SPYING ON AMERICA

The FBI's Domestic Counterintelligence Program

JAMES KIRKPATRICK DAVIS

PRAEGER

Westport, Connecticut
London

Copyright Acknowledgment

The author and publisher gratefully acknowledge permission to reprint extracts from the following:

Clarence M. Kelley and James Kirkpatrick Davis, *Kelley: The Story of an FBI Director* (Kansas City, Mo.: Andrews, McMeel, and Parker, 1987). By permission of Universal Press Syndicate.

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

Davis, James Kirkpatrick.
Spying on America : the FBI's domestic counterintelligence program / James Kirkpatrick Davis.
p. cm.
Includes bibliographical references and index.
ISBN 0-275-93407-1 (alk. paper)
1. United States. Federal Bureau of Investigation. 2. Political crimes and offenses—United States—Investigation—History—20th century. 3. Political persecution—United States—History—20th century. I. Title.
HV8144.F43D38 1992
364.1'32'0973—dc20 91-23131

British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data is available.

Library of Congress Catalog Card Number: 91-23131
ISBN: 0-275-93407-1

First published in 1992

Praeger Publishers, 88 Post Road West, Westport, CT 06881
An imprint of Greenwood Publishing Group, Inc.

Printed in the United States of America

The paper used in this book complies with the Permanent Paper Standard issued by the National Information Standards Organization (Z39.48-1984).

10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1

For Nancy, Whitney, and Carter Davis

5 The Black Nationalist Hate Group COINTELPRO

> We knew it wasn't going to be a tea party but we didn't anticipate how violent the U.S. government would get.
>
> Ron Karenga
> United Slaves

The incident began routinely enough.

On the oppressively hot night of August 11, 1965, Los Angeles motorcycle patrolman Lew W. Minikus briefly pursued and then stopped a twenty-one-year-old drunk driver named Marquette Frye. Frye was black. It was about 7:00 P.M. when Minikus approached Frye's vehicle, which had stopped at the corner of 116th and Avalon streets in the Watts district of Los Angeles.

Frye, accompanied by his brother Ronald, was in no mood to be arrested by a white policeman. Harsh words were exchanged as the young black resisted arrest. Pushing and shoving followed. An angry crowd began to gather as police reinforcements arrived. A few rocks and bottles were thrown and there was a tense standoff. However, by some miracle, the black crowd began to subside. By 1:00 A.M., a huge Los Angeles police contingent had successfully controlled the situation.

The next day, however, the Watts district exploded in electrifying

fury. A racial disorder of such magnitude had never before been seen in the United States. For three days, Watts convulsed with savage firefights and indiscriminate looting and destruction. Almost 16,000 law enforcement personnel, including police, sheriff's deputies, and National Guardsmen, moved in to restore order.

All told there were 4,000 arrests, 34 deaths, 1,300 injuries, and $35 million in property damage.[1] Although black riots had occurred in the United States before, Watts was the first race riot to capture national attention. It is no exaggeration to say that Watts was a turning point. After August 1965, race relations in the United States were never the same again. Watts, in fact, was the first in a series of race riots that traumatized the nation during the summers of 1965, 1966, 1967, and 1968.

Most of the riots were sparked by a minor incident, usually involving the police. Most escalated to involve looting, tear gas, and firefights, sometimes with automatic weapons. In total, the race riots of the 1960s accounted for at least 225 deaths and 4,000 injuries, and more than $100 billion in property damage.[2] The collective psychological damage was beyond measurement.

Lyndon B. Johnson, chief architect of the Great Society, was shattered. "By every traditional index of progress—of wages earned, of housing, of entry into high public service, of education, of integration in the armed forces—the black community was, in the 1960's, moving forward more rapidly than ever before in American history."[3] The president's anguish over black violence was profound. He wanted answers. He turned to the FBI for help.

Answers were not easy. Originally, the government suspected that communists or some other foreign influences might be involved. This was not the case.

As a general practice, the bureau had kept track of racial agitators by use of its Security Index, which, as we have seen, was developed during the Roosevelt administration. From the 1950s on, this listing was generally comprised of about 15,000 individuals who were regarded as dissidents. Although more than 1,500 blacks were usually named on the Security Index, none were felt to endanger the security of the nation.

Over the years (also as a general practice), bureau special agents had followed civil rights groups to determine, primarily, if these groups were

under any form of foreign influence—communist or otherwise. Generally, there was no evidence of such influence.

In 1960 the FBI maintained microphonic surveillance on just "one black separatist group." By 1963 the microphonic surveillance had increased to "two black separatist groups" and "one black separatist functionary."[4] The findings from these projects were less than startling.

A good part of the surveillance of Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., occurred within the Communist Party U.S.A. COINTELPRO. Here too, as noted in Chapter 2, there was very little evidence to suggest that black organizations or black leaders in the United States—in spite of the most inflammatory rhetoric—were part of a communist conspiracy at all.

In 1964, after the small-scale ghetto uprisings of that summer, the president instructed the FBI to investigate and determine the origins and extent of racial unrest. Director Hoover, almost certainly after conferring with the president, made the bureau's report public in September 1964. Nine cities has been studied. Information was gathered from "public officials, police officers, clergymen, leaders of responsible organizations and individuals considered to be reliable." There was no evidence of any kind to suggest "that the riots were organized on a nation-wide basis."[5]

In 1965, after the Watts riot, FBI field offices were instructed to be alert for and provide information regarding "planned racial activity such as demonstrations, rallies, marches."[6]

In late 1966 a number of FBI field offices were ordered to prepare monthly and in some cases semimonthly reports of "existing racial conditions in major urban areas." Special agents were instructed to utilize "established sources"[7] in ghetto areas. These reports were to be used by the FBI in Washington to analyze the activities of virtually all civil rights organizations, black nationalist hate groups, and any other hate groups known to function in ghetto areas.

Thus, by early 1967, the FBI was utilizing considerable resources to keep the White House, the Justice Department, the military, and the other intelligence agencies within the federal government up to date.

After riots in Newark and Detroit later in 1967, President Johnson announced that the FBI had standing instructions "to search for evidence of conspiracy." In addition, internal field-office directives instructed special agents "to conduct a continuing survey to develop advance information concerning racial developments with clearly point to the possibility of mob violence and riotous conditions." Surveillance targets

included "black nationalist groups" and "hate-type organizations with a propensity for violence."[8]

That year, 1967, turned out to be the most violent year of all. With reference to the Detroit riots, Lyndon B. Johnson remembered that "the events of July 24–28, 1967, will remain forever etched in my memory. The phone rang at 3 A.M. on the morning of July 24. Attorney General Ramsey Clark was on the line."[9] From that point on, it was all downhill. The Detroit violence was unparalleled. Before it was over, federal troops had been sent in.

By September, racial violence had erupted in sixty-seven cities. Thirty-two people had been killed and 3,200 were injured. Property damage exceeded $100 million.[10]

In an address to the nation, Johnson said, "We will not endure violence." He gave a special warning to public officials nationwide: "If your response to these tragic events is only business as usual you invite not only disaster but dishonor."[11]

Against this backdrop of extreme violence, J. Edgar Hoover was developing the next COINTELPRO.

The president and Hoover had been close friends for many years, and the director was a regular visitor to the Oval Office. They agreed that a new counterintelligence program had to be developed—one that would, if possible, intercept and neutralize violent black activists. Such an effort, as a matter of course, would almost certainly improve and supplement other FBI programs, other Justice Department programs, and the intelligence efforts of the military.

