International Perceptions of Human Rights

Stopping Genocide S ho uld the U.S . and U.N. tak e ac tio n in S udan?

T en years ago, nearly a million ethnic-minority

Rwandans died in a government-planned massacre.

Political leaders in the United States and the United

Nations later admitted they should have intervened

and vowed “Never again” — just as they vowed after the Holo-

caust. But as ethnic killings occurring today in western Sudan

make tragically clear, genocide still flourishes. The Bush adminis-

tration supports sanctions against the Khartoum government, but

human-rights activists say an international force is needed to pro-

tect civilians. With U.S. troops stretched thin in Iraq, however, the

United States has been reluctant to act. Some question whether

Americans, preoccupied with terrorism, have the appetite for hu-

manitarian military actions. The U.N. has tried to improve its poor

record of mobilizing troops by authorizing Western powers to lead

forces in recent crises. But many believe the U.N. is politically

paralyzed by the competing interests of the five major members of

the Security Council, who can veto any military action.

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THE ISSUES ......................6 8 7

CHRONOLOGY ..................6 9 5

BACKGROUND ..................6 9 6

CURRENT SITUATION ..........6 9 8

AT ISSUE ..........................7 0 1

OUTLOOK ........................7 0 2

BIBLIOGRAPHY ..................7 0 5

THE NEXT STEP ................7 0 6

THISREPORT

A mak e s hift me mo r ial in Camb o dia e x hib its the r e mains o f v ic tims o f the Khme r Ro ug e r e g ime in the late 1970s .

Re se arche r Published by CQ Press, a division of Congressional Quarterly Inc.

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THE IS S UES

687 • Is the United Statesdoing enough to stop and prevent genocide? • Is the United Nations doing enough to stop genocide? • Will the International Criminal Court prevent genocide?

BACKGROUND

696 Ge noc ide Conv e ntionA 1948 U.N. treaty calls for action to stop future genocides.

696 Wa r ning s Ig nor e dThe United States didn’t stop killings in Cambodia in the 1970s.

CURRENT S ITUATION

699 Punis hing Ge noc ideIn 1994, a special U.N. tribunal was authorized to try suspects in Rwanda’s genocide.

699 Hus s e in Tr ibuna lA special Iraqi court is hearing war-crimes charges against Saddam Hussein.

699 Inte r na tiona l Cour tThe United States opposes joining the International Criminal Court.

702 Cr is is in Da r furAt least 50,000 Sudanese have been killed since 2003.

OUTL OOK

702 U.S . Role ?American troops may be spread too thin to stop atrocities.

S IDEBARS AND GRAPHICS

688 Ge noc ide in S uda nRampaging militiamen have left a million people home- less since early 2003.

689 The Ge noc ide Tr e a tyThe 1948 convention defines genocide and calls for action.

692 Mode r n Ge noc ide s v s . theHoloc a us t Today’s ethnic killings often stem from wars or rebellions.

695 Chr onolog yKey events since 1915.

697 Ethnic Cle a ns ing in Bos niaSome 200,000 people were killed in the early 1990s.

700 He a ling Rwa nda Afte r theGe noc ide Progress has been slow.

701 At Is s ueShould the U.S. support the International Criminal Court?

F OR F URTHER RES EARCH

704 F or Mor e Infor ma tionOrganizations to contact.

705 Bibliog r a phySelected sources used.

706 The Ne xt S te pAdditional articles.

707 Citing The CQ ResearcherSample bibliography formats.

STOPPING GENOCIDE

Cover: A youth examines the remains of victims of the Khmer Rouge in a makeshift memorial. Two million Cambodians died under the murderous regime in the late 1970s. (AFP Photo)

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Stopping Genocide

THE ISSUES A

fter Arab nomads raided the Sudanese village of Kornei and

killed Hatum Atraman Bashir’s husband, she fled with her seven children. But when Bashir and a few other moth- ers crept out one day to find food, the raiders raped them.

“They said, ‘You are black women, and you are our slaves,’ ” she recalled, weep- ing softly. “One of the women cried, and they killed her. Then they told me, ‘If you cry, we will kill you, too.’ ”

Bashir, already pregnant by one of the rapists when she told this story earlier this summer, was camping in the shade of a tree after stum- bling across the border into Chad in search of help from one of the overburdened aid agencies serving Sudanese refugees. 1

Bashir is part of a wave of more than a million people from the west- ern Darfur region of Sudan left home- less by rampaging nomadic militia- men on horseback, known as the Janjaweed. Since early 2003, the Arab militias have been killing and raping black Africans, who traditionally farm the land, and have burned many of their villages to the ground. The Unit- ed Nations estimates that violence in Darfur has killed 50,000 and left 2 million short of food and medicine. 2

The Agency for International Devel- opment warns that between 300,000 and a million people could die by year’s end, depending on how much aid reaches the refugees. 3

Human-rights groups have accused the Sudanese government of arming the militias in an effort to root out and threaten rebels from Darfur’s black African tribal groups. Some villages had

been bombed by Sudan’s air force and then attacked by Arab militias. 4

Although the violence began in early 2003, it took until July of this year for the U.S. government and the international community to back up statements of concern with threats of serious action. On July 30, the Unit- ed Nations Security Council passed a U.S.-drafted resolution giving the Sudanese government 30 days to dis- arm and prosecute the Arab militias or face unspecified sanctions. 5

Congress declared the violence “geno- cide” on July 22 and urged President Bush to do the same. 6 But as of mid- August, Secretary of State Colin L. Pow- ell studiously avoided using the word “genocide” on the advice of govern- ment lawyers, he explained. 7 Under the International Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, the United States and other participating countries are oblig- ed “to prevent and punish” genocide,

although experts say the 1948 treaty is not specific about what that entails. (S e e b o x , p . 689.)

Even some of the most com- mitted activists have been re- luctant to bandy about a word like genocide, concerned that it should be reserved for clear- cut cases. As of mid-August, groups like Amnesty Interna- tional and Human Rights Watch said they did not have enough information to call the violence in Darfur genocide, even as they called for tougher action by the international commu- nity. The African Union also declined to label the situation genocide even as it was send- ing 150 troops to Darfur to protect its cease-fire monitors and was expressing interest in sending more troops with a broadened mandate to pro- tect civilians. 8

Complicating the question of whether the situation in Darfur could be called genocide is the fact that some of the victims of the militias are Arab, and not all Arab groups partic- ipated in the killings. 9

Yet critics in Congress and human- rights groups called the response to Darfur too slow and — in some eyes — too weak. They said it bore a dis- turbing resemblance to the world’s in- action 10 years ago, when close to a million Rwandans died in killings now widely described as genocide. 10 In 1994, the Clinton administration also had in- tentionally avoided describing the Rwan- da crisis as genocide because Pentagon lawyers had advised that using the term could commit the United States “to ac- tually do something” under the inter- national genocide convention. 11

Both former President Bill Clinton and U.N. Secretary-General Kofi Annan have since traveled to Rwanda to ex- press regret over the world’s failure to stop the genocide. “We did not act

BY S ARAH GL AZER

A F P P h o to /M

a rc o L o n g a ri

S ur v iv o r s o f e thnic v io le nc e r e s t in a r e fug e e c amp in we s te r n S udan’s e mb attle d Dar fur r e g io n, whe r e 50,000

p e o p le hav e b e e n k ille d and a millio n le ft ho me le s s . On July 22, the U.S . Co ng r e s s de c lar e d the v io le nc e “ g e no c ide .”

6 8 8 The CQ Researcher

quickly enough after the killing began,” Clinton told hundreds of genocide sur- vivors after hearing harrowing eyewit- ness accounts of the massacre. “We did not immediately call these crimes by their rightful name: genocide.” 12

Two months later, after touring a memorial containing the bones of 3,000 genocide victims, Annan somberly ac- knowledged, “The world failed Rwan- da at that time of evil. The interna- tional community and the United Nations could not muster the political will to confront it.” 13

Instead, Clinton officials had urged the Rwandan government to negoti- ate with rebel militants from the Tutsi ethnic minority — the group the Hutu- led Rwandan government had target- ed for killing. An estimated 800,000 minority Tutsi and moderate Hutu’s were killed in three months — most hacked to death with machetes. The daily death rate exceeded even Hitler’s killing machine. Many observers now agree Rwanda’s leaders used their par- ticipation at the peace table as a cover for the killings they were planning and executing elsewhere in the country.

Similarly, Bush administration offi- cials have stressed their role in en- couraging north-south peace talks be- tween the Sudan government and rebel groups, which want a share of Sudan’s oil wealth. (The African rebel groups from Darfur charge they have been largely excluded from those agreements, which is one reason they are rebelling.)

“Once again, the world is turning its back on a defenseless people,” said Rep. Tom Lantos, D-Calif., ranking minority member of the House International Re- lations Committee. He had warned State Department officials earlier this spring that Sudanese government leaders were “masters of manipulating” the interna- tional community, even as they engaged in the peace process. 14

What does it take for a country like the United States to intervene in an eth- nically driven massacre abroad — par- ticularly if it puts American soldiers at

STOPPING GENOCIDE

Ge noc ide in S uda n S udan is Afr ic a’s lar g e s t c o untr y — almo s t fiv e time s the s iz e o f F r anc e . In the we s te r n Dar fur r e g io n, r amp ag ing Ar ab militiame n o n ho r s e b ac k , k no wn as the Janjawe e d, hav e le ft mo r e than a millio n p e o p le ho me le s s s inc e e ar ly 2003. T he militias hav e b e e n k illing and r ap ing b lac k Afr ic ans , who tr aditio nally far m the land. T he v io le nc e has k ille d s o me 50,000 and le ft 2 millio n s ho r t o f fo o d and me dic ine . Aid o ffic ials e s timate up to a millio n r e fug e e s c o uld die b y y e ar ’s e nd witho ut s uffic ie nt s up p lie s . T he v io le nc e b e g an in e ar ly 2003, b ut it to o k until July 2004 fo r the wo r ld c o mmunity to thr e ate n s e r io us ac tio n. Altho ug h Co ng r e s s c alle d the k illing s “ g e no c ide ” o n July 22, as o f mid-Aug us t, S e c r e tar y o f S tate Co lin L . Po we ll has av o ide d the wo r d. On July 30, the U.N. S e c ur ity Co unc il p as s e d a U.S .-dr afte d r e s o lutio n g iv ing S udan 30 day s to dis ar m and p r o s e c ute the Ar ab militias o r fac e uns p e c ifie d s anc tio ns .

S o ur c e s : CIA Wo r ld F ac tb o o k

ZAIRE

TANZANIA

K E N YAUGANDA

ETHIOPIA

S U D A N

CHAD

L IB Y A E G Y P T

SOMALIA

YEMEN

S A U D I

A R A B IA

DJIBOUTI

RWANDA

BURUNDI

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O C E A N

Nubian Desert

Lake Victoria

Lake Tanganyika

Lake Nasser

Lake Tana

Aswan Riyadh

Kassala

Port Sudan

Wadi-Halfa

El Fasher

Djibouti

Wad Medani

El Obeid

Atbara

Dar-es-Salaam

Mombasa

Nairobi

Mogadishu

Dodoma

Mwanza

Kisumu

Kismayu

Bujumburo

Kisangani

Kananga

Kigali

Khartoum

Bukavu

Zanzibar

D a rfu

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CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC

Tan

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Kampala

Berbera Addis Ababa

ERITREA Asmera

B lue Nile

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risk? Increasingly, observers seem to con- cur with former journalist Samantha Power, a lecturer at Harvard’s Kennedy School of Government. Her 2002 book, A Pr o b le m fr o m He ll, argues that Ameri- can presidents from Franklin D. Roosevelt to Clinton have been reluctant to inter- vene unless they perceive it to be in their political interest. And humanitarian intervention is widely viewed as un- likely to be popular with voters.

It’s hard to argue for a compelling U.S. interest in far-off Sudan, even if it once harbored al-Qaeda terrorists. But proponents of humanitarian in- tervention say genocidal countries could indeed threaten the United States be- cause they often become breeding grounds for terrorism and disease.

“Sudan’s chaos is destabilizing sur- rounding countries, especially Chad, which is an increasing source of oil for us,” Ne w Yo r k T ime s columnist Nicholas D. Kristof recently argued, adding that recent outbreaks of ebola virus and polio in Sudan could also spread to neighboring countries. 15

In a recent example of how ethnic persecution can spread to surrounding countries, a Hutu rebel faction in Bu- rundi on Aug. 13 shot or hacked to death at least 189 Tutsi refugees from neighboring Congo, who had fled to a refugee camp in Burundi to escape a civil war at home. 16

Rwandan President Paul Kagame later said the massacre “proves . . . that there have been incidents that are ignored by the international commu- nity and the U.N. where people are being killed in eastern Congo, being targeted for who they are.” 17

U.N. officials were investigating whether the killings were perpetrated by Hutu insurgents from neighboring Rwanda, who fled to Congo after par- ticipating in the 1994 genocide against Rwanda’s minority Tutsi ethnic group.

