<<Sovereignty and Authenticity : Manchukuo and the East Asia Modern>> Book Review

Manchukuo: A Historical Overview ..---.. 49

Railroad Company in 1 920 alone was 440 million yen. By 1 932, Japan's share of the total industrial capital in Manchuria was 64 percent, while China's share was 28 percent.29

The incorporation of Manchuria into the Chinese nation during a period of high imperialism presented considerable problems. While its demographic Sinicization should have made the political claim of Chinese nationhood easy, it was precisely the historical image of Manchuria as a frontier, a virgin land of "primitive" and martial peoples unrelated to the Chinese, that was to undergird imperialist­ especially, but not only, Japanese--claims to the area. Thus Manchuria became a contested borderland where China, Russia, and Japan were the main competitors, though at another historical moment the Koreans and the Mongols could have been included as well. The notion of a borderland has been introduced by American his­ torians Jeremy Adelman and Stephen Aaron to distinguish this political condition from both the premodern imperial frontier and the boundaries of the modern terri­ torial nation-state. 3D The borderland is a kind of a liminal and indeterminate histori­ cal space often characterized by warfare, but also by opportunities for local elites who are able to play off one outside power against another.

To be sure, Manchuria does not fit with this scheme in all respects, but it allows us to comprehend the rise of the illiterate soldier-bandit Zhang Zuolin-as well as almost every other warlord leader in Manchuria-to governor of Fengtian province (now Liaoning) and supreme warlord in all Manchuria. Zhang assisted the Qing government against the Russians in the aftermath of the Boxer uprising. But whereas other bandit leaders supported the Japanese in the Russo-Japanese War, he sup­ ported the Russians. Nonetheless, he was able to convince the Japanese of his useful­ ness to them. It is possible that he played a double game; but despite many frustrations on both sides, the Japanese backed him all the way until 1 928, when they finally murdered him.3J

There are two paradoxically contrary ways in which the Manchurian case does not fit the borderland model. First, the original model of Adelman and Aaron pre­ supposed the borderlands to be inhabited by ethnically and culturally different indigenous peoples, whereas by our time Manchuria was ovetwhelming populated by Han Chinese. Second, despite this ethnic domination by Chinese, the political ambitions of elites like Zhang Zuolin were not restricted to carving out a temporary political space by eluding the domination of a single power; rather, their ambitions could attain imperial heights: Zhang was bent on bringing China itself under his sole command. In this way, the relevance of Lattimore's insight into Manchuria as a reservoir-a resource base for the domination of China-had not quite faded despite many fundamental reversals. At the same time, given these reversals, such ambition could only be sustained because the borderland situation allowed him to maximize his political resources.

In his splendid study of Zhang Zuolin, Gavan McCormack has outlined the fun­ damental political tensions in the region during the period of Zhang's ascendancy, 1 9 1 1 to 1 928.32 Zhang and the Japanese needed each other to satisfy their ambi-

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tions. The Japanese were caught in a contradiction: they had economic and consid­ erable political power in the region, but no sovereignty. They were interested in cultivating Zhang as a strongman who could protect their interests. Zhang, on the other hand, needed Japanese financial and military support not only against his war­ lord rivals within Manchuria, but even more, against the other warlords vying for control of Beijing itself. For the sake of this latter goal, which occupied a good deal of his energies till the end of his life, Zhang had already fought several exorbitant and unsuccessful wars bankrupting the Fengtian provincial treasuty and causing much hardship on the people. Despite his continental goals, however, Zhang had developed a good relationship with many in the Fengtian provincial assembly and implemented several state-building and modernizing reforms. He had built up a sig­ nificant core of civilian support in the Mukden clique which by the mid-1920s was moving him in the direction of increasing independence from Japan.

But Zhang's ambition to control Beijing took primacy over all and so weakened his support even among the loyal supporters in his administration, such as Wang Yongjiang. The administrators and assemblymen launched a campaign to contain his ambitions called the baojing anmin movement (to protect the borders and secure the people of the region), which has been interpreted widely, and especially by the Japanese, as a movement of regional autonomy. Indeed, Zhang himself had set the precedent in 1922 when he declared the independence of the three Eastern prov­ inces, Rehe, Chahar, and Inner and Outer Mongolia. Zhang was responding to Pres­ ident Xu Shichang's dismissal of him as governor of Fengtian because of his role in the 1922 Zhili Fengtian war. He even entered into independent treaties with nations like the Soviet Union.33

For somewhat different reasons, a similar declaration of regional autonomy was made by the Association of the Three Provincial Assemblies, the chambers of com­ merce, education associations, and many other groupsY This popular upsurge was part of south China's spreading federalist movement, which sought the autonomy of the region to implement democratic reform at a time when the center was chaotic and oppressive. The baojing anmin movement of the later 1920s appears to have been triggered by a similar impetus, although, dominated as it was by conservative administrators and assemblymen, it was rather cautious about mass nationalism and democratic change.

While their interests were different, the disillusionment of the assemblymen and administrators with Zhang coincided with the frustration of the Japanese, who began to fear that Zhang's increasing military involvement south of the Great Wall would devastate the economy, and even more, that his defeat would bring in a gov­ ernment hostile to the Japanese.35 When both sides decided to abandon him, Zhang's end was clear. But nothing was solved for the Japanese. While some mem­ bers of the Mukden clique were anti-Japanese and succeeded in moving Zhang towards their position, Zhang was no modern nationalist. As McCormack has said, he was a traditional dynast waiting in the wings for the dragon throne.36 However, the times had changed and Zhang had been caught up in a growing nationalist

Manchukuo: A Historical Overview '--' 5 1

movement he did not fully comprehend. His son, Zhang Xueliang, who succeeded him in power, while subject to charges of corruption and drug use, was distinctly more nationalistic. Besides, he was surrounded by a dynamic group of intellectuals and bureaucrats who would go on to form the nucleus of the Northeast National Salvation Society (dongbei jiuguohuz); they were fervently devoted to the nationalist cause.3?

At the end of 1 928, Zhang Xueliang hoisted the national flag and declared his allegiance to the KMT government of a unified China. But it was not only the polit­ ical allegiance that caused the Japanese to strike down the regime. Two other major issues, equally representative of the growing Chinese nationalist feelings, caused the Japanese military to believe that it would need to become the dominant political power in Manchuria. One was the younger Zhang's continued building of railway lines competitive with the South Manchurian Railroad Company (SMR); the other was the denial of landownership to Japanese nationals. Many Chinese were discour­ aged and disallowed from leasing land to the Japanese, who used Koreans with Chi­ nese citizenship in Manchuria for this purpose. Koreans working on large-scale Japanese farms (leased originally from the Koreans) competed with Chinese farm­ ers-a displaced expression of the Sino-Japanese competition that sometimes erupted in violence. One such flare-up helped to instigate a reaction against Chinese in Korea and provided the provocation for the Japanese to strike down the Zhang Xueliang regime.38 On September 18, 1 93 1 , the Guandong Army set a bomb on an SMR line near Mukden and used the explosion as an excuse to occupy all of Man­ churia by the end of 1 932. In March of 1 932 it proclaimed the independent Repub­ lic of Manchukuo.

The League of Nations and Sovereignty Claims

Manchukuo had a global significance as the first imponant test put to the new inter­ national institution for settling disputes peaceably and nonimperialistically within the nation-state system, the League of Nations. Cenainly, the verdict delivered by the League condemning Japanese expansionism lived up to the new rhetoric of the age of anti-imperialism. But the details and practical actions taken revealed the severe limits of the new system. The failure to back its verdict with suitable action suggests a number of questions: Was the system truly representative of the interests of nationalism, or was it a disguised tool of imperialist nations? Did it point to the limits of nationalism itself, shaped by the expansionary impulse of the modern terri­ torial state? Manchukuo presents us with a similar set of problems.

The verdict of the League, delivered in the fall of 1 932, was based on the volumi­ nous report of the Lytton Commission, which was submitted to the League in Sep­ tember 1 932 after six months of intensive investigation. However, from the stan, the League was impotent to impose sanctions or take action against Japan because of the contrary opinions of Great Britain and the nonparticipation of the United States in the League. It could do little more than declare nonrecognition of the new

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state and call for the evacuation of Japanese troops in Manchuria from outside the railway zone. It also recommended beginning negotiations for the reorganization of Manchuria under Chinese sovereignty, but with considerable autonomy.

The Lytton Commission report deemed the crisis to have arisen from a situation where both parties claimed to have rights and interests that were not clearly defined by international law. Moreover, although the Commission recognized the disputed territory to be legally an integral part of China, this territory had a local administra­ tion of sufficiently autonomous character to carry on direct negotiations with Japan on the matters that lay at the root of the conflict.39 Thus, on the one hand, the Lytton report was unambiguous in its view that Manchuria had been formally a part of China at least since the Manchu conquest of 1 644, and was influenced by Chi­ nese culture long before that. It was also unambiguous in condemning Japan's actions in the Manchurian Incident as unlawful, a violation of China's sovereignty and international law. As we shall see, Japan sought relentlessly to demonstrate that China was not an organized state and therefore not a nation. It seized upon the "Law of Nations" invoked by the Lytton report-"a State must possess and con­ tinue to possess one supreme Government"4°-arguing that China lacked precisely this condition. The Lytton Commission, however, was satisfied that China, as "a nation in evolution," was in the process of gradual but distinct modernization.41 The report did express concerns about antiforeignism in China, which tended "to kindle patriotism with the flame of hatred, and to build up manliness on the sense of injury," but attributed this more to the communists than to the established gov­ ernment.42

On the other hand, as the dispute was complex and characterized by a lack of clarity regarding rights on both sides, the report did not come out completely on the side of Chinese nationalism. Indeed, it often tended to take a middle position between the Chinese and Japanese. For this reason, although KMT officials endorsed the Lytton report, the communists denounced it.43 The first principle the Commission report proposed was that the League's decision should be compatible with both Chinese and Japanese interests. The fourth principle stated that the "rights and interests ofJapan are facts that cannot be ignored,"44 and the report even went on to argue that seeing Manchuria as part of China would better promote Japan's interests as well. It recommended that the government of Manchuria should be modified so as to secure, in a way consistent with the sovereignty and administra­ tive integrity of China, a large measure of autonomy designed to meet the local conditions and special characteristics of the three provinces.45

The verdict of the assembly of the League of Nations based upon the Lytton Commission report also reflected its framework of understanding. While the League clearly acknowledged Chinese sovereignty, it also sought to recognize the historical autonomy of Manchuria and acknowledge the treaty rights of other powers such as the Japanese and the Russians in the region. In other words, while the League acknowledged that sovereignty was based upon historical claims of belonging and culture, it also was wary of denying the rights of states-states that had imperialisti-

Manchukuo: A Historical Overview .--.... 53

cally acquired rights in an earlier period. Other realpolitik concerns also weighed heavily in the verdict, as in the report: the need to strengthen the KMT against the communists in China and the fear that Japanese rule in Manchuria would affect the Open Door policy and principles of free trade, and thus harm foreign interests (in addition to the people of Manchuria).46 As the Chinese communists never tired of pointing out, the great powers that dominated the League of Nations were hardly free and neutral agents themselves. In a way, the practical if not always rhetorical ambivalence of the League, given the preponderant role within it of imperialist pow­ ers, matched the practical role of Japanese expansionism in contrast to its rhetoric. However, the rhetoric did not merely seek to hide an old and ugly reality. In both cases, the rhetoric and some of the innovations reflected the power of new forces that would have significant effects.

In their response, the Japanese side rejected the fundamental assumptions of the Lytton Commission report and finally withdrew from the League of Nations in 1 933. Where the report of the League emphasized Manchurian autonomy but not independence from China, the Japanese emphasized the de facto independence of Manchuria. The Japanese representative to the League, Matsuoka Yosuke, rejected the Commission's claim that Manchuria had historically been an integral part of China. He asserted that the union of Manchuria with China had only been "tempo­ rary and accidental." Matsuoka cited the authority of M. Escarra, an advisor to the Nanjing government, who had argued that Manchuria was never a vassal of China, since, on the contrary, it was the Manchu family that conquered the Chinese empireY The empire had been the product of a personal union and could not be considered a question of China's rights over Manchuria. M. Escarra was of the view that imperial and national claims to sovereignty were simply incommensurable. He urged that since the Manchu family had disappeared, another juridical formula had to be developed to explain the reconnection of China and Manchuria.

Not only did Matsuoka deny the claim that Manchuria was an integral part of China in the deep historical perspective, he rejected the claim that the recent history of the settlement of Manchuria by Han Chinese made Manchuria a part of the Chi­ nese nation-a denial that few non-Japanese would find acceptable. He invoked the idea of common political consciousness as the basis of nationhood. Manchuria's numerical domination by Chinese did not mean that it was part of the nation, because "the Chinese have not a keen sense of nationality."48 However, Matsuoka had to walk a thin line here. He had to show that while the Chinese inhabitants of Manchuria may not have had a Chinese national consciousness, they had a sense of Manchurian identity. He pointed to the presence of the baojing anmin movement, "a movement based on Manchurian independence,"49 not only during the rule of Zhang Zuolin but also under Zhang Xueliang, who had declared allegiance to the KMT. He suggested that these aspirations came together spontaneously after the Manchurian Incident.

When the authorities who, under General Chang Hsueh-liang, were responsible for the maintenance of order in Manchuria disappeared, as they mainly did after the

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events of September 1 8th, some organization was evidently necessary in order to carry on the normal machinery of daily life; local vigilance committees were formed by the local leaders, and the Japanese Army welcomed their co-operation and assisted them . . . . [Tlthat these nuclei of government eventually coalesced and developed into a genuine State is no matter for astonishment . . . . 50

While we need not accept Matsuoka's interpretation of these committees (whom we will encounter again), they were quite critical to the reestablishment of order in the region.

At the same time, Matsuoka asserted that China had neither a strong state nor an acceptable nationalism.

[S] ince the Revolution of 1 9 1 1 , [China has] fallen into a condition of confusion bor­ dering upon anarchy, and remains in the same condition at the present moment . . . . [U] nder present circumstances, it is entirely impossible to tell when China may come to have a strong and permanent central government, even if we grant the ultimate possibiliry of that eventY

Thus, not only was it incapable of governing Manchuria (or restraining the warlords there), it could not ensure the security of foreigners' life and property, guaranteed by treaty rights. Matsuoka seized on a statement in the Lyrton report that held anti­ foreignism in China-particularly the economic boycott and antiforeign educa­ tion-to have also contributed to the present conflict. While the report found this antiforeignism to be an expression of a negative rather than a positive nationalism, Matsuoka sought to draw the lesson that China was anarchic and possessed of nei­ ther nation nor stateY

The position of the government of the Republic of China as publicized to the outside world was perhaps best summarized by Chih Meng, associate director of the China Institute in America, in its 1 932 publication China Speaks. Meng's view was supported in most respects by the most authoritative account of the conflict at the time, that of W. W. Willoughby. Willoughby, an American professor who had served as a legal advisor to the Chinese government between 1 9 1 6 and 1 9 1 9, and W. W. Yen, China's chief delegate to the League of Nations, both endorsed Meng's account in their respective prefatoty comments to the book, in which Chih Meng claimed that "Manchuria is part of China because of priority in political affiliation and by explicit international recognition."53 By the former he meant that since China and Manchuria were ruled jointly by the Manchus, Manchuria had been part of China for nearly three hundred years. Although, according to Meng, there was a period of time in the Qing when the government attempted to stop Chinese migra­ tion into Manchuria "to reserve the land for the Manchus," that law was never effec­ tively nor strictly enforced. He added the argument that China needed Manchuria more than did Japan. It is noteworthy that Meng's argument for establishing Chi­ nese sovereignty included a mix of recent historical developments and practical fac­ tors. It was by no means the deep historical view that later emerged.

Manchukuo: A Historical Overview .--. 55

More important than the historical claim was Meng's effort to establish China's sovereignty over Manchuria by means of its recognition in legal statements, interna­ tional law, and international precedents. Meng cites the constitution of China and, more importantly, Article 1 0 of the Covenant of the League of Nations and Article 1 of the Nine Power Treaty of 1 922, which recognized China's sovereignty over the region. 54 Even the recent historical process of Han Chinese colonization that he had cited gains its significance by international comparison: "The Manchus in Manchu­ ria today are somewhat in the position of Indians in the United States, except that the Manchus have been entirely assimilated into Chinese culture."55 The appeal to international precedent in order to establish sovereignty claims appears again in the bid to demonstrate that China was a genuine nation-state. Meng says that although China is an ancient and the world's most continuous civilization, it had also begun recently to awaken to a modern nationalism:

The seemingly unchanging China has been changing, and rapidly, during recent years. China has awakened. She instinctively thinks first of self-preservation. She discovers Nationalism, the secret power of the modern nation, and the modern definition of sovereign rights . . . . Call it anti-foreignism, if you wish; it is anti-foreign injustices [sic] . In this sense, the Thirteen Colonies of America were also "anti-foreign."56

Thus Meng acknowledges, through his complex argument integrating antiforeign­ ism with nationalism by way of international precedent, the systemic principle that only nation-states have the right �o reject foreign occupation.

Manchukuo as event allows us to observe how history becomes central to the claims of nationhood. One is hard pressed to find Chinese historical scholarship laying deep historical claims on Manchuria, whether based on racial, cultural, or political ties, at the time of the Manchurian Incident. As Feng Jiasheng, who was to subsequently publish his historical researches on the Northeast, pointed out in an early issue of Yugong in 1 934, the history and geography of the Northeast had been utterly neglected by the Chinese and was far behind the scholarship of the Russians and the Japanese.57 The very few extant works on Manchuria in Chinese published before 1 93 1 seem to have been written precisely to alert Chinese to the impending Japanese threat. They bemoan the ignorance and indifference towards the region among the Chinese, who had tended to regard it as an insignificant wasteland. They too do not delve into long-term historical questions. Even a historian like Fu Sinian, who was close to the political establishment, writing on the first anniversary of the Manchurian Incident in 1932, emphasized how it was the recent colonization of Manchuria in the last century by thirty million immigrants from the provinces of Shandong and Hebei that had changed it into Chinese territory. 58

Moreover, historians at the time were also conscious of the problems of making deep historical claims. Among the century's finest and most provocative historians, Gu Jiegang, wrote a brilliant essay in which we may see how the spatial representa­ tion of China as the eternal geo-body had been historically constructed during

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momentous political transformations such as the Qin-Han unification of 221 B.C. In his 1 926 essay on the image of the world during the Warring States (fifth-third century B.C.) and its transformation after the Qin unification, Gu showed that spa­ tial conceptions of the world as the "four seas" or the "nine zhou" from earlier eras such as the Xia and the Zhou were mistakenly regarded as literal and unchanging representations. Thus people from times following the Qin believed the territorial extent of China to have been continuous with these earlier representations. Gu showed that in fact these abstract spatial representations not only hid changing terri­ torial realities, but were hypothetical. They represented a scheme for unification that only took place under the Qin. Gu was interested in exploring the functions of this "laughable ignorance" of history. 59

A few years after the Manchurian Incident, historical writing on Manchuria developed a momentum and tended to make deep claims. Although there developed more complex strategies by professional historians to claim the region historically as a part of China, the more crudely nationalist writing relied on flimsy evidence. Thus Wu Shangquan wrote, twenry years after Gu's piece, that the Northeast was a dis­ tinct part of the nine zhou. He even sought to naturalize the relationship between the Northeast and China proper by showing how the mountain chains are linked to the mainland, and how the northeastern rivers belong to the same system as those in the mainland.60 Such deep historical claims continue to this day. For instance, considerable historical energy has been spent on demonstrating that 1 998 was not the hundredth anniversary of the founding of Harbin (by the Russians, who built the China Eastern Railroad). Instead, unconnected historical traces have been uti­ lized to construct a historical claim to the region for many hundreds of years before 1 898. Soren Clausen and Stig Thogersen have grasped the means whereby this his­ tory was created: "Since Manchu and Mongols and others are today incorporated in 'Chinese people' (Zhonghua minzu), the area can be said to have been inhabited by Chinese for a very long time."61

Doubtless, the appropriation of Manchuria into the Chinese geo-body within Chinese historical writing has to be understood in the context of the inefficacy of the League and the Japanese denial of Chinese sovereignty, whether in the long or short history. Matsuoka's claim discussed above was consistent with Japanese histori­ cal scholarship before 1 93 1 , which held that it was not until the second half of the nineteenth century that efforts were made to integrate Manchuria with China. As Nishimura Shigeo has pointed out, scholarship after the Russo-Japanese War and the annexation of Korea was conducted increasingly under the dominant ideology that Japan had special rights in Manchuria and Mongolia because these regions rep­ resented Japan's lifeline.62

Thus, long before 1 93 1 , Japanese historians tended to celebrate the autonomy of the region. Consider the detailed introduction to Inaba Kunzan's 1 91 8 history of the region written by the great Sinologist Naito Konan. In Naito's view, both the Chinese and Japanese developed their political interests in Manchuria during the Koguryo rule of the region, which lasted for seven hundred years, from the late Han

Manchukuo: A Historical Overview � 57

until the Tang. During the succeeding three hundred years of rule by the Bohai, the ancestors of the present Manchus, the state's political and economic ties with Japan were actually closer than those with China. Indeed, if it had not been for the Khitan, who occupied the region between them and the Chinese proper in western Liaoning, the Bohai could have established their power over China. Later it was the Jin or Jurchen, also ancestors of the Manchus, who defeated the Song dynasty in China. While the Jurchen suffered a setback during the Yuan-Ming period, their Manchu descendants went on to found the Qing empire in China. It was not until the middle of the nineteenth century that the Qing began to encourage Han settlement in Man­ churia. Naito evokes the image of a region with an autonomous history disrupted only recently by accidental developments. For three thousand years, he writes, the land has had its own natural history, its own monuments, routes, and relics. Only in the last two to three hundred years has this pattern changed with the intrusion of agriculture and other developments. It is also in recent centuries that we have become aware of this ancient history and its importance for understanding the pres­ ent. At the same time, Naito urges against a historical determinism. The future, he says, can always unfold a different history.63

The main text by Inaba Kunzan fills out this natural history with thick descrip­ tions of primeval peoples hunting in the green woods, fishing, pearl diving, digging for ginseng, and trapping for fur. Of course they had periodic contact with Chinese culture, but they always returned to their primeval forests and mountains. The pol­ icy of the Qing to ban agricultural settlement by outsiders reinforced the nonagricul­ tural character of the region. The Han had always dreamed of this virgin land as a vast agricultural garden, and Inaba fears that they had made it so in recent years, and not only in Manchuria proper but in Mongolia and Siberia as well. He warns his compatriots to fear the Chinese. Poor and weak as they seem, they have strong national ties and will make a formidable foe!

The historical narrative sketched by Naito and Inaba seemed to structure many of the official publications that poured out of Manchukuo. The introduction to the official 1 940 text known as KIJmin (citizen or civic person), produced by the Police Department for the instruction of police officers, constructs its own deep history of Manchuria, celebrating in particular the Koguryo period of rule over much of this land and Korea over 1 ,600 years ago. It follows through with the Bohai and their close links to Nara and Heian courts, and then settles down to the Khitan/Liao and Jin ancestry of the Manchu clans. Subsequently, the Russians are blamed for encroaching into the region and releasing the modern period of ethnic struggles. The historical segment closes with a discussion of how notions of ethnic harmony and the "kingly way" have finally brought peace to the region. Note, however, that the Chinese are not even mentioned.64

In a way, Japanese historical scholarship was not too distant from the view of Western historians like Lattimore with regard to the history of Manchuria as fron­ tier. Yet the contemporary population of Manchuria overwhelmingly by Chinese did not lead the majority of these Japanese scholars to acknowledge Chinese sovereignty

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either, although, as the League report pointed out, neither did they deny this sover­ eignty before September 1931 . After the Manchurian Incident, Matsuoka and oth­ ers sought to hammer home the point that the autonomy of Manchuria had also meant that the region had no sense of Chinese nationhood. The historical narrative of an autonomous Manchuria suddenly became the histoty of an independent Man­ chukuo.

Note also the transformation of Chinese sovereignty claims. Chih Meng and oth­ ers did not initially make deep historical claims, emphasizing instead the practical needs of an existing population. This was in accord with the Lytton report: "China, at first, showed little activity in the field of development in Manchuria. She almost allowed Manchuria to pass from her control to that of Russia . . . . Meanwhile the immigration of millions of Chinese farmers settled the future possession of the soil, and Manchuria is now unalterably Chinese."65 Yet the basis of the claim to sover­ eignty transmuted into a deep historical one. Given the Japanese use of history, there were presumably few alternatives. However unsuitable or inapplicable it may have been in sorting out territorial claims, history, in the sense of a long and continuous presence, had become implicated in the claim to national sovereignty. In the same essay cited above, Gu Jiegang captures the painful moral dilemma presented to the historian-who is both professional and national-by the use of historical mala­ propisms.

It is laughable that people identifY the territory of the Warring States period with that of the earlier Xia, Shang, and Zhou periods without historical knowledge. But we really should not laugh at them. We need to know if the capaciry of China for uniry has to depend on such a preposterous historical view. We can only eliminate racial prejudices and create the territory of China as an organized federation if we have such a notion of "past uniry." In the past, when Chinese saw the tattoos on the people of Wu and Yue and heard the butcherbird-like sounds of the Chu people, they thought of them as disgraced convict-soldiers of the Zhou. Once, however, they developed the concept of the "nine zhou," everyone felt that we and they were of the same family. No matter that they lived at some distance from each other, we all developed a famil­ iariry. Since then, the various Chinese states (zhuxia) and the barbarians began to feel a sense of natural intimacy. Moreover, when the ancestors of each state were strung together in a single lineage, it caused the people to feel as if they were all the descen­ dants of the Yellow Emperor, and this generated a still greater intimacy among them.

