Marketing Strategy 2

The CASE Journal Stakeholders and corporate environmental decision making: The BP Whiting Refinery controversy Bryan T. Stinchfield

Article information: To cite this document: Bryan T. Stinchfield , (2009),"Stakeholders and corporate environmental decision making: The BP Whiting Refinery controversy", The CASE Journal, Vol. 6 Iss 1 pp. 5 - 18 Permanent link to this document: http://dx.doi.org/10.1108/TCJ-06-2009-B002

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Bryan T. Stinchfield Franklin & Marshall College_______________________________________ INTRODUCTION During the late summer of 2007, Bob Malone, British Petroleum (BP) America Chairman and President, was faced with one of the most important decisions of his career – to expand the Whiting Refinery in northwest Indiana on the banks of Lake Michigan, or to yield to pressure from the public and not expand operations. Regional and global consumer demand for gasoline was rising, which helped push prices toward record highs, and the refinery had an opportunity to expand capacity to help meet that demand. However, thousands of citizens, a host of environmental groups, and even national politicians were opposed to the expansion for fear of increasing pollution in Lake Michigan. Malone believed his company followed the letter of the law when BP received regulatory approval to proceed as planned. However, public opposition to the expansion was fiercer than expected and BP’s environmental image, which the company highly valued, came under sharp criticism. As Chairman of BP America, Bob Malone was responsible for ensuring that the company achieved high levels of financial performance while meeting “the growing demand for sustainable, environmentally responsible energy”1

. In light of this, Bob Malone was faced with one of the most important decisions of his career: proceed as planned, yield to public pressure, or some other course of action.

THE APPROVAL PROCESS The Whiting Refinery resided about 20 miles southeast of Chicago, Illinois, and 50 miles west of the Michigan border. Despite the refinery’s close proximity to two other states, BP was legally required to gain regulatory approval from the state of Indiana only, since the facility was located entirely within its borders. In the summer of 2006, BP contacted Indiana’s environmental regulatory authorities--the Indiana Department of Environmental Management (IDEM)--and the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) regarding its intention to expand operations at the Whiting Refinery. A few months later, Indiana’s Governor, Mitch Daniels, publically stated that he appreciated BP’s selection of Indiana as the site for BP’s large capital project. ________________________________________________________________________ ©2010 by the author and The CASE Journal. Contact the author at [email protected].

Stakeholders and Corporate Environmental Decision-making: The BP Whiting Refinery Controversy

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During the winter of 2007, BP, IDEM, and the EPA reached out to environmental groups to discuss BP’s intentions. In March 2007, BP formally applied to IDEM for a permit that would be valid for five years to increase the amount of treated wastewater, storm water, and cooling water that would be discharged from its Whiting Refinery into Lake Michigan2

. By submitting a formal application to an environmental regulatory agency, BP set in motion a common legal process within the United States.

When a company sought to discharge regulated chemicals into the environment, environmental agencies were required to review the permit application, and the general public was also entitled to review the application and provide comments to regulatory officials as to whether they supported or opposed the proposed action. Under Indiana law, which was similar to most other states’ laws, the public had 60 days to comment on BP’s permit application, and IDEM had a legal requirement to respond in writing to those citizens’ comments3

. After the regulatory agency addressed public comments, the public had another 18 days to appeal the regulator’s decision regarding the permit application. If no appeals were submitted, then the proposed permit application would become legally effective.

During the 60-day comment period, Save the Dunes, an Indiana-based environmental group opposed to the refinery expansion, sent a letter to IDEM urging the agency and BP to gather additional information, exercise prudence, and adhere to existing statues that required BP to prove that “no harm” would come to the lake or surrounding communities as a result of its proposed actions4

. According to environmental law, the burden of proof was on the organization seeking the permit to prove that its actions will not cause environmental harm. This was the opposite of criminal law, where the defendant is innocent until proven guilty. Unlike Save the Dunes and other environmental groups, both IDEM and EPA were satisfied with BP’s permit application that no additional harm would come to Lake Michigan and surrounding communities as a result of a proposed increase in discharge from the refinery.

