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Specifying Kidnapping for Ransom Epidemics at the Global Level: A Matched-Case Control Design

Stephen F. Pires, Rob T. Guerette, and Auzeen Shariati

Department of Criminal Justice, Florida International University, Miami, FL, USA

ARTICLE HISTORY Received 20 January 2016 Accepted 14 March 2016

ABSTRACT Criminal groups around the world frequently rely on kidnapping for ransom (K&R) to fund and further their cause. Some case studies suggest war torn, fragile, and corrupt countries experience K&R epidemics more often. While such factors may be present in some countries experiencing K&R epidemics, it remains to be seen if these failed state factors are generalizable to all nations. To date, no research has systematically examined the conditions that might facilitate K&R epidemics. This study used a case-control design comparing countries with high rates of K&R (experimental) to countries without a K&R problem (control). Findings suggest that problem K&R countries were less secure, less peaceful, and unevenly developed in relation to social and economic indicators. Better understanding of the conditions involving K&R problems offers to improve foresight and the development of effective policy responses.

Nasser al-Wuhayshi, an Al Qaeda leader in the Arabian Peninsula, wrote, “kidnapping hos- tages is an easy spoil, which I may describe as a profitable trade and a precious treasure.”1

This statement is supported by a recent New York Times analysis of kidnappings conducted by Al Qaeda and its affiliates that found at least $125 million has been garnered from hos- tage-taking since 2008.2 The Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) has followed suit and uses kidnappings for ransom to generate income for their terrorist activities.3 Kidnappings for ransom (K&R) is now one of the leading tactics used by “violent non-state actors”4 such as terrorists, guerrillas, and criminal gangs throughout the world.5 In some ways, the K&R phe- nomenon we see today can be attributed to the kidnapping industry that began in Colombia6

and Italy7 in the late 1960s and 1970s. The kidnapping industry involved repeated successful kidnappings that generated small and large ransoms for guerrilla groups in Colombia and for organized and common criminals in Italy and was quickly imitated by other individuals and groups globally. While most kidnappings go unreported,8 recent estimates for global kidnappings suggest between 25,000 and 100,000 kidnappings for ransom occur annually.9

The K&R phenomenon has metastasized well beyond the original sources of the kidnap- ping industry, yet it is highly concentrated in a few countries. Some case studies and anec- dotal evidence suggest that countries experiencing kidnapping epidemics are more likely to

CONTACT Stephen F. Pires [email protected] Department of Criminal Justice, Florida International University, 11200 SW 8th Street, PCA-368A Miami, FL 33199, USA.

Color versions of one or more figures in the article can be found online at www.tandfonline.com/uter. © 2017 Taylor & Francis Group, LLC

STUDIES IN CONFLICT & TERRORISM 2017, VOL. 40, NO. 2, 139–156 http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/1057610X.2016.1168656

be war-torn, corrupt, and fragile.10 These factors have often been attributed to the K&R epi- demic that took hold in Colombia between the late 1970s and the early 2000s.11 Yet Colom- bia’s fragility at that time was due to a complex set of factors that may not necessarily be present in other countries experiencing a similar epidemic. Indeed the term “fragile state,” also known as a failed state, is a broad term given to nations in which the government is no longer thought to be in control. Rather than classifying states as either fragile or secure, frag- ile states can be better understood on a scale, whereby a “fragility” assessment of a nation is based on a variety of social, economic, political, and security-based factors.12 If researchers only defined and understood K&R epidemics as problems of failed states, it would miss the broader continuum of conditions in which these illicit markets flourish. Moreover, while it may appear valid that K&R problems commonly exist within failed states, it is also evident there are many more failed states around the world which do not experience K&R problems. Considering this, a more precise understanding of the conditions that promote K&R markets is needed.

No study to date has systematically examined why particular countries experience kid- napping for ransom epidemics. To fill this void, the present study uses a matched case-con- trol design to compare countries with a high rate of kidnappings for ransom (experimental group) to countries without a kidnapping for ransom problem (control group). Using a wide variety of independent variables that include socioeconomic, security, and sociopolitical measures, this study identifies which “state fragility” factors may explain why some countries suffer from a kidnapping epidemic while others do not.

This study has a number of important contributions that add to the small but growing body of literature on kidnappings for ransom. First, systematically collecting data on multi- ple nations, as opposed to a case study approach on a single nation, allows for more general- izable conclusions on the conditions that might facilitate K&R epidemics. Second, this study improves our understanding of these significant factors by conducting a more finite exami- nation of measures related to the fragility of nation-states. Finally, this research offers to assist in identifying future hotspots where ransom kidnappings may proliferate. In doing so, local and/or international resources could be used to prevent the emergence of kidnapping epidemics within high-risk countries.

Background

Kidnapping refers to the unlawful taking and detention of an individual against their will, often with the threatened use of violence.13 Kidnappings come in many forms,14 but they can be categorized broadly under three main categories: ransom, political, and abductions.15

Abductions are absent of a political or economic motive,16 and are generally perpetrated against children and women.17 For the present study, we are interested in the broader cate- gories of kidnappings that include economic and political motives. Economic kidnappings have a primary motive of obtaining cash or assets in exchange for a person’s freedom while political kidnappings demand political concessions, such as a release of a prisoner.18 Going forward, we use the term K&R to encompass both economic and political.

K&R events can be recorded as a violent crime or a terrorist incident, depending on who the perpetrator of the crime is and their motives. Ordinary criminals lack any motives beyond the immediate economic benefit of ransoming individuals. For terrorists who perpe- trate K&R, the primary motive may be economic, but there are secondary benefits to their

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act that instills fear into the local, and more distant, population in order to achieve their larger objectives. This is particularly the case if they attract a large audience to their act, as was the case with Jamey Foley, an American journalist, who was beheaded on camera by ISIS.19 According to the Global Terrorism Database definition,20 such incidents can poten- tially be classified as terrorist events because they: (1) are intentional, (2) use or threaten to use violence, (3) are perpetrated by sub-national actors, (4) are “aimed at attaining a politi- cal, economic, religious, or social goal,”21 and (5) are intended to intimidate a larger audience.