Some of President Bush’s harshest critics have given his administration credit for publicly condemning the killings in Sudan — if late in the game. In early July, Powell visited Sudan and received pledges from Sudanese offi-

cials to disarm the militias. The con- tinuing killings in late July spurred the United States to push the Security Coun- cil to threaten punitive measures if a 30-day deadline was not met. 18

According to Power, 10,000 peace- keeping troops would be needed to stop the killing. 19 But with its forces stretched thin in Iraq, the United States has so far been unwilling to commit troops to Dar- fur. In July, the United States was in- stead urging countries in the African Union and Europe to help, according to Pierre-Richard Prosper, U.S. ambas- sador-at-large for war crimes issues. 20

“What about the Europeans, Spain — all those people not helping us in Iraq?” he asks. “Why don’t they help us? We’re pretty locked down in Iraq right now.”

American and U.N. reliance on Sudan’s government to pacify the same Arab militias they have been charged with arming means “the wolf will guard the henhouse,” in the opinion of John Pren- dergast, who handled African affairs dur- ing the Clinton administration. Only an international military force backed by

T he United States and 135 other nations have signed the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide since the United Nations General

Assembly approved it on Dec. 9, 1948. The treaty recognizes that genocide “is contrary to the spirit and aims of the United Nations and condemned by the civilized world” and that “in order to liberate mankind from such an odious scourge, inter- national cooperation is required. . . .”

Key treaty provisions: • The Contracting Parties confirm that genocide, whether

committed in time of peace or in time of war, is a crime under international law which they undertake to prevent and to punish.

• In the present Convention, genocide means any of the fol- lowing acts committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group, as such: (a) Killing members of the group; (b) Causing serious bodily or mental harm to members

of the group; (c) Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life

calculated to bring about its physical destruction in

whole or in part; (d) Imposing measures intended to prevent births within

the group; (e) Forcibly transferring children of the group to anoth-

er group. • The Contracting Parties undertake to enact, in accordance

with their respective Constitutions, the necessary legisla- tion to give effect to the provisions of the present Con- vention, and, in particular, to provide effective penalties for persons guilty of genocide. . . .

• Persons charged with genocide [or attempted genocide or related crimes] . . . shall be tried by a competent tribunal of the State in the territory of which the act was com- mitted, or by such international penal tribunal as may have jurisdiction with respect to those Contracting Parties which shall have accepted its jurisdiction.

• Any Contracting Party may call upon the competent or- gans of the United Nations to take such action under the Charter of the United Nations as they consider appropri- ate for the prevention and suppression of acts of geno- cide. . . .

The Genocide Treaty

6 9 0 The CQ Researcher

STOPPING GENOCIDE

the United States and Europe is likely to succeed, he has suggested. 21

Complicating matters, the current scandal over American soldiers’ abuse of Iraqi prisoners may have fatally un- dermined the United States’ moral cred- ibility if it calls for international mili- tary action in Sudan, argues Holly Burkhalter, U.S. policy director for Physicians for Human Rights.

“The U.S. has no authority in the world right now. We couldn’t get con- sensus on a lemonade stand much less United Nations intervention,” says Burkhalter, who favors sending troops to protect the delivery of food, med- icine and shelter to Sudanese refugees, many of them in unprotected camps inside Sudan.

Some critics blame international in- action on the fact that the Security Council must approve the mobiliza- tion of U.N. peacekeepers. Any one of the five permanent members — in- cluding nations like Russia and China, which have themselves been accused of human-rights abuses — can veto a resolution. “In this case, it’s not the U.S. that’s the spoiler as we were with Rwanda,” Burkhalter notes.

This time, however, the Security Council has an option that was not available in 1994: It could seek action by the International Criminal Court (ICC) in the Hague, Netherlands, es- tablished in 1998 to try crimes against humanity. 22 But such a move would be “difficult for us to even contem- plate supporting,” Prosper says. Ex- pressing concern that American peace- keepers abroad could be hauled before the court on politically motivated war- crimes charges, the Bush administra- tion has refused to join the court.

Human-rights activists say the ad- ministration’s opposition to the court reflects its overall disdain for interna- tional law. Similarly, some see the ad- ministration’s choice of an Iraqi-led tri- bunal to try Saddam Hussein on charges of genocide as just another chance to reject international justice.

“You’ve got an effort to deliberate- ly hold at arms length international in- volvement and expertise in the name of an Iraqi-led effort while behind the scenes you have a U.S.-motored ef- fort,” says Richard Dicker, director of the International Justice Program at Human Rights Watch.

Bush administration officials counter that the Iraqi court could prove to be an improvement over the tribunals the U.N. set up after the genocides in Rwanda and Yugoslavia in the early 1990s. Those tribunals were criticized for being slow to bring cases to trial and for being held outside the coun- tries where the crimes occurred.

As the United States struggles over its roles in Sudan and Iraq, here are some of the debates taking place in Congress and the international arena:

Is the United States doing enough to stop and prevent genocide?

Sudan may be the test case for de- termining whether the United States learned any lessons from Rwanda. Some human-rights activists have crit- icized the United States for doing too little too late, waiting more than a year after the attacks began on Su- danese civilians to consider stronger steps. But as of August, despite con- tinued killing and raping, the admin- istration still was not contemplating military action, despite the urging of some human-rights groups. 23

Human rights in Darfur started to deteriorate after two rebel groups at- tacked Sudanese troops in February 2003 over the government’s failure to protect civilians there or to include Dar- fur in ongoing peace negotiations. 24

Some activists say the Bush adminis- tration’s slowness to act shows the United States has not learned the main lesson of Rwanda — act early, before crimes escalate to genocide.

“We wouldn’t be facing hundreds of thousands of deaths in western Sudan today if we’d learned enough,” Burkhalter says.

Yet other analysts say Rwanda has sensitized the administration to the need for earlier action. The United States has taken “the strongest public stance” of any nation against the sit- uation in Darfur, Human Rights Watch declared in May, amid what it called a “shameful” void in international re- sponse. 25 In April, Bush called on Sudan to stop the militia attacks.

“I condemn these atrocities, which are displacing hundreds of thousands of civilians, and I have expressed my views directly to President [Omar Has- san Ahmed al] Bashir,” Bush said.

Author Power saw Bush’s statement as an improvement over Rwanda. “Pres- ident Bush called Bashir, which is one more phone call than Clinton made to Rwanda in 1994,” she said. “At least he’s not saying, ‘We’re not going to send troops, so let’s stay mute,’ which is what happened before. That’s a ver- sion of progress.” 26

It’s too early to say how much more Bush might be willing to do in Sudan. But some experts say American pres- idents only risk military intervention if they see some political payoff.

“We don’t intervene because the political risks of not acting are less than the political risks of acting,” says Jerry Fowler, staff director of the Com- mittee on Conscience, which guides the genocide-prevention activities of the United States Holocaust Memorial Museum. For the first time in its his- tory, the committee declared a “geno- cide emergency” on July 26, saying that genocide in Sudan “was imminent or actually happening.” 27

Other observers suggest that Amer- icans tend to be far less sympathetic to genocide in remote continents like Africa, where black people are vic- tims, than to similar events in Europe. In 1999, an American-backed NATO bombing campaign to end ethnic killing in Kosovo, in the former Yugoslavia, came after enormous media attention and political pressure, in contrast to scant press attention to Rwanda. 28

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Noting the handful of reporters cov- ering a May 6 hearing on Darfur before the International Relations Committee, Rep. Donald M. Payne, D-N.J., an African- American, said, “Perhaps if this was in Europe, we’d have TV cameras all over the place. But since it’s just another gov- ernment in Africa, we don’t.”

The country’s attitude toward foreign disasters has also been influenced by the Sept. 11, 2001, terrorist attacks, Ne w Yo r k T ime s columnist James Traub argued recently. “One of the consequences of 9/11 may be that vital interests have come to seem so pressing that humanitari- anism has become an un- affordable luxury,” he sug- gested. 29

During his first presi- dential campaign, Presi- dent Bush said the “best interests of the United States” would guide his international policies, not the well-being of foreign nations. He indicated he would not send troops if another Rwanda occurred on his watch. In justify- ing the invasions of Iraq and Afghanistan, howev- er, Bush has recently borrowed the moral ar- guments used by liberal humanitarian interven- tionists during the 1990s to push for military ac- tion in Rwanda and Bosnia.

Over the summer, Secretary of State Powell came under fire for refusing to call the Sudan killings genocide. “Why would we call it a genocide when the genocide definition has to meet certain legal tests?” he told Na- tional Public Radio on June 30. “And based on what we have seen, there were some indicators but there was certainly no full accounting of all in-

dicators that lead to a legal definition of genocide. And that’s the advice of my lawyers.” 30

On July 1, the liberal grass-roots group MoveOn.org urged its members to lobby the administration to declare genocide in Darfur: “Formally recog- nizing the genocide would enable the U.N. Security Council to authorize other countries, like Germany, France, and

Spain, which don’t have troops in Iraq, to help stop the killing in Sudan.”

Contrary to MoveOn’s perception, declaring a genocide is not needed to trigger military action by either the Unit- ed States or the United Nations under the international genocide convention. The U.N. Charter empowers the Secu- rity Council to order military forces abroad to protect civilians, under its mission of

protecting peace and security, notes Dick- er of Human Rights Watch.

However, the international conven- tion does commit participating coun- tries to undertake to “prevent and pun- ish genocide,” an obligation weighty enough that administration lawyers have advised presidents against using the term. American presidents mistakenly — and repeatedly — assume their re-

sponse to genocide must be either military action or noth- ing at all, Power observes.31

President Bush demon- strated that political clout could be exerted in other ways with his call to Sudan’s President al Bashir on April 7 to de- nounce the killings in Darfur. Anxious to have economic sanctions lifted, Sudan an- nounced an immediate cease- fire. When U.S. attention waned, however, the killings resumed.

Often forgotten in the de- bate over stopping genocide is another obligation of na- tions under the internation- al convention — to make genocidal leaders account- able for their crimes. Many experts see the Internation- al Criminal Court as a cru- cial ingredient in preventing future genocides.

“By leaving perpetrators of genocide unpunished, we only make genocide more possible, not less,” says Juan E. Mendez, the U.N.’s recently appointed special adviser on

the prevention of genocide. But the United States has refused

to join the court and has sought ex- emptions from the court’s jurisdiction for U.S. troops and officials, drawing fire from human-rights groups.

“The U.S should be leading the ef- fort to have the Security Council refer the situation in Darfur to the Interna- tional Criminal Court,” Dicker argues.

F o r me r Rwandan Pr ime Minis te r Je an Kamb anda r e c e iv e s a life s e nte nc e in S e p te mb e r 1998 fo r his r o le in the de aths o f 800,000 Rwandans in 1994. T he s p e c ial U.N. tr ib unal in T anz ania was

the fir s t inte r natio nal c o ur t to c o nv ic t any o ne fo r g e no c ide and the fir s t to ho ld a he ad o f g o v e r nme nt r e s p o ns ib le .

A F P P h o to /A

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6 9 2 The CQ Researcher

“The court was created to go after those who are behind the Janjaweed and the Sudanese military authorities in their cam- paign of ethnic cleansing in Darfur.”

The Bush administration’s opposition to the court makes that unlikely. (S e e “ At Issue ,” p . 701.) Instead, the admin- istration supports setting up ad hoc courts to punish perpetrators as each new geno- cide arises — as in Rwanda, Yugoslavia and most recently Iraq. But the court’s advocates say ad hoc tribunals take too long to establish and are too expensive.

Ambassador Prosper disagrees. “The world has learned over the years and is more efficient in creating those mech- anisms,” he maintains. He notes that a tribunal set up in about 45 days in Sierra Leone last year indicted those bearing the greatest responsibility for atrocities committed during a civil war that ended in 2002.

The administration also objects to the international court because it does not come under Security Council jurisdic- tion. If it did, State Department officials argue, the Security Council would pre- vent politicized prosecutions by the court.

Moreover, as an independent entity, the international court doesn’t have the po- litical clout to force a state to give up a genocide suspect, Prosper argues.

