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Clandestine/Hidden Organizations CYNTHIA STOHL and MICHAEL STOHL University of California, Santa Barbara, USA

Clandestine organizations are composed of groups of people who keep their affiliations secret and conceal internal and external organizational activities. They have been vari- ously described as underground organizations, secret societies, illicit or dark networks, enclaves, black markets, backstreet businesses, anonymous agencies, gangs, covert col- lectives, hidden organizations, and shadow states. Many of these descriptors are laden with negative connotations; the terms “clandestine” or “hidden” are used in this entry to denote any sort of organizing that is intentionally shrouded from view. Since the early 2000s, the prominence and notoriety of clandestine organizations have made them the subject of much discussion, debate, and research. Pundits, politicians, scholars, and the popular press are filled with stories and reflections about the relationship between digital communication technology and the rise of secret organizations like the hacker activist group Anonymous, terrorist groups such as al-Qaeda and ISIS, cyber drug car- tels, including the notorious Sinaloa cartel, and anonymous markets like the Silk Road, known for selling illegal drugs on the web. Likewise, much greater attention has been drawn to the clandestine aspects and behaviors of organizations that exist within the government sphere, such as the Federal Bureau of Investigation (Hoerl & Ortiz, 2015) and NSA (the National Security Agency, aka “No such Agency”) in the US, and GCHQ (Government Communications Headquarters) in the UK as a result of the Snowden revelations.

Research history

It is not just the affordances of the “dark net” and the covert protocols of servers like TOR (TheOnionRouter) that havemade hidden organizations and organizing possible. Clandestine organizations and secret societies have existed for centuries, conducting their business in hidden spaces and places, concealingmembership rosters,maintaining secret rituals, and keeping their identities and their ultimate goals strategically opaque. For example, the Knights Templar, a clandestine religiousmilitary group, was formed in the 12th century and had secret initiations and furtive financial holdings. The Knights of the Golden Circle was a 19th-century proslavery secret society whose most infa- mous member was John Wilkes Booth, the American who assassinated US President Abraham Lincoln in 1865. Many visible organizations have clandestine counterparts. The Freemasons was a well-known secret society that began in 1717 and had power- ful members such as GeorgeWashington.This fraternal organization continues to exist

The International Encyclopedia of Organizational Communication. Craig R. Scott and Laurie K. Lewis (General Editors), James R. Barker, Joann Keyton, Timothy Kuhn, and Paaige K. Turner (Associate Editors). © 2017 John Wiley & Sons, Inc. Published 2017 by John Wiley & Sons, Inc. DOI: 10.1002/9781118955567.wbieoc022

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today; members and some of its activities are well known and “legitimate,” but its inner workings remain awash with secrecy. Criminal secret organizations like the Mafia, ter- rorist groups including the Irish Republican Army (IRA), collegiate secret societies like The College of William and Mary’s “Flat Hat Club” founded in 1750 (Thomas Jeffer- son was a member), and backstreet businesses that include gambling and prostitution “houses” have long been of concern in the predigital era.

In 1906, sociologist Georg Simmel first published what was to become the seminal work on clandestine organizations, “The Sociology of Secrecy and of Secret Societies” (1906). Many of Simmel’s ideas regarding the influence of clandestine organizations on larger society are still cornerstones of contemporary social science research and the wayswe think about these organizations. For example, two of his propositions regarding the dynamics of secret collectives remain central concerns for contemporary schol- arship on clandestine organizing and continue to generate attention in our local and global communities: first, the breadth and depth of a clandestine organization’s span of control goes beyond the organization and permeates its members’ personal and social lives; second, the power of clandestine organizations is elaborated by manipulating the ratio of public knowledge to ignorance.

