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The Nonproliferation Review

ISSN: 1073-6700 (Print) 1746-1766 (Online) Journal homepage: https://www.tandfonline.com/loi/rnpr20

Strategic challenges to WMD elimination

Rebecca Hersman

To cite this article: Rebecca Hersman (2016) Strategic challenges to WMD elimination, The Nonproliferation Review, 23:1-2, 31-47, DOI: 10.1080/10736700.2016.1190506

To link to this article: https://doi.org/10.1080/10736700.2016.1190506

Published online: 08 Sep 2016.

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Strategic challenges to WMD elimination Rebecca Hersman

ABSTRACT Operations to eliminate weapons of mass destruction (WMD) are highly situation-dependent and defy easily replicable solutions and approaches. Nevertheless, by examining WMD elimination missions as they have transpired over the past several decades, we can begin to identify several consistent challenges. Learning to better prepare for these challenges—both within and across various facets of the US government as well as with our international partners—will enhance future elimination operations and their chances of success. The article concludes by asserting that military and nonmilitary approaches to these operations are not competing ideological approaches but rather reflect the complexity of the operational environment and the subsequent need for a range of legal, political, military, financial, and diplomatic tools.

KEYWORDS Weapons of mass destruction; disarmament; nonproliferation; Cooperative Threat Reduction; former Soviet Union; Iraq; chemical weapons; Middle East; Libya; Syria

Eliminating weapons of mass destruction (WMD) is both an obligation and an opportu- nity borne of the post-Cold War security environment. The challenges to eliminating nuclear, chemical, or biological weapons continually evolve within the changing geopoli- tical and strategic context. From the early post-Soviet days of Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) efforts to incipient threats presented by non-state actors, important lessons can be learned from past efforts to reduce, reverse, and eliminate WMD threats.

This article examines the development of WMD elimination missions, starting with the 1991 collapse of the Soviet Union and the Gulf War and continuing to the WMD threats arising out of the Arab Spring and recent WMD use by non-state actors. Although the scenarios requiringWMD elimination vary and lack predictability, several consistent chal- lenges—legal, financial, operational, technical—are likely to persist. Moreover, individual elimination operations and activities defy easily replicable solutions and approaches. Future successes will depend not only on our ability to plan and prepare realistically, but also to preserve and foster innovation, creativity, and collaboration across the US government and among our international partners.

WMD threat reduction efforts cannot focus exclusively on reducing access to capacity; material and equipment security and destruction are important but insufficient. Pairing these efforts with norms and legal obligations, as well as with a strong security culture, builds accountability and reinforces deterrence. Justice, accountability, and consequences at the national, institutional, and even individual levels represent the most effective way to prevent WMD use in the future.

© 2016 Middlebury Institute of International Studies at Monterey, James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies

CONTACT Rebecca Hersman [email protected]

NONPROLIFERATION REVIEW, 2016 VOL. 23, NOS. 1–2, 31–47 http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/10736700.2016.1190506

The evolving strategic context

The collapse of the Soviet Union changed the nonproliferation landscape forever. During the conventional and unconventional military arms race that ebbed and flowed through- out the Cold War, nations addressed the risks of WMD—chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons and missile delivery systems—through three principal mechanisms. Nonproli- feration agreements and export controls sought to suppress or prevent the emergence of new WMD-possessing states by creating legal, political, and economic barriers to WMD acquisition. Deterrence and defense activities and capabilities reflected efforts to prevent, respond to, and manage WMD use during conflict. Finally, bilateral arms control between the United States and the Soviet Union attempted to slow acquisition and reduce or eliminate military capabilities through mutual agreement. When individual states chose to reduce or eliminate their own WMD capabilities—such as the United States’s decision to forego biological weapons in 1969 or South Africa’s elimination of its nuclear weapons in the early 1990s—they did so according to their own strategic logic and at their own expense.

In 1991, the ground shifted. Three new republics—Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakhstan— suddenly inherited substantial nuclear capabilities (as well as chemical and biological capabilities) from the devolving Soviet empire. At the same time, economic and political collapse across Russia appeared imminent, prompting fears that Russia’s vast WMD capa- bilities could find their way to the highest bidder or simply be left to disrepair as funds to secure and maintain them evaporated. On December 12, 1991, President George H. W. Bush signed into law the Soviet Nuclear Threat Reduction Act of 1991, paving the way for extensive financial, operational, and technical assistance to help consolidate, secure, and destroy substantial portions of the former Soviet Union’s WMD capabilities. This landmark legislation recognized that WMD threats came not only from the deliberate use of these weapons during conflict, but also by their mere existence and, by extension, their vulnerability to theft and misuse.

That same year, in the Middle East, an international coalition assembled to eject Iraq from Kuwait discovered biological, chemical, and nuclear weapons programs across Iraq far more extensive than previously estimated. UN Security Council Resolution (687), which set the terms to end the 1991 Gulf War, required that Iraq permanently for- swear its chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons programs and destroy all related materials, equipment, and facilities under international supervision via the United Nations Special Commission (UNSCOM) and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). Spurred not only by the alarming discoveries about the Iraqi WMD programs but also by the horrors of chemical weapons (CW) attacks during the 1980–88 Iran- Iraq War—particularly the devastating 1988 Halabja massacre, in which Iraqi troops attacked Kurdish villages with mustard and nerve agents—the United States and several other likeminded nations set out to finalize a convention on the complete abolition of CW, verifiably prohibiting the use of CW and their acquisition, development, and posses- sion. One hundred and thirty states signed the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) in January 1993, prompting the need for CW destruction and elimination efforts in seven declared CW-possessing states, including the United States and Russia, and ushering in an expansion of WMD elimination to include international assistance to states seeking to fulfill their treaty obligations.

