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NEWTON Robert fife NIETZSCHE Michael Tanner NINETEENTH-CENTURY BRITAIN

Christopher Harvie and H. C. G. Matthew THE NORMAN CONQUEST

George Garnett NORTH AMERICAN INDIANS

Theda Perdue and Michael D. Green NORTHERN IRELAND Marc Mulholland NOTHING Frank Close NUCLEAR WEAPONS Joseph M. Siracusa THE OLD TESTAMENT

Michael D. Coogan PARTICLE PHYSICS Frank Close PAUL E. P. Sanders PENTECOSTALISM William K. Kay PHILOSOPHY Edward Craig PHILOSOPHY OF LAW Raymond Wacks PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE Samir °kasha PHOTOGRAPHY Steve Edwards PLANETS David A. Rothery PLATO Julia Annas POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY David Miller POLITICS Kenneth Minogue POSTCOLONIALISM Robert Young POSTMODERNISM Christopher Butler POSTSTRUCTURALISM Catherine Belsey PREHISTORY Chris Gosden PRESOCRATIC PHILOSOPHY

Catherine Osborne PRIVACY Raymond Wacks PROGRESSIVISM Walter Nugent PSYCHIATRY Tom Burns PSYCHOLOGY Gillian Butler and

Freda McManus

PURITANISM Francis J. Bremer THE QUAKERS Pink Dandelion QUANTUM THEORY John Polkinghorne RACISM Ali Rattansi THE REAGAN REVOLUTION Gil Troy THE REFORMATION Peter Marshall RELATIVITY Russell Stannard RELIGION IN AMERICA Timothy Beal THE RENAISSANCE Jerry Brotton RENAISSANCE ART Geraldine A. Johnson RISK Baruch Fischhoff and John Kadvany

ROMAN BRITAIN Peter Salway THE ROMAN EMPIRE Christopher Kelly ROMANTICISM Michael Ferber ROUSSEAU Robert Wokler RUSSELL A.C. Grayling RUSSIAN LITERATURE Catriona Kelly THE RUSSIAN REVOLUTION S.A. Smith SCHIZOPHRENIA Chris Frith and

Eve Johnstone

SCHOPEN HAUER Christopher Janaway SCIENCE AND RELIGION Thomas Dixon SCOTLAND Rab Houston SEXUALITY Veronigue Mottier SHAKESPEARE Germaine Greer SOCIAL AND CULTURAL

ANTHROPOLOGY John Monaghan and Peter Just

SOCIALISM Michael Newman SOCIOLOGY Steve Bruce SOCRATES C.C.W. Taylor THE SOVIET UNION Stephen Lovell THE SPANISH CIVIL WAR Helen Graham SPANISH LITERATURE Jo Labanyi SPINOZA Roger Scruton STATISTICS David J. Hand STUART BRITAIN John Morrill SUPERCONDUCTIVITY Stephen Blundell TERRORISM Charles Townshend THEOLOGY David F. Ford THOMAS AQUINAS Fergus Kerr TOCQUEVILLE Harvey C. Mansfield TRAGEDY Adrian Poole THE TUDORS John Guy TWENTIETH-CENTURY BRITAIN

Kenneth 0. Morgan THE UNITED NATIONS

Jussi M. Hanhimaki THE U.S. CONGRESS Donald A. Ritchie UTOPIANISM Lyman Tower Sargent THE VIKINGS Julian Richards WITCHCRAFT Malcolm Gaskill WITTGENSTEIN A.C. Grayling WORLD MUSIC Philip Bohlman THE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION

Amrita Narlikar WRITING AND SCRIPT Andrew Robinson

For more information visit our web site: www.oup.co.uk/general/vsi/

Manfred B. Steger

GLOBALIZATION A Very Short Introduction

OXFORD UNIVERSITY PRESS

Great Clarendon Street, Oxford ox2 60P Oxford University Press is a department of the University of Oxford.

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First edition published 2003. This edition published 2009.