The Business of Kidnapping

Previous to the 1980s, politically motivated K&R incidents were more common. Such incidents commonly occurred in Israel and nearby, and continue to this day, where Palesti- nian terrorist organizations, such as Hamas, kidnap Israeli soldiers in exchange for the release of Palestinian prisoners.22 At some point between the 1980s and the early 1990s, global K&R incidents were more likely to be an economic crime.23 In large part, this was a consequence of the success of Colombian illegally armed groups, such as the Fuerzas Arma- das Revolucionarias de Colombia (Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia—FARC) and the Ejercio Liberacion Nacional (National Liberation Army—ELN), in turning the tactic into a business model. Colombian guerrilla groups have been among the most successful in his- tory in creating a business out of K&R with estimates suggesting that such groups earned about $220 million annually from this tactic.24 K&R quickly spread to Colombia’s Latin America neighbors, making this part of the world one of the hotbeds for kidnapping.25

The view that K&R is a type of business has become a popular view.26 Frequently exchanging hostages for monetary gain as a primary motive can be viewed as a viable busi- ness model,27 albeit an illicit one. Although an assumption is made that any group that employs K&R more than once has made a business out of the tactic, an economic motive alone is not sufficient evidence to make such conclusions. Certainly there is a difference between common criminals who occasionally commit K&R and acquire only small ransoms and organized groups who continuously kidnap for large ransoms and may also have politi- cal motives.28 The latter groups are more likely to have made a business out of K&R because they frequently kidnap over long periods of time, are highly structured (i.e., where members have particular roles such as kidnappers, hostage watchers, negotiators, transporters), and can continuously launder ransom money.29

K&R is among many criminal activities utilized by groups to fund other activities, such as crime, insurgencies, or terrorism.30 Aside from K&R, guerilla groups and militias in Colom- bia committed extortion and were involved in drug cultivation, drug taxing, and drug traf- ficking to increase revenue for their causes.31 In some countries, namely Mexico, the Philippines, Iraq, and Trinidad & Tobago, K&R is utilized for purely economic reasons rather than for a particular social or political agenda.32 In other countries, K&R has second- ary benefits such as fueling terrorism and weakening the political stability of a state.

Among those groups that have been influenced by the potential for high ransoms are terrorist organizations, which have increasingly become involved in using K&R to generate income for their causes. The past decade has seen a rise in the number of kidnapping incidents by terrorist groups, and this rise is largely attributed to Islamic extremists.33 Some suggest this rise is due to the Global War on Terrorism since 9/11. From this perspective,

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the rise in terrorist-perpetrated kidnappings is a result of motivated offenders being in closer proximity to high value targets such as foreign soldiers and journalists from western nations. Further, kidnapping such individuals from foreign nations instills fear into the enemy and may cost governments a great deal of money to release their citizens from hostage situa- tions.34 In fact, a recent analysis has shown European governments have paid several million dollars per hostage to Islamic extremists in order to have their citizens released.35

It seems clear why kidnappings have become so popular in many parts of the world, as it frequently leads to quick cash, including, at times, very large ransoms. Groups of all types have tapped into K&R, but its increasing use by terrorist groups and insurgents is a worrying sign. What is not clear is why it happens in particular countries more often than others. The next section examines the literature on factors that could plausibly be related to explaining K&R epidemics.

Factors Related to Kidnapping for Ransom Epidemics

Case studies and anecdotal evidence suggest that certain national factors may facilitate, hinder, or promote crime problems such as K&R. The literature suggests failed states (also called “fragile states”), corruption, and economic conditions may be associated with K&R epidemics. Many suggest fragile states are more likely to experience K&R epidemics,36 par- ticularly as it’s discussed in the context of Colombia37 and Pakistan.38 Fragile states are unable to perform the most basic government functions such as governing, providing secu- rity, and offering public services.39 As a result, some suggest criminal and terrorist organiza- tions flourish in such environments, further decreasing the stability of a sovereign government.40 Nations such as Colombia, Afghanistan, and Iraq have long experienced insurgencies as a consequence of a weakened or failed state.41

Once criminal and terrorist organizations create crime epidemics in fragile states, the state has difficulty in combating internal threats and bringing about crime reductions. Domestic institutions (e.g., the criminal justice system) that would normally be able to counter such threats are ineffective and weakened.42 Additionally, the state’s difficulties in countering crime are partly due to under-reporting, which makes it even more difficult to apprehend and prosecute offenders responsible for crime epidemics.43 In Colombia, for example, an estimated 99 percent of kidnapping offenders were never apprehended during the 1990s,44 and in Mexico, low prosecution numbers have been found.45 Ultimately, the low-risk of apprehension and prosecution further encourages offenders to commit serious crime.

The low reporting rates of crime may reflect common citizens’ perceptions’ that the police and the government are corrupt or ineffective. Often, fragile states experience higher amounts of corruption.46 In such states, reporting a kidnapping is believed to be futile as the police will either refrain from investigating the crime or not prosecute cases against the accused. In Mexico, “widespread corruption allows kidnappers to either buy or intimidate their way out of prosecution.”47 For these reasons, nations with more corruption may be more likely to experience a K&R epidemic.