The documents creating the new COINTELPRO were drafted during the third week of August 1967. An August 25 memorandum initiating the new COINTELPRO was sent via registered mail to twenty-three field offices strategically located in cities across the United States. The memo came directly from Hoover. All copies were sent directly to the special agents-in-charge.[12]

Field offices were instructed to "establish a control file" immediately and assign responsibility for following and coordinating this new counterintelligence program to all experienced and "imaginative" special agents "with experience in working with black nationalists, hate-type groups and organizations." Special agents were well equipped to fill this need.[13] By 1967 more than 1,000 agents were receiving intelligence on civil rights groups each month. The effort might have been more

successful, though, if black agents had been used for many of these assignments. However, in 1967 black agents comprised only 2 percent of all special agents working for the FBI.

The purpose of the new COINTELPRO was to "expose, disrupt, misdirect, discredit or otherwise neutralize the activities of black nationalist hate type organizations."[14] The August 25 memo—more than two and a half pages of single-spaced instructions—specified that groups for special attention would include the Congress of Racial Equality, the Nation of Islam, the Student Non-violent Coordinating Committee, the Deacons of Defense and Justice, and the Southern Christian Leadership Conference.

Individual extremists targeted for special attention included Maxwell Stanford, H. "Rap" Brown, Stokely Carmichael, and Elijah Mohammed. The memo closed with the traditional warning that "under no circumstances should the existence of the program be made known outside the bureau."[15]

Including the Southern Christian Leadership Conference with the original group of COINTELPRO targets was an odd move. Section Chief George C. Moore recalled, "At that time it was still under investigation because of the communist infiltration. As far as I know, there were not any violent propensities, except that I note, in the cover memo [executing the Black Nationalists COINTELPRO] or somewhere, that they mentioned that if Martin Luther King decided to go a certain way, he could cause some trouble. . . . I cannot explain it satisfactorily."[16] The Black Panthers were not mentioned in the August 25 memo because they had not yet risen to national recognition.

Less than a month after the beginning of the new Black Nationalist Hate Group COINTELPRO, the Justice Department expanded and refined its administrative machinery for evaluation "of civil disturbance intelligence." The FBI was to be a vital part of this expansion.

In a memorandum dated September 14, 1967, Attorney General Ramsey Clark continued to broaden the FBI's basic intelligence authority. Clark advised the bureau that "sources or informants in black nationalists organizations, SNCC and other less-publicized groups"[17] should be developed and expanded to determine the size and purpose of these groups.

This "Ghetto Informant Program" was to function concurrently with the new COINTELPRO. It grew rapidly. By 1968 some 3,000 ghetto

informants were being used; by 1969 the program had grown to 4,000 informants, and there were 7,000 by 1972.[18]

The program was designed to establish listening posts in the black areas of virtually every major city in the United States. Informants were recruited from many walks of ghetto life. In many cases, the informants were property or business owners. Some were the parents and grandparents of militants. Veterans and especially members of veterans' organizations proved to be excellent informants. All lived in or worked in ghetto areas, and all were paid regularly for their information.

The primary objective—as outlined in an October 1967 Justice Department memo—was to develop "additional penetrative coverage of militant black nationalist groups and the ghetto areas immediately to be in a position to have maximum intelligence in anticipation of another outburst of racial violence next summer."[19]

Informants attended and reported on open meetings of extremist groups and attempted to identify underground outlets for extremist literature and weapons. Every effort was made to determine racial feelings and attitudes—particularly, quick changes in attitudes. Foreigners in the ghetto were watched. The Justice Department was advised every two weeks on the possibility of riots and their most likely times and locations.

Additionally, Ramsey Clark created the Interdivisional Intelligence Unit in December 1967. The IDIU accepted and classified the large volume of incoming FBI reports. These data were categorized and filed within a vast Justice Department master index system designed for quick reference. In time, the IDIU was processing almost 3,000 reports a month.[20]

Even when the new programs were in place, the director and the top associates of the bureau were still nervous. The prospect of another riot-filled summer was almost too awful to contemplate. Hoover decided to expand the programs. On March 4, 1968, Hoover expanded the Black Hate COINTELPRO from twenty-three to forty-one offices. He also announced to the field offices the long-range goals for this COINTELPRO: the prevention of the unification of black nationalist groups and the possible rise of a "black Messiah," neutralization of potential troublemakers, discreditation of the groups in the eyes of the black community as a whole, and the prevention of recruitment of youths.

Field offices were to advise headquarters of the local special agent assigned to coordinate this new COINTELPRO at the field office level.

In addition, field offices were instructed to provide immediately a summary of local black nationalist movements, listings of all black nationalist organizations, as well as suggestions for COINTELPRO actions. Reports, which were to be submitted every ninety days, were to use the following captions: operations under consideration, operations being effected, tangible results, and developments of counterintelligence interest.[21]

The director followed almost immediately with another memo, which stated, "The Negro youth and moderate must be made to understand that if they succumb to revolutionary teaching, they will be dead revolutionaries."[22]

Hoover's expansion more than doubled the size of the COINTELPRO by the late winter of 1968. In hindsight, it seems strange that what was to become the most feared of all the black nationalist organizations was not even mentioned in the August 1967 or March 1968 COINTELPRO directives.

The Black Panther party—originally known as the Black Panther Party for Self Defense—was founded in October 1966 by Huey Newton and Bobby Seale, both students at Merritt College in Oakland, California. Its purpose was to provide a unified black response to the perceived police brutality in the Oakland area. Actually, it went much further than that. Huey Newton remembered later that "the police, not only in the Oakland community, but throughout the black communities in the country were really the government."[23] And Bobby Seale recalled, "Basically we wanted land, bread, housing, education, clothing, justice, and peace."[24] Many blacks felt as if they were living in a colony that was ruled by white police.

Panther members began to appear in public openly carrying weapons and wearing black berets and leather jackets, but their first official action was a minor one: directing traffic. An intersection at the Santa Fe Elementary School in North Oakland was considered dangerous for children to cross. A traffic light had been needed for years. Two of the Panthers had gone to school there. The Panthers arrived, in full battle gear, to see that the children crossed safely. It wasn't long before the much-needed light was installed.

Panther members began patrolling the crime-infested slums of Oakland. They became active in protesting rent evictions of blacks and in counseling welfare recipients. They monitored the actions of the Oakland Police Department and worked with black prisoners. Others soon

joined, including author and Panther Minister of Information Eldridge Cleaver, Kathleen Cleaver, David Hilliard, Donald Lee Cox, Emory Douglas, and others.

The organization stepped into the national spotlight when its members made a brazen entrance at the California State Legislature on May 2, 1967. About forty fully armed Panthers walked right into the California Assembly while it was in session, protesting a bill that would outlaw carrying loaded weapons in public. All were arrested.

This single act—as ill advised as it may have been—just about made the Panthers a household word overnight.

Wayne Davis, then a special agent assigned to the Washington field office, remembers that "there was a great deal of fear about the Panther philosophy."[25] That fear was focused on the "Huey Newton/Bobby Seale faction out on the west coast that had gone to the state capitol armed."[26] Many in the government saw this as "perhaps the beginning of a breakdown in respect for law enforcement."[27] That was putting it mildly.

Media coverage increased with the almost weekly confrontations between Panthers and the Oakland and other Bay Area police departments.

On October 27, 1967, the Black Panthers collided head-on with the Oakland police. At five o'clock in the morning, Oakland police officers Herbert C. Hearnes and John F. Frey stopped two Panthers for a routine traffic violation. Huey Newton got out of his car and shooting erupted. Newton was shot four times. He survived, but Officer Frey was killed at the scene. Officer Hearnes was critically wounded. Newton went to prison.

In spite of the Panthers' obvious propensity for violence and their growing national reputation, the FBI still took no steps to include them as a target in the new COINTELPRO.

