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Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3175579

A Quick Glance at Agroterrorism Response

Jason E. Thomas

Agricultural terrorism or agroterrorism refers to the purposeful use of chemical or

biological agents to weaken, alter, or destroy agricultural assets (Grieco 2015). Biological

warfare against agriculture can be devastating. Consequently, countries have biowarfare

programs that target agriculture (FAS 2011). While the advantages of diminishing an enemy’s

food supply are apparent, agroterrorism can have much more far-reaching effects. Attacks on

U.S. agriculture would have damaging effects on the both the domestic and international

economies (Wheelis, Casagrande and Madden 2002).

The Threat of Agroterrism

The threat of agroterroisim is daunting. Chemical and biological attacks could potentially

harm, maim, or kill crops, animals, and citizens as well as generate widespread alarm (Gill

2015). Biological and chemical weapons are easy to transport and difficult to detect. In addition

to physical harm and panic, agroterroism cause severe economic damage (Wheelis, Casagrande

and Madden 2002). The U.S. has three distinct agricultural vulnerabilities (Grieco 2015). These

include the susceptibility of livestock to foreign animal diseases, the frequent transportation

livestock in large quantities in condensed containers, and the lack of security measures to address

agroterroism (Gilpen, et al. 2008)

Agroterrorism is difficult to detect because it does not produce results quickly, which is

why agroterrorism has not been a primary tactic for terrorist attacks (Gill 2015). Agroterroism

can, however, produce social instability, substantial economic losses, social fear and instability,

and outbreaks of disease (Gill 2015; Wheelis, Casagrande and Maden 2002). Though

agroterroism would not have the same immediate impact as a dirty bomb, agroterrorism is less

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expensive and would have a substantial and lasting psychological effect on the nation (Kermidis,

et al. 2013).

Several factors contribute to increased potential interest in agroterrorism by know

terrorist groups. The reduction and elimination of the senior leaders in Al Queda over the past 12

years has left a vacuum with mid and low-level actors to act as leaders (Gill 2015). These

resources most likely do not have the ability or resources to conduct large-scale acts of terror

(Gill 2015). Further, one of Al Queda’s primary goals to damage the economy of the United

States (Gill 2015). Lastly, microorganisms can be created in secret labs inexpensively by those

with only minor training in microbiology (Olson 2012). The ease in which pathogens may be

obtained is evidenced by the volumes of information that can gathered on the Internet with

strong search skills (Gill 2015). Moreover, many potential biological agents occur naturally in

the environment and simply need to be collected (Kermidis, et al. 2013).

There are four categories of actors that might generate an agroterrorism attack (a) militant

animal rights groups, (b) domestic terrorists, (c) economic opportunists, and (f) international

terrorists (Knowles, et al. 2005). Militant animal rights groups believe they have a moral duty to

prevent abuse of animals by any means necessary. Domestic terrorists include disgruntled

employees, who may pose an enhanced threat due to their intimate knowledge of the target and

increased access to the target (Gill 2015). Economic opportunists might use agroterroism to

remove a rival or manipulate markets to their advantage. International terrorists may use

agroterrorism attacks because of their ease of use or to specifically to create economic disruption

(Olson 2012; Wheelis, Casagrande and Maden 2002).

The U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) estimates the United States will export

$139 billion agriculture products in fiscal year 2018 (USDA 2017). Consequently, the impact of

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agroterroism could have significant economic ramifications. Further, once an attack occurs, it

has a broader effect than just the assets targeted (Gill 2015). For example, foot-and-mouth

disease is significant threat to agriculture (Knowles, et al. 2005). If foot-and-mouth infection

were to occur in the U.S. cloven hoof animal population, the U.S. ability to export any products

from cloven hoof animals such as pigs, sheep, or cattle would be limited for two years (OIE

2017).

Containing Agroterrims After an Attack

Containing an agroterrorism attack is vital. A study by the National Institute of Justice

recommends having law enforcement effect an immediate quarantine of the area affected

(Knowles, et al. 2005). This includes setting up a system of roadblocks to prevent both

contaminated vehicles as well and compromised animals from moving and spreading the

infection to other areas. The next step is to initiate an effective criminal investigation starting

with the crime scene.