The majority of the literature perceives that fragile and corrupt states increase the likelihood of crime epidemics, but some suggest that economic conditions may also play a part. A recent Department of Defense white paper argued:

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Weak and unstable government institutions coupled with scarce legitimate economic opportu- nities, extreme socio�economic inequities, and permissive corrupt environments are key ena- blers that allow TCOs [transnational crime organizations] to operate with impunity. These same factors enable the emergence of violent extremist organizations.48

Poverty, or high inequality, may incentivize individuals to look for highly lucrative oppor- tunities in illicit activities. While the proposition is certainly plausible, the majority of empir- ical research suggests economic conditions do not relate to criminal activity levels.49 In fact, many studies find that crime increases as economies grow, not the other way around.50 Nev- ertheless, one recent study found terrorist groups are more likely to engage in K&R within countries that are less democratic and have worse economic conditions.51 While this study only focused on whether terrorists, and not organized crime or common criminals, are influ- enced by contextual factors, it suggests that external factors may influence decisions of offending groups.

Other contextual factors not discussed in the literature are overall violence and tourism. High violent crime rates, as measured by homicides, along with terrorism incidents can be proxy measures for overall violence within a nation. A reasonable postulate is that nations with high rates of certain violent activity may be more susceptible to having high rates of other violent activity such as K&R. While Colombia’s K&R epidemic was increasingly get- ting worse in the 1980s and 1990s, for example, the country was also experiencing epidemic homicide rates.52 Violent criminal activity may also be, partly, a reflection of police effective- ness. If law enforcement cannot tamper down the most serious crime, such as homicides and terrorism, it can do very little to prevent kidnappings. Nations experiencing such serious crimes at high levels will be at greater risk of experiencing high K&R rates because offenders are not deterred from committing such crimes.

Finally, nations experiencing more tourism, particularly from affluent nations, may be at greater risk of having a K&R problem. Although most kidnapped victims have been shown to be locals,53 foreign hostages can increase the ransom amount54 and are highly coveted in certain parts of the world. Islamic terrorist groups in the Middle East have largely generated ransom income from European hostages given their high value.55 The rise in “adventure tourism”56 may also be creating new opportunities for criminal groups by bringing foreign- ers to areas of countries that are less secure and may have more motivated K&R offenders nearby.

Research Design

The current study applies a matched case-control design to better understand why particular countries experience a high number of kidnappings for ransom while other similar countries do not.57 To identify problematic countries this study relies on a report from a worldwide study on the kidnapping epidemic problem published by IKV PAX Christi, an organization that works in 15 countries, including countries in Africa, Latin America, the Middle East, and Southeastern Europe for the establishment of peace and justice.58 That study obtained data from various sources such as national authorities, research institutions, and embassies resulting in a comprehensive report which identified countries that were highly affected by a kidnapping for ransom problem in the year 2006.

They identified 17 countries59 that were experiencing a serious K&R problem. These countries are the experimental group for this current study. We then matched each

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experimental country to one or more control countries that are very similar but have no kid- napping problem. Control countries were selected based on three criteria: � must not be experiencing a K&R problem according to the IKV PAX Christi Report; � bordering or within the same region as the experimental country; and � have a similar population density. Where possible, control nations were selected based on having a border with a

country that was experiencing a kidnapping problem. If no border country could be found, a control country was chosen from the same region with a similar population density. We chose up to three control nations (n D 35) for every experimental country (n D 17) to increase our sample size to 52 (see Appendix for matched countries). In some regions (i.e., South America), however, it was not possible to choose more than one control nation since most of these countries experienced a kidnapping epidemic problem (Figure 1).

Data and Variables

Data for independent variables (economic, sociopolitical, and security measures) of this study came from different sources. Several indices created by nongovernmental organiza- tions (NGOs) such as The Fund for Peace (FFP), Transparency International (TI), and Vision of Humanity, along with other public data available on the Web were utilized. Every attempt was made to collect independent variable data from 2006 in order to align with the K&R data in the IKV PAX Christi Report.60 However, this was not possible for our tourism index variable and several independent variables that were included from the FFP, which was collected from 2011.

The literature suggests states that are fragile, corrupt, impoverished, or highly economi- cally unequal are more likely to experience higher K&R rates. We also believe that the levels of tourism and violence may influence such an outcome. To test whether these concepts are in fact related to K&R, relevant independent variable data were collected and grouped under

Figure 1. Selected high K&R nations and control nations (2006).

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three broad categories: sociopolitical, socioeconomic, and security. Here, a detailed descrip- tion of these measures is presented:

Sociopolitical Measures Group Grievances. An indicator of the Fragile State Index (FSI) produced by FFP repre- sents the level of tension and conflict between social groups as well as the government’s inability in dealing with these problems. Several elements are considered to measure group grievances, such as ethnic violence, discrimination, and powerlessness. (Range is 0 to 10, with 10 suggesting the most social conflict.)

Human Rights and Rule of Law (FSI/FFP). This measures the extent to which human rights and legal rules are violated by the state. The existence of political prisoners, torture, execu- tion, human trafficking, and lack of civil liberties, press freedom, and political freedoms are the indicators by which this variable is gauged. (Range is 0 to 10, with 10 equaling the high- est violations of human rights and rule of law.)

State Legitimacy (FSI/FFP). State legitimacy is measured based on the level of representa- tiveness of government authorities. Several features such as political participation, democ- racy, and government effectiveness are used to assess the level of legitimacy of the states. Some other factors like corruption, drug trade, illicit economy, and power struggles are regarded as destructive features for state legitimacy. (Range is 0 to 10, with 10 equaling the highest illegitimacy.)

Global Peace Index (GPI). The GPI measures national peacefulness, which is developed by the Vision of Humanity, an initiative of the Institute for Economics and Peace (IEP). GPI evaluates the state of peace in 162 countries based on a wide range of quantitative and quali- tative indicators.61 It is a composite index that subsumes 23 indicators that, in turn, can be categorized in three groups of indices, including domestic and international conflict, societal safety and security, and militarization. So, every country gets a score for each of the above three sub-indices and then gets a rank among all 162 countries. Scores range from 1–162, with 162 meaning the lowest level of national peacefulness.