Nowadays we hear of the "Republic of Five Races," but we cannot generate any feelings of friendship of the Han people towards the Manchus, the Mongols, the Mus­ lims, and the Tibetans. This is because the Han have known them to have been "bar­ barian states" lfanbang); they harbor arrogance towards them in their minds and cannot feel an intimacy. If the Han today were ignorant in the same way as the ancients and followed those who constructed a false history, believing that the territor­ ies of the Manchus and the Mongols were in the realm of the Yellow Emperor, Yao, and Shun, and that the people of those regions were descendants of these sage kings, then they would see the Manchus and the Mongols as the same as one from the eigh-

Manchukuo: A Historical Overview � 59

teen central provinces, and the five races could truly become a republic (wuzu jiu zhen keyi gonghele).66

This is an extraordinarily revealing passage that suggests that the fabrication of a deep history is necessary for the production of true national loyalry. Once the Japa­ nese invasion had occurred, Gu's work became increasingly torn between relatively objective historical research and propagandistic historical writingY &; we shall see later, Gu and other concerned historians would try to conceive of the relationship between national uniry and historiography at a different epistemological level-one that would perhaps transcend what Benedict Anderson has characterized as the "necessary forgetting," or, as Gu himself put it, a "laughable ignorance." For the moment, however, we may wonder if a legitimate nationalism called up to defend people who have been attacked may not have transmuted into an essentialist doc­ trine demanding unconditional loyalry-one that, in being purposefully forgetful of other histories, is also homogenizing, exclusive, hierarchical, and unable to distin­ guish between defense and aggression.

Manchukuo

Historical cases like Manchukuo present the historian with a facile clariry. A great deal is written about them, but what is written tends not to stray from the accepted narrative shaped by the judgment of the case, here Manchukuo, as an unspeakable abomi-nation. When writing of the experiences of people, whether ordinary or elite, the expectation is that they cannot but be reduced to symbols of victimization, col­ laboration, or resistance. My objection to this position is not that we should not denounce a brutal regime, but that this narrative itself is shaped by a nationalist politics that channels history into very narrow passages. This is true not only of contemporary Chinese writings, but also of much Western and postwar Japanese historiography.

Manchukuo was established in March 1 932 as the Republic of Manchukuo and was subsequently renamed an empire. Despite the claims to independence, there is no question that the real power behind it was the Japanese Army-hence the West­ ern historiographical designation of it as a "puppet state." Chinese scholarship refers to it as the "false Manchukuo" (wei Manzhouguo), its falsiry referring to its illegiti­ macy. While both designations capture important aspect of the poliry, these charac­ terizations tend to shape the kind of scholarship that is produced and obscure a wide range of historical issues. Until recently, much scholarship tended to concentrate on the negative effects of state policies on people's lives. The wider effects of Manchu­ kuo's massive industrialization, urbanization, and modernization-perhaps more massive than elsewhere in &;ia during the period-have barely been probed.68 Socially, the vast range of activities and complex responses to political power that do not conform to victimization, collaboration, or resistance are deemed to have little consequence. Finally, the puppet designation suggests a scarcely veiled colo-

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nialism and cannot capture the novel institutional arrangements that produced results very different from the old colonial states.

I have found it useful to think of a fourfold distinction in discussing the poliry of Manchukuo: its power structure, regime form, state form, and sovereignty claims. The puppet state designation clarifies the power structure of the polity, which was a form of disguised imperialism. Real power resided with those whose principal loyalry was often to Japan or to Japanese groups. However, while the power structure did influence policy and institutions, it was not as central or overwhelming as we have believed. Many of the institutions, policies, and experiences were shaped by the other three factors.

I will define state form here as the rationale, goals, and "rationalities" that enable the legal exercise of power in society. The state form is capable of encompassing several different regimes and I believe Manchukuo belongs to the modern state form that we have identified as "governmentality." To be sure, governmentality cannot be applied mechanically to Manchukuo or East Asia generally. We will consider later how Foucault's slighting of the distinction between state and civil society does not aid our understanding of governmentality in this region. Moreover, specific expres­ sions of governmentality articulate with historical representations from the East Asian modern, regarding, for instance, gender and morality (jiaohua), which equally shape lived experience. But as a modern state form, Manchukuo is to be distin­ guished not only from premodern states, bur also from most nineteenth-century colonial states. These states usually sought to reproduce the difference between rulers and ruled, and were not preoccupied with the rationalities of the modern state except insofar as they needed to implement them to extract resources or maintain the colonial order.

The regime form specifies the decision-making institutions and methods of imple­ menting policies. We may characterize the regime form of Manchukuo as "military fascist" to emphasize the central role of the Guandong Army in place of the supreme leader.69 To be sure, fascism here is to be construed loosely, and there are aspects of the central European model that do not apply, most conspicuously and ironically Manchukuo's commitment to a multicultural polity in opposition to fascism's homogenizing imperative. But similarities include the nondemocratic and narrow circle of decision-makers, policies of state-led industrialization and modernization, implementation through a state-sponsored mass organization (the Concordia Asso­ ciation, Xiehehui, Kyowakat) , and a corporatist system in which each group has its place and function within the state. Finally, the Manchukuo state severely restricted individual rights and often exhibited a dictatorial and brutal conduct. Interestingly, both the Japanese and the Chinese KMT state also shared important features of this fascist model and thus bear a closer resemblance to the Manchukuo regime than might appear at first sight.

Finally, in its sovereignty claims, Manchukuo devised, deployed, and sometimes pioneered the rhetoric of the emerging anti-imperialist nationalism. It made the rather outrageous claim that it was not merely a nation, but one that embodied

Manchukuo: A Historical Overview .---.. 61

utopian ideals. While it soon became clear that these ideals were often appropriated for militaristic purposes, they nonetheless shaped several policies and the lives of many people. One of these was the multiculturalism embodied in the Concordia Association; another was the redemptive universalism of the many religious and "Eastern" civilizational organizations that flourished in Manchukuo; and a third was the efforr to realize a modern utopia blending the best of East and West-which could only be attained in this last frontier of the East. Although the bulk of this book is devoted to exploring the historical process whereby cultural formations and practices were transformed into sovereignty claims, this process cannot be grasped aparr from each of the other dimensions. Most of all, any understanding of Manchu­ kuo will have to grapple with the contradiction between a disguised imperialist power structure and the three other dimensions, without reducing the latter to the former.

Visions: Utopian and Colonial

Why was Manchukuo established as an independent, civilian nation-state, however formal, rather than as a colonial and military state? To be sure, key elements of the Guandong Army that drove out the Zhang Xueliang government were not necessar­ ily committed to its independence from the stan. Senior officer Ishiwara Kanji, per­ haps the single most forceful figure behind the creation of Manchukuo, initially saw the Japanese possession of Manchuria as necessary for the survival of Japan and its continued control over Korea. The "strategic autarky" or "Japan's lifeline" argu­ ment, which had gained currency in the army from the end of World War I, always figured Manchuria at the center of a sphere of self-sufficiency that would be critical to the outcome of any battle in the future. According to Tak Matsusaka, Japanese military analysts came to this conclusion after observing the close relationship between state and resource mobilization during World War I. Manchuria and China would be necessary for the sphere of Japanese self-sufficiency, whether through vol­ untary cooperation or, if necessary, occupation and coercion. In other words, an imperialist intent distinctly pervaded the enterprise.7°

The general view regarding the proclamation of independence is that it was a fig leaf designed to mollifY the League of Nations and fend off Chinese nationalist charges. But it is notewonhy that Manchukuo remained a formally independent nation even after the withdrawal of Japan from the League and at a time when Japan and other powers continued to possess colonies. Two other factors merit consider­ ation. First, in order to effectively attain its goals, the Japanese military had to develop an alliance with key groups in Manchukuo, both Chinese and Japanese. In order to do so meaningfully, it was compelled to champion the rhetoric of these allies, which included the framework of a sovereign state. Ishiwara and his associates in the Guandong Army, Itagaki Seishiro and Doihara Kenji, recognized that they could ignore the new discourse of rights and autonomy only at their own peril. 71

Second, ideas of strategic autarky and an "economic bloc" came to be interpene-

62 .--.-, Chapter 2

trated by pan-Asianist discourse. While figures like Ishiwara were motivated by Japa­ nese nationalism, this nationalism was itself framed by a vision of the inevitable confrontation between East and West. The cooperation of China and Manchuria under Japanese leadership was necessary for success in this holy war or righteous duty (zhengyi, seigt) .72 Ishiwara became a convert to the pan-Asianist idea of the for­ mal equality of Asian nations; there was no contradiction between viewing the alli­ ance as representing the supposed difference between Asian ideals and Western imperialism and treating it as a tool in the final war for global dominance/3

Thus, while the idea of an autarkic Japan-Manchuria bloc was influenced by models of autarky in Europe, it was grasped within the civilizational discourse of pan-Asianism. The bloc idea grew by the mid-l 930s into the East Asian League (loa renmei) and the East Asian Community (loa kyodotai), and still later into the idea of the Greater East Asian Co-prosperity Sphere (Dai-loa Kyoeiken). Indeed, figures associated with the propagation of these ideas, such as Ozaki Hotsumi, Kada Tetsuji, and Shinmei Masamichi (whose lecture tours in Manchukuo were sponsored by the SMR), were critical of Nazi ideas of racial superiority and emphasized cooperation with the Chinese in a regional alliance under Japanese leadership/4 Commitment to the idea of an alliance-and even that Japanese should renounce extraterritoriality in Asian countries-hardly meant that the Japanese were not thought to be intrinsically superior or that Asian nations need not accept the leadership of Japan. Yet it is impossible to fully understand why the military encouraged the rapid modernization and industrial buildup in Manchuria without grasping its framing within pan­ Asianism. ?5

The discourse of Manchuria as an autonomous place fostering a new type of pol­ ity had been advocated by a variety of Japanese groups within Manchuria. Some were idealistic and some even utopian, finding in Manchuria a frontier where they could realize a vision that many considered impossible to achieve in the established society of Japan. Yamamuro Shinichi has said that in the entire history of Japanese expansionism, Manchuria is arguably the only place that held a romance for Japa­ nese. Idealists and visionaries of every hue saw there a frontier of boundless possibili­ ties. And yet, as he further notes, the reality of the Japanese imperial system stood in their way; indeed, convinced as they were of the superiority of Japanese personal­ ity and institutions, it stood inside their way as welJ.76

Groups like the Mantetsu Shainkai and the Daiyuhokai were formed by employ­ ees of the SMR. The former advocated the ideals of racial harmony and a new state, while the latter was inspired by Buddhist universalist ideas of divine compassion/? Another important group whose ideas informed the new Manchukuo state was the Manchurian Youth League (Manshu Seinen Renmet) , formed by the Japanese settler society in Manchuria. This group was particularly sensitive to the rise of Chinese nationalism and, although a paramilitary outfit, it was painfully aware that Japanese interests in Manchuria were doomed without some kind of compact with the Chi­ nese communities or a framework of Sino-Japanese coexistence. Under its idealistic leader Yamaguchi J iiji, the League developed the idea of kyowa, or cooperation

Manchukuo: A Historical Overview r--.> 63

between races or nationalities and the rejection of colonialist attitudes. This idea would ultimately incarnate in a fascistic mass organization in Manchukuo known as the Concordia Association. Though fascist, the association was built upon a rhetoric of eternal peace embedded in East Asian ideals and a framework of mutual coopera­ tion among the different peoples. It advocated anti-imperialism and even conceived of a new type of anticolonial state that would replace all imperialist powers­ including the Japanese.78 Although the history of Manchukuo since the mid-1 930s is one of subordination to Japanese expansionism, the effects of these early ideas and policies should not be underestimated.

In all these groups-although with different emphases or in different combina­ tions-we see the modern progressive, even radical, ideals of the equality of gender and peoples combined with notions of the distinctiveness of Eastern civilizational traditions. Thus Buddhist thinkers such as Kasagi Ryomei of the DaiyuhiJkai and Ishiwara emphasized Easternness, while the Youth League and Tachibana Shiraki sought more progressive ideals. But it was really Tachibana Shiraki who synthesized this duality in a way that was suitable for the new state. A well-respected Sinologist and a journalist in Manchuria, Tachibana began to work for the influential SMR Research Department in 1925.79 He was perhaps more sympathetic to Chinese nationalism than most other Japanese, and his goal was to create a new East that was modern, progressive, and socialistically egalitarian.80 At the same time, he was convinced that the East was organized around different ethical and spiritual princi­ ples than the West. He was much struck with Sun Yat-sen's appeal to wangdao, or the way of the ethical monarch of Chinese antiquity, as a means of countering the "way of the hegemon" represented by both Western powers and the local warlords.

Ironically, the Manchukuo state would seek to deploy precisely such Chinese ide­ als as wangdao and their own supposedly more genuine version, the Republic of Five Nationalities of 1 9 12, in the minzu xiehe (Concordia of Nationalities). Not only did both these ideas refer to Sun's rhetoric, they also alluded (as had Sun) to Chinese civilizational categories, including the Qing notion of the federated empire. As cre­ ative as he was in his efforts to synthesize the modern West and ancient East, and to channel Japanese expansionist energies toward the construction or restoration of China and other Asian societies, Tachibana's desire to see Asia unified under Japan led him to work with the military.8! Tachibana's implication in the core reality of the military power, like that of all the other idealists who dreamed of building a new world on the frontier, would lead him to compromises and even the reversal of his ideals.

In 1 93 1 , Tachibana became associated with the Manchurian Youth League by accepting the editorship of their journal Mamhu HyiJron.82 At the same time, because of his connections to the economic research group of the SMR, which in turn was actively allied with the radicals in the Guandong Army, he was well positioned to represent the different Japanese interests in Manchuria and serve as the architect of the new state.83 In the immediate aftermath of the Manchurian Incident on Septem­ ber 1 8, his principal political task was to direct the Self-Government Guidance

64 ,-....., Chapter 2

Department (zizhi zhidaobu), which sought to build the apparatuses of local admin­ istration from among local elites who had been associated with the earlier autonomy movement and who probably saw de facto Japanese rule as their best available option. In March 1 932, when the guidance department was disbanded, Tachibana threw himself into building the Concordia Association, which replaced the Machu­ rian Youth League. He sought to build upon the ideas of Yamaguchi, who had artic­ ulated the vision of a new society in which all the different groups in "Man-Mo" (Manchuria and Mongolia) would "participate in politics equally and without dis­ crimination."84

Despite Japanese militaty control, there was no shortage of Chinese­ autonomists, opportunists, "Eastern" religious salvationists, revolution-fearing elites, and war weary masses-who could be persuaded or coerced to join the "peace main­ tenance committees" that served as the effective administration under the Self-Gov­ ernment Guidance Department. At the top level, most of the important militaty generals, such as the Manchu Xi Xia in Jilin, Zang Shiyi in Fengtian, and Zhang Jinghui in Heilongjiang, swiftly switched sides and became the new provincial gov­ ernors. Thus, by January 1 932 pro-Japanese regimes had been established in all three provinces. At the local level, a group of Chinese politicians, merchants, and local notables formed the Peace Maintenance Committee of Liaoning Province, with Yuan Jinkai as its chairman. There is considerable scholarly consensus that the most significant basis of Chinese support for the Manchukuo regime came from the landed classes who tacitly promised support in return for stability and anticommun­ ism.85 In large measure because of the ways in which corrupt officials and land com­ panies distributed the land for settlement and cultivation in the late nineteenth century, Manchuria had an extremely unequal profile of land distribution. The investigation of the Land Records Bureau, set up in 1936, revealed that 3 percent of the rural households in northern Manchuria owned 50 percent of the land, and 4 percent of the rural households in southern Manchuria owned 40 percent of the land, while 84 percent of rural households in the north and 65 percent in the south owned very little or no land.86 It is for this reason that the first reform item on Tachibana's agenda-radical agrarian reform, which grew out of his socialist agrarian philosophy (nohonshugt)-was shelved, and the rural sector remained stagnant dur­ ing the entire period. In general, the refusal of the Guandong Army to interfere with the interests of the landed classes made several of the projects of the radicals impossible.

The leader of the Guidance Department, Yu Chonghan, was a representative of landed interests and also had financial interests in an SMR company.87 Yu had been an advocate of the autonomist baojing anmin movement and was also a leader of a group of top civilian administrators in the Zhang administration known as the wen­ zhipai (civilian rule group). When he came out of retirement to accept the offer to lead the department, Yu declared the necessity of constructing a new, independent state based upon the principles of wangdao, which involved, among other things, reform of the taxation, official compensation, and police systems. He also advocated

Manchukuo: A Historical Overview r--> 65

an industrialization policy and, most curiously (although consistent with the spirit of wangdao) , the abolition of the national defense forces, a policy that Tachibana also advocated in the early stages.88

Rana Mitter has shown how various forms of local alliances, in particular, the county-level peace maintenance committees, were crucial to ensuring a relatively smooth takeover by the Guandong Army of much of Manchuria.89 The economic integrity of the county and the effective control of county elites was perhaps most in evidence in the financial panic following the Manchurian Incident, when the Guandong Army seized the banks of the old government. Many counties were able to forestall the slide into economic and political chaos by issuing their own currenc­ ies. That these currencies circulated countywide-unlike other parts of Republican China, where one could find multiple currencies in a single county-not only reflects the integration of county power, but Yasutomi Ayumu and Fukui Chie argue, it also permitted the relative ease of political control in Manchukuo.90

Once regular administration was reestablished, particularly after the formation of the Republic of Manchukuo in March 1 932, these county-level committees were formally dissolved, but the spirit of (doubtless forced) cooperation that lay behind them was to be sustained through two institutions: the Concordia Association and the principally Chinese associations that I have called the modern redemptive socie­ ties, such as the Daodehui (Morality Society) and the Hongwanzihui (Red Swastika Society) . The tacit alliance that the Manchukuo state formed with Chinese landed groups, local elites, autonomists, and redemptive societies, as well as modernizing bureaucrats and modernizing elements in the Concordia Association, shaped the rhetoric of its sovereignty claims.

Political Economy: Violence and Development

The political structure of Manchukuo exemplified the contradictions between its sovereignty claims and strategies (based on social alliances) and the structure of power. At the same time, its broader macrosocietal agenda indexed its difference from the older colonial model and revealed many of its contradictions to be charac­ teristic of modern governmentality, particularly as expressed in the Manchukuo regime form. This governmentality was expressed in its slogan of jianguo or kenkoku (founding the nation-state).

Despite the rhetoric of self-rule or local self-government, the political structure was carefully controlled by the Guandong Army. Puyi, who had reigned as child emperor until the fall of the Manchu dynasty in the Republican revolution of 1 9 1 1 , was designated head of state in 1 932 on the model of the KMT presidency, and became emperor again in 1 934.91 Much has been written and at least two movies made about this somewhat tragic, if colorless and powerless, emperor. In his role as the titular ruler of an independent state, Puyi was initially considered equal to the Japanese emperor. After the Japanese invasion of China in 1 937, he was increasingly subordinated to the Japanese emperor. He was induced to worship at holy shrines

66 r--.o Chapter 2

SEA O F JA PA N

•

Provinces, Cities, and Principal Railroads of Manchulruo

ofIse, and in 1939 a shrine for Amarcrasu was ioscatled in his palace in Xinjing, the new capital built in the old city of Changchun. In 1940, Puyi underwent a ritual rebirth from the womb of Amaterasu, thus becoming the': younger half brother of the Japanese emperor. In the view of the authoritative Chinese history of Manchu­ kuo, such an act made ''che Chinese people into Japanese imperial subje':cts."92 By 1937, and especially after the outbreak of the Paci6c War, the symbolic indcpcn-

Manchukuo: A Historical Overview .--.J 67

dence of Manchukuo was seriously compromised, as it increasingly became an imponant supply base for the Japanese war machine in inland China.

Initially, the army sought to control the administrative structure directly, and Muto Nobuyoshi, commander in chief of the Guandong Army, was also appointed governor of the Guandong-Ieased territory (as well as Japanese ambassador to Man­ chukuo). The civilian governorship was separated from the other posts soon after,93 and by the mid-1 930s army officers had to share power with a host of "reform bureaucrats" from Japan who envisioned Manchukuo as a "modern national defense state" that would serve as a model for Japan. Totalitarian in conception, the vision of these bureaucrats involved the rational and efficient mobilization of material, political, scientific, and cultural resources under state control. Although more closely identified with Japan than were the Guandong Army officers, their conception also involved winning the "hearts and minds of the people" through propaganda and the Concordia Association, which developed into an administered mass organization.94

The reform bureaucrats and the army controlled the wider administration through the General Affairs Board (zongwuting) of the State Council, the most pow­ erful administrative body. It consisted of the six bureaus of planning, legislation, personnel, accounts, statistics, and information. The board made the budget and supervised all imponant hiring and firings. Most of the top political and administra­ tive positions in the government as a whole were occupied by Chinese, although they were closely supervised by a high-level Japanese who was said to repon to the board. The director general of the General Affairs Board was always Japanese.95 The first prime minister was Zheng Xiaoxu, a Qing loyalist and Confucian scholar who apparently hoped for a genuine return to the principles of Confucian governance. He was gradually ousted from power and replaced by the former warlord Zhang Jinghui in 1 935.96 Many of the Chinese administrators were locals, frequently edu­ cated in Japanese institutions in the SMR-leased regions or in Japan itself.97

Manchukuo did not have a formal constitution, but bureaucrats and scholars referred to the Proclamation of the Establishment of the State (Jianguo xuangao) of 1 932 and the Government Organization Law (Zheng{u zuzhija) as containing the fundamental laws of the state. According to these laws the political system was a modern one, containing an executive, a legislature, and a judiciary. However, there was no true separation of powers and Yamamuro has aptly called the system "appar­ ent constitutionalism." The language of the laws frequently referred to the rights and duties of citizens (although there was no explicit citizenship law), but couched as it was in the familiar imperial Japanese metaphor of the family-state, the obliga­ tions of the citizen overwhelmed her rights: "National citizenship is the expanded version of family membership. Just as the family member has an obligation to obey the family unconditionally, so does the citizen have to obey the state."98

Groups and nationalities, rather than individual citizens, were more frequently seen as rights-bearing units: "No matter what race or religion, all the people are guaranteed to enjoy equality in the nation . . . . We are a country of different nation-

68 � Chapter 2

alities/races (minzoku) and religions, and the nation-state guarantees equality among them."99 Such legal statutes underpinned the corporatist organization of society, which was managed at an everyday level by the Concordia Association and the vari­ ous redemptive societies. The political constitution of Manchukuo was a sham as far as democratic rights and checks were concerned. But the regime was by no means an old-style colonial power moved to intervene in society simply in order to secure its power and profits. It was a fascistic regime whose laws were designed to produce its vision of a disciplined and mobilized society. As the war beyond its boundaries expanded, it became ever more committed to mobilizing the population, regardless of ethnicity, for its political, economic, and ideological projects.

The most modern part of the state was the economic system, particularly the urban, industrial sector. 100 The modern sector of the economy grew more rapidly and developed a more advanced industrial base than any part of Asia outside Japan. Kung-tu Sun calculates that industrial production tripled between 1 933 and 1 942, and producer goods output grew the fastest.lol The establishment of a unified cur­ rency equivalent to the Japanese yen was very important to the economic recovery of the region after years of fiscal irresponsibility. It also enabled Manchukuo to inte­ grate with the Japanese economy, forming a "yen bloc." The banking system was reorganized and unified. There was a dramatic rise in Japanese investments­ according to Louise Young, to almost 6 billion yen between 1 932 and 1 94 1 (in 1941 exchange rates), a figure far greater than that for any other transfer from a metropole to colony. By 1 945, Japanese investment in Manchukuo exceeded the combined total of investment in Korea, Taiwan, and the rest of China.102 This economic growth meant that immigration from China continued to rise as a whole, although the Japanese made efforts to control and reverse it during the early period, when they hoped to settle the land with Japanese and Koreans. 103 As a result of these efforts, migration into Manchuria from north China in 1 93 1-1938 fell to below half the levels of the preceding years, but with the industrialization drive of the war years immigration picked up again, to an average of 1 .2 million per annum between 1 939 and 1 942. Most of this labor force went into the industrial sector. 104

Ramon Myers has argued that the establishment of Manchukuo marked a break from the older colonial pattern of economic domination, which involved the emer­ gence of a small Westernized industrial sector alongside a much larger, traditional agricultural sector. There was also little transfer of capital or technology or signifi­ cant economic integration between colony and metropolis. Myers argues that between 1 93 1 and 1 945 the Japanese military and government began to create a "modern enclave" economy in Manchukuo and, later, north China, comprising the full panoply of modern economic enterprises and services such as hospitals, schools, and research centers. Capital assets in this sector far exceeded the size and value of Chinese-owned mining and manufacturing south of Manchukuo. As Louise Young says, "The truly radical and novel facet of Manchurian development lay in the plans for heavy industrialization and the hope to make Manchukuo the advance guard of Japanese industrial capitalism. By turning Manchukuo into a testing ground for

Manchukuo: A Historical Overview r--J 69

industrial management and planning techniques, Japan departed from existing colo­ nial practices."105 The modern enclave economy idea fits our efforts to characterize the complexity of Manchukuo. On the one hand, the massive modernization of eco­ nomic and social life is continuous with the modern state's imperative of govern­ mentality. On the other hand, this buildup was itself designed to create a war machine dominated by an imperialistic power structure.

