustments in both strategic and short-term objectives. The emergence of new industries can have a drastic effect on the demand for products and services in more traditional industries.

Action plans are critical to the implementation of chosen strategies. Unless action plans are specific, there may be little assurance that managers have thought through all of the resource requirements for implementing their strategies. In addition, unless plans are specific, managers may not understand what needs to be implemented or have a clear time frame for completion.

boundaries and constraints rules that specify behaviors that are acceptable and unacceptable.

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This is essential for the scheduling of key activities that must be implemented. Finally, indi- vidual managers must be held accountable for the implementation. This helps to provide the necessary motivation and “sense of ownership” to implement action plans on a timely basis.

Improving Operational Efficiency and Effectiveness Rule-based controls are most appropri- ate in organizations with the following characteristics:

• Environments are stable and predictable. • Employees are largely unskilled and interchangeable. • Consistency in product and service is critical. • The risk of malfeasance is extremely high (e.g., in banking or casino operations).35

McDonald’s Corp. has extensive rules and regulations that regulate the operation of its franchises.36 Its policy manual from a number of years ago stated, “Cooks must turn, never flip, hamburgers. If they haven’t been purchased, Big Macs must be discarded in 10 minutes after being cooked and French fries in 7 minutes. Cashiers must make eye contact with and smile at every customer.”

Guidelines can also be effective in setting spending limits and the range of discretion for employees and managers, such as the $2,500 limit that hotelier Ritz-Carlton uses to empower employees to placate dissatisfied customers.

Minimizing Improper and Unethical Conduct Guidelines can be useful in specifying proper relationships with a company’s customers and suppliers.37 Many companies have explicit rules regarding commercial practices, including the prohibition of any form of payment, bribe, or kickback. For example, Singapore Airlines has a 17-page policy outlining its anti- corruption and antibribery policies.38

Behavioral Control in Organizations: Situational Factors Here, the focus is on ensuring that the behavior of individuals at all levels of an organiza- tion is directed toward achieving organizational goals and objectives. The three fundamen- tal types of control are culture, rewards and incentives, and boundaries and constraints. An organization may pursue one or a combination of them on the basis of a variety of inter- nal and external factors.

Not all organizations place the same emphasis on each type of control.39 In high-technology firms engaged in basic research, members may work under high levels of autonomy. An indi- vidual’s performance is generally quite difficult to measure accurately because of the long lead times involved in R&D activities. Thus, internalized norms and values become very important.

When the measurement of an individual’s output or performance is quite straightfor- ward, control depends primarily on granting or withholding rewards. Frequently, a sales manager’s compensation is in the form of a commission and bonus tied directly to his or her sales volume, which is relatively easy to determine. Here, behavior is influenced more strongly by the attractiveness of the compensation than by the norms and values implicit in the organization’s culture. The measurability of output precludes the need for an elaborate system of rules to control behavior.40

Control in bureaucratic organizations is dependent on members following a highly for- malized set of rules and regulations. Most activities are routine, and the desired behavior can be specified in a detailed manner because there is generally little need for innovative or creative activity. Managing an assembly plant requires strict adherence to many rules as well as exacting sequences of assembly operations. In the public sector, the Department of Motor Vehicles in most states must follow clearly prescribed procedures when issuing or renewing driver licenses. Strategy Spotlight 9.2 highlights how Digital Reasoning is using data analytics to strengthen control in major financial firms.

Exhibit 9.5 provides alternative approaches to behavioral control and some of the situ- ational factors associated with them.

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9.2 DATA ANALYTICSSTRATEGY SPOTLIGHT USING DATA ANALYTICS TO ENHANCE ORGANIZATIONAL CONTROL Tim Estes’s goal was to develop cognitive computing as a use- ful business tool. Cognitive computing strives to integrate raw computing power with natural-language processing and pat- tern recognition to build powerful computer systems that mimic human problem solving and learning. He first found a ready home for his vision in national security. The U.S. Army’s Ground Intelligence Center contracted with Digital Reasoning to develop systems to identify potential terrorists on the basis of analyses of large volumes of different sources of data, including emails, travel information, and other data.

More recently, Digital Reasoning has taken its expertise to the financial services industry and, in doing so, is providing a new type of control system to catch potential rogue traders and market manipulators within the firms. Digital Reasoning provides systems Estes refers to as “proactive compliance” to a number of major financial services providers, including Credit Suisse and Goldman Sachs. Digital Reasoning has developed software that

looks for information in and patterns across billions of emails, instant messages, media reports, and memos that suggest an employee’s intention to engage in illegal or prohibited behavior before the employee crosses the line. Rather than looking for evidence of actions already taken, Digital Reasoning’s software looks into ongoing patterns of correspondence to search for evolving personal relationships within the company, putting up red flags when it sees unexpected patterns, such as people in different units of the firm suddenly communicating with unusual frequency or a heightened level of discussion on topics that may be tied to unethical or illegal behavior. Any unusual patterns are then investigated by analysts in each of the financial services’ firms. The goal for the firms is to both control employee behavior to stay on the right side of the law and also to send signals to customers and regulators that they are taking steps to stay on the right side of legal and ethical boundaries.

Sources: McGee, J. 2014. When crisis strikes, Digital Reasoning takes action. tennessean.com, October 9: np; McGee, J. 2014. Digital reasoning gains $24M from Goldman, Credit Suisse. tennessean.com, October 9: np; and Dillow, C. 2014. Nothing to hide, everything to fear. Fortune, September 1: 45–48.

Evolving from Boundaries to Rewards and Culture In most environments, organizations should strive to provide a system of rewards and incentives, coupled with a culture strong enough that boundaries become internalized. This reduces the need for external controls such as rules and regulations.

First, hire the right people—individuals who already identify with the organization’s dom- inant values and have attributes consistent with them. Kroger, a supermarket chain, uses a preemployment test to assess the degree to which potential employees will be friendly and communicate well with customers.41 Microsoft’s David Pritchard is well aware of the conse- quences of failing to hire properly:

If I hire a bunch of bozos, it will hurt us, because it takes time to get rid of them. They start infiltrating the organization and then they themselves start hiring people of lower quality. At Microsoft, we are always looking for people who are better than we are.

Approach Some Situational Factors

Culture: A system of unwritten rules that forms an internalized influence over behavior.

• Often found in professional organizations. • Associated with high autonomy. • Norms are the basis for behavior.

Rules: Written and explicit guidelines that provide external constraints on behavior.

• Associated with standardized output. • Most appropriate when tasks are generally repetitive and routine. • Little need for innovation or creative activity.

Rewards: The use of performance-based incentive systems to motivate.

• Measurement of output and performance is rather straightforward. • Most appropriate in organizations pursuing unrelated

diversification strategies. • Rewards may be used to reinforce other means of control.

EXHIBIT 9.5 Organizational Control: Alternative Approaches

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Second, training plays a key role. For example, in elite military units such as the Green Berets and Navy SEALs, the training regimen so thoroughly internalizes the culture that individuals, in effect, lose their identity. The group becomes the overriding concern and focal point of their energies.

Third, managerial role models are vital. Andy Grove, former CEO and cofounder of Intel, didn’t need (or want) a large number of bureaucratic rules to determine who is responsible for what, who is supposed to talk to whom, and who gets to fly first class (no one does). He encouraged openness by not having many of the trappings of success—he worked in a cubicle like all the other professionals. Can you imagine any new manager asking whether or not he can fly first class? Grove’s personal example eliminated such a need.

Fourth, reward systems must be clearly aligned with the organizational goals and objec- tives. For example, as part of its efforts to drive sustainability efforts down through its sup- pliers, Marks and Spencer pushes the suppliers to develop employee reward systems that support a living wage and team collaboration.

THE ROLE OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE We now address the issue of strategic control in a broader perspective, typically referred to as “corporate governance.” Here we focus on the need for both shareholders (the owners of the corporation) and their elected representatives, the board of directors, to actively ensure that management fulfills its overriding purpose of increasing long-term shareholder value.42

Robert Monks and Nell Minow, two leading scholars in corporate governance, define it as “the relationship among various participants in determining the direction and perfor- mance of corporations. The primary participants are (1) the shareholders, (2) the manage- ment (led by the CEO), and (3) the board of directors.”* Our discussion will center on how corporations can succeed (or fail) in aligning managerial motives with the interests of the shareholders and their elected representatives, the board of directors.43 As you will recall from Chapter 1, we discussed the important role of boards of directors and provided some examples of effective and ineffective boards.44

Good corporate governance plays an important role in the investment decisions of major institutions, and a premium is often reflected in the price of securities of companies that prac- tice it. The corporate governance premium is larger for firms in countries with sound corporate governance practices compared to countries with weaker corporate governance standards.45

Sound governance practices often lead to superior financial performance. However, this is not always the case. For example, practices such as independent directors (directors who are not part of the firm’s management) and stock options are generally assumed to result in better performance. But in many cases, independent directors may not have the necessary expertise or involvement, and the granting of stock options to the CEO may lead to deci- sions and actions calculated to prop up share price only in the short term.

At the same time, few topics in the business press are generating as much interest (and disdain!) as corporate governance.

Some recent notable examples of flawed corporate governance include:46

• In 2016, John Stumpf, CEO of Wells Fargo, was forced to resign after both stakeholder and government scrutiny of the firm’s practices. Firm management had instituted very aggressive sales goals for employees, leading employees to create sham accounts using the names and money of the bank’s real customers.47

LO 9-5 The three key participants in corporate governance: shareholders, management (led by the CEO), and the board of directors.

* Management cannot ignore the demands of other important firm stakeholders such as creditors, suppliers, customers, employees, and government regulators. At times of financial duress, powerful creditors can exert strong and legitimate pressures on managerial decisions. In general, however, the attention to stakeholders other than the owners of the corporation must be addressed in a manner that is still consistent with maximizing long-term shareholder returns. For a seminal discussion on stakeholder management, refer to Freeman, R. E. 1984. Strategic Management: A Stakeholder Approach. Boston: Pitman.

corporate governance the relationship among various participants in determining the direction and performance of corporations. The primary participants are (1) the shareholders, (2) the management, and (3) the board of directors.

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• In 2014, three senior executives at Walmart resigned from the firm in the wake of accusations of bribery of government officials in Mexico. In response, Walmart changed both the leadership in this region and its compliance structure.48

• In 2012 Japanese camera and medical equipment maker Olympus Corporation and three of its former executives pleaded guilty to charges that they falsified accounting records over a five-year period to inflate the financial performance of the firm. The total value of the accounting irregularities came to $1.7 billion.49

Because of the many lapses in corporate governance, we can see the benefits associ- ated with effective practices.50 However, corporate managers may behave in their own self-interest, often to the detriment of shareholders. Next we address the implications of the separation of ownership and management in the modern corporation, and some mecha- nisms that can be used to ensure consistency (or alignment) between the interests of share- holders and those of the managers to minimize potential conflicts.

The Modern Corporation: The Separation of Owners (Shareholders) and Management Some of the proposed definitions for a corporation include:

• “The business corporation is an instrument through which capital is assembled for the activities of producing and distributing goods and services and making investments. Accordingly, a basic premise of corporation law is that a business corporation should have as its objective the conduct of such activities with a view to enhancing the corporation’s profit and the gains of the corporation’s owners, that is, the shareholders.” (Melvin Aron Eisenberg, The Structure of Corporation Law)

• “An association of individuals, created by law or under authority of law, having a continuous existence independent of the existences of its members, and powers and liabilities distinct from those of its member.” (dictionary.com)

• “An ingenious device for obtaining individual profit without individual responsibility.” (Ambrose Bierce, The Devil’s Dictionary)51

All of these definitions have some validity and each one reflects a key feature of the corpo- rate form of business organization—its ability to draw resources from a variety of groups and establish and maintain its own persona that is separate from all of them. As Henry Ford once said, “A great business is really too big to be human.”

Simply put, a corporation is a mechanism created to allow different parties to contrib- ute capital, expertise, and labor for the maximum benefit of each party.52 The sharehold- ers (investors) are able to participate in the profits of the enterprise without taking direct responsibility for the operations. The management can run the company without the respon- sibility of personally providing the funds. The shareholders have limited liability as well as rather limited involvement in the company’s affairs. However, they reserve the right to elect directors who have the fiduciary obligation to protect their interests.

Over 80 years ago, Columbia University professors Adolf Berle and Gardiner C. Means addressed the divergence of the interests of the owners of the corporation from the pro- fessional managers who are hired to run it. They warned that widely dispersed owner- ship “released management from the overriding requirement that it serve stockholders.” The separation of ownership from management has given rise to a set of ideas called “agency theory.” Central to agency theory is the relationship between two primary players— the principals, who are the owners of the firm (stockholders), and the agents, who are the people paid by principals to perform a job on their behalf (management). The stockholders elect and are represented by a board of directors that has a fiduciary responsibility to ensure that management acts in the best interests of stockholders to ensure long-term financial returns for the firm.

corporation a mechanism created to allow different parties to contribute capital, expertise, and labor for the maximum benefit of each party.

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Agency theory is concerned with resolving two problems that can occur in agency rela- tionships.53 The first is the agency problem that arises (1) when the goals of the principals and agents conflict and (2) when it is difficult or expensive for the principal to verify what the agent is actually doing.54 The board of directors would be unable to confirm that the managers were actually acting in the shareholders’ interests because managers are “insiders” with regard to the businesses they operate and thus are better informed than the principals. Thus, manag- ers may act “opportunistically” in pursuing their own interests—to the detriment of the cor- poration.55 Managers may spend corporate funds on expensive perquisites (e.g., company jets and expensive art), devote time and resources to pet projects (initiatives in which they have a personal interest but that have limited market potential), engage in power struggles (where they may fight over resources for their own betterment and to the detriment of the firm), and negate (or sabotage) attractive merger offers because they may result in increased employment risk.56

The second issue is the problem of risk sharing. This arises when the principal and the agent have different attitudes and preferences toward risk. The executives in a firm may favor additional diversification initiatives because, by their very nature, they increase the size of the firm and thus the level of executive compensation.57 At the same time, such diver- sification initiatives may erode shareholder value because they fail to achieve some syner- gies that we discussed in Chapter 6 (e.g., building on core competencies, sharing activities, or enhancing market power). Agents (executives) may have a stronger preference toward diversification than shareholders because it reduces their personal level of risk from poten- tial loss of employment. Executives who have large holdings of stock in their firms are more likely to have diversification strategies that are more consistent with shareholder interests— increasing long-term returns.58

At times, top-level managers engage in actions that reflect their self-interest rather than the interests of shareholders. We provide two examples below:

• In addition to an annual base salary of $1.3 million and $10.4 million in stock compensation and bonuses, Heather Bresch, CEO of Mylan Pharmaceuticals, also received $6.4 million in other compensation in 2015. This included $19,200 for the use of a company-provided automobile and $310,000 in personal use of the company jet.59

• John Hammergren, the CEO of health care giant McKesson Corporation, has a pretty sweet deal. In 2015, Hammergren took home $25.9 million in salary and stock options. But he’s also protected himself well if he’s dismissed as CEO. According to the firm’s 2015 proxy statement, McKesson would pay Hammergren $141.7 million in unearned compensation if he was terminated. In addition to that, he’d receive a $161 million severance payout that he previously negotiated, resulting in a combined farewell package of $300 million if he was fired.60

Governance Mechanisms: Aligning the Interests of Owners and Managers As noted above, a key characteristic of the modern corporation is the separation of owner- ship from control. To minimize the potential for managers to act in their own self-interest, or “opportunistically,” the owners can implement some governance mechanisms.61 First, there are two primary means of monitoring the behavior of managers. These include (1) a committed and involved board of directors that acts in the best interests of the shareholders to create long-term value and (2) shareholder activism, wherein the owners view themselves as shareowners instead of shareholders and become actively engaged in the governance of the corporation. Finally, there are managerial incentives, sometimes called “contract-based outcomes,” which consist of reward and compensation agreements. Here the goal is to care- fully craft managerial incentive packages to align the interests of management with those of the stockholders.62

agency theory a theory of the relationship between principals and their agents, with emphasis on two problems: (1) the conflicting goals of principals and agents, along with the difficulty of principals to monitor the agents, and (2) the different attitudes and preferences toward risk of principals and agents.

LO 9-6 The role of corporate governance mechanisms in ensuring that the interests of managers are aligned with those of shareholders from both the United States and international perspectives.

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We close this section with a brief discussion of one of the most controversial issues in cor- porate governance—duality. Here, the question becomes: Should the CEO also be chairman of the board of directors? In many Fortune 500 firms, the same individual serves in both roles. However, in recent years, we have seen a trend toward separating these two positions. The key issue is what implications CEO duality has for firm governance and performance.

A Committed and Involved Board of Directors The board of directors acts as a fulcrum between the owners and controllers of a corporation. The directors are the intermediaries who provide a balance between a small group of key managers in the firm based at the cor- porate headquarters and a sometimes vast group of shareholders.63 In the United States, the law imposes on the board a strict and absolute fiduciary duty to ensure that a company is run consistent with the long-term interests of the owners—the shareholders. The reality, as we have seen, is somewhat more ambiguous.64

The Business Roundtable, representing the largest U.S. corporations, describes the duties of the board as follows:

1. Making decisions regarding the selection, compensation and evaluation of a well- qualified and ethical CEO. The board also appoints or approves other members of the senior management team.

2. Directors monitor management on behalf of the corporation’s shareholders. Exercise vigorous and diligent oversight of the corporation’s affairs. This includes the following activities.

a. Plan for senior management development and succession. b. Review, understand and monitor the implementation of the corporation’s

strategic plans. c. Review and understand the corporation’s risk assessment and oversee the

corporation’s risk management processes. d. Review, understand and oversee annual operating plans and budgets. e. Ensure the integrity and clarity of the corporation’s financial statements and

financial reporting. f. Advise management on significant issues facing the corporation. g. Review and approve significant corporate actions. h. Nominate directors and committee members and oversee effective corporate

governance. i. Oversee legal and ethical compliance.

3. Represent the interests of all shareholders.65

While the roles of the board are fairly clear, following these guidelines does not guaran- tee that the board will be effective. To be effective, the board needs to allocate its scarce time to the most critical issues to which its members can add value. A survey of several hundred corporate board members revealed dramatic differences in how the most and least effective boards allocated their time. Boards that were seen as being ineffective, meaning they had limited impact on the direction and success of the firm, spent almost all of their time on the basic requirements of ensuring compliance, reviewing financial reports, assess- ing corporate diversification, and evaluating current performance metrics. Effective boards examined these issues but also expanded the range of issues they discussed to include more forward-looking strategic issues. Effective boards discussed potential performance synergies and the value of strategic alternatives open to the firm, assessed the firm’s value drivers, and evaluated potential resource reallocation options. In the end, effective and ineffective boards spent about the same time on their basic board roles, but effective boards spent additional time together to discuss more forward-looking, strategic issues. As a result, board members of effective boards spent twice as many days, about 40 per year, in their role as a board member compared to only about 19 days per year for members of ineffective boards.66

board of directors a group that has a fiduciary duty to ensure that the company is run consistently with the long-term interests of the owners, or shareholders, of a corporation and that acts as an intermediary between the shareholders and management.

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Although boards in the past were often dismissed as CEOs’ rubber stamps, increas- ingly they are playing a more active role by forcing out CEOs who cannot deliver on performance.67 Not only are they dismissing CEOs, but boards are more willing to make strong public statements about CEOs they dismissed. In the past, firms would often announce that a CEO was leaving the position to spend more time with family or pursue new opportunities. More frequently, boards are unambiguously labeling the action a dismissal to signal that they are active and engaged boards. For example, when the Lending Club removed CEO Renaud Laplanche in 2016, Hans Morris, the firm’s Executive Chairman, lauded him, saying his “entrepreneurial spirit was critical to the success of the firm.” But he also signaled the board was removing Mr. Laplanche since he had failed to build a strong control system and culture, stating “as a public company that provides a financial service, Lending Club must meet the industry’s high stan- dards of transparency and disclosure.”68 When Andrew Mason was ousted as head of Groupon, he released a humorous statement saying, “After four and a half intense and wonderful years as CEO of Groupon, I’ve decided to spend more time with my family. Just kidding—I was fired today.”69

Another key component of top-ranked boards is director independence.70 Governance experts believe that a majority of directors should be free of all ties to either the CEO or the company.71 This means that a minimum of “insiders” (past or present members of the management team) should serve on the board and that directors and their firms should be barred from doing consulting, legal, or other work for the company.72 Interlocking directorships—in which CEOs and other top managers serve on each other’s boards—are not desirable. But perhaps the best guarantee that directors act in the best interests of share- holders is the simplest: Most good companies now insist that directors own significant stock in the company they oversee.73

Taking it one step further, research and simple observations of boards indicate that sim- ple prescriptions, such as having a majority of outside directors, are insufficient to lead to effective board operations. Firms need to cultivate engaged and committed boards. There are several actions that can have a positive influence on board dynamics as the board works to both oversee and advise management.74

1. Build in the right expertise on the board. Outside directors can bring in experience that the management team is missing. For example, corporations that are considering expanding into a new region of the globe may want to add a board member who brings expertise on and connections in that region. Similarly, research suggests that firms that are focusing on improving their operational efficiency benefit from having an external board member whose full-time position is as a chief operating officer, a position that typically focuses on operational activities.

2. Keep your board size manageable. Small, focused boards, generally with 5 to 11 members, are preferable to larger ones. As boards grow in size, the ability for them to function as a team declines. The members of the board feel less connected with each other, and decision making can become unwieldy.

3. Choose directors who can participate fully. The time demands on directors have increased as their responsibilities have grown to include overseeing management, verifying the firm’s financial statements, setting executive compensation, and advising on the strategic direction of the firm. As a result, the average number of hours per year spent on board duties has increased to over 350 hours for directors of large firms. Directors have to dedicate significant time to their roles—not just for scheduled meetings but also to review materials between meetings and to respond to time-sensitive challenges. Thus, firms should strive to include directors who are not currently overburdened by their core occupation or involvement on other boards.

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4. Balance the need to focus on the past, the present, and the future. Boards have a three-tiered role. They need to focus on the recent performance of the firm, how the firm is meeting current milestones and operational targets, and what the strategic direction of the firm will be moving forward. Under current regulations, boards are required to spend a great amount of time on the past as they vet the firm’s financials. However, effective boards balance this time and ensure that they give adequate consideration to the present and the future.

5. Consider management talent development. As part of their future-oriented focus, effective boards develop succession plans for the CEO but also focus on talent development at other upper echelons of the organization. In a range of industries, human capital is an increasingly important driver of firm success, and boards should be involved in evaluating and developing the top management core.

6. Get a broad view. In order to better understand the firm and make contact with key managers, the meetings of the board should rotate to different operating units and sites of the firm.

7. Maintain norms of transparency and trust. Highly functioning boards maintain open, team-oriented dialogue wherein information flows freely and questions are asked openly. Directors respect each other and trust that they are all working in the best interests of the corporation.

Because of financial crises and corporate scandals, regulators and investors have pushed for significant changes in the structure and actions of boards. This has resulted in a dramatic rise in the proportion of boards dominated by outsiders (with over 84 percent now being outside board members), a reduction in the size of boards (with most being smaller than 12 members), and a modest increase in the percentage of directors who are female, rising from 12 percent to 15 percent between 2012 and 2016. It has also led to an increase in the amount of time board members spend on their role, which increased from an average of 28 days in 2011 to 33 days in 2015. More specifically, board members reported that they spent significantly more time devoted to discussing firm strategy and evaluating the performance of the firm and its management.75

Shareholder Activism As a practical matter, there are so many owners of the largest American corporations that it makes little sense to refer to them as “owners” in the sense of individuals becoming informed and involved in corporate affairs.76 However, even an indi- vidual shareholder has several rights, including (1) the right to sell the stock, (2) the right to vote the proxy (which includes the election of board members), (3) the right to bring suit for damages if the corporation’s directors or managers fail to meet their obligations, (4) the right to certain information from the company, and (5) certain residual rights following the company’s liquidation (or its filing for reorganization under bankruptcy laws), once credi- tors and other claimants are paid off.77

Collectively, shareholders have the power to direct the course of corporations.78 This may involve acts such as being party to shareholder action suits and demanding that key issues be brought up for proxy votes at annual board meetings.79 The power of shareholders has intensi- fied in recent years because of the increasing influence of large institutional investors such as mutual funds (e.g., T. Rowe Price and Fidelity Investments) and retirement systems such as TIAA-CREF (for university faculty members and school administrative staff).80 Institutional investors hold over 50 percent of all listed corporate stock in the United States.81

Shareholder activism refers to actions by large shareholders, both institutions and indi- viduals, to protect their interests when they feel that managerial actions diverge from share- holder value maximization.

Many institutional investors are aggressive in protecting and enhancing their invest- ments. They are shifting from traders to owners. They are assuming the role of permanent shareholders and rigorously analyzing issues of corporate governance. In the process they are reinventing systems of corporate monitoring and accountability.82

shareholder activism actions by large shareholders to protect their interests when they feel that managerial actions of a corporation diverge from shareholder value maximization.

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Consider the proactive behavior of CalPERS, the California Public Employees’ Retirement System, which manages nearly $300 billion in assets and is the third-largest pen- sion fund in the world.83 Every year CalPERS reviews the performance of the 1,000 firms in which it retains a sizable investment.84 It reviews each firm’s short- and long-term perfor- mance, governance characteristics, and financial status, as well as market expectations for the firm. CalPERS then meets with selected companies to better understand their gover- nance and business strategy. If needed, CalPERS requests changes in the firm’s governance structure and works to ensure shareholders’ rights. If CalPERS does not believe that the firm is responsive to its concerns, it considers filing proxy actions at the firm’s next share- holders meeting and possibly even court actions. CalPERS’s research suggests that these actions lead to superior performance. The portfolio of firms it has included in its review program produced a cumulative return that was 11.59 percent higher than a respective set of benchmark firms over a three-year period. Thus, CalPERS has seen a real benefit of acting as an interested owner, rather than as a passive investor.

More generally, institutional investors have taken an increasingly active role in the corpo- rate governance of firms in which they invest. Strategy Spotlight 9.3 discusses how female executives have taken on key leadership roles in institutional investors and how this has influenced the efforts these firms have undertaken to improve corporate governance.

In addition to traditional institutional investors, a growing set of activist investors aggres- sively pressure firm managers for major changes.85 These activist investors include indi- vidual investors, such as Carl Icahn, and activist investor funds, such as Pershing Square, ValuAct, and Trian. Activist investors typically purchase a small, but substantial stake in

9.3 ETHICSSTRATEGY SPOTLIGHT HOW WOMEN HAVE COME TO DOMINATE A CORNER OF FINANCE When you think of a meeting Wall Street leaders and investment bankers, most people would think of a room filled mostly with men. But there is one area of Wall Street that women have come to dominate. The heads of corporate governance at seven of the ten largest institutional investors at the end of 2016 were women. These institutional investors control over $14 trillion in assets. To see the power of institutional investors, consider BlackRock, where Michelle Edkins is the head of corporate gov- ernance. BlackRock owns at least 5 percent of the stock of 75 of the largest 100 corporations. It’s the single largest shareholder in one out of every five U.S. public firms. State Street and Capital Group, investment firms which also have women corporate gov- ernance heads, have at least a 5 percent stake in over 20 of the 100 largest firms.

How does this influence efforts on behalf of shareholders? These female corporate governance heads argue that they work diligently but also quietly as advocates for greater shareholder rights and as change agents in the corporate governance of the firms they have a stake in. Ms. Edkins puts it this way, “We don’t meet with CEOs and tell them how to remedy the problem. It’s a stylistic difference, and my observation is that this constructive challenge comes more naturally to women.”

This doesn’t mean these women don’t push for important changes. For example, Donna Anderson and her team at the investment firm T. Rowe Price set a policy that they would vote against directors who support dual-class share structures— situations where one class of stock has much stronger voting power (such as 10 votes per share) than other classes of stock (which may even have no voting rights). Ms. Anderson’s team is also working on a policy to push for greater gender diversity on boards. As she stated, “We have an interest in seeing more women on boards because there is data that a more diverse board makes better decisions.” Anne Sheehan, the corporate governance head at the pension fund CalSTRS, is pushing both for greater gender diversity in boards and a reduction of the pay gap between corporate executives and employees lower in the hierarchy.

Interestingly, while these female corporate governance man- agers are pushing for greater gender diversity in the leadership of the corporations in which they invest, they face a different struggle in their own business—the lack of men in the field of corporate governance. “It’s counterintuitive in finance,” Ms. Edkins said, “but when we are hiring, we need to really push that diversity to make sure we have men on the slate.”

Sources: Stevenson, A. & Picker, L. 2017. A rare corner of finance where women dominate. nytimes.com. January 16: np; and, Craig, S. 2013. The giant of shareholders, quietly stirring. nytimes.com. May 18: np.

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firms, often as little as 5 percent of the firm’s stock, and then either pressure the firm to change its leadership or undertake strategic actions, typically a stock buy-back, selling parts of the firm off to focus on core operations, or the initiation of a search for a buyer to acquire the firm. In recent years, activist investors have played a role in the resignations of the CEOs of Procter & Gamble and Microsoft and pushed for the breakup of Motorola and the breakup and sale of Yahoo. Activist investors are often successful since many insti- tutional investors, such as mutual funds, who have little interest in actively overseeing firm management, are willing to support activist investors in their efforts to push management to improve firm profitability and shareholder returns. As a result, when activist investors push for a proxy vote (a vote by firm shareholders), they win over 70 percent of the time. To keep things from coming to a vote, firm management is often willing to negotiate with activist investors to give them part of what they want.

Managerial Rewards and Incentives As we discussed earlier in the chapter, incentive sys- tems must be designed to help a company achieve its goals.86 From the perspective of gover- nance, one of the most critical roles of the board of directors is to create incentives that align the interests of the CEO and top executives with the interests of owners of the corporation— long-term shareholder returns.87 Shareholders rely on CEOs to adopt policies and strategies that maximize the value of their shares.88 A combination of three basic policies may create the right monetary incentives for CEOs to maximize the value of their companies:89

1. Boards can require that the CEOs become substantial owners of company stock. 2. Salaries, bonuses, and stock options can be structured so as to provide rewards for

superior performance and penalties for poor performance. 3. Dismissal for poor performance should be a realistic threat.

In recent years the granting of stock options has enabled top executives of publicly held corporations to earn enormous levels of compensation. In 2015, the average CEO in the Standard & Poor’s 500 stock index took home 335 times the pay of the average worker—up from 40 times the average in 1980.90 The counterargument, that the ratio is down from the 514 multiple in 2000, doesn’t get much traction.91

Many boards have awarded huge option grants despite poor executive performance, and others have made performance goals easier to reach. However, stock options can be a valu- able governance mechanism to align the CEO’s interests with those of the shareholders. The extraordinarily high level of compensation can, at times, be grounded in sound gov- ernance principles.92 Research by Steven Kaplan at the University of Chicago found that firms with CEOs in the top quintile of pay generated stock returns 60 percent higher than their direct competitors, while firms with CEOs in the bottom quintile of pay saw their stock underperform their rivals by almost 20 percent.93 For example, Robert Kotik, CEO of video game firm Activision Blizzard, made $64.9 million in 2013, but the firm’s stock price rose by over 60 percent that year, producing a strong return for stockholders as well.

CEO Duality: Is It Good or Bad? CEO duality is one of the most controversial issues in corporate governance. It refers to the dual-leadership structure wherein the CEO acts simultaneously as the chair of the board of directors.94 Scholars, consultants, and executives who are interested in determining the best way to manage a corporation are divided on the issue of the roles and responsibilities of a CEO. Two schools of thought represent the alternative positions.

Unity of Command Advocates of the unity-of-command perspective believe that when one person holds both roles, he or she is able to act more efficiently and effectively. CEO dual- ity provides firms with a clear focus on both objectives and operations as well as eliminates confusion and conflict between the CEO and the chairman. Thus, it enables smoother,

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more effective strategic decision making. Holding dual roles as CEO/chairman creates unity across a company’s managers and board of directors and ultimately allows the CEO to serve the shareholders even better. Having leadership focused in a single individual also enhances a firm’s responsiveness and ability to secure critical resources. This perspective maintains that separating the two jobs—that of a CEO and that of the chairperson of the board of directors—may produce all types of undesirable consequences. CEOs may find it harder to make quick decisions. Ego-driven chief executives and chairmen may squabble over who is ultimately in charge. The shortage of first-class business talent may mean that bosses find themselves second-guessed by people who know little about the business.95 Companies like Coca-Cola, JPMorgan, and Time Warner have refused to divide the CEO’s and chairman’s jobs and support this duality structure.

Agency Theory Supporters of agency theory argue that the positions of CEO and chair- man should be separate. The case for separation is based on the simple principle of the sep- aration of power. How can a board discharge its basic duty—monitoring the boss—if the boss is chairing its meetings and setting its agenda? How can a board act as a safeguard against corruption or incompetence when the possible source of that corruption and incompetence is sitting at the head of the table? CEO duality can create a conflict of interest that could negatively affect the interests of the shareholders.

Duality also complicates the issue of CEO succession. In some cases, a CEO/chairman may choose to retire as CEO but keep his or her role as the chairman. Although this splits up the roles, which appeases an agency perspective, it nonetheless puts the new CEO in a difficult position. The chairman is bound to question some of the new changes put in place, and the board as a whole might take sides with the chairman they trust and with whom they have a history. This conflict of interest would make it difficult for the new CEO to institute any changes, as the power and influence would still remain with the former CEO.96

Duality also serves to reinforce popular doubts about the legitimacy of the system as a whole and evokes images of bosses writing their own performance reviews and setting their own salaries. A number of the largest corporations, including Ford Motor Company, General Motors, Citigroup, Oracle, Apple, and Microsoft, have divided the roles between the CEO and chairman and eliminated duality. Finally, more than 90 percent of S&P 500 companies with CEOs who also serve as chairman of the board have appointed “lead” or “presiding” directors to act as a counterweight to a combined chairman and chief executive.

Research suggests that the effects of going from having a joint CEO/chairman to separat- ing the two positions is contingent on how the firm is doing. When the positions are broken apart, there is a clear shift in the firm’s performance. If the firm has been performing well, its performance declines after the separation. If the firm has been doing poorly, it experi- ences improvement after separating the two roles. This research suggests that there is no one correct answer on duality, but that firms should consider their current position and performance trends when deciding whether to keep the CEO and chairman positions in the hands of one person.97

External Governance Control Mechanisms Thus far, we’ve discussed internal governance mechanisms. Internal controls, however, are not always enough to ensure good governance. The separation of ownership and con- trol that we discussed earlier requires multiple control mechanisms, some internal and some external, to ensure that managerial actions lead to shareholder value maximiza- tion. Further, society-at-large wants some assurance that this goal is met without harming other stakeholder groups. Now we discuss several external governance control mechanisms that have developed in most modern economies. These include the market for corporate control, auditors, banks and analysts, governmental regulatory bodies, media, and public activists.

external governance control mechanisms methods that ensure that managerial actions lead to shareholder value maximization and do not harm other stakeholder groups that are outside the control of the corporate governance system.

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The Market for Corporate Control Let us assume for a moment that internal control mech- anisms in a company are failing. This means that the board is ineffective in monitoring man- agers and is not exercising the oversight required of it and that shareholders are passive and are not taking any actions to monitor or discipline managers. Under these circumstances managers may behave opportunistically.98 Opportunistic behavior can take many forms. First, managers can shirk their responsibilities. Shirking means that managers fail to exert themselves fully, as is required of them. Second, they can engage in on-the-job consump- tion. Examples of on-the-job consumption include private jets, club memberships, expensive artwork in the offices, and so on. Each of these represents consumption by managers that does not in any way increase shareholder value. Instead, they actually diminish shareholder value. Third, managers may engage in excessive product-market diversification.99 As we dis- cussed in Chapter 6, such diversification serves to reduce only the employment risk of the managers rather than the financial risk of the shareholders, who can more cheaply diversify their risk by owning a portfolio of investments. Is there any external mechanism to stop managers from shirking, consumption on the job, and excessive diversification?

The market for corporate control is one external mechanism that provides at least some partial solution to the problems described. If internal control mechanisms fail and the man- agement is behaving opportunistically, the likely response of most shareholders will be to sell their stock rather than engage in activism.100 As more stockholders vote with their feet, the value of the stock begins to decline. As the decline continues, at some point the market value of the firm becomes less than the book value. A corporate raider can take over the company for a price less than the book value of the assets of the company. The first thing that the raider may do on assuming control over the company is fire the underperform- ing management. The risk of being acquired by a hostile raider is often referred to as the takeover constraint. The takeover constraint deters management from engaging in opportu- nistic behavior.101

Although in theory the takeover constraint is supposed to limit managerial opportunism, in recent years its effectiveness has become diluted as a result of a number of defense tactics adopted by incumbent management (see Chapter 6). Foremost among them are poison pills, greenmail, and golden parachutes. Poison pills are provisions adopted by the company to reduce its worth to the acquirer. An example would be payment of a huge one-time dividend, typically financed by debt. Greenmail involves buying back the stock from the acquirer, usu- ally at an attractive premium. Golden parachutes are employment contracts that cause the company to pay lucrative severance packages to top managers fired as a result of a takeover, often running to several million dollars. Strategy Spotlight 9.4 discusses another way firms can avoid the market for corporate control, and that is to keep or take the firm private.

Auditors Even when there are stringent disclosure requirements, there is no guarantee that the information disclosed will be accurate. Managers may deliberately disclose false infor- mation or withhold negative financial information as well as use accounting methods that distort results based on highly subjective interpretations. Therefore, all accounting state- ments are required to be audited and certified to be accurate by external auditors. These auditing firms are independent organizations staffed by certified professionals who verify the firm’s books of accounts. Audits can unearth financial irregularities and ensure that financial reporting by the firm conforms to standard accounting practices.

However, these audits often fail to catch accounting irregularities. In the past, auditing fail- ures played an important part in the failures of firms such as Enron and WorldCom. A recent study by the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB) found that audits con- ducted by the Big 4 accounting firms were often deficient. For example, 20 percent of the Ernst & Young audits examined by the PCAOB failed. And this was the best of the Big 4! The PCAOB found fault with 45 percent of the Deloitte audits it examined. Why do these repu- table firms fail to find all of the issues in audits they conduct? First, auditors are appointed

market for corporate control an external control mechanism in which shareholders dissatisfied with a firm’s management sell their shares.

takeover constraint the risk to management of the firm being acquired by a hostile raider.

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9.4 STRATEGY SPOTLIGHT THE RISE OF THE PRIVATELY OWNED FIRM It used to be that the sign that a firm had made it to the big time was when it would issue an initial public offering and become a publicly traded firm. But times have changed. While there are 20 percent more companies in the United States than the mid- 1990s, the number of firms that are publicly traded on a major stock exchange has dropped 45 percent compared to 1995. A number of major firms, including Dell, Safeway, and PetSmart, went from being publicly traded to privately held firms in recent years. Other firms, such as Uber, have simply chosen to stay private for a longer period than successful start-up firms did in the past.

What’s driving this change? Firm managers argue that being private gives them the freedom to think longer term and for the benefit of the firm as a whole, rather than simply maximizing the firm’s current stock price. It also removes the challenge of activist investors pushing the firm to take actions manag- ers would prefer to avoid, and it lessens the threat of a hostile takeover. One survey found that 77 percent of CEOs of publicly traded firms agree with the statement “It would be easier to manage my company if it were a private company rather than

a public company.” Another factor driving this change is that many modern technology companies don’t need much capital to grow. Platform firms, such as Airbnb and Uber, need little capital since they don’t own the hard assets used to serve customers. Other firms outsource capital intensive activities, such as manufacturing, lessening the capital needed to grow. A McKinsey study found that 31 percent of Western companies, those based in the United States, Canada, and Western Europe, now follow an “asset light” business model, compared to 17 percent in 1999. A third factor keeping firms private is that it is expensive to go public. The underwriting and registration costs associated with an initial public offering typically eat up about 14 percent of the funds raised in the offering. A final ben- efit with staying private is that the firm does not have to submit formal disclosure documents to the SEC and other government agencies. This reduces the risk that key financial or technical information that could benefit rivals or other firm stakeholders leaks out in these documents.

Sources: Colvin, G. 2016. Private desires. Fortune. June 1: 51-57; and, Dorward, L. 2017. The advantages of being a privately owned company. chron.com. February 11: np.

by the firm being audited. The desire to continue that business relationship sometimes makes them overlook financial irregularities. Second, most auditing firms also do consulting work and often have lucrative consulting contracts with the firms that they audit. Understandably, some of them tend not to ask too many difficult questions, because they fear jeopardizing the consulting business, which is often more profitable than the auditing work.

Banks and Analysts Commercial and investment banks have lent money to corporations and therefore have to ensure that the borrowing firm’s finances are in order and that the loan covenants are being followed. Stock analysts conduct ongoing in-depth studies of the firms that they follow and make recommendations to their clients to buy, hold, or sell. Their rewards and reputation depend on the quality of these recommendations. Their access to information, their knowledge of the industry and the firm, and the insights they gain from interactions with the management of the company enable them to alert the investing com- munity of both positive and negative developments relating to a company.

It is generally observed that analyst recommendations are often more optimistic than warranted by facts. “Sell” recommendations tend to be exceptions rather than the norm. Many analysts failed to grasp the gravity of the problems surrounding failed companies such as Lehman Brothers and Countrywide till the very end. Part of the explanation may lie in the fact that most analysts work for firms that also have investment banking relationships with the companies they follow. Negative recommendations by analysts can displease the management, who may decide to take their investment banking business to a rival firm. Otherwise independent and competent analysts may be pressured to overlook negative information or tone down their criticism.

Governmental Regulatory Bodies The extent of government regulation is often a function of the type of industry. Banks, utilities, and pharmaceuticals are subject to more regulatory oversight because of their importance to society. Public corporations are subject to more regulatory requirements than private corporations.102

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All public corporations are required to disclose a substantial amount of financial infor- mation by bodies such as the Securities and Exchange Commission. These include quarterly and annual filings of financial performance, stock trading by insiders, and details of exec- utive compensation packages. There are two primary reasons behind such requirements. First, markets can operate efficiently only when the investing public has faith in the market system. In the absence of disclosure requirements, the average investor suffers from a lack of reliable information and therefore may completely stay away from the capital market. This will negatively impact an economy’s ability to grow. Second, disclosure of information such as insider trading protects the small investor to some extent from the negative conse- quences of information asymmetry. The insiders and large investors typically have more information than the small investor and can therefore use that information to buy or sell before the information becomes public knowledge.

Government pressures to improve corporate governance is not only found in the United States. Strategy Spotlight 9.5 discusses how Japanese regulators are pushing for governance reform in a country that has long resisted changes that would lead firms to focus more on shareholders.

9.5 ETHICSSTRATEGY SPOTLIGHT JAPANESE GOVERNMENT PUSHES FOR GOVERNANCE REFORM Corporate governance structures in Japan look very different than those found in the United States. Few members of boards of directors are independent of the firm. Instead, most are also firm managers, meaning they are unlikely to recommend the firm radically change its strategy even if such change may be warranted. Even though many Japanese firms have extensive global operations, only 274 of the approximately 40,000 direc- tor positions at Japanese firms were held by foreigners in 2015. Firms within business groups have cross-shareholding, where supplier firms own part of their customer firms and vice versa. Also, banks often own shares in the companies they lend to and, as a result, do not put strong public pressure on client firms to improve their operations or balance sheets. Government regula- tions do not require that accounting firms that serve as external auditors are independent of the firm. As a result, many firms use closely affiliated “outside” auditors, reducing the pressure the firm faces to accurately report earnings and file financial state- ments. Finally, top manager compensation is low compared to other countries and not closely tied to firm performance, reduc- ing the incentive for management to take bold actions. These cozy governance systems fit the longstanding Japanese desire for economic stability and lifetime employment.

However, two decades of economic malaise has led Prime Minister Shinzo Abe and his government to push for governance reform. These cozy governance arrangements have resulted in firms that are slow to restructure, not very competitively aggres- sive, and unable to fully understand the different needs of the global markets in which they compete. One measure of the con- servatism of firm management is that, in 2015, Japanese com- panies were hoarding $1.9 trillion in cash, an amount nearly half the size of the Japanese economy. This is cash firms could use

to expand, develop new technologies, or acquire other firms, but these firms were choosing to sit on it instead. Abe and his gov- ernment are trying to change things with a new corporate gov- ernance code. Rather than working up hard and fast rules, Abe’s code lays out general principles and relies on social pressure to get firms to change. Companies are advised to improve commu- nication with shareholders, to respond to large shareholder con- cerns, to focus more on increasing shareholder value, to remove anti-takeover provisions, to increase diversity and the promotion of women, and to use an independent auditor.

There is some evidence these social pressures are working. In 2016, firms distributed a record amount of cash to their stock- holders. An increasing number of firms are introducing share- holder friendly measures, such as return on equity targets and regular earnings reports. Corporate boards are also becoming a bit more independent with the average number of outsiders on the boards of large Japanese firms rising from less than one to three members since 2012. Big banks have announced they will reduce their shareholding in customer firms by about 25 percent in the next five years. Cross-shareholdings between firms have reduced to 11 percent of market capitalization in 2016, com- pared to 34 percent in 1990. Finally, some major firms, such as Hitachi, are divesting unrelated and unprofitable business units and focusing on core, growing business operations.

Japan has no interest in fully incorporating American corporate governance practices. It sees the United States as too short term and shareholder focused. Instead, Abe wants to alter governance practices to push firms to be more aggressive and responsive while also maintaining a degree of stability and a longer term focus.

Sources: Anonymous. 2015. Meet Shinzo Abe, shareholder activist. economist.com. June 6: np; Smith, N. 2015. Japan flirts with governance reform. bloomberg.com. January 9: np; de Swaan, J. 2016. Abe must double down on Japan’s corporate sector reforms. ft.com. September 28: np; and, Lewis, L. 2016. Abe’s corporate governance reforms show signs of progress. ft.com. December 20: np.

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Media and Public Activists The press is not usually recognized as an external control mechanism in the literature on corporate governance. There is no denying that in all devel- oped capitalist economies, the financial press and media play an important indirect role in monitoring the management of public corporations. In the United States, business maga- zines such as Bloomberg Businessweek and Fortune, financial newspapers such as The Wall Street Journal and Investor’s Business Daily, as well as television networks like Fox Business Network and CNBC are constantly reporting on companies. Public perceptions about a company’s financial prospects and the quality of its management are greatly influenced by the media. For example, the business practices of Turing Pharmaceuticals were called into question in 2015, first on a health care news website, Healio, and then by USA Today and the New York Times.103 The ensuing scrutiny resulted in Turing’s CEO, Martin Shkreli, being described as “the most hated man in America” in a number of news articles. Shkreli resigned as firm CEO within a few months of the emergence of the scandal.

Similarly, consumer groups and activist individuals often take a crusading role in expos- ing corporate malfeasance.104 For example, pressure from activists and consumers led firms that deal in diamonds, gold, and other precious minerals to change their sourcing behavior to ensure that their suppliers are legitimate operators, mines and dealers that provide appropri- ate wages for workers and safe working conditions as well as refuse to deal in “conflict miner- als” (that rebel groups trade so that they can buy arms for military conflicts). This pressure also led to government regulation, part of the Dodd-Frank Act of 2010, that requires dealers in these minerals to disclose the country of origin of minerals they import into the United States.

Corporate Governance: An International Perspective The topic of corporate governance has long been dominated by agency theory and based on the explicit assumption of the separation of ownership and control.105 The central conflicts are principal–agent conflicts between shareholders and management. However, such an underlying assumption seldom applies outside the United States and the United Kingdom. This is particularly true in emerging economies and continental Europe. Here, there is often concentrated ownership, along with extensive family ownership and control, business group structures, and weak legal protection for minority shareholders. Serious conflicts tend to exist between two classes of principals: controlling shareholders and minority shareholders. Such conflicts can be called principal–principal (PP) conflicts, as opposed to principal– agent conflicts (see Exhibits 9.6 and 9.7).

principal–principal conflicts conflicts between two classes of principals—controlling shareholders and minority shareholders—within the context of a corporate governance system.

Source: Adapted from Young, M., Peng, M. W., Ahlstrom, D., & Bruton, G. 2002. Governing the Corporation in Emerging Economies: A Principal–Principal Perspective. Academy of Management Best Papers Proceedings, Denver.

Principal–Agent Conflicts Principal–Principal Conflicts

Goal incongruence Between shareholders and professional managers who own a relatively small portion of the firm’s equity.

Between controlling shareholders and minority shareholders.

Ownership pattern Dispersed—5% to 20% is considered “concentrated ownership.”

Concentrated—often greater than 50% of equity is controlled by controlling shareholders.

Manifestations Strategies that benefit entrenched managers at the expense of shareholders in general (e.g., shirking, pet projects, excessive compensation, and empire building).

Strategies that benefit controlling shareholders at the expense of minority shareholders (e.g., minority shareholder expropriation, nepotism, and cronyism).

Institutional protection of minority shareholders

Formal constraints (e.g., judicial reviews and courts) set an upper boundary on potential expropriation by majority shareholders. Informal norms generally adhere to shareholder wealth maximization.

Formal institutional protection is often lacking, corrupted, or unenforced. Informal norms are typically in favor of the interests of controlling shareholders ahead of those of minority investors.

EXHIBIT 9.6 Traditional Principal–Agent Conflicts versus Principal–Principal Conflicts: How They Differ along Dimensions

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Source: Young, M. N., Peng, M. W., Ahlstrom, D., Bruton, G. D., & Jiang, 2008. Principal–Principal Conflicts in Corporate Governance. Journal of Management Studies, 45(1): 196–220; and Peng, M. V. 2006. Global Strategy. Cincinnati: Thomson South-Western. We are very appreciative of the helpful comments of Mike Young of Hong Kong Baptist University and Mike Peng of the University of Texas at Dallas.

EXHIBIT 9.7 Principal–Agent Conflicts and Principal–Principal Conflicts: A Diagram

Professional managers

Family managers

Controlling shareholders

Family managers are appointed by controlling shareholders

Principal–Principal conflicts

Principal–Agent conflicts

Minority shareholders

Minority shareholders

Strong family control is one of the leading indicators of concentrated ownership. In East Asia (excluding China), approximately 57 percent of the corporations have board chairmen and CEOs from the controlling families. In continental Europe, this number is 68 percent. A very common practice is the appointment of family members as board chairmen, CEOs, and other top executives. This happens because the families are controlling (not necessarily majority) shareholders.

In general, three conditions must be met for PP conflicts to occur:

• A dominant owner or group of owners who have interests that are distinct from minority shareholders.

• Motivation for the controlling shareholders to exercise their dominant positions to their advantage.

• Few formal (such as legislation or regulatory bodies) or informal constraints that would discourage or prevent the controlling shareholders from exploiting their advantageous positions.

The result is often that family managers, who represent (or actually are) the controlling shareholders, engage in expropriation of minority shareholders, which is defined as activities that enrich the controlling shareholders at the expense of minority shareholders. What is their motive? After all, controlling shareholders have incentives to maintain firm value. But controlling shareholders may take actions that decrease aggregate firm performance if their personal gains from expropriation exceed their personal losses from their firm’s lowered performance.

Another ubiquitous feature of corporate life outside the United States and United Kingdom is business groups such as the keiretsus of Japan and the chaebols of South Korea. This is particularly dominant in emerging economies. A business group is “a set of firms that, though legally independent, are bound together by a constellation of formal and infor- mal ties and are accustomed to taking coordinated action.”106 Business groups are especially common in emerging economies, and they differ from other organizational forms in that they are communities of firms without clear boundaries.

expropriation of minority shareholders activities that enrich the controlling shareholders at the expense of the minority shareholders.

business group a set of firms that, though legally independent, are bound together by a constellation of formal and informal ties and are accustomed to taking coordinated action.

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Business groups have many advantages that can enhance the value of a firm. They often facilitate technology transfer or intergroup capital allocation that otherwise might be impossible because of inadequate institutional infrastructure such as excellent financial services firms. On the other hand, informal ties—such as cross-holdings, board interlocks, and coordinated actions—can often result in intragroup activities and transactions, often at very favorable terms to member firms. Expropriation can be legally done through related transactions, which can occur when controlling owners sell firm assets to another firm they own at below-market prices or spin off the most profitable part of a public firm and merge it with another of their private firms.

ISSUE FOR DEBATE

Striking the balance between shareholder rights and the rights of corporate managers to run firms is a challenging issue. Since most shareholders, even institutional investors, own less than 5 percent of the stock in any one firm, there are typically no controlling shareholders who can, on their own, force management to make major changes or address the key concerns of the investors. To address this issue, U.S. regulators have created guidelines that make it easy for shareholders, even small shareholders, to initiate shareholder proposals at annual shareholder meetings. Shareholders who own $2,000 or 1 percent of a firm’s stock, whichever is lower, have the right to submit a shareholder proposal. Once submitted, firm management must hold a vote, where all shareholders weigh in on whether they agree that the corporation should address the issues raised in the proposal. If the proposal gets support from at least 3 percent of shareholders, its sponsor can call for a vote on it again at the next shareholder meeting. Proponents of these rules believe that this is corporate democracy in action and keeps management from becoming tone deaf to the concerns of small shareholders.

However, these rules also allow small shareholders with personal concerns, sometimes called “corporate gadflies,” to generate shareholder proposals that can potentially create unnecessary and costly work by firms. For example, Choice Hotels had to fight a shareholder proposal from one stockholder, who owned .001 percent of the firm’s stock, which called for Choice to measure how much water flowed through every single showerhead in every bathroom in the 6,300 hotels the company owns. Some investors make it something of a career submitting these proposals. Three people, John Chevedden, William Steiner, and James McRitchie and their families, filed 70 percent of all of the shareholder proposals at Fortune 250 firms in 2013. Less than 5 percent of their proposals passed, but the cost to fight them was substantial. According to one estimate, the cost for firms to counter these proposals was $90 million.

Regulators struggle with how to deal with this issue. Making it harder to file shareholder proposals would reduce the cost to corporations, but it would also reduce the voice of shareholders to raise substantive issues.

Discussion Question 1. How would you strike a balance to ensure that shareholders have a voice while limiting the

cost of unnecessary proposals? Are the current rules appropriate? If not, how would you change them?

Sources: Engler, J. 2016. How gadfly shareholders keep CEOs distracted. Wall Street Journal. May 27: A11; and Soloman, S. 2014. Grappling with the cost of corporate gadflies. nytimes.com. August 19: np.

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Reflecting on Career Implications . . . This chapter focuses on the varying means firms can use to control and direct behavior. The following questions ask you how you would respond to different control mechanisms and how you can construct monitoring and control systems to enhance you career.

Behavioral Control: What types of behavioral control does your organization employ? Do you find these behavioral controls helping or hindering you from doing a good job? Some individuals are comfortable with and even desire rules and procedures for everything. Others find that they inhibit creativity and stifle initiative. Evaluate your own level of comfort with the level of behavioral control and then assess the match between your own optimum level of control and the level and type of control used by your organization. If the gap is significant, you might want to consider other career opportunities.

Setting Boundaries and Constraints: Your career success depends to a great extent on you monitoring and regulating your own behavior. Setting boundaries and constraints on yourself can help you focus on strategic priorities, generate

short-term objectives and action plans, improve efficiency and effectiveness, and minimize improper conduct. Identify the boundaries and constraints you have placed on yourself and evaluate how each of those contributes to your personal growth and career development. If you do not have boundaries and constraints, consider developing them.

Rewards and Incentives: Is your organization’s reward structure fair and equitable? On what criteria do you base your conclusions? How does the firm define outstanding performance and reward it? Are these financial or nonfinancial rewards? The absence of rewards that are seen as fair and equitable can result in the long-term erosion of morale, which may have long-term adverse career implications for you.

Culture: Given your career goals, what type of organizational culture would provide the best work environment? How does your organization’s culture deviate from this concept? Does your organization have a strong and effective culture? In the long run, how likely are you to internalize the culture of your organization? If you believe that there is a strong misfit between your values and the organization’s culture, you may want to reconsider your relationship with the organization.

For firms to be successful, they must practice effective strategic control and corporate governance. Without such controls, the firm will not be able to achieve competitive advantages and outperform rivals in the marketplace.

We began the chapter with the key role of informational control. We contrasted two types of control systems: what we termed “traditional” and “contemporary” information control systems. Whereas traditional control systems may have their place in placid, simple competitive environments, there are fewer of those in today’s economy. Instead, we advocated the contemporary approach wherein the internal and external environment are constantly monitored so that when surprises emerge, the firm can modify its strategies, goals, and objectives.

Behavioral controls are also a vital part of effective control systems. We argued that firms must develop the proper balance between culture, rewards and incentives, and boundaries and constraints. Where there are strong and positive cultures and rewards, employees tend to internalize the organization’s strategies and objectives. This permits a firm to spend fewer resources on monitoring behavior, and assures the firm that the efforts and initiatives of employees are more consistent with the overall objectives of the organization.

In the final section of this chapter, we addressed corporate governance, which can be defined as the relationship between various participants in determining the direction and performance of the corporation. The primary participants

include shareholders, management (led by the chief executive officer), and the board of directors. We reviewed studies that indicated a consistent relationship between effective corporate governance and financial performance. There are also several internal and external control mechanisms that can serve to align managerial interests and shareholder interests. The internal mechanisms include a committed and involved board of directors, shareholder activism, and effective managerial incentives and rewards. The external mechanisms include the market for corporate control, banks and analysts, regulators, the media, and public activists. We also addressed corporate governance from both a United States and an international perspective.

SUMMARY REVIEW QUESTIONS 1. Why are effective strategic control systems so

important in today’s economy? 2. What are the main advantages of contemporary

control systems over traditional control systems? What are the main differences between these two systems?

3. Why is it important to have a balance between the three elements of behavioral control—culture, rewards and incentives, and boundaries?

4. Discuss the relationship between types of organizations and their primary means of behavioral control.

5. Boundaries become less important as a firm develops a strong culture and reward system. Explain.

summary

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6. Why is it important to avoid a “one best way” mentality concerning control systems? What are the consequences of applying the same type of control system to all types of environments?

7. What is the role of effective corporate governance in improving a firm’s performance? What are some of the key governance mechanisms that are used to ensure that managerial and shareholder interests are aligned?

8. Define principal–principal (PP) conflicts. What are the implications for corporate governance?

strategic control 268 traditional approach to

strategic control 268 informational control 269 behavioral control 269 organizational culture 270 reward system 271 boundaries and

constraints 275 corporate governance 278

corporation 279 agency theory 280 board of directors 281 shareholder activism 283 external governance control

mechanisms 286 market for corporate

control 287 takeover constraint 287 principal–principal

conflicts 290 expropriation of minority

shareholders 291 business group 291

key terms

Management 1.

2.

3.

Board of directors 1.

2.

3.

Shareholder activism 1.

2.

3.

EXPERIENTIAL EXERCISE McDonald’s Corporation is the world’s largest fast-food restaurant chain. Using the Internet, evaluate the quality of the corporation in terms of management, the board of

APPLICATION QUESTIONS & EXERCISES 1. The problems of many firms may be attributed to a

traditional control system that failed to continuously monitor the environment and make necessary changes in their strategy and objectives. What companies are you familiar with that responded appropriately (or inappropriately) to environmental change?

2. How can a strong, positive culture enhance a firm’s competitive advantage? How can a weak, negative culture erode competitive advantages? Explain and provide examples.

3. Use the Internet to research a firm that has an excellent culture and/or reward and incentive system. What are this firm’s main financial and nonfinancial benefits?

4. Using the Internet, go to the website of a large, publicly held corporation in which you are interested. What evidence do you see of effective (or ineffective) corporate governance?

ETHICS QUESTIONS 1. Strong cultures can have powerful effects on

employee behavior. How does this create inadvertent control mechanisms? That is, are strong cultures an ethical way to control behavior?

2. Rules and regulations can help reduce unethical behavior in organizations. To be effective, however, what other systems, mechanisms, and processes are necessary?

directors, and shareholder activism. (Fill in the chart below.) Are the issues you list favorable or unfavorable for sound corporate governance?

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1. Anonymous. 2014. Not so funny. economist.com, September 27: np; Evans, P. & Fleisher, L. 2014. Tesco investigates accounting error. wsj. com, September 23: np; Rosenblum, P. 2014. Tesco’s accounting irregularities are mind blowing. forbes.com, September 22: np; and Davey, J. 2014. UK watchdog to investigate Tesco accounts and auditor PwC. reuters.com, December 22: np.

2. This chapter draws upon Picken, J. C. & Dess, G. G. 1997. Mission critical. Burr Ridge, IL: Irwin Professional.

3. For a unique perspective on governance, refer to Carmeli, A. & Markman, G. D. 2011. Capture, governance, and resilience: Strategy implications from the history of Rome. Strategic Management Journal, 32(3): 332–341.

4. Argyris, C. 1977. Double-loop learning in organizations. Harvard Business Review, 55: 115–125.

5. Simons, R. 1995. Control in an age of empowerment. Harvard Business Review, 73: 80–88. This chapter draws on this source in the discussion of informational control.

6. Goold, M. & Quinn, J. B. 1990. The paradox of strategic controls. Strategic Management Journal, 11: 43–57.

7. Quinn, J. B. 1980. Strategies for change. Homewood, IL: Irwin.

8. Mintzberg, H. 1987. Crafting strategy. Harvard Business Review, 65: 66–75.

9. This discussion of control systems draws upon Simons, op. cit.

10. Ryan, M. K., Haslam, S. A., & Renneboog, L. D. R. 2011. Who gets the carrot and who gets the stick? Evidence of gender discrimination in executive remuneration. Strategic Management Journal, 32(3): 301–321.

11. For an interesting perspective on this issue and how a downturn in the economy can reduce the tendency toward “free agency” by managers and professionals, refer to Morris, B. 2001. White collar blues. Fortune, July 23: 98–110.

12. For a colorful example of behavioral control in an organization, see Beller, P. C. 2009. Activision’s unlikely hero. Forbes, February 2: 52–58.

13. Collins, J. C. & Porras, J. I. 1994. Built to last: Successful habits of visionary companies. New York: Harper Business.

14. Lee, J. & Miller, D. 1999. People matter: Commitment to employees, strategy, and performance in Korean

firms. Strategic Management Journal, 6: 579–594.

15. For an insightful discussion of IKEA’s unique culture, see Kling, K. & Goteman, I. 2003. IKEA CEO Anders Dahlvig on international growth and IKEA’s unique corporate culture and brand identity. Academy of Management Executive, 17(1): 31–37.

16. For a discussion of how professionals inculcate values, refer to Uhl-Bien, M. & Graen, G. B. 1998. Individual self-management: Analysis of professionals’ self-managing activities in functional and cross-functional work teams. Academy of Management Journal, 41(3): 340–350.

17. A perspective on how antisocial behavior can erode a firm’s culture can be found in Robinson, S. L. & O’Leary-Kelly, A. M. 1998. Monkey see, monkey do: The influence of work groups on the antisocial behavior of employees. Academy of Management Journal, 41(6): 658–672.

18. Benkler, Y. 2011. The unselfish gene. Harvard Business Review, 89(7): 76–85.

19. An interesting perspective on organizational culture is in Mehta, S. N. 2009. Under Armour reboots. Fortune, February 2: 29–33.

20. For insights on social pressure as a means for control, refer to Goldstein, N. J. 2009. Harnessing social pressure. Harvard Business Review, 87(2): 25.

21. Mitchell, R. 1989. Masters of innovation. BusinessWeek, April 10: 58–63.

22. bigspaceship.com/warby-parker-culture; and businesscollective.com/12-ways-to- reinforce-your-company-culture.

23. Kerr, J. & Slocum, J. W., Jr. 1987. Managing corporate culture through reward systems. Academy of Management Executive, 1(2): 99–107.

24. For a unique perspective on leader challenges in managing wealthy professionals, refer to Wetlaufer, S. 2000. Who wants to manage a millionaire? Harvard Business Review, 78(4): 53–60.

25. Netessine, S. & Yakubovich, V. 2012. The Darwinian workplace. Harvard Business Review, 90(5): 25–28.

26. For a discussion of the benefits of stock options as executive compensation, refer to Hall, B. J. 2000. What you need to know about stock options. Harvard Business Review, 78(2): 121–129.

27. Anonymous. 2013. Rewarding your employees: 15 examples of successful incentives in the corporate world. rrgexec.com. June 20: np.

28. Carter, N. M. & Silva, C. 2010. Why men still get more promotions than women. Harvard Business Review, 88(9): 80–86.

29. Sirota, D., Mischkind, L. & Meltzer, I. 2008. Stop demotivating your employees! Harvard Management Update, July: 3–5; Nelson, B. 2003. Five questions about employee recognition and reward. Harvard Management Update; Birkinshaw, J., Bouquet, C., & Barsaoux, J. 2011. The 5 myths of innovation. MIT Sloan Management Review. Winter, 43–50; and Dewhurst, M. Guthridge, M., & Mohr, E. 2009. Motivating people: Getting beyond money. mckinsey.com. November: np.

30. This section draws on Picken & Dess, op. cit., chap. 5.

31. Anonymous. 2012. Nestle set to buy Pfizer unit. Dallas Morning News, April 19: 10D.

32. Isaacson, W. 2012. The real leadership lessons of Steve Jobs. Harvard Business Review, 90(4): 93–101.

33. This section draws upon Dess, G. G. & Miller, A. 1993. Strategic management. New York: McGraw-Hill.

34. For a good review of the goal- setting literature, refer to Locke, E. A. & Latham, G. P. 1990. A theory of goal setting and task performance. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall.

35. For an interesting perspective on the use of rules and regulations that is counter to this industry’s (software) norms, refer to Fryer, B. 2001. Tom Siebel of Siebel Systems: High tech the old fashioned way. Harvard Business Review, 79(3): 118–130.

36. Thompson, A. A., Jr., & Strickland, A. J., III. 1998. Strategic management: Concepts and cases (10th ed.): 313. New York: McGraw-Hill.

37. Weaver, G. R., Trevino, L. K., & Cochran, P. L. 1999. Corporate ethics programs as control systems: Influences of executive commitment and environmental factors. Academy of Management Journal, 42(1): 41–57.

38. www.singaporeair.com/pdf/ media-centre/anti-corruption-policy- procedures.pdf.

39. William Ouchi has written extensively about the use of clan control (which is viewed as an

REFERENCES

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alternative to bureaucratic or market control). Here, a powerful culture results in people aligning their individual interests with those of the firm. See Ouchi, W. 1981. Theory Z. Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley. This section also draws on Hall, R. H. 2002. Organizations: Structures, processes, and outcomes (8th ed.). Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice Hall.

40. Poundstone, W. 2003. How would you move Mount Fuji? New York: Little, Brown: 59.

41. Abby, E. 2012. Woman sues over personality test job rejection. abcnews.go.com, October 1: np.

42. Interesting insights on corporate governance are in Kroll, M., Walters, B. A., & Wright, P. 2008. Board vigilance, director experience, and corporate outcomes. Strategic Management Journal, 29(4): 363–382.

43. For a brief review of some central issues in corporate governance research, see Hambrick, D. C., Werder, A. V., & Zajac, E. J. 2008. New directions in corporate governance research. Organization Science, 19(3): 381–385.

44. Monks, R. & Minow, N. 2001. Corporate governance (2nd ed.). Malden, MA: Blackwell.

45. Pound, J. 1995. The promise of the governed corporation. Harvard Business Review, 73(2): 89–98.

46. Maurer, H. & Linblad, C. 2009. Scandal at Satyam. BusinessWeek, January 19: 8; Scheck, J. & Stecklow, S. 2008. Brocade ex-CEO gets 21 months in prison. The Wall Street Journal, January 17: A3; Levine, D. & Graybow, M. 2010. Mozilo to pay millions in Countrywide settlement. finance. yahoo.com, October 15: np; Ellis, B. 2010. Countrywide’s Mozilo to pay $67.5 million settlement. cnnmoney. com, October 15: np; Frank, R., Efrati, A., Lucchetti, A., & Bray, C. 2009. Madoff jailed after admitting epic scam. The Wall Street Journal, March 13: A1; and Henriques, D. B. 2009. Madoff is sentenced to 150 years for Ponzi scheme. www. nytimes.com, June 29: np.

47. Corkery, M. & Cowley, S. 2016. Wells Fargo CEO John Stumpf quits after scandal. bostonglobe.com. October 12: np.

48. Harris, E. 2014. After bribery scandal, high-level departures at Walmart. nytimes.com, June 4: np.

49. Anonymous. 2012. Olympus and ex-executives plead guilty in

accounting fraud. nytimes.com, September 25: np.

50. Corporate governance and social networks are discussed in McDonald, M. L., Khanna, P., & Westphal, J. D. 2008. Academy of Management Journal, 51(3): 453–475.

51. This discussion draws upon Monks & Minow, op. cit.

52. For an interesting perspective on the politicization of the corporation, read Palazzo, G. & Scherer, A. G. 2008. Corporate social responsibility, democracy, and the politicization of the corporation. Academy of Management Review, 33(3): 773–774.

53. Eisenhardt, K. M. 1989. Agency theory: An assessment and review. Academy of Management Review, 14(1): 57–74. Some of the seminal contributions to agency theory include Jensen, M. & Meckling, W. 1976. Theory of the firm: Managerial behavior, agency costs, and ownership structure. Journal of Financial Economics, 3: 305–360; Fama, E. & Jensen, M. 1983. Separation of ownership and control. Journal of Law and Economics, 26: 301, 325; and Fama, E. 1980. Agency problems and the theory of the firm. Journal of Political Economy, 88: 288–307.

54. Nyberg, A. J., Fulmer, I. S., Gerhart, B., & Carpenter, M. 2010. Agency theory revisited: CEO return and shareholder interest alignment. Academy of Management Journal, 53(5): 1029–1049.

55. Managers may also engage in “shirking”—that is, reducing or withholding their efforts. See, for example, Kidwell, R. E., Jr. & Bennett, N. 1993. Employee propensity to withhold effort: A conceptual model to intersect three avenues of research. Academy of Management Review, 18(3): 429–456.

56. For an interesting perspective on agency and clarification of many related concepts and terms, visit www. encycogov.com.

57. The relationship between corporate ownership structure and export intensity in Chinese firms is discussed in Filatotchev, I., Stephan, J., & Jindra, B. 2008. Ownership structure, strategic controls and export intensity of foreign-invested firms in transition economies. Journal of International Business, 39(7): 1133–1148.

58. Argawal, A. & Mandelker, G. 1987. Managerial incentives and corporate investment and financing

decisions. Journal of Finance, 42: 823–837.

59. Woods, L. 2017. The most outrageous CEO salaries and perks. msn.com. January 17: np.

60. Swanson, C. 2015. America’s 3 most overpaid CEOs. usatoday.com. November 10: np.

61. For an insightful, recent discussion of the academic research on corporate governance, and in particular the role of boards of directors, refer to Chatterjee, S. & Harrison, J. S. 2001. Corporate governance. In Hitt, M. A., Freeman, R. E., & Harrison, J. S. (Eds.), Handbook of strategic management: 543–563. Malden, MA: Blackwell.

62. For an interesting theoretical discussion on corporate governance in Russia, see McCarthy, D. J. & Puffer, S. M. 2008. Interpreting the ethicality of corporate governance decisions in Russia: Utilizing integrative social contracts theory to evaluate the relevance of agency theory norms. Academy of Management Review, 33(1): 11–31.

63. Haynes, K. T. & Hillman, A. 2010. The effect of board capital and CEO power on strategic change. Strategic Management Journal, 31(110): 1145–1163.

64. This opening discussion draws on Monks & Minow, op. cit. pp. 164, 169; see also Pound, op. cit.

65. Business Roundtable. 2012. Principles of corporate governance.

66. Bhagat, C. & Kehoe, C. 2014. High performing boards: What’s on their agenda? mckinsey.com, April: np.

67. The role of outside directors is discussed in Lester, R. H., Hillman, A., Zardkoohi, A., & Cannella, A. A., Jr. 2008. Former government officials as outside directors: The role of human and social capital. Academy of Management Journal, 51(5): 999–1013.

68. Rudegeair, P. & Andriotis, A. 2016. Inside the final days of Lending Club CEO Renaud Laplanche. wsj.com. May 16: np.

69. Feintzeig, R. 2014. You’re fired! And we really mean it. The Wall Street Journal, November 5: B1, B6.

70. For an analysis of the effects of outside directors’ compensation on acquisition decisions, refer to Deutsch, T., Keil, T., & Laamanen, T. 2007. Decision making in acquisitions: The effect of outside directors’ compensation on acquisition patterns. Journal of Management, 33(1): 30–56.

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71. Director interlocks are addressed in Kang, E. 2008. Director interlocks and spillover effects of reputational penalties from financial reporting fraud. Academy of Management Journal, 51(3): 537–556.

72. There are benefits, of course, to having some insiders on the board of directors. Inside directors would be more aware of the firm’s strategies. Additionally, outsiders may rely too often on financial performance indicators because of information asymmetries. For an interesting discussion, see Baysinger, B. D. & Hoskisson, R. E. 1990. The composition of boards of directors and strategic control: Effects on corporate strategy. Academy of Management Review, 15: 72–87.

73. Hambrick, D. C. & Jackson, E. M. 2000. Outside directors with a stake: The linchpin in improving governance. California Management Review, 42(4): 108–127.

74. Corsi, C., Dale, G., Daum, J., Mumm, J., & Schoppen, W. 2010. 5 things board directors should be thinking about. spencerstuart.com, December: np; Evans, B. 2007. Six steps to building an effective board. inc.com : np; Beatty, D. 2009. New challenges for corporate governance. Rotman Magazine, Fall: 58–63; and Krause, R., Semadeni, M., & Cannella, A. 2013. External COO/ presidents as expert directors: A new look at the service role of boards. Strategic Management Journal, 34(13): 1628–1641.

75. Anonymous. 2011. Corporate boards now and then. Harvard Business Review 89(11): 38–39; Choe, S. 2017. Women are, very slowly, getting more seats in the boardroom. Dallas Morning News, February 5: 1D, 8D; and Kehoe, C., Lund, F., & Speilman, N. 2016. Toward a value creating board. mckinsey.com. February: np.

76. A discussion on the shareholder approval process in executive compensation is presented in Brandes, P., Goranova, M., & Hall, S. 2008. Navigating shareholder influence: Compensation plans and the shareholder approval process. Academy of Management Perspectives, 22(1): 41–57.

77. Monks and Minow, op. cit., p. 93. 78. A discussion of the factors that lead

to shareholder activism is found in Ryan, L. V. & Schneider, M. 2002. The antecedents of institutional investor activism. Academy of Management Review, 27(4): 554–573.

79. For an insightful discussion of investor activism, refer to David, P., Bloom, M., & Hillman, A. 2007. Investor activism, managerial responsiveness, and corporate social performance. Strategic Management Journal, 28(1): 91–100.

80. There is strong research support for the idea that the presence of large- block shareholders is associated with value-maximizing decisions. For example, refer to Johnson, R. A., Hoskisson, R. E., & Hitt, M. A. 1993. Board of director involvement in restructuring: The effects of board versus managerial controls and characteristics. Strategic Management Journal, 14: 33–50.

81. Anonymous. 2011. Institutional ownership nears all-time highs. Good or bad for alpha-seekers? allaboutalpha.com, February 2: np.

82. For an interesting perspective on the impact of institutional ownership on a firm’s innovation strategies, see Hoskisson, R. E., Hitt, M. A., Johnson, R. A., & Grossman, W. 2002. Academy of Management Journal, 45(4): 697–716.

83. calpers.ca.gov. 84. www.calpers-governance.org. 85. Anonymous. 2011. Corporate boards

now and then. Harvard Business Review. 89(11): 38–39.

86. For a study of the relationship between ownership and diversification, refer to Goranova, M., Alessandri, T. M., Brandes, P., & Dharwadkar, R. 2007. Managerial ownership and corporate diversification: A longitudinal view. Strategic Management Journal, 28(3): 211–226.

87. Jensen, M. C. & Murphy, K. J. 1990. CEO incentives—It’s not how much you pay, but how. Harvard Business Review, 68(3): 138–149.

88. For a perspective on the relative advantages and disadvantages of “duality”—that is, one individual serving as both chief executive office and chairman of the board, see Lorsch, J. W. & Zelleke, A. 2005. Should the CEO be the chairman? MIT Sloan Management Review, 46(2): 71–74.

89. A discussion of knowledge sharing is addressed in Fey, C. F. & Furu, P. 2008. Top management incentive compensation and knowledge sharing in multinational corporations. Strategic Management Journal, 29(12): 1301–1324.

90. Nicks, D. 2016. CEOs make 335 times what workers earn. time.com. May 17: np.

91. Sasseen, J. 2007. A better look at the boss’s pay. BusinessWeek, February 26: 44–45; and Weinberg, N., Maiello, M., & Randall, D. 2008. Paying for failure. Forbes, May 19: 114, 116.

92. Research has found that executive compensation is more closely aligned with firm performance in companies with compensation committees and boards dominated by outside directors. See, for example, Conyon, M. J. & Peck, S. I. 1998. Board control, remuneration committees, and top management compensation. Academy of Management Journal, 41: 146–157.

93. Anonymous. 2012. American chief executives are not overpaid. The Economist, September 8: 67.

94. Chahine, S. & Tohme, N. S. 2009. Is CEO duality always negative? An exploration of CEO duality and ownership structure in the Arab IPO context. Corporate Governance: An International Review, 17(2): 123–141; and McGrath, J. 2009. How CEOs work. HowStuffWorks.com. January 28: np.

95. Anonymous. 2009. Someone to watch over them. The Economist, October 17: 78; Anonymous. 2004. Splitting up the roles of CEO and chairman: Reform or red herring? Knowledge@Wharton, June 2: np; and Kim, J. 2010. Shareholders reject split of CEO and chairman jobs at JPMorgan. FierceFinance.com, May 18: np.

96. Tuggle, C. S., Sirmon, D. G., Reutzel, C. R., & Bierman, L. 2010. Commanding board of director attention: Investigating how organizational performance and CEO duality affect board members’ attention to monitoring. Strategic Management Journal, 31: 946–968; Weinberg, N. 2010. No more lapdogs. Forbes, May 10: 34–36; and Anonymous. 2010. Corporate constitutions. The Economist, October 30: 74.

97. Semadeni, M. & Krause, R. 2012. Splitting the CEO and chairman roles: It’s complicated . . . businessweek.com, November 1: np.

98. Such opportunistic behavior is common in all principal–agent relationships. For a description of agency problems, especially in the context of the relationship between shareholders and managers, see Jensen, M. C. & Meckling, W. H. 1976. Theory of the firm: Managerial behavior, agency costs, and ownership structure. Journal of Financial Economics, 3: 305–360.

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99. Hoskisson, R. E. & Turk, T. A. 1990. Corporate restructuring: Governance and control limits of the internal market. Academy of Management Review, 15: 459–477.

100. For an insightful perspective on the market for corporate control and how it is influenced by knowledge intensity, see Coff, R. 2003. Bidding wars over R&D-intensive firms: Knowledge, opportunism, and the market for corporate control. Academy of Management Journal, 46(1): 74–85.

101. Walsh, J. P. & Kosnik, R. D. 1993. Corporate raiders and their

disciplinary role in the market for corporate control. Academy of Management Journal, 36: 671–700.

102. The role of regulatory bodies in the banking industry is addressed in Bhide, A. 2009. Why bankers got so reckless. BusinessWeek, February 9: 30–31.

103. Timmerman, L. 2015. A timeline of the Turing Pharma controversy. forbes.com. September 23: np.

104. Swartz, J. 2010. Timberland’s CEO on standing up to 65,000 angry activists. Harvard Business Review, 88(9): 39–43.

105. This section draws upon Young, M. N., Peng, M. W., Ahlstrom, D., Bruton, G. D., & Jiang, Y. 2005. Principal– principal conflicts in corporate governance (unpublished manuscript); and, Peng, M. W. 2006. Global Strategy. Cincinnati: Thomson South-Western. We appreciate the helpful comments of Mike Young of HongKong Baptist University and Mike Peng of the University of Texas at Dallas.

106. Khanna, T. & Rivkin, J. 2001. Estimating the performance effects of business groups in emerging markets. Strategic Management Journal, 22: 45–74.

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chapter

After reading this chapter, you should have a good understanding of the following learning objectives:

10

LO10-1 The growth patterns of major corporations and the relationship between a firm’s strategy and its structure.

LO10-2 Each of the traditional types of organizational structure: simple, functional, divisional, and matrix.

LO10-3 The implications of a firm’s international operations for organizational structure.

LO10-4 The different types of boundaryless organizations—barrier-free, modular, and virtual—and their relative advantages and disadvantages.

LO10-5 The need for creating ambidextrous organizational designs that enable firms to explore new opportunities and effectively integrate existing operations.

Creating Effective Organizational Designs

©Anatoli Styf/Shutterstock

PART 3: STRATEGIC IMPLEMENTATION

The Boeing 787 Dreamliner is a game changer in the aircraft market.1 It is the first commercial airliner that doesn’t have an aluminum skin. Instead, Boeing designed it to have a composite exterior, which provides a weight savings that allows the plane to use 20 percent less fuel than the 767, the plane it is designed to replace. The increased fuel efficiency and other design advancements made the 787 very popular with airlines. Boeing received orders for over 900 Dreamliners before the first 787 ever took flight.

It was also a game changer for Boeing. In 2003, when Boeing announced the development of the new plane, it also decided to design and manufacture the 787 in a way that was different from what it had ever done before. In the past, Boeing had internally designed and engineered the major components of its planes. Boeing would then provide detailed engineering designs and specifications to its key suppliers. The suppliers would then build the components to Boeing’s specifications. To limit the up-front investment it would need to make with the 787, Boeing moved to a modular structure and outsourced much of the engineering of the components to suppliers. Boeing provided them with basic specifications and left it to the suppliers to undertake the detailed design, engineering, and manufacturing of components and subsystems. Boeing’s operations in Seattle were then responsible for assembling the pieces into a completed aircraft.

Working with about 50 suppliers on four continents, Boeing found the coordination and integration of the work of suppliers to be very challenging. Some of the contracted suppliers didn’t have the engineering expertise needed to do the work and outsourced the engineering to subcontractors. This made it especially difficult to monitor the engineering work for the plane. Jim Albaugh, Boeing’s commercial aviation chief, identified a core issue with this change in responsibility and stated, “We gave work to people that had never really done this kind of technology before, and we didn’t provide the oversight that was necessary.” With the geographic stretch of the supplier set, Boeing also had difficulty monitoring the progress of the supplying firms. Boeing even ended up buying some of the suppliers once it became apparent they couldn’t deliver the designs and products on schedule. For example, Boeing spent about $1 billion to acquire the Vought Aircraft Industries unit responsible for the plane’s fuselage. When the suppliers finally delivered the parts, Boeing sometimes found they had difficulty assembling or combining the components. With its first 787, it found that the nose section and the fuselage didn’t initially fit together, leaving a sizable gap between the two sections. To address these issues, Boeing was forced to co-locate many of its major suppliers together for six months to smooth out design and integration issues.

In the end, the decision to outsource cost Boeing dearly. The plane was three years behind schedule when the first 787 was delivered to a customer. The entire process took billions of dollars more than originally projected and also more than what it would have cost Boeing to design in-house. In early 2013, all 49 of the 787s that had been delivered to customers were grounded because of concerns about onboard fires in the lithium ion batteries used to power the plane—parts that were not designed by Boeing. As Boeing CEO Jim McNerney concluded, “In retrospect, our 787 game plan may have been overly ambitious, incorporating too many firsts all at once—in the application of new technologies, in revolutionary design and build processes, and in increased global sourcing of engineering and manufacturing content.”

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Discussion Questions 1. A number of firms benefit from outsourcing design and manufacturing. What is different with

Boeing that makes it so much harder to be successful? 2. What lessons does its experience with the 787 offer Boeing for its next plane development

effort?

One of the central concepts in this chapter is the importance of boundaryless organizations. Successful organizations create permeable boundaries among the internal activities as well as between the organization and its external customers, suppliers, and alliance partners. We introduced this idea in Chapter 3 in our discussion of the value-chain concept, which con- sisted of several primary (e.g., inbound logistics, marketing and sales) and support activities (e.g., procurement, human resource management). There are a number of possible ben- efits to outsourcing activities as part of becoming an effective boundaryless organization. However, outsourcing can also create challenges. As in the case of Boeing, the firm lost a large amount of control by using independent suppliers to design and manufacture key subsystems of the 787.

Today’s managers are faced with two ongoing and vital activities in structuring and designing their organizations.2 First, they must decide on the most appropriate type of organizational structure. Second, they need to assess what mechanisms, processes, and techniques are most helpful in enhancing the permeability of both internal and external boundaries.

TRADITIONAL FORMS OF ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE Organizational structure refers to the formalized patterns of interactions that link a firm’s tasks, technologies, and people.3 Structures help to ensure that resources are used effec- tively in accomplishing an organization’s mission. Structure provides a means of balancing two conflicting forces: a need for the division of tasks into meaningful groupings and the need to integrate such groupings in order to ensure efficiency and effectiveness.4 Structure identifies the executive, managerial, and administrative organization of a firm and indicates responsibilities and hierarchical relationships. It also influences the flow of information as well as the context and nature of human interactions.5

Most organizations begin very small and either die or remain small. Those that survive and prosper embark on strategies designed to increase the overall scope of operations and enable them to enter new product-market domains. Such growth places additional pressure on executives to control and coordinate the firm’s increasing size and diversity. The most appropriate type of structure depends on the nature and magnitude of growth.

Patterns of Growth of Large Corporations: Strategy-Structure Relationships A firm’s strategy and structure change as it increases in size, diversifies into new product markets, and expands its geographic scope.6 Exhibit 10.1 illustrates common growth pat- terns of firms.

A new firm with a simple structure typically increases its sales revenue and volume of out- puts over time. It may also engage in some vertical integration to secure sources of supply

organizational structure the formalized patterns of interactions that link a firm’s tasks, technologies, and people.

LO 10-1 The growth patterns of major corporations and the relationship between a firm’s strategy and its structure.

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(backward integration) as well as channels of distribution (forward integration). The simple- structure firm then implements a functional structure to concentrate efforts on both increas- ing efficiency and enhancing its operations and products. This structure enables the firm to group its operations into functions, departments, or geographic areas. As its initial markets mature, a firm looks beyond its present products and markets for possible expansion.

A strategy of related diversification requires a need to reorganize around product lines or geographic markets. This leads to a divisional structure. As the business expands in terms of sales revenues, and domestic growth opportunities become somewhat limited, a firm may seek opportunities in international markets. A firm has a wide variety of structures to choose from. These include international division, geographic area, worldwide product divi- sion, worldwide functional, and worldwide matrix. Deciding upon the most appropriate struc- ture when a firm has international operations depends on three primary factors: the extent of international expansion, type of strategy (global, multidomestic, or transnational), and degree of product diversity.7

Some firms may find it advantageous to diversify into several product lines rather than focus their efforts on strengthening distributor and supplier relationships through vertical integration. They would organize themselves according to product lines by implementing a divisional structure. Also, some firms may choose to move into unrelated product areas, typically by acquiring existing businesses. Frequently, their rationale is that acquiring assets

EXHIBIT 10.1 Dominant Growth Patterns of Large Corporations

Holding Company Structure

Growth in revenues and employees

Vertical integration

Diversification into related products and markets

Diversification into unrelated areas

Strategies leading to new structure

Dominant growth path for U.S. firms

Increase relatedness of products and markets

Increase relatedness of products and markets

Related diversification

Related diversification International

expansion International expansion

International expansion

Simple Structure

Functional Structure

Divisional Structure

International Structures

Worldwide Holding Company Structure

Worldwide Functional Structure

Functional Structure

Source: Adapted from J.R. Galbraith and R.K. Kazanjian, Strategy Implementation: Structure, Systems and Process 2nd ed., 1986, St. Paul, MN: West Publishing Company.

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and competencies is more economical or expedient than developing them internally. Such an unrelated, or conglomerate, strategy requires relatively little integration across businesses and sharing of resources. Thus, a holding company structure becomes appropriate. There are many other growth patterns, but these are the most common.*

Now we will discuss some of the most common types of organizational structures—simple, functional, divisional (including two variants: strategic business unit and holding company), and matrix—and their advantages and disadvantages. We will close the section with a discussion of the structural implications when a firm expands its operations into international markets.8

Simple Structure The simple organizational structure is the oldest, and most common, organizational form. Most organizations are very small and have a single or very narrow product line in which the owner-manager (or top executive) makes most of the decisions. The owner-manager con- trols all activities, and the staff serves as an extension of the top executive.

Advantages The simple structure is highly informal, and the coordination of tasks is accom- plished by direct supervision. Characteristics of this structure include highly centralized deci- sion making, little specialization of tasks, few rules and regulations, and an informal evaluation and reward system. Although the owner-manager is intimately involved in almost all phases of the business, a manager is often employed to oversee day-to-day operations.

Disadvantages A simple structure may foster creativity and individualism since there are generally few rules and regulations. However, such “informality” may lead to problems. Employees may not clearly understand their responsibilities, which can lead to conflict and confusion. Employees may take advantage of the lack of regulations and act in their own self-interest, which can erode motivation and satisfaction and lead to the possible misuse of organizational resources. Small organizations have flat structures that limit opportunities for upward mobility. Without the potential for future advancement, recruiting and retaining talent may become very difficult.

Functional Structure When an organization is small (15 or fewer employees), it is not necessary to have a variety of formal arrangements and groupings of activities. However, as firms grow, excessive demands may be placed on the owner-manager in order to obtain and process all of the information necessary to run the business. Chances are the owner will not be skilled in all specialties (e.g., accounting, engineering, production, marketing). Thus, he or she will need to hire special- ists in the various functional areas. Such growth in the overall scope and complexity of the business necessitates a functional organizational structure wherein the major functions of the firm are grouped internally. The coordination and integration of the functional areas become among the most important responsibilities of the chief executive of the firm (see Exhibit 10.2).

Functional structures are generally found in organizations in which there is a single or closely related product or service, high production volume, and some vertical integration. Initially, firms tend to expand the overall scope of their operations by penetrating existing markets, introducing similar products in additional markets, or increasing the level of verti- cal integration. Such expansion activities clearly increase the scope and complexity of the

* The lowering of transaction costs and globalization have led to some changes in the common historical patterns that we have discussed. Some firms are, in effect, bypassing the vertical integration stage. Instead, they focus on core competencies and outsource other value-creation activities. Also, even relatively young firms are going global early in their history because of lower communication and transportation costs. For an interesting perspective on global start-ups, see McDougall, P. P. & Oviatt, B. M. 1996. New Venture Internationalization, Strategic Change and Performance: A Follow-Up Study. Journal of Business Venturing, 11: 23–40; and McDougall, P. P. & Oviatt, B. M. (Eds.). 2000. The Special Research Forum on International Entrepreneurship. Academy of Management Journal, October: 902–1003.

LO 10-2 Each of the traditional types of organizational structure: simple, functional, divisional, and matrix.

simple organizational structure an organizational form in which the owner- manager makes most of the decisions and controls activities, and the staff serves as an extension of the top executive.

functional organizational structure an organizational form in which the major functions of the firm, such as production, marketing, R&D, and accounting, are grouped internally.

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operations. The functional structure provides for a high level of centralization that helps to ensure integration and control over the related product-market activities or multiple pri- mary activities (from inbound logistics to operations to marketing, sales, and service) in the value chain (addressed in Chapters 3 and 4).

Advantages By bringing together specialists into functional departments, a firm is able to enhance its coordination and control within each of the functional areas. Decision making in the firm will be centralized at the top of the organization. This enhances the organizational-level (as opposed to functional area) perspective across the various functions in the organization. In addition, the functional structure provides for a more efficient use of managerial and technical talent since functional area expertise is pooled in a single depart- ment (e.g., marketing) instead of being spread across a variety of product-market areas. Finally, career paths and professional development in specialized areas are facilitated.

Disadvantages The differences in values and orientations among functional areas may impede communication and coordination. Edgar Schein of MIT has argued that shared assumptions, often based on similar backgrounds and experiences of members, form around functional units in an organization. This leads to what are often called “stove pipes” or “silos,” in which departments view themselves as isolated, self-contained units with little need for interaction and coordination with other departments. This erodes communication because functional groups may have not only different goals but also differing meanings of words and concepts. According to Schein:

The word “marketing” will mean product development to the engineer, studying customers through market research to the product manager, merchandising to the salesperson, and constant change in design to the manufacturing manager. When they try to work together, they will often attribute disagreements to personalities and fail to notice the deeper, shared assumptions that color how each function thinks.9

Such narrow functional orientations also may lead to short-term thinking based largely upon what is best for the functional area, not the entire organization. In a manufacturing firm, sales may want to offer a wide range of customized products to appeal to the firm’s customers; R&D may overdesign products and components to achieve technical elegance; and manufacturing may favor no-frills products that can be produced at low cost by means of long production runs. Functional structures may overburden the top executives in the firm because conflicts have a tendency to be “pushed up” to the top of the organization since there are no managers who are responsible for the specific product lines. Functional structures make it difficult to establish uniform performance standards across the entire organization. It may be relatively easy to evaluate production managers on the basis of pro- duction volume and cost control, but establishing performance measures for engineering, R&D, and accounting becomes more problematic.

EXHIBIT 10.2 Functional Organizational Structure

Lower-level managers, specialists, and operating personnel

Manager Accounting

Manager Engineering

Manager Marketing

Manager R&D

Manager Personnel

Chief Executive Officer or President

Manager Production

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Divisional Structure The divisional organizational structure (sometimes called the multidivisional structure or M-Form) is organized around products, projects, or markets. Each of the divisions, in turn, includes its own functional specialists who are typically organized into departments.10 A divisional structure encompasses a set of relatively autonomous units governed by a central corporate office. The operating divisions are relatively independent and consist of products and services that are different from those of the other divisions.11 Operational decision making in a large business places excessive demands on the firm’s top management. In order to attend to broader, longer-term organizational issues, top-level managers must delegate decision mak- ing to lower-level managers. Divisional executives play a key role: They help to determine the product-market and financial objectives for the division as well as their division’s contribution to overall corporate performance.12 The rewards are based largely on measures of financial performance such as net income and revenue. Exhibit 10.3 illustrates a divisional structure.

General Motors was among the earliest firms to adopt the divisional organizational structure.13 In the 1920s the company formed five major product divisions (Cadillac, Buick, Oldsmobile, Pontiac, and Chevrolet) as well as several industrial divisions. Since then, many firms have discovered that as they diversified into new product-market activities, functional structures—with their emphasis on single functional departments—were unable to manage the increased complexity of the entire business.

Advantages By creating separate divisions to manage individual product markets, there is a separation of strategic and operating control. Divisional managers can focus their efforts on improving operations in the product markets for which they are responsible, and cor- porate officers can devote their time to overall strategic issues for the entire corporation. The focus on a division’s products and markets—by the divisional executives—provides the corporation with an enhanced ability to respond quickly to important changes. Since there are functional departments within each division of the corporation, the problems associ- ated with sharing resources across functional departments are minimized. Because there are multiple levels of general managers (executives responsible for integrating and coordinating all functional areas), the development of general management talent is enhanced.

divisional organizational structure an organizational form in which products, projects, or product markets are grouped internally.

EXHIBIT 10.3 Divisional Organizational Structure

Chief Executive Officer or President

Corporate Staff

Division A General Manager

Organized similarly to Division A

Organized similarly to Division A

Division C General Manager

Division B General Manager

Lower-level managers, specialists, and operating personnel

Manager Accounting

Manager Engineering

Manager Marketing

Manager R&D

Manager Personnel

Manager Production

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10.1 STRATEGY SPOTLIGHT WHOLE FOODS CENTRALIZES TO IMPROVE EFFICIENCY Whole Foods is making a major change to its structure. Historically, Whole Foods has used a decentralized, regional division structure. This structure, with its 12 semi-autonomous regional divisions, has allowed the firm to be responsive to the needs of customers in each of these regions. Differences across the regions included store layout, the products carried in the stores, and the methods for scheduling workers. However, the firm found this decentralized structure was inefficient and left it vulnerable to competitive attacks by Kroger and Costco, firms that enhanced their organic food portfolio at a lower cost point than Whole Foods. This led to a more than 50 percent drop in Whole Foods’ stock price from late 2013 to early 2017.

Whole Foods has responded by centralizing key activities, most notably the firm’s purchasing function. This will allow the firm to have one point of purchase with major suppliers, giving it stronger bargaining power since suppliers will be working

with one large buyer rather than eleven smaller buyers. It is also developing centralized, automated information systems to sim- plify and standardize both staff and shelf replenishment schedul- ing. The firm is also eliminating over 2,000 jobs as part of this restructuring effort.

While this change promises significant efficiency gains, it doesn’t come without risks. These changes may harm the firm’s reputation as it replaces local products with nationally sourced products. As Jim Hertel, Senior Vice President of the retail con- sulting firm Willard Bishop stated, “The battle that always gets waged is cost relative to localized consumer preferences. Whole Foods must take care not to damage the reputation for being a top-quality location for regional products.” Whole Foods’ Global Vice President of Purchasing, Don Clark, is confident the change will not hurt the firm’s core identity as “America’s Healthiest Grocery Store” or its relationship with its customers. Source: Brat, I. 2016. Whole Foods works to reduce cost and boost clout with suppliers. wsj.com. February 16: np; and, Anonymous. 2016. Whole Foods outlines move from regional to centralized buying. specialtyfoods.com. April 6: np.

Disadvantages It can be very expensive; there can be increased costs due to the duplication of personnel, operations, and investment since each division must staff multiple functional departments. There also can be dysfunctional competition among divisions since each divi- sion tends to become concerned solely about its own operations. Divisional managers are often evaluated on common measures such as return on assets and sales growth. If goals are conflicting, there can be a sense of a “zero-sum” game that would discourage sharing ideas and resources among the divisions for the common good of the corporation. In sum, divisional structures, by design, divide people, resources, and knowledge. They insulate divi- sional managers from other divisional managers, inhibiting their ability to coordinate activi- ties, share resources, and learn from each other.

With many divisions providing different products and services, there is the chance that differences in image and quality may occur across divisions. One division may offer no- frills products of lower quality that may erode the brand reputation of another division that has top-quality, highly differentiated offerings. Since each division is evaluated in terms of financial measures such as return on investment and revenue growth, there is often an urge to focus on short-term performance. If corporate management uses quarterly profits as the key performance indicator, divisional management may tend to put significant emphasis on “making the numbers” and minimizing activities, such as advertising, maintenance, and capital investments, which would detract from short-term performance measures. Strategy Spotlight 10.1 discusses how Whole Foods is trying to overcome some of the limitations of a divisional structure by centralizing key activities.

We’ll discuss two variations of the divisional form: the strategic business unit (SBU) and holding company structures.

Strategic Business Unit (SBU) Structure Highly diversified corporations such as ConAgra, a $13 billion food producer, may consist of dozens of different divisions.14 If ConAgra were to use a purely divisional structure, it would be nearly impossible for the corporate office to plan and coordinate activities, because the span of control would be too large. To attain

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synergies, ConAgra has put its diverse businesses into three primary SBUs: food service (restaurants), retail (grocery stores), and agricultural products.

With an SBU structure, divisions with similar products, markets, and/or technologies are grouped into homogeneous units to achieve some synergies. These include those discussed in Chapter 6 for related diversification, such as leveraging core competencies, sharing infrastruc- tures, and market power. Generally the more related businesses are within a corporation, the fewer SBUs will be required. Each of the SBUs in the corporation operates as a profit center.

Advantages The SBU structure makes the task of planning and control by the corporate office more manageable. Also, with greater decentralization of authority, individual busi- nesses can react more quickly to important changes in the environment than if all divisions had to report directly to the corporate office.

Disadvantages Since the divisions are grouped into SBUs, it may become difficult to achieve synergies across SBUs. If divisions in different SBUs have potential sources of synergy, it may become difficult for them to be realized. The additional level of management increases the number of personnel and overhead expenses, while the additional hierarchical level removes the corporate office further from the individual divisions. The corporate office may become unaware of key developments that could have a major impact on the corporation.

Holding Company Structure The holding company structure (sometimes referred to as a conglomerate) is also a variation of the divisional structure. Whereas the SBU structure is often used when similarities exist between the individual businesses (or divisions), the hold- ing company structure is appropriate when the businesses in a corporation’s portfolio do not have much in common. Thus, the potential for synergies is limited.

Holding company structures are most appropriate for firms with a strategy of unrelated diversification. Companies such as Berkshire Hathaway and Loews use a holding company structure to implement their unrelated diversification strategies. Since there are few similari- ties across the businesses, the corporate offices in these companies provide a great deal of autonomy to operating divisions and rely on financial controls and incentive programs to obtain high levels of performance from the individual businesses. Corporate staffs at these firms tend to be small because of their limited involvement in the overall operation of their various businesses.15

Advantages The holding company structure has the cost savings associated with fewer per- sonnel and the lower overhead resulting from a small corporate office and fewer hierarchi- cal levels. The autonomy of the holding company structure increases the motivational level of divisional executives and enables them to respond quickly to market opportunities and threats.

Disadvantages There is an inherent lack of control and dependence that corporate-level executives have on divisional executives. Major problems could arise if key divisional execu- tives leave the firm, because the corporate office has very little “bench strength”—additional managerial talent ready to quickly fill key positions. If problems arise in a division, it may become very difficult to turn around individual businesses because of limited staff support in the corporate office.

Strategy Spotlight 10.2 discusses the prominent position of conglomerate firms in Asian countries.

Matrix Structure One approach that tries to overcome the inadequacies inherent in the other structures is the matrix organizational structure. It is a combination of the functional and divisional structures.

strategic business unit (SBU) structure an organizational form in which products, projects, or product-market divisions are grouped into homogeneous units.

holding company structure an organizational form that is a variation of the divisional organizational structure in which the divisions have a high degree of autonomy both from other divisions and from corporate headquarters.

matrix organizational structure an organizational form in which there are multiple lines of authority and some individuals report to at least two managers.

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10.2 STRATEGY SPOTLIGHT WHERE CONGLOMERATES PROSPER While conglomerates were numerous and well regarded in the United States and Western Europe in the 1960s and 1970s, firms that compete in a wide range of unrelated industries now are seen as being unfocused and unlikely to succeed. As a result, there are only about two dozen conglomerates still in existence in the United States and Europe.

The situation is quite different in much of the rest of the world, especially in Asia. For example, 45 of the largest 50 companies in India belong to a conglomerate business group. In South Korea, it is 40 of the largest 50. Additionally, in India, companies that belong to a conglomerate business group, on average, have outper- formed independent companies. They also grow more rapidly than independent firms in their markets. For example, Indian conglom- erates grew by more than 20 percent a year in the 2004 to 2013 period. Why is this the case? Some have argued that conglomerate business groups have thrived in developing markets because the social ties within conglomerate business groups serve as a sub- stitute for weak governmental regulation and legal systems. The tightness of the group leads to social pressures that keep com- panies in line, and the head ownership group can settle disputes between companies. But these conglomerate groups have contin- ued to grow even as the government and legal systems in these countries have modernized and become more westernized.

A second explanation is that the business groups in these coun- tries are structured in a way that offers the benefits of being in a business with a vast range of competencies without some of the costs found in conglomerates in the United States, Canada, and Western Europe. A key difference is that while a conglomerate that is based in the United States, Canada, or Western Europe is a single corporation with a wide set of wholly owned subsidiaries, a con- glomerate in Asia is actually made up of a set of legally separate corporations. Each of these corporations has its own board of direc- tors and shareholders, but it is tied to the conglomerate since one of its major owners also owns part of the other corporations in the conglomerate. For example, the Tata group in India is comprised of over 100 separate companies. This type of structure allows the companies to have a degree of independence but also the benefits of size and power. This hybrid structure has a number of benefits.

• Superior decision making. The top managers of the affiliated firms have a great deal of autonomy to make decisions—meaning that key strategic decisions are made by managers who are close to the market. Thus, decisions can be quick and based on local market knowledge. In

U.S. conglomerates, subsidiary managers typically have much less autonomy and have to get the approval of the corporate office.

• Access to financial resources. When affiliated units in business groups need financial capital to fund strategic investments, they can use funds within their own company, look to the central business group to provide funding, or look to outside investors to raise funds. Thus, they have great flexibility in raising capital. In contrast, the corporate offices of U.S. conglomerates typically accumulate financial resources and then allocate these funds to the business units. As a result, there is less funding available since units can’t look to outside investors, and the process for allocating capital often becomes very political.

• More effective managerial incentives. Since the affiliated units are independent firms, the firm is able to set up evaluation and reward systems for managers that are tailored to the firm’s distinctive needs and market position. In contrast, in U.S. conglomerates, the firms typically set up evaluation and rewards systems that are consistent across all of its units.

• Resources and guidance from the group center. These affiliated firms also have advantages over independent firms in their own market. These business groups have a center group that can provide strategic insight to the affiliated businesses. The center group will search for long- term business opportunities associated with emerging technologies or market changes and bring promising ideas to the affiliated businesses. This frees up the affiliated businesses to focus on current activities and allow the center group to do the longer term visioning. The center group is also responsible for linking together different businesses when cross-business opportunities arise. Finally, the center group ensures that all of the activities in the businesses align with the identity of the overall group. As a result, each of the businesses benefits from the strong and consistent image associated with the overall business group.

It is unclear if these conglomerates will continue to thrive in these markets, but their ability to sustain their dominance to date and their success in regularly moving into new markets suggest that they will continue to be major players for the foreseeable future.

Source: Hirt, M., Smit, S., and Yoo, W. 2013. Understanding Asia’s conglomerates. mckinsey.com. February: np; and, Ramachandran, J., Manikandan, K., and Pant, A. 2013. Why conglomerates thrive. Harvard Business Review. 91(2): 110– 119.

Most commonly, functional departments are combined with product groups on a project basis. For example, a product group may want to develop a new addition to its line; for this project, it obtains personnel from functional departments such as marketing, production, and engineer- ing. These personnel work under the manager of the product group for the duration of the project, which can vary from a few weeks to an open-ended period of time. The individuals

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EXHIBIT 10.4 Matrix Organizational Structure

Manager Public Relations

Manager Manufacturing

Manager Engineering

Manager Marketing

Manager Projects

Project A

Project B

Project C

Project D

Chief Executive Officer or President

Manager Administration

and Human Resources

Corporate Staff

who work in a matrix organization become responsible to two managers: the project manager and the manager of their functional area. Exhibit 10.4 illustrates a matrix structure.

Some large multinational corporations rely on a matrix structure to combine product groups and geographic units. Product managers have global responsibility for the devel- opment, manufacturing, and distribution of their own line, while managers of geographic regions have responsibility for the profitability of the businesses in their regions. Vodafone, the wireless service provider, utilizes this type of structure.

Other organizations, such as Cisco, use a matrix structure to try to maintain flexibility. In these firms, individual workers have a permanent functional home but also are assigned to and work within temporary project teams.16

Advantages The matrix structure facilitates the use of specialized personnel, equipment, and facilities. Instead of duplicating functions, as would be the case in a divisional structure based on products, the resources are shared. Individuals with high expertise can divide their time among multiple projects. Such resource sharing and collaboration enable a firm to use resources more efficiently and to respond more quickly and effectively to changes in the competitive environ- ment. The flexibility inherent in a matrix structure provides professionals with a broader range of responsibility. Such experience enables them to develop their skills and competencies.

Disadvantages The dual-reporting structures can result in uncertainty and lead to intense power struggles and conflict over the allocation of personnel and other resources. Working relationships become more complicated. This may result in excessive reliance on group processes and teamwork, along with a diffusion of responsibility, which in turn may erode timely decision making.

Exhibit 10.5 briefly summarizes the advantages and disadvantages of the functional, divi- sional, and matrix organizational structures.