GPI (Domestic and International Conflict). This sub-index is of the GPI is calculated based on the intensity of internal conflicts, deaths of internal and external conflicts, and neighbor- ing countries relations. Scores range from 1–5, where 5 means higher level of internal and external conflict.

Socioeconomic Measures Poverty and Economic Decline (FSI/FFP). This variable is defined as unfavorable economic situations that weaken the ability of governments in providing the needs of citizens. Unem- ployment, government debt, Gross Domestic Product (GDP) per capita, GDP growth, infla- tion, and purchasing power are the indicators which are taken into account to measure this variable. (Range is 0 to 10, with 10 suggesting the most poverty and economic decline.)

Uneven Economic Development (FSI/FFP). This variable refers to the situation in which governments are inconsistent in the fulfillment of their social and economic obligations. The

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following factors are considered for measuring this variable: GINI coefficient, income share of highest 10 percent, income share of lowest 10 percent, urban–rural service distribution, access to improved services, and slum population. (Range is 0 to 10, with 10 equaling the highest level of uneven economic development.)

GDP Per Capita. The GDP refers to the monetary value of all goods and services produced in a given country during a specific time period, usually a year. GDP Per Capita data for this study was obtained from the National Accounts Main Aggregates Database, which reports on more than 200 countries around the world.62 This database is produced by the Economic Statistics Branch of the United Nations Statistics Division with the cooperation of interna- tional statistical agencies and the national statistical services of these countries.

Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI). CPI measures corruption in the public sectors of 163 countries and ranks them based on the extent of corruption in their governments.63 It is a composite index produced by TI using a variety of databases such as polls and corruption- related data collected by reputable institutions. (Range is 0 to 10, with 10 equaling low or non-existent corruption.)

Travel & Tourism Competitiveness Index (TTCI). This is a composite index that measures the level of attractiveness of countries for tourists and travelers. TTCI is produced by the World Economic Forum (WEF), which ranks 139 countries based on a wide range of indica- tors.64 It is composed of three sub-indices; (1) the T&T regulatory framework sub-index; (2) the T&T business environment and infrastructure sub-index; and (3) the T&T human, cul- tural, and natural resources sub-index. It ranges from 1 (minimum attractiveness) to 6 (max- imum attractiveness).

Security Measures Security Apparatus (FSI/FFP). This variable indicates how much governments are able to exert exclusive power over their countries. On the condition that several competing groups rather than only one powerful government seek control over the country the government will be weakened. To measure this variable a number of factors are accounted for, including internal conflict, small arms proliferation, riots and protests, fatalities from conflict, military coups, rebel activity, militancy, bombings, and political prisoners. (Range is 0 to 10, with 10 equaling the weakest security apparatus.)

Murder Rate. Murder rate is calculated by dividing a country’s population by 100,000 and then dividing the number of homicides by the resulting figure. These data are obtained from Nation Master Website,65 which compiles crime data from different sources and reports them at the national level.

Global Terrorism Index (GTI). According to The Vision of Humanity, the definition of ter- rorism used by the GTI is: “the threatened or actual use of illegal force and violence by a non-state actor to attain a political, economic, religious or social goal through fear, coercion, or intimidation.”66 The GTI is produced by IEP and provides a ranking of 162 countries with 99.6 percent of the world’s population, based on the effects of terrorist activities and the economic and social dimensions related to terrorism. The number of terrorist incidents,

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fatalities, injuries, and property damage constitute the indicators used for this evaluation. This variable ranges from 0–10, with 10 equaling the greatest impact of terrorism.

GPI (Society & Security). This sub-index of the GPI is measured based on a variety of fac- tors such as perception of criminality, violent crime, incarceration, and security officers and police. Scores range from 1–5, where 5 suggest less safe and secure nations.

GPI (Militarization). This is the third sub-index of GPI indicators that is measured based on military expenditure, armed services personnel, and nuclear and heavy weapons. This is also ranged from 1–5 with higher score meaning higher level of militarization.

Analytical Approach

Employing a Kolmogorov-Smirnov and Shapiro-Wilk test revealed that five variables (Group Grievances, Poverty and Decline, Human Rights and Rule of Law, GPI Society & Security, and Global Peace Index) were normally distributed. Thus, t-tests were used to examine the differences between 17 K&R nations and 35 Control nations for these variables. However, the remaining variables (Security Apparatus, Uneven Economic Development, Legitimacy of the State, GDP, Murder Rate, Corruption Perceptions Index, GPI Domestic & Intl Conflict, GPI Militarization, Tourism Index, and Terrorism Index) were not normally distributed. For these variables, a Mann-Whitney test was conducted to statistically test the differences between the two groups of nations. We chose to compare means/medians of the two groups (Mann-Whitney and t-test) as they were the only statistical tests appropriate given the data.

Results

The comparative results from the analysis, illustrated in Table 1, indicate that the differences between the two groups of nations were significant in the expected direction for the variables GPI (aggregate score), GPI (Society & Security), Security Apparatus, Uneven Development, and Global Terrorism Index.

T-Test Results

In terms of GPI (aggregate score), which measures national peacefulness, K&R epidemic countries had a weaker status (M D 120.4, SE D 7.92) compared to non-problematic nations (M D 85.9, SE D 7.33) implying that K&R countries experienced higher levels of domestic and international conflict, societal security problems, and militarization. This difference was significant t (44) D ¡3.036, p > .05; however, it did represent a small-sized effect (r D 0.41).

K&R nations on average had a less favorable GPI (Society & Security) score (M D 3, SE D 0.127) compared to control nations (M D 2.4, SE D 0.067) suggesting that kidnapping for ransom countries had a lower state of safety and security. This difference was significant t (44) D ¡4.805, p > .001; representing a medium-sized effect (r D 0.58).