Scholars have tended to divide economic development during the fourteen-year period from 1 93 1 to 1 945 into three stages. In 1 93 1-1 936, the Guandong Army was relatively responsive to the various Manchuria based Japanese utopian and visionary groups, such as the DaiyuhiJkai, the Mantetsu Shainkai, the Manchurian Youth League, and others.l06 This early influence by no means precluded the estab­ lishment of Japanese dominance, but rather emphasized the independence of Man­ chukuo from both the Japanese government and from Zaibatsu capitalists. 107 From the mid-1 930s, the bureaucrats arriving from Japan increased their influence, and by 1 936 the government announced the first of a series of five-year plans based on extensive state control of the industry and commerce that had been built up over the preceding years. Special companies in charge of a particular industry were set up, usually as state corporations in which the government was a principal or important shareholder. However, since the available capital was still insufficient, the army began to abandon its vestigial anticapitalism and invited the Zaibatsu to establish joint ventures with the state corporations. lOB Most important among the houses was the new and supposedly less plutocratic Nippon SangyiJ Kaisha, or Nissan, headed by Ayukawa Yoshisuke. 109

The dependence on Nissan grew after the invasion of China proper in 1 937, as it became increasingly clear that Manchukuo would serve as a principal supply base. Nissan became a holding company controlling most of the state enterprises­ increasingly at the cost of the South Manchurian Railroad Company, which was reduced to a transportation company and research organization. 1 10 Thus, while the period before 1 936 saw considerable industrial development, it was far surpassed by industrial growth in 1 937- 1 94 1 . 1 1 1 There are no reliable statistics for the second five-year plan, which began in 1 942, because of the wartime statistical blackout, but most economists believe that production increased still faster, judging from available data. In 1 945, total thermal and hydroelectric production was around 3 million kilo­ watts, compared to the unmet annual target of 1 .4 million from 1 937 to 1 94 1 . 1 12

The maniacal increase in industrial production and the diversion of resources to feed the war machine came at a terrible price. Inflation and increased taxes began to bur­ den the people as early as 1 937. But it is after the outbreak of the Pacific War in 1 94 1 that we get a palpable sense of the reduction in living standards, especially among the urban Chinese population.l l3 The increasing costs of maintaining the Japanese armies led to shortages and still more stringent state control of the distribu­ tion system, which in turn led to popular dissatisfaction and black-marketing. This period was increasingly shaped by the fascistic regime structure and tensions gener-

70 .-. Chapter 2

ated by a Japanese imperialist racism, which blatantly contradicted the sovereignty claims of the multicultural ideology of Concordia. 1 14

In addition to these wartime problems, Chinese authors have pointed to many injustices produced by the inequality berween Japanese and Chinese. They note the monopolistic nature of the industrialization drive; the Manchukuo government and Japanese houses controlled 72 percent of the total invested capital, making it hard for Chinese capital to compete. l l 5 Moreover, the wage differential berween Chinese and Japanese workers in the factories was staggering; in 1939, for evety one hundred yuan made by a Japanese, a Chinese worker made 29 yuan. 1 16 Conditions of work in the mines were especially appalling. In the agricultural sector not only was there no reform, but the means used by the government to settle Japanese and Korean farmers produced much tension and conflict. The Land Records Bureau set up in March 1936 turned out to be a means to grab the best land for Japanese settlers. l 17 Chinese farmers were evicted with a token compensation of 5 yuan, or else their land was bought in August, when the price was lowest. By the end of 1939, over one million hectares of land-representing about one-sixth of all the cultivable land in Japan-was under Japanese cultivation. Nineteen percent of this land had already been under cultivation. 1 18

The brutality of the regime cannot be doubted. Some of this was, not unexpect­ edly, directed at resistance forces. Given Chiang Kai-shek's policy of nonresistance, followed, however reluctantly, by Zhang Xueliang, most of the existing military forces in the Northeast either fled Manchuria or capitulated to the Japanese. A few warlord armies, most famously that that of Ma Zhanshan in Harbin (studied by Rana Mitter) and such disparate entities as student groups, "patriotic landlords," and secret societies, particularly in the old Chinese regions of southern Liaoning, offered resistance, but they were routed by 1933. 1 1 9 After 1933, as the Soviet Union felt more emboldened to encourage the Chinese Communist Party to attack the Japanese, the CCP brought together many of the resistance forces into the Yiyongjun (or Righteous/Volunteer Army) and put up considerable resistance. Communist-led uprisings continued, particularly in the Korean-dominated Jiandao region, but the Manchukuo and Japanese armies were able to decimate them by the late 1930s. Whole villages were wiped out, including the killing of 2,500 villagers in the Ping­ tingshan massacre. Altogether almost 66,000 people were slaughtered berween 1932 and 1940. 12° According to Lee Chong-sik, the principal reason for Japanese success lay in their draconic counterinsurgency measures. In response to suspected peasant support for anti-Japanese guerillas in the Jiandao border region with Korea, 5.5 mil­ lion rural residents were forcibly relocated, by the end of 1937, to 10,629 hamlets. These concentration camplike hamlets came with three-meter-high walls, barbed wire, and squads of forced labor. 12 1 As Japanese forces cut off supplies to the guerril­ las, the latter were forced to raid the hamlets themselves, which gradually led to the deterioration of villager-guerilla relations.

In contravention of the 1925 Hague Convention ban on bacteriological warfare and experimentation, the Japanese government sanctioned germ warfare experimen-

Manchukuo: A Historical Overview C--' 7 1

tation in Manchuria and elsewhere in China. Unit 73 1 in Harbin, where over 3,000 deaths took place between 1 937 and 1 945 alone,I22 has become the most notorious symbol of this cruel experimentation with humans, but there is evidence of experi­ mentation in Xinjing and other places as well. Colonel Ishii Shiro ran his own bacte­ riological factory in Pingfang (Unit 73 1) , equipped with a private airstrip, railway line, and other facilities. Here they experimented with the transmission of deadly infections such as the plague and typhoid; they also conducted vivisection, freezing, and dehydration experiments on people.123 Recently the Japanese government has undertaken to clean up the site.

Manchukuo presents us with two faces. On the one hand, we have a record of cruel violence; on the other, one of a developmental state. Nishimura Shigeo has plotted these recurring phenomena as the plunder and development phases.124 How­ ever, it is worth noting that it was the same state that underwent both phases. Although the contrast between development and violence seemed particularly sharp in Manchukuo, Foucault has pointed out that this antinomy is typical of the mod­ ern state.

In all history, it would be hard to find such butchery as in World War II, and it is precisely this period, this moment, when the great welfare, public health, and medical assistance programs were instigated . . . . One could symbolize such a coincidence by a slogan: Go get slaughtered and we promise you a long and pleasant life.125

If the modern state is increasingly driven by the autonomous logic of governmental­ ity to intervene to take care of men as population, it does so for its own sake. And since population is nothing more than what the state takes care of for its own sake, says Foucault, the state is also entitled to slaughter it, if necessary. 126 The case of Manchukuo suggests that we also need to invoke the "regime of authenticity" to grasp how the distinctions between authentic and inauthentic groups of people­ based on ethnicity, class, or gender, even within the nation--could generate such contradictory forces within govern mentality.

Even while it killed people mercilessly, the Manchukuo state sought to ensure high levels of investment, enjoyed considerable success in state building, eliminated banditry, and disciplined the warlord armies, turning them into the Manchukuo army. A very important propaganda item of this regime was that it had brought security from warlord disorder. With regard to infrastructural development-the construction of world-class dams, ports, railroads, planes, automobiles, and spectac­ ularly modern cities-its achievements were greater than those of most other states in Asia. Japanese city planners who failed to realize their dreams in Japan sought to do so in Manchukuo. Xinjing, for instance, was designed as a futuristic world-class city to showcase the progressive Japanese leadership of Asia. Indeed, the state was the precursor of the postwar Japanese "construction state" (doken kokka), endlessly building Manchukuo. 127

Other aspects of governmentality include the punctiliously detailed censuses and

72 r--> Chapter 2

surveys; the extensive and complex plans for settlements; the close attention to hygiene and welfare, making available education, drinkable water, and shelters; and the mobilization of the population for forced inoculations-sometimes at gun­ point.128 No state in the region had ever been so busy classifying, surveilling, manag­ ing, and directing the lives of the people. Suk-jung Han's important work has shown how the Ministry of Civil Affairs (Minzhengbu) under one-time warlord Zang Shiyi

pok[edl its nose into all realms of daily life, even examining bathroom designs of new buildings, dogs, carts, and checking the health conditions of prostitutes monthly . . . . Each provincial office was a small scale replication of the ministry with similar sections (such as personnel, finance, statistics, police, welfare, land, construction). The ministry sent a hundred directives annually to local officials for them to report on endless items (from the condition of roads to that of Confucian shrines) . . . . It also devised an extreme measure for directing local offices. It finally graded them for their achievement in various fields. 129

There is perhaps no better symbol of the antinomian structure of the modern state in Manchukuo than the police. According to Han, who is fascinated by the multifar­ ious and moralized role they were assigned, Manchukuo had a huge police force that was relatively well paid and regularly trained, and that engaged in every kind of supervisory, surveillance, regulatory, mobilizational, and educational activity. 130

Indeed, they appear to have occupied the much broader role of the polizeistaat, which according to Foucault heralded governmentality in eighteenth-century Europe.

The rationality at work in hygiene and welfare was also at work in the elaborately planned isolation of peasants in their hamlets, the cold-blooded science of human experimentation with lethal bacteria, and the mobilization of the population for a deadly war. But many modern states exhibited this duality. The governmentality that characterized Manchukuo was typical of the modern nondemocratic regimes of the inter-war years, such as fascist Italy, Nazi Germany, the Stalinist Soviet Union, and Japan. Even KMT China sought to emulate these examples. In contrast to the democratic regimes of the period, in which the functions of governmentality were distributed between state and nonstate organizations of civil society, in this other type of regime the administration itself and its extensions-what Gregory Kasza has called "administered mass organizations"-reached into every sector of the popula­ tion to control and manage. The particular combination of the state form and the fascistic regime form characterized the governmentality of Manchukuo. What made it different from other modern states was that it did not have the legitimacy of a nation. Governmentality does not eliminate the need for sovereignty, and sover­ eignty in the post-World War I era was increasingly embedded in the discourse of nationhood. The failure to secure recognition from the League on the basis of state rights pitted the Manchukuo government all the more against the deep claims made by Chinese nationalism. The story of Manchukuo--at least during the early

Manchukuo: A Historical Overview .--..J 73

phase-is the story of a state in search of a nation. Let me turn to one of its principal claims to be a sovereign nation: what it regarded as its prized innovation, the Con­ cordia Association.

Sovereignty, Mobilization, and the Concordia Association

In conception, the Concord of Nationalities, the doctrine of the Association, was supposed to be two stages ahead of the old colonial ideas of the nineteenth-century West. Not only was it supposed to reject exploitation and the reproduction of differ­ ence between ruler and ruled, it was also designed to counter the homogenization of differences produced by nationalism itself, which had led to such insoluble con­ flicts in the early twentieth century. By allegedly granting different peoples or nationalities their rights and self-respect under a state structure, it saw itself as a nation in the mode of the Soviet union of nationalities or today's multicultural nations.l3l But where in the eyes of a Yamaguchi or Tachibana or even an increas­ ingly sympathetic Ishiwara, the Concordia Association was to represent the will of the people and was ultimately destined to replace the Guandong Army, by mid­ decade it was purged of its original leadership and made into an instrument of the army and government. 132 It became less the means of ethnic, cultural, and occupa­ tional representation than of their surveillance and mobilization. Nonetheless, in the process, it could not avoid confronting the problem of identity politics of modern nationalism.

As a mediator between local structures and the center, the Concordia Association enrolled all officials, teachers, and imponant figures in society. Several scholars have referred to it as a totalitarian party, and indeed the Guandong Army decided against calling it a party precisely because patties were too closely associated with pattisan interests and hence insufficiently "total." According to the commander in chief of the Guandong Army, it was in theory "the ideological mother of government."133 Members often wore uniforms and served as propaganda agents, whether through making films, training youth, or organizing meetings, while also undenaking lower­ level administrative functions, such as surveillance and even labor mobilization dur­ ing the Pacific War. As an organ for mass mobilization, all youth aged sixteen to nineteen were compulsorily enrolled in the Concordia Youth League from April 1 937. McCormack notes that the Association's numbers grew from 1 million in early 1 938 to 4.28 million by June 1 943 (of a total population of approximately 40 million). I34 While the CCP enrolled 5 percent of the population, it enrolled over 1 0 percent.135 Gradually, as i n "administered mass organizations" o f this kind of regime, most of the population was organically woven into one pan or another of the Concordia Association structure.

The Concordia Association was also the nucleus of a fascistic corporatism. Ana­ lysts of fascism have used the notion of corporatism to describe the actualization of

74 r--J Chapter 2

twentieth-century fascist theories of "organic sociery" into social organizations that emphasized solidarity of the national community rather than competition between individuals or classes. The Concordia Association claimed to be both anticapitalist and anticommunist, and sought to overcome class and other divisions by organizing people through their communities. These communities were occupational or profes­ sional, cultural (generational, gendered) , and ethnic. Developed originally as a framework to represent the different ethnic communities, such as Mongols, Man­ chus, or Hui Muslims, the association was particularly important for mobilizing the support of the elites of these ethnicities who allegedly represented the masses in their communities. These elites were themselves often divided into an older, traditional group and a younger, modernizing one, reflecting a split within Concordia ideology.

Many Japanese ideologists, such as Tachibana, did not see any contradiction between the modern ideals of republicanism, equality, and modernization and "Eastern" values of community solidarity and the moral state (wangdao) . After all, had not Japan exemplified the synthesis and represented the best of both worlds? As Tachibana declared,

Since the Manchurian Incident, the warlord regime in the Northeast has collapsed. With this collapse, the 30 million people of Manchuria and Mongolia (Man-Mo) and the 300 million Chinese people have been liberated from the shackles of semifeudal­ ism. Moreover, this liberation has directly awakened the Asian essence (honshitsu) of Manchurian society. By turning to these traditions (dentoteki seikatsu shiso; literally, traditional life ideas) and self-governing capacities, a new oM (wangdao) nation has been created. Hence, the establishment of the oM nation-state possesses a historical and social inevitability. 136

Yet when these ideas were the bases not merely for talking points but for different interests and programs, the tensions were very real.

On the one hand, having declared its sovereignty to be founded upon the distinc­ tive and superior essence of Asia, the corporatism of the Concordia Association necessitated a notion of Asiatic traditionalism. This form of corporatism often strengthened the regime's control of local society because it preserved the existing power structure intact. It was similar to the baojia system of community self-surveil­ lance, an imperial Chinese method of local control that the Association also imple­ mented among the Han Chinese communities in Manchukuo. By the 1940s, the Concordia Association was organizing Hui mosque communities, Mongol lama monasteries, and Manchu villages, among others. To promote the goal of solidarity, the Association sought to emphasize the so-called values of communalism or kyodo­ tai within religion; to celebrate pan-Asianism, which they allegedly found even among Muslims and Central Asian peoples; and to support the religious leadership among these peoples, such as Mongol lamas, Manchu and Daur shamans, Muslim ahongs, Buddhist monks, and Confucian moralists. Thus traditional pan-Asianism was an important aspect of maintaining the specific nature of corporatist control in

Manchukuo: A Historical Overview ,-.. 75

this fascist regime. At the same time, we can see how the regime form in Manchukuo served to bolster or even produce its sovereignty claims based on the implicit com­ pact with conservative forces in the society.

However, the sovereignty claims of the regime also incorporated modernity; indeed the modernity of Asian tradition was implicit in the idea of the "kingly way." It was expressed most clearly in the forms of governmentality that characterized state power. We have already attended to the large-scale state projects of modernity such as cities, dams, ports, hygiene programs, five-year plans, and the like, whereby the modern state performs---or perhaps, calls up-the modernity through which it will legitimate its rule. James Holston writes,

Like prophets gathering flocks, modern states invent nations where they do not yet exist and create polities to which they later belong. And like prophets, they often do this inventing by means of public works that are supposed to demonstrate their capac­ ity to create an imagined, usually alternative future and to fashion new subjects and subjectivities for it. . . . [S]uch projects aim to cultivate the belief that states can pro­ duce the future-modern by accelerating histoty ("Fifty Years of Progress in Five") [and] dematerializing distance ("National Unification through Highway Construction"). 137

Technocrats, bureaucrats, and other modernizing elites tied in one way or another to state projects were the advocates of this vision.

It should not be forgotten that the Concordia Association was originally designed to realize a visionary modern polity. Many of its early recruits, especially among the younger elite of the minorities, turned out to be quite fiercely iconoclastic. Thus Mongol tribal youth who served in border armies were decidedly against the lama priests and demanded modern education. A Daur intellectual and member of the Association wrote a savage critique of shamanism. Even Japanese reformers were appalled at the massive state expenditures in building temples to Chinese gods such as Guandi and others. At the highest level, Chinese supporters of the regime were fiercely divided between those who wanted to keep Manchukuo a modern republic and those, such as Zheng Xiaoxu, who sought to make Puyi, the last Manchu emperor, an emperor once again-a goal they realized with the declaration of the Manchukuo Empire in 1 934. At the same time, even when subordinated to the Guandong Army, the state still needed the cooperation of modern elements among the Japanese, the Han, and the minorities in order to become strong and modern.

This tension was particularly apparent after the Pacific War. The Concordia Association became increasingly involved in the war effort, and through the forties one of its most important function was to encourage unrealistic increases in factory production while ensuring that workers did not rebel under these harsh conditions. Japanese representatives were quite candid about their dissatisfaction with this impossible task, and one member wrote in the society's journal Kyowa Undo that the fanatical need to increase production existed basically in the Japanese head alone!

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But what was most aggravating was the policy from about 1 942 of involving the religious or redemptive societies in this rwin effort to increase production and reduce tension. As a representative wrote in the same journal, the various religious organiza­ tions appeared to have very little comprehension of the goals of the mobilization campaign and refused to cooperate in the least. The ciry authorities now planned to change the format and use seminars and lectures to teach the activists of the redemp­ tive societies. 138

Although we can find this tension in its distilled form in the Concordia Associa­ tion, it characterized the state and sociery beyond it; we may think of it as the fault line in the ideology of this Asian fascist regime. The survival of the regime depended upon maintaining a balance berween, on the one hand, constructing a traditionalist corporatism and supporting redemptive societies, and, on the other, developing a modernizing project that was compatible with its state-building goals. Support from significant, but mutually hostile, communities depended upon the commitment to attaining both aims. Both were also crucial to the sovereignry claims of a state that was increasingly being recognized by other states.139 Thus the regime functions of fascist corporatism appealed to ideas of Asian essentialism, whereas the imperative of governmentality in this particular time and space called for a rhetoric of modern­ izing legitimation. While, as we have seen, this was a characteristic tension of the temporaliry of the modern nation-state, and was doubly intense for non-Western nations, in Manchukuo it was triply intense because Asianism was so central to its claim to sovereignry. Like several East Asian regimes around it, the Manchukuo state sought to resolve the tension by re-presenting the authentic tradition in such a way that it could exclude what it did not like. By so deploying the East Asian modern, the ideologists of the regime sought to contain the aporia of modern time and its particularly heavy political fallout. This containment effort often assumed-as we shall see below-the figure of the modernity-of-tradition.

In an effort to escape the judgment that forecloses or severely restricts so many stud­ ies of Manchukuo, I determined to de-compose the categories of political analysis so that we could arrive at a more differentiated understanding of the situation with­ out at the same time losing sight of the power structure in the regime. The underly­ ing question posed by this mode of analysis is whether the imperialist power structure implied by the terms puppet state, false Manzhouguo, and even informal empire played such an important role as to make the experience substantially com­ parable to a colonial one. Does the ability of power-holders to influence and manip­ ulate institutions and rhetoric overwhelm the effects of new institutions and policies in the changed domestic and international circumstances after World War I?

There are many ways in which power-holders are able to manipulate institutions not necessarily designed for their benefit. We can see this not only in the reduction of the autonomy of Manchukuo and the decision to go to war in Asia, but perhaps more strikingly through informal attitudes and everyday practices. Two recent and excellent Japanese studies by Yamamuro Shinichi and Komagome Takeshi both

Manchukuo: A Historical Overview ..---. 77

point to this factor as pivotal. For Komagome, the racialist ideology of the consan­ guineous descent group (ketsuzoku), identified with a unique Japanese people, tended to prevail over whatever other sentiments of affinity, built through cultural and linguistic ties, the Japanese may have felt with the peoples they came to colonize or dominate. No matter how radically sympathetic a Japanese activist in Manchuria may have been towards Chinese and others, it was, more often than not, premised upon a presumption of the acceptability of a naturally superior Japanese leader­ ship.140 Yamamuro points to the apparatus of control and the arbitrary authority of the police and the army. But he finds that the Japanese failure in Manchukuo lies less in the institutions they designed than in their attitudes and practices. The rheto­ ric of concord was contradicted in everyday practices such as the discrimination against Chinese in the military school or the consumption of ethnically differenti­ ated rationed items-rice for the Japanese, sorghum for Chinese-at the same table during the war. 141

To be sure, there is evidence that there were forces working for autonomy even within the power structure in Manchukuo. There were several occasions when spe­ cial Japanese rights were attacked by the Guandong Army, most notably in 1 936, when extraterritorial rights for Japanese citizens were abolished and a series of very real privileges began to unraveL The Japanese government also raised tariffs against the overwhelming exports from Manchukuo. 142 More recent research by Han, Young, and others takes seriously the Guandong Army's autonomy from the despised civilian governments at home-at least until the war in Asia. Nonetheless, these tendencies towards autonomy pale in comparison to the growing subordina­ tion of Manchukuo to the growing Japanese war machine.

The novelty of Manchukuo emerges from the institutional consequences of imperial nationalism in an emergent postcolonial time of mobilization and identity politics. Whether it be corporatist governmentality or the development of the "yen bloc," Manchukuo was considerably different from the colonial "night watchman state" or previous patterns of economic relationships between metropole and colony. Its locus as the site of the most advanced forms of design, mobilization, and experi­ mentation had as much to do with the changing climate, demands, and strategies of the globally ambitious military as with metropolitan Japanese discourses and atti­ tudes towards Manchuria. For many reformers and radical militarists, reform here was the starting point for reform in Japan.143 It was also different because of reasons "ex-centric" to the metropole. Because Manchukuo was created at a different time and space from the conquest of Taiwan and Korea, the Japanese military had to work with Chinese allies and employ Chinese political and ideological forms in the creation of the political system.

In a general sense, as an aspect of Japanese imperialism, Manchukuo was of a piece with Korea and Taiwan, and we shall explore their role in the East Asian mod­ ern in the concluding chapter. As Komagome has revealed, this imperialism con­ tained tendencies toward assimilation and alliance on the one hand, and racial exclusivism and reproduction of difference on the other.l44 But Manchukuo as a

78 ,-....., Chapter 2

multinational state was only conceivable after the March 1 9 1 9 Korean anticolonial movement, when groups both within the colonial regime and outside began to rethink the nature of Japanese expansionism. The need to avoid the repercussions of nationalism by seeking to co-opt it came to be intertwined with pan-Asianism, particularly after anti-immigration legislation in the United States and other devel­ opments in the 1 920s fueled the Japanese self-perception not only as imperialists, but as victims of Western imperialism. [45 Soon after World War I, elements in the military began to conceive of a "strategic autarky" within an economic defense perimeter. Thus, the logics of territory and economics, which fused into a new type of regional hegemony sought by the Japanese-justified in the language of an Asiatic Monroe Doctrine-found expression in Manchukuo.

In several ways, Manchukuo was more continuous with the informal empire in Manchuria before 1 93 1 than with Korea and Taiwan. As Tak Matsusaka has pointed out, many of the projects and policies carried out in Manchukuo, such as defense­ related industrialization, managed economy, utopianism, and "techno-national­ ism"-had been undertaken by the SMR long before 193 1 . Moreover, the plan for strategic autarky could never have been carried out without the partnership of Zhang Zuolin in the 1 920s.[46 When he withdrew from this alliance, those who founded Manchukuo had to find other, more malleable allies. While imperialism was cer­ tainly preserved in this hegemony, it also dictated relations between center and periphery different from those of the older colonies. The new program involved more alliance, autonomy, investment, development, identity, and competitiveness. In many ways, Manchukuo prefigured the phenomenon of a junior partner or a client state dominated by hegemonic states such as the United States and the Soviet Union in the postwar period.

What kind of nation was Manchukuo designed to be? Official writings insist upon the special character of Manchukuo nationality and its difference from the colonies well into the Pacific War. But it was clearly a weak sense of territorial nationality, emphasizing civilizational character, nationality policies, and, of course, the ties to Japan. Anonymous Hegelian dialecticians from the flagship Jianguo Uni­ versiry grappled with the relationship between nationality and the state.

All nationalities in their life-worlds (seken seikatsu) must progress from the simple to the complex, from the unenlightened to the enlightened. The organizations, institu­ tions, and culture of the various people express the spirit of universal citizenship (read, state) in form; but it is the special national character that determines the content. The objective existence of spirit is not exhausted (by this content); but it is external and moves from the outside to the inside. In the process, the institutions, organizations, and culture accept spirit, and national culture becomes the basis for the realization of spirit.I4?

The state would shape nationality, even as nationality was the basis of the state. In philosophy, mobilizational strategy, identity formation, the production of

Manchukuo: A Historical Overview r--.> 79

authenticity, and the representation of sovereignty, Manchukuo resembled the mod­ ern nation-state. These strategies drew upon circulating resources and the most sophisticated technologies in East Asia. But the goal or object of these techniques of producing authenticity and citizenship was open-ended, variable, and confused. Apart from loyalty to the state (jianguo), Manchukuo failed to settle upon a vision of community-ethnic nationality, civilization, Manchukuo nation or empire, Japa­ nese empire-because of the imperialist power structure and differences within it. In some ways, the regime "overimagined" the nation, presenting itself as the custo­ dian of whatever cultural practice could appear as authentic. By the same token, it gives us the oppottunity to examine these processes, not only in Manchukuo but in East Asia.

Notes

1 . I still use the term Northeast when I quote or cite authors who use that designation. 2. League of Nations Commission of Enquiry on Manchuria [Lytton Commission],

The Far Eastern Problem: Official Texts and Summary of the Lytton Report (Worcester, Mass.: New York Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Division of Intercourse and Educa­ tion, 1933), 63.