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You must not circulate this book in any other binding or cover and you must impose the same condition on any acquirer

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ISBN 978-0-19-955226-9

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Typeset by SPI Publisher Services, Pondicherry, India Printed in Great Britain by

Ashford Colour Press Ltd, Gosport, Hampshire

Preface to the second edition ix

Abbreviations xiii

List of illustrations xv

List of maps xvii

List of figures xix

Globalization: a contested concept 1

Globalization and history: is globalization a new phenomenon? 17

The economic dimension of globalization 38

The political dimension of globalization 58

The cultural dimension of globalization 71

The ecological dimension of globalization 84

Ideologies of globalization: market globalism, justice globalism, jihadist globalism 98

Assessing the future of globalization 129

References 136

Index 143

Although the term 'globalization' can be traced back to the early 1960s, it was not until a quarter of a century later that it took the public consciousness by storm. 'Globalization' surfaced as the buzzword of the 'Roaring Nineties' because it best captured the increasingly interdependent nature of social life on our planet. At the end of the opening decade of the twenty-first century, there were millions of references to globalization in both virtual and printed space. Unfortunately, however, early bestsellers on the subject - Samuel Huntington's The Clash of Civilizations, Benjamin Barber's Jihad Versus MeWorld, or Thomas Friedman's The Lewis and the Olive Tree - had left their readers with the simplistic impression that globalization was the inevitable process of a universalizing Western civilization battling the parochial forces of nationalism, localism, and tribalism. This influential assumption deepened further in the wake of the 9/11 attacks and the ensuing Global War on Terror spearheaded by an American Empire' of worldwide reach. As a result of this rigid dichotomy that pitted the universal against the particular and the global against the local, many people had trouble recognizing the myriad ties binding religious-traditionalist fundamentalisms to the secular postmodernity of the global age.

As an illustration of this narrow perspective, let me introduce a bright history major from one of my Global Studies courses.

`I understand that "globalization" is a contested concept that refers to the shrinkage of time and space,' she quipped, `but how can you say that religious fanatics who denounce modernity and secularism from a mountain cave somewhere in the Middle East perfectly capture the complex dynamics of globalization? Don't these terrible acts of terrorism suggest the opposite, namely, the growth of reactionary forces that undermine globalization?' Obviously, the student was referring to Saudi-born Al-Qaeda leader Osama bin Laden and his associates whose videotaped statements condemning the activities of `infidel crusaders and Zionists' were the steady diet of worldwide broadcasts in the years following the 9/11 attacks.

To be fair, however, I could not help but be struck by the sense of intellectual urgency that fuelled my student's question. It showed that globalization in all its dimensions remains an elusive concept without real-life examples capable of breathing shape, colour, and sound into a vague term that continues to dominate the twenty-first century media landscape. Hence, before delving into necessary matters of definition and analytical clarification, we ought to approach our subject in less abstract fashion. Let's begin our journey with a careful examination of the aforementioned videotapes. It will soon become fairly obvious why a deconstruction of those images provides important clues to the nature and dynamics of the phenomenon we have come to call `globalization'.

Deconstructing Osama bin Laden

The most infamous of the bin Laden tapes was broadcast worldwide on 7 October 2001, less than a month after the collapse of the Twin Towers in Lower Manhattan. The recording bears no date, but experts have estimated that it was made about two weeks before it was broadcast. The timing of its release appears to have been carefully planned so as to achieve the maximum effect on the

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day the United States commenced its bombing campaign against the Taliban and Al-Qaeda (The Base') forces in Afghanistan. Although Osama bin Laden and his top lieutenants were then hiding in a remote region of the country, they obviously possessed the hi-tech equipment needed to record the statement. Moreover, Al-Qaeda members clearly enjoyed immediate access to sophisticated information and telecommunication networks that kept them informed - in real-time - of relevant international developments. Bin Laden may have denounced the international `crusaders' with great conviction, but the smooth operation of his entire organization was entirely dependent on information and communication technology developed in the globalizing decades of the waning 20th century.

To further illustrate this apparent contradiction, consider the complex chain of global interdependencies that must have existed in order for bin Laden's message to be heard and seen by countless TV viewers around the world. After making its way from the secluded mountains of eastern Afghanistan to the capital city of Kabul, the videotape was dropped off by an unknown courier outside the local office of Al-Jazeera, a Qatar-based television company. This network had been launched only five years earlier as a state-financed, Arabic-language news and current affairs channel that offered limited programming. Before the founding of Al-Jazeera, cutting-edge TV journalism - such as free-ranging public affairs interviews and talk shows with call-in audiences - simply did not exist in the Arab world. Within only three years, however, Al-Jazeera was offering its Middle Eastern audience a dizzying array of programmes, transmitted around the clock by powerful satellites put into orbit by European rockets and American space shuttles.

Indeed, the network's market share increased even further as a result of the dramatic reduction in the price and size of satellite dishes. Suddenly, such technologies became affordable, even for low-income consumers. By the turn of the century, Al-Jazeera

broadcasts could be watched around the clock on all five

continents.

