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StrategicManagementCompetitivenessandGlobalisation7thAsia-PacificEdition2.pdf

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PA C I F I C E D I T I O N

STUDY HACK #17 Use Google Docs to take notes in

class, then transform these notes into exam revision.

Sam, student, Adelaide

This book has all the tools for you to ace this subject. What’s stopping you?

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Strategic Management: Competitiveness and Globalisation

7th Edition

Dallas Hanson

Kim Backhouse

David Leaney

Michael A. Hitt

R. Duane Ireland

Robert E. Hoskisson

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Adaptation of Strategic Management: Competitiveness and Globalization,

13th edition by Michael A. Hitt, R. Duane Irelane and Robert F. Hoskisson

[9780357033838], Cengage Learning, 2015.

This seventh edition published in 2022.

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1 2 3 4 5 6 7 25 24 23 22 21

B R I E F C O N T E N T S

1 PART 1 STRATEGIC MANAGEMENT INPUTS 1 1 Strategic management and strategic

competitiveness 2

2 The external environment: opportunities, threats, industry competition and competitor analysis 34

3 The internal organisation: resources, capabilities, core competencies and competitive advantages 72

2 PART 2 STRATEGIC ACTIONS: STRATEGY FORMULATION 101 4 Business-level strategy 102

5 Competitive dynamics 131

6 Corporate-level strategy 161

7 Acquisition and restructuring strategies 189

8 International strategy 218

9 Cooperative strategy 252

3 PART 3 STRATEGIC ACTIONS: STRATEGY IMPLEMENTATION 283

10 Corporate governance 284

11 Organisational structure and controls 321

12 Strategic leadership 355

13 Strategic entrepreneurship 386

4 PART 4 CASE STUDIES 411 Introduction: A summary of the case analysis process 412

Case 1: JB Hi-Fi Ltd acquisition of The Good Guys 415

Case 2: Challenges at Australia Post 426

Case 3: Nyrstar NV: a case study in a failed vertical integration strategy 432

Case 4: Pfizer 442

Case 5: Atlassian 454

Case 6: The Sunshine Coast UNESCO Biosphere Reserve and Smart City: a new governance opportunity in a post-pandemic world? 458

Case 7: CrossFit at the crossroads 465

Case 8: The movie exhibition industry: 2018 and beyond 482

Case 9: Pacific Drilling: the preferred offshore driller 506

Case 10: The trivago way - growing without growing up? 522

Case 11: The Volkswagen emissions scandal 539

Case 12: Otis in the global elevator industry 549

Case 13: Dick Smith: the fall of an Aussie icon 555

GLOSSARY 566 NAME INDEX 572 SUBJECT INDEX 580

v

C O N T E N T S GUIDE TO THE TEXT XII GUIDE TO THE ONLINE RESOURCES XIV PREFACE XVI ABOUT THE AUTHORS XVIII ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS XXI

1 PART 1 STRATEGIC MANAGEMENT INPUTS 1 1 Strategic management and strategic

competitiveness 2

Opening case study: McDonald’s and brand recognition 3

The strategic management process 4

The competitive landscape 7 The global economy 8

Strategic focus: Starbucks is a new economy multinational yet has had failures in key markets 9 The march of globalisation 10 Technology and technological changes 11

Strategic focus: The core of Apple: technology and innovation 14

The I/O model of above-average returns 15

The resource-based model of above-average returns 17

Vision and mission 19 Vision 19 Mission 20

Stakeholders 21 Classifications of stakeholders 21

Strategic leaders 23 The work of effective strategic leaders 24 Predicting outcomes of strategic decisions 25 Ethical dimensions 25

STUDY TOOLS 27

2 The external environment: opportunities, threats, industry competition and competitor analysis 34

Opening case study: Drilling for oil: risks and rewards 35

The general, industry and competitor environments 38

External environmental analysis 39 Scanning 40 Monitoring 40 Forecasting 41 Assessing 41

Segments of the general environment 41 The demographic segment 42 The economic segment 44 The political/legal segment 46 The sociocultural segment 47 The technological segment 49 The global segment 50 The physical environment segment 51

Strategic focus: Target (Tar-zhey) is trying to navigate in a new and rapidly changing competitive landscape 52

Industry environment analysis 53 Threat of new entrants 54 Bargaining power of suppliers 57 Bargaining power of buyers 57 Threat of substitute products 58

Strategic focus: German performance/luxury cars: if you’ve seen one, have you seen them all? 58 Intensity of rivalry among competitors 59 Interpreting industry analyses 61

Strategic groups 61

Competitor analysis 62 Ethical considerations 64

STUDY TOOLS 65

vi

3 The internal organisation: resources, capabilities, core competencies and competitive advantages 72

Opening case study: Large pharmaceutical companies, big data analytics, artificial intelligence and core competencies: a brave new world 73

Analysing the internal organisation 75 The context of internal analysis 75 Creating value 76 The challenge of analysing the internal organisation 77

Resources, capabilities and core competencies 79 Strategic focus: Tangible and intangible resources as the base for core competencies 80 Resources 80 Capabilities 83 Core competencies 83

Building core competencies 84 Strategic focus: Procter & Gamble: using capabilities and core competencies to create value for customers 85 The four criteria of sustainable competitive advantage 86 Value chain analysis 89

Competencies, strengths, weaknesses and strategic decisions 92

STUDY TOOLS 94

2 PART 2 STRATEGIC ACTIONS: STRATEGY FORMULATION 101 4 Business-level strategy 102

Opening case study: Clonakilla Wines in a quality niche position 103

Customers: their relationship with business- level strategies 105 Effectively managing relationships with customers 105 Reach, richness and affiliation 106 Who: determining the customers to serve 107 What: determining which customer needs to satisfy 107

How: determining core competencies necessary to satisfy customer needs 108

The purpose of a business-level strategy 109

Business models and their relationship with business-level strategies 109

Types of business-level strategies 110 Cost leadership strategy 112 Differentiation strategy 115 Focus strategies 119 Integrated cost leadership/differentiation strategy 120

Strategic focus: Apple vs Samsung vs Huawei: the battle for smart technology 121

STUDY TOOLS 125

5 Competitive dynamics 131

Opening case study: Tesco PLC: a case study in competitive behaviour 132

A model of competitive rivalry 134

Competitor analysis 135 Market commonality 136

Strategic focus: Competitive rivalry in fast fashion: a constant stream of actions and responses 137 Resource similarity 138

Drivers of competitive actions and responses 139

Competitive rivalry 141 Strategic and tactical actions 141

Likelihood of attack 142 First-mover incentives 142 Organisational size 144 Quality 144

Likelihood of response 145 Type of competitive action 146 Actor’s reputation 146 Dependence on the market 147

Competitive dynamics 147 Slow-cycle markets 147 Fast-cycle markets 148

viiCONTENTS

Strategic focus: The emergence of competitive rivalry among battery manufacturers: who will establish the most attractive market position? 150 Standard-cycle markets 152

STUDY TOOLS 153

6 Corporate-level strategy 161

Opening case study: The quintessential diversified organisation 162

Purpose of corporate-level strategies 163

Levels of diversification 164 Low levels of diversification 165 Moderate and high levels of diversification 166

Strategic focus: Acciona’s related diversification and renewable energy growth 166

Reasons for diversification 167

Value-creating diversification: related constrained and related linked diversification 169 Operational relatedness: sharing activities 170 Corporate relatedness: transferring of core competencies 170 Market power 171

Strategic focus: Alphabet’s evolution through diversification 172 Simultaneous operational relatedness and corporate relatedness 174

Unrelated diversification 174 Efficient internal capital market allocation 174 Restructuring of assets 176

Value-neutral diversification: incentives and resources 176 Incentives to diversify 177 Resources and diversification 178

Value-reducing diversification: managerial motives to diversify 179

STUDY TOOLS 182

7 Acquisition and restructuring strategies 189

Opening case study: Strategic acquisitions and a people- focused integration of those acquisitions are vital capabilities of Atlassian 190

The popularity of merger and acquisition strategies 192 Mergers, acquisitions and takeovers: what are the differences? 192

Reasons for acquisitions 193 Increased market power 193 Overcoming entry barriers 195

Strategic focus: Cross-border acquisitions by organisations from emerging economies: leveraging resources to gain a larger global footprint and market power 196 Cost of new product development and increased speed to market 198 Lower risk compared to developing new products 199 Increased diversification 199 Reshaping the organisation’s competitive scope 200 Learning and developing new capabilities 200

Problems in achieving acquisition success 201 Integration difficulties 201 Inadequate evaluation of target 202 Large or extraordinary debt 203 Inability to achieve synergy or harvest benefits 203 Too much diversification 204 Managers overly focused on acquisitions 205 Too large 205

Effective acquisitions 206

Restructuring 208 Downsizing 208 Downscoping 209 Leveraged buyouts 209 Restructuring outcomes 209

STUDY TOOLS 211

viii CONTENTS

8 International strategy 218

Opening case study: An international strategy powers ABB’s future 219

Identifying international opportunities 221 Incentives to use international strategy 221 Three basic benefits of international strategy 222

International strategy types 224 International business-level strategy 225 International corporate-level strategy 227

Environmental trends 230 Liability of foreignness 230 Regionalisation 231

Choice of international entry mode 232 Exporting 232 Licensing 233 Strategic alliances 234 Acquisitions 235 New wholly owned subsidiaries 236 Dynamics of mode of entry 236

Strategic focus: Mondelez International: a global leader in snack foods 237

Risks in an international environment 238 Political risks 238 Economic risks 239

The challenge of international strategies 240 Managing international strategies: size and complexity 240 Limits to international expansion 241

Strategic focus: Mexico’s FEMSA: building its international prowess 241

Strategic competitiveness outcomes 242 International diversification and returns 242 Enhanced innovation 243

STUDY TOOLS 244

9 Cooperative strategy 252

Opening case study: Global cars, with a twist 253

Strategic alliances as a primary type of cooperative strategy 254

Types of major strategic alliances 255

Strategic focus: Samsung Electric is using diversifying alliances to reduce its dependence on Google’s Android operating system 256 Reasons organisations develop strategic alliances 258

Strategic focus: Industrial clusters: geographic centres for collaborative partnering 260

Competition-reducing strategy 263

Business-level cooperative strategy 263 Complementary strategic alliances 264 Competition response strategy 266 Uncertainty-reducing strategy 266 Assessing business-level cooperative strategies 266

Corporate-level cooperative strategy 267 Diversifying strategic alliance 267 Synergistic strategic alliance 268 Franchising 268 Assessing corporate-level cooperative strategies 269

International cooperative strategy 269

Network cooperative strategy 270 Alliance network types 271

Competitive risks with cooperative strategies 272

Managing cooperative strategies 273

STUDY TOOLS 275

3 PART 3 STRATEGIC ACTIONS: STRATEGY IMPLEMENTATION 283

10 Corporate governance 284

Opening case study: General Electric’s complex diversification strategy makes evaluation difficult for board directors 285

Separation of ownership and managerial control 288 Agency relationships 288 Product diversification as an example of an agency problem 290 Agency costs and governance mechanisms 291

ixCONTENTS

Ownership concentration 292 Ownership structures of companies in Australia 293 The increasing influence of institutional owners 293

Board of directors 293 Board of directors process 296 Enhancing the effectiveness of the board of directors 297 Executive compensation 298 The effectiveness of executive compensation 299

Strategic focus: Has more governance scrutiny made large CEO compensation packages more reasonable? 300

Market for corporate control 301

International corporate governance 302 Corporate governance in Australia 302 Corporate governance in Germany and Japan 306 Corporate governance in China 307 Corporate governance in Spain 308

Governance mechanisms and ethical behaviour 308 Strategic focus: Rewarding top executives of one of the most poorly governed banks in the world: Westpac 309 Corporate governance and organisation performance 311 Corporate social responsibility 311

STUDY TOOLS 313

11 Organisational structure and controls 321

Opening case study: Changing McDonald’s organisational structure and controls: a path to improved performance 322

Organisational structure and controls 323 Organisational structure 324 Organisational controls 325

Relationships between strategy and structure 326

Evolutionary patterns of strategy and organisational structure 327 Simple structure 328 Functional structure 328 Multi-divisional structure 328 Matches between business-level strategies and the functional structure 329

Matches between corporate-level strategies and the multi-divisional structure 332

Strategic focus: Globalisation and beer 333

Strategic focus: General Electric’s decline, new strategy and reorganisation 339 Matches between international strategies and worldwide structure 340 Matches between cooperative strategies and network structures 344

Implementing business-level cooperative strategies 345

Implementing corporate-level cooperative strategies 346

Implementing international cooperative strategies 347

STUDY TOOLS 348

12 Strategic leadership 355

Opening case study: Meg Whitman: a pioneering strategic leader 356

Strategic leadership and style 358

The role of executive managers 360 Executive management teams 361

Managerial succession 363 Strategic focus: Women in leadership 365

Key strategic leadership actions 366 Determining strategic direction 366 Effectively managing the organisation’s resource portfolio 368 Sustaining an effective organisational culture 370

Strategic focus: Organisational culture: is it really that important? 372 Emphasising ethical practices 373 Leadership and corporate social responsibility 374 Establishing balanced organisational controls 375

STUDY TOOLS 378

x CONTENTS

13 Strategic entrepreneurship 386

Opening case study: Today it is gas and diesel: tomorrow it is likely to be electric vehicles, plug-in hybrids, and driverless cars and trucks 387

Entrepreneurship and entrepreneurial opportunities 389

Innovation 389 Product innovation 391

Entrepreneurs 391

International entrepreneurship 392

Internal innovation 393 Incremental and radical innovation 393

Implementing internal innovations 394 Cross-functional product development teams 395 Facilitating integration and innovation 396 Creating value from internal innovation 396

Innovation through cooperative strategies 397 Strategic focus: Social networking websites facilitate innovation: application software innovation 398

Innovation through acquisitions 399 Strategic focus: Will these acquisitions lead to innovation success or to strategic failure? 400

Creating value through strategic entrepreneurship 401

STUDY TOOLS 403

4 PART 4 CASE STUDIES 411 Introduction: A summary of the case analysis process 412

Case 1: JB Hi-Fi Ltd acquisition of The Good Guys 415

Case 2: Challenges at Australia Post 426

Case 3: Nyrstar NV: a case study in a failed vertical integration strategy 432

Case 4: Pfizer 442

Case 5: Atlassian 454

Case 6: The Sunshine Coast UNESCO Biosphere Reserve and Smart City: a new governance opportunity in a post-pandemic world? 458

Case 7: CrossFit at the crossroads 465

Case 8: The movie exhibition industry: 2018 and beyond 482

Case 9: Pacific Drilling: the preferred offshore driller 506

Case 10: The trivago way - growing without growing up? 522

Case 11: The Volkswagen emissions scandal 539

Case 12: Otis in the global elevator industry 549

Case 13: Dick Smith: the fall of an Aussie icon 555

GLOSSARY 566 NAME INDEX 572 SUBJECT INDEX 580

xiCONTENTS

xii

Strategic management and strategic competitiveness

CH AP

TE R

1 Studying this chapter should provide you with the strategic management knowledge needed to: LO1 analyse the components of the strategic management process LO2 describe the competitive landscape and explain how globalisation and

technological changes shape it LO3 use the industrial organisation (I/O) model to explain how companies can earn

above-average returns LO4 use the resource-based model to explain how companies can earn above-

average returns LO5 describe vision and mission and discuss their value LO6 define and classify the four major stakeholder groups and describe their ability

to influence organisations LO7 describe the work of strategic leaders.

Learning Objectives

2

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McDonald’s in Australia is part of a global empire of fast- food restaurants. McDonald’s has achieved substantial international success over the years, with its restaurants spread widely throughout the world. Brand recognition is huge: many people know about, and are customers of, McDonald’s. For example, a recent survey found that 88 per cent of people recognise the golden arches and associate them with McDonald’s. Each day, about 69 million people eat at a McDonald’s store, which equates

to almost 0.8 per cent of the world’s population. In 2018, McDonald’s had 37 855 total restaurants globally located in 120 different countries and 14 155 stores in the US alone. China has 2223 stores compared with Japan 2975, the UK 1261, Canada 1443 and Australia 920. Globally, McDonald’s hires 1.9 million employees, and it hires approximately one million employees per year in the USA. In 2018, its annual revenue was $21 billion and its net income was $5.9 billion.

McDonald’s: Restaurant expansion since 1955.

Source: https://mcdonalds.com.au/about-maccas/maccas-story.

Given that McDonald’s includes a toy in about 20 per cent of its sales, it is considered the world’s largest distributor of toys. Each year, McDonald’s distributes 1.5 billion toys globally, which is more than Mattel and Hasbro. McDonald’s decided early to move into international markets, and now one can find the golden arches in far-flung locations around the globe.

In Australia, ‘Maccas’ (the locals’ name for the organisation) is thriving, with flexible offerings, ‘gourmet coffee’ and fresh-food bars. These have been successful moves. The UK arm has also been responsive to consumer demand; for example, it accommodates consumers who ask what goes into their food, providing information to staff that allows them to respond, and it promotes jobs in the chain as upwardly mobile.

China is a promising arena but there are continuing pressures there, with high levels of rivalry from KFC. There are now over 2000 McDonald’s outlets in China, which is approximately one-third the number of KFC outlets. KFC has around 5919 stores and is presently considered the most popular fast-food chain in China.

In India, where historically the brand was relatively small with only 400 stores compared with China, Japan and Australia, McDonald’s turned a corner when it announced in May 2019 that it had finally acquired full ownership of Connaught Plaza Restaurants. This entity had run the global giant’s operations in north and east India – from its long-estranged business partner Vikram Bakshi. The association between Bakshi and McDonald’s commenced in 1995 when, under a 25-year deal, the

McDonald’s and brand recognition

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CHAPTER 1 STRATEGIC MANAGEMENT AND STRATEGIC COMPETITIVENESS

3

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Definitions or explanations of important key terms are located in the margin for quick reference.

Guide to the text As you read this text you will find a number of features in every

chapter to enhance your study of strategic management and help you understand how the theory is applied in the real world.

CHAPTER-OPENING FEATURES

Knowledge objectives Identify the key concepts that the chapter will cover with the learning objectives that start each chapter.

Opening Case study Gain an insight into how strategic management theories relate to the real world through the case study at the beginning of each chapter.

1

2 1

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FEATURES WITHIN CHAPTERS

As we can see from t he open ing case, McDonald’s organ isations in Aust ralia, t he U K, Ch ina, Ind ia, Japan and t he USA a re all in d i fferent compet it ive posit ions. Therefore, we can conclude that they are not equally competitive (i.e. they are unable to achieve similar strategic competitiveness). In the USA, the organisation is now using the strategic management process (see Figure 1.1) as the foundation for changes to the commitments, decisions and actions it undertook to pursue strategic competitiveness and above-average terms. It may well succeed, given time.1

The strategic management process As explained in the opening case, McDonald’s is trying to enrich its traditional approach globally with more marketing and by making its stores more responsive to local consumers’ needs. A study conducted to identify the factors that contribute to the success of top corporate performers shows why the organisation is doing this. This study found that the top performers were entrepreneurial, were market oriented (possessing effective knowledge of the customers’ needs), used valuable competencies and offered innovative products and services.2

The t y pes of behav iou rs ex h ibited by top per for mers l i ke McDona ld’s represent a strategic management process (see Fig u re 1.1), wh ich is a f u l l set of com m it ments, decisions and actions required for an organisation to achieve strategic competitiveness and earn above-average returns. The organisation’s first step in the process is to analyse its external environment and internal organisation to determine its resources, capabilities and core competencies – the sources of its ‘strategic inputs’. We will now analyse each of the different components of the strategic management process.

Strategic competitiveness is achieved when an organisation successfully formulates and implements a value-creating strategy. A strategy is an integrated and coordinated set of commitments and actions designed to exploit core competencies and gain a competitive adva ntage. W hen choosi ng a st rateg y, orga n isat ions ma ke choices a mong compet i ng alternatives as the pathway for deciding how they will pursue strategic competitiveness. 3

In this sense, the chosen strateg y indicates what the organisation will do as well as what the organisation will not do. A n organisation’s strateg y also demonstrates how it differs from its competitors.

strategic management process the full set of commitments, decisions and actions required for an organisation to achieve strategic competitiveness and earn above-average returns

strategic competitiveness achieved when an organisation successfully formulates and implements a value-creating strategy

strategy an integrated and coordinated set of commitments and actions designed to exploit core competencies and gain a competitive advantage

two partners formed a 50:50 joint venture company – Connaught Plaza Restaurant – to set up outlets in the north and the east under the franchisee model. To date, McDonald’s has two business entities in India. Amit Jatia’s Hardcastle Restaurants runs the McDonald’s business in southern and western India. McDonald’s India is committed to sourcing almost all of its products from within the country. For this purpose, it has developed local Indian businesses, which can supply the highest- quality products required for its Indian operations.

The McDonald’s empire is obviously difficult to control and constantly presents country-specific challenges. Clever strategy is important for its continued survival and,

for the company, hopefully, its growth post the Covid-19 pandemic.

Sources: C. Smith, 2020, 50 interesting McDonald’s statistics and facts 2020, DMR Business Statistics, https://expandedramblings.com/index.php/

mcdonalds-statistics, 28 May; R. Darling, 2019, Thanks to the Happy Meal, McDonald’s is the largest toy manufacturer, http://www.considerable.com,

6 November; 2019, KFC is most popular food chain in China, http://www. businessinsider.com, 8 March; The Economic Times, 2019, Vikram Bakshi is

finally out, and McDonald’s India is lovin’ it, ET Online, https://economictimes. indiatimes.com/industry/services/hotels-/-restaurants/vikram-bakshi-is-

finally-out-and-mcdonalds-india-is-lovin-it/articleshow/69309704.cms?utm_ source=contentofinterest&utm_medium=text&utm_campaign=cppst, 14 May; T.

DiChristopher, 2015, McDonald’s new CEO faces many problems, CNBC, http:// www.cnbc.com/2015/01/29/how-mcdonalds-new-ceo-can-turn-around-the-

company.html, 29 January; FT Reporters, 2015, McDonald’s and its challenges worldwide: A market-by-market look, Financial Times, http://www.ft.com/intl/

cms/s/0/f8ac22fc-a7c1-11e4-8e78-00144feab7de.html#slide0, 29 January.

4 PART 1: STRATEGIC MANAGEMENT INPUTS

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KEY TERMS WITH MARGIN DEFINITIONS

Examine the ways in which key concepts are applied in a business context, using real situations and familiar local and international companies. The Strategic Focus boxes are categorised to emphasise the focus: general, ethics, technology, sustainability and globalisation.

STRATEGIC FOCUS BOXES

Strategy Now margin icons highlight companies that have effectively put a strategic management tool, concept or technique into practice.

STRATEGY NOW

Increasing knowledge intensity K nowledge (infor mation, intelligence and exper tise) is the basis of tech nolog y and its applicat ion. In t he compet it ive la ndscape of t he 21st centu r y, k nowledge is a cr it ical organisational resource and an increasingly valuable source of competitive advantage.75

Indeed, sta r t ing in t he 1980s, t he basis of compet it ion sh if ted from ha rd assets to intangible resources; for example, ‘Walmart transformed retailing through its proprietar y approach to supply chain management and its information rich relationships with customers and suppliers’.76 Relationships with customers and suppliers are an example of an intangible resource.

Knowledge is gained through experience, observation and inference, and is an intangible resource. The value of intangible resources, including knowledge, is growing as a proportion of tota l sha reholder va lue i n today ’s compet it ive la ndscape.77 In fact, t he Brook i ngs Institution estimates that intangible resources contribute approximately 85 per cent of that value.78 The probability of achieving strategic competitiveness is enhanced for the organisation that develops the ability to capture intelligence, transfor m it into useable k nowledge a nd d i ff use it rapid ly t h roughout t he compa ny.79 Therefore, orga n isat ions must develop (e.g. through training programs) and acquire (e.g. by hiring educated and experienced employees) knowledge, integrate it into the organisation to create capabilities, and then apply it to gain a competitive advantage.80

Apple retail stores enjoy a steady flow of traffic each day. More remarkable is that Apple’s stores in China handled in excess of 40 000 people daily prior to the Covid-19 pandemic. Apple has opened 510 retail stores across 25 countries, with 271 located in the United States alone. Apple’s newest locations include: Kawasaki and Tokyo, Japan; Mexico City; Singapore Airport; and Taipei, Taiwan.

Source: Newspix/Alan Pryke

Apple has achieved phenomenal success with the introduction of innovative products and brand maintenance. The late Steve Jobs was selected by Fortune magazine as the CEO of the first decade of the 21st

century, based on the fact that Apple under his leadership had transformed four industries, three of them in a decade. In addition, in 2020 Fast Company named Apple in the World’s Most Innovative Companies list. Apple is one of the top companies in the world based on almost any criterion or set of criteria used. Because of this, Apple is perceived exceptionally well by customers. Apple’s growth rate has been extraordinary and its financial performance even more impressive. And the appeal of Apple’s products is global. For example, Apple’s iPhones now exceed 925 million units globally. Apple also disclosed that there were 1.4 billion active devices as of January 2019.

Although there are many reasons for its success, the primary reasons rest with Apple’s new technology development and innovative new products.

Sources: MacRumors Staff, 2020, Keep track of Apple’s retail stores worldwide, http://www.macrumors.com, 12 May; Above Avalon, 2019,

http://www.aboveavalon.com, 30 May; Fortune, 2011, World’s most admired companies, http://www.fortune.com, 3 March; B. Worthen,

2011, With new iPad, Apple tries to stay ahead of wave of tablet rivals, Wall Street Journal, http://www.online.wsj.com, 3 March; G. A. Fowler &

N. Wingfield, 2011, Apple’s showman takes the stage, Wall Street Journal, http://www.online.wsj.com, 3 March; Financial Times, 2011, Apple and

the tablets, http://www.ft.com, 1 March; N. Louth, 2011, Finding value in Apple’s core, Financial Times, http://www.ft.com, 25 February; M. Helft,

2011, After iPad’s head start, rival tablets are poised to flood offices, New York Times, http://www.nytimes.com, 20 February; L. Chao, 2011, New Shanghai Apple store will be biggest in China, Wall Street Journal,

http://www.online.wsj.com, 18 February.

STRATEGY NOW

Apple’s drive to innovate

16 PART 1: STRATEGIC MANAGEMENT INPUTS

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xiiiGUIDE TO THE TEXT

Key terms Review the important terminology from the chapter margin with the Key terms list.

At the end of each chapter you’ll find several tools to help you to review, practise and extend your knowledge of the key learning objectives.

STUDy TOOLS SUMMARY LO1 The organisation’s external environment is challenging

and complex. The external environment has three major parts: the general environment (elements in the broader society that affect industries and their organisations), the industry environment (factors that influence an organisation, its competitive actions and responses, and the industry’s profit potential) and the competitor environment (in which the organisation analyses each major competitor’s future objectives, current strategies, assumptions and capabilities).

LO2 The external environmental analysis process has four steps: scanning, monitoring, forecasting and assessing. Through environmental analyses, the organisation identifies opportunities and threats.

LO3 The general environment has seven segments: demographic, economic, political/legal, sociocultural, technological, global and physical. For each segment, the organisation has to determine the strategic relevance of environmental changes and trends.

LO4 Compared with the general environment, the industry environment has a more direct effect on the organisation’s strategic actions. The five forces

model of competition comprises the threat of entry, the power of suppliers, the power of buyers, product substitutes and the intensity of rivalry among competitors. By studying these forces, the organisation can find a position in an industry where it can influence the forces in its favour or where it can buffer itself against the power of the forces in order to achieve strategic competitiveness and earn above- average returns.

LO5 Industries are populated with different strategic groups. A strategic group is a collection of organisations following similar strategies along similar dimensions. Competitive rivalry is greater within a strategic group than between strategic groups.

LO6 Competitor analysis focuses on each company against which an organisation directly competes. Critical to an effective competitor analysis is gathering data and information that can help the organisation understand its competitors’ intentions and the strategic implications resulting from them. Organisations must follow mandatory laws and regulations as well as ethical guidelines when gathering competitor intelligence.

KEY TERMS competitor intelligence

complementors

demographic segment

economic environment

general environment

global segment

industry

industry environment

opportunity

physical environment segment

political/legal segment

sociocultural segment

strategic group

technological segment

threat

REVIEW QUESTIONS 1. Why is it important for an organisation to study and

understand the external environment?

2. What are the differences between the general environment and the industry environment? Why are these differences important?

3. What are the four steps in the external environmental analysis process? What does the organisation want to learn when using this process?

4. What are the seven segments of the general environment? Explain the differences among them. Is any segment more important than another?

5. How do the five forces of competition in an industry affect its profit potential? Explain.

6. What is the importance of collecting and interpreting data and information about competitors? What practices should an organisation use to gather competitor intelligence, and why?

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STUDy TOOLS SUMMARY LO1 The organisation’s external environment is challenging

and complex. The external environment has three major parts: the general environment (elements in the broader society that affect industries and their organisations), the industry environment (factors that influence an organisation, its competitive actions and responses, and the industry’s profit potential) and the competitor environment (in which the organisation analyses each major competitor’s future objectives, current strategies, assumptions and capabilities).

LO2 The external environmental analysis process has four steps: scanning, monitoring, forecasting and assessing. Through environmental analyses, the organisation identifies opportunities and threats.

LO3 The general environment has seven segments: demographic, economic, political/legal, sociocultural, technological, global and physical. For each segment, the organisation has to determine the strategic relevance of environmental changes and trends.

LO4 Compared with the general environment, the industry environment has a more direct effect on the organisation’s strategic actions. The five forces

model of competition comprises the threat of entry, the power of suppliers, the power of buyers, product substitutes and the intensity of rivalry among competitors. By studying these forces, the organisation can find a position in an industry where it can influence the forces in its favour or where it can buffer itself against the power of the forces in order to achieve strategic competitiveness and earn above- average returns.

LO5 Industries are populated with different strategic groups. A strategic group is a collection of organisations following similar strategies along similar dimensions. Competitive rivalry is greater within a strategic group than between strategic groups.

LO6 Competitor analysis focuses on each company against which an organisation directly competes. Critical to an effective competitor analysis is gathering data and information that can help the organisation understand its competitors’ intentions and the strategic implications resulting from them. Organisations must follow mandatory laws and regulations as well as ethical guidelines when gathering competitor intelligence.

KEY TERMS competitor intelligence

complementors

demographic segment

economic environment

general environment

global segment

industry

industry environment

opportunity

physical environment segment

political/legal segment

sociocultural segment

strategic group

technological segment

threat

REVIEW QUESTIONS 1. Why is it important for an organisation to study and

understand the external environment?

2. What are the differences between the general environment and the industry environment? Why are these differences important?

3. What are the four steps in the external environmental analysis process? What does the organisation want to learn when using this process?

4. What are the seven segments of the general environment? Explain the differences among them. Is any segment more important than another?

5. How do the five forces of competition in an industry affect its profit potential? Explain.

6. What is the importance of collecting and interpreting data and information about competitors? What practices should an organisation use to gather competitor intelligence, and why?

CHAPTER 2 THE ExTERnAL EnvIROnmEnT: OPPORTUnITIES, THREATS, InDUSTRy COmPETITIOn AnD COmPETITOR AnALySIS

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EXPERIENTIAL EXERCISES

Exercise 1: Strategic group mapping If a given set of organisations emphasise similar strategic dimensions and use a similar strategy, these organisations can be said to reside in the same strategic group. Other common definitions of strategic groups typically argue that the organisations in a given industry follow similar strategies, such as pricing, degree of specialisation, research and development commitment and the like. It is also likely that organisations operating in a given industry may have very different profitability profiles, which raises the question: if one organisation is the most profitable, why don’t all the others in that industry attempt to move into the same strategic group as the industry leader?

Part 1 1. Form teams and pick an industry the team finds

interesting. A list of industries and industry leaders may be found at yahoo! Finance (http://biz.yahoo.com/ic/ ind_index.html).

2. Investigate this industry in order to create a strategic group map. you must pick the two dimensions for your map that best represent the key success factors in this industry (e.g. R&D investments, pricing, geographic reach).

3. For each organisation listed on your map, investigate its overall financial performance, not only historically, but also its five-year growth forecast. (This information is also available at yahoo! Finance and other locations.)

Part 2 Prepare a presentation to the class that discusses your findings and answers the following key issues or questions: 1. Who are the most direct competitors and on what basis

do they mostly compete? That is, why did you choose the competitive dimensions that you did?

2. How does profitability stack up between strategic groups? Which groups are most profitable, and why?

3. What would it take for an organisation to move from an underperforming (in terms of profitability) strategic group to a more profitable strategic group? How likely is it that this could happen?

4. Think about one of the organisations in a particular strategic group. Are there any opportunities for this organisation that you see because of your strategic group mapping?

5. What conclusions can you reach about why some organisations end up where they do among various strategic groups?

Exercise 2: What does the future look like? A critical ingredient in studying the general environment is identifying opportunities and threats. An opportunity is a condition in the environment that, if exploited, helps a company to achieve strategic competitiveness. In order to identify opportunities, you must be aware of trends that affect the world around us now or that are projected to do so in the future.

Thomas Fry, senior futurist at the Davinci Institute, believes that the chaotic nature of interconnecting trends and the vast array of possibilities that arise from them are somewhat akin to watching a spinning compass needle. From the way we use phones and email and recruit new workers to organisations, the climate for business is changing and shifting dramatically, and at rapidly increasing rates. Sorting out these trends and making sense of them provides the basis for opportunity decision making. Which ones will dominate and which ones will fade? Understanding this is crucial for business success.

your challenge (either individually or as a group) is to identify a trend, technology, entertainment or design that is likely to alter the way in which business is conducted in the future. Once you have identified this, be prepared to discuss which of the six dimensions of the general environment this will affect. (There may be more than one.) • Describe the impact.

• List some business opportunities that will come from this.

• Identify some existing organisations that stand to benefit.

• What, if any, are the ethical implications?

you should consult a wide variety of sources. For example, the Gartner Group and mcKinsey & Co. both produce market research and forecasts for business. There is also a host of web forecasting tools and addresses. These include TED (see http://www.ted.com for videos of its discussions), which hosts an annual conference for path- breaking new ideas. Similarly, the Davinci Institute, Institute for Global Futures and a wide range of others have their own unique visions of tomorrow’s environment.

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CASE STUDIES INTRODUCTION A summary of the case analysis process 466

CASE 1 JB Hi-Fi Ltd acquisition of The Good Guys 469

CASE 2 Challenges at Australia Post 480

CASE 3 Nyrstar NV: a case study in a failed vertical integration strategy 486

CASE 4 Virgin Australia: a flight to oblivion? 496

CASE 5 Atlassian 508

CASE 6 The sunshine coast UNESCO biosphere reserve and smart city: a new governance opportunity in a post-pandemic world? 513

CASE 7 CrossFit at the crossroads 520

CASE 8 The movie exhibition industry: 2015 and beyond 538

CASE 9 Pacific drilling: the preferred offshore driller 565

CASE 10 The trivago way – growing without growing up? 582

CASE 11 The Volkswagen emissions scandal 600

CASE 12 Otis in the global elevator industry 611

CASE 13 Dick Smith: the fall of an Aussie icon 618

PA R T 4

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Summar y The end-of-chapter summar y lists key points from the chapter, providing a snapshot of the important concepts covered.

Case Studies Apply the case analyses process to in-depth case studies. Thirteen case studies are provided to demonstrate theor y in practice.

Each case includes a Case Link identif ying the relevant chapters where key concepts explored in the case are introduced in the book.

Review questions These questions promote the application and critical analysis of theories and practices as well as encourage group discussion.

Experiential exercises These exercises emphasise applied learning, giving students the opportunity to put knowledge into practice.

END-OF-CHAPTER FEATURES

STUDy TOOLS SUMMARY LO1 The organisation’s external environment is challenging

and complex. The external environment has three major parts: the general environment (elements in the broader society that affect industries and their organisations), the industry environment (factors that influence an organisation, its competitive actions and responses, and the industry’s profit potential) and the competitor environment (in which the organisation analyses each major competitor’s future objectives, current strategies, assumptions and capabilities).

LO2 The external environmental analysis process has four steps: scanning, monitoring, forecasting and assessing. Through environmental analyses, the organisation identifies opportunities and threats.

LO3 The general environment has seven segments: demographic, economic, political/legal, sociocultural, technological, global and physical. For each segment, the organisation has to determine the strategic relevance of environmental changes and trends.

LO4 Compared with the general environment, the industry environment has a more direct effect on the organisation’s strategic actions. The five forces

model of competition comprises the threat of entry, the power of suppliers, the power of buyers, product substitutes and the intensity of rivalry among competitors. By studying these forces, the organisation can find a position in an industry where it can influence the forces in its favour or where it can buffer itself against the power of the forces in order to achieve strategic competitiveness and earn above- average returns.

LO5 Industries are populated with different strategic groups. A strategic group is a collection of organisations following similar strategies along similar dimensions. Competitive rivalry is greater within a strategic group than between strategic groups.

LO6 Competitor analysis focuses on each company against which an organisation directly competes. Critical to an effective competitor analysis is gathering data and information that can help the organisation understand its competitors’ intentions and the strategic implications resulting from them. Organisations must follow mandatory laws and regulations as well as ethical guidelines when gathering competitor intelligence.

KEY TERMS competitor intelligence

complementors

demographic segment

economic environment

general environment

global segment

industry

industry environment

opportunity

physical environment segment

political/legal segment

sociocultural segment

strategic group

technological segment

threat

REVIEW QUESTIONS 1. Why is it important for an organisation to study and

understand the external environment?

2. What are the differences between the general environment and the industry environment? Why are these differences important?

3. What are the four steps in the external environmental analysis process? What does the organisation want to learn when using this process?

4. What are the seven segments of the general environment? Explain the differences among them. Is any segment more important than another?

5. How do the five forces of competition in an industry affect its profit potential? Explain.

6. What is the importance of collecting and interpreting data and information about competitors? What practices should an organisation use to gather competitor intelligence, and why?

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END-OF-BOOK FEATURES

xiv

Guide to the online resources

INSTRUCTOR’S MANUAL The Instructor’s Manual includes: • knowledge objectives • chapter outlines • lecture notes • answers to review questions

• instructor’s notes for experiential exercises • instructor’s notes for MindTap including What Would

You Do?, You Make the Decision and Video Cases. • additional questions and exercises.

FOR THE INSTRUCTOR

MINDTAP Premium online teaching and learning tools are available on the MindTap platform – the personalised eLearning solution.

MindTap is a flexible and easy-to-use platform that helps build student confidence and gives you a clear picture of their progress. We partner with you to ease the transition to digital – we’re with you ever y step of the way.

The Cengage Mobile App puts your course directly into students’ hands with course materials available on their smartphone or tablet. Students can read on the go, complete practice quizzes or participate in interactive real-time activities.

MindTap for Hanson’s Strategic Management is full of innovative resources to support critical thinking, and help your students move from memorisation to master y! Includes: • Hanson’s Strategic Management eBook • ‘What would you do?’ polling questions • Video Cases • ‘You make the decision’ simulation activities.

MindTap is a premium purchasable eLearning tool. Contact your Cengage learning consultant to find out how MindTap can transform your course.

Cengage is pleased to provide you with a selection of resources that will help you prepare your lectures. These teaching tools are accessible via cengage.com.au/instructors for Australia

or cengage.co.nz/instructors for New Zealand.

CASE STUDY RESOURCES Case notes for each of the end-of-book case studies, a case analysis rubric and case matrix allow instructors to assign case studies for analysis. Cases and case notes from the previous editions are also available.

TEST BANK A bank of questions has been developed in conjunction with the text for creating quizzes, tests and exams for your students. Create multiple test versions in an instant and deliver tests from your LMS, your classroom, or wherever you want using Cognero. Cognero test generator is a flexible online system that allows you to import, edit and manipulate content from the text’s test bank or elsewhere, including your own favourite test questions.

xvGUIDE TO THE ONLINE RESOURCES

FOR THE STUDENT

POWERPOINT™ PRESENTATIONS Use the chapter-by-chapter PowerPoint presentations to enhance your lecture presentations and handouts to reinforce the key principles of your subject.

ARTWORK FROM THE TEXT Add the digital files of graphs, pictures and flowcharts into your course management system, use them in student handouts, or copy them into your lecture presentations.

MINDTAP MindTap is the next-level online learning tool that helps you get better grades!

MindTap gives you the resources you need to study – all in one place and available when you need them. In the MindTap Reader, you can make notes, highlight text and even find a definition directly from the page. If your instructor has chosen MindTap for your subject this semester, log in to MindTap to: • Get better grades • Save time and get organised • Connect with your instructor and peers • Study when and where you want, online and mobile • Complete assessment tasks as set by your instructor.

When your instructor creates a course using MindTap, they will let you know your course key so you can access the content. Please purchase MindTap only when directed by your instructor. Course length is set by your instructor.

P R E FAC E This new seventh Asia–Pacific edition of Strategic Management: Competitiveness and Globalisation has been updated to include new mater ial and cases from Aust ralia, New Zealand and the Asia–Paci fic region. It continues to integrate ‘cutting edge’ research and content from the US authors Hitt, Ireland and Hoskisson.

Features • Australian and Asia–Pacific material in all chapters • chapter opening cases and ‘Strategic focus’ segments • organisation-specific examples that are integrated with each chapter’s topic • inclusion of public sector and community organisation examples • substantial emphasis on use of the internet and e-commerce • substantial emphasis on corporate governance • coverage of strategic issues in the 21st-centur y competitive landscape, including a strong emphasis on the

competition created through e-commerce ventures and start-ups • global coverage with an emphasis on the international context • new and current research integrated throughout the chapters’ conceptual presentations • review questions, including application discussion questions and ethics questions at the end of each chapter • experiential exercises • a summar y of the case analysis process. The book emphasises a global outlook with comprehensive coverage of Australian and international concepts

and issues. The book contains a wealth of references. Drawn from the business literature and academic research, these mater ials are used to present cur rent and accurate descr iptions of how organisations use the strategic management process. Our goal while preparing this book has been to present you, our readers, with a complete, accurate and up-to-date explanation of the strategic management process as it is used in the global economy. We have sought to include enough local content to stimulate interest, and enough international content to reflect the nature of current strategic management.

The book’s focus This book is intended for use pr imar ily in strategic management and business policy courses. The mater ials presented in the 13 chapters have been researched thoroughly. Both the academic, scholarly literature and the business, practitioner literature were studied and then integrated to prepare this edition. The academic literature provides the foundation to develop an accurate yet meaningful description of the strategic management process. The business practitioner literature yields a rich base of current domestic and global examples to show how the strategic management process’s concepts, tools and techniques are applied in different organisations.

Our discussion of the strategic management process is both traditional and contemporar y. In maintaining t rad it ion, we exa m i ne i mpor ta nt mater ia ls t hat have h istor ica l ly been a pa r t of u ndersta nd i ng st rateg ic management. For example, we thoroughly examine how to analyse an organisation’s external environment and internal environment.

xvi

The strategic advantage The st rategic management process is cr itical to organisational success. As descr ibed in Chapter 1, st rategic competitiveness is achieved when an organisation develops and exploits a sustained competitive advantage. Attaining such an advantage results in the earning of above-average returns; that is, returns that exceed those an investor could expect from other investments with similar amounts of risk.

The competitive advantage Success in the 21st-centur y competitive landscape requires specific capabilities, including the abilities to:

1 use scarce resources wisely to maintain the lowest possible costs 2 constantly anticipate frequent changes in customers’ preferences 3 adapt to rapid technological changes 4 identify, emphasise and effectively manage what an organisation does better than its competitors 5 continuously structure an organisation’s operations so objectives can be achieved more efficiently 6 successfully manage and gain commitments from a culturally diverse workforce.

The global advantage Critical to the approach used in this text is the fact that all organisations face increasing global competition. Organisations no longer operate in relatively safe domestic markets, as Australian supermarkets have discovered. In the past, many companies produced large quantities of standardised products. Today, organisations typically compete in a global economy that is complex, highly uncertain and unpredictable. To a greater degree than in a primarily domestic economy, the global economy rewards effective performers, whereas poor performers are forced to restructure significantly to enhance their strategic competitiveness. As noted earlier, increasing globalisation and the technological revolution have produced a new competitive landscape in the 21st centur y. This landscape presents a challenging and complex env ironment for organisations, but one that also has oppor tunities. The importance of developing and using these capabilities should not be underestimated.

Final comment Organisations face exciting and dy namic competitive challenges in the 21st centur y. These challenges, and effective responses to them, are explored in Strategic Management: Competitiveness and Globalisation. The strategic management process conceptualised in this text offers valuable insights and knowledge to those committed to meeting successfully the challenge of dynamic competition. Thinking strategically – as this book challenges you to do – increases the likelihood that you will assist your organisation to achieve strategic success. In addition, continuous practice with strategic thinking and the use of the strategic management process gives you skills and knowledge that will contribute to career advancement and success. Finally, we want to wish you all the best and nothing other than complete success in all of your endeavours.

Dallas Hanson Hobart

xviiPREFACE

A B O U T T H E AU T H O R S Dallas Hanson Dallas Hanson lectured in strategic management at the University of Tasmania for many years. He has wide- ra ng i ng i ntellectua l (a nd scholast ic) i nterests, i nclud i ng bra nd ma nagement, tou r ism, g reen st rateg y a nd governance. He has won teaching awards for his work in strategy and enjoys the challenge of making strategy i nterest i ng a nd engag i ng. He now adv ises as a st rateg y consu lta nt, wh ich cont i nua l ly rem i nds h i m t hat organisation politics matter in the world of strategy, while logic does not always win in the process of strategy implementation.

Kim Backhouse Kim Backhouse has lectured in strategic management, law and other business units for the past two decades in the Faculty of Business and Faculty of Law at the University of Tasmania. Kim has also facilitated units in legal and risk for the Australian Institute of Company Directors and runs short courses on governance through the Law School at the University of Tasmania. Kim is passionate about research and teaching in strategic management and governance and enjoyed being part of Dr Hanson’s teaching team in strategy for many years. Dr Backhouse has published in a variety of journals on governance and corporate social responsibility. She has won teaching awards for many years for her work in strategy and organisational behaviour. Dr Backhouse also works in part-time executive roles outside of the academic landscape and consults regularly to boards on complex governance issues. Kim has a current practising certificate from the Law Society of Tasmania, Fellow of the Governance Institute of Australia and is a current board member of the Governance Institute of Australia (Tas). Kim currently sits on several not-for-profit boards such as ACH AT and has been sitting on various boards for the past two decades.

David Leaney Dav id Leaney lectures in strategic management at post-graduate level at the Australian National University (A NU) and the Australian Graduate School of Management (AGSM) at the University of NSW. He also lectures in marketing and global supply chain management at post-graduate and under-graduate levels. David brings a practitioner’s perspective, fuelled by his work as a management consultant and his role as the Managing Director of Strategium – an IT and business strategy consultancy. David is the chair of several private company boards in professional ser vices and technology, and advises clients in the public sector, defence, utilities, banking and the retail sector. He is sought as a facilitator for executive workshops and the development of corporate strategy and organisational change management. David is a Fellow of the Institute of Managers and Leaders (FIML) and a Certified Management Consultant (CMC).

Michael A. Hitt Texas A&M University Michael A. Hitt is a Distinguished Professor and holds the Joe B. Foster Chair in Business Leadership at Texas A&M University. He received his PhD from the University of Colorado and has more than 260 publications, including 26 co-authored or co-edited books. He has been recognised as one of the 10 most cited scholars in management

xviii

over a 25-year period in an article published in the 2008 volume of the Journal of Management. He is co-editor of numerous management, organisation, strategy and development books and has ser ved on the editorial review boards of multiple journals, including the Academy of Management Journal, Academy of Management Executive, Journal of Applied Psychology, Journal of Management, Journal of World Business and Journal of Applied Behavioral Sciences.

In addition, Professor Hitt has served as Consulting Editor and Editor of the Academy of Management Journal and is currently a co-editor of the Strategic Entrepreneurship Journal. He is the current past president of the Strategic Management Society, is a past president of the Academy of Management and is a Fellow in the Academy of Management and in the Strategic Management Society. He received an honorar y doctorate from the Universidad Carlos III de Madrid and is an Honorary Professor and Honorary Dean at Xi’an Jiao Tong University. He has received the Irwin Outstanding Educator Award and the Distinguished Ser vice Award from the Academy of Management and has received best paper awards for ar ticles published in the Academy of Management Journal, Academy of Management Executive and Journal of Management.

R. Duane Ireland University of Richmond R. Duane Ireland is a Distinguished Professor and holds the Conn Chair in New Ventures Leadership at the Mays Business School, Texas A& M University, where he previously ser ved as head of the management department. He teaches st rateg ic management cou rses to u nderg raduate, masters, doctoral and execut ive students and has more than 175 publications, including more than a dozen books. His research on diversification, cor porate entrepreneurship and strategic entrepreneurship has been published in Academy of Management Journal, Academy of Management Executive, Strategic Management Journal, Journal of Management, Strategic Entrepreneurship Journal, Entrepreneurship Theory and Practice and Journal of Management Studies, among others. He has ser ved on editorial review boards for the Academy of Management Journal, Journal of Management, Journal of Business Venturing, Journal of Business Strategy and European Management Journal. He is current editor of the Academy of Management Journal and has completed ed itor ial ter ms for Academy of Management Journal, Academy of Management Executive and Entrepreneurship Theory and Practice. He has co-edited special issues of Academy of Management Review, Academy of Management Executive, Journal of Business Venturing and Organizational Research Methods.

Professor Ireland has received awards for the best article published in Academy of Management Executive and Academy of Management Journal. He is a Fellow of the Academy of Management and 21st Century Entrepreneurship Research Scholar, and ser ved a three-year term as Representative-at-Large for the Academy of Management’s Board of Governors. He received the Award for Outstanding Intellectual Contributions to Competitiveness Research from the A merican Society for Competitiveness and the USASBE Scholar in Corporate Entrepreneurship Award.

Robert E. Hoskisson The University of Oklahoma Robert E. Hoskisson is the George R. Brown Chair of Strategic Management at the Jesse H. Jones Graduate School of Business, Rice University. He received his PhD from the University of California-Irvine. Dr Hoskisson’s research topics focus on corporate governance, acquisitions and divestitures, corporate and international diversification

xixABOUT THE AUTHORS

and cooperative strategy. He teaches courses in corporate and international strategic management, cooperative strategy and strategy consulting. Dr Hoskisson’s research has appeared in more than 120 publications, including the Academy of Management Journal, Strategic Management Journal, Journal of Management, Journal of International Business Studies, Journal of Management Studies and the Academy of Management Executive. He has co-authored 26 books, including recent books on business strategic and competitive advantage, and is currently Associate Editor of the Strategic Management Journal and Consulting Editor for the Journal of International Business Studies. He also ser ves on the Editorial Review board for the Academy of Management Journal. Professor Hoskisson has ser ved on editorial boards for the Academy of Management Journal, Journal of Management, Journal of Management Studies and Entrepreneurship Theory and Practice, among others. He is Special Professor at the University of Nottingham and Honorar y Professor at X i’an Jiao Tong University.

Professor Hoskisson is also a Fellow of the Strategic Management Society and has received awards from the A mer ican Society for Competitiveness and the Mar r iott School of Management, Br igham Young University. He completed three years of ser vice as Representative-at-Large for the Board of Governors of the Academy of Management and currently ser ves on the Board of Directors of the Strategic Management Society.

xx ABOUT THE AUTHORS

AC K N OW L E D G E M E N T S To my wonderful wife Meg for supporting me in consulting full-time, running three companies, teaching at two universities, and adding a textbook to my list of additional interests.

David Leaney

This has been a long journey and a heartfelt thanks to my children who have patiently waited on the sidelines for me to complete my part and who forfeited many weekends with their mother, in pursuit of academic excellence. I would like to thank Dallas Hanson for his continued support of my academic career and to my dear friends who have supported me from afar: Dr Kevin Radecki (USA) and Fran Scherrer (Spain). I hope you enjoy this edition.

Kim Backhouse

Cengage would also like to thank Greg Zooeff and Francis Hartnett for contributing new case studies to this edition, and would also like to thank the following reviewers for their incisive and helpful feedback:

• Nguyen Viet Ngo – Australian National University • Elisa Backer – Federation University Australia • Gar y Mankelow – University of Newcastle • David Robinson – Holmes Institute • Fiona Hurd – Auckland University of Technology • Harsha Sar vaiya – Griffith University • Austin Norman – Victoria University • Ralitza Bell – Australian Catholic University, North Sydney • Lisa Daniel – University of the Sunshine Coast • Stuart Middleton – University of Queensland • Georges Baume – University of Adelaide.

Ever y effort has been made to trace and acknowledge copyright. However, if any infringement has occurred, the publishers tender their apologies and invite the copyright holders to contact them.

xxi

PA R T 1 STRATEGIC MANAGEMENT INPUTS 1 Strategic management and strategic

competitiveness 2

2 The external environment: opportunities, threats, industry competition, and competitor analysis 34

3 The internal organisation: resources, capabilities, core competencies, and competitive advantages 72

1

1

Strategic management and strategic competitiveness

CH AP

TE R

1 Studying this chapter should provide you with the strategic management knowledge needed to: LO1 analyse the components of the strategic management process LO2 describe the competitive landscape and explain how globalisation and

technological changes shape it LO3 use the industrial organisation (I/O) model to explain how companies can earn

above-average returns LO4 use the resource-based model to explain how companies can earn above-

average returns LO5 describe vision and mission and discuss their value LO6 define and classify the four major stakeholder groups and describe their ability

to influence organisations LO7 describe the work of strategic leaders.

Learning Objectives

2

McDonald’s in Australia is part of a global empire of fast- food restaurants. McDonald’s has achieved substantial international success over the years, with its restaurants spread widely throughout the world. Brand recognition is huge: many people know about, and are customers of, McDonald’s. For example, a recent survey found that 88 per cent of people recognise the golden arches and associate them with McDonald’s. Each day, about 69 million people eat at a McDonald’s store, which equates

to almost 0.8 per cent of the world’s population. In 2018, McDonald’s had 37 855 total restaurants globally, located in 120 different countries and 14 155 stores in the US alone. China has 2223 stores compared with Japan 2975, the UK 1261, Canada 1443 and Australia 920. Globally, McDonald’s hires 1.9 million employees, and it hires approximately one million employees per year in the USA. In 2018, its annual revenue was $21 billion and its net income was $5.9 billion.

McDonald’s: Restaurant expansion since 1955.

Source: https://mcdonalds.com.au/about-maccas/maccas-story.

Given that McDonald’s includes a toy in about 20 per cent of its sales, it is considered the world’s largest distributor of toys. Each year, McDonald’s distributes 1.5 billion toys globally, which is more than Mattel and Hasbro. McDonald’s decided early to move into international markets, and now one can find the golden arches in far-flung locations around the globe.

In Australia, ‘Maccas’ (the locals’ name for the organisation) is thriving, with flexible offerings, ‘gourmet coffee’ and fresh-food bars. These have been successful moves. The UK arm has also been responsive to consumer demand; for example, it accommodates consumers who ask what goes into their food, providing information to staff that allows them to respond, and it promotes jobs in the chain as upwardly mobile.

China is a promising arena but there are continuing pressures there, with high levels of rivalry from KFC. There are now over 2000 McDonald’s outlets in China, which is approximately one-third the number of KFC outlets. KFC has around 5919 stores and is presently considered the most popular fast-food chain in China.

In India, where historically the brand was relatively small with only 400 stores compared with China, Japan and Australia, McDonald’s turned a corner when it announced in May 2019 that it had finally acquired full ownership of Connaught Plaza Restaurants. This entity had run the global giant’s operations in north and east India – from its long-estranged business partner Vikram Bakshi. The association between Bakshi and McDonald’s commenced in 1995 when, under a 25-year deal, the

McDonald’s and brand recognition

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1968

45 000

2000

1972

5000

1978 1986

25 000

1999

38 000

2020

9000

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As we can see from the opening case, McDonald’s organisations in Australia, the UK, China, India, Japan and the USA are all in different competitive positions. Therefore, we can conclude that they are not equally competitive (i.e. they are unable to achieve similar strategic competitiveness). In the USA, the organisation is now usi ng t he st rateg ic ma nagement process (see Fig u re 1.1) as t he fou ndat ion for cha nges to t he commitments, decisions and actions it under took to pursue strategic competitiveness and above-average terms. It may well succeed, given time.1

The strategic management process As explained in the opening case, McDonald’s is trying to enrich its traditional approach globally with more marketing and by making its stores more responsive to local consumers’ needs. A study conducted to identify the factors that contribute to the success of top corporate performers shows why the organisation is doing this. This study found that the top performers were entrepreneurial, were market oriented (possessing effective knowledge of the customers’ needs), used valuable competencies and offered innovative products and services.2

The types of behaviours exhibited by top performers like McDonald’s represent a strategic management process (see Fig u re 1.1), wh ich is a f u l l set of com m it ments, decisions a nd act ions requ i red for a n organ isat ion to ach ieve st rategic compet it iveness and ea r n above-average retu r ns. The organ isat ion’s fi rst step in the process is to analyse its external environment and internal organisation to determine its resources, capabilities and core competencies – the sources of its ‘strategic inputs’. We will now analyse each of the different components of the strategic management process.

Strategic competitiveness is achieved when an organisation successfully formulates and implements a value-creating strateg y. A strategy is an integrated and coordinated set of commitments and actions desig ned to ex ploit core competencies a nd ga i n a compet it ive adva ntage. W hen choosi ng a st rateg y, orga n isat ions ma ke choices a mong compet ing alter nat ives as t he pat hway for decid ing how t hey w ill pursue strategic competitiveness. 3

I n t h is sense, t he chosen st rateg y i nd icates what t he orga n isat ion w i l l do as wel l as what t he organisation will not do. A n organisation’s strateg y also demonstrates how it differs from its competitors.

A n organ isat ion has a compet it ive advantage when it implements a st rateg y t hat creates super ior value for customers a nd t hat its compet itors a re u nable to duplicate or fi nd too cost ly to im itate.4 A n organisation can be confident that its strategy has resulted in one or more useful competitive advantages only after competitors’ effor ts to duplicate its strategy have ceased or failed. In addition, an organisation must understand that no competitive advantage is permanent, and this was witnessed in 2020 during the Covid-19 pandemic.5 The speed with which competitors are able to acquire the skills needed to duplicate

strategic management process the full set of commitments, decisions and actions required for an organisation to achieve strategic competitiveness and earn above-average returns strategic competitiveness achieved when an organisation successfully formulates and implements a value- creating strategy

strategy an integrated and coordinated set of commitments and actions designed to exploit core competencies and gain a competitive advantage

two partners formed a 50:50 joint venture company – Connaught Plaza Restaurant – to set up outlets in the north and the east under the franchisee model. To date, McDonald’s has two business entities in India. Amit Jatia’s Hardcastle Restaurants runs the McDonald’s business in southern and western India. McDonald’s India is committed to sourcing almost all of its products from within the country. For this purpose, it has developed local Indian businesses, which can supply the highest- quality products required for its Indian operations.

The McDonald’s empire is obviously difficult to control and constantly presents country-specific challenges. Clever strategy is important for its continued survival and,

for the company, hopefully, its growth post the Covid-19 pandemic.

Sources: C. Smith, 2020, 50 interesting McDonald’s statistics and facts 2020, DMR Business Statistics, https://expandedramblings.com/index.php/

mcdonalds-statistics, 28 May; R. Darling, 2019, Thanks to the Happy Meal, McDonald’s is the largest toy manufacturer, http://www.considerable.com,

6 November; 2019, KFC is most popular food chain in China, http://www. businessinsider.com, 8 March; The Economic Times, 2019, Vikram Bakshi is

finally out, and McDonald’s India is lovin’ it, ET Online, https://economictimes. indiatimes.com/industry/services/hotels-/-restaurants/vikram-bakshi-is-

finally-out-and-mcdonalds-india-is-lovin-it/articleshow/69309704.cms?utm_ source=contentofinterest&utm_medium=text&utm_campaign=cppst, 14 May; T.

DiChristopher, 2015, McDonald’s new CEO faces many problems, CNBC, http:// www.cnbc.com/2015/01/29/how-mcdonalds-new-ceo-can-turn-around-the-

company.html, 29 January; FT Reporters, 2015, McDonald’s and its challenges worldwide: A market-by-market look, Financial Times, http://www.ft.com/intl/

cms/s/0/f8ac22fc-a7c1-11e4-8e78-00144feab7de.html#slide0, 29 January.

4 PART 1: STRATEGIC MANAGEMENT INPUTS

the benefits of an organisation’s value-creating strategy determines how long the competitive advantage will last.6

Above-average returns are returns in excess of what an investor expects to earn from other investments with a similar amount of risk. Risk is an investor’s uncertainty about the economic gains or losses that will result from a par ticular investment.7 The most successful organisations learn how to effectively manage r isk. Effectively managing r isks reduces investors’ uncer tainty about t he results of t heir invest ment. 8 Retu r ns a re of ten measu red in ter ms of accou nt ing fig u res, such as retu r n on assets, retu r n on equity or retu r n on sa les. A lter nat ively, retu r ns ca n be measu red on t he basis of stock ma rket retu r ns, such as mont h ly retu r ns (t he end-of-t he-per iod stock pr ice m inus t he begin n ing stock pr ice, d iv ided by t he beginning stock price, yielding a percentage return). In smaller, new venture organisations, returns are sometimes measured in terms of the amount and speed of grow th (e.g. in annual sales) rather than more traditional profitability measures9 because new ventures require time to earn acceptable returns (in the form of return on assets and so for th) on investors’ investments.10

Understanding how to exploit a competitive advantage is impor tant for organisations seeking to earn above-average returns.11 Organisations without a competitive advantage or that are not competing in an

above-average returns returns in excess of what an investor expects to earn from other investments with a similar amount of risk

risk an investor’s uncertainty about the economic gains or losses that will result from a particular investment

Strategic competitiveness Above-average returns

Chapter 3 The internal organisation

Chapter 2 The external environment

Strategic intent Strategic mission

Strategy formulation

Feedback

St ra

te gi

c o

u tc

o m

es St

ra te

gi c

ac ti

o n

s St

ra te

gi c

in p

u ts

Chapter 4 Business-level strategy

Chapter 6 Corporate-level strategy

Acquisition and restructuring strategies

Chapter 8 International strategy

Chapter 9 Cooperative strategy

Strategy implementation

Chapter 10 Corporate governance

Chapter 11 Organisational structure and controls

Chapter 12 Strategic leadership

Chapter 13 Strategic entrepreneurship

Chapter 5 Competitive dynamics

Chapter 7

Figure 1.1 The strategic management process

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attractive industr y earn, at best, average returns. Average returns are returns equal to those an investor expects to earn from other investments with a similar amount of risk. In the long r un, an inability to earn at least average returns results fi rst in decline and, eventually, failure. Failure occurs because investors w it hd raw t heir invest ments from t hose organ isations ear n ing less-t han-average retu r ns. As we noted above, there are no guarantees of permanent success. Even considering its excellent current performance, McDonald’s still must be careful not to become overcon fident, and continue its quest to be the leader in its markets.

With the information gained from external and internal analyses, the organisation develops its vision and mission and formulates one or more strategies. To implement its strategies, the organisation takes actions towards achieving strategic competitiveness and above-average returns. Effective strategic actions that take place in the context of carefully integrated strategy formulation and implementation efforts result in positive outcomes. This dynamic strategic management process must be maintained as ever-changing markets and competitive structures are coordinated with an organisation’s continuously evolving strategic inputs.12

In t he remai n i ng chapters of t h is book, we use t he st rateg ic ma nagement process to ex plai n what organisations do to achieve strategic competitiveness and earn above-average returns. These explanations demonstrate why some organisations consistently achieve competitive success while others fail to do so.13 As you will see, the reality of global competition is a critical part of the strategic management process and significantly influences organisations’ performances.14 Indeed, learning how to successfully compete in the globalised world is one of the most significant challenges for organisations competing in the 21st century.15

Several topics are discussed in this chapter. First, we describe the current competitive landscape. This challenging landscape has been created primarily by the emergence of a global economy, globalisation resulting from that economy, rapid technological changes and the Covid-19 pandemic. Next, we examine t wo models t hat orga n isat ions use to gat her t he i n for mat ion a nd k nowledge requ i red to choose a nd t hen effect ively i mplement t hei r st rateg ies. The i nsights ga i ned f rom t hese models a lso ser ve as t he foundation for forming the organisation’s vision and mission. The fi rst model (the industrial organisation or I/O model) suggests t hat t he exter nal env iron ment is t he pr imar y deter m inant of an organ isation’s strategic actions. Identifying and then competing successfully in an attractive (i.e. profitable) industr y or segment of an industr y are the keys to competitive success when using this model.16 The second model (resource based) suggests that an organisation’s unique resources and capabilities are the critical link to strategic competitiveness.17 Thus, the fi rst model is concerned primarily with the organisation’s external environment, while the second model is concerned primarily with the organisation’s internal environment. A f ter d iscussing v ision and m ission, d irection-setting statements t hat in fluence t he choice and use of strategies, we describe the stakeholders that organisations serve. The degree to which stakeholders’ needs can be met increases when organisations achieve strategic competitiveness and earn above-average returns. Closing the chapter are introductions to strategic leaders and the elements of the strategic management process.

For ease, t h is book is d iv ided i nto t h ree pa r ts. I n Pa r t 1, we desc r ibe what orga n isat ions do to analyse t heir ex ter nal env iron ment (Chapter 2) and inter nal organ isation (Chapter  3). These analyses a re completed to identif y ma rketplace oppor tun ities and t h reats in t he ex ter nal env iron ment (Chapter 2), and to decide how to use the resources, capabilities, core competencies and competitive advantages in t he organ isation’s inter nal organ isation to pu rsue oppor tun ities and overcome t h reats (Chapter 3). The analyses explained in Chapters 2 and 3 comprise the well-known SWOT analyses (strengths, weaknesses, opportunities and threats).18 (In our analysis, the important ‘strengths’ concept is made more sophisticated by using the ideas of capabilities and core competencies.) With knowledge about its external environment and inter nal organ isation, t he organ isation for ms its st rateg y consider ing t he organ isation’s v ision and m ission.

The organisation’s strategic inputs (see Fig ure 1.1) provide the foundation for choosing one or more strategies and deciding how to implement them. As suggested in Figure 1.1 by the horizontal arrow linking the two ty pes of strategic actions, for mulation and implementation must be simultaneously integrated

average returns returns equal to those an investor expects to earn from other investments with a similar amount of risk

global economy one in which goods, services, people, skills and ideas move freely across geographic borders

6 PART 1: STRATEGIC MANAGEMENT INPUTS

to successf u l ly use t he st rateg ic ma nagement process. Integ rat ion happens as decision ma kers t h i n k about implementation issues when choosing strategies and as they think about possible changes to the organisation’s strategies while implementing a cur rently chosen strateg y.

In Pa r t 2 of t h is book, we d iscuss t he d i fferent st rateg ies orga n isat ions may choose to use. Fi rst, we exa m i ne busi ness-level st rateg ies (Chapter 4). A busi ness-level st rateg y descr ibes t he act ions a n orga n isat ion ta kes to ex ploit its compet it ive adva ntage over r iva ls. A compa ny compet i ng i n a si ngle product market (e.g. a locally owned grocer y store operating in only one location) has one business-level strateg y, while a diversified organisation competing in multiple product markets forms a business-level strateg y for each of its businesses. In Chapter 5, we describe the actions and reactions that occur among organ isations in marketplace competition. Competitors ty pically respond to and t r y to anticipate each other’s actions. The dynamics of competition affect the strategies organisations choose, as well as how they tr y to implement the chosen strategies.19

For the diversified organisation, cor porate-level strateg y (Chapter 6) is concerned with determining the businesses in which the company intends to compete as well as how to manage its different businesses. Other topics vital to strategy formulation, particularly in the diversified company, include acquiring other businesses and, as appropriate, restr ucturing the organisation’s por tfolio of businesses (Chapter 7) and selecting an inter national st rateg y (Chapter 8). With cooperative st rategies (Chapter 9), organ isations form a par tnership to share their resources and capabilities in order to develop a competitive advantage. Cooperative strategies are becoming increasingly impor tant as organisations seek ways to compete in the global economy’s ar ray of different markets.20

To exa m i ne act ions ta ken to i mplement st rateg ies, we consider severa l topics i n Pa r t 3. Fi rst, we e xa m i ne t he d i f fe rent mec ha n ism s u sed to gove r n orga n isat ion s (C hapte r 10). W it h dema nd s for improved cor porate governance being voiced by many stakeholders in the cur rent business environment, orga n isat ion s a re c ha l lenged to lea r n how to si mu lta neou sly sat isf y t hei r sta keholders’ d i f ferent interests.21 Finally, the organisational structure and actions needed to control an organisation’s operations (Chapter 11), t he patter ns of st rategic leadersh ip appropr iate for today ’s organ isations and competitive environments (Chapter 12), and strategic entrepreneurship (Chapter 13) as a path to continuous innovation a re add ressed.

The competitive landscape The fundamental nature of competition in many of the world’s industries is changing. The reality is that financial capital continues to be scarce and markets are increasingly volatile. 22 Because of this, the pace of change is relentless and ever-increasing. Even determining the boundaries of an industr y has become challenging.

Managers must adopt a new m indset t hat values flex ibility, speed, in novat ion, integ rat ion and t he challenges that evolve from constantly changing conditions.23 The conditions of the competitive landscape result in a perilous business world, one in which the investments that are required to compete on a global scale are enormous and the consequences of failure are severe.24 Effective use of the strategic management process reduces t he li kelihood of failu re for orga n isat ions as t hey encou nter t he cond it ions of today ’s competitive landscape.

Hypercompetition is a ter m often used to capture the realities of the competitive landscape. Under cond it ions of hy percompet it ion, assu mpt ions of ma rket stabi l it y a re replaced by not ions of i n herent instability and change.25 Hy percompetition results from the dynamics of strategic manoeuv ring among globa l a nd i n novat ive combata nts. I n a hy percompet it ive ma rket, orga n isat ions of ten agg ressively challenge their competitors in the hopes of improv ing their competitive position and, ultimately, their performance.26 In recent years, internet giant Tencent Holdings Ltd of China has become one of the world’s largest technolog y investors. Between 2013 and mid-2018, the organisation took stakes in 277 star t-ups. A nalysts believe this is a calculated strateg y to crowd out rivals and to increase profits. 27

hypercompetition a condition where competitors engage in intense rivalry, markets change quickly and often, and entry barriers are low

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Several factors create hy percompetitive env iron ments and in fluence t he natu re of t he competitive landscape. The emergence of a global economy and technolog y – specifically rapid technological change – have been the two primary drivers of hypercompetitive environments and the nature of today’s competitive landscape.

The global economy A global economy is one in which goods, ser vices, people, skills and ideas move freely across geographic borders. Relatively unfettered by ar tificial constraints, such as tariffs, the global economy significantly ex pa nds a nd compl icates a n orga n isat ion’s compet it ive env i ron ment. 2 8 T he globa l economy is u nder pressu re, weighed dow n by t rade tensions, inequality and geopolit ical u ncer tainty. The world is at an econom ic ‘t ippi ng poi nt ’ accord i ng to t he 2019 Global Competiveness Report ‘a m id a back lash aga i nst capitalism and globalization’.29

Interesting opportunities and challenges are associated with the emergence of the global economy.30 For example, the European Union (EU; composed of 27 countries after the UK exited the EU in 2020) has become one of the world’s largest markets, with 700 million potential customers, while China has rapidly become a huge market that was pursued by many organisations prior to the Covid-19 pandemic. Notwithstanding, China remains an extremely competitive market in which local market-seeking multinational corporations (MNCs) must fiercely compete against other MNCs, as well as against those local companies that are more cost-effective and faster in product development. W hile China has been viewed as a countr y from which to source low-cost goods, many MNCs, such as Procter & Gamble (P&G), are actually net expor ters of local management talent; they have been dispatching more Chinese abroad than bringing foreign expatriates to China. 31

The size of par ts of the global economy is an impor tant aspect of studying this competitive landscape. In 2019, for example, the USA was the world’s largest economy at a value of US$21 trillion. It accounts for approximately 20 per cent of global output; the economy is still larger than that of China;32 and the services sectors in the USA are technologically sophisticated. China is the world’s second-largest economy, with a nominal gross domestic product (GDP) value of US$9.2 trillion, while Japan in 2019 was ranked the third- largest global economy at US$5.2 trillion. Following Japan were Germany at US$4.2 trillion and the UK at US$3.2 trillion. These were closely followed by India, which over took the French economy in 2018, and looks set to move into fifth position in 2021–22. In observing economies’ values in 2018, the World Economic For um noted that the size of the USA’s economy was ‘larger than the combined economies of numbers four to 10 on the list. Overall, the global economy (was) worth an estimated $79.98 trillion, meaning the United States in 2018 accounted for more than one-quar ter of the world total’. 33 Thus, organisations scanning the global economy for oppor tunities in 2021 might conclude that markets in the USA, China and Japan yield potentially significant oppor tunities for them.

Of course, such an analysis also must consider entry barriers to various economies in the form of tariffs. This type of analysis must also be forward-looking in that the World Economic Forum has estimated that the economies of China and India would exceed the size of the US economy by 2050 and that the economies of Germany, the UK and France would decline in size by this time as well. Organisations should study carefully future forecasts when determining the parts of the world in which growth opportunities, as well as threats to their competitive global positions, may exist in the next decade. US-based Netflix, for example, studies the global economy to identify oppor tunities in countries and regions in which it may grow. In mid-2018, Netflix continued adding subscribers, reaching 125 million globally. A nalysts predicted the organisation would have 360 million subscribers by 2030, and that international markets would be the source of much of the grow th in subscribers. 34 Informing this prediction was the expectation that Netflix would achieve reasonable levels of market penetration internationally, including reaching penetration in 35 per cent of all broadband households worldwide, excluding China.35 In 2018 alone, the organisation allocated $8 billion to develop or ig inal prog ra m m ing, w it h some of t hose prog ra ms ta rgeted to inter nat ional customers. 36 Netflix was one of the rare organisations that continued to grow during the Covid-19 pandemic, adding

8 PART 1: STRATEGIC MANAGEMENT INPUTS

15.8 million subscribers between March and April 2020, more than double the amount that was predicted and representing a huge grow th of over 22 per cent during the 12-month period to 2020. Netflix also saw a quar terly revenue of US$5.76 billion in 2020. 37 According to market research organisation HarrisX, Netflix is a long way ahead of its compet itors; however, t he organ isat ion is m ind f ul t hat t here a re challenges ahead, as noted in a recent ar ticle: ‘when you’re number one, it’s always difficult to grow as fast as your competitors or whoever’s trailing you’. 38

Ind ia, one of the world’s largest democracies, has an economy that also is grow ing rapid ly and now ranks as the fifth largest in the world, and it has a ver y fast-growing population. 39 Simultaneously, many orga n isat ions i n emerg i ng econom ies a re mov i ng i nto i nter nat ional ma rkets a nd a re now rega rded as multinational organisations. Bar riers to entering foreign markets still exist. The statistics detailing the nature of the global economy reflect the realities of a hypercompetitive business environment and challenge ind iv idual organ isat ions to t h in k ser iously about t he ma rkets in wh ich t hey w ill compete; t he case of Netflix is a good example.

Starbucks is a new economy multinational yet has had failures in key markets

Starbucks is not an ordinary supplier of a cup of coffee. It is a large and innovative multinational organisation that engages in major strategic actions to enter new international and product markets (e.g. acquisitions). It is a multibillion-dollar organisation with many stores operating in multiple countries. Starbucks surpassed its goal set to have at least 12 500 stores in the USA by 2015 to 15 149 US locations in 2020. Starbucks was the largest global coffeehouse company in 2019 with 31 256 stores across the globe. Starbucks has become a major player in Asian markets, which is interesting because it took on a largely ingrained tea-drinking culture. Starbucks had 1026 stores operating in China in 2015, 1540 in 2017 (which was the expected store numbers for 2015), and in 2019 there were 4123 Starbuck stores in China, with 629 newly opened stores and 27 closures – a major increase over its 3000 stores since 2015. Starbucks adapted to local market tastes by developing larger stores where, for example, people can lounge and meet with friends. It has products that cater to tea drinkers as well. China ranked second in front of Japan, which had a total of 1286 locations in 2019, and Starbucks generated more than US$16 billion in the region.

Starbucks has also entered Vietnam and India with high expectations. In 2013 it opened its first store in Vietnam, although in 2019 it had only 46 stores there. Interestingly, Vietnam is the second-largest producer of coffee beans in the world, behind Brazil. Starbucks works with local Vietnamese farmers to grow a high-quality Arabica coffee bean. In partnership with

the Tata Group, Starbucks also opened its first stores in India, with plans to expand rapidly there, and in 2019 it had 132 stores in India, three times that of Vietnam.

In contrast, in Australia the scorecard has been extremely poor. CNBC reported that while the Australian café industry was expected to reach more than A$6 billion in revenue in 2018, in its first seven years in Australia, Starbucks accumulated A$105 million in losses and 61 locations were forced to close. Starbucks referred to its efforts in the country as a ‘huge flop’. Starbucks entered the market hard in 2000 and had 84 stores at its peak. The problems were obvious from the start. The organisation charged more than competitors, had stores in low-traffic locations and, basically, the well-established coffee culture of Australia was better than the Starbucks offerings. Melbourne- style coffee is arguably the world’s best and Starbucks could not compete on taste in an already thriving coffee culture, which proved to be a huge challenge for the US brand. Starbucks has not given up just yet, and in 2021 there were 55 locations (more than Vietnam) in Australia. With slow growth forecasts into the future, its Australian goal is to focus more on international tourists that recognise this global brand.

The experience of Starbucks in Europe has been more mixed. It has had some success, but has also encountered another different set of coffee cultures. At first, it tried to encourage Europeans to adapt to the Starbucks approach, but this strategy failed. Now, because of the importance Starbucks places on

Strategic focus | Globalisation

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The march of globalisation Globalisat ion is t he increasing econom ic interdependence a mong cou nt r ies a nd t hei r orga n isat ions as reflected i n t he flow of goods a nd ser v ices, fi na ncia l capita l a nd k nowledge across cou nt r y borders.4 0 Globalisation is a product of a large number of organisations competing against one another in an increasing number of global economies.

In globalised markets and industries, financial capital might be obtained in one national market and used to buy raw materials in another. Manufacturing equipment bought from a third national market can then be used to produce products that are sold in yet a four th market. Thus, globalisation increases the range of oppor tunities for companies competing in the cur rent competitive landscape.41 Organisations operating globally must ma ke cu ltu rally sensit ive decisions when using t he st rateg ic ma nagement process,4 2 as ev idenced i n Sta rbucks’ operat ions i n Eu ropea n a nd A sia n cou nt r ies. Add it iona l ly, h igh ly globa l ised organisations should anticipate ever-increasing complexity in their operations as goods, services and people move freely across geographic borders and throughout different economies.

Overall, it is impor tant to note t hat globalisation has led to h igher per for mance standa rds in many compet it ive d i mensions, i nclud i ng t hose of qua l it y, cost, product iv it y, product i nt roduct ion t i me a nd operat ional eff iciency. In add it ion to orga n isat ions compet i ng i n t he global economy, t hese sta nda rds a f fect orga n isat ions compet i ng on a domest ic-on ly basis. T he reason is t hat customers w i l l pu rchase from a global competitor rat her t han a domestic organ isation when t he global company ’s good or ser v ice is super ior. Because workers now f low rat her freely among global econom ies, and because employees a re a key source of competitive advantage, organisations must understand that, increasingly, ‘the best people w ill come from … any where’.4 3 Thus, managers have to lea r n how to operate effectively in a ‘multi-pola r ’ world, w it h many impor tant cou nt r ies hav ing u n ique interests and env iron ments.4 4 Organ isations must lear n how to deal w it h t he reality t hat, in t he competitive landscape of t he 21st centu r y, on ly compan ies

its future in Europe, the company is adapting to the European café culture. This means that Starbucks is building larger stores with additional seating to allow people to meet and spend time in its stores, as it has done in Asia. It has implemented other practices and products that adapt even more to local (country) cultures and tastes (e.g. in France and England).

In addition to Starbucks’ international thrust, it also engages in significant innovation and strategic actions to add to its product line. In recent years, it has introduced Via, an instant coffee, and a single- cup coffee maker (named the Verismo) that allows customers to make their own lattes at home. Another attempt to add to its product line was evidenced by its acquisition of the tea chain Teavana. In fact, it paid US$620 million to acquire the Atlanta-based company. In recent times, it also acquired a juice maker, Evolution Fresh, and Bay Bread, the operator of La Boulange bakeries. Starbucks’ variety of beverage and food companies now includes: Seattle’s Best Coffee, Teavana, Tazo, Evolution Fresh, Torrefazione Italia Coffee and Ethos Water.

Sources: S. Lock, 2019, Starbucks stores: US and international 2005 to 2019, http://www.statista.com;

http://www.financesonline.com, Number of Starbucks worldwide 2020: facts, statistics, and trends;

L. L. Thomala, 2020, Number of Starbucks stores in China from 2005 to 2019, Statista.com, 27 May; L. MacLellan, 2019, The countries with the

most Starbucks locations, Quartz, http://www.qz.com, 30 January; A. Turner, 2018, Why there are almost no Starbucks in Australia, CNBC, http://www.cnbc.com, 25 July; J. Gertner, 2013, For infusing a steady

stream of new ideas to revive its business, Fast Company, http://www. fastcompany.com; A. Gasparro, 2013, Starbucks enjoys sales jolt from

its US, China stores, Wall Street Journal, http://www.wsj.com, 24 January; J. Noble, 2013, Starbucks takes on Vietnam coffee culture, Financial Times, http://www.ft.com, 3 January; A. Gasparro, 2012, Starbucks:

China to become no. 2 market, Wall Street Journal, http://www.wsj.com, 6 December; 2012, A look at Starbucks’ U.S. presence over the years,

Bloomberg Businessweek, http://www.businessweek.com, 5 December; L. Burkitt, 2012, Starbucks plays to local Chinese tastes, Wall Street Journal, http://www.wsj.com, 26 November; J. Jargon, 2012, Starbucks CEO: ‘We

will do for tea what we did for coffee’, Wall Street Journal, http://www. wsj.com, 14 November; V. Bajaj, 2012, Starbucks opens in India with pomp and tempered ambition, New York Times, http://www.nytimes.

com, 19 October; S. Strom, 2012, Starbucks to introduce single-serve coffee maker, New York Times, http://www.nytimes.com, 20 September;

L. Alderman, 2012, In Europe, Starbucks adjusts to a café culture, New York Times, http://www.nytimes.com, 30 March.

10 PART 1: STRATEGIC MANAGEMENT INPUTS

capable of meeting, if not exceeding, global standards ty pically have the capability to earn above-average retu r ns.

A lthough globalisation offers potential benefits to organisations, it is not without risks. Collectively, the risks of par ticipating outside of an organisation’s domestic countr y in the global economy are labelled a ‘liability of foreignness’.45

The increasing oppor tunities available in emerging economies is a major driver of grow th in the size of the global economy. Impor tant emerging economies include the BR IC countries (Brazil, Russia, India and China),46 the V ISTA countries ( Vietnam, Indonesia, South A frica, Turkey and A rgentina),47 as well as Mexico and Thailand. Demonstrating the growth in size of some of these economies was the 2018 prediction that, by 2050, Indonesia, Brazil, Russia and Mexico would be the four th-, fifth-, sixth- and seventh-largest economies in the world by size, respectively. If this were to happen, by 2050 the size of these emerging economies would exceed those of Japan, Germany, the UK and France.48 Emerging economy organisations now compete i n globa l ma rkets, some w it h i ncreasi ng success.4 9 I ndeed, t he emergence of M NCs i n international markets forces large M NCs based in developed markets to enrich their own capabilities to compete effectively in global markets.50

One r isk of enter ing the global market is the amount of time ty pically required for organisations to lear n how to compete in markets that are new to them. A n organisation’s per for mance can su ffer until this knowledge is either developed locally or transfer red from the home market to the newly established global locat ion. 51 Add it ionally, an organ isat ion’s per for mance may su ffer w it h substant ial amou nts of globalisat ion. In t h is insta nce, a n orga n isat ion may over-d iversif y inter nat ionally a nd t h is may have strong negative effects on overall performance.

Thus, entry into international markets, even for organisations with substantial experience in the global economy, requires effective use of the strategic management process. It is also important to note that even though global markets are an attractive strategic option for some companies, they are not the only source of strategic competitiveness. In fact, for most organisations – even those capable of competing successfully in global markets – it is cr itical to remain committed to and strategically competitive in both domestic and international markets by staying attuned to technological oppor tunities and potential competitive d isr uptions t hat in novations create. 52 The challenge is also to be responsive to local needs, somet h ing Starbucks failed to do in Australia. Starbucks is now emphasising both product innovation and international expansion as means of growing profitably.

Technology and technological changes Boston Consulting Group analysts describe the impact of technology as follows: ‘No company can afford to ignore the impact of technolog y on ever y thing from supply chains to customer engagement, and the advent of even more advanced technologies, such as artificial intelligence (AI) and the Internet of Things, portends more far-reaching change.’53 There are three categories of technology-related trends and conditions affecting today’s organisations: technology diffusion and disruptive technologies; the information age; and increasing knowledge intensity. These categories have a significant effect on the nature of competition in many industries.

Technology diffusion and disruptive technologies The rate of technolog y diff usion, which is the speed at which new technologies become available and are used, has increased substantially over the past 15 to 20 years. Consider the following rates of technolog y diff usion:

It took the telephone 35 years to get into 25 per cent of all homes in the United States. It took TV 26 years. It took radio 22 years. It took PCs 16 years. It took the internet 7 years.54

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The i mpact of tech nolog ica l cha nges on orga n isat ions a nd i ndust r ies is broad a nd sig n i fica nt. For example, in the not-too-distant past, people rented movies on videotapes from global retail stores such as Blockbuster. Blockbuster has just one store that remains open globally, located in Oregon, USA. Fifteen years earlier there were 9000 stores. Today, customers on a global basis use electronic means almost exclusively to rent movies (such as via Foxtel) and games (e.g. For tnite). The publishing industr y ( books, jour nals, magazines and newspapers) is moving rapidly from hard copy to electronic formats. Many organisations in these industries, operating with a more traditional business model, are suffering. These changes are also affecting other industries, from tr ucking to mail ser vices.

Pe r pet ua l i n novat ion i s a te r m u sed to desc r ibe how rapid ly a nd con si stent ly new, i n for mat ion- i nte n sive tec h nolog ies replace olde r ones. T he shor te r produc t l i fe c yc les resu lt i ng f rom t he rapid d i f f u sion of new tec h nolog ies place a compet it ive prem iu m on bei ng able to qu ic k ly i nt roduce new, i n novat ive good s a nd ser v ices i nto t he ma rket place. 55

I n fact, when products become somewhat i nd ist i ng u ishable because of t he w idespread a nd rapid d i ff usion of tech nolog ies, speed to ma rket w it h i n novat ive products may be t he pr i ma r y sou rce of compet it ive adva ntage (see Chapter 5). 56 Indeed, some a rg ue t hat t he globa l economy is i ncreasi ngly driven by, or revolves around, constant innovations. Not sur prisingly, such innovations must be derived from an understanding of global standards and expectations of product functionality.57 A lthough some arg ue t hat large established organ isations may have t rouble in novating, ev idence suggests t hat today these organisations are developing radically new technologies that transform old industries or create new ones. 58 Apple is an excellent example of a large established organ isation capable of rad ical in novation. A lso, in order to diff use the technolog y and enhance the value of an innovation, additional organisations need to be i n novat ive i n t hei r use of t he new tech nolog y, bu i ld i ng it i nto t hei r products. 59 A lt hough matu re orga n isat ions may have t rouble in novat ing, ev idence suggests t hat today t hese orga n isat ions are developing radically new technologies that transform old industries or create new ones.60 In 2018, for example, Boston Consulting Group identified the 50 most innovative companies in the world. The first five organisations on this list are large companies: Apple, Google, Microsoft, A mazon and Samsung.61 Wireless A irPods, A R K it (the organisation’s augmented-reality framework) and HomePod (an intelligent speaker) are some of the in novative products Apple has int roduced and for which some recognise it as the most innovative company in the world.62

A not her i nd icator of rapid tech nolog y d i ff usion is t hat it now may ta ke on ly 12 to 18 mont hs for orga n isat ions to gat her i n for mat ion about t hei r compet itors’ resea rch a nd development a nd product decisions.6 3 I n t he globa l economy, compet itors ca n somet i mes i m itate a n orga n isat ion’s successf u l competitive actions within a few days. In this sense, the rate of technological diff usion has reduced the competitive benefits of patents. Today, patents may be an effective way of protecting proprietary technology in a small number of industries such as pharmaceuticals. Indeed, many organisations competing in the electronics industr y often do not apply for patents, in order to prevent competitors from gaining access to the technological knowledge included in the patent application.

Disr uptive tech nologies – tech nologies that dest roy the value of an ex isting tech nolog y and create new markets6 4 – surface frequently in today’s competitive markets. Think of the new markets created by the technologies underly ing the development of products such as the iPad and A irPods. These ty pes of products are thought by some to represent rad ical or breakth rough in novations.65 ( We talk more about radical innovations in Chapter 13.) A disr uptive or radical technology can create what is essentially a new industr y or it can harm industr y incumbents. However, some incumbents are able to adapt due to their superior resources, experience and ability to gain access to the new technolog y through multiple sources (e.g. alliances, acquisitions and ongoing internal research).66 Clearly, Apple has developed and introduced ‘d isr uptive technologies’ such as the iPad and A irPods, and in so doing changed several industr ies. For example, the iPod and its complementar y iTunes have revolutionised how music is sold to, and used by, consumers. In conjunction with other complementar y and competitive products (e.g. A mazon’s K indle),

12 PART 1: STRATEGIC MANAGEMENT INPUTS

the iPad has contributed to and sped up major changes in the publishing industry, which, as noted earlier, is moving more and more from hard copies to electronic books. Apple’s new technologies and products are also contributing to the new ‘information age’. Thus, Apple provides an example of entrepreneurship through technolog y emergence across multiple industries.67

The information age Dramatic changes in information technolog y have occur red in recent years. Personal computers, mobile phones, ar tificial intelligence, vir tual reality, massive databases and multiple social networking sites are on ly a few examples of how infor mat ion is used d i fferent ly as a result of tech nolog ical developments. A n i mpor ta nt outcome of t hese cha nges is t hat t he abi l it y to effect ively a nd efficient ly access a nd use infor mat ion has become an impor tant sou rce of compet it ive advantage in v i r tually all indust r ies. Information technology advances have given small organisations more flexibility in competing with large organisations, if that technolog y can be efficiently used.68

Data and information are vital to organisations’ effor ts to understand customers and their needs and to implement st rateg ies t hat sat isf y t hose needs as well as t he interests of all ot her sta keholders. For today’s organisations in vir tually all industries, information technolog y is an impor tant capability that contributes positively to product innovation efforts and may be a source of competitive advantage as well. Organisations failing to harness the power of data and information are disadvantaged compared to their competitors.69 Both the pace of change in information technolog y and its diff usion continue to increase on a global scale. In 2018, 36 per cent of the world’s population owned a smar tphone. W hile expectations are that the number of personal computers (PCs) sold annually w ill decline, from 258.8 million in 2017 to 215.8 million in 2023, conversely, technolog y innovations, such as touch-enabled PCs, ultra-slim and conver tible laptops, and hybrid machines, will stimulate revenue grow th among technolog y companies.70 Technolog y-based innovations also stimulate additional markets. For example, predictions are that the global video streaming market will reach US$70 billion by 2021. Contributing to this market’s grow th is the fact that in 2018, the percentage of internet and mobile audiences watching live video continued to expand.71 Trends such as these inform the work that organisations complete to select and implement their st rategies in the global economy. The most successf ul organ isations env ision infor mation tech nolog y- der ived i n novat ions as oppor tu n it ies to ident if y a nd ser ve new ma rkets rat her t ha n as t h reats to t he markets they ser ve cur rently.72

Bot h t he pace of cha nge i n i n for mat ion tech nolog y a nd its d i ff usion w ill cont i nue to i ncrease. For instance, the number of personal computers in use globally was recently expected to sur pass 2.3 billion.73 The declining costs of information technologies and the increased access to them are also evident in the current competitive landscape. The global proliferation of relatively inexpensive computing power and its linkage on a global scale via computer networks combine to increase the speed and diffusion of information technologies. Thus, the competitive potential of information technologies is now available to companies of all sizes throughout the world, including those in emerging economies.74

The inter net is a not her tech nolog ical in novat ion cont r ibut ing to hy percompet it ion. Available to a n increasing nu mber of people t h roughout t he world, t he inter net prov ides a n inf rast r uctu re t hat allows t he deliver y of infor mat ion to computers in a ny locat ion. Access to t he inter net on smaller dev ices such as sma r tphones is hav ing a n ever-g row ing impact on compet it ion in a nu mber of indust r ies. However, possible cha nges to t he pr ici ng st r uct u res of i nter net ser v ice prov iders ( ISPs) cou ld a f fect t he rate of g row t h of inter net-based applicat ions. Users dow n load ing or st rea m ing h igh-def in it ion f ilms, play ing video games online and so for th would be affected the most if ISPs were to base pricing str uctures around total usage.

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The core of Apple: technology and innovation

Apple has transformed industries with the introduction of new products such as the iPod, iPad, iPhone, Apple Watch and AirPods. The extent of its dominance of the smartphone industry is hard to comprehend: around 1000 companies make smartphones but just one makes most of the profits in this industry. In 2019, Apple announced that its revenue totalled US$260 billion for the 2019 financial year. How? It commands higher prices, does not sell products cheap and never appears to discount its products, ever. Samsung is the other profit maker in this highly competitive industry and it sells many more units than Apple. Going back to 2012, industry profits were 50–50 between Apple and Samsung, but no longer.

This dominance and good performances from other arms of the Apple empire have yielded huge profits.

Apple has achieved phenomenal success with the introduction of innovative products and brand maintenance. The late Steve Jobs was selected by Fortune magazine as the CEO of the first decade of the 21st century, based on the fact that Apple under his leadership had transformed four industries, three of them in a decade. In addition, in 2020 Fast Company named Apple in the World’s Most Innovative Companies list. Apple is one of the top companies in the world based on almost any criterion or set of criteria used. Because of this, Apple is perceived exceptionally well by customers. Apple’s growth rate has been extraordinary and its financial performance even more impressive. And the appeal of Apple’s products is global. For example, Apple’s iPhones now exceed 925 million units globally. Apple also disclosed that there were 1.4 billion active devices as of January 2019.

Apple retail stores enjoy a steady flow of traffic each day. More remarkable is that Apple’s stores in China handled in excess of 40 000 people daily prior to the Covid-19 pandemic. Apple has opened 510 retail stores across 25 countries, with 271 located in the United States alone. Apple’s newest locations include: Kawasaki and Tokyo, Japan; Mexico City; Singapore Airport; and Taipei, Taiwan.

Source: Newspix/Alan Pryke

Although there are many reasons for its success, the primary reasons rest with Apple’s new technology development and innovative new products.

Sources: MacRumors Staff, 2020, Keep track of Apple’s retail stores worldwide, http://www.macrumors.com, 12 May; Above Avalon, 2019,

http://www.aboveavalon.com, 30 May; Fortune, 2011, World’s most admired companies, http://www.fortune.com, 3 March; B. Worthen,

2011, With new iPad, Apple tries to stay ahead of wave of tablet rivals, Wall Street Journal, http://www.online.wsj.com, 3 March; G. A. Fowler &

N. Wingfield, 2011, Apple’s showman takes the stage, Wall Street Journal, http://www.online.wsj.com, 3 March; Financial Times, 2011, Apple and

the tablets, http://www.ft.com, 1 March; N. Louth, 2011, Finding value in Apple’s core, Financial Times, http://www.ft.com, 25 February; M. Helft,

2011, After iPad’s head start, rival tablets are poised to flood offices, New York Times, http://www.nytimes.com, 20 February; L. Chao, 2011, New Shanghai Apple store will be biggest in China, Wall Street Journal,

http://www.online.wsj.com, 18 February.

Strategic focus |Technology

Increasing knowledge intensity K nowledge (i n for mat ion, i ntelligence a nd ex per t ise) is t he basis of tech nolog y a nd its applicat ion. In t he compet it ive la ndscape of t he 21st centu r y, k nowledge is a cr it ica l orga n isat ional resou rce a nd a n increasingly valuable source of competitive advantage.75

Indeed, starting in the 1980s, the basis of competition shifted from hard assets to intangible resources; for example, ‘Walmart transformed retailing through its proprietary approach to supply chain management and its information rich relationships with customers and suppliers’.76 Relationships with customers and suppliers are an example of an intangible resource.

K nowledge is ga i ned t h rough ex per ience, obser vat ion a nd i n ference, a nd is a n i nta ng ible resou rce. T he va lue of i nta ng ible resou rces, i nclud i ng k nowledge, is g row i ng as a propor t ion of tota l sha reholder

STRATEGY NOW

Apple’s drive to innovate

14 PART 1: STRATEGIC MANAGEMENT INPUTS

va lue i n today ’s compet it ive la ndscape.7 7 I n fac t, t he Brook i ngs I nst it ut ion est i mates t hat i nta ng ible resou rces cont r ibute approx i mately 85 per cent of t hat va lue.78 T he probabi l it y of ach iev i ng st rateg ic compet it ive ness i s e n ha nced for t he orga n i sat ion t hat develops t he abi l it y to capt u re i ntel l ige nce, t ra n sfor m it i nto u seable k nowled ge a nd d i f f u se it rapid ly t h roug hout t he compa ny.7 9 T he re fore, orga n isat ions must develop (e.g. t h rough t ra i n i ng prog ra ms) a nd acqu i re (e.g. by h i r i ng educated a nd ex per ienced employees) k nowledge, i nteg rate it i nto t he orga n isat ion to create capabi l it ies, a nd t hen apply it to ga i n a compet it ive adva ntage. 8 0

A st rong k nowledge base is necessar y to create in novations. Organisations lack ing the appropr iate internal knowledge resources are less likely to invest money in research and development.81 Organisations must continue to learn ( building their knowledge stock) because knowledge spillovers to competitors are common. There are several ways in which knowledge spillovers occur, including the hiring of professional sta ff and managers by compet itors. 82 Because of t he potent ial for spillovers, organ isat ions must move quick ly to use their k nowledge in productive ways. In add ition, organisations must build routines that facilitate t he d i ff usion of local k nowledge t h roughout t he organ isat ion for use ever y where t hat it has va lue. 8 3 Orga n isat ions a re better able to do t hese t h i ngs when t hey have strategic flexibility.

St rateg ic flex ibi l it y is a set of capabi l it ies used to respond to va r ious demands and opportunities existing in a dynamic and uncertain competitive env i ron ment. Thus, st rateg ic flex ibility involves coping w it h u ncer tainty and its accompanying risks.8 4 Organisations should tr y to develop strategic flex ibility in all a reas of t hei r operat ions. However, t hose work ing w it h in orga n isat ions to develop st rateg ic flex ibi l it y shou ld u ndersta nd t hat t he task is not easy, largely because of iner tia that can build up over time. A n organisation’s focus and past core competencies may actually slow the rate of change and its aptitude for strategic flexibility.85

To be st rateg ica l ly f le x ible on a cont i nu i ng basis, a nd to ga i n t he competitive benefits of such flex ibility, an organisation has to develop the capacity to learn. Continuous learning provides the organisation with new and up-to-date skill sets that allow it to adapt to its environment as it encounters changes.86 Organisations capable of rapidly and broadly applying what they have lear ned ex hibit the strategic flex ibility and the capacity to change in ways that will increase the probability of successfully dealing with uncertain, hy percompetitive environments.

The I/O model of above-average returns The exter nal env ironment has been v iewed histor ically as the pr imar y deter minant of strategies that organ isations selected to be successf ul.87 In add ition, lead ing organ isations believe t hat t he exter nal environment rather than the internal organisation is the strongest influence on the choice of strategy. The industrial organisation model of above-average retur ns explains the exter nal environment’s dominant influence on an organisation’s strategic actions. The model specifies that the industr y, or segment of an industr y, in which a company chooses to compete has a stronger in fluence on performance than do the choices managers make inside their organ isations. 8 8 The organ isation’s per for mance is believed to be determined primarily by a range of industr y properties, including economies of scale, barriers to market ent r y, d iversi fication, product d i fferentiation and t he deg ree of concent ration of organ isations in t he industry.89 We examine these industry characteristics in Chapter 2.

G rou nded i n econom ics, t he I /O mode l ha s fou r u nde rly i ng a ssu mpt ion s. Fi rst , t he e x te r na l env i ron ment is assumed to impose pressu res and const raints t hat deter m ine t he st rategies t hat would result in above-average retu r ns. Second, most organ isations competing w it h in an indust r y or w it h in a

strategic flexibility a set of capabilities used to respond to various demands and opportunities existing in a dynamic and uncertain competitive environment

The pricing landscape of ISPs evolves based upon the advent of streaming video and the increased use of iPads and other tablet and mobile devices.

Source: iStockphoto/hocus-focus

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seg ment of t hat indust r y a re assu med to cont rol sim ila r st rategically relevant resou rces and to pu rsue sim ila r st rategies in light of t hose resou rces. Th ird, resou rces used to implement st rategies a re assumed to be h ig h ly mobi le ac ross orga n isat ion s, so a ny resou rce d i f ferences t hat m ig ht develop bet ween organ isations w ill be shor t-lived. Fou r t h, organ isational decision ma kers a re assu med to be rational and committed to acting in the organisation’s best interests, as shown by their profit-maximising behaviours.90 The I/O model challenges organisations to find the most attractive industr y in which to compete. Because most orga n isat ions a re assu med to have si m i la r va luable resou rces t hat a re mobi le across compa n ies, t heir per for mance generally can be increased on ly when t hey operate in t he indust r y w it h t he h ighest prof it potential and lear n how to use their resources to implement the strateg y required by the industr y’s st r uctu ral cha racter istics.91

The five forces model of competition is an analy tical tool used to assist organisations find the industr y that is the most attractive for them. The model (explained in Chapter 2) encompasses several variables and tries to capture the complexity of competition. The five forces model suggests that an industry’s profitability (i.e. its rate of return on invested capital relative to its cost of capital) is a function of interactions among five forces: suppliers, buyers, competitive rivalr y among organisations cur rently in the industr y, product substitutes, and potential entrants to the industr y.92

Organisations use the f ive forces model to identif y the attractiveness of an industr y (as measured by its prof itability potential) as well as the most advantageous position for the organisation to take in that industry, given the industry’s structural characteristics.93 Typically, the model suggests that organisations may ear n above-average retur ns by producing either standard ised goods or ser v ices at costs below those of compet itors (a cost leadersh ip st rateg y) or by produci ng d if ferent iated goods or ser v ices for wh ich customers are w illing to pay a pr ice premium (a d ifferentiation strateg y). (Cost leadership and product d if ferent iat ion st rateg ies a re d iscussed i n Chapter 4.) Operat i ng i n a n u natt ract ive i ndust r y does not mean prof its cannot be made. The fact that ‘the fast food industr y is becoming a “zero-sum industr y” as companies battle for the same pool of customers’94 suggests that fast-food giant McDonald’s is competing in a relatively unattractive industry. However, by focusing on product innovations and enhancing existing facilities while buy ing proper ties in d ifferent global markets at attractive pr ices to selectively build new stores, McDona ld’s is posit ioned i n t he fast-food (or qu ick-ser v ice) restau ra nt i ndust r y to ea r n above- average retur ns. There may be bumps in the road of prof it, but McDonald’s has demonstrated that it can change and succeed.

A s show n i n Fig u re 1. 2 , t he I/O model suggests t hat above -average ret u r n s a re ea r ned when organ isations are able to effectively study the exter nal env iron ment as t he foundation for identif y ing a n at t ract ive i ndust r y a nd i mplement i ng t he appropr iate st rateg y. For exa mple, i n some i ndust r ies, organisations can reduce competitive rivalry and erect barriers to entry by forming joint ventures. Because of these outcomes, the joint ventures increase profitability in the industr y.95 Companies that develop or acquire the internal skills needed to implement strategies required by the external environment are likely to succeed, while those that do not are likely to fail.96 Hence, this model suggests that returns are determined pr i ma r ily by ex ter na l cha racter ist ics rat her t ha n by t he orga n isat ion’s u n ique i nter na l resou rces a nd capabilities.

Resea rch fi nd i ngs suppor t t he I/O model i n t hat approx i mately 20 per cent of a n orga n isat ion’s profitability is explained by the industry in which it chooses to compete. However, this research also shows t hat 36 per cent of t he va r ia nce i n profitability ca n be att r ibuted to t he orga n isat ion’s cha racter ist ics a nd act ions.97 These fi nd i ngs suggest t hat t he ex ter na l env i ron ment a nd a n orga n isat ion’s resou rces, capabilities, core competencies and competitive advantages (see Chapter 3) influence its ability to achieve strategic competitiveness and earn above-average returns.

As shown in Figure 1.2, the I/O model assumes that an organisation’s strategy is a set of commitments and actions flowing from the characteristics of the industr y in which it has decided to compete.

T he resou rce-based model, d iscussed nex t, ta kes a d i fferent v iew of t he major i n fluences on a n organisation’s choice of strateg y.

16 PART 1: STRATEGIC MANAGEMENT INPUTS

The resource-based model of above-average returns T he resou rce-based model assu mes t hat each orga n isat ion is a col lec t ion of u n ique resou rces a nd capabilities. The uniqueness of its resources and capabilities is the basis of an organisation’s strateg y and its ability to earn above-average returns.98

Resources are inputs into an organisation’s production process, such as capital equipment, the skills of individual employees, patents, finances and talented managers. In general, an organisation’s resources are classified into three categories: physical, human and organisational capital. Described fully in Chapter 3, resources are either tangible or intangible in nature.

I nd iv idua l resou rces a lone may not y ield a compet it ive adva ntage. 9 9 I n fac t, resou rces have a greater likelihood of being a source of competitive advantage when they are formed into a capability. A capability is the capacity for a set of resources to perform a task or an activity in an integrative manner. Capabilities evolve over time and must be managed dynamically in pursuit of above-average returns.10 0 Core competencies are resources and capabilities that ser ve as a source of competitive advantage for an organisation over its rivals. Core competencies are often visible in the form of organisational functions.

resources inputs into an organisation’s production process, such as capital equipment, the skills of individual employees, patents, finances and talented managers

capability the capacity for a set of resources to perform a task or an activity in an integrative manner

core competencies capabilities that serve as a source of competitive advantage for an organisation over its rivals

1 Study the external environment, especially the industry environment.

2 Locate an industry with high potential for above-average returns.

3 Identify the strategy called for by the attractive industry to earn above-average returns.

4 Develop or acquire assets and skills needed to implement the strategy.

5 Use the organisation’s strength (its developed or acquired assets and skills) to implement the strategy.

The external environment • The general environment • The industry environment • The competitor environment

An attractive industry An industry whose structural characteristics suggest above-average returns

Strategy formulation Selection of a strategy linked with above-average returns in a particular industry

Strategy implementation Selection of strategic actions linked with effective implementation of the chosen strategy

Superior returns Earning of above-average returns

Assets and skills Assets and skills required to implement a chosen strategy

Figure 1.2 The I/O model of above-average returns

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For example, Apple’s R&D function is one of its core competencies. A mazon’s distribution function is also considered a core competency. There is little doubt that the ability to produce innovative new products that are perceived as valuable in the marketplace is a core competence for Apple, as suggested in the earlier ‘Strategic focus’ feature.

According to the resource-based model, differences in an organisation’s performances across time are due primarily to its unique resources and capabilities rather than the industry’s structural characteristics. This model also assumes that an organisation acquires different resources and develops unique capabilities based on how it combines and uses the resources; that resources and cer tain capabilities are not highly mobile across organisations; and that the differences in resources and capabilities are the basis of competitive advantage.101 Through continued use, capabilities become stronger and more difficult for competitors to understand and imitate. As a source of competitive advantage, a capability ‘should be neither so simple that it is highly imitable, nor so complex that it defies internal steering and control’.102

The resou rce-based model of super ior retu r ns is show n in Fig u re 1.3. Th is model suggests t hat t he strategy the organisation chooses should allow it to use its competitive advantages in an attractive industry (the I/O model is used to identify an attractive industr y).

1 Identify the organisation’s resources. Study its strengths and weaknesses compared with those of competitors.

2 Determine the organisation’s capabilities. What do the capabilities allow the organisation to do better than its competitors?

3 Determine the potential of the organisation’s resources and capabilities in terms of a competitive advantage.

4 Locate an attractive industry.

5 Select a strategy that best allows the organisation to utilise its resources and capabilities relative to opportunities in the external environment.

Superior returns Earning of above-average returns

Strategy formulation and implementation Strategic actions taken to earn above-average returns

An attractive industry An industry with opportunities that can be exploited by the organisation’s resources and capabilities

Competitive advantage Ability of an organisation to outperform its rivals

Resources Inputs into an organisation’s production process

Capability Capacity of an integrated set of resources to integratively perform a task or activity

Figure 1.3 The resource-based model of above average returns

Not all of an organisation’s resources and capabilities have the potential to be the foundation for a compet it ive adva ntage. Th is potent ia l is rea lised when resou rces a nd capabi lit ies a re va luable, ra re, costly to imitate and non-substitutable.103 Resources are valuable when they allow an organisation to take advantage of opportunities or neutralise threats in its external environment. They are rare when possessed

18 PART 1: STRATEGIC MANAGEMENT INPUTS

by few (if any) current and potential competitors. Resources are costly to imitate when other organisations either cannot obtain them or are at a cost disadvantage in obtaining them compared with the organisation that already possesses them. A nd they are non-substitutable when they have no structural equivalents. Many resources can either be imitated or substituted over time. Therefore, it is d i fficult to achieve and sustain a competitive advantage based on resources alone.104 Individual resources are often integrated to produce integrated configurations in order to build capabilities. These capabilities are more likely to have these four attributes.105 W hen these four criteria are met, however, resources and capabilities become core competencies.

A s noted prev iously, resea rc h shows t hat bot h t he i ndust r y env i ron ment a nd a n orga n isat ion’s i nter na l assets a f fect t hat orga n isat ion’s per for ma nce over t i me.10 6 T hus, to for m a v ision a nd m ission, a nd subsequent ly to select one or more st rateg ies a nd deter m i ne how to i mplement t hem, orga n isat ions use bot h t he I/O a nd resou rce-based models.107 I n fact, t hese models complement each ot her i n t hat one (I/O) focuses outside t he orga n isat ion wh i le t he ot her (resou rce-based) focuses i nside t he orga n isat ion. Ne x t, we d isc u ss t he for m i ng of  t he orga n isat ion’s v ision a nd m ission : t he ac t ion s ta ken a f ter t he organisation understands the realities of its exter nal env iron ment (Chapter 2) and inter nal organisation (Chapter 3).

Vision and mission A f ter st udy i ng t he ex ter na l env i ron ment a nd t he i nter na l env i ron ment, t he orga n isat ion has t he information it needs to form its vision and mission (see Figure 1.1). Stakeholders (those who affect or are affected by an organisation’s performance, as explained later in the chapter) learn a great deal about an organisation by studying its vision and mission. Indeed, a key pur pose of vision and mission statements is to inform stakeholders of what the organisation is, and what it seeks to accomplish in line with its strategic direction.

Vision Vision is a picture of what the organisation wants to be and, in broad terms, what it wants to ultimately achieve.108 A vision statement ar ticulates the ideal description of an organisation and gives shape to its intended future. In other words, a vision statement points the organisation in the direction of where it would like to be in the years to come.109 An effective vision stretches and challenges people as well. Carmine Gallo, in her book about Steve Jobs, Apple’s phenomenally successful CEO, argues that one of the reasons Apple is so innovative was Jobs’ vision for the company. She suggests that he thought bigger than, and differently from, most people – she describes it as ‘putting a dent in the universe’. To be innovative, she explains that one has to think differently about their products and customers – ‘sell dreams not products’ – and differently about the story to ‘create great expectations’.110 Interestingly, many new entrepreneurs are highly optimistic when they develop their ventures.111

It is also impor tant to note that vision statements reflect an organisation’s values and aspirations and are intended to capture the heart and mind of each employee and, hopefully, many of its other stakeholders. A n orga n isat ion’s v ision tends to be endu r i ng, wh ile its m ission ca n cha nge w it h new env i ron mental cond it ions. A v ision statement tends to be relat ively shor t a nd concise, ma k ing it easily remembered. Examples of vision statements include the following:

Our vision is to be the world’s best quick service restaurant.112

McDonald’s

vision a picture of what the organisation wants to be and, in broad terms, what it wants to ultimately achieve

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The Red Cross, born of a desire to bring assistance without discrimination to the wounded on the battlefield, endeavors – in its international and national capacity – to prevent and alleviate human suffering wherever it may be found. Its purpose is to protect life and health and to ensure respect for the human being.113

The Red Cross

We aim to be the airline of choice for customers with specific needs, by providing a travel experience that is comfortable and hassle free, whilst ensuring the safety of passengers and our staff.114

Qantas

As an organisation’s most important and prominent strategic leader, the CEO is responsible for working with others to form the organisation’s vision. Experience shows that the most effective vision statement results when the CEO involves a host of stakeholders (e.g. other top-level managers, employees working i n d i fferent pa r ts of t he orga n isat ion, suppl iers a nd customers) to develop it. In add it ion, to help t he organisation reach its desired future state, a vision statement should be clearly tied to the conditions in the organisation’s external environment and internal organisation. Moreover, the decisions and actions of those involved with developing the vision, especially the CEO and the other top-level managers, must be consistent with that vision.

Mission The vision is the foundation for the organisation’s mission. A mission specifies the business or businesses in which the organisation intends to compete and the customers it intends to ser ve.115 The organisation’s m ission is more concrete t han its v ision. However, sim ila r to t he v ision, a m ission should establish an organisation’s individuality and should be inspiring and relevant to all stakeholders.116 Together, the vision a nd m ission prov ide t he fou ndat ion t hat t he orga n isat ion needs to choose a nd implement one or more strategies. The probability of forming an effective mission increases when employees have a strong sense of the ethical standards that guide their behaviours as they work to help the organisation reach its vision.117 Thus, business ethics are a vital par t of the organisation’s discussions to decide what it wants to become (its vision) as well as who it intends to ser ve and how it desires to ser ve those individuals and groups (its mission).118

Even though the final responsibility for forming the organisation’s mission rests with the CEO, they and other top-level managers often involve more people in developing the mission. The main reason is that the mission deals more directly with product markets and customers, and middle- and first-level managers and other employees have more direct contact with customers and the markets in which they are ser ved. McDonald’s mission statement, for example, flows from its vision of being the world’s best quick-ser vice restaurant:

Be the best employer for our people in each community around the world; deliver operational excellence to our customers in each of our restaurants.119

McDonald’s

Some say that v ision and mission statements prov ide little value. One exper t believes: ‘Most v ision statements are either too vag ue, too broad in scope, or r idd led w ith superlatives’.120 Clearly, v ision and mission statements that are poorly developed do not provide the direction an organisation needs to take appropr iate st rateg ic act ions. St i l l, as show n i n Fig u re 1.1, a n orga n isat ion’s v ision a nd m ission a re critical aspects of the strategic inputs required to engage in strategic actions that help to achieve strategic

mission specifies the business or businesses in which the organisation intends to compete and the customers it intends to serve

STRATEGY NOW

Red Cross’s sustainability vision

20 PART 1: STRATEGIC MANAGEMENT INPUTS

competitiveness and earn above-average returns. Therefore, organisations must accept the challenge of forming effective vision and mission statements.

Stakeholders Ever y orga n isat ion i nvolves a system of pr i ma r y sta keholder g roups w it h whom it establ ishes a nd manages relationships.121 Stakeholders are the individuals, groups and organisations who may affect the organ isation’s v ision and m ission, who are a ffected by t he st rategic outcomes ach ieved, and who have en forceable clai ms on t he orga n isat ion’s per for ma nce.122 Clai ms on a n orga n isat ion’s per for ma nce a re enforced through the stakeholders’ ability to withhold participation essential to the organisation’s survival, competitiveness and profitability.123 Stakeholders continue to support an organisation when its performance meets or exceeds their expectations.124 A lso, research suggests that organisations that effectively manage stakeholder relationships outperform those that do not. Stakeholder relationships therefore can be managed to be a source of competitive advantage.125

A lthough organisations have dependency relationships with their stakeholders, they are not equally dependent on all stakeholders at all times.126 As a consequence, not ever y stakeholder has the same level of in fluence.127 The more critical and valued a stakeholder’s par ticipation, the greater an organisation’s dependence on it. Greater dependence, in tu r n, g ives t he sta keholder more potent ial in fluence over a n organisation’s commitments, decisions and actions. Managers must find ways to either accommodate or insulate the organisation from the demands of stakeholders controlling critical resources.128

Classifications of stakeholders The par ties involved w ith an organisation’s operations can be separated into at least four groups.129 As show n i n Fig u re 1.4, t here a re t he capita l ma rket sta keholders (sha reholders a nd t he major suppl iers of a n orga n isat ion’s capita l), t he product ma rket sta keholders (t he orga n isat ion’s pr i ma r y customers, suppliers, host communities and unions representing the workforce), the organisational stakeholders (all of an organisation’s employees, including both non-managerial and managerial personnel) and the natural environment (as represented by activist groups).

stakeholders the individuals and groups who can affect and are affected by the strategic outcomes achieved and who have enforceable claims on an organisation’s performance

People who are affected by an organisation’s performance and who have claims on its performance

Capital market stakeholders • Shareholders • Major suppliers of capital (e.g. banks)

Product market stakeholders • Primary customers • Suppliers • Host communities • Unions

Organisational stakeholders • Employees • Managers • Non-managers

The natural world • Natural resources • Climate • Governments and environmental groups

Stakeholders

Figure 1.4 The four stakeholder groups

Each sta keholder g roup ex pects t hose ma k ing st rategic decisions in an organ isat ion to prov ide t he leadership through which its valued objectives will be reached.130 The objectives of the various stakeholder groups often differ from one another, sometimes placing those involved with an organisation’s strategic

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management process in situations where trade-offs have to be made. The most obvious stakeholders are shareholders: individuals and groups who have invested capital in an organisation in the expectation of earning a positive return on their investments. These stakeholders’ rights are grounded in laws governing private proper ty and private enter prise.

In contrast to shareholders, another group of stakeholders – the organisation’s customers – prefer that investors receive a minimum return on their investments. Customers could have their interests maximised when the quality and reliability of an organisation’s products are improved, but without high prices. High returns to customers, therefore, might come at the expense of lower returns for capital market stakeholders.

Because of potent ial con fl icts, each organ isat ion must ca ref ully manage its sta keholders. Fi rst, an organisation must thoroughly identify and understand all important stakeholders. Second, it must prioritise them in case it cannot satisfy all of them. Power is the most critical criterion in prioritising stakeholders. Other criteria might include the urgency of satisfying each par ticular stakeholder group and the degree of impor tance of each to the organisation.131

When the organisation earns above-average returns, the challenge of effectively managing stakeholder relat ionsh ips is lessened substa nt ia lly. Wit h t he capabilit y a nd flex ibilit y prov ided by above-average ret u r ns, a n orga n isat ion ca n more easi ly sat isf y mu lt iple sta keholders si mu lta neously. W hen t he organisation ear ns only average retur ns, it is unable to ma x imise the interests of all stakeholders. The objective then becomes one of at least minimally satisfying each stakeholder.

Trade-off decisions are made in light of how impor tant the suppor t of each stakeholder group is to the organisation. For example, environmental groups may be ver y impor tant to organisations in the energ y industry but less important to professional service organisations.132 An organisation earning below-average returns does not have the capacity to minimally satisfy all stakeholders. The managerial challenge in this case is to make trade-offs that minimise the amount of suppor t lost from stakeholders. Societal values also in fluence the general weightings allocated among the four stakeholder groups shown in Figure 1.4. A lthough all the groups are ser ved by organisations in the major industrialised nations, the priorities in their ser vice var y because of cultural differences. Next, we present additional details about each of the major stakeholder groups.

Capital market stakeholders Sha reholders a nd lenders bot h ex pect a n orga n isat ion to preser ve a nd en ha nce t he wea lt h t hey have entr usted to it. The returns they expect are commensurate with the degree of risk accepted with those investments (i.e. lower returns are expected with low-risk investments while higher returns are expected w it h h igh-r isk i nvest ments). I nst it ut iona l i nvestors (e.g. supera n nuat ion f u nd s) of ten a re w i l l i ng to sell their share in the f und if the retur ns are not what they desire, or to take actions to improve the organisation’s performance, such as pressuring top managers to improve the governance oversight by the board of d irectors. Some institutions ow ning major shares of an organisation’s sharehold ing may have con flicting views about the actions needed, which can be challenging for managers. This is because some may wa nt a n i ncrease i n retu r ns i n t he shor t ter m, wh ile ot hers may desi re a focus on bu ild i ng long- term competitiveness.133 Managers may have to balance their desires with other shareholders or prioritise the impor tance of the institutional ow ners w ith d i fferent goals. Clearly, shareholders who hold a large share parcel (sometimes referred to as large-block shareholders – see Chapter 10 for more explanation) are influential, especially in the determination of the organisation’s capital structure (i.e. the amount of equity versus the amount of debt used). Often, large shareholders prefer that the organisation minimise its use of debt because of the risk, its cost and the possibility that debt holders have fi rst call on the organisation’s assets in case of default over the shareholders.134

Product market stakeholders Some might think that product market stakeholders (customers, suppliers and unions) share few common interests. However, all these groups can benefit as organisations engage in competitive battles. For example,

22 PART 1: STRATEGIC MANAGEMENT INPUTS

depending on product and industr y characteristics, marketplace competition may result in lower product pr ices bei ng cha rged to a n orga n isat ion’s customers a nd h igher pr ices bei ng pa id to its suppl iers (t he organisation might be willing to pay higher supplier prices to ensure deliver y of the ty pes of goods and ser vices that are linked with its competitive success).135

Customers (a lso k now n as ‘clients’ i n ma ny not-for-profit orga n isat ions), as sta keholders, dema nd reliable products (or ser vices) at the lowest possible prices. Suppliers seek loyal customers who are willing to pay the highest sustainable prices for the goods and ser vices they receive. A lthough all product market stakeholders are impor tant, without customers the other product market stakeholders are of little value. Therefore, the organisation must tr y to learn about and understand cur rent and potential customers.136

Organisational stakeholders Employees – the organisational stakeholders – expect their place of employ ment to prov ide a dy namic, stimulating and rewarding work environment. Employees are usually satisfied working for an organisation that is growing and actively developing their skills, especially those skills required to be effective team members and to meet or exceed global work standards. Employees who learn how to use new knowledge productively are cr itical to organ isational success. In a collective sense, the education and sk ills of an organisation’s workforce are competitive weapons affecting strateg y implementation and organisational per for ma nce.137 St rateg ic leaders a re u lt i mately responsible for ser v i ng t he needs of orga n isat iona l sta keholders on a day-to-day basis. In fact, to be successf ul, st rategic leaders must effect ively use t he organisation’s human capital.138 The impor tance of human capital to their success is possibly why outside directors are more likely than inside strategic leaders to propose downsizing, with insiders more likely to use preventative cost-cutting measures and seek to protect incumbent employees.139 A highly important means of building employee skills for the global competitive landscape is through international assignments. The process of managing expatriate employees and helping them build knowledge can have significant effects over time on the organisation’s ability to compete in global markets.140

The natural world and corporate social responsibility (CSR) The natural world is increasingly impor tant as a stakeholder because of the vital issue of the depletion of nat u re resu lt i ng f rom hu ma n ac t ions. I n add it ion, t he presence of wel l- orga n ised, wel l-f u nded environmental groups representing the interests of nature means that organisations should be very careful about their impact on the environment if they do not want legal challenges and brand damage to occur. This is clearly evident in resource extraction industries such as coal and iron ore, where great care has to be taken to respect nature if projects are to proceed; but it is also evident in retailing industries where major companies such as IK EA are now concerned about ensuring the sustainable sourcing of timber because of pressure from consumers.

Accenture (a For tune Global 500 company) in 2020 noted that 65 per cent of global CEOs inter viewed on the topic of seeking responsible leadership agreed that they need to decouple economic growth from the use of natural resources and that: ‘Organisations have the oppor tunity and the obligation to drive grow th in tandem with positive social and environmental outcomes. This star ts with redefining what it means to lead responsibly…’141 In a similar vein, cor porate social responsibility (CSR) has become a major interest and ver y topical as an issue for many global organisations, and a major factor in cor porate governance, which we will explore fur ther later in the chapter. The growing interest in working towards a sustainable society requires a new ty pe of leadership that promotes CSR’s ideals.142 This point provides a natural segue into the topic of strategic leadership.

Strategic leaders Strategic leaders are people located in different areas and levels of the organisation using the strategic management process to select strategic actions that assist the organisation achieve its vision and fulfil

strategic leaders people located in different sections of the organisation using the strategic management process to assist the organisation reach its vision and mission

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its m ission. Rega rd less of t hei r locat ion i n t he orga n isat ion, successf u l st rateg ic leaders a re decisive, committed to nur turing those around them14 3 and committed to assisting the organisation create value for all stakeholder groups.144 In this vein, research evidence suggests that employees who perceive that their CEO is a visionar y leader also believe that the CEO leads the organisation to operate in ways that are consistent with the values of all stakeholder groups, rather than emphasising only the maximising of profits for shareholders. In turn, visionar y leadership helps to obtain extra effor t by employees, thereby achieving enhanced organisational performance.

W hen identif y ing st rategic leaders, most of us tend to thin k of CEOs and other executives. Clearly, these individuals are strategic leaders. In the final analysis, CEOs are responsible for making cer tain their organisation effectively uses the strategic management process. Indeed, the pressure on CEOs to manage st rategically is st ronger t han ever.14 5 However, many ot her people assist in choosing an organ isation’s strateg y and then deter mining the actions for successfully implementing it.146 The main reason is that t he rea l it ies of 21st-cent u r y compet it ion, d iscussed ea rl ier i n t h is chapter (e.g. t he globa l economy, globa lisat ion, rapid tech nolog ica l cha nge, a nd t he i ncreasi ng i mpor ta nce of k nowledge a nd people as sources of competitive advantage), are creating a need for those ‘closest to the action’ to make decisions and determine the actions to be taken.147 The most effective CEOs and executives understand how to delegate strategic responsibilities to people throughout the organisation who in fluence the use of organisational resou rces. Delegat ion also helps to avoid too much manager ial hubr is at t he top and t he problems t h is causes, especially in situations allowing significant managerial discretion.148

Organisational culture a lso a ffec ts st rateg ic leaders a nd t hei r work. I n t u r n, st rateg ic leaders’ decisions and actions shape an organisation’s culture. Organisational culture refers to the complex set of ideologies, symbols and core values that are shared throughout the organisation and that influence how the organisation conducts business. It is the social energy that drives – or fails to drive – the organisation.149 For example, US airline Southwest A irlines is known for having a unique and valuable culture that encourages employees to work hard but also to have fun while doing so. Moreover, its culture entails respect for others – employees and customers alike.

Some organisational cultures are a source of disadvantage or dysfunction. For example, the Australian Pr udent ial Reg ulat ion Aut hor ity (A PR A) released t he Prudential Inquiry into the Commonwealth Bank of Australia (CBA) Final Report in May 2018, noting that it ‘… found a number of prominent cultural themes such as a widespread sense of complacency, a reactive stance in dealing with risks, being insular and not learning from ex per iences and m ista kes, and an overly collegial and collaborat ive work ing env i ron ment wh ich lessened the opportunity for constructive criticism, timely decision-making and a focus on outcomes…’. The Panel recommended that ‘cultural change that moves the dial from reactive and complacent to empowered, challenging and striving for best practice in risk identification and remediation’.150

It is impor tant for strategic leaders to understand, however, that whether the organisation’s culture is functional or dysfunctional, their effectiveness is in fluenced by that culture. The relationship between organisational culture and strategic leaders’ work is reciprocal in that the culture shapes the outcomes of their leadership, while their leadership helps shape an ever-evolving organisational culture.

The work of effective strategic leaders Perhaps not surprisingly, hard work, thorough analyses, a willingness to be candid, a penchant for wanting t he orga n isat ion a nd its people to accomplish more, a nd tenacit y a re prerequ isites for a n i nd iv idua l’s success as a strategic leader.151 In addition, strategic leaders must have a strong strategic orientation while simultaneously embracing change in the dynamic competitive landscape we have discussed.152 In order to deal with this change effectively, strategic leaders must be innovative thinkers and promote innovation i n t hei r orga n isat ion.153 Promot i ng i n novat ion is facilitated by a d iverse execut ive ma nagement tea m representing different ty pes of exper tise and leveraging relationships with external par ties.154 Strategic leaders may best leverage partnerships with external parties and organisations when their organisations are ‘ambidextrous’ – that is, the organisations simultaneously promote exploratory learning of new and unique

organisational culture refers to the complex set of ideologies, symbols and core values that are shared throughout the organisation and that influence how the organisation conducts business

24 PART 1: STRATEGIC MANAGEMENT INPUTS

for ms of k nowledge and ex ploitative lear n ing t hat adds incremental k nowledge to ex isting k nowledge bases, allowing them to better understand and use their existing products.155 In addition, strategic leaders need to have a global mindset, or what some refer to as an ambicultural approach to management.156

In summary, effective strategic leaders provide a vision as the foundation for the organisation’s mission and subsequent choice and use of one or more strategies.

Predicting outcomes of strategic decisions Strategic leaders attempt to predict the outcomes of their decisions before taking efforts to implement them, which is difficult to do. Many decisions that are a par t of the strategic management process are concerned with an uncer tain future and the organisation’s place in that future. As such, managers tr y to predict the effects on the organisation’s profits of strategic decisions that they are considering.157

Mappi ng a n i ndust r y ’s profit pool is somet h i ng st rateg ic leaders ca n do to a nt icipate t he possible outcomes of different decisions and to focus on grow th in profits rather than strictly grow th in revenues. A profit pool entails the total profits earned in an industry at all points along the value chain.158 (We explain the value chain in Chapter 3 and discuss it fur ther in Chapter 4.) A nalysing the profit pool in the industr y may assist an organisation to see something others are unable to see and to understand the primary sources of profits in an industr y. There are four steps to identifying profit pools:

1 define the pool’s boundaries 2 estimate the pool’s overall size 3 estimate the size of the value chain activity in the pool 4 reconcile the calculations. For example, McDonald’s might desire to map the quick-service restaurant industry’s profit pools. First,

McDonald’s would need to define the industr y’s boundaries and, second, estimate its size (which is large, because McDonald’s operates in markets across the globe). The net result of this is that McDonald’s tries to take market share away from competitors such as Hungr y Jack’s or K FC, and grow th is more likely to be in international markets. A rmed with information about its industr y, McDonald’s could then estimate the amount of profit potential in each part of the value chain (step 3). In the quick-ser vice restaurant industr y, marketing campaigns and customer service are likely to be more important sources of potential profits than are inbound logistics activities (see Chapter 3). With an understanding of where the greatest profits are likely to be earned, McDonald’s would then be ready to select the strateg y to use to be successful where the largest profit pools are located in the value chain.159 As this brief discussion shows, profit pools are a potentially usef ul tool to help st rategic leaders recognise the actions to take to increase the likelihood of i ncreasi ng profits. Of cou rse, profits made by a n orga n isat ion a nd i n a n i ndust r y ca n be pa r t ia l ly interdependent with the profits earned in adjacent industries.160 For example, profits earned in the energ y industr y can affect profits in other industries (e.g. airlines). W hen oil prices are high, this can reduce the profits earned in industries that must use a lot of energ y to provide their goods or ser vices.

Ethical dimensions It is impor tant to emphasise t hat, pr ima r ily because t hey a re related to how an organ isat ion interacts w it h its sta keholders, a l most a l l st rateg ic ma nagement process decisions have et h ica l d i mensions.161 Organisational ethics are revealed by an organisation’s culture; that is, an organisation’s decisions are a product of the core values that are shared by most or all of a company’s managers and employees. Especially in the turbulent and often ambiguous competitive landscape of the 21st century, those making decisions as a par t of the strategic management process are challenged to recognise that their decisions affect capital markets, product markets and organisational stakeholders differently, and to regularly evaluate the ethical implications of their decisions.162 Decision makers failing to recognise these realities accept the r isk of placing their organisation at a competitive disadvantage with regard to ethical business practices.163

profit pool entails the total profits earned in an industry at all points along the value chain

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As you w ill d iscover, the st rategic management process exam ined in th is book calls for d isciplined approaches to serve as the foundation for developing a sustainable competitive advantage. These approaches provide the pathway through which organisations will be able to achieve strategic competitiveness and earn above-average returns. Mastery of this strategic management process will effectively assist and guide you and the organisations for which you will choose to work.

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STUDY TOOLS SUMMARY LO1 Organisations use the strategic management process

to achieve strategic competitiveness and earn above- average returns. Strategic competitiveness is achieved when an organisation develops and implements a value-creating strategy. Above-average returns (in excess of what investors expect to earn from other investments with similar levels of risk) provide the foundation needed to simultaneously satisfy all of an organisation’s stakeholders.

LO2 The fundamental nature of competition is different in the current competitive landscape. As a result, those making strategic decisions must adopt a different mindset, one that allows them to learn how to compete in highly turbulent and chaotic environments that produce a great deal of uncertainty. The globalisation of industries and their markets, and rapid and significant technological changes, are the two primary factors contributing to the turbulence of the competitive landscape.

LO3 Organisations use two major models to help develop their vision and mission and then choose one or more strategies in pursuit of strategic competitiveness and above-average returns. The I/O model is used to understand the effects an industry’s characteristics can have on an organisation when deciding on what strategies to use to compete against rivals. The logic supporting the I/O model suggests that above-average returns are earned when the organisation locates an attractive industry, or part of an industry, and successfully implements the strategy dictated by that industry’s characteristics.

LO4 The resource-based model is based on the assumption that the organisation’s unique resources, capabilities and core competencies have a major influence on selecting and using strategies more than does the organisation’s external environment. Above-average

returns are earned when the organisation uses its valuable, rare, costly-to-imitate and non-substitutable resources and capabilities to compete against its rivals in one or more industries.

LO5 Vision and mission are formed to guide the selection of strategies based on the information from the analyses of the organisation’s internal and external environments. Vision is a picture of what the organisation wants to be and, in broad terms, what it wants to ultimately achieve. Flowing from the vision, the mission specifies the business or businesses in which the organisation intends to compete and the customers it intends to serve. Vision and mission provide direction to the organisation and signal important descriptive information to stakeholders.

LO6 Stakeholders are those who can affect, and are affected by, an organisation’s strategic outcomes. Because an organisation is dependent on the continuing support of stakeholders (e.g. shareholders, customers, suppliers, employees, host communities, the natural world), they have enforceable claims on the organisation’s performance.

LO7 Strategic leaders are people located in different areas and levels of an organisation using the strategic management process to help the organisation achieve its vision and fulfil its mission. In general, the CEO is responsible for making certain that their organisation properly uses the strategic management process. The effectiveness of the process is increased when it is grounded in ethical intentions and behaviours. It is important for all strategic leaders – and especially the CEO and other members of the executive team – to conduct thorough analyses of conditions facing the organisation, be candid and consistently honest, and work jointly to select and implement the correct strategies.

KEY TERMS average returns

capability

core competencies

global economy

hypercompetition

mission

organisational culture

profit pool

resources

risk

stakeholders

strategic competitiveness

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strategic flexibility

strategic leaders

strategic management process

strategy

vision

REVIEW QUESTIONS 1. What are the main components of the strategic

management process?

2. Is there any one component of the strategic management process that is more important than others?

3. What are the characteristics of the current competitive landscape? What two factors are the primary drivers of this landscape?

4. According to the I/O model, what should an organisation do to earn above-average returns?

5. What does the resource-based model suggest an organisation should do to earn above-average returns?

6. What are vision and mission? Should all organisations have a vision and mission statement? What is their value for the strategic management process?

7. What are stakeholders? How many primary stakeholder groups could influence an organisation’s decision- making process?

8. What are the three main drivers for strategic leaders?

EXPERIENTIAL EXERCISES

Exercise 1: Stakeholder analysis, strategic planning and strategic leadership Every organisation relies on its own unique bundle of organisational stakeholders. Each one of the relationships between the organisation and its stakeholders is influential in its ability to serve its mission and achieve above-average profits in the for-profit sector, or to create value in the not- for-profit sector. However, there are many ways in which stakeholder management differs between the for-profit and not-for-profit worlds. It is easy to think of a for-profit organisation that has product market stakeholders, such as customers, who can add or subtract their support by their decision about whether or not to purchase the organisation’s products or services. But who is the customer for a not-for-profit, and are the categories of product, market, organisation and capital market stakeholders very different from the for-profit arena? This exercise challenges you to uncover some of the more influential ways in which this is so.

In this exercise, you will be working in teams of approximately four to five students. 1. Conduct a web search for a not-for-profit organisation.

Decide which not-for-profit organisation you would like to analyse. Otherwise consider the Red Cross, Amnesty International, World Wide Fund for Nature (WWF) or Greenpeace.

2. Determine two or three key strategic initiatives of this not-for profit organisation. Most not-for-profits, particularly well-known ones, post their strategic plans on their websites.

3. Now perform an analysis, such as a macro- environmental analysis, and list all known or expected stakeholders for the organisation. You should place them in the context of product, market and organisational stakeholders.

NOTES 1. The big issue is competition. They must be

responsive in all markets. 2. K. Matzler, F. Bailom, M. Anschober & S.

Richardson, 2010, Sustaining corporate success: What drives the top performers? Journal of Business Strategy, 31(5): 4–13.

3. J. McGregor, 2009, Smart management for tough times, Businessweek, http://www. businessweek.com, 12 March.

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127. M. L. Barnett & R. M. Salomon, 2006, Beyond dichotomy: The curvilinear relationship between social responsibility and financial performance, Strategic Management Journal, 27: 1101–22.

128. T. Kuhn, 2008, A communicative theory of the firm: Developing an alternative perspective on intra-organizational power and stakeholder relationships, Organization Studies, 29: 1227–54; L. Vilanova, 2007, Neither shareholder nor stakeholder

management: What happens when firms are run for their short-term salient stakeholder? European Management Journal, 25(2): 146–62.

129. J. L. Murrillo-Luna, C. Garces-Ayerbe & P. Rivera-Torres, 2008, Why do patterns of environmental response differ? A stakeholders’ pressure approach, Strategic Management Journal, 29: 1225–40; R. E. Freeman & J. McVea, 2001, A stakeholder approach to strategic management, in M. A. Hitt, R. E. Freeman & J. S. Harrison (eds), Handbook of Strategic Management, Oxford, UK: Blackwell Publishers, 189–207.

130. R. Boutilier, 2009, Stakeholder Politics: Social Capital, Sustainable Development, and the Corporation, Sheffield, UK: Greenleaf Publishing; C. Caldwell & R. Karri, 2005, Organizational governance and ethical systems: A conventional approach to building trust, Journal of Business Ethics, 58: 249–67.

131. F. G. A. de Bakker & F. den Hond, 2008, Introducing the politics of stakeholder influence, Business & Society, 47: 8–20.

132. Darnell, Henrique & Sadorsky, Adopting proactive environmental strategy; P. Berrone & L. R. Gomez-Meija, 2009, Environmental performance and executive compensation: An integrated agency–institutional perspective, Academy of Management Journal, 52: 103–26.

133. B. L. Connelly, L. Tihanyi, S. T. Certo & M. A. Hitt, 2010, Marching to the beat of different drummers: The influence of institutional owners on competitive actions, Academy of Management Journal, 53: 723–42.

134. X. Zuoping, 2010, Large shareholders, legal institution and capital structure decision, Nankai Business Review International, 1: 59–86.

135. L. Pierce, 2009, Big losses in ecosystems niches: How core firm decisions drive complementary product shakeouts, Strategic Management Journal, 30: 323–47; B. A. Neville & B. Menguc, 2006, Stakeholder multiplicity: Toward an understanding of the interactions between stakeholders, Journal of Business Ethics, 66: 377–91.

136. O. D. Fjeldstad & A. Sasson, 2010, Membership matters: On the value of being embedded in customer networks, Journal of Management Studies, 47: 944–66.

137. D. A. Ready, L. A. Hill & J. A. Conger, 2008, Winning the race for talent in emerging markets, Harvard Business Review, 86(11): 62–70; A. M. Grant, J. E. Dutton & B. D. Rosso, 2008, Giving commitment: Employee support programs and the prosocial sensemaking process, Academy of Management Journal, 51: 898–918.

138. M. A. Hitt, K. T. Haynes & R. Serpa, 2010, Strategic leadership for the 21st century, Business Horizons, 53: 437–44.