International Operations: Implications for Organizational Structure Today’s managers must maintain an international outlook on their firm’s businesses and competitive strategies. In the global marketplace, managers must ensure consistency between

LO 10-3 The implications of a firm’s international operations for organizational structure.

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Functional Structure

Advantages Disadvantages

• Pooling of specialists enhances coordination and control. • Differences in functional area orientation impede communication and coordination.

• Centralized decision making enhances an organizational perspective across functions.

• Tendency for specialists to develop short-term perspective and narrow functional orientation.

• Efficient use of managerial and technical talent. • Functional area conflicts may overburden top-level decision makers.

• Facilitates career paths and professional development in specialized areas.

• Difficult to establish uniform performance standards.

Divisional Structure

Advantages Disadvantages

• Increases strategic and operational control, permitting corporate-level executives to address strategic issues.

• Increased costs incurred through duplication of personnel, operations, and investment.

• Quick response to environmental changes. • Dysfunctional competition among divisions may detract from overall corporate performance.

• Increases focus on products and markets. • Difficult to maintain uniform corporate image.

• Minimizes problems associated with sharing resources across functional areas.

• Overemphasis on short-term performance.

• Facilitates development of general managers.  

Matrix Structure

Advantages Disadvantages

• Increases market responsiveness through collaboration and synergies among professional colleagues.

• Dual-reporting relationships can result in uncertainty regarding accountability.

• Allows more efficient utilization of resources. • Intense power struggles may lead to increased levels of conflict.

• Improves flexibility, coordination, and communication. • Working relationships may be more complicated and human resources duplicated.

• Increases professional development through a broader range of responsibility.

• Excessive reliance on group processes and teamwork may impede timely decision making.

EXHIBIT 10.5 Functional, Divisional, and Matrix Organizational Structures: Advantages and Disadvantages

their strategies (at the business, corporate, and international levels) and the structure of their organization. As firms expand into foreign markets, they generally follow a pattern of change in structure that parallels the changes in their strategies.17 Three major contingencies that influence the chosen structure are (1) the type of strategy that is driving a firm’s foreign opera- tions, (2) product diversity, and (3) the extent to which a firm is dependent on foreign sales.18

As international operations become an important part of a firm’s overall operations, managers must make changes that are consistent with their firm’s structure. The primary types of structures used to manage a firm’s international operations are:19

• International division • Geographic-area division • Worldwide functional • Worldwide product division • Worldwide matrix

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Multidomestic strategies are driven by political and cultural imperatives requiring manag- ers within each country to respond to local conditions. The structures consistent with such a strategic orientation are the international division and geographic-area division structures. Here, local managers are provided with a high level of autonomy to manage their operations within the constraints and demands of their geographic market. As a firm’s foreign sales increase as a percentage of its total sales, it will likely change from an international division to a geographic-area division structure. And, as a firm’s product and/or market diversity becomes large, it is likely to benefit from a worldwide matrix structure.

Global strategies are driven by economic pressures that require managers to view opera- tions in different geographic areas to be managed for overall efficiency. The structures con- sistent with the efficiency perspective are the worldwide functional and worldwide product division structures. Here, division managers view the marketplace as homogeneous and devote relatively little attention to local market, political, and economic factors. The choice between these two types of structures is guided largely by the extent of product diversity. Firms with relatively low levels of product diversity may opt for a worldwide product divi- sion structure. However, if significant product-market diversity results from highly unrelated international acquisitions, a worldwide holding company structure should be implemented. Such firms have very little commonality among products, markets, or technologies and have little need for integration.

Global Start-Ups: A Recent Phenomenon International expansion occurs rather late for most corporations, typically after possibilities of domestic growth are exhausted. Increasingly, we are seeing two interrelated phenomena. First, many firms now expand internationally relatively early in their history. Second, some firms are “born global”—that is, from the very beginning, many start-ups are global in their activities. For example, Logitech International, a leading producer of personal computer accessories, was global from day one. Founded in 1982 by a Swiss national and two Italians, the company was headquartered in both California and Switzerland. R&D and manufactur- ing were also conducted in both locations and, subsequently, in Taiwan and Ireland.20

The success of companies such as Logitech challenges the conventional wisdom that a company must first build up assets, internal processes, and experience before venturing into faraway lands. It also raises a number of questions: What exactly is a global start-up? Under what conditions should a company start out as a global start-up? What does it take to suc- ceed as a global start-up?

A global start-up has been defined as a business organization that, from inception, seeks to derive significant competitive advantage from the use of resources and the sale of outputs in multiple countries. Right from the beginning, it uses inputs from around the world and sells its products and services to customers around the world. Geographic boundaries of nation-states are irrelevant for a global start-up.

There is no reason for every start-up to be global. Being global necessarily involves higher communication, coordination, and transportation costs. Therefore, it is important to iden- tify the circumstances under which going global from the beginning is advantageous.21 First, if the required human resources are globally dispersed, going global may be the best way to access those resources. For example, Italians are masters in fine leather and Swedes in ergonomics. Second, in many cases foreign financing may be easier to obtain and more suit- able. Traditionally, U.S. venture capitalists have shown greater willingness to bear risk, but they have shorter time horizons in their expectations for return. If a U.S. start-up is looking for patient capital, it may be better off looking overseas. Third, the target customers in many specialized industries are located in other parts of the world. Fourth, in many industries a gradual move from domestic markets to foreign markets is no longer possible because, if a product is successful, foreign competitors may immediately imitate it. Therefore, preemp- tive entry into foreign markets may be the only option. Finally, because of high up-front

international division structure an organizational form in which international operations are in a separate, autonomous division. Most domestic operations are kept in other parts of the organization.

geographic-area division structure a type of divisional organizational structure in which operations in geographic regions are grouped internally.

worldwide matrix structure a type of matrix organizational structure that has one line of authority for geographic- area divisions and another line of authority for worldwide product divisions.

worldwide functional structure a functional structure in which all departments have worldwide reponsibilities.

worldwide product division structure a product division structure in which all divisions have worldwide responsibilities.

global start-up a business organization that, from inception, seeks to derive significant advantage from the use of resources and the sale of outputs in multiple countries.

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development costs, a global market is often necessary to recover the costs. This is par- ticularly true for start-ups from smaller nations that do not have access to large domestic markets.

Successful management of a global start-up presents many challenges. Communication and coordination across time zones and cultures are always problematic. Since most global start-ups have far less resources than well-established corporations, one key for success is to internalize few activities and outsource the rest. Managers of such firms must have con- siderable prior international experience so that they can successfully handle the inevitable communication problems and cultural conflicts. Another key for success is to keep the communication and coordination costs low. The only way to achieve this is by creating less costly administrative mechanisms. The boundaryless organizational designs that we discuss in the next section are particularly suitable for global start-ups because of their flexibility and low cost.

Strategy Spotlight 10.3 discusses a Kenyan technology start-up with a global vision and scope of operations.

How an Organization’s Structure Can Influence Strategy Formulation Discussions of the relationship between strategy and structure usually strongly imply that structure follows strategy. The strategy that a firm chooses (e.g., related diversification) dic- tates such structural elements as the division of tasks, the need for integration of activities, and authority relationships within the organization. However, an existing structure can influ- ence strategy formulation. Once a firm’s structure is in place, it is very difficult and expensive

10.3 STRATEGY SPOTLIGHT GLOBAL START-UP, BRCK, WORKS TO BRING RELIABLE INTERNET CONNECTIVITY TO THE WORLD BRCK is a notable technology pioneer. It’s bringing a novel and potentially very valuable product to market, and it is doing so as a truly global start-up. BRCK’s first product is a surge- resistant, battery-powered router to provide Internet service, which the firm is simply calling the BRCK. In many parts of the world, power systems are unreliable and offer only intermittent service. Additionally, they are prone to generate power surges that can fry many electronic products, including Internet rout- ers. For example, in 2013, a single power-surge event in Nairobi, Kenya, blew out more than 3,000 routers. BRCK has developed a product to address these issues. Its router has a built-in battery that charges up whenever the power grid is operating and that runs off the battery for up to eight hours when the power grid goes down. It can also handle power surges up to 400 volts. The BRCK is also flexible as to how it connects to the Internet. It can connect directly to an ethernet line, can link up with a Wi-Fi network in its area, and can con- nect via a wireless phone connection. BRCK is aiming to sell its product to small and medium-size businesses, schools, and medical facilities. Its routers allow up to 20 users to simulta- neously connect to the Internet. The technologies it uses are

not cutting-edge, but the end product itself is innovative and meets a market need.

What really sets BRCK apart is that it is a global start-up that turns the table on typical global structures. Most tech-oriented global firms design their products in a technology center in the developed world and manufacture the products in a developing country. BRCK has flipped this model. BRCK designs its products in a developing country and manufactures in a developed coun- try. Its corporate headquarters are in Nairobi, Kenya, at a technol- ogy center that houses a small group of entrepreneurs. The firm employs a dozen engineers to design its products in its corporate headquarters, and while its offices look a bit like those in Silicon Valley, the building has backup power for times when the Kenyan power grid inevitably goes down. The firm sources most of the components for its routers from Asia and manufactures its prod- ucts in Austin, Texas. Even its sales are also going global right from the start. As of 2016, the firm had sold BRCKs to customers in 50 countries. The firm has also gotten global acclaim, including winning Fast Company’s 2016 Innovation by Design Award, the Global SME Award at the 2016 ITU Global Telecom Conference, and a finalist award at the 2016 African Entrepreneurship Awards.

Sources: Cary, J. 2014. Made in Kenya, assembled in America: This Internet- anywhere company innovates from silicon savannah. fastcoexist.com, September 4: np; Vogt, H. 2014. Made in Africa: A gadget startup. wsj.com, July 10: np; and Hersman, E. 2017. The year at BRCK. brck.com. January 2: np.

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to change.22 Executives may not be able to modify their duties and responsibilities greatly or may not welcome the disruption associated with a transfer to a new location. There are costs associated with hiring, training, and replacing executive, managerial, and operating person- nel. Strategy cannot be formulated without considering structural elements.

An organization’s structure can also have an important influence on how it competes in the marketplace. It can also strongly influence a firm’s strategy, day-to-day operations, and performance.23

BOUNDARYLESS ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNS The term boundaryless may bring to mind a chaotic organizational reality in which “any- thing goes.” This is not the case. As Jack Welch, GE’s former CEO, has suggested, bound- aryless does not imply that all internal and external boundaries vanish completely, but that they become more open and permeable.24 We are not suggesting that boundaryless organizational designs replace the traditional forms of organizational structure, but they should complement them.

We will discuss three approaches to making boundaries more permeable that help to facilitate the widespread sharing of knowledge and information across both the internal and external boundaries of the organization. The barrier-free type involves making all orga- nizational boundaries—internal and external—more permeable. Teams are a central building block for implementing the boundaryless organization. The modular and virtual types of organizations focus on the need to create seamless relationships with external organizations such as customers or suppliers. While the modular type emphasizes the outsourcing of noncore activities, the virtual (or network) organization focuses on alliances among inde- pendent entities formed to exploit specific market opportunities.

The Barrier-Free Organization The “boundary” mind-set is ingrained deeply into bureaucracies. It is evidenced by such clichés as “That’s not my job” and “I’m here from corporate to help” or by endless battles over transfer pricing. In the traditional company, boundaries are clearly delineated in the design of an organization’s structure. Their basic advantage is that the roles of managers and employees are simple, clear, well defined, and long lived. A major shortcoming was pointed out to the authors during an interview with a high-tech executive: “Structure tends to be divisive; it leads to territorial fights.”

Such structures are being replaced by fluid, ambiguous, and deliberately ill-defined tasks and roles. Just because work roles are no longer clearly defined, however, does not mean that differences in skills, authority, and talent disappear. A barrier-free organization enables a firm to bridge real differences in culture, function, and goals to find common ground that facilitates information sharing and other forms of cooperative behavior. Eliminating the multiple boundaries that stifle productivity and innovation can enhance the potential of the entire organization.

Creating Permeable Internal Boundaries For barrier-free organizations to work effectively, the level of trust and shared interests among all parts of the organization must be raised.25 The organization needs to develop among its employees the skill level needed to work in a more democratic organization. Barrier-free organizations also require a shift in the organi- zation’s philosophy from executive to organizational development and from investments in high-potential individuals to investments in leveraging the talents of all individuals.

Teams can be an important aspect of barrier-free structures.26 Jeffrey Pfeffer, author of several insightful books, including The Human Equation, suggests that teams have three primary advantages.27 First, teams substitute peer-based control for hierarchical control of work activities. Employees control themselves, reducing the time and energy management

LO 10-4 The different types of boundaryless organizations—barrier- free, modular, and virtual—and their relative advantages and disadvantages.

boundaryless organizational designs organizations in which the boundaries, including vertical, horizontal, external, and geographic boundaries, are permeable.

barrier-free organization an organizational design in which firms bridge real differences in culture, function, and goals to find common ground that facilitates information sharing and other forms of cooperative behavior.

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needs to devote to control. Second, teams frequently develop more creative solutions to problems because they encourage the sharing of the tacit knowledge held by individuals.28 Brainstorming, or group problem solving, involves the pooling of ideas and expertise to enhance the chances that at least one group member will think of a way to solve the prob- lems at hand. Third, by substituting peer control for hierarchical control, teams permit the removal of layers of hierarchy and absorption of administrative tasks previously performed by specialists. This avoids the costs of having people whose sole job is to watch the people who watch other people do the work. Novartis, the Swiss pharmaceutical giant, is lever- aging the power of teams by consolidating its R&D activities in four locations. Novartis believes that grouping together and teaming up researchers from different disciplines into self-managed work teams will foster creativity and cooperation.29

Some have argued for the need to move more radically to discard formal hierarchical structures and work toward a more democratic team organizational structure.30 One version of such systems is called a “holacracy.” In a holacracy, there is no formal organizational structure in the traditional sense. Instead, employees self-identify into roles, undertaking the types of tasks that they are highly skilled at and interested in. Most employees will have multiple roles. Employees then group together into self-organized teams—or, in the terminol- ogy of holacracy, circles—in which they work together to complete tasks, such as circles for service delivery or product development. Since individual employees have multiple roles, they typically belong to multiple circles. This overlapping membership facilitates communi- cation and coordination between circles. The circles within a firm change over time to meet the evolving situation of the firm. Each circle elects a lead, called a “lead link.” This lead link guides meetings and sets the general agenda for the circle, although the members of the circle decide democratically on how the circle will complete tasks. The lead link also serves as a member of a higher-level circle. Overseeing it all is the general company circle, a collec- tion of lead links who serve as the leadership team for the firm.

Most firms that have moved to a holacracy way of organizing are small technology firms. These firms see little need for hierarchical authority, and they are attracted to the promises of improved agility and creativity, as well as higher employee morale, with this flexible, autonomous type of structure. However, in 2014, Zappos decided to transition its entire 1,500 employees to a holacracy structure. The new structure initially consisted of 250 cir- cles, and it may grow to 400 circles as the new system gets fully implemented. Tony Hsieh, who was Zappos’ CEO and is now lead link of the Experiential SWAT Team, says he wants “Zappos to function more like a city and less like a top-down bureaucratic organization.” In making this change, Zappos is serving as a natural experiment to see if a larger firm can operate as a holacracy.

Developing Effective Relationships with External Constituencies In barrier-free organiza- tions, managers must also create flexible, porous organizational boundaries and establish communication flows and mutually beneficial relationships with internal (e.g., employees) and external (e.g., customers) constituencies.31 IBM has worked to develop a long-standing cooperative relationship with the Mayo Clinic. The clinic is a customer but more impor- tantly a research partner. IBM has placed staff at the Mayo Clinic, and the two organizations have worked together on technology for the early identification of aneurysms, the mining of data in electronic health records to develop customized treatment plans for patients, and other medical issues.32

Barrier-free organizations create successful relationships between both internal and external constituencies, but there is one additional constituency—competitors—with whom some organizations have benefited as they developed cooperative relationships. For exam- ple, Coca-Cola and PepsiCo, often argued to be the most intense rivals in business, work together to develop new, environmentally conscious refrigerants for use in their vending machines.33

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10.4 ENVIRONMENTAL SUSTAINABILITYSTRATEGY SPOTLIGHT THE BUSINESS ROUNDTABLE: A FORUM FOR SHARING BEST ENVIRONMENTAL SUSTAINABILITY PRACTICES The Business Roundtable is a group of chief executive offi- cers of major U.S. corporations that was created to promote pro-business public policy. It was formed in 1972 through the merger of three existing organizations: The March Group, the Construction Users Anti-Inflation Roundtable, and the Labor Law Study Committee. The group was called President Obama’s “closest ally in the business community.”

The Business Roundtable became the first broad-based busi- ness group to agree on the need to address climate change through collective action, and it remains committed to limiting greenhouse gas emissions and setting the United States on a more sustainable path. The organization considers that threats to water quality and quantity, rising greenhouse gas emissions, and the risk of climate change—along with increasing energy prices and growing demand—are of great concern.

Its report “Create, Grow, Sustain” provides best practices and metrics from Business Roundtable member companies that rep- resent nearly all sectors of the economy with $6 trillion in annual revenues. CEOs from Walmart, FedEx, PepsiCo, Whirlpool, and Verizon are among the 126 executives from leading U.S. com- panies that shared some of their best sustainability initiatives in this report. These companies are committed to reducing emis- sions, increasing energy efficiency, and developing more sus- tainable business practices.

Let’s look, for example, at some of Walmart’s initiatives. The firm’s CEO, Mike Duke, says it is working with suppliers, partners, and consumers to drive its sustainability program. It has helped establish the Sustainability Consortium to drive metrics for measur- ing the environmental effects of consumer products across their life cycle. The retailer also helped lead the creation of a Sustainable

Product Index to provide product information to consumers about the environmental impact of the products they purchase.

As part of its sustainability efforts, Walmart has completed over 400 renewable energy projects. Combined, these efforts have resulted in more than 1 billion kilowatt-hours of renewable energy production each year, enough power to provide the elec- trical needs of 78,000 homes.

Walmart’s renewable energy efforts have focused on three general initiatives:

• It has invested in developing distributed electrical generation systems on its property. As part of this effort, Walmart has installed 105 megawatts of solar panels— enough to power about 20,000 houses—on the roofs of 327 stores and distribution centers. It plans to double this number by 2020.

• Expanding its contracts with suppliers for renewable energy has also been a focus of Walmart. Thus, Walmart bypasses the local utility to go directly to renewable energy suppliers to sign long-term contracts for renewable energy. With long-term contracts, Walmart has found that providers will give it more favorable terms. Walmart also believes that the long-term contracts give suppliers the incentive to invest in their generation systems, increasing the availability of renewable power for other users.

• In regions where going directly to renewable energy suppliers is difficult or impossible, Walmart has engaged the local utilities to increase their investment in renewable energy.

Sources: Helman, C. 2015. How Walmart became a green energy giant, using other people’s money. forbes.com. November 4: np; Anonymous. 2010. Leading CEOs share best sustainability practices. www.environmentalleader.com, April 26: np; Hopkins, M. No date. Sustainable growth. www.businessroundtable, np; Anonymous. 2012. Create, grow, sustain. www.businessroundtable.org, April 18: 120; www.en.wikipedia.org.

By joining and actively participating in the Business Roundtable—an organization con- sisting of CEOs of leading U.S. corporations—Walmart has been able to learn about cutting- edge sustainable initiatives of other major firms. This free flow of information has enabled Walmart to undertake a number of steps that have increased the energy efficiency of its operations. These are described in Strategy Spotlight 10.4.

The Insights from Research box offers evidence on how breaking down internal and external boundaries influences learning.

Risks, Challenges, and Potential Downsides Many firms find that creating and managing a barrier-free organization can be frustrating.34 Puritan-Bennett Corporation, a manufacturer of respiratory equipment, found that its product development time more than doubled after it adopted team management. Roger J. Dolida, director of R&D, attributed this failure to a lack of top management commitment, high turnover among team members, and infrequent meetings. Often, managers trained in rigid hierarchies find it difficult to make the transition to the more democratic, participative style that teamwork requires.

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Overview What company wouldn’t want to improve financial perfor- mance? Research suggests that when employees of innova- tive companies engage in learning activities both inside their companies, such as across functional areas, and outside their companies, such as via strategic alliances, they can achieve the best performance. This is particularly true for businesses operating in transitional economies.

What the Research Shows Businesses are expanding into transitional economies, such as China and India, to capitalize on these large markets. But how can businesses operating in these economies improve their financial performance? Research in Entrepreneurship, Theory, and Practice from scholars at Xi’an Jiaotong University and Old Dominion University provides tips to enhance performance. The researchers conducted a study using face-to-face interviews with 607 top managers in manu- facturing companies in China. They sought to understand how innovative companies with an “entrepreneurial orienta- tion” could realize better performance when their employ- ees learn about technology, markets, customers, and other important information from a range of sources.

In particular, the researchers examined whether it mattered if companies focused learning activities within their organizations—such as sharing information across functional areas or implementing technology to facilitate internal knowledge sharing—or outside the organization— such as studying competitors, learning from government sources, or engaging in strategic alliances with other com- panies. The results demonstrated that, in general:

• Companies with a high entrepreneurial orientation engage in more internal learning activities.

• Companies with a moderate entrepreneurial orientation engage in more external learning activities.

• Companies with a low entrepreneurial orientation engage in little external learning.

• When companies with a high entrepreneurial orientation engaged in more internal learning, performance improved.

• Learning from external sources enhanced financial performance but by a lesser amount than learning from internal sources.

Why This Matters Company leaders have long understood the impor- tance of learning about new markets and entrepreneurial

opportunities. This research suggests that where employees learn can have an impact on firm performance. It is useful for companies to engage in multiple learning sources, includ- ing developing ways to share knowledge internally and from external sources, such as rivals and government entities. However, the results also suggest that when it comes to being more innovative, entrepreneurial, and financially profitable, managers should emphasize internal learning and knowledge sharing among employees.

Generally, this is because knowledge coming from external sources is more available to all industry competi- tors, reducing its value and utility toward achieving a com- petitive advantage. Internal learning, on the other hand, involves members within an organization who combine company-specific knowledge, resources, and intellectual property. This allows the organization to fashion unique and proprietary innovations that are difficult for competi- tors to replicate.

Overall, to achieve the best performance, innovative companies with entrepreneurial drive should balance exter- nal and internal learning activities. Still, relatively more internal learning can generate the best overall performance.

Key Takeaways • Entrepreneurial businesses operating in transition

economies, such as China, can achieve the best performance when engaging in learning activities inside and outside the firm.

• When employees spend more time learning about internal company projects and activities, their companies are more innovative than when they try to learn from competitors in the industry.

• Companies whose employees have an innovative, entrepreneurial spirit and who spend time learning about internal company activities can improve their financial performance.

• Although learning through interactions with competitors or other external sources is valuable, businesses in transition economies can most improve their performance when employee learning is focused on internal company sources.

Research Reviewed Zhao, Y., Ly, Y., Chen, L. 2011. Entrepreneurial orientation, organizational learning, and performance: Evidence from China. Entrepreneurship, Theory and Practice 35: 293–317.

INSIGHTS from Research

WHERE EMPLOYEES LEARN AFFECTS FINANCIAL PERFORMANCE

10.1

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The pros and cons of barrier-free structures are summarized in Exhibit 10.6. Strategy Spotlight 10.5 discusses how Cloudflare balanced the need for management structure and the desire for a barrier-free organization to facilitate growth.

The Modular Organization The modular organization outsources nonvital functions, tapping into the knowledge and expertise of “best in class” suppliers, but retains strategic control. Outsiders may be used to manufacture parts, handle logistics, or perform accounting activities.35 The value chain can be used to identify the key primary and support activities performed by a firm to create value: Which activities do we keep in-house and which activities do we outsource to suppli- ers?36 The organization becomes a central hub surrounded by networks of outside suppliers

modular organization an organization in which nonvital functions are outsourced, using the knowledge and expertise of outside suppliers while retaining strategic control.

Pros Cons

• Leverages the talents of all employees. • Enhances cooperation, coordination, and information sharing

among functions, divisions, SBUs, and external constituencies. • Enables a quicker response to market changes through a single-

goal focus. • Can lead to coordinated win–win initiatives with key suppliers,

customers, and alliance partners.

• Difficult to overcome political and authority boundaries inside and outside the organization.

• Lacks strong leadership and common vision, which can lead to coordination problems.

• Time-consuming and difficult-to-manage democratic processes. • Lacks high levels of trust, which can impede performance.

10.5 STRATEGY SPOTLIGHT CLOUDFLARE SEES THE NEED FOR STRUCTURE Like most Internet startup firms, when CloudFlare was formed in 2009, the firm’s founders proudly and boldly asserted that the firm would build a boundary-free organization with no hierarchy, no formal titles, and no HR function. CEO Matthew Prince wanted his firm to be flexible and focus on individuals being able to craft their own role and feel rewarded and valued in their chosen role. Bureaucracy and hierarchy would stifle those aims. Prince asserted, “Titles serve to differentiate, often in an arbitrary way, which can lead to perceived or actual unfair treatment. Here, you’re judged by your work, not your rank.” He also worried that putting people in formal roles would reduce the firm’s ability to get the right people in the right roles as conditions changed. For example, the person tabbed to head up a small develop- ment team may not be suited to lead a growing venture team that may have 250 people on it. Prince commented that if roles were formalized in this situation, “Either the original person gets demoted, in which case he or she will likely leave, or the new person doesn’t get brought in. Neither is a great outcome.”

But as the firm succeeded and grew, Prince saw increasing difficulties with the boundaryless structure. In mid-2012, five of the firm’s 35 employees quit. Two of the issues at work in these departures were that workers found the lack of a formal report- ing structure and the lack of clarity regarding how a mid-level employee would advance frustrating. When problems arose,

there was no one to turn to resolve the problem, other than pes- tering one of the founders. Also, since there were no formal HR policies, there were no policies regarding planning vacations, responding to departures, or developing expectations about work/life balance issues.

Prince knew things would need to change as the firm got larger. “People want feedback. They want direction. When we double our current staff, we will need more hierarchy and man- agers and processes.” By 2015, he had hired a lead product engineer, an HR administrator, and a talent recruiter. CloudFlare still avoided giving people the title of manager, but it put people in key senior roles. As the sales team grew, the firm instituted formal hierarchical levels. Prince quipped that it actually worked, and that the engineering team noticed the sales team appreci- ated having the hierarchy, commenting, “Hey, they actually look happy and productive. Maybe managers aren’t such a bad thing.”

CloudFlare’s experience shows that too much structure and too much hierarchy can slow things down and constrict informa- tion sharing. However, too little structure can also inhibit the ability to get things done and can demotivate workers. The chal- lenge for CloudFlare and other fast growing firms is to find the right balance in providing enough structure but not so much that the firm becomes bureaucratic.

Sources: Gulati, R., & Desantola, A. 2016. Start-ups that last. hbr.org. March: np; and, Haden, J. 2013. Why there are no job titles at my company. inc.com. October: np.

EXHIBIT 10.6 Pros and Cons of Barrier-Free Structures

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and specialists, and parts can be added or taken away. Both manufacturing and service units may be modular.37

Apparel is an industry in which the modular type has been widely adopted. adidas, for example, does little of its own manufacturing. Instead, it contracts with outside suppliers who run over 1,000 manufacturing plants in over 60 different countries. These production facilities are mostly located in low labor cost countries, including Cambodia, China, Egypt, Pakistan, and Turkey.38 Avoiding large investments in fixed assets helps adidas derive large profits on minor sales increases. Adidas can also keep pace with changing tastes in the marketplace because its suppliers have become expert at rapidly retooling to produce new products.39

In a modular company, outsourcing the noncore functions offers three advantages:

1. A firm can decrease overall costs, stimulate new product development by hiring suppliers with talent superior to that of in-house personnel, avoid idle capacity, reduce inventories, and avoid being locked into a particular technology.

2. A company can focus scarce resources on the areas where it holds a competitive advantage. These benefits can translate into more funding for R&D to hire the best engineers and for sales and service to provide continuous training for staff.

3. An organization can tap into the knowledge and expertise of its specialized supply chain partners, adding critical skills and accelerating organizational learning.40

The modular type enables a company to leverage relatively small amounts of capital and a small management team to achieve seemingly unattainable strategic objectives.41 Certain preconditions are necessary before the modular approach can be successful. First, the com- pany must work closely with suppliers to ensure that the interests of each party are being ful- filled. Companies need to find loyal, reliable vendors who can be trusted with trade secrets. They also need assurances that suppliers will dedicate their financial, physical, and human resources to satisfy strategic objectives such as lowering costs or being first to market.

Second, the modular company must be sure that it selects the proper competencies to keep in-house. For adidas, its core competencies are design and marketing, not shoe manu- facturing; for Honda, the core competence is engine technology. An organization must avoid outsourcing components that may compromise its long-term competitive advantages.

Strategic Risks of Outsourcing The main strategic concerns are (1) loss of critical skills or developing the wrong skills, (2) loss of cross-functional skills, and (3) loss of control over a supplier.42

Too much outsourcing can result in a firm “giving away” too much skill and control.43 Outsourcing relieves companies of the requirement to maintain skill levels needed to manu- facture essential components.44 At one time, semiconductor chips seemed like a simple technology to outsource, but they have now become a critical component of a wide variety of products. Companies that have outsourced the manufacture of these chips run the risk of losing the ability to manufacture them as the technology escalates. They become more dependent upon their suppliers.

Cross-functional skills refer to the skills acquired through the interaction of individuals in various departments within a company.45 Such interaction assists a department in solv- ing problems as employees interface with others across functional units. However, if a firm outsources key functional responsibilities, such as manufacturing, communication across departments can become more difficult. A firm and its employees must now integrate their activities with a new, outside supplier.

The outsourced products may give suppliers too much power over the manufacturer. Suppliers that are key to a manufacturer’s success can, in essence, hold the manufacturer “hostage.”

Exhibit 10.7 summarizes the pros and cons of modular structures.46

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The Virtual Organization In contrast to the “self-reliant” thinking that guided traditional organizational designs, the strategic challenge today has become doing more with less and looking outside the firm for opportunities and solutions to problems. The virtual organization provides a new means of leveraging resources and exploiting opportunities.47

The virtual organization can be viewed as a continually evolving network of independent companies—suppliers, customers, even competitors—linked together to share skills, costs, and access to one another’s markets.48 The members of a virtual organization, by pooling and sharing the knowledge and expertise of each of the component organizations, simulta- neously “know” more and can “do” more than any one member of the group could do alone. By working closely together, each gains in the long run from individual and organizational learning.49 The term virtual, meaning “being in effect but not actually so,” is commonly used in the computer industry. A computer’s ability to appear to have more storage capacity than it really possesses is called virtual memory. Similarly, by assembling resources from a variety of entities, a virtual organization may seem to have more capabilities than it really possesses.50

Virtual organizations need not be permanent, and participating firms may be involved in multiple alliances. Virtual organizations may involve different firms performing com- plementary value activities or different firms involved jointly in the same value activities, such as production, R&D, and distribution. The percentage of activities that are jointly performed with partners may vary significantly from alliance to alliance.51

How does the virtual type of structure differ from the modular type? Unlike the modular type, in which the focal firm maintains full strategic control, the virtual organization is characterized by participating firms that give up part of their control and accept interde- pendent destinies. Participating firms pursue a collective strategy that enables them to cope with uncertainty through cooperative efforts. The benefit is that, just as virtual memory increases storage capacity, the virtual organizations enhance the capacity or competitive advantage of participating firms.

Each company that links up with others to create a virtual organization contributes only what it considers its core competencies. It will mix and match what it does best with the best of other firms by identifying its critical capabilities and the necessary links to other capabilities.52

In addition to linking a set of organizations in a virtual organization, firms can cre- ate internal virtual organizations, in which individuals who are not located together and may not even be in the same traditional organizational unit are joined together in virtual teams. These teams may be permanent but often are flexible, with changing membership as business needs evolve. For example, advertising agencies often create flexible membership teams for each client to provide the expertise that a firm’s advertising program needs.

virtual organization a continually evolving network of independent companies that are linked together to share skills, costs, and access to one another’s markets.

Pros Cons

• Directs a firm’s managerial and technical talent to the most critical activities.

• Maintains full strategic control over most critical activities—core competencies.

• Achieves “best in class” performance at each link in the value chain. • Leverages core competencies by outsourcing with smaller capital

commitment. • Encourages information sharing and accelerates organizational

learning.

• Inhibits common vision through reliance on outsiders. • Diminishes future competitive advantages if critical

technologies or other competencies are outsourced. • Increases the difficulty of bringing back into the firm

activities that now add value due to market shifts. • Leads to an erosion of cross-functional skills. • Decreases operational control and potential loss of control

over a supplier.

EXHIBIT 10.7 Pros and Cons of Modular Structures

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Challenges and Risks The virtual organization demands that managers build relationships both within the firm and with other companies, negotiate win–win deals for all parties, find the right partners with compatible goals and values, and provide the right balance of freedom and control. Information systems must be designed and integrated to facilitate communication with current and potential partners.

Managers must be clear about the strategic objectives while forming alliances. Some objectives are time-bound, and those alliances need to be dissolved once the objective is fulfilled. Some alliances may have relatively long-term objectives and will need to be clearly monitored and nurtured to produce mutual commitment and avoid bitter fights for control. The highly dynamic personal computer industry is characterized by multiple temporary alliances among hardware, operating system, and software producers.53 But alliances in the more stable automobile industry have long-term objectives and tend to be relatively stable.

The virtual organization is a logical culmination of joint venture strategies of the past. Shared risks, costs, and rewards are the facts of life in a virtual organization.54 When virtual organizations are formed, they involve tremendous challenges for strategic planning. As with the modular corporation, it is essential to identify core competencies. However, for vir- tual structures to be successful, a strategic plan is also needed to determine the effectiveness of combining core competencies.

The strategic plan must address the diminished operational control and overwhelming need for trust and common vision among the partners. This new structure may be appropri- ate for firms whose strategies require merging technologies (e.g., computing and communi- cation) or for firms exploiting shrinking product life cycles that require simultaneous entry into multiple geographic markets. It may be effective for firms that desire to be quick to the market with a new product or service. The recent profusion of alliances among airlines was primarily motivated by the need to provide seamless travel demanded by the full-fare-paying business traveler. Exhibit 10.8 summarizes the pros and cons of virtual structures.

Boundaryless Organizations: Making Them Work Designing an organization that simultaneously supports the requirements of an organiza- tion’s strategy, is consistent with the demands of the environment, and can be effectively implemented by the people around the manager is a tall order for any manager.55 The most effective solution is usually a combination of organizational types. That is, a firm may out- source many parts of its value chain to reduce costs and increase quality, engage simultane- ously in multiple alliances to take advantage of technological developments or penetrate new markets, and break down barriers within the organization to enhance flexibility.

When an organization faces external pressures, resource scarcity, and declining perfor- mance, it tends to become more internally focused, rather than directing its efforts toward

Pros Cons

• Enables the sharing of costs and skills. • Enhances access to global markets. • Increases market responsiveness. • Creates a “best of everything” organization since each partner

brings core competencies to the alliance. • Encourages both individual and organizational knowledge

sharing and accelerates organizational learning.

• Harder to determine where one company ends and another begins, due to close interdependencies among players.

• Leads to potential loss of operational control among partners. • Results in loss of strategic control over emerging technology. • Requires new and difficult-to-acquire managerial skills.

Source: Miles, R. E., & Snow, C. C. 1986. Organizations: New Concepts for New Forms. California Management Review, Spring: 62–73; Miles & Snow. 1999. Causes of Failure in Network Organizations. California Management Review, Summer: 53–72; and Bahrami, H. 1991. The Emerging Flexible Organization: Perspectives from Silicon Valley. California Management Review, Summer: 33–52.

EXHIBIT 10.8 Pros and Cons of Virtual Structures

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managing and enhancing relationships with existing and potential external stakeholders. This may be the most opportune time for managers to carefully analyze their value-chain activities and evaluate the potential for adopting elements of modular, virtual, and barrier- free organizational types.

In this section, we will address two issues managers need to be aware of as they work to design an effective boundaryless organization. First, managers need to develop mechanisms to ensure effective coordination and integration. Second, managers need to be aware of the benefits and costs of developing strong and long-term relationships with both internal and external stakeholders.

Facilitating Coordination and Integration Achieving the coordination and integration nec- essary to maximize the potential of an organization’s human capital involves much more than just creating a new structure. Techniques and processes to ensure the coordination and integration of an organization’s key value-chain activities are critical. Teams are key building blocks of the new organizational forms, and teamwork requires new and flexible approaches to coordination and integration.

Managers trained in rigid hierarchies may find it difficult to make the transition to the more democratic, participative style that teamwork requires. As Douglas K. Smith, co- author of The Wisdom of Teams, pointed out, “A completely diverse group must agree on a goal, put the notion of individual accountability aside and figure out how to work with each other. Most of all, they must learn that if the team fails, it’s everyone’s fault.”56 Within the framework of an appropriate organizational design, managers must select a mix and balance of tools and techniques to facilitate the effective coordination and integration of key activi- ties. Some of the factors that must be considered include:

• Common culture and shared values. • Horizontal organizational structures. • Communications and information technologies. • Human resource practices.

Common Culture and Shared Values Shared goals, mutual objectives, and a high degree of trust are essential to the success of boundaryless organizations. In the fluid and flexible environments of the new organizational architectures, common cultures, shared values, and carefully aligned incentives are often less expensive to implement and are often a more effec- tive means of strategic control than rules, boundaries, and formal procedures. Tony Hsieh, the founder of Zappos, discussed the importance of culture and values this way: “We for- malize the definition of our culture into . . . 10 core values at Zappos. And one of the really interesting things I found from the research is that it actually doesn’t matter what your values are, what matters is that you have them and that you align the organization around them.”57

Horizontal Organizational Structures These structures, which group similar or related busi- ness units under common management control, facilitate sharing resources and infrastructures to exploit synergies among operating units and help to create a sense of common purpose. Consistency in training and the development of similar structures across business units facilitates job rotation and cross-training and enhances understanding of common problems and opportu- nities. Cross-functional teams and interdivisional committees and task groups represent impor- tant opportunities to improve understanding and foster cooperation among operating units.

Communications and Information Technology (IT) The effective use of IT can play an important role in bridging gaps and breaking down barriers between organizations. This can include communication systems, such as email and videoconferencing, internal social network systems, knowledge portals, and other technology means to link people within

horizontal organizational structures organizational forms that group similar or related business units under common management control and facilitate sharing resources and infrastructures to exploit synergies among operating units and help to create a sense of common purpose.

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an organization across regions and organizational units. Additionally, firms can leverage point-of-sale inventory systems and RFID technology to facilitate automated communica- tions and coordinated actions with suppliers, distributors, and other firm partners. Thus, information technology should be viewed more as a prime component of an organization’s overall strategy than simply in terms of administrative support.

Human Resource Practices Change always involves and affects the human dimension of organizations. The attraction, development, and retention of human capital are vital to value creation. As boundaryless structures are implemented, processes are reengineered, and organizations become increasingly dependent on sophisticated ITs, the skills of workers and managers alike must be upgraded to realize the full benefits.

The Benefits and Costs of Developing Lasting Internal and External Relationships Success- ful boundaryless organizations rely heavily on the relational aspects of organizations. Rather than relying on strict hierarchical and bureaucratic systems, these firms are flexible and coordinate action by leveraging shared social norms and strong social relationships between both internal and external stakeholders.58 At the same time, it is important to acknowledge that relying on relationships can have both positive and negative effects. To successfully move to a more boundaryless organization, managers need to acknowledge and attend to both the costs and benefits of relying on relationships and social norms to guide behavior.

There are three primary benefits that organizations accrue when relying on relationships:

• Agency costs within the firm can be dramatically cut through the use of relational systems. Managers and employees in relationship-oriented firms are guided by social norms and relationships they have with other managers and employees. As a result, the firm can reduce the degree to which it relies on monitoring, rules and regulations, and financial incentives to ensure that workers put in a strong effort and work in the firm’s interests. A relational view leads managers and employees to act in a supportive manner and makes them more willing to step out of their formal roles when needed to accomplish tasks for others and for the organization. They are also less likely to shirk their responsibilities.

• There is also likely to be a reduction in the transaction costs between a firm and its suppliers and customers. If firms have built strong relationships with partnering firms, they are more likely to work cooperatively with these firms and build trust that their partners will work in the best interests of the alliance. This will reduce the need for the firms to write detailed contracts and set up strict bureaucratic rules to outline the responsibilities and define the behavior of each firm. Additionally, partnering firms with strong relationships are more likely to invest in assets that specifically support the partnership. Finally, they will have much less fear that their partner will try to take advantage of them or seize the bulk of the benefits from the partnership.

• Since they feel a sense of shared ownership and goals, individuals within the firm as well as partnering firms will be more likely to search for win–win rather than win–lose solutions. When taking a relational view, individuals are less likely to look out solely for their personal best interests. They will also be considerate of the benefits and costs to other individuals in the firm and to the overall firm. The same is true at the organizational level. Firms with strong relationships with their partners are going to look for solutions that not only benefit themselves but also provide equitable benefits and limited downside for the partnering firms.

While there are a number of benefits with using a relational view, there can also be some substantial costs:

• As the relationships between individuals and firms strengthen, they are also more likely to fall prey to suboptimal lock-in effects. The problem here is that as decisions

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become driven by concerns about relationships, economic factors become less important. As a result, firms become less likely to make decisions that could benefit the firm since those decisions may harm employees or partnering firms. For example, firms may see the economic logic in exiting a market, but the ties they feel with employees that work in that division and partnering firms in that market may reduce their willingness to make the hard decision to exit the market. This can be debilitating to firms in rapidly changing markets where successful firms add, reorganize, and sometimes exit operations and relationships regularly.

• Since there are no formal guidelines, conflicts between individuals and units within firms, as well as between partnering firms, are typically resolved through ad hoc negotiations and processes. In these circumstances, there are no legal means or bureaucratic rules to guide decision making. Thus, when firms face a difficult decision where there are differences of opinion about the best course of action, the ultimate choices made are often driven by the inherent power of the individuals or firms involved. This power use may be unintentional and subconscious, but it can result in outcomes that are deemed unfair by one or more of the parties.

• The social capital of individuals and firms can drive their opportunities. Thus, rather than identifying the best person to put in a leadership role or the optimal supplier to contract with, these choices are more strongly driven by the level of social connection the person or supplier has. This also increases the entry barriers for potential new suppliers or employees with whom a firm can contract since new firms likely don’t have the social connections needed to be chosen as a worthy partner with whom to contract. This also may limit the likelihood that new innovative ideas will enter into the conversations at the firm.

As mentioned earlier in the chapter, the solution may be to effectively integrate elements of formal structure and reward systems with stronger relationships. This may influence spe- cific relationships so that a manager will want employees to build relationships while still maintaining some managerial oversight and reward systems that motivate the desired behav- ior. This may also result in different emphases with different relationships. For example, there may be some units, such as accounting, where a stronger role for traditional structures and forms of evaluation may be optimal. However, in new product development units, a greater emphasis on relational systems may be more appropriate.

CREATING AMBIDEXTROUS ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNS In Chapter 1, we introduced the concept of “ambidexterity,” which incorporates two con- tradictory challenges faced by today’s managers.59 First, managers must explore new oppor- tunities and adjust to volatile markets in order to avoid complacency. They must ensure that they maintain adaptability and remain proactive in expanding and/or modifying their product-market scope to anticipate and satisfy market conditions. Such competencies are especially challenging when change is rapid and unpredictable.

Second, managers must also effectively exploit the value of their existing assets and com- petencies. They need to have alignment, which is a clear sense of how value is being created in the short term and how activities are integrated and properly coordinated. Firms that achieve both adaptability and alignment are considered ambidextrous organizations—aligned and efficient in how they manage today’s business but flexible enough to changes in the environment so that they will prosper tomorrow.

Handling such opposing demands is difficult because there will always be some degree of conflict. Firms often suffer when they place too strong a priority on either adaptability or

LO 10-5 The need for creating ambidextrous organizational designs that enable firms to explore new opportunities and effectively integrate existing operations.

adaptibility managers’ exploration of new opportunities and adjustment to volatile markets in order to avoid complacency.

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alignment. If it places too much focus on adaptability, the firm will suffer low profitability in the short term. If managers direct their efforts primarily at alignment, they will likely miss out on promising business opportunities.

Ambidextrous Organizations: Key Design Attributes A study by Charles O’Reilly and Michael Tushman60 provides some insights into how some firms were able to create successful ambidextrous organizational designs. They investigated companies that attempted to simultaneously pursue modest, incremental innovations as well as more dramatic, breakthrough innovations. The team investigated 35 attempts to launch breakthrough innovations undertaken by 15 business units in nine different industries. They studied the organizational designs and the processes, systems, and cultures associated with the breakthrough projects as well as their impact on the operations and performance of the traditional businesses.

Companies structured their breakthrough projects in one of four primary ways:

• Seven were carried out within existing functional organizational structures. The projects were completely integrated into the regular organizational and management structure.

• Nine were organized as cross-functional teams. The groups operated within the established organization but outside the existing management structure.

• Four were organized as unsupported teams. Here, they became independent units set up outside the established organization and management hierarchy.

• Fifteen were conducted within ambidextrous organizations. Here, the breakthrough efforts were organized within structurally independent units, each having its own processes, structures, and cultures. However, they were integrated into the existing senior management structure.

The performance results of the 35 initiatives were tracked along two dimensions:

• Their success in creating desired innovations was measured by either the actual commercial results of the new product or the application of practical market or technical learning.

• The performance of the existing business was evaluated.

The study found that the organizational structure and management practices employed had a direct and significant impact on the performance of both the breakthrough initiative and the traditional business. The ambidextrous organizational designs were more effective than the other three designs on both dimensions: launching breakthrough products or services (i.e., adaptation) and improving the performance of the existing business (i.e., alignment).

Why Was the Ambidextrous Organization the Most Effective Structure? The study found that there were many factors. A clear and compelling vision, consis- tently communicated by the company’s senior management team, was critical in build- ing the ambidextrous designs. The structure enabled cross-fertilization while avoiding cross-contamination. The tight coordination and integration at the managerial levels enabled the newer units to share important resources from the traditional units, such as cash, talent, and expertise. Such sharing was encouraged and facilitated by effective reward systems that emphasized overall company goals. The organizational separation ensured that the new units’ distinctive processes, structures, and cultures were not overwhelmed by the forces of “business as usual.” The established units were shielded from the distractions of launching new businesses, and they continued to focus all of their attention and energy on refining their operations, enhancing their products, and serving their customers.

alignment managers’ clear sense of how value is being created in the short term and how activities are integrated and properly coordinated.

ambidextrous organizational designs organizational designs that attempt to simultaneously pursue modest, incremental innovations as well as more dramatic, breakthrough innovations.

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ISSUE FOR DEBATE

In the fall of 2015, Google unveiled a new organizational structure. Google created a holding company, Alphabet Inc., which offers overall oversight for the disparate collection of businesses the firm owns. The parent company is run by firm founders Larry Page and Sergey Brin and its Chief Financial Officer, Ruth Porat. Alphabet is using a hybrid SBU- divisional structure with the main SBU, Google, housing several core businesses, including its search business, YouTube, Android, and the Chrome operating systems. The businesses in the Google SBU accounted for nearly 90 percent of Alphabet’s $90 billion of revenue in 2016. Other divisions in the structure include Nest, a smart-home project division; Verily, a group working on health care and disease prevention; and GV, the firm’s venture capital arm. The structure also includes an incubator SBU, X, which houses the firm’s secretive “moonshot” projects, including Project Loon, a venture to offer Internet service in the developing world with high-altitude balloons; Project Titan, a drone delivery service; and ventures that are not yet publicly known. The hope is that once projects advance inside X and can stand on their own, they can be moved and become their own divisions, an action that took place with Waymo, Google’s self-driving car project in 2016.

Larry Page, Alphabet’s CEO, says he looked to Warren Buffett’s Berskshire Hathaway as a model for running a large, complex organization. His goal is to allow the different units the freedom to focus on their particular areas. Mr. Page wrote in his blog, “Fundamentally, we believe this allows us more management scale, as we can run things independently that aren’t very related.” The new structure also allows the firm to more effectively control costs in the independent units, resulting in more constrained budgets in these units.

But the transition has not been entirely smooth. From outside, the firm has faced criticism that the new structure simply reinforced the view that it is investing in businesses far from Google’s core markets and into markets for which Alphabet’s core competencies are not well suited. As Brian Wieser, an analyst with Pivotal Research, stated: “just because they break out the data doesn’t mean they’ll stop making investments in things that are so far removed from the core business.” With the Google(x) businesses losing $3.6 billion in 2016, this criticism is unlikely to wane. The firm has also experienced leadership challenges. In the past, the founders, Larry Page and Sergey Brin, its chairman, Eric Schmidt, and Google’s CEO, Sundar Pichal, provided strong leadership to hold it all together. In building all of the operating units, Alphabet needs to develop management talent to run them. This appears to be a work in progress, at best, with one division CEO called “divisive and impulsive” while another has been labeled “mercurial.” The structure also makes it harder to coordinate activities across the different business units. For example, while Google was working to develop its home unit Alexa, Alphabet’s smart-home division, Nest, had signaled its intention to work with Amazon to link its smart-home products with Amazon’s Echo. This raised the potential of Alphabet divisions competing with each other.

Discussion Questions 1. What are the benefits and the costs of making this move? What are the long-run risks of this

change? Do the benefits outweigh the costs? 2. Is Alphabet trying to build an ambidextrous organization? Should it be doing so? If yes,

what actions can it take to build an ambidextrous firm? 3. Do these issues raise concerns about Alphabet’s business portfolio? Should the firm stay the

course with the businesses it owns, or should it change? If it should change, how should it change?

Sources: Barr, A., & Winkler, R. 2015. Google creates parent company called Alphabet in restructuring. wsj.com. August 11: np; Price, R. & Nudelman, M. 2016. Google’s parent company, Alphabet, explained in one chart. businessinsider.com. January 12: np; Hempel, J. 2016. Google’s Alphabet transition has been tougher than A-B-C. wired.com. April 1: np; and Fiegerman, S. 2017. Google’s moonshots lost $1 billion last quarter. money.cnn.com. January 27: np.

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Reflecting on Career Implications . . . This chapter discusses both organizational structures and the benefits of creating permeable boundaries across structural boundaries. You can enhance your value to your firms and career prospects by developing skills and abilities to span internal and external organizational boundaries. The questions below challenge you to consider ways you can build those skills.

Boundaryless Organizational Designs: Does your firm have structural mechanisms (e.g., culture, human resource practices) that facilitate sharing information across boundaries? Regardless of the level of boundarylessness of your organization, a key issue for your career is the extent to which you are able to cut across boundaries within your organization. Such boundaryless behavior on your part will enable you to enhance and leverage your human capital. Evaluate how boundaryless you are within your organizational context. What actions can you take to become even more boundaryless?

Culture and Shared Values: Does your firm or department have a strong or weak culture? Consider how your actions can help reinforce or build a strong culture. Also, think of the types of actions leaders in your group can take to strengthen the group‘s culture. Consider sharing these ideas with your leaders. Do you think they will be receptive to your suggestions? Their response likely gives you further insight into the group’s culture.

Ambidextrous Organizations: Firms that achieve adaptability and alignment are considered ambidextrous. As an individual, you can also strive to be ambidextrous. Evaluate your own ambidexterity by assessing your adaptability (your ability to change in response to changes around you) and alignment (how good you are at exploiting your existing competencies). What steps can you take to improve your ambidexterity?

Successful organizations must ensure that they have the proper type of organizational structure. Furthermore, they must ensure that their firms incor- porate the necessary integration and processes so that the internal and

external boundaries of their firms are flexible and permeable. Such a need is increasingly important as the environments of firms become more complex, changing rapidly and unpredictably.

In the first section of the chapter, we discussed the growth patterns of large corporations. Although most organizations remain small or die, some firms continue to grow in terms of revenues, vertical integration, and diversity of products and services. In addition, their geographic scope may increase to include international operations. We traced the dominant pattern of growth, which evolves from a simple structure to a functional structure as a firm grows in terms of size and increases its level of vertical integration. After a firm expands into related products and services, its structure changes from a functional to a divisional form of organization. Finally, when the firm enters international markets, its structure again changes to accommodate the change in strategy.

We also addressed the different types of organizational structure—simple, functional, divisional (including two variations: strategic business unit and holding company), and matrix—as well as their relative advantages and disadvantages. We closed the section with a discussion of the implications for structure that arise when a firm enters international markets. The three primary factors to take into account when determining the appropriate structure

are type of international strategy, product diversity, and the extent to which a firm is dependent on foreign sales.

The second section of the chapter introduced the concept of the boundaryless organization. We did not suggest that the concept of the boundaryless organization replaces the traditional forms of organizational structure. Rather, it should complement them. This is necessary to cope with the increasing complexity and change in the competitive environment. We addressed three types of boundaryless organizations. The barrier-free type focuses on the need for the internal and external boundaries of a firm to be more flexible and permeable. The modular type emphasizes the strategic outsourcing of noncore activities. The virtual type centers on the strategic benefits of alliances and the forming of network organizations. We discussed both the advantages and disadvantages of each type of boundaryless organization, and we suggested some techniques and processes that are necessary to successfully implement each type. These are common culture and values, horizontal organizational structures, horizontal systems and processes, communications and information technologies, and human resource practices.

The final section addressed the need for managers to develop ambidextrous organizations. In today’s rapidly changing global environment, managers must be responsive and proactive in order to take advantage of new opportunities. At the same time, they must effectively integrate and coordinate existing operations. Such requirements call for organizational designs that establish project teams that are structurally independent units, with each having its own processes, structures, and cultures. But, at the same time, each unit needs to be effectively integrated into the existing management hierarchy.

summary

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SUMMARY REVIEW QUESTIONS 1. Why is it important for managers to carefully

consider the type of organizational structure that they use to implement their strategies?

2. Briefly trace the dominant growth pattern of major corporations from simple structure to functional structure to divisional structure. Discuss the relationship between a firm’s strategy and its structure.

3. What are the relative advantages and disadvantages of the types of organizational structure—simple, functional, divisional, matrix—discussed in the chapter?

4. When a firm expands its operations into foreign markets, what are the three most important factors to take into account in deciding what type of structure is most appropriate? What are the types of international structures discussed in the text, and what are the relationships between strategy and structure?

5. Briefly describe the three different types of boundaryless organizations: barrier-free, modular, and virtual.

6. What are some of the key attributes of effective groups? Ineffective groups?

7. What are the advantages and disadvantages of the three types of boundaryless organizations: barrier- free, modular, and virtual?

8. When are ambidextrous organizational designs necessary? What are some of their key attributes?

organizational structure 302 simple organizational

structure 304 functional organizational

structure 304 divisional organizational

structure 306 strategic business unit (SBU)

structure 308 holding company

structure 308 matrix organizational

structure 308 international division

structure 312

geographic-area division structure 312

worldwide matrix structure 312

worldwide functional structure 312

worldwide product division structure 312

global start-up 312 boundaryless organizational

designs 314 barrier-free organization 314 modular organization 318 virtual organization 320 horizontal organizational

structures 322 adaptability 324 alignment 325 ambidextrous organizational

designs 325

key terms

EXPERIENTIAL EXERCISE Many firms have recently moved toward a modular structure. For example, they have increasingly outsourced many of their information technology (IT) activities. Identify three such organizations. Using secondary sources, evaluate (1) the firm’s rationale for IT outsourcing and (2) the implications for performance.

Firm Rationale Implication(s) for Performance

1.

2.

3.

APPLICATION QUESTIONS & EXERCISES 1. Select an organization that competes in an industry

in which you are particularly interested. Go on the Internet and determine what type of organizational structure this organization has. In your view, is it consistent with the strategy that it has chosen to implement? Why? Why not?

2. Choose an article from Bloomberg Businessweek, Fortune, Forbes, Fast Company, or any other well- known publication that deals with a corporation that has undergone a significant change in its strategic direction. What are the implications for the structure of this organization?

3. Go on the Internet and look up some of the public statements or speeches of an executive in a major

corporation about a significant initiative such as entering into a joint venture or launching a new product line. What do you feel are the implications for making the internal and external barriers of the firm more flexible and permeable? Does the executive discuss processes, procedures, integrating mechanisms, or cultural issues that should serve this purpose? Or are other issues discussed that enable a firm to become more boundaryless?

4. Look up a recent article in the publications listed in question 2 that addresses a firm’s involvement in outsourcing (modular organization) or in strategic alliance or network organizations (virtual organization). Was the firm successful or unsuccessful in this endeavor? Why? Why not?

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ETHICS QUESTIONS 1. If a firm has a divisional structure and places extreme

pressures on its divisional executives to meet short- term profitability goals (e.g., quarterly income), could this raise some ethical considerations? Why? Why not?

2. If a firm enters into a strategic alliance but does not exercise appropriate behavioral control of

its employees (in terms of culture, rewards and incentives, and boundaries—as discussed in Chapter 9) who are involved in the alliance, what ethical issues could arise? What could be the potential long-term and short-term downside for the firm?

1. Wilson, K. & Doz, Y. 2012. 10 rules for managing global innovation. Harvard Business Review, 90(10): 84–92; Wallace, J. 2007. Update on problems joining 787 fuselage sections. Seattlepi.com, June 7: np; Peterson, K. 2011. Special report: A wing and a prayer: Outsourcing at Boeing. Reuters.com, January 20: np; Hiltzik, M. 2011. 787 Dreamliner teaches Boeing costly lesson on outsourcing. Latimes.com, February 15: np; Gates, D. 2013. Boeing 787’s problems blamed on outsourcing, lack of oversight. Seattletimes.com, February 2: np; and Ostrower, J. 2014. Boeing’s Key Mission: Cut Dreamliner cost. wsj.com . January 7: np.

2. For a unique perspective on organization design, see Rao, R. 2010. What 17th century pirates can teach us about job design. Harvard Business Review, 88(10): 44.

3. This introductory discussion draws upon Hall, R. H. 2002. Organizations: Structures, processes, and outcomes (8th ed.). Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice Hall; and Duncan, R. E. 1979. What is the right organization structure? Decision-tree analysis provides the right answer. Organizational Dynamics, 7(3): 59–80. For an insightful discussion of strategy-structure relationships in the organization theory and strategic management literatures, refer to Keats, B. & O’Neill, H. M. 2001. Organization structure: Looking through a strategy lens. In Hitt, M. A., Freeman, R. E., & Harrison, J. S. 2001. The Blackwell handbook of strategic management: 520–542. Malden, MA: Blackwell.

4. Gratton, L. 2011. The end of the middle manager. Harvard Business Review, 89(1/2): 36.

5. An interesting discussion on the role of organizational design in strategy execution is in Neilson, G. L., Martin, K. L., & Powers, E. 2009. The secrets to successful strategy execution. Harvard Business Review, 87(2): 60–70.

6. This discussion draws upon Chandler, A. D. 1962. Strategy and structure. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press; Galbraith J. R. & Kazanjian, R. K. 1986. Strategy implementation: The role of structure and process. St. Paul, MN: West; and Scott, B. R. 1971. Stages of corporate development. Intercollegiate Case Clearing House, 9-371-294, BP 998. Harvard Business School.

7. Our discussion of the different types of organizational structures draws on a variety of sources, including Galbraith & Kazanjian, op. cit.; Hrebiniak, L. G. & Joyce, W. F. 1984. Implementing strategy. New York: Macmillan; Distelzweig, H. 2000. Organizational structure. In Helms, M. M. (Ed.), Encyclopedia of management: 692–699. Farmington Hills, MI: Gale; and Dess, G. G. & Miller, A. 1993. Strategic management. New York: McGraw-Hill.

8. A discussion of an innovative organizational design is in Garvin, D. A. & Levesque, L. C. 2009. The multiunit enterprise. Harvard Business Review, 87(2): 106–117.

9. Schein, E. H. 1996. Three cultures of management: The key to organizational learning. Sloan Management Review, 38(1): 9–20.

10. Insights on governance implications for multidivisional forms are in Verbeke, A. & Kenworthy, T. P. 2008. Multidivisional vs. metanational governance. Journal of International Business, 39(6): 940–956.

11. Martin, J. A. & Eisenhardt, K. 2010. Rewiring: Cross-business-unit collaborations in multibusiness organizations. Academy of Management Journal, 53(2): 265–301.

12. For a discussion of performance implications, refer to Hoskisson, R. E. 1987. Multidivisional structure and performance: The contingency of diversification strategy. Academy of Management Journal, 29: 625–644.

13. For a thorough and seminal discussion of the evolution toward the divisional form of organizational structure in the United States, refer to Chandler, op. cit. A rigorous empirical study of the strategy and structure relationship is found in Rumelt, R. P. 1974. Strategy, structure, and economic performance. Cambridge, MA: Harvard Business School Press.

14. Koppel, B. 2000. Synergy in ketchup? Forbes, February 7: 68–69; and Hitt, M. A., Ireland, R. D., & Hoskisson, R. E. 2001. Strategic management: Competitiveness and globalization (4th ed.). Cincinnati, OH: South-Western.

15. Pitts, R. A. 1977. Strategies and structures for diversification. Academy of Management Journal, 20(2): 197–208.

16. Silvestri, L. 2012. The evolution of organizational structure. footnote1. com, June 6: np.

17. Haas, M. R. 2010. The double- edged swords of autonomy and external knowledge: Analyzing team effectiveness in a multinational organization. Academy of Management Journal, 53(5): 989–1008.

18. Daniels, J. D., Pitts, R. A., & Tretter, M. J. 1984. Strategy and structure of U.S. multinationals: An exploratory study. Academy of Management Journal, 27(2): 292–307.

19. Habib, M. M. & Victor, B. 1991. Strategy, structure, and performance of U.S. manufacturing and service MNCs: A comparative analysis. Strategic Management Journal, 12(8): 589–606.

20. Our discussion of global start- ups draws from Oviatt, B. M. & McDougall, P. P. 2005. The internationalization of entrepreneurship. Journal of International Business Studies, 36(1): 2–8; Oviatt, B. M. & McDougall, P. P. 1994. Toward a theory of international new ventures. Journal of International Business Studies,

REFERENCES

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25(1): 45–64; and Oviatt, B. M. & McDougall, P. P. 1995. Global start- ups: Entrepreneurs on a worldwide stage. Academy of Management Executive, 9(2): 30–43.

21. Some useful guidelines for global start-ups are provided in Kuemmerle, W. 2005. The entrepreneur’s path for global expansion. MIT Sloan Management Review, 46(2): 42–50.

22. See, for example, Miller, D. & Friesen, P. H. 1980. Momentum and revolution in organizational structure. Administrative Science Quarterly, 13: 65–91.

23. Many authors have argued that a firm’s structure can influence its strategy and performance. These include Amburgey, T. L. & Dacin, T. 1995. As the left foot follows the right? The dynamics of strategic and structural change. Academy of Management Journal, 37: 1427–1452; Dawn, K. & Amburgey, T. L. 1991. Organizational inertia and momentum: A dynamic model of strategic change. Academy of Management Journal, 34: 591–612; Fredrickson, J. W. 1986. The strategic decision process and organization structure. Academy of Management Review, 11: 280–297; Hall, D. J. & Saias, M. A. 1980. Strategy follows structure! Strategic Management Journal, 1: 149–164; and Burgelman, R. A. 1983. A model of the interaction of strategic behavior, corporate context, and the concept of strategy. Academy of Management Review, 8: 61–70.

24. An interesting discussion on how the Internet has affected the boundaries of firms can be found in Afuah, A. 2003. Redefining firm boundaries in the face of the Internet: Are firms really shrinking? Academy of Management Review, 28(1): 34–53.

25. Govindarajan, V. G. & Trimble, C. 2010. Stop the innovation wars. Harvard Business Review, 88(7/8): 76–83.

26. For a discussion of the role of coaching on developing high- performance teams, refer to Kets de Vries, M. F. R. 2005. Leadership group coaching in action: The zen of creating high performance teams. Academy of Management Executive, 19(1): 77–89.

27. Pfeffer, J. 1998. The human equation: Building profits by putting people first. Cambridge, MA: Harvard Business School Press.

28. For a discussion on how functional area diversity affects performance, see Bunderson, J. S. & Sutcliffe, K. M. 2002. Comparing alternative

conceptualizations of functional diversity in management teams: Process and performance effects. Academy of Management Journal, 45(5): 875–893.

29. Falconi, M. 2014. Novartis chairman stresses need for R&D investment. wsj.com, March 24: np.

30. Groth, A. 2015. Holacracy at Zappos: It’s either the future of management or a social experiment gone awry. qz. com, January 14: np; Anonymous. 2014. The holes in holacracy. economist.com, July 5: np; and Van De Kamp, P. 2014. Holacracy—A radical approach to organizational design. medium.com, August 2: np.

31. Public-private partnerships are addressed in Engardio, P. 2009. State capitalism. BusinessWeek, February 9: 38–43.

32. Aller, R., Weiner, H., & Weilart, M. 2005. IBM and Mayo collaborating to customize patient treatment plans. cap.org, January: np; and McGee, M. 2010. IBM, Mayo partner on aneurysm diagnostics. informationweek.com, January 25: np.

33. Winston, A. 2014: The big pivot. Boston: Harvard Business Review Press.

34. Dess, G. G., Rasheed, A. M. A., McLaughlin, K. J., & Priem, R. 1995. The new corporate architecture. Academy of Management Executive, 9(3): 7–20.

35. An original discussion on how open sourcing could help the Big 3 automobile companies is in Jarvis, J. 2009. How the Google model could help Detroit. BusinessWeek, February 9: 32–36.

36. For a discussion of some of the downsides of outsourcing, refer to Rossetti, C. & Choi, T. Y. 2005. On the dark side of strategic sourcing: Experiences from the aerospace industry. Academy of Management Executive, 19(1): 46–60.

37. Tully, S. 1993. The modular corporation. Fortune, February 8: 196.

38. adidas-group.com/en/sustainability/ compliance/supply-chain-structure/.

39. Offshoring in manufacturing firms is addressed in Coucke, K. & Sleuwaegen, L. 2008. Offshoring as a survival strategy: Evidence from manufacturing firms in Belgium. Journal of International Business Studies, 39(8): 1261–1277.

40. Quinn, J. B. 1992. Intelligent enterprise: A knowledge and service based paradigm for industry. New York: Free Press.

41. For an insightful perspective on outsourcing and its role in developing capabilities, read Gottfredson, M., Puryear, R., & Phillips, C. 2005. Strategic sourcing: From periphery to the core. Harvard Business Review, 83(4): 132–139.

42. This discussion draws upon Quinn, J. B. & Hilmer, F. C. 1994. Strategic outsourcing. Sloan Management Review, 35(4): 43–55.

43. Reitzig, M. & Wagner, S. 2010. The hidden costs of outsourcing: Evidence from patent data. Strategic Management Journal, 31(11): 1183–1201.

44. Insights on outsourcing and private branding can be found in Cehn, S-F. S. 2009. A transaction cost rationale for private branding and its implications for the choice of domestic vs. offshore outsourcing. Journal of International Business Strategy, 40(1): 156–175.

45. For an insightful perspective on the use of outsourcing for decision analysis, read Davenport, T. H. & Iyer, B. 2009. Should you outsource your brain? Harvard Business Review, 87(2): 38.

46. See also Stuckey, J. & White, D. 1993. When and when not to vertically integrate. Sloan Management Review, Spring: 71–81; Harrar, G. 1993. Outsource tales. Forbes ASAP, June 7: 37–39, 42; and Davis, E. W. 1992. Global outsourcing: Have U.S. managers thrown the baby out with the bath water? Business Horizons, July– August: 58–64.

47. For a discussion of knowledge creation through alliances, refer to Inkpen, A. C. 1996. Creating knowledge through collaboration. California Management Review, 39(1): 123–140; and Mowery, D. C., Oxley, J. E., & Silverman, B. S. 1996. Strategic alliances and interfirm knowledge transfer. Strategic Management Journal, 17 (Special Issue, Winter): 77–92.

48. Doz, Y. & Hamel, G. 1998. Alliance advantage: The art of creating value through partnering. Boston: Harvard Business School Press.

49. DeSanctis, G., Glass, J. T., & Ensing, I. M. 2002. Organizational designs for R&D. Academy of Management Executive, 16(3): 55–66.

50. Barringer, B. R. & Harrison, J. S. 2000. Walking a tightrope: Creating value through interorganizational alliances. Journal of Management, 26: 367–403.

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51. One contemporary example of virtual organizations is R&D consortia. For an insightful discussion, refer to Sakaibara, M. 2002. Formation of R&D consortia: Industry and company effects. Strategic Management Journal, 23(11): 1033–1050.

52. Bartness, A. & Cerny, K. 1993. Building competitive advantage through a global network of capabilities. California Management Review, Winter: 78–103. For an insightful historical discussion of the usefulness of alliances in the computer industry, see Moore, J. F. 1993. Predators and prey: A new ecology of competition. Harvard Business Review, 71(3): 75–86.

53. See Lorange, P. & Roos, J. 1991. Why some strategic alliances succeed and others fail. Journal of Business Strategy, January–February: 25–30; and Slowinski, G. 1992. The human touch in strategic alliances. Mergers and Acquisitions, July–August: 44–47. A compelling argument for strategic

alliances is provided by Ohmae, K. 1989. The global logic of strategic alliances. Harvard Business Review, 67(2): 143–154.

54. Some of the downsides of alliances are discussed in Das, T. K. & Teng, B. S. 2000. Instabilities of strategic alliances: An internal tensions perspective. Organization Science, 11: 77–106.

55. This section draws upon Dess, G. G. & Picken, J. C. 1997. Mission critical. Burr Ridge, IL: Irwin Professional.

56. Katzenbach, J. R. & Smith, D. K. 1994. The wisdom of teams: Creating the high performance organization. New York: HarperBusiness.

57. Bulygo, Z. 2013. Tony Hsieh, Zappos, and the art of great company culture. kissmetrics.com. February 26: np.

58. Gupta, A. 2011. The relational perspective and east meets west. Academy of Management Perspectives, 25(3): 19–27.

59. This section draws on Birkinshaw, J. & Gibson, C. 2004. Building

ambidexterity into an organization. MIT Sloan Management Review, 45(4): 47–55; and Gibson, C. B. & Birkinshaw, J. 2004. The antecedents, consequences, and mediating role of organizational ambidexterity. Academy of Management Journal, 47(2): 209–226. Robert Duncan is generally credited with being the first to coin the term “ambidextrous organizations” in his article entitled: Designing dual structures for innovation. In Kilmann, R. H., Pondy, L. R., & Slevin, D. (Eds.). 1976. The management of organizations, vol. 1: 167–188. For a seminal academic discussion of the concept of exploration and exploitation, which parallels adaptation and alignment, refer to March, J. G. 1991. Exploration and exploitation in organizational learning. Organization Science, 2: 71–86.

60. This section is based on O’Reilly, C. A. & Tushman, M. L. 2004. The ambidextrous organization. Harvard Business Review, 82(4): 74–81.

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chapter

After reading this chapter, you should have a good understanding of the following learning objectives:

11

LO11-1 The three key interdependent activities in which all successful leaders must be continually engaged.

LO11-2 Two elements of effective leadership: overcoming barriers to change and using power effectively.

LO11-3 The crucial role of emotional intelligence (EI) in successful leadership, as well as its potential drawbacks.

LO11-4 The importance of creating a learning organization. LO11-5 The leader’s role in establishing an ethical organization. LO11-6 The difference between integrity-based and compliance-based

approaches to organizational ethics.

LO11-7 Several key elements that organizations must have to become ethical organizations.

Strategic Leadership Creating a Learning Organization and an Ethical Organization

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PART 3: STRATEGIC IMPLEMENTATION

It took four generations to build Stroh’s Brewing into a major player in the beer industry and just one generation to tear it down. Stroh’s was founded in Detroit by Bernard Stroh, who had emigrated from Germany in 1850. Bernard took the $150 he had and a cherished family beer recipe and began selling beer door to door. By 1890, his sons, Julius and Bernard, had grown the family business and were shipping beer around the Great Lakes region. The family business survived prohibition by making ice cream and maple syrup. After World War II ended, the business grew along with the industrial Midwest, seeing its sales surge from 500,000 barrels of beer in 1950 to 2.7 million barrels in 1956. The firm succeeded by following a simple business recipe: catering to the needs of working- class tastes by brewing a simple, drinkable, and affordable beer and treating its employees well. Following this business blueprint, the company found success and growth, resulting in a business that was worth an estimated $700 million in the mid-1980s. A little over a decade later, the firm was out of business.1

Its rapid descent from a successful and growing firm to failure is tied to a series of disastrous decisions made by Peter Stroh, representing the fifth generation of the family to lead the firm, who took on the role of CEO in 1980. Rather than stick to the tried-and-true business plan of catering to the needs of the Midwest working class, Peter stepped out to build a larger, national beer empire. He purchased F&M Schaefer, a New York–based brewer, in 1981. He followed this up in 1982 by purchasing Joseph Schlitz Brewing, a firm that was much bigger than Stroh’s. To undertake this acquisition, Stroh’s borrowed $500 million, five times the value of Stroh’s itself. Peter’s acquisitions hampered the firm in two key ways. First, working to combine the firms distracted Stroh’s from seeing the evolving needs of customers. Most notably, it completely missed the most significant shift in customer tastes in a generation—the emergence of light beer. Also, the heavy debt load taken on to finance the acquisitions left the firm with little money to launch the national advertising campaigns needed to support a company that was now the third-largest brewer in the United States. In the words of Greg Stroh, a cousin of Peter and an employee of the firm, “We made the decision to go national without having the budget. It was like going to a gunfight with a knife. We didn’t have a chance.”

Stroh’s tried various tactics to improve its situation. It tried undercutting the price of its major rivals, Anheuser-Busch and Miller, by offering 15 cans of beer for the price of 12. It laid off hundreds of employees to save on cost. It then changed course, raising prices and nixing the 15-pack containers. Customers rebelled, pushing sales down 40 percent in a single year. The firm was left with 6 million barrels of excess brewing capacity. Finally, the firm took on one last, disastrous acquisition. Stroh’s purchased another struggling brewer, G. Heileman, for $300 million, saddling itself with even more debt. While the firm struggled in its core beer business, Peter tried to diversify Stroh’s into biotechnology and real estate investing. The almost inevitable end came in 1999 when Stroh’s assets were purchased by Pabst Brewing for $350 million—$250 million of which went to the debtholders of the firm.

Discussion Questions 1. Why were the acquisitions so debilitating for Stroh’s? 2. What would have been the likely outcome for Stroh’s if it hadn’t purchased other brands?

LEARNING FROM MISTAKES

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Under Peter Stroh’s leadership, Stroh’s Brewing went from being a successful and grow- ing family business to a failed firm. He took the firm away from its traditional strategy and also missed seeing key shifts in the beer industry. This led him to change the firm’s strategy in ways that undercut the value of its brand and its culture, ultimately leading to Stroh’s demise and the loss of the family’s legacy. In contrast to Peter’s ineffective leadership, effec- tive leaders set a clear direction for the firm, create and reinforce valuable strategies, and strengthen firm values and culture.

This chapter provides insights into the role of strategic leadership in managing, adapting, and coping in the face of increased environmental complexity and uncertainty. First, we define leadership and its three interdependent activities—setting a direction, designing the organization, and nurturing a culture dedicated to excellence and ethical behavior. Then, we identify two elements of leadership that contribute to success—overcoming barriers to change and using power effectively. The third section focuses on emotional intelligence, a trait that is increasingly acknowledged to be critical to successful leadership. Next, we emphasize the importance of leaders developing competency companions and creating a learning organi- zation. Here, we focus on empowerment wherein employees and managers throughout an organization develop a sense of self-determination, competence, meaning, and impact that is centrally important to learning. Finally, we address the leader’s role in building an ethical organization and the elements of an ethical culture that contribute to firm effectiveness.

LEADERSHIP: THREE INTERDEPENDENT ACTIVITIES In today’s chaotic world, few would argue against the need for leadership, but how do we go about encouraging it? Is it enough to merely keep an organization afloat, or is it essential to make steady progress toward some well-defined objective? We believe custodial management is not leadership. Leadership is proactive, goal-oriented, and focused on the creation and imple- mentation of a creative vision. Leadership is the process of transforming organizations from what they are to what the leader would have them become. This definition implies a lot: dissat- isfaction with the status quo, a vision of what should be, and a process for bringing about change. An insurance company executive shared the following insight: “I lead by the Noah Principle: It’s all right to know when it’s going to rain, but, by God, you had better build the ark.”

Doing the right thing is becoming increasingly important. Many industries are declin- ing; the global village is becoming increasingly complex, interconnected, and unpredictable; and product and market life cycles are becoming increasingly compressed. When asked to describe the life cycle of his company’s products, the CEO of a supplier of computer com- ponents replied, “Seven months from cradle to grave—and that includes three months to design the product and get it into production!”

Despite the importance of doing the “right thing,” leaders must also be concerned about “doing things right.” Charan and Colvin strongly believe that execution, that is, the imple- mentation of strategy, is also essential to success:

Mastering execution turns out to be the odds-on best way for a CEO to keep his job. So what’s the right way to think about that sexier obsession, strategy? It’s vitally important— obviously. The problem is that our age’s fascination feeds the mistaken belief that developing exactly the right strategy will enable a company to rocket past competitors. In reality, that’s less than half the battle.2

Thus, leaders are change agents whose success is measured by how effectively they for- mulate and implement a strategic vision and mission.3

Many authors contend that successful leaders must recognize three interdependent activities that must be continually reassessed for organizations to succeed. As shown in Exhibit 11.1, these are (1) setting a direction, (2) designing the organization, and (3) nurtur- ing a culture dedicated to excellence and ethical behavior.4

leadership the process of transforming organizations from what they are to what the leader would have them become.

LO 11-1 The three key interdependent activities in which all successful leaders must be continually engaged.

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The interdependent nature of these three activities is self-evident. Consider an organiza- tion with a great mission and a superb organizational structure but a culture that implicitly encourages shirking and unethical behavior. Or one with a sound direction and strong cul- ture but counterproductive teams and a “zero-sum” reward system that leads to the dysfunc- tional situation in which one party’s gain is viewed as another party’s loss and collaboration and sharing are severely hampered. Clearly, such combinations would be ineffective.

Often, failure of today’s organizations can be attributed to a lack of equal consideration of these three activities. The imagery of a three-legged stool is instructive: The stool will col- lapse if one leg is missing or broken. Let’s briefly look at each of these activities as well as the value of an ambicultural approach to leadership.

Setting a Direction A holistic understanding of an organization’s stakeholders requires an ability to scan the envi- ronment to develop a knowledge of all of the company’s stakeholders and other salient envi- ronmental trends and events. Managers must integrate this knowledge into a vision of what the organization could become.5 This necessitates the capacity to solve increasingly complex problems, become proactive in approach, and develop viable strategic options. A strategic vision provides many benefits: a clear future direction; a framework for the organization’s mission and goals; and enhanced employee communication, participation, and commitment.

Strategy Spotlight 11.1 discusses how Marvin Ellison exhibits leadership attributes as he tries to bring JC Penney back from the brink.

Designing the Organization At times, almost all leaders have difficulty implementing their vision and strategies.6 Such problems may stem from a variety of sources:

• Lack of understanding of responsibility and accountability among managers. • Reward systems that do not motivate individuals (or collectives such as groups and

divisions) toward desired organizational goals. • Inadequate or inappropriate budgeting and control systems. • Insufficient mechanisms to integrate activities across the organization.

Successful leaders are actively involved in building structures, teams, systems, and organi- zational processes that facilitate the implementation of their vision and strategies. Without appropriately structuring organizational activities, a firm would generally be unable to attain an overall low-cost advantage by closely monitoring its costs through detailed and formal- ized cost and financial control procedures. With regard to corporate-level strategy, a related

setting a direction a strategic leadership activity of strategy analysis and strategy formulation.

designing the organization a strategic leadership activity of building structures, teams, systems, and organizational processes that facilitate the implementation of the leader’s vision and strategies.

EXHIBIT 11.1 Three Interdependent Leadership Activities

Setting a direction

Designing the organization

Nurturing a culture dedicated to excellence and ethical behavior

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11.1 STRATEGY SPOTLIGHT MARVIN ELLISON ATTEMPTS TO TURN JC PENNEY CO. INC. AROUND JC Penney found a way to generate double-digit growth in the sales of men’s shoes in 2015. They simply needed to put the men’s footwear displays next to men’s clothes. Up until that point, men’s shoes were displayed with women’s shoes next to women’s clothing. The logic for that placement went back to decades ago when women often bought shoes for their hus- bands. JC Penney just hadn’t updated its thinking on this prod- uct placement as the world around the firm had changed.

These are the types of challenges facing Marvin Ellison as he tries to turn around the struggling retailer. Ellison is imple- menting a number of changes in JC Penney stores to stoke up demand and meet the challenge of responding to traditional rivals as well as online retailing. Along with moving men’s shoes, Ellison has pushed for other changes to store layouts, such as moving women’s fashion jewelry to be near fashion clothing brands. He has also pushed for updates in store décor, especially in areas that pull in store traffic, such as the store’s in-house salons. He’s also working to extend the store’s private-label brands, such as Arizona, St. John’s Bay, and a.n.a., to draw in customers who are both price and fashion conscious. He’s extended the store’s product line to include appliances—a play to pull in former Sears’ customers as Sears shrinks its store network. Finally, he’s emphasized improving inventory management. In recent years, JC Penney has often found itself out of stock of its hottest items.

He doesn’t rely on intuition for any of this. Ellison is a data fanatic. He states “pure intuition without any data gets you in trou- ble.” He previously worked at Home Depot, where he was heavily involved with streamlining the firm’s supply chain, integrating store operations, and building an e-commerce platform. At JC Penney,

he’s emphasizing data-driven decision making. He runs ideas, such as moving men’s shoes, through test stores, and if the data shows benefits, he rolls them out across the chain. To manage inventory better, he’s implemented a “demand-based logic” system where JC Penney uses real-time sales data to replenish inventory.

But it’s not all about data. While he was in college, Ellison worked as a security guard at a Target, and though he saw things and had ideas for improvement, he perceived that management had no interest in hearing from low-level workers. He learned from this early experience that he wants JC Penney to be a com- pany where associates feel they have a voice to offer ideas. To help connect with workers, in his first year at JC Penney, Ellison held town halls with workers at 60 stores and visited over 100 stores. These experiences led him to conclude there was separa- tion between workers and management in the stores. Reflective of this, managers often wore high-priced fashion clothes that were unavailable at JC Penney and out of the reach of most of its workers and customers. To help reduce the barrier between man- agement and associates in stores, he requires all managers to wear JC Penney clothing and the same nametags workers wear.

A big part of Ellison’s leadership is to channel everyone at JC Penney to remember what the firm is and to be the best JC Penney it can be. That means being effective in providing a wide range of products to price-conscious consumers in middle- American towns and suburban shopping malls. In executing this turnaround, Ellison says “we’re going to start with the founda- tion: No one can beat us being us.” So far, the results are modest but promising. In 2016, JC Penney reported its first profit in six years, and it appears to be stabilizing its sales. But it is a long road for Ellison to turn the firm fully around. Sources: Wahba, P. 2016. The man who’s re-re-re-inventing J.C. Penney. fortune. com. March 1: 77–86; and d’Innocenzio, A. 2017. J.C. Penney to shut 130-plus stores, offer early retirements. finance.yahoo.com. February 24: np.

diversification strategy would necessitate reward systems that emphasize behavioral mea- sures because interdependence among business units tends to be very important. In con- trast, reward systems associated with an unrelated diversification strategy should rely more on financial indicators of performance because business units are relatively autonomous.

These examples illustrate the important role of leadership in creating systems and struc- tures to achieve desired ends. As Jim Collins says about the importance of designing the orga- nization, “Along with figuring out what the company stands for and pushing it to understand what it’s really good at, building mechanisms is the CEO’s role—the leader as architect.”7

Nurturing a Culture Committed to Excellence and Ethical Behavior Organizational culture can be an effective means of organizational control.8 Leaders play a key role in changing, developing, and sustaining an organization’s culture. Brian Chesky, cofounder and CEO of Airbnb, clearly understands the role of the leader in building and maintaining an organization’s culture. In October 2013, as Airbnb was growing rapidly, Chesky sent out an email to his leadership team imploring the team members to be very conscious to maintain the culture of the firm.9 He stated, “The culture is what creates

excellent and ethical organizational culture an organizational culture focused on core competencies and high ethical standards.

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11.2 ENVIRONMENTAL SUSTAINABILITY, ETHICSSTRATEGY SPOTLIGHT FAMILY LEADERSHIP SUSTAINS THE CULTURE OF SC JOHNSON SC Johnson, the maker of Windex, Ziploc bags, and Glade Air Fresheners, is known as one of the most environmentally con- scious consumer products companies. The family-owned company is run by Fisk Johnson, the fifth generation of the family to serve as firm CEO. It is the 35th largest privately owned firm, with 13,000 employees and nearly $10 billion in sales. Over the decades, the firm has built and reinforced its reputation for environmental con- sciousness. Being privately owned by the Johnson family is part of it. Fisk Johnson put it this way, “Wall Street rewards that short- termism. . . . We are in a very fortunate situation to not have to worry about those things, and we’re very fortunate that we have a family that is principled and has been very principled.”

Fisk uses the benefits of dedicated family ownership to work in both substantive and symbolic ways. On the substantive side, he has implemented systems in place to improve its environ- mental performance. For example, with its Greenlist process, the firm rates the ingredients it uses or is considering using. It then rates each ingredient on several criteria, including biodegrad- ability and human toxicity, and gives the ingredient a score rang- ing from 0 to 3, with 3 being the most environmentally friendly. The goal is to increase the percentage of ingredients rated a 2 or a 3 and eliminate those with a score of 0. With this system, the firm has increased the percentage of ingredients rated as a 2 or

3 (better or best) from about 20 percent to over 50 percent from 2001 to 2016.

Fisk uses stories from decisions in the past as it acts to sustain its culture of environmental consciousness. In using stories to rein- force the environmental focus within the firm and to explain it to external stakeholders, Fisk Johnson draws on stories relating to decisions his father made as well as ones he’s made. Most promi- nently, he uses a story about a decision his father made to stop using chlorofluorocarbons in the firm’s aerosol products. “Our first decision to unilaterally remove a major chemical occurred in 1975, when research began suggesting that chlorofluorocar- bons (CFCs) in aerosols might harm Earth’s ozone layer. My father was CEO at the time, and he decided to ban them from all the company’s aerosol products worldwide. He did so several years before the government played catch-up and banned the use of CFCs from everyone’s products.” He goes on to say, “You look back on that decision today, in light of the strong laws that came in, and that was a very prescient decision.” This story is especially effective since it highlights his father’s willingness and ability to take actions that can lead both the government and industry rivals to change. A second story outlines the firm’s decision to remove chlorine as an ingredient in its Saran Wrap. In the late 1990s, regu- lators and environmentalists were raising concerns that chlorine used in plastic released toxic chemicals when the plastic was burned. As Fisk Johnson explains, this was a difficult situation for

the foundation for all future innovation. If you break the culture, you break the machine that creates your products.” He then went on to comment that they needed to uphold the firm’s values in all they do: who they hire, how they work on a project, how they treat other employees in the hallway, and what they write in emails. Chesky then laid out the power of firm culture in the following words:

The stronger the culture, the less corporate process a company needs. When the culture is strong, you can trust everyone to do the right thing. People can be independent and autonomous. They can be entrepreneurial. And if we have a company that is entrepreneurial in spirit, we will be able to take our next “(wo)man on the moon” leap. . . . In organizations (or even in a society) where the culture is weak, you need an abundance of heavy, precise rules, and processes.

In sharp contrast, leaders can also have a very detrimental effect on a firm’s culture and ethics. Imagine the negative impact that Todd Berman’s illegal activities have had on a firm that he cofounded—New York’s private equity firm Chartwell Investments.10 He stole more than $3.6 million from the firm and its investors. Berman pleaded guilty to fraud charges brought by the Justice Department. For 18 months he misled Chartwell’s investors concern- ing the financial condition of one of the firm’s portfolio companies by falsely claiming it needed to borrow funds to meet operating expenses. Instead, Berman transferred the money to his personal bank account, along with fees paid by portfolio companies.

Clearly, a leader’s behavior and values can make a strong impact on an organization—for good or for bad. Strategy Spotlight 11.2 provides a positive example, with H. Fisk Johnson carrying on a legacy of maintaining a strong ethical culture at his family’s firm.

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him and the firm. “We set out to figure out an alternative for Saran that didn’t contain chlorine, but that’s just as good. Bottom line is we couldn’t find anything that’s just as good. Nothing had those clinging properties. We went out there with an inferior product, and we’ve been steadily losing business.” This story demonstrates that he not only wants to lead the firm to be an agent of change, but he is also willing to sacrifice profits to do the right thing.

The combination of the firm’s ownership structure, its strong leader, and its story-driven culture reinforce the firm’s

willingness to lead the market in environmental awareness. For example, in early 2016, Fisk decided that SC Johnson would be the first firm to list 100 percent of the fragrance ingredients it uses. He saw this decision as a means to push itself and its rivals to use more environmentally friendly fragrance ingredients.

Source: Kaufman, A. 2016. CEO admits that environmentalism does cost him profits. huffingtonpost.com. February 18: np; Byron, E. 2016. How Fisk Johnson works to keep the shine on the family business. wsj.com. March 11: np; and, Johnson, F. 2015. SC Johnson’s CEO on doing the right thing, even when it hurts business. hbr.org. March: np.

continued

Managers and top executives must accept personal responsibility for developing and strengthening ethical behavior throughout the organization. They must consistently dem- onstrate that such behavior is central to the vision and mission of the organization. Several elements must be present and reinforced for a firm to become highly ethical, including role models, corporate credos and codes of conduct, reward and evaluation systems, and poli- cies and procedures. Given the importance of these elements, we address them in detail in the last section of this chapter.

GETTING THINGS DONE: OVERCOMING BARRIERS AND USING POWER The demands on leaders in today’s business environment require them to perform a variety of functions. The success of their organizations often depends on how they as individuals meet challenges and deliver on promises. What practices and skills are needed to get the job done effectively? In this section, we focus on two capabilities that are marks of successful leadership— overcoming barriers to change and using power effectively. Then, in the next section, we will examine an important human trait that helps leaders be more effective—emotional intelligence.

Overcoming Barriers to Change What are the barriers to change that leaders often encounter, and how can leaders best bring about organizational change?11 After all, people generally have some level of choice about how strongly they support or resist a leader’s change initiatives. Why is there often so much resistance? Organizations at all levels are prone to inertia and are slow to learn, adapt, and change because:

1. Many people have vested interests in the status quo. People tend to be risk-averse and resistant to change. There is a broad stream of research on “escalation,” wherein certain individuals continue to throw “good money at bad decisions” despite negative performance feedback.12

2. There are systemic barriers. The design of the organization’s structure, information processing, reporting relationships, and so forth impedes the proper flow and evaluation of information. A bureaucratic structure with multiple layers, onerous requirements for documentation, and rigid rules and procedures will often “inoculate” the organization against change. Strategy Spotlight 11.3 discusses efforts to overcome systemic barriers in the supply chain operations at Target.

3. Behavioral barriers cause managers to look at issues from a biased or limited perspective due to their education, training, work experiences, and so forth. Consider an incident shared by David Lieberman, former marketing director at GVO, an innovation consulting firm:

LO 11-2 Two elements of effective leadership: overcoming barriers to change and using power effectively.

barriers to change characteristics of individuals and organizations that prevent a leader from transforming an organization.

vested interest in the status quo a barrier to change that stems from people’s risk aversion.

systemic barriers barriers to change that stem from an organizational design that impedes the proper flow and evaluation of information.

behavioral barriers barriers to change associated with the tendency for managers to look at issues from a biased or limited perspective based on their prior education and experience.

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11.3 STRATEGY SPOTLIGHT OVERCOMING SUPPLY CHAIN LIMITATIONS AT TARGET Arthur Valdez and Benjamin Cook chose to take on a chal- lenging task. Valdez, a longtime Amazon executive, and Cook, a supply chain executive with Apple, signed on to head up Target’s chief supply chain and logistics operations in mid- 2016. The challenge for Mr. Valdez, Mr. Cook, and Target is to modernize its supply chain system to meet changing market dynamics. Target has developed a very effective supply chain system to meet the needs of a large-scale national retailer, where stores largely stock the same items across the entire chain. But this isn’t the market Target competes in anymore. As the chain has added groceries, it aims to stock its stores with fresh, local produce and grocery products. As customers increasingly order online and pick up items in stores, Target needs to develop inventory systems that can stock shelves and also process single orders for customers. As Target CEO, Brian Cornell, stated, “The systems were built to continue to replenish a normal store. Now, we’re shipping from stores.

Now, we’re trying to localize items. It has added a greater complexity.”

To meet these changing demands, Target realized they had to go outside the firm to bring in executives who had experience with fast moving, flexible supply chain operations and who could work to break down traditional barriers in the firm. Mr. Valdez and Mr. Cook will need to restructure a range of operations and report- ing relationships. This will include changes in information systems to process single orders, the implementation of technology that allows store staff to search inventory and process orders from the store floor, redesigned warehouses that can handle deliver- ies from national and local vendors, and different reporting struc- tures to allow local managers to tailor the merchandise they carry. The price tag to change all of these systems is heavy. The changes Mr. Valdez and Mr. Cook will put in place are part of a $7 billion investment Target is making to upgrade its operations.

Sources: Ziobro, P. 2016. Target hires executive to lead supply revamping. wsj.com. February 29: np; Gustafson, K. 2017. Target’s $7 billion spending plan still leaves some question marks. cnbc.com. March 1: np; and Chao, L. 2016. Target hires supply chain executive from Apple. wsj.com. July 20: np.

A company’s creative type had come up with a great idea for a new product. Nearly everybody loved it. However, it was shot down by a high-ranking manufacturing representative who exploded: “A new color? Do you have any idea of the spare-parts problem that it will create?” This was not a dimwit exasperated at having to build a few storage racks at the warehouse. He’d been hearing for years about cost cutting, lean inventories, and “focus.” Lieberman’s comment: “Good concepts, but not always good for innovation.”

4. Political barriers refer to conflicts arising from power relationships. This can be the outcome of a myriad of symptoms such as vested interests, refusal to share information, conflicts over resources, conflicts between departments and divisions, and petty interpersonal differences.

5. Personal time constraints bring to mind the old saying about “not having enough time to drain the swamp when you are up to your neck in alligators.” Gresham’s law of planning states that operational decisions will drive out the time necessary for strategic thinking and reflection. This tendency is accentuated in organizations experiencing severe price competition or retrenchment wherein managers and employees are spread rather thin.

Leaders must draw on a range of personal skills as well as organizational mechanisms to move their organizations forward in the face of such barriers. Two factors mentioned earlier—building a learning organization and building an ethical organization—provide the kind of climate within which a leader can advance the organization’s aims and make progress toward its goals.

One of the most important tools a leader has for overcoming barriers to change is his or her personal and organizational power. On the one hand, good leaders must be on guard not to abuse power. On the other hand, successful leadership requires the measured exercise of power. We turn to that topic next.

Using Power Effectively Successful leadership requires the effective use of power in overcoming barriers to change.13 As humorously noted by Mark Twain, “I’m all for progress. It’s change I object to.” Power

political barriers barriers to change related to conflicts arising from power relationships.

personal time constraints a barrier to change that stems from people’s not having sufficient time for strategic thinking and reflection.

power a leader’s ability to get things done in a way he or she wants them to be done.

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refers to a leader’s ability to get things done in a way he or she wants them to be done. It is the ability to influence other people’s behavior, to persuade them to do things that they otherwise would not do, and to overcome resistance and opposition. Effective exercise of power is essential for successful leadership.14

A leader derives his or her power from several sources or bases. The simplest way to understand the bases of power is by classifying them as organizational and personal, as shown in Exhibit 11.2.

Organizational bases of power refer to the power that a person wields because of her formal management position.15 These include legitimate, reward, coercive, and information power. Legitimate power is derived from organizationally conferred decision-making author- ity and is exercised by virtue of a manager’s position in the organization. Reward power depends on the ability of the leader or manager to confer rewards for positive behaviors or outcomes. Coercive power is the power a manager exercises over employees using fear of pun- ishment for errors of omission or commission. Information power arises from a manager’s access, control, and distribution of information that is not freely available to everyone in an organization.

A leader might also be able to influence subordinates because of his or her personal- ity characteristics and behavior. These would be considered the personal bases of power, including referent power and expert power. The source of referent power is a subordinate’s identification with the leader. A leader’s personal attributes or charisma might influence subordinates and make them devoted to that leader. The source of expert power is the lead- er’s expertise and knowledge. The leader is the expert on whom subordinates depend for information that they need to do their jobs successfully.

Successful leaders use the different bases of power, and often a combination of them, as appropriate to meet the demands of a situation, such as the nature of the task, the per- sonality characteristics of the subordinates, and the urgency of the issue.16 Persuasion and developing consensus are often essential, but so is pressing for action. At some point strag- glers must be prodded into line.17 Peter Georgescu, former CEO of Young & Rubicam (an advertising and media subsidiary of the U.K.-based WPP Group), summarized a lead- er’s dilemma brilliantly (and humorously), “I have knee pads and a .45. I get down and beg a lot, but I shoot people too.”18

Strategy Spotlight 11.4 addresses some of the subtleties of power. Here, the CEO of Siemens successfully brought about organizational change by the effective use of peer pressure.

organizational bases of power a formal management position that is the basis of a leader’s power.

personal bases of power a leader’s personality characteristics and behavior that are the basis of the leader’s power.

EXHIBIT 11.2 A Leader’s Bases of Power

Legitimate power

Organizational

Reward power

Coercive power

Information power

Referent power

Personal

Expert power

Bases of Power

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11.4 STRATEGY SPOTLIGHT THE USE OF “SOFT” POWER AT SIEMENS Until 1999, not only was paying bribes in international markets legally allowed in Germany, but German corporations could also deduct bribes from taxable income. However, once those laws changed, German industrial powerhouse Siemens found it hard to break its bribing habit in its sprawling global operations. Eventually a major scandal forced many top executives out of the firm, including CEO Klaus Kleinfeld. As the successor to Kleinfeld, Peter Löscher became the first outside CEO in the more than 160-year history of Siemens in 2007. As an outsider Löscher found it challenging to establish himself as a strong leader inside the bureaucratic Siemens organization. However, he eventually found a way to successfully transition into his new position.

Naturally, in the early stage of his tenure, he lacked inter- nal connections and the bases of power associated with inside knowledge of people and processes. Yet Siemens faced tremen- dous challenges, such as a lack of customer orientation, and required a strong leader with the ability to change the status quo. Absent a more formal power base, he turned to more infor- mal means to accomplish his mandate of organizational change and increasing customer orientation.

Once a year, all 700 of Siemens top managers come together for a leadership conference in Berlin. Given the historical lack of

customer focus, Löscher used peer pressure as an informal (or soft) form of power in order to challenge and eventually change the lack of customer orientation. In preparation for his first leader- ship conference, Löscher collected the prior year’s Outlook calen- dars from all of his division executives. He calculated how much time they each spent with customers and ranked them. In the meeting, he shared this information, including executives’ names.

The results of this exercise were quite remarkable: Löscher spent around 50 percent of his time with customers, more than any other top executive. Clearly, the people who were running the business divisions should rank higher on customer interac- tion than the CEO. This confirmed the lack of customer orien- tation in the organization. This ranking has been repeated at every Siemens leadership conference since Löscher took office. Over time, customer orientation has improved because nobody wants to fall short on this metric and endure potential ridicule. Löscher’s leadership style and use of soft power during his early time in office seemed to have paid off, as the Siemens board extended his contract as CEO of the German industry icon a year early.

Source: Löscher, P. 2012. The CEO of Siemens on using a scandal to drive change. Harvard Business Review, 90(11): 42; and Anonymous. 2011. Löscher soll vorstandschef bleiben. www.manager-magazin.de, July 25: np.

EMOTIONAL INTELLIGENCE: A KEY LEADERSHIP TRAIT In the previous sections, we discussed skills and activities of strategic leadership. The focus was on “what leaders do and how they do it.” Now the issue becomes “who leaders are,” that is, what leadership traits are the most important. Clearly, these two issues are related, because successful leaders possess the valuable traits that enable them to perform effec- tively in order to create value for their organization.19

There has been a vast amount of literature on the successful traits of leaders.20 These traits include integrity, maturity, energy, judgment, motivation, intelligence, expertise, and so on. For simplicity, these traits may be grouped into three broad sets of capabilities:

• Purely technical skills (like accounting or operations research). • Cognitive abilities (like analytical reasoning or quantitative analysis). • Emotional intelligence (like self-management and managing relationships).

Emotional intelligence (EI) has been defined as the capacity for recognizing one’s own emotions and those of others.21

Research suggests that effective leaders at all levels of organizations have high levels of EI.22 After controlling for cognitive abilities and manager personality attributes, EI leads to stronger job performance across a wide range of professions, with stronger effects for professions that require a great deal of human interaction. Interestingly, there is only partial support for the catchy phrase “IQ gets you hired, but EQ (emotional quotient) gets you pro- moted.” Evidence indicates that high levels of EI increase the likelihood of being promoted up to the middle-manager level. However, managers at high levels of the corporate hierarchy tend to evidence lower levels of EI, with the CEOs having, on average, lower levels of EI

LO 11-3 The crucial role of emotional intelligence (EI) in successful leadership, as well as its potential drawbacks.

emotional intelligence (EI) an individual’s capacity for recognizing his or her own emotions and those of others, including the five components of self- awareness, self-regulation, motivation, empathy, and social skills.

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than managers at any other level. This is troubling given that firms led by CEOs high in EI outperform firms led by CEOs lower in EI. High-EI CEOs excel in managing relationships, influencing people, and forging alliances both inside and outside the firm. These CEOs can also benefit the firm since their ability to connect with and relate to outside stakeholders helps build the firm’s reputation. Thus, firms would benefit from considering more than cognitive ability and easily measured performance metrics when choosing corporate leaders. Including EI as an element to consider would help firms choose superior corporate leaders.

Exhibit 11.3 identifies the five components of EI: self-awareness, self-regulation, motiva- tion, empathy, and social skill.

Self-Awareness Self-awareness is the first component of EI and brings to mind that Delphic oracle that gave the advice “Know thyself” thousands of years ago. Self-awareness involves a person having a deep understanding of his or her emotions, strengths, weaknesses, and drives. People with strong self-awareness are neither overly critical nor unrealistically optimistic. Instead, they are honest with themselves and others.

People generally admire and respect candor. Leaders are constantly required to make judgment calls that require a candid assessment of capabilities—their own and those of oth- ers. People who assess themselves honestly (i.e., self-aware people) are well suited to do the same for the organizations they run.23

Self-Regulation Biological impulses drive our emotions. Although we cannot do away with them, we can strive to manage them. Self-regulation, which is akin to an ongoing inner conversation, frees us from being prisoners of our feelings.24 People engaged in such conversation feel bad moods and emotional impulses just as everyone else does. However, they find ways to con- trol them and even channel them in useful ways.

Self-regulated people are able to create an environment of trust and fairness where political behavior and infighting are sharply reduced and productivity tends to be high. People who have mastered their emotions are better able to bring about and implement

EXHIBIT 11.3 The Five Components of Emotional Intelligence at Work

Emotional Intelligence

Motivation Being driven to achieve

for the sake of achievement, not simply for money or

status

Self-regulation The ability to control or

redirect disruptive emotions and impulses and adapt to

changing circumstances

Empathy The ability to see and

consider other people's feelings especially when

making decisions

Social Skill The ability to build and

manage relationships to move people in the desired

direction

Self-awareness The ability to know your

own emotions, drives, values, and goals as well as recognize

their impact on others

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change in an organization. When a new initiative is announced, they are less likely to panic; they are able to suspend judgment, seek out information, and listen to executives explain the new program.

Motivation Successful executives are driven to achieve beyond expectations—their own and everyone else’s. Although many people are driven by external factors, such as money and prestige, those with leadership potential are driven by a deeply embedded desire to achieve for the sake of achievement.

Motivated people show a passion for the work itself, such as seeking out creative chal- lenges, a love of learning, and taking pride in a job well done. They also have a high level of energy to do things better as well as a restlessness with the status quo. They are eager to explore new approaches to their work.

Empathy Empathy is probably the most easily recognized component of EI. Empathy means thought- fully considering an employee’s feelings, along with other factors, in the process of making intelligent decisions. Empathy is particularly important in today’s business environment for at least three reasons: the increasing use of teams, the rapid pace of globalization, and the growing need to retain talent.25

When leading a team, a manager is often charged with arriving at a consensus—often in the face of a high level of emotions. Empathy enables a manager to sense and understand the viewpoints of everyone around the table.

Globalization typically involves cross-cultural dialogue that can easily lead to miscues. Empathetic people are attuned to the subtleties of body language; they can hear the mes- sage beneath the words being spoken. They have a deep understanding of the existence and importance of cultural and ethnic differences.

Empathy also plays a key role in retaining talent. Human capital is particularly important to a firm in the knowledge economy when it comes to creating advantages that are sustain- able. Leaders need empathy to develop and keep top talent, because when high performers leave, they take their tacit knowledge with them.

Social Skill While the first three components of EI are all self-management skills, the last two— empathy and social skill—concern a person’s ability to manage relationships with others. Social skill may be viewed as friendliness with a purpose: moving people in the direction you desire, whether that’s agreement on a new marketing strategy or enthusiasm about a new product.

Socially skilled people tend to have a wide circle of acquaintances as well as a knack for finding common ground and building rapport. They recognize that nothing gets done alone, and they have a network in place when the time for action comes.

Social skill can be viewed as the culmination of the other dimensions of EI. People will be effective at managing relationships when they can understand and control their own emotions and empathize with others’ feelings. Motivation also contributes to social skill. People who are driven to achieve tend to be optimistic, even when confronted with setbacks. And when people are upbeat, their “glow” is cast upon conversations and other social encounters. They are popular, and for good reason.

A key to developing social skill is to become a good listener—a skill that many execu- tives find to be quite challenging. Deborah Triant, former CEO of Check Point Software Technologies, says, “Debating is easy; listening with an open mind is not. The worst thing that you as a leader can do in the decision-making process is to voice your opinion before anyone else can.”26

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Emotional Intelligence: Some Potential Drawbacks and Cautionary Notes Many great leaders have great reserves of empathy, interpersonal astuteness, awareness of their own feelings, and an awareness of their impact on others.27 More importantly, they know how to apply these capabilities judiciously as best benefits the situation. Having some minimum level of EI will help a person be effective as a leader as long as it is channeled appropriately. However, if a person has a high level of these capabilities it may become “too much of a good thing” if he or she is allowed to drive inappropriate behaviors. Some addi- tional potential drawbacks of EI can be gleaned by considering the flip side of its benefits.

Effective Leaders Have Empathy for Others However, they also must be able to make the “tough decisions.” Leaders must be able to appeal to logic and reason and acknowledge oth- ers’ feelings so that people feel the decisions are correct. However, it is easy to overidentify with others or confuse empathy with sympathy. This can make it more difficult to make the tough decisions.

Effective Leaders Are Astute Judges of People A danger is that leaders may become judg- mental and overly critical about the shortcomings they perceive in others. They are likely to dismiss other people’s insights, making them feel undervalued.

Effective Leaders Are Passionate about What They Do, and They Show It This doesn’t mean that they are always cheerleaders. Rather, they may express their passion as persis- tence in pursuing an objective or a relentless focus on a valued principle. However, there is a fine line between being excited about something and letting your passion close your mind to other possibilities or cause you to ignore realities that others may see.