3. Roben H. G. Lee, The Manchurian Frontier in Ch'ing History (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1970), 1 84.

4. Mark C. Elliott, "The Limits of Tartary: Manchuria in Imperial and National Geog­ raphies," Journal of Asian Studies 59 (August 2000): 614. See also Mark C. Elliott, The Man­ chu Way: The Eight Banners and Ethnic Identity in Late Imperial China (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2001).

5. Caroline Humphrey, "Shamanic Practices and the State in Northern Asia: Views from the Center and Periphery," in Shamanism, History, and the State, ed. Nicholas Thomas and Caroline Humphrey (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1994), 191-228.

6. Elliott, "The Limits of Tartary," 619-24. 7. Owen Lattimore, Manchuria: Cradle of Conflict (New York: Macmillan, 1935),

39-42. 8. Lattimore, Manchuria, 4 1 . 9 . Lattimore, Manchuria, 60-61 , 70. Christopher Atwood has revealed that a good

many of Lattimore's ideas, particularly relating to the Mongols, derived from the views of Merse, a Daur Mongol intellectual and progressive Mongol nationalist; see Atwood, Young Mongols and Vigilantes in Inner Mongolia's Interregnum Decades, 1911-1931 (Leiden: Brill, fonhcoming).

10. Thomas Gottschang, "Economic Change, Disasters, and Migration: The Historical Case of Manchuria," Economic Development and Cultural Change 35 (1987): 461 .

1 1 . R. Lee, Manchurian Frontier, 78. 1 2. R. Lee, Manchurian Frontier, 1 13. 1 3. G. William Skinner, "Marketing and Social Structure in Rural China," Journal of

Asian Studies 24 (1964-65): 3-43, 195-228. 14. Yasutomi Ayumu, "Teikiichi to kenjo keizai-1930 nen zengo ni okeru Mansho

80 .-...... Chapter 2

noson shijo no tokucho" (The rural marketing system in Manchuria around 1930: Periodic markets and the economy of the county town) (paper submitted to Ajia Keizai 2002), 1-9.

15 . Yasutomi, "Teikiichi to kenjo keizai," 19. 16. R. Lee, Manchurian Frontier, 40-55, and Tessa Morris-Suzuki, "Through Ethno­

graphic Eyes" (unpublished paper, n.d.), 6-7. 17. Akamatsu Chijo and Akiba Takashi, Manmo no minzoku to shukyo (Peoples and reli­

gions of Manchuria and Mongolia) (Tokyo: n.p., 1939), 161-64. 18. V. K. Arseniev, Dersu the Trapper, trans. Malcolm Burr ( 1941 ; reprint, New York:

McPherson, 1996), 72-73. 19. R. Lee, Manchurian Frontier, 123, and Lattimore, Manchuria, 132-45. 20. R. Lee, Manchurian Frontier, 138-40. 2 1 . C. Walter Young, The International Relations of Manchuria: A Digest and Analysis of

Treaties, Agreements, and Negotiations Concerning the Three Eastern Provinces of China (Chi­ cago: University of Chicago Press, 1929), 136-52.

22. Kang Chao, The Economic Development of Manchuria: The Rise of a Frontier Economy (Ann Arbor: Center for Chinese Studies, 1982), 5. Chao believes that the reported population increase-from roughly 7 million to 17 million-is likely to be an exaggeration and probably represents a considerable underestimate of the population before that date.

23. Chao, Economic Development of Manchuria, 7. 24. F. C. Jones, Manchuria since 1931 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1949), 7-8,

and Gavan McCormack, Chang Tso-lin in Northeast China, 1911-1928: China, Japan, and the Manchurian Idea (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1977), 7.

25. Chao, Economic Development of Manchuria, 10. 26. Lattimore, Manchuria, 260. 27. McCormack, Chang Tso-lin, 7. 28. Jones, Manchuria since 1931, 12. 29. McCormack, Chang Tso-lin, 7-8. 30. Jeremy Adelman and Stephen Aron, "From Borderlands to Borders: Empires,

Nation-States and the Peoples in Between in North American History," American Historical Review 104 (June 1999).

3 1 . McCormack, Chang Tso-lin, 16-18. 32. McCormack, Chang Tso-lin, 59-72. 33. See also the recent study by Ronald Suleski, Civil Government in Warlord China:

Tradition, Modernization, and Manchuria (New York: Peter Lang, 2002). Suleski reveals just how much Zhang was indebted to Wang Yongjiang for developing the economic and fiscal base of the region. For details of administrative reform, see chaps. 3 and 4.

34. McCormack, Chang Tso-lin, 79. 35. McCormack, Chang Tso-lin, 223. 36. McCormack, Chang Tso-lin, 253. 37. Mitter, Manchurian Myth, 132-34, and ZDLSG, 54-56. For an excellent account of

the making of Chinese nationalism and its growth during the 1920s, see James H. Carter, Creating a Chinese Harbin: Nationalism in an International City, 1916-1932 (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2002). Albeit focused on the city of Harbin, Carter's discussion of the growth of nationalism and its subsequent unraveling after 1928, as the interests of radical nationalists and security-seeking merchants began to diverge, is also relevant more generally to the region. He finds that many of the officials who had promoted this nationalism in the 1920s also promoted the new nationalism of Manchukuo in the 1930s.

Manchukuo: A Historical Overview .--... 81

38. ZDLSG, 27-30, and Jones, Manchuria since 1931, 17-18. 39. Westel W. Willoughby, The Sino-Japanese Controversy and the League ofNatiom (Bal­

timore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1935), 400. 40. See Yosuke Matsuoka, The Manchurian Question: Japan's Case in the Sino-Japanese

Dispute as Presented before the League of Nations, Observations of the Japanese Government on the Report of the Commission of Inquiry, Memorandum of the Japanese Delegation (Geneva: League of Nations, 1933), 27-28.

4 1 . League of Nations Commission ofInquiry, Far Eastern Problem, 60-63; Willoughby, Sino-Japanese Controversy, 385.

42. League of Nations Commission of Inquiry, cited in Willoughby, Sino-Japanese Con­ troversy, 387.

43. This was also because it was an anticommunist report. 44. League of Nations Commission of Inquiry, Far Eastern Problem, 80; Willoughby,

Sino-Japanese Controversy, 404. 45. League of Nations Commission of Inquiry, Far Eastern Problem, 8 1 . 46. Willoughby, Sino-Japanese Controversy, 399. 47. Matsuoka, Manchurian Question, 25-26. 48. Matsuoka, Manchurian Question, 28. 49. Matsuoka, Manchurian Question, 47. 50. Matsuoka, Manchurian Question, 48. 5 1 . Matsuoka, Manchurian Question, 65. 52. League of Nations Commission ofInquiry, Far Eastern Problem, 62. Matsuoka, Man­

churian Question, 19-20. 53. Chih Meng, China Speaks: On the Conflict between China and Japan (New York:

Macmillan, 1932), 4. For Willoughby see Hatsue Shinohara, "Forgotten Crusade: The Quest for a New International Law" (Ph.D. diss., University of Chicago, 1996), 6 1 .

54. Chih Meng, China Speaks, 182. 55. Chih Meng, China Speaks, S . 56. Chih Meng, China Speaks, 65. 57. Feng Jiasheng, "Wode yanjiu dongbei shidi de jihua" (My research plan of the his­

tory and geography of the Northeast) Yugong 1 , no. 10 (1934): 2-6. 58. Wang Qingyu, Dongbei wenti (The problem of the Northeast) (Shanghai: shangwu

chubanshe, 1931 ), and Hua Qiyun, Manmeng wenti (The problems of Manchuria and Mon­ golia) (Shanghai: Dadong shuju, 1931) . Fu Sinian, Dongbei Shigang (Outline of Northeast History), 1932, in The Complete Works of Fu Sinian, vol. 5, 74-85. Taipei: Lianjing Press, 1980.

59. Gu Jiegang, "Qin-Han tongyide youlai he zhanguoren duiyu shijiede xiangxiang" (The origins of Qin-Han unification and the image of the world during the Warring States) (1926; reprint in Gushibian, ed. Gu Jiegang, vol. 2., no. 1 , Beijing: Pu she, 1930), 1-6.

60. Wu Shangquan, Dongbei dili yu minzu shengcunzhi guanxi (The relationship of the geography of the Northeast and the survival of the nation) (Chongqing: Duli chubanshe, 1944), 57-68.

6 1 . Soren Clausen and Stig Thogersen, The Making of a Chinese City: History and Histori­ ography in Harbin (New York: Sharpe, 1996), 9.

62. See also Hatada Takashi, Chugoku sonraku to kyodotai riron (Chinese villages and the theory of village community) (Tokyo: Iwanami shoten, 1976), and Nishimura Shigeo, Chu-

82 .--.. Chapter 2

goku kindai tohoku chiyushi kenkyu (A regional history of Northeast China) (Kyoto: Haritsu bunkasha, 1984), 2, 234-54.

63. NaitO's views on Manchuria and Manchukuo were quite ambivalent. In 1922, he had written that Manchuria was under Chinese sovereignty, but he was of the opinion that it was so because Japan had wrested it back ftom Russia. He regarded Manchukuo as the realization of a multiethnic and nonmilitarist state, but believed strongly that it had to be a Sino-Japanese partnership, a cooperative venture nourished in its own national conditions. However, he came to fear and mistrust the Guandong Army and refused to provide his knowledge to the propagandists of wangdao; see Joshua Fogel, Politics and Sinology: The Case of Naito Konan, 1866-1934 (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1984), 252-60.

64. Chianbu keisatsushi (Law and Order Ministty, Police Department), ed., Komin (Cit- izen) (Shinkya: Manshiikoku tosha kabushiki geisha, 1940), 2-4.

65. League of Nations Commission of Inquiry, Far Eastern Problem, 63. 66. Gu Jiegang, "Qin-Han tongyide youlai," 4-5. 67. Laurence A. Schneider, Ku Chieh-kang and China's New History: Nationalism and the

Quest for Alternative Traditiom (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1971) , 293. 68. Recently, the views of younger Chinese scholars appear to be changing. In personal

conversations at least, they are prepared to acknowledge the higher levels of achievement in aspects of modernization such as life expectancy and information gathering in Manchukuo and Taiwan as compared with mainland China during the Republic. Indeed, one scholar believes that censuses in Manchukuo were more comprehensive than those conducted on the mainland in 1990. He has, however, yet to publish these findings.

69. Mark Peattie has suggested that Ishiwara Kanji, the architect of Manchukuo, could be described as a "military fascist"; see Mark R. Peattie, lshiwara Kdnji and Japan 's Confronta­ tion with the West (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1975), 253-54.

70. Yoshihisa Tak Matsusaka, The Making of Japanese Manchuria, 1904-1932 (Cam­ bridge: Harvard University Press, 2001), 214-23. The security argument was underpinned by the rising threat of communism in China and Korea and the expectation of inevitable confrontation with the Soviet Union. Note here the way in which the argument for territorial security becomes a rationale for territorial expansion, how nationalism and imperialism were inseparable in this thinking.

7 1 . Komagome Takeshi suggests that this decision should be seen in the trajectory of Japanese failed experiments with the participation of the colonized in government, particu­ larly in Korea; see Shokuminchi Teikoku Nippon no Bunka logo (The cultural integration of the Japanese colonial empire) (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 1996), 236-37.

72. Yamamuro Shinichi, J(jmera: Mamhokoku no shozii (Chimera: A portrait of Manz­ houguo) (Tokyo: Chua karonsha, 1993), 42-48.

73. Peattie, lshiwara Kdnji, 167, 281 , 335. Note, however, that the special privilege of Japan and the supreme power of the Guandong Army was preserved by the signing between Japan and Manchukuo of two treaties, secretly settled beforehand; see Yamamuro, Kimera, 162.

74. Tessa Morris-Suzuki, Re-inventing Japan: Time, Space, Nation (London: Sharpe, 1998), 97-101 ; L. Young, Japan 's Total Empire, 203-5, 221-27. Many of these people were associated with the Showa Research group.

75. One of the old questions of the historiography on Japanese expansion into Asia after the Manchurian Incident of 1931 is the extent to which the civilian government and the

Manchukuo: A Historical Overview ,.-.. 83

military headquatters in Japan were involved in its premediration. While scholars like James Crowley ( I966) emphasized the impottance of autonomous actions by local military officers, especially of the Guandong Army, others, such as Gavan McCormack, have preferred to view Japanese expansionism as a long-term process that preceded such unilateral milirary action. Louise Young's recent work leaves no doubt of the many sectors of society---especially the mass media-involved in whipping up mass suppott and even hysteria within Japan for the intervention in Manchuria. See James B. Crowley, Japan s Quest for Autonomy: National Security and Foreign Policy, 1930-1938 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1 966); McCormack, Chang Tso-lin; and L. Young, Japans Total Empire.

76. Yamamuro, Kimera, 14-1 5. 77. Yamamuro, Kimera, 99-10 1 . 78. Gavan McCormack, "Manchukuo: Vision, Plan, and Reality" (unpublished paper,

1 987), 4, and Yamamuro, Kimera, 94-95. 79. Lincoln Li, The China Factor in Modern Japanese Thought: The Case of Tachibana

Shiraki, 1991-1945 (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1 996), 1 7. 80. Li, China Factor, 1 04, and Yamamuro, Kimera, 1 13-17. 8 1 . Li, China Factor, 13 . 82. Li, China Factor, 46. 83. Ito Takeo, Lifo along the South Manchurian Railway: The Memoirs of Ito Takeo, trans.

Joshua A. Fogel (Armonk, N.Y.: Sharpe, 1 988), 1 1 8-20; Kenichiro Hirano, "The Japanese in Manchuria 1 906-1931: A Study of the Historical Background of Manchukuo" (Ph.D. cUss., Harvard University, 1 983), 400-403; and Li, China Factor, 49.

84. McCormack, "Manchukuo: Vision, Plan, and Reality," 4. 85. Hirano, "Japanese in Manchuria," 407; Komagome, Shokuminchi Teikoku Nippon no

Bunka TOgo, 25 1-52; and Jones, Manchuria since 1931, 1 72-74. For biographical sketches of some of the military men and Yu Chonghan and details of provincial administrative reforms, see Suleski, Civil Government in Warlord China, 1 0-20.

86. ZDLSG, 304. 87. Mitrer, Manchurian Myth, 95; Hirano, "Japanese in Manchuria," 403-4; Li, China

Factor, 57. 88. Hirano, "Japanese in Manchuria," 419. 89. Mitter, Manchurian Myth, 1 02-1 1 0. See also Suleski, Civil Government in Warlord

China, 1 93-201 , for the extent to which the warlord government had been dependent on local control over county officials and elites for their activities.

90. Yasutomi Ayumu and Fukui Chie, Mamha no kenryatsilken (Manchuria and county currencies) (paper submitted to Ajia Keizai, 2002).

9 1 . Yamamuro, Kimera, 228. Scholars have speculated about why Pu Yi was subsequently made emperor. Actually, Pu Yi himself was quite disappointed at not having been made emperor in 1 932. Many of his Chinese suppotters, led by Prime Minister Zheng Xiaoxu, sought to reinsrate him as emperor, but were opposed by other Chinese republican groups as well as the Youth Alliance and the Daiyuhokai; see Hirano, "Japanese in Manchuria," 409, and Yamamuro, Kimera, 1 5 1 . His instatement as emperor in 1 934 was, according to Yama­ muro, due to pressure from other colonial administrators to make his position more consis­ tent with the Japanese imperial system and thereby facilirate greater Japanese control of Manchukuo; see Yamamuro, Kimera, 226-27.

92. ZDLSG, 277-280, and Jones, Manchuria since 1931, 41-42.

B4 � Chapter 2

93. Jones, Manchuria since 1931, 26. 94. Janis Mimura, "From 'Manchukuo' to Japan's 'New Order': Bureaucratic Visions of

a Totalitarian State" (unpublished paper, 1999), 1 1-15 . 95 . ZDLSG, 95-97, and Jones, Manchuria since 1931, 25 . 96. ZDLSG, 100. 97. Hirano, "Japanese in Manchuria," 419-23, and Jones, Manchuria since 1931, 26. 9B. Chianbu keisatsushi, Kamin, 4 1 . 99. Chianbu keisatsushi, Kamin, 54-55.

100. The rural sector remained sluggish through the period. 101 . Kungtu C. Sun with Ralph W Huenemann, The Economic Development of Manchuria

in the First Half of the Twentieth Century (Cambridge, Mass.: East Asian Research Center, Harvard University, 1969), 101-2.

102. Young, fapan 's Total Empire, I B3-B4, 213-15; Jones, Manchuria since 1931, 139. 103. Although at the height of the campaign to encourage rural settlement it was hoped

that as many as five million Japanese settlers would migrate to Manchukuo by the mid-1940s, the rural settler population from Japan never did exceed 250,000. Potential settlers appeared to have a good enough idea of the harsh conditions of settlement among a hostile Chinese population who had often lost land to these alien settlers, and of the difficulties of learning a new terrain and climate while also engaging in military defense. Obviously, this knowledge was sufficient to dampen their enthusiasm for the whipped-up patriotic campaign to settle in Manchukuo; see Young, Japan 's Total Empire.

104. Gottschang, "Economic Change, Disasters, and Migration," 465; Jones, Manchuria since 1931, 169-70.

105. Young, fapan 's Total Empire, 240. 106. Ito, Lift along the South Manchurian Railway, 134-5 1 . 107. Sun, Economic Development of Manchuria, 76-7B. Lattimore observed early in the

regime that the Guandong Army's vision was not to have direct colonialism, but to create an "economic bloc." This demanded the ruthless subordination of the Manchurian economy "to forms that will supplement but not compete with the interests of Japan; but it also demands the suppression of interests in Japan which have a natural appetite for exploiting a region like Manchuria by extracting its wealth and transferring it to Japan"; see Lattimore, Manchuria, 306.

lOB. Ito, Lift along the South Manchurian Railway, 1 52-55, and Jones, Manchuria since 1931, 145-47.

109. Sun, Economic Development of Manchuria, BO-B l , and Jones, Manchuria since 1931, 146-48.

1 10. Jones, Manchuria since 1931, 14B, and ZDLSG, 313-19. 1 1 1 . See Sun, Economic Development of Manchuria, for figures. 1 12. Compare Jones, Manchuria since 1931, 1 57, with Sun, Economic Development of

Manchuria, 82. 1 13. Jones, Manchuria since 1931, 139. Jones believes that the cost of war to the people

in Manchukuo was perhaps comparable (though not more than) to that borne by the people in Japan themselves.

1 14. ZDLSG, 300-304, Myers, "Creating a Modern Enclave Economy," 1 5B, 155 . 1 1 5. ZDLSG, 13 1-3B, 317-20. 1 16. Gavan McCormack, "Manchukuo: Constructing the Past," East Asian History 2

(December 1991) : 122.

Manchukuo: A Historical Overview ,-...., 85

1 17. ZDLSG, 304. 1 18. McCormack, "Manchukuo: Constructing the Past," 1 19-20. 1 19. ZDLSG, 60-76, 190-210. 120. See Lee Chong-sik, Revolutionary Struggle in Manchuria: Chinese Communism and

Soviet Interest, 1922-1945 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1983); Nishimura, Chu­ goku kindai tohoku chiyushi kenkyu; and McCormack, "Manchukuo: Constructing the Past."

1 2 1 . ZDLSG, 160-74; Lee, Revolutionary Struggle in Manchuria, 271 . 1 22. ZDLSG, 380-84. 123. Clausen and Thogersen, Making of a Chinese City, 120. The brutality and ruthless­

ness of the Japanese military is not in question, as it may be for the Japanese right wing. The nationalist lenses through which we have approached the understanding of this brutality is, however, quite limiting. There is often an assumption that these kinds of acts were a product of Japanese national character or something intrinsic to the Japanese. This is no more prov­ able than it is for any other systematic act of violence by any people. Moreover, this kind of essentialist allegation tends only to reproduce the cycle of hostile or resentful nationalist consciousness, obscuring the will to see these acts of barbarism in cross-nationally discursive, political, and institutional terms.

1 24. Beginning around 1935 we see the decline of the plunder function and a rise in the developmental function. This is reversed in 1937, and once again there is a rise in the devel­ opmental function in 1939. With the Pacific War in 194 1 , the developmental function begins to decline steeply. See Nishimura Shigeo, "Research in Japan on the History of North-East China: Present State and Problems," trans. Gavan McCormack (unpublished manuscript, 1992), 10-14.

125. Foucault, "Political Technology of Individuals," 147. 1 26. Foucault, "Political Technology ofIndividuals," 160. 1 27. David Vance Tucker, "Building 'Our Manchukuo': Japanese City Planning, Archi­

tecture, and Nation-Building in Occupied Northeast China" (Ph.D. diss., University ofIowa, 1999), 27-28. Tucker believes the Manchukuo state was the "metaphorical precursor" for a "people that existed only in a metaphorical sense." See also David D. Buck, "Railway City and National Capital: Two Faces of the Modern in Changchun," in Remaking the Chinese City: Modernity and National Identity, 1900-1950, ed. Joseph Esherick (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 2000); Jones, Manchuria since 1931, 54, 1 57, 207-13; and Lattimore, Man­ churia, 260, 264.

1 28. Han, "Puppet Sovereignty," esp. chaps. 3 and 4. 1 29. Han, "Puppet Sovereignty," 10. 130. Han, "Puppet Sovereignty," 122-30. 13 1 . See, for instance, the authorless and limited circulation publication entitled Soren no

minzoku seisaku (Soviet nationality policy) (Shinky6: Kenkoku Daigaku kenkyuin kan, 1940). In Tachibana's original plan for a national assembly, later rejected by the Guandong Army, the apportionment of seats was to follow the ratio: Han 7, Manchu 3, Korean 2, Muslim 2, Mongol 2, Japanese 7, and white (Russian) 1 . However, a general principle of representation was maintained within the bureaucracy and for mobilization purposes; see Komagome, Sho­ kuminchi Teikoku Nippon no Bunka Togo, 262.

132. Peanie, Ishiwara Ivmji, 171 , 174. 1 33. Cited in ZDLSG, 1 80; Jones, Manchuria since 1931, 50. 134. McCormack, "Manchukuo: Constructing the Past," 5.

86 ..-.. Chapter 2

135. ZDLSG, 177. 136. Tachibana, quoted in Yamamuro, Kimera, 1 1 5-16. 1 37. James Holston, "Alternative Modernities: Statecrafr and Religious Imagination in the

Valley of the Dawn," American Ethnologist 26 (August 1999): 605. 1 38. Fujiwara Kazuo, "Hoten ni okeru shokuba kojo undo no genjo" (The circumstances

of the workplace labor movement in Fengtian [Mukden]), Kyowa undo 5 (September 1 943), 43-47.

139. Manchukuo was recognized by Japan, El Salvador, the Vatican, Italy, Germany, Poland, Rumania, Bulgaria, Finland, Hungary, and Thailand; see Tucker, "Building 'Our Manchukuo,' '' 93-94, n. 33.

140. Komagome, introduction to Shokuminchi Teikoku Nippon no Bunka TOgo. Mariko Tamanoi has written a sensitive study of different Japanese identities in Manchukuo, includ­ ing peasant immigrants, students, and officials; see "Knowledge, Power, and Racial Classifi­ cations: The 'Japanese' in 'Manchuria,' '' journal of Asian Studies 59 (May 2000): 248-76.

14 1 . Yamamuro, Kimera, 279-80. 142. Han, "Puppet Sovereignty," 257-58; Young, japan's Total Empire, 205, 2 1 1 . 1 43. Young, japan 's Total Empire, 227. 144. For Komagome, Japanese nationalism was, as is well known, at the heatt of its impe­

rialism. At the same time, he is more aware than most other critics of the different possibilities in the Japanese political system and of its integrative tendencies, based on assimilation (diika) by language and culture. But whenever the question of incorporating a colony appeared, the exclusionary principle of blood descent raised its head by inventing new forms of institu­ tional, legal, or even attitudinal exclusion of non-Japanese in the empire. Imperial ideology made for a powerful and efficacious nationalism within what came to be thought of as the national core or inner territories (naichi) of Japan, but was unable to find sufficient cultural resources within to negate or transcend itself when this nationalism became expansionist in the outer territories (gaichi). Komagome thus wants to investigate the hypothesis that "in the histoty of imperial Japan's colonial domination of other people, the opponunity for the self­ negation of nationalism carries within it a clarification of the deepening contradiction within this nationalism"; see Shokuminchi Teikoku Nippon no Bunka TOgo, 8.

145 . See Oguma Eiji, "The Green of the Willow, the Flower's Scarlet: Public Debate on the U.S. Exclusion Movement and the Colonization of Korea under the Japanese Empire," trans. Joseph Murphy (unpublished paper).

146. Matsusaka, Making of japanese Manchuria, 393-95, 403. 147. Soren no minzoku seisaku, 1-2.

PA R T T W O

CIVILIZAT ION AND SOVEREIGNTY

CHAPTER T H R E E

Asianism and the New Discourse of Civilization

Since the Japanese have occupied Liaoning, the people have been terrified. Every day, the planes belonging to the other side (the Japanese) fly over the counties to conduct surveillance exercises. The noise is deafening and makes the people still more afraid. Further, since the merchant militias and police have surrendered, bandits have arisen and occupied the railroads and stations, dis­ rupting communications. The other side has posted notices announcing that they sent their army because our government officials had exploited and harmed the people. They say that if we honestly obey their benevolent government, it will be fine. Although they will continue armed activities, they will not harm the merchants and the people. This has pacified the people a bit.

In each place they have taken over the fine buildings. Since ours is old and decrepit, it has not been occupied, and as they have not entered the interior, the spirit of Laozi (Laozi zhi ling) is as it was before. We dare not stop our work. Yesterday, we provided relief to over 250 refugees who had come up the river. This time it was fine, but whether or not we will be able to continue our work without harassment in the future is still unknown.