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Over the next decade, unilateral destruction by the Iraqi government, supervised inter- national destruction efforts, and military strikes all played a part in eliminating the vast majority of the known Iraqi WMD program. Never a truly cooperative partner in the elim- ination process, Saddam Hussein’s regime played a decades-long game of cat-and-mouse as it alternatively concealed and revealed different aspects of its nuclear, chemical, biologi- cal, and missile programs. Uncertainty about the Iraqi program and the long-running difficulties in locating and eliminating its WMD programs prompted rethinking in the military about the challenges dealing with an adversary’s WMD capabilities both during and after conflict.

The post-Cold War, post-Gulf War WMD landscape

Alone, diplomatic efforts designed to constrain nations from acquiring or proliferating WMD capabilities could do little to reduce or eliminate extant weapons and programs that states had spent years accumulating at enormous expense. Treaties and accords, while essential for shaping intent across the vast majority of nations, often lack the insti- tutional resources—including technical acumen and operational skills—needed to ensure compliance through dangerous and expensive efforts, especially in war-torn or economi- cally weakened states. As the United States came to understand from its own destruction experience, safely and securely destroying nuclear, chemical, or biological materials, facili- ties, or equipment is as or more difficult and costly than building the programs in the first place. International assistance in implementing treaties, agreements, and accords has become expected and essential to the successful completion of elimination tasks.

At the same time, defense planners and strategists began to recognize that, while the chances of world-ending WMD Armageddon may have receded, the risk of smaller- scale use, including use of chemical and biological agents in conflict had indeed risen— making preparedness and defenses against WMD use of growing importance. The 1995 sarin attacks on the Tokyo subway by Aum Shinrikyo, the Japanese doomsday cult, raised WMD terrorism as a real and present danger. At the same time, military options designed specifically to reduce or eliminate WMD, however, proved highly limited: the lack of precise targeting data, risks of collateral damage and contamination, and legal and political constraints on the use of force made the destruction of these capabilities through direct kinetic attack highly problematic and of limited utility.

In this environment, in 1993, threat reduction and counterproliferation became staples of the nonproliferation parlance and part of a broader expansion of Department of Defense (DOD) roles and responsibilities in dealing withWMD threats. Preventing, deter- ring, and defending against WMD threats to US deployed forces and homeland remained essential but insufficient. The nation’s counter-WMD toolkit now needed the ability to roll back, reduce, or eliminate existing WMD-related capabilities, whether to support new or existing treaty partners fulfill treaty obligations, prevent loss of control or transfer to other states or non-state actors, or simply to take advantage of fleeting opportunities for perma- nent reductions in risk.

Following the September 11, 2001, attacks, fears of WMD terrorism came dramatically to the fore, while state use of WMD became a receding concern. In fact, some states, such as Muammar Qaddafi’s Libya, came to see their WMD programs as sources of increasing risk and decreasing utility and chose to forego them (see, in this volume, Patrick Terrell,

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Katharine Hagen, and Ted A. Ryba, Jr., “Eliminating Libya’s WMD Programs: Creating a Cooperative Situation,” pp. 185–196). Yet, if terrorists could kill nearly 3,000 Americans and bring the nation to a standstill with four hijacked jetliners, it took little imagination to foresee what destruction they could wreak with even relatively small quantities of nuclear, biological, or chemical weapons in their possession. The traditional nonproliferation and deterrence approaches used to counter state behavior were of limited value in preventing WMD terrorism or shaping the decisions of non-state actors. The United States’s post-9/11 counterterrorism efforts—the Global War on Terror—focused on finding and eliminating actors of concern. WMD counterproliferation policy looked almost exclu- sively at the capability side of the equation—preventing access to materials, weapons, tech- nology, and expertise by securing, reducing, and eliminating those capabilities at the source. In short hand, counterterrorism was about the people, and counterproliferation was about the “stuff.”

Of course, by 2003, the US security apparatus was consumed by the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. The substantial overstatement of Iraq’s WMD capabilities as the grounds for invasion and war—and the multiyear political firestorm that ensued—completely over- shadowed profound gaps in the military’s ability to locate, characterize, secure, disable, or destroy WMD capabilities, especially in conflict environments. CTR activities in both the Departments of State and Defense continued quietly and even expanded to states such as Iraq and Libya as the political leadership remained largely preoccupied with the military campaigns. At the same time in 2003, the failure to seize the weapons on the So San—an unflagged merchant ship intercepted in the Gulf of Aden and illegally carrying fifteen complete Scud-B missiles, fifteen warheads, and missile propellant—revealed substantial political, legal, and operational gaps in the international community’s ability to respond to WMD proliferation activities.1

The So San episode prompted a re-examination of military strategy and capabilities for countering WMD threats. As a result, the 2006 National Military Strategy to Combat WMD (CWMD) revamped and expanded military responsibilities in the WMD realm and identified a range of specific “mission areas” for DOD counterproliferation, including new responsibilities for WMD elimination and interdiction.2 The 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) echoed these concerns about military organization and prepared- ness for WMD activities and operations and called for the establishment of a Combined Joint Task Force for WMD elimination.3 Shortly thereafter, recognizing the disparate and complex command and control over the CWMD mission space, Secretary of Defense Robert Gates decided to consolidate responsibility for “synchronizing” the CWMD mission at US Strategic Command in hopes that unification under a single combatant command would provide the mission with a sense of coherence, priority, and focus it otherwise lacked. These changes were enshrined in the Unified Command Plan signed by President George W. Bush in 2007. Still, resources, attention, and focus did not accompany the organizational changes, and the mission continued to languish. Strategy, doctrine, and planning for WMD elimination became rather rigidly associated with large-scale ground combat operations.4

In 2009, President Barack Obama came to office with a clear mandate to reduce US military involvement overseas and bring the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan to a close. He also brought a personal interest and passion to reducing and eliminating WMD threats, and a determination to act through diplomatic and cooperative means.