Another shoot-out occurred on April 11, 1968. One Oakland squad car was hit with more than 150 rounds. Amazingly, no police officers were killed, but two were wounded. Richard Jensen, one of the injured police officers, remembers the fury of the Panther onslaught: "I had been shot maybe nine different times and they thought I was dead. I wasn't but the firing continued. It was like a war going on. We found out later there was thirteen people shooting at us."[28]

One Panther was killed. Eldridge Cleaver was charged with attempted murder and later fled the country.

A September 27, 1968, memorandum from George C. Moore to W. C. Sullivan advised of things to come: "The information we are reviewing from our sources concerning activities of the BPP clearly indicates that more violence can be expected from this organization in the immediate future."[29]

By May 1968 the Panthers had been involved in several firefights and countless confrontations with police. They had received tremendous news coverage. They were becoming a black power force in the cities and on the nation's campuses. Panthers had made violent threats against the highest officials in Washington.

The FBI reaction to all of this was curious.

Initially, the San Francisco field office—the office of origin in the Black Panther investigation—resisted the whole idea of selecting the Black Panther party to be a COINTELPRO target. Charles W. Bates, the San Francisco special agent-in-charge—who was later to direct the Patty Hearst investigation—was a man who spoke his mind. He did not feel that a COINTELPRO action against the Panthers would be effective, and he made his views known on more than one occasion. However, in time, the headquarters people prevailed. The Panthers were becoming legendary. The public wanted to know what the FBI was doing about them! The Panthers *had* to be placed on the COINTELPRO target list.

And after all, as always, the director was going to have his way. In a scorching four-page memo dated May 27, 1969, Hoover told the San Francisco field office personnel that their reasoning was "not in line with Bureau objectives as to our responsibilities under the CIP [counterintelligence program]." The San Francisco special agent-in-charge received a full dressing down with closing instructions: "The CIP in the San Francisco office must be reevaluated. During the reevaluation, give thorough consideration to the adequacy of the personnel assigned. Insure that you are utilizing the best personnel available in this program. Advise the Bureau of the results of your reevaluation by June 9, 1969."[30]

In September 1968, J. Edgar Hoover had described the Panthers as "the greatest threat to the internal security of the country."[31]

One of the primary aims of the Black Nationalist Hate Group COINTELPRO was to prevent the unification of the various black nationalist groups into one powerful political force. In the March 4, 1968, memo expanding the COINTELPRO, the director outlined its various goals in exhaustive detail. The prevention of "the coalition of black nationalist groups" was goal number one: A united black nationalist force was the

director's greatest fear. Interestingly, in the same memo, goal number three called for the prevention of black violence.[32] In fact, an alarming number of COINTELPRO actions achieved just the opposite result.

It should be noted that not all special agents of field offices necessarily agreed with the Black Hate COINTELPRO methodologies or philosophy. As we have seen, there was considerable resistance to the black nationalist program at the San Francisco office. There is reason to believe that disenchantment existed to some degree at most field offices.

Robert Wall—then a special agent in the Washington, D.C., field office—remembers that, as far as programs like the Black Nationalist program were concerned, "investigations on almost anything done by or for black people could be opened simply by labeling it a Racial Matter."[33] Wall investigated teenagers in Washington who simply wanted city government funds restored in order to provide summer employment for ghetto youths. He investigated black-owned bookstores, the Poor People's March, and other matters that had nothing to do with black extremism, but only with black people.

According to Wall, it was common practice for special agents to scan the local paper and look for any kind of racial incident. When one was found, a call would be quickly made to the local police to verify the details. Then a teletype would be sent to headquarters, advising that the matter was under investigation. Matters like this did not usually become full-fledged COINTELPRO actions, but they do illustrate the type of racial thinking that was present within the bureau from top to bottom.

Wall recalls that while he was a special agent "the appalling racism of the FBI on every level became glaringly apparent to me." As time went on, "it seemed as if every dissident black man was a candidate for investigation."[34]

Regarding the Black Panthers, Wall felt that "it was absurd to investigate hundreds of people whose only connection with the Black Panther Party was that the Party was trying to influence them."[35]

The feelings of Special Agent Wall, and perhaps others like him, had no direct bearing on the investigations or the basic thrust of this COINTELPRO. Hoover's word was the law. Indeed, the actions taken against the black nationalists were probably the most dangerous and aggressive of all the COINTELPROs.

In southern California, the bureau's intent was to promote violence between the Black Panther party and another black group known as the United Slaves (US) Incorporated. Ostensibly, the effort was to nullify the power of each.

By the fall of 1968 the Panthers were the most widely known and the most widely feared of all the black militant groups in the United States; their membership at this time totaled about 3,000. US, headed by Ron Karenga, was every bit as militant as the Panthers; they wore olive drab uniforms and were trained in karate.

For a time the two groups were allies on a number of projects. Ron Karenga remembers that "we used to do community patrol together."[36]

During the summer of 1968 the San Diego field office conducted interviews of virtually all members of the US group. "In these interviews," a COINTELPRO memorandum of May 31, 1968, notes, "questions will be asked in such a manner as to weaken the influence of leaders of the group." Any group tendency toward dissension was encouraged. By working closely with the San Diego Police Department, the FBI made it difficult for the US group to hold meetings.[37]

By the late fall of 1968 the political landscape had changed. It became clear that the Black Panther–US relationship was in serious trouble. Many members of both groups came from San Diego east-side youth gangs, and they knew the meaning of gang warfare. Both groups wanted to be number one.

A September 25, 1968, COINTELPRO memorandum from the Los Angeles field office told headquarters of the depth of the split between the groups. Several informants reported that the Panthers had "let a contract"[38] on US leader Ron Karenga.

This same memo reported that the Peace and Freedom Party (PFP), which had some white members, was an active financial supporter of the Panthers. Evidently, the Panthers were not impressed with white support. The memo predicted that Caucasians in PFP "will be stood up against the wall with other whites and eliminated."[39] With specific reference to the Panther–US friction, the memo said that "Los Angeles is presently analyzing the situation to determine if further disruption can be caused between these two antagonists."[40]

Black militants' phone calls were being monitored at this time. Not surprisingly, the Los Angeles office was also requesting income tax and selective service records to "determine if a counter-intelligence technique can be used in this regard."[41]

On November 2, 1968, the bureau learned that US members planned to kill Eldridge Cleaver. The next day, at a Black Panther rally in Los

Angeles, a bureau undercover informant learned that a Panther had been revealed as a US informant. The Panthers planned to kill him.[42] Three weeks later, a headquarters memo noted the state of virtual "gang warfare" with "attendant threats of murder and reprisals" between US and the Panthers. "Hard hitting counterintelligence measures aimed at crippling the BPP"[43] were ordered. Threats of violence and provocative surveillance by the two groups continued on a daily basis.

On January 19 a violent clash occurred at the Westwood campus of the University of California at Los Angeles. The Panthers and US members disagreed over the selection process for an Afro-American studies director at the university. Shouting and threats followed. Then, at Campbell Hall located on the campus, a savage firefight broke out. One US member—Larry Stiner—was hit and went down, but survived. Two Panthers—Apprentice "Buckey" Carter and John Huggins—were killed outright. It was later claimed by the Panthers that those who actually did the shooting were FBI agents.

On February 20, 1969, the San Diego field office—in an attempt to maintain and probably exacerbate the tension between the rival groups—requested permission to mail derogatory and highly inflammatory cartoons to the southern California Black Panther offices and to the homes of other Panther leaders across the country.[44] By this time, the FBI was actively investigating all forty-two Panther chapters then known to be in existence, plus more than 1,000 active Panther members. Mailings would be anonymous but made to appear as if they came from the US organization.

Authorization was quickly given on February 27, 1969. The cartoons themselves—extraordinarily crude and abrasive—were mailed during the first week of March 1969. One in particular featured a Panther member hanging from a tree and two smiling US members looking on. The caption read, "He really was a paper tiger." Other cartoons were meant to imply that the entire Panther organization was "riddled with graft and corruption."