139. N. Abe & S. Shimizutani, 2007, Employment policy and corporate governance: An

32 PART 1: STRATEGIC MANAGEMENT INPUTS

empirical comparison of the stakeholder and the profit-maximization model, Journal of Comparative Economics, 35: 346–68.

140. R. Takeuchi, 2010, A critical review of expatriate adjustment research through a multiple stakeholder view: Progress, emerging trends and prospects, Journal of Management, 36: 1040–64.

141. E. Shook, 2020, Seeking responsible leadership, Accenture, https://www. accenture.com/us-en/insights/consulting/ responsible-leadership, 20 January.

142. K. Backhouse & M. Wickham, 2020, Corporate governance, boards of directors and corporate social responsibility: The Australian context. Corporate Ownership & Control, 17(4), 60–71, http://doi. org/10.22495/cocv17i4art5.

143. J. Welch & S. Welch, 2009, An employee bill of rights, Businessweek, 16 March, 72.

144. Hitt, Haynes & Serpa, 2010, Strategic leadership for the 21st century; J. P. Jansen, D. Vera & M. Crossan, 2008, Strategic leadership for exploration and exploitation: The moderating role of environmental dynamism, The Leadership Quarterly, 20: 5–18.

145. N. Byrnes, 2009, Executives on a tightrope, Businessweek, 19 January, 43; D. C. Hambrick, 2007, Upper echelons theory: An update, Academy of Management Review, 32: 334–9.

146. J. C. Camillus, 2008, Strategy as a wicked problem, Harvard Business Review, 86(5): 99–106; A. Priestland & T. R. Hanig, 2005, Developing first-level managers, Harvard Business Review, 83(6): 113–20.

147. R. J. Harrington & A. K. Tjan, 2008, Transforming strategy one customer at a time, Harvard Business Review, 86(3): 62–72; R. T. Pascale & J. Sternin, 2005, Your company’s secret change agent, Harvard Business Review, 83(5): 72–81.

148. J. Li & Y. Tang, 2010, CEO hubris and firm risk taking in China: The moderating role of managerial discretion, Academy of

Management Journal, 53: 45–68; Y. L. Doz & M. Kosonen, 2007, The new deal at the top, Harvard Business Review, 85(6): 98–104.

149. B. Stevens, 2008, Corporate ethical codes: Effective instruments for influencing behavior, Journal of Business Ethics, 78: 601–9; D. Lavie, 2006, The competitive advantage of interconnected firms: An extension of the resource-based view, Academy of Management Review, 31: 638–58.

150. APRA, 2018, Media releases, APRA releases CBA Prudential Inquiry Final Report and accepts enforceable undertaking from CBA, https://www.apra.gov.au/ news-and-publications/apra-releases- cba-prudential-inquiry-final-report-and- accepts-enforceable, 1 May. © Australian Prudential Regulation Authority (APRA), 2018 © Commonwealth of Australia CC BY 3.0 Attribution https://creativecommons. org/licenses/by/3.0/au/

151. H. Ibarra & O. Obodru, 2009, Women and the vision thing, Harvard Business Review, 87(1): 62–70; M. Crossan, D. Vera & L. Nanjad, 2008, Transcendent leadership: Strategic leadership in dynamic environments, The Leadership Quarterly, 19: 569–81.

152. R. Shambaugh, 2011, Leading in today’s economy: The transformational leadership model, in What’s Next 2011, New York: McGraw-Hill Professional, e-book.

153. Shambaugh, 2011, Leading in today’s economy; A. Leiponen & C. E. Helfat, 2010, Innovation objectives, knowledge sources and the benefits of breadth, Strategic Management Journal, 31: 224–36.

154. T. Buyl, C. Boone, W. Hendriks & P. Matthyssens, 2011, Top management team functional diversity and firm performance: The moderating role of CEO characteristics, Journal of Management Studies, 48: 151–77; S. Nadkarni & P. Hermann, 2010, CEO personality, strategic flexibility and firm performance: The case of Indian business

process outsourcing industry, Academy of Management Journal, 53: 1050–73.

155. Q. Cao, Z. Simsek & H. Zhang, 2010, Modelling the joint impact of the CEO and the TMT on organizational ambidexterity, Journal of Management Studies, 47: 1272–96.

156. M.-J. Chen & D. Miller, 2010, West meets East: Toward an ambicultural approach to management, Academy of Management Perspectives, 24(4): 17–37.

157. Y.-C. Tang & F.-M. Liou, 2010, Does firm performance reveal its own causes? The role of Bayesian inference, Strategic Management Journal, 31: 39–57.

158. O. Gadiesh & J. L. Gilbert, 1998, Profit pools: A fresh look at strategy, Harvard Business Review, 76(3): 139–47.

159. C. Zook, 2007, Finding your next core business, Harvard Business Review, 85(4): 66–75; M. J. Epstein & R. A. Westbrook, 2001, Linking actions to profits in strategic decision making, Sloan Management Review, 42(3): 39–49.

160. M. J. Lenox, S. F. Rockart & A. Y. Lewin, 2010, Does interdependency affect firm and industry profitability? An empirical test, Strategic Management Journal, 31: 121–39.

161. Y. Luo, 2008, Procedural fairness and interfirm cooperation in strategic alliances, Strategic Management Journal, 29: 27–46; S. J. Reynolds, F. C. Schultz & D. R. Hekman, 2006, Stakeholder theory and managerial decision-making: Constraints and implications of balancing stakeholder interests, Journal of Business Ethics, 64: 285– 301; L. K. Trevino & G. R. Weaver, 2003, Managing Ethics in Business Organizations, Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.

162. D. Pastoriza, M. A. Arino & J. E. Ricart, 2008, Ethical managerial behavior as an antecedent of organizational social capital, Journal of Business Ethics, 78: 329–41.

163. B. W. Heineman Jr, 2007, Avoiding integrity land mines, Harvard Business Review, 85(4): 100–8.

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33

34

The external environment: opportunities, threats, industry competition and competitor analysis

CH AP

TE R

2

Studying this chapter should provide you with the strategic management knowledge needed to: LO1 define and describe the general environment, the industry environment and the

competitor environment LO2 explain the importance of analysing and understanding the organisation’s

external environment, and discuss the four activities of the external environmental analysis process

LO3 outline and describe the seven segments of the general environment LO4 identify the five competitive forces and interpret industry analyses to determine

an industry’s profit or surplus potential LO5 define strategic groups and describe their influence on the organisation LO6 describe what organisations need to know about their competitors, competitor

analysis and ethical considerations.

Learning Objectives

British Petroleum (BP) has had experience of disasters in drilling; however, because of the demand for oil and issues with supply from the Middle East, there is continuing investigation and exploitation of oil reserves that are difficult to access. The Deepwater Horizon spill by BP in the Gulf of Mexico in April 2010 was the largest accidental offshore spill in history, at 206 million gallons. One of the main challenges for the organisation’s strategic leadership was to understand what the external environment’s effects were on the organisation and to predict how its future strategic actions might lead to success.

The Gulf disaster has not deterred BP. It still explores in difficult situations. In 2016, BP was planning to go ahead with a controversial US$1 billion-plus frontier exploration campaign in the Great Australian Bight, off the coast of South Australia, in the face of mounting concern from environmental groups, and despite a tumbling oil price that has deterred other explorers around the country from drilling. US giant Chevron also has a permit to drill in the region, as does Santos, a local oil company. Following the Deepwater Horizon accident, BP recovered to grow as a better-disciplined organisation, one that delivered consistently for 12 consecutive quarters. BP made a profit of US$10 billion in 2019 and operating cash flow was strong at US$26 billion for the year.

BP’s head of exploration for Asia-Pacific, Bryan Ritchie, said that while the oil company has cut back on exploration in some regions, it wants to go forward in Australia because of the large potential oil price on offer. However, the company is spreading costs, and risk, by selling a further stake in the venture, intending to cut its 70 per cent holding to 40 or 50 per cent.

The project is aiming to drill 2.5 km underwater. It will cost US$600 million for four wells, and in addition BP is having a US$755 million drilling rig built in South Korea. The financial risks are huge. Peter Owen, the South Australian director of the Wilderness Society, pointed to huge community concern about the drilling plans: ‘We don’t need a Gulf of Mexico disaster in the Great Australian Bight’. The Gulf catastrophe will clearly be easy to use as part of a media campaign by environmentalists.

In 2020, the Chair of BP, Helge Lund, noted to shareholders that ‘We enter a new decade with a new

company purpose: to reimagine energy for people and our planet.’ In 2019, the BP board of directors recommended that shareholders support a special resolution requisitioned by Climate Action 100+ on climate change disclosures.

The economic segment of the general environment will continue to produce demand for energy, especially with the rise of emerging markets such as China and India; thus, exploration for hydrocarbon products will continue, at least while social forces stay favourable to this. The Global Energy Review 2020 by the International Energy Association (IEA) noted that the global energy demand decreased by 3.8 per cent in the first quarter of 2020. Globally, the demand for coal fell by approximately 8 per cent due to three reasons: first, China – a coal-based economy – was hit the hardest by the Covid-19 pandemic in the first quarter; second, cheap gas and continued growth in renewable energy elsewhere challenged coal; and, third, mild weather also capped coal use. Oil demand also dropped by 5 per cent and the impact of the pandemic on gas demand was more moderate, at a 2 per cent decrease. Despite these factors, demand for energy will continue and the pressure to use alternative sources of energy will rise, driven by the sociocultural segment of the environment because of the carbon emissions produced by such hydrocarbons. The value to society of hydrocarbons is that it accelerates development and deployment of clean technologies for transport, industry and power according to the IEA. Government policies could include hydrogen use in national decarbonisation plans, public research and development funding and adopt transmission tariff exemptions for electrolysers.

Technology changes have also affected many companies in this industry. Gas drilling and fracturing (fracking) have dramatically increased gas reserves and may provide a substitute for other CO2 emission- producing resources such as coal. Problems with fracking include the potential effects on water tables, and thus farming, so there is widespread opposition to this technique. The Lock the Gate Alliance in Australia is one example of such farmer-driven activism.

The Arctic is another frontier for exploration, despite the enormous environmental risks of drilling in this fragile ecosystem. BP has worked there in cooperation with the

Drilling for oil: risks and rewards

OPENING CASE STUDY

35CHAPTER 2 THE ExTERnAL EnvIROnmEnT: OPPORTUnITIES, THREATS, InDUSTRy COmPETITIOn AnD COmPETITOR AnALySIS

As described in the opening case, the external environment affects an organisation’s strategic actions.1 For example, BP also sought to expand its oil reser ves by forming joint ventures in Russia with Rosneft Cor poration and in India with Reliance Industries.2 In addition, it is clear that BP’s strategic actions are affected by conditions in other segments of its general environment, such as the political/legal, sociocultural and physical environment segments. As we explain in this chapter, an organisation’s external environment creates both oppor tunities (e.g. the oppor tunity for BP to enter other global markets) and threats (e.g. the possibility that additional regulation in its markets will reduce opportunities to extract oil and gas). Collectively, opportunities and threats affect an organisation’s strategic actions.3

Rega rd less of t he i ndust r y i n wh ich orga n isat ions compete, t he ex ter na l env i ron ment i n fluences organisations as they seek strategic competitiveness and above-average returns. This chapter focuses on how organisations analyse their external environment. The understanding of conditions in its external environment that the organisation gains by analysing that environment is matched with knowledge about

Russian Government–owned company Rosneft. In 2019, BP reported that it had a 19.75 per cent shareholding in Rosneft, one of Russia’s largest oil and gas companies, which has both upstream and downstream operations.

Exxon-Mobil also had a US$700 million deal with Russia, which was eager to proceed because the country needs oil. The prospects are enticing – the Kara Sea has reserves estimated at US$900 billion, exceeding Saudi Arabia’s reserves. But the Exxon-mobil deal came unstuck in mid-2015 because of events in the political sphere, when Western financial sanctions were enacted in response to Russia’s takeover of the Crimean Peninsula.

As these examples demonstrate, assessing the influence of various segments of the external environment is critical in ensuring future success for any organisation. This is especially true for energy organisations, which are part of a global integrated process of extracting energy, refining various products and distributing them around the world. The economic rise of China and India, coupled with the rise of Brazil as an energy power, and Russia’s energy reserves, is a significant influence in world markets. Balancing this are increasingly high-profile environmental groups aided by the power and reach of social media. Understanding how these complex processes work and how to deal with these segments of the external environment is critical in formulating successful strategies to manage global environmental forces.

The external world for oil exploration is especially complex and very uncertain. many forces are at play: there is new technology allowing deep well exploration; there are ever-better-organised environmental groups; governments are sensitive to environmental issues; unpredictable international events impact on permissions; competition is fierce for new areas

to exploit; fracking is now common, and productive; alternative energy sources are developing quickly; and there still is a demand for oil albeit at a low price (how low can it go?). The situation with low prices threatens the stability of the industry that will remain central to the functioning of the global economy. Oil companies still face the challenges of investing to offset natural production declines and to meet future growth. Global capital expenditure by exploration and production companies in 2020 is forecast to drop by 32 per cent, the lowest level for 13 years. The reduction of financial resources will undermine the ability of the oil industry to develop several of the technologies needed for clean energy transitions around the globe. The strategists in oil companies must remain very alert indeed.

Sources: BP, 2019, Energy with Purpose: BP Annual Report and Form 20-F 2019, https://www.bp.com/content/dam/bp/business-sites/en/global/

corporate/pdfs/investors/bp-annual-report-and-form-20f-2019.pdf; IEA, 2020, Oil Market Report – April 2020, http://www.iea.org; IEA, 2020, Carbon-

free hydrogen from low cost wind power, stored for use on demand, IEA Paris, https://www.iea.org/articles/Carbon-free hydrogen from low cost

wind power, stored for use on demand, 3 July; IEA, 2020, Global Energy Review 2020. The Impact of the Covid-19 Crisis on Global Energy Demand

and CO2 Emissions. Flagship Report – April 2020; m. Galluchi, 2015, Russian oil giant Rosneft is delaying Arctic drilling plans amid Western sanctions

against Moscow, International Business Times, 30 January; C. Winter, 2015, Oil and gas companies converge on the Great Australian Bight to explore

reserves, ABC, http://www.abc.net.au/news/2015-01-19/bight-oil-gas- exploration/6025402, 19 January; A. macdonald-Smith, 2015, BP forges

ahead with $1b Great Australian Bight exploration, Sydney Morning Herald, 20 May; The Economist, 2011, Dancing with bears: BP in Russia, 5 February,

73; J. Ball, 2011, Environment (special report) – lessons from the Gulf: William Reilly on why the oil spill happened, and where the industry goes from here, Wall Street Journal, http://www.wsj.com, 7 march, R5; P. Elkind,

D. Whitford & D. Burke, 2011, An accident waiting to happen, Fortune, 7 February, 105–32; P. Hunter & P. Russell, 2011, Capitol Hill views divided

on oil spill report, Engineering News-Record, 7 February, 7; A. Peaple, 2011, Reshaped BP finds east is no Eden, Wall Street Journal, http://www.wsj.

com, 23 February, C14; R. Gold, 2010, Halliburton faulted over cement job, Wall Street Journal, http://www.wsj.com, 9 September; J. Weisman, 2010, BP

softens political hit, Wall Street Journal, http://www.wsj.com, 21 June.

36 PART 1: STRATEGIC MANAGEMENT INPUTS

its internal organisation (discussed in the next chapter) as the foundation for forming the organisation’s vision, developing its mission, and identifying and implementing strategic actions (see Figure 1.1).

As noted in Chapter 1, the environmental conditions in the current global economy differ from historical conditions. For example, technological changes and the continuing grow th of information gathering and processing capabilities increase the need for organisations to develop effective competitive actions on a timely basis;4 in other words, organ isations have little time to cor rect er rors when implementing their competitive actions. The rapid sociological changes occurring in many countries affect labour practices and the nature of products demanded by increasingly diverse consumers. Governmental policies and laws also affect where and how organisations choose to compete.5 In addition, changes to nations’ financial regulatory systems that were enacted in 2010 and beyond are expected to increase the complexity of organisations’ financial transactions.6

Viewed i n t hei r tota l it y, t he cond it ions t hat a ffec t orga n isat ions today i nd icate t hat, for most orga n isat ions, t hei r ex ter na l env i ron ment is fi l led w it h u ncer ta i nt y. To successf u l ly dea l w it h t h is u ncer tainty, and to ach ieve st rateg ic compet it iveness and t h r ive, organ isat ions must be awa re of and fully understand the different segments of the external environment.7

Orga n isat ions u ndersta nd t he ex ter na l env i ron ment by acqu i r i ng i n for mat ion about compet itors, customers and other stakeholders to build their own base of knowledge and capabilities.8 On the basis of the new information, organisations take action, such as building new capabilities and core competencies, in the hope of buffering themselves against any negative environmental effects and to pursue oppor tunities as the basis for better serving their stakeholders’ needs.9 An organisation’s strategic actions are influenced by the conditions in the three par ts of its external environment: the general, industr y and competitor (see Figure 2.1).

Economic

Technological

Sociocultural

Physical

Political/Legal

Demographic

Industry environment

Threat of new entrants Power of suppliers

Power of buyers Product substitutes Intensity of rivalry

Competitor environment

Global

Figure 2.1 The external environment

CHAPTER 2 THE ExTERnAL EnvIROnmEnT: OPPORTUnITIES, THREATS, InDUSTRy COmPETITIOn AnD COmPETITOR AnALySIS

37

The general, industry and competitor environments The general environment is composed of dimensions in the broader society that influence an industr y and the organisations within it.10 We group these dimensions into seven environmental segments: demographic, economic, political/legal, sociocultural, technological, global and physical. Examples of elements analysed in each of these segments are shown in Table 2.1.

Organisations can not d irectly cont rol the general env iron ment’s segments, as business failure and ba n k r uptcies i nd icate. Because orga n isat ions ca n not d i rect ly cont rol t he seg ments of t hei r ex ter na l env i ron ment, successf u l orga n isat ions lea r n how to gat her t he i n for mat ion needed to u ndersta nd a l l segments and their implications for selecting and implementing the organisation’s strategies.

T he industry environment is t he set of factors t hat d i rect ly i n fluences a n orga n isat ion a nd its competitive actions and responses: the threat of new entrants, the power of suppliers, the power of buyers, the threat of product substitutes and the intensity of rivalry among competitors.11 In total, the interactions among these five factors determine an industr y’s profit potential; in turn, the industr y’s profit potential influences the choices each organisation makes about its strategic actions. The challenge for an organisation

general environment composed of dimensions in the broader society that influence an industry and the organisations within it

industry environment the set of factors that directly influences an organisation and its competitive actions and competitive response: the threat of new entrants, the power of suppliers, the power of buyers, the threat of product substitutes and the intensity of rivalry among competitors

The general environment: segments and elements

Segments Elements

Demographic • Population size • Age structure • Geographic distribution

• Ethnic mix • Income distribution

Economic • Inflation rates • Interest rates • Trade deficits or surpluses • Budget deficits or surpluses

• Personal savings rate • Business savings rates • Gross domestic product

Political/legal • Taxation laws • Superannuation laws • Deregulation philosophies

• Labour training laws • Educational philosophies and policies

Sociocultural • Women in the workforce • Workforce diversity • Attitudes about the quality

of work life

• Shifts in work and career preferences • Shifts in preferences regarding

product and service characteristics • vegan activists

Technological • Product innovations • Applications of knowledge

• Focus of private and government- supported R&D expenditures

• new communication technologies

Global • Important political events • Critical global markets • Pandemic (Covid-19)

• newly industrialised countries • Different cultural and institutional

attributes

Physical environment

• Energy consumption • Practices used to develop

energy sources • Renewable energy efforts • Minimising an organisation’s

environmental footprint

• Availability of water as a resource • Producing environmentally friendly

products • Reacting to natural or human-made

disasters

Table 2.1

38 PART 1: STRATEGIC MANAGEMENT INPUTS

is to locate a position within an industr y where it can favourably in fluence the five factors or where it can successfully defend against their influence. The greater an organisation’s capacity to favourably influence its industry environment, the greater the likelihood that the organisation will earn above-average returns.

How companies gather and interpret information about their competitors is called competitor analysis. Understanding the organisation’s competitor environment complements the insights provided by studying the general and industry environments.12 This means, for example, that BP wants to learn as much as it can about its major competitors – such as Ex xon-Mobil and Royal Dutch Shell plc – while also learning about its general and industr y environments.

Analysis of the general environment is focused on environmental trends; an analysis of the industry environment is focused on the factors and conditions influencing an industry’s profitability potential; and an analysis of competitors is focused on predicting competitors’ actions, responses and intentions. In combination, the results of these three analyses influence the organisation’s vision, mission and strategic actions. Although we discuss each analysis separately, performance improves when the organisation integrates the insights provided by analyses of the general environment, the industry environment and the competitor environment.

External environmental analysis Most organisations face external environments that are highly turbulent, complex and global: conditions t hat ma ke i nter pret i ng t hose env i ron ments d i fficu lt.13 To cope w it h of ten a mbig uous a nd i ncomplete env i ron mental data, and to increase u nderstand ing of t he general env iron ment, organ isat ions engage in external environmental analysis. This analysis has four par ts: scanning, monitoring, forecasting and assessing (see Table 2.2). A nalysing the external environment is a difficult, yet significant, activity.14

Identifying oppor tunities and threats is an impor tant objective of studying the general environment. A n opportunity is a condition in the general environment that, if exploited effectively, helps a company to achieve strategic competitiveness. For example, market research results suggested to Procter & Gamble ( P&G) af ter its acquisit ion of Gillette, a shav ing products company, t hat an increasing nu mber of men globally are interested in fragrances and skin-care products. To take advantage of this oppor tunity, P&G reoriented towards beauty products to better serve both men and women generally. The change constituted an organisation change focused on combining product categories rather than its typical organisation around a specific branded product.15

A threat is a condition in the general environment that may hinder an organisation’s efforts to achieve strategic competitiveness.16 Microsoft is cur rently experiencing a severe external threat as smar tphones sur passed personal computer (PC) sales. In the second quar ter of 2020, worldwide PC shipments totalled 64.8 million units, according to results by Gar tner. Lenovo and HP shared the number one position in the worldwide PC market. They accounted for half of PC shipments in the second quar ter of 2020, up from 46.6 per cent in the second quar ter of 2019. A lthough PC grow th will continue to expand, it is not growing at the rate that smartphones are. Yet, although the top five smartphone vendors reported a decline in the first

opportunity a condition in the general environment that, if exploited, helps a company achieve strategic competitiveness

threat a condition in the general environment that may hinder a company’s efforts to achieve strategic competitiveness

Components of the external environmental analysis

Scanning Identifying early signals of environmental changes and trends

Monitoring Detecting meaning through ongoing observations of environmental changes and trends

Forecasting Developing projections of anticipated outcomes based on monitored changes and trends

Assessing Determining the timing and importance of environmental changes and trends for organisations’ strategies and their management

Table 2.2

CHAPTER 2 THE ExTERnAL EnvIROnmEnT: OPPORTUnITIES, THREATS, InDUSTRy COmPETITIOn AnD COmPETITOR AnALySIS

39

quar ter of 2020, sales among them totalled near 300 million smar tphones, which was over four times the global sales of PCs during the same period. Samsung recorded sales of 51 million smar tphones, Huawei 42 million and, closely following in third spot, Apple sold nearly 41 million smar tphones. W hile Apple is not as dependent on the China market as Huawei is, it still faced challenges with supply constraints and store closures due to the Covid-19 pandemic, which negatively impacted global sales. However, the impact of the pandemic was less significant for Apple compared to its impact on other top vendors. Apple had a strong star t to 2020 due to its new product lineup.17

Organisations use several sources to analyse the general environment, including a wide variety of printed materials (such as trade publications, newspapers, business publications and the results of academic research and public polls), trade shows and suppliers, customers, and employees of public-sector organisations. People in boundary-spanning positions may obtain a great deal of this type of information. Customer service staff, sales personnel, purchasing managers, public relations directors and customer service representatives – each of whom interacts with external constituents – are examples of boundary-spanning positions.

Scanning Scanning entails the study of all segments in the general environment. Through scanning, organisations identify early signals of potential changes in the general environment and detect changes that are already underway.18 Scanning often reveals ambiguous, incomplete or unconnected data and information. Thus, environmental scanning is challenging but critically important for organisations, especially those competing in highly volatile environments.19 In addition, scanning activities must be aligned with the organisational context.

Many organisations use special sof tware to assist them in identif y ing events that are tak ing place in t he env iron ment and t hat a re an nounced in public sou rces. For example, news event detection uses information-based systems to categorise text and reduce the trade-off between an important missed event and false alarm rates.20 The internet provides significant opportunities for scanning. Amazon, for example, records significant information about individuals visiting its website, par ticularly if a purchase is made. A mazon then welcomes these customers by name when they revisit the website. The organisation sends messages to customers about specials and new products similar to those they purchased on previous visits. Other organisations, such as Netflix, also collect demographic data about their customers in an attempt to identify their unique preferences (demographics is one of the segments in the general environment).

Philip Morris International (PMI), a manufacturer and retailer of tobacco products, continuously scans segments of its external environment to detect cur rent conditions and to anticipate changes that might take place in different segments. For example, PMI studies various nations’ tax policies on cigarettes (these policies are par t of the political/legal segment), because raising cigarette taxes reduces sales (as it has in Australia), while lowering these taxes might increase sales.

Monitoring W hen monitoring, analysts obser ve environmental changes to see if an impor tant trend is emerging from among those spotted through scanning.21 Critical to successful monitoring is the organisation’s ability to detect meaning in environmental events and trends. For example, Tesco, the UK’s largest retailer, added Turkish, Sri Lankan, Latin, Filipino and African and South African cuisine to its food offerings. One analyst noted: ‘Britain has become one of the most ethnically diverse nations on Ear th, and there is a ver y strong, growing demand by those who have settled here to buy food from their homelands’.22 Tesco already sells Asian, oriental, A fro-Caribbean, kosher, Polish and halal foods. Continual monitoring of these trends is necessar y for a large retailer such as Tesco to maintain the right balance among its products.

Effective monitoring requires the organisation to identify impor tant stakeholders and understand its reputation among these stakeholders as the foundation for ser ving their unique needs.23 (Stakeholders’ unique needs are described in Chapter 1.) Scanning and monitoring are par ticularly impor tant when an

STRATEGY NOW

Smartphones – Apple

40 PART 1: STRATEGIC MANAGEMENT INPUTS

organisation competes in an indust r y w ith high tech nological uncer tainty. 24 Scan ning and monitor ing can provide the organisation with information; they also ser ve as a means of impor ting knowledge about markets and about how to successfully commercialise new technologies the organisation has developed.25

Forecasting Scanning and monitoring are concerned with events and trends in the general environment at a point in time. W hen forecasting, analysts develop feasible projections of what might happen, and how quickly, as a result of the changes and t rends detected th rough scan n ing and mon itor ing. 26 For example, analysts might forecast the time that will be required for a new technolog y to reach the marketplace, the length of time before d i fferent cor porate t rain ing procedu res are required to deal w ith anticipated changes in the composition of the workforce, or how much time will elapse before changes in governmental taxation policies affect consumers’ purchasing patterns.

Forecasting events and outcomes accurately is challenging. Forecasting demand for new technological products is difficult because technolog y trends are continually driving shor ter product life cycles. This is par ticularly difficult for an organisation like Intel, for example, whose products go into many customers’ tech nolog ica l mercha nd ise t hat a re consistent ly updated. I ncreasi ng t he d i fficu lt y, each new wa fer fabrication or silicon chip technolog y production plant that Intel invests in becomes significantly more expensive for each generation of chip products. Having tools that allow better forecasting of electronic product demand is increasingly impor tant.27

During an economic downturn, forecasting becomes more difficult and more impor tant. For example, P&G, Unilever and Colgate-Palmolive, which primarily sell branded products, have been pushed by retailers to lower their prices, while at the same time these retailers (including Coles and Woolwor ths) are selling lower-priced, private-label goods. Hence, these consumer product companies are forecasting the effects of the two trends noted as they seek to project demand. For tunately for these consumer product companies, they are seeing demand increase for branded products as the economy improves.28

Assessing The object ive of assessing is to deter m i ne t he t i m i ng a nd sig n i fica nce of t he effects of env i ron mental changes and trends that have been identified.29 The timing of a product release is imperative as it could result in either positive or negative sales or returns. For instance, in March 2020, executive producers in the Holly wood film industr y strategically delayed scheduled blockbuster movies due to the impact of the Covid-19 pandemic. It was determined that releasing these movies when originally scheduled would have been financially disastrous at the box office, due to the restrictions placed on access to cinemas globally. 30 The James Bond movie, Quiet Place 2, and the most recent Marvel movie were among those due to be released in April 2020, but were rescheduled to be released from November 2020. Through scanning, monitoring and forecasting, analysts are able to understand the general environment. Going a step fur ther, the intent of assessment is to specify the implications of that understanding. Without assessment, the organisation is left with data that may be interesting but of unknown competitive relevance. Even if formal assessment is inadequate, the appropriate inter pretation of that information is impor tant.

How accurate senior executives are in assessing their competitive environments may be less important for strategy and corresponding organisational changes than correctly interpreting environmental trends. Thus, although gathering and organising information is important, it is paramount to appropriately interpret that intelligence to determine if an identified trend in the external environment is an opportunity or a threat.31

Segments of the general environment As noted, t he general env iron ment is composed of segments t hat are exter nal to t he organ isation (see Table 2.1). A lthough the degree of impact varies, these environmental segments affect all industries and

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the organisations competing in them. The challenge to each organisation is to scan, monitor, forecast and assess the elements in each segment to determine their effects on the organisation. Effective scanning, mon itor ing, forecast ing and assessing a re v ital to t he organ isat ion’s effor ts to recog n ise and evaluate oppor tunities and threats.

The demographic segment The demographic segment is concerned with a population’s size, age str ucture, geographic distribution, ethnic mi x and income distr ibution. 32 Demographic segments are commonly analysed on a global basis because of their potential effects across countries’ borders and because many organisations compete in global markets.

Population size The world’s population doubled (from three billion to six billion) between 1959 and 1999. In November 2020, the global population was recorded as 7.8 billion people, according to the World Population Clock.33 Current projections suggest that population grow th will continue in the 21st centur y, albeit at a slower pace, and it is projected to be nine billion by 2040. 34 By 2050, India is expected to be the most populous nation in the

world (w it h over 1.8 billion people). Ch i na, t he USA, Indonesia a nd Pak istan are pred icted to be the next four most-populous nations in 2050. Organisations seeking to find growing markets in which to sell their goods and ser vices will want to recognise the market potential that may exist for them in these five nations.

W hile obser ving the population of different nations and regions of the world, organisations also study changes occurring within different populations to assess their strategic implications. For example, Japan is experiencing what is known as a ‘super-ageing’ society. 35 In 2019, the World Bank repor ted that 28 per cent of Japan’s citizens were aged 65 or older, compared with China at 9 per cent and India at 6 per cent, and it has been forecast that China will not reach this level until 2036 (Aust ralia w ill reach 25 per cent in 2042). 36 Ageing populat ions a re a sig n i fica nt problem for cou nt r ies because of t he need for workers and the burden of funding retirement programs. In Japan, and other countries, employees are being encouraged to work longer to overcome t hese problems. Interest i ngly, t he USA has a h igher bi r t h rate a nd significant immigration, placing it in a better position than Japan and European nations.

Age structure As noted earlier, the world’s population is rapidly ageing. In Nor th A merica and Europe, millions of baby boomers have approached retirement. However, even in developing countries with large numbers of people under the age of 35, birth rates have declined sharply. In China, for example, by 2040 there will be more than 400 million people over the age of 60. China is a par ticularly interesting case of the power of demography. With around 1.43 billion people, it has a huge market and labour force. The problem China will face in the future is that the number of women of childbearing age will fall quickly. 37 The problems in Europe are more immediate. Low fertility rates in Italy, Spain and Germany mean that the native-born populations of these countries may be reduced by more than 80 per cent in coming years, although this may be replaced to some extent by immigration.

The possibility of future declines in wealth based on housing is creating uncertainty for European Union (EU) baby boomers about how to invest and when they might be able to retire.38 On the other hand, delayed retirements by baby boomers in Australia, the EU and the USA with value-creating skills may facilitate

demographic segment concerned with a population’s size, age structure, geographic distribution, ethnic mix and income distribution

many Asian countries have ageing populations of citizens aged 65 or older. Ageing populations are a significant issue because of the need to maintain the workforce and the burden on the government and taxes required to fund retirement programs.

Source: age-fotostock/imagenavi

42 PART 1: STRATEGIC MANAGEMENT INPUTS

orga n isat ions’ effor ts to successf u l ly i mplement t hei r st rateg ies. Moreover, delayed ret i rements may allow organisations to think of creative ways for skilled, long-time employees to impart their accumulated knowledge to younger employees as they work longer than originally anticipated.

Geographic distribution For decades, the Australian population has been shifting to the coast, while in China there is a move to urban areas, and in the USA the population has been shifting from the north and east to the south and west. Organisations should consider the effects of this shift in demographics. 39 For example, in Australia, the areas with the highest propor tion of people aged over 65 are in mid-Nor th Coast New South Wales (around Port Macquarie, with around 20 per cent over 60 years of age), the Wimmera in Victoria and Yorke Peninsula in South Australia.40 Organisations providing goods and ser vices that are targeted to senior citizens might pay close attention to these areas.

Geographic distribution patterns are not identical throughout the world. For example, in China, 60 per cent of the population lives in r ural areas; however, the grow th is in urban communities such as Shanghai (with a cur rent population in excess of 27 million) and Beijing (over 20 million). These data suggest that organisations seeking to sell their products in China should recognise the grow th in metropolitan areas rather than in r ural areas. Larger cities are expected to generate more grow th in gross domestic product (GDP) per person than smaller cities and also attract more human capital – people with talent to produce economic grow th.41

Ethnic mix T he et h n ic m i x of most cou nt r ies’ popu lat ions cont i nues to cha nge. For exa mple, H ispa n ics a re now t he largest eth n ic minor ity (18.5%) in the USA, representing more than 50 million of the total US population i n 2019 of 328 m i l l ion.4 2 I n fact, t he US H ispa n ic ma rket is t he t h i rd-la rgest ‘ Lat i n A mer ica n’ economy beh i nd Brazi l a nd Mex ico. Spa n ish is now t he dom i na nt la ng uage i n pa r ts of US states such as Texas, Ca l ifor n ia, Flor ida a nd New Mex ico. I n Aust ra l ia, Melbou r ne is perhaps t he cou nt r y ’s lead i ng reg ion for et h n ic d iversit y, w it h 34 per cent of t he popu lat ion bor n overseas. Melbou r ne has now t he 10 t h-la rgest i m m ig ra nt popu lat ion a mong world met ropol ita n a reas. Given t hese facts, some orga n isat ions m ight wa nt to assess t he deg ree to wh ich t hei r goods or ser v ices cou ld be adapted to ser ve t he u n ique needs of t hese consu mers. T h is is pa r t icu la rly appropr iate for compa n ies compet i ng i n consu mer sectors such as restau ra nts, g rocer ies, f i na ncia l ser v ices a nd clot h i ng.

Income distribution Understanding how income is distributed within and across populations informs organisations of different groups’ purchasing power and discretionary income. Studies of income distributions suggest that although living standards have improved over time, variations exist within and between nations.43 In Australia, for example, the median household income in the Australian Capital Ter ritor y, home to many public ser vice workers, represents the highest-paying jurisdiction (A $1825.80 per week), followed by Western Australia and t he Nor t her n Ter r itor y, whose med ian ea r n ings were A $120 0 per week. The lowest ea r n ings were Tasma n ia (A $10 0 0 per week) a nd Sout h Aust ralia (A $1010 per week). The m i n i mu m average wage i n Australia, as of 1 July 2020, was A $753.80 per week. In 2019, the median weekly earnings for an employee in Australia was A$1100.00, and there was still a marked difference between male employee median weekly earnings at A $1275.00 compared with female employee earnings at A $950.00. Managers had the highest incomes, and income in mining was the highest, while retailing and accommodation and food services were the lowest industr y categories.44

These earnings statistics are interesting to organisations because the average incomes of households and individuals are related to expenditure: not only how much they spend, but what they spend their money on. A nother income-based factor is the increase in numbers of dual-career couples, which has a notable effect on average household incomes.

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The growth of the economy in China has attracted many organisations, not only for the relatively low- cost production there, but also because of the large potential demand for products, given its huge population base. However, it has been repor ted that income inequality in China could expand in 2020 as the negative effects of the Covid-19 pandemic flow through the economy. It has been repor ted that approximately one- third of Chinese households earning annual incomes of US$1426 expect their earnings to decrease, while only 13 per cent of wealthier households earning over US$185 000 believed that the pandemic would affect their income severely.45 The relationship between China and the world is changing. The 2019 McK insey Global Institute China-World Exposure Index notes that China’s exposure to the world in trade, technology and capital has fallen in relat ive ter ms. Conversely, t he world’s ex posu re to Ch ina has increased. Th is reflects the rebalancing of the Chinese economy towards domestic consumption. In 11 of the 16 quar ters since 2015, consumption contributed more than 60 per cent of total GDP grow th. Exposure to China varies significantly among sectors and geographies, according to an analysis of 20 sectors and 73 economies.46

Ind ia also is v iewed by global cor porat ions as one of t he key ma rkets f rom where f utu re g row t h is likely to emerge. Ind ia now compr ises a huge m idd le class, a relatively la rge a ffluent class and a small economically disadvantaged class. Despite Covid-19, growth in India’s consumer market is likely still to be driven primarily by a favourable population composition and increasing disposable income. Per capita GDP of India is expected to reach US$3273.85 in 2023, up from US$1983.00 in 2012. The maximum consumer spend ing is  likely to occu r in the food, housing, consumer du rables, and t ranspor t and com mun ication sectors.47 Figures 2.2 and 2.3 offer some insight into the Indian consumer market.

Indian consumer market size

• Indian appliance and consumer electronics (ACE) market reached US$10.93 billion in 2019.

• Smartphone shipments in India increased 8 per cent year-on-year to reach 152.5 million units in 2019, the fastest growing among the top 20 smartphone markets in the world.

• The S&P BSE Consumer Durables Index was up 6.8 per cent in Jan 2020 and gained 32.1 per cent in one year.

• Appliances and consumer electronics industry is expected to double to US$21.18 billion by 2025.

• Electronics hardware production in the country increased from US$31.13 billion in FY14 to US$65.53 billion in FY19.

• Television industry in India reached an estimated US$11.26 billion in 2019 and is projected to reach US$13.66 billion) by 2021.

Source: India Brand Equity Foundation, 2020, India Consumer Durables Industry Report, Snapshot, https://www.ibef.org/industry/indian-consumer-market.aspx.

Figure 2.2

As such, many Wester n mult inat ionals a re consider ing enter ing Ind ia as a consu mpt ion ma rket as its middle class grows. A lthough India has poor infrastr ucture, its middle-class consumers are in a good position to spend. Furthermore, the urban–rural income difference has been declining in India more rapidly t han in Ch ina. Because of situations like t hese in Ch ina and Ind ia, pay ing attention to t he d i fferences between markets based on income distribution can be ver y impor tant for organisations.48

The economic segment The economic environment refers to the nature and direction of the economy in which an organisation competes or may compete.49 In general, organisations seek to compete in relatively stable economies with strong grow th potential. Australia, for example, was more stable during the global financial crisis (GFC; 2008– 09) than either the EU or USA, and therefore attracted strong foreign interest.50 This also appears to have been the case during the Covid-19 pandemic. In June 2020, the International Monetar y Fund (IMF)

economic environment refers to the nature and direction of the economy in which an organisation competes or may compete

44 PART 1: STRATEGIC MANAGEMENT INPUTS

A snapshot of the Indian consumer market

Growing demand

Advantage India

Increasing investments

Opportunities

Policy support

• Refrigerators and consumer electronics good to witness higher demand in rural markets. • Demand growth likely to accelerate with rising disposable incomes and easy access to credit.

• Government intends to develop electronics components manufacturing base in India and encourage export. • Huge untapped market with substantially lower penetration of consumer appliances compared to other countries.

• National policy on electronics targets production of one billion mobile handsets worth US$190 billion by 2025. • 100 per cent FDI is allowed in the electronic-hardware manufacturing sector under the automatic route.

• India’s consumer durables sector has attracted significant investment.

Source: India Brand Equity Foundation, 2020, India Consumer Durables Industry Report, 4 September, https://www.ibef.org/industry/indian-consumer-market.aspx.

Figure 2.3

noted that the economic outlook growth projections for the US for 2020 were negative (-8.0%), but 2021 was forecast to have positive 4.5 per cent grow th to the economy. The IMF also recorded that Germany grow th projections were negative (-7.8%), as were those of other European countries such as France (-12.5%), and Italy and Spain ( both -12.8%). Economic g row th outlook was projected for the U K at -10.2 per cent, for China at 1.0 per cent and for India at -4.5 per cent. The IM F forecast for 2021 is positive for all countries (see Table 2.3).51 Because nations are interconnected as a result of the global economy, organisations must scan, monitor, forecast and assess the health of their host nation and the health of the economies outside their host nation.

As organisations prepare to compete during the third decade of the 21st centur y, the world’s economic env i ron ment is u ncer ta i n, w it h cha l leng i ng t i mes a head due to t he i mpact of Cov id-19 on t he world economy.

In ter ms of speci fic econom ic env i ron ments, orga n isat ions compet ing in Japa n or desi r ing to do so might continue to carefully evaluate the ongoing economic impact of the radiation leaks at the nuclear power generation plants in Sendai and Fukushima that occur red in 2011.52 A lthough the crisis in Japan was countr y specific, its ripple effects were felt at the time around the globe. Because of its acknowledged econom ic g row t h, a number of compan ies a re evaluat ing t he possibility of enter ing Russia to compete or, for those already competing in that nation, to expand the scope of their operations. 53 This unique and somet i mes d i fficu lt-to-u ndersta nd busi ness env i ron ment presents sig n i fica nt r isks. Th is cha l leng i ng environment can also be an advantage because it serves as an entry barrier to limit the number of companies willing to enter, learn how to operate effectively and then reap the returns. A nother countr y with grow th oppor tunities is Vietnam, as organisations across the globe take note of how its government reforms and economic decentralisation are creating opportunities for investment for sourcing, as well as its developing consumer market.54

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IMF world economic outlook growth projections, June 2020

Projections

(Real GDP, annual per cent change) 2019 2020 2021

World output 2.9 –4.9 5.4

Advanced economies 1.7 –8.0 4.8

United States 2.3 –8.0 4.5

Euro Area 1.3 –10.2 6.0

Germany 0.6 –7.8 5.4

France 1.5 –12.5 7.3

Italy 0.3 –12.8 6.3

Spain 2.0 –12.8 6.3

Japan 0.7 –5.8 2.4

United Kingdom 1.4 –10.2 6.3

Canada 1.7 –8.4 4.9

Other advanced economies 1.7 –4.8 4.2

Emerging markets and developing economies 3.7 –3.0 5.9

Emerging and developing Asia 5.5 –0.8 7.4

China 6.1 1.0 8.2

India 4.2 –4.5 6.0

ASEAn-5 4.9 –2.0 6.2

Emerging and developing Europe 2.1 –5.8 4.3

Russia 1.3 –6.6 4.1

Latin America and the Caribbean 0.1 –9.4 3.7

Brazil 1.1 –9.1 3.6

Mexico –0.3 –10.5 3.3

middle East and Central Asia 1.0 –4.7 3.3

Saudi Arabia 0.3 –6.8 3.1

Sub-Saharan Africa 3.1 –3.2 3.4

nigeria 2.2 –5.4 2.6

South Africa 0.2 –8.0 3.5

Low-income developing countries 5.2 –1.0 5.2 Source: International monetary Fund, 2020, World Economic Outlook Update, June 2020,

https://www.imf.org/en/Publications/WEO/Issues/2020/06/24/WEOUpdateJune2020.

Table 2.3

The political/legal segment The political/legal segment is the arena in which organisations and interest groups compete for attention, resources and a voice in overseeing the body of laws and regulations guiding interactions among nations as well as between organisations and var ious local gover nmental agencies. 55 Essentially, this segment represents how organisations tr y to influence governments and how they tr y to understand the influences (cur rent and projected) of those governments on their strategic actions.

political/legal segment the arena in which organisations and interest groups compete for attention, resources and a voice in overseeing the body of laws and regulations guiding the interactions among nations

46 PART 1: STRATEGIC MANAGEMENT INPUTS

W hen reg ulations are for med in response to new legislation, they of ten in fluence an organisation’s strategic actions. For example, less-restrictive regulations on organisations’ actions are a product of the global trend towards privatisation of government-owned or government-regulated organisations. Much privatisation in recent years has been driven by government budget concerns and the desire to raise funds by selling government-owned organisations to reduce deficits.56 Some believe that the transformation from state-owned to private organisations that has occurred in multiple nations has substantial implications for the competitive landscapes in a number of countries and across multiple industries. 57

Organisations must carefully analyse a new political ad ministration’s business-related policies and philosophies. Competition laws, ta xation laws, industries chosen for deregulation, labour training laws and the degree of commitment to educational institutions are areas in which an administration’s policies can a ffect t he operat ions and profitability of indust r ies and ind iv idual organ isat ions across t he globe. To deal w ith issues such as those we are descr ibing, organisations often develop a political strateg y to influence governmental policies that might affect them. Some argue that developing an effective political strateg y was essential to the restr uctured General Motors’ effor ts to achieve strategic competitiveness during the GFC-related economic downturn. In addition, the effects of global governmental policies (e.g. those related to organisations in India that are engaging in information technolog y outsourcing work) on an organisation’s competitive position increase the need for organisations to form an effective political strateg y.58

Orga n isat ions compet i ng i n t he globa l economy encou nter a n i nterest i ng a r ray of pol it ica l/ lega l quest ions a nd issues. Key recent developments a ffect i ng doi ng busi ness i n Aust ra lia i nclude cha nges to foreig n i nvest ment reg u lat ions, cu r rency reg u lat ions a nd i ncent ives, laws reg u lat i ng employ ment relat ionsh ips, compet it ion law, data protect ion, product l iabi l it y a nd sa fet y, ta xat ion a nd residency, intellectual proper ty rights over patents, trademarks, registered and unregistered designs.

To restore busi ness con fidence i n Aust ra l ia i n 2019, reg u lator y cha nge fol lowed f rom t he Roya l Com m ission into M isconduct in t he Ba n k ing, Supera n nuat ion a nd Fina ncial Ser v ices Indust r y, wh ich concluded in Febr uar y 2019.59 For example, Treasur y laws that came into effect in March 2019 introduced new ma x imum penalties for cor porate and fi nancial sector m isconduct and ex panded t he civ il penalty regime for financial ser vices licensees in Australia and cor porates for cer tain contraventions.

Reg u lator y bod ies have i ncreased en forcement matters i n Aust ra l ia, as a resu lt of t he Aust ra l ia n Transaction Repor ts and A nalysis Centre (AUSTR AC) alleging in late 2019 that one of the four Australian major banks had turned a blind eye to approximately 23 million transactions and had allegedly breached counter ter rorism finance laws and anti-money laundering laws.60

Australia and other countr ies also follow United Nations Secur ity Council sanctions w ith regard to i mposi ng t rade rest r ict ions on cer tai n cou nt r ies. They a re selected by t he Foreig n A ffai rs M i n ister at a ny g iven t i me a nd i mplemented i n Aust ra l ia u nder t he Autonomous Sanctions Act 2011 (Ct h) a nd t he Autonomous Sanctions Regulations 2011 (Cth).

The sociocultural segment The sociocultural segment is concerned with a society’s attitudes and cultural values. Because attitudes and values form the cornerstone of a society, they often drive demographic, economic, political/legal and technological conditions and changes.

Societies’ attitudes and cultural values appear to have undergone changes in the second decade of the 21st century. In the USA, attitudes and values about health care are one area in which sociocultural changes are occurring. Specifically, while the USA has the highest overall health care expenditure as well as the highest expenditure per capita of any countr y in the world, millions of the nation’s citizens lack health insurance. National health care spending in the United States is forecast to grow at an average annual rate of 5.4 per cent from the period 2019 to 2028, which is greater than the average grow th rate of GDP of 4.3 per cent.61 The USA spends 19.7 per cent of GDP on health care while similarly prosperous countries

sociocultural segment concerned with a society’s attitudes and cultural values

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such as Germany and the Netherlands spend 11.7 and 13 per cent, respectively; yet Australia spends only 10.3 per cent, and Singapore and Malaysia spend only 4 per cent.62 Most of these countries have quite varied health insurance systems compared with the USA. Continuing changes to the nature of health care policies can have a significant effect on business organisations,63 so they must carefully examine trends regarding health care in order to anticipate the effects on their operations.

A ny national workforce is diverse in its makeup and work patterns. From a population of 25 million, the Australian workforce in September 2020 was 12.6 million.64 Within it, a range of complex differences between groups make planning difficult. For example, the labour force participation rate in 2019 was 64.8 per cent, which was an all-time high.65 The 2018–19 figures revealed some other patterns buried in a broad statistic, such as: for women aged 20 –74, participation was 67.4 per cent, but for males in that age group it was 78.5 per cent. Furthermore, the labour force participation rate for the 60–64-year-old group increased for women (51%), compared to men (65.4%).66 For the age bracket 30 to 34 year olds, 76.1 per cent were females compared to 92.7 per cent males. In Australia in 2018–19, the industries with the highest proportion of women were health care and social assistance (78.2%) and education and training (72%), whereas men dominated mining (84%) and construction (88%). Women were more likely to be employed part-time, with 43.4 per cent of women working part-time.

Growing gender, ethnic and cultural diversity in the workforce creates challenges and oppor tunities, including combining the best of both men’s and women’s traditional leadership styles. Although diversity in the workforce has the potential to improve performance, research indicates that management of diversity in it iat ives is requi red in order to reap t hese organ isat ional benefits. Hu man resou rce pract it ioners a re

trained to successfully manage diversity issues to enhance positive outcomes.67

O t he r ma rked d i f fe re nces i n re lat ion to ge nde r have bee n highlighted during the Covid-19 pandemic, with the Workplace Gender Equa l it y Agenc y ( WGE A) i n Aust ra l ia not i ng t hat t he pa ndem ic has a ffec ted women a nd men d i fferent ly. T he effec ts on women include their predominant employment in the health care sector and responsibility for care work, the gendered division of domestic duties, as well as issues related to financial security and domestic violence. Federa l gover n ment data has show n, however, t hat men a re more likely to die from Covid-19. To date, generally equal numbers of women and men are con fi rmed to have contracted Covid-19.68

A ma n i festat ion of c ha ng i ng at t it udes towa rd s work is t he cont i nu i ng g row t h of cont i ngency workers (pa r t-t i me, tempora r y and contract employees) throughout the global economy. This trend is significant in several parts of the world, including Canada, Australia, Japan, Latin A merica, Western Europe and the USA.

Nat iona l cu ltu ra l va lues a ffect behav iou r i n orga n isat ions a nd t hus a lso i n fluence orga n isat iona l outcomes, such as differences in CEO compensation.69 The average pay for a Chinese CEO is CN Y 2 301 327 a year (equivalent to AU$500 000) and CN Y 1106 an hour in Beijing. The average salar y range for a CEO is between CNY 1 412 752 and CNY 3 914 057. On average, a Master’s Degree is the highest level of education for a CEO.70 In Australia, median cash pay for ASX100 CEOs in 2018 fell 1 per cent from $2.87 million to $2.84 million, while the average salar y fell 4.1 per cent to $2.92 million. Median cash pay for ASX100 CEOs has been flat for a decade, ranging between $2.79 million (FY20) and $2.95 million (FY11). The five highest-paid CEOs in the ASX100 on a cash pay basis all received more than $5 million, and three (CSL’s Perreault, Sonic’s Goldschmidt and A mcor’s Delia) all received more than $5 million in cash pay; while Treasur y’s Clarke and Macquarie’s Moore both received more than $4.7 million in FY17.71 See Table 2.4.

L i kew ise, nat iona l c u lt u re i n f luences to a la rge e x tent t he i nter nat iona l isat ion st rateg y t hat orga n isat ions pu rsue relat ive to t hei r home cou nt r y.72 K nowledge sha r i ng is i mpor ta nt for d ispersi ng

Women in the Workplace will create further leadership opportunities for women in 2021.

Source: iStock.com/gremlin

48 PART 1: STRATEGIC MANAGEMENT INPUTS

Chief executive remuneration September 2019

FY18 FY17 FY13 FY08 One-year increase

Five-year p.a. increase

10-year p.a. increase

Median $2 841 711 $2 871 409 $2 529 885 $2 903 752 −1 per cent 2.4 per cent −0.2 per cent

Average $2 919 156 $3 044 666 $3 005 935 $3 814 687 −4.1 per cent −0.6 per cent −2.6 per cent

Highest $6 236 722 $12 944 540 $11 107 787 $27 894 726

Lowest $750 000 $646 396 $616 972 $198 648

Median (incumbent)

$2 939 000 $2 920 000

Average (incumbent)

$2 983 746 $2 952 839

Source: Australian Council of Superannuation Investors, 2019, CEO pay in ASx200 companies: September 2019, melbourne: ACSI, https://acsi.org.au/wp-content/ uploads/2020/02/CEO-Pay-in-ASx200-Companies-September-2019.pdf, p. 27.

Table 2.4

new k nowledge w it h in organ isat ions and increasing t he speed of implement ing in novat ions. Personal relationships are especially impor tant in China, where guanxi (personal con nections) is a way of doing business within the countr y and for individuals to advance their careers in what is becoming a more open- market society. Understanding the importance of guanxi is critical for foreign organisations doing business in China.73

The technological segment Pervasive and diversified in scope, technological changes affect many parts of societies. These effects occur primarily through new products, processes and materials, notwithstanding the significant technological innovations that have been an outcome of the Covid-19 pandemic. The technological segment includes the organisations and activities involved in creating new knowledge and translating that knowledge into new outputs, products, processes and materials. Given the rapid pace of technological change and risk of disruption, it is vital for organisations to thoroughly study the technological segment.74 The importance of these efforts is suggested by the finding that early adopters of new technology often achieve higher market shares and earn higher returns. Thus, both large and small organisations should continuously scan the external environment to identify potential substitutes for technologies that are in current use, as well as to identify newly emerging technologies from which their organisation could derive competitive advantage.75

A s a sig n i f ica nt tec h nolog ica l development, t he i nter net has rema rkable capabi l it y to prov ide infor mat ion easily, quick ly and effect ively to an ever-increasing percentage of t he world’s populat ion. Organisations continue to study the internet’s capabilities to anticipate how it may allow them to create more value for customers and staff in the future and to anticipate future trends.

In spite of the internet’s far-reaching effects, wireless communication technology is becoming the next significant technological oppor tunity for companies to apply when pursuing strategic competitiveness. Handheld devices and other wireless communications equipment are used to access a variety of network- based ser vices. The use of handheld computers with wireless network connectivity, web-enabled mobile phone handsets and other emerging platforms (e.g. consumer internet-access devices such as the iPhone and iPad) has increased substantially and should soon become the dominant form of communication and commerce.76 For example, in the first quarter of 2020, global sales totalled nearly 300 million for smartphones alone. With each new version of mobile devices such as the iPhone, iPad and K indle, amazing additional functionalities and software applications are added.

technological segment the organisations and activities involved with creating new knowledge and translating that knowledge into new outputs, products, processes and materials

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The global segment The global segment includes relevant new global markets, existing markets that are changing, impor tant international political events, and critical cultural and institutional characteristics of global markets.77 There is little doubt that markets are more global and that consumers, as well as companies throughout the world, accept this fact. Consider the automobile industr y. The global automobile industr y is one in which an increasing number of people believe that because ‘we live in a global community’, consumers in multiple nations are willing to buy cars and tr ucks ‘from whatever area of the world’.78

W hen st udy i ng t he globa l seg ment, orga n isat ions (i nclud i ng automobi le ma nu fact u rers) shou ld recognise that globalisation of business markets may create oppor tunities to enter new markets as well as threats that new competitors from other economies may also enter their market. This is both an opportunity and a threat for the world’s automobile manufacturers: worldwide production capacity is now a potential threat to all global companies where entering another market to sell a company’s products appears to be an oppor tunity. In China, the world’s biggest auto market has exper ienced slower car sales since 2015, although the industr y remains sustainable.

Over t he past decade, Ch i na’s automot ive i ndust r y has been i n overd r ive, g row i ng approx i mately 15 per cent each yea r, a nd accounting for 70 per cent of global grow th over this period. By 2012, China had sur passed the USA as the world’s largest auto market, but by 2018 China’s cooling economy put the brakes on the auto market, pushing sales grow th into negative ter ritor y, a trend that persisted t h rough 2019. Over t he two yea rs up to 2019, Ch ina sales fell from 8.2 per cent to 6 per cent. Accord i ng to t he Ch i na A ssociat ion of Automobile Manufacturers, 25.8 million vehicles were sold in 2019.79

Fur ther challenges have occur red in the auto industr y since 2020 due to t he globa l econom ic slowdow n resu lt i ng f rom t he Cov id-19 pa ndem ic. Ot her issues a re t hat, i n order to i ncrease sa les, ma ny ca r compa n ies wa nt to enter foreig n ma rkets a nd t h is has led to overcapacit y worldw ide. I n Ch i na, labou r u n ions of ten orga n ise strikes to demand higher wages, fur ther increasing pressures in this industr y.

McKinsey research highlights that Chinese consumers’ automobile brand loyalty, measured by their willingness to purchase their existing

brand of car again, increased from 12 per cent in 2017 to 31 per cent in 2019. Companies selling cars in the mid-price range (100 000 –200 000 R MB) will face particular challenges, with pressure coming from opposite ends of the price spectr um. At the top, premium brands are making their cars more affordable to appeal to consumers seeking to trade up. In China, consumers’ acceptance level for autonomous vehicles in 2019 is 80 per cent, double that of Germany and the USA. With the Chinese Government expected to double down on support for autonomous vehicles, China is likely to be at the forefront of autonomous vehicle development. ‘The considerable costs of keeping pace with these trends is forcing consolidation and collaboration among rivals. BMW and Mercedes-Benz, for instance, have forged a par tnership focused on the next generation of mobility. Volkswagen and Ford have also teamed up to develop autonomous and electric vehicles, in a fur ther example of a trend we expect to see more of in future’.80 A nother change in purchasing vehicles is likely to occur with the consideration that the days of purchasing cars exclusively through dealers are numbered. For instance, China’s dealership industry is highly fragmented, with profit margins having been squeezed in recent years. Electric car sellers Tesla and NIO have attempted to overcome this, for example, by focusing on selling cars online directly to the consumer, while Daimler launched Mercedes me, a system that allows drivers to track and control their vehicle remotely.81

global segment includes relevant new global markets, existing markets that are changing, important international political events and critical cultural and institutional characteristics of global markets

Elon musk delivers made-in-China Teslas – just one of many consumer options within the Chinese automotive market.

Source: Getty Images/AFP

50 PART 1: STRATEGIC MANAGEMENT INPUTS

The markets from which organisations generate sales and income are one indication of the degree to which they are par ticipating in the global economy. For example, H. J. Heinz Company, a large global food producer, acquired a stake in Coniexpress S.A. Industrias Alimenticias, a leading Brazilian manufacturer of tomato-based products, condiments and vegetables, in order to target the South A merican market. Heinz’s sales in emerging economies grew 16.8 per cent while its main Nor th A merican group grew 14.5 per cent. Thus, much of Heinz’s sales grow th and its profit margins were coming from emerging markets.82 For this company, and so many others, understanding the conditions of today’s global segment and being able to predict future conditions is critical to success.

The globa l seg ment presents orga n isat ions w it h bot h oppor tu n it ies a nd t h reats or r isks. Because of t he t h reats a nd r isks, some orga n isat ions choose to ta ke a more caut ious approach to compet ing in international markets. These organisations par ticipate in what some refer to as ‘global focusing’. Global focusing often is used by organisations with moderate levels of international operations that increase their internationalisation by focusing on global niche markets.83 In this way, they build on and use their special competencies and resou rces wh ile lim iting t heir r isks w it h in t he n iche market. A not her way in wh ich organisations limit their risks in international markets is to focus their operations and sales in one region of the world.8 4 In this way, they can build stronger relationships in, and knowledge of, their markets. As they build these strengths, rivals find it more difficult to enter their markets and compete successfully.

In all instances, organisations competing in global markets should recognise their sociocultural and institutional att r ibutes. For example, Korean ideolog y emphasises com munitar ianism, a character istic of ma ny A sia n cou nt r ies. Korea’s approach d i ffers f rom t hose of Japa n a nd Ch i na, however, i n t hat it focuses on inhwa, or harmony. Inhwa is based on a respect for hierarchical relationships and obedience to authority. A lternatively, as noted earlier, the approach in China stresses guanxi – personal relationships or good con nections – wh ile, in Japan, t he focus is on wa, or g roup ha r mony and social cohesion.85 The institutional context of China suggests a major emphasis on centralised planning by the government. The Chinese Government provides incentives to organisations to develop alliances with foreign organisations that have sophisticated technolog y, in the hope of building knowledge and introducing new technologies to t he Ch i nese ma rkets over t i me. 86 As such, it is i mpor ta nt to a na lyse t he st rateg ic i ntent of foreig n organisations when pursuing alliances and joint ventures abroad, especially where the local par tners are receiving technolog y that in the long r un may reduce the foreign organisations’ advantages.87

The physical environment segment T he physical environment segment refers to potent ia l a nd act ua l cha nges i n t he physica l (nat u ra l) env i ron ment a nd busi ness pract ices t hat a re i ntended to posit ively respond to a nd dea l w it h t hose changes.88 Concerned with trends oriented to sustaining the world’s physical environment, organisations recog n ise t hat ecolog ica l, socia l a nd econom ic systems i nteract ively i n fluence what happens i n t h is par ticular segment.89

There are many par ts or att r ibutes of the physical env iron ment that organ isations should consider as t hey t r y to ident if y t rends i n t h is seg ment.9 0 Ma ny now a rg ue t hat cli mate cha nge is a t rend t hat organisations and nations should carefully examine in effor ts to predict any potential effects on societies globally, as well as on their business operations. Investors are seek ing to take advantage of th is t rend – ca l l i ng it ‘g reen a lpha’ – by look i ng to profit by i ncreasi ng env i ron menta l susta i nabi l it y. 91 Energ y consumption is another par t of the physical environment that concerns both organisations and nations.

Because of increasing concern about sustaining the quality of the physical environment, a number of companies are developing environmentally friendly policies. BP has established a new ambition to become a net zero emissions company by 2050 and to assist the world to achieve net zero emissions. Its ambition is suppor ted by 10 aims, released in Febr uar y 2020, and these include: net zero across BP’s operations on an absolute basis by 2050 or sooner; net zero on carbon in BP’s oil and gas production on an absolute basis by 2050 or sooner; a 50 per cent cut in the carbon intensity of products BP sells by 2050 or sooner; to install

physical environment segment refers to potential and actual changes in the physical environment and business practices that are intended to positively respond to and deal with those changes

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methane measurement at all BP’s major oil and gas processing sites by 2023 and reduce methane intensity of operations by 50 per cent; and to increase the propor tion of investment into non-oil and gas businesses over time. It includes five aims to assist the global community achieve net zero emissions, and these are: more active advocacy for policies that suppor t net zero, including carbon pricing; to fur ther incentivise BP’s work force to deliver aims and mobilise t hem to advocate for net zero; to set new ex pectat ions for relationships with trade associations; to aim to be recognised as a leader for transparency of repor ting, includ ing suppor ting t he recom mendations of t he Task Force on Climate-related Financial Disclosu res (TCFD); and launch a new team to help countries, cities and large companies decarbonise. To deliver these ambitions, BP plans to reorganise to become a more focused and more integrated company.92

As our discussion of the general environment shows, identifying anticipated changes and trends among external elements is a key objective of analysing the organisation’s general environment. With a focus on the future, the analysis of the general environment allows organisations to identify oppor tunities and threats. It is necessar y to have a senior management team with the experience, knowledge and sensitivity required to effectively analyse this segment of the environment.93 Also critical to an organisation’s choices of strategic action is an understanding of its industr y environment and its competitors; we consider these issues next.

Target (Tar-zhey) is trying to navigate in a new and rapidly changing competitive landscape

Target became known by consumers as Tar-zhey, the retailer of cheaper but ‘chic’ products. The firm offered a step up in quality goods at a slightly higher price than discount retailers such as Walmart, but was targeted below major, first-line retailers such as macy’s and nordstrom. Additionally, it promoted its stores to offer one-stop shopping with clothing, toys, health products and food goods, among other products. For many years, Tar-zhey ‘hit the bullseye’ and performed well serving this large niche in the market. But the company took its eye off the target and began losing market share (along with other poor strategic actions). The first major crack appeared with the announcement of a massive cyber attack on Target’s computer system that netted customers’ personal information. not only was this a public relations disaster, it drew a focus on Target that identified other problems. For example, careful analysis showed that Target was losing customers to established competitors and new rivals, especially internet retailers (e.g. Amazon.com).

Target’s marketing chief stated that ‘it’s not that we became insular. We were insular’. This suggests that the organisation was not analysing its environment. By allowing rivals, and especially internet competitors, to woo the company’s customers, it lost sales, market share and profits. It obviously did not predict and

prepare for the significant competition from internet rivals that is now reshaping most retail industries. Competitors were offering better value to customers (perhaps more variety and convenience through online sales). Thus, Target’s reputation and market share were simultaneously harmed.

Because of all the problems experienced, Target hired a new CEO, Brian Cornell, in 2014. Cornell made a number of changes, but the continued revolution in the industry, largely driven by Amazon, continued to gnaw away at Target’s annual sales. Target’s annual sales declined by approximately 5 per cent in 2017 and its stock price suffered as a result. Target was forced to develop a new strategy, which involved a major rebranding. It launched four new brands late in 2017, including A new Day, a fashionable line of women’s clothes, and Goodfellow & Co, a modern line of menswear, with the intent to make an emotional connection with customers. It also plans to remodel 100 of its stores and change in-store displays to improve customer experiences. It will add 30 small stores that offer innovative designs and, to compete with Amazon, is emphasising its digital sales and delivery of products. Up to now, its digital strategy has not been highly successful, so it is narrowing its focus to increase its effectiveness.

Target planned to discontinue several major brands by 2019 and will continue to introduce new brands

Strategic focus |Technology

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As described in the ‘Strategic focus’ feature, Target failed to maintain a good understanding of its industry and lost market share to internet company rivals and other more established competitors. We conclude that critical to an organisation’s choices of strategies and their associated competitive actions and responses is an understanding of its industry environment, its competitors and the general environment of the countries in which it operates. Next, we discuss the analyses organisations complete to gain such an understanding.94

Industry environment analysis A n industry is a g roup of organ isations producing products that are close substitutes. In the cou rse of compet it ion, t hese orga n isat ions i n fluence one a not her. Ty pica l ly, i ndust r ies i nclude a r ich m i x t u re of compet it ive st rateg ies t hat orga n isat ions use i n pu rsu i ng above-average ret u r ns. I n pa r t, t hese strategies are chosen because of the influence of an industr y’s characteristics.95

Compa red w it h t he ge ne ra l e nv i ron me nt , t he i ndu st r y environment has a more direct effect on the organisation’s strategic competitiveness and ability to earn above-average returns.96 A n industr y’s profit potential is a function of five forces of competition: the threats posed by new entrants, the power of suppliers, the power of buyers, product substitutes and the intensity of rivalry among competitors (see Figure 2.4).

The five forces model of compet it ion ex pa nds t he a rena for compet it ive a na lysis. H istor ica l ly, when st udy i ng t he compet it ive env i ron ment, orga n isat ion s concent rated on compa n ies w it h wh ic h t hey competed d i rec t ly. However, orga n isat ions must now sea rch more broad ly to recog n ise cu r rent a nd potent ia l compet itors by ident if y i ng potent ia l customers as wel l as t he orga n isat ions ser v i ng t hem. For example, the communications industry is now broadly defined as encompassing media companies, telecoms, enter tainment

industry a group of organisations producing products that are close substitutes

Source: ZUmA Wire/TnS/Glen Stubbe

(12 in total are planned). The intent is to increase the appeal of Target and its products to millennials. These actions alone suggest the importance of gathering and

analysing data on the market and competitors’ actions. The next few years will show the fruits of all of Target’s changes. If they are successful, Target will still face substantial competition from Amazon and Walmart; if they are not successful, Target may suffer the same fate of many other large and formerly successful retailers that no longer exist.

Sources: A. Pasquarelli, 2017, Our strategy is working: Target plows into the holidays, AdAge, http://adage.com, 19 October; S. Heller, 2017,

Target’s biggest brands are about to disappear from stores, The Insider, http://www.theinsider.com, 6 July; 2017, Rebranding its wheel: Target’s new strategy, Seeking Alpha, http://seekingalpha.com, 4 July; K. Safdar,

2017, Target’s new online strategy: Less is more, Wall Street Journal, http://www.wsj.com, 15 may; 2015, What your new CEO is reading:

Smell ya later; Target’s new CEO, CIO Journal/Wall Street Journal, http:// www.wsj.com/cio, 6 march; J. Reingold, 2014, Can Target’s new CEO

get the struggling retailer back on target? Fortune, http://www.fortune. com, 31 July; G. Smith, 2014, Target turns to PepsiCo’s Brian Cornell to

restore its fortunes, Fortune, http://www.fortune.com, 31 July; P. Ziobro, m. Langley & J. S. Lublin, 2014, Target’s problem: Tar-zhey isn’t working.

Wall Street Journal, http://www.wsj.com, 5 may.

Goodfellow & Co menswear, a new line introduced by Target in late 2017.

The five forces of competition model

Threat of new entrants

Bargaining power of suppliers

Bargaining power of buyers

Threat of substitute products

Rivalry among competing

organisations

Figure 2.4

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companies and companies producing devices such as smartphones.97 In such an environment, organisations must study many other industries to identify organisations with capabilities (especially technology-based capabilities) that might be the foundation for producing a good or a ser vice that can compete against what they are producing. Using this perspective finds organisations focusing on customers and their needs rather than on specific industr y boundaries to define markets.

W hen st udy i ng t he i ndust r y env i ron ment, orga n isat ions must a lso recog n ise t hat suppl iers ca n become an organisation’s competitors ( by integrating for ward) as can buyers ( by integrating backward). For example, several organisations have integrated for ward in the pharmaceutical industr y by acquiring distributors or wholesalers. In addition, organisations choosing to enter a new market and those producing products that are adequate substitutes for existing products can become a company’s competitors. Next, we examine the five forces the organisation analyses to understand the profitability potential within the industr y (or a segment of an industr y) in which it competes or may choose to compete.

Threat of new entrants Identifying new entrants is important because they may threaten the market share of existing competitors.98 One reason new entrants pose such a threat is that they bring additional production capacity. Unless the demand for a good or ser vice is increasing, additional capacity holds consumers’ costs down, resulting in less revenue and lower returns for competing organisations. Often, new entrants have a keen interest in gaining a large market share. As a result, new competitors may force existing organisations to be more efficient and to learn how to compete on new dimensions (e.g. using an internet-based distribution channel).

The likelihood that organisations will enter an industr y is a function of two factors: bar riers to entr y and the retaliation expected from cur rent industr y par ticipants. Entr y barriers make it difficult for new organisations to enter an industr y and often place them at a competitive disadvantage even when they are able to enter. As such, high entr y barriers tend to increase the returns for existing organisations in the industr y and may allow some organisations to dominate the industr y.99 Thus, organisations competing successfully in an industry want to maintain high entry barriers in order to discourage potential competitors from deciding to enter the industr y.

Barriers to entry Orga n isat ions compet i ng i n a n i ndust r y (a nd especia l ly t hose ea r n i ng above-average retu r ns) t r y to develop entry barriers to thwart potential competitors. For example, the server market is hypercompetitive and dominated by IBM, Hewlett-Packard and Dell. Historically, the scale economies these organisations have developed by operating efficiently and effectively have created significant entr y bar riers, causing potential competitors to think ver y carefully about entering the ser ver market to compete against them. Oracle, primarily a software-oriented company, acquired Sun Microsystems, which is primarily a ser ver hardware company, to overcome the barriers to entry that exist in this industry. Oracle intended to preload Oracle software into its new ser ver line: ‘Hardware makers such as Dell and HP are getting into software, and software companies like Oracle are getting into hardware’ because these ‘companies want to create the integrated hardware and software systems that can satisfy a cor porate customer’s ever y IT need’.10 0 The degree of success Oracle might achieve as a result of its decision to enter the ser ver market v ia an acquisition remained uncertain. By mid-2015, Oracle’s ser ver operation was part of a ‘floundering division’ that competed in a crowded marketplace. However, things turned around in 2020 with Oracle’s Gen2 Cloud Infrastr ucture, which added more customers and growing revenue at a rate of over 100 per cent per year once the bar riers to entr y into the marketplace were overcome.101

S eve r a l k i nd s of p ote nt ia l ly s ig n i f ic a nt e nt r y ba r r ie r s m ay d i scou r a ge comp e t itor s f r om entering a market.

54 PART 1: STRATEGIC MANAGEMENT INPUTS

Economies of scale Econom ies of sca le a re der ived f rom i ncrementa l efficiency i mprovements t h rough ex per ience as a n organisation grows larger. Therefore, the cost of producing each unit declines as the quantity of a product produced during a given period increases. This is the case for IBM, Hewlett-Packard and Dell in the ser ver market, as previously described.

Economies of scale may be developed in most business functions, such as marketing, manufacturing, research and development, and purchasing.102 Increasing economies of scale enhances an organisation’s flexibility. For example, an organisation may choose to reduce its price and capture a greater share of the market. A lternatively, it may keep its price constant to increase profits. In so doing, it likely will increase its free cash flow, which is ver y helpful during financially challenging times.

New entrants face a dilemma when confronting current competitors’ scale economies. Small-scale entry places them at a cost disadvantage. Given the size of Sun Microsystems relative to the three major competitors in the ser ver market, Oracle has found it easier to compete against its scale-advantaged competitors in 2020.103 Additionally, large-scale entry through such an acquisition, in which the new entrant manufactures large volumes of a product to gain economies of scale, risks strong competitive retaliation.

Some compet it ive cond it ions reduce t he ability of econom ies of scale to create an ent r y ba r r ier. Ma ny compa n ies now custom ise t hei r products for la rge nu mbers of sma l l customer g roups. Custom ised products a re not ma nu fact u red i n t he volu mes necessa r y to ach ieve econom ies of sca le. Custom isat ion is made possible by flex ible manufacturing systems (this point is discussed fur ther in Chapter 4). In fact, the new manufactu r ing tech nolog y facilitated by advanced infor mat ion systems has allowed the development of mass customisation in an increasing number of industries. A lthough it is not appropr iate for a l l products, a nd i mplement i ng it ca n be cha l leng i ng, mass customisation has become increasingly common in manufacturing products.104 Online ordering has enhanced the ability of customers to obtain customised products. Companies manufacturing customised products learn how to respond quickly to customers’ needs in lieu of developing scale economies.

Product differentiation Over time, customers may come to believe that an organisation’s product is unique. This belief can result from the organisation’s service to the customer, effective advertising campaigns or being the first to market a good or ser vice. The Coca-Cola Company and PepsiCo have established strong brands in the soft drink market and now control the carbonated soft drink industry (CSD) globally. Since 2004, Coca-Cola Company has been the market leader, according to Statista. However, in 2020 PepsiCo had a market cap of US$188.6 billion compared with Coca-Cola of US$185.8 billion. These brands compete with each other worldwide, with Coca-Cola owning 500 brands. Because each has used a great deal of resources building their brands, customer loyalty is strong. These companies battle each other for market leadership, which has changed back and for th over the years. W hen considering entr y into the soft drink market, an organisation needs to pause to examine how one can overcome the brand image and consumer loyalty to these two giants in this global industry. One needs significant resources to capture market share, although many organisations that have the resources to produce private label products, such as Woolwor ths and Coles, are doing so.

Companies such as P&G and Colgate-Palmolive spend a great deal of money on advertising and product development to convince potential customers of their products’ distinctiveness and the value their brands provide. Customers valuing a product’s uniqueness tend to become loyal to both the product and the company producing it. In turn, customer loyalty is an entry barrier for organisations thinking of entering an industry and competing against the likes of P&G and Colgate-Palmolive. To compete against organisations offering differentiated products to individuals who have become loyal customers, new entrants often allocate many

Many organisations like Woolworths produce private label products like tissues in an effort to capture market share.

Source: Dreamstime.com/Richard van Der Spuy

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resources. To combat the perception of uniqueness, new entrants frequently offer products at lower prices. This decision, however, may result in lower profits or even losses.

Capital requirements Competing in a new industr y requires an organisation to have resources to invest. In addition to physical facilities, capital is needed for inventories, marketing activities and other critical business functions. Even when a new industr y is attractive, the capital required for successful market entr y may not be available to pursue the market oppor tunity.105 For example, defence industries are difficult to enter because of the substantial resource investments required to be competitive. In addition, because of the high knowledge requirements of the defence industr y, an organisation might acquire an existing company as a means of entering this industr y, but it must have access to the capital necessar y to do this.

Switching costs Switching costs are the one-time costs customers incur when they buy from a different supplier. The costs of buying new ancillary equipment and of retraining employees, and even the psychological costs of ending a relationship, may be incurred in switching to a new supplier. In some cases, switching costs are low, such as when the consumer switches to a different brand of soft drink. Switching costs can vary as a function of time. For example, in terms of credit hours towards graduation, the cost to a student to transfer from one university to another in their first year is much lower than it is when the student is entering their final year.

Occasionally, a decision made by manufactu rers to produce a new, in novative product creates h igh switching costs for the final consumer. Customer loyalty programs, such as airlines’ frequent flyer points, are intended to increase the customer’s switching costs. If switching costs are high, a new entrant must offer eit her a substa nt ia l ly lower pr ice or a much better product to att ract buyers. Usua l ly, t he more established the relationships between par ties, the greater the switching costs.

Access to distribution channels Over t i me, i ndust r y pa r t icipa nts t y pica l ly develop effect ive mea ns of d ist r ibut i ng products. Once a relationship with its distributors has been built, an organisation will nur ture it, thus creating switching costs for the distributors. Access to distribution channels can be a strong entr y bar rier for new entrants, par ticularly in consumer non-durable goods industries (e.g. in grocer y stores where shelf space is limited) a nd i n i nter nat iona l ma rkets. New ent ra nts have to persuade d ist r ibutors to ca r r y t hei r produc ts, either in addition to or in place of those cur rently distributed. Price breaks and cooperative adver tising allowances may be used for this purpose; however, those practices reduce the new entrant’s profit potential. Interestingly, access to distribution is less of a bar rier for products that can be sold on the internet.

Cost disadvantages independent of scale Sometimes, established competitors have cost advantages that new entrants cannot duplicate. Proprietary product technolog y, favourable access to raw materials, desirable locations and government subsidies are examples. Successful competition requires new entrants to reduce the strategic relevance of these factors. Deliver ing purchases d irectly to the buyer can counter the advantage of a desirable location; new food establishments in an undesirable location often follow this practice.

Government policy Through licensing and permit requirements, governments can also control entr y into an industr y. Liquor retailing, rad io and telev ision broadcasting, ban k ing and tr uck ing are examples of industr ies in which government decisions and actions affect entr y possibilities. A lso, governments often restrict entr y into some industries because of the need to provide quality ser vice or the need to protect jobs. A lternatively, dereg ulation of industr ies, exempli fied by the airline industr ies in Australia and the USA, allows more organisations to enter.106

56 PART 1: STRATEGIC MANAGEMENT INPUTS

Expected retaliation Compan ies seek ing to enter an indust r y also anticipate t he reactions of organ isations in t he indust r y. A n ex pectat ion of sw if t a nd v igorous compet it ive responses reduces t he li kelihood of ent r y. Vigorous retaliation can be expected when the existing organisation has a major stake in the industr y (e.g. it has fixed assets with few, if any, alternative uses), when it has substantial resources and when industry growth is slow or constrained. For example, any organisation attempting to enter the airline industr y can expect significant retaliation from existing competitors due to overcapacity.

Locating market niches not being served by incumbents allows the new entrant to avoid entry barriers. Sma l l ent repreneu r ia l orga n isat ions a re genera l ly best su ited for ident i f y i ng a nd ser v i ng neglected market segments. W hen Honda fi rst entered the US motorcycle market, it concentrated on small-engine motorcycles, a market that organisations such as Harley-Davidson had ignored. By targeting this neglected n iche, Honda avoided compet it ion. A f ter consolidat i ng its posit ion, Honda used its st reng t h to attack rivals by introducing larger motorcycles and competing in the broader market. Competitive actions and compet it ive responses between organ isat ions such as Honda and Ha rley-Dav idson a re d iscussed more fully in Chapter 5.

Bargaining power of suppliers Increasing prices and reducing the quality of their products are potential means suppliers use to exert power over organisations competing within an industr y. If an organisation is unable to recover cost increases by its suppliers through its own pricing str ucture, its profitability is reduced by its suppliers’ actions. A supplier group is powerful when:

• it is dominated by a few large companies and is more concentrated than the industr y to which it sells • satisfactor y substitute products are not available to industr y organisations • industr y organisations are not a significant customer for the supplier group • suppliers’ goods are critical to buyers’ marketplace success • the effectiveness of suppliers’ products has created high switching costs for industr y organisations • it poses a credible threat to integrate forward into the buyers’ industr y. Credibility is enhanced when

suppliers have substantial resources and provide a highly differentiated product. The airline industr y is one in which suppliers’ bargaining power is changing. Though the number of

suppliers is low, the demand for major aircraft is also relatively low. Boeing and Airbus aggressively compete for orders of major aircraft, creating more power for buyers in the process. W hen a large airline signals that it might place a ‘significant’ order for wide-body airliners that either A irbus or Boeing might produce, both companies are likely to battle for the business and include a financing arrangement, highlighting the buyer’s power in the potential transaction.

Bargaining power of buyers Organ isations seek to ma x im ise the retu r n on their invested capital. Conversely, buyers (customers of an industr y or an organisation) want to buy products at the lowest possible price – the point at which the industr y earns the lowest acceptable rate of return on its invested capital. To reduce their costs, buyers ba rga i n for h igher qua l it y, g reater levels of ser v ice a nd lower pr ices.107 These outcomes a re ach ieved by encou raging competitive battles among the indust r y’s organisations. Customers ( buyer g roups) are powerful when:

• they purchase a large por tion of an industr y’s total output • t he sa les of t he product bei ng pu rchased accou nt for a sig n i fica nt por t ion of t he sel ler ’s a n nua l

revenues • they could switch to another product at little, if any, cost

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• the industr y’s products are undifferentiated or standardised, and the buyers pose a credible threat if they were to integrate backward into the sellers’ industr y.

Consumers armed with greater amounts of information about the manufacturer’s costs and the power of the internet as a shopping and distribution alternative have increased bargaining power in many industries. One reason for this shift is that individual buyers incur vir tually no switching costs when they decide to purchase from one manufacturer rather than another, or from one dealer as opposed to any other.

Threat of substitute products Substitute products are goods or ser vices from outside a given industr y that perform similar or the same f unctions as a product that the indust r y produces. For example, as a sugar substitute, NutraSweet and other sugar substitutes place an upper limit on sugar manufacturers’ prices; NutraSweet and sugar perform the same function, though with different characteristics. Other product substitutes include email instead of overnight mail deliver y, plastic containers rather than glass jars, and tea instead of coffee. Newspaper organisations have experienced significant circulation declines over the past decade or more. The declines are due to substitute outlets for news, including internet sources, cable television news channels, and email and mobile phone alerts. Likewise, satellite television and cable and telecommunication companies provide substitute ser vices for basic media ser vices such as television, the internet and the telephone. However, the possible switching is becoming more complicated as consumer demand for content is changing through increasing use of mobile devices, such as tablets and smar tphones.108

In general, product substitutes present a strong threat to an organisation when customers face few, if any, sw itching costs and when the substitute product’s pr ice is lower or its quality and per for mance capabilities are equal to or greater than those of the competing product. Differentiating a product along dimensions that customers value (such as quality, service after the sale and location) reduces a substitute’s attractiveness.

German performance/luxury cars: if you’ve seen one, have you seen them all?

Audi, BmW and mercedes-Benz (mercedes) have long competed against each other in the performance/ luxury segment of the car industry. Given that they implement similar strategies in many of the same markets throughout the world and emphasise similar dimensions to do so, these organisations form a strategic group. This means that the rivalry within the group is more intense than is the rivalry between members of this group and companies offering products that are intended to functionally serve and satisfy a mass-market appeal among large customer groups. One could even argue that three sub-strategic groups exist for these organisations in that each offers products in the large, mid-size and small parts of the performance/luxury segment. (Think of the Audi S8 versus the BmW 7 series versus the S mercedes series as products through which these organisations compete against each other in terms of large performance/luxury cars.)

The similarities among these organisations as they compete are extensive. The Chinese and US markets are critical to their success. With respect to China, an analyst noted that ‘BmW, Audi and Daimler’s mercedes- Benz units have benefited as China’s fast-growing wealthy population has flocked to high-end cars in recent years’. A new generation of younger, more eco- minded and female consumers is driving innovation in the luxury car industry. In response to this shift in demand for their products, all three organisations are investing billions of dollars to expand production and their sales operations in China.

These organisations are emphasising similar dimensions or product features to produce new models as well as some existing ones. For example, diesel engines are important to the companies and their efforts to sell more cars in China and the USA. To better serve the needs of younger consumers, all three companies are ‘re-thinking everything from dashboard

Strategic focus | Globalisation

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Intensity of rivalry among competitors Because an industr y’s organisations are mutually dependent, actions taken by one organisation usually inv ite competitive responses. In many industr ies, organisations actively compete against one another. Competitive rivalr y intensifies when an organisation is challenged by a competitor’s actions or when a company recognises an oppor tunity to improve its market position.

Organisations within industries are rarely homogeneous: they differ in resources and capabilities and seek to differentiate themselves from competitors.109 Ty pically, organisations seek to differentiate their products from competitors’ offerings in ways that customers value and in which the organisations have a competitive advantage. Common dimensions on which rivalr y is based include price, ser vice after the sale and innovation.

Ne x t, we d isc uss t he most prom i nent fac tors t hat e x per ience shows to a f fec t t he i ntensit y of organisations’ rivalries.

Numerous or equally balanced competitors Intense rivalries are common in industries with many companies. With multiple competitors, it is common for a few organisations to believe they can act without eliciting a response. However, the evidence suggests that other organisations generally are aware of competitors’ actions and often choose to respond to them. At the other extreme, industries with only a few organisations of equivalent size and power also tend to have strong rivalries. The large and often similar-sized resource bases of these organisations permit vigorous

entertainment systems to the relative importance of mileage over horsepower to fundamental marketing strategies’. An initial outcome from these evaluation processes was a decision to include smartly presented, smartphone-driven multimedia systems in models.

As is often the case with strategic groups, the rivalry and strategic moves among Audi, BMW and mercedes have remained stable over the years. As such, we can anticipate that the rivalry among them will remain intense as they rely on similar strategic dimensions to implement similar strategies. yet there is more rivalry to commence with other players in the market, such as Jaguar with its E and F Pace, and Tesla, to name a few. This industry also faces fresh competition from manufacturers specialising in all- electric cars that are encroaching in the sector; with lower barriers to entry, electric cars appear easier to design and build than traditional cars. As demographics shift, car manufacturers are becoming nimbler and taking greater risks to remain competitive. Chris Craft, Bentley’s Head of Sales and marketing, noted that new luxury car buyers won’t associate with brands they don’t feel have their values. For example, in 2016 Rolls-Royce launched its Black Badge range designed to appeal to a hip-hop and clubbing culture, rather than to its cars’ traditional owners.

Globally, the age of luxury car buyers varies dramatically. For example, in the EU, Japan and the UK, typical luxury car purchasers will be in their 50s. In California, the typical age is 35 and in China it as young as 20. These fresh-faced customers bring with them different demands, including the latest technological innovations. In addition, regardless of the gender of buyers, sales of high-end SUvs are increasing. For example, 60 per cent of Lamborghini sales in the first half of 2019 were the Urus SUv, and the company reported that buyers were trading in Range Rovers to purchase the Urus. Aston martin has strategically forecast its upcoming DBx (an SUv) will be a success.

Sources: P. Campbell, 2019, Luxury car makers are battling to cater to the changing needs of the super-rich, Financial Times,

http://www.ft.com, 31 August; B. Laban, 2003, The Mini: Making of a Modern Icon, Singapore: Collins; C. Carroll, 2013, Audi

plans to attract more U.S. buyers with diesels, Wall Street Journal, http://www.wsj.com, 8 February; v. Fuhrmans, 2013, Europe bets U.S.

auto demand to stay high, Wall Street Journal, http://www.wsj.com, 16 January; v. Fuhrmans, 2013, German auto makers to shake up l uxury market, Wall Street Journal, http://www.wsj.com, 14 January;

v. Fuhrmans & F. Geiger, 2013, vW to bolster its output in China, Wall Street Journal, http://www.wsj.com, 14 march; F. Geiger, 2013,

Daimler boosts investment in China, Wall Street Journal, http://www.wsj.com, 1 February; J. W. White, 2013,

Beyond boomer buyers: Car makers seek younger crop of customers, Wall Street Journal, http://www.wsj.com, 16 January.

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actions and responses. The competitive battles between A irbus and Boeing mentioned earlier exemplify intense rivalry between relatively equal competitors. Coca-Cola and PepsiCo have a strong rivalry in drink products as consumers demand not only great taste but real health benefits.110

Slow industry growth W hen a market is growing, organisations tr y to effectively use resources to ser ve an expanding customer base. Grow i ng ma rkets reduce t he pressu re to ta ke customers f rom compet itors. However, r iva l r y i n no-growth or slow-growth markets (slow change) becomes more intense as organisations battle to increase their market shares by attracting competitors’ customers. For example, there is a growing trend globally of competition in the health care of baby boomers, who are now aged 65 or older. Competition is also increasing in in-home health care; however, as regulation becomes more prominent in this industry (e.g. resulting from recommendations released in Febr uar y 2021 by Australia’s Royal Commission into Aged Care Quality and Safety), grow th is likely to slow and rivalr y will increase.111

Ty pically, battles to protect market share are fierce. As indicated, this has been the case in the airline industr y, as well as in the fast-food industr y as McDonald’s, Hungr y Jack’s and K FC tr y to win each other’s customers, and in the highly competitive sports footwear segment between Nike, Adidas and Reebok. The instability in markets that results from these competitive engagements may reduce the profitability for all organisations engaging in such battles.

High fixed costs or high storage costs W hen fi xed costs account for a large par t of total costs, organ isations t r y to ma x im ise the use of their product ive capacity. Doing so allows an organ isat ion to spread costs across a la rger volu me of output. However, when many organ isations attempt to ma x im ise t heir productive capacity, excess capacity is created on a n i ndust r y-w ide basis. To t hen reduce i nventor ies, i nd iv idua l orga n isat ions t y pica lly cut t he pr ice of t hei r products a nd offer rebates a nd ot her special d iscou nts to customers. However, t hese practices, such as have been common in the car manufacturing industr y, often intensify competition. The pattern of excess capacity at the industr y level, followed by intense rivalr y at the organisation level, is obser ved frequently in industries with high storage costs. Perishable products, for example, rapidly lose their value with the passage of time. As their inventories grow, producers of perishable goods often use pricing strategies to sell products quickly.

Lack of differentiation or low switching costs W hen buyers find a differentiated product that satisfies their needs, they frequently purchase the product loyally over time. Industries with many companies that have successfully differentiated their products have less rivalr y, resulting in lower competition for individual organisations. Organisations that develop and sustain a differentiated product that cannot be easily imitated by competitors often earn higher returns. However, when buyers v iew products as commod ities (i.e. as products w ith few d ifferentiated features or capabilities), rivalr y intensifies. In these instances, buyers’ purchasing decisions are based primarily on price and, to a lesser degree, ser vice. Personal computers are a commodity product. Thus, the rivalr y between Dell, Hewlett-Packard, Lenovo and other computer manufacturers is strong and these companies are always trying to find ways to differentiate their offerings (Hewlett-Packard now pursues product design as a means of differentiation). Apple has been able to maintain a differentiation strateg y through ease of use of its superb brand, products, software applications and integration capabilities with other software platforms.

High strategic stakes Competitive rivalr y is likely to be high when it is impor tant for several of the competitors to perform well in the market. For example, although it is diversified and is a market leader in other businesses, Samsung has targeted market leadership in the consumer electronics market and is doing quite well. This market

60 PART 1: STRATEGIC MANAGEMENT INPUTS

is also impor tant to Sony and other major competitors, such as Hitachi, Matsushita, NEC and Mitsubishi, suggesting that rivalr y among these competitors will remain strong.

High strategic stakes can also exist in terms of geographic locations. For example, Japanese automobile manufactu rers a re com m itted to a sig n i ficant presence in t he US ma rketplace because it is t he world’s largest single market for cars and trucks. Due to the high stakes involved in the USA for both Japanese and US manufacturers, rivalr y among the global organisations from these two countries is intense. With the excess capacity in this industr y we mentioned earlier in this chapter, there is ever y reason to believe that the rivalr y among global car manufacturers will remain intense in the foreseeable future.

High exit barriers Sometimes companies continue competing in an industry even though the returns on their invested capital are low or negative. Organisations making this choice likely face high exit barriers, which include economic, strategic and emotional factors that cause them to remain in an industr y when the profitability of doing so is questionable. Exit barriers are especially high in the airline industr y. A lthough earning even average returns is difficult for these organisations, they face substantial exit bar riers, such as their ownership of specialised assets (e.g. large aircraft).112 Common exit bar riers include the following:

• specialised assets (assets with values linked to a par ticular business or location) • fi xed costs of exit (such as labour agreements) • strategic interrelationships (relationships of mutual dependence, such as those between one business

and other parts of a company’s operations, including shared facilities and access to financial markets) • emotional bar r iers (aversion to economically justified business decisions because of fear for one’s

own career, loyalty to employees and so for th) • government and social restrictions (often based on government concerns for job losses and regional

economic effects).

Interpreting industry analyses Effective industr y analyses are products of careful study and inter pretation of data and information from multiple sources. A wealth of industr y-specific data is available to be analysed by individual companies and, because of globalisation, international markets and rivalries must be included in the organisation’s analyses. Research shows that in some industries, international variables are more important than domestic ones as deter minants of st rategic competitiveness. Fur ther more, because of the development of global markets, a countr y’s borders no longer restrict industr y str uctures. In fact, movement into international markets enhances the chances of success for new ventures as well as more established organisations.113

A na lysis of t he five forces i n t he i ndust r y a l lows t he orga n isat ion to deter m i ne t he i ndust r y ’s att ract iveness i n ter ms of t he potent ia l to ea r n adequate or super ior retu r ns. In general, t he st ronger competitive forces are, the lower the profit potential is for an industr y’s organisations. A n unattractive industry has low entry barriers, suppliers and buyers with strong bargaining positions, strong competitive threats from product substitutes and intense rivalr y among competitors. These industr y characteristics make it difficult for organisations to achieve strategic competitiveness and earn above-average returns. Conversely, an att ractive indust r y has high ent r y bar r iers, suppliers and buyers w ith little bargaining power, few competitive threats from product substitutes and relatively moderate rivalry.114 Next, we explain strategic groups as an aspect of industr y competition.

Strategic groups A set of organisations that emphasise similar strategic dimensions and use a similar strategy is called a strategic group.115 For example, the budget airline group in the Australian domestic airline industry includes

strategic group a set of organisations that emphasise similar strategic dimensions and use a similar strategy

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Virgin Australia and Jetstar. It does not include Qantas. The competition between organisations within a strategic group is greater than the competition between a member of a strategic group and companies outside that strategic group. Therefore, intra-strategic group competition is more intense than is inter- strategic group competition. In fact, more heterogeneity is evident in the performance of organisations within strategic groups than across the groups. The performance leaders within groups are able to follow strategies similar to those of other organisations in the group and yet maintain strategic distinctiveness to gain and sustain a competitive advantage.116

The ex tent of tech nolog ical leadersh ip, product quality, pr icing policies, d ist r ibut ion chan nels and customer ser vice are examples of strategic dimensions that organisations in a strategic group may treat sim ilarly. Thus, membersh ip in a par ticular st rategic g roup defi nes the essential character istics of the organisation’s strateg y.117

The notion of strategic groups can be useful for analysing an industr y’s competitive str ucture. Such analyses can be helpful in diagnosing competition, positioning and the profitability of organisations within an industr y.118 High mobility bar riers, high rivalr y and low resources among the organisations within an industry limit the formation of strategic groups.119 Research suggests that after strategic groups are formed, their membersh ip remains relatively stable over time, although some research has also exam ined how change occurs.120 Using strategic groups to understand an industr y’s competitive str ucture requires the organisation to plot companies’ competitive actions and competitive responses along strategic dimensions such as pricing decisions, product quality, distribution channels and so for th. This ty pe of analysis shows the organisation how certain companies are competing similarly in terms of how they use similar strategic dimensions.

Strategic groups have several implications. First, because organisations within a group offer similar products to the same customers, the competitive rivalr y among them can be intense. The more intense the rivalr y, the greater the threat is to each organisation’s profitability. Second, the strengths of the five industr y forces differ across strategic groups. Third, the closer the strategic groups are in terms of their strategies, the greater is the likelihood of rivalr y between the groups.

Competitor analysis The competitor env iron ment is the fi nal par t of t he exter nal env iron ment requir ing study. Competitor analysis focuses on each company against which an organisation directly competes. For example, Coca-Cola and PepsiCo, Woolwor ths and Coles, and Boeing and A irbus are keenly interested in understanding each other’s objectives, strategies, assumptions and capabilities. Indeed, intense rivalr y creates a strong need to understand competitors.121 In a competitor analysis, the organisation seeks to understand the following:

• what drives the competitor, as shown by its future objectives • what the competitor is doing and can do, as revealed by its cur rent strateg y • what the competitor believes about the industr y, as shown by its assumptions • what the competitor’s capabilities are, as shown by its strengths and weaknesses.122

Information about these four dimensions assists the organisation to prepare an anticipated response profi le for each compet itor (see Fig u re 2.5). T he resu lts of a n effect ive compet itor a na lysis help a n organisation to understand, inter pret and predict its competitors’ actions and responses. Understanding the actions of competitors clearly contributes to the organisation’s ability to compete successfully within the industr y.123 Interestingly, research suggests that executives often fail to analyse competitors’ possible react ions to compet it ive act ions t hei r orga n isat ion ta kes,12 4 placi ng t hei r orga n isat ion at a potent ia l competitive disadvantage as a result.

Cr it ica l to a n effect ive compet itor a na lysis is gat her i ng data a nd i n for mat ion t hat ca n help t he organisation understand its competitors’ intentions and the strategic implications resulting from them.125

62 PART 1: STRATEGIC MANAGEMENT INPUTS

Competitor analysis components

Response • What will our competitors do in the future? • Where do we hold an advantage over our competitors? • How will this change our relationship with our competitors?

Future objectives • How do our goals compare with our competitors’ goals? • Where will emphasis be placed in the future? • What is the attitude towards risk?

Current strategy • How are we currently competing? • Does this strategy support changes in the competitive structure?

Assumptions • Do we assume the future will be volatile? • Are we operating under a status quo? • What assumptions do our competitors hold about the industry and themselves?

Capabilities • What are our strengths and weaknesses? • How do we rate compared to our competitors?

Figure 2.5

Usef ul data and infor mation combine to for m competitor intelligence, t he set of data and infor mation t he orga n isat ion gat hers to bet ter u ndersta nd a nd a nt ic ipate compet itors’ objec t ives, st rateg ies, assumptions and capabilities. In competitor analysis, the organisation gathers intelligence not only about its competitors but also regarding public policies in countries around the world. Such intelligence facilitates an understanding of the strategic posture of foreign competitors. Through effective competitive and public policy intelligence, the organisation gains the insights needed to make effective strategic decisions on how to compete against its rivals.

When asked to describe competitive intelligence, it seems that a number of people respond with phrases such as ‘competitive spy ing’ and ‘cor porate espionage’. These ph rases denote the fact that competitive intelligence is an activity that appears to involve trade-offs.126 According to some, the reason for this is that ‘what is ethical in one country is different from what is ethical in other countries’. This position implies that the rules of engagement to follow when gathering competitive intelligence change in different contexts.127 However, organisations avoid the possibility of legal entanglements and ethical quandaries only when their competitive intelligence gathering methods are governed by a strict set of legal and ethical guidelines.128 This means that ethical behaviour and actions, as well as the mandates of relevant laws and regulations, should be the foundation on which an organisation’s competitive intelligence-gathering process is formed. We address this matter in greater detail in the next section.

W hen gathering competitive intelligence, organisations must also pay attention to the complementors of its produc ts a nd st rateg y.12 9 Complementors a re compa n ies or net work s of compa n ies t hat sel l complementar y goods or ser vices that are compatible with the focal organisation’s good or ser vice. W hen a complementor’s good or service adds value to the sale of the focal organisation’s good or service, it is likely to create value for the focal organisation.

competitor intelligence the set of data and information the organisation gathers to better understand and better anticipate competitors’ objectives, strategies, assumptions and capabilities

complementors companies or networks of companies that sell complementary goods or services that are compatible with the focal organisation’s good or service

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T here a re ma ny exa mples of orga n isat ions whose good or ser v ice complements ot her compa n ies’ of fer i ngs. For e xa mple, orga n isat ion s ma nu fac t u r i ng a f fordable home photo pr i nters complement ot her compa n ies’ ef for ts to sel l d ig ita l ca meras. I ntel a nd M ic rosof t a re perhaps t he most w idely recog n ised complementors. The M icrosof t slogan ‘Intel Inside’ demonst rates t he relat ionsh ip between two organisations that do not d irectly buy from or sell to each other but whose products have a strong complementar y relationship. A lliances among airline operations (e.g. the Star A lliance and the SkyTeam A lliance) find these companies sharing their route str uctures and customer loyalty programs as a means of complementing each other’s operations – each alliance is a network of complementors.

As our discussion shows, complementors expand the set of competitors organisations must evaluate when completing a competitor analysis. For example, sometimes complementors change, as in the purchase of Sun Microsystems by Oracle. A fter the acquisition, Oracle was no longer a complementor of Dell and HP but a competitor. Similarly, Intel and Microsoft analyse each other’s actions in that those actions might either help each organisation gain a competitive advantage or damage each organisation’s ability to exploit a competitive advantage.

Ethical considerations Organisations must follow relevant laws and regulations as well as carefully articulated ethical guidelines when gathering competitor intelligence. Industr y associations often develop lists of these practices that organisations can adopt. Practices considered both legal and ethical include: obtaining publicly available infor mation (e.g. cour t records, competitors’ help-wanted adver tisements, annual repor ts and fi nancial reports of publicly held corporations); and attending trade fairs and shows to obtain competitors’ brochures, view their exhibits and listen to discussions about their products. By contrast, certain practices (including blackmail, trespassing, hawking, eavesdropping, and stealing drawings, samples or documents) are widely viewed as unethical and often are illegal.

Some competitor intelligence practices may be legal, although an organisation must decide whether they are also ethical, given the image it desires as a corporate citizen (which is generally achieved through its own cor porate social responsibility policies and procedures). Especially with electronic transmissions, the line between legal and ethical practices can be difficult to deter mine. For example, an organisation may develop website addresses that are similar to those of its competitors and thus occasionally receive email transmissions that were intended for those competitors. This shows the challenges companies face in deciding how to gather intelligence about competitors, while simultaneously determining how to prevent compet itors f rom lea r n i ng too much about t hem. To dea l w it h t hese cha llenges, orga n isat ions shou ld establish principles and take actions that are consistent with them.

Open d iscussions of i ntel l igence-gat her i ng tech n iques may assist a n orga n isat ion to ensu re t hat employees, customers, suppl iers a nd even potent ia l compet itors u ndersta nd its conv ict ion to fol low ethical practices for gathering competitor intelligence. An appropriate guideline for competitor intelligence practices is to respect the principles of common morality and the right of competitors not to reveal cer tain information about their products, operations and strategic intentions.130

64 PART 1: STRATEGIC MANAGEMENT INPUTS

STUDy TOOLS SUMMARY LO1 The organisation’s external environment is challenging

and complex. The external environment has three major parts: the general environment (elements in the broader society that affect industries and their organisations), the industry environment (factors that influence an organisation, its competitive actions and responses, and the industry’s profit potential) and the competitor environment (in which the organisation analyses each major competitor’s future objectives, current strategies, assumptions and capabilities).

LO2 The external environmental analysis process has four steps: scanning, monitoring, forecasting and assessing. Through environmental analyses, the organisation identifies opportunities and threats.

LO3 The general environment has seven segments: demographic, economic, political/legal, sociocultural, technological, global and physical. For each segment, the organisation has to determine the strategic relevance of environmental changes and trends.

LO4 Compared with the general environment, the industry environment has a more direct effect on the organisation’s strategic actions. The five forces

model of competition comprises the threat of entry, the power of suppliers, the power of buyers, product substitutes and the intensity of rivalry among competitors. By studying these forces, the organisation can find a position in an industry where it can influence the forces in its favour or where it can buffer itself against the power of the forces in order to achieve strategic competitiveness and earn above- average returns.

LO5 Industries are populated with different strategic groups. A strategic group is a collection of organisations following similar strategies along similar dimensions. Competitive rivalry is greater within a strategic group than between strategic groups.

LO6 Competitor analysis focuses on each company against which an organisation directly competes. Critical to an effective competitor analysis is gathering data and information that can help the organisation understand its competitors’ intentions and the strategic implications resulting from them. Organisations must follow mandatory laws and regulations as well as ethical guidelines when gathering competitor intelligence.

KEY TERMS competitor intelligence

complementors

demographic segment

economic environment

general environment

global segment

industry

industry environment

opportunity

physical environment segment

political/legal segment

sociocultural segment

strategic group

technological segment

threat

REVIEW QUESTIONS 1. Why is it important for an organisation to study and

understand the external environment?

2. What are the differences between the general environment and the industry environment? Why are these differences important?

3. What are the four steps in the external environmental analysis process? What does the organisation want to learn when using this process?

4. What are the seven segments of the general environment? Explain the differences among them. Is any segment more important than another?

5. How do the five forces of competition in an industry affect its profit potential? Explain.

6. What is the importance of collecting and interpreting data and information about competitors? What practices should an organisation use to gather competitor intelligence, and why?

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EXPERIENTIAL EXERCISES

Exercise 1: Strategic group mapping If a given set of organisations emphasise similar strategic dimensions and use a similar strategy, these organisations can be said to reside in the same strategic group. Other common definitions of strategic groups typically argue that the organisations in a given industry follow similar strategies, such as pricing, degree of specialisation, research and development commitment and the like. It is also likely that organisations operating in a given industry may have very different profitability profiles, which raises the question: if one organisation is the most profitable, why don’t all the others in that industry attempt to move into the same strategic group as the industry leader?

Part 1 1. Form teams and pick an industry the team finds

interesting. A list of industries and industry leaders may be found at yahoo! Finance (http://biz.yahoo.com/ic/ ind_index.html).

2. Investigate this industry in order to create a strategic group map. you must pick the two dimensions for your map that best represent the key success factors in this industry (e.g. R&D investments, pricing, geographic reach).

3. For each organisation listed on your map, investigate its overall financial performance, not only historically, but also its five-year growth forecast. (This information is also available at yahoo! Finance and other locations.)

Part 2 Prepare a presentation to the class that discusses your findings and answers the following key issues or questions: 1. Who are the most direct competitors and on what basis

do they mostly compete? That is, why did you choose the competitive dimensions that you did?

2. How does profitability stack up between strategic groups? Which groups are most profitable, and why?

3. What would it take for an organisation to move from an underperforming (in terms of profitability) strategic group to a more profitable strategic group? How likely is it that this could happen?

4. Think about one of the organisations in a particular strategic group. Are there any opportunities for this organisation that you see because of your strategic group mapping?

5. What conclusions can you reach about why some organisations end up where they do among various strategic groups?

Exercise 2: What does the future look like? A critical ingredient in studying the general environment is identifying opportunities and threats. An opportunity is a condition in the environment that, if exploited, helps a company to achieve strategic competitiveness. In order to identify opportunities, you must be aware of trends that affect the world around us now or that are projected to do so in the future.

Thomas Fry, senior futurist at the Davinci Institute, believes that the chaotic nature of interconnecting trends and the vast array of possibilities that arise from them are somewhat akin to watching a spinning compass needle. From the way we use phones and email and recruit new workers to organisations, the climate for business is changing and shifting dramatically, and at rapidly increasing rates. Sorting out these trends and making sense of them provides the basis for opportunity decision making. Which ones will dominate and which ones will fade? Understanding this is crucial for business success.

your challenge (either individually or as a group) is to identify a trend, technology, entertainment or design that is likely to alter the way in which business is conducted in the future. Once you have identified this, be prepared to discuss which of the six dimensions of the general environment this will affect. (There may be more than one.) • Describe the impact.

• List some business opportunities that will come from this.

• Identify some existing organisations that stand to benefit.

• What, if any, are the ethical implications?

you should consult a wide variety of sources. For example, the Gartner Group and mcKinsey & Co. both produce market research and forecasts for business. There is also a host of web forecasting tools and addresses. These include TED (see http://www.ted.com for videos of its discussions), which hosts an annual conference for path- breaking new ideas. Similarly, the Davinci Institute, Institute for Global Futures and a wide range of others have their own unique visions of tomorrow’s environment.

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109. D. G. Sirmon, m. A. Hitt, J. Arregle & J. Campbell, 2010, The dynamic interplay of capability strengths and weaknesses: Investigating the bases of temporary competitive advantage, Strategic Management Journal, 31(13): 1386–1409; D. G. Sirmon, S. Gove & m. H. Hitt, 2008, Resource management in dyadic competitive rivalry: The effects of resource bundling and deployment, Academy of Management Journal, 51: 919–35.

110. C. Dieroff, 2011, Beverage trends: Consumers want it all, Prepared Foods, February: 49–55.

111. J. Tozzi, 2011, Home-care companies brace for regulation, Bloomberg Businessweek, 21 march, 60–1.

112. R. García-Castro & m. A. Ariño, 2011, The multidimensional nature of sustained competitive advantage: Test at a United States airline, International Journal of Management, 28(1): 230–48; P. Prada & m. Esterl, 2009, Airlines predict more trouble, broaden cuts, Wall Street Journal Online, http://www.wsj.com, 12 June.

113. S. nadkarni, P. Herrmann & P. Perez, 2011, Domestic mindsets and early international performance: The moderating effect of global industry conditions, Strategic Management Journal, 32(5): 510–31; S. E. Feinberg & A. K. Gupta, 2009, mnC subsidiaries and country risk: Internalization as a safeguard against weak external institutions, Academy of Management Journal, 52: 381–99.

114. m. E. Porter, 1980, Competitive Strategy, new york: Free Press.

115. S. Kaplan, 2011, Research in cognition and strategy: Reflections on two decades of progress and a look to the future, Journal of Management Studies, 48(3): 665–95; m. S. Hunt, 1972, Competition in the major home appliance industry, 1960–1970 (doctoral dissertation, Harvard University); Porter, Competitive Strategy, 129.

116. S. Cheng & H. Chang, 2009, Performance implications of cognitive complexity: An empirical study of cognitive strategic groups in semiconductor industry, Journal of Business Research, 62(12): 1311–20; G. mcnamara, D. L. Deephouse & R. A. Luce, 2003, Competitive positioning within and across a strategic group structure: The performance of core, secondary, and solitary firms, Strategic Management Journal, 24: 161–81.

117. D. Williams, C. young, R. Shewchuk & H. Qu, 2010, Strategic groupings of US biotechnology initial public offerings and a measure of their market influence, Technology Analysis & Strategic Management, 22(4): 399–415; F. Zen & C. Baldan, 2008, The strategic paths and performance of Italian mutual banks: A nonparametric analysis, International Journal of Banking, Accounting and Finance, 1: 189–214; m. W. Peng, J. Tan & T. W. Tong, 2004, Ownership types and strategic groups in an emerging economy, Journal of Management Studies, 41: 1105–29.

118. W. S. DeSarbo & R. Grewal, 2008, Hybrid strategic groups, Strategic Management Journal, 29: 293–317; m. Peteraf & m. Shanley, 1997, Getting to know you: A theory of strategic group identity, Strategic Management Journal, 18 (Special Issue): 165–86.

119. J. Lee, K. Lee & S. Rho, 2002, An evolutionary perspective on strategic group emergence: A genetic algorithm-based model, Strategic Management Journal, 23: 727–46.

120. P. Ebbes, R. Grewal & W. S. DeSarbo, 2010, Modeling strategic group dynamics: A hidden Markov approach, Quantitative Marketing and Economics, 8: 241–74; J. A. Zuniga-vicente, J. m. de la Fuente Sabate & I. S. Gonzalez, 2004, Dynamics of the strategic group membership performance linkage in rapidly changing environments, Journal of Business Research, 57: 1378–90.

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121. T. yu, m. Subramaniam & A. A. Cannella, Jr, 2009, Rivalry deterrence in international markets: Contingencies governing the mutual forbearance hypothesis, Academy of Management Journal, 52: 127–47.

122. Porter, Competitive Strategy, 49. 123. J. E. Prescott & R. Herko, 2010, TOWS: The

role of competitive intelligence, Competitive Intelligence Magazine, 13(3): 8–17; L. Capron & O. Chatain, 2008, Competitors’ resource- oriented strategies: Acting on competitors’ resources through interventions in factor markets and political markets, Academy of Management Review, 33: 97–121.

124. D. B. montgomery, m. C. moore & J. E. Urbany, 2005, Reasoning about competitive reactions: Evidence from executives, Marketing Science, 24: 138–49.

125. K. xu, S. Liao, J. Li & y. Song, 2011, mining comparative opinions from customer reviews for competitive intelligence, Decision Support Systems, 50(4): 743–54; S. Jain, 2008, Digital piracy: A competitive analysis, Marketing Science, 27: 610–26.

126. J. G. york, 2009, Pragmatic sustainability: Translating environmental ethics into competitive advantage, Journal of Business Ethics, 85: 97–109.

127. R. Huggins, 2010, Regional competitive intelligence: Benchmarking and policymaking, Regional Studies, 44(5): 639–58.

128. SCIP, 2011, SCIP Code of ethics for CI professionals, http://www.scip.org, 15 April; K. A. Sawka, 2008, The ethics of competitive intelligence, Kiplinger Business Resource

Center Online, http://www.kiplinger.com, march.

129. T. mazzarol & S. Reboud, 2008, The role of complementary actors in the development of innovation in small firms, International Journal of Innovation Management, 12: 223–53; A. Brandenburger & B. nalebuff, 1996, Co-opetition, new york: Currency Doubleday.

130. C. S. Fleisher & S. Wright, 2009, Examining differences in competitive intelligence practice: China, Japan, and the West, Thunderbird International Business Review, 51: 249–61; A. Crane, 2005, In the company of spies: When competitive intelligence gathering becomes industrial espionage, Business Horizons, 48(3): 233–40.

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71

3 The internal organisation: resources, capabilities, core competencies and competitive advantages

CH AP

TE R

Studying this chapter should provide you with the strategic management knowledge needed to: LO1 explain why organisations need to study and understand their internal

organisation LO2 define value and discuss its importance LO3 describe the differences between tangible and intangible resources LO4 define capabilities and discuss their development LO5 describe four criteria of sustainable competitive advantage used to determine

whether resources and capabilities are core competencies LO6 explain how organisations analyse the support functions and activities of the

value chain for determining where they can create value for customers.

Learning Objectives

72

To date, and perhaps surprisingly, the idea of using data strategically remains somewhat novel in some organisations. However, the reality of ‘big data’ and ‘big data analytics’ (which is ‘the process of examining big data to uncover hidden patterns, unknown correlations, and other useful information that can be used to make better decisions’) is becoming increasingly popular in business. Indeed, in the current competitive landscape, most businesses must use big data analytics (BDA) across all customer channels (mobile, web, email and physical stores) throughout their supply chain to help them become more innovative.

This is the situation for large pharmaceutical companies (the organisations often called ‘big pharma’) in that many have been working to develop a core competence in BDA. (We define and discuss core competencies in this chapter.) There are several reasons they are doing this. In addition to the vast increases in the amounts of data that must be studied and interpreted for competitive purposes, ‘health care reform and the changing landscape of health care delivery’ systems throughout the world are influencing these organisations to think about developing BDA as a core competence. Many benefits can accrue to big pharma

organisations that develop BDA as a core competence. For example, having BDA as a core competence can help an organisation quickly identify trial candidates and accelerate its recruitment, develop improved inclusion and exclusion criteria to use in clinical trials, and uncover unintended uses and indications for products. In terms of customer functionality, superior products can be provided at a faster pace as a foundation for helping patients live better and healthier lives. In developing their BDA capabilities, many of the big pharma companies are investing in artificial intelligence (AI). AI provides the capability to analyse many different sets of information. For example, AI can help analyse data on clinical trials, health records, genetic profiles and preclinical studies. AI can analyse and integrate these data to identify patterns in the data and suggest hypotheses about relationships. A new drug generally requires a decade of research and $2.6 billion of investment. And only about 5 per cent of the drugs that enter experimental research make it to the market and are successful. Eventually, it is expected that the use of AI could reduce the early research development time from four to six years to one year, not only greatly reducing the time of development but also the costs.

As we discuss in this chapter, capabilities are the foundation for developing core competencies. There are several capabilities big pharma companies need for BDA to be a core competence. Supportive architecture, the proper mix of data scientists, and ‘technology that integrates and manages new types and sources of data flexibility and scalability while maintaining the highest standards of data governance, data quality, and data security’ are examples of capabilities that big pharma need if they wish to develop BDA as a core competence. Of course, using artificial intelligence provides strong support for the application of BDA.

Having a strong BDA competence could be critical for pharmaceutical organisations in the future. Most Chinese pharmaceutical companies are medium-sized and sell generic drugs and therapeutic medicines, investing in R&D at only about 25 per cent of the amount invested by big pharma in developed countries. However, China

Large pharmaceutical companies, big data analytics, artificial intelligence and core competencies: a brave new world

OPENING CASE STUDY

AI can help analyse data on clinical trials, health records, genetic profiles and preclinical studies. China has a goal to become the world leader in AI.

Source: Shutterstock.com/Creativa Images

73CHAPTER 3 THE INTERNAL ORGANISATION: RESOURCES, CAPABILITIES, CORE COMPETENCIES AND COMPETITIVE ADVANTAGES

has a plan to develop large, competitive pharmaceutical organisations by 2025. In 2017, for example, China’s second-largest class of investments was biopharma. Interestingly, the largest Chinese investment that year was in information systems, including AI. China has a goal to become the world leader in AI.

In recent years, big pharma has been earning mediocre returns of about 3 per cent ROI, down from 10 per cent a decade earlier. Thus, big pharma executives feel pressure, especially with the initial costs of developing BDA and AI. They hope soon to be able to reduce their costs and experience higher rates of success in the development of new drugs. Until then, however, analysts are predicting record numbers of mergers and acquisitions in the pharmaceutical industry, with big pharma acquiring

successful medium-sized pharmaceuticals and biotechnology businesses.

Sources: S. Mukherjee, 2018, How big pharma is using AI to make better drugs, Fortune, http://fortune.com, 19 March; Z. Torrey, 2018,

China prepares for big pharma, http://thediplomat.com, 14 March; E. Corbett, 2018, European mid-sized pharma companies-biotechs and big

pharma? The Pharmaletter, http://www.thepharmaletter.com, 9 March; M. Jewel, 2018, Signs that 2018 will be a record year for pharma M&A, The

Pharmaletter, http://www.thepharmaletter.com, 1 March; B. Nelson, 2018, Why big pharma and biotech are betting big on AI, NBC News, http://www.

nbc.news, 1 March; Big data analytics: What it is & why it matters, 2015, SAS, http://www.sas.com, 2 April; Big data for the pharmaceutical industry,

Informatica, http://www.informatica.com, 17 March; B. Atkins, 2015, Big data and the board, Wall Street Journal Online, http://www.wsj.com, 16

April; S. F. DeAngelis, 2014, Pharmaceutical big data analytics promises a healthier future, Enterrasolutions, http://www.enterrasolutions.com, 5 June; T. Wolfram, 2014, Data analytics has big pharma rethinking its core

competencies, Forbes Online, http://www.forbes.com, 22 December.

As discussed in the first two chapters, several factors in the global economy, including the rapid development of the internet’s capabilities1 and globalisation in general, have made it increasingly difficult for organisations to find ways to develop sustainable competitive advantages.2 Increasingly, innovation appears to be a vital path to efforts to develop competitive advantages, particularly sustainable ones. Innovative actions are required by big pharma companies, and they need to develop new drugs more quickly and at lower costs while improving the success of the drugs that they develop. As the opening case shows, they are tr ying to use A I to help develop capabilities in big data analy tics that hopefully can become core competencies.

As is the case for big pharma companies, innovation is critical to most organisations’ success. This means that many organisations seek to develop innovation as a core competence. We define and discuss core competencies in this chapter and explain how organisations use their resources and capabilities to form them. As a core competence, innovation has long been critical to Boeing’s success, for example. Today, however, the organisation is focusing on incremental innovations as well as developing new technologies that are linked to major innovations and the projects they spawn, such as the 787 Dreamliner. The first delivery of the 787-10 Dreamliner was made to Singapore Airlines on 26 March 2018. Boeing believes its incremental innovations enable the organisation to deliver reliable products to customers more quickly and at a lower cost. 3

To identify and successfully use resources over time, leading organisations need to think constantly about how to manage resources for the purpose of increasing the value their goods or services create for customers, as compared with the value rivals’ products create. As this chapter shows, organisations achieve strategic competitiveness and earn above-average returns by acquiring, bundling and leveraging their resources for the purpose of taking advantage of opportunities in the external environment in ways that create value for customers.4

Even if t he orga n isat ion develops a nd ma nages resou rces i n ways t hat create core competencies and competitive advantages, competitors will eventually learn how to duplicate the benefits of any organisation’s value-creating strategy; thus, all competitive advantages have a limited life.5 Because of this, the question of duplication of a competitive advantage is not if it will happen, but when. In general, a compet it ive adva ntage’s susta i nabi l it y is a f u nct ion of t h ree factors: t he rate of core competence obsolescence because of environmental changes; the availability of substitutes for the core competence; and the imitability of the core competence.6 For all organisations, the challenge is to effectively manage current core competencies while simultaneously developing new ones.7 Only when organisations are able

value measured by a product’s performance characteristics and by its attributes for which customers are willing to pay

74 PART 1: STRATEGIC MANAGEMENT INPUTS

to do this can they expect to achieve strategic competitiveness, earn above-average returns and remain ahead of competitors (see Chapter 5).

We studied the general, industry and competitor environments in Chapter 2. Armed with knowledge about the realities and conditions of their external environment, organisations have a better understanding of ma rketplace oppor tu n it ies a nd t he cha racter ist ics of t he compet it ive env i ron ment i n wh ich t hose opportunities exist. In this chapter, we focus on the organisation itself. By analysing its internal organisation, an organisation determines what it can do. Matching what an organisation can do (a function of its resources, capabilities and core competencies in the internal organisation) with what it might do (a function of oppor tunities and threats in the external environment) is a process that yields insights the organisation requires to select its strategies.

We begin this chapter by briefly describing conditions associated with analysing the organisation’s i nter na l orga n isat ion. We t hen d isc uss t he roles of resou rces a nd capabi l it ies i n developi ng core competencies, which are the sources of the organisation’s competitive advantages. Included in this discussion are the techniques organisations use to identify and evaluate resources and capabilities, and the criteria for identifying core competencies from among them. Resources by themselves ty pically are not competitive advantages; in fact, resources create value when the organisation uses them to form capabilities, some of which become core competencies, and hopefully competitive advantages. Because of the relationship among resources, capabilities and core competencies, we also discuss the value chain and examine four criteria that organisations use to determine if their capabilities are core competencies and, as such, sources of competitive advantage.8 The chapter closes with cautionary comments about outsourcing and the need for organisations to prevent their core competencies from becoming core rigidities. The existence of core rigidities indicates that the organisation is too anchored to its past, which prevents it from continuously developing new capabilities and core competencies.

Analysing the internal organisation The context of internal analysis One of the conditions associated with analysing the internal organisation is the reality that, in today’s global economy, some of the resources that were traditionally critical to organisations’ efforts to produce, sell and distribute their goods or services – such as labour costs, access to financial resources and raw materials, and protected or regulated markets – are still important; however, it is now less likely that these resources will become core competencies and possibly competitive advantages.9 An important reason for this is that an increasing number of organisations are using their resources to form core competencies through which they successfully implement an international strategy (discussed in Chapter 8) as a means of overcoming the advantages created by these more traditional resources.

The Volkswagen Group has established a ‘Together 2025 + Group Strategy’, replacing its ‘Strategy 2018’ as its international strategy. This organisation sells its products in over 150 countries, employs (including its Chinese joint venture) around 667 748 people worldwide to operate over 60 production plants located in 15 countries. In 2019, the Volkswagen Group delivered close to 11 million vehicles to customers, which exceeded the previous year’s figures by 1.3 per cent and set a new organisational record.10

Increasingly, those analysing their organisation’s internal organisation use a global mindset to do so. A global mindset is the ability to analyse, understand and manage an internal organisation in ways that are not dependent on the assumptions of a single country, culture or context.11 Because they are able to span artificial boundaries, those with a global mindset recognise that their organisations must possess resources and capabilities that allow understanding of, and appropriate responses to, competitive situations that are influenced by country-specific factors and unique cultures. Using a global mindset to analyse the internal organisation has the potential to significantly help the organisation in its efforts to outperform rivals.12

outsourcing the purchase of a value-creating activity from an external supplier

global mindset the ability to study an internal environment in ways that are not dependent on the assumptions of a single country, culture or context

75CHAPTER 3 THE INTERNAL ORGANISATION: RESOURCES, CAPABILITIES, CORE COMPETENCIES AND COMPETITIVE ADVANTAGES

Finally, analysing internal organisation requires that evaluators examine the organisation’s entire portfolio of resources and capabilities. This perspect ive suggests t hat i nd iv idua l orga n isat ions possess at least some resources and capabilities that other companies do not – at least not in the same combination. Resources are the source of capabilities, some of which lead to the development of core competencies; in turn, some core competencies may lead to a competitive advantage for the organisation.13 Understanding how to leverage the organisation’s unique bundle of resources and capabilities is a key outcome decision makers seek when analysing the internal organisation.14 Figure 3.1 illustrates the relationships among resources, capabilities, core competencies and competitive advantages, and shows how their integrated use can lead to strategic competitiveness. As we discuss next, organisations use the assets in their internal organisation to create value for customers.

Creating value Organ isations use t heir resou rces as t he fou ndation for producing goods or ser vices that will create value for customers.15 Organisations create value by innovatively bundling and leveraging their resources to form capabilities and core competencies.16

O rga n isat ion s w it h a compet it ive adva ntage c reate more va lue for customers than do their competitors.17 Big W, Kmart and Target have used their ‘everyday low price’ approach to doing business (an approach that is grounded in the organisations’ core competencies, such as lower priced products and

d ist r ibut ion cha n nels) to create value for t hose seek ing to buy products at a low pr ice compa red w it h competitors’ prices for those products.18 Australian mattress manufacturer Koala creates value for customers

This Volkswagen technician is one of nearly 700 000 people Volkswagen employs to operate its 62 production plants located in 15 European countries and China by way of a joint venture.

Source: Alamy Stock Photo/dpa picture alliance

Resources • Tangible • Intangible

• Valuable • Rare • Costly to imitate • Non-substitutable

• Outsource

Capabilities

Core competencies

Competitive advantage

Strategic competitiveness

Discovering core

competencies

Four criteria of sustainable

advantage

Value chain analysis

Figure 3.1 Components of an internal analysis

76 PART 1: STRATEGIC MANAGEMENT INPUTS

interested in buying what the organisation promotes as ‘a better sleep starts with Koala’ and is now rated as Australia’s highest-rated mattress brand. The organisation has diversified its single product range of selling mattresses to making furniture for the digital age. Koala states that it has replaced negative and unattractive industry practices, such as overpricing and showrooms, with a complete experience from high- tech design through to instant deliver y. Combining furniture with the internet is likely to prove a source of competitive advantage for Koala into the future.19 The stronger such organisations’ core competencies, the greater the amount of value they are able to create for their customers.20

Ultimately, creating value for customers is the source of above-average returns for an organisation. What the organisation intends regarding value creation affects its choice of business-level strategy (see Chapter 4) and its organisational structure (see Chapter 11).21 In the discussion of business-level strategies in Chapter 4, we note that value is created by a product’s low cost, by its highly differentiated features or by a combination of low cost and high differentiation, compared with competitors’ offerings. A business- level strategy is effective only when it is grounded in exploiting the organisation’s capabilities and core competencies. Thus, the successful organisation continuously examines the effectiveness of current capabilities and core competencies while thinking about the capabilities and competencies it will require for future success.22

At one time, the organisation’s efforts to create value were largely oriented to understanding the characteristics of the industry in which it competed and, in light of those characteristics, determining how it should be positioned relative to competitors. This emphasis on industry characteristics and competitive strategy underestimated the role of the organisation’s resources and capabilities in developing core competencies as the source of competitive advantages. In fact, core competencies, in combination with product-market positions, are the organisation’s most important sources of competitive advantage.23 An organisation’s core competencies, integrated with an understanding of the results of studying the conditions in the external environment, should drive the selection of strategies.24 As Clay ton Christensen noted, ‘Successful strategists need to cultivate a deep understanding of the processes of competition and progress and of the factors that undergird each advantage. Only thus w ill they be able to see when old advantages are poised to disappear and how new advantages can be built in their stead’.25 By emphasising core competencies when selecting and implementing strategies, companies learn to compete primarily on the basis of organisation-specific differences. However, while doing so, they must be simultaneously aware of how things are changing in the exter nal env iron ment.26

The challenge of analysing the internal organisation The strategic decisions managers make about their organisation’s internal organisation are non-routine,27 have ethical implications28 and significantly influence the organisation’s ability to earn above-average returns. 29 These decisions involve choices about the resources the organisation needs to collect and how to best manage them.

Making decisions involving the organisation’s assets – identifying, developing, deploying and protecting resources, capabilities and core competencies – may appear to be relatively easy. However, this task is as challenging and difficult as any other with which managers are involved; moreover, it is a task that is being increasingly inter nationalised.30 Some believe t hat t he pressu re on managers to pu rsue on ly decisions that assist the organisation meet the quarterly earnings expected by market analysts makes it difficult to accurately examine the organisation’s internal organisation. 31

The challenge and difficulty of making effective decisions is implied by preliminary evidence suggesting that one-half of organisational decisions fail.32 Sometimes, mistakes are made as the organisation analyses conditions in its internal organisation.33 Managers might, for example, think a capability is a core competence when it is not. This may have been the case at Polaroid Corporation when decision makers continued to believe that the capabilities it used to build its instant film cameras were highly relevant at the time its competitors were developing and using the capabilities required to introduce digital cameras. In this instance, Polaroid’s decision makers may have concluded that superior manufacturing was a core competence, as was the organisation’s

77CHAPTER 3 THE INTERNAL ORGANISATION: RESOURCES, CAPABILITIES, CORE COMPETENCIES AND COMPETITIVE ADVANTAGES

ability to innovate in terms of creating value-adding features for its instant cameras. If a mistake is made when analysing and managing an organisation’s resources, such as appears to have been the case at Polaroid, decision makers must have the confidence to admit it and take corrective actions.34

An organisation may improve by studying its mistakes; in fact, the learning generated by making and correcting mistakes can be important to efforts to create new capabilities and core competencies. 35 A study by the Australian Centre for Business Growth, which examined the failure of Australian business leaders, linked lack of leadership and management, lack of planning and execution as the key reasons.36

As we discuss next, three conditions – uncertainty, complexity and intra- organisational conflict – affect managers as they analyse the internal organisation and make decisions about resources (see Figure 3.2).37

Managers face uncertainty because of a number of issues, including those of new proprietary technologies, rapidly changing economic environments such as those experienced during the Covid-19 pandemic, and political trends, transformations in societal values and sh if ts in customers’ demands.38 Env i ron mental u ncer tainty increases the complexity and range of issues to examine when studying the internal environment.39 For example, consider the way uncertainty affects how to use resources at Peabody.

Peabody is the world’s largest private-sector coal company listed on the New York Stock Exchange. The organisation’s coal products fuel approximately 11 per cent of all US electricity generation and 2 per cent of worldwide electricity. It conducts its

operations in both the USA and Australia and has over 6600 employees across its global operations. Its mission is to create superior value for shareholders as the leading global supplier of coal to enable economic prosperity and a better quality of life. However, in 2011, the organisation faced a loss in market share to companies operating cost-efficient surface mining operations. Today it still continues to face a great deal of uncer tainty with respect to how it might best use its resources to prepare for the future. One reason for

At one time, Polaroid’s cameras created a significant amount of value for customers. Poor decisions may have contributed to the organisation’s subsequent inability to create value and its initial filing for bankruptcy in 2001.

Source: Getty Images/claudio.arnese

Condition Uncertainty regarding characteristics of the general and the industry environments, competitors’ actions and customers’ preferences

Condition Complexity regarding the interrelated causes shaping an organisation’s environments and perceptions of the environments

Condition Intraorganisational conflicts among people making managerial decisions and those affected by them

 Conditions affecting managerial decisions about resources, capabilities and core competencies

Source: Adapted from R. Amit & P. J. H. Schoemaker, 1993, Strategic assets and organizational rent, Strategic Management Journal, 14: 33.

Figure 3.2

78 PART 1: STRATEGIC MANAGEMENT INPUTS

this is that, for many, coal is thought of as a ‘dirty fuel’. Partly to reduce the uncertainty the organisation faces because of this, Peabody is using some of its resources to build a ‘clean’ coal-fired plant and has signed two agreements to develop clean coal in China (where air purity is a hot topic). As a proponent of strong emissions standards, Peabody’s leaders argue for more use of ‘clean coal’. One of these agreements calls for Peabody and its partners to develop a green coal energy campus, including a 1200-megawatt power plant that will capture carbon dioxide and conver t it into green building materials.40 The complexity of the decisions Peabody is making to reduce uncertainty (such as working with partners in China) is quite significant. In 2016, Peabody experienced greater uncertainty when it filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy protection. A year later, the organisation had recovered from bankruptcy and started to trade on the New York Stock Exchange in 2017. Peabody was ranked number 582 on the Fortune 500 list released in 2020.41

Biases about how to cope with uncertainty affect decisions made about how to manage the organisation’s resou rces a nd capabilit ies to for m core competencies.4 2 For example, Peabody’s CEO strongly believes in coal’s future, suggesting that automobiles capable of burning coal could be built. Finally, intra- organisational conflict may surface when decisions are made about the core competencies an organisation should develop and nurture. Conflict might surface in Peabody about the degree to which resources and capabilities should be used to form core competencies to suppor t current coal technologies relative to the building of core competencies to support newer ‘clean technologies’.

Environmental uncertainty (including the Covid-19 pandemic) increases the complexity and range of issues to examine when studying the internal environment. The pandemic current forecast for the last quarter of 2020 includes a 13–32 per cent decline in merchandise trade, a 30–40 per cent decrease in foreign direct investment and an 80 per cent drop in international airline passengers in 2020. It is forecast also that trade flows will undo globalisation future considerations, including researching global growth patterns, supply chain examinations and technological shifts.4 3 In making decisions affected by these three conditions, judgement is required. Judgement is the capability of making successful decisions when no obviously correct model or r ule is available or when relevant data are unreliable or incomplete. In such situations, decision makers must be aware of possible cognitive biases, such as overconfidence. Individuals who are too confident in the decisions they make about how to use the organisation’s resources may fail to fully evaluate contingencies that could affect those decisions.44

When exercising judgement, decision makers often take intelligent risks. In the current competitive landscape, executive judgement can become a valuable capability. One reason is that, over time, effective judgement allows an organisation to build a strong reputation and retain the loyalty of stakeholders whose support is linked to above-average returns.45

Finding individuals who can make the most successful decisions about using the organisation’s resources is challenging. Being able to do this is important because the quality of leaders’ decisions regarding resources and their management affect an organisation’s ability to achieve strategic competitiveness. Individuals holding these key decision-making positions are called strategic leaders. This is discussed fully in Chapter 12, but for our purposes in this chapter we can think of strategic leaders as individuals with an ability to make effective decisions when examining the organisation’s resources, capabilities and core competencies for the purpose of making choices about their use.

Next, we consider the relationships among an organisation’s resources, capabilities and core competencies. While reading these sections, keep in mind that organisations have more resources than capabilities, and more capabilities than core competencies.

Resources, capabilities and core competencies Resources, capabilities and core competencies are the foundation of competitive advantage. Resources are bundled to create organisational capabilities. In turn, capabilities are the source of an organisation’s core

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Tangible and intangible resources as the base for core competencies

While tangible resources are important, intangible resources are perhaps even more important in the development of an organisation’s core competencies. Understandably, most professional service organisations have few tangible resources, but they can have high market value primarily because of their intangible resources. For example, Herbert Smith Freehills is a premier commercial law firm located in Melbourne, Australia, and is one of the world’s leading professional service businesses. Its aim is to provide superior legal services to its clients. Within this broad framework, however, there is a core competence. The organisation provides legal advice and support for commercial business, and corporate transactions for large institutions, high-net-worth individuals and privately owned businesses. For example, in 2019 it provided the legal services to represent AustralianSuper on its US$1 billion investment in India’s national investment and infrastructure fund. This complex transaction required lengthy negotiations with a multi- level corporate legal team.

It is important to note that organisations’ reputations are often significant intangible assets; for example, professional service organisations must be considered not only highly knowledgeable in the areas in which they compete, but also must be considered honest and highly trustworthy. Organisations can also enhance intangible assets, such as their reputation, through use of their core competencies. For example, in the aftermath of the Australian bushfires in 2019–20, Andrew ‘Twiggy’ Forrest pledged A$70 million to bushfire recovery efforts and stated that leading by

Generous corporate philanthropy benefits Australian bushfire victims.

Source: AAP Image/Richard Wainwright

example is more important than preaching to people. Other significant contributors to the bushfire recovery included NewsCorp, Crown, National Australia Bank, Earth Alliance, the Australian Football League and BHP. Such contributions assist organisations in strengthening their local brand and demonstrate that they are practising corporate social responsibility within their community.

Sources: Herbert Smith Freehills, 2020, Herbert Smith Freehills named as one of the top international law firms for India for

India-related work for the 12th consecutive year, http://www. Herbertsmithfreehills.com, 27 August; D. Taylor & L. Mottram, 2020, Australian bushfire donations from big business worth millions but

charities warn long term assistance needed, ABC News online, PM, 10 January, updated 11 January.

Strategic focus |General

competencies, which are the basis of establishing competitive advantages.46 We show these relationships in Figure 3.1. Here, we define and provide examples of these building blocks of competitive advantage.

Resources Broad in scope, resources cover a spectrum of individual, social and organisational phenomena.47 By themselves, resources do not allow organisations to create value for customers as the foundation for earning above-average returns. Indeed, resources are combined to form capabilities.48 The fast-food company Subway links its fresh ingredients with several other resources, including the continuous training it provides to those running the organisation’s units, as the foundation for customer service as a capability. As its sole distribution channel, the internet is a resource for Amazon. The organisation uses the internet to sell goods at prices that typically are lower than those offered by competitors selling the same goods

80 PART 1: STRATEGIC MANAGEMENT INPUTS

through what are more costly bricks-and-mortar shopfronts. By combining other resources (such as access to a wide product inventory), Amazon has developed a reputation for excellent customer service. Amazon’s capability in terms of customer service is a core competence as well, in that the organisation creates unique value for customers through the services it provides to them. Amazon was ranked in 2020 as being in the top five recognisable brands globally. The brand itself has become a core competency. Amazon also uses its technological core competence to offer AWS (Amazon Web Services), through which businesses can rent computing power from Amazon at a cost of cents per hour. In the words of the leader of this effort, ‘AWS makes it possible for anyone with an internet connection and a credit card to access the same kind of world- class computing systems that Amazon uses to run its multi-billion-a-year operation’.49 In January 2020, Amazon reported a profit of US$87.4 billion in the fourth quarter 2019, and a net income of US$3 billion. AWS was up 34 per cent, and subscriptions had increased 32 per cent.50

Some of an organisation’s resources (defined in Chapter 1 as inputs to the organisation’s production process) are tangible, while others are intangible. Tangible resources are assets that can be obser ved and quantified. Production equipment, manufacturing facilities, distribution centres and formal reporting structures are examples of tangible resources; for example, Peabody’s factories, location and coal are tangible resources. Intangible resources are assets that are rooted deeply in the organisation’s histor y and have accumulated over time. Because they are embedded in unique patterns of routines, intangible resources are difficult for competitors to analyse and imitate. Knowledge, trust between managers and employees, managerial capabilities, organisational routines (the unique ways people work together), scientific capabilities, the capacity for innovation, brand name, the organisation’s reputation for its goods or services, how it interacts with people (such as employees, customers and suppliers) and organisational cu ltu re a re i nta ng ible resou rces. 51 The reputation for reliability of Amazon or Apple is an example of an intangible resource. The four primary categories of tangible resources are financial, organisational, physical and technological (see Table 3.1). The three primary categories of intangible resources are human, innovation and reputational (see Table 3.2).

tangible resources assets that can be seen and quantified

intangible resources assets that generally are rooted deeply in the organisation’s history and have accumulated over time

Tangible resources

Financial resources • The organisation’s capacity to borrow • The organisation’s ability to generate funds through internal

operations

Organisational resources

• Formal reporting structures

Physical resources • The sophistication of an organisation’s plant and equipment and the attractiveness of its location

• Distribution facilities • Product inventory

Technological resources

• Availability of technology-related resources such as trade secrets

Sources: Adapted from J. B. Barney, 1991, Firm resources and sustained competitive advantage, Journal of Management, 17: 101; R. M. Grant, 1991,Contemporary Strategy Analysis, Cambridge,

UK: Blackwell Business, 100–2.