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Obama’s April 2009 speech in Prague laid out the key elements and priorities of the president’s nuclear policy, which included a renewed focus on arms control with Russia, diplomatic leadership on a range of nonproliferation efforts, and the announce- ment of the Nuclear Security Summit process, which would support and guide efforts to “lock down” weapon-usable nuclear materials worldwide within four years.5

Complex interagency actions to remove and secure these materials, such as the Febru- ary 2010 removal of more than 18 kilograms of highly enriched uranium (HEU) from Chile and the 2012 removal of more than 200 kilograms of HEU from Ukraine to secure storage facilities, as well as the 2012 completion of DOD CTR efforts to remove and secure more than a dozen weapons’ worth of plutonium from the former nuclear test site at Semipalatinsk, Kazakhstan, further expanded the concept of eliminating WMD threats at the source. The sum of these elimination efforts is impressive: since May 2004, more than 4,100 kilograms of HEU and plutonium (more than enough material for 165 nuclear weapons) have been removed or disposed, and all weapon-usable HEU has been eliminated from sixteen states.6

President Obama’s concerns about WMD threats were not limited to the nuclear domain; the administration placed substantial emphasis on biological threats as well. The National Strategy for Countering Biological Threats was the first major strategy released by the new president in December 2009, laying out an integrated approach to address infectious-disease threats, whether of natural, deliberate, or accidental origin, and it prompted a major expansion of threat-reduction efforts aimed at detecting, secur- ing, and reducing biological risks.

These priorities were reflected in the 2010 QDR and in the president’s fiscal year 2011 budget requests for CTR and other nonproliferation programs in both the DOD and the Department of Energy.7 Concerns about instability and weak and fragile states also figured prominently. The 2010 QDR directed DOD to “prepare to contain WMD threats emanat- ing from fragile states and ungoverned spaces. Success in this area will hinge on the ability to prevent and respond to global WMD crises, such as situations in which responsible state control of nuclear, chemical, or biological materials is not guaranteed,” requiring “the ability to locate and secure WMD and WMD-related components, as well as interdict them on land, on sea, or in the air.”8

North Korea was and remains among the greatest concerns for instability-induced proliferation and use of WMD, given the breadth and scale of its WMD programs. But as the Arab Spring unfolded throughout 2011, the Middle East once again became a focal point for the potential loss of control of WMD and the growing risk of acquisition and use by terrorists.

Back in the Middle (East)

Events in the Middle East also placed renewed attention on the WMD stepchild: CW. To many, CW had become old news—the weapon-of-not-quite-mass-destruction that was simply riding the nuclear and biological threats’ coattails. There were many causes for this deprioritization: sharp reductions in the size and number of large, military-owned CW programs around the world; the relative effectiveness of the 1997 Chemical Weapons Convention in curbing the proliferation and acquisition of CW; the belief that passive defense and protection measures sharply limited any military utility of CW; and

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the awareness that employment of CWagainst even unprotected civilian populationswould never produce mass casualties on the scale associated with biological or nuclear weapons and were more comparable to the use of conventional explosives.

Those perceptions began to change in 2011 as the Arab Spring spread to Libya and NATO intervened with airstrikes in the face of political and humanitarian chaos. The residual stockpile of declared Libyan mustard agent, stored and awaiting destruction at the Ruwagha CW depot and military facility, received attention at the highest levels as the air campaign was planned. Preventing accidental release or the loss of control was a top priority; no one wanted the air campaign to be blamed for the release of CW or for their transfer into terrorist or insurgent hands. Shortly after the fall of Qaddafi, forces aligned with the new national authority found and relocated a number of additional CW that the Qaddafi regime had not previously declared. These included 517 filled chemi- cal artillery shells, eight 250-kilogram bombs, and forty-five containers filled with degrad- ing mustard agent.9 This relatively small chemical stockpile received considerable attention in the White House, from the president on down. Without much fanfare, an enormous effort took place behind the scenes. The remaining stockpile of weapons and materials was destroyed by January 2014.10

This elimination effort unfolded at record speed, under extremely difficult circum- stances, with a barely functioning Libyan government, and within a steadily deteriorat- ing security environment. As former White House Senior Director and Assistant Secretary of Defense Derek Chollet stated, “beyond some effective civil society and elec- tions assistance programs, just one program designed and implemented between 2012 and 2014 has worked as intended in the security sphere: the destruction of leftover and undeclared CW.”11

Even before the NATO air campaign had run its course in late 2011, much attention had shifted across the Mediterranean to Syria, where one of the largest, active military CW programs co-existed uneasily with civil war, unfolding humanitarian catastrophe, and mounting instability. Fears about the loss of control of the weapons or transfer of these capabilities ran high, even, on occasion, eclipsing the more obvious and immediate concern: their use by the regime against its own people. On August 21, 2013, nerve agent attacks in Ghouta, outside of Damascus, constituted the largest and deadliest confirmed use of CW against civilians since the 1988 Halabja massacre by Saddam Hussein. Over 1,400 civilians were killed in Ghouta in a single day, and the evidence soon proved over- whelming that Syrian regime forces were responsible for the attack.12

With a declared “red line” crossed, the US administration felt compelled to respond for- cefully to prevent future attacks.13 Nevertheless, military options to eliminate or even sub- stantially degrade Bashar al Assad’s CW program were limited and fraught with risk of escalation and collateral damage. Faced with a fraying international coalition, congres- sional opposition, and a fairly bleak assessment as to the practical efficacy of airstrikes, President Obama dispatched Secretary of State John Kerry to Geneva to pursue a diplo- matic option. As elsewhere in this volume explained in greater detail (see Philipp C. Bleek and Nicholas J. Kramer, “Eliminating Syria’s Chemical Weapons: Implications for Addressing Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Threats,” pp. 197–230), what followed was one of the largest and most complex WMD elimination efforts ever attempted by the international community. Over the next year, the coalition of international partners, alongside the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) and the

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United Nation’s Joint Mission for the Elimination of the Chemical Weapons Programme of the Syrian Arab Republic, eliminated over 1,200 metric tons of prohibited chemicals dispersed across more than twenty sites and twelve storage facilities. In addition to the destruction of equipment, facilities, and munitions destroyed in place, the international community removed more than 180 intermodal containers of chemical precursors for destruction, either at commercial facilities or aboard the US-outfitted chemical-destruc- tion ship, the MV Cape Ray.