On June 23, however, the Bush ad- ministration backed down from its at- tempt to get the U.N. to exempt U.S. military personnel serving as U.N. peacekeepers from international court jurisdiction. Secretary-General Annan had criticized the move in light of the accusations that American soldiers in Iraq were torturing prisoners.

“The U.S. is engaging in torture and pretending that it’s not,” Burkhalter says. “It puts us in a uniquely bad position to be rallying around a moral cause.” 32

Is the U.N. doing enough to stop and prevent genocide?

Annan has spoken out forcefully against the killings in Darfur and sent a special envoy there this summer. The U.N. also surprised some critics on July 30 when the Security Council threatened punitive measures if Sudan did not disarm the Arab militias. But human-rights activists say the U.N. has a weak record on geno-

cide, citing what happened in Rwanda. Some critics blame the weak record

on the structure of the Security Coun- cil, the only U.N. organ empowered to authorize military force. Any one of the five permanent members — the Unit- ed States, England, France, China or Russia — on the 15-member body can block council action. Human-rights groups have accused Russia of geno- cidal abuses in Chechnya, and China of violating human rights in Tibet.

The qualifications for Security Coun- cil membership need to be changed to eliminate members who practice geno- cide, says William Pace, who heads the Coalition for the International Criminal Court. Likening the council to a fire de- partment, he says: “We shouldn’t have pyromaniacs on the Security Council.”

The Security Council’s makeup has been blamed for the U.N.’s paralysis on several occasions. In June, the council failed to pass a U.S.-backed resolution criticizing Sudan because of opposition from Pakistan and Algeria, the two Mus- lim countries currently on the council, and China. 33

STOPPING GENOCIDE

T he horrendous death toll from the Nazi Holocaust — 6 million Jews and another 5 million Gypsies, homo- sexuals and communists — prompted U.S. political lead-

ers to vow “Never again.” And yet genocides continue with little effort to stop them.

One reason — or excuse — may be that ethnic killings since World War II look very different from the Nazi atrocities. Geno- cide today usually occurs in the context of wars or armed re- bellions, with killing occurring on both sides. This fueled the argument against intervening during the Bosnian war, when Muslims and Serbs were killing each other. “It’s been easy to analogize [the Bosnia situation] to the Holocaust,” President Bill Clinton’s secretary of State, Warren Christopher, told the House Foreign Affairs Committee on May 18, 1993, “but I never heard of any genocide by the Jews against the German people.”

Historian Frank Chalk, co-director of the Montreal Institute for Genocide and Human Rights Studies at Concordia Univer- sity, observes, “The public has in its mind cases like that of the Holocaust, where you could never sustain the argument

that the Jewish people were lethal enemies of the Nazis or that the killing was part of military necessity.”

But when both the government and the armed opposition are using famine as a weapon to starve civilians on the oppos- ing side, he adds, “It’s very hard to tell the public that both sides are doing that, and then mobilize the pressure for intervention.”

Rwanda is a case in point. In 1994, the Rwandan govern- ment was battling an armed rebellion by the Tutsi Rwandan Patriotic Front at the same time that it was exhorting Hutu mothers and fathers to machete their Tutsi neighbors. But Joyce Leader, the U.S. deputy chief of mission to Rwanda in 1994, says her State Department superiors had enough information to distinguish military from civilian killings.

“That was a clear situation where the violence could have been stopped if there was a show of force by the international com- munity; but the U.S. didn’t want to get involved in a civil war — even when the killing of Tutsis was separate from the Tutsi rebel group fighting with government forces,” Leader says. “We did in- form the higher-ups that different kinds of killings were occurring, but they initially didn’t hear it or didn’t want to hear it.”

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When the Clinton administration wanted the Security Council to charge Iraq’s Hussein with war crimes, the op- position of a few permanent members — China, Russia and France — blocked any action, according to David J. Scheffer, then-U.S. ambassador-at-large for war-crimes issues. They were more interested in protecting their oil inter- ests in Iraq, he has charged. 34

In Rwanda, the council responded to the 1994 ethnic killings by reduc- ing its peacekeeping force to just 270 soldiers — one-tenth its original size. Many believe a larger contingent could have saved lives. Author Power has argued that Annan, who then head- ed U.N. peacekeeping operations, had so internalized the paralysis govern- ing the veto-prone Security Council that he did not even bother to ask for a council vote in response to an urgent cable from the U.N. troop com- mander in Rwanda, Romeo Dallaire, warning of an impending massacre. In the cable, Dallaire said he planned to seize arms that he had been in- formed were being assembled by local Hutu militias to exterminate Tutsi’s. Annan’s cable rejected the proposed arm raids telling him, “the United States in particular would not support such an aggressive interpretation of his man- date,” Power writes. 35

“We’ve acknowledged our respon- sibilities in failing the people of Rwan- da,” says U.N. spokesman Farhan Haq.

However, Mendez, the special advis- er, notes when it comes to genocide, “In the last 10 years there hasn’t been a veto on action by any of the perma- nent five members. I don’t see it as hav- ing been the main reason the interna- tional community failed to act.”

Rather, the council’s inaction may stem from individual members’ desire to avoid a veto, Mendez suggests. In the case of Kosovo, for example, the NATO countries decided not even to seek Security Council authorization for military intervention because they feared a veto, Mendez notes. Instead, they

acted on their own, sending in a NATO force in 1999. “It seems to me the U.N. is sometimes scapegoated for the lack of will of some member states: If you don’t want to do something, you can argue, ‘I can’t do it because there will be a veto,’ ” Mendez says.

The U.N. General Assembly has dis- cussed proposals to abolish the coun- cil’s veto power, but U.N. spokesman Haq says, “Frankly, I don’t think it will be resolved any time quickly.”

In April, Annan announced that he wanted his main legacy to be a U.N. better equipped to prevent genocide. Saying regrets over Rwanda had “dom- inated” his thoughts ever since, Annan announced a plan built around giving early warning of wars and ethnic con- flicts that have the potential to esca- late into genocide.

“One of the reasons for our failure in Rwanda was that beforehand, we did not face the fact that genocide was a real possibility,” he said in Geneva. “And once it started, for too long we could not bring ourselves to recognize it or call it by name.” 36

In that spirit, Annan created a new post this year — special adviser on the prevention of genocide. In July he appointed Mendez, an Argentinean lawyer who was tortured in Argen- tine prisons as a political prisoner. He will collect information on threats of genocide and recommend action to the Security Council. Human-rights activists have hailed this reform. In the case of Rwanda, for example, in- formation often did not rise to the highest levels of international atten- tion because genocide was not a ca- reer priority for either bureaucrats or appointed officials, some argue.

Annan also has called for the use of military force to prevent future geno- cides. In 1999, he argued for “human- itarian intervention” to protect people subjected to human-rights abuses by their governments. In September 2003 he cited the need for criteria for “co- ercive” action — an obligation to in-

tervene with force if necessary. How- ever, it usually takes months for the U.N. to gather forces from nations will- ing to contribute troops. Although the idea of a rapid-reaction force was in the original U.N. Charter, fears about creating a world army blocked its cre- ation. U.N. peacekeepers are only au- thorized to maintain peace, not stop wars. Humanitarian intervention also sounds similar to the Bush administra- tion’s pre-emptive action in Iraq, mak- ing some countries nervous that a U.N. intervention could rationalize an act of aggression. 37

Yet the current system has led to some disasters. The U.N. contingent protecting Srebrenica during the Bosnian war was so small that it was overrun by a Bosnian Serb invasion in 1995. Within days, Bosnian Serbs separated 7,000 Muslim men and boys from their families and executed them.

Following highly critical reports in 1999 highlighting the U.N.’s failures in Srebrenica and Rwanda, Annan ap- pointed a panel of experts to advise the U.N. Led by former Algerian Prime Minister Lakhder Brahimi, it recom- mended in 2000 the U.N. not enter trouble spots until it could put ade- quate troops on the ground. 38

Over the past five years, the Secu- rity Council, at Annan’s request, has authorized individual nations instead of the U.N. to lead multinational peacekeeping forces in several cases.

For example, last year, in an incident disturbingly reminiscent of Srebrenica, U.N. peacekeepers in Congo’s eastern Ituri region found themselves out- numbered, lightly armed and unable to prevent horrifying tribal killings. The Security Council approved a mandate for a French-led multilateral force to restore order with some success. And last year the council authorized a U.S.- led force in Liberia and a French-led force in Ivory Coast. Each time, U.N. troops followed. The council autho- rized an Australian-led force in East Timor in 1999.

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Will the International Criminal Court prevent genocide?

Opponents of the court, including Bush administration officials, argue that any dictator bent on massacring his own people is unlikely to pause at the thought of ICC prosecution.

They note, for example, that in 1995, two years after a U.N. tribunal was created to prosecute genocide in the former Yugoslavia, Bosnian Serb lead- ers seized Srebrenica and carried out the largest massacre in Europe in 50 years. The commander of the Bosnian Serb army, Ratko Mladic, had the 7,000 Bosnian Muslims executed shortly after it became clear the tribunal was about to indict him.

It’s little surprise that “weak tri- bunals” like the Yugoslavia tribunal “do little to deter potential offenders,” writes Gary Bass, an assistant profes- sor of politics and international affairs at Princeton University. But Bass ar- gues that “even more credible efforts” like the Allied military action against Nazi Germany “met with little success when trying to dissuade genocide.” 39

Cornell Professor of Government Je- remy Rabkin says the ICC won’t do any better because it has no power to make arrests. “If there are mass atrocities, is it likely the perpetrator is going to stop because people call him names?” he asks. “The ICC has no army, no police.”

Supporters of the court answer that a nation’s own police force or army is expected to do the physical arresting, much as they do now for the tribunals.

But some of the most likely candi- dates for genocide prosecution are heads of governments like Sudan that have never ratified the underlying treaty. That means they are not under the court’s ju- risdiction unless the Security Council unanimously votes to refer their case to the court. “If you are a butcher, you are not going to ratify it,” Rabkin asserts.

If the United States ratified the treaty, it might be inhibited from using force to stop future genocides for fear of being accused of war crimes, Rabkin maintains.

Under that scenario, he speculates, “We could have been indicted for attacking Saddam Hussein, but Saddam [who did not ratify the treaty] couldn’t have been indicted for butchering his own people.”

Brett Schaefer, a fellow at the con- servative Heritage Foundation, a Washington think tank, argues that the new court could actually encourage genocidal despots to stay in power in- definitely: “What is the incentive for these folks to step aside if they know they’ll be dragged before the ICC and possibly sentenced to life in prison?”

But supporters argue the court is already having a positive effect, such as the ICC prosecutor’s announcement in June that he would begin investi- gating killings in eastern Congo.

“Warlords put down their AK-47s, put on business suits, picked up at- taché cases and moved into the Grand Hotel in Kinshasha in hopes of get- ting jobs in the new transitional gov- ernment,” says Human Rights Watch’s Dicker. “I don’t want to attribute it all to the ICC, but it was crystal clear to everyone there that the threat of pros- ecution by this international court had a chilling effect on those associated with the most serious crimes.”

History is not necessarily a good guide to whether the prospect of pun- ishment could deter genocidists be- cause it’s hardly ever been tried, says historian Ben Kiernan, director of the Yale Genocide Studies Program. The United States didn’t even ratify the 1948 international convention against genocide until 1988, he points out. Until the 1990s, he says, most geno- cidal leaders “didn’t even know the genocide convention existed.”

Perhaps surprisingly, genocide does- n’t just flare up spontaneously during ethnic conflicts but is usually carefully planned and documented. The planning for the Khmer Rouge killings of 2 mil- lion people in Cambodia in the late 1970s was revealed in tens of thousands of documents, Kiernan discovered, which he has posted on the Web. 40

An international court “will ham- string the killing and in a practical sense deter it if [the leaders] know the paperwork can be publicized and used in court against them,” Kiernan maintains.

In the United States, however, the heart of the debate is whether the U.S. should bow to an international legal body. The Bush administration believes that ratifying the treaty could put American troops and officials overseas at risk of politicized prosecution. The underlying treaty creates an institution of “unchecked power,” and “threatens the sovereignty of the United States” through the court’s claim of authority over American citizens, said Under- secretary of State for Political Affairs Marc Grossman. 41

United States government officials and British Prime Minister Tony Blair have already been accused of war crimes for invading Iraq in communi- cations sent to the court, critics ob- serve. Sally Eberhardt, media liaison at the Coalition for the International Criminal Court (CICC), responds that like any court, the ICC doesn’t act on every charge — especially unfounded ones. For example, she notes, the court received 906 communications from individuals and organizations in 85 countries between its opening on July 1, 2002, and June 1, 2004. Of these, the court has publicly announced serious consideration or action in only two cases — Uganda and the Demo- cratic Republic of the Congo.