Today we recognize that clandestine organizations may be legal or illicit, profit or nonprofit, ideologically or socially grounded, and may promote prosocial behavior or embody antisocial values and activities. We know that these are organizations whose communication structures and patterns are unique and powerful. But because they operate in the shadows they are hard to study and analyze. What we do know, how- ever, suggests that clandestine organizations are a significant and embedded part of the contemporary organizational landscape; they recruit and socialize members in unique ways, they simultaneously are known and unknown to society, they exert influence on legitimate enterprise, and, although they are hard to see and understand, we ignore them at our peril.

The communicative constitution of clandestine organizations

In communication terms, a clandestine organization is a social network defined by “a persisting pattern of relationships which directly and indirectly links the participants in related secret activities” (Erickson, 1981, p. 189). From religious cults to university societies, terrorist cells to criminal cartels, intelligence agencies to black markets, these networks are part of the ebb and flow of domestic and global business, politics, cul- ture, and social relations. What distinguishes these groups from one another and from nonclandestine organizations is (1) the degree of organizational visibility– that is, how recognizable or identifiable it is to the public at large; (2) member identification – that is, the degree to which members express through words or behavior their identifica- tion with the organization; and (3) the relevant audience – that is, who are the central stakeholders and audiences for the organization (see Scott, 2013). But as varied as the goals, motives, reputation, identity, infrastructure, and activities of clandestine organi- zations may be, they have three common characteristics that insure a level of shrouded

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secrecy not associated with other types of organizations (Stohl & Stohl, 2011). These characteristics have been the focus of recent communication research.

The first characteristic is that there ismutual agreement within the organization that bona fide members keep their association with the organization secret for some signifi- cant period of time. This creates several communication challenges. Gambetta (2009, pp. 149–150), who focuses on criminal organizations, identifies three problems: the communication problem, the identification problem, and the advertising problem.The response from clandestine organizations has been the development of what Gambetta labels signs and signals.The communication problem refers to howmembersmay com- municate with colleagues but not allow the interception or understanding of the mes- sage by outsiders.The identification problem concerns how to identify fellowmembers not yet known, while not being recognized by a third party (see also Morselli, Gigu’ere, & Petit, 2009). Thus, clandestine organizations often develop identity markers, includ- ing secret handshakes, tattoo markings, nicknames, hand gestures, code words, and other symbolic totems that are largely indecipherable to outsiders but meaningful for insiders. These markers enable members to identify and interact with other members while remaining unidentifiable to the outside world. The advertising problem refers to how organizations advertise their goods and services to people they do not know such that connections can be made without putting the organization at risk. But being able to identify and communicate with other members is not enough. Organizations need to solve the advertising problem and they need to recruit new members over time if they are to thrive or even just survive. But this is a very dangerous and risky activity. Clandestine organizations need to attract new members without letting others find out about the organization. Thus, they have to recruit in nontraditional ways, bypassing conventional avenues of marketing or posting job openings or recruitment materials on publically available open media sources and professional networks. Studies have shown that recruitment of new affiliates is through trusted networks of like-minded individuals, kinship and ethnic networks where in-group identities have already been established, or connections with other clandestine, sympathetic, or front organizations that hide the clandestine organization within it. Studies have typically shown that clan- destine networks based on kinship ties are more sustaining than those built on ideolog- ical commonalities (Mincheva & Gurr, 2013). Clearly, understanding the recruitment patterns and socialization dynamics of clandestine organizations is an important step in developing strategies and policies to intervene in their sustained development (on confronting al-Qaeda, e.g., see Eilstrup-Sangiovanni & Jones, 2008).