In 2001, the company further intensified its global reach when its chief executives signed a lucrative cooperation agreement with CNN, the leading news network owned by the giant multinational corporation AOL-Time-Warner. A few months later, when the world's attention shifted to the war in Afghanistan, Al-Jazeera had already positioned itself as a truly global player, powerful enough to rent equipment to such prominent news providers as Reuters and ABC, sell satellite time to the Associated Press and BBC, and design an innovative Arabic-language business news channel together with its other American network partner, CNBC.

Unhampered by national borders and geographical obstacles, cooperation among these sprawling news networks had become so efficient that CNN acquired and broadcast a copy of the Osama bin Laden tape only a few hours after it had been delivered to the Al-Jazeera office in Kabul. Caught offguard by the incredible speed of today's information exchange, the Bush administration asked the Qatari government to 'rein in Al-Jazeera, claiming that the swift airing of the bin Laden tape without prior consultation was contributing to the rise of anti-American sentiments in the Arab world and thus threatened to undermine the US war effort. However, not only was the perceived 'damage' already done, but segments of the tape - including the full text of bin Laden's statement - could be viewed online by anyone with access to a computer and a modem. The Al-Jazeera website quickly attracted an international audience as its daily hit count skyrocketed to over 7 million.

There can be no doubt that it was the existence of this chain of global interconnections that made possible the instant broadcast of bin Laden's speech to a global audience. At the same time, however, it must be emphasized that even those voices that oppose

modernity cannot extricate themselves from the very process of globalization they so decry. In order to spread their message and recruit new sympathizers, apparent `antiglobalizers' must utilize the tools provided by globalization. This obvious truth was visible even in bin Laden's personal appearance. The tape shows that he was wearing contemporary military fatigues over traditional Arab garments. In other words, his dress reflects the contemporary processes of fragmentation and cross-fertilization that Global Studies scholars call 'hybridization' - the mixing of different cultural forms and styles facilitated by global economic and cultural exchanges. In fact, the pale colours of bin Laden's mottled combat dress betrayed its Russian origins, suggesting that he wore the jacket as a symbolic reminder of the fierce guerrilla war waged by him and other Islamic militants against the Soviet occupation forces in Afghanistan during the 1980s.

His ever-present AK-47 Kalashnikov, too, was probably made in Russia, although dozens of gun factories around the world have been building this popular assault rifle for over forty years. By the mid-1990s, more than 70 million Kalashnikovs had been manufactured in Russia and abroad. At least fifty national armies include such rifles in their arsenal, making Kalashnikovs truly weapons of global choice. Thus, bin Laden's AK-47 could have come from anywhere in the world. However, given the astonishing globalization of organized crime during the last two decades, it is quite conceivable that bin Laden's rifle was part of an illegal arms deal hatched and executed by such powerful international criminal organizations as Al-Qaeda and the Russian Mafia. It is also possible that the rifle arrived in Afghanistan by means of an underground arms trade similar to the one that surfaced in May 1996, when police in San Francisco seized 2,000 illegally imported AK-47s manufactured in China.

A close look at bin Laden's right wrist reveals yet another clue to the powerful dynamics of globalization. As he directs his words of contempt for the United States and its allies at his hand-held

microphone, his retreating sleeve exposes a stylish sports watch. Journalists who noticed this expensive accessory have speculated about its origins. The emerging consensus points to a Timex product. However, given that Timex watches are as American as apple pie, it seems rather ironic that the Al-Qaeda leader should have chosen this particular chronometer. After all, Timex Corporation, originally the Waterbury Clock Company, was founded in the 1850s in Connecticut's Naugatuck Valley, known throughout the nineteenth century as the 'Switzerland of America'. Today, Timex has gone multinational, maintaining close relations to affiliated businesses and sales offices in sixty-five countries. It employs 7,500 employees, located on four continents. Thousands of workers - mostly from low-wage countries in the global South - constitute the driving force behind the corporation's global production process.