The court had no jurisdiction over the United States concerning Iraq, ac- cording to Eberhardt. But because Britain has ratified the treaty, “Tony Blair could very well be brought up on charges,” the Heritage Foundation’s Schaefer asserts.

Defenders of the court argue there are enough built-in safeguards to make that unlikely. The ICC only has jurisdiction over a ratifying country if it is unwilling or unable to carry out

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Chronology 1900s-1940s Ottoman Turkey enters World War I and declares intention to empty the country of Christians. In run-up to World War II, Adolf Hitler plans to kill Jews and other “undesirables.”

1915-1916 Turks kill 1 million Armenians.

1939-1945 Nazis kill 11 million people.

1945 Allies establish Nuremburg war- crimes tribunal.

1948 U.N. passes a genocide treaty.

•

1970sU.S. supports radical regime in Cambodia.

1975-1979 Communist Khmer Rouge regime kills 2 million Cambodians.

•

1980sU.S. views Iraq as ally against fundamentalist Muslim Iran; U.S. continues aid as Saddam Hussein kills thou- sands during Kurdish rebellion.

1987-1988 Hussein uses chemical weapons and execution to kill 100,000 Kurds.

1988 U.S. signs U.N. genocide convention.

•

1990sU.S. intervenes in

genocide in Bosnia but not Rwan- da; genocide trials begin.

1992-1995 An estimated 200,000 predominantly Muslim Bosnians are killed.

1993 Yugoslav genocide tribunal created.

1994 An estimated 800,000 Rwandans are killed by civilians and soldiers.

1995 Bosnian Serbs invade Srebrenica, executing 7,000 Muslims in a day.

1998 U.N. convention agrees to create international genocide court.

March 24, 1999 NATO starts bombing Serbs perse- cuting Albanians in Kosovo.

May 24, 1999 U.N. tribunal indicts Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic for genocide.

•

2000sInternational tribunals punish Rwandan leaders, stall over Cambodia and Yugoslavia; human-rights groups seek action in Sudan.

May 23, 2002 President Bush withdraws U.S. support for International Criminal Court (ICC).

Aug. 3, 2002 Bush signs American Servicemem- bers’ Protection Act, withholding mili- tary aid from countries that refuse to give Americans immunity from ICC.

December 2002 Milosevic trial begins.

2003 U.N. and Cambodian leaders agree to create tribunal to try Khmer Rouge leaders, but political dead- lock in Cambodia stalls action. . . . Arab militias begin attacks on black civilians in Sudan.

May 2, 2003 President Bush declares end of U.S. war in Iraq.

April 7, 2004 Bush condemns Sudan killings, urges Sudanese president to act.

June 24, 2004 Bush administration drops attempt in U.N. to exempt U.S. soldiers from International Criminal Court.

June 30, 2004 U.S. hands over Hussein to provi- sional government of Iraq. . . . Secretary of State Colin L. Powell declines to call Sudan killings “genocide.”

July 2004 Iraqi tribunal charges Hussein with war crimes; report finds U.N. has failed to assure Serbian rights in Kosovo; U.N. tribunal convicts 19th Rwandan leader for role in 1994 genocide; Human Rights Watch charges Sudanese govern- ment is behind ethnic cleansing in Darfur; Security Council gives Sudan 30 days to disarm and pun- ish the militias operating in Darfur.

Aug. 5, 2004 Preliminary State Department report documents “a consistent and wide- spread pattern of atrocities” in Darfur, but stops short of terming it genocide.

Aug. 10, 2004 Senate Majority Leader Bill Frist, R-Tenn., calls Darfur killings “genocide.”

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a prosecution or investigation. The CICC’s Pace says the provision is aimed at a country whose court sys- tem is a sham. In the case of the Unit- ed States, “The belief that would ever be a decision of the judges at the ICC is a fantasy,” Pace says, because ICC judges are from democratic countries. “These are not [Muammar el] Quaddafi’s and Saddam Hussein’s judges,” he says.

Pace’s argument assumes that the United States will agree with the in- ternational court over the need to prosecute an American for a given war-related crime. But Johns Hopkins University Professor of International Law Ruth Wedgwood argues the Unit- ed States could have “good faith dif- ferences of opinion in war-making doc- trine” with the court, thereby subjecting it to the court’s jurisdiction.

Disagreement would likely arise over the principle of “proportionality,” which requires troops to distinguish between military and civilian targets, she pre- dicts. “The U.S. is hardly likely to pros- ecute its own pilots for faithfully car- rying out the air attacks assigned to them,” Wedgwood has written. 42

Still, the prosecution of an Ameri- can or a Brit remains politically un- likely given the court’s dependence on the major democracies for support, says Federico Borello, an international lawyer and senior associate at the International Center for Transitional Justice in New York City. “If the court decides to pros- ecute Bush, Blair and [France’s Jacques] Chiraq, that court is finished,” he says.

And finally there are moral arguments. “No criminal-justice system provides perfect deterrence — but it would be astonishing to conclude that we should therefore abandon criminal justice alto- gether,” says Diane F. Orentlicher, a pro- fessor of international law at American University’s Washington College of Law.

Even Princeton’s Bass, a critic of international courts, concludes tribunals are better than the most likely alter- native — revenge.

BACKGROUND Ge noc ide Conv e ntion

H istorically, the United States hasnot acted on foreign genocides until domestic political pressure made inaction untenable. Indeed, some his- torians argue that the United States has never stopped a genocide in progress.

Author Power contends the United States usually had sufficient informa- tion that the genocide was occurring but felt intervention would have com- peted with other national interests. 43

In 1915, for example, Henry Mor- genthau Sr., the U.S. ambassador to Turkey, urged Washington to con- demn Turkey’s deportation and slaugh- ter of its Armenian minority, but the U.S. refused to act because it wanted to maintain its position of neutrality with the European powers. Some 1 million Armenians were murdered or died of disease and starvation during the genocide.

Government officials dismissed the warnings of Raphael Lemkin, a Polish Jew and international lawyer, who told them about Hitler’s extermination plans beginning in the early 1940s. Before and during the United States’ entry into the war, the Allies resisted calls to de- nounce Hitler’s atrocities, open their doors to Europe’s Jewry or bomb the tracks to Nazi concentration camps. The Germans exterminated 6 million Jews and 5 million other “undesir- ables,” including Jehovah’s Witnesses, Poles, gypsies, homosexuals and polit- ical opponents during World War II.

Lemkin, haunted by the death of his family under Hitler, coined the word “genocide.” Through unrelenting lob- bying, he persuaded the fledgling United Nations in 1948 to pass the Convention on the Prevention and Pun- ishment of the Crime of Genocide.

The convention commits participat- ing countries to “prevent and punish” the crime of genocide and empowers them to call upon an organ of the United Nations to take action.

However, “That may mean nothing more than sending a letter to the U.N. Secretary-General,” notes the Holocaust museum’s Fowler. Just as important, however, may be the political or moral obligations incurred in the public’s eyes once the government uses the “geno- cide” label. “If we call something genocide, we can’t be seen not to do anything about it,” he says.

The convention includes only two specific legal obligations for participat- ing nations: pass legislation providing effective penalties for persons guilty of genocide and grant extradition of those indicted for genocide. However, be- cause of Senate concerns about threats to U.S. sovereignty, so many conditions were inserted into the convention, Power has contended, “that it carried next to no force” after it was finally ratified by the United States in 1988. 44

Wa r ning s Ig nor e d

In the 1970s, a few American diplo-mats and journalists in Cambodia warned of the widespread atrocities being committed in Cambodian villages by rad- ical Maoist communists known as the Khmer Rouge. But America’s political left ridiculed such warnings as falling for anti-communist propaganda. For its part, the U. S. government was leery of intervening in Southeast Asia so soon after the trauma of the Vietnam War.

The Khmer Rouge would eventual- ly persecute ethnic Vietnamese, ethnic Chinese, educated citizens, academics and Buddhist monks — anyone seen as a potential political enemy. Between 1975 and 1979, the Khmer regime of leader Pol Pot killed 2 million people. But the Carter administration maintained diplomatic relations with the regime

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even after its overthrow, in large part because the United States wanted to maintain good relations with China, Pol Pot’s prime backer.

In 1988, Sen. Claiborne Pell, D-R.I., chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, tried to cut off agricultural and manufacturing credits to Iraq in re- taliation for Hussein’s attempt in the late 1980s to wipe out Iraq’s rural Kurds. A coalition of the Reagan White House and the farm lobby defeated the sanctions package because they wanted to main- tain friendly ties with Hussein’s regime, then seen as a bulwark against the fun- damentalist Muslim government in Iran,

and sell wheat and rice to Iraq. As a re- sult, Hussein was receiving more that $1 billion in American financial support as his regime was killing 100,000 Kurds.

Three months before the genocide began against Rwanda’s minority Tut- sis in April 1994, the Canadian com- mander of the U.N. peacekeeping troops there, Romeo Dallaire, sought permission to round up the Hutu mili- tias’ machetes, warning they had built up the capacity to kill “up to 1,000” Tutsi “every 20 minutes.” 45

Denied permission by U.N. head- quarters, Dallaire watched the killings helplessly as the United States led the

effort to remove most of the troops under his command. Clinton wanted to avoid repeating the country’s hu- miliation in Somalia only eight months before, in October 1993, when 18 Amer- ican soldiers on a peacekeeping mis- sion had been killed.

The Clinton administration also re- fused requests from human-rights ac- tivists to jam a Hutu radio station that was exhorting Hutus to kill their Tutsi neighbors. A Defense Department memo in May 1994 argued that the jamming would be too expensive — $8,500 per hour — and ineffective compared to military action. 46

W ithin days after the citizens of Bosnia voted to se- cede from Yugoslavia in March 1992, Bosnian Serb soldiers and militiamen began rounding up non-

Serbs — Muslims and Croats — savagely beating them and often killing them. They also shelled the city of Sarajevo, de- stroying most Muslim and Croat cultural and religious sites. The Serbs called their actions “ethnic cleansing,” a term rem- iniscent of the Nazi euphemism — “cleansing” — for elimi- nating the Jews.

Over the next three years, a few State Department diplo- mats and members of Congress tried to convince the White House to bomb the Serb ethnic cleansers and lift the U.S. arms embargo against the outgunned Bosnian Muslims. Between 1992 and 1995, some 200,000 Bosnians were killed.

Clinton administration officials described the conflict as an an- cient, intractable ethnic conflict they were powerless to end. Only when that stance became politically impossible did President Bill Clinton finally intervene, argues journalist Samantha Power, who covered the Bosnian conflict and authored the 2002 book A Pr o b - le m fr o m He ll: Ame ric a and the Ag e o f Ge no c ide .

On July 11, 1995, Bosnian Serb military leaders seized an area of Srebrenica protected by a small force of U.N. troops, who were unable to resist the invasion. The Bosnians rounded up and slaughtered 7,000 Muslim men and boys.

Sen. Bob Dole of Kansas, then a Republican presidential challenger, pushed legislation through Congress ending the arms embargo. His crusade got editorial support and nightly news coverage, making Clinton’s non-interventionist policy political- ly embarrassing. In a telling scene on the White House putting green, Clinton shouted at his top national security advisers over the mounting political costs: “I’m getting creamed!” 1

Clinton reversed course, and with his blessings NATO un- dertook a three-week bombing campaign on Aug. 30, 1995.

By then, however, “Bosnia’s genocide had been largely com- pleted, and a multiethnic state destroyed,” Power writes. Nev- ertheless, backed by a credible threat of force, the United States convinced the Serbs to stop shelling civilians. That November, the Clinton administration brokered a peace accord between the parties in Dayton, Ohio.

Clinton responded more aggressively when Yugoslav Pres- ident Slobodan Milosevic began brutalizing ethnic Albanians, mostly Muslims, in the southern Serbian province of Kosovo in the mid-1990s. In 1996, embittered Kosovo Albanians formed the Kosovo Liberation Army, gunning down several Serbian policemen in 1998. The following year, avenging Serbians killed 3,000 Muslims and drove another 300,000 from their homes.

Beginning on March 24, 1999, NATO jets commanded by U.S. General Wesley Clark began a two-and-a-half month bomb- ing campaign. This was “the first time in history the United States or its allies had intervened to head off a potential geno- cide,” Power writes. 2

She attributes Clinton’s decision to bomb to embarrassment over Srebrenica, guilt over Rwanda and fear the fighting could expand into a wider European war.