Effective Leaders Create Personal Connections with Their People Most effective leaders take time to engage employees individually and in groups, listening to their ideas, suggestions, and concerns and responding in ways that make people feel that their ideas are respected and appreciated. However, if the leader makes too many unannounced visits, it may create a culture of fear and micromanagement. Clearly, striking a correct balance is essential.

From a moral standpoint, emotional leadership is neither good nor bad. On the one hand, emotional leaders can be altruistic, focused on the general welfare of the company and its employees, and highly principled. On the other hand, they can be manipulative, selfish, and dishonest. For example, if a person is using leadership solely to gain power, that is not leadership at all.28 Rather, that person is using his or her EI to grasp what people want and pander to those desires in order to gain authority and influence. After all, easy answers sell.

CREATING A LEARNING ORGANIZATION To enhance the long-term viability of organizations, leaders also need to build a learning organization. Such an organization is capable of adapting to change, fostering creativity, and succeeding in highly competitive markets.

Successful, innovative organizations recognize the importance of having everyone involved in the process of actively learning and adapting. As noted by a leading expert on learning organizations, MIT’s Peter Senge, the days when Henry Ford, Alfred Sloan, and Tom Watson “learned for the organization” are gone:

In an increasingly dynamic, interdependent, and unpredictable world, it is simply no longer possible for anyone to “figure it all out at the top.” The old model, “the top thinks and the local acts,” must now give way to integrating thinking and acting at all levels. While the challenge is great, so is the potential payoff. “The person who figures out how to harness

LO 11-4 The importance of creating a learning organization.

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the collective genius of the people in his or her organization,” according to former Citibank CEO Walter Wriston, “is going to blow the competition away.”29

Learning and change typically involve the ongoing questioning of an organization’s sta- tus quo or method of procedure. This means that all individuals throughout the organization must be reflective.30 Many organizations get so caught up in carrying out their day-to-day work that they rarely, if ever, stop to think objectively about themselves and their businesses. They often fail to ask the probing questions that might lead them to call into question their basic assumptions, to refresh their strategies, or to reengineer their work processes.

To adapt to change, foster creativity, and remain competitive, leaders must build learning organizations. Exhibit 11.4 lists the six key elements of a learning organization.

Inspiring and Motivating People with a Mission or Purpose Successful learning organizations create a proactive, creative approach to the unknown, actively solicit the involvement of employees at all levels, and enable all employees to use their intelligence and apply their imagination. Higher-level skills are required of everyone, not just those at the top.31 A learning environment involves organizationwide commitment to change, an action orientation, and applicable tools and methods.32 It must be viewed by everyone as a guiding philosophy and not simply as another change program.

A critical requirement of all learning organizations is that everyone feels and supports a compelling purpose. In the words of William O’Brien, former CEO of Hanover Insurance, “Before there can be meaningful participation, people must share certain values and pic- tures about where we are trying to go. We discovered that people have a real need to feel that they’re part of an enabling mission.”33 Medtronic, a medical products company, does this well. The company’s motto is “restoring patients to full life,” and it works to bring this to life for its employees. At the company’s holiday party, patients, their families, and their doctors come and share their survival and recovery stories. The event inspires employees, who are moved to tears, are able to directly see the results of their work, and are motivated to do even more.

Inspiring and motivating people with a mission or purpose is a necessary but not suffi- cient condition for developing an organization that can learn and adapt to a rapidly chang- ing, complex, and interconnected environment.

Empowering Employees at All Levels “The great leader is a great servant,” asserted Ken Melrose, former CEO and chairman of Toro Company and author of Making the Grass Greener on Your Side.34 A manager’s role becomes one of creating an environment where employees can achieve their potential as they help move the organization toward its goals. Instead of viewing themselves as resource controllers and power brokers, leaders must envision themselves as flexible resources will- ing to assume numerous roles as coaches, information providers, teachers, decision makers, facilitators, supporters, or listeners, depending on the needs of their employees.35

learning organizations organizations that create a proactive, creative approach to the unknown; characterized by (1) inspiring and motivating people with a mission and purpose, (2) empowering employees at all levels, (3) accumulating and sharing internal knowledge, (4) gathering and integrating external information, and (5) challenging the status quo and enabling creativity.

These are the six key elements of a learning organization. Each of these items should be viewed as necessary, but not sufficient. That is, successful learning organizations need all six elements.

1. Inspiring and motivating people with a mission or purpose. 2. Developing leaders. 3. Empowering employees at all levels. 4. Accumulating and sharing internal knowledge. 5. Gathering and integrating external information. 6. Challenging the status quo and enabling creativity.

EXHIBIT 11.4 Key Elements of a Learning Organization

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The central key to empowerment is effective leadership. Empowerment can’t occur in a leadership vacuum. According to Melrose, “You best lead by serving the needs of your people. You don’t do their jobs for them; you enable them to learn and progress on the job.”

Leading-edge organizations recognize the need for trust, cultural control, and expertise at all levels instead of the extensive and cumbersome rules and regulations inherent in hier- archical control.36 Some commentators have argued that too often organizations fall prey to the “heroes-and-drones syndrome,” wherein the value of those in powerful positions is exalted and the value of those who fail to achieve top rank is diminished. Such an attitude is implicit in phrases such as “Lead, follow, or get out of the way” or, even less appealing, “Unless you’re the lead horse, the view never changes.” Few will ever reach the top hierarchi- cal positions in organizations, but in the information economy, the strongest organizations are those that effectively use the talents of all the players on the team.

Empowering individuals by soliciting their input helps an organization to enjoy better employee morale. It also helps create a culture in which middle- and lower-level employees feel that their ideas and initiatives will be valued and enhance firm performance.

Accumulating and Sharing Internal Knowledge Effective organizations must also redistribute information, knowledge (skills to act on the information), and rewards.37 To do so, firms need to develop a culture that: (1) encourages employees to offer ideas, ask questions, and express concerns, (2) encourages widespread sharing of information from various sources, (3) identifies opportunities and makes it safe to experiment, (4) encourages collaborative decision making and the sharing of best prac- tices, and (5) utilizes technology to facilitate both the gathering and sharing of information.

Let’s take a look at Whole Foods Market, Inc., the largest natural-foods grocer in the United States.38 An important benefit of the sharing of internal information at Whole Foods becomes the active process of internal benchmarking. Competition is intense at Whole Foods. Teams compete against their own goals for sales, growth, and productivity; they compete against different teams in their stores; and they compete against similar teams at different stores and regions. There is an elaborate system of peer reviews through which teams benchmark each other. The “Store Tour” is the most intense. On a periodic schedule, each Whole Foods store is toured by a group of as many as 40 visitors from another region. Lateral learning—discovering what your colleagues are doing right and carrying those prac- tices into your organization—has become a driving force at Whole Foods.

In addition to enhancing the sharing of company information both up and down as well as across the organization, leaders also have to develop means to tap into some of the more informal sources of internal information. In a survey of presidents, CEOs, board members, and top executives in a variety of nonprofit organizations, respondents were asked what dif- ferentiated the successful candidates for promotion. The consensus: The executive was seen as a person who listens. According to Peter Meyer, the author of the study, “The value of listening is clear: You cannot succeed in running a company if you do not hear what your people, customers, and suppliers are telling you. . . . Listening and understanding well are key to making good decisions.”39

Gathering and Integrating External Information Recognizing opportunities, as well as threats, in the external environment is vital to a firm’s success. As organizations and environments become more complex and evolve rapidly, it is far more critical for employees and managers to become more aware of environmental trends and events—both general and industry-specific—and more knowledgeable about their firm’s competitors and customers. Next, we will discuss some ideas on how to do it.

First, company employees at all levels can use a variety of sources to acquire external infor- mation. Firms can tap into knowledge from alliance partners, suppliers, competitors, and the scientific community. For example, in the pharmaceutical and biotechnology industries,

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participation in networks and alliances is increasingly common and critical to knowledge diffusion and learning. To gain up-to-date information on particular rivals, firms can moni- tor the direct communications from rival firms and their executives, such as press releases and quarterly-earnings calls. These communications can provide insight on the rival’s actions and intended actions. It may also be valuable to follow rival-firm employees’ online postings, on Twitter and other platforms, to gain insights on rivals’ investments and actions.

Second, benchmarking can be a useful means of employing external information. Here man- agers seek out the best examples of a particular practice as part of an ongoing effort to improve the corresponding practice in their own organization.40 There are two primary types of benchmarking. Competitive benchmarking restricts the search for best practices to competitors, while functional benchmarking endeavors to determine best practices regard- less of industry. Industry-specific standards (e.g., response times required to repair power outages in the electric utility industry) are typically best handled through competitive bench- marking, whereas more generic processes (e.g., answering 1-800 calls) lend themselves to functional benchmarking because the function is essentially the same in any industry.

Ford Motor Company works with its suppliers on benchmarking its competitors’ prod- ucts during product redesigns. At the launch of the redesign, Ford and its suppliers identify a few key components they want to focus on improving. They then do a “tear down” of Ford’s components as well as matching components from three or four rivals. The idea is to get early input from suppliers so that Ford can design components that are best in class— lighter, cheaper, and more reliable.41

Third, focus directly on customers for information. For example, William McKnight, head of 3M’s Chicago sales office, required that salesmen of abrasives products talk directly to the workers in the shop to find out what they needed, instead of calling on only front-office executives.42 This was very innovative at the time—1909! But it illustrates the need to get to the end user of a product or service. (McKnight went on to become 3M’s president from 1929 to 1949 and chairman from 1949 to 1969.)

Challenging the Status Quo and Enabling Creativity Earlier in this chapter we discussed some of the barriers that leaders face when trying to bring about change in an organization: vested interests in the status quo, systemic barriers, behavioral barriers, political barriers, and time constraints. For a firm to become a learning organization, it must overcome such barriers in order to foster creativity and enable it to permeate the firm. This becomes quite a challenge if the firm is entrenched in a status quo mentality.

Perhaps the best way to challenge the status quo is for the leader to forcefully create a sense of urgency. For example, when Tom Kasten was vice president of Levi Strauss, he had a direct approach to initiating change:

You create a compelling picture of the risks of not changing. We let our people hear directly from customers. We videotaped interviews with customers and played excerpts. One big customer said, “We trust many of your competitors implicitly. We sample their deliveries. We open all Levi’s deliveries.” Another said, “Your lead times are the worst. If you weren’t Levi’s, you’d be gone.” It was powerful. I wish we had done more of it.43

Such initiative, if sincere and credible, establishes a shared mission and the need for major transformations. It can channel energies to bring about both change and creative endeavors.

Establishing a “culture of dissent” can be another effective means of questioning the sta- tus quo and serving as a spur toward creativity. Here norms are established whereby dissent- ers can openly question a superior’s perspective without fear of retaliation or retribution.

Closely related to the culture of dissent is the fostering of a culture that encourages risk taking. “If you’re not making mistakes, you’re not taking risks, and that means you’re not

benchmarking managers seeking out best examples of a particular practice as part of an ongoing effort to improve the corresponding practice in their own organization.

competitive benchmarking benchmarking in which the examples are drawn from competitors in the industry.

functional benchmarking benchmarking in which the examples are drawn from any organization, even those outside the industry.

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going anywhere,” claimed John Holt, coauthor of Celebrate Your Mistakes.44 “The key is to make errors faster than the competition, so you have more chances to learn and win.”

Companies that cultivate cultures of experimentation and curiosity make sure that fail- ure is not, in essence, an obscene word. They encourage mistakes as a key part of their com- petitive advantage. It has been said that innovation has a great paradox: Success—that is, true breakthroughs—usually come through failure. Below are some approaches to encourage risk taking and learning from mistakes in an organization:45

• Formalize forums for failure. To keep failures and the important lessons that they offer from getting swept under the rug, carve out time for reflection. GE formalized the sharing of lessons from failure by bringing together managers whose “Imagination Breakthrough” efforts were put on the shelf.

• Move the goalposts. Innovation requires flexibility in meeting goals, since early predictions are often little more than educated guesses. Intuit’s Scott Cook even goes so far as to suggest that teams developing new products ignore forecasts in the early days. “For every one of our failures, we had spreadsheets that looked awesome,” he claims.

• Bring in outsiders. Outsiders can help neutralize the emotions and biases that prop up a flop. Customers can be the most valuable. After its DNA chip failed, Corning brought pharmaceutical companies in early to test its new drug-discovery technology, Epic.

• Prove yourself wrong, not right. Development teams tend to look for supporting, rather than countervailing, evidence. “You have to reframe what you’re seeking in the early days,” says Innosight’s Scott Anthony. “You’re not really seeking proof that you have the right answer. It’s more about testing to prove yourself wrong.”

Finally, failure can play an important and positive role in one’s professional develop- ment. Former Utah Governor Scott Matheson had strong views on the benefits of failure.

You have to suffer failures occasionally in order to have successes. You’ve got to back up risk-takers in order to encourage people to try out new ideas that might succeed. . . . I never had much patience with the “play it safe” manager who attempted to minimize failures. Those people rarely have successes.46

CREATING AN ETHICAL ORGANIZATION Ethics may be defined as a system of right and wrong.47 Ethics assists individuals in deciding when an act is moral or immoral, socially desirable or not. The sources for an individual’s ethics include religious beliefs, national and ethnic heritage, family practices, community standards, educational experiences, and friends and neighbors. Business ethics is the appli- cation of ethical standards to commercial enterprise.

Individual Ethics versus Organizational Ethics Many leaders think of ethics as a question of personal scruples, a confidential matter between employees and their consciences. Such leaders are quick to describe any wrongdo- ing as an isolated incident, the work of a rogue employee. They assume the company should not bear any responsibility for individual misdeeds. In their view, ethics has nothing to do with leadership.

Ethics has everything to do with leadership. Seldom does the character flaw of a lone actor completely explain corporate misconduct. Instead, unethical business practices typi- cally involve the tacit, if not explicit, cooperation of others and reflect the values, attitudes, and behavior patterns that define an organization’s operating culture. Ethics is as much an organizational as a personal issue. Leaders who fail to provide proper leadership to institute proper systems and controls that facilitate ethical conduct share responsibility with those who conceive, execute, and knowingly benefit from corporate misdeeds.48

LO 11-5 The leader’s role in establishing an ethical organization.

ethics a system of right and wrong that assists individuals in deciding when an act is moral or immoral and/or socially desirable or not.

organizational ethics the values, attitudes, and behavioral patterns that define an organization’s operating culture and that determine what an organization holds as acceptable behavior.

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11.5 ENVIRONMENTAL SUSTAINABILITY, ETHICSSTRATEGY SPOTLIGHT  GREEN ENERGY: REAL OR JUST A MARKETING PLOY? Many consumers want to “go green” and are looking for oppor- tunities to do so. Utility companies that provide heat and elec- tricity are one of the most obvious places to turn, because they often use fossil fuels that could be saved through energy con- servation or replaced by using alternative energy sources. In fact, some consumers are willing to pay a premium to contrib- ute to environmental sustainability efforts if paying a little more will help curb global warming. Knowing this, many power com- panies in the United States have developed alternative energy programs and appealed to customers to help pay for them.

Unfortunately, many of the power companies that are offer- ing eco-friendly options are falling short on delivering on them. Some utilities have simply gotten off to a slow start or found it dif- ficult to profitably offer alternative power. Others, however, are suspected of committing a new type of fraud—“greenwashing.” This refers to companies that make unsubstantiated claims about how environmentally friendly their products or services really are. In the case of many power companies, their claims of “green power” are empty promises. Instead of actually generating

additional renewable energy, most of the premiums are going for marketing costs. “They are preying on people’s goodwill,” says Stephen Smith, executive director of the Southern Alliance for Clean Energy, an advocacy group in Knoxville, Tennessee.

Consider what two power companies offered and how the money was actually spent:

• Duke Power of Indiana created a program called “GoGreen Power.” Customers were told that they could pay a green-energy premium and a specific amount of electricity would be obtained from renewable sources. What actually happened? Less than 18 percent of voluntary customer contributions in one year went to renewable energy development.

• Alliant Energy of Iowa established a program dubbed “Second Nature.” Customers were told that they would “support the growth of earth-friendly ‘green power’ created by wind and biomass.” What actually happened? More than 56 percent of expenditures went to marketing and administrative costs, not green-energy development.

Sources: Elgin, B. & Holden, D. 2008. Green power: Buyers beware. BusinessWeek, September 29: 68–70; www.cleanenergy.org; duke-energy.com; and alliantenergy.com.

The ethical orientation of a leader is a key factor in promoting ethical behavior. Ethical leaders must take personal, ethical responsibility for their actions and decision making. Leaders who exhibit high ethical standards become role models for others and raise an organization’s overall level of ethical behavior. Ethical behavior must start with the leader before the employees can be expected to perform accordingly.

There has been a growing interest in corporate ethical performance. Some reasons for this trend may be the increasing lack of confidence regarding corporate activities, the growing emphasis on quality-of-life issues, and a spate of recent corporate scandals. Without a strong ethical culture, the chance of ethical crises occurring is enhanced. Ethical crises can be very expensive—both in terms of financial costs and in the erosion of human capital and overall firm reputation. Merely adhering to the minimum regulatory standards may not be enough to remain competitive in a world that is becoming more socially conscious. Strategy Spotlight 11.5 highlights potential ethical problems at utility companies that were trying to capitalize on consumers’ desire to participate in efforts to curb global warming.

The past two decades have been characterized by numerous examples of unethical and illegal behavior by many top-level corporate executives. These include executives of firms such as Enron, Tyco, WorldCom, Adelphia, and HealthSouth, who were all forced to resign and are facing (or have been convicted of) criminal charges. Perhaps the most glaring example is Bernie Madoff, whose Ponzi scheme, which unraveled in 2008, defrauded investors of $50 billion in assets they had set aside for retirement and chari- table donations.

The ethical organization is characterized by a conception of ethical values and integrity as a driving force of the enterprise.49 Ethical values shape the search for opportunities, the design of organizational systems, and the decision-making process used by individuals

ethical orientation the practices that firms use to promote an ethical business culture, including ethical role models, corporate credos and codes of conduct, ethically based reward and evaluation systems, and consistently enforced ethical policies and procedures.

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and groups. They provide a common frame of reference that serves as a unifying force across different functions, lines of business, and employee groups. Organizational ethics helps to define what a company is and what it stands for.

There are many potential benefits of an ethical organization, but they are often indi- rect. Research has found somewhat inconsistent results concerning the overall relationship between ethical performance and measures of financial performance.50 However, positive relationships have generally been found between ethical performance and strong organiza- tional culture, increased employee efforts, lower turnover, higher organizational commit- ment, and enhanced social responsibility.

The advantages of a strong ethical orientation can have a positive effect on employee commitment and motivation to excel. This is particularly important in today’s knowledge- intensive organizations, where human capital is critical in creating value and competitive advantages. Positive, constructive relationships among individuals (i.e., social capital) are vital in leveraging human capital and other resources in an organization. Drawing on the concept of stakeholder management, an ethically sound organization can also strengthen its bonds among its suppliers, customers, and governmental agencies.

Integrity-Based versus Compliance-Based Approaches to Organizational Ethics Before discussing the key elements of an ethical organization, one must understand the links between organizational integrity and the personal integrity of an organization’s members.51 There cannot be high-integrity organizations without high-integrity individuals. However, individual integrity is rarely self-sustaining. Even good people can lose their bearings when faced with pressures, temptations, and heightened performance expectations in the absence of organizational support systems and ethical boundaries. Organizational integrity rests on a concept of purpose, responsibility, and ideals for an organization as a whole. An impor- tant responsibility of leadership is to create this ethical framework and develop the organi- zational capabilities to make it operational.52

Lynn Paine, an ethics scholar at Harvard, identifies two approaches: the compliance- based approach and the integrity-based approach. (See Exhibit 11.5 for a comparison of compliance-based and integrity-based strategies.) Faced with the prospect of litigation,

LO 11-6 The difference between integrity-based and compliance-based approaches to organizational ethics.

Characteristics Approach Actions

Ethos Compliance-based

Integrity-based

Conformity with externally imposed standards

Self-governance according to chosen standards

Objective Compliance-based

Integrity-based

Prevent criminal misconduct

Enable responsible conduct

Leadership Compliance-based

Integrity-based

Driven by legal office

Driven by management, with input from functional staff

Methods Compliance-based

Integrity-based

Reduced discretion, training, controls, audits, and penalties

Education, leadership, accountability, decision processes, auditing, and penalties

Behavioral Assumptions Compliance-based

Integrity-based

Individualistic, self-interested actors

Social actors, guided by a combination of self-interest, ideals, values, and social expectations

EXHIBIT 11.5 Approaches to Ethics Management

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several organizations reactively implement compliance-based ethics programs. Such pro- grams are typically designed by a corporate counsel with the goal of preventing, detecting, and punishing legal violations. But being ethical is much more than being legal, and an integrity-based approach addresses the issue of ethics in a more comprehensive manner.

An integrity-based ethics program combines a concern for law with an emphasis on man- agerial responsibility for ethical behavior. It is broader, deeper, and more demanding than a legal compliance initiative. It is broader in that it seeks to enable responsible conduct. It is deeper in that it cuts to the ethos and operating systems of an organization and its members—their core guiding values, thoughts, and actions. It is more demanding because it requires an active effort to define the responsibilities that constitute an organization’s ethical compass. Most importantly, organizational ethics is seen as the responsibility of management.

A corporate counsel may play a role in designing and implementing integrity strategies, but it is managers at all levels and across all functions who are involved in the process. Once integrated into the day-to-day operations, such strategies can prevent damaging ethical lapses, while tapping into powerful human impulses for moral thought and action. Ethics becomes the governing ethos of an organization and not burdensome constraints. Here is an example of an organization that goes beyond mere compliance to laws in building an ethical organization:

In teaching ethics to its employees, Texas Instruments, the $13 billion chip and electronics manufacturer, asks them to run an issue through the following steps: Is it legal? Is it consistent with the company’s stated values? Will the employee feel bad doing it? What will the public think if the action is reported in the press? Does the employee think it is wrong? If the employees are not sure of the ethicality of the issue, they are encouraged to ask someone until they are cleard about it. In the process, employees can approach high-level personnel and even the company’s lawyers. At TI, the question of ethics goes much beyond merely being legal. It is no surprise that this company is a benchmark for corporate ethics and has been honored as one of the World’s Most Ethical Companies by the Ethisphere Institute every year since 2007.53

Compliance-based approaches are externally motivated—that is, based on the fear of pun- ishment for doing something unlawful. On the other hand, integrity-based approaches are driven by a personal and organizational commitment to ethical behavior.

A firm must have several key elements to become a highly ethical organization:

• Role models. • Corporate credos and codes of conduct. • Reward and evaluation systems. • Policies and procedures.

These elements are highly interrelated. Reward structures and policies will be useless if leaders are not sound role models. That is, leaders who implicitly say, “Do as I say, not as I do,” will quickly have their credibility eroded and such actions will sabotage other elements that are essential to building an ethical organization.

Role Models For good or for bad, leaders are role models in their organizations. Perhaps few executives can share an experience that better illustrates this than Linda Hudson, former president of General Dynamics.54 Right after she was promoted to become the firm’s first female president, she went to Nordstrom and bought some new suits to wear to work. A lady at the store showed her how to tie a scarf in a very unique way. The day after she wore it to work, guess what: No fewer than a dozen women in the organization were wearing scarves tied exactly the same way. She realized that people were watching everything she did and said. She became more aware of the example she offered, the tone she set for the organization,

compliance-based ethics programs programs for building ethical organizations that have the goal of preventing, detecting, and punishing legal violations.

integrity-based ethics programs programs for building ethical organizations that combine a concern for law with an emphasis on managerial responsibility for ethical behavior, including (1) enabling ethical conduct; (2) examining the organization’s and members’ core guiding values, thoughts, and actions; and (3) defining the responsibilities and aspirations that constitute an organization’s ethical compass.

LO 11-7 Several key elements that organizations must have to become ethical organizations.

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and the way she carried herself. As a leader, she was the role model for many others in the organization, especially for other female managers.

Clearly, leaders must “walk the talk”; they must be consistent in their words and deeds. The values as well as the character of leaders become transparent to an organization’s employ- ees through their behaviors. When leaders do not believe in the ethical standards that they are trying to inspire, they will not be effective as good role models. Being an effective leader often includes taking responsibility for ethical lapses within the organization—even though the exec- utives themselves are not directly involved. Consider the actions of the senior executive team at AES, a $14 billion energy company. Several employees of the firm lied to the EPA about water quality at an AES-owned water treatment plant in Oklahoma. Although senior managers had no direct role in the scandal, they agreed to take pay cuts because they saw these employee actions as an indication that they hadn’t done enough to communicate AES values.

Such action enhances the loyalty and commitment of employees throughout the organization. By sharing responsibility for misdeeds, top executives—through their highly visible action—make it clear that responsibility and penalties for ethical lapses go well beyond the “guilty” parties. Such courageous behavior by leaders helps to strengthen an organization’s ethical environment.

Corporate Credos and Codes of Conduct Corporate credos and codes of conduct are mechanisms that provide statements of norms and beliefs as well as guidelines for decision making. They provide employees with a clear understanding of the organization’s policies and ethical position. Such guidelines also pro- vide the basis for employees to refuse to commit unethical acts and help to make them aware of issues before they are faced with the situation. For such codes to be truly effective, orga- nization members must be aware of them and what behavioral guidelines they contain.55

Large corporations are not the only ones to develop and use codes of conduct. For example, the Baylor College of Medicine, in Houston, has a short code of ethics that sets out basic rules. The code instructs all employees to follow Baylor’s Mission Statement, Compliance Program, and Conflict of Interest policy. The code includes basic guidelines for how employees should handle business conduct; financial and medical records; confi- dentiality; Baylor property; the workplace environment; and contact with the government.56

Reward and Evaluation Systems It is entirely possible for a highly ethical leader to preside over an organization that commits several unethical acts. How? A flaw in the organization’s reward structure may inadvertently cause individuals to act in an inappropriate manner if rewards are seen as being distributed on the basis of outcomes rather than the means by which goals and objectives are achieved.57

Generally speaking, unethical (or illegal) behaviors are also more likely to take place when competition is intense. Some researchers have called this the “dark side of competi- tion.” Consider a couple of examples:58

• Competition among educational institutions for the best students is becoming stiffer. A senior admissions officer at Claremont McKenna College resigned after admitting to inflating SAT scores of the incoming classes for six years. The motive, of course, was to boost the school’s rankings in the U.S. News & World Report’s annual listing of top colleges and universities in the United States. Carmen Nobel, who reported the incident in Working Knowledge (a Harvard Business School publication), suggested that the scandal “questions the value of competitive rankings.”

• A study of 11,000 New York vehicle emission test facilities found that companies with a greater number of local competitors passed cars with considerably high emission rates and lost customers when they failed to pass the tests. The authors of the study concluded, “In contexts when pricing is restricted, firms use illicit quality as a business strategy.”

corporate credo a statement of the beliefs typically held by managers in a corporation.

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Many companies have developed reward and evaluation systems that evaluate whether a manager is acting in an ethical manner. For example, Raytheon, a $24 billion defense contractor, incorporated the following items in its “Leadership Assessment Instrument”:59

• Maintains unequivocal commitment to honesty, truth, and ethics in every facet of behavior.

• Conforms with the letter and intent of company policies while working to affect any necessary policy changes.

• Actions are consistent with words; follows through on commitments; readily admits mistakes.

• Is trusted and inspires others to be trusted.

As noted by Dan Burnham, Raytheon’s former CEO: “What do we look for in a leader- ship candidate with respect to integrity? What we’re really looking for are people who have developed an inner gyroscope of ethical principles. We look for people for whom ethical thinking is part of what they do—no different from ‘strategic thinking’ or ‘tactical thinking.’”

Policies and Procedures Many situations that a firm faces have regular, identifiable patterns. Leaders tend to han- dle such routine by establishing a policy or procedure to be followed that can be applied uniformly to each occurrence. Such guidelines can be useful in specifying the proper rela- tionships with a firm’s customers and suppliers. For example, Levi Strauss has developed stringent global sourcing guidelines, and Chemical Bank (part of JPMorgan Chase Bank) has a policy of forbidding any review that would determine if suppliers are Chemical cus- tomers when the bank awards contracts.

Carefully developed policies and procedures guide behavior so that all employees will be encouraged to behave in an ethical manner. However, they must be reinforced with effective communication, enforcement, and monitoring, as well as sound corporate governance practices. In addition, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 provides considerable legal protection to employees of publicly traded companies who report unethical or illegal practices. Provisions in the act:60

• Make it unlawful to “discharge, demote, suspend, threaten, harass, or in any manner discriminate against ‘a whistleblower.’”

• Establish criminal penalties of up to 10 years in jail for executives who retaliate against whistleblowers.

• Require board audit committees to establish procedures for hearing whistleblower complaints.

• Allow the secretary of labor to order a company to rehire a terminated whistleblower with no court hearings whatsoever.

• Give a whistleblower the right to a jury trial, bypassing months or years of cumbersome administrative hearings.

ISSUE FOR DEBATE

Is it important that leaders be truthful and transparent with their employees and firm stakeholders? On the one hand, ethical leaders are supposed to show openness and candor with others, and to not deceive investors, partners, and employees. On the other hand, deception and even lying may be important to motivate employees and curry favor with outside stakeholders.

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Focusing on employees, research going as far back as the mid-20th century shows that positive feedback, even bogus positive feedback, motivates people to strive to live up with that prior feedback. This has been labeled the Pygmalion Effect. When leaders provide guidance that they believe followers have the potential to be high performers, people strive to meet those expectations. This has been found with students who receive fake test results, sales people who receive strong goals, and military personnel who are given demanding expectations. Additionally, if leaders speak highly about employees to other supervisors, those supervisors treat these employees better. But to do this, leaders must deliver inflated or bogus information to or about their followers. Thus, if leaders want followers to excel beyond their basic capabilities, these leaders will have to say things they may not believe. This may trigger employee growth, but it can also leave employees feeling that leaders are not authentic.

Turning to other firm stakeholders, investors and potential business partners want firms to be open and honest with them. But investors want to invest in and partner firms want to work with firms that are seen as strong and healthy. This creates a tension for corporate managers. If they are truthful, they increase the likelihood that others will trust them, but if leaders successfully convey optimism and confidence, even when it isn’t truthful, they can attract support from investors and cooperation from business partners. This support, in turn, can help lead to the success that the leaders try to project. However, if leaders project unwarranted confidence and underdeliver on outcomes, they can erode their legitimacy as leaders.

So, should leaders be truthful or deceptive?

Discussion Questions 1. Is employing deception with employees or firm stakeholders unethical? 2. In what ways can deception pay off for executives? In what ways is it dangerous? 3. Jeffrey Pfeffer, a management scholar, has argued that leaders should be trained to be decep-

tive. Do you agree or disagree?

Sources: Pfeffer, J. 2016. Why deception is probably the single most important leadership skill. fortune.com. June 2: np; and, Kerr, J. 2014. The trickle-down effect of deceptive leadership. inc.com. November 12: np.

Reflecting on Career Implications . . . This chapter examines the skills and activities associated with effective organizational leadership. The questions below challenge you to observe and learn from leaders of firms in which you work and outline issues to consider as you develop your own leadership skills.

Strategic Leadership: The chapter identifies three interdependent activities that are central to strategic leadership; namely, setting direction, designing the organization, and nurturing a culture dedicated to excellence and ethical behavior. Both during your life as a student and in organizations at which you have worked, you have often assumed leadership positions. To what extent have you consciously and successfully engaged in each of these activities? Observe the leaders in your organization and assess to what extent you can learn from them the qualities of strategic leadership that you can use to advance your own career.

Power: Identify the sources of power used by your superior at work. How do this person’s primary source of power and the

way he or she uses it affect your own creativity, morale, and willingness to stay with the organization? In addition, identify approaches you will use to enhance your power as you move up your career ladder. Explain why you chose these approaches.

Emotional Intelligence: The chapter identifies the five components of emotional intelligence (self-awareness, self- regulation, motivation, empathy, and social skills). How do you rate yourself on each of these components? What steps can you take to improve your emotional intelligence and achieve greater career success?

Creating an Ethical Organization: Identify an ethical dilemma that you personally faced in the course of your work. How did you respond to it? Was your response compliance-based, integrity- based, or even unethical? If your behavior was compliance- based, speculate on how it would have been different if it were integrity-based. What have you learned from your experience that would make you a more ethical leader in the future?

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Strategic leadership is vital in ensuring that strategies are formulated and implemented in an effective manner. Leaders must play a central role in performing three critical and interdependent activities: setting the

direction, designing the organization, and nurturing a culture committed to excellence and ethical behavior. If leaders ignore or are ineffective at performing any one of the three, the organization will not be very successful. We identified two elements of leadership that contribute to success—overcoming barriers to change and using power effectively.

For leaders to effectively fulfill their activities, emotional intelligence (EI) is very important. Five elements that contribute to EI are self-awareness, self-regulation, motivation, empathy, and social skill. The first three elements pertain to self-management skills, whereas the last two are associated with a person’s ability to manage relationships with others. We addressed some of the potential drawbacks from the ineffective use of EI. These include the dysfunctional use of power as well as a tendency to become overly empathetic, which may result in unreasonably lowered performance expectations.

Leaders need to play a central role in creating a learning organization. Gone are the days when the top-level managers “think” and everyone else in the organization “does.” With rapidly changing, unpredictable, and complex competitive environments, leaders must engage everyone in the ideas and energies of people throughout the organization. Great ideas can come from anywhere in the organization—from the executive suite to the factory f loor. The five elements that we discussed as central to a learning organization are inspiring and motivating people with a mission or purpose, empowering people at all levels throughout the organization, accumulating and sharing internal knowledge, gathering external information, and challenging the status quo to stimulate creativity.

In the final section of the chapter, we addressed a leader’s central role in instilling ethical behavior in the organization. We discussed the enormous costs that firms face when ethical crises arise—costs in terms of financial and reputational loss as well as the erosion of human capital and relationships with suppliers, customers, society at large, and governmental agencies. And, as we would expect, the benefits of having a strong ethical organization are also numerous. We contrasted compliance-based and integrity-based approaches to organizational ethics. Compliance-based approaches are largely externally motivated; that is, they are motivated by the fear of punishment for doing something that is unlawful. Integrity-based approaches, on the other hand, are driven by a personal and organizational commitment to ethical behavior. We also addressed the four key elements of an ethical organization: role models, corporate credos

and codes of conduct, reward and evaluation systems, and policies and procedures.

SUMMARY REVIEW QUESTIONS 1. Three key activities—setting a direction, designing

the organization, and nurturing a culture and ethics—are all part of what effective leaders do on a regular basis. Explain how these three activities are interrelated.

2. Define emotional intelligence (EI). What are the key elements of EI? Why is EI so important to successful strategic leadership? Address potential “downsides.”

3. The knowledge a firm possesses can be a source of competitive advantage. Describe ways that a firm can continuously learn to maintain its competitive position.

4. How can the five central elements of “learning organizations” be incorporated into global companies?

5. What are the benefits to firms and their shareholders of conducting business in an ethical manner?

6. Firms that fail to behave in an ethical manner can incur high costs. What are these costs, and what is their source?

7. What are the most important differences between an “integrity organization” and a “compliance organization” in a firm’s approach to organizational ethics?

8. What are some of the important mechanisms for promoting ethics in a firm?

summary

leadership 334 setting a direction 335 designing the

organization 335 excellent and ethical

organizational culture 336 barriers to change 338 vested interest in the

status quo 338 systemic barriers 338 behavioral barriers 338 political barriers 339 personal time constraints 339 power 339

organizational bases of power 340

personal bases of power 340 emotional intelligence

(EI) 341 learning organizations 345 benchmarking 347 competitive

benchmarking 347 functional

benchmarking 347 ethics 348 organizational ethics 348 ethical orientation 349 compliance-based ethics

programs 351 integrity-based ethics

programs 351 corporate credo 352

key terms

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Emotional Intelligence Characteristics Admired Leader Leader Not Admired

Self-awareness

Self-regulation

Motivation

Empathy

Social skills

EXPERIENTIAL EXERCISE Select two well-known business leaders—one you admire and one you do not. Evaluate each of them on the five characteristics of emotional intelligence in the table below.

APPLICATION QUESTIONS & EXERCISES 1. Identify two CEOs whose leadership you admire.

What is it about their skills, attributes, and effective use of power that causes you to admire them?

2. Founders have an important role in developing their organization’s culture and values. At times, their influence persists for many years. Identify and describe two organizations in which the cultures and values established by the founder(s) continue to flourish. You may find research on the Internet helpful in answering this question.

3. Some leaders place a great emphasis on developing superior human capital. In what ways does this help a firm to develop and sustain competitive advantages?

4. In this chapter we discussed the five elements of a “learning organization.” Select a firm with which you are familiar and discuss whether or not it epitomizes some (or all) of these elements.

ETHICS QUESTIONS 1. Sometimes organizations must go outside the firm to

hire talent, thus bypassing employees already working for the firm. Are there conditions under which this might raise ethical considerations?

2. Ethical crises can occur in virtually any organization. Describe some of the systems, procedures, and processes that can help to prevent such crises.

1. Dolan, K. 2014. How to blow $9 billion. Forbes, July 21: 74–77; Woo, E. 2002. Peter Stroh, 74, head of brewery, philanthropist. latimes.com, September 21: np; and Anonymous. 2014. How to lose $700 million: The rise and fall of Stroh’s. finance.yahoo.com, July 15: np.

2. Charan, R. & Colvin, G. 1999. Why CEOs fail. Fortune, June 21: 68–78.

3. Yukl, G. 2008. How leaders influence organizational effectiveness. Leadership Quarterly, 19(6): 708–722.

4. These three activities and our discussion draw from Kotter, J. P. 1990. What leaders really do. Harvard Business Review, 68(3): 103–111; Pearson, A. E. 1990. Six basics for general managers. Harvard Business Review, 67(4): 94–101; and Covey, S. R. 1996. Three roles of the leader in the new paradigm. In Hesselbein, F., Goldsmith, M., & Beckhard, R. (Eds.), The leader of the future: 149–160. San Francisco: Jossey-Bass. Some of the discussion of each of the three leadership activity concepts

draws on Dess, G. G. & Miller, A. 1993. Strategic management: 320– 325. New York: McGraw-Hill.

5. García-Morales, V. J., Lloréns- Montes, F. J., & Verdú-Jover, A. J. 2008. The effects of transformational leadership on organizational performance through knowledge and innovation. British Journal of Management, 19(4): 299–319.

6. Martin, R. 2010. The execution trap. Harvard Business Review, 88(7/8): 64–71.

7. Collins, J. 1997. What comes next? Inc., October: 34–45.

8. Hsieh, T. 2010. Zappos’s CEO on going to extremes for customers. Harvard Business Review, 88(7/8): 41–44.

9. Chesky, B. 2014. Don’t f*ck up the culture. linkedin.com, April 24: np.

10. Anonymous. 2006. Looking out for number one. BusinessWeek, October 30: 66.

11. Schaffer, R. H. 2010. Mistakes leaders keep making. Harvard Business Review, 88(9): 86–91.

12. For insightful perspectives on escalation, refer to Brockner, J. 1992. The escalation of commitment to a failing course of action. Academy of Management Review, 17(1): 39–61; and Staw, B. M. 1976. Knee- deep in the big muddy: A study of commitment to a chosen course of action. Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, 16: 27–44. The discussion of systemic, behavioral, and political barriers draws on Lorange, P. & Murphy, D. 1984. Considerations in implementing strategic control. Journal of Business Strategy, 5: 27–35. In a similar vein, Noel M. Tichy has addressed three types of resistance to change in the context of General Electric: technical resistance, political resistance, and cultural resistance. See Tichy, N. M. 1993. Revolutionalize your company.

REFERENCES

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Fortune, December 13: 114–118. Examples draw from O’Reilly, B. 1997. The secrets of America’s most admired corporations: New ideas and new products. Fortune, March 3: 60–64.

13. This section draws on Champoux, J. E. 2000. Organizational behavior: Essential tenets for a new millennium. London: South-Western; and The mature use of power in organizations. 2003. RHR International-Executive Insights, May 29, 12.19.168.197/ execinsights/8-3.htm.

14. An insightful perspective on the role of power and politics in organizations is provided in Ciampa, K. 2005. Almost ready: How leaders move up. Harvard Business Review, 83(1): 46–53.

15. Pfeffer, J. 2010. Power play. Harvard Business Review, 88(7/8): 84–92.

16. Westphal, J. D., & Graebner, M. E. 2010. A matter of appearances: How corporate leaders manage the impressions of financial analysts about the conduct of their boards. Academy of Management Journal, 53(4): 15–44.

17. A discussion of the importance of persuasion in bringing about change can be found in Garvin, D. A. & Roberto, M. A. 2005. Change through persuasion. Harvard Business Review, 83(4): 104–113.

18. Lorsch, J. W. & Tierney, T. J. 2002. Aligning the stars: How to succeed when professionals drive results. Boston: Harvard Business School Press.

19. Some consider EI to be a “trait,” that is, an attribute that is stable over time. However, many authors, including Daniel Goleman, have argued that it can be developed through motivation, extended practice, and feedback. For example, in D. Goleman, 1998, What makes a leader? Harvard Business Review, 76(5): 97, Goleman addresses this issue in a sidebar: “Can emotional intelligence be learned?”

20. For a review of this literature, see Daft, R. 1999. Leadership: Theory and practice. Fort Worth, TX: Dryden Press.

21. EI has its roots in the concept of “social intelligence” that was first identified by E. L. Thorndike in 1920 (Intelligence and its uses. Harper’s Magazine, 140: 227–235). Psychologists have been uncovering other intelligences for some time now and have grouped them into such clusters as abstract intelligence (the ability to understand and manipulate verbal and mathematical symbols),

concrete intelligence (the ability to understand and manipulate objects), and social intelligence (the ability to understand and relate to people). See Ruisel, I. 1992. Social intelligence: Conception and methodological problems. Studia Psychologica, 34(4–5): 281–296. Refer to trochim. human.cornell.edu/gallery.

22. Joseph, D. & Newman, D. 2010. Emotional intelligence: An integrative meta-analysis and cascading model. Journal of Applied Psychology, 95(1): 54–78; Brusman, M. 2013. Leadership effectiveness through emotional intelligence. workingresourcesblog.com, September 18: np; and Bradberry, T. 2015. Why your boss lacks emotional intelligence. forbes.com, January 6: np.

23. Tate, B. 2008. A longitudinal study of the relationships among self- monitoring, authentic leadership, and perceptions of leadership. Journal of Leadership & Organizational Studies, 15(1): 16–29.

24. Moss, S. A., Dowling, N., & Callanan, J. 2009. Towards an integrated model of leadership and self-regulation. Leadership Quarterly, 20(2): 162–176.

25. An insightful perspective on leadership, which involves discovering, developing, and celebrating what is unique about each individual, is found in Buckingham, M. 2005. What great managers do. Harvard Business Review, 83(3): 70–79.

26. Muoio, A. 1998. Decisions, decisions. fastcompany.com, September 30: np.

27. This section draws upon Klemp. G. 2005. Emotional intelligence and leadership: What really matters. Cambria Consulting, Inc., www. cambriaconsulting.com.

28. Heifetz, R. 2004. Question authority. Harvard Business Review, 82(1): 37.

29. Senge, P. M. 1990. The leader’s new work: Building learning organizations. Sloan Management Review, 32(1): 7–23.

30. Bernoff, J. & Schandler, T. 2010. Empowered. Harvard Business Review, 88(7/8): 94–101.

31. Hannah, S. T. & Lester, P. B. 2009. A multilevel approach to building and leading learning organizations. Leadership Quarterly, 20(1): 34–48.

32. For some guidance on how to effectively bring about change in organizations, refer to Wall, S. J. 2005. The protean organization: Learning to love change.

Organizational Dynamics, 34(1): 37–46.

33. Covey, S. R. 1989. The seven habits of highly effective people: Powerful lessons in personal change. New York: Simon & Schuster.

34. Melrose, K. 1995. Making the grass greener on your side: A CEO’s journey to leading by servicing. San Francisco: Barrett-Koehler.

35. Tekleab, A. G., Sims, H. P., Jr., Yun, S., Tesluk, P. E., & Cox, J. 2008. Are we on the same page? Effects of self-awareness of empowering and transformational leadership. Journal of Leadership & Organizational Studies, 14(3): 185–201.

36. Helgesen, S. 1996. Leading from the grass roots. In Hesselbein et al., The leader of the future: 19–24. San Francisco: Jossey-Bass.

37. Bowen, D. E. & Lawler, E. E., III. 1995. Empowering service employees. Sloan Management Review, 37: 73–84.

38. Schafer, S. 1997. Battling a labor shortage? It’s all in your imagination. Inc., August: 24.

39. Meyer, P. 1998. So you want the president’s job . . . Business Horizons, January–February: 2–8.

40. The introductory discussion of benchmarking draws on Miller, A. 1998. Strategic management: 142–143. New York: McGraw-Hill.

41. Sedgwick, D. 2014. Ford and suppliers jointly benchmark competitors’ vehicles. automotivenews. com, October 19: np.

42. Main, J. 1992. How to steal the best ideas around. Fortune, October 19: 102–106.

43. Sheff, D. 1996. Levi’s changes everything. Fast Company, June–July: 65–74.

44. Holt, J. W. 1996. Celebrate your mistakes. New York: McGraw-Hill.

45. McGregor, J. 2006. How failure breeds success. Bloomberg Businessweek, July 10: 42–52.

46. Sitkin, S. 1992. Learning through failure: The strategy of small losses. Research in Organizational Behavior 14: 231–266.

47. This opening discussion draws upon Conley, J. H. 2000. Ethics in business. In Helms, M. M. (Ed.), Encyclopedia of management (4th ed.): 281–285. Farmington Hills, MI: Gale Group; Paine, L. S. 1994. Managing for organizational integrity. Harvard Business Review, 72(2): 106– 117; and Carlson, D. S. & Perrewe, P. L. 1995. Institutionalization of organizational ethics through transformational leadership. Journal of Business Ethics, 14: 829–838.

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48. Pinto, J., Leana, C. R., & Pil, F. K. 2008. Corrupt organizations or organizations of corrupt individuals? Two types of organization-level corruption. Academy of Management Review, 33(3): 685–709.

49. Soule, E. 2002. Managerial moral strategies—In search of a few good principles. Academy of Management Review, 27(1): 114–124.

50. Carlson & Perrewe, op. cit. 51. This discussion is based upon Paine,

Managing for organizational integrity; Paine, L. S. 1997. Cases in leadership, ethics, and organizational integrity: A Strategic approach. Burr Ridge, IL: Irwin; and Fontrodona, J. 2002. Business ethics across the Atlantic. Business Ethics Direct, www.ethicsa. org/BED_art_fontrodone.html.

52. For more on operationalizing capabilities to sustain an ethical framework, see Largay, J. A., III, & Zhang, R. 2008. Do CEOs worry about being fired when making investment decisions? Academy of Management Perspectives, 22(1): 60–61.

53. See www.ti.com/corp/docs/company/ citizen/ethics/benchmark.shtml; and www.ti.com/corp/docs/company/ citizen/ethics/quicktest.shtml.

54. Bryant, A. 2011. The corner office: 91. New York: St. Martin’s Griffin.

55. For an insightful, academic perspective on the impact of ethics codes on executive decision making, refer to Stevens, J. M., Steensma, H. K., Harrison, D. A., & Cochran, P. S. 2005. Symbolic or substantive

document? The influence of ethics code on financial executives’ decisions. Strategic Management Journal, 26(2): 181–195.

56. media.bcm.edu/documents/2015/94/ bcm-code-of-conduct-final-june-2015.pdf.

57. For a study on the effects of goal setting on unethical behavior, read Schweitzer, M. E., Ordonez, L., & Douma, B. 2004. Goal setting as a motivator of unethical behavior. Academy of Management Journal, 47(3): 422–432.

58. Williams, R. 2012. How competition can encourage unethical business practices. business.financialpost.com, July 31: np.

59. Fulmer, R. M. 2004. The challenge of ethical leadership. Organizational Dynamics, 33(3): 307–317.

60. www.sarbanes-oxley.com.

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Chapter

After reading this chapter, you should have a good understanding of the following learning objectives:

12

LO12-1 The importance of implementing strategies and practices that foster innovation.

LO12-2 The challenges and pitfalls of managing corporate innovation processes. LO12-3 How corporations use new venture teams, business incubators, and

product champions to create an internal environment and culture that promote entrepreneurial development.

LO12-4 How corporate entrepreneurship achieves both financial goals and strategic goals.

LO12-5 The benefits and potential drawbacks of real options analysis in making resource deployment decisions in corporate entrepreneurship contexts.

LO12-6 How an entrepreneurial orientation can enhance a firm’s efforts to develop promising corporate venture initiatives.

Managing Innovation and Fostering Corporate Entrepreneurship

©Anatoli Styf/Shutterstock

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If you ask a group of students to name a successful company, Google is likely to be one of the first firms mentioned. It dominates online search and advertising, has developed a successful browser, and developed the operating system that powers 82 percent of the smartphones sold in the fourth quarter of 2016.1 Its success is evident in its stock price, which rose from about $150 in early 2009 to over $525 a share in early 2015. But that doesn’t mean that Google has been successful at all it has tried. One of Google’s most notable failures occurred when it tried to venture outside the online and wireless markets. In 2006, Google decided to expand its advertising business to radio advertising. After spending several hundred million dollars on its entrepreneurial effort in the radio advertising market, Google pulled the plug on this business in 2009.

Google saw great potential in applying its business model to the radio advertising industry. In the traditional radio advertising model, companies that wished to advertise their products and services contracted with an advertising agency to develop a set of radio spots (commercials). They then bought blocks of advertising time from radio stations. Advertisers paid based on the number of listeners on each station. Google believed that it could develop a stronger model. Its design was to purchase large blocks of advertising time from stations. It would then sell the time in a competitive auction to companies that wished to advertise. Google believed it could sell ad time to advertisers at a higher rate if it could identify what ads on what stations had the greatest impact for advertisers. Thus, rather than charging based on audience size, Google would follow the model it used on the web and charge based on ad effectiveness. To develop the competency to measure ad effectiveness, Google purchased dMarc, a company that developed technology to manage and measure radio ads, for $102 million.

Google’s overall vision was even broader. The company also planned to enter print and TV advertising. It could then provide a “dashboard” to marketing executives at firms that would provide information on the effectiveness of advertising on the web, on TV, in print, and on radio. Google would then sell them a range of advertising space among all four to maximize a firm’s ad expenditures.

However, Google found that its attempt to innovate the radio market bumped up against two core challenges. First, the radio advertising model was based much more on relationships than online advertising was. Radio stations, advertising firms, and advertising agencies had long-standing relationships that limited Google’s ability to break into the market. In fact, few radio stations were willing to sell advertising time to Google. Also, advertising agencies saw Google as a threat to their business model and were unwilling to buy time from Google. Second, Google found that its ability to measure the effectiveness of radio ads was limited. Unlike the case with online markets, where it could measure whether people clicked on ads, the company found it difficult to measure whether listeners responded to ads. Google tried ads that mentioned specific websites that listeners could go to, but it found few people accessed these sites. In the end, Google was able to sell radio time at only a fraction of what radio stations could get from working their traditional advertising deals. This led stations to abandon Google’s radio business.

Google found that it had the initiative to innovate the radio market but didn’t have the knowledge, experience, or social connections needed to win in this market.

Discussion Questions 1. Why didn’t the lessons Google learned in the online advertising market apply to the radio market? 2. Radio is increasingly moving to satellite and streaming systems. Is this a new opportunity for

Google, or should it steer clear of radio altogether?

LEARNING FROM MISTAKES

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Managing change is one of the most important functions performed by strategic lead- ers. There are two major avenues through which companies can expand or improve their business— innovation and corporate entrepreneurship. These two activities go hand-in-hand because they both have similar aims. The first is strategic renewal. Innovations help an orga- nization stay fresh and reinvent itself as conditions in the business environment change. This is why managing innovation is such an important strategic implementation issue. The second is the pursuit of venture opportunities. Innovative breakthroughs, as well as new product con- cepts, evolving technologies, and shifting demand, create opportunities for corporate ventur- ing. In this chapter we will explore these topics—how change and innovation can stimulate strategic renewal and foster corporate entrepreneurship.

MANAGING INNOVATION One of the most important sources of growth opportunities is innovation. Innovation involves using new knowledge to transform organizational processes or create commercially viable products and services. The sources of new knowledge may include the latest technology, the results of experiments, creative insights, or competitive information. However it comes about, innovation occurs when new combinations of ideas and information bring about positive change.

The emphasis on newness is a key point. For example, for a patent application to have any chance of success, one of the most important attributes it must possess is novelty. You can’t patent an idea that has been copied. This is a central idea. In fact, the root of the word innovation is the Latin novus, which means “new.” Innovation involves introducing or changing to something new.2

Among the most important sources of new ideas is new technology. Technology creates new possibilities. Technology provides the raw material that firms use to make innovative products and services. But technology is not the only source of innovations. There can be innovations in human resources, firm infrastructure, marketing, service, or many other value-adding areas that have little to do with anything “high-tech.” Strategy Spotlight 12.1 highlights a simple but very successful innovation by Kraft Heinz with its MiO Drops.

Types of Innovation Although innovations are not always high-tech, changes in technology can be an important source of change and growth. When an innovation is based on a sweeping new technol- ogy, it often has a more far-reaching impact. Sometimes even a small innovation can add value and create competitive advantages. Innovation can and should occur throughout an organization— in every department and all aspects of the value chain.

One distinction that is often used when discussing innovation is between process innova- tion and product innovation.3 Product innovation refers to efforts to create product designs and applications of technology to develop new products for end users. Recall from Chapter 5 how generic strategies were typically different depending on the stage of the industry life cycle. Product innovations tend to be more common during the earlier stages of an indus- try’s life cycle. Product innovations are also commonly associated with a differentiation strategy. Firms that differentiate by providing customers with new products or services that offer unique features or quality enhancements often engage in product innovation.

Process innovation, by contrast, is typically associated with improving the efficiency of an organizational process, especially manufacturing systems and operations. By drawing on new technologies and an organization’s accumulated experience (Chapter 5), firms can often improve materials utilization, shorten cycle time, and increase quality. Process inno- vations are more likely to occur in the later stages of an industry’s life cycle as companies seek ways to remain viable in markets where demand has flattened out and competition

innovation the use of new knowledge to transform organizational processes or create commercially viable products and services.

product innovation efforts to create product designs and applications of technology to develop new products for end users.

process innovation efforts to improve the efficiency of organizational processes, especially manufacturing systems and operations.

LO 12-1 The importance of implementing strategies and practices that foster innovation.

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12.1 STRATEGY SPOTLIGHT MIO DROPS CHANGE THE BEVERAGE GAME Sometimes relatively small innovations can create significant changes to markets. Kraft Heinz came up with such a change in 2011 when it introduced MiO drops. Kraft Heinz had long had a major stake in the drink mix market with its Crystal Light and Kool Aid powdered beverage brands. Although the MiO product is a relatively incremental innovation, with it Kraft Heinz created an entirely new beverage category, liquid water enhancers. Within three years of its introduction, MiO was a $400 million dollar business for Kraft Heinz and was projected to grow to over $1 billion as Kraft Heinz expanded the product into global markets. Kraft Heinz called MiO “one of the most successful new product introductions” in its history. Kraft Heinz also received a number of innovation awards with MiO, includ- ing Walmart’s Innovation of the Year Award in 2011 and a Gold Medal Edison Innovation Award in 2012. With MiO’s commer- cial and critical success, it is not surprising to see a number of imitative products, such as Dasani Drops and Powerade Drops

by Coke, Hawaiian Punch and Crush Drops from Dr Pepper, and Aquafina Splash from Pepsi. But MiO continues to be the mar- ket leader.

What insights led Kraft Heinz to develop this product? Kraft Heinz believed there was an opportunity with Millennial con- sumers who appeared to be more concerned with health and wellness than prior generations. They were moving away from traditional sweetened drinks and were open to alternative fla- vored beverages. Additionally, Kraft Heinz thought that a prod- uct that allowed customers to tailor the degree of flavoring and sweetening as well as a product that could easily be offered in a wide range of flavors would resonate with what Kraft Heinz saw as Millennials’ desire for individual expression. Becky McAnich, MiO’s marketing director, puts it this way: “Millennials really per- sonalize every part of their life,” and MiO “embraces their indi- viduality, that customization.” Sources: Clements, M. 2013. Kraft’s breakthrough innovation with MiO: Marketing to millennials. chicagonow.com. February 6: np; and, Latif, R. 2014. Everyone’s looking for the big squeeze. bevnet.com. March 28: np.

is more intense. As a result, process innovations are often associated with overall cost leader strategies, because the aim of many process improvements is to lower the costs of operations.

Another way to view the impact of an innovation is in terms of its degree of innovative- ness, which falls somewhere on a continuum that extends from incremental to radical.4

• Radical innovations produce fundamental changes by evoking major departures from existing practices. These breakthrough innovations usually occur because of technological change. They tend to be highly disruptive and can transform a company or even revolutionize a whole industry. They may lead to products or processes that can be patented, giving a firm a strong competitive advantage. Examples include electricity, the telephone, the transistor, desktop computers, fiber optics, artificial intelligence, and genetically engineered drugs.

• Incremental innovations enhance existing practices or make small improvements in products and processes. They may represent evolutionary applications within existing paradigms of earlier, more radical innovations. Because they often sustain a company by extending or expanding its product line or manufacturing skills, incremental innovations can be a source of competitive advantage by providing new capabilities that minimize expenses or speed productivity. Examples include frozen food, sports drinks, steel-belted radial tires, electronic bookkeeping, shatterproof glass, and digital thermometers.

Some innovations are highly radical; others are only slightly incremental. But most inno- vations fall somewhere between these two extremes (see Exhibit 12.1).

Harvard Business School Professor Clayton M. Christensen identified another useful approach to characterize types of innovations.5 Christensen draws a distinction between sus- taining and disruptive innovations. Sustaining innovations are those that extend sales in an exist- ing market, usually by enabling new products or services to be sold at higher margins. Such innovations may include either incremental or radical innovations. For example, smartphone

radical innovation an innovation that fundamentally changes existing practices.

incremental innovation an innovation that enhances existing practices or makes small improvements in products and processes.

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technology was a breakthrough innovation that transformed how people access the Internet. But rather than disrupting the business of Google and Facebook, the rise of the smartphone offered these service providers new opportunities to extend their reach into users’ lives.

By contrast, disruptive innovations are those that overturn markets by providing an alto- gether new approach to meeting customer needs. The features of a disruptive innovation make it somewhat counterintuitive. Disruptive innovations:

• Are technologically simpler and less sophisticated than currently available products or services.

• Appeal to less demanding customers who are seeking more convenient, less expensive solutions.

• Take time to take effect and only become disruptive once they have taken root in a new market or low-end part of an existing market.

For example, streaming services, such as Hulu and Amazon Prime Video, have disrupted established cable and satellite systems by providing a more limited but more efficient distri- bution system for entertainment content. Similarly, sharing services in short-term housing, such as Airbnb, are offering a disruptive innovation that is a strong challenge to the hotel industry. “Instead of sustaining the trajectory of improvement that has been established in a market,” says Christensen, a disruptive innovation “disrupts it and redefines it by bringing to the market something that is simpler.”6

Innovation is both a force in the external environment (technology, competition) and a factor affecting a firm’s internal choices (generic strategy, value-adding activities).7 Nevertheless, innovation can be quite difficult for some firms to manage, especially those that have become comfortable with the status quo.

Challenges of Innovation Innovation is essential to sustaining competitive advantages. Recall from Chapter 3 that one of the four elements of the balanced scorecard is the innovation and learning perspective. The extent and success of a company’s innovation efforts are indicators of its overall perfor- mance. As management guru Peter Drucker warned, “An established company which, in an age demanding innovation, is not capable of innovation is doomed to decline and extinction.”8 In today’s competitive environment, most firms have only one choice: “Innovate or die.”

As with change, however, firms are often resistant to innovation. Only those companies that actively pursue innovation, even though it is often difficult and uncertain, will get a pay- off from their innovation efforts. But managing innovation is challenging.9 As former Pfizer

LO 12-2 The challenges and pitfalls of managing corporate innovation processes.

EXHIBIT 12.1 Continuum of Radical and Incremental Innovations

Radical Innovation

Fiber-optic cable

Laparoscopic “keyhole” surgery

Speech recognition software

Polyester Enterprise resource planning (ERP)

Frozen yogurt

Internet browser

Online auction exchanges

Bubble wrap

Incremental Innovation

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former chairman and CEO William Steere puts it: “In some ways, managing innovation is analogous to breaking in a spirited horse. You are never sure of success until you achieve your goal. In the meantime, everyone takes a few lumps.”10

What is it that makes innovation so difficult? The uncertainty about outcomes is one fac- tor. Companies are often reluctant to invest time and resources in activities with an unknown future. Another factor is that the innovation process involves so many choices. These choices present five dilemmas that companies must wrestle with when pursuing innovation:11

• Seeds versus weeds. Most companies have an abundance of innovative ideas. They must decide which of these is most likely to bear fruit—the “seeds”—and which should be cast aside—the “weeds.” This is complicated by the fact that some innovation projects require a considerable level of investment before a firm can fully evaluate whether they are worth pursuing. Firms need a mechanism with which they can choose among various innovation projects.

• Experience versus initiative. Companies must decide who will lead an innovation project. Senior managers may have experience and credibility but tend to be more risk-averse. Midlevel employees, who may be the innovators themselves, may have more enthusiasm because they can see firsthand how an innovation would address specific problems. Firms need to support and reward organizational members who bring new ideas to light.

• Internal versus external staffing. Innovation projects need competent staffs to succeed. People drawn from inside the company may have greater social capital and know the organization’s culture and routines. But this knowledge may actually inhibit them from thinking outside the box. Staffing innovation projects with external personnel requires that project managers justify the hiring and spend time recruiting, training, and relationship building. Firms need to streamline and support the process of staffing innovation efforts.

• Building capabilities versus collaborating. Innovation projects often require new sets of skills. Firms can seek help from other departments and/or partner with other companies that bring resources and experience as well as share costs of development. However, such arrangements can create dependencies and inhibit internal skills development. Further, struggles over who contributed the most or how the benefits of the project are to be allocated may arise. Firms need a mechanism for forging links with outside parties to the innovation process.

• Incremental versus preemptive launch. Companies must manage the timing and scale of new innovation projects. An incremental launch is less risky because it requires fewer resources and serves as a market test. But a launch that is too tentative can undermine the project’s credibility. It also opens the door for a competitive response. A large-scale launch requires more resources, but it can effectively preempt a competitive response. Firms need to make funding and management arrangements that allow for projects to hit the ground running, and they need to be responsive to market feedback.

These dilemmas highlight why the innovation process can be daunting even for highly successful firms. Strategy Spotlight 12.2 discusses how Procter & Gamble has been strug- gling with these challenges to improve its innovativeness. Next, we consider five steps that firms can take to improve the innovation process within the firm.12

Cultivating Innovation Skills Some firms, such as Apple, Google, and Amazon, regularly produce innovative products and services, while other firms struggle to generate new, marketable products. What sepa- rates these innovative firms from the rest of the pack? Jeff Dyer, Hal Gregersen, and Clayton Christensen argue it is the innovative DNA of the leaders of these firms.13 The leaders of these firms have exhibited “discovery skills” that allow them to see the potential

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12.2 STRATEGY SPOTLIGHT PROCTER & GAMBLE STRIVES TO REMAIN INNOVATIVE From the development of Ivory Soap in 1879; to Crisco Oil, the first all-vegetable shortening, in 1911; to Crest, the first fluo- ridated toothpaste in 1955; to the stackable Pringles chips in 1968; to the Swiffer mop in 1998, Procter & Gamble (P&G) has long been known as a successful innovative firm. It led the mar- ket with these products and used these innovative products to build up its position as a differentiated consumer products firm. By all measures, P&G is a very successful company and was hon- ored as the Fifth Most Admired Company by Fortune magazine in 2012. Still, P&G has found it challenging to remain innovative. The last major innovative blockbuster product P&G launched was Crest Whitestrips, and this product was introduced in 2001. Instead, in recent years, its new products have been extensions of current products, such as adding whitening flecks to Crest toothpaste, or derivatives of current products, such as taking the antihistamine in Nyquil and using it as a sleeping aid, labeled ZzzQuil. With ZzzQuil, P&G is not an innovator in this market, since there were a number of earlier entrants in the sleep mar- ket, such as Johnson & Johnson with its Tylenol PM product. One portfolio manager at a mutual fund derided the ZzzQuil product, saying, “It’s a sign of what passes for innovation at P&G. It’s not enough. It’s incremental, derivative.”

The factors leading to P&G’s struggles to remain innovative should not be surprising. They largely grow out of the success

the firm has had. First, with its wide range of products, P&G has a wide range of potential new product extensions and derivatives from which to choose. Though these are unlikely to be block- busters, they look much safer than truly new innovative ideas. Second, while lower-level managers at P&G may be excited about new, innovative ideas, the division heads of P&G units, who are responsible for developing new products, are likely to shy away from big-bet product launches. These unit heads are also responsible for and rewarded on current division per- formance, a metric that will be negatively affected by the large costs associated with developing and marketing truly innova- tive new products. Third, due to its large size, P&G moved R&D responsibilities down to the divisions. While this enhances the divisions’ abilities to quickly launch incrementally new products, it doesn’t facilitate the collaboration across units often needed to develop boldly new products.

P&G is trying to address these issues by centralizing 20 to 30 percent of its research efforts within a new corporate-level business creation and innovation unit. Having a corporate effort at innovation separates the budget for product development from divisional profit numbers, enhancing the firm’s willingness to invest in long-term product development efforts. Also, the cor- porate unit will be able to foster collaboration between units to develop blockbuster products. Sources: Coleman-Lochner, L. & Hymowitz, C. 2012. At P&G, the innovation well runs dry. Bloomberg Businessweek, September 10: 24–26; and Bussey, J. 2012. The innovator’s enigma. wsj.com, October 4: np.

in innovations and to move the organization forward in leveraging the value of those inno- vations.14 These leaders spend 50 percent more time on these discovery activities than the leaders of less innovative firms. To improve their innovative processes, firms need to culti- vate the innovation skills of their managers.

The key attribute that firms need to develop in their managers in order to improve their innovative potential is creative intelligence. Creative intelligence is driven by a core skill of associating—the ability to see patterns in data and integrate different questions, informa- tion, and insights—and four patterns of action: questioning, observing, experimenting, and networking. As managers practice the four patterns of action, they will begin to develop the skill of association. To illustrate how the actions of individuals will affect their ability to develop innovative ideas, imagine the following scenario:

You and a co-worker are both tasked with developing innovative ideas for your firm and then presenting your ideas to firm management in a week. You dedicate each evening to developing innovative ideas and sit at your kitchen table, writing down any ideas that pop into your head. Your co-worker talks with 10 people about the task, including an artist friend, an engineer, a marketing executive, three co-workers from your company, two customers, and two employees from a competing firm. She also visits three local entrepreneurial firms and observes their operations, and tries out four newly introduced product in other product markets. She shares three prototype ideas with four friends, and asks people, “What if I added this capability?” and “What don’t you like about the current product?” regularly throughout the week. At the end of the week, who do you think would have developed more innovative and feasible ideas?

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The point is that by questioning, observing, experimenting, and networking as part of the innovative process, managers will not only make better innovation decisions now but, more importantly, start to build the innovative DNA needed to be more successful innovators in the future. As they get into the practice of these habits, decision makers will see opportuni- ties and be more creative as they associate information from different parts of their life, different people they come in contact with, and different parts of their organizations. The ability to innovate is not hard-wired into our brains at birth. Research suggests that only one-third of our ability to think creatively is genetic. The other two-thirds is developed over time. Neuroscience research indicates that the brain is “plastic,” meaning it changes over time due to experiences. As managers build up the ability to ask creative questions, develop a wealth of experiences from diverse settings, and link together insights from different are- nas of their lives, their brains will follow suit and will build the ability to easily see situations creatively and draw upon a wide range of experiences and knowledge to identify creative solutions. The five traits of the effective innovator are described and examples of each trait are presented in Exhibit 12.2.

Trait Description Example

Associating

Innovators have the ability to connect seemingly unrelated questions, problems, and ideas from different fields. This allows them to creatively see opportunities that others miss.

Pierre Omidyar saw the opportunity that led to eBay when he linked three items: (1) a personal fascination with creating more efficient markets, (2) his fiancee’s desire to locate hard-to-find collectible Pez dispensers, and (3) the ineffectiveness of local classified ads in locating such items.

Questioning

Innovators constantly ask questions that challenge common wisdom. Rather than accept the status quo, they ask “Why not?” or “What if?” This gets others around them to challenge the assumptions that limit the possible range of actions the firm can take.

After witnessing the emergence of eBay and Amazon, Marc Benioff questioned why computer software was still sold in boxes rather than leased with a subscription and downloaded through the Internet. This was the genesis of Salesforce.com, a firm with over $4.1 billion in sales in 2014.

Observing

Discovery-driven executives produce innovative business ideas by observing regular behavior of individuals, especially customers and potential customers. Such observations often identify challenges customers face and previously unidentified opportunities.

From watching his wife struggle to keep track of the family’s finances, Intuit founder Scott Cook identified the need for easy-to-use financial software that provided a single place for managing bills, bank accounts, and investments.

Experimenting

Thomas Edison once said, “I haven’t failed. I’ve simply found 10,000 ways that do not work.” Innovators regularly experiment with new possibilities, accepting that many of their ideas will fail. Experimentation can include new jobs, living in different countries, and new ideas for their businesses.

Founders Larry Page and Sergey Brin provide time and resources for Google employees to experiment. Some, such as the Android cell phone platform, have been big winners. Others, such as the Orkut and Buzz social networking systems, have failed. But Google will continue to experiment with new products and services.

Networking

Innovators develop broad personal networks. They use this diverse set of individuals to find and test radical ideas. This can be done by developing a diverse set of friends. It can also be done by attending idea conferences where individuals from a broad set of backgrounds come together to share their perspectives and ideas, such as the Technology, Entertainment, and Design (TED) Conference or the Aspen Ideas Festival.

Michael Lazaridis got the idea for a wireless email device that led him to found Research in Motion, now called BlackBerry, from a conference he attended. At the conference, a speaker was discussing a wireless system Coca-Cola was using that allowed vending machines to send a signal when they needed refilling. Lazaridis saw the opportunity to use the same concept with email communications, and the idea for the BlackBerry was hatched.

EXHIBIT 12.2 The Innovator’s DNA

Source: Adapted from J.H. Dyer, H.G. Gregerson and C.M. Christensen, “The Innovator’s DNA,” Harvard Business Review, December 2009, pp. 61–67.

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12.3 ENVIRONMENTAL SUSTAINABILITYSTRATEGY SPOTLIGHT FAIR OAKS FARMS SEES THE POWER OF WASTE Mike McCloskey is a man on a mission. McCloskey owns Fair Oaks Farms, one of the largest dairy farms in the country. With over 36,000 cows, Fair Oaks produces about 430,000 gallons of manure every day. Rather than seeing this simply as waste, Fair Oaks has developed a number of innovations to leverage the power of the waste. To start with, Fair Oaks developed spe- cially designed animal stalls so the manure would be easily col- lected. The manure is separated from sand and dirt and then put in anaerobic digesters. The manure sits in the digesters for 14 to 21 days and produces gas that is collected and refined into pure methane gas. About half of the methane is used to power the farm and all of its operations. McCloskey looked to sell the rest of the gas but found that it wasn’t economical to do so. His answer was to build a fleet of delivery trucks for the dairy that run on compressed natural gas. This allows Fair Oaks to avoid using diesel fuel to deliver its milk; over two million gallons of diesel fuel are saved per year. The next step for Fair Oaks was to turn the remaining manure byproduct into fertilizer. The farm

developed the means to extract much of the water and turn it into a fertilizer paste, some of which is used in the farm’s fields. The remainder is used by an outside company that has built a fertilizer plant on Fair Oaks’ property. Fair Oaks is now looking for ways to use the remaining water. Mike’s plan is to create an artificial wetlands area on the farm that would help clean the water. Mike and his wife, Sue, have also discussed distilling the filtered water and using it to brew beer. What would be the name of their beer? Sue says, “I’m thinking of . . . a Milk Cow Stout.” What is the end goal? Mike says, “My dream . . . is to have a zero-carbon-footprint dairy, and I believe we can get there.”

But it goes even further. Mike is now developing businesses that can help other dairy farmers to follow his lead. His dairy cooperative owns a part of Newtrient, a firm that is developing digester and methane processing equipment for smaller farms. McCloskey is also partner in a company that is building com- pressed natural gas filling stations around the country in order to build a market for farm-produced methane gas. Sources: Donnell, R. 2016. Big agriculture gets its sh*t together. Fortune. February 1: 86-92; and Ravve, R. 2013. Could cow manure be the future of green energy? foxnews.com. April 9: np.

Defining the Scope of Innovation Firms must have a means to focus their innovation efforts. By defining the “strategic enve- lope”—the scope of a firm’s innovation efforts—firms ensure that their innovation efforts are not wasted on projects that are outside the firm’s domain of interest. Strategic enveloping defines the range of acceptable projects. A strategic envelope creates a firm-specific view of innovation that defines how a firm can create new knowledge and learn from an innovation initiative even if the project fails. It also gives direction to a firm’s innovation efforts, which helps separate seeds from weeds and builds internal capabilities.

One way to determine which projects to work on is to focus on a common technology. Then innovation efforts across the firm can aim at developing skills and expertise in a given technical area. Another potential focus is on a market theme. Strategy Spotlight 12.3 dis- cusses how Fair Oaks Farms, one of the largest dairy farms in the country, responded to environmental concerns by developing processes to turn animal waste into fuel.

Companies must be clear about not only the kinds of innovation they are looking for but also the expected results. Each company needs to develop a set of questions to ask itself about its innovation efforts:

• How much will the innovation initiative cost? • How likely is it to actually become commercially viable? • How much value will it add; that is, what will it be worth if it works? • What will be learned if it does not pan out?

However a firm envisions its innovation goals, it needs to develop a systematic approach to evaluating its results and learning from its innovation initiatives. Viewing innovation from this perspective helps firms manage the process.15

strategic envelope a firm-specific view of innovation that defines how a firm can create new knowledge and learn from an innovation initiative even if the project fails.

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Managing the Pace of Innovation Along with clarifying the scope of an innovation by defining a strategic envelope, firms also need to regulate the pace of innovation. How long will it take for an innovation initia- tive to realistically come to fruition? The project timeline of an incremental innovation may be 6 months to 2 years, whereas a more radical innovation is typically long term— 10 years or more.16 Radical innovations often begin with a long period of exploration in which experimentation makes strict timelines unrealistic. In contrast, firms that are innovating incrementally in order to exploit a window of opportunity may use a milestone approach that is more stringently driven by goals and deadlines. This kind of sensitivity to realistic time frames helps companies separate dilemmas temporally so they are easier to manage.

Time pacing can also be a source of competitive advantage because it helps a com- pany manage transitions and develop an internal rhythm.17 Time pacing does not mean the company ignores the demands of market timing; instead, companies have a sense of their own internal clock in a way that allows them to thwart competitors by controlling the innovation process. With time pacing, the firm works to develop an internal rhythm that matches the buying practices of customers. For example, for years, Intel worked to develop new microprocessor chips every 18 months. The company would have three chips in process at any point in time—one it was producing and selling, one it was currently developing, and one that was just on the drawing board. This pacing also matched the market, because most corporate customers bought new computers about every three years. Thus, customers were then two generations behind in their computing technology, leading them to feel the need to upgrade at the three-year point. In the post-PC era, Apple has developed a similar but faster internal cycle, allowing it to launch a new generation of the iPhone on an annual basis.

This doesn’t mean the aim is always to be faster when innovating. Some projects can’t be rushed. Companies that hurry their research efforts or go to market before they are ready can damage their ability to innovate—and their reputation. Thus, managing the pace of inno- vation can be an important factor in long-term success.

Staffing to Capture Value from Innovation People are central to the processes of identifying, developing, and commercializing inno- vations effectively. They need broad sets of skills as well as experience—experience work- ing with teams and experience working on successful innovation projects. To capture value from innovation activities, companies must provide strategic decision makers with staff members who make it possible.

This insight led strategy experts Rita Gunther McGrath and Thomas Keil to research the types of human resource management practices that effective firms use to capture value from their innovation efforts.18 Four practices are especially important:

• Create innovation teams with experienced players who know what it is like to deal with uncertainty and can help new staff members learn venture management skills.

• Require that employees seeking to advance their career with the organization serve in the new venture group as part of their career climb.

• Once people have experience with the new venture group, transfer them to mainstream management positions where they can use their skills and knowledge to revitalize the company’s core business.

• Separate the performance of individuals from the performance of the innovation. Otherwise, strong players may feel stigmatized if the innovation effort they worked on fails.

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There are other staffing practices that may sound as if they would benefit a firm’s innova- tion activities but may, in fact, be counterproductive:

• Creating a staff that consists only of strong players whose primary experience is related to the company’s core business. This provides too few people to deal with the uncertainty of innovation projects and may cause good ideas to be dismissed because they do not appear to fit with the core business.

• Creating a staff that consists only of volunteers who want to work on projects they find interesting. Such players are often overzealous about new technologies or overly attached to product concepts, which can lead to poor decisions about which projects to pursue or drop.

• Creating a climate where innovation team members are considered second-class citizens. In companies where achievements are rewarded, the brightest and most ambitious players may avoid innovation projects with uncertain outcomes.

Unless an organization can align its key players into effective new venture teams, it is unlikely to create any differentiating advantages from its innovation efforts.19 An enlight- ened approach to staffing a company’s innovation efforts provides one of the best ways to ensure that the challenges of innovation will be effectively met. The nearby Insights from Research box discusses actions a firm can take to use the departure of key employees as a catalyst for new innovative efforts.

Collaborating with Innovation Partners It is rare for any one organization to have all the information it needs to carry an innovation from concept to commercialization. Even a company that is highly competent with its cur- rent operations usually needs new capabilities to achieve new results. Innovation partners provide the skills and insights that are needed to make innovation projects succeed.20

Innovation partners may come from many sources, including research universities and the federal government. Each year the federal government issues requests for proposals (RFPs) asking private companies for assistance in improving services or finding solutions to public problems. Universities are another type of innovation partner. Chip-maker Intel, for example, has benefited from underwriting substantial amounts of university research. Rather than hand universities a blank check, Intel bargains for rights to patents that emerge from Intel-sponsored research. The university retains ownership of the patent, but Intel gets royalty-free use of it.21

Strategic partnering requires firms to identify their strengths and weaknesses and make choices about which capabilities to leverage, which need further development, and which are outside the firm’s current or projected scope of operations.

To choose partners, firms need to ask what competencies they are looking for and what the innovation partner will contribute.22 These might include knowledge of markets, tech- nology expertise, or contacts with key players in an industry. Innovation partnerships also typically need to specify how the rewards of the innovation will be shared and who will own the intellectual property that is developed.23

Innovation efforts that involve multiple partners and the speed and ease with which part- ners can network and collaborate are changing the way innovation is conducted.24

The Value of Unsuccessful Innovation Companies are often reluctant to pursue innovations due to the high uncertainty associated with innovative efforts. They are torn about whether to invest in emerging technologies, wondering which, if any, will win in the market and offer the best payoff for the firm. Conventional wisdom suggests that firms pay dearly if they bet on the wrong technology or new product direction. However, research by NYU professor J. P. Eggers suggests that

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OVERVIEW When star employees head for the exit, business leaders surely feel the loss, but research reveals that smart business leaders adapt by looking to fresh talent and formerly unex- plored opportunities.

WHAT THE RESEARCH SHOWS Losing talent may disrupt activity and routines that have served a company well, but it also opens a door to new unexplored opportunities. That is the conclusion reached by researchers from Drexel University and Rutgers University in a recent article in the Journal of Management.

Using a sample of 197 U.S. biotechnology companies, the researchers examined the effects of losing a star scientist on his or her company’s subsequent innovation efforts. According to the paper, star scientists are innovators who were above the industry average in both the number of patents they produced and the influence of their patents. The researchers included two types of company innovation: exploitation, referring to patent activity related to an organization’s existing knowl- edge, and exploration, patent activity focused on new areas for the company.

During the period studied, 90 stars from 32 organiza- tions left to join other biotechnology firms. The effects of turnover were significant and complex.

• Compared with their peers, companies that lost star scientists saw an average decline of 14 percent in exploitation-related innovation during the next three years.

• At the same time, however, the departure of a star scientist led to a 22 percent average increase in exploration-related innovation during the next three years.

In other words, although the departure of a star scientist was disruptive to existing areas of innovation, companies appeared to adapt by exploring new areas. These effects, moreover, varied from company to company, depending on the characteristics of the star scientist. In general, the more

the scientist was involved in patent activity and collabo- rated with others in the company, the larger the effects of his or her departure on the organization’s subsequent levels of innovation.

WHY THIS MATTERS Smart managers appreciate the extent to which their organi- zation’s competitive performance depends on the talents of its workforce. The majority of academic evidence suggests that the loss of employees hurts corporate performance because it reduces productivity, erodes customer service, and lowers quality. Turnover is particularly worrisome in busi- nesses that require higher education, creativity, or technical skill, because their employees are not easily replaced.

Yet in industries that rely heavily on intellectual capi- tal, such as technology, life sciences, or the arts, the loss of talented employees may have an unexpected benefit for the organization. While turnover of star scientists did dis- rupt innovation related to the companies’ existing lines of research, it also increased the rate of innovation in previ- ously unexplored areas. Companies adapt to the loss of tal- ent by exploring products, brands, and methods they may not have otherwise considered.

KEY TAKEAWAYS • Employee turnover can both hurt and help an

organization. • The loss of talented employees disrupts innovation

related to established products. • The loss of talented employees allows fresh

perspectives and ideas to emerge. • Companies adapt to star turnover by innovating in

formerly unexplored areas.

RESEARCH REVIEWED Tzabar, D. & Kehoe, R. 2014. Can opportunity emerge from disarray? An examination of exploration and exploitation follow- ing star scientist turnover. Journal of Management. 40: 449–482.

INSIGHTS from Research

YOU CAN ADAPT TO THE LOSS OF A STAR EMPLOYEE

12.1

betting on a losing technology and then switching to the winner can position a company to come out ahead of competitors that were on the right track all along.25

His research shows that firms that initially invest in an unsuccessful innovative effort often end up dominating the market in the long run. The key is that the firm remains open to change and to learning from both its mistakes and the experience of the innovators that initially chose to pursue the winning technology. Eggers offers the following insights for

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companies competing in a dynamic market where it is uncertain which technology will emerge triumphant:

1. Avoid overcommitting. This can be difficult as the firm sees the need to build specific expertise and stake out a decisive position to be seen as a leader in the market. However, managers can become entrenched as confirmation bias leads them to focus only on data that suggest they’ve made the right choice. Eggers suggests firms consider joint ventures and other alliances to avoid overinvestments they may come to regret.

2. Don’t let shame or despair knock you out of the game. Shame has been shown to be a particularly destructive reaction to failure. Remember that it is very likely no one could have had complete confidence regarding which technology would win. And try to avoid seeing things as worse than they are. Some companies that bet on the wrong technology decide, unnecessarily, to get out of the market entirely, missing out on any future market opportunities.

3. Pivot quickly. Once they realized they made a mistake, firms that were ultimately successful changed course and moved quickly. Studies have shown that the ideal moment to enter a high-tech industry is just as the dominant design emerges. So missing the target initially doesn’t have to mean that a firm is doomed to failure if the firm moves swiftly as the dominant technology becomes clear.

4. Transfer knowledge. Successful firms use the information they gathered in a losing bet to exploit other market opportunities. For example, when flat-panel computer displays were first emerging, it was unclear if plasma or LCD technology would win. IBM initially invested heavily in plasma displays, a bet that turned out to be wrong when LCD technology won out. But IBM took away valuable knowledge from its plasma investments. For example, the heavy glass required by plasma technology forced IBM to become skilled at glass design, which helped it push glass technology in new directions in products such as the original ThinkPad laptop.

5. Be aware that it can be dangerous to be right at the outset. Managers in firms that initially select the winning technology have a tendency to interpret their ability to choose the most promising technology as an unconditional endorsement of everything they had been doing. As a result, they fail to recognize the need to rethink some details of their product and the underlying technology. Their complacency can give firms that initially chose the wrong technology the space to catch up and then pull ahead, since the later-moving firms are more open to see the need for improvements and are hungry and aggressive in their actions. The key to who wins typically isn’t who is there first. Instead, the winning firm is the one that continuously incrementally innovates on the initial bold innovation to offer the best product at the best price.

Offering additional insight into the potential benefits of unsuccessful innovations, research by Julian Birkinshaw suggests that failure can be a great catalyst for learning.26 He advises three key steps to ensure that firms can leverage the value of failures. First, firms should study individual projects that did not pan out and gather as many insights as possible from them. This should include what the failure can teach the firm about customers and market dynam- ics; the organization’s culture, strategy, and processes; the decision team and firm leaders; and trends in the market and the larger environment. Second, firms need to crystallize those insights and share them across the organization. This can involve regular meetings where firm leaders share their recent struggles and the lessons learned. It can also involve reports that are shared across the firm. For example, Engineers Without Borders, a global volunteer organization that strives to offer engineering solutions in underdeveloped countries, launched an annual “failure report” that discussed failures and their lessons. Third, he advises that firm

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leaders take a step back and do overall corporate reviews occasionally to ensure that the over- all approach to failure is yielding strong benefits. This can give insight into whether the orga- nization is repeating the same pattern of failure or if it is learning and improving. It can also serve to identify the most widely applicable learning or the most critical areas needed for improvement. Finally, it can also help identify if the firm is being too conservative and failing too infrequently. One key takeaway is that highlighting the value of learning from failures can lessen the fear of failure by showing that it is not the end to an employee’s career. Instead, it is the foundation for learning and something to accept as part of the process of innovation. As Sunil Sinha, the head of Tata Quality Management, stated: “We want people to be bold and not be afraid to fail.”

CORPORATE ENTREPRENEURSHIP Corporate entrepreneurship (CE) has two primary aims: the pursuit of new venture oppor- tunities and strategic renewal.27 The innovation process keeps firms alert by exposing them to new technologies, making them aware of marketplace trends, and helping them evaluate new possibilities. Corporate entrepreneurship uses the fruits of the innovation process to help firms build new sources of competitive advantage and renew their value propositions. Just as the innovation process helps firms to make positive improvements, CE helps firms identify opportunities and launch new ventures.

Corporate new venture creation was labeled “intrapreneuring” by Gifford Pinchot because it refers to building entrepreneurial businesses within existing corporations.28 However, to engage in corporate entrepreneurship that yields above-average returns and contributes to sustainable advantages, it must be done effectively. In this section we will examine the sources of entrepreneurial activity within established firms and the methods large corpora- tions use to stimulate entrepreneurial behavior.

In a typical corporation, what determines how entrepreneurial projects will be pursued? The answer depends on many factors, including:

• Corporate culture. • Leadership. • Structural features that guide and constrain action. • Organizational systems that foster learning and manage rewards.

All of the factors that influence the strategy implementation process will also shape how corporations engage in internal venturing.

Other factors will also affect how entrepreneurial ventures will be pursued:

• The use of teams in strategic decision making. • Whether the company is product- or service-oriented. • Whether its innovation efforts are aimed at product or process improvements. • The extent to which it is high-tech or low-tech.

Because these factors are different in every organization, some companies may be more involved than others in identifying and developing new venture opportunities.29 These fac- tors will also influence the nature of the CE process.

Successful CE typically requires firms to reach beyond their current operations and mar- kets in the pursuit of new opportunities. It is often the breakthrough opportunities that provide the greatest returns. Such strategies are not without risks, however. In the sections that follow, we will address some of the strategic choice and implementation issues that influence the success or failure of CE activities.

Two distinct approaches to corporate venturing are found among firms that pursue entre- preneurial aims. The first is focused corporate venturing, in which CE activities are isolated

corporate entrepreneurship (CE) the creation of new value for a corporation through investments that create either new sources of competitive advantage or renewal of the value proposition.

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from a firm’s existing operations and worked on by independent work units. The second approach is dispersed, in which all parts of the organization and every organization member are engaged in intrapreneurial activities.

Focused Approaches to Corporate Entrepreneurship Firms using a focused approach typically separate the corporate venturing activity from the other ongoing operations of the firm. CE is usually the domain of autonomous work groups that pursue entrepreneurial aims independent of the rest of the firm. The advantage of this approach is that it frees entrepreneurial team members to think and act without the con- straints imposed by existing organizational norms and routines. This independence is often necessary for the kind of open-minded creativity that leads to strategic breakthroughs. The dis- advantage is that, because of their isolation from the corporate mainstream, the work groups that concentrate on internal ventures may fail to obtain the resources or support needed to carry an entrepreneurial project through to completion. Two forms—new venture groups (NVGs) and business incubators—are among the most common types of focused approaches.

New Venture Groups Corporations often form new venture groups (NVGs) whose goal is to identify, evaluate, and cultivate venture opportunities. These groups typically function as semiautonomous units with little formal structure. The NVG may simply be a commit- tee that reports to the president on potential new ventures. Or it may be organized as a corporate division with its own staff and budget. The aims of the NVG may be open-ended in terms of what ventures it may consider. Alternatively, some corporations use an NVG to promote concentrated effort on a specific problem. In both cases, NVGs usually have a substantial amount of freedom to take risks and a supply of resources to do it with.30

New venture groups usually have a larger mandate than a typical R&D department. Their involvement extends beyond innovation and experimentation to coordinating with other corporate divisions, identifying potential venture partners, gathering resources, and actually launching the venture.

Business Incubators The term incubator was originally used to describe a device in which eggs are hatched. Business incubators are designed to “hatch” new businesses. They are a type of corporate NVG with a somewhat more specialized purpose—to support and nurture fledgling entrepreneurial ventures until they can thrive on their own as stand-alone busi- nesses. Corporations use incubators as a way to grow businesses identified by the NVG. Although they often receive support from many parts of the corporation, they still operate independently until they are strong enough to go it alone. Depending on the type of busi- ness, they either are integrated into an existing corporate division or continue to operate as a subsidiary of the parent firm. Strategy Spotlight 12.4 outlines how a number of large firms are using NVGs and business incubators to improve their CE efforts.

Incubators typically provide some or all of the following five functions:31

• Funding. This includes capital investments as well as in-kind investments and loans. • Physical space. Incubators in which several start-ups share space often provide fertile

ground for new ideas and collaboration. • Business services. Along with office space, young ventures need basic services and

infrastructure, which may include anything from phone systems and computer networks to public relations and personnel management.

• Mentoring. Senior executives and skilled technical personnel often provide coaching and experience-based advice.

• Networking. Contact with other parts of the firm and external resources such as suppliers, industry experts, and potential customers facilitates problem solving and knowledge sharing.

LO 12-3 How corporations use new venture teams, business incubators, and product champions to create an internal environment and culture that promote entrepreneurial development.

focused approaches to corporate entrepreneurship corporate entrepreneurship in which the venturing entity is separated from the other ongoing operations of the firm.

new venture group (NVG) a group of individuals, or a division within a corporation, that identifies, evaluates, and cultivates venture opportunities.

business incubator a corporate new venture group that supports and nurtures fledgling entrepreneurial ventures until they can thrive on their own as stand-alone businesses.

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To encourage entrepreneurship, corporations sometimes need to do more than create independent work groups or venture incubators to generate new enterprises. In some firms, the entrepreneurial spirit is spread throughout the organization.

Dispersed Approaches to Corporate Entrepreneurship The second type of CE is dispersed. For some companies, a dedication to the principles and practices of entrepreneurship is spread throughout the organization. One advantage of this dispersed approach is that organizational members don’t have to be reminded to think entrepreneurially or be willing to change. The ability to change is considered to be a core capability. This leads to a second advantage: Because of the firm’s entrepreneurial reputa- tion, stakeholders such as vendors, customers, or alliance partners can bring new ideas or venture opportunities to anyone in the organization and expect them to be well received. Such opportunities make it possible for the firm to stay ahead of the competition. However, there are disadvantages as well. Firms that are overzealous about CE sometimes feel they

dispersed approaches to corporate entrepreneurship corporate entrepreunership in which a dedication to the principles and policies of entrepreneurship is spread throughout the organization.

12.4 STRATEGY SPOTLIGHT BIG FIRMS USE NVGS AND BUSINESS INCUBATORS TO TRIGGER CREATIVITY Common wisdom is that to be innovative firms need to be small and nimble. Major firms, such as GE, IBM, Coke, Taco Bell, and others, are buying into this wisdom. They have each launched groups within the firm whose expressed purpose is to generate innovations. Here are a few examples of how some large firms across a range of industries are using these focused groups to stoke up the entrepreneurial spirit in the firm.

• Taco Bell. Employs a 40 member innovation center team that is tasked with coming up regularly with catchy, innovative food items. Its most notable innovation was Doritos Locos Tacos, which generated over $1 billion in sales in its first year. The group considers dozens of new ideas a week and aims to launch a new menu item every five weeks. These new items typically are only available for a limited time, but they generate 5 percent of sales. Notable products have included Cap’n Crunch Delights (cereal encrusted, icing filled doughnut holes) and DareDevil Loaded Grillers (burritos filled with a collection of hot peppers). This innovative effort has sparked nearly 10 percent annual growth in a mature market.

• Mondelez. The food giant created a group called Mobile Futures. The aim of the incubator group is to foster new entrepreneurial efforts that may stay as part of Mondelez but may also be spun off. In a venture that stayed internal, it launched a direct-to-consumer business in the United States with Oreo Colorfilled cookies. The culture of the group facilitated speed with the new product. “We were able to launch it in two-months time instead of two years,” said a corporate spokesperson. Another new venture launched through the program, Betabox, was sold off once the business took off.

• General Electric. Created a FastWorks program that changes the product development process. Rather than

a closed product development cycle that could take up to five years, it created small cross-functional teams that were charged with getting the new product designed and the new business up and running in a matter of months. The first team in the program were thrown into a room together. They became a tight group as they went down to the factory floor and built products together and looked at market research together. Instead of the traditional approach in which salespeople give design requirements and then leave, customers were involved throughout. Having the team hear customer feedback firsthand was a big change, especially for the engineers. They bounced ideas and product prototypes off of retail salespeople who visited GE’s training office to learn about GE’s products.

• Tyco. Launched several Innovation Centers that serve as new venture development groups, and develop new products and services in security, fire protection, and smart connected technologies. The first centers opened were in Silicon Valley and Tel Aviv and employ a few hundred of Tyco’s 57,000 employees.

• MasterCard. The credit card giant has created dozens of new product design teams to develop new services to meet the technology-driven changes occurring in the e-commerce market. These teams typically have less than two dozen members and operate in a three- floor, open architecture innovation lab in MasterCard’s New York office.

The key goal for all of these large and successful firms is to think and act like a small firm to stay on the cutting edge of the market and one step ahead of the entrepreneurial start-ups looking to challenge them if they stumble and fail to innovate.

Sources: Alsever, J. 2015. Startups inside giant companies. Fortune. May 1: 33–36; Power, B. 2014. How GE applies lean startup practices. hbr.org. April 23: np; and, Ringen, J. 2016. For combining corn, beans, meat, and cheese into genius. Fast Company. March: 46–49.

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must change for the sake of change, causing them to lose vital competencies or spend heav- ily on R&D and innovation to the detriment of the bottom line. Three related aspects of dispersed entrepreneurship include entrepreneurial cultures that have an overarching com- mitment to CE activities, resource allotments to support entrepreneurial actions, and the use of product champions in promoting entrepreneurial behaviors.

Entrepreneurial Culture In some large corporations, the corporate culture embodies the spirit of entrepreneurship. A culture of entrepreneurship is one in which the search for ven- ture opportunities permeates every part of the organization. The key to creating value suc- cessfully is viewing every value-chain activity as a source of competitive advantage. The effect of CE on a firm’s strategic success is strongest when it animates all parts of an organiza- tion. It is found in companies where the strategic leaders and the culture together generate a strong impetus to innovate, take risks, and seek out new venture opportunities.32

In companies with an entrepreneurial culture, everyone in the organization is attuned to opportunities to help create new businesses. Many such firms use a top-down approach to stimulate entrepreneurial activity. The top leaders of the organization support programs and incentives that foster a climate of entrepreneurship. Many of the best ideas for new cor- porate ventures, however, come from the bottom up. Catherine Winder, former president of Rainmaker Entertainment, discussed how she welcomed any employee to generate and pitch innovative ideas this way:33

We have an open-door policy for anyone in the company to pitch ideas . . . to describe their ideas in 15 to 30 seconds. If we like the core idea, we’ll work with them. If you can be concise and come up with your idea in a really clear way, it means you’re on to something.

An entrepreneurial culture is one in which change and renewal are on everybody’s mind. Amazon, 3M, Intel, and Cisco are among the corporations best known for their corporate venturing activities. Many fast-growing young corporations also attribute much of their suc- cess to an entrepreneurial culture. But other successful firms struggle in their efforts to remain entrepreneurial.

Resource Allotments Corporate entrepreneurship requires the willingness of the firm to invest in the generation and execution of innovative ideas. On the generation side, employees are much more likely to develop these ideas if they have the time to do so. For decades, 3M allowed its engineers free time, up to 15 percent of their work schedule, to work on develop- ing new products.34 Intuit follows a similar model, offering employees the opportunity to spend 10 percent of their time on ideas that improve Intuit’s processes or on products that address user problems. According to Brad Smith, Intuit’s CEO, this time is critical for the future success of Intuit since “innovation is not going to come from me. It’s going to come from challenging people to think about new and different ways of solving big, important problems.”35 In addition to time, firms can foster CE by providing monetary investment to fund entrepreneurial ideas. Johnson & Johnson (J&J) uses its Internal Ventures Group to support entrepreneurial ideas developed inside the firm. Entrepreneurs within J&J sub- mit proposals to the group. The review board decides which proposals to fund and then solicits further investments from J&J’s operating divisions. Nike’s Sustainable Business and Innovation Lab and Google’s Ventures Group have a similar charter to review and fund promising corporate entrepreneurship activities. The availability of these time and financing sources can enhance the likelihood of successful entrepreneurial activities within the firm.

Product Champions Corporate entrepreneurship does not always involve making large investments in start-ups or establishing incubators to spawn new divisions. Often, innovative ideas emerge in the normal course of business and are brought forth and become part of the way of doing business. Entrepreneurial champions are often needed to take charge of

entrepreneurial culture corporate culture in which change and renewal are a constant focus of attention.

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internally generated ventures. Product champions (or project champions) are those individu- als working within a corporation who bring entrepreneurial ideas forward, identify what kind of market exists for the product or service, find resources to support the venture, and promote the venture concept to upper management.36

When lower-level employees identify a product idea or novel solution, they will take it to their supervisor or someone in authority. A new idea that is generated in a technology lab may be introduced to others by its inventor. If the idea has merit, it gains support and builds momentum across the organization.37 Even though the corporation may not be looking for new ideas or have a program for cultivating internal ventures, the independent behaviors of a few organizational members can have important strategic consequences.

No matter how an entrepreneurial idea comes to light, however, a new venture concept must pass through two critical stages or it may never get off the ground:

1. Project definition. An opportunity has to be justified in terms of its attractiveness in the marketplace and how well it fits with the corporation’s other strategic objectives.

2. Project impetus. For a project to gain impetus, its strategic and economic impact must be supported by senior managers who have experience with similar projects. It then becomes an embryonic business with its own organization and budget.

For a project to advance through these stages of definition and impetus, a product cham- pion is often needed to generate support and encouragement. Champions are especially important during the time after a new project has been defined but before it gains momen- tum. They form a link between the definition and impetus stages of internal development, which they do by procuring resources and stimulating interest for the product among poten- tial customers.38 Product champions play an important entrepreneurial role in a corporate setting by encouraging others to take a chance on promising new ideas.39

Measuring the Success of Corporate Entrepreneurship Activities At this point in the discussion, it is reasonable to ask whether CE is successful. Corporate venturing, like the innovation process, usually requires a tremendous effort. Is it worth it? We consider factors that corporations need to take into consideration when evaluating the success of CE programs. We also examine techniques that companies can use to limit the expense of venturing or to cut their losses when CE initiatives appear doomed.

Comparing Strategic and Financial CE Goals Not all corporate venturing efforts are financially rewarding. In terms of financial performance, slightly more than 50 percent of corporate venturing efforts reach profitability (measured by ROI) within six years of their launch.40 If this were the only criterion for success, it would seem to be a rather poor return. On the one hand, these results should be expected, because CE is riskier than other investments such as expanding ongoing operations. On the other hand, corporations expect a higher return from corporate venturing projects than from normal operations. Thus, in terms of the risk–return trade-off, it seems that CE often falls short of expectations.41

There are several other important criteria, however, for judging the success of a corpo- rate venture initiative. Most CE programs have strategic goals.42 The strategic reasons for undertaking a corporate venture include strengthening competitive position, entering into new markets, expanding capabilities by learning and acquiring new knowledge, and build- ing the corporation’s base of resources and experience. Three questions should be used to assess the effectiveness of a corporation’s venturing initiatives:43

1. Are the products or services offered by the venture accepted in the marketplace? Is the venture considered to be a market success? If so, the financial returns are likely to be satisfactory. The venture may also open doors into other markets and suggest avenues for other venture projects.

product champion an individual working within a corporation who brings entrepreneurial ideas forward, identifies what kind of market exists for the product or service, finds resources to support the venture, and promotes the venture concept to upper management.

LO 12-4 How corporate entrepreneurship achieves both financial goals and strategic goals.

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2. Are the contributions of the venture to the corporation’s internal competencies and experience valuable? Does the venture add to the worth of the firm internally? If so, strategic goals such as leveraging existing assets, building new knowledge, and enhancing firm capabilities are likely to be met.44

3. Is the venture able to sustain its basis of competitive advantage? Does the value proposition offered by the venture insulate it from competitive attack? If so, it is likely to place the corporation in a stronger position relative to competitors and provide a base from which to build other advantages.

These criteria include both strategic and financial goals of CE. Another way to evaluate a corporate venture is in terms of the four criteria from the balanced scorecard (Chapter 3). In a successful venture, not only are financial and market acceptance (customer) goals met but so are the internal business and innovation and learning goals. Thus, when assessing the success of corporate venturing, it is important to look beyond simple financial returns and consider a well-rounded set of criteria.45

Exit Champions Although a culture of championing venture projects is advantageous for stimulating an ongoing stream of entrepreneurial initiatives, many—in fact, most—of the ideas will not work out. At some point in the process, a majority of initiatives will be aban- doned. Sometimes, however, companies wait too long to terminate a new venture and do so only after large sums of resources are used up or, worse, result in a marketplace failure. Motorola’s costly global satellite telecom project known as Iridium provides a useful illustra- tion. Even though problems with the project existed during the lengthy development pro- cess, Motorola refused to pull the plug. Only after investing $5 billion and years of effort was the project abandoned.46

One way to avoid these costly and discouraging defeats is to support a key role in the CE process: exit champions. In contrast to product champions and other entrepreneurial enthusiasts within the corporation, exit champions are willing to question the viability of a venture project.47 By demanding hard evidence and challenging the belief system that is car- rying an idea forward, exit champions hold the line on ventures that appear shaky.

Both product champions and exit champions must be willing to energetically stand up for what they believe. Both put their reputations on the line. But they also differ in impor- tant ways.48 Product champions deal in uncertainty and ambiguity. Exit champions reduce ambiguity by gathering hard data and developing a strong case for why a project should be killed. Product champions are often thought to be willing to violate procedures and operate outside normal channels. Exit champions often have to reinstate procedures and reassert the decision-making criteria that are supposed to guide venture decisions. Whereas product champions often emerge as heroes, exit champions run the risk of losing status by opposing popular projects.

The role of exit champion may seem unappealing. But it is one that could save a cor- poration both financially and in terms of its reputation in the marketplace. It is especially important because one measure of the success of a firm’s CE efforts is the extent to which it knows when to cut its losses and move on.

REAL OPTIONS ANALYSIS: A USEFUL TOOL One way firms can minimize failure and avoid losses from pursuing faulty ideas is to apply the logic of real options. Real options analysis (ROA) is an investment analysis tool from the field of finance. It has been slowly, but increasingly, adopted by consultants and executives to support strategic decision making in firms.

Applied to entrepreneurship, real options suggest a path that companies can use to man- age the uncertainty associated with launching new ventures. Some of the most common

exit champion an individual working within a corporation who is willing to question the viability of a venture project by demanding hard evidence of venture success and challenging the belief system that carries a venture forward.

LO 12-5 The benefits and potential drawbacks of real options analysis in making resource deployment decisions in corporate entrepreneurship contexts.

real options analysis (ROA) an investment analysis tool that looks at an investment or activity as a series of sequential steps, and for each step the investor has the option of (a) investing additional funds to grow or accelerate, (b) delaying, (c) shrinking the scale of, or (d) abandoning the activity.

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applications of real options are with property and insurance. A real estate option grants the holder the right to buy or sell a piece of property at an established price some time in the future. The actual market price of the property may rise above the established (or strike) price—or the market value may sink below the strike price. If the price of the property goes up, the owner of the option is likely to buy it. If the market value of the property drops, the option holder is unlikely to execute the purchase. In the latter circumstance, the option holder has limited his or her loss to the cost of the option but during the life of the option retains the right to participate in whatever the upside potential might be.

Applications of Real Options Analysis to Strategic Decisions The concept of options can also be applied to strategic decisions where management has flex- ibility. Situations arise where management must decide whether to invest additional funds to grow or accelerate the activity, perhaps delay in order to learn more, shrink the scale of the activity, or even abandon it. Decisions to invest in new ventures or other business activities such as R&D, motion pictures, exploration and production of oil wells, and the opening and closing of copper mines often have this flexibility.49 Important issues to note are:

• ROA is appropriate to use when investments can be staged; a smaller investment up front can be followed by subsequent investments. Real options can be applied to an investment decision that gives the company the right, but not the obligation, to make follow-on investments.

• Strategic decision makers have “tollgates,” or key points at which they can decide whether to continue, delay, or abandon the project. Executives have flexibility. There are opportunities to make other go or no-go decisions associated with each phase.

• It is expected that there will be increased knowledge about outcomes at the time of the next investment and that additional knowledge will help inform the decision makers about whether to make additional investments (i.e., whether the option is in the money or out of the money).

Consider the real options logic that Johnson Controls, a maker of car seats, instrument panels, and interior control systems, uses to advance or eliminate entrepreneurial ideas.50 Johnson options each new innovative idea by making a small investment in it. To receive additional funding, the idea must continue to prove itself at each stage of development. Here’s how Jim Geschke, former vice president and general manager of electronics integra- tion at Johnson, described the process:

Think of Johnson as an innovation machine. The front end has a robust series of gates that each idea must pass through. Early on, we’ll have many ideas and spend a little money on each of them. As they get more fleshed out, the ideas go through a gate where a go or no-go decision is made. A lot of ideas get filtered out, so there are far fewer items, and the spending on each goes up. . . . Several months later each idea will face another gate. If it passes, that means it’s a serious idea that we are going to develop. Then the spending goes way up, and the number of ideas goes way down. By the time you reach the final gate, you need to have a credible business case in order to be accepted. At a certain point in the development process, we take our idea to customers and ask them what they think. Sometimes they say, “That’s a terrible idea. Forget it.” Other times they say, “That’s fabulous. I want a million of them.”

This process of evaluating ideas by separating winning ideas from losing ones in a way that keeps investments low has helped Johnson Controls grow its revenues to over $38 bil- lion a year. Using real options logic to advance the development process is a key way that firms reduce uncertainty and minimize innovation-related failures.51 Real options logic can also be used with other types of strategic decisions. Strategy Spotlight 12.5 discusses how Intel uses real options logic in making capacity expansion decisions.