Table 3.1

81CHAPTER 3 THE INTERNAL ORGANISATION: RESOURCES, CAPABILITIES, CORE COMPETENCIES AND COMPETITIVE ADVANTAGES

Intangible resources

Human resources • Knowledge • Trust • Skills • Abilities to collaborate with others

Innovation resources • Ideas • Scientific capabilities • Capacity to innovate

Reputational resources

• Brand name • Perceptions of product quality, durability and reliability • Positive reputation with stakeholders such as suppliers and

customers

Sources: Adapted from R. Hall, 1992, The strategic analysis of intangible resources, Strategic Management Journal, 13: 136–9; R. M. Grant, 1991,Contemporary Strategy Analysis,

Cambridge, UK: Blackwell Business, 101–4.

Table 3.2

Tangible resources As tangible resources, an organisation’s borrowing capacity and the status of its physical facilities are visible. The value of many tangible resources can be established through financial statements; however, these statements do not account for the value of all the organisation’s assets because they disregard some intangible resources.52 The value of tangible resources is also constrained because they are hard to leverage; that is, it is difficult to derive additional business or value from a tangible resource.

Although production assets are tangible, many of the processes necessary to use these assets, such as human capital, are intangible. Thus, the learning and potential proprietary processes associated with a tangible resource, such as manufacturing facilities, can have unique intangible attributes, such as quality control processes, manufacturing processes and technologies that develop over time.53

Intangible resources Compared to tangible resources, intangible resources are a superior source of capabilities and, subsequently, core competencies.54 In fact, in the global economy, ‘the success of a corporation lies more in its intellectual and systems capabilities than in its physical assets. [Moreover], the capacity to manage human intellect – and to convert it into useful products and services – is fast becoming the critical executive skill of the age’.55

Because intangible resources are less visible and more difficult for competitors to understand, purchase, imitate or substitute for, organisations prefer to rely on them rather than on tangible resources as the foundation for their capabilities. In fact, the more unobservable (i.e. intangible) a resource is, the more valuable that resource is to create capabilities.56 Another benefit of intangible resources is that, unlike most tangible resources, their use can be leveraged. For instance, sharing knowledge among employees does not diminish its value for any one person. To the contrary, two people sharing their individualised knowledge sets often can be leveraged to create additional knowledge that, although new to each individual, contributes to performance improvements for the organisation.

Reputational resources (see Table 3.2) are important sources of an organisation’s capabilities and core competencies. Indeed, some argue that a positive reputation can even be a source of competitive advantage, as it is for Apple.57 Earned through the organisation’s actions as well as its words, a value- creating reputation is a product of years of superior marketplace competence as perceived by stakeholders.58 A reputation indicates the level of awareness an organisation has been able to develop among stakeholders and the degree to which they hold the organisation in high esteem. 59

82 PART 1: STRATEGIC MANAGEMENT INPUTS

A well-known and highly valued brand name is a specific reputational resource.60 A cont i nu i ng commitment to innovation and aggressive advertising facilitates organisations’ efforts to take advantage of the reputation associated with their brands.61 Harley-Davidson has a reputation for producing and servicing high-quality motorcycles with unique designs. The company also produces a wide range of accessory items that it sells on the basis of its reputation for offering unique products with high quality. Sunglasses, jewellery, belts, wallets, shirts, slacks and hats are just a few of the accessories customers can purchase from a Harley-Davidson dealer or from its online store.62

Capabilities The organisation combines individual tangible and intangible resources to create capabilities. In turn, capabilities are used to complete the organisational tasks required to produce, distribute and service the goods or ser vices the organisation provides to customers for the pur pose of creating value for them.63 As a foundation for building core competencies and hopefully competitive advantages, capabilities are often based on developing, carrying and exchanging information and knowledge through the organisation’s human capital.64 Hence, the value of human capital in developing and using capabilities and, ultimately, core competencies cannot be overstated.65 In fact, it seems to be ‘well known that human capital makes or breaks companies’.66 At pizza-maker Domino’s, human capital is critical to the organisation’s efforts to change how it competes. Describing this, CEO Patrick Doyle says that, in many ways, Domino’s is becoming ‘a tech company … that sell pizzas’.67

As illustrated in Table 3.3, capabilities are often developed in specific functional areas (such as manufacturing, R&D and marketing) or in a part of a functional area (such as advertising). Table 3.3 shows a grouping of organisational functions and the capabilities that some companies are thought to possess in terms of all or par ts of those functions.

Core competencies Defined in Chapter 1, core competencies are capabilities that serve as a source of competitive advantage for an organisation over its rivals. Core competencies distinguish a company competitively and reflect its personality. Core competencies emerge over time through an organisational process of accumulating and learning how to deploy different resources and capabilities.68 As the capacity to take action, core competencies are the ‘crown jewels of a company’, the activities the organisation performs especially well compared with competitors and through which the organisation adds unique value to the goods or services it sells to customers.69 Thus, if a big pharma company (such as Pfizer) developed big data analytics as a core competence, one could conclude that the organisation had formed capabilities through which it was able to analyse and effectively use huge amounts of data in a competitively superior manner.

Innovation is thought to be a core competence at Apple, Google, Facebook, Amazon, Alphabet and Netflix. As a capability, research and development (R&D) activities are the source of this core competence. More specifically, the way Apple has combined some of its tangible (e.g. financial resources and research laboratories) and intangible (e.g. scientists and engineers and organisational routines) resources to complete R&D tasks creates a capability in R&D. By emphasising its R&D capability, Apple is able to innovate in ways that create unique value for customers in the form of the products it sells, suggesting that innovation is a core competence for Apple.

Excellent customer service in its retail stores is another of Apple’s core competencies. In this instance, u n ique a nd contempora r y store desig ns (a ta ng ible resou rce) a re combi ned w it h k nowledgeable a nd skilled employees (an intangible resource) to provide superior ser vice to customers. A number of carefully developed t rai n i ng a nd development procedu res a re capabilit ies on wh ich Apple’s core competence of excellent customer service is based. The procedures that are capabilities include ‘intensive control of how employees interact with customers, scripted training for on-site tech support and consideration of every store detail down to the pre-loaded photos and music on demo devices’.70

83CHAPTER 3 THE INTERNAL ORGANISATION: RESOURCES, CAPABILITIES, CORE COMPETENCIES AND COMPETITIVE ADVANTAGES

Examples of organisations’ capabilities

Functional areas Capabilities Examples of organisations

Distribution • Effective use of logistics management techniques

• Woolworths • IKEA

Human resources • Motivating, empowering and retaining employees

• Microsoft • Southwest Airlines

Management information systems

• Effective and efficient control of inventories through point-of-purchase data-collection methods

• Coles

Marketing • Effective promotion of brand-name products

• Effective customer service • Innovative merchandising

• Procter & Gamble (P&G) • Ralph Lauren Corp. • McKinsey & Co. • RM Williams

Management • Ability to envision the future of clothing • Zara

Manufacturing • Design and production skills yielding reliable products

• Product and design quality • Miniaturisation of components and

products

• Komatsu • Sony

Research and development

• Innovative technology • Development of sophisticated lift-

control solutions • Rapid transformation of technology into

new products and processes • Digital technology

• Caterpillar • Otis Elevator Co. • Cochlear • Apple • Amazon • Netflix • Google • Alphabet • Facebook

Table 3.3

Consumer products giant P&G sells branded products that it values as superior quality and value to customers located in more than 180 countries and generating billions of dollars in annual sales revenue. Net sales in the third quarter of the 2020 fiscal year were US$17.2 billion, up 5 per cent compared with the previous year. While its Beauty and Grooming segments only increased nominally, its Skin and Personal Health Care, Fabric Care and Home Care segments increased by 10 per cent for the quarter.71 P&G has numerous tangible and intangible resources that are used to form capabilities, some of which are core competencies. Interestingly, even in light of its size and scale (in terms of the number of products sold and the organisation’s encompassing geographic reach), P&G has perhaps five core competencies (labelled core strengths by the organisation).

Building core competencies Two tools assist organisations to identify their core competencies. The first consists of four specific criteria of sustainable competitive advantage that can be used to determine which capabilities are core competencies. Because the capabilities shown in Table 3.3 have satisfied these four criteria, they are

84 PART 1: STRATEGIC MANAGEMENT INPUTS

Procter & Gamble: using capabilities and core competencies to create value for customers

Guided by its slogan of ‘Touching lives, improving life’, P&G is known throughout the world for its stable of consumer brands. Organised within 10 global business categories (Skin and Personal Health Care), Fabric Care and Home Care, Grooming, Beauty, Hair Care, Baby and Feminine Care, Oral Care and Family Care are just a few of the categories. Eight of the 10 global categories held or experienced growth in 2019.

The organisation has 97 000 employees (compared with 135 000 in 2007); a whopping 3500 products produced in 25 manufacturing plants predominantly located in the US and 14 customer business centres; and it has grown its customer base to five billion, with its largest brand reportedly being Pantene hair care products.

How have these achievements been realised? According to company officials and analysts, in part it was done through plans to move quickly and broadly into developing countries such as China and India, and to produce products that would appeal to new but lower-income customers. Of course, efforts simultaneously continued to satisfy the needs of P&G’s huge stable of current customers. These actions appear to support the view that P&G is an effective competitor that continuously seeks growth through its competitive actions.

P&G relies on its capabilities and core competencies to satisfy current customers and to develop products to serve the needs of new customers. Typically, P&G likes to use its capabilities and competencies to grow organically rather than through mergers and acquisitions or through cooperative relationships. In the words of a previous P&G CEO: ‘Organic growth is more valuable because it comes from your core competencies. Organic growth exercises your innovation muscle. If you use it, it gets stronger’. The company does spend a lot on the bases for competencies. For example, it claims ‘consumer understanding’, based not only on its history but also on 20 000 studies of consumers each year. Cutting-edge technology, supply chain management skills, marketing

and advertising expertise, a broad product portfolio, and R&D skills with respect to fats, oils, skin chemistry, surfactants and emulsifiers, are a few of P&G’s highly regarded capabilities. All of these capabilities, which result from combinations of the organisation’s tangible and intangible resources, allow P&G to perform tasks that must be completed to produce, sell, distribute and service its branded products.

Taking this a step further, we discover that these capabilities contribute to the organisation’s five core competencies (called core strengths by P&G). For example, R&D capabilities are foundational to P&G’s innovation and are a core competence. Similarly, the organisation’s marketing and advertising skills contribute to its consumer understanding and brand-building core competencies. The supply chain management capability is critical to the go-to-market core competence (a competence through which P&G ‘reaches retailers and consumers at the right place and time’) and to the scale competence (a competence allowing P&G to be efficient and to create value for customers as a result). Thus, we see how some of P&G’s capabilities are linked to one or more of the organisation’s five core competencies. From an operational perspective, these core competencies are activities P&G performs especially well relative to competitors and through which the organisation is able to create unique value for customers.

Sources: Procter & Gamble, 2019, P&G 2019 Annual Report, http:// pg.com; M. Shahbandeh, 2019, Procter & Gamble – Statistics & Facts,

Statista, 23 October; P&G, 2018, http://www.Pglocations.com; Statista, 2015, Total number of employees of Procter & Gamble worldwide from 2007 to 2015 (in thousands), http://www.statista.com/statistics/244037/

total-number-of-employees-of-procter-und-gamble-worldwide; P&G, 2015, Core strengths, https://www.pg.com/en_ANZ/company/core- strengths.shtml; E. Byron, 2011, P&G turns Febreze into a $1 billion

brand, Wall Street Journal, http://www.wsj.com, 8 March; A. K. Reese, 2011, Planning to succeed at Procter & Gamble, Supply & Demand Chain Executive, http://www.sdcexe.com, 12 January; Reuters, 2011, Energizer

to shut two international battery plants, http://www.fidelity.com, 9 March; Procter & Gamble, 2011, P&G core strengths, http://www.p&g.

com, 6 June; Standard & Poor’s Stock Report, 2011, Procter & Gamble Co., http://www.standardandpoors.com, 11 June; Treflis, 2011, P&G’s

strategy to win market share to pay off, http://www.treflis.com, 12 January; B. Horovitz, 2010, Procter & Gamble looks beyond US borders,

USA Today, http://www.usatoday.com, 19 March.

Strategic focus |General

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core competencies. The second tool is the value chain analysis. Organisations use this tool to select the value-creating competencies that should be maintained, upgraded or developed, and those that should be outsourced.

The four criteria of sustainable competitive advantage Capabilities that are valuable, rare, costly to imitate and non-substitutable are core competencies (see Table 3.4). In turn, core competencies can lead to competitive advantages for the organisation over its rivals. Capabilities failing to satisfy the four criteria are not core competencies, meaning that although every core competence is a capability, not every capability is a core competence. In other words, for a capability to be a core competence, it must be valuable and unique from a customer’s point of view. For a core competence to be a potential source of competitive advantage, it must be inimitable and non-substitutable by competitors.72

The four criteria of sustainable competitive advantage

Valuable capabilities • Assist an organisation to neutralise threats or exploit opportunities

Rare capabilities • Are not possessed by many others

Costly-to-imitate capabilities

• Historical: a unique and valuable organisational culture or brand name

• Ambiguous cause: the causes and uses of a competence are unclear

• Social complexity: interpersonal relationships, trust and friendship among managers, suppliers and customers

Non-substitutable capabilities

• No strategic equivalent

Table 3.4

A sustainable competitive advantage exists only when competitors cannot duplicate the benefits of an organisation’s strategy or when they lack the resources to attempt imitation. For some period of time, the organisation may have a core competence by using capabilities that are valuable and rare but imitable. For example, some organisations are trying to develop a core competence and potentially a competitive advantage by out-greening their competitors.

Interestingly, developing a ‘green’ core competence can contribute to the organisation’s efforts to earn above-average returns while benefiting the broader society. For example, Qantas Group is committed to minimising its impact on the environment by sustainable aviation through emissions and waste reduction initiatives. A strong initiative includes removing 100 million single-use plastics from Qantas operations by the end of 2020.73

Valuable Valuable capabilities allow an organisation to exploit oppor tunities or neutralise threats in its external environment. By effectively using capabilities to exploit opportunities or neutralise threats, an organisation creates value for customers. For publishers, e-books are both an opportunity (to sell books through different distribution channels) and a major threat (a reduction in publishers’ ability to sell books through traditional channels, such as physical shopfronts). To neutralise the possibility or threat of lower sales revenue from traditional channels, publishers such as Penguin Group are trying to determine how to take advantage of the oppor tunities digital technologies create to transform their businesses. In par tnership with other companies, Penguin sees using the internet to sell directly to customers as an opportunity to create value

valuable capabilities allow the organisation to exploit opportunities or neutralise threats in its external environment

86 PART 1: STRATEGIC MANAGEMENT INPUTS

for customers. Revenue in its e-books segment was projected to amount to US$15 635 million in 2021 with 1019 million users.74 Forbes, BBC and Fortune have all noted a massive boom in e-books and reading apps readers as a result of the Covid-19 lockdowns.75 Amazon is considered a major threat to other booksellers by some in both the digital and print worlds, and in December 2019 it was reported that Amazon had 42 per cent of the US print book market and at least 80 per cent of the publishers’ e-book sales.76 It also owns Book Depository, the UK online bookseller that operates a system with free postage for all books.77

Rare Rare capabilities are capabilities that few, if any, competitors possess. A key question to be answered when evaluating this criterion is: ‘How many rival organisation possess these valuable capabilities?’ Capabi l it ies possessed by ma ny r iva ls a re u n l i kely to become core competencies for a ny of t he i nvolved organisations. Instead, valuable albeit common (i.e. not rare) capabilities are sources of competitive parity.78 Competitive advantage results only when organisations develop and exploit valuable capabilities that become core competencies and that differ from those shared with competitors. For example, Qantas’ sa fet y record is con sidered a core competenc y t hat ca n be d i f ferent iated f rom compet itors suc h as Malaysian Airlines.

Costly to imitate Costly-to-imitate capabilities are capabilities that other organisations cannot easily develop. Capabilities that are costly to imitate are created because of one reason or a combination of three reasons (see Table 3.4). First, an organisation sometimes is able to develop capabilities because of unique historical conditions. As organisations evolve, they often acquire or develop capabilities that are unique to them.79

A n organisation with a unique and valuable organisational culture that emerged in the early stages of the company’s history ‘may have an imperfectly imitable advantage over firms founded in another historical period’80 – one in which less valuable or less competitively useful values and beliefs strongly influenced the development of the organisation’s culture. Briefly discussed in Chapter 1, organisational culture is a set of values that is shared by members in the organisation. We explain this in greater detail in Chapter 12. A n organisational culture is a source of advantage when employees are held together tightly by their belief in it.81 With its emphasis on cleanliness, consistency and service, and the training that reinforces the value of these characteristics, the McDonald’s culture is thought by some to be a core competence and a competitive advantage. Equally, Southwest Airlines’ culture in the US is considered a core competency.82 The same seems to be the case for Natio, the Australian cosmetics company. It uses ‘pure and natural, plant-based’ ingredients, and the founders base the growing range of products on insight developed through yoga and meditation. It is one of the fastest-growing brands in the industry and sells in top-end department stores and chemists.83

A second cond ition of being costly to imitate occu rs when the lin k between the organ isation’s core competencies a nd its compet it ive adva ntage is causally a mbig uous.84 In these instances, competitors ca n not clea rly u nderstand how an organ isat ion uses its capabilit ies t hat a re core competencies as t he foundation for competitive advantage. As a result, organisations are uncertain about the capabilities they should develop to duplicate the benefits of a competitor’s value-creating strategy. For years, organisations tried to imitate Southwest Airlines’ low-cost strategy, but most have been unable to do so, primarily because they cannot duplicate this organisation’s unique culture. In the same way, the apparent simple success of The Body Shop with environmentally sensitive cosmetics has not been fully imitated, despite several attempts by global organisations.

Social complexity is the third reason that capabilities can be costly to imitate. Social complexity means that at least some, and frequently many, of the organisation’s capabilities are the product of complex social phenomena. Interpersonal relationships, trust, friendships among managers and between managers and employees, and an organisation’s reputation with suppliers and customers are examples of socially complex capabilities. Southwest Airlines is careful to hire people who fit or align with its culture. This complex

rare capabilities capabilities that few, if any, competitors possess

costly-to-imitate capabilities capabilities that another organisation cannot easily develop

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interrelationship between the culture and human capital adds value in ways that other airlines cannot match, such as jokes on flights by the flight attendants or the cooperation between gate personnel and pilots.

Non-substitutable Non-substitutable capabilities a re capabilities t hat do not have strategic equivalents. This final criterion ‘is that there must be no strategically equivalent valuable resources that are themselves either not rare or imitable. Two valuable firm resources (or two bundles of firm resources) are st rateg ica l ly equ iva lent when t hey each ca n be sepa rately e x ploited to i mplement t he sa me strategies’.85 In general, the strategic value of capabilities increases as they become more difficult to substitute. The more intangible and hence invisible capabilities are, the more difficult it is for organisations to find substitutes and the greater the challenge there is for competitors trying to imitate an organisation’s value-creating strategy. Organisation-specific knowledge and trust-based working relationships between managers and non-managerial personnel are examples of capabilities that are difficult to identify and for which finding a substitute is challenging. However, causal ambiguity may make it difficult for the organisation to learn as well and may stifle progress, because the organisation may not know how to improve processes that are not easily codified and thus are ambiguous.86

In summary, only using valuable, rare, costly-to-imitate and non-substitutable capabilities has the potential for the organisation to create sustainable competitive advantages. Table 3.5 shows t he compet it ive consequences a nd per for ma nce implicat ions resu lt ing f rom combinat ions of t he four criteria of sustainability. The analysis suggested by the table helps managers to determine the strategic value of an organisation’s capabilities. The organisation should not emphasise capabilities that fit the criteria described in the first row in the table (i.e. resources and capabilities that are neither valuable nor rare and that are imitable and for which strategic substitutes exist). Capabilities yielding competitive parity and either temporary or sustainable competitive advantage, however, will be supported. Some competitors, such as Coca-Cola and PepsiCo, and Boeing and Airbus, may have capabilities that result in competitive parity. In such cases, the organisations will nurture these capabilities while simultaneously tr ying to develop capabilities that can yield either a temporar y or sustainable competitive advantage.

non-substitutable capabilities capabilities that do not have strategic equivalents

Outcomes from combinations of the criteria for sustainable competitive advantage

Is the capability valuable?

Is the capability rare?

Is the capability costly to imitate?

Is the capability non- substitutable?

Competitive consequences

Performance implications

No No No No Competitive disadvantage

Below-average returns

Yes No No Yes/no Competitive parity Average returns

Yes Yes No Yes/no Temporary competitive advantage

Average returns to above-average returns

Yes Yes Yes Yes/no Sustainable competitive advantage

Above-average returns

Table 3.5

88 PART 1: STRATEGIC MANAGEMENT INPUTS

Value chain analysis Value chain analysis allows the organisation to understand the parts of its operations that create value and those that do not.87 Understanding these issues is important because the organisation earns above-average returns only when the value it creates is greater than the costs incurred to create that value.88

The value chain is a template that organisations use to analyse their cost position and to identify the multiple means that can be used to facilitate implementation of a chosen strateg y.89 Today’s competitive landscape demands that organisations examine their value chains in a global rather than a domestic-only context. In particular, activities associated with supply chains should be studied within a global context.90

We show a model of the value chain in Figure 3.3. As depicted in the model, an organisation’s value chain is segmented into value chain activities and support functions. Value chain activities are activities or tasks the organisation completes in order to produce products and then sell, distribute and service those products in ways that create value for customers. Suppor t f unctions include the activ ities or tasks the organisation completes in order to support the work being done to produce, sell, distribute and service t he products t he orga n isat ion is produci ng. A n orga n isat ion may develop a capabi l it y a nd /or a core competence in any of the value chain activities and in any of the support functions. When it does so, it has established an ability to create value for customers. In fact, as shown in Figure 3.3, customers are the ones organisations seek to ser ve when using value chain analysis to identif y their capabilities and core competencies. W hen using their unique core competencies to create unique value for customers that competitors cannot duplicate, organisations have established one or more competitive advantages. This appears to be the case for P&G as it relies on the five core competencies described earlier in the ‘Strategic focus’ feature to produce unique, high-quality branded products that are sold to customers throughout the world.

The activities associated with each part of the value chain are shown in Figure 3.4, while the activities that are part of the tasks organisations complete when dealing with support functions appear in Figure 3.5. All items in both figures should be evaluated relative to competitors’ capabilities and core competencies. To become a core competence and a source of competitive advantage, a capability must allow the organisation to either perform an activity in a manner that provides value superior to that provided by competitors, or

value chain activities activities or tasks the organisation completes in order to produce products and then sell, distribute and service those products in ways that create value for customers

support functions include the activities or tasks the organisation completes in order to support the work being done to produce, sell, distribute and service the products the organisation is producing

Support functions

Supply-chain management Operations

Follow-up service

Customer value

Value chain activities

Distribution

Finance

Human resources

Management information systems

Marketing (including

sales)

Figure 3.3 A model of the value chain

89CHAPTER 3 THE INTERNAL ORGANISATION: RESOURCES, CAPABILITIES, CORE COMPETENCIES AND COMPETITIVE ADVANTAGES

to perform a value-creating activity that competitors cannot perform. Only under these conditions does an organisation create value for customers and have oppor tunities to capture that value.

Creating value for customers by completing activities that are par t of the value chain often requires building effective alliances with suppliers (and sometimes others to which the organisation outsources activities, as discussed in the next section) and developing strong, positive relationships with customers. When organisations have such strong, positive relationships with suppliers and customers, they are said to have ‘social capital’.91 The relationships themselves have value because they produce knowledge transfer and access to resources that an organ isation may not hold inter nally.92 To build social capital whereby resources such as knowledge are transferred across organisations requires trust between the parties. The par tners must tr ust each other in order to allow their resources to be used in such a way that both par ties will benefit over time and neither party will take advantage of the other.93 Trust and social capital usually

Customer value

Activities including sourcing, procurement, conversion, and logistics management that are

necessary for the organisation to receive raw materials and convert

them into final products.

Supply-chain management

Activities necessary to efficiently change raw materials into finished products. Developing employees’

work schedules, designing production processes and physical layout of the operations’ facilities, determining production capacity

needs, and selecting and maintaining production equipment

are examples of specific operations activities.

Operations

Activities taken to increase a product’s value for customers.

Surveys to receive feedback about the customer’s satisfaction,

offering technical support after the sale, and fully complying with a product’s warranty are examples of these activities.

Follow-up service

Distribution

Activities related to getting the final product to the customer. Efficiently handling customers’ orders, choosing the optimal delivery channel, and working

with the finance support function to arrange for customers’

payments for delivered goods are examples of these activities.

Marketing (including sales)

Activities taken for the purpose of segmenting target customers on the

basis of their unique needs, satisfying customers’ needs, retaining customers,

and locating additional customers. Advertising campaigns, developing and managing product brands, determining

appropriate pricing strategies, and training and supporting a sales force are

specific examples of these activities.

Figure 3.4 Creating value through value chain activities

90 PART 1: STRATEGIC MANAGEMENT INPUTS

evolve over time with repeated interactions, but organisations may also establish special means to jointly manage alliances that promote greater trust with the outcome of enhanced benefits for both partners.94

Evaluating an organisation’s capability to execute its value chain activities and suppor t functions is challenging. Earlier in the chapter, we noted that identifying and assessing the value of an organisation’s resources and capabilities requires judgement. Judgement is equally necessary when using value chain analysis, because no obviously correct model or rule is universally available to help in the process. What should an organisation do about value chain activities and suppor t functions in which its resources and capabilities are not a source of core competence? Outsourcing is one solution to consider.

Outsourcing Concerned with how components, finished goods or services will be obtained, outsourcing is the purchase of a value-creating activity or a support function activity from an external supplier.95 Not-for-profit agencies as well as for-profit organisations actively engage in outsourcing.96 Organisations engaging in effective outsourcing increase their flexibility, mitigate risks and reduce their capital investments.97 In multiple global industries, the trend towards outsourcing continues at a rapid pace.98 Moreover, in some industries, virtually all organisations seek the value that can be captured through effective outsourcing. As with other strategic management process decisions, careful analysis is required before the organisation decides to

Customer value

Human resources

Activities associated with managing the organisation’s

human capital. Selecting, training, retaining, and compensating

human resources in ways that create a capability and hopefully a core competence are specific

examples of these activities.

Management information systems

Activities taken to obtain and manage information and knowledge

throughout the organisation. Identifying and utilising

sophisticated technologies, determining optimal ways to collect

and distribute knowledge, and linking relevant information and

knowledge to organisational functions are activities associated

with this support function.

Finance

Activities associated with effectively acquiring and managing financial

resources. Securing adequate financial capital, investing in

organisational functions in ways that will support the organisation’s efforts to produce and distribute its

products in the short and long term, and managing relationships

with those providing financial capital to the organisation are

specific examples of these activities.

Figure 3.5 Creating value through support functions

91CHAPTER 3 THE INTERNAL ORGANISATION: RESOURCES, CAPABILITIES, CORE COMPETENCIES AND COMPETITIVE ADVANTAGES

outsource.99 And if outsourcing is to be used, organisations must recognise that only activities where they cannot create value or where they are at a substantial disadvantage compared with competitors should be outsourced.100

Outsourcing can be effective because few, if any, organisations possess the resources and capabilities required to achieve competitive superiority in all value chain activities and support functions. For example, research suggests that few companies can afford to develop internally all the technologies that might lead to competitive advantage.101 By nurturing a smaller number of capabilities, an organisation increases the probability of developing core competencies and achieving a competitive advantage because it does not become overextended. In addition, by outsourcing activities in which it lacks competence, the organisation may fully concentrate on those areas in which it can create value. The consequences of outsourcing cause additional concerns.102 For the most part, these concerns revolve around the potential loss in organisations’ i n novat ive abi lit y a nd t he loss of jobs w it h i n compa n ies t hat decide to outsou rce some of t hei r work activities to others. Thus, innovation and technological uncertainty are two important issues to consider when making outsourcing decisions. However, organisations can also learn from outsource suppliers how to increase their own innovation capabilities.103 Companies must be aware of these issues and be prepared to fully consider the concerns about opportunities from outsourcing suggested by different stakeholders (e.g. employees). The opportunities and concerns may be especially significant when organisations outsource activities or functions to a foreign supply source (often referred to as offshoring).104 Bangalore, Bangladesh and Belfast are hot spots for technology outsourcing, competing with major operations in other nations such as China.105 The global pharmaceutical giant GlaxoSmithKline made a similar decision in expanding its manufacturing base in Australia, despite the high wage levels there. It reasons that the manufacturing plants are more efficient and quality control is easier in Australia.

Competencies, strengths, weaknesses and strategic decisions By analysing the internal organisation, organisations are able to identify their strengths and weaknesses in resources, capabilities and core competencies. For example, if an organisation has weak capabilities or does not have core competencies in areas required to achieve a competitive advantage, it must acquire those resources and build the capabilities and competencies needed. Alternatively, the organisation could decide to outsource a function or activity where it is weak in order to improve its ability to use its remaining resources to create value.106

In considering the results of examining the organisation’s internal organisation, managers should understand that having a significant quantity of resources is not the same as having the ‘right’ resources. The ‘right’ resources are those with the potential to be formed into core competencies as the foundation for creating value for customers and developing competitive advantages as a result of so doing. Interestingly, decision makers sometimes become more focused and productive when seeking to find the right resources when the organisation’s total set of resources is constrained.107

Tools such as outsourcing assist the organisation to focus on its core competencies as the source of its competitive advantage. However, evidence shows that the value-creating ability of core competencies should never be taken for granted. Moreover, the ability of a core competence to be a permanent competitive advantage cannot be assumed. The reason for these cautions is that all core competencies have the potential to become core rigidities.108 Typically, events occurring in the organisation’s external environment create conditions through which core competencies can become core rigidities, generating inertia and stifling innovation: ‘Often the flip side, the dark side, of core capabilities is revealed due to external events when new competitors figure out a better way to serve the firm’s customers, when new technologies emerge, or when political or social events shift the ground underneath’.109

92 PART 1: STRATEGIC MANAGEMENT INPUTS

As discussed previously, over the past decade, digital technologies (part of the organisation’s external environment) have rapidly changed customers’ shopping patterns for reading materials. For example, Amazon’s use of the internet significantly changed the competitive landscape for bricks-and-mortar sellers such as Angus and Robertson. Managers studying the organisation’s internal organisation are responsible for making cer tain that core competencies do not become core rigidities.

A f ter study ing its ex ter nal env i ron ment to deter m ine what it m ight choose to do (as ex plained in Chapter 2) and its internal organisation to understand what it can do (as explained in this chapter), the organisation has the information required to select a business-level strategy that it will use to compete against rivals. We describe different business-level strategies in the next chapter.

93CHAPTER 3 THE INTERNAL ORGANISATION: RESOURCES, CAPABILITIES, CORE COMPETENCIES AND COMPETITIVE ADVANTAGES

STUDY TOOLS SUMMARY LO1 In the current competitive landscape, the most

effective organisations recognise that an internal analysis is identified by studying the organisation’s internal organisation and it is imperative to determine the organisational level of strength, capabilities and competencies are matched with opportunities (determined by studying the organisation’s external environment).

LO2 Value is measured by a product’s performance characteristics and by its attributes for which customers are willing to pay. Even if the organisation develops and manages resources in ways that create core competencies and competitive advantages, competitors will eventually learn how to duplicate the benefits of any organisation’s value-creating strategy; thus, all competitive advantages have a limited life. Because competitive advantages are not always permanently sustainable, as witnessed during the Covid-19 pandemic, organisations must exploit their current advantages while simultaneously using their resources and capabilities to form new advantages that may lead to future competitive success.

LO3 Tangible resources are assets that may be observed and quantified. Production equipment, manufacturing facilities, distribution centres and formal reporting structures are examples of tangible resources. Intangible resources are assets that are rooted deeply in the organisation’s history and have accumulated over time. The knowledge the organisation’s human capital possesses is among the most significant of an organisation’s capabilities and ultimately provides the base for most competitive advantages. The organisation must create an organisational culture that

allows people to integrate their individual knowledge with that held by others so that, collectively, the organisation has a significant amount of value-creating organisational knowledge.

LO4 Capabilities are a more likely source of core competence, and subsequently of competitive advantages, than are individual resources. How an organisation nurtures and supports its capabilities so they can become core competencies is less visible to rivals, making efforts to understand and imitate the focal organisation’s capabilities difficult.

LO5 Only when a capability is valuable, rare, costly to imitate and non-substitutable is it a core competence and a source of competitive advantage. Core competencies are a source of competitive advantage only when they allow the organisation to create value by exploiting opportunities in its external environment. When this is no longer possible, the organisation shifts its attention to forming other capabilities that satisfy the four criteria of a sustainable competitive advantage. Effectively managing core competencies requires careful analysis of the organisation’s resources (inputs to the production process) and capabilities (resources that have been purposely integrated to achieve a specific task or set of tasks).

LO6 Value chain analysis is used to identify and evaluate the competitive potential of resources and capabilities. By studying their skills relative to those associated with value chain activities and support functions, organisations can understand their cost structure and identify the activities through which they can create value.

KEY TERMS competitive advantage

core competence

costly-to-imitate capabilities

global mindset

intangible resources

non-substitutable capabilities

outsourcing

rare capabilities

strategic competitiveness

strategy

support functions

tangible resources

valuable capabilities

value

value chain activities

94 PART 1: STRATEGIC MANAGEMENT INPUTS

REVIEW QUESTIONS 1. Why is it important for an organisation to study

and understand the strengths of its internal organisation?

2. What is value? Why is it critical for the organisation to create value? How would an organisation examine its value propositions?

3. What is meant by a value chain analysis? Why is this analysis so important for managers to conduct?

4. What are the differences between tangible and intangible resources? Are tangible resources more valuable than intangible resources, or is the reverse true? Why?

5. What are capabilities? How do organisations create capabilities?

6. What four criteria must capabilities satisfy for them to become core competencies? Why is it important for organisations to use these criteria to evaluate their capabilities’ value-creating potential?

7. Why do organisations need to create core competencies to be sustainable?

8. What is outsourcing? Why do organisations outsource? Will outsourcing’s importance grow in the future? If so, why?

9. How do organisations identify internal strengths and weaknesses? Why is it necessary that managers have a clear understanding of their organisation’s strengths and weaknesses?

10. What are core rigidities? What does it mean to say that each core competence could become a core rigidity?

EXPERIENTIAL EXERCISES

Exercise 1: VRIO analysis – is the organisation’s advantage sustainable? In this chapter, the concepts of sustainable competitive advantage and how organisations can use their unique bundle of resources to achieve such an advantage were introduced. Remember that a sustainable competitive advantage can only be present if competitors are unsuccessful in duplicating the organisation’s benefit or the competitor is unable to acquire the resources necessary to imitate.

However, discovering if a competitive advantage is sustainable or merely temporary can be difficult for managers. According to Business Insider’s War Room online magazine (http://www.businessinsider.com/warroom), there are six critical ingredients to achieve a sustainable competitive advantage: 1. real intellectual property

2. a dynamic rather than a single product line

3. dramatic cost-improvement capabilities

4. a proven team with inside relationships

5. a lock on the customer or market

6. strong focus and differentiation.

In your teams, prepare for class discussion an analysis of a Fortune 500 company that your team finds interesting (the 2020 list may be viewed at http://fortune.com/ fortune500). Your team should be prepared, at a minimum, to address the following issues: 1. How does the organisation describe its value

proposition?

2. What are the organisation’s capabilities?

3. What do you consider to be the organisation’s core competencies?

4. Do you consider this organisation to possess a sustainable competitive advantage? If so, do you believe this to be sustainable in the future?

5. Categorise the organisation’s performance over the past few years.

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71. Procter & Gamble, 2019, P&G 2019 Annual Report, http://pg.com; P&G, 2018, http:// www.Pglocations.com; M. Shahbandeh, 2019, Procter & Gamble – Statistics & Facts, Statista, 23 October.

72. M. Makri, M. A. Hitt & P. J. Lane, 2010, Complementary technologies, knowledge relatedness, and invention outcomes in high technology mergers and acquisitions, Strategic Management Journal, 31: 602–28; S. Newbert, 2008, Value, rareness, competitive advantage, and performance: A conceptual-level empirical investigation

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73. Qantas, 2019, Qantas Group to slash waste to landfill, plastic in major environment push, Qantas Newsroom, https://www.qantasnewsroom.com. au/media-releases/qantas-group-to- slash-waste-to-landfill-plastic-in-major- environmental-push, 21 February.

74. Statista, 2021, eBooks, http://www. statista.com./outlook/213/100/ebooks/ worldwide#market-globalRevenue, 5 January.

75. A. Rowe, 2020, Ebook app readership is up 30% amid pandemic lockdowns, Forbes, http://www.Forbes.com, 28 March; A. Pressman, 2020, E-book reading is booming during the coronavirus pandemic, Fortune, http:// www.Fortune.com, 18 June; BBC News, 2020, Coronavirus: Book sales surge as readers seek escapism and education, http://www.BBC.com, 26 March.

76. M. Day & J. Gu, 2019, The enormous numbers behind Amazon’s market reach, Bloomberg, https://www.bloomberg.com/ graphics/2019-amazon-reach-across- markets, 27 March.

77. Book Depository, https://www. bookdepository.com.

78. Q. Gu & J. W. Lu, 2011, Effects of inward investment on outward investment: The venture capital industry worldwide: 1985–2007, Journal of International Business Studies, 42: 263–84; S. A. Zahra, 2008, The virtuous cycle of discovery and creation of entrepreneurial opportunities, Strategic Entrepreneurship Journal, 2: 243–57.

79. C. A. Coen & C. A. Maritan, 2011, Investing in capabilities: The dynamics of resource allocation, Organization Science, 22: 199–217.

80. J. B. Barney, 1991, Firm resources and sustained competitive advantage, Journal of Management, 17: 99–120.

81. C. C. Maurer, P. Bansal & M. M. Crossan, 2011, Creating economic value through social values: Introducing a culturally informed resource-based view, Organization Science, 22: 432–48.

82. J. Thomson, 2018, Company culture soars at Southwest Airlines, Forbes, https://www. forbes.com/sites/jeffthomson/2018/12/18/ company-culture-soars-at-southwest- airlines/?sh=55baf2a9615f, 18 December.

83. Natio, 2020, http://www.natio.com.au. 84. M. H. Kinc & J. D. W. Morecroft, 2010,

Managerial decision making and firm performance under a resource-based paradigm, Strategic Management Journal, 31: 1164–82; A. W. King & C. P. Zeithaml, 2001, Competencies and firm performance: Examining the causal ambiguity paradox, Strategic Management Journal, 22: 75–99.

85. Barney, Firm resources, 111. 86. K. Srikanth & P. Puranam, 2011, Integrating

distributed work: Comparing task design, communication, and tacit coordination

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mechanisms, Strategic Management Journal, 32: 849–75; A. K. Chatterjee, 2009, Spawned with a silver spoon? Entrepreneurial performance and innovation in the medical device industry, Strategic Management Journal, 30: 185–206.

87. R. Belderbos, W. van Olffen & J. Zou, 2011, General and specific social learning mechanisms in foreign investment location choice, Strategic Management Journal, 32, 1309–30; A. Leiponen & C. E. Helfat, 2010, Innovation objectives, knowledge sources, and the benefits of breadth, Strategic Management Journal, 31: 224–36.

88. M. E. Porter, 1985, Competitive Advantage, New York: Free Press, 33–61.

89. Z. G. Zacharia, N. W. Nix & R. F. Lusch, 2011, Capabilities that enhance outcomes of an episodic supply chain collaboration, Journal of Operations Management, 29: 591–603; J. Alcacer, 2006, Location choices across the value chain: How activity and capability influence co-location, Management Science, 52: 1457–71.

90. M. Christopher, 2016, Logistics and Supply Chain Management, London, UK: Pearson.

91. U. Zander & L. Zander, 2010, Opening the grey box: Social communities, knowledge and culture in acquisitions, Journal of International Business Studies, 41: 27–37; C. L. Luk, O. H. M. Yau, L. Y. M. Sin, A. C. B. Tse, R. P. M. Chow & J. S. Y. Lee, 2008, The effects of social capital and organizational innovativeness in different institutional contexts, Journal of International Business Studies, 39: 589–612.

92. R. M. Wiseman, G. Cuevas-Rodriguez & L. R. Gomez-Mejia, 2011, Towards a social theory of agency, Journal of Management Studies, 49(1): 202–22; L. F. Mesquita, J. An & T. H. Brush, 2008, Comparing the resource-based and relational views: Knowledge transfer and spillover in vertical alliances, Strategic Management Journal, 29: 913–41.

93. R. E. Hoskisson, J. Covin, H. W. Volberda & R. A. Johnson, 2011, Revitalizing entrepreneurship: The search for new research opportunities, Journal of Management Studies, 48(6): 1141–68; A. A. Lado, R. R. Dant & A. G. Tekleab, 2008, Trust–opportunism paradox, relationalism, and performance in interfirm relationships: Evidence from the retail industry, Strategic Management Journal, 29: 401–23; S. N. Wasti & S. A. Wasti, 2008, Trust in buyer–

supplier relations: The case of the Turkish automotive industry, Journal of International Business Studies, 39: 118–31.

94. D. Faems, M. Janssens, A. Madhok & B. Van Looy, 2008, Toward an integrative perspective on alliance governance: Connecting contract design, trust dynamics and contract application, Academy of Management Journal, 51: 1053–78.

95. A. Hecker & T. Kretschmer, 2011, Outsourcing decisions: The effect of scale economies and market structure, Strategic Organization, 8: 155–75.

96. Outsourcing-law.com, 2011, Not-for-profit organisations, http://www.outsourcing-law. com, 8 June; P. W. Tam, 2007, Business technology: Outsourcing finds new niche, Wall Street Journal, 17 April, B5.

97. S. Nadkami & P. Hermann, 2010, CEO personality, strategic flexibility, and firm performance: The case of the Indian business process outsourcing industry, Academy of Management Journal, 53: 1050–73.

98. R. Liu, D. J. Feils & B. Scholnick, 2011, Why are different services outsourced to different countries?, Journal of International Business Studies, 42: 558–71.

99. F. Castellucci & G. Ertug, 2010, What’s in it for them? Advantages of higher status partners in exchange relationships, Academy of Management Journal, 53: 149–66; C. C. De Fontenay & J. S. Gans, 2008, A bargaining perspective on strategic outsourcing and supply competition, Strategic Management Journal, 29: 819–39; A. Tiwana & M. Keil, 2007, Does peripheral knowledge complement control? An empirical test in technology outsourcing alliances, Strategic Management Journal, 28: 623–34.

100. M. H. Zack & S. Singh, 2010, A knowledge- based view of outsourcing, International Journal of Strategic Change Management, 2: 32–53.

101. M. Reitzig & S. Wagner, 2010, The hidden costs of outsourcing: Evidence from patent data, Strategic Management Journal, 31: 1183–201; A. Tiwana, 2008, Does interfirm modularity complement ignorance? A field study of software outsourcing alliances, Strategic Management Journal, 29: 1241–52.

102. C. S. Katsikeas, D. Skarmeas & D. C. Bello, 2009, Developing successful trust-based international exchange relationships,

Journal of International Business Studies, 40: 132–55; E. Perez & J. Karp, 2007, US to probe outsourcing after ITT case, Wall Street Journal (Eastern Edition), 28 March, A3, A6.

103. C. Grimpe & U. Kaiser, 2010, Balancing internal and external knowledge acquisition: The gains and pains from R&D outsourcing, Journal of Management Studies, 47: 1483–509; C. Weigelt & M. B. Sarkar, 2009, Learning from supply- side agents: The impact of technology solution providers’ experiential diversity on clients’ innovation adoption, Academy of Management Journal, 52: 37–60.

104. P. D. O. Jensen & T. Pederson, 2011, The economic geography of offshoring: The fit between activities and local context, Journal of Management Studies, 48: 352–72; F. J. Contractor, V. Kumar, S. K. Kundu & T. Pedersen, 2010, Reconceptualizing the firm in a world of outsourcing and offshoring: The organizational and geographical relocation of high-value company functions, Journal of Management Studies, 47: 1417–33.

105. N. Heath, 2009, Outsourcing: The new hot spots, BusinessWeek, http://www. businessweek.com, 20 February.

106. Y. Li, Z. Wei & Y. Liu, 2010, Strategic orientations, knowledge acquisition, and firm performance: The perspective of the vendor in cross-border outsourcing, Journal of Management Studies, 47: 1457–82; M. A. Hitt, D. Ahlstrom, M. T. Dacin, E. Levitas & L. Svobodina, 2004, The institutional effects on strategic alliance partner selection in transition economies: China versus Russia, Organization Science, 15: 173–85.

107. D. M. Sullivan & M. R. Marvel, 2011, Knowledge acquisition, network reliance, and early-stage technology venture outcomes, Journal of Management Studies, 48(6): 1169–93; M. Gibbert, M. Hoegl & L. Valikangas, 2007, In praise of resource constraints, MIT Sloan Management Review, 48(3): 15–17, 126.

108. E. Rawley, 2010, Diversification, coordination costs, and organizational rigidity: Evidence from microdata, Strategic Management Journal, 31: 873–91.

109. D. L. Barton, 1995, Wellsprings of Knowledge: Building and Sustaining the Sources of Innovation, Boston, MA: Harvard Business School Press, 30–1.

99CHAPTER 3 THE INTERNAL ORGANISATION: RESOURCES, CAPABILITIES, CORE COMPETENCIES AND COMPETITIVE ADVANTAGES

PA R T 2 STRATEGIC ACTIONS: STRATEGY FORMULATION 4 Business-level strategy 102

5 Competitive dynamics 131

6 Corporate-level strategy 161

7 Acquisition and restructuring strategies 189

8 International strategy 218

9 Cooperative strategy 252

101

101

Business-level strategy CH

AP TE

R 4

Studying this chapter should provide you with the strategic management knowledge needed to: LO1 discuss the relationship between customers and business-level strategies in

terms of who, what and how LO2 explain the purpose of forming and implementing a business-level strategy LO3 describe business models and explain their relationship with business-level

strategies LO4 explain the differences among business-level strategies LO5 use the five forces of competition model to explain how above-average returns

can be earned through each business-level strategy LO6 discuss the risks of using each of the business-level strategies.

Learning Objectives

102

Clonakilla Wines is a Canberra region winery well- known for its high-quality wines, particularly its Shiraz Viognier, which was named as Australia’s wine of the year in 2006 and 2011 and retails for over A$100 a bottle. The Australian wine industry is highly competitive – it is worth A$40 billion, encompassing 65 wine regions, 2500 wineries and 6000 grape growers and, as such, a vast range of quality, volume produced and regional prominence. The Canberra region alone has more than 30 wineries and 150 grape growers competing for local, national and international customers.

Clonakilla’s iconic Shiraz Viognier

Clonakilla (the name means ‘meadow of the church’ in Irish) is a family business based in Murrumbateman, New South Wales, north of Canberra. The winery produces between 18 000 and 20 000 cases (216 000 to 240 000 bottles) of wine annually, from grape varieties such as Shiraz, Viognier and Riesling. According to Clonakilla, when CSIRO Plant Industry researcher Dr John Kirk planted the first vines in 1971, he had ‘no idea that his vineyard would one day be celebrated as one of the best in the country’ and that over the decades, there would be ‘trials and tribulations as well as moments of unprecedented success’.

After John’s son Tim Kirk visited the Rhone Valley in France in 1991, his decision to blend a small amount of Viognier white wine with the 1992 Shiraz paid off. The major awards started in 1999, winning the NSW wine of the year, followed by many others, and culminating in the 2006 and 2011 Australian wine of the year, and 2010 and

2011 international airlines best first class red wine. The Wall Street Journal stated ‘some argue this is Australia’s greatest red wine, it is certainly one of the greatest Shirazs’. Wine critic and writer James Halliday described Clonakilla’s Shiraz Viognier as ‘an icon wine, one of the best in Australia’. Langton’s Andrew Callard describes it as ‘one of the most important advances in the development of Australian Shiraz since the release of 1952 Penfolds Grange Hermitage’. Langton, an Australian wine auction house and publisher of the Langton classification of the leading wines in Australia, went further and has included the Shiraz Viognier in the highest category, ‘Exceptional’, since 2010, a category it shares with other Australian icons such as Penfolds Grange and Henschke Hill of Grace. Tim Kirk himself was awarded Gourmet Traveller’s Australian Winemaker of the Year in 2013, one of the highest accolades in the Australian wine industry.

Similar to other winemakers, recurring trials or challenges faced by Clonakilla included droughts and water shortages, high evaporation rates, frosts and grasshopper plagues, and all of these have been exacerbated by the effects of climate change. Recent challenges include how to deal with demand and growth, maintain quality and differentiate the winery (and its flagship wine) in an increasingly crowded market.

One of the important things for any organisation, but particularly for a small business, is to define its competitive strategy. Will the organisation compete on the basis of cost or quality, and will it serve the whole market or focus on a niche? Clonakilla employs a focused differentiation strategy, with an integrated set of actions taken to produce goods that serve the needs of a particular competitive segment (at an acceptable cost) that customers perceive as being different in ways that are important to them. For Clonakilla, the differentiation is via quality.

This strategy has consequences for the competitive forces that impact the organisation and also has wide- ranging consequences for the organisation itself. To successfully implement a focused differentiation strategy, it needs to be consistent, persistent and aligned across all aspects of the business. The product, price, place, promotion, people, processes and physical evidence (the ‘7Ps’ of marketing) associated with the brand all need

Clonakilla Wines in a quality niche position

OPENING CASE STUDY

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Vita l to a n orga n isat ion’s success,1 st rateg y is concer ned w it h ma k i ng choices a mong t wo or more alter nat ives. 2 As we noted in Chapter 1, when choosing a st rateg y, t he organ isat ion decides to pu rsue one course of action instead of others. The choices are influenced by opportunities and threats in the organisation’s external environment3 (see Chapter 2), as well as by the nature and quality of the resources, capabilities and core competencies in its internal organisation4 (see Chapter 3). As we see in the opening case, Clonakilla has chosen a differentiation strategy that focuses on a specific niche in the market.

T he f u nda menta l objec t ive of usi ng a ny t y pe of st rateg y (see Fig u re 1.1) is to ga i n st rateg ic competitiveness and earn above-average returns. 5 Strategies are purposeful, precede the taking of actions to which they apply, and demonstrate a shared understanding of the organisation’s vision and mission.6 An effectively formulated strategy marshals, integrates and allocates the organisation’s resources, capabilities and competencies so that it will be properly aligned with its external environment.7 A properly developed strategy also rationalises the organisation’s vision and mission along with the actions taken to achieve them.8 Information about a host of variables, including markets, customers, technology, worldwide finance and the changing world economy, must be collected and analysed to properly form and use strategies. In the final analysis, sound strategic choices that reduce uncertainty regarding outcomes are the foundation for building successful strategies.9

Business-level strategy, this chapter’s focus, is an integrated and coord inated set of commitments and act ions t he organ isat ion uses to gain a compet it ive advantage by ex ploit ing core competencies in specific product markets.10 Business-level strateg y indicates the choices the organisation has made about how it intends to compete in ind iv idual product markets. The choices are impor tant because long-ter m performance is linked to an organisation’s strategies.11 Given the complexity of successfully competing in the global economy, the choices about how the organisation will compete can be difficult.12 For example, many traditional bricks-and-mortar retail organisations have found themselves disrupted by the so-called FA A NG group of technolog y companies trading publicly in the market – Facebook (FB), A mazon (A MZN), Apple (AAPL), Netflix (NFLX) and Google (GOOG) – as customers change purchasing preferences to online and subscription-based ser vices.13 This chapter will examine some of the aspects of information, reach, richness and affiliation that help a business-level strategy to be successful.

Ever y organisation must form and use a business-level strateg y. This extends beyond commercial organisations to include government departments, health care, sporting and community not-for-profit organisations. Every organisation competes for staff, resources and market share. However, every organisation may not use all the strategies – corporate-level, merger and acquisition, international and cooperative – that we examine in Chapters 6 to 9. An organisation competing in a single product market area in a single geographic location does not need a corporate-level strategy to deal with product diversity or an international strategy to deal with geographic diversity. By contrast, a diversified organisation will use one of the corporate-level strategies as well as a separate business-level strategy for each product market area in which it competes. Every organisation – from the local dry cleaner to a community not-for-profit to the multinational corporation – must develop and use at least one business-level strategy. Thus business-level strategy is the core strategy: the strategy that the organisation forms to describe how it intends to compete in a product market.14

business-level strategy an integrated and coordinated set of commitments and actions the organisation uses to gain a competitive advantage by exploiting core competencies in specific product markets

to align with the chosen strategy – in this case, a quality niche strategy.

Time will tell if Clonakilla’s focused differentiation business-level strategy will maintain and build on its market success.

Sources: Clonakilla website, 2020, A philosophy of wine, https://clonakilla.com. au/story; G. Whiteside, 2019, Australia’s wine industry recovers from decade-

long grape glut, industry marketing group says, ABC News, https://www.abc. net.au/news/rural/2019-10-18/australias-wine-glut-is-over/11613680,

18 October; H. Hooke, 2018, Langton’s Classification of Australian Wine, The Real Review, https://www.therealreview.com/2018/09/03/langtons-

classification-of-australian-wine, 3 September; M. Allen, 2017, Odd couple: Meet the winemakers at Clonakilla and Ravensworth, Australian Financial

Review, https://www.afr.com/life-and-luxury/food-and-wine/strange- bedfellows-the-winemakers-at-clonakilla-and-ravensworth-20170518- gw7mdq, 25 May; H. Hooke, 2012, Rewards for a ’killa instinct, Sydney

Morning Herald, https://www.smh.com.au/lifestyle/rewards-for-a-killa- instinct-20120922-26d4j.html, 25 September.

STRATEGY NOW

Clonakilla’s focused differentiation strategy

104 PART 2: STRATEGIC ACTIONS: STRATEGY FORMULATION

We discuss several topics to examine business-level strategies. Because customers are the foundation of successful business-level strategies and should never be taken for granted,15 we present information about customers that is relevant to business-level strategies. In terms of customers, when selecting a business- level strategy the organisation determines who will be served, what needs those target customers have that it will satisfy and how those needs will be satisfied. Selecting customers and deciding which of their needs the organisation will try to satisfy – as well as how it will do so – are challenging tasks. Global competition has created many attractive options for customers, making it difficult for an organisation to determine the strateg y to best ser ve them.16 Effective global competitors have become adept at identifying the needs of customers in different cultures and geographic regions, as well as learning how to quickly and successfully adapt the functionality of an organisation’s good or ser vice to meet those needs.

Descriptions of the purpose of business-level strategies, and of the five business-level strategies, follow the discussion of customers. The five strategies we examine are called generic because they can be used in any organisation competing in any industry.17 Our analysis describes how the effective use of each strategy allows the organisation to favourably position itself relative to the five competitive forces in the industry (see Chapter 2).In addition, we use the value chain (see Chapter 3) to show examples of the primary and support activities necessary to implement specific business-level strategies. Because no strategy is risk- free,18 we also describe the different risks the organisation may encounter when using these strategies. In Chapter 11, we explain the organisational structures and controls linked with the successful use of each business-level strategy.

Customers: their relationship with business-level strategies Strategic competitiveness results only when the organisation satisfies a group of customers by using its compet it ive adva ntages as t he basis for compet i ng i n i nd iv idua l product ma rkets.19 A key reason orga n isat ions must sat isf y customers w it h t hei r busi ness-level st rateg y is t hat ret u r ns ea r ned f rom relat ionsh ips w it h customers a re t he l i feblood of a l l orga n isat ions. 2 0 Even gover n ment agencies or com munity organisations ex ist to prov ide a retu r n on investment to their ow ners, although the words ‘return’, ‘investment’ and ‘owner’ might mean different things to each of them. Every organisation has customers a nd ever y orga n isat ion has compet itors. For exa mple, one of t he major compet itors of t he Australian Taxation Office (ATO) is non-compliance with taxation laws, and the ATO invests significant resources to convince and assist its customers to maintain voluntary compliance. Effective relationships with customers are vital to success.

The most successful organisations try to find new ways to satisfy current customers and/or to meet the needs of new customers. Being able to do this can be even more difficult when organisations and consumers face challenging economic conditions. During such times, organisations may decide to reduce their workforce to control costs. This can lead to problems, however, when having fewer employees makes it more difficult for organisations to meet individual customers’ needs and expectations. In these instances, some suggest that organisations should follow several courses of action, including paying extra attention to their best customers and developing a flexible workforce by cross-training employees so they can undertake a variety of responsibilities on their jobs. Amazon and Lexus have been identified as ‘customer service champions’ because they devote extra care and attention to customer service, especially during challenging economic times. 21

Effectively managing relationships with customers The organisation’s relationships with its customers are strengthened when it delivers superior value to them. Strong interactive relationships with customers often provide the foundation for the organisation’s efforts to profitably serve customers’ unique needs.

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As the follow ing statement shows, Caesar’s Enter tain ment (the world’s largest prov ider of branded casino enter tainment) is committed to providing superior value to customers: ‘Caesar’s Enter tainment is focused on building loyalty and value with its customers through a unique combination of great ser vice, e xcel lent produc ts, u nsu r passed d ist r ibut ion, operat iona l e xcel lence a nd tec h nolog y leadersh ip’. 2 2 Importantly, as Caesar’s appears to anticipate, delivering superior value often results in increased customer loyalty. In turn, customer loyalty has a positive relationship with profitability. However, more choices and easily accessible information about the functionality of organisations’ products are creating increasingly sophisticated and knowledgeable customers, making it difficult to earn their loyalty.23

A number of organisations have become skilled at the ar t of managing all aspects of their relationship w it h t hei r customers. 2 4 For exa mple, A mazon is w idely recog n ised for t he qua l it y of i n for mat ion it maintains about its customers, the ser vices it renders and its ability to anticipate customers’ needs. Using the information it has, A mazon tries to serve what it believes are the unique needs of each customer, and it has a strong reputation for being able to successfully do this. Amazon uses big data gathered from customers while they browse to build and fine-tune its recommendation engine. The more Amazon knows about them, the better it can predict what they want to buy. 25

As we discuss next, organisations’ relationships with customers are characterised by three dimensions. Companies such as Acer and A mazon understand these dimensions and manage their relationships with customers in light of them.

Reach, richness and affiliation The reach d i mension of relat ionsh ips w it h customers is concer ned w it h t he orga n isat ion’s access a nd connection to customers. In general, organisations seek to extend their reach, add ing customers in the process of doing so.

Reach is an especially critical dimension for social networking sites such as Facebook and Instagram in that the value these organisations create for users is to connect them with others. The number of Facebook users has been dramatically increasing globally.26 Reach is also important to Netflix, which began life as a provider of postal DVDs in the USA and now streams movies and series to 190 countries. Fortunately for this organisation, its reach continues to expand. In a letter sent to shareholders in July 2019, Netflix reported it had 151 million subscribers and estimated it would grow that number by seven million in one quar ter to 158 million total subscribers.27 Nine years earlier, the company had just over 20 million subscribers, and it added 25 million subscribers in 2018–19.

Richness, the second dimension of organisations’ relationships with customers, is concerned with the depth and detail of the two-way flow of information between the organisation and the customer. The potent ia l of t he r ich ness d i mension to help t he orga n isat ion establ ish a compet it ive adva ntage i n its relationship with customers leads many organisations to offer online services in order to better manage i nfor mat ion excha nges w it h t hei r customers. Broader a nd deeper i n for mat ion-based excha nges allow organisations to better understand their customers and their needs. Such exchanges also enable customers to become more k nowledgeable about how t he organ isation can satisf y t hem. Inter net tech nolog y and e-com merce t ra nsact ions have substa nt ia l ly reduced t he costs of mea n i ng f u l i n for mat ion excha nges with current and potential customers. As we have noted, A mazon is a leader in using the internet to build relat ionsh ips w it h customers. In fact, it bil ls itself as t he most ‘customer-cent r ic compa ny ’ on Ea r t h. A mazon and other organisations use rich information from customers to help them develop innovative new products that better satisfy customers’ needs. 28

Affiliation, t he t h i rd d imension, is concer ned w it h facilitat ing usef u l interact ions w it h customers. View ing t he world t h rough t he customer ’s eyes and constant ly seek ing ways to create more value for the customer have positive effects in terms of affiliation. This approach enhances customer satisfaction and produces fewer customer complaints. In fact, for ser v ices, customers of ten do not complain when dissatisfied; instead they simply go to competitors for their service needs.29 Internet navigators such as

106 PART 2: STRATEGIC ACTIONS: STRATEGY FORMULATION

Reach is important for Netflix

Source: Shutterstock.com/DenPhotos

Microsoft’s MSN Autos help online clients find and sort information. MSN Autos provides data and software to prospective car buyers that enables them to compare car models along multiple objective specifications. A prospective buyer who has selected a specific car based on comparisons of different models can then be linked to dealers that meet the customer’s needs a nd pu rchasing requirements. Infor mation about ot her relevant issues such as financing and insurance, and even local traffic patterns, is also available at the site. Because its revenues come not from the final customer or end user but from other sources (such as adver tisements on its website, hyperlinks, and associated products and services), MSN Autos represents the customer’s interests, a service that fosters affiliation.30 In Australia, Seek promotes a similar affiliation for customers through the number of services it provides to job seekers via its portal, including career advice and templates for résumés. 31

As we discuss next, effectively managing customer relationships (a long t he d i mensions of reach, r ich ness a nd a f f i l iat ion) helps t he organisation answer questions related to the issues of who, what and how.

Who: determining the customers to serve Deciding who the target customer is that the organisation intends to serve with its business-level strategy is an important decision.32 Organisations divide customers into groups based on differences in the customers’ needs (needs are d iscussed f ur ther in the next section) to make this decision. Div id ing customers into groups based on their needs is called market segmentation, which is a process that clusters people with similar needs into individual and identifiable groups.33 In the animal food products business, for example, the food product needs of owners of companion pets (e.g. dogs and cats) differ from the needs for food and health-related products of those owning production animals (e.g. livestock). A subsidiar y of Colgate- Palmolive, Hill’s Pet Nutrition, sells food products for pets. In fact, the company’s mission is ‘to help enrich and lengthen the special relationship between people and their pets’. 34 Thus, Hill’s Pet Nutrition targets the needs of different segments of customers with the food products it sells for animals.

Almost any identifiable human or organisational characteristic can be used to subdivide a market into segments that differ from one another on a given characteristic. Common characteristics on which customers’ needs var y are illustrated in Table 4.1.

What: determining which customer needs to satisfy A fter the organisation decides who it will ser ve, it must identify the targeted customer group’s needs that its goods or ser vices can satisfy. In a general sense, needs (what) are related to a product’s benefits and features.35 Successful organisations learn how to deliver to customers what they want, when they want it.36 Having close and frequent interactions with both current and potential customers helps the organisation identify those individuals’ and groups’ current and future needs. 37

From a strategic perspective, a basic need of all customers is to buy products that create value for them. The generalised forms of value that goods or ser vices provide are either low cost with acceptable features or highly differentiated features with acceptable cost. During the global financial crisis (GFC) of 2008–09, organisations across industries recognised their customers’ needs to feel as secure as possible when making purchases. The most effective organisations continuously strive to anticipate changes in customers’ needs. The organisation that fails to anticipate and certainly to recognise changes in its customers’ needs may lose its customers to competitors whose products can provide more value to the focal organisation’s customers. It is also recognised that consumer needs and desires have been changing in recent years. For example, more consumers desire to have an experience rather than to simply purchase a good or ser vice. As a result,

market segmentation a process used to cluster people with similar needs into individual and identifiable groups

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one of Starbucks’ goals has been to provide an experience, not just a cup of coffee. Customers also prefer to receive customised goods and services. Starbucks in the USA has been doing this for some time, by allowing customers to design their own d rinks, within its menus (which have become rather extensive over time). Customers also demand fast service. Consumers of coffee are known for their impatience, and rapid service is now expected by most consumers. 38 Unhappy consumers lead to lost sales, from both those consumers and others who learn of their dissatisfaction. Therefore, it is impor tant to maintain customer satisfaction by meeting and satisfying consumers’ needs. 39

How: determining core competencies necessary to satisfy customer needs A fter deciding who the organisation will serve and the specific needs of those customers, the organisation is prepared to determine how to use its capabilities and competencies to develop products that can satisfy t he needs of its ta rget customers. A s ex pla i ned i n Chapters 1 a nd 3, core competencies a re resou rces a nd capabi l it ies t hat ser ve as a sou rce of compet it ive adva ntage for t he orga n isat ion over its r iva ls. Organisations use core competencies (how) to implement value-creating strategies and thereby satisf y customers’ needs. Only those organisations with the capacity to continuously improve, innovate and upgrade their competencies can expect to meet and hopefully exceed customers’ expectations across time.40 Organisations must continuously upgrade their capabilities to ensure that they maintain an advantage over their rivals by providing customers with a superior product.41 Often these capabilities are difficult for competitors to imitate, par tly because they are constantly being upgraded, but also because they are integrated and used as configurations of capabilities to perform an important activity (e.g. R&D).42

Organisations draw from a wide range of core competencies to produce goods or services that can satisfy customers’ needs. For example, Merck is a large pharmaceutical organisation well known for its R&D capabilities. In recent times, Merck has been building on these capabilities by investing heavily in R&D. In 2015, Merck invested US$6.7 billion to conduct research and identify major new drugs; in 2018, it invested US$9.7 billion. These new drugs are intended to meet the needs of consumers and to sustain Merck’s competitive advantage in the industr y.43

Basis for customer segmentation

Consumer markets

1 Demographic factors (age, income, sex, etc.) 2 Socioeconomic factors (social class and stage in the family life cycle) 3 Geographic factors (cultural, regional and national differences) 4 Psychological factors (lifestyle and personality traits) 5 Consumption patterns (heavy, moderate and light users) 6 Perceptual factors (benefit segmentation and perceptual mapping)

Industrial markets

1 End-use segments 2 Product segments (based on technological differences or production

economics) 3 Geographic segments (defined by boundaries between countries or by

regional differences within them) 4 Common buying factor segments (cut across product market and

geographic segments) 5 Customer size segments

Source: Based on information in S. C. Jain, 2009, Marketing Planning and Strategy, Mason, OH: South-Western-Cengage Custom Publishing.

Table 4.1

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SAS Institute is the world’s largest privately owned software company and is the leader in business intelligence and analy tics. Customers use SAS programs for data warehousing, data mining and decision suppor t purposes. SAS serves 83 000 sites in 147 countries and 92 per cent of the top Fortune 100 firms. Allocating approximately 24 per cent of revenues to R&D, a percentage that exceeds its competitors, SAS relies on its core competence in R&D to satisfy the data-related needs of such customers, including a host of consumer goods organisations (e.g. hotels, banks and catalogue companies).44

Sometimes organisations may find it necessary to use their core competencies as the foundation for producing new goods or ser vices for new customers. This may be the case for some small car par ts suppliers. Given that car production in recent years has declined about one-th ird from more typical levels in major markets, a number of these organisations are seek ing to d iversif y their operations, perhaps ex iting the car par ts supplier industry as a result. Some analysts believe that the first rule for these small manufacturers is to determine how their current capabilities and competencies might be used to produce value-creating products for different customers. One analyst gave the following example of how this might work: ‘There may be no reason that a company making automobile door handles couldn’t make ball- and-socket joints for artificial shoulders’.45

Our discussion about customers shows that all organisations must use their capabilities and core competencies (the how) to satisf y the needs (the what) of the target g roup of customers (the who) that the organisation has chosen to serve. Next, we describe the different business-level strategies that are available to organisations to use to satisfy customers as the foundation for earning above-average returns.

The purpose of a business-level strategy The purpose of a business-level strategy is to create differences between the organisation’s position and t hose of its compet itors.46 To position itself differently from competitors, an organisation must decide whether it intends to perform activities differently or to perform different activities. Strategy defines the path t hat prov ides t he d irection of actions to be taken by leaders of t he organ isation.47 In fact, ‘choosing to perform activities differently or to perform different activities than rivals’ is the essence of business-level strategy.48 Thus, the organisation’s business-level strategy is a deliberate choice about how it will perform the value chain’s primar y and suppor t activities to create unique value. Indeed, in the cur rent complex competitive landscape, successful use of a business-level strateg y results from the organisation learning how to integrate the activities it performs in ways that create superior value for customers.

Business models and their relationship with business-level strategies As is the case with strategy, there are multiple definitions of a business model. 49 The consensus across these definitions is that a business model describes what an organisation does to create, deliver and capture value for its stakeholders. 50 As explained in Chapter 1, stakeholders value related yet different outcomes. For example, for shareholders, the organisation captures and d istr ibutes value to them in the for m of a retur n on their investment. For customers, the organisation creates and delivers value in the for m of a product featuring the combination of price and features for which they are willing to pay. For employees, the organisation creates and delivers value in the form of a job about which they are passionate and through

business model describes what an organisation does to create, deliver and capture value for its stakeholders

This crowded shop could benefit from more attention to service or alternative service options such as self-service or online shopping. Too few salespeople to process transactions can have a negative impact on a customer’s experience.

Source: Shutterstock.com/Sorbis

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which they have opportunities to develop their skills by participating in continuous learning experiences. In a sense then, a business model is a framework for how the organisation will create, deliver and capture value while a business-level strateg y is the set of commitments and actions that yields the path an organisation intends to follow to gain a competitive advantage by exploiting its core competencies in a specific product market. Understanding customers in terms of who, what and how is foundational to developing and using successfully both a business model and a business-level strateg y. 51

Regardless of the business model chosen, those leading an organisation should view that selection as one that will require adjustment in response to conditions that change from time to time in the organisation’s external environment (e.g. an opportunity to enter a new region surfaces) and its internal environment (e.g. the development of new capabilities). 52 Par ticularly because it is involved primarily with implementing a business-level strateg y, the operational mechanics of a business model should change given the realities an organisation encounters while engaging rivals in marketplace competitions.

There is an array of different business models, from which organisations select one to use.53 A franchise business model, for example, finds an organisation licensing its trademark and the processes it follows to create and deliver a product to franchisees. In this instance, the organisation franchising its trademark and processes captures value by receiving fees and royalty payments from its franchisees.

McDonald’s and Jim’s Group (Jim’s Mowing, Jim’s Cleaning, Jim’s Dog Wash, etc.) both use the franchise business model. McDonald’s uses the model as par t of its cost leadership strateg y, while Jim’s Group uses it to implement a differentiation strategy (we discuss both strategies in detail in the next major section). The McDonald’s cost leadership strategy finds it using processes detailed in its franchise business model to deliver food items to its customers that are offered at a low price but with acceptable levels of differentiation. Customers receive acceptable levels of differentiation in terms of taste quality, service quality, the clean liness of the organ isation’s un its and the value customers believe they receive when buying McDonald’s food. 54 Jim’s Group also uses a franchise business model, but its model differs from the McDonald’s model. Rather than hav ing the same product at each franch ise, Jim’s has over 50 d iv isions covering household ser vices such as mowing, cleaning, dog washing and fencing.55 A lso, Jim’s employs a regional and national franchisor model where owning a region or a division allows the franchisor the right to sell franchises in a specific area.56 Thus, while McDonald’s and Jim’s Group use the same business model, the franchising business models these organisations use differ in the actions they take to implement different business-level strategies.

As mentioned, there are multiple kinds of business models, including the subscription model. In this instance, the business model finds an organisation offering a product to customers on a regular basis, such as once-per-month, once-per-year or upon demand. Netflix uses a subscription business model, as does Xero, an organisation providing accounting software that extends to business functions such as payroll, timesheets and expense management. In this way, Xero combines the differentiation strategy with a subscription model to create, deliver and capture value for the stakeholders (e.g. customers, suppliers and employees) with whom the organisation interacts while implementing its business-level strateg y. 57 Other business models that also support the use of any of the five generic business-level strategies we discuss next include the following: (1) a freemium model (here the organisation provides a basic product to customers for free and earns revenues and profits by selling a premium version of the service – examples include Dropbox and Mailchimp); (2) an advertising model (where, for a fee, organisations provide advertisers with high-quality access to their target customers – Google and Pinterest are examples of organisations using this business model); and (3) a peer-to-peer model (where a business matches those wanting a particular service with those providing that ser vice – an example is A irbnb).

Types of business-level strategies Organisations choose from among five business-level strategies to establish and defend their desired st rateg ic posit ion aga i nst compet itors: cost leadership, differentiation, focused cost leadership, focused

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differentiation and integrated cost leadership/differentiation (see Figure 4.1). Each business-level strategy helps the organisation to establish and exploit a par ticular competitive advantage within a par ticular competitive scope. How organisations integrate the activities they perform within each different business-level strategy demonstrates how they differ from one another.58 For example, organisations have different activity maps, and thus Virgin Australia’s activity map differs from those of competitor airlines Jetstar and Regional Express. Superior integration of activities increases the likelihood of an organisation being able to gain an advantage over competitors and earn above-average returns.

W hen selecting a business-level strateg y, organisations evaluate two ty pes of potential competitive advantages: ‘lower cost than rivals, or the ability to differentiate and command a premium price that exceeds the extra cost of doing so’. 59 Having lower cost derives from the organisation’s ability to perform activities differently from rivals; being able to differentiate indicates the organisation’s capacity to perform different (and valuable) activities. Thus, based on the nature and quality of its internal resources, capabilities and core competencies, an organisation seeks to form either a cost competitive advantage or a distinctiveness competitive advantage as the basis for implementing its business-level strateg y.60

Two t y pes of ta rget ma rkets a re a broad ma rket a nd na r row ma rket seg ment(s) (see Fig u re 4.1). Organisations serving a broad market seek to use their capabilities to create value for customers on an industry-wide basis. A narrow market segment means that the organisation intends to serve the needs of a narrow customer group. With focus strategies, the organisation ‘selects a segment or group of segments in the industry and tailors its strategy to serving them to the exclusion of others’.61 Buyers with special needs and buyers located in specific geographic regions are examples of narrow customer groups.62 As shown in Figure 4.1, an organisation could also strive to develop a combined low-cost/distinctiveness value-creation approach as the foundation for serving a target customer group that is larger than a narrow market segment but not as comprehensive as a broad (or industr y-wide) customer group. In this instance, the organisation uses the integrated cost leadership/differentiation strategy.

None of the five business-level strategies shown in Figure 4.1 is inherently or universally superior to the others.63 The effectiveness of each strategy is contingent both on the opportunities and threats in an organisation’s external environment and on the strengths and weaknesses derived from the organisation’s resource por tfolio. It is critical, therefore, for the organisation to select a business-level strateg y that is based on a match between the oppor tunities and threats in its external environment and the strengths of its internal organisation as shown by its core competencies.6 4 A fter the organisation chooses its strateg y, it shou ld consistently emphasise actions t hat a re requ ired to successf u lly use it. For example, Big W ’s

Figure 4.1 Five business-level strategies

Narrow target

Broad target Cost leadership Differentiation

Cost

Competitive advantage

Competitive scope

Uniqueness

Focused cost leadership

Focused differentiation

Integrated cost leadership/differentiation

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continuous emphasis on driving its costs lower is thought to be a key to the organisation’s effective cost leadership strateg y.65

Cost leadership strategy The cost leadership strategy is an integrated set of actions taken to produce goods or services with features that are acceptable to customers at the lowest cost, relative to those of competitors.66 Organisations using the cost leadership strateg y commonly sell standardised goods or ser vices ( but with competitive levels of differentiation) to the industry’s most typical customers. Process innovations – which are newly designed production and distribution methods and techniques that allow the organisation to operate more efficiently – are critical to successful use of the cost leadership strategy.67

As noted, cost leaders’ goods and services must have competitive levels of differentiation that create value for customers. For example, in recent years Hyundai Motors has emphasised the design of its cars in the market as a source of differentiation while implementing a cost leadership strategy. Called ‘cheap chic’, this is used by K ia Motors, and some analysts have a positive view of this decision, saying: ‘ W hen they’re done, K ia’s cars will still be low-end [in price], but they won’t necessarily look like it’.68 It is impor tant for organisations using the cost leadership strateg y to not simply concentrate on reducing costs, because it could result in the organisation efficiently producing products that no customer wants to purchase. In fact, such extremes could limit the potential for impor tant process innovations and lead to employment of lower-skilled workers, poor conditions on the production line, accidents and a poor quality of work life for employees.69

As shown in Figure 4.1, the organisation using the cost leadership strategy targets a broad customer segment or group. Cost leaders concentrate on finding ways to lower their costs relative to competitors by constantly rethinking how to complete their primary and support activities to reduce costs still further, while maintaining competitive levels of differentiation.70

As primar y activities, inbound logistics (e.g. materials handling, warehousing and inventor y control) and outbound logistics (e.g. collecting, storing and distributing products to customers) often account for significant portions of the total cost to produce some goods and services. Research suggests that having a compet it ive adva ntage i n log ist ics creates more va lue w it h a cost leadersh ip st rateg y t ha n w it h a differentiation strategy.71 Thus, cost leaders seek ing competitively valuable ways to reduce costs may want to concentrate on the primary activities of inbound logistics and outbound logistics. In so doing, many organisations choose to outsource their manufacturing operations to low-cost organisations with low-wage employees (e.g. China).72 However, care must be taken because outsourcing also makes the organisation more dependent on organisations over which they have little control. At best, it creates interdependencies between the outsourcing organisation and the suppliers. If dependencies become too great, it gives the supplier more power, with which it may increase the prices of the goods and services provided. Such actions could harm the organisation’s ability to maintain a low-cost competitive advantage.73

Cost leaders also carefully examine all support activities to find additional potential cost reductions. Developing new systems for finding the optimal combination of low-cost and acceptable levels of differentiation in the raw materials required to produce the organisation’s goods or services is an example of how the procurement suppor t activity can facilitate successful use of the cost leadership strateg y.

A s desc r ibed i n Chapter 3, orga n isat ions use va lue cha i n a na lysis to ident i f y t he pa r ts of t he organisation’s operations that create value and those that do not. Fig ure 4.2 demonstrates the primar y and suppor t activ ities that allow an organ isation to create value th rough the cost leadersh ip st rateg y. Organisations unable to link the activities shown in this figure through the activity map they form typically lack the core competencies needed to successfully use the cost leadership strateg y.

Effective use of the cost leadership strategy allows an organisation to earn above-average returns in spite of the presence of strong competitive forces (see Chapter 2). The five forces model (rivalry with existing competitors, bargaining power of customers, bargaining power of suppliers, threat of new entrants, and

cost leadership strategy an integrated set of actions taken to produce goods or services with features that are acceptable to customers at the lowest cost, relative to that of competitors

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threat of substitute products) can be applied for any of the five business-level strategies. The next sections (one covering each of the five forces) explain how organisations implement a cost leadership strategy from the perspective of the industr y forces that impact on them when using that business-level strateg y.

Rivalry with existing competitors Having the low-cost position is valuable to deal with rivals. Because of the cost leader’s advantageous position, rivals hesitate to compete on the basis of price, especially before evaluating the potential outcomes of such competition.74 The US giant Walmar t is a good case study of how hard this can be: it has been known for its ability to maintain very low costs, thereby creating value for customers in competition with, among others, Target and Dollar Stores. However, changes it made to attract upmarket customers made its low-cost position vulnerable to rivals. Ultra-low-cost players such as A mazon took advantage of this opportunity. Amazon is a low-cost leader and has begun to siphon off Walmart customers. Because of Walmart’s unprecedented loss of sales and market position, it has started to fight back by returning to its former strategy, and is implementing new competitive actions as well.

The degree of rivalry present is based on a number of different factors such as size and resources of rivals, their dependence on the par ticular market, and location and prior competitive interactions, among

Sources: Based on M. E. Porter, 1998, Competitive Advantage: Creating and Sustaining Superior Performance, New York: The Free Press; D. G. Sirmon, M. A. Hitt & R. D. Ireland, 2007, Managing firm resources in dynamic environments to create value: Looking inside the black box, Academy of Management

Review, 32: 273–92; J. B. Barney, D. J. Ketchen, Jr, M. Wright, D. G. Sirmon, M. A. Hitt, R. D. Ireland & B. A. Gilbert, 2011, Resource orchestration to create competitive advantage: Breadth, depth and life cycle effects, Journal of Management, 37(5): 1390–412.

Examples of value-creating activities associated with the cost leadership strategy

Supply-chain management

Support functions

Value chain activities

Operations Distribution

Customers

Marketing (including

sales)

Follow-up service

Finance Manage financial resources to ensure positive cash flow and low debt costs.

Effective relationships with suppliers to maintain efficient flow of goods (supplies) for operations

Build economies of scale and efficient operations (e.g., production processes)

Use of low- cost modes of transporting goods and delivery times that produce lowest costs

Targeted advertising and low prices for high sales volumes

Efficient follow-up to reduce returns

Develop policies to ensure efficient hiring and retention to keep costs low. Implement training to ensure high employee efficiency.

Human resources

Develop and maintain cost-effective MIS operations. Management information systems

Figure 4.2

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others.75 Organisations may also take actions to reduce the amount of rivalry that they face. For example, organisations sometimes form joint ventures to reduce rivalry and increase the amount of profitability enjoyed by organisations in the industr y.76

In t he past, r iva ls hesitated to compete d i rect ly w it h Wa l ma r t st r ict ly on t he basis of costs a nd, subsequently, pr ices to consumers. Yet, given Walmar t’s changes, its pr ices on some products are only slightly below the prices of similar goods at Target. Walmar t’s changes then also provided an oppor tunity for Target and Costco. Walmart saw the error in its new direction and vowed to return to its cost leadership strateg y of providing the lowest prices on all goods sold.

Bargaining power of buyers (customers) Powerful customers can force a cost leader to reduce its prices, but not below the level at which the cost leader’s next-most-efficient industry competitor can earn average returns. Although powerful customers might be able to force the cost leader to reduce prices even below this level, they probably would choose not to do so. Prices that are low enough to prevent the next-most-efficient competitor from earning average returns would force that organisation to exit the market, leaving the cost leader with less competition and in an even stronger position. Customers would thus lose their power and pay higher prices if they were forced to purchase from a single organisation operating in an industr y without rivals.

Buyers can also develop a cou nterbalancing power to t he customers’ power by ca ref u lly analysing a nd u ndersta nd i ng each of t hei r customers. To help i n obta i n i ng i n for mat ion a nd u ndersta nd i ng t he customers, buyers can participate in customers’ networks. In so doing, they share information, build trust and participate in joint problem solving with their customers.77 In turn, they use the information obtained to supply a product that provides superior value to customers by most effectively satisfying their needs.

Bargaining power of suppliers The cost leader operates with margins greater than those of competitors and strives to constantly increase its margins by driving its costs lower. Among other benefits, higher gross margins relative to those of competitors make it possible for the cost leader to absorb its suppliers’ price increases. W hen an industr y faces substantial increases in the cost of its supplies, only the cost leader may be able to pay the higher prices and continue to earn either average or above-average returns. A lternatively, a powerful cost leader may be able to force its suppliers to hold down their prices, which would reduce the suppliers’ margins in the process. This has become the fate of farming globally: large organisations are forcing farmers to sell at low prices.

Some organisations create dependencies on suppliers by outsourcing whole functions. They do so to reduce their overall costs.78 They may outsource these activities to reduce their costs because of earnings pressures from stakeholders (e.g. institutional investors who own a major stock holding in the company) in the industr y.79 Often when there is such earnings pressure, the organisation may see foreign suppliers whose costs are also lower, providing them the capability to offer the goods at lower prices.80 Yet when organisations outsource, particularly to a foreign supplier, they also need to invest time and effort into building a good relationship, hopefully developing tr ust between the organisations. 81

Potential entrants Through continuous efforts to reduce costs to levels that are lower than those of competitors, a cost leader becomes highly efficient. Because increasing levels of efficiency (e.g. economies of scale) enhance profit margins, they serve as a significant entry barrier to potential competitors.82 New entrants must be willing to accept no-better-t han-average retu r ns u nt il t hey gain t he ex per ience requ i red to approach t he cost leader’s efficiency. To earn even average returns, new entrants must have the competencies required to match the cost levels of competitors other than the cost leader. The low profit margins (relative to margins earned by organisations implementing the differentiation strategy) make it necessary for the cost leader to sell large volumes of its product to earn above-average returns. However, organisations striving to be

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the cost leader must avoid pricing their products so low that their ability to operate profitably is reduced, even though volume increases.

Product substitutes Compared w ith its industr y r ivals, the cost leader also holds an attractive position in ter ms of product substitutes. A product substitute becomes an issue for the cost leader when its features and characteristics, in terms of cost and differentiated features, are potentially attractive to the organisation’s customers. When faced with possible substitutes, the cost leader has more flexibility than its competitors. To retain customers, it can reduce the price of its good or ser vice. With still lower prices and competitive levels of differentiation, the cost leader increases the probability that customers prefer its product rather than a substitute.

Competitive risks of the cost leadership strategy The cost leadership strategy is not risk free. One risk is that the processes used by the cost leader to produce a nd d ist r ibute its good or ser v ice cou ld become obsolete because of compet itors’ i n novat ions.8 3 These innovations may allow rivals to produce at costs lower than those of the original cost leader, or to provide additional differentiated features without increasing the product’s price to customers.

A second risk is that too much focus by the cost leader on cost reductions may occur at the expense of trying to understand customers’ perceptions of ‘competitive levels of differentiation’. Low-cost stores are sometimes cr iticised for hav ing too few salespeople available to help customers and too few individuals at checkout registers. These complaints suggest that there might be a discrepancy between how organisations and customers define ‘minimal levels of service’ and organisations’ attempts to drive their costs increasingly lower.

Imitation is a final risk of the cost leadership strategy. Using their own core competencies, competitors somet i mes lea r n how to successf u l ly i m itate t he cost leader ’s st rateg y. W hen t h is happens, t he cost leader must increase the value its good or ser vice provides to customers. Commonly, value is increased by selling the current product at an even lower price or by adding differentiated features that create value for customers while maintaining price.

Differentiation strategy The differentiation strategy is a n i nteg rated set of act ions ta ken to produce goods or ser v ices (at a n acceptable cost) that customers perceive as being different in ways that are important to them.8 4 W hile cost leaders serve a typical customer in an industry, differentiators target customers for whom value is created by the manner in which the organisation’s products differ from those produced and marketed by competitors. Product innovation, which is ‘the result of bringing to life a new way to solve the customer’s problem – through a new product or service development – that benefits both the customer and the sponsoring company’,85 is critical to successful use of the differentiation strategy.86

Organisations must be able to produce differentiated products at competitive costs to reduce upward pressure on the price that customers pay. When a product’s differentiated features are produced at non- compet it ive costs, t he pr ice for t he product may exceed what t he orga n isat ion’s ta rget customers a re willing to pay. If the organisation has a thorough understanding of what its target customers value, the relative importance they attach to the satisfaction of different needs, and for what they are willing to pay a premium, the differentiation strategy can be effective in helping it earn above-average returns. Of course, to achieve these returns, the organisation must apply its knowledge capital (knowledge held by its employees and managers) to provide customers with a differentiated product that gives them superior value.87

Through the differentiation strategy, the organisation produces non-standardised (i.e. distinctive) products for customers who value differentiated features more than they value low cost. For example, supe r ior produc t rel iabi l it y a nd du rabi l it y a nd h ig h-pe r for ma nce sou nd system s a re a mong t he

differentiation strategy an integrated set of actions taken to produce goods or services (at an acceptable cost) that customers perceive as being different in ways that are important to them

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differentiated features of Toyota Motor Corporation’s Lexus products. However, Lexus offers its vehicles to customers at a competitive purchase price relative to other luxury automobiles. As with Lexus products, a product’s unique attributes, rather than its purchase price, provide the value for which customers are willing to pay.

To maintain success with the differentiation strategy results, the organisation must consistently upgrade differentiated features that customers value and/or create new valuable features (innovate) without significant cost increases.8 8 Th is approach requ i res orga n isat ions to consta nt ly cha nge t hei r product lines.89 These organisations may also offer a portfolio of products that complement each other, thereby enriching the differentiation for the customer and perhaps satisfying a portfolio of consumer needs.9 0 For example, Billabong, the Australian surf wear company that star ted in 1973, has a wide range of surf wear and snowboarding products differentiated by its brand as a well-established surf-oriented and board-spor ts company. It strives to keep this fresh with a continual stream of new products and with sponsorship of surfing (e.g. the Billabong Pipeline Masters) and snowboarding events. That said, despite the brand’s prominence, management at Billabong got the company into trouble in 2012 and 2013, to the extent that the brand’s value did not equal the debt level – a good brand is extremely valuable, but is not the complete answer. After disappointing sales and losses, the company was acquired by the owner of rival brand Quiksilver in a A$198 million deal in 2018.91

Because a differentiated product satisfies customers’ unique needs, organisations following the differentiation strategy are able to charge premium prices. The ability to sell a good or service at a price that substantially exceeds the cost of creating its differentiated features allows the organisation to outperform rivals and earn above-average returns. Rather than costs, an organisation using the differentiation strategy primarily concentrates on investing in and developing features that differentiate a product in ways that create value for customers.92 Overall, an organisation using the differentiation strategy seeks to be different from its competitors on as many dimensions as possible. The less similarity between an organisation’s goods or services and those of competitors, the more buffered it is from rivals’ actions. Commonly recognised differentiated goods include Toyota’s Lexus, Rolex watches, Caterpillar’s heavy-duty earth-moving equipment and McKinsey & Co.’s consulting services.

A good or service can be differentiated in many ways. Unusual features, responsive customer service, rapid product innovations and technological leadership, perceived prestige and status, different tastes, and engineering design and performance are examples of approaches to differentiation.93 W hile the number of ways to reduce costs may be finite, virtually anything an organisation can do to create real or perceived value is a basis for differentiation. Consider product design as a case in point. Because it can create a positive experience for customers, design is an important source of differentiation (even for cost leaders seeking to find ways to add functionalities to their low-cost products as a way of differentiating their products from competitors) and, hopefully, of competitive advantage. 94 Apple is often cited as the organisation that sets the standard in design, with the iPhone and the iPad demonstrating Apple’s product design capabilities.95

The value chain can be analysed to determine if an organisation is able to link the activities required to create value by using the differentiation strategy. Examples of primary value chain activities and support functions that are commonly used to differentiate a good or service are shown in Figure 4.3. Organisations without the skills needed to link these activities cannot expect to successfully use the differentiation strategy. Next, we explain how organisations using the differentiation strategy can successfully position themselves in terms of the five forces of competition (see Chapter 2) to earn above-average returns.

Rivalry with existing competitors Customers tend to be loyal purchasers of products differentiated in ways that are meaningful to them. As their loyalty to a brand increases, customers’ sensitivity to price increases is reduced. The relationship between brand loyalty and pr ice sensitiv ity insulates an organ isation f rom competitive r ivalr y. Thus, Bose is insulated from intense rivalr y as long as customers continue to perceive that its stereo equipment

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offers superior sound quality at a competitive purchase price. Bose has a strong positive reputation for high quality and unique products. Thus, reputations can sustain the competitive advantage of organisations following a differentiation strategy.96

Bargaining power of buyers (customers) The distinctiveness of differentiated goods or services reduces customers’ sensitivity to price increases. Customers are willing to accept a price increase when a product still satisfies their perceived unique needs better than does a competitor’s offering. Thus, the golfer whose needs are specifically satisfied by Callaway golf clubs will be likely to continue buying those products even if their cost increases. Similarly, the customer who has been highly satisfied with a Louis Vuitton wallet will probably replace that wallet with another one made by the same company, even though the purchase price is higher than the original one. Purchasers of brand-name food and household items (e.g. Vegemite and K leenex tissues) accept price increases in those products as long as they continue to perceive that the product satisfies their distinctive

Supply-chain management

Support functions

Value chain activities

Operations Distribution

Customers

Marketing (including

sales)

Follow-up service

Finance Make long-term investments in development of new technology and innovative products, in marketing and advertising, and in ability to provide exceptional service.

Human resources Recruit highly qualified employees and invest in training that provides them with the latest technological knowledge and the capabilities to provide breakthrough services.

Management information systems Acquire and develop excellent information systems that provide up-to-date market intelligence and real-time information in all areas relevant for strategic and major operational decisions.

Develop and maintain positive relation with major suppliers. Ensure the receipt of high- quality supplies (raw materials and other goods).

Manufacture high-quality goods. Develop flexible systems that allow rapid response to customers’ changing needs.

Provide accurate and timely delivery of goods to customers.

Build strong positive relationships with customers. Invest in effective promotion and advertising program.

Have specially trained unit to provide after- sales service. Ensure high customer satisfaction.

Examples of value-creating activities associated with the differentiation strategy

Source: Based on M. E. Porter, 1998, Competitive Advantage: Creating and Sustaining Superior Performance, New York: The Free Press; D. G. Sirmon, M. A. Hitt & R. D. Ireland, 2007, Managing firm resources in dynamic environments to create value: Looking inside the black box, Academy of Management Review, 32: 273–92; J. B. Barney, D. J. Ketchen,

Jr, M. Wright, D. G. Sirmon, M. A. Hitt, R. D. Ireland & B. A. Gilbert, 2011, Resource orchestration to create competitive advantage: Breadth, depth and life cycle effects, Journal of Management, 37(5): 1390–412.

Figure 4.3

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needs at an acceptable cost. In all of t hese instances, t he customers a re relat ively insensit ive to pr ice increases because they do not think that an acceptable product alternative exists.

Bargaining power of suppliers B e c au s e t he o r g a n i s at ion u s i n g t he d i f fe r e nt i at ion s t r ateg y c h a r ge s a p r e m iu m p r ice fo r its products, suppliers must provide high-quality components, driving up the organisation’s costs. However, the high margins the organisation earns in these cases partially insulate it from the influence of suppliers in that higher supplier costs can be paid through these margins.97 Alternatively, because of buyers’ relative insensitivity to price increases, the differentiated organisation might choose to pass the additional cost of supplies on to the customer by increasing the price of its unique product.

Potential entrants Customer loyalty and the need to overcome the uniqueness of a differentiated product present substantial barriers to potential entrants. Entering an industry under these conditions typically demands significant investments of resources and patience while seeking customers’ loyalty.

Product substitutes Organisations selling brand-name goods and services to loyal customers are positioned effectively against product substitutes. By contrast, organisations without brand loyalty face a higher probability of their customers switching either to products that offer differentiated features that serve the same function (particularly if the substitute has a lower price) or to products that offer more features and perform more attractive functions.

Competitive risks of the differentiation strategy One risk of the differentiation strategy is that customers might decide that the price differential between the differentiator’s product and the cost leader’s product is too large. In this instance, an organisation may be offering differentiated features that exceed target customers’ needs. The organisation then becomes vulnerable to competitors that are able to offer customers a combination of features and price that is more consistent with their needs.

This risk is generalised across a number of organisations producing different types of products during an economic recession, which is a time when sales of lu xur y goods (e.g. jeweller y and leather goods) often suffer. The decline during the GFC was more severe in the USA compared with Australia, but it certainly affected Australian companies. Billabong, already struggling with the fact that its core target had become older and its brand less ‘surf ’, was badly hit by an ill-timed expansion into having its own stores ( because that is where the biggest profits were in the value chain). This took shape as the GFC crisis hit, and profits shrank as debt increased, which contributed to the company’s sale in 2018. 98

As the Billabong example demonstrates, another risk of the differentiation strategy is that an organisation’s means of differentiation may cease to provide value for which customers are willing to pay (i.e. it stopped being a really credible youth surf brand). A differentiated product becomes less valuable if imitation by rivals causes customers to perceive that competitors offer essentially the same good or service, but at a lower price.99 A third risk of the differentiation strategy is that experience can narrow customers’ perceptions of the value of a product’s differentiated features. For example, customers having positive experiences with generic tissues may decide that the differentiated features of the Kleenex product are not worth the extra cost. To counter this risk, organisations must continue to meaningfully differentiate their product (e.g. through innovation) for customers at a price they are willing to pay.10 0

Cou nter feit i ng is t he d if ferent iat ion st rateg y ’s fou r t h r isk. ‘Cou nter feits a re t hose products bea r i ng a t rade ma rk t hat i s ide nt ica l to or i nd i st i ng u i shable f rom a t rade ma rk reg i ste red to a not he r pa r t y,

118 PART 2: STRATEGIC ACTIONS: STRATEGY FORMULATION

t hus i n f r i ng i ng t he r ights of t he holder of t he t radema rk .’101 Companies such as Hewlett-Packard must ta ke ac t ion s to dea l w it h t he proble m s cou nte r fe it good s c reate for orga n i sat ion s whose r ig ht s a re i n f r i nged upon .

Focus strategies The focus strategy is an integrated set of actions taken to produce goods or ser vices that ser ve the needs of a pa r t icula r compet it ive seg ment. Thus, organ isat ions use a focus st rateg y when t hey ut ilise t hei r core competencies to ser ve the needs of a par ticular industr y segment or niche to the exclusion of others. Examples of specific market segments that can be targeted by a focus strategy include a particular buyer group (e.g. youths or senior citizens), a different segment of a product line (e.g. products for professional painters or the do-it-yourself group) and a different geographic market (e.g. northern or southern Italy by using a foreign subsidiar y).102

There are many specific customer needs that organisations can serve by using a focus strategy. For example, Melbour ne-based fast-food organisation Lord of the Fr ies positions itself as ‘hip’ and ethical, appealing to students and anti-establishment people with its vegan burgers and high-end fries (hot chips).103 By successfully using a focus strategy, organisations such as these gain a competitive advantage in specific market niches or segments, even though they do not possess an industr y-wide competitive advantage.

A lthough the breadth of a target is clearly a matter of degree, the essence of the focus strateg y ‘is the exploitation of a narrow target’s differences from the balance of the industry’.10 4 Organisations using the focus strategy intend to serve a particular segment of an industry more effectively than can industry-wide competitors. They succeed when they effectively serve a segment whose unique needs are so specialised that broad-based competitors choose not to serve that segment or when they satisfy the needs of a segment being ser ved poorly by industr y-wide competitors.105

Organisations can create value for customers in specific and unique market segments by using the focused cost leadership strategy or the focused differentiation strategy.

Focused cost leadership strategy Based in Sweden (but with a financial base in the Netherlands), IKEA, a global furniture retailer with 433 stores in 27 countries, 211 000 staff, suppliers in 51 countries and sales revenue of €41 billion in 2019, uses the focused cost leadership strategy. Young buyers desiring style at a low cost are IKEA’s target customers.106 For these customers, the organisation of fe rs home f u r n i sh i ngs t hat combi ne good desig n , f u nc t ion a nd acceptable quality with low prices. According to the organisation, ‘Low cost is always in focus. This applies to ever y phase of our activities’.107

I K E A e mpha si ses seve ra l ac t iv it ies to keep it s cost s low. For exa mple, i nstead of rely i ng pr i ma r i ly on t h i rd-pa r t y ma nu fact u rers, the organisation’s engineers design low-cost, modular fur niture ready for assembly by customers. To eliminate the need for sales associates or decorators, IKEA positions the products in its stores so that customers can view different living combinations (complete with sofas, chairs, tables, etc.) in a single room-like setting, which helps the customer imagine how furniture will look in their home. A third practice that helps keep IK EA’s costs low is requiring customers to transpor t their own purchases rather than providing a deliver y ser vice.

Although it is a cost leader, IKEA also offers some differentiated features that appeal to its target customers, including its unique furniture designs, in-store playrooms for children, wheelchairs for customer use and extended hours. IKEA believes that these services and products

focus strategy an integrated set of actions taken to produce goods or services that serve the needs of a particular competitive segment

IKEA, the Swedish branded furniture organisation, is a well-known model for running a low-cost value chain.

Source: iStock.com/cloudytronics

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‘are uniquely aligned with the needs of [its] customers, who are young, are not wealthy, are likely to have children (but no nanny), and, because they work, have a need to shop at odd hours’.108 Thus, IKEA’s focused cost leadership strategy also includes some differentiated features with its low-cost products.

Focused differentiation strategy Other organisations implement the focused differentiation strategy. As noted earlier, there are many dimensions on which organisations can differentiate their good or service. Lord of the Fries differentiates by the quality of its food and by demonstrating in its newsletter, internet and Facebook presences how highly aware it is of youth music culture. It also sells exclusively vegan products, distinguishing itself from the competition on ethical grounds.

The activities required to use the focused cost leadership strateg y are vir tually identical to those of t he indust r y-w ide cost leadersh ip st rateg y (see Fig u re 4.2), a nd act iv it ies requ i red to use t he focused differentiation strategy are largely identical to those of the industry-wide differentiation strategy (see Figure 4.3). Similarly, the manner in which each of the two focus strategies allows an organisation to deal successfully with the five competitive forces parallels those of the two broad strategies. The only difference is in the organisation’s competitive scope; the organisation focuses on a narrow industry segment. Thus, Figures 4.2 and 4.3 and the text describing the five competitive forces also explain the relationship between each of the two focus strategies and competitive advantage.

Competitive risks of focus strategies With either focus strateg y, the organisation faces the same general risks as the organisation using the cost leadership or the differentiation strategy, respectively, on an industry-wide basis. However, focus strategies have two additional risks.

First, a competitor may be able to focus on a more narrowly defined competitive segment and thereby ‘out-focus’ the focuser. This would happen to IKEA if another organisation found a way to offer IKEA’s customers (young buyers interested in stylish furniture at a low cost) additional sources of differentiation while charging the same price, or to provide the same service with the same sources of differentiation at a lower price. Second, a company competing on an industr y-wide basis may decide that the market segment ser ved by t he organ isation using a focus st rateg y is att ractive and wor t hy of competitive pu rsuit. For example, leading up to Christmas 2019, Billabong’s broad youth target was under attack from ‘core surf ’ brands, and the company’s operations were disr upted by an international cyber attack.109

Integrated cost leadership/differentiation strategy Most consumers have high expectations when purchasing a good or ser vice. In general, it seems that most consumers want to pay a low price for products with somewhat highly differentiated features. Because of these customer expectations, a number of organisations engage in primar y value chain activities and support functions that allow them to simultaneously pursue low cost and differentiation. Organisations seeking to do this use the integrated cost leadership/differentiation strategy. The objective of using this strategy is to efficiently produce products with some differentiated features. Efficient production is the source of maintaining low costs, while differentiation is the source of creating unique value. Organisations that successfully use the integrated cost leadership/differentiation strategy usually adapt quickly to new tech nologies and rapid changes in their exter nal env iron ments. Simultaneously concent rating on developing two sources of competitive advantage (cost and differentiation) increases the number of primary and suppor t activities in which the organisation must become competent. Such organisations often have strong networks with external par ties that perform some of the primar y and suppor t activities.110 In turn, having skills in a larger number of activities makes an organisation more flexible.

integrated cost leadership/ differentiation strategy involves engaging in primary value chain activities and support functions that allow an organisation to simultaneously pursue low cost and differentiation

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Concent rat ing on t he needs of its core customer g roup ( h igher-income, fash ion-conscious d iscou nt shoppers), Target (Australia) uses an integrated cost leadership/differentiation strategy, as shown by its ‘Expect more. Pay less’ brand promise. Target’s annual report describes this strategy: ‘Our enduring “Expect more. Pay less” brand promise helped us to deliver greater convenience, increased sav ings and a more personalised shopping experience’. However, Australian bricks-and-mortar retail stores are st r uggl i ng aga i nst on l i ne shoppi ng a nd st ronger Eu ropea n a nd US compet itors, a nd Ta rget closed 15 stores in 2018 –19 af ter a 1.5 per cent decline in sales. In 2010, Ta rget had 341 stores in Aust ralia, but this had dropped to 289 stores by 2019.111 European-based Zara, which pioneered ‘cheap chic’ in clothing apparel, is another organisation using the integrated cost leadership/differentiation strategy. Zara offers current and desirable fashion goods at relatively low prices. To implement this strategy effectively requires sophisticated designers and means of managing costs, which fits Zara’s capabilities. Zara can design and begin manufacturing a new fashion in three weeks, which suggests a highly flexible organisation that can adapt easily to changes in the market or with competitors.112

Flexibility is required for organisations to complete primary value chain activities and support functions in ways that allow them to use the integrated cost leadership/differentiation strategy in order to produce somewhat differentiated products at relatively low costs. Chinese car manufacturers have developed a means of product design that provides a flexible architecture that allows low-cost manufacturing but also car designs that are differentiated from competitors.113 Flexible manufacturing systems, information networks and total quality management systems are three sources of flexibility that are particularly useful for organisations tr y ing to balance the objectives of continuous cost reductions and continuous enhancements to sources of differentiation as called for by the integrated strategy.

The Chinese footwear and apparel company Li Ning has implemented an integrated cost leadership/ differentiated strategy. The company entered the market and grew quickly using a cost leadership strategy. It is now entering the upscale markets in China, in which it will compete with Nike and Adidas. It is also entering the US market, in which it will compete against both of these organisations and other brand-name sportswear producers. Thus, it will encounter significant challenges. In fact, it may end up ‘stuck in the middle’ and not compete effectively in any markets. Perhaps its opportunity is to provide high-quality brand-name goods for a lower price than its ‘upmarket’ competitors.

Apple vs Samsung vs Huawei: the battle for smart technology

Apple traditionally had several advantages that kept it as market leader in its sector of ‘smart technology’. It is a product innovator, has a huge installed base of customers, and owns and controls most of its supply chain and value chain. Apple is not only a product innovator; it creates new markets and then dominates them as a first mover. Apple has done this with the iPod, iPhone and iPad. However, as shown in Figure 4.4, both Samsung and Huawei surpassed Apple in smartphone sales in 2018 and 2019, with similar trends for tablets and other devices.

There are significant differences in the overall company market focus between the tech giants. Apple is focused on consumer technology, Huawei is focused more specifically on telecommunications, and

Samsung is a highly diversified company with interests in technology, motor vehicles, military hardware, apartments and ships, and even operates a Korean amusement park. Samsung is one of the top four investors in R&D globally, along with Amazon, Alphabet (Google) and Volkswagen. Samsung invested over US$15 billion in R&D in 2018.

In response to its competitors, Apple has stepped up its own R&D spend, with a record US$4.2 billion in a single quarter in 2019. Apple still leads in terms of installed customer base, and perhaps most significantly, in terms of profit. Also, Apple is well-positioned to take advantage of the customer trend towards online and subscription- based services, with Apple’s services divisions making up an increasing percentage of its revenues and profits.

Strategic focus |Technology

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Apple’s services business brings in more revenue than the iPad or Mac. Apple’s future seems to be clearly focused on services and subscriptions, with Apple Music, App Store, iCloud, iTunes, Apple Books, Apple Pay, AppleCare and licensing as the fastest- growing part of the company. Apple may be beaten on physical devices by Samsung and Huawei, but Apple’s differentiation strategy based on product innovation, a superb brand, and a focus on services and subscriptions is likely to be a winner.

Sources: E. Schulze, 2019, Huawei smartphone sales surge 50% as Apple and Samsung struggle, CNBC, https://www.cnbc.

com/2019/05/01/huawei-ahead-of-apple-in-q1-2019-smartphone- shipments.html, 1 December; J. Riley, 2013, Samsung – the world’s

biggest diversified company?, https://www.tutor2u.net/business/

blog/samsung-the-worlds-biggest-diversified-company, 9 February; Statista, 2019, Ranking of the 20 companies with the highest

spending on research and development in 2018 (in billion U.S. dollars), https://www.statista.com/statistics/265645/ranking-of- the-20-companies-with-the-highest-spending-on-research-and-

development, 1 December; Naresh, 2019, Samsung continues to pour money into R&D, https://www.sammobile.com/news/

samsung-spending-on-research-development-grows, 1 September; C. Miller, 2019, Apple R&D spending continues to increase as it

invests in core iPhone tech, future products, https://9to5mac. com/2019/08/04/apple-rd-spending-q3, 4 August; C. Gartenberg,

2019, How Apple makes billions of dollars selling services: Breaking down Apple’s new focus – from Apple Music to accounting tricks,

The Verge, https://www.theverge.com/2019/3/20/18273179/apple- icloud-itunes-app-store-music-services-businesses, 20 March; D. Reisinger, 2016, How Apple nabbed 104% of smartphone profits

last quarter, Fortune, https://fortune.com/2016/11/04/apple- smartphone-profits, 4 November.

25.0%

20.0%

15.0%

10.0%

5.0%

0.0% 2018Q1

U n

it m

ar ke

t sh

ar e

2018Q2 2018Q3 2018Q4 2019Q1

Samsung Huawei Apple Xiaomi vivo* OPPO*

Source: E. Schulze, 2019, Huawei smartphone sales surge 50% as Apple and Samsung struggle, https://www.cnbc.com/2019/05/01/huawei-ahead-of-apple-in-q1-2019-smartphone-

shipments.html, 1 December.

Global smartphone market shareFigure 4.4

Flexible manufacturing systems A flexible manufacturing system (FMS) increases the ‘flexibilities of human, physical and information resources’114 that the organisation integrates to create relatively differentiated products at relatively low costs. A significant technological advance, FMS is a computer-controlled process used to produce a variety of products in moderate, flexible quantities with a minimum of manual intervention.115 Often the flexibility is derived from modularisation of the manufacturing process (and sometimes other value chain activities as well).116

The goal of an FMS is to eliminate the ‘low cost versus product variety’ trade-off that is inherent in traditional manufacturing technologies. Organisations use an FMS to change quickly and easily from making one product to making another. Used properly, an FMS allows the organisation to respond more effectively to changes in its customers’ needs, while retaining low-cost advantages and consistent product quality.117 Because an FMS also enables the organisation to reduce the lot size needed to manufacture a

122 PART 2: STRATEGIC ACTIONS: STRATEGY FORMULATION

product efficiently, the organisation’s capacity to serve the unique needs of a narrow competitive scope is higher. In industries of all types, effective mixes of the organisation’s tangible assets (e.g. machines) and intangible assets (e.g. people’s sk ills) facilitate implementation of complex competitive st rategies, especially the integrated cost leadership/differentiation strategy.118

Information networks By linking organisations with their suppliers, distributors and customers, information networks provide another source of flexibility. These networks, when used effectively, help the organisation to satisfy customer expectations in terms of product quality and deliver y speed.119

Earlier, we discussed the importance of managing the organisation’s relationships with its customers in order to understand their needs. Customer relationship management (CR M) is one form of an information- based network process t hat organ isat ions use for t h is pu r pose.120 An effective CRM system provides a 360 -deg ree v iew of t he orga n isat ion’s relat ionsh ip w it h customers, encompassi ng a l l contact poi nts, busi ness processes a nd com mu n icat ion med ia a nd sa les cha n nels.121 T he orga n isat ion ca n t hen use this information to determine the trade-offs its customers are willing to make between differentiated features and low cost – an assessment that is vital for organisations using the integrated cost leadership/ differentiation strategy. Such systems help organisations to monitor their markets and stakeholders and allow them to better predict future scenarios. This capability helps organisations to adjust their strategies to be better prepa red for t he f utu re.122 Thus, to make comprehensive strategic decisions with effective knowledge of the organisation’s context, good information flow is essential. Better-quality managerial decisions require accurate information on the organisation’s environment.123

Total quality management systems Total quality management (TQM) is a managerial process that emphasises an organisation’s commitment to t he customer a nd to cont i nuous i mprovement of all processes t h rough problem-solv ing approaches based on empowerment of employees.124 Organisations develop and use TQM systems to increase customer satisfaction, cut costs and reduce the amount of time required to int roduce in novative products to the marketplace.125

Organisations able to simultaneously reduce costs while enhancing their ability to develop innovative products increase their flexibility, an outcome that is particularly helpful to organisations implementing the integrated cost leadership/differentiation strategy. Exceeding customers’ expectations regarding quality is a differentiating feature, and eliminating process inefficiencies to cut costs allows the organisation to offer that quality to customers at a relatively low price. Thus, an effective TQM system helps the organisation develop the flexibility needed to identify opportunities to simultaneously increase differentiation and reduce costs. Yet TQM systems are available to all competitors, so they may help organisations maintain competitive parity, but rarely alone will they lead to a competitive advantage.126

Competitive risks of the integrated cost leadership/ differentiation strategy The potential to earn above-average returns by successfully using the integrated cost leadership/ differentiation strategy is appealing. However, it is a risky strategy because organisations find it difficult to perform primary value chain activities and support functions in ways that allow them to produce relatively inexpensive products with levels of differentiation that create value for the target customer. Moreover, to properly use this strategy across time, organisations must be able to simultaneously reduce costs incurred to produce products (as required by the cost leadership strategy) while increasing products’ differentiation (as required by the differentiation strategy).

Organisations that fail to perform the primary and support activities in an optimum manner become ‘stuck in the middle’.127 Being stuck in the middle means that the organisation’s cost str ucture is not low

total quality management (TQM) a managerial innovation that emphasises an organisation’s total commitment to the customer and to continuous improvement of every process through the use of data-driven, problem-solving approaches based on empowerment of employee groups and teams

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enough to allow it to attractively price its products and that its products are not sufficiently differentiated to create value for the target customer. These organisations will not earn above-average returns, and they will earn average returns only when the structure of the industry in which they compete is highly favourable.128 Thus, organisations implementing the integrated cost leadership/differentiation strategy must be able to produce products that offer the target customer some differentiated features at a relatively low cost/price.

Organisations can also become stuck in the middle when they fail to successfully implement either the cost leadership or the differentiation strategy. In other words, industry-wide competitors too can become stuck in the middle. Tr ying to use the integrated strateg y is costly in that organisations must pursue both low costs and differentiation. This is the challenge for Li Ning Company mentioned earlier. If it can offer high-quality goods desired by consumers at lower prices, however, it may be able to capture market share from the leaders, such as Nike.

Organisations may need to form alliances with other organisations to achieve differentiation, yet alliance partners may extract prices for the use of their resources that make it difficult to meaningfully reduce costs.129 Organisations may be motivated to make acquisitions to maintain their differentiation through innovation or to add products to their portfolio not offered by competitors.130 Research suggests that organisations using ‘pure strategies’, either cost leadership or differentiation, often outperform organisations attempting to use a ‘hybrid strategy’ (i.e. integrated cost leadership/differentiation strategy). This research suggests the risky nature of using an integrated strategy.131 However, the integrated strategy is becoming more common and perhaps necessar y in many industries because of technological advances and global competition. This strategy often requires a long-term perspective to make it work effectively, and therefore it requires dedicated owners that allow the implementation of a long-term strategy that can require several years to produce positive returns.132

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LO1 Customers are the foundation of successful business- level strategies. When considering customers, an organisation simultaneously examines three issues: who, what and how. These issues refer, respectively, to the customer groups to be served, the needs those customers have that the organisation seeks to satisfy, and the core competencies the organisation will use to satisfy customers’ needs. Increasing segmentation of markets throughout the global economy creates opportunities for organisations to identify more distinctive customer needs they can serve with one of the business-level strategies.

LO2 A business-level strategy is an integrated and coordinated set of commitments and actions the organisation uses to gain a competitive advantage by exploiting core competencies in specific product markets. Five business-level strategies (cost leadership, differentiation, focused cost leadership, focused differentiation and integrated cost leadership/ differentiation) are examined in the chapter.

LO3 A business model, which describes what an organisation does to create, deliver and capture value for stakeholders, is part of an organisation’s business-level strategy. In essence, a business model is a framework for how the organisation will use processes to create, deliver and capture value, while a business-level strategy is the path the organisation will follow to gain a competitive advantage by exploiting its core competencies in a specific product market. There are many types of business models, including the franchise, subscription, freemium, advertising and peer-to-peer models. Organisations may pair each type of business model with any one of the five generic business-level strategies as they seek to compete successfully against rivals.

LO4 Organisations seeking competitive advantage through the cost leadership strategy produce no- frills, standardised products for an industry’s typical customer. However, these low-cost products must be offered with competitive levels of differentiation. Above-average returns are earned when organisations continuously emphasise efficiency

such that their costs are lower than those of their competitors, while providing customers with products that have acceptable levels of differentiated features.

Through the differentiation strategy, organisations provide customers with products that have different (and valued) features. Differentiated products must be sold at a cost that customers believe is competitive relative to the product’s features as compared with the cost–feature combinations available from competitors’ goods. Because of their distinctiveness, differentiated goods or services are sold at a premium price. Products can be differentiated on any dimension that a customer group values. Organisations using this strategy seek to differentiate their products from competitors’ goods or services on as many dimensions as possible. The less similarity to competitors’ products, the more buffered an organisation is against competition with its rivals.

Through the cost leadership and differentiated focus strategies, organisations serve the needs of a narrow competitive segment (e.g. a buyer group, product segment or geographic area). This strategy is successful when organisations have the core competencies required to provide value to a specialised market segment that exceeds the value available from organisations serving customers on an industry-wide basis.

Organisations using the integrated cost leadership/ differentiation strategy strive to provide customers with relatively low-cost products that also have valued differentiated features. Flexibility is required for organisations to learn how to use primary value chain activities and support functions in ways that allow them to produce differentiated products at relatively low costs.

LO5 Porter’s five forces of competition model is a tool for analysing the forces that shape the industry immediately impacting on an organisation. The model helps to define where the major forces are, what shapes competition in that industry and whether the industry is attractive for an organisation. The five forces are: (1) rivalry with existing competitors,

STUDY TOOLS SUMMARY

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(2) bargaining power of customers, (3) bargaining power of suppliers, (4) threat of new entrants, and (5) threat of substitute products. Effective use of this model can shape business-level strategy to adjust to compensate for or counteract these forces.

LO6 Competitive risks associated with the cost leadership strategy include: (1) a loss of competitive advantage to newer technologies; (2) a failure to detect changes in customers’ needs; and (3) the ability of competitors to imitate the cost leader’s competitive advantage through their own distinct strategic actions.

Risks associated with the differentiation strategy include: (1) a customer group’s decision that the differences between the differentiated product and the cost leader’s goods or services are no longer worth a premium price; (2) the inability of a differentiated product to create the type of value for which customers are willing to pay a premium price; (3) the ability of competitors to provide customers with products that have features similar to those of

the differentiated product, but at a lower cost; and (4) the threat of counterfeiting, whereby organisations produce a cheap imitation of a differentiated good or service.

The competitive risks of focus strategies include: (1) a competitor’s ability to use its core competencies to ‘outfocus’ the focuser by serving an even more narrowly defined market segment; (2) decisions by industry-wide competitors to focus on a customer group’s specialised needs; and (3) a reduction in differences of the needs between customers in a narrow market segment and the industry-wide market.

The primary risk of the integrated cost leadership/ differentiation strategy is that an organisation might produce products that do not offer sufficient value in terms of either low cost or differentiation. In such cases, the organisation becomes ‘stuck in the middle’. Organisations stuck in the middle compete at a disadvantage and are unable to earn more than average returns.

KEY TERMS business model

business-level strategy

cost leadership strategy

differentiation strategy

focus strategy

integrated cost leadership/ differentiation strategy

market segmentation

total quality management

REVIEW QUESTIONS 1. What is a business-level strategy?

2. What is the relationship between an organisation’s customers and its business-level strategy in terms of who, what and how? Why is this relationship important?

3. In what ways do non-commercial organisations (public sector or not-for-profit) compete?

4. What changes in the market (including customer behaviour and preferences) are causing the need to review business-level strategy?

5. What are the differences among the cost leadership, differentiation, focused cost leadership, focused differentiation and integrated cost leadership/ differentiation business-level strategies?

6. How can organisations use each of the business-level strategies to position themselves favourably relative to the five forces of competition?

7. What are the specific risks associated with using each business-level strategy?

EXPERIENTIAL EXERCISES

Exercise 1: Market segmentation through branding The ‘who’ in an organisation’s target market is an extremely important decision. As discussed in the chapter, organisations divide customers into groups based upon

differences in customer needs, which is the heart of market segmentation. For example, if you owned a restaurant and your target market was university-aged students, your strategy would be very different than if your target market was business professionals.

126 PART 2: STRATEGIC ACTIONS: STRATEGY FORMULATION

In this exercise, your team will be identifying market segmentation strategies used by various organisations. Remember that market segmentation ‘is a process used to cluster people with similar needs into individual and identifiable groups’.

Part 1 Your team should select an advertised and prominent brand. You may choose a business or consumer product. However, you should choose a brand widely known and widely advertised. Once you have chosen the brand, find and collect at least four instances of this brand being advertised in print or digital media. Find your four or more instances from different publications, if possible.

Part 2 Assemble a poster with the images you collected from your research. Be prepared to present your findings to the class. 1. Why did you choose this brand?

2. Review each of the criteria discussed in Table 4.1 for either your consumer market or industrial market.

Exercise 2: Create a business-level strategy This assignment brings together elements from the previous chapters. Accordingly, you and your team will create a business-level strategy for an organisation of your own creation. The instructor will assign you an industry. You will create a strategy for entering that industry using one of the five potential business-level strategies.

Each team is assigned one of the business-level strategies described in the chapter: • cost leadership

• differentiation

• focused cost leadership

• focused differentiation

• integrated cost leadership/differentiation.

Part 1 Research your industry and describe the general environment and the industry. Using the dimensions of the general environment, identify some factors for each dimension that are influential for your industry. Next, describe the industry environment using the five forces model. Database services like Mint Global, Datamonitor or IBIS World can be helpful in this regard. If those are not available to you, consult your local librarian for assistance. You should be able to clearly articulate the opportunities and the threats that exist.

Part 2 Create on a poster the business-level strategy assigned to your team. Be prepared to describe the following: • What is the mission statement?

• What is the description of your target customer?

• Provide a picture of your business. Where is it located (city, suburban, rural etc.)?

• What trends provide opportunities and threats for your intended strategy?

• List the resources, both tangible and intangible, required to compete successfully in this market.

• How will you go about creating a sustainable competitive advantage?

NOTES 1. R. D. Ireland, R. E. Hoskisson & M. A. Hitt,

2012, Understanding Business Strategy, Mason, OH: South-Western Cengage Learning.

2. H. Greve, 2009, Bigger and safer: The diffusion of competitive advantage, Strategic Management Journal, 30: 1–23.

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Competitive dynamics

Studying this chapter should provide you with the strategic management knowledge needed to: LO1 define competitors, competitive rivalry, competitive behaviour and competitive

dynamics LO2 describe market commonality and resource similarity as the building blocks of a

competitor analysis LO3 explain awareness, motivation and ability as drivers of competitive behaviours LO4 describe how strategic actions and tactical actions drive competitive rivalry

between organisations LO5 discuss factors affecting the likelihood a competitor will take competitive

actions LO6 describe factors affecting the likelihood a competitor will respond to actions

taken against it LO7 explain the competitive dynamics in each of slow-cycle, fast-cycle and

standard-cycle markets.

Learning Objectives

CH AP

TE R

5

131

Major supermarket chains are a global phenomenon. In Australia, Coles and Woolworths control around 80 per cent of the market and are among the 20 biggest retailers in the world, having thrashed the competition for over a century. However, globally they are dwarfed by Tesco. Tesco PLC is the world’s third-largest retailer (only Walmart and France’s Carrefour are larger), suggesting its ability to compete successfully against companies both in the UK (its home market) and throughout the world. However, the organisation’s recent competitive struggles, both domestically and globally, appear to highlight that, as noted in Chapter 1, no company’s success at a point in time guarantees its future success.

So what are some descriptors of the situation Tesco encountered? From a financial perspective, the organisation reported a decline in profits in 2012 for the first time in approximately two decades, and profits declined significantly through to 2017 before a partial recovery in 2018 and 2019. In 2013, Tesco closed its Fresh & Easy stores in the USA and also took a write-down of £804 million to reflect the then- current value of its UK properties. In all, Tesco wrote down the value of its global operations by US$3.5 billion in 2013. (This global write-down accounts for the organisation’s troubled operations in countries such as Turkey, China and India as well as the closing of its US operations.)

Another issue is that revenue had been declining in Tesco’s home market, partially due to competition from discount rivals like Aldi and Lidl, where the company still generates roughly two-thirds of its sales and profits. Part of the reason for the revenue decline is related to customer service, as suggested by the fact that the results from a survey of UK consumers a few years ago ‘found that despite £1 billion of investment in the U.K. in FY2012/13, customer perceptions of Tesco’s quality, prices, promotions and overall value for money had all deteriorated quarter on quarter and year on year’. In light of these results, the organisation took a number of actions, including adding more and better-trained staff members in its stores, refurbishing those stores, and revamping its product lines and the prices it charged for them.

Revamping product lines and changing the prices charged for items are tactical actions. In contrast, entering (and exiting) the US market with the Fresh &

Easy concept was a strategic action (strategic and tactical actions and responses are defined later in this chapter). On the surface, entering the large US market seems to be a reasonable course of action for a successful global retailer to take. As is often the case, though, execution of that strategic action appears to be where problems were encountered. Fresh & Easy stores were sized to be handy neighbourhood stores such as those found in many European cities. This did not appeal to American consumers, as suggested by an analyst: ‘My sense is that what they tried to do was make a European model. Europeans tend to make more frequent trips to grocery stores, maybe every day or every other day, where Americans are used to going for bigger trips less frequently’. Additionally, products carried in stores located in different parts of the USA were not customised to any degree, meaning that the potentially unique needs of any local consumers who might choose to shop daily were not being identified and satisfied. Tesco sold Fresh & Easy in 2013 and exited the American market.

Tesco has taken additional strategic actions as part of its current array of competitive behaviours. For example, it took positions in other companies for the purpose of being able to turn their stores into compelling retail destinations for customers. ‘Investments in the Harris & Hoole coffee chain, working with the Euphorium bakery brand in London and acquiring the Giraffe restaurant chain’ are examples of the competitive behaviour Tesco displayed as a foundation for improving its performance and trying to outcompete its rivals in the process of doing so. However, after poor results and corporate financial pressures, these investments were divested in 2016. Tesco is hoping that investments in mobile payment technology and other initiatives will help to improve its market position.

Sources: 2016, Tesco starts sell-off ahead of results with Asian disposal, BBC News, https://www.bbc.com/news/business-36022305, 12 April; M. Knox, 2015, Supermarket Monsters, Melbourne: Redback; J. Davey & K. Holton, 2013, Tesco quits U.S. and takes $3.5 billion global writedown, Reuters, http://www. reuters.com, 17 April; J. Dunkley, 2014, Warren Buffett says Tesco investment

was a ‘huge mistake’, Independent, https://www.independent.co.uk/news/ business/news/warren-buffett-says-tesco-investment-was-a-huge-mistake- 9770684.html, 2 October; K. Gordon, 2013, Tesco leans on outside brands, Wall Street Journal, http://www.wsj.com, 18 April; R. Head, 2013, Can Tesco outperform Wal-Mart stores?, Daily Finance, http://www.dailyfinance.com,

21 March; N. Pratley, 2013, Tesco’s era of rolling out its aisles is over, for now, The Guardian, http://www.guardian.co.uk, 17 April.

OPENING CASE STUDY Tesco PLC: a case study in competitive behaviour

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Organisations operating in the same market, offering similar products and targeting similar customers are competitors.1 Qantas, Virgin Australia, Regional Express and Jetstar (part of the Qantas Group) are competitors, as are PepsiCo and Coca-Cola Company, and to some extent, even the Salvation Army and St Vincent de Paul. As described in the opening case study, Tesco in the UK is currently engaging in a competitive battle in the supermarket game with large competitors, with at least one, Aldi, having a slightly different model, one that seems to be successful. Coles and Woolworths also face the Aldi threat in the Australian market.2

Organisations interact with their competitors as part of the broad context within which they operate while attempting to earn above-average returns.3 As stated in Chapter 4, competitors and return on investment also applies to non-commercial organisations, including government departments, not-for- profit, sporting, health care and community organisations. The decisions organisations make about their interactions with their competitors significantly affect their ability to earn above-average returns.4 Because 80–90 per cent of new organisations fail, learning how to select the markets in which to compete and how to best compete within them is highly important.5

Competitive rivalry is the ongoing set of competitive actions and competitive responses that occur among organisations as they manoeuvre for an advantageous market position.6 Especially in highly competitive industries, organisations constantly jockey for advantage as they launch strategic actions and respond or react to rivals’ moves.7 It is important for those leading organisations to understand competitive rivalry, in that ‘the central, brute empirical fact in strategy is that some firms outperform others’,8 meaning that competitive rivalry influences an individual organisation’s ability to gain and sustain competitive advantages.9

A sequence of organisation-level moves results, with the rivalry a consequence from organisations initiating their own competitive actions and then responding to actions taken by competitors.10 Competitive behaviour is the set of competitive actions and responses the organisation takes to build or defend its competitive advantages and to improve its market position.11 Through competitive behaviour, the organisation tries to successfully position itself relative to the five forces of competition (see Chapter 2) and to defend current competitive advantages while building advantages for the future (see Chapter 3). Increasingly, competitors engage in competitive actions and responses in more than one market.12 Organisations competing against each other in several product or geographic markets are engaged in multi- market competition.13 All competitive behaviour – that is, the total set of actions and responses taken by all organisations competing within a market – is called competitive dynamics. The relationships among these key concepts are shown in Figure 5.1.

This chapter focuses on competitive rivalry and competitive dynamics. An organisation’s strategies are dynamic in nature because actions taken by one organisation elicit responses from competitors that, in turn, typically result in responses from the organisation that took the initial action.14 Strateg y is not a matter of following a recipe. It is more like a game of chess. You cannot have an effective strategy without considering the responses by competitors, and your response to their responses.

Competitive rivalries affect an organisation’s strategies, as shown by the fact that a strategy’s success is determined not only by the organisation’s initial competitive actions but also by how well it anticipates competitors’ responses to them and by how well the organisation anticipates and responds to its competitors’ initial actions (also called attacks).15 Although competitive rivalry affects all types of strategies (e.g. corporate-level, acquisition and international), its dominant influence is on the organisation’s business- level strategy or strategies. Indeed, organisations’ actions and responses to those of their rivals are the basic building blocks of business-level strategies.16 You will recall from Chapter 4 that business-level strategy is concerned with what the organisation does to successfully use its competitive advantages in specific product markets. In the global economy, competitive rivalry is intensifying,17 meaning that the significance of its effect on organisations’ business-level strategies is increasing. However, organisations that develop and use effective business-level strategies tend to outperform competitors in individual product markets, even when experiencing intense competitive rivalry that price cuts bring about.18

competitors organisations operating in the same market, offering similar products and targeting similar customers

STRATEGY NOW

Tesco’s competitive behaviour

competitive rivalry the ongoing set of competitive actions and competitive responses occurring between competitors as they compete against each other for an advantageous market position

competitive behaviour the set of competitive actions and competitive responses the organisation takes to build or defend its competitive advantages and to improve its market position

multi-market competition occurs when organisations compete against each other in several product or geographic markets

competitive dynamics refers to all competitive behaviours; that is, the total set of actions and responses taken by all organisations competing within a market

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Figure 5.1 From competitors to competitive dynamics

• To gain an advantageous market position

• Competitive dynamics • Competitive actions and responses taken by all organisations competing in a market

Competitors Engage in

W h

at resu lts?

Why?

How?

What results?

Competitive rivalry

• Through competitive behaviour • Competitive actions • Competitive responses

Source: Based on M.-J. Chen, 1996, Competitor analysis and interfirm rivalry: Toward a theoretical integration, Academy of Management Review, 21: 100–34.

A model of competitive rivalry Competitive rivalry evolves from the pattern of actions and responses as one organisation’s competitive actions have noticeable effects on competitors, eliciting competitive responses from them.19 This pattern suggests that organisations are mutually interdependent, that they are affected by each other’s actions and responses, and that marketplace success is a function of both individual strategies and the consequences of their use.20 Increasingly, too, executives recognise that competitive rivalry can have a major effect on the organisation’s financial performance.21 Research shows that intensified rivalry within an industry results in decreased average profitability for the competing organisations.22 For example, Research In Motion (RIM) dominated the smartphone market with its BlackBerry operating system platform until Apple’s iPhone platform emerged. Likewise, the introduction of the Android platform by Google and the growth of Samsung has cut into RIM’s market share and thereby further lowered the company’s performance expectations. The organisation is now in deep trouble with, in mid-2019, only around 0.04 per cent of the global smartphone market.23

Figure 5.2 presents a straightforward model of competitive rivalry at the organisation level; this type of rivalry is usually dynamic and complex.24 The competitive actions and responses the organisation takes are the foundation for successfully building and using its capabilities and core competencies to gain an advantageous market position.25 The model in Figure 5.2 presents the sequence of activities commonly involved in competition between a particular organisation and each of its competitors. Companies can use the model to understand how to be able to predict competitors’ behaviour (actions and responses) and reduce the uncertainty associated with competitors’ actions.26 Being able to predict competitors’ actions and responses has a positive effect on the organisation’s market position and its subsequent financial performance.27 The sum of all the individual rivalries modelled in Figure 5.2 that occur in a particular market reflect the competitive dynamics in that market.

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Apple’s cutting- edge technology strategy

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The remainder of the chapter explains components of the model shown in Figure 5.2. We first describe market commonality and resource similarity as the building blocks of a competitor analysis. Next, we discuss the effects of three organisational characteristics – awareness, motivation and ability – on the organisation’s competitive behaviour. We then examine competitive rivalry between organisations (or inter-organisation rivalry) in detail, by describing the factors that affect the likelihood an organisation will take a competitive action and the factors that affect the likelihood an organisation will respond to a competitor’s action. In the chapter’s final section, we turn our attention to competitive dynamics to describe how market characteristics affect competitive rivalry in slow-cycle, fast-cycle and standard-cycle markets.

Competitor analysis As previously noted, a competitor analysis is the first step the organisation takes to be able to predict the extent and nature of its rivalry with each competitor. The number of markets in which organisations compete against each other (called market commonality, defined in the following section) and the similarity in their resources (called resource similarity, also defined in the following section) determine the extent to which organisations are competitors. Organisations with high market commonality and highly similar resources are ‘clearly direct and mutually acknowledged competitors’.2 8 The drivers of competitive behaviour – as well as factors influencing the likelihood that a competitor will initiate competitive actions and will respond to its competitors’ actions – influence the intensity of rivalry, even for direct competitors.29

In Chapter 2, we discussed competitor analysis as a technique organisations use to understand their competitive environment. Together, the general, industry and competitive environments comprise the

Figure 5.2 A model of competitive rivalry

Drivers of competitive behaviour

Awareness

Motivation

Inter-organisation rivalry: Action and response

Likelihood of attack • First-mover incentives • Organisational size • Quality

Likelihood of response • Type of competitive action • Actor’s reputation • Market dependence • Resource availability

Competitor analysis

Market commonality

Resource similarity

Ability for action and response

Relative size

Speed

Innovation

Quality

Feedback

Feedback

Outcomes of inter-organisation rivalry

Competitive market types • Slow cycle • Standard cycle • Fast cycle

Competitive outcomes • Sustained competitive advantage • Temporary competitive advantage

Evolutionary outcomes • Entrepreneurial actions • Growth-oriented actions • Market-power actions

Source: Adapted from M.-J. Chen, 1996, Competitor analysis and interfirm rivalry: Toward a theoretical integration, Academy of Management Review, 21: 100–34.

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organisation’s external environment. We also described how competitor analysis is used to help the organisation understand its competitors. This understanding results from studying competitors’ future objectives, current strategies, assumptions and capabilities (see Figure 2.5 in Chapter 2). In this chapter, the discussion of competitor analysis is extended to describe what organisations study to be able to predict competitors’ behaviour in the form of their competitive actions and responses. The discussions of competitor analysis in Chapter 2 and in this chapter are complementary in that organisations must first understand competitors (Chapter 2) before their competitive actions and competitive responses can be predicted (this chapter).

Such competitive awareness is illustrated in the competitors in the global automobile market such as Toyota, Ford, General Motors, Honda, Tesla, Tata, Chrysler, Nissan, Volkswagen (VW), Daimler-Benz and others. These analyses are highly important because they help managers to avoid ‘competitive blind spots’, in which managers are unaware of specific competitors or their capabilities. If managers have competitive blind spots, they may be surprised by a competitor’s actions, thereby allowing the competitor to increase its market share at the expense of the manager’s organisation.30 Competitor analyses are especially important when an organisation enters a foreign market. Managers need to understand the local competition and foreign competitors currently operating in the market.31 Without such analyses, they are less likely to be successful.

Market commonality Each industry is composed of various markets. The financial services industry has markets for insurance, brokerage services, banks and so forth. To concentrate on the needs of different, unique customer groups, markets can be further subdivided. The insurance market, for example, could be broken into market segments (such as commercial and consumer), product segments (such as health insurance and life insurance) and geographic markets (such as Western Europe and South-East Asia). In general, the capabilities generated by the internet’s technologies help to shape the nature of industries’ markets, along with the competition among organisations operating in them. For example, Alex Tosolini, formerly vice president of e-commerce for Procter & Gamble (P&G), noted: ‘Facebook is both a marketing and a distribution channel, as P&G has worked to develop “f-commerce” capabilities on its fan pages, fulfilled by Amazon, which has become a top 10 retail account for Pampers’, a disposable nappy product.32

Competitors tend to agree about the different characteristics of individual markets that form an industry. For example, in the transportation industry, the commercial air travel market differs from the ground transportation market, which is served by such organisations as YRC Worldwide (one of the largest transportation service providers in the world) and major YRC competitor FedEx Freight.33 Although differences exist, many industries’ markets are partially related in terms of the technologies used or the core competencies needed to develop a competitive advantage. For example, although railroads and truck ground transport compete in a different segment and can be substitutes, different types of transportation companies need to provide reliable and timely service. Commercial air carriers such as Jetstar and Virgin Australia must therefore develop service competencies to satisfy their passengers, while YRC, railroads and their major competitors must develop such competencies to serve the needs of those using their services to transport goods.

Organisations sometimes compete against each other in several markets that are in different industries. As such, these competitors interact with each other several times, a condition called market commonality. More formally, market commonality is concerned with the number of markets in which the organisation and a competitor are jointly involved and the degree of importance of the individual markets to each.34 When organisations produce similar products and compete for the same customers, as in the global automobile industry, the competitive rivalry is likely to be high.35 Organisations competing against one another in several or many markets engage in multi-market competition.36 Coca-Cola and PepsiCo compete across a number of product (e.g. soft drinks and bottled water) and geographic markets. Airlines, chemicals, pharmaceuticals and consumer foods are examples of other industries in which organisations often simultaneously compete against each other in multiple markets.

market commonality concerned with the number of markets with which the organisation and a competitor are jointly involved and the degree of importance of the individual markets to each

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Organisations competing in several markets have the potential to respond to a competitor’s actions not only within the market in which the actions are taken, but also in other markets where they compete with the rival. This potential creates a complicated competitive mosaic in which ‘the moves an organisation makes in one market are designed to ach ieve goals in anot her market in ways t hat aren’t im med iately apparent to its rivals’.37 This potential complicates the rivalry between competitors. In fact, research suggests that an organisation with greater multi-market contact is less likely to initiate an attack but more likely to respond aggressively when attacked. For instance, research in the computer industry found that organisations ‘respond to competitive attacks by introducing new products but do not use price as a retaliatory weapon’.38 Thus, in general, multi-market competition reduces competitive rivalry, but some organisations will still compete when the potential rewards (e.g. potential market share gain) are high.39

Competitive rivalry in fast fashion: a constant stream of actions and responses

Zara is competing in the ‘fast fashion’ segment of the retailing clothing industry and ‘uses its resources and capabilities as the foundation for its core competencies’. These core competencies allow Zara to ‘give customers what they want and get it to them faster than anyone else’. Quick designs and its supply chain are two core competencies that remain critical to Zara’s success.