Despite remarkable success in completing the removal and destruction effort quickly, under budget, and in an extraordinarily difficult environment, the celebration has been subdued. True, the “threat” was reduced and the capability radically degraded. In fact, the overwhelming majority and most dangerous of Syria’s CW program has been destroyed. Syria cannot threaten its neighbors with CW and large quantities of chemicals or high-value CW munitions and equipment cannot be lost or transferred to terrorist groups because they no longer exist. Nevertheless, the sustained use of chemicals as weapons in the conflict, both during and after the removal effort, calls into question the sufficiency of the effort, especially in deterring and responding to any future WMD use. In June, September, and December of 2014, the OPCW’s fact-finding mission issued a series of reports that made clear chlorine was being used as a weapon of war in the Syrian conflict.14 While the fact-finding mission did not have the mandate to attribute the attacks, they did point to several factors—most significantly the repeated use of heli- copters to deliver the chemical-laden barrel bombs—that strongly indicate the Assad regime to have been the perpetrator. In response, the UN Security Council created a Joint Investigative Mechanism (JIM) in August 2015 “to identify to the greatest extent feasible individuals, entities, groups or Governments who were perpetrators, organizers, sponsors or otherwise involved in the use of chemicals as weapons, including chlorine or any other toxic chemical, in the Syrian Arab Republic in accordance with resolution 2235 (2015).”15 The Syrian government agreed to provide support to the JIM in December 2015, despite evidence of its own culpability in continued chemical attacks.16 If the Syrian government, the newest entrant to the CWC, can flagrantly violate the ban against the use of chemicals as weapons of war, the success of the overall mission may be called into ques- tion. WMD elimination can reduce access to WMD capabilities, but it cannot eliminate the WMD threat unless the intent to acquire and use such weapons is reduced as well. Fundamentally, the WMD threat lies with those who seek to use these weapons. Threat reduction and elimination efforts that reduce access to capability but leave the nonproli- feration (prevention) and deterrence (response) aspects of the problem unaddressed can only be partially successful. Nonproliferation efforts must establish the expectations of the international community in terms of norms and legal obligations. But deterrence is essential as well. Justice, accountability, and consequences at the national, institutional, and even individual levels are critical to preventing future WMD attacks and rebuilding a taboo against CW use.

In both the Libya and Syria cases, WMD elimination unfolded as relatively “coopera- tive,”multilateral state-based efforts but in highly insecure environments, with risks of ter- rorist or non-state actor proliferation and in proximity to ongoing military conflict. These elimination efforts matched neither the long-term “partnership” efforts of Russia and other former Soviet republics nor WMD elimination efforts envisioned as part of conflict

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with a WMD-armed adversary, such as Iraq. Libya and Syria nevertheless may also be more realistic models for future elimination efforts.

Eliminating WMD threats today and tomorrow

The history of WMD elimination suggests one basic rule of thumb: “expect the unex- pected.” The number of states that could choose today to eliminate or dramatically reduce their nuclear, chemical, biological, or missile arsenals, and request international assistance in doing so is limited. Among the potential “cooperative” examples are Burma, Egypt, possibly Sudan, but the political hurdles remain large and the likely stock- piles or facilities for elimination are probably small. Potential WMD-armed adversaries are limited but significant. Should the July 2015 international agreement designed to limit Iran’s nuclear program collapse, military options to degrade or reduce Iran’s nuclear capabilities may once again be considered. North Korea would represent among the most complex, dangerous, and largest-scale elimination operations ever envisioned —all the more reason to plan wisely for the task rather than wish it away as too difficult. As the events of the Arab Spring remind us, even seemingly intractable regimes can change and create strategic inflection points for states seeking to improve their position in the world. In such moments, a nation may choose to declare and forego WMD-related pro- grams, and the United States and its partners can and should be ready to seize the oppor- tunity. Such was the case for South Africa, Kazakhstan, Belarus, and Ukraine in the 1990s, and Libya in 2003 and 2011. These targets of opportunity may be fleeting, but they must not be missed.

Traditional state-based WMD programs will not be the only, and perhaps not even the primary elimination challenges in the future. In fact, it is in the weakening—and in some cases collapse—of state structures and security apparatus where the next WMD elimin- ation cases may appear. Across the Middle East and Africa, an arc of instability has spread with alarming rapidity—the Islamic State (IS) now controls extensive territory in Iraq, Syria, and Libya. Based on 2014 UN estimates, more than 250,000 people have died in the Syrian civil war, with more than half of the population either internally or externally displaced, placing enormous financial, health, and political burdens on already vulnerable neighboring countries.17 More recent estimates state the death toll at nearly 470,000, a sharp increase from the last independent UN tracking report on Syria’s war deaths.18 From Nigeria to Libya to Yemen, non-state actors are setting up shop and taking hold, putting weak governments on their heels, and becoming the providers of essential services, from basic healthcare to policing. The proliferation of states experien- cing an erosion of sovereign power, replaced by chaotic, armed factionalism, often involving competing forms of radical Islam, has led to the collapse of basic services in many settings and raised the specter of humanitarian crises that exceed international response capacities, reshaping and transforming regional demographics at an alarming rate.

This cauldron of instability creates the opportunity for the nexus of WMD and terror- ism to flourish in unprecedented ways. In this environment, non-state actors can now control territory and facilities and coerce experts to enhance their access to WMD- related materials, technology, and know-how. The IS’s takeover of the University of Mosul in Iraq, which brought with it considerable access to bench science and scientists, as well as critical materials and precursors, significantly augmenting the organization’s

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ability to manufacture explosives and CW.19 Efforts to secure WMD-related or usable materials and detect and interdict proliferation are of limited utility if the “bad guy” is already “inside the wire.”