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Potential Pitfalls of Real Options Analysis Despite the many benefits that can be gained from using ROA, managers must be aware of its potential limitations or pitfalls. Below we will address three major issues.52

Agency Theory and the Back-Solver Dilemma Let’s assume that companies adopting a real options perspective invest heavily in training and that their people understand how to effec- tively estimate variance—the amount of dispersion or range that is estimated for potential outcomes. Such training can help them use ROA. However, it does not solve another inher- ent problem: Managers may have an incentive and the know-how to “game the system.” Most electronic spreadsheets permit users to simply back-solve any formula; that is, you can type in the answer you want and ask what values are needed in a formula to get that answer. If managers know that a certain option value must be met in order for the proposal to get approved, they can back-solve the model to find a variance estimate needed to arrive at the answer that upper management desires.

Managerial Conceit: Overconfidence and the Illusion of Control Often, poor decisions are the result of such traps as biases, blind spots, and other human frailties. Much of this litera- ture falls under the concept of managerial conceit.53

First, managerial conceit occurs when decision makers who have made successful choices in the past come to believe that they possess superior expertise for managing uncer- tainty. They believe that their abilities can reduce the risks inherent in decision making to

back-solver dilemma problem with investment decisions in which managers scheme to have a project meet investment approval criteria, even though the investment may not enhance firm value.

managerial conceit biases, blind spots, and other human frailties that lead to poor managerial decisions.

12.5 STRATEGY SPOTLIGHT SAVING MILLIONS WITH REAL OPTIONS AT INTEL The semiconductor business is complex and dynamic. This makes it a difficult one to manage. On the one hand, both the technol- ogy in the chips and the consumer demand for chips are highly volatile. This makes it difficult to plan for the future as far as the need for chip designs and production plants is concerned. On the other hand, it is incredibly expensive to build new chip plants, about $5 billion each, and chip manufacturing equipment needs to be ordered well ahead of when it is needed. The lead time for ordering new equipment can be up to three years. This creates a great challenge. Firms have to decide how much and what type of equipment to purchase long before they have a good handle on what the demand for semiconductor chips will be. Guessing wrong leaves the firm with too much or too little capacity.

Intel has figured out a way to limit the risk it faces by using option contracts. Intel pays an up-front fee for the right to pur- chase key pieces of equipment at a specific future date. At that point, Intel either purchases the equipment or releases the sup- plier from the contract. In these cases, the supplier is then free to sell the equipment to someone else. This all seems fairly simple. A number of commodities, such as wheat and sugar, have robust option markets. The challenge isn’t in setting up the contracts. It is in pricing those contracts. Unlike wheat and sugar, where a large number of suppliers and buyers results in an efficient market that sets the prices of standard commodity products, there are few buyers and suppliers of chip manufacturing equipment. Further,

the equipment is not a standard commodity. As a result, prices for equipment options are the outcome of difficult negotiations.

Karl Kempf, a mathematician with Intel, has figured out how to make this process smoother. Along with a group of mathema- ticians at Stanford, Kempf has developed a computing logic for calculating the price of options. He and his colleagues create a forecasting model for potential demand. They calculate the like- lihood of a range of potential demand levels. They also set up a computer simulation of a production plant. They then use the possible demand levels to predict how many pieces of produc- tion equipment they will need in the plant to meet the demand. They run this over and over again, thousands of times, to gener- ate predictions about the likelihood they will need to purchase a specific piece of equipment. They use this information to iden- tify what equipment they definitely need to order. Where there is significant uncertainty about the need for equipment, they use the simulation results to identify the specific equipment for which they need option contracts and the value of those options to Intel. This helps with the pricing.

Intel estimates that in the five years from 2008 to 2012, the use of options in equipment purchases saved the firm in excess of $125 million and provided the firm with at least $2 billion in revenue upside for expansions it could have quickly made using optioned equipment.

Sources: Kempf, K., Erhun, F., Hertzler, E., Rosenberg, T., & Peng, C. 2013. Optimizing capital investment decisions at Intel Corporation. Interfaces, 43(1): 62–78; and King, I. 2012. A chipmaker’s model mathematician. Bloomberg Businessweek, June 4: 35.

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a much greater extent than they actually can. Such managers are more likely to shift away from analysis to trusting their own judgment. In the case of real options, they can simply declare that any given decision is a real option and proceed as before.

Second, employing the real options perspective can encourage decision makers toward a bias for action. Such a bias may lead to carelessness. The cost to write the first stage of an option is much smaller than the cost of full commitment, and managers pay less attention to small decisions than to large ones. Because real options are designed to minimize potential losses while preserving potential gains, any problems that arise are likely to be smaller at first, causing less concern for the manager. Managerial conceit could suggest that managers will assume that those problems are the easiest to solve and control—a concern referred to as the illusion of control. Managers may fail to respond appropriately because they overlook the problem or believe that since it is small, they can easily resolve it. Thus, managers may approach each real option decision with less care and diligence than if they had made a full commitment to a larger investment.

Managerial Conceit: Irrational Escalation of Commitment A strength of a real options perspec- tive is also one of its Achilles heels. Both real options and decisions involving escalation of commitment require specific environments with sequential decisions.54

An option to exit requires reversing an initial decision made by someone in the organi- zation. Organizations typically encourage managers to “own their decisions” in order to motivate them. As managers invest themselves in their decision, it proves harder for them to lose face by reversing course. For managers making the decision, it feels as if they made the wrong decision in the first place, even if it was initially a good decision. Thus, they are likely to continue an existing project even if it should perhaps be ended.55

Despite the potential pitfalls of a real options approach, many of the strategic decisions that product champions and top managers must make are enhanced when decision makers have an entrepreneurial mind-set.

ENTREPRENEURIAL ORIENTATION Firms that want to engage in successful CE need to have an entrepreneurial orientation (EO).56 Entrepreneurial orientation refers to the strategy-making practices that businesses use in identi- fying and launching corporate ventures. It represents a frame of mind and a perspective toward entrepreneurship that is reflected in a firm’s ongoing processes and corporate culture.57

An EO has five dimensions that permeate the decision-making styles and practices of the firm’s members: autonomy, innovativeness, proactiveness, competitive aggressiveness, and risk taking. These factors work together to enhance a firm’s entrepreneurial performance. But even those firms that are strong in only a few aspects of EO can be very successful.58 Exhibit 12.3 summarizes the dimensions of entrepreneurial orientation. Below, we discuss the five dimensions of EO and how they have been used to enhance internal venture development.

Autonomy Autonomy refers to a willingness to act independently in order to carry forward an entrepre- neurial vision or opportunity. It applies to both individuals and teams that operate outside an organization’s existing norms and strategies. In the context of corporate entrepreneur- ship, autonomous work units are often used to leverage existing strengths in new arenas, identify opportunities that are beyond the organization’s current capabilities, and encourage development of new ventures or improved business practices.59

The need for autonomy may apply to either dispersed or focused entrepreneurial efforts. Because of the emphasis on venture projects that are being developed outside the normal flow of business, a focused approach suggests a working environment that is relatively autonomous. But autonomy may also be important in an organization where entrepreneurship is part of the

escalation of commitment the tendency for managers to irrationally stick with an investment, even one that is broken down into a sequential series of decisions, when investment criteria are not being met.

LO 12-6 How an entrepreneurial orientation can enhance a firm’s efforts to develop promising corporate venture initiatives.

entrepreneurial orientation the practices that businesses use in identifying and launching corporate ventures.

autonomy independent action by an individual or a team aimed at bringing forth a business concept or vision and carrying it through to completion.

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corporate culture. Everything from the methods of group interaction to the firm’s reward system must make organizational members feel as if they can think freely about venture oppor- tunities, take time to investigate them, and act without fear of condemnation. This implies a respect for the autonomy of each individual and an openness to the independent thinking that goes into championing a corporate venture idea. Thus, autonomy represents a type of empow- erment (see Chapter 11) that is directed at identifying and leveraging entrepreneurial oppor- tunities. There are two common techniques firms can use to promote autonomy. First, they can create independent work groups, often called skunkworks, that are tasked with generating new ideas. Second, they can create organizational structures to foster creativity and flexibility, such as breaking large firms into smaller, decentralized entrepreneurial units.

Creating autonomous work units and encouraging independent action may have pit- falls that can jeopardize their effectiveness. Autonomous teams often lack coordination. Excessive decentralization has a strong potential to create inefficiencies, such as duplicating effort and wasting resources on projects with questionable feasibility. For example, Chris Galvin, former CEO of Motorola, scrapped the skunkworks approach the company had been using to develop new wireless phones. Fifteen teams had created 128 different phones, which led to spiraling costs and overly complex operations.60

For autonomous work units and independent projects to be effective, such efforts have to be measured and monitored. This requires a delicate balance: Companies must have the patience and budget to tolerate the explorations of autonomous groups and the strength to cut back efforts that are not bearing fruit. Efforts must be undertaken with a clear sense of purpose—namely, to generate new sources of competitive advantage.

Innovativeness Innovativeness refers to a firm’s efforts to find new opportunities and novel solutions. In the beginning of this chapter we discussed innovation; here the focus is on innovativeness— a firm’s attitude toward innovation and willingness to innovate. It involves creativity and experimentation that result in new products, new services, or improved technological pro- cesses.61 Innovativeness is one of the major components of an entrepreneurial strategy. As indicated at the beginning of the chapter, however, the job of managing innovativeness can be very challenging.

innovativeness a willingness to introduce novelty through experimentation and creative processes aimed at developing new products and services as well as new processes.

EXHIBIT 12.3 Dimensions of Entrepreneurial Orientation

Dimension Definition

Autonomy Independent action by an individual or team aimed at bringing forth a business concept or vision and carrying it through to completion.

Innovativeness A willingness to introduce novelty through experimentation and creative processes aimed at developing new products and services as well as new processes.

Proactiveness A forward-looking perspective characteristic of a marketplace leader that has the foresight to seize opportunities in anticipation of future demand.

Competitive aggressiveness An intense effort to outperform industry rivals characterized by a combative posture or an aggressive response aimed at improving position or overcoming a threat in a competitive marketplace.

Risk taking Making decisions and taking action without certain knowledge of probable outcomes; some undertakings may also involve making substantial resource commitments in the process of venturing forward.

Sources: Dess, G. G. & Lumpkin, G. T. 2005. The Role of Entrepreneurial Orientation in Stimulating Effective Corporate Entrepreneurship. Academy of Management Executive, 19(1): 147–156; Covin, J. G. & Slevin, D. P. 1991. A Conceptual Model of Entrepreneurship as Firm Behavior. Entrepreneurship Theory & Practice, Fall: 7–25; Lumpkin, G. T. and Dess, G. G. 1996. Clarifying the Entrepreneurial Orientation Construct and Linking It to Performance. Academy of Management Review, 21: 135–172; and Miller, D. 1983. The Correlates of Entrepreneurship in Three Types of Firms. Management Science, 29: 770–791.

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Innovativeness requires that firms depart from existing technologies and practices and venture beyond the current state of the art. Inventions and new ideas need to be nurtured even when their benefits are unclear. However, in today’s climate of rapid change, effectively producing, assimilating, and exploiting innovations can be an important avenue for achiev- ing competitive advantages. Interest in global warming and other ecological concerns has led many corporations to focus their innovativeness efforts on solving environmental problems.

As our earlier discussion of CE indicated, many corporations owe their success to an active program of innovation-based corporate venturing.62 How firms invest their resources is often a powerful driver for innovativeness. Firms can do this by regularly budgeting sig- nificant resources in both product and process R&D to stay ahead of competitors. They can also do it in a more decentralized way by having internal competitions where employees can win funding to start internal new innovative businesses.

Innovativeness can be a source of great progress and strong corporate growth, but there are also major pitfalls for firms that invest in innovation. Expenditures on R&D aimed at identifying new products or processes can be a waste of resources if the effort does not yield results. Another danger is related to the competitive climate. Even if a company innovates a new capability or successfully applies a technological breakthrough, another company may develop a similar innovation or find a use for it that is more profitable. Finally R&D and other innovation efforts are among the first to be cut back during an economic downturn.

Even though innovativeness is an important means of internal corporate venturing, it also involves major risks, because investments in innovations may not pay off. For strategic managers of entrepreneurial firms, successfully developing and adopting innovations can generate competitive advantages and provide a major source of growth for the firm.

Proactiveness Proactiveness refers to a firm’s efforts to seize new opportunities. Proactive organizations mon- itor trends, identify the future needs of existing customers, and anticipate changes in demand or emerging problems that can lead to new venture opportunities. Proactiveness involves not only recognizing changes but also being willing to act on those insights ahead of the competi- tion.63 Strategic managers who practice proactiveness have their eye on the future in a search for new possibilities for growth and development. Such a forward-looking perspective is impor- tant for companies that seek to be industry leaders. Many proactive firms seek out ways not only to be future-oriented but also to change the very nature of competition in their industry.

Proactiveness puts competitors in the position of having to respond to successful initia- tives. The benefit gained by firms that are the first to enter new markets, establish brand identity, implement administrative techniques, or adopt new operating technologies in an industry is called first-mover advantage.64

First movers usually have several advantages. First, industry pioneers, especially in new industries, often capture unusually high profits because there are no competitors to drive prices down. Second, first movers that establish brand recognition are usually able to retain their image and hold on to the market share gains they earned by being first. Sometimes these benefits also accrue to other early movers in an industry, but, generally speaking, first movers have an advan- tage that can be sustained until firms enter the maturity phase of an industry’s life cycle.65

First movers are not always successful. The customers of companies that introduce novel products or embrace breakthrough technologies may be reluctant to commit to a new way of doing things. In his book Crossing the Chasm, Geoffrey A. Moore noted that most firms seek evolution, not revolution, in their operations. This makes it difficult for a first mover to sell promising new technologies.66

Careful monitoring and scanning of the environment, as well as extensive feasibility research, are needed for a proactive strategy to lead to competitive advantages. Firms that do it well usually have substantial growth and internal development to show for it. Many of them have been able to sustain the advantages of proactiveness for years.

proactiveness a forward-looking perspective characteristic of a marketplace leader that has the foresight to seize opportunities in anticipation of future demand.

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Competitive Aggressiveness Competitive aggressiveness refers to a firm’s efforts to outperform its industry rivals. Companies with an aggressive orientation are willing to “do battle” with competitors. They might slash prices and sacrifice profitability to gain market share or spend aggressively to obtain manufacturing capacity. As an avenue of firm development and growth, competitive aggressiveness may involve being very assertive in leveraging the results of other entrepre- neurial activities such as innovativeness or proactiveness.

Strategic managers can use competitive aggressiveness to combat industry trends that threaten their survival or market position. Sometimes firms need to be forceful in defending the competitive position that has made them an industry leader. Firms often need to be aggressive to ensure their advantage by capitalizing on new technologies or serving new market needs. An example of competitive aggressiveness would be to dra- matically lower prices to take market share from rival firms. Of course, this will only be successful if the attacking firm has a cost advantage over rivals. Another tactic is to regularly imitate rivals by copying new products, marketing messages, or other aspects of their strategy. One advantage of this is that it is generally cheaper to imitate a suc- cessful rival.

Another practice companies use to overcome the competition is to make preannounce- ments of new products or technologies. This type of signaling is aimed not only at potential customers but also at competitors to see how they will react or to discourage them from launching similar initiatives. Sometimes the preannouncements are made just to scare off competitors, an action that has potential ethical implications.

Competitive aggressiveness may not always lead to competitive advantages. Some com- panies (or their CEOs) have severely damaged their reputations by being overly aggressive. For example, Walmart’s aggressive pricing structure has forced smaller, local retailers out of business in many markets. This has led a number of local communities, often at the urg- ing of local retailers, to pass regulations that make it difficult for Walmart to move into or expand operations in these towns and cities.

Competitive aggressiveness is a strategy that is best used in moderation. Companies that aggressively establish their competitive position and vigorously exploit opportunities to achieve profitability may, over the long run, be better able to sustain their competitive advantages if their goal is to defeat, rather than decimate, their competitors.

Risk Taking Risk taking refers to a firm’s willingness to seize a venture opportunity even though it does not know whether the venture will be successful—to act boldly without knowing the conse- quences. To be successful through corporate entrepreneurship, firms usually have to take on riskier alternatives, even if it means forgoing the methods or products that have worked in the past. To obtain high financial returns, firms take such risks as assuming high levels of debt, committing large amounts of firm resources, introducing new products into new markets, and investing in unexplored technologies.

All of the approaches to internal development that we have discussed are potentially risky. Whether they are being aggressive, proactive, or innovative, firms on the path of CE must act without knowing how their actions will turn out. Before launching their strategies, corporate entrepreneurs must know their firm’s appetite for risk.67

Three types of risk that organizations and their executives face are business risk, finan- cial risk, and personal risk:

• Business risk taking involves venturing into the unknown without knowing the probability of success. This is the risk associated with entering untested markets or committing to unproven technologies.

competitive aggressiveness an intense effort to outperform industry rivals; characterized by a combative posture or an aggressive response aimed at improving position or overcoming a threat in a competitive marketplace.

risk taking making decisions and taking action without certain knowledge of probable outcomes. Some undertakings may also involve making substantial resource commitments in the process of venturing forward.

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• Financial risk taking requires that a company borrow heavily or commit a large portion of its resources in order to grow. In this context, risk is used to refer to the risk–return trade-off that is familiar in financial analysis.

• Personal risk taking refers to the risks that an executive assumes in taking a stand in favor of a strategic course of action. Executives who take such risks stand to influence the course of their whole company, and their decisions also can have significant implications for their careers.

Even though risk taking involves taking chances, it is not gambling. The best-run com- panies investigate the consequences of various opportunities and create scenarios of likely outcomes. A key to managing entrepreneurial risks is to evaluate new venture opportunities thoroughly enough to reduce the uncertainty surrounding them.

Risk taking, by its nature, involves potential dangers and pitfalls. Only carefully managed risk is likely to lead to competitive advantages. Actions that are taken without sufficient fore- thought, research, and planning may prove to be very costly. Therefore, strategic managers must always remain mindful of potential risks. In his book Innovation and Entrepreneurship, Peter Drucker argued that successful entrepreneurs are typically not risk takers. Instead, they take steps to minimize risks by carefully understanding them. That is how they avoid focusing on risk and remain focused on opportunity.68 Risk taking is a good place to close this chapter on corporate entrepreneurship. Companies that choose to grow through inter- nal corporate venturing must remember that entrepreneurship always involves embracing what is new and uncertain.

ISSUE FOR DEBATE

Few would argue with the observation that Tesla is an innovative firm. It has taken out a leading position in developing technology for electric vehicles. It is also building autonomous control systems into its cars. It has taken one seeming step backward and strategically developed its own technology for batteries and manufacturing capacity to produce batteries. It has subtly innovated the design for its cars. Rather than putting the batteries for its cars in what would normally be the engine compartment, it places them under the main compartment of the car, allowing the firm to include a “frunk” (or front trunk) in its cars. It has also innovated on the distribution side of the business by circumventing dealers to sell its cars directly to customers through company-owned showrooms. Thus, it is innovating in ways that change the supply system, the technology of automobile drive trains, the technology of driving, the physical design of cars, and how cars are distributed.

However, it is not clear whether Tesla is offering a disruptive innovation in the automobile market. For this to be the case, Tesla’s business model would have to innovate in ways that can significantly undercut the value of the resources of Ford, GM, Toyota, and the other incumbent competitors in the auto industry.

Discussion Questions 1. Do you see Tesla’s business model and product as offering a sustaining or a disruptive inno-

vation? Why do you see it this way? 2. In what ways will incumbent firms be able to respond effectively to Tesla? In what ways will

it be difficult? 3. Whether or not you see Tesla as offering a disruptive innovation, what would be a different

way that an entrepreneurial firm could offer a disruptive innovation in this market?

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Reflecting on Career Implications . . . This chapter focuses on corporate entrepreneurship and innovation. You can provide greater value to your firm and build a higher impact career if you develop innovativeness skills and an entrepreneurial orientation. The questions below identify issues to consider as you build these skills and orientation.

Innovation: Identify the types of innovations being pursued by your company. Do they tend to be incremental or radical? Product-related or process-related? Are there ways in which you can add value to such innovations, no matter how minor your contributions are?

Cultivating Innovation Skills: Exhibit 12.2 describes the five traits of an effective innovator (associating, questioning, observing, experimenting, and networking). Assess yourself on each of these traits. Practice the skills in your work and professional life to build your skills as an innovator. If you are

interviewing for a job with an organization that is considered high on innovation, it might be in your interest to highlight these traits.

Real Options Analysis: Success in your career often depends on creating and exercising career “options.” However, creation of options involves costs as well, such as learning new skills, obtaining additional certifications, and so on. Consider what options you can create for yourself. Evaluate the cost of these options.

Entrepreneurial Orientation: Consider the five dimensions of entrepreneurial orientation. Evaluate yourself on each of these dimensions (autonomy, innovativeness, proactiveness, competitive aggressiveness, and risk taking). If you are high on entrepreneurial orientation, you may have a future as an entrepreneur. Consider the ways in which you can use the experience and learning from your current job to become a successful entrepreneur in later years.

To remain competitive in today’s economy, established firms must find new avenues for development and growth. This chapter has addressed how innovation and corporate entrepreneurship can be a means of internal venture creation and

strategic renewal, and how an entrepreneurial orientation can help corporations enhance their competitive position.

Innovation is one of the primary means by which corporations grow and strengthen their strategic position. Innovations can take several forms, ranging from radical breakthrough innovations to incremental improvement innovations. Innovations are often used to update products and services or to improve organizational processes. Managing the innovation process is often challenging, because it involves a great deal of uncertainty and there are many choices to be made about the extent and type of innovations to pursue. By cultivating innovation skills, defining the scope of innovation, managing the pace of innovation, staffing to capture value from innovation, and collaborating with innovation partners, firms can more effectively manage the innovation process.

We also discussed the role of corporate entrepreneurship in venture development and strategic renewal. Corporations usually take either a focused or dispersed approach to corporate venturing. Firms with a focused approach usually separate the corporate venturing activity from the ongoing operations of the firm in order to foster independent thinking and encourage entrepreneurial team members to think and act without the constraints imposed by the corporation. In corporations where venturing activities are dispersed, a culture of entrepreneurship permeates all

parts of the company in order to induce strategic behaviors by all organizational members. In measuring the success of corporate venturing activities, both financial and strategic objectives should be considered. Real options analysis is often used to make better-quality decisions in uncertain entrepreneurial situations. However, a real options approach has potential drawbacks.

Most entrepreneurial firms need to have an entrepreneurial orientation: the methods, practices, and decision-making styles that strategic managers use to act entrepreneurially. Five dimensions of entrepreneurial orientation are found in firms that pursue corporate venture strategies. Autonomy, innovativeness, proactiveness, competitive aggressiveness, and risk taking each make a unique contribution to the pursuit of new opportunities. When deployed effectively, the methods and practices of an entrepreneurial orientation can be used to engage successfully in corporate entrepreneurship and new venture creation. However, strategic managers must remain mindful of the pitfalls associated with each of these approaches.

SUMMARY REVIEW QUESTIONS 1. What is meant by the concept of a continuum of

radical and incremental innovations?

2. What are the dilemmas that organizations face when deciding what innovation projects to pursue? What steps can organizations take to effectively manage the innovation process?

3. What is the difference between focused and dispersed approaches to corporate entrepreneurship?

summary

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4. How are business incubators used to foster internal corporate venturing?

5. What is the role of the product champion in bringing a new product or service into existence in a corporation? How can companies use product champions to enhance their venture development efforts?

6. Explain the difference between proactiveness and competitive aggressiveness in terms of achieving and sustaining competitive advantage.

7. Describe how the entrepreneurial orientation (EO) dimensions of innovativeness, proactiveness, and risk taking can be combined to create competitive advantages for entrepreneurial firms.

innovation 362 product innovation 362 process innovation 362 radical innovations 363 incremental innovations 363 strategic envelope 368 corporate entrepreneurship (CE) 373 focused approaches to corporate entrepreneurship 374 new venture groups (NVGs) 374

business incubators 374 dispersed approaches to corporate entrepreneurship 375 entrepreneurial culture 376 product champions 377 exit champions 378 real options analysis (ROA) 378 back-solver dilemma 380 managerial conceit 380 escalation of commitment 381 entrepreneurial orientation 381 autonomy 381 innovativeness 382 proactiveness 383 competitive aggressiveness 384 risk taking 384

key terms

APPLICATION QUESTIONS & EXERCISES 1. Select a firm known for its corporate

entrepreneurship activities. Research the company and discuss how it has positioned itself relative to its close competitors. Does it have a unique strategic advantage? Disadvantage? Explain.

2. Explain the difference between product innovations and process innovations. Provide examples of firms that have recently introduced each type of innovation. What are the types of innovations related to the strategies of each firm?

3. Using the Internet, select a company that is listed on the NASDAQ or New York Stock Exchange. Research the extent to which the company has an entrepreneurial culture. Does the company use product champions? Does it have a corporate venture capital fund? Do you believe its entrepreneurial efforts are sufficient to generate sustainable advantages?

4. How can an established firm use an entrepreneurial orientation to enhance its overall strategic position? Provide examples.

ETHICS QUESTIONS 1. Innovation activities are often aimed at making a

discovery or commercializing a technology ahead of the competition. What are some of the unethical practices that companies could engage in during the innovation process? What are the potential long-term consequences of such actions?

2. Discuss the ethical implications of using entrepreneurial policies and practices to pursue corporate social responsibility goals. Are these efforts authentic and genuine or just an attempt to attract more customers?

EXPERIENTIAL EXERCISE Select two different major corporations from two different industries (you might use Fortune 500 companies to make your selection). Compare and contrast these organizations in terms of their entrepreneurial orientation. (Fill in the table below.)

Based on your comparison:

1. How is the corporation’s entrepreneurial orientation reflected in its strategy?

Entrepreneurial Orientation Company A Company B

Autonomy

Innovativeness

Proactiveness

Competitive aggressiveness

Risk taking

2. Which corporation would you say has the stronger entrepreneurial orientation?

3. Is the corporation with the stronger entrepreneurial orientation also stronger in terms of financial performance?

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1. Eddy, N. 2014. Android captures 85 percent of smartphone market worldwide. eweek.com, August 8: np; Vascellaro, J. 2009. Radio tunes out Google in rare miss for web titan. wsj.com, May 12: np; and McGrath, R. 2011. Failing by design. Harvard Business Review, 89(4): 76–83; statista.com.

2. For an interesting discussion, see Johannessen, J. A., Olsen, B., & Lumpkin, G. T. 2001. Innovation as newness: What is new, how new, and new to whom? European Journal of Innovation Management, 4(1): 20–31.

3. The discussion of product and process innovation is based on Roberts, E. B. (Ed.). 2002. Innovation: Driving product, process, and market change. San Francisco: Jossey-Bass; Hayes, R. & Wheelwright, S. 1985. Competing through manufacturing. Harvard Business Review, 63(1): 99–109; and Hayes, R. & Wheelwright, S. 1979. Dynamics of product–process life cycles. Harvard Business Review, 57(2): 127–136.

4. The discussion of radical and incremental innovations draws from Leifer, R., McDermott, C. M., Colarelli, G., O’Connor, G. C., Peters, L. S., Rice, M. P., & Veryzer, R. W. 2000. Radical innovation: How mature companies can outsmart upstarts. Boston: Harvard Business School Press; Damanpour, F. 1996. Organizational complexity and innovation: Developing and testing multiple contingency models. Management Science, 42(5): 693–716; and Hage, J. 1980. Theories of organizations. New York: Wiley.

5. Christensen, C. M. & Raynor, M. E. 2003. The innovator’s solution. Boston: Harvard Business School Press.

6. Dressner, H. 2004. The Gartner Fellows interview: Clayton M. Christensen. www.gartner.com, April 26.

7. For another perspective on how different types of innovation affect organizational choices, see Wolter, C. & Veloso, F. M. 2008. The effects of innovation on vertical structure: Perspectives on transactions costs and competences. Academy of Management Review, 33(3): 586–605.

8. Drucker, P. F. 1985. Innovation and entrepreneurship. New York: Harper & Row.

9. Birkinshaw, J., Hamel, G., & Mol, M. J. 2008. Management innovation.

Academy of Management Review, 33(4): 825–845.

10. Steere, W. C., Jr. & Niblack, J. 1997. Pfizer, Inc. In Kanter, R. M., Kao, J., & Wiersema, F. (Eds.), Innovation: Breakthrough thinking at 3M, DuPont, GE, Pfizer, and Rubbermaid: 123–145. New York: HarperCollins.

11. Morrissey, C. A. 2000. Managing innovation through corporate venturing. Graziadio Business Report, Spring, gbr.pepperdine.edu; and Sharma, A. 1999. Central dilemmas of managing innovation in large firms. California Management Review, 41(3): 147–164.

12. Sharma, op. cit. 13. Dyer, J. H., Gregerson, H. B., &

Christensen, C. M. 2009. The innovator’s DNA. Harvard Business Review, December: 61–67.

14. Eggers, J. P. & Kaplan, S. 2009. Cognition and renewal: Comparing CEO and organizational effects on incumbent adaptation to technical change. Organization Science, 20: 461–477.

15. For more on defining the scope of innovation, see Valikangas, L. & Gibbert, M. 2005. Boundary-setting strategies for escaping innovation traps. MIT Sloan Management Review, 46(3): 58–65.

16. Leifer et al., op. cit. 17. Bhide, A. V. 2000. The origin and

evolution of new businesses. New York: Oxford University Press; Brown, S. L. & Eisenhardt, K. M. 1998. Competing on the edge: Strategy as structured chaos. Cambridge, MA: Harvard Business School Press.

18. McGrath, R. G. & Keil, T. 2007. The value captor’s process: Getting the most out of your new business ventures. Harvard Business Review, May: 128–136.

19. For an interesting discussion of how sharing technology knowledge with different divisions in an organization can contribute to innovation processes, see Miller, D. J., Fern, M. J., & Cardinal, L. B. 2007. The use of knowledge for technological innovation within diversified firms. Academy of Management Journal, 50(2): 308–326.

20. Ketchen, D. J., Jr., Ireland, R. D., & Snow, C. C. 2007 Strategic entrepreneurship, collaborative innovation, and wealth creation. Strategic Entrepreneurship Journal, 1(3–4): 371–385.

21. Chesbrough, H. 2003. Open innovation: The new imperative for

creating and profiting from technology. Boston: Harvard Business School Press.

22. For a study of what makes alliance partnerships successful, see Sampson, R. C. 2007. R&D alliances and firm performance: The impact of technological diversity and alliance organization on innovation. Academy of Management Journal, 50(2): 364–386.

23. For an interesting perspective on the role of collaboration among multinational corporations, see Hansen, M. T. & Nohria, N. 2004. How to build collaborative advantage. MIT Sloan Management Review, 46(1): 22–30.

24. Wells, R. M. J. 2008. The product innovation process: Are managing information flows and cross- functional collaboration key? Academy of Management Perspectives, 22(1): 58–60; Dougherty, D. & Dunne, D. D. 2011. Organizing ecologies of complex innovation. Organization Science, 22(5): 1214– 1223; and Kim, H. E. & Pennings, J. M. 2009. Innovation and strategic renewal in mature markets: A study of the tennis racket industry. Organization Science, 20: 368–383.

25. Eggers, J. P. 2014. Get ahead by betting wrong. Harvard Business Review, 92(7/8): 26; and Lepore, J. 2014. The disruption machine. newyorker.com, June 23: np.

26. Birkinshaw, J. 2016. Increase your return on failure. Harvard Business Review. May: 89–93.

27. Guth, W. D. & Ginsberg, A. 1990. Guest editor’s introduction: Corporate entrepreneurship. Strategic Management Journal, 11: 5–15.

28. Pinchot, G. 1985. Intrapreneuring. New York: Harper & Row.

29. For an interesting perspective on the role of context on the discovery and creation of opportunities, see Zahra, S. A. 2008. The virtuous cycle of discovery and creation of entrepreneurial opportunities. Strategic Entrepreneurship Journal, 2(3): 243–257.

30. Birkinshaw, J. 1997. Entrepreneurship in multinational corporations: The characteristics of subsidiary initiatives. Strategic Management Journal, 18(3): 207–229; and Kanter, R. M. 1985. The change masters. New York: Simon & Schuster.

31. Hansen, M. T., Chesbrough, H. W., Nohria, N., & Sull, D. 2000.

REFERENCES

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Networked incubators: Hothouses of the new economy. Harvard Business Review, 78(5): 74–84.

32. For more on the importance of leadership in fostering a climate of entrepreneurship, see Ling, Y., Simsek, Z., Lubatkin, M. H., & Veiga, J. F. 2008. Transformational leadership’s role in promoting corporate entrepreneurship: Examining the CEO-TMT interface. Academy of Management Journal, 51(3): 557–576.

33. Bryant, A. 2011. Got an idea? Sell it to me in 30 seconds. nytimes.com, January 1: np.

34. Gunther, M. 2010. 3M’s innovation revival. cnnmoney.com, September 24: np; Byrne, J. 2012. The 12 greatest entrepreneurs of our time. Fortune, April 9: 76; and Anonymous. 2007. Johnson & Johnson turns to internal venturing. silico.wordpress.com, July 16: np.

35. Colvin, G. 2014. Brad Smith: Getting rid of friction. Fortune, July 21: 24.

36. For an interesting discussion, see Davenport, T. H., Prusak, L., & Wilson, H. J. 2003. Who’s bringing you hot ideas and how are you responding? Harvard Business Review, 80(1): 58–64.

37. Howell, J. M. 2005. The right stuff. Identifying and developing effective champions of innovation. Academy of Management Executive, 19(2): 108–119. See also Greene, P., Brush, C., & Hart, M. 1999. The corporate venture champion: A resource- based approach to role and process. Entrepreneurship Theory & Practice, 23(3): 103–122; and Markham, S. K. & Aiman-Smith, L. 2001. Product champions: Truths, myths and management. Research Technology Management, May–June: 44–50.

38. Burgelman, R. A. 1983. A process model of internal corporate venturing in the diversified major firm. Administrative Science Quarterly, 28: 223–244.

39. Greene, Brush, & Hart, op. cit.; and Shane, S. 1994. Are champions different from non-champions? Journal of Business Venturing, 9(5): 397–421.

40. Block, Z. & MacMillan, I. C. 1993. Corporate venturing—Creating new businesses with the firm. Cambridge, MA: Harvard Business School Press.

41. For an interesting discussion of these trade-offs, see Stringer, R. 2000. How to manage radical innovation. California Management Review, 42(4): 70–88; and Gompers, P. A. & Lerner, J. 1999. The venture capital cycle. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

42. Cardinal, L. B., Turner, S. F., Fern, M. J., & Burton, R. M. 2011. Organizing for product development across technological environments: Performance trade-offs and priorities. Organization Science, 22: 1000–1025.

43. Albrinck, J., Hornery, J., Kletter, D., & Neilson, G. 2001. Adventures in corporate venturing. Strategy + Business, 22: 119–129; and McGrath, R. G. & MacMillan, I. C. 2000. The entrepreneurial mind-set. Cambridge, MA: Harvard Business School Press.

44. Kiel, T., McGrath, R. G., & Tukiainen, T. 2009. Gems from the ashes: Capability creation and transforming in internal corporate venturing. Organization Science, 20: 601–620.

45. For an interesting discussion of how different outcome goals affect organizational learning and employee motivation, see Seijts, G. H. & Latham, G. P. 2005. Learning versus performance goals: When should each be used? Academy of Management Executive, 19(1): 124–131.

46. Crockett, R. O. 2001. Motorola. BusinessWeek, July 15: 72–78.

47. The ideas in this section are drawn from Royer, I. 2003. Why bad projects are so hard to kill. Harvard Business Review, 80(1): 48–56.

48. For an interesting perspective on the different roles that individuals play in the entrepreneurial process, see Baron, R. A. 2008. The role of affect in the entrepreneurial process. Academy of Management Review, 33(2): 328–340.

49. For an interesting discussion on why it is difficult to “kill options,” refer to Royer, I. 2003. Why bad projects are so hard to kill. Harvard Business Review, 81(2): 48–57.

50. Slywotzky, A. & Wise, R., 2003. How to Grow When Markets Don’t. New York, NY: Warner Books; Slywotzky, A. & Wise, R. 2003. Double-digit growth in no-growth times. Fast Company, April: 66–72; www.hoovers. com; and www.johnsoncontrols.com.

51. For more on the role of real options in entrepreneurial decision making, see Folta, T. B. & O’Brien, J. P. 2004. Entry in the presence of dueling options. Strategic Management Journal, 25: 121–138.

52. This section draws on Janney, J. J. & Dess, G. G. 2004. Can real options analysis improve decision-making? Promises and pitfalls. Academy of Management Executive, 18(4): 60–75. For additional insights on pitfalls of real options, consider

McGrath, R. G. 1997. A real options logic for initiating technology positioning investment. Academy of Management Review, 22(4): 974–994; Coff, R. W. & Laverty, K. J. 2001. Real options on knowledge assets: Panacea or Pandora’s box? Business Horizons, 73: 79; McGrath, R. G. 1999. Falling forward: Real options reasoning and entrepreneurial failure. Academy of Management Review, 24(1): 13–30; and Zardkoohi, A. 2004. Do real options lead to escalation of commitment? Academy of Management Review, 29(1): 111–119.

53. For an understanding of the differences between how managers say they approach decisions and how they actually do, March and Shapira’s discussion is perhaps the best. March, J. G. & Shapira, Z. 1987. Managerial perspectives on risk and risk-taking. Management Science, 33(11): 1404–1418.

54. A discussion of some factors that may lead to escalation in decision making is included in Choo, C. W. 2005. Information failures and organizational disasters. MIT Sloan Management Review, 46(3): 8–10.

55. One very useful solution for reducing the effects of managerial conceit is to incorporate an exit champion into the decision process. Exit champions provide arguments for killing off the firm’s commitment to a decision. For a very insightful discussion on exit champions, refer to Royer, I. 2003. Why bad projects are so hard to kill. Harvard Business Review, 81(2): 49–56.

56. For more on how entrepreneurial orientation influences organizational performance, see Wang, L. 2008. Entrepreneurial orientation, learning orientation, and firm performance. Entrepreneurship Theory & Practice, 32(4): 635–657; and Runyan, R., Droge, C., & Swinney, J. 2008. Entrepreneurial orientation versus small business orientation: What are their relationships to firm performance? Journal of Small Business Management, 46(4): 567–588.

57. Covin, J. G. & Slevin, D. P. 1991. A conceptual model of entrepreneurship as firm behavior. Entrepreneurship Theory and Practice, 16(1): 7–24; Lumpkin, G. T. & Dess, G. G. 1996. Clarifying the entrepreneurial orientation construct and linking it to performance. Academy of Management Review, 21(1): 135–172; and McGrath, R. G. & MacMillan, I. C. 2000. The entrepreneurial mind-set. Cambridge, MA: Harvard Business School Press.

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58. Lumpkin, G. T. & Dess, G. G. 2001. Linking two dimensions of entrepreneurial orientation to firm performance: The moderating role of environment and life cycle. Journal of Business Venturing, 16: 429–451.

59. For an interesting discussion, see Day, J. D., Mang, P. Y., Richter, A., & Roberts, J. 2001. The innovative organization: Why new ventures need more than a room of their own. McKinsey Quarterly, 2: 21–31.

60. Crockett, R. O. 2001. Chris Galvin shakes things up—again. BusinessWeek, May 28: 38–39.

61. For insights into the role of information technology in innovativeness, see Dibrell, C., Davis, P. S., & Craig, J. 2008. Fueling innovation through information

technology in SMEs. Journal of Small Business Management, 46(2): 203–218.

62. For an interesting discussion of the impact of innovativeness on organizational outcomes, see Cho, H. J. & Pucik, V. 2005. Relationship between innovativeness, quality, growth, profitability, and market value. Strategic Management Journal, 26(6): 555–575.

63. Danneels, E. & Sethi, R. 2011. New product exploration under environmental turbulence. Organization Science, 22(4): 1026–1039.

64. Lieberman, M. B. & Montgomery, D. B. 1988. First mover advantages. Strategic Management Journal, 9 (Special Issue): 41–58.

65. The discussion of first-mover advantages is based on several articles, including Lambkin, M. 1988. Order of entry and performance in new markets. Strategic Management Journal, 9: 127–140; Lieberman & Montgomery, op. cit., pp. 41–58; and Miller, A. & Camp, B. 1985. Exploring determinants of success in corporate ventures. Journal of Business Venturing, 1(2): 87–105.

66. Moore, G. A. 1999. Crossing the chasm (2nd ed.). New York: HarperBusiness.

67. Miller, K. D. 2007. Risk and rationality in entrepreneurial processes. Strategic Entrepreneurship Journal, 1(1–2): 57–74.

68. Drucker, op. cit., pp. 109–110.

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Chapter

After reading this chapter, you should have a good understanding of the following learning objectives:

13

LO13-1 How strategic case analysis is used to simulate real-world experiences. LO13-2 How analyzing strategic management cases can help develop the ability

to differentiate, speculate, and integrate when evaluating complex business problems.

LO13-3 The steps involved in conducting a strategic management case analysis. LO13-4 How to get the most out of case analysis. LO13-5 How integrative thinking and conflict-inducing discussion techniques can

lead to better decisions.

LO13-6 How to use the strategic insights and material from each of the 12 previous chapters in the text to analyze issues posed by strategic management cases.

Analyzing Strategic Management Cases

©Anatoli Styf/Shutterstock

PART 4: CASE ANALYSIS

Why Analyze Strategic Management Cases?

If you don’t ask the right questions, then you’re never going to get the right solution. I spent too much of my career feeling like I’d done a really good job answering the wrong question. And that was because I was letting other people give me the question.1

—Tim Brown, CEO of IDEO (a leading design consulting firm)

It is often said that the key to finding good answers is to ask good questions. Strategic managers and business leaders are required to evaluate options, make choices, and find solutions to the challenges they face every day. To do so, they must learn to ask the right questions. The study of strategic management poses the same challenge. The process of analyzing, decision making, and implementing strategic actions raises many good questions:

• Why do some firms succeed and others fail? • Why are some companies higher performers than

others? • What information is needed in the strategic

planning process? • How do competing values and beliefs affect

strategic decision making? • What skills and capabilities are needed to

implement a strategy effectively?

How does a student of strategic management answer these questions? By strategic case analysis. Case analysis simulates the real-world experience that strategic manag- ers and company leaders face as they try to determine how best to run their companies. It places students in the middle of an actual situation and challenges them to figure out what to do.2

Asking the right questions is just the beginning of case analysis. In the previous chapters we have discussed issues and challenges that managers face and provided analytical frame- works for understanding the situation. But once the analysis is complete, decisions have to be made. Case analysis forces you to choose among different options and set forth a plan of action based on your choices. But even then the job is not done. Strategic case analysis also requires that you address how you will implement the plan and the implications of choosing one course of action over another.

A strategic management case is a detailed description of a challenging situation faced by an organization.3 It usually includes a chronology of events and extensive support materials, such as financial statements, product lists, and transcripts of interviews with employees. Although names or locations are sometimes changed to provide anonymity, cases usually report the facts of a situation as authentically as possible.

One of the main reasons to analyze strategic management cases is to develop an abil- ity to evaluate business situations critically. In case analysis, memorizing key terms and conceptual frameworks is not enough. To analyze a case, it is important that you go beyond textbook prescriptions and quick answers. It requires you to look deeply into the informa- tion that is provided and root out the essential issues and causes of a company’s problems.

The types of skills that are required to prepare an effective strategic case analysis can benefit you in actual business situations. Case analysis adds to the overall learning experi- ence by helping you acquire or improve skills that may not be taught in a typical lecture course. Three capabilities that can be learned by conducting case analysis are especially use- ful to strategic managers—the ability to differentiate, speculate, and integrate.4 Here’s how case analysis can enhance those skills:

1. Differentiate. Effective strategic management requires that many different elements of a situation be evaluated at once. This is also true in case analysis. When analyzing cases, it is important to isolate critical facts, evaluate whether assumptions are useful

LO 13-1 How strategic case analysis is used to simulate real-world experiences.

LO 13-2 How analyzing strategic management cases can help develop the ability to differentiate, speculate, and integrate when evaluating complex business problems.

case analysis a method of learning complex strategic management concepts— such as environmental analysis, the process of decision making, and implementing strategic actions—through placing students in the middle of an actual situation and challenging them to figure out what to do.

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or faulty, and distinguish between good and bad information. Differentiating between the factors that are influencing the situation presented by a case is necessary for making a good analysis. Strategic management also involves understanding that problems are often complex and multilayered. This applies to case analysis as well. Ask whether the case deals with operational, business-level, or corporate issues. Do the problems stem from weaknesses in the internal value chain or threats in the external environment? Dig deep. Being too quick to accept the easiest or least controversial answer will usually fail to get to the heart of the problem.

2. Speculate. Strategic managers need to be able to use their imagination to envision an explanation or solution that might not readily be apparent. The same is true with case analysis. Being able to imagine different scenarios or contemplate the outcome of a decision can aid the analysis. Managers also have to deal with uncertainty since most decisions are made without complete knowledge of the circumstances. This is also true in case analysis. Case materials often seem to be missing data or the information provided is contradictory. The ability to speculate about details that are unknown or the consequences of an action can be helpful.

3. Integrate. Strategy involves looking at the big picture and having an organizationwide perspective. Strategic case analysis is no different. Even though the chapters in this textbook divide the material into various topics that may apply to different parts of an organization, all of this information must be integrated into one set of recommendations that will affect the whole company. A strategic manager needs to comprehend how all the factors that influence the organization will interact. This also applies to case analysis. Changes made in one part of the organization affect other parts. Thus, a holistic perspective that integrates the impact of various decisions and environmental influences on all parts of the organization is needed.

In business, these three activities sometimes “compete” with each other for your atten- tion. For example, some decision makers may have a natural ability to differentiate among elements of a problem but are not able to integrate them very well. Others have enough innate creativity to imagine solutions or fill in the blanks when information is missing. But they may have a difficult time when faced with hard numbers or cold facts. Even so, each of these skills is important. The mark of a good strategic manager is the ability to simulta- neously make distinctions and envision the whole, and to imagine a future scenario while staying focused on the present. Thus, another reason to conduct case analysis is to help you develop and exercise your ability to differentiate, speculate, and integrate. David C. Novak, the chairman and CEO of Yum! Brands, provides a useful insight on this matter:5

I think what we need in our leaders, the people who ultimately run our companies and run our functions, is whole-brained people—people who can be analytical but also have the creativity, the right-brain side of the equation.

Case analysis takes the student through the whole cycle of activity that a manager would face. Beyond the textbook descriptions of concepts and examples, case analysis asks you to “walk a mile in the shoes” of the strategic decision maker and learn to evaluate situations critically. Executives and owners must make decisions every day with limited information and a swirl of business activity going on around them. Consider the example of Sapient Health Network, an Internet start-up that had to undergo some analysis and problem solv- ing just to survive. Strategy Spotlight 13.1 describes how this company transformed itself after a serious self-examination during a time of crisis.

As you can see from the experience of Sapient Health Network, businesses are often faced with immediate challenges that threaten their lives. The Sapient case illustrates how the strategic management process helped it survive. First, the company realistically assessed the environment, evaluated the marketplace, and analyzed its resources. Then it made tough

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decisions, which included shifting its market focus, hiring and firing, and redeploying its assets. Finally, it took action. The result was not only firm survival but also a quick turn- around leading to rapid success.

HOW TO CONDUCT A CASE ANALYSIS The process of analyzing strategic management cases involves several steps. In this section we will review the mechanics of preparing a case analysis. Before beginning, there are two things to keep in mind that will clarify your understanding of the process and make the results of the process more meaningful.

First, unless you prepare for a case discussion, there is little you can gain from the discus- sion and even less that you can offer. Effective strategic managers don’t enter into problem- solving situations without doing some homework—investigating the situation, analyzing and researching possible solutions, and sometimes gathering the advice of others. Good problem solving often requires that decision makers be immersed in the facts, options, and implications surrounding the problem. In case analysis, this means reading and thoroughly comprehending the case materials before trying to make an analysis.

The second point is related to the first. To get the most out of a case analysis, you must place yourself “inside” the case—that is, think like an actual participant in the case

LO 13-3 The steps involved in conducting a strategic management case analysis.

13.1 STRATEGY SPOTLIGHT ANALYSIS, DECISION MAKING, AND CHANGE AT SAPIENT HEALTH NETWORK Sapient Health Network (SHN) had gotten off to a good start. CEO Jim Kean and his two cofounders had raised $5 million in investor capital to launch their vision: an Internet-based health care infor- mation subscription service. The idea was to create an Internet community for people suffering from chronic diseases. It would provide members with expert information, resources, a message board, and chat rooms so that people suffering from the same ailments could provide each other with information and support. “Who would be more voracious consumers of information than people who are faced with life-changing, life- threatening ill- nesses?” thought Bill Kelly, one of SHN’s cofounders. Initial mar- ket research and beta tests had supported that view.

During the beta tests, however, the service had been offered for free. The troubles began when SHN tried to convert its trial subscribers into paying ones. Fewer than 5 percent signed on, far less than the 15 percent the company had projected. Sapient hired a vice president of marketing who launched an aggressive promotion, but after three months of campaigning SHN still had only 500 members. SHN was now burning through $400,000 per month, with little revenue to show for it.

At that point, according to SHN board member Susan Clymer, “there was a lot of scrambling around trying to figure out how we could wring value out of what we’d already accomplished.” One thing SHN had created was an expert software system that had two components: an “intelligent profile engine” (IPE) and an “intelligent query engine” (IQE). SHN used this system to collect detailed information from its subscribers.

SHN was sure that the expert system was its biggest sell- ing point. But how could the company use it? Then the founders remembered that the original business plan had suggested there might be a market for aggregate data about patient populations gathered from the website. Could they turn the business around by selling patient data? To analyze the possibility, Kean tried out the idea on the market research arm of a huge east coast health care conglomerate. The officials were intrigued. SHN realized that its expert system could become a market research tool.

Once the analysis was completed, the founders made the decision: They would still create Internet communities for chroni- cally ill patients, but the service would be free. And they would transform SHN from a company that processed subscriptions to one that sold market research.

Finally, they enacted the changes. Some of the changes were painful, including laying off 18 employees. However, SHN needed more health care industry expertise. It even hired an interim CEO, Craig Davenport, a 25-year veteran of the industry, to steer the company in its new direction. Finally, SHN had to communicate a new message to its members. It began by reim- bursing the $10,000 of subscription fees they had paid.

All of this paid off dramatically in a matter of just two years. Revenues jumped to $1.9 million, and early in the third year SHN was purchased by WebMD. Less than a year after that, WebMD merged with Healtheon. The combined company still operates a thriving office out of SHN’s original location in Portland, Oregon.

Sources: Ferguson, S. 2007. Health care gets a better IT prescription. Baseline, www.baselinemag.com, May 24. Brenneman, K. 2000. Healtheon/WebMD’s local office is thriving. Business Journal of Portland, June 2; and Raths, D. 1998. Reversal of fortune. Inc. Technology, 2: 52–62.

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situation. However, there are several positions you can take. These are discussed in the following paragraphs:

• Strategic decision maker. This is the position of the senior executive responsible for resolving the situation described in the case. It may be the CEO, the business owner, or a strategic manager in a key executive position.

• Board of directors. Since the board of directors represents the owners of a corporation, it has a responsibility to step in when a management crisis threatens the company. As a board member, you may be in a unique position to solve problems.

• Outside consultant. Either the board or top management may decide to bring in outsiders. Consultants often have an advantage because they can look at a situation objectively. But they also may be at a disadvantage since they have no power to enforce changes.

Before beginning the analysis, it may be helpful to envision yourself assuming one of these roles. Then, as you study and analyze the case materials, you can make a diagnosis and recommend solutions in a way that is consistent with your position. Try different per- spectives. You may find that your view of the situation changes depending on the role you play. As an outside consultant, for example, it may be easy for you to conclude that certain individuals should be replaced in order to solve a problem presented in the case. However, if you take the role of the CEO who knows the individuals and the challenges they have been facing, you may be reluctant to fire them and will seek another solution instead.

The idea of assuming a particular role is similar to the real world in various ways. In your career, you may work in an organization where outside accountants, bankers, lawyers, or other professionals are advising you about how to resolve business situations or improve your practices. Their perspective will be different from yours, but it is useful to understand things from their point of view. Conversely, you may work as a member of the audit team of an accounting firm or the loan committee of a bank. In those situations, it would be help- ful if you understood the situation from the perspective of the business leader who must weigh your views against all the other advice that he or she receives. Case analysis can help develop an ability to appreciate such multiple perspectives.

One of the most challenging roles to play in business is as a business founder or owner. For small businesses or entrepreneurial start-ups, the founder may wear all hats at once—key decision maker, primary stockholder, and CEO. Hiring an outside consultant may not be an option. However, the issues faced by young firms and established firms are often not that dif- ferent, especially when it comes to formulating a plan of action. Business plans that entrepre- neurial firms use to raise money or propose a business expansion typically revolve around a few key issues that must be addressed no matter what the size or age of the business. Strategy Spotlight 13.2 reviews business planning issues that are most important to consider when evaluating any case, especially from the perspective of the business founder or owner.

Next we will review five steps to follow when conducting a strategic management case analysis: becoming familiar with the material, identifying the problems, analyzing the strate- gic issues using the tools and insights of strategic management, proposing alternative solu- tions, and making recommendations.6

Become Familiar with the Material Written cases often include a lot of material. They may be complex and include detailed finan- cials or long passages. Even so, to understand a case and its implications, you must become familiar with its content. Sometimes key information is not immediately apparent. It may be contained in the footnotes to an exhibit or in an interview with a lower-level employee. In other cases the important points may be difficult to grasp because the subject matter is so unfamiliar. When you approach a strategic case, try the following technique to enhance comprehension:

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• Read quickly through the case one time to get an overall sense of the material. • Use the initial read-through to assess possible links to strategic concepts. • Read through the case again, in depth. Make written notes as you read. • Evaluate how strategic concepts might inform key decisions or suggest alternative

solutions. • After formulating an initial recommendation, thumb through the case again quickly

to help assess the consequences of the actions you propose.

Identify Problems When conducting case analysis, one of your most important tasks is to identify the problem. Earlier we noted that one of the main reasons to conduct case analysis is to find solutions. But you cannot find a solution unless you know the problem. Another saying you may have heard is “A good diagnosis is half the cure.” In other words, once you have determined what the problem is, you are well on your way to identifying a reasonable solution.

Some cases have more than one problem. But the problems are usually related. For a hypothetical example, consider the following: Company A was losing customers to a new

13.2 STRATEGY SPOTLIGHT USING A BUSINESS PLAN FRAMEWORK TO ANALYZE STRATEGIC CASES Established businesses often have to change what they are doing in order to improve their competitive position or some- times simply to survive. To make the changes effectively, busi- nesses usually need a plan. Business plans are no longer just for entrepreneurs. The kind of market analysis, decision mak- ing, and action planning that is considered standard practice among new ventures can also benefit going concerns that want to make changes, seize an opportunity, or head in a new direction.

The best business plans, however, are not those that are loaded with decades of month-by-month financial projections or that depend on rigid adherence to a schedule of events that is impossible to predict. The good ones are focused on four factors that are critical to new venture success. These same factors are important in case analysis as well because they get to the heart of many of the problems found in strategic cases.

1. The people. “When I receive a business plan, I always read the résumé section first,” says Harvard Professor William Sahlman. The people questions that are critically important to investors include: What are their skills? How much experience do they have? What is their reputation? Have they worked together as a team? These same questions also may be used in case analysis to evaluate the role of individuals in the strategic case.

2. The opportunity. Business opportunities come in many forms. They are not limited to new ventures. The chance to enter new markets, introduce new products, or merge with a competitor provides many of the challenges that are found in strategic management cases. What are the

consequences of such actions? Will the proposed changes affect the firm’s business concept? What factors might stand in the way of success? The same issues are also present in most strategic cases.

3. The context. Things happen in contexts that cannot be controlled by a firm’s managers. This is particularly true of the general environment, where social trends, economic changes, or events such as the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks can change business overnight. When evaluating strategic cases, ask: Is the company aware of the impact of context on the business? What will it do if the context changes? Can it influence the context in a way that favors the company?

4. Risk and reward. With a new venture, the entrepreneurs and investors take the risks and get the rewards. In strategic cases, the risks and rewards often extend to many other stakeholders, such as employees, customers, and suppliers. When analyzing a case, ask: Are the managers making choices that will pay off in the future? Are the rewards evenly distributed? Will some stakeholders be put at risk if the situation in the case changes? What if the situation remains the same? Could that be even riskier?

Whether a business is growing or shrinking, large or small, industrial or service-oriented, the issues of people, opportuni- ties, context, and risks and rewards will have a large impact on its performance. Therefore, you should always consider these four factors when evaluating strategic management cases. Sources: Wasserman, E. 2003. A simple plan. MBA Jungle, February: 50–55; DeKluyver, C. A. 2000. Strategic thinking: An executive perspective. Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice Hall; and Sahlman, W. A. 1997. How to write a great business plan. Harvard Business Review, 75(4): 98–108.

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competitor. Upon analysis, it was determined that the competitor had a 50 percent faster delivery time even though its product was of lower quality. The managers of company A could not understand why customers would settle for an inferior product. It turns out that no one was marketing to company A’s customers that its product was superior. A second problem was that falling sales resulted in cuts in company A’s sales force. Thus, there were two related problems: inferior delivery technology and insufficient sales effort.

When trying to determine the problem, avoid getting hung up on symptoms. Zero in on the problem. For example, in the company A example, the symptom was losing customers. But the problems were an underfunded, understaffed sales force combined with an outdated delivery technology. Try to see beyond the immediate symptoms to the more fundamental problems.

Another tip when preparing a case analysis is to articulate the problem.7 Writing down a problem statement gives you a reference point to turn to as you proceed through the case analysis. This is important because the process of formulating strategies or evaluating imple- mentation methods may lead you away from the initial problem. Make sure your recommen- dation actually addresses the problems you have identified.

One more thing about identifying problems: Sometimes problems are not apparent until after you do the analysis. In some cases the problem will be presented plainly, perhaps in the opening paragraph or on the last page of the case. But in other cases the problem does not emerge until after the issues in the case have been analyzed. We turn next to the subject of strategic case analysis.

Conduct Strategic Analyses This textbook has presented numerous analytical tools (e.g., five-forces analysis and value- chain analysis), contingency frameworks (e.g., when to use related rather than unrelated diversification strategies), and other techniques that can be used to evaluate strategic situa- tions. The previous 12 chapters have addressed practices that are common in strategic man- agement, but only so much can be learned by studying the practices and concepts. The best way to understand these methods is to apply them by conducting analyses of specific cases.

The first step is to determine which strategic issues are involved. Is there a problem in the company’s competitive environment? Or is it an internal problem? If it is internal, does it have to do with organizational structure? Strategic controls? Uses of technology? Or perhaps the company has overworked its employees or underutilized its intellectual capi- tal. Has the company mishandled a merger? Chosen the wrong diversification strategy? Botched a new product introduction? Each of these issues is linked to one or more of the concepts discussed earlier in the text. Determine what strategic issues are associated with the problems you have identified. Remember also that most real-life case situations involve issues that are highly interrelated. Even in cases where there is only one major problem, the strategic processes required to solve it may involve several parts of the organization.

Once you have identified the issues that apply to the case, conduct the analysis. For exam- ple, you may need to conduct a five-forces analysis or dissect the company’s competitive strategy. Perhaps you need to evaluate whether its resources are rare, valuable, difficult to imitate, or difficult to substitute. Financial analysis may be needed to assess the company’s economic prospects. Perhaps the international entry mode needs to be reevaluated because of changing conditions in the host country. Employee empowerment techniques may need to be improved to enhance organizational learning. Whatever the case, all the strategic con- cepts introduced in the text include insights for assessing their effectiveness. Determining how well a company is doing these things is central to the case analysis process.

Financial ratio analysis is one of the primary tools used to conduct case analysis. Appendix 1 to Chapter 13 includes a discussion and examples of the financial ratios that are often used to evaluate a company’s performance and financial well-being. Exhibit 13.1 provides a summary of the financial ratios presented in Appendix 1 to this chapter.

financial ratio analysis a method of evaluating a company’s performance and financial well- being through ratios of accounting values, including short-term solvency, long-term solvency, asset utilization, profitability, and market value ratios.

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In this part of the overall strategic analysis process, it is also important to test your own assumptions about the case.8 First, what assumptions are you making about the case materials? It may be that you have interpreted the case content differently than your team members or classmates. Being clear about these assumptions will be important in determin- ing how to analyze the case. Second, what assumptions have you made about the best way to resolve the problems? Ask yourself why you have chosen one type of analysis over another. This process of assumption checking can also help determine if you have gotten to the heart of the problem or are still just dealing with symptoms.

As mentioned earlier, sometimes the critical diagnosis in a case can be made only after the analysis is conducted. However, by the end of this stage in the process, you should know the problems and have completed a thorough analysis of them. You can now move to the next step: finding solutions.

EXHIBIT 13.1 Summary of Financial Ratio Analysis Techniques

Ratio What It Measures

Short-term solvency, or liquidity, ratios:

Current ratio Ability to use assets to pay off liabilities.

Quick ratio Ability to use liquid assets to pay off liabilities quickly.

Cash ratio Ability to pay off liabilities with cash on hand.

Long-term solvency, or financial leverage, ratios:

Total debt ratio How much of a company’s total assets are financed by debt.

Debt-equity ratio Compares how much a company is financed by debt with how much it is financed by equity.

Equity multiplier How much debt is being used to finance assets.

Times interest earned ratio How well a company has its interest obligations covered.

Cash coverage ratio A company’s ability to generate cash from operations.

Asset utilization, or turnover, ratios:

Inventory turnover How many times each year a company sells its entire inventory.

Days’ sales in inventory How many days on average inventory is on hand before it is sold.

Receivables turnover How frequently each year a company collects on its credit sales.

Days’ sales in receivables How many days on average it takes to collect on credit sales (average collection period).

Total asset turnover How much of sales is generated for every dollar in assets.

Capital intensity The dollar investment in assets needed to generate $1 in sales.

Profitability ratios:

Profit margin How much profit is generated by every dollar of sales.

Return on assets (ROA) How effectively assets are being used to generate a return.

Return on equity (ROE) How effectively amounts invested in the business by its owners are being used to generate a return.

Market value ratios:

Price-earnings ratio How much investors are willing to pay per dollar of current earnings.

Market-to-book ratio Compares market value of the company’s investments to the cost of those investments.

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Propose Alternative Solutions It is important to remember that in strategic management case analysis, there is rarely one right answer or one best way. Even when members of a class or a team agree on what the problem is, they may not agree upon how to solve the problem. Therefore, it is helpful to consider several different solutions.

After conducting strategic analysis and identifying the problem, develop a list of options. What are the possible solutions? What are the alternatives? First, generate a list of all the options you can think of without prejudging any one of them. Remember that not all cases call for dramatic decisions or sweeping changes. Some companies just need to make small adjustments. In fact, “Do nothing” may be a reasonable alternative in some cases. Although that is rare, it might be useful to consider what will happen if the company does nothing. This point illustrates the purpose of developing alternatives: to evaluate what will happen if a company chooses one solution over another.

Thus, during this step of a case analysis, you will evaluate choices and the implications of those choices. One aspect of any business that is likely to be highlighted in this part of the analysis is strategy implementation. Ask how the choices made will be implemented. It may be that what seems like an obvious choice for solving a problem creates an even bigger problem when implemented. But remember also that no strategy or strategic “fix” is going to work if it cannot be implemented. Once a list of alternatives is generated, ask:

• Can the company afford it? How will it affect the bottom line? • Is the solution likely to evoke a competitive response? • Will employees throughout the company accept the changes? What impact will the

solution have on morale? • How will the decision affect other stakeholders? Will customers, suppliers, and

others buy into it? • How does this solution fit with the company’s vision, mission, and objectives? • Will the culture or values of the company be changed by the solution? Is it a

positive change?

The point of this step in the case analysis process is to find a solution that both solves the problem and is realistic. A consideration of the implications of various alternative solutions will generally lead you to a final recommendation that is more thoughtful and complete.

Make Recommendations The basic aim of case analysis is to find solutions. Your analysis is not complete until you have recommended a course of action. In this step the task is to make a set of recommenda- tions that your analysis supports. Describe exactly what needs to be done. Explain why this course of action will solve the problem. The recommendation should also include sugges- tions for how best to implement the proposed solution because the recommended actions and their implications for the performance and future of the firm are interrelated.

Recall that the solution you propose must solve the problem you identified. This point cannot be overemphasized; too often students make recommendations that treat only symptoms or fail to tackle the central problems in the case. Make a logical argument that shows how the problem led to the analysis and the analysis led to the recommendations you are proposing. Remember, an analysis is not an end in itself; it is useful only if it leads to a solution.

The actions you propose should describe the very next steps that the company needs to take. Don’t say, for example, “If the company does more market research, then I would recommend the following course of action. . . .” Instead, make conducting the research part of your recommendation. Taking the example a step further, if you also want to suggest subsequent actions that may be different depending on the outcome of the market research,

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that’s OK. But don’t make your initial recommendation conditional on actions the com- pany may or may not take.

In summary, case analysis can be a very rewarding process but, as you might imagine, it can also be frustrating and challenging. If you follow the steps described, you will address the different elements of a thorough analysis. This approach can give your analysis a solid footing. Then, even if there are differences of opinion about how to interpret the facts, ana- lyze the situation, or solve the problems, you can feel confident that you have not missed any important steps in finding the best course of action.

Students are often asked to prepare oral presentations of the information in a case and their analysis of the best remedies. This is frequently assigned as a group project. Or you may be called upon in class to present your ideas about the circumstances or solutions for a case the class is discussing. Exhibit 13.2 provides some tips for preparing an oral case presentation.

HOW TO GET THE MOST FROM CASE ANALYSIS One of the reasons case analysis is so enriching as a learning tool is that it draws on many resources and skills besides just what is in the textbook. This is especially true in the study of strategy. Why? Because strategic management itself is a highly integrative task that draws

LO 13-4 How to get the most out of case analysis.

Rule Description

Organize your thoughts. Begin by becoming familiar with the material. If you are working with a team, compare notes about the key points of the case and share insights that other team members may have gleaned from tables and exhibits. Then make an outline. This is one of the best ways to organize the flow and content of the presentation.

Emphasize strategic analysis. The purpose of case analysis is to diagnose problems and find solutions. In the process, you may need to unravel the case material as presented and reconfigure it in a fashion that can be more effectively analyzed. Present the material in a way that lends itself to analysis—don’t simply restate what is in the case. This involves three major categories with the following emphasis:

Background/Problem Statement 10–20%

Strategic Analysis/Options 60–75%

Recommendations/Action Plan 10–20%

As you can see, the emphasis of your presentation should be on analysis. This will probably require you to reorganize the material so that the tools of strategic analysis can be applied.

Be logical and consistent. A presentation that is rambling and hard to follow may confuse the listener and fail to evoke a good discussion. Present your arguments and explanations in a logical sequence. Support your claims with facts. Include financial analysis where appropriate. Be sure that the solutions you recommend address the problems you have identified.

Defend your position. Usually an oral presentation is followed by a class discussion. Anticipate what others might disagree with, and be prepared to defend your views. This means being aware of the choices you made and the implications of your recommendations. Be clear about your assumptions. Be able to expand on your analysis.

Share presentation responsibilities. Strategic management case analyses are often conducted by teams. Each member of the team should have a clear role in the oral presentation, preferably a speaking role. It’s also important to coordinate the different parts of the presentation into a logical, smooth-flowing whole. How well team members work together is usually very apparent during an oral presentation.

EXHIBIT 13.2 Preparing an Oral Case Presentation

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on many areas of specialization at several levels, from the individual to the whole of society. Therefore, to get the most out of case analysis, expand your horizons beyond the concepts in this text and seek insights from your own reservoir of knowledge. Here are some tips for how to do that:9

• Keep an open mind. Like any good discussion, a case analysis discussion often evokes strong opinions and high emotions. But it’s the variety of perspectives that makes case analysis so valuable: Many viewpoints usually lead to a more complete analysis. Therefore, avoid letting an emotional response to another person’s style or opinion keep you from hearing what he or she has to say. Once you evaluate what is said, you may disagree with it or dismiss it as faulty. But unless you keep an open mind in the first place, you may miss the importance of the other person’s contribution. Also, people often place a higher value on the opinions of those they consider to be good listeners.

• Take a stand for what you believe. Although it is vital to keep an open mind, it is also important to state your views proactively. Don’t try to figure out what your friends or the instructor wants to hear. Analyze the case from the perspective of your own background and belief system. For example, perhaps you feel that a decision is unethical or that the managers in a case have misinterpreted the facts. Don’t be afraid to assert that in the discussion. For one thing, when a person takes a strong stand, it often encourages others to evaluate the issues more closely. This can lead to a more thorough investigation and a more meaningful class discussion.

• Draw on your personal experience. You may have experiences from work or as a customer that shed light on some of the issues in a case. Even though one of the purposes of case analysis is to apply the analytical tools from this text, you may be able to add to the discussion by drawing on your outside experiences and background. Of course, you need to guard against carrying that to extremes. In other words, don’t think that your perspective is the only viewpoint that matters! Simply recognize that firsthand experience usually represents a welcome contribution to the overall quality of case discussions.

• Participate and persuade. Have you heard the phrase “Vote early . . . and often”? Among loyal members of certain political parties, it has become rather a joke. Why? Because a democratic system is built on the concept of one person, one vote. Even though some voters may want to vote often enough to get their candidate elected, doing so is against the law. Not so in a case discussion. People who are persuasive and speak their mind can often influence the views of others. But to do so, you have to be prepared and convincing. Being persuasive is more than being loud or long-winded. It involves understanding all sides of an argument and being able to overcome objections to your own point of view. These efforts can make a case discussion more lively. And they parallel what happens in the real world; in business, people frequently share their opinions and attempt to persuade others to see things their way.

• Be concise and to the point. In the previous point, we encouraged you to speak up and “sell” your ideas to others in a case discussion. But you must be clear about what you are selling. Make your arguments in a way that is explicit and direct. Zero in on the most important points. Be brief. Don’t try to make a lot of points at once by jumping around between topics. Avoid trying to explain the whole case situation at once. Remember, other students usually resent classmates who go on and on, take up a lot of “airtime,” or repeat themselves unnecessarily. The best way to avoid this is to stay focused and be specific.

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• Think out of the box. It’s OK to be a little provocative; sometimes that is the consequence of taking a stand on issues. But it may be equally important to be imaginative and creative when making a recommendation or determining how to implement a solution. Albert Einstein once stated, “Imagination is more important than knowledge.” The reason is that managing strategically requires more than memorizing concepts. Strategic management insights must be applied to each case differently—just knowing the principles is not enough. Imagination and out-of-the-box thinking help to apply strategic knowledge in novel and unique ways.

• Learn from the insights of others. Before you make up your mind about a case, hear what other students have to say. Get a second opinion, and a third, and so forth. Of course, in a situation where you have to put your analysis in writing, you may not be able to learn from others ahead of time. But in a case discussion, observe how various students attack the issues and engage in problem solving. Such observation skills also may be a key to finding answers within the case. For example, people tend to believe authority figures, so they would place a higher value on what a company president says. In some cases, however, the statements of middle managers may represent a point of view that is even more helpful for finding a solution to the problems presented by the case.

• Apply insights from other case analyses. Throughout the text, we have used examples of actual businesses to illustrate strategy concepts. The aim has been to show you how firms think about and deal with business problems. During the course, you may be asked to conduct several case analyses as part of the learning experience. Once you have performed a few case analyses, you will see how the concepts from the text apply in real-life business situations. Incorporate the insights learned from the text examples and your own previous case discussions into each new case that you analyze.

• Critically analyze your own performance. Performance appraisals are a standard part of many workplace situations. They are used to determine promotions, raises, and work assignments. In some organizations, everyone from the top executive down is subject to such reviews. Even in situations where the owner or CEO is not evaluated by others, top executives often find it useful to ask themselves regularly, Am I being effective? The same can be applied to your performance in a case analysis situation. Ask yourself, Were my comments insightful? Did I make a good contribution? How might I improve next time? Use the same criteria on yourself that you use to evaluate others. What grade would you give yourself? This technique not only will make you more fair in your assessment of others but also will indicate how your own performance can improve.

• Conduct outside research. Many times, you can enhance your understanding of a case situation by investigating sources outside the case materials. For example, you may want to study an industry more closely or research a company’s close competitors. Recent moves such as mergers and acquisitions or product introductions may be reported in the business press. The company itself may provide useful information on its website or in its annual reports. Such information can usually spur additional discussion and enrich the case analysis. (Caution: It is best to check with your instructor in advance to be sure this kind of additional research is encouraged. Bringing in outside research may conflict with the instructor’s learning objectives.)

Several of the points suggested for how to get the most out of case analysis apply only to an open discussion of a case, like that in a classroom setting. Exhibit 13.3 provides some additional guidelines for preparing a written case analysis.

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USEFUL DECISION-MAKING TECHNIQUES IN CASE ANALYSIS The demands on today’s business leaders require them to perform a wide variety of func- tions. The success of their organizations often depends on how they as individuals—and as part of groups—meet the challenges and deliver on promises. In this section we address three different techniques that can help managers make better decisions and, in turn, enable their organizations to achieve higher performance.

First, we discuss integrative thinking, a technique that helps managers make better decisions through the resolution of competing demands on resources, multiple contin- gencies, and diverse opportunities. Second, we address the concept of “asking heretical questions.” These are questions that challenge conventional wisdom and may even seem odd or unusual—but they can often lead to valuable innovations. Third, we introduce two approaches to decision making that involve the effective use of conflict in the decision- making process. These are devil’s advocacy and dialectical inquiry.

Integrative Thinking How does a leader make good strategic decisions in the face of multiple contingencies and diverse opportunities? A study by Roger L. Martin reveals that executives who have a capa- bility known as integrative thinking are among the most effective leaders. In his book The Opposable Mind, Martin contends that people who can consider two conflicting ideas simul- taneously, without dismissing one of the ideas or becoming discouraged about reconciling them, often make the best problem solvers because of their ability to creatively synthesize the opposing thoughts. In explaining the source of his title, Martin quotes F. Scott Fitzgerald, who observed, “The test of a first-rate intelligence is the ability to hold two opposing ideas

LO 13-5 How integrative thinking and conflict-inducing discussion techniques can lead to better decisions.

integrative thinking a process of reconciling opposing thoughts by generating new alternatives and creative solutions rather than rejecting one thought in favor of another.

Rule Description

Be thorough. Many of the ideas presented in Exhibit 13.2 about oral presentations also apply to written case analysis. However, a written analysis typically has to be more complete. This means writing out the problem statement and articulating assumptions. It is also important to provide support for your arguments and reference case materials or other facts more specifically.

Coordinate team efforts. Written cases are often prepared by small groups. Within a group, just as in a class discussion, you may disagree about the diagnosis or the recommended plan of action. This can be healthy if it leads to a richer understanding of the case material. But before committing your ideas to writing, make sure you have coordinated your responses. Don’t prepare a written analysis that appears contradictory or looks like a patchwork of disconnected thoughts.

Avoid restating the obvious.

There is no reason to restate material that everyone is familiar with already, namely, the case content. It is too easy for students to use up space in a written analysis with a recapitulation of the details of the case— this accomplishes very little. Stay focused on the key points. Restate only the information that is most central to your analysis.

Present information graphically.

Tables, graphs, and other exhibits are usually one of the best ways to present factual material that supports your arguments. For example, financial calculations such as break-even analysis, sensitivity analysis, or return on investment are best presented graphically. Even qualitative information such as product lists or rosters of employees can be summarized effectively and viewed quickly by using a table or graph.

Exercise quality control. When presenting a case analysis in writing, it is especially important to use good grammar, avoid misspelling words, and eliminate typos and other visual distractions. Mistakes that can be glossed over in an oral presentation or class discussion are often highlighted when they appear in writing. Make your written presentation appear as professional as possible. Don’t let the appearance of your written case keep the reader from recognizing the importance and quality of your analysis.

EXHIBIT 13.3 Preparing a Written Case Analysis

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in mind at the same time and still retain the ability to function. One should, for example, be able to see that things are hopeless yet be determined to make them otherwise.”10

In contrast to conventional thinking, which tends to focus on making choices between competing ideas from a limited set of alternatives, integrative thinking is the process by which people reconcile opposing thoughts to identify creative solutions that provide them with more options and new alternatives. Exhibit 13.4 outlines the four stages of the integra- tive thinking and deciding process. Martin uses the admittedly simple example of deciding where to go on vacation to illustrate the stages:

• Salience. Take stock of what features of the decision you consider relevant and important. For example: Where will you go? What will you see? Where will you stay? What will it cost? Is it safe? Other features may be less important, but try to think of everything that may matter.

• Causality. Make a mental map of the causal relationships between the features, that is, how the various features are related to one another. For example, is it worth it to invite friends to share expenses? Will an exotic destination be less safe?

• Architecture. Use the mental map to arrange a sequence of decisions that will lead to a specific outcome. For example, will you make the hotel and flight arrangements first, or focus on which sightseeing tours are available? No particular decision path is right or wrong, but considering multiple options simultaneously may lead to a better decision.

• Resolution. Make your selection. For example, choose which destination, which flight, and so forth. Your final resolution is linked to how you evaluated the first three stages; if you are dissatisfied with your choices, the dotted arrows in the diagram (Exhibit 13.4) suggest you can go back through the process and revisit your assumptions.

EXHIBIT 13.4 Integrative Thinking: The Process of Thinking and Deciding

SALIENCE Consider more-salient

factors.

RESOLUTION Strive for a creative

resolution of conflicts.

CAUSALITY Consider both

multidirectional and nonlinear

causality.

ARCHITECTURE When working on

parts, visualize the whole.

Source: Adaption from Harvard Business School Press from R. L. Martin. The Opposable Mind, 2007.

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Applied to business, an integrative thinking approach enables decision makers to con- sider situations not as forced trade-offs—either decrease costs or invest more; either satisfy shareholders or please the community—but as a method for synthesizing opposing ideas into a creative solution. The key is to think in terms of “both-and” rather than “either-or.” “Integrative thinking,” says Martin, “shows us that there’s a way to integrate the advantages of one solution without canceling out the advantages of an alternative solution.”

Although Martin found that integrative thinking comes naturally to some people, he also believes it can be taught. But it may be difficult to learn, in part because it requires people to unlearn old patterns and become aware of how they think. For executives willing to take a deep look at their habits of thought, integrative thinking can be developed into a valuable skill. Strategy Spotlight 13.3 tells how Red Hat Inc. cofounder Bob Young made his com- pany a market leader by using integrative thinking to resolve a major problem in the domain of open-source software.

Asking Heretical Questions In his recent book The Big Pivot, Andrew Winston introduced the concept of heretical innovation to help address the challenges associated with environmental sustainability in today’s world.11 He describes the need to pursue a deeper level of innovation that chal- lenges long-held beliefs about how things work. Central to addressing these challenges

13.3 STRATEGY SPOTLIGHT INTEGRATIVE THINKING AT RED HAT, INC. How can a software developer make money giving away free software? That was the dilemma Red Hat founder Bob Young was facing during the early days of the open-source software movement. A Finnish developer named Linus Torvalds, using freely available UNIX software, had developed an operating system dubbed “Linux” that was being widely circulated in the freeware community. The software was intended specifically as an alternative to the pricey proprietary systems sold by Microsoft and Oracle. To use proprietary software, corporations had to pay hefty installation fees and were required to call Microsoft or Oracle engineers to fix it when anything went wrong. In Young’s view it was a flawed and unsustainable business model.

But the free model was flawed as well. Although several companies had sprung up to help companies use Linux, there were few opportunities to profit from using it. As Young said, “You couldn’t make any money selling [the Linux] operating sys- tem because all this stuff was free, and if you started to charge money for it, someone else would come in and price it lower. It was a commodity in the truest sense of the word.” To complicate matters, hundreds of developers were part of the software com- munity that was constantly modifying and debugging Linux—at a rate equivalent to three updates per day. As a result, systems administrators at corporations that tried to adopt the software spent so much time keeping track of updates that they didn’t enjoy the savings they expected from using free software.

Young saw the appeal of both approaches but also realized a new model was needed. While contemplating the dilemma, he realized a salient feature that others had overlooked—because

most major corporations have to live with software decisions for at least 10 years, they will nearly always choose to do business with the industry leader. Young realized he had to position Red Hat as the top provider of Linux software. To do that, he proposed a radi- cal solution: provide the authoritative version of Linux and deliver it in a new way—as a download rather than on CD. He hired program- mers to create a downloadable version—still free—and promised, in essence, to maintain its quality (for a fee, of course) by dealing with all the open-source programmers who were continually sug- gesting changes. In the process, he created a product companies could trust and then profited by establishing ongoing service rela- tionships with customers. Red Hat’s version of Linux became the de facto standard. By 2000, Linux was installed in 25 percent of server operating systems worldwide and Red Hat had captured over 50 percent of the global market for Linux systems.

By recognizing that a synthesis of two flawed business models could provide the best of both worlds, Young exhibited the traits of integrative thinking. He pinpointed the causal rela- tionships between the salient features of the marketplace and Red Hat’s path to prosperity. He then crafted an approach that integrated aspects of the two existing approaches into a new alternative. By resolving to provide a free downloadable version, Young also took responsibility for creating his own path to suc- cess. The payoff was substantial: When Red Hat went public in 1999, Young became a billionaire on the first day of trading. And by 2015 Red Hat had over $1.5 billion in annual revenues and a market capitalization of nearly $13 billion.

Sources: Martin, R. L. 2007. The opposable mind. Boston: Harvard Business School Press; and finance.yahoo.com.

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is the need to pose “heretical questions”—those that challenge conventional wisdom. Typically, they may make us uncomfortable or may seem odd (or even impossible)—but they often become the means of coming up with major innovations. Although the context of Winston’s discussion was environmental sustainability, we believe that his ideas have useful implications for major challenges faced by today’s managers in a wide range of firms and industries.

Heretical questions can address issues that are both small and large—from redesigning a single process or product to rethinking the whole business model. One must not discount the value of the approach in considering small matters. After all, the vast majority of people in a company don’t have the mandate to rethink strategy. However, anyone in an organiza- tion can ask disruptive questions that profoundly change one aspect of a business. What makes this heretical is how deeply it challenges the conventional wisdom.

Consider the fascinating story of UPS’s “no left turns,” a classic tale in the sustainability world that has become rather well known. The catchy phrase became a rallying cry for map- ping out new delivery routes that avoided crossing traffic and idling at stoplights. UPS is saving time, money, and energy—about 85 million miles and 8 million gallons of fuel annually.

Also, take the example of dyeing clothing—a tremendously water-intensive process. Somebody at adidas asked a heretical question: Could we dye clothes with no water? The answer was yes. However, the company needed to partner with a small Thailand-based com- pany, Yeh Group. The DreDye process Adidas is now piloting uses heat and pressure to force pigment into the fibers. The process uses no water and also cuts energy and chemical use by 50 percent!

Finally, in 2010, Kimberly-Clark, the $21 billion firm that is behind such brands as Kleenex and Scott, questioned the simple assumption that toilet paper rolls must have card- board tubes to hold their shape. It created the Scott Naturals Tube-Free line, which offers this household staple in the familiar cylindrical shape. But it comes with no cardboard core—just a hole the same size. It’s been very successful—a key part of the now $100 million Scott Naturals brand. While this product may not save the world, if it became the industry standard, we could eliminate 17 billion tubes that are used in the United States every year and save fuel by shipping lighter rolls. This is a good example of heretical thinking. After all, the product doesn’t incrementally use less cardboard—it uses none.

The concept of accepting failure and aiming for deep, heretical innovation is difficult for most organizations to embrace. Ed Catmull, the president and cofounder of anima- tion pioneer Pixar, claims that when you are doing something new, you are by definition doing something you don’t know very well, and that means mistakes. However, if you don’t encourage mistakes, he says, you won’t encourage anything new: “We’re very conscientious about making it so that mistakes really aren’t thought of as bad . . . they’re just learning.”

Conflict-Inducing Techniques Next we address some techniques often used to improve case analyses that involve the con- structive use of conflict. In the classroom—as well as in the business world—you will fre- quently be analyzing cases or solving problems in groups. While the word conflict often has a negative connotation (e.g., rude behavior, personal affronts), it can be very helpful in arriving at better solutions to cases. It can provide an effective means for new insights as well as for rigorously questioning and analyzing assumptions and strategic alternatives. In fact, if you don’t have constructive conflict, you may get only consensus. When this hap- pens, decisions tend to be based on compromise rather than collaboration.

In your organizational behavior classes, you probably learned the concept of “group- think.”12 Groupthink, a term coined by Irving Janis after he conducted numerous studies on executive decision making, is a condition in which group members strive to reach agree- ment or consensus without realistically considering other viable alternatives. In effect, group norms bolster morale at the expense of critical thinking, and decision making is impaired.13

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Many of us have probably been “victims” of groupthink at one time or another in our life. We may be confronted with situations when social pressure, politics, or “not wanting to stand out” may prevent us from voicing our concerns about a chosen course of action. Nevertheless, decision making in groups is a common practice in the management of many businesses. Most companies, especially large ones, rely on input from various top managers to provide valuable information and experience from their specialty area as well as their unique perspectives. Organizations need to develop cultures and reward systems that encour- age people to express their perspectives and create open dialogues. Constructive conflict can be very helpful in that it emphasizes the need for managers to consider other people’s perspectives and not simply become a strong advocate for positions that they may prefer.

Chapter 11 emphasized the importance of empowering individuals at all levels to partici- pate in decision-making processes. After all, many of us have experienced situations where there is not a perfect correlation between one’s rank and the viability of one’s ideas! In terms of this course, case analysis involves a type of decision making that is often conducted in groups. Strategy Spotlight 13.4 provides guidelines for making team-based approaches to case analysis more effective.

13.4 STRATEGY SPOTLIGHT MAKING CASE ANALYSIS TEAMS MORE EFFECTIVE Working in teams can be very challenging. Not all team mem- bers have the same skills, interests, or motivations. Some team members just want to get the work done. Others see teams as an opportunity to socialize. Occasionally, there are team mem- bers who think they should be in charge and make all the deci- sions; other teams have freeloaders—team members who don’t want to do anything except get credit for the team’s work.

One consequence of these various styles is that team meet- ings can become time wasters. Disagreements about how to proceed, how to share the work, or what to do at the next meet- ing tend to slow down teams and impede progress toward the goal. While the dynamics of case analysis teams are likely to always be challenging depending on the personalities involved, one thing nearly all members realize is that, ultimately, the team’s work must be completed. Most team members also aim to do the highest-quality work possible. The following guidelines provide some useful insights about how to get the work of a team done more effectively.

Spend More Time Together One of the factors that prevents teams from doing a good job with case analysis is their failure to put in the necessary time. Unless teams really tackle the issues surrounding case analysis— both the issues in the case itself and organizing how the work is to be conducted—the end result will probably be lacking because decisions that are made too quickly are unlikely to get to the heart of the problem(s) in the case. “Meetings should be a precious resource, but they’re treated like a nec- essary evil,” says Kenneth Sole, a consultant who specializes in

organizational behavior. As a result, teams that care more about finishing the analysis than getting the analysis right often make poor decisions.

Therefore, expect to have a few meetings that run long, especially at the beginning of the project, when the work is being organized and the issues in the case are being sorted out, and again at the end, when the team must coordinate the components of the case analysis that will be presented. Without spending this kind of time together, it is doubtful that the analy- sis will be comprehensive and the presentation is likely to be choppy and incomplete.

Make a Focused and Disciplined Agenda To complete tasks and avoid wasting time, meetings need to have a clear purpose. To accomplish this at Roche, the Swiss drug and diagnostic product maker, CEO Franz Humer imple- mented a “decision agenda.” The agenda focuses only on Roche’s highest-value issues, and discussions are limited to these major topics. In terms of case analysis, the major topics include sorting out the issues of the case, linking elements of the case to the strategic issues presented in class or the text, and assigning roles to various team members. Such objectives help keep team members on track.

Agendas also can be used to address issues such as the timeline for accomplishing work. Otherwise, the purpose of meetings may only be to manage the “crisis” of getting the case analysis finished on time. One solution is to assign a team mem- ber to manage the agenda. That person could make sure the team stays focused on the tasks at hand and remains mindful of time constraints. Another role could be to link the team’s efforts to the steps presented in Exhibit 13.2 and Exhibit 13.3 on how to prepare a case analysis.

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Pay More Attention to Strategy Teams often waste time by focusing on unimportant aspects of a case. These may include details that are interesting but irrel- evant or operational issues rather than strategic issues. It is true that useful clues to the issues in the case are sometimes embed- ded in the conversations of key managers or the trends evident in a financial statement. But once such insights are discovered, teams need to focus on the underlying strategic problems in the case. To solve such problems, major corporations such as Cadbury Schweppes and Boeing hold meetings just to gener- ate strategic alternatives for solving their problems. This gives managers time to consider the implications of various courses of action. Separate meetings are held to evaluate alternatives, make strategic decisions, and approve an action plan.

Once the strategic solutions or “course corrections” are identified—as is common in most cases assigned—the opera- tional implications and details of implementation will flow from the strategic decisions that companies make. Therefore, focus- ing primarily on strategic issues will provide teams with insights for making recommendations that are based on a deeper under- standing of the issues in the case.

Produce Real Decisions Too often, meetings are about discussing rather than deciding. Teams often spend a lot of time talking without reaching any con- clusions. As Raymond Sanchez, CEO of Florida-based Security Mortgage Group, says, meetings are often used to “rehash the

hash that’s already been hashed.” To be efficient and produc- tive, team meetings need to be about more than just informa- tion sharing and group input. For example, an initial meeting may result in the team realizing that it needs to study the case in greater depth and examine links to strategic issues more carefully. Once more analysis is conducted, the team needs to reach a consensus so that the decisions that are made will last once the meeting is over. Lasting decisions are more actionable because they free team members to take the next steps.

One technique for making progress in this way is recapping each meeting with a five-minute synthesis report. According to Pamela Schindler, director of the Center for Applied Management at Wittenberg University, it’s important to think through the impli- cations of the meeting before ending it. “The real joy of synthesis,” says Schindler, “is realizing how many meetings you won’t need.”

Not only are these guidelines useful for helping teams finish their work, but they can also help resolve some of the difficulties that teams often face. By involving every team member, using a meeting agenda, and focusing on the strategic issues that are critical to nearly every case, the discussion is limited and the cri- teria for making decisions become clearer. This allows the task to dominate rather than any one personality. And if the team fin- ishes its work faster, this frees up time to focus on other projects or put the finishing touches on a case analysis presentation.

Sources: Mankins, M. C. 2004. Stop wasting valuable time. Harvard Business Review, September: 58–65; and Sauer, P. J. 2004. Escape from meeting hell. Inc., May, www.inc.com.

Clearly, understanding how to work in groups and the potential problems associated with group decision processes can benefit the case analysis process. Therefore, let’s first look at some of the symptoms of groupthink and suggest ways of preventing it. Then we will suggest some conflict-inducing decision-making techniques—devil’s advocacy and dialectical inquiry—that can help to prevent groupthink and lead to better decisions.

Symptoms of Groupthink and How to Prevent It Irving Janis identified several symptoms of groupthink, including:

• An illusion of invulnerability. This reassures people about possible dangers and leads to overoptimism and failure to heed warnings of danger.

• A belief in the inherent morality of the group. Because individuals think that what they are doing is right, they tend to ignore ethical or moral consequences of their decisions.

• Stereotyped views of members of opposing groups. Members of other groups are viewed as weak or not intelligent.

• The application of pressure to members who express doubts about the group’s shared illusions or question the validity of arguments proposed.

• The practice of self-censorship. Members keep silent about their opposing views and downplay to themselves the value of their perspectives.

• An illusion of unanimity. People assume that judgments expressed by members are shared by all.

• The appointment of mindguards. People sometimes appoint themselves as mindguards to protect the group from adverse information that might break the climate of consensus (or agreement).

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Clearly, groupthink is an undesirable and negative phenomenon that can lead to poor decisions. Irving Janis considers it to be a key contributor to such faulty decisions as the failure to prepare for the attack on Pearl Harbor, the escalation of the Vietnam conflict, and the failure to prepare for the consequences of the Iraqi invasion. Many of the same sorts of flawed decision making occur in business organizations. Janis has provided several sugges- tions for preventing groupthink that can be used as valuable guides in decision making and problem solving:

• Leaders must encourage group members to address their concerns and objectives. • When higher-level managers assign a problem for a group to solve, they should adopt

an impartial stance and not mention their preferences. • Before a group reaches its final decision, the leader should encourage members to

discuss their deliberations with trusted associates and then report the perspectives back to the group.

• The group should invite outside experts and encourage them to challenge the group’s viewpoints and positions.

• The group should divide into subgroups, meet at various times under different chairpersons, and then get together to resolve differences.

• After reaching a preliminary agreement, the group should hold a “second chance” meeting that provides members a forum to express any remaining concerns and rethink the issue prior to making a final decision.

Using Conflict to Improve Decision Making In addition to the above suggestions, the effec- tive use of conflict can be a means of improving decision making. Although conflict can have negative outcomes, such as ill will, anger, tension, and lowered motivation, both lead- ers and group members must strive to ensure that it is managed properly and used in a constructive manner.

Two conflict-inducing decision-making approaches that have become quite popular are devil’s advocacy and dialectical inquiry. Both approaches incorporate conflict into the decision- making process through formalized debate. A group charged with making a decision or solving a problem is divided into two subgroups, and each will be involved in the analysis and solution.

With devil’s advocacy, one of the groups (or individuals) acts as a critic to the plan. The devil’s advocate tries to come up with problems with the proposed alternative and suggest reasons why it should not be adopted. The role of the devil’s advocate is to create dissonance. This ensures that the group will take a hard look at its original proposal or alternative. By having a group (or individual) assigned the role of devil’s advocate, it becomes clear that such an adversarial stance is legitimized. It brings out criticisms that might otherwise not be made.

Some authors have suggested that the use of a devil’s advocate can help boards of direc- tors to ensure that decisions are addressed comprehensively and to avoid groupthink.14 And Charles Elson, a director of Sunbeam Corporation, has argued:

Devil’s advocates are terrific in any situation because they help you to figure a decision’s numerous implications. . . . The better you think out the implications prior to making the decision, the better the decision ultimately turns out to be. That’s why a devil’s advocate is always a great person, irritating sometimes, but a great person.

As one might expect, there can be some potential problems with using the devil’s advo- cate approach. If one’s views are constantly criticized, one may become demoralized. Thus, that person may come up with “safe solutions” in order to minimize embarrassment or personal risk and become less subject to criticism. Additionally, even if the devil’s advocate is successful with finding problems with the proposed course of action, there may be no new ideas or counterproposals to take its place. Thus, the approach sometimes may simply focus on what is wrong without suggesting other ideas.

devil’s advocacy a method of introducing conflict into a decision- making process by having specific individuals or groups act as a critic to an analysis or planned solution.

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Dialectical inquiry attempts to accomplish the goals of the devil’s advocate in a more con- structive manner. It is a technique whereby a problem is approached from two alternative points of view. The idea is that out of a critique of the opposing perspectives—a thesis and an antithesis—a creative synthesis will occur. Dialectical inquiry involves the following steps:

1. Identify a proposal and the information that was used to derive it. 2. State the underlying assumptions of the proposal. 3. Identify a counterplan (antithesis) that is believed to be feasible, politically viable,

and generally credible. However, it rests on assumptions that are opposite to the original proposal.

4. Engage in a debate in which individuals favoring each plan provide their arguments and support.

5. Identify a synthesis which, hopefully, includes the best components of each alternative.

There are some potential downsides associated with dialectical inquiry. It can be quite time-consuming and involve a good deal of training. Further, it may result in a series of compromises between the initial proposal and the counterplan. In cases where the original proposal was the best approach, this would be unfortunate.

Despite some possible limitations associated with these conflict-inducing decision- making techniques, they have many benefits. Both techniques force debate about underlying assumptions, data, and recommendations between subgroups. Such debate tends to prevent the uncritical acceptance of a plan that may seem to be satisfactory after a cursory analysis. The approach serves to tap the knowledge and perspectives of group members and contin- ues until group members agree on both assumptions and recommended actions. Given that both approaches serve to use, rather than minimize or suppress, conflict, higher-quality decisions should result. Exhibit 13.5 briefly summarizes these techniques.

FOLLOWING THE ANALYSIS-DECISION-ACTION CYCLE IN CASE ANALYSIS In Chapter 1 we defined strategic management as the analysis, decisions, and actions that organizations undertake to create and sustain competitive advantages. It is no accident that we chose that sequence of words because it corresponds to the sequence of events that typically occurs in the strategic management process. In case analysis, as in the real world, this cycle of events can provide a useful framework. First, an analysis of the case in terms of the business

LO 13-6 How to use the strategic insights and material from each of the 12 previous chapters in the text to analyze issues posed by strategic management cases.

EXHIBIT 13.5 Two Conflict-Inducing Decision-Making Processes

Alternative #1 Alternative #1 (Thesis)

Alternative #3 (Synthesis)

Alternative #2 (Antithesis)

Revised Alternative

Structural Debate

Alternative #1 Critiqued by

Devil’s Advocate

dialectical inquiry a method of introducing conflict into a decision- making process by devising different proposals that are feasible, politically viable, and credible but rely on different assumptions and then debating the merits of each.

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environment and current events is needed. To make such an analysis, the case background must be considered. Next, based on that analysis, decisions must be made. This may involve formulating a strategy, choosing between difficult options, moving forward aggressively, or retreating from a bad situation. There are many possible decisions, depending on the case situation. Finally, action is required. Once decisions are made and plans are set, the action begins. The recommended action steps and the consequences of implementing these actions are the final stage.

Each of the previous 12 chapters of this book includes techniques and information that may be useful in a case analysis. However, not all of the issues presented will be important in every case. As noted earlier, one of the challenges of case analysis is to identify the most critical points and sort through material that may be ambiguous or seem unimportant.

In this section we draw on the material presented in each of the 12 chapters to show how it informs the case analysis process. The ideas are linked sequentially and in terms of an overarching strategic perspective. One of your jobs when conducting case analysis is to see how the parts of a case fit together and how the insights from the study of strategy can help you understand the case situation.

1. Analyzing organizational goals and objectives. A company’s vision, mission, and objectives keep organization members focused on a common purpose. They also influence how an organization deploys its resources, relates to its stakeholders, and matches its short-term objectives with its long-term goals. The goals may even impact how a company formulates and implements strategies. When exploring issues of goals and objectives, you might ask: • Has the company developed short-term objectives that are inconsistent with its

long-term mission? If so, how can management realign its vision, mission, and objectives?

• Has the company considered all of its stakeholders equally in making critical decisions? If not, should the views of all stakeholders be treated the same or are some stakeholders more important than others?

• Is the company being faced with an issue that conflicts with one of its long- standing policies? If so, how should it compare its existing policies to the potential new situation?

2. Analyzing the external environment. The business environment has two components. The general environment consists of demographic, sociocultural, political/legal, technological, economic, and global conditions. The competitive environment includes rivals, suppliers, customers, and other factors that may directly affect a company’s success. Strategic managers must monitor the environment to identify opportunities and threats that may have an impact on performance. When investigating a firm’s external environment, you might ask: • Does the company follow trends and events in the general environment?

If not, how can these influences be made part of the company’s strategic analysis process?

• Is the company effectively scanning and monitoring the competitive environment? If so, how is it using the competitive intelligence it is gathering to enhance its competitive advantage?

• Has the company correctly analyzed the impact of the competitive forces in its industry on profitability? If so, how can it improve its competitive position relative to these forces?

3. Analyzing the internal environment. A firm’s internal environment consists of its resources and other value-adding capabilities. Value-chain analysis and a resource- based approach to analysis can be used to identify a company’s strengths and

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weaknesses and determine how they are contributing to its competitive advantages. Evaluating firm performance can also help make meaningful comparisons with competitors. When researching a company’s internal analysis, you might ask: • Does the company know how the various components of its value chain are

adding value to the firm? If not, what internal analysis is needed to determine its strengths and weakness?

• Has the company accurately analyzed the source and vitality of its resources? If so, is it deploying its resources in a way that contributes to competitive advantages?

• Is the company’s financial performance as good as or better than that of its close competitors? If so, has it balanced its financial success with the performance criteria of other stakeholders such as customers and employees?

4. Assessing a firm’s intellectual assets. Human capital is a major resource in today’s knowledge economy. As a result, attracting, developing, and retaining talented workers is a key strategic challenge. Other assets such as patents and trademarks are also critical. How companies leverage their intellectual assets through social networks and strategic alliances, and how technology is used to manage knowledge, may be a major influence on a firm’s competitive advantage. When analyzing a firm’s intellectual assets, you might ask: • Does the company have underutilized human capital? If so, what steps are

needed to develop and leverage its intellectual assets? • Is the company missing opportunities to forge strategic alliances? If so, how can

it use its social capital to network more effectively? • Has the company developed knowledge-management systems that capture what it

learns? If not, what technologies can it employ to retain new knowledge?

5. Formulating business-level strategies. Firms use the competitive strategies of differentiation, focus, and overall cost leadership as a basis for overcoming the five competitive forces and developing sustainable competitive advantages. Combinations of these strategies may work best in some competitive environments. Additionally, an industry’s life cycle is an important contingency that may affect a company’s choice of business-level strategies. When assessing business-level strategies, you might ask: • Has the company chosen the correct competitive strategy given its industry

environment and competitive situation? If not, how should it use its strengths and resources to improve its performance?

• Does the company use combination strategies effectively? If so, what capabilities can it cultivate to further enhance profitability?

• Is the company using a strategy that is appropriate for the industry life cycle in which it is competing? If not, how can it realign itself to match its efforts to the current stage of industry growth?

6. Formulating corporate-level strategies. Large firms often own and manage portfolios of businesses. Corporate strategies address methods for achieving synergies among these businesses. Related and unrelated diversification techniques are alternative approaches to deciding which business should be added to or removed from a portfolio. Companies can diversify by means of mergers, acquisitions, joint ventures, strategic alliances, and internal development. When analyzing corporate-level strategies, you might ask: • Is the company competing in the right businesses given the opportunities

and threats that are present in the environment? If not, how can it realign its diversification strategy to achieve competitive advantages?

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• Is the corporation managing its portfolio of businesses in a way that creates synergies among the businesses? If so, what additional business should it consider adding to its portfolio?

• Are the motives of the top corporate executives who are pushing diversification strategies appropriate? If not, what action can be taken to curb their activities or align them with the best interests of all stakeholders?

7. Formulating international-level strategies. Foreign markets provide both opportunities and potential dangers for companies that want to expand globally. To decide which entry strategy is most appropriate, companies have to evaluate the trade-offs between two factors that firms face when entering foreign markets: cost reduction and local adaptation. To achieve competitive advantages, firms will typically choose one of three strategies: global, multidomestic, or transnational. When evaluating international-level strategies, you might ask: • Is the company’s entry into an international marketplace threatened by the

actions of local competitors? If so, how can cultural differences be minimized to give the firm a better chance of succeeding?

• Has the company made the appropriate choices between cost reduction and local adaptation to foreign markets? If not, how can it adjust its strategy to achieve competitive advantages?

• Can the company improve its effectiveness by embracing one international strategy over another? If so, how should it choose between a global, multidomestic, or transnational strategy?

8. Formulating entrepreneurial strategies. New ventures add jobs and create new wealth. To do so, they must identify opportunities that will be viable in the marketplace as well as gather resources and assemble an entrepreneurial team to enact the opportunity. New entrants often evoke a strong competitive response from incumbent firms in a given marketplace. When examining the role of strategic thinking on the success of entrepreneurial ventures and the role of competitive dynamics, you might ask: • Is the company engaged in an ongoing process of opportunity recognition? If not,

how can it enhance its ability to recognize opportunities? • Do the entrepreneurs who are launching new ventures have vision, dedication

and drive, and a commitment to excellence? If so, how have these affected the performance and dedication of other employees involved in the venture?

• Have strategic principles been used in the process of developing strategies to pursue the entrepreneurial opportunity? If not, how can the venture apply tools such as five-forces analysis and value-chain analysis to improve its competitive position and performance?

9. Achieving effective strategic control. Strategic controls enable a firm to implement strategies effectively. Informational controls involve comparing performance to stated goals and scanning, monitoring, and being responsive to the environment. Behavioral controls emerge from a company’s culture, reward systems, and organizational boundaries. When assessing the impact of strategic controls on implementation, you might ask: • Is the company employing the appropriate informational control systems? If

not, how can it implement a more interactive approach to enhance learning and minimize response times?

• Does the company have a strong and effective culture? If not, what steps can it take to align its values and rewards system with its goals and objectives?

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• Has the company implemented control systems that match its strategies? If so, what additional steps can be taken to improve performance?

10. Creating effective organizational designs. Organizational designs that align with competitive strategies can enhance performance. As companies grow and change, their structures must also evolve to meet new demands. In today’s economy, firm boundaries must be flexible and permeable to facilitate smoother interactions with external parties such as customers, suppliers, and alliance partners. New forms of organizing are becoming more common. When evaluating the role of organizational structure on strategy implementation, you might ask: • Has the company implemented organizational structures that are suited to the

type of business it is in? If not, how can it alter the design in ways that enhance its competitiveness?

• Is the company employing boundaryless organizational designs where appropriate? If so, how are senior managers maintaining control of lower-level employees?

• Does the company use outsourcing to achieve the best possible results? If not, what criteria should it use to decide which functions can be outsourced?

11. Creating a learning organization and an ethical organization. Strong leadership is essential for achieving competitive advantages. Two leadership roles are especially important. The first is creating a learning organization by harnessing talent and encouraging the development of new knowledge. Second, leaders play a vital role in motivating employees to excellence and inspiring ethical behavior. When exploring the impact of effective strategic leadership, you might ask: • Do company leaders promote excellence as part of the overall culture? If so, how

has this influenced the performance of the firm and the individuals in it? • Is the company committed to being a learning organization? If not, what can it do

to capitalize on the individual and collective talents of organizational members? • Have company leaders exhibited an ethical attitude in their own behavior? If not,

how has their behavior influenced the actions of other employees?

12. Fostering corporate entrepreneurship. Many firms continually seek new growth opportunities and avenues for strategic renewal. In some corporations, autonomous work units such as business incubators and new venture groups are used to focus corporate venturing activities. In other corporate settings, product champions and other firm members provide companies with the impetus to expand into new areas. When investigating the impact of entrepreneurship on strategic effectiveness, you might ask: • Has the company resolved the dilemmas associated with managing innovation? If

so, is it effectively defining and pacing its innovation efforts? • Has the company developed autonomous work units that have the freedom to

bring forth new product ideas? If so, has it used product champions to implement new venture initiatives?

• Does the company have an entrepreneurial orientation? If not, what can it do to encourage entrepreneurial attitudes in the strategic behavior of its organizational members?

We close this chapter with Strategy Spotlight 13.5—an example of how the College of Business and Economics at Towson University went about conducting a “live” business case competition across all of the strategic management sections. The “Description” and “Case Competition Checklist” includes many of the elements of the analysis-decision-action cycle in case analysis that we have discussed.

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13.5 STRATEGY SPOTLIGHT CASE COMPETITION ASSIGNMENT Brief Description The purpose of this assignment is to apply theory to a real life strategic management case on Cintas Corporation (Baltimore). Your role is to analyze the case and recommend practical, inno- vative, and theoretically sound solutions. Participation in the competition will provide invaluable experience and the opportu- nity to interact with business executives in a meaningful activity. The executives will select the winning teams and identify Gold, Silver, and Bronze Team winners.