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Mann-Whitney Test Results

Uneven economic development had a median of 8.4 for kidnapping epidemic nations; however, countries without a K&R problem showed a median of 7.4. This difference reflects the failure of K&R countries’ governments in providing equal social and eco- nomic opportunities (U D 176.5, Z D ¡2.132, p < .01, r D ¡0.3). Security apparatus showed a median of 7.6 for K&R epidemic nations while this number for control coun- tries was 6.2 suggesting that kidnapping epidemic nations tend to have weaker govern- ments which lack exclusive power over their territory (U D 177.5, Z D ¡2.111, p < .01, r D ¡0.29). Finally, problematic countries had a median GTI of 2.5, yet this number for control nations was equal to 0.5 implying that the issue of terrorism is five times more serious in K&R nations compared to control countries (U D 131.5, Z D ¡2.745, p < .05, r D ¡0.4).

The remaining measures, which include Group Grievances, Human Rights and Rule of Law, Poverty and Decline, State Legitimacy, GPI Domestic & Intl Conflict, GDP, Corrup- tion, Tourism Index, Murder Rate, were not significant.

Correlations and Boxplots

To further test these differences between the two samples of countries on the collected variables, correlations were run to determine any significant relationships. As reported in Table 2, the same variables found significantly different in the means tests were also significantly correlated. Pearson correlations revealed moderate positive relationships between the GPI Society & Security and GPI aggregate measures with countries identi- fied as experiencing high K&R problems. Spearman correlations identified slight to moderate positive relationships between the security apparatus measure, uneven devel- opment, and the GTI measure with K&R inflicted countries.

Table 1. Comparing nations with a high K&R occurrence to control nations.

K&R nations (N D 17)

Control nations (N D 35)

Independent variables Mean Mean Sig.

Group grievances (2011) Sociopolitical 7.4 6.5 Human rights and rule of law (2011) Sociopolitical 6.6 6.5 Global Peace Index (GPI) (aggregate score) Sociopolitical 120.4 85.9 ��

Poverty and decline (2011) Economic 6.0 6.2 GPI society & security Security 3.0 2.4 ���

Median Median State legitimacy (2011) Political 7.5 6.6 GPI domestic & intl conflict Political 1.8 1.8 Unevend (2011) Economic 8.4 7.4 �

GDP Economic 3337.4 3406.5 Corruption Socioeconomic 2.75 3.0 Tourism Index (2013) Socioeconomic 3.9 3.5 Security apparatus (2011) Security 7.6 6.2 �

Murder rate Security 13.5 8.0 Global Terrorism Index (GTI) Security 2.5 0.5 ��

GPI militarization Security 1.8 1.7

�p < .05 ��p < .01 ���p < .001

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Box plots further illustrate the differences revealed in the means tests and are presented in Figures 2 to 4. For these, the dark horizontal line in the middle of the distributions represents the median and the upper and lower horizontal lines represent the range of the distribution. Each segment either between the boundary range lines and the beginning of the box or from the box line to the median, represents one quartile. The longer and more stretched out those quartiles the more spread out the distribution of countries in terms of how they fall on that measurement spectrum. The tighter, more condensed the box lines are, the more closely dis- tributed the scores. In each of these figures the distribution of scores on each of these meas- ures for high kidnapping countries are noticeably higher than for those of low kidnapping (control) countries. Figure 2 presents the distributions comparing the significant sociopoliti- cal related indicators of high to low kidnapping problem countries. Note that for both of

Figure 2. Significant sociopolitical-related indicators of high kidnapping problems.

Table 2. Correlations of potential K&R indicators.

Independent variables # of cases Pearson correlation

Group grievances 50 0.24 Poverty and decline 50 ¡0.01 Human rights and rule of law 50 0.03 Global Peace Index (society and security) 46 0.58��

Global Peace Index (aggregate score) 46 0.41��

Security apparatus 50 0.30�

Independent variables # of cases Spearman correlation

Uneven development 50 0.30�

Legitimacy of the state 50 0.09 GDP 51 0.02 Murder rate 37 0.11 Corruption 49 –0.21 GPI domestic & intl (2006) 46 0.14 GPI militarization (2006) 52 0.23 Tourism Index (2013) 52 0.05 Global Terrorism Index (2006) 47 0.40��

�p < .05 ��p < .01

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these GPI measures, 75 percent of the high kidnapping countries fell above the median of the low kidnapping country distribution.

Figure 3 presents the distributions of the economic related indicator of uneven develop- ment for high and low kidnapping countries. Here again more than 75 percent of those countries experiencing a high kidnapping problem scored above the median on the measure- ment for uneven economic development compared to the control group of low kidnapping countries. Not only was the distribution for high kidnapping countries much higher, but it was also more tightly distributed on the upper end of the scoring spectrum. The distribution among the control sample was much more dispersed.

Figure 4 presents the distributions of the security related indicators for the comparative samples. The first security apparatus measure is very similar to Figure 3 in that the sample of high kidnapping countries exhibited a smaller distribution at the upper most and of that

Figure 3. Significant economic related indicators of high kidnapping problems.

Figure 4. Significant security related indicators of high kidnapping problems.

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measures range. The terrorism index measure on the right side of Figure 4 was much more dispersed for high kidnapping countries yet still well above the median of the control sample.

Discussion and Conclusion

This study used a case-control design that compared countries with a high rate of kidnap- pings for ransom (experimental group) to countries without a kidnapping for ransom prob- lem (control group). Using a wide variety of independent variables including socioeconomic, sociopolitical, and security measures, it was found that countries experienc- ing a kidnapping for ransom epidemic tended to be less secure, less peaceful, and unevenly developed in relation to social and economic indicators. Three of the five variables that were significantly related were “security-based” measures (GPI Society & Security, FFP Security Apparatus, GTI Terrorism Index). One was an indicator of sociopolitical factors (GPI aggre- gate) and one was a measure of economics (FFP uneven economic development).