While the above-mentioned procedures may seem simple, the sheer scale of an incident

caused by agroterrorism may be overwhelming (Moats 2007). As many of the weapons used by

agroterrorist are difficult to detect and have long incubation periods (Grieco 2015), the infection

may have spread far and wide before it becomes noticed. Accordingly, an agroterrorism incident

might be as complicated to address as the 9/11 terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center

(Moats 2007). The difficulties inherent in containing an agroterrorism event seem to auger for

stricter biosecurity measures to prevent attacks (Gill 2015).

Best Practices for Agroterrorism Response

There many complex factors that make handling agroterrorism attacks challenging. These

include: (a) the insufficient supply of trained resources to treat and care for affected and

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potentially affected animals, (b) the potential for wide spread danger, (c) the hazardous materials

involved, and (d) the staggering amount of information and communications that would be

occurring (Moats 2007). This creates a need for multiple government agencies and other

organizations to work together to address such incidents.

The National Incident Management Systems (NIMS) is the primary system used to

respond to these types of incidents. NIMS provides a comprehensive approach to incident

management that integrates many working components at all levels of government and is

designed to address all hazardous scenarios and potential incidents no matter their size or scale

(FEMA 2011). NIMS provides a framework and methodology for incident response that includes

defined roles and actions for different types of scenarios. Organizations and individuals are

encouraged to train and certify their personnel in the NIMS process to enables them to better

work together and assume the appropriate roles as needed (FEMA 2011).

Best practices for agroterrorism response include robust surveillance, tight control of the

incident scene, reliable information and physical security, biosecurity, and evidence preservation

(Moats 2007). Incidents must be detected and observed for proper containment, security must be

in place to protect personnel and the scene, the additional spread of infection must be prevented,

and the evidence must be collected to initiate the investigation and address the attack properly.

After those items are executed, infected animals must be treated and may require termination

(Moats 2007). All infected carcasses must be disposed of properly such as by incineration or

burial and healthy animals should be vaccinated, if appropriate (Moats 2007). Lastly, affected

areas need to be decontaminated and action an plan needs to be developed for the remaining

animals such as determining how they might be used or what restrictions might be placed on

them or their use (Moats 2007). These items merely represent the physical responses to an

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incident. Many other items that need to be addressed such as public messaging, status reporting,

and addressing the impacts of income for those affected (Moats 2007).

Conclusion

An agroterroism attack on the United States could have many wide-ranging consequences

on the economy and social stability (Gill 2015; Grieco 2015; Kermidis, et al. 2013). While there

is recognition of this problem, it is likely that an agroterroism attack would be overwhelming

(Moats 2007). NIMS provides a robust framework for addressing attacks of varying sizes with

multiple agencies and organizations (FEMA 2011). However, there is still room for improvement

in incident response such making dedicated incident response teams (Moats 2007). Given the

massive resources required to respond to agroterroism incidents and their overwhelming nature,

agencies should strongly consider investing in preventive measures to prevent attacks from

occurring (Gill 2015).

Future Trends

In addition to addressing the growing scale of terrorist capabilities and the potential

magnitude of an agroterrorism incident, authorities need to consider newer delivery methods and

attack vectors such as cyber attacks. Technology is fully integrated into work and private lives,

which makes nearly all processes subject to cyber threats due to reliance on technology tools.

Consequently, government agencies and first responders are also vulnerable. For example, key

systems could be subject to ransomware attacks which would make the critical data and systems

unusable (Thomas and Galligher 2018). With critical systems down all work grinds to a halt and

response effectiveness plummets.

Besides having quality IT security resources and process, agencies need to both prevent

cyber attacks from occurring and to be able to recover when an effective attack occurs.

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3175579

Exploiting interactions with employees and computer users are one of the most common

methods by which miscreants and potential terrorists can gains access to critical systems

(Thomas 2018). Accordingly, agencies must ensure that all members are properly training on

security best practices to resist common tactics such as spear phishing and social engineering.