The response to the mailing was immediate. A San Diego field office memo dated March 12, 1969, advised that the original mailing was on target.[45] Informants reported that Panther members were outraged. They were indeed fooled into thinking that the mailings were coming from the United Slaves.

Other strategies were also at work.

Around the same time as the cartoon mailing, the San Diego field office placed anonymous calls to Panther members, falsely advising that others in their group were police informants.

The violence continued. On March 17 a Panther member was hit by US gunfire and critically wounded at a rally near Carver High School in Los Angeles. A counterattack followed: Panthers fired several rounds into the home of a US member.

The San Diego FBI office followed up with another mailing of inflammatory materials to Panthers in Sacramento, Los Angeles, and New York.

In April 1969 the bureau mailed out still more crude cartoons that ridiculed Panther members. Again, the illustrations were crude. Continuing a favorite motif, one showed two of the dead Panthers—Huggins and Carter—looked on by gleeful US members. A flyer was sent to the United Slaves (purportedly from the Panthers) that referred to US members as "Pork chop niggers."

On April 4, 1969, there was another confrontation between the two groups, in Southcrest Park in San Diego. According to an FBI undercover informant who was at the scene, the Panthers literally "ran the US members off."[46] On the same day, US members broke into a Panther education meeting and "roughed up" a female Panther member.[47]

A San Diego memo dated April 10, 1969, reported that "the BPP members strongly object to being made fun of by cartoons distributed by the US organization." Informants reported that the continuous mailing of cartoons was "really shaking up the BPP. . . . They have made the BPP feel that US is getting ready to move and this was the cause of the confrontation at Southcrest Park on 4/4/69."[48]

There was more gunfire. On May 23 John Savage, a Panther member, was shot and killed by US member Terry Horne. A June 5, 1969, memo to headquarters reported that the almost daily confrontation between the two groups ranged "from mere harassment up to and including beatings of various individuals."[49] A few days later it was also reported that US members were buying large amounts of ammunition including "9mm, 32 automatic, and 38 special."[50] In this atmosphere of extraordinary tension, the FBI decided to take even more action.

The San Diego field office mailed a forged Black Panther letter to Panther headquarters in Oakland. The letter expressed outrage and dismay over the killing of local Panther members at the hands of the United

Slaves; and in an obvious attempt to create tension within the Panther organization, the letter stated that the local Panther leader had a white girlfriend.

The violence continued. US members shot and wounded two Panthers on August 14, 1969. The next day, US members shot and killed Panther member Sylvester Bell. On August 30, the US office in San Diego was firebombed by retaliating Panthers.

The San Diego FBI office was pleased with these new developments. In a September 18, 1969, memo to bureau headquarters, the field office reported, "In view of the recent killing of BPP member Sylvester Bell, a new cartoon is being considered in the hopes that it will assist in the continuance of the rift between BPP and US." The memo pointed out that "a substantial amount of the unrest is directly attributed to this program."[51]

On November 12, 1969, the San Diego office learned that US leader Ron Karenga feared he would be killed by the Panthers. To heighten this fear, the office sent a letter—anonymous, but appearing to come from a US ally—that strongly suggested that he order reprisals against the Panthers.

On January 29, 1970, new cartoons were approved by headquarters for release by the San Diego, San Francisco, and Los Angeles field offices. One portrayed a Panther leader as basically antagonistic toward black women and children. Another suggested that US leader Ron Karenga had the Panthers completely at his mercy.

On May 2, 1970, an extremely hostile article entitled "KARENGA, KING OF THE BLOOD SUCKERS" appeared in the Black Panther newspaper. Headquarters requested proposals from the field offices to use the article in stirring up even more violence.

The Los Angeles field office replied that it was now difficult to induce Panther members to attack the US group in southern California because the Panthers now feared the United Slaves.

By the end of May 1970, the efforts to promote Panther–US violence had come to a halt. The beatings, the confrontations, the surveillance, the street violence, together with the extremely destructive work of undercover informants, had combined to practically destroy the Panther organization in San Diego and, to a lesser extent, on the entire West Coast. The US group had also suffered. Ron Karenga recalls, "We knew it wasn't going to be a tea party but we didn't anticipate how violent the U.S. government would get."[52]

Discussing the bureau's rather blatant efforts to encourage violence between the groups, the FBI Black Nationalist supervisor later recalled, "You make the best judgment you can based on all the circumstances and you always have an element of doubt where you are dealing with individuals that I think most people would characterize as having a degree of instability."[53]

Another, far less violent COINTELPRO strategy was to create tension and mistrust within the groups, so as to neutralize their effectiveness from the inside.

In several situations, FBI COINTELPRO actions attempted to destroy group members' marriages.

In Saint Louis, a black-nationalist group member's wife—described by friends as an intelligent and respectable woman—received an anonymous bureau letter saying that her husband had "been making it here" with other women in his organization and that "he gives us this jive 'bout their better in bed than you."[54]

In San Francisco, the wife of a Panther leader received an anonymous letter that accused her husband of having affairs with several teenage girls, and taking some of the girls on trips with him.

In another situation in Saint Louis, a husband who had expressed concern about his wife's activities in a biracial group received an anonymous letter that caused him and his wife to separate. The letter said, in part, "Look man. I guess your old lady doesn't get enough at home or she wouldn't be shuckin and jivin with our Black men in this group."[55]

In Chicago another type of internal discord was created. In March 1969, a local Panther leader made known his fears that a party faction led by Fred Hampton and Bobby Rush was "out to get him." The bureau capitalized on the situation by sending an anonymous letter to Fred Hampton in an effort to create additional strain in the Panther's relations with another group—the Blackstone Rangers—and within the Panther group itself. The letter read, "Brother Hampton: Just a word of warning. A Stone friend tells me [name deleted] wants the Panthers and is looking for somebody to get you out of the way. Brother Jeff [leader of the Blackstone Rangers] is supposed to be interested. I'm just a black man looking for blacks working together, not more of this gang banging."[56]

The FBI Key Black Extremist Program which was incorporated into the COINTELPRO strategy, began in 1970. Key black extremists were defined as "black activists who were particularly agitative, extreme, and

vocal in their demands for terrorism and violence."[57] Reports on these extremists were to be submitted every ninety days.

One of the bureau's most successful efforts at creating internal strife within the Black Panthers played on the schism that had developed between the followers of Eldridge Cleaver and those who followed Huey Newton. This program began in March 1970 while Cleaver was in exile in Algeria and Newton was in prison. An anonymous bureau letter was sent to Cleaver in Algeria to tell him that certain Panther officials in California were actively working against him. The letter was a masterpiece of deceit. Cleaver responded immediately by expelling three leaders from the party, and a furious exchange of letters between Panther leaders in California and Cleaver soon followed.

On August 13, 1970, Huey Newton was released from prison. The Philadelphia Panther office, as well as the national headquarters, received an anonymous bureau letter questioning Newton's competence and leadership.

FBI wiretaps at Panther headquarters and at other offices, together with informant reporting, confirmed that the anonymous letters were very unsettling to the party as a whole.

In the summer of 1970 Cleaver led a delegation to North Vietnam and North Korea. A letter was sent to Cleaver, criticizing Newton for not having arranged adequate press coverage.

In January 1971 an anonymous letter to Cleaver—written to appear as if it had come from Connie Matthews, Newton's secretary—read, in part,

> Things around headquarters are dreadfully disorganized with the comrade commander not making proper decisions. The newspaper is in a shambles. No one knows who is in charge. The foreign department gets no support. . . . I fear there is rebellion working just beneath the surface. . . .
>
> We must either get rid of the Supreme Commander [Newton] or get rid of the disloyal members.[58]

On January 28, 1971, bureau headquarters announced that Newton had immediately disciplined several Panther leaders. Newton had said emphatically that he was prepared to "respond violently to any question of his actions or policies."[59]

On February 2, a bureau memo asked the field offices for still more proposals aimed at causing even more dissension within the Panthers.