In late June 2007, IDEM approved BP’s application, and within a matter of weeks, citizens, non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and politicians across the tri-state region became angered and voiced their opposition to BP’s intentions and to IDEM’s approval of the permit. Tens of thousands of signatures were collected in protest along the Chicago lakefront, several Illinois politicians threatened a boycott of BP products, nationally-elected representatives from Illinois and Michigan spoke out against the expansion, citizen groups threatened legal action, and even the U.S. House of Representatives passed a resolution urging the EPA to review the decision. Bob Malone and BP were completely caught off guard. They had followed the letter of the law and even engaged several citizen groups months before they submitted their permit application to the environmental regulators. They had spent millions of dollars branding their oil company as a good steward of the environment, and now all that goodwill seemed to be evaporating before their eyes.

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BP was faced with two potentially opposed realities. They sought to fill a need in the marketplace for additional petroleum products, and their corporate philosophy was one of open dialogue and engagement with relevant stakeholders5. The company desired to satisfy consumer demand and deliver healthy financial returns to stockholders (see Tables 1 and 2 below), but it also had to weigh the environmental, political, and economic consequences of its proposed actions, given that one of the Whiting Refinery’s top goals was to “carry on its business in an environmentally responsible manner…and is committed to the responsible treatment of the planet’s resources.”6

Table 1: Selected Financial Information for BP Global

2003 2004 2005 2006 Sales 164,653 192,024 239,792 265,906 Profit before interest and taxation 18,776 25,746 32,182 35,658 Profit for the year 12,618 17,262 22,317 22,601 Capital expenditure and acquisitions 19,623 16,651 14,149 17,231 Capital expenditures only n/a n/a 13,938 16,910

In millions of U.S. dollars

Source: BP 20-F SEC Filing, for year ending 2007, www.bp.com/liveassets/bp_internet/globalbp/STAGING/global_assets/downloads/20-F_2007_Form.pdf, accessed September 2009

Table 2: BP Global Refining Margins ($ per barrel)

$4.50 $4.50

$2.30

$4.11

$6.38

$8.56 $8.49

$0

$2

$4

$6

$8

$10

2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 Ye ar

Source: BP Strategy Presentation, 27 February 2008, www.bp.com/liveassets/bp_internet/globalbp/STAGING/global_assets/downloads/I/IC_bp_strategy_presen tation_2008_slides.pdf, accessed September 2009

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Both the IDEM and EPA approved of BP’s expansion plans, but many citizens and groups opposed the manner in which the company gained regulatory approval and how it planned to dispose of its waste (the sequence of key events regarding IDEM’s approval of BP’s permit application is summarized in Table 3). Thus, Bob Malone and BP were faced with a dilemma as to how they should proceed.

Table 3: Key Dates

Date Event Summer 2006 BP first contacted IDEM and EPA regarding its intentions to

expand the Whiting Refinery Winter 2007 BP and environmental regulators reached out to public to gather

early opinions and attitudes Early March 2007 BP formally submitted a written request for permit to IDEM and

IDEM posted BP’s request on its website March 16 – May 11, 2007

- 60-day comment period began - Citizens and environmental groups submitted comments to IDEM

April 5, 2007 EPA stated that it did not object to BP’s permit April 26, 2007 IDEM hosted a public meeting in Whiting, IN that was attended by

citizens, environmental groups, and BP officials May 11, 2007 The 60-day comment period was scheduled to end Late March - early June 2007

- Citizens, environmental groups, and businesspeople emailed and mailed comments to IDEM regarding BP’s permit (the vast majority of comments were not supportive of the project) - IDEM responded to comments

June 21, 2007 - IDEM issued final permit approval for BP expansion - 18-day appeal period started

June 29, 2007 Northwest Indiana newspaper reported “BP not required to build treatment plant in Whiting”

July 9, 2007 - 18-day appeal period ended - IDEM did not receive any appeals, therefore permit became effective August 1, 2007

July 15, 2007 Chicago public learned of BP’s permit; Chicago Tribune headline read, “BP gets a break on dumping in Lake – Refinery expansion entices Indiana”