Our brief deconstruction of some of the central images on the videotape makes it easier to understand why the seemingly anachronistic images of an `antiglobalist' terrorist in front of an Afghan cave do, in fact, capture some essential dynamics of globalization. To be sure, in his subsequent taped appearances, Osama bin Laden presented himself more like a learned Muslim cleric than a holy warrior. In a September 2007 tape, he even went so far as to show off his neatly trimmed and dyed beard. But even this softened image of one of the world's most famous mujahicleen (`holy warriors') doesn't change the overarching reality of intensifying global interdependence: the tensions between localism and globalism have reached unprecedented levels precisely because the links connecting them have been growing faster than at any time in history. The rise of worldwide terrorist organizations like Al-Qaeda represents but one of the many manifestations of globalization. Just as bin Laden's romantic ideology of a 'pure Islam' is itself an articulation of the global imaginary, so has our global age, with its insatiable appetite for technology, mass-market commodities, and celebrities, indelibly shaped the violent backlash against globalization. Our

deconstruction of Osama bin Laden has provided us with a real-life example of the intricate - and sometimes contradictory - social dynamics of globalization. We are now in a better position to tackle the rather demanding task of assembling a working definition of a contested concept that has proven to be notoriously hard to pin down.

Towards a definition of globalization

`Globalization' has been variously used in both popular and academic literature to describe a process, a condition, a system, a force, and an age. Given that these competing labels have very different meanings, their indiscriminate usage is often obscure and invites confusion. For example, a sloppy conflation of process and condition encourages circular definitions that explain little. The often repeated truism that 'globalization [the process] leads to more globalization [the condition]' does not allow us to draw meaningful analytical distinctions between causes and effects.

Hence, I suggest that we adopt the term globality to signify a social condition characterized by tight global economic, political, cultural, and environmental interconnections and flows that make most of the currently existing borders and boundaries irrelevant. Yet, we should neither assume that globality is already upon us nor that it refers to a determinate endpoint that precludes any further development. Rather, this concept signifies a future social condition that, like all conditions, is destined to give way to new constellations. For example, it is conceivable that globality might eventually be transformed into something we might call `planetarity' -a new social condition brought about by the successful colonization of our solar system. Moreover, we could easily imagine different social manifestations of globality: one might be based primarily on values of individualism, competition, and laissez-faire capitalism, while another might

draw on more communal and cooperative norms. These possible alternatives point to the fundamentally indeterminate character of

globality.

The term globalization applies to a set of social processes that appear to transform our present social condition of weakening nationality into one of globality. At its core, then, globalization is about shifting forms of human contact. Indeed, any affirmation of globalization implies three assertions: first, we are slowly leaving behind the condition of modern nationality that gradually unfolded from the eighteenth century onwards; second, that we are moving towards the new condition of postmodern globality; and, third, we have not yet reached it. Indeed, like 'modernization' and other verbal nouns that end in the suffix`-ization, the term `globalization' suggests a sort of dynamism best captured by the notion of 'development' or 'unfolding' along discernible patterns. Such unfolding may occur quickly or slowly, but it always corresponds to the idea of change, and, therefore, denotes

transformation.

Hence, academics exploring the dynamics of globalization are particularly keen on pursuing research questions related to the theme of social change. How does globalization occur? What is driving globalization? Is it one cause or a combination of factors? Is globalization a uniform or an uneven process? Is globalization a continuation of modernity or is it a radical break? How does globalization differ from previous social developments? Does globalization create new forms of inequality and hierarchy? Notice that the conceptualization of globalization as a dynamic process rather than as a static condition forces the researcher to pay close attention to shifting perceptions of time and space. This explains why many globalization scholars assign particular significance to historical analysis and the reconfiguration of social space. Indeed, the crucial insights of human geographers have played a major role in developing the field of Global Studies. Most importantly, these

scholars point out that old geographical scales that distinguish sharply between 'local, 'national' 'regional, and 'global, no longer work in a complex, networked world where these scales overlap and interpenetrate each other. Indeed, the best place to study the `global' is often the 'local' - reflected, for example, in 'global cities' like New York, London, Tokyo, and Shanghai.

Finally, let us adopt global imaginary as a concept referring to people's growing consciousness of belonging to a global community. This is not to say that national and local communal frameworks have lost their power to provide people with a meaningful sense of home and identity But it would be a mistake to close one's eyes to the weakening of the national imaginary. As the global imaginary erupts with increasing frequency within and onto the national and local, it destabilizes and unsettles the conventional parameters of understanding within which people imagine their communal existence. As we shall see in later chapters, the rising global imaginary is also powerfully reflected in the current transformation of political ideologies - the ideas and beliefs that go into the articulation of concrete political agendas and programmes.