Two months into NATO’s bombing campaign, a U.N. war- crimes tribunal indicted Milosevic for crimes against humanity and war crimes committed in Kosovo. It was the first time a head of state had been charged during a war with violating international law. On June 3, 1999, Milosevic surrendered. On June 9, he signed an agreement forcing Serbian troops to leave Kosovo and per- mitting 50,000 NATO peacekeepers to enter it.

After numerous delays, Milosovic’s trial finally started in Feb- ruary 2002; it is still continuing.

1 Samantha Power, A Pr o b le m fr o m He ll (2002), pp. 436-437. 2 Ib id.

Ethnic Cleansing in Bosnia

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But in the wake of Somalia, the Clinton administration had a firm pol- icy of avoiding humanitarian situations that could lead to military entangle- ments, and neither the White House nor the Pentagon wanted a military so- lution in Rwanda. Just as important was the lack of ringing phones at the White House. “You must make more noise,” Clinton foreign policy adviser Anthony Lake told human-rights activists in April 1994, when they asked how they could influence U.S. policy on Rwanda. 47 At the time, Human Rights Watch had not yet developed the grass-roots base to lobby the govern- ment, and the press was paying scant at- tention to Rwanda.

As government- supported radio pro- paganda warned of a fabricated Tutsi inva- sion, men and women became killers. An es- timated 800,000 Rwan- dans were killed in 100 days. 48

The failure of the United States to act in Rwanda has led some scholars to question whether the genocide con- vention’s emphasis on proving geno- cidal “intent” is counter-productive. Genocide “is absolutely the hardest crime to prove,” notes Frank Chalk, co-director of Concordia University’s Montreal Institute for Genocide and Human Rights Studies, because the “intent” to destroy a particular group is hard to establish. In addition, he says, “We need to intervene earlier. We can’t wait until we have an open- and-shut case.”

Chalk is among a group of schol- ars calling for a broad category of “atrocity crimes” that would carry the international obligation to intervene without carrying such a heavy burden

of proof. Former Ambassador Schef- fer said that would more likely have produced action in Rwanda and the Balkans, as well as in Iraq. 49

“Atrocity crimes” would include crimes against humanity and war crimes, which are easier to prove, cover many of the same actions and carry penal- ties just as great as genocide, Chalk says. Deportations, terror raids and killings, for example, are all considered war crimes and often signal the pre- liminary stages of a genocide.

CURRENT SITUATION

Punis hing Ge noc ide

In November 1994, seven months afterthe Rwandan genocide started, the Security Council authorized a special tri- bunal. It handed down its first indict- ments a few months later, eventually be- coming the first international court to convict anyone for genocide and the first to hold a head of government — Prime Minister Jean Kambanda — responsible.

By mid-July, 68 individuals had been arrested for war crimes or genocide in Rwanda, according to the State De- partment’s Office of War Crimes Is- sues. Of those, 19 had been convict- ed, including, former Finance Minister Emmanuel Ndindabahizi, who was sen- tenced to life imprisonment in July.50

“It’s a good success record,” says Alison DesForges, a senior adviser at Human Rights Watch and an expert witness at the Rwanda tribunal. “They’ve got the real leadership here.”

Indeed, the Rwanda tribunal has a far better track record than its coun- terpart in The Hague, cre- ated by the Security Council in 1993 for Yu- goslav war crimes. The trial of Slobodan Milose- vic, the former Yugoslav president and Serbian leader accused of mas- terminding the slaughter of non-Serb civilians in the 1990s, did not get started until February 2002 and may not finish. On July 5, Milosevic’s poor health prompted judges to postpone the beginning of his defense and to question whether

the trial could continue. 51

The Yugoslav tribunal has indicted 101 people and convicted 34, according to the war-crimes office. However, the government of Serbia-Montenegro has not turned over some of the most im- portant suspects; 21 remain at large, and several reportedly even give media interviews.

NATO has been trying for almost nine years to apprehend the region’s most wanted war-crimes suspect, for- mer Bosnian Serb Leader Radovan Karadzic. NATO leaders also have been trying to find former Bosnian Serb army commander Mladic. Both men face ac- cusations that they ordered the Srebrenica slaughter in 1995. 52

STOPPING GENOCIDE

F o r me r Yug o s lav Pr e s ide nt S lo b o dan Milo s e v ic is b e ing tr ie d o n c har g e s he mas te r minde d the s laug hte r o f tho us ands o f no n-S e r b c iv ilians in the 1990s . T he U.N. tr ib unal in T he Hag ue , Ne the r lands , s o far has

indic te d 101 p e o p le fo r war c r ime s and c o nv ic te d 34.

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Under congressional legislation con- ditioning foreign aid on cooperation with the Yugoslav tribunal, Secretary of State Powell told Congress in March that Ser- bia and Montenegro had not cooperat- ed in apprehending accused war crim- inals. As a result, aid to the government was halted as of March 31, 2004. 53

Hus s e in Tr ibuna l

T he world’s attention was fixed onSaddam Hussein on July 1, when the former Iraqi leader was charged with war crimes and crimes against humanity in a makeshift courtroom at U.S. military headquarters near the Baghdad airport.

Four days before U.S. soldiers pulled Hussein out of what President Bush called his “spider hole” in December 2003, Iraq’s Governing Council had an- nounced that an Iraqi Special Tribunal composed of five-judge panels would hold trials for crimes against humani- ty, war crimes and genocide commit- ted between July 17, 1968, when Hus- sein’s Baath Party consolidated power, and May 1, 2003, when President Bush declared an end to the war in Iraq.

The starting date for Hussein’s trial is uncertain. Ambassador Prosper says there’s tension between Iraqis, “who want this done quickly,” and the Unit- ed States, which wants due process pre- served. “We don’t want to see Iraqis sacrificing quality for speed,” he says.

What Iraqis want is “a quick process to judge Saddam guilty and just kill him,” said Salem Chalabi, general di- rector of the Special Tribunal. 54

Human-rights activists fault Iraq for being insufficiently public in forming the tribunal and for not including in- ternational lawyers and judges, as in the U.N.’s Yugoslavia and Rwanda tri- bunals. Some have criticized the heavy involvement of the United States, which has spent years preparing the case against Hussein and is supplying the investigators. 55

“We’re working hard to reduce the active involvement we have,” Prosper says. “We’ll be there to assist and ad- vise; it needs to be Iraqi, and it needs to be transparent.”

As for making the tribunal interna- tional, he says, “No one wants a Milo- sevic trial, which was too long in com- ing and too long in going — that’s a problem with full-blown international tribunals.”

The Iraqi tribunal is similar to so- called mixed tribunals, which combine both international and national law. Many human-rights activists consider them a second-best to international tribunals, saying they are too dependent on the whim of a country’s leadership. How- ever, it’s too early to say how well this relatively new type of tribunal will work.

Another mixed tribunal, which is supposed to try the aging leaders of the Khmer Rouge, has yet to get start- ed. U.N. and Cambodian officials agreed in June 2003 to create the court, but the arrangement requires ratification by the National Assembly. The assembly is basically not functioning because the main political parties remain deadlocked over their roles in the government.

Some human-rights groups have ques- tioned the objectivity of Cambodian judges — who will compose the ma- jority of the tribunal’s judges — to try the Khmer Rouge leaders. They note that Prime Minister Hun Sen and other government leaders were themselves once in the Khmer Rouge. Moreover, many of the Khmer Rouge leaders are now in their seventies and could die before the trials get under way. 56

Inte r na tiona l Cr imina l Cour t

T he difficulty of launching tribunals,sometimes years after genocide occurs, spurred support for the ICC. In 1998, 160 nations voted to establish the court. The United States was one of

only seven nations voting against the Rome Statute, the treaty creating the court. The other dissenters were China, Iraq, Libya, Yemen, Qatar and Israel.

Although President Clinton signed the treaty, he called it “fundamental- ly flawed” and did not send it to the Senate for ratification. Currently, 140 countries have signed the treaty and 94 have ratified it.

The Bush administration actively op- poses the treaty, arguing that American troops and government officials over- seas could be subjected to politically motivated charges. On May 6, 2002, the administration withdrew from the treaty. The administration later negoti- ated a Security Council resolution pro- viding a one-year exemption from ICC jurisdiction for American troops oper- ating in U.N. peacekeeping operations.

However, the administration recently withdrew its proposal for another one- year exemption following opposition from Secretary-General Annan, who cited the scandal over American sol- diers’ abuse of Iraqi prisoners and pos- sible violations of the Geneva Con- vention on torture. 57

Despite this setback, the Bush ad- ministration is pursuing another strat- egy to avoid the ICC: It is negotiating bilateral agreements with individual al- lies requiring them not to surrender American citizens to the ICC. As of mid-July, 91 countries had agreed, Am- bassador Prosper says.

The Bush administration also has re- ceived congressional assistance in en- forcing the bilateral treaties. Under the American Servicemembers’ Protection Act, signed by Bush on Aug. 3, 2002, the United States must refuse military aid to nations that sign the ICC treaty — un- less the administration grants them a waiv- er. Washington has been using the threat of withdrawing military aid to pressure countries to sign the bilateral agreements, according to human-rights activists.

The legislation also prohibits U.S. participation in peacekeeping activ- ities unless immunity from the ICC

7 0 0 The CQ Researcher

STOPPING GENOCIDE

is guaranteed for American person- nel. It authorizes the president to use “all means necessary and ap- propriate,” presumably including mil- itary force, to free Americans de- tained by the ICC. 58

Human Rights Watch has charged that the Bush campaign against the ICC has diluted U.S. efforts against

genocide, such as leading NATO in its efforts to arrest war criminals in the Balkans or bringing war-crimes charges against Hussein. 59

Even more disturbing, according to Human Rights Watch Executive Di- rector Kenneth Roth, “A court that ex- empts the world’s superpower risks losing its legitimacy.” 60

For his part, Ambassador Prosper re- sponds that his office has taken a lead role in supporting the tribunals for Yu- goslavia, Rwanda, Sierra Leone and Iraq. “Everyone knows we share the same values,” he says. “The only dif- ference is the mechanism.”

Co ntinue d o n p . 702

H ow does a country heal after ordinary citizens pick up machetes to kill their neighbors by the hundreds of thousands? If the response of Rwanda’s increasingly re-

pressive government is any sign, the news is not good. An international tribunal set up by the United Nations has

convicted the leadership of Rwanda’s former government of genocide and other war crimes for leading a three-month killing frenzy in 1994. An estimated 800,000 men, women and chil- dren from the country’s Tutsi minority died at the hands of cit- izens and soldiers from the majority Hutu ethnic group.

But even though some Tutsi rebel soldiers committed re- venge atrocities against Hutu civilians at the time, not one has been arrested or indicted by the international tribunal, because the current Tutsi-backed government refuses to cooperate, ac- cording to Alison DesForges, senior adviser to the Africa divi- sion of Human Rights Watch.

Rwanda’s government, born of the rebel army that stopped the genocide, has also come under criticism for human-rights violations in its efforts to bring other Rwandans to justice for their part in the genocide.

Over the past 10 years, the number of Rwandans held in overcrowded prisons grew to more than 100,000, of which the government has tried fewer than 10,000. Many were arrested in arbitrary sweeps of young Hutu men, according to human-rights activists. Some have remained behind bars the entire time with- out trial or evidence. “It’s enough [simply] for someone to point a finger,” says Sara Rakita, a consultant on Africa to the Ford Foundation.

To speed up the trials, the government recently decided to adopt g ac ac a, a traditional form of village justice that deals with minor squabbles, such as the theft of a neighbor’s cattle; conventional courts still deal with serious crimes like murder and rape.

But the g ac ac a system has yet to hold a single trial, even though a quarter-million local judges were elected two years ago. Rwanda’s rural communities have had trouble gathering the 100-person quorum demanded to attend long hearings held on the open ground in broiling sun or pouring rain.

In addition, the g ac ac a system is aimed solely at Hutu per- petrators. DesForges says many Hutus ask, “Why participate in a system that to them is unbalanced?”

Human-rights activists also question the fairness of the g ac a- c a system. DesForges cites a Hutu teacher who was hiding seven Tutsi children in his house during the 1994 massacre. Afraid that his Hutu relatives and neighbors would discover the children, he helped man the roadblock set up to capture and kill Tutsis. Every day, he took a chair to the barrier and read a book. “He didn’t hold a weapon. Is that person guilty of genocide?” DesForges asks. Some communities have so de- fined it; others not, she says.