Source: Easterly, T. 2008. IDEM update, January 3, 2008, www.in.gov/idem/files/nirpc-01-03-08ppt, accessed May 2009 BP’S MOTIVATION TO EXPAND THE WHITING REFINERY BP’s overall corporate goal was “finding, producing and marketing the natural energy resources on which the modern world depends.”7 In order to do this, Bob Malone and other BP executives faced a competitive environment characterized by regional instability in the oil-producing Persian Gulf states, concern among some people about the future

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security of oil supplies, and record high gas prices (Table 4) and profits in the oil industry. Few economists, businessmen, consumers, analysts, and politicians expected demand for oil to decrease over the next decade, and in fact the global demand for oil was expected to double between the period of 1980-2004 to 2004-2030.8

The economic incentive to meet rising demand was enticing indeed.

Table 4: U.S. Gasoline Price Trend

Source: Energy Information Agency, http://tonto.eia.doe.gov/dnav/pet/hist/mg_rt_usa.htm, accessed September 2009 The Whiting Refinery was integral to BP America’s success and even to BP Global’s achievement of their economic goals (see Table 5, below, for financial and operational data on BP America, and Tables 1 and 2 for data on BP Global). In 2007, the refinery was BP’s largest in the U.S., and was among the four largest overall in the United States. The operation produced about 16 million gallons of products each day of which half was gasoline. Approximately one in eight gallons of gas in the U.S. and 8 percent of all asphalt came from the Whiting Refinery. The refinery employed 1,300 people, which was about 4 percent of BP’s U.S.-based workforce and 1.3 percent of its global workforce.9 (See Table 6 for additional operational data on the Whiting Refinery.)

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Table 5: Selected Data on BP America (2007)

Market capitalization (global): $206 billion Revenues: $105 billion Operating capital: $46 billion Fixed U.S. assets: $42 billion U.S. employees: 33,000 In business since: Amoco 1889, ARCO 1866, BP 1909, BP Amoco 1998 U.S. refineries: 5 Refining capacity: 1.5 million barrels per day Community investment: $48 million Service stations: 12,200 Source: BP in the U.S., www.bp.com, accessed May 2008

Table 6: Selected Data on Whiting Business Unit (2006)

Year built: 1889 Area: Covers 1,400 acres Refining capacity: 400,000 barrels of crude oil per day Employees: 1,300 Products made: Gasoline, diesel fuel, jet fuel, asphalt Operation: 24 hours/day; 365 days/year Storage tanks: 220 How raw materials are received: By ship, rail, truck, and pipelines

Source: 2006 Environmental Statement Whiting Business Unit, www.bp.com/liveassets/bp_internet/globalbp/STAGING/global_assets/downloads/V/verfied_site_ reports/N_America/Whiting_2006.pdf, accessed September 2009

Given the rising global demand for oil, BP saw a market opportunity to expand its refining production in Whiting. However, the additional crude oil that BP would process was not the Persian Gulf’s ‘light sweet crude,’ but a heavier and difficult-to-process Canadian Extra Heavy Crude Oil (CXHO). For these reasons, BP planned to invest $3.8 billion to increase the Whiting Refinery’s capacity by 1.7 million gallons of gasoline and diesel fuel per day (an increase of about 15 percent)10, but the crude oil they were expecting to import required a more complex refining process, and the oil contained greater amounts of ammonia than light sweet crude. The result would be a 34 percent increase in the refinery’s discharge of ammonia, and a 54 percent increase in its discharge of Total Suspended Solids (TSS)11

, which are particles containing a variety of pollutants such as chromium, mercury and lead.

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BP believed that the additional discharge would not cause environmental harm to Lake Michigan or negatively affect the health of the four million residents who depended on the lake for drinking water. BP stated that the water discharged back into Lake Michigan would be 99.9 percent pure, and that the ammonia content was half of the EPA’s limit. Additionally, BP stated that no technology existed to completely remove TSS and that all wastewater treatment plants released varying amounts of TSS. BP equated the amount of their proposed discharge to that of a small city.12

Despite BP’s claims, which were officially supported by IDEM and the EPA, environmental groups and concerned citizens were not convinced of the safety of BP’s expansion.