To argue that globalization constitutes a set of social processes enveloped by the rising global imaginary and propelling us towards the condition of globality may eliminate the danger of circular definitions, but it gives us only one defining characteristic of the process: movement towards greater interdependence and integration. Such a general definition of globalization tells us little about its remaining qualities. In order to overcome this deficiency, let us identify additional qualities that make globalization different from other sets of social processes. Yet, whenever researchers raise the level of specificity in order to bring the phenomenon in question into sharper focus, they also heighten the danger of provoking scholarly disagreements over definitions. Our subject is no exception. One of the reasons why globalization remains a contested concept is because there exists

po scholarly consensus on what kinds of social processes constitute its essence.

After all, globalization is an uneven process, meaning that people living in various parts of the world are affected very differently by this gigantic transformation of social structures and cultural zones. Hence, the social processes that make up globalization have

been analysed and explained by various commentators in different, often contradictory ways. Scholars not only hold different views with regard to proper definitions of globalization, they also disagree on its scale, causation, chronology, impact, trajectories, and policy outcomes. The ancient Buddhist parable of the blind scholars and their encounter with the elephant helps to illustrate the academic controversy over the nature and various dimensions of globalization.

Since the blind scholars did not know what the elephant looked like, they resolved to obtain a mental picture, and thus the knowledge they desired, by touching the animal. Feeling its trunk, one blind man argued that the elephant was like a lively snake. Another man, rubbing along its enormous leg, likened the animal to a rough column of massive proportions. The third person took hold of its tail and insisted that the elephant resembled a large, flexible brush. The fourth man felt its sharp tusks and declared it to be like a great spear. Each of the blind scholars held firmly to his own idea of what constituted an elephant. Since their scholarly reputation was riding on the veracity of their respective findings, the blind men eventually ended up arguing over the true nature of the elephant.

The ongoing academic quarrel over which dimension contains the essence of globalization represents a postmodern version of the parable of the blind men and the elephant. Even those few remaining scholars who still think of globalization as a singular process clash with each other over which aspect of social life constitutes its primary domain. Some Global Studies experts

2. The globalization scholars and the elephant

argue that economic processes lie at the core of globalization. Others privilege political, cultural, or ideological aspects. Still others point to environmental processes as the essence of globalization. Like the blind men in the parable, each globalization researcher is partly right by correctly identifying one important dimension of the phenomenon in question. However, their collective mistake lies in their dogmatic attempts to reduce such a complex phenomenon as globalization to a single domain that corresponds to their own expertise. Surely, one of the central tasks for Global Studies as an emerging field must be to devise better ways for gauging the relative importance of each dimension without losing sight of the interconnected whole. Fortunately, more and more researchers have begun to heed this call for a genuine multidimensional approach to globalization that avoids pernicious reductionism.

Despite such differences of opinion, it is nonetheless possible to detect some thematic overlap in various scholarly attempts to identify the core qualities of globalization processes. Consider, for example, the five influential definitions of globalization (see box).

I `Globalization can thus be defined as the intensification of worldwide social relations which link distant localities in such a way that local happenings are shaped by events occurring many miles away and vice versa:

Anthony Giddens, Former Director of the London School of Economics

`The concept of globalization reflects the sense of an immense enlargement of world communication, as well as of the horizon of a world market, both of which seem far more tangible and immediate than in earlier stages of modernity:

Fredric Jameson, Professor of Literature, Duke University

`Globalization maybe thought of as a process (or set of processes) which embodies a transformation in the spatial organization of social relations and transactions - assessed in terms of their extensity, intensity, velocity and impact - generating transcontinental or interregional flows and networks of activity, interaction, and the exercise of power:

David Held, Professor of Political Science, London School of Economics

`Globalization as a concept refers both to the compression of the world and the intensification of consciousness of the world as a whole.'

Roland Robertson, Professor of Sociology, University of Aberdeen, Scotland

`Globalization compresses the time and space aspects of social relations.'

James Mittelman, Professor of International Relations, American 'University, Washington

These definitions point to four additional qualities or characteristics at the core of the phenomenon. First, globalization involves the creation of new, and the multiplication of existing, social networks and activities that cut across traditional political, economic, cultural, and geographical boundaries. As we have seen in the case of Al- Jazeera, the creation of today's satellite-news corporations is made possible by the combination of professional networking, technological innovation, and political decisions that permit the emergence of new social orders that transcend nationally-based arrangements.

The second quality of globalization is reflected in the expansion and the stretching of social relations, activities, and interdependencies.