In terms of design, analysts say that Zara gives customers decently made fashion items that are based on the latest looks from runways throughout the world, yet are also sold at affordable prices – hence the reason to ascribe the term ‘cheap chic’ to the organisation’s clothes and to those produced by its major competitors as well. With respect to the supply chain competence, this is framed around the fact that Spanish parent company Industria de Diseño Textil (Inditex) owns a number of brands in addition to Zara, such as Massimo Dutti, Bershka, Pull & Bear, Stradivarius and Oysho. In total, the clothing giant has over 7400 stores located in over 90 countries. In serving the product needs of all of its units, some say that ‘Inditex is something of a supply chain marvel: clothes move from concept to design to the Zara stores in a matter of days. And they move out of Zara stores within weeks’.

With over 4500 stores located in over 70 countries, Swedish multinational Hennes & Mauritz (H&M) is another very large global clothing retailer. This organisation also concentrates on the fast fashion market, and Zara and H&M compete on some of the same dimensions, such as supply chain. But as discussed in Chapter 3, organisations’ resources are unique or idiosyncratic and as such do not yield identical capabilities and core competencies. This uniqueness is the foundation for how organisations compete against

one another. Relative to H&M, Zara’s supply chain appears to be an advantage and a means of taking competitive actions. In the words of an analyst: ‘Zara has a lightning-fast supply chain with 50 per cent of its clothes made in Western Europe. That allows it to capture catwalk and luxury trends and put product in its stores within weeks – something customers are willing to pay a premium for’. While H&M’s supply chain is impressive, it does not allow the organisation to achieve competitive parity with Zara with respect to this competitive dimension. ‘H&M with its longer supply chain can’t keep pace in terms of fashion, so it tries to compete on price instead: H&M’s offerings are on average about 60 per cent cheaper than Zara’s. But the Stockholm-based chain is still more expensive than budget competitors such as Primark, owned by Associated British Foods PLC and US chain Forever 21,

Strategic focus | Technology

A window display from a Zara store. Zara’s supply chain gives it a competitive advantage and underlies its ability to take competitive actions.

Source: iStock.com/ManuelVelasco

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Resource similarity Resource similarity is the extent to which the organisation’s tangible and intangible resources are comparable to a competitor’s in terms of both type and amount.40 Organisations with similar ty pes and amounts of resources are likely to have similar strengths and weaknesses and use similar strategies.41 The competition between FedEx and United Parcel Service (UPS) in using information technology to improve the efficiency of their operations and to reduce costs demonstrates these expectations. Pursuing similar strategies that are supported by similar resource profiles, personnel in these organisations work at pace to receive, sort and ship packages. Rival DHL (owned by Deutsche Post) is trying to compete with the two global giants. DHL has made impressive gains in recent years; it competes strongly in Europe and Asia with resources and capabilities similar to those of FedEx and UPS.42 To survive, it has negotiated a partnership agreement with UPS and others to make its US deliveries. Such arrangements are often referred to as ‘coopetition’ (cooperation between competitors). This agreement has helped DHL to focus on its European operations, where it has pioneered the use of street scooters and electric delivery vans to improve its environmental profile.43

When performing a competitor analysis, an organisation analyses each of its competitors in terms of market commonality and resource similarity. The results of these analyses can be mapped for visual comparisons. In Figure 5.3, we show different hypothetical intersections between the organisation and individual competitors in terms of market commonality and resource similarity. These intersections indicate the extent to which the organisation and those with which it is compared are competitors.

resource similarity the extent to which the organisation’s tangible and intangible resources are comparable to a competitor’s in terms of both type and amount

leaving H&M struggling to position itself’. Thus, in terms of competitive rivalry, Zara uses its supply chain advantage while H&M uses price as a competitive action to try to reduce the value Zara generates by emphasising its supply chain.

There are additional examples of competitive rivalry between Zara and H&M. Recently, H&M, along with other retailers including Gap, American Eagle Outfitters and Forever 21, established units in Mexico. Steadily increasing incomes of Mexican citizens and the country’s sizeable and youthful population are reasons for these entries. However, Zara is a first mover in Mexico, having established its first unit there in 1992 and expanding that initial location to around 440 Inditex stores (including more than 90 Zara stores). Thus, entry now by some additional clothing retailers is a competitive response to the competitive action Zara took long ago. On the other hand, H&M is seeking to expand more rapidly in India compared with Zara. In this instance, H&M is taking a competitive action to which Zara may have to respond.

The internet is a growing source of competitive rivalry between Zara and H&M. More specifically, H&M announced that it would establish a significant online shopping presence in the USA. However, this intended action appears to be at least in part a response to Zara’s

increasing internet-related success. In commenting about its website, a Zara official noted that the number of visitors to the site had doubled and that the site was receiving over two million hits per day. Both chains announced in 2019 that they would be closing some stores to invest more resources in online shopping.

Overall, the never-ending string of competitive actions and responses occurring between Zara and H&M provide an interesting ‘picture’ of competitive rivalry.

Sources: H&M Group, 2020, https://hmgroup.com/investors/five- year-summary.html, 21 January; G. Smith, 2019, H&M and Zara are

closing stores to get ahead, https://fortune.com/2019/08/11/hm-zara- store-closing, 11 August; C. Hudgins, 2019, Zara owner Inditex faces

headwinds but still outruns rival H&M, https://www.spglobal.com/ marketintelligence/en/news-insights/latest-news-headlines/50958006,

8 April; Inditex Annual Report 2018, 2018 in data, https://static.inditex. com/annual_report_2018/en/2018-data.html; C. Bjork, 2013, Inditex profit rises as global expansion continues, Wall Street Journal, http://

www.wsj.com, 13 March; J. Cartner-Morley, 2013, How Zara took over the high street, The Guardian, http://www.guardian.co.uk, 15 February;

L. Dishman, 2013, H&M’s competitive advantage: Expansion in India, Forbes, http://www.forbes.com, 29 April; J. Hansegard, 2013, H&M plans

U.S. online store in summer, Wall Street Journal, http://www.wsj.com, 21 March; M. Moffett, 2013, Soul-searching in Spanish fashion after Bangladesh factory details, Wall Street Journal, http://www.wsj.com,

23 May; M. Sanchantra & L. Burkitt, 2013, Asia gravitates to cheap chic, Wall Street Journal, http://www.wsj.com, 23 April.

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Zara’s internet success

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For example, the organisation and its competitor displayed in quadrant I have similar types and amounts of resources (i.e. the two organisations have a similar portfolio of resources). The organisation and its competitor in quadrant I would use their similar resource portfolios to compete against each other in many markets that are important to each. These conditions lead to the conclusion that the organisations modelled in quadrant I are direct and mutually acknowledged competitors (e.g. as in the global car industry). By contrast, the organisation and its competitor shown in quadrant III share few markets and have little similarity in their resources, indicating that they are not direct and mutually acknowledged competitors. Thus, a small, local, family-owned Italian restaurant does not compete directly against Pizza Hut, nor does it have resources that are similar to those of Pizza Hut (which also owns KFC). The organisation’s mapping of its competitive relationship with rivals is fluid as organisations enter and exit markets and as companies’ resources change in type and amount. Thus, the companies with which the organisation is a direct competitor change across time.

Drivers of competitive actions and responses As shown in Figure 5.2, market commonality and resource similarity influence the drivers (awareness, motivation and ability) of competitive behaviour. In turn, the drivers influence the organisation’s competitive behaviour, as shown by the actions and responses it takes while engaged in competitive rivalry.44

Awareness, which is a prerequisite to any competitive action or response taken by an organisation, refers to the extent to which competitors recognise the degree of their mutual interdependence that results from market commonality and resource similarity.45 Awareness tends to be greatest when organisations have highly similar resources (in terms of types and amounts) to use while competing against each other in multiple markets. Komatsu Ltd, Japan’s top construction machinery maker, and Caterpillar Inc. have similar resources and are certainly aware of each other’s actions.46 The same is true for Walmart and France’s Carrefour, the two largest supermarket groups in the world. The last two organisations’

Figure 5.3 A framework of competitor analysis

Resource similarity

Market commonality

Low

Portfolio of resources A

High

The shaded area represents the degree of market commonality between two firms.

Portfolio of resources B

High

Low

II I

III IV

Source: M.-J. Chen, 1996, Competitor analysis and interfirm rivalry: Toward a theoretical integration, Academy of Management Review, 21: 100–34.

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joint awareness has increased as they use similar resources to compete against each other for dominant positions in multiple European and South American markets. In China, where local competitors Alibaba, JD.com and Suning dominate the market, the success of Walmart and Carrefour has diverged, with Carrefour choosing in 2019 to sell an 80 per cent stake in its 210 retail stores to Suning and basically exit the market, whereas Walmart is remaining with 400 stores.47 Awareness affects the extent to which the organisation understands the consequences of its competitive actions and responses. A lack of awareness can lead to excessive competition, resulting in a negative effect on all competitors’ performance.48

Motivation, which concerns the organisation’s incentive to take action or to respond to a competitor’s attack, relates to perceived gains and losses. Thus, an organisation may be aware of competitors but may not be motivated to engage in rivalry with them if it perceives that its position will not improve or that its market position won’t be damaged if it doesn’t respond.49 In some cases, organisations may locate near competitors in order to more easily access suppliers and customers.

Market commonality affects the organisation’s perceptions and resulting motivation. For example, the organisation is generally more likely to attack the rival with whom it has low market commonality than the one with whom it competes in multiple markets. The primary reason is the high stakes involved in trying to gain a more advantageous position over a rival with whom the organisation shares many markets. As mentioned earlier, multi-market competition can find a competitor responding to the organisation’s action in a market different from the one in which the initial action was taken. Actions and responses of this type can cause both organisations to lose focus on core markets and to battle each other with resources that had been allocated for other purposes. Because of the high stakes of competition under the condition of market commonality, the probability is high that the attacked organisation will respond to its competitor’s action in an effort to protect its position in one or more markets.50

In some instances, the organisation may be aware of the markets it shares with a competitor and be motivated to respond to an attack by that competitor, but lack the ability to do so. Ability relates to each organisation’s resources and the flexibility they provide. Without available resources (such as financial capital and people), the organisation lacks the ability to attack a competitor or respond to its actions. For example, smaller and newer organisations tend to be more innovative but generally have fewer resources to attack larger and established competitors. Likewise, foreign organisations often are at a disadvantage against local organisations because of the local organisations’ social capital (relationships) with consumers, suppliers and government officials.51 However, similar resources suggest similar abilities to attack and respond. When an organisation faces a competitor with similar resources, careful study of a possible attack before initiating it is essential because the similarly resourced competitor is likely to respond to that action.52

Resource dissimilarity also influences competitive actions and responses between organisations, in that ‘the greater is the resource imbalance between the acting firm and competitors or potential responders, the greater will be the delay in response’53 by the organisation with a resource disadvantage. For example, Walmart initially used a focused cost leadership strategy to compete only in small communities (those with a population of 25 000 or less). Using sophisticated logistics systems and extremely efficient purchasing practices, among others, to gain competitive advantages, Walmart created a new type of value (primarily in the form of wide selections of products at the lowest competitive prices) for customers in small retail markets. Local competitors lacked the ability to marshal needed resources at the pace required to respond quickly and effectively. However, even when facing competitors with greater resources (greater ability) or more attractive market positions, organisations should eventually respond, no matter how daunting the task seems. Choosing not to respond can ultimately result in failure, as happened with at least some local retailers who didn’t respond to Walmart’s competitive actions. Of course, the actions taken by Walmart were only the beginning. Walmart has become the largest physical retailer in the world (a title that belongs to Amazon, or perhaps Alibaba, in online retail) and is feared by competitors large and small.

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Competitive rivalry The ongoing competitive action–response sequence between an organisation and a competitor affects the performance of both organisations;54 thus, it is important for companies to carefully analyse and understand the competitive rivalry present in the markets they serve to select and implement successful strategies.55 Understanding a competitor’s awareness, motivation and ability helps the organisation to predict the likelihood of an attack by that competitor and the probability that a competitor will respond to actions taken against it.

As we described earlier, the predictions drawn from studying competitors in terms of awareness, motivation and ability are grounded in market commonality and resource similarity. These predictions are fairly general. The value of the final set of predictions the organisation develops about each of its competitors’ competitive actions and responses is enhanced by studying the ‘Likelihood of attack’ factors (such as first-mover incentives and organisational size) and the ‘Likelihood of response’ factors (such as the actor’s reputation) that are shown in Figure 5.2. Evaluating and understanding these factors allows the organisation to refine the predictions it makes about its competitors’ actions and responses.

Strategic and tactical actions Organisations use both strategic and tactical actions when forming their competitive actions and competitive responses in the course of engaging in competitive rivalry.56 A competitive action is a strategic or tactical action the organisation takes to build or defend its competitive advantages or improve its market position. A competitive response is a strategic or tactical action the organisation takes to counter the effects of a competitor’s competitive action. A strategic action or strategic response is a market-based move that involves a significant commitment of organisational resources and is difficult to implement and reverse. A tactical action or tactical response is a market-based move that is taken to fine-tune a strategy; it involves fewer resources and is relatively easy to implement and reverse.

Apple opened a service called ‘Game Center’ once it found that users were using its iPhone, iPad and iPod platforms for video games. With its update to its iOS (operating system) software, game producers began producing game applications to use the Apple system as its graphics became more advanced. This represented a strategic move by Apple. The now wider category of its ‘App store’ includes over 1.8 million items, making it easy for Apple users to find handy applications and fun games. Game platform hardware and software producers such as Nintendo and Sony then created strategic responses to the Apple threat. For example, Sony, which produces the PlayStation console, partnered with Sony Ericsson to make the Xperia Play phone, which uses ‘PlayStation- certified games’ and runs on Google’s Android operating system. As of the fourth quarter of 2019, Android users were able to choose between 2.57 million apps, making Google Play the app store with the biggest number of available apps.57

Coles supermarkets price aggressively as a means of increasing revenues and gaining market share at the expense of competitors. However, pricing is a tactical strategy and is easily matched by Woolworths and IGA in the Australian market. Although pricing aggressively is at the core of what Coles is and how it competes, can the tactical action of aggressive pricing continue to lead to the competitive success the organisation has historically enjoyed? Is Coles achieving the type of balance between strategic and tactical competitive actions and competitive responses that is the foundation for all organisations’ success in marketplace competitions? Can it answer the threat of Aldi with still lower prices?

competitive action a strategic or tactical action the organisation takes to build or defend its competitive advantages or improve its market position

competitive response a strategic or tactical action the organisation takes to counter the effects of a competitor’s competitive action

strategic action or strategic response a market-based move that involves a significant commitment of organisational resources and is difficult to implement and reverse

tactical action or tactical response a market-based move that is taken to fine-tune a strategy; it involves fewer resources and is relatively easy to implement and reverse

Sony, makers of the PlayStation console, partnered with Sony Ericsson to make the Xperia Play phone.

Source: Getty Images/Bloomberg

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When engaging rivals in competition, organisations must recognise the differences between strategic and tactical actions and responses and should develop an effective balance between the two types of competitive actions and responses. Several years ago, Airbus, Boeing’s major competitor in commercial airliners, became aware that Boeing was strongly committed to taking the actions it believed were necessary to successfully launch the 787 Dreamliner, because deciding to design, build and launch the 787 was a major strategic action. Analysts believed that Boeing’s development of the 787 airliner was a strategic response to Airbus’ then-new A380 aircraft.58

Likelihood of attack In addition to market commonality, resource similarity and the drivers of awareness, motivation and ability, other factors affect the likelihood a competitor will use strategic actions and tactical actions to attack its competitors. Three of these factors – first-mover incentives, organisational size and quality – are discussed next.

First-mover incentives A first mover is an organisation that takes an initial competitive action in order to build or defend its competitive advantages or to improve its market position. The first-mover concept has been influenced by the work of the famous economist Joseph Schumpeter, who argued that organisations achieve competitive advantage by taking innovative actions59 (innovation is defined and described in detail in Chapter 13). In general, first movers ‘allocate funds for product innovation and development, aggressive advertising, and advanced research and development’.60

The benefits of being a successful first mover can be substantial.61 Especially in fast-cycle markets (discussed later in the chapter), where changes occur rapidly and it is virtually impossible to sustain a competitive advantage for any length of time, a first mover can experience many times the valuation and revenue of a second mover.62 This evidence suggests that although first-mover benefits are never absolute, they are often critical to an organisation’s success in industries experiencing rapid technological developments and relatively short product life cycles.6 3 In addition to earning above-average returns until its competitors respond to its successful competitive action, the first mover can gain the loyalty of customers who may become committed to the goods or services of the organisation that first made them available, and gain market share that can be difficult for competitors to take during future competitive rivalry.64 The general evidence that first movers have greater survival rates than later market entrants is perhaps the culmination of first-mover benefits.65

The organisation trying to predict its competitors’ competitive actions might conclude that they will take aggressive strategic actions to gain first movers’ benefits. However, even though an organisation’s competitors might be motivated to be first movers, they may lack the ability to do so. First movers tend to be aggressive and willing to experiment with innovation and take higher, yet reasonable, levels of risk.66 To be a first mover, the organisation must have readily available the resources to significantly invest in R&D, as well as to rapidly and successfully produce and market a stream of innovative products and services.67 If the organisation does not have the necessary resources or cannot establish the necessary legitimacy, being a first mover can lead to survival risks.68

Organisational slack makes it possible for organisations to have the ability (as measured by available resources) to be first movers. Slack is the buffer or cushion provided by actual or obtainable resources that are not currently in use and are in excess of the minimum resources needed to produce a given level of organisational output. For example, in January 2020, Apple passed a share price of US$300 (around

first mover an organisation that takes an initial competitive action in order to build or defend its competitive advantages or to improve its market position

A high rivalry situation can be partly hidden by brands: check the organisations behind water brands and you will find many are owned by Coca-Cola or PepsiCo. There’s not as much competition as it seems.

Source: Shutterstock.com/Pressmaster

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A$440) and had a A$245 billion cash hoard.69 As a liquid resource, slack can quickly be allocated to support competitive actions, such as R&D investment and aggressive marketing campaigns that lead to first-mover advantages. This relationship between slack and the ability to be a first mover allows the organisation to predict that a first-mover competitor likely has available slack and will probably take aggressive competitive actions to continuously introduce innovative products and services. Furthermore, the organisation can predict that, as a first mover, a competitor will try to rapidly gain market share and customer loyalty in order to earn above-average returns until its competitors are able to effectively respond to its first move.

Organisations evaluating their competitors should realise that being a first mover carries risk. For example, it is difficult to accurately estimate the returns that will be earned from introducing product innovations to the marketplace.70 Additionally, the first mover’s cost to develop a product innovation can be substantial, reducing the slack available to support further innovation. Thus, the organisation should carefully study the results a competitor achieves as a first mover. Continuous success by the competitor suggests additional product innovations, while lack of product acceptance over the course of the competitor’s innovations may indicate less willingness in the future to accept the risks of being a first mover.71

A second mover is an organisation that responds to the first mover’s competitive action, typically through imitation. More cautious than the first mover, the second mover studies customers’ reactions to product innovations. In the course of doing so, the second mover also tries to find any mistakes the first mover made so that it can avoid them and the problems they created. Often, successful imitation of the first mover’s innovations allows the second mover to avoid the mistakes and the major investments required of the pioneers (first movers).72

Second movers also have the time to develop processes and technologies that are more efficient than those used by the first mover or that create additional value for consumers.73 The most successful second movers rarely act too fast (so they can fully analyse the first mover’s actions) nor too slow (so they do not give the first mover time to correct its mistakes and ‘lock in’ customer loyalty).74 Overall, the outcomes of the first mover’s competitive actions may provide an effective blueprint for second and even late movers (discussed below) as they determine the nature and timing of their competitive responses.75 Determining whether a competitor is an effective second mover (based on its past actions) allows a first-mover organisation to predict that the competitor will respond quickly to successful, innovation-based market entries. The first mover can expect a successful second-mover competitor to study its market entries and to respond with a new entry into the market within a short time period. As a second mover, the competitor will try to respond with a product that provides greater customer value than does the first mover’s product. The most successful second movers are able to rapidly and meaningfully interpret market feedback to respond quickly, yet successfully, to the first mover’s successful innovations.

For example, Hyundai has traditionally been a second mover in the automobile industry. However, it has decided that ‘playing follow the leader on R&D isn’t good enough any more’.76 It is leading the way in a number of new features in its vehicles, such as an ‘onslaught of new drive train technologies’ and a new hybrid drive that makes the transmission – and therefore the car – efficient at higher speeds than traditional hybrids such as the Toyota Prius. In 2019, Hyundai announced major changes to its R&D structure, with an agile structure aimed at pre-empting changing markets, and an ‘architecture-driven system-based organisation’ to streamline the vehicle development process.77

A late mover is an organisation that responds to a competitive action a significant amount of time after the first mover’s action and the second mover’s response. Typically, a late response is better than no response at all, although any success achieved from the late competitive response tends to be considerably less than that achieved by first and second movers. However, on occasion, late movers can be successful if they develop a unique way to enter the market and compete. For organisations from emerging economies, this often means a niche strategy with lower-cost production and manufacturing.78

The organisation competing against a late mover can predict that the competitor will likely enter a particular market only after both the first and second movers have achieved success in that market.

second mover an organisation that responds to the first mover’s competitive action, typically through imitation

late mover an organisation that responds to a competitive action, but only after considerable time has elapsed after the first mover’s action and the second mover’s response

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Moreover, on a relative basis, the organisation can predict that the late mover’s competitive action will allow it to earn average returns only after the considerable time required for it to understand how to create at least as much customer value as that offered by the first and second movers’ products.

Organisational size An organisation’s size affects the likelihood it will take competitive actions, as well as the types and timing of those actions.79 In general, small organisations are more likely than large companies to launch competitive actions and tend to do it more quickly. Smaller organisations are thus perceived as nimble and flexible competitors who rely on speed and surprise to defend their competitive advantages or develop new ones while engaged in competitive rivalry, especially with large companies, to gain an advantageous market position.80 Small organisations’ flexibility and nimbleness allow them to develop variety in their competitive actions; large organisations tend to limit the types of competitive actions used.81

Large organisations, however, are likely to initiate more competitive actions along with more strategic actions during a given period.82 Thus, when studying its competitors in terms of organisational size, the organisation should use a measurement such as total sales revenue or total number of employees. The competitive actions the organisation likely will encounter from competitors larger than it is will be different from the competitive actions it will encounter from smaller competitors. The organisational size factor adds another layer of complexity. When engaging in competitive rivalry, the organisation often prefers a large number of unique competitive actions. Ideally, the organisation has the amount of slack resources held by a large organisation to launch a greater number of competitive actions and a small organisation’s flexibility to launch a greater variety of competitive actions. Herb Kelleher, cofounder and former CEO of Southwest Airlines (the world’s largest low-cost airline), addressed this matter: ‘Think and act big and we’ll get smaller. Think and act small and we’ll get bigger’.83

In the context of competitive rivalry, Kelleher’s statement can be interpreted to mean that relying on a limited number or types of competitive actions (which is the large organisation’s tendency) can lead to reduced competitive success across time, partly because competitors learn how to effectively respond to the predictable. By contrast, remaining flexible and nimble (which is the small organisation’s tendency) in order to develop and use a wide variety of competitive actions contributes to success against rivals.

Coles supermarkets are retailers previously owned by the Wesfarmers corporation, but they demerged from Wesfarmers in 2018. There are around 2200 retail outlets in the Coles group, with supermarkets and liquor stores across Australia. Because of its size, scale and resources, Coles has the flexibility required to take many types of competitive actions that few – if any – of its competitors can undertake, and at reduced cost. Demonstrating this type of flexibility in terms of competitive actions has proven critical to the success of its entry into the petrol retailing and insurance industries.84

Quality Quality has many definitions, including ‘fit for purpose’, and well-established definitions relating it to the production of goods or services with zero defects85 and as a cycle of continuous improvement.86 From a strategic perspective, we consider quality to be the outcome of how an organisation competes through its primary and support activities (see Chapter 3). Thus, quality exists when the organisation’s goods or services meet or exceed customers’ expectations. Some evidence suggests that quality may be the most critical component in satisfying the organisation’s customers.87

In the eyes of customers, quality is about doing the right things relative to performance measures that are important to them.88 Customers may be interested in measuring the quality of an organisation’s goods and services against a broad range of dimensions. Sample quality dimensions in which customers commonly express an interest are shown in Table 5.1.

Quality is possible only when top-level managers support it and when its importance is institutionalised throughout the entire organisation and its value chain.89 When quality is institutionalised and valued by

STRATEGY NOW

Southwest Airlines

quality exists when the organisation’s goods or services meet or exceed customers’ expectations

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all, employees and managers alike become vigilant about continuously finding ways to improve quality.9 0 Quality is a universal theme in the global economy and is a necessary but insufficient condition for competitive success.91 Without quality, an organisation’s products lack credibility, meaning that customers don’t think of them as viable options. Indeed, customers won’t consider buying a product until they believe that it can satisfy at least their base-level expectations in terms of quality dimensions that are important to them.92 Boeing’s 787 aircraft was delayed due to quality concerns. Many of its problems came from its numerous suppliers and supply chain subassemblies, but such media events made large airline customers nervous, and there were some associated postponements in orders.93

Quality affects competitive rivalry. The organisation evaluating a competitor whose products suffer from poor quality can predict declines in the competitor’s sales revenue until the quality issues are resolved. In addition, the organisation can predict that the competitor likely won’t be aggressive in its competitive actions until the quality problems are corrected in order to gain credibility with customers.94 However, after the problems are corrected, that competitor is likely to take more aggressive competitive actions.

Likelihood of response The success of an organisation’s competitive action is affected by the likelihood that a competitor will respond to it as well as by the type (strategic or tactical) and effectiveness of that response. As noted earlier, a competitive response is a strategic or tactical action the organisation takes to counter the effects of a competitor’s competitive action. In general, an organisation is likely to respond to a competitor’s action when:

1 the action leads to better use of the competitor’s capabilities to gain or produce stronger competitive advantages or an improvement in its market position

Table 5.1 Quality dimensions of goods and services

Product quality dimensions

1 Performance – operating characteristics

2 Features – important special characteristics

3 Flexibility – meeting operating specifications over some period of time

4 Durability – amount of use before performance deteriorates

5 Conformance – match with pre-established standards

6 Serviceability – ease and speed of repair

7 Aesthetics – how a product looks and feels

8 Perceived quality – subjective assessment of characteristics (product image)

Service quality dimensions

1 Timeliness – performed in the promised period of time

2 Courtesy – performed cheerfully

3 Consistency – giving all customers similar experiences each time

4 Convenience – accessibility to customers

5 Completeness – fully serviced, as required

6 Accuracy – performed correctly each time Source: Adapted from J. Evans, 2008, Managing for Quality and Performance, 7th edn,

Mason, OH: Thomson Publishing.

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2 the action damages the organisation’s ability to use its capabilities to create or maintain an advantage 3 the organisation’s market position becomes less defensible.95 In addition to market commonality and resource similarity and awareness, motivation and ability,

organisations evaluate three other factors – type of competitive action, reputation and market dependence – to predict how a competitor is likely to respond to competitive actions (see Figure 5.2).

Type of competitive action Competitive responses to strategic actions differ from responses to tactical actions. These differences allow the organisation to predict a competitor’s likely response to a competitive action that has been launched against it. Strategic actions commonly receive strategic responses and tactical actions receive tactical responses. In general, strategic actions elicit fewer total competitive responses because strategic responses, such as market-based moves, involve a significant commitment of resources and are difficult to implement and reverse.96

Another reason that strategic actions elicit fewer responses than do tactical actions is that the time needed to implement a strategic action and to assess its effectiveness can delay the competitor’s response to that action.97 By contrast, a competitor likely will respond quickly to a tactical action, such as when an airline company almost immediately matches a competitor’s tactical action of reducing prices in certain markets. Either strategic actions or tactical actions that target a large number of a rival’s customers are likely to elicit strong responses.98 In fact, if the effects of a competitor’s strategic action on the focal organisation are significant (e.g. loss of market share or loss of major resources such as critical employees), a response is likely to be swift and strong.99

Actor’s reputation In the context of competitive rivalry, an actor is the organisation taking a n act ion or a response wh ile reputation is ‘the positive or negative attribute ascribed by one rival to another based on past competitive behaviour’.10 0 A positive reputation may be a source of above-average returns, especially for consumer goods producers.101 Thus, a positive corporate reputation is of strategic value102 and affects competitive rivalry. To predict the likelihood of a competitor’s response to a current or planned action, organisations evaluate the responses that the competitor has taken previously when attacked – past behaviour is assumed to be a predictor of future behaviour.

Competitors are more likely to respond to strategic or tactical actions when they are taken by a market leader.10 3 In particular, evidence suggests that commonly successful actions, especially strategic actions, will be quickly imitated. For example, although a second mover, IBM committed significant resources to enter the information service market. When IBM was immediately successful in this endeavour, competitors such as Hewlett-Packard (HP), Dell and others responded with strategic actions to enter the market.104 IBM’s

reputation, as well as its successful strategic action, strongly influenced entry by these competitors. In contrast to an organisation with a strong reputation such as IBM, competitors are less likely to

take responses against a company with a reputation for competitive behaviour that is risky, complex and unpredictable. The organisation with a reputation as a price predator (an actor that frequently reduces prices to gain or maintain market share) generates few responses to its pricing tactical actions because price predators, which typically increase prices once their market share objective is reached, lack credibility with their competitors.105 Occasionally, an organisation with a minor reputation can sneak up on larger,

more resourceful competitors and take market share from them. In recent years, for example, organisations from emerging markets have taken market share from major competitors based in developed markets.106

Dependence on the market Market dependence denotes the extent to which an organisation’s revenues or profits are derived from a particular market.107 In general, competitors with high market dependence are likely to respond strongly to attacks threatening their market position.108 Interestingly, the threatened organisation in these instances may not always respond quickly, even though an effective response to an attack on the organisation’s position in a critical market is important.

Akamai Technologies is the dominant player in a multi-billion dollar market for content delivery network (CDN) services. If a person clicks on a website to download software or music, or to examine headlines or video clips, Akamai often provides these bigger files to the consumer through its servers rather than through the company computer system from which the download appears to be taking place. Akamai owns and operates the world’s largest CDN, which spans more than 216 000 servers in over 120 countries and more than 1500 networks around the world.109 As such, Akamai has well-equipped servers to facilitate improved and more reliable download performance, as it handles billions of daily web interactions for organisations like NBC, the NASDAQ market and the US Department of Defense. However, because Akamai is dependent on this market (it is not very diversified), rival CDN providers such as Limelight Networks and Level 3 Communications have forced Akamai to lower its basic CDN service prices. The company has responded quickly to both tactical and strategic entry moves and hopes to make up the difference through ‘volume’. However, Akamai is facing more competition as major companies such as Amazon (with CloudFront) and Microsoft (with Azure CDN) add content distribution capabilities to their networks.110

Competitive dynamics Whereas competitive rivalry concerns the ongoing actions and responses between an organisation and its direct competitors for an advantageous market position, competitive dynamics concern the ongoing actions and responses among all organisations competing within a market for advantageous positions. Building and sustaining competitive advantages are at the core of competitive rivalry, in that advantages are the key to creating value for shareholders.111

To explain competitive dynamics, we explore the effects of varying rates of competitive speed in different markets (called slow-cycle, fast-cycle and standard-cycle markets) on the behaviour (actions and responses) of all competitors within a given market. Competitive behaviours as well as the reasons for taking them are similar within each market type but differ across types of markets. Thus, competitive dynamics differ in slow-cycle, fast-cycle and standard-cycle markets. The sustainability of the organisation’s competitive advantages differs across the three market types. Research has also shown how organisations go through life-cycle stages as markets within which an organisation is competing evolve over time.112 However, understanding what happens within each type of market is more pertinent in knowing how to respond to the competition.

As noted in Chapter 1, organisations want to sustain their competitive advantages for as long as possible, although no advantage is permanently sustainable. The degree of sustainability is affected by how quickly competitive advantages can be imitated and how costly it is to do so.

Slow-cycle markets Slow-cycle markets are those in which the organisation’s competitive advantages are shielded from imitation, commonly for long periods of time, and where imitation is costly.113 Thus, competitive advantages are sustainable over longer periods of time in slow-cycle markets.STRATEGY NOW

IBM, HP and Dell

slow-cycle markets markets in which the organisation’s competitive advantages are shielded from imitation for what are commonly long periods of time and where imitation is costly

Dell’s response to actions by competitors such as IBM and HP is influenced by their reputation.

Source: Dreamstime.com/Ken Wolter

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more resourceful competitors and take market share from them. In recent years, for example, organisations from emerging markets have taken market share from major competitors based in developed markets.106

Dependence on the market Market dependence denotes the extent to which an organisation’s revenues or profits are derived from a particular market.107 In general, competitors with high market dependence are likely to respond strongly to attacks threatening their market position.108 Interestingly, the threatened organisation in these instances may not always respond quickly, even though an effective response to an attack on the organisation’s position in a critical market is important.

Akamai Technologies is the dominant player in a multi-billion dollar market for content delivery network (CDN) services. If a person clicks on a website to download software or music, or to examine headlines or video clips, Akamai often provides these bigger files to the consumer through its servers rather than through the company computer system from which the download appears to be taking place. Akamai owns and operates the world’s largest CDN, which spans more than 216 000 servers in over 120 countries and more than 1500 networks around the world.109 As such, Akamai has well-equipped servers to facilitate improved and more reliable download performance, as it handles billions of daily web interactions for organisations like NBC, the NASDAQ market and the US Department of Defense. However, because Akamai is dependent on this market (it is not very diversified), rival CDN providers such as Limelight Networks and Level 3 Communications have forced Akamai to lower its basic CDN service prices. The company has responded quickly to both tactical and strategic entry moves and hopes to make up the difference through ‘volume’. However, Akamai is facing more competition as major companies such as Amazon (with CloudFront) and Microsoft (with Azure CDN) add content distribution capabilities to their networks.110

Competitive dynamics Whereas competitive rivalry concerns the ongoing actions and responses between an organisation and its direct competitors for an advantageous market position, competitive dynamics concern the ongoing actions and responses among all organisations competing within a market for advantageous positions. Building and sustaining competitive advantages are at the core of competitive rivalry, in that advantages are the key to creating value for shareholders.111

To explain competitive dynamics, we explore the effects of varying rates of competitive speed in different markets (called slow-cycle, fast-cycle and standard-cycle markets) on the behaviour (actions and responses) of all competitors within a given market. Competitive behaviours as well as the reasons for taking them are similar within each market type but differ across types of markets. Thus, competitive dynamics differ in slow-cycle, fast-cycle and standard-cycle markets. The sustainability of the organisation’s competitive advantages differs across the three market types. Research has also shown how organisations go through life-cycle stages as markets within which an organisation is competing evolve over time.112 However, understanding what happens within each type of market is more pertinent in knowing how to respond to the competition.

As noted in Chapter 1, organisations want to sustain their competitive advantages for as long as possible, although no advantage is permanently sustainable. The degree of sustainability is affected by how quickly competitive advantages can be imitated and how costly it is to do so.

Slow-cycle markets Slow-cycle markets are those in which the organisation’s competitive advantages are shielded from imitation, commonly for long periods of time, and where imitation is costly.113 Thus, competitive advantages are sustainable over longer periods of time in slow-cycle markets.STRATEGY NOW

IBM, HP and Dell

slow-cycle markets markets in which the organisation’s competitive advantages are shielded from imitation for what are commonly long periods of time and where imitation is costly

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Building a unique and proprietary capability produces a competitive advantage and success in a slow- cycle market. This type of advantage is difficult for competitors to understand. As discussed in Chapter 3, a difficult-to-understand and costly-to-imitate resource or capability usually results from unique historical conditions, causal ambiguity and/or social complexity. Copyrights, geography, patents and ownership of an information resource are examples of resources.114 After a proprietary advantage is developed, the organisation’s competitive behaviour in a slow-cycle market is oriented to protecting, maintaining and extending that advantage. Thus, the competitive dynamics in slow-cycle markets usually concentrate on competitive actions and responses that enable organisations to protect, maintain and extend their competitive advantage. Major strategic actions in these markets, such as acquisitions, usually carry less risk than in faster-cycle markets.115

Walt Disney Co. continues to extend its proprietary characters, such as Mickey Mouse, Minnie Mouse and Goofy. These characters have a unique historical development as a result of Walt and Roy Disney’s creativity and vision for entertaining people. Products based on the characters seen in Disney’s animated films are sold through Disney’s theme park shops as well as free-standing retail outlets called Disney Stores. Because copyrights shield it, the proprietary nature of Disney’s advantage in terms of animated character trademarks protects the organisation from imitation by competitors.

Consistent with another attribute of competition in a slow-cycle market, Disney protects its exclusive rights to its characters and their use. As with all organisations competing in slow-cycle markets, Disney’s competitive actions (such as building theme parks in France, Japan and China) and responses (such as lawsuits to protect its right to fully control use of its animated characters) maintain and extend its proprietary competitive advantage while protecting it.

Patent laws and regulatory requirements such as those requiring approval to launch new products shield pharmaceutical companies’ positions. Competitors in this market try to extend patents on their drugs to maintain advantageous positions that the patents provide. However, after a patent expires, the organisation is no longer shielded from competition, allowing generic imitations and usually leading to a loss of sales.

The competitive dynamics generated by organisations competing in slow-cycle markets are shown in Figure 5.4. In slow-cycle markets, organisations launch a product (e.g. a new drug) that has been developed through a proprietary advantage (e.g. R&D) and then exploit it for as long as possible while the product is shielded from competition. Eventually, competitors respond to the action with a counterattack. In markets for drugs, this counterattack commonly occurs as patents expire or are broken through legal means, creating the need for another product launch by the organisation seeking a protected market position. It is becoming more difficult for organisations like Merck, Pfizer or GlaxoSmithKline (GSK) to get drugs approved; patent- protected drug approvals are trending down, while risky research spending is rising.116

Fast-cycle markets Fast-cycle markets are markets in which the organisation’s capabilities that contribute to competitive advantages are not shielded from imitation and where imitation is often rapid and inexpensive.117 Thus, competitive advantages aren’t sustainable in fast-cycle markets. Organisations competing in fast-cycle markets recognise the importance of speed; these companies appreciate that ‘time is as precious a business resource as money or head count – and that the costs of hesitation and delay are just as steep as going over budget or missing a financial forecast’.118 Such high-velocity environments place considerable pressures on top managers to quickly make strategic decisions that are also effective.119 The often substantial competition and technology-based strategic focus make the strategic decision complex, increasing the need for a comprehensive approach integrated with decision speed, which are two often-conflicting characteristics of the strategic decision process.120

Reverse engineering and the rate of technology diffusion in fast-cycle markets facilitate rapid imitation. A competitor uses reverse engineering to quickly gain the knowledge required to imitate or improve the organisation’s products. Technology is diffused rapidly in fast-cycle markets, making it available to competitors in a short period. The technology often used by fast-cycle competitors isn’t proprietary, nor

fast-cycle markets markets in which the organisation’s capabilities are not shielded from imitation and where imitation happens quickly and perhaps somewhat inexpensively

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is it protected by patents as is the technology used by organisations competing in slow-cycle markets. For example, only a few hundred parts, which are readily available on the open market, are required to build a PC. Patents protect only a few of these parts, such as microprocessor chips. Interestingly, research also demonstrates that showing what an incumbent organisation knows and its research capability can be a deterrent to other organisations to enter the market.121

The reality of fast-cycle markets has led to the development of generational products. Such products usually start with a substantial technical advance in the performance of a product category and are followed with additional regular, though incremental, technological advances as new generations of products are introduced, as in Intel semiconductor logic chips or HP printer families.122 Fast-cycle markets are more volatile than slow-cycle and standard-cycle markets. Indeed, the pace of competition in fast-cycle markets is almost frenzied, as companies rely on innovations as the engines of their growth. Because prices often decline quickly in these markets, companies need to profit quickly from their product innovations. Cloud computing is an example where change is happening rapidly as organisations seek to establish space in the market while it evolves rapidly.123

Fast-cycle market characteristics make it virtually impossible for companies in this type of market to develop sustainable competitive advantages. Recognising this reality, organisations avoid ‘loyalty’ to any of their products, preferring to cannibalise their own before competitors learn how to do so through successful imitation. This emphasis creates competitive dynamics that differ substantially from those found in slow-cycle markets. Instead of concentrating on protecting, maintaining and extending competitive advantages, as in slow-cycle markets, companies competing in fast-cycle markets focus on learning how to rapidly and continuously develop new competitive advantages that are superior to those they replace. They commonly search for fast and effective means of developing new products. For example, it is common in some industries for organisations to use strategic alliances to gain access to new technologies and thereby develop and introduce more new products into the market.124 In recent years, many of these alliances have been offshore (with partners in foreign countries) in order to access appropriate skills while maintaining lower costs to compete. However, achieving the appropriate balance is important so that key capabilities are not lost in the offshoring and outsourcing process.125

The competitive behaviour of organisations competing in fast-cycle markets is shown in Figure 5.5. As suggested by the figure, competitive dynamics in this market type entail actions and responses that are oriented to rapid and continuous product introductions and the development of a stream of ever-changing competitive advantages. The organisation launches a product to achieve a competitive

Figure 5.4 Gradual erosion of a sustained competitive advantage

Returns from a sustained competitive advantage

Time (years)

Launch Exploitation

Counterattack

0 5 10

Source: Adapted from I. C. MacMillan, 1988, Controlling competitive dynamics by taking strategic initiative, Academy of Management Executive, 11(2): 111–18.

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advantage and then exploits the advantage for as long as possible. However, the organisation also tries to develop another temporary competitive advantage before competitors can respond to the first one. Thus, competitive dynamics in fast-cycle markets often result in rapid product upgrades as well as quick product innovations.126

As our discussion suggests, innovation plays a critical role in the competitive dynamics in fast-cycle markets. For individual organisations, then, innovation is a key source of competitive advantage. Through innovation, the organisation can cannibalise its own products before competitors successfully imitate them and still maintain an advantage through next-generation products.

Figure 5.5 Developing temporary advantages to create sustained advantage

Returns from a series of replicable actions

Time (years)

Launch Exploitation

Counterattack

Organisation has already advanced to advantage no. 2

5 10 15

etc.

Source: Based on I. C. MacMillan, 1988, Controlling competitive dynamics by taking strategic initiative, Academy of Management Executive, 11(2): 111–18.

The emergence of competitive rivalry among battery manufacturers: who will establish the most attractive market position?

Although small in size today, the growth potential of the battery-storage market is substantial. ‘Utilities looking for less expensive alternatives to power plants that fire up during peak hours to meet power demands’ are a key customer for the manufacturers of large-scale battery-storage products. Utility companies encounter the challenge of having sufficient capacity to meet peak demand for energy consumption. Commonly, mornings and evenings are the times when customers use the greatest amounts of the product that utilities provide. At non-peak times though, utilities have idle capacity. Examining today’s competitive scene finds IHS Markit predicting that the global market for batteries in the power sector will expand annually by 14 per cent through at least 2025. Thus, energy storage on a large- scale basis is an attractive market.

Increasing levels of power generation from renewable energy sources such as wind and power and the need to store that energy influence the growth in large-scale battery-storage units. The challenge with wind and solar as energy sources is that they are intermittent energy sources. In this sense, power companies do not know exactly when the wind will blow (and for how long and at what velocity) and exactly when the sun will shine (and for how long and with what degree of intensity). Large-scale storage batteries address this issue by allowing the capture of wind- and solar-generated power when created and then storing it until needed to meet consumer demand. In the words of an industry expert: ‘With large grid systems, batteries can be attached directly to generation sources such as wind turbines and solar panels to store and release excess electricity

Strategic focus | Sustainability

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Tesla’s battery storage facility can store a megawatt of alternative energy, allowing the district to use more ‘green’ power during peak times of the day.

Source: Alamy Stock Photo/ZUMA Press

that the grid can’t absorb in that moment, or even be used in hybridizing conventional power generation (gas engines or turbines) in order to enhance the flexibility of and speed of response to grid intermittency.’ The decreasing cost of lithium-ion batteries is increasing the attractiveness of large-scale, battery-storage systems. (Small versions of lithium-ion batteries power mobile phones and a host of other products.)

Tesla, Siemens AG and General Electric (GE) are primary competitors in the large-scale, battery-storage system market. The commercial attractiveness of this market elicits competition among these competitors as they jockey to establish the most attractive market position. In mid-2017, for example, Tesla announced that in partnership with Neoen, a French renewable energy provider, it would build, deliver and install the world’s largest lithium battery to a location north of Jamestown, South Australia, in 100 days. Tesla fulfilled this promise and delivered a battery-storage product that runs constantly and provides stability services for renewable energy sources and is available for emergency backup power in case of an energy shortfall. Early operational results from using this product have been positive.

Recognising the importance of battery-storage size in what is an attractive market and to compete against Tesla, Siemens and AES combined their efforts to form an energy storage start-up called Fluence Energy. This partnership commenced operations on 1 January

2018; the organisation immediately became the ‘supplier of AES’ Alamitos power center energy storage project in Long Beach, California serving Southern California Edison and the Western Los Angeles area’. Fluence’s battery-storage project was to be the largest in the world, exceeding the size of Tesla’s project in South Australia.

Trying to catch up to rivals Tesla and Siemens, GE announced in early 2018 that it would establish a giant energy-storage platform called GE Reservoir. This platform ‘is expected to store electricity generated by wind turbines and solar panels for later use’.

How do GE, Tesla and Siemens’ products differ? What position will each organisation’s product allow it to establish in the large-scale battery-storage market? With respect to GE, some analysts observe that ‘one of GE’s biggest challenges will be differentiating its battery products from those offered by competitors such as Fluence’. Early responses to this challenge suggest that GE’s Reservoir platform lasts approximately 15 per cent longer than competitors’ products; faster installation of the platform is a second differentiator. Thus, product longevity and installation ease may be the foundation for GE’s effort to ‘stake out’ a viable market position. For Tesla, being a first mover (this concept is discussed later in the chapter) and being very willing to collaborate with governmental agencies to install products may be sources of differentiation (Tesla and Neoen partnered with the South Australian Government to establish their battery-storage system). Siemens uses a ‘holistic approach’ to serve battery-storage customers. In this sense, the organisation notes that it offers ‘customers in the battery industry solutions comprising software, automation and drives spanning the entire value chain’. Thus, integrated technology solutions may be a marketplace differentiator for Siemens and for Fluence, the start-up formed by Siemens and AES.

Going forward, these three major competitors will encounter competition from additional entrants to a very attractive market. Overall, ‘competition in the energy storage market will only improve the industry, forcing companies like Tesla and the newly-established Fluence (and GE) to continue being innovative’. Thus, energy customers throughout the world will benefit from the competitive rivalry occurring among organisations seeking to establish the most attractive market position.

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Sources: 2018, Siemens backs efficient digitalized large-scale production of batteries, Siemens Homepage, http://www.siemens.co, 22 February; E. Ailworth, 2018, GE Power, in need of a lift, chases Tesla and Siemens

in batteries, Wall Street Journal, http://www.wsj.com, 7 March; J. Cropley, 2018, GE rolls out battery-based energy storage product, Daily Gazette,

http://www.dailygazette.com, 7 March; T. Kellner, 2018, Making waves: GE unveils plans to build an offshore wind turbine the size of a

skyscraper, the world’s most powerful, Renewables, http://www.ge.com, 1 March; F. Lambert, 2018, AES and Siemens launch new energy storage

startup to compete with Tesla Energy, will supply new world’s biggest battery project, Electrek, http://www.electrek.com, 11 January; C. Mimms,

2018, The battery boost we’ve been waiting for is only a few years out, Wall Street Journal, http://www.wsj.com, 18 March; S. Patterson & R. Gold, 2018, There’s a global race to control batteries – and China is

winning, Wall Street Journal, http://www.wsj.com, 11 February; B. Spaen, 2018, New ‘Fluence Energy’ builds world’s biggest storage system in

California, GreenMatters, http://www.greenmatters.com, 12 January; B. Fung, 2017, Tesla’s enormous battery in Australia, just weeks old, is

already responding to outages in ‘record’ time, Washington Post, http:// www.washingtonpost.com, 26 December; I. Slav, 2017, Tesla is facing stiff competition in the energy storage war, OilPrice.com, http://www.

oilprice.com, 17 July.

Standard-cycle markets Standard-cycle markets are markets in wh ich t he organ isation’s competitive advantages are par tially shielded from imitation, and imitation is moderately costly. Competitive advantages are partially sustainable in standard-cycle markets, but only when the organisation is able to continuously upgrade the quality of its capabilities to stay ahead of competitors. The competitive actions and responses in standard- cycle markets are designed to seek large market shares, to gain customer loyalty through brand names and to carefully control an organisation’s operations in order to consistently provide the same positive experience for customers.127

Standard-cycle companies serve many customers in competitive markets. Because the capabilities and core competencies on which their competitive advantages are based are less specialised, imitation is faster and less costly for standard-cycle organisations than for those competing in slow-cycle markets. However, imitation is slower and more expensive in these markets than in fast-cycle markets. Thus, competitive dynamics in standard-cycle markets rest midway between the characteristics of dynamics in slow-cycle and fast-cycle markets. Imitation comes less quickly and is more expensive for standard-cycle competitors when an organisation is able to develop economies of scale by combining coordinated and integrated design and manufacturing processes with a large sales volume for its products.

Because of large volumes, the size of mass markets and the need to develop scale economies, the competition for market share is intense in standard-cycle markets. In some markets associated with consumer electronics, fast cycles occur, such as in smartphones and tablet sales. However, in other consumer segments such as the television market, the cycles are more placid and closer to standard-cycle markets. Nonetheless, rivalry is intense as new technologies emerge. For example, prices came down in the flat-panel television market as competition in this market become relatively more stable. The steady increase in screen resolution and technology has led to 4K and 8K models, with relatively stable prices. The biggest changes over the past 10 years have been with OLED (organic light emitting diode) and QLED (quantum-dot light emitting diode) displays, particularly with the web-connected nature of ‘smart’ TVs. Smart TVs, a connected convergence of TVs, set-top boxes and computers, have integrated and interactive Web 2.0 features to browse the internet, view photos and stream music or videos. Sony, LG Electronics and Samsung are highly competitive rivals in this market.128

Innovation can also drive competitive actions and responses in standard-cycle markets, especially when rivalry is intense. Some innovations in standard-cycle markets are incremental rather than radical in nature (incremental and radical innovations are discussed in Chapter 13). For example, consumer foods producers are innovating within their lines of healthy products. Overall, many organisations are relying on innovation as a means of competing in standard-cycle markets and earning above-average returns.

Overall, innovation has a substantial influence on competitive dynamics as it affects the actions and responses of all companies competing within a slow-cycle, fast-cycle or standard-cycle market. We have emphasised the importance of innovation to the organisation’s strategic competitiveness in earlier chapters and do so again in Chapter 13. These discussions highlight the importance of innovation in most types of markets.

standard-cycle markets markets in which the organisation’s competitive advantages are moderately shielded from imitation and where imitation is moderately costly

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STUDY TOOLS SUMMARY LO1 Competitors are organisations competing in the

same market, offering similar products and targeting similar customers. Competitive rivalry is the ongoing set of competitive actions and competitive responses occurring between competitors as they compete against each other for an advantageous market position. The outcomes of competitive rivalry influence the organisation’s ability to sustain its competitive advantages as well as the level (average, below average or above average) of its returns on investment.

The set of competitive actions and responses that an individual organisation takes while engaged in competitive rivalry is called competitive behaviour. Competitive dynamics is the set of actions and responses taken by all organisations that are competitors within a particular market. Remember that strategy is like a game of chess.

LO2 A competitor analysis is the first step the organisation takes to be able to predict its competitors’ actions and responses. In Chapter 2, we discussed what organisations do to understand competitors. This discussion was extended in this chapter to describe what the organisation does to predict competitors’ market-based actions. Thus, understanding precedes prediction. Market commonality (the number of markets in which competitors are jointly involved and their importance to each) and resource similarity (how comparable competitors’ resources are in terms of type and amount) are studied to complete a competitor analysis. In general, the greater the market commonality and resource similarity, the more organisations acknowledge that they are direct competitors.

LO3 Market commonality and resource similarity shape the organisation’s awareness (the degree to which it and its competitors understand their mutual interdependence), motivation (the organisation’s incentive to attack or respond) and ability (the quality of the resources available to the organisation to attack and respond). Having knowledge of these characteristics of a competitor increases the quality of the organisation’s predictions about that competitor’s actions and responses.

LO4 Organisations study competitive rivalry in order to predict the competitive actions and responses that each of their competitors likely will take. Competitive actions are either strategic or tactical in nature. The organisation takes competitive actions to defend or build its competitive advantages or to improve its market position. Competitive responses are taken to counter the effects of a competitor’s competitive action. A strategic action or a strategic response requires a significant commitment of organisational resources, is difficult to successfully implement and is difficult to reverse. By contrast, a tactical action or a tactical response requires fewer organisational resources and is easier to implement and reverse. For example, for an airline company, entering major new markets is an example of a strategic action or a strategic response, while changing its prices in a particular market is an example of a tactical action or a tactical response.

LO5 In addition to market commonality, resource similarity, awareness, motivation and ability, three more-specific factors affect the likelihood a competitor will take competitive actions. The first of these concerns first- mover incentives. First movers – those taking an initial competitive action – often gain loyal customers and earn above-average returns until competitors can successfully respond to their action. Not all organisations can be first movers in that they may lack the awareness, motivation or ability required to engage in this type of competitive behaviour. Moreover, some organisations prefer to be a second mover (the organisation responding to the first mover’s action). One reason for this is that second movers, especially those acting quickly, can successfully compete against the first mover. By evaluating the first mover’s product, customers’ reactions to it and the responses of other competitors to the first mover, the second mover can avoid the early entrant’s mistakes and find ways to improve upon the value created for customers by the first mover’s good or service. Late movers (those that respond a long time after the original action was taken) commonly are lower performers and are much less competitive.

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Organisational size, the second factor, tends to reduce the variety of competitive actions that large organisations launch, while it increases the variety of actions undertaken by smaller competitors. Ideally, the organisation would prefer to initiate a large number of diverse actions when engaged in competitive rivalry.

The third factor, quality, is a base denominator to competing successfully in the global economy. It is a necessary prerequisite to achieving competitive parity, and is a necessary but insufficient condition for gaining an advantage.

LO6 To predict a competitor’s response to its actions, an organisation should examine the type of action (strategic or tactical) it took, the competitor’s reputation for the nature of its competitive behaviour, and that competitor’s dependence on the market in which the action was taken. In general, the number of tactical responses taken exceeds the number of strategic responses. Competitors respond more frequently to the actions taken by the organisation with a reputation for predictable and understandable competitive behaviour, especially if that organisation is a market leader. In general, the organisation can predict that when its competitor is highly dependent for its revenue and profitability on the market in which the organisation took a competitive action, that competitor is likely to launch a strong response.

However, organisations that are more diversified across markets are less likely to respond to a particular action that affects only one of the markets in which they compete.

LO7 In slow-cycle markets, where competitive advantages can be maintained for at least a period of time, the competitive dynamics often include organisations taking actions and responses intended to protect, maintain and extend their proprietary advantages. In fast-cycle markets, competition is substantial as organisations concentrate on developing a series of temporary competitive advantages. This emphasis is necessary because organisations’ advantages in fast-cycle markets aren’t proprietary and, as such, are subject to rapid and relatively inexpensive imitation. Standard-cycle markets have a level of competition between that in slow-cycle and fast-cycle markets; organisations are moderately shielded from competition in these markets as they use capabilities that produce competitive advantages that are moderately sustainable. Competitors in standard- cycle markets serve mass markets and try to develop economies of scale to enhance their profitability. Innovation is vital to competitive success in each of the three types of markets. Companies should recognise that the set of competitive actions and responses taken by all organisations differs by type of market.

KEY TERMS competitive action

competitive advantage

competitive behaviour

competitive dynamics

competitive response

competitive rivalry

competitors

fast-cycle markets

first mover

late mover

market commonality

multi-market competition

quality

resource similarity

second mover

slow-cycle markets

standard-cycle markets

strategic action or strategic response

strategic competitiveness

strategy

tactical action or tactical response

REVIEW QUESTIONS 1. Who are competitors? How are competitive rivalry,

competitive behaviour and competitive dynamics defined in the chapter?

2. What is market commonality? What is resource similarity? What does it mean to say that these concepts are the building blocks for a competitor analysis?

3. How do awareness, motivation and ability affect the organisation’s competitive behaviour?

4. What factors affect the likelihood an organisation will take a competitive action?

5. What factors affect the likelihood an organisation will initiate a competitive response to the action taken by a competitor?

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6. What competitive dynamics can be expected among organisations competing in slow-cycle markets? In fast- cycle markets? In standard-cycle markets?

7. How do competitive dynamics apply in non-commercial organisations and sectors?

EXPERIENTIAL EXERCISES

Exercise 1: Tragedy of the commons The tragedy of the commons is a dilemma that encompasses elements from social psychology and competitive behaviour, among other disciplines. The concept first appeared in 1968 in an article by Garrett Hardin in the journal Science. The dilemma arises from a situation in which individuals act in ways that may not necessarily be in everyone’s long-term interests. In general, the tragedy of the commons occurs when individuals all have equal access to a shared resource and each individual seeks to maximise his or her own self- interest. For a contemporary example, think about global warming in general, or localised pollution in particular, as instances of the dilemma: there is a distinct advantage for one country, state or business to pollute, which in turn imperils society as a whole.

As explained by De Young,129 ecologist Garrett Hardin’s parable involves a pasture ‘open to all’. He asks us to imagine the grazing of animals on a common ground. Individuals are motivated to add to their flocks to increase personal wealth. Yet, every animal added to the total degrades the commons a small amount. Although the degradation for each additional animal is small relative to the gain in wealth for the owner, if all owners follow this pattern, the commons will ultimately be destroyed. And, being rational actors, each owner is motivated to add to their flock: ‘Therein is the tragedy. Each man is locked into a system that compels him to increase his herd without limit – in a world that is limited. Ruin is the destination toward which all men rush, each pursuing his own interest in a society that believes in the freedom of the commons’.130

In this exercise, the instructor needs four volunteers to participate. You will be asked to come to the front of the class and demonstrate the concept through a short exercise. You should be familiar with the tragedy of the commons. There are many good resources in the library and you are encouraged to read Hardin’s original 1968 article in Science (vol. 162, pages 1243–48), titled ‘The tragedy of the commons’ before attending class.

Exercise 2: Is being the first mover usually advantageous? Henry Ford is often credited with saying that he would rather be the first person to be second. This is strange coming from the innovator of the mass-produced automobile in the USA. So is the first mover advantage really a myth or is it something that every organisation should strive for?

First movers are typically considered to be the ones that initially introduce an innovative product or service into a market segment (in other words, the first to market in a new product or service segment). The notion subscribed to first movers is that doing so creates an almost impenetrable competitive advantage that later entrants find difficult to overcome. However, history is replete with situations where second or later movers find success. If the best way to succeed in the future is to understand the past, then an understanding of why certain first movers succeeded and others failed should be instructive. Accordingly, this exercise requires you to investigate a first mover and identify specifically why, or why not, it was able to hold onto its first- mover advantage.

Part 1 Pick an industry that you find interesting. This assignment can be done individually or in a team. Research that industry and identify one or two instances of a first mover, and research the introduction of a new offering into new market segments. For example, you might pick consumer electronics and look for organisations that initiated new products in new market segments. Your choice of industry must be approved in advance by your instructor as duplication of industries is to be avoided.

Part 2 Each individual or team is to present their findings, with the discussion centring on the following at a minimum: • Provide a brief history and description of the industry

chosen; for example, was this a fast-, standard- or slow- cycle market at the time the first mover initiated its strategic action?

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• Identify how the innovation of new products has traditionally been accomplished in this industry: through new organisations entering the market or by existing organisations launching new offerings?

• Identify one or two first movers and provide a review of what happened. If the product or offering

is still considered successful, describe why. If not, why is it not?

• What did you learn as a result of this exercise? Do you consider the first mover a wise strategy, and is your answer dependent upon industry, timing or luck?

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Studying this chapter should provide you with the strategic management knowledge needed to: LO1 define corporate-level strategy and discuss its purpose LO2 describe different levels of diversification with different corporate-level

strategies LO3 explain three primary reasons organisations diversify LO4 describe how organisations can create value by using a related diversification

strategy LO5 explain the two ways value can be created with an unrelated diversification

strategy LO6 discuss the incentives and resources that encourage diversification LO7 describe motives that can encourage managers to over-diversify an

organisation, unintentionally reducing value.

Learning Objectives

Corporate-level strategy

CH AP

TE R

6

161

OPENING CASE STUDY

The world has many very large corporations. Australia’s Wesfarmers, which started as a farmers cooperative, is relatively small by world standards but owns an array of significant business units, including Bunnings, Officeworks, Kmart, Target and a range of industrial firms, covering chemicals, energy and fertilisers in one division, and general industrial and safety in another. It previously owned the Coles empire (Coles, BI-LO, Liquorland, etc.) and is extremely well regarded as a diversified organisation. General Electric (GE) is much larger; it would be easier to list business areas in which it does not compete than to list those in which it sells products. GE competes in 16 different industries: appliances, aviation, consumer electronics, electrical distribution, energy, entertainment, finance, gas, health care, lighting, locomotives, oil, software, water, weapons and wind turbines. As can be seen from this list, these industries are quite diverse. Yet there are similarities among several of them. In fact, GE’s businesses are grouped in four divisions: GE Capital, GE Energy, GE Technology Infrastructure and GE Home & Business Solutions. In recent years, more than 50 per cent of GE’s annual revenue has come from its financial services businesses. Thus, it could be labelled a services company with a strong industrial component. In 2015 GE was ranked the eighth-largest corporation in the Fortune 500, but dropped to 18th by 2018, 21st by 2019 and 33rd by 2020. In June 2018, it lost its coveted position as the only remaining original company that was listed in the initial Dow Jones Industrial Average in 1896. For the past 124 years, GE has achieved an average annual increase in its stock value of 5.8 per cent, but has been recently burdened by debt and exposure to a turbulent market.

These data suggest that despite recent troubles, GE has an impressive history and has experienced a significant amount of success. It is one of only a few widely diversified organisations to achieve such success. GE is a highly influential global corporation. Its former CEO, Jeffrey Immelt, was selected by US President Barack Obama to chair an advisory group on economic

and job creation concerns. However, GE has experienced some ‘bumps in the road’ along the way. This is to be expected because it is difficult to manage a large, widely diversified set of businesses. In the past, GE was criticised for the poor environmental records of some of its businesses. Finally, it had reductions in stock value during the first two decades of the 21st century. GE has bounced back from some of these problems. It has worked hard to overcome and correct its environmental problems. Today, it is a major player in the ‘clean energy’ industry, such as wind turbines and solar power. GE is also beginning to experience strong growth from its investments in emerging economies such as China and Brazil. In both of these countries, GE has made major business investments working with local partners and has developed R&D centres as well.

A common strategy to achieve growth (and diversification) for GE over the years has been mergers and acquisitions. For example, in 2011 GE acquired French company Converteam for US$3.2 billion. This company will provide support equipment for GE’s wind turbine business. The years 2014 and 2015 were also lively for GE. In this period, it acquired French organisation Alstom for US$17 billion, announced it would sell its property portfolio, and sold most of its finance units and also its health care finance units.

The quintessential diversified organisation

General Electric wind turbines at Silverton Wind Farm, New South Wales, (similar to those above) each produce 3.4 megawatts of energy.

Source: iStock.com/istock80

162 PART 2: STRATEGIC ACTIONS: STRATEGY FORMULATION

Ou r d iscussions of busi ness-level st rateg ies (Chapter 4) a nd t he compet it ive r iva l r y a nd compet it ive dy nam ics associated w it h t hem (Chapter 5) have concent rated on organ isat ions compet ing in a single indust r y or product ma rket.1 In t h is chapter, we int roduce you to cor porate-level st rategies, wh ich a re strategies organisations use to diversify their operations from a single business competing in a single market into several product markets – most commonly, into several businesses.

Purpose of corporate-level strategies A corporate-level strategy speci fies actions an organ isation ta kes to gain a competitive advantage by selecting and managing a group of different businesses competing in different product markets. Corporate- level strategies help companies to select new strategic positions – positions that are expected to increase the organisation’s value.2 As explained in the opening case, General Electric competes in 16 widely diverse industries and Wesfarmers in 10 (depending on how you define industries).

A s is t he case w it h GE, orga n isat ions use cor porate-level st rateg ies as a mea ns to g row revenues and profits, but there can be different strategic intents in addition to grow th. Organisations can pursue defensive or offensive strategies that realise growth but have different strategic intents. Organisations can also pursue market development by moving into different geographic markets (this approach is discussed in Chapter 8). Organisations can acquire competitors (horizontal integration) or buy a supplier or customer (ver tical integration). These strategies are discussed in Chapter 7. The basic cor porate strateg y, the topic of this chapter, focuses on diversification.

The decision to take actions to pursue growth is never a risk-free choice for organisations. Indeed, as the opening case explored, GE’s environmental record likely suffered because of a lack of adequate oversight and the strong interest in producing returns for the shareholders. Effective organisations carefully evaluate their growth options (including the different corporate-level strategies) before committing organisation resources to any of them.3

Because t he d iversif ied organ isation operates in several d ifferent and un ique product ma rkets, a nd l i kely i n severa l busi nesses, it for ms t wo t y pes of st rateg ies: cor porate-level (or compa ny-w ide) a nd busi ness-level (or compet it ive).4 Cor porate-level st rateg y is concer ned w it h t wo key issues: i n what product markets and businesses the organisation should compete and how cor porate headquar ters should manage those businesses. 5 For the diversif ied cor poration, a business-level strateg y (see Chapter 4) must

corporate-level strategy specifies actions an organisation takes to gain a competitive advantage by selecting and managing a group of different businesses competing in different product markets

After many decades of acquisitions, recent years have been populated more by divestments, with the September 2017 announcement of the US$2.6 billion sale of its Industrial Solutions business to ABB. The deal closed on 30 June 2018.

Sources: Wesfarmers, 2020, Wesfarmers industrial and safety, https:// www.wesfarmers.com.au/our-businesses/industrials, 23 January;

Fortune 500, 2020, General Electric company profile Fortune 500 # 33, Fortune, https://fortune.com/company/general-electric/fortune500,

30 August; Wikipedia, 2020, General Electric, https://en.wikipedia.org/ wiki/General_Electric; General Electric, 2020, Fact sheet, http://www.

ge.com/about-us/fact-sheet; T. Gryta & T. Mann, 2018, GE powered the American century – then it burned out, Wall Street Journal,

https://www.wsj.com/articles/ge-powered-the-american-centurythen- it-burned-out-11544796010, 14 December; C. Loomis, 2011, The

really, really, really long-term record for GE, Fortune, http://www. fortune.com, 14 May; T. Woody, 2011, GE’s new ecomagination chief: Green tech innovation goes global, Forbes, http://www.forbes.com, 3 May; S. Pearson, 2011, GE targets Latin America for growth, Financial

Times, http://www.ft.com, 1 May; E. Crooks, 2011, GE says growth outlook is very strong, Financial Times, http://www.ft.com, 28 April; B. Sechler, 2011, GE plan will tap solar power, Wall Street Journal, http:// online.wsj.com, 8 April; T. Zeller, 2011, GE to buy French company for $3.2 billion, New York Times, http://dealbook.nytimes.com, 29 March;

R. Layne, 2011, General Electric agrees to buy Converteam for $3.2 billion, Bloomberg Businessweek, http://www.businessweek.com, 29

March; General Electric plans to invest $2 billion in China, Bloomberg Businessweek, 2010, http://www.businessweek.com, 9 November; D.

Zax, 2010, GE and Siemens outpacing wind pioneers, becoming clean energy’s new oligopoly, Fast Company, http://www.fastcompany.com,

2 November.

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be selected for each of the businesses in wh ich the organ isation has decided to compete. In th is regard, each of GE’s product divisions uses different business-level strategies; while most focus on differentiation, its consumer elect ron ics business has products that compete in market n iches to include some that are intended to ser ve the average-income consumer. Thus, cost must also be an issue along w ith some level of quality.

A s is t he case w it h a busi ness-level st rateg y, a cor porate-level st rateg y is ex pected to help t he orga n isat ion ea r n above-average ret u r ns by creat i ng va lue.6 Some suggest t hat few cor porate-level strategies actually create value.7 As the opening case indicates, realising value through a corporate strategy ca n be ach ieved but it is challeng ing to do so. In fact, GE a nd Wesfa r mers a re some of t he few w idely diversified and large organisations that have been successful over time.

Ev idence suggests t hat a cor porate-level st rateg y ’s va lue is u lt i mately deter m i ned by t he deg ree to wh ich ‘ t he busi nesses i n t he por t fol io a re wor t h more u nder t he ma nagement of t he compa ny t ha n t hey wou ld be u nder a ny ot her ow nersh ip’. 8 T hus, a n ef fec t ive cor porate-level st rateg y creates, across a l l of a n orga n isat ion’s busi nesses, agg regate ret u r ns t hat exceed what t hose ret u r ns wou ld be w it hout t he st rateg y 9 a nd cont r ibutes to t he orga n isat ion’s st rateg ic compet it iveness a nd it s abi l it y to ea r n above-average ret u r ns.10

P roduc t d iversi ficat ion, a pr i ma r y for m of cor porate-level st rateg ies, concer ns t he scope of t he markets and industries in which the organisation competes as well as ‘how managers buy, create and sell different businesses to match skills and strengths with oppor tunities presented to the fi rm’.11 Successful diversification is expected to reduce variability in the organisation’s profitability as earnings are generated from different businesses.12 Diversification can also provide organisations with the flexibility to shift their investments to markets where the greatest returns are possible rather than being dependent on only one or a few markets.13 Because organisations incur development and monitoring costs when diversifying, the ideal portfolio of businesses balances diversification’s costs and benefits. CEOs and their top-management teams are responsible for determining the best por tfolio for their company.14

We beg i n t h is c hapte r by e xa m i n i ng d i f fe rent levels of d ive rsi f icat ion (f rom low to h ig h). A f te r desc r ibi ng t he d i f fe rent rea son s orga n isat ion s d ive rsi f y t hei r ope rat ion s, we foc u s on t wo t y pes of related d iversi f icat ion (related d iversi f icat ion sig n i f ies a moderate-to-h igh level of d iversi f icat ion for the organisation). W hen properly used, these strategies help create value in the d iversif ied organisation, eit her t h rough t he sha r i ng of resou rces (t he related const ra i ned st rateg y) or t he t ra nsfer r i ng of core compete nc ies ac ross t he orga n i sat ion’s d i f fe re nt bu si nesses (t he related l i n ked st rateg y). We t he n d isc uss u n related d iversi f icat ion, wh ich is a not her cor porate-level st rateg y t hat ca n create va lue. T he chapter t hen sh i f ts to t he topic of i ncent ives a nd resou rces t hat may st i mu late d iversi f icat ion t hat is va lue neut ra l. However, ma nager ia l mot ives to d iversi f y, t he f i na l topic i n t he chapter, ca n ac t ua l ly dest roy some of t he orga n isat ion’s va lue.

Levels of diversification Diversified organisations var y according to their level of diversification and the connections between and among their businesses. Figure 6.1 lists and defines five categories of businesses according to increasing levels of d iversi ficat ion. The si ngle- a nd dom i na nt-busi ness categor ies denote relat ively low levels of diversification; more fully diversified organisations are classified into related and unrelated categories. A n organisation is related through its diversification when its businesses share several links; for example, businesses may share products (goods or ser vices), technologies or distribution channels. The more links among businesses, the more ‘constrained’ is the related ness of d iversi fication. ‘Un related’ refers to the absence of direct links between businesses.

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Low levels of diversification A n orga n isat ion pu rsu i ng a low level of d iversi ficat ion uses eit her a si ngle- or a dom i na nt-busi ness, corporate-level diversification strategy. A single-business diversification strategy is a corporate-level strategy wherein the organisation generates 95 per cent or more of its sales revenue from its core business area.15 For example, Wm. Wrigley Jr Company, the world’s largest producer of chewing and bubble gums, historically used a single-business strateg y while operating in relatively few product markets. Wrigley’s trademark chewing gum brands include Spearmint, Doublemint and Juicy Fr uit, although the organisation produces other products as well. Sugar-free Extra chewing gum was introduced in 1984.

In 2005, Wrigley shifted from its traditional focused strategy when it acquired the confectionery brands of Kraft Foods Inc., including the well-known brand Life Savers. As Wrigley expanded, it may have intended to use the dominant-business strategy with the diversification of its product lines beyond gum; however, Wrigley was acquired by Mars, a privately held global confectionery company (the maker of Mars bars and M&Ms).16

With the dominant-business diversification strategy, the organisation generates between 70 and 95 per cent of its total revenue w it h in a single business a rea. Un ited Pa rcel Ser v ice ( U PS) uses t h is st rateg y. Recently, UPS generated 65 per cent of its revenue from its US package deliver y business and 22 per cent from its international package business, with the remaining 13 per cent coming from the organisation’s non- package business.17 Organisations that focus on one or ver y few businesses and markets can earn positive retur ns, because they develop capabilities useful for these markets and can prov ide super ior ser v ice to their customers. Additionally, there are fewer challenges in managing one or a very small set of businesses, allowing them to gain economies of scale and efficiently use their resources.18 Family-owned and controlled businesses are commonly less diversified. They prefer the focus because the family’s reputation is related closely to that of the business. Thus, family members prefer to provide quality goods and ser vices, which a focused strateg y better allows.19

Low levels of diversification

Single business: More than 95 per cent of revenue comes from a single business.

Dominant business: Between 70 and 95 per cent of revenue comes from a single business.

Moderate to high levels of diversification

Related constrained: Less than 70 per cent of revenue comes from the dominant business, and all businesses share product, technological and distribution linkages.

Related linked (mixed Less than 70 per cent of revenue comes from the dominant related and unrelated): business, and there are only limited links between businesses.

Very high levels of diversification

Unrelated: Less than 70 per cent of revenue comes from the dominant business, and there are no common links between businesses.

A

A

A

B

A

B

B C

A

B C

C

Figure 6.1 Levels and types of diversification

Source: Adapted from R. P. Rumelt, 1974, Strategy, Structure and Economic Performance, Boston, MA: Harvard Business School

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Moderate and high levels of diversification A n organisation generating more than 30 per cent of its revenue outside a dominant business and whose businesses are related to each other in some manner uses a related diversification corporate-level strategy. W hen the links between the diversified organisation’s businesses are rather direct, a related constrained diversification strategy is being used. Campbell’s Soup, Procter & Gamble (P&G) and Merck & Company all use a related constrained strateg y, as do some large cable companies. With a related constrained strateg y, an organisation shares resources and activities between its businesses.

Acciona’s related diversification and renewable energy growth

While household brands such as Tesla have dominated headlines in the ‘green economy’ boom in the past decade, one should also pay attention to the activities of existing organisations in responding to the changing technological, financial and economic environment regarding green energy.

Acciona is a Spanish conglomerate group with extensive experience in infrastructure and renewable energy. While the current entity was founded in 1997, its origin can be traced back to 1862. Acciona is among the first large organisations to have an exclusive focus on renewable energy. With the motto of ‘Business as unusual’, and its desire to lead the transition to a low carbon economy, Acciona is one of the earliest energy operators utilising renewable energy exclusively. With total sales in the energy sector at 2 billion euros, it has created one of the largest ‘green fortunes’ for its chairman, José Manuel Entrecanales, since 2004.

Acciona has five core business divisions: construction, concessions, water, services and energy. While each core business is distinct, similar competencies are utilised in construction and equipment. Therefore, there is a transfer of knowledge across these businesses, with construction expertise assisting the development and deployment of energy projects. Acciona is involved in wind power, solar photovoltaic and concentrating technologies, hydropower and biomass projects as part of its global presence in 40 countries.

Its early commitment to sustainability has borne fruit, and capitalising on environmental concerns, global warming and political commitments to create a clean energy sector are all significant drivers of growth.

Increasingly, the conventional wisdom that renewable energy is economically unviable in comparison with fossil fuel alternatives is being proven wrong, and this can be observed through Acciona’s financial performance, as it has recorded significant sales growth in 2017 and 2018, with the energy sector comprising 60.6 per cent of its EBITDA (earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation and amortisation) while only comprising 28.7 per cent of total revenue in 2018. With a diverse portfolio of projects, supported by friendly renewable energy policies, and a significant global presence, there is still significant growth potential.

As a percentage of revenue, Acciona is among the most innovative companies in the energy and utilities space, investing 2.7 per cent of its revenue into R&D activities. This allows Acciona to maintain its competitive edge, particularly as a leader in the wind energy value chain. A combination of innovation and commitment to sustainability means that Acciona is recognised as one of the top 100 sustainable organisations in the S&P Global 100 index.

With renewable energy becoming increasingly competitive against traditional fuel sources such as fossil fuels, natural gas and nuclear, Acciona is well- suited to capitalise on the renewable energy boom. However, with the emergence of other major players in the renewable energy sector, particularly those coming from mainland China, it remains to be seen if Acciona’s track record in the renewable energy sector can still be maintained.

Sources: B. Jaruzelski, 2020, The 2018 Global Innovation 1000 study, PwC, https://www.strategyand.pwc.com/gx/en/insights/

innovation1000.html, 11 February; CK Staff, 2019, 2019 Global 100 results, Corporate Knights, https://www.corporateknights.com/reports/

Strategic focus | Globalisation

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The d iversi fied company w ith a por tfolio of businesses that have on ly a few lin ks between them is called a mixed related and unrelated organisation and is using the related linked diversification strategy (see Figure 6.1). As displayed in the opening case, GE uses this cor porate-level diversification strateg y, as does Wesfarmers. Compared with related constrained organisations, related linked organisations share fewer resources and assets between their businesses, concentrating instead on transferring knowledge and core competencies between the businesses. GE has four strategic business units (see Chapter 11 for a definition of SBUs) that it calls ‘divisions’, each composed of related businesses. There are no relationships among the strategic business units, only within them. As with organisations using each ty pe of diversification strateg y, companies implementing the related linked strateg y constantly adjust the mix in their por tfolio of businesses as well as make decisions about how to manage these businesses.20 Managing a diversified orga n isat ion such as GE is h igh ly cha l leng i ng, but GE appea rs to have been wel l ma naged over t he years given its success (see also the ‘Opening case study’ in Chapter 11 for another perspective on GE’s performance).

A highly diversified organisation that has no relationships between its businesses follows an unrelated diversification strategy. Samsung and CK Hutchison Holdings Limited (CK H) are examples of organisations usi ng t h is t y pe of cor porate-level st rateg y. Com mon ly, orga n isat ions usi ng t h is st rateg y a re ca l led conglomerates. Samsung is a well-known and highly diversified conglomerate. CKH is a leading international cor porat ion w it h five core busi nesses: por ts a nd related ser v ices; proper t y a nd hotels; reta i l; energ y, infrastructure, investments and others; and telecommunications. These businesses are not related to each other and the organisation makes no effor t to share activities or to transfer core competencies between or among them. Each of these five businesses is quite large; for example, the retailing arm of the retail and manufactur ing business has more than 15 70 0 stores in 25 count r ies. Grocer ies, cosmetics, elect ronics, wine and airline tickets are some of the product categories featured in these stores. This organisation’s size and diversity suggest the challenge of successfully managing the unrelated diversification strateg y. However, CK Hutchison’s former CEO, Li Ka-shing, was successful at not only making smar t acquisitions but also at divesting businesses with good timing. 21

Reasons for diversification A n organ isat ion uses a cor porate-level d iversi ficat ion st rateg y for a va r iety of reasons (see Table 6.1). Ty pically, a diversification strateg y is used to increase the organisation’s value by improving its overall performance. Value is created either through related diversification or through unrelated diversification when the strategy allows a company’s businesses to increase revenues or reduce costs while implementing their business-level strategies.

Ot her reasons for usi ng a d iversi ficat ion st rateg y may have not h i ng to do w it h i nc reasi ng t he organisation’s value; in fact, diversification can have neutral effects or even reduce an organisation’s value. Value-neutral reasons for diversification include a desire to match and thereby neutralise a competitor’s market power (such as to neutralise another organisation’s advantage by acquiring a similar distribution outlet). Decisions to expand an organisation’s por tfolio of businesses to reduce managerial risk can have a negative effect on the organisation’s value. Greater amounts of diversification reduce managerial risk in

global-100/2019-global-100-results-15481152, 22 January; G. Wetstone, 2019, Renewable energy is booming. Here’s how to keep it going,

Fortune, https://fortune.com/2019/07/02/renewable-solar-wind-energy- investment, 3 July; T. Metcalf & P. Y. Mak, 2020, These billionaires made their fortunes by trying to stop climate change, Bloomberg

Green, https://www.bloomberg.com/features/2020-green-billionaires, 22 January; G. Parkinson, 2020, New CSIRO, AEMO study confirms

wind, solar and storage beat coal, gas and nuclear, Renew Economy, https://reneweconomy.com.au/new-csiro-aemo-study-confirms-

wind-solar-and-storage-beat-coal-gas-and-nuclear-57530, 6 February; Acciona, 2020, Clean energy for a sustainable world, https://www.

acciona-energia.com/?language=en, 12 February; J. Entrecanales, 2018, Acciona Annual Report, https://annualreport2018.acciona.com/

#_ga=2.151524921.1094319634.1581121579-1988099629.1580279385.

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GE’s diversification strategy

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Reasons for diversification

Value-creating diversification

• Economies of scope (related diversification)

• Sharing activities

• Transferring core competencies

• Market power (related diversification)

• Blocking competitors through multi-point competition

• vertical integration

• Financial economies (unrelated diversification)

• Efficient internal capital allocation

• Business restructuring

Value-neutral diversification

• Antitrust regulation

• Tax laws

• Low performance

• Uncertain future cash flows

• Risk reduction for organisation

• Tangible resources

• Intangible resources

Value-reducing diversification

• Diversifying managerial employment risk

• Increasing managerial compensation

Table 6.1

that if one of the businesses in a diversified organisation fails, the top executive of that business does not risk total failure by the corporation. As such, this reduces the top executives’ employment risk. In addition, because diversification can increase an organisation’s size and thus managerial compensation, managers have motives to diversify an organisation to a level that reduces its value. 22 Diversification rationales that may have a neutral or negative effect on the organisation’s value are discussed later in the chapter.

Operational relatedness and corporate relatedness are two ways diversification strategies can create value (see Figure 6.2). Studies of these independent relatedness dimensions show the importance of resources and key competencies.23 The figure’s vertical dimension depicts opportunities to share operational activities between businesses (operational relatedness) while the horizontal dimension suggests opportunities for transferring corporate-level core competencies (corporate relatedness). The organisation with a strong capability in managing operational synergy, especially in sharing assets between its businesses, falls in the upper left quadrant, which also represents vertical sharing of assets through vertical integration. The lower right quadrant represents a highly developed corporate capability for transferring one or more core competencies across businesses.

This capability is located primarily in the cor porate headquar ters office. Unrelated diversification is also illustrated in Figure 6.2 in the lower left quadrant. Financial economies (discussed later), rather than either operational or cor porate relatedness, are the source of value creation for organisations using the unrelated diversification strateg y.

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High

Sharing: Operational relatedness between businesses

Corporate relatedness: Transferring skills into businesses through corporate headquarters

Low

Related constrained diversification

Vertical integration (market power)

Both operational and corporate relatedness

(rare capability and can create diseconomies

of scope)

Related linked diversification

(economies of scope)

Unrelated diversification (financial economies)

Low High

Value-creating diversification strategies: operational and corporate relatedness

Figure 6.2

Value-creating diversification: related constrained and related linked diversification Wit h t he related d iversi ficat ion cor porate-level st rateg y, t he orga n isat ion bu i lds upon or ex tends its resources and capabilities to build a competitive advantage by creating value for customers.24 The company using the related d iversi fication st rateg y wants to develop and ex ploit econom ies of scope between its businesses. 25 Available to compan ies operat ing in mult iple product ma rkets or indust r ies, 26 economies of scope are cost savings that the organisation creates by successfully sharing some of its resources and capabilities or transfer ring one or more cor porate-level core competencies that were developed in one of its businesses to another of its businesses.

A s i l lust rated i n Fig u re 6.2, orga n isat ions seek to create va lue f rom econom ies of scope t h rough two basic k inds of operational economies: shar ing activ ities (operational related ness) and transfer r ing cor porate-level core competencies (cor porate related ness). T he d i fference bet ween sha r i ng act iv it ies and transfer ring competencies is based on how separate resources are jointly used to create economies of scope. To create economies of scope, tangible resources – such as plant and equipment or other business- unit physical assets – often must be shared. Less-tangible resources, such as manufacturing know-how and technological capabilities, can also be shared. 27 However, k now-how transfer red between separate activities with no physical or tangible resource involved is a transfer of a cor porate-level core competence, not an operational sharing of activities.28

economies of scope cost savings that the organisation creates by successfully sharing some of its resources and capabilities or transferring one (or more) corporate-level core competence that was developed in one of its businesses to another of its businesses

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Operational relatedness: sharing activities Organisations can create operational relatedness by sharing either a primar y activity (such as inventor y delivery systems) or a support activity (such as purchasing practices) – see discussion of the value chain in Chapter 3. Organisations using the related constrained diversification strategy share activities in order to create value. P&G uses this corporate-level strategy. P&G’s paper towel business and nappy business both use paper products as a primar y input to the manufacturing process. The organisation’s paper production plant produces inputs for both businesses and is an example of a shared activity. In addition, because they both produce consumer products, these two businesses are likely to share distribution channels and sales networks.

Activity sharing is also risky because ties among an organisation’s businesses create links between outcomes. For instance, if demand for one business’s product is reduced, it may not generate sufficient revenues to cover the fi xed costs required to operate the shared facilities. These types of organisational difficulties can reduce activity-sharing success. Additionally, activity sharing requires careful coordination between the businesses involved. The coordination challenges must be managed effectively for the appropriate sharing of activities.29

A lt houg h ac t iv it y sha r i ng ac ross bu si nesses is not r isk-f ree, resea rc h shows t hat it ca n c reate va lue. For e xa mple, st ud ies of acqu i sit ion s of orga n i sat ion s i n t he sa me i ndu st r y ( hor i zonta l acquisitions), such as the banking industr y and software, found that sha r i ng resou rces a nd act iv it ies a nd t hereby creat i ng econom ies of scope cont r ibuted to post-acqu isit ion i ncreases i n per for ma nce a nd higher returns to shareholders. 30 Additionally, organisations that sold off related u n its i n wh ich resou rce sha r i ng was a possible sou rce of economies of scope have been found to produce lower returns than those that sold off businesses unrelated to the organisation’s core business. 31

Still other research discovered that organisations with closely related businesses have lower risk.32 These results suggest that gaining economies of scope by sharing activities across an organisation’s businesses may be impor tant in reducing r isk and in creating value. Fu r ther, more-att ractive results are obtained through activity sharing when a strong cor porate headquar ters office facilitates it. 33

Corporate relatedness: transferring of core competencies Over time, the organisation’s intangible resources, such as its know-how, become the foundation of core competencies. Corporate-level core competencies a re complex sets of resou rces a nd capabi l it ies t hat lin k d i fferent businesses, pr ima r ily t h rough manager ial and tech nolog ical k nowledge, ex per ience and exper tise. 34 Organisations seek ing to create value th rough cor porate related ness use the related lin ked diversification strateg y, as exemplified by GE.

In at least two ways, the related linked diversification strateg y helps organisations to create value. 35 Fi rst, because t he ex pense of developi ng a core competence has a l ready been i ncu r red i n one of t he organisation’s businesses, transfer ring this competence to a second business eliminates the need for that business to allocate resources to develop it. Such is the case at Hewlett-Packard (HP), where the organisation transfer red its competence in in k pr inters to high-end copiers. Rather than the standard laser pr inting technology in most high-end copiers, HP uses ink-based technology. One manager liked the product because, as he noted, ‘ We are able to do a lot better quality at less price.’36 This capability gives HP the oppor tunity to sell more ink products and create higher profit margins.

corporate-level core competencies complex sets of resources and capabilities that link different businesses, primarily through managerial and technological knowledge, experience and expertise

The merger of BHP and Billiton created a global mining giant (see also the detailed discussion about acquisition and restructuring in Chapter 7).

Source: Getty Images/Carla Gottgens/Bloomberg

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Resource intangibility is a second source of value creation through corporate relatedness. Intangible resources are difficult for competitors to understand and imitate. Because of this difficulty, the unit receiving a t ra nsfer red cor porate-level competence of ten ga i ns a n i m med iate competitive advantage over its rivals. 37

A nu mber of orga n isat ions have successf u l ly t ra nsfer red one or more cor porate-level core competencies across their businesses. Virgin Group Ltd t ra nsfers its ma rket i ng core competence across a i rl i nes, cosmetics, music, drinks, mobile phones, health clubs and a number of other businesses.38 Honda has developed and transferred its competence i n eng i ne desig n a nd ma nu fact u r i ng a mong its busi nesses ma k i ng products such as motorcycles, lawnmowers, cars and tr ucks. Company officia ls state t hat Honda is a major ma nufactu rer of eng i nes a nd is focused on providing products for all forms of human mobility. 39

One way ma nagers facilitate t he t ra nsfer of cor porate-level core competencies is by moving key people into new management positions.40 However, the manager of an older business may be reluctant to transfer key people who have accu mu lated k nowledge a nd ex per ience cr it ica l to t he busi ness’s success. Thus, managers with the ability to facilitate the transfer of a core competence may come at a premium, or the key people involved may not want to transfer. Additionally, the top-level managers from the transferring busi ness may not wa nt t he competencies t ra nsfer red to a new busi ness to f u l fi l t he orga n isat ion’s d iversi fication objectives.41 Research also suggests too much dependence on outsourcing can lower the usefulness of core competencies and thereby reduce their useful transferability to other business units in the diversified organisation.42

Market power Organisations using a related diversification strateg y may gain market power when successfully using a related constrained or related linked strateg y. Market power exists when an organisation is able to sell its products above the existing competitive level or to reduce the costs of its primar y and suppor t activities below t he compet it ive level, or bot h.4 3 Ma rs’ acqu isit ion of t he Wr igley assets was pa r t of its related constrained diversification strategy and added market share to the Mars–Wrigley integrated organisation, as it realised 14.4 per cent of the market share. This catapulted Mars–Wrigley above Cadbur y and Nestlé, which had 10.1 and 7.7 per cent of the market share, respectively, at the time; and left Hershey with only 5.5 per cent of the market.44

In addition to effor ts to gain scale as a means of increasing market power, as Mars did when it acquired Wrigley, organisations can create market power through multi-point competition and vertical integration. Multi-point competition ex ists when two or more d iversified organisations simultaneously compete in the same product areas or geographic markets.45 Coles’ and Woolwor ths’ operations are classic examples of t h is. They compete i n a w ide va r iet y of product ma rkets as wel l as a l l geog raph ica l ma rkets r ight across Australia, and together they control over 70 per cent of the Australian supermarket market. Some organisations using a related diversification strategy engage in ver tical integration to gain market power. Vertical integration exists when a company produces its own inputs (backward integration) or owns its own source of output distribution (for ward integration). In some instances, organisations par tially integrate t hei r operat ions, producing and selling t hei r products by using company businesses as well as outside sources.46

Ver tical integration is commonly used in the organisation’s core business to gain market power over r ivals. Market power is gained as the organ isation develops the ability to save on its operations, avoid ma rket costs, i mprove product qua l it y, possibly protect it s tec h nolog y f rom i m itat ion by r iva l s a nd

market power exists when an organisation is able to sell its products above the existing competitive level or to reduce the costs of its primary and support activities below the competitive level, or both

multi-point competition exists when two or more diversified organisations simultaneously compete in the same product areas or geographic markets

vertical integration exists when a company produces its own inputs (backward integration) or owns its own source of output distribution (forward integration)

Woolworths supermarkets are part of a larger corporation that includes, among other holdings, Big W, Dan Murphy’s and BWS.

Source: Getty Images/Brendon Thorne/Bloomberg

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potent ia l ly ex ploit u nderly i ng capabi l it ies to ha nd le specia l resou rces (e.g. soph ist icated chem ica ls or tech nolog ies).47 Ma rket power a lso is created when orga n isat ions have st rong t ies bet ween t hei r assets for which no market pr ices ex ist. Establishing a market pr ice would result in high search and t ransaction costs, so orga n isat ions seek to ver t ica l ly i nteg rate rat her t ha n rema i n sepa rate busi nesses.4 8

Ver tical integration has its limitations. For example, an outside supplier may produce the product at a lower cost. As a result, inter nal t ransact ions f rom ver t ical integ rat ion may be ex pensive and reduce profitability relative to competitors.49 A lso, bureaucratic costs can be present with ver tical integration. 50 Because vertical integration can require substantial investments in specific technologies, it may reduce the organisation’s flexibility, especially when technolog y changes quickly. Finally, changes in demand create capacity, balance and coordination problems. If one business is building a part for another internal business but achieving economies of scale requires the first division to manufacture quantities that are beyond the capacity of the internal buyer to absorb, it would be necessar y to sell the par ts outside the organisation as well as to the internal business. Thus, although ver tical integration can create value, especially through market power over competitors, it is not without risks and costs.51

As noted in the following ‘Strategic focus’ feature, Google’s parent company, A lphabet, is diversifying into new markets that allow it to engage in multi-point competition. For example, Google is competing with Microsoft and Apple in several markets. A ll of its competitors know that Google is a formidable rival with significant resources to invest in the competition. As such, the competitors have reacted, some with substantive actions and others in less positive ways. For example, Apple acquired Siri, a small voice search organisation, to help it compete with Google’s search business.52 Siri has since become a household word and brand, competing strongly against Amazon’s Alexa and Microsoft’s Cortana. Microsoft filed a complaint with the European Union (EU) about potential antitrust violations by Google; Yahoo! has undertaken advertising that criticises Google; and Facebook hired a public relations organisation to plant negative stories in the press about Google.53 Some of Google’s diversification moves represent a form of vertical integration because the new business areas build on the company’s substantial search business (for ward integration).

A lthough Google appears to be increasing its ver tical integration, many manufacturing organisations have been reducing ver tical integration as a means of gaining market power.54 In fact, deintegration is the focus of most manufacturing organisations, such as Intel and Dell, and even some large vehicle companies, such as Ford and General Motors, as they develop independent supplier networks.55 Flex (formerly known as Flextronics), an electronics contract manufacturer, represents a new breed of large contract manufacturers that is helping to foster this revolution in supply-chain management. 56 Such organisations often manage their customers’ entire product lines and offer ser vices ranging from inventor y management to deliver y and after-sales ser vice.

Alphabet’s evolution through diversification

Alphabet, through its most famous product, Google, dominates the internet search engine business and as a result has substantial market power. In 2018, the company’s total revenue was US$136.819 billion with a net income of US$30.736 billion, representing 23 per cent revenue growth from 2017 and 207 per cent growth from 2014. Its strong emphasis on R&D and significant liquidity in the form of cash and marketable securities provide opportunities for the organisation

to diversify into new markets. Through these channels, Alphabet has been diversifying through acquisitions (using its cash reserves) and internal development (e.g. R&D).

Alphabet is diversifying in several ways that extend the services it provides. It has a related link type of diversification strategy, but acquisitions are reducing the relatedness of its businesses. While acquisition has slowed over the years, it has permitted Alphabet

Strategic focus|Technology

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Source: Google and the Google logo are registered trademarks of Google Inc., used with permission.

to expand into areas such as humanoid robots, traffic detection software, airborne wind turbines, computer vision, robot arms, robot wheel, gesture recognition technology, movement tracking (through Fitbit), autonomous vehicles and more. It has also expanded into hardware manufacturing and is reaping the benefits of increased exposure. Some of the new services create multi-point competition with prominent competitors (e.g. Microsoft, Facebook, Apple, Netflix and Amazon) and some appear to represent a form of vertical integration. For example, Google has been developing a subscription service for YouTube. Termed YouTube Premium, it aims to transform YouTube to operate like a network, in that it presents a variety of topics such as entertainment, news and politics, and sports.

Through Google’s new market entries in recent years, it has ‘locked horns’ with substantial competitors such as Microsoft (e.g. office software, laptop, browsers, internet access, email and cloud computing), Apple (e.g. search services, smartphones and digital payment), Netflix (film distribution) and Amazon (digital distribution and cloud computing). All of these competitors watch Google’s moves closely and often react with moves of their own. While Google has been one of the pioneers in cloud computing through its Google Cloud Platform, it has been facing stiff competition from Amazon and Microsoft, through Amazon Web Services and Microsoft Azure, respectively. It must also contend with the entry of Chinese organisations such as Baidu and Huawei in the global arena, having dominated the world’s largest market.

Another noteworthy example of stiff competition is in the field of intelligent virtual assistants. virtually every major technology player is involved, with Google Assistant, Apple’s Siri, Amazon’s Alexa, Microsoft’s Cortana and Samsung’s Bixby. The competition spans both hardware and software, with each organisation either licensing their virtual assistants on other hardware platforms or manufacturing their own hardware. With the market projected to reach US$21 billion by 2026, the competition is still heating up.

While Alphabet’s rate of diversification has slowed, its reputation for aggressiveness has forced other

huge and resourceful corporations to learn to respect and fear it. However, it remains to be seen how Alphabet will operate in the rapidly changing technology landscape, where competitive advantage rapidly erodes, and where many previously prominent organisations have faded to irrelevance.

Sources: Market Study Report LLC, 2019, Intelligent virtual assistant market size is set to grow 21,523.6 million USD by 2026, Market

Watch, https://www.marketwatch.com/press-release/intelligent- virtual-assistant-market-size-is-set-to-grow-215236-million-usd-

by-2026-2019-10-24, 24 October; Alphabet Investor Relations, 2020, Alphabet announces date of fourth quarter 2019 financial results

conference call, https://abc.xyz/investor, 3 February; C. Gartenberg, Google buys Fitbit for $2.1 billion, The verge, https://www.theverge.

com/2019/11/1/20943318/google-fitbit-acquisition-fitness-tracker- announcement, 1 November; M. A. Azevedo, 2019, As Google buys Fitbit, a look at its M&A and investment history, Crunchbase News,

https://news.crunchbase.com/news/as-google-buys-fitbit-a-look- at-its-ma-and-investment-history, 1 November; J. Alexander, 2018,

YouTube Premium is changing because it has to, The verge, https:// www.theverge.com/2018/11/29/18116154/youtube-premium-free- ads-subscription-red, 29 November; K. Wiggers, 2020, Why Google

Assistant supports so many more languages than Siri, Alexa, Bixby, and Cortana, vB, https://venturebeat.com/2020/01/29/google-assistant-siri-

alexa-bixby-cortana, 29 January; L. Dignan, 2019, Top cloud providers 2019: AWS, Microsoft Azure, Google Cloud; IBM makes hybrid move;

Salesforce dominates SaaS, ZD Net, https://www.zdnet.com/article/top- cloud-providers-2019-aws-microsoft-azure-google-cloud-ibm-makes-

hybrid-move-salesforce-dominates-saas, 15 August; S. Wise, 2018, Blockbuster failed to master this 1 thing, and it made the company

irrelevant, https://www.inc.com/sean-wise/blockbuster-failed-to- master-this-1-thing-it-made-company-irrelevant.html, Inc., 31 October;

N. Somasundaram & C. Liu, 2019, Baidu: ‘China’s Google’ looks for a way forward, Nikkei Asia, https://asia.nikkei.com/Business/China-

tech/Baidu-China-s-Google-looks-for-a-way-forward, 28 October.

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Simultaneous operational relatedness and corporate relatedness As Fig ure 6.2 suggests, some organisations simultaneously seek operational and cor porate related ness to create econom ies of scope. 57 T he abi l it y to si mu lta neously create econom ies of scope by sha r i ng activities (operational relatedness) and transfer ring core competencies (cor porate relatedness) is difficult for competitors to understand and lear n how to im itate. However, if t he cost of realising bot h ty pes of relatedness is not offset by the benefits created, the result is diseconomies, because the cost of organisation and incentive str ucture is ver y expensive.58

Walt Disney Co. uses a related diversification strateg y to simultaneously create economies of scope through operational and cor porate relatedness. Within the organisation’s Studio Enter tainment business, for example, Disney can gain economies of scope by sharing activities among its different film distribution companies such as Touchstone Pictures and 20th Centur y Studios. Broad and deep k nowledge about its customers is a capability on which Disney relies to develop cor porate-level core competencies in terms of adver tising and marketing. With these competencies, Disney is able to create economies of scope through cor porate relatedness as it cross-sells products that are highlighted in its films through the distribution cha n nels t hat a re pa r t of its Pa rks a nd Resor ts a nd Consu mer P roducts busi nesses. Thus, cha racters created in fi lms become fig ures that are marketed th rough Disney’s retail stores (wh ich are par t of the Consumer Products business). In addition, themes established in films become the source of new rides in the organisation’s theme parks, which are par t of the Parks and Resor ts business and provide themes for clothing and other retail business products.59

Thus, Walt Disney Co. has been able to successf ully use related d iversi ficat ion as a cor porate-level st rateg y t h rough wh ich it creates econom ies of scope by sha r i ng some act iv it ies a nd by t ra nsfer r i ng core competencies. However, it can be difficult for investors to actually obser ve the value created by an organisation (such as Walt Disney Co.) as it shares activ ities and transfers core competencies. For this reason, the value of the assets of an organisation using a diversification strateg y to create economies of scope often is discounted by investors.

Unrelated diversification Organisations do not seek either operational relatedness or corporate relatedness when using the unrelated diversification cor porate-level strateg y. A n unrelated diversification strateg y (see Figure 6.2) can create value through two ty pes of financial economies. Financial economies are cost savings realised through improved allocations of financial resources based on investments inside or outside the organisation.60

E fficient i nter na l capita l a l locat ions ca n lead to fi na ncia l econom ies a nd reduce r isk a mong t he organisation’s businesses; for example, by lead ing to the development of a por tfolio of businesses w ith different risk profiles. The second type of financial economy concerns the restructuring of acquired assets. Here, the diversified organisation buys another company, restructures that company’s assets in ways that allow it to operate more profitably, and then sells the company for a profit in the external market.61 Next, we discuss the two ty pes of financial economies in greater detail.

Efficient internal capital market allocation In a ma rket economy, capita l ma rkets a re t hought to efficient ly a l locate capita l. Efficiency resu lts as investors take equity positions (ow nership) with high expected future cash-flow values. Capital is also allocated through debt as shareholders and debt holders tr y to improve the value of their investments by taking stakes in businesses with high grow th and profitability prospects.

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financial economies cost savings realised through improved allocations of financial resources based on investments inside or outside the organisation

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In large diversified organisations, the corporate headquarters office distributes capital to its businesses to create value for t he overall cor porat ion. The natu re of t hese d ist r ibut ions may generate gains f rom inter nal capital market allocations that exceed the gains that would accr ue to shareholders as a result of capital being allocated by the external capital market.62 Because those in an organisation’s cor porate headqua r ters genera l ly have access to deta i led a nd acc u rate i n for mat ion rega rd i ng t he ac t ua l a nd prospective performance of the company’s portfolio of businesses, they have the best information to make capital distribution decisions.

Compared with cor porate office personnel, external investors have relatively limited access to internal i n for mat ion a nd ca n on ly est i mate t he per for ma nces of i nd iv idua l busi nesses as wel l as t hei r f utu re prospects. Moreover, although businesses seeking capital must provide information to potential suppliers (such as banks or insurance companies), organisations with inter nal capital markets may have at least two in for mat ional adva ntages. Fi rst, i n for mat ion prov ided to capital ma rkets t h rough a n nual repor ts a nd ot her sou rces may not i nclude negat ive i n for mat ion, i nstead emphasisi ng posit ive prospects a nd outcomes. External sources of capital have a limited ability to understand the operational dynamics of large organisations. Even external shareholders who have access to information have no guarantee of full and complete disclosure.63 Second, although an organisation must disseminate information, that information a lso becomes si mu lta neously ava i lable to t he orga n isat ion’s cu r rent a nd potent ia l compet itors. Wit h insights gained by studying such information, competitors might attempt to duplicate an organisation’s value-creating strategy. Thus, an ability to efficiently allocate capital through an internal market may help the organisation protect the competitive advantages it develops while using its cor porate-level strateg y as well as its various business-unit-level strategies.

If inter vention from outside the organisation is required to make cor rections to capital allocations, only significant changes are possible, such as forcing the organisation into bankruptcy or changing the top management team. Alternatively, in an internal capital market, the corporate headquarters office can fine- tune its cor rections, such as choosing to adjust managerial incentives or suggesting strategic changes in one of the organisation’s businesses.64 Thus, capital can be allocated according to more specific criteria than is possible with external market allocations. Because it has less accurate information, the external capital market may fail to allocate resources adequately to high-potential investments. The corporate headquarters office of a diversified company can more effectively perform such tasks as disciplining under performing management teams through resource allocations.65 Wesfarmers (discussed in the opening case) has done a n except iona l ly good job of a l locat i ng capita l across its ma ny busi nesses. A lt hough a related l i n ked organisation, it differentially allocates capital across its major strategic business units.

La rge, h igh ly d iversi fied businesses of ten face what is k now n as t he ‘conglomerate d iscou nt’. Th is discount results from analysts not knowing how to value a vast ar ray of large businesses with complex financial repor ts. To overcome this discount, some unrelated diversified or industrial conglomerates have sought to establish a brand for the parent company. For instance, United Technologies initiated a brand development approach with the slogan ‘United Technologies. You can see ever y thing from here’. United Technologies suggested that its earnings multiple (PE ratio) compared with its stock price is only average, even though its performance has been better than other conglomerates in its group. It is hoping that the ‘umbrella’ brand advertisement will raise its PE to a level comparable to its competitors.66 In another attempt to sway investors on the value of a large diversified company, United Technologies CEO Louis Chenever t stated that ‘our future success depends on our ability to innovate – to find new and better ways to ser ve our customers. A nd, our ability to innovate relies on our ability to leverage the power of diverse inputs’.67

In spite of the challenges associated with it, a number of cor porations continue to use the unrelated diversification strateg y, especially in Europe and in emerging markets. Siemens, for example, is a large Ger man conglomerate w ith a highly d iversi fied approach. Its for mer CEO arg ued: ‘ W hen you are in an up-cycle and the capital markets have plenty of oppor tunities to invest in single-industr y companies …

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investors savor those opportunities. But when things change pure plays go down faster than you can look’.68 In economic downturns, diversification can help some companies improve future performance.69

The Achilles heel for organisations using the unrelated diversification strategy in a developed economy is that competitors can imitate financial economies more easily than they can replicate the value gained from the economies of scope developed through operational relatedness and cor porate relatedness. This issue is less of a problem in emerging economies, where the absence of a ‘soft infrastr ucture’ (including effective financial intermediaries, sound regulations and contract laws) suppor ts and encourages use of the unrelated diversification strategy.70 In fact, in emerging economies such as those in South Korea, India and Chile, research has shown that diversification increases the performance of organisations affiliated with large, diversified business groups.71

Restructuring of assets Fi na ncia l econom ies ca n a lso be created when orga n isat ions lea r n how to create va lue by buy i ng, restr ucturing and then selling the restr uctured companies’ assets in the external market.72 As in the real estate business, buying assets at low prices, restr ucturing them and selling them at a price that exceeds their cost generates a positive return on the organisation’s invested capital.

Unrelated diversified companies that pursue this strategy try to create financial economies by acquiring and restr ucturing other companies’ assets, but it involves significant trade-offs. For example, the success of u mbrella cor porat ion Danaher requi res a focus on matu re manufactu r ing businesses because of t he uncertainty of demand for high-technology products.73 In high-technology businesses, resource allocation decisions a re h igh ly complex, of ten creat i ng i n for mat ion-processi ng overload on t he sma l l cor porate headquar ters offices that are common in unrelated diversified organisations. High-technolog y businesses are often human-resource dependent; these people can leave or demand higher pay and thus appropriate or deplete the value of an acquired organisation.74

Buy i ng a nd t hen rest r uct u r i ng ser v ice-based assets so t hey ca n be prof itably sold i n t he ex ter na l market is also difficult. Sales in such instances are often a product of close personal relationships between a client and t he representative of t he organ isation being rest r uctu red. Thus, for bot h h igh-tech nolog y organisations and ser v ice-based companies, relatively few tangible assets can be rest r uctured to create value and sell profitably. It is difficult to restructure intangible assets such as human capital and effective relationships that have evolved over time between buyers (customers) and sellers (organisation personnel). Ca re must be ta ken i n a n econom ic dow nt u r n to rest r uct u re a nd buy a nd sel l at appropr iate t i mes. A dow nt u r n ca n present oppor t u n it ies but a lso some r isks. Idea l ly, execut ives w i l l fol low a st rateg y of buy i ng busi nesses when pr ices a re lower, such as i n t he m idst of a recession, a nd sel l i ng t hem at late stages in an expansion.75

Value-neutral diversification: incentives and resources The objectives organisations seek when using related diversification and unrelated diversification strategies all have the potential to help the organisation create value by using a cor porate-level strateg y. However, these strategies, as well as single- and dominant-business diversification strategies, are sometimes used with value-neutral rather than value-creating objectives in mind. As we discuss next, different incentives to diversify sometimes exist, and the quality of the organisation’s resources may permit only diversification that is value neutral rather than value creating.

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Incentives to diversify I ncent ives to d iversi f y come f rom bot h t he e x ter na l env i ron ment a nd a n orga n isat ion’s i nter na l environment. External incentives include antitr ust regulations and tax laws. Internal incentives include low per for mance, uncer tain f utu re cash flows, and the pu rsuit of sy nerg y and reduction of r isk for the organisation.

Low performance Some research shows that low returns are related to greater levels of diversification.76 If ‘high performance elim inates t he need for g reater d iversi ficat ion’,77 t hen low per for mance may prov ide an incent ive for diversification. In 2005, eBay acquired Skype for US$3.1 billion in hopes that it would create synergies and improve communication between buyers and sellers. However, within three years, eBay decided to sell Skype because it had failed to increase cash flow for its core e-commerce business, and the expected synergies were not realised. In 2011, eBay sold Skype to Microsoft for US$8.5 billion. A lthough analysts thought the premium paid by Microsoft may have been too high, one review in the Financial Times suggested that Skype could play a prominent role in Microsoft’s multimedia strategy. Thus, the potential synergies between Skype and Microsoft may be greater than those with eBay.78 The poor performance may be because of errors made by top managers (such as eBay’s original acquisition of Skype) and thus led to divestitures similar to eBay’s action.79 From 2013 to 2015, Microsoft phased out (divested) Windows Live Messenger and Lync due to poor per for mance relative to Sky pe, and from 2016 M icrosoft steadily moved Sky pe’s focus away from voice calling to text-based messaging, which better suited Microsoft’s product suite such as Azure.80 The major benefit for Microsoft was the development of Microsoft Teams in 2017, which integrates with Skype, and was only possible because of the knowledge gained from Skype.81

Research evidence and the experience of a number of organisations suggest that an overall cur vilinear relationship, as illustrated in Figure 6.3, may exist between diversification and performance.82 A lthough low performance can be an incentive to diversify, organisations that are more broadly diversified compared with their competitors may have overall lower performance.

P er

fo rm

an ce

Level of diversification

Dominant business Related constrained Unrelated business

 The curvilinear relationship between diversification and performanceFigure 6.3

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As an organisation’s product line matures or is threatened, diversification may be an important defensive strategy.83 Small organisations and companies in mature or maturing industries sometimes find it necessary to diversify for long-term survival.84 For example, music retailers began to diversify as CD sales started to decline. By the end of 2009, CD sales had declined by about 50 per cent from their peak. Ten years later in 2019, CD sales had slumped to 5 per cent of that peak (46.5 million in 2019 compared to 943 million in 2000 for the US).85

Diversifying into other product markets or into other businesses can reduce the uncer tainty about an organisation’s future cash flows. Merck decided to expand into the biosimilars business (production of drugs that are similar to approved dr ugs) in hopes of stimulating its prescription dr ug business due to expected lower results as many of its drug patents expire.86 Thus, in 2009 it purchased Insmed’s portfolio of follow-on biologics for US$130 million. It continued to carr y out the development of biologics that prevent infections in cancer patients receiving chemotherapy. In 2020, Merck announced it would spin off a specialist company in 2021 to market its biosimilar products.87

Synergy and organisation risk reduction Diversified organisations pursuing economies of scope often have investments that are too inflexible to realise synergy between business units. As a result, a number of problems may arise. Synergy exists when the value created by business units working together exceeds the value that those same units create working independently. But as an organisation increases its relatedness between business units, it also increases its risk of corporate failure, because synergy produces joint interdependence between businesses that constrains the organisation’s flexibility to respond. This threat may force two basic decisions.

First, the organisation may reduce its level of technological change by operating in environments that are more certain. This behaviour may make the organisation risk averse and thus uninterested in pursuing new product lines that have potential but are not proven. A lternatively, the organisation may constrain its level of activity sharing and forgo potential benefits of synergy. Either or both decisions may lead to fur ther diversification.88 The former likely leads to related diversification into industries in which more cer tainty exists.89 The latter may produce additional, but unrelated, diversification. Research suggests that an organisation using a related diversification strategy is more careful in bidding for new businesses, whereas an organisation pursuing an unrelated diversification strategy may be more likely to overprice its bid, because an unrelated bidder is less likely to have full information about the acquired organisation.90 However, organisations using either a related or an unrelated diversification strategy must understand the consequences of paying large premiums.91 In the situation with eBay, former CEO Meg Whitman received heav y criticism for paying such a high price for Sky pe, especially when the organisation did not realise the synergies it was seeking. However, eBay sold Skype six years later at 175 per cent of the price at which it purchased the business. The question is whether Microsoft paid too high a premium to achieve positive returns from the acquisition of Skype. In hindsight, the then record price of US$8.5 billion seems reasonable, given the rise and prominence of IP-based videoconferencing in 2020 during the Covid-19 pandemic, and the synergy between Skype and Microsoft Teams, with Microsoft Teams jumping 70 per cent in a month to 75 million daily active users.92

Resources and diversification As already discussed, organisations may have several value-neutral incentives as well as value-creating incentives (such as the ability to create economies of scope) to diversify. However, even when incentives to diversify exist, an organisation must have the ty pes and levels of resources and capabilities needed to successfully use a corporate-level diversification strategy.93 Although both tangible and intangible resources facilitate diversification, they var y in their ability to create value. Indeed, the degree to which resources are valuable, rare, difficult to imitate and non-substitutable (see Chapter  3) in fluences an organisation’s ability to create value through diversification. For instance, free cash flows are a tangible financial resource

synergy exists when the value created by business units working together exceeds the value that those same units create working independently

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that may be used to diversify the organisation. However, compared with diversification that is grounded in intangible resou rces, d iversi fication based on fi nancial resou rces on ly is more v isible to competitors and thus more imitable and less likely to create value on a long-term basis.94 Tangible resources usually include the plant and equipment necessar y to produce a product and tend to be less-flexible assets. A ny excess capacity often can be used only for closely related products, especially those requiring highly similar manufacturing technologies. For example, large computer makers such as Dell and HP underestimated the demand for tablet computers, especially Apple’s iPad. Apple developed the iPad and many expected it to eventually replace the personal computer (PC). In fact, HP’s and Dell’s sales of their PCs have been declining since the introduction of the iPad. In-between their launch and 2014, 225 million iPads were sold, hur ting sales by computer companies. Then, in 2015, the rise of the ‘phablet’ ( basically a unit sized in-between an iPad and a phone) bit into iPad sales – high tech is a tricky landscape to negotiate.95 However, after little sales grow th from 2015 to 2019, Apple recorded strong grow th again with iPad sales up 22 per cent in the third quar ter of 2019, and fur ther strong grow th to the third quar ter of 2020.96

E xcess capacit y of ot her ta ng ible resou rces, such as a sa les force, ca n be used to d iversi f y more easily. Again, excess capacity in a sales force is more effect ive w it h related d iversi ficat ion, because it may be ut i l ised to sel l si m i la r products. The sa les force wou ld be more k nowledgeable about related- product characteristics, customers and distribution channels.97 Tangible resources may create resource i nter relat ionsh ips i n product ion, ma rket i ng, procu rement a nd tech nolog y, defi ned ea rl ier as act iv it y sharing. Intangible resources are more flexible than tangible physical assets in facilitating diversification. A lthough the sharing of tangible resources may induce diversification, intangible resources such as tacit knowledge could encourage even more diversification.98

Sometimes, however, the benefits expected from using resources to diversify the organisation for either value-creating or value-neutral reasons are not gained.99 A fter not gaining the desired and required value from its diversified portfolio, GE has recently undergone successive years of major divestments, with US$8.4 billion of divestments in 2018, US$10.4 billion in 2019 and a huge US$58.7 billion in 2020.10 0

Value-reducing diversification: managerial motives to diversify Ma nager ia l mot ives to d iversi f y ca n ex ist i ndependent of va lue-neut ra l reasons (i.e. i ncent ives a nd resources) and value-creating reasons (e.g. economies of scope). The desire for increased compensation a nd reduced ma nager ia l r isk a re t wo mot ives for top-level execut ives to d iversif y t hei r orga n isat ion beyond va lue-creat i ng a nd va lue-neut ra l levels.101 In ot her words, top-level execut ives may d iversif y an organisation in order to diversify their own employment risk, as long as profitability does not suffer excessively.102

Diversi ficat ion prov ides add it iona l benefits to top-level ma nagers t hat sha reholders do not enjoy. Resea rc h ev idence shows t hat d iversi f icat ion a nd orga n isat ion size a re h igh ly cor related , a nd as organisation size increases, so does executive compensation.103 Because large organisations are complex, difficult-to-manage organisations, top-level managers commonly receive substantial levels of compensation to lead them.104 Greater levels of diversification can increase an organisation’s complexity, resulting in still more compensation for executives to lead an increasingly diversified organisation. Governance mechanisms – such as the board of directors, monitoring by owners, executive compensation practices and the market for corporate control – may limit managerial tendencies to over-diversify. These mechanisms are discussed in more detail in Chapter 10.

In some instances, though, an organisation’s governance mechanisms may not be strong, resulting in a situation in which executives may diversify the organisation to the point that it fails to earn even average returns.105 The loss of adequate internal governance may result in poor relative performance, thereby triggering

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a threat of takeover. A lthough takeovers may improve efficiency by replacing ineffective managerial teams, managers may avoid takeovers through defensive tactics, such as ‘poison pills’, or may reduce their own exposure with ‘golden parachute’ agreements.106 Therefore, an external governance threat, although restraining managers, does not flawlessly control managerial motives for diversification.107

Most large publicly held organisations are profitable because the managers leading them are positive stewards of organisation resources, and many of their strategic actions, including those related to selecting a corporate- level diversification strategy, contribute to the organisation’s success.108 As mentioned, governance mechanisms should be designed to deal with exceptions to the managerial norms of making decisions and taking actions that will increase the organisation’s ability to earn above-average returns. Thus, it is overly pessimistic to assume that managers usually act in their own self-interest as opposed to their organisation’s interest.109

Top-level executives’ diversification decisions may also be held in check by concerns for their reputation. If a posit ive reputat ion faci l itates development a nd use of ma nager ia l power, a poor reputat ion may reduce it. Likew ise, a st rong exter nal market for manager ial talent may deter managers from pursuing inappropriate diversification.110 In addition, a diversified organisation may police other organisations by acquiring those that are poorly managed in order to restr ucture its ow n asset base. K nowing that their organisations could be acquired if they are not managed successfully encourages executives to use value- creating, diversification strategies.

As show n in Fig ure 6.4, the level of d iversif ication that can be expected to have the greatest positive ef fect on per for ma nce is based pa r t ly on how t he i nteract ion of resou rces, ma nager ia l mot ives a nd incentives affects the adoption of particular diversification strategies. As indicated earlier, the greater the

Organisation performance

Resources

Managerial motives

Incentives

Diversification strategy

Capital market intervention and the market for managerial talent

Internal governance

Strategy implementation

Summary model of the relationship between diversification and organisation performance

Figure 6.4

Source: Adapted from R. E. Hoskisson & M. A. Hitt, 1990, Antecedents and performance outcomes of diversification: A review and critique of theoretical perspectives, Journal of Management, 16: 498.

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incentives and the more f lex ible the resources, the higher the level of expected d iversif ication. Financial resou rces (t he most f lex ible) shou ld have a st ronger relat ionsh ip to t he ex tent of d iversif icat ion t ha n either tangible or intangible resources. Tangible resources (the most inf lex ible) are useful pr imar ily for related d iversif ication.

As discussed in this chapter, organisations can create more value by effectively using diversification st rateg ies. However, d iversi ficat ion must be kept in check by cor porate gover nance (see Chapter 10). Appropr iate st rateg y implementation tools, such as organ isational st r uctu res, are also impor tant (see Chapter 11).

We have desc r ibed cor porate -leve l st rateg ies i n t h i s c hapte r. I n t he ne x t c hapte r, we d i sc u ss mergers a nd acqu isit ions as prom i nent mea ns for orga n isat ions to d iversi f y a nd to g row prof itably. T hese t rends towa rds more d iversi f icat ion t h rough acqu isit ions, wh ich have been pa r t ia l ly reversed due to rest r uct u r i ng (see Chapter 7), i nd icate t hat lea r n i ng has ta ken place rega rd i ng cor porate-level d iversif icat ion st rateg ies.111 Accord ingly, organ isat ions t hat d iversif y should do so caut iously, choosing to focus on relat ively few, rat her t ha n ma ny, busi nesses. In fact, some resea rch suggests t hat a lt hough u n related d ive rsi f icat ion has dec reased , related d ive rsi f icat ion has i nc reased , possibly due to t he rest r uc t u r i ng t hat cont i nued i nto t he 199 0s a nd ea rly 21st cent u r y. T h is sequence of d iversi f icat ion followed by rest r uctu r i ng took place i n Eu rope a nd ot her places such as Sout h Korea, m i r ror i ng act ions of organ isat ions in t he USA and t he U K.112 Recent resea rch shows t hat whet her d iversif icat ion is related or u n related, t he core d r ivers of i ncreasi ng busi ness revenue, reduci ng costs a nd avoid i ng r isks st i l l apply, a nd t he foc us shou ld be on bu i ld i ng ef fec t ive busi ness models.11 3 Orga n isat ions ca n i mprove t hei r st rateg ic compet it iveness when t hey pu rsue a level of d iversif icat ion t hat is appropr iate for t hei r resou rces (especia lly f i na ncia l resou rces) a nd core competencies, a nd t he oppor tu n it ies a nd t h reats i n t hei r cou nt r y ’s i nst itut iona l a nd compet it ive env i ron ments.114

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181

STUDY TOOLS SUMMARY LO1 A corporate-level strategy specifies actions an

organisation takes to gain a competitive advantage by selecting and managing a group of different businesses competing in different product markets. Organisations use corporate-level strategies to diversify their operations across several product markets. Thus, corporate-level strategies help companies to select new strategic positions that are expected to increase the organisation’s value.

LO2 Using a single- or dominant-business corporate- level strategy may be preferable to seeking a more diversified strategy, unless a corporation can develop economies of scope or financial economies between businesses, or unless it can obtain market power through additional levels of diversification. Economies of scope and market power are the main sources of value creation when the organisation diversifies by using a corporate-level strategy with moderate-to-high levels of diversification.

LO3 Organisations may diversify to create additional value, for value-neutral reasons, or to reduce the value of the organisation.

LO4 The related diversification corporate-level strategy helps the organisation create value by sharing activities or transferring competencies between different businesses in the company’s portfolio.

Sharing activities usually involves sharing tangible resources between businesses. Transferring core competencies involves transferring core competencies developed in one business to another business. It also may involve transferring competencies between the corporate headquarters office and a business unit. Sharing activities is usually associated with the related constrained diversification corporate-level strategy. Activity sharing is costly to implement and coordinate, may create unequal benefits for the divisions involved

in the sharing, and can lead to fewer managerial risk- taking behaviours.

Transferring core competencies is often associated with related linked (or mixed related and unrelated) diversification, although organisations pursuing both sharing activities and transferring core competencies can also use the related linked strategy.

LO5 Efficiently allocating resources or restructuring a target organisation’s assets and placing them under rigorous financial controls are two ways to accomplish successful unrelated diversification. Organisations using the unrelated diversification strategy focus on creating financial economies to generate value.

LO6 Diversification is sometimes pursued for value-neutral reasons. Incentives from tax and antitrust government policies, risk reduction, performance disappointments or uncertainties about future cash flow are examples of value-neutral reasons that organisations may choose to become more diversified.

LO7 Managerial motives to diversify (including to increase compensation) can lead to over-diversification and a subsequent reduction in an organisation’s ability to create value. Evidence suggests, however, that many top-level executives seek to be good stewards of the organisation’s assets and avoid diversifying the organisation in ways that destroy value.

Managers need to pay attention to their organisation’s internal organisation and its external environment when making decisions about the optimum level of diversification for their company. Of course, internal resources are important determinants of the direction that diversification should take. However, conditions in the organisation’s external environment may facilitate additional levels of diversification, as might unexpected threats from competitors.

KEY TERMS corporate-level core

competencies

corporate-level strategy

economies of scope

financial economies

market power

multi-point competition

synergy

vertical integration

182 PART 2: STRATEGIC ACTIONS: STRATEGY FORMULATION

REVIEW QUESTIONS 1. What is corporate-level strategy and why is it important?

2. What are the different levels of diversification organisations can pursue by using different corporate- level strategies?

3. How does diversification create economies of scope? What level of diversification is typically associated with economies of scope?

4. What are three primary reasons organisations choose to diversify their operations?

5. How do organisations create value when using a related diversification strategy? How does this differ from an unrelated diversification strategy?

6. What are the two ways to obtain financial economies when using an unrelated diversification strategy?

7. What incentives and resources encourage diversification?

8. What motives might encourage managers to over- diversify their organisation?

EXPERIENTIAL EXERCISES

Exercise 1: What’s my corporate-level strategy and how did I get this way? Your text defines corporate-level strategy as ‘actions an organisation takes to gain a competitive advantage by selecting and managing a group of different businesses competing in different product markets’. However, these actions are dynamic and longitudinal – they evolve over time. How did GE, Ford Motor Company or IBM arrive at the corporate-level strategies they use today, and what are those strategies?

Part 1 Form teams of four or five students and select a publicly traded organisation, preferably one that has been in existence for a few decades.

Part 2 Complete a poster that can be displayed in class. Your poster should represent the organisation and its evolution as far back in its history as you can fit on one poster. The goal is to highlight the organisation’s beginnings, its acquisitions and divestiture activity, and its movement from one corporate- level strategy to another. You will need to do some extensive research on the organisation to identify common linkages between operating units.

Be prepared to answer the following questions: • How has the organisation’s corporate-level strategy

evolved over time?

• What is the current corporate-level strategy and what links, if any, exist between operating units?

• How successful is the current corporate-level strategy (e.g. too much diversification, too little, just right)? Why is this so?

Exercise 2: How does the organisation’s portfolio stack up? The Boston Consulting Group (BCG) product portfolio matrix has been around for decades and was introduced by the BCG as a way for organisations to understand the priorities that should be given to various segments within their mix of businesses. It is based on a matrix with two vertices: organisation market share and projected market growth rate. Each organisation therefore can categorise its business units as follows: • Stars: High growth and high market share. These

business units generate large amounts of cash but also use large amounts of cash. These are often the focus of the organisation’s priorities as this segment has a potentially bright future.

• Cash cows: Low market growth coupled with high market share. Profits and cash generated are high, and need for new cash is low. Cash cows provide a foundation for the organisation from which it can launch new initiatives.

• Dogs: Low market growth and low market share. This is usually a situation organisations seek to avoid. These

183ChaPter 6 CORPORATE-LEvEL STRATEGY

units are quite often the target of a turnaround plan or liquidation effort.

• Question marks: High market growth but low market share. It is difficult to say what the organisation should do in this quadrant. It creates a need to move strategically because of high demands on cash due to market needs yet low cash returns because of the low organisation market share.

Using this matrix to analyse an organisation’s corporate- level strategy or the way in which it rewards and prioritises its business units has come under some criticism. For one, market share is not the only way in which an organisation should view success or potential success; second, market growth is not the only indicator for the attractiveness of a

market; and third, sometimes ‘dogs’ can earn as much cash as ‘cows’.

Part 1 Select a publicly traded organisation that has a diversified corporate-level strategy. The more unrelated the segments, the better.

Part 2 Analyse the organisation utilising the BCG matrix. In order to do this, you will need to develop market share ratings for each operating unit and assess the overall market attractiveness for that segment.

NOTES 1. M. E. Porter, 1980, Competitive Strategy,

New York: The Free Press, xvi. 2. M. D. R. Chari, S. Devaraj & P. David, 2008,

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5. Ibid.; M. E. Raynor, 2007, What is corporate strategy, really?, Ivey Business Journal, 71(8): 1–3.

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7. K. Lee, M. W. Peng & K. Lee, 2008, From diversification premium to diversification discount during institutional transitions, Journal of World Business, 43(1): 47–65; M. Ammann & M. verhofen, 2006, The conglomerate discount: A new explanation

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8. A. Campbell, M. Goold & M. Alexander, 1995, Corporate strategy: The question for parenting advantage, Harvard Business Review, 73(2): 120–32.

9. D. Collis, D. Young & M. Goold, 2007, The size, structure, and performance of corporate headquarters, Strategic Management Journal, 28: 283–405; M. Goold & A. Campbell, 2002, Parenting in complex structures, Long Range Planning, 35(3): 219– 43; T. H. Brush, P. Bromiley & M. Hendrickx, 1999, The relative influence of industry

MARKET GROWTH

RATE

HIGH

LOW

HIGH LOW

MARKET SHARE

QUESTION MARKSSTARS

CASH COWS DOGS

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82. L. E. Palich, L. B. Cardinal & C. C. Miller, 2000, Curvilinearity in the diversification– performance linkage: An examination of over three decades of research, Strategic Management Journal, 21: 155–74.

83. D. G. Sirmon, M. A. Hitt & R. D. Ireland, 2007, Managing firm resources in dynamic environments to create value: Looking inside the black box, Academy of Management Review, 32: 273–92; A. E. Bernardo & B. Chowdhry, 2002, Resources, real options, and corporate strategy, Journal of Financial Economics, 63: 211–34.

84. W. H. Tsai, Y. C. Kuo, J.-H. Hung, 2009, Corporate diversification and CEO turnover in family businesses: Self-entrenchment or risk reduction?, Small Business Economics, 32(1): 57–76; N. W. C. Harper & S. P. viguerie, 2002, Are you too focused?, McKinsey Quarterly, Mid-Summer, 29–38; J. C. Sandvig & L. Coakley, 1998, Best practices in small firm diversification, Business Horizons, 41(3): 33–40.

85. F. Richter, 2020, The rise and fall of the compact disc, Statista, https://www.statista. com/chart/12950/cd-sales-in-the-us, 27 February.

86. L. Jarvis, 2008, Pharma strategies: Merck launches into the biosimilars business, Chemical & Engineering News, December, 86(50): 7.

87. S. Mehr, 2020, Merck to spin off company that will include its biosimilar marketing in 2021, BR&R Biosimilars Review & Report, https://biosimilarsrr.com/2020/02/07/ merck-to-spin-off-company-that-will- include-its-biosimilar-marketing-in-2021, 7 February.

88. T. B. Folta & J. P. O’Brien, 2008, Determinants of firm-specific thresholds in acquisition decisions, Managerial and Decision Economics, 29(2/3): 209–25.

89. N. M. Kay & A. Diamantopoulos, 1987, Uncertainty and synergy: Towards a formal model of corporate strategy, Managerial and Decision Economics, 8: 121–30.

90. R. W. Coff, 1999, How buyers cope with uncertainty when acquiring firms in knowledge-intensive industries: Caveat emptor, Organization Science, 10: 144–61.

91. P. B. Carroll & C. Muim, 2008, 7 ways to fail big, Harvard Business Review, 86(9): 82–91.

92. T. Warren, 2020, Microsoft Teams jumps 70 percent to 75 million daily active users, The verge, https://www.theverge. com/2020/4/29/21241972/microsoft- teams-75-million-daily-active-users-stats, 29 April.

93. D. G. Sirmon, S. Gove & M. A. Hitt, 2008, Resource management in dyadic competitive rivalry: The effects of resource bundling and deployment, Academy of Management Journal, 51(5): 919–35; S. J. Chatterjee & B. Wernerfelt, 1991,

The link between resources and type of diversification: Theory and evidence, Strategic Management Journal, 12: 33–48.

94. E. N. K. Lim, S. S. Das & A. Das, 2009, Diversification strategy, capital structure, and the Asian financial crisis (1997–1998): Evidence from Singapore firms, Strategic Management Journal, 30(6): 577–94; W. Keuslein, 2003, The EBITDA folly, Forbes, 17 March, 165–7.

95. v. Woollaston, 2015, The rise and fall of the iPad: Sales of Apple tablets slump as people shift to phablets, Daily Mail, http://www.dailymail.co.uk/sciencetech/ article-2929909/The-rise-fall-iPad-Sales- Apple-tablets-slump-people-shift-phablets. html, 29 January.

96. Statista, 2020, Revenue of Apple from iPad sales worldwide from 3rd quarter 2010 to 3rd quarter 2020, https://www.statista. com/statistics/269914/apples-global- revenue-from-ipad-sales-by-quarter, 30 August.

97. L. Capron & J. Hull, 1999, Redeployment of brands, sales forces, and general marketing management expertise following horizontal acquisitions: A resource-based view, Journal of Marketing, 63(2): 41–54.

98. M. v. S. Kumar, 2009, The relationship between product and international diversification: The effects of short-run constraints and endogeneity, Strategic Management Journal, 30(1): 99–116; C. B. Malone & L. C. Rose, 2006, Intangible assets and firm diversification, International Journal of Managerial Finance, 2(2): 136–53.

99. C. Moschieri, 2011, The implementation and structuring of divestitures: The unit’s perspective, Strategic Management Journal, 32: 368–401; K. Shimizu & M. A. Hitt, 2005, What constrains or facilitates divestitures of formerly acquired firms? The effects of organizational inertia, Journal of Management, 31: 50–72.

100. Macrotrends, 2020, General Electric net acquisitions/divestitures 2006–2020, GE, https://www.macrotrends.net/stocks/ charts/GE/general-electric/net-acquisitions- divestitures, 30 August.

101. A. J. Nyberg, I. S. Fulmer, B. Gerhart & M. A. Carpenter, 2010, Agency theory revisited: CEO return, and shareholder interest alignment, Academy of Management Journal, 53: 1029–49; M. A. Williams, T. B. Michael & E. R. Waller, 2008, Managerial incentives and acquisitions: A survey of the literature, Managerial Finance, 34(5): 328–41; J. G. Combs & M. S. Skill, 2003, Managerialist and human capital explanation for key executive pay premiums: A contingency perspective, Academy of Management Journal, 46: 63–73.

102. L. L. Lan & L. Heracleous, 2010, Rethinking agency theory: The view from law, Academy of Management Review, 35: 294–314; R. E. Hoskisson, M. W. Castleton & M. C. Withers, 2009, Complementarity in monitoring and

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bonding: More intense monitoring leads to higher executive compensation, Academy of Management Perspectives, 23(2): 57–74.

103. S. W. Geiger & L. H. Cashen, 2007, Organizational size and CEO compensation: The moderating effect of diversification in downscoping organizations, Journal of Managerial Issues, 9: 233–52. J. J. Cordeiro & R. veliyath, 2003, Beyond pay for performance: A panel study of the determinants of CEO compensation, American Business Review, 21(1): 56–66; P. Wright, M. Kroll & D. Elenkov, 2002, Acquisition returns, increase in firm size, and chief executive officer compensation, Academy of Management Journal, 45(30): 599–608; S. R. Gray & A. A. Cannella, Jr, 1997, The role of risk in executive compensation, Journal of Management, 23: 517–40.

104. Y. Deutsch, T. Keil & T. Laamanen, 2011, A dual agency view of board compensation: The joint effects of outside director and CEO options on firm risk, Strategic Management Journal, 32: 212–27; R. Bliss & R. Rosen, 2001, CEO compensation and bank mergers, Journal of Financial Economics, 1: 107–38.

105. A. J. Wowak & D. C. Hambrick, 2010, A model of person–pay interaction: How executives vary in their responses to compensation arrangements, Strategic Management Journal, 31: 803–21; J. Bogle, 2008, Reflections on CEO compensation, Academy of Management Perspectives, 22(2): 21–5; J. J. Janney, 2002, Eat or get eaten? How equity ownership and diversification shape CEO risk-taking, Academy of Management Executive, 14(4): 157–8.

106. M. Kahan & E. B. Rock, 2002, How I learned to stop worrying and love the pill: Adaptive responses to takeover law, University of Chicago Law Review, 69(3): 871–915.

107. R. C. Anderson, T. W. Bates, J. M. Bizjak & M. L. Lemmon, 2000, Corporate governance and firm diversification, Financial Management, 29(1): 5–22; J. D. Westphal, 1998, Board games: How CEOs adapt to increases in structural board independence from management, Administrative Science Quarterly, 43: 511–37; J. K. Seward & J. P. Walsh, 1996, The governance and control of voluntary corporate spin-offs, Strategic Management Journal, 17: 25–39; J. P. Walsh & J. K. Seward, 1990, On the efficiency of internal and external corporate control mechanisms, Academy of Management Review, 15: 421–58.

108. S. M. Campbell, A. J. Ward, J. A. Sonnenfeld & B. R. Agle, 2008, Relational ties that bind: Leader–follower relationship dimensions and charismatic attribution, Leadership Quarterly, 19(5): 556–68; M. Wiersema, 2002, Holes at the top: Why CEO firings backfire, Harvard Business Review, 80(12): 70–7.

109. D. Allcock & I. Filatotchev, 2010, Executive incentive schemes in initial public offerings: The effects of multiple-agency conflicts and corporate governance, Journal of Management, 36: 663–86; J. M. Bizjak, M. L. Lemmon & L. Naveen, 2008, Does the use of peer groups contribute to higher pay and less efficient compensation?, Journal of Financial Economics, 90(2): 152–68; N. Wasserman, 2006, Stewards, agents, and the founder discount: Executive compensation in new ventures, Academy of Management Journal, 49: 960–76.

110. E. F. Fama, 1980, Agency problems and the theory of the firm, Journal of Political Economy, 88: 288–307.

111. M. Y. Brannen & M. F. Peterson, 2009, Merging without alienating: Interventions promoting cross-cultural organizational integration and their limitations, Journal of International Business Studies, 40(3): 468–89; M. L. A. Hayward, 2002, When do firms learn from their acquisition experience? Evidence from 1990–1995, Strategic Management Journal, 23: 21–39.

112. R. E. Hoskisson, R. A. Johnson, L. Tihanyi & R. E. White, 2005, Diversified business groups and corporate refocusing in emerging economies, Journal of Management, 31: 941–65.

113. N. H. Tien, 2020, Related and non-related diversification strategy of domestic business groups in vietnam, International Journal of Advanced Research in Engineering & Management (IJAREM), https://www. researchgate.net/publication/338719842_ Related_and_Non-Related_Diversification_ Strategy_of_Domestic_Business_Groups_ in_vietnam, 2020.

114. C. N. Chung & X. Luo, 2008, Institutional logics or agency costs: The influence of corporate governance models on business group restructuring in emerging economies, Organization Science, 19(5): 766–84; Chakrabarti, Singh & Mahmood, Diversification and performance; W. P. Wan & R. E. Hoskisson, 2003, Home country environments, corporate diversification strategies, and firm performance, Academy of Management Journal, 46: 27–45.

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CH AP

TE R

CH AP

TE R

7Acquisition and restructuring strategies Studying this chapter should provide you with the strategic management knowledge needed to: LO1 explain the popularity of merger and acquisition strategies in organisations

competing in the global economy LO2 discuss reasons why organisations use an acquisition strategy to achieve

strategic competitiveness LO3 describe seven problems that work against achieving success when using an

acquisition strategy LO4 name and describe the attributes of effective acquisitions LO5 define and understand the restructuring strategy and the long- and short-term

outcomes of its common forms.

Learning Objectives

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Atlassian is in the business of creating solutions that allow for more effective team management. As the internet – and how the business world utilises the internet – evolved, Atlassian’s business was required to change with this evolution. As part of its advancement, Atlassian has used an acquisition strategy to build its products and extend its reach into new areas, both related and unrelated. With work increasingly moving online, teams dispersed geographically and team complexity constantly on the rise due to increasing responsibilities, the nature of workplace collaboration has evolved and, as such, requires software solutions that can facilitate digital collaboration effectively and securely.

The new digital workplace requires software solutions that integrate disparate teams and projects in formats that allow for effective tracking, planning and supporting. There are solutions needed for collaboration online, within and between workplaces, and internationally. The systems must also be open enough to allow for tailored and proprietary solutions to be developed for client organisations. The open nature of the internet, however, makes it vulnerable to cyber attacks, so it is critical to ensure strong digital security.