The memo said in part that "dissension coupled with financial difficulties offers an exceptional opportunity to further disrupt, aggravate, and possibly neutralize this organization through counterintelligence."[60]

Almost immediately, twenty-nine FBI field offices fired off a withering barrage of acrimonious letters to top-level Panthers. In this campaign, letters reached Eldridge Cleaver, Kathleen Cleaver, Huey Newton, Melvin Newton, David Hilliard, and a number of others on both sides of the Newton–Cleaver divide. Kathleen Cleaver later recalled that "we did not know who to believe about what, so the general effect, not only of the letters but of the whole situation in which the letters were a part was creating uncertainty. It was a very bizarre feeling."[61]

Thus, this mailing campaign too came to a close. The bureau concluded in a March 25, 1971, memo that "since the differences between Newton and Cleaver now appear to be irreconcilable, no further counterintelligence activity in this regard will be undertaken at this time and now new targets must be established."[62]

The snitch-jacket technique was another particularly unpleasant COINTELPRO method of creating internal dissension within the Black Panther party. The snitch jacket involved falsely labeling certain innocent Panther members as police informants—or as "snitches"—so that those persons could no longer be trusted by anyone within the Panther organization. A very unpleasant experience.

The methods for creating snitch-jacket rumors varied. In some situations, rumors were started by using falsified informants' reports; in others, anonymous phone calls or letters to key Panthers were used; in still other situations, actual informants themselves were used to create snitch-jacket rumors.

In one situation in San Diego, a Black Panther leader and four members were arrested. The four members were released by police in a few days, but the leader remained in custody. The Panthers wanted to know why. The bureau authorized the San Diego office to circulate the rumor that their leader had not been released because "he is cooperating with and has made a deal with the Los Angeles Police Department to furnish them with information about the BPP."[63] All of this was completely untrue.

Nevertheless, this Panther's career—that is, *if* he managed to escape violence at the hands of the other Panthers—was all but finished. In this situation—to make matters even worse—after he was released he received an anonymous bureau phone call advising him that his arrest had been caused by a rival black leader.

The New York field office learned that the chairman of the New York Black Panther Party was suspected of being an informant—which he was not. In any event, the suspicion stemmed from the arrest of another Panther member on a weapons charge. The FBI saw an opportunity here and decided to "cast further suspicion on him." The bureau sent anonymous letters to the wife of the arrested member, to a number of other black groups in New York, and to Panther officials throughout the state. The letter said, "Danger Beware—Black Brothers, [target name deleted] is the fink who told the pigs that [arrested Panther name deleted] were carrying guns."[64] The letter even furnished the targeted Panther's home address.

In a volatile situation in Newark, New Jersey, the bureau determined the hiding place of a Panther fugitive by means of a telephone tap. Then, after the Panther's arrest, the bureau attempted to create as much distrust and disruption as possible within the Panther organization. This finger-pointing letter was sent to the captured Panther's brother.

Brother:

Jimmie was sold out by Sister [name deleted—the BPP leader who made the phone call picked up by the tap] for some pig money to pay her rent. When she don't get it that way she takes Panther money. How come her kid sells the paper in his school and no one bothers him. How comes Tyler got busted up by the pigs and her kid didn't. How comes the FBI pig fascists knew where to bust Lonnie and Winnie way out where they were.

—Think baby[65]

Another snitch-jacket operation developed in March 1971 in Charlotte, North Carolina. An important local Panther official had been photographed outside of a house where Panthers had held a shoot-out with local police. The photograph showed the snitch-jacket target talking to a police officer. The photo, together with newspaper copy and an accompanying handwritten note, was sent to Panther headquarters in Oakland, California. The letter, allegedly from a disenchanted female Panther, said that "I think this is the pigs oinking."[66]

In all, the snitch-jacket technique was used in at least a dozen different field offices during the life of the Black Nationalist Hate Group COINTELPRO. In most cases, the damage to the credibility of individual Panthers was simply beyond repair.

George Moore, racial intelligence chief within the bureau during these years, later recalled, "You have to be able to make decisions and I am sure that labeling somebody as an informant, that you'd want to make certain that it served a good purpose before you did it and not do it haphazardly. It is a serious thing. As far as I am aware, in the black extremist area, by using that technique [the snitch-jacket] no one was killed. I am sure of that." Moore was asked whether the fact that no one was killed was just a matter of luck. He answered, "Oh, it just happened that way, I'm sure."[67]

Other former COINTELPRO supervisors do not agree. One in particular said that the labeling of Panthers as informants almost certainly led to violence and injury or death.

As part of the overall Black Nationalist operation, the FBI did not hesitate to take COINTELPRO actions against the black clergy and church organizations that funded black nationalist activities.

Donald W. Jackson, a black minister from Chester, Pennsylvania became a target of the bureau. Jackson, originally an antipoverty worker in the Chester area, changed his name to Muhammad Kenyatta before moving to Jackson, Mississippi. In 1969 Kenyatta was a college student at Tougaloo College in Mississippi. He was also involved with the Jackson Human Rights Project, which was funded by the Episcopal church.

The bureau watched Kenyatta closely. A Jackson, Mississippi, field office memo of February 26, 1969, advised that "Jackson [Kenyatta] gave an inflammatory anti-white, anti-establishment and anti–law enforcement speech and told the crowd that the FBI had informants at Tougaloo College."[68]

The memo said that Kenyatta was one of four instructors at the Black and Proud School in Jackson.[69] An April 16, 1969, memo reported that Kenyatta had been dismissed from college because of unpaid bills, that he had attempted to steal a television set from the college, and that he and some of his associates were involved in several acts of wild and disruptive behavior during Black Spring Weekend, which took place on the Tougaloo campus during April 10–13, 1969.[70]

The Jackson field office, with approval from bureau headquarters, prepared the letter below. It was mailed to Kenyatta on April 25, 1969.

Muhammad Kenyatta—

The deplorable activities and conduct of you and your Black Panther brothers at the recently completed Black Spring Weekend

have shocked the Tougaloo College community into realizing the basic errors in the intimidation methods and nihilistic doctrines which you promote. Your immature actions of discharging firearms near the campus on Saturday afternoon, April 11, further alienated you and your "outsiders" from the spirit and tone in which all desired the BSW to take. Your recent involvement in various criminal activities in and near Tougaloo College as well as your irresponsibility in paying your school bills while at Tougaloo College further exemplify the inappropriateness of you, of all people, in any manner acting as a representative of blacks in Mississippi or anywhere for that matter. Your conduct and demeanor is representative of traits and habits we in our quest are trying to rise above.

Accordingly, it has been determined by solidly representative elements of the Tougaloo College Student Body that you are directed to remain away from this campus until such time as your conduct and general demeanor reach the desired level. This directive also applies to your bringing any of your unruly and undisciplined associates to the campus.

Should you feel that this is a hollow directive and not heed our diplomatic and well thought out warning we shall consider contacting local authorities regarding some of your activities or take other measures available to us which would have a more direct effect and which would not be as cordial as this note.

Tougaloo College Defense Committee[71]

The letter had an immediate impact. Kenyatta moved to Philadelphia very soon thereafter.