The case competition within each section will represent 25 percent of the grade for the course. The rubric for judging the winning team in each section will be standardized across all sec- tions of the strategic management course to address conceptual skills in strategic analysis, strategy formulation, strategy imple- mentation, and strategic control.

The case will be disseminated on the case competi- tion Blackboard site. Each team must give a presentation as described below, turn in a hardcopy of its multimedia presenta- tion and any updated supplementary materials, and upload all relevant materials as specified by the instructor (presentation, supplements).

The team presentation may not exceed fifteen minutes and will be graded based on coverage of all elements in the grading rubric. Approximately five additional minutes will be devoted to responding to questions and comments from the judges.

Case Competition Checklist Be sure to address all of the following statements in order for your presentation to earn a positive evaluation.

To what extent do you agree with the following statements?

External Analysis • Effectively uses an analysis of the general business

environment to address all key general environment trends. • Effectively uses Porter’s Five Forces model to assess

industry attractiveness.

Internal Analysis • Identifies all key organization resources and capabilities. • Appropriately discusses all key organization resources and

capabilities and identifies the degree to which they serve as the foundation for a competitive advantage.

• Appropriately discusses Cintas Baltimore’s strengths and weaknesses.

• Explains in depth all important implications for Cintas Baltimore.

Corporate Alignment • Evaluates areas of alignment/misalignment (strategic

fit) between the catalog line of business in the

restaurant industry and the organization’s overall corporate strategy.

Proposed Strategy and Resource Requirements • Provides a comprehensive strategy for the catalog line

of business that spans three years. This should include milestones that you hope to accomplish over that time period. Supplementary materials fully complement and support the presentation.

• Your plan’s resource requirements are fully identified and explained.

• Your plan’s resource needs are feasible with realistic costs.

• The total cost of your plan does not exceed $45,000 ($15,000 per year).

• All assumptions are clearly explained and logical. • Strategic alternatives are fully explained in supporting

supplementary materials. • Recommendations address all major issues. • Recommendations are explained in-depth.

Barriers to Imitation • Obstacles for competitors to imitate the strategy are fully

identified. • Obstacles for competitors to imitate the strategy are

justified with clear logic.

Tactics • An appropriate number of milestones for the next three

years is proposed. • For each milestone, at least three tactics are proposed. All

milestones and tactics clearly pertain to the strategy.

Writing and Presentation Criteria • Written materials contain no technical/grammar/spelling

errors. • Writing is completely clear and well-organized. • Writing uses appropriate word choice. • All ideas not your own are appropriately referenced. • Arguments are logically compelling. • All exhibits are referenced. • All exhibits’ relevance is explained. • Basic information that the business audience would know

is not rehashed. • The presentation is limited to 15 minutes. • All members of the team present for at least one minute. • All members are dressed professionally.

CHAPTER 13 :: ANALYZING STRATEGIC MANAGEMENT CASES 417

Strategic management case analysis provides an effective method of learning how companies analyze problems, make decisions, and resolve challenges. Strategic cases include detailed accounts of actual business situations. The

purpose of analyzing such cases is to gain exposure to a wide variety of organizational and managerial situations. By putting yourself in the place of a strategic decision maker, you can gain an appreciation of the difficulty and complexity of many strategic situations. In the process you can learn how to ask good strategic questions and enhance your analytical skills. Presenting case analyses can also help develop oral and written communication skills.

In this chapter we have discussed the importance of strategic case analysis and described the five steps involved in

conducting a case analysis: becoming familiar with the material, identifying problems, analyzing strategic issues, proposing alternative solutions, and making recommendations. We have also discussed how to get the most from case analysis. Finally, we have described how the case analysis process follows the analysis-decision-action cycle of strategic management and outlined issues and questions that are associated with each of the previous 12 chapters of the text.

summary

case analysis 393 financial ratio analysis 398 integrative thinking 404 devil’s advocacy 410 dialectical inquiry 411

key terms

1. Bryant, A. 2011. The corner office: 15. New York: St. Martin’s.

2. The material in this chapter is based on several sources, including Barnes, L. A., Nelson, A. J., & Christensen, C. R. 1994. Teaching and the case method: Text, cases and readings. Boston: Harvard Business School Press; Guth, W. D. 1985. Central concepts of business unit and corporate strategy. In Guth, W. D. (Ed.), Handbook of business strategy: 1–9. Boston: Warren, Gorham & Lamont; Lundberg, C. C., & Enz, C. 1993. A framework for student case preparation. Case Research Journal, 13 (Summer): 129–140; and Ronstadt, R. 1980. The art of case analysis: A guide to the diagnosis of business situations. Dover, MA: Lord.

3. Edge, A. G. & Coleman, D. R. 1986. The guide to case analysis and reporting (3rd ed.). Honolulu, HI: System Logistics.

4. Morris, E. 1987. Vision and strategy: A focus for the future. Journal of Business Strategy, 8: 51–58.

5. Bryant, A. 2011. The corner office: 15. New York: St. Martin’s.

6. This section is based on Lundberg & Enz, op. cit., and Ronstadt, op. cit.

7. The importance of problem definition was emphasized in Mintzberg, H., Raisinghani, D., & Theoret, A. 1976. The structure of “unstructured” decision processes. Administrative Science Quarterly, 21(2): 246–275.

8. Drucker, P. F. 1994. The theory of the business. Harvard Business Review, 72(5): 95–104.

9. This section draws on Edge & Coleman, op. cit.

10. Evans, R. 2007. The either/or dilemma, www.ft.com, December 19: np; and Martin, R. L. 2007. The opposable mind. Boston: Harvard Business School Press.

11. This section draws on Winston, A. S. 2014. The big pivot. Boston: Harvard Business Review Press.

12. Irving Janis is credited with coining the term groupthink, and he applied it primarily to fiascos in government (such as the Bay of Pigs incident in 1961). Refer to Janis, I. L. 1982. Victims of groupthink (2nd ed.). Boston: Houghton Mifflin.

13. Much of our discussion is based upon Finkelstein, S. & Mooney, A. C. 2003. Not the usual suspects: How to use board process to make boards better. Academy of Management Executive, 17(2): 101–113; Schweiger, D. M., Sandberg, W. R., & Rechner, P. L. 1989. Experiential effects of dialectical inquiry, devil’s advocacy, and consensus approaches to strategic decision making. Academy of Management Journal, 32(4): 745–772; and Aldag, R J. & Stearns, T. M. 1987. Management. Cincinnati: South-Western.

14. Finkelstein and Mooney, op. cit.

REFERENCES

• All presenters are enthusiastic (eye contact, no filler words, posture).

• All presenters use proper diction and voice. • All presenters clearly present the intended content

(arguments are convincing). • All presenters follow a group theme and structure. • All presenters respond well to questions during the Q&A.

• All presenters show deep understanding of the analyses. • All presenters are respectful and professional.

Note: We thank a team of contributors at Towson University for sharing this information with us, including Lori Kiyatkin, Doug Sanford, David Brannon, Shana Gass, Shohreh Kaynama, Don Kopka, Mariana Lebron, Jimmy Lien, Wayne Paul, Doug Ross, and Precha Thavikulwat. The information provided here is an abridged version of the materials actually used for the assignment, which would also include the grading rubric, etc.

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APPENDIX 1 TO CHAPTER 13

FINANCIAL RATIO ANALYSIS* Standard Financial Statements One obvious thing we might want to do with a company’s financial statements is to compare them to those of other, similar companies. We would immediately have a problem, however. It’s almost impos- sible to directly compare the financial statements of two companies because of differences in size.

For example, Oracle and IBM are obviously serious rivals in the computer software market, but IBM is much larger (in terms of assets), so it is difficult to compare them directly. For that matter, it’s difficult to even compare financial statements from different points in time for the same company if the company’s size has changed. The size problem is compounded if we try to compare IBM and, say, SAP (of Germany). If SAP’s financial statements are denominated in euros, then we have a size and a currency difference.

To start making comparisons, one obvious thing we might try to do is to somehow standard- ize the financial statements. One very common and useful way of doing this is to work with percentages instead of total dollars. The resulting financial statements are called common-size statements. We consider these next.

Common-Size Balance Sheets For easy reference, Prufrock Corporation’s 2016 and 2017 balance sheets are provided in Exhibit 13A.1. Using these, we construct common-size balance sheets by expressing each item as a percentage of total assets. Prufrock’s 2016 and 2017 common-size balance sheets are shown in Exhibit 13A.2.

Notice that some of the totals don’t check exactly because of rounding errors. Also notice that the total change has to be zero since the beginning and ending numbers must add up to 100 percent.

In this form, financial statements are relatively easy to read and compare. For example, just look- ing at the two balance sheets for Prufrock, we see that current assets were 19.7 percent of total assets in 2017, up from 19.1 percent in 2016. Current liabilities declined from 16 percent to 15.1 percent of total liabilities and equity over that same time. Similarly, total equity rose from 68.1 percent of total liabilities and equity to 72.2 percent.

Overall, Prufrock’s liquidity, as measured by current assets compared to current liabilities, increased over the year. Simultaneously, Prufrock’s indebtedness diminished as a percentage of total assets. We might be tempted to conclude that the balance sheet has grown “stronger.”

Common-Size Income Statements A useful way of standardizing the income statement, shown in Exhibit 13A.3, is to express each item as a percentage of total sales, as illustrated for Prufrock in Exhibit 13A.4.

This income statement tells us what happens to each dollar in sales. For Prufrock, interest expense eats up $.061 out of every sales dollar and taxes take another $.081. When all is said and done, $.157 of each dollar flows through to the bottom line (net income), and that amount is split into $.105 retained in the business and $.052 paid out in dividends.

These percentages are very useful in comparisons. For example, a relevant figure is the cost percentage. For Prufrock, $.582 of each $1 in sales goes to pay for goods sold. It would be inter- esting to compute the same percentage for Prufrock’s main competitors to see how Prufrock stacks up in terms of cost control.

Ratio Analysis Another way of avoiding the problems involved in comparing companies of different sizes is to calculate and compare financial ratios. Such ratios are ways of comparing and investigating the

*This entire appendix is adapted from Rows, S. A., Westerfield, R. W., & Jordan, B. D. 1999. Essentials of Corporate Finance (2nd ed.), chap. 3. NewYork: McGraw-Hill.

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relationships between different pieces of financial information. We cover some of the more com- mon ratios next, but there are many others that we don’t touch on.

One problem with ratios is that different people and different sources frequently don’t com- pute them in exactly the same way, and this leads to much confusion. The specific definitions we use here may or may not be the same as others you have seen or will see elsewhere. If you ever use ratios as a tool for analysis, you should be careful to document how you calculate each one, and, if you are comparing your numbers to those of another source, be sure you know how its numbers are computed.

For each of the ratios we discuss, several questions come to mind:

1. How is it computed? 2. What is it intended to measure, and why might we be interested? 3. What is the unit of measurement? 4. What might a high or low value be telling us? How might such values be misleading? 5. How could this measure be improved?

Financial ratios are traditionally grouped into the following categories:

1. Short-term solvency, or liquidity, ratios. 2. Long-term solvency, or financial leverage, ratios. 3. Asset management, or turnover, ratios. 4. Profitability ratios. 5. Market value ratios.

EXHIBIT 13A .1 Prufrock Corporation

2016 2017

Assets

Current assets

Cash $ ,,,,,84 $ ,,,,,98

Accounts receivable 165 188

Inventory ,,,,,393 ,,,,422

Total $ ,,,,,642 $ ,,,,,708

Fixed assets

Net plant and equipment $2,731 $2,880

Total assets $3,373 $3,588

Liabilities and Owners’ Equity

Current liabilities

Accounts payable $ ,,,,,312 $ ,,,,,344

Notes payable ,,,,,231 ,,,,196

Total $ ,,,,,543 $ ,,,,,540

Long-term debt $ ,,,,,531 $ ,,,,,457

Owners’ equity

Common stock and paid-in surplus $ ,,,,,500 $ ,,,,,550

Retained earnings 1,799 2,041

Total $2,299 $2,591

Total liabilities and owners’ equity $3,373 $3,588

Balance sheets as of December 31, 2016 and 2017 ($ millions).

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EXHIBIT 13A .2 Prufrock Corporation

2016 2017 Change

Assets

Current assets

Cash 2.5% 2.7% + .2%

Accounts receivable 4.9 5.2 + .3

Inventory   11.7     11.8   ,,,,,,,,,, + .1 ,, ,,,

Total   19.1     19.7   ,,,,,,,,,, + .6 ,, ,,,

Fixed assets

Net plant and equipment   80.9       80.3   ,,,,,,,,,, − .6 ,, ,,,

Total assets 100.0% 100.0%      ,,,,,,,.0%

Liabilities and Owners’ Equity

Current liabilities

Accounts payable 9.2% 9.6% + .4%

Notes payable 6.8 ,,,,,  5.5 ,,,,,  −1.3 ,,,,, 

Total  ,  16.0 ,,,,,   ,  15.1 ,,,,,  − .9 ,,,,, 

Long-term debt  ,  15.7 ,,,,,   ,  12.7 ,,,,,   −3.0 ,,,,, 

Owners’ equity

Common stock and paid-in surplus 14.8 15.3 + .5

Retained earnings  ,  53.3 ,,,,,   ,  56.9 ,,,,,   +3.6 ,,,,, 

Total  ,  68.1 ,,,,,   ,  72.2 ,,,,,  +4.1 ,,,,, 

Total liabilities and owners’ equities 100.0% 100.0% ,,,,,,,,,.0%

Common-size balance sheets as of December 31, 2016 and 2017 (%).

Note: Numbers may not add up to 100.0% due to rounding.

EXHIBIT 13A .3 Prufrock Corporation

Sales $2,311

Cost of goods sold 1,344

Depreciation ,,, 276

Earnings before interest and taxes $ , 691

Interest paid ,,, 141

Taxable income $ ,,,,, 550

Taxes (34%) ,,, 187

Net income $ ,,,,, 363

Dividends $121

Addition to retained earnings 242

2017 income statement ($ millions).

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We will consider each of these in turn. In calculating these numbers for Prufrock, we will use the ending balance sheet (2017) figures unless we explicitly say otherwise. The numbers for the various ratios come from the income statement and the balance sheet.

Short-Term Solvency, or Liquidity, Measures As the name suggests, short-term solvency ratios as a group are intended to provide information about a firm’s liquidity, and these ratios are sometimes called liquidity measures. The primary concern is the firm’s ability to pay its bills over the short run without undue stress. Consequently, these ratios focus on current assets and current liabilities.

For obvious reasons, liquidity ratios are particularly interesting to short-term creditors. Since financial managers are constantly working with banks and other short-term lenders, an under- standing of these ratios is essential.

One advantage of looking at current assets and liabilities is that their book values and market values are likely to be similar. Often (though not always), these assets and liabilities just don’t live long enough for the two to get seriously out of step. On the other hand, like any type of near cash, current assets and liabilities can and do change fairly rapidly, so today’s amounts may not be a reliable guide to the future.

Current Ratio One of the best-known and most widely used ratios is the current ratio. As you might guess, the current ratio is defined as:

Current ratio = Current assets

______________ Current liabilities

For Prufrock, the 2017 current ratio is:

Current ratio = $708

_____ $540

= 1.31 times

Because current assets and liabilities are, in principle, converted to cash over the following 12 months, the current ratio is a measure of short-term liquidity. The unit of measurement is either dollars or times. So we could say Prufrock has $1.31 in current assets for every $1 in cur- rent liabilities, or we could say Prufrock has its current liabilities covered 1.31 times over.

To a creditor, particularly a short-term creditor such as a supplier, the higher the current ratio, the better. To the firm, a high current ratio indicates liquidity, but it also may indicate an inefficient use of cash and other short-term assets. Absent some extraordinary circumstances, we would expect to see a current ratio of at least 1, because a current ratio of less than 1 would mean

EXHIBIT 13A .4 Prufrock Corporation

Sales 100.0%

Cost of goods sold 58.2  

Depreciation 11.9   

Earnings before interest and taxes 29.9

Interest paid   ,,,,,,6.1   

Taxable income 23.8   

Taxes (34%)   ,,,,,,8.1   

Net income 15.7%

Dividends 5.2%

Addition to retained earnings 10.5

2017 Common-size income statement (%).

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that net working capital (current assets less current liabilities) is negative. This would be unusual in a healthy firm, at least for most types of businesses.

The current ratio, like any ratio, is affected by various types of transactions. For example, suppose the firm borrows over the long term to raise money. The short-run effect would be an increase in cash from the issue proceeds and an increase in long-term debt. Current liabilities would not be affected, so the current ratio would rise.

Finally, note that an apparently low current ratio may not be a bad sign for a company with a large reserve of untapped borrowing power.

Quick (or Acid-Test) Ratio Inventory is often the least liquid current asset. It’s also the one for which the book values are least reliable as measures of market value, since the quality of the inven- tory isn’t considered. Some of the inventory may later turn out to be damaged, obsolete, or lost.

More to the point, relatively large inventories are often a sign of short-term trouble. The firm may have overestimated sales and overbought or overproduced as a result. In this case, the firm may have a substantial portion of its liquidity tied up in slow-moving inventory.

To further evaluate liquidity, the quick, or acid-test, ratio is computed just like the current ratio, except inventory is omitted:

Quick ratio = Current assets − Inventory

_____________________ Current liabilities

Notice that using cash to buy inventory does not affect the current ratio, but it reduces the quick ratio. Again, the idea is that inventory is relatively illiquid compared to cash.

For Prufrock, this ratio in 2017 was:

Quick ratio = $708 − 422

_________ $540

= .53 times

The quick ratio here tells a somewhat different story than the current ratio, because inventory accounts for more than half of Prufrock’s current assets. To exaggerate the point, if this inven- tory consisted of, say, unsold nuclear power plants, then this would be a cause for concern.

Cash Ratio A very short-term creditor might be interested in the cash ratio:

Cash ratio = Cash _______________

Current liabilities

You can verify that this works out to be .18 times for Prufrock.

Long-Term Solvency Measures Long-term solvency ratios are intended to address the firm’s long-run ability to meet its obliga- tions, or, more generally, its financial leverage. These ratios are sometimes called financial lever- age ratios or just leverage ratios. We consider three commonly used measures and some variations.

Total Debt Ratio The total debt ratio takes into account all debts of all maturities to all credi- tors. It can be defined in several ways, the easiest of which is:

Total debt ratio

=

Total assets − Total equity _____________________

Total assets

= $3,588 − 2,591

_____________ $3,588

= .28 times

In this case, an analyst might say that Prufrock uses 28 percent debt.1 Whether this is high or low or whether it even makes any difference depends on whether or not capital structure matters.

1Total equity here includes preferred stock, if there is any. An equivalent numerator in this ratio would be (Current liabilities + Long-term debt).

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Prufrock has $.28 in debt for every $1 in assets. Therefore, there is $.72 in equity ($1 — .28) for every $.28 in debt. With this in mind, we can define two useful variations on the total debt ratio, the debt-equity ratio and the equity multiplier:

Debt−equity ratio

= Total debt / Total equity

=$.28/$.72 = .39 times Equity multiplier = Total assets/Total equity

=$1/$.72 = 1.39 times

The fact that the equity multiplier is 1 plus the debt-equity ratio is not a coincidence:

Equity multiplier

= Total assets / Total equity = $1/ $.72 = 1.39

= ( Total equity + Total debt ) / Total equity

= 1 + Debt−equity ratio = 1.39 times

The thing to notice here is that given any one of these three ratios, you can immediately calculate the other two, so they all say exactly the same thing.

Times Interest Earned Another common measure of long-term solvency is the times interest earned (TIE) ratio. Once again, there are several possible (and common) definitions, but we’ll stick with the most traditional:

Times interest earned ratio

=

EBIT ___________

Interest paid

= $691

_____ $141

= 4.9 times

As the name suggests, this ratio measures how well a company has its interest obligations cov- ered, and it is often called the interest coverage ratio. For Prufrock, the interest bill is covered 4.9 times over.

Cash Coverage A problem with the TIE ratio is that it is based on earnings before interest and taxes (EBIT), which is not really a measure of cash available to pay interest. The reason is that depreciation, a noncash expense, has been deducted. Since interest is most definitely a cash out- flow (to creditors), one way to define the cash coverage ratio is:

Cash coverage ratio

=

EBIT + Depreciation _________________

Interest paid

= $691 + 276

_________ $141

= $967

_____ $141

= 6.9 times

The numerator here, EBIT plus depreciation, is often abbreviated EBDIT (earnings before depreciation, interest, and taxes). It is a basic measure of the firm’s ability to generate cash from operations, and it is frequently used as a measure of cash flow available to meet financial obligations.

Asset Management, or Turnover, Measures We next turn our attention to the efficiency with which Prufrock uses its assets. The measures in this section are sometimes called asset utilization ratios. The specific ratios we discuss can all be interpreted as measures of turnover. What they are intended to describe is how efficiently, or intensively, a firm uses its assets to generate sales. We first look at two important current assets: inventory and receivables.

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Inventory Turnover and Days’ Sales in Inventory During the year, Prufrock had a cost of goods sold of $1,344. Inventory at the end of the year was $422. With these numbers, inventory turnover can be calculated as:

Inventory turnover

=

Cost of goods sold _______________

Inventory

= $1, 344

______ $422

= 3.2 times

In a sense, we sold off, or turned over, the entire inventory 3.2 times. As long as we are not run- ning out of stock and thereby forgoing sales, the higher this ratio is, the more efficiently we are managing inventory.

If we know that we turned our inventory over 3.2 times during the year, then we can immedi- ately figure out how long it took us to turn it over on average. The result is the average days’ sales in inventory:

Day’s sales in inventory

=

365 days _______________

Inventory turnover

= 365

____ 3.2

= 114 days

This tells us that, on average, inventory sits 114 days before it is sold. Alternatively, assuming we used the most recent inventory and cost figures, it will take about 114 days to work off our cur- rent inventory.

For example, we frequently hear things like “Majestic Motors has a 60 days’ supply of cars.” This means that, at current daily sales, it would take 60 days to deplete the available inventory. We could also say that Majestic has 60 days of sales in inventory.

Receivables Turnover and Days’ Sales in Receivables Our inventory measures give some indica- tion of how fast we can sell products. We now look at how fast we collect on those sales. The receivables turnover is defined in the same way as inventory turnover:

Receivables turnover

=

Sales ________________

Accounts receivable

= $2, 311

______ $188

= 12.3 times

Loosely speaking, we collected our outstanding credit accounts and reloaned the money 12.3 times during the year.2

This ratio makes more sense if we convert it to days, so the days’ sales in receivables is:

Day’s sales in receivables

=

365 days _________________

Receivables turnover

= 365

____ 12.3

= 30 days

Therefore, on average, we collect on our credit sales in 30 days. For obvious reasons, this ratio is very frequently called the average collection period (ACP).

Also note that if we are using the most recent figures, we can also say that we have 30 days’ worth of sales currently uncollected.

Total Asset Turnover Moving away from specific accounts like inventory or receivables, we can consider an important “big picture” ratio, the total asset turnover ratio. As the name suggests, total asset turnover is:

2Here we have implicitly assumed that all sales are credit sales. If they were not, then we would simply use total credit sales in these calculations, not total sales.

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Total asset turnover

=

Sales __________

Total assets

= $2, 311

______ $3, 588

= .64 times

In other words, for every dollar in assets, we generated $.64 in sales. A closely related ratio, the capital intensity ratio, is simply the reciprocal of (i.e., 1 divided

by) total asset turnover. It can be interpreted as the dollar investment in assets needed to gen- erate $1 in sales. High values correspond to capital-intensive industries (e.g., public utilities). For Prufrock, total asset turnover is .64, so, if we flip this over, we get that capital intensity is $1/.64 = $1.56. That is, it takes Prufrock $1.56 in assets to create $1 in sales.

Profitability Measures The three measures we discuss in this section are probably the best known and most widely used of all financial ratios. In one form or another, they are intended to measure how efficiently the firm uses its assets and how efficiently the firm manages its operations. The focus in this group is on the bottom line, net income.

Profit Margin Companies pay a great deal of attention to their profit margin:

Profit margin

=

Net income __________

Sales

= $363

______ $2, 311

= 15.7%

This tells us that Prufrock, in an accounting sense, generates a little less than 16 cents in profit for every dollar in sales.

All other things being equal, a relatively high profit margin is obviously desirable. This situ- ation corresponds to low expense ratios relative to sales. However, we hasten to add that other things are often not equal.

For example, lowering our sales price will usually increase unit volume, but will normally cause profit margins to shrink. Total profit (or, more importantly, operating cash flow) may go up or down; so the fact that margins are smaller isn’t necessarily bad. After all, isn’t it possible that, as the saying goes, “Our prices are so low that we lose money on everything we sell, but we make it up in volume!”3

Return on Assets Return on assets (ROA) is a measure of profit per dollar of assets. It can be defined several ways, but the most common is:

Return on assets

=

Net income __________

Total assets

= $363

______ $3, 588

= 10.12%

Return on Equity Return on equity (ROE) is a measure of how the stockholders fared during the year. Since benefiting shareholders is our goal, ROE is, in an accounting sense, the true bottom- line measure of performance. ROE is usually measured as:

Return on enquiry

=

Net income ___________

Total enquiry

= $363

______ $2, 591

= 14%

3No, it’s not; margins can be small, but they do need to be positive!

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For every dollar in equity, therefore, Prufrock generated 14 cents in profit, but, again, this is only correct in accounting terms.

Because ROA and ROE are such commonly cited numbers, we stress that it is important to remember they are accounting rates of return. For this reason, these measures should properly be called return on book assets and return on book equity. In addition, ROE is sometimes called return on net worth. Whatever it’s called, it would be inappropriate to compare the results to, for example, an interest rate observed in the financial markets.

The fact that ROE exceeds ROA reflects Prufrock’s use of financial leverage. We will examine the relationship between these two measures in more detail below.

Market Value Measures Our final group of measures is based, in part, on information not necessarily contained in finan- cial statements—the market price per share of the stock. Obviously, these measures can be calcu- lated directly only for publicly traded companies.

We assume that Prufrock has 33 million shares outstanding and the stock sold for $88 per share at the end of the year. If we recall that Prufrock’s net income was $363 million, then we can calculate that its earnings per share were:

EPS = Net income

________________ Shares outstanding

= $363

_____ 33

= $11

Price-Earnings Ratio The first of our market value measures, the price-earnings, or PE, ratio (or multiple), is defined as:

PE ratio

=

Price per share ______________

Earning per share

= $88

____ $11

= 8 times

In the vernacular, we would say that Prufrock shares sell for eight times earnings, or we might say that Prufrock shares have, or “carry,” a PE multiple of 8.

Since the PE ratio measures how much investors are willing to pay per dollar of current earnings, higher PEs are often taken to mean that the firm has significant prospects for future growth. Of course, if a firm had no or almost no earnings, its PE would probably be quite large; so, as always, be careful when interpreting this ratio.

Market-to-Book Ratio A second commonly quoted measure is the market-to-book ratio:

Market-to-book ratio

=

Market value per share ___________________

Book value per share

= $88 ___________

( $2, 591 / 33 ) = $88

_____ $78.5

= 1.12 times

Notice that book value per share is total equity (not just common stock) divided by the number of shares outstanding.

Since book value per share is an accounting number, it reflects historical costs. In a loose sense, the market-to-book ratio therefore compares the market value of the firm’s investments to their cost. A value less than 1 could mean that the firm has not been successful overall in creat- ing value for its stockholders.

Conclusion This completes our definition of some common ratios. Exhibit 13A.5 summarizes the ratios we’ve discussed.

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Current ratio =

I.

II.

III.

Short-term solvency, or liquidity, ratios Current assets

Current liabilities

Quick ratio = Current assets – Inventory

Current liabilities

Cash ratio = Cash Current liabilities

Inventory turnover =

Asset utilization, or turnover, ratios

Cost of goods sold Inventory

Days’ sales in inventory = 365 days

Inventory turnover

Receivables turnover = Sales

Accounts receivable

Total debt ratio =

Long-term solvency, or financial leverage, ratios

Total assets – Total equity Total assets

Debt-equity ratio = Total debt/Total equity

Equity multiplier = Total assets/Total equity

Times interest earned ratio = EBIT

Interest paid

Cash coverage ratio = EBIT + Depreciation

Interest paid

Days’ sales in receivables =

IV.

V.

365 days Receivables turnover

Total asset turnover = Sales

Total assets

Capital intensity = Total assets

Sales

Price-earnings ratio =

Market value ratios

Price per share Earnings per share

Return on assets (ROA) = Net income Total assets

Market-to-book ratio = Market value per share Book value per share

Profit margin =

Profitability ratios

Net income Sales

Return on equity (ROE) = Net income Total equity

ROE = × Net income

Sales ×

Sales Assets

Assets Equity

EXHIBIT 13A.5 A Summary of Five Types of Financial Ratios

*This information was compiled by Ruthie Brock and Carol Byrne, business librarians at The University of Texas at Arlington. We greatly appreciate their valuable contribution.

APPENDIX 2 TO CHAPTER 13

SOURCES OF COMPANY AND INDUSTRY INFORMATION* In order for business executives to make the best decisions when developing corporate strat- egy, it is critical for them to be knowledgeable about their competitors and about the industries in which they compete. The process used by corporations to learn as much as possible about competitors is often called “competitive intelligence.” This appendix provides an overview of important and widely available sources of information that may be useful in conducting basic competitive intelligence. Much information of this nature is available in libraries in article data- bases and business reference books and on websites. This appendix will recommend a variety of them. Ask a librarian for assistance, because library collections and resources vary.

The information sources are organized into 10 categories: Competitive Intelligence Public or Private—Subsidiary or Division—U.S. or Foreign? Finding Public-Company Information Guides and Tutorials

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SEC Filings/EDGAR—Company Disclosure Reports Company Rankings Business Websites Strategic and Competitive Analysis—Information Sources Sources for Industry Research and Analysis Search Engines

Competitive Intelligence According to the Society of Competitive Intelligence Professionals (http://www.scip.org), “Competitive Intelligence is an ongoing process of developing a holistic analysis of your organi- zational environment. If used effectively, data and information can provide valuable insights and prepare companies to deal effectively with unexpected events.”

Students and other researchers who want to learn more about the value and process of com- petitive intelligence should refer to recent articles or books on this subject. Ask a librarian about electronic (ebook) versions of the following titles. A few suggestions are provided below. Ask a librarian for assistance, if needed.

Heesen, Bernd. Effective Strategy Execution: Improving Performance with Business Intelligence. Berlin: Springer, 2015.

Maccoby, Michael. Strategic Intelligence: Conceptual Tools for Leading Change. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015.

Maheshwari, Anil K. Business Intelligence and Data Mining. New York: Business Expert Press, 2015. He, Wu, et al. “Gaining competitive intelligence from social media data: Evidence from two

largest retail chains in the world.” Industrial Management & Data Systems, 115.9 (2015): 1622–1636. http://dx.doi.org/10.1108/IMDS-03-2015-0098

Public or Private—Subsidiary or Division—U.S. or Foreign? Companies traded on stock exchanges in the United States are required to file a variety of reports that disclose information about the company. This begins the process that produces a wealth of data on public companies and, at the same time, distinguishes them from private com- panies, which often lack available data. Similarly, financial data of subsidiaries and divisions are typically filed in a consolidated financial statement by the parent company, rather than treated independently, thus limiting the kind of data available on them. On the other hand, foreign com- panies that trade on U.S. stock exchanges are required to file 20F reports, similar to the 10-K for U.S. companies, the most comprehensive of the required reports. The following directories provide brief facts about companies, including whether they are public or private, subsidiary or division, U.S. or foreign.

Corporate Affiliations. New York, NY: RELX, Inc. (formerly Reed Elsevier), 2017. This database of nearly 2 million corporate family relationships identifies ownership between entities such as ultimate parent, parent, subsidiary, joint venture, affiliate, division, factory or plant, branch, group, holding, and non-operating entities (shells). The database content includes both public and private companies, primarily large with U.S.-located headquarters. Detailed executive and board member profiles are provided. Mergers and acquisitions are tracked from announcement to post-merger organizational changes. Corporate Affiliations data is compiled by the LexisNexis Enterprise Entity Management Group. Downloading from multiple searches to one customized spreadsheet is a new feature. Some historical data is also available. Hard copy volumes can be purchased.

ReferenceUSA. Omaha, NE: Infogroup.Inc. ReferenceUSA is an online directory of more than 15 million verified businesses located in the United States plus 30 million unverified. New businesses and closed businesses are searchable separately. This resource includes both public and private companies regardless of how small or large, as well as educational, medical, and nonprofit organizations. Job opportunities are provided by Indeed.com in search results when available. Specialized

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modules include consumer lifestyles, historical records, and health care. Check with a librarian regarding availability of specialized modules at your location.

Finding Public-Company Information Most companies provide their annual report to shareholders and other financial reports are available on their corporate website usually listed under “Investor Relations” or similar headings. Searching Google with the company’s name and annual report or 10K report finds most com- panies financials. Be aware that all company documents are by default told in the most positive language and images; therefore serious research should include analysts’ assessments, SWOT analyses, and newspaper or magazine articles to get a complete and less biased view of the com- pany’s strengths and weaknesses.

Mergent Online. Fort Mill, SC: Mergent, Inc. Mergent Online is a database that provides company reports and financial statements for both U.S. and foreign public companies. Mergent’s database has up to 25 years of quarterly and annual financial data that can be downloaded into a spreadsheet for analysis across time or across companies. Tabs lead to other features for further analysis. Students should check with a librarian to determine the availability of this database at their college or university library. http://mergentonline.com

Guides & Tutorials for Researching Companies and Industries Researching Public Companies through EDGAR: A Guide for Investors. Washington DC: U.S.

Securities and Exchange Commission. This guide informs EDGAR database users about two different search interfaces: the EDGAR Full-Text Search which searches the full-text filings from the last four years only and the Historical EDGAR Archives Search which searches the headings information only (not full text) for a longer period, from 1994 to 2017 (up to yesterday’s filings). Each version has some advantages and disadvantages for the user, depending on how exhaustive their research is. https://www.sec.gov/investor/pubs/edgarguide.htm

Ten Steps to Industry Intelligence Research. Industry Tutorial. George A. Smathers Libraries, University of Florida, Gainesville, FL. This tutorial provides a step-by-step approach for finding information about industries, with embedded links to recommended sources. http://businesslibrary.uflib.ufl.edu/industryresearch

Conducting Business Research. University of Texas at Austin Libraries, Austin, TX. This tutorial provides a step-by-step process for business research. www.lib.utexas.edu/services/instruction/learningmodules/businessresearch/intro.html

Guide to Financial Statements. Armonk, NY: IBM. International Business Machines (IBM) created an educational guide for beginners to learn how to understand and interpret a typical financial statement in a company’s annual report. http://www.ibm.com/investor/help/guide/introduction.wss

How to Read Annual Reports. Armonk, NY: IBM. An annual report is one of the most important documents a company produces and is often the first document someone consults when researching a company. Created by IBM, this guide explains the purpose of each of the elements that are included in annual reports or 10-K reports, so that novices who are not familiar with business terminology and financials are able to understand. http://www.ibm.com/investor/help/reports/introduction.wss

Ten Steps to Company Intelligence. Company Research Tutorial. William and Joan Schreyer Business Library, Penn State University, University Park, PA. This tutorial provides a step-by-step approach to finding company intelligence information. http://businesslibrary.uflib.ufl.edu/companyresearch

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SEC Filings/EDGAR—Company Disclosure Reports SEC Filings are the various reports that publicly traded companies must file with the Securities and Exchange Commission to disclose information about their corporation. These are often referred to as “EDGAR” filings, an acronym for the Electronic Data Gathering, Analysis and Retrieval System. Some websites and commercial databases improve access to these reports by offering additional retrieval features not available on the official (www.sec.gov) website.

EDGAR Database. U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), Washington, DC. Public companies are required to disclose financial information for the benefit of shareholders and other interested researchers and investors. The SEC is the agency which oversees the process and provides free access to more than 21 million filings in their EDGAR database. See also the guide described previously called: Researching Public Companies through EDGAR. www.sec.gov/edgar/searchedgar/companysearch.html

LexisNexis Nexis Uni. SEC Filings & Reports. Bethesda, MD: LexisNexis. SEC filings are available in Nexis Uni by selecting “Search by Subject or Topic.” Under the Companies category, select SEC Filings. A company-name search or an advanced search can be conducted at that point.

Mergent Online—Government Filings Search. This database also provides an alternative search interface for SEC filings. Mergent’s Government Filings search allows searching by company name, ticker, CIK (Central Index Key) number, or industry SIC number. The search can be limited by date and by type of SEC file. Ask a librarian whether your library subscribes to Mergent Online for this feature.

Company Rankings Fortune 500. New York: Time Inc.

The Fortune 500 list and other company rankings are published in the printed edition of Fortune magazine and are also available online. http://beta.fortune.com/fortune500

Forbes Global 2000. Forbes, Inc. The companies listed on the Forbes Global 2000 are the biggest and most powerful in the world. www.forbes.com/global2000/

Business Websites Big Charts. San Francisco: MarketWatch, Inc.

BigCharts is an easy-to-use investment research website operated by and linked to MarketWatch.com. Research tools such as interactive charts, current and historical quotes, industry analysis, and intraday stock screeners, as well as market news and commentary are provided. Supported by site sponsors, it is free to self-directed investors. http://bigcharts.marketwatch.com/

GlobalEdge. East Lansing, MI: Michigan State University. GlobalEdge is a web portal providing a significant amount of information about international business, countries around the globe, the U.S. states, industries, and news. http://globaledge.msu.edu/

Yahoo Finance. Sunnyvale, CA: Yahoo! Inc. The finance section of Yahoo’s website on U.S. world markets, financial news, and other information useful to investors. http://finance.yahoo.com

Strategic and Competitive Analysis—Information Sources Analyzing a company can take the form of examining its internal and external environments. In the process, it is useful to identify the company’s strengths, weaknesses, opportunities, and threats (SWOT). Sources for this kind of analysis are varied, but perhaps the best would be articles from The Wall Street Journal, business magazines, and industry trade publications.

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Publications such as these can be found in the following databases available at many public and academic libraries. When using a database that is structured to allow it, try searching the com- pany name combined with one or more keywords, such as “IBM and competition” or “Microsoft and lawsuits” or “AMR and fuel costs” to retrieve articles relating to the external environment.

ABI/INFORM Complete. Ann Arbor, MI: ProQuest LLC. ABI/INFORM Complete provides abstracts and full-text articles covering disciplines such as management, law, taxation, economics, health care, and information technology from more than 6,800 scholarly, business, and trade publications. Other types of resources include company and industry reports, case studies, market research reports, and a variety of downloadable economic data.

Business Insights: Essentials. Farmington Hills, MI: Gale CENGAGE Learning. Business Insights provides company and industry intelligence for a selection of public and private companies. Company profiles include parent-subsidiary relationships, industry rankings, products and brands, industry statistics, and financial ratios. Selections of SWOT analysis reports are also available. The Company and Industry comparison tool allows a researcher to compare up to six companies’ revenues, employees, and sales data over time. Results are available as an image, chart, or spreadsheet.

Business Source Complete. Ipswich, MA: EBSCO Industries. Business Source Complete is a full-text database with over 3,800 scholarly business journals covering management, economics, finance, accounting, international business, and more. The database also includes detailed company profiles for more than one million public and private companies, as well as selected country economic reports provided by the Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU). The database includes case studies, investment and market research reports, SWOT analyses, and more. Business Source Complete contains over 2,400 peer- reviewed business journals.

Hoover’s Academic. Short Hills, NJ: Dun & Bradstreet. Hoover’s provides company and industry information for over 85 million public and private U.S. and international companies. The company profiles include the company’s history, key financials, and executive information, as well as access to the latest news stories and SEC filings. Over 900 industries are covered in Hoover’s.

IBISWorld. Los Angeles, CA: IBISWorld. The database provides access to detailed industry reports for over 700-plus United States industries. Each report includes industry structure, market characteristics, product and customer segments, cost structure, industry conditions, major players, market share, supply chain structure, and 5-year revenue forecasts. Separate subscriptions are required for the Global and China industry reports.

OneSource. Short Hills, NJ: Dun & Bradstreet. OneSource provides a wealth of information about U.S. and international public and private companies. The profiles include key executives, a financial report, and the corporate family structure. Also available are recent analyst reports, company SWOT analyses, industry reports, news and SEC filings information. Custom reports can be created and downloaded.

Thomson ONE Research. Thomson ONE Research offers full-text analytical reports on more than 65,000 companies worldwide. The research reports are excellent sources for strategic and financial profiles of a company and its competitors and of industry trends. Developed by a global roster of brokerage, investment banking, and research firms, these full-text investment reports include a wealth of current and historical information useful for evaluating a company or industry over time.

International Directory of Company Histories. Detroit, MI: St. James Press, 1988–present. 187 volumes to date. This directory covers more than 11,000 multinational companies, and the series is still adding volumes. Each company history is approximately three to five pages in length and provides a summary of the company’s mission, goals, and ideals, followed by company milestones, principal subsidiaries, and competitors. Strategic decisions made during the company’s period of existence are usually noted. This series covers public and private

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companies and nonprofit entities. Entry information includes a company’s legal name, headquarters information, URL, incorporation date, ticker symbol, stock exchange listing, sales figures, and the primary North American Industry Classification System (NAICS) code. Further reading selections complete the entry information. Volumes 59 to the most recent are available electronically in the Gale Virtual Reference Library database from Gale CENGAGE Learning.

LexisNexis Academic. Bethesda, MD: LexisNexis. LexisNexis Academic provides access to legal, company, and industry information, news sources, and public records. Industry information is available through the Company Info tab or the “Search by content type” selection. The Company Dossier tool allows a researcher to compare up to five companies’ financial statements at one time with download capabilities.

The Wall Street Journal. New York: Dow Jones & Co. This respected business newspaper is available in searchable full text from 1984 to the present in the Factiva database. The “News Pages” link provides access to current articles and issues of The Wall Street Journal. Dow Jones, publisher of the print version of the Wall Street Journal, also has an online subscription available at wsj.com. Some libraries provide access to The Wall Street Journal through the ProQuest Newspapers database.

Sources for Industry Research and Analysis Factiva. New York: Dow Jones & Co.

The Factiva database has several options for researching an industry. One would be to search the database for articles in the business magazines and industry trade publications. A second option in Factiva would be to search in the Companies/Markets category for company/industry comparison reports.

Mergent Online. New York: Mergent Inc. Mergent Online is a searchable database of over 60,000 global public companies. The database offers worldwide industry reports, U.S. and global competitors, and executive biographical information. Mergent’s Basic Search option permits searching by primary industry codes (either SIC or NAICS). Once the search is executed, companies in that industry should be listed. A comparison or standard peer-group analysis can be created to analyze companies in the same industry on various criteria. The Advanced Search allows the user to search a wider range of financial and textual information. Results, including ratios for a company and its competitors, can be downloaded to a spreadsheet.

North American Industry Classification System (NAICS) The North American Industry Classification System has officially replaced the Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) as the numerical structure used to define and analyze industries, although some publications and databases offer both classification systems. The NAICS codes are used in Canada, the United States, and Mexico. In the United States, the NAICS codes are used to conduct an Economic Census every five years providing a snapshot of the U.S. economy at a given moment in time. NAICS: www.census.gov/eos/www/naics/ Economic Census: www.census.gov/programs-surveys/economic-census/year.html

NetAdvantage. New York: S & P Capital IQ. The database includes company, financial, and investment information as well as the well- known publication called Industry Surveys. Each industry report includes information on the current environment, industry trends, key industry ratios and statistics, and comparative company financial analysis. Available in HTML, PDF, or Excel formats.

Business Insights: Essentials. Farmington Hills, MI: Gale CENGAGE Learning. Business Insights provides company and industry intelligence for a selection of public and private companies. Company profiles include parent-subsidiary relationships, industry rankings, products and brands, industry statistics, and financial ratios. Selections of SWOT analysis reports are also available. The Company and Industry comparison tool allows a researcher to compare up to six companies’ revenues, employees, and sales data over time. Results are available as an image, chart, or spreadsheet.

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Plunkett Research Online. Houston, TX: Plunkett Research, Ltd. Plunkett’s provides industry-specific market research, trends analysis, and business intelligence for 34 industries.

Search Engines Google. Mountain View, CA: Google, Inc.

Recognized for its advanced technology, quality of results, and simplicity, the search engine Google is highly recommended by librarians and other expert web surfers. www.google.com

Dogpile. Bellevue, WA: InfoSpace, Inc. Dogpile is a metasearch engine that searches and compiles the most relevant results from more than 12 individual search engines. http://www.dogpile.com/

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CASE 1 Robin Hood . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . C1

CASE 2 The Global Casino Industry in 2017 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . C3

CASE 3 McDonald’s in 2017 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . C7

CASE 4 Zynga: Is the Game Over? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . C13

CASE 5 QVC . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . C19

CASE 6 Microfinance: Going Global . . . and Going Public? . . . . . . . . . C24

CASE 7 World Wrestling Entertainment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . C27

CASE 8 Greenwood Resources: A Global Sustainable Venture in the Making . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . C32

CASE 9 FreshDirect: How Fresh Is It? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . C46

CASE 10 Dippin’ Dots: Is the Future Frozen? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . C58

CASE 11 Kickstarter and Crowdfunding . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . C68

CASE 12 Emirates Airline in 2017 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . C75

CASE 13 Cirque du Soleil . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . C82

CASE 14 Pixar . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . C86

CASE 15 Campbell: How to Keep the Soup Simmering . . . . . . . . . . . . . . C91

CASE 16 Heineken . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . C102

CASE 17 Ford: No Longer Just an Auto Company? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . C107

CASE 18 General Motors in 2017 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . C120

CASE 19 Johnson & Johnson . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . C128

CASE 20 Avon: A New Era? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . C133

CASE 21 The Boston Beer Company: Poised for Growth . . . . . . . . . . . . C144

CASE 22 Nintendo’s Switch . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . C154

CASE 23 Tata Starbucks: How to Brew a Sustainable Blend for India . . C165

CASE 24 Weight Watchers International Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . C173

CASE 25 Samsung Electronics 2017 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . C184

CASE 26 Procter & Gamble . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . C189

CASE 27 Apple Inc.: Is the Innovation Over? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . C195

CASE 28 JetBlue Airlines: Getting Over the “Blues”? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .C208

CASE 29 United Way Worldwide . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . C218

CASE 30 eBay . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . C227

CASE 31 Jamba Juice: Mixing It Up & Starting Afresh . . . . . . . . . . . . . . C241

CASE 32 Blackberry Limited: Is There a Path to Recovery? . . . . . . . . .C250

CASE 33 Ascena: Odds of Survival in Specialty Retail? . . . . . . . . . . . . .C263

cases

PART 5: CASES

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CASES

CASE 1 ROBIN HOOD*

* Prepared by Joseph Lampel, City University, London. Copyright Joseph Lampel © 1985, revised 1991. Reprinted with permission.

It was in the spring of the second year of his insurrection against the High Sheriff of Nottingham that Robin Hood took a walk in Sherwood Forest. As he walked he pondered the progress of the campaign, the disposition of his forces, the Sheriff’s recent moves, and the options that confronted him.

The revolt against the Sheriff had begun as a personal crusade, erupting out of Robin’s conflict with the Sheriff and his administration. Alone, however, Robin Hood could do little. He therefore sought allies, men with grievances and a deep sense of justice. Later he welcomed all who came, asking few questions, and only demanding a willing- ness to serve. Strength, he believed, lay in numbers.

He spent the first year forging the group into a disci- plined band, united in enmity against the Sheriff, and will- ing to live outside the law. The band’s organization was simple. Robin ruled supreme, making all important deci- sions. He delegated specific tasks to his lieutenants. Will Scarlett was in charge of intelligence and scouting. His main job was to shadow the Sheriff and his men, always alert to their next move. He also collected information on the travel plans of rich merchants and tax collectors. Little John kept discipline among the men, and saw to it that their archery was at the high peak that their profession demanded. Scarlock took care of the finances, convert- ing loot into cash, paying shares of the take, and finding suitable hiding places for the surplus. Finally, Much the Miller’s son had the difficult task of provisioning the ever- increasing band of Merrymen.

The increasing size of the band was a source of satis- faction for Robin, but also a source of concern. The fame of his Merrymen was spreading, and new recruits poured in from every corner of England. As the band grew larger, their small bivouac became a major encampment. Between raids the men milled about, talking and playing games. Vigilance was in decline, and discipline was becoming harder to enforce. “Why,” Robin reflected, “I don’t know half the men I run into these days.”

The growing band was also beginning to exceed the food capacity of the forest. Game was becoming scarce, and sup- plies had to be obtained from outlying villages. The cost of buying food was beginning to drain the band’s finan- cial reserves at the very moment when revenues were in decline. Travelers, especially those with the most to lose, were now giving the forest a wide berth. This was costly

and inconvenient to them, but it was preferable to having all their goods confiscated.

Robin believed that the time had come for the Merrymen to change their policy of outright confiscation of goods to one of a fixed transit tax. His lieutenants strongly resisted this idea. They were proud of the Merrymen’s famous motto: “Rob the rich and give to the poor.” “The farmers and the townspeople,” they argued, “are our most impor- tant allies. How can we tax them, and still hope for their help in our fight against the Sheriff?”

Robin wondered how long the Merrymen could keep to the ways and methods of their early days. The Sheriff was growing stronger and better organized. He now had the money and the men, and was beginning to harass the band, probing for its weaknesses.

The tide of events was beginning to turn against the Merrymen. Robin felt that the campaign must be decisively concluded before the Sheriff had a chance to deliver a mor- tal blow. “But how,” he wondered, “could this be done?”

Robin had often entertained the possibility of killing the Sheriff, but the chances for this seemed increasingly remote. Besides, while killing the Sheriff might satisfy his per- sonal thirst for revenge, it would not improve the situation. Robin had hoped that the perpetual state of unrest, and the Sheriff’s failure to collect taxes, would lead to his removal from office. Instead, the Sheriff used his political connec- tions to obtain reinforcement. He had powerful friends at court, and was well regarded by the regent, Prince John.

Prince John was vicious and volatile. He was consumed by his unpopularity among the people, who wanted the imprisoned King Richard back. He also lived in constant fear of the barons, who had first given him the regency, but were now beginning to dispute his claim to the throne. Several of these barons had set out to collect the ransom that would release King Richard the Lionheart from his jail in Austria. Robin was invited to join the conspiracy in return for future amnesty. It was a dangerous proposition. Provincial banditry was one thing, court intrigue another. Prince John’s spies were everywhere. If the plan failed, the pursuit would be relentless and retribution swift.

The sound of the supper horn startled Robin from his thoughts. There was the smell of roasting venison in the air. Nothing was resolved or settled. Robin headed for camp promising himself that he would give these problems his utmost attention after tomorrow’s raid.

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CASE 2 :: THE GLOBAL CASINO INDUSTRY IN 2017 C3

For well over fifty years, the casino business has been on a roll, on its way to becoming a $150 billion a year global industry. For much of that period, the U.S. has been lead- ing the charge, accounting for nearly half the global gam- bling revenues as recently as 2010. Most of these revenues have come from Las Vegas and Atlantic City, magnets for gamblers from around the world. Over the last couple of decades, these two locations have accounted for a large por- tion of the total revenues generated by all forms of casinos throughout the United States.

Over the past decade, however, Las Vegas and Atlantic City have had to deal with increased competition from other locales, as casinos have opened all across the U.S. as other states have legalized gambling in order to generate more tax revenues and to promote tourism. Over a dozen states now generate substantial revenue from their casinos, many of which have opened on waterfronts such as rivers and lakes. When combined with Native American casinos, gambling revenues in other parts of the U.S. now exceed those generated by casinos in Las Vegas and Atlantic City.

Casinos in Las Vegas and Atlantic City are able to rely upon gamblers who come from all over the world, as far away as China. Although casinos have operated for a long time in Europe and the Caribbean, no single location was ever able to compete with Las Vegas or Atlantic City. Las Vegas offers more than two dozen large casinos on its strip that have spent lavishly to differentiate themselves from all others. Luxor’s pyramids and columns evoke ancient Egypt; Mandalay Bay borrows looks from the Pacific Rim; and the Venetian’s plaza and canals re-create the Italian destination.

But more recently, the dominance of Las Vegas and Atlantic City in the global market has been challenged by the development of several casinos along a strip in the former Portuguese colony of Macau. Casinos have existed in Macau for decades, but basically served a local popula- tion. Since a monopoly on casinos by a single local tycoon was terminated in 2002, there has been a proliferation of mega-sized high-end casinos there, developed and managed by some of the world’s largest casino operators, including those from Las Vegas. This has allowed Macau to grow from a tiny backwater territory to a booming center of gam- bling, with casinos generating over $40 billion, more than six times that of the Las Vegas strip (see Exhibit 1).

Casinos have spread to other locations across the Asia- Pacific region. Singapore already has two casinos, while the Philippines is opening new ones and Japan is planning to legalize them. Yet even as casinos are expanding into new locations, there are concerns about the potential for gaming revenues. Revenues from gaming have dipped considerably in locations like Macau and Atlantic City over the last three years, while they are still recovering in Las Vegas. Casino owners are trying to figure out how to draw in more gamblers by creating more interest among the younger generation.

Riding an American Wave Although gambling has existed in the U.S. since colonial times, the recent advent of casinos can be traced back to the legalization of gaming in Nevada in 1931. For many years, this was the only state in which casinos were allowed. After New Jersey passed laws in 1976 to allow gambling in Atlantic City, the large population on the east coast acquired easier access to casinos. Since 1988, more and more states have begun to legalize the operation of casinos because of the tax revenues that they can generate.

As casinos have spread across the U.S., there has been a growing tendency to regard casino gambling as an accept- able form of entertainment for a night out. A large part of the growth in casino revenues has come from slot machines. These coin-operated devices typically account for almost two-thirds of all casino gaming revenues (see Exhibit 2). A major reason for their popularity is that it is easier for prospective gamblers to feed a slot machine than to master the nuances of various table games.

CASES

CASE 2 THE GLOBAL CASINO INDUSTRY IN 2017*

* Case prepared by Jamal Shamsie, Michigan State University, with the assistance of Professor Alan B. Eisner, Pace University. Material has been drawn from published sources to be used for purposes of class discussion. Copyright © 2017 Jamal Shamsie and Alan B. Eisner.

Location Revenue

Macau $32.0

United States 30.01

Singapore 6.0

Australia 4.0

South Korea 2.5

Malaysia 2.0

Philippines 2.0

1$6.0 billion comes from Las Vegas.

Source: Morgan Stanley.

EXHIBIT 1 Top Casino Revenue Locations, 2016 ($ billions)

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Over the years casinos in Las Vegas and Atlantic City have tried to draw gamblers by developing extravagant new properties. The most ambitious recent development in Las Vegas was the opening by MGM Mirage of its City Center, an $8.5 billion mini-city spread over 67 acres that includes luxury hotels, condominium units, restaurants, and shops. Even some of the older properties have under- gone extensive renovation, such as Caesars Palace adding a new Colosseum and a new Roman Plaza. Atlantic City welcomed the much-ballyhooed opening of the $2.4 billion Revel Hotel built on 20 acres of beachfront, following the opening several years earlier of another lavish resort, the Borgota Hotel, which offered amenities such as penthouse spas and tropical indoor pools.

Aside from ramping up the appeal of their particular properties, most casinos have also offered incentives to keep their customers from moving over to competitors. These incentives can be particularly helpful in retaining those high rollers who come often and spend large amounts of money. Casinos try to maintain their business by providing complimentary rooms, food, beverages, shows, and other perks each year that are worth billions of dollars. Gamblers can also earn various types of rewards through the loyalty programs offered by the casinos, with the specific rewards being tied to the amount bet on the slot machines and at the tables.

Some of the larger casinos in the U.S. have also tried to fend off competition by growing through mergers and acquisitions. In 2004, Harrah’s announced that it was buy- ing casino rival Caesers, allowing it to become the nation’s leading operator of casinos, with several properties in both Las Vegas and Atlantic City. This deal came just a month after MGM Mirage had stated that it was buying the Mandalay Resort Group, allowing it to double the num- ber of casinos it held on the Las Vegas strip. Firms that own several casinos can pitch each of their properties to a different market and allow their customers to earn rewards on the firm’s loyalty program by gambling at any of these properties.

Exploiting the Chinese Market Though gambling has been legal for over a century in Macau, which was a former Portuguese territory, its casinos

were typically small and seedy. In part, this was because of the monopoly on gambling in the territory that was held by Stanley Ho, a local tycoon. However, this began to change in 2002, as the liberalization of casino licensing led to the development of new casinos by some of the world’s larg- est casino operators, including many of the U.S. firms that wanted to find markets outside of Las Vegas. “The Las Vegas of the Far East” is how Sheldon Adelson, head of Las Vegas Sands, has described the recent development of Macau.

Macau has grown explosively with a tripling of casinos from the dozen or so that existed before 2002. Many are situated on the Cotai strip land that was once a stretch of water between the islands of Coloane and Taipa. Las Vegas–based firms such as Sands and Wynn have been plowing billions of dollars into new casinos there. Sands, which already has a supersized version of the Venetian with a Grand Canal and a Rialto Bridge, has added a complex called the Parisian with an Eiffel Tower. Even locally based Sociedade de Jogos de Macau is opening a $3.9 billion complex that will feature three hotels, one modeled on the Palace of Versailles.

Macau’s dramatic rise in the casino business owes much to a collision of geography and history. The Chinese love to gamble, but the leaders in Beijing have long for- bidden casinos on the mainland. They did, however, let them continue to operate in Macau after the Portuguese handed over sovereignty in 1999. Like Hong Kong, Macau has retained a degree of legal autonomy and is also a few hours or less flying time from a billion potential gamblers in China. “We sit next to the biggest market in the world,” said Edward M. Tracy, chief executive of the Hong Kong– based subsidiary of Las Vegas Sands. “It’s one billion more people than the U.S.”1

Macau has been attracting a growing number of visitors from mainland China. Nearly 20 million people, or one in five Chinese who ventured outside mainland China last year, came to Macau to gamble. Many come from neighbor- ing Guangdong province, usually on day trips. But bigger betters from as far away as Beijing have clearly played an important role in fueling Macau’s growth. These high roll- ers will spend as much as $10 million on gambling in a sin- gle trip. They account for up to 65 percent of the revenues for the larger casinos (see Exhibit 3).

Share of Revenues

Share of Profits

High rollers 63% 35%

Low rollers 34 52

Source: Deutsche Bank; author estimates.

EXHIBIT 3 Financials of Macau Casinos, 2016

Slot machines 61%

Blackjack 19

Roulette 8

Poker 4

Craps 4

Source: American Gaming Association; author estimates.

EXHIBIT 2 Favorite U.S. Casino Games, 2016

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Even as Macau has shown remarkable growth over the last decade, its prospects for the future remain quite bright. Analysts at securities firms forecast that gambling revenue from Macau casinos could easily reach $80 billion by 2018. In part, this rise would be driven by an increase in visi- tors from mainland China because of rising affluence and improved transportation. China had increased the capacity of roads and high-speed trains to the territory, providing access for more visitors. Visitors from all over the world would also have better access because of a series of bridges that would connect Macau with Hong Kong’s huge interna- tional airport.

Spreading across Asia The growth of gambling revenues in Macau has led coun- tries across the Asia-Pacific to abandon their hostilities to gambling and to encourage the development of casinos. Casinos have been opening in several countries, includ- ing Singapore, Philippines, Malaysia, South Korea, and Australia, and are likely to take off soon in other places such as Japan, Vietnam, Taiwan, and Sri Lanka. A group of investors have even made a deal to open a casino near Vladivostok in Russia’s Far East. They claim that it takes less time for a high roller in Beijing to fly there than to steamy Macau.

Singapore, in particular, has been extremely successful with its two new upmarket casinos. In 2010, the island state issued permits to two large casino operators. The Marina Bay Sands is part of Las Vegas–based Sands casino oper- ations and Resorts World Sentosa is run by Malaysia’s Genting group. Even though Singapore has limited the size of its casinos and discourages locals from visiting them, they earn more than $6 billion annually, almost as much as all of the casinos on the Las Vegas strip.

Among the other contenders, the Philippines looks like it is poised to claim a substantial share of global casino revenues. Malaysia-based casino giant Genting kickstarted Manila’s casino craze when it opened Resorts World Manila opposite the capital’s main airport in 2009. The opening of the new casino represented a departure from the older smoke-filled gambling dens and its success has lured other casinos. As many as four new casinos have been developed on a large plot overlooking Manila Bay. The first of these, Solaire Resort and Casino, is a sleek plate-glass building with a suitably flashy interior created by Paul Steelman, a casino designer from Las Vegas.

Efforts are also underway to boost gambling in Japan by getting the government to lift its ban on casinos. At present, gambling is confined to seedy areas such as Kabukicho, a sleazy one-kilometer block of Tokyo. The prime minister, Shinzo Abe, is likely to approve legalization of casinos as a way to boost Japan’s sluggish growth. Proponents of casi- nos argue that casinos will boost the country’s earnings from foreign tourists and deliver a tax windfall to the heav- ily indebted government. A Japanese business magazine has argued that the country is being left behind as neighboring

countries are rushing to build upscale casinos with luxury hotels, designer shops, and cultural attractions.

The casino operators that are developing casinos all over the region are hoping that they can lure Chinese high roll- ers away from Macau. A Chinese businessman who visits Macau’s casinos stated that the new Chinese leadership’s crackdown on official corruption and flaunting of wealth will drive clients to other locations. “Beijing has too many cameras watching us in Macau,” he explained.2 Solaire, recently opened in Manila, is willing to send a private jet to pick up big spenders from all across China. “If we can get 7 percent of Macau business to come here,” said the casino’s chief operating officer, “then we all achieve our goals for the market.”3

Moving beyond Gambling Over the last couple of decades, Las Vegas has moved beyond gambling to offer visitors many choices for fine dining, great shopping, and top-notch entertainment. This has allowed most of its higher end casinos to generate rev- enues from offering a wide selection of activities apart from gambling. At MGM Mirage, for example, revenue from non-gaming activities has typically accounted for almost 60 percent of net revenue in recent years. During the 1990s, Las Vegas had tried to become more receptive to families, with attractions such as circus performances, ani- mal reserves, and pirate battles. But the city has been very successful with its recent return to its sinful roots with a stronger focus on topless shows, hot night clubs, and other adult offerings that have been highlighted by the new adver- tising slogan “What happens in Vegas, stays in Vegas.”

By comparison, visitors are drawn to Atlantic City mostly because of gambling. Although it does offer a beach and a boardwalk, along which its dozen large casino hotels are lined, the city has never been able to develop itself as a beach resort. The opening of the much-ballyhooed Revel a few years ago was part of a drive to make Atlantic City much more competitive with Las Vegas. But it failed to replicate the suc- cess of the Borgota Hotel, the major new resort to open there in 2003. The failure to develop other forms of entertainment has led to the closing of several big casinos, including the Revel, as casinos that have opened in several neighboring states have drawn gamblers away from Atlantic City.

Macau has also been trying to reduce its dependence on gaming. By 2017, gambling revenues at its casinos were generating revenues that accounted for almost four-fifths of the territory’s economy. But these revenues have begun to decline, in part because of the China’s economic slow- down. Another factor has been that country’s sweeping crackdown on corruption. Many of the high rollers from the mainland were gambling with the proceeds of shady deals, which are now subject to greater scrutiny. This is forcing the casinos to shift their focus away from the older, hardcore gamblers who come primarily to gamble toward younger, fun-loving gamblers who see gambling as only one part of their Macau experience.

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intend to develop a stronger presence in the U.S. market by building one of the biggest new resorts in Las Vegas with a 3,500-room hotel and 175,000 feet of gambling space.

Casino operators in Macau are also continuing to make new bets, even as competition grows in neighboring coun- tries. Eight new casino complexes, all of which will offer many forms of entertainment, are being added, promising to almost double the supply of hotel rooms on the strip. Galaxy Entertainment, a local casino firm, claims that with its $7.7 billion expansion its already huge Macau casino will be bigger even than the Pentagon. Another local operator, SJM, has developed a huge new resort on the Cotai strip to include a hotel designed by Versace, an Italian luxury fashion house.

As casinos’ emphasis shifts from older high-stakes gam- blers to younger customers who enjoy gambling but are interested in dining, drinking, shopping, and taking in shows, casinos are also eager to embrace new types of gaming experiences that will attract Millennials who have grown up playing video and mobile phone games. “Gambling won’t go out of fashion. It will just become part of a wider offering,” says Ian M. Coughlan, president of Wynn Macau. “We’ve not really tapped all the demand that exists—we’re far from it.”7

ENDNOTES 1. Bettina Wassener. A hot streak for Macau. New York Times, March 26,

2014, p. B7. 2. The rise of the low rollers. The Economist, September 7, 2013, p. 63. 3. Ibid., p. 64. 4. Chris Horton. All in on gambling? Not for Macau. International New

York Times, December 20–21, 2014, p. 1. 5. The Economist, p. 64. 6. Adam Nagourney. Las Vegas bounces back, with caveats. International

New York Times, August 2, 2013. 7. New York Times, March 26, 2014, p. B7.

The newer casinos are trying to offer more non-gambling activities by including restaurants, shops, cinemas, spas, and even concert arenas. The shops inside Sands casinos in Macau, for example, have been generating as much as $2 billion of revenues. Edward Tracy, the head of Sands China, is also bringing in shows ranging from boxing matches to Bollywood award ceremonies. One of the newly opened casinos has an enormous “fortune diamond” that emerges from a fountain every half-hour to the delight of photo- snapping onlookers. “There’s an opportunity for Macau to attract a new breed of customer, one that is looking for a more holistic experience,” said Aaron Fischer, a gambling analyst at a brokerage firm.4

Macau is now trying to overcome one of its most seri- ous limitations—its small land area, just under 30 square kilometers—by expanding business on the thinly populated island of Hengqin. Three times the size of Macau, the island has been declared a special economic zone by Chinese offi- cials. The idea is for it to develop accommodations and entertainments that can support Macau’s aspirations for mass-market tourism. “Hengqin is the game changer for Macau,” insists Sands China head Tracy.5

Gambling on the Future In spite of growing competition from the many other U.S. and world locations, Las Vegas and Atlantic City continue fighting for visitors to come for various forms of entertain- ment as well as gambling—the clubs, stores, and concerts and shows. “I think we’re seeing a shift away from Las Vegas as the only gaming destination,” said Stephen P. A. Brown from U.N.L.V. “But it is holding up as a tourist destina- tion.”6 Genting, the Malaysian gaming group, has recently taken over the site of the Echelon, which was abandoned because of lack of funds during the recent recession. They

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CASE 3 :: MCDONALD’S IN 2017 C7

On January 18, 2017, McDonald’s announced that it was introducing two new versions of the Big Mac on a lim- ited basis. Although such changes are necessary for the world’s largest restaurant chain, the new offerings will be similar to the original version because they will use frozen beef patties and a secret sauce. This is unlikely to address the shift in tastes among consumers for fresher beef and a variety of toppings. In fact, a recent survey indicated a serious cause for concern for the firm, finding that only 20 percent of Millennials had even tried a Big Mac (see Exhibits 1, 2, and 3).

Nevertheless, Steve Easterbrook, who took the helm of McDonald’s in March 2015, has continued to push for changes to several of the ingredients that the firm has been using in its products. It has removed high fructose corn syrup from its buns, changed from the use of liquid

margarine to real butter, decided to use chicken that has been raised without antibiotics, and to make use of cage- free eggs. Mike Andres, president of McDonald’s USA, explained why the firm has decided to make these changes: “Why take a position to defend them if consumers are say- ing they don’t want them?”1

These changes are expected to address some of challenges that McDonald’s has been facing in many markets, including the U.S., where it has over 14,000 of its 35,000 mostly fran- chised restaurants. It has lost a lot of ground with consum- ers, especially Millennials, who are defecting to traditional competitors like Burger King and Wendy’s as well as to new designer burger outlets such as Five Guys and Shake Shack. Changing tastes are also responsible for the loss of custom- ers that are lining up at fast-casual chains such as Chipotle Mexican Grill and Panera Bread, which offer customized ordering and fresh ingredients (see Exhibit 4).

Over the years, McDonald’s response to this grow- ing competition was to expand its menu with snacks, sal- ads and new drinks. From 33 basic items that the chain offered in 1990, the menu had grown by 2014 to 121 items. The greatly expanded menu led to a significant increase in

CASES

CASE 3 MCDONALD’S IN 2017*

* Case prepared by Jamal Shamsie, Michigan State University, with the assistance of Professor Alan B. Eisner, Pace University. Material has been drawn from published sources to be used for purposes of class discussion. Copyright © 2017 Jamal Shamsie and Alan B. Eisner.

Year Ending

Dec. 31, 2016 Dec. 31, 2015 Dec. 31, 2014

Total Revenue $24,622 $25,413 $27,441

Operating Income 7,744 7,145 7,949

Net Income 4,686 4,529 4,758

Source: McDonald’s.

EXHIBIT 1 Income Statement ($ millions)

Year Ending

Dec. 31, 2016 Dec. 31, 2015 Dec. 31, 2014

Current Assets $ 4,849 $ 9,643 $ 4,186

Total Assets 31,024 37,939 34,281

Current Liabilities 3,468 2,950 2,748

Total Liabilities 33,228 30,851 21,428

Stockholder Equity (2,204) 7,088 12,853

Source: McDonalds.

EXHIBIT 2 Balance Sheet ($ millions)

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costs and longer preparation times. This forced the firm to increase the prices of many of its items and to take more time to serve customers, moving it away from the attributes that it had built its reputation upon. “McDonald’s stands for value, consistency and convenience,” said Darren Tristano, a restaurant industry consultant.2

The fast food chain has been through a similar crisis before. Back in 2002–2003, McDonald’s had experienced a decline in performance because of quality problems as the result of rapid expansion. At that time, the firm had brought James R. Cantalupo back out of retirement to turn things around. He formulated a “Plan to Win,” which has been the basis of McDonald’s strategy over the last decade. The core of the plan was to increase sales at existing locations by improving the menu, refurbishing the outlets, and extending hours. This time, however, such incremental steps might not be enough.

Pulling out of a Downward Spiral Since it was founded more than fifty years ago, McDonald’s has been defining the fast food business. It provided mil- lions of Americans their first jobs even as it changed their eating habits. It rose from a single outlet in a nondescript Chicago suburb to become one of the largest chains of out- lets spread around the globe. But it gradually began to run into various problems which began to slow down its sales growth (see Exhibit 5).

This decline could be attributed in large part to a drop in McDonald’s once-vaunted service and quality since its expansion in the 1990s, when headquarters stopped grading franchises for cleanliness, speed, and service. By the end of the decade, the chain ran into more problems because of the tighter labor market. McDonald’s began to cut back on

2016 2015 2014

U.S. $8,253 $8,559 $8,651

International Lead Markets 7,223 7,615 8,544

High Growth Markets 6,161 6,173 6,845

Foundational Markets & Corporate 2,985 3,066 3,401

Source: McDonald’s.

EXHIBIT 3 Breakdown of Revenues ($ millions)

McDonald’s 2016 17.0%

2014 49.6%

2012 50.0%

2010 49.2%

Wendy’s 2016 4.4%

2014 12.3%

2012 12.2%

2010 12.7%

Burger King 2016 15.4%

2014 11.9%

2012 12.1%

2010 13.2%

Five Guys 2016 1.8%

2014 1.7%

2012 1.5%

2010 1.1%

Source: USA Today, December 8, 2014; and author estimates.

EXHIBIT 4 U.S. Market Share of Fast-Food Burger Chains

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EXHIBIT 5 McDonald’s Milestones

1948 Brothers Richard and Maurice McDonald open the first restaurant in San Bernadino, California, that sells hamburgers, fries, and milkshakes.

1955 Ray A. Kroc, 52, opens his first McDonald’s in Des Plaines, Illinois. Kroc, a distributor of milkshake mixers, figures he can sell a bundle of them if he franchises the McDonalds’ business and install his mixers in the new stores.

1961 Six years later, Kroc buys out the McDonald brothers for $2.7 million.

1963 Ronald McDonald makes his debut as corporate spokesclown using future NBC-TV weatherman Willard Scott. During the year, the company also sells its 1 billionth burger.

1965 McDonald’s stock goes public at $22.50 a share. It will split 12 times in the next 35 years.

1967 The first McDonald’s restaurant outside the U.S. opens in Richmond, British Columbia. Today there are 31,108 McDonald’s in 118 countries.

1968 The Big Mac, the first extension of McDonald’s basic burger, makes its debut and is an immediate hit.

1972 McDonald’s switches to the frozen variety for its successful French fries.

1974 Fred L. Turner succeeds Kroc as CEO. In the midst of a recession, the minimum wage rises to $2 per hour, a big cost increase for McDonald’s, which is built around a model of young, low-wage workers.

1975 The first drive-through window is opened in Sierra Vista, Arizona.

1979 McDonald’s responds to the needs of working women by introducing Happy Meals. A burger, some fries, a soda, and a toy give working moms a break.

1987 Michael R. Quinlan becomes chief executive.

1991 Responding to the public’s desire for healthier foods, McDonald’s introduces the low-fat McLean Deluxe burger. It flops and is withdrawn from the market. Over the next few years, the chain will stumble several times trying to spruce up its menu.

1992 The company sells its 90 billionth burger, and stops counting.

1996 In order to attract more adult customers, the company launches its Arch Deluxe, a ”grownup” burger with an idiosyncratic taste. Like the low-fat burger, it also falls flat.

1997 McDonald’s launches Campaign 55, which cuts the cost of a Big Mac to $0.55. It is a response to discounting by Burger King and Taco Bell. The move, which prefigures similar price wars in 2002, is widely considered a failure.

1998 Jack M. Greenberg becomes McDonald’s fourth chief executive. A 16-year company veteran, he vows to spruce up the restaurants and their menu.

1999 For the first time, sales from international operations outstrip domestic revenues. In search of other concepts, the company acquires Aroma Cafe, Chipotle, Donatos, and, later, Boston Market.

2000 McDonald’s sales in the U.S. peak at an average of $1.6 million annually per restaurant. It is, however, still more than at any other fast-food chain.

2001 Subway surpasses McDonald’s as the fast-food chain with the most U.S. outlets. At the end of the year it had 13,247 stores, 148 more than McDonald’s.

2002 McDonald’s posts its first-ever quarterly loss, of $343.8 million. The stock drops to around $13.50, down 40% from five years ago.

2003 James R. Cantalupo returns to McDonald’s in January as CEO. He immediately pulls back from the company’s 10–15% forecast for per-share earnings growth.

2004 Charles H. Bell takes over the firm after the sudden death of Cantalupo. He states he will continue with the strategies that have been developed by his predecessor.

2005 Jim Skinner takes over as CEO after Bell announces retirement for health reasons.

2006 McDonald’s launches specialty beverages, including coffee-based drinks.

2008 McDonald’s plans to add McCafes to each of its outlets.

2012 Don Thompson succeeds Skinner as CEO of the chain.

2015 Thompson resigns because of declining performance and is replaced by Steve Easterbrook, the firm’s chief branding officer.

2016 McDonald’s opens restaurant in the 120th country; the first McDonald’s restaurant opens in Astana, Kazakhstan, on March 8, 2016.

Source: McDonald’s.

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In response to the growing health concerns, one of the first steps taken by McDonald’s was to phase out supersiz- ing by the end of 2004. The supersizing option allowed cus- tomers to get a larger order of French fries and a bigger soft drink by paying a little extra. McDonald’s also announced that it intended to start providing nutrition information on the packaging of its products. The information will be easy to read and will tell customers about the calories, fat, pro- tein, carbohydrates and sodium that are in each product. Finally, McDonald’s has also begun to remove the artery- clogging trans fatty acids from the oil that it uses to make its French fries and has recently announced plans to reduce the sodium content in all of its products by 15 percent.

But Skinner was also trying to push out more offerings that are likely to be perceived by customers to be health- ier. McDonald’s has continued to build upon its chicken offerings using white meat with products such as Chicken Selects. It has also placed a great deal of emphasis upon its new salad offerings. McDonald’s has carried out exten- sive experiments and tests with these, deciding to use higher quality ingredients, from a variety of lettuces and tasty cherry tomatoes to sharper cheeses and better cuts of meat. It offered a choice of Newman’s Own dressings, a well-known higher-end brand. “Salads have changed the way people think of our brand,” said Wade Thoma, vice president for menu development in the U.S. “It tells people that we are very serious about offering things people feel comfortable eating.”4

McDonald’s has also been trying to include more fruits and vegetables in its well-known and popular Happy Meals. It announced in 2011 that it would reduce the amount of French fries and phase out the caramel dipping sauce that accompanied the apple slices in these meals. The addition of fruits and vegetables has raised the firm’s operating costs, because these are more expensive to ship and store because of their more perishable nature. “We are doing what we can,” said Danya Proud, a spokesperson for the firm. “We have to evolve with the times.”5

The rollout of new beverages, highlighted by new coffee- based drinks, represents the chain’s biggest menu expan- sion in almost three decades. Under a plan to add a McCafe section to all of its nearly 14,000 U.S. outlets, McDonald’s has been offering lattes, cappuccinos, ice-blended frappes and fruit-based smoothies to its customers. “In many cases, they’re now coming for the beverage, whereas before they were coming for the meal,” said Lee Renz, an executive who was responsible for the rollout.6

Refurbishing the Outlets As part of its turnaround strategy, McDonald’s has also been selling off the outlets that it owned. More than 80 percent of its outlets are now in the hands of franchi- sees and other affiliates. Skinner is working with the fran- chisees to address the look and feel of many of the chain’s aging stores. Without any changes to their décor, the firm is likely to be left behind by other more savvy fast food and

training as it struggled hard to find new recruits, leading to a dramatic falloff in the skills of its employees. According to a 2002 survey by market researcher Global Growth Group, McDonald’s came in third in average service time behind Wendy’s and sandwich shop Chick-fil-A Inc.

By the beginning of 2003, consumer surveys were indi- cating that McDonald’s was headed for serious trouble. Measures for the service and quality of the chain were con- tinuing to fall, dropping far behind those of its rivals. In order to deal with its deteriorating performance, the firm decided to bring back retired Vice-Chairman James R. Cantalupo, 59, who had overseen McDonald’s successful international expansion in the 1980s and 1990s. Cantalupo, who had retired only a year earlier, was perceived to be the only candidate with the necessary qualifications, despite shareholder sentiment for an outsider. The board had felt that it needed someone who knew the company well and could move quickly to turn things around.

Cantalupo realized that McDonald’s often tended to miss the mark on delivering the critical aspects of consis- tent, fast, and friendly service and an all-around enjoyable experience for the whole family. He understood that its franchisees and employees alike needed to be inspired as well as retrained on their role in putting the smile back into the McDonald’s experience. When Cantalupo and his team laid out their turnaround plan in 2003, they stressed getting the basics of service and quality right, in part by reinsti- tuting a tough “up or out” grading system that would kick out underperforming franchisees. “We have to rebuild the foundation. It’s fruitless to add growth if the foundation is weak,” said Cantalupo.3

In his effort to focus on the core business, Cantalupo sold off the non-burger chains that the firm had recently acquired. He also cut back on the opening of new outlets, focusing instead on generating more sales from existing out- lets. Cantalupo pushed McDonald’s to try to draw more customers through the introduction of new products. The chain had a positive response to its increased emphasis on healthier foods, led by a revamped line of fancier salads. The revamped menu was promoted through a new worldwide ad slogan, “I’m loving it,” which was delivered by pop idol Justin Timberlake through a set of MTV style commercials.

Striving for a Healthier Image When Jim Skinner took over from Cantalupo in 2004, he continued to push for McDonald’s to change its image. Skinner felt that one of his top priorities was to deal with the growing concerns about the unhealthy image of McDonald’s, given the rise of obesity in the U.S. These concerns were highlighted in the popular documentary Super Size Me, made by Morgan Spurlock. Spurlock vividly displayed the health risks that were posed by a steady diet of food from the fast food chain. With a rise in awareness of the high fat content of most of the products offered by McDonald’s, the firm was also beginning to face lawsuits from some of its loyal customers.

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who may be moving away from frozen processed food that is loaded with preservatives. The firm has plans to gradu- ally expand the concept to more locations, but there are risks involved with making such a change. Franchises are concerned about the costs, which can run up to $125,000 per restaurant to make the required changes. The burgers are priced higher at $5.49, can take seven minutes to pre- pare, can only be ordered from inside the store, and eventu- ally are brought to your table. Franchises have complained the concept cannot be offered to drive-through customers that make up such a large portion of the chain’s business. “Customization is not McDonald’s historic strength,” said Mark Kalinowski, an analyst at Janney Montgomery Scott.10

Further, such a change runs counter to the image of inexpensive and fast food that McDonald’s has worked hard to build over the years. Easterbrook has acknowledged that its customized menu is a work in progress. He stated that the firm is also testing a downsized version that would allow both in-store and drive-through customers to choose a bun and one of four sandwich types. At the same time, McDonald’s is hoping that this will bring more customers inside their outlets, bringing the U.S. counter/drive-thru customer ratio closer to 50/50, up from the current 30/70.

McDonald’s has also been working to simplify its menu, reducing the number of “value meal” promotions, groups of items that together cost less than ordering items indi- vidually. It has tweaked its “dollar menu” replacing it with “dollar value and more,” raising the prices for many items as part of a bid to get each customer to spend more. But McDonald’s first introduced these bargain menus because its prices had risen over the years, driving away customers to cheaper outlets. Consequently, as much as 15 percent of the chain’s sales have been coming from its “dollar menu” where everything costs a dollar.

McDonald’s saw a slight jump in U.S. sales after launch- ing an all-day breakfast at almost half of its locations. The franchises had to be convinced to invest about $5,000 to add food preparation space in order to offer breakfast along with the regular lunch or dinner items. However, sales from the all-day breakfast had begun to flatten out by the end of 2016, as no additional sales were coming from customers who were ordering breakfast.

More Gold in these Arches? In spite of all the changes that have been made by Easterbrook, sales growth for McDonald’s has continued to be sluggish. The firm does, however, believe that sales will rebound in the U.S. as well as in foreign markets. In order to provide a boost to its operations in China and Hong Kong, McDonald’s announced a deal with Citic, a state-owned conglomerate, and the Caryle Group, a private equity firm. They plan to open more outlets and to expand to many smaller cities that show potential for growth. “China and Hong Kong represent an enormous growth opportunity for McDonald’s,” Easterbrook said in a recent news release. “The new partnership will

drink retailers. The firm is in the midst of pushing harder to refurbish—or re-image—all of its outlets around the world. “People eat with their eyes first,” said Thompson. “If you have a restaurant that is appealing, contemporary, and relevant both from the street and interior, the food tastes better.”7

The re-imaging concept was first tried in France in 1996 by Dennis Hennequin, an executive in charge of the chain’s European operations, who felt that the effort was essential to revive the firm’s sagging sales. “We were hip 15 years ago, but I think we lost that,” he said.8 McDonald’s has been applying the re-imaging concept to its outlets around the world, with a budget of more than half its total annual capital expenditures. In the U.S., the changes cost as much as $650,000 per restaurant, a cost that is shared with the franchisees when the outlet is not company owned.

One of the prototype interiors being tested out by McDonald’s has curved counters with surfaces painted in bright colors. In one corner, a touch-activated screen allows customers to punch in orders without queuing. The interiors can feature armchairs and sofas, modern lighting, large television screens and even wireless Internet access. The firm is also trying to develop new features for its drive- through customers, which account for 65 percent of all transactions in the U.S. They include music aimed at queue- ing vehicles and a wall of windows on the drive-through side of the restaurant allowing customers to see meals being prepared from their cars.

The chain has even been developing McCafes inside its outlets next to the usual fast food counter. The McCafe con- cept originated in Australia in 1993 and has been rolled out in many restaurants around the world. McDonald’s has been introducing the concept to the U.S. as part of the refurbishment of its outlets. In fact, part of the refurbish- ment has focused on the installation of a specialty beverage platform across all U.S. outlets. The cost of installing this equipment is running at about $100,000 per outlet, with McDonald’s subsidizing part of this expense.

The firm has planned for all McCafes to offer espresso- based coffee, gourmet coffee blends, fresh baked muffins and high-end desserts. Customers will be able to consume these while they relax in soft leather chairs listening to jazz, big band, or blues music. Commenting on this significant expansion of offerings, Marty Brochstein, executive editor of The Licensing Letter, said: “McDonald’s wants to be seen as a lifestyle brand, not just a place to go to have a burger.”9

Rethinking the Business Model In response to the decline in performance, McDonald’s is testing other new concepts, including a kiosk in some loca- tions that allows customers to skip the counter and head to tabletlike kiosks where they can customize everything about their burger, from the type of bun to the variety of cheese to the many glossy toppings and sauces that can go on it. Dubbed the “Create Your Taste” platform, McDonald’s is hoping the kiosks will attract more younger customers

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that the long-term success of the firm may well depend on its ability to compete with rival burger chains. “The burger category has great strength,” says David C. Novak, chair- man and CEO of Yum! Brands, parent of KFC and Taco Bell. “That’s America’s food. People love hamburgers.”13

ENDNOTES 1. Stephanie Strom. In a shift, McMuffins with real butter. New York

Times, August 3, 2016, p. B2. 2. The Economist. When the chips are down. January 10, 2015, p. 53. 3. Pallavi Gogoi and Michael Arndt. Hamburger hell. BusinessWeek,

March 3, 2003, p. 105. 4. Melanie Warner. You want any fruit with that Big Mac? New York

Times, February 20, 2005, p. 8. 5. Stephanie Strom. McDonald’s trims its Happy Meal. New York Times,

July 27, 2011, p. B7. 6. Janet Adamy. McDonald’s coffee strategy is tough sell. Wall Street

Journal, October 27, 2008, p. B3. 7. Ben Paynter. Super style me. Fast Company, October 2010, p. 107. 8. Jeremy Grant. McDonald’s to revamp UK outlets. Financial Times,

February 2, 2006, p. 14. 9. Bruce Horovitz. McDonald’s ventures beyond burgers to duds, toys.

USA Today, November 14, 2003, p. 6B. 10. Hiroko Tabuchi. Faced with sagging sales, McDonald’s chief

announces a reorganization. New York Times, May 5, 2015, p. B3. 11. Amie Tsang and Wee Sui-Lee. McDonald’s China operations to be

sold to locally led consortium. New York Times, January 9, 2017, p. B1. 12. Fortune, December 1, 2014, p. 110. 13. Julie Jargon. McDonald’s is feeling fried. Wall Street Journal,

November 9, 2012, p. B2.

combine one of the world’s most powerful brands and our unparalleled quality standards with partners who have an unmatched understanding of the local markets.”11

McDonald’s has also been trying to grow by reaching out to different customer segments with different products at different times of the day. It has tried to target young adults for breakfast with its gourmet coffee, egg sandwiches, and fat-free muffins. It attracts working adults for lunch, particularly those who are squeezed for time, with its burg- ers and fries. And its introduction of wraps has drawn in teenagers late in the evening after they have been partying.

Restaurant analyst Bryan Elliott commented: “They’ve tried to be all things to all people who walk in their door.”12 The current marketing campaign, anchored around the catchy phase “I’m loving it,” takes on different forms in order to target each of the groups that it is seeking. Larry Light, who was the head of global marketing at McDonald’s and pushed for this new campaign, insists that the firm has to exploit its brand through pushing it in many different directions. In spite of these efforts, 30 percent of sales come from just five items: Big Macs, hamburgers, cheese- burgers, McNuggets, and fries.

The expansion of the menu beyond the staple of burgers and fries raises some fundamental questions. Most signifi- cantly, it is not clear just how far McDonald’s can stretch its brand while keeping all of its outlets under the traditional symbol of its golden arches. In fact, industry experts believe

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CASE 4 :: ZYNGA: IS THE GAME OVER? C13

In 2017, Zynga not only struggled to remain relevant in the gaming industry but fought to seem attractive to investors. During the previous four years, the company had a new CEO almost every year. In 2013, the founder Mark Pincus stepped down and handed the charge to Don Mattrick, a 15-year employee of Electronic Arts expecting to turn the company around. In April 2015, Don Mattrick left the position, and Pincus returned as CEO for the second time. Just a year later

in March 2016, Zynga announced the replacement of Pincus by the new CEO Frank Gibeau, another 20-year employee of Electronic Arts, again expecting to turn around the company.

Zynga’s lack of consistent leadership has been critical to not formulating an effective turnaround strategy that might have led to progress. Throughout the revolving door of CEO replacements, Zynga has not developed a substan- tially successful new game. Consequently, its revenues have been falling over the past years accompanied by consistent net losses. Though Zynga’s revenue rose by $53 million by the end of 2015, it still posted a net loss of $121 million for the year (see Exhibits 1 and 2). The primary reason for the increase in 2015 revenue was a surge in the number of

CASES

CASE 4 ZYNGA: IS THE GAME OVER?*

* This case was developed by graduate students Eric S. Engelson, Dev Das, Saad Nazir, and Professor Alan B. Eisner, Pace University. Material has been drawn from published sources to be used for class discussion. Copyright © 2017 Alan B. Eisner.

EXHIBIT 1 Zynga Consolidated Income Statements ($ thousands, except per-share, user, and ABPU data)

Year Ended December 31:

2016 2015 2014

Revenue:

Online game $ !547,291 $ 590,755 $ 537,619

Advertising and other 194,129 173,962 152,791

Total revenue 741,420 764,717 690,410

Costs and expenses:

Cost of revenue 238,546 235,985 213,570

Research and development 320,300 361,931 396,553

Sales and marketing 183,637 169,573 157,364

General and administrative 92,509 143,284 167,664

Impairment of intangible assets 20,677 – –

Total costs and expenses 855,669 910,773 935,151

Income (loss) from operations (114,249) (146,056) (244,741)

Interest income 3,057 2,568 3,266

Other income (expense), net 6,461 13,306 8,248

Income (loss) before income taxes (104,731) (130,182) (233,227)

Provision for (benefit from) income taxes 3,442 (8,672) (7,327)

Net income (loss) $(108,173) $(121,510) $(225,900)

Net income (loss) per share attributable to common stockholders

Basic $ (0.12) $ (0.13) $ (0.26)

Diluted $ (0.12) $ (0.13) $ (0.26)

Weighted average common shares used to compute net income (loss) per share attributable to common stockholders:

Basic 878,827 913,511 874,509

Diluted 878,827 913,511 874,509

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EXHIBIT 2 Zynga Balance Sheets ($ thousands, except par value)

December 31, 2016

December 31, 2015

Assets

Current assets:

Cash and cash equivalents $ 852,467 $ 742,217

Marketable securities – 245,033

Accounts receivable 77,260 79,610

Income tax receivable 296 5,233

Restricted cash 6,199 209

Other current assets 29,254 39,988

Total current assets 965,476 1,112,290

Goodwill 613,335 657,671

Other intangible assets, net 25,430 64,016

Property and equipment, net 269,439 273,221

Restricted cash 3,050 986

Other long-term assets 29,119 16,446

Total assets $ 1,905,849 $ 2,124,630

Liabilities and stockholders’ equity

Current liabilities:

Accounts payable $ 23,999 $ 29,676

Income tax payable 1,889 –

Other current liabilities 75,754 77,691

Deferred revenue 141,998 128,839

Total current liabilities 243,640 236,206

Deferred revenue 158 204

Deferred tax liabilities 5,791 6,026

Other non-current liabilities 75,596 95,293

Total liabilities 325,185 337,729

Stockholders’ equity:

Common stock, $0.00000625 par value, and additional paid in capital - authorized shares: 2,020,517; shares outstanding: 886,850 shares (Class A, 770,269, Class B, 96,064, Class C, 20,517) as of December 31, 2016 and 903,617 (Class A, 769,533, Class B, 113,567, Class C, 20,517) as of December 31, 2015

3,349,714 3,234,551

Treasury stock – (98,942)

Accumulated other comprehensive income (loss) (128,694) (52,388)

Accumulated deficit (1,640,356) (1,296,320)

Total stockholders’ equity 1,580,664 1,786,901

Total liabilities and stockholders’ equity $ 1,905,849 $ 2,124,630

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mobile users, accounting for 73 percent of the company’s revenue in 2015.1 However, year-over-year decline in reve- nues has been primarily attributable to the innovative prod- uct pipeline, which Mr. Gibeau has tried to turn around by focusing on development of high-quality mobile applica- tions that had helped to shrink the net losses in 2015.

In response to the wildly successful Clash of Clans by SuperCell, Zynga released a new mobile game, Dawn of Titans, at the end of 2016. Dawn of Titans features high- quality graphics and options to play with other users in real time. The 3D strategy game also allows users to create their own fantasy kingdoms and develop strategy to stay ahead of the other players. Prior to the introduction of Dawn of Titans, the company had launched a new version of Zynga Poker, which includes a sophisticated design and feature set that inspires more competition, authenticity, and social connections between players. Zynga also launched NFL Showdown at the beginning of the NFL season with the intention of adding new features based on customer feed- back and play patterns. However, the new product-driven growth was not able to reverse declines in the existing online games.2

Zynga’s Background At the time it incorporated in October 2007, Zynga had become a dominant player in the online gaming field, almost entirely through the use of social media platforms. Located in San Francisco, the company was named by CEO Mark Pincus to pay tribute to his deceased beloved pet bulldog Zynga. Although this might have seemed whimsical, Zynga was actually a quite powerful company. Exemplifying Zynga’s prominence, Facebook was reported to have earned roughly 12 percent of its revenue from the operations of Zynga’s virtual merchandise sales.3

No other direct competitor was close to this revenue. Zynga’s collection of games continued to expand, with more and more success stories emerging. A relative newcomer to the market, its quick success was astonishing. However, Zynga’s impressive financials were possibly at risk because of what some considered questionable decision making. Many of Zynga’s competitors, and even some partners, were displeased with the company’s actions and began to show it in the form of litigation. Agincourt, a plaintiff in a lawsuit brought against Zynga, stated, “Zynga’s remarkable growth has not been driven by its own ingenuity. Rather it has been widely reported that Zynga’s business model is to copy creative ideas and game designs from other game developers and then use its market power to bulldoze the games’ originators.”4 If lawsuits and ethical issues contin- ued to arise for Zynga, its powerful bulldog could start look- ing more like a poodle.

The Products With an abundance of software developers, the ability to create and distribute online games increases by the day, and the demand to play them is equally high. However, while

many people find these online games fun and, better yet, therapeutic, others can’t understand the hype. The best way to understand the sudden infatuation is to view online gam- ing as simply a means of relaxation.

In the movies, at least, large executive offices are often shown with putting greens, dartboards, or even a bar full of alcoholic beverages. These amenities are all meant to serve the same purpose: to relieve stress during a hard day’s work. We’ve all been there and looked for a way to cope. However, few of us have the opportunity to use such things as putting greens to unwind at the workplace. And even if we did, how long could we afford to engage in such an activity before being pulled back to our desks?

Stress reduction at work is one of the many purposes that virtual games fulfill: no need to leave our desks; no need to make others around us aware of our relaxation periods; and, better yet, no need to separate the task of relaxation from sitting at our computers while we work. The ability to play these games on office computers and “relax” now and then as the day goes by makes online gam- ing enticing. This, of course, is just one of many uses for the games. Some people play them after work or at the end of a long day. With the onset of smartphones, people of all ages play these games on the go throughout the day—sitting on the bus, in the waiting room of a doctor’s office, or at the Department of Motor Vehicles. Diverting game play is readily available with the click of a button.

Market Size Compared to other game developers with games present on the Facebook platform, Zynga had once been a dominant force, but by 2016 it failed to surface in the top 5 virtual- gaming rankings (see Exhibits 3 and 4). The King Company appeared to rule with its numerous popular games, includ- ing the billion-dollar Candy Crush Saga.

Zynga’s virtual games provided the opportunity for constant buildup and improvements, offering users virtual goods and services to increase their gaming experience. These items could be purchased using a credit card and were often needed to accomplish fast progressions in the games. These goods were advertised throughout the games and the user was enticed by price cuts for larger purchases.

Zynga’s virtual games could be played both remotely and through social media platforms, most commonly Facebook. Five of Zynga’s games, FarmVille, CityVille, Empire and Allies, CastleVille, and Texas HoldEm Poker, were among the most popular games on Facebook. CityVille had over 100 million active monthly users within months of its release in late 2010.5 On July 1, 2011, Zynga filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission with intention of raising up to $1 billion in its IPO, and its stock began trad- ing on NASDAQ December 16, 2011.6

Of course, Zynga was not the only virtual-gaming com- pany striving for this degree of success. There were and are many others, in what seems to be one of the fastest- growing industries. The capability to create online games

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Toyland, Zoo World, Hero World, and MyCasino. Its most played game, Zoo World, was a free social media applica- tion whereby users tried to build the best zoo they could. The company underwent a phase of major layoffs but con- tinued to work on new and improved games.7

GameHouse, based in Seattle, Washington, was a developer, publisher, and distributor of casual games. GameHouse was acquired by RealNetworks for $14.6 mil- lion cash and about 3.3 million shares of RNWK common stock, which had an estimated value of $21 million at the time.8 Prior to its acquisition, GameHouse generated an impressive amount of revenue through the sale of games on its own website, www.gamehouse.com, and through third-party affiliates and other distributors. GameHouse and RealArcade merged their websites into one portal in an

is widespread. Creativity and innovation are accepted to be the grounds on which competing companies challenge each other. With all competitors after the same audience, the industry is prone to a significant amount of head-butting rivalry.

Background of Competitors RockYou was founded by Lance Tokuda and Jia Shen. Their first product was a slide-show service, crafted to work as an application widget. RockYou was one of the compa- nies invited by Facebook to participate in the F8 event, in which Facebook announced the start of an open platform that would allow third parties to develop and run their own applications on Facebook. RockYou then shifted toward producing more in-depth social application games, such as

EXHIBIT 3 Monthly Users of Facebook Gaming, as of October 2016

Source: Statista 2016.

20 40 60 80 100 120 1400

Candy Crush Saga

Candy Crush Soda Saga

Farm Heroes Saga

8 Ball Poll

Clash of Clans

Criminal Case

Pet Rescue Saga

Subway Surfers

Dragon City

Trivia Crack

38.78

30.53

26.03

24.04

22.2

16.14

12.7

10

Monthly active users in millions 160

149.57

17.47

EXHIBIT 4 Top 5 Virtual-Gaming Developers of 2016

Rank Company 2015 Revenue ($ millions) Key Games

1 Machine Zone $1,000 Game of War, Mobile Strike

2 Supercell 2,300 Clash of Clans, Clash Royale, Boom Beach Hay Day

3 EA Mobile 504 Star Wars Galaxy of Heroes, NFL Madden Mobile, The Simpsons: Tapped Out

4 Mixi 2,000 Monster Strike

5 Com2uS 369 Summoners War

Source: www.pocketgamer.biz, 2016 top developers list.

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Background of the CEO Mark Jonathan Pincus was the entrepreneur behind Zynga. He was also the founder of Freeloader, Inc., Tribe Networks, and Support.com.17 In prior years, Mark was named CEO of the Year in the Crunchies awards,18 as well as Founder of the Year.19 Prior to his entrepreneurial endeavors, Pincus worked in venture capital and financial services for several years. After graduating from Wharton, he went on to obtain his master’s degree from Harvard Business School. Soon after graduating, Pincus launched his first start-up, Freeloader, Inc., a web-based push tech- nology service. Individual, Inc., acquired the company only seven months later for $38 million.20 Pincus later founded his third start-up, Tribe.net, one of the first social networks. Tribe.net focused on partnerships with major, yet local, newspapers and was supported by The Washington Post, Knight Ridder Digital, and Mayfield Fund.21 Unfortunately for him, Pincus’s resume did not impress his competitors, irritated by what they viewed as his questionable business tactics, nor did it dissuade them from making their feelings known via a lengthening laundry list of threats and lawsuits.

Intellectual Property and Ethical Issues Nissan has claimed that its trademarks were used without consent in Zynga’s game Street Racing. Zynga consequently changed the thumbnail images and renamed all the cars that were branded Nissan and Infiniti to “Sindats” and “Fujis.”22 Zynga was criticized on Hacker News as well as other social media sites for filing a patent application involving the abil- ity to obtain virtual currency for cash on gambling and other gaming websites. Many said that the concept was not new and that in fact significant prior art for the concept already existed.23 The unveiling of the game Mafia Wars generated a lawsuit from the creators of Mob Wars. An attorney of the parent company of Mob Wars said that by making Mafia Wars, Zynga “copied virtually every important aspect of the game.”24 The lawsuit was later settled out of court for an amount between $7 million and $9 million.25

California-based web developer SocialApps brought Zynga to court seeking damages for alleged “copyright infringement, violation of trade secrets, breach of written contract, breach of implied-in-fact contract, and breach of confidence.” SocialApps claimed to have entered into an agreement with Zynga, allowing Zynga access to the source code for SocialApps’ Facebook game MyFarm in exchange for an undisclosed compensation. According to the suit, Zynga was given the code, but failed to pay SocialApps. SocialApps claimed that MyFarm’s source code was the foundation of Farmville, as well as many of Zynga’s simi- lar games.26 Following Zynga’s release of the game Hidden Chronicles, Forbes’ Paul Tassi wrote that Zynga “refuses to innovate in any way, and is merely a follower when it comes to ideas and game design.”27

Ethical issues, though less tangible and definable than intellectual property, were equally troubling in assessments

effort to create one massive distribution center. RealArcade delivered its games on a downloadable demo basis, with a 60-minute trial time for most games. When the trial expired, the user needed to purchase the full version to continue playing. Users also had the option of purchasing a mem- bership package for a monthly fee. GameHouse later began offering the full version of many of its games, supported by the sale of in-game advertising.9

EA Playfish, a subsidiary of Electronic Arts, began as Playfish Ltd., a developer of social network games that were free to play. Who Has the Biggest Brain? was the first suc- cess of Playfish Ltd. and was the gateway to the company’s ability to raise funding. The company, like many of its com- petitors, generated revenue by selling virtual goods inside its games. Electronic Arts later acquired Playfish for $400 million. Soon after, Playfish drew approximately 55 million users a month, with over 37 million of those users coming from Facebook.10 Users could purchase “Playfish Cards” at Walmart, Walgreens, and Toys ‘R’ Us stores, at which point they could register on the Playfish website to begin earn- ing “Playfish Cash” that could be used to purchase virtual goods within the games. Playfish announced the change from Playfish Cash to individual cash for all games (except Crazy Planets at that time) and allowed users to trade for the new cash.11

CrowdStar, based in Burlingame, California, was another developer of social games. Founded by Suren Markosian and Jeff Tseng, it ranked fourth for most monthly active users among Facebook applications.12 Its most popular titles were Happy Aquarium and Happy Pets. CrowdStar turned down an offer from Microsoft to acquire the company for more than $200 million.13 The company subsequently raised an additional $23 million and planned on using the money to double its workforce and increase expansion on a global scale. CrowdStar also planned to add about 100 employees, including game developers, server developers, artists, producers, business analysts, and content managers. Peter Relan, CrowdStar’s CEO, said the company needed to raise money to exploit opportunities for global expansion in Japan, China, Eastern Europe, and Brazil.14

Supercell Oy operated as a subsidiary of Tencent Holdings Limited. Supercell Oy, based in Helsinki, Finland, was another successful developer of mobile games with additional office locations in United States, Japan, South Korea, and China.15 The initial hit for the company was its browser game called Gunshine.net. In 2011, the company started developing games for tablets and smartphones, gain- ing worldwide popularity over just a few years. The most popular mobile games developed by Supercell included Clash of Clans, Clash Royale, Boom Beach, and Hay Day, free to download and play. The company had annual rev- enue of about $2 billion, and its strategy game Clash of Clans was a leading competitor of Zynga’s Dawn of Titans. Supercell’s flagship game, Clash of Clans, had approxi- mately 100 million daily users, which posed a big competi- tive challenge for Zynga’s Dawn of Titans.16

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begin creating true one-of-a-kind games—showing its capa- bilities as a leader in the industry rather than a follower? With all eyes on the company, it is certain that it won’t be easy for Zynga to get away with some of its earlier stunts, especially now as a public company. As a public company, Zynga needs to watch its step or prepare to feel the wrath of its shareholders.

ENDNOTES 1. http://www.pocketgamer.biz/list/62773/

top-50-mobile-game-developers-of-2016/entry/48/. 2. Zynga Q4 2014 earnings call transcripts. 3. www.vanityfair.com/business/features/2011/06/

mark-pincus-farmville-201106. 4. http://news.cnet.com/8301-31001_3-20093473-261/

zynga-targeted-in-patent-infringement-lawsuit/. 5. www.appdata.com/apps/facebook/291549705119-cityville. 6. www.reuters.com/article/2011/11/30/

us-zynga-ipo-idUSTRE7AT2FJ20111130. 7. http://techcrunch.com/2010/10/15/

rockyou-rocked-by-layoffs-as-it-switches-focus-to-social-games/. 8. http://investor.realnetworks.com/faq.cfm?faqid=2. 9. www.gamehouse.com/. 10. www.gamasutra.com/view/news/32496/Playfish_Social_Games_

Reaching_55_Million_Monthly_Players.php. 11. www.insidesocialgames.com/2011/04/19/exclusive-playfish-ending-

playfish-cash-going-almost-all-in-on-facebook-credits/. 12. www.appdata.com/devs/30679-crowdstar. 13. www.businessweek.com/news/2010-03-31/crowdstar-said-to-break-off-

talks-to-be-bought-by-microsoft.html. 14. http://venturebeat.com/2011/05/23/

social-game-leader-crowdstar-raises-23m-from-intel-and-time-warner/. 15. http://www.bloomberg.com/research/stocks/private/snapshot.

asp?privcapId=127260687 16. http://www.gamespot.com/articles/100-million-people-play-clash-of-

clans-devs-games-/1100-6435433/ 17. http://company.zynga.com/about/leadership-team/zynga-management. 18. http://venturebeat.com/2010/01/11/crunchies-winners-facebook-bing/. 19. http://techcrunch.com/2011/01/21/

congratulations-crunchies-winners-twitter-takes-best-startup-of-2010/. 20. http://startup2startup.com/2009/06/24/june29-markpincus-zynga/. 21. www.nytimes.com/2007/03/03/technology/03social.

html?pagewanted=1&_r=1&ei=5088&en=f718f182170673a4 &ex=1330578000.