Atlassian has evolved from its original software platform and flagship product Jira to a broader suite of businesses through a mix of in-house development as well as targeted acquisitions. This required the transformation of Jira, a project and issue tracker software, from a software suite dedicated for developers to a platform that can be used by all organisations. It also required the development of a suite of software and relevant infrastructure to enhance and supplement existing capabilities and deliver superior results to teams. For example, in 2017 Atlassian acquired Trello, a Kanban- style list-making application from Fog Creek Software. Through this acquisition, Atlassian operates within its core project management capabilities while expanding its reach to smaller-scale clients and individual users.

With its original intention to support software developers, Atlassian also expanded its capabilities by acquiring Bitbucket, a service for code collaboration.

Other complementary services include Sourcetree, Bamboo, Fisheye and Crucible, all of which offer different solutions to software developers, such as code collaboration, integration, deployment and release management, and improving code quality. The company also delivers security solutions through Atlassian Access and Crowd.

While several of these acquisitions have worked well for Atlassian, others represent business reversals. An example is Atlassian’s foray into the business communication market. In 2015, Atlassian acquired HipChat, a web-based service for internal private online chat and instant messaging. In 2017, Atlassian introduced Stride in complement with HipChat, intended as a competitor to Slack, the dominant player in the business communication space. However, with a lack of demand for both HipChat and Stride, Atlassian decided to enter a strategic partnership with Slack in 2018, selling relevant IP to Slack, shutting down HipChat and Stride, and invested in Slack’s equity, effectively exiting the business communication space.

As Atlassian itself noted, merger and acquisition is part of its strategy for growth. With 20 companies acquired for approximately US$1 billion, it has noted its ability to integrate acquisitions. Atlassian emphasises the importance of people and culture in its integration process as well as the critical role of communication to ensure successful integration. It has noted that the M&A process is outdated, inefficient and unnecessarily combative, and this creates friction and mistrust. To create certainty for the acquired firm and future potential acquisition targets, Atlassian made public its term sheet, which strives to make it more favourable to selling companies and to be fair to future team members.

Atlassian’s integration practices also align with this acquisition practice of openness and transparency. While popular perceptions of integration tend to focus on the size of the transaction and the high-profile personalities involved, it is the successful integration of people and culture that help to ensure long-term success for any organisation. While most of the due diligence is

Strategic acquisitions and a people-focused integration of those acquisitions are vital capabilities of Atlassian

OPENING CASE STUDY

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We examined corporate-level strategy in Chapter 6, focusing on types and levels of product diversification strategies that organisations derive from their core competencies to create competitive advantages and value for stakeholders. As noted in that chapter, diversification allows an organisation to create value by productively using excess resou rces.1 In this chapter, we explore merger and acquisition strategies. Organisations throughout the world use these strategies, often in concert with diversification strategies, to become more diversified and improve economies of scale or economies of scope. As noted in the opening case, merger and acquisition strategies remain popular as a source of organisation growth and, hopefully, of above-average returns.

Most corporations are very familiar with merger and acquisition strategies. For example, the latter half of the 20th centur y found major companies using these strategies to grow and to deal with the competitive challenges in their domestic markets as well as those emerging from global competitors. Today, smaller organisations also use merger and acquisition strategies to grow in their ex isting markets and to enter new markets.2

Not unexpectedly, many mergers and acquisitions fail to fulfil their promise.3 Accordingly, explaining how organisations can successfully use merger and acquisition strategies to create stakeholder value4 is a key purpose of this chapter. To do this, we first explain the continuing popularity of merger and acquisition strategies as a choice organisations evaluate when seeking growth and strategic competitiveness. As part of this explanation, we describe the differences between mergers, acquisitions and takeovers. We next discuss specific reasons organisations choose to use acquisition strategies and some of the problems organisations may encounter when implementing them. We then describe the characteristics associated with effective acquisitions before closing the chapter with a discussion of different types of restructuring strategies. Restructuring strategies are commonly used to correct or deal with the results of ineffective mergers and acquisitions.

economies of scale average cost (i.e. cost per unit of output) decreases as output volume increases

conducted with the finance and legal teams, it also works to start integration before the deal itself is announced. Integration means significant uncertainty for people working with the acquired organisation, particularly with work arrangements, which were significantly influenced by existing work culture. According to Betty Jane Hess, an acquisition specialist from Arrow Electronics, ‘The first 30 days of any acquisition is hell, because no matter how much you try, no matter how much you plan, stuff goes wrong’.

As such, a people-focused and values-driven understanding of the acquired business is core to its successful integration. This is important for identifying the differences of the acquired company, identifying pain points and therefore understanding what can be done moving forward. An example from Atlassian was its acquisition of Trello, which was found to have a remote work policy. While Atlassian does not have a remote work policy, it did not force this change onto Trello, and it even

piloted a few new remote work programs itself. From a people perspective, Atlassian emphasised transparency through engaging with its acquisition from the start. Through this engagement, Atlassian aims to answer employees’ most pressing questions, understand their work requirements and find hidden leaders, on whom Atlassian can lean to support the eventual integration. This constant interaction creates trust and paves the way to the eventual introduction and integration of Atlassian’s own culture.

Sources: Atlassian, 2020, Products for teams, from startup to enterprise, https://www.atlassian.com/software; T. Kennedy & C. Hecht, 2019, The

M&A process is broken, Atlassian, https://www.atlassian.com/blog/ technology/atlassian-term-sheet, 17 June; T. Middleton, 2019, What 20

acquisitions taught us about post-merger integration, Atlassian, https:// www.atlassian.com/blog/teamwork/post-merger-integration-tips, 14

August; C. Aiello, 2018, Atlassian exits business communications space, surrenders to Slack, CNBC, https://www.cnbc.com/2018/07/26/atlassian-

surrenders-slack.html, 26 July; F. Lardinois, 2017, Atlassian acquires Trello for $425M, TechCrunch, https://techcrunch.com/2017/01/09/atlassian-

acquires-trello, 10 January.

STRATEGY NOW

Atlassian’s acquisition of Trello

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the popularity of merger and acquisition strategies Merger a nd acqu isit ion (M& A) st rateg ies have been popu la r for ma ny yea rs. Some bel ieve t hat t hese strategies played a central role in the restr uctur ing of businesses dur ing the 1980s and 1990s and that they continue to generate these types of benefits in the 21st century.5

Although popular, and appropriately so, as a means of growth with the potential to lead to strategic competitiveness, it is important to emphasise that changing conditions in the external environment influence the type of M&A activity organisations pursue. During the global financial crisis (GFC) of 2008– 09, tightening credit markets made it more difficult for organisations to complete ‘megadeals’ (those costing US$10 billion or more). However, the flow of deals picked up in 2011 in the USA, where ‘first-quarter deal volume rose a healthy 45 per cent to $290.8 billion, compared with $200.6 billion’ in 2010, while 2014 was the strongest year for deal making since 2007, and cross-border acquisitions led the way.6 A relatively weak currency increases the interest of organisations from other nations with a strong currency to pursue cross- border acquisitions in the countr y where the cur rency is weaker.7

In the final analysis, organisations use M&A strategies to improve their ability to create more value for all stakeholders, including shareholders. As suggested by Figure 1.1 (page 5), this reasoning applies equally to all of the other strategies (e.g. business-level, corporate-level, international and cooperative) an organisation may formulate and then implement.

However, evidence suggests that using M&A strategies in ways that consistently create value is challenging. This is particularly true for acquiring organisations, in that some research results indicate that shareholders of acquired organisations often earn above-average returns from acquisitions, while sha reholders of acqu i r i ng orga n isat ions t y pica l ly ea r n ret u r ns t hat a re close to zero. 8 Moreover, in approximately two-thirds of all acquisitions, the acquiring organisation’s stock price falls immediately after the intended transaction is announced. This negative response reflects investors’ scepticism about t he likelihood t hat t he acquirer w ill be able to ach ieve t he sy nergies required to justif y t he prem ium. 9 Premiums can sometimes appear to be excessive, as in the acquisition of National Semiconductor by Texas Instruments (TI). One analyst suggested that the 85 per cent premium ‘indicated the level of confidence TI execs have in both the purchase and the ability to rapidly boost the flagging growth rate of National’s product sales’.10 Obviously, creating the amount of value required to account for this type of premium is not going to be easy. Overall then, those leading organisations that are using M&A strategies must recognise that creating more value for their stakeholders by doing so is indeed difficult.11

Mergers, acquisitions and takeovers: what are the differences? A merger is a strategy through which two organisations agree to integrate their operations on a relatively coequal basis. In 2001, the biggest mining company in the world was created with the merger of Australia’s BHP and Billiton, a South Africa–based miner. At the time, the message in world mining was ‘get big or get out’.12 More recently and locally in 2018, Nine Entertainment and Fairfax Media merged two $2 billion companies to control television (Channel 9), newspapers (Sydney Morning Herald, The Age, Australian Financial Review), radio (2GB, 3AW) and online media (Stan).13

The reality is that few true (pure) mergers actually take place. The main reason for this is that one party to the transaction is usually dominant in regard to various characteristics such as market share, size or value of assets. In the BHP Billiton example, BHP was the dominant partner. Another reason is that, even if the organisations are equal in terms of size or market share, the merged entity only needs one board, one CEO, one CFO and one information technology (IT) system, so the entity that controls most of these shapes the future direction of the merged organisation.

merger a strategy through which two organisations agree to integrate their operations on a relatively coequal basis

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An acquisition is a strategy through which one organisation buys a controlling, or 100 per cent, interest in another organisation with the intent of making the acquired organisation a subsidiar y business within its portfolio. After completing the transaction, the management of the acquired organisation reports to the management of the acquiring organisation.

Although most of the mergers that are completed are friendly in nature, acquisitions can be friendly or unfriendly. A takeover is a special type of acquisition wherein the target organisation does not solicit, or even opposes, the acquiring organisation’s bid; thus, takeovers are unfriendly acquisitions, and are usually described as hostile. Nearly one-third of all public company M&A deals announced in Australia in 2017 were hostile takeover bids. For example, in 2017 Downer EDI launched a successful $1.26 billion hostile takeover of Spotless. The bid was rejected by the board of Spotless until Downer achieved shareholder acceptances and equity control of over 65 per cent, after which the Spotless board had little choice but to accept the takeover. There are thresholds under Australian law that apply to takeovers, including a 5 per cent equity control for public disclosure, a 20 per cent equity control for takeover laws to apply, and a >50 per cent equity threshold for board control.14

Research evidence reveals that ‘pre-announcement returns’ of hostile takeovers ‘are largely anticipated and associated with a significant increase in the bidder’s and target’s share prices’.15 This evidence provides a rationale for why some organisations are w illing to pu rsue buy ing another company even when that organisation is not interested in being bought. Often, determining the price the acquiring organisation is willing to pay to ‘take over’ the target organisation is the core issue in these transactions. In Downer’s hostile takeover of Spotless, Downer offered $1.15 per share for Spotless, which was 59 per cent more than Spotless’ closing price before the deal was announced.16

On a comparative basis, acquisitions are more common than mergers and takeovers. Accordingly, we focus the remainder of this chapter’s discussion on acquisitions.

reasons for acquisitions In this section, we discuss reasons organisations decide to acquire another company. Although each reason can provide a legitimate rationale, acquisitions are not always as successful as the involved parties want them to be. Later in the chapter, we examine problems organisations may encounter when seeking growth and strategic competitiveness through acquisitions.

Increased market power Achieving greater market power is a primar y reason for acquisitions.17 Defined in Chapter 6, market power exists when an organisation is able to sell its goods or ser vices above competitive levels or when the costs of its primar y or support activities are lower than those of its competitors. Market power usually is derived from the size of the organisation and its resources and capabilities to compete in the marketplace;18 it is also affected by the organisation’s share of the market. Therefore, most acquisitions that are designed to achieve greater market power entail buying a competitor, a supplier, a distributor or a business in a highly related industr y to allow the exercise of a core competence and to gain competitive advantage in the acquiring organisation’s primary market.

If an organisation achieves enough market power, it can become a market leader, which is the goal of many organisations. Next, we discuss how organisations use horizontal, vertical and related types of acquisitions to increase their market power.

Horizontal acquisitions The acquisition of a company competing in the same industr y as the acquiring organisation is a horizontal acquisition. Horizontal acquisitions increase an organisation’s market power by exploiting cost-based and

acquisition a strategy through which one organisation buys a controlling, or 100 per cent, interest in another organisation with the intent of making the acquired organisation a subsidiary business within its portfolio

takeover a special type of acquisition strategy wherein the target organisation does not solicit the acquiring organisation’s bid

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revenue-based synergies.19 These synergies are often described as economies of scale, and typically rely on decreasing the long-run average costs of the combined entity.

Research suggests that horizontal acquisitions result in higher performance when the organisations have similar characteristics,20 such as strategy, managerial styles and resource allocation patterns. Similarities in these characteristics, as well as previous alliance management experience, support efforts to integrate the acquiring and the acquired organisation. Horizontal acquisitions are often most effective when the acquiring organisation integrates the acquired organisation’s assets with its own assets, but only after evaluating and divesting excess capacity and assets that do not complement the newly combined organisation’s core competencies.21 Duplication needs to be identified and reduced, and benefits need to be har vested by divesting the excess capacity and assets.

Vertical acquisitions A vertical acquisition refers to an organisation acquiring a supplier or distributor of one or more of its goods or ser vices. 22 Through a vertical acquisition, the newly formed organisation controls additional parts of the value chain (see Chapters 3 and 6),23 which is how vertical acquisitions lead to increased market power.

As a result of increased market power, vertical acquisitions are not encouraged in some Australian sectors, with both the Australian Competition and Consumer Commission (ACCC) and the Royal Commission into Misconduct in the Banking, Superannuation and Financial Services Industry (Banking Royal Commission) opposing attempts by Australian banks to expand into supplying the financial services products they recommend.24 In contrast, the agricultural and technology sectors are more positive when it comes to vertical acquisitions. Beef and commercial cannabis production are two agricultural sectors with recent successful ver tical acquisitions. 25

Internationally, Larry Ellison, executive chairman of Oracle Corporation, pursued many acquisitions of other software organisations, most of which were horizontal acquisitions. However, he also orchestrated vertical acquisitions. For example, Oracle acquired Sun Microsystems, a computer hardware producer (backward vertical integration). With the deal, Sun also gained significant software expertise that is important for developing cloud computing expertise. Oracle has also made vertical acquisitions of producers in particular markets that facilitate distribution into industries in which it does not have a strong presence; for example, Oracle ‘got into healthcare through its purchase of Relsys, a maker of analytics applications for the life sciences industry’.26

Related acquisitions Acqui r ing an organ isat ion in a h igh ly related indust r y is called a related acquisition. Th rough a related acquisition, organisations seek to create value through the synergy that can be generated by integrating some of their resources and capabilities. For example, Amazon acquires related businesses to build its retail services beyond books, music, DVDs and appliances. It acquired an online entertainment business, LOVEFiLM International, known as the Netflix of Europe, at a price of US$555 million. This was an important move for Amazon as DVD sales make up about 20 per cent of its revenues, and online video deliver y is likely to displace much of this revenue in the future.27 In addition, Amazon keeps market power dominance by acquisition in its core business area, in 2011 acquiring Book Depository, its UK-based global competition in internet-based book selling; while in 2012 it acquired Kiva systems (a warehouse robot system company), and in 2014 it bought Twitch (a video platform for games). All add directly to the core business.28

Horizontal, vertical and related acquisitions that organisations complete to increase their market power are subject to regulatory review as well as to analysis by financial markets.29 Thus, organisations seeking

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growth and market power through acquisitions must understand the political/legal segment of the general environment (see Chapter 2) in order to successfully use an acquisition strategy.

Overcoming entry barriers Barriers to entry (introduced in Chapter 2) are factors associated with a market or with the organisations currently operating in it that increase the expense and difficulty new organisations encounter when trying to enter that particular market. For example, well-established competitors may have economies of scale in the manufacture or service of their products. In addition, enduring relationships with customers often create product loyalties that are difficult for new entrants to overcome. When facing differentiated products, new entrants typically must spend considerable resources to advertise their products and may find it necessary to sell below competitors’ prices to entice new customers. Another entry barrier can be an other wise closed contract with suppliers or customers. Suppliers might have limitations on who they will supply to or customers might have a pre-qualified group of suppliers they will buy from. This can take the form of a panel or period contract that represents an attractive asset and target for the acquiring organisation. A good example is the Australian Government Digital Marketplace panel for IT-related services, where membership of the panel is considered a valuable asset for suppliers wishing to do business with the Australian Government.30

Facing the entry barriers that economies of scale and differentiated products create, a new entrant may find acquiring an established company to be more effective than entering the market as a competitor offering a product that is unfamiliar to current buyers. In fact, the higher the barriers to market entry, the greater the probability that an organisation will acquire an existing organisation to overcome them.

As this discussion suggests, a key advantage of using an acquisition strategy to overcome entry barriers is that the acquiring organisation gains immediate access to a market. This advantage can be par ticularly att ractive for organisations seek ing to overcome ent r y bar r iers associated w ith enter ing inter national markets. 31 Large multinational cor porations from developed economies seek to enter emerging economies such as Brazil, Russia, India and China (the so-called BRIC economies) because they are among the fastest- growing economies in the world.32 As discussed next, completing a cross-border acquisition of a local target allows an organisation to quickly enter fast-growing economies such as these.

Cross-border acquisitions Acquisitions made between companies with headquarters in different countries are called cross-border acquisitions. 33 The purchase of UK car makers Jaguar and Land Rover by India’s Tata Motors is an example of a cross-border acquisition.

There are other interesting changes taking place in terms of cross-border acquisition activity. Historically, North American and European companies were the most active acquirers of companies outside their domestic markets. However, the current global competitive landscape is one in which organisations from other nations may use an acquisition strateg y more frequently than do their counter par ts in Nor th America and Europe. In this regard, Chinese companies, in particular, are well positioned for cross-border acquisitions. Chinese corporations are typically well capitalised, with strong balance sheets and cash reserves, and they have learned from their past failures.34 In the ‘Strategic focus’ feature, we also describe cross-border acquisitions by some Indian and Brazilian companies and how their approaches differ. As you will see, many of the deals cited are horizontal acquisitions through which the acquiring companies seek to increase their market power. This demonstrates a trend over more than 20 years of cross-border acquisitions, where non-American and non-European organisations have increasingly adopted this approach over the past decade.

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Cross-border acquisitions by organisations from emerging economies: leveraging resources to gain a larger global footprint and market power

Historically, large multinational organisations from North America and Europe have pursued international acquisitions in emerging and developing countries in order to establish stronger economies of scale for domestic brands as well as provide opportunities for the sourcing of scarce resources. Although the Spanish economy is in the doldrums, Spanish organisations have used this strategy relatively recently to expand, first into Latin America and then into other European countries. Telefonica and Banco Santander are Spanish companies that have extended their reach, especially through cross-border acquisitions. For instance, Telefonica is now the world’s fifth-largest telecommunications provider in terms of revenue, and Santander is the fourth-largest bank on the same metric and has become Latin America’s largest retail bank.

Like these Spanish organisations, many emerging economy organisations are seeking to build a global footprint through acquisitions. For example, after China was accepted into the World Trade Organization in 2000, many Chinese cross-border mergers and acquisitions were attempted. However, many Chinese companies that made cross-border acquisitions saw them end in failure on their first attempts. In 2003, there was US$1.6 billion spent on acquisitions, which swelled to US$18.2 billion by 2006. However, TLC Corporation’s acquisition of France’s Thomson Electronics, SAIC’s takeover of South Korea’s SsangYong Motor Company, Ping An’s investment in the Belgian–dutch financial services group Fortis and Ningbo Bird’s strategic partnership with France’s Sajan ended in stunning failures, where the Chinese either pulled out or had to sell off much of their acquired assets. The Chinese, however, have learned from their mistakes. Instead of buying global brands, sales networks and goodwill in branded products, they are now mainly trying to acquire concrete assets such as mineral deposits, state-of-the-art technologies or r&d facilities. This strategy was encouraged by the Chinese government after pulling back from the various failed acquisitions. As the economy around the world depreciated assets and as the rMB (China’s currency)

appreciated relative to developed economies, the strategy focused on hard assets because this made better investing sense, rather than seeking to buy established branded products in which organisations did not always have managerial capability to realise successful performance. Interestingly, research suggests that India’s acquiring companies (comparative to Chinese companies) have focused on buying competitors (horizontal acquisitions) in less-developed nations to build global market power.

Bimbo is the world’s largest bakery company, formed in 1945 by a Spanish immigrant to Mexico. Initially, Bimbo expanded its operations throughout Latin America from its Mexican base. However, in 1996 it made its first acquisition in the USA. By 2012, it had acquired more than a dozen US organisations, including the bakery operations of Sara Lee, Weston Foods. Under Sara Lee, Weston Foods had declined because of a lack of focus on efficient execution in the low-margin bread and bakery business. Bimbo’s leaders are continually on the road looking for ways to improve productivity. For instance, in China Bimbo used tricycle delivery bikes in urban areas where streets are too narrow for trucks, a practice first honed and implemented in Latin America. At the same time, its trucks are equipped with sophisticated computer systems that optimise delivery routes. In the process of developing better strategic execution, it has also created better ways of integrating new acquisitions into its operating procedures honed in emerging economies. As such, Bimbo is likely to increase the efficiency of the Weston Foods baker operations.

Similarly, Orascom group, a Cairo-based Egyptian conglomerate, has used the construction business as a base platform and has prospered by pursuing acquisitions in countries that others shun. Orascom has entered a set of turbulent countries, including Jordan, Yemen, Pakistan, Zimbabwe, Algeria, Tunisia, Iraq, Bangladesh, North Korea, Burundi, Central African republic and Lebanon. Its entry into North Korea in 2007 was due to the desire to use North Korean labour on a project already underway in China. Orascom

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agreed to a US$150 million modernisation of a North Korean cement plant in exchange for 50 per cent equity in its operation and permission to use North Korean labour. Through this agreement, Orascom built trust with North Korean officials and, more importantly, gained insight into North Korea’s infrastructure plans. Since 2007, it has diversified into partial ownership of a North Korean bank and also helped build the ryugyong Hotel, a 105-floor skyscraper in Pyongyang. Other diversifications have included a large mobile phone business in Egypt as well as other emerging countries’ economies, mostly through acquisitions and subsequent internal development.

Brazil is another country with a large emerging economy whose companies have significant acquisition activity. In 2013, Natura Cosméticos, a Brazilian beauty products organisation, acquired 65 per cent ownership of Australian-based Emeis Holdings, owner of luxury beauty brand Aesop. Emeis sells Aesop-branded products in more than 60 stores in 11 countries. In 2010, Marfrig, a Brazilian meat packer, acquired Keystone Foods for US$1.25 billion. Keystone is a top supplier to American fast-food chains such as Subway and Mcdonald’s. JBS, now the world’s largest meat packer, bought Pilgrim’s Pride for US$800 million as well as Swift for US$1.4 billion. Both of these organisations are meat packing operations, which gives JBS significant exposure in the USA. These acquisitions in large part were made possible by Brazil’s national development bank (BNdES), which supports Brazilian organisations in developing their international operations.

In 2019, according to a KPMg survey published by the Valor Econômico newspaper, there were 1231 M&A transactions in Brazil, which is the largest number since the beginning of the consulting company’s historical series in 1999. Major deals announced in 2018 (and implemented in 2019) with Brazilian involvement included: • Boeing’s US$4.2 billion joint venture with Embraer • rhône Capital’s acquisition of Fogo de Chão for

US$560 million • Kroton Educacional’s acquisition of Somos Educação

for US$1.5 billion • Suzano Papel e Celulose’s merger with Fibria

Celulose, with a value of 36.7 billion reals.

Although acquisitions allow emerging market organisations to enter foreign developed-country markets as well as industries outside their domestic market, such acquisitions come at a price. research suggests that emerging economy organisations pay a higher premium than other organisations. Perhaps these organisations feel they have to pay this premium in order to win the deal and persuade regulators that they are not a threat, especially in industries that domestic politics indicate are strategic. Much of the research suggests that government ownership leads organisations to overpay and that the overpayment reduces value for minority shareholders (non- government shareholders). Many of these acquisitions are also becoming less focused on infrastructure development and more on consumer market acquisitions because the organisations cannot only extend their power into developed companies, but they can help to improve technology in their own domestic market, where a large middle class is emerging with consumers having more buying power. It is expected that this trend of acquisitions from emerging economies to developed economies will continue.

Sources: Latin America Business Stories, 2020, Brazil’s number of mergers and acquisitions is the greatest in 21 years, https://labs.ebanx.

com/en/news/business/mergers-acquisitions-brazil-2019-total, 17 January; A. C. Branco, C. M. Oksenberg & J. M. Cavalcanti, Jr, 2019, The

Mergers & Acquisitions Review – Edition 13: Brazil, https://thelawreviews.

Spanish telecommunications company Telefonica has extended its market reach through cross-border acquisitions.

Source: getty Images/denis doyle/Bloomberg

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Organisations headquartered in India are also completing more cross-border acquisitions than in the past. Favourable government policies towards cross-border acquisitions are supporting Indian companies’ desire to rapidly become more global, although in some cases they are more careful than other emerging market counterparts, such as those found in China.35 In addition to rapid market entry, Indian companies ty pically seek access to product innovation capabilities and new brands and distribution channels when acquiring organisations outside their domestic market.

Organisations using an acquisition strategy to complete cross-border acquisitions should understand that these transactions are not risk free. For example, organisations seeking to acquire companies in China must recognise that China remains a challenging environment for foreign investors. Political and legal obstacles make acquisitions in China risky and difficult.36 Due diligence is problematic as well because corporate governance and transparency of financial statements are often obscure. Thus, organisations must carefully study the risks as well as the potential benefits when contemplating cross-border acquisitions.

Cost of new product development and increased speed to market Developing new products internally and successfully introducing them into the marketplace often requires significant investment of an organisation’s resources, including time, making it difficult to quickly earn a profitable return.37 Because an estimated 88 per cent of innovations fail to achieve adequate returns, organisation managers are also concerned with achieving adequate returns from the capital invested to develop and commercialise new products. Potentially contributing to these less-than-desirable rates of return is the successful imitation of approximately 60 per cent of innovations within four years after the patents are obtained. These types of outcomes may lead managers to perceive internal product development as a high-risk activity.38

Acquisitions are another means an organisation can use to gain access to new products and to cur rent products that are new to the organisation. Compared with internal product development processes, acquisitions provide more predictable returns as well as faster market entr y. Returns are more predictable because the performance of the acquired organisation’s products can be assessed prior to completing the acquisition. 39

Medtronic is the world’s largest medical device maker with US$30 billion in sales in 2019. While most pharmaceutical organisations invent many of their products internally, most of Medtronic’s products are acquired from surgeons or other outside inventors.40 Research confirms that it can be a good strategy to buy early-stage products, especially if the organisation has a strong R&D capability, even though there is risk and uncer tainty in doing so.41

A number of pharmaceutical organisations use an acquisition strateg y besides internal development because of the cost of new product development. Acquisitions can enable organisations to enter markets quickly and to increase the predictability of returns on their investments.

STRATEGY NOW

International mergers and acquisitions

co.uk/edition/the-mergers-acquisitions-review-edition-13/1197247/ brazil#:~:text=Major%20deals%20announced%20in%202018,for%20

US%241.5%20billion%3B%20and, September; F. Bonifacio, 2013, Natura acquires majority stake in Australian skin care company, Global Cosmetic Industry, March, 22–3; B. grant & g. Stieglitz, 2013, Equipment

maker crumbles as baking industry consolidates, Journal of Corporate Renewal, 26(3): 10–13; V. Chen, J. Li & d. M. Shapiro, 2012, International

reverse spillover effects on parent firms: Evidences from emerging- market MNEs in developed markets, European Management Journal,

30(3): 204–18; F. de Beule & J. duanmu, 2012, Locational determinants of internationalization: A firm-level analysis of Chinese and Indian

acquisitions, European Management Journal, 30(3): 264–77; M. F. guillén & E. garcía-Canal, 2012, Execution as strategy, Harvard Business Review,

90(10): 103–7; g. Jones, 2012, The growth opportunity that lies next door, Harvard Business Review, 90(7/8): 141–5; B. Kedia, N. gaffney

& J. Clampit, 2012, EMNEs and knowledge-seeking FdI, Management International Review, 52(2): 155–73; S. A. Nonis & C. relyea, 2012,

Business innovations from emerging market countries into developed countries: Implications for multinationals from developed countries, Thunderbird International Business Review, 54(3): 291–8; L. rabbiosi, S. Elia & F. Bertoni, 2012, Acquisitions by EMNCs in developed markets, Management International Review, 52(2): 193–212; P. J. Williamson & A.

P. raman, 2011, How China reset its global acquisition agenda, Harvard Business Review, 89(4): 109–14; J. Zhang, C. Zhou & H. Ebbers, 2011,

Completion of Chinese overseas acquisitions: Institutional perspectives and evidence, International Business Review, 20(2): 226–38.

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Lower risk compared to developing new products Because the outcomes of an acquisition can be estimated more easily and accurately than the outcomes of an internal product development process, managers may view acquisitions as being less risky.42 However, organisations should exercise caution when using acquisitions to reduce their risks relative to the risks the organisation incurs when developing new products internally. Indeed, even though research suggests acquisition strategies are a common means of avoiding risky internal ventures (and therefore risky R&D investments), acquisitions may also become a substitute for innovation. Accordingly, acquisitions should always be strategic rather than defensive in nature.

Increased diversification Acquisitions are also used to diversify organisations. Based on experience and the insights resulting from it, organisations typically find it easier to develop and introduce new products in markets they are currently serving. By contrast, it is difficult for companies to develop products that differ from their current lines for markets in which they lack experience.4 3 Thus, it is relatively uncommon for an organisation to develop new products internally to diversify its product lines.44

For example, Xerox purchased Affiliated Computer Services, an outsourcing organisation, to bolster its services business. Xerox is seen primarily as a hardware technology company, selling document management equipment. However, over time, Xerox has sought to diversify into helping organisations to manage business processes and technology services. As such, through this acquisition it seeks to have more and more of its business in the technology service sector. Ursula Burns, who became CEO of Xerox in 2009 (and was the first African American female to head a Fortune 500 company), indicated that Xerox is helping organisations to focus on their real business while it ‘takes care of the document-intensive business processes behind the scenes’.45

Acquisition strategies can be used to support use of both unrelated and related diversification strategies (see Chapter 6).46 For example, United Technologies Corp. (UTC) uses acquisitions as the foundation for implementing its unrelated diversification strategy. Since the mid-1970s it has been building a portfolio of stable and non-cyclical businesses, including Otis Elevator Co. (lifts, escalators and moving walkways) and Carrier Corporation (heating and air-conditioning systems) in order to reduce its dependence on the volatile aerospace industry. Pratt & Whitney (aircraft engines), Hamilton Sundstrand (aerospace and industrial systems), Sikorsky (helicopters), UTC Fire & Security (fire safety and security products and services) and UTC Power (fuel cells and power systems) are the other businesses in which UTC competes as a result of using its acquisition strategy. While each business acquired by UTC manufactures industrial and/or commercial products, many have a relatively low focus on technology (e.g. lifts, air conditioners and security systems).47

In contrast to UTC, Cisco Systems pursues related acquisitions. Historically, these acquisitions have he lped t he orga n i sat ion bu i ld it s net work compone nt s bu si ness t hat i s foc u sed on produc i ng network backbone hardware. However, Cisco purchased IronPort Systems Inc., a company focused on producing security software for networks. This acquisition helped Cisco diversify its operations beyond its or ig i na l ex per t ise i n net work ha rdwa re a nd net work ma nagement sof t wa re i nto net work sec u r it y sof t wa re. Ot her acqu isit ions have foc used on sof t wa re to faci l itate v ideo con ferences (t he Ta ndberg acqu isit ion) 4 8 a nd helpi ng c l ient orga n isat ion s ma nage c loud comput i ng appl icat ion s (t he new Sca le acqu isit ion).4 9

Organisations using acquisition strategies should be aware that, in general, the more related the acquired organisation is to the acquiring organisation, the greater is the probability that the acquisition will be successful. 50 Thus, horizontal acquisitions and related acquisitions tend to contribute more to the organisation’s strategic competitiveness than do acquisitions of companies operating in product markets that are quite different from those in which the acquiring organisation competes, although complementary acquisitions in different industries can help expand an organisation’s capabilities.51

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Reshaping the organisation’s competitive scope As discussed in Chapter 2, the intensity of competitive rivalry is an industry characteristic that affects the organisation’s profitability.52 To reduce the negative effect of an intense rivalry on their financial performance, organisations may use acquisitions to lessen their dependence on one or more products or markets. Reducing a company’s dependence on specific markets shapes the organisation’s competitive scope.

Each time UTC enters a new business (such as UTC Power, the organisation’s most recent business segment), the corporation reshapes its competitive scope. In a more subtle manner, Procter & Gamble’s acquisition of Gillette reshaped its competitive scope by giving P&G a stronger presence in some products for which men are the target market. Xerox’s purchase of Affiliated Computer Services likewise reshaped Xerox’s competitive scope to focus more on services, and Cisco has become more focused on software through its latest acquisitions. Thus, using an acquisition strategy reshaped the competitive scope of each of these organisations.

Learning and developing new capabilities Organisations sometimes complete acquisitions to gain access to capabilities they lack. For example, acquisitions may be used to acquire a special technological capability. Research shows that organisations can broaden their knowledge base and reduce inertia through acquisitions.53 For example, research suggests that organisations increase the potential of their capabilities when they acquire diverse talent through cross-border acquisitions.54 Of course, organisations are better able to learn these capabilities if they share some similar properties with the organisation’s current capabilities. Thus, organisations should seek to acquire companies with different but related and complementary capabilities in order to build their own knowledge base. 55

A number of large pharmaceutical organisations are acquiring the ability to create ‘large molecule’ drugs, also known as biological drugs, by buying biotechnology organisations. Thus, these organisations a re seek ing access to bot h t he pipeline of possible d r ugs a nd t he capabilit ies t hat t hese orga n isat ions

have to produce t hem. Suc h capabi l it ies a re i mpor ta nt for la rge pha r maceut ica l orga n isat ions because t hese biolog ica l d r ugs a re more difficult to duplicate by chemistry alone (the historical basis on wh ich most pha r maceut ica l orga n isat ions have ex per t ise). Biotech organisations are focused on DNA research and have a biology base rather than a chemistry base. As an example, Sanofi-Aventis acquired biotech company Genzyme for US$20 billion. Sanofi’s hope was that Genzyme would help it keep rare-disease drugs in the pipeline without losing sales to more gener ic competition (those d r ugs that have lost patent protec t ion). It is c r it ica l i n a n acqu isit ion such as t h is to keep experimental drug projects moving forward, and this requires science-based and research-oriented employees to stay in the merged organisation. Sanofi’s intention was to transfer Genzyme’s expertise in genetics and biomarkers back to Sanofi. Such biomarkers ‘are biological substa nces i n t he body t hat help show t he body is respond i ng to disease and drug’.56 If such an acquisition is successful, there is added competitive advantage. Biological d r ugs must clear more reg ulator y barriers or hurdles, but once this is accomplished it adds more to the advantage the acquiring organisation develops.

When P&g acquired gillette, it gained a foothold in the men’s razor segment.

Source: getty Images/Mario Tama

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problems in achieving acquisition success Acquisition strategies based on reasons described in this chapter can increase strategic competitiveness and help organisations earn above-average returns. However, even when pursued for value-creating reasons, acquisition strategies are not problem-free. Reasons for the use of acquisition strategies and potential problems with such strategies are shown in Figure 7.1.

Research suggests that perhaps 20 per cent of all mergers and acquisitions are successful, approximately 60 per cent produce disappointing results, and the remaining 20 per cent are clear failures; evidence on technolog y acquisitions repor ts even higher failure rates. 57 In general, though, companies appear to be increasing their ability to effectively use acquisition strategies. One analyst suggests: ‘Accenture research and subsequent work with clients show that half of large corporate mergers create at least marginal returns – an improvement from a decade ago, when many studies concluded that as many as three-quarters of all mergers destroyed shareholder value as measured two years after the merger announcement’.58 Greater acquisition success accrues to organisations able to select the ‘right’ target, avoid paying too high a premium (doing appropriate due diligence), and effectively integrate the operations of the acquiring and target organisations. 59 In addition, retaining the target organisation’s human capital is foundational to efforts by employees of the acquiring organisation to fully understand the target organisation’s operations and the capabilities on which those operations are based.60 The Sanofi-Aventis acquisition of Genzyme noted above is an example of the importance of retaining the right employees. As summarised in Figure 7.1, the discussion in the following sections (‘Integration difficulties’ through to ‘Too large’) outlines the seven key problems that may prevent successful acquisitions.

Integration difficulties The impor tance of a successful integration should not be underestimated.61 As suggested by a researcher studying the process, ‘Managerial practice and academic writings show that the post-acquisition integration phase is probably the single most important determinant of shareholder value creation (and equally of value destruction) in mergers and acquisitions’.62

Although critical to acquisition success, organisations should recognise that integrating two companies following an acquisition can be quite difficult. Melding two corporate cultures, linking different financial and control systems, building effective working relationships (particularly when management styles differ) and resolving problems regarding the status of the newly acquired organisation’s executives are examples of the integration challenges organisations often face.63

Integration is complex and involves a large number of activities, which if overlooked can lead to significant difficulties.64 For example, when United Parcel Service (UPS) acquired Mail Boxes Etc., a large retail shipping chain, it appeared to be a merger that would generate benefits for both organisations. The problem was that most of the Mail Boxes Etc. outlets were owned by franchisees. Following the merger, the franchisees lost the ability to deal with other shipping companies such as FedEx, which reduced their competitiveness. Furthermore, franchisees complained that UPS often built company-owned shipping stores close by franchisee outlets of Mail Boxes Etc. Additionally, a culture clash evolved between the free- wheeling entrepreneurs who owned the franchises of Mail Boxes Etc. and the efficiency-oriented corporate approach of the UPS operation, which focused on managing a large fleet of trucks and an information system to efficiently pick up and deliver packages. Also, Mail Boxes Etc. was focused on retail traffic, whereas UPS was focused more on the logistics of wholesale pickup and deliver y. A lthough 87 per cent of Mail Boxes Etc. franchisees decided to rebrand under the UPS name, many formed an owners’ group and even filed suit against UPS in regard to the unfavourable nature of the franchisee contract.65

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Lower risk compared to developing

new products

Increased diversification

Reshaping the organisation’s competitive scope

Learning and developing new capabilities

Cost of new product development and increased

speed to market

Overcome entry barriers

Increased market power

Reasons for acquisitions

Acquisitions

Too much diversification

Managers overly focused on acquisitions

Too large

Inability to achieve synergy

Large or extraordinary debt

Inadequate evaluation of target

Integration difficulties

Problems in achieving success

Figure 7.1 reasons for acquisitions and problems in achieving success

Inadequate evaluation of target Due diligence is a process through which a potential acquirer evaluates a target organisation for acquisition. In an effective due-diligence process, hundreds of items are examined in areas as diverse as the financing for the intended transaction, differences in cultures between the acquiring and target organisation, tax consequences of the transaction, and actions that would be necessary to successfully meld the two workforces. Due diligence is commonly performed by investment bankers such as Deutsche Bank, Goldman Sachs and Morgan Stanley, as well as accountants, lawyers and management consultants specialising in that activity, although organisations actively pursuing acquisitions may form their own internal due- diligence team. Although due diligence often focuses on evaluating the accuracy of the financial position and accounting standards used (a financial audit), due diligence also needs to examine the quality of the strategic fit and the ability of the acquiring organisation to effectively integrate the target to realise the potential gains from the deal.66

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The failure to complete an effective due-diligence process may easily result in the acquiring organisation paying an excessive premium for the target company. Interestingly, research shows that in times of high or increasing stock prices, due diligence is relaxed; organisations often overpay during these periods and long-run performance of the newly formed organisation suffers.67 Research also shows that without due diligence, ‘the purchase price is driven by the pricing of other “comparable” acquisitions rather than by a rigorous assessment of where, when, and how management can drive real performance gains. [In these cases], the price paid may have little to do with achievable value’.68

In addition, organisations sometimes allow themselves to enter a ‘bidding war’ for a target, even though they realise that their current bids exceed the parameters identified through due diligence. Earlier, we mentioned Downer’s hostile takeover of Spotless, and the 59 per cent premium paid for Spotless’ shares. We cannot be sure that Downer overpaid, but the point is that rather than enter a bidding war, organisations should only extend bids that are consistent with the results of their due-diligence process. It could be that Spotless will provide Downer with a new platform for growth (i.e. defence facilities management contracts) and over time this deal will look cheap, but the key is doing a strategic analysis along with rational due diligence so that both the strategic fit and financials make sense.69

Large or extraordinary debt To finance a number of acquisitions completed during the 1980s and 1990s, some companies significantly increased their levels of debt. A financial innovation called junk bonds helped make this possible. Junk bonds are a financing option through which risky acquisitions are financed with money (debt) that provides a large potential return to lenders (bondholders). Because junk bonds are unsecured obligations that are not tied to specific assets for collateral, interest rates for these high-risk debt instruments sometimes reached between 18 and 20 per cent during the 1980s.70 Some prominent financial economists viewed debt as a means to discipline managers, causing them to act in the shareholders’ best interests.71 Managers holding this view are less concerned about the amount of debt their organisation assumes when acquiring other companies.

Junk bonds are now used less frequently to finance acquisitions, and the conviction that debt disciplines managers is less st rong.72 Nonetheless, organisations sometimes still take on what turns out to be too much debt when acquiring companies. Caterpillar Inc., betting on a long-term boom and global demand for mining equipment, purchased Bucyrus International, Inc., a maker of mining equipment, for US$7.6 billion in 2011. It was expected that rapid growth in emerging economies such as China, India, Brazil and other developing economies over the next decade would push demand for coal, copper, iron ore and ‘everything that comes out of the ground’,73 which, despite inevitable hiccups, remains the basis for the prosperity of the Australian economy. Caterpillar paid a 32 per cent premium for Bucyrus. Furthermore, Bucyrus had also bought Terex Corp., for US$1.3 billion, in February 2010. Bucyrus’ debt, because of previous acquisitions, was significant and forced Caterpillar not only to issue new stock but to absorb this additional debt. As noted earlier, organisations often pay rich premiums and possibly ‘overpay’, partly because they have to take on additional debt. This had happened before – Bucyrus went through a leveraged buyout and had to file for bankruptcy in the mid-1990s because it took on more debt than it could handle at the time. Because of the assumption of debt for this deal, the price tag increased from US$7.6 billion to US$8.6 billion. As such, this is a significant increase in the premium noted earlier because of the assumption of debt.74 Thus, organisations using an acquisition strateg y must be cer tain that their purchases do not create a debt load that overpowers the company’s ability to remain solvent.

Inability to achieve synergy or harvest benefits Derived from synergos, a Greek word that means ‘working together’, synergy exists when the value created by units working together exceeds the value those units could create working independently (see Chapter 6). That is, synergy exists when assets are worth more when used in conjunction with each other than when they are used separately. For shareholders, synergy generates gains in their wealth that they could not duplicate or exceed t h rough t heir ow n por tfolio d iversif ication decisions.75 Sy nerg y is created by t he

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efficiencies derived from economies of scale and economies of scope and by sharing resources (e.g. human capital and knowledge) across the businesses in the merged organisation.76 If those economies of scale and scope via shared resources are not harvested, then the benefits (such as long-run average cost reduction) are not realised. After an acquisition, duplication of roles and resources needs to be removed. Duplicate IT systems need to be decommissioned, and duplicate roles (such as a second CFO) need to be removed.

A n orga n isat ion develops a compet it ive adva ntage t h rough a n acqu isit ion st rateg y on ly when a t ra nsact ion generates pr ivate sy nerg y. Private synergy is created when combi n i ng a nd i nteg rat i ng t he acquiring and acquired organisations’ assets yield capabilities and core competencies that could not be developed by combining and integrating either organisation’s assets with another company. Private synergy is possible when organisations’ assets are complementary in unique ways; that is, the unique type of asset complementarity is not possible by combining either company’s assets with another organisation’s assets.77 Because of its uniqueness, private synergy is difficult for competitors to understand and imitate. However, private synergy is difficult to create.

An organisation’s ability to account for costs that are necessary to create anticipated revenue and cost- based synergies affects its efforts to create private synergy. Organisations experience several expenses when trying to create private synergy through acquisitions. Called transaction costs, these expenses are incurred when organisations use acquisition strategies to create synergy.78 Transaction costs may be direct or indirect. Direct costs include legal fees and charges from investment bankers who complete due diligence for the acquiring organisation. Indirect costs include managerial time to evaluate target organisations and then to complete negotiations, as well as the loss of key managers and employees following an acquisition.79 Organisations tend to underestimate the sum of indirect costs when the value of the synerg y that may be created by combining and integrating the acquired organisation’s assets with the acquiring organisation’s assets is calculated.

Too much diversification As explained in Chapter 6, diversification strategies can lead to strategic competitiveness and above- average returns. In general, organisations using related diversification strategies outperform those employing unrelated diversification strategies. However, conglomerates formed by using an unrelated diversification strategy also can be successful, as demonstrated by UTC.

At some point, however, organisations can become over-diversified. The level at which over- diversification occurs varies across companies because each organisation has different capabilities to manage diversification. Recall from Chapter 6 that related diversification requires more information processing than does unrelated diversification. Because of this additional information processing, related diversified organisations become over-diversified with a smaller number of business units than do organisations using an unrelated diversification strategy.80 Regardless of the type of diversification strategy implemented, however, over-diversification leads to a decline in performance, after which business units are often divested.81 Commonly, such divestments, which tend to reshape an organisation’s competitive scope, are part of an organisation’s restructuring strategy. (We discuss the strategy in greater detail later in this chapter.)

Even when an organisation is not over-diversified, a high level of diversification can have a negative effect on its long-term performance. For example, the scope created by additional amounts of diversification often causes managers to rely on financial rather than strategic controls to evaluate business units’ performance (we define and explain financial and strategic controls in Chapters 11 and 12). Top-level executives often rely on financial controls to assess the performance of business units when they do not have a rich understanding of business units’ objectives and strategies. The use of financial controls, such as return on investment (ROI), causes individual business-unit managers to focus on short-term outcomes at the expense of long-term investments. When long-term investments are reduced to increase short-term profits, an organisation’s overall strategic competitiveness may be harmed.82

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Another problem resulting from too much diversification is the tendency for acquisitions to become substitutes for innovation. As we noted earlier, pharmaceutical organisations such as Sanofi-Aventis must be awa re of t h is tendency as t hey acqu i re ot her orga n isat ions to ga i n access to t hei r products and capabilities. Typically, managers have no interest in acquisitions substituting for internal R&D efforts and the innovative outcomes that they can produce. However, a reinforcing cycle evolves. Costs associated with acquisitions may result in fewer allocations to activities such as R&D that are linked to innovation. Without adequate support, an organisation’s innovation skills begin to atrophy. Without internal innovation skills, the only option available to an organisation to gain access to innovation is to complete still more acquisitions. Evidence suggests that an organisation using acquisitions as a substitute for internal innovations eventually encounters performance problems.83

Managers overly focused on acquisitions Typically, a considerable amount of managerial time and energy is required for acquisition strategies to be used successfully. Activities with which managers become involved include searching for viable acquisition candidates, completing effective due-diligence processes, preparing for negotiations and managing the integration process after completing the acquisition.

Top-level managers do not personally gather all of the data and information required to make acquisitions. However, these executives do make critical decisions on the organisations to be targeted, the nature of the negotiations and so forth. Company experiences show that participating in and overseeing the activities required for making acquisitions can diver t managerial attention from other matters that are necessary for long-term competitive success, such as identifying and taking advantage of other oppor tunities and interacting with impor tant external stakeholders.8 4

Both theor y and research suggest that managers can become overly involved in the process of making acquisitions.85 One observer suggested: ‘Some executives can become preoccupied with making deals – and the thrill of selecting, chasing and seizing a target’.86 The over-involvement can be surmounted by learning from mistakes and by not having too much agreement in the boardroom. Dissent is helpful to make sure that all sides of a question are considered (see Chapter 10).87 When failure does occur, leaders may be tempted to blame the failure on others and on unforeseen circumstances rather than on their excessive involvement in the acquisition process.

The acquisitions strategy of Citigroup is a classic case in point. Citigroup’s CEO, John Reed, in a merger between Citicorp and Travelers Group (CEO Sanford I. Weill), set out to cross-sell financial services to the same customer and thereby reduce sales costs. Weill ultimately became the CEO. The merged organisation focused on a set of acquisitions including insurance and private equity investing beyond traditional banking services. However, as noted by one commentator:

More than once, ambitious executives, such as Sanford Weill of Citigroup fame, have assembled ‘financial supermarkets’, and thinking that customers’ needs for credit cards, checking accounts, wealth management services, insurance and stock brokerage could be furnished most efficiently and effectively by the same company. Those efforts have failed, over and over again. Each function fulfills a different job that arises at a different point in a customer’s life, so a single source for all of them holds no advantage.88

Ultimately, Vikram Pandit, the CEO who took over after Charles Prince at Citigroup, was forced to sell off a lot of those peripheral financial service businesses.

Too large Most acquisitions create a larger organisation, which should help increase its economies of scale. These economies can then lead to more efficient operations; for example, two sales organisations can be integrated

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using fewer sales representatives because such sales personnel can sell the products of both organisations (par ticularly if the products of the acquiring and target organisations are highly related).89 Size can also increase the complexity of the management challenge and create diseconomies of scope; that is, there is not enough economic benefit to outweigh the costs of managing the more complex organisation created through acquisitions. This was the case in a failed merger between DaimlerChrysler and Mitsubishi; it became too costly to integrate the operations of Mitsubishi to derive the necessary benefits of economies of scale in the merged organisation.9 0

Many organisations seek increases in size because of the potential economies of scale and enhanced market power (discussed earlier). At some level, the additional costs required to manage the larger organisation will exceed the benefits of the economies of scale and additional market power. The complex ities generated by the larger size often lead managers to implement more bureaucratic controls to manage the combined organisation’s operations. Bureaucratic controls are formalised super visor y and behavioural rules and policies designed to ensure consistency of decisions and actions across different units of an organisation. However, through time, formalised controls often lead to relatively rigid and standardised managerial behaviour.91 Certainly, in the long run, the diminished flexibility that accompanies rigid and standardised managerial behaviour may produce less innovation. Because of the impor tance of innovation to competitive success, the bureaucratic controls resulting from a large organisation (i.e. built by acquisitions) can have a detrimental effect on performance. For this reason, Cisco announced an internal restructuring to reduce bureaucracy after its numerous acquisitions: ‘It will dispense with most of a network of internal councils and associated boards that have been criticised for adding layers of bureaucracy and wasting managers’ time’.92 As one analyst noted, ‘Striving for size per se is not necessarily going to make a company more successful. In fact, a strategy in which acquisitions are undertaken as a substitute for organic growth has a bad track record in terms of adding value’.93

Effective acquisitions Earlier in the chapter, we noted that acquisition strategies do not always lead to above-average returns for the acquiring organisation’s shareholders.94 Nonetheless, some companies are able to create value when using an acquisition strateg y.95 The probability of success increases when the organisation’s actions are consistent with the attributes of successful acquisitions shown in Table 7.1.

Cisco Systems appears to pay close attention to the attributes listed in Table 7.1 when using its acquisition strategy. In fact, Cisco is admired for its ability to complete successful acquisitions and integrate them quickly, although as noted this has created a larger organisation.96 A number of other network companies pursued acquisitions to build up their ability to sell into the network equipment binge, but only Cisco has retained much of its value in the post-bubble era. Many organisations, such as Lucent, Nortel and Ericsson, teetered on the edge of bankruptcy after the dot-com bubble burst in the 2000s. When it makes an acquisition:

Cisco has gone much further in its thinking about integration. Not only is retention important, but Cisco also works to minimise the distractions caused by an acquisition. This is important, because the speed of change is so great that if the target firm’s product development teams are distracted, they will be slowed, contributing to acquisition failure. So, integration must be rapid and reassuring.97

Cisco published specific work stream structures and process flows to assist with integration of corporate acquisitions, and has been recognised for its successful corporate integrations.98

Results from a research study shed light on the differences between unsuccessful and successful acqu isit ion st rateg ies a nd suggest t hat a pat ter n of act ions i mproves t he probabi l it y of acqu isit ion success.99 The study shows that when the target organisation’s assets are complementary to the acquired organisation’s assets, an acquisition is more successful. With complementary assets, the integration of two organisations’ operations has a higher probability of creating synergy. In fact, integrating two

STRATEGY NOW

Cisco acquisitions

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organisations with complementar y assets frequently produces unique capabilities and core competencies. With complementary assets, the acquiring organisation can maintain its focus on core businesses and leverage the complementary assets and capabilities from the acquired organisation. In effective acquisitions, targets are often selected and ‘groomed’ by establishing a working relationship prior to the acquisition.10 0 As discussed in Chapter 9, strategic alliances are sometimes used to test the feasibility of a future merger or acquisition between the involved organisations.101

The study’s results also show that friendly acquisitions facilitate integration of the organisations involved in an acquisition. Through friendly acquisitions, organisations work together to find ways to integrate their operations to create synerg y.102 In hostile takeovers, animosity often results between the two top-management teams, a condition that in turn affects working relationships in the newly created organisation. As a result, more key personnel in the acquired organisation may be lost, and those who remain may resist the changes necessary to integrate the two organisations.103 With effort, cultural clashes can be overcome, and fewer key managers and employees will become discouraged and leave.104

Additionally, effective due-diligence processes involving the deliberate and careful selection of target organisations and an evaluation of the relative health of those organisations (financial health, cultural fit and the value of human resources) contribute to successful acquisitions.105 Financial slack in the form of debt equity or cash, in both the acquiring and acquired organisations, also frequently contributes to acquisition success. Even though financial slack provides access to financing for the acquisition, it is still impor tant to maintain a low or moderate level of debt after the acquisition to keep debt costs low. W hen substantial debt was used to finance the acquisition, companies with successful acquisitions reduced the debt quickly, partly by selling off assets from the acquired organisation, especially non-complementary or poorly performing assets. For these organisations, debt costs do not prevent long-term investments such as R&D, and managerial discretion in the use of cash flow is relatively flexible.

Attributes Results

1  Acquired organisation has assets or resources that are complementary to the acquiring organisation’s core business.

1  High probability of synergy and competitive advantage by maintaining strengths.

2  Acquisition is friendly. 2  Faster and more effective integration and possibly lower premiums.

3  Acquiring organisation conducts effective due diligence to select target organisations and evaluate the target organisation’s health (financial, cultural and human resources).

3  Organisations with strongest complementarities are acquired and overpayment is avoided.

4  Acquiring organisation has financial slack (cash or a favourable debt position).

4  Financing (debt or equity) is easier and less costly to obtain.

5  Merged organisation maintains low-to- moderate debt position.

5  Lower financing cost, lower risk (e.g., of bankruptcy) and avoidance of trade-offs that are associated with high debt.

6  Acquiring organisation has sustained and consistent emphasis on r&d and innovation.

6  Maintain long-term competitive advantage in markets.

7  Acquiring organisation manages change well and is flexible and adaptable.

7  Faster and more effective integration facilitates achievement of synergy.

Table 7.1 attributes of successful acquisitions

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Another attribute of successful acquisition strategies is an emphasis on innovation, as demonstrated by continuing investments in R&D activities.106 Significant R&D investments show a strong managerial commitment to innovation, a characteristic that is increasingly important to overall competitiveness in the global economy as well as to acquisition success.

Flexibility and adaptability are the final two attributes of successful acquisitions. When executives of bot h t he acqu i r i ng a nd t he ta rget orga n isat ions have ex per ience i n ma nag i ng cha nge a nd lea r n i ng from acquisitions, they will be more skilled at adapting their capabilities to new environments.107 As a result, they will be more adept at integrating the two organisations, which is particularly important when organisations have different organisational cultures.

As we have learned, organisations use an acquisition strategy to grow and achieve strategic competitiveness. Sometimes, though, the actual results of an acquisition strategy fall short of the projected results. When this happens, organisations consider using restructuring strategies.

restructuring Restructuring is a strateg y through which an organisation changes its set of businesses or its financial st r uctu re.10 8 Rest r uctu r i ng is a globa l phenomenon.10 9 From the 1970s into the early 2020s, divesting businesses from company portfolios and downsizing has accounted for a large percentage of organisations’ restructuring strategies. Commonly, organisations focus on a lesser number of products and markets following restructuring. The words of an executive describe this typical outcome: ‘Focus on your core business, but don’t be distracted; let other people buy assets that aren’t right for you’.110

A lthough restr ucturing strategies are generally used to deal with acquisitions that are not reaching expectations, organisations sometimes use these strategies because of changes they have detected i n t hei r ex ter na l env i ron ment.111 For example, opportunities sometimes surface in an organisation’s external environment that a diversified organisation can pursue because of the capabilities it has formed by integrating organisations’ operations. In such cases, restructuring may be appropriate to position the organisation to create more value for stakeholders, given the environmental changes.112 As discussed next, organisations use three types of restructuring strategies: downsizing, downscoping and leveraged buyouts.

Downsizing Downsizing is a reduction in the number of an organisation’s employees and, sometimes, in the number of its operating units, but it may or may not change the composition of businesses in the company’s portfolio. Thus, downsizing is an intentional proactive management strategy whereas ‘decline is an environmental or organisational phenomenon that occurs involuntarily and results in erosion of an organisation’s resource base’.113 Downsizing is often a part of acquisitions that fail to create the value anticipated when the transaction was completed. Downsizing is often used when the acquiring organisation paid too high a premium to acquire the target organisation.114 Once thought to be an indicator of organisational decline, downsizing is now recognised as a legitimate restr ucturing strateg y.

Reducing the number of employees and/or the organisation’s scope in terms of products produced and markets ser ved occurs in organisations to enhance the value being created as a result of completing an acquisition. When integrating the operations of the acquired organisation and the acquiring organisation, managers may not at first appropriately downsize. This is understandable in that ‘no-one likes to lay people off or close facilities’.115 However, downsizing may be necessary because acquisitions often create a situation in which the newly formed organisation has duplicate organisational functions such as sales, manufacturing, distribution, human resource management and so forth. Failing to downsize appropriately may lead to too many employees doing the same work and prevent the new organisation from realising the cost synergies it anticipated. Managers should remember that as a strategy, downsizing will be far more effective when they consistently use human resource practices that ensure procedural justice and fairness in downsizing decisions.116

restructuring a strategy through which an organisation changes its set of businesses or its financial structure

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Downscoping Downscoping refers to divestiture, spin-off or some other means of eliminating businesses that are unrelated to an organisation’s core businesses. Downscoping has a more positive effect on organisation per for ma nce t ha n does dow nsizi ng117 because organisations commonly find that downscoping causes t hem to refocus on t hei r core business.118 Managerial effectiveness increases because the organisation has become less diversified, allowing the top management team to better understand and manage the remaining businesses.119 Interestingly, sometimes the divested unit can also take advantage of unforeseen opportunities not recognised while under the leadership of the parent organisation.120 Organisations often use downscoping and downsizing strategies simultaneously. In Citigroup’s restructuring it has used both downscoping and downsizing, as have many large financial institutions in the recession.121 However, when doing this, organisations need to avoid lay-offs of key employees, as such lay-offs might lead to a loss of one or more core competencies. Instead, an organisation that is simultaneously downscoping and downsizing becomes smaller by reducing the diversity of businesses in its por tfolio.122

In general, US organisations use downscoping as a restructuring strategy more frequently than do European companies; in fact, the trend in Europe, Latin America and Asia has been to build conglomerates. In Latin America, these conglomerates are called grupos. Many Asian and Latin A merican conglomerates have begun to adopt Western cor porate strategies in recent years and have been refocusing on their core businesses. This downscoping has occur red simultaneously with increasing globalisation and with more open markets that have greatly enhanced competition. By downscoping, these organisations have been able to focus on their core businesses and improve their competitiveness.123

Leveraged buyouts A leveraged buyout ( L BO) is a rest r uc t u r i ng st rateg y whereby a pa r t y (t y pica l ly a pr ivate equ it y organisation) buys all of an organisation’s assets in order to take the organisation private. Once the transaction is completed, the company’s stock is no longer traded publicly. Traditionally, LBOs were used as a restructuring strategy to correct for managerial mistakes or because the organisation’s managers were making decisions that primarily ser ved their own interests rather than those of shareholders.124 However, some organisations use buyouts to build organisation resources and expand rather than simply restructure distressed assets.125

However, significant amounts of debt are commonly incurred to finance a buyout, hence the term leveraged buyout. To suppor t debt pay ments a nd to dow nscope t he compa ny to concent rate on t he organisation’s core businesses, the new owners may immediately sell a number of assets.126 It is not uncommon for those buying an organisation through an LBO to restr ucture the organisation to the point that it can be sold at a profit within a five- to eight-year period.

Management buyouts (MBOs), employee buyouts (EBOs) and whole-organisation buyouts, in which one company or partnership purchases an entire company instead of a part of it, are the three types of LBOs. In part because of managerial incentives, MBOs, more so than EBOs and whole-organisation buyouts, have been found to lead to downscoping, increased strategic focus and improved performance.127 Research shows that management buyouts can lead to greater entrepreneurial activity and grow th.128 As such, buyouts can represent a form of organisation rebirth to facilitate entrepreneurial efforts and stimulate strategic grow th and productivity.129

Restructuring outcomes The short- and long-term outcomes associated with the three restructuring strategies are shown in Figure 7.2. As indicated, downsizing typically does not lead to higher organisation performance.130 In fact, some research results show that downsizing contributes to lower returns for organisations. The stock markets in the organisations’ respective nations evaluated downsizing negatively, believing that it would have

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The loss of human capital is another potential problem of downsizing (see Figure 7.2). Losing employees w it h ma ny yea rs of ex per ience w it h t he orga n isat ion represents a major loss of k nowledge. A s noted in Chapter 3, knowledge is vital to competitive success in the global economy. Research also suggests that such loss of human capital can also spill over into dissatisfaction of customers.133 Thus, in general, research evidence and corporate experience suggest that downsizing may be of more tactical (or short-term) value than strategic (or long-term) value,134 mean ing t hat organ isat ions should exercise caut ion when restr ucturing through downsizing.

Downscoping generally leads to more positive outcomes in both the short and long term than does downsizing or a leveraged buyout. Downscoping’s desirable long-term outcome of higher performance is a product of reduced debt costs and the emphasis on strategic controls derived from concentrating on the organisation’s core businesses. In so doing, the refocused organisation should be able to increase its ability to compete.135

Although whole-organisation LBOs have been hailed as a significant innovation in the financial restructuring of organisations, they can involve negative trade-offs.136 First, the resulting large debt increases an organisation’s financial risk, as was evidenced by the number of companies that filed for bankruptcy in the 1990s after executing a whole-organisation LBO. Sometimes, the intent of the owners to increase the efficiency of the bought-out organisation and then sell it within five to eight years creates a short-term and risk-averse managerial focus.137 As a result, these organisations may fail to invest adequately in R&D or take other major actions designed to maintain or improve the company’s core competence.138 Research also suggests that in organisations with an entrepreneurial mindset, buyouts can lead to greater innovation, especially if the debt load is not too great.139 However, because buyouts more often result in significant debt, most LBOs have been completed in mature industries where stable cash flows are possible.

long-term negative effects on the organisations’ efforts to achieve strategic competitiveness. Investors also seem to conclude that downsizing occurs as a consequence of other problems in a company.131 This assumption may be caused by an organisation’s diminished corporate reputation when a major downsizing is announced.132

Downsizing

Downscoping

Leveraged buyout

Alternatives Short-term outcomes

Loss of human capital

Lower performance

Higher performance

Higher risk

Long-term outcomes

Reduced labour costs

Reduced debt costs

Emphasis on strategic controls

High debt costs

Figure 7.2 restructuring and outcomes

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STUdY TOOLS SUMMARY LO1 Although the number of mergers and acquisitions

completed declined in 2008 and 2009 – largely because of the gFC – merger and acquisition strategies became more frequent in 2010–20 as a path to organisation growth and earning strategic competitiveness. globalisation and deregulation of multiple industries in many economies are two of the factors making mergers and acquisitions attractive to large corporations and small organisations.

LO2 Organisations use acquisition strategies to make a step change to the scope and boundaries of their operations and market. An acquisition offers the opportunity to increase the size, market power and economies of scale of an existing market, or to quickly enter new markets. It can lower average costs and reshape an organisation in terms of concentration or diversification.

LO3 despite the potential advantages, many acquisitions fail to deliver the promised benefits for stakeholders – customers, staff and particularly owners/investors. Acquisitions are complex, time-consuming and difficult to plan and execute. The value, synergy and benefits can be overestimated, and harvesting the benefits relies on reducing duplication by divesting the excess capacity and assets.

LO4 Effective acquisitions are more likely to be friendly (mutually sought), have complementary resources and capabilities, and invest in change management and innovation. The acquisition deal should be based on thorough due diligence, take into account the equity

or debt requirements, and have a clear plan to harvest the benefits.

LO5 restructuring is used to improve an organisation’s performance by correcting for problems created by ineffective management. restructuring by downsizing involves reducing the number of employees and hierarchical levels in the organisation. Although it can lead to short-term cost reductions, they may be realised at the expense of long-term success, because of the loss of valuable human resources (and knowledge) and overall corporate reputation. restructuring by downscoping reduces diversification and focuses on the core business.

• Through a leveraged buyout (LBO), an organisation is purchased so that it can become a private entity. LBOs usually are financed largely through debt. Management buyouts (MBOs), employee buyouts (EBOs) and whole-organisation LBOs are the three types of LBOs. Because they provide clear managerial incentives, MBOs have been the most successful of the three. Often, the intent of a buyout is to improve efficiency and performance to the point where the organisation can be sold successfully within five to eight years.

• Commonly, restructuring’s primary goal is gaining or re-establishing effective strategic control of the organisation. Of the three restructuring strategies, downscoping is aligned most closely with establishing and using strategic controls and usually improves performance more on a comparative basis.

KEY TERMS acquisition

economies of scale

merger

restructuring

takeover

REVIEW QUESTIONS 1. Why are merger and acquisition strategies popular in

many organisations competing in the global economy? What are the economic reasons and the non-economic reasons for the popularity of M&A as a strategy?

2. What reasons account for organisations’ decisions to use acquisition strategies as a means of achieving strategic competitiveness?

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3. What are the seven primary problems that affect an organisation’s efforts to successfully use an acquisition strategy?

4. What are the attributes associated with a successful acquisition strategy?

5. What are the typical reasons why M&A benefits are not realised?

6. Why can it be stated that there is no such thing as an equal merger, and that all M&A deals are effectively acquisitions?

7. What is the restructuring strategy and what are its common forms?

8. What are the short- and long-term outcomes associated with the different restructuring strategies?

EXPERIENTIAL EXERCISES

Exercise 1: How did the deal work out? The text argues that mergers and acquisitions are a popular strategy for businesses. However, returns for acquiring organisations do not always live up to expectations. This exercise seeks to address this notion by analysing, pre and post hoc, the results of actual acquisitions. By looking at the notifications of a deal beforehand, categorising that deal and then following it for a year, you will be able to learn about actual deals and their implications for strategists.

Working in teams, identify a merger or acquisition that was completed in the last few years. Each team must have their M&A choice approved in advance to avoid duplicates.

To complete this assignment, you should be prepared to complete the following: 1. describe the environment for this arrangement at the

time it was completed. Using concepts discussed in the text, focus on management’s representation to

shareholders, the industry environment and the overall rationale for the deal.

2. did the acquirer pay a premium for the target organisation? If so, how much? In addition, search for investor comments regarding the wisdom of this agreement. Attempt to identify how the market reacted to the announcement of the deal (LexisNexis typically provides an article that will address this issue).

3. describe the merger or acquisition. Use concepts from the text such as, but not limited to:

a the reason for the merger or acquisition (i.e. market power, overcoming entry barriers, etc.)

b any problems in achieving acquisition success c whether you would categorise this deal as

successful as of the time of your research, giving the reasons why or why not.

4. Produce a 10–15 minute presentation for your class. Organise the presentation as if you were updating the shareholders of the newly combined organisation.

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131. H. A. Krishnan & d. Park, 2002, The impact of work force reduction on subsequent performance in major mergers and acquisitions: An exploratory study, Journal of Business Research, 55(4): 285–92; P. M. Lee, 1997, A comparative analysis of layoff announcements and stock price reactions in the United States and Japan, Strategic Management Journal, 18: 879–94.

132. d. J. Flanagan & K. C. O’Shaughnessy, 2005, The effect of layoffs on firm reputation, Journal of Management, 31(3): 445–63.

133. P. Williams, K. M. Sajid & N. Earl, 2011, Customer dissatisfaction and defection: The hidden costs of downsizing, Industrial Marketing Management, 40(3): 405–13.

134. P. galagan, 2010, The biggest losers: The perils of extreme downsizing, T+D, November, 27–9; d. S. derue, J. r. Hollenbeck, M. d. Johnson, d. r. Ilgen & d. K. Jundt, 2008, How different team downsizing approaches influence team- level adaptation and performance,

Academy of Management Journal, 51: 182–96; C. d. Zatzick & r. d. Iverson, 2006, High-involvement management and workforce reduction: Competitive advantage or disadvantage?, Academy of Management Journal, 49: 999–1015.

135. Moschieri, The implementation and structuring of divestitures; K. Shimizu & M. A. Hitt, 2005, What constrains or facilitates divestitures of formerly acquired firms? The effects of organizational inertia, Journal of Management, 31: 50–72.

136. d. T. Brown, C. E. Fee & S. E. Thomas, 2009, Financial leverage and bargaining power with suppliers: Evidence from leveraged buyouts, Journal of Corporate Finance, 15: 196–211; S. Toms & M. Wright, 2005, divergence and convergence within Anglo-American corporate governance systems: Evidence from the US and UK, 1950–2000, Business History, 47(2): 267–95.

137. S. B. rodrigues & J. Child, 2010, Private equity, the minimalist organization and the quality of employment relations, Human Relations, 63(9): 1321–42; g. Wood & M. Wright, 2009, Private equity: A review and synthesis, International Journal of Management Reviews, 11: 361–80; A.-L. Le Nadant & F. Perdreau, 2006, Financial profile of leveraged buy-out targets: Some French evidence, Review of Accounting and Finance, (4): 370–92.

138. M. goergen, N. O’Sullivan & g. Wood, 2011, Private equity takeovers and employment in the UK: Some empirical evidence, Corporate Governance: An International Review, 19(3): 259–75; g. d. Bruton, J. K. Keels & E. L. Scifres, 2002, Corporate restructuring and performance: An agency perspective on the complete buyout cycle, Journal of Business Research, 55: 709–24; W. F. Long & d. J. ravenscraft, 1993, LBOs, debt, and r&d intensity, Strategic Management Journal, 14 (Special Issue): 119–35.

139. S. A. Zahra, 1995, Corporate entrepreneurship and financial performance: The case of management leveraged buyouts, Journal of Business Venturing, 10: 225–48.

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International strategy CH

AP TE

R 8

Studying this chapter should provide you with the strategic management knowledge needed to: LO1 explain incentives for organisations to use an international strategy and

identify three basic benefits of successful strategy implementation LO2 explore the determinants of national advantage as the basis for international

business-level strategies LO3 describe the three main international corporate-level strategies LO4 discuss environmental trends affecting the choice of international strategies,

particularly international corporate-level strategies LO5 explain the five modes organisations use to enter international markets LO6 discuss the two major risks of using international strategies LO7 understand the challenges of increased organisation size and operation

complexity in achieving positive outcomes as well as the limitations of international expansion

LO8 discuss the strategic competitiveness outcomes associated with international strategies, particularly with an international diversification strategy.

Learning Objectives

218

ABB is a Swiss–Swedish multinational corporation headquartered in Zurich, Switzerland, operating mainly in robotics, power, heavy electrical equipment and automation technology areas. It ranked 341st in the Fortune Global 500 list of 2018 and has been a Fortune 500 company for 24 years. ABB is a major competitor in the power and automation technologies industries across the major markets globally. It has 147 000 employees operating in more than 100 countries. It has five major businesses – electrification (power products), industrial automation, motion (drives and motors), robotics and discrete automation and power grids. It operates in eight major regions: (1) Northern Europe, (2) Central Europe, (3) the Mediterranean, (4) North America, (5) South America, (6) India, the Middle East and Africa, (7) North Asia and (8) South Asia. Over time, ABB has been a successful company, using its geographic diversification across the globe to its advantage. However, it also exemplifies the difficulty of managing an international strategy and operations. For example, its power business has experienced performance problems in recent years due to poor performance in some countries. As a result, ABB reduced or eliminated operations in Lithuania, Nigeria, the Philippines, Slovakia and six additional countries. The CEO stated that the returns from these operations had not justified the investments made. A major divestment is scheduled for 2020–21, with the sale of the power grid business to Hitachi. The company divested several other businesses from 2014 to 2017, including its cable business to NKT in 2017, US cable factory to Southwire Company LLC in 2015, and steel manufacturing to Trinity Industries and services businesses to Nordic Capital in 2014.

In recent years, most of ABB’s entries into new markets and expansions in existing markets have come from

acquisitions of existing businesses in those markets. It acquired automotive welding business AB Rotech and GE Industrial Solutions in 2018, communication networks business KEYMILE and machine and factory automation specialist Bernecker + Rainer (B&R) in 2017, and Sweden’s robotic automation company SVIA in 2016. ABB also uses other modes of entry and expansion, exemplified by its 2013 joint venture with China’s Jiangsu Jinke Smart Electric Company to design, manufacture and provide follow-up service on high-voltage instrument transformers. It also procured major contracts for business in Brazil and South Africa.

Partly due to the global recession that began in 2008, weak economic performance and some poor expansion decisions, ABB’s performance in 2010–13 was weaker than expected. As a result, the CEO and chief technology officer announced their resignations in 2013. The new CEO shifted focus from power to the automation technology sector, and launched a series of small international acquisitions. The focus on automation technology and a more targeted international strategy have improved financial performance over recent years. ABB remains a highly respected global brand, and even in turbulent times, ABB’s future looks bright.

Sources: ABB, 2020, Meet our five focused leading businesses, https:// new.abb.com/about/our-businesses, 3 June; ABB, 2020, Acquisitions and

disposals, https://new.abb.com/investorrelations/calendar-events-and- publications/acquisitions-and-disposals, 3 June; Crunchbase, 2020, ABB

acquisitions, https://www.crunchbase.com/organization/abb, 4 June; Mergr, 2020, ABB mergers and acquisitions summary, https://mergr.

com/abb-acquisitions, 4 June; Zacks Equity Research, 2013, ABB procures contract in Brazil, http://www.zacks.com, 14 May; Zacks Equity Research,

2013, ABB’s South African project, http://www.zacks.com, 13 May; P. Winters, 2013, ABB loses Banerjee after Hogan’s decision to step down,

Bloomberg Businessweek, http://www.businessweek.com, 13 May; J. Revill & A. Morse, 2013, ABB CEO to resign, Wall Street Journal, http://www.wsj.com, 10 May; Zacks Equity Research, 2013, ABB strengthens footprints in China,

http://www.zacks.com, 10 May.

An international strategy powers ABB’s future

OPENING CASE STUDY

Chapter 8 INTERNATIONAL STRATEGY

219Chapter 8 INTERNATIONAL STRATEGY

219

Th is chapter’s open ing case h igh lights t he increasing impor tance of inter national markets to A BB, an international powerhouse. However, being able to effectively compete in countries and regions outside an organisation’s domestic market is increasingly impor tant to organisations of all ty pes. One reason for this is that the effects of globalisation continue to reduce the number of industrial and consumer markets in which only domestic organisations can compete successfully. In place of what historically were relatively stable and predictable domestic markets, organisations across the globe find they are now competing in globally oriented industries – industries in which organisations must compete in all world markets where a consumer or com mercial good or ser v ice is sold in order to be competitive.1 Unlike domestic markets, global markets are relatively unstable and unpredictable. The disr uption of international supply chains and international travel in 2020 –21 due to the Covid-19 pandemic is a good example of the unpredictable nat u re of globa l ma rkets. Th is has had a major negat ive i mpact on Aust ra l ia n orga n isat ions such as Qantas, 2 whereas some Australian organisations, such as Emperor Champagne, have experienced major grow th. 3

The pu r pose of t h is chapter is to d iscuss how i nter nat iona l st rateg ies ca n be a sou rce of st rateg ic competitiveness for organisations competing in global markets. To do this, we examine a number of topics (see Figure 8.1). After describing factors or incentives that influence organisations to identify international oppor t u n it ies, we d isc uss t h ree basic benef its t hat ca n acc r ue to orga n isat ions t hat successf u l ly use i nter nat iona l st rateg ies. We t hen t u r n ou r at tent ion to t he i nter nat iona l st rateg ies ava i lable to organ isat ions. Speci fically, we exam ine bot h inter nat ional business-level st rateg ies and inter nat ional cor porate-level st rategies. The five modes of ent r y organ isat ions consider when decid ing how to enter inter national markets as a foundation for implementing t heir chosen inter national st rategies are t hen considered. Organisations encounter economic and political risks when using international strategies. These risks must be effectively managed if the organisation is to achieve the strategic competitiveness outcomes of improved per for mance and en hanced in novation. A f ter d iscussing t he outcomes organ isations seek when using international strategies, the chapter closes with mention of two cautions about international strateg y that should be kept in mind.

STRATEGY NOW

ABB’s international acquisitions and joint ventures

Increased market size

Return on investment

Economies of scale and learning

Advantage in location

Identify international opportunities

International business-level strategy

Multi-domestic strategy

Global strategy

Transnational strategy

explore resources and capabilities

International strategies

Exporting

Licensing

Strategic alliances

Acquisitions

Establishment of a new subsidiary

Use core competencies

Modes of entry

Management problems and risk

Management problems and risk

Better performance

Innovation

Strategic competitiveness outcomes

Figure 8.1 Opportunities and outcomes of international strategy

220 PART 2: STRATEGIC ACTIONS: STRATEGY FORMULATION

Identifying international opportunities An international strategy is a strategy through which the organisation sells its goods or services outside its domestic market.4 In some instances, organisations using an international strategy become quite diversified geographically as they compete in numerous countries or regions outside their domestic market. This is the case for A BB in that it competes in over 100 countries. In other cases, organisations experience less geographic or international diversification in that they only compete in a small number of markets outside their ‘home’ market.

T here a re i ncent ives for orga n isat ion s to use a n i nter nat iona l st rateg y a nd to d iversi f y t hei r operat ions geog raph ica l ly, a nd t hey ca n ga i n t h ree basic benef its when t hey successf u l ly do so. 5 We show the incentives and benefits of international strateg y in Figure 8.2.

Incentives to use international strategy Raymond Vernon expressed the classic rationale for an international strategy.6 He suggested that typically an organisation discovers an innovation in its home-countr y market, especially in advanced economies such as those in Australia, Germany, France, Japan, Sweden, Canada and the USA. Often, demand for the product then develops in other countries, causing an organisation to expor t products from its domestic operations to fulfil that demand. Continuing increases in demand can subsequently justify an organisation’s decision to establish operat ions outside of its domest ic base. As Ver non noted, ta k ing t hese act ions in t he for m of inter national st rateg y has t he potential to help an organ isation extend t he life cycle of its product(s).

Ga i n i ng access to needed a nd potent ia l ly sca rce resou rces is a not her reason orga n isat ions use a n i nter nat iona l st rateg y. Key supplies of raw material – especially minerals and energy – are critical to orga n isat ions’ effor ts i n some i ndust r ies to ma nu fact u re t hei r products. Of course, energ y and mining companies have operations t h roughout t he world to ga i n access to t he raw mater ia ls t hey sell to ma nufactu rers requ i r i ng t hose resou rces. R io Ti nto is a lead i ng i nter nat iona l m i n i ng g roup. O perat i ng as a globa l orga n isat ion, the organisation indicates that ‘most of [its] assets are in Australia a nd Nor t h A mer ica, but t hat [t he orga n isat ion] a lso operates i n Eu rope, Sout h A mer ica, A sia a nd A f r ica’. R io Ti nto ex t rac ts t he raw mater ia ls it sells f rom va r ious sou rces i nclud i ng ‘open pit a nd underground mines, mills, refineries and smelters’.7 In other industries where labou r costs account for a sign i ficant por tion of a company’s ex penses, orga n isat ions may choose to establish facilit ies i n ot her cou nt r ies to ga i n access to less e x pen sive labou r. Clot h i ng a nd elect ron ics ma nufactu rers a re exa mples of orga n isat ions pu rsu i ng an international strateg y for this reason.

I ncreased pressu re to i nteg rate operat ions on a globa l sca le is another factor in fluencing organisations to pursue an inter national strateg y. As nations industrialise, the demand for some products and commodities appears to become more similar. This borderless demand for globally branded products such as those Starbucks provides may be due to similarities in lifestyle in developed nations.

I ncreases i n globa l com mu n icat ions a lso faci l itate t he abi l it y of people i n d i fferent cou nt r ies to v isualise a nd model lifestyles i n

international strategy a strategy through which the organisation sells its goods or services outside its domestic market

Incentives Basic

benefits

Extend a product’s life

cycle

Gain easier access to raw

materials

Economies of scale and learning

Opportunities to integrate

operations on a global scale

Opportunities to better use rapidly

developing technologies

Gain access to consumers in

emerging markets

Location advantages

Increased market

size

Figure 8.2  �Incentives�and�basic�benefits� of international strategy

Chapter 8 INTERNATIONAL STRATEGY

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different cultures.8 With over 211 000 employees, and 433 stores in 52 countries, IK EA has become a global retail brand selling a wide variety of furniture and related products. Using operations (including marketing and adver tising) t hat are integ rated globally, IK E A sells all of its f u r n itu re in components t hat can be packaged in flat packs and assembled by consumers after purchase. This business model allows for easy shipping and handling, which in turn facilitates development of a global brand. Winning the international Webby Awa rd i n 2018 for best socia l med ia ca mpa ig n, bei ng a fi na l ist i n t he 2018 Ca n nes Lions, a nd w inning the prestigious Cannes Lions 2011 Adver tiser of the Year Award for its ‘creative and effective global adver tising effor ts’ are indicators of IK EA’s effectiveness at integrating its operations on a global basis.9

In an increasing number of industries, technolog y drives globalisation because the economies of scale necessar y to reduce costs to the lowest level often require an investment greater than that needed to meet domestic market demand. Moreover, in emerging markets the increasingly rapid adoption of technologies such as the internet and mobile applications permits greater integration of trade, capital, culture and labour. In this sense, technologies are the foundation for efforts to bind together disparate markets and operations across the world. International strateg y makes it possible for organisations to use technologies and global connectedness to organise their operations into a seamless whole.10

The potential of large demand for goods and ser vices from people in emerging markets such as China and India is another strong incentive for organisations to use an international strateg y.11 China and India offer the potential for two billion customers, which has been an att ractive proposition for the physical retail and supermarket categor y. The world’s largest physical retailers, Walmar t and France’s Car refour Group, entered the Chinese market but have struggled. In 2011, Carrefour acquired minority stakes in three mainland Chinese retailers to strengthen its presence, but by 2019 chose to exit the market by selling an 80 per cent stake in its 210 retail stores to Chinese competitor Suning.12 Walmart has been more successful, and has grown to over 420 stores, but recent performance indicates it is str uggling to compete with the strong online market led by A libaba and JD.com.13

Even though India, another emerging market economy, differs from Western countries in many respects – including culture, politics and the precepts of its economic system – it also offers a huge potential market and its government is becoming more supportive of foreign direct investment.14 However, differences among Chinese, Indian and Western-style economies and cultures make the successful use of an international strategy challenging. In particular, organisations seeking to meet customer demands in emerging markets must learn how to manage an ar ray of political and economic risks,15 such as those we discuss later in the chapter.

We have now d isc ussed i ncent ives t hat i n fluence orga n isat ions to use i nter nat iona l st rateg ies. Organisations derive three basic benefits by successfully using international strategies: increased market size, increased econom ies of scale and lea r n ing, and development of a compet it ive advantage t h rough location (e.g. access to low-cost labour, critical resources or customers). These benefits are examined here in terms of both their costs (such as higher coordination expenses and limited access to knowledge about host countr y political in fluences)16 and their challenges.

Three basic benefits of international strategy As noted, effectively using one or more international strategies can result in three basic benefits for the organisation. These benefits facilitate the organisation’s effor t to achieve strategic competitiveness (see Figure 8.1) when using an international strateg y.

Increased market size Orga n isat ions ca n ex pa nd t he size of t hei r potent ia l ma rket – somet i mes d ra mat ica l ly – by usi ng a n international strateg y to establish stronger positions in markets outside their domestic market. As noted, access to additional consumers is a key reason many sectors see China as a major source of grow th.

222 PART 2: STRATEGIC ACTIONS: STRATEGY FORMULATION

Takeda, a large Japanese pharmaceutical company, acquired Swiss dr ug maker Nycomed for US$13.7 billion in 2011. Buying Nycomed made Takeda a major player in European markets. More significantly, the acquisition broadened Takeda’s distribution capability in emerging markets ‘at a time when pharmaceutical fi rms world-wide were w restling with the impact on revenue from the expiration of patents’. In fact, the Nycomed deal was thought to increase Takeda’s sales in Ch ina about fou r fold.17 A long w ith Starbucks, Wa l ma r t a nd Ta keda a re t wo add it iona l compa n ies rely i ng on i nter nat iona l st rateg y as t he pat h to increased market size in China.

Orga n isat ions such as A BB, Wa l ma r t a nd Ta keda u ndersta nd t hat effect ively ma nag i ng d i fferent consumer tastes and practices linked to cultural values or traditions in different markets is challenging. Nonetheless, they accept this challenge because of the potential to enhance the organisation’s performance. Other organisations accept the challenge of successfully implementing an international strateg y largely because of limited growth opportunities in their domestic market. This appears to be at least partly the case for major competitors Coca-Cola and PepsiCo, organisations that have not been able to generate significant g row t h i n t hei r home ( Nor t h A mer ica n) ma rkets for some t i me. Indeed, most of t hese orga n isat ions’ g row t h is occu r r ing in inter national markets. These two organ isations approach inter national g row t h somewhat differently. PepsiCo, the world’s largest snack-food maker as a result of its Frito-Lay division, relies on its ‘global beverage business, and the only component str uggling is its Nor th A merica unit’ and that international ‘combined snacks and beverage por tfolios also synergistically help the company when working with retailers and food ser vice operators’.18 Less diversified than PepsiCo in terms of products, but not in terms of geography, Coca-Cola is the world’s largest producer of soft drink concentrates and sy r ups and the world’s largest producer of juice and juice-related products. Selling its products in more than 200 countries, Coca-Cola derives only approximately 32 per cent of its revenue from sales in Nor th A merica, suggesting that the organisation’s inter national strategies are critical to its effor ts to be competitively successful, and that it does not rely on sales in North America as the cornerstone of its efforts to outperform PepsiCo, its chief rival.19

A n i nter nat iona l ma rket ’s overa l l size a lso has t he potent ia l to a ffec t t he deg ree of benefit a n orga n isat ion ca n accr ue as a resu lt of using a n inter nat ional st rateg y. In general, la rger inter nat ional ma rkets offer h igher potent ia l retu r ns a nd t hus pose less r isk for t he orga n isat ion choosi ng to i nvest in t hose ma rkets. Related ly, t he st reng t h of t he science base of t he inter national ma rkets in wh ich an organisation may compete is impor tant in that scientific knowledge and the human capital needed to use that knowledge can facilitate effor ts to more effectively sell and/or produce products that create value for customers.20

Economies of scale and learning By expanding the number of markets in which they compete, organisations may be able to enjoy economies of scale, par ticularly in their manufacturing operations. More broadly, organisations able to standardise the processes used to produce, sell, distribute and ser vice their products across countr y borders enhance their ability to learn how to continuously reduce costs while hopefully increasing the value their products create for customers. For example, rivals A irbus SAS and Boeing have multiple manufacturing facilities and outsou rce some activ ities to organ isations located th roughout the world, par tly for the pu r pose of developing economies of scale as a means of being able to create value for customers.

Economies of scale are critical in a number of settings in addition to the airline manufacturing industry. Automobile manufacturers cer tainly seek economies of scale as a benefit of their international strategies. Competing in markets throughout the world, Ford Motor Company ‘is counting on rapid grow th in Asia to fuel a dramatic expansion of sales and boost profits over the next several years’. 21 Overall, Ford seeks to i ncrease t he a n nual nu mber of products it sells outside of Nor t h A mer ica to eight m illion u n its (up from about 5.3 million sold internationally in 2010). Ford is using a global cor porate-level international strateg y to reach this objective (this strateg y is discussed later in the chapter). Demonstrating the use of this international strateg y is the fact that Ford is now r un as a single global business developing cars and

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tr ucks that can be built and sold throughout the world. The organisation intends for about 75 per cent of all the vehicles it sells globally to be variants of five basic sets of manufacturing platforms, and will rely on these to reduce costs by increasing economies of scale. Ford continues to strive to reduce the number of platfor ms it uses for its veh icles. The goal in 2015 was bold, and it intended to increase t he nu mber of product ty pes it sells in China from five to 15 and in India from five to eight. Sales peaked in China in 2016 with 965 800 units across the five Ford Lincoln products, but have significantly decreased since with competition from German and local Chinese competitors.22

Organisations may also be able to exploit core competencies in international markets through resource and knowledge sharing between units and network partners across country borders.23 By sharing resources and knowledge in this manner, organisations can learn how to create synergy, which in turn can help each organisation learn how to produce higher-quality products at a lower cost. This may be the case for the members of the International Aero Engines (IAE) consortium: Pratt & Whitney, Rolls-Royce, Japanese Aero Engines and MTU Aero Engines. Relying on their members’ joint capabilities and core competencies, I A E developed an innovative PurePower geared turbofan (GTF) engine platform. One version of this engine is in some of A irbus’ A 320neo aircraft, which the consor tium sees as a positive reaction to its innovation. 24 Working in multiple international markets also provides organisations with new learning opportunities,25 perhaps even in terms of research and development (R&D) activities. Increasing the organisation’s R&D ability can contribute to its effor ts to enhance innovation, which is critical to both shor t- and long-term success. However, resea rch resu lts suggest t hat to ta ke adva ntage of inter nat ional R& D invest ments, orga n isat ions need to al ready have a st rong R& D system i n place to absorb k nowledge resu lt i ng f rom effective R&D activities. 26

Location advantages Locating facilities in markets outside their domestic market can sometimes help organisations reduce costs. This benefit of an international strateg y accr ues to the organisation when its facilities in international locations provide easier access to lower-cost labour, energ y and other natural resources. Other location adva ntages i nclude access to cr it ica l suppl ies a nd to customers. Once posit ioned favou rably w it h a n att ract ive locat ion, orga n isat ions must ma nage t hei r facilit ies effect ively to gai n t he f u ll benefit of a location advantage.27

A n organisation’s costs, par ticularly those dealing with manufacturing and distribution, as well as the nature of international customers’ needs, affect the degree of benefit it can capture through a location advantage. 28 Cultural in fluences may also a ffect location advantages and d isadvantages. Inter national business transactions are less difficult for an organisation to complete when there is a strong match among t he cu ltu res w it h wh ich t he orga n isat ion is i nvolved wh ile i mplement i ng its i nter nat ional st rateg y. 29 Finally, physical distances influence organisations’ location choices as well as how to manage facilities in the chosen locations. 30

International strategy types Organisations choose to use one or both basic types of international strategy: business-level international strategy and corporate-level international strategy. At the business level, organisations select from among the generic strategies of cost leadership, differentiation, focused cost leadership, focused differentiation and integrated cost leadership/differentiation. At the corporate level, multi-domestic (polycentric strategy), global (ethnocentric strategy) and transnational (‘glocalisation’ strategy) international strategies (transnational is a combination of the global/ethnocentric and local multi-domestic/polycentric strategies) are considered. To contribute to the organisation’s efforts to achieve strategic competitiveness in the form of improved performance and enhanced innovation (see Figure 8.1), each international strategy the organisation uses must be based on one or more core competencies.31

polycentric strategy strategy based on the belief that the local people, customs and traditions are best suited to business in that country. This means hiring or promoting local staff, and adopting many local processes rather than a single standardised global approach

ethnocentric strategy strategy based on the belief that the people, customs and traditions of your own race or nationality are better than those of others. In business, this means hiring or promoting staff from the country of the headquarters, and standardising based on the HQ country’s processes

‘glocalisation’ strategy strategy based on the belief that products or services should be developed and distributed globally but is also adjusted to accommodate the user or consumer in a local market. Glocalisation is a combination of the words ‘globalisation’ and ‘localisation’

224 PART 2: STRATEGIC ACTIONS: STRATEGY FORMULATION

International business-level strategy Organisations considering the use of any international strateg y fi rst develop domestic-market strategies (at the business level and at the cor porate level if the organisation has diversified at the product level). One reason t h is is i mpor ta nt is t hat t he orga n isat ion may be able to use some of t he capabi l it ies a nd core competencies it has developed in its domestic market as the foundation for competitive success in international markets.32 However, research results indicate that the value created by relying on capabilities a nd core competencies developed i n domest ic ma rkets as a sou rce of success i n i nter nat ional ma rkets diminishes as an organisation’s geographic diversity increases. 33

As we know from our discussion of competitive dynamics in Chapter 5, organisations do not select and then use strategies in isolation from market realities. In the case of international strategies, conditions in an organisation’s domestic market affect the degree to which the organisation can build on capabilities and core competencies it established in that market to create capabilities and core competencies in international ma rkets. T he reason for t h is is g rou nded i n M ichael Por ter ’s a na lysis of why some nat ions a re more competitive than other nations and why and how some industries within nations are more competitive relat ive to t hose indust r ies in ot her nat ions. Por ter ’s core a rg u ment is t hat cond it ions or factors in an orga n isat ion’s home base – t hat is, i n its domest ic ma rket – eit her h i nder t he orga n isat ion’s effor ts to use an international business-level strateg y for the pur pose of establishing a competitive advantage in international markets, or suppor t those effor ts. Por ter identifies four factors as determinants of a national advantage that some countries possess (see Figure 8.3). 34 Interactions among these four factors in fluence an organisation’s choice of international business-level strateg y.

The fi rst determinant of national advantage is factors of production. This determinant refers to the inputs necessary for an organisation to compete in any industry. Labour, land, natural resources, capital and infrastr ucture (such as transpor tation, postal and communication systems) are examples of such inputs. There are basic factors (e.g. natural and labour resources) and advanced factors (e.g. digital communication systems and a highly educated workforce). Other production factors are generalised (highway systems and the supply of debt capital) and specialised (skilled personnel in a specific industr y, such as the workers in a

Informal institutions – culture

Formal institutions – regulatory

Political

Factors of production

Demand conditions

Organisation strategy, structure

and rivalry

Related and

supporting industries

Figure 8.3 Determinants of national advantage

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port that specialise in handling bulk chemicals). If a country possesses advanced and specialised production factors, it is likely to ser ve an industr y well by spawning strong home-countr y competitors that also can be successful global competitors.

Ironically, countries often develop advanced and specialised factors because they lack critical basic resources. For example, some Asian countries, such as South Korea, lack abundant natural resources but have a workforce with a strong work ethic, a large number of engineers, and systems of large organisations to create an expertise in manufacturing. Similarly, Germany developed a strong chemical industry, partially because Hoechst and BA SF spent yea rs creat ing a sy nt het ic ind igo dye to reduce t hei r dependence on impor ts, unlike Britain, whose colonies provided large supplies of natural indigo. 35

The second factor or determinant of national advantage – demand conditions – is characterised by the nature and size of customers’ needs in the home market for the products organisations competing in an industry produce. Meeting the demand generated by a large number of customers creates conditions through which an organisation can develop scale-efficient facilities and refine the capabilities, and perhaps core competencies, required to use those facilities. Once refined, the probability that the capabilities and core competencies will benefit the organisation as it diversifies geographically increases.

This may be the case for some Chinese manufacturing companies that have spent years building their businesses in China and developing economies of scale and scale-efficient facilities in the process of doing so. Today, many of these organisations hope to be able to rely on these facilities and the capabilities and core competencies they have developed to use those facilities to become ‘global players’, capable of using international business-level strategies to profitably sell their products in multiple international markets.36

The third factor in Por ter’s model of the determinants of national advantage is related and suppor ting industries. Italy has become the leader in the shoe industr y because of related and suppor ting industries. For example, a well-established leather-processing industry provides the leather needed to construct shoes and related products. A lso, many people travel to Italy to purchase leather goods, prov id ing suppor t in distribution. Suppor ting industries in leather-working machiner y and design ser vices also contribute to the success of the shoe industr y. In fact, the design ser vices industr y suppor ts its own related industries, such as sk i boots, fash ion appa rel a nd f u r n itu re. In Japa n, ca meras a nd copiers a re related indust r ies. Similarly, it is argued that the creative resources associated with ‘popular cartoons such as manga and the animation sector along with technological knowledge from the consumer electronics industr y facilitated the emergence of a successful v ideo game industr y in Japan’. 37 In a like manner, Ger many is k now n for the quality of its machine tools and eastern Belgium is known for skilled manufacturing (suppor ting and related industries are impor tant in these two settings, too). 38

Orga n isat ion st rateg y, st r uctu re a nd r ival r y ma ke up t he fi nal deter m i na nt of nat ional adva ntage a nd a lso foster t he g row t h of cer ta i n i ndust r ies. The t y pes of st rateg y, st r uct u re a nd r iva l r y a mong organisations var y g reatly from nation to nation. The excellent tech nical t raining system in Ger many fosters a strong emphasis on continuous product and process improvements. In Japan, unusual cooperative and competitive systems facilitate the cross-functional management of complex assembly operations. In Italy, the national pr ide of the count r y’s designers spaw ns st rong indust r ies not only in shoes but also spor ts cars, fashion apparel and furniture. In the USA, competition among computer manufacturers and software producers contributes to fur ther development of these industries.

The four determinants of national advantage (see Figure 8.3) emphasise the structural characteristics of a specific economy that contribute to some degree to national advantage and that influence the organisation’s selection of an international business-level strategy. Individual governments’ policies also affect the nature of the determinants as well as how organisations compete within the boundaries governing bodies establish and enforce within a par ticular economy. 39 W hile studying their external environment (see Chapter 2), organisations considering the possibility of using an international strateg y need to gather information and data that will allow them to understand the effects of governmental policies and their enforcement on their nation’s ability to establish advantage relative to other nations. This also relates to the degree of competitiveness on a global basis of the industr y in which organisations might compete on a global scale.

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Those lead ing compan ies should recogn ise t hat an organ isation based in a count r y w it h a national competitive advantage is not guaranteed success as it implements its chosen international business-level strateg y. The actual strategic choices managers make may be the most compelling reasons for success or failu re as organ isat ions d iversif y geog raph ically. Accord ingly, t he factors illust rated in Fig u re 8.3 a re likely to produce the foundation for an organisation’s competitive advantages only when it develops and implements an appropriate international business-level strategy that takes advantage of distinct countr y factors. Thus, t hese d istinct count r y factors should be t horough ly considered when ma k ing a decision about the international business-level strateg y the organisation will use. In a competitive rivalr y sense, the organisation w ill then make continuous adjustments to its inter national business-level strateg y in light of the nature of competition it encounters in different international markets and in light of customers’ needs. Lexus, for example, did not have the share of the lu xur y car market in China that it desired in 2011. Accordingly, Toyota (Lexus’ manufacturer) adjusted how it implemented its international differentiation business-level strategy in China to better serve customers. The organisation is doing this by ‘turning to the feature that cemented its early success in the USA: extreme customer ser vice. Show room amenities such as cappuccino machines, wi-fi, Lego tables for the kids, and air por t shuttles for busy executives dropping off their cars for ser vicing are examples of the ser vices now being offered to customers in China’.40 Lexus had double-digit grow th in China from 2015–20 and, in April 2019, Lexus sold more vehicles in China than in the USA.41

International corporate-level strategy A n organisation’s international business-level strateg y is also based at least par tially on its international cor porate-level strateg y. Some international cor porate-level strategies give individual countr y units the authority to develop their own business-level strategies, while others dictate the business-level strategies in order to standardise the organisation’s products and sharing of resources across countries.42

Inter national cor porate-level strateg y focuses on the scope of an organisation’s operations th rough geog raph ic d iversi ficat ion.4 3 Inter nat iona l cor porate-level st rateg y is requ i red when t he orga n isat ion operates in multiple industries that are located in multiple countries or regions (e.g. South-East Asia or the European Union (EU)) and in which they sell multiple products. The headquarters unit guides the strategy, although, as noted, business- or country-level managers can have substantial strategic input depending on the ty pe of international cor porate-level strateg y the organisation uses. We show the three international corporate-level strategies in Figure 8.4. As shown, the international corporate-level strategies vary in terms of two dimensions: the need for global integration and the need for local responsiveness.

Multi-domestic strategy A multi-domestic strategy is an inter nat ional st rateg y in wh ich st rategic and operat ing decisions a re decentralised to the strategic business units in individual countries or regions for the pur pose of allowing each u n it t he oppor tu n ity to tailor products to t he local ma rket.4 4 Th is is also k now n as a polycent r ic strategy (poly meaning many). With this strategy, the organisation’s need for local responsiveness is high while its need for global standardisation or integration is low. Influencing these needs is the organisation’s belief that consumer needs and desires, indust r y cond itions (e.g. the number and ty pe of competitors), political and legal structures, and social norms vary by country. Thus, a multi-domestic strategy focuses on competition within each country in that market needs are thought to be segmented by country boundaries. To meet t he speci fic needs a nd preferences of local customers, cou nt r y or reg ional ma nagers have t he autonomy to custom ise t he orga n isat ion’s products. T h is approach of ten ex tends to hu ma n resou rce ( H R) pract ices a nd busi ness processes. Therefore, t hese st rateg ies shou ld ma x i m ise a n orga n isat ion’s compet it ive response to t he id iosy ncrat ic requi rements of each ma rket.4 5 The mult i-domest ic st rateg y is most appropr iate for use when t he d i fferences between t he ma rkets a n orga n isat ion ser ves a nd t he customers in them are significant.

multi-domestic strategy an international strategy in which strategic and operating decisions are decentralised to the strategic business unit in each country so as to allow that unit to tailor products to the local market. See also polycentric strategy

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The use of multi-domestic strategies usually expands the organisation’s local market share because the organisation can pay attention to the local clientele’s needs. However, using a multi-domestic strategy results in less knowledge sharing for the cor poration as a whole because of the differences across markets, decent ra l isat ion a nd t he d i fferent i nter nat iona l busi ness-level st rateg ies employed by loca l u n its.46 Moreover, multi-domestic strategies do not allow the development of economies of scale and thus can be more costly.

Unilever is a large European consumer products company selling products in over 180 countries. The organ isat ion has more t han 40 0 global brands t hat a re g rouped into t h ree business u n its: foods, home care and personal care. Historically, Unilever has used a highly decentralised approach for the pur pose of managing its global brands. This approach allows regional managers considerable autonomy to adapt the characteristics of specific products to satisfy the unique needs of customers in different markets. However, more recently, Unilever has sought to increase the coordination between its independent subsidiaries in order to establish an even stronger global brand presence.47 As such, Unilever may be transitioning from a multi-domestic strateg y (polycentric) to a transnational strateg y (‘glocalisation’).

Global strategy A global strategy is a n i nter nat iona l st rateg y i n wh ich a n orga n isat ion’s home office deter m i nes t he strategies business units are to use in each country or region.48 This is also known as an ethnocentric strategy. This strategy indicates that the organisation has or values a high need for global integration and a low need for local responsiveness. These needs ind icate that, compared w ith a multi-domestic st rateg y, a global strateg y seeks greater levels of standardisation of products across countr y markets. This standardisation of ten ex tends to H R pract ices a nd busi ness processes. The orga n isat ion usi ng a globa l st rateg y seeks to develop economies of scale as it produces the same or vir tually the same products for distribution to customers throughout the world who are assumed to have similar needs. The global strategy offers greater oppor tu n it ies to ta ke in novat ions developed at t he cor porate level or in one ma rket and apply t hem in other markets.49 Improvements in global accounting and financial reporting standards facilitate use of this strateg y.50 A global strateg y is most effective when the differences between markets and the customers the organisation is ser ving are insignificant.

global strategy an international strategy through which the organisation offers standardised products across country markets, with competitive strategy being dictated by the home office

High

Low

Low High

Global strategy Transnational

strategy

Multi-domestic strategyN

ee d

f o

r gl

o b

al in

te gr

at io

n

Need for local responsiveness

Figure 8.4 International corporate-level strategies

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Efficient operations are required to successfully implement a global strateg y. Increasing the efficiency of an organ isat ion’s inter nat ional operat ions mandates resou rce sha r ing and g reater coord inat ion and cooperation across market boundaries. Centralised decision making, as designed by headquar ters, details how resources are to be shared and coordinated across markets. Research results suggest that the outcomes an organisation achieves by using a global strateg y become more desirable when the strateg y is used in areas where regional integration among countries is occur ring. 51

Cemex is a globa l bu i ld i ng mater ia ls compa ny t hat uses t he i nter nat iona l st rateg y. Cemex is t he world’s leading supplier of ready-mix concrete and one of the world’s largest producers of white Por tland cement. Cemex sells to customers in more than 50 countries in multiple regions, including the A mericas, Europe, A frica the Middle East and Asia. With annual sales of more than US$18 billion, the organisation employs more than 42 000 people. To implement its global strateg y, Cemex has centralised a number of its activities. The shared services model is an example of how this organisation centralises operations in order to gain scale economies, among other benefits. According to company documents, this model ‘converges, cent ra l ises, a nd st rea m l i nes back-office ser v ices – such as hu ma n resou rces a nd pay rol l, i n for mat ion technolog y, and transactional and financial ser vices – for our operations across regions’. 52 In essence, the shared ser v ices model integrates and centralises some suppor t functions from the organisation’s value chain (see Chapter 3). This integ ration and cent ralisation br ings about the ty pes of benefits sought by organisations when using a global strateg y. Significant cost savings, increases in the productivity of the involved support functions, the fostering of economies of scale and the freeing up of resources to enable an improved focus on core tasks are examples of the benefits Cemex is accr uing by using its shared ser vices model.

Because of increasing global competition and the need to simultaneously be cost-efficient and produce differentiated products, the number of organisations using a transnational international cor porate-level strateg y is increasing.

Transnational strategy A transnational strategy is an international strategy through which an organisation seeks to achieve both global efficiency and local responsiveness. This is also k now n as ‘glocalisation’ strategy (combination of global and local). With this strategy, the organisation has strong needs for both global integration and local responsiveness. Starbucks is using the transnational strategy to pursue profitable growth in international markets. For example, in China, Starbucks is trying to standardise its operations (global integration) while it simultaneously decent ralises some decision-ma k ing responsibility to local levels so products can be made to meet customers’ unique needs (local responsiveness). Chai tea lattes, green tea frappuccinos with black sesame, and black bean muffins are examples of products Starbucks has adapted to meet local tastes in China.53 In Australia, McDonald’s tailors its product range to Australian tastes, and even puts beetroot in its Aussie burger.

Realising the twin goals of global integration and local responsiveness is difficult in that global integration requires close global coordination while local responsiveness requires local flexibility. Flexible coordination – building a shared vision and individual commitment through an integrated network – is required to implement the transnational strategy. Such integrated networks allow an organisation to manage its connections with customers, suppliers, partners and other parties more efficiently rather than using arm’s-length transactions.54 The transnational strategy is difficult to use because of its conflicting goals (see Chapter 11 for more on the implementation of this and other corporate-level international strategies). On the positive side, effectively implementing a transnational strategy often produces higher performance than does implementing either the multi-domestic or global strategy.55

Transnational strategies are becoming increasingly necessary to successfully compete in international ma rkets. Reasons for t h is i nclude t he fact t hat cont i nu i ng i ncreases i n t he nu mber of v iable globa l competitors challenge organisations to reduce their costs. Simultaneously, the increasing sophistication of

transnational strategy an international strategy through which the organisation seeks to achieve both global efficiency and local responsiveness

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markets with greater information flows made possible largely by the diffusion of the internet, and the desire for specialised products to meet consumers’ unique needs, pressures organisations to differentiate their products in local markets. Differences in culture and institutional environments also require organisations to adapt their products and approaches to local environments. However, some argue that transnational st rateg ies a re not requ i red to successf u lly compete i n i nter nat ional ma rkets. Those hold i ng t h is v iew suggest that most multinational organisations try to compete at the regional level (e.g. the EU) rather than at the countr y level. To the degree this is the case, the need for the organisation to simultaneously offer unique products that are adapted to local markets and to produce those products at lower costs permitted by developing scale economies is reduced.56

Next we discuss trends in the global environment that are affecting the choices organisations make when deciding which international cor porate-level strategies to use and in which international markets to compete.

environmental trends Although the transnational strategy is difficult to implement, an emphasis on global efficiency is increasing as more industries and the companies competing within them encounter intensified global competition. Magnifying the scope of this issue is the fact that, simultaneously, organisations are experiencing demands for local adaptations of their products. These demands can be from customers (for products to satisfy their tastes and preferences) and from gover n ing bod ies (for products to sat isf y a cou nt r y ’s reg ulat ions). In addition, most multinational organisations desire coordination and sharing of resources across countr y markets to hold down costs, as illustrated by the Cemex example.57

Because of t hese cond it ions, some la rge mu lt i nat iona l orga n isat ions w it h d iverse products use a multi-domestic strateg y with cer tain product lines and a global strateg y with others when diversifying geog raph ically. Many mult inat ional organ isat ions may requi re t h is ty pe of flex ibility if t hey a re to be strategically competitive, in par t due to trends that change over time.

Liability of foreign ness and regionalisation are two impor tant t rends in fluencing an organ isation’s choice and use of international strategies, particularly international corporate-level strategies. We discuss these trends next.

Liability of foreignness The dramatic success of Japanese organisations such as Toyota and Sony in the 1980s was a powerful jolt to many managers and awakened them to the impor tance of international competition and the fact that many markets were rapidly becoming globalised. In the 21st century, Brazil, Russia, India and China (BR IC) represent major international market oppor tunities for orga n isat ions f rom ma ny cou nt r ies, i nclud i ng t he USA , Japa n, Sout h Korea and members of the EU.58 However, even if foreign markets seem attractive, as appears to be the case with the BR IC countries, there are legitimate concerns for organisations considering entering these markets. This is the liability of foreignness, 59 a set of costs associated with various issues orga n isat ions face when enter i ng foreig n ma rkets, i nclud i ng u n fa m i l ia r ope rat i ng env i ron ment s; econom ic, ad m i n ist rat ive a nd cultural differences; and the challenges of coordination over distances.60 Four types of distances commonly associated with liability of foreignness are cultural, administrative, geographic and economic.61

Wa lt Disney Compa ny ’s ex per ience wh i le open i ng t heme pa rks i n countries outside the USA demonstrates the liability of foreignness. For example, Disney suffered ‘lawsuits in France, at Disneyland Paris, because

Disney executives learned from their mistakes with Disneyland Paris when entering other foreign markets, such as Hong Kong.

Source: Alamy Stock Photo/Howard Harrison

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of the lack of fit between its transfer red personnel policies and the French employees charged to enact them’.62 Disney executives learned from this experience in building the organisation’s theme park in Hong Kong as the company ‘went out of its way to tailor the park to local tastes’.63 Thus, as with Walt Disney Company, organisations thinking about using an international strateg y to enter foreign markets must be aware of the four ty pes of distances they will encounter when doing so and determine actions to take to reduce the potentially negative effects associated with those distances.

Regionalisation Regionalisation is a second global environmental trend influencing an organisation’s choice and use of international strategies. This trend is becoming prominent largely because where an organisation chooses to compete can affect its strategic competitiveness.64 As a result, the organisation considering using international strategies must decide if it should enter individual country markets or if it would be better served by competing in one or more regional markets rather than in individual country markets. This is also known as a regiocentric strategy. The growing popularity of a regiocentric approach almost warrants this being considered along with the ‘big three’ approaches of ethnocentric, polycentric and glocalisation.

Cur rently, the global (ethnocentric) international strateg y is used less frequently. It remains difficult to successfully implement even when the organisation uses internet-based strategies.65 In addition, the amount of competition v y ing for a limited amount of resources and customers can limit organisations’ focus to a specific region rather than on countr y-specific markets that are located in multiple par ts of the world. A regional (regiocentric) focus allows organisations to marshal their resources to compete effectively rather than spreading their limited resources across multiple countr y-specific international markets.66

However, an organisation that competes in industries where the international markets differ greatly (in which it must employ a multi-domestic strategy) may wish to narrow its focus to a particular region of the world. In so doing, it can better understand the cultures, legal and social norms, and other factors that are important for effective competition in those markets. For example, an organisation may focus on East Asian markets only rather than competing simultaneously in the Middle East, Europe and East Asia. Or the organisation may choose a region of the world where the markets are more similar and some coordination and sharing of resources would be possible. In this way, the organisation may be able not only to better understand the markets in which it competes, but also to achieve some economies, even though it may have to employ a multi-domestic strategy. For instance, research suggests that most large retailers are better at focusing on a particular region rather than being truly global.67 Organisations commonly focus much of their international market entries on countries adjacent to their home country, which might be referred to as their home region.68

Countries that develop trade agreements to increase the economic power of their regions may promote regional strategies. The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) – which includes around 647 million people – the EU and South America’s Organization of American States (OAS) are associations of countries that have developed trade agreements to promote the flow of trade across country boundaries within their respective regions.69 Many European organisations acquire and integrate their businesses in Europe to better coordinate pan-European brands as the EU creates more unity in European markets. With this process likely to continue as new countries join the EU, some international organisations may prefer to focus on regions rather than multiple country markets when entering international markets.

Most organisations enter regional markets sequentially, begin ning in markets w ith which they are more familiar. They also introduce their largest and strongest lines of business into these markets fi rst, followed by other product lines once the initial effor ts are deemed successful. The additional product lines ty pically are introduced in the original investment location.70 However, research also suggests that the size of the market and industr y characteristics can in fluence this decision.71

A fter selecting its business- and cor porate-level international strategies, the organisation determines how it w i l l enter t he i nter nat iona l ma rkets i n wh ich it has chosen to compete. We t u r n to t h is topic next.

regiocentric strategy strategy based on the belief that the regional people, customs and traditions are best suited to business in that region. This means hiring or promoting staff from, or with knowledge of, that region, and adopting regional processes that apply across multiple countries in the region rather than a single standardised global approach or an individual country approach

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Choice of international entry mode Five modes of entr y into international markets are available to organisations. We show these entr y modes and their characteristics in Figure 8.5. Each means of market entr y has its advantages and disadvantages, suggesting that the choice of entr y mode can affect the degree of success the organisation achieves by implementing an international strateg y. Large organisations competing in multiple markets commonly use more than one and may use all five entr y modes.

Exporting For many organisations, expor ting is the initial mode of entr y used.72 Exporting is an entr y mode through which the organisation sends products it produces in its domestic market to inter national markets. For example, Populous was the 2019 winner of the Australian Exporter of the Year award. The company provides

Exporting

Type of entry Characteristics

High cost, low control

Low cost, low risk, little control, low returns

Shared costs, shared resources, shared risks, problems of integration (e.g. two corporate cultures)

Quick access to new markets, high costs, complex negotiations, problems of merging with domestic operations

Complex, often costly, time consuming, high risk, maximum control, potential above-average returns

Licensing

Strategic alliances

Acquisitions

New wholly owned subsidiary

Figure 8.5 Modes of entry and their characteristics

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spor t a nd enter ta i n ment venue desig n. Popu lous’ i mpressive por t fol io i ncludes icon ic venues such as Suncor p Stadium in Brisbane, Tottenham Hotspur Stadium in London and Yankee Stadium in New York.73

By ex por t i ng, orga n isat ions avoid t he ex pense of establish i ng operat ions i n host cou nt r ies (i.e. i n countries outside their home country) in which they have chosen to compete. However, organisations must establish some means of marketing and distributing their products when exporting. Usually, contracts are formed with host-country organisations to handle these activities. Potentially high transportation costs to expor t products to international markets and the expense of tariffs placed on the organisation’s products as a result of host countries’ policies are examples of expor ting costs. The loss of some control when the organisation contracts w ith local companies in host countr ies for marketing and d istr ibution pur poses is a not her d isadva ntage of ex por t i ng. Moreover, cont ract i ng w it h loca l compa n ies ca n be ex pensive, making it harder for the expor ting organisation to earn profits.74 Evidence suggests that, in general, using an inter national cost leadership strateg y when expor ting to developed countr ies has the most positive effect on organisation per for mance, while using an inter national d ifferentiation strateg y w ith a larger scale when expor ting to emerging economies leads to the greatest amount of success.75

Orga n isat ions ex por t most ly to cou nt r ies t hat a re closest to t hei r faci l it ies because of t he lower t ra nspor tat ion costs a nd t he usua lly g reater si m ila r it y between geog raph ic neighbou rs. For exa mple, around 17 per cent of New Zealand’s goods expor ts and 21 per cent of ser v ices expor ts are to Australia and 29 per cent of its ser vices impor ts are from Australia.76 The internet has also made expor ting easier. Organisations of any size can use the internet to access critical information about foreign markets, examine a target market, research the competition and find lists of potential customers.77 Governments also use the internet to suppor t the effor ts of those applying for expor t and impor t licences, facilitating international trade among countries while doing so.

Licensing Licensing is an entr y mode in which an agreement is for med that allows a foreign company to purchase the r ight to manufacture and sell an organisation’s products w ithin a host countr y’s market or a set of host cou nt r ies’ ma rkets.78 The licensor is nor mally paid a royalty on each u n it produced a nd sold. The licensee takes the risks and makes the monetary investments in facilities for manufacturing, marketing and distributing products. As a result, licensing is possibly the least costly form of international diversification. As with expor ting, licensing is an attractive entr y mode option for smaller organisations, and potentially for newer organisations as well.79

China, which accounts for almost one-third of all cigarettes smoked worldw ide, is obv iously a huge ma rket for t h is product. Foreig n ciga rette orga n isat ions wa nt to have a st rong presence i n Ch i na but have had t rouble enter ing t h is ma rket, la rgely because of successf ul lobby ing by state-ow ned tobacco orga n isat ions aga i nst such ent r y. Because of t hese cond it ions, ciga ret te ma nu fact u rer Ph i l ip Mor r is International (PMI) had an incentive to form a deal with these state-owned organisations. Accordingly, PMI and the China National Tobacco Cor poration (CNTC) completed a licensing agreement at the end of 2005. This agreement provides CNTC access to the most famous brand in the world, Marlboro.80 Because it is a l icensi ng ag reement rat her t ha n a foreig n d i rect i nvest ment by PM I, Ch i na ma i nta i ns cont rol of d ist r ibut ion. However, t he Ch i nese state-ow ned tobacco monopoly, as pa r t of t he ag reement, a lso gains PMI’s help in distributing its own brands in select foreign markets. The result of this distribution approach for Chinese cigarettes is uncertain though. An analyst made the following observation about this distribution ar rangement: ‘The question is whether it can pluck three cigarette brands – RGD, Harmony and Dubliss – from relative obscurity and elevate them to an international, or at least regional, presence’.81 The licence agreement and PMI’s future appear to depend on a transition to less harmful product options (assuming that is possible with cigarettes).82

A nother potential benefit of licensing as an entr y mode is the possibility of earning greater returns from product innovations by selling the organisation’s innovations in inter national markets as well as in the domestic market.83 EDU-Science, a Hong Kong-based manufacturer of educational toys that have a

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base in science, is doing this through its multiyear licensing agreement with Scientific American magazine. Scientific American, founded in 1845 and the oldest continuously published magazine in the USA, remains an impor tant science publication. The agreement called for EDU-Science to produce a Scientific American- branded toy line ranging from ‘Science Fair Projects’ to ‘How Things Work Today’. Using some of its existing innovative products, in addition to others the organisation may develop, the EDU-Science toys that are part of the Scientific American brand are ‘distributed internationally and to all retail channels’.8 4

Licensing also has disadvantages. For example, once an organisation licenses its product or brand to another par ty, it has little control over selling and d istr ibution. Developing licensing agreements that protect the interests of both par ties while suppor ting the relationship embedded w ithin an agreement helps deal with this potential disadvantage.85 In addition, licensing provides the least potential returns because returns must be shared between the licensor and the licensee. A nother disadvantage is that the international organisation may learn the technology of the party with whom it formed an agreement and then produce and sell a similar competitive product after the licensing agreement expires. Komatsu, for example, first licensed much of its technology from International Har vester, Bucyrus-Erie and Cummins Engine to compete against Caterpillar in the earth-moving equipment business. Komatsu then dropped these licences and developed its own products using the technology it had gained from the US companies.86 Because of potential disadvantages such as those we have discussed, the parties to a licensing arrangement should formally finalise an agreement only after they are convinced that both parties’ best interests are protected.

Strategic alliances Increasingly popular as an entr y mode among organisations using international strategies,87 a strategic alliance finds an organisation collaborating with another company in a different setting in order to enter one or more inter nat ional ma rkets.8 8 Organ isat ions sha re t he r isks and t he resou rces requi red to enter inter nat ional ma rkets when using st rategic alliances. 89 Moreover, because pa r t ners br ing t hei r un ique resources together for the pur pose of working collaboratively, strategic alliances can facilitate developing new capabi l it ies a nd possibly core competencies t hat may cont r ibute to t he orga n isat ion’s st rateg ic compet it iveness. 9 0 Indeed, developi ng a nd lea r n i ng how to use new capabi l it ies a nd /or competencies (pa r t icula rly t hose related to tech nolog y) is of ten a key pu r pose for wh ich organ isat ions use st rategic alliances as an entr y mode.91 Organisations should be aware that establishing tr ust between par tners is critical for developing and managing technolog y-based capabilities while using strategic alliances.92

French-based Limagrain is the fourth-largest seed company in the world through its subsidiary Vilmorin & Cie. An international agricultural cooperative group specialising in field seeds, vegetable seeds and cereal products, part of Limagrain’s strategy calls for it to enter additional international markets. Limagrain is using strategic alliances as an entry mode. The organisation formed a strategic alliance with the Brazilian seed company Sementes Guerra in Brazil. Corn is the focus of the alliance between these companies. Guerra is a family-owned company engaged in seed research, the production of corn, wheat and soybeans, and the distribution of those products to farmers in Brazil and neighbouring countries. Commenting about the purpose of this alliance, a Limagrain official said: ‘Our investment in research, combined with Guerra’s knowledge of the Brazilian market and its commercial network, will extend the range of varieties [of seeds and corn] proposed to farmers’.93

Not all alliances formed for the purpose of entering international markets are successful.94 Incompatible partners and conflict between the partners are primary reasons for failure when organisations use strategic allia nces as a n ent r y mode. A not her issue here is t hat i nter nat ional st rateg ic allia nces a re especially difficult to manage. Tr ust is an impor tant aspect of alliances and must be carefully managed. The degree of t r ust bet ween pa r t ners st rongly i n fluences a l l ia nce success. T he probabi l it y of a l l ia nce success increases as the amount of tr ust between par tners expands. Effor ts to build tr ust are affected by at least four fundamental issues: the initial condition of the relationship, the negotiation process to ar rive at an agreement, par tner interactions and exter nal events.95 Tr ust is also in fluenced by the countr y cultures

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involved in t he alliance.96 Organ isat ions should be awa re of t hese issues when t r y ing to appropr iately manage tr ust.

Research has shown that equity-based alliances over which an organisation has more control are more likely to produce positive retu r ns.97 ( We d iscuss equity-based and ot her ty pes of st rategic alliances in Chapter 9.) However, if tr ust is required to develop new capabilities through an alliance, equity positions can ser ve as a barrier to the necessar y relationship building. If conflict in a strategic alliance formed as an entr y mode is not manageable, using acquisitions to enter international markets may be a better option.98

Acquisitions When an organisation acquires another company to enter an international market, it has completed a cross- border acquisition. Specifically, a cross-border acquisition is an entr y mode through which an organisation from one countr y acquires a stake in, or purchases all of, an organisation located in another countr y.

As free trade expands in global markets, organisations throughout the world are completing a larger number of cross-border acquisitions. The ability of cross-border acquisitions to provide rapid access to new markets is a key reason for their growth. In fact, of the five entry modes, acquisitions often are the quickest means for organisations to enter international markets.99

Today, there is a broad range of cross-border acquisitions being completed by a diverse set of companies. Increasi ngly, Ch i nese compa n ies a re acqu i r i ng orga n isat ions i n ot her nat ions as a mea ns of enter i ng international markets. LDK Solar Co., with headquar ters in Hi-Tech Industrial Park, X iny u City, Jiang xi province in China, is a leading ver tically integrated manufacturer of photovoltaic products as well as a leading manufacturer of solar wafers in terms of capacity. On acquiring 70 per cent of US-based Solar Power Inc. (SPI), which is also a ver tically integrated photovoltaic solar developer, LDK Solar’s CEO commented, ‘This transaction … expands our downstream ver tical integration oppor tunities and provides LDK Solar and SPI the opportunity to jointly explore opening manufacturing operations in the US to further enhance SPI’s competitive advantage in North America’.100 Thus, the expectation was that both organisations would benefit from this transaction.

JA Solar is another Chinese company involved with solar power that is using cross-border acquisitions as an entry mode. One of the world’s largest manufacturers of high-performance solar cells and solar power products, JA Solar acquired 100 per cent of Silver Age Hold ings, ‘a Br itish Virgin Islands company that owns 100 per cent of Solar Silicon Valley Electronic Science and Technolog y Co. Ltd’.101 A JA Solar official commented about the expected benefits of this acquisition: ‘By boosting JA Solar’s internal wafer capacity t h rough t h is acqu isit ion, we ex pect to ach ieve g reater econom ies of scale a nd improve t he compa ny ’s profitability’.102

I nterest i ngly, orga n isat ions use cross-border acqu isit ions less f requent ly to enter ma rkets where cor r uption affects business transactions and, hence, the use of inter national strategies. Organisations’ preference is to use joi nt ventu res to enter ma rkets i n wh ich cor r upt ion is a n issue rat her t ha n usi ng acquisitions. (Discussed fully in Chapter 9, a joint venture is a type of strategic alliance in which two or more organisations create a legally independent company and share their resources and capabilities to operate it.) However, these ventures fail more often, although this is less frequently the case for organisations ex per ienced w it h enter ing ‘cor r upt’ ma rkets. W hen acquisitions a re made in such count r ies, acquirers commonly pay smaller premiums to buy organisations in different markets.103

Although increasingly popular, acquisitions as an entry mode are not without costs, nor are they easy to successfully complete and operate. Cross-border acquisitions carr y some of the disadvantages of domestic acquisitions (see Chapter 7). In addition, they often require debt financing to complete, which car ries an extra cost. A nother issue for organisations to consider is that negotiations for cross-border acquisitions can be exceedingly complex and are generally more complicated than are the negotiations associated with domestic acquisitions. Dealing w it h t he legal and reg ulator y requirements in t he target organ isation’s cou nt r y and obtain ing appropr iate infor mat ion to negot iate an ag reement a re also f requent problems.

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Finally, the merging of the new organisation into the acquiring organisation is often more complex than is the case with domestic acquisitions. The organisation completing the cross-border acquisition must deal not only with different corporate cultures but also with potentially different social cultures and practices.104 These d i fferences ma ke integ rating t he two organ isat ions af ter t he acquisit ion more challenging; it is d i fficu lt to capt u re t he potent ia l sy nerg y when i nteg rat ion is slowed or st y m ied because of cu lt u ra l differences.105 Therefore, while cross-border acquisitions are popular as an entr y mode primarily because they provide rapid access to new markets, organisations considering this option should be fully aware of the costs and risks associated with using it.

New wholly owned subsidiaries A greenfield venture is an entr y mode through which an organisation invests directly in another countr y or market by establishing a new wholly owned subsidiar y. The process of creating a green field venture is often complex and potentially costly, but this entr y mode affords maximum control to the organisation and has t he g reatest amou nt of potent ial to cont r ibute to t he organ isat ion’s st rategic compet it iveness as it implements international strategies. This potential is especially tr ue for organisations with strong intangible capabilities that might be leveraged through a greenfield venture.106 Moreover, having additional cont rol over its operat ions i n a foreig n ma rket is especia lly adva ntageous when t he orga n isat ion has proprietar y technolog y.

Research also suggests that ‘wholly owned subsidiaries and expatriate staff are prefer red’ in ser vice industries where ‘close contacts with end customers’ and ‘high levels of professional skills, specialised k now-how, and customisation’ are required.107 Other research suggests that as investments, green field ventures are used more prominently when the organisation’s business relies significantly on the quality of its capital-intensive manufacturing facilities. By contrast, cross-border acquisitions are more likely to be used as an entr y mode when an organisation’s operations are human capital intensive; for example, if a strong local union and high cultural distance would cause difficulty in transfer ring knowledge to a host nation through a green field venture.108

The risks associated with green field ventures are significant in that the costs of establishing a new business operation in a new countr y or market can be substantial. To suppor t the operations of a newly established operation in a foreign countr y, the organisation may have to acquire knowledge and exper tise about t he new ma rket by h i r i ng eit her host-cou nt r y nat iona ls, possibly f rom compet itors, or t h rough consultants, which can be costly. This new knowledge and exper tise often is necessar y to facilitate the building of new facilities, establishing distribution networks and learning how to implement marketing st rateg ies t hat ca n lead to compet it ive success i n t he new ma rket.10 9 Impor ta nt ly, wh i le ta k i ng t hese actions the organisation maintains control over the technology, marketing and distribution of its products. Research also suggests that when the country risk is high, organisations prefer to enter with joint ventures instead of green field investments. However, if organisations have previous experience in a countr y, they prefer to use a wholly owned green field venture rather than a joint venture.110

The globalisation of the air cargo industry has implications for companies such as United Parcel Service (UPS) and Fed Ex. The impact of this globalisation is especially per tinent to China and the Asia-Pacific region. China’s air cargo market is expected to grow by 11 per cent per year until 2023. Accordingly, UPS and FedEx opened new hub operations in Shanghai and Guangzhou, respectively. These hubs supported the organisations’ distribution and logistics business during the Olympics in Beijing in 2008. The investments a re wholly ow ned because t hese organ isat ions need to maintain t he integ r ity of t hei r IT and log ist ics systems in order to maximise efficiency. Green field ventures also help these two organisations maintain the proprietar y nature of their systems.111

Dynamics of mode of entry Several factors affect the organisation’s choice about how to enter international markets. Market entr y is of ten ach ieved in it ially t h rough ex por t ing, wh ich requ i res no foreig n manufactu r ing ex per t ise and

greenfield venture the establishment of a new wholly owned subsidiary

236 PART 2: STRATEGIC ACTIONS: STRATEGY FORMULATION

invest ment on ly in d ist r ibution. Licensing can facilitate t he product improvements necessar y to enter foreign markets, as in the Komatsu example. Strategic alliances are a popular entr y mode because they allow an organisation to connect with an experienced partner already in the market. Partly because of this, geographically diversifying organisations often use alliances in uncertain situations, such as an emerging economy where there is significant risk (e.g. Venezuela and Colombia).112 However, if intellectual proper ty r ights in t he emerging economy a re not well protected, t he nu mber of organ isat ions in t he indust r y is growing fast and the need for global integration is high, other entr y modes such as a joint venture (see Chapter 9) or a wholly owned subsidiar y are prefer red.113 In the final analysis though, all three modes – expor t, licensing and strategic alliance – can be effective means of initially entering new markets and for developing a presence in those markets.

Acquisitions, green field ventures and sometimes joint ventures are used when organisations want to establish a strong presence in an international market. Aerospace organisations A irbus and Boeing have used joint ventures, especially in large markets, to facilitate entry, while military equipment organisations such as T ha les SA have used acqu isit ions to bu i ld a globa l presence. Japa nese veh icle ma nu fact u rer Toyota has establ ished a presence i n t he USA t h rough bot h g reen field vent u res a nd joi nt vent u res. Because of Toyota’s highly efficient manufacturing processes, the organisation wants to maintain control over manufacturing when possible. To date, Toyota has established manufactur ing facilities in over 20 countries. Demonstrating the importance of greenfield ventures and joint ventures to Toyota’s international diversification strategy is the fact that the organisation opened its first new manufacturing plant in Japan in over 20 years in 2011, whereas a new international plant was opened in Mexico as recently as December 2019.114 Both acquisitions and green field ventures are likely to come at later stages in the development of an organisation’s international strategies.

Thus, to enter a global market, an organisation selects the entry mode that is best suited to the situation at hand. In some instances, the various options will be followed sequentially, beginning with expor ting a nd end i ng w it h g reen field ventu res. In ot her cases, t he orga n isat ion may use severa l, but not a ll, of the different entr y modes, each in different markets. The decision regarding which entr y mode to use is primarily a result of the industry’s competitive conditions, the country’s situation and government policies, and the organisation’s unique set of resources, capabilities and core competencies.

T he g ia nt US reta i ler Wa l ma r t Stores I nc.’s operat ions a re d iv ided i nto t h ree d iv isions: Wa l ma r t Stores US, Sam’s Club and Walmar t International. Through Walmar t International, this organisation is diversified geographically and uses several entr y modes to enter the international markets it ser ves. Of course, Walmar t uses the international cost leadership business-level strateg y and, historically at least, has used the global (ethnocentric) strateg y as its international cor porate-level strateg y.

STRATEGY NOW

Walmart’s international growth strategy

Mondelez International: a global leader in snack foods

In 2012, with 80 per cent of its sales in faster-growing international markets, Kraft Foods decided that it needed to split into two separate companies – a North American grocery business and an international snack foods company. The business focused on North America would sell well-known, traditional Kraft brands such as Velveeta, Kraft Macaroni & Cheese, and Oscar Mayer. These goods were profitable despite being low growth. The snack food company would focus on such power brands as Oreo, Cadbury and Ritz. It would also

promote local brands tailored to the idiosyncratic needs of local markets.

The snack foods business was named Mondelez by combining two words, monde (meaning ‘world’) and delez (a new word meaning ‘delicious’), to communicate the meaning of products that are ‘world delicious’. The separation into different businesses has allowed each to use its own specialised strategy that best suits its products and markets, and the competitive landscape it faces. Mondelez International is the global market

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risks in an international environment I nter nat iona l st rateg ies a re r isk y, pa r t ic u la rly t hose t hat wou ld cause a n orga n isat ion to become substantially more d iversi fied in ter ms of t he geog raph ic ma rkets ser ved. Political and econom ic r isks cannot be ignored by organisations using international strategies (see specific examples of political and economic risks in Figure 8.6).

Political risks Pol it ica l r isks ‘denote t he probabi l it y of d isr upt ion of t he operat ions of mu lt i nat iona l enter pr ises by polit ica l forces or events whet her t hey occu r i n host cou nt r ies, home cou nt r y, or resu lt f rom cha nges in the inter national environment’.115 Possible disr uptions to an organisation’s operations when seek ing to i mplement its i nter nat iona l st rateg y create nu merous problems, i nclud i ng u ncer ta i nt y created by government regulation, the existence of many (possibly conflicting) legal authorities or corruption, and the potential nationalisation of private assets.116 Organisations investing in other countries when implementing their inter national strateg y may have concer ns about the stability of the national gover nment and the effects of unrest and government instability on their investments or assets.117 To deal with these concerns, organisations should conduct a political risk analysis of the countries or regions they may enter using one of the five entr y modes. Through political risk analysis, the organisation examines potential sources and factors of non-commercial disruptions of their foreign investments and the operations flowing from them.118

Russia has ex per ienced a relat ively h igh level of inst itut ional instability in t he yea rs follow ing its transition to a more democratic government. Decentralised political control and frequent changes in policies created chaos for many, but especially for t hose in t he business landscape. In an effor t to regain more central control and reduce the chaos, Russian leaders took actions such as prosecuting powerful private

STRATEGY NOW

Mondelez International

leader in biscuits, chocolate, candy and powdered beverages and holds the number two position in the global markets for chewing gum and coffee. About 45 per cent of its sales come from fast-growing emerging markets. Some of the local brands designed for customers in the emerging markets include Barni (soft biscuits) sold in Russia, Bubbalo (bubble gum) sold in India, Mexico, Portugal and Spain, and Corte Noire (coffee) sold in France, Ireland, Russia, Ukraine and the UK. Mondelez is reinvesting profits into emerging markets seeking more growth.

In the years since Mondelez formed in 2012, sales revenue, net income and assets have declined, particularly in the US. The combined international net revenues for Asia-Pacific, Eastern Europe, Africa, Latin America and the Middle East have grown (excluding the effects of foreign currency valuation changes). Performance was especially strong in the BRIC countries, with double-digit growth. Mondelez is listed on the NASDAQ (as MDLZ), and the share price has more than doubled from US$23 in 2012 to US$52 in 2020.

Despite its success in the emerging markets and several international acquisitions, Mondelez’s revenue

and net income has declined recently due to lower coffee prices and a reduction in demand for chewing gum and candy. The CEO and other top executives suggested that volatility in global markets also has affected the organisation’s results. These are problems experienced by most of the companies that enter and compete in global markets. Without its international presence, Mondelez would be relying on US domestic performance alone, and would be unlikely to have the same share price growth.

Sources: Mondelez International, 2020, Reporting first quarter 2020 earnings, http://www.mondelezinternational.com, 7 June; Mondelez Investor Relations, 2020, Mondelēz International Reports 2018 Results,

https://ir.mondelezinternational.com/news-releases/news-release- details/mondelez-international-reports-2018-results, 7 June; N. Munshi,

2013, Mondelez targets emerging markets growth, Financial Times, http://www.ft.com, 7 May; D. Gelles, D. McCrum & N. Munshi, Activists

hope to profit when cookie crumbles, Financial Times, http://www.ft.com, 14 April; 2013, Kraft and Mondelez: Snacks and snags, Financial Times,

http://www.ft.com, 8 April; S. Strom, 2012, For Oreo, Cadbury and Ritz, a new parent company, New York Times, http://www.nytimes.com, 23 May;

2012, Kraft Foods proposes Mondelez International Inc. as new name for global snacks company, PR Newswire, http://www.printthis.clickability.

com, 21 March; M. J. de la Merced, 2012, Kraft, ‘Mondelez’ and the art of corporate rebranding, New York Times Dealbook, http://dealbook.

nytimes.com, 21 March.

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Risks

Political

Economic

• Political • Economic

• China’s use of economic and trade power to achieve political objectives • Global military engagements (e.g. Afghanistan, Syria) • Nationalist and protectionist political trends • Shifts in the geopolitical power balance causing uncertainty and conflict • Regions with political instability (e.g. Middle East, South China Sea) • Social disruption due to political changes (e.g. Hong Kong)

• Economic impact of climate change and extreme weather events • Cyber security threats and incidents • Economic impacts of Covid-19 pandemic • Disruption to global supply chains • High national debt of various regions and countries • Trade disputes, tariffs and trade protectionism • Failure of countries to pay debt obligations • Economic impacts of terrorism • Currency and exchange rate fluctuations

Figure 8.6 risks in the international environment

organisation executives, seeking to gain state control of organisation assets and not approving some foreign acqu isit ions of Russian businesses. The in it ial inst itut ional instability, followed by t he act ions of t he central government, caused some organisations to delay or avoid significant foreign direct investment in Russia. A lthough leaders in Russia have tried to reassure potential investors about their proper ty rights, prior actions, the fact that other laws (e.g. environmental and employee laws) are weak, and commonplace government cor r uption make organisations war y of investing in Russia.119

Economic risks Economic risks include fundamental weaknesses in a countr y’s or region’s economy with the potential to cause adverse effects on organisations’ effor ts to successfully implement their international strategies. As illustrated in the example of Russian institutional instability and proper ty rights, political risks and economic risks are interdependent. If organisations cannot protect their intellectual proper ty, they are highly unlikely to use a means of entering a foreign market that involves significant and direct investments. Therefore, cou nt r ies need to create, sustain and enforce st rong intellectual proper ty r ights in order to attract foreign direct investment.

A nother economic risk is the perceived security risk of a foreign organisation acquiring organisations that have key natural resources or organisations that may be considered strategic in regard to intellectual proper ty. For instance, many Chinese organisations have been buying natural resource organisations in Australia and Latin A merica as well as manufacturing assets in the USA. This has made the governments of the key resource organisations ner vous about such strategic assets falling under the control of state- owned Chinese organisations.120 Terrorism has also been of concern. Indonesia, for example, has difficulty competing for investment against China and India, countries that are viewed as having fewer security risks.