Moreover, whether eliminating WMD materials or focusing on the people who seek to acquire and use them, proximity and access remain essential. Remote-control-led actions, whether airstrikes or drones, require near-perfect intelligence, can only affect limited targets, present high risks of collateral damage and secondary effects, and prevent the technical assessment and analysis necessary to determine what has been “eliminated” and what might remain. At the same time, general reluctance to involve the US military in regional conflicts—“boots on the ground,” specifically—is likely to persist for the foreseeable future.

The old and already problematic division of labor between counterterrorism (focus on the people) and counterproliferation (focus on the “stuff”) is poorly suited to an environ- ment where non-state actors can acquire state-like attributes, exploit state-based struc- tures, and coerce populations under their control. On the other hand, business-as-usual for CTR and elimination efforts is impossible in such a setting. Cooperative partnering at the national and ministerial level may not provide the security and access necessary in contested areas. State-centric international legal instruments that provide a basis for international engagement may be irrelevant where the actors in question are not parties to the agreements.

Focusing on the stuff alone won’t work. Future WMD elimination efforts will need to take a holistic approach to the physical and human aspects of the problem. Who is the possessor? What is their intent for the capability? Have the underlying incentives to retain or acquire a WMD-related capability changed? Are they willing and voluntary par- ticipants in the elimination process, or are they operating under coercion of some kind? What do we know about the key leaders of these WMD activities? What are the command-and-control arrangements? Who are their principal sources of operational and scientific or technical expertise? Do they have indigenous production capabilities or are they operating mainly through illicit acquisition networks? What are the essential pressure points to facilitate cooperation where possible and coercion or deterrence where necessary?

The 2014 Department of Defense Strategy to Counter Weapons of Mass Destruction identifies the need to “manage WMD risks from emanating from hostile, fragile, or failed states and safe havens” as one of four priority objectives for DOD efforts in the CWMD arena:

Both state and non-state actors interested in WMD could seek to exploit fragile or failed states with WMD programs or related capabilities. Despite significant progress in securing vulnerable WMD materials, new avenues for exploitation continuously emerge. These devel- opments contribute to the risk of dangerous WMD crises involving the theft or loss of control of weapons or material of concern. These crises could lead to acquisition by hostile actors.20

Rather than isolating CWMD tasks and responsibilities into narrow, and potentially stove- piped, mission areas, the strategy lays out three principal lines of effort: 1) prevent acqui- sition; 2) contain and reduce threats; and 3) respond to crises. The strategy directs DOD to “be prepared to lead or support operations to locate, characterize, secure, exploit, and destroy WMD” under “varying security and political conditions” in “collaboration with

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other departments and agencies as well as international partners and organizations.”21

These activities may occur in isolation or as part of broader crisis response, hence the priority given to “respond to crises” as a stand-alone line of effort. This comes from the recognition that helping states voluntarily secure or reduce WMD risks is the prefer- able form ofWMD elimination, but the imminent or actual loss of control of WMDwill be experienced as a crisis. Under those circumstances, DOD will be expected to present options and capabilities to locate, seize, secure, and destroy WMD capabilities to prevent further use or transfer.

Challenges

The scenarios and situations that call for action and assistance to eliminate WMD may be varied and unpredictable, but some challenges and issues have appeared with remarkable consistency across a wide spectrum of cases over time and are likely to persist.

Identifying, locating, and characterizing threats with sufficient precision to enable action and verify completion

The destruction of WMD receives much attention, but finding it—especially with suffi- cient precision to enable action and verify completion—remains the biggest challenge to these efforts. Eliminating or reducing WMD threats requires highly precise and detailed information about types, quantities, and locations of materials and capabilities. As for comprehensiveness, complete elimination depends on near-perfect information that is unlikely to be available for a variety of reasons. Even in the most cooperative environ- ments, such as with Albania, information on the exact locations and amounts of chemical, biological, or nuclear materials, weapons, or equipment may be missing or insufficient. When elimination actions involve an unwilling or uncooperative partner, especially if it involves the use of force, the armed forces will be completely dependent upon intelligence to ensure an action is precise, effective, thorough, and reasonably safe for both forces and innocent parties on the ground. The lack of precise, actionable information plagued mili- tary planning and execution during the 2003 Iraq War. In the case of Syria—where the United States possessed information of remarkable detail and precision—it still fell far short of what would be needed to support reliable military targeting and minimize the risk of collateral damage. Imagine the enormous challenge of effective elimination in North Korea, which possesses much larger, geographically dispersed WMD programs, including an uncertain number of nuclear weapons, about which we know relatively little.

Is the possessor cooperative? Does it intend to fully disclose all aspects and full extent of their WMD activities? When a country is compelled or coerced into eliminat- ing its WMD, its intentions will always be suspicious. Saddam Hussein never intended to fully disclose his programs in the years immediately following the Gulf War. Defec- tions and discoveries continued to reveal undisclosed Iraqi activities and facilities after the war and ensured severe mistrust for the decade that followed, even after the over- whelming majority of Iraq’s WMD programs had in fact been revealed. In some cases, a country has had the “will” to destroy a capability but, fearing other consequences of disclosure, refused to declare it. Iraq destroyed a large portion of its WMD capabilities in 1991 before UNSCOM entered the country. Syria took similar steps with some of its

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program. The Syrian regime has also tried to avoid disclosing capabilities that could suggest responsibility for the August 21, 2013, Ghouta attack or that would compro- mise valuable facilities they believe have dual-use value. Whether to hide past misdeeds, preserve dual-use assets or retain residual capabilities for the future, states have many incentives to avoid completeness.