22. http://mafiawars.wikia.com/wiki/Zynga. 23. http://allfacebook.com/zynga-patent-currency_b20985. 24. www.bizjournals.com/sanfrancisco/stories/2009/07/13/story7.html. 25. http://techcrunch.com/2009/09/13/

zynga-settles-mob-wars-litigation-as-it-settles-in-to-playdom-war/. 26. www.joystiq.com/2011/07/18/

lawsuit-filed-against-zynga-over-farmville-source-code/. 27. www.forbes.com/sites/insertcoin/2012/01/06/

zynga-stock-falls-as-second-post-ipo-game-fails-to-impress/. 28. http://blog.games.com/2010/09/08/

zynga-ceo-to-employees-i-dont-f-ing-want-innovation/. 29. http://blogs.sfweekly.com/thesnitch/2011/11/zynga_corporate_culture.

php. 30. www.sfweekly.com/2010-09-08/news/farmvillains/4/. 31. http://forbrukerportalen.no/Artikler/2010/

Facebook_and_Zynga_reported_to_the_Data_Inspectorate.

of Zynga’s operations. A former employee of the company revealed firsthand quotes from CEO Mark Pincus, such as: “You’re not smarter than your competitor. Just copy what they do and do it until you get their numbers.” One contractor said he was presented with freelance work from Zynga related to imitating a competitor’s application and was given precise instructions to “copy that game.”28 Other past employees, even those at the senior level, spoke out about the corrupt ways that Pincus had apparently decided to operate the business. One quoted the banter of employ- ees in the office, “Do Evil,” a twist on the Google motto, “Don’t Be Evil.”29

A former high-level Zynga employee provided an insight into the company’s culture, as regarding any emphasis on creativity and originality. According to the employee, a group of designers brought a new and innovative idea to the table, only to have it turned down by Pincus because of his wariness toward a new idea that didn’t fit the “tried-and- true” mold of other successes.30

Zynga was accused of taking advantage of its end cus- tomers, pertaining to a lack of security and safekeeping of consumer information. The Norwegian Consumer Council filed a complaint against Zynga to the Data Inspectorate concerning breaches of the Data Protection Act. According to the Consumer Council, Zynga’s terms of use “do not offer a clear description of what is being collected in terms of information or what this information is being used for. Nor do they state how long the information is stored for or how it is protected against unauthorized access.” The Consumer Council went even further with its forewarning: “Many of the gravest examples of unreasonable and one- sided terms of use can be found in games providers such as Zynga.”31

Zynga Going Forward Although Zynga game users tend to be pleased with Zynga’s games, many note there seem to be recurring obstacles that limit that pleasure. Many Zynga users complain of lag time while playing the games. Even more complain that when problems arise, Zynga support staff are nowhere to be found. The company has no customer service initiative and forces users to resort to sending their claims through e-mail—which many believed is ignored, or never read. Further, many believe that the company makes it too dif- ficult for users to make real strides in the games without spending ridiculous sums of money. Based on their experi- ences, many users believe that Zynga is all about revenue generation and that everything else comes second.

As Zynga looks to the future, where might its next big hit come from? With all the criticism aimed at Zynga’s past behavior, will the company continue on the path it has become notorious for and reap further accusations of imitating its competitors’ games? Or will Zynga change its approach, gain a reputation for intellectual integrity, and

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CASE 5 :: QVC C19

After years of shrugging off competition from traditional and online retailers, home shopping TV channel QVC is finally seeing cracks in a business model that has relied on impulse purchases by television viewers. QVC’s U.S. sales fell 6 percent during the last part of 2016, the first drop in seven years on its home turf. It was especially troubling that this decline extended into the crucial year-end holi- day period. The slip raises questions about the resilience of QVC as it faces growing competition from e-commerce along with the drop in cable television subscribers.

Launched in 1986, QVC rapidly grew to become the largest television shopping network. Although it entered the market a couple of years after rival Home Shopping Network, the channel soon built a leading position. By 2016, its reach had extended to almost 350 million house- holds all over the world. It regularly features about 1000 products on its sites each week, leading to almost $9 million in sales (see Exhibits 1 and 2). Beyond the United States, its presence has grown to the U.K., Germany, France, Italy, Japan, and through a 49 percent interest in a joint venture, to China (see Exhibit 3).

The success of QVC is driven by its popular television shows that feature a wide variety of eye-catching products, many of which are unique to the channel. It organizes prod- uct searches in cities all over the U.S. in order to continu- ously find new offerings from entrepreneurs that can be pitched to customers. During any of these search events, the firm has to screen hundreds of products. In one of its recent searches, QVC had to evaluate the appeal of such products as nail clippers that catch clippings, bicycle seats built for bigger bottoms, and novelty items shaped like coffins.

QVC battles a perception that direct-response TV retailers just sell hokey, flimsy, or kitschy goods. Its jew- elry selection features prestigious brands such as Tacori, worn by TV stars. It offers clothing from couture designers such as Marc Bouwer, who has made clothing for Angelina Jolie and Halle Berry. And it has recently added exclusive products from reality stars such as Kim Kardashian and Rachel Zoe, who have introduced thousands to QVC, often through social media like Facebook and Twitter. “Rachel Zoe brings so many new customers it’s staggering,” said CEO Michael George.1

QVC has expanded its shopping experience to the Internet, attracting more than 7 million unique monthly visitors by early 2015. It attracts customers from its televi- sion channel to its website, making it one of the leading multimedia retailers. Building on this, the firm has been creating a family of mobile shopping applications for smart- phones and tablets. Although QVC is still developing this segment, mobile applications already account for almost a third of its sales.

Pursuing a Leading Position QVC was founded by Joseph Segel in June 1986 and began broadcasting in November that year. Earlier in 1986, Segel had tuned in to the Home Shopping Network, which had been launched two years earlier. He had not been impressed with the crude programming and the down-market prod- ucts that he saw. But he was convinced that an enhanced

CASES

CASE 5 QVC*

* Case prepared by Jamal Shamsie, Michigan State University, with the assistance of Professor Alan B. Eisner, Pace University. Material has been drawn from published sources to be used for purposes of class discussion. Copyright © 2017 Jamal Shamsie and Alan B. Eisner.

EXHIBIT 1 ANNUAL SALES (In Billions of dollars)

2016 $8.7

2015 8.7

2014 8.8

2013 8.6

2012 8.5

2011 8.3

2010 7.8

2009 7.4

2008 7.3

2007 7.4

2006 7.1

2004 5.7

2001 3.8

1998 2.4

1995 1.6

1992 0.9

1989 0.2

Source: QVC, Liberty Media.

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EXHIBIT 2 Consolidated Statement of Operations ($ millions)

Year Ended December 31

2016 2015 2014

Net revenue $8,682 8,743 8,801

Cost of goods sold 5,540 5,528 5,547

Gross profit 3,142 3,215 3,254

Operating expenses:

Operating 606 607 618

Selling, general and administrative, including stock-based compensation 728 745 770

Depreciation 142 134 135

Amortization 463 454 452

1,939 1,940 1,975

Operating income 1,203 1,275 1,279

Other (expense) income:

Equity in losses of investee (6) (9) (8)

Gains on financial instruments 2 — —

Interest expense, net (210) (208) (239)

Foreign currency gain 38 14 3

Loss on extinguishment of debt — (21) (48)

(176) (224) (292)

Income before income taxes 1,027 1,051 987

Income tax expense (385) (389) (354)

Net income 642 662 633

Less net income attributable to the noncontrolling interest (38) (34) (39)

Net income attributable to QVC, Inc. stockholder $ 604 628 594

Source: QVC, Inc.

EXHIBIT 3 Geographic Breakdown of Revenue ($ millions)

Year Ended December 31,

(in millions) 2016 2015 2014

United States $6,120 6,257 6,055

Japan 897 808 908

Germany 865 837 970

United Kingdom 654 718 730

Other countries 146 123 138

Consolidated QVC $8,682 8,743 8,801

Source: Liberty Media, QVC.

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CASE 5 :: QVC C21

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TV shopping network would have the potential to attract a large client base and produce significant profits. He envi- sioned superior resources he could bring to his network, while the operating expenses for a shopping network could still be kept relatively low.

Over the next few months, Segel raised $30 million in start-up capital, hired several seasoned television execu- tives, and launched QVC. Operating out of headquarters in West Chester, Pennsylvania, QVC offered 24-hour, seven- day television home shopping to viewers. By the end of its first year of operation, QVC reached 13 million homes by satellite and cable systems; 700,000 viewers had become customers, resulting in shipping 3 million orders. Sales had already topped $100 million and the firm was able to show a small profit.

Segel attributed the instant success of his company to the potential offered by television shopping. “Television’s com- bination of sight, sound and motion is the best way to sell a product. It is more effective than presenting a product in print or just putting the product on a store shelf,” he stated. “The cost-efficiency comes from the cable distribution system. It is far more economical than direct mail, print advertising, or traditional retail store distribution.”2

In fall 1988, Segel acquired the manufacturing facili- ties, proprietary technology, and trademark rights of the Diamonique Corporation, which produced a wide range of simulated gemstones and jewelry that could be sold on QVC shows. Over the next couple of years, Segel expanded QVC by acquiring competitors such as the Cable Value Network Shopping channel (see Exhibit 4).

By 1993, QVC had overtaken Home Shopping Network to become the leading TV shopping channel in sales and profits. Its reach extended to over 80 percent of all cable homes and to 3 million satellite dishes. Segel retired the same year, passing control of the company to Barry Diller. Since then, QVC’s sales have continued to grow substan- tially, widening the gap between it and Home Shopping Network, its closest competitor.

Striving for Retailing Excellence QVC has established itself as the world’s preeminent virtual shopping mall that never closes. Its customers around the world can, and do, shop at any hour at the rate of more than five customers per second. It sells a wide variety of products, using a combination of description and demon- stration by live program hosts. QVC is extremely selective in choosing its hosts, screening as many as 3,000 applicants annually in order to pick three. New hosts are trained for at least six months before they are allowed on air. Regularly scheduled shows are each focused on a particular type of product and a well-defined market. Shows typically lasts for one hour and are based on a theme such as Now You’re Cooking or Cleaning Solutions.

QVC frequently entices celebrities such as clothing designers or book authors to appear live on special program segments to sell their own products. In order to prepare

them to succeed, celebrities are given training on how to best pitch their offerings. On some occasions, customers are able to call in and have on-air conversations with program hosts and visiting celebrities. Celebrities are schooled in QVC’s “ backyard-fence” style, which means conversing with viewers the way they would chat with a friendly neighbor. “They’re just so down-home, so it’s like they’re right in your living room demonstrating,” said a long time QVC customer.3

In spite of the folksy presentation, the sales are minutely managed. Behind the scenes, a producer scans nine televi- sion and computer screens to track sales of featured items. “We track new orders per minute in increments of six sec- onds; we can look backward in time and see what it was that drove that spike,” said Doug Rose, who oversees pro- gramming and marketing.4 Hosts and guests are prompted to make adjustments in their pitch that might increase sales. A beauty designer was asked to rub an eyeliner onto her hand, which immediately led to a surge of new orders.

QVC transmits its programming live from its central production facilities in Pennsylvania through uplinks to a satellite. The representatives who staff QVC’s four call centers, which handle 180 million or more calls a year, are well trained to take orders. More than 90 percent of orders are shipped within 48 hours from one of QVC’s dis- tribution centers. The distribution centers have a combined floor space equivalent to the size of over 100 football fields. An effort is made to see that every item works as it should before it is shipped and that its packaging will protect it during the shipping process. “Nothing ships unless it is quality-inspected first,” said one of the logistics managers for QVC. “Since our product is going business-to-consumer, there’s no way to fix or change a product-related problem.”5

All new products must pass through stringent tests that are carried out by QVC’s in-house Quality Assurance Lab. Only 15 percent of the products pass the firm’s rigorous quality inspection on first try and as many as a third are never offered to the public because they fail altogether.

Searching for Profitable Products More than 100 experienced, informed buyers comb the world on a regular basis to search for new products to launch on QVC. The shopping channel concentrates on unique products that can be demonstrated on live televi- sion. Jeffrey Rayport, author of a book on customer ser- vice, states, “QVC staff look for a product that is complex enough—or interesting enough—that the host can talk about it on air.”6 Furthermore, the price of these products must be high enough for viewers to justify the additional ship- ping and handling charge. Over the course of a typical year, QVC carries more than 60,000 products. As many as 1,000 items are typically offered in any given week, of which about 20 percent are new products for the network. QVC’s sup- pliers range from some of the world’s biggest companies to small entrepreneurial enterprises.

About a third of QVC’s sales come from broadly avail- able national brands. The firm has been able to build trust

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C22 CASE 5 :: QVC

des13959_case05_019-023.indd 22 01/02/18 01:31 PM

offer lower margins. It has been gradually expanding into new product categories that have higher margins, such as cosmetics, apparel, food, and toys. Several of these new cat- egories have displayed the strongest rates of growth in sales for the shopping channel over the past couple of years.

Expanding the Customer Base QVC reaches almost all the cable television and broadcast satellite homes in the U.S. But only about 10 percent of these households have actually bought anything from the network. Still, QVC has developed a remarkably large cus- tomer base, many of whom make as many as 10 purchases (around 24 items) in a year. QVC devotees readily call in to the live segments to offer product testimonials, are up to date on the personal lives of their favorite program hosts, and generally view the channel as entertaining. “As weird as it may sound, for people who love the network, it’s good company,” says Rayport.7

QVC promises to deliver Quality, Value, and Convenience to its viewers. QVC hopes to attract new cus- tomers on the basis of the strong reputation that surveys indicate it has established among its current buyers. More than three-quarters of the shopping channel’s customers

among its customers in large part through offering these well-known brands. QVC relies on promotional campaigns with a variety of existing firms for another third of its sales. It has made deals with Dell, Target, and Bath & Body Works for special limited-time promotional offerings. But QVC has been most successful with products sold exclu- sively on QVC or not readily available through other dis- tribution channels. Although such products account for only about a third of its sales, the firm has been able to earn higher margins with these proprietary products, many of which come from firms that are either start-ups or new entrants into the U.S. market.

Most vendors are attracted to QVC because they reap higher profits selling through the channel than they would by selling through physical stores. Stores typically require vendors to help to train or pay the sales force and to par- ticipate in periodic sales where prices are discounted. QVC rarely sells products at discount prices. Maureen Kelly, founder of Tarte Cosmetics, said she typically makes more from an eight-minute segment on QVC than she used to make in a month at a high-end department store.

QVC has been moving away from some product catego- ries, such as home appliances and electronic gadgets, which

EXHIBIT 4 QVC MILESTONES

1986 Launched by Joseph Segel, broadcasting from studios in West Chester, PA

1987 Expands programming to 24 hours a day

1988 Acquires Diamonique, manufacturer of simulated gemstone jewelry

1993 Segel retires and Barry Diller is named Chairman & CEO Launches channel in U.K.

1995 Acquired by Comcast and Doug Briggs takes over as President & CEO

1996 Launches Internet site

2001 Launches channel in Japan

2003 Sold off to Liberty Media

2005 Michael George is named President

2006 George takes over as CEO with retirement of Briggs

2007 Ships its billionth package in the U.S.

2008 Launches QVCHD, a high definition simulcast in the U.S.

2009 Rolls out several mobile services

2010 Launches channel in Italy

2012 Acquires e-commerce shopping site Send the Trend Launches joint venture in China

2013 Launches QVC PLUS as a second channel in the U.S.

2015 Launches channel in France

2016 Launches operations unit in Krakow, Poland, to streamline European business operation.

Source: QVC.

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revenue. CEO Michael George recently stated that 60 per- cent of QVC’s new customers in the United States buy on the Internet or on mobile devices. “The online busi- ness is becoming such a crucial part of the business for QVC,” remarked Douglas Anmuth, an analyst at Barclay’s Capital.9 Furthermore, QVC.com is now more profitable than QVC’s television operation. It needs fewer call-center workers, and while QVC must share profits with cable com- panies on TV orders, it does not have to pay them on online orders for products which have not been featured on the air for 24 hours.

The falloff in cable television subscribers may affect QVC. QVC is not immune from shifts in technology usage and people’s entertainment choices and information gath- ering habits. But for many of QVC’s loyal consumers, nothing will ever replace shopping via television. Michael George insists that QVC shoppers are less likely to drop cable services because they tend to be slightly older and more affluent. These customers tune in at different times of the day or night and are drawn to the offerings. “We’re going to try and find 120 to 140 items every day where we think we can tell compelling stories and inspire you to con- sider it,” he says.10

The website does not offer the hybrid of talk show and sales pitch that attracts audiences to the QVC shopping television channel. Online shoppers also miss out on the interaction between hosts and shoppers and the continuous urgent feedback about the time that they may have to place an order before an item is sold out. “You know, on Sundays I might find a program on Lifetime Movie Network, but whatever I’m watching, if it’s not QVC, when the commer- cial comes on I’ll flip it back to QVC,” said one loyal QVC fan. “I’m just stuck on them.”11

ENDNOTES 1. Stephanie Clifford. Can QVC translate its pitch online? New York

Times, November 21, 2010, p. B7. 2. QVC Annual Report, 1987–1988. 3. New York Times, November 21, 2010, p. B7. 4. Ibid. 5. Eugene Gilligan. The show must go on. Journal of Commerce, April 12,

2004, p. 1. 6. USA Today, May 5, 2008, p. 2B. 7. Ibid. 8. Send the Trend relaunches with QVC to bring shoppers a more

personalized e-commerce experience. PR Newswire, October 2, 2012. 9. New York Times, November 21, 2010, p. B7. 10. Paul Ziobro. QVC’s strength ebbs as web retail booms. Wall Street

Journal, January 12, 2017, p. B6. 11. New York Times, November 21, 2010, p. B7.

have given it a score of 7 out of 7 for trustworthiness. Once viewers start buying from QVC, they tend to be loyal to the firm. This has led most of its customers to recommend it to their friends.

QVC has benefited from the growing percentage of women entering the workforce, resulting in a significant increase in dual-income families. Although the firm’s cur- rent customer base spans several socioeconomic groups, it is led by young professional families who have above aver- age disposable income, and enjoy various forms of “thrill- seeking” activities, including ranking shopping relatively high as a leisure activity when compared to the typical consumer.

The firm is exploring an interactive service which would allow viewers to purchase offerings with the single click of a remote. QVC also provides a credit program to allow customers to pay for goods over a period of several months. Everything it sells is backed by a 30-day uncondi- tional money-back guarantee. Furthermore, QVC does not impose any hidden charges, such as a ”restocking fee,” for any returned merchandise. These policies help the home shopping channel to attract customers for products that they can view but are not able to either touch or feel.

In 2012, QVC built on its existing customer base by acquiring Send the Trend, Inc., an e-commerce destina- tion known for trendy fashion and beauty products. It uses proprietary technology to deliver monthly personalized recommendations that can easily be shared by customers over their social networks for an assortment of prestigious brands in jewelry, beauty and fashion accessories. “The teams at QVC and Send the Trend share a passion for bringing the customer what she wants, in the way she wants it,” said Claire Watts, the U.S.–based CEO of QVC.8

Positioning for Future Growth In spite of its success on television, QVC has not ignored opportunities that are emerging in online shopping. Since 1996, the firm has offered a website to complement its television channel which has provided it with another form of access to customers. Initially, the site offered more detailed information about QVC offerings. Since then, it has branched out to develop its own customer base by fea- turing many products that have not been recently shown on its television channel. Over the last few years, QVC has been fine-tuning its website by offering mobile phone, interactive-television, and iPad apps.

By 2012, QVC.com, a once-negligible part of the QVC empire, accounted for about a third of the firm’s domestic

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C24 CASE 6 :: MICROFINANCE: GOING GLOBAL . . . AND GOING PUBLIC?

a transition from destitution to economic self-sufficiency. Dr. Yunus was convinced that a nontraditional approach to financing is the only way to help the very poor to help themselves.

The Grameen Project would soon follow—it officially became a bank under the law in 1983. The poor borrow- ers own 95 percent of the bank, and the rest is owned by the Bangladeshi government. Loans are financed through deposits only, and there are 8.35 million borrow- ers, of which 97 percent are women. There are over 2,500 branches serving around 81,000 villages in Bangladesh with a staff of more than 22,000 people. Since its incep- tion, the bank has dispersed more than $10 billion, with a cumulative loan recovery rate of 97.38 percent. The Grameen Bank has been profitable every year since 1976 except three years and pays returns on deposits up to 100 percent to its members.2 In 2006 Dr. Yunus and the Grameen Bank shared the Nobel Peace Prize for the concept and methodology of microfinance, also known as micro-credit or microloans.3

What Is Microfinance? Microfinance involves a small loan (US$20–$750) with a high rate of interest (0 to 200 percent), typically provided to poor or destitute entrepreneurs without collateral.4 A traditional loan has two basic components captured by interest rates: (1) risk of future payment, and (2) pres- ent value (given the time value of money). Risk of future payments is particularly high when dealing with the poor, who are unlikely to have familiarity with credit. To reduce this uncertainty, many microfinance banks refuse to lend to individuals and only lend to groups. Groups have proven to be an effective source of “social collateral” in the microloan process.

In addition to the risk and time value of money, the value of a loan must also include the transaction costs asso- ciated with administering the loan. A transaction cost is the cost associated with an economic exchange and is often considered the cost of doing business. For banks like the Grameen Bank, the cost of administering ($125) a small loan may exceed the amount of the small loan itself ($120). These transaction costs have been one of the major deter- rents for traditional banks.

Consider a bank with $10,000 to lend. If broken into small loans ($120), the available $10,000 can provide about 83 transactions. If the cost to administer a small loan ($120) is $125, its cost per unit is about 104 percent (!), while the cost of one $10,000 loan is only 1.25 percent.

In the world of development, if one mixes the poor and nonpoor in a program, the nonpoor will always drive out the poor, and the less poor will drive out the more poor, unless protective measures are instituted right at the beginning.

—Dr. Muhammad Yunus, founder of Grameen Bank1

More than 2.5 billion people in the world earn less than $2.50 a day. None of the developmental economics theo- ries have helped change this situation. Less than $2.50 a day means that these unfortunate people have been living without clean water, sanitation, sufficient food to eat, or a proper place to sleep. In Southeast Asia alone, more than 500 million people live under these circumstances. In the past, almost every effort to help the very poor has been either a complete failure or at best partially successful. As Dr. Yunus argues, in every one of these instances, the poor will push the very poor out!

In 1972 Dr. Muhammad Yunus, a young economics pro- fessor trained at Vanderbilt, returned home to Bangladesh to take a position at Chittagong University. Upon his arrival, he was struck by the stark contrast between the developmental economics he taught in the classroom and the abject poverty of the villages surrounding the university. Dr. Yunus witnessed more suffering of the poor when, in 1974, inclement weather wiped out food crops and resulted in a widespread and prolonged famine. The theories of developmental economics and the traditional banking insti- tutions, he concluded, were completely ineffectual for less- ening the hunger and homelessness among the very poor of that region.

In 1976 Dr. Yunus and his students were visiting the poorest people in the village of Jobra to see whether they could directly help them in any way. They met a group of craftswomen making simple bamboo stools. After paying for their raw materials and financing, the women were left with a profit of just two cents per day. From his own pocket, Dr. Yunus gave $27 to be distributed among 42 crafts- women and rickshaw (human-driven transport) drivers. Little did he know that this simple act of generosity was the beginning of a global revolution in microfinance that would eventually help millions of impoverished and poor begin

CASES

CASE 6 MICROFINANCE: GOING GLOBAL . . . AND GOING PUBLIC?*

* This case was developed by Brian C. Pinkham, LL.M., and Dr. Padmakumar Nair, both from the University of Texas at Dallas. Material has been drawn from published sources to be used for class discussion. Copyright © 2011 Brian C. Pinkham and Padmakumar Nair.

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CASE 6 :: MICROFINANCE: GOING GLOBAL . . . AND GOING PUBLIC? C25

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This loan ranges from $115 to $2,075, available to groups (12–50) of women. Maturity is four months, and payments are weekly or biweekly.

If a group of women demonstrates the ability to man- age credit through the crédito mujer, they have access to crédito mejora tu casa (home-improvement loans). This loan ranges from $230 to $2,300 with a 6- to 24-month maturity. Payments are either biweekly or monthly.

The average interest rate on these loans is 80 percent. Banco focuses on loans to groups of women and requires the guarantee of the group—every individual in the group is held liable for the payment of the loan. This provides a social reinforcement mechanism for loan payments typi- cally absent in traditional loans. The bank also prefers groups because they are more likely to take larger loans. This has proven effective even in times of economic down- turn, when banks typically expect higher demand for loans and lower recovery of loans.

In 2009, with Mexico still reeling from the eco- nomic recession of 2008, Banco provided financing to 1.5 million Mexican households. This represented a growth of 30 percent from 2008. The core of the financing was crédito mujer, emphasizing the bank’s focus on provid- ing services for the low-income groups. The average loan was 4.6 percent of GDP per capita ($440), compared with an average loan of 54 percent of GDP per capita ($347) at the Grameen Bank in Bangladesh.9 With pressure from the economic downturn, Banco also reduced its cost per client by more than 5 percent, and it continues (in late 2010) to have a cost per client under $125.

Consider two examples of how these microloans are used. Julia González Cueto, who started selling candy door- to-door in 1983, used her first loan to purchase accesso- ries to broaden the image of her business. This provided a stepping-stone for her decision to cultivate mushrooms and nopales (prickly pear leaves) to supplement her candy business. She now exports wild mushrooms to an Italian restaurant chain. Leocadia Cruz Gómez has had 16 loans, the first in April 2006. She invested in looms and thread to expand her textile business. Today, her workshop has grown, she is able to travel and give classes, and her work is widely recognized.

Beyond the Grameen Bank These are just a few examples of how capitalistic free- market enterprises have helped the world to progress. It is generally accepted that charitable contributions and gov- ernment programs alone cannot alleviate poverty. More resources and professional management are essential for microfinance institutions to grow further and sustain their mission. An IPO is one way to achieve this goal when deposits alone cannot sustain the demand for loans. At the same time, investors expect a decent return on their invest- ment, and this expectation might work against the most important goal of microfinancing, namely, to help the very poor. Dr. Yunus has recently reemphasized his concern

Because of the high cost per unit and the high risk of future payment, the rate of interest assigned to the smaller loan is much higher than the rate on the larger loan.

Finally, after these costs are accounted for, there must be some margin (or profit). In the case of microfinance banks, the margins are split between funding the growth of the bank (adding extra branches) and returns on deposits for bank members. This provides even the poorest bank member a feeling of “ownership.”

Microfinance and Initial Public Offerings With the global success of the microfinance concept, the number of private microfinance institutions exploded. Today there are more than 7,000 microfinance institutions, and their profitability has led many of the larger institu- tions to consider whether or not to “go public.” Many microfinance banks redistribute profits to bank members (the poor) through returns on deposits. Once the bank goes public through an initial public offering (IPO), how- ever, there is a transfer of control to public buyers (typically investors from developed economies). This transfer creates a fiduciary duty of the bank’s management to maximize value for the shareholders.5

For example, Compartamos Banco (Banco) of Mexico raised $467 million in its IPO in 2007. The majority of buy- ers were leading investment companies from the United States and United Kingdom—the geographic breakdown of the investors was 52 percent U.S., 33 percent Europe, 5 percent Mexico, and 10 percent other Latin American countries. Similarly, Bank Rakyat Indonesia (BRI) raised $480 million in its IPO by listing on multiple stock exchanges in 2003; the majority of investors who purchased the avail- able 30 percent interest in the bank were from the United States and United Kingdom. The Indonesian government controls the remaining 70 percent stake in BRI. In Kenya, Equity Bank raised $88 million in its IPO in late 2006. Because of the small scale of Equity Bank’s initial listing on the Nairobi Stock Exchange, the majority of the investors were from eastern Africa.6 About one-third of the investors were from the European Union and United States.”7

Compartamos Banco8 Banco started in 1990 as a nongovernmental organization (NGO). At the time, population growth in Latin America and Mexico outpaced job growth. This left few job opportuni- ties within the largest population group in Mexico—the low- income. Banco recognized that the payoffs for high-income opportunities were much larger (dollars a day), relative to low-income opportunities that may return only pennies a day. Over the next 10 years, Banco offered larger loans to groups and individuals to help bridge the gap between these low- income and high-income opportunities. However, its focus is to serve low-income individuals and groups, particularly the women who make up 98 percent of Banco’s members.

The bank offers two microfinance options available to women only. The first is the crédito mujer (women’s credit).

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C26 CASE 6 :: MICROFINANCE: GOING GLOBAL . . . AND GOING PUBLIC?

to bank members as returns on deposits, are now split between bank members (poor) and stockholders (made up of mostly EU and U.S. investors). Many of these microfi- nance banks are feeling the pressure of NGOs and bank members requesting lower interest rates.13 This trend could potentially erode the large profit margins these banks cur- rently enjoy. When faced with falling profits, publicly traded microfinance institutions will have to decide how best to provide financial services for the very poor and struggling members of the society without undermining their fidu- ciary duties to stockholders.

ENDNOTES 1. Yunus, M. 2007. Banker to the poor: Micro-lending and the battle against

world poverty. New York: PublicAffairs. 2. The Grameen Bank removes funding for administration and branch

growth from the initial profits and redistributes the remaining profits to bank members. This means that a poor bank member who deposits $1 in January may receive up to $1 on December 31! Grameen Bank, www.grameen-info.org.

3. Grameen Bank, www.grameen-info.org. 4. Microfinance banks vary to the extent that the rates of interest are

annualized or specified to the term. Grameen Bank, for instance, annualizes the interest on its microloans. However, many other banks set a periodic rate whereby, in extreme cases, interest may accrue daily. Grameen Bank, www.grameen-info.org.

5. Khavul, S. 2010. Microfinance: Creating opportunities for the poor? Academy of Management Perspectives, 24(3): 58–72.

6. Equity Bank, www.equitybank.co.ke. 7. Rhyne, E., & Guimon, A. 2007. The Banco Compartamos

initial public offering. Accion: InSight, no. 23: 1–17, resources. centerforfinancialinclusion.org.

8. Unless otherwise noted, this section uses information from Banco Compartamos, www.compartamos.com.

9. We calculated all GDP per capita information as normalized to current (as of 2010) U.S. dollars using the International Monetary Fund (IMF) website, www.imf.org. The estimated percentages are from Banco Compartamos, www.compartamos.com.

10. Yunus. 2007. Banker to the poor. 11. Grameen Bank, www.grameen-info.org. 12. Khavul. 2010. Microfinance. 13. Rhyne & Guimon. 2007. The Banco Compartamos initial public

offering.

of the nonpoor driving out the poor, and he talks about microfinance institutions seeking investments from “social- objective-driven” investors with a need to create a separate “social stock market.”10

The Grameen Bank story, and that of microfinancing, and the current enthusiasm in going public raise several concerns. Institutions like the Grameen Bank have to grow and sustain a long-run perspective. The Grameen Bank has not accepted donor money since 1998 and does not foresee a need for donor money or other sources of external capi- tal. The Grameen Bank charges four interest rates, depend- ing on who is borrowing and for what purpose the money is being used: 20 percent for income-generating loans, 8 percent for housing loans, 5 percent for student loans, and interest-free loans for struggling members (unsympa- thetically called beggars). (Although these rates would appear to be close to what U.S. banks charge, we must point out that the terms of these loans are typically three or four months. Thus, the annualized interest rates would be four or five times the aforementioned rates.)

The Grameen Bank’s “Beggars-As-Members” program is a stark contrast to what has been theorized and practiced in contemporary financial markets—traditional banking would assign high-risk borrowers (like beggars) the highest inter- est rate compared to more reliable borrowers who are using the borrowed money for generating income. Interestingly, the loan recovery rate is 79 percent from the “Beggars- As-Members” program, and about 20,000 members (out of 110,000) have left begging completely.11 However, it is difficult to predict the future, and it is possible that the Grameen Bank might consider expanding its capital base by going public just like its Mexican counterpart.

Most developmental economists question the wisdom of going public, because publicly traded enterprises are likely to struggle to find a balance between fiduciary respon- sibilities and social good.12 The three large IPOs men- tioned above (Banco, BRI, and Equity First) all resulted in improved transparency and reporting for stockholders. However, the profits, which were originally distributed

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CASE 7 :: WORLD WRESTLING ENTERTAINMENT C27

World Wrestling Entertainment was planning to crown its first ever WWE United Kingdom Champion live on the WWE Network during a special, two-night tournament on January 14 and January 15, 2017. “Our passionate U.K. fans deserve their own Champion,” said WWE’s Vice President Paul Levesque.1

Pushing a strategy to cater to local markets is one way WWE is trying to deal with the growing competition from different forms of mixed martial arts, which pres- ent a free-for-all of boxing, ju-jitsu, and wrestling, among other disciplines. Ultimate Fighting Championship, for instance, has been expanding around the world, while ONE Championship has been stealing markets in Asia by build- ing up local fighters in each market.

WWE does not have much to worry about in the short run (see Exhibit 1). Its strategy of coupling its live wres- tling matches with programming on television, on the web, and on mobile devices has made it one of the world’s most social brands. The firm recently added to its presence on the Internet with an exclusive, multi-year agreement to bring WWE programming to Hulu Plus, offering next-day access to its television programs and other exclusive shows. “We continue to see the distribution of our creative con- tent through various emerging channels,” Linda McMahon stated in 2009 when she was the firm’s president and CEO.2 Clearly, WWE has moved out of the slump that it endured between 2001 and 2005.

During the 1990s, Vince McMahon used a potent mix of shaved, pierced, and pumped-up muscled hunks; buxom, scantily-clad, and sometimes cosmetically enhanced beau- ties; and body-bashing clashes of good versus evil to build an empire that claimed over 35 million fans. The vast majority of these fans were males between the ages of 12 and 34, the demographic segment that makes most adver- tisers drool.

Just when it looked like everything was going well, WWE hit a rough patch. Its attempt to move beyond wres- tling to other sports and entertainment was not successful. It failed with its launch of a football league during 2001, which folded after just one season. WWE has not done much better with its foray into movies that use some of its wrestlers. The firm was also struggling with its efforts to build new wrestling stars and to introduce new characters

into its shows. Some of its most valuable younger viewers were turning to new reality-based shows on television such as Survivor, Fear Factor, and Jackass.

Since 2005, however, WWE has been turning pro wres- tling into a perpetual road show that makes millions of fans pass through turnstiles in a growing number of locations around the globe. Its flagship television programs, Raw and Smackdown! are broadcast in 30 languages in 145 countries reaching 600 million homes around the world. WWE has also been signing pacts with dozens of licensees, including one with toymaker Mattel, to sell DVDs, video games, toys, and trading cards.

Developing a Wrestling Empire Most of the success of the WWE can be attributed to the persistent efforts of Vince McMahon. A self-described juve- nile delinquent who went to military school as a teenager to avoid being sent to a reformatory institution, around 1970 Vince joined his father’s wrestling company which operated in northeastern cities such as New York, Philadelphia, and Washington, D.C. He did on-air commentary, developed scripts, and otherwise promoted the wrestling matches.

Vince bought the wrestling firm from his father in 1982, eventually renaming it World Wrestling Federation. At that time, wrestling was managed by regional fiefdoms where everyone avoided encroaching on anyone else’s territory. Vince began to change all that by paying local television stations around the country to broadcast his matches. His aggressive pursuit of audiences across the country gradu- ally squeezed out most of the other rivals. “I banked on the fact that they were behind the times, and they were,” said Vince.3

Vince broke another taboo by admitting to the public that wrestling matches were scripted. Although he made this admission to avoid the scrutiny of state athletic com- missions, wrestling fans appreciated the honesty. The WWF began to draw in more fans through the elaborate

CASES

CASE 7 WORLD WRESTLING ENTERTAINMENT*

* Case prepared by Jamal Shamsie, Michigan State University, with the assistance of Professor Alan B. Eisner, Pace University. Material has been drawn from published sources to be used for purposes of class discussion. Copyright © 2017 Jamal Shamsie and Alan B. Eisner.

EXHIBIT 1 Income Statement ($ millions)

2016 2015 2014

Net Revenues $729.2 $658.8 $542.6

Operating Income 55.6 38.8 (42.5)

Net Income 33.8 24.1 (30.1)

Source: WWE Annual Report 2017.

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story lines and captivating characters of its wrestling matches. The firm turned wrestlers such as Hulk Hogan and Andre the Giant into mainstream icons of pop culture. By the late 1980s, the WWF’s Raw Is War had become a top-rated show on cable, and the firm had also begun to offer pay-per-view shows.

Vince faced his most formidable competition after 1988, when Ted Turner bought out World Championship Wrestling, one of the few major rivals that was still operat- ing. Turner spent millions luring away WWF stars such as Hulk Hogan and Macho Man Randy Savage. He used these stars to launch a show on his own TNT channel to go up against WWF’s major show, Raw Is War. Although Turner’s new show caused a temporary dip in the ratings for WWF’s shows, Vince fought back with pumped-up scripts, mouthy muscle-men, and Lycra-clad women. “Ted Turner decided to come after me and all of my talent,” growled Vince, “and now he’s where he should be.”4 In 2001, Vince acquired WCW from Turner’s parent firm AOL Time Warner for a bargain price of $5 million.

Because of the manner in which he has eliminated most of his rivals, Vince has earned a reputation for being as aggressive and ambitious as any character in the ring. Paul MacArthur, publisher of Wrestling Perspective, an indus- try newsletter, praised his accomplishments: “McMahon understands the wrestling business better than anyone else. He’s considered by most in the business to be brilliant.”5

Then in 2002, WWF was hit by a ruling from a British court that their original WWF acronym belonged to the World Wildlife Fund. The firm had to undergo a major branding transition, changing its well-known name and triple logo from WWF to WWE.

Although the change in name has been costly, it is not clear that this will hurt the firm in the long run. “Their product is really the entertainment. It’s the stars. It’s the bodies,” said Larry McNaughton, managing director and principal of CoreBrand, a branding consultancy.6 Vince’s wife Linda stated that the new name might actually be ben- eficial for the firm. “Our new name puts the emphasis on the ‘E’ for entertainment,” she commented.7

Creating a Script for Success It is appropriate to call WWE’s entertainments wrestling shows, rather than matches. The wrestlers are characters in ongoing dramatic plots and adventure stories as much as athletes. The content of WWE’s live events is akin to tele- vision soap operas and Hollywood melodramas. From the start Vince McMahon reduced the amount of actual wres- tling in favor of mesmerizing characters and compelling story lines, relying on “good versus evil” and “settling the score” themes. The plots and subplots provide viewers with a mix of action, comedy, violence, sex, and even romance, against a backdrop of pyrotechnics.

Over time, the “matches,” or shows, have become ever more heavily scripted, with increasingly intricate plots and dialog. All the details of every match are worked out well in

advance, leaving the wrestlers to decide only the manner in which the hero dispatches a villain to the mat. Vince refers to his wrestlers as “athletic performers.” They are selected on the basis of their acting ability in addition to their phys- ical stamina.

The firm owns the rights to the characters played by its wrestlers. This allows WWE to continue to exploit the characters developed for the television shows, even after a wrestler that played a character has left the firm. By now Vince holds the rights to many characters that have become familiar to audiences around the world.

By the late 1990s Vince had two weekly shows on tele- vision. Besides the original flagship program on the USA cable channel, WWE had added a Smackdown! show on the UPN broadcast channel. A continuous story line fea- tured the same characters so that the audience was driven to both the shows. The acquisition of the WCW resulted in a significant increase in the number of wrestling stars under contract. Trying to incorporate almost 150 characters into the story lines for WWE’s shows proved to be a challenging task, perhaps resulting in some loss of energy in the plots. At the same time, the move of Raw to the Spike TV channel resulted in a loss of viewers.

However, in October 2005, WWE signed a new agree- ment with NBC that moved Raw back to its USA channel. Smackdown! is now carried by the Syfy channel, which has been climbing in the charts. WWE’s newest show, Total Divas, has recently been launched on the E! network. All of these programs have done well in ratings, particularly for male viewers, because of the growth in popularity of a new breed of characters such as John Cena, Chris Benoit, Ray Mysterio, and Triple H. The visibility of these charac- ters is enhanced through profiles on the WWE website and mobile apps.

Managing a Road Show A typical work week for the WWE can be grueling for the McMahons, for the talent, and for the crew. The organiza- tion is now putting on almost 330 live shows a year requir- ing everyone to be on the road most days of the week. The touring crew includes over 200 members, including stage hands. All of WWE’s live events, including those that are used for its two longstanding weekly shows Raw and Smackdown! as well as the newer ones, are held in different cities. Consequently, the crew is always packing up a dozen 18-wheelers and driving hundreds of miles to get from one performance to another. Since there are no repeats of any WWE shows, the live performances must be held all year round.

The live shows form the core of all of WWE’s businesses (see Exhibit 2). They give the firm a big advantage in the entertainment world. Most of the crowd show up wear- ing WWE merchandise and scream throughout the show. Vince and his crew pay special attention to the response of the audience to different parts of the show. The script for each performance is not set until the day of the show, and

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sometimes changes are made in the middle of a show. This allows the crew some flexibility to respond to the emotions of the crowd as they witness the unfolding action. Vince boasts: “We’re in contact with the public more than any entertainment company in the world.”8

The shows usually fill up. Tickets and the merchandise sold at the shows cover the cost of production. Sales of mer- chandise also represent a significant and growing portion of the revenues from each of the live shows. The perfor- mances are the source for all the other revenue streams. They provide content for six hours of original television programming as well as for the growing list of pay-per-view and video-on-demand programming. They create strong demand for WWF merchandise purchased apart from the shows ranging from video games and toys to magazines and home videos.

Much of the footage from the live shows is used on the WWE website, which is the growth engine for its new digital media business (see Exhibits 3 and 4). The firm produces a show, WWE NXT, exclusively for the website. WWE also offers content on the apps that it has launched for smartphones and tablets. Fans can also follow program- ming on Hulu Plus, with which the firm signed an exclusive multi-year contract in 2012. All of these channels serve to promote the various offerings of the firm and carry selec- tions from its various other television programs.

The entire operations of WWE are overseen by Vince McMahon, along with some help from other members of his family. While the slick and highly toned Vince can be regarded as the creative muscle behind the grow- ing entertainment empire, his wife Linda has for many

years been quietly managing its day-to-day operations. Throughout its existence, she has helped to balance the books, do the deals, and handle the details neces- sary for the growth and development of the WWF and WWE franchise. Their son and daughter have also been involved with various activities of the enterprise, with Stephanie McMahon holding an executive position in charge of creative development.

Searching for Growth In 1999, shortly after going public, WWF launched an eight-team football league called the XFL. Promising full competitive sport unlike the heavily scripted wrestling matches, Vince tried to make the XFL a faster-paced, more fan-friendly form of football than the NFL’s brand. Vince was able to partner with NBC, which was looking for a lower-priced alternative to the NFL televised games. The XFL kicked off with great fanfare in February 2001. Although the games drew good attendance, television rat- ings dropped steeply after the first week. The football ven- ture folded after just one season, resulting in a $57 million loss for WWF. Both Vince and Linda insist that the venture could have paid off if it had been given enough time. Vince commented: “I think our pals at the NFL went out of their way to make sure this was not a successful venture.”9

WWE has also tried to become involved with movie production using its wrestling stars, releasing a few films over the past decade such as Steve Austin’s The Condemned and John Cena’s Legendary, and smaller films designed for release in a few theatres and on television. Besides

EXHIBIT 2 Principal Activities

Media

Network: Subscriptions to WWE Network, fees for pay-per-view, video-on-demand

Television: Fees for television rights

Home entertainment: Sales of WWE programs on various platforms, including DVDs and Blu Rays

Digital media: Revenues from advertising on websites

Live Events

Live events: Revenues from ticket sales and travel packages for live events

Consumer Products

Licensing: Revenues from royalties or license fees from video games, toys, or apparel

Venue merchandise: Revenues from merchandise at live events

WWE Shop: Revenues from merchandise sales on websites

WWE Studios

WWE Studios: Revenues from investing in producing and distributing films

Source: WWE Annual Report 2017.

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“While it is based in America, the themes are worldwide: sibling rivalry, jealousy. We have had no pushback on the fact it was an American product,” said Linda.10

Considerable excitement was generated by the launch of WWE 24/7, a subscriber video-on-demand service. The new service allows the firm to distribute for a fee thousands of content hours consisting of highlights from old shows as well as exclusive new programming. Much of the firm’s pro- gramming, both old and new, is also offered on its website, which has continued to show strong growth. By enabling audiences to watch WWE programming whenever they may want to, these new forms of distribution have allowed the firm to reach out to new audiences.

The new push on mobile devices and also through the Hulu channel has provided ever more opportunities for WWE to expand into digital media. The firm believes that offering their programming on smartphones and tablets will lead to a significant growth in revenues, in part from additional sales of their merchandise. “Our fans have proven that they want to consume WWE content day and night and now, through our new mobile app, they can stay completely connected to the action wherever they are,” said Jason Hoch, WWE’s recently appointed senior vice presi- dent of digital operations.11

Staying the Champ Although WWE may find it challenging to keep building on its already formidable fan base, there is no question that it continues to generate excitement. Most of the excite- ment is driven by the live shows, which fill up the arenas. “They have the most excited fans that have come through our doors,” said the director of sales and marketing at one of the arenas that holds WWE matches. “They make signs, dress up, and cheer constantly.”12 The interest in the live matches is most evident each year with the frenzy that is created by WrestleMania, the annual pop culture extrava- ganza that has become an almost weeklong celebration of “everything wrestling.” No wrestlers become true stars until their performance is featured at WrestleMania, and any true fan must make the pilgrimage at least once in his or her life.

WWE has begun to expand its audience by toning down the sex and violence to make their shows more fam- ily friendly. They no longer use fake blood and have toned down the use of abusive language in order to get a rating of TV-PG for their television programming. The new media, such as the launch of shows through streaming video, is expected to bring in younger viewers. “I think any good entertainment product has to change with the times,” said McMahon. “You have to have your fingers on the pulse of the marketplace.”13

Vince McMahon is aware of the growing threat of mixed martial arts, which started in Japan and Brazil, but is spreading. Because of its similarity to wrestling, this

generating some box office revenues, these movies provide revenues from home video markets, distribution on pre- mium channels, and offerings on pay-per-view.

The firm has all along sought growth opportunities that are driven by its core wrestling business. With more characters at their disposal and different characters being used in each of their shows, WWE has been ramping up the number of live shows, including more in overseas markets. By 2014, the firm was staging almost 70 shows in locations around the world. WWE has been expanding its live per- formances, introducing them in six new countries, such as UAE and Egypt. The company has opened offices in six cities around the world to manage its overseas operations.

EXHIBIT 3 Breakdown of Revenues ($ millions)

2016 2015 2014

Network $180.9 $159.4 $115.0

Television 241.7 231.1 176.7

Home Entertainment 13.1 13.4 27.3

Digital Media 26.9 21.5 20.9

Live Events 144.4 124.7 108.5

Licensing 49.1 48.9 38.6

Venue Merchandise 24.2 22.4 19.3

WWE Shop 34.6 27.1 20.2

WWE Studios 10.1 7.1 10.9

Source: WWE Annual Report 2017.

EXHIBIT 4 Breakdown of Operating Income ($ millions)

2016 2015 2014

Network $43.0 $48.4 $(1.8)

Television 119.8 97.0 61.9

Home Entertainment 5.3 4.6 15.0

Digital Media 4.6 4.4 0.3

Live Events 40.1 36.9 27.8

Licensing 27.4 28.8 20.9

Venue Merchandise 9.8 8.9 7.7

WWE Shop 7.3 5.1 3.5

WWE Studios (0.2) (1.5) 0.5

Source: WWE Annual Report 2017.

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ENDNOTES 1. WWE to crown U.K. champion. Entertainment Newsweekly, December

30, 2016. 2. WWE. World Wrestling Entertainment, Inc., reports Q3 results. Press

release, February 23, 2005. 3. Bethany McLean. Inside the world’s weirdest family business. Fortune,

October 16, 2000, p. 298. 4. Diane Bradley. Wrestling’s real grudge match. BusinessWeek, January

24, 2000, p. 164. 5. Don Mooradian. WWF gets a grip after acquisition. Amusement

Business, June 4, 2001, p. 20. 6. Dwight Oestricher and Brian Steinberg. WW . . . E it is, after fight for

F nets new name. Wall Street Journal, May 7, 2002, p. B2. 7. David Finnegan. Down but not out, WWE is using a rebranding effort

to gain strength. Brandweek, June 3, 2002, p. 12. 8. Fortune, October 16, 2000, p. 304. 9. Diane Bradley. Rousing itself off the mat? BusinessWeek, February 2,

2004, p. 73. 10. Brooke Masters. Wrestling’s bottom line is no soap opera. Financial

Times, August 25, 2008, p. 15. 11. Business Wire. WWE launches free mobile second screen app. August

17, 2012. 12. Brandi Ball. The face of the WWE. McClatchy-Tribune Business News,

January 13, 2011. 13. Seth Berkman. The body slam is buffering. The New York Times,

March 31, 2014, p. B7. 14. R. M. Schneiderman. Better days, and even the candidates, are coming

to WWE. New York Times, April 28, 2008, p. B3. 15. New York Times, March 31, 2014, p. B1.

new combat sport is likely to pull away some of WWE’s fans. However, everyone at WWE is convinced that these “real sports” cannot match the drama and passion of the story lines and characters that enliven their stage and draw audiences to their matches. As Dana White, president of Ultimate Fighting Championship, said: “People have been trying to count the WWE out for years. They are a powerhouse.”14

Nevertheless, there are questions about the future of WWE after McMahon, who single-handedly built his wrestling empire from his father’s small regional business. Although he has involved his wife and children in the firm, Vince has always been the brain behind the strategic moves over the years. The launch of the WWE Network, which represents a significant new step, could be his final act, according to industry observers. “If he has changed how pro wrestling and sports entertainment will reach audi- ences in the future, I don’t think there’s a better way to go out,” said Brandon Stroud, a wrestling commentator and editor at the sports site With Leather.15

As for the enduring appeal of pro wrestling, Marty, a 19-year-old wrestling fan quoted in Fortune (October 6, 2000), may have expressed it best: “Those who understand don’t need an explanation. Those who need an explanation will never understand.”

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C32 CASE 8 :: GREENWOOD RESOURCES: A GLOBAL SUSTAINABLE VENTURE IN THE MAKING

these two projects had been extensive, lasting over a year, but both projects still faced considerable obstacles and even potential deadlock. In June 2010, Jeff and his senior man- agement team were still weighing the pros and cons of the two projects, which had been the subject of their last man- agement meeting. They felt that GreenWood needed to pro- ceed carefully to ensure the company’s sustainable business criteria (rather than its financial return per se) were met in China but also realized the company needed to show some progress to its major investor in China, Oriental Timber Fund Limited. Jeff needed to bring a recommendation from his senior management team to the investment committee comprising himself and two representatives from Oriental. The decision deadline was approaching. Jeff anticipated that the next senior management meeting would result in a recommendation. Should GreenWood choose one of the two projects?

GreenWood Resources, Inc. Founding of the Venture In 1998, after 12 years of experience with CH2M Hill3 as a bioresources engineer, Jeff Nuss, a native Oregonian, decided to start his own venture, GreenWood Resources, Inc., specializing in the development and management of high-yield, fast-growing tree plantations. Having looked into other potential businesses such as a golf course and a winery, he was eventually convinced, based on his edu- cation and years of experience working with poplar tree farms, that investments in tree plantations held great prom- ise for the future (see Appendix 1 for background industry information).

Jeff’s plan was to help institutional investors (pen- sion funds, endowments, insurance companies, etc.) and wealthy individuals invest in professionally managed high- yield, short-rotation tree farms (Exhibit 1 illustrates tree rotation length and yield of several representative tree spe- cies). He wanted to operate farms in accordance with Forest Stewardship Council (FSC) certification. FSC’s objective was to conserve biological diversity and enhance the long- term social and economic well-being of forest workers and local communities (see Exhibit 2).

Firms with FSC certificates were rare because the stan- dards were stringent, often leading to higher operating costs. For example, FSC required the use of less toxic pesti- cides and herbicides, which were more expensive. It prohib- ited the use of genetically modified trees. It also demanded

“Money still grows on trees.”

—Larry Light, Deputy Editor for Personal Finance, Wall Street Journal1

“The answer to some of the world’s most pressing concerns (global warming, alternative energy, sustainable forestry) lies in one of the earth’s most renewable resources—trees.”

—GreenWood Resources, Inc.2

Jeff Nuss and other senior managers of GreenWood Resources, Inc., emerged after a long deliberation from the conference room in their headquarters in Portland, Oregon, in June 2010. On the one hand, they were inspired by their global vision to build “a resource that lasts forever” and their belief the company, with nearly 70 employees, was finally taking off after almost 10 years of persistent efforts in building the key elements (opportunity, people, resources, and business networks) for a successful tree plan- tation venture. On the other hand, they had just finished a grueling meeting during which they found it hard to reach a consensus on how to proceed with two strategic investment alternatives in rural China.

Since 2000, Jeff and several other senior managers had traveled to China on numerous occasions. The process of making a deal in the Chinese forest industry had proven to be more time-consuming than anticipated. Complex own- ership structures, underdeveloped farming systems, and emerging, sometimes equivocal and unpredictable, govern- ment policies characterized the forest industry in China. Chinese farmers who embraced business models and man- agement styles far different than those in the United States posed additional complications.

By March 2009, GreenWood had assessed some 20 potential investment projects in China. The Luxi and Dongji projects passed the initial phase of screening and became the company’s top priorities. The due diligence on

CASE 8 GREENWOOD RESOURCES: A GLOBAL SUSTAINABLE VENTURE IN THE MAKING*

CASES

* Copyright © 2014 by the Case Research Journal and by Lei Li, Nottingham University Business School China; Howard Feldman, University of Portland; and Alan Eisner, Pace University. This case is developed solely as the basis for class discussion. It is not intended to serve as endorsements, sources of primary data, or illustrations of effective or ineffective management. The authors acknowledge the able assistance of Wendy Ye and Pratik Rachh in the process of developing the case.

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EXHIBIT 2 Forest Stewardship Council (FSC) Principles and Criteria for Forest Management

1. Compliance with laws and FSC principles and criteria. Forest management shall respect all applicable laws of the country in which they occur, and international treaties and agreements to which the country is a signatory, and comply with all FSC principles and criteria.

2. Tenure and use rights and responsibilities. Long-term tenure and use rights to the land and forest resources shall be clearly defined, documented, and legally established.

3. Indigenous people’s rights. The legal and customary rights of indigenous people to own, use, and manage their lands, territories, and resources shall be recognized and respected.

4. Community relations and workers’ rights. Forest management operations shall maintain or enhance the long-term social and economic well-being of forest workers and local communities.

5. Benefits from the forest. Forest management operations shall encourage the efficient use of the forest’s multiple products and services to ensure economic viability and a wide range of environmental and social benefits.

6. Environmental impact. Forest management shall conserve biological diversity and its associated value, water resources, soil, and unique and fragile ecosystems and landscapes, and, by so doing, maintain the ecological functions and the integrity of the forest.

7. Management plan. A management plan—appropriate to the scale and intensity of the operations—shall be written, implemented, and kept up to date. The long-term objectives of management, and the means of achieving them, shall be clearly stated.

8. Monitoring and assessment. Monitoring shall be conducted—appropriate to the scale and intensity of forest management—to assess the condition of the forest, yields of forest products, chain of custody, management activities, and their social and environmental impact.

9. Maintenance of high-conservation-value forests. Management activities in high-conservation-value forests shall maintain or enhance the attributes which define such forests. Decisions regarding high-conservation-value forests shall always be considered in the context of a precautionary approach.

10. Plantations. Plantations shall be planned and managed in accordance with Principles and Criteria 1–9, and Principle 10 and its Criteria. While plantations can provide an array of social and economic benefits, and can contribute to satisfying the world’s needs for forest products, they should complement the management of, reduce pressures on, and promote the restoration and conservation of natural forests.

Source: Austin and Reficco 2006.4

EXHIBIT 1 Tree Rotation Length and Yield

The figure shows that eucalyptus and hybrid poplar ripen for harvest much faster than other species.

Source: GreenWood’s brochure.

7 0 25 30 35 40 452015105

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14

21

28

35

42

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that 10 percent of tree farms be reserved for native habitats. At the same time, however, the economic benefits were uncertain because most end users of wood products were not necessarily willing to pay a premium price for FSC- certified products. Nevertheless, Jeff felt it was the right thing to do. “At the end of the day, we do what we believe (is right).”

Key Milestones: Building Research Expertise and the Management Team Looking back, Jeff recalled several key milestones for GreenWood. Having founded GreenWood with his lim- ited personal wealth, Jeff’s first milestone occurred when he convinced a large Oregon family office5 to acquire an existing poplar plantation. As a result of this acquisition, GreenWood not only earned a steady fee through managing the poplar plantation assets for the family office but also inherited a group of staff experienced in plantation man- agement. The head of this group was Dr. Brian Stanton, a renowned expert in poplar hybridization and genetic improvement. Over the years, Dr. Stanton’s research team had developed dozens of poplar varieties characterized by high growth rate, strong pest resistance, high wood density, and broad site adaptability.

The second milestone came in 2002. On behalf of the family office, GreenWood helped sell the poplar plantation to GMO Renewable Resources, a large timber investment management organization (TIMO). Despite the ownership change, GreenWood remained the management company, taking care of the plantation assets. This enhanced the com- pany’s credibility and stature and helped initiate a business model which integrated tree improvement, nurseries, tree farm operations, product (i.e., log, lumber, chips) sales, and trading and ecosystem services (i.e., monetizing car- bon credits, biodiversity credits, water quality, and renew- able energy credits and managing land for total ecosystem value).

Other milestones included the formation of a seasoned management team and the development of a series of stra- tegic relationships. In the course of formulating a viable global business plan and raising capital, Jeff was able to successfully put together what he believed was a highly competent management team (see Exhibit 3 for manage- ment team biographies and Exhibit 4 for the organizational structure). For example, Hunter Brown, a veteran opera- tional manager with experience in Asia, joined GreenWood as the chief operating officer. Brian Liu, a Chinese American with years of experience working for the Oregon

EXHIBIT 3 Executive Management Team Biographies, 2010

Jeff Nuss is the founder, chairman, and CEO of GreenWood Resources, Inc., and its subsidiaries and is directly responsible for the leadership and strategic direction of the company. He is a leading industry spokesman and advocate for novel methods of sustainable timber production and serves on the boards of the World Forestry Center, Agribusiness Council, and Western Hardwood Council. He received a BS in bioresource engineering and an MS in resource management and policy within the Civil Engineering Department of Oregon State University.

Hunter Brown is chief operating officer of GreenWood Resources, Inc. Prior to joining GreenWood, he was executive vice president for PACCESS, a global supply chain services management firm. He has extensive business experience in Asia. Hunter received a BS in forestry from the University of the South and an MS in forestry from Duke University, and he completed the Executive Program at the Darden School of Business at the University of Virginia.

Lincoln Bach is corporate controller of GreenWood Resources, Inc. Prior to joining GreenWood, he was corporate controller for an international family-wealth-management firm. He had previously served as an audit manager at Deloitte & Touche. He received a BS in accounting from Linfield College and is a CPA and CFP professional.

Brian Stanton is managing director of Tree Improvement Group & Nurseries at GreenWood Resources, Inc. For 20 years, he has overseen the technological developments for poplar on commercial tree farms in the U.S. where he has produced over 40,000 varieties of hybrid poplar that have been tested throughout Chile, China, Europe, and the United States. Brian is the chair of the Poplar and Willow Working Party for the International Union of Forest Research Organizations. He received a BS in biology from West Chester State College, an MS in forestry from the University of Maine, and a PhD in forest resources from Pennsylvania State University.

Don Rice is managing director of Resource Management Group at GreenWood Resources, Inc. Previously, Don was the Oregon poplar resource and manufacturing manager for Potlatch Corporation. Don has a degree in agricultural engineering from Washington State University.

Jake Eaton is managing director of resource planning and acquisitions at GreenWood Resources. He worked for 21 years with Potlatch Corporation. Jake has extensive global experience in short-rotation tree farm silviculture. He holds a BS in forest management from Oregon State University and an MS in silviculture and genetics from University of Montana.

Brian Liu is vice president and general manager of GreenWood Resources, Inc.’s China Operations. Previously, as an international trade representative for the State of Oregon Department of Agriculture, he successfully led the U.S. negotiation teams in opening the Chinese market for Oregon agricultural products. Brian was born and raised in Guangdong, China, and moved to the U.S. at the age of 14. He holds a BS in finance and an MBA in international management from Portland State University. He is fluent in English, Mandarin, and Cantonese.

Source: GreenWood Resources, Inc.

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the very beginning Jeff believed that GreenWood needed to consider opportunities in other regions of the world.

In China, the potential of high-yield, fast-growing planta- tions in general, and poplar tree farming in particular, was projected to be significant. Furthermore, the concept of “sustainably managing” tree farms was attractive to many people given that growing demand for wood products had resulted in years of excessive logging and, ultimately, signifi- cant desertification and deforestation. The country’s loss of forestland was almost ignored until the 1990s. In response, China launched a project in 2000 to plant trees and grass in an effort to slow desertification in northern China, includ- ing the Beijing region. Nationwide, China set a goal of rais- ing its afforestation (i.e., establishing forestland by planting seeds or trees in open land) rate to 26 percent of its land area by 2050, which would require an increase of forestland in excess of 65 million hectares.6 To achieve this ambitious goal, high-yield, fast-growing plantations would have to play an important role.

GreenWood’s Experience in China In 2000, Jeff was invited to join a Mercy Corps task force visiting China. Mercy Corps was a Portland, Oregon–based charity whose mission was to alleviate suffering, poverty, and oppression by helping people worldwide to build just, secure, and productive communities. Its cofounder, Ells

State Department of Agriculture (responsible for the for- est industry), was recruited to lead the company’s China operations. Brian had supported GreenWood’s endeavors while visiting China as a state government official, and he had been convinced to leave his stable government position to join GreenWood in 2005. In reflecting on his success in recruiting people, Jeff said:

I am good at connecting to people. In that process, I am getting people around an idea and a vision and motivating (them). . . . I tried to first understand what is really their passion. If that passion can be aligned with (the vision of the company), it makes it really easy to get people on the same page and aboard.

Thanks to the dedication of its people as well as its growing business network, GreenWood looked to expand its operations to China and South America and launched two investment fund-raising campaigns to support its initia- tives (see Exhibit 5).

Entering the Chinese Poplar Plantation Industry Perhaps the most important entrepreneurial initiative for GreenWood was the decision to commit itself to the Chinese poplar plantation market. The poplar plantation industry in the United States was of limited scale. From

EXHIBIT 5 A Chronicle of GreenWood Resources, Inc.

Year Event

1998 Jeff Nuss founded GreenWood with dedication to the innovative development and management of sustainable tree farms and their products.

1999 GreenWood started to manage poplar plantation assets on behalf of a large Oregonian family office.

2000 Jeff Nuss made the initial visit to China.

2001 Dr. Brian Stanton joined GreenWood.

2002 GreenWood helped sell the poplar plantation assets to GMO Renewable Resources on behalf of the Oregonian family office and consequently became a specialized poplar assets manager for GMO Renewable Resources.

2005 Hunter Brown and Brian Liu joined GreenWood.

2005 GreenWood established its Beijing office in China.

2006 GreenWood established its representative office in Chile.

2007 GreenWood raised $175 million through GreenWood Tree Farm Fund and acquired Potlatch’s poplar plantation assets in Oregon.

2008 Oriental Timber Fund Limited made a capital commitment of $200 million for GreenWood to invest in tree plantation assets in China.

2009 Preliminary assessment of 20 potential investment projects was completed by March; the Luxi and Dongji projects became priorities.

2010 GreenWood was due to make an investment decision in China together with Oriental Timber Fund Limited.

Source: Interviews.

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GreenWood’s global vision, entrepreneurial spirit, and rela- tionships with the right people at the right places would eventually lead the company to success.

Brian remembered the process involved in setting up GreenWood’s subsidiary in China:

Jeff got a vision. It’s critical that a leader has that vision because a lot of times, people are uncertain when it’s a good time to do that. At that time, the company was small with a very limited budget. But his vision was he could get more money. . . . We came to China pretty much with that US$1 million. We didn’t know how long it would last. It was very scary. It was a classic example of entrepreneurship. Let’s just do it and don’t look back.

Fund-Raising Success! While GreenWood was grappling with funding difficulties in China, an acquisition opportunity arose in the Pacific Northwest region in the United States. Potlatch, a large tim- ber company, changed ownership and decided to sell its pop- lar plantation assets located in Oregon. Jeff had consulted with Potlatch while working with CH2M Hill. He knew that an acquisition of Potlatch’s tree farms would expand GreenWood’s scale to a point where the company would be really attractive to capital investors. With the help of his busi- ness connections, Jeff established GreenWood Tree Farm Fund L.P. (GTFF) and raised US$175 million of private equity funding. GTFF used the money to purchase 18,000 acres of poplar trees from Potlatch, Inc., as well as three other poplar tree farms totaling an additional 17,000 acres. According to Jeff, this was a breakthrough for the firm that was almost serendipitous in the way it happened.

The expanded scale and personnel resulting from the US$175 million investment in GTFF enabled GreenWood to become a much more visible player in the tree planta- tion industry. In February 2008, Oriental, a GTFF inves- tor interested in emerging markets, made a commitment of US$200 million to GreenWood for use in the Chinese market.8

Brian relished the experience:

We changed our strategy. A lesson we learned is that you should be able to change. You should have an entrepreneurial spirit. We wanted to raise US$5 million (of equity) but ended up raising US$200 million (of capital commitment.)9

Risks and Challenges China was an exploding timber market. The tree planta- tion industry, still in its nascent stage, was fragmented and lacked serious competition. GreenWood believed that abundant opportunities were available to it. For example, the company could use its elite plant materials and its sophisticated silvicultural (i.e., forest cultivation) manage- ment approach to substantially increase the annual growth of trees (quantity) in China as well as their quality.

GreenWood, however, faced a range of risks and chal- lenges unique to China. First, there was a serious concern

Culver, had grown up in China as a missionary’s son in the 1940s and firmly believed tree farming could help Chinese rural communities develop and flourish. He convinced Jeff, who had never thought about visiting China, to travel with him to explore the potential opportunities.

GreenWood’s entry into China took part in two stages. The first took place in the five years following Jeff’s ini- tial trip, from 2000 to 2005. During this period, Jeff and his colleagues visited China three or four times every year with the express purpose of establishing relationships with academics, government agencies, and various businesses in the Chinese forest industry. Greenwood learned the market and local business practices. It also brought plant materials for site adaptability tests to one of the local tree-growing companies with which it planned to partner.

Establishing GreenWood Resources China, Ltd. (GreenWood China), a wholly owned subsidiary of GreenWood, based on greenfield investment,7 and opening its Beijing office in 2005 highlighted the second stage of GreenWood’s entry into China. Brian Liu, vice president and general manager in charge of GreenWood China, explained why it took the company five years before setting up its operating facility:

Since the No. 9 state council decree was promulgated to encourage Chinese people to go out and grow trees in 2003, a lot of entrepreneurs jumped in. The market was overwhelmed. Some entrepreneurs were doing the wrong thing. For example, “Wanli Afforestation Group” and “Yilin Wood Industry Co., Ltd.,” two large local private forestry companies, were involved in some sort of financial scheme. . . . I personally felt something was going wrong, but we didn’t know what. It’s not the correct way. It’s not the Western way. It’s just too chaotic for a Western company. In addition, we had financial and personnel constraints.

Jeff recalled the decision to enter China:

We collectively looked at what we had been doing in China. We came to the conclusion that if we were going to do anything, we couldn’t do it from afar . . . we knew that we wanted to go and put a nursery there. . . . China had two main hybrid varietals of poplar trees imported from Europe. We have many new hybrid varietals. We felt the best opportunity for us was that (China) needed more (plant) materials, better materials. . . . The (Chinese) government was issuing policies in the forestry sector that were all laser-driven to industry-based plantations, of which 45 percent were represented by poplar plantations.

Despite the potentially immense opportunities in the Chinese tree plantation market and Jeff’s experience, pas- sion, and business connections, raising institutional capital proved to be very challenging. Investors looked to historical performance and operating scale, which made it difficult for a relatively young venture like GreenWood to attract invest- ment funds. GreenWood wanted to raise US$5 million (in the form of equity) to fund its entry but was able to raise only about US$1 million. Regardless, Jeff believed

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tree asset evaluations (preliminary investigation, survey, inventory analysis, comprehensive due diligence, etc.), which its potential Chinese partners perceived as inef- ficient (because the procedure was time-consuming) or even inappropriate (because certain tree plantation data were not available in China). Hunter Brown, the COO of GreenWood, pointed out the key difference:

The Chinese approach is an informal management style (as opposed to) the much more structured and organized contract-driven style in the U.S.

Furthermore, during the global economic down- turn of 2008–2009, there was a growing perception that GreenWood’s market-based assessment and pricing were unfair to local farmers and communities.12 Jake Eaton, director of GreenWood’s Global Acquisitions and Resource Planning, acknowledged the disagreement with the compa- ny’s potential Chinese partners regarding the valuation of existing tree plantation assets. For GreenWood, the valua- tion was based on current market prices, whereas its Chinese counterparts believed the market would quickly rebound and therefore the valuation should take into account the prices that prevailed prior to the economic downturn.

Business challenges in China notwithstanding, GreenWood grew its business steadily. In 2009, it had about 10 employees in China (out of 70 companywide) and operated five tree nurseries which were used to test GreenWood’s elite plant materials for site adaptability.

Investment Opportunities in China With the capital commitment of US$200 million for the Chinese market, GreenWood, in conjunction with Oriental, established Green China Forestry Company, Ltd. (GCFC). GCFC was essentially responsible for making investment decisions in China. An investment committee, comprising Jeff and two representatives from Oriental, made invest- ment decisions while GreenWood China provided daily management services for a fee (see Exhibit 6 for an illus- tration of the management and investment relationship). The investment decision-making process consisted of two phases. First, GreenWood China conducted preliminary investigations to identify potential projects.13 Some 20 potential investment projects had been reviewed by March 2009 (see Exhibit 7).

Marc Hiller, a specialist in Forest Stewardship Council (FSC) at GreenWood, commented on the phase one evaluation:

In every project, we look at the quality of the (assets), the ability to sell the timber to the markets. . . . Can the tree farms (potentially) meet the FSC requirements? . . . Do the current owners have a lot of conflicts with the local communities? . . . Does the local company have problems with its employees? . . . Were the local farmers coerced to turn in their tree assets for the consolidation purpose?14 . . . Can we acquire the assets at an attractive rate? . . . What are the financial and legal risks in acquiring the land?

with the relatively weak intellectual property protection in the Chinese institutional system. Since plant materi- als existed in both tree nurseries and farms, it was hard to prevent people from “stealing” them. Elite plant materials were one of GreenWood’s most valuable resources and were critical for developing its competitive advantages in China. GreenWood was confident, however, that it could capitalize on its years of experience to create increasingly better plant materials faster than any imitators could pos- sibly copy them.

Second, there were political and social risks everywhere they turned. Chinese forestlands were owned either by the state or collectively. In practice, all kinds of government entities at different administrative levels (including small towns and villages) owned the lands, resulting in a very complex ownership structure. Many farmers worked small, government-allocated plots based on a lease contract of typ- ically 20 to 30 years. GreenWood could negotiate long-term leases only with the local government, which either owned the lands and/or could represent farmers in striking a deal with foreign companies. A thorny issue was that “China’s weak contract laws carried a risk for leaseholders. . . . In several instances, unhappy farmers waged protests against foreign companies when they felt they didn’t get a fair share on the lease.”10 Thus, there was still a concern of potential expropriation for foreign investors.

Third, GreenWood needed to know where to find the most cost-effective tree farms and learn with whom to partner in acquiring and managing tree assets. The lack of proper documentation of plantation assets complicated this effort.

GreenWood also dealt with several other unique chal- lenges. For example, the Chinese approach to silviculture was rudimentary compared to Western standards. There was a lack of knowledge in tree farm investment, plant materials development, and efficient irrigation, according to Zhang Weidong, director of the Resource Planning and Acquisition Group at GreenWood China.

The differences in silvicultural approaches presented the biggest challenge to Brian. In Western countries, long- term internal rate of return (IRR) was a prevalent business concept. This was at odds, however, with the mind-set of Chinese farmers, who had a short-term focus and wanted to know only the “value” of their timber assets per mu (0.067 hectare),11 which was either a historical price based on the booming market of previous years or a price determined by cumulative capital expenditures plus a desired surplus. Brian noted that his team often used both the Western method and the Chinese method to conduct side-by-side comparisons:

I call myself a translator, translating Western concepts and applying them to China. . . . It’s easier said than done. It took us two years to figure it out.

Another big challenge was cultural, especially the dif- ferences in business cultures. GreenWood followed a strict Western procedure when conducting environmental and

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Luxi Project16

Luxi County was located in Shandong, in east China. The county had fertile soil, sophisticated river and water irriga- tion networks, and other highly favorable natural conditions (ample sunlight, rain, and gentle slopes) for fast-growth, high-yield poplar plantations. Luxi had been making tre- mendous efforts in afforestation and sustainable economic development since 2002. A plan was executed to build a for- estry park where tree plantation, landscaping, and tourism would be integrated to create an ecological system.

GreenWood explored investment opportunities in Luxi starting in late 2005. Since then, company personnel had visited Luxi many times surveying and analyzing tree farms and building guanxi (personal connections for mutual ben- efits)17 with local government officials. The county govern- ment’s support and coordination were critical for going forward with an investment since various local government agencies owned large parcels of poplar tree farms.

GreenWood was negotiating with the Luxi Forestry Bureau, a government agency with a mandate to implement government policies, regulate environmental construction, protect forest resources, and organize forestry development within Luxi County. Mr. Jiao, director of Luxi Forestry Bureau, indicated that he hoped GreenWood would help local farmers improve forestry management and facilitate local economic development by contributing capital and tree plantation know-how.

It was not, however, until December 2008 that GreenWood signed a nonbinding letter of intent (LOI) with the Luxi County government specifying the scope of the project. While commending GreenWood’s meticu- lous style in dealing with the project, Jiao speculated that GreenWood’s Portland headquarters had limited knowl- edge of the local situation and was not willing to delegate its responsibilities to the Beijing office. Consequently, the responses from GreenWood tended to be slow during the negotiation.

Jeff also stressed the dual significance of financial via- bility and social responsibility:

(The process) addresses the environmental and social issues. . . . The model (of sustainability) we hold ourselves to is FSC certification. . . . Of course, we’ve got to figure out how to become profitable. . . . Sustainability is not achieved unless you are economically sustainable.

Among the 20 potential projects, Luxi and Dongji were the most desirable based on preliminary analyses and thus entered phase two, which consisted of a more compre- hensive due diligence analysis including economic, social, and environmental elements. The economic element was mainly reflected in the estimation of internal rate of return (IRR), net present value (NPV), and initial cash outlay. According to GreenWood, the investor’s expected IRR was approximately 15 percent. The discount rate for NPV calcu- lation was 10 percent.15 The social and environmental due diligence analysis largely followed the FSC principles and criteria for forest management such as indigenous people’s rights, community relations and workers’ rights, compli- ance with laws and FSC principles, environmental impact, and so on, as described in Exhibit 2.

Both the Luxi and Dongji investments, if executed suc- cessfully, could achieve the investor’s expected IRR, which was much higher than the approximate average return of 6 percent generated by timber investment in the United States. Moreover, it was anticipated that the investments would help improve the ecological environment in China and contribute to economic and social development in their respective local communities.

However, the two projects differed vastly in terms of physical locations, natural conditions, and partner- ship opportunities. The difference, as highlighted in GreenWood’s detailed due diligence review, led to consid- erable discussion of the various pros and cons of the two projects.

EXHIBIT 6 Relationships between GreenWood’s Management and Investment Organizations

Source: GreenWood internal documents.

Investment Organization (USA)

Management Organization Investment Organization (China)

Management Services

Management Services

Management Fees

Management Fees

Multiple Institutional Investors

(Majority Ownership)

GreenWood Resources, Inc.

GreenWood Resources, Inc.

(Minority Ownership)

Oriental Timber Fund (Majority Ownership)

GreenWood Resources, Inc.

(Minority Ownership)

GreenWood Tree Farm Fund L.P.

(GTFF)

GreenWood Resources China, Ltd.

GreenWood China Forestry Company,

Ltd. (GCFC)

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ID Location Province (area) 1 BSY Hebei 2 Luxi Shandong 3 Gengmin Jiangxi 4 Zuheng Jiangxi 5 Dongji Inner Mongolia 6 Chaoyang Liaoning 7 Dong Ying Shandong 8 Kaifeng Henan 9 Kashi Xinjiang 10 Lanzhou Gansu 11 Meili NingXia 12 Nanyang Henan 13 Yili Xinjiang 14 Weifang Shandong 15 Daxing Beijing 16 AIC Hunan 17 Jilin Hebei 18 Nanning Guangxi 19 Shaoguan Guangdong 20 Zhongfu Shaanxi

Source: GreenWood’s internal documents.

13 5

11

6

1 15

14

8

12

20

3

4

16

10

2

17 7

1918

9

EXHIBIT 7 China Potential Investment Projects

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In addition to meeting the substantial demand in Luxi and its neighboring county, GreenWood was aiming at Linyi, a timber-processing hub and wood market about 300 kilometers (186.4 miles) from Luxi. There were about 2,600 mills in Linyi, and the largest 200 mills each needed more than 15,000 m3 of timber annually. However, many of these mills were closing because their export-oriented businesses were seriously affected by the global financial crisis.

GreenWood tried to make an offer to the Luxi County government based on the local market prices of logs and its estimate of standing inventory volume. However, the county government argued that the assessment and sub- sequent offer would take unfair advantage of local enti- ties and farmers, given the current economic meltdown in China due to the global financial crisis. Moreover, some government officials complained about GreenWood’s slow pace in negotiating an agreement, which had resulted in the loss of seasonal planting and harvesting opportunities.

Dongji Project19

Dongji was located in the eastern part of the Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region in northeast China. The area suffered not only from a severe timber shortage but also from continued desertification. Although the area was semiarid and subject to windy weather all year, it was suit- able for poplar cultivation due to its appropriate soil tex- ture and access to the local river systems. The Dongji land was marginally fertile. It was estimated that the annual tree growth rate would not be much beyond 0.7 m3 per mu even with GreenWood’s elite plant materials and silvicultural management practices. One GreenWood analyst suggested that an annual rate of 0.9 m3 per mu would be optimistic. Still, Dr. Stanton felt excited about the project because of the challenges it would bring to his research.

To combat desertification, the government of Dongji set up an ambitious goal of raising forest coverage from 22 to 30 percent from 2006 to 2010, resulting in a net increase of forestland by 10 million mu, of which 1.5 million mu was targeted for planting poplar trees.

Unlike the case in Luxi, private firms were essential in developing poplar tree plantations in Dongji. For example, Dongji Lideng Forestry Development Co., Ltd. (Lideng), a potential partner of GreenWood, held a 30-year lease on land totaling 126,600 mu planted with hybrid poplar, whereas 55 state-owned forest farms together had approxi- mately 60,000 mu.

Lideng was a private forestry development company with activities in poplar plantation establishment, poplar nurseries, poplar stumpage, timber harvest rights transfer, and so on. To take advantage of the extensive land resources with large contiguous blocks and low land lease rates rang- ing from RMB15 to RMB25 per mu per year, the company planned to establish an additional 300,000 mu of poplar plantation within 3 to 5 years. This plan had already been

Jake Eaton agreed the process could have been faster. He pointed out that a major factor slowing down the nego- tiations was that GreenWood was often not talking to the real decision makers. Jessica Zhi, the Luxi project manager at GreenWood China, also mentioned the complexity of the Luxi project, in part because many local government bureaus were involved and at times leadership changes occurred.

If this project were selected, GreenWood planned to establish a wholly owned foreign enterprise in Luxi for acquiring and developing approximately 100,000 mu (6,667 hectares) of poplar tree plantations. The Luxi Forestry Bureau had been managing these tree plantations since 2002. It was expected to be a primary contractor for GreenWood, providing crop care activities at low labor costs and helping maintain the local relationships. The lease documents for the land were held by several govern- ment bureaus and were transferable. The land lease price was 300 to 400 renminbi (RMB), or US$43.90–58.60, per mu per year.18 Typical lease length was 20 to 30 years, with some leases up to 70 years. GreenWood estimated that an investment of US$30–40 million was required in the first five years.

The high up-front fixed costs required by the Luxi proj- ect were a serious concern for the main investor, Oriental, as Jeff noted:

If you look at the land (lease) pricing in China today, it would make more sense (for the investors) to buy (or lease) the land in another country (such as Australia, New Zealand, Poland and Romania).

As part of the negotiation process, the Luxi Forestry Bureau asked GreenWood to help set up a small wood- processing mill with an estimated investment of US$750,000. The mill, associated with high value-added activities, would provide employment opportunities to local residents. GreenWood, however, gave only a lukewarm response as the mill was not its essential business.

GreenWood planned to adopt a seven-year rotation strategy in Luxi (i.e., trees would be harvested at the age of seven for veneer log and pulpwood). It believed the locally tested GreenWood elite plant materials, coupled with favor- able natural conditions and intensive management (e.g., site preparation, planting, spacing and thinning, weed and pest control, and fertilization) could readily enhance tree growth rate by 50 percent from 1.2 cubic meters (m3) to 1.8m3 per mu per year.

According to the data provided by the Luxi Forestry Bureau, GreenWood estimated the annual local timber demand within 100 kilometers (62 miles) of the project site was about 2.2 million m3, which greatly exceeded the exist- ing annual supply of 1 million m3. As a result, local buyers looked to supplement their supply with imported timber. However, buyers found it increasingly difficult to depend on large volumes of imported timber because of high tar- iffs (e.g., for Russian logs) and high transportation costs required to bring logs into the area.

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proximity to the Russian border. Moreover, the export market appeared to be relatively inaccessible for Dongji- based companies due to their inland locations.20 Jeff and his senior management team also wondered whether there would be any reputational risks if GreenWood collaborated with Lideng. The latter had provided extensive silvicultural management services for Wanli Afforestation Group and Yilin Wood Industry Co., Ltd., the two large private for- estry companies noted earlier that were currently under litigation for illegal fund-raising and the use of a pyramid scheme.

Huang believed Lideng and GreenWood would make a great partnership given the potential synergy between his com- pany’s local expertise and cost efficiency and GreenWood’s sophisticated silvicultural management and leading poplar hybridization technology. However, he also believed his tree plantation assets had been undervalued by at least 20 percent based on GreenWood’s assessment. Moreover, he had seri- ous grievances with GreenWood’s lengthy decision-making process. He considered dropping the deal if the negotiations continued to drag on for much longer.

What to Do? Jeff and his senior management team knew expansion in China would help them achieve their vision of maximiz- ing long-term returns for their investors and fulfilling the company’s social and environmental responsibilities. They were also aware of potential business challenges as well as economic and political risks in an institutionally unique environment. After reading the two comprehensive due diligence reports, Jeff turned his attention to the finan- cial data (see Exhibit 8) and a summarized assessment of

approved by the State Forestry Administration, the central government agency for the forestry industry.

Lideng had a trained professional poplar tree plant- ing team equipped with a patented deep planting tech- nique suited to the harsh environment of northern China. The planting technique and its accompanying machinery were the result of a 13-year forestry development research project, led by the United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO). The company had an annual planting capacity of 200,000 mu. Lideng also told GreenWood that it had the sole right to propagate commercially superior plant materials developed by the FAO project.

In response to GreenWood’s interest in its poplar tree farm assets, Lideng offered 82,644 mu out of its existing total for GreenWood’s purchase. The remaining 43,000- plus mu had already been bought by individual investors through a government-approved Dongji Stumpage Trading Center, in which Huang Jingbao, the CEO and president of Lideng, was a senior consultant.

GreenWood planned what it considered a prudent strategy for Dongji. First, it would focus on deploying local hybrid varietals while testing the suitability of its home-grown elite plant materials. Second, it would adopt a 10-year rotation scheme due to the low annual growth rate in Dongji. Third, it would capitalize on Lideng’s expertise in planting and crop care activities.

In Dongji, timber was mainly consumed in the local mar- ket. A potential capacity of 2 million m3 of annual wood consumption existed across 698 wood-processing mills. Though the local market experienced a limited impact from the economic meltdown, there was a concern that Russian timber could potentially flood the market due to Dongji’s

Total Existing Areab (mu)

Current Standing Inventory

Volume (m3)

Stumpage Price (2008) (weighted average, RMB/m3)

Investment in Existing Plantation

Assets (RMB)

Luxi 92,073 530,529 559 296,548,734

Dongji 202,650 225,391 445 100,298,995

Land Lease and Related Expensesc

(RMB/mu/year)

Crop Care Expenses

(RMB/mu/year)

Planting Expenses

(RMB/mu, 1st year)

Stumpage Volume at End of Each

Rotation (m3/mu)

Luxi 367 110 632 12.6 (year 7)

Dongji 87 45 255 7.0 (year 10)d

a 1 hectare = 15 mu; 1 U.S. dollar = 6.83 renminbi; the numbers are rounded. b These total existing areas were used in GreenWood’s investment feasibility reports. c The related expenses include management fee, security fee, etc. d The growth rate of 0.7 m3 per mu per year for Dongji was deemed to be realistic, whereas the rate of 0.9 m3 per mu per year was mentioned as

an optimistic scenario.

Source: Adapted from GreenWood’s investment feasibility reports.

EXHIBIT 8 Estimated Investment Costs and Yields: Luxi versus Dongjia

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9. GreenWood planned to recruit shareholders (i.e., equity owners) for its business expansion but ended up playing the role of investment (and assets) manager for large investors such as Oriental Timber Fund, Ltd.

10. Hsuan, A. (2009, Feb. 23). “See a Forest through the Trees.” The Oregonian.

11. Mu is a common metric for land in China. 1 hectare = 15 mu, or 2.47 acres.

12. Interviews with GreenWood’s two potential partners. 13. Although GreenWood China was responsible for the investigations,

the parent company was supervising the relevant activities and controlling the process.

14. When business developers needed to lease a large piece of land for commercial purposes in China, they often tried to incentivize and/ or at times coerce through the government agencies the current land users (e.g., farmers) to transfer their land lease contracts.

15. In the broadly defined forest industry, investors prefer long-term hold, good cash flows, and net value appreciation of tree assets resulting from biological growth. Tree plantation assets are also perceived as insurance against economic/financial crisis.

16. This section draws heavily upon Luxi Investment Feasibility Report by GreenWood Resources China, Ltd.

17. “Guanxi, as compared to social capital in the West, tends to be more personal and enduring, and involves more exchanges of favors. In general, relationships tend to precede business in China, whereas in the west it is usually the reverse, i.e., relationships follow as a result of the business.” Tung, Worm, and Fang, 2008, Organizational Dynamics, 37(1): 69.

18. 1 U.S. dollar = 6.83 renminbi (the Chinese currency) in 2009; the land lease price does not include the price for the trees.

19. This section draws heavily upon Dongji Investment Feasibility Report by GreenWood Resources China, Ltd.

20. Interview with an industry expert on May 11, 2009.

economic, social, and environmental viability of the two projects prepared by GreenWood staff (see Exhibit 9). Over a year had passed since the announcement of Oriental’s capital commitment. Jeff understood that GreenWood needed to proceed with the investment with some sense of urgency, but he wanted to make sure that his team provided the best recommendations possible to the investment committee.

ENDNOTES 1. Light, L. (2009, May 6). “For Some, Sound of Profit Is ‘Timber.’” Wall

Street Journal. 2. See the company’s website: www.greenwoodresources.com. 3. CH2M HILL provided a wide range of engineering and land

development services including consulting, design, construction, procurement, operations and maintenance, and project management to federal, state, municipal, and local government entities as well as private industries in the U.S. and internationally.

4. Austin, J. and Reficco, E. (2006). Forest Stewardship Council. Harvard Business School Case (9-303-047).

5. A family office is a private company that manages investments and trusts for a single wealthy family.

6. Reporter (2009, May). “China to Fully Open Its Forestry Industry.” People’s Daily Online, http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/200111/23/ eng20011123_85194.html, accessed on May 14, 2009.

7. Greenfield investment is direct investment to build a new manufacturing, marketing, or administrative facility, as opposed to acquiring existing facilities.

8. The name of this investor was disguised as requested by GreenWood Resources, Inc.

Manager 1 (Beijing Office)b

Manager 2 (Beijing Office)

One Executive (Portland HQ)

Luxi Dongji Luxi Dongji Luxi Dongji

Economic value 5 3–4 5 3 5 3

Social value 5 3–4 4 4 5 3

Environmental stewardship 1 5 3 5 3 5

a The scale is 1–5. (1 = very low potential value; 5 = very high potential value.) b The manager pointed out that the ecological system had been considerably improved in Luxi in recent years. Thus, the potential value creation of environmental stewardship by GreenWood had declined.

Source: Interviews.

EXHIBIT 9 Assessment of Economic, Social, and Environmental Viabilitya

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C44 CASE 8 :: GREENWOOD RESOURCES: A GLOBAL SUSTAINABLE VENTURE IN THE MAKING

APPENDIX 1 BACKGROUND—TIMBER INVESTMENTS AND TREE PLANTATION MANAGEMENT

Timber Investments The U.S. had some of the most productive timberland (i.e., tree-growing land) in the world. Traditionally, timber investment was dominated by such large integrated forest product companies as Weyerhaeuser, International Paper Company, Plum Creek Timber Company, and James River Corporation, to name a few.

Since the mid-1990s, however, there had been a signifi- cant trend toward institutional ownership of timberlands. Institutional investors such as timber investment manage- ment organizations (TIMOs) and real estate investment trusts (REITs) purchased large tracts of land from the tra- ditional forest product companies because of the potential to generate attractive long-term capital returns.1 “Timber often is likened to high-grade bonds, meant to be held for ten years or more. The average annual timber appre- ciation for the past decade was 4.1 percent versus minus 3.8 percent for the S&P-500 stock index.”2 Moreover, timber was not closely correlated with other asset classes. “Trees keep growing 4 percent per year, no matter what happens to inflation, interest rates or market trends.”3 In addition, potential federal and state tax benefits could be accrued from timber acquisitions.

Unfortunately, the downside of a timber investment was significant. It required a substantial amount of capital to be invested in a very illiquid asset with no quick payoff. For example, a minimum of $100,000 was required to partici- pate in a TIMO.

Tree Plantations U.S. commercial timberland was concentrated in the Northwest, Southeast, and Northeast regions of the coun- try. The Northwest and Southeast were managed like farms, with landowners planting trees, allowing them to grow for a number of years, clear cutting the stand, and then plant- ing again. Each cycle was a rotation. The Pacific Northwest contained 90 percent Western hemlock and Douglas fir with normal rotations of 45 to 60 years. In contrast, the Southeast United States was dominated by the Southern yellow pine species, with a typical rotation of 20 to 40 years. The Northeast United States had a diverse mix of trees, which were managed differently.

Plantation forests (as opposed to natural forests) were assuming a rapidly increasing role in commercial timber

production. By 2005, the share of global timber production sourced from plantations was estimated as “approaching 50 percent.” The largest plantation areas were located in Asia (China, India, and Japan), Europe (Russia, Scandinavia, and Eastern Europe), and the United States.4

The increasing importance of tree plantations was attrib- uted to the fact that “less than half of the world’s original forests remain, and ongoing deforestation is potentially dev- astating to the environment. Yet population growth and the increasing standard of living in many countries continue to drive the demand for timber products.”5

High-yield, fast-growing tree farms lessen the pressure of deforestation by providing the type of timber products demanded by world markets. At the same time, tree farms are a sustainable environmental solution that can improve air and water quality, reclaim deforested land, and produce renewable energy in the form of biomass.6

Two popular, high-yield, and fast-growing tree species grown in plantation farms were eucalyptus and poplar. Eucalyptus was concentrated in tropical and subtropical regions of the world, while poplar was grown mainly in more temperate regions.

Hybrid Poplar Plantation Development7 Poplar was an important fiber resource for the global pulp and paper industry. In the United States, a number of prom- inent North American paper companies managed poplar plantations. Hybrid varieties, formed by crossing poplars, cottonwoods, and aspens, were among the first trees domes- ticated in North America by the pulp and paper industry. Several of these hybrid varieties were used to expand plan- tation development in the Pacific Northwest in the 1980s and 1990s.

As of 2009, hybrid poplars remained the best choice for hardwood plantation management for the manufacture of premium grades of communication papers throughout all of North America. There was also a growing trend to use hybrid poplars as a source for biomass feedstock for the emerging biofuels and composite-products industries and for hardwood lumber markets.

Key success factors for hybrid poplar plantations included (1) favorable natural site conditions (e.g., flat plain, river bot- tom), (2) elite plant materials (with high growth rate and strong pest resistance), and (3) sound silvicultural (forest cultivation) management, among others.8

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3. Ibid. 4. The Campbell Group. (2009, May 14). Global Supply. www.campbell-

group.com/timberland/primer/global-supply.aspx, accessed on May 14, 2009.

5. GreenWood Resources, Inc., brochure. 6. Ibid. 7. This section draws heavily on an internal document of GreenWood

Resources titled “Hybrid Poplar and the Pulp and Paper Industry in North America: Implications for a Secured Supply of Quality Fiber for Papermakers Worldwide.”

8. Silvicultural management refers to integrated management of forestry, which includes land preparation, spacing and thinning, pruning, weed control, pest and disease control, fertilization, irrigation, and harvesting, among others.

Hybrid poplar plantations were tended throughout North America using cultivation methods that included mechanical and chemical methods of weed control, inte- grated pest management techniques, fertilization, and, in some cases, irrigation. Under competent management, hybrid poplar was the fastest-growing tree in the temperate zone.

APPENDIX ENDNOTES 1. Draffan, G. (2006, April). Notes on Institutional Ownership of

Timber. www.endgame.org/timo.html, accessed on May 6, 2009. 2. Light, L. (2009, May 6). “For Some, Sound of Profit Is ‘Timber.’”

Wall Street Journal.

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C46 CASE 9 :: FRESHDIRECT: HOW FRESH IS IT?

On its website, FreshDirect boldly proclaimed, “Our food is fresh, our customers are spoiled. Order on the web today and get next-day delivery of the best food at the best price, exactly the way you want it, with 100 percent satisfaction guaranteed.”1 Recently, however, many consumers ques- tioned the freshness of the food delivered by FreshDirect. Since online shopping did not give customers the chance to feel and choose the products themselves, they had to rely completely on FreshDirect to select the food for them.

Since 2001, operating out of its production center in Long Island City, Queens, FreshDirect had offered online grocery shopping and delivery service in Manhattan, Queens, Brooklyn, Nassau County, Riverdale, Westchester, select areas of Staten Island, the Bronx, the Hamptons, New Jersey including Jersey Shore, Philadelphia, Delaware, and parts of Connecticut. FreshDirect also offered pickup service at its Long Island City facility, as well as corporate service to select delivery zones in Manhattan and summer delivery service to the Hamptons on Long Island.

In 2012, the company decided to move its facility from Long Island City, Queens, to a new 800,000-square-foot property in the Bronx, and received court clearance to do so. FreshDirect had threatened to relocate its operational hub and headquarters to New Jersey, but New York City and the State of New York offered close to a $130 million subsidy package, including tax breaks and abatements, to keep the online grocer in New York City. A petition by the community group South Bronx United had earlier chal- lenged the move arguing that the city had failed to properly analyze the potential environmental impact (e.g., air and noise pollution) that would result from a “truck-intensive” business. However, the court ruled in FreshDirect’s favor in 2013.2

FreshDirect’s new headquarters was slated to open by 2016 (this would be slightly delayed), and CEO Jason Ackerman was delighted with the court’s decision. “We are eager to move forward with our plans to bring thousands of jobs to the Bronx and make it easier for people to get fresh food,” he declared.3

During the early years of the company, FreshDirect had pronounced to the New York City market that it was “the new way to shop for food.” This was a bold statement

given that the previous decade had witnessed the demise of numerous online grocery ventures. However, the creators of FreshDirect were confident in the prospects for success of their business. Their entire operation had been designed to deliver on one simple promise to grocery shoppers: “higher quality at lower prices.”

While this promise was an extremely common tagline used within and outside the grocery business, FreshDirect had integrated numerous components into its system to give real meaning to their words. Without a retail loca- tion, FreshDirect didn’t have to pay expensive rent for a retail space. To offer the highest-quality products to its customers, FreshDirect had designed a state-of-the-art pro- duction center and staffed it with expert personnel. The 800,000-square-foot production facility newly located in the Bronx would employ about 700 workers when it opened in 2018. The current facility in Long Island City, Queens, would operate until the new building came online. In each FreshDirect warehouse, twelve separate temperature zones ensured that each piece of produce, meat, and other food was kept at its optimal temperature for ripening and/or preservation. The company claimed the entire facility was kept colder and cleaner than any other retail environment.4

Further quality management was achieved by an SAP manufacturing software system that controlled every detail of the facility’s operations. All of the thermometers, scales, and conveyor belts within the facility were connected to a central command center. Each specific setting was pro- grammed into the system by an expert from the correspond- ing department—everything from the ideal temperature for ripening a cantaloupe to the amount of flour that went into the French bread. The system was equipped with a monitor- ing alarm that alerted staff to any deviation from the pro- grammed settings.

FreshDirect maintained extremely high standards for cleanliness, health, and safety. The floor was immaculate. All food-preparation areas and equipment were bathed in antiseptic foam at the end of each day. Incoming and outgoing food was tested in FreshDirect’s in-house labo- ratory, which ensured adherance to USDA guidelines and the Hazard Analysis and Critical Control Point food safety system. In all respects, food passing through the FreshDirect facility met the company’s high health and safety standards.5

System efficiency was the key to FreshDirect’s ability to offer its high-quality products at low prices. The middle- man was completely eliminated. Instead of going through an intermediary, both fresh and dry products were ordered

CASES

CASE 9 FRESHDIRECT: HOW FRESH IS IT?*

* This case was prepared by Professor Alan B. Eisner of Pace University as a basis for class discussion rather than to illustrate either effective or ineffective handling of an administrative situation. Thanks to graduate students Saad Nazir, Dev Das, Rohit R. Phadtare, and Shruti Shrestha for research assistance. Copyright © 2017 Alan B. Eisner.

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CASE 9 :: FRESHDIRECT: HOW FRESH IS IT? C47

from individual growers and producers and shipped directly to FreshDirect’s production center, where its expert staff prepared them for purchase. In addition, FreshDirect did not accept any slotting allowances.6 This unique relation- ship with growers and producers allowed FreshDirect to enjoy reduced purchase prices from its suppliers, passing the savings on to its customers.

Each department of the facility, including the cof- fee roaster, butcher, and bakery, was staffed by carefully selected experts. FreshDirect offered premium fresh coffees (roasted on site), pastries and breads (baked on site), deli, cheese, meats (roast beef dry-aged on site), and seafood. Perishable produce was FreshDirect’s specialty—by buying locally as much as possible and using the best sources of the season, it was able to bring food the shortest distance from farms, dairies, and fisheries to the customer’s table.

FreshDirect catered to the tastes of its busy Manhattan clientele by offering a full line of heat-and-serve meals prepared in the FreshDirect kitchen by New York execu- tive chef Michael Stark (formerly of Tribeca Grill) and his team. Another celebrity chef, Terrance Brennan of New York’s French-Mediterranean restaurant Picholine, oversaw creation of “restaurant-worthy” four-minute meals. Made from raw ingredients delivered in a “steam valve system” package, these complete meals were not frozen but were delivered ready to cook in a microwave.

The proximity of FreshDirect’s processing facility to its Manhattan customer base was a critical factor in its cost- effective operational design. The processing center’s loca- tion in the South Bronx put approximately 4 million people within a 10-mile radius of FreshDirect, enabling the firm to quickly deliver a large volume of orders.7 Further, cost con- trols had been implemented through FreshDirect’s order and delivery protocols. Products in each individual order were packed in boxes, separated by type of item (meat, seafood, and produce packed together; dairy, deli, cheese, coffee, and tea packed together; grocery, specialty, and nonrefrigerated products packed together), and placed on a computerized conveyor system to be sorted, assembled, and loaded into a refrigerated truck for delivery.

Orders had to be a minimum of $40, with a delivery charge between $6.99 and $7.99 per order, depending on the order dollar amount and delivery location. Delivery was made by one of FreshDirect’s own trucks and was available only during a prearranged two-hour window from 6:30 a.m. to 10 p.m. every day of the week. To attract more customers and to encourage repeat purchases, FreshDirect also offered DeliveryPass that enabled customers to get unlimited free deliveries by purchasing a free delivery subscription for 6 or 12 months. The DeliveryPass price for 6 months was $79 and for 12 months was $129.

Competing with other online grocers like AmazonFresh, specialty gourmet/gourmand stores in Manhattan, and high- end chain supermarkets like Whole Foods, Trader Joe’s, and Fairway, FreshDirect was trying to woo the sophisticated grocery shopper with an offer of quality, delivered to the

customer’s door, at a price more attractive than others in the neighborhood. Operating in the black for the first time in 2005,8 by choosing to remain a private company and expanding gradually, FreshDirect’s owners hoped to turn a daily profit, steadily recovering the estimated $60 million start-up costs, silencing critics, and winning converts.9

An interesting idea for expansion was to cater to home cooks who liked to cook from scratch. FreshDirect teamed up with online recipe website Foodily to launch a new service called Popcart. Users could order deliveries of food ingredients directly applicable to online recipes. The Internet was a popular recipe source for home cooks, but shopping for ingredients was widely seen as an unpleasant chore. The new Popcart technology alleviated this burden by linking with the FreshDirect portal and providing next- day deliveries of whatever a recipe called for. “This is really at the heart and soul of making food shopping easier for consumers. About 70% of New Yorkers cook from scratch multiple times a week, and 30% cook multiple times a day. Think about that opportunity,” said Jodi Kahn, chief con- sumer officer for FreshDirect.10

In January 2016, aiming a direct attack on the heated competition in online food delivery services, FreshDirect introduced a new service called FoodKick, which promised to deliver food and liquor within an hour of a customer placing an order. FoodKick was initially available in partic- ular areas of Brooklyn and Queens; however, the company planned to expand this service nationwide.11

Founding Partners Cofounder and its first chief executive officer Joseph Fedele was able to bring a wealth of experience in New York City’s food industry to FreshDirect. In 1993 he had cofounded Fairway Uptown, a 35,000-square-foot super- market on West 133 Street in Harlem. Many critics origi- nally questioned the success of a store in that location, but Fairway’s low prices and quality selection of produce and meats made it a hit with neighborhood residents, as well as many downtown and suburban commuters.

Cofounder Jason Ackerman, FreshDirect’s vice chair- man and chief financial officer, had gained exposure to the grocery industry as an investment banker with Donaldson Lufkin & Jenrette, where he specialized in supermarket mergers and acquisitions.

Fedele and Ackerman first explored the idea of starting a large chain of fresh-food stores, but they realized main- taining a high degree of quality would be impossible with a large enterprise. As an alternative, they elected to pursue a business that incorporated online shopping with central distribution. Using the failure of Webvan, the dot-com deliv- ery service that ran through $830 million in five years of rapid expansion, as their example of what not to do, Fedele and Ackerman planned to start slowly, use off-the-shelf soft- ware and an automated delivery system, and pay attention to essentials such as forming relationships with key suppli- ers and micromanaging quality control.12

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FreshDirect acquired the bulk of its $100 million invest- ment from several private sources, along with the contribu- tion that was expected to come from the State of New York in tax breaks. By locating FreshDirect’s distribution center within the state border and promising to create at least 300 permanent, full-time, private-sector jobs in the state, FreshDirect became eligible for a $500,000 training grant from the Empire State Development Jobs Now Program. As its name implied, the purpose of the Jobs Now program was to create new, immediate job opportunities for New Yorkers.

CEO Successions Although the press was mostly positive about FreshDirect’s opportunities, growth and operational challenges remained. In the words of an ex–senior executive of FreshDirect, “The major problem seems to be constant change in Senior Management. I think they are now on their 4th CEO.”13 At the time, the company was actually on its fifth CEO, and it later named its sixth. FreshDirect cofounder Joseph Fedele had remained CEO until January 2004, when cofounder Jason Ackerman succeeded him. Ackerman served as CEO of FreshDirect for a little over seven months; Dean Furbush succeeded him in September 2004. Ackerman remained vice chairman and chief financial officer. The tenure of Dean Furbush lasted a little over two years. Steve Michaelson, president since 2004, replaced Furbush as CEO of FreshDirect in early 2007.14 In 2008 Michaelson left for another firm, and FreshDirect’s chairman of the board, Richard Braddock, expanded his role in the firm and took over as CEO. Braddock said, “I chose to increase my involvement with the company because I love the busi- ness and I think it has great growth potential.” Braddock had previously worked at private equity firm MidOcean Partners and travel services retailer Priceline.com, where he’d also served as chairman and CEO.15 Braddock wound up leaving the company in March 2011. Jason Ackerman returned to the role of CEO for a second time.

Business Plan While business started out relatively slowly, FreshDirect hoped to capture around 5 percent of the New York City grocery market. Availability citywide was originally slated for the end of 2002. However, to maintain its superior service and product quality, FreshDirect chose to expand its service area slowly. This business model seemed to be working well for FreshDirect, as the company continued to gradually expand successfully into new areas surrounding its Long Island City facility. With the success of its business model and its steady growth strategy, by the spring of 2011, FreshDirect had delivery available to select zip codes and neighborhoods throughout Manhattan and as far away as Westchester, Connecticut, New Jersey, and the Hamptons on Long Island (in the summer only).

By early 2017 FreshDirect was serving the Delaware, Jersey Shore, Hamptons, and Philadelphia area, particularly

in and around Center City, with plans to eventually expand the service region to the greater Philadelphia area suburbs depending on customer response. The company had a cross dock on Richmond Street, Philadelphia, where orders were sorted after arriving from New York.

The company employed a relatively low-cost marketing approach, which originally consisted mainly of billboards, public relations, and word of mouth to promote its products and services. FreshDirect hired Trumpet, an ad agency that promoted FreshDirect as a better way to shop by emphasiz- ing the problems associated with traditional grocery shop- ping. For example, one commercial stressed the unsanitary conditions in a supermarket by showing a shopper bend- ing over a barrel of olives as she sneezed, getting an olive stuck in her nose, and then blowing it back into the barrel. The advertisement ended with the question, “Where’s your food been?” Another ad showed a checkout clerk morph into an armed robber, demand money from the customer, and then morph back into a friendly checkout clerk once the money was received. The ad urged viewers to “stop get- ting robbed at the grocery store.”16 FreshDirect enlisted celebrity endorsements from New York City personalities such as film director Spike Lee, actress Cynthia Nixon, former mayor Ed Koch, supermodel Paulina Porizkova, and chef Bobby Flay.17 The company planned to change its marketing strategy by launching a new testimonial-based campaign using actual customers, rather than celebrities. FreshDirect was number 73 in the Internet Retailer Top 500 Guide of 2016.

Operating Strategy Building on its efficient low-cost supply chain that elimi- nated the middleman and sourced direct from farms and fisheries, FreshDirect was able to pursue a make-to-order philosophy.18 By focusing on providing produce, meat, sea- food, baked goods, and coffees that were selected or made to the customer’s specific order, FreshDirect offered its cus- tomers an alternative to the standardized cuts and choices available at most brick-and-mortar grocery stores. This strategy created a business model that was unique within the grocery business community.

A typical grocery store carried about 25,000 packaged goods, which accounted for approximately 50 percent of its sales, and about 2,200 perishable products, which accounted for the other 50 percent of sales. In contrast, FreshDirect offered about 5,000 perishable products, accounting for approximately 75 percent of its sales, but only about 3,000 packaged goods, which made up the remaining 25 percent of sales.19

While this stocking strategy enabled a greater array of fresh foods, it limited the brands and available sizes of pack- aged goods such as cereals, crackers, and laundry deter- gents. However, FreshDirect believed that customers would accept a more limited packaged-good selection in order to get lower prices, as evidenced in the success of wholesale grocery stores, which offered bulk sales of limited items.

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their apartments to unload their purchases. Suburban customers were served in a slightly different manner. Many suburban customers worked at corporations in the tristate area that could arrange for depot drop-off in the office parking lot, creating a central delivery sta- tion. FreshDirect sent a refrigerated truck, large enough to hold 500 orders, to these key spots during designated times. Suburbanites, leaving their office building to go to their cars, swung by the FreshDirect truck, picked up their orders, and headed home. FreshDirect could also provide delivery to the parking lot of football or concert events for tailgate parties or picnics. Customers could also pick up their orders directly from the processing cen- ter. Orders were ready at the pickup desk 5 to 10 minutes after they were called in.

For business customers in Manhattan, chef-prepared breakfast and luncheon platters and restaurant-quality indi- vidual meals were delivered right to the office. FreshDirect offered catering for business meetings and upscale events. FreshDirect provided dedicated corporate account man- agers and customer service representatives for corporate clients; however, FreshDirect provided only delivery, not setup and platter-arrangement services. The corporate delivery minimum order was $50, and delivery costs were $14.99 (see Exhibit 3).