Personal rivalries and old hatreds may also hold more sway in local courts. “I saw a proceeding where an old man’s Hutu sons accused him [of genocidal crimes] because the sons want- ed to get the old man’s land,” DesForges says, even though his Tutsi in-laws defended him.

The government often points to efforts like g ac ac a as an effort to achieve “reconciliation” between Hutu and Tutsis. But it’s becoming increasing difficult for citizens of Rwanda to speak freely, according to human-rights groups.

In July, the Rwandan parliament asked the government to dissolve the country’s four leading human-rights groups on the grounds that they were harboring “genocidal” ideas. 1 The groups had opposed the government’s plans for consolidating land hold- ings and had asked for justice for victims of the Rwanda Patri- otic Front (RPF), the rebel Tutsi group that took power after the genocide in 1994. Last year, the government dissolved the one party that could have successfully contested the RPF in elections. “It’s simply an attempt to eliminate dissent,” says DesForges.

Ironically, the main lesson Rwanda’s ruling party seems to have learned from the U.N.’s failure to stop the 1994 genocide is that the only way to ensure survival of the Tutsis is “to stay in power indefinitely,” T he E c o no mist magazine recently opined. Some of the government’s efforts to protect its vulnerable Tutsi minority echo disturbingly of 1994. “It was justified in invad- ing the Congo to disperse [Hutu] genocidaires who were using the place as a base for attacks on Rwanda,” the magazine noted, “but it surely did not have to kill 200,000 people in the process.” 2

1 Human Rights Watch press release, “Rwanda: Parliament Seeks to Abol- ish Rights Group,” July 2, 2004. 2 “Rwanda, remembered: Lessons of a genocide,” T he E c o no mist, March 27, 2004.

Healing Rwanda After the Genocide

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At Issue: Should the U.S. support the International Criminal Court?Yes

WIL L IAM PACE CONVENOR, COALITION FOR THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT

WRITTEN F OR THE CQ RESEARCHER, AUGUS T 2 0 0 4

the United States’ needless opposition to the InternationalCriminal Court (ICC) — which is supported by nearly 100democracies — has seriously damaged America’s interna- tional standing at a time when the U.S. needs to regain the trust of its global partners. The opposition began with the Bush administration’s “unsigning” of the court’s treaty in May 2002 and continues with the withholding of much-needed aid to eco- nomically vulnerable countries that refuse to grant ICC immunity to U.S. personnel.

In light of the many protections built into the ICC treaty, U.S. claims that Americans will be targeted by politically motivated ICC investigations are without merit. Indeed, rather than su- perceding national jurisdiction, the court’s mandate allows it to act o nly where an individual state is unwilling or unable to try alleged criminals itself. As long as the U.S. military and civil judi- cial systems are functioning, U.S. personnel will ne v e r face the ICC. Additionally, the ICC has no jurisdiction over acts committed in the U.S. However, U.S. nationals are already prohibited from committing murders, much less war crimes, in other nations. Therefore, to insist that U.S. sovereignty is threatened unless Americans are granted blanket immunity is dangerous nonsense.

Rather than being criticised via unfounded allegations, the ICC should be judged by its track record. In July 2003, the ICC prosecutor announced he would not consider complaints submitted against the United States and United Kingdom’s ac- tions in Iraq. The ICC has no jurisdiction over the U.S., and in the case of the U.K,. which is an ICC party, the court would have to first allow for British national jurisdiction to be in- voked. Instead, the court has initiated investigations requested by the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Uganda, which have suffered some of the most atrocious human-rights abuses.

By rejecting global consensus on international justice — em- bodied in effective structures such as the ICC, the U.N. and the Geneva Conventions — the United States has eroded its moral authority and squandered its outstanding legacy of leadership in support of international law. Even when treaty ratification is prolonged, most U.S. administrations sign or engage construc- tively while new international laws are being tested. Following the revelations of torture at Abu Ghraib prison, U.S. attempts to thwart international law now look all the more unjustifiable.

The ICC provides justice for the victims of the world’s great- est atrocities and works to deter future atrocities. At this critical moment in U.S. diplomatic history, the United States should see that rather than the phantom menace it envisions, the ICC can contribute significantly to U.S. national-security interests.

MARC GROS S MAN UNDERSECRETARY OF STATE FOR POLITICAL AFFAIRS

F ROM REMARKS TO THE CENTER F OR S TRATEGIC AND INTERNATIONAL S TUDIES , MAY 6 , 2 0 0 2

w e believe the ICC undermines the role of theUnited Nations Security Council in maintaining in-ternational peace and security. We believe in checks and balances. The Rome Statute creates

a prosecutorial system that is an unchecked power. We believe that in order to be bound by a treaty, a state must be party to that treaty. The ICC asserts jurisdiction over citizens of states that have not ratified the treaty. This threatens U.S. sovereignty.

We believe that the ICC is built on a flawed foundation. These flaws leave it open for exploitation and politically moti- vated prosecutions.

President Bush has come to the conclusion that the United States can no longer be a party to this process. . . .

Like many of the nations that gathered in Rome in 1998 for the negotiations to create a permanent International Crimi- nal Court, the United States arrived with the firm belief that those who perpetrate genocide, crimes against humanity, and war crimes must be held accountable — and that horrendous deeds must not go unpunished. But the International Criminal Court that emerged from the Rome negotiations . . . will not effectively advance these worthy goals.

First, we believe the ICC is an institution of unchecked power. Second, the treaty approved in Rome dilutes the authority

of the U.N. Security Council and departs from the system that the framers of the U.N. Charter envisioned.

Third, the treaty threatens the sovereignty of the United States. The court, as constituted today, claims the authority to detain and try American citizens, even through our democrati- cally elected representatives have not agreed to be bound by the treaty.

Fourth, the current structure of the International Criminal Court undermines the democratic rights of our people and could erode the fundamental elements of the United Nations Charter, specifically the right to self defense.

Fifth, we believe that by putting U.S. officials, and our men and women in uniform, at risk of politicized prosecu- tions, the ICC will complicate U.S. military cooperation with many friends and allies who will now have a treaty obliga- tion to hand over U.S. nationals to the court — even over U.S. objections. . . .

We must ensure that our soldiers and government officials are not exposed to the prospect of politicized prosecutions and investigations. Our president is committed to a robust American engagement in the world to defend freedom and defeat terror; we cannot permit the ICC to disrupt that vital mission.

7 0 2 The CQ Researcher

Cr is is in Da r fur

T his summer, aid workers returnedto the United States with mount- ing evidence of genocide in Sudan. On July 17, former Clinton official Pren- dergast reported seeing mass graves of people who had been killed execu- tion-style, shot in the back of the head. Refugees from Darfur told him their villages had first been bombed by the Sudanese air force and then attacked by Janjaweed militiamen shooting au- tomatic weapons. “There’s still mass raping going on,” he reported. 61

On July 30, the Security Council passed a U.S.-drafted resolution threatening sanc- tions if the Sudanese government failed to disarm and prosecute the marauding Janjaweed militias within 30 days. But in mid-August, with little more than two weeks to go to the Aug. 31 deadline, the violence had deepened amid in- creasing raids on refugee camps and rapes carried out by Sudanese forces and Arab militamen. 62 Since the be- ginning of the conflict in 2003, the num-

ber of deaths has been estimated at a minimum of 50,000, according to the United Nations, and over a million have fled their homes in Darfur. In the over- crowded refugee camps, epidemics and widespread starvation threatened. Aid officials estimate that up to a million people could die by year’s end. 63

Activists have urged the United States to persuade the Security Coun- cil to back up demands for an end to the killing with the threat of U.N. troops, but no such proposal had been made. The Sudanese govern- ment was rejecting all proposals for peacekeeping troops to protect civil- ians and angrily accused the United

States of being after its oil and gold. While the African Union was sending a few hundred troops to protect mon- itors of the cease-fire, it was unclear whether it had either the political power or the practical ability to send more troops to protect civilians. 64

And some columnists doubted the American public wanted to engage in a humanitarian crusade so soon after the war in Iraq. As Ne w Yo rk T ime s writer Traub suggested on July 18, “perhaps the

Bush administration’s effort to repackage the immensely unpopular war in Iraq as a Wilsonian crusade to free a subject people has discredited the very princi- ple of humanitarian intervention.” 65

The chaos in Iraq vividly demon- strated the difficulty of rebuilding a coun- try following a military intervention. An- other sign of the difficulty came in a report in July that faulted the U.N. and local authorities that have run Kosovo for the past five years for not protect- ing the province’s Serbian minority. 66

The report appeared four months after thousands of ethnic Albanians — the group Milosevic persecuted in the 1990s — began attacking Serbian communities. The U.N. mission there had been established after Yugoslav and Serbian forces, which had been accused of widespread atrocities, were forced out of Kosovo by the NATO bombing campaign.

OUTLOOK U.S . Role ?

F ollowing genocide, human-rightsactivists often stress, the interna- tional community needs to help rebuild a country’s courts and democratic in- stitutions to prevent the kind of revenge violence seen in Kosovo recently. But critics of humanitarian intervention sug- gest that the United States is not cut out for such ventures, as witnessed by its recent experience in Iraq.

“People may say abstractly, ‘Let’s do it,’ ” Cornell University’s Rabkin says, “but when they face casualties it’s not so pret- ty. We’re not committed enough; we’re not willing to shell out what it costs.”

Yet humanitarian crises are only like- ly to proliferate as global struggles over dwindling resources like water and arable land become more desperate. “There are

STOPPING GENOCIDE

Co ntinue d fr o m p . 700

Pe ac e k e e p e r s p r e p ar e to le av e fo r the tr o ub le d Dar fur r e g io n, in we s te r n S udan, o n Aug . 14, 2004. T he Rwandan tr o o p s ar e p ar t o f a 300-man

fo r c e b e ing s e nt b y the Afr ic an Unio n to r e s to r e o r de r fo llo wing attac k s b y Ar ab militiame n o n b lac k Afr ic an v illag e s .

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over 200 conflicts around the world. Any of those could be at risk of escalating to mass violence or to genocide,” Am- bassador Joyce Leader, who was deputy chief of mission in Rwanda during the 1994 genocide, says.

The United States is already in- volved in 100 peacekeeping operations around the world, according to the State Department, not to mention its major commitment in Iraq. That level of activity raises the question of how many other places the country can af- ford to send troops.

Other countries have similar prob- lems. “We’re all very thin,” said Gunther Altenburg, an assistant secretary-general at NATO, which has peacekeeping troops in Afghanistan and Kosovo. Most NATO members are facing budget cuts, he noted. “When the call comes” asking for peacekeeping troops, “maybe they’re al- ready in the Balkans or in Afghanistan,” he said, and are unwilling or unable to commit more troops. 67

Practical problems aside, will na- tions have the political will to stop and punish the next genocide?

After the major genocides of the past century, leaders around the world have publicly pledged “Never again!” repeatedly. That increased conscious- ness gives some experts hope that this time, the shame over past massacres will mobilize democratic governments around the world. Genocide scholar Chalk notes that Secretary Powell’s visit to Darfur this summer is a striking con- trast to the U.S. response to Rwanda’s massacres in 1994, when not a single prominent government official visited the killing grounds. “I think these guys are really going to do something this time,” he says hopefully.

Yale Professor Kiernan sees two con- flicting trends in the 1990s. On the one hand, increased world concern about bringing genocidal leaders to justice re- sulted in concrete solutions — the es- tablishment of tribunals. On the other hand, longstanding ethnic conflicts were exacerbated as the Soviet bloc and Cold

War alignments disintegrated — leading to genocide in places like Bosnia. On the negative side, Kiernan suspects that leaders of genocides in countries like Rwanda were encouraged by the slow international response to Bosnia. But on balance, “The story of the ’90s is one of increasing awareness of the crimi- nality of genocide and action to pun- ish if not deter it,” Kiernan says.

While governments and experts often show great conviction concern- ing genocides past and future, the Holocaust museum’s Fowler notes that “it’s very hard to get people to talk about the present” — actual cases in which military power, soldiers’ lives and political prestige are at stake.

And it seems likely that there will continue to be despotic leaders who think they can act with impunity, count- ing on the indecisiveness of the rest of the world — as some experts believe is occurring in Sudan right now.

A reminder of that threat is contained in Adolf Hitler’s famous expression of cynicism in August 1939 as he planned his military campaign. Assuring his gen- erals that the Nazis would have the last word in the history books, Hitler said, “Who today still speaks of the massacre of the Armenians?” A week later, he in- vaded Poland. 68

Note s

1 Nicholas D. Kristof, “Magboula’s Brush with Genocide,” T he Ne w Yo r k T ime s, June 23, 2004. 2 Reuters, “Factbox: What’s Happening in Western Sudan,” Aug. 11, 2004.