On May 24 a representative of the Episcopal church contacted the Jackson FBI field office. Rumors about Kenyatta's behavior had reached him; he was looking for updated information on Kenyatta and the Jackson Human Rights Project. The bureau, as might be imagined, was happy to oblige the church representative. The FBI referred him to several sources that, according to a May 27, 1969, Jackson field office memo, "were in possession of or contained derogatory information regarding Kenyatta to include arrests, affiliation with black extremist groups, and unfavorable publicity received from his attempted 'take-over' of church meetings and services in Pennsylvania and elsewhere."[72]

The church was not happy with what was found. In August 1969 the FBI field office announced to bureau headquarters that "funds previously approved for [the] Jackson Human Rights Project have been discontinued . . . due to the development of derogatory information regarding Mr. Kenyatta's activities."[73]

The FBI made a number of additional attempts to stop sources from funding targeted black nationalist organizations. The New York office learned from an undercover informant that the Student Non-violent Coordinating Committee was attempting to obtain about $35,000 in funds from the Episcopal church. The money would finance SNCC's planned "liberation school." The FBI used a series of well-placed anonymous derogatory letters alleging that SNCC was really planning to use the money for a "fraudulent scheme." The SNCC also anticipated funding from the Inter-religious Foundation for Community Organization to finance various social reform plans. Again the bureau took action. In this situation, an anonymous letter to the potential funding organization suggested that the funds would really be used by SNCC in an "illegal kickback scheme."[74]

In Pittsburgh a black nationalist group known as Unity, Incorporated, was working to obtain a $150,000 grant from the Mellon Foundation. Unity operated a black power center in Pittsburgh and planned, among other things, to build a target range in their headquarters basement. The FBI, alerted to this situation, developed a contact inside the Mellon organization. The bureau apprised the organization of the true nature of Unity, Incorporated. The funding was quickly blocked. A COINTELPRO memo dated August 28, 1968, from the Pittsburgh field office advised headquarters that "it can be stated with certainty that Unity, Inc. did not receive a grant from the Mellon Foundation because of this counterintelligence operation."[75]

In twenty-six separate COINTELPRO actions, the bureau made information "available to friendly media representatives for the purpose of using such material in a newspaper, magazine, or radio or television program to expose and make public the objectives and activities of the Black Panther Party"[76] and other black nationalist hate groups. In all cases, this information was supplied to the media on the basis that the source would never be revealed.

The bureau's use of news information, which was administered by the Crime Records Division, was handled in two different ways: first, by placing negative information or propaganda about the Panthers and

other black *organizations* with the news media and, second, by leaking derogatory information intended to discredit particular *individuals* within black organizations.

Internal memoranda that dealt specifically with using the media for COINTELPRO operations were labeled within the bureau as part of the Mass Media Program. The Crime Records Division disseminated media information at the request of the Domestic Intelligence Division.

In Tampa, information on an extremist group known as the Junta of Military Organizations was furnished to a friendly contact at a local television station. The local station manager, of course, had no idea that this particular black group was a COINTELPRO target. After the information had been used by the station, several special agents were invited to see a preview of the half-hour show. According to a Tampa field office memo dated February 7, 1969, the Tampa special agent-in-charge complimented the station manager on his work. The special agent also suggested that the program should be shown to civic groups in the area. A headquarters memo in early spring of that year congratulated the Tampa office on a job well done.

Miami television station WCKT-TV made several television documentaries based on information secretly supplied by the FBI, including one on black nationalist extremist groups in 1968. The thirty-minute program appeared on WCKT-TV on Sunday evening, July 7, 1968, at 6:30 P.M. The audience was estimated at 250,000 viewers. It was rated as one of the "week's best" by a local newspaper. J. Edgar Hoover narrated the end of the program.

A COINTELPRO memo from Hoover dated August 5, 1968, was sent to all COINTELPRO participating field offices. It praised the work of the Miami field office. "Miami has demonstrated," it said, "that a carefully planned television show can be extremely effective in showing these extremists for what they are." Hoover mentioned that "the interviewer of black nationalist leaders on the show had the leaders seated, ill at ease, in hard chairs. Full-length camera shots showed each movement as they squirmed about in their chairs, resembling rats trapped under scientific observation." The director concluded by strongly suggesting that "each office should be alert to the possibility of using this technique."[77]

In San Francisco, a special agent assigned to monitor the bank account of Eldridge Cleaver learned that Kathleen Cleaver withdrew $33,000 in cash in December 1968. The FBI quickly leaked this information to the local press, and it appeared in print almost immediately. To add additional weight to the story it was "backed up by a statement from the office of the U.S. attorney verifying the accuracy of the account." Kathleen Cleaver reacted strongly. She held a news conference on December 23, 1968, and "claimed that the story was an FBI plot to discredit her husband and the BPP."[78]

The damage, however, had already been done. Informants reported that publicity regarding the huge cash withdrawal was beginning to cause the Black Panther party considerable fund-raising difficulties.

In January 1970, apparently in an effort to duplicate the success of the Miami program, a memo was directed to nine selected field offices. Special agents were again instructed to contact any reliable connections in the television and/or radio field who might be interested in drawing up a program for local consumption, depicting the true facts regarding the BPP.[79]

In July 1970 a bureau-backed editorial appeared on television in the Los Angeles area. Other features soon followed. All were sharply critical of the Panthers and other black extremist groups.[80]

In February 1971 an article appeared in the *San Francisco Examiner* that was based on bureau-supplied information. It reported that the supreme commander of the Black Panther party, Huey Newton, was living in a lavish apartment overlooking Lake Merritt in Oakland under the assumed name of Don Penn. Copies of the article were forwarded to bureau offices and Panther chapters nationwide.[81]

The Memphis, Tennessee, field office also worked closely with local media. A 1970 field office memo told FBI headquarters that the "leaking of derogatory information regarding the Invaders [a Memphis-area black nationalist group] and their plans to a trusted newspaper source has resulted in almost daily articles exposing the activities of the militant group."[82]

The Memphis special agent-in-charge stated that, according to informants, the articles in the newspaper had disillusioned many in the Memphis black community. Interestingly, a number of Memphis merchants who had been extortion targets of the Invaders were now ready to come forward and testify. Indeed, a number of blacks said that they now wanted to work in cooperation with the Memphis Police Department.

Some COINTELPRO actions were developed specifically to prevent black extremist–group officials from speaking at public forums.

In Chicago the FBI, working through an undercover informant, learned that Chicago Black Panther leader Fred Hampton was scheduled to appear on a local talk show. The bureau knew that a warrant had been issued for Hampton in the Chicago area and it had not yet been served. A golden opportunity fell into the bureau's hands: Chicago police served Hampton's arrest warrant right in the television studio in front of about twenty-five fellow Panther members and studio personnel just before air time. In February 1969 bureau headquarters congratulated the Chicago field office for the timing of the arrest "under circumstances which proved highly embarrassing to the BPP."[83]

Another important disruption involved Panther official Bobby Seale. Seale had planned to make an extensive speaking tour on the West Coast to raise badly needed operating funds for the Panther organization. He arrived in Oregon in May 1969. On the eve of his first speech, the FBI anonymously telephoned Seale's mother and advised her that her son would not be safe. Mrs. Seale immediately telephoned Panther officials in Oakland, who took the matter very seriously. A portion of Seale's fund raising, including a major trip to Seattle, was cancelled. The San Francisco field office estimated that, as a result of the cancellations, the Panthers lost more than $1,700.

The bureau's overall program to neutralize black groups also included efforts to undermine groups and celebrities who supported them. Leonard Bernstein—for example—became a target, as did Jane Fonda. An FBI anonymous letter to Hollywood gossip columnist Army Archerd advised that Jane Fonda had appeared at a Panther fund-raising event. And in at least one instance, the bureau's efforts to neutralize a Panther supporter turned out tragically.

Jean Seberg, a white Hollywood actress, was probably at the peak of her acting career in 1970. She was also a supporter of the Black Panthers, and as such she became a COINTELPRO target.