Today's financial markets reach around the globe, and electronic trading occurs around the clock. Gigantic and virtually identical shopping malls have emerged on all continents, offering those consumers who can afford commodities from all regions of the world - including products whose various components were manufactured in different countries. This process of social stretching applies to the Al-Qaeda terrorist network as well as to less sinister associations such as non-governmental organizations, commercial enterprises, social clubs, and countless regional and global institutions and associations: the United Nations, the European Union, the Association of South-East Asian Nations, the Organization of African Unity, Doctors Without Borders, the World Social Forum, or Google, to name but a few.

Third, globalization involves the intensification and acceleration of social exchanges and activities. As the Spanish sociologist Manuel Castells has pointed out, the creation of a global 'network society' required a technological revolution - one that has been powered chiefly by the rapid development of new information and transportation technologies. Proceeding at breakneck speed, these innovations are reshaping the social landscape of human life. The

Internet relays distant information in real time, and satellites provide consumers with instant pictures of remote events. The intensification of worldwide social relations means that local happenings are shaped by events occurring far away, and vice versa. In other words, the seemingly opposing processes of globalization and localization actually imply each other. Rather than sitting at the base and the top of conventional geographical hierarchies, the local and global intermingle messily with the national and regional in new horizontal scales.

Fourth, as we emphasized in our discussion of the global imaginary, globalization processes do not occur merely on an objective, material level but also involve the subjective plane of human consciousness. The compression of the world into a single place increasingly makes global the frame of reference for human thought and action. Hence, globalization involves both the macro-structures of community and the micro-structures of personhood. It extends deep into the core of the self and its dispositions, facilitating the creation of new individual and collective identities nurtured by the intensifying relations between the individual and the globe.

It seems that we have succinctly identified some of the core qualities of globalization. Compressing them into a single sentence yields the following very short definition of globalization:

Globalization refers to the expansion and intensification of social

relations and consciousness across world-time and world-space.

Before we draw this chapter to a close, let us consider some objections raised by those scholars who belong to the camp of the `globalization sceptics. Their objections range from the accusation that fashionable 'globalization talk' amounts to little more than `globaloney' to less radical suggestions that globalization is a much more limited and uneven process than the sweeping arguments of the so-called 'hyperglobalizers' would have us believe. In many

ways, the most radical globalization sceptics resemble the blind scholar who, occupying the empty space between the elephant's front and hind legs, groped in vain for a part of the elephant. Finding none, he accused his colleagues of making up fantastic stories about non-existent things, asserting that there were no such animals as 'elephants' at all. Since evidence pointing to the rapid intensification of worldwide social relations has been mounting in the 2000s, I will resist delving into a detailed refutation of those few remaining sceptics who deny the existence of globalization altogether.

Still, globalization sceptics performed the valuable service of forcing global studies scholars to hone their arguments. One of the most challenging questions posed by globalization sceptics is a historical one: is globalization a modern phenomenon? Some critics would respond to this question in the negative, insisting that the concept of globalization has been used in a historically imprecise manner. In a nutshell, this thoughtful group of sceptics contends that even a cursory look at history suggests that there is not much that is 'new' about contemporary globalization. Hence, before we explore in some detail the main dimensions of globalization in subsequent chapters of this book, I suggest we give this weighty historical argument a fair hearing. Indeed, such a critical investigation of globalization's alleged novelty is closely related to yet another question hotly debated in Global Studies. What does a proper chronology and historical periodization of globalization look like? Let us turn to Chapter 2 to seek answers to these questions.

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If we asked an ordinary person on the busy streets of global cities like London, New York, or Singapore about the essence of globalization, the answer would probably involve some reference to growing forms of political and economic interdependence fuelled by 'new technologies' like personal computers, the Internet, cellular phones, pagers, personal digital assistants like the popular 'Blackberry, digital cameras, high-definition television, satellites, jet planes, space shuttles, and supertankers. As subsequent chapters will show, however, technology provides only a partial explanation for the latest wave of globalization. Yet, it would be foolish to deny that these new innovations have played a crucial role in the expansion and intensification of social relations and consciousness across world-time and world-space. The Internet, in particular, has assumed a pivotal function in facilitating globalization through the creation of the World Wide Web that connects billions of individuals, civil society associations, and governments. Since most of these technologies have been around for less than three decades, it seems to make sense to agree with those commentators who claim that globalization is, indeed, a relatively new phenomenon.

At the same time, however, the definition of globalization we arrived at in the previous chapter stresses the dynamic nature of the phenomenon. The enhancement of worldwide