As noted earlier, the differences and fluctuations in the value of currencies are among the foremost economic risks of using an international strategy.121 This is especially true if the level of the organisation’s geog raphic d iversi fication increases to the point where the organisation is t rad ing in a large number of cur rencies. The value of the local cur rency relative to other cur rencies deter mines the value of the international assets and earnings of organisations. A n increase in the value of the dollar can harm an organisation’s expor ts to international markets because of the price differential of the products. Thus, government oversight and control of economic and financial capital in a country affect not only local economic activity but also foreign investments in the country. Certainly, the significant political and policy changes in Eastern Europe since the early 1990s have stimulated much more foreign direct investment there.122

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the challenge of international strategies Effect ively usi ng i nter nat iona l st rateg ies creates basic benefits a nd cont r ibutes to t he orga n isat ion’s strategic competitiveness. However, for several reasons, attaining these positive outcomes is difficult.

Managing international strategies: size and complexity P u rsu i ng i nter nat iona l st rateg ies, pa r t ic u la rly a n i nter nat iona l d iversi f icat ion st rateg y, t y pica l ly leads to g row t h in a n orga n isat ion’s size a nd t he complex ity of its operat ions. In tu r n, la rger size a nd g reater operat iona l complex it y ma ke a n orga n isat ion more d i fficu lt to ma nage. At some poi nt, size a nd complex it y eit her cause orga n isat ions to become v i r tua l ly u n ma nageable or i ncrease t he cost of t hei r ma nagement beyond t he va lue t hat usi ng i nter nat iona l st rateg ies creates. Di fferent c u lt u res and institut ional practices (such as t hose associated w it h gover n mental agencies) t hat a re pa r t of t he cou nt r ies i n wh ich a n orga n isat ion competes when usi ng a n i nter nat iona l st rateg y a lso ca n create difficulties.123

Toyota’s experiences over the past decade appear to demonstrate the relationship between organisation size and managerial complexity. Toyota became the world’s largest car manufacturer at the end of 2008, sur passing General Motors (GM had been the largest automobile manufacturer for 77 years). As is always the case, however, larger size makes an organisation harder to manage successfully. In spite of its legendary focus on and reputation for quality, Toyota experienced product quality problems, par ticularly in the all- impor tant US market, after becoming the world’s largest manufacturer. Perhaps the increased difficulty of ma nag i ng a la rger orga n isat ion cont r ibuted to Toyota’s product quality problems. However, Toyota recovered f rom t hese d i fficu lt ies a nd cont i nues seek i ng add it iona l g row t h t h rough its i nter nat iona l st rateg y. Say i ng t hat ‘Ind ia is a n i nteg ral pa r t of [t he orga n isat ion’s] global g row t h st rateg y ’, Toyota introduced the Etios Liva as a competitor in India’s small car market. From 2012 to 2020, Toyota sold more than 10 million vehicles per year.124

I nte rest i ng ly, Vol k swage n-Porsc he ha s replaced Toyota a s t he world’s la rgest ca r a nd t r uc k ma nu fact u rer. H igh ly d iversi fied, t h is compa ny ’s por t fol io of passenger ca rs i ncludes Aud i, Bent ley, Bugatti, Lamborghini, SEAT and Skoda, in addition to Porsche and V W. Time will tell if this organisation is now of a size and complexity level that will make it difficult to successfully manage its international strategies.

The V W emissions scandal that was uncovered in the USA in 2015 has affected all V W diesel sales. I n  what has been ca l led t he ‘d iesel dupe’ or ‘d ieselgate’, t he US Env i ron menta l P rotec t ion Agenc y (EPA) found that many V W cars being sold in A merica had a ‘defeat device’ in diesel engines, or hidden software, that could detect when they were being tested, and then change the performance to improve em ission resu lts. On t he road, t he eng i nes t hen went back to g reater em issions t ha n t he sta nda rd. The Ger ma n ca r g ia nt has si nce ad m itted cheat i ng t hese tests. Vol kswagen took a €16.2 billion h it to its 2015 resu lts a nd slashed its d iv idend to help pay for t he em issions-test cheat i ng sca nda l. T here have a lso been i mpac ts on ot her ca r compa n ies, w it h a reg u lator y cla mpdow n on ot her Ger ma n- based automa kers, i nclud i ng Mercedes-Benz a nd Opel, ag reei ng to reca ll a tota l of 630 0 0 0 ca rs to fi x diesel-engine technology blamed for high pollution. V W has already agreed a settlement with US authorities to buy back or fi x about half a m illion ca rs fitted w it h illegal test-fi x i ng sof twa re, a nd has also set up environmental and consumer compensation funds. These consumer compensation funds have been put to active use with substantial fines and payouts to V W owners in various countries. In 2019, V W settled two major class actions with Australian V W owners for between A$87 million and A$147 million. In 2020, Canadian prosecutors proposed a fi ne of C$196 million, and the UK High Cour t r uled that V W software was a ‘defeat device’ under EU r ules. Globally, the scandal had cost V W over €30 billion in fines, penalties, payouts and buybacks by 2020.125

240 PART 2: STRATEGIC ACTIONS: STRATEGY FORMULATION

Limits to international expansion Learning how to effectively manage an international strategy improves the likelihood of achieving positive outcomes such as enhanced performance. However, at some point the degree of geographic and (possibly) product d iversi ficat ion t he organ isat ion’s inter nat ional st rategies br ing about causes t he retu r ns from using the strategies to level off and eventually become negative.126

There are several reasons that explain the limits to the positive effects of the diversification associated with inter national strategies. First, greater geographic dispersion across countr y borders increases the costs of coordination between units and the distribution of products. Second, trade barriers, logistical costs, cultural diversity and other differences by countr y (e.g. access to raw materials and different employee skill levels) greatly complicate the implementation of an international strateg y.

I nst it ut iona l a nd cu lt u ra l factors ca n be st rong ba r r iers to t he t ra nsfer of a n orga n isat ion’s core competencies f rom one ma rket to a not her. Ma rket i ng prog ra ms of ten have to be redesig ned a nd new distribution networks established when organisations expand into new markets. In addition, organisations may encounter different labour costs and capital expenses. In general, it becomes increasingly difficult to effectively implement, manage and control an organisation’s international operations with increases in geographic diversity.

The amount of diversification in an organisation’s international operations that can be managed varies from company to company and is affected by managers’ abilities to deal with ambiguity and complexity. The problems of cent ral coord inat ion a nd integ rat ion a re m it igated if t he orga n isat ion’s inter nat ional operations find it competing in friendly countries that are geographically close and have cultures similar to its own countr y’s culture. In that case, the organisation is likely to encounter fewer trade bar riers, the laws and customs are better understood, and the product is easier to adapt to local markets.127

Relationships between the organisation using an international strateg y and the governments in the countries in which the organisation is competing can also be constraining.128 The reason for this is that the differences in host countries’ governmental policies and practices can be substantial, creating a need for the focal organisation to learn how to manage what can be a large set of different enforcement policies and practices. At some point, the differences create too many problems for the organisation to be successful. Using strategic alliances is another way organisations can deal with this limiting factor. Par tnering with companies in different countries allows the focal organisation to rely on its par tner to help deal with local laws, r ules, regulations and customs. But these par tnerships are not risk free and managing them tends to be difficult.129

T he Me x ica n orga n isat ion F E M SA , deta i led i n t he ‘St rateg ic foc us’ feat u re, demonst rates how international expansion can benefit an organisation. It also shows how organisations need to be aware of regional economic and political differences.

Mexico’s FeMSa: building its international prowess

Fomento Economico Mexicano SAB de CV (FEMSA) has a market capitalisation of US$39.02 billion. It has more than 180 000 employees and is a major competitor in the beverage industry, convenience stores and drugstores/pharmacies. In fact, Coca-Cola FEMSA SAB is the largest bottler of Coke not only in Latin America but in the entire world. In 2013, it continued to add to its strength in this business with the purchase of a regional

bottler, Grupo Yoli, which was the largest soft drink bottler in southern Mexico. In 2008, FEMSA decided to expand its convenience store chain, Oxxo, to other countries outside of Mexico. It now operates more than 10 600 stores in Mexico and Colombia. In 2012, it opened 1040 new stores, which amounts to almost three per day. Oxxo is the largest and fastest-growing chain of convenience stores in Latin America.

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Until 2010, FEMSA was a major beer producer in Mexico, with operations in Brazil (which it entered through the acquisition of Kaiser Brewery) as well. However, Heineken acquired the FEMSA brewery business at that time. Yet because the sale involved an exchange of equity, FEMSA now holds 20 per cent of the equity in the Heineken Group (the second-largest equity stake in this company).

Although FEMSA continues to promote organic growth, most of its major advances in size have come from acquisitions. For example, in 2013 FEMSA made its first foray outside of Latin America. It acquired a 51 per cent stake (controlling interest) in Coca-Cola’s bottling operations in the Philippines. It now has operations in nine countries, including eight in Latin America. In 2013, it also expanded its drugstore/ pharmacy chain with the acquisition by its retail subsidiary, FEMSA Comercio, of Farmacias FM Moderno. At the time of its acquisition, Farmacias FM Moderno

operated more than 100 stores in Mexico’s western state of Sinaloa.

Therefore, FEMSA is a multibillion-dollar business that has used its stash of cash to build substantial growth through acquisitions. It has expanded its presence in Mexico but also in all of the economies in Latin America (e.g. Brazil, Argentina, Colombia, Guatemala, Ecuador, Uruguay, Chile and Venezuela).

Sources: FEMSA, 2020, Strategic business, http://femsa.com/en; FEMSA, 2020, Our history, https://www.femsa.com/en/about-femsa/our-history,

7 June; New York Times, 2013, Fomento Economico Mexicano SAB de CV, DealBook, http://dealbook.on.nytimes.com, 16 May; E. Garcis, 2013,

Mexico’s FEMSA: From convenience stores to pharmacies, Financial Times, http://blogs.ft.com, 15 May; Zacks Equity Research, 2013, FEMSA

expands drugstore chain, http://finance.yahoo.com, 14 May; Market Wire, 2013, FEMSA announces acquisition of Farmacias FM Moderno, http:// www.nbcnews.com, 13 May; B. Case, 2013, Coca-Cola FEMSA expands with $700 million Yoli purchase, Bloomberg Businessweek, http://www.

businessweek.com, 18 January; A. Thomson, 2012, Mexico’s FEMSA eyes Coca-Cola’s Philippines unit, Financial Times, http://blogs.ft.com, 21

February; M. J. de la Merced & C. V. Nicholson, 2010, Heineken in deal to buy a big Mexican brewer, New York Times, http://www.nytimes.com, 12 January; D. D. Stanford & T. Black, 2008, Mexico’s Oxxo convenience

stores to branch out, Houston Chronicle, http://www.chron.com, 22 February.

Strategic competitiveness outcomes A s prev iously d iscussed, i nter nat iona l st rateg ies ca n resu lt i n t h ree basic benefits (i ncreased ma rket size, economies of scale and learning, and location advantages) for organisations. These basic benefits are gained when the organisation successfully manages political and economic risks while implementing its international strategies; in turn, these benefits are critical to the organisation’s efforts to achieve strategic competitiveness (as measured by improved performance and enhanced innovation – see Figure 8.1). Overall, the degree to which organisations achieve strategic competitiveness through international strategies is expanded or increased when they successfully implement an international diversification strateg y. As an extension or elaboration of international strateg y, an international diversification strategy is a strateg y through which an organisation expands the sales of its goods or services across the borders of global regions and countries into a potentially large number of geographic locations or markets. Instead of entering one or just a few markets, the international diversification strateg y finds organisations using international business-level and inter national cor porate-level strategies for the pur pose of enter ing multiple regions and markets in order to sell their products.

International diversification and returns Evidence suggests numerous reasons for organisations to use an international diversification strateg y,130 mea n i ng t hat i nter nat iona l d iversi ficat ion shou ld be related posit ively to orga n isat ions’ per for ma nce as measu red by t he retu r ns t hey ear n on t heir invest ments. Research has show n t hat as inter national d iversi ficat ion i ncreases, a n orga n isat ion’s ret u r ns decrease i n it ia l ly but t hen i ncrease qu ick ly as it learns how to manage the increased geographic diversification it has created.131 In fact, the stock market is particularly sensitive to investments in international markets. Organisations that are broadly diversified into multiple international markets usually achieve the most positive stock returns, especially when they diversify geographically into core business areas.132

international diversification strategy a strategy through which an organisation expands the sales of its goods or services across the borders of global regions and countries into different geographic locations or markets

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Many factors contribute to the positive effects of international diversification, such as private versus government ownership, potential economies of scale and experience, location advantages, increased market size and the oppor tunity to stabilise returns. The stabilisation of returns helps reduce an organisation’s overall risk.133 Large, well-established organisations and entrepreneurial ventures can both achieve these positive outcomes by successfully implementing an international diversification strateg y.

Based in Tokyo, Asahi Group Holdings Ltd is a Japanese global beer, spirits, soft drinks and food business group. Asahi has used an international diversification strategy as it acquires companies in foreign markets. A nheuser-Busch InBev (InBev) sold its Dutch business Grolsch Brewer y, Italian business Peroni Brewer y and the UK’s craft Meantime Brewer y and Miller Brands UK to Asahi for €2.3 billion in 2016.134 Asahi has acquired all or par t of companies in Australia, New Zealand and China, and plans to acquire companies in other markets in the years to come for the pur pose of expanding its geographic scope, strengthening its product por tfolio and gaining economies of scale, par ticularly in supply chain management.

Enhanced innovation In Chapter 1, we indicated that developing new technolog y is at the hear t of strategic competitiveness. A s noted i n ou r d isc ussion of t he deter m i na nts of nat iona l adva ntage (see Fig u re 8. 3), a nat ion’s competitiveness depends, in par t, on the capacity of its industries to innovate. Eventually and inevitably, competitors outperform organisations that fail to innovate. Therefore, the only way for individual nations a nd i nd iv idua l orga n isat ions to susta i n a compet it ive adva ntage is to upg rade it cont i nua lly t h rough innovation.135

A n international diversification strateg y and the geographic diversification it brings about create the potential for organisations to achieve greater returns on their innovations (through larger or more numerous ma rkets) wh i le reduci ng t he of ten substa nt ia l r isks of R& D i nvest ments. Add it iona l ly, i nter nat iona l diversification may be necessary to generate the resources required to sustain a large-scale R&D operation. A n env ironment of rapid technological obsolescence makes it d i fficult to invest in new technolog y and the capital-intensive operations necessar y to compete in such an environment. Organisations operating solely in domestic markets may find such investments difficult because of the length of time required to recoup the original investment. However, diversifying into a number of international markets improves an organisation’s ability to achieve additional returns from innovation before competitors can overcome t he i n it ia l compet it ive adva ntage created by t he i n novat ion. I n add it ion, orga n isat ions mov i ng i nto i nter nat iona l ma rkets a re ex posed to new products a nd processes. If t hey lea r n about t hose products and processes and integrate this knowledge into their operations, fur ther innovation can be developed. To incor porate the lear ning into their ow n R& D processes, organisations must manage those processes effectively in order to absorb and use the new knowledge to create fur ther innovations.136 For a number of reasons then, international strategies and cer tainly an international diversification strateg y provide incentives for organisations to innovate.137

The relationship among international geographic diversification, innovation and returns is complex. Some level of per for ma nce is necessa r y to prov ide t he resou rces t he orga n isat ion needs to d iversif y geographically; in tur n, geographic d iversi fication prov ides incentives and resources to invest in R& D. Effective R&D should enhance the organisation’s returns, which then provide more resources for continued geographic diversification and investment in R&D. Of course, the returns generated from these relationships i ncrease t h rough effect ive ma nager ia l pract ices. Ev idence suggests t hat more cu lt u ra l ly d iverse top management teams of ten have a g reater k nowledge of inter nat ional ma rkets and t hei r id iosy ncrasies, but t hei r or ientat ion to ex pand inter nat ionally can be a ffected by t he natu re of t hei r compensat ion.138 Moreover, managing the business units of a geographically diverse multinational organisation requires skill, not only in managing a decentralised set of businesses but also in coordinating diverse points of view emerging from businesses located in different countries and regions. Organisations able to do this increase the likelihood of outperforming their rivals.139

Japan’s Asahi Group Holdings Ltd seeks to become one of the world’s top 10 food and beverage companies. It includes alcoholic beverages, soft drinks, infant formulas, dietary supplements, soups and confectionery in its portfolio.

Source: Alamy Stock Photo/ © Lenscap

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STUDY TOOLS SUMMARY LO1 The use of international strategies is increasing. When

used effectively, international strategies yield three basic benefits (increased market size, economies of scale and learning, and location advantages) that facilitate the organisation’s efforts to achieve strategic competitiveness.

LO2 International business-level strategies are usually grounded in one or more home-country advantages. Research suggests that there are four determinants of national advantage: factors of production; demand conditions; related and supporting industries; and patterns of organisation strategy, structure and rivalry.

LO3 There are three main types of international corporate- level strategies. (1) A multi-domestic strategy (polycentric strategy) focuses on competition within each country in which the organisation competes. Organisations using a multi-domestic strategy decentralise strategic and operating decisions to the business units operating in each country, so that each unit can tailor its products and processes to local conditions. (2) A global strategy (ethnocentric strategy) assumes more standardisation of products across country boundaries; therefore, a competitive strategy is centralised and controlled by the home office. Commonly, large multinational organisations, particularly those with multiple diverse products being sold in many different markets, use a multi-domestic strategy with some product lines and a global strategy with others. (3) A transnational strategy (‘glocalisation’ strategy) seeks to integrate characteristics of both global and multi-domestic strategies for the purpose of being able to simultaneously emphasise global integration and local responsiveness.

LO4 Two global environmental trends – liability of foreignness and regionalisation – influence organisations’ choices of international strategies as well as their implementation. Liability of foreignness challenges organisations to recognise that four types of distance between their domestic market and international markets affect how they compete. Some organisations choose to concentrate their international strategies on regions (e.g. the EU and the North American Free Trade Agreement zone) rather than on individual country markets.

LO5 Organisations can use one or more of five entry modes to enter international markets: exporting, licensing, strategic alliances, acquisitions and new wholly owned subsidiaries (often referred to as greenfield ventures). Most organisations begin with exporting or licensing, because of their lower costs and risks, but later they might use strategic alliances and acquisitions as well. The most expensive and risky means of entering a new international market is establishing a new wholly owned subsidiary, but it can offer maximum control and greater returns if successful.

LO6 Organisations encounter a number of risks when implementing international strategies. The two major categories of risks organisations need to understand and address when diversifying geographically through international strategies are political risks (risks concerned with the probability an organisation’s operations will be disrupted by political forces or events, whether they occur in the organisation’s domestic market or in the markets the organisation has entered to implement its international strategies) and economic risks (risks resulting from fundamental weaknesses in a country’s or a region’s economy with the potential to adversely affect an organisation’s ability to implement its international strategies).

LO7 Several issues or conditions affect an organisation’s use of international strategies to pursue strategic competitiveness. Some limits also constrain the ability to manage international expansion effectively. International diversification increases coordination and distribution costs, and management problems are exacerbated by trade barriers, logistical costs and cultural diversity, among other factors.

LO8 Successful use of international strategies (especially an international diversification strategy) contributes to an organisation’s strategic competitiveness in the form of improved performance and enhanced innovation. International diversification facilitates innovation in an organisation because it provides a larger market to gain greater and faster returns from investments in R&D and innovation. Effectively implemented and well- managed international diversification can generate the resources, economies of scope and learning necessary to generate and sustain improved performance.

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KEY TERMS ethnocentric strategy

global strategy

‘glocalisation’ strategy

greenfield venture

international diversification strategy

international strategy

multi-domestic strategy

polycentric strategy

regiocentric strategy

transnational strategy

REVIEW QUESTIONS 1. What incentives influence organisations to use

international strategies?

2. What are some examples of global markets being unstable and unpredictable?

3. What are the three basic benefits organisations can achieve by successfully using an international strategy?

4. What four factors are determinants of national advantage and serve as a basis for international business-level strategies?

5. What are the three main international corporate-level strategies? What are the advantages and disadvantages associated with these individual strategies? Which alternative is emerging as a potential fourth international corporate-level strategy?

6. What are some global environmental trends affecting the choice of international strategies, particularly international corporate-level strategies?

7. What five entry modes do organisations consider as paths to use to enter international markets? What is the typical sequence in which organisations use these entry modes?

8. What are political risks and what are economic risks? How should organisations approach dealing with these risks?

9. What are two important issues that can potentially affect an organisation’s ability to successfully use international strategies?

10. What are the strategic competitiveness outcomes organisations can reach through international strategies, and particularly through an international diversification strategy?

EXPERIENTIAL EXERCISES

Exercise 1: Multi-domestic or transnational strategy? McDonald’s is one of the world’s best-known brands: The company has approximately 38 000 restaurants located in more than 117 countries, and serves 69 million customers every day. McDonald’s opened its first international restaurant in Japan in 1971. Its ‘golden arches’ are featured prominently in two former bastions of communism: Pushkin Square in Moscow, Russia, and Tiananmen Square in Beijing, China.

What strategy has McDonald’s used to achieve such visibility? For this exercise, each group will be asked to conduct some background research on the organisation and then make a brief presentation to identify the international strategy (i.e. global, multi-domestic or transnational) that McDonald’s is implementing.

Individual Search the internet to find examples of menu variations in different countries. How much do menu items for a McDonald’s restaurant differ across regions?

Group Review the characteristics of global, multi-domestic and transnational strategies. Conduct additional research to assess the strategy that best describes the one McDonald’s is using. Prepare a flip chart with a single page of bullet points to explain your reasoning.

Whole class Each group should have 5–7 minutes to explain its reasoning. Following a Q&A for each group, each class member should vote for his or her respective strategy choice.

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Exercise 2: Where next? In this exercise, you are to consider your team to be a consultant to a multinational fast-food restaurant company that is trying to increase its international exposure in the coming years. As you recall from the chapter, an international strategy is one in which ‘the organisation sells its goods or services outside its domestic market’. The choices to do so are varied and include exporting, licensing, alliance, acquisition and creating a new wholly owned subsidiary. The reasons are just as varied as the entry modes.

To identify a suitable candidate for analysis, consult research databases such as Datamonitor or Business Source Complete. For example, Jack in the Box operates over 2700 units but they are all in the USA, which provides advantages as well as disadvantages. Compare this with McDonald’s, the world’s largest food-service retailing chain. You will also find SWOT (strengths, weaknesses, opportunities and threats) analysis on companies through databases such as those mentioned above.

Your consulting organisation has been retained by the fast-food retailer to investigate the feasibility of expanding internationally. You should be prepared to address the following questions: 1. Which international location(s) seem to fit best based on

your research?

2. Which entry mode seems the most reasonable for the organisations to use?

3. What macro environmental and industry trends support your recommendations? Economic characteristics include gross national product, wages, unemployment and inflation. Trend analysis of these data (e.g. are wages rising or falling, rate of change in wages, etc.) is preferable to single point-in-time snapshots.

4. What country risks seem most problematic? The following additional internet resources may be useful in your research:

• The Library of Congress has a collection of country studies.

• BBC News offers country profiles. • The Economist Intelligence Unit (http://www.eiu.com)

offers country profiles. • Both the United Nations and International Monetary

Fund provide statistics and research reports. • The CIA World Factbook has profiles of different

regions. • The Global Entrepreneurship Monitor provides

reports with detailed information about economic conditions and social aspects for a number of countries.

• Links can be found at http://www.countryrisk.com to a number of resources that assess both political and economic risk for individual countries.

• For US data, see http://www.census.gov. Be prepared to discuss and defend your recommendations in class.

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CH AP

TE R

Cooperative strategy9 Studying this chapter should provide you with the strategic management knowledge needed to: LO1 define cooperative strategies and explain why organisations use them LO2 define and discuss the three major types of strategic alliances LO3 understand that collusive and other types of competition-reducing strategies

are deemed illegal and opposed by many governments around the world LO4 name the four main business-level cooperative strategies and describe their use LO5 discuss the use of corporate-level cooperative strategies in diversified

organisations LO6 understand the importance of cross-border strategic alliances as an

international cooperative strategy LO7 understand that some organisations use a network cooperative strategy where

several organisations agree to form multiple partnerships LO8 understand the high probability of failure in cooperative strategies and explain

cooperative strategies’ risks LO9 describe cost minimisation and opportunity maximisation as key approaches

used to manage cooperative strategies.

Learning Objectives

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Global cars, with a twist

OPENING CASE STUDY

The academic literature on alliances has some interesting findings. One of these findings is the rationale that because organisations are often located in the same country, and often in the same region of the country, it is easier for them to collaborate on major projects. As such, they compete globally but may cooperate locally. Historically, organisations have learned to collaborate by establishing strategic alliances and forming cooperative strategies when there is intensive competition. This interesting paradox is due to several reasons. First, when there is intense rivalry, it is difficult to maintain market power. As such, cooperative strategy can reduce market power through better norms of competition; this pertains to the idea of mutual forbearance (this idea will be discussed later in the chapter). Another rationale that has emerged is based on the resource-based view of the organisation (see Chapter 3). To compete, organisations often need resources that they don’t have but which may be found in other organisations in or outside the focal organisation’s home industry. As such, these ‘complementary resources’ are another rationale for why large organisations form joint ventures and strategic alliances within the same industry or in vertically related industries (this idea also will be more clearly explained later in the chapter).

Because organisations are co-located and have similar needs, it is easier for them to jointly work together; for example, to produce engines and transmissions as part of the power train. This is evident in the European alliance between Peugeot-Citroën and Opel-Vauxhall (owned by General Motors). It is also the reason for the US alliance between Ford and General Motors to develop upgraded nine- and 10-speed transmissions, as well as 11- and 12-speed automatic transmissions to improve fuel efficiency and help them to meet federal guidelines.

In regard to resource complementarity, a very successful alliance was formed in 1999 by French- based Renault and Japan-based Nissan. Each of these organisations lacked the necessary size to develop economies of scale and economies of scope that were critical to succeed in the 1990s and beyond in the global automobile industry. When the alliance was formed, each organisation took an ownership stake in the other.

The larger of the two companies, Renault, holds a 43.3 per cent stake in Nissan, while Nissan has a 15 per cent stake in Renault. It is interesting to note that the two companies shared a joint CEO until 2017. The alliance changed its name to Renault–Nissan–Mitsubishi in 2017, a year after Nissan acquired a controlling interest in Mitsubishi. Over time, this corporate-level synergistic alliance (we discuss this type of alliance later in the chapter) has developed three values to guide the relationship: (1) trust (work fairly, impartially and professionally), (2) respect (honour commitments, liabilities and responsibilities) and (3) transparency (be open, frank and clear). Largely due to these established principles, the Renault–Nissan–Mitsubishi alliance is a recognised success. One could argue that the main reason for the success of this alliance is the complementary assets that the organisations bring to the alliance; Nissan and Mitsubishi are strong in Asia while Renault is strong in Europe. Together they have been able to establish other production locations, such as those in Latin America, which they may not have obtained independently.

Some organisations enter alliances because they are ‘squeezed in the middle’; that is, they have moderate volumes, mostly for the mass market, but need to collaborate to establish viable economies of scale. For example, Fiat-Chrysler needs to boost its annual sales from US$4.3 billion to something like US$6 billion and likewise needs to strengthen its presence in the booming Asian market to have enough global market power. As such, it is entering joint ventures with two undersized Japanese carmakers, Mazda and Suzuki; however, the past history of Mazda and Suzuki with alliances may be a reason for their not being overly enthusiastic about the prospects of the current alliances. Fiat broke up with GM, Chrysler with Daimler, and Mazda with Ford.

In France, Peugeot-Citroën and Opel-Vauxhall had an agreement to share platforms and engines to raise the capital necessary for investment in future models. As in the previous examples, they needed additional market share, but also enough capital to make the investment necessary to realise more market power to compete. This agreement evolved into an equity alliance with the formation of Groupe PSA (Peugeot Société Anonyme),

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which owns Peugeot, Citroën, DS, Opel and Vauxhall. Fiat Chrysler and Groupe PSA have signed a binding merger agreement, solidifying a US$73 billion deal that will create the world’s third- or fourth-largest automaker.

In summary, there are a number of rationales why competitors not only compete but also cooperate in establishing strategic alliances and joint ventures in order to meet strategic needs for increased market power, take advantage of complementary assets, and cooperate with close neighbours, often in the same region of the country. Sources: Renault–Nissan–Mitsubishi, 2020, A global automotive alliance

founded in 1999, https://www.alliance-2022.com/about-us,

8 June; C. Barry, 2019, The $73b company with no name: Fiat Chrysler, Peugeot seal merger, Sydney Morning Herald, https://www.smh.com. au/business/companies/fiat-chrysler-peugeot-merge-to-create-73b-

car-giant-20191219-p53lcg.html, 19 December; C. Riley, 2019, Fiat Chrysler and Peugeot owner agree deal to create world’s third largest

automaker, https://edition.cnn.com/2019/12/18/business/fiat-chrysler- peugeot/index.html, CNN Business, 18 December; PSA Groupe Media

Centre, 2017, Opel/Vauxhall to join PSA Group, https://web.archive.org/ web/20170306210707/http://media.groupe-psa.com/en/press-releases/

group/opelvauxhall-join-psa-group, 6 March; Economist, 2013, Markets and makers: Running harder, 20 April, ss4–ss7; T. Yu, M. Subramaniam

& A. A. Cannella, Jr, 2013, Competing globally, allying locally: Alliances between global rivals and host-country factors, Journal of International Business Studies, 44: 117–37; W. Lim, 2012, The voyage

of the Renault–Nissan Alliance: A successful venture, Advances In Management, 5(9): 25–9.

As explained in the opening case, car companies have formed corporate-level cooperative strategies as a means of improving performance. Additionally, each company is independently using a number of cooperative strategies at the business-unit level with the same objective in mind: to improve the performance of the individual organisations. In all of these instances, the organisations are trying to use their resources and capabilities in ways that will create the greatest amount of value for stakeholders.1

Forming a cooperative strategy like the 1999 one between Renault and Nissan (which from 2017 has also included Mitsubishi), or between other global automobile companies (e.g. between Fiat Chrysler and Groupe PSA in 2019),2 has the potential to be a viable engine of organisation growth.3 Specifically, a cooperative strategy is a means by which organisations collaborate for the purpose of working together to achieve a shared objective.4 Cooperating with other organisations is a strategy organisations use to create value for a customer that it likely could not create by itself. For example, in describing a Fiat-designed and developed compact car that Chrysler builds and sells in the USA under its own name, an automobile industry analyst said that a product such as this is ‘why the two auto makers … have a relationship’.5

Orga n isat ions a lso t r y to c reate compet it ive adva ntages when usi ng a cooperat ive st rateg y. A competitive advantage developed through a cooperative strategy often is called a collaborative or relational advantage,6 denoting that the relationship that develops among collaborating par tners is commonly the basis on which a competitive advantage is built. Importantly, successful use of cooperative strategies finds an organisation outperforming its rivals in terms of strategic competitiveness and above-average returns,7 often because they’ve been able to form a competitive advantage.

We examine several topics in this chapter. First, we define and offer examples of different strategic alliances as primary types of cooperative strategies. We focus on strategic alliances because organisations use them more frequently than other types of cooperative relationships. We highlight that not all cooperative strategies are welcome, and that collusive strategies designed to reduce competition are deemed illegal. Next, we discuss the extensive use of cooperative strategies in the global economy and reasons for their use. In succession, we describe business-level, corporate-level, international and network cooperative strategies. The chapter closes with a discussion of the risks of using cooperative strategies as well as how effectively managing the strategies can reduce those risks.

Strategic alliances as a primary type of cooperative strategy A strategic alliance is a cooperative strategy in which organisations combine some of their resources and capabilities for the purpose of creating a competitive advantage.8 Strategic alliances involve organisations with some degree of exchange and sharing of resources and capabilities to co-develop, sell and service

cooperative strategy a strategy in which organisations work together to achieve a shared objective

strategic alliance a cooperative strategy in which organisations combine some of their resources and capabilities to create a competitive advantage

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goods or services.9 In addition, organisations use strategic alliances to leverage their existing resources and capabilities while working with partners to develop additional resources and capabilities as the foundation for new competitive advantages.10 The reality today is that ‘strategic alliances have become a cornerstone of many firms’ competitive strategy’.11 This means that for many organisations, and particularly for large global competitors, strategic alliances are potentially many in number but are always important to efforts to outperform competitors.

Consider the case of BMW Group. Focusing exclusively on premium products (its entry car is the Mini), this organisation uses an international focused differentiation business-level strategy (see Chapter 8) to sell its cars, trucks and motorcycles in multiple geographic regions. According to the company’s CEO, this organisation relies in part on a host of strategic alliances ‘to further shape (BMW’s) future, which involves topics such as technology leadership’.12 Among BMW Group’s current alliances are: a purchasing cooperation with Daimler AG; a joint venture with the SGL Group to produce carbon fibres (SGL Group is one of the world’s leading producers of carbon-based products); and a joint venture with Groupe PSA (BMW Peugeot Citroën Electrification) to produce four-cylinder engines and hybrid components.

Before describing three types of major strategic alliances and reasons for their use, we need to note that for all cooperative strategies, success is more likely when partners behave cooperatively. Actively solving problems, being trustworthy and consistently pursuing ways to combine partners’ resources and capabilities to create value are examples of cooperative behaviour known to contribute to alliance success.13 Recall that trust, respect and transparency are three core values on which the Renault–Nissan–Mitsubishi corporate-level cooperative strategy is based. Perhaps these values are instrumental to the success that is credited to this cooperative relationship.

Types of major strategic alliances Joint ventures, equity strategic alliances and non-equity strategic alliances are the three major types of strategic alliances organisations use. The ownership arrangement is a key difference among these alliances.

A joint venture is a strategic alliance in which two or more organisations create a legally independent company to share some of their resources and capabilities for the purpose of developing a competitive advantage. Some evidence suggests that economic difficulties arising from the global financial crisis (GFC; 2008–09) increased the attractiveness of this type of strategic alliance: ‘Joint ventures have become a more prevalent way for companies to gain access to new capabilities, products, and geographies since the start of the most recent economic downturn’.14 Often formed to improve an organisation’s ability to compete in uncertain competitive environments, such as those associated with economic downturns,15 joint ventures are effective in establishing long-term relationships and in transferring tacit knowledge. Because it cannot be codified, tacit knowledge, which is increasingly critical to organisations’ efforts to develop core competencies, is learned through experiences such as those taking place when people from partner organisations work together in a joint venture.16 Overall, a joint venture may be the optimal type of cooperative arrangement when organisations need to combine their resources and capabilities to create a competitive advantage that is substantially different from any they possess individually and when the partners intend to enter highly uncertain, hypercompetitive markets.

Typically, partners in a joint venture own equal percentages and contribute equally to the venture’s operations. When established in 1999, Germany’s Siemens AG and Japan’s Fujitsu Ltd each owned 50 per cent of the joint venture Fujitsu Siemens Computers BV. Based in Maarssen, the Netherlands, this collaboration was the last major European-based computer manufacturer. This joint venture was established primarily to enable Fujitsu and Siemens to combine their technology-based resources and capabilities to compete in an uncertain market (computer manufacturing). On 1 April 2009, though, this company became Fujitsu Technology Solutions after Fujitsu bought Siemens’ share of the joint venture. As this outcome suggests, joint ventures are not necessarily permanent in nature. There are different reasons for the lack

joint venture a strategic alliance in which two or more organisations create a legally independent company to share some of their resources and capabilities to develop a competitive advantage

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of permanence, including dissatisfaction by one or all parties with the partnership’s outcomes or changes in the strategic direction one or more par tners wish to pursue. The agreement reached to end the joint venture was very amicable and served the emerging interests of Fujitsu and Siemens.

Samsung Electric is using diversifying alliances to reduce its dependence on Google’s Android operating system

Samsung has a diverse range of alliances and partnerships to develop and support its diverse range of products. Samsung was one of the driving forces behind Tizen, an operating system designed to use HTML5 apps, and target mobile and embedded platforms such as netbooks, smartphones, tablets, smart TVs and in-car entertainment systems. This appears to be a strategy to reduce its reliance on Google’s Android operating system (OS), especially after the internet search company acquired handset maker Motorola, which could potentially be a competitor for Samsung. The Tizen association (a strategic partnership) was formed in 2012 by executives from Intel, Samsung, NTT DoCoMo, NEC Casio, SK Telecom and Vodafone Group PLC to support an open-source software association, which has led to the Tizen operating system being available for mobile devices. Because Google is devoting more attention to producing mobile hardware devices as its rivalry with Apple accelerates, this has led to a reaction from Samsung, Intel and others to make sure they are not too dependent upon any one operating system. While not gaining significant inroads in the smartphone mobile OS space, Tizen has become the most popular operating system for smart TVs, with a 25 per cent market share in 2018–19.

Samsung and Mozilla have also developed a strategic alliance to build a new mobile web browser, based on Android and ARM (Advanced RISC Machine) software architecture. The mobile web browser, called Servo, is still at an experimental stage as of 2020. Samsung and Mozilla are also bringing Microsoft, Google and the W3C (World Wide Web Consortium) together to create cross-browser documentation. The goal is to consolidate information about web development for multiple browsers.

It seems that Samsung is concerned about being overly dependent on Google’s Android system even though it shipped more than 250 million handsets every year from 2012–19 using this OS. Furthermore, it leads the industry with over 20 per cent of the global market share in smartphones (2012–19), so why would it be bothered with developing an alternative browser to Google Chrome

as well as possibly pursuing a new mobile OS? Additional evidence of this diversification is that Samsung intended to produce mobile devices managed by Microsoft’s Windows Phone OS. Again, it is seen by one analyst as a hedge against the company’s overdependence on Android: ‘Samsung continues to have a strategic weakness in its reliance on an ecosystem that the company does not own’. However, as of 2020, there is not much progress in the space, as the race for mobile operating systems is dominated by two main operating systems, Apple’s iOS and Google’s Android, with the Windows Phone OS discontinued in 2015.

Samsung also uses alliances to develop global industry standardisation for products that provide reduced costs across the industry. For instance, to reduce dependence on the Wireless Power Consortium’s Qi standard, in 2012 it established ‘an alliance for wireless power (A4WP) initialised between Qualcomm Inc. and Samsung Group (and other vendors) to promote global standardisation of a wireless power transfer technology, which could be utilised for mobile phones, electric vehicles and other devices’. Now known as the Rezence interface, it is poised to capitalise on the increasing levels of commercialisation of the technology, which has been growing by 30 per cent and is poised to reach US$27 billion by 2025. While the technology is currently limited to charging mobile devices, there is potential in other fields, given the increasing rate of electric vehicles adoptions and the research being conducted to scale wireless charging to electric cars.

Samsung is also developing partnerships to help sell its hardware. For instance, Samsung developed a strategic partnership with Houghton Mifflin Harcourt Publishing Co. (HMH) through its Samsung Electronics America Inc. subsidiary. It partners with HMH to develop ‘educational content and solutions on the Android-powered tablet device of Samsung’. This partnership helps power technology transformation in schools in the use of educational text material. Likewise, the partnership helps promote Samsung

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Android-powered tablets in schools and provides schools with ‘special pricing, services, and support’ besides helping them to implement their mobile education goals. The Samsung devices use the ‘learning hub’, an exclusive Samsung platform for educational content that is available worldwide.

As can be seen from these examples, Samsung is using alliances to diversify away from its dependence on the Android OS and also to have an edge in selling new devices based on new operating systems if they become popular. Likewise, it is using alliances to develop new sources of components, such as an alliance for wireless power, and new sources of distribution, such as its alliance with HMH. As such, it uses alliances as a form of corporate strategy to diversify among various operating systems to sell devices as well as for relationships with suppliers of parts and software (Mozilla) and distributors (HMH). One

should also be mindful that not all efforts at diversification or alliances will succeed, and some may have unintended end uses, as the case of the Tizen OS can attest.

Sources: B. Munson, 2019, Samsung’s Tizen OS dominates global smart TV market, https://www.fiercevideo.com/video/samsung-s-tizen-os-

dominates-global-smart-tv-market, Questex, 25 March; A. Spivak, 2017, Mozilla brings Microsoft, Google, the W3C, Samsung together to create cross-browser documentation on MDN, The Mozilla Blog, https://blog.

mozilla.org/blog/2017/10/18/mozilla-brings-microsoft-google-w3c- samsung-together-create-cross-browser-documentation-mdn, 18 October;

IDC, 2020, Worldwide top 5 smartphone company unit market share (%), https://www.idc.com/promo/smartphone-market-share/vendor, 8 June;

C. Wood, 2020, Researchers work on the next generation of wireless charging for electric vehicles and mobile devices, CNBC, https://www.cnbc.

com/2020/06/08/researchers-work-on-the-next-generation-of-wireless- charging-for-evs.html, 8 June; Educational Marketer, 2013, HMH partners

with Samsung, 11 February, 1–7; J. Lee, 2013, Samsung to sell Tizen-based handsets after Motorola deal, Bloomberg, http://www.bloomberg.com, 3

January; J. Paczkowski, 2013, Samsung buddies up with Mozilla on new Android browser tech, All Things D, http://www.allthingsd.com, 3 April; J. Paczkowski, 2013, Samsung plans multiple Tizen smartphones for 2013,

All Things D, http://www.allthingsd.com, 3 January; Energy Daily, 2012, Samsung, Qualcomm establish wireless charging alliance, 14 May.

An equity strategic alliance is an alliance in which two or more organisations own different percentages of the company they have formed by combining some of their resources and capabilities for the purpose of creating a competitive advantage. Many foreign direct investments, such as those that companies from multiple countries are making in China, are completed through equity strategic alliances.17

Panasonic invested US$30 million in Tesla to accelerate battery technology for Tesla’s electric vehicles and support the growth of the electric car industry overall. This growth is clearly in Panasonic’s interests as a major supplier of electric vehicle batteries. The alliance between the two organisations grew to include other electric technology such as solar cells. In 2017, Panasonic announced it and Tesla would start making batteries at a lithium-ion battery plant outside of Reno, Nevada.18 The alliance’s focus on solar cells has decreased, but the electric vehicle lithium-ion battery production focus has strengthened the market for both organisations.

A non-equity strategic alliance is an alliance in which two or more organisations develop a contractual relationship to share some of their resources and capabilities for the purpose of creating a competitive advantage.19 In this type of alliance, organisations do not establish a separate independent company and therefore do not take equity positions. For this reason, non-equity strategic alliances are less formal, demand fewer partner commitments than do joint ventures and equity strategic alliances, and generally do not foster an intimate relationship between partners; nonetheless, research evidence indicates that they can create value for the involved organisations.20 The relative informality and lower commitment levels characterising non-equity strategic alliances make them unsuitable for complex projects where success requires effective transfers of tacit knowledge between partners.21 Licensing agreements, distribution agreements and supply contracts are examples of non-equity strategic alliances.

A number of technology-based organisations form non-equity strategic alliances. Hewlett-Packard (HP) actively uses this type of cooperative strategy to license some of its intellectual property. Xerox formed an initial six-year relationship with HCL Technologies. This non-equity alliance saw HCL handling disaster recovery, data centre hosting and migration, virtualisation and consolidation tasks across Xerox’s data centres in North America and Europe. Describing the reason for this alliance, Xerox’s chief information officer said: ‘Data centre environments are the heart of our business operations and we look to partner with companies that can manage our centres and take them to the next level.’22 In 2019, building on the decade-long product engineering relationship, Xerox and HCL signed a US$1.3 billion managed services

equity strategic alliance an alliance in which two or more organisations own different percentages of the company they have formed by combining some of their resources and capabilities to create a competitive advantage

non-equity strategic alliance an alliance in which two or more organisations develop a contractual relationship to share some of their unique resources and capabilities to create a competitive advantage

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arrangement which ‘positions HCL to transform Xerox’s shared services globally, resulting in greater operational efficiency, automation and enhanced service levels’.23

Commonly, outsourcing commitments are specified in the form of a non-equity strategic alliance. (Discussed in Chapter 3, outsourcing is the purchase of a value chain activity or a support function activity from another organisation.) Home décor and fashion brand Laura Ashley and delivery services company FedEx have a long-standing (20-year) non-equity strategic alliance where Laura Ashley outsources its global supply chain and logistics to FedEx. Laura Ashley gains from FedEx’s services and expertise, and FedEx gained an entry to Europe and the sector. The alliance is well-known for its informal nature, mutual trust and lack of complicated contracts.

Dell Inc. and most other computer organisations outsource most or all of their production of laptop computers and often form non-equity strategic alliances to detail the nature of the relationship with organisations to whom they outsource. Interestingly, many of these organisations that outsource introduce modularity that prevents the contracting partner or outsourcee from gaining too much knowledge or from sharing certain aspects of the business the outsourcing organisation does not want revealed.24

Reasons organisations develop strategic alliances Cooperative strategies are an integral part of the competitive landscape and are quite important to many companies and even to educational institutions. In fact, many organisations are cooperating with educational institutions to help commercialise ideas flowing from basic research projects completed at universities.25 In for-profit organisations, many executives believe that strategic alliances are central to their organisation’s grow th and success.26 The fact that alliances can account for up to 25 per cent or more of an organisation’s sales revenue demonstrates their importance. Also highlighting alliances’ importance is the fact that in some settings, such as the global airline industry, competition is increasingly between large alliances rather than between large companies.27

Among other benefits, strategic alliances allow partners to create value that they couldn’t develop by acting independently and to enter markets more quickly and with greater market penetration possibilities.28 For example, South America’s largest retailer by market value, Chilean organisation SACI Falabella, is seeking to establish a foothold in Brazil through its Sodimac home-improvement unit by taking a 51 per cent ownership position in Dicico, a chain of home-improvement stores owned by Construdecor SA. Falabella owns department stores, supermarkets, shopping malls and home improvement stores in Chile, Colombia, Peru and Argentina. Falabella’s chief executive, CEO Sandro Solari, said, ‘We see good value in having a [local] partner’ in managing Dicico. Falabella purchased its ownership position from previous part-owner Markinvest Gestao de Participaceos Limitada. The Brazilian entry is important for Falabella because Brazil is home to half of South America’s population and has a large and growing middle class.29

Another reason to form strategic alliances is that most (if not all) organisations lack the full set of resources and capabilities needed to reach their objectives, which indicates that partnering with others will increase the probability of reaching organisation-specific performance objectives. This may be especially true for small businesses – ones in which capital is scarce. Given constrained resources, small organisations can collaborate for a number of purposes, including those of reaching new customers and broadening the distribution of their products without adding significantly to their cost structures.30

Unique competitive conditions characterise slow-cycle, fast-cycle and standard-cycle markets.31 We discussed these three market types in Chapter 5 while examining competitive rivalry and competitive dynamics. These unique conditions find organisations using strategic alliances to reach objectives that differ slightly by market type (see Figure 9.1).

Slow-cycle markets are markets where the organisation’s competitive advantages are shielded from imitation for relatively long periods of time and where imitation is costly. These markets are close to monopolistic conditions. Railroads and, historically, telecommunications, utilities and financial services are industries characterised as slow-cycle markets. In fast-cycle markets, the organisation’s competitive

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Market type

Standard- cycle

• Gain market power (reduce industry overcapacity) • Gain access to complementary resources • Establish better economies of scale • Overcome trade barriers • Meet competitive challenges from other competitors • Pool resources for very large capital projects • Learn new business techniques

Slow-cycle

• Gain access to a restricted

market • Establish a

franchise in a new market

• Maintain market stability (e.g. establishing standards)

Fast-cycle

• Speed up development of

new goods or services

• Speed up new market entry • Maintain market leadership • Form an industry technology standard • Share risky R&D expenses • Overcome uncertainty

Reasons for using a strategic alliance

advantages are not shielded from imitation, preventing their long-term sustainability. Competitive advantages are moderately shielded from imitation in standard-cycle markets, typically allowing them to be sustained for a longer period of time than in fast-cycle market situations, but for a shorter period of time than in slow-cycle markets.

Slow-cycle markets Organisations in slow-cycle markets often use strategic alliances to enter restricted markets or to establish franchises in new markets. For example, because of consolidating acquisitions, the American steel industry has two remaining major players: US Steel and Nucor (competitors ArcelorMittal USA, AK Steel, Carpenter Technology, Commercial Metals Company and Steel Dynamics are significantly smaller). To improve their ability to compete successfully in the global steel market, these companies are forming cooperative relationships. They have formed strategic alliances in Europe and Asia and are invested in ventures in South A merica and Australia.

One of Nucor’s alliances with an organisation outside its US domestic market is its joint venture with Italian-based Duferco Group’s subsidiary Duferdofin. Each organisation has a 50 per cent ownership of the venture, called Duferdofin–Nucor S.r.l. Through this collaboration, the organisations are producing steel joists and beams in Italy and then selling them in Europe and North Africa. The resources and capabilities contributed by each partner are suggested by the following comment from Nucor’s CEO:

Figure 9.1 Reasons for strategic alliance by market type

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‘[This venture] combines Nucor’s world-recognised know-how in the efficient production of structural shapes with Duferdofin’s strong management team and strategic locations in Italy’.32 On t he domest ic front, Nucor formed a long-term strategic alliance with Truswal Systems Corporation, ‘a leading supplier of engineered products and state of the art software for the building components industry’. The purpose of this collaboration is the development of proprietary design, engineering and layout software.33

Slow-cycle markets are becoming rare in the 21st-century competitive landscape for several reasons, including the privatisation of industries and economies, the rapid expansion of the internet’s capabilities for quick dissemination of information, and the speed with which advancing technologies make quickly imitating even complex products possible.34 Organisations competing in slow-cycle markets, including steel manufacturers, should recognise the future likelihood that they will encounter situations in which their competitive advantages become partially sustainable (in the instance of a standard-cycle market) or unsustainable (in the case of a fast-cycle market). Cooperative strategies can help organisations transition from relatively sheltered markets to more competitive ones.35

Fast-cycle markets Fast-cycle markets are unstable, unpredictable and complex; in a word, they are hypercompetitive.36 Combined, these conditions virtually preclude establishing long-lasting competitive advantages, forcing organisations to constantly seek sources of new competitive advantages while creating value by using current ones. Alliances between organisations with current excess resources and capabilities and those with promising capabilities help companies compete in fast-cycle markets to effectively transition from the present to the future and to gain rapid entry into new markets. As such, a ‘collaboration mindset’ is paramount.37 Samsung’s moves to outflank the Android system provide an example of this.

The entertainment business is fast becoming a new digital marketplace as television content is now available on the web. This has led the entertainment business into a fast-cycle market where collaboration is important not only to succeed but also to survive. Many of the organisations that have digital video content have also sought to make a profit through digital music and have had difficulties in profiting from their earlier ventures. To address issues such as these, General Electric’s NBC Universal and News Corporation formed Hulu.com in 2007. Walt Disney Company joined this equity strategic alliance in 2009 (and subsequently took control in 2019 after acquiring 21st Century Fox and buying other minority stakes from shareholders). This web-based cooperative relationship is an alliance between organisations that are direct competitors. To support Hulu, ABC (owned by Disney) makes much of its content available on the Hulu site, as do the other content providers, including NBC Universal. As digital video content moves onto the web, it is interesting to see the evolution of competition and cooperation between these organisations.38

Telecommunications and software organisations also compete in fast-cycle markets and use strategic alliances as a means of doing so. When Microsoft and Nokia formed a comprehensive collaboration, the organisations’ CEOs described the agreed-upon arrangement: ‘Our two companies [have] plans for a broad strategic partnership that combines the respective strengths of our companies and builds a new global mobile ecosystem. The partnership increases our scale, which will result in significant benefits for consumers, developers, mobile operators and businesses around the world. We both are incredibly excited about the journey we are on together’.39

Industrial clusters: geographic centres for collaborative partnering

Clusters or industrial districts are geographic concentrations of a set of interconnected companies, often with specialised suppliers and service providers, and with education, government and trade association

institutions focused on a particular industrial sector and agglomerated in a specific geographic region. Often these clusters begin because they increase company productivity, enabling them to lower costs

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and facilitate innovation. Developing such regions is important to government officials looking to increase economic development, as well as for companies seeking to co-locate with other reputable companies, often with government tax incentives and institutions, such as universities to facilitate training of students with increased employment opportunities for graduates.

Research, in fact, shows that where there is cluster- driven agglomeration, there is also higher employment growth and higher wage growth, growth in the number of new establishments, and an increase in innovation and patenting. The strength of a dominant cluster, such as California’s Silicon Valley, also strengthens related clusters in the region and adjacent regions. Often, new industries emerge where there is a strong cluster environment. As such, there are good reasons why governments are interested in incentivising strong cluster growth in their geographic area.

For instance, African nations are increasingly seeking economic growth, and some have used innovation hubs to accelerate start-up company growth. Kenya, for example, has over 40 per cent of its population living on the equivalent of US$2 a day, and political corruption, crippling droughts and power outages have plagued the country. However, the Kenyan Government revised its constitution in 2010 to create more transparency and better institutions supporting business. As such, a number of high-tech companies developed an iHub in central Nairobi, with supporting partners from Intel, Samsung, Google, Facebook, Oracle, Microsoft and others in the cluster. It also created mLab and NaiLab as incubators to foster growth-oriented start-ups focused on mobile software and hardware applications. In 2019, after many successful start-ups, Kenya’s iHub was acquired by Nigeria’s CcHub to create a mega Africa tech incubator.

Research, however, suggests that such clusters or hubs have been implemented around the world, with varied results. Studies indicate that specialising in one area of R&D without added diversification often leads to eventual failure. As such, clusters with businesses, suppliers, think tanks, universities, multiple industries and trade associations co-located in an industrial park or innovation cluster work best for stimulating economic growth and innovation. Accordingly, companies with a variety of purposes

and specialisations co-located with network suppliers, customers and support services facilitate new and more innovative products and services and thus are more successful.

Sometimes these clusters are driven by specific regional geographic strengths. For example, large data storage centres for high-tech companies using cloud resources have located such centres in Prineville, The Dalles and other small towns in Oregon. Such locations in Oregon allow for more natural cooling of such large computer systems. Facebook executive Jay Park states that Prineville is ‘an ideal location for the crew and system Facebook uses for its data storage center’. Other locations were chosen for more idiosyncratic reasons. Microsoft and the software cluster associated with it in Seattle were located there because Bill Gates, Microsoft’s founder, was born in Seattle.

Research suggests that workers who began their career in industrial hub locations, such as people in the hedge fund industry who previously worked in New York and London, outperform their peers once they leave these districts. As such, there is an individual effect on the human capital development in these industrial hubs. Furthermore, research also suggests there is a collective impact on the organisations that are in centralised positions (i.e. have connections to more organisations, suppliers and customers in the industrial district); the more central organisations have more and better innovation. Those who connect organisations to each other (bridging ties) have a positive impact on innovation, but not as impactful as those that are more centralised in the hub.

Geographic clusters are being developed around the world focused on creating a vast database of genetic information. It took nearly 13 years and almost US$14 million in government and private funding for the Human Genome Project to complete the first map of a person’s genome. Now, for US$1000, a company in Iceland will chart a person’s genetic propensities for 47 different diseases and traits. New preventative measures from this project ‘will save patients, insurers, and employers money, and studies project genomic medicine will generate US$350 billion worth of economic activity and millions of jobs’. But the industry is a long way from having the ability to fully utilise the data encoded in our chromosomes. The question is,

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where will the various clusters be found around the world? There are a number in the USA and Canada – one in Vancouver, British Columbia, and one around La Jolla, California. The cluster at La Jolla includes the University of California-San Diego, the Salk Institute, the Scripps Research Institute, the Venter Institute, Synthetic Genomics and 30 or 40 companies all within a few square kilometres and all using genomic methods and research. There are also clusters growing in the Boston area, the Cambridge area in the UK and the Genomics Institute in Beijing, China. Thus, the history of industrial districts is positive overall, and they are now being planned with more precision.

Sources: J. Bright, 2019, Nigeria’s CcHub acquires Kenya’s iHub to create mega Africa incubator, TechCrunch, https://techcrunch.com/2019/09/26/

nigerias-cchub-acquires-kenyas-ihub-to-create-mega-africa-incubator, 26 September; C. Casanueva, I. Castro & J. L. Galán, 2013, Information

networks and innovation in mature industrial clusters, Journal of Business Research, 66(5): 603–13; R. J. P. De Figueiredo, P. Meyer-Doyle & E. Rawley, 2013, Inherited agglomeration effects in hedge fund spawns,

Strategic Management Journal, 34(7): 843–62; L. Dobusch & E. Schübler, 2013, Theorizing path dependence: A review of positive feedback

mechanisms in technology markets, regional clusters, and organizations, Industrial & Corporate Change, 22(3): 617–47; E. Francis, 2013, Building

an auto industry hub through value creation, Automotive Industries, January, 111–12; G. Holden, 2013, Kenya’s fertile ground for tech

innovation, Research Technology Management, 56(3): 7–8; H. Milanov & D. A. Shepherd, 2013, The importance of the first relationship: The ongoing

influence of initial network on future status, Strategic Management Journal, 34(6): 727–50; Economist, 2012, Not a cloud in sight, 27 October,

19–20; F. Ghadar, J. Sviokla & D. A. Stephan, 2012, Why life science needs its own Silicon Valley, Harvard Business Review, 90(7/8): 25–7.

Standard-cycle markets In standard-cycle markets, alliances are more likely to be made by partners that have complementary resources and capabilities. The alliances formed by airline companies are an example of standard-cycle market alliances.

When initially established decades ago, these alliances were intended to allow organisations to share their complementary resources and capabilities to make it easier for passengers to fly between secondary cities in the USA and Europe. Today, airline alliances are mostly global in nature and are formed primarily so members can gain marketing clout, have opportunities to reduce costs and have access to additional international routes.40 Of these reasons, international expansion by having access to more international routes is the most important because these routes are the path to increased revenues and potential profits. To support efforts to control costs, alliance members jointly purchase some items and share facilities when possible, such as passenger gates, customer service centres and airport passenger lounges. For passengers, airline alliances ‘offer simpler ticketing and smoother connections on intercontinental trips as well as the chance to earn and redeem frequent-flier miles on other member carriers’.41

There are three major airline alliances operating today. Star Alliance is the largest, with 26 members. With 13 members, OneWorld Alliance is the smallest (it includes Qantas), while 19-member SkyTeam Alliance sits in-between. Given the geographic areas where markets are growing, these global alliances are adding partners from Asia.

In addition to the three major alliances, a host of other alliances exist among airline carriers. For example, ANA (All Nippon Airways) and Deutsche Lufthansa AG are both members of the Star Alliance. However, these organisations decided to launch a joint venture at the end of 2011 for the purpose of combining their resources to serve routes between Japan and Europe. Sharing revenue, coordinating flight schedules and working together on joint product sales are examples of how the organisations’ resources and capabilities are to be shared through the joint venture.42 Similarly, Singapore Airlines, a member of Star Alliance, and Virgin Australia announced plans for a wide-ranging alliance. Under the alliance, Singapore Airlines (which has been seeking access to the Pacific route for many years) would have access to Virgin Australia’s routes to New Zealand and the US west coast. At the same time, Virgin Australia was planning to complete alliances with Air New Zealand and Etihad Airways PJSC, based in Abu Dhabi.43 In general, most airline alliances such as the ones we have described are formed to help organisations gain economies of scale and meet competitive challenges (see Figure 9.1).

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Competition-reducing strategy Before we discuss the key business-level cooperative strategies, it is important to note that not all cooperative strategies are welcome in the market, and some are deemed illegal and are actively policed and opposed by many governments around the world. Used to reduce competition, collusive strategies (also known as anti-competitive strategies) differ from strategic alliances in that collusive strategies are often an illegal type of cooperative strategy. Explicit collusion and tacit collusion are the two types of collusive strategies.

Explicit collusion exists when two or more organisations negotiate directly to jointly agree about the amount to produce as well as the prices for what is produced.4 4 Explicit collusion strategies are illegal in most developed economies (except in regulated industries). Accordingly, companies choosing to use explicit collusion as a strategy should recognise that competitors and regulatory bodies might challenge the acceptability of their competitive actions.

Tacit collusion exists when several organisations in an industry indirectly coordinate their production and pricing decisions by observing each other’s competitive actions and responses.45 Tacit collusion results in production output that is below fully competitive levels and above fully competitive prices. Unlike explicit collusion, organisations engaging in tacit collusion do not directly negotiate output and pricing decisions. However, research suggests that joint ventures or cooperation between two organisations can lead to less competition in other markets in which both organisations operate.46

Tacit collusion tends to be used as a competition-reducing business-level strategy in industries with a high degree of concentration, such as the airline and breakfast cereal industries. Research in the airline industry suggests that tacit collusion reduces service quality and on-time performance.47 Organisations in these industries recognise their interdependence, which means that their competitive actions and responses significantly affect competitors’ behaviour towards them. Understanding this interdependence and carefully observing competitors can lead to tacit collusion.

Mutual forbearance is a form of tacit collusion in which organisations do not take competitive actions against rivals they meet in multiple markets. R ivals learn a great deal about each other when engaging in multi-market competition, including how to deter the effects of their rivals’ competitive attacks and responses. Given what they know about each other as competitors, organisations choose not to engage in what could be destr uctive competition in multiple product markets.48

In general, governments in free-market economies seek to determine how rivals can form cooperative strategies for the purpose of increasing their competitiveness without violating established regulations about competition.49 However, this task is challenging when evaluating collusive strategies, particularly tacit ones. For example, the regulation of pharmaceutical and biotech organisations that collaborate to meet global competition might lead to too much price fixing, meaning that regulation is required to make sure that the balance is ‘right’ (though sometimes the regulation gets in the way of efficient markets).50 In turn, individual companies must analyse the effect of a competition-reducing strategy on their performance and competitiveness and decide if pursuing such a strategy is an overall facilitator of their competitive success.

Business-level cooperative strategy A business-level cooperative strategy is a strategy through which organisations combine some of their resources and capabilities for the purpose of creating a competitive advantage by competing in one or more product markets. As discussed in Chapter 4, business-level strategy details what the organisation intends to do to gain a competitive advantage in specific product markets. Thus, the organisation forms a business- level cooperative strategy when it believes that combining some of its resources and capabilities with those of one or more partners will create competitive advantages that it cannot create by itself and will lead to success in a specific product market. We list the four business-level cooperative strategies in Figure 9.2.

business-level cooperative strategy used to help the organisation improve its performance in individual product markets

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Complementary strategic alliances Complementary strategic alliances are business-level alliances in which organisations share some of their resources and capabilities in complementary ways for the purpose of creating a competitive advantage.51 Vertical and horizontal are the two types of complementary strategic alliances (see Figure 9.2).

Vertical complementary strategic alliance In a vertical complementary strategic alliance, organisations share some of their resources and capabilities from different stages of the value chain for the purpose of creating a competitive advantage (see Fig ure 9.3).52 Often, vertical complementary alliances are formed to adapt to environmental changes;53 sometimes the changes represent an opportunity for partnering organisations to innovate while adapting.54

Operating with four segments (EA Games, EA Sports, The Sims and EA Casual Entertainment), Electronic Arts (EA) develops, markets, publishes and distributes video game software, mobile games and online interactive games in more than 35 countries, meaning that the organisation is geographically diversified as well as diversified with its product lines.

Vertical strategic alliances are a key part of how EA competes, including the alliances the organisation has formed with Nintendo and Hasbro. EA produces software and games for Nintendo’s Wii game console through the alliance it has with that organisation. Through the alliance with Hasbro, EA offers Monopoly Millionaires on Facebook. An EA executive described the organisation’s alliance with Hasbro in this manner: ‘We strive to continually re-imagine Hasbro brands digitally in creative ways and Monopoly Millionaires is no exception. We’re bringing the world’s favorite game brand into the new era of social gaming, offering an accessible and enjoyable experience for Facebook users worldwide’.55

Sometimes, private–public sector vertical collaborations are formed, such as the alliance Novartis AG and the World Health Organization (WHO) developed in 2001. The purpose of the 10-year alliance was to battle malaria in developing countries. The agreement called for Novartis to provide one of its drugs, Coartem, at an average price of US$1.57 per treatment for adults and at a substantially discounted price for children, who are most vulnerable to malaria. Using the distribution part of the value chain, WHO evaluated requests for Coartem and then distributed the drug through government agencies of malaria- endemic countries.

complementary strategic alliances business-level alliances in which organisations share some of their resources and capabilities in complementary ways to develop competitive advantages

Complementary strategic alliances

Competition response strategy

• Vertical

• Horizontal

Competition-reducing strategy

Uncertainty-reducing strategy

Figure 9.2 Business-level cooperative strategies

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The terms of the original alliance between Novartis and WHO expired in May 2011. However, at that time Norvartis announced that because of its long-term commitment to battling malaria, it would ‘continue to provide Coartem to public health systems in developing countries on the same terms as before’.56

Horizontal complementary strategic alliance A horizontal complementary strategic alliance is an alliance in which organisations share some of their resources and capabilities from the same stage (or stages) of the value chain for the purpose of creating a competitive advantage. Commonly, organisations use complementary strategic alliances to focus on joint long-term product development and distribution opportunities.57 As noted previously, Hulu is a joint website that GE’s NBC Universal, News Corporation and Walt Disney Company formed for the purpose of distributing video content. Although now majority-owned and fully controlled by Disney, the alliance’s partners provide content (one stage of the value chain) to Hulu for distribution (another part of the value chain).

Pharmaceutical companies form a number of horizontal alliances. For example, as health care reform takes place, large pharmaceutical organisations seek relationships with generic drug producers. Pfizer formed an alliance with Santaris Pharma A/S to develop and commercialise RNA-targeted medicines using Santaris Pharma A/S’s locked nucleic acid (LNA) drug platform. (Santaris is a clinical-stage biopharmaceutical company.)58

Horizontal alliance between buyers (each buyer is also a potential competitor)

Customer value

Support functions

Finance

Human resources

Management

information systems

V er

ti ca

l a lli

an ce

– s

u p

p lie

r

Value chain activities

Supply-chain

management Operations Distribution

Marketing

(including

sales)

Follow-up

service

Figure 9.3 Vertical and complementary strategic alliances

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Novartis AG’s orientation to collaborations reflects the perspective of many pharmaceutical manufacturers. Supporting Norvartis’ collaborations is the belief that ‘the path from scientific breakthrough to successful pharmaceutical brand depends on mobilizing the best global resources, expertise and experience’.59 Thus, as noted earlier in the chapter, cooperative strategies are used largely to enable organisations (such as pharmaceutical manufacturers) to combine the ‘world’s best’ resources, capabilities and core competencies in the pursuit of competitive success.

Many horizontal complementary strategic alliances are formed in the automobile manufacturing industry. For example, Renault, Nissan and Mitsubishi formed a corporate-level synergistic strategic alliance. A number of horizontal complementary strategic alliances the three organisations have developed support implementation of their corporate-level alliance. The Renault alliance with Bajaj Auto Ltd of India is an example of the horizontal relationships the organisation is forming. Even more broadly, cooperative strategies of all types are instrumental to automobile manufacturers’ efforts to successfully compete globally.

Competition response strategy As discussed in Chapter 5, competitors initiate competitive actions to attack rivals and launch competitive responses to their competitors’ actions. Strategic alliances can be used at the business level to respond to competitors’ attacks. Because they can be difficult to reverse and expensive to operate, strategic alliances are primarily formed to take strategic rather than tactical actions and to respond to competitors’ actions in a like manner.

Uncertainty-reducing strategy Organisations sometimes use business-level strategic alliances to hedge against risk and uncertainty, especially in fast-cycle markets.60 These strategies are also used where uncertainty exists, such as in entering new product markets and especially those of emerging economies.

As large global automobile organisations manufacture more hybrid vehicles, there is insufficient industry capacity to meet the demand for the type of batteries used in these vehicles. In turn, the lack of a sufficient supply of electric batteries creates uncertainty for automobile manufacturers. To reduce this uncertainty, automobile organisations are forming alliances. For example, Volkswagen formed an agreement with Samuel Electric and Toshiba Corp. of Japan to manufacture lithium-ion batteries used in hybrid vehicles (since 2017, Volkswagen has manufactured lithium-ion batteries for all battery cells in the Volkswagen Group).61 Renault–Nissan established a joint venture with the French Government in 2009 to make batteries. However, this venture was dissolved in mid-2011 due to the French Government deciding not to contribute to financing the plant.62

Assessing business-level cooperative strategies Organisations use business-level cooperative strategies to develop competitive advantages that can contribute to successful positions in individual product markets. Evidence suggests that complementary business-level strategic alliances, especially vertical ones, have the greatest probability of creating a compet it ive advantage and possibly even a sustainable one.63 Horizontal complementary alliances are sometimes difficult to maintain because often they are formed between organisations that compete against each other at the same time they are cooperating. Renault, Nissan and Mitsubishi still compete against each other with some of their products while collaborating to produce and sell other products. In a case such as this, partnering organisations may feel a ‘push’ towards and a ‘pull’ from alliances. Airline organisations, for example, want to compete aggressively against others serving their markets and target their customers. However, the need to develop scale economies and to share resources and capabilities (such as scheduling systems) dictates that alliances be formed so the organisations can compete by using cooperative actions and responses while they simultaneously compete against one another through competitive actions and

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responses. The challenge in these instances is for each organisation to find ways to create the greatest amount of value from both their competitive and cooperative actions. It seems that Renault, Nissan and Mitsubishi may have learned how to achieve this balance.

A lthough strategic alliances designed to respond to competition and to reduce uncer tainty can also create competitive advantages, these advantages often are more temporary than those developed through complementary (both vertical and horizontal) alliances. The primary reason for this is that complementary alliances have a stronger focus on creating value than do competition-reducing and uncertainty-reducing alliances, which are formed to respond to competitors’ actions or reduce uncertainty rather than to attack competitors.

Of the four business-level cooperative strategies, the competition-reducing strategy has the lowest probability of creating a competitive advantage. For example, research suggests that organisations following a foreign direct investment strategy using alliances as a follow-the-leader imitation approach may not have strong strategic or learning goals. Thus, such investment could be attributable to tacit collusion among the par ticipating organisations rather than tr ying to develop a competitive advantage (which should be the core objective).

Corporate-level cooperative strategy A corporate-level cooperative strategy is a st rateg y t h rough wh ich an organ isat ion collaborates w it h one or more companies for the purpose of expanding its operations. The alliance between Itochu Corp. and Drummond Company, for example, aims to ‘allow Itochu to diversify its coal assets to a new geographic region and grow its trading activities’.6 4 As such, this is a corporate-level cooperative strategy between these two organisations. Diversifying alliances, synergistic alliances and franchising are the most commonly used corporate-level cooperative strategies (see Figure 9.4).

Organisations use diversifying and synergistic alliances to improve their performance by diversifying their operations through a means other than or in addition to internal organic growth or a merger or acquisition.65 When an organisation seeks to diversify into markets in which the host nation’s government prevents mergers and acquisitions, alliances become an especially appropriate option. Corporate-level strategic alliances are also attractive compared with mergers and, particularly, acquisitions, because they require fewer resource commitments66 and permit greater flexibility in terms of efforts to diversify partners’ operations.67 An alliance can be used as a way to determine whether the partners might benefit from a future merger or acquisition between them. This ‘testing’ process often characterises alliances formed to combine organisations’ unique technological resources and capabilities.68

Diversifying strategic alliance A diversifying strategic alliance is a strateg y in which organisations share some of their resources and capabilities to engage in product and/or geographic diversification. The agreement between Itochu and Drummond is a diversifying strategic alliance.

The spread of high-speed wireless networks and devices with global positioning chips and the popularity of website applications running on various companies’ smartphones indicate that consumers are more

corporate-level cooperative strategy used by the organisation to help it diversify in terms of products offered or markets served, or both

diversifying strategic alliance a corporate-level cooperative strategy in which organisations share some of their resources and capabilities to diversify into new product or market areas

Corporate-level cooperative strategies

Diversifying alliances

Synergistic alliances Franchising

Figure 9.4 Corporate-level cooperative strategies

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frequently and intensely accessing mobile information. Equipped with this knowledge, Alcatel-Lucent entered the market through mobile advertising, which allows a mobile phone carrier to alert customers about the location of a favourite store or the closest ATM.69 The partners pursued this alliance with 1020 Placecast, a California-based developer of mobile phone online ads associated with user locations. Hyatt, FedEx and Avis were especially interested in using the service. The ads also include a link to coupons or other promotions. Alcatel-Lucent and Millicom Ghana Ltd ‘under the brand of Tigo, one of Ghana’s leading mobile network operators, [formed] a partnership to introduce the first permission- and preference-based mobile advertising service in Ghana’. The Tigo partnership then merged with Airtel in November 2017 to form AirtelTigo, which is now the second-largest mobile network operator in Ghana.70 Th rough t h is partnership, AirtelTigo’s customers are able to receive targeted promotions on their phones. Overall, these networks are trying to gain a share of the profits that would normally be out of their reach through revenue- sharing models with companies that are advertising as well as the ad-producing service companies.

Synergistic strategic alliance A synergistic strategic alliance is a strategy in which organisations share some of their resources and capabilities to create economies of scope. Similar to the business-level horizontal complementary strategic alliance, synergistic strategic alliances create synergy across multiple functions or multiple businesses bet ween pa r t ner orga n isat ions. T he Renau lt–Nissa n–M itsubish i col laborat ion we d isc ussed i n t h is chapter’s opening case is a synergistic strategic alliance in that, among other outcomes, the organisations seek to create economies of scope by sharing their resources and capabilities to develop manufacturing platforms that can be used to produce cars that will be Renaults, Nissans or Mitsubishis. The cooperative arrangement between Fiat and Chrysler is also a synergistic alliance. As noted earlier, Chrysler will produce a Fiat-designed and developed compact car in its Illinois facility. Reflecting the complexity of synergistic alliances and their ‘twin’ horizontal complementary alliances at the business-unit level is the fact that Fiat used the same underpinnings for what will be a car carrying the Dodge brand that it uses to produce the Alfa Romeo Giulietta.71 (Alfa Romeo is a part of Fiat SpA, which is part of the Groupe PSA and Fiat Chrysler merger.) Without economies of scope such as those Fiat seeks by using the same underpinnings for a car carrying the Dodge brand and the Alfa Romeo brand, the probability of success with a synergistic alliance is substantially reduced.

Franchising Franchising is a strategy in which an organisation (the franchisor) uses a franchise as a contractual relationship to describe and control the sharing of its resources and capabilities with its partners (the franchisees).72 A franchise is a ‘contractual agreement between two legally independent companies whereby the franchisor grants the right to the franchisee to sell the franchisor’s product or do business under its trademarks in a given location for a specified period of time’.73 Often, success is determined in these strategic alliances by how well the franchisor can replicate its success across multiple partners in a cost-effective way.74

Franchising is a popular strategy. In Australia, franchises employ over 598 000 people and have revenues of over A$180 billion per year. There are more than 101 000 businesses in the sector, and 91 per cent of the franchises are Australian in origin.75 In the USA in 2019, 773 600 franchises supported 8.4 million direct jobs, provided US$787 billion of economic output for the economy, and represented 3 per cent of total gross domestic product (GDP).76 Already frequently used in developed nations, franchising is also expected to account for significant portions of growth in emerging economies in the 21st century.77 As with diversifying and synergistic strategic alliances, franchising is an alternative to pursuing growth through mergers and acquisitions. McDonald’s, Jim’s Group (Jim’s Mowing, Jim’s Cleaning, Jim’s Dog Wash, etc.), Hilton International, Marriott International, Subway and Harvey Norman (which operates a model where there are several franchisees for each store) are well-known examples of organisations using the franchising corporate-level cooperative strategy.

synergistic strategic alliance a corporate-level cooperative strategy in which organisations share some of their resources and capabilities to create economies of scope

franchising a corporate-level cooperative strategy in which an organisation (the franchisor) uses a franchise as a contractual relationship to describe and control the sharing of its resources and capabilities with partners (the franchisees)

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For the franchisee, the model has many benefits: the business model is available, the brand is established, training and systems are usually provided, and they know others have been successful in that franchise area. It can be relatively expensive to get into one, though. For McDonald’s in Australia, a franchisee has to make a 20-year commitment, undertake 12 months of unpaid training and have A$1 200 000 in ‘unencumbered funds’ available. They may be told to go to any region in the country to set up their franchise and will be part of a very tightly controlled franchise operation from that time on.78 At the other end of the scale, a Jim’s franchise costs typically less than A$100 000, and the franchisee has much more control over their own business.

Franchising is a particularly attractive strategy to use in fragmented industries, such as retailing, hotels and motels, and commercial printing. In fragmented industries, a large number of small and medium-sized organisations compete as rivals; however, no organisation or small set of organisations has a dominant share, making it possible for a company to gain a large market share by consolidating independent companies through the contractual relationships that are a part of a franchise agreement.

In the most successful franchising strategy, the partners (the franchisor and the franchisees) work closely toget her.79 A primary responsibility of the franchisor is to develop programs to transfer to the franchisees the knowledge and skills that are needed to successfully compete at the local level.80 In return, franchisees should provide feedback to the franchisor regarding how their units could become more effective and efficient.81 Working cooperatively, the franchisor and its franchisees find ways to strengthen the core company’s brand name, which is often the most important competitive advantage for franchisees operating in their local markets.82

Assessing corporate-level cooperative strategies Costs are incurred to implement each type of cooperative strategy.83 Compared with their business-level counterparts, corporate-level cooperative strategies commonly are broader in scope and more complex, making them relatively more challenging and costly to use.

In spite of these costs, organisations can create competitive advantages and value for customers by effectively using corporate-level cooperative strategies.8 4 Internalising successful alliance experiences makes it more likely that the strategy will attain the desired advantages. In other words, those involved with forming and using corporate-level cooperative strategies can also use them to develop useful knowledge about how to succeed in the future. To gain maximum value from this knowledge, organisations should organise that knowledge and verify that it is always properly distributed to those involved with forming and using alliances.

We explained in Chapter 6 that organisations answer two questions when dealing with corporate-level strategy: in which businesses and product markets will the organisation choose to compete, and how will those businesses be managed? These questions are also answered as organisations form corporate-level cooperative strategies. Thus, organisations able to develop corporate-level cooperative strategies and manage them in ways that are valuable, rare, imperfectly imitable and non-substitutable (see Chapter 3) develop a competitive advantage that is in addition to advantages gained through the activities completed to implement individual cooperative strategies. (Later in the chapter, we further describe alliance management as another potential competitive advantage.)

International cooperative strategy The new competitive landscape finds organisations using cross-border transactions for several purposes. In  Chapter 7, we discussed cross-border acquisitions: actions through which a company located in one country acquires an organisation located in a different country. In Chapter 8, we described how organisations use cross-border acquisitions as a way of entering international markets. Here in Chapter 9, we examine cross-border strategic alliances as a type of international cooperative strategy. Thus, organisations engage in cross-border activities to achieve several related objectives.

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A cross-border strategic alliance is a strateg y in which organisations with headquarters in different countries decide to combine some of their resources and capabilities for the purpose of creating a competitive advantage. Taking place in virtually all industries, the number of cross-border alliances organisations a re complet i ng cont i nues to i ncrease.85 These alliances are sometimes formed instead of mergers and acquisitions, which can be riskier. Even though cross-border alliances can themselves be complex and hard to manage,86 they have the potential to help organisations use some of their resources and capabilities to create value in locations outside their home market.

Limited domestic growth opportunities and foreign government economic policies are key reasons organisations use cross-border alliances. As discussed in Chapter 8, local ownership is an important national policy objective in some nations. In India and China, for example, governmental policies reflect a strong preference to license local companies. Thus, in some countries, the full range of entry mode choices we described in Chapter 8 may not be available to organisations seeking to geographically diversify into a number of international markets. Indeed, investment by foreign organisations in these instances may be allowed only through a partnership with a local organisation, such as in a cross-border alliance. Also important is the fact that strategic alliances with local partners can help organisations overcome certain liabilities of moving into a foreign country, including those related to a lack of knowledge of the local cu ltu re or i nst itut iona l nor ms.87 A cross-border strategic alliance can also help foreign partners from an operational perspective, because the local partner has significantly more information about factors contributing to competitive success such as local markets, sources of capital, legal procedures and politics.88 Interestingly, research results suggest that organisations with foreign operations have longer survival rates than domestic-only organisations, although this is reduced if there are competition problems between foreign subsidiaries.89

As a result of two major global trends – increasing fuel costs and tougher environmental regulations – airlines are deeply interested in flying planes that are powered by more fuel-efficient engines. Manufacturers of aeroplane engines have responded to this strong customer interest and are pushing ‘the frontiers of technology by building lighter planes and borrowing essential engine-design advances from the automobile industry, like automatic transmissions’.90 To build these engines, manufacturers are forming strategic alliances, many of which are cross-border alliances. For example, Volvo Aero (which was a wholly owned subsidiary of Sweden’s AB Volvo before being acquired by British engineering conglomerate GKN in 2012) and US-based Pratt & Whitney (one of Raytheon Technologies Corporation’s divisions) formed a cross-border strategic alliance to collaborate on the PW1100G engine, an engine that ‘is a part of Pratt & Whitney’s Next Generation Product Family of engines which contain geared turbofan (GTF) technology’.91 Through this collaboration – which was not the first between these two organisations – Volvo Aero designed and manufactured two components that are critical to Pratt & Whitney’s engine. As we noted in Chapter 8, this engine initially was designed for use in the A320neo family, the updated version of the Airbus A320, with the aim to reduce fuel consumption, carbon dioxide and nitric oxide emissions, and noise, as well as lowering running and operating costs significantly. The engine was demonstrated at the Paris Air Show in 2013.92

In general, then, cross-border strategic alliances are more complex and risky than are domestic strategic alliances, especially when used in emerging economies. However, the fact that organisations competing internationally tend to outperform domestic-only competitors suggests the importance of learning how to geographically diversify into international markets. Compared with mergers and acquisitions, cross- border alliances may be a better way to learn this process, especially in the early stages of an organisation’s geographic diversification efforts.

Network cooperative strategy In addition to forming their own alliances with individual companies, an increasing number of organisations are collaborating in multiple networks.93 A network cooperative strategy is a strateg y wherein several organisations agree to form multiple partnerships for the purpose of achieving shared objectives.

cross-border strategic alliance an international cooperative strategy in which organisations with headquarters in different nations combine some of their resources and capabilities to create a competitive advantage

network cooperative strategy a cooperative strategy wherein several organisations agree to form multiple partnerships to achieve shared objectives

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Through its Global Partner Network, Cisco has formed alliances with a host of individual companies, including IBM, Microsoft, Accenture, Emerson, Fujitsu, Intel and Nokia. According to Cisco, partnering allows an organisation to ‘drive growth and differentiate [its] business by extending [its] capabilities to meet customer requirements’.94 Demonstrating the complexity of network cooperative strategies is the fact that Cisco also competes against a number of the organisations with which it has formed cooperative agreements. For example, Cisco is competing against IBM as it now sells and services servers. Although a new business line for Cisco, sales revenue for Cisco’s servers exceeded US$900 million in 2010, and grew to US$4 billion by 2019.95 At the same time, Cisco and IBM’s alliance is very active as the organisations seek to help customers ‘maximise (their) business results by uniting IBM’s vast industry, business process and implementation expertise with Cisco’s world-class unified communications and networking technologies’.96 Overall, in spite of their complexity, as the IBM–Cisco example shows, organisations are using network cooperative strategies more extensively as ways of creating value for customers by offering many goods and services in many geographic (domestic and international) markets.

A network cooperative strategy is particularly effective when it is formed by geographically clustered organisations,97 as in California’s Silicon Valley (where ‘the culture of Silicon Valley encourages collaborative webs’)98 and Singapore’s Biopolis (in the biomedical sciences) and Fusionopolis (collaborations in ‘physical sciences and engineering to tackle global science and technolog y challenges’).99 Effective social relationships and interactions among partners while sharing their resources and capabilities make it more likely that a network cooperative strategy will be successful,100 as does having a productive strategic centre organisation (we discuss strategic centre organisations in detail in Chapter 11). Organisations involved in networks gain information and knowledge from multiple sources. They ca n use t hese heterogeneous k nowledge sets to produce more a nd better innovation. As a result, organisations involved in networks of alliances tend to be more i n novat ive.101 However, there are disadvantages to participating in networks because an organisation can be locked into its partnerships, precluding the development of alliances with others. In certain network configurations, such as Japanese keiretsus, organisations in a network are expected to help other organisations in that network whenever support is required. Such expectations can become a burden and negatively affect the focal organisation’s performance over time.102

Alliance network types An important advantage of a network cooperative strategy is that organisations gain access to their partners’ other partners. Having access to multiple collaborations increases the likelihood that additional competitive advantages will be formed as the set of shared resources and capabilities expands.103 In turn, being able to develop new capabilities further stimulates product innovations that are critical to strategic competitiveness in the global economy.

The set of strategic alliance partnerships organisations develop when using a network cooperative strateg y is called an alliance network. Companies’ alliance networks vary by industry characteristics. A stable alliance network is formed in mature industries where demand is relatively constant and predictable. Through a stable alliance network, organisations try to extend their competitive advantages to other settings while continuing to profit from operations in their core, relatively mature industry. Thus, stable networks are built primarily to exploit the economies (scale and/or scope) that exist between the partners, such as in the airline industr y.104

Singapore’s Fusionopolis complex represents the collaboration of physical sciences and engineering to tackle global science and technology challenges.

Source: Alamy Stock Photo/© Gregory Bergman

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Dynamic alliance networks are used in industries characterised by frequent product innovations and short product life cycles.105 For instance, the pace of innovation in the information technology (IT) industry (as well as other fast-cycle market industries) is too fast for any one company to be successful across time if it only competes independently. Another example is the film industry, in which organisations participate in a number of networks for the purpose of producing and distributing films.106 In dynamic alliance networks, par tners ty pically explore new ideas and possibilities with the potential to lead to product innovations, entries to new markets and the development of new markets.107 Often, large organisations in industries such as software and pharmaceuticals create networks of relationships with smaller entrepreneurial start-up organisations in their search for innovation-based outcomes.108 An important outcome for small organisations successfully partnering with larger organisations in an alliance network is the credibility they build by being associated with their larger collaborators.109

Competitive risks with cooperative strategies Stated simply, many cooperative strategies fail. In fact, evidence shows that two-thirds of cooperative strategies have serious problems in their first two years and that as many as 50 per cent of them fail. This failure rate suggests that even when the partnership has potential complementarities and synergies, alliance success is elusive.110 Although failure is undesirable, it can be a valuable learning experience, meaning that organisations should carefully study a cooperative strategy’s failure to gain insights into how to form and manage future cooperative arrangements.111 We show prominent cooperative strateg y risks in Figure 9.5.

One cooperat ive st rateg y r isk is t hat a n orga n isat ion may act i n a way t hat its pa r t ner t h i n ks is opportunistic. Amylin Pharmaceuticals seems to believe that this is the case with Eli Lilly & Co., its partner in an alliance formed in 2002. Developing and commercialising the type 2 diabetes drug exenatide, which is sold as a twice-daily injection under the brand Byetta, is a major outcome of this alliance. However, Lilly signed an agreement with another organisation for the purpose of jointly developing and commercialising several diabetes drugs – including Tradjenta, a drug the US Food and Drug Administration has approved – is creating a situation in which Amylin appeared to conclude that Lilly is acting opportunistically. This led Amylin to file a lawsuit (subsequently withdrawn) against Lilly, ‘alleging [that] Lilly’s recent diabetes venture with Boehringer Ingelheim GmbH breaches the terms of Lilly’s older partnership with Amylin to market other drugs for the disease’.112

In general, opportunistic behaviours surface either when formal contracts fail to prevent them or when an alliance is based on a false perception of partner trustworthiness. Not infrequently, the opportunistic organisation wants to acquire as much of its partner’s tacit knowledge as it can.113 Full awareness of what

• Inadequate contracts • Misrepresentation of competencies • Partners fail to use their complementary resources • Holding alliance partner’s specific investment hostage

• Detailed contracts and monitoring • Developing trusting relationships

• Creating value

Competitive risks Risk and asset management approaches Desired outcome

Figure 9.5 Managing competitive risks in cooperative strategies

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a partner wants in a cooperative strategy reduces the likelihood that an organisation will suffer from another’s oppor tunistic actions.114

Some cooperative strategies fail when it is discovered that an organisation has misrepresented the competencies it can bring to the par tnership. This risk is more common when the par tner’s contribution is grounded in some of its intangible assets. Superior knowledge of local conditions is an example of an intangible asset that partners often fail to deliver. An effective way to deal with this risk may be to ask the par tner to provide evidence that it does possess the resources and capabilities (even when they are largely intangible) it will share in the cooperative strateg y.115

An organisation’s failure to make available to its partners the resources and capabilities (such as the most sophisticated technologies) that it committed to the cooperative strategy is a third risk. For example, the effectiveness of the collaboration between BP Plc and OAO Rosneft is dependent on each organisation contributing some of its seismic and drilling-related resources and capabilities as the foundation for efforts to develop three blocks in Russia’s Arctic Ocean. A failure by either partner to contribute needed resources and capabilities to this alliance has the potential to diminish the likelihood of success. This particular risk surfaces most commonly when organisations form an international cooperative strategy, especially in emerging economies.116 In these instances, different cultures and languages can cause misinterpretations of contractual terms or trust-based expectations.

A final risk is that one organisation may make investments that are specific to the alliance while its partner does not. For example, the organisation might commit resources and capabilities to develop manufacturing equipment that can be used only to produce items coming from the alliance. If the partner is not also making alliance-specific investments, the organisation is at a relative disadvantage in terms of returns earned from the alliance compared with investments made to earn the returns.

Managing cooperative strategies Cooperative strategies are an important means of organisation growth and enhanced performance, but these strategies are difficult to effectively manage. Because the ability to effectively manage cooperative strategies is unevenly distributed across organisations in general, assigning managerial responsibility for an organisation’s cooperative strategies to a high-level executive or to a team improves the likelihood that the strategies will be well managed. In turn, being able to successfully manage cooperative strategies can itself be a competitive advantage.117

Those responsible for managing the organisation’s cooperative strategies should take the actions necessary to coordinate activities, categorise knowledge learned from previous experiences, and make certain that what the organisation knows about how to effectively form and use cooperative strategies is in the hands of the right people at the right time. Organisations must also learn how to manage both the tangible and intangible assets (such as knowledge) that are involved with a cooperative arrangement. Too often, partners concentrate on managing tangible assets at the expense of taking action to also manage the cooperative relationship’s intangible assets.118

Cost minimisation and opportunity maximisation are the two primary approaches organisations use to manage cooperative strategies119 (see Figure 9.5). In the cost-minimisation approach, the organisation develops formal contracts with its partners. These contracts specify how the cooperative strategy is to be monitored and how partner behaviour is to be controlled. The alliance between BP Plc and OAO Rosneft, through which the organisations aimed to develop three blocks in Russia’s Arctic Ocean to search for oil, was managed largely through contracts.120 (The perils of geopolitical rivalry made this alliance difficult.) The goal of the cost-minimisation approach is to minimise the cooperative strategy’s cost and to prevent oppor tunistic behaviour by a par tner.

Maximising a partnership’s value-creating opportunities is the focus of the opportunity-maximisation approach. In this case, partners are prepared to take advantage of unexpected opportunities to learn from each other and to explore additional marketplace possibilities. Less formal contracts, with fewer constraints

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on partners’ behaviours, make it possible for partners to explore how their resources and capabilities can be shared in multiple value-creating ways. This is the approach Renault, Nissan and Mitsubishi use to manage their collaborative relationship. The values of trust, respect and transparency on which this alliance is based facilitate use of the opportunity-maximisation management approach.

Organisations can successfully use both approaches to manage cooperative strategies. However, the costs to monitor the cooperative strategy are greater with cost minimisation, in that writing detailed contracts and using extensive monitoring mechanisms is expensive, even though the approach is intended to reduce alliance costs. A lthough monitoring systems may prevent par tners from acting in their own best interests, they also often preclude positive responses to new opportunities that surface to productively use alliance partners’ resources and capabilities. Thus, formal contracts and extensive monitoring systems tend to stifle partners’ efforts to gain maximum value from their participation in a cooperative strategy and require significant resources to be put into place and used.121

The relative lack of detail and formality that is a part of the contract developed when using the opportunity-maximisation approach means that organisations need to trust that each party will act in the partnership’s best interests. The psychological state of trust in the context of cooperative arrangements is the belief that an organisation will not do anything to exploit its partner’s vulnerabilities, even if it has an opportunity to do so. When partners trust each other, there is less need to write detailed formal contracts to specify each organisation’s alliance behaviours122 and the cooperative relationship tends to be more stable.123

On a relative basis, trust tends to be more difficult to establish in international cooperative strategies compared with domestic ones. Differences in trade policies, cultures, laws and politics that are part of cross-border alliances account for the increased difficulty. When trust exists, monitoring costs are reduced and opportunities to create value are maximised. Essentially, in these cases, the organisations have built social capital.124 Renault, Nissan and Mitsubishi have built social capital through their alliance by building their relationship on the mutual tr ust between the par tners as well as their adherence to operating within the framework of agreed-upon confidentiality rules.125

Research showing that trust between partners increases the likelihood of success when using alliances highlights the benefits of the opportunity-maximisation approach to managing cooperative strategies. Trust may also be the most efficient way to influence and control alliance partners’ behaviours. Research indicates that trust can be a capability that is valuable, rare, imperfectly imitable and often non-substitutable.126 Thus, organisations known to be trustworthy can have a competitive advantage in terms of how they develop and use cooperative strategies. Increasing the importance of trust in alliances is the fact that it is not possible to specify all operational details of a cooperative strategy in a formal contract. As such, being confident that its partner can be trusted reduces the organisation’s concern about the inability to contractually control all alliance details.

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STUDY TOOLS SUMMARY LO1 A cooperative strategy is one in which organisations

work together to achieve a shared objective. The reasons organisations use cooperative strategies vary by slow-cycle, fast-cycle and standard-cycle market conditions. To enter restricted markets (slow cycle), to move quickly from one competitive advantage to another (fast cycle) and to gain market power (standard cycle) are among the reasons organisations choose to use cooperative strategies.

LO2 The main type of cooperative strategy is strategic alliance, where organisations combine some of their resources and capabilities for the purpose of creating a competitive advantage. Joint ventures (where organisations create and own equal shares of a new venture), equity strategic alliances (where organisations own different shares of a newly created venture) and non-equity strategic alliances (where organisations cooperate through a contractual relationship) are the three major types of strategic alliances. Outsourcing, discussed in Chapter 3, commonly occurs as organisations form non-equity strategic alliances.

LO3 Collusive strategies are the second type of cooperative strategy. In many economies, explicit collusive strategies are illegal unless sanctioned by government policies. Increasing globalisation has led to fewer government-sanctioned situations of explicit collusion. Tacit collusion is a cooperative strategy through which organisations tacitly cooperate to reduce industry output below the potential competitive output level, thereby raising prices above the competitive level.

LO4 Four business-level cooperative strategies are used to help the organisation improve its performance in individual product markets. Of these, complementary alliances have the highest probability of helping an organisation form a competitive advantage; competition-reducing alliances have the lowest probability.

The four strategies are: (1) through vertical and horizontal complementary alliances, companies combine some of their resources and capabilities to create value in different parts (vertical) or the same parts (horizontal) of the value chain; (2) competition

response strategies are formed to respond to competitors’ actions, especially strategic actions; (3) uncertainty-reducing strategies are used to hedge against the risks created by the conditions of uncertain competitive environments (such as new product markets); and (4) competition-reducing strategies are used to avoid excessive competition while the organisation marshals its resources and capabilities to improve its strategic competitiveness.

LO5 Organisations use corporate-level cooperative strategies to engage in product and/or geographic diversification. Through diversifying strategic alliances, organisations agree to share some of their resources and capabilities to enter new markets or produce new products. Synergistic alliances are ones where organisations share some of their resources and capabilities to develop economies of scope. Synergistic alliances are similar to business-level horizontal complementary alliances where organisations try to develop operational synergy, except that synergistic alliances are used to develop synergy at the corporate level. Franchising is a corporate-level cooperative strategy where the franchisor uses a franchise as a contractual relationship to specify how resources and capabilities will be shared with franchisees.

LO6 As an international cooperative strategy, a cross- border strategic alliance is used for several reasons, including the performance superiority of organisations competing in markets outside their domestic market and governmental restrictions on an organisation’s efforts to grow through mergers and acquisitions. Commonly, cross-border strategic alliances are riskier than their domestic counterparts, particularly when partners are not fully aware of each other’s purpose for participating in the partnership.

LO7 In a network cooperative strategy, several organisations agree to form multiple partnerships to achieve shared objectives. An organisation’s opportunity to gain access to its partner’s other partnerships is a primary benefit of a network cooperative strategy. Network cooperative strategies are used to form either a stable alliance network or a dynamic alliance network. Used

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in mature industries, stable networks are used to extend competitive advantages into new areas. In rapidly changing environments where frequent product innovations occur, dynamic networks are used primarily as a tool of innovation.

LO8 Cooperative strategies are not risk free. If a contract is not developed appropriately, or if a partner misrepresents its competencies or fails to make them available, failure is likely. Furthermore, an organisation may be held hostage through asset-specific investments made in conjunction with a partner, which may be exploited.

LO9 Trust is an increasingly important aspect of successful cooperative strategies. Organisations place high value on opportunities to partner with companies known for their trustworthiness. When trust exists, a cooperative strategy is managed to maximise the pursuit of opportunities between partners. Without trust, formal contracts and extensive monitoring systems are used to manage cooperative strategies. In this case, the interest is ‘cost minimisation’ rather than ‘opportunity maximisation’.

KEY TERMS business-level cooperative

strategy

complementary strategic alliances

cooperative strategy

corporate-level cooperative strategy

cross-border strategic alliance

diversifying strategic alliance

equity strategic alliance

franchising

joint venture

network cooperative strategy

non-equity strategic alliance

strategic alliance

synergistic strategic alliance

REVIEW QUESTIONS 1. What is the definition of cooperative strategy? Why

is this strategy important to organisations competing in the 21st-century competitive landscape?

2. What is a strategic alliance? What are the three major types of strategic alliances organisations form for the purpose of developing a competitive advantage?

3. What are two main types of competition-reducing strategies? How and why might governments monitor or regulate them?

4. What are the four business-level cooperative strategies? What are the key differences among them?

5. What are the three corporate-level cooperative strategies? How do organisations use each of these strategies for the purpose of creating a competitive advantage?

6. Which organisations represent examples of long- standing successful cooperative strategies?

7. Why do organisations use cross-border strategic alliances?

8. Why do organisations sometimes adopt network cooperative strategies? What are the alliance network types typically used?

9. What risks are organisations likely to experience as they use cooperative strategies?

10. What are the differences between the cost-minimisation approach and the opportunity-maximisation approach to managing cooperative strategies?

EXPERIENTIAL EXERCISES Exercise 1: What is it – television, internet or both? Hulu (http://www.hulu.com) is a website and cooperative alliance that offers commercially supported content of television (video on demand) shows through the internet. The name is derived from a Chinese word that means

‘holder of precious things’. The alliance has many different partners that are related in interesting ways and from very different market types.

Working in groups, complete the following: 1. Describe the original alliance partners. Characterise the

market type as slow, fast or standard cycle.

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2. Characterise the type of strategic alliance Hulu has become.

3. In what type of market is Hulu competing?

4. Why did this alliance form? List some competitive pressures that made this alliance a necessity for its partners.

5. How has this alliance changed? What does the future hold for this alliance?

Exercise 2: Airlines and alliances According to your text, a strategic alliance ‘is a partnership between organisations whereby their resources and capabilities are combined to create a competitive advantage’. So what is in an alliance for an airline company such as United, American or British Airways? In this exercise, your instructor will assign one of the three main alliances (OneWorld, Star or SkyTeam) and your teams will be requested to investigate the alliance and be prepared to discuss the following issues:

1. In general, why do airlines form an alliance with one another (particularly internationally) rather than expanding by acquisition?

2. What is the history of the alliance to which you were assigned?

3. Describe the main benefits that airlines hope to gain through membership. What is the competitive advantage of your particular alliance (if you find there is one)?

4. Categorise the alliance in terms of the three types of strategic alliance. Also describe the cooperative strategy of a member organisation in relation to its business- level and corporate-level strategy.

5. Think through issues of the future of airline alliances. If you were the CEO of a major US airline, what might worry you about your particular alliance, if anything?

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64. K. Maxwell, 2011, Itochu buys stake in Colombian coal operation, Wall Street Journal, https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10 00142405270230431980457638954363122 3696, 16 June.

65. C. Haeussler, 2011, The determinants of commercialization strategy: Idiosyncrasies in British and German biotechnology, Entrepreneurship Theory and Practice, 35: 653–81.

66. P. Ritala & H.-K. Ellonen, 2010, Competitive advantage in interfirm cooperation: Old and new explanations, Competitiveness Review, 20: 367–83; L. H. Lin, 2009, Mergers and acquisitions, alliances and technology development: An empirical study of the global auto industry, International Journal of Technology Management, 48: 295–307.

67. J. Anand, R. Oriani & R. S. Vassolo, 2010, Alliance activity as a dynamic capability in the face of a discontinuous technological change, Organization Science, 21: 1213–32; J. Li, C. Dhanaraj & R. L. Shockley, 2008, Joint venture evolution: Extending the real options approach, Managerial and Decision Economics, 29: 317–36.

68. V. Moatti, 2009, Learning to expand or expanding to learn? The role of imitation and experience in the choice among several expansion modes, European Management Journal, 27: 36–46.

69. S. Silver & E. Steel, 2009, Alcatel gets into mobile ads: Service will target cell phone users based on location, Wall Street Journal, 21 May, B9.

70. Alcatel-Lucent, 2011, Tigo and Alcatel- Lucent personalized mobile advertising to millions of subscribers in Ghana, http:// www.alcatel-lucent.com, 16 February; AirtelTigo, 2020, Brief profile, https://www. airteltigo.com.gh/profile, 8 June.

71. R. Hutton, 2010, 2010 Alfa Romeo Giulietta: First drive review, Car and Driver, http:// www.caranddriver.com, April.

72. J. G. Combs, D. J. Ketchen, Jr, C. L. Shook & J. C. Short, 2011, Antecedents and consequences of franchising: Past accomplishments and future challenges, Journal of Management, 37: 99–126; A. M. Doherty, 2009, Market and partner selection processes in international retail franchising, Journal of Business Research, 62: 528–34.

73. F. Lafontaine, 1999, Myths and strengths of franchising, ‘Mastering Strategy’ (Part Nine), Financial Times, 22 November, 8–10.

74. D. Grewal, G. R. Iyer, R. G. Javalgi & L. Radulovich, 2011, Franchise partnership and international expansion: A conceptual framework and research propositions, Entrepreneurship Theory and Practice, 35: 533–57; A. M. Hayashi, 2008, How to replicate success, MIT Sloan Management Review, 49(3): 6–7.

75. Which Franchise Australia, 2020, Franchising in Australia facts, https://www. whichfranchise.net.au/index.cfm?event=ge tArticle&articleId=6, 8 June.

76. International Franchise Association, 2019, Franchise Business Economic Outlook 2020: Franchise Growth Continues, https:// franchiseeconomy.com/assets/32304.pdf.

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78. McDonald’s, 2020, Franchise opportunities, http://mcdonalds.com.au/ franchiseopportunities.

79. J. McDonnell, A. Geatson & C.-H. Huang, 2011, Investigating relationships between relationship quality, customer loyalty and cooperation: An empirical study of convenience stores’ franchise chain systems, Asia Pacific Journal of Marketing and Logistics, 23: 367–85.

80. T. M. Nisar, 2011, Intellectual property securitization and growth capital in retail franchising, Journal of Retailing, 87(3): 393–405; A. K. Paswan & C. M. Wittman, 2009, Knowledge management and franchise systems, Industrial Marketing Management, 38: 173–80.

81. W. R. Meek, B. Davis-Sramek, M. S. Baucus & R. N. Germain, 2011, Commitment in franchising: The role of collaborative communication and a franchisee’s propensity to leave, Entrepreneurship Theory and Practice, 35: 559–81.

82. T. W. K. Leslie & L. S. McNeill, 2010, Towards a conceptual model for franchise perceptual equity, Journal of Brand Management, 18: 21–33; B. Arrunada, L. Vazquez & G. Zanarone, 2009, Institutional constraints in organizations: The case of Spanish car dealerships, Managerial and Decision Economics, 30: 15–26.

83. M. J. Nieto & A. Rodriguez, 2011, Offshoring of R&D: Looking abroad to improve innovation performance, Journal of International Business Studies, 42: 345–61; A. Tiwana, 2008, Does technological modularity substitute for control? A study of alliance performance in software outsourcing, Strategic Management Journal, 29: 769–80.

84. E. Levitas & M. A. McFadyen, 2009, Managing liquidity in research-intensive firms: Signaling and cash flow effects of patents and alliance activities, Strategic Management Journal, 30: 659–78.

85. L. D. Qiu, 2010, Cross-border mergers and strategic alliances, European Economic Review, 54: 818–31; H. Ren, B. Gray & H. Kim, 2009, Performance of international joint ventures: What factors really make a difference and how?, Journal of Management, 35: 805–32.

86. Y. Yan, D. Ding & S. Mak, 2009, The impact of business investment on capability exploitation and organizational control in international strategic alliances, Journal of Change Management, 9(1): 49–65.

87. A. Zaheer & E. Hernandez, 2011, The geographic scope of the MNC and its alliance portfolio: Resolving the paradox of distance, Global Strategy Journal, 1:

109–26; B. Elango, 2009, Minimizing effects of ‘liability of foreignness’: Response strategies of foreign firms in the United States, Journal of World Business, 44(1): 51–62.

88. M. Meuleman & M. Wright, 2011, Cross- border private equity syndication: Institutional context and learning, Journal of Business Venturing, 26: 35–48; T. J. Wilkinson, A. R. Thomas & J. M. Hawes, 2009, Managing relationships with Chinese joint venture partners, Journal of Global Marketing, 22(2): 109–20.

89. D. Kronborg & S. Thomsen, 2009, Foreign ownership and long-term survival, Strategic Management Journal, 30: 207–20.

90. S. Mayerowitz, 2011, Airlines making speed to boost fuel efficiency, Houston Chronicle, http://www.chron.com, 8 July.

91. Raytheon Technologies Corporation – Pratt & Whitney Division, 2020, Pratt & Whitney GTF engine, https://prattwhitney. com/en/products-and-services/products/ commercial-engines/pratt-and-whitney-gtf, 8 June.

92. GKN Aerospace, 2013, Technological innovations dominate for GKN Aerospace at the Paris Air Show, https://www. gknaerospace.com/en/newsroom/news- releases/2013/technological-innovations- dominate-for-gkn-aerospace-at-the-paris- air-show-2013, 9 June.

93. D. Lavie, 2009, Capturing value from alliance portfolios, Organizational Dynamics, 38(1): 26–36; D. Lavie, C. Lechner & H. Singh, 2007, The performance implications of timing of entry and involvement in multipartner alliances, Academy of Management Journal, 49: 569–604.

94. Cisco, 2020, Become a registered partner, https://www.cisco.com/c/en_au/partners/ ecosystem/become-registered.html, 8 June.

95. S. Higginbotham, 2011, Amid gloom, Cisco’s servers approaching a $1B business, Gigacom.com, http://www.gigacom.com, 12 May; IDC, 2019, Worldwide server market revenue increased 4.4% year over year in the first quarter of 2019 according to IDC, https://www.idc.com/getdoc. jsp?containerId=prUS45151319, 5 June.

96. Cisco, 2020, https://www.cisco.com/c/en/ us/solutions/global-partners/ibm.html, IBM and Cisco Solutions, 8 June.

97. A. T. Arkan & M. A. Schilling, 2011, Structure and governance in industrial districts: Implications for competitive advantage, Journal of Management Studies, 48: 772–803; K. Atkins, J. Chen, V. S. A. Kumar, M. Macauley & A. Marathe, 2009, Locational market power in network constrained markets, Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 70: 416–30.

98. K. Sawyer, 2007, Strength in webs, The Conference Board, July/August, 9–11.

99. C. Yarbrough, 2008, Singapore to open Fusionopolis, Research Technology Management, 51: 4–5.

100. J. Wincent, S. Anokhin, D. Ortqvist & E. Autio, 2010, Quality meets structure: Generalized reciprocity and firm-level advantage in strategic networks, Journal of Management Studies, 47: 597–624; D. Lavie, 2007, Alliance portfolios and firm performance: A study of value creation and appropriation in the US software industry, Strategic Management Journal, 28: 1187–212.

101. A. M. Joshi & A. Nerkar, 2011, When do strategic alliances inhibit innovation by firms? Evidence from patent pools in the global optical disc industry, Strategic Management Journal, 32(11): 1139–60; R. Cowan & N. Jonard, 2009, Knowledge portfolios and the organization of innovation networks, Academy of Management Review, 34: 320–42.

102. J. P. MacDuffie, 2011, Inter-organizational trust and the dynamics of distrust, Journal of International Business Studies, 42: 35–47; H. Kim, R. E. Hoskisson & W. P. Wan, 2004, Power, dependence, diversification strategy and performance in keiretsu member firms, Strategic Management Journal, 25: 613–36.

103. A. V. Shipilov, 2009, Firm scope experience, historic multimarket contact with partners, centrality, and the relationship between structural holes and performance, Organization Science, 20: 85–106.

104. P.-H. Soh, 2010, Network patterns and competitive advantage before the emergence of a dominant design, Strategic Management Journal, 31: 438–61.

105. G. Soda, 2011, The management of firms’ alliance network positioning: Implications for innovation, European Management Journal, 29(5): 377–89; T. Kiessling & M. Harvey, 2008, Globalisation of internal venture capital opportunities in developing small and medium enterprises’ relationships, International Journal of Entrepreneurship and Innovation Management, 8: 233–53; V. Shankar & B. L. Bayus, 2003, Network effects and competition: An empirical analysis of the home video game industry, Strategic Management Journal, 24: 375–84.

106. J. J. Ebbers & N. M. Wijnberg, 2010, Disentangling the effects of reputation and network position on the evolution of alliance networks, Strategic Organization, 8: 255–75; A. Schwab & A. S. Miner, 2008, Learning in hybrid-project systems: The effects of project performance on repeated collaboration, Academy of Management Journal, 51: 1117–49.

107. A. Capaldo & A. M. Petruzzelli, 2011, In search of alliance-level relational capabilities: Balancing innovation, value creation, and appropriability in R&D alliances, Scandinavian Journal of Management, 27(3): 273–86; A. E. Leiponen, 2008, Competing through cooperation: The organization of standard setting in wireless telecommunications, Management Science, 54: 1904–19.

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108. D. Somaya, Y. Kim & N. S. Vonortas, 2011, Exclusivity in licensing alliances: Using hostages to support technology commercialization, Strategic Management Journal, 32: 159–86; P. Puranam & K. Srikanth, 2007, What they know vs. what they do: How acquirers leverage technology acquisitions, Strategic Management Journal, 28: 805–25.

109. M. J. Nieto & L. Santamaria, 2010, Technological collaboration: Bridging the innovation gap between small and large firms, Journal of Small Business Management, 48: 44–69; P. Ozcan & K. M. Eisenhardt, 2009, Origin of alliance portfolios: Entrepreneurs network strategies, and firm performance, Academy of Management Journal, 52: 246–79.

110. H. R. Greve, J. A. C. Baum, H. Mitsuhashi & T. J. Rowley, 2010, Built to last but falling apart: Cohesion, friction, and withdrawal from interfirm alliances, Academy of Management Journal, 53: 302–22; M. Rod, 2009, A model for the effective management of joint ventures: A case study approach, International Journal of Management, 26(10): 3–17.

111. G. Vasudeva & J. Anand, 2011, Unpacking absorptive capacity: A study of knowledge utilization from alliance portfolios, Academy of Management Journal, 54: 611–23; J.-Y. Kim & A. S. Miner, 2007, Vicarious learning from the failures and near-failures of others: Evidence from the US commercial banking industry, Academy of Management Journal, 49: 687–714.

112. P. Loftus, 2011, Amylin sues Eli Lilly over diabetes pact, Wall Street Journal, http:// www.wsj.com, 16 May; B. V. Bigelow, 2011, Amylin and Eli Lilly part ways on diabetes drug; Alkermes deal intact, Xconomy, https://xconomy.com/san- diego/2011/11/08/amylin-and-lilly-part- ways-agree-to-separation-agreement, 8 November.

113. R. Agarwal, D. Audretsch & M. B. Sarkar, 2010, Knowledge spillovers and strategic entrepreneurship, Strategic Entrepreneurship Journal, 4: 271–83; Y. Li, Y. Liu & H. Wu, 2008, Transformational offshore outsourcing: Empirical evidence

from alliances in China, Journal of Operations Management, 26: 257–74.

114. T. K. Das, 2011, Regulatory focus and opportunism in the alliance development process, Journal of Management, 37: 682– 708; J. Connell & R. Voola, 2007, Strategic alliances and knowledge sharing: Synergies or silos?, Journal of Knowledge Management, 11: 52–66.

115. M. S. Giarratana & S. Torrisi, 2010, Foreign entry and survival in a knowledge-intensive market: Emerging economy countries’ international linkages, technology competencies, and firm experience, Strategic Entrepreneurship Journal, 4: 85–104; M. G. Sarkar, P. S. Aulakh & A. Madhok, 2009, Process capabilities and value generation in alliance portfolios, Organization Science, 20: 583–600.

116. F. Lumineau, M. Frechet & D. Puthod, 2011, An organizational learning perspective on the contracting process, Strategic Organization, 9: 8–32; P.-X. Meschi, 2009, Government corruption and foreign stakes in international joint ventures in emerging economies, Asia Pacific Journal of Management, 26: 241–61.

117. J. B. Barney, D. J. Ketchen, Jr, M. Wright, D. G. Sirmon, M. A. Hitt, R. D. Ireland & B. A. Gilbert, 2011, Resource orchestration to create competitive advantage: Breadth, depth, and life cycle effects, Journal of Management, 37(5): 1390–412; M. H. Hansen, R. E. Hoskisson & J. B. Barney, 2008, Competitive advantage in alliance governance: Resolving the opportunism minimization-gain maximization paradox, Managerial and Decision Economics, 29: 191–208.

118. C. C. Chung & P. W. Beamish, 2010, The trap of continual ownership change in international equity joint ventures, Organization Science, 21: 995–1015.

119. Mudambi & Tallman, Make, buy or ally?; Hansen, Hoskisson & Barney, Competitive advantage in alliance governance.

120. W. Kennedy & A. Shiryaevskaya, 2011, BP agrees Rosneft share swap to form global strategic alliance, Bloomberg Businessweek, http://www.businessweek.com, 14 January.

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122. J. J. Li, L. Poppo & K. Z. Zhou, 2010, Relational mechanisms, formal contracts, and local knowledge acquisition by international subsidiaries, Strategic Management Journal, 31: 349–70; K. Langfield-Smith, 2008, The relations between transactional characteristics trust and risk in the start-up phrase of a collaborative alliance, Management Accounting Research, 19: 344–64.

123. H. C. Dekker & A. Van den Abbeele, 2010, Organizational learning and interfirm control: The effects of partner search and prior exchange experience, Organization Science, 21: 1233–50; T. K. Das & R. Kumar, 2009, Interpartner harmony in strategic alliances: Managing commitment and forbearance, International Journal of Strategic Business Alliances, 1(1): 24–52.

124. G. Dokko & L. Rosenkopf, 2010, Social capital for hire? Mobility of technical professionals and firm influence in wireless standards committees, Organization Science, 21: 677–95; J. W. Rottman, 2008, Successful knowledge transfer within offshore supplier networks: A case study exploring social capital in strategic alliances, Journal of Information Technology, 23(10): 31–43.

125. Renault–Nissan–Mitsubishi, 2020, A global automotive alliance founded in 1999, https://www.alliance-2022.com/about-us, 8 June.

126. C. C. Phelps, 2010, A longitudinal study of the influence of alliance network structure and composition on firm exploratory innovation, Academy of Management Journal, 53: 890–913; C. E. Ybarra & T. A. Turck, 2009, The evolution of trust in information technology alliances, Journal of High Technology Management Research, 20(10): 62–74.

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STRATEGIC ACTIONS: STRATEGY IMPLEMENTATION 10 Corporate governance 284

11 Organisational structure and controls 3 2 1

12 Strategic leadership 355

13 Strategic entrepreneurship 386

PA R T 3 283

283

Corporate governance CH

AP TE

R 10

Studying this chapter should provide you with the strategic management knowledge needed to: LO1 define corporate governance and explain why it is used to monitor and control

executive managers’ decisions LO2 explain why ownership is largely separated from managerial control in

organisations LO3 define an agency relationship and managerial opportunism and describe their

strategic implications LO4 explain the use of three internal governance mechanisms to monitor and

control managers’ decisions LO5 discuss the types of compensation executive managers receive and their effects

on managerial decisions LO6 describe how the external corporate governance mechanism – the market for

corporate control – restrains executive managers’ decisions LO7 discuss the nature and use of corporate governance in international settings,

especially in Australia, Germany, Japan, Spain and China LO8 describe how corporate governance fosters the making of ethical decisions by

an organisation’s executive managers.

Learning Objectives

284

As noted in Chapter 6, diversified organisations can be complex, given the number of businesses an organisation is trying to manage simultaneously. This is not only a difficult task for managers, but is more difficult for board directors, especially when they come from outside the organisation. Outside directors largely have to depend on the analyses managers present, given the overall complexity of large diversified organisations. Concerning General Electric (GE), former CEO Jack Welch formed a large set of businesses in the 1980s and 1990s. Although his successor, Jeffery Immelt, largely dealt with the financial crisis and the divestiture of GE Capital, there were still significant problems from the excess diversification. In December 2016, the earnings reports started raising alarms. Nelson Peltz, from Trian Partners, had invested heavily in the organisation in 2015. When this investment began to decrease in value in 2016, Trian and other activist shareholders forced Immelt’s dismissal, and John Flannery took over as CEO. Flannery was subsequently replaced by Lawrence Culp Jr. Edward Garden of Trian Partners subsequently became a board member to watch over Trian’s investment, which had shrunk to US$1.7 billion from its original US$2.5 billion in value.

In early 2018, as Flannery sought to overcome GE’s performance difficulties, nine new board members were proposed on GE’s proxy statement, which meant half of the board was targeted for replacement. Although there had already been significant restructuring under Immelt – including selling the majority of GE Capital, NBCUniversal and GE’s appliance business – Flannery announced that he would seek to sell more assets worth an additional US$80 billion as well as propose layoffs and other cost improvements. In addition, GE had been paying a significant dividend and buying back shares, but much of this capital came from increased debt. To deal with this, Flannery reduced the dividend payment and became more transparent with how GE used its free cash flow. Garden’s board seat gave Trian access to the board’s deliberations and detailed financial results just as the organisation was conducting a strategic review

of its business portfolio and deciding how to cut costs and spend its cash flow. GE also took a large US$6 billion charge against its earnings in early 2018 associated with its insurance business, which was part of the legacy GE Capital business. Interestingly, when Lawrence Culp Jr took over the leadership of GE, overnight the share price increased approximately 10 per cent.

Apparently, along with the increased debt burden and this US$6 billion charge, the board had failed to monitor other things carefully, including an extra private plane used by Mr Immelt. Additionally, there were problems with earnings calculations that the board failed to catch, so much so that GE had to restate its earnings from 2016 and 2017. These failings led to significant governance restructuring – particularly, the replacement of the nine outside board members, including an activist board member, Mr Garden.

In late 2017, Flannery announced that GE would focus on three core segments going forward: aviation, power and power distribution, and health care. One of the difficulties in restructuring the organisation was that GE was saddled with US$97.5 billion in debt. Furthermore, it had US$31 billion in unfunded pension liabilities. To fund the debt and pension liabilities, GE needed substantial cash flow from its remaining businesses, making it difficult to sell all the assets, so Flannery sought to

General Electric’s complex diversification strategy makes evaluation difficult for board directors

OPENING CASE STUDY

John Flannery was let go by the GE board in October of 2018, after a 14-month stint as CEO.

Source: Getty Images/Bloomberg/Prashanth Vishwanathan

CHAPTER 10 COrPOrATE GOVErNANCE

285285CHAPTER 10 COrPOrATE GOVErNANCE

As t he open ing case suggests, cor porate gover nance involves a nu mber of act iv it ies dealing w it h how organisations operate. Given that we are concerned with the strategic management process organisations use, ou r focus i n t h is chapter is on cor porate gover na nce i n orga n isat ions. Cor porate gover na nce is concerned with various activities, including those intended to:

1 strengthen the effectiveness of an organisation’s board of directors 2 verify the transparency of an organisation’s operations 3 enhance accountability to shareholders 4 effectively incentivise executives 5 in an overall sense, maximise the organisation’s ability to create value for stakeholders and especially

for shareholders. Comprehensive in scope and complex in nature, corporate governance is a responsibility that challenges

orga n isat ions a nd t hei r leaders. Successf u l ly dea l i ng w it h t h is cha l lenge is i mpor ta nt, as ev idence suggests that cor porate governance is critical to organisations’ performance and success. Because of this, governance is an increasingly impor tant par t of the strategic management process.1 For example, if the board makes the w rong decisions in selecting, governing and compensating the organisation’s CEO as its key strategic leader, the shareholders and the organisation suffer. Recent cases on point include former CEOs of Westpac Group, National Australia Bank and Bellamy’s, and for mer CEO and Chair of A M P, all of whom resigned due to reputational damage su ffered by the organisations under their leadership and shareholder and stakeholder concerns. Conversely, when CEOs are motivated to act in the best interests of the organisation – in par ticular, the shareholders – the organisation’s value should increase. Additionally, effective succession plans and appropriate monitoring and direction-setting efforts by the board of directors contribute positively to an organisation’s performance.

Corporate governance is the set of mechanisms used to manage the relationship among stakeholders and determine and control the strategic direction and performance of organisations, and is widely accepted as the most fitting for current global context: ‘… [cor porate governance represents] the system by which compa n ies a re d i rected a nd cont rol led. Boa rd of Di rectors a re responsible for t he gover na nce of t hei r companies, ensuring that they are well r un’.2 The significance of cor porate governance was captured in a broader definition authored by Sir Adrian Cadbur y, who noted that the governance framework is there to encourage the efficient use of resources and equally to require accountability for the stewardship of those resources. 3 At its core, cor porate governance is concerned with three impor tant issues. The fi rst issue is the monitoring of the organisation. The second issue is setting the tone for the strategic appetite of the organisation as well as the strategic direction, ensuring that strategic decisions are made effectively and

corporate governance the set of mechanisms used to manage the relationship among stakeholders and to determine and control the strategic direction and performance of organisations

restructure. To deal with this dilemma GE set up a new board committee focused on restructuring its portfolio and working through the legal ramifications. When you build a business such as GE, you build it for specific strategic reasons; breaking it up cannot be readily undone, despite shareholder wishes or demands.

In summary, GE was in a bind, largely because the board members seemed not to understand the complexity that the organisation’s strategic leaders were pursuing. Because they missed the warning signs, they could not shelter the organisation from bad strategic acquisitions. More painful decisions are probably ahead.

Sources: r. Clough, N. Buhayar & T. Black, 2018, Conglomerates don’t work, Bloomberg Businessweek, 5 February, 14–16; r. Messenbock, Y.

Morieux, J. Backx & D. Wunderlich, 2018, How complicated is your company? http://www.bcg.com, 16 January; A. Narayanan, 2018, If General Electric breaks up should you break up with GE stocks?, Investor’s Business

Daily, http://www.investors.com, 19 January; B. Sutherland, 2018, The slow ugly unraveling of GE, Bloomberg Businessweek, 22 January, 30; 2017,

The right mechanic? Economist, 18 November, 54–5; T. Gryta, D. Benoit & J. S. Lublin, 2017, GE gives activist Trian a seat on the board, Wall Street

Journal, http://www.wsj.com, 9 October; T. Gryta, 2017, GE probed who knew about spare jet for Immelt, Wall Street Journal, http://www.wsj.

com, 13 December; D. Z. Morris, 2017, General Electric to lose 9 board members, Fortune, http://www.fortune.com, 19 November; G. roumeliotis,

2017, General Electric faces long road to pruning assets, reuters, http:// www.reuters.com, 13 November; L. Shen, 2017, Biggest breakup: General

Electric, Fortune, http://www.fortune.com, 20 December.

286 PART 3: STRATEGIC ACTIONS: STRATEGY IMPLEMENTATION

that they facilitate an organisation’s effor ts to achieve strategic competitiveness.4 The third issue is the appointment and removal of the CEO (or equivalent) of the organisation.

In moder n cor porations – especially those in nations w ith ‘ Wester nised’ business practices such as Aust ra l ia, t he USA a nd t he U K – ensu r i ng t hat execut ive ma nagers’ i nterests a re a l ig ned w it h ot her sta keholders’ i nterests, pa r t icu la rly t hose of sha reholders, is a not her pr i ma r y object ive of cor porate governance. Thus, corporate governance involves oversight in areas where owners, managers and members of boards of directors may have conflicts of interest. Processes used to elect members of the organisation’s board of directors, the general super vision of CEO pay and more focused super vision of director pay, and the organisation’s overall strategic direction, are examples of areas in which oversight is sought.5 Because cor porate gover nance is an ongoing process concer ned w it h how an organ isat ion is to be managed, its nature evolves in light of the ty pes of never-ending changes in an organisation’s external environment that we discussed in Chapter 2.

T he emphasis on cor porate gover na nce t hat is occu r r i ng across t he globe stems ma i n ly f rom t he appa rent fa i lu re of cor porate gover na nce mecha n isms to adequately mon itor a nd cont rol execut ive managers’ decisions. Relevant examples of cor porate governance failures internationally and in Australia include: Enron, Lehman Brothers, HIH, Dick Smith, Thomas Cook Travel, Blockbuster Video, Toys R Us, A M P, Commonwealth Bank of Australia and Westpac Group. A second and more positive reason for this interest comes from evidence that a well-functioning corporate governance system can create a competitive advantage for an individual organisation.6

Corporate governance is of concern to nations as well as to individual organisations.7 Although corporate governance reflects organisational standards, it also collectively reflects the societal standards of nations.8 Commenting about governance-related changes being made in Singapore, an official noted: ‘Good corporate governance plays an important role in ensuring the effective functioning of Singapore’s capital markets’.9 Ensuring the independence of board members and practices a board should follow to exercise effective oversight of an organisation’s internal control efforts are examples of recent changes to governance standards being applied in Singapore. Efforts such as these are important because research shows that how nations choose to gover n their organisations does affect organisations’ investment decisions. In other words, organisations seek to invest in nations with national governance standards that are acceptable to them.10 This is particularly the case when organisations consider the possibility of geographically expanding into emerging markets.

I n t he chapter ’s fi rst sect ion, we descr ibe t he relat ionsh ip on wh ich t he moder n orga n isat ion is bu i lt: na mely, t he relat ionsh ip between ow ners a nd ma nagers. We use t he major it y of t he chapter to explain various mechanisms owners use to govern managers and to ensure that they comply with their responsibility to satisfy stakeholders’ needs, especially those of shareholders.

Three internal governance mechanisms and a single external one are used in the modern organisation. The t h ree i nter na l gover na nce mecha n isms we descr ibe i n t h is chapter a re ow nersh ip concent rat ion, represented by t y pes of sha reholders a nd t hei r d i f ferent i ncent ives to mon itor ma nagers; t he boa rd of d i rectors; a nd execut ive compensat ion. We t hen consider t he ma rket for cor porate cont rol, wh ich is a n ex ter na l cor porate gover na nce mecha n ism. Essent ia l ly, t h is ma rket is a set of potent ia l ow ners seek i ng to acqu i re u nder va lued orga n isat ions a nd ea r n above-average ret u r ns on t hei r i nvest ments by replaci ng i nef fect ive execut ive ma nagement tea ms.11 T he chapter ’s focus t hen sh i f ts to t he issue of inter national cor porate gover nance. We br ief ly descr ibe gover nance approaches used in Aust ralian, Ger ma n , Japa nese, Ch i nese a nd Spa n ish orga n isat ion s. I n pa r t, t h is d isc u ssion suggest s t hat t he st r uc t u res used to gover n globa l compa n ies compet i ng i n bot h developed a nd emerg i ng econom ies a re becom i ng more, rat he r t ha n less, si m i la r. C losi ng ou r a na lysi s of cor porate gove r na nce i s a consideration of t he need for t hese cont rol mechan isms to encou rage and suppor t et h ical behav iou r in organ isations.

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Separation of ownership and managerial control H istor ica l ly, orga n isat ions were ma naged by fou nder-ow ners a nd t hei r descenda nts. I n t hese cases, cor porate ow nersh ip a nd cont rol resided i n t he sa me i nd iv idua ls. A s orga n isat ions g rew la rger, ‘t he ma nager ia l revolut ion led to a sepa rat ion of ow nersh ip a nd cont rol i n most la rge cor porat ions, where control of the firm shifted from entrepreneurs to professional managers while ownership became dispersed among thousands of unorganised stockholders who were removed from the day-to-day management of the fi rm’.12 These changes created the modern public cor poration, which is based on the efficient separation of ownership and managerial control. Suppor ting the separation is a basic legal premise suggesting that the primar y objective of an organisation’s activities is to increase the cor poration’s profit and, thereby, the owners’ (shareholders’) financial gains.13

The separation of ownership and managerial control allows shareholders to purchase shares, which entitles them to income (residual returns) from the organisation’s operations after paying expenses. This r ight, however, requi res t hat sha reholders ta ke a r isk t hat t he organ isat ion’s ex penses may exceed its revenues. To manage this investment risk, shareholders maintain a diversified por tfolio by investing in several companies to reduce their overall risk.14 The poor performance or failure of any one organisation i n wh ich t hey i nvest has less overa ll effect on t he va lue of t he ent i re por tfolio of i nvest ments. Thus, shareholders specialise in managing their investment risk.

Commonly, those managing small organisations also own a significant percentage of the organisation. In such instances, there is less separation between ownership and managerial control. Moreover, in a large number of family-owned organisations, ownership and managerial control are not separated at all. Research shows that family-owned organisations perform better when a member of the family is the CEO than when the CEO is an outsider.15

In many regions, including Latin A merica, Asia and some parts of Europe, family-owned organisations still dominate the competitive landscape.16 The primary purpose of most of these organisations is to increase the family’s wealth, which explains why a family CEO often is perceived as better than an outside CEO. Family-controlled organisations face at least two critical issues related to cor porate governance. First, as they grow, they may not have access to all of the skills needed to effectively manage the organisation and maximise returns for the family. Thus, outsiders (or ‘independent directors’, as they are commonly known in ot her Wester n count r ies) may be required to facilitate g row t h. A lso, as t he organ isation g rows, t he family-owners may need to seek outside capital and thus give up some of their ownership. In these cases, protecting the minority owners’ rights becomes important.17 To avoid these potential problems, when family organisations grow and become more complex, their owner-managers may contract managerial specialists. These managers make major decisions in the owners’ organisation and are compensated on the basis of their decision-making skills. Research suggests that organisations in which families own enough equity to have influence without major control tend to make the best strategic decisions.18

Without owner (shareholder) specialisation in risk bearing and management specialisation in decision mak ing, an organisation may be limited by its ow ners’ abilities to simultaneously manage it and make effective strategic decisions relative to risk. Thus, the separation and specialisation of ow nership (risk bearing) and managerial control (decision making) should produce the highest returns for the organisation’s owners.

Agency relationships The separation between ow ners and managers creates an agency relationship. A n agency relationship exists when one or more persons (the principal or principals) hire another person or persons (the agent or agents) as decision-making specialists to perform a ser vice.19 Thus, an agency relationship exists when one par ty delegates decision-making responsibility to a second par ty for compensation (see Figure 10.1).

agency relationship exists when one or more persons (the principal or principals) hire another person or persons (the agent or agents) as decision- making specialists to perform a service

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I n add it ion to sha reholders a nd execut ive ma nagers, ot her exa mples of agency relat ionsh ips a re consu lta nts a nd cl ients, i nsu red a nd i nsu rer, or rea l estate agents a nd vendors. Moreover, w it h i n organisations an agency relationship exists between managers and their employees, as well as between executive managers and t he organ isation’s ow ners. 20 However, in t h is chapter we focus on t he agency relationship between the organisation’s owners (the principals) and executive managers (the principals’ agents) because t hese ma nagers a re responsible for for mu lat i ng a nd i mplement i ng t he orga n isat ion’s strategies, which have major effects on organisation performance. 21

The sepa rat ion between ow nersh ip a nd ma nager ial cont rol ca n be problemat ic. Resea rch ev idence documents a variety of agency problems in the modern cor poration.22 Problems can surface because the principal and the agent have different interests and goals or because shareholders lack direct control of large, publicly traded cor porations. Problems also surface when an agent makes decisions that result in pursuing goals that con flict with those of the principals. Thus, the separation of ownership and control potent ia l ly a l lows d ivergent i nterests ( bet ween pr i ncipa ls a nd agents) to occ u r, wh ich ca n lead to managerial oppor tunism.

Managerial opportunism is the seeking of self-interest with guile (i.e. cunning or deceit).23 Opportunism is both an attitude (e.g. an inclination) and a set of behaviours (i.e. specific acts of self-interest).24 Principals do not k now beforeha nd wh ich agents w i l l or w i l l not act oppor tu n ist ica l ly. A n execut ive ma nager ’s reputation is an imperfect predictor; moreover, oppor tunistic behaviour cannot be obser ved until it has occur red. Thus, principals establish governance and control mechanisms to prevent agents from acting oppor tunistically, even though only a few are likely to do so. Interestingly, research suggests that when CEOs feel constrained by governance mechanisms, they are more likely to seek external advice, which in turn helps them make better strategic decisions. 25

The agency relationship suggests that any time principals delegate decision-making responsibilities to agents, the oppor tunities for con fl icts of interest ex ist. Executive managers, for example, may make st rategic decisions t hat ma x im ise t heir personal welfare and m in im ise t heir personal r isk. 26 Decisions such as these prevent the maximisation of shareholder wealth. Decisions regarding product diversification demonstrate this situation.

managerial opportunism the seeking of self- interest with guile (i.e. cunning or deceit)

Shareholders (Principals)

• Organisation owners

Managers (Agents)

• Decision makers

An agency relationship

• Risk-bearing specialist (principal)

Paying compensation to

• A managerial decision- making specialist (agent)

Hire

and create

Figure 10.1 An agency relationship

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Product diversification as an example of an agency problem As ex plained in Chapter 6, a cor porate-level st rateg y to d iversif y t he orga n isat ion’s product lines ca n en hance an organ isat ion’s st rateg ic compet it iveness and increase its retu r ns, bot h of wh ich ser ve t he i nterests of a l l sta keholders a nd cer ta i n ly sha reholders a nd execut ive ma nagers. However, product diversification can create two benefits for executive managers that shareholders do not enjoy, meaning that they may prefer product diversification more than shareholders do. 27

The fact t hat product d iversi ficat ion usua lly i ncreases t he size of a n orga n isat ion a nd t hat size is positively related to executive compensation is the fi rst of the two benefits of additional diversification t hat may accr ue to execut ive managers. Diversi ficat ion also increases t he complex ity of manag ing an organisation and its network of businesses, possibly requiring additional managerial remuneration because of this complexity.28 Thus, increased product diversification provides an opportunity for executive managers to increase their compensation.29

The second potent ial benefit is t hat product d iversi ficat ion a nd t he resu lt ing d iversi ficat ion of t he orga n isat ion’s por t fol io of busi nesses ca n reduce execut ive ma nagers’ employ ment r isk. Ma nager ia l employ ment risk is the risk of job loss, loss of compensation and loss of managerial reputation. 30 These risks are reduced with increased diversification because this makes an organisation and its upper-level managers less vulnerable to the reduction in demand associated with a single or limited number of product lines or businesses. Events occurring at Bellamy’s Australia Limited demonstrate these issues.

In December 2016, Bellamy ’s, an organ ic infant for mula and baby food producer, an nou nced to t he Australian Securities Exchange (ASX) that it would continue to grow from strength to strength across Asia to diversify its limited product range beyond two businesses. Bellamy’s recognised that oppor tunities in China were vast. Yet less than a month later, Bellamy’s shares had declined by more than one-third after it ter m inated its CEO and slashed its profit g u idance for t he com ing si x mont hs. The organ isat ion had emerged from a 40 -day trading halt announcing an overhaul of its leadership team. The board announced CEO Laura McBain had been replaced by chief operating officer A ndrew Cohen. During the trading halt, the organisation faced a push from shareholders to replace a number of independent non-executive directors.

In a statement to the ASX, Bellamy’s said it had shaken up its contract with Fonter ra, allowing it to cut production. It was expecting its net profit after tax to be between 4 and 6 per cent of revenue, due to lower sales volumes, high interest costs and increased costs of organic ingredients. Shares in Bellamy’s fell more than 40 per cent on 2 December 2017, when the organisation announced new Chinese regulations were crimping sales and depressing prices. The dair y organisation had been a favourite of the ASX with shares wor th more than $15.00. The organisation’s shares were halted, and then suspended, from trade on the ASX. Shares were wor th $6.68 when the organisation entered the halt. 31

Free cash flow is the source of another potential agency problem. Calculated as operating cash flow m i nus capita l ex pend it u res, f ree cash flow represents t he cash rema i n i ng af ter t he orga n isat ion has invested in all projects t hat have posit ive net present value w it h in its cu r rent businesses. 32 Execut ive managers may decide to invest free cash flow in product lines that are not associated with the organisation’s current lines of business to increase the organisation’s degree of diversification. However, when managers use free cash flow to diversify the organisation in ways that do not have a strong possibility of creating add it ional value for sta keholders, a nd cer tai n ly for sha reholders, t he orga n isat ion is over-d iversi fied. Over-d iversification is an example of self-ser v ing and oppor tunistic manager ial behav iour. In contrast to managers, shareholders may prefer that free cash flow be distributed to them as dividends, so they can control how the cash is invested. 33

In Fig u re 10.2, Cu r ve S shows sha reholders’ opt i ma l level of d iversi ficat ion. A s t he orga n isat ion’s owners, shareholders seek the level of diversification that reduces the risk of the organisation’s total failure wh ile simultaneously increasing its value by developing econom ies of scale and scope (see Chapter 6).

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As is the case for principals, executive managers – as agents – also seek an optimal level of diversification. Declin ing per for mance result ing from too much d iversi ficat ion increases t he probability t hat ex ter nal investors (representing the market for cor porate control) w ill purchase a substantial percentage of the organisation (or the entire organisation) for the pur pose of controlling it. If an organisation is acquired, the employ ment r isk for its executive managers increases signi ficantly. Fur ther more, these managers’ employ ment oppor t u n it ies i n t he ex ter na l ma nager ia l labou r ma rket (d isc ussed i n Chapter 12) a re affected negatively by an organisation’s poor performance. Therefore, executive managers prefer that the organisations they lead be diversified. However, their preference is that the organisation’s diversification fa l ls shor t of t he poi nt at wh ich it i ncreases t hei r employ ment r isk a nd reduces t hei r employ ment oppor tun ities. 36 Cu r ve M in Fig u re 10.2 shows t hat executive managers prefer h igher levels of product diversification than do shareholders. Executive managers might find the optimal level of diversification as shown by point B on Cur ve M.

In general, shareholders prefer riskier strategies and more-focused diversification. Shareholders reduce their risk by holding a diversified por tfolio of investments. A lternatively, managers cannot balance their employ ment r isk by work ing for a d iverse por tfolio of organisations; therefore, managers may prefer a level of diversification that maximises organisation size and their compensation while also reducing their employ ment r isk. Product d iversi ficat ion, t herefore, is a potent ial agency problem t hat cou ld resu lt in principals incur ring costs to control their agents’ behaviours.

Agency costs and governance mechanisms The potential con flict between shareholders and executive managers shown in Figure 10.2, coupled with the fact that principals cannot easily predict which managers might act oppor tunistically, demonstrates why principals establish governance mechanisms. However, the organisation incurs costs when it uses one or more gover na nce mecha n isms. Agency costs a re t he su m of i ncent ive costs, mon itor i ng costs,

agency costs the sum of incentive costs, monitoring costs, enforcement costs and individual financial losses incurred by principals because governance mechanisms cannot guarantee total compliance by the agent

Of the four cor porate-level diversification strategies shown in Figure 10.2, shareholders likely prefer the diversified position noted by point A on Cur ve S – a position that is located between the dominant business and related-constrained diversification strategies. Of course, the optimum level of diversification owners seek varies from organisation to organisation. 34 Factors that affect shareholders’ preferences include the orga n isat ion’s pr i ma r y i ndust r y, t he i ntensity of r ival r y a mong compet itors i n t hat i ndust r y, a nd t he top management team’s experience with implementing diversification strategies and its effects on other organisation strategies, such as its entr y into international markets. 35

R is

k

Diversification

Dominant business

Shareholder (business) risk profile

Managerial (employment)

risk profile

Related- constrained

Related- linked

Unrelated business

S

A

M

B

Figure 10.2 Manager and shareholder risk and diversification

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enforcement costs and individual financial losses incurred by principals because governance mechanisms cannot guarantee total compliance by the agent. Because monitoring the activities taking place within an organisation is difficult, the principals’ agency costs are larger in diversified organisations given the additional complexity of diversification. 37

In general, manager ial interests may prevail when gover nance mechan isms are weak and as such, ineffective; this is exemplified in situations where managers have a significant amount of autonomy to make st rategic decisions. If, however, the board of d irectors cont rols manager ial autonomy, or if other strong governance mechanisms are used, the organisation’s strategies should better reflect stakeholders’, and certainly shareholders’, interests.