-Shijie Hongwanzihui Zhonghua zonghui dangan, September 29, 193 1

S o reported a n anxious follower of the Hongwanzihui (Red Swastika Society) to his superiors in Beiping in the immediate aftermath of the Manchurian Incident in Sep­ tember 1 93 1 . Another report from the same branch says,

Before we were able to devise a plan for relief work in the war areas, the enemy had already assembled the gentry and the professions. The ciry government called a meet­ ing of all the groups (jie) in the localities regarding the mobilization of relief funds and efforts. The moneys were determined by discussion among the groups and the leader­ ship of each group bore the responsibiliry.

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Again, the report ends with the fear that good charitable organizations might have to stop their independent activities. 1 These reports speak to many issues: the terrors of war, the constant threat to noncooperation with bombers close at hand, the deser­ tion by existing authorities, the early start of corporatist organizing, the mobilization of the elite, and, not least, the concerns of our reporters. I am particularly struck by their twin concerns about the ability to continue the work of public salvation and the possible desecration of the spirit of Laozi, which animated all their activities.

Our reporters, it turned out, did not need to worry overly much about the sur­ vival of their society. Apparently around the same time, a rumor began to circulate among the Society's members and others that Laozi had prophesied the Incident as a new beginning. After what had been a disastrous period for these societies with the KMT's Northern Expedition, the launching of the anti superstitious movement, and the ban on most "redemptive societies" between 1 928 and 1931 (detailed below), many among them were prepared to welcome a new beginning.2 Whatever the actual details of the fit, it was, as Takizawa Toshihiro pointed out, an unexpected and timely opportunity for the Japanese to garner support from these popular ele­ ments. Tachibana was prepared to seize it. The opening salvo of his volume on Dao­ ism opposed the view of Christian missionaries that "there is no religion in China," declaring, "the Chinese nationality is a religious nationality."3 The Japanese not only permitted organizations such as the Red Swastika or the Morality Society to continue their work, they emerged stronger after Manchukuo and the Japanese occupation of the mainland than they had ever been. They were at the forefront of relief work after the Nanjing massacre in 1 937, and the Red Swastika Society in particular became the largest welfare organization in Shanghai during the transi­ tional years 1 945 to 1 949. The religious passion informing their work has eluded many historians, but the Japanese-backed regime not only recognized it, they uti­ lized it to the hilt.

While the Red Swastika Society cadres may have been concerned about their work of salvation, their mission would come to be folded into a discourse of civiliza­ tion. Although the new regime was bent on modernization to secure its goals, the rhetoric of tradition and Eastern civilization was the most important means to secure local allies and sovereignty claims. "The Government derives its authority from Heaven, as mirrored in the Popular Will. . . . The essence of the Wang-tao Govern­ ment exists in the realization of ideal government based on theocracy (the Unity of Gods and Man)" declared Prince Konoye, adapting Mencian ideas of Heaven's mandate.4 Ishiwara had proclaimed the "righteous duty" (seigi, zhengyz) to save the East, and Tachibana had spoken of "Asian essence." They all recognized the power of the old cultural universe in the establishment of the new poliry. The Manchukuo regime was forced, by the circumstance of being an imperialist power in a national form, to exaggerate the transnational, civilizational source of its ideals. But it is pre­ cisely this exaggeration that reveals to us the importance of civilizational discourse in the sovereignty claims of anti-imperialist nationalism generally.

Asianism and the New Discourse of Civilization <---' 9 1

A Genealogy of Civilization

It is perhaps not difficult to understand why the Manchukuo regime sought to trans­ form older, but living, cultural ideals and ptocesses into symbols of civilizational authenticity. As custodians (and interpreters) of this authenticity, it could claim sov­ ereignty vis-a.-vis the outside world while building alliances within and deploying "civilizational" groups to consolidate state and regime power. But why and how ideas of civilization developed a salience and authorizing power at this time requires understanding in a wider, global framework.

Like all social concepts, "civilization" has varied with time and place, and I can only define it minimally, as expressive of the relationship of Self to Other­ particularly a relationship in which the civilized Self embodies the ideals of a macro­ societal order. Here I will undertake to reveal the salient differences, ultimately relevant to Manchukuo and East Asia, that emerged over the last century or so.

The relationship between nations and civilizations transformed sometime during or at the end of World War I. From the mid-nineteenth century until that time, the signifier Civilization had become established as a singular and universal phenome­ non in much of the world. I capitalize the term in order to specify the European Enlightement conception of civilization. During much of the nineteenth century, Western imperial nations invoked the signifier to justify their conquest as a civilizing mission. Whole continents were subjugated and held in thrall because they were not constituted as civilized nations (to be a nation was to be civilized, and vice versa). Of course, the idea that there were civilizations other than that of Europe or Chris­ tendom had been around from at least the late eighteenth century, but during the nineteenth century the singular conception of Civilization, based originally upon Christian and Enlightenment values, came not only to be dominant but to be the criterion whereby sovereignty could be claimed in the world. In this way, it also became clear that to be a nation was to belong to a higher, authorizing order of civilization. 5

Arising in the context of European domination of the non-Western world, this conception could be specifically found in the legal language of various "unequal treaties" and its interpretation by the international lawyers of the time. At an explicit level, the term Civilization in these treaties and interpretations referred principally to the ability and willingness of states to protect life, property, and freedoms as rights (particularly for foreigners), but this usage necessarily also presupposed and demanded the institutions, goals, values, and practices of the modern European state, ranging from the pursuit of material progress to Civilized manners and cloth­ ing. By the late nineteenth century, international law and its standard of civilization became increasingly positivist, and reflected the social Darwinist conception that certain races were more civilized than others. While a hierarchy of races with differ­ ent capacities to achieve civilization seemed natural, it should be noted that the notion of Civilization did not theoretically preclude the ability of a "race" to become civilized.6

92 ........, Chapter 3

At the same time, an alternative view of civilization-the beginnings of what Lucien Febvre called "the ethnographic conception"-had emerged in Europe of the 1 820s and '30s, particularly in the ideas of Herder and Alexander von Hum­ boldt.? During the latter half of the nineteenth century, this Germanic counter­ evolutionary strain coexisted with several other discourses within the penumbra of the hegemonic conception of Civilization. Most significant among these discourses in Asia were the older imperial Chinese conception of wenming; the Christian, and particularly Jesuit, valorization of Chinese civilization; the tradition of Orientalist scholarship of Sir William Jones and others in Bengal; and the world Buddhist revival.8 Douglas Howland has elegaically documented the death of the imperial Chinese notion of the civilized world, or wenming, when the exchanges berween Chinese and Japanese diplomats conducted through "brush-talk"-signifYing mas­ tery, and thereby affirmation, of the world of the written character-became evi­ dently irrelevant to the Japanese and the world around them. Nonetheless, even as Fukuzawa Yukichi was exhorting Japan to escape from Asia (Datsua) and become Civilized, both Japanese and Chinese were reworking vestigial expressions of the old Chinese notions of common civilization (tongwenldobun, tongjiaoldokyo) and impro­ vising upon these ideas under the influence of contemporary social Darwinism, as seen in the neologism tongzhongldoshu, or common race.9 While these efforts at the turn of the century may have been intended to create an alternative East Asian civili­ zation, they were still closely associated with the European ideas underlying Civiliza­ tion. At any rate they did not make much headway.

Also relevant to the transformation of the conception of civilization was the idea of a world religion. Heinz Bechert has identified the emergence of "Buddhist mod­ ernism" in the last quarter of the nineteenth century, beginning with the Christian­ Buddhist debates in Sri Lanka, the initiatives taken by Sri Lankan Buddhists and their Western supporters in the Theosophical Society, and the forging of interna­ tional links berween Buddhists in Sri Lanka, Japan, and the West. Indeed, Sri Lankans and Japanese Buddhist thinkers have remained in the forefront of contribu­ tions to contemporary Buddhist thought.10 James Ketelaar has demonstrated how Japanese Buddhism could survive the persecution of a new Shinto national cult dur­ ing the Meiji period only by refashioning itself as a world religion. In all of these cases, the end product resembled much less any particular or lived experience of Buddhism or Hinduism than an abstract, rationalized, modernized, and, perhaps most of all, Christianized body of thought that served to represent the core of another civilization. Central to this development was the 1 893 Chicago Congress of World Religions, in which these traditions first gained publicity-indeed, were pub­ licly produced as world religions. 1 1

By the time of World War I , the German counter-evolutionary intellectual tradi­ tion produced what may have been the most important statement of the new con­ ception of civilization, Oswald Spengler's Decline of the West. Ironically, if not unexpectedly, Spengler does not refer to the entities of his world history as civiliza­ tions, but as Cultures, or Kultur. This is because he reserves the term civilization for

Asianism and the New Discourse of Civilization r--> 93

the final, frozen stage of a dynamic, evolving Culture. 1 2 For our purposes, his cul­ tures are equivalent to what we have been calling the alternative conception of civili­ zation: multiple, spiritual, and-as the highest expression of a people's achievements, virtues, and authenticity-authorizing. At the moment of German defeat in war, the Germanic notion of Kultur gained a significant victoty over the notion of a universal Civilization that measured value only according to certain Western standards of progress.

The triumph of the alternative civilization must be grasped in relation to that other triumph of the world system of nation-states and nationalism as a global ideol­ ogy, which ironically required the conception of a transcendent civilization. But Spengler's notions are important partly because they were vety influential in global discourse (relayed to the English speaking world by Arnold Toynbee) and thus con­ structive of this new discourse of civilization. They clarified the inchoate shapes that had hovered in the penumbra of Civilization. Moreover, I believe it is important to recognize that the new discourse of civilization--especially Eastern civilization-was affirmed in the West before it was confirmed in Asia. In this sense too, civilization remains a postcolonial concept.

In his sweeping vision of the new world history, Spengler lays out the basic fea­ tures that have endured in our understanding of civilization to this day. First is the critique of linear history based on the ancient-medieval-modern division, which rigs the stage to make the rest of the world turn around the "little part-world" that is Europe. 13 In its place, Spengler traces many mighty Cultures developing upon the model of organisms, each undergoing its own temporal cycle of rise and decline in isolation from the others. Spengler not only presents Cultures as autochthonous, but by distinguishing the new history from science, he also confirms the irreducible authority of Culture/civilization.

For Spengler, each Culture is a fundamentally spiritual or ideal phenomenon, authoritatively distinct from other Cultures. This ideational quality would become, or perhaps already reflected, the most salient characteristic of the new conception of civilization. Ideas of Eastern versus Western civilizations, which increasingly accom­ panied the Great War, were premised upon this ideal of civilizational spirituality. In the West, the most influential scholar to propagate and develop these ideas was Arnold Toynbee. In the course of over forty years (1 920s-1 960s) he wrote the twelve volumes of A Study of World History, which broke with the vestigial progressivist vision of (essentially Western) civilization.14 But perhaps most significant was Toyn­ bee's conception of the role of religion in civilizations. In contrast to Gibbon and others who often associated Christianity with barbarism as the destroyer of Civiliza­ tion, Toynbee, in his earlier volumes, already viewed religion as a kind of aid to civilization, as a chrysalis that preserved features of an older civilization. By the 1 940s, he began to see the rise and fall of civilizations as subsidiary to the growth of religion.ls In the final years of his life, Toynbee was drawn to ideas of a common global civilization originating in the technological achievements of the West, but spiritually regenerated by the major world civilizations. It is not surprising to find

94 ..---.-.. Chapter 3

his ideas fall on fertile ground in Japan, where he was accepted as a major public thinker and conducted a series of dialogues with the leader of the Soka Gakkai, a new religion nourished precisely on such ideas of the blending of Eastern and West­ ern civilizations. 16

What were the conditions for the emergence of this view of civilization? It sur­ faced in tandem with the disillusionment the Great War wrought on the idea of the "civilizing mission." "The nature of the battle on the Western Front made a mock­ ery of the European conceit that discovery and invention were necessarily progressive and beneficial to humanity," writes Michael Adas. 17 Writer after writer denounced the materialism and destructiveness of Western Civilization. At the same time, the wider political forces produced by the end of the war and the new balance of power, namely, the beginnings of decolonization, the emergence of new nation-states, and the concomitant ascendancy of the ideology of anti-imperialism, found little use for Civilization. To many in these nascent movements, Civilization was increasingly seen not only as compatible with but as having furnished the moral ground for imperialism and war. The final triumph of nationalism or national self-determination over imperi­ alism as the hegemonic global ideology was clinched by rwo political developments: the Soviet revolution and Woodrow Wilson's advocacy of the right to national self­ determination in the aftermath of World War 1. 18

The philosophy of Spengler and Toynbee reflected the world as a newly unified theater of history. '9 Spengler's insistence on seeing Europe as just a bit player in the history of humanity (rather than its telos) was well suited to a changing world where other actors (nations) had learned the language through which they could demand to be heard. Not only were new nations beginning to emerge all over the world from the early part of the century, they were telling their histories in the same linear mode of emergent national subjects fathered by classical civilizations. To be sure, the new civilizational discourse was part and parcel of the challenge to the hegemons of global competition, but this is not all. Since nationalism was genetically linked to a moral universalism greater than itself, civilization would serve as an ultimate ratio­ nale for the sovereignty of these nations, just as it had for imperialist nations.

While nations saw themselves as deeply linked to civilizations, the territorial nation-states were not coextensive with these civilizations. Indeed, nations require this duality because they often need to move berween the nationalist and civiliza­ tional positions. New nations, like old ones, seek the transnational conception of civilization because it is only as a transterritorial, universal ideal-say, Islam or Con­ fucianism-with its potential to reveal the truth of the human condition and embrace all of humanity, that the (civilizational) Self can achieve recognition from the Other. At the heart of the critique of Civilization launched by both Western and non-Western intellectuals after the Great War was the universalizing promise of the "civilizing mission," which exemplified the desire not (simply) to conquer the Other, but to be desired by the Other. In this critique, Civilization had forfeited the right to represent the highest goals or ultimate values of humanity and was no longer worthy of being desired, or even recognized, by the Other. In so opposing the legally articulated notion of the good and valuable posed by Civilization, the alternative

Asianism and the New Discourse of Civilization .---.... 95

civilizational self had to counterpose a still higher good and a truth that was authen­ tically universal. One might say that the transcendent authority of civilization derives from this dialectic.

Note here the close relationship, indeed mirroring, by civilization of the older Western conception of Civilization. The spiritual, moral, and universal core of civili­ zations furnishes new nations with the same kind of authenticating and authorizing function that Civilization furnished for Western imperialist nations and, as such, the similarity represents the "recognition function" of the global circulatory process. Note further that the gap between the territorial nation and civilization is not only territorial, but principled. Because the spiritual impulse of a civilization tends to be universalizing, national boundaries are ultimately artificial and limiting. The tran­ scendent stance of civilization thus may permit a critique of the nation and, as we shall see, produce the problem of loyalties divided between the nation and civiliza­ tion.

At the same time, there is no doubt that the territorial nation-state seeks to equate itself with or otherwise appropriate civilization. As the masthead in the regime of authenticity, where the noble virtues of civilization identify the abiding subject of a changing national history, civilization becomes the means of exercising national hegemony both within and without. One might argue that for nations such as China or India, just as for France or England, one can stretch the nation to fit the civiliza­ tion-territorially, if not in principle. But how can smaller nations do so? I believe there are several narrative strategies within national historiography that can be deployed by nations to enable them to be the true representative or the leader of, if not equivalent to, a certain civilizational tradition. The most powerful of these, at least in terms of its impact on the domestic population, was the Japanese claim to have inherited the leadership of Asian civilization because of its success in mastering Western Civilization. Lee Kuan-yew of Singapore made a similar bid for leadership in Confucianism and Asian values more generally. One can think of how Sri Lankan intellectuals went about constructing a Buddhist civilization in a way that made their nation the leader of such a project. Consider also the promotion of pre-Columbian civilizations among the relevant Latin American nations or pre-Islamic civilizations among Middle Eastern nations. Civilization in the era of nation-states thus needs to both transcend and serve the territorial nation.

The duality between the national and transnational orientation of civilization is closely related to another ambiguity in the term: civilization as an achieved state and as a civilizing process. Norbert Elias pointed this out most effectively in contrasting the civilizing process as an unselfconscious process emanating from the coun before it was transformed into a "concept" of national achievement and superiority in the nineteenth century. In Elias's view, the bourgeois classes of France and Germany championed this reified version of civilisation and Kultur when they aniculated their role as leaders of these competing nations. Given the thrust, timing, and reference points of Elias's work, the reader may well be led to believe that this transmutation

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of civilization had much to do with the European wars that enveloped the world in the twentieth century. 20

Thus, the new civilization opposes the Civilization of imperialism, but also depends on it in the way that it authorizes this opposition for nations. This is most evident in the way the new civilization selects elements and themes from its history and reconstructs them in a narrative that will enable it to perform this authorizing function. The basic approach involves establishing equivalence by identifying ele­ ments that are both identical to and the binary opposites of the constituents of Civi­ lization. One strategy is to discover elements identical to Civilized society within the suppressed traditions of civilization: Confucian rationality, Buddhist humanism, Hindu logic, and so forth. The other strategy finds the opposite of the West in Asian civilizations, which are, for instance, peaceful as opposed to warlike, spiritual as opposed to material, ethical as opposed to decadent, natural as opposed to rational, timeless as opposed to temporal. Finally, the nation authorizes its opposition to imperialist Civilization by synthesizing or harmonizing the binaries after the equiva­ lence has been established. Thus Western materialism will be balanced by Eastern spirituality, and modernity redeemed. Indeed, because the categories of civilization have to be translated into the new lexicon of modernity they are more meaningful to a contemporary sensibility than to the historical society they allegedly represent. In these ways, civilization is always remade in reference to Civilization. Contempo­ rary analysts such as Samuel Huntington, whose notion of civilization presents rela­ tively open historical formations as pure and closed ancient continuities, are, like contemporary nationalists, reifying a relatively recent construction.

Asian Civilization in Japan and China

The story of how non-Western societies, beginning with Japan, began to overhaul their entire society and cosmology in an effort to become Civilized and sovereign is a well-known one. The Meiji period represented the height of the effort to make Japan a Civilized nation in the name of bunmei kaika (Civilization and enlighten­ ment). It is worth reiterating, however, that the roughly ten-year period-between 1 894, when it signed the Aoki-Kimberley treaty with Great Britain, and the end of the Russo-Japanese War in 1905-during which Japan succeeded in reversing the unequal treaties and began to gain access to "Civilized society" was a period bounded by its two successful modern wars.2l For equally well-known reasons detailed in histories of the modernization of China, it took nearly fifty more years for China to have its unequal treaties finally abrogated in 1 943 and be granted Civi­ lized status. Indeed, the European conception of Civilization did not penetrate Chi­ nese discourses until the turn of the century.

The great reformer Liang Qichao was perhaps the most influential advocate of the necessity for China to become Civilized. Liang was most definitely aware of the legal dimensions of Civilization and sought to make China into a Civilized legal nation even before his exile in Japan upon the failure of the 1 898 reforms. However,

Asianism and the New Discourse of Civilization .........., 97

he acquired a fuller understanding of Civilization in Japan, where, influenced by the writings of Fukuzawa Yukichi and Kato Hiroyuki, among others, he perceived its significance in relation to rhe new ideas of History and progress. Nothing could have been further from the Confucian notion of wenming when he wrote, "Competition is rhe morher of Civilization. "22 Through the writings of Liang and others, Civiliza­ tion became, in the words of Ishikawa Yoshihiro, a keyword in Chinese intellectual discourse by the first decade of the new century, as essays on topics such as a civilized revolution, civilized drama, and civilized races began to appear among the modern reading community.23 Beginning with the late Qing reforms at rhe turn of the cen­ tury (1902), and certainly by the Republican revolution of 1 9 1 1 , rhe Chinese regimes tried strenuously to make Chinese laws fully compatible with the general expectation of Civilized countries through, for instance, the Revised Law Codifica­ tion Commission. But because the political situation was beyond real control, these regimes could not implement the kind of legal and political system rhat, according to the 1 926 Commission on Extraterritoriality in China, would make it a Civilized nation.24

Even as the regimes in both countries embraced the standard of Civilization in order to become fully sovereign, this embrace by no means excluded the develop­ ment of alternative conceptions of civilization, which, as we have seen, burgeoned particularly during World War 1. For instance, Zhang Binglin and his admirer Lu Xun quickly saw through rhe universalist pretensions of Civilization when it was being fervently propagated in the early 1900s. In Japan the notion of an alternate civilization centered around the concept of Asia. Although it was a conception that the Japanese inherited from rhe Europeans only in rhe nineteenth century, it became a powerful if changing spatial representation in relation to which Japanese identity came to be repeatedly made and remade.25 Among the sharpest critics of Civilization was Okakura Tenshin, who early on perceived the critical link berween warfare and Civilization in Japan. Among rhe first bilingual and bicultural thinkers in Meiji Japan, Okakura was able to gain some distance from the frenzied effort to "escape Asia" in Japan and build upon emergent Western ideas of an alternative Asian civili­ zation. The case of Okakura is indicative of the extent to which the rediscovery or production of an alternative Asian civilization entailed a deep familiarity with Euro­ pean modes of constructing the idea of a civilization. Indeed, Okakura's conversion to Asian civilization came during his first voyage to Europe, which turned out to be a voyage of self-discovery. To be sure, he was aware of differences berween Asian civilizations, but he believed rhat they all differed from Western Civilization in prin­ ciple-in rheir promotion of peace and beauty. Okakura saw Japan as the exhibition hall of all these Asian civilizations but did not advocate what would become com­ monplace in the aftermath of the Russo-Japanese War: rhat Japan become rhe leader of an Asian federation because it could harmonize rhe best of Asian civilization with rhat of Civilization. Rarher, he urged rhe various Asian nations to look within their common traditions to produce an alternative to rhe aggressive and dominating Civi­ lization of the West.26

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As Hashikawa Bunso has revealed, pan-Asianism in Japan contained both of these trends: the solidarity-oriented, nondominating conception of Japan's role in reviving Asia, and the notion of Japan as what we might call the harmonizing or synthesizing leader. Pan-Asianism in Japan both fed and resisted the nascent imperi­ alism of that nationY Increasingly after the Russo-Japanese War, however, the view that Japan was the only Asian nation capable of rescuing Asia and harmonizing East­ ern and Western civilizations began to take hold. This, then, became the characteris­ tic Japanese response to the aporia of nationalism: to absorb civilization within the confines of the nation and to yet maintain its transcendence so it may continue to perform the authorizing function. Because it belonged to Asia, the Japanese nation could bring to modernity the timeless essence of Asia, and because it had mastered Western Civilization, it could bring material modernity to Asia. Popular educational journals from the 1910s reveal the production of this sense of belonging; they depict the peoples of Asia as having close cultural and racial ties with the Japanese but as being without nation-states or a sense of peoplehood. The message was clear: given the danger of Western colonization, it was imperative for Japan, as their leader, to bring them into the modern era without destroying their traditions. What is remark­ able is how the idea of the closeness or intimacy with Asians-the eternal Asians-in the Japanese imagination was produced so rapidly during the 191Os. Indeed, the language of the Twenty-one Demands made upon the Chinese government in 1915 reflected this narrative.28 It was a compelling narrative precisely because it made the familial relationship between Asian peoples appear so natural. It compelled an entire nation to pursue its destiny in Asia.

Another, more aggressive ideology based upon the confrontation of Eastern and Western civilizations appeared in the immediate post-World War I era. Fueled by the American racial exclusions of Chinese and Japanese, this ideology would reap­ pear during the Pacific War as the theater of an East-West showdown. The tendency was best represented by the thinker Okawa Shomei, and later by Ishiwara Kanji in Manchuria. Okawa (1886-1957), an activist, writer, student of Indian philosophy, and translator of the Koran, was significantly influenced by Okakura. Like the latter, Okawa saw an underlying unity among the different Asian societies-a spiritual, moral, and timeless essence-which he opposed to Western civilization. Unlike Okakura, however, Okawa did not believe in the value of peace and viewed history in Civilizational terms, as progress born out of conflict and war-most centrally, war between Asia and the West. The ultimate victory of Asia over the West would be led by Japan's victory over America, which would liberate Asia from the enslave­ ment of Western colonialism, and which was Japan's moral duty despite the ingrati­ tude of the Asian peoples. But the first task for Okawa was to combat the corruption and obstacles that he encountered in the Taisho state. He was implicated in several terrorist incidents, including one in which Prime Minster Inukai was assassinated.29

In 1920, various Japanese pan-Asianist groups, including those associated with the Omotokyo (discussed below), had sought to establish in northeast Asia their ideal polity, which was in some ways the blueprint for Manchukuo. The Japanese

Asianism and the New Discourse of Civilization r---J 99

involved in this enterprise were stalwart Asianists from the 191 1 Chinese revolution, like Suenaga Misao of the Genyosha and far right political groups like the Black Dragon Society of Uchida Ryohei. In alliance with disaffected Korean elites, the Japanese Asianists sought to create their own utopian, anti-Western polity called the Koryo (Gaolt) nation in the Jiandao region between Manchuria and Korea, which had been the heartland of the ancient Koguryo state. Several circumstances con­ verged to produce this movement. The evacuation of the Russian presence in north­ east Asia following the Soviet revolution allowed the expansion of Japanese power into the region. The erstwhile yangban-the ConfUcian elite-were disaffected because of their displacement by Japanese policies. About one million laboring Kore­ ans in the Jiandao region of Manchuria were rendered vulnerable by their stateless condition. Finally, American immigration policies sparked off renewed anti-Western sentiments.