In further defense of their position, BP argued that the benefits of the $3.8 billion expansion would help meet the rising demand of gasoline in the Midwest, reduce dependence on imported oil from the Middle East, provide permanent jobs to 70-80 full- time employees, create 2,000 temporary contract jobs, and contribute to Indiana’s general economic development.13 All of these articulated benefits demonstrated BP’s consideration for its own financial well-being, for its stockholders, employees, and to a certain extent to the financial interests of the community in which it operated. Against these benefits, BP acknowledged that the plan would increase pollutants discharged into the lake; however, they stated that they followed all regulatory approval procedures in an open and transparent manner, they did not seek exceptions or waivers, and that their expansion would fully comply with all existing federal and state laws.14 BP’s operating philosophy and public comments throughout the controversy communicated that BP “care[s] about the environment” and that its “environmental commitment is demonstrated in our significant investments that minimize the footprint of our operations”.15

This public comment was similar to the corporate philosophy BP articulated in nearly all of its communication with the public. BP was one of the few companies that published an annual Sustainability Report, which contained detailed efforts by the firm to reduce its pollution (air emissions, water discharge, oil spills, and toxic waste), create safer working conditions for its employees, build closer alliances with the communities in which it operated, and promote responsible corporate governance. The former CEO of BP, Lord Browne, stated “we aim to achieve the sustainability of the [corporation] and, even more important, the sustainability of the societies in which we operate. Companies are part of society and in the long term we can only thrive if society is itself thriving.”16

(Key environmental performance metrics in BP’s 2006 Sustainability Report are provided in Table 7.)

Table 7: BP’s 2006 Environmental Performance Summary

Environmental Parameter Change from 2005 Direct Greenhouse Gas Emissions -4% Primary Energy Consumption -1% Non-Greenhouse Gas Emissions -8% Flaring of Hydrocarbons -6%

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Fresh Water Withdrawal -13% Discharges to Water +64% Hazardous Waste Disposed +49%

Source: BP Sustainability Report, 2006: pg. 21

While the BP Sustainability Report addressed the firm’s aggregate operations, BP also published facility-level ‘Environmental Statements’. The 2007 Whiting Business Unit report began by stating, “In all our activities we seek to display some unchanging, fundamental qualities – integrity, honest dealing, treating everyone with respect and dignity, striving for mutual advantage and contributing to human progress.” Among the business unit’s goals were “to have the best competitive corporate, operating, and financial performance” and to “carry on its business in an environmentally responsible manner.”17 Contained in this report were the refinery’s efforts and results in reducing water and air pollution (see Figures 1 and 2). Since 1998, the Whiting Refinery’s capacity utilization was steady. However, in the first half of 2006 utilization increased, which resulted in an increase in air and TSS emissions18

. Absent from this report were data involving the release of ammonia.

Figure 1: Whiting Refinery’s Historic Discharge of TSS

Source: Whiting Business Unit, 2006 Environmental Statement, pg. 9

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Figure 2: Whiting Refinery’s Historic Greenhouse Gas Emissions in Kilotonnes (1 kilotonne ~ 2.2 million pounds)

Source: Whiting Business Unit, 2006 Environmental Statement, pg. 7

STAKEHOLDERS OPPOSED TO BP’S ORIGINAL INTENTION Among the most vocal groups opposed to BP’s expansion plans were the environmental organizations Save the Dunes and Alliance for the Great Lakes. In May, 2007, Save the Dunes19 and Alliance for the Great Lakes20 submitted comments to IDEM urging the agency to exercise caution regarding its impending regulatory decision to grant BP a permit to expand the Whiting Refinery. On June 21st, 2007, IDEM sent a letter to BP approving the Whiting Refinery’s expansion plans and resultant increases in pollution discharge.21 However, in August 2007, Alliance for the Great Lakes filed a complaint against IDEM arguing that the regulatory agency did not make its approval of the BP expansion sufficiently public, as it is legally required to do. In this petition, Alliance for the Great Lakes wrote that they “did not receive adequate notice of IDEM’s final action” because in mid-May of 2007 the Alliance submitted written comments to IDEM via fax and U.S. mail, and according to Indiana state law IDEM was required to “give written notice” that it approved BP’s permit. The Alliance maintained that neither it nor Indiana’s LaPorte County Environmental Association received written notice of IDEM’s decision and therefore the appeal period should be extended. The Alliance acknowledged that IDEM posted a permit on the agency’s website, but noted that IDEM’s letter approving the permit did not include a date. Therefore, the environmental groups argued they were not aware that the permit was issued and that it was in fact final22, and thus their legal right to be notified of IDEM’s decision had been violated.