In the USA, observers of organisations’ governance practices have been concerned about more egregious behaviour beyond mere ineffective cor porate strategies, such as that discovered at Enron and WorldCom. Par tly in response to these behaviours, the US Congress enacted the Sarbanes-Oxley (SOX ) Act in 2002 and passed the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (Dodd-Frank) in mid-2010. 38

One of t he ma i n cha llenges for leaders today is to ma i nta i n t he boa rd of d i rectors’ key role i n t he gover nance system. The clea r ram i ficat ions for gover nance for Aust ralian boa rds of d i rectors f rom an agency perspective is that adequate monitoring or control mechanisms need to be established to protect shareholders from management’s conflict of interest – the so-called ‘agency costs’ of modern capitalism.39 This chapter supports the notion that, in most instances, the board of directors is an important mechanism to allev iate agency problems in pr incipal–agent relat ionsh ips. Legally, t he boa rd of d i rectors mon itors t he boa rd’s f u nct ions a nd represents t he sha reholders’ i nterests. The boa rd of d i rectors is elected by shareholders and has the ultimate decision-making and voting rights over the organisation’s assets. In general, the CEO repor ts directly to the board.

Nex t we ex plain t he effects of t he t h ree inter nal gover nance mechan isms on manager ial decisions regarding the organisation’s strategies.

Ownership concentration Ownership concentration is defined by the number of large-block shareholders and the total percentage of the organisation’s shares they own. Large-block shareholders typically own at least 5 per cent of an organisation’s issued shares. For example, BHP’s top shareholders are a mix of investment funds and banks.40 Ownership concentration as a governance mechanism has received considerable interest because large-block shareholders are increasingly active in their demands that organisations adopt effective governance mechanisms to control managerial decisions so that they will best represent owners’ interests.41 In recent years, the number of individuals who are large-block shareholders has declined. Institutional owners such as banks have replaced individuals as large-block shareholders.

In general, d i ff use ow nersh ip (a la rge nu mber of sha reholders w it h small hold ings a nd few, if a ny, large-block shareholders) produces weak monitoring of managers’ decisions. One reason for this is that diff use ownership makes it difficult for owners to effectively coordinate their actions. As noted earlier, diversification beyond the shareholders’ optimum level can result from ineffective monitoring of managers’ decisions. H igher levels of mon itor i ng cou ld encou rage ma nagers to avoid st rateg ic decisions t hat ha r m sha reholder value, such as too much d iversi fication. Resea rch ev idence suggests t hat ow nersh ip concentration is associated w ith lower levels of organisation product d iversification.42 Thus, w ith high degrees of ownership concentration, the probability is greater that managers’ decisions will be designed to maximise shareholder value.43

The i mpor ta nce of boa rds of d i rectors to m it igate excessive appropr iat ion of m i nor it y sha reholder va lue has been fou nd i n orga n isat ions w it h st rong fa m i ly ow nersh ip wherei n fa m i ly members have incentives to appropriate shareholder wealth, especially in the second generation after the founder has depar ted.44

ownership concentration refers to both the number of large-block shareholders and the total percentage of shares they own

large-block shareholders typically own at least 5 per cent of a corporation’s issued shares

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Ownership structures of companies in Australia Aust ralian cor porations must be registered by t he Aust ralian Secu r ities and Invest ments Com m ission (ASIC) and they legally operate under the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth). In relation to limitation of liability of a n orga n isat ion i n Aust ra lia t here a re two d i fferent t y pes: ‘li m ited by g ua ra ntee’ (i.e. t he liabi lit y of members is restricted to an amount set out in the organisation constitution) and ‘limited by shares’. Contemporary literature refers primarily to two model types for corporate governance: namely, the outsider and insider models.45 Solomon points out that:

Every country exhibits a unique system of corporate governance: there are as many corporate governance systems as there are countries. The system of corporate governance presiding in any one country is determined by a wide array of internal factors including ownership structure, the state of the economy, the legal system, and government policies.46

The increasing influence of institutional owners A classic work published i n t he 1930s a rg ued t hat a sepa rat ion of ow nersh ip a nd cont rol had come to cha racter ise t he ‘moder n’ orga n isat ion.47 T h is cha nge occu r red pr i ma r i ly because g row t h prevented fou nder-ow ners f rom mai ntai n i ng t hei r dual posit ions i n what were i ncreasi ngly complex compa n ies. More recently, another shift has occur red: ownership of many modern cor porations is now concentrated in the hands of institutional investors rather than individual shareholders.48

Institutional owners are financial institutions such as mutual funds and superannuation funds that control large-block shareholder positions. Because of their prominent ownership positions, institutional owners, as large-block shareholders, have the potential to be a powerful governance mechanism. In 2017, it was estimated that institutional owners held roughly 80 per cent of all the market value of the US broad- market Russell 3000 Index and 80 per cent of the large-cap S&P 500 Index. In dollars, that is approximately US$21.7 trillion and US$18 trillion, respectively.49 The importance of pension/superannuation funds to an entire economy is suggested by this comment: ‘Pension funds are critical drivers of grow th and economic activity because they are one of the only significant sources of long-term, patient capital’. 50

These percentages suggest that, as investors, institutional owners have both the size and the incentive to discipline ineffective executive managers and that they can significantly in fluence an organisation’s choice of st rategies and st rategic decisions. 51 Resea rch ev idence ind icates t hat inst itut ional and ot her large-block shareholders are becoming more active in their effor ts to in fluence a cor poration’s strategic decisions, u n less t hey have a business relat ionsh ip w it h t he organ isat ion. In it ially, t hese sha reholder act iv ists and inst itut ional investors concent rated on t he per for mance and accou ntability of CEOs and contributed to the dismissal of a number of them. Activists often target the actions of boards more directly via proxy vote proposals that are intended to give shareholders more decision rights because they believe board processes have been ineffective.52 To date, research suggests that institutional activism may not have a strong direct effect on organisation performance but may indirectly in fluence a targeted organisation’s strategic decisions, including those concerned with international diversification and innovation. Thus, to some degree at least, institutional activism has the potential to discipline managers and to enhance the likelihood of an organisation taking future actions that are in shareholders’ best interests. 53

Board of directors Shareholders elect the members of an organisation’s board of directors. The board of directors is a group of elected ind iv iduals whose pr ima r y responsibility is to act in t he ow ners’ best interests by for mally monitoring and controlling the organisation’s executive managers. 54 Those elected to an organisation’s board of directors are expected to oversee managers and to ensure that the organisation operates in ways

institutional owners financial institutions such as stock mutual funds and superannuation funds that control large- block shareholder positions

board of directors a group of elected individuals whose primary responsibility is to act in the owners’ interests by formally monitoring and controlling the organisation’s executives

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that will best serve stakeholders’ interests, and particularly the owners’ interests. Helping board members reach their expected objectives are their powers to direct the affairs of the organisation and to reward and discipline executive managers.

Though important to all shareholders, an organisation’s individual shareholders with small ownership percentages are ver y dependent on the board of directors to represent their interests.

The str ucture of a board of directors concerns the size, composition and skill sets that in fluence the effectiveness of a board and determine the ability of the board members to work together.55 Each of these three factors will be discussed in turn:

1 Size: Size could be a hindrance on governance capacity and performance. Some research recommends a limit of eight directors as any larger number will interfere with group dynamics and inhibit a board of directors’ performance, and a larger board brings greater levels of bureaucracy. 56 The view points of ot hers have been less defi n it ive, w it h resu lts of a lter nat ive resea rch not i ng t hat it is not t he size of the board of directors that is critical, in relation to governance, but rather the number of outside members of the board.57 Notwithstanding this viewpoint, it has been noted that the key consideration should be around whether there are enough directors to provide the skills that the board of directors needs at the boardroom table.58 A ll these researchers raise valid points and it is recommended in the Australian context that regardless of whether it is a commercial, superannuation or not-for-profit board of directors, the size should not exceed eight or nine board members with the prerequisite skills and experience that should be expected around a boardroom table.

2 Board composition: Board of directors composition does matter. The board’s composition and leadership structure can influence a variety of organisational outcomes.59 Factors such as culture and ownership structure impact on composition.60 Related studies on the issue of the diversity of boards of directors have identified that the large majority of directors are white males from a managerial or professional background, aged in their fifties or sixties, and that a number of observations could be made about their personalities, including a personality profile to be much less risk averse than a diverse board.61

3 Trustee or director skill set: Tr ustee competence is ga i ned f rom ex per ience, sk i l ls, at t it udes a nd knowledge. Behavioural competencies also in fluence the relationships around the boardroom table – in par ticular, between the board of directors and management and between tr ustees or directors.62 The area of directors’ skills and capabilities is an extremely impor tant one in Australia and has not been given the attention that it deser ves.

Unfor tunately, evidence suggests that many boards have not been highly effective in monitoring and controlling executive managers’ decisions and subsequent actions.63 Because of their relatively ineffective performance, and as a consequence of the 2008– 09 global financial crisis (GFC), boards are continuing to experience increasing pressure from shareholders, lawmakers and regulators to be more forceful in their oversight role to prevent executive managers from acting in their own best interests. Moreover, in addition to their monitoring role, board members increasingly are expected to provide resources to the organisations they ser ve. These resources include their personal knowledge and exper tise, and their relationships with a wide variety of organisations.6 4

Genera l ly, boa rd members (of ten ca l led d i rec tors) a re c lassi f ied i nto one of t h ree g roups (see Table 10.1). Insiders are active executive managers in the organisation who are elected to the board because they are a source of information about the organisation’s day-to-day operations.65 Related outsiders have some relat ionsh ip w it h t he orga n isat ion, cont ract ua l or ot her w ise, t hat may create quest ions about their independence, but these individuals are not involved with the cor poration’s day-to-day activities. Outsiders provide independent counsel to the organisation and may hold executive managerial positions i n ot her compa n ies or may have been elected to t he boa rd pr ior to t he beg i n n i ng of t he cu r rent CEO’s tenure.66

Historically, inside managers dominated an organisation’s board of directors. A widely accepted view is that a board with a significant percentage of its membership from the organisation’s executive managers

294 PART 3: STRATEGIC ACTIONS: STRATEGY IMPLEMENTATION

provides relatively weak monitoring and control of managerial decisions.67 With weak board monitoring, managers sometimes use their power to select and compensate directors and exploit their personal ties with them. Critics advocate reforms to ensure that independent outside directors are a significant majority of a board’s total membership; research suggests this has been accomplished.68 However, others argue that having outside directors is not enough to resolve the problems in that CEO power can strongly in fluence a board’s decision. One proposal, and this is common practice in Australia, is to reduce the power of the CEO by separating the chair’s role and the CEO’s role on the board so that the same person does not hold both positions.69 A situation in which an individual holds both the CEO and chair of the board title is called CEO duality. Yet, having a board that actively monitors executive managers’ decisions and actions does not ensure high performance. The value that the directors bring to the organisation also in fluences the outcomes. For example, boards with members having significant relevant experience and knowledge are the most likely to help the organisation formulate and implement effective strategies.70

Alternatively, having a large number of outside (also commonly known as ‘independent’) board members can also create some problems. For example, because independent directors ty pically do not have contact with the organisation’s day-to-day operations and do not have ready access to detailed information about ma nagers a nd t hei r sk i lls, t hey may lack t he i nsights requ i red to f u lly a nd effect ively eva luate t hei r decisions a nd i n it iat ives.71 Independent d i rectors ca n, however, obta i n va luable i n for mat ion t h rough frequent interactions with inside board members and during board meetings to enhance their understanding of managers and their decisions.

Because t hey work w it h a nd lead t he orga n isat ion da i ly, i nsiders have access to i n for mat ion t hat facilitates for ming and implementing appropriate strategies. Accordingly, some evidence suggests that boards with a critical mass of insiders ty pically are better informed about intended strategic initiatives, t he reasons for t he in it iat ives a nd t he outcomes ex pected f rom pu rsu ing t hem.72 Wit hout t h is ty pe of information, independent (outsider)-dominated boards may emphasise financial, as opposed to strategic, controls to gather performance information to evaluate managers’ and business units’ performances. A vir tually exclusive reliance on financial evaluations shifts risk to executive managers who, in turn, may make decisions to maximise their interests and reduce their employment risk. Reducing investments in resea rch a nd development ( R& D), f u r t her d iversif y ing t he orga n isat ion a nd pu rsu i ng h igher levels of compensation are some of the results of managers’ actions to reach the fi nancial goals set by outsider- dominated boards.73 Additionally, boards can make mistakes regarding CEO succession decisions because of the lack of important information about candidates as well as the organisation’s specific needs. Overall, knowledgeable and balanced boards are likely to be the most effective over time.74

Table 10.2 provides some insight into the sor ts of exper tise available by different ty pes of directors or tr ustees. Notwithstanding this, research that investigated over 100 boards of directors over a five-year period found that many boards lack competent members.75

Classification of board of directors’ members

Insiders

• The organisation’s CEO and other executive managers

related outsiders

• Individuals not involved with the organisation’s day-to-day operations, but who have a relationship with the organisation

Outsiders

• Individuals who are independent of the organisation in terms of day-to-day operations and other relationships

Table 10.1

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There is no perfect board str ucture. The str ucture of each board of directors needs to be determined by the characteristics of each entity in isolation,76 and it has been acknowledged that ‘…each organisation must put a Board of Directors in place with a composition and shape – tailored to fit its legal environment, the organisation’s size and development stage, and the personality of its Chairman and CEO’.77 Regardless of the country of origin, board of director roles, such as monitoring and ratifying,78 supervisory and management functions,79 and strategic and control roles identified by leading international academics, remain relevant to the Australian context.

Board of directors process The board of directors process is another element that should be recognised in any cor porate governance f ra mework. P rocess va r iables i nclude: f requenc y a nd leng t h of meet i ngs; for ma l it y of proceed i ngs; evaluations; professional development; and meeting agendas, minutes and committees. These processes are impor tant in the overall context of cor porate governance in Australia.80

Impor tant responsibilities for the board of directors, as discussed previously, are: the strategic vision, setting the strategy and direction of the organisation; monitoring of the organisation; and the recruitment,

Expertise of different type of directors or trustees

Director category

Areas of resources provided Type of director or trustee

Insiders • Expertise on the organisation, its strategy and direction

• Specific knowledge in areas such as finance and law

• Current and former officers of the organisation

Business experts

• Expertise on competition decision making and problem solving in large organisations

• Serve as ‘sounding boards’ for ideas • Alternative viewpoints on problems • Channels of communication between

organisations • Legitimacy

• Current and former senior officers of other large for-profit organisations

• Directors of other large for-profit organisations

Support specialists

• Specialised expertise on law, banking, insurance and public relations

• Channels of communication to large and powerful suppliers or government agencies

• Ease of access to vital resources, such as financial capital and legal support

• Legitimacy

• Lawyers • Bankers (commercial and investment) • Insurance organisation representatives • Public relations experts

Community influentials

• Non-business perspectives on issues, problems and ideas

• Influence with powerful stakeholders • representation of interests outside competitive

products or supply markets • Legitimacy

• Political leaders • University faculty • Members of clergy • Leaders of social or community organisations

Source: A. J. Hillman, A. A. Cannella & r. L. Paetzold, 2000, The resource dependence role of corporate directors: Strategic adaptation of board composition in response to environmental change, Journal of Management Studies, 37(2): 235–56, https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-6486.00179.

Table 10.2

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per for ma nce ma nagement a nd ter m i nat ion (if necessa r y) of t he CEO. I n su m ma r y, most boa rds dea l w ith both the st rategic d irection and t r y ing to maintain the sustainable competitive advantage of the organisation in an ever-changing economic landscape; whereas the CEO and other senior managers would deal on a daily basis w it h t he operat ional matters of t he busi ness. There is considerable debate about whether the board develops or ratifies the strategy of the organisation; research has outlined the different arg uments per taining to this notion.81 For the sake of completeness, it is notewor thy that the board of d i rectors in Aust ralia can compr ise bot h independent and non-execut ive d i rectors; t he A SX defi n it ion states that:

An independent director is a non-executive director who is not a member of management and who is free of any business or other relationship that could materially interfere with – or could reasonably be perceived to materially interfere with – the independent exercise of their judgment.82

Boards of directors need to consider a suitable mix of independent directors for the board composition.83 In Australia, the ASX Cor porate Governance Council recommends that a majority of the board of directors should be independent directors and that the roles of the chair and the CEO should not be exercised by the same individual.84 In Australia, a director’s legal duty is to the organisation itself and they are not to act for any personal gain. Company law in Australia sets out directors’ general duties imposed by the Corporations Act. These include:

• the duty to exercise their powers and duties w ith the care and d iligence that a reasonable person would have, which includes taking steps to ensure they are properly informed about the financial position of the organisation and ensuring the organisation does not trade if it is insolvent

• the duty to exercise their powers and duties in good faith in the best interests of the organisation • the duty not to improperly use their position to gain an advantage for themselves or someone else, or

to cause detriment to the organisation • a duty not to improperly use information obtained through their position to gain an advantage for

themselves or to cause detriment to the organisation. Directors have a positive duty to prevent their organisation trading if it is insolvent.85

ASIC has issued a regulator y guide on the duty to prevent insolvent trading for directors.

Enhancing the effectiveness of the board of directors Because of t he i mpor ta nce of boa rds of d i rectors i n cor porate gover na nce a nd as a resu lt of i ncreased scr utiny from shareholders – in par ticular, large institutional investors – the performances of individual board members and of entire boards are being evaluated more formally and with greater intensity.86 The demand for greater accountability and improved performance is stimulating many boards to make changes voluntarily. A mong these changes are:

1 i ncreases i n t he d iversity of t he backg rou nds of boa rd members (e.g. a g reater nu mber of et h n ic minorities, var ying ages and women)

2 the strengthening of internal management and accounting control systems 3 establishing and consistently using formal processes to evaluate the board’s performance 4 modifying the compensation of directors, especially reducing or eliminating share options as a par t

of their package 5 creating the ‘lead director’ role87 that has strong powers with regard to the board agenda and oversight

of non-management board member activities.

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I n today ’s rapid ly c ha ng i ng la nd scape, d iversit y i n t he boa rd room (gender, et h n icit y, age a nd socioeconomic background) remains an impor tant issue for shareholders and institutional investors. A n increase in the board’s involvement with an organisation’s strategic decision-making processes creates the need for effective collaboration between board members and executive managers. Some arg ue that improving the processes used by boards to make decisions and monitor managers and organisation outcomes is impor tant for board effectiveness.88 Moreover, because of the increased pressure from owners and the potential conflict among board members, procedures are necessary to help boards function effectively while seeking to discharge their responsibilities.

Research suggests that diverse boards help organisations make more effective strategic decisions and perform better over time.89 Although questions remain about whether more independent and diverse boards enhance board effectiveness, the trends for greater independence and increasing diversity among board members are likely to continue.

Executive compensation The compensation of executive managers, and especially of CEOs, generates a great deal of interest and strongly held opinions. Some believe that top-management team members and certainly CEOs have a great deal of responsibility for an organisation’s performance and that they should be rewarded accordingly.9 0 Others conclude that these individuals (and again, especially CEOs) are greatly over paid and that their compensation is not as strongly related to organisation performance as should be the case.91 One of the three internal governance mechanisms seeks to deal with these issues. Specifically, executive compensation is a governance mechanism that seeks to align the interests of managers and owners through salaries, bonuses and long-term incentives, such as stock awards and options.92

Long-term incentive plans (ty pically involving share options) are an increasingly impor tant par t of compensation packages for executive managers. Theoretically, using long-term incentives facilitates the organ isat ion’s effor ts (t h rough t he boa rd of d i rectors’ pay-related decisions) to avoid potent ial agency problems by l i n k i ng ma nager ia l compensat ion to t he wea lt h of com mon sha reholders. 93 E ffect ively designed long-term incentive plans have the potential to prevent large-block stockholders (e.g. institutional investors) from pressing for changes in the composition of the board of directors and the top-management tea m i n t hat t hey assu me t hat, when exercised, t he pla ns w ill ensu re execut ive ma nagers w ill act i n shareholders’ best interests. Additionally, shareholders ty pically assume that executive managers’ pay and the organisation’s performance are more properly aligned when outsiders are the dominant block of a board’s membership. Research results suggesting that fraudulent behaviour can be associated with share opt ion incent ives, such as ea r n ings ma n ipu lat ion,94 demonst rate t he impor ta nce of t he orga n isat ion’s board of directors (as a governance mechanism) actively monitoring the use of executive compensation as a governance mechanism.

Effect ively usi ng execut ive compensat ion as a gover na nce mecha n ism is pa r t icu la rly cha lleng i ng for orga n isat ions i mplement i ng i nter nat iona l st rateg ies. For e xa mple, t he i nterests of t he ow ners of mu lt i nat iona l cor porat ions may be best ser ved by less u n i for m it y i n t he orga n isat ion’s foreig n subsidiaries’ compensation plans.95 Developing an array of unique compensation plans requires additional monitoring, potentially increasing the organisation’s agency costs. Importantly, pay levels var y by region of t he world. For exa mple, ma nager ial pay is h ighest in t he USA, h igh in Aust ralia a nd much lower in Asia.

Qantas CEO A lan Joyce was the highest-paid chief executive officer in Australia in 2018, taking home A $23.9 m illion, wh ich is g reater t han 275 t imes t he f ull-t ime average wage. However, Joyce’s ran k ing cha nged considerably i n 2019 (see Table 10.3). A repor t by t he Aust ra l ia n Cou nci l of Supera n nuat ion Investors (ACSI) noted that most of the nation’s top 100 CEOs received a huge bonus in the 2018 financial year, and two CEOs realised more than A $20 million, these being Joyce and Macquarie’s Nicholas Moore (who has since been replaced by Shemara Wik ramanayake as CEO).96

executive compensation a governance mechanism that seeks to align the interests of managers and owners through salaries, bonuses and long-term incentive compensation, such as stock awards and options

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There is growing pressure for companies to be more open and transparent with shareholders about CEO remuneration. ACSI is calling for Australia to consider a UK model where CEO pay is measured against that of their organisation’s average worker.

Historically, compensation for executive managers has been lower in countries such as India, par tly because many of the largest organisations have strong family ow nership and control.97 A lso, acquiring organisations in other countries increases the complexity associated with a board of directors’ effor ts to use executive compensation as an effective internal cor porate governance mechanism.98

The effectiveness of executive compensation A s a n i nte r na l gove r na nce mec ha n i sm , e xec ut ive compe n sat ion – es pec ia l ly long-te r m i nce nt ive compensat ion – is compl icated, for severa l reasons. Fi rst, t he st rateg ic decisions e xec ut ive ma nagers ma ke a re comple x a nd non-rout i ne, mea n i ng t hat d i rec t super v ision (even by t he orga n isat ion’s boa rd of d i rec tors) is l i kely to be i nef fec t ive as a mea ns of judg i ng t he qua l it y of t hei r decisions. T he resu lt is a tendenc y to l i n k e xec ut ive ma nagers’ compen sat ion to outcomes t he boa rd ca n easi ly eva luate, suc h as t he orga n isat ion’s f i na ncia l per for ma nce. T h is lead s to a second issue i n t hat, t y pica l ly, t he ef fec ts of e xec ut ive ma nagers’ decisions a re st ronger on t he orga n isat ion’s long-ter m t ha n its shor t- ter m per for ma nce. T h is rea l it y ma kes it d i f f ic u lt to assess t he ef fec ts of t hei r decisions on a reg u la r basis, suc h as a n nua l ly. T h i rd, a nu mber of ot her fac tors a f fec t a n orga n isat ion’s per for ma nce besides e xe c ut ive m a n a ge r i a l de c i s ion s a nd b e h av iou r. Un pr e d ic t able c h a n ges i n seg me nt s (e conom ic , demog raph ic, pol it ica l/ lega l, etc.) i n t he orga n isat ion’s genera l env i ron ment (see Chapter 2) ma ke it d i f f icu lt to sepa rate out t he ef fects of execut ive ma nagers’ decisions a nd t he ef fects ( bot h posit ive a nd negat ive) of c ha nges i n t he orga n isat ion’s e x ter na l env i ron ment on t he orga n isat ion’s per for ma nce.

P rope rly desig ned a nd u sed i nce nt ive compe n sat ion pla n s for e xec ut ive ma nage rs may i nc rea se t he va lue of a n orga n i sat ion i n l i ne w it h sh a re holde r e x pec tat ion s, but s uc h pla n s a re s ubjec t to ma nager ia l ma n ipu lat ion. 9 9 Add it iona l ly, a n nua l bonuses may prov ide i ncent ives to pu rsue shor t-ter m

Ten highest-paid ASX200 CEOs on a realised-pay basis in financial year 2019

Rank CEO Company Realised pay

1 Andrew Barkla IDP Education $37 761 322

2 Paul Perreault CSL $30 526 634

3 Philippe Wolgen Clinuvel Pharmaceuticals $20 624 450

4 Michael Clarke Treasury Wine Estates $19 853 177

5 John Guscic Webjet $16 498 937

6 Greg Goodman Goodman Group $14 967 391

7 robert Kelly Steadfast Group $14 419 677

8 Alan Joyce Qantas Airways $12 217 400

9 Colin Goldschmidt Sonic Healthcare $11 912 450

10 J. S. Jacques rio Tinto $10 323 975

*Webjet CEO realised pay includes share options which are currently valued to be significantly lower.

Source: N. Khadem, 2020, IDP Education CEO Andrew Barkla tops ACSI’s list of highest-paid bosses in 2019, ABC News, https://www. abc.net.au/news/2020-08-07/idp-education-ceo-andrew-barkla-tops-acsi-list-of-highest-paid/12531862, updated 10 August.

Table 10.3

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objec t ives at t he e x pen se of t he orga n isat ion’s long-ter m i nterests. A lt houg h long-ter m per for ma nce - based i ncent ives may reduce t he temptat ion to u nder-i nvest i n t he shor t ter m, t hey i ncrease exec ut ive e x posu re to r i sk s a ssoc iated w it h u ncont rol lable eve nt s, suc h a s ma rket f luc t uat ion s a nd i ndu st r y dec l i ne. T he longe r te r m t he foc u s of i nce nt ive compe n sat ion , t he g reate r a re t he long-te r m r i sk s bor ne by e xec ut ive ma nage rs. A lso, becau se long-te r m i ncent ives t ie a ma nage r ’s ove ra l l wea lt h to t he orga n isat ion i n a way t hat is i n f lex ible, such i ncent ives a nd ow nersh ip may not be va lued as h igh ly by a ma nager as by out side i nvestors who have t he oppor t u n it y to d iversi f y t hei r wea lt h i n a nu mber of ot her f i na ncia l i nvest ments.10 0 T hus, orga n isat ions may have to overcompensate for ma nagers usi ng long-ter m i ncent ives.

A s t he ‘St rateg ic foc us’ feat u re suggests, i nter na l gover na nce mecha n isms a re l i kely to cont i nue receiv i ng a g reat dea l of scr ut i ny. One issue is t he deg ree to wh ich execut ive compensat ion pract ices promote a long-ter m versus a shor t-ter m focus on t he pa r t of CEOs.

Has more governance scrutiny made large CEO compensation packages more reasonable?

This question often circulates in the media regarding the large compensation packages that CEOs receive as leaders of large publicly traded organisations. reporters in the media are often focused on the growing inequality between top executives’ pay and the average wages of workers. In 1983, average pay for leaders of the six largest US banks was 40 times the average of all US workers, while the average pay for leaders of the largest Fortune 500 companies was about 38 times. However, CEO compensation has grown significantly compared to the average worker, and now the median CEO-to-median-worker pay ratio in the USA stands at 140 to 1. It is easy to see why the media would focus on this issue.

For example, Marathon Corporation, the second- largest oil refiner in the USA, paid its CEO, Gary Heminger, US$19.7 million in 2017. His salary is 900 times that of the average employee. However, Marathon runs Speedway retail gas stations with many part-time and low-wage employees; if the Speedway workers are excluded, employee median pay at Marathon shoots up to nearly US$126 000 per year, which translates into a CEO-to-worker pay ratio of 156 to 1, much closer to the overall median. As noted, there are large differences within sectors. For example: ‘Processed food giant Kraft Heinz Co. last year paid its CEO $4.2 million, about 91 times its median worker’s $46 000 compensation. Kellogg Co., a smaller food maker, paid its CEO an annualized $7.3 million, or 183 times its median employee, who was paid about $40 000.’

Of course, as explained in this chapter, CEO compensation is more complex than might be deduced

from media headlines. However, because of the increased transparency, organisations and boards of directors making compensation decisions for CEOs are more sensitive to issues associated with executive compensation. Notwithstanding the complexities, CEO compensation continues to rise, although not as much as in the pre-GFC period, primarily due to the emphasis on long-term incentive compensation versus cash compensation (salary and annual bonus). research from the finance discipline finds that the makeup of the pay package that most top executives receive has been changing. Instead of an over-

Strategic focus | Ethics

Gary Heminger, CEO of Marathon, earned a salary in 2017 that was 156 times that of the average employee, partly because the organisation has a lot of low-wage part-time employees.

Source: Goodney/Bloomberg/Getty Images

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emphasis on stock options, top executives have been receiving compensation that is based on restricted stock ownership, which cannot be realised unless they meet significant performance targets over time. As such, research finds that managers are taking much more measured risks now than before, with far less of the oversized risk taking that can result in disastrous consequences for a large organisation.

In summary, executive compensation worldwide is a complex issue that cannot be simply determined by the overall size of the package. Although executive compensation has grown dramatically, there are both legitimate and illegitimate reasons for such huge pay packages. Each case needs to be examined closely. However, the perception will certainly linger that top management executive compensation relative to the average worker has added to inequality in society. As such, care should be taken to manage this issue from a policy point of view. Managerial human capital should

be rewarded for its capability and the value it creates, but lower-level workers and their human capital should also have opportunities to make progress.

Sources: K. Bouslah, J. Liñares-Zegarra, B. M’Zali & B. Scholtens, 2018, CEO risk-taking incentives and socially irresponsible activities, British Accounting Review, 50: 76–92; T. Francis & V. Fuhrmans, 2018, Are you underpaid? In a first, U.S. organisations reveal how much they pay workers, Wall Street Journal, http://www.wsj.com, 11 March; T. Francis & V. Fuhrmans, 2018, Median CEO pay hit record of nearly $12 million in 2017, juiced by markets, Wall Street Journal, http://www.wsj. com, 21 March; B. Tuttle, 2018, This CEO makes 900 times more than his typical employee, Money, http://www.time.com/money, 12 March; A. Gande & S. Kalpathy, 2017, CEO compensation and risk-taking at financial organisations: Evidence from U.S. federal loan assistance, Journal of Corporate Finance, 47: 131–50; M. Grosse, S. Kean & T. Scott, 2017, Shareholder say on pay and CEO compensation: Three strikes and the board is out. Accounting & Finance, 57(3): 701–25; K. Shue & r. r. Townsend, 2017, Growth through rigidity: An explanation for the rise in CEO pay, Journal of Financial Economics, 123: 1–21; H. Wang, S. Zhao & G. Chen, 2017, Organisation-specific knowledge assets and employment arrangements: Evidence from CEO compensation design and CEO dismissal, Strategic Management Journal, 38(9): 1875–94; T. Greckhamer, 2016, CEO compensation in relation to worker compensation across countries: The configurational impact of country-level institutions, Strategic Management Journal, 37(4): 793–815.

W hen designed properly and used effectively, each of the three internal governance mechanisms can contribute positively to the organisation operating in ways that best ser ve stakeholders’, and especially shareholders’, interests. By the same token, because none of the three mechanisms is perfect in design or execution, the market for cor porate control, an external governance mechanism, is sometimes needed.

Market for corporate control T he market for corporate control is a n e x ter na l gover na nce mec ha n ism t hat is ac t ive when a n organisation’s internal governance mechanisms fail.101 The market for cor porate control is composed of individuals and organisations that buy ownership positions in or purchase all of potentially under valued cor porations ty pically for the pur pose of forming new divisions in established companies or merging two previously separate organisations. Because the executive managers are assumed to be responsible for the under valued organisation’s poor performance, they are usually replaced. A n effective market for corporate control ensures that ineffective and/or oppor tunistic executive managers are disciplined.102

Com mon ly, ta rget orga n isat ion ma nagers a nd boa rd members a re sensit ive about ta keover bids ema nat i ng f rom t he ma rket for cor porate cont rol i n t hat bei ng a ta rget suggests t hat t hey have been ineffective with effor ts to fulfil their responsibilities. For executive managers, a board’s decision to accept an acquiring organisation’s offer ty pically finds them losing their jobs because the acquirer usually wants different people to lead the organisation. At the same time, rejection of an offer also increases the risk of job loss for executive managers because the pressure from the board and shareholders for them to improve the organisation’s performance becomes substantial.103

I n su m ma r y, t he ma rket for cor porate cont rol may appea r to be a blu nt i nst r u ment for cor porate governance; nonetheless, this governance mechanism does have the potential to represent shareholders’ best i nterests. Accord i ngly, execut ive ma nagers wa nt to lead t hei r orga n isat ions i n ways t hat ma ke disciplining by activists outside the organisation unnecessar y and/or inappropriate.

There a re a nu mber of defence tact ics execut ive managers can choose to use to fend off a ta keover attempt. Managers leading a target organisation that is performing well are almost certain to use tactics to

STRATEGY NOW

‘Say on pay’ initiatives

market for corporate control an external governance mechanism that becomes active when an organisation’s internal controls fail

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thwart the takeover attempt. Even in instances when the target organisation is underperforming compared with its peers, managers might use defence tactics to protect their own interests. In general, managers’ use of defence tactics is thought to be self-ser ving in nature.

A n awareness on the par ts of executive managers of the existence of external investors in the form of individuals or groups (e.g. hedge funds) often positively in fluences them to align their interests with t hose of t he orga n isat ion’s sta keholders, especia l ly t he sha reholders. Moreover, when act ive as a n external governance mechanism, the market for cor porate control has brought about significant changes i n ma ny orga n isat ions’ st rateg ies a nd, when used appropr iately, has ser ved sha reholders’ i nterests. Nex t, we descr ibe i nter nat iona l gover na nce pract ices to ex pla i n how t hey d i ffer across reg ions a nd countries.

International corporate governance Cor porate gover na nce is a n i ncreasi ngly i mpor ta nt issue i n econom ies globa l ly, i nclud i ng emerg i ng econom ies. Globa l isat ion i n t rade, i nvest ments a nd equ it y ma rkets i ncreases t he potent ia l va lue of organisations throughout the world using similar mechanisms to govern cor porate activities. Moreover, because of globalisation, major companies want to attract foreign investment. For this to happen, foreign investors must be con fident that adequate cor porate governance mechanisms are in place to protect their investments.

A lt hough globa l isat ion is st i mu lat i ng a n i ncrease i n t he i ntensit y of effor ts to i mprove cor porate gover nance and potentially to reduce the var iation in regions’ and nations’ gover nance systems,10 4 the reality remains that d i fferent nations do have d i fferent gover nance systems in place. Recognising and u ndersta nd i ng d i fferences i n va r ious cou nt r ies’ gover na nce systems, as well as cha nges ta k i ng place w it h in t hose systems, improves t he li kelihood an organ isat ion w ill be able to compete successf ully in the international markets it chooses to enter. To highlight the general issues of differences and changes taking place in governance systems, we discuss corporate governance practices in two developed economies (Germany and Japan), in China, an emerging economy, and, lastly, in Spain. First, though, we look at the system used in Australia.

Corporate governance in Australia To date, cor porate governance in Australia has been studied from a variety of theoretical perspectives, in par ticular: agency theor y; stewardship theor y; resource dependency theor y; shareholder theor y; and stakeholder theory.105 The myriad approaches to the topic have resulted in many normative definitions in the Australian context (these might best be described as a set of descriptive statements about what cor porate gover na nce ‘may i nclude’ or ‘m ight do’ rat her t ha n a sou nd t heoret ica l basis for promot i ng cor porate transparency). Cadbur y’s definition of cor porate governance, highlighted at the star t of this chapter, is still widely accepted as the most fitting for the egalitarian Australian context.106

Overview of the legal framework of corporate governance in Australia In Australia, a board of directors is a legal requirement set out in the Cor porations Act. Boards of directors are fundamental to cor porate governance, with legislation outlining certain powers and responsibilities to be carried out for the best interests of the relevant shareholders (and indirectly to the entire market). In terms of its prime directive, the legal framework in Australia is not primarily concerned with adding value to the organisation (although it does attempt to protect shareholder rights); instead, it is based on the traditional conventions of A nglo-Saxon tr ust law. The Cor porations Act provides a mandator y legal requirement that all Australian companies must have d irectors. There are d i fferent requirements for a proprietary organisation that has at least one director (s. 201A(1)) compared to a public organisation, which

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must have a minimum of three directors (s. 201A(2)). According to ASX CGC Principle 2 (effective Januar y 2020):

The board of a listed entity should be of an appropriate size and collectively have the skills, commitment and knowledge of the entity and the industry in which it operates, to enable it to discharge its duties effectively and to add value.107

The impor tance of cor porate governance in Australia was initially recognised in 1995, with the ASX i nt roduci ng List i ng Ru le 3c(3)(i), wh ich requ i red l isted compa n ies to i nclude i n t hei r a n nua l repor t a statement of the main cor porate governance practices they had adopted.108 Subsequently, and in response to criticism following the aftermath of cor porate collapses in the 1990s, the ASX Cor porate Governance Council (ASX CGC) released the first version of the ASX Corporate Governance Principles and Recommendations (ASX Guidelines) in March 2003. These guidelines have been fur ther revised and are designed to provide best pract ice cor porate gover na nce measu res for A SX-l isted ent it ies. They a re based on eight cent ra l principles (see Table 10.4) and 29 specific recommendations published by the ASX CGC, and represent an impor tant document outlining key elements of cor porate governance; they were subsequently updated in 2019.109

The principles of the ASX-CGC

1 Lay solid foundations for management and oversight

2 Structure the board to be effective and add value

3 Instil a culture of acting lawfully, ethically and responsibly

4 Safeguard the integrity of corporate reports

5 Make timely and balanced disclosure

6 respect the rights of security holders

7 recognise and manage risk

8 remunerate fairly and responsibly Source: ASX Corporate Governance Council, 2019, Corporate Governance Principles and Recommendations,

4th edn, https://www.asx.com.au/documents/regulation/cgc-principles-and-recommendations-fourth- edn.pdf, p. 2. © Copyright 2020 ASX Corporate Governance Council

Table 10.4

Despite that fact that the principles and recommendations were only intended to apply to ASX-listed entities (albeit not mandatorily), many other Australian entities have adopted them (as appropriate) to form par t of their own governance strategies.

In order to ach ieve contempora r y ‘cor porate gover na nce goals’, a nu mber of Aust ralia n-specif ic laws a nd i nst it ut ions have emerged i n t he per iod post-1970: leg islat ion (i n pa r t ic u la r, t he Competition and Consumer Act 2010 (Ct h)), as well as t he establish ment of t he ACCC, A SIC, A SX a nd its compa ny list i ng r u les, a nd Sta nda rds Aust ra l ia; plus t he i n f luence of sha reholder ac t iv ists a nd i n f luent ia l ‘ f i na ncia l media’ attention. These institutions act together to apply the appropriate pressures to organisations (and t hei r boa rds) to ach ieve i mpor ta nt societal goa ls as well as t he ma x i m isat ion of retu r ns on sha reholder f u nd i ng.

Competition and Consumer Act The Competition and Consumer Act 2010 (Ct h) replaced t he Trade Practices Act 1974 and includes a w ide- ranging set of provisions including:

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1 a national unfair contract terms law covering standard form consumer and small business contracts 2 a national law guaranteeing consumer rights when buying goods and ser vices 3 a national product safety law and enforcement system 4 a national law for unsolicited consumer agreements covering door-to-door sales and telephone sales 5 simple national r ules for lay-by agreements 6 penalties, enforcement powers and consumer redress options.110

Australian Competition and Consumer Commission (ACCC) The ACCC was for med on 6 November 1995 by t he merger of t he Trade Pract ices Com m ission a nd t he P r ices Su r vei l la nce Aut hor it y. Its for mat ion was a n i mpor ta nt step i n t he i mplementat ion of t he national competition policy refor m prog ram ag reed on by the Council of Aust ralian Gover n ments. The ACCC’s consu mer protect ion work complements t hat of state a nd ter r itor y consu mer a ffai rs agencies, wh ich ad m i n ister t he m i r ror leg islat ion of t hei r ju r isd ict ions a nd t he Consu mer A ffa i rs Div ision of Treasur y.111

The ACCC’s in fluence in Aust ralia extends beyond d irect action into policy. For example, t he ACCC w ill soon examine the exper iences of Aust ralian consumers, developers, suppliers and others in a  new repor t scr utinising mobile app stores. Issues to be examined include the use and sharing of data by apps, the extent of competition between Google’s and Apple’s app stores, and whether more pricing transparency is needed in Australia’s mobile apps market. This is par t of a five-year ACCC inquir y examining markets for the supply of digital platform ser vices in Australia, and it plans to produce repor ts ever y six months.112

Australian Securities and Investments Commission (ASIC) ASIC, another independent Commonwealth Government body, was established by the Australian Securities and Investments Commission Act 1989. It began in 1991 as the Australian Securities Commission to administer the Cor porations Law. In July 1998, it received new consumer protection responsibilities and its cur rent name. ASIC is the single national regulator of Australia’s companies.

A SIC per for ms t he fol low i ng gener ic f u nct ions w it h rega rd to cor porate gover na nce: it protects investors, superannuants, depositors and insurance policy holders from financial harm arising from poor ma nagement pract ices; it reg u lates a nd en forces laws t hat promote honest y a nd fa i r ness i n fi na ncia l markets, products and services and in Australian companies; it serves to underpin the strength, growth and international reputation of Australia’s financial markets; and it maintains a public database on Australia’s companies to provide cer tainty in commercial dealings.113

Australian Securities Exchange (ASX) listing rules The A SX i mposes a ser ies of i mpor ta nt reg u lator y g u idel i nes on a l l l isted compa n ies i n Aust ra l ia. In par ticular, in order for a company to be publicly listed, it must confor m to a ser ies of speci fic repor ting procedures that it would not be required to follow other wise. For example, an ASX-listed company must:

1 institute a board of directors 2 under take annual general meetings with shareholders 3 produce an annual repor t for all shareholders, as well as for the ASX 4 under take continuous and periodic disclosure of business activities.114 The full listing of A SX r ules and requirements can be found at http://w w w.asx.com.au/reg ulation/

r ules-guidance-notes-and-waivers.htm and provides an indication of the governance implications for all listed companies.

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ASX formed the Cor porate Governance Council (CGC) in 2002 with a view to developing an industr y- wide framework for cor porate governance that would provide a guide for listed companies, government a nd t he com mu n ity. In Ma rch 20 03, t he CGC published its Principles for Good Corporate Governance and Best Practice Recommendations. In 2019, this was revised and became Corporate Governance Principles and Recommendations (4th edition), which now forms the basis for reporting by listed companies as to corporate governance matters. This material can be found at https://w w w.asx.com.au/documents/asx-compliance/ cgc-principles-and-recommendations-four th-edn.pdf.

In addition, and as a result of the ASX’s own listing on the stock exchange, the ASX Supervisory Review was formed. This ASX subsidiary body was established in order to dispel any perceived conflicts of interest that may exist between the ASX (a regulator y body itself ) and its own listing on the ASX.

Standards Australia Standards Australia has produced a set of cor porate governance standards that complement the ASX Best Practice Recommendations and that target small and medium enterprises and the not-for-profit sector. The standards (AS8000 –8004) deal with good governance principles, fraud control, ethical codes of conduct and whistleblower protection programs.

Shareholders’ rights protection There are various types of shareholders in Australia, ranging from small ‘mum and dad investors’ to wealthy private individuals and large institutional investors (such as superannuation funds). The Corporations Act sets out the rights per taining to all shareholders in Australia. The Cor porations Law deals with becoming a shareholder and ceasing to be a shareholder in sections 117, 120 and 601A A– 601A D of the Cor porations Act. Australian companies  may  have  different classes of  shares. The  rights  and restrictions attached to the shares in a class distinguish it from other classes of shares and are covered in sections 254 A–254B of the Cor porations Act. Section 252D, which deals with the calling of meetings under the Cor porations Act, allows for members to call meetings of all shareholders or meetings of only those shareholders who hold a pa r t icu la r class of  sha res. Sha reholders who  hold  at least 5 per cent of t he votes t hat may be cast at a general meeting of an  organisation  have the  power  to call and  hold  a meeting themselves or to require the  directors  to call and  hold  a meeting. Meetings may be held regularly or to resolve specific questions about the management or business of the organisation. The Cor porations Act sets out r ules dealing with sha reholders’ meet i ngs. A sha reholder of a n  orga n isat ion  may ask t he  orga n isat ion  for a copy of t he record of a meeting or of a  decision  of shareholders taken without a meeting. Different  rights  to vote at meetings of shareholders may attach to different classes of shares. This is dealt with under sections 250E a nd 254A–254 B of t he Cor porat ions Act. T he buy i ng a nd sel l i ng of  sha res i n Aust ra l ia is dea lt w it h u nder sect ions  1091D –1091E. A sha reholder may sel l t hei r  sha res  but on ly if t he sa le does not breach the cor poration’s constitution.115

Shareholder activists Shareholder activism refers to the extent to which individual shareholders (albeit as a group) are willing (or even perhaps able) to influence a corporation’s board of directors. In Australia, the main organisation of such shareholders is the Australian Shareholders’ Association (ASA). The ASA has established an annual general meeting monitoring ser vice for its members, employing analysts to review cor porate resolutions a nd ma ke recom mendat ions on how to vote on t he sa me. Sha reholder act iv ists tend to become more visible during the round of annual general meetings. The focus has increased to include a greater number of directors and a wider range of issues. For example, the ASA now has policies that include the following areas of shareholder concern: poor performance; executive remuneration; accounting policies; conflicts of interest; disclosure and share ownership limits.116

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Corporate governance in Germany and Japan In ma ny pr ivate Ger ma n orga n isat ions, t he ow ner a nd ma nager may be t he sa me i nd iv idual. In t hese i nsta nces, agency problems a re not present.117 Even i n publ icly t raded Ger ma n cor porat ions, a si ngle shareholder is often dominant. Thus, the concentration of ownership is an impor tant means of cor porate governance in Germany, as it is in the USA.118

Historically, banks occupied the centre of the German corporate governance system. This is the case in other European countries as well, such as Italy and France. As lenders, banks become major shareholders when companies they have financed seek funding on the stock market or default on loans. A lthough the stakes are usually less than 10 per cent, banks can hold a single ownership position up to but not exceeding 15 per cent of the bank’s capital. Although shareholders can tell banks how to vote their ownership position, they generally do not do so. The banks monitor and control managers, both as lenders and as shareholders, by electing representatives to super visor y boards.

Ger ma n orga n isat ions w it h more t ha n 20 0 0 employees a re requ i red to have a t wo-t iered boa rd st r uc t u re t hat places t he responsibi l it y for mon itor i ng a nd cont rol l i ng ma nager ia l (or super v isor y) decisions and actions in the hands of a separate group.119 A ll the functions of strateg y and management are the responsibility of the management board (the Vorstand); however, appointment to the Vorstand is the responsibility of the super visor y tier (the Aufsichtsrat). Employees, union members and shareholders appoint members to the Aufsichtsrat. Proponents of the Ger man st r ucture suggest that it helps prevent cor porate w rongdoing and rash decisions by ‘d ictator ial CEOs’. However, cr itics maintain t hat it slows decision mak ing and often ties a CEO’s hands. The cor porate gover nance practices in Ger many also make it diff icult to restr ucture companies quick ly. Because of the role of local gover nment (through the board st r uctu re) and t he power of ban ks in Ger many ’s cor porate gover nance st r uctu re, pr ivate sha reholders rarely have major ow nersh ip positions in Ger man organ isations. Large institutional investors, such as pension funds and insurance companies, are also relatively insignificant owners of cor porate stock. Thus, at least h istor ically, Ger man execut ives generally have not been ded icated to ma x im ising sha reholder wealth to the degree that is the case for executive managers in the UK and the USA.120

However, cor porate gover nance pract ices used in Ger many a re chang ing. A man ifestat ion of t hese changes is t hat a nu mber of Ger man organ isat ions a re beg in n ing to g rav itate towa rds US gover nance mechan isms. Recent resea rch suggests t hat t he t rad itional system in Ger many produced some agency costs because of a lack of external ow nership power. Interestingly, German organisations with listings on US stock exchanges have increasingly adopted executive stock option compensation as a long-ter m incentive pay policy.121

The concepts of obl igat ion, fa m i ly a nd consensus af fect att itudes towa rds cor porate gover na nce i n Japa n. In Japa n, a n obl igat ion ‘may be to retu r n a ser v ice for one rendered or it may der ive f rom a more genera l relat ionsh ip, for exa mple, to one’s fa m i ly or old a lu m n i, or one’s compa ny (or m i n ist r y), or t he cou nt r y. T h is sense of pa r t icu la r obl igat ion is com mon elsewhere but it feels st ronger i n Japa n’.122 A s pa r t of a n orga n isat ion fa m i ly, i nd iv idua ls a re members of a u n it t hat envelops t hei r l ives; fa m i l ies com mand the attention and allegiance of par ties th roughout cor porations. Moreover, a keiretsu (g roup of organisations tied together by cross-shareholdings) is more than an economic concept; it, too, is a family. Some bel ieve, t hough, t hat ex tensive cross-sha rehold i ngs i mpede t he t y pe of st r uctu ra l cha nge t hat is needed to i mprove Japa n’s cor porate gover na nce pract ices.123 Consensus, a not her i mpor ta nt i n f luence i n Japa nese cor porate gover na nce, ca l ls for t he ex pend it u re of sig n i f ica nt a mou nts of energ y to w i n t he hea r ts a nd m i nds of people whenever possible, as opposed to execut ive ma nagers issu i ng ed icts.124 Consensus is h igh ly va lued, even when it resu lts i n a slow a nd cu mbersome decision-ma k i ng process. Japanese corporate governance has been identified as a stakeholder governance system in a code law (civil law) cou nt r y125 a nd is i n cont rast to gover na nce systems dom i na nt i n com mon law cou nt r ies. Wit h t he sta keholder gover na nce system, ot her sta keholders may i n f luence ma nagement t h rough cross-sha r i ng a mong af f i l iated orga n isat ions, t rad i ng pa r t ners a nd t he ma i n ba n ks.126

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A s i n Ger ma ny, ba n ks i n Japa n have a n i mpor ta nt role i n fi na nci ng a nd mon itor i ng la rge publ ic organ isat ions.127 Because it ow ns t he la rgest sha re of stocks and holds t he la rgest amount of debt, t he ma i n ba n k has t he closest relat ionsh ip w it h a n orga n isat ion’s execut ive ma nagers. T he ma i n ba n k provides financial advice to the organisation and also closely monitors managers. Thus, Japan has a bank- based financial and cor porate governance str ucture, whereas the USA has a market-based financial and governance str ucture.128

Aside from lending money, a Japanese bank can hold up to 5 per cent of an organisation’s total stock; a group of related financial institutions can hold up to 40 per cent. In many cases, main-bank relationships are par t of a hor izontal keiretsu. A keiretsu organisation usually ow ns less than 2 per cent of any other member organisation; however, each organisation ty pically has a stake of that size in ever y organisation in the keiretsu. As a result, somewhere between 30 and 90 per cent of an organisation is owned by other members of the keiretsu. Thus, a keiretsu is a system of relationship investments.

After a series of corporate scandals in Japan, including Kanebo (2004), Seibu Railway (2004), Livedoor (2005) and Olympus Corporation (2011), a corporate governance reform was initiated under the Japanese Gover n ment ’s Rev ita l isat ion Pol ic y. T he rev ised Compa ny Act of 2014 establ ished more st r i ngent requirements on outside (independent) directors and outside statutor y auditors (kansayaku). In 2016, the Japan Exchange Group noted that 414 listed organisations had chosen the new system and transitioned into a new organisation with audit and supervisory committees. Under the new legislation, Japanese companies had a choice of three different types of organisational structure: a company with three committees; a company with a kansayaku; board or a company with audit and supervisory committees. A company with a kansayaku board, as well as a board of directors and an accounting auditor, is a governance system unique to Japan.

Japan’s cor porate gover nance practices are changing accord ingly. Japanese ban ks are continuing to develop as economic organisations, as their role in the monitoring and control of managerial behaviour and organisation outcomes is less significant than in the past.129 A lso, deregulation in the financial sector has reduced the cost of mounting hostile takeovers.130 As such, deregulation facilitated additional activity in Japan’s market for corporate control, which had been nonexistent in preceding years. Interestingly, CEOs of both public and private companies in Japan receive similar levels of compensation and their compensation is tied closely to obser vable performance goals.131

Corporate governance in China ‘Ch ina has a u n ique and la rge, socialist, ma rket-or iented economy. The gover n ment has done much to improve the corporate governance of listed companies.’132 This comment denotes that corporate governance practices in China are changing and the country is experiencing increasing privatisation of businesses and the development of equity markets. However, the stock markets in China remain young and are continuing to develop. In their early years, these markets were weak because of significant insider trading, but with stronger governance these markets have improved.133

There has been a g radual decline in Ch ina in t he equ ity held in state-ow ned enter pr ises, a nd bot h the number and percentage of private organisations have grown, but the state still relies on direct and/ or ind i rect cont rols to in fluence t he st rateg ies orga n isat ions use. In ter ms of long-ter m success, t hese cond it ions may a ffect orga n isat ions’ per for ma nces i n t hat resea rch shows t hat orga n isat ions w it h h igher state ow nersh ip tend to have lower ma rket value and more volat ility in t hat value across t ime. T h is is because of agenc y con fl icts i n t he orga n isat ions a nd because t he execut ives do not seek to maximise shareholder returns given that they must also seek to satisfy social goals placed on them by the government.134 This suggests a potential conflict between the principals, par ticularly the state owner and the private equity owners of such enter prises.135

Some evidence suggests that corporate governance in China may be tilting towards the Western model. Changing a nation’s gover nance systems is a complicated task that will inevitably encounter setbacks. Still, corporate governance in Chinese companies continues to evolve and likely will do so for some time to

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come as par ties (e.g. the Chinese Government and those seeking fur ther movement towards free-market economies) interact to form governance mechanisms that are best for their nation, businesses and citizens. However, along with changes in the governance systems of specific countries, multinational companies’ boards and managers are also evolving. For example, organisations that have entered more international markets are likely to have more top executives with greater international experience and to have a larger propor tion of foreign owners and foreign directors on their boards.136

Corporate governance in Spain Spa i n has been i n f luenced by t he Eu ropea n a nd i nter nat iona l lens to establ ish recom mendat ions t h rough codes of good gover na nce for listed compa n ies. These codes may be followed or not i n Spai n. Spanish Company Law (Royal Legislative Decree) (A r t. 538) establishes that listed companies must make an an nual cor porate gover nance repor t t hat details t he deg ree of f ul fi lment of t he code of gover nance recommendations.

The fi rst code of cor porate gover nance was the Olivencia Repor t (1998), followed five years later by t he A ldama Repor t (20 03). In 20 06, t he Un i fied Good Gover nance Code was approved w it h subsequent updates in 2009 and 2013. Fur ther amendments in 2014 to the Spanish Company Law incor porated basic cor porate governance guidelines, which were mandated from 2015 into a new code, Good Governance of Listed Companies. This cor porate governance framework was based on two main principles:

1 the binding provisions contained in the Spanish Company Law and other applicable law 2 the cor porate governance recommendations contained in the Good Governance of Listed Companies

(which contains 64 recommendations).137

This code has contributed to the continued development of corporate governance best practice in Spain.

Governance mechanisms and ethical behaviour The th ree inter nal and one exter nal gover nance mechanisms are designed to ensure that the agents of the organisation’s owners (i.e. the organisation’s executive managers) make strategic decisions that best ser ve the interests of all stakeholders. In the USA and trending that way in Australia, shareholders are commonly recognised as the organisation’s most significant stakeholders. Increasingly, though, executive managers are expected to lead their organisations in ways that will also ser ve the needs of product market sta keholders (e.g. customers, suppl iers a nd host com mu n it ies) a nd orga n isat iona l sta keholders (e.g. manager ial and non-manager ial employees).138 Therefore, t he organ isat ion’s act ions and t he outcomes flow i ng f rom t hem shou ld resu lt i n, at least, m i n i ma l sat isfact ion of t he i nterests of a ll sta keholders; other w ise, a d issatisfied stakeholder may w ithd raw its suppor t from the organisation and prov ide it to another (e.g. customers will purchase products from a supplier offering an acceptable substitute).

Some bel ieve t hat t he i nter na l cor porate gover na nce mecha n isms desig ned a nd used by et h ica l ly responsible companies increase the likelihood the organisation will be able to, at least, minimally satisfy all stakeholders’ interests.139 Gover nance scandals at companies such as R io Tinto, A M P and Bellamy’s Organic, among others, illustrate the negative effects of poor ethical behaviour on an organisation’s efforts to satisf y stakeholders. The issue of et h ical behav iou r by executive managers as a foundation for best ser ving stakeholders’ interests is being taken seriously in countries throughout the world.140

The decisions and actions of the board of directors can be an effective deterrent to unethical behaviours by executive managers. Indeed, evidence suggests that the most effective boards set boundaries for their organisations’ business ethics and values.141 Once the boundaries for ethical behaviour are determined and likely formalised in a code of ethics, the board’s ethics-based expectations must be clearly communicated to the organisation’s executive managers and to other stakeholders (e.g. customers and suppliers) with

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whom interactions are necessar y for the organisation to produce and sell its products. Moreover, as agents of the organisation’s owners, executive managers must understand that the board, acting as an internal governance mechanism, will hold them fully accountable for developing and supporting an organisational culture in which only ethical behaviours are permitted. As explained in Chapter 12, CEOs can be positive role models for improved ethical behaviour.

Through effective governance that results from well-designed internal mechanisms and the appropriate use of the market for corporate control as an external mechanism, executive managers, working with others, are able to assist their organisation in selecting and using strategies with a high probability of resulting in strategic competitiveness and earning above-average returns. W hile some organisations’ governance mechanisms have been ineffective – for example, Bellamy’s, Westpac Group, A MP and Commonwealth Bank in Australia – other companies are recognised for the quality of their governance activities.

World Fi na nce, wh ich eva luates t he cor porate gover na nce pract ices of compa n ies t h roughout t he world and commends companies with a track record of excellence in governance, has acknowledged that investors are still seeking boards with a strong sense of leadership and solid moral alignment. In 2019, World Finance Best Corporate Governance Awards by country were given to Bank of Cyprus (Cyprus), Total (France), Piraeus Bank (Greece), Oberoi (India), Enel (Italy), Jordan Islamic Bank (Jordan), Boursa Kuwait (Kuwait), FBN Holdings (Nigeria), NattoPharma (Nor way), PKO Bank Polski (Poland), Commercial Bank of Qatar (Qatar), Credit Bank of Moscow (Russia), Iberdrola (Spain), Swiss Re (Switzerland), Kasikornbank (Thailand) and AVANGRID (USA). These awards are determined by analysing a number of issues concerned with corporate governance, such as board accountability and financial disclosure, executive compensation, shareholder rights, ownership base, takeover provisions, cor porate behaviour and overall responsibility exhibited by the organisation.142

A s t he d isc ussion i n t h is c hapter suggest s, cor porate gover na nce mec ha n ism s a re pivota l to organisations’ overall success and sustainable competitive advantage.

Rewarding top executives of one of the most poorly governed banks in the world: Westpac

AUSTrAC, Australia’s anti-money-laundering and terrorism financing regulator, has today applied to the Federal Court of Australia for civil penalty orders against Westpac Banking Corporation (Westpac). The civil penalty orders relate to systemic non-compliance with the Anti- Money Laundering and Counter-Terrorism Financing Act 2006 (AML/CTF Act). AUSTrAC alleges Westpac contravened the AML/CTF Act on over 23 million occasions.

AUSTrAC Chief Executive Officer, Nicole rose, noted that AUSTrAC’s decision to commence civil penalty proceedings was determined following an investigation into Westpac’s non-compliance. It is alleged that Westpac’s oversight of the banking and designated services provided through its correspondent banking relationships was deficient. Westpac’s oversight of its AML/CTF Program, intended to identify, mitigate and manage the money laundering and terrorism financing risks of its designated services, was also deficient. These

failures in oversight resulted in serious and systemic non-compliance with the AML/CTF Act.

Westpac failed to:  1 appropriately assess and monitor the ongoing

money laundering and terrorism financing risks associated with the movement of money into and out of Australia through correspondent banking relationships. Westpac has allowed correspondent banks to access its banking environment and the Australian Payments System without conducting appropriate due diligence on those correspondent banks and without appropriate risk assessments and controls on the products and channels offered as part of that relationship

2 report over 19.5 million International Funds Transfer Instructions (IFTIs) to AUSTrAC over nearly five years for transfers both into and out of Australia. The late incoming IFTIs received from four correspondent

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banks alone represent over 72% of all incoming IFTIs received by Westpac in the period November 2013 to September 2018 and amounts to over $11 billion. IFTIs are a key source of information from the financial services sector that provides vital information into AUSTrAC’s financial intelligence to protect Australia’s financial system and the community from harm

3 pass on information about the source of funds to other banks in the transfer chain. This conduct deprived the other banks of information they needed to understand the source of funds to manage their own AML/CTF risks

4 keep records relating to the origin of some of these international funds transfers

5 carry out appropriate customer due diligence on transactions to the Philippines and South East Asia that have known financial indicators relating to potential child exploitation risks. Westpac failed to introduce appropriate detection scenarios to detect known child exploitation typologies, consistent with AUSTrAC guidance and their own risk assessments. ‘These AML/CTF laws are in place to protect

Australia’s financial system, businesses and the community from criminal exploitation. Serious and systemic non-compliance leaves our financial system open to being exploited by criminals,’ Ms rose said.

‘The failure to pass on information about IFTIs to AUSTrAC undermines the integrity of Australia’s financial system and hinders AUSTrAC’s ability to track down the origins of financial transactions, when required to support police investigations.’

AUSTrAC’s approach to regulation is based on building resilience in the financial system and on educating the financial services sector to ensure they understand, and are able to comply with, their compliance and reporting obligations. Businesses are the first line of defence in protecting the financial system from abuse.

‘We have been, and will continue to work with Westpac during these proceedings to strengthen their AML/CTF processes and frameworks,’ Ms rose said.

‘Westpac disclosed issues with its IFTI reporting, has cooperated with AUSTrAC’s investigation and has commenced the process of uplifting its AML/CTF controls.’

Following on from AUSTrAC Chief Executive Officer’s statement, on 26 November 2019 Westpac Group Chairman Lindsay Maxted announced to the ASX a number of significant executive changes.

Despite healthy profits and leaving the bank in a strong financial position with each business number one or number two in their markets, Mr Hartzer (CEO) has now left after scandals around anti-money laundering and other financial crimes.

The Board accepted the seriousness of the issues raised by AUSTrAC and Ewen Crouch will not seek re- election as a Director at the AGM. Westpac Group had sought feedback from all of its stakeholders, including shareholders, and through this process it decided that board and management changes were in the best interest of the bank, with the chair of the board noting that the bank had fallen short of both their own and regulator’s standards. ‘We are determined to fix these issues and lift our standards to ensure our anti-money laundering and other financial crime processes are industry leading. As a major bank we play a critical role in helping law enforcement agencies prevent criminals from carrying out illegal activity.’ He further noted that the board recognised the seriousness of the events and an external expert would be appointed to oversight the process. The Chair further noted that over the past two years the organisation has recognised the gaps and taken a number of steps to improve its monitoring of financial crime and other serious crime. Despite numerous completed actions such as consolidating different financial crime systems into a single, group-wide technology system and doubling the resourcing dedicated to financial crime to around 750 people. Despite all the turmoil at Westpac and lack of internal governance throughout the business, the current CEO stood down from Westpac in December 2019. Mr Hartzer was provided with a 12 months’ notice period and it was intended he would be paid his fixed remuneration of $2.686 million over the period. Sources: AUSTrAC, 2019, AUSTrAC applies for civil penalty orders against

Westpac, Media release, https://www.austrac.gov.au/about-us/media- release/civil-penalty-orders-against-westpac, 20 November,

© AUSTrAC for the Commonwealth of Australia; Westpac, 2019, Westpac announces response plan, Media release, https://www.westpac.com.au/

about-westpac/media/media-releases/2019/24-november, 24 November; Westpac, 2019, Westpac board announces CEO and board changes, Media release, https://www.westpac.com.au/about-westpac/media/

media-releases/2019/26-november, 26 November.

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Corporate governance and organisation performance The topic of corporate governance and organisation performance represents a comprehensive and growing a rea of resea rch i nter nat iona lly. In a n Aust ra lia n contex t, as elsewhere, t here is a major d i fficu lt y i n determining a causal relationship between corporate governance and organisation performance (especially when it comes to the more subjective indicators of social, environmental and innovative performance). The results of empirical research in Australia remain divided between ‘some support’, ‘inconclusive support’ and ‘no relationship’ between corporate governance and organisational performance (largely depending on the independent and proxy dependent variables chosen to represent the relationship). James Psaros provided a comprehensive meta-analysis on t he lin k between cor porate gover nance and econom ic per for mance a nd out l i ned t he posit ive i nd i rect relat ionsh ip t hat cor porate gover na nce prov ides as a facilitator of economic performance. It was noted by Psaros that the ‘… editorial from the journal Corporate Governance: An International Review prov ides a n endorsement for t he econom ic mer its of cor porate gover na nce’14 3 stating:

There has been much discussion recently about whether corporate governance makes a difference to the bottom line, that is, does corporate governance improve shareholder value? In my view, the evidence, both academic and practitioner, points on balance towards the opinion that good corporate governance helps realise value and create competitive advantage.144

In an Australian context, research examined whether cor porate gover nance was d irectly related to organisation performance and measured this by the Howar th Cor porate Governance Score. It was found t hat t here was no sig n i fica nt relat ionsh ip between cor porate gover na nce a nd t rad it iona l measu res of organisation per for mance.145 Despite these fi ndings, scholars, legislators, managers and investors alike remain convinced that corporate governance practices are nonetheless important measures for sustainable societal outcomes.

Corporate social responsibility Cor porate social responsibility (CSR) has become a major factor in cor porate governance internationally. I n t he pract it ioner sphere, t he exa m i nat ion of CSR per for ma nce measu res (speci fica l ly as cor porate governance criteria) has been researched by a range of commercial organisations,146 as well as peak and professional bodies (e.g. Business Council of Australia, Centre for Cor porate Public A ffairs, CPA Australia and Volunteer ing Aust ralia). As a result, a var iety of ind ices have been developed to evaluate the CSR performance of Australian companies, most notably the St James Ethics Centre’s Cor porate Responsibility Index, the Reputex SR Index and the Australian CSR Standards (AS 8003). In suppor t of all these indices, the Australian Institute of Social and Ethical Accountability and Models of Success and Sustainability (MOSS) has emerged to prov ide g uidance for cor porations to implement, measu re and repor t t heir CSR performance measures more effectively.147

A recent example of the failure of CSR practices and procedures was witnessed with the destr uction of the ancient Indigenous site at the Juukan Gorge caves in Western Australia by Rio Tinto. Rio Tinto chairman Simon Thompson said in a statement:

What happened at Juukan was wrong and we are determined to ensure that the destruction of a heritage site of such exceptional archaeological and cultural significance never occurs again at a Rio Tinto operation… We are also determined to regain the trust of the Puutu Kunti Kurrama and Pinikura [PKKP] people and other Traditional Owners.148

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I n Sp a i n , t he r e s p on s i bi l it y to a p p r ove a n o r g a n i s at ion’s s o c i a l responsibility policy falls within the ambit of board of directors duties. Being more prog ressive i n C SR t ha n ma ny nat ions, t he CBGSC (2015) prov ided t h ree speci fic recom mendat ions concer n i ng CSR, na mely: a CSR Com m ittee (w it h t he responsibility to super v ise t he CSR policy concu r rent ly w it h good gover nance principles); setting the goals of the CSR policy and the cor porate st rateg y in respect of sustainability; and the env iron ment and social issues. Finally, in the interests of openness and transparency, the organisation must repor t i n a sepa rate doc u ment (or ma nagement repor t) mat ters related to CSR, ack nowledg i ng t hat i nter nat iona lly accepted met hodolog ies shou ld be considered.

Australian Indigenous history was destroyed by blasts at Juukan Gorge, WA.

Source: Alamy Stock Photo/Suzanne Long

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STUDY TOOLS SUMMARY LO1 Corporate governance is a relationship among

stakeholders that is used to determine an organisation’s direction and control its performance. How organisations monitor and control executive managers’ decisions and actions affects the implementation of strategies. Effective governance that aligns managers’ decisions with shareholders’ interests can help produce a competitive advantage for the organisation.

LO2 Ownership is separated from control in the modern corporation. Owners (principals) hire managers (agents) to make decisions that maximise the organisation’s value. As risk-bearing specialists, owners diversify their risk by investing in multiple corporations with different risk profiles. Owners expect their agents (the organisation’s executive managers, who are decision-making specialists) to make decisions that will help to maximise the value of their organisation. Thus, modern corporations are characterised by an agency relationship that is created when one party (the organisation’s owners) hires and pays another party (executive managers) to use its decision-making skills.

LO3 Separation of ownership and control creates an agency problem when an agent pursues goals that conflict with the principals’ goals. Principals establish and use governance mechanisms to control this problem.

LO4 Three internal governance mechanisms are used in the modern corporation: ownership concentration, the board of directors and executive compensation. The market for corporate control is an external governance mechanism influencing managers’ decisions and the outcomes resulting from them.

Ownership concentration is based on the number of large-block shareholders and the percentage of shares they own. With significant ownership percentages, institutional investors often are able to influence executive managers’ strategic decisions and actions. Institutional investors are a powerful force globally and actively use their positions of concentrated ownership to force managers and boards of directors to make decisions that best serve shareholders’ interests.

LO5 Executive compensation is a highly visible and often- criticised governance mechanism. Salary, bonuses and long-term incentives are used for the purpose of aligning managers’ and shareholders’ interests. An organisation’s board of directors is responsible for determining the effectiveness of the organisation’s executive compensation system. An effective system elicits managerial decisions that are in shareholders’ best interests.

LO6 Evidence suggests that shareholders and boards of directors have become more vigilant in controlling managerial decisions. Nonetheless, these mechanisms are often insufficient. When the internal mechanisms fail, the market for corporate control – as an external governance mechanism – becomes important. Although it too is imperfect, the market for corporate control has been effective in causing corporations to combat inefficient diversification and to implement more effective strategic decisions.

LO7 The Australian system of governance has a backbone of strong legislation, including the Australian Consumer Law, and is also strongly influenced by an active financial media presence and recent shareholder activism. Corporate governance structures in Germany, Japan, Spain and China differ from each other and from the structures used in Australia, the UK and the USA. Historically, US governance structure focused on maximising shareholder value. In Germany, employees, as a stakeholder group, take a more prominent role in governance. By contrast, until recently, Japanese shareholders played virtually no role in monitoring and controlling executive managers. However, Japanese organisations are now being challenged by ‘activist’ shareholders. In China, the central government still plays a major role in corporate governance practices. Internationally, all of these systems are becoming increasingly similar, as are many governance systems both in developed countries, such as France and Spain, and in transitional economies, such as russia and India.

LO8 Effective governance mechanisms ensure that the interests of all stakeholders or shareholders are served. Thus, strategic competitiveness results when

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organisations are governed in ways that permit, at least, minimal satisfaction of capital market stakeholders (e.g. shareholders), product market stakeholders (e.g. customers and suppliers) and organisational stakeholders (e.g. managerial and non-

managerial employees; see also Chapter 2). Moreover, effective governance produces ethical behaviour and consideration of CSr principles in the formulation and implementation of strategies.

KEY TERMS agency costs

agency relationship

board of directors

compensation

corporate governance

executive

institutional owners

large-block shareholders

managerial opportunism

market for corporate control

ownership concentration

REVIEW QUESTIONS 1. What is corporate governance? Why is governance

necessary to control managers’ decisions?

2. What is meant by the statement that ownership is separated from managerial control in the corporation? Why does this separation exist?

3. What is an agency relationship? What is managerial opportunism? What assumptions do owners of corporations make about managers as agents?

4. How are each of the three internal governance mechanisms – ownership concentration, boards of directors and executive compensation – used to align the interests of managerial agents with those of the organisation’s owners?

5. What trends exist regarding executive compensation? What is the effect of the increased use of long-term

incentives on executive managers’ strategic decisions?

6. What is the market for corporate control? What conditions generally cause this external governance mechanism to become active? How does this mechanism constrain executive managers’ decisions and actions?

7. What is the nature of corporate governance in Germany, Japan, Spain and China?

8. How can corporate governance foster ethical decisions and behaviours on the part of managers as agents?

9. What is the legislative basis to the Australian system of governance?

10. What is CSr? How is CSr linked to corporate governance?

EXPERIENTIAL EXERCISES

Exercise 1: Governance – does it matter competitively? Governance mechanisms are effective when they meet the needs of all stakeholders. Governance mechanisms are also a key way in which to ensure that strategic decisions are made effectively. As a potential employee, how would you go about investigating an organisation’s governance structure, and would that investigation weigh in your decision to become an employee? Identify an organisation that you currently would like to join or one that you find interesting. Working individually, research the following aspects of your target organisation: 1. Find a copy of the organisation’s most recent

proxy statement. Typically, proxy statements are

sent to shareholders prior to each year’s annual general meeting and contain detailed information about the organisation’s governance and issues on which a shareholder vote might be held. Proxy statements are typically available from an organisation’s website (look for an ‘Investors’ submenu). Alongside the proxy you should also be able to access the organisation’s annual report. Here you will find information concerning performance, governance and the organisation’s outlook, among other matters.

2. Identify one of the organisation’s main competitors for comparison. You can find one of the organisation’s main

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competitors by using organisation analysis tools such as Datamonitor.

The topics that you should examine include:

• compensation plans (for both the CEO and board members; be sure to look for the difference between fixed and incentive compensation)

• directors’ fees • board composition (e.g. board size, insiders and

outsiders, interlocking directorates, functional experience, how many active CEOs, how many retired CEOs, what is the demographic makeup, and age diversity)

• committees (e.g. how many, composition and compensation)

• stock ownership by officers and directors – identify beneficial ownership from stock owned (you will need to look through the notes of the ownership tables to comprehend this)

• ownership concentration – how much of the organisation’s outstanding stock is owned by institutions, individuals, insiders? How many large- block shareholders are there (5 per cent or more owners)?

Also consider the following questions:

a How many directors are independent of the organisation?

b What activities are there by activist shareholders regarding corporate governance issues of concern?

c Are there any managerial defence tactics employed by the organisation? For example, what does it take for a shareholder proposal to come to a vote and be adopted?

d Does the organisation have a code of conduct? If so, what is it?

Prepare a report summarising the results of your findings that compares your target organisation and its competitor side by side. Your memo should include the following topics:

• Summarise the key aspects of the organisations’ governance mechanisms.

• Create a single graph covering the last 10-year historical stock performance for both companies. If applicable, find a representative index to compare both with, such as S&P.

• Highlight key differences between your target organisation and its competitor.

• Based on your review of the organisation’s governance, did you change your opinion of the organisation’s desirability as an employer? Why or why not? How does the target organisation compare to the main competitor you identified?

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of Management Review, 35: 246–64; E. E. Lawler III & D. L. Finegold, 2005, The changing face of corporate boards, MIT Sloan Management Review, 46(2): 67–70.

87. D. Carey, J. J. Keller & M. Patsalos-Fox, 2010, How to choose the right nonexecutive board leader, McKinsey Quarterly, May.

88. D. Northcott & J. Smith, 2011, Managing performance at the top: A balanced scorecard for boards of directors, Journal of Accounting & Organizational Change, 7: 33–56; L. Erakovic & J. Overall, 2010, Opening the ‘black box’: Challenging traditional governance theorems, Journal of Management & Organization, 16: 250–65.

89. F. A. Gul, B. Srinidhi & A. C. Ng, 2011, Does board gender diversity improve the informativeness of stock prices?, Journal of Accounting and Economics, 51: 314–38; D. A. Matsa & A. r. Miller, 2011, Chipping at the glass ceiling: Gender spillovers in corporate leadership, Social Science research Network, http://ssrn. com/abstract=1709462; A. J. Hillman, C. Shropshire & A. A. Cannella, Jr, 2007, Organizational predictors of women on corporate boards, Academy of Management Journal, 50: 941–52.

90. M. J. Conyon, J. E. Core & W. r. Guay, 2011, Are US CEOs paid more than UK CEOs? Inferences from risk-adjusted pay, Review of Financial Studies, 24: 402–38; S. N. Kaplan, 2008, Are US CEOs overpaid?, Academy of Management Perspectives, 22(2): 5–20.

91. E. A. Fong, V. F. Misangyi, Jr & H. L. Tosi, 2010, The effect of CEO pay deviations on CEO withdrawal, firm size, and firm profits, Strategic Management Journal, 31: 629–51; J. P. Walsh, 2009, Are US CEOs overpaid? A partial response to Kaplan, Academy of Management Perspectives, 23(1): 73–5; J. P. Walsh, 2008, CEO compensation and the responsibilities of the business scholar to society, Academy of Management Perspectives, 22(3): 26–33.

92. M. A. Geletkanycz & B. K. Boyd, 2011, CEO outside directorships and firm performance: A reconciliation of agency and embeddedness views, Academy of Management Journal, 54: 335–52; K. rehbein, 2007, Explaining CEO compensation: How do talent, governance, and markets fit in?, Academy of Management Perspectives, 21(1): 75–7; J. S. Miller, r. M. Wiseman & L. r. Gomez-Mejia, 2002, The fit between CEO compensation design and firm risk, Academy of Management Journal, 45: 745–56.

93. D. Souder & J. M. Shaver, 2010, Constraints and incentives for making long horizon corporate investments, Strategic Management Journal, 31: 1316–36; M. Larraza-Kintana, r. M. Wiseman, L. r. Gomez-Mejia & T. M. Welborne, 2007, Disentangling compensation and employment risks using the behavioral agency model, Strategic Management Journal, 28: 1001–19.

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94. E. A. Fong, 2010, relative CEO underpayment and CEO behavior towards r&D spending, Journal of Management Studies, 47: 1095–122; X. Zhang, K. M. Bartol, K. G. Smith, M. D. Pfarrer & D. M. Khanin, 2008, CEOs on the edge: Earnings manipulations and stock-based incentive misalignment, Academy of Management Journal, 51: 241–58; J. P. O’Connor, r. L. Priem, J. E. Coombs & K. M. Gilley, 2006, Do CEO stock options prevent or promote fraudulent financial reporting?, Academy of Management Journal, 49: 483–500.

95. Y. Du, M. Deloof & A. Jorissen, 2011, Active boards of directors in foreign subsidiaries, Corporate Governance: An International Review, 19: 153–68; J. J. reuer, E. Klijn, F. A. J. van den Bosch & H. W. Volberda, 2011, Bringing corporate governance to international joint ventures, Global Strategy Journal, 1: 54–66; K. roth & S. O’Donnell, 1996, Foreign subsidiary compensation: An agency theory perspective, Academy of Management Journal, 39: 678–703.

96. Australian Council for Superannuation Investors, 2019, CEO Pay in ASX200 Companies, Melbourne: Ownership Matters, https://acsi. org.au/wp-content/uploads/2020/02/CEO- Pay-in-ASX200-Companies-September-2019. pdf, September.

97. B. Balasubramanian, B. S. Black & V. Khanna, 2010, The relation between firm-level corporate governance and market value: A study of India, University of Michigan working paper series; A. Ghosh, 2006, Determination of executive compensation in an emerging economy: Evidence from India, Emerging Markets, Finance & Trade, 42(3): 66–90.

98. M. Ederhof, 2011, Incentive compensation and promotion-based incentives of mid-level managers: Evidence from a multinational corporation, The Accounting Review, 86: 131–54; C. L. Staples, 2007, Board globalization in the world’s largest TNCs 1993–2005, Corporate Governance, 15: 311–32.

99. Y. Deutsch, T. Keil & T. Laamanen, 2011, A dual agency view of board compensation: The joint effects of outside director and CEO stock options on firm risk, Strategic Management Journal, 32: 212–27; P. Kalyta, 2009, Compensation transparency and managerial opportunism: A study of supplemental retirement plans, Strategic Management Journal, 30: 405–23.

100. L. K. Meulbroek, 2001, The efficiency of equity-linked compensation: Understanding the full cost of awarding executive stock options, Financial Management, 30(2): 5–44.

101. V. V. Acharya, S. C. Myers & r. G. rajan, 2011, The internal governance of firms, Journal of Finance, 66: 689–720; r. Sinha, 2006, regulation: The market for corporate control and corporate governance, Global Finance Journal, 16: 264–82.

102. T. Yoshikawa & A. A. rasheed, 2010, Family control and ownership monitoring in family-controlled firms in Japan, Journal of Management Studies, 47: 274–95; D. N. Iyer & K. D. Miller, 2008, Performance feedback, slack, and the timing of acquisitions, Academy of Management Journal, 51: 808–22; r. W. Masulis, C. Wang & F. Xie, 2007, Corporate governance and acquirer returns, Journal of Finance, 62: 1851–89.

103. E. M. Fich, J. Cai & A. L. Tran, 2011, Stock option grants to target CEOs during private merger negotiations, Journal of Financial Economics, 101: 413–30; J. A. Krug & W. Shill, 2008, The big exit: Executive churn in the wake of M&As, Journal of Business Strategy, 29(4): 15–21.

104. I. Haxhi & H. Ees, 2010, Explaining diversity in the worldwide diffusion of codes of good governance, Journal of International Business Studies, 41: 710–26; P. Witt, 2004, The competition of international corporate governance systems: A German perspective, Management International Review, 44: 309–33.

105. Backhouse & Wickham, Corporate governance, boards of directors and corporate social responsibility: The Australian context, CC BY 4.0 https:// creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/.

106. Cadbury, Report of the Committee on the Financial Aspects of Corporate Governance: The Code of Best Practice.

107. ASX Corporate Governance Council, Corporate Governance Principles and Recommendations, 2.

108. K. Henry, 2010, Australia’s Future Tax System: Report to the Treasurer, December 2009. Part One: Overview, Canberra; Commonwealth of Australia, http://esvc000076.wic060u. server-web.com/ssl/CMS/files_cms/00_ AFTS_final_report_consolidated.pdf.

109. ASX Corporate Governance Council, Corporate Governance Principles and Recommendations.

110. Australian Consumer Law, 2020, Legislation, https://consumerlaw.gov.au/ australian-consumer-law/legislation.

111. Australian Competition and Consumer Commission (ACCC), 2020, https://www. accc.gov.au.

112. Australian Competition and Consumer Commission (ACCC), 2020, Mobile apps market under scrutiny, https://www.accc. gov.au/media-release/mobile-apps-market- under-scrutiny, 8 September.

113. Australian Securities and Investments Commission, 2007, http://www.asic.gov.au.

114. ASX, 2020, rules, guidance notes and waivers, http://www.asx.com.au/regulation/ rules-guidance-notes-and-waivers.htm.

115. Backhouse & Wickham, Corporate governance, boards of directors and corporate social responsibility: The Australian context.

116. J. Kavanagh, 2000, Shareholders bare their teeth, Business Review Weekly, 3 November.

117. J. Block & F. Spiegel, 2011, Family firms and regional innovation activity: Evidence from the German Mittelstand, Social Science research Network, http://ssrn.com/ abstract=1745362.

118. S. K. Bhaumik & A. Gregoriou, 2010, ‘Family’ ownership, tunneling and earnings management: A review of the literature, Journal of Economic Surveys, 24: 705–30; A. Tuschke & W. G. Sanders, 2003, Antecedents and consequences of corporate governance reform: The case of Germany, Strategic Management Journal, 24: 631–49; J. Edwards & M. Nibler, 2000, Corporate governance in Germany: The role of banks and ownership concentration, Economic Policy, 31: 237–68.

119. D. Hillier, J. Pinadado, V. de Queiroz & C. de la Torre, 2010, The impact of country- level corporate governance on research and development, Journal of International Business Studies, 42: 76–98; P. C. Fiss, 2006, Social influence effects and managerial compensation evidence from Germany, Strategic Management Journal, 27: 1013–31.

120. J. T. Addison & C. Schnabel, 2011, Worker directors: A German product that did not export?, Industrial Relations: A Journal of Economy and Society, 50: 354–74; P. C. Fiss & E. J. Zajac, 2004, The diffusion of ideas over contested terrain: The (non)adoption of a shareholder value orientation among German firms, Administrative Science Quarterly, 49: 501–34.

121. A. Chizema, 2010, Early and late adoption of American-style executive pay in Germany: Governance and institutions, Journal of World Business, 45: 9–18; W. G. Sanders & A. C. Tuschke, 2007, The adoption of the institutionally contested organizational practices: The emergence of stock option pay in Germany, Academy of Management Journal, 50: 33–56.

122. J. P. Charkha, 1994, Keeping Good Companies: A Study of Corporate Governance in Five Countries, New York: Oxford University Press, 70.

123. eStandardsForum, 2010, Japan: Principles of corporate governance, http://www. estandardsforum.org, May.

124. D. r. Adhikari & K. Hirasawa, 2010, Emerging scenarios of Japanese corporate management, Asia-Pacific Journal of Business Administration, 2: 114–32; M. A. Hitt, H. Lee & E. Yucel, 2002, The importance of social capital to the management of multinational enterprises: relational networks among Asian and Western firms, Asia Pacific Journal of Management, 19: 353–72.

125. r. La Porta, F. Lopez de Silanes, A. Shleifer & r. Vishny, 1998, Law and finance, Journal of Political Economy, 106(6): 1113–55, doi:10.1086/250042; S. J. Ball, 1996, Case Study in A. Kruper & J. Kruper (eds), The Social Science Encyclopaedia, London: routledge.

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126. A. Shleifer & r. W. Vishny, 1997, A survey of corporate governance, Journal of Finance, 52(2): 737–83; T. Hoshi &A. K. Kashyap, 2001, Corporate Financing and Governance in Japan: The Road to the Future, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

127. W. P. Wan, D. W. Yiu, r. E. Hoskisson & H. Kim, 2008, The performance implications of relationship banking during macroeconomic expansion and contraction: A study of Japanese banks’ social relationships and overseas expansion, Journal of International Business Studies, 39: 406–27.

128. P. M. Lee & H. M. O’Neill, 2003, Ownership structures and r&D investments of US and Japanese firms: Agency and stewardship perspectives, Academy of Management Journal, 46: 212–25.

129. X. Wu & J. Yao, 2011, Understanding the rise and decline of the Japanese main bank system: The changing effects of bank rent extraction, Journal of Banking & Finance, 36(1): 36–50; I. S. Dinc, 2006, Monitoring the monitors: The corporate governance in Japanese banks and their real estate lending in the 1980s, Journal of Business, 79: 3057–81.

130. K. Kubo & T. Saito, 2011, The effect of mergers on employment and wages: Evidence from Japan, Journal of Japanese and International Economics, 26(2): 263–84; N. Isagawa, 2007, A theory of unwinding of cross-shareholding under managerial entrenchment, Journal of Financial Research, 30: 163–79.

131. J. M. ramseyer, M. Nakazato & E. B. rasmusen, 2009, Public and private firm compensation: Evidence from Japanese tax returns, Harvard Law and Economics discussion paper, 1 February.

132. J. Yang, J. Chi & M. Young, 2011, A review of corporate governance in China, Asian- Pacific Economic Literature, 25: 15–28.

133. H. Berkman, r. A. Cole & L. J. Fu, 2010, Political connections and minority- shareholder protection: Evidence from securities-market regulation in China, Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, 45: 1391–417; S. r. Miller, D. Li, E. Eden & M. A. Hitt, 2008, Insider trading and the valuation of international strategic alliances in emerging stock markets, Journal of International Business Studies, 39: 102–17.

134. J. Chi, Q. Sun & M. Young, 2011, Performance and characteristics of acquiring firms in the Chinese stock

markets, Emerging Markets Review, 12: 152– 70; Y.-L. Cheung, P. Jiang, P. Limpaphayom & T. Lu, 2010, Corporate governance in China: A step forward, European Financial Management, 16: 94–123; H. Zou & M. B. Adams, 2008, Corporate ownership, equity risk and returns in the People’s republic of China, Journal of International Business Studies, 39: 1149–68.

135. S. Globerman, M. W. Peng & D. M. Shapiro, 2011, Corporate governance and Asian companies, Asia Pacific Journal of Management, 28: 1–14; Y. Su, D. Xu & P. H. Phan, 2008, Principal–principal conflict in the governance of the Chinese public corporation, Management and Organization Review, 4: 17–38.

136. X. Du, W. Jian & S. Lai, 2017, Do foreign directors mitigate earnings management?, Evidence from China, International Journal of Accounting, 52: 142–77; H. Berkman, r. A. Cole & L. J. Fu, 2014, Improving corporate governance where the state is the controlling block holder: Evidence from China, European Journal of Finance, 20: 752–77.

137. E. A. Uribarri, F. Marin de la Barcena, Gomez-Acebo & Pombo Abogados, 2020, Corporate governance and directors’ duties in Spain: Overview, Thomson reuters Practical Law, https://uk.practicallaw. thomsonreuters.com, June.

138. S. Muthusamy, P. A. Bobinski & D. Jawahar, 2011, Toward a strategic role for employees in corporate governance, Strategic Change, 20: 127–38; T. Tse, 2011, Shareholder and stakeholder theory: After the financial crisis, Qualitative Research in Financial Markets, 3(1): 51–63; C. Shropshire & A. J. Hillman, 2007, A longitudinal study of significant change in stakeholder management, Business & Society, 46(1): 63–87.

139. r. A. G. Monks & N. Minow, 2011, Corporate Governance, 5th edn, New York: John Wiley & Sons.

140. S. P. Deshpande, J. Joseph & X. Shu, 2011, Ethical climate and managerial success in China, Journal of Business Ethics, 99: 527–34; D. L. Gold & J. W. Dienhart, 2007, Business ethics in the corporate governance era: Domestic and international trends in transparency, regulation, and corporate governance, Business and Society Review, 112: 163–70.

141. A. P. Cowan & J. J. Marcel, 2011, Damaged goods: Board decisions to dismiss

reputationally compromised directors, Academy of Management Journal, 54: 509–27; J. r. Knapp, T. Dalziel & M. W. Lewis, 2011, Governing top managers: Board control, social categorization, and their unintended influence on discretionary behaviors, Corporate Governance: An International Review, 19: 295–310; r. V. Aguilera, D. E. rupp, C. A. Williams & J. Ganapathi, 2007, Putting the S back in corporate social responsibility: A multilevel theory of social change in organizations, Academy of Management Review, 32: 836–63.

142. World Finance, 2019, Corporate governance awards 2019, http://www. worldfinance.com/awards, 25 November.

143. J. Psaros, 2009, Australian Corporate Governance: A Review and Analysis of Key Issues, Frenchs Forest, NSW: Pearson Education.

144. Ibid. 145. P. Linden & Z. Matolcsy, 2004, Corporate

governance scoring systems: What do they tell us? Australian Accounting Review, 14(32): 9–16, https://doi. org/10.1111/j.1835-2561.2004.tb00278.x.

146. Baker & McKenzie, 2007, Corporate responsibility: A guide for Australian directors. Sydney: Baker & McKenzie; KPMG, 2005, KPMG international survey of corporate responsibility reporting. University of Amsterdam & KPMG Global Sustainability Services, http://www.theiafm. org/publications/243_International_Survey_ Corporate_responsibility_2005.pdf39; KPMG, 2006, Carbon disclosure project report 2006 Australia & New Zealand, in conjunction with the Investor Group on Climate Change Australia/New Zealand, https://www.yumpu.com/en/document/ view/6861793/carbon-disclosure-project- report-2006-australia-new-zealand.

147. K. Backhouse & M. Wickham, 2017, Exploring the link between corporate governance and innovative capacity in the Australian superannuation industry, Corporate Ownership & Control, 14(4): 32–40, http://dx.doi.org/10.22495/ cocv14i4art3.

148. D. Chau, M. Janda & Staff, 2020, rio Tinto boss Jean-Sebastien Jacques quits over Juukan Gorge blast, ABC News, https:// www.abc.net.au/news/2020-09-11/ rio-tinto-boss-jean-sebastien-jacques- quits-over-juukan-blast/12653950, 11 September.

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CH AP

TE R Studying this chapter should provide you with the strategic management knowledge needed to:LO1 define organisational structure and controls and discuss the difference between

strategic and financial controls LO2 describe the relationship between strategy and structure LO3 discuss the functional structures used to implement business-level strategies LO4 explain the use of three versions of the multi-divisional (M-form) structure to

implement different diversification strategies LO5 discuss the organisational structures used to implement three international

strategies LO6 define strategic networks and discuss how strategic centre organisations

implement such networks at the business, corporate and international levels.

Learning Objectives

Organisational structure and controls 11

CH AP

TE R

321

Chris Kempczinski, CEO of McDonald’s

Source: Getty Images/Bloomberg

McDonald’s is a huge fast-food restaurant chain – several times larger than Burger King and Wendy’s, its closest competitors. In addition to the USA and Canada, McDonald’s is present in over 100 countries worldwide. However, Steve Easterbrook, the former CEO, appointed in 2015, worked to adjust the organisation’s strategy and structure. The strategic direction continued to remain sustainable under the leadership of Chris Kempczinski, who was appointed in 2019. As outlined in the ‘Opening case’ in Chapter 2, the external and competitive environments of McDonald’s are turbulent. Its established competitors are fierce and others are entering the market; for example, International House of Pancakes (IHOP) placed an advertisement suggesting it may change its name to IHOb, International House of Burgers, signalling that it is now competing with McDonald’s and others. This is probably due to McDonald’s and others offering their breakfast menu items any time during the day. Chapter 4 also indicated that McDonald’s is pursuing a low-cost strategy to deal with its competitive environment. To improve its performance, McDonald’s needs structures and controls that match the strategy it is seeking to implement. At the same time, McDonald’s is largely financed by franchisees who purchase a franchise contract to manage one or many locations worldwide. (Franchising is an alliance strategy that was outlined in Chapter 9.) The effectiveness of this alliance strategy is dependent on how well the franchisor can replicate its success across multiple partners in a cost-effective way.

This is especially important to the low-cost strategy McDonald’s employs, where it is desirable for customers to have a similar experience at any of its locations. The organisation is reducing the number of layers between the CEO and the franchisee from eight to six, especially in the regional structure. There will be a number of unspecified layoffs to reduce costly bureaucracy. The remaining regional and corporate staff will ‘spend more time helping operators figure out ways to boost restaurant profitability rather than just grading restaurants on such things as cleanliness, customer

service and order accuracy’. As noted above, the focus of the controls has largely been on enforcing replicability across franchisees. The company is now fine-tuning its corporate controls to focus on supply chain and process innovation at the franchisee level, giving more support to franchisees rather than penalising them for not meeting exact specifications.

For example, ‘McDonald’s assembled a panel of sensory experts consisting of suppliers, chefs and employees to compare rivals’ burgers against theirs. They discovered that McDonald’s burgers just weren’t hot and fresh enough’. So, they adjusted ‘the supply chain and distribution system to handle fresh – rather than frozen – hamburger patties’ and ‘McDonald’s also altered its grilling methods, began toasting its buns longer and changed its preparation procedures so that burgers would be cooked upon request rather than held in warming cabinets’.

For a number of years, McDonald’s was structured around geographic segments including the USA, Europe, Asia-Pacific, the Middle East and Africa (APMEA). Easterbrook wants to strip away the bureaucracy at McDonald’s so the organisation can anticipate trends as a foundation for moving nimbly, and fully understand and appropriately respond to customers’ interests. Additionally, Easterbrook specified that the new structure

Changing McDonald’s organisational structure and controls: a path to improved performance

OPENING CASE STUDY

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should be built on ‘commercial logic’ rather than simply geography.

McDonald’s has implemented this new organisational structure as part of its effort to increase revenues and profitability and improve its stock value. Corporate officials are confident the new structure will enable individual segments to identify and successfully address what are common needs of their markets and customers, and that those operating units within each segment will have the flexibility they need to innovate in ways that will create value for customers and, in turn, for the entire corporation.

As the new structure and controls reduce costs and increase effectiveness, McDonald’s is using some of these cost savings to implement a digital transition to online ordering and in-store kiosks. Thus, not only are the structure

and control more simplified and effective, but technology is speeding up and improving the customer experience.

Sources: H. Detrick, 2018, McDonald’s new Chicago headquarters is officially open. Why it moved back to the city after 47 years, Fortune, http://www.fortune.com, 5 June; L. Grossman, 2018, Wendy’s got all

savage on McDonald’s with the perfect meme, Time, http://www.time. com, 9 May; J. Jargon, 2018, McDonald’s shares details of restructuring

plan in new memo, Wall Street Journal, http://www.wsj.com, 12 June; L. Patton, 2018, McDonald’s high-tech makeover is stressing workers

out, Bloomberg, http://www.bloomberg.com, 13 March; B. Peters, 2018, McDonald’s plans more corporate job cuts amid tech push: Report,

Investor’s Business Daily, http://www.investor.com, 7 June; J. Sperling, 2018, McDonald’s plans to eliminate a number of corporate jobs as part of reorganization plan, Fortune, http://www.fortune.com, 7 June; C. Choi, 2015, McDonald’s to simplify structure, focus on customers, Spokesman,

http://www.spokesman.com, 5 May; R. Neate, 2015, McDonald’s plans huge shakeup as CEO admits: ‘Our performance has been poor’, The

Guardian, http://www.theguardian.com, 4 May.

As we explained in Chapter 4, all organisations use one or more business-level strategies. In Chapters 6–9, we discussed other strategies organisations may choose to use (corporate-level, international and cooperative). After they are selected, strategies must be implemented effectively to make them work. Organisational structure and controls, which are this chapter’s topic, provide the framework within which strategies are implemented and used in both for-profit organisations and not-for-profit agencies.1 However, as we explain, separate structures and controls are required to successfully implement different strategies. In all organisations, executive managers have the final responsibility for ensuring that the organisation has matched each of its strategies with the appropriate organisational structure and that both change when necessary. The former CEO of McDonald’s, Steve Easterbrook, was responsible for changing its organisational structure to effectively implement its business- or corporate-level strategy. The match or degree of fit between strategy and structure influences the organisation’s attempts to earn above-average returns.2 The ability to select an appropriate strategy and match it with the appropriate structure is an important characteristic of effective strategic leadership.3

This chapter opens with an introduction to organisational structure and controls. We then provide more details about the need for the organisation’s strategy and structure to be properly matched. Affecting organisations’ efforts to match strategy and structure is their influence on each other.4 As we discuss, strategy has a more important influence on structure, although once in place, structure influences strategy.5 Next, we describe the relationship between growth and structural change that successful organisations experience. We then discuss the different organisational structures organisations use to implement separate business-level, corporate-level, international and cooperative strategies. A series of figures highlights the different structures organisations match with strategies. Across time and based on their experiences, organisations – especially large and complex ones – customise these general structures to meet their unique needs.6 Typically, the organisation tries to form a structure that is complex enough to facilitate use of its strategies, but simple enough for all parties to understand and implement.7 When strategies become more diversified, an organisation must adjust its structure to deal with the increased complexity.

Organisational structure and controls Research shows that organisational structure and the controls that are a part of the structure affect organisation performance.8 In particular, evidence suggests that performance declines when the organisation’s strategy is not matched with the most appropriate structure and controls.9 Even though mismatches between strategy and structure do occur, research indicates that managers try to act rationally

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when forming or changing their organisation’s structure.10 This chapter’s opening case highlights challenges McDonald’s has encountered when trying to deal with rapid changes that are occurring in the external environment. As noted, the organisation is changing its controls and processes to better meet the competition, and changes have been made to the organisational structure with the expectation that these will lead to enhanced organisational performance. Defined comprehensively below, organisational structure essentially specifies the functions that must be completed so the organisation can implement its strategy. The leadership at McDonald’s believes that changes being made to the organisation’s structure will increase its efficiency (i.e. its daily operations will improve) and its effectiveness (i.e. it will better serve customers’ needs).

Organisational structure Organisational structure specifies the organisation’s formal reporting relationships, procedures, controls, and authority and decision-making processes.11 Developing an organisational structure that effectively supports the organisation’s strategy is difficult, especially because of the uncertainty (or unpredictable variation)12 about cause–effect relationships in the global economy’s rapidly changing and dynamic competitive environments.13 When a structure’s elements (e.g. reporting relationships and procedures) are properly aligned with one another, the structure facilitates effective use of the organisation’s strategies.14 Thus, organisational structure is a critical component of effective strategy implementation processes.15

An organisation’s structure specifies the work to be done and how to do it, given the organisation’s strategies. Thus, organisational structure influences how managers work and the decisions resulting from that work. Supporting the implementation of strategies, structure is concerned with processes used to complete organisational tasks.16 Having the right structure and process is important. For example, many product-oriented organisations have been moving to develop service businesses associated with those products. However, research suggests that developing a separate division for such services in product- oriented companies, rather than managing the service business within the product divisions, leads to additional growth and profitability in the service business.

Effective structures provide the stability an organisation needs to successfully implement its strategies and maintain its current competitive advantages while simultaneously providing the flexibility to develop advantages it will need in the future.17 Structural stability provides the capacity the organisation requires to consistently and predictably manage its daily work routines,18 while structural flexibility provides the opportunity to explore competitive possibilities and then allocate resources to activities that will shape the competitive advantages the organisation will need for it to be successful in the future.19 An effectively flexible organisational structure allows the organisation to exploit current competitive advantages while developing new ones that can potentially be used in the future.20 Alternatively, an ineffective structure that is inflexible may drive good employees away because of frustration and an inability to complete their work in the best way possible. As such, it can lead to a loss of knowledge for the organisation, sometimes referred to as a knowledge spillover, which benefits competitors.21

Modifications to the organisation’s current strategy or selection of a new strategy call for changes to its organisational structure. However, research shows that, once in place, organisational inertia often inhibits efforts to change structure, even when the organisation’s performance suggests that it is time to do so.22 In his pioneering work, Alfred Chandler found that organisations change their structures when inefficiencies force them to do so.23 Chandler’s contributions to our understanding of organisational structure and its relationship to strategies and performance are quite significant. Indeed, some believe that Chandler’s emphasis on ‘organisational structure so transformed the field of business history that some call the period before Chandler’s work was published “B.C.”, meaning “before Chandler”’.24

Organisations seem to prefer the structural status quo and its familiar working relationships until the organisation’s performance declines to the point where change is absolutely necessary.25 For example,

organisational structure specifies the organisation’s formal reporting relationships, procedures, controls, and authority and decision-making processes

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necessity was clearly the case for General Motors given that it went into bankruptcy a decade ago to force a required restructuring.26 Leading Australian icon brands on the brink of collapse include Seafolly, which appointed a voluntary administrator due to the crippling impact of the Covid-19 pandemic on its business. The administrators continued to trade the business due to the quality of the brand and its strong reputation. Aussie Disposals also went into administration in 2020, citing the pandemic as the contributing factor.27 Unfortunately, it was too late for fashion label Tigerlily, which foreclosed in early 2020.28

Executive managers often hesitate to conclude that the organisation’s structure (or its strategy) is the problem, because doing so suggests that their previous choices were not the best ones. Because of these inertial tendencies, structural change is often induced by actions from stakeholders (e.g. those from the capital market and customers; see Chapter 2) who are no longer willing to tolerate the organisation’s performance. This happened at Bellamy’s, for example. Evidence shows that appropriate timing of str uctural change happens when executive managers recognise that a cur rent organisational str ucture no longer provides the coordination and direction needed for the organisation to successfully implement its strategies.29 Interestingly, many organisational changes take place in an economic downturn, as has occurred during the Covid-19 pandemic, apparently because poor performance reveals organisational weaknesses. As we discuss next, effective organisational controls help managers recognise when it is time to adjust the organisation’s structure.

Organisational controls Organisational controls are an important aspect of structure.30 Organisational controls guide the use of strategy, indicate how to compare actual results with expected results, and suggest corrective actions to take when the difference is unacceptable. When fewer differences separate actual from expected outcomes, the organisation’s controls are more effective.31 It is difficult for the company to successfully exploit its competitive advantages without effective organisational controls.32 Properly desig ned orga n isat iona l controls provide clear insights regarding behaviours that enhance organisation performance.3 3 Organisations employ both strategic controls and financial controls to support the implementation and use of their strategies.

Strategic controls are largely subjective criteria intended to verify that the orga n isat ion is usi ng appropriate strategies for the conditions in the external environment and the company’s competitive advantages. Thus, strategic controls are concerned with examining the fit between what the organisation might do (as suggested by opportunities in its external environment) and what it can do (as indicated by its competitive advantages). Effective strategic controls help the organisation understand what it takes to be successful.34 Strategic controls demand rich communications between managers responsible for using them to judge the organisation’s performance and those with primary responsibility for implementing the organisation’s strategies (such as middle and first-level managers). These frequent exchanges are both formal and informal in nature.35

St rateg ic cont rols a re a lso used to eva luate t he deg ree to wh ich t he orga n isat ion focuses on t he requirements to implement its strategies. For a business-level strategy, for example, the strategic controls are used to study primary and support activities to verify that the critical activities are being emphasised and properly executed. Nokia failed to employ effective strategic controls, leading to a fight for survival that was further exacerbated as it struggled to keep pace with its Chinese competitors Huawei and ZTE. The evolution of the current trade war also made it difficult for Nokia to win Chinese contracts, causing its sales in China to decrease by 15 per cent in 2020.36

With related corporate-level strategies, strategic controls are used by corporate strategic leaders to verify the sharing of appropriate strategic factors such as knowledge, markets and technologies across businesses. To effectively use strategic controls when evaluating related diversification strategies, headquarter executives must have a deep understanding of each unit’s business-level strategy.37

organisational controls guide the use of strategy, indicate how to compare actual results with expected results and suggest corrective actions to take when the difference between actual and expected results is unacceptable

strategic controls largely subjective criteria intended to verify that the organisation is using appropriate strategies for the conditions in the external environment and the company’s competitive advantages

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Financial controls are largely objective criteria used to measure the organisation’s performance against previously established quantitative standards. Accounting-based measures such as return on investment (ROI) and return on assets (ROA), as well as market-based measures such as economic value added, are examples of financial controls. Partly because strategic controls are difficult to use with extensive diversification,38 financial controls are emphasised to evaluate the performance of the organisation using the unrelated diversification strategy. The unrelated diversification strategy’s focus on financial outcomes (see Chapter 6) requires using standardised financial controls to compare performances between business units and associated managers.39

When using financial controls, organisations evaluate their current performance against previous outcomes, as well as against competitors’ performance and industry averages. In the global economy, technological advances are being used to develop highly sophisticated financial controls, making it possible for organisations to more thoroughly analyse their performance results, and to assure compliance with regulations.

Both strategic and financial controls are important aspects of each organisational structure and, as we noted previously, any structure’s effectiveness is determined by using a combination of strategic and financial controls. However, the relative use of controls varies by type of strategy. For example, companies and business units of large diversified organisations using the cost leadership strategy emphasise financial controls (such as quantitative cost goals), while companies and business units using the differentiation strategy emphasise strategic controls (such as subjective measures of the effectiveness of product development teams).40 As previously explained, a corporation-wide emphasis on sharing among business units (as called for by related diversification strategies) results in an emphasis on strategic controls, while financial controls are emphasised for strategies in which activities or capabilities are not shared (e.g. in an unrelated diversification strategy).

As organisations consider controls, the important point is to properly balance the use of strategic and financial controls. Indeed, over-emphasising one at the expense of the other can lead to performance declines. According to Michael Dell, an overemphasis on financial controls to produce attractive short-term results contributed to performance difficulties at Dell Inc. In addressing this issue, Dell said the following: ‘The company was too focused on the short term, and the balance of priorities was way too leaning towards things that deliver short-term results’.41 Executives at Dell have now achieved a more appropriate emphasis on the long term as well as the short term due to a re-emphasis on strategic controls, continuing the organisation’s focus on recapturing market share and leadership in the personal computer (PC) market.

Relationships between strategy and structure Strategy and structure have a reciprocal relationship.42 This relationship highlights the interconnectedness between strategy formulation (Chapters 4 and 6–9) and strategy implementation (Chapters 10–13). In general, this reciprocal relationship finds structure flowing from or following selection of the organisation’s strategy. Once in place, though, structure can influence current strategic actions as well as choices about future strategies. The new structure being adopted at McDonald’s has the potential to influence implementation of strategies that are better aimed at identifying and satisfying customers’ changing needs. The general nature of the strategy–structure relationship means that changes to the organisation’s strategy create the need to change how the organisation completes its work.

Alternatively, because structure likely influences strategy by constraining the potential alternatives considered, organisations must be vigilant in their efforts to verify how their structure not only affects implementation of the chosen strategies, but also the limits the structure places on future strategies to be

financial controls largely objective criteria used to measure the organisation’s performance against previously established quantitative standards

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As shown in Figure 11.1, sales growth creates coordination and control problems that the existing organisational structure cannot efficiently handle. Organisational growth creates the opportunity for the organisation to change its strategy to try to become even more successful. However, the existing structure’s formal reporting relationships, procedures, controls, and authority and decision-making processes lack the sophistication required to support using the new strategy.47 A new structure is needed to help decision makers gain access to the knowledge and understanding required to effectively integrate and coordinate actions to implement the new strategy.48

considered. Research shows, however, that ‘strategy has a much more important influence on structure than the reverse’.43

Regardless of the strength of the reciprocal relationships between strategy and structure, those choosing the organisation’s strategy and structure should be committed to matching each strategy with a structure that provides the stability needed to use current competitive advantages, as well as the flexibility required to develop future advantages. Therefore, when changing strategies, the organisation should simultaneously consider the structure that will be needed to support use of the new strategy; properly matching strategy and structure can create a competitive advantage.44

Evolutionary patterns of strategy and organisational structure Research suggests that most organisations experience a certain pattern of relationships between strategy and structure. Chandler45 found that organisations tend to grow in somewhat predictable patterns: ‘first by volume, then by geography, then integration (vertical, horizontal), and finally through product/business diversification’46 (see Figure 11.1). Chandler interpreted his findings as an indication that an organisation’s growth patterns determine its structural form.

Simple structure

Efficient implementation of formulated strategy

Efficient implementation of formulated strategy

Multi-divisional structure

Sales growth – coordination and control problems

Sales growth – coordination and control problems

Functional structure

Figure 11.1 Strategy and structure growth pattern

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Organisations choose from among three major types of organisational structures – simple, functional and multi-divisional – to implement strategies. Across time, successful organisations move from the simple to the functional to the multi-divisional structure to support changes in their growth strategies.49

Simple structure The simple structure is a structure in which the owner-manager makes all major decisions and monitors all activities, while the staff serves as an extension of the manager’s supervisory authority.50 Typically, the owner-manager actively works in the business on a daily basis. Informal relationships, few rules, limited task specialisation and unsophisticated information systems characterise this structure. Frequent and informal communications between the owner-manager and employees make coordinating the work to be done relatively easy. The simple structure is matched with focus strategies and business-level strategies, as organisations implementing these strategies commonly compete by offering a single product line in a single geographic market. Local restaurants, repair businesses and other specialised enterprises are examples of organisations using the simple structure.

As the small organisation grows larger and becomes more complex, managerial and structural challenges emerge. For example, the amount of competitively relevant information requiring analysis substantially increases, placing significant pressure on the owner-manager. Additional growth and success may cause the organisation to change its strategy. Even if the strategy remains the same, the organisation’s larger size dictates the need for more sophisticated workflows and integrating mechanisms. At this evolutionary point, organisations tend to move from the simple structure to a functional organisational structure.51

Functional structure The functional structure consists of a chief executive officer (CEO) and a limited corporate staff, with functional line managers in dominant organisational areas, such as production, accounting, marketing, R&D, engineering and human resources.52 This structure allows for functional specialisation,53 thereby facilitating active sharing of knowledge within each functional area. Knowledge sharing facilitates career paths as well as professional development of functional specialists. However, a functional orientation can negatively affect communication and coordination among those representing different organisational functions. For this reason, the CEO must verify that the decisions and actions of individual business functions promote the entire organisation rather than a single function. The functional structure supports implementing business-level strategies and some corporate-level strategies (e.g. single or dominant business) with low levels of diversification. When changing from a simple to a functional structure, organisations should avoid introducing value-destroying bureaucratic procedures such as failing to promote innovation and creativity.54

Multi-divisional structure With continuing growth and success, organisations often consider greater levels of diversification. Successfully using a diversification strategy requires analysing substantially greater amounts of data and information when the organisation offers the same products in different markets (market or geographic diversification) or offers different products in several markets (product diversification). In addition, trying to manage high levels of diversification through functional structures creates serious coordination and control problems,55 a fact that commonly leads to a new structural form.56

The multi-divisional (M-form) structure consists of a corporate office and operating divisions, with each operating division representing a separate business or profit centre in which the top corporate officer delegates responsibilities for day-to-day operations and business-unit strategy to division managers. Each division represents a distinct, self-contained business with its own functional hierarchy.57 As initially designed, the M-form was thought to have three major benefits: ‘(1) it enabled corporate officers to more accurately monitor the performance of each business, which simplified the problem of control; (2) it

simple structure a structure in which the owner-manager makes all major decisions and monitors all activities while the staff serves as an extension of the manager’s supervisory authority

functional structure consists of a chief executive officer and a limited corporate staff, with functional line managers in dominant organisational areas, such as production, accounting, marketing, research and development, engineering and human resources

multi-divisional (M-form) structure consists of operating divisions, each representing a separate business or profit centre in which the top corporate officer delegates responsibilities for day-to-day operations and business-unit strategy to division managers

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facilitated comparisons between divisions, which improved the resource allocation process; and (3) it stimulated managers of poorly performing divisions to look for ways of improving performance’.58 Active monitoring of performance through the M-form increases the likelihood that decisions made by managers heading individual units will be in stakeholders’ best interests. Because diversification is a dominant corporate-level strategy used in the global economy, the M-form is a widely adopted organisational structure.59

Used to support implementation of related and unrelated diversification strategies, the M-form assists organisations to successfully manage diversification’s many demands.60 Chandler viewed the M-form as an innovative response to coordination and control problems that surfaced during the 1920s in the functional structures then used by large organisations such as DuPont and General Motors. A more contemporary example is the Virgin Australia Group – the parent company of Virgin Australia domestic, Tiger Airlines (which in March 2020 had suspended operations due to the impact of the Covid-19 pandemic) and Velocity. The new organisational structure integrates the corporate, operational and commercial functions of Virgin Australia Airlines.61 Research shows that the M-form is appropriate when the organisation grows through diversification.62 Partly because of its value to diversified corporations, some consider the multi-divisional structure to be one of the 20th century’s most significant organisational innovations.63

No one organisational structure (simple, functional or multi-divisional) is inherently superior to the others.64 Peter Drucker says the following about this matter: ‘There is no one right organisation … Rather the task … is to select the organisation for the particular task and mission at hand’.65 This statement suggests that the organisation must select a structure that is ‘right’ for successfully using the chosen strategy. Because no single structure is optimal in all instances, managers concentrate on developing proper matches between strategies and organisational structures rather than searching for an ‘optimal’ structure. We now describe the strategy–structure matches that evidence shows positively contribute to organisation performance.

Matches between business-level strategies and the functional structure Organisations use different forms of the functional organisational structure to support implementing the cost leadership, differentiation and integrated cost leadership/differentiation strategies. The differences in these forms are accounted for primarily by different uses of three important structural characteristics: specialisation (concerned with the type and number of jobs required to complete work),66 centralisation (the degree to which decision-making authority is retained at higher managerial levels)67 and formalisation (the degree to which formal rules and procedures govern work).68

Using the functional structure to implement the cost leadership strategy Organisations using the cost leadership strategy sell large quantities of standardised products to an industry’s typical customers, such as McDonald’s, Target and Kmart. Organisations using this strategy need a structure and capabilities that allow them to achieve efficiencies and produce their goods at costs lower than those of competitors.69 Simple reporting relationships, few layers in the decision-making and authority structure, a centralised corporate staff and a strong focus on process improvements through the manufacturing function rather than the development of new products by emphasising product R&D help to achieve the efficiencies and thus characterise the cost leadership form of the functional structure70 (see Figure 11.2). This structure contributes to the emergence of a low-cost culture – a culture in which employees constantly try to find ways to reduce the costs incurred to complete their work.71 They can do this through the development of a product architecture that is simple and easy to manufacture, as well as through the development of efficient processes to produce the goods.72

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Chief executive officer

Centralised staff

Engineering Marketing Operations Personnel Accounting

M ay

b e

a re

la ti

ve ly

fl at

o r

ta ll

st ru

ct u

re

Notes: • Operations is the main function. • Process engineering is emphasised, rather than new product R&D. • A relatively large centralised staff coordinates functions. • Formalised procedures allow for emergence of a low-cost culture. • The overall structure is mechanical; job roles are highly structured.

In terms of centralisation, decision-making authority is centralised in a staff function to maintain a cost-reducing emphasis within each organisational function (engineering, marketing, etc.). While encouraging continuous cost reductions, the centralised staff also verifies that further cuts in costs in one function will not adversely affect the productivity levels in other functions.73

Jobs are highly specialised in the cost leadership functional structure; work is divided into homogeneous subgroups. Organisational functions are the most common subgroup, although work is sometimes batched on the basis of products produced or clients served. Specialising in their work allows employees to increase their efficiency, resulting in reduced costs. Guiding individuals’ work in this structure are highly formalised rules and procedures, which often emanate from the centralised staff.

Woolworths Group Ltd uses the functional structure to implement cost leadership strategies in each of its core businesses (Woolworths supermarkets, Woolworths Insurance, Countdown (NZ) and Endeavour Group Ltd comprising Dan Murphy’s, BWS, Cellarmasters, Langton’s and ALH Group). In the Woolworths Group segment, the cost leadership strategy is used in the organisation’s retailing formats.74 The stated purpose of Woolworths Group from the beginning has been: ‘we create better experiences together for a better tomorrow’. 75 It continues using the functional organisational structure in its divisions to drive costs lower. Woolworths Group manages some of Australia’s most recognised and trusted brands. JB Hi-Fi also aims for a match of strategy and structure, as do many other low-cost organisations in the world; the problem is achieving it and maintaining a sustainable competitive advantage, but this appears to have been successful for JB Hi-Fi during the Covid-19 pandemic, when its share price more than doubled between late March and the end of August 2020.76

Using the functional structure to implement the differentiation strategy Organisations using the differentiation strategy produce products that customers hopefully perceive as being different in ways that create value for them. With this strategy, the organisation wants to sell

Functional structure for implementing a cost leadership strategyFigure 11.2

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Continuous product innovation demands that people throughout the organisation inter pret and take action based on information that is often ambiguous, risky, incomplete and uncertain. Following a strong focus on the external environment to identify new opportunities, employees often gather this information from people external to the organisation (e.g. customers and suppliers). Commonly, rapid responses to the possibilities indicated by the collected information are necessary, suggesting the need for decentralised decision-making responsibility and authority. It also requires building a strong technological capability and strategic flexibility, which allow the organisation to take advantage of opportunities created by changes in the market.78 To support the creativity needed and the continuous pursuit of new sources of differentiation and new products, jobs in this structure are not highly specialised. This lack of specialisation means that workers have a relatively large number of tasks in their job descriptions. Few formal rules and procedures also characterise this structure. Low formalisation, decentralisation of decision-making authority and responsibility, and low specialisation of work tasks combine to create a structure in which people interact frequently to exchange ideas about how to further differentiate current products while developing ideas for new products that can be crisply differentiated.

Using the functional structure to implement the integrated cost leadership/differentiation strategy Organisations using the integrated cost leadership/differentiation strategy sell products that create value because of their relatively low cost and reasonable sources of differentiation. The cost of these products

non-standardised products to customers with unique needs. Relatively complex and flexible reporting relationships, frequent use of cross-functional product development teams and a strong focus on marketing and product R&D rather than manufacturing and process R&D (as with the cost leadership form of the functional structure) characterise the differentiation form of the functional structure (see Figure 11.3). From this structure emerges a development-oriented culture in which employees try to find ways to further differentiate current products and to develop new, highly differentiated products.77

Functional structure for implementing a differentiation strategy

Chief executive officer and limited staff

New product R&D

Operations

R&D

Marketing Human resources

Marketing

Finance

Notes: • Marketing is the main function for keeping track of new product ideas. • New product R&D is emphasised. • Most functions are decentralised; however, R&D and marketing may have centralised staffs that work closely with each other. • Formalisation is limited so that new product ideas can emerge easily and change is more readily accomplished. • The overall structure is organic; job roles are less structured.

Figure 11.3

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is low ‘relative’ to the cost leader’s prices, while their differentiation is ‘reasonable’ when compared with the clearly unique features of the differentiator’s products.

Although challenging to implement, the integrated cost leadership/differentiation strategy is used frequently in the global economy by organisations such as IKEA. The challenge of using this strategy is due largely to the fact that different primary and support activities (see Chapter 3) are emphasised when using the cost leadership and differentiation strategies. To achieve the cost leadership position, production and process engineering need to be emphasised, with infrequent product changes. To achieve a differentiated position, marketing and new product R&D need to be emphasised, while production and process engineering are not. Thus, effective use of the integrated strategy depends on the organisation’s successful combination of activities intended to reduce costs with activities intended to create additional differentiation features. As a result, the integrated form of the functional structure must have decision-making patterns that are partially centralised and partially decentralised. Additionally, jobs are semi-specialised, and rules and procedures call for some formal and some informal job behaviour. All of this requires a measure of flexibility to emphasise one or the other set of functions at any given time.

Matches between corporate-level strategies and the multi-divisional structure As explained earlier, Chandler’s research shows that the organisation’s continuing success leads to product or market diversification or both.79 The organisation’s level of diversification is a function of decisions about the number and type of businesses in which it will compete as well as how it will manage the businesses (see Chapter 6). Geared to managing individual organisational functions, increasing diversification eventually creates information processing, coordination and control problems that the functional structure cannot handle. Thus, using a diversification strategy requires the organisation to change from the functional structure to the multi-divisional structure to develop an appropriate strategy–structure match.

As defined in Figure 6.1, corporate-level strategies have different degrees of product and market diversification. The demands created by different levels of diversification highlight the need for a unique organisational structure to effectively implement each strategy (see Figure 11.4).

The computer company Cisco must use a differentiation strategy in order to compete in its several high- technology product market segments. However, given the presence of major competitors in those markets, such as Hewlett-Packard (HP) and Huawei, and its loss of market share in its core market of routers, Cisco must also be sensitive to costs. Thus, the horizontal structure can be useful to integrate the two disparate dimensions of structure needed to implement Cisco’s integrated cost leadership/differentiation strategy. In addition, Cisco needs to coordinate several related product units, and the horizontal structure should facilitate this cooperation. Therefore, Cisco’s approach is similar to the cooperative M-form structure, discussed next.

STRATEGY NOW

Constellation Brands

Three variations of the multi-divisional structure

Multi-divisional structure (M-form)

Strategic business unit

(SBU) form Competitive formCooperative form

Figure 11.4

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Globalisation and beer

In 2005, the global beer industry was highly fragmented, with Anheuser-Busch’s (AB) 8.5 per cent market share enough to make it the global leader. Since then, a steady process of consolidation via mergers and acquisition has taken place. Much of this was around cost-cutting opportunities, including the US$60 billion merger of AB and InBev, completed in 2008. Also, there were moves geared towards acquiring attractive emerging market assets in Asia; for example, Heineken’s US$24 billion acquisition of Asia Pacific Breweries, completed in 2012. In late 2014, AB InBev had an estimated 21 per cent global market share. Today’s top five companies represent more than 50 per cent of the global market (versus 32 per cent for the top five players in 2003).

Consolidation means it is hard to know who owns a beer brand; Coopers is the only major independent beer producer in Australia, and major brands dominate all over the Asia-Pacific region. To demonstrate how hard it is to know what goes on, take Little Creatures as an example. It is a craft beer out of Fremantle in Western Australia. And it is a subsidiary of Little World, which is a subsidiary of Lion Nathan, itself a subsidiary of Kirin, the Japanese brewer, which is part of the Mitsubishi group! Complex ownership patterns such as this and changes in strategy also require changes in organisation structure, as the case of Constellation Brands in the USA demonstrates.

In 2013, Constellation Brands Inc. became the third- largest beer producer in the USA behind AB InBev and MillerCoors. An opportunity appeared for Constellation through a merger between AB InBev and Mexico’s Grupo Modelo. The US Justice Department would not allow the merger to take place unless Grupo Modelo’s top import brand, Corona, was divested. This is the asset that Constellation acquired with the associated brewery over the Texas border in Mexico with distribution rights in the USA. Constellation had already signed a 50/50 joint venture with Modelo in 2007 to distribute the Mexican company’s beer in the USA. As such, Constellation got to continue its distribution rights but also became a producer with the acquisition of the large brewery. Through this acquisition, Constellation will control nearly 50 per cent of US beer imports. Even though beer distribution is shrinking relative to other

segments of overall alcohol sales, imported beers are a growing segment. In part, this is due to the growth of the Hispanic population in the USA.

Constellation started out as a small family wine producer in upstate New York. Through acquisitions, Constellation Brands has become the largest wine producer in the world. In particular, it has the largest share of premium wine distribution in the USA, the UK, Australia and Canada, and the second-largest in New Zealand. It also has a large set of brands in the spirits category. For instance, it owns Svedka Vodka and competes with Grey Goose, owned by Bacardi Limited, and Smirnoff, owned by Diageo. It also owns other spirit brands including Black Velvet Canadian Whisky and Paul Masson Grande Amber Brandy.

Because it has three different types of producing technologies in wine, spirits and beer, it must understand each of these processes and be able to have strategic control of these separate operations. Accordingly, the appropriate structure for these three types of operations requires the SBU (strategic business unit) structure such that the wine, spirits and beer operations are combined into three different business groups with divisional structures for each brand within the group. Being the producer of only wines to being a producer of spirits and beer as well, meant Constellation had to change its operating structure because it moved from being a related constrained diversifier to a related linked diversifier (mixed-related-unrelated). With this change, the better fit between strategy and structure would be the installation of the SBU structure and a move away from the cooperative structure. It may be possible to run the premium wine and spirits in the same group because they have similar distribution outlets. However, because there is not much production or operational relatedness in these business units, it may be better to keep them separate. Beer is both distributed differently (more of a consumer product) and produced differently than wine and spirits. Robert Sands, CEO of Constellation, acknowledges that ‘Constellation has a lot to learn about mixing barley and hops’, but he notes ‘the brewery is highly automated’. He also sees some cost benefits across the whole corporation in being able to strike cheaper procurement deals for ‘glass bottles, cardboard, and freight, three big input costs, and

Strategic focus | Globalisation

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improve its negotiation position with retailers by offering a full menu of alcohol’.

Constellation Brands has to change its structure due to its diversification strategy. This industry is highly competitive and has further competition from China. Interestingly, China has overtaken the USA as the largest beer economy. Increased globalisation has contributed to a convergence in alcohol consumption patterns across countries. China’s beer industry was booming until the Covid-19 pandemic, which closed down bars and restaurants and has significantly affected sales.

Sources: M. Smith, 2020, China’s beer brewers bitter at Australian barley tariff plan, Financial Review, 12 May; cbrands.com, 2020, Summary Annual

Report 2020; Wikipedia, 2015, List of Breweries in Australia, https:// en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_breweries_in_Australia; M. Boesler, 2014,

How the global beer industry has consolidated over the last 10 years, Business Insider Australia, http://www.businessinsider.com.au/global-

beer-industry-consolidation-2014-2; A. Collins, 2013, Strategic buyer AB InBev sells US rights and other Modelo brands to Constellation, Mergers

& Acquisitions Report, 25 February, 5; A. Deckert, 2013, Constellation Brands gears up for changes, Rochester Business Journal, 12 April, 3; M.

Esterl, 2013, New US brewing giant is crowned, Wall Street Journal, 7 June, B6; B. Kindle, 2013, Constellation wants legal role in beer merger

battle, Wall Street Journal, 11 February, B5.

A nother example of diversification is News Corporation, which in 2013 approved a split of its media businesses into many organisations. Over many years, it had acquired a number of businesses both in television and print. It had been organised into an SBU-type of organisation given its focus in different areas. In the split-up, the print media company is called News Corp and has newspaper assets including The Australian, the Wall Street Journal, New York Post and The Times of London. It also has the book publisher HarperCollins. The other business is called 21st Century Fox and includes the Fox broadcast and cable networks and 20th Century Fox studio, which produces film and television programs.80 The companies in New Corp’s global network in 2020 included News UK, Dow Jones, New York Post, HarperCollins Publishers, News America Marketing, Move, Storyful and News Corp Australia. News Corp Australia is a majority shareholder of merged entities Foxtel and FOX SPORTS Australia. News Corp Australia also has 100 per cent ownership of Australian News Channel Pty Ltd, which operates Sky News Australia, a 24 hour multi-channel, multi-platform news service. News Corp Australia’s other brands include The Australian, Daily Telegraph, Sunday Telegraph, Herald Sun, Herald Sun Sunday, Courier Mail, Sunday Mail, The Advertiser, NT News, Sunday Territorian, Mercury, REA Group, news.com.au, Taste, punters.com.au, Delicious and Sky News.

REA Group Limited is a subsidiary company of News Corp. It is a multinational digital advertising company specialising in property, and operates in the Australian residential, commercial and share property websites realestate.com.au, realcommercial.com.au and flatmates.com.au, Chinese property site myfun.com and iProperty Group, which owns a number of leading property portals in Asia. News Corp Australia also has 100 per cent ownership of punters.com.au and racenet.com.au providing specialised racing content and industry news. News Corp is an excellent example of a diversification strategy used globally.81

Using the cooperative form of the multi-divisional structure to implement the related constrained strategy The cooperative form is an M-form structure in which horizontal integration is used to bring about interdivisional cooperation. Divisions in an organisation using the related constrained diversification strategy commonly are formed around products, markets or both. In Figure 11.5, we use product divisions as part of the representation of the cooperative form of the multi-divisional structure, although market divisions could be used instead of, or in addition to, product divisions to develop the figure. Using this structure, formal coordination devices are used to achieve cooperation.8 2

STRATEGY NOW

Implications of News Corp’s restructuring

cooperative form a structure in which horizontal integration is used to bring about interdivisional cooperation

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The cooperative structure uses different characteristics of structure (centralisation, standardisation and formalisation) as integrating mechanisms to facilitate interdivisional cooperation. Frequent, direct contact between division managers, another integrating mechanism, encourages and supports cooperation and the sharing of knowledge, capabilities or other resources that could be used to create new advantages.84

Ultimately, a matrix organisation may evolve in organisations implementing the related constrained strategy. A matrix organisation is an organisational structure in which there is a dual structure combining both functional specialisation and business product or project specialisation.85 Although complicated, an effective matrix structure can lead to improved coordination among an organisation’s divisions.86

Cooperative form of the multi-divisional structure for implementing a related constrained strategy

Chief executive officer

Corporate R&D lab

Strategic planning

Government affairs

Corporate human resources

Corporate marketing

Legal affairs

Corporate finance

Product division

Headquarters office

Product division Product division Product division Product division

Notes: • Structural integration devices create tight links among all divisions. • Corporate office emphasises centralised strategic planning, human resources and marketing to foster cooperation between divisions. • R&D is likely to be centralised. • Rewards are subjective and tend to emphasise overall corporate performance, in addition to divisional performance. • The culture emphasises cooperative sharing.

Figure 11.5

Sharing divisional competencies facilitates the corporation’s efforts to develop economies of scope. As explained in Chapter 6, economies of scope (cost savings resulting from the sharing of competencies developed in one division with another division) are linked with successful use of the related constrained strategy. Interdivisional sharing of competencies depends on cooperation, suggesting the use of the cooperative form of the multi-divisional structure.83 News Corp’s new structure and processes were able to accomplish this.

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The success of the cooperative multi-divisional structure is significantly affected by how well divisions process information. However, because cooperation among divisions implies a loss of managerial autonomy, division managers may not readily commit themselves to the type of integrative information-processing activities that this structure demands. Moreover, coordination among divisions sometimes results in an unequal flow of positive outcomes to divisional managers. In other words, when managerial rewards are based at least in part on the performance of individual divisions, the manager of the division that is able to benefit the most by the sharing of corporate competencies might be viewed as receiving relative gains at others’ expense. Strategic controls are important in these instances, as divisional managers’ performance can be evaluated at least partly on the basis of how well they have facilitated interdivisional cooperative efforts. In addition, using reward systems that emphasise overall company performance, besides outcomes achieved by individual divisions, helps overcome problems associated with the cooperative form. Still, the costs of coordination and inertia in organisations limit the amount of related diversification attempted (i.e. they constrain the economies of scope that can be created).87

Using the strategic business unit form of the multi- divisional structure to implement the related linked strategy Organisations with fewer links or less constrained links among their divisions use the related-linked diversification strategy. The strategic business unit form of the multi-divisional structure supports implementation of this strategy. The strategic business unit (SBU) form is an M-form structure consisting of three levels: corporate headquarters, strategic business units (SBUs) and SBU divisions (see Figure 11.6). The SBU structure is used by large organisations and can be complex, given associated organisation size and product and market diversity.

The divisions within each SBU are related in terms of shared products or markets, or both, but the divisions of one SBU have little in common with the divisions of the other SBUs. Divisions within each SBU share product or market competencies to develop economies of scope and possibly economies of scale. The integrating mechanisms used by the divisions in this structure can be equally well used by the divisions within the individual strategic business units that are part of the SBU form of the multi-divisional structure. In this structure, each SBU is a profit centre that is controlled and evaluated by the headquarters office. Although both financial and strategic controls are important, on a relative basis financial controls are vital to headquarters’ evaluation of each SBU, while strategic controls are critical when the heads of SBUs evaluate their divisions’ performances. Strategic controls are also critical to the headquarters’ efforts to determine whether the company has formed an effective portfolio of businesses and whether those businesses are being successfully managed. Therefore, there is need for strategic structures that promote exploration to identify new products and markets, but also for actions that exploit the current product lines and markets.88

Wesfarmers operates an SBU system. It has a ‘Retail’ SBU that includes a number of very significant business units. Bunnings Warehouse (home improvement), Officeworks (office supplies), Kmart (variety) and Target (clothing) are included. Another SBU is even more varied; termed ‘Industrial and Other’ it includes insurance, resources, industrial and safety, part of a bank, a sawmill and the property trust that owns the Bunnings warehouses.89

Sharing competencies among units within an SBU is an important characteristic of the SBU form of the multi-divisional structure (see the ‘Notes’ to Figure 11.6). For Wesfarmers this is more evident in the Retail unit than in the disparate holdings of the Industrial and Other unit.

A drawback to the SBU structure is that multifaceted businesses often have difficulties in communicating this complex business model to shareholders.9 0 Furthermore, if coordination between SBUs is needed, problems can arise because the SBU structure, similar to the competitive form discussed next, does not readily foster cooperation across SBUs.

strategic business unit (SBU) form consists of three levels: corporate headquarters, strategic business units (SBUs) and SBU divisions

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SBU form of the multi-divisional structure for implementing a related linked strategy

Chief executive officer

Corporate R&D

Corporate finance

Strategic planning

Corporate marketing

Corporate human resources

Strategic business unit

Division Division Division Division Division Division Division Division Division

Headquarters office

Strategic business unit

Strategic business unit

Notes: • There is structural integration among divisions within SBUs, but independence across SBUs. • Strategic planning may be the most prominent function in headquarters for managing the strategic planning approval process of

SBUs for the chief executive officer. • Each SBU may have its own budget for staff to foster integration. • Corporate headquarters staff serve as consultants to SBUs and divisions, rather than having direct input to product strategy, as in the

cooperative form.

Figure 11.6

Using the competitive form of the multi-divisional structure to implement the unrelated diversification strategy Organisations using the unrelated diversification strategy want to create value through efficient internal capital allocations or by restructuring, buying and selling businesses.91 The competitive form of the multi- divisional structure supports implementation of this strategy.

The competitive form is an M-form structure characterised by complete independence a mong t he organisation’s divisions that compete for corporate resources (see Figure 11.7). Unlike the divisions included in the cooperative structure, divisions that are part of the competitive structure do not share common corporate strengths. Because strengths are not shared, integrating devices are not developed for use by the divisions included in the competitive structure.

The efficient internal capital market that is the foundation for using the unrelated diversification strategy requires organisational arrangements emphasising divisional competition rather than cooperation.92 Three benefits are expected from the internal competition. First, internal competition creates flexibility (e.g. corporate headquarters can have divisions working on different technologies and projects to identify those with the greatest potential). Resources can then be allocated to the division appearing to have the most potential to fuel the entire organisation’s success. Second, internal competition challenges the status quo and inertia, because division heads know that future resource a llocat ions a re a product of excellent cu r rent per for ma nce as well as super ior posit ion i ng i n ter ms of future performance. Third, internal competition motivates effort in that the challenge of competing against internal peers can be as great as the challenge of competing against external rivals.93 In this

competitive form a structure in which there is complete independence among the organisation’s divisions

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structure, organisational controls (primarily financial controls) are used to emphasise and support internal competition among separate divisions and as the basis for allocating corporate capital based on divisions’ performances.

The three major forms of the multi-divisional structure should each be paired with a particular corporate-level strategy. Table 11.1 shows these structures’ characteristics. Differences exist in the degree of centralisation, the focus of the performance evaluation, the horizontal structures (integrating mechanisms) and the incentive compensation schemes. The most centralised and most costly structural form is the cooperative structure. The least centralised, with the lowest bureaucratic costs, is the competitive structure. The SBU structure requires partial centralisation and involves some of the mechanisms necessary to implement the relatedness between divisions. Also, the divisional incentive compensation awards are allocated according to both SBUs and corporate performance.

The huge Korean technology business LG Company (formerly called Lucky Goldstar) operates like a holding company and appears to use a competitive multi-divisional structure. The different units are operating in significantly different industries. LG Electronics, one of the companies in the LG Company portfolio, has several businesses operating in different consumer products businesses (e.g. LG Home Appliance and Air Solution Company, LG Home Entertainment Company, LG Mobile Communication Company and LG Vehicle Component Solutions Company). LG Company issues financial controls to govern and evaluate the different corporations in its portfolio.94

Competitive form of the multi-divisional structure for implementing an unrelated strategy

Chief executive officer

Headquarters office

Finance AuditingLegal affairs

Division Division Division DivisionDivision Division

Notes • Corporate headquarters has a small staff. • Finance and auditing are the most prominent functions in the headquarters office to manage cash flow and assure the accuracy of

performance data coming from divisions. • The legal affairs function becomes important when the organisation acquires or divests assets. • Divisions are independent and separate for financial evaluation purposes. • Divisions retain strategic control, but cash is managed by the corporate office. • Divisions compete for corporate resources.

Figure 11.7

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Characteristics of the structures necessary to implement the related constrained, related linked and unrelated diversification strategies

Overall structural form

Structural characteristics

Cooperative M-form (related constrained strategy)

SBU M-form (related linked strategy)

Competitive M-form (unrelated diversification strategy)a

Centralisation of operations

Centralised at corporate office

Partially centralised (in SBUs)

Decentralised to divisions

Use of integration mechanisms

Extensive Moderate Non-existent

Divisional performance evaluation

Emphasises subjective (strategic) criteria

Uses a mixture of subjective (strategic) and objective (financial) criteria

Emphasises objective (financial) criteria

Divisional incentive compensation

Linked to overall corporate performance

Mixed linkage to corporate, SBU and divisional performance

Linked to divisional performance

a Strategy implemented with structural form.

Table 11.1

General Electric’s decline, new strategy and reorganisation

As noted in Chapter 6, General Electric (GE) has been declining and has had to restructure its portfolio of businesses. In doing so, GE CEO John Flannery announced a new orientation in its implemented structure. How did it get to this point of significant peril, requiring such restructuring?

GE has been historically run from the top; its many acquisitions over the years had to be approved by top managers, and often were businesses outside areas that GE had run before and whose acquisitions were ill timed. ‘GE became the great counterexample to a growing skepticism among investors and economists about giant diversified companies. During the 1980s, as conglomerates were increasingly written off as lumbering and opaque, GE was lauded as what researchers at the Boston Consulting Group called a “premium conglomerate” – focused despite its diversity, nimble despite its scale, and armored against cyclical downturns in individual industries’. However, in the wake of the dot-com bubble and right before the

terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001, a new CEO, Jeffrey Immelt, took over the company. Under pressure from Wall Street to do something impressive, he undertook a series of splashy acquisitions; for example, paying US$5.5 billion for the entertainment assets of Vivendi Universal and US$9.5 billion for the British medical imaging company, Amersham. Although there were bargains, such as Enron Corp.’s wind-turbine business (picked up in a bankruptcy auction), for the most part the deals proved more expensive and less synergistic than promised. One analyst calculated that GE’s total return on Immelt’s acquisitions turned out to be half what the company would have earned by simply investing in stock index mutual funds.