3 Marc Lacey, “Despite Appeals, Chaos Still Stalks the Sudanese,” T he Ne w Yo r k T ime s, July 18, 2004, p. A1. 4 See Human Rights Watch and Amnesty In- ternational Web sites: www.hrw.org and www.amnesty.org. 5 U.N. News Service, “Sudan Must Act on Darfur in 30 Days or Face Measures, Secu- rity Council Warns,” July 30,2004. 6 The Associated Press, “US Congress De- clares Genocide in Sudan,” July 23, 2004, at www.cnn.com. 7 Ib id. 8 See Reuters, “France Says Peacekeepers May be Needed in Darfur,” Aug. 13, 2004, and Reuters, “Sudan Accuses West of Seeking its Oil and Gold,” Aug. 12, 2004. 9 Marc Lacey, “In Darfur, Appalling Atrocity, but is That Genocide?” T he Ne w Yo r k T ime s, July 23, 2004, p. A3. 10 For background on Rwanda, see the fol- lowing CQ Re s e ar c he r reports by David Masci: “United Nations and Global Security,” Feb. 27, 2004, pp. 173-196; “Ethics of War,” Dec. 13, 2002, pp. 1013-1037; “Famine in Africa,” Nov. 8, 2002, pp. 921-944. 11 Testimony of author Samantha Power be- fore House International Relations Subcom- mittee on Africa, April 22, 2004. 12 The Associated Press, “Clinton in Africa; Clin- ton’s Painful Words Of Sorrow and Chagrin,” T he Ne w Yo rk T ime s, March 26, 1998, p. A12. 13 James C. McKinley Jr., “Annan Given Cold Shoulder By Officials In Rwanda, T he Ne w Yo r k T ime s, May 8, 1998, p. A9. 14 House International Relations Committee hearings on Darfur, May 6, 2004. 15 Nicholas D. Kristof, “Dithering as Others Die,” T he Ne w Yo r k T ime s, June 26, 2004. 16 The Associated Press, “At Least 180 Killed in Attack on a Refugee Camp in Burundi,” T he Ne w Yo r k T ime s, Aug. 15, 2004, p. A10. 17 Ib id. 18 Warren Hoge, “At UN, U.S. Threatens Penal- ties on Sudan,” T he Ne w Yo rk T ime s, July 23, 2004.

About the Author S a r a h Gla z e r is a New York freelancer who specializes in health, education and social-policy issues. Her articles have appeared in T he Ne w Yo r k T ime s, T he Washing to n Po st, T he Pub lic Inte r e st and Ge nde r and Wo r k , a book of es- says. Her recent CQ Re se ar c he r reports include “Increase in Autism” and “Mothers’ Movement.” She graduated from the University of Chicago with a B.A. in American history.

7 0 4 The CQ Researcher

STOPPING GENOCIDE

19 Testimony before House International Re- lations Committee, April 22, 2004. 20 For background, see Kenneth Jost, “War Crimes,” T he CQ Re se arc he r, July 7, 1995, pp. 585-608. 21 John Prendergast, “Sudan’s Ravines of Death,” T he Ne w Yo r k T ime s, July 15, 2004. 22 For background on International Criminal Court, see Masci, “Ethics of War,” o p . c it.; David Masci, “Torture,” T he CQ Re se arc he r, April 18, 2003, pp. 345-368, and Kenneth Jost, “War Crimes,” T he CQ Re se arc he r, July 7, 1995, pp. 585-608. 23 On July 18, Amnesty International blamed the Sudanese government for the Darfur at- tacks. See “Sudan: Darfur: Rape as a Weapon of War,” www.amnestyusa.org. 24 Reuters, “Factbox,” o p . c it. 25 Human Rights Watch, “Too Little, Too Late: Sudanese and International Response 2004,” May 2004; www.hrw.org. 26 Maggie Farley, “Annan Calls on Humani- ty to be Ready to Fight Genocide,” L o s An- g e le s T ime s, April 2, 2004. 27 “Holocaust Museum Declares Genocide Emergency,” July 26, 2004 at www.ushm.org/ conscience/Sudan/Darfur. 28 For background, see Mary H. Cooper, “Fu- ture of NATO,” T he CQ Re se ar c he r, Feb. 23, 2003, pp. 177-200. 29 James Traub, “Never Again, No Longer?” T he Ne w Yo r k T ime s Mag az ine , July 18, 2004, pp. 17-18. 30 Available at www.npr.org. 31 Power testimony, o p . c it. 32 For background, see Masci, “Torture,” o p . c it. 33 Traub, o p . c it., p. 17. 34 Peter Landesman, “Who v. Saddam?” T he Ne w Yo rk T ime s Mag az ine , July 11, 2004, p. 34. 35 Power, o p . c it., pp. 343-344. 36 Farley, o p . c it. 37 Ib id. 38 U.N. press release, “Report of the Panel on U.N. Peace Operations,” Aug. 23, 2000. 39 Gary Bass, S tay the Hand o f Ve ng e anc e (2000), pp. 294-295. 40 See www.yale.edu/gsp. 41 Address to Center for Strategic and In- ternational Studies, May 6, 2002. 42 Ruth Wedgwood, “An International Criminal Court is Still a Bad Idea,” T he Wall S tre e t Jo ur- nal, April 15, 2002. 43 Power, o p . c it. 44 Ib id., p. xix. 45 Power testimony, o p . c it. 46 Power, o p . c it., pp. 377-378. 47 Ib id., p. 377. 48 James Waller, Be c o ming E v il (2002), pp. 184-185.

49 Doug Saunders, “Is the Brutality in Sudan Genocide?” Glo b e andmail.c o m, June 19, 2004, p. A1. 50 “World Briefings: Africa: Rwanda: Ex-Min- ister Jailed for Life,” T he Ne w Yo r k T ime s, July 16, 2004. 51 Reuters, “Poor Health of Milosevic Delays Trial,” T he Ne w Yo r k T ime s, July 6, 2004. 52 Nicholas Wood, “NATO Tries Again, to Capture War Suspect,” T he Ne w Yo r k T ime s, June 22, 2004. 53 State Department press release, “Serbia and Montenegro Certification,” March 31, 2004; also see State Department Daily Briefing, March 31, 2004. 54 Landesman, o p . c it., p. 36. 55 Ib id. 56 Alan Sipress, “Khmer Rouge Trials Stalled by Political Deadlock,” T he Washing to n Po st, May 5, 2004, p. A24. 57 For coverage, see Warren Hoge, “Annan Rebukes U.S. for Move to Give its Troops Im- munity,” T he Ne w Yo r k T ime s, June 18, 2004, and Warren Hoge, “US Drops Plan to Exempt GI’s from UN Court,” T he Ne w Yo r k T ime s, June 24, 2004, p. A1. Note: “UN Court” is a misnomer; the ICC is an independent entity.

58 See Human Rights Watch, “The United States and the International Criminal Court,” www.hrw.org. 59 Ib id. 60 Remarks to the International Criminal Court Assembly of State Parties, Sept. 9, 2002; www.iccnow.org. 61 “Is Sudan’s Crisis a Case of Genocide?” “Weekend Edition,” National Public Radio, July 17, 2004, at www.npr.org. 62 Nima Elbagir, “New Violence Deepens Dar- fur Crisis,” Reuters, Aug. 11, 2004. 63 Lacey, o p . c it. 64 Somini Sengupta, “Crisis in Sudan,” T he Ne w Yo r k T ime s, Aug. 16, 2004, p. A8. 65 Traub, o p . c it., pp. 17-18. 66 Nicholas Wood, “Kosovo Report Criticizes Rights Progress by UN and Local Leaders,” T he Ne w Yo r k T ime s, July 14, 2004. 67 The symposium, “The Responsibility to Protect, The Capacity to Prevent and the Ca- pacity to Intervene,” was held May 5, 2004, at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, Washington, D.C. 68 Quoted in Power, o p . c it., p. 23.

F OR MORE I NF ORMATI ON Amne s ty Inte r na tiona l, 322 Eighth Ave., New York, NY 10001; (212) 807-8400; www.amnesty.org. Campaigns for human rights worldwide.

Coa lition for the Inte r na tiona l Cr imina l Cour t, 777 U.N. Plaza, New York, NY 10017; (212) 687-2176; www.iccnow.org. A network of 2,000 non-governmen- tal organizations.

Ge noc ide Wa tc h, P.O. Box 809, Washington, DC 20044, (703) 448-0222; www.genocidewatch.org. Coordinates an international campaign to end genocide.

Huma n Rig hts Wa tc h, 350 Fifth Ave., 34th Floor, New York, NY 10118-3299; (212) 290-4700; www.humanrightswatch.org. Investigates and exposes human- rights violations around the world.

“ Kr is tof Re s ponds ” We b s ite . Ne w Yo r k T ime s columnist Nicholas D. Kristof posts his columns, answers reader e-mail and puts new developments on Darfur here. http://forums.nytimes.com/top/opinion/readersopinions/forums/editorialsoped/ opedcolumnists/kristofresponds/index.html.

Of fic e of Wa r Cr ime s Is s ue s , U.S. Department of State; 2201 C St., N.W., Washington, DC 20520; www.state.gov/s/wci. Formulates administration policy in response to atrocities committed around the world.

U.S . Holoc a us t Me mor ia l Mus e um Committe e on Cons c ie nc e , 100 Raoul Wallenberg Place, S.W., Washington, DC 20024; www.ushmm.org/conscience. Publicizes present-day threats of genocide.

Ya le Univ e r s ity Ge noc ide S tudie s Pr og r a m, P.O. Box 208206, New Haven, CT 06520-8206; www.yale.edu/gsp. Posts genocide information on its Web site.

F OR MORE I NF ORMATI ON

Aug . 2 7 , 2 0 0 4 7 0 5Av a ila ble online : www.the c qr e s e a r c he r .c om

Books

Ba s s , Ga r y J ona tha n, Stay the Hand of Vengeance: The Politics of War Crimes Tribunals, Pr inc e ton Univ e r s ity Pr e s s , 2 0 0 0 . An assistant professor of politics and international affairs at

Princeton University finds that war-crimes tribunals — from Napoleon to Milosevic — rarely deter genocide, but are bet- ter than the alternative — revenge.

Gour e v itc h, Philip, We Wish to Inform You That To- morrow We Will Be Killed with Our Families, Pic a dor , 1 9 9 8 . Reporter Gourevitch visits Rwanda in the aftermath of the

genocide and in a series of compelling interviews with Rwan- dans on both sides of the killings explores the themes of guilt, vengeance and responsibility.

Kupe r ma n, Ala n J ., The Limits of Humanitarian Inter- vention: Genocide in Rwanda, Br ooking s Ins titution Pr e s s , 2 0 0 1 . Countering the conventional wisdom, an assistant professor

of political science at the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies argues that the Rwandan genocide hap- pened too fast for the West to have prevented it.

Me lv e r n, L inda , A People Betrayed: The Role of the West in Rwanda’s Genocide, Ze d Books , 2 0 0 4 . An investigative journalist details the Rwandan genocide in

1994, the history leading up to it and the role of the West- ern powers.

Mills , Nic ola us , a nd Kir a Br unne r , e ds ., The New Killing Fields: Massacre and the Politics of Intervention, Ba s ic Books , 2 0 0 2 . War reporters and scholars examine why — and why not

— the United States has intervened in state-sponsored mas- sacres in Cambodia, Yugoslavia, Rwanda and East Timor.

Powe r , S a ma ntha , A Problem from Hell: America and the Age of Genocide, Pe r e nnia l, 2 0 0 2 . A former journalist in Bosnia argues that American presi-

dents rarely consider it in their political interest to stop geno- cides even when they know about them.

Wa lle r , J a me s , Becoming Evil: How Ordinary People Commit Genocide and Mass Killing, Oxfor d Univ e r s ity Pr e s s , 2 0 0 2 . A psychologist concludes that ordinary people get in-

volved in genocide and do not have to be evil monsters to do so.

Articles

S e ng upta , S omini, “ De a th a nd S or r ow S ta lk S uda ne s e Ac r os s Bor de r,” The New York Times, Aug . 2 0 , 2 0 0 4 , p. A1 . A month after Sudan pledged to crack down on maraud-

ing militias, the killings continue and an epidemic threat- ened to sweep overcrowded refugee camps.