The second characteristic of clandestine organizations is that internal activities and governance structures are kept hidden from the public. For a long time, scholars assumed that all secret organizations were hierarchically organized with a well-articulated com- mand and control structure in place to ensure secrecy and adherence to organizational rules and expectations. More recent research has shown this is no longer the case, if it ever was. Clandestine organizations may be highly bureaucratized or loosely con- nected, centralized or decentralized, extremely ritualized with strong socialization rou- tines for newmembers or emergent systems that are highly flexible and entrepreneurial (Scott, 2013). Because of the surreptitious and changing nature of the organizational structure, policies and interventions designed to eliminate clandestine organizations

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are quite precarious. Research suggests that the assumptions made by most politicians and law enforcement that clandestine organizations have similar hierarchical network structures, for example, has resulted in serious miscalculations about the magnitude, pervasiveness, and ability of drug cartels, human traffickers, or terrorist organizations to survive the capture, arrest, or death of significant portions of the leadership (Stohl & Stohl, 2007). Scholarship on social movements and the “public secret sphere” also show how clandestine organizing often entangles transparent organizations with shad- owed organizations, creating organizational hybrids and alternative structures that are difficult to monitor, regulate, or control (Bratich, 2014).

The third characteristic, namely, that external traces of the existence of the organization eventually become known (or at least rumored) outside the membership, but may remain hidden for very long periods of time, is associated with the degree to which the clandes- tine organization is embedded within the fabric of society. During World War II, the Franc-Tireurs et Partisans, a well-known resistance movement, operated furtively, but within local communities therewas tacit acknowledgment that they existed. Although it is clearly impossible to track the number of secret organizations we do not know about, ironically many clandestine groups have names that are extraordinarily well known, are or were in the public’s consciousness, and, in more than a few cases in the con- temporary period, have their own websites (e.g., www.kkkknights.com). The Ku Klux Klan, the Los Angeles Crips, the Japanese Yakuza, and the Sons of Liberty are just a few examples of groups with global reputations that have long and continuing histories. In the case of the Mafia, it has a powerful reputation; the public knows it exists because its daily lives are affected by the Mafia’s criminal activity, including extortion activi- ties that make it feared and the favors the organization bequeaths upon the community to try and build rapport and trust. Consequently, newspaper stories about the Mafia are commonplace, and its portrayal in popular media sensationalizes and/or glamor- izes the organization. But still, most of the actual organizational activity and Mafia practices remain hidden from sight. Similarly, in the case of the collegiate undergrad- uate secret society Skull and Bones, most Yale students and administrators know that the organization exists and are even aware that their membership roster has included US presidents, senators, and Supreme Court justices. Little is known, however, about their practices and routines. Only traces of the organization have entered public con- sciousness; members pledge to keep organizational business concealed and this has remained an honored tradition. The incomplete details and popular culture framing of clandestine systems, such as prostitution enterprises, gangs, or illegal immigration networks, sometimes lead to exaggerated, misguided, and inflated views of the size, organizing competencies, and collaborative dynamics of these hidden systems, giving them enhanced prestige and power beyond their actual operational capabilities (Egley & O’Donnell, 2009).

The study of clandestine/hidden organizations

By their very nature, clandestine organizations are difficult to study. At the most basic level it is often difficult to even know if an organization is clandestine or not. For

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example, several contemporary organizations with early connections to the secret rituals and meetings associated with Freemasonry (such as the National Grange of the Order of Patrons of Husbandry and The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter Day Saints) are still seen by many as clandestine organizations where, beyond the basic membership level, there are higher levels at which you must swear oaths and partake in secret rituals (Rich & Merchant, 2003).

But even when scholars are fully aware that a clandestine organization exists, it is still especially challenging to study such groups. Traditional methods of research from both social scientific and humanistic perspectives (e.g., member surveys, interviews, experi- ments, content analysis of archival data, participant observation, and case studies) rely upon some degree of openness and transparency in the organization. Because secrecy is the defining feature of clandestine organizations, it is also very difficult to get human subject approval for any type of research protocol, and often there are ethical issues surrounding the collection and dissemination of the information.