To create this utopian nation Uchida's group joined with nativist Korean socie­ ties in an alliance named Isshinkai. They even formulated a constitution,30 in which ConfUcianism was to be the national religion; property was to be owned collectively; land was to be distributed according to the ancient Chinese well-field system; the system of governance was to be wuwei (noninterventionist) and its goal Datong (the Great Unity). Citizenship among Koreans, Japanese, Chinese, and Asian Russians was to be exercised without discrimination on the basis of ethnicity or race. If we are to believe the proclamations, the doctrine of equality was of particular signifi­ cance because the Isshinkai was opposed to the Japanese state policies in Korea and viewed the annexation as an imperialist act that denied the equality of Asian peoples. Thus the Isshinkai's ideology contained elements of a return to East Asian traditions, self-consciously embedding an opposition to the modern Western or Westernized state; at the same time, it proclaimed modern notions of republicanism and equality. In these ways it prefigured some of the theoretically radical ideas of Manchukuo ( 1932-1945), such as that of Concordia. While we cannot but see the Isshinkai movement as an effort to expand Japanese (albeit nonstate) power on the mainland, at the same time we also see how the new ideology of civilization, with its roots in the utopian egalitarianism of nationalism, shaped the movement and its projected political forms.

In China the new civilizational discourse and its links to pan-Asianism have been largely neglected or dismissed in the historiography precisely because of their associa­ tion with Japanese imperialism. However, from 1 9 1 1 until 1 945 the discourse of Eastern civilization, whether as superior to Western civilization or as necessary to redeem the latter, actually flourished in China as an intellectual, cultural, and social movement. To what extent Eastern civilization could be distinguished from Chinese civilization was a subject both of debate and of ambivalence. The ambivalence mir­ rored the structural ambiguity in the relationship between nationalism and civiliza­ tion noted above. While the (Chinese) nationalist impulse sought to conflate civilization with the territorial nation, the spiritual impulses sustaining the formula­ tion of civilization tended to seek a universal sphere of application, viewing national

1 00 .-.. Chapter 3

boundaries as artificial walls. To some degree, as we shall see, the modern intellectu­ alist construction of civilization tended towards the conflation, whereas the more popular social movements tended to view civilization trans nationally.

Ishikawa has persuasively argued that the development of East-West civilizational discourse among Chinese intellectuals during the 1 9 1 0s was closely connected to that in Japan, even though it would take distinctive shape in China. Through the 1 9 1 0s and early 1920s, Japan continued to be the principal lens through which Chi­ nese gained modern knowledge, and there was a steady influx of Japanese books and magazines together with a continuing growth of translations from the Japanese.3! The new civilizational discourse also entered through the same routes and brought with it the particular assumptions upon which it had been constructed or recon­ structed in Japan: the geographical and environmental bases of civilizational differ­ ences, the role of linear progressive history, the binary construction, the synthesis formulation, and the redemptive character of Eastern civilization, among others.

One of the more important Japanese influences on Chinese thinkers during World War I was the middle-brow Japanese writer Kayahara Kazan (1 880-1 951). He was popular with Chinese intellectuals because his Japanese writing was relatively lucid and simple. Kayahara's philosophy sought to synthesize the thought of various Western philosophers such as Hegel, Bergson, and Emerson, as well as the geograph­ ical determinism of Henry Buckle and Ratzel. Kayahara delineated his own stages of civilization, posited the distinction berween the dynamic northern civilizations of the Europeans and the quiescent southern civilizations, and explained these in terms of geography and environment. Like other Taisho intellectuals he arrived at the necessiry of synthesizing the rwo civilizationsY Kayahara's impact on Chinese intel­ lectuals was considerable; one Communist Parry member even wrote to Mao, urging him to fulfill the world historical tasks of Lenin and Kayahara. Li Dazhao, founder of the Communist Parry and librarian at Beijing Universiry, collected a large num­ ber of contemporary Japanese magazines that included the writings of Kayahara, whose stamp is evident particularly in Li's Spring Youth, which is centrally concerned with the renewal of ancient civilizations such as those of China and India. Although Li was perfectly aware of Japanese expansionist designs embedded in these ideas, KaYahara appears to have influenced his conception of history and his particular mode of synthesizing East and West to create a new civilization in the aftermath of the world war.33 Incidentally, Li Dazhao believed that the Russian revolution also derived its world significance from Russia's intermediate geographical and civiliza­ tional location and resultant abiliry to mediate berween East and West.J4

Another important channel for the introduction of civilizational discourse was the popular Chinese journal Dongf"angzazhi (Eastern miscellany). Its editor, Du Yaquan, was a tireless promoter of the idea of the superioriry of the still or quiet civilization of the East, which was obliged to rescue the world from the restless civili­ zation of the West, responsible for the terrible violence of the world war. The edito­ rial essays of the journal frequently dwelt on this theme, especially towards the end of the war, and the journal often translated Japanese essays on the problem. In 1 9 1 9,

Asianisrn and the New Discourse of Civilization .-.. 101

Dongf'angzazhi published a translation of a Japanese article on the Chinese Spirit and the European Spirit. Ishikawa has followed the chain of writing from an alienated, diasporic Chinese, via Europe and Japan, back to China. The article discussed rwo essays translated from English into German by Gu Hongming, the Malay-born, British- and German-educated, classical Chinese scholar. One of Gu's essays was entitled, "Reasons for China's Opposition to European Concepts," and the Japanese article reported the reception of his essay by a group of disaffected German intellec­ tualS.35 In China the Dongf'angzazhi essay led to a major debate on the question of Chinese civilization versus Western civilization, in which the giants of Chinese intellectual life, including Li Dazhao, Liang Qichao, Liang Shuming, Hu Shi, Feng Youlan, Chen Duxiu, Zhang Dongsun, and others took a position. Thus the new discourse of Chinese civilization entered China through a complex global loop. This route underscores not only the emergence of a global intellectual sphere, but how the acceptability of civilization was dependent upon its recognition by the Other.36

The debate in China was framed in terms of whether China's-and more broadly, Eastern-traditional civilization could redeem the West. Some, like Liang Shuming, believed in the superiority of Chinese civilization; others, such as Li Daz­ hao and Du Yaquan, favored a synthesis, though in different ways; and the main­ stream of radical intellectuals rejected the value of Chinese civilization. Nonetheless, the debate underscored certain common assumptions: that the differences berween East and West were civilizational, and that such differences posited holistic, isolated, and pure civilizations. This was assumed even when thinkers called for the synthesis of the best qualities of the rwo. Since the ideas of these intellectuals are well known, I shall not dwell on them. By the mid-1 920s, however, the discourse began to appear in cultural, political, and social practices as wellY

Perhaps the least studied and the most successful realm in which the idea of an Eastern civilization was constructed was culture. We have a rough idea of how the notion of an essentialized Eastern civilization was constructed by interactions during the 1 920s berween Chinese intellectuals and a host of Western philosophers, such as Bertrand Russell, John Dewey, Henri Bergson, Rudolph Eucken, Irving Babbit, and the Indian poet Rabindranath Tagore. Emerging research in a wide range of cultural practices reveals that perhaps more significant were the Sino-Japanese exchanges in areas such as the revival or reconstruction of traditional medicine, the reconstructions of Buddhism and Confucianism, and the representation of literati and Buddhist art (among other kinds) as exemplary of Eastern civilization.38 Devel­ oped with reference to modern Western forms, in that their significance emerged either in opposition to or as a prefiguration of the latter, these practices exemplified the East Asian modern.

The political moment of Eastern civilization in China is associated with the famous lecture by Sun Yat-sen in December 1 924 in Kobe, Japan, entitled "Greater Asianism" (Da Yaxiyazhuyz). I have discussed this lecture elsewhere, so I will only note that its significance has often been minimized in the historical scholarship, per­ haps because of the later record ofJapanese actions in China. Yet Sun seems to have

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absorbed the Asian civilizational discourse quite deeply and spelled out its key politi­ cal category of wangdao, or the way of the ethical monarchs and peaceful ruler­ ship--as opposed to the unethical and violent way (badao) of the hegemon (the way of the West). Sun was rhetorically skillful at drawing the Japanese into a discourse of solidariry while simultaneously retaining a Chinese centraliry by invoking the imperial Chinese tribute system. Wangdao was based upon the recognition of the Chinese emperor through the hierarchical system of reciprocities of the tribute. Thus Sun appealed to the Japanese to renounce the Western methods of badao and return to the Asian method of peaceful solidarity. As we have seen, the Japanese military appropriated the language of wangdao and used it to rule China instead. The political interest in pan-Asianism in China is also indicated by the convening of two successive Asian People's conferences, in Nagasaki (1926) and Shanghai ( 1927). Yet these conferences hardly demonstrated much solidarity, because the Chi­ nese and Korean delegates understandably used the forum to argue that the condi­ tion for Asian unity must be Japanese renunciation of imperialism.39

In any event, Sun's discourse of civilization developed in two directions that exemplify nationalism's dual relationship to the idea of civilization. On the one hand, by the 1 930s the KMT actively propagated the binary of East and West, per­ haps best expressed in the New Life movement, through which it sought to revitalize Western material modernity by means of an ascetic Confucian spirituality and morality. Chen Lifu, the theorist of the New Life movement, made a classic state­ ment of the East-West synthesis. Creatively employing the framework of evolution­ ism, Chen outlined a parallel material and spiritual evolutionism. Without spiritual progress, the evolution of material civilization would inevitably lead to the enslave­ ment of mankind by things. The role of the New Life movement was to infuse the moral qualities from the essence of Chinese civilization into the evolution of material life. Thus will history be propelled into the civilizational ideal of Datong, or the Great Unity.40

Note, however, that Chen's civilization is uniquely a Chinese civilization; it rep­ resents that aspect of the new doctrine of civilization that becomes tied to the nation-state. But for several reasons the KMT's equation of civilization and national­ ism could not always work, even for its own statist purposes. Sun Yat-sen's concep­ tion of a pan-Asianism was also centered on Confucian virtues of the kingly way, but unlike Chen he saw these ethical and moral goals as more fully Asian. This strand of thought in the KMT was picked up by another leading KMT theorist and leader, Dai Jitao, who in 1930 created an institute and the journal Xin Y�iya (New Asia) to keep alive Sun's ideas. The publication well expressed the tensions of the new civilizational discourse in its mission both to counter European materialist and imperialist civilization and to create a pan-Asianist ideology. An important function of this Asianism was to secure the allegiance of the minority populations who occu­ pied the vast hinterland over which the nation-state sought to exercise its sover­ eignty. The rhetoric of Asian brotherhood was one of the civilizational narratives transcending the racial or ethnic nation that Chinese nationalists developed in order

Asianism and the New Discourse of Civilization r--.J 103

to integrate the populations of these vast outlying regions (constituting over half the present Chinese territory) into the Chinese nation.

Redemptive Societies and Civilizational Discourse

In order to see how the Japanese mobilized the discourse of eastern civilization to gain political support, we need to grasp the political history of the redemptive socie­ ties in China. Some of the more famous of these societies were the Daodehui (Moral­ ity Society); the Daoyuan (Society of the Way) and its philanthropic wing, the Hongwanzihui (Red Swastika Society); the Tongshanshe (Fellowship of Goodness); the Zailijiao (The Teaching of the Abiding Principle); the Shijie Zongjiao Datonghui (Sociery for the Great Unity of World Religions), first organized in Sichuan in 1 9 1 5 as the Wushanshe; and the Yiguandao (Way of Pervading Unity) . There were many others. A great deal of our knowledge of the contemporary spread of these societies comes from Japanese surveys of religious and charitable societies in China conducted in the 1 930s and 1 940s. According to Japanese researchers and officials of the pup­ pet administrations in north China, these societies claimed to command enormous followings. The Fellowship of Goodness claimed a following of 30 million in 1929, and the Red Swastika Society a following of 7 to 10 million in 1 937.41 There are also some notable Chinese works on individual societies, such as the famous study of the Yiguandao by Professor Li Shiyu of Shandong University, who joined the society in order to study them. Wing-tsit Chan's study of Chinese religion tends to dismiss these societies. He regards them as "negative in outlook, utilitarian in pur­ pose, and superstitious in belief," and cites a figure of merely 30,000 adherents for the Red Swastika Society in 1 927, as opposed to Suemitsu's figure of 3 million fol­ lowers in 1 932. However, Chan does note that the Fellowship of Goodness (Tongs­ hanshe) claimed more than a thousand branches in all parts of China proper and Manchuria in 1 923.42 A recent study by Shao Yong, while perhaps even more critical of these societies than Chan's, cites figures that are closer to the Japanese estimates.43

These societies have to be understood in terms of the complex interplay between the particular historical tradition of their derivation and the contemporaty global context of the 1 9 1 0s. The societies clearly emerged out of the Chinese historical tradition of sectarianism and syncretism. While some were closely associated with the sectarian tradition and involved the worship of Buddhist and folk deities like the Eternal Mother, they also represented the late imperial syncretic tradition (sanji­ aoheyi) that combined the three religions of Confucianism, Buddhism, and Daoism into a single universal faith. Late imperial syncretism, which urged the extinguishing of worldly desires and engagement in moral action, gained popularity among the Confucian gentry and the Buddhist and Daoist laity in the sixteenth and seven­ teenth centuries.44 The modern redemptive societies inherited the mission of univer­ salism and moral self-transformation from this syncretism. At the same time, these societies also retained the association of the older syncretic societies with sectarian traditions, popular gods, and practices such as divination, planchette, and spirit writ-

1 04 .---. Chapter 3

ing.45 In this way they continued to remain organically connected to Chinese popu­ lar society. Hence, while it might appear confused to associate these movements with secret societies, their connections to popular culture and local concerns indeed caused several of them to blur with secret societies at their rural edges.

The new global context of the twentieth centuty significantly transformed the meaning of the societies' project. A number of them-with a strong elite base­ viewed themselves explicitly in the new civilizational discourse as representing an Eastern solution to the problems of the modern world. Many of them were formally established or saw rapid expansion during the period from World War I through the 1 920s, when the discourse of Western civilization as overly materialist and violent began to emerge globally.46 The societies sought to supplement and correct the material civilization of the West with the spiritual civilization of the East. The resul­ tant synthesis they envisaged took the shape of a religious universalism that included not only Confucianism, Daoism, and Buddhism, but Islam and Christianity. Several of them claimed to represent the essential truth of the five world religions, and by spreading this truth to bring an end to religious partisanship and achieve world peace and personal salvation. Not only did the societies adapt their cosmology to the new geographical conception of the universe (to include Christianity and Islam), some of them also adapted to the temporal vision of a progressive history. The Morality Society, established in 1 9 19, declared that it sought to synthesize the scien­ tific view of the world with the religious and moral visions of Asian thoughtY With the great reformer and constitutional monarchist Kang Youwei as its president from 1 920 until his death in 1 927, the Morality Society argued that without moral and spiritual regeneration, human evolution (jinhua) would stall and turn even more destructive because of the present trend toward hedonistic materialism.48 Even the Yiguandao, perhaps the least "modern" or "this-worldly" of these societies, added the truths of Christianity and Islam to its earlier synthesis and cross-referenced its own esoteric temporal scheme with the modern chronology of dynastic and republi­ can history.49

Their modern orientation is also revealed by their engagement in contemporary projects. Organized with chatters and bylaws, armed with a strong this-worldly ori­ entation and a rhetoric of worldly redemption, these societies resembled other mod­ ern religious and morality societies all over the world. The New Religion to Save the World (Jiushi Xinjiao) sought to do so not only through philanthropic activities such as hospitals, orphanages, and refugee centers, 50 but also through dissemination and publiciry (schools, newspapers, libraries, lectures), through charitable enterprises such as factories and farms employing the poor, through savings and loan associa­ tions, and even through engineering projects such as road and bridge repair.51 As for the "red swastika" of the society with that name, while this can, of course, be under­ stood in Buddhist terms, it was clearly modeled upon-an Eastern equivalent of­ the Red Cross Society. The Red Swastika society, like several others, not only developed traditional and modern charities, their projects included international activities, such as contributions to foreign relief efforts and the establishment of pro-

Asianism and the New Discourse of Civilization ,--...J 105

fessors of Esperanto in Paris, London, and Tokyo.52 The Zailijiao, which emerged in the very late Qing period, had established twenty-eight centers in Beijing and Tianjin in 1 9 1 3, and appeared to have forty-eight centers in Tianjin alone by the late 1 920s.53 It was a strict disciplinarian movement and developed drug rehabilita­ tion centers using herbal medicines and self-cultivation techniques (zheng.rhen) that were said to fully cure over two hundred opium addicts a year.54 This outer or worldly dimension was matched by a strong inner dimension relating to moral and religious cultivation of the individual spirit and body, as will be discussed below. 55

Some Japanese researchers tried to grasp the class character of these societies through loosely Marxist categories. Takizawa saw them as new religions characteris­ tic of an early capitalist society; through them, incipient capitalist groups sought to bring the rich and poor together in a traditional idiom. For the rich they were a means of gaining popular support, while the poor welcomed both the philanthropy and the salvationism. At the same time, Japanese scholars were insistent in recogniz­ ing the religious passion and devotion of the adherents to their mission. 56 They sug­ gest that those who sought to manipulate the societies could not always appropriate this passion for their own purposes. To the extent that we can sustain the class analy­ sis, we are reminded of Elias's critique of the nineteenth-century European bour­ geoisie's identification of civilization with the nation, transforming it from a process to an achieved condition. However, while it may have had the effect of muting class tensions, the religiosity of these societies continued to predispose them towards a universalism. The Japanese military would seek to transform this universalism into a doctrine of confrontation between East and West, particularly after the outbreak of the Pacific War.

Civilization in Popular Society The groups that the Japanese would seek to mobilize with the rhetoric of upholding Asian values, both in Manchukuo and on the mainland, occupied a spectrum rang­ ing from redemptive societies, other sectarians, and secret societies to those whose concerns were more purely local. Aside from the last, most groups could, to a greater or lesser degree, be associated with civilizational ideals and practices. Let us further explore this connection in the Chinese context.

It may be useful here to summarize the genealogy of civilization. I differentiated between the singui4r and multiple conceptions of civilization, which were, in scope, both national and transnational. Either could manifest as civilizing process or as achieved state. The core of Elias's book is concerned with the idea that the civilizing process is unselfconscious before it is transformed into a "concept" of national achievement. As achieved state, civilization tends to conflate with the nation, whereas as process, the urge towards transcendent universalism is deepened. As proc­ ess, the civilizing imperative also develops advocates in popular sociery. Figure 3.1 tries to diagram some of the principal connections and exclusions in the discourse of civilization from the late nineteenth century. 57

1 06 r--J Chapter 3 � Transcendent / � +natiral � � Singular � Na ionaVachieved state"'�Multiple

�pr • POPUI/ Figure 3.1 . Principal Connections and Exclusions in the Discourse of Civilization

The imperial Chinese notion of wenming and the related idea of jiaohua express well the notion of civilization as process. Wenming means to enlighten with wen, which, at different moments in the long history of China, referred to the interpreta­ tion of heavenly signs or omens, and metonymically to writing or literature. Its prac­ titioner potentially possessed a virtue that could fill or illumine the world. 58 Jiaohua-the use of teachings or doctrine to transform people's customs lfengru)­ may be thought of as a nonmilitarist means of spreading wenming. The Hanyu Daci­ dian's definition of the premodern use of wenming includes the coupling wenzhi jiaohua, or "to morally transform (jiaohua) by means of virtuous rule {wenzht)." The mode of moral transformation is explicated in the Liji: "Transformation through rites is subtle, one may nip the evil before it takes form."59 Civilizing entailed the teaching of rites and obligations such as filiality, as well as the deeper cosmological truths of "heaven" and the Way. It was applied, moreover, to the barbarians as well as to "depraved" local customs. However, the process was not infinitely extendable; the circumstances of certain barbarians-such as the Xiongnu-might necessitate military subjugation alone.

The civilizing process as the relatively unbounded extension of a cosmologically sanctioned "way of life" also came to include a popular dimension insofar as many normative ideas were selectively absorbed in popular society.60 This is one source of the "ethnographic" conception of civilization mentioned by Lucien Febvre. This popular dimension-whereby the populace, or a selection of the populace, was seen to represent the authentic civilization-became increasingly important through the twentieth century, as the idea of "multiple civilizations" gained ground. When the idea of civilization became somewhat freed from its ties to the cosmology of prog­ ress, intellectuals in both East and West sought to find the distinctive civilizational traditions among the people. The impetus for this ethnographic deepening of civili­ zation came, of course, from the nationalist ideal of popular sovereignty, but it was also reinforced by the holistic conception of culture that was gaining ground glob­ ally.

This conception of culture is most closely associated in the scholarly world with

Asianism and the New Discourse of Civilization .--.. 1 07

Franz Boas, who influenced American anthropology from his arrival in the United States in 1 887 until and beyond his death in 1 943.61 We may see the holistic and relativistic Boasian notion of "culture" (also, of course, deriving from the German counter-evolutionary tradition) as an ethnographic parallel to Spengler's views of history and the philosophy of history. The two influences merged indistinguishably within many scholars, especially those studying non-Western societies in America, such as Ruth Benedict, Robert Redfield, Milton Singer, William McNeil, John K. Fairbank, Owen Lattimore, and many others. A pivotal figure, who synthesized the new ideas of culture and civilization conceptually and methodologically was Robert Redfield. Redfield, who ran the Comparative Civilizations Project for many years in Chicago, integrated the two notions into a multicivilizational ethnology; his efforts reflected the very multicultural sources of this new global discourse, and in the proc­ ess lay the foundation for postwar American area studies.

Redfield was influenced deeply by the ideas ofToynbee and Spengler, and shared views of civilization with prominent Asian anthropologists like Fei Xiaotong and M. N. Srinivas.62 Like Toynbee, Redfield sought to achieve lasting world peace by drawing from the various civilizational traditions, Eastern and Western. In order to do this, he had to first conceptualize the world as composed of different cultural wholes. Redfield's synthesis was quite remarkable. He brought the twin German counter-evolutionary traditions together in anthropology by treating civilization as a "sub-class of culture."63 He sought to develop this anthropological synthesis as the foundation of area studies through the articulation of "great and little traditions," where the products of high Orientalism could be reconciled with peasant culture.

In China, we have seen how the idea of a holistic Chinese and East Asian civiliza­ tion had its advocates among thinkers such as Liang Qichao, Liang Shuming, Du Yaquan, and many others. By the 1 930s and 1 940s, historians and anthropologists were also involved in the production of a pattern of Chinese civilization, in the con­ ception, for instance, of "the Central Plains Confucian Culture of the Great Unity" (Zhongyuan rujiao datong wenhua). We will discuss this conception in a later chapter, but the ethnographic conception of civilization as one that pervaded even (or per­ haps especially) the deepest reaches of rural culture was influential panicularly among younger anthropologists such as Fei Xiaotong and Francis Hsu. Again, we will have occasion later to examine Fei's idea that Confucian norms and ideals (as opposed to legal or contractual relations) were most naturalistically preserved in peasant life. Although no romantic, Fei lamented precisely the erosion of these moral qualities and relationships brought on by Westernization.64 I think Redfield betrays the influence of Fei-who lived in his home-when he writes about civilizations, "distinct in their total character," persisting for millennia in India and China. For Redfield, the unity of China, which "maintained its cultural integrity to modern times . . . was both made possible and exaggerated as the predominating Confucian view of life came to be cultivated and promulgated by the imponant scholarly elite. "65

1 08 .........., Chapter 3

This mid-century, global, social scientific view was part of the new civilizational discourse furnishing-and reinforcing-a perspective on the ethnographic dimen­ sion of the "civilizing process," where elements in popular sociery could bring true and proper civilizational virtues to all. As we have seen, many religious societies articulated a redemptive vision that was continuous with their conception of the older moral order. David Ownby has identified a kind of "fundamentalism" among some of these societies, which were "both against and from within the mainstream." For example, some of them condemned the Buddhist church "for having abandoned its own mission of self-abnegation and transcendence."66 Ownby's recent study of the apocalyptic Way of the Temple of the Heavenly Immortals illustrates how these societies fused deeply orthodox or "fundamental" values from Confucianism or Daoism with popular cultural traditions to reconstruct communiry along tradi­ tional, even utopian prescriptions.67 These societies are civilizing in Redfield's sense: not only do they mediate between great and little traditions, they are a means "for communication between components that are universal, reflexive, and indoctrinat­ ing, and components which are local, unreflective and accepting."68

Consonant with the inner, spiritual dimension emphasized in the new concep­ tion of civilization was the primacy of self-cultivation in the consciousness of these societies. A Yiguandao text composed sometime in the first half of the twentieth century declares that its purpose is to recover a person's true nature-the good mind (liangxin) of Confucianism and Buddha nature lfoxing)-by drawing the truth of the universe into personal life. The technology of such a realization combines the self-cultivation techniques of the inner sage (neisheng) with the practical good deeds of the outer king (waiwang).69 A similar statement was made by a leader of the Dao­ yuan (the parent of the Red Swastika Society) to Japanese surveyor Suemitsu some­ time before 1 930.

Q: What is the Daoyuan about? A: To simultaneously cultivate the inner and outer; the inner through meditation

and the outer through philanthropy. Q: What is the dao of Daoyuan? A: It is the source of all things (wanyou genyuan). It is not a single religion; it has

the power to clarifY the good . . . . Actually the dao has no name, but we in the human world have to give it a name to show our reverence. So we revere the founders of the five religions . . . . We also respect nature and morality, and cultivate the self through charity,?o

Thus the cognitive map of these SOCieties traced a path from the individual directly to the universal. True knowledge of the self came from self-cultivation prac­ tices sanctioned by cosmological ideas of heaven and the Way. Self-cultivation (ziji xiuyang or xiushen) ranged from practicing charity, to cultivating the habit of close moral and spiritual introspection, to the exercise of a strict disciplinary regimen. The disciplinary regimen in some societies emphasized strict vows of abstinence from

Asianism and the New Discourse of Civilization ......., 109

drugs, meat, and alcohol, and sometimes involved the quasi renunciation of the fam­ ily; in others, it provided detailed codes of moral behavior and bodily comport­ ment.7l Most societies combined all three: abstinence, renunciation, and morality. In the characteristic reciprocal movement from the self to the universal, these socie­ ties frequently defied political boundaries. For instance, the Yiguandao's construc­ tion of the genealogical transmission of the Way (daotong) begins with the Chinese sage kings, Yao and Shun, and follows the orthodox Confucian line until Mencius. Thereafter, the Confucian orthodoxy loses the way and the mantle is carried forth by Buddhists and Daoists. In its genealogical record of masters who continued to transmit the Way, Buddhist teachers from all over India and Central Asia are cited together with the classical Chinese place-names of their provenance.72 The Yiguan­ dao genealogy reveals how the geo-body of the nation was quite irrelevant to its principally spiritual mission. This is certainly one reason why the Chinese state has been relatively intolerant of these redemptive societies.