L a nde s ma n, Pe te r , “ Who v . S a dda m? ” The New York Times Magazine, J uly 1 1 , 2 0 0 4 , pp. 3 4 -3 9 . The special court that will try Saddam Hussein and other

Iraqis for genocide has come under fire from human-rights activists, who want more international participation, and Iraqis, who want swift justice.

Tr a ub, J a me s , “ Ne v e r Ag a in, No L ong e r ? ” The New York Times Magazine, J uly 1 8 , 2 0 0 4 . The war in Iraq and the Sept. 11, 2001, terrorist attacks

have muddied the waters about the legitimacy of interven- tion, making Americans’ vulnerability to terror their prime concern and humanitarian intervention “yesterday’s problem.”

Reports, Studies and Transcripts

Amne s ty Inte r na tiona l, “ S uda n: Da r fur : Ra pe a s a We a pon of Wa r ,” J uly 1 9 , 2 0 0 4 ; www.a mne s ty us a .or g . Rape, abduction and sexual slavery of young girls is being used

on a mass scale by Janjaweed Arab militiamen to intimidate black Sudanese, but Amnesty stops short of calling it genocide.

Public Br oa dc a s ting S e r v ic e , “ F r ontline ,” “ Ghos ts of Rwa nda ,” Apr il 9 , 2 0 0 4 ; www.pbs .or g / wg bh/ pa g e s / fr ont- line / s hows / g hos ts . The transcript of this documentary about the 1994 Rwandan

genocide describes the bureaucratic paralysis that seized Wash- ington and the United Nations during the killings; the Web site has links to related interviews and reports.

Huma n Rig hts Wa tc h, “ L e a v e No One to Te ll the S tor y : Te n Ye a r s L a te r ,” Apr il 1 , 2 0 0 4 ; http:/ / www.hr w.or g / r e - por ts / 1 9 9 9 / r wa nda . This update of the Rwandan story 10 years after the geno-

cide describes how ethnic slaughters have spilled into neigh- boring Burundi and the Congo and how Rwanda’s Tutsi- dominated government has become increasingly repressive.

Huma n Rig hts Wa tc h, “ Da r fur De s tr oy e d,” Ma y 2 0 0 4 ; http:/ / www.hr w.or g / r e por ts / 2 0 0 4 / s uda n0 5 0 4 . The human-rights group concludes that Sudan has been

working hand in glove with the Janjaweed militias attacking villages in Darfur and urges the U.N. to step in.

S e le c te d S o ur c e s

Bibliography

7 0 6 The CQ Researcher

Darfur

Booke r , S a lih, a nd Ann-L ouis e Colg a n, “ Ge noc ide in Da r - fur ,” The Nation, J uly 1 2 , 2 0 0 4 , p. 2 7 . Diplomats worry that intervention by outside powers might

jeopardize a recent peace agreement.

Dixon, Roby n, a nd Ma r y Cur tius , “ He lp Will Come Too L a te for We s te r n S uda n,” Los Angeles Times, J une 2 8 , 2 0 0 4 , p. A5 . The U.S. Agency for International Development estimates

320,000 people will die as a result of the carnage in Darfur.

F owle r , J e r r y , “ In S uda n, S ta r ing Ge noc ide in the F a c e ,” The Washington Post, J une 6 , 2 0 0 4 , p. B2 . More than 1 million Darfurians are fleeing the Janjaweed, no-

madic raiders who are backed by the Sudanese government.

Ma r quis , Chr is tophe r , a nd Ma r c L a c e y , “ Powe ll a nd Anna n S e e Hints of Dis a s te r in S uda n,” The New York Times, J uly 1 , 2 0 0 4 , p. A1 . The secretary of State and U.N. secretary-general visit a refugee

camp in Darfur, and government forces fire on students.

F a r le y , Ma g g ie , “ U.N. Counc il OKs S uda n Re s olution,” Los Angeles Times, J uly 3 1 , 2 0 0 4 , p. A3 . The U.N. Security Council calls on the Sudanese govern-

ment to clamp down on militias in Darfur.

S e ng upta , S omini, “ Cr is is in S uda n: Thor ny Is s ue s Un- de r ly ing Ca r na g e in Da r fur Complic a te Wor ld’s Re s pons e ,” The New York Times, Aug . 1 6 , 2 0 0 4 , p. A8 . Hostility among Sudan and its neighbors toward any West-

ern intervention illustrates the tension between national sov- ereignty and humanitarian impulses.

Wa x, Emily , “ In S uda n, a ‘Big S he ik’ Roa ms F r e e ,” The Washington Post, J uly 1 8 , 2 0 0 4 , p. A1 . “No one can wipe out an ethnicity,” says a Janjaweed leader

with a criminal past as he denies allegations of genocide.

International Law

Ande r s on, Ke nne th, “ Who Owns the Rule s of Wa r ? ” The New York Times Magazine, Apr il 1 3 , 2 0 0 3 , p. 3 8 . The United States and international organizations are locked

in a fight about who has the right to interpret and admin- ister the laws of war.

F r a nke l, Gle nn, “ Be lg ia n Wa r Cr ime s L a w Undone by Its Globa l Re a c h,” The Washington Post, S e pt. 3 0 , 2 0 0 3 , p. A1 . A far-reaching Belgian law results in cases against George

H.W. Bush, Colin Powell and the Belgian foreign minister before it is repealed.

L a c e y , Ma r c , “ In Da r fur , Appa lling Atr oc ity , But Is Tha t Ge noc ide ? ” The New York Times, J uly 2 3 , 2 0 0 4 , p. A3 . The Genocide Convention requires governments to pre-

vent and punish genocide, but deciding what constitutes genocide is something few agree on.

L y nc h, Colum, “ Eur ope a n Countr ie s Cut De a l to Pr ote c t Afg ha n Pe a c e ke e pe r s ,” The Washington Post, J une 2 0 , 2 0 0 2 , p. A1 5 . Cries of hypocrisy are raised when nations that support

the International Criminal Court get waivers for their troops from the Afghan government.

The U.N. and Genocide

“ I n Anna n a nd Chir a c ’s Wor ds : ‘F or k in the Roa d’ a nd ‘Ca ll a S ummit’,” The New York Times, S e pt. 2 4 , 2 0 0 3 , p. A1 3 . U.N. Secretary-General Annan calls for “a discussion on the

criteria for an early authorization of coercive measures” to be used in critical situations, such as cases of genocide.

F a r le y , Ma g g ie , “ Anna n Ca lls on Huma nity to Be Re a dy to F ig ht Ge noc ide ,” Los Angeles Times, Apr il 8 , 2 0 0 4 , p. A3 . Annan, who headed U.N. peacekeeping operations in 1994,

envisages a global warning system to help identify poten- tial instances of genocide.

Holbr ooke , Ric ha r d, “ How Did ‘Ne v e r Ag a in’ Be c ome J us t Wor ds ? ” The Washington Post, Apr il 4 , 2 0 0 4 , p. B2 . The U.N. is only the sum of its parts, and its decision not

to intervene in Rwanda was a joint decision by the nations of the Security Council.

The U.S. and the ICC

Ca s s e l, Doug , “ With or Without U.S ., Wor ld Cour t Will De but,” The Chicago Tribune, Ma y 1 2 , 2 0 0 2 , Pe r s pe c tiv e S e c tion, p. 1 . A legal expert says the ICC would be unlikely to abuse

its power against Americans and argues that the world needs the ICC.

Che r tof f, Mic ha e l, “ J us tic e De nie d,” The Weekly Stan- dard, Apr il 1 2 -1 9 , 2 0 0 4 . A federal judge criticizes the overly broad power of the

ICC and its prosecutors, which could pose a danger to Amer- ican businessmen.

Kis s ing e r , He nr y , “ The Pitfa lls of Univ e r s a l J ur is dic tion,” Foreign Affairs, J uly -Aug us t 2 0 0 1 , p. 8 6 . The former secretary of State argues a just end does not

permit the application of unjust means and that the ICC is flawed by prosecutorial discretion without accountability.

The Next Step: Additio nal Artic le s fr o m Curr e nt Pe rio dic als

Aug . 2 7 , 2 0 0 4 7 0 7Av a ila ble online : www.the c qr e s e a r c he r .c om

Ma tthe ws , Ma r k, “ U.S . Dr ops Bid to Exe mpt GIs F r om Wa r Cr ime s Pr os e c ution,” The Baltimore Sun, June 2 4 , 2 0 0 4 , p. 1 A. Tainted by the events at Abu Ghraib, American attempts

to win renewed immunity from the ICC while engaged in U.N. missions end in failure.

Or me , Willia m, “ Pe a c e Mis s ions Ar e Put in Doubt,” Los Angeles Times, J uly 3 , 2 0 0 2 , p. A1 . The Bush administration threatens to block peacekeeping

missions unless Americans win immunity from prosecution by the ICC.

Roth, Ke nne th, “ The Ca s e for Univ e r s a l J ur is dic tion,” Foreign Affairs, S e pt.-Oc t. 2 0 0 1 , p. 1 5 0 . The director of Human Rights Watch rebuts Kissinger’s fears

(see above), saying the abuses of the legal system he fears are unlikely.

Trying the Accused

Ba s s , Ga r y J ., “ Milos e v ic in the Ha g ue ,” Foreign Affairs, Ma y -J une 2 0 0 3 , p. 8 2 . The trial’s most important aspect will not be legal, but po-

litical — whether it will shame bystanders, comfort the in- jured and deter future crimes.

Br ooke , J a me s , “ 2 5 Ye a r s L a te r , Ca mbodia Pr opos e s Tr i- a ls of Khme r L e a de r s ,” The New York Times, J a n. 8 , 2 0 0 4 , p. A1 1 . Most people would resent a foreign invasion, but many

Cambodians credit their survival to a lengthy Vietnamese in- vasion that toppled the Khmer Rouge.

Ha r ma n, Da nna , “ A Woma n on Tr ia l for Rwa nda ’s Ma s - s a c r e ,” The Christian Science Monitor, Ma r c h 7 , 2 0 0 3 , p. 9 . The first woman to be accused of genocide also alleged-

ly personally encouraged Hutu gangs to select the prettiest Tutsi women and rape them.

Kitfie ld, J a me s , et al., “ A Ty r a nt’s Tr ia l,” National Jour- nal, De c . 2 0 , 2 0 0 3 . Saddam’s trial could stir even more resentment among Arabs

enraged by “victor’s justice” imposed on their defeated hero, or it could signal a new beginning for Iraq and the Arab world.

L a F r a nie r e , S ha r on, “ 3 Rwa nda n Me dia Exe c s Conv ic t- e d of Ge noc ide ,” The Chicago Tribune, De c . 4 , 2 0 0 3 , Ne ws S e c tion, p. 1 . The three defendants used their radio station and news-

paper to incite the murder of Tutsis, even reading out in- dividual license plate numbers and names.

S e nnott, Cha r le s , “ Doubt Air e d on Ge noc ide Ca s e Ag a ins t Milos e v ic ,” The Boston Globe, F e b. 2 6 , 2 0 0 4 , p. A2 2 . As the prosecution rests its case, chief prosecutor Carla del

Ponte expresses doubts over whether the genocide charge will stick.

Intervention

Boot, Ma x, “ S houlde r ing the L oa d, a nd the Rifle ,” Los Angeles Times, F e b. 2 6 , 2 0 0 4 , p. B1 3 . A senior fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations calls

for a standing U.N. force to deal with failed states and their humanitarian catastrophes.

Ev a ns , Ga r e th, a nd Ma home d S a hnoun, “ The Re s pons i- bility to Pr ote c t,” Foreign Affairs, Nov e mbe r -De c e mbe r 2 0 0 2 , p. 8 9 . A former Australian foreign minister and high-ranking U.N.

diplomat lay out principles the Security Council could use for authorizing humanitarian interventions.

S c he f fe r , Da v id, “ S ha me ful Ina c tion in F a c e of Ge no- c ide ,” Los Angeles Times, Apr il 5 , 2 0 0 4 , p. B1 1 . A former U.S. ambassador calls on America to recognize

genocide for what it is and to have the courage to act.

CITING THE CQ RESEARCHER Sample formats for citing these reports in a bibliography include the ones listed below. Preferred styles

and formats vary, so please check with your instructor or professor.

MLA STYLE

Jost, Kenneth. “Rethinking the Death Penalty.” The CQ Researcher 16 Nov. 2001: 945-68.

APA STYLE

Jost, K. (2001, November 16). Rethinking the death penalty. T he CQ Re se ar c he r, 11, 945-968.

CHICAGO STYLE

Jost, Kenneth. “Rethinking the Death Penalty.” CQ Re se ar c he r, November 16, 2001, 945-968.

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