Therefore, many methods used to study clandestine organizations are unconven- tional and at times controversial. For example, a great deal of journalistic work has been done by undercover agents (people who join the organization on false pretenses in order to learn the its secrets) who then partner with a journalist or scholar to articu- late and publicize their narratives and conclusions. One of the most extreme examples is described in Jacobs’s (2002) book Friend of the Family, which recounts the experi- ences of FBI undercover agent Edgar Robb, the only undercover agent to rise to the ranks of Mafia boss. In academic writing, research is sometimes also based on data gained by an undercover researcher who joins a group, such as a religious cult, with- out informing other members that the real reason for his or her membership is to learn about the organization (Lauder, 2011). It is more common, however, to find case studies based on a researcher’s own experiences as a bona fide member of a clandes- tine organization, as Rios (2011) did, or as a trusted confidant as Conquergood (1994) did in his work with Albany Park, Illinois residents, including members of the Latin Kings gang.

More conventional methods used to study clandestine organizations include inter- viewing informers (people who are, or were, members of the organization) and archival analyses of newspaper coverage or diaries of members. For example, Shu (2002) con- ducted in-depth interviews with 14 Taiwanese residents living in the United States who were members of an underground political group, and also published datasets about the activist demographic characteristics. Archival data has also been creatively used by scholars to investigate the social networks of Australian drug trafficking syndicates by analyzing judges’ sentencing comments (Bright, Hughes, & Chambers, 2012). Qualitative analyses of court cases related to clandestine drug laboratories found that the best intervention policies focused on location, chemicals, and equipment rather than on individual members of the clandestine organization (Townsley, 2011). Many communication scholars are also interested in how media portray particular types of clandestine organizations, most especially terrorist organizations. Because it is so difficult to obtain data about clandestine organizations, scholars often use a multi-method approach. To find out how women became engaged with illegal abortion clinics in Africa, for example, researchers interviewed women whose abortions had led

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to complications and hence were under a doctor’s care, but, to enrich the study, these data were supplemented with focus group discussions, case study analyses, and key informant interviews (Osur et al., 2015).

Not surprisingly, the unprecedented growth of the internet, cybercrime, and online extremism have led to the development of new tools to collect and analyze dark web forums quantitatively as well as qualitatively (Ful, Abaasi, & Chen, 2010). Furthermore, the digital environment has given a new twist to traditional methods. For example, in one study of the motives, structure, and practices of Silk Road participants, the researchers were only able to recruit a participant informant after they had cultivated a lengthy relationship building phase on the silk road chat forum (Van Hout & Bingham, 2013). In a study designed to answer questions of identity development in clandestine systems, Dobusch & Shoeneborn (2015) relied upon a renowned journalist, who served as a trusted intermediary for interviews with key Anonymous hacktivists in order to develop a framework for analyzing publicly available “Anonymous” communication episodes (e.g., online texts from Twitter, Facebook, and the news media).

Studying clandestine organizations not only challenges researchers to develop appro- priate methods and address ethical concerns, but also raises theoretical issues that must be addressed.Most organizational and communication theories assume that interaction is knowable in some empiricalmanner, whether it be through self-reports, observations, or textual artifacts. Despite their vast differences in perspectives, the propositions, con- structs, and hypothesized relationship embedded in classical organizational theories (such as contingency theory, resource dependency theory, and institutional theory), as well as the arguments presented in more recent organizational theories (such as the communicative constitution of organizations, feminist theory, critical theory, and post- modernism), are all based on a “transparency principle” (Stohl & Stohl, 2011). This principle posits that although in all organizations there is some degree of mystery and not everything about the organization is public (strategies, finances, production, even motives may remain intentionally concealed), organizations are evolving empirical sys- tems that are knowable through conversations across multiple networks, texts and dis- course, observable communities of practice, articulated multiple voices, overt symbols and rituals, andmanifest aswell as latentmatrices of relational ties. In otherwords, these theories assume there are organizational dynamics, explicit goals and regulations, and relations and structures that can be empirically observed in some form. Nonclandestine organizations typically have clear makers for who does and who can speak for the orga- nization, a documented history and acknowledged narrative that enables scholars to contextualize the present organization, and a relatively clear delineation and definition of members. But this is not the case for clandestine organizations.Thus, new theoretical frameworks and new approaches to how to learn about organizations will continue to develop.