All the principal Chinese regimes of the twentieth century-the imperial, the KMT, and the communists-have banned these societies or sought to keep very strict control over them. The societies appear to have been caught in a pattern of relationship with the Chinese state, which made it hard for them to work together. The Chinese regimes appear to be especially threatened by the personal empower­ ment that allegedly emerged from tapping into cosmic forces. While direct traffic between the transcendent or cosmic power and the individual is hardly unique to China, historically, the Chinese state has tended to interpose itself between the twO,?3 Whether because it claimed monopoly of access to the principle of the cosmos (the imperial state) or because it sought to guard forcefully the cosmological author­ ity of science (modern states), the state has severely restricted religiosity to state­ licensed organizations. Thus, even though they may have had orthodox and elitist elements within them, the redemptive societies ofren found themselves beyond the law. In turn, these groups tend to emphasize direct access to the cosmic principle not only as a means of self-empowerment for individuals, but as the only path to save the world.

It is in significant part for this reason that the KMT sought to prohibit all redemptive societies almost since it first came to power. In 1 928, newspapers reported that the societies were banned not only because they were believed to have disseminated harmful superstition, but because they were regarded as incompatible with the spirit of progress. All provincial and city authorities were ordered to shut down these establishments and manage their properties for the public good,74 In turn, the redemptive societies mobilized important figures to oppose this ban. A letter in the archives of the Red Swastika Society from Xiong Xiling, one-time prime minister during the preceding warlord era, written around 1 929 and addressed to Chiang Kai-shek, makes several arguments to lift the ban on these societies and con­ stitute a committee to reorder the role of religion in the new state. Xiong invokes the importance of religion in the cultural lives and morality of the people, and attri­ butes to it the fundamental superiority of national morality to that of the West. He

1 1 0 ........, Chapter 3

furnishes several practical reasons to preserve religion. Religion was the basis of the Qing unification of the empire, which the nation-state now seeks to inherit. Within this territory, he says, one-third are (the lands of) believers; and within the nation's population, two-thirds are believers. While the Chinese government attacks the "time-honored hearts of the people" (guyou renxin), foreign powers explore the great cultures of the East and are able to penetrate the hearts of the people both in the peripheries and inside China proper. He warns that the policy of banning redemp­ tive societies will destroy the nation and strengthen the foreign powers. Xiong also emphasizes the functionalist role of all religious traditions-making people good, not through fear, but through their conscience (liangxin). Finally, with unexpected poignancy, he charges the government with turning its back on the very soldiers who had won its revolutionary war. Having witnessed the horrors of war, many of these revolutionary soldiers took the tonsure or othetwise turned to Buddhism. Does the government, at the very least, not owe those "wounded in the heart" (shangxin) the right to seek solace in religion?

Xiong closes his appeal by assimilating religious ideals to civilizational greatness. All the ancient religions take self-abnegation (wusi, wuyii, wuwo) as the principle whereby to redeem the self, humaniry, and the world (jiuji, jiuren, jiusht). This is also the truth of Datong. But at the same time, he acknowledges the need for some reform.

If religion becomes an obstacle to the progress of civilization, then it will lose its fol­ lowers. If reform based on research of our ancient religious and philosophical truths can glorifY them, then it will influence Europe and America and we may promote world unity (shijie datong) as well as our own national glory.75

The KMT did modify its interdiction of these groups following the reactions to its antireligious campaigns in the early 1 930s.76 Thus there was considerable discus­ sion of what differentiated a religious sociery from a social welfare organization, and the Red Swastika Sociery was finally permitted to operate independently of the Daoyuan, as a philanthropic entiry.?7 But even though the KMT sought to deploy the new civilizational discourse for its sovereignry claims, it was hardly prepared to adopt Xiong's synthesis of historical religions and civilization. Rather, it launched the extraordinarily ambitious New Life movement, by which it invoked classical Confucian ideals to produce a thoroughly modern and disciplinary transformation of the everyday lives of people. We shall discuss this movement in greater detail in the next chapter. In its effort to constitute a civilization selectively from Confucian ideals that were amenable to its state-centered vision, the regime ended up con­ demning even the relatively apolitical, gentry/merchant societies, such as the Moral­ iry Sociery and the Tongshanshe, as riven by superstitions and dominated by local bullies and warlords.?8 Behind this rhetoric, however, lay a strategic representation of modern religion and national civilization. In this strategy, the KMT produced a realm of legitimate spiritualism into which it incorporated modern, licensed reli-

Asianism and the New Discourse of Civilization .--...> 1 1 1

gions as part of China's national civilization, while banning popular religious tradi­ tions as superstition.79 As we have seen, many of the religious practices of these redemptive societies were, in fact, drawn from popular culture. But the regime was also threatened by the historical, subversive power of the societies deriving from their transcendent vision. The transnational spiritualism of the redemptive societies trans­ gressed not only the KMT's definition of the modern, but its definition of the national boundaries of spiritual civilization. Certainly the cultural bonds of the soci­ eties to similar Japanese societies such as the Omotokyo made them susceptible to these attacks.

Redemptive Societies and the State in Manchukuo The civilizational rhetoric upon which the sovereignty of Manchukuo rested, and which subsequently became the basis of the strategic alliances underlying Japanese control of the rest of China, was not simply initiated by the Guandong Army or Japanese political leadership. Redemptive societies in China and their equivalents in Japan had sought alternative, "Eastern" models of governance since at least the end of World War 1.80 Societies in Japan that championed Confucianism and Shinto as the spiritual alternative to excessive materialism and individualism, such as the Shibunkai, had begun to grow in strength from the 1 920s, particularly as economic conditions worsened and social unrest grew. Asiatic moral systems emphasizing ethi­ cal responsibilities were celebrated as alternatives to capitalism and Marxism, both Western doctrines. 81 These new religious societies of the inter-war years numbered over a thousand in 1 935, and some, such as the Omotokyo or the Hitonomichi, claimed adherents in the millions.sz According to Sheldon Garon, these groups dif­ fered from the more established Shinto, Buddhist, and Christian societies not in their opposition to state goals, but in their resistance to manipulation within the framework of ideological orthodoxy devised by the state to utilize the religions as agencies of moral suasion (kyoka,jiaohua).83 Thus, even though some of these socie­ ties may have supported the militant pan-Asianist vision of an imminent world war, the hardening of ideological orthodoxy in the 1 930s led to ferocious state attacks that sought to destroy the societies. Interestingly, while similar attitudes and doubts dogged Japanese policy researchers in Manchukuo and occupied China, on the whole these regimes sought whenever possible to transform the societies into jiaohua agencies. Perhaps the need for constituencies of support in Manchuria, as well as the Guangdong Army officers' sympathy for some of these groups, such as the Omotokyo in Japan, led the Japanese in Manchuria to ally with groups similar to those that were attacked at home.

Founded in 1 892 by Deguchi Nao, the Omotokyo had close ties with Chinese redemptive societies. It began as a regional sect responding to the erosion of commu­ nity life generated by the new capitalist industrialization.84 It rapidly evolved into a powerful, pan-Asianist spiritual movement in the 1 920s under the leadership of Deguchi Onisaburo, boasting relations with other new world religious societies,

1 1 2 ........., Chapter 3

such as the Baha'i and the Daoyuan (Red Swastika Society).85 The arrival of the leaders of the Daoyuan in Japan to aid the Tokyo earthquake victims in 1924 appar­ ently marked the beginning of an active program of cooperation with the Dmoto­ kyiJ.86 The mission of the DmotokyiJ states,

From the perspective of world history, it is clear that no single nation has the power to control other nations, that no one culture can have universal relevance, or that any one religion can assimilate all the people of the world. So we must strive to bring peace by love and faith in the Great Source (Omoto) ."7

The Daoyuan thus found a common basis in their pursuit of world peace through spirituality, morality, and humanitarianism.88 But despite their rhetoric of universal love and world brotherhood, the Japanese "Eastern civilizational" societies, unlike the Daoyuan or Daodehui, had a violent and nationalist streak, as they had revealed in the past and would show again.89

In Manchukuo, the ideas of Japanese Sinologists like Tachibana and local researchers like Takizawa and Suemitsu were developed into an ideology and lan­ guage that could forge an alliance with the redemptive societies. Tachibana had a unique perspective on Chinese religions. He not only believed the Chinese to be deeply religious, he felt that sectarians such as the Zailijiao and the Daoyuan, as distinct from secret societies, represented splendidly organized systems of faith whose authenticity (shinjitsusei) matched that of Christianity. Incidentally, he also viewed Christianity as one of the most influential forces in Chinese popular reli­ gion.90 Indeed, Tachibana was inclined to highlight the nonsuperstitious character of redemptive societies, not only to counter intellectual or bureaucratic critics in both China and Japan, but because he wanted to showcase these groups as represent­ ing the East in the way that Christianity arguably did the West.

The East-West opposition furnished Tachibana with a way to draw what he called these "objectively valuable" groups into the Manchukuo regime. The state's doctrines of the Great Unity (Datong) and the "kingly way" (wangdao) represented the political symbols of this ideology of Eastern civilization. They became nodes in an ideological nexus of different groups, including political leaders of the old society, such as Yuan Jinkai, Zhang Jinghui, and Yu Chonghan; dyed-in-the-wool Confu­ cian monarchists, such as Zheng Xiaoxu and his associates (who were the strongest advocates of imperial restoration); and, most numerously, the deeply religious and universalist redemptive societies. Tachibana said that they needed to deploy such groups as "the upper-class Hongwanzihui and Jiushifotuan, the middle-class Daode­ hui, and the lower-class Zailijiao," since they were much more amenable to mobili­ zation as civic organizations (jiaohua, kyiJka) than either purely community-defense organizations such as the Red Spears and Big Swords or the secret societies.91 How­ ever, as we will see, doctrine was only one factor determining whether or not a reli­ gious or secretive group would support the Japanese military.

The Japanese ideologues of Manchukuo offered the redemptive societies an ideol-

Asianism and the New Discourse of Civilization r---> 1 13

ogy and a space, however circumscribed, in which to pursue their goals. Given the history of their persecution, the societies must have found the opportunity very attractive. In the aftermath of the Manchurian Incident, a rumor suddenly floated among Daoyuan followers that Laozi had prophesied this apocalypse, and they wel­ comed it as a sign of their liberation.92 The Morality Society (Daodehui) also embraced the regime, and, by one report, expanded its following to eight million adherents in 1 936-1 937 in Manchukuo alone (roughly one-fourth of the total pop­ ulation).93 Founded in 1 9 1 9 by the high literati of Shan dong around a child prodigy who had once been a companion of the Xuantong emperor, the Society flourished until the establishment of KMT power and the antireligion campaign of 1928. It had developed a mass following within China and extensive networks around the world. Philosopher Kang Youwei, its president, believed that the ultimate signifi­ cance of the nation arose from its self-transcendence in the universalist utopia of Datong (Great Unity), an ideal that meshed well with Manchukuo's rhetoric of civi­ lization.

In Manchuria, the Morality Society expanded suddenly in the mid-1 920s when the legendary Wang Fengyi (1 864-1937) joined it, bringing with him a massive following and an extensive network of schools in Liaoning and Rehe.94 Wang was a self-educated intellectual from a modest rural background in Chaoyang county, Rehe. His adoring followers referred to him as the righteous sage (yisheng), and he was popularly known as shanren (man who does good). His activities have been char­ acterized as being in the tradition of jiaohua or advocating ethical transformation. Upon enlightenment of the dao, he threw himself into lecturing and doing good, urging filiality and the study of the sages and curing various ills with his theory of nature.95 But perhaps the two most interesting dimensions of his civilizing program were his promotion of women's education and his theory of self-realization and self­ reliance. We will elaborate on his program for women in the next chapter. His con­ ception of self-knowledge was based upon a complex theory synthesizing the doc­ trine of the five conducts (based on the five elements) and yinyang cosmology with the teachings of the three religions.

In brief, the technical aspect of his theory sought to show how the five elements (wuxing)-wood, fire, earth, metal, and water-shape the five behavioral character­ istics of a person (wuxing), not in a determinative way, but in combination with how the person cultivates (xiudao) these elements in the different circumstances of a life. On one level, his theory prescribed inner cultivation, but the self was ulti­ mately realized in outward actions within a framework of changing circumstances. Self-exploration and self-reliance were the keynotes in Wang's philosophy.96 We shall observe the practice of this philosophy in the next chapter.

Wang's technology of the self was rooted in the wider religious and philosophical movement of syncretism, or the religion of the "three-in-one" (sanjiao heyt). Accord­ ing to Lin Anwu, a contemporary follower and analyst of the philosophy, Wang affirmed the basic goodness of nature or natural dispositions (tianxing) and the three bonds (sangang) of Confucianism (father-son, ruler-subject, husband-wife). He

1 14 r--> Chapter 3

found them compatible with the three treasures of Buddhism and the three transfor­ mations (the hua of xing, xin, and shen) of Daoism, all of which could be understood within the Buddhist realms of the three worlds.97 Yet the goal of the philosophy, Lin writes, "is neither theoretical nor technical, but practically related to experiences in one's life; one can in this way find the roots of one's life. A person may thus return to the principles underlying the bonds between the world, heaven and humans."98 In this cosmological foundation we may discern the civilizational agenda of the Morality Society.

Wang's commitment to "transform the world" (huasht) had been noted locally even before his association with the Morality Society. The Chaoyang county gazet­ teer observed that his efforts had led to an improvement of customs and the spread of education. Over a hundred segregated schools initiated by his son were epony­ mously called Wang Guohua schools.99 A female devotee, Liu Shuquan, whom the senior Wang had deputed as the principal of a righteous girl's school in his home­ town of Yangshan, was praised in her funeraty inscription as having "enlightened (kaiming) our women's world, which had been steeped in darkness for thousands of years."IOO Wang himself appeared to be extremely energetic, traveling widely and establishing schools and branches of the society in what might be seen as a process of civilizing the frontier. He received the patronage of important politicians, such as the Manchu literatus Bai Yongzhen, who had been an important official before the Republic and later served as the speaker of the Fengtian provincial assembly (Shengy­ ihui jiangchang). 101 It is Bai's calligraphy that adorns Wang's little book of teachings.

When Manchukuo was established, the Morality Society responded to Tachiba­ na's formulation of wangdao, and became the most influential group aside from the Red Swastika Society. Wang sought government permission to organize a major summit in Xinjing and rapidly created branches all across the new state.102 By 1 934, the 3 1 2 branches of the Manchukuo Morality Society operated 235 "righteous" or "virtuous" schools, 226 lecture halls, and 124 clinics.103 By 1 936, a year before Wang's death, it boasted 1 3 head offices, 208 city and county branch offices, and 529 zhen-Ievel branches. 104 Many of the top Chinese figures in the government, such as Yuan Jinkai and Zhang Jinghui, were associated with it. Its membership and officeholders included top officials, merchants, and landowners all the way from the major cities to the subcounty townships. The message of peace, morality, and spiri­ tual salvation of the world by the East befitted these successors of the old gentty elite. As a jiaohua agency, the society revealed a strong propagandist urge. It put great stock by its cadres or activists (sht), who were characterized as benevolent and resolute. 105 Through their activities in schools, through lectures, through spreading baihua commentaries on classical morality, and through establishing popular enlightenment societies to "reform popular customs and rectify the people's minds and heans," the society propounded a strong rhetoric of reaching out to all-the rich and poor, men and women.106

The effort to assimilate groups such as the Morality Society into the rhetoric of Eastern civilization reflected both the regime's concern for its sovereignty claims and

Asianism and the New Discourse of Civilization .--. 1 1 5

its interest in transforming the societies to serve regime and state goals. The mecha­ nism whereby it was able to bridge these rwo goals was the policy of jiaohua or kyoka. We have considered the role of jiaohua-to transform by teaching-in the civilizing process of imperial China. Like hundreds of words in the modern Japanese lexicon, kyokaljiaohua was a paleonym from the classical Chinese that yielded a con­ siderably different signification. Sheldon Garon, who has discussed the imponance of kyoka in modern Japan, has translated it as "moral suasion": "Elaborate bureau­ cracies sprang up, devoted to running moral suasion campaigns, coordinating local moral suasion groups, disseminating 'social education,' and effecting 'spiritual mobi­ lization.' "107 We might say that in its modern incarnation, kyoka represented the state's institutionalized framework for guiding panicipation in governmentality.

Like the KMT based in Nanjing, the Manchukuo government censured the "superstitious" character of the redemptive societies, but instead of seeking to eradi­ cate these societies it sought to transform them into jiaohua organizations-agencies engaged in welfare, enlightenment, and control of the people. lOB Japanese observers had long noted that religious groups and temple societies were the only agencies of social "welfare" (kosez) in Manchuria, distributing food and providing shelter to the needy. 109 At the same time, they inevitably observed how, despite the strong this­ worldly, social orientation, these same religious organizations were also rife with superstition and dangerous possibilities. The task facing the Manchukuo govern­ ment was to reform the societies and make them usable while preserving their reli­ gious source of inspiration.

One significant institution developed to effect this transformation was the Feder­ ation of Social Enterprises (Manzhou shehui shiye lianhehuz), established early in 1 933 by the Department of Home Affairs (Minzhengbu, later Mimhengbu); Prime Minister Zheng Xiaoxu, who was also minister of the Culture and Education Depanment (Wenjiaobu), served as an honorary member. The rwo depanments often had different views of the role of religion in Manchukuo. The Federation, which brought out a regular publication of its activities, was expected to oversee relief provision, welfare enterprises, and improvement of the people's morality and spirit of citizenship. It was also charged with coordinating the activities of the vari­ ous local government welfare depanments with those of the redemptive societies and chambers of commerce. 1 10 On the one hand, the organization was an instrument of modern governmentality. Its agencies prepared meticulously detailed classifications of the needy and the means to help them, including factories for the poor, vocational training schools, and labor dormitories. 1 1 I On the other, it actively sought to associ­ ate its welfare and relief programs with a traditionalist ideology. Food distribution, free clinics, lectures on hygiene and sanitation, management of schools, widows' homes and orphanages, and general relief work were often undenaken by redemp­ tive groups such as the Buddhists, the Red Swastika Society, the Zailijiao, or the Morality Society. Whenever possible, philanthropy took place around temples and during religious festivals (such as for Niangniang, goddess of fenility, or Guandi, god of loyalty), and was inevitably accompanied by traditional imagery, drama, and

1 16 ...-..-. Chapter 3

propaganda heralding wangdao and letu (paradise). I 12 Thus, under the rubric of jiao­ hua-adding modern Japanese techniques to an old Chinese idea-the regime cre­ ated a unique organizational structure integrating its rhetoric of civilization with modern welfare and political control.

Through the structural incorporation of these redemptive societies from the out­ side, the regime hoped to effect their internal transformation. The general idea was to model them upon Christian--especially Protestant-missionary societies under state supervision. I 13 This meant ridding them of their extreme "superstitious" prac­ tices and further encouraging their educational, charitable, and civilizing functions. Their activities were to be closely scrutinized by officials. Records of the Morality Society indicate that officials of the Home and Education Departments constantly issued detailed rules and regulations and demanded strict accountability for finances and properties. Textbooks and even the daily schedule of the schools run by the Morality Society had to be in strict conformance with Education Department guide­ lines. 1 14 Before going on to examine the particular relationships between the differ­ ent societies and the regime, let me indicate the extent to which this model of relations between popular societies and the Japanese-backed regime applied else­ where in China.

The Japanese invasion of China south of the pass in 1 937 produced a breakdown in the formal structures of control and authority, whether of the KMT or the war­ lords. Secret societies, sectarians, and redemptive societies were able to enlarge their influence in this vacuum. Indeed, in some cases the Chinese communists and Japa­ nese forces often competed for their allegiance. I I) Unlike the KMT, which had ear­ lier driven most groups of all three types underground, the Japanese militaty, drawing on their experience in Manchukuo, sought particularly to bring the redemptive societies under their wing. Researchers like Suemitsu believed that by forcing them underground, the KMT had actually increased the association of these societies with the violent secret societies and made them politically unreliable. The Japanese military hoped to appeal not only to the redemptive societies, but to secret societies that valued the traditional Confucian rhetoric of righteousness and loy­ alty. 1 16

Occupation-era governments in north China at the county and city levels con­ ducted investigations of religious societies in order both to identify opposition and to bring out and encourage the registration of sectarian and redemptive societies as jiaohua organizations. Records reveal the registration of, or petitions to register, a very large number of these societies between 1 937 and 1 945 with the Department of Police, the Department of Social Affairs, or the Department of Rites. In some places, these societies registered with the quasi-official Revive Asia Association (Xin­ gyayuan) or the New Peoples Society (Xinminhuz). The total figure for participants or followers of all societies within a single county or city often reached beyond tens of thousands. In one survey of several counties in Shanxi, of twenty-seven societies registered, only one was founded after 1 94 1 ; twelve were founded from 1931 to 194 1 , and the rest predated the Japanese invasion. These were typically syncretic or

Asianism and the New Discourse of Civilization .--.. 1 17

Buddhist societies that sought to uphold traditional Eastern morality, to salvage society, and more and more, to resist communism and uphold the East Asian new order. Many have the names we have encountered above, but there were also several Buddhist societies and some purely local ones. Of the societies registered only after 1 937, some may have been created just to seize opponunities under an occupying regime, but the evidence points only to their registration as public bodies and not their founding. I I?

In central China under the Wang Jingwei regime the process of incorporating the societies into government projects came under the responsibility of the Social Movements Guidance Depanment (Shehui yundong zhidao weiyuanhut), which kept detailed records, including educational qualifications and other information about members of many societies. The groups included not only redemptive societies but secret brotherhoods (banghut), native-place associations, and professional groups (tongye), all of which the puppet Wang regime sought to control, mobilize, and transform into welfare agencies and propagators of the ideas of Eastern civiliza­ tion. 1 18 The roster of one of these societies, the One Heart Heavenly Way Longhua Sagely Teaching (Yixin tiandao longhua shengjiao), which profiled its members in Tianjin and Nanjing, reveals that in 1 943, of its sixty-five members in Tianjin, an overwhelming number (fifty-two) were educated in the traditional private schools (sishu). About five were teachers in such schools, a few were Chinese medicine doc­ tors, and the remainder were merchants or farmers. Of the 420 members in the Nanjing branch, 1 1 8 had primary school degrees, about four or five had higher degrees, and most of the rest (312) had a traditional school education. Most of the members were merchants.1 19 Records also include the distribution of the Morality Society in several provinces in 1 942. There were about 1 30 branches in Hebei, 75 in Shandong, 7 in Anhui, 1 4 in Shanxi, and 7 in Inner Mongolia; the branches averaged about 1 50 members.120

Meanwhile, in Manchukuo, despite the relative success of the regime in working with these groups, the results were mixed. Most analysts, who usually conducted their surveys of them for the Home Depanment, continued to be suspicious of the societies. Takizawa was perhaps the most sympathetic, or perhaps the most cognizant of the importance of the religious inspiration behind social activism and loyalty. As part of general religious policy, he advocated the legal protection and expansion of temples and other religious properties, which he regarded as the most important collective property of the people. He recommended the reform of temples and mon­ asteries and the education of priests and monks along the lines of both Christian missions and Japanese Buddhist missionaries. Finally, he called on his fellow Japa­ nese to break with the idea of a pure national religion and promote the desegregation of the customarily separate worship in Chinese and Japanese temples and shrines, and the mixing of deities among them, in order to develop a composite Manchurian religion. "Religion," he concluded, "will be first and last in melding the spirits of Japan and Manchukuo." 12 1

Others found this religiosity quite problematic. We noted the opposition by the

1 1 8 .-. Chapter 3

Concordia Association, which tended to be more interested in modernization. It preferred the other founding narrative of Manchukuo, as a new type of nation with equality between its nationalities and ethnicities. 122 Often the opposition to religion was spearheaded by the younger leadership of the different ethnic groups, such as the Mongols and the Daurs, who felt that too much emphasis on ethnic traditions would condemn them to backwardness. Most of all, the Japanese feared religious societies for security reasons. If religion could be said to be the opium that produces compliance and collaboration, it was equally a force that produced opposition to the regime in Manchukuo and north China. Manchukuo military and police often found religious societies, particularly in the rural areas, to be subversive. Christianity in particular afforded many of the Koreans in Manchukuo a means to resist the state, sometimes because Western pastors and the Christian church continued to be protected by extraterritorial rights.123 Even such well-established elite societies as the Morality Society and the Red Swastika Society continued to have links with subver­ sive secret societies in the countryside.124 Otani Komei suggests that in smaller towns all over Manchukuo the larger societies were connected to violent secret societies whose politics were local and often directed against Japanese state penetration. In the hinterlands, the redemptive societies were hardly as cohesive as they appeared in the cities, and internal strife between pro- and anti-Japanese forces continued within them for a long time. 125

Two societies about which the regime was most uncertain were the Zaijiali (or Jialt) and the Zailijiao, two different organizations, but both hybrid in their own ways and possessing secretive and public faces. In Suemitsu's survey, the Zailijiao was listed under the category of religious self-cultivation societies and the Jiali as a bang or secret society, but with strong syncretic, religious, and orthodox qualities. 126

The Jiali in Manchuria had evolved from a self-help organization among Shandong migrants and sometimes used the language of native-place associations. Indeed, by the 1930s it had produced a modern, legal charitable institution, the Jiali tongxiang jiujihui Oiali Native Place Charitable Association), which operated under the laws of the state and appeared to cooperate with it. 127 At the same time, the association with rural self-help groups convinced surveyors that the regime would not be able to rid it of its subversive secretiveness. 128

The Zailijiao, as we have seen, was a fiercely disciplinary and renunciatory redemptive society. It too never gave up its secretive dimension-keeping certain practices secret even from the adherent's family.129 Otani gives us a glimpse into the state's effort to co-opt this society. According to secret police reports, the Harbin Zailijiao, which claimed to have about a thousand followers, actually commanded a much larger covert following and harbored "criminals and assassins."l3o When the Manchukuo regime was established, the group's leaders apparently affirmed the compatibility and sympathy of the new state with their own doctrine of righteous­ ness (yiqz) , thus supposedly coming into the open and conducting their activities lawfully. The number of their branches expanded rapidly, and they also set up many Japanese language schools. Yet the Harbin center appeared to have little control over

Asianism and the New Discourse of Civilization ,-, 1 1 9

the southern branches, and continued reports of opposition to the regime suggested that the results of its efforts were quite mixed. The regime continued to exercise strict surveillance of their activities.13 1

Surveys also found two other circumstances that contributed to the oppositional character of redemptive societies. First, in regions with ethnic diversity, such as Rehe-where over half the population was Mongol in many counties-there was often a tradition of communal hostility between Han and Mongol. 132 Religious soci­ eties here, including the Red Swastika and the Jiali, as much as the Red Spears and other communal societies, seemed to have a stronger Han consciousness, and were, according to Japanese surveyors, torn between loyalty to their ethnicity and to their faith.133 Finally, the ecstatic and shamanistic aspects of these religious societies were viewed with genuine concern. In some areas, even seemingly pacific Buddhist socie­ ties could become inflammatory and oppose the regime. According to Otani, they were loyal to none but their own religious convictions centered around oracular authority. 134

Despite these serious concerns, sectarian and redemptive societies were far too important to the regime's political projects to be abandoned. Bureaucrats from the Rituals Division (Lijiaoke) of the Education Department and other ideologues believed that it was necessary to stress the religious character of the various ethnic communities and associations in order to distinguish them from Western civiliza­ tion. Religious societies could best exemplifY the basically Asiatic characteristics of agrarian communitarianism (niJhomhugi kyiJdotatJ that represented the essence of all the national and ethnic groups of East Asia. Fukunaga Tadashi, also author of The Principle of Cultural War, sought to deploy a transnational, civilizational argument about kyiJdotai nations in opposition to the individualistic civilization of the nations of the West. He argued that East Asian civilizational (and, more generally, Asian) qualities such as communitarianism and cooperativism were based upon a shared pantheistic view of the world. The shared qualities mandated a fundamental equality among the nationalities of the East and could thus also be distinguished from the German Nazi theory of pure blood. 1 35 Indeed, Fukunaga invoked the familiar Japa­ nese historical narrative of Manchuria as the crossroads of many different peoples, starting with the Tungus groups and ending with the recent Han and Japanese set­ ders. While this narrative was used to make several claims, here it served to establish the region as the exemplary site of Asian cooperativeness. Manchukuo emerges as the state able to realize this essential quality in a new type of nationalism more in tune with the spirit of true egalitarianism than the nationalism of the West. Again, the discourse of civilization was essential to the rhetoric of the new nationalism.