While scholars and practitioners have often claimed that K&R industries typically flourish in failed and weak states thus far there has been no systematic empirical examination to test this. While the findings here generally support those claims, more precise understanding of the factors that seem to correlate with kidnapping and ransom epidemics such as that carried out here is important. This is partly because there are several weak and underdeveloped countries around the world that do not have kidnapping problems, at least not to the extent that one would expect if failed and weak governance where the only forces at play. In 2006 for instance, of the top twenty nations around the world listed as fragile, just four (Nigeria, Iraq, Colombia, and Haiti) were noted by IKV Pax Christi as having a high rate of kidnap- ping. Thus, the large majority (80 percent) of fragile states did not experience kidnapping problems. If the failed state was the primary reason for the existence of K&R problems, then it would be expected to occur in more than just 20 percent of those countries. This on its own suggests the need for better understanding. With more precise empirical indicators gov- ernment and industry professionals can better gauge potential or emerging kidnapping and ransom hotspots around the globe. By doing so, local and/or international resources could be used to prevent the emergence of kidnapping epidemics within high-risk countries. At the very least it could be used as an alert system to forewarn individuals, businesses, and organizations with some interest or planned activities in those countries.

This study also has implications within the broader debate of whether organized crime groups and terrorist organizations proliferate more in under developed areas of the world, since most kidnapping and ransom epidemics tend to be carried out by those same groups. While conventional thinking has been that they do, others have raised credible claims that organized crime and terrorist groups operate just as readily within developed and secure nations.67 The findings here seem to suggest that kidnapping and ransom problems do have some relationship with uneven developed and less secure nation states, but there also appears to be other factors responsible. Yet, it is possible that both claims are valid. What likely differs is the opportunity structures that determine and allow certain types of crime behavior to be carried out by the organized crime and terrorist groups. Thus, crime and ter- rorist organizations might be equally present in developed and under developed nations, but the types of criminal activities they partake in will likely be different. For instance, money laundering may be much more prevalent in developed countries where financial infrastruc- tures are plentiful, whereas overt and systematic acts of violence (kidnappings among them)

STUDIES IN CONFLICT & TERRORISM 151

may be more common within less secure and underdeveloped nations where rule of law is weak.

While this study offers an important step forward in understanding the occurrence of kid- napping and ransom epidemics it does nonetheless have limits. As previously mentioned, we attempted to collect independent variable data from 2006 to coincide with our dependent variable data, but it was not possible for all measures. The FFP data was collected from 2011 (two were significantly related) and the tourism variable was collected from 2013 (not signif- icantly related). As much of the data was drawn from the year 2006 over a decade ago it is likely that things have changed and of course more up-to-date data would be more desirable. Yet, this is probably of less concern as the variables that correlate at any given point in time are likely to continue to be influential and related to K&R problems across time. There is also some plausible question as to the reliability of the measurements relied on, yet they were systematically collected and are the best available. While the precision of these meas- urements may be wanting, what can be more readily defended is the specification of the countries that appear to experience a disproportionate share of K&R in the world and the countries that do not experience K&R very often.

Nonetheless, the development of quantifiable indicators such as those analyzed here con- tinues to offer a basis for better decision making at the global or transnational level in terms of foreseeing, managing and addressing kidnapping problems. Previous understanding was limited to blanket assertions pointing to the culpability of weak and failed states. Using those vague criteria alone (i.e. without empirical determinants) would lead to more false predic- tions than accurate ones regarding countries “at risk” for kidnapping and ransom problems. The analysis conducted here establishes a more precise understanding of kidnapping and ransom epidemics globally. Doing so ultimately improves our capacity to reduce the poten- tial for kidnapping victimization and to save human lives.

Notes

1. Rukmini Callimachi, “Paying Ransoms, Europe Bankrolls Qaeda Terror,” The New York Times 29 (2014). Available at http://www.nytimes.com/2014/07/30/world/africa/ransoming-citizens-europe- becomes-al-qaedas-patron.html?_rD0 (accessed 1 September 2015).

2. Ibid. 3. CBS News. “‘Multiple Kidnappings for Ransom” Funding ISIS, Source says,’” CBS (August 2014).

Available at http://www.cbsnews.com/news/multiple-kidnappings-for-ransom-funding-isis-source- says/

4. Troy S. Thomas, Stephen D. Kiser, and William D. Casebeer, Warlords Rising: Confronting Vio- lent Non-State Actors (Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2005).

5. Everard Phillips, “The Business of Kidnap for Ransom,” The Faces of Terrorism: Multidisciplinary Perspectives (West Sussex, UK: Wiley-Blackwell, 2009), pp. 189–207.

6. M. Moor and S. Remijnse, “Kidnapping is a Booming Business,” IKV PAX Christi (2008); Richard Clutterbuck, Kidnap and Ransom: The Response (London: Faber, 1978); Christopher H. Stubbert, Stephen F. Pires, and Rob T. Guerette, “Crime Science and Crime Epidemics in Developing Countries: A Reflection on Kidnapping for Ransom in Colombia, South America,” Crime Science 4(1) (2015), pp. 1–11.

7. Pietro Marongiu and Ronald V. Clarke, “Ransom Kidnapping in Sardinia, Subcultural Theory and Rational Choice,” in Ronald V. Clarke and Marcus Felson, Routine Activity and Rational Choice: Advances in Criminological Theory (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers, 1993), pp. 179–200; Richard P. Wright, Kidnap for Ransom: Resolving the Unthinkable (Boca Raton, FL: CRC Press, 2009).