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According to some reports, IDEM took three actions that exacerbated the public’s outrage: 1) IDEM did not make its decision publicly known in a timely manner23, 2) IDEM’s approval marked the first time in several years that a company was authorized to increase its level of pollution into Lake Michigan, amid great efforts to clean up the lake, and 3) the agency granted BP the “first ever exemption” to the Clean Water Act, allowing them to dilute their pollution 200 feet offshore in what was called a ‘mixing zone’ and this process was “banned in Lake Michigan under Indiana state law.”24

Throughout the permit process, several small-town newspapers in northwest Indiana had been intermittently covering the story. While many local residents were opposed to the expansion, there were also many who paid it little attention as they welcomed economic development in the region. The expansion of BP’s Whiting Refinery was suddenly presented to millions of people in Chicago on Sunday, July 15, 2007, when the Chicago Tribune’s environmental correspondent, Michael Hawthorne, wrote a story with the headline “BP Gets a Break on Dumping in Lake”. The article described how the “massive BP oil refinery in Whiting, Ind., is planning to dump significantly more ammonia and industrial sludge into Lake Michigan running counter to years of efforts to clean up the Great Lakes,”25

and how citizens and environmental groups were unsuccessful in persuading BP and Indiana’s environmental regulators to take greater care to ensure that pollution levels discharged into Lake Michigan would not be increased.

Only months earlier, Chicago Mayor Richard Daley pledged to make Chicago the ‘greenest’ city in America. For years, Chicago residents and politicians invested millions of dollars to clean up Lake Michigan, develop environmentally sustainable business practices, and constructed the highest number of environmentally-friendly building projects in the United States. Literally hours after the story broke in the Chicago Tribune, thousands of Chicagoans were outraged and began contacting their elected representatives. Shortly thereafter, the list of politicians who stepped forward to voice their opposition included U.S. Senators Richard Durbin (D-IL), Barack Obama (D-IL) and Richard Lugar (R-IN), and U.S. Representatives Rahm Emanuel (D-IL), Dan Lipinski (D-IL), Pete Hoekstra (R-MI), Vernon Ehlers (R-MI) and Mark Kirk (R-IL). Representative Kirk later said on a radio show, “BP…now stands for ‘Bad Pollution’”26. Mayor Daley and the Chicago Park District were equally upset. The mayor “threatened legal action to block the permit,”27 and the Park District initiated a petition drive at Illinois beaches to generate public awareness and opposition to BP’s plans, which ultimately secured signatures numbering in the tens of thousands.28

In the ensuing weeks, Chicago city alderman Edward Burke proposed a plan to stop city employees from using BP gas stations and to prevent three banks that conducted business with BP from receiving further contracts from the city of Chicago. The editorial staff at the Chicago Sun-Times called for consumers to boycott BP, but Mayor Daley advised against it until Indiana’s governor had a chance to review IDEM’s approval.29 Senator

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Durbin requested the U.S. EPA use its regulatory powers to prevent BP’s proposal from going forward until additional public comments could be presented, and several federal Indiana lawmakers met with Bob Malone to pressure him to stop the Whiting Refinery’s plans.30 Additionally, Senator Obama pressed the Chair of the Senate Environment and Public Works Committee to hold a hearing on IDEM’s authorization of BP’s expansion plans.31 The protest was not limited to Illinois and Indiana; in early August, Michigan State Representative Arlan Meekhof and other state politicians supported a resolution to oppose BP’s plans. Finally, the U.S. Congress overwhelmingly passed a “resolution to urge the EPA to reconsider issuance of the permit.”32