Jason Ackerman identified the ideal FreshDirect customers as those who bought their bulk staples from Costco on a monthly basis and bought everything else from FreshDirect on a weekly basis.20

FreshDirect’s Website FreshDirect’s website not only offered an abundance of products to choose from but also provided a broad spec- trum of information on the food that was sold and the manner in which it was sold (see Exhibit 1). Web surfers could take a pictorial tour of the FreshDirect facility; get background information on the experts who managed each department; get nutritional information on food items; compare produce or cheese on the basis of taste, price, and usage; specify the thickness of meat or seafood orders and opt for one of several marinades or rubs (see Exhibit 2); search for the right roast and variety of coffee according to taste preferences; and read nutritional information for fully prepared meals. A large selection of recipes was available depending on the items chosen.

For example, if you wanted to purchase chicken, you were first asked to choose from breasts and cutlets, cubes and strips, ground, legs and thighs, specialty parts, split and quartered, whole, or wings. Once your selection was made— let’s say you chose breasts and cutlets—you were given fur- ther options based on your preference for skin, bone, and thickness. The final selection step offered you a choice of rubs and marinades, including teriyaki, sweet and sour, gar- lic rosemary, poultry seasoning, lemon herb rub, and salt- and-pepper rub. Throughout, the pages offered nutritional profiles of each cut of meat as well as tips for preparation and storage.

As for FreshDirect’s several delivery models, custom- ers within the city were attracted to the FreshDirect ser- vice (prearranged two-hour delivery window) because it eliminated the need to carry groceries or park a car near

EXHIBIT 2 Example of FreshDirect Seafood Selection

EXHIBIT 1 FreshDirect Website

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chains in the United States command a large share of the total grocery industry business (see Exhibit 4).

The supermarket business is a low-margin business with net profits of only 1 to 2 percent of revenues. Store profits depend heavily on high customer traffic and rapid inventory turnover, especially for perishables such as produce and meat. Competitors must operate effi- ciently to make money, so tight control of labor costs and product spoilage is essential. Because of modest capital investment—mainly construction of distribution centers and stores—supermarket chains realize 15 to 20 percent returns on invested capital. Online grocery retailers, like FreshDirect—because of the f lexibility of information control, automated order fulfillment, and reduced real estate costs—could potentially have operating margins up to 10 percent, rather than the 3 to 4 percent of traditional supermarkets.22

The Online Grocery Segment Total online grocery shopping sales were estimated to be about $27 billion for the 12 months ending June 2016.23 This accounted for about 4.4 percent of total grocery sales.

Online grocery shopping was slow to catch on in the 1990s, and industry newcomers had encountered high start-up and operating costs. Sales volumes and profit margins remained too small to cover the high start-up costs. The problem, according to industry analysts, was that consumers had been disappointed in online service, selection, and prices. Coupled with the extensive invest- ment needed in warehousing, fulfillment, and inventory control, this meant the “pure play” e-grocery models were risky. There was a belief then that better success would

The Retail Grocery Industry In the United States, supermarket chains make over $649 billion in sales annually. The typical supermarket carries 39,500 items, averages about 42,800 square feet, and enjoys over $18 million in sales annually.21 The top 10 supermarket

EXHIBIT 3 FreshDirect at the Office

EXHIBIT 4 Top 10 North American Food Retailers, 2016

Supermarket Chain Stores 2016 Sales ($ billions) Comments

Wal-Mart Stores 5,708 $355.2 Includes Sam’s Clubs

Kroger 2,796 109.8 Includes jewelry sales

Costco Wholesale Corp. 602 118.72 Groceries were 72% of total sales

Albertsons 2,230 45.8 Headquartered in Boise, Idaho

Ahold Delhaize 769 26.4 Delhaize Group & Ahold USA

Loblaw Cos. 1,250 34.3 Based in Brampton, Canada

Target Corp. 1,672 69.8 Based in Minneapolis

C&S Wholesale Grocers 50 30 Based in the New Hampshire

Sobeys 1,500 18.8 Headquartered in Nova Scotia, Canada

Supervalu Inc. 1,370 17.53 Headquartered in Minnesota

Source: Supermarket News 2017. http://supermarketnews.com/2017-top-75-clickable-list. (Estimated sales and stores count.)

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online shopping in an attempt to maintain and expand their customer base. Two basic models were used for online order fulfillment: (1) pick items from the shelves of existing stores within the grocer’s chain, and (2) build special warehouses dedicated to online orders. The demand for home delivery of groceries had been increasing, but in many market areas the demand had not reached a level that would justify the high cost of warehouses dedicated to fulfilling online orders.29

Safeway began an ambitious online grocery venture, GroceryWorks, a shopping system that included ware- houses dedicated to filling online orders. Unfavorable returns forced Safeway to reevaluate its system, and it eventually chose to form a partnership with Tesco, a U.K.- based grocer. Tesco filled its online orders from the shelves of local stores in close proximity to the customer’s home. Safeway and Tesco worked together on GroceryWorks in Portland, Oregon, where they received a positive initial response from customers.30

The craze over health food had created room in the grocery industry for organic-food suppliers to enter as an attractive substitute to traditional groceries. When asked what kept him up at night, FreshDirect’s former CEO Dean Furbush said that Whole Foods or Trader Joe’s moving into a FreshDirect neighborhood was his biggest threat, as that hurt FreshDirect the most.

Whole Foods, the Austin, Texas–based supermarket chain with the organic-health-food focus, had already threatened FreshDirect’s sales in Manhattan. Trader Joe’s, another specialty food retailer, was opening a store in downtown Union Square, prime territory for FreshDirect.31 Although commentators believed there was enough room for all, including even street farmers’ markets, FreshDirect focused on organic foods to respond to the threats of Whole Foods and other specialty food stores.32 With the shift among some customers to pay- ing attention to local, sometimes organic, suppliers, FreshDirect highlighted its support of and partnership

come from traditional grocery retailers that chose to ven- ture online.24

However, some analysts expected online grocery sales to grow at a rapid pace as companies improved their service and selection, computer penetration of households rose, and consumers became more accustomed to making purchases online.25 An article in Computer Bits examined the customer base for online grocers, looking specifically at the types of consumers who would be likely to shop online and the kinds of home computer systems that were required for online shop- ping. An Andersen Consulting report identified six major types of online shoppers (see Exhibit 5), and FreshDirect’s Richard Braddock predicted that online grocery sales could account for as much as 20 percent or more of total grocery sales within the next 10 years.26 A MARC Group study con- cluded, “Consumers who buy groceries online are likely to be more loyal to their electronic supermarkets, spend more per store ‘visit,’ and take greater advantage of coupons and premiums than traditional customers.”27

A problem with online grocery shopping was that con- sumers were extremely price-sensitive when it came to buy- ing groceries, and the prices of many online grocers at the outset were above those at supermarkets. Shoppers also were unwilling to pay extra to online grocers for home deliv- ery. Consumer price sensitivity meant that online grocers had to achieve a cost structure that would allow them to (1) price competitively, (2) cover the cost of selecting items in the store and delivering individual grocery orders, and (3) have sufficient margins to earn attractive returns on their investment. Some analysts estimated that to be suc- cessful, online grocers had to do 10 times the volume of a traditional grocer.28

Potential Competitors in the Online Grocery Segment When online grocers started appearing within the industry, many established brick-and-mortar grocers began offering

EXHIBIT 5 Types of Online Shoppers and Their Propensity to Be Attracted to Online Grocery Shopping

Types of Online Shoppers Comments

Traditional Might be older technology-avoiders or simply shoppers who like to sniff-test their own produce and eyeball the meat selection.

Responsible Feed off the satisfaction of accomplishing this persistent to-do item.

Time-starved Find the extra costs associated with delivery fees or other markups a small price to pay for saving time.

New technologists Use the latest technology for any and every activity they can, because they can.

Necessity users Have physical or circumstantial challenges that make grocery shopping difficult; likely to be the most loyal group of shoppers.

Avoiders Dislike the grocery shopping experience for a variety of reasons.

Source: Andersen Consulting.

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with the local companies that provided their produce, poultry, fish, cheese, milk, eggs, and specialties such as wine (see Exhibit 6). However, its efforts were inconsis- tent in this area. For example, to help shoppers and check- out operators distinguish between organic and nonorganic produce, FreshDirect wrapped organics in plastic, which in itself is not organic. FreshDirect chairman Jeff Turner recognized the incongruity.33

Rivals in the NYC Online Grocery Segment YourGrocer.com FreshDirect’s most geographically significant competi- tor in the online grocery industry was YourGrocer.com (see Exhibits 7 to 10). YourGrocer.com was launched in New York City in 1998 with the goal of being the leading online grocery service for the New York metropolitan area. By November 2001 the company ran out of money and was forced to shut down, but in spring 2002, new capital resources were found and the company reopened for busi- ness. The second time around, YourGrocer’s approach was a little different.

YourGrocer was created with a bulk-buying strategy, believing that customers would order large, economical quantities of goods from the website and the company would make home deliveries in company trucks. During YourGrocer’s first life, the ambitious business plan covered a large service area and included the acquisition of another online grocery company, NYCGrocery.com.34 This busi- ness plan was modified in its second life. The company reduced the size of its staff, got rid of warehouses, decided to rent instead of owning its delivery vans, and scaled down its delivery routes.35 Nassau County and New Jersey were eliminated from the service area, leaving only Manhattan, the Bronx, Brooklyn, Queens, Rockland, Westchester County, and Fairfield County (Connecticut).

EXHIBIT 6 FreshDirect Local Market Offerings

EXHIBIT 7 Profiles of Select Online Grocers

Name Minimum Area Covered

Delivery Order Minimum

Delivery Charge Method Specialization

FreshDirect Manhattan, Queens, Brooklyn, Staten Island, the Bronx, Nassau County, Westchester County, Fairfield County, Hoboken, Philadelphia, Jersey City

$40 $6.99–$7.99, depending on order size and destination; tipping optional

Trucks; delivers every day 6:30 a.m.– 10 p.m. depending on location

• Mostly perishables: fresh produce, meats, baked goods.

• Low prices because there is no middleman.

YourGrocer Manhattan, the Bronx, Westchester, Greenwich, Brooklyn, Queens, Rockland

None $9.95 for orders > $75; $14.95 for orders < $75

Rented vans; delivers 9 a.m.–9 p.m. depending on location

• Bulk orders of packaged goods.

Peapod Chicago, Boston, D.C., Long Island, Connecticut, New Jersey, Rhode Island, Milwaukee, Wisconsin, Indiana, New Hampshire, Maryland, Virginia, Pennsylvania

$60 $6.95 Trucks; delivery available 6 a.m. to 1 p.m. on Saturday and 6 a.m.–10 p.m. every other day; pickup available as well

• Partner with Giant Foods and Stop & Shop; items picked from shelves of local warehouses near customer’s home.

AmazonFresh Select Cities of New York, Massachusetts, Maryland, Philadelphia and California

None $9.99 for orders under $40, in addition to 14.99 monthly membership

Order by 10 a.m. for delivery by 6 p.m. & Order by 10 p.m. for delivery by 6 a.m.

• Nonperishables as well as packaged goods.

Source: Company websites.

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YourGrocer continued to offer a limited selection of items that could be purchased only in bulk. Deliveries were made in varied time slots, depending on the customer’s location in the New York area. There was a $9.95 delivery charge for orders over $75, and $14.95 for orders below $75.

Peapod Founded in 1989 by brothers Andrew and Thomas Parkinson, Peapod (see Exhibits 11 and 12) was an early pioneer in e-commerce, inventing an online home- shopping service for grocery items years ahead of the commer- cial emergence of the Internet. With its tagline “Smart Shopping for Busy People,” the company began providing consumers with a home-shopping experience in the early 1990s, going so far as to install modems in customer homes to provide an online connection.

From its founding in 1989 until 1998, the company’s business model involved filling customer orders by forming alliances with traditional grocery retailers. The company chose a retail partner in each geographic area where it oper- ated and used the partner’s local network of retail stores to

EXHIBIT 8 Comparison of Prices for Selected Online Grocers

Prices

Grocery Item FreshDirect YourGrocer Peapod AmazonFresh

Tide laundry detergent $15.99/100 oz. $27.89/156 oz. ($16.39/100 oz.) $12.99/100 oz. $11.99/100 oz.

Wish-Bone Italian dressing $2.29/8 oz. $4.48/20 oz. $3.69/16 oz. $2.92/16 oz.

Cheerios $4.49/18 oz. $4.30/20.3 oz $4.59/12 oz. $3.68/18 oz.

Ragu spaghetti sauce $2.99/24 oz. $3.30/45 oz. $2.69/24 oz. $1.79/24 oz.

Granny Smith apples $3.99/4 pack (no per-lb. price) $11.89/6 lb. bag ($1.98/lb.) $1.49/each $1.66/lb.

Source: Company websites.

EXHIBIT 10 YourGrocer’s Service Focus

New YourGrocer focuses on providing three benefits that families in the area most value:

1. Easy ordering over the Internet or on the phone to save hours of thankless shopping. You can use your last order as a starting point to save even more time.

2. Delivery right to the home or office, which eliminates the burden of lifting and transporting heavy and bulky items each month.

3. Significant savings with everyday low prices—not short-duration specials—which reduce what you pay for stock-up groceries and household supplies on average by 25% to 30% below local supermarkets.

Source: www.yourgrocer.com.

EXHIBIT 9 YourGrocer.com Website

pick and pack orders for delivery to customers. Peapod per- sonnel would cruise the aisles of a partner’s stores, select- ing the items each customer ordered, pack and load them into Peapod vehicles, and then deliver them to customers at prearranged times. Peapod charged customers a fee for its service and collected fees from its retail supply partners for using their products in its online service.

In 1997, faced with mounting losses despite growing revenues, Peapod management shifted to a new order- fulfillment business model utilizing a local company-owned central distribution warehouse to store, pick, and pack customer orders for delivery. By mid-1999 the company had opened new distribution centers in three of the eight markets it served—Chicago, Long Island, and Boston—and a fourth distribution center was under construction in San Francisco.

In late spring 2000, Peapod created a partnership with Royal Ahold, an international food provider based in the Netherlands. At the time, Ahold operated five supermarket companies in the United States: Stop & Shop, Tops Market, Giant-Landover, Giant-Carlisle, and BI-LO. In September

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a threat to other online retailers because of its existing loyal customer base and legendary customer service. The selection of dry goods rather than perishables meant that Amazon, unlike FreshDirect and Peapod, didn’t have to worry about delivery costs on time- and climate- sensitive items.

By mid-2016, AmazonFresh service was available in Boston, and rapidly expanding in select areas of California, New York, New Jersey, Philadelphia, Connecticut, and Maryland. AmazonFresh offered over 95,000 different items available for same day delivery if ordered before 10 a.m. and next day early morning delivery for items ordered between 10 a.m. and 10 p.m. The company had difficulty managing the economics of the grocery delivery business, and it kept membership prices considerably higher than competitors. To become an AmazonFresh member, a cus- tomer had to subscribe to Prime Fresh in addition to the subscription of Amazon Prime with a total annual cost of about $299. In contrast, FreshDirect and Peapod charged customers for delivery of the goods purchased, without requiring customers to pay subscription charges.

Still, AmazonFresh remains a vigorous competitor in the online grocery sector with a proven history of success

2000 Peapod acquired Streamline.com Inc.’s operations in Chicago and the Washington, D.C., markets and announced that it planned to exit its markets in Columbus, Ohio, and in Houston, Dallas, and Austin, Texas. All of these moves were made as part of Peapod’s strategic plan for growth and future profitability. Under Peapod’s initial partnership agreement with Ahold, Peapod was to continue as a stand- alone company, with Ahold supplying Peapod’s goods, services, and fast-pick fulfillment centers. However, in July 2001 Ahold acquired all the outstanding shares of Peapod and merged Peapod into one of Ahold’s subsidiaries.

By 2017, Peapod offered delivery services from its own warehouses to many areas, including Chicagoland, Milwaukee and southeast Wisconsin, and Indianapolis. Peapod by Stop & Shop provided delivery services in southern New Hampshire, Massachusetts, Rhode Island, Connecticut, New York, and New Jersey. And Peapod by Giant provided delivery services to Maryland, Washington D.C., Virginia, and Philadelphia and southeastern Pennsylvania.36

In large markets, orders were picked, packed, loaded, and delivered from a freestanding centralized fulfillment center; in smaller markets, Peapod established fast-pick centralized fulfillment centers adjacent to the facilities of retail partners.37 Peapod’s proprietary transportation routing system ensured on-time delivery and efficient truck and driver utilization.

AmazonFresh AmazonFresh entered the grocery market in recent years by offering a wide range of dry goods. Amazon was always

EXHIBIT 11 Peapod Website

EXHIBIT 12 Peapod Product Selection

EXHIBIT 14 AmazonFresh Product Selection

EXHIBIT 13 AmazonFresh Website

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Some city dwellers even express concern about FreshDirect’s adverse effect on the overall makeup of their neighborhoods: “It is not just the impact they have on congestion, pollution, space, etc., but their very adverse impact on the best of busi- nesses in neighborhoods that they can undersell because of their externalized costs. It is these small businesses, farmers markets and local grocery stores, that FreshDirect undercuts, that are some of the best businesses for supporting and pre- serving our walkable, diverse and safe neighborhoods.”46

In 2015, a New York federal court decided that FreshDirect must pay $1.2 million in response to a class action lawsuit against the company that it withheld $23 million in tips and wages.47 A group of FreshDirect’s delivery workers claimed that the company charged delivery fees in excess of their fuel and delivery costs. FreshDirect’s customers were under the impression that the additional charge was going into the pockets of delivery drivers. FreshDirect had violated regulations under the Fair Labor Standards Act by not paying overtime wages to its workers. As a result, FreshDirect has increased wages for its employ- ees and claims that the average wages for the company’s hourly employees are now $12.52 per hour as compared to the federal minimum wage of $8 per hour.48

A another major issue for FreshDirect is its customers’ concerns about how fresh the produce and meats really are. One of the biggest obstacles to the growth of online order- ing of groceries is the inability to view and touch food, par- ticularly fresh produce and meat. Online customers cannot pick up and thump a melon or peel back the leaves on a head of romaine lettuce to check for freshness the same way they could in the grocery store. FreshDirect has received numerous comments from consumers which basically state, “I can’t see, touch, and smell the products. I have to rely on you.” This lack of control over identifying the freshness of the food is a major concern for customers. The company has recognized the problem and spun this negative aspect of online shopping into a positive one by creating a food- quality rating system. Consumer feedback has jump-started a new way of doing business for FreshDirect.49

The company’s Daily Produce Rating System ranks the quality of fruits and vegetables available for delivery the next day. The five-star rating system gives shoppers “a foolproof way to ensure that the ripest fruits and crunchi- est veggies are consistently delivered to their doorsteps,” as advertised at the company’s website. The Daily Produce Rating System is based on a daily inspection of all produce in stock by a quality assurance team. Rating criteria include taste, color, firmness, and ripeness. Rankings are based on an easy ratings scale:50

• Five stars: “never better, the best we’ve seen.” • Four stars: “great/delicious.” • Three stars: “good/reliably decent.” • Two stars: “average/inconsistent quality/generally OK.” • One star: “below average/expect wide inconsistency in

quality/probably out of season.”

in online retail. All the existing and rising competition amid growth in online grocery stores threatens FreshDirect’s future profitability.

Current Challenges As the online grocery retailing business has matured, all players realize they must pay close attention to customer per- ception. Online grocery retailers need to “serve their online customers just like they would serve the customers who come into their physical stores.”38 Even mighty Amazon has suffered grocery delivery failures, from out-of-stock problems to delivery glitches and website crashes. Unique challenges confront the business model. Even though FreshDirect has been able to woo local New Yorkers, gaining a Fast Company “Local Hero” award, the company has had to absorb “hun- dreds of thousands of dollars in parking tickets to get its cus- tomers its orders within the delivery window.”39

Some investors have shown confidence in FreshDirect’s brand and its strategic approach to expanding outside the New York metro area. J.P. Morgan Asset Management group invested $189 million through its PEG Digital Growth Fund. However, expanding national operations is a challenge for FreshDirect’s business model because most people residing outside metro areas own cars and prefer handpicked grocery shopping at nearby stores. According to research published by Morgan Stanley in 2016, about 67 percent of the consum- ers surveyed stated that they did not buy groceries online because they liked to select the fresh products themselves.40 The study suggests that buying fresh products online remains an unwelcoming idea for most consumers.

Environmental concerns have started to creep in as a major issue for FreshDirect. First, because of the conveyor packing system at the processing facility, FreshDirect is forced to use lots of cardboard boxes to deliver groceries: Produce comes in one box, dry goods in another, and a single tube of tooth- paste in its separate cardboard delivery container. Although FreshDirect has transitioned to the use of 100 percent post- consumer recycled paper,41 the reusability of the cardboard boxes is limited and the general public is aware that its tax dollars are used to “collect and dispose of the huge stacks of cardboards that FreshDirect’s customers leave in the trash.”42 As one environmentally conscious consumer observed, “I was baffled by the number of boxes they used to pack things. Groceries worth $40 came in five boxes. And after I unpacked, I had to discard the boxes. There was no system of returning them to FreshDirect to be recycled.”43

A second environmental issue is the additional exhaust fumes FreshDirect trucks contribute to the urban atmo- sphere.44 Issues of this nature were at the forefront of citi- zens’ concerns regarding the environmental impact that FreshDirect’s move into the South Bronx would have on their neighborhood. Third, FreshDirect trucks double-parking on busy city streets only makes traffic congestion worse. As one commentator stated, “It’s probably no exaggeration to say that FreshDirect has built its financial success on its ability to fob off its social and environmental costs on the city as a whole.”45

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According to research conducted by Morgan Stanley, comparing the year ending 2015 to the year ending 2016, “In the U.S., online grocery penetration [is] expected to increase from 8% to 26% for fresh foods, and 16% to 28% for packaged foods.”57 But despite all the innovations in e- commerce and service offerings, given the rising com- petition in online grocery services and the persistent preferences of most consumers to handpick fresh food, FreshDirect may still have a long way to go.

ENDNOTES 1. www.freshdirect.com/site_access/site_access.jsp. 2. Wall, Patrick. Undated. Judge tosses lawsuit meant to

stop FreshDirect from moving to the Bronx. https:// www.dnainfo.com/new-york/20130603/port-morris/ judge-tosses-lawsuit-meant-stop-freshdirect-from-moving-bronx.

3. Karni, A. 2013. FreshDirect foes lose in court. Crains New York, June 3. 4. http://www.ny1.com/nyc/all-boroughs/news/2016/05/31/exclusive--a-

first-look-at-freshdirect-s-new-bronx-home.html. 5. Dubbs, D. 2003. Catch of the day. Multichannel Merchant,

July 1, multichannelmerchant.com/opsandfulfillment/orders/ fulfillment_catch_day.

6. A “slotting allowance” is defined by the American Marketing Association as “1. (retailing definition) A fee paid by a vendor for space in a retail store. 2. (sales promotion definition) The fee a manufacturer pays to a retailer in order to get distribution for a new product. It covers the costs of making room for the product in the warehouse and on the store shelf, reprogramming the computer system to recognize the product’s UPC code, and including the product in the retailer’s inventory system.” www.marketingpower.com/ mg-dictionary-view2910.php.

7. Laseter, T. et al. 2003. What FreshDirect learned from Dell. Strategy Business, 30 (Spring), www.strategy-business.com/article/8202.

8. Schoenberger, C. R. 2006. Will work with food. Forbes, September 18, members.forbes.com/global/2006/0918/041.html.

9. Smith, C. 2004. Splat: The supermarket battle between Fairway, FreshDirect and Whole Foods. New York: The Magazine, May 24, nymag.com/nymetro/food/industry/n_10421.

10. Fahey, M. 2014. Foodily, FreshDirect start recipe delivery service. Crains New York, August 5.

11. https://www.wsj.com/articles/ freshdirect-updates-delivery-service-1452646806.

12. Dignan, L. 2004. FreshDirect: Ready to deliver. Baseline: The Project Management Center, February 17, www. baselinemag.com/print_ article2/0,1217,a5119342,00.asp.

13. Chelsea-Wide Blogs. 2006. chelsea.clickyourblock.com/bb/-archive/ index.php?t-128.html.

14. Supermarket News. 2007. Michaelson named CEO at FreshDirect; Furbush resigns. January 9, supermarketnews.com/retail_financial/- michaelson_named_ceo_at_freshdirect_furbush_resigns_337/index. html.

15. InternetRetailer.com. 2008. FreshDirect’s chairman hopes to deliver the goods in bigger role. July 14.

16. Elliot, S. 2003. A “fresh” and “direct” approach. New York Times, February 11.

17. Bosman, J. 2006. FreshDirect emphasizes its New York flavor. New York Times, January 31, www.nytimes.com/2006/01/31/business/ media/31adco.html.

18. Laseter et al., op. cit. 19. Ibid. 20. Ibid. 21. Food Market Institute. Undated. Supermarket facts: Industry overview.

www.fmi.org/facts_figs/superfact.htm.

Results are updated each morning on FreshDirect’s website to let customers know which fruits and veggies are the best bets for the following day. FreshDirect also offers the same five-star rating service for seafood; some 50 to 70 percent of its customers use this feature.51 The system aims to simulate the in-store shopping experience, allow- ing the grocers to showcase their best stuff and customers to decide what looks good. “Not everyone is an expert on the seasonality of a fruit or vegetable, so this system takes the guesswork out of choosing the best available items,” says FreshDirect’s former chief marketing officer Steve Druckman. “Each of the buyers and managers who rate the produce have years on the job, so they have great expertise. I am not aware of any other online or conventional grocer that’s developing a system such as this.”52

However, the strategy comes with a big risk: To gain customers’ trust, FreshDirect has had to acknowledge that not every item it stocks is picture-perfect every day. Before implementation not everyone at the company was enthusi- astic about the idea. Many feared backlash from consumers about FreshDirect’s products’ not always being top quality. “Was it scary? Yeah!” recalls Glenn Walsh, the produce manager. “I thought it was insane in the beginning.”53

Despite the risk, the company claims that the rating sys- tem has changed consumer buying patterns. Around 70 per- cent of customers say they have purchased something they wouldn’t have if it weren’t for the rating system. Druckman asserts, “One hundred percent of customers changed buy- ing patterns. The rating system works. If we put something out like black seedless grapes or golden pineapples with four stars, we’ll sell twice as many of those because of their rating than otherwise.”54

FreshDirect has upgraded the company’s website, using an internal database to profile customers and serve a cus- tomized online experience. For example, the site’s software analyzes order patterns, reminding customers of their favor- ite products and suggesting other items they might like, a marketing tool that works well for Netflix and Amazon. The database recognizes whether a visiting customer is a new, infrequent, lapsed, or loyal customer—and provides appropriate messages and ads.

A final major issue for FreshDirect is its new second distribution center in Prince Georges County, Maryland. In the second quarter of 2017, FreshDirect started offer- ing service in Washington, D.C., Virginia, and Maryland as part of a business expansion plan.55 It is yet to be seen whether FreshDirect will achieve success from the expan- sion, as Peapod has a strong foothold in the Washington, D.C., market as well as in the nearby cities. Relay Foods, a Charlottesville-based online grocer, has been operating in the Washington, D.C., market since 2008.56 FreshDirect also faces competition in the area from large supermarket chains, including Giant and Safeway, offering delivery ser- vice. FreshDirect’s second distribution center appears to face more competitors from the start, offering yet another challenge for FreshDirect managers.

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40. http://www.morganstanley.com/ideas/ online-groceries-could-be-next-big-ecommerce-driver.

41. Supermarket News. 2007. FreshDirect transitions to eco-friendly boxes. May 11, supermarketnews.com/fresh_market/-freshdirect_eco_ friendly/index.html.

42. StreetsBlog. 2006. FreshDirect builds a grocery empire on free street space. November 22, www.streetsblog.org/2006/11/22/ fresh-direct-builds-a-grocery-empire-on-free-street-space.

43. Wadia, A. S. 2007. Is FreshDirect good for you? Metroblogging NYC, January 30, http://nyc.metblogs.com/2007/01/30/ is-freshdirect-good-for-you/.

44. StreetsBlog, op. cit. 45. Ibid. 46. Ibid. 47. http://www.workingsolutionsnyc.com/

delivery-drivers-face-misclassification-wage-violations/. 48. http://freshdirectfacts.com/jobs/. 49. McConnon, Aili. 2009. The issue: FreshDirect focuses on customer

service. Bloomberg Businessweek, July 1, www.businessweek.com/ managing/content/jun2009/ca20090630_154481.htm.

50. FreshDirect. Undated. About our daily produce rating system. www .freshdirect.com/brandpop.jsp?brandId5fd_ratings.

51. Cohan, P. 2010. Growth matters: FreshDirect nudges its way to profits. Dailyfinance, March 23, www.dailyfinance.com/story/company-news/ growth-matters-freshdirect-nudges-its-way-to-profits/19372267/.

52. Briggs, Bill. 2009. FreshDirect takes a new approach to customer service. Internetretailer.com, January 7, www.internetretailer.com/mobile/2009/01/07/ freshdirect-takes-a-new-approach-to-customer-service.

53. Bruder, J. 2010. At FreshDirect, reinvention after a crisis. New York Times, August 12: B9.

54. Perishable Pundit. 2009. New York’s FreshDirect succeeds when most online grocers have failed. May 22, www.perishablepundit.com/index. php?date505/22/09&pundit52.

55. FreshDirect. Undated. FreshDirect announces expansion to Washington, D.C. http://www.prnewswire.com/news-releases/ freshdirect-announces-expansion-to-washington-dc-300424391.htm.

56. Bhattarai, Abha. 2017. FreshDirect is coming to Washington. The Washington Post, March 16, https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/ business/wp/2017/03/16/freshdirect-is-coming-to-washington/.

57. http://www.morganstanley.com/ideas/ online-groceries-could-be-next-big-ecommerce-driver.

22. Leonhardt, D. 2006. Filling pantries without a middleman. New York Times, November 22, www.nytimes. com/2006/11/22/business/22leonhardt.html?pagewanted51&_ r52&adxnnlx51164556801-6ScpsMek8edyTRh8S2BWyA.

23. https://www.internetretailer.com/2016/10/06/ online-grocery-sales-top-48-billion-worldwide.

24. Kempiak, M., & Fox, M. A. 2002. Online grocery shopping: Consumer motives, concerns and business models. First Monday, vol. 7, no. 9, www.firstmonday.org/issues/issue7_9/kempiak. and author estimates.

25. Machlis, S. 1998. Filling up grocery carts online. Computerworld, July 27: 4.

26. Hamstra, M. 2010. FreshDirect CEO predicts online gains in next decade. Supermarket News, March 1, supermarketnews.com/ retail_financial/freshdirect-ceo-projects-online-gains-0301.

27. Woods, B. 1998. America Online goes grocery shopping for e-commerce bargains. Computer News, August 10: 42.

28. Fisher, L. M. 1999. Online grocer is setting up delivery system for $1 billion. New York Times, July 10: 1.

29. Frontline Solutions. 2002. Online supermarkets keep it simple. Vol. 3, no. 2: 46–49.

30. Ibid. 31. Smerd, J. 2005. Specialty foods stores will go head-to-head

at Union Square. New York Sun, March 4, www.nysun.com/ article/10058?page_no51.

32. Progressive Grocer. 2005. NYC’s FreshDirect launches street fight against Whole Foods. March 3, www.allbusiness.com/retail-trade/food- stores/4258105-1.html.

33. New Zealand Herald. 2007. We don’t have time to waste. February 3. 34. Joyce, E. 2002. YourGrocer.com wants to come back.

ECommerce, May 15, ecommerce.internet.com/news/news/- article/0,10375_1122671,00.html.

35. Fickenscher, L. 2002. Bouncing back from cyber limbo: Resurgence of failed dot coms after downsizing. Crain’s New York Business, June 24.

36. https://www.peapod.com/site/gateway/deliveryAreas.jsp. 37. Peapod Inc. Undated. Corporate fact sheet. www.peapod.com/

corpinfo/peapodFacts.pdf. 38. Hamstra, M. 2007. Online stores may need to bone up on their

execution. Supermarket News, January 29, supermarketnews.com/ viewpoints/-online-stores-bone-up-execution/index.html.

39. Danigelis, A. 2006. Customers’ first local hero: FreshDirect. Fast Company, September, www.fastcompany.com/customer/-2006/articles/ local-fresh-direct.html.

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C58 CASE 10 :: DIPPIN’ DOTS: IS THE FUTURE FROZEN?

Dippin’ Dots has produced and distributed its tiny flash- frozen beads of ice cream, yogurt, sherbet, and flavored- ice products since microbiologist Curt Jones invented the cryogenic process in 1988. Available in many tastes and types—Original Dots, Dots ’n Cream, Coffee, and Dot Treats—Dippin’ Dots’ innovative take on frozen food has changed some portion of the public’s way of looking at ice cream. Made at the company’s production facility in Paducah, Kentucky, Dippin’ Dots’ unique frozen products are distributed in all 50 states and 11 countries.

At the beginning of 2017, Dippin’ Dots had experi- enced a steep increase in total sales and was involved in numerous lucrative developments. Since being acquired by Fischer Enterprises in 2012, Dippin’ Dots had pursued a multi-pronged distribution strategy of establishing partner- ships with other renowned amusement destinations such as Philadelphia Zoo, Chuck E Cheese, and several premier parks. The new distribution strategy also included a part- nership that involved co-branding between Dippin’ Dots and Doc Popcorn, which increased the product presence in nearly 7,000 convenience stores around the U.S.1 Many challenges remained, however, for the company to expand internationally and achieve organic growth instead of struc- turing partnership and co-branding contracts.

The company was bailed out of bankruptcy in 2012. There seemed a lot of potential to grow Dippin’ Dots at that time. The vision and creativity of the company founder and CEO, Curt Jones, appeared to be complemented perfectly by the business acumen and experience of its president, Scott Fischer.2

Recently, Dippin’ Dots had added five new franchises within the U.S., increasing the total number of franchises from 130 in 2015 to 135 in 2016.3 However, the number of Dippin’ Dots U.S. franchises was not growing steadily, and the number of international franchises remained stagnant.

A year earlier, Dippin’ Dots had celebrated the 30th anniversary of National Ice Cream Month** by attempting to set a new world record in the world of ice cream. Dippin’ Dots, the maker of the iconic flash-frozen ice cream and frozen treats, achieved a Guinness World Record title for the number of ice cream cups prepared by a team of five in three minutes. Curt Jones, Dippin’ Dots’ founder and CEO, was part of the record-setting team. “Our record attempt

was a fun and unique way to commemorate the 30th anni- versary of National Ice Cream Month,” said Jones.

The company had launched the Monster Munch, Kettle Corn Dippin’ Dots, and Dinner Dots ice cream lines in 2014. The Monster Munch line included eight monster- themed flavors with what the company called “crazy fla- vors, crazy names and some crazy ingredients,” while the Dinner Dots line included dot-size portions of five savory meals.

The company promoted the low cost of entry and flex- ibility of its franchising options. In an interview with CNN Money, Steve Rothenstein, Dippin’ Dots’ director of fran- chising, said the company had a lot of opportunities to suit a variety of business models. With a franchise start-up fee of only $15,000, the company offered an economic option for budding entrepreneurs.

Dippin’ Dots was flexible with alternative delivery mod- els in addition to its more traditional brick-and-mortar locations. These included kiosks at malls and carts at com- munity events (e.g., fairs and festivals).

What remained to be seen was whether all these advan- tages, innovations, and fixes would have a lasting impact on reversing the softness in company revenues and give the financials a much needed boost. Were these enhancements to the product portfolio, promotions, and business expan- sion efforts clever ways of growing the business, or just a last-ditch effort before the end? Despite the introduction of innovative new products, record-setting promotional events, and enticing franchise expansion opportunities, the future of the company remained uncertain.

Company Overview In May 2012, Dippin’ Dots LLC, a newly formed com- pany based in Oklahoma and funded by private capital, acquired the Paducah, Kentucky–based Dippin’ Dots Inc. A motion to approve the proposed sale was filed in April 2012 in the U.S. Bankruptcy Court in Louisville, Kentucky. In November 2011, Dippin’ Dots Inc. had filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy protection in federal court in Kentucky for a combination of reasons, including owing millions to lend- ers from costly patent litigation, as well as having increased operating costs and plummeting sales. Despite its unique twist on the classic frozen novelty, prior to the acquisition, Dippin’ Dots had been encountering abysmal revenues and having trouble maintaining attention in the market. Feeling

CASES

CASE 10 DIPPIN’ DOTS: IS THE FUTURE FROZEN?*

* This case was prepared by Professor Alan B. Eisner of Pace University and graduate student Brian R. Callahan and Saad Nazir of Pace University as a basis for class discussion rather than to illustrate either effective or ineffective handling of an administrative situation. Copyright © 2017 Alan B. Eisner.

** July was designated National Ice Cream Month by the U.S. government in 1984.

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CASE 10 :: DIPPIN’ DOTS: IS THE FUTURE FROZEN? C59

the pressure, the company had looked to innovative new products, promotions, and business-expansion efforts as the hope for a turnaround. In the bankruptcy filing, the company listed about $20.2 million in assets and more than $12 million in liabilities.4 The acquisition was approved shortly after.

Dippin’ Dots employed approximately 170 workers at its facility in Paducah, Kentucky, and Scott Fischer, president of Dippin’ Dots LLC, had no particular plan to move the facility or let go any existing employees. Dippin’ Dots LLC was unaffiliated with the existing Dippin’ Dots Inc. entity. Fischer said:

We are looking forward to working with the Dippin’ Dots management team and employees to maximize the opportunity of the business and realize the company’s growth potential in a global market. We are committed to ensuring that Dippin’ Dots reclaims its status, not as a novelty of the past, but as the ice cream of the future. This transaction has become a very equitable solution to the parties involved, and we expect a very smooth transition.5

Fischer said they had taken the opportunity to acquire Dippin’ Dots Inc. in order to rescue the frozen novelty and keep it afloat. Fischer added:

We are looking forward to rolling up our sleeves and personally meeting with all of the employees, franchisees, and business associates of the company and moving forward in a very stable and productive manner. We see substantial value in the Dippin’ Dots brand, one of the most well-known brand names in the retail market.6

Showing their enthusiasm for growth, in January 2013 Fischer and the new executive team decided to invest over $3.1 million in the company’s home facility in Kentucky, expanding operations and creating 30 new full-time jobs. Prior to the expansion, of Dippin’ Dots’ 170 workers, 60 lived in the Paducah area. Fischer stated, “This investment underscores our long-term commitment to market the wonderful Dippin’ Dots brand, introduce new products to complement existing ones, and maintain the historic ties to Kentucky.”7 Other improvements were to include purchas- ing energy-efficient equipment, upgrading processes, and renovating the facility.

Earlier, Dippin’ Dots had expanded its product line from ice creams to uniquely brewed coffees. Founder Curt Jones took a colder-than-cold instant-freezing process, similar to the one that made Dippin’ Dots ice creams so delectable, and redirected that technology to fresh-brewed coffee. Just as he had dubbed Dippin’ Dots the “Ice Cream of the Future” two decades earlier, he said the new “coffee dots” would adopt the slogan “Coffee of the Future.” Real espresso was made from fresh, high-quality arabica beans and then flash-frozen into dots immediately, capturing the flavor and aroma. Named “Forty Below Joe edible coffee,” the coffee dots could be eaten with a spoon, heated with water and milk to make a hot “fresh-brewed” coffee without

brewing, or blended with Frappé beads to make a Dippin’ Dots Frappé. Jones’s once kid-targeted dots now had a very adult twist.

Jones was thinking about more kid-friendly treats, too. For years Jones had been thinking of coming out with low- calorie, low-fat Dippin’ Dots that could meet the nutrition requirements and regulations set by public schools and thus be sold at the schools. The result was “Chillz,” a lower- calorie alternative to ice cream. Dippin’ Dots Chillz was a low-fat frozen-beaded dessert made with Truvia, an all- natural sweetener. This healthier alternative to ice cream was also an excellent source of vitamin C. It was avail- able in three flavors: Sour Blue Razz, Wango Rainbo, and Chocolate.8 In the words of Dippin’ Dots’ vice president of sales, Michael Barrette:

We’re starting to distribute Chillz through the vending channel. We already have two contracts under way and expect to get more. Vending companies know and love the Dippin’ Dots brand. With Chillz and other products, it’s a great opportunity for them. Schools need that revenue. They’ve thrown out a lot of products in recent times that have no nutritional value. So we feel bullish about Chillz.9

An Innovative Product The company’s chief operation was the sale of BB-sized pel- lets of flash-frozen ice cream in some two-dozen flavors to franchisees and national accounts throughout the world. As a Six Flags customer commented, “I gotta say, man, they’re pretty darn good. . . . Starts off like a rock candy but ends up like ice cream.”10

Dippin’ Dots was the product of a marriage between old-fashioned handmade ice cream and space-age technol- ogy. Dippin’ Dots were tiny round beads of ice cream made at super-cold temperatures, served at subzero temperatures in a soufflé cup, and eaten with a spoon. The super-cold freezing of Dippin’ Dots ice cream, done by liquid nitro- gen, cryogenically locked in both flavor and freshness in a way that no other manufactured ice cream could offer. The process virtually eliminated the presence of trapped ice and air, giving the ice cream a fresh flavor and a hard texture. Not only had Jones discovered a new way of making ice cream, but many felt his product was more flavorful and richer than regular ice cream. According to Jones, “I cre- ated a way . . . [to] get a quicker freeze so the ice cream wouldn’t get large ice crystals. . . . About six months later, I decided to quit my job and go into business.”

Jones was a microbiologist by trade, with an area of expertise in cryogenics. His first job was researching and engineering as a microbiologist for ALLtech Inc., a bioengi- neering company based in Lexington, Kentucky. During his days at ALLtech, Jones worked with different types of bac- teria to find new ways of preserving them so that they could be transported throughout the world. He applied a method of freezing using super-cold temperatures with substances such as liquid CO2 and liquid nitrogen—the same method he later used to create Dippin’ Dots.

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One process Jones developed was “microencapsulating” the bacteria by freezing their medium with liquid nitrogen. Other scientists thought he was crazy, because nothing like that had ever been done before. Jones, however, was convinced his idea would work. He spent months trying to perfect the process and continued to make progress. While Jones was working over 80 hours a week in ALLtech’s labs to perfect the microencapsulating process, he made the most influential decision of his life. He took a weekend off and attended a family barbeque at his parents’ house. It just so happened that his mother was making ice cream the day of the barbeque. Jones began to reminisce about homemade ice cream prepared the slow, old-fashioned way. Then Jones wondered if it was possible to flash-freeze ice cream. Instead of using a bacteria medium, was it possible to microencapsulate ice cream?

The answer was yes. After virtually reinventing a fro- zen dessert that had been around since the second century BC,11 Jones patented his idea to flash-freeze liquid cream, and he opened the first Dippin’ Dots store.12 Once fran- chising was offered in 2000, the “Ice Cream of the Future” could be found at thousands of shopping malls, amusement parks, water parks, fairs, and festivals worldwide. Dippin’ Dots ice cream was transported coast to coast and around the world by truck, train, plane, and ship. In addition to being transported in specially designed cryogenic transport containers, the product was transported in refrigerated boxes known as pallet reefers. Both types of containers ensured fast and efficient delivery to franchisees around the world. The product was served in 4-, 5-, and 8-ounce cups and in 5-ounce vending prepacks.

Product Specifics Dippin’ Dots flash-frozen beads of ice cream typically are served in a cup or vending package. The ice cream averages 90 calories per serving, depending on the flavor, and has 9 grams of fat. The ice cream is produced by a patented pro- cess that introduces flavored liquid cream into a vat of nega- tive 320 degree liquid nitrogen, where it is flash-frozen to produce the bead or dot shape. Once frozen, the dots are col- lected and either mixed with other flavors or packaged sepa- rately for delivery to retail locations. The product has to be stored at subzero temperatures to maintain the consistency of the dots. Subzero storage temperatures are achieved by utilizing special equipment and freezers supplemented with dry ice. Although storage is a challenge for international shipping, the beads can maintain their shape for up to 15 days in their special containers. To maintain product integ- rity and consistency, the ice cream has to be served at 10 to 20 degrees below zero. A retail location has to have special storage and serving freezers. Because the product has to be stored and served at such low temperatures, it is unavailable in regular frozen-food cases and cannot be stored in a typi- cal household freezer. Therefore, it can be consumed only at or near a retail location, unless stored with dry ice to main- tain the necessary storage temperature.

Industry Overview The frozen dairy industry has traditionally been occupied by family-owned businesses such as Dippin’ Dots, full-line dairies, and a couple of large international companies that focus on only a single sales region. The year 2016 was a rela- tively flat year for the production and sale of ice cream, as volume in traditional varieties remained flat and new types of ice cream emerged. Despite higher ingredient costs, manufacturers were continually churning out new products, though at a slower rate than in the previous year. New prod- ucts and varieties range from super-premium selections to good-for-you varieties to cobranded packages and novelties. Most novelty ice creams can be found together in supermar- ket freezer cases, in small freezers in convenience stores, and in carts, kiosks, or trucks at popular summertime events. Ice cream makers have been touched by consolida- tion trends affecting the overall food and beverage industry that extend beyond their products, as even the big names have been folded into global conglomerates.

The ice cream segment in the United States is a battle- ground for two huge international consumer-product com- panies seeking to corner the ice cream market. Those two industry giants are Nestlé SA of Switzerland, the world’s largest food company, with more than $88 billion in annual sales, and Unilever PLC of London and Rotterdam, with over $53 billion in annual revenues.13 Both have been buy- ing into U.S. firms for quite a while, but Nestlé, which already owned the Häagen-Dazs product line, upped the ante with its June 2003 merger with Dreyer’s Grand/Edy’s Ice Cream Inc. of Oakland, California. But even as the two giants dominate the U.S. ice cream industry, about 500 small businesses continue to produce and distribute frozen treats. As one commentator has said, “Like microbrew- ers and small-scale chocolate makers, entrepreneurs are drawn to ice cream as a labor of love.”14 Some of the better- known brands are regional ones, such as Blue Bell, based in Brenham, Texas (see Exhibit 1).

Approximately $54 billion was spent on ice cream in 2016.15 Ice cream and related frozen desserts are consumed by more than 90 percent of households in the United States.16 Harry Balzar, of the market research firm NPD Group, said about ice cream in general, “It’s not a small category, but one that has remained flat for more than a decade, and is not likely to grow.”17 The challenge for pro- ducers is to woo customers away from competitors and sus- tain a loyal fan base by continuing to innovate. The trend toward more healthy treats has spurred the major players, Nestlé and Unilever, to develop reduced-fat product lines that still have the taste and texture of full-fat ice cream. Edy’s/Dreyer’s, Breyers, and Häagen-Dazs have all contin- ued to experiment, and the “slow churned,” “double-churn,” and “light” products are seeing increased sales.18

A novelty product delivery system in the independent scoop shop is the “slab” concept. Employees at franchises such as Marble Slab Creamery and Cold Stone Creamery work ingredients on a cold granite or marble slab to blend

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Industry Segmentation Frozen desserts come in many forms. Each of the following foods has its own definition, and many are standardized by federal regulations.22

• Ice cream consists of a mixture of dairy ingredients, such as cream, milk, and nonfat milk, and ingredients for sweetening and flavoring, such as fruits, nuts, and chocolate chips. Functional ingredients, such as stabilizers and emulsifiers, are often included in the product to promote proper texture and enhance the eating experience. By federal law, ice cream must contain at least 10 percent butterfat before the addition of bulky ingredients, and it must weigh a minimum of 4.5 pounds to the gallon.

• Novelties are separately packaged single servings of a frozen dessert, such as ice cream sandwiches, fudge sticks, and juice bars, which may or may not contain dairy ingredients.

• Frozen custard or French ice cream must also contain a minimum of 10 percent butterfat as well as at least 1.4 percent egg yolk solids.

• Sherbets have a butterfat content of between 1 and 2 percent and have a slightly higher sweetener content than ice cream. Sherbet weighs a minimum of 6 pounds to the gallon and is flavored with either fruit or other characterizing ingredients.

premium ice cream with the customer’s choice of tasty additives, such as crumbled cookies, fruits, and nuts, before serving it in a cup or cone. The novelty is the entertain- ment of watching the preparation. Both chains rank in Entrepreneur’s list of the top 500 franchise opportunities, but commentators are skeptical of their sustainability once the novelty wears off, especially since the average price is $5 for a medium serving.19

Kona Ice, shaved ice with a wide range of flavors, was among the popular ice cream brands of 2017. The com- pany’s primary selling points are 814 decorated shaved ice cream trucks that entertain customers with colorful characters and tropical music while serving ice cream. Kona Ice franchisees own trucks that they bring to social events, schools, sports events and other community groups. Interestingly, Kona Ice experienced steady growth from the start of the company in 2008 and ranked 127th on Entrepreneur’s Franchise 500 list of 2017.20

Another prominent participant in the ice cream indus- try is Yogurtland Franchising Inc. Started in 2006, the California-based company offers 16 flavors of frozen yogurt along with 33 toppings. Customers are charged the price of frozen yogurt by the ounce. Yogurtland has been grow- ing at a significant rate by expanding the number of fran- chises in the U.S. as well as Venezuela, Australia, Thailand and Dubai. By 2017, the company had 326 franchises and ranked 184th on Entrepreneur’s Franchise 500 list.21

EXHIBIT 1 Top 10 Ice Cream Brands, 2016

Source: Statistica 2017.

200 400 600 800 1000 12000

Private label

Breyers

Ben & Jerry's

Häagen-Dazs

Wells Blue Bunny

Dreyer's/Edy's Grand

Dreyer's/Edy's Slowchurned

Turkey Hill

Blue Bell

Other Unilever Bestfoods North America

499.9

465.4

418.8

251.5

238.7

222.4

207.2

Sales in million U.S. dollars

1,128.5

249.3

284.2

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shows the growth of franchises for Dippin’ Dots. Exhibit 3 shows the growth trajectory of revenue and productivity, and Exhibit 4 lists key corporate milestones.

Despite the company’s initial success, the achievements of Curt Jones and Dippin’ Dots did not come without obstacles. Once Jones had perfected his idea, needing to start a company for the new process of flash-freezing ice cream, like many new entrepreneurs he enlisted the help of his family to support his endeavor. It was essential to start selling his product, and he had no protection for his idea from competitors.

The first obstacle confronting Jones was the need to locate funding to accomplish his goals. He needed money for the patent to protect his intellectual property, and he needed seed money to start manufacturing the ice cream once the patent was granted. At the same time that Jones was perfecting the flash-freezing process for his ice cream, he was also working on a Small Business Administration (SBA) loan to convert the family farm into one that would manufacture ethanol. However, instead of using the farm to produce the alternative fuel, Jones’s parents took out a first, and then a second, mortgage to help fund Jones’s endeavor. Thus, Jones initiated the entire venture by self-funding his company with personal and family assets.

Unfortunately, the money from Jones’s parents was enough to pay for only the patent and some crude manufac- turing facilities (a liquid nitrogen tank in his parents’ garage).

• Gelato is characterized by an intense flavor and is served in a semifrozen state. Gelato contains sweeteners, milk, cream, egg yolks, and flavoring.

• Sorbet and water ices are similar to sherbets, but they contain no dairy ingredients.

• A quiescently frozen confection is a frozen novelty such as a water-ice novelty on a stick.

• Frozen yogurt consists of a mixture of dairy ingredients, such as milk and nonfat milk, that have been cultured, as well as ingredients for sweetening and flavoring.

Dippin’ Dots’ Growth from Its Origins23 The growth of Dippin’ Dots Inc. has been recognized in the United States and the world by industry watchdogs such as Inc. magazine, which ranked Dippin’ Dots as one of the 500 fastest-growing companies two years in a row, in 1996 and 1997. Dippin’ Dots Franchising Inc. ranked number 4 on Entrepreneur magazine’s 2004 list of the top 50 new franchise companies, and it achieved the 101st spot on Entrepreneur’s Franchise 500 for 2004. In 2005 Dippin’ Dots ranked number 2 as a top new franchise opportunity and climbed to number 93 on the Franchise 500 list. By the end of 2009, Dippin’ Dots had slid to the 175th posi- tion on Entrepreneur’s Franchise 500 list.24 And by 2017 Dippin’ Dots had fallen to the 382nd position.25 Exhibit 2

EXHIBIT 2 Dippin’ Dots Franchise Growth

Year U.S. Franchises Canadian Franchises Foreign Franchises Company Owned

2016 120 1 13 1

2015 115 1 13 1

2014 116 1 13 1

Source: www.entrepreneur.com.

EXHIBIT 3 Dippin’ Dots Revenue and Productivity Growth

Year Revenues (in millions) Productivity (Revenue/Employee) Total Employees

2015 $34.80 $185,000 170

2014 $32.85 $185,000 170

2013 $31.26 $180,000 170

2012 $29.87 $175,706 165

2011 $27.70 $167,879 170

2010 $26.70 $157,059 180

2009 $33.90 $188,333 190

2008 $36.00 $189,474 190

Source: www.privco.com/company/dippin-dots-inc, author estimates.

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EXHIBIT 4 Dippin’ Dots Milestones

1988 Dippin’ Dots is established as a company in Grand Chain, Illinois.

1989 First amusement park account debuts at Opryland USA in Nashville.

1990 Production facility moves to Paducah, Kentucky.

1991 Dealer network is established for fair, festival, and commercial retail locations.

1994 First international licensee is set up (Japan).

1995 New 32,000-square-foot production facility opens in Paducah.

1997 Production facility expands by 20,000 square feet; company earns spot on Inc. 500 list of fastest-growing private companies in the United States.

2000 Dippin’ Dots Franchising Inc. is established, and first franchise is offered; litigation against competitors is initiated to protect patent.

2001 Dippin’ Dots enlists 30 new franchisees. Franchise Times magazine lists Dippin’ Dots third in the United States in number of ice cream franchise locations, behind Baskin-Robbins and Dairy Queen.

2002 Dippin’ Dots Franchising Inc. achieves 112th spot on Entrepreneur magazine’s Franchise 500 list, ranks 69th on its list of the fastest-growing franchise companies, and is named the number 1 new franchise company. Dippin’ Dots becomes a regular menu offering at McDonald’s restaurants in the San Francisco Bay area.

2003 Dippin’ Dots Franchising Inc. achieves 144th spot on Entrepreneur magazine’s Franchise 500 list and number 4 on Entrepreneur’s list of the top 50 new franchise companies. Dippin’ Dots opens the Ansong manufacturing plant, 80 miles south of Seoul, South Korea.

2004

Dippin’ Dots Franchising Inc. ranks number 4 on Entrepreneur’s Top 50 New Franchise Companies list and achieves 101st spot on Entrepreneur magazine’s Franchise 500 list. Curt Jones and Dippin’ Dots are featured on a segment of the Oprah Winfrey Show, appearing in 110 countries. Dippin’ Dots is featured among the top 10 ice cream palaces on the Travel Channel. Curt Jones is quoted in Donald Trump’s best-selling The Way to the Top (p. 131).

2005

International Dairy Foods Association names Dippin’ Dots Best in Show for Dot Delicacies. Dippin’ Dots also wins three awards for package design. Dippin’ Dots Franchising Inc. ranks number 1 on Franchise Times magazine’s Fast 55 list of the fastest-growing young franchises in the nation. Ice cream cake and ice cream sandwiches (Dotwiches) are introduced to launch the Dot Delicacies program.

2006 Company leadership is restructured. Curt Jones becomes chairman of the board. Tom Leonard becomes president of Dippin’ Dots Inc. Dots ’n Cream, conventional ice cream enhanced by beads of Dippin’ Dots, is introduced for market testing in Kroger stores in the Midwest. The 200th franchisee begins operations.

2007 Dippin’ Dots is available in Colombia, and www.dippindots.com V.5 is launched.

2008 Dippin’ Dots Franchising Inc. ranks 112th on Entrepreneur’s Franchise 500 list.

2009 Curt Jones returns to running the day-to-day operations of the firm. Dippin’ Dots slides to 175th on Entrepreneur’s Franchise 500 list.

2010 Dippin’ Dots has 3 million Facebook fans.

2011 On November 4, 2011, Dippin’ Dots files for chapter 11 bankruptcy.

2012 On May 18, 2012, the purchase of Dippin’ Dots by Scott Fischer, president of Dippin’ Dots LLC, is approved by U.S. Bankruptcy Court; Scott Fischer joins the team as president.

2013 Dippin’ Dots begins distribution to pharmacies and convenience stores to increase access.

2014 Dippin’ Dots enters Guinness World Records book for producing the largest number of ice cream cups with a team of five in 3 minutes.

2016 Dippin’ Dots teams up with the singer/songwriter Dawin for exclusive remix dessert.

Source: Dippin’ Dots Inc. Undated. History. www.dippindots.com/more-info/history.html.

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Dippin’ Dots seems to appeal more to youngsters, the prod- uct still has to have staying power as customers grow older. As one individual commented, “How can this stuff keep continuing to call itself the ‘ice cream of the future’? Well the future is now, folks, and they have been pushing this sorry excuse for ice cream off on me at amusement parks and zoos since I was a little kid.”26

In 2002 McDonald’s reportedly spent $1.2 million on advertising to roll out Dippin’ Dots in about 250 restau- rants in the San Francisco area. Jones called the deal “open- ended” if it worked favorably for both firms. However, by 2007 Dippin’ Dots was available only at a few McDonald’s franchises in southern California. Storage and transporta- tion issues were problematic, and the price of the prod- uct, 5 ounces for $5, was too steep for all but the die-hard Dippin’ Dots fans.

In other marketing efforts, Dippin’ Dots ads were run- ning in issues of Seventeen and Nickelodeon magazines. Additionally, Dippin’ Dots hired a Hollywood firm to place its ice cream in the background of television and movie scenes, including the 2003 Cheaper by the Dozen. In 2002 the Food Network’s Summer Foods: Unwrapped show- cased Dippin’ Dots as one of the most unique and cool- est ice cream treats. ’N Sync member Joey Fatone ordered a Dippin’ Dots freezer for his home after seeing a Dots vending machine at a theater the band rented in Orlando. Caterers also sought Dippin’ Dots for their star clients. A birthday party at the home of NBA star Shaquille O’Neal featured Dippin’ Dots ice cream. Dippin’ Dots continues to pursue the celebrity word-of-mouth route by serving its products at events such as the MTV awards and celebrity charity functions.

Dippin’ Dots’ sales come from approximately 131 fran- chisees, 90 percent of which have multiple locations.27 Dippin’ Dots has met with increased competition in the out-of-home ice cream market. The major threats to Dippin’ Dots are other franchise operations, such as Ben & Jerry’s, Häagen-Dazs, Baskin-Robbins, Carvel, Dairy Queen, and newcomers such as Cold Stone Creamery, Maggie Moo’s, and Marble Slab Creamery (see Exhibit 5).

Although one dealer commented that Dippin’ Dots used incoming franchise fees from royalties on sales for its own corporate means rather than for improvements in franchise support, most dealers converted to the new franchise sys- tem. Dippin’ Dots Franchising Inc. grandfathered exist- ing dealers’ locations by issuing a franchise and waiving the franchise fee for the first contract period of five years. Many dealers had to renew their contracts in 2004. While many were initially apprehensive of converting to a fran- chise system, fewer than 2 percent left the system, and the firm has shown franchise growth.

Meltdown? In an attempt to counteract the copycat threats from Frosty Bites and Mini Melts, Dippin’ Dots brought a pat- ent infringement lawsuit against them in 2005. However,

He next had to open a store, and doing so required even more money—money that Jones and his family did not have. They were unable to get the SBA loan because, while the product was novel and looked promising, there was no proof that it would sell. So Jones and his newly appointed CFO (his sister) went to an alternative lender who lent them cash at an exorbitant interest rate that was tacked on to the principal weekly if unpaid.

Now in possession of the seed money they needed, Jones and his family opened their first store. Its summer- time opening created a buzz in the community. The store was mobbed every night, and Dippin’ Dots was legitimized by public demand. With the influx of cash, Jones was able to move his manufacturing operation from his family’s garage into a vacant warehouse. There he set up shop and personally made flash-frozen ice cream for 12 hours every day to supply the store.

After the store had been operating for a few months, the Joneses were able to secure small business loans from local banks to cover the expenses of a modest manufactur- ing plant and office. At the same time, Jones’s sister made calls to fairs and other events to learn whether Dippin’ Dots products could be sold at them. Luckily for the Joneses, the amusement park at Opryland in Nashville, Tennessee, was willing to have Dippin’ Dots as a vendor. Unfortunately, the first Dippin’ Dots stand was placed in front of a roller coaster, and people generally did not want ice cream before they went on a ride. After a few unsuccessful weeks, Jones moved the stand and business picked up considerably. Eventually, the Joneses were able to move to an inline loca- tion, which was similar to a store, where Dippin’ Dots had its own personnel and sitting area to serve customers.

Through word of mouth, interest in Curt Jones and Dippin’ Dots spread. Soon other entrepreneurs contacted Jones about opening up stores to sell Dippin’ Dots. A deal- ership network was developed to sell ice cream to autho- rized vendors and provide support with equipment and marketing. During that time, Jones employed friends in cor- porate jobs. Dippin’ Dots grew into a multimillion-dollar company with authorized dealers operating in all 50 states and internationally.

The result was a cash inflow for Dippin’ Dots fran- chising. A franchise location was any mall, fair, national account, or large family entertainment center. According to the franchising information in 2016, the initial franchise fee was $15,000, with an estimated initial investment rang- ing from $112,204 to $376,950. In addition, franchisees are required to pay a variable royalty fee.

The Ice Cream of the Future Dippin’ Dots is counting on youthful exuberance to expand growth. “Our core demographic was pretty much 8- to 18-year-olds,” said Terry Reeves, former corporate commu- nications director. “On top of that, we’re starting to see a generation of parents who grew up on Dippin’ Dots and are starting to introduce the products to their kids.” Although

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EXHIBIT 5 Ice Cream Franchises, 2016

Franchise Start-Up Costs Number of Franchises

Baskin-Robbins Ice cream, frozen yogurt, frozen beverages

$943–402K 7,728

Ben & Jerry’s Ice cream, frozen yogurt, sorbet, smoothies

$156K–486K 582

Bruster’s Real Ice Cream Ice cream, frozen yogurt, ices, sherbets

$264K–1.32M 192

Camille’s Ice Cream Bars Ice cream, shakes, frozen yogurt

$152K–553K 2

Carvel Ice cream, ice cream cakes

$250K–383K 417

Cold Stone Creamery Ice cream, sorbet

$52K–467K 1,263

Culver Franchising System Inc. Frozen custard, specialty burgers

$1.84M–4.15M 574

Dairy Queen Ice cream, burgers, chicken

$361K–1.83M 6,711

Dippin’ Dots Franchising LLC Specialty ice cream, frozen yogurt, ices, sorbet

$112K–377K 135

Freddy’s Frozen Custard LLC Frozen custard, steakburgers, hot dogs

$606K–1.18M 234

Fro.Zen.Yo Frozen yogurt

$354K–588K 9

The Haagen-Dazs Shoppe Co. Inc. Ice cream, frozen yogurt

$154K–542K 205

Happy Joe’s Pizza, pasta, sandwiches, salads, frozen yogurt

$310K–1M 54

Kona Ice Shaved-ice truck

$117K–136K 814

Marble Slab Creamery Ice cream, frozen yogurt, baked goods

$293K–381K 343

Menchie’s Self-serve frozen yogurt

$218K–385K 496

Milani Gelateria Gelato

$176K–242K 1

Paciugo Gelato Caffé Gelato, beverages

$101K–455K 37

Popbar Gelato, sorbetto and frozen yogurt on a stick

$217K–457K 23

Red Mango - Yogurt Cafe & Juice Bar Frozen yogurt, smoothies, juices, wraps

$297K–415K 314

Repicci’s Italian Ice Italian ice and gelato

$152K–176K 47

Continued

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Franchise Start-Up Costs Number of Franchises

Rita’s Italian Ice Italian ice, frozen custard, gelato

$150K–439K 621

Ritter’s Frozen Custard Frozen custard

$365K–1.10K 20

Sloan’s Ice Cream Ice cream, candy, toys, novelty items

$588K–596K 9

Stricklands Frozen Custard Frozen custard, ice cream, yogurt, sorbet

$188K–315K 4

Sub Zero Ice Cream Ice cream, yogurt, custard, smoothies

$161K–386K 53

Tasti D-Lite Frozen desserts

$234K–423K 60

Yogurtland Franchising Inc. Self-serve frozen yogurt

$310K–702K 326

Source: Entrepreneur. Ice cream franchises. As of January 30, 2017, www.entrepreneur.com/franchises/categories/ffqicecr.html.

during the jury trial, Dippin’ Dots’ testimony in support of the original patent revealed that Jones had made sales of the beaded ice cream product to over 800 customers more than a year before submitting the patent application. Even though Jones argued that these sales were for the purpose of market testing and that the production method had subsequently been further refined, and therefore was deserving of a patent, the court rendered the patent non- enforceable because these sales were not disclosed to the Patent Office. An appeal by Dippin’ Dots was denied in 2007, and the patent was declared invalid.28

Mini Melts, released from the lawsuit, continued to expand its manufacturing facilities throughout the world; it has plants in South Korea, the Philippines, the United Arab Emirates, Hong Kong, and China as well as the United Kingdom and the United States. Instead of having fran- chises, Mini Melts sells dealerships for vending machines and kiosks carrying its products. One year Mini Melts CEO Tom Mosey was nominated by Ernst and Young as Entrepreneur of the Year and Mini Melts has been listed in the Inc. 500 for two separate ventures over the years.

By 2009 Dippin’ Dots had billed itself as the “Ice Cream of the Future” for over 20 years. However, Dippin’ Dots was close to a meltdown. Founder Curt Jones said that Dippin’ Dots “just got hit by a perfect storm” of soaring operating costs and plummeting sales. Jones resumed daily control over the troubled Dippin’ Dots after a three-year break from operations. He let go President Tom Leonard, who had run Samsonite before joining Dippin’ Dots in August 2006, and Operations Vice President Dominic Fontana, who had earlier spent about 17 years with Häagen-Dazs. Jones described the separations as amicable and regrettable.

In spite of these challenges, Jones, always the inventor, invested in R&D to create a conventional ice cream product that has super-frozen dots embedded in it and withstands conventional freezers while preserving the super-frozen dots in the ice cream. Called Dots ’n Cream and avail- able in berry creme, caramel cappuccino, mint chocolate, orange creme de la creme, vanilla bean, vanilla over the rainbow, wild about chocolate, and banana split, this prod- uct was introduced for market testing in Kroger stores in the Midwest in 2006. Thus, Dippin’ Dots was finally on the verge of having a take-home ice cream option. As of April 2011, the Dots ’n Cream product was still available only in a few locations but could be bought online.

By 2010, Dippin’ Dots had started an online venture by selling some of its products through its website. Customers could order ice creams, yogurts, and sherbets online, and the items would be delivered to their doors.

A new product line introduced by Dippin’ Dots was Dot Delicacies. A new product in this category was Dot Treats. As of April 2011, there were seven different Dot Treats: Solar Freeze, sundaes, floats, shakes, Clusterz, Quakes, and LOL (lots of layers). These products were available at most of the retail locations where Dippin’ Dots ice cream was sold.

As mentioned earlier in this case, the company branched out and released a series of coffee-based products. The “cof- fee dots” were new concepts in coffee—frappé and espresso that could be eaten by spoon or could be made into hot coffee drinks by just adding water and milk. Again, another untapped market Jones and his team tried to enter was the market of healthy ice cream. The new low-fat frozen beaded dessert named “Chillz,” made with an all-natural sweetener, was intro- duced by Dippin’ Dots as a healthier alternative to ice cream.

EXHIBIT 5 Continued

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and nectar. Biblical references also show that King Solomon was fond of iced drinks during harvesting. During the Roman Empire, Nero (AD 54–86) frequently sent runners into the mountains for snow, which was then flavored with fruits and juices. Information from International Dairy Foods Association, Ice Cream Media Kit.

12. The idea of using liquid nitrogen to make ice cream has been around in scientific circles for some time. To learn how to make ice cream this way at home, see www.polsci.wvu.edu/henry/icecream/icecream. html. See also Kurti, N., & This-Benckhard, H. Chemistry and physics in the kitchen. 1994. Scientific American, April: 66–71; and www .subzeroicecream.com/press/coldfacts2006.pdf.

13. www.quotes.wsj.com. 14. Anderson, G. 2005. America’s favorite ice cream. CNN/Money.com,

July 29, money.cnn.com/2005/07/25/pf/goodlife/summer_ice_cream. 15. https://www.statista.com/statistics/326315/

global-ice-cream-market-size/. 16. Author estimates; and Dairy Facts, International Ice Cream

Association, www.idfa.org. 17. Murphy, K. 2006. Slabs are joining scoops in ice cream retailing.

New York Times, October 26, www.nytimes.com/2006/10/26/ business/26sbiz.html.

18. Moskin, J. 2006. Creamy, healthier ice cream? What’s the catch? New York Times, July 26, www.nytimes.com/2006/07/26/dining/26cream. html. Note: Slow churned and double churned refer to a process called low-temperature extrusion, which significantly reduces the size of the fat globules and ice crystals in ice cream.

19. Murphy. 2006. Slabs are joining scoops in ice cream retailing. 20. https://www.entrepreneur.com/franchises/konaice/334197. 21. https://www.entrepreneur.com/franchises/

yogurtlandfranchisinginc/333815. 22. All definitions are taken from International Dairy Foods Organization

(IDFA). Undated. What’s in the ice cream aisle? www.idfa.org/ news—views/media-kits/ice-cream/whats-in-the-ice-cream-aisle/.

23. Dippin’ Dots 10th anniversary promotional video. 24. Entrepreneur. 2015. 2015 Franchise 500 rankings, www.entrepreneur.

com/franchises/rankings/franchise500-115608/2009,-4.html. 25. Dippin’ Dots Franchising LLC, Franchise information. 26. Michelle, S. 2006. Review. Yelp Reviews–Chicago, November 17,

www.yelp.com/biz/qnA4ml7Lu-9W4SDJOF1YPA. 27. www.entrepreneur.com. 28. Jones, L. 2010. Dippin’ Dots spends millions on patent

invalidity. Noro IP, November 15, www.noroip.com/news-blog/ dippin-dots-spends-millions-on-patent-invalidity/.

This product was developed with public schools in mind and was being distributed in schools through vending channels.

Despite the development of all the new products, the company’s experience and resource base are clearly in the ice cream manufacturing and scoop-shop retailing busi- nesses. Dealing with supermarket chains and vending dis- tribution firms is an ongoing challenge for this relatively small firm. However, with a penchant for innovation (from Curt Jones) and an infusion of business acumen and capi- tal (from Scott Fischer), Dippin’ Dots is optimistic about the future, focusing on what it is good at, and looking to recapture attention in the frozen novelty industry.

ENDNOTES 1. Dippin’ Dots sales up 60 percent in 2013–15, company expects

additional 25 percent increase in 2016, http://www.franchising.com/ news/20160524_dippinrsquo_dots_sales_up_60_percent_in_201315_ com.html.

2. Saving the ice cream of the future. Profile Magazine, http:// profilemagazine.com/2013/dippin-dots/.

3. Dippin’ Dots Franchising LLC, Franchise information. Jason Daley, entrepreneur staff, Punita Sabharwal. https://www.entrepreneur.com/ franchises/dippindotsfranchisingllc/289468.

4. www.nydailynews.com/life-style/eats/dippin-dots-maker-declares- bankruptcy-ice-cream-future-files-chapter-11-reorganization- article-1.973683.

5. www.dippindots.com/news/2012/04/Purchase-Agreement.html. 6. Ibid. 7. www.dippindots.com/news/2013/01/Expand-Manufacturing.html. 8. Dippin’ Dots Inc. 2010. Dippin’ Dots Chillz frozen treat.

VendingMarketWatch.com, January 7, www.vendingmarketwatch.com/ product/10110602/dippin-dots-chillz-frozen-treat.

9. Perna, G., & Fairbanks, B. 2010. From the future to the present. Food and Drink Digital, March 24, www.foodanddrinkdigital.com/reports/ dippin’-dots-future-present.

10. Associated Press. 2006. Business blazing for supercold Dippin’ Dots. July 23, www.msnbc.msn.com/id/14001806.

11. Ice cream’s origins are known to reach back as far as the second century BC, although no specific date of origin is known and no inventor has been indisputably credited with its discovery. We know that Alexander the Great enjoyed snow and ice flavored with honey

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C68 CASE 11 :: KICKSTARTER AND CROWDFUNDING

On March 1, 2017, Kickstarter released its first annual ben- efits statement after reincorporating as a Public Benefit Corporation. By becoming a Public Benefit Corporation, Kickstarter renewed its image as a socially responsible cor- poration and announced that it would donate 5 percent of the company’s annual after-tax profit to promote the arts, music, education, and systemic equality.

As a result of advancements in technology and world- wide adoption of media paltforms, the concept of “crowd- funding” had become a norm. According to Wharton School researcher Ethan Mollick, crowdfunding allowed “founders of for-profit, artistic, and cultural ventures to fund their efforts by drawing on relatively small contribu- tions from a relatively large number of individuals using the Internet, without standard financial intermediaries.” It was considered “a novel method for funding a variety of new ventures,” but it was not without its problems. Although billions of dollars had been raised for projects ranging from something as small as an artist’s video diary to large endeavors such as the development of a new product for accessing e-mail or an award-winning film documentary, very little was known about the kinds of mechanisms that made funding efforts successful or whether “existing proj- ects ultimately deliver the products they promise.”

One example of this “new phenomenon in entrepreneur- ship”1 was the story of Kickstarter. As of February 2017, according to ConsumerAffairs.com, Kickstarter ranked in 3rd position among the top 10 best crowdfunding sites, with over 119,273 successfully funded projects, over 12 million backers, and over $2.86 billion in pledged dollars; 217 proj- ects had raised over $1 million each. Kickstarter also had a success rate of nearly 36 percent—meaning, however, that 64 percent of the time the backers got nothing in return for their donations.2 What was this crowdfunding thing all about, and was Kickstarter truly a boon for entrepreneurs, or a bust for backers?

“Kickstarter = Dumb people giving money to anony- mous people in hope of some goodies in an unspecified amount of time.”3 So read a comment posted in response to a story about one nine-year-old girl’s Kickstarter campaign.

Mackenzie Wilson wanted to raise $829 so that she could go to computer camp and create her own video game. (She said her older brothers were making fun of her, and she wanted to prove that girls could do “tech stuff” too.) The trouble was that Kickstarter rules said someone had to be at least 18 years old in order to list a project, so Mackenzie’s mom, Susan Wilson, created the information listing. Susan Wilson was a Harvard graduate, a known entrepreneur, and had allegedly promoted her daughter’s Kickstarter campaign by tweeting celebrities like Lady Gaga and Ellen DeGeneres to elicit support.

The project launched on March 20, 2013, and within 24 hours it not only had reached its $829 goal but was on its way to getting 1,247 backers and $22,562 in pledges.4 Despite the success of a campaign that raised a lot of money, Wilson and her family received negative responses. The majority of the negative responses seemed to come from those who believed that Susan Wilson had misrepresented the nature of the project, that she had acted in bad faith—intending to profit from her daughter’s story—and thereby had violated Kickstarter’s project guidelines. It also received headlines because of the extreme public response—accusations of a scam and death threats against Wilson and her family.

Kickstarter clearly stated that its crowdfunding service could not be used for “charity or cause funding” such as an awareness campaign or scholarship; nor could a proj- ect be used to “fund my life”—things like going on vacation, buying a new camera, or paying for tuition. And a project had to have a clear goal, “like making an album, a book, or a work of art. . . . A project is not open-ended. Starting a business, for example, does not qualify as a project.” In addition, for Kickstarter to maintain its reputation as one of the top crowdfunding services, it had to make sure it kept control of how the projects were promoted: “Sharing your project with friends, fans, and followers is one thing, but invading inboxes and social networks is another.”5

Kickstarter responded to comments on the Wilson proj- ect by affirming its support, saying, “Kickstarter is a fund- ing platform for creative projects. The goal of this project is to create a video game, which backers are offered for a $10 pledge. On Kickstarter backers ultimately decide the validity and worthiness of a project by whether they decide to fund it.”6 However, backers and Kickstarter fans were concerned, with one user commenting, “It’s all of our jobs to be on the lookout for shady Kickstarters and personally I don’t want to see it devolve into a make a wish founda- tion for already privileged kids to learn how to sidestep rules of a website to profit.”7 And therein lay Kickstarter’s

CASES

CASE 11 KICKSTARTER AND CROWDFUNDING*

* This case was prepared by graduate student Eric Engelson of Pace University, Professor Alan B. Eisner of Pace University, Professor Dan Baugher of Pace University, Associate Professor Pauline Assenza, Western Connecticut State University, and graduate student Saad Nazir of Pace University. This case was solely based on library research and was developed for class discussion rather than to illustrate either effective or ineffective handling of an administrative situation. Copyright © 2017 Alan B. Eisner.

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dilemma—how to provide a service that allowed funding for obvious commercial ventures while also providing safe- guards for backers.

Kickstarter remained a service business, collecting 5 percent of successfully funded projects as a fee for this ser- vice, and had kept itself hands-off otherwise. However, in addition to getting comments such as the ones in response to the Wilsons’ project, Kickstarter came under fire for providing no guarantees that funded projects would actu- ally produce promised items or deliver on the project’s goals. In September 2012, Kickstarter’s three founders had even had to create a specific blog post titled “Kickstarter Is Not a Store”—reminding backers that the ventures were projects and, as such, would be subject to delays, sometimes long ones, while in development.8 Kickstarter made it clear that it was the project creators’ responsibility to complete projects and that it would pull projects from its web pages if project promises were obviously unrealistic or violated copyright or patent law, but otherwise it gave no other protection to backers. And even if a project couldn’t fully deliver, Kickstarter collected its fee. By keeping its busi- ness model as a fee-for-service commercial venture, was it in danger of losing its reputation and therefore its future business stream?

More competitors were entering the crowdfunding, crowdinvesting, or peer-to-peer lending space, partly because of the Jumpstart Our Business Startups (JOBS) Act passed by Congress in April 2012. The JOBS Act was designed to encourage small business and start-up funding by easing federal regulations, allowing individu- als to become investors; and crowdfunding by the likes of Kickstarter was a “major catalyst in shifting the way small businesses” operated and found start-up capital.9 Crowdsourcing had already changed the way businesses interacted with consumers; crowdfunding needed to fig- ure out “how to build a community of supporters before, during, and after” a business launched.10 But Kickstarter’s founders seemed to believe “a big part of the value back- ers enjoy throughout the Kickstarter experience” was to get “a closer look at the creative process as the project comes to life.”11 Kickstarter seemed to want to be a place where people could “participate in something”—something they “held dear”—and ultimately become a “cultural institution” that would outlive its founders.12 Was that the vision of a commercial venture, or was it a wish to eventually become a not-for-profit legitimate cause-funding organization? What did Kickstarter want to be when it ultimately grew up?

The Kickstarter Business Model By 2017 Kickstarter had become a popular “middle- man”—acting as a go-between, connecting the entrepreneur and the capital needed to turn an idea into a reality. The Kickstarter platform had launched on April 28, 2009, cre- ated by Perry Chen, Yancey Strickler, and Charles Adler, and was one of the first to introduce the new concept of crowdfunding: raising capital from the general public in

small denominations. In a social media–filled world, an opportunity had been recognized—you could count on your peers to help you fund your big idea. Many creators, who were young, inexperienced, low on capital, or any combina- tion of the above, turned to websites such as Kickstarter for financial support for their projects. The site acted as a channel, enabling them to call on their friends, family, and other intrigued peers to help them raise money.

When establishing a listing on Kickstarter, the creator could place his or her project offering in one of 15 different categories: art, comics, crafts, dance, design, fashion, film & video, food, journalism, games, music, photography, pub- lishing, technology, and theater. The project “owner” filled out some basic information, and the listing was on its way. However, certain standards had to be met before the listing could go live. If the project met those requirements, it was approved by the Kickstarter team and listed.

The guidelines were surprisingly basic and straightfor- ward. First and foremost, the listing had to be for a project. As mentioned previously, it could not be for a charity or involve cause funding, nor could it be a “fund my life” kind of a project. The guidelines also disallowed prohibited con- tent. Other than that, the project simply had to fit into one of the 15 designated categories. More recently, however, a few more cautious measures were added to ensure that only real and recognizable listings were created (see the sec- tion on rules and regulations later in this case). The project creator now had to set a deadline for the fund-raising, as well as a monetary goal, stating how much money he or she hoped to raise for the project. If that goal was met, the funds were then transferred to the project creator/owner. If the goal was not met, however, all donating parties were given refunds and the project was not funded. Additionally, the project owner could create rewards as incentives for dif- ferent levels of donations, to be received by the donor if the project met its goal and was therefore funded. The more a donor pledged, the better the reward, which was usually related in some way to the project at hand, such as being the first backer to receive the finished product.

If the project succeeded in reaching its goal, payment was collected through Amazon. The project creator had to have an active Amazon Payments account when setting up his or her project. If a project was successfully funded, the money was transferred from the backers’ credit cards to the creator’s Amazon Payments account. If the project was not successfully funded, Amazon released the funds back to the backers’ credit cards and no charges were issued; Kickstarter never actually possessed the funds at all. Once a project was successfully funded, Kickstarter took 5 per- cent of the total funds raised, while Amazon took around 3 to 5 percent for its services. After both parties deducted their commissions, the project creator/owner could still expect a payout of about 90 percent of the total money that was raised.13 On January 6, 2015, Amazon decided to dis- continue its payment service with Kickstarter. Kickstarter replaced Amazon with Stripe Payment, a service similar

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to PayPal.14 For project creators, Stripe made it easier to collect the funds as it did not require setting up a sepa- rate account like Amazon did, and backers could check out faster using Stripe to pay directly via bank accounts or credit cards. It allowed Kickstarter to have a complete control on backers’ checkout experience and access to raise funds anywhere in the world.

Kickstarter History As previously mentioned, the company was launched in April 2009 by its three cofounders: Perry Chen, Yancey Strickler, and Charles Adler. Originally based in New York City, Kickstarter initially raised $10 million from Union Square Ventures and angel investors, including Jack Dorsey of Twitter, Zach Klein of Vimeo, Scott Heiferman of Meetup, and Caterina Fake of Flickr.15 It all started with the hope of a musical success—a $20,000 late-night concert that Perry Chen was trying to organize at the 2002 New Orleans Jazz Fest. Chen had hopes of bringing a pair of DJs into town to perform. He had found a perfect venue for the concert and even gotten in touch with the DJs’ management, yet the show never happened. The problem was the lack of capital, and, even if he had found willing backers, Chen had wondered what he would do if the show was unable to attract sufficient interest to pay back any investment.

This dilemma brought Chen to the realization that the world needed a better way to fund the arts. He thought to himself, “What if people could go to a site and pledge to buy tickets for a show? And if enough money was pledged they would be charged and the show would happen. If not, it wouldn’t.”16 Although Chen loved this initial idea, he put it on the back burner at the time, being more focused on making music and not on starting an Internet company. Three years later, in 2005, Chen moved back to New York and began to reconsider the potential for his business idea, but he was unsure how to go about building it. That fall, Chen met Yancey Strickler, the editor-in-chief of eMusic, through a mutual friend and approached him with the idea of Kickstarter. Strickler was intrigued, and the two began brainstorming. Then, about a year later, Chen was intro- duced to Charles Adler. Adler was also intrigued and began working with Chen and Strickler.17 After months of work, the team had created specifications for an Internet site, yet one major problem remained: None of them knew HTML coding, so the project was put on hold. Adler moved to San Francisco to do some freelance work, and Strickler remained at his day job.

Finally, in the summer of 2008, Chen was introduced to Andy Baio, who joined the team remotely as an adviser, since he was living in Portland, Oregon, at the time. Soon after, Baio and Adler contacted some developers, including Lance Ivy in Walla Walla, Washington, and the site started to take shape. Although the team was scattered throughout the country, they were well connected through Skype and e-mail and finally began building the web portal. By April

28, 2009, Kickstarter had been created and was launched to the public. The idea for creating a new channel for artis- tic entrepreneurs of all kinds to explore their creativity was finally realized.18

Crowdfunding Competition Although by 2017, Kickstarter had become a well-known name in crowdfunding, many other companies had had the same idea. Not all of them had attracted as much media attention, but this meant that they had also avoided some of the negative press. Being a market follower rather than leader gave Kickstarter a prime opportunity to maintain a clean track record with the media because the company was able to avoid the mistakes made by other similar businesses.

One of the better-known Kickstarter competitors was Indiegogo, founded in January 2008 in San Francisco. Indiegogo was initially funded with $1.5 million from investors such as Zynga cofounder Steve Schoettler. By June 2012, the company had attracted over 100,000 proj- ects from 196 countries. Aiming to “make an even bigger impact,” in 2012 Indiegogo raised an additional $15 million in a “Series A” private equity stock offering.19 CEO Slava Rubin said that the money was needed mostly to hire, build out, and increase resources to take on other crowdsourcing competitors such as Kickstarter. However, while Kickstarter focused on individuals’ creative projects, Indiegogo was much more business oriented. Projects on Indiegogo were not regulated as they were on Kickstarter. Indiegogo used an algorithm that decided which projects to promote on the basis of activity and engagement metrics like “funding velocity.”20

Additionally, Indiegogo projects followed the “keep it all” model—all funds collected were handed over to the project creator, regardless of any goal achievement. If the project fund-raising goal was never met, or the proj- ect’s objectives were never achieved, it was up to the proj- ect creator to refund collected funds to the contributors. Indiegogo was also available for use internationally, while Kickstarter required backers to have either a U.S. or U.K. bank account.21

Other online crowdfunding companies, which raised funds for either charitable or creative projects, included ArtistShare for musicians22 and Fundly for charitable projects and political campaigns—Meg Whitman used Fundly to raise $20 million for her 2010 campaign for governor of California.23 Illustrating the degree of com- petition, ArtistShare and Kickstarter had been in a pat- ent dispute since 2011 over ownership of the “methods and apparatuses for financing and marketing a creative work,” with ArtistShare claiming Kickstarter infringe- ment.24 Meanwhile, similar companies that created some buzz in the area of business investment were Crowdfunder and Grow VC. While only in start-up mode, Crowdfunder had made enough noise to grab some attention. This plat- form enabled funders to participate in three different ways: They could simply donate to a project, lend to a project

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million in 12 hours to fund a movie based on the popu- lar Veronica Mars franchise.33 Kickstarter was becoming a source of major support for independent films. According to the company, as of 2013 it had facilitated over $100 mil- lion in donations to various “indie” films and had funded 10 percent of all the films shown at the 2013 Sundance Film Festival.34

These projects made contributions to Kickstarter’s business model. Even with an office in New York City, large amounts of capital raised, and about 125 employ- ees, Kickstarter had to have been profitable. Based on the Januray 2017 statistics, at an average 3 percent cut, Kickstarter should have grossed just over $75 million since the beginning of its business operations.

Kickstarter Failures However, as in all sectors of capital investment, some Kickstarter projects did not work out as planned. In the world of start-ups, many venture capitalists or angel inves- tors made investments in projects that were inherently risky. Some were lucky and achieved their intended goals or did even better. Others fell short. There were many possible rea- sons for the failures, including lack of industry knowledge, unrealistic projections of cost, lack of managerial experi- ence, manufacturing capabilities, or simply a lack of com- petence for the task at hand. These possibilities existed for Kickstarter projects as well, but in the Kickstarter model, investors/backers/donators didn’t “own” anything— project creators kept ownership of their work. As Kickstarter pointed out, “Backers are supporting projects to help them come to life, not to profit financially.”35

This disclaimer didn’t stop backers or the media from highlighting Kickstarter’s risks. Eyez was one of the better- known project failures on Kickstarter. More than 2,000 backers collectively contributed more than $300,000 to the entrepreneurs developing the high-tech glasses, meant for recording live video. Eyez’s product creators promised delivery of the glasses ahead of the fall 2011 goal, yet by 2013 Eyez glasses still weren’t being produced and none of the individual backers had received a pair. Meanwhile, the entrepreneurs had stopped providing online updates on the project and wouldn’t answer questions from back- ers.36 Another prominent failed project was the Skarp cam- paign in 2015, which raised about $4 million. The project promised to develop and offer a razor that used a laser beam instead of a traditional blade. The Skarp campaign also showed a video demonstrating the procedure of laser razor to cut hair. However, in reality the prototype of the laser razor was far from a properly functioning product.37 Others, such as the group behind MYTHIC, a nonexistent game from an imaginary team, continued to try to scam the crowdfunding scene.38

A major challenge to Kickstarter’s business model was related to intellectual property rights. It was probable that anyone with a good idea trying to raise capital through Kickstarter would discover that his or her idea was already

and receive a return, or purchase equity. However, the third option, purchasing equity through crowdfunding, was still not allowed in the U.S. as of 2013.25

Grow VC, similar to Kickstarter, made funds accessible to the company or entrepreneur only when the goal had been reached. One important difference between the two was that Grow VC enabled companies to collect monthly installments from investors, allowing a growing business to collect a continuous influx of funds rather than just a one-time investment. The cap for funding was set at $1 mil- lion.26 Other recognizable competitors were Rockethub, EarlyShares, and Bolstr in the United States, CrowdCube in the United Kingdom, and Symbid, based in the Netherlands. These were only a few of the more publicized newcomers to the industry—there were at least 50 legitimate crowdfunding platforms operating worldwide.27

Kickstarter Successes By January 2017, Kickstarter had launched 338,479 projects, raising $2.86 billion, of which $2.51 billion was successfully collected by project owners, $329 million was unsuccess- ful, and $27 million was currently in “live” donation status on the site.28 On February 8, 2012, the first project to ever get a million dollars funded from the site was a project in the design category, an iPod dock created by ElevationLab. Its goal was set at $75,000, and backers reached this goal almost instantly, raising a total of $1,464,706. However, as impressive as this feat was, its top-funding status was short- lived. Six hours later, in the game category, Double Fine beat that goal, receiving $3,336,371 to fund its new adven- ture game, far exceeding the initial request for $400,000.29 On March 27, 2015, a California based smartwatch com- pany, Pebble Time, ran a record-breaking Kickstarter cam- paign by raising a total of $20,338,986.30 The initial goal was to raise $500,000 yet Pebble Time was able to raise the first million dollars in less than an hour. Pebble Time was founded in 2012, and since then the company had been working to perfect its smartwatch that offered battery time of about 10 days and more than 6,500 applications via an open platform app store. However, one of the pio- neers in the fitness tracker and smartwatch industry, Fitbit, acquired the intellectual property and hired key personnel from Pebble Technology Corp. in December 2016.

Other notable projects with over $1 million in funding included the TikTok and LunaTik multitouch watch kits and the Coolest Cooler in the design category; the OUYA TV console and Project Eternity in the games category; the FORM1 3-D printer and the Oculus Rift virtual real- ity headset in the technology category; and a new Amanda Palmer record, art book, and tour in the music category. Gustin premium men’s wear and Ministry of Supply men’s dress shirts, in the fashion category, were notably success- ful offerings, with over $400,000 in pledges.31 In the movie category, in 2013, Inocente became the first Kickstarter crowdfunded film to win an Oscar—for Best Documentary (Short Subject)32—and Kickstarter backers donated over $2

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toward the creation of the project. If the funds were used for any other purpose, legal repercussions would follow.41 In 2013 Kickstarter did a “major overhaul” on the set of tools project creators used to communicate with backers, including a “rewards sent” checklist, a tool to survey back- ers regarding rewards, and a project “dashboard” so that creators could track their progress.42

Even if Kickstarter was able to sustain its success with the implementation of tougher approval policies on its end, the future of the size and success of projects was also to be determined by the government and its ability to police the crowdfunding world through its own set of regulations. Recent federal legislation showed the government’s inten- tions to do just that.

The JOBS Act Signed into law in April 2012 by President Obama, the Jumpstart Our Business Startups (JOBS) Act supported entrepreneurship and the growth of small businesses in the United States and emphasized the new phenomenon of crowdfunding. The act eased federal regulations in regard to crowdfunding by allowing individuals to become investors in new business efforts. However, it also set out specific pro- visions to regulate just how much funding was acceptable, in order to ensure the financial safety and security of the investors. The new act stated that, as of January 2013, an equity-based company could raise no more than $1 million a year. Additionally, a company could sell to investors only through a middleman—a broker or website—that was registered with the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). The middleman could sell only shares that had orig- inated from the company.

The JOBS Act did not yet apply to Kickstarter, because there were no equity sales under its current business model—on its platform, the project creator maintained 100 percent ownership of the product or service.43 With no cap to investments and minimal federal regulations, people could be more inclined to contribute to a Kickstarter proj- ect than invest in projects from an equity investment–based competitor.

The Future for Kickstarter Perry Chen, the cofounder and person responsible for the idea behind Kickstarter, was interviewed in May 2012 and spoke about Kickstarter’s future. Chen talked about fund- ing business start-ups and stated that Kickstarter was not interested in that model: “We’re going to keep funding cre- ative projects in the way we currently do it. We’re not gear- ing up for the equity wave if it comes. The real disruption is doing it without equity.”44 Regarding one of the more basic details of Kickstarter’s business model, Chen com- mented on expanding beyond 13 categories, which by 2017 had increased to 15 catagories. Particularly, he spoke about focusing on more public-service projects: “We’re also look- ing at . . . expanding a little bit into urban design and things like bike lanes and bike racks and community gardens.

stolen by merchants in China. Yekutiel Sherman, an Israeli entrepreneur, spent years developing an innovative smart- phone case that unfolded into a selfie stick. In December 2015, Sherman started a Kickstarter campaign, hoping to raise funds to capitalize on the new product. A week later, Sherman found that his designed selfie stick was already on sale by vendors across China. People around the world could buy the new selfie stick using online sites including eBay.

Ongoing Issues—Backers’ Concerns; Rules and Regulations Despite the success Kickstarter had achieved, the company was under fire for many things, particularly regarding false projects, the collection of funds with no end product, and the failure of backers to receive the stated rewards set by project creators. Kickstarter followed the “all or nothing” approach to funding—pledged dollars were collected only if the fund-raising goal was met. In the beginning, Kickstarter tried to explain that the company had no control over the donated funds once these funds were in the hands of the developer—there was no guarantee of product or project “delivery.” Additionally, if the fund-raising goal was met but the project never made it to fruition, Kickstarter had no ability to issue refunds. These explanations didn’t keep backers from complaining of “delays, deception, and bro- ken promises.”39

In 2012 the Kickstarter founders felt it was necessary to reiterate “Kickstarter Is Not a Store” and point out, yet again, that “in addition to rewards, a big part of the value backers enjoy throughout the Kickstarter experience is getting a closer look at the creative process as the project comes to life.”40 Kickstarter then implemented a new set of rules, designed to prevent creators from promising a prod- uct they couldn’t deliver. The goal, Kickstarter said, was to help prevent entrepreneurs from overpromising and disap- pointing backers by not delivering. By forcing creators to be transparent about their progress, Kickstarter hoped to discourage unrealistic projects and encourage the participa- tion of more creative individuals who had the skills to ship products as promised.

These new rules required Kickstarter’s project creators to list all potential problems involved in seeing their proj- ects through to completion; to submit proper supporting materials—no simulations or “renderings,” just technical drawings or photos of the actual current prototype; and to create a “reasonable” reward system in which backers received a reward based on their level of participation, which in most cases included a working version of the proj- ect in question. Kickstarter prohibited the use of multiple quantities at any reward level: Kickstarter was not a store, but an opportunity to invest in good ideas. The company also included the use of investors’ funds in the project cre- ator agreement. The regulations stated that if funds were collected, the creator was required to use those funds

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12. From Strickler, Y. 2013. Talk given at Expand Engadget Conference, March 16, www.youtube.com/watch?v=thlaPwpobMk. Also see the conversation liveblog at www.engadget.com/2013/03/16/ kickstarter-yancey-strickler-expand-liveblog/; and the interview with Myriam Joire, Engadget editor, linked at the Huffington Post story at www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/03/26/9-year-old-kickstarter- campaign_n_2949294.html#slide=1240691.

13. Nick, D. 2012. The history of Kickstarter: “Crowdfunding” at its best. 1Up.com, May 14, www.1up.com/do/blogEntry?publicUserId=6111503 &bId=9097349.

14. https://www.kickstarter.com/blog/ making-payments-easier-for-creators-and-backers.

15. Kafka, P. 2011. Kickstarter fesses up: The crowdsourcing funding start-up has funding, too. All Things D, March 17, allthingsd. com/20110317/kickstarter-fesses-up-the-crowd-sourced-funding-startup- had-funding-too/.

16. See Kickstarter Pressroom at www.kickstarter.com/press. 17. Vinh, K. 2012. An interview with Charles Adler of Kickstarter.

Subtraction, June 28, www.subtraction.com/2012/06/28/ an-interview-with-charles-adler-of-kickstarter.

18. Details. 2010. 2010 mavericks: Yancey Strickler, Perry Chen, John Auerback & Chris Wong. October, www.details.com/culture-trends/ critical-eye/201010/strickler-chen-kickstarter-auerbach-wong-gilt-man.

19. Taylor, C. 2012. Indiegogo raises $15 million series A to make crowdfunding go mainstream. TechCrunch.com, June 6, techcrunch. com/2012/06/06/indiegogo-funding-15-million-crowdfunding/.

20. Jeffries, A. 2012. Kickstarter competitor Indiegogo raises $15M, staffing up in New York. BetaBeat, June 6, betabeat.com/2012/06/ kickstarter-competitor-indiegogo-raises-15-m-staffing-up-in-new-york/.

21. Taylor, C. 2011. Indiegogo wants to give Kickstarter a run for its money. Gigaom.com, August 5, gigaom.com/2011/08/05/indiegogo/.

22. See the Wikipedia entry at en.wikipedia.org/wiki/ArtistShare. 23. See the Wikipedia entry at en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Fundly. 24. Jeffries, A. 2012. Kickstarter wins small victory in patent lawsuit with

2000-era crowdfunding site. BetaBeat, May 14, betabeat.com/2012/05/ kickstarter-artistshare-fan-funded-patent-lawsuit/.

25. See Crowdfunder: How it works, www.crowdfunder.com/ how-it-works#a-1.

26. See Loikkanen, V. 2011. What is Grow VC? GrowVC.com, September 8, www.growvc.com/help/2011/09/08/what-is-grow-vc/.

27. See the list of crowdfunding services as of April 1, 2013, on Wikipedia at en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Comparison_of_crowd_funding_services; see also Fiegerman, S. 2012. 8 Kickstarter alternatives you should know about. Mashable.com, December 6, mashable.com/2012/12/06/ kickstarter-alternatives/.

28. See current Kickstarter stats at www.kickstarter.com/help/stats. 29. See Strickler, Y. 2012. The history of #1. Kickstarter Blog, April 18,

www.kickstarter.com/blog/the-history-of-1-0. 30. https://www.entrepreneur.com/article/235313. 31. See, The most funded projects in Kickstarter history (since 2009!),

www.kickstarter.com/discover/most-funded. 32. Watercutter, A. 2013. The first Kickstarter film to win an Oscar

takes home crowdsourced gold. Wired, February 15, www.wired.com/ underwire/2013/02/kickstarter-first-oscar/.

33. McMillan, G. 2013. Veronica Mars. Kickstarter breaks records, raises over $2M in 12 hours. Wired, March 14, www.wired.com/ underwire/2013/03/veronica-mars-kickstarter-record/.

34. Watercutter. 2013. The first Kickstarter film. 35. See, What is Kickstarter? at www.kickstarter.com/hello. 36. Krantz, M. 2012. Crowd-funding dark side: Sometimes investments

go down drain. USA Today, August 14, usatoday30. usatoday.com/money/markets/story/2012-08-14/ crowd-funding-raising-money/57058678/1.

37. https://www.bloomberg.com/view/articles/2015-10-15/ failed-inventions-aren-t-scams.

A lot of cities have approached us, talking to us about proj- ects in that space.”45

As Time magazine said when it voted Kickstarter one of the 50 best inventions of 2010: “Think of Kickstarter as crowdsourced philanthropy.”46 Chen said, back when Kickstarter was founded, that the concept was “not an investment, lending or a charity. . . . It’s something else in the middle: a sustainable marketplace where people exchange goods for services or some other benefit and receive some value.”47 Cofounder Yancey Strickler pointed out that “everyday people” had pledged over half a billion dollars to Kickstarter projects in the five years since its founding and said that this “shows the power and passion of the human spirit.” As Strickler explained it, “We want to become part of things bigger than our- selves.”48 In an interview with the Financial Times, Strickler summed up the idea of Kickstarter, “The aim is to have a sense of purpose but not feel the need to con- trol it much beyond that. This is a canvas that everyone can plug into.”49

What would Kickstarter become? While it seemed to have a clear mission and was certainly profitable, as Wharton School researcher Mollick warned, “Crowdfunding repre- sents a potentially disruptive change in the way that new ventures are funded.”50 Going forward, the Kickstarter founders needed to consider whether they had the right business model for the future.

ENDNOTES 1. Mollick, E. R. 2013. The dynamics of crowdfunding: Determinants

of success and failure. University of Pennsylvania–Wharton School. March 25. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2088298 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2088298; from the abstract.

2. Statistics gathered on February 11, 2017, 3:40 p.m. EDT, from www. kickstarter.com/help/stats.

3. Reader comment by Devlin1776, attached to news story: Bindley, K. 2013. 9-year-old’s $20,000 Kickstarter campaign draws scam accusations. Huffington Post, March 26, www.huffingtonpost. com/2013/03/26/9-year-old-kickstarter-campaign_n_2949294. html#slide=1240691.

4. See the full Kickstarter project listing, plus current status, and both backer and general comments at www.kickstarter.com/projects/ susanwilson/9-year-old-building-an-rpg-to-prove-her-brothers-w.

5. See Kickstarter funding guidelines at www.kickstarter.com/help/ guidelines. See also comments on the Wilson project as a scam: Multi- millionaire scams Kickstarter for over $22,000—“Sending daughter to game dev camp,” http://imgur.com/zwyRWCa.

6. Bindley. 2013. 9-year-old’s $20,000 Kickstarter campaign. 7. Ibid. 8. See Chen, P., Strickler, Y., & Adler, C. 2012. Kickstarter is not a store.

September 20, www.kickstarter.com/blog/kickstarter-is-not-a-store. 9. Farrell, J. 2012. The JOBS Act: What startups and small businesses

need to know. Forbes, September 9, www.forbes.com/sites/work-in- progress/2012/09/21/the-jobs-act-what-startups-and-small-businesses- need-to-know-infographic/.

10. Ibid. 11. An, J. 2013. Dude, where’s my Kickstarter stuff? Dealing

with delays, deception and broken promises. Digital Trends, March 20, www.digitaltrends.com/social-media/ dude-wheres-my-kickstarter-stuff/#ixzz2OmMqQ4dq.

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45. Ibid. 46. Snyder, S. J. 2010. Kickstarter one of 50 best inventions of 2010.

Time, November 11, www.time.com/time/specials/packages/ article/0,28804,2029497_2030652_2029823,00.html #ixzz2P9t9PunP.

47. Worthan, J. 2009. A few dollars at a time, patrons support artists on the web. New York Times, August 24, www.nytimes.com/2009/08/25/ technology/start-ups/25kick.html?_r=1&em.

48. Strickler. 2013. Talk given at Expand Engadget Conference. 49. https://www.ft.com/content/1978854c-d4b5-11e3-bf4e-00144feabdc0. 50. Mollick. 2013. The dynamics of crowdfunding.

38. Koetsler, J. 2012. Kickstarter dodges responsibility for failed projects. Venture Beat, September 4, venturebeat.com/2012/09/04/ kickstarter-co-founder-failed-projects/.

39. An. 2013. Dude, where’s my Kickstarter stuff? 40. Ibid. 41. Boris, C. 2012. Kickstarter’s new rules for entrepreneurs. Entrepreneur,

September 28, www.entrepreneur.com/blog/224524. 42. See Better tools for project creators, www.kickstarter.com/blog/

better-tools-for-project-creators. 43. Farrell. 2012. The JOBS Act. 44. Malik, O. 2012. Kickstarted: My conversation with Kickstarter

co-founder Perry Chen. Gigaom.com, May 22, gigaom. com/2012/05/22/kickstarter-founder-perry-chen-intervie/#3.

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CASE 12 :: EMIRATES AIRLINE IN 2017 C75

Within three decades, Emirates Airline went from a small start-up to one of the world’s biggest carriers measured by international passenger mileage. Started in 1985, the airline deviated from the strategy of most other airlines to use its position between the U.S., Europe, Africa, and Asia to con- nect flights between distant pairs of cities such as New York and Shanghai or London and Nairobi. Tim Clark, the firm’s president, referred to these as “strange city pairs.” No air- line has grown like Emirates, whose expansion qualifies it to claim the crown of the freewheeling sultan of the skies.

Its strategy of flying large number of passengers all around the world would have been difficult without the

introduction of Boeing 777 long-range planes and Airbus 380 superjumbos. In particular, Emirates has managed over the years to radically redraw the map of the world, trans- ferring the hub of international travel from Europe to the Middle East. Dubai, the hub of Emirates, which currently handles over 80 million passengers each year, has become the world’s busiest airport for international passengers. A new terminal, the largest in the world, was recently built at a cost of $4.5 billion just to accommodate the almost 240 Emirates aircraft that fly out to 145 destinations around the world (see Exhibit 1).

Recent developments, however, such as the drop in oil prices and the growth in terrorist attacks have led to a decline in demand. Many companies, particularly in the Middle East, have been cutting back on travel for their employees, reducing the premium revenue that Emirates has been generating from first and business

CASES

CASE 12 EMIRATES AIRLINE IN 2017*

EXHIBIT 1 Top Global Airlines

There are several rankings of the world’s airlines, but a few have consistently been rated highest in service over the last five years. These are listed below in no particular order.

Started Main Hub Fleet Destinations

SINGAPORE 1972 Singapore 108 63

CATHAY PACIFIC 1946 Hongkong 161 102

EMIRATES 1985 Dubai 221 142

THAI 1960 Bangkok 91 78

ASIANA 1988 Seoul 85 108

ETIHAD 2003 Abu Dhabi 102 109

EVA 1989 Taipei 68 73

AIR NEW ZEALAND 1940 Auckland 106 58

GARUDA 1949 Jakarta 119 102

QATAR 1994 Doha 146 146

ANA 1952 Tokyo 211 73

SOUTH AFRICAN 1934 Johannesburg 60 42

VIRGIN ATLANTIC 1984 London 40 30

QANTAS 1920 Sydney 118 42

LUFTHANSA 1953 Frankfurt 273 190

Source: Skytrax.

* Case prepared by Jamal Shamsie, Michigan State University, with the assistance of Professor Alan B. Eisner, Pace University. Material has been drawn from published sources to be used for purposes of class discussion. Copyright © 2017 Jamal Shamsie and Alan B. Eisner.

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C76 CASE 12 :: EMIRATES AIRLINE IN 2017

class passengers. Growing fears about terrorism have led passengers to cut back on international travel and to reduce connecting through the Middle East. This has led Emirates to switch from the A380 to the smaller Boeing 777 on some routes.