8. Phillips, “The Business of Kidnap for Ransom.”

152 S. F. PIRES ET AL.

9. Moor and Remijnse, “Kidnapping is a Booming Business.” 10. Rachel Briggs, The Kidnapping Business (London: Foreign Policy Centre, 2001); Moor and

Remijnse, “Kidnapping is a Booming Business” Phillips, “The Business of Kidnap for Ransom.” 11. James J. F. Forest, “Kidnapping by Terrorist Groups, 1970–2010: Is Ideological Orientation Rele-

vant?’ Crime & Delinquency 58(5) (2012), pp. 769–797; Stephen F. Pires, Rob T. Guerette, and Christopher H. Stubbert, “The Crime Triangle of Kidnapping for ransom Incidents in Colombia, South America: A ‘Litmus’ Test for Situational Crime Prevention,” British Journal of Criminology 54(5) (2014), pp. 784–808.

12. Fund for Peace (FFP). The Fragile States Index. (March 2016). Available at http://fsi.fundfor peace.org/indicators

13. Marongiu and Clarke, “Ransom Kidnapping in Sardinia, Subcultural Theory and Rational Choice.” 14. Mohd Kassim Noor�Mohamed, “The Definitional Ambiguities of Kidnapping and Abduction,

and its Categorisation: The Case for a More Inclusive Typology,” The Howard Journal of Criminal Justice 53(1) (2014), pp. 83–100.

15. Robyn Pharoah, “An Unknown Quantity: Kidnapping for Ransom in South Africa,” SA Crime Quarterly 14 (2005).

16. Noor�Mohamed, “The Definitional Ambiguities of Kidnapping and Abduction, and its Categorisation.” 17. Department of Justice Canada, Kidnapping, Trafficking in Persons, Hostage Taking and Abduc-

tion (2006). Available at http://laws.justice.gc.ca/en/C-46/280786.html (accessed 20 December 2008); E. A. Martin, ed., Oxford Dictionary of Law, 4th ed. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997).

18. Briggs, The Kidnapping Business. 19. Rukmini Callimachi, “The Horror before the Beheadings,” New York Times (2014), pp. 14–15. 20. Global Terrorism Database, “Codebook: Inclusion Criteria and Variables’ (2015). Available at

http://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/downloads/Codebook.pdf 21. Ibid., p. 9. 22. Forest, “Kidnapping by Terrorist Groups, 1970–2010.” 23. Moor and Remijnse, “Kidnapping is a Booming Business.” 24. A. J. Riascos and J. F. Vargas, “Violence and Growth in Colombia: A Brief Review of the Litera-

ture” (2006, January). Available at www.webpondo.org (accessed 27 June 2007). 25. Moor and Remijnse, “Kidnapping is a Booming Business.” 26. Briggs, The Kidnapping Business; David Canter, ed., “The Business of Kidnap for Ransom,” in

David Canter, ed., The Faces of Terrorism: Multidisciplinary Perspectives (Oxford, UK: Wiley- Blackwell, 2009), pp. 189–207; Moor and Remijnse, “Kidnapping is a Booming Business”; Rodan- thi Tzanelli, “Capitalizing on Value: Towards a Sociological Understanding of Kidnapping,” Soci- ology 40(5) (2006), pp. 929–947.

27. Phillips, “The Business of Kidnap for Ransom.” 28. Ibid. 29. Ibid.; Alex P. Schmid, “The Links between Transnational Organized Crime and Terrorist

Crimes,” Transnational Organized Crime 2(4) (1996), pp. 40–82; P. Williams, “Transnational Criminal Networks.” in J. Arquilla and D. Ronfeldt, eds., Networks and Netwars (Santa Monica: RAND Corporation, 2001), pp. 61–97.

30. J. McFarlane, “Organised Crime and Terrorism in the Asia-Pacific Region: The Reality and Response.” Transnational Organised Crime, Terrorism and Transnational Relations, European Consortium for Political Research, 2nd General Conference (18–12 September 2003); R. Thomas Naylor, “The Insurgent Economy: Black Market Operations of Guerrilla Organizations,” Crime, Law and Social Change 20(1) (1993), pp. 13–51; Marianne Moor, Liduine Zumpolle, and Afdeling Nederland Pax Christi International, The Kidnap Industry in Colombia: Our Business? (Utrecht: Pax Christi Netherlands, 2001).

31. START. National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (2015). Available at http://www.start.umd.edu/tops/terrorist_organization_profile.asp?id=218

32. Phillips, “The Business of Kidnap for Ransom.” 33. Forest, “Kidnapping by Terrorist Groups, 1970–2010

STUDIES IN CONFLICT & TERRORISM 153

34. Yun, Minwoo. “Implications of Global Terrorist Hostage-taking and Kidnapping,” The Korean Journal of Defense Analysis 19(2) (2007), pp. 135–165.

35. Callimachi, “Paying Ransoms, Europe Bankrolls Qaeda Terror.” 36. Briggs, The Kidnapping Business; Moor and Remijnse, “Kidnapping is a Booming Business’; Phil-

lips, “The Business of Kidnap for Ransom.” 37. Mauricio Rubio, Del rapto a la pesca milagrosa. Breve historia del secuestro en Colombia (Bogot�a:

Universidad de los Andes, Facultad de Economia, 2005); David J. Topel, “Hostage Negotiation in Columbia and the FARC: Deconstructing the Problem,” Iberoamerica Global 2(1) (2009), pp. 24– 38.

38. Khan, A. N., and A. I. Sajid. “Kidnapping in the North West Frontier Province (NWFP),” Paki- stan Journal of Criminology 2(1) (2010).