STAKEHOLDERS WHO SUPPORTED BP’S DECISION Despite complaints filed by multiple environmental organizations, letters to agencies and BP executives by state and federal representatives, thousands of individual signatures on petitions, and well-respected media outlets’ opposition of BP’s plans, there were several stakeholder groups who supported the expansion. Many of these stakeholders emphasized the large economic benefits to the region as a result of BP increasing its refining capacity. When BP had announced its decision to expand its Whiting Refinery, they had noted that it would be a $3.8 billion investment in the region, consisting of capital investment, the creation of jobs, and a boost to the region’s economic development. One of the project’s strongest supporters was Indiana Governor Mitch Daniels. In September 2006, when BP had announced it was in its “final planning stage” for the refinery’s expansion, Governor Daniels stated, “We appreciate BP’s choice of Indiana for this massive, landmark project…In capital investment this is the largest we’ve had…The eyes of the whole state are on Northwest Indiana today, as they should be. This marks another huge step in Indiana’s economic comeback.”33

At this stage, Governor Daniels may not have been informed of the environmental consequences of the expansion because BP was still months away from applying for regulatory approval. However, after IDEM issued the final permit on June 21, 2007, and the eruption of the firestorm in mid-July, Governor Daniels maintained his support for the expansion. Regarding BP’s application and IDEM’s approval for increasing discharge into Lake Michigan, Governor Daniels stated: “We’ve checked it and rechecked it. They’re in complete compliance with Indiana law, which is tougher than federal law…We’ve got thousands of jobs that will be at risk if [the expansion] doesn’t go forward…I don’t think it should be held up without a good scientific reason, and none has been provided.”34 As the controversy continued to build, Governor Daniels recommended a “credible, independent evaluation of the permitting decision and outcome,” and asked an Indiana University professor and former EPA attorney in the Reagan Administration to review the impact that BP’s proposed discharge would have on the health of Lake Michigan.35

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Other stakeholders supporting BP’s decision included the IDEM, EPA, Indiana Chamber of Commerce, Chicagoland Chamber of Commerce, and the Illinois Petroleum Council, which was a trade association that represented oil companies’ interests in the state.36

Many individuals from these organizations had an opportunity to express their support for BP on August 22, 2007, when the Indiana Administrative Rules Oversight Committee (IAROC) held a public meeting to discuss IDEM’s approval of the Whiting Refinery expansion. The oversight committee was comprised of Indiana state senators and representatives authorized under Indiana law to convene either at the committee’s discretion or when a citizen or group of citizens filed a complaint against a ruling made by a regulatory agency. After conducting such hearings, the IAROC could then make a series of recommendations to the agencies in question and to the Indiana legislature, at which point the legislature could adopt additional laws if necessary. In this case, the complaint filed by the Alliance for the Great Lakes and other tremendous political pressure prompted the IAROC to hold the meeting.

At the August 22 hearing, the President of the Indiana Chamber of Commerce, Kevin Brinegar, stated, “It is the height of hypocrisy for local and national politicians to bemoan $3 a gallon gasoline and then deny the means to increase our country’s ability to refine oil – particularly when that capacity is being expanded after a thorough, public and scientifically-based permitting process.” He added, “Businesses of all sizes need to know they can rely on existing regulations and that the processes of government are fair, objective, and reliable.”37

The Director of IDEM, Thomas Easterly, also reaffirmed his support of the expansion and of his agency’s handling of the approval process. He stated that he was stunned by the public’s outrage because the April 26 meeting (hosted by IDEM in Whiting to hear the public’s comments on IDEM’s approval of the permit) during the 60-day comment was sparsely attended. Easterly stated, “This is a good permit. This is a very restrictive permit…I’m not aware of people doing much better than this.”38

BP’s Whiting Refinery manager, Dan Sajkowski, also testified in support of the expansion and he emphasized three important points: 1) the economic impact on the region would be enormous, 2) BP followed all applicable rules and regulations when they applied for the permit, and 3) BP engineers did not believe an increase in TSS and ammonia discharge would have harmful effects on residents living near Lake Michigan or on the lake’s ecosystem.39

BP’S IMPENDING DECISION In late August 2007, Bob Malone was faced with a difficult decision: How to go forward in pursuit of a $3.8 billion capital project that would increase the region’s supply of refined petroleum products in a climate of intense regional and national opposition. Even though the expansion would not be completed until 2011 (if it proceeded as planned), Malone was confronted with a crucial decision that would have great consequences for the Whiting Refinery, BP America, and BP Global.