In some cases, a state may intend to fully eliminate the program or capability but may lack knowledge or control of the full extent of the WMD-related materials, equip- ment, or facilities on its territory. In Libya, the Qaddafi regime declared and relin- quished the vast majority of its WMD programs in 2003, followed by a lengthy destruction process. Following the 2011 air campaign and Qaddafi’s death, opposition fighters found an old and degraded stash of mustard-filled munitions. There is little reason to believe that Qaddafi knew about these remnants of his country’s CW program, let alone sought to preserve it as a secret “hedge” of some kind. This small stockpile of old and decrepit weapons had no military utility or ready means of efficient employment, but it would have caused an accounting headache if these mis- placed items were discovered after Libya's initial declarations had been submitted, par- ticularly after misgivings about the weapons' origin. While Qaddafi’s Libya may not have been concerned about the loss or misuse of these weapons, the transfer and improvised use of these munitions in the post-Qaddafi chaos was a genuine concern.

Even under the best of circumstances, with fully cooperative programs in relatively peaceful and secure environments, efforts to eliminate WMD will inevitably encounter the “prove a negative” problem. It will always be practically impossible to verify that absol- utely nothing is left. Moreover, while relatively small amounts of residual materials, weapons, or equipment may not pose a strategic threat, they can be more than enough for terrorist and non-state actors seeking to conduct attacks.

Establishing the legal and political basis for action

Legal authorities are foundational to any WMD elimination effort and essential to estab- lishing both domestic and international support. A strong legal foundation has several essential components and layers: the international legal basis to enter another state’s ter- ritory; the domestic authorities to provide assistance; appropriate legal protections from liability for individuals and states; and assurances that such efforts will not result in inter- national treaty violations and/or other conditions that could place states in political or legal jeopardy (For a more detailed discussion of the legalities of these efforts, see, in this volume, Robert A. Friedman, “Legal Aspects of Weapons of Mass Destruction Elim- ination Contingencies,” pp. 61–82).

Of course, matters of intervention and sovereignty are foremost when considering WMD elimination in times of armed conflict, when permission to enter sovereign territory is withheld, illegitimate, or unavailable (for example, in a state-collapse scenario). Is a plausible “self-defense” rationale available and is the government prepared to act unilat- erally? In most cases, where multilateral support is necessary or preferred, support from NATO or the United Nations is essential to build support. An invitation to cooperate on elimination efforts would appear to resolve sovereignty concerns, but many states require UN Security Council authorization or a NATO mission if military assets are required to support the effort regardless of permission from the government involved.

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Eliminating WMD in weak, vulnerable, or fragile states, or states with a transitional or even absent government, will pose additional challenges for which the international legal system is ill-prepared.

Within the United States, particular care must be given to the authorities and programs that allow foreign support and assistance. The State Department’s Nonproliferation and Disarmament Fund and the Department of Defense’s CTR program both provide valuable resources and legal authorities to address WMD threats, but they also have important limitations, caveats, and requirements that constrain and guide their use. The comprehen- sive, multiyear legal agreements that shaped and protected large-scale threat reduction activities in Russia and other former Soviet republics have proven very difficult to replicate in other parts of the world. Threat-reduction efforts have become more diffuse, having extended to many more states on a much smaller financial scale in Africa, Southeast Asia, and the Middle East. Most of these states are reluctant to sign legal agreements to limit tax and liability exposure or extend legal protection to foreign personnel; and such negotiations can be very time consuming. In some cases, smaller, developing states usually lack the wherewithal to negotiate agreements and navigate their own bureaucratic and institutional hurdles. In addition, as threat-reduction and elimination efforts are increasingly associated with complex security environments in areas with weak or non- existent governmental authorities, the pursuit of legal protections becomes even more problematic. Programs designed to secure and destroy WMD must accept greater risk concerning liability, privileges, immunities, and improper taxation.

Operating within complex environments

Elimination efforts may follow or coexist with military operations, as they have in Iraq or Libya, or during civil war, as in Syria. On the other hand, threatened or actual use of force may play a role in compelling cooperation or responding if cooperative efforts fail to meet the objective. This was the case in Iraq after 1991 and in Syria in 2013. A similar circum- stance in Iran is not implausible.

In addition, American leaders’ reluctance to put US “boots on the ground” in high-risk areas, even with the support or cooperation of local authorities, is likely to continue for the foreseeable future. We should expect that, for the United States, the opportunity or requirement to reduce or eliminate WMD threats will be accompanied by limited access, tight timelines, and dangerous operating conditions, and these factors should become planning assumptions.

DOD’s CWMD strategy acknowledges the likelihood of these conditions:

some of these tasks may be executed with the consent and cooperation of relevant actors, but all may be required under various threat conditions and security environments across the range of military operations, and could require specialized units, equipment, and expertise.22

Navigating the evolving technical landscape

Operations involving WMD threats are extraordinarily dangerous and pose substantial risks to those performing the actions as well as nearby civilians and personnel. Yet with the US nuclear arsenal declining and chemical- and biological- weapons programs focused exclusively on defensive requirements, the US base of qualified technical

42 R. HERSMAN

experts who can design and develop new elimination technologies is shrinking and aging. In the military, promotions and career paths that focus in these critical areas are highly limited. In organizations like Defense Threat Reduction Agency, which houses the CTR program, the expertise that developed over sustained, multiyear efforts in CW destruction and strategic nuclear arms elimination and nuclear security in Russia is waning as steady work in those areas has dried up. When the United States completes its own CW destruc- tion in compliance with its CWC requirements, sustaining US technical expertise will be even more difficult as this final source of funding will disappear.

At the same time, threats related to WMD will continue to evolve as a result of rapid technical innovation. Complex scientific procedures in DNA manipulation, biochemical applications, and other techniques are no longer solely the purview of elite Western laboratories and highly trained scientists. Access to simple bench-science facilities and modest levels of education may lead to fairly sophisticated capabilities that may confound traditional approaches to detection, assessment, and destruction. Preserving an effective technical base at an affordable cost is essential to ensuring that critical capabilities con- tinue to exist.