In April 1970, Seberg was pregnant and married to the French author and diplomat Romain Gary. The bureau decided to neutralize her. An FBI memo written in the spring of 1970 stated, "Jean Seberg has been a financial supporter of the BPP and should be neutralized. Her current pregnancy by [name deleted] while still married affords an opportunity for such effort."[84]

As the result of an anonymous FBI news release to the *Los Angeles Times* gossip columnist Joyce Harber, a lengthy column appeared about

Seberg—referred to as "Miss A"—in which the suggestion was made that the father was a Black Panther.

The column closed by saying, "According to those really international sources Topic A is the baby Miss A is expecting and its father. Papa's said to be a rather prominent Black Panther."[85] The effect on the actress was traumatic. Seberg's husband reported that she immediately went into labor. The child, a girl, was delivered by emergency caesarean section and died three days later.

Gary reported that the emotional damage to Seberg was devastating. She attempted to commit suicide every year thereafter on the anniversary of the child's death. She succeeded on September 8, 1979. Fifteen months later Romain Gary, her former husband, also ended his own life.

Joyce Harber, the *Los Angeles Times* columnist who wrote the Jean Seberg story, has since left the *Times*. She recalls, "If I was used by the FBI, I didn't know it. To my knowledge, I didn't know anyone with the FBI then, and I don't now."[86]

Other tragedies resulted from the COINTELPRO.

In Chicago, as in almost all major cities with Panther chapters, bureau informants were placed in important positions.

In 1968 Chicago special agent Ray M. Mitchell recruited William O'Neal and several other blacks to infiltrate the local Panther chapter. O'Neal, a nineteen-year-old who was recruited while serving a jail term, remembers, "Mitchell asked me to join the Black Panther Party. He never used the word 'informant.' He always said, 'You are working for me.' "

O'Neal was well paid and was very successful. He quickly moved up the ranks to become chief of security and a personal bodyguard to Fred Hampton, vice-chairman of the Chicago chapter. O'Neal began his work as an undercover informant in 1968 and, by the fall of 1969, it was evident that the bureau's pressure was mounting.[87] Around this time, in fact, the Chicago police along with the bureau were watching the Panthers very closely. There were periodic confrontations and several raids on Panther facilities. On October 20, 1969, J. Edgar Hoover advised Attorney General John N. Mitchell of the results obtained from the FBI telephone surveillance then in operation at the Chicago office of the Panthers, located at 2350 West Madison Street.[88] The FBI learned for example that instructions and directions came from Panther headquarters in Berkeley, California. Information was also received concerning firefights between the Panthers and the Chicago police in July and Oc-

tober of 1969. The surveillance revealed that the Panthers planned to retaliate against the Chicago police for the October raid of the Panther office.

O'Neal later said, "Within the Panther organization, it was a given—that we would have wiretaps, that we would be followed, that we would be harassed."[89]

On November 13 there was a firefight between Chicago police and Panther Jake Winters. Two police officers were killed; shock waves went through the city.

O'Neal remembers, "The shoot-out on the South Side had pretty much laid the foundation within the party, within the Black Panthers. We knew the police would react in some type of way.... We knew something bad was going to happen."[90]

The FBI intensified its surveillance.

On November 19, O'Neal informed Special Agent Mitchell that the Panthers were stockpiling weapons at a first-floor apartment located at 2337 West Monroe. The inventory included carbines, shotguns, revolvers, smoke bombs, and more than 50,000 rounds of ammunition.

Four days later, on November 23, 1969, O'Neal advised that the Panthers somehow knew that Chicago Police Gang Intelligence Unit planned to raid the Panthers' weapons supply. The raid was canceled. The weapons were moved to another location.

On December 1, the bureau learned that the weapons had been moved back to the West Monroe location. O'Neal gave Mitchell a detailed inventory of the weapons, a floor plan of the West Monroe Street apartment showing where Panther Vice-chairman Hampton slept, and a list of all the Panthers who lived there. On December 2, Special Agent Mitchell gave this information to Assistant State Attorney Richard Jalovec and Cook County State Attorney Edward V. Hanrahan.

A raid was authorized. It was to be led by Police Sergeant Daniel Groth of the Chicago Police Department.

The police squad—nine white and five black officers—arrived at Panther headquarters at 4:45 A.M. on December 4. Ostensibly they were there to serve a warrant and conduct a search. What happened next has been the subject of much debate. Sergeant Groth has said that they were fired upon first and they returned the fire.[91]

Deborah Johnson, a twenty-one-year-old Panther at the time, remembers a night of complete terror. She recalls that a Panther came running into Hampton's bedroom screaming, "Chairman, Chairman, wake up, the pigs are back."[92] At that point there was a complete fire storm. Police

fired almost 100 rounds. Fred Hampton was hit twice in the head, once in the arm and shoulder. He died, as did his associate Mark Clark. Seven survived the raid. The Chicago chapter, for all practical purposes, had been destroyed.

On June 20, 1970, the Detroit field office, which had planted several informants in the local Panther chapter, was informed that the Panthers were planning to ambush several Detroit police officers on the city's east side. The FBI immediately notified the Detroit Police Department.

On June 27, informants further detailed the exact time and place of the ambush. The next day the attempted ambush and accompanying firefight did occur. The Panthers were surrounded and a total of eight were ultimately arrested; a huge arsenal of weapons and ammunition, together with fifty sticks of dynamite, was captured.

As with other COINTELPROs, the Black Nationalist Hate Group campaign came to a rather abrupt end, on April 28, 1971.

In total, bureau headquarters had received 540 COINTELPRO proposals from forty-one approved field offices. Of these, 302 actions were implemented, with known results obtained in seventy-six separate actions. The Black Panther party was the primary target.

The bureau had again used its extraordinary range of counterintelligence tools. The technique of sending anonymous or fictitious materials to members or groups to create discord and friction was used repeatedly with fatal consequences. A number of black extremists were killed in street violence as a direct result of bureau actions.

In twenty-six cases, public source material was made available to media contacts; one-seventh of the Black Hate COINTELPRO actions involved leaking nonpublic information to friendly media. Undercover extremist informants were used in almost all Black Nationalist actions. In seven cases, employers and creditors were advised of individual Black Panther party-member activity; in sixty-two cases, the bureau "notified persons or businesses with whom members had economic dealings of the member's association with the various groups involved for the purpose of adversely affecting their economic interests."[93] In thirty-six situations, the FBI attempted to use religious or civic leaders to disrupt Black Panther activities. In twelve COINTELPRO actions, family members or friends were advised of Panther activities.

In many areas, the Black Panthers and other black extremist groups were decimated. A number of individuals were killed. In a number of

situations, constitutional guarantees were clearly violated. William C. Sullivan—former assistant to the director—said, when referring to the COINTELPRO programs, "This is a rough, tough, dirty business, and dangerous."[94]

Indeed, how right he was.