During the global financial crisis (GFC), many problems appeared in GE Capital’s financial businesses and Immelt sought to divest them, while at the same time trying to return the company to its industrial roots. While GE Capital was severely downsized, Immelt acquired a US$10 billion power turbine business from

Strategic focus |Technology

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Matches between international strategies and worldwide structure As explained in Chapter 8, international strategies are becoming increasingly important for long-term compet it ive success95 in what is becoming an increasingly borderless global economy.9 6 A mong ot her benefits, international strategies allow the organisation to search for new markets, resources, core competencies and technologies as part of its efforts to outperform competitors.97

As with business-level and corporate-level strategies, unique organisational structures are necessary to successfully implement the different international strategies.9 8 Forming proper matches between international strategies and organisational structures facilitates the organisation’s efforts to effectively coordinate and control its global operations. More importantly, research findings confirm the validity of the international strategy–structure matches we discuss here.99

Using the worldwide geographic area structure to implement the multi-domestic strategy The multi-domestic strategy decentralises the organisation’s strategic and operating decisions to business units in each country so that product characteristics can be tailored to local preferences. Organisations using this strategy try to isolate themselves from global competitive forces by establishing protected

French company Alstom. GE made a massive investment in natural gas power plants just as the market for them was contracting. Similarly, in oil and gas, GE bought Vetco Gray, Dresser and Lufkin Industries, and then tried to merge them with Baker-Hughes at a time when oil and gas extraction revenues were depressed.

This legacy has continued to weigh GE down under its new CEO. In order to change the strategy and structure of

the organisation, Flannery announced in June of 2018 that GE ‘will spin off its core health business within 12– 18 months, fully separate Baker Hughes (BHGE), and narrow its focus to aviation, power and renewable energy, among the most salient portfolio changes’. Thus, GE’s strategic approach will be much less diversified. Although health care is still a good business, it has ‘the least amount of synergies with the rest of GE’. Meanwhile, the aviation and power businesses ‘share engine

technology synergies’, with the former boasting growth while the latter has a path to recovery.

At the same time, Flannery noted that ‘his plan calls for GE to change how it is run, shifting from a centralized, top-down approach to a culture where the business units are the center of gravity’. He is quoted as saying GE’s business has been run ‘from the center for decades’, but that is being inverted. With fewer businesses to run, the headquarters should be much smaller, and resources and investment responsibility would be pushed out to the business units to make sure that acquisitions are more in line with business segment strategies. As such, the new structure appears to be more in line with the competitive M-form rather than the former SBU M-form structure that has been the historic structural form at GE.

Sources: 2018, John Flannery gets down to business restructuring General Electric, Economist, http://www.economist.com, 27 June;

D. Bennett & R. Clough, 2018, What the hell is wrong with General Electric? Bloomberg Businessweek, http://www.bloombergbusinessweek.

com, 5 February; J. Collins, 2018, GE Capital’s painful legacy curbs my enthusiasm for the company’s restructuring, Forbes, http://www.forbes.

com, 26 June; G. Colvin, 2018, What the hell happened at GE?, Fortune, http://www.fortune.com, 24 May; E. Crook, 2018, Flannery resists

pressure for quick fixes at GE, Financial Times, http://www.ft.com, 25 June; T. Gryta, 2018, Q&A: GE CEO explains strategy, smaller HQ, Wall

Street Journal, http://www.wsj.com, 27 June; T. Gryta, J. S. Lublin & D. Benoit, 2018, How Jeffrey Immelt’s ‘success theater’ masked the rot at

GE. Wall Street Journal, http://www.wsj.com, 22 February; A. Narayanan, 2018, GE finishes restructuring, but another sharp dividend cut is

expected, Investor’s Business Daily, http://www.investors.com, 26 June.

In October 2018, GE Aviation reported eight consecutive quarters of double-digit growth.

Source: Alamy Stock Photo/Jonathan Weiss

340 PART 3: STRATEGIC ACTIONS: STRATEGY IMPLEMENTATION

market positions or by competing in industry segments that are most affected by differences among local countries. The worldwide geographic area structure is used to implement this strategy. The worldwide geographic area structure emphasises national interests and facilitates the organisation’s efforts to satisfy local differences (see Figure 11.8).

worldwide geographic area structure emphasises national interests and facilitates the organisation’s efforts to satisfy local or cultural differences

Asia Australia

Latin America

Europe

United States

Middle East/Africa

Multinational Headquarters

Notes: • The perimeter circles indicate decentralisation of operations. • Emphasis is on differentiation by local demand to fit an area or country culture. • Corporate headquarters coordinates financial resources among independent subsidiaries. • The organisation is like a decentralised federation.

Worldwide geographic area structure for implementing a multi-domestic strategy

Figure 11.8

Although the US car industry is doing poorly in global markets, on a relative basis Ford Europe is doing better than other car organisations in Europe within the same middle market segment strategy. This is due to the fact that Ford implemented a worldwide geographic area structure more than a decade ago to give local European managers more autonomy to manage their operations. One analysis called Ford ‘the most efficient volume carmaker in Europe’.10 0 Furthermore, Ford has an efficient set of designs matched responsively to the European market. Ford has kept costs down by partnering with European automakers such as Fiat and France’s PSA Peugeot-Citroën on chassis and engine production. Using the multi-domestic strategy requires little coordination between different country markets, meaning that integrating mechanisms among divisions around the world are not needed. Coordination among units in an organisation’s worldwide geographic area structure is often informal. As mentioned earlier, this may be the most effective form of cooperation.

The multi-domestic strategy–worldwide geographic area structure match evolved as a natural outgrowth of the multicultural European marketplace. Friends and family members of the main business who were sent as expatriates into foreign countries to develop the independent country subsidiary often used this structure for the main business. The relationship to corporate headquarters by divisions took place through informal communication among ‘family members’.101

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A key disadvantage of the multi-domestic strategy–worldwide geographic area structure match is the inability to create strong global efficiency. With an increasing emphasis on lower-cost products in international markets, the need to pursue worldwide economies of scale has also increased. These changes foster use of the global strategy and its structural match, the worldwide product divisional structure.

Using the worldwide product divisional structure to implement the global strategy With the corporation’s home office dictating competitive strategy, the global strategy is one through which the organisation offers standardised products across country markets. The organisation’s success depends on its ability to develop economies of scope and economies of scale on a global level. Decisions to outsource or maintain integrated subsidiaries may in part depend on the country risk and institutional environment into which the organisation is entering.102

The worldwide product divisional structure supports use of the global strategy. In the worldwide product divisional structure, decision-making authority is centralised in the worldwide division headquarters to coordinate and integrate decisions and actions among divisional business units (see Figure 11.9). This structure is often used in rapidly growing organisations seeking to manage their diversified product lines effectively. Avon Products, Inc. is an example of an organisation using the worldwide product divisional structure.

worldwide product divisional structure decision-making authority is centralised in the worldwide division headquarters to coordinate and integrate decisions and actions among divisional business units Worldwide product divisional structure for implementing

a global strategy

Worldwide products division

Global Corporate

Headquarters

Worldwide products division

Worldwide products division

Worldwide products division

Worldwide products division

Worldwide products division

Notes: • The ‘Global corporate headquarters’ circle indicates centralisation to coordinate information flow among

worldwide products. • Corporate headquarters uses many inter-coordination devices to facilitate global economies of scale and

scope. • Corporate headquarters also allocates financial resources in a cooperative way. • The organisation is like a centralised federation.

Figure 11.9

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Integrating mechanisms are important in the effective use of the worldwide product divisional structure. Direct contact between managers, liaison roles between departments, and both temporary task forces and permanent teams are examples of these mechanisms. One researcher describes the use of these mechanisms in the worldwide structure: ‘There is extensive and formal use of task forces and operating committees to supplement communication and coordination of worldwide operations’.103 The disadvantages of the global strategy–worldwide structure combination are the difficulties involved with coordinating and integrating decisions and actions across country borders and the inability to quickly respond to local needs and customer preferences. A solution is to develop a regional approach in addition to the product focus, which might be similar to the combination structure discussed next.104

Using the combination structure to implement the transnational strategy The transnational strategy calls for the organisation to combine the multi-domestic strategy’s local responsiveness with the global strategy’s efficiency. Organisations using this strategy are trying to gain the advantages of both local responsiveness and global efficiency.105 The combination str ucture is used to implement the transnational strategy. The combination structure is a str ucture drawing characteristics and mechanisms from both the worldwide geographic area structure and the worldwide product divisional structure. The transnational strategy is often implemented through two possible combination structures: a global matrix structure and a hybrid global design.106

The global matrix design brings together both local market and product expertise into teams that develop and respond to the global marketplace. The global matrix design (the basic matrix structure was defined earlier) promotes flexibility in designing products and responding to customer needs. However, it has severe limitations in that it places employees in a position of being accountable to more than one manager. At any given time, an employee may be a member of several functional or product group teams. Relationships that evolve from multiple memberships can make it difficult for employees to be simultaneously loyal to all of them. Although the matrix places authority in the hands of managers who are most able to use it, it creates problems in regard to corporate reporting relationships that are so complex and vague that it is difficult and time-consuming to receive approval for major decisions.

We illustrate the hybrid structure in Figure 11.10. In this design, some divisions are oriented towards products while others are oriented towards market areas. Thus, in cases when the geographic area is more important, the division managers are area-oriented. In other divisions where worldwide product coordination and efficiencies are more important, the division manager is more product-oriented.

combination structure a structure drawing characteristics and mechanisms from both the worldwide geographic area structure and the worldwide product divisional structure

Hybrid form of the combination structure for implementing a transnational strategy

Headquarters

Product division A

Area 2Area 1 Area 2Area 1

Product division B

Product BProduct BProduct A Product A

Geographic area

division 1

Geographic area

division 2

Figure 11.10

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The fit between the multi-domestic strategy and the worldwide geographic area structure and between the global strategy and the worldwide product divisional structure is apparent. However, when an organisation wants to implement the multi-domestic and global strategies simultaneously through a combination structure, the appropriate integrating mechanisms are less obvious. The structure used to implement the transnational strategy must be simultaneously centralised and decentralised, integrated and non-integrated, and formalised and non-formalised.

IKEA has done a good job of balancing these organisation aspects in implementing the transnational strategy.107 IKEA, a global furniture retailer with more than 300 outlets in 39 countries and regions, focuses on lowering its costs and understanding its customers’ needs, especially younger customers. It has been able to manage these seemingly opposite characteristics through its structure and management process. It has also been able to encourage its employees to understand the effects of cultural and geographic diversity on organisation operations. The positive results from this are evident in the more than 600 million visitors to IKEA stores.108 IKEA’s system also has internal network attributes, which are discussed next in regard to external inter-organisational networks.

Matches between cooperative strategies and network structures As discussed in Chapter 9, a network strategy exists when partners form several alliances in order to improve the performance of the alliance network itself through cooperative endeavours.109 The greater levels of environmental complexity and uncertainty facing companies in today’s competitive environment are causing more organisations to use cooperative strategies such as strategic alliances and joint ventures.110

The breadth and scope of organisations’ operations in the global economy create many opportunities for organisations to cooperate.111 In fact, an organisation can develop cooperative relationships with many of its stakeholders, including customers, suppliers and competitors. When an organisation becomes involved with combinations of cooperative relationships, it is part of a strategic network, or what others call an alliance constellation or portfolio.112

A strategic network is a group of organisations that has been formed to create value by participating in multiple cooperative arrangements. An effective strategic network facilitates discovering opportunities beyond those identified by individual network participants. A strategic network can be a source of competitive advantage for its members when its operations create value that is difficult for competitors to duplicate and that network members cannot create by themselves.113 St rategic networks are used to implement business-level, corporate-level and international cooperative strategies.

Commonly, a strategic network is a loose federation of partners participating in the network’s operations on a flexible basis. At the core or centre of the strategic network, the strategic centre organisation is the one around which the network’s cooperative relationships revolve (see Figure 11.11).

Because of its central position, the strategic centre organisation is the foundation for the strategic network’s structure. Concerned with various aspects of organisational structure, such as formal reporting relationships and procedures, the strategic centre organisation manages what are often complex, cooperative interactions among network partners. To perform the tasks discussed next, t he st rateg ic cent re orga n isat ion must ma ke su re t hat i ncent ives for pa r t icipat i ng i n t he network a re aligned so that network organisations continue to have a reason to remain connected.114 The strategic centre organisation is engaged in four primar y tasks as it manages the strategic network and controls its operations:115

1 St rategic out sourc ing: The strategic centre organisation outsources and partners with more organisations than other network members. At the same time, the strategic centre organisation requires network partners to be more than contractors. Members are expected to find opportunities for the network to create value through its cooperative work.

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2 Competencies: To increase network effectiveness, the strategic centre organisation seeks ways to support each member’s efforts to develop core competencies with the potential of benefiting the network.

3 Technology: The strategic centre organisation is responsible for managing the development and sharing of technology-based ideas among network members. The structural requirement that members submit formal reports detailing the technology-oriented outcomes of their efforts to the strategic centre organisation facilitates this activity.116

4 Race to lear n : The strategic centre organisation emphasises that the principal dimensions of competition are between value chains and between networks of value chains. Because of this interconnection, the strategic network is only as strong as its weakest value chain link. With its centralised decision-making authority and responsibility, the strategic centre organisation guides participants in efforts to form network-specific competitive advantages. The need for each participant to have capabilities that can be the foundation for the network’s competitive advantages encourages friendly rivalry among participants seeking to develop the skills needed to quickly form new capabilities that create value for the network.117

Interestingly, strategic networks are being used more frequently, partly because of the ability of a strategic centre organisation to execute a strategy that effectively and efficiently links partner organisations. Improved information systems and communication capabilities (e.g. the internet) make such networks possible.

Implementing business-level cooperative strategies As noted in Chapter 9, the two types of business-level complementary alliances are vertical and horizontal. Organisations with competencies in different stages of the value chain form a vertical alliance to cooperatively integrate their different, but complementary, skills. Organisations combining their competencies to create value in the same stage of the value chain are using a horizontal alliance. Vertical complementary strategic alliances, such as those developed by Toyota Motor Company, are formed more frequently than horizontal alliances.118

A strategic network

Strategic centre

organisation

Figure 11.11

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A strategic network of vertical relationships, such as the network in Japan between Toyota and its suppliers, often involves a number of implementation issues.119 First, the strategic centre organisation encourages subcontractors to modernise their facilities and provides them with technical and financial assistance to do so, if necessary. Second, the strategic centre organisation reduces its transaction costs by promoting longer-term contracts with subcontractors, so that supplier-partners increase their long- term productivity. This approach is diametrically opposed to that of continually negotiating short-term contracts based on unit pricing. Third, the strategic centre organisation enables engineers in upstream companies (suppliers) to have better communication with those companies with whom it has contracts for services. As a result, suppliers and the strategic centre organisation become more interdependent and less independent.

The lean production system (a vertical complementary strategic alliance) pioneered by Toyota and others has been diffused throughout the global automobile industry.120 In vertical complementary strategic alliances, such as the one between Toyota and its suppliers, the strategic centre organisation is obvious, as is the structure that organisation establishes. However, the same is not always true with horizontal complementar y strategic alliances where organisations tr y to create value in the same par t of the value chain. For example, airline alliances are commonly formed to create value in the marketing and sales primary activity segment of the value chain. Because air carriers commonly participate in multiple horizontal complementary alliances, such as the Oneworld Alliance that includes Air Berlin, American Airlines, British Airways, Cathay Pacific, Finnair, Qantas, Japan Airlines and many others, and the Star Alliance between Lufthansa, US Airways, Thai Airways, Air Canada, SAS, Singapore Airlines and others, it is difficult to determine the strategic centre organisation.121 Moreover, participating in several alliances can cause organisations to question partners’ true loyalties and intentions. Also, if rivals band together in too many collaborative activities, one or more governments may suspect the possibility of illegal collusive activities. For these reasons, the horizontal complementary alliance is used less often and less successfully than its vertical counterpart, although there are examples of success; for instance, among automobile and aircraft manufacturers.

Implementing corporate-level cooperative strategies Corporate-level cooperative strategies (such as franchising) are used to facilitate product and market diversification. As a cooperative strategy, franchising allows the organisation to use its competencies to extend or diversify its product or market reach, but without completing a merger or an acquisition.122 Research suggests that knowledge embedded in corporate-level cooperative strategies facilitates synergy.123 For example, McDonald’s Corporation and KFC (within Yum Brands, which also runs Pizza Hut and Taco Bell) pursue a franchising strategy, emphasising a limited value-priced menu in many countries.

The McDonald’s franchising system is a strategic network. McDonald’s headquarters serves as the strategic centre organisation for the network’s franchisees. The headquarters office uses strategic and financial controls to verify that the franchisees’ operations create the greatest value for the entire network. An important strategic control issue for McDonald’s is the location of its franchisee units. Because it believes that its greatest expansion opportunities are international, the organisation has decided to continue expanding in countries such as China and India, where it often needs to adjust its menu according to the local culture. For example, ‘McDonald’s adapts its restaurants in India to local tastes; in a nation that is predominantly Hindu and reveres the cow, beef is not on the menu, for instance, replaced by chicken burgers and vegetable patties’.124 As the strategic centre organisation around the globe for its restaurants, McDonald’s is devoting the majority of its capital expenditures to develop units in non-US markets.

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Implementing international cooperative strategies St rateg ic net works for med to i mplement i nter nat iona l cooperat ive st rateg ies resu lt i n orga n isat ions competing in several countries.125 Differences among countries’ regulatory environments increase the challenge of managing international networks and verifying that, at a minimum, the network’s operations comply with all legal requirements.126

Distributed strategic networks are the organisational structures used to manage international cooperative strategies. As shown in Figure 11.12, several regional strategic centre organisations are included in the distributed network to manage partner organisations’ multiple cooperative arrangements.127 The structure used to implement the international cooperative strategy is complex and demands careful attention to be used successfully.

A distributed strategic network

Distributed strategic centre organisations

Main strategic

centre organisation

Figure 11.12

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STUDY TOOLS SUMMARY LO1 Organisational structure specifies the organisation’s

formal reporting relationships, procedures, controls, and authority and decision-making processes. Essentially, organisational structure details the work to be done in an organisation and how that work is to be accomplished. Organisational controls guide the use of strategy, indicate how to compare actual and expected results, and suggest actions to take to improve performance when it falls below expectations. A proper match between strategy and structure can lead to a competitive advantage. Strategic controls (largely subjective criteria) and financial controls (largely objective criteria) are the two types of organisational controls used to implement a strategy. Both controls are critical, although their degree of emphasis varies based on individual matches between strategy and structure.

LO2 Strategy and structure influence each other. Overall, though, strategy has a stronger influence on structure than vice versa. Research indicates that organisations tend to change structure when declining performance forces them to do so. Effective managers anticipate the need for structural change and quickly modify structure to better accommodate the organisation’s strategy when evidence calls for that action.

LO3 The functional structure is used to implement business-level strategies. The cost leadership strategy requires a centralised functional structure – one in which manufacturing efficiency and process engineering are emphasised. The differentiation strategy’s functional structure decentralises implementation-related decisions, especially those concerned with marketing, to those involved with individual organisational functions. Focus strategies, often used in small organisations, require a simple structure until such time that the organisation diversifies in terms of products and/or markets.

LO4 Unique combinations of different forms of the multi-divisional structure are matched with different

corporate-level diversification strategies to properly implement these strategies. The cooperative M-form, used to implement the related constrained corporate- level strategy, has a centralised corporate office and extensive integrating mechanisms. Divisional incentives are linked to overall corporate performance to foster cooperation among divisions. The related linked SBU M-form structure establishes separate profit centres within the diversified organisation. Each profit centre or SBU may have divisions offering similar products, but the SBUs are often unrelated to each other. The competitive M-form structure, used to implement the unrelated diversification strategy, is highly decentralised, lacks integrating mechanisms and utilises objective financial criteria to evaluate each unit’s performance.

LO5 The multi-domestic strategy, implemented through the worldwide geographic area structure, emphasises decentralisation and locates all functional activities in the host country or geographic area.

The worldwide product divisional structure is used to implement the global strategy. This structure is centralised in order to coordinate and integrate different functions’ activities so as to gain global economies of scope and economies of scale. Decision- making authority is centralised in the organisation’s worldwide division headquarters.

The transnational strategy – a strategy through which the organisation seeks the local responsiveness of the multi-domestic strategy and the global efficiency of the global strategy – is implemented through the combination structure. Because it must be simultaneously centralised and decentralised, integrated and non-integrated, and formalised and non-formalised, the combination structure is difficult to organise and successfully manage. However, two structural designs are suggested: the matrix and the hybrid structure with both geographic and product- oriented divisions.

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LO6 Increasingly important to competitive success, cooperative strategies are implemented through organisational structures framed around strategic networks. Strategic centre organisations play a critical role in managing strategic networks. Business- level strategies are often employed in vertical and horizontal alliance networks. Corporate-level

cooperative strategies are used to pursue product and market diversification. Franchising is one type of corporate strategy that uses a strategic network to implement this strategy. This is also true for international cooperative strategies, where distributed networks are often used.

KEY TERMS combination structure

competitive form

cooperative form

financial controls

functional structure

multi-divisional (M-form) structure

organisational controls

organisational structure

simple structure

strategic business unit (SBU) form

strategic controls

worldwide geographic area structure

worldwide product divisional structure

REVIEW QUESTIONS 1. What is organisational structure and what are

organisational controls? What are the differences between strategic controls and financial controls? What is the importance of these differences?

2. Is there a close relationship between strategy and structure? Does strategy influence structure or does structure influence strategy?

3. What are the characteristics of the functional structures used to implement the cost leadership, differentiation, integrated cost leadership/differentiation and focused business-level strategies?

4. What are the differences among the three versions of the multi-divisional (M-form) organisational structures that are used to implement the related constrained, the related linked and the unrelated corporate-level diversification strategies?

5. What organisational structures are used to implement the multi-domestic, global and transnational international strategies?

6. What is a strategic network? How are strategic networks used in international cooperative strategies?

EXPERIENTIAL EXERCISES

Exercise 1: Organisational structure and business- level strategy The purpose of this exercise is to apply the concepts introduced in this chapter to live examples of business-level strategies and to examples of how various organisations actually structure their organisations to compete. Your instructor will assign a business-level strategy, such as differentiation or cost leadership, to teams of students. After you have your category assigned, identify an organisation that exemplifies this strategy and pictorially represent its corporate structure.

You will need to present the results of your investigation by comparing your organisation’s organisational chart with the one in your text identified for your particular business- level strategy (see Figure 11.3).

Be prepared to address the following issues: 1. Describe your organisation’s business-level strategy.

Why do you consider it to be a cost leader or a differentiator?

2. What is the mission statement and/or vision statement of this organisation? Are there specific goals that you can identify that this organisation is targeting?

3. Using the text examples for a functional structure, how does your organisation differ, if it does?

4. Summarise your conclusions. Does your team believe that this organisation is structured appropriately, considering its goals for the future?

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349

Exercise 2: Is structure contagious? Form two teams to analyse and recommend changes (if any) regarding pairs of competitors. Are these competitors, such as Coles and Woolworths, structured similarly or differently? How do their strategies and board structure compare?

Part 1 Select a pair of competitors. You have wide latitude in this choice, such as Coles and Woolworths, or Virgin Australia and Qantas. Another option is to select two competitors that reside in your town that may be small- to-medium-sized organisations. The important thing is that the organisations should be competitors and roughly comparable in size.

Part 2 Research these organisations and be prepared to address the following issues: 1. Describe the strategies of the two organisations –

differences and similarities.

2. Present the two organisations’ organisational structures and note differences and similarities.

3. Does structure follow strategy, as Chandler argues?

4. Are the boards of directors structured similarly between the pair as far as board meetings and titles?

5. Which one of these organisations would you most likely desire to work for, all else being equal?

Be prepared to discuss your findings in a PowerPoint presentation to the class.

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108. L. O’Connell, IKEA, 2020, Ikea – Statistics and facts. Statista.com, 13 February.

109. T. Saebi, 2011, Successfully Managing Alliance Portfolios: An Alliance Capability View, Maastricht: University of Maastricht; D. Lavie, 2009, Capturing value from alliance portfolios, Organizational Dynamics, 38(1): 26–36.

110. V. A. Aggarwal, N. Siggelkow & H. Singh, 2011, Governing collaborative activity: Interdependence and the impact of coordination and exploration, Strategic Management Journal, 32: 705–30; J. Li, C. Zhou & E. J. Zajac, 2009, Control, collaboration, and productivity in international joint ventures: Theory and evidence, Strategic Management Journal, 30: 865–84; Y. Luo, 2007, Are joint venture partners more opportunistic in a more volatile environment?, Strategic Management Journal, 28: 39–60.

111. D. Li, L. E. Eden, M. A. Hitt & R. D. Ireland, 2008, Friends, acquaintances, or strangers? Partner selection in R&D alliances, Academy of Management Journal, 51(2): 315–34.

112. J. Wincent, S. Anokhin, D. Ortqvist & E. Autio, 2010, Quality meets structure: Generalized reciprocity and firm-level advantage in strategic networks, Journal of Management Studies, 47: 597–624; Lavie, Capturing value from alliance portfolios.

113. T. P. Moliterno & D. M. Mahoney, 2011, Network theory of organization: A multilevel approach, Journal of Management, 37: 443–67; V. Moatti, 2009, Learning to expand or expanding to learn? The role of imitation and experience in the choice among several expansion modes, European Management Journal, 27(1): 36–46.

114. A. T. Arikan & M. A. Schilling, 2011, Structure and governance of industrial districts: Implications for competitive advantage, Journal of Management Studies, 48: 772–803; J. Wiklund & D. A. Shepherd, 2009, The effectiveness of alliances and acquisitions: The role of resource combination activities, Theory and Practice,

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31(1): 193–212; R. D. Ireland & J. W. Webb, 2007, A multitheoretic perspective on trust and power in strategic supply chains, Journal of Operations Management, 25: 482–97.

115. S. Harrison, 1998, Japanese Technology and Innovation Management, Northampton, MA: Edward Elgar.

116. J. Bae, F. C. Wezel & J. Koo, 2011, Cross- cutting ties, organizational density and new firm formation in the US biotech industry, 1994–98, Academy of Management Journal, 54: 295–311; J. Zhang & C. Baden- Fuller, 2010, The influence of technological knowledge base and organizational structure on technological collaboration, Journal of Management Studies, 47: 679–704; M. H. Hansen, R. E. Hoskisson & J. B. Barney, 2008, Competitive advantage in alliance governance: Resolving the opportunism minimization–gain maximization paradox, Managerial and Decision Economics, 29: 191–208.

117. H. Hoang & F. T. Rothaermel, 2010, Leveraging internal and external experience: Exploration, exploitation and R&D project performance, Strategic Management Journal, 31: 734–58; G. Lorenzoni & C. Baden-Fuller, 1995, Creating a strategic center to manage a web of partners, California Management Review, 37(3): 146–63.

118. A. C. Inkpen, 2008, Knowledge transfer and international joint ventures: The case of NUMMI and General Motors, Strategic Management Journal, 29(4): 447–53; T. A. Stewart & A. P. Raman, 2007, Lessons from Toyota’s long drive, Harvard Business Review, 85(7/8): 74–83; J. H. Dyer & K.

Nobeoka, 2000, Creating and managing a high-performance knowledge-sharing network: The Toyota case, Strategic Management Journal, 21: 345–67.

119. L. F. Mesquita, J. An & J. H. Brush, 2008, Comparing the resource-based and relational views: Knowledge transfer and spillover in vertical alliances, Strategic Management Journal, 29: 913–41: M. Kotabe, X. Martin & H. Domoto, 2003, Gaining from vertical partnerships: Knowledge transfer, relationship duration and supplier performance improvement in the US and Japanese automotive industries, Strategic Management Journal, 24: 293–316.

120. S. G. Lazzarini, D. P. Claro & L. F. Mesquita, 2008, Buyer-supplier and supplier-supplier alliances: Do they reinforce or undermine one another?, Journal of Management Studies, 45(3): 561–84; P. Dussauge, B. Garrette & W. Mitchell, 2004, Asymmetric performance: The market share impact of scale and link alliances in the global auto industry, Strategic Management Journal, 25: 701–11.

121. Oneworld, 2020, http://www.oneworld. com, 29 August.

122. A. M. Hayashi, 2008, How to replicate success, MIT Sloan Management Review, 49(3): 6–7; M. Tuunanen & F. Hoy, 2007, Franchising: Multifaceted form of entrepreneurship, International Journal of Entrepreneurship and Small Business, 4: 52–67.

123. A. Zaheer, R. Gozubuyuk & H. Milanov, 2010, It’s the connections: The network perspective in interorganizational research, Academy of Management Perspectives, 24(1): 62–77; J. Li, C. Dhanaraj & R. L. Shockley,

2008, Joint venture evolution: Extending the real options approach, Managerial and Decision Economics, 29(4): 317–36.

124. E. Bellman, 2009, Corporate news: McDonald’s plans expansion in India, Wall Street Journal, 30 June, B4.

125. T. W. Tong, J. J. Reuer & M. W. Peng, 2008, International joint ventures and the value of growth options, Academy of Management Journal, 51: 1014–29; P. H. Andersen & P. R. Christensen, 2005, Bridges over troubled water: Suppliers as connective nodes in global supply networks, Journal of Business Research, 58: 1261–73; C. Jones, W. S. Hesterly & S. P. Borgatti, 1997, A general theory of network governance: Exchange conditions and social mechanisms, Academy of Management Review, 22: 911–45.

126. M. W. Hansen, T. Pedersen & B. Petersen, 2009, MNC strategies and linkage effects in developing countries, Journal of World Business, 44(2): 121–39; A. Goerzen, 2005, Managing alliance networks: Emerging practices of multinational corporations, Academy of Management Executive, 19(2): 94–107.

127. C. C. Phelps, 2010, A longitudinal study of the influence of alliance network structure and composition on the firm exploratory innovation, Academy of Management Journal, 53: 890–913; L. H. Lin, 2009, Mergers and acquisitions, alliances and technology development: An empirical study of the global auto industry, International Journal of Technology Management, 48(3): 295–307.

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CH AP

TE R

Studying this chapter should provide you with the strategic management knowledge needed to: LO1 Define strategic competitiveness, strategy, competitive advantage, above-

average returns, and the strategic management process. LO2 Describe the competitive landscape and explain how globalisation and

technological changes shape it. LO3 Use the industrial organisation (I/O) model to explain how firms can earn

above-average returns. LO4 Use the resource-based model to explain how firms can earn above average

returns. LO5 Describe vision and mission and discuss their value. LO6 Define stakeholders and describe their ability to influence organisations. LO7 Describe the work of strategic leaders. LO8 Explain the strategic management process.

Learning Objectives

Strategic leadership

Studying this chapter should provide you with the strategic management knowledge needed to: LO1 define strategic leadership and describe executive managers’ importance LO2 explain what executive management teams are and how they affect

organisational performance LO3 describe the managerial succession process using internal and external

managerial labour markets LO4 discuss the value of strategic leadership in determining the organisation’s

strategic direction LO5 describe the importance of strategic leaders in managing the organisation’s

resources LO6 define organisational culture and explain what must be done to sustain an

effective culture LO7 explain what strategic leaders can do to establish and emphasise ethical

practices LO8 describe the importance of leadership and corporate social responsibility LO9 discuss the importance and use of organisational controls.

Learning Objectives

CH AP

TE R

12

355

OPENING CASE STUDY Meg Whitman: a pioneering strategic leader

Meg Whitman, the only female to serve as the CEO for two major US corporations, announced in November 2017 that she would step down from her CEO position at Hewlett Packard Enterprise Co. on 1 February 2018. Saying that she was returning to what she considers her ‘start-up roots’, she had decided to join with Hollywood executive and long-time friend Jeffrey Katzenberg to run a mobile-video company called WndrCo NewTV. This organisation is part of Katzenberg’s WndrCo LLC, a media and tech venture that plans to develop a portfolio of companies. In her position, Whitman is to build ‘an online service, securing production partnerships and building a team at NewTV, which will target the 18- to 34-year-olds who have driven the rise in mobile-video viewing over the past several years’. In essence, the organisation intends to develop a platform through which high-budget short videos will be available to users to watch while standing in a line, riding a bus and so forth. Some videos will be one-off stories while others will be part of richer and longer stories.

The path Whitman travelled to become one of the most prominent women in American business and an experienced CEO in Silicon Valley is enlightening. Her path as a leader demonstrates increasing levels of responsibility and decision-making authority while moving from one opportunity to another.

A graduate of Harvard Business School, Whitman started her career at Procter & Gamble. She later worked as a consultant in Bain & Company’s San Francisco office, rising to a position as senior vice president in that organisation. In 1989, she accepted a position as vice president for strategic planning at Walt Disney Corporation. She met Katzenberg while working for Disney. After two years, she joined Stride Rite Corporation prior to becoming president and CEO of Florists’ Transworld Delivery in 1995. After another two years, she accepted the role of General Manager for Hasbro’s Playskool division, where she had responsibility for global management and marketing for two brands targeted to children – Playskool and Mr Potato Head. From Hasbro, Whitman became CEO of eBay (the pioneering company that made it possible for strangers to exchange goods online) in March 1998. At the time,

the organisation had only 30 employees and annual revenue of approximately US$4 million. Prior to resigning as eBay’s CEO in November 2007, the organisation’s revenues had increased to US$8 billion annually and the workforce numbered around 15 000. Whitman became CEO of Hewlett-Packard in September 2011. She remained in this role for a bit over six years. During those years, ‘she led a turnaround plan that involved the largest split in corporate history, tens of thousands of layoffs, $18 billion in write-offs and a leadership shake- up’. Deciding in 2015 to split Hewlett-Packard into Hewlett Packard Enterprises (HPE) and Hewlett Packard Inc. (HPQ) was the most prominent strategic action she took as HP’s CEO. HPQ took the printer and PC businesses while business-focused HPE works in a variety of markets such as servers, storage, networking, consulting and support, and financial services.

Whitman, her team and HP’s board chose to split the organisation into two companies because of declining sales in what was a complicated conglomerate. The leaders believed that breaking the organisation into two units would allow each to focus more as a means of unlocking the full value embedded in the portfolios

Meg Whitman, former CEO of Hewlett-Packard, led the turnaround plan to split HP into two companies: Hewlett Packard Enterprises (HPE) and Hewlett Packard Inc. (HPQ).

Source: Getty Images/VCG

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that formed the two new organisations. Results achieved across time will show if the decision to break HP into two organisations was one of Whitman’s best strategic actions or one that failed to deliver increased value to shareholders. As is the case for virtually all leaders serving as a CEO, Whitman’s career is not without controversy. During her tenure at eBay, for example, the organisation paid roughly US$4.1 billion to acquire Skype in 2005. Later admitting that the premium she and her team agreed to pay for Skype was too large, eBay sold Skype to a group of investors for US$2.75 billion. In Whitman’s view, failing to recognise the market potential for eBay in Japan was a major error. Instead of investing in Japan, Whitman chose to invest in eBay’s existing website. At the time, Japan was the world’s second- largest internet consumer market. In commenting about this, Whitman said ‘I had a sense that the technology underpinning eBay was not going to help us scale where we needed to. That miss of eBay Japan is one of the big failures of my time at eBay’. Some also question a few

decisions Whitman made during her tenure as HP’s CEO: ‘Meg Whitman’s tenure at Hewlett-Packard was marked by a series of splits and sales that reshaped the storied Silicon Valley company. Now, her successor Antonio Neri must take the remnants and reignite innovation.’ Many view Whitman’s career as a strategic leader as one through which she played a major role in commercialising the internet industry.

Sources: D. Gallagher, 2018, New HPs give fresh life to old businesses, Wall Street Journal, http://www.wsj.com, 23 February; E. Shwartzel, 2018,

Meg Whitman to lead mobile-video startup NewTV, Wall Street Journal, http://www.wsj.com, 24 January; D. Gallagher, 2017, Meg Whitman’s

latest turn signal, Wall Street Journal, http://www.wsj.com, 22 November; R. King, 2017, Can Antonio Neri revive HP Enterprise after Meg Whitman?

Wall Street Journal, http://www.wsj.com, 30 November; R. King, 2017, Meg Whitman to step down as Hewlett Packard Enterprise CEO, Wall

Street Journal, http://www.wsj.com, 21 November; G. Hall, 2014, Hewlett Packard CEO talks biggest fails, bizwomen, http://www.bizjournals.com, 2 May; M. Ames & Y. Levine, 2010, How Meg Whitman failed her way to

the top at eBay, collecting billions while nearly destroying the company, Alternet, http://www.alternet.org, 25 October; M. Mangalindan, 2008, EBay

chief Whitman, web pioneer, plans to retire, Wall Street Journal, http://www.wsj.com, 22 January.

As the opening case implies, strategic leaders’ work is demanding, challenging and requires balancing short- term performance with long-term goals. Regardless of how long they remain in their positions, strategic leaders (and most prominently CEOs) can make a major difference in how an organisation performs.1 If a strategic leader can create a strategic vision for the organisation using for ward thinking, they may be able to energise the organisation’s human capital and achieve positive outcomes. However, the challenge of strategic leadership is significant and should never be underestimated.

A major message in this chapter is that effective strategic leadership is the foundation for successfully using the strategic management process. As is implied in Figure 1.1, strategic leaders guide the organisation i n ways t hat resu lt i n for m i ng a v ision a nd m ission (see  Chapter 1). Of ten t h is g u ida nce fi nds leaders t h i n k i ng of ways to create goa ls t hat st retch ever yone i n t he orga n isat ion to i mprove per for ma nce. 2 Moreover, strategic leaders facilitate the development of appropriate strategic actions and determine how to implement them. As we show in Figure 12.1, these actions are the path to strategic competitiveness and above-average returns. 3

We beg i n t h is chapter w it h a def i n it ion of st rateg ic leadersh ip; we t hen d iscuss its i mpor ta nce as a potential source of competitive advantage as well as effective strategic leadership styles. Next we examine top management teams and their effects on in novation, st rategic change and organ isation per for mance. Follow i ng t h is d iscussion, we a na lyse t he i nter na l a nd ex ter na l ma nager ia l labou r ma rkets f rom wh ich strategic leaders are selected. Closing the chapter are descriptions of the five key components of effective strategic leadership: deter mining a st rategic d irection, effectively managing the organisation’s resource por tfolio (wh ich i ncludes ex ploit i ng a nd ma i nta i n i ng core competencies, a long w it h developi ng hu ma n capital and social capital), sustain ing an effective organ isational cultu re, emphasising et h ical practices a nd establish i ng ba la nced orga n isat iona l cont rols.

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Figure 12.1 Strategic leadership and the strategic management process

and

yield syields

shapes the formation of

influences

Effective strategic leadership

Successful strategic actions

Formulation of strategies

Strategic competitiveness Above-average returns

Implementation of strategies

Strategic intent Strategic mission

Strategic leadership and style Strategic leadership is the ability to anticipate, envision, maintain flexibility and empower others to create strategic change as necessar y. Multifunctional in nature, strategic leadership involves managing through others, managing an entire organisation rather than a functional subunit, and coping with change that continues to increase in the global economy. Because of the global economy’s complexity, strategic leaders must learn how to effectively influence human behaviour, often in uncertain environments. By word or by personal example, and through their ability to envision the future, effective strategic leaders meaningfully in fluence the behaviours, thoughts and feelings of those with whom they work.4

The ability to attract and then manage human capital may be the most critical of the strategic leader’s skills,5 especially because the lack of talented human capital constrains organisation growth. Increasingly, leaders throughout the global economy possess or are developing this skill. Some believe, for example, that leaders now surfacing in Chinese companies understand the rules of competition in market-based economies and are leading in ways that will develop their organisations’ human capital.6

In the 21st centur y, intellectual capital that the organisation’s human capital possesses, including the ability to manage knowledge and create and commercialise innovation, affects a strategic leader’s success.7 Effect ive st rateg ic leaders also establish t he contex t t h rough wh ich sta keholders (such as employees,

strategic leadership the ability to anticipate, envision, maintain flexibility and empower others to create strategic change as necessary

358 PART 3: STRATEGIC ACTIONS: STRATEGY IMPLEMENTATION

customers and suppliers) can perform at peak efficiency.8 Being able to demonstrate these skills is important, given that the crux of strategic leadership is the ability to manage the organisation’s operations effectively and sustain high performance over time.9

A n orga n isat ion’s abi lit y to ach ieve a susta i nable compet it ive adva ntage a nd ea r n above-average returns (or sur plus revenue in the context of a not-for-profit organisation) is compromised when strategic leaders fail to respond appropriately and quickly to changes in the complex global competitive environment. The inability to respond or to identify the need for change in the competitive environment is one of the reasons some CEOs fail. For example, t he past CEO of Myer, R icha rd Umbers, quit af ter failing to tu r n the company around financially in 2018.10 W hen it became obvious to the Myer board that the execution of its strateg y was undeliverable with an improved financial performance, hard decisions were made to implement significant leadership changes within the existing executive team (or leadership str ucture) to remove the incumbent CEO. In addition, Myer also hired a new chief merchandise officer and a new chief financial officer. As a result of its leadership str ucture at the time, tumbling share price and poor financial performance, Myer was bumped out of the benchmark ASX200 Index in March 2018. Its share price in the last qua r ter of 2020 cont inued to tu mble due to Cov id-19 rest r ict ions, a nd operat ionally t he pa ndem ic forced the temporar y closure of its Melbourne stores. Uncer tainty lingers in relation to Myer’s future in Australia, with the organisation yet to issue an update to shareholders on its cur rent financial position in late 2020.11

Conversely, Qantas CEO A lan Joyce tried to remain on the front foot when he took hard decisions in an attempt to handle a changed environment for the heritage airline and deal with government-imposed Covid-19 restrictions that significantly impacted on the global business.12 A ll strategic leaders must learn how to deal w ith d iverse and complex env ironmental situations. Ind iv idual judgement is an impor tant part of learning about and analysing the organisation’s competitive environment.13 In particular, effective strategic leaders build strong ties with external stakeholders to gain access to information and advice on the events in the external environment.14

The primary responsibility for effective strategic leadership rests at the top, in particular with the CEO. Ot her com mon ly recogn ised st rategic leaders include members of t he board of d irectors, t he executive management team and divisional general managers. In reality, any individual with responsibility for the performance of human capital and/or a part of the organisation (e.g. a production unit) is a strategic leader. Regardless of their title and organisational function, strategic leaders have substantial decision-making responsibilities that cannot be delegated.15 Strategic leadership is a complex but critical form of leadership. St rateg ies can not be for mulated and implemented for t he pu r pose of ach iev ing above-average retu r ns without effective strategic leaders.16

The styles used to provide leadership often affect the productivity of those being led. Transformational leadersh ip is t he most effect ive st rateg ic leadersh ip st yle. T h is st yle enta i ls mot ivat i ng fol lowers to exceed the expectations others have of them, to continuously enrich their capabilities, and to place the i nterests of t he orga n isat ion above t hei r ow n.17 Tra nsfor mat ional leaders develop a nd com mu n icate a v ision for the organisation and for mulate a st rateg y to achieve the v ision. They make followers aware of t he need to ach ieve va lued orga n isat iona l outcomes a nd encou rage t hem to cont i nuously st r ive for h igher levels of ach ievement. T hese t y pes of leaders have a h igh deg ree of i nteg r it y (e.g. Ray K roc, fou nder of McDona ld’s, was a st rateg ic leader va lued for h is h igh deg ree of i nteg r it y by a l l but vegetar ians)18 and character. Speak ing about character, one CEO said: ‘Leaders are shaped and defi ned by cha racter. Leaders i nspi re a nd enable ot hers to do excel lent work a nd rea l ise t hei r potent ia l. A s a resu lt, t hey bu i ld successf u l, endu r i ng orga n isat ions’.19 Add it iona l ly, t ra nsfor mat iona l leaders have emot iona l i ntel l igence. E mot iona l ly i ntel l igent leaders u ndersta nd t hem selves wel l, have st rong mot ivat ion, a re empat het ic w it h ot hers a nd have effect ive i nter persona l sk i l ls. 20 A s a resu lt of t hese characteristics, transformational leaders are especially effective in promoting and nurturing innovation in organisations.21

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The role of executive managers Executive managers also play a critical role in that they are charged to make cer tain their organisation is able to effectively formulate and implement strategies.22 Executive managers’ strategic decisions influence how the organisation is designed and how goals will be achieved. Thus, a critical element of organisational success is having an executive management team with superior managerial skills. 23

Managers often use their discretion (or latitude for action) when making strategic decisions, including those concer ned w ith effectively implementing strategies. 24 Manager ial discretion differs significantly across industries. The primar y factors that determine the amount of decision-making discretion held by a manager (especially an executive (or senior) manager) are:

1 exter nal env iron mental sou rces such as t he indust r y st r uctu re, t he rate of market g row t h in t he organisation’s primar y industr y and the degree to which products can be differentiated

2 characteristics of the organisation, including its size, age, resources and culture 3 characteristics of the manager, including commitment to the organisation and its strategic outcomes,

tolerance for ambiguity, skills in working with different people, and aspiration levels (see Figure 12.2). Because strategic leaders’ decisions are intended to help the organisation gain a competitive advantage,

how ma nagers exercise d iscret ion when deter m i n i ng appropr iate st rateg ic act ions is cr it ica l to t he organisation’s success.25 In addition to determining new strategic initiatives, executive managers develop an organisational str ucture and reward systems. Executives also have a major effect on an organisation’s cu lt u re. Ev idence suggests t hat ma nagers’ va lues a re cr it ica l i n shapi ng a n orga n isat ion’s cu lt u ra l values.26

Figure 12.2 Factors affecting managerial discretion

Managerial discretion

External environment • Industry structure • Rate of market growth • Number and type of competitors • Nature and degree of political/legal constraints • Degree to which products can be differentiated

Characteristics of the manager • Tolerance for ambiguity • Commitment to the organisation and its desired strategic outcomes • Interpersonal skills • Aspiration level • Degree of self-confidence

Characteristics of the organisation • Size • Age • Culture • Availability of resources • Patterns of interaction among employees

Source: Adapted from S. Finkelstein & D. C. Hambrick, 1996, Strategic Leadership: Top Executives and Their Effects on Organizations, St Paul, MN: Western Publishing Company.

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Accord i ng ly, e xec ut ive ma nage rs have a n i mpor ta nt ef fec t on orga n i sat iona l ac t iv it ies a nd performance.27 The challenges executives face mean they often are more effective when they operate as executive management teams and an inability to collaborate may have disastrous effects for not only the organisational culture but the financial performance of the organisation as well.

Executive management teams In most organisations, the complexity of challenges and the need for substantial amounts of information and knowledge require strategic leadership by a team of executives. Using a team to make strategic decisions also helps to avoid another potential problem when these decisions are made by the CEO alone: namely, managerial hubris. Research evidence shows that when CEOs begin to believe glowing press accounts and to feel that they are unlikely to make errors, they are more likely to make poor strategic decisions. 28 Senior execut ives need to have self-con fidence, but t hey must g ua rd against allow ing it to become a r rogance and a false belief in t hei r ow n inv incibility. 29 To g ua rd against CEO overcon fidence a nd poor st rateg ic decisions, organisations often use an executive management team to consider strategic oppor tunities and problems and to make strategic decisions. The executive management team comprises the key individuals who are responsible for selecting and implementing the organisation’s strategies. Ty pically, the executive ma nagement tea m i ncludes t he officers of t he cor porat ion, defi ned by t he t it le of ch ief (such as ch ief executive officer, chief financial officer, chief strateg y officer, chief information officer or head of people and culture) or by service as a member of the board of directors.30 The quality of the strategic decisions made by an executive management team affects the organisation’s ability to innovate and engage in effective strategic change. 31

Executive management team, organisation performance and strategic change The job of executives is complex and requires a broad knowledge of the organisation’s operations, as well as the three key par ts of the organisation’s external environment: the general, industr y and competitor environments (as discussed in Chapter 2). Therefore, organisations tr y to form an executive management (or executive) team that has the k nowledge and exper tise needed to operate the inter nal organisation, yet that also can deal with all the organisation’s stakeholders as well as its competitors. 32 To have these characteristics normally requires a heterogeneous management team. A heterogeneous management team is composed of individuals with different cultural backgrounds, experience and education.

Members of a heterogeneous exec ut ive ma nagement tea m benefit f rom d isc ussi ng t he d i fferent perspect ives adva nced by tea m members. 33 I n ma ny cases, t hese d iscussions i ncrease t he qua l it y of the team’s decisions, especially when a synthesis emerges within the team after evaluating the diverse perspectives.34 The net benefit of such actions by heterogeneous teams has been positive in terms of market sha re, above-average retu r ns or su r pluses. Resea rch shows t hat more heterogeneity a mong execut ive management team members promotes debate, which often leads to better strategic decisions. In turn, better strategic decisions produce higher organisation performance. 35

It is also impor tant for executive management team members to function cohesively. In general, the more heterogeneous and larger t he executive management team is, t he more d i fficult it is for t he team to effectively implement strategies. 36 Comprehensive and long-ter m strategic plans can be inhibited by com mu n icat ion d i fficult ies among execut ives who have d i fferent backg rou nds and d i fferent cog n it ive sk i l ls. 37 A lter nat ively, com mu n icat ion a mong d iverse execut ive ma nagement tea m members ca n be faci l itated t h rough elect ron ic com mu n icat ions, somet i mes reduci ng t he ba r r iers before face-to-face meetings. 38 However, a group of senior executives with diverse backgrounds may inhibit the process of decision making if it is not effectively managed by the CEO, or in some instances the CEO may knowingly or unconsciously create divisiveness among its executive team. In such cases, executive management teams may fail to comprehensively examine threats and opportunities, leading to a sub-optimal strategic decision. Thus, the CEO must attempt to achieve behavioural integration among the team members. 39

executive management team composed of the key managers who are responsible for selecting and implementing the organisation’s strategies

heterogeneous management team composed of individuals with different cultural backgrounds, experience and education

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Having members with substantive expertise in the organisation’s core functions and businesses is also impor tant to an executive management team’s effectiveness.40 In a high-technolog y industr y, it may be critical for an organisation’s executive management team members to have R&D or innovation exper tise, particularly when growth strategies are being implemented. Yet their eventual effect on strategic decisions depends not only on their expertise and the way the team is managed, but also on the context in which they make the decisions (the governance str ucture, incentive compensation, etc.).41

The characteristics of an executive management team and even the personalities of the CEO and other team members are related to innovation and strategic change.42 For example, more heterogeneous executive management teams are positively associated with innovation and strategic change. The heterogeneity may force the team or some of its members to ‘think outside of the box’ and thus be more creative in making decisions.4 3

Therefore, orga n isat ions t hat need to cha nge t hei r st rateg ies a re more li kely to do so if t hey have executive management teams w ith d iverse backgrounds and exper tise. W hen a new CEO is hired from outside the industr y, the probability of strategic change is greater than if the new CEO is from inside the organisation or inside the industr y.44 A lso, there can sometimes be significant change if the new CEO is from outside the organisation but from within the industr y. A lthough hiring a new CEO from outside the industr y adds diversity to the team, the executive management team must be managed effectively to use t he d iversity in a posit ive way. Thus, to successf ully create st rategic change, t he CEO should exercise transformational leadership to shape the new capabilities needed for implementation of the change.45 A n execut ive ma nagement tea m w it h va r ious a reas of ex per t ise is more li kely to ident if y env i ron mental changes (opportunities and threats) or changes within the organisation, suggesting the need for a different strategic direction.

I n t he c u r rent compet it ive env i ron ment, a n u ndersta nd i ng of i nter nat iona l ma rket s is v ita l. I nterest i ngly, resea rc h suggests t hat on ly about 15 per cent of t he e xec ut ives i n US For t u ne 50 0 organisations have global leadership exper tise.46 Executives generally gain this k nowledge by work ing in one of the organisation’s inter national subsidiaries; however, they can also gain some k nowledge by working with international alliance par tners.47

The CEO and executive management team power As noted i n Chapter 10, t he boa rd of d i rectors is a n i mpor ta nt gover na nce mecha n ism for mon itor i ng a n orga n isat ion’s st rateg ic d i rect ion a nd for represent i ng sta keholders’ i nterests, especia l ly t hose of shareholders.48 In fact, higher performance normally is achieved when the board of directors is more directly involved in shaping an organisation’s strategic direction.49

Boa rds of d i rectors, however, may fi nd it d i fficu lt to d i rect t he st rateg ic act ions of power f u l CEOs a nd exec ut ive ma nagement tea ms. 5 0 A n excel lent exa mple of t h is played out i n recent t i mes w it h Commonwealth Australia Bank, which was investigated in the Prudential Inquiry into the Commonwealth Bank of Australia. The resulting repor t by the Australian Pr udential Regulation Authority (A PR A) noted t hat inter v iews w it h boa rd d i rectors and g roup execut ives at t he Com monwealt h Ban k, toget her w it h the board’s ow n evaluation, ind icated that ‘there was not su fficient challenge from the Board to Group Executives. The feedback cited a somewhat “intimidating” environment with a highly intelligent Executive team and a propensity for positive and assuring messaging from optimistic senior leadership that made constr uctive challenge more difficult’.51

Often a powerful CEO appoints a number of sympathetic independent directors or members to the board, or the CEO may have inside board members who are also on the executive management team and repor t to her or him, which would be a direct conflict of interest.52 In either case, the CEO may significantly influence or manipulate the board’s actions. Thus, the amount of discretion a CEO has in making strategic decisions is related to the relationship it has with the board of directors and how the board chooses to oversee the actions of the CEO and the executive management team.53

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CEOs and executive management team members can achieve power in other ways. A CEO who also holds the position of chair person of the board – as is common in the USA but not in Australia – has more power than the CEO who does not.54 For example, Alan Joyce at Qantas initially had as chairman the ex-CEO Geoff Dixon, someone who also understood the industr y. Some analysts and cor porate ‘watchdogs’ criticise the A merican practice of CEO duality (when the CEO and the chair person of the board are the same) because it can lead to poor performance and slow the response to change, par tly because the board tends to engage in less monitoring of the CEO’s decisions and actions. 55

Execut ive ma nagement tea m members a nd CEOs who have long tenu re – on t he tea m a nd i n t he organisation – have a greater in fluence on board decisions. CEOs with greater in fluence may take actions in their own best interests, the outcomes of which increase their compensation from the company. 56 As reported in Chapter 10, there have been negative reactions from the public and within the media regarding excessive executive compensation, especially during poor economic times when some people are losing their jobs because of ineffective strategic decisions made by these same managers.

In summary, the relative degrees of power held by the board and executive management team members shou ld be exa m i ned i n l ight of a n i nd iv idua l orga n isat ion’s situat ion. For exa mple, t he abu nda nce of resources in an organisation’s exter nal env ironment and the volatility of that env ironment may a ffect the ideal balance of power between the board and the executive management team. Moreover, a volatile and uncertain environment may create a situation where a powerful CEO is needed to move quickly, but a diverse executive management team may create less cohesion among team members and prevent or stall necessary strategic actions. With effective working relationships, boards, CEOs and other executive management team members have the foundation required to select arrangements with the highest probability of best ser ving stakeholders’ interests.57

Managerial succession The choice of senior executives – especially CEOs – is a critical decision for the board of directors and has impor tant implications for the overall organisational performance. 58 Many organisations use leadership screening systems to identify individuals with managerial and strategic leadership potential as well as to determine the criteria individuals should satisfy to be candidates for the CEO position. 59

T he most ef fec t ive of t hese system s assesses people w it h i n t he orga n isat ion a nd ga i n s va luable i n for mat ion about t he capabi l it ies of ot her compa n ies’ ma nagers, pa r t icu la rly t hei r st rateg ic leaders.6 0 Based on t he resu lts of t hese assessments, t ra i n i ng a nd development prog ra ms a re prov ided for cu r rent i nd iv idua l s i n a n at te mpt to prese lec t a nd shape t he sk i l l s of people who may become tomor row ’s leade r s. Not w it h s ta nd i n g t he m a ny e xce l le nt leade r sh ip pr og r a m s on of fe r w it h i n orga n i sat ion s g loba l ly, t he re a re, howeve r, ma ny orga n i sat ion s t hat do not have succession pla n s for t hei r sen ior e xec ut ives.

Organ isations select managers and st rategic leaders from two ty pes of manager ial labou r markets: internal and external.61 A n internal managerial labour market consists of an organisation’s opportunities for managerial positions and the qualified employees within that organisation. A n external managerial labour market is the collection of managerial career opportunities and the qualified people who are external to the organisation in which the oppor tunities exist.

Several benefits are thought to accr ue to an organisation when the internal labour market is used to select a n i nsider as t he new CEO. Because of t hei r ex per ience w it h t he orga n isat ion a nd t he i ndust r y environment in which it competes, insiders are familiar with company products, markets, technologies and operating procedures. A lso, internal hiring produces lower turnover among existing personnel, many of whom possess valuable organisation-speci fic k nowledge. W hen the organisation is per for ming well, internal succession is favoured to sustain high performance. It is assumed that hiring from inside keeps the impor tant knowledge necessar y to sustain performance.

internal managerial labour market consists of an organisation’s opportunities for managerial positions and the qualified employees within that organisation

external managerial labour market the collection of managerial career opportunities and the qualified people who are external to the organisation in which the opportunities exist

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Results of work completed by management consultant Jim Collins support the value of using the internal labou r market when selecting a CEO. Collins found t hat h igh-per for m ing organ isations almost always appoint an insider to be the new CEO. He argues that bringing in a well-known outsider, whom he refers to as a ‘white knight’, is a recipe for mediocrity.62

E mployees com mon ly prefer t he i nter na l ma nager ia l labou r ma rket when selec t i ng e xec ut ive management team members and a new CEO. In the past, companies have also had a preference for insiders to fill executive management positions because of a desire for continuity and a continuing commitment to the organisation’s cur rent vision, mission and chosen strategies.63 For example, Campbell Soup Company has had relatively stable leadership, w ith only 13 CEOs since it was founded in 1869. This represents a CEO succession about ever y 11 years on average. In 2019, former Pinnacle Foods CEO, Mark Clouse, was appointed as Campbell’s cur rent CEO.6 4

However, an insider is not guaranteed success. Because of a changing competitive landscape and varying levels of performance, an increasing number of boards of directors are turning to outsiders to succeed CEOs. A n orga n isat ion of ten has valid reasons to select a n outsider as its new CEO. In some situat ions, long tenure with an organisation may reduce strategic leaders’ level of commitment to pursue innovation. Given innovation’s impor tance to organisation success (see Chapter 13), this hesitation could be a liability for a strategic leader. In Figure 12.3, we show how the composition of the executive management team and the CEO succession (managerial labour market) interact to affect strateg y. For example, when the executive management team is homogeneous (i.e. its members have similar functional experiences and educational backgrounds) and a new CEO is selected from inside the organisation, the organisation’s current strategy is unlikely to change. Conversely, when a new CEO is selected from outside the organisation and the executive management team is heterogeneous, the probability is high that strateg y will change. W hen the new CEO is from inside the organisation and a heterogeneous executive management team is in place, the strateg y may not change but in novation is likely to continue. A n exter nal CEO succession w ith a homogeneous team creates a more ambig uous situation. Fu r ther more, outside CEOs who lead moderate change of ten achieve increases in performance, but high strategic change by outsiders frequently leads to declines in performance.65

Heterogeneous

Homogeneous Stable strategy

Ambiguous: possible change in top management team and strategy

Internal CEO succession

External CEO succession

Managerial labour market: CEO succession

Top management team composition

Stable strategy with innovation

Strategic change

Figure 12.3 Effects of CEO succession and executive management team composition on strategy

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When organisations do not have a formal managerial succession plan, they will sometimes appoint an interim CEO until a new CEO is identified and in place.66 The advantage of using an interim CEO is that it allows adequate time to do a thorough executive search to fi nd the best cand idate. Most interim CEOs perform the basic functions and keep the organisation operating; however, rarely will they make major strategic decisions. Therefore, interim CEOs are generally only used when the CEO depar ts unexpectedly and abr uptly.

Succession plans are ver y impor tant to maintain the desired course for the organisation when there is a change in the CEO. Yet only slightly more than one-third of companies are prepared for a succession of the CEO. Because of the impor tance of the CEO position and the in fluence CEOs have on the organisation’s share price or stakeholders, investors have been placing increasing pressure on boards to develop formal succession plans for the executive management positions. Formal succession pla ns of ten call for t he use of ex ter nal execut ive sea rch orga n isat ions (somet imes refer red to as headhunters). Research suggests that executive search organisations primarily target executives in large, reputable and high-performing organisations. However, these organisations often identify the executives to target based largely on their job title instead of their known capabilities, reputation or individual performance. The executives who agree to be candidates in the search frequently have less tenure and experience and hold positions in less successful organisations.67 Therefore, executive search organisations may not always provide the best pool of candidates.

Includ ing talent from all par ts of both the inter nal and exter nal labour markets increases the l i kel i hood t hat t he orga n isat ion w i l l be able to for m a n effect ive execut ive ma nagement tea m. Ev idence suggests that women are a qualified source of talent as strategic leaders who have been somewhat overlooked.

Women in leadership

The latest Gender Diversity Progress Report released by the Australian Institute of Company Directors highlighted that at the end of January 2020 the percentage of women holding director roles on Australian boards listed in the top 200 listed companies has increased for the first time to 30.7 per cent. Elizabeth Proust, one of Australia’s most successful business women, recently commented that there should be a greater number of women on boards. Proust is currently the Chair of the Bank of Melbourne, Nestlé Australia and a non-executive director of Lendlease. She encourages women to become better at networking and has recognised that this is something she struggled with at the beginning of her career. ‘A lot of women believe if they work hard and put their head down, they will get ahead. While I wish that was the case, you do need to make sure your work is recognised.’ Proust notes that people do not need to necessarily network via drinking with colleagues after work; however, it does mean taking part in work functions, such as CPA events, to develop networks.

Australian women CEOs speak With only 14 female CEOs in the ASX200, corporate Australia has been a challenging environment for women to succeed in strategic leadership roles. the Korn Ferry Institute in 2017 researched the careers of CEO women in US companies and its latest report in collaboration with the Australian Institute of Company Directors is an extension of that work. the institute conducted structured interviews with 21 Australian women: current and former CEOs, as well as women who had experience heading professional services organisations, government departments and universities – all CEO-equivalent roles. The report concluded that the women who made it to the top leadership roles did so by leveraging a particular combination of personality, skills and approaches that is different in key ways from the global norms.

The study also highlighted the importance of exposure to the board for the women on the path to the top job. The Chief Executive Women census of the ASX200 highlights the overall percentage of women in the C-suite is not only low but there is an obvious lack

Strategic focus | General

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of women in line-management roles that will deeply impact the succession talent pool for CEO and board roles for years to come.

Sources: Australian Institute of Company Directors, 2020, Gender Diversity Progress Report: October 2019 to January 2020, https://aicd.

companydirectors.com.au/-/media/cd2/resources/advocacy/board- diversity/pdf/final-07649-gender-diversity-report-2020-2020-jan-2020- a4-v5.ashx; Korn Ferry institute, 2020, Australian women CEOs speak:

How female leaders rise and how organisations can help, https://www. kornferry.com/insights/articles/australian-women-ceos-speak; CPA

Australia, 2019, Elizabeth Proust is used to being the only woman in the boardroom. Now she wants more women to join her, In The Black,

https://www.intheblack.com/articles/2019/12/01/elizabeth-proust-only- woman-in-the-boardroom, December; Korn Ferry institute, 2017, Women

CEOs speak: Strategies for the next generation of female executives and how companies can pave the road, https://engage.kornferry.com/

womenceosspeak/about-the-report-735Y4-26367F.html; Australian institute of Company Directors, 2017, Boards for balance: Your

leadership shadow, http://aicd.companydirectors.com.au/advocacy/ board-diversity/boards-for-balance-your-leadership-shadow,

May.

48% had postgraduate degrees

in business

Arriving well prepared

70% had overseas work experience

Arriving well prepared

43% always wanted to be a CEO

Chief executive impulse

75% said some part of their

career path was improvised

Improvising up the ladder

Source: Korn Ferry institute, 2020, Australian women CEOs speak: how female leaders rise and how organisations can help, https://www.kornferry.com/insights/articles/australian-women-ceos-speak, 8.

Key strategic leadership actions Cer ta i n ac t ions cha rac ter ise effec t ive st rateg ic leadersh ip; we present t he most i mpor ta nt ones i n Fig u re 12.4. Many of t he act ions interact w it h each ot her. For example, managing t he organ isat ion’s resou rces effect ively includes developing hu ma n capital6 8 a nd cont r ibutes to establish ing a st rateg ic direction, fostering an effective culture, exploiting core competencies, using effective organisational control systems and establishing ethical practices and corporate social responsibility. The most effective strategic leaders create viable options for making decisions regarding each of the key strategic leadership actions.69

Determining strategic direction Determining strategic direction involves specifying the vision and the strategy to achieve this vision over time.70 The strategic direction is framed within the context of the conditions (i.e. opportunities and threats) strategic leaders expect their organisation to face in roughly the next three to five years. The strategic issues faced by Qantas demonstrate this.

The ideal long-term strategic direction has two par ts: a core ideolog y and an envisioned future. The core ideology motivates employees through the company’s heritage, but the envisioned future encourages employees to stretch beyond their expectations of accomplishment and requires significant change and prog ress to be realised.71 The env isioned f utu re ser ves as a g uide to many aspects of an organ isat ion’s st rateg y i mplementat ion process, i nc lud i ng mot ivat ion , leade rsh ip, employee empowe r ment a nd organisational design. The strategic direction could include such actions as entering new international markets and developing a set of new suppliers to add to the organisation’s value chain.72

Most changes in st rategic d i rect ion a re d i fficult to desig n and implement; however, GE CEO Jeff rey Immelt had an even greater challenge. GE performed exceptionally well in terms of profit and share price rises under Jack Welch’s leadership. A lthough change was necessar y because the competitive landscape

strategic direction the image and character the organisation seeks to develop over time

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Figure 12.4 Exercise of strategic leadership

Emphasising ethical practices

Effectively managing the organisation’s

resource portfolio

Sustaining an effective

organisational culture

Establishing balanced organisational controls

Determining strategic direction

Effective strategic leadership

had shifted significantly, shareholders accustomed to Welch and high performance had problems accepting Immelt’s changes (e.g. changes to the organisation’s cor porate-level strateg y and str ucture). It is difficult for new leaders to follow successful leaders such as Welch and Steve Jobs (Apple). On succeeding Jobs as CEO, Tim Cook changed course a little at Apple. He announced the payment of dividends (for the first time since 1995; Jobs was not a fan of dividend payments), visited factories where Apple machines are made to ensure they were safe, and made donations of US$50 million to Stanford hospitals (a ver y un Apple act).73 W hatever the changes made by new CEOs, information regarding the organisation’s strategic direction must be consistently and clearly communicated to all affected par ties.74

Some strategic leaders, however, may not choose the best strateg y for the organisation to follow given its competitive environment. For example, some executives are committed to the status quo. This risk- averse stance is common in organisations that have per for med well in the past and for CEOs who have been in t hei r jobs for ex tended per iods of t ime.75 Resea rch also suggests t hat some CEOs a re er rat ic or even ambivalent in their choices of strategic direction, especially when their competitive environment is turbulent and it is difficult to identify the best strategy.76 Of course, these behaviours are unlikely to produce high per for mance and may then lead to CEO tur nover. Interestingly, research has found that incentive compensation in the form of share options encourages talented executives to select the best strategies and thus achieve the highest performance. However, the same incentives used with less talented executives produce lower performance.77

A cha r ismat ic CEO may foster sta keholders’ com m it ment to a new v ision a nd st rateg ic d i rect ion. Nonetheless, it is important not to lose sight of the organisation’s strengths and weaknesses when making changes required by a new strategic direction. The organisation must take advantage of resource strengths a nd overcome or avoid act ions requ i r i ng capabi lit ies i n a reas where t he orga n isat ion is wea k.78 To do th is requires sen ior managers to develop the capability to analyse complex cond itions and understand t he i nter relat ionsh ips t hat ex ist i n order to desig n t he most effect ive st rateg y.79 In t he cu r rent global competitive landscape, senior managers also need to be ambicultural. In other words, they need to be able to identify the best managerial and strategic practices, regardless of their cultural origin, and meld them to create the best strategic approach for their organisation wherever they operate across the globe.80 The goal is to pursue the organisation’s shor t-term need to adjust to a new vision and strategic direction while maintaining its long-term sur vivability by effectively managing its por tfolio of resources.

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Effectively managing the organisation’s resource portfolio Effect ively ma nag i ng t he orga n isat ion’s por t fol io of resou rces may be t he most i mpor ta nt st rateg ic leadership task. The organisation’s resources are categor ised as fi nancial capital, human capital, social capital and organisational capital (including organisational culture).81

Clea rly, fi nancial capital is cr itical to organ isational success, and st rategic leaders u nderstand t h is reality.82 However, the most effective strategic leaders recognise the equivalent impor tance of managing each remaining type of resource as well as managing the integration of resources (e.g. using financial capital to provide training opportunities to enhance the capabilities embedded in human capital). Most importantly, effective strategic leaders manage the organisation’s resource por tfolio by organising the resources into capabilities, str uctur ing the organisation to facilitate using those capabilities, and choosing strategies through which the capabilities are successfully leveraged to create value for customers.83 Exploiting and maintaining core competencies and developing and retaining the organisation’s human and social capital are actions taken to reach these impor tant objectives.

Exploiting and maintaining core competencies Exa m i ned i n Chapters 1 a nd 3, core competencies a re capabilit ies t hat ser ve as a sou rce of compet it ive adva ntage for a n orga n isat ion over its r iva ls. Ty pica lly, core competencies relate to a n orga n isat ion’s f u nct iona l sk i l ls, such as ma nu fact u r i ng, fi na nce, ma rket i ng, a nd resea rch a nd development ( R& D). Strategic leaders must verify that the organisation’s competencies are emphasised when implementing strategies. Intel, for example, has core competencies of competitive agility (an ability to act in a variety of competitively relevant ways) and competitive speed (an ability to act quickly when facing environmental and competitive pressures).84 A nother way of looking at core competencies is the uniqueness differentials that organisations build and enhance relative to the industry competitors. A good example is the retailer JB Hi-Fi. It operates in a competitive industr y where brand recognition and ser vice deliver y are core capabilities. In JB H i-Fi’s case, its u n iqueness is a rou nd si mplicity a nd customer con nect iveness. For i nsta nce, t he handw ritten sales discount signs and relaxed ‘hip’ ser vice staff appeal to customers and differentiate its business model from competitors.

Capabi l it ies a re developed over t i me as orga n isat ions lea r n f rom t hei r act ions a nd en ha nce t hei r knowledge about specific actions needed. For example, through repeated interactions, some organisations have for med a capabi l it y a l low i ng t hem to f u l ly u ndersta nd c ustomers’ need s as t hey c ha nge. 8 5 Organisations with capabilities in R&D that develop into core competencies are rewarded by the market because of t he cr it ica l nat u re of i n novat ion i n ma ny i ndust r ies. 8 6 To cont i nuously develop c u r rent competencies and build new ones, organisations create a dynamic capability.87

Given the need for transformation, former General Motors (GM) CEO Dan Akerson built new capabilities i n tech nolog y development a nd ma rket i ng, especia l ly i n customer ser v ice. H is i ntent was to develop these into the new core competencies of GM; he was succeeded in Januar y 2015 by Mar y Bar ra, the fi rst female CEO of a major car maker.88 Since assuming this role, Barra has been tr ying to reorient GM’s culture and str ucture towards superior performance in order to ward off serious competitive challenges. With a continuing focus on profitability, GM announced early in 2018 that it intended to close its factor y in South Korea. This decision represents a step in a broad global downsizing implemented by Barra, who has closed, shr unk or sold unprofitable business units in India, Russia, Wester n Europe and South-East Asia. In all instances, Bar ra and her executive management team will need to implement various restr ucturing and downsizing decisions in ways that employees view as just and reasonable as well as necessar y for GM to succeed. However, it has been noted t hat ‘she has tu r ned it into a market-lead ing manufactu rer. GM is seen as innovative, powerful and successful – and its stock price has performed accordingly’.89 Using the dy namic capability descr ibed earlier, organisations must continuously develop and, when appropr iate, change their core competencies to outperform rivals. If they have a competence that provides an advantage,

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competitors will eventually imitate that competence and reduce or eliminate the organisation’s competitive advantage. Additionally, organisations must guard against the competence becoming a liability, thereby preventing change.

As we discuss next, human capital is critical to an organisation’s success. One reason it is so critical is that human capital is the resource through which core competencies are developed and used.

Developing human capital and social capital Human capital refers to the knowledge and skills of an organisation’s entire workforce. From the perspective of human capital, employees are viewed as a capital resource requiring continuous investment.9 0

Invest ments made to acquire and develop h igh-quality human capital are productive, in t hat much of t he development of Aust ra lia n a nd A sia n i ndust r ies ca n be att r ibuted to t he effect iveness of t hei r human resources. This fact suggests that ‘as the dynamics of competition accelerate, people are perhaps t he on ly t r uly sustainable sou rce of competitive advantage’.91 In all ty pes of organ isations – large and small, new and established – human capital’s increasing impor tance suggests a sig n i ficant role for t he organ isat ion’s hu man resou rce management act iv it ies.92 As a suppor t act iv ity (see Chapter 3), hu man resource management practices facilitate people’s effor ts to successfully select, and especially to use, the organisation’s strategies.93

E ffec t ive t ra i n i ng a nd development prog ra ms i nc rease t he probabi l it y of i nd iv idua ls becom i ng successful strategic leaders.94 These programs are increasingly linked to organisation success as knowledge becomes more integral to gaining and sustaining a competitive advantage.95 Additionally, such programs bu i ld k nowledge a nd sk i lls, i ncu lcate a com mon set of core va lues a nd offer a systemat ic v iew of t he organisation, thus promoting the organisation’s vision and organisational cohesion.

Effective training and development programs also contribute positively to the organisation’s effor ts to for m core competencies.96 Fur ther more, they help strategic leaders improve sk ills that are cr itical to completing other tasks associated with effective strategic leadership, such as determining the organisation’s strategic direction, exploiting and maintaining the organisation’s core competencies, and developing an organisational culture that supports ethical practices. Thus, building human capital is vital to the effective execution of strategic leadership. Indeed, some argue that the world’s ‘best companies are realising that no matter what business they’re in, their real business is building leaders’.97

W hen hu ma n capita l i nvest ments a re successf u l, t he resu lt is a work force capable of lea r n i ng continuously. Continuous learning and leveraging the organisation’s expanding knowledge base are linked with strategic success.98

Learning also can preclude making errors. Strategic leaders tend to learn more from their failures than their successes because they sometimes make the w rong attr ibutions for the successes.99 Sara Blakely, t he youngest self-made female billionaire in t he world, noted: ‘Don’t be intim idated by what you don’t know. That can be your greatest strength and ensure that you do things differently from ever yone else’.10 0 We k now t hat using teams to ma ke decisions can be effective, but sometimes it is better for leaders to make decisions alone, especially when the decisions must be made and implemented quickly (e.g. in crisis situations).101 As such, effective strategic leaders recognise the impor tance of learning from success and from failure.

Learning and building knowledge are important for creating innovation in organisations.102 Innovation leads to compet it ive adva ntage.103 Overall, orga n isat ions t hat create a nd mai ntai n g reater k nowledge usually achieve and maintain competitive advantages. However, as noted with core competencies, strategic leaders must guard against allowing high levels of knowledge in one area to lead to myopia and overlooking knowledge development oppor tunities in other impor tant areas of the business.

W hen facing challenging conditions, organisations sometimes decide to lay off some of their people. Strategic leaders must recognise, though, that lay-offs can result in a significant loss of the k nowledge possessed by the organisation’s human capital. Research shows that moderate-sized lay-offs may improve

human capital refers to the knowledge and skills of an organisation’s entire workforce

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organisation performance, but large lay-offs produce stronger performance downturns in organisations because of t he loss of people ( hu ma n capita l).10 4 A lt hough it is a lso not u ncom mon for rest r uct u r i ng orga n isat ions to reduce t hei r ex pend itu res on or i nvest ments i n t ra i n i ng a nd development prog ra ms, restr ucturing may actually be an impor tant time to increase investments in these programs. The reason for increased focus on training and development is that restr ucturing organisations have less slack and cannot absorb as many er rors; moreover, the employees who remain after lay-offs may find themselves in positions without all the skills or knowledge they need to perform the required tasks effectively.

View ing employees as a resou rce to be ma x im ised rat her t han as a cost to be m in im ised facilitates successful implementation of an organisation’s strategies, as does the strategic leader’s ability to approach lay-offs i n a ma n ner t hat employees believe is fai r a nd equ itable. A cr it ical issue for employees is t he fairness in the lay-offs and how they are treated in their jobs, especially relative to their peers.105

Social capital involves relationships inside and outside the organisation that help the organisation to accomplish tasks and create value for customers and shareholders.106 Social capital is a critical asset for an organ isation. Inside the organ isation, employees and un its must cooperate to get the work done. In multinational organisations, employees often must cooperate across country boundaries on activities such as R&D to achieve performance objectives (e.g. developing new products).107

Ex ter na l socia l capita l is i ncreasi ngly cr it ica l to orga n isat ion success. The reason for t h is is t hat few, if any, companies have all of the resources they need to successfully compete against their r ivals. Organisations can use cooperative strategies such as strategic alliances (see Chapter 9) to develop social capital. Social capital can be built in strategic alliances as organisations share complementar y resources. Resource sharing must be effectively managed to ensure that the par tner tr usts the organisation and is willing to share the desired resources.108 This social capital has many benefits. For example, organisations with strong social capital are able to be more ‘ambidextrous’; that is, they can develop or have access to multiple capabilities, providing them with the flexibility to take advantage of opportunities identified and to respond to significant challenges encountered.109 Research evidence suggests that the success of many types of organisations may partially depend on social capital. Large multinational organisations often must establish alliances in order to enter new foreign markets. Likewise, entrepreneurial organisations often must establish alliances to gain access to resources, venture capital or other types of resources (e.g. special exper tise that the entrepreneurial organisation cannot afford to maintain in-house).110 Retaining quality human capital and maintaining strong internal social capital can be affected strongly by the organisation’s culture.

Sustaining an effective organisational culture In Chapter 1, we defined organisational culture as a complex set of ideologies, symbols and core values that are shared throughout the organisation and in fluence the way business is conducted. Evidence suggests that an organisation can develop core competencies in terms of both the capabilities it possesses and the way the capabilities are leveraged when implementing strategies to produce desired outcomes. In other words, because the organisational culture influences how the organisation conducts its business and helps to reg ulate and cont rol employees’ behav iou r, it can be a sou rce of compet it ive advantage.111 Given its importance, it may be that a vibrant organisational culture is the most valuable competitive differentiator for busi ness orga n isat ions. Thus, shapi ng t he contex t w it h i n wh ich t he orga n isat ion for mu lates a nd implements its strategies – that is, shaping the organisational culture – is an essential strategic leadership action.112

‘Culture eats strategy for breakfast’ is accredited to the late business management guru Peter Drucker to emphasise that a powerful and empowering culture is a safer route to organisational success. With that said, it is clear that we have now reached the next stage in the global business landscape, where all organisations should reflect on their own cor porate culture if they want to maintain a sustainable business model. The bar has been raised in relation to organisational culture in Australia, with events such as the Misconduct in the Banking, Superannuation and Financial Ser vices Industr y Royal Commission (completed in 2019),

social capital involves relationships inside and outside the organisation that assist the organisation to accomplish tasks and create value for customers and shareholders

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and the ongoing Royal Commissions into Aged Care Quality and Safety, and Violence, Abuse, Neglect and Exploitation of People with Disability.113

In addition, APR A’s inquiry into CBA further raised the stakes regarding the nature of corporate culture and its impact on the role of directors. A PR A announced the Pr udential Inquir y in 2017 to examine the frameworks and practices in relation to gover nance, culture and accountability w ithin the CBA group, following a number of incidents that had damaged the reputation of the bank. Findings in the Final Report included several prominent cultural themes, such as a widespread sense of complacency, a reactive stance in dealing with risks, being insular and not learning from experiences and mistakes, and an overly collegial and collaborative working environment, which lessened the opportunity for constructive criticism, timely decision making and a focus on outcomes.114

Entrepreneurial mindset Especially in large organisations, an organisational culture often encourages (or discourages) strategic leaders from pursuing (or not pursuing) entrepreneurial oppor tunities.115 This issue is impor tant because entrepreneur ial oppor tunities are a v ital source of grow th and innovation.116 Accord ingly, a key role of strategic leaders is to encourage and promote innovation by pursuing entrepreneurial oppor tunities.117

One way to encourage innovation is to invest in oppor tunities as real options; that is, to invest in an oppor tunity in order to provide the potential option of taking advantage of the oppor tunity at some point in the future.118 For example, an organisation might buy a piece of land to have the option to build on it at some time in the future should the company need more space and should that location increase in value to t he company. Organ isat ions m ight enter st rategic alliances for sim ila r reasons. In t h is instance, an organisation might form an alliance to have the option of acquiring the partner later or of building a stronger relationship with it (e.g. developing a joint new venture).119

I n Chapter 13, we desc r ibe how la rge orga n isat ion s use st rateg ic ent repreneu rsh ip to pu rsue entrepreneurial oppor tunities and to gain first-mover advantages. Small and medium-sized organisations also rely on strategic entrepreneurship when trying to develop innovations as the foundation for profitable g row t h. In orga n isat ions of a l l sizes, st rateg ic ent repreneu rsh ip is more l i kely to be successf u l when employees have an entrepreneurial mindset.120

Five dimensions characterise an organisation’s entrepreneurial mindset: autonomy, innovativeness, risk taking, proactiveness and competitive aggressiveness.121 In combination, these dimensions influence the actions an organisation takes to be innovative and launch new ventures.

Autonomy, the first of an entrepreneurial orientation’s five dimensions, allows employees to take actions that are free of organisational constraints and per mits individuals and groups to be self-directed. The second dimension, innovativeness, ‘reflects a firm’s tendency to engage in and support new ideas, novelty, ex per imentat ion, a nd creat ive processes t hat may resu lt in new products, ser v ices, or tech nolog ical processes’.122 Cultures with a tendency towards innovativeness encourage employees to think beyond existing knowledge, technologies and parameters to find creative ways to add value. Risk taking reflects a willingness by employees and their organisation to accept risks when pursuing entrepreneurial opportunities. Assuming significant levels of debt and allocating large amounts of other resources (e.g. people) to projects that may not be completed are examples of these risks. The four th dimension of an entrepreneurial orientation, proactiveness, describes an organisation’s ability to be a market leader rather than a follower. Proactive organisational cultures constantly use processes to anticipate future market needs and to satisfy them before competitors learn how to do so. Finally, competitive aggressiveness is an organisation’s propensity to take actions that allow it to consistently and substantially outperform its rivals.123

Changing the organisational culture and restructuring Cha ng i ng a n orga n isat ion’s c u lt u re is much more d i ffic u lt t ha n ma i nta i n i ng it; however, effec t ive st rateg ic leaders recog n ise when cha nge is needed. Incremental cha nges to t he orga n isat ion’s cu ltu re

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t y pica l ly a re used to i mplement st rateg ies.12 4 More sig n i fica nt a nd somet i mes even rad ica l cha nges to orga n isat iona l c u lt u re suppor t selec t i ng st rateg ies t hat d i f fer f rom t hose t he orga n isat ion has implemented h istor ically. Regard less of t he reasons for change, shaping and reinforcing a new cultu re requ i res effect ive com mu n icat ion a nd problem solv i ng, a long w it h select i ng t he r ight people (t hose who have t he va lues desi red for t he orga n isat ion), engag i ng i n ef fec t ive per for ma nce appra isa ls (establish ing goals and measu r ing ind iv idual per for mance towa rds goals t hat fit in w it h t he new core values) and using appropriate reward systems (rewarding the desired behaviours that reflect the new core values).125

‘Changing the prevailing culture is often hard and it takes time. It starts with a realisation that what is occurring in the business is preventing the organization from performing at its peak.’126 Evidence suggests t hat cultu ral changes succeed on ly when t hey are actively suppor ted by t he organ isation’s CEO, ot her key executive management team members and middle-level managers.127 To effect change, middle-level managers in par ticular need to be highly disciplined to energise the culture and foster alignment with the strategic vision.128 In addition, managers must be sensitive to the effects of other major strategic changes on orga n isat ional cu ltu re. For exa mple, major dow nsizings or major g row t h ca n have negat ive effects on a n orga n isat ion’s cu ltu re, especially if t hey a re not implemented in accorda nce w it h t he dom ina nt organisational values.129

Organisational culture: is it really that important?

The answer to the title of this ‘Strategic focus’ is yes! The reason is that organisational culture has a significant influence on employees and, in turn, on an organisation’s performance as it interacts with strategy and structure. In this regard, ‘organisational culture sets the context for everything an enterprise does’. Strategic leaders recognise the important relationship among organisational culture, employees’ actions and organisation performance. For example, based on its survey of CEOs, the US Conference Board reported that these leaders view culture and quality talent to be the critical enablers of organisational success. The CEOs also believe that an open and inclusive culture is one in which organisational talent can thrive.

Effective strategic leaders also know that the type of culture that leads to positive outcomes requires time and effort to build. indeed, leaders must work diligently and consistently to build an effective organisational culture. Building this type of culture ‘takes patience, sacrifice and vision. it requires that leaders have the passion to improve their organization and to motivate, engage, and inspire their people with more than simply words or perks’. Once developed, culture changes in response to efforts needed to implement the organisation’s strategy within the context provided by the structures that are in place to support strategy execution efforts.

Research results support leaders’ belief about culture’s importance and its relationship with strategy and structure. Some researchers have found, for example, that ‘the key to running a successful organization is to have a culture based on a strongly held and widely shared set of beliefs that are appropriately supported by strategy and structure’. Among other benefits, a strong culture informs employees how leaders want them to respond to situations that may develop; gives employees confidence that the responses they initiate will be the correct ones; and assures employees that they will be recognised and rewarded for acting in a manner that demonstrates the organisation’s values as embedded in its culture. Thus, there is a strong link between leaders and the actions they take and the nature of an organisation’s culture.

Building and supporting an effective culture yields multiple specific benefits for an organisation. As examples, culture (1) increases employee loyalty in that individuals working in an organisation with a strong culture like the challenges associated with their job and enjoy the atmosphere in which they work; (2) attracts and retains talent in that strong cultures are environments in which people want to work and are passionate about their role in helping an organisation reach its vision and mission; (3) reflects an organisation’s

Strategic focus | Ethics

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identity in that it demonstrates ‘how the company views itself and how the company wishes to be viewed by the outside world’; and (4) creates intrinsic motivation for employee behaviour.

the most effective strategic leaders understand that their organisation’s culture can be a source of competitive advantage; as such, they proactively work to form an effective culture. At its best, ‘culture expresses goals through values and beliefs and guides activity through shared assumptions and group norms’. Going a step further, Bain & Company consultants suggest that ‘company culture is at the heart of competitive advantage, because it determines how things are done and how people behave’. Importantly, the consultants also say, culture ‘is the hardest thing for competitors to copy’. Culture’s imperfect imitability (see Chapter 3) explains why it can be a source of competitive advantage and perhaps a sustainable one.

To develop such a culture, leaders work with others to create an environment in which people have a passion to perform at high levels and to develop a culture with a unique personality and soul in the process of doing so. With an effective culture, organisations are able to attract and retain high-quality talent and serve loyal customers. Overall, developing and sustaining an effective organisational culture is indeed a key strategic leadership action.

Sources: 2018, Performance culture, Bain & Company, http://www.bain. com, 20 February; 2018, Understanding and developing organizational culture, Society for Human Resource Management, http://www.shrm. org, 12 February; B. groysberg, J. Lee, J. Price & Y.-J. Cheng, 2018, the

leader’s guide to corporate culture, Harvard Business Review, 96(1): 44–57; 2017, Survey finds CEOs leaning on talent and organizational culture to survive and thrive amid global volatility, Conference Board, http://www.

conference-board-org, 31 January; W. A. Levenson, 2017, Culture: A decisive competitive advantage, QualityDigest, http://www.qualitydigest.

com, 3 October; S. Patel, 2017, The importance of building culture in your organization, inc.com, http://www.inc.com, 24 October; D. Smith,

2017, How to define and build a great organizational culture in 2018, Medium.com, http://www.medium.com, 18 December.

Emphasising ethical practices The effectiveness of processes used to implement the organisation’s strategies increases when they are based on ethical practices. Ethical companies encourage and enable people at all organisational levels to act ethically when doing what is necessar y to implement strategies. In turn, ethical practices and the judgement on which they are based create ‘social capital’ in the organisation, increasing the ‘goodwill available to individuals and groups’ in the organisation.130 Conversely, when unethical practices evolve in an organisation, they may become acceptable to many managers and employees.131 One study found that in these circumstances, managers were par ticularly likely to engage in unethical practices to meet their goals when cur rent effor ts to meet them were insufficient.132

To properly influence employees’ judgement and behaviour, ethical practices must shape the organisation’s decision-ma k i ng process a nd must be a n i nteg ral pa r t of orga n isat ional cu ltu re. In fact, resea rch ev idence suggests that a value-based culture is the most effective means of ensuring that employees comply with the organ isation’s eth ical requirements.133 The inaug u ral Global Director Su r vey completed in 2018 prov ides an over v iew of how worldw ide d i rectors v iew a ra nge of issues, i nclud i ng et h ical behav iou r t hat i mpacts t he organ isat ions t hey gover n. Two t housand d i rectors f rom 17 member-based organ isat ions located in A f r ica, the Middle East, the A mericas, Asia-Pacific and Europe repor ted that ethical behaviour, health and safety and employee engagement were the three most social issues and risks facing directors.134

As we ex plained in Chapter 10, managers may act oppor tu n ist ically, ma k ing decisions t hat a re in t hei r own best interests but not in the organisation’s best interests when facing lax expectations regarding ethical behav iou r. I n ot her words, ma nagers act i ng oppor t u n ist ica l ly ta ke adva ntage of t hei r posit ions, ma k i ng decisions that benefit themselves to the detriment of the organisation’s stakeholders.135 But strategic leaders are most likely to integrate ethical values into their decisions when the organisation has explicit ethics codes, t he code is integ rated into t he business t h rough extensive et h ics t rain ing, and shareholders ex pect et h ical behaviour.136

Organisations should employ ethical strategic leaders: leaders who include ethical practices as par t of their st rateg ic d i rect ion for t he orga n isat ion, who desi re to do t he r ight t h i ng, a nd for whom honesty, t r ust a nd

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integrity are impor tant.137 Strategic leaders who consistently display these qualities inspire employees as they work with others to develop and suppor t an organisational culture in which ethical practices are the expected behavioural norms.138

Strategic leaders can take several actions to develop an ethical organisational culture. Examples of these actions include:

1 establishing and communicating specific goals to describe the organisation’s ethical standards (e.g. developing and disseminating a code of conduct)

2 continuously revising and updating the code of conduct, based on inputs from people throughout the organisation and from other stakeholders (e.g. customers and suppliers)

3 disseminating the code of conduct to all stakeholders to inform them of the organisation’s ethical standards and practices

4 developing and implementing methods and procedures to use in achieving the organisation’s ethical standards (e.g. using internal auditing practices that are consistent with the standards)

5 creating and using explicit reward systems that recognise acts of courage (e.g. rewarding those who use proper channels and procedures to repor t obser ved w rongdoings)

6 creating a work environment in which all people are treated with dignity.139 The effect iveness of t hese act ions i ncreases when t hey a re ta ken si mu lta neously a nd t hereby a re

mutually suppor tive. W hen strategic leaders and others throughout the organisation fail to take actions such as these – perhaps because an ethical culture has not been created – problems are likely to occur. For example, during the Australian men’s cricket tour to South A frica in 2018, Cricket Australia considered that it was imperative to appoint the Ethics Centre to conduct an independent organisational review of an incident where Australian cricketers tampered with the cricket ball in an attempt to influence the outcome of a Test match being held in Cape Town.

The Ethics Centre’s scope of the review into Cricket Australia was as follows: consider whether any cultural, organisational and/or governance factors within the Australian Men’s Team, Cricket Australia or Australian cricket may have contributed to the issues, either directly or indirectly; and recommend measures that Cricket Australia and Australian cricket should consider to ensure that any issues are addressed and that these or similar events never occur again.140

A culture of win-at-all-costs within the Australian men’s cricket team left the board and executive of Cricket Australia to deal with the fallout from what escalated into an international scandal. This scandal also raised questions about the board’s governance of culture and ethics. The reputational damage, loss of major sponsorship and depar ture of directors and the CEO resulted in Cricket Australia considering the 42 recommendations provided by the Ethics Centre and establishing the Australian Cricket Ethics Commission. The pur pose of this Commission would be ‘to hold all par ticipants in Australian Cricket accountable to the et h ical fou ndat ions for t he game as played in Aust ralia in accordance w it h How We Play, t he Spi r it of Cricket, the Laws of Cricket – and any successor documents that establish ethical standards for the game’.141

Leadership and corporate social responsibility Corporate social responsibility (CSR) has become a major interest and issue for many global organisations a nd a sig n i fica nt factor i n cor porate gover na nce i n Aust ralia over t he past two decades. The g row i ng interest towards a sustainable society requires a new type of leadership that promotes the ideals of CSR, and we will watch with interest over coming years for advancement in the landscape of CSR. Notwithstanding, there are many organisations that have been committed to CSR for some time. For example, since 2014,

corporate social responsibility (CSR) requires companies to consider the interests of all stakeholders, including investors, suppliers, consumers, employees and the community, in going about its business

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CalPERS (California Public Employees’ Retirement System) has worked with various par tners to promote susta i nabi l it y; one such exa mple is t he Un ited Nat ions Env i ron ment P rog ra m me Fi na nce I n it iat ive, wh ich is a globa l pa r t nersh ip to develop a nd promote l i n kages bet ween susta i nabi l it y a nd fi na ncia l performance.

Although Australia does not have mandatory reporting on social and environmental performance, many companies repor t voluntarily on their performance in these areas to meet annual disclosure obligations and demonstrate a commitment to CSR. Stakeholders can have a huge in fluence and impact if they are dissatisfied with the day-to-day management or strategic direction of any organisation. For example, as touched on in Chapter 10, inf u r iated investors forced the board of R io Tinto to ter m inate its CEO Jean- Sebast ien Jacques,  along w it h two of t he sen ior execut ives pa r t ially responsible for t he dest r uct ion of the  Juukan Gorge caves  in the Pilbara region of Western Australia, which contained evidence of human habitation 46 000 years ago.142 R io Tinto Chair Simon Thompson acknowledged that shareholder concerns played a significant role in the decision to par t ways with the three executives who were accountable for the Juukan Gorge blasting, stating: ‘We have listened to our stakeholders’ concerns that a lack of individual accountability undermines the group’s ability to rebuild that tr ust and to move for ward to implement the changes identified in the board review’.143

In 20 06, bot h t he Pa rl ia menta r y Joi nt Com m ittee on Cor porat ions a nd Fi na ncia l Ser v ices a nd t he Corporations and Markets Advisory Committee released reports examining the extent to which Australian companies should adopt CSR. The repor ts concluded that CSR can be an impor tant means for companies to manage non-financial risks and maximise their long-term financial value. The St James Ethics Centre’s Cor porate Responsibility Index (2003), the Reputex SR Index (2005) and the Australian CSR Standards (AS 8003) are suppor ted by the Australian Institute of Social and Ethical Accountability and Models of Success and Sustainability (MOSS), and have emerged to provide guidance for cor porations to implement, measure and repor t their CSR performance measures more effectively.144 Global companies in 2019 ranked by Forbes to have the best CSR reputation included BMW, Google, Daimler, Sony, Intel, Apple and Nestlé.145

Establishing balanced organisational controls Organisational controls are basic to a capitalistic system and have long been viewed as an important part of strategy implementation processes.146 Controls are necessary to help ensure that organisations achieve their desired outcomes.147 Defined as the ‘formal, information based … procedures used by managers to maintain or alter patterns in organisational activities’, controls help strategic leaders build credibility, demonstrate the value of strategies to the organisation’s stakeholders, and promote and support strategic change.148 Most critically, controls provide the parameters for implementing strategies as well as the cor rective actions to be ta ken when implementat ion-related adjust ments a re requ i red. The exa mple of R io Tinto a nd t he destr uction of the Juukan Gorge caves highlights a systemic failure of internal organisational controls.

In this chapter, we focus on two organisational controls – strategic and financial – that were introduced in Chapter 11. Strategic and financial controls are impor tant because strategic leaders, especially those at the top of the organisation, are responsible for their development and effective use.

As we explained in Chapter 11, financial control focuses on short-term financial outcomes. By contrast, st rateg ic cont rol focuses on t he content of st rateg ic act ions rat her t ha n t hei r outcomes. Some st rateg ic actions can be cor rect but still result in poor financial outcomes because of external conditions such as an economic recession, unexpected domestic or foreign government actions, natural disasters and other events with major impact, such as the Covid-19 pandemic. Therefore, emphasising financial controls often produces more short-term and risk-averse managerial decisions, because financial outcomes may be caused by events beyond managers’ direct control. Alternatively, strategic control encourages lower-level managers to make decisions t hat incor porate moderate a nd acceptable levels of r isk because outcomes a re sha red a mong the business-level executives making strategic proposals and the cor porate-level executives evaluating them.

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The challenge for strategic leaders is to achieve an appropriate balance of financial and strategic controls so that organisation performance improves. The balanced scorecard is a tool that helps strategic leaders to evaluate the effectiveness of the controls used.

The balanced scorecard The balanced scorecard is a framework organisations can use to evaluate whether they have achieved the appropriate balance among the strategic and financial controls to attain the desired level of organisation performance.149 This technique is most appropriate for use in evaluating business-level strategies; however, it can also be used with the other strategies organisations implement (e.g. cor porate level, international and cooperative).

T he u nderly i ng prem ise of t he ba la nced scoreca rd is t hat orga n isat ions jeopa rd ise t hei r f ut u re performance when financial controls are emphasised at the expense of strategic controls.150 This occurs because fi na ncia l cont rols prov ide feedback about outcomes ach ieved f rom past act ions but do not communicate the drivers of future performance.151 Thus, an overemphasis on financial controls may promote managerial behaviour that sacrifices the organisation’s long-term, value-creating potential for short-term performance gains.152 A n appropriate balance of strategic controls and financial controls, rather than an overemphasis on either, allows organisations to achieve higher levels of performance.

Four perspectives are integrated to form the balanced scorecard framework: financial (concerned with grow th, profitability and risk from the shareholders’ perspective), customer (concerned with the amount of va lue customers perceive was created by t he orga n isat ion’s products), internal business processes (w it h a focus on t he pr ior it ies for va r ious busi ness processes t hat create customer a nd sha reholder sat isfact ion) and learning and growth (concer ned w it h t he organ isat ion’s effor t to create a climate t hat suppor ts cha nge, i n novat ion a nd g row t h). Thus, usi ng t he ba la nced scoreca rd f ra mework a l lows t he organisation to understand how it responds to shareholders (financial perspective), how customers view it (customer perspective), the processes it must emphasise to successfully use its competitive advantage (internal perspective) and what it can do to improve its performance in order to grow (learning and growth perspective).153 Generally speaking, strategic controls tend to be emphasised when the organisation assesses its performance relative to the learning and growth perspective, whereas financial controls are emphasised when assessing performance in terms of the financial perspective.

Organisations use different criteria to measure their standing relative to the scorecard’s four perspectives. We show sample criteria in Figure 12.5. The organisation should select the number of criteria that will allow it to have both a strategic understanding and a financial understanding of its performance without becoming immersed in too many details.154 For example, we know from research that an organisation’s innovation, quality of its goods and ser vices, growth of its sales and its profitability are all interrelated.155

Strategic leaders play an important role in determining a proper balance between strategic controls and financial controls, whether they are in single-business organisations or large diversified organisations. A proper balance between controls is impor tant, in that ‘wealth creation for organisations where strategic leadership is exercised is possible because these leaders make appropriate investments for future viability [th rough strategic control], while maintaining an appropr iate level of fi nancial stability in the present [through financial control]’.156 In fact, most corporate restructuring is designed to refocus the organisation on its core businesses, thereby allowing senior executives to re-establish strategic control of their separate business units.157

Successfully using strategic control frequently is integrated with appropriate autonomy for the various subunits so that they can gain a competitive advantage in their respective markets.158 Strategic control can be used to promote the sharing of both tangible and intangible resources among interdependent businesses w ith in an organ isation’s por tfolio. In add ition, the autonomy prov ided allows the flex ibility necessar y to ta ke adva ntage of speci fic ma rket place oppor t u n it ies. A s a resu lt, st rateg ic leadersh ip promotes simultaneous use of strategic control and autonomy.159

balanced scorecard a framework that organisations can use to verify that they have established both strategic and financial controls to assess their performance

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The balanced scorecard is being used by car manufacturer Porsche. A fter this manufacturer of sought- after spor ts cars regained its market-leading position, it implemented a balanced scorecard approach in an effort to maintain this position. In particular, Porsche used the balanced scorecard to promote learning and continuously improve the business. For example, k nowledge was collected from all Porsche dealerships t h roughout t he world. The inst r u ment used to collect t he infor mat ion was refer red to as ‘Porsche Key Performance Indicators’. The fact that Porsche is now one of the world’s most profitable carmakers suggests the value the organisation gained, and continues to gain, by using the balanced scorecard as a foundation for simultaneously emphasising strategic and financial controls.160

As we have explained, strategic leaders are critical to an organisation’s ability to successfully use all par ts of the strategic management process.

• Cash flow • Return on equity • Return on assets

• Assessment of ability to anticipate customers’ needs • Effectiveness of customer service practices • Percentage of repeat business • Quality of communications with customers

• Asset utilisation improvements • Improvements in employee morale • Changes in turnover rates

• Improvements in innovation ability • Number of new products compared to competitors’ • Increases in employees’ skills

Learning and

growth

Internal business

processes

Customer

Financial

Perspectives Criteria

Figure 12.5 Strategic controls and financial controls in a balanced scorecard framework

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StUDY tOOLS SUMMARY LO1 Effective strategic leadership is a prerequisite of

successfully using the strategic management process. Strategic leadership entails the ability to anticipate events, envision possibilities, maintain flexibility and empower others to create strategic change. Executive managers are an important resource for organisations to develop and exploit competitive advantages. In addition, when they and their work are valuable, rare, imperfectly imitable and non-substitutable, strategic leaders are also a source of competitive advantage.

LO2 The executive management team is composed of key managers who play a critical role in selecting and implementing the organisation’s strategies. generally, they are senior officers of the organisation and/or the board of directors. The executive management team’s characteristics, an organisation’s strategies and its performance are all interrelated. For example, an executive management team with significant marketing and R&D knowledge positively contributes to the organisation’s use of a growth strategy. Overall, having diverse skills increases most executive management teams’ effectiveness. typically, performance improves when the board of directors is involved in shaping an organisation’s strategic direction. However, when the CEO has a great deal of power, the board may be less involved in decisions about strategy formulation and implementation. By appointing people to the board and simultaneously serving as CEO and chair of the board, CEOs increase their power.

LO3 In managerial succession, strategic leaders are selected from either the internal or the external managerial labour market. Because of their effect on organisation performance, selection of strategic leaders has implications for an organisation’s effectiveness. there is a variety of reasons that companies select the organisation’s strategic leaders from either internal or external sources. In most instances, the internal market is used to select the CEO, but the number of outsiders chosen is increasing. Outsiders often are selected to initiate major changes in strategy.

LO4 Effective strategic leadership has five major components: determining the organisation’s strategic direction, effectively managing the organisation’s resource portfolio (including exploiting and maintaining core competencies and managing human capital and social capital), sustaining an effective organisational culture, emphasising ethical practices, establishing balanced organisational controls and corporate social responsibility.

Strategic leaders must develop the organisation’s strategic direction. the strategic direction specifies the image and character the organisation wants to develop over time. To form the strategic direction, strategic leaders evaluate the conditions (e.g. opportunities and threats in the external environment) they expect their organisation to face over the next three to five years.

LO5 Strategic leaders must ensure that their organisation exploits its core competencies, which are used to produce and deliver products that create value for customers, when implementing its strategies. in related diversified and large organisations in particular, core competencies are exploited by sharing them across units and products. The ability to manage the organisation’s resource portfolio and manage the processes used to effectively implement the organisation’s strategy are critical elements of strategic leadership. Managing the resource portfolio includes integrating resources to create capabilities and leveraging those capabilities through strategies to build competitive advantages. Human capital and social capital are perhaps the most important resources.

As a part of managing the organisation’s resources, strategic leaders must develop an organisation’s human capital. Effective strategic leaders view human capital as a resource to be maximised – not as a cost to be minimised. Such leaders develop and use programs designed to train current and future strategic leaders to build the skills needed to nurture the rest of the organisation’s human capital. Effective strategic leaders build and maintain internal and external social capital. Internal social capital promotes

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cooperation and coordination within and across units in the organisation. External social capital provides access to resources the organisation needs to compete effectively.

LO6 Shaping the organisation’s culture is a central task of effective strategic leadership. An appropriate organisational culture encourages the development of an entrepreneurial orientation among employees and an ability to change the culture as necessary.

LO7 In ethical organisations, employees are encouraged to exercise ethical judgement and to always act ethically. Improved ethical practices foster social capital. Setting specific goals to meet the organisation’s ethical standards, using a code of conduct, rewarding ethical behaviours and creating a work environment where

all people are treated with dignity are actions that facilitate and support ethical behaviour.

LO8 The concept of corporate social responsibility is generally understood to mean that corporations have a degree of responsibility not only for the economic consequences of their activities, but also for the social and environmental implications.

LO9 Developing and using balanced organisational controls are the final components of effective strategic leadership. The balanced scorecard is a tool that measures the effectiveness of the organisation’s strategic and financial controls. An effective balance between strategic and financial controls allows for flexible use of core competencies, but within the parameters of the organisation’s financial position.

KEY TERMS balanced scorecard

corporate social responsibility (CSR)

executive management team

external managerial labour market

heterogeneous management team

human capital

internal managerial labour market

social capital

strategic direction

strategic leadership

REVIEW QUESTIONS 1. What is strategic leadership? in what ways are executive

managers considered important resources for an organisation?

2. What is an executive management team, and how does it affect an organisation’s performance and its abilities to innovate and design and implement effective strategic changes?

3. What is the effect of strategic leadership on determining the organisation’s strategic direction?

4. How do strategic leaders effectively manage their organisation’s resource portfolio to exploit its core competencies and leverage the human capital and social capital to achieve a competitive advantage?

5. What is organisational culture? What must strategic leaders do to develop and sustain an effective organisational culture?

6. What actions might a leader take to demonstrate that their interest in diversity goes beyond rhetoric?

7. As a strategic leader, what actions should leaders take to establish and emphasise ethical practices in the organisation?

8. What are organisational controls? Why are strategic controls and financial controls important aspects of the strategic management process?

9. How can CSR practices be encouraged and implemented within an organisation?

EXPERIENTIAL EXERCISES

Exercise 1: The CEO and executive management team Chapter 10 discussed corporate governance and the fiduciary role that the board plays in overseeing the

affairs of the company. the composition of the executive management team is critical in assessing the strategic direction of an organisation. It is not uncommon for a powerful CEO and senior management team to thwart the

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desires of the board. There are various ways in which a CEO may become powerful: it may be the result of equity ownership, tenure, expertise or by appointing sympathetic board members, for example. This exercise will allow you to assess the power of a CEO and his or her team and develop your thoughts regarding their relationship to the board.

Part 1 Identify with your team the organisation you would like to analyse. Pick an organisation that is publicly traded on the Australian Securities Exchange (ASX) so that you have adequate information about the executives.

Part 2 Explore the power relationship between the CEO and the executive management team and the board. You should at a minimum be able to address the following points: 1. What is the tenure of the CEO?

2. What is the tenure of the executive management team? Is there any diversity within the executive management team? if so, explain what the diversity is (age, gender or cultural)?

3. What is the relationship between the executive management team and the CEO (i.e. were they hired by the CEO or a predecessor)?

4. What is the board member tenure and composition (i.e. does the board structure possess only independent directors)?

5. Describe the CEO and the executive management team in terms of experience and networks. For example, do they sit on other organisations’ boards of directors, and are there any overlaps with their employer’s board?

6. What conclusions do you reach regarding the power relationship between the CEO and the board? Be prepared to discuss this utilising a PowerPoint presentation of your findings and conclusions.

Exercise 2: Strategic leadership is tough! We define strategic leadership as ‘the ability to anticipate, envision, maintain flexibility and empower others’. Accordingly, this exercise combines the practical elements of leadership in an experiential exercise. You are asked to replicate leaders and followers in the attainment of a defined goal.

Divide the class into teams of three to five individuals. Each team should choose a leader (and by that decision, who will be the followers). It is important to choose wisely. The classroom instructor will then assign the task to be completed. Students should be prepared to debrief the rest of the class when the assignment is completed. Your instructor will guide this discussion.

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109. Q. Cao, Z. Simsek & H. Zhang, 2010, Modelling the joint impact of the CEO and the tMt on organizational ambidexterity, Journal of Management Studies, 47: 1272–96; A. S. Alexiev, J. J. P. Jansen, F. A. J. Van den Bosch & H. W. Volberda, 2010, Top management team advice seeking and exploratory innovation: The moderating role of TMT heterogeneity, Journal of Management Studies, 47: 1343–64.

110. F. X. Molina-Morales & M. t. Martinez- Fernandez, 2010, Social networks: Effects of social capital on firm innovation, Journal of Small Business Management, 48: 258–79; H. E. Aldrich & P. H. Kim 2007, Small worlds, infinite possibilities? How social networks affect entrepreneurial team formation and search, Strategic Entrepreneurship Journal, 1: 147–65.

111. A. Klein, 2011, Corporate culture: its value as a resource for competitive advantage, Journal of Business Strategy, 32(2): 21–8; J. B. Barney, 1986, Organizational culture: Can it be a source of sustained competitive advantage?, Academy of Management Review, 11: 656–65.

112. E. F. Goldman & A. Casey, 2010, Building a culture that encourages strategic thinking, Journal of Leadership and Organizational Studies, 17: 119–28; V. Govindarajan &

A. K. gupta, 2001, Building an effective global business team, MIT Sloan Management Review, 42(4): 63–71.

113. Australian Government, 2020, Royal Commission into Misconduct in the Banking, Superannuation and Financial Services Industry, https:// financialservices.royalcommission.gov.au; Australian Government, 2020, Royal Commission into Aged Care Quality and Safety, https://agedcare.royalcommission. gov.au; Australian Government, 2020, Royal Commission into Violence, Abuse, Neglect and Exploitation of People with Disability, https://disability. royalcommission.gov.au.

114. APRA, 2018, APRA releases CBA Prudential Inquiry Final Report and accepts Enforceable Undertaking from CBA, Media release, https://www.apra.gov.au/ news-and-publications/apra-releases- cba-prudential-inquiry-final-report-and- accepts-enforceable, 1 May.

115. R. D. Ireland, J. G. Covin & D. F. Kuratko, 2009, Conceptualizing corporate entrepreneurship strategy, Entrepreneurship Theory and Practice, 33(1): 19–46; D. F. Kuratko, R. D. ireland & J. S. Hornsby, 2001, improving firm performance through entrepreneurial actions: Acordia’s corporate entrepreneurship strategy, Academy of Management Executive, 15(4): 60–71.

116. J. H. Dyer, H. B. Gregersen & C. Christensen, 2008, Entrepreneur behaviors, opportunity recognition and the origins of innovative ventures, Strategic Entrepreneurship Journal, 2: 317–38; R. D. Ireland & J. W. Webb, 2007, Strategic entrepreneurship: Creating competitive advantage through streams of innovation, Business Horizons, 50: 49–9.

117. S. A. Alvarez & J. B. Barney, 2008, Opportunities, organizations and entrepreneurship, Strategic Entrepreneurship Journal, 2: 171–4; D. S. Elenkov, W. Judge & P. Wright, 2005, Strategic leadership and executive innovation influence: An international multi-cluster comparative study, Strategic Management Journal, 26: 665–82.

118. R. E. Hoskisson, M. A. Hitt, R. D. ireland & J. S. Harrison, 2008, Competing for Advantage, 2nd edn, Cincinnati, OH: Thomson Publishing; R. G. McGrath, W. J. Ferrier & A. L. Mendelow, 2004, Real options as engines of choice and heterogeneity, Academy of Management Review, 29: 86–101.

119. Y. Luo, 2008, Structuring interorganizational cooperation: the role of economic integration in strategic alliances, Strategic Management Journal, 29: 617–37; R. S. Vassolo, J. Anand & T. B. Folta, 2004, Non-additivity in portfolios of exploration activities: A real options analysis of equity alliances in biotechnology, Strategic Management Journal, 25: 1045–61.

120. M. A. Hitt, R. D. Ireland, D. G. Sirmon & C. A. Trahms, 2011, Strategic entrepreneurship: Creating value for individuals, organizations and society, Academy of Management Perspectives, 25(2): 57–75; P. g. Kein, 2008, Opportunity discovery, entrepreneurial action and economic organization, Strategic Entrepreneurship Journal, 2: 175–90.

121. g. t. Lumpkin & g. g. Dess, 1996, Clarifying the entrepreneurial orientation construct and linking it to performance, Academy of Management Review, 21: 135–72; R. g. Mcgrath & i. MacMillan, 2000, The Entrepreneurial Mindset, Boston, MA: Harvard Business School Press.

122. Lumpkin & Dess, Clarifying the entrepreneurial orientation construct, 142.

123. Ibid., 137. 124. D. D. Bergh, R. A. Johnson & R. Dewitt,

2008, Restructuring through spinoff or sell-off: transforming information asymmetries into financial gain, Strategic Management Journal, 29: 133–48; P. Pyoria, 2007, informal organizational culture: The foundation of knowledge workers’ performance, Journal of Knowledge Management, 11(3): 16–30.

125. M. Kuenzi & M. Schminke, 2009, Assembling fragments into a lens: A review, critique, and proposed research agenda for the organizational work climate literature, Journal of Management, 35: 634–717; C. M. Christensen & S. D. Anthony, 2007, Put investors in their place, BusinessWeek, 28 May, 10.

126. G. Schroder, 2018, 5 key culture questions for boards, Australian Institute of Company Directors, 1 November, https://aicd. companydirectors.com.au/membership/ company-director-magazine/2018-back- editions/november/culture-how-to.

127. J. Kotter, 2011, Corporate culture: Whose job is it?, Forbes, http://blog. forbes.com/johnkotter, 17 February; J. S. Hornsby, D. F. Kuratko & S. A. Zahra, 2002, Middle managers’ perception of the internal environment for corporate entrepreneurship: Assessing a measurement scale, Journal of Business Venturing, 17: 253–73.

128. D. F. Kuratko, R. D. ireland, J. g. Covin & J. S. Hornsby, 2005, A model of middle- level managers’ entrepreneurial behavior, Entrepreneurship Theory and Practice, 29: 699–716.

129. E. g. Love & M. Kraatz, 2009, Character, conformity, or the bottom line? How and why downsizing affected corporate reputation, Academy of Management Journal, 52: 314–35.

130. Adler & Kwon, Social capital. 131. J. Pinto, C. R. Leana & F. K. Pil, 2008, Corrupt

organizations or organizations of corrupt individuals? two types of organization-level corruption, Academy of Management Review, 33: 685–709.

384 PART 3: STRATEGIC ACTIONS: STRATEGY IMPLEMENTATION

132. M. E. Scheitzer, L. Ordonez & M. Hoegl, 2004, Goal setting as a motivator of unethical behavior, Academy of Management Journal, 47: 422–32.

133. D. C. Kayes, D. Stirling & t. M. Nielsen, 2007, Building organizational integrity, Business Horizons, 50: 61–70; L. K. trevino, g. R. Weaver, D. g. toffler & B. Ley, 1999, Managing ethics and legal compliance: What works and what hurts, California Management Review, 41(2): 131–51.

134. Global Network of Director Institutes (GNDI), 2018, Global Director Survey Report, September, https://gndi.weebly.com/ uploads/1/4/2/1/14216812/gndi_global_ survey_2018.pdf.

135. X. Zhang, K. M. Bartol, K. g. Smith, M. D. Pfaffer & D. M. Khanin, 2008, CEOs on the edge: Earnings manipulation and stock- based incentive misalignment, Academy of Management Journal, 51: 241–58; M. A. Hitt & J. D. Collins, 2007, Business ethics, strategic decision making, and firm performance, Business Horizons, 50: 353–7.

136. J. M. Stevens, H. K. Steensma, D. A. Harrison & P. L. Cochran, 2005, Symbolic or substantive document? influence of ethics codes on financial executives’ decisions, Strategic Management Journal, 26: 181–95.

137. Y. Zhang & M. F. Wiersema, 2009, Stock market reaction to CEO certification: The signaling role of CEO background, Strategic Management Journal, 30: 693–710; C. Driscoll & M. McKee, 2007, Restorying a culture of ethical and spiritual values: A role for leader storytelling, Journal of Business Ethics, 73: 205–17.

138. R. Rumelt, 2011, Good Strategy/Bad Strategy, New York: Crowne Business; C. Caldwell & L. A. Hayes, 2007, Leadership, trustworthiness, and the mediating lens, Journal of Management Development, 26: 261–81.

139. B. E. Ashforth, D. A. gioia, S. L. Robinson & L. K. trevino, 2008, Re-viewing organizational corruption, Academy of Management Review, 33: 670–84; M. Schminke, A. Arnaud & M. Kuenzi, 2007, The power of ethical work climates, Organizational Dynamics, 36: 171–86; L. B. Ncube & M. H. Wasburn, 2006, Strategic collaboration for ethical leadership: A mentoring framework for business and organizational

decision making, Journal of Leadership & Organizational Studies, 13: 77–92.

140. Cricket Australia, 2018, Organisational Review and Players Pact, https://www. cricketaustralia.com.au/the-ethics-centre- organisational-review-players-pact, October.

141. Ibid. 142. D. Chau, M. Janda & Staff, 2020, Rio tinto

boss Jean-Sebastien Jacques quits over Juukan Gorge blast, ABC News, https:// www.abc.net.au/news/2020-09-11/ rio-tinto-boss-jean-sebastien-jacques- quits-over-juukan-blast/12653950, 11 September.

143. Ibid. 144. K. Backhouse & M. Wickham, 2020,

Corporate governance, boards of directors and corporate social responsibility: The Australian context, Corporate Ownership & Control, 17(4): 60–71, http://doi. org/10.22495/cocv17i4art5.

145. Forbes.com, The 10 companies with the best CSR reputations, https://www. forbes.com/pictures/efkk45fdekj/no-5- daimler/#2e2f9dd0bf8f.

146. A. Weibel, 2007, Formal control and trustworthiness, Group & Organization Management, 32: 500–17; G. Redding, 2002, The capitalistic business system of China and its rationale, Asia Pacific Journal of Management, 19: 221–49.

147. B. D. Rostker, R. S. Leonard, O. Younassi, M. V. Arena & J. Riposo, 2009, Cost controls: How the government can get more bang for its buck, Rand Review, http://www. rand.org/publications/randreview/issues/ spring2009; A. C. Costa, 2007, Trust and control interrelations, Group & Organization Management, 32: 392–406.

148. Control (management), 2011, Wikipedia, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/control, 6 July; M. D. Shields, F. J. Deng & Y. Kato, 2000, the design and effects of control systems: tests of direct- and indirect-effects models, Accounting, Organizations and Society, 25: 185–202.

149. R. S. Kaplan & D. P. Norton, 2009, the balanced scorecard: Measures that drive performance (HBR OnPoint Enhanced Edition), Harvard Business Review, Boston, March; R. S. Kaplan & D. P. Norton, 2001, the strategy-focused organization, Strategy & Leadership, 29(3): 41–2.

150. B. E. Becker, M. A. Huselid & D. Ulrich, 2001, The HR Scorecard: Linking People, Strategy, and Performance, Boston, MA: Harvard Business School Press, 21.

151. Kaplan & Norton, the strategy-focused organization.

152. R. S. Kaplan & D. P. Norton, 2001, Transforming the balanced scorecard from performance measurement to strategic management: Part I, Accounting Horizons, 15(1): 87–104.

153. Balanced scorecard, 2011, Wikipedia, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/control, 6 July; R. S. Kaplan & D. P. Norton, 1992, the balanced scorecard: Measures that drive performance, Harvard Business Review, 70(1): 71–9.

154. M. A. Mische, 2001, Strategic Renewal: Becoming a High-Performance Organization, Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice Hall, 181.

155. H. J. Cho & V. Pucik, 2005, Relationship between innovativeness, quality, growth, profitability and market value, Strategic Management Journal, 26: 555–75.

156. G. Rowe, 2001, Creating wealth in organizations: the role of strategic leadership, Academy of Management Executive, 15(1): 81–94.

157. R. E. Hoskisson, R. A. Johnson, D. Yiu & W. P. Wan, 2001, Restructuring strategies of diversified business groups: Differences associated with country institutional environments, in M. A. Hitt, R. E. Freeman & J. S. Harrison (eds), Handbook of Strategic Management, Oxford, UK: Blackwell Publishers, 433–63.

158. J. Birkinshaw & N. Hood, 2001, Unleash innovation in foreign subsidiaries, Harvard Business Review, 79(3): 131–7.

159. Hitt, Haynes & Serpa, Strategic leadership for the 21st century; Ireland & Hitt, Achieving and maintaining strategic competitiveness.

160. Balanced scorecard, 2011, Maxi-Pedia, http://www.maxipedia.com/balanced+sco recard+method+what+is; G. Edmondson, 2007, Pedal to the metal at Porsche, BusinessWeek, 3 September, 68; J. D. Gunkel & G. Probst, 2003, Implementation of the balanced scorecard as a means of corporate learning: The Porsche case, Cranfield, UK: European Case Clearing House.

385CHAPTER 12 StRAtEgiC LEADERSHiP

Strategic entrepreneurship CH

AP TE

R 13

Studying this chapter should provide you with the strategic management knowledge needed to: LO1 define strategic entrepreneurship and corporate entrepreneurship LO2 define entrepreneurship and entrepreneurial opportunities and explain their

importance LO3 define invention, innovation and imitation, and describe the relationships

among them LO4 describe entrepreneurs and the entrepreneurial mindset LO5 explain international entrepreneurship and its importance in improving

organisation performance LO6 describe how organisations internally develop and implement innovations LO7 explain how organisations use cooperative strategies to innovate LO8 describe how organisations use acquisitions as a means of innovation LO9 explain how strategic entrepreneurship helps organisations create value.

Learning Objectives

386

As explained in this chapter, organisations engaging in strategic entrepreneurship concentrate on advantage-seeking and opportunity-seeking behaviours simultaneously. In essence, this concentration finds organisations seeking entrepreneurial opportunities in their external environment that they can exploit through innovations and by successfully executing their chosen strategies. When engaging in strategic entrepreneurship, organisations develop innovations through internal investments, by using cooperative strategies and acquisitions strategies. Focusing on advantage- and opportunity-seeking behaviours simultaneously is challenging in that, by doing so, an organisation concentrates on selling its current products while seeking to identify needs in the marketplace that it can serve by innovating. As an example, consider the fact that Ford Motor Co. earns the bulk of its profits by selling large pick-up trucks and sport-utility vehicles. However, for a number of reasons, including environmental sustainability, consumer demand and governmental regulations, the organisation sees electric and plug-in hybrids along with trucks as an opportunity that it should pursue through product innovations. To do this, Ford intends to allocate US$11 billion to R&D between 2018 and 2022 to develop new and innovative transportation products. Volkswagen AG likewise sees electric, plug- in hybrid and driverless products as an opportunity to pursue through innovation and chose to commit US$40 billion to R&D between 2018 and 2023 to develop these products.

The situation for global automobile manufacturers, such as Ford and Volkswagen, which are today earning the majority of their profits by selling gasoline- and diesel-powered cars and trucks, is likely to be far different in the future. Resulting from environmental concerns, some changes in consumer preferences and anticipated regulations are opportunities for these companies to innovate in ways that will result in competitive success. Demonstrating this opportunity are predictions of increases in the sales volume of electric and hybrid vehicles along with the continuing advances with driverless cars and trucks. At the end of 2017, for

example, worldwide sales of electric and plug-in hybrid models exceeded three million units. Predictions at that time were that the total number of these units would exceed five million by the end of 2018 and that the rate of annual growth in sales of these types of vehicles beginning in 2019 and continuing would be significant. These predictions yield significant opportunities to innovate as a way to satisfy consumer and societal demands in terms of transportation vehicles.

Driverless vehicles are another opportunity for companies to pursue. In about 2007, General Motors was the first major automaker to envision driverless vehicles as a viable and important opportunity to pursue through innovation. Today, a multitude of companies, including internet organisations (e.g. Amazon), chipmakers (e.g. Microsoft) and software vendors (e.g. Cisco), see driverless vehicles as a viable opportunity to pursue by innovating. Organisations are using different approaches to pursue the driverless vehicle opportunity. Aptiv, the automotive-technology company previously named Delphi Automotive, initially partnered with Lyft, Inc., the ride-sharing organisation. Ford also established a partnership with Lyft as a means of testing its driverless products.

Today it is gas and diesel: tomorrow it is likely to be electric vehicles, plug-in hybrids, and driverless cars and trucks

OPENING CASE STUDY

Sedric, the first autonomous automobile from Volkswagen, on display in Geneva, Switzerland.

Source: Getty Images/Bloomberg/Chris Ratcliffe

Chapter 13 STRATeGIC enTRePReneURSHIP

387Chapter 13 STRATeGIC enTRePReneURSHIP

387

In Chapter 1, we indicated that organisational culture refers to the complex set of ideologies, symbols and core values that are shared throughout the organisation and that influence how an organisation conducts its business. Hence, culture is the social energy that drives – or fails to drive – the organisation. As you can see, at Ford and General Motors the strategic value of innovation is disseminated throughout the business. For organisations to be truly innovative, there are a number of factors that need to be considered in the context of driving an innovative culture, such as setting values that truly depict a desire to be innovative, risk taking and creating, or supporting a learning environment by either a founder of a start-up business, a board of directors of a private or public company, and the CEO or executive team. This is witnessed at organisations such as Ford that use strategic entrepreneurship to integrate their actions to find opportunities, innovate and then implement strategies for the purpose of adding value to the organisation’s bottom line. Leaders must leverage organisational structures and processes to build a culture of innovation and manage the perception of risk around innovating if they are to succeed at service innovation.1

Strategic entrepreneurship is taking entrepreneurial actions using a strategic perspective. In this process, the organisation tries to find opportunities in its external environment that it can try to exploit through innovations. Identifying opportunities to exploit through innovations is the entrepreneurship dimension of strategic entrepreneurship, while determining the best way to manage the organisation’s innovation efforts is the strategic dimension. Thus, organisations engaging in strategic entrepreneurship integrate their actions to find opportunities and to successfully innovate in order to pursue them.2 In the 21st-century competitive landscape, organisation survival and success depend on an organisation’s ability to continuously find new opportunities and quickly produce innovations to pursue them.3

To examine strategic entrepreneurship, we consider several topics in this chapter. First, we examine entrepreneurship and innovation in a strategic context. Definitions of entrepreneurship, entrepreneurial oppor tu n it ies a nd ent repreneu rs as t hose who engage i n ent repreneu rsh ip to pu rsue ent repreneu r ia l opportunities are presented. We then describe international entrepreneurship, a phenomenon reflecting the increased use of entrepreneurship in economies throughout the world. After this discussion, the chapter shifts to descriptions of the three ways organisations innovate. Internally, organisations innovate through either autonomous or induced strategic behaviour. We then describe the actions organisations take to implement the innovations resulting from those two types of strategic behaviours.

STRATEGY NOW

Driverless cars – innovation at Ford

Given the complexity of the opportunity, driverless vehicles require additional testing and development before becoming a viable option for a significant number of customers. In 2018, some predicted that Ford and General Motors had the highest probability of first introducing a meaningful number of viable driverless products into global markets. Ford, in fact, intends to roll out a fleet of driverless vehicles in 2021 that provides ride-sharing and ride-hailing services.

Automotive companies are not the only ones visualising electric vehicles, plug-in hybrids and self- driving products as an opportunity to pursue. 3M, for example, is focusing on how to tailor many of its products for what it sees as ‘auto electrification’, such as developing cooling fluids for batteries. 3M also sees driverless vehicles as an opportunity. In early 2018, the organisation tested stickers that are ‘transparent to the naked eye but actually contain bar codes that

autonomous cars will be able to read’ as a means of keeping track of their position. PPG Industries, the Pittsburgh-based paints and coatings manufacturer, is committed to developing car paints ‘to become more visible to electronic sensors that guide autonomous vehicles’.

Sources: M. Colias, 2018, Ford increasing electric vehicle investment to $11 billion by 2022, Wall Street Journal, http://www.wsj.com, 14 January;

T. Higgins, 2018, Driverless-car companies try to rev their engines on commercial prospects, Wall Street Journal, http://www.wsj.com, 8 January;

T. Higgins, VW, Hyundai turn to driverless-car startup in Silicon Valley, Wall Street Journal, http://www.wsj.com, 4 January; A. Levy & L. Kolodny, 2018, Self-driving cars take over CES: Here’s how big tech is playing the market,

CNBC News, http://www.cnbc.com, 12 January; J. C. Reindl, 2018, next step in driverless cars: Boot the driver, USA Today, http://www.usatoday. com, 10 January; D. Muoio, 2017, Ranked: The 18 companies most likely

to get self-driving cars on the road first, Business Insider, http://www. businessinsider.com, 27 September; J. Stern & C. Mims, 2017, Tech that will change your life in 2018, Wall Street Journal, http://www.wsj.com, 27

December; A. Tangel, 2017, Latest entrants into electric car race: Makers of Post-It notes, paint, Wall Street Journal, http://www.wsj.com,

26 December.

strategic entrepreneurship taking entrepreneurial actions using a strategic perspective

388 PART 3: STRATEGIC ACTIONS: STRATEGY IMPLEMENTATION

In addition, organisations can also develop innovations by using cooperative strategies, such as strategic alliances, and by acquiring other companies to gain access to their innovations and innovative capabilities.4 Most large, complex organisations use all three methods to innovate. The chapter closes with summary comments about how organisations use strategic entrepreneurship to create value and earn above-average returns.

As emphasised in this chapter, innovation and entrepreneurship are vital for young and old and for large and small organisations, for service companies as well as manufacturing organisations, and for high-technology ventures.5 In the global competitive landscape, the long-term success of new ventures and established organisations is a function of their ability to meld entrepreneurship with strategic management.6 A major portion of the material in this chapter is on innovation and entrepreneurship within established organisations. This phenomenon is called corporate entrepreneurship, which is the use or application of entrepreneurship within an established organisation.7 Corporate entrepreneurship has become critical to the survival and success of established organisations.8 Indeed, established organisations use entrepreneurship to strengthen their performance and to enhance growth opportunities.9 Of course, innovation and entrepreneurship play a critical role in the degree of success achieved by start-up entrepreneurial ventures as well. Much of the content examined in this chapter is equally important in entrepreneurial ventures (sometimes called ‘start-ups’) and established organisations.10

entrepreneurship and entrepreneurial opportunities Entrepreneurial opportunities are cond itions in which new goods or ser v ices can satisf y a need in the market. These opportunities exist because of competitive imperfections in markets and among the factors of production used to produce them or because they were independently developed by entrepreneurs.11 Strategic entrepreneurial opportunities come in many forms, such as the chance to develop and sell a new product and the chance to sell an existing product in a new market.12 Organisations should be receptive to pursuing entrepreneurial opportunities whenever and wherever they may surface.13

We study entrepreneurship at the level of the individual organisation. However, evidence suggests that entrepreneurship is the economic engine driving many nations’ economies in the global competitive landscape.14 Thus, entrepreneurship and the innovation it spawns are important for organisations competing in the global economy and for countries seeking to stimulate economic climates with the potential to enhance the living standards of their citizens.

Innovation Innovation is a complex interaction between a number of variables such as intellectual capital, corporate governance, financial performance, leadership, competitive intensity, industry/market and structure.15 It covers a wide range of activities to improve organisation performance, including the implementation of a new or significantly improved product, service, distribution process, manufacturing process, marketing method or organisational method.16 A broad definition of innovation is offered in the latest edition of the Oslo Manual and is most applicable to the context of strategic management.17

Innovation is a new or improved product or process (or combination thereof) that differs significantly from the unit’s previous products or processes and that has been made available to potential users (product) or brought into use by the unit (process). Innovation is a direct requirement of specific strategies such as differentiation (product innovation) and cost leadership (process innovation). Innovation is also associated with competitive dynamics, and effective innovation results in sustainable competitive advantage. Due to the link between the development of competitive advantages, many entities are interested in producing innovations and in effectively managing the innovation process. In relation to the management of the

corporate entrepreneurship the use or application of entrepreneurship within an established organisation

entrepreneurial opportunities conditions in which new goods or services can satisfy a need in the market

innovation a new or improved product or process that differs from the previous product or process and that has been made available to potential users

innovation process based on the need to commit resources and the consideration of the uncertainty of returns from innovative investments

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389

The innovation process is based on the need to commit resources and the consideration of the uncertainty of returns from innovative investments, which requires a need for a control of resources by the decision makers who shape the innovative process.18 Peter Drucker argued that ‘innovation is the specific function of entrepreneurship, whether in an existing business, a public service institution or a new venture started by a lone individual’.19 Moreover, Drucker suggested that innovation is ‘the means by which the entrepreneur either creates new wealth-producing resources or endows existing resources with enhanced potential for creating wealth’.20 Thus, entrepreneurship and the innovation resulting from it are critically important for all organisations. The realities of competition in the competitive landscape of the 21st century suggest that to be market leaders, companies must regularly develop innovative products desired by customers. This means that innovation should be an intrinsic part of virtually all of an organisation’s activities.21

Innovation is a key outcome organisations seek through entrepreneurship and is often the source of competitive success, especially in turbulent, highly competitive environments.22 For example, research results show that organisations competing in global industries that invest more in innovation also achieve the highest returns.23 In fact, investors often react positively to the introduction of a new product, thereby increasing the price of an organisation’s shareholding. Furthermore, ‘innovation may be required to maintain or achieve competitive parity, much less a competitive advantage in many global markets’.24 Investing in t he development of new tech nologies can increase t he per for mance of organ isations t hat operate in different but related product markets (refer to the discussion of related diversification in Chapter 6). In this way, the innovations can be used in multiple markets, and return on the investments is earned more quickly.25 Innovation is largely market driven, but also is driven by organisational culture and should be related to the strategy of the organisation. There are a number of barriers to innovation including costs and legislative requirements.26

In his classic work, Joseph Schumpeter argued that organisations engage in three types of innovative activities: invention, innovation and imitation.27 Invention is t he act of creat ing or developi ng a new product or process. Innovation is the process of creating a commercial product from an invention. It begins after an invention is chosen for development.28 Thus, an invention brings something new into being, while

invention the act of creating or developing a new product or process

innovation process in service organisations, innovation must be a strategic task; it must have a broad organisational process; and the innovation process should follow the four stage approach of idea generating, transformation into an innovation project, development and implementation.

The Oslo Manual defines four types of innovation, as described in Table 13.1.

Four types of innovation

Type of innovation Definition

Product innovation A good or service that is new or significantly improved. This includes significant improvements in technical specifications, components and materials, software in the product, user friendliness or other functional characteristics.

Process innovation A new or significantly improved production or delivery method. This includes significant changes in techniques, equipment and/or software.

Marketing innovation A new marketing method involving significant changes in product design or packaging, product placement, product promotion or pricing.

Organisational innovation A new organisational method in business practices, workplace organisation or external relations.

Source: Organisation for economic Cooperation and Development (OeCD), 2018, Oslo Manual: Guidelines for Collecting and Interpreting Innovation Data, 4th edn, Paris: OeCD, pp. 20–1.

Table 13.1

390 PART 3: STRATEGIC ACTIONS: STRATEGY IMPLEMENTATION

an innovation brings something new into use. Accordingly, technical criteria are used to determine the success of an invention, whereas commercial criteria are used to determine the success of an innovation.29 Finally, imitation is the adoption of a similar innovation by different organisations. Imitation usually leads to product or process standardisation, and products based on imitation often are offered at lower prices, but without as many features. Entrepreneurship is critical to innovative activity in that it acts as the linchpin between invention and innovation.30

Product innovation The term ‘product’ is defined in the System of National Accounts and encompasses both goods and services; products are the economic output of production activities.31 They can be exchanged and used as inputs in the production of other goods and services, as final consumption by households or governments, or for investment, as in the case of financial products. A product innovation is a new or improved good or service that differs significantly from the organisation’s previous goods or services and that has been introduced on the market.

Product innovations provide for significant improvements to one or more characteristics or performance specifications. This includes the addition of new functions, or improvements to existing functions or user utility. Relevant functional characteristics include quality, technical specifications, reliability, durability, economic efficiency during use, affordability, convenience, usability and user friendliness. Product innovations do not need to improve all functions or performance specifications. An improvement to or addition of a new function can also be combined with a loss of other functions or a decline in some performance specifications.

An additional characteristic of both goods and services that may influence usability or utility is product design. New designs or improved design features can influence the appearance or ‘look’ of a product and consequently enhance the user’s utility; for example, through a substantial design change that creates a positive emotional response.32

Many organisations are able to create ideas that lead to inventions, albeit commercialising those inventions has, at times, proved difficult.33 This difficulty is suggested by the fact that approximately 80 per cent of R&D occurs in large organisations, but these same organisations produce fewer than 50 per cent of the patents.34 Patents are a strategic asset and the ability to regularly produce them can be an important source of competitive advantage, especially when an organisation intends to commercialise the invention and when the organisation competes in a knowledge-intensive industry (e.g. pharmaceuticals).35

entrepreneurs Entrepreneurs are individuals, acting independently or as part of an organisation, who perceive an entrepreneurial opportunity and then take risks to develop an innovation to exploit it. Entrepreneurs can be found throughout an organisation, from executive managers to those working to produce an organisation’s goods or services. Entrepreneurs are found throughout organisations such as Amazon, Appen, Atlassian and Afterpay, for example. At Amazon many employees devote a portion of their time to developing ideas and innovations. Entrepreneurs tend to demonstrate several characteristics: they are highly motivated, willing to take responsibility for their projects, self-confident and often optimistic.36 In addition, entrepreneurs tend to be passionate, have a vision and be emotional about the value and importance of their innovation- based ideas.37 They are able to deal with uncertainty and risk, and are more alert to opportunities than others.38 Interestingly, recent research found that genetic factors partly influence people to engage in entrepreneurship.39 To be successful, entrepreneurs often need to have good social skills and be able to plan exceptionally well (e.g. to obtain venture capital).40 Entrepreneurship entails much hard work to create a vision and achieve success.

Evidence suggests that successful entrepreneurs have an entrepreneurial mindset. The person with an entrepreneurial mindset values uncer tainty in the marketplace and seeks to continuously identif y

imitation the adoption of an innovation by similar organisations

product innovation a good or service that is new or significantly improved, including significant improvements in technical specifications, components and materials, software in the product, user friendliness or other functional characteristics

entrepreneurs individuals, acting independently or as part of an organisation, who see an entrepreneurial opportunity and then take risks to develop an innovation to pursue it

STRATEGY NOW

Entrepreneurship at Amazon

entrepreneurial mindset the person who values uncertainty in the marketplace and seeks to continuously identify opportunities with the potential to lead to important innovations

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opportunities with the potential to lead to important innovations.41 Because it has the potential to lead to continuous innovations, an individual’s entrepreneurial mindset can be a source of competitive advantage for an organisation.42 Entrepreneurial mindsets are fostered and supported when knowledge is readily available throughout an organisation. Indeed, research has shown that units within organisations are more innovative when they have access to new knowledge.43 Transferring knowledge, however, may be difficult, often because the receiving party must have adequate absorptive capacity (or the ability) to learn the knowledge.44 Learning requires that the new knowledge be linked to the existing knowledge. Thus, managers need to develop the capabilities of their human capital to build on their current knowledge base while incrementally expanding that knowledge.45

International entrepreneurship International entrepreneurship is a process in which organisations creatively discover and exploit opportunities that are outside their domestic markets in order to develop a competitive advantage.46 As the practices suggested by this definition show, entrepreneurship is a global phenomenon.47 As noted earlier, approx