Ensuring effective verification and accountability

Eliminating weapons, materials, facilities, and programs can do many things to reduce WMD threats. But eliminating “things” is insufficient to deal with matters of intent. Without some process of justice for the misdeeds of the past and mechanisms to verify and hold to account future behavior, enduring threat reduction is not possible. The most profound of these deeds is the actual use of these weapons, especially when used criminally and reprehensibly against civilians. The track record for dealing with WMD use is poor: the international community never took any actions against Saddam Hussein or his cronies for the horrific use of CW in the Iran-Iraq war or against his own Kurdish civilians in Halabja. In Syria, the sarin attacks in Ghouta that killed more than 1,400 civilians prompted the entire international effort to eliminate Syria’s CW program, but nothing has yet been done to hold the perpetrators of that attack to account for their actions. Moreover, despite the extraordinary success of the removal and destruction of Syria’s CW program, CW attacks using chlorine have continued since April 2013, during and after the removal and destruction operations. Chlorine attacks by the regime constitute an unambiguous violation of the CWC, yet the inability to fully investigate and attribute these attacks risks rendering this treaty unenforceable and calls into question the utility of threat reduction that cannot prevent, deter, or respond to use.

It now appears that IS fighters may also be developing CW, both chlorine and perhaps even more lethal chemical agents such as blister agents.23 Whatever motivations inspire the group’s WMD activities, the ability to justify their actions as retribution for similar actions perpetrated against them is a powerful force. Are they developing these capabilities internally? Have they stolen materials or found undeclared stockpiles in either Syria or Iraq? Are they being aided by accomplices from either state or even from individuals elsewhere?

Perhaps the new accountability mechanism called for in UN Security Council Resol- ution 2235, which established the Joint Investigative Mechanism, can be a step in the right direction and hopefully a model for the future. It is clear, however, that future

NONPROLIFERATION REVIEW 43

elimination efforts that simply ignore the intent question by failing to incorporate accountability and consequences into the overall approach will face enormous credibility challenges. This crisis of credibility will be especially acute if these gaps are accompanied by weak verification procedures that allow significant questions of completeness and “cheating” to linger.

Requirements for success

The challenges to international WMD elimination efforts are substantial but not insur- mountable. Success will depend on our ability to innovate in the face of unexpected chal- lenges and accept that “business-as-usual” has little bearing on operations as complex, diverse, and far-ranging as WMD elimination.

International partnerships and effective coalitions

The United States in particular has considerable authority and resources to secure and destroy WMD programs, either unilaterally or in partnership with a host government, but rarely will it choose to do so. Multilateral efforts can increase complexity and con- straints, but in most cases, the benefits will outweigh the costs. International partnerships and coalitions enhance international legitimacy, improve public and political support, encourage cost sharing, and include expertise, information, and capabilities that a single country, even the United States, may not possess. Effective coalition-building requires time, attention, and focus, preferably in advance of a crisis or window of opportunity.

Operational innovation

Those seeking to secure, reduce, or eliminate WMD programs must be able to respond to opportunity or crisis in a range of operating environments and conditions in a flexible manner. Of course, it is preferable to undertake these efforts in a cooperative, secure, and stable environment and with a willing, cooperative partner. But in the future, those circumstances probably will be the exception rather than the rule. Instead, planning and preparing for WMD elimination should assume an insecure and potentially unstable environment, even in the absence of an armed conflict. Easily replicable, business-as-usual operational approaches to WMD threats are nearly certain to miss the mark. The combi- nation of timing, risk, actors, and threats will make each problem unique, requiring flexibility and innovation to succeed.

Civil-military collaboration

Both civilian and military communities can bring critical expertise, capabilities, and experience to any WMD elimination effort. It is possible that future activities and oper- ations will have a predominantly military or civilian character, but hybrid or combined approaches are the most likely. Both communities have different command or manage- ment structures, risk tolerances, bureaucratic and organizational cultures, and business practices. Learning to bridge and benefit from those differences could spell the difference between success and failure.

44 R. HERSMAN

Technical competency and innovation

Any successful effort to locate, characterize, secure, disable, or destroy nuclear, chemical, biological, and missile threats requires specialized technical competencies, as well as the ability to adapt and innovate as these threats evolve and environments change. This will require preserving and adapting skill sets within both civilian and military sectors as well as enhancing partnerships and collaborations with the private sector that would allow rapid access to expertise and capabilities when the need arises.

Effective capabilities

Capabilities for expedited assessment and disablement, field-deployable destruction and removal assets, and adaptive combined training between military and civilian personnel would greatly enhance preparedness for activities in these environments. Capabilities to prevent access to materials and facilities by hostile actors could buy time to enable more effective destruction efforts. Stand-off capabilities to assess and disable WMD threats would provide options where direct access is impossible. Dual-purposing capabili- ties for use by both civilian and military personnel as well as by privately contracted oper- ators or foreign personnel would greatly enhance options in complex environments. Such capability development would also benefit from rapid acquisition mechanisms, ready con- tract vehicles, and pre-established liability protections or insurance to ensure that precious time is not lost when opportunity strikes.

Realistic planning

Planning and exercises are essential tools to prepare for reducing and eliminating WMD threats, but if they are unrealistic or fail to involve the correct range of participants, they add little value. In fact, sometimes plans and exercises enforce rigidity and inflexibility through precise definitions, thresholds, roles, and responsibilities as well as adherence to past scenarios that may indeed be non-replicable. Useful planning focuses on generating options rather than forcing decisions. It creates opportunities and space for innovation, rather than introducing constraints. Most importantly, realistic planning brings a range of voices to the table and listens to them.