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Endnotes 1 BP in America report, 2007, bp.com 2 BP Fact Sheet. 2007. Dated March, 2007. www.indianalawblog.com/documents/bp_factsheet.pdf, accessed November, 2007 3 Davis, C. 2007. Alliance for the Great Lakes, Petition for administrative review and request for stay of permit, filed August 14, 2007, www.allianceforthegreatlakes.org/news/pdf/Petition-Indiana.081407.doc, accessed November, 2007 4 Anderson, T., & Clay, C. 2007, Save the Dunes Comments on BP NPDES, Letter to IDEM, www.savedunes.org/news/index.php?uid=3602a20a526f, accessed September 2007 5 BP Sustainability Report 2006. www.bp.com/sectiongenericarticle.do?categoryId=9010753&contentId=7021550, accessed September 2007 6 BP 2006 Whiting Business Unit Environmental Statement. 7 BP.com 8 BP Sustainability Report 2006, pg. 4, citing figures from the OECD/IEA World Energy Outlook 9 BP in the United States and Indiana, press release dated July 20th, 2007. 10 BP Whiting Refinery Fact Sheet, 2007. www.whiting.bp.com/go/doc/1550/165356/, accessed September 2007 11 BP Factsheet, 2007 12 BP Whiting Refinery Fact Sheet, 2007 13 Sajkowski, D. 2007. BP Talking points for Dan Sajkowski – Whiting Refinery Manager, talking points

for Aug 22nd, 2003 Hearing Indiana Administrative Rules Oversight Committee, www.bpissuesnews.com/go/doc/1550/169737, accessed September, 2007

14 Ibid, pp. 5-6 15 Ibid, pg. 1 16 BP Sustainability Report, 2006: 2 17 Whiting Business Unit, 2006 Environmental Statement, BP sustainability report, www.bp.com, accessed November, 2007, pg. 2 18 Ibid, pg. 7 19 Anderson & Clay, 2007 20 Davis, C. 2007 21 IDEM, 2007. State of Indiana Department of Environmental Management authorization to discharge under the National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System, dated June, 21, 2007 22 Davis, 2007, pg. 8 23 Ibid 24 Hawthorne, M. 2007a. BP gets a break on dumping into the lake. Chicago Tribune, July 15, 2007 25 Hawthorne, M. 2007a. BP gets a break. Chicago Tribune. July 15, 2007. 26 Hawthorne, M. 2007b. BP backs down! BP backs down on dumping in lake. Chicago Tribune, August 23, 2007 27 Brainard, C. 2007. Sun-Times says boycott BP, Columbia Journalism Review, August 17, 2007 28 Hawthorne, M. 2007b. 29 Brainard, 2007 30 Reuters, 2007. Lawmakers oppose BP oil refinery expansion, July 24, 2007 31 Obama, B. 2007. Obama Calls on EPW Committee to Examine Approved Lake Michigan Pollution. Press release dated August 15, 2007, www.obama.senate.gov/press/070815-obama_calls_on_12/, accessed December 2007 32 Meekhof, A. 2007. Meekhof opposes BP plan to dump waste in Lake Michigan, press release from Representative Arlan Meekhof’s office, dated August 7, 2007 33 BP Press Release, 2006. BP plans $3 billion project to refine more Canadian heavy crude oil in the U.S. Midwest, dated September, 20, 2006, www.whiting.bp.com/go/doc/1550/165362, accessed December 2007 34 Guinane, P. 2007a. Daniels won’t budge on BP. Northwest Indiana Times, July, 26, 2007

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35 Guinane, P. 2007b. Daniels commissions review of BP permit. Northwest Indiana Times, August, 14, 2007 36 Brainard, 2007 37 Indiana Chamber of Commerce, 2007. Statement on BP permit for Whiting Refinery: Rules followed, project should move forward, dated August, 22, 2007, www.indianachamber.com/newsdetail.asp?ID=3406, accessed December, 2007 38 Callahan, R. 2007. Agency chief says BP refinery uproar late coming, Associated Press, August 23, 2007 39 Callahan, R. 2007

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