NOTES

1. Theodore White, *The Making of the President 1968* (New York: Atheneum Publishers, 1969), pp. 25–27.
2. Ibid., pp. 23–30, 188–223.
3. Ibid., p. 200.
4. Senate Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities, "Intelligence Activities and the Rights of Americans," Book II, 94th Cong., 2d sess., 14 Apr. 1976, p. 61.
5. Senate Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities, "FBI Intelligence and the Black Community," Book II, 94th Cong., 2d sess., 14 Apr. 1976, pp. 475–91.
6. Ibid.
7. Kenneth O'Reilly, *Racial Matters: The FBI's Secret War on Black America, 1966–1972* (New York: Free Press, 1990), pp. 268–69.
8. Senate Select Committee, "Intelligence Activities and the Rights of Americans," Book II, p. 83.
9. Lyndon B. Johnson, *The Vantage Point: Prospectives of the Presidency, 1963–1969* (New York: Holt, Rinehart & Winston, 1971), pp. 167–68.
10. White, *Making of the President 1968*, pp. 23–30, 188–223.
11. The President's Address to the Nation on Civil Disorders, Public Papers of Presidents, Lyndon Baines Johnson Foundation, Austin, Texas, 27 July 1967, 2:721.
12. FBI Memorandum, Headquarters to Field Offices, 25 Aug. 1967.
13. Ibid.
14. Ibid.
15. Ibid.
16. Senate Select Committee, "Intelligence Activities and the Rights of Americans," Book II, p. 21.
17. O'Reilly, *Racial Matters*, p. 265.
18. Senate Select Committee, "Intelligence Activities and the Rights of Americans," Book II, p. 75.
19. Senate Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities, Book III, 94th Cong., 2d sess. 14 Apr. 1976, p. 493.
20. O'Reilly, *Racial Matters*, p. 269.
21. FBI Memorandum, Headquarters to Field Offices, 4 Mar. 1968.

22. FBI Memorandum, Headquarters to FBI Field Offices, 3 Apr. 1968.
23. Henry Hampton, Steve Fayer, and Sarah Flynn, *Voices of Freedom: An Oral History of the Civil Rights Movement from the 1950's through the 1980's* (New York: Bantam Books, 1989), p. 351.
24. Ibid., p. 353.
25. Ibid., p. 512.
26. Ibid., p. 513.
27. Ibid.
28. Hampton, Fayer, and Flynn, *Voices of Freedom*, p. 516.
29. FBI Memorandum, George C. Moore to W. C. Sullivan, 27 Sept. 1968.
30. FBI Memorandum, Headquarters to San Francisco Field Office, 27 May 1969.
31. O'Reilly, *Racial Matters*, p. 297.
32. FBI Memorandum, Headquarters to Field Offices, 4 Mar. 1968.
33. Robert Wall, "Special Agent for the FBI," *New York Times Book Review*, 27 Jan. 1972, pp. 16–17.
34. Ibid., p. 17.
35. Ibid., p. 18.
36. O'Reilly, *Racial Matters*, p. 305.
37. FBI Memorandum, San Diego Field Office to Headquarters, 25 September 1968.
38. FBI Memorandum, Los Angeles Field Office to Headquarters, 25 September 1968.
39. Ibid.
40. Ibid.
41. Ibid.
42. FBI Memorandum, George C. Moore to W. C. Sullivan, 5 Nov. 1968.
43. FBI Memorandum, Headquarters to Baltimore Field Office, 25 Nov. 1968.
44. FBI Memorandum, San Diego Field Office to Headquarters, 20 Feb. 1969.
45. FBI Memorandum, San Diego Field Office to Headquarters, 12 Mar. 1969.
46. FBI Memorandum, San Diego Field Office to Headquarters, 10 Apr. 1969.
47. Ibid.
48. Ibid.
49. FBI Memorandum, San Diego Field Office to Headquarters, 5 June 1969.
50. FBI Memorandum, San Diego Field Office to Headquarters, 13 June 1969.

51. FBI Memorandum, San Diego Field Office to Headquarters, 18 Sept. 1969.
52. O'Reilly, *Racial Matters*, p. 309.
53. Senate Select Committee, Book III, p. 40.
54. Ibid., p. 55.
55. Ibid., p. 53.
56. FBI Memorandum, Headquarters to Chicago Field Office, 8 Apr. 1969.
57. Senate Select Committee, Book III, pp. 517–18.
58. FBI Memorandum, San Francisco Field Office to Headquarters, 18 Jan. 1970.
59. FBI Memorandum, Headquarters to Boston, New York, Los Angeles, and San Francisco Field Offices, 28 Jan. 1971.
60. FBI Memorandum, Headquarters to Twenty-nine Field Offices, 2 Feb. 1971.
61. Senate Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities, "The FBI's Covert Action Program to Destroy the Black Panther Party," Book III, 94th Cong., 2d sess., 14 Apr. 1976, see Kathleen Cleaver Testimony, 8 Apr. 1976, at p. 34.
62. FBI Memorandum, Headquarters to San Francisco and Chicago Field Offices, 25 Mar. 1971.
63. Senate Select Committee, "FBI's Covert Action Program to Destroy Black Panther Party," Book III, p. 46.
64. FBI Memorandum, New York Field Office to Headquarters, 14 Feb. 1969; FBI Memorandum, Headquarters to New York Field Office, 10 Mar. 1969.
65. FBI Memorandum, Headquarters to Newark Field Office, 3 July 1969; FBI Memorandum, Headquarters to Newark Field Office, 14 July 1969.
66. FBI Memorandum, Charlotte Field Office to Headquarters, 23 Mar. 1971; FBI Memorandum, Headquarters to Charlotte Field Office, 31 Mar. 1971.
67. Senate Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities, "George C. Moore Testimony, 3 Nov. 1975," Book III, 94th Cong., 2d sess., 14 Apr. 1976, at p. 49.
68. FBI Memorandum, Jackson Field Office to Headquarters, 26 Feb. 1969.
69. Ibid.
70. FBI Memorandum, Jackson Field Office to Headquarters, 16 Apr. 1969.
71. FBI Memorandum, Jackson Field Office to Headquarters, 27 May 1969.
72. Ibid.

73. John M. Crewdson, "Black Pastor Got FBI Threat in '69," *New York Times*, 15 Feb. 1975, p. 1.
74. Senate Select Committee, "The FBI's Action Programs Against American Citizens," Book III, p. 56.
75. FBI Memorandum, Pittsburgh Field Office to Headquarters, 28 Aug. 1968.
76. House Committee on the Judiciary, Civil Rights and Constitutional Rights Subcommittee, *Hearings on FBI Counterintelligence Programs*, 93rd Cong., 2d sess., 20 Nov. 1974, Serial No. 55, p. 13.
77. FBI Memorandum, Headquarters to Field Offices, 5 Aug. 1968.
78. FBI Memorandum, San Francisco Field Office to Headquarters, 30 Dec. 1968.
79. FBI Memorandum, Headquarters to Selected Field Offices, 23 Jan. 1970.
80. FBI Memorandum, Los Angeles Field Office to Headquarters, 10 Sept. 1970.
81. FBI Memorandum, San Francisco Field Office to Headquarters, 12 Feb. 1971.
82. FBI Memorandum, Memphis Field Office to Headquarters, Mar. 1970.
83. FBI Memorandum, Headquarters to Chicago Field Office, 20 Feb. 1969.
84. FBI Memorandum, Headquarters to Los Angeles Field Office, May 1970; Joyce Harber, "Miss A Rates as Expectant Mother," *Los Angeles Times*, 19 May 1970, p. 11.
85. Harber, "Miss A Rates as Expectant Mother," p. 11.
86. Wendell Rawls, Jr., "FBI Admits Planting a Rumor to Discredit Jean Seberg in 1970," *New York Times*, 15 Sept. 1979, p. 1.
87. John Kifner, "Panther Chief of Security Was Paid FBI Informer," *New York Times*, 13 Feb. 1974, p. 18.
88. FBI Memorandum, J. Edgar Hoover for the Attorney General, 20 Oct. 1969.
89. Hampton, Fayer, and Flynn, *Voices of Freedom*, pp. 523–37.
90. Ibid.
91. Andrew M. Malcolm, "Chicago Witness Says Weapons Were Seized in Panther Raid," *New York Times*, 16 July 1972, p. 31.
92. "Survivor Recalls Raid on Panthers," *New York Times*, 23 July 1972.
93. House Civil Rights and Constitutional Rights Subcommittee, *Hearings on FBI Counterintelligence Programs*, p. 13.
94. Senate Select Committee, Book III, p. 7.