Clandestine/hidden organizations in the future

Technological innovations and future advancements will enable scholars and practi- tioners to more easily access the distinct features of clandestine organizations in the

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future. The burgeoning use of social media provides entry into these organizations in ways that were never before deemed possible. The new analytic tools and web crawlers that are being developed will uncover traces of clandestine activity and links that were heretofore unavailable for analysis. Big datasets, new spatial recognition techniques, longitudinal network analyses, and sentiment analyses are just a few of the new ways in which researchers (and government intelligence agencies such as the NSA and GCHQ) can discover previously unseen communication patterns as well as explore newly rich sets of discourse about and from clandestine organizing. Of course, as researchers begin to use these powerful tools to learn about clandestine organizing, ethical dilemmas will continue to surface. Issues of surveillance and researcher/informant trust, and ques- tions of whether to publish secret information that might be detrimental to the wel- fare of individuals or nations (as was argued by governments in the context of the Snowden revelations) are all part of the research process. Making secrets public is not only enlightening, but also potentially dangerous for individuals both directly and not directly involved in the surreptitious activities.

Ironically, at the same time that digital technologies are enabling researchers to infiltrate more deeply the distinct and unique world of clandestine organi- zations, they are also making the study of clandestine organizations even more complex. The affordances of digital media have problematized the meaning of membership. Until recently, organizational membership had clear properties. Membership was bound in time and space and defined by the exchange of formal commitments. Today, as the boundaries between what is private and/or public or collective and/or individual action are blurred, it is increasingly difficult for researchers, law enforcement officials, and policymakers to know how to draw the line between members of the KKK, for example, and those who go online and share their racist materials and views with friends. This raises questions about whether the consumption and sharing of such communications constitute mem- bership in the network or organization. Underspecifying linkages or exaggerating connections has important theoretical as well as practical consequences for under- standing why clandestine organizations develop and the dynamics that keep them flourishing.

Clandestine organizations have been a significant part of the past and our present, and will undoubtedly continue to be so in the future. It is critical that we continue to strive to understand them. A special issue of Management Communication Quarterly, edited by Scott (2015), represents some of the latest conceptual/theoretical and empirical approaches being used to understand hidden organizations. Grounded in the dialectic tensions of visibility–invisibility and revelation–concealment (Wolfe & Blithe, 2015) as well as the communicative constitution of organization (Bean & Buikema, 2015), these studies embody a new generation of communication scholarship.

SEE ALSO: Communication & Terrorist Organizations; Information and Communi- cation Technologies (ICTs) in Organizations; Networks, Communication Networks; Privacy and Secrecy; Surveillance; Transparency

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Cynthia Stohl is professor of communication and Director of the Center for Informa- tion Technology and Society at theUniversity of California, Santa Barbara. Her research focuses on globalization, network processes, and social justice issues, most recently in the context of collective action and corporate social responsibility in the digital media environment.The author of more than 120 articles and book chapters, she has also pub- lished two award-winning books, Organizational Communications: Connectedness in Action (1995) and Collective Action in Organizations: Interaction and engagement in an era of technological change (2012).

Michael Stohl is professor of communication and Director of the Orfalea Center for Global and International Studies at the University of California, Santa Barbara. His research focuses on political and organizational communication with special reference to political violence, terrorism, and human rights. He is the author, editor, or coedi- tor of 15 books and the author or coauthor of more than 100 scholarly journal articles and book chapters, including, with Cynthia Stohl, “Secret agencies: The communica- tive constitution of a clandestine organization,” Organization Studies, 32 (2011), and “Networks of terror: Theoretical assumptions and pragmatic consequences,” Commu- nication Theory, 47 (2007).