39. Fund for Peace. Fragile State Index (2006). Available at http://fsi.fundforpeace.org/indicators 40. Hriar Cabayan, “Executive Summary,” in Ben Riley and Kathleen Kiernan, eds., The “New” Face

of Transnational Crime Organizations (TCOs): A Geopolitical Perspective and Implications for U.S. National Security (Alexandria, VA: Kiernan Group Holdings, May 2013), p. 5; Scott Helfstein and John Solomon, Risky Business: The Global Threat Network and the Politics of Contraband (West Point, NY: Combating Terrorism Center, 2014); Stewart Patrick, “‘Failed’ States and Global Security: Empirical Questions and Policy Dilemmas,” International Studies Review 9(4) (2007), pp. 644–662; Hung-En Sung, “State Failure, Economic Failure, and Predatory Organized Crime: A Comparative Analysis,” Journal of Research in Crime and Delinquency 41(2) (2004), pp. 111– 129.

41. Phillips, “The Business of Kidnap for Ransom.” 42. Helfstein and Solomon, Risky Business. 43. Elvira Maria Restrepo, Fabio S�anchez, and Mariana Mart�ınez Cu�ellar, “Impunity or Punishment?

An Analysis of Criminal Investigation into Kidnapping, Terrorism and Embezzlement in Colom- bia,” Global Crime 7(2) (2006), pp. 176–199; Briggs, The Kidnapping Business.

44. Sheri Merkling and Elaine Davis, “Kidnap & Ransom Insurance: A Rapidly Growing Benefit,” Compensation & Benefits Review 33(6) (2001), pp. 40–45.

45. Briggs, The Kidnapping Business 46. Ibid. 47. Ibid., p. 16. 48. Cabayan, “Executive Summary,” 49. Kristin M. Finklea, “Economic Downturns and Crime,” Congressional Research Service, Library

of Congress, 2011. Available at www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R40726.pdf 50. Francois Bourguignon, “Crime, Violence and Inequitable Development,” in Annual World Bank

Conference on Development Economics 1999, pp. 199–220 (Washington, D.C.: The World Bank, 2000); Marcus Felson and Rachel L. Boba, eds., Crime and Everyday Life (Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage, 2009).

51. This was only significant as a 1-tailed test; Forest, “Kidnapping by Terrorist Groups, 1970–2010.” 52. Douglas Porch and Mar�ıa Jos�e Rasmussen, “Demobilization of Paramilitaries in Colombia:

Transformation or Transition?,” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 31(6) (2008), pp. 520–540. 53. Briggs, The Kidnapping Business; Pires, Guerette, and Stubbert, “The Crime Triangle of Kidnap-

ping for Ransom Incidents in Colombia, South America.” 54. Briggs, The Kidnapping Business. 55. Callimachi, “Paying Ransoms, Europe Bankrolls Qaeda Terror.” 56. Briggs, The Kidnapping Business. 57. Two alternative sources of K&R data exist, but were found to be unreliable (see United Nations

dataset on crime) or solely focused on political kidnappings (Global Terrorism Database, “Code- book”). Regarding the first dataset, the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) reports on crime and criminal justice operations at a global level annually. However, these data were found to be unreliable because several countries that are known for having serious kidnap- ping problem were shown as experiencing no such problem by the UNODC. This issue was detected in fragile states such as Iraq, Somalia, and Afghanistan for which no reliable K&R data

154 S. F. PIRES ET AL.

are available. This was also the case for countries such as China, Colombia, and Mexico, where the governments are unwilling to reveal their actual kidnapping statistics to the public.

58. Moor and Remijnse, “Kidnapping is a Booming Business.” 59. The Chechen Republic, which is recognized as a federal subject of Russia, is reported to have a

K&R problem by Moor and Remijnse, “Kidnapping is a Booming Business,” but it was excluded from our sample because no other data were available for this region.

60. Moor and Remijnse, “Kidnapping is a Booming Business.” 61. Vision of Humanity (2006). Global Peace Index (GPI). Available at http://www.visionofhumanity.

org/#/page/indexes/global-peace-index 62. National Accounts Main Aggregates Database (GDP, 2006). Available at http://unstats.un.org/

unsd/snaama/dnllist.asp 63. Transparency International. Corruption Perception Index (CPI, 2006). Available at http://www.

transparency.org/research/cpi/cpi_2006/0/ 64. World Economic Forum. Travel and Tourism Competitiveness Index (2015). Available at http://

www.weforum.org/reports/travel-tourism-competitiveness-report-2013 65. Nation Master. Murder rates. Available at http://www.nationmaster.com/country-info/stats/

Crime/Murder-rate (accessed 1 September 2015). 66. Vision of Humanity (2006). Global Terrorism Index (GTI). Available at http://www.visionofhu

manity.org/#page/indexes/terrorism-index/2006 67. Hehir, Aidan, “The Myth of the Failed State and the War on Terror: A Challenge to the Conven-

tional Wisdom,” Journal of Intervention and Statebuilding 1(3) (2007), pp. 307–332; Edward Newman. Ibid.; Stewart Patrick, Stewart. Ibid, 2006.

STUDIES IN CONFLICT & TERRORISM 155

Appendix. K&R epidemic nations (n D 17) and control nations (n D 35). K&R nations Region Control nations

Afghanistan Central Asia Tajikistan Turkmenistan Uzbekistan

Iraq Middle east Saudi Arabia Turkey Jordan

Bangladesh South Asia Bhutan Myanmar Nepal

India South Asia China Pakistan South Asia Kazakhstan

Iran Kyrgyzstan

Argentina South America Uruguay Brazil South America Paraguay Colombia South America Bolivia

Panama Ecuador South America Suriname Peru South America Chile Trinidad & Tobago South America Grenada

Barbados St. Vincent & the Grenadines

Venezuela South America Guyana French Guinea

Guatemala Central America Belize Costa Rica El Salvador

Mexico North America USA Haiti Caribbean Dominican Republic Nigeria West Africa Niger

Cameroon Chad

South Africa Southern Africa Namibia Botswana Zimbabwe

156 S. F. PIRES ET AL.

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