The largest U.S. airlines have alleged that Emirates, like others such as Etihad and Qatar, have received subsidies from their government. These subsidies have, according to these claims, provided Emirates with an unfair advantage. Tim Clark, the president, has responded to such charges by insisting that his carrier has never received government subsidies or obtained free or cheap fuel. The airline has always disclosed its finances, used international auditors, and posted regular quarterly profits (see Exhibits 2 to 5). In fact, according to its financial statements, Emirates has shown profits for the last 27 years. “We are confident that any allegation that Emirates has been subsidized is totally without grounds,” Clark declared.1

In fact, Emirates claims that it has worked hard to achieve its leading position by offering onboard amenities, like bars and showers on its aircraft, which other carriers find frivolous (see Exhibit 6). Beyond this, it points to the high standards of service from its crew that speak many lan- guages and come from many countries. Emirates’ service manager, Terry Daly, employs an inspiring quote: “I may not remember exactly what you said. I may not remember exactly what you did. I will always remember exactly how you made me feel.”

EXHIBIT 2 Performance Highlights

Year Ended, 31 March

Passengers Flown (thousands)

Profit or Loss (AEDm)

2005 12,529 2,619

2006 14,498 2,652

2007 17,544 3,339

2008 21,229 4.451

2009 22,731 2,278

2010 27,454 3,565

2011 31,422 5,443

2012 33,981 1,813

2013 39,391 2,839

2014 44,537 3,254

2015 49,292 5,893

2016 51,853 8,330

Source: Emirates Airline.

EXHIBIT 3 Income Statement (United Arab Emirates Dirham)

Consolidated Income Statement for the year ended 31 March

2016 2015

Revenue 83,500 86,728

Other operating income 1,544 2,091

Operating costs (76,714) (82,926)

Operating profit 8,330 5,893

Finance income 220 175

Finance costs (1,329) (1,449)

Share of results of investments accounted for using the equity method

142 152

Profit before income tax 7,363 4,771

Income tax expense (45) (43)

Profit for the year 7,318 4,728

Profit attributable to non-controlling interests 193 173

Profit attributable to Emirates’ Owner 7,125 4,555

Source: Emirates Airline.

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EXHIBIT 4 Balance Sheet (United Arab Emirates Dirham)

2016 2015

ASSETS

Non-current assets

Property, plant and equipment 82,836 80,554

Intangible assets 1,317 975

Investments accounted for using the equity method

522 544

Advance lease rentals 2,580 920

Loans and other receivables 494 619

Derivative financial instruments - 21

Deferred income tax asset 3 4

87,752 83,627

Current assets

Inventories 2,106 1,919

Trade and other receivables 9,321 8,589

Derivative financial Instruments 12 342

Short term bank deposits 7,823 8,488

Cash and cash equivalents 12,165 8,397

31,427 27,735

Total assets 119,179 111,362

EQUITY AND LIABILITIES

Capital and reserves

Capital 801 801

Other reserves (1,179) (168)

Retained earnings 32,287 27,253

Attributable to Emirates’ Owner 31,909 27,886

Non-controlling interests 496 400

Total equity 32,405 28,286

Non-current liabilities

Trade and other payables 513 202

Borrowings and lease liabilities 40,845 42,426

Deferred revenue 1,596 1,650

Deferred credits 1,090 207

Derivative financial instruments 440 521

Provisions 3,762 3,589

Deferred income tax liability 4 -

48,250 48,595 continued

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2016 2015

Current liabilities

Trade and other payables 27,037 27,770

Income tax liabilities 35 34

Borrowings and lease liabilities 9,260 5,382

Deferred revenue 1,316 1,244

Deferred credits 139 49

Derivative financial instruments 737 2

38,524 34,481

Total liabilities 86,774 83,076

Total equity and liabilities 119,179 111,362

Source: Emirates Airline.

EXHIBIT 4 Continued

EXHIBIT 5 Cash Flow Statement (United Arab Emirates Dirham)

2016 2015

Operating activities

Profit before income tax 7,363 4,771

Adjustments for:

Depreciation and amortisation 8,000 7,446

Finance costs - net 1,109 1,274

(Gain) / loss on sale of property, plant and equipment (367) (132)

Share of results of investments accounted for using the equity method (142) (152)

Net provision for impairment of trade receivables 21 32

Provision for employee benefits 733 669

Net movement on derivative financial instruments (5) (17)

Gain on sale of investments accounted for using the equity method (12) -

Employee benefit payments (585) (534)

Income tax paid (62) (68)

Change in inventories (168) (213)

Change in receivables and advance lease rentals (2,234) 194

Change in provisions, payables, deferred credits and deferred revenue 454 (5)

Net cash generated from operating activities 14,105 13,265

Investing activities

Proceeds from sale of property, plant and equipment 6,535 3,478

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2016 2015

Additions to intangible assets (374) (157)

Additions to property, plant and equipment (9,504) (10,269)

Investments in associates and joint ventures (19) (12)

Acquisition of a subsidiary, net of cash acquired (23) -

Movement in short term bank deposits 665 266

Finance income 231 168

Dividends from investments accounted for using the equity method 128 115

Net cash used in investing activities (2,361) (6,411)

Financing activities

Proceeds from loans 1,213 2,215

Repayment of bonds and loans (1,703) (622)

Aircraft finance lease costs (918) (951)

Other finance costs (294) (341)

Repayment of lease liabilities (4,055) (5,628)

Dividend paid to Emirates’ Owner (2,100) (869)

Dividend paid to non-controlling interests (118) (68)

Net cash used in financing activities (7,975) (6,264)

Net change in cash and cash equivalents 3,7696 590

Cash and cash equivalents at beginning of year 8,393 7,800

Effects of exchange rate changes 3 3

Cash and cash equivalents at end of year 12,165 8,393

Source: Emirates Airline.

EXHIBIT 6 Service For Premium Passengers On Emirates A380

• Offer 1,600 channels of in-seat entertainment • Serve Cuvee Dom Perignon, 2000 champagne • Serve Iranian caviar • Serve gourmet cuisine prepared by chefs of 47 nationalities • Offer largest selection of premium wines • Use bone china by Royal Doulton • Use specially made cutlery by British design house Robert Welch • Provide Bulgari-designed amenity kits • Feature a stand-up bar • Offer two on-board walnut and marble design showers *

* Only for first-class passengers.

Source: Emirates Airline.

Launching a Dream The roots of Emirates can be traced back to Gulf Air, which was a formidable airline owned by the governments of Bahrain, Abu Dhabi, Qatar, and Oman. In the early 1980s, the young sheikh of Dubai, Sheikh Mohammed bin Rashid al Maktoum, was upset by the decision of Gulf Air to cut flights into and out of Dubai. He responded by resolving to start his own airline that would help build Dubai into a center of business and tourism, given the emirates lack of significant oil resources.

The sheikh recruited British Airways veteran Sir Maurice Flanagan to lay the groundwork for the new air- line, which he bankrolled with $10 million in royal funding. He placed a member of his royal family, Sheikh Ahmed bin Saeed al Maktoum, to the top post. At 26 years old, Ahmed bin Saeed had just graduated from the University of Denver in the U.S. Since he had not held a job before, the young

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pioneered the concept of a suite in first class with its launch of the A340 back in 2003. With its 50 A380s, the world’s biggest jetliner, Emirates is able to offer 14 first-class suites, each with a vanity table, closet, 23-inch TV screen and elec- tronic doors that seal shut for total seclusion.

First-class passengers also have access to two enor- mous spa showers, a first in the industry. An event plan- ner who flew first class said, “To walk onto the A380, to have an average size bathroom, a seven minute shower, full size bath towels and your own attendant is pretty amaz- ing.”5 All premium-class passengers—both in first and business class—have access to a big, circular lounge, with a horseshoe-shaped stand-up bar in the center, for which Emirates forfeited a number of business-class seats.

Grooming a Special Employee Each year, Emirates holds Open Days in more than 140 cities across 70 countries for the purpose of attracting new recruits to join its elite force of 18,000 flight attendants from 140 nationalities who speak more than 50 languages. They are not attracted by the starting salary, which is only about $30,000 per year, or to the free room and board that comes with it. They are excited about the possibility of joining an iconic brand which encompasses people around the world.

The airline offers a vast no-expenses-spared crew train- ing program, where for seven weeks, each new recruit moves through different departments with specialists in various areas. Emirates carefully trains all its employees, from those who check in passengers to those who serve them on their planes. Only about 5 percent of the applicants make it through the selection process. The low acceptance rate pushes people with diverse backgrounds to compete in an American Idol style brains-and-beauty contest for a chance to travel around the world as a member of an Emirates cabin crew.

The exterior of the Emirates’ state-of-the-art training facility resembles the fuselage of a jetliner. Inside, everyone pays particular attention to the flight attendants, who must make sure that everyone on the aircraft receives the highest level of service on every single flight. This is particularly important for a carrier whose flights are of long duration because they serve destinations across all continents.

By the end of their training, the newcomers have been instructed in aspects of posture, etiquette, safety, and evacu- ation. There are strict standards for the color of the lipstick, the shade of the hair, and even the style of the lingerie. According to a recent report, the crew, who are 75 percent women, have an average age of 26 years, compared with an age of over 40 at U.S. airlines. Their weight is carefully monitored, their makeup mandatorily reapplied regularly, and unwed pregnancy is not allowed. Everything must go well with the pinstripe khaki uniform, the color of sand, with white scarfs billowing like exotic sails. Women must adhere to certain hairstyles that the crowning blood-red hat will work with. “When walking through an airport terminal, it’s usually a Catch Me If You Can movie moment, with passen- gers all turning their heads,” said one of the new recruits.6

sheikh looked to Flanagan in order to figure out how to run the airline.

However, the speculator growth of Emirates can be attrib- uted to Sir Tim Clark, who was handed the critical task of route planning. He recognized that about two-thirds of the world’s population was within eight hours of Dubai, but the firm lacked the aircraft to take advantage of its location. This began to change with the arrival of more advanced aircraft, beginning with the introduction of the Boeing 777 in 1996, on to the Airbus A380 in 2008. The long range of these air- craft allowed Emirates to develop routes that could link any two points in the world with one stop in Dubai.

From serving 12 destinations in 1988, Emirates was able to expand at an amazing rate, particularly after it started adding Boeing 777s to its fleet after 1996. The carrier con- tinued to grow even through the recession that started in 2008, taking possession of more new aircraft than any other competitor. “We operated normally. We put on more aircraft. We carried more passengers,” said Mohammed H. Mattar, senior vice president of the carrier’s airport services.2

Providing the Ultimate Experience Emirates strives to provide the best possible experience to its passengers in all sections of its aircraft. It was the first airline to offer in-flight viewing in the back of every seat. “That seems pretty normal for long haul airlines now, but it wasn’t then,” said Terry Daly.3 A caravan of flight atten- dants, who are fluent in a dozen languages, pass up and down the aisles, providing service with a smile. Daly, who maintains the highest standards for all in-flight services, is known for having once fired eight service supervisors on a single day when he discovered that the flight attendants that they had supervised had deviated from his precise instruc- tions on how to respond to requests from passengers.

From its start, Emirates has also been known for the qual- ity and selection of food that the airline provides, even to passengers in the back of the aircraft. The catering division is one of the world’s biggest, a multi-floor maze of monorails, cameras, vast warehouses of wines and liquors, multinational chefs slaving over steaming pans, kettles, grills, stretching as far as the eye can see, along with the latest in robotics, all of which deliver 115,000 meal trays to Emirates planes each day. “It’s about making sure the culinary offering is abso- lutely first class across the airplane,” said Daly.4

But Emirates has always tried to push further and fur- ther on the service and amenities that it provides to its premium-class passengers. Included with a Business Class ticket is a limousine ride to and from the airport, personal assistance with the check-in process, and use of one of its 30 worldwide lounges. One of 600 multinational and multi- lingual members of a welcome team called Marhaba, Arabic for “welcome,” help all first- and business-class passengers clear all formalities upon departure and arrival.

Over the years, as Emirates has moved to larger and larger aircraft, it has found ways to enhance the experi- ence of its premium passengers during flight. The airline

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Chasing Tomorrow? Even as Emirates has been trying to set itself apart from other carriers by enhancing the customer experience, it is facing new challenges. It is trying to attract tourists to Dubai to replace some of the connecting passengers that it is losing because of the wars in the Middle East and terrorism there and elsewhere. It is cutting back on its additional orders for the Airbus 380 at least until passenger levels rise again.

At the same time, many of its competitors have been trying to improve on their offerings, particularly for passen- gers who are willing to pay a little more. Airlines are fight- ing with each other to attract this more upscale segment as the higher fares allow them to increase their profits without having to add capacity. Singapore Airlines, for example, is trying to beat all competitors by providing a truly enhanced premium economy section. It will offer wider seats with more recline, a cocktail table, more storage space, and a sleek 13.3-inch high-definition screen, the largest in its class. Passengers will be offered state-of-the-art noise can- celing headsets and hundreds of channels of entertainment, and they will be offered more options on a menu that will be designed specifically for the premium economy class.

Emirates faces its biggest challenge from its other U.A.E.–based rival, Etihad, which announced an improve- ment to the first-class suite that Emirates pioneered 12 years ago. Etihad introduced, with grand bravado, a three-room, $21,000 one-way Residence and nine $16,000 one-way one- room First Apartments, complete with Savoy Academy– trained butler and private chefs, on its A380 flights. First offered on flights between Dubai and London, the service is to be expanded to flights between Dubai and New York and Dubai and Sydney.

Some industry analysts have questioned the ability of Emirates to deal with these challenges. Joe Brancatelli, a business travel writer, recently stated: “I could make the case that Emirates’ moment has passed. Emirates was the trendy airline three or four years ago.”10 In a recent meeting to announce the latest performance figures for the airline, Emirates Chairman and CEO His Highness Sheikh Ahmed bin Saeed Al Maktoum brushed away these concerns. “Over the years, we have always managed to come up with new products,” the young chairman responded.11

ENDNOTES 1. Mark Seal. Fly me to the moon . . . with a stop in Dubai. Departures

.com, Summer 2014, p. 276. 2. Susan Carey. U.S. carriers claim unfair practices. The Wall Street

Journal, March 6, 2015, p. B 3. 3. Departures.com., Summer 2014, p. 276. 4. Ibid., p. 277. 5. Ibid., p. 277. 6. Ibid., p. 278. 7. Ibid., p. 277. 8. Ibid., p. 310. 9. Ibid., p. 278. 10. Ibid., p. 278. 11. Ibid., p. 275.

Like everything else, Emirates goes over the top in what it calls Nujoum, the Arabic word for stars, by including moti- vational team-building exercises in its training program. Travel writer Christine Negroni, who participated in one of these, described the experience that the new recruits typi- cally go through. “It is a combination of a customer service experience and a come-to-Jesus rally, highly produced like a Hollywood spectacular. If you had told me that Disney pro- duced it, I wouldn’t doubt it. By the end of the day, they are whipped into a frenzy of feeling What can I do for Emirates?”7

Communicating to the Masses In spite of the extra touches and amenities that Emirates can provide for its passengers, the carrier discovered from focus groups that their name was not well known in many parts of the world where they were expanding. They realized that they needed to create a message they could use to develop their brand among consumers that would inform them what to expect from Emirates. This mes- sage could also be used to motivate existing and potential employees to rally behind the airline and work to deliver on its promise.

In its usual style of pushing for the best, Emirates sum- moned the world’s top 10 advertising agencies to Dubai to compete for a massive international advertising cam- paign contract. StrawberryFrog, an advertising agency that had recently started operations in New York City, was one of the firms vying for the contract. Its founder, Scott Goodson, had read an interview with Tim Clark, the presi- dent of Emirates, shortly before this gathering of the adver- tising agencies. “And in that article, he was talking about his vision, that he wanted Emirates to be a global company and wanted to make the world a smaller place by bringing people together,” said Goodson.8

These comments inspired Goodson to come up with the idea of “Hello Tomorrow,” which allowed his firm to clinch the contract with Emirates. These words became not just the theme for an ad campaign but a new way to think about the airline. Through the use of powerful storytelling, images, and music, the message portrayed Emirates not just as a carrier that delivered a superior experience but as a cat- alyst for connecting a new global culture of shared aspira- tions, values, enthusiasm, and dreams. In his conversation with Tim Clark, Goodson said: “Ad campaigns are fleeting. The power of a movement is that it can change habits and rally millions.”9

The StrawberryFrog team spent 18 month at Emirates headquarters educating employees, making them foot sol- diers in this “movement” or campaign. In the early spring of 2012, the “Hello Tomorrow” brand was launched, a uni- versal message in myriad languages in 150 countries. In television ads, an Emirates steward pushes his drink cart as a mammoth A380 airplane seems to be literally built around him, its various parts and personnel coming from countries spanning the globe, providing proof that the air- line is a truly global enterprise.

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C82 CASE 13 :: CIRQUE DU SOLEIL

New York City, a combination of theater and acrobat- ics called Paramour that had been running on Broadway since May 25, 2016. The show was distinguished from most other Cirque productions by the use of a script with dialogue along with original songs. While two pre- vious efforts had failed, the firm claimed that its first Broadway venture which had cost $25 million to launch had managed to draw large enough audiences each week to make a profit. Paramour managed to achieve this suc- cess even though the show received mostly tepid reviews from the critics.

Starting a New Concept Cirque du Soleil developed out of early efforts of Guy Laliberte, who left his Montreal home at the age of 14 with little more than an accordion. He traveled around, try- ing out different acts such as fire-eating for spare change in front of Centre Pompidou in Paris. When he returned home, he hooked up with another visionary street per- former from Quebec, a stilt-walker named Gilles Ste-Croix. In 1982, Laliberte and Ste-Croix organized a street perfor- mance festival in the sleepy town of Baie St. Paul along the St. Lawrence valley.

In 1984, Cirque du Soleil was formed with financial support from the government of Quebec, as banks were reluctant to support the band of fire-eaters, stilt-walkers and clowns. Its breakthrough 1987 show We Reinvent the Circus burst on the art scene in Montreal as an entirely new art form. No one had seen anything like it before. Laliberte and Ste-Croix had turned the whole concept of circus on its head. Using story lines, identifiable characters, and an emotional trajectory in the show, Cirque du Soleil embodied far more than a mere collection of disparate acts and feats.

Despite its early success, Cirque du Soleil struggled financially. They took a gamble on making their debut in the U.S. as the opening act of the 1987 Los Angeles Festival. They managed to sell out all of their perfor- mances, which were run in a tent on a lot adjacent to downtown’s Little Tokyo. Its success in Los Angeles led to the troupe to open shows across the U.S. in cities such as Washington, DC, San Francisco, Miami, and Chicago. Soon after, Cirque du Soleil performed in Japan and Switzerland, introducing their concept to audiences out- side North America.

In 1992, Cirque du Soleil took a show called Nouvelle Experience to Las Vegas for the first time. It was performed under the big top in the parking lot of the Mirage. The suc- cess of this show led to building a permanent theater at

For over three decades, Cirque du Soleil, led by the fire- eater-turned-billionaire Guy Laliberte, has reinvented and revolutionized the circus. From its beginning in 1984, the world’s leading producer of high-quality live artistic enter- tainment has thrilled over 160 million spectators with a novel show concept that is an astonishing theatrical blend of circus acts and street entertainment, featuring spectacular costumes, fairyland sets, spellbinding music, and magical lighting. Cirque manages to run as many as 20 shows at a time and has played in 330 cities across 48 countries.

Cirque du Soleil’s business triumphs have mirrored its high-flying aerial stunts, and it is a case study for business journal articles on carving out unique markets. But fol- lowing a recent bleak outlook report from a consultant, a spate of poorly received shows over the last few years, and a decline in profits, executives at Cirque say they are now restructuring and refocusing their business—shifting some of the attention away from their string of successful shows toward several other potential business ventures.

For the first time in its recent history, Cirque du Soleil failed to generate a profit in 2013. Its market dropped 20 percent from $2.7 billion in 2008. In interviews with The Wall Street Journal at Cirque du Soleil’s sleek headquarters in Montreal, top executives including founder and 90 per- cent owner Laliberte talked about the firm’s deteriorating finances and their desire to expand into new areas. In 2015, they announced an agreement under which TPG, a global private investment firm, would acquire a majority stake in Cirque du Soleil to fuel its future growth. Cirque has also sold a minority stake to a Chinese investment group that will help launch shows in China.

Debate has swirled over whether Cirque du Soleil should return to its roots or aim for constant reinvention. At the end of 2011, Bain & Co., contracted by Cirque, reported that its market had hit saturation and the company needed to be careful with how many new shows it added. Bain suggested Cirque seek growth by moving their concept to movies, television, and nightclubs. “Guy Laliberté always said we are a rarity—but the rarity was gone,” said Marc Gagnon, a former top executive in charge of operations for Cirque du Soleil who left in 2012.1

Nevertheless, Cirque du Soleil had finally been suc- cessful in establishing a long-running production in

CASE 13 CIRQUE DU SOLEIL*

CASES

* Case prepared by Jamal Shamsie, Michigan State University, with the assistance of Professor Alan B. Eisner, Pace University. Material has been drawn from published sources to be used for purposes of class discussion. Copyright © 2017 Jamal Shamsie and Alan B. Eisner.

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All of Cirque du Soleil shows were originally developed to be performed under a Grand Chapiteau, or “big top,” for an extended period of time, before they were modified, if necessary, for touring in arenas and other venues. The troupe’s grand chapiteaux were easily recognizable by their blue and yellow coloring. The facilities could seat more than 2,600 spectators, and were accompanied by smaller structures that were necessary to accommodate practice sessions, food preparation, and administrative services. However, after the contract to develop Mystere for Treasure Island in Las Vegas, Cirque also began to develop shows that were to be performed on a more permanent basis in specially designed auditoriums.

Losing its Touch Cirque du Soleil continued to expand even as the recent recession cut into demand. It had launched 20 shows in the 23 years from 1984 through 2006, none of which closed during that time, other than a couple of early failures. Over the next six years, however, Cirque opened 14 more shows, five of which flopped and closed early. The reasons for the failures differed. One show, Zarkana, couldn’t make enough money to cover its production costs playing in New York City’s 6,000-seat Radio City Music Hall. Iris, in Los Angeles, played in Hollywood, in a seedy neighborhood that despite heavy tourist traffic was commercially marginal. Zaia, in Macau, simply didn’t appeal to local audiences. Perhaps more troubling, the company’s nearly perfect record of producing artistic successes began to waver. Viva Elvis and Banana Shpeel were among several Cirque shows that garnered terrible reviews. Both shows closed quickly. “Shows like that diluted the brand,” said Patrick Leroux, a professor at Montreal’s Concordia University who has closely studied Cirque du Soleil.2

One problem, say Cirque du Soleil executives, was that audiences didn’t understand the differences among vari- ous shows carrying the Cirque brand. As a result many people would dismiss the opportunity to see, for instance, the show Totem thinking they had already seen some- thing similar in the older Varekai. On the other hand, Cirque tried to move in different directions with each of the new shows that it developed. “We’re constantly chal- lenging ourselves,” Laliberte said.3 Audiences, however, complained that some newer shows were not as focused on the acrobatic feats that they had come to expect and enjoy from Cirque.

By August 2012, Laliberte had become concerned and convened a five-day summit for executives at his estate out- side Montreal. There, he and others drew up plans to lay off hundreds of executives and performers and pare the number of big new touring circus shows Cirque produced. The cuts began soon after and continued through 2013 and amounted to around $100 million of savings, according to Laliberte. The savings included everything from giving out fewer suede anniversary jackets to employees to cutting out child performers and tutors.

Treasure Island for a show called Mystere, a nonstop per- petual motion kaleidoscope of athleticism and raw emotion that thrilled audiences. It became the first of the troupe’s permanent shows and led to several others that opened in other hotels along the Las Vegas strip. The most spectacu- lar of these was O that included acts that are performed in a 25-foot-deep, 1.5 million gallon pool of crystal clear water in a custom built theater at Bellagio.

By the end of 2011, Cirque du Soleil had 22 shows—seven of them in Las Vegas. It had become an international enter- tainment conglomerate with 4,000 employees in offices all around the world. It had established its headquarters in a $40 million building in Montreal, where all of Cirque’s shows are created and produced. Much of the building is devoted to practice studios for various types of performers and a costume department that outfits performers in fantas- tical hand-painted clothing. Cirque du Soleil recruits many types of talent, among them acrobats, athletes, dances, musicians, clowns, actors, and singers.

Growing with the Concept Cirque du Soleil hired key people from the National Circus School in its formative years in order to develop its concept of the contemporary circus. Its first recruit was Guy Caron, the head of this school, to be the Cirque’s artistic director. Shortly after, the troupe recruited Franco Dragone, another instructor from the National Circus School, who had been working in Belgium. Dragone brought with him his experi- ence in commedia dell’arte techniques, which he imparted to the Cirque performers.

Together, Caron and Dragone were behind the creation of all of the Cirque du Soleil shows during their formative years, including Saltimbanco, Mystere, Algeria, Quidam and the extravagant O. Under the watchful eye of Laliberte, Cirque developed its unique formula that defined their shows. From the beginning, they promoted the whole show, rather than specific acts or performers. They eliminated spoken dialogue so that their show would not be culture bound, replacing this with a strong emotional sound track that was played from the beginning to the end by live musi- cians. Performers, rather than a technical crew, moved equipment and props on and off stage so that it did not disrupt the momentum as the show transitioned from one act to the next. Most important, the idea was to create a cir- cus without a ring or animals, as Laliberte believed that the lack of these two elements would draw the audience more into the performance.

Even though Laliberte and his creative team were clearly innovative in their approach, they were not reluctant to obtain inspiration from outside sources. They drew on the tradition of pantomime and masks from circuses in Europe. They learned about blending presentational, musical, and choreographic elements from the Chinese. Caron readily admitted that Cirque took everything that had existed in the past and pulled it into the present, so that it would strike a chord with present day audiences.

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A New Direction? Cirque du Soleil has managed to generate profits out of a business model that is quite challenging. Kenneth Feld, of Ringling Bros. and Barnum and Bailey circus, commented: “If you think about spending $165 million on a show that seats 1,900 people, the economics are just staggering.”5 But Laliberte’s stroke of genius was to realize that no Cirque show ever had to close. They could either keep touring or play in locations such as Las Vegas and Orlando that draw a lot of tourists. The troupe managed to build a repertory of shows that could all be running at the same time (see Exhibit 1).

Laliberte also reexamined core production costs. The payroll for Cirque’s show O, in Las Vegas, for instance, had ballooned thanks to a surge in contortionists. “I said, ‘Why do we need six contortionists?’” Laliberté, 55, recalled while chain smoking inside his office.4 In addi- tion to the layoffs, Cirque also suffered a blow to morale when acrobat Sarah Guyard-Guillot was killed during a performance. The company overhauled the show’s finale, a “battle” staged on a vertical wall, with performers sus- pended from motorized wire harnesses. Since the per- former’s death, Cirque has continued to stage the show, replacing the live finale with a videotape of the scene from a past performance.

C84 CASE 13 :: CIRQUE DU SOLEIL

EXHIBIT 1 Cirque du Soleil Shows

Grand Chapiteau & Arena Shows Resident Shows

1990 Nouvelle Experience 1993 Mystere*

Treasure Island, Las Vegas

1992 Saltimbanco 1998 O*

Bellagio, Las Vegas

1994 Alegria 1998 La Nouba*

Downtown Disney, Lake Buena Vista

1996 Quidam* 2003 Zumanity*

New York New York, Las Vegas

1999 Dralion 2005 Ka*

MGM Grand, Las Vegas

2002 Varekai* 2006 Love*

The Mirage, Las Vegas

2005 Corteo* 2008 Zaia The Venetian Macao

2006 Delirium 2008 Zed Tokyo Disney Resort, Tokyo

2007 Kooza* 2008 Criss Angel Believe*

Luxor, Las Vegas

2007 Wintuk 2009 Viva Elvis Aria Resort & Casino, Las Vegas

2009 Ovo* 2011 Iris Dolby Theatre, Los Angeles

2009 Banana Shpeel 2013 Michael Jackson: One*

Mandalay Bay & Resort, Las Vegas

2010 Totem* 2014 JOYA*

Riviera Maya, Mexico

2011 Michael Jackson: The Immortal World Tour 2016 PARAMOUR*

Lyric Theatre, Broadway, New York

2012 Amaluna*

2014 Kurios: Cabinet of Curiosities*

2015 Toruk*

2016 Luzia*

2017 Volta*

*Still in performance.

Source: Cirque du Soleil.

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CASE 13 :: CIRQUE DU SOLEIL C85

However, the rising costs of new shows and the increase in the number of early flops had cut into the firm’s revenues and profits. Yet although revenues dropped to around $850 million in 2015 from $1 billion in 2012, Cirque still managed to return to profitability because of stringent cost controls.

Laliberte has been working with his executive team to come up with a business restructuring plan to manage diversification through the creation of discrete business units under a central corporate entity to try to beef up the noncircus side of the business. Paramour was the first show to be launched by a new subsidiary for musical-theater pro- duction that is based in New York City.

Another subsidiary of the firm that is operating under the name of 45Degrees is starting work on producing special events. Other new areas that Cirque is venturing into include small cabaret shows at hotels, children’s television programs, and theme parks. Executives say that currently the company’s biggest growth area isn’t a show at all. It is an expanding deal to provide ticketing services to the arena company AEG.

Circus experts say Cirque du Soleil is walking a fine line as it seeks to expand into new ventures without damag- ing its central brand as a creative entity. But Laliberte is convinced that Cirque can apply its unique talents to other businesses. “We’ll be more about intelligent analysis of each project,” he remarked to critics who have questioned the new directions.6 For Laliberte, the stakes are high. He now has new investors that he must satisfy with the future success of his endeavors.

ENDNOTES 1. Alexandra Berzon. Cirque’s next act: Rebalancing the business. The

Wall Street Journal, December 2, 2014, p. B1. 2. Ibid., p. B4. 3. Ibid. 4. Christopher Palmeri. The $600 million circus maximus. BusinessWeek,

December 13, 2004, p. 82. 5. Berzon, p. B4. 6. Ibid.

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C86 CASE 14 :: PIXAR

pulled the film away from its director as it began to search for new ways to rework the story. Pixar had done this before, and insists that rethinking an animated film is not uncommon, especially when you are working with fresh, untested ideas. In the end, although The Good Dinosaur worked well as family entertainment, it did not quite meet the lofty standards for originality and creativity set by Pixar’s other films.

The continued success of its films has put aside doubts about the ability of Pixar to maintain its creativ- ity after being acquired by the Walt Disney Company in 2006 for the hefty sum of $7.4 billon. The deal was final- ized by the late Steve Jobs, the Apple Computer chief executive, who then served as the head of the computer

Since Pixar launched Toy Story in 1995, it has released 17 other films, each of which has debuted at the top of the box office charts (see Exhibit 1). Its films have received critical acclaim, with 10 Academy Award nominations and eight wins for Best Animated Film. This is far more than any other studio since the category was added in 2001.

The only exception to its stellar record was The Good Dinosaur, which was released in late 2015, after Pixar had yanked it from release the previous year. The firm had

CASE 14 PIXAR

CASES

* Case prepared by Jamal Shamsie, Michigan State University, with the assistance of Professor Alan B. Eisner, Pace University. Material has been drawn from published sources to be used for purposes of class discussion. Copyright © 2017 Jamal Shamsie and Alan B. Eisner.

All of Pixar’s films released to date have ended up among the top animated films of all time based on worldwide box office revenues in millions of U.S. dollars.

Rank Title Year Revenue

($US millions)

1 Toy Story 3 2010 $1065

2 Finding Nemo 2003 $940

3 Monsters University 2013 $745

4 Up 2009 $735

5 The Incredibles 2005 $630

6 Ratoutille 2007 $620

7 Monsters, Inc 2002 $575

8 Cars 2 2011 $560

9 Brave 2012 $555

10 Wall-E 2009 $535

11 Toy Story 2 1999 $515

12 Finding Dory 2016 $485

13 Cars 2006 $460

14 Toy Story 1995 $390

15 A Bug’s Life 1998 $365

16 Inside Out 2015 $356

17 The Good Dinosaur 2015 $123

EXHIBIT 1

Pixar Films

Source: IMDB, Variety.

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a third of Lucas’s asking price. While the newly named Pixar Animation Studios tried to push the boundaries of computer animation over the next five years, Jobs ended up having to invest an additional $50 million—more than 25 percent of his total wealth at the time. “There were times that we all despaired, but fortunately not all at the same time,” said Jobs.4

Still, Catmull’s team did continue to make substantial breakthroughs in the development of computer-generated full-length feature films (see Exhibit 2). In 1991, Disney ended up giving Pixar a three-film contract that started with Toy Story. When the movie was finally released in 1995, its success surprised everyone in the film industry. Rather than the nice little film Disney had expected, Toy Story became the sensation of 1995. It rose to the rank of the third high- est grossing animated film of all time, earning $362 million in worldwide box office revenues.

Within days, Jobs had decided to take Pixar public. When the shares, priced at $22, shot past $33, Jobs called his best friend, Oracle CEO Lawrence J. Ellison, to tell him he had company in the billionaire’s club. With Pixar’s sud- den success, Jobs returned to strike a new deal with Disney. Early in 1996, at a lunch with Walt Disney chief Michael D. Eisner, Jobs made his demands: an equal share of the prof- its, equal billing on merchandise and on-screen credits, and guarantees that Disney would market Pixar films as they did their own.

Boosting the Creative Component With the success of Toy Story, Jobs realized that he had hit something big. He had obviously tapped into his Silicon Valley roots and turned to computers to forge a unique style of creative moviemaking. In each of its subsequent films, Pixar continued to develop computer animation that allowed for more lifelike backgrounds, texture, and move- ment than ever before. For example, since real leaves are translucent, Pixar’s engineers developed special software algorithms that both reflect and absorb light, creating lumi- nous scenes among jungles of clover.

In spite of the significance of these advancements in computer animation, Jobs was well aware that suc- cessful feature films would require a strong creative spark. He understood that it would be the marriage of technology with creativity that would allow Pixar to rise above most of its competition. To get that, Jobs fostered a campus-like environment within the newly formed outfit similar to the freewheeling, charged atmosphere in the early days of his beloved Apple, where he also returned as acting CEO. “It’s not simply the technology that makes Pixar,” said Dick Cook, former President of Walt Disney studios.5

Even though Jobs played a crucial supportive role, it was Catmull who was most responsible for ensuring that the firm’s technological achievements created synergies with its creative efforts. He has been the keeper of the company’s unique innovative culture, which has blended Silicon Valley

animation firm Pixar. Disney CEO Bob Iger worked hard to acquire Pixar, whose track record made it one of the world’s most successful animation companies. Both Jobs and Iger were aware, however, that they must pro- tect Pixar’s creative culture while they carried it over to Disney’s environment.

Jobs and Iger were convinced that Pixar’s link with Disney would be mutually beneficial for both firms. In Jobs’s words: “Disney is the only company with animation in their DNA.”1 John Lasseter, who oversees all story development at Pixar, denied any negative effects from Disney’s acquisition of his firm and insisted that Pixar’s films were increasingly being subjected to higher standards by critics because of its string of successes. If some of the studio’s films had fallen a bit short, this could be attributed to some growing pains rather than compromising on its standards under Disney.

Ed Catmull, president of Pixar, reiterated his firm’s com- mitment to take whatever steps were necessary to put out the best possible films. “Nobody ever remembers the fact that you slipped [up in] a film, but they will remember a bad film,” he said.2 Catmull’s remarks indicated that Pixar was dedicated to its lengthy process of playfully crafting a film to replace the standard production line approach tra- ditionally pursued by Disney. This contrast in culture was best reflected in the Oscars that employees at Pixar proudly display, but which someone dressed in Barbie doll clothing.

After having won another Academy Award for Best Animated Film for Inside Out the previous year, Pixar failed to receive a nomination in January 2017 for Finding Dory. The sequel was heralded by critics, however, and went on to become one of the biggest box office hits of 2016.

Pushing for Computer Animated Films The roots of Pixar stretch back to 1975 with the founding of a vocational school in Old Westbury, NY, called the New York Institute of Technology. It was there that Edwin E. Catmull, a strait-laced Mormon from Salt Lake City who loved animation but couldn’t draw, teamed up with the peo- ple who would later form the core of Pixar. “It was artists and technologists from the very start,” recalled Alvy Ray Smith, who worked with Catmull during those years. “It was like a fairy tale.”3

By 1979, Catmull and his team decided to join forces with famous Hollywood director George W. Lucas, Jr. They were hopeful that this would allow them to pursue their dream of making animated films. As part of Lucas’s film- making facility in San Rafael, California, Catmull’s group of aspiring animators was able to make substantial progress in the art of computer animation. But the unit was not able to generate any profits and Lucas was not willing to let it grow beyond using computer animation for special effects.

In 1985 Catmull finally turned to Jobs, who had just been ousted from Apple. Jobs was reluctant to invest in a firm that wanted to make full-length feature films using computer animation. But a year later, Jobs did decide to buy Catmull’s unit for just $10 million, which represented

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the school’s dean was Randall E. Nelson, a former juggler known to perform his act using chain saws so students in animation classes had something compelling to draw.

Becoming Accomplished Storytellers A considerable part of the creative energy at Pixar always goes into story development. Jobs understood that a film works only if its story can move the hearts and minds of families round the world. His goal was to develop Pixar into an animated movie studio known for the quality of its story- telling above everything else. “We want to create some great stories and characters that endure with each generation,” Jobs stated.7

For story development, Pixar relies on 43-year-old John Lasseter, who goes by the title of “vice president of the cre- ative.” Known for his collection of 358 Hawaiian shirts and his irrepressible playfulness with toys, Lasseter has been the key to the appeal of all of Pixar’s films. Lasseter gets very passionate about developing great stories and then harnessing computers to tell these stories. Most of Pixar’s employees believe it is this passion that has ensured the string of commercial hits. Lasseter is widely regarded as the Walt Disney for the 21st century.

techies, Hollywood production honchos, and artsy anima- tion experts. In the pursuit of Catmull’s vision, this eclectic group transformed their office cubicles into tiki huts, circus tents, and cardboard castles with bookshelves stuffed with toys and desks adorned with colorful iMac computers.

One of Catmull’s biggest achievements has been the cre- ation of what is called the Pixar Braintrust (see Exhibit 3). This creative group of employees, which includes directors, meets on a regular basis to assess each movie that the firm is developing and offer their ideas for improvement. It is such emphasis on creativity that has kept Pixar on the cutting edge. Each of their films has been innovative in many respects, including of course making the best possible use of computer animation. “They’re absolute geniuses,” gushed Jules Roman, co-founder and CEO of rival Tippett Studio. “They’re the people who created computer animation really.”6

Catmull has worked hard to build creative innova- tion into programs to develop all the employees, who are encouraged to devote up to four hours a week, every week, to further their education at Pixar University. The in-house training program offers 110 different courses that cover sub- jects such as live improvisation, creative writing, painting, drawing, sculpting, and cinematography. For many years,

EXHIBIT 2 Milestones

1986 Steve Jobs buys Lucas’s computer group and christens it Pixar. The firm completes a short film, Luxo Jr., which is nominated for an Oscar.

1988 Pixar adds computer-animated ads to its repertoire, making spots for Listerine, Lifesavers, and Tropicana. Another short, Tin Toy, wins an Oscar.

1991 Pixar signs a production agreement with Disney. Disney is to invest $26 million; Pixar is to deliver at least three full- length, computer-animated feature films.

1995 Pixar releases Toy Story, the first fully digital feature film, which becomes the top-grossing movie of the year and wins an Oscar. A week after release, the company goes public.

1997 Pixar and Disney negotiate a new agreement: a 50-50 split of the development costs and profits of five feature-length movies. Short Geri’s Game wins an Oscar.

1998–99 A Bug’s Life and Toy Story 2 are released, together pulling in $1.3 billion through box office and video.

2001–04 A string of hits from Pixar: Monsters Inc., Finding Nemo, and The Incredibles.

2006 Disney acquires Pixar and assigns responsibilities for its own animation unit to Pixar’s creative brass. Cars is released and becomes another box office hit.

2008 Wall-E becomes the fourth film from Pixar to receive the Oscar for a feature-length animated film.

2009 Up becomes the Fifth film from Pixar to receive the Oscar for a feature-length animated film.

2011 Toy Story 3 receives five Oscar nominations and wins two, including one for Best Animated Film.

2011 Steve Jobs dies, leaving Ed Catmull in charge.

2013 Brave becomes the seventh film from Pixar to receive an Oscar for Best Animated Film.

2015 Inside Out becomes the eighth film from Pixar to receive an Oscar for Best Animated Film.

2016 Piper received a nomination for an Oscar for best animated short film

Source: Pixar.

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Stanton recast the story to be about Flik, the heroic ant who recruits Flea’s troupe to fight the grasshoppers. “You have to rework and rework it,” explained Lasseter. “It is not rare for a scene to be rewritten as much as 30 times.”9

Pumping Out the Hits In spite of its formidable string of hits, Pixar has had dif- ficulty in stepping up its pace of production. Although they may cost 30 percent less, computer-generated animated films take considerable time to develop. Because of the desired emphasis on detail, Pixar completed most of the work on a film before moving to the next one, until Catmull and Lasseter decided to work on several projects at the same time. Still, the firm has not been able to release more than one movie a year.

To push for increased production, Pixar has built up its workforce to well over 1,000 employees and turned to a stable of directors to oversee its movies. Lasseter, who directed Pixar’s first three films, supervises other directors who are taking the helm. Monsters Inc., Finding Nemo, The Incredibles, Ratatouille, and Brave were directed by some of this new talent. But there are concerns about the qual- ity of directors that Pixar can rely upon to turn out high- quality animated films. Michael Savner of Bank of America Securities commented: “You can’t simply double produc- tion. There is a finite amount of talent.”10

To meet the faster production pace, Catmull has added new divisions, including one for development of new mov- ies and one to oversee movie development shot by shot. The eight-person new-movie development team has helped to generate more ideas for new films. “Once more ideas are

When it’s time to start a project, Lasseter isolates a group of eight or so writers and directs them to forget about the constraints of technology. The group bounces ideas off each other, taking collective responsibility for developing a story. While many studios try to rush from script to pro- duction, Lasseter takes up to two years just to work out all the details. Once the script has been developed, artists cre- ate storyboards that connect the various characters to the developing plot. “No amount of great animation is going to save a bad story,” he said. “That’s why we go so far to make it right.8

Only after the basic story has been set does Lasseter begin to think about what he’ll need from Pixar’s technolo- gists. And it’s always more than the computer animators expect. Lasseter, for example, demanded that the crowds of ants in A Bug’s Life not be a single mass of look-alike faces. To solve the problem, computer expert William T. Reeves developed software that randomly applied physical and emotional characteristics to each ant. In another instance, writers brought a model of a butterfly named Gypsy to researchers, asking them to write code so that when she rubbed her antennas, you could see the hairs press down and pop back up.

At any stage during the process, Lasseter may go back to potential problems that he may see with the story. In A Bug’s Life, for example, the story was totally revamped after more than a year of work had been completed. Originally, it was about a troupe of circus bugs run by P.T. Flea that tries to rescue a colony of ants from marauding grasshoppers. But because of a flaw in the story—why would the circus bugs risk their lives to save stranger ants?—co-director Andrew

Ed Catmull President, producer

John Lasseter Chief creative officer, producer, director, writer

Jim Morris Business manager

Brad Bird Director, writer

Pete Doctor Director, writer

Harley Jessup Production designer

Bill Cone Production designer

Ricky Nierva Production designer, art director, character designer

Ralph Eggleston Art director

Randy Barrett Character designer, set designer, matte painter

Tia Kratter Shading art director, digital painter

Bob Pauley Character designer, sketch artist

Jay Shuster Character and environment designer

EXHIBIT 3

Sample of Roles

Source: Pixar.

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to the new talent the firm is able to recruit and train to work together. This recognition leads to a culture of con- tinuous exchange of ideas and fosters a collective sense of responsibility on all their films. “We created the studio we want to work in,” Lasseter remarked. “We have an environ- ment that’s wacky. It’s a creative brain trust: It’s not a place where I make my movies—it’s a place where a group of peo- ple make movies.”15

Pixar’s string of successful films is particularly striking, given that there has been a considerable increase in the number of animated films released each year. Over the past decade, there have been years when as many as 16 films have been offered, as more and more studios have grabbed for a share of this lucrative market. The growth in competition has led to a string of losses at Dreamworks Animation, Pixar’s largest competitor. Lasseter welcomes the competition because it forces Pixar to stick to its commitment to qual- ity. “I like healthy competition,” he says. “I’d rather be in a healthy industry than be the only player in a dead industry.”16

Think about how off-putting a movie about rats preparing food could be, or how risky it must’ve seemed to start a movie about robots with 39 dialogue- free minutes. We dare to attempt these stories, but we don’t get them right on the first pass. This is as it should be.

—Ed Catmull from his book, Creativity, Inc, published in 2014

ENDNOTES 1. Charles Solomon. Pixar Creative Chief to Seek to Restore the Disney

Magic. New York Times, January 25, 2006, p. C6. 2. Daniel Miller. Pixar Film Delay Leads to Layoffs. Los Angeles Times,

November 23, 2013, p. B 3. 3. Peter Burrows and Ronald Grover. Steve Jobs: Movie Mogul.

BusinessWeek, November 23, 1998, p. 150. 4. Ibid. 5. Ibid., p. 146. 6. Ibid. 7. Marc Graser. Pixar Run by Focused Group. Variety, December 20,

1999, p. 74. 8. New York Times, October 18, 2011, p. C4. 9. Burrows and Grover. BusinessWeek, November 23, 1998, p. 146. 10. Andrew Bary. Coy Story. Barron’s, October 13, 2003, p. 21. 11. Daniel Terdiman. Bravely Going Where Pixar Animation Tech Has

Never Gone. CNET News, June 16, 2012. 12. Pui-Wing Tam. Will Quantity Hurt Pixar’s Quality? Wall Street Journal,

February 15, 2001, p. B4. 13. Peter Burrows and Ronald Grover. Steve Jobs’ Magic Kingdom.

BusinessWeek, February 6, 2006, p. 66. 14. Solomon. New York Times, January 25, 2006. 15. Bary. Barron’s, October 13, 2003, p. 21. 16. Richard Verrier. Animation Boom May Become Glut. Los Angeles

Times, August 20, 2013, p. B 3.

percolating, we have more options to choose from so no one artist is feeling the weight of the world on their shoul- ders,” said Sarah McArthur, who served as Pixar’s vice president of production.11

Catmull keeps pushing technology to improve the qual- ity of the animation. During the production of Brave, for example, the animators had to make the curly hair of the main character appear to be natural. Claudia Chung, who worked on the film, talked about their reaction to various methods they kept trying: “We’d kind of roll our eyes and say, ‘I guess we can do that,’ but inside we were all excited, because it’s one more stretch we can do.”12 At the same time, new animation software, Luxo, has allowed the use of fewer people, with no more than 100 animators working on each film.

The high standards of the firm cannot be compromised for the sake of a steady flow of films. This was evident in their decision to delay the launch of The Good Dinosaur because they felt that they had to rethink the film. Everyone at Pixar remains committed to the philosophy that every one of Pixar’s films should grow out of the very best efforts of the firm’s animators, storytellers, and technolo- gists. “Quality is more important than quantity,” Jobs had emphasized. “One home run is better than two doubles.”13

Catmull works hard to retain Pixar’s commitment to quality even as it grows. He uses Pixar University to encour- age collaboration among employees, and to instill the key values that are tied to Pixar’s success. And he has helped devise ways to avoid collective burnout. A masseuse and a doctor now come by Pixar’s campus each week, and anima- tors must get permission from their supervisors if they want to work more than 50 hours a week.

To Infinity and Beyond? Over time the individuals behind the success of Pixar have only become more instrumental. After it acquired Pixar, Disney placed Catmull and Lasseter in charge of the com- bined animation business of both Pixar and Disney. Two of the films that were nominated in January 2017 for Best Animated Film, Moana and Zootopia, were both made at Disney under the supervision of these Pixar heads. For Lasseter, the new responsibilities for Disney represent a return to his roots. He had been inspired by Disney films as a kid and he started his career at Disney before being lured away to Pixar by Catmull. “For many of us at Pixar, it was the magic of Disney that influenced us to pursue our dreams of becoming animators, artists, storytellers and filmmakers,” Lasseter remarked.14

Something that had to be adjusted to was the loss of Jobs, who passed away in 2011. At the same time, everyone at Pixar understands that their success can be attributed

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CASE 15 :: CAMPBELL: HOW TO KEEP THE SOUP SIMMERING C91

In 2017, Campbell Soup neared the boiling point with numer- ous challenges. The most important challenge related to its intention of being attractive to health-conscious consum- ers, although there were others. The company had tried to turn its focus toward fresh food categories, in response to a shift in consumer tastes and preferences for fresh food, by capitalizing on its fresh food division “Campbell Fresh.” The company also acquired Garden Fresh Gourmet, one of the most popular refrigerated salsa brands in the U.S. Under the umbrella of its fresh food division, the company started selling fresh carrots, hummus, and salad dressings, but the sales did not meet the expectations of management. The company attributed Campbell Fresh’s lack of success to the shortage of carrots amid unsuitable weather conditions in California for carrot crops. The company’s CEO, Denise Morrison, said, “I am not pleased with the results of our fourth quarter, 2016. The performance of our Campbell Fresh busi- ness, driven predominantly by execution issues, is disappoint- ing. However, we remain confident in our Campbell Fresh strategy and its ability to deliver long-term growth consistent with its portfolio role, as the business remains well-positioned to capitalize on the health and well-being consumer trend.”1

Denise Morrison, who formerly headed the company’s North American soup business, had taken over as CEO several years ago. The change at the top of the company received a lukewarm response from investors, who were watching to see what drastic changes Morrison might have in store. Analysts suggested that Campbell might have missed an opportunity by picking insider Denise Morrison to lead

the world’s largest soup maker instead of bringing in out- side talent to revive sales.2

By 2017, with Morrison at the helm, the Campbell Soup Company had launched more than 50 new prod- ucts, including 32 new soups. This number was way up from prior years. Morrison also shocked experts with the $1.55 billion buyout of California juice-and-carrot seller Bolthouse Farms, the largest acquisition in Campbell’s his- tory.3 Despite the revitalization of its product line, however, the company failed to accomplish an impressive comeback.

Company Background Known for its red-and-white soup cans, the Campbell Soup Company was founded in 1869 by Abram Anderson and Joseph Campbell as a canning and preserving business. Over 140 years later, Campbell offered a whole lot more than just soup in a can.

In 2016 the company, headquartered in Camden, New Jersey, implemented a new product category structure by reducing from five categories to three: America’s Simple Meals and Beverages, Global Biscuits and Snacks, and Campbell Fresh (see Exhibit 1).

In 2017 Campbell’s products were sold in over 100 countries around the world. The company had operations in the United States, Canada, Mexico, Australia, Belgium, China, France, Germany, Indonesia, Malaysia, and Sweden (see Exhibit 2).4

The company had for a long time been pursuing strat- egies designed to expand the availability of its products in existing markets and to capitalize on opportunities in emerging channels and markets around the globe. As an early step, in 1994, Campbell Soup Company, synonymous with the all-American kitchen for 125 years, had acquired Pace Foods Ltd., the world’s largest producer of Mexican sauces. Frank Weise, CFO at that time, said that a major motivation for the purchase was to diversify Campbell and

CASES

CASE 15 CAMPBELL: HOW TO KEEP THE SOUP SIMMERING*

* This case study was prepared by Professors Alan B. Eisner and Dan Baugher of Pace University, Professor Helaine J. Korn of Baruch College, City University of New York and graduate student Saad Nazir of Pace University. The purpose of the case is to stimulate class discussion rather than to illustrate effective or ineffective handling of a business situation. Copyright © 2017 Alan B. Eisner.

EXHIBIT 1 Sales by Segment ($ millions)

% Change

2016 2015 2014 2016/2015 2015/2014

Americas Simple Meals and Beverages

$4,380 $4,483 $4,588 (2)% (2)%

Global Biscuits and Snacks 2,564 2,631 2,725 (3) (3)

Campbell Fresh   1,017    ***  968 955  *5  *1

$7,961 $8,082 $8,268 (1)% (2)%

Source: The Campbell Soup Company, annual report, 2016.

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to extend the Pace brand to other products. In addition, he said, the company saw a strong potential for Pace products internationally. Campbell also saw an overlap with its raw material purchasing operations, since peppers, onions, and tomatoes were already used in the company’s soups, V8 juice, barbecue sauce, and pasta sauces.5 To help reduce some of the price volatility for ingredients, the company used various commodity risk management tools for a num- ber of its ingredients and commodities, such as natural gas, heating oil, wheat, soybean oil, cocoa, aluminum, and corn.6

A leading food producer in the United States, Campbell Soup had some presence in approximately 9 out of 10 U.S. households. However, in recent years, the company faced a slowdown in its soup sales, as consumers were seeking more convenient meal options, such as ready meals and dining out. To compete more effectively, especially against General Mills’ Progresso brand, Campbell had undertaken various efforts to improve the quality and convenience of its products.

China and Russia Historically, consumption of soup in Russia and China has far exceeded that in the United States, but in both countries nearly all of the soup is homemade. With their launch of products tailored to local tastes, trends, and eat- ing habits, nevertheless, Campbell presumed that it had a chance to lead in soup commercialization in Russia and China. According to Campbell, “We have an unrivaled understanding of consumers’ soup consumption behavior and innovative technology capabilities within the Simple Meals category. The products we developed are designed to serve as a base for the soups and other meals Russian and Chinese consumers prepare at home.”7 For about three years, in both Russia and China, Campbell sent its market- ing teams to study the local markets. The main focus was on how Russians and Chinese ate soup and how Campbell could offer something new. As a result, Campbell came up with a production line specifically created for the local

EXHIBIT 2 Campbell’s Principal Manufacturing Facilities

Inside the U.S.

California Michigan Texas

Bakersfield (CF) Femdale (CF) Paris (ASMB)

Dixon (ASMB) Grand Rapids (CF) Utah

Stockton (ASMB) New Jersey Richmond (GBS)

Connecticut East Brunswick (GBS) Washington

Bloomfield (GBS) North Carolina Everett (CF)

Florida Maxton (ASMB) Prosser (CF)

Lakeland (GBS) Ohio Wisconsin

Illinois Napoleon (ASMB) Milwaukee (ASMB)

Downers Grove (GBS) Willard (GBS)

Pennsylvania

Denver (GBS)

Downingtown (GBS)

Outside the U.S.

Australia Canada Indonesia

Huntingwood (GBS) Toronto (ASMB) Jawa Barat (GBS)

Marleston (GBS) Denmark Malaysia

Shepparton (GBS) Nørre Snede (GBS) Selangor Darul Ehsan (GBS)

Virginia (GBS) Ribe (GBS)

ASMB—Americas Simple Meals and Beverages GBS—Global Biscuits and Snacks CF—Campbell Fresh

Source: The Campbell Soup Company, annual report, 2016.

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Russian market. Called “Domashnaya Klassika,” the line was a stock base for soups that contains pieces of mush- rooms, beef, or chicken. Based on this broth, the main tra- ditional Russian soup recipes could be prepared.

But after just four short years, Campbell pulled out of the Russian market that it had thought would be a simmer- ing new location for its products. Campbell’s chief operat- ing officer and newly elected CEO Denise Morrison said results in Russia fell below what the company had expected. “We believe that opportunities currently under exploration in other emerging markets, notably China, offer stronger prospects for driving profitable growth within an accept- able time frame,” Morrison said.

When the company entered Russia, Campbell knew that it would be challenging to persuade a country of homemade- soup eaters to adopt ready-made soups. When Campbell initially researched the overseas markets, it learned that Russians eat soup more than five times a week, on average, compared with once a week among Americans.8 This indi- cated that both the quality and sentiment of the soup meant a great deal to Russian consumers—something that, despite its research, Campbell may have underestimated.

As for China, a few years after Campbell infiltrated the market, CEO Denise Morrison was quoted by Global Entrepreneur as saying, “The Chinese market consumes roughly 300 billion servings of soup a year, compared with only 14 billion servings in the U.S.”9 When entering the Chinese market, Campbell had determined that if the com- pany could capture at least 3 percent of the at-home con- sumption, the size of the business would equal that of its U.S. market share. “The numbers blow your hair back,” said Larry S. McWilliams, president of Campbell’s international group.10 While the company did successfully enter the mar- ket, it remained to be seen whether Campbell had the right offerings in place to capture such a market share or whether China’s homemade-soup culture would be as disinclined to change as Russia’s was.

U.S. Soup Revitalization In September 2010, Campbell launched its first-ever umbrella advertising campaign to support all of its U.S. soup brands with the slogan “It’s Amazing What Soup Can Do,” highlighting the convenience and health benefits of canned soup. The new campaign supported Campbell’s condensed soups, Campbell’s Chunky soups, Campbell’s Healthy Request soups, and Campbell’s Select Harvest soups, as well as soups sold in microwaveable bowls and cups under these brands.11 Despite other departments flourishing, the soup division continued to struggle, however.

Campbell Soup was one of the first large U.S. packaged- food makers to focus heavily on decreasing sodium across its product line. The salt-reduction push was one of the com- pany’s biggest initiatives in acknowledgement of the health- conscious market. “The company had pursued reducing sodium levels and other nutritional health initiatives partly to prepare for expected nutritional labeling changes in the U.S.

But amid the attention on salt-cutting, management focused less on other consumer needs, such as better tastes and excit- ing varieties,” said former CEO Douglas Conant. “I think we’ve addressed the sodium issue in a very satisfactory way. The challenge for us now is to create some taste adventure.”12 Campbell Soup Company began moving away from reducing salt in its products and focusing more on “taste adventure” as its U.S. soup business was turning cold.

With Campbell reinventing its product offerings and revitalizing its soup line, Conant had decided that his work was done and it was time to retire. He stepped down as CEO in July 2011 at the age of 60. Denise Morrison, for- merly president of the North America Soup division, took the reins as chief executive. At the time of her promotion, many were hesitant to accept her as the best candidate for the position. After all, the soup division, which had been her responsibility, had been losing steam and encountering declining sales under her tenure. Yet the company asserted confidence in her to do the job, and Morrison assured everyone that changes were on the way and a shift in focus was in the works. Morrison said that Campbell would bring both the “taste and adventure” back to its soups, with a new expanded product line offering unique flavors and “adding the taste back” by doing away with sodium reduction.

Firm Structure and Management Campbell Soup was controlled by the descendants of John T. Dorrance, the chemist who invented condensed soup more than a century ago. In struggling times, the Dorrance family had faced agonizing decisions: Should they sell the Campbell Soup Company, which had been in the family’s hands for three generations? Should they hire new management to revive flagging sales of its chicken noodle and tomato soups and Pepperidge Farm cookies? Or should Campbell per- haps become an acquirer itself? The company went public in 1954, when William Murphy was the president and CEO. Dorrance family members continued to hold a large portion of the shares. After CEO David Johnson left Campbell in 1998, the company weakened and lost customers,13 until Douglas Conant became CEO and transformed Campbell into one of the food industry’s best performers.

Conant became CEO and director of Campbell Soup Company in January 2001. He joined the Campbell’s team with an extensive background in the processed- and packaged-food industry. He had spent 10 years with General Mills, filled top management positions in market- ing and strategy at Kraft Foods, and served as president of Nabisco Foods. Conant worked toward the goal of imple- menting the Campbell’s mission of “building the world’s most extraordinary food company by nourishing people’s lives everywhere, every day.”14 He was confident that the company had the people, the products, the capabilities, and the plans in place to actualize that mission.

Under Conant’s direction, Campbell made many reforms through investments in improving product quality, packaging, and marketing. He worked to create a company

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In 2011, after 10 years leading the company, Conant retired. His successor, Denise Morrison, had worked for Conant for quite some time, not just at Campbell but at Nabisco as well earlier in their careers. In August 2011, on her first day as CEO, she was set on employing a new vision for the company: “Stabilize the soup and simple meals busi- nesses, expand internationally, grow faster in healthy bever- ages and baked snacks—and add back the salt.”19 With the younger generation now making up an increasingly large per- centage of the population, Morrison knew that the company had to change in order to increase the appeal of its products. At that time, the U.S. population included 80 million people between the ages of 18 and 34, approximately 25 percent of the population. Early on in her role as chief executive, Morrison dispatched Campbell’s employees to hipster hubs— including Austin, Texas; Portland, Oregon; London; and Paris—to find out what these potential customers wanted.20

To build employee engagement, Campbell provided manager training across the organization. This training was just one part of the curriculum at Campbell University, the company’s internal employee learning and development program. Exemplary managers built strong engagement among their teams through consistent action planning. The company emphasized employees’ innovation capabilities, leadership behavior, workplace flexibility, and wellness.

Challenges Ahead In her new role, Morrison said she planned to “accelerate the rate of innovation” at the company. Morrison planned to grow the company’s brands through a combination of healthier food and beverage offerings, global expansion, and the use of technology to woo younger consumers. While innovation isn’t a term typically associated with the food-processing industry, Morrison said that innovation was a key to the company’s future success. As an example, she cited Campbell’s develop- ment of an iPhone application that provided consumers with Campbell’s Kitchen recipes. The company’s marketing team devised the plan as a way to appeal to technologically savvy, millennial-generation consumers, Morrison said.21

In fiscal year 2017, under the ongoing leadership of Morrison, the company continued its focus on unleashing the power of its overall potential and performance. The future plan was to focus on four key strategies to enhance the company’s growth:22

1. Elevate Trust Through Real Food, Transparency and Sustainability

2. Increase Engagement and Drive Sales Through Digital and E-Commerce

3. Continue to Diversify the Product Portfolio in Health and Well-Being

4. Expand the Company’s Presence in Developing Markets

Yet more than a few years into her governance, analysts still had a lukewarm response about Morrison taking over. They still expressed their doubt about whether Morrison was the right choice, rather than some new blood as a CEO replacement.

characterized by innovation. During his tenure, the com- pany improved its financial profile, upgraded its supply chain system, developed a more positive relationship with its customers, and enhanced employee engagement. Conant focused on winning in both the marketplace and the work- place. His efforts produced an increase in net sales from $7.1 billion in fiscal 2005 to $7.67 billion in fiscal 2010.15

For Conant, the main targets for investment, following the divestiture of many brands, included simple meals, baked snacks, and vegetable-based beverages. In 2010, the baking and snacking segments sales increased 7 percent, primarily due to currency conditions. Pepperidge Farm sales were comparable to those a year earlier, as the additional sales from the acqui- sition of Ecce Panis, Inc., and volume gains were offset by increased promotional spending. Some of the reasons for this growth were the brand’s positioning, advertising investments, and improvements and additions in the distribution system. Conant also secured an agreement with Coca-Cola North America and Coca-Cola Enterprises Inc. for distribution of Campbell’s refrigerated single-serve beverages in the United States and Canada through the Coca-Cola bottler network.16

In fiscal year 2010, the company continued its focus on delivering superior long-term total shareowner returns by executing the following seven key strategies:17

• Grow its icon brands within simple meals, baked snacks, and healthy beverages.

• Deliver higher levels of consumer satisfaction through superior innovation focused on wellness while providing good value, quality, and convenience.

• Make its products more broadly available and relevant in existing and new markets, consumer segments, and eating occasions.

• Strengthen its business through outside partnerships and acquisitions.

• Increase margins by improving price realization and companywide total cost management.

• Improve overall organizational excellence, diversity, and engagement.

• Advance a powerful commitment to sustainability and corporate social responsibility.

Other major focuses for Conant and Campbell Soup were care for their customers’ wellness needs, overall prod- uct quality, and product convenience. Some of the main considerations regarding wellness in the U.S. market were obesity and high blood pressure. For example, building on the success of the V8 V-Fusion juice offerings, the com- pany planned to introduce a number of new V8 V-Fusion Plus Tea products. In the baked snacks category, the com- pany planned to continue upgrading the health credentials of its cracker (or savory biscuit) offerings. Responding to consumers’ value-oriented focus, Campbell’s condensed soups were relaunched with a new contemporary packag- ing design and an upgrade to the company’s gravity-fed shelving system.18

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traction by offering lower prices or more convenience. The recession forced shoppers to consider alternative retail channels as they looked for ways to save money. A big ben- eficiary of this consumer trend was the discounters, which carried fewer items and national brands than supermarkets but offered lower prices in return. For example, dollar store chains Dollar General and Family Dollar expanded their food selections to increase their appeal. Drugstore chains CVS and Walgreens expanded their food selections as well, especially in urban areas, to leverage their locations as a fac- tor of convenience. Mass merchandiser Target continued to expand its PFresh initiative, featuring fresh produce, frozen food, dairy products, and dry groceries.25

The increasing availability of refrigeration and other kinds of storage space in homes influenced the demand for pack- aged goods in emerging markets. However, for consumers who lacked the ability to preserve and keep larger quantities, U.S. companies began selling smaller packages, with portions that could be consumed more quickly (see Exhibit 3).26

Industry Overview The U.S. packaged-food industry had recorded faster current-value growth in recent years mainly due to a rise in commodity prices. In retail volume, however, many catego- ries saw slower growth rates because Americans began to eat out more often again. This dynamic changed for a cou- ple of years when cooking at home became a more popular alternative in response to the recession and the sharp rise in commodity prices in 2008.23

After years of expansions and acquisitions, U.S. packaged- food companies were beginning to downsize. In August 2011, Kraft Foods announced that it would split into two compa- nies: a globally focused biscuits and confectionery enterprise and a domestically focused cheese, chilled processed-meats, and ready-meals firm. After purchasing Post cereals from Kraft in 2008, Ralcorp Holdings spun off its Post cereals business (Post Holdings Inc.) in February 2012.24

Though supermarkets were the main retail channel for buying packaged food, other competitors were gaining

EXHIBIT 3 Leading U.S. Agricultural Export Destinations, by Value ($US)

Top 15 U.S. agricultural export destinations, by fiscal year, $U.S. value

FY 2016 FY 2015 FY 2014

World Total 129,726,142,939 World Total 139,742,129,299 World Total 152,321,615,876

Canada 20,338,201,356 China 22,610,826,845 China 25,694,818,817

China 19,170,564,522 Canada 21,422,125,064 Canada 21,783,496,415

Mexico 17,656,109,699 Mexico 18,005,115,309 Mexico 19,489,884,901

European Union—28 11,645,339,464 European Union—28 12,309,001,795 Japan 13,363,172,381

Japan 10,614,410,394 Japan 11,691,008,030 European Unoin—28 12,694,931,484

South Korea 5,708,473,736 South Korea 6,421,506,394 South Korea 6,869,115,885

Hong Kong 3,504,972,386 Hong Kong 3,932,441,222 Hong Kong 4,052,103,438

Taiwan 3,080,164,670 Taiwan 3,932,441,222 Taiwan 3,491,316,446

Philippines 2,461,280,059 Colombia 2,583,239,620 Indonesia 2,963,928,886

Indonesia 2,386,390,705 Indonesia 2,441,427,114 Philippines 2,774,280,054

Vietnam 2,354,728,383 Philippines 2,417,382,646 Colombia 2,310,665,909

Colombia 2,251,154,942 Vietnam 2,404,677,258 Vietnam 2,229,935,830

Thailand 1,470,071,504 Thailand 1,713,215,105 Turkey 2,089,835,119

Turkey 1,365,728,465 Turkey 1,572,644,817 Egypt 1,858,177,130

Australia 1,304,071,600 Australia 1,452,910,628 Brazil 1,642,408,763

European Union–27 history revised 12/11/07 to include Romania and Bulgaria who accede in January 2007. European Union–28 includes Croatia, who acceded in July 2003. Economic Research Service, USDA. Updated 12/16/2016.

Source: U.S. Economic Research Service, U.S. Department of Agriculture, 2016, https://www.ers.usda.gov/data-products/ foreign-agricultural-trade-of-the-united-states-fatus/fiscal-year/.

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Competition Campbell operated in the highly competitive global food industry and experienced worldwide competition for all of its principal products. The principal areas of competition were brand recognition, quality, price, advertising, promo- tion, convenience, and service. (See Exhibits 4 and 5.)

Nestlé Nestlé was the world’s number-one food company in terms of sales, the world leader in coffee (Nescafé), one of the world’s largest bottled-water (Perrier) makers, and a top player in the pet food business (Ralston Purina). Its most well-known global brands included Buitoni, Friskies, Maggi, Nescafé, Nestea, and Nestlé. The company owned Gerber Products, Jenny Craig, about 75 percent of Alcon Inc. (ophthalmic drugs, contact-lens solutions, and equipment for ocular surgery), and almost 28 percent of L’Oréal.27 In July 2007 it purchased Novartis Medical Nutrition, and in August 2007 it purchased the Gerber business from Sandoz Ltd., with the goal of becoming a nutritional powerhouse. Furthermore, by adding Gerber baby foods to its baby for- mula business, Nestlé became a major player in the U.S. baby food sector.

General Mills General Mills was the U.S. number-one cereal maker, behind Kellogg, fighting for the top spot on a consistent basis. Its brands included Cheerios, Chex, Total, Kix, and Wheaties. General Mills was also a brand leader in flour (Gold Medal), baking mixes (Betty Crocker, Bisquick), dinner mixes (Hamburger Helper), fruit snacks (Fruit Roll- Ups), grain snacks (Chex Mix, Pop Secret), and yogurt (Colombo, Go-Gurt, and Yoplait). In 2001 it acquired Pillsbury from Diageo and doubled the company’s size, making General Mills one of the world’s largest food com- panies. Although most of its sales came from the United States, General Mills was trying to grow the reach and posi- tion of its brands around the world.28

The Kraft Heinz Company The Kraft Foods Group and H. J. Heinz Company closed a merger deal in July 2015. The combined company was called The Kraft Heinz Company, and became the third largest food company in North America and fifth larg- est in the world. Its most popular brands included Kraft cheeses, beverages (Maxwell House coffee, Kool-Aid drinks), convenient meals (Oscar Mayer meats and Kraft mac’n cheese), grocery fare (Cool Whip, Shake N’ Bake), and nuts (Planters). Kraft Foods Group was looking to resuscitate its business in North America.29 H. J. Heinz had thousands of products. Even prior to the merger, Heinz products enjoyed first or second place by market share in more than 50 countries. One of the world’s largest food producers, Heinz produced ketchup, condiments, sauces, frozen foods, beans, pasta meals, infant food, and other processed-food products. Its flagship product was ketchup,

and the company dominated the U.S. ketchup market. Its leading brands included Heinz ketchup, Lea & Perrins sauces, Ore-Ida frozen potatoes, Boston Market, T.G.I. Friday’s, and Weight Watchers foods. In 2013 Heinz agreed to be acquired by Berkshire Hathaway and 3G Capital.30 The post-merger Kraft Heinz Company was also dedicated to offering healthy food products to its customers by adapt- ing to changing tastes and consumer preferences.

Financials In the 2016 fiscal year, Campbell’s earnings from continu- ing operations decreased from $666 million to $563 mil- lion, due to disruptions in product availability for a period of time. Organic sales declined 1 percent, while adjusted earnings per share (EPS) from continuing operations decreased from $2.13 to $1.82. The larger pie of the sales came from the U.S. market, whereas about 19 percent of the company’s total sales were from international markets outside the U.S.

(See Exhibits 6, 7, and 8.) With regard to financials, Morrison stated:

For fiscal year 2017, the company’s sales for year ending 2016 declined by approximately 1 percent to $7.961 amid the negative impact of exchange rate volatility and decrease in organic sales. However, most of the adverse impacts were offset by the benefits achieved by acquiring Garden Fresh Gourmet. The decline in sales could be larger if company had not increased the selling prices in 2016 to offset the loss of sales by decrease in sales volume.31

Similarly, for America’s Simple Meals and Beverage division, Campbell’s sales decreased 2 percent amid the decline in V8 beverages and soup, but increased costs were up, wearing away margins. Also, the Global Biscuits and Snacks division sales decreased 3 percent but for the Campbell Fresh division sales increased 1 percent, which could be better if the company had not gone through the trouble of execution issues and crop destruction.32

Sustainability Campbell Soup Company was named to the Dow Jones Sustainability Indexes (DJSI) repeatedly and to the DJSI World Index. This independent ranking recognized the company’s strategic and management approach to delivering economic, environmental, and social perfor- mance. Launched in 1999, the DJSI tracked the financial performance of leading sustainability-driven companies worldwide. In selecting the top performers in each busi- ness sector, DJSI reviewed companies on several general and industry-specific topics related to economic, envi- ronmental, and social dimensions. These included corpo- rate governance, environmental policy, climate strategy, human capital development, and labor practices. Campbell included sustainability and corporate social responsibility as one of its seven core business strategies.33 Campbell’s Napoleon, Ohio, plant had implemented a new renewable

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C98 CASE 15 :: CAMPBELL: HOW TO KEEP THE SOUP SIMMERING

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EXHIBIT 6 Campbell Income Statement

CAMPBELL SOUP COMPANY Consolidated Statements of Earnings (millions, except per share amounts)

2016 52 weeks

2015 52 weeks

2014 53 weeks

Net sales $ 7,961 $ 8.082 $ 8,268

Costs and expenses

Cost of products sold 5,181 5,300 5,297

Marketing and selling expenses 893 884 929

Administrative expenses 641 601 576

Research and development expenses 124 117 122

Other expenses / (income) 131 24 22

Restructuring charges 31 102 55

Total costs and expenses 7,001 7,028 7,001

Earnings before interest and taxes 960 1,054 1,267

Interest expense 115 108 122

Interest income 4 3 3

Earnings before taxes 849 949 1,148

Taxes on earnings 286 283 374

Earnings from continuing operations 563 666 774

Earnings from discontinued operations — — 81

Net earnings 563 666 855

Less: Net earnings (loss) attributable to noncontrolling interests — — (11)

Net earnings attributable to Campbell Soup Company $ 563 $ 666 $ 866

Per Share — Basic

Earnings from continuing operations attributable to Campbell Soup Company $ 1.82 $ 2.13 $ 2.50

Go to library tab in Connect to access Case Financials.

Source: Campbell Soup Company Annual Report, 2016.

EXHIBIT 5 Campbell Soup Top Competitors’ Stock Prices

0%

–15%

2014 2015 20172016

15%

30%

45%

Mar 24, 2014 – Mar 24,2017

29.81

16.64

CPB KHC GIS 25.66

Source: finance.yahoo.com/, retrieved on March 24, 2017.

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EXHIBIT 7 Campbell Balance Sheet

CAMPBELL SOUP COMPANY Consolidated Statements of Earnings (millions, except per share amounts)

July 31, 2016 August 2, 2015

Current assets

Cash and cash equivalents ..................................................................................................... . $ 296 $ 253

Accounts receivable, net ......................................................................................................... 626 647

Inventories ............................................................................................................................... 940 995

Other current assets. ............................................................................................................... 46 198

Total current assets ......................................................................................................... 1,908 2,093

Plant assets, net of depreciation 2,407 2,347

Goodwill ....................................................................................................................................... 2,263 2,344

Other intangible assets, net of amortization................................................................................ 1,152 1,205

Other assets ($34 and $0 attributable to variable interest entity)............................................... 107 88

Total assets $ 7,837 $ 8,077

Current liabilities

Short-term borrowings............................................................................................................. $ 1,219 $ 1,543

Payable to suppliers and others .............................................................................................. 610 544

Accrued liabilities ..................................................................................................................... 604 589

Dividend payable ..................................................................................................................... 100 101

Accrued income taxes .............................................................................................................. 22 29

Total current liabilities ..................................................................................................... 2,555 2,806

Long-term debt............................................................................................................................. 2,314 2,539

Deferred taxes .............................................................................................................................. 396 505

Other liabilities ............................................................................................................................. 1,039 850

Total liabilities ................................................................................................................. 6,304 6,700

Commitments and contingencies

Campbell Soup Company shareholders’ equity

Capital stock, $.0373 par value; authorized 560 shares; issued 323 shares ......................... 12 12

Additional paid-in capital ......................................................................................................... 354 339

Earnings retained in the business ........................................................................................... 1,927 1,754

Capital stock in treasury, at cost .............................................................................................. (664) (556)

Accumulated other comprehensive loss ................................................................................. (104) (168)

Total Campbell Soup Company shareholders’ equity ....................................................... 1,525 1,381

Noncontrolling interests ............................................................................................................... 8 (4)

Total equity ..................................................................................................................... 1,533 1,377

Total liabilities and equity ................................................................................ $ 7,837 $ 8,077

Go to library tab in Connect to access Case Financials.

Source: Campbell Soup Company Annual Report, 2016.

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energy initiative, anchored by 24,000 new solar panels. The 60-acre, 9.8-megawatt solar power system was expected to supply 15 percent of the plant’s electricity while reducing CO2 emissions by 250,000 metric tons over 20 years.

34

Additionally, Campbell employees volunteered an aver- age of 20,000 hours annually at more than 200 nonprofit organizations. Supported by local farmers and Campbell, the Food Bank of South Jersey was earning revenue for hunger relief from sales of Just Peachy salsa. The salsa was created from excess peaches from New Jersey and was man- ufactured and labeled by employee volunteers at Campbell’s plant in Camden.35

What’s Next? Campbell’s advertising campaign failed to assist the com- pany much in gaining the expected traction in the ready-to- serve soup business. Campbell was trying to correct this by introducing new products offering unique flavors into what many considered a rather ordinary product line. If the econ- omy continued to improve would Campbell be successful in its international expansion, especially in lucrative emerg- ing markets such as China? As the recession became a dis- tant memory, would Campbell’s name still resonate with American consumers or would consumers venture back to restaurants? Would Campbell Fresh become a success or would it spoil? Would Campbell’s soup simmer to perfec- tion, or would the company be in hot water?

ENDNOTES 1. https://www.forbes.com/sites/maggiemcgrath/2016/09/01/campbell-

soup-ceo-i-am-disappointed-by-lackluster-campbell-fresh-business/ &bsol;#290fc1103830.

2. Boyle, M. 2010. Campbell CEO pick may be lost chance, analysts say. BusinessWeek, September 29, www.businessweek.com/news/2010-09- 29/campbell-ceo-pick-may-be-lost-chance-analysts-say.html.

3. Goudreau, Jenna. 2012. Kicking the can: Campbell’s CEO bets on soup-in-a-bag for 20-somethings. Forbes.com, December 6, www.forbes.com/sites/jennagoudreau/2012/12/06/ kicking-the-can-campbells-ceo-bets-on-soup-in-a-bag-for-20-somethings.

4. Campbells. 2013. Our company. www.campbellsoupcompany.com/ around_the_world.asp.

5. Collins, G. 1994. Campbell Soup takes the big plunge into salsa. New York Times, November 29: D1.

6. Campbell Soup Co. 2010. 2009 annual report. 7. Campbell Soup Co. 2008. 2007 annual report. 8. Wall Street Journal. 2011. Campbell Soup to exit Russia. June 29,

online.wsj.com/article/SB100014240527023044478045764142024604 91210.html.

9. Want China Times. 2013. Campbell Soup aims to break into Chinese market through chef endorsements. March 6, www.wantchinatimes .com/news-subclass-cnt.aspx?id520130306000016&cid51102.

10. Boyle, M. 2009. Campbell’s: Not about to let the soup cool. BusinessWeek, September 17.

11. News release. 2010. Campbell launches “It’s Amazing What Soup Can Do” ad campaign to promote Campbell’s U.S. soup brands. September 7, investor.campbellsoupcompany.com/phoenix .zhtml?c588650&p5irol-newsArticle&ID51467644.

12. Brat, I., and Ziobro, P. 2010. Campbell to put new focus on taste. Wall Street Journal, November 24, online.wsj.com/article/0,, SB10001424052748704369304575632342839464532,00.html.

EXHIBIT 8 Campbell’s Key Ratios

Valuation

P/E Current 31.73

P/E Ratio (with extraordinary items) 35.71

P/E Ratio (without extraordinary items) 34.40

Price to Sales Ratio 2.43

Price to Book Ratio 12.58

Price to Cash Flow Ratio 13.24

Enterprise Value to EBITDA 14.32

Enterprise Value to Sales 2.61

Total Debt to Enterprise Value 0.16

Efficiency

Revenue/Employee 482,485.00

Income Per Employee 34,121.00

Receivables Turnover 12.51

Total Asset Turnover 1.00

Liquidity

Current Ratio 0.75

Quick Ratio 0.38

Cash Ratio 0.12

Profitability

Gross Margin 34.61

Operating Margin 14.29

Pretax Margin 10.66

Net Margin 7.07

Return on Assets 7.07

Return on Equity 38.76

Return on Total Capital 10.69

Return on Invested Capital 14.49

Capital Structure

Total Debt to Total Equity 231.67

Total Debt to Total Capital 69.85

Total Debt to Total Assets 45.08

Long-Term Debt to Equity 151.74

Long-Term Debt to Total Capital 45.75

Source: MarketWatch Inc. 2017, http://www.marketwatch.com/investing/stock/ cpb/profile.

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24. ReportsnReports. 2013. Packaged food in the US. April, www. reportsnreports.com/reports/150486-packaged-food-in-the-us.html.

25. Ibid. 26. Graves, T., and Kwon, E. Y. 2009. Standard and Poor’s foods and

nonalcoholic beverages industry report. July. 27. Hoovers. Undated. Company profiles: Nestlé. www.hoovers.

com/company-information/cs/company-profile.Nestlé_ SA.6a719827106be6ff.html, accessed April 2013.

28. Hoovers. Undated. Company profiles: General Mills. www.hoovers. com/company-information/cs/company-profile.General_Mills_Inc. a90ba57dc8f51a65.html, accessed April 2013.

29. Hoovers. Undated. Company profiles: Kraft Foods. www.hoovers. com/company-information/cs/company-profile.Kraft_Foods_Group_ Inc.43af8ed4b4ae51f2.html, accessed April 2013.

30. Hoovers. Undated. Company profiles: H. J. Heinz Company. www .hoovers.com/company-information/cs/company-profile.H_J_Heinz_ Company.1696a42275f81d38.html, accessed April 2013.

31. Campbell Soup Co. 2016 annual report. 32. Ibid. 33. News release. 2010. Campbell Soup company named to Dow Jones

Sustainability Indexes. investor.campbellsoupcompany.com/phoenix. zhtml?c588650&p5irol-newsArticle&ID51471159.

34. Campbell Soup Co. 2013. 2012 annual report. 35. Ibid.

13. Abelson, Reed. 2000. The first family of soup, feeling the squeeze; Should it sell or try to go it alone? New York Times, July 30, www. nytimes.com/2000/07/30/business/first-family-soup-feeling-squeeze- should-it-sell-try-go-it-alone.html?pagewanted5all&src5pm.

14. Campbell Soup Co. 2008. 2007 annual report. 15. Campbell Soup Co. 2011. 2010 annual report. 16. Press release. 2007. The Coca-Cola Company, Campbell Soup

Company and Coca-Cola Enterprises sign agreement for distribution of Campbell’s beverage portfolio. investor.shareholder.com/campbell/ releasedetail.cfm?ReleaseID5247903.

17. Campbell Soup Co. 2011. 2010 annual report. 18. Ibid. 19. Goudreau, op. cit. 20. Ibid. 21. Katz, Jonathan. 2010. Campbell Soup cooking up

a new recipe? Industry Week, December 15, www. industryweek.com/companies-amp-executives/ iw-50-profile-campbell-soup-cooking-new-recipe.

22. Campbell Soup Co. 2017 annual report. 23. PRNewswire. 2012. U.S. Packaged Food Market—Consumers seek

out ethnic & bold flavours—new industry report. PRNewswire, March 12, www.prnewswire.com/news-releases/us-packaged-food- market—consumers-seek-out-ethnic–bold-flavours—new-industry- report-142292805.html.

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C102 CASE 16 :: HEINEKEN

At the same time, Heineken maintained its leading posi- tion across Europe. It had made a high profile acquisition in 2008 of Scottish-based brewer Scottish & Newcastle, the brewer of well-known brands such as Newcastle Brown Ale and Kronenbourg 1664. Although the purchase had been made in partnership with Carlsberg, Heineken was able to gain control of Scottish & Newcastle’s operations in several crucial European markets such as the United Kingdom, Ireland, Portugal, Finland, and Belgium.

These decisions to acquire brewers that operate in dif- ferent parts of the world have been a part of a series of changes that the Dutch brewer has been making to raise its stature in the various markets and to respond to grow- ing consolidation within the industry and changes that are occurring in the global market for beer. Even as sales of beer have stagnated in the U.S. and Europe, demand has been growing elsewhere, especially in developing countries. This has led the largest brewers to expand across the globe through acquisitions of smaller regional and national play- ers (see Exhibits 1 and 2).

The need for change was clearly reflected in the appoint- ment in October 2005 of Jean-Francois van Boxmeer as Heineken’s first non-Dutch CEO. He was brought in to replace Thorny Ruys, who had decided to resign because of his failure to show much improvement in performance. Prior to the appointment of Ruys in 2002, Heineken had been run by three generations of Heineken ancestors, whose portraits still adorn the dark paneled office of the CEO in its Amsterdam headquarters. Like Ruys, van Boxmeer

Dutch brewer Heineken was expanding its presence around the globe in response to the merger of Anheuser-Busch InBev with SAB Miller giving the combined firm a com- manding 30 percent of global beer sales. Heineken was in talks to buy the Brazilian unit of Kirin, which the Japanese parent was planning to sell. The addition of Kirin beer would double Heineken’s share in Brazil to 20 percent. The firm was also planning to launch Bintang, its biggest selling beer brand in Indonesia, into the UK and select European markets. An industry spokesman was positive about the move: “There is clearly significant demand for premium world beers. We believe Bintang is perfectly suited to meet this demand.”1

These moves came on the heels of acquisitions and capacity investments that Heineken had been making in other developing markets. In 2013, the firm had strength- ened its position as the world’s third largest brewer by tak- ing full ownership of Asian Pacific Breweries, the owner of Tiger, Bintang, and other popular Asian beer brands. With this deal, Heineken added 30 breweries across several coun- tries in the Asia Pacific region. A few years earlier, the firm had acquired Mexican brewer FEMSA Cervesa, producer of Dos Equis, Sol, and Tecate beers, to become a stronger, more competitive player in Latin America.

CASE 16 HEINEKEN*

CASES

* Case prepared by Jamal Shamsie, Michigan State University, with the assistance of Professor Alan B. Eisner, Pace University. Material has been drawn from published sources to be used for purposes of class discussion. Copyright © 2017 Jamal Shamsie and Alan B. Eisner.

EXHIBIT 1 Income Statement (millions of euros)

2016 2015 2014 2013

Revenue 20,792 20,511 19,257 19,203

EBIT 2,993 2,785 2,814 2,484

Net profit 1,540 1,892 1,516 1,364

EXHIBIT 2 Balance Sheet (millions of euros)

2016 2015 2014 2013 2012

Assets 39,321 40,122 34,830 33,337 35,979

Liabilities 24,748 25,052 17,869 17,797 9,260

Equity 14,573 15,070 13,452 12,356 12,805

Source: Heineken.

Source: Heineken.

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190 breweries in over 70 countries, claiming about 10 per- cent of the global market for beer (see Exhibits 3 and 4).

The firm’s flagship Heineken brand ranked second only to Budweiser in a global brand survey jointly undertaken by BusinessWeek and Interbrand. The premier brand has achieved worldwide recognition according to Kevin Baker, director of alcoholic beverages at British market researcher Canadean Ltd. When a U.S. wholesaler asked a group of marketing students to identify an assortment of beer bot- tles that had been stripped of their labels, the stubby green Heineken bottle was the only one instantly recognized.

The beer industry has been undergoing significant change in a furious wave of consolidation. Most of the

faced the challenge of preserving the firm’s family-driven traditions, while trying to deal with threats Heineken had never faced before.

Confronting a Globalizing Industry Heineken was one of the pioneers of an international strat- egy, using cross-border deals to expand its distribution of its Heineken, Amstel, and about 175 other beer brands in more than 100 countries around the globe. For years, it had been picking up small brewers from various countries to add more brands and to get better access to new markets. From its roots on the outskirts of Amsterdam, the firm had evolved into one of the world’s largest brewers, operating more than

EXHIBIT 4 Significant Heineken Brands In Various Markets

Markets Brands

U.S. Heineken, Amstel Light, Paulaner,1 Moretti

Netherlands Heineken, Amstel, Lingen’s Blond, Murphy’s Irish Red

France Heineken, Amstel, Buckler,2 Desperados3

Italy Heineken, Amstel, Birra Moretti

Spain Heineken, Amstel, Cruzcampo, Buckler

Poland Heineken, Krolewskie, Kujawiak, Zywiec

China Heineken, Tiger, Reeb*

Singapore Heineken, Tiger, Anchor, Baron’s

India Heineken, Arlem, Kingfisher

Indonesia Heineken, Bintang, Guinness

Kazakhstan Heineken, Amstel, Tian Shan

Egypt Heineken, Birell, Meister, Fayrouz2

Israel Heineken, Maccabee, Gold Star*

Nigeria Heineken, Star, Maltina, Gulder

South Africa Heineken, Amstel, Windhoek. Strongbow

Panama Heineken, Soberana, Crystal, Panama

Chile Heineken, Cristal, Escudo, Royal *Minority interest 1Wheat beer 2Nonalcoholic beer 3Tequila-flavored beer

Source: Heineken

EXHIBIT 3 Geographical Breakdown of Sales (millions of euros)

2016 2015

Western Europe 10,112 10,227

Americas 5,203 5,159

Africa, Middle East, & Eastern Europe 3,203 3,263

Asia Pacific 2,894 2,483

Source: Heineken.

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C104 CASE 16 :: HEINEKEN

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heir, Charlene de Carvalho, who has insisted on having a say in all of the major decisions.

Family members, however, were behind some of changes that were announced at the time of van Boxmeer’s appoint- ment to support the firm’s next phase of growth as a global organization. As part of the plan, dubbed Fit 2 Fight, the Executive Board was cut down from five members to just CEO van Boxmeer and Chief Financial Officer Rene Hooft Graafland. The change was made to centralize control at the top of the firm to better enable a global strategy. The idea behind the global strategy is to win over younger customers across different markets whose tastes are still developing.

Heineken has created management positions respon- sible for five different operating regions and several dif- ferent functional areas. These positions were created to more clearly define different spheres of responsibility. Van Boxmeer has argued that the new structure provides incen- tives for people to be accountable for their performance: “There is more pressure for results, for achievement.”4 He claims the new structure has already encouraged more risk taking and boosted the level of energy within the firm.

The Executive Committee of Heineken was cut down from 36 to 12 members in order to speed up the decision-making process. Besides the two members of the Executive Board, this management group consists of the managers who are responsible for the different operating regions and several of the key functional areas. Van Boxmeer hopes that the reduc- tion in the size of this group will allow the firm to combat the cumbersome consensus culture that has made it difficult for Heineken to respond swiftly to various challenges even as its industry has been experiencing considerable change.

Finally, all of the activities of Heineken are overseen by a Supervisory Board, which currently consists of 10 members. Individuals that make up this board are drawn from different countries and own a wide range of expertise and experience. The Board sets policies for making major decisions in the firm’s overall operations. Members of the Supervisory Board are rotated on a regular basis.

Developing a Global Presence Van Boxmeer is well aware of the need for Heineken to use its brands to build upon its existing stature across global markets. Yet in spite of its formidable presence in markets

bigger brewers have been acquiring or merging with their competitors in foreign markets in order to become global players. Ownership of local brands has propelled them into dominant positions in various markets around the world. Beyond this, they hope acquisitions of foreign brewers can provide them with the manufacturing and distribution capa- bilities to develop a few global brands. “The era of global brands is coming,” said Alan Clark, Budapest-based manag- ing director of SABMiller Europe (see Exhibit 5).2

Over the past decade, South African Breweries Plc has acquired U.S.-based Miller Brewing to become a major global brewer. They have acquired Fosters, the largest Australian brewer. U.S.-based Coors linked with Canadian- based Molson in 2005, with their combined operations giving them a leading position among the world’s biggest brewers. In 2008, Belgium’s Interbrew, Brazil’s AmBev, and U.S.-based Anheuser Busch merged to become the largest global brewer with operations across most of the conti- nents. Finally, Anheuser-Busch InBev acquired SAB Miller to become an even more dominant player in the industry.

Since its acquisition of Anheuser Busch, InBev has been attempting to develop not only Budweiser but also Stella Artois, Brahma, and Becks as global flagship brands. Each of these brands originated in different locations, with Budweiser coming from the U.S., Stella Artois coming from Belgium, Brahma from Brazil, and Becks from Germany. Similarly, SAB Miller has been attempting to develop the Czech brand Pilsner Urquell into a global brand. Exports of this pilsner doubled shortly after SAB acquired it in 1999, but sales have since plateaued. John Brock, the CEO of InBev, commented: “Global brands sell at significantly higher prices, and the margins are much better than with local beers.”3

Wrestling with Change Although the management of Heineken has moved away from the family for the first time, they have been well aware of the longstanding and well-established family traditions that are difficult to change. Even with the appointment of nonfamily members to manage the firm, a little over half of the shares of Heineken are still owned by a holding com- pany which is controlled by the family. With the death of Freddy Heineken in 2002, the last family member to head the Dutch brewer, control has passed to his only child and

Brewers Market Share

1. Anheuser-Busch InBev, Leuven, Belgium, 21%

2. SAB Miller, London, UK,* 11

3. Heineken, Amsterdam, Netherlands, 10

4. Carlsberg, Copenhagen, Denmark, 6

5. China Resources Enterprise, China, 4 *To be merged with Anhesuser-Busch InBev.

EXHIBIT 5 Leading Global Brewers (2016 market share based on annual sales, millions of US dollars)

Source: Beverage World.

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John A. Quelch, a professor at Harvard Business School who has studied the beer industry, said of Heineken: “It’s in danger of becoming a tired, reliable, but unexciting brand.”5 The firm has therefore worked hard to increase awareness of their flagship brand among younger drinkers. Heineken also introduced a light beer, Heineken Premium Light, to target the growing market for such beers in the U.S. The firm has managed to reduce the average age of the Heineken drinker from about 40 years old to about 30 years old.

At the same time, Heineken has pushed its other brands to reduce its reliance on its core Heineken brand. It has achieved considerable success with Amstel Light, which has become the leading imported light beer in the U.S. and has been selling well in many other countries. Owing to its acquisitions of smaller breweries around the globe, it has managed to develop a relatively small but loyal base of con- sumers for its strong local brands—specialty brands such as Murphy’s Irish Red and Moretti.

For Hispanics, who account for one-quarter of U.S. sales, Heineken developed specific marketing campaigns, and added popular Mexican beers Tecate, Dos Equis, and others. For years, these had been marketed and distributed by Heineken in the U.S. under a license from FEMSA Cervesa. In 2010, they acquired the firm, giving them full control over all of their brands. Benj Steinman, publisher and editor of newsletter Beer Marketer’s Insight believed their relationship with FEMSA had been quite beneficial: “This gives Heineken a commanding share of the U.S. import business and . . . gives them a bigger presence in the Southwest . . . and better access to Hispanic consumers,” he stated.6

Above all, Heineken wants to maintain its leadership in the premium beer industry, which represents the most prof- itable segment of the beer business. In this category, the firm’s brands face competition in the U.S. from domestic beers such as Anheuser’s Budweiser Select and imported beers such as InBev’s Stella Artois. Premium brews often have slightly higher alcohol content than standard beers, and they are developed through a more exclusive position- ing of the brand. This allows a firm to charge a higher price for their premium brands. The flagship Heineken brand remains positioned as a premium beer. A six-pack of Heineken, for example, costs $9, versus around $6 for a six-pack of Budweiser. Just-drinks.com, a London-based online research service, estimates that the market for pre- mium beer will continue to expand over the next decade.

Building on Its Past The acquisitions in different parts of the world—Asia, Africa, Latin America and Europe—represent an impor- tant step in Heineken’s quest to build on its global stature. Most analysts expect that van Boxmeer and his team will continue to build Heineken into a powerful global competi- tor. Without providing any specific details, Graafland, the firm’s CFO, makes it clear that the firm’s management will take initiatives to drive long-term growth. In his words: “We

around the world with its flagship Heineken brand, the firm has been reluctant to match the recent moves of formidable competitors such as Belgium’s InBev and UK’s SABMiller, which have grown significantly through mega-acquisitions.

For many years, Heineken limited itself to snapping up small national brewers such as Italy’s Moretti and Spain’s Cruzcampo that have provided it with small, but profitable avenues for growth. In 1996, Heineken acquired Fischer, a small French brewer, whose Desperados brand has been quite successful in niche markets. Similarly, Paulaner, a wheat beer that the firm picked up in Germany a few years ago, has been making inroads into the U.S. market.

But as other brewers reached out to make acquisitions all over the globe, Heineken risked falling behind its more aggressive rivals. To deal with this growing challenge, the firm broke out of its play-it-safe corporate culture to make a few big deals. In 2003, Heineken spent $2.1 billion to acquire BBAG, a family-owned company based in Linz, Austria. Because of BBAG’s extensive presence in Central Europe, Heineken has become the biggest beer maker in seven countries across Eastern Europe. The acquisition of Scottish & Newcastle in 2008 similarly reinforced the firm’s dominance in Western Europe.

Heineken’s acquisitions in Ethiopia, Singapore, and Mexico have allowed it to build its position in these grow- ing markets. The firm has made an aggressive push into Russia with the acquisition of mid-sized brewing con- cerns. Through several acquisitions since 2002, Russia has become one of Heineken’s largest markets by volume. Heineken now ranks as the third-largest brewer in Russia, behind Sweden’s Baltic Beverages Holding and InBev. The firm has also pounced on brewers in far-flung places like Belarus, Panama, Egypt, and Kazakhstan. In Egypt, Ruys bought a majority stake in Al Ahram Beverages Co. and has been using the Cairo-based brewer’s fruit-flavored, nonalco- holic malts as an avenue into other Muslim countries. Rene Hooft Graafland, the company’s Chief Financial Officer, has stated that Heineken will continue to participate in the consolidation of the $460 billion global retail beer industry by targeting many different markets around the world.

Maintaining a Premium Position For decades, Heineken was able to rely on the success of its flagship Heineken brand, which enjoyed a leading posi- tion among premium beers in many markets around the world. It was the best-selling imported beer in the U.S. for several decades, giving it a steady source of revenues and profits from the world’s biggest market. But by the late 1990s, Heineken had lost its 65-year-old leadership among imported beers in the U.S. to Grupo Modelo’s Corona. The Mexican beer appeals to a certain segment of younger American beer drinkers, and more importantly, to the grow- ing number of Hispanic Americans who represent one of the fastest growing segments of beer drinkers in the U.S.

The firm was concerned that Heineken was perceived as a stodgy or even an obsolete brand by many young drinkers.

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has proved it is the right concept,” he stated about the cur- rent ownership structure. “The whole business about family restraint on us is absolutely untrue. Without its spirit and guidance, the company would not have been able to build a world leader.”9

ENDNOTES 1. Olly Wehring. Heineken Readies Europe-wide Launch of Indonesia’s

Bintang Beer. Just-drinks global news, January 17, 2017. 2. Jack Ewing & Gerry Khermouch. Waking Up Heineken.

BusinessWeek, September 8, 2003, p. 68. 3. Richard Tomlinson. The New King of Beers. Fortune, October 18,

2004, p. 238. 4. Ian Bickerton & Jenny Wiggins. Change Is Brewing at Heineken.

Financial Times, May 9, 2006, p. 12. 5. BusinessWeek, September 8, 2003, p. 69. 6. Andrew Kaplan. Border Crossings. Beverage World, July 15, 2004, p. 6. 7. Christopher C. Williams. Heineken Seeing Green. Barron’s, September 18,

2006, p. 19. 8. Financial Times, May 9, 2006, p. 12. 9. Ibid.

are positive that the momentum in the company and trends will continue.”7

Since taking over the helm at Heineken, van Boxmeer has committed himself to accelerating the speed of decision mak- ing. There has been some expectation both inside and outside the firm that the new management would try to break loose from the conservative style of the family. Instead, the affable 46-year-old Belgian has indicated that he is trying to stream- line the firm’s decision-making process rather than to make any drastic shifts in the company’s existing culture.

Van Boxmeer’s devotion to the firm is evident. Heineken’s first non-Dutch CEO spent 20 years working his way up within the firm. He sports cufflinks that are sil- ver miniatures of a Heineken bottle top and opener. “We are in the logical flow of history,” he explained. “Every time you have a new leader you have a new kind of vision. It is not radically different, because you are defined by what your company is and what your brands are.”8

Furthermore, van Boxmeer seems comfortable working within the family-controlled structure. “Since 1952 history

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CASE 17 :: FORD: NO LONGER JUST AN AUTO COMPANY? C107

In January 2017 Ford Motor Company celebrated a major milestone as the F-Series became the top-selling truck in the U.S. for the 40th consecutive year—all told, 26 million trucks sold since January 1977. The F-Series had also been the best-selling vehicle in the U.S. for 35 years straight.1 In February 2017, the F-Series, which included the Super Duty and the all-new F-150 Raptor, hit an all-time annual sales record of 65,956 vehicles.2 The F-150 was named 2017’s Autobytel buyer’s choice full-size truck, Edmunds most wanted full-size truck, Cars.com best pickup truck, U.S. News & World Report best truck brand, Kelley BlueBook Best Buy truck, and the Motor Trend Truck of the Year. Commenting on these results, Todd Eckert, Ford truck group marketing manager said, “what’s made the F-Series so successful is the Ford truck team’s ability to anticipate the needs of our customers better than anyone else—how those needs change, what’s most important, and what they need to do to move forward. Their insights help us design, engineer and build America’s best-selling trucks.”3

The ability to anticipate customers’ needs is crucial to any company’s long-term success, but especially in the capital-intensive, consumer-driven, globally competi- tive automobile industry. As the major players from Asia, Europe, and the U.S. jockey for position in the sales of traditional trucks and cars, smaller, more innovative com- panies such as Tesla, Elio Motors, and start-up Faraday Futures are creating concept cars that address consumers’ interests in alternative fuels, low operational costs, and self- driving autonomous designs that leave the passenger free to use in-transit time for other more productive pursuits.

Self-driving cars are reported to be coming as early as 2018 to the global roadways; and in 2017 Ford Motor Company was in this business big-time, testing its fleet of 30 autonomous cars in Arizona, California, and Michigan.4

Ford Motor Company CEO Mark Fields announced in January 2015 that Ford would be using innovation “not only to create advanced new vehicles but also to help change the way the world moves by solving today’s growing global transportation challenges.”5 Given the increasing disrup- tion in the industry, and the obligation to return value to

understandably concerned investors, Mark Fields had some significant decisions to make in the coming years.

Fields had been promoted to CEO in July 2014 on the retirement of Alan Mulally, widely hailed as one of the “five most significant corporate leaders of the last decade,” and architect of Ford’s eight-year turnaround from the brink of bankruptcy in 2006.6 It was Mulally who created the vision that drove Ford’s revitalization: “ONE Ford.” The ONE Ford message was intended to communicate consis- tency across all departments, all segments of the company, requiring people to work together as one team, with one plan, and one goal: “an exciting viable Ford delivering prof- itable growth for all.”7 Mulally worked to create a culture of accountability and collaboration across the company. His vision was to leverage Ford’s unique automotive knowledge and assets to build cars and trucks that people wanted and valued, and he managed to arrange the financing neces- sary to pay for it all. The 2009 economic downturn that caused a financial catastrophe for U.S. automakers trapped General Motors and Chrysler in emergency government loans, but Ford was able to avoid bankruptcy because of Mulally’s actions.

Mulally had groomed Mark Fields as his successor since 2012, instilling confidence among the company’s stakehold- ers that Ford would be able to continue to be profitable once Mulally stepped down. Even with this preparation, CEO Fields was still facing an industry affected by general economic conditions over which he had little control and a changing technological and sociocultural environment where consumer preferences were difficult to predict. And rivals were coming from unexpected directions. Fields would have to anticipate and address numerous challenges as he positioned the company for continued success.

Attempts at repositioning Ford had been under way for many years. In the 1990s, former CEO Jacques Nasser had emphasized acquisitions to reshape Ford, but day-to- day business activities were ignored in the process. When Nasser left in October 2001, Bill Ford, great-grandson of company founder Henry Ford, took over and emphasized innovation as a core strategy to reshape Ford. In an attempt to stem the downward slide at Ford, and perhaps to jump- start a turnaround, Bill Ford recruited industry outsider Alan Mulally, who was elected president and chief executive officer of Ford on September 5, 2006. Mulally, former head of commercial airplanes at Boeing, was expected to steer the struggling automaker out of the problems of falling mar- ket share and serious financial losses. Mulally created his vision of “ONE Ford” to reshape the company and in 2009

CASES

CASE 17 FORD: NO LONGER JUST AN AUTO COMPANY?*

This case study was prepared by Associate Professor Pauline Assenza of Western Connecticut State University; Professor Helaine J. Korn of Baruch College, City University of New York; Professor Naga Lakshmi Damaraju of the Indian School of Business; and Professor Alan B. Eisner of Pace University. The purpose of the case is to stimulate class discussion rather than to illustrate effective or ineffective handling of a business situation. Copyright © 2017 Alan B. Eisner.

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finally achieved profitability. He committed Ford to remain- ing “on track for both [Ford’s] overall and North American Automotive pre-tax results to be breakeven or profitable”8 in the coming years. Mulally was able to sustain this success past the initial stages of his tenure, and maintained profit- ability up until his retirement in June 2014.

In 2014, as CEO Mark Fields took over, challenging global conditions meant 2014 year-end profit saw a 56 percent drop from 2013—meaning Fields had work to do. In 2015, Fields continued the focus on ONE Ford, high- lighting the idea that ONE team, working with ONE plan, could achieve ONE goal, profitable growth for all. By

successfully launching 16 new global products, opening the last of ten new plants to support growth in Asia Pacific, and seeing profitable global business unit performance in every region except South America, Ford had the most profitable year ever in 2015, and 2016 was just slightly lower, and the second best ever. The 2016 full year net income of $4.6 billion was down from 2015 due to a one- time pre-tax pension re-measurement. Adjusted pre-tax profit would have been $10.4 billion, on par with 2015. (See income statement in Exhibit 1.)

But in 2016 CEO Mark Fields decided to restructure, creating a new focus, expanding the company’s scope from

EXHIBIT 1 Ford Motor Company and Subsidiaries: Income Statement

For the Years Ended December 31,

2014 2015 2016

Revenues

Automotive $ 135,782 $ 140,566 $ 141,546

Financial Services 8,295 8,992 10,253

Other — — + 1

Total revenues 144,077 149,558 151,800

Costs and expenses

Cost of sales 125,025 124,041 126,584

Selling, administrative, and other expenses 11,842 10,502 12,196

Financial Services interest, operating, and other expenses 6,878 7,368 8,904

Total costs and expenses 143,745 141,911 147,684

Interest expense on Automotive debt 797 773 894

Non-Financial Services interest income and other income/(loss), net 76 1,188 1,356

Financial Services other income/(loss), net 348 372 438

Equity in net income of affiliated companies 1,275 1,818 1,780

Income before income taxes 1,234 10,252 6,796

Provision for/(Benefit from) income taxes 4 2,881 2,189

Net income 1,230 7,371 4,607

Less: Income/(Loss) attributable to noncontrolling interests (1) (2) 11

Net income attributable to Ford Motor Company $ 1,231 $ 7,373 $ 4,596

EARNINGS PER SHARE ATTRIBUTABLE TO FORD MOTOR COMPANY COMMON AND CLASS B STOCK

Basic income $ 0.31 $ 1.86 $ 1.16

Diluted income 0.31 1.84 1.15

Cash dividends declared 0.50 0.60 0.85

Note: Figures in millions, except per-share amounts; year-end December 31.

Source: Ford Motor Company 10K filings.

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vehicles to “mobility,” through business model innovation. Of interest in the income statement shown in Exhibit 1 is the presence, for the first time, of an “Other” revenue item, representing the newly operational Ford Smart Mobility LLC, a subsidiary formed to design, build, grow, and invest in emerging mobility s