Conclusion

WMD elimination involves the actions necessary to locate, characterize, secure, disable, destroy, or remove WMD capabilities in another state or territory. It reflects an acknowl- edgment that while preventing the acquisition of WMD by any state or non-state actor is always the preferred course of action, it is insufficient to address WMD threats as they cur- rently exist or may evolve in the future. Reducing, reversing, and eliminating these threats is essential to prevent and respond to use of these weapons and to ensure that they can be managed and reduced reliably and over time. It is always preferable to reduce these threats cooperatively and in partnership with the international community, and it is well worth the investment to assist states that seek to reduce or eliminate such capabilities. It is equally essential to recognize the need for the safe and effective elimination of WMD as

NONPROLIFERATION REVIEW 45

part of any use of armed force when nuclear, chemical, or biological threats might be present. As the many lessons of the past suggest (and the articles in this volume describe in detail), military and nonmilitary approaches to WMD elimination are not competing alternatives or ideological preferences. Rather, they reflect the environments where these requirements may emerge and evolve over time and expose the need for the many legal, policy, military, financial, and diplomatic tools required to reduce WMD threats in the complex and disordered world that lies before us.

Disclaimer

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not reflect those of the Center for Strategic and International Studies or any US government agency.

Notes

1. Brian Knowland, “Ship allowed to take North Korea Scuds on to Yemeni port: U.S. frees freighter carrying missiles,” New York Times, December 12, 2002, <www.nytimes.com/ 2002/12/12/news/12iht-scuds_ed3_.html>.

2. Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, “National Military Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction,” February 13, 2006, p. 7, <http://archive.defense.gov/pdf/ NMS-CWMD2006.pdf>.

3. United States Department of Defense, “Quadrennial Defense Review Report,” February 6, 2006, p. 6. <www.dod.mil/pubs/pdfs/QDR20060203.pdf>.

4. Department of Defense, “Combating Weapons of Mass Destruction Policy,” April 19, 2007, <www.dtic.mil/whs/directives/corres/pdf/206002p.pdf>.

5. Barack Obama, “Remarks By President Barack Obama In Prague As Delivered,” Prague, April 5, 2009, <www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/remarks-president-barack-obama- prague-delivered>.

6. National Nuclear Security Administration, “GTRI: Reducing Nuclear Threats,” May 29, 2014, <http://nnsa.energy.gov/mediaroom/factsheets/reducingthreats>.

7. Kingston Reif, “Congress Doesn’t Show the Money for Nuclear Security,” Center for Arms Control and Non-Proliferation, January 24, 2011, <http://armscontrolcenter.org/congress- doesnt-show-the-money-for-nuclear-security/>; United States Department of Defense, “Fiscal Year 2011 Budget Estimate Cooperative Threat Reduction Program,” February 2010, <http://comptroller.defense.gov/Portals/45/Documents/defbudget/fy2011/budget_just ification/pdfs/01_Operation_and_Maintenance/O_M_VOL_1_PARTS/CTR_FY11.pdf>.

8. United States Department of Defense, “Quadrennial Defense Review Report,” February 2010, p. 35, <http://history.defense.gov/Portals/70/Documents/quadrennial/QDR2010.pdf>.

9. Eric Schmitt, “Libya’s Cache of Toxic Arms All Destroyed,” New York Times, February 2, 2014, <www.nytimes.com/2014/02/03/world/africa/libyas-cache-of-toxic-arms-all-destroyed.html>.

10. For additional information and details on Libya, see, in this volume, Patrick Terrell, Kathar- ine Hagen, and Ted A. Ryba, Jr., “Eliminating Libya’s WMD Programs: Creating a Coopera- tive Situation,” pp. 185–196.

11. Derek Chollet and Ben Fishman, with Alan J. Kuperman, “Who Lost Libya?” Foreign Affairs, May/June 2015, <www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/libya/2015-04-20/who-lost-libya>.

12. Joby Warrick, “More than 1,400 killed in Syrian CW attack, U.S. says,” Washington Post, August 30, 2013, <www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/nearly-1500-killed- in-syrian-chemical-weapons-attack-us-says/2013/08/30/b2864662-1196-11e3-85b6- d27422650fd5_story.html>.

13. James Ball, “Obama issues Syria a ‘red line’ warning on CW,” Washington Post, August 20, 2014, <www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/obama-issues-syria-red-line-

46 R. HERSMAN

warning-on-chemical-weapons/2012/08/20/ba5d26ec-eaf7-11e1-b811-09036bcb182b_story. html>.

14. OPCW Executive Council, “Decision: Reports of the OPCW Fact-Finding Mission in Syria,” February 4, 2015, <www.opcw.org/fileadmin/OPCW/EC/M-48/ecm48dec01_e_.pdf>.

15. UN Security Council, Resolution 2235, August 7, 2015, <www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/ cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/s_res_2235.pdf>.

16. United Nations, “United Nations Signs Status of Mission Agreement with Syria,” Press Release DC/3596, December 11, 2015, <www.un.org/press/en/2015/dc3596.doc.htm>.

17. United Nations, “Alarmed by Continuing Syria Crisis, Security Council Affirms Its Support for Special Envoy’s Approach in Moving Political Solution Forward,” August 17, 2015, <www.un.org/press/en/2015/sc12008.doc.htm>.

18. Priyanka Boghani, “A Staggering New Death Toll for Syria’s War— 470,000,” Frontline, February 11, 2016, <www.pbs.org/wgbh/frontline/article/a-staggering-new-death-toll-for- syrias-war-470000/>.

19. Margaret Coker and Ben Kesling, “Islamic State Hijacks Mosul University Chemistry Lab for Making Bombs,” Wall Street Journal, April 1, 2016, <www.wsj.com/articles/islamic-state- hijacks-mosul-university-chemistry-lab-for-making-bombs-1459503003>.

20. United States Department of Defense, “Strategy for Countering Weapons of Mass Destruc- tion,” June 2014, p. 7, <www.defense.gov/Portals/1/Documents/pubs/DOD_Strategy_for_ Countering_Weapons_of_Mass_Destruction_dated_June_2014.pdf>, pp. 4, 7.

21. Ibid., pp. 9-11. 22. Ibid., p. 15. 23. Paul Blake, “US Official: ‘IS making and using CW in Iraq and Syria’,” BBC News, September

11, 2015, <www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-34211838>.

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