This training must be reinforced regularly using assessment techniques to gauge learning

and the current computer security proficiency of team members (Thomas and Hornsey 2014).

Having a highly trained team is the first line of defense and training is the best way to ensure

user readiness to resist cyber threats (Thomas 2018). If an attack does occur, the fastest and

most reliable remedy is to restore from backups (Thomas and Galligher 2018). With proper time

delineated backups, attacks such as ransomware can be addressed by simply restoring from the

last known good backup that was made prior to the attack. It is easy to focus on the physical

dynamics of an attack and the process of working through the chaotic events that happen once

and incident occurs, however by proactively guarding against cyber attacks, organization can

ensure they are ready to respond to all incidents.

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3175579

References

FAS. 2011. Biowarfare against agriculture. https://fas.org/biosecurity/education/dualuse-

agriculture/1.-agroterrorism-and-foodsafety/biowarfare-against-agriculture.html.

FEMA. 2011. National Incident Management System (NIMS). Accessed October 4, 2017.

https://www.fema.gov/media-library-data/20130726-1853-25045-

0014/nims_overview.pdf.

Gill, K M. 2015. "Agroterroism: The risks to the United States food supply and national

security." U.S. Army Medical Department Journal January-March: 9-15.

https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/25651140.

Gilpen, J L, H Carabin, J L Regens, and R W Burden. 2008. "Agriculture emergencies: A primer

for first responders." Biosecur Bioterror 7 (2): 187-198. doi:10.1089/bsp.2008.0037.

Grieco, D F. 2015. "Closing the barn door: Interagency approches to reduce agroterrorism

threats." InterAgency Jourla 6 (2): 28-37. thesimonscenter.org.

Kermidis, H, B Appel, A Menrath, K Tomuzia, M Normak, and R Roffey. 2013. "Historical

perspective on agroterrorism: Lessons learned from 1945 to 2012." Biosecur Bioterror

11: S17-S24. doi:10.189/bsp.2012.0080.

Knowles, T, J Lane, G Bayens, N Speer, J Jaax, J Carter, and A Bannister. 2005. NIJ research

report: Defining law enforcement's role in protecting American agriculture from

agroterroism. Research Report, Washington, D.C.: National Institute of Justice, 1-188.

Accessed October 4, 2017. doi:https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/grants/212280.pdf.

Moats, J B. 2007. Agroterrosim: A guilde for first responders. annotated. College Station: Texas

A&M University Press.

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3175579

OIE. 2017. Terretrial Animal Health Code. Accessed October 4, 2017.

http://www.oie.int/index.php?id=169&L=0&htmfile=chapitre_fmd.htm#article_fmd.1.

Olson, M A. 2012. Threats to America's economy and food supply. February 1. Accessed

October 4, 2017. https://leb.fbi.gov/articles/featured-articles/agroterrorism-threats-to-

americas-economy-and-food-supply.

Thomas, J E. 2018. "Individual cyber security: Empowering employees to resist spear phishing

to prevent identity theft and ransomware attacks." International Journal of Business and

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Thomas, J E, and G C Galligher. 2018. "Improving backup system evaluations in information

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(1): 14-25. doi:10.5539/cis.v11n1p14.

Thomas, J E, and P E Hornsey. 2014. "Adding rigor to classroom assessment techniques for non-

traditional adult programs: A lifecycle improvement approach." Journal of Instructional

Research 3: 27-37. https://cirt.gcu.edu/jir.

USDA. 2017. usda.gov. August 10. Accessed October 4, 107.

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Wheelis, M, R Casagrande, and L Madden. 2002. "Biological Attack on Agriculture: Low-Tech,

High-Impact Bioterrorism: Because bioterrorist attack requires relatively little specialized

expertise and technology, it is a serious threat to US agriculture and can have very large

economic repercussion." BioScience 52 (7): 569-576. doi:https://doi.org/10.1641/0006-

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Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3175579

A Quick Glance at Agroterrorism Response
The Threat of Agroterrism
Containing Agroterrims After an Attack
Best Practices for Agroterrorism Response
Conclusion

Future Trends

References