Even as he sought to conjoin the modern egalitarian and timeless communitarian aspects of Asian civilization, Fukunaga firmly established Japan's role as the leader of these nations. Because Japan combined the superior Asiatic spiritual culture with the advantages of Western material culture, Japan had a responsibility to implant its culture in Manchukuo and other Asian societies in order to raise their civilizational level. 136 In other words, whereas the other peoples may have had some kind of pan-

1 20 r--J Chapter 3

theism and communitarianism that distinguished them from individualistic Western societies, this spirit was not as well developed as it was among the Japanese, where the people and the rulers were entirely one. 137

Fukunaga's text returns us to the civilizational discourse with which we opened this chapter. It shows how the redemptive universalism of the sectarian and syncretic groups, an expression of an older civilizing process tied to new concerns, became assimilated into the hard doctrine of an exclusive civilization that underlay the prin­ ciple of cultural war berween East and West, especially after the outbreak of the Pacific War. Given the gaps berween them, the only way this could be done was to subordinate the various societies to the state's ideology. Otani articulated this posi­ tion most effectively. Noting that the secular philosophy of the Concordia Associa­ tion did not appear to have much relevance to the lives of ordinary people, he had come to believe that religion was the more fundamentally motivating sentiment. 138

While many of the contemporary religious beliefs of the people in Manchukuo were decadent and backward, it was both necessary and possible to elevate this sentiment and bring the plurality of beliefs under a higher unified order, which he called Datong weiyi shijie, or the world of the Great Unity. Confucianism provided the moral and Buddhism the religious foundation for this transformation. 139 In this way, the state could channel the energies of the redemptive societies into productive and loyal activities as well as attain the civilizational goals of the Great Unity. Thus did the redemptive societies emerge from their hidden, secretive condition into a public world of srate supervision and control. They were permitted to pursue their goal of redemptive universalism, but only under the watchful eye of a non universal state.

The goal of this chapter has been to see how a global discourse of civilization worked within a particular political formation. Civilization in the rwentieth century had come to represent the highest ideals of humanity, but, curiously, as embodied in distinctive national cultures. In other words, while each national project claimed its ultimate worth in its universal relevance or scope, their ideologues found it necessary to stress the origins, and hence the distinct authority, of their civilization. There were many groups emerging from the older Chinese society who found personal meaning and mission in the universalist aims and civilizing projects, but nationalists among the Chinese and Japanese-who valued such ideals largely for their authorizing func­ tion-sought to seize this universalism for the national or statist project.

Through the discourse of Asian civilization, state-builders in Manchukuo attempted to connect older conceptions of society, morality, and personhood to claims of sovereignty. In an age when this sovereignty was expected to conform to the identity (if not quite "will") of the people, the Manchukuo laboratory presents us with certain insights into how this dynamic worked more broadly in East Asia. On the one hand, the need to found sovereignty at least partially through the histori­ cal language and cultural imagery of older formations in East Asia was shared with the Chinese and Japanese nation-states, whether in the emperor system or the New Life movement, or, as we shall see, in the common conception of authentic woman-

Asianism and the New Discourse of Civilization (--..J 1 2 1

hood. On the other hand, the state in all three societies had to transform or seriously modify the meanings and connotations of this historical language in order to achieve their goals of governmentality and the extension or stabilization of regime power. In all three nondemocratic regimes, the East Asian modern entailed a high degree of top-down reconstruction of tradition, enabling the state to lead modernization according to its own conception and interests. We have seen this in the KMT effort to define tradition and religion through its particular interpretation of Confucian­ ism; in Japan, the cultural framework of kyoka furnished the mechanism to control the management of society within the larger ideology of the emperor system. Such top-down statist formulations frequently led to the exclusion from legitimate "tradi­ tion" of large groups of people who may have lived these traditions or who sought to embody their ideals.

Ironically, precisely because they lacked legitimacy as conationals or coethnics, Japanese power-holders in Manchukuo had few options but to ally with elements of these popular cultural traditions in order to stabilize their regime and achieve their goals. The rhetoric of Asian civilizational distinctiveness not only furnished a frame­ work for this alliance and claim to sovereignty, it provided the opportunity to trans­ form them for purposes of the state. Thus we may see the regime's use of redemptive societies as instrumental and ultimately uncommitted to the original ideals of these societies. We have also seen the incorporative process to have had mixed results, but it was more productive than the KMT's relationship with these societies.

Over the course of the anti-Japanese war, the KMT became increasingly aware of the Japanese co-optation of the redemptive societies and other religious and cul­ tural groups that it deemed backward and lacking in education, culture, and national consciousness. 140 The KMT Central Committee's Bureau of Investigation and Sta­ tistics (Zhongtongju) was entrusted to investigate, penetrate, and countermobilize these societies, although it is not at all clear that they had much success. Judging from the classified reports of its investigations in Sichuan and other parts of south and west China in 1 939-1940,141 these societies were highly susceptible to the rhet­ oric and ideals of an older worldview, even when modern professionals were involved in them. An extensive report on the Gelaohui, an important secret society in Sichuan and the middle Yangzi provinces, reveals that the society had penetrated the civil and militaty administration-including bankers-of many cities and coun­ ties in these provinces. It points to the dangers of this infiltration by revealing how in 1 940 a branch in Ba county, Sichuan, gathered followers and spread the message that China was destined to have an emperor.

Another report, about the Hailufing zhangtang in Guangdong, also shows us the tensions generated by efforts to modernize these groups. Originally a branch of the White Lotus, the group became a formal and peaceful organization after the Repub­ lican revolution and even had important officials from the warlord government among its members. Although it remained vegetarian and sutra-reciting, it was nei­ ther political nor secretive. It was apparently in the forefront of the resistance against the Japanese occupation, attending to military preparedness and to the common

122 ,--...., Chapter 3

people's needs. Soon after the failure of the resistance, the older leadership appar­ ently regained control of the organization, restarted qigong practices, and turned the society into a militant Buddhist group whose loyalties appeared uncertain. 142

While local factors-the perception of Japanese (or KMT, or warlord) threat to the community, local rivalries, and so on-played an indubitably important role in determining which side these groups would support, the KMT reports reveal a consistently negative view of these groups as backward and show little flexibility in accommodating their worldviews. Committed to a modernized Confucianism of its own kind, the KMT seemed unable to respond to the appeal of older, living prac­ tices and ideals. In this regard, although the Japanese militaty also often found them to be unusable for their purposes, it nonetheless developed the language and institu­ tions of accommodation while it sought to transform them. Restoration of the impe­ rial institution, which was pivotal to the historical cosmology, seemed vety important to many of these groups and served the Japanese cause. 143

By creating a framework for a working relationship, Manchukuo revealed a yawning gap that divided Chinese modernizing nationalists from the society they sought to modernize and nationalize. This society was linked in myriad practical, spatial, and material ways to conceptions of the cosmos and personhood that seemed hopelessly out-of-date to these modernizers. It would require a revolution to over­ haul.

Notes

1 . SjHWZ, case 143, October 8, 193 1 . 2. Takizawa Toshihiro, Manshu no gaison shinko (Beliefs o f Manchuria's towns and vil­

lages) (Shinkyo: Manshu jijo annaijo, 1940), 284. 3. Tachibana Shiraki, Dokyo to Shinwa Densetsu (Daoism and myths and legends)

(Tokyo: KaizQsha, 1947), 1 . 4 . Fumimaro Konoye, "Manchoukuo, Precursor of Asiatic Renaissance and the Gov­

ernment by Wang-tao (Kingly Way) based on Theocracy," Contemporary Manchuria 2 Guly 1 937): 14-15.

5 . Gerrit W. Gong, The Standard of "Civilization " in International Society (Oxford: Clarendon, 1984), 1 2, and Lucien P. V. Febvre, "Civilisation: Evolution of a Word and a Group of Ideas," in A New Kind of History and Other Essays, ed. Peter Burke (New York: Harper and Row, 1973), 229-47.

6. The embodiment of Civilization in legal form had the effect of universalizing it, or in other words of disassociating it from the particular soil or conditions of its emergence (such as Christianity) in the West. It was in this particular legal incarnation that countries like Japan (and Turkey) could aspire to the status of a Civilized nation and, indeed, sought very hard to do so.

7. Febvre, "Civilisation," 220, 236, and Matti Bunz!, "Franz Boas and the Humbold­ tian Tradition: From Volksgeist and Nationalcharakter to an Anthropological Concept of Cul­ ture," in Volksgeist as Method and Ethic: Essays on Boasian Ethnography and the Gennan Anthropological Tradition, ed. George W. Stocking Jr. (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1996).

Asianism and the New Discourse of Civilization .--. 1 23

8. James E. Ketelaar, Of Heretics and Martyrs in Meiji Japan: Buddhism and Its Persecu­ tion (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1990); Heinz Bechert, "Buddhist Revival in East and West," in The World of Buddhism: Buddhist Num and Monks in Society and Culture, ed. Heinz Bechert and Richard Gombrich (London: Thames and Hudson, 1984); and Raymond Schwab, Oriental Renaissance: Europe's Rediscovery of India and the East, 1680-1880, trans. Gene Parterson-Black and Victor Reinking (New York: Columbia University Press, 1984).

9. Douglas Howland, Borders of Chinese Civilization: Geography and History at Empire's End (Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 1996), 262 n. 22, and Douglas R. Reynolds, China, 1898-1912: The Xinzheng Revolution and Japan (Cambridge, Mass.: Council on East Asian Studies, 1993), 22, 28.

10. Bechert, "Buddhist Revival in East and West," 274-75. The same reconstruction of Hinduism was taking place in India under the auspices of the Theosophical Society and thinkers like Sri Aurobindo and Swami Vivekananda.

1 1 . Ketelaar, Of Heretics and Martyrs. 12. Oswald Spengler, The Decline of the West, abridged ed., ed. Helmut Werner (New

York: Knopf, 1962), 5. One cannot but be reminded of the German association of the word civilization with an effete and superficial French cult of manners and courtesy; see Norbert Elias, The Civilizing Process: The Development of Manners, trans. Edmund Jephcort (New York: Urizen, 1978). But note that for Homboldt, writing in the early part of the nineteenth centuty, Kultur and Zivilisation were quite interchangeable; see Febvre, "Civilisation," 244.

1 3. Spengler, Decline of the West, 12. 14. William H. McNeill, Arnold Toynbee: A Lift (New York: Oxford University Press,

1989), 103, 165, and Jerty H. Bentley, Shapes of World History in Twentieth-Century Scholar­ ship (Washington, D.C.: American Historical Association, 1996), 7.

1 5. Toynbee, "Christianity and Civilization," 230-34. 16. McNeill, Arnold Toynbee, 269-73. 1 7. Michael Adas, "The Great War and the Decline of the Civilizing Mission," in Auton­

omous Histories: Particular Truths, ed. Laurie Sears. (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1993), 109.

1 8. Barraclough, Introduction to Contemporary History, 1 1 8-22. 19. Bentley, Shapes of World History, 3. 20. Elias, The Civilizing Process, 3-4, 29-34, 38-40, 50. According to Elias, by civiliza­

tion, "Western society seeks to describe what constitutes its special character and what it is proud of: the level of its technology, the nature of its manners, the development of its scientific knowledge or view of the world, and much more." Although Elias notes that this civilization allows Europeans to think of themselves transnationally as the "upper-class to large sections of the non-European world," he is much more concerned with its transformation within intra­ European relationships into "national" civilizations. Note, however, that despite this transfor­ mation in the nineteenth centuty, the civilizing process does not disappear, as Raymond Wil­ liams points out; see The Country and the City (London: Charto and Windus, 1973), 57-60. As we have seen, this is most evident in the "civilizing mission" idea.

2 ! . Gong, Standard of "Civilization, " 190. 22. Liang, cited in Ishikawa Yoshihiro, "Bunmei, bunka, soshite Ryo Keicho" (Civiliza­

tion, culture, and Liang Qichao) (unpublished manuscript, 1995), 8. 23. Ishikawa, "Bunmei, bunka, soshite Ryo Keicho," 9-10. 24. Gong, Standard of "Civilization, " 1 57.

1 24 r---J Chapter 3

25. Yamamuro Shinichi, "Ajia ninshiki no kijiku" (The axes of perceiving Asia), in Kindai Nihon no Ajia ninshiki (Modern Japan's perceptions of Asia), ed. Furuya Tetsuo (Kyoto: Kyoto Daigaku Jinbun Kagaku Kenkyiijo, 1 994), 3-4 1 .

26. Ueda Makoto, "Okakura Tenshin-aru kyokai no Ajia kan" (Okakura Tenshin: A view of Asia from a certain margin), Kokusai kyoryu 77 ( 1 996): 56-58.

27. Bunso Hashikawa, "Japanese Perspectives on Asia: From Dissociation to Coprosper­ ity," in The Chinese and the Japanese: Essays in Political and Cultural Interactions, ed. Akira Iriye (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1 980), 331-4 1 .

28. Yamazaki Mugen, "Kyoiku zasshi ni miru Ajia ninshiki no tenkai" (The development of the perception of Asia as seen in educational journals), in Kindai Nihon no Ajia ninshiki (Modern Japan's perceptions of Asia), ed. Furuya Tetsuo (Kyoto: Jinbun kagaku kenkyiijo, 1 994), 299-350.

29. Christopher W. A. Szpilman, "The Dream of One Asia: Okawa Shomei and Japa­ nese Pan-Asianism," in The Japanese Empire and Its Legacy in East Asia, ed. Harald Fuess (Munich: German Institute ofjapanese Studies, 1 988), 43-47, 50.

30. Hasegawa Yoichi, "Taisho choki tairiku kokka e no imeiji-'Daikoraikoku' (Dagaoli, Koryo) koso to sono shohen" (The image of a mainland nation in the mid-Taisho era: The conception of the "Great Koryo nation" and the area around it), Kokusai Seiji 71 ( 1 982): 95.

3 1 . SanetO Keisho, Nihon bunka no Shina e no eikyo (The influence of Japanese culture on China) (Tokyo: Keisetsu shoin, 1 940).

32. Ishikawa Yoshihiro, "Tozai bunmeiron to Nihon no rondan" (The discourse of East­ West civilization and the Sino-Japanese world of letters), in Kindai Nihon no Ajia ninshiki (Modern Japan's perceptions of Asia), ed. Furuya Tetsuo (Kyoto: Kyoto Daigaku Jinbun Kagaku Kenkyiijo, 1 994), 398-403.

33. Ishikawa, "Thzai bunmeiron to Nihon no rondan," 430. 34. Ishikawa, "Tozai bunmeiron to Nihon no rondan," 420. 35. Ishikawa, "Tozai bunmeiron to Nihon no rondan," 4 1 5-16. 36. The ambivalence regarding the value of Chinese "civilization" continues to dominate

Chinese intellectual discourse on the subject. Partly as a result, both the Enlightenment con­ ception and the post-Great War conception of civilization continue to inform the Chinese signifier wenming. Thus it is by identifYing the context of its use, as well as by differentiating the usages of "culture" (wenhua)-as in the German usage of Kultur-that we can grasp which sense of civilization is meant.

37. See Jerome B. Grieder, Intellectuals and the State in Modern China (New York: Free Press, 1981) , and Guy S. Alitto, The Last Confocian: Liang Shu-ming and the Chinese Dilemma of Modernity (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1 979).

38. Aida Yuen Wong, "In Search of the East: Art History and Sino-Japanese Relations" (Ph.D. diss., Columbia University, 1 999).

39. Mizuno Naoki, "Senkyohyaku nijO nendai Nihon, Chosen, Chogoku ni okeru Ajia ninshiki no ichidanmen-Ajia minzoku kaigi 0 meguru sankoku no roncho" (An aspect of the perception of Asia in the three countries of Japan, Korea, and China during the 1 920s: The arguments of the three countries surrounding the conference on Asian peoples), in Kindai Nihon no Ajia ninshiki (Modern Japan's perceptions of Asia), ed. Furuya Tetsuo (Kyoto: KyotO Daigaku Jinbun Kagaku Kenkyiijo, 1994), 509-44.

40. Chen Lifu, "Xin shenghuo yu minsheng shiguan" (New Life and the Minsheng con­ ception of history), in GWXSY, 1 28, 133.

Asianism and the New Discourse of Civilization ......., 1 25

4 1 . Takayoshi Suemitsu, Shina no himitsu kessha to jizen kaisha (China's secret societies and charitable societies) (Dalian: Manshu hyoronsha, 1 932), 252; Takizawa, Mamhu no gai­ son shinko, 67.

42. Wing-tsit Chan, Religious Trends in Modern China (New York: Columbia University Press, 1 953), 1 64-65, 1 67; cf. Suemitsu, Shina no himitsu kessha to jizen kaisha, 302.

43. Shao Yong does not furnish a systematic estimate of the membership of these socie­ ties, which he calls huidaomen. He supplies scattered figures of membership in different locali­ ties, drawn from various sources, including the societies' own statements. For instance, in one place he suggests that the Tongshamhe membership in Hunan province alone exceeded 20,000 in 1 9 1 8. Again, for 1 938 he claims that the societies had a combined membership of one million in the provinces of Henan, Shandong, and Anhui. Most astonishing is his revelation that membership of the Morality Society was as high as eight million in 1 936-1937 in Man­ chukuo alone. See Shao Yong, Zhongguo huidaomen (China's religious societies) (Shanghai: Remmin chubanse, 1 997), 1 74, 32 1 , 325. Thanks to David Ownby for supplying me with this reference and his translated notes. I have since consulted the original and am fully respon­ sible for any errors in transcription. While we can assume that the Japanese researchers may have wanted to exaggerate the numbers in these groups, there was also a concern for accuracy since the surveys were conducted principally to assess the potential for support and opposition to their rule. The figures cited above refer to the spread of religious societies all over China, largely before the Japanese occupation. Most of the surveys were marked secret or for internal consumption. Note that a similar mystety of exaggerated numbers accompanies the rise of such redemptive societies as the Falungong or the Zhonggong today. Given the climate of sup­ pression and secrecy in which these societies had to operate during both periods, the resem­ blance is perhaps not accidental.

44. Kai-wing Chow, The Rise ofConfocian Ritualism in Late Imperial China: Ethics, C/m­ sics, and Lineage Discourse (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1 994), 21-25.

45. Kai-wing Chow, The Rise ofConfocian Ritualism, 22-27. 46. MDNJ, 4: 1 ; Takizawa Toshihiro, Shakyo chosa shiryo (Materials from the survey of

religions), vol. 3, Minkan shinko chosa hokokusho (Report on the survey of popular beliefs) (Shinkyo: Minseibu, 1 937), 67 ff ; and HZN, 505-57 ff.

47. MDNJ, 1 :3-6. 48. MDNJ, 4: 1 , and Takizawa, Shukyo chosa shiryo, 67. 49. Li Shiyu, Xianzai Huabei mimi zongjiao (Secret religions in north China today)

( 1948; reprint, Taipei: Guding shuwu, 1975), 50-55. 50. HZN, 485-86. 5 1 . HZN, 491-93. 52. Suemitsu, Shina no himitsu kessha to jizen kaisha, 292-305, 354. 53. HZN, 507-27. 54. Suemitsu, Shina no himitsu kessha to jizen kaisha, 262-63. 55. For the fullest reports on the social welfare activities of these societies, especially for

the Red Swastika Society, see the reports of the Shanghai city social bureau's reports in SSfYB, 1 930-1 932, 1 946.

56. Takizawa, Mamha no gaison shinko, 282-84, and Suemitsu, Shina no himitsu kessha to jizen kaisha, 337-40.

57. Note that the four definitions of civilization in Webster! II New College Dictionary ( 1 995) basically conform to the different dimensions I have identified: 1) advanced human

1 26 ,.-....., Chapter 3

condition (conforms to singular/transnational); 2) nations showing advanced condition (con­ forms to nationalltransnational); 3) the type of culture of a group or society (conforms to Kultur/multiple); 4) the act or process of civilizing or reaching a civilized state (conforms to process and achieved state) .

58. Hanyu Dacidian bianji weiyuanhui (Hanyu Dacidian editorial committee), ed., Hanyu Dacidian (Shanghai: Sanlian chuban, 1 987), 6:1 522.

59. Hanyu Dacidian bianji weiyuanhui, Hanyu Dacidian, 5:445. 60. These popular ideas may have still shared in a common cosmology, or "doxa," even

if imperial orthodoxy regarded them as heterodox (xiejiao). According to a recent, well­ researched historical study of the Yiguandao by Fu Zhong, a sympathizer, not only were the doctrinal differences between the redemptive (jiushi) societies-at least by the early twentieth centuty-not great, but popular Confucianism also incorporated a strong redemptive ele­ ment. Most popular religious societies combined a strong salvationist ethic with the propaga­ tion of orthodox teachings of loyalty, filiality, charity, and social ethics (daode lunlz); see Fu Zhong, ed., Yiguandao Lishi (Taipei: Zhengyi shanshu, 1 997), 250. Note also how, although they may have advocated the overthrow of the dynasty, even secret societies valued these doxic teachings of righteousness (zhong;yz) and so forth. Perhaps the most important difference was the presence or absence of an eschatological vision--of the imminence of apocalypse; how­ ever, it not only differentiated some of them from the state, but from other secret societies. We should note that Fu Zhong seeks to play down the apocalyptic element, claiming even the Yiguandao to be orthodox (wulun, bade) and restorative of classical values; see Fu, Yiguan­ dao Lishi, 273-74, 280.

6 1 . See George W. Stocking Jr., ed., Volksgeist as Method and Ethic: Essays on Boasian Ethnography and the German Anthropological Tradition (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1 996), 3-5.

62. Robert Redfield, Human Nature and the Study of Society: The Papers of Robert Red­ field, ed. Margaret Park Redfield, vol. 1 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1 962-63), 373-77, 406-10.

63. Redfield, Human Nature, 402. 64. In postliberation China this ethnographic conception of civilization does not seem

to have survived too well; wenming tends to refer to the Enlightenment ideal of material and moral progress. I believe this has a lot to do with the close affiliation of Marxism with Enlight­ enment ideals. Someone like Du Weiming, on the other hand, is clearly more representative of the idea of Confucian civilization.

65. Redfield, Human Nature, 4 1 3. 66. David Ownby, "Chinese Millenarian Traditions: The Formative Age," American His­

torical Review 1 04 (December 1 999): 1 528. 67. David Ownby, "Imperial Fantasies: The Chinese Communists and Peasant Rebel-

lions," Comparative Studies in Society and History 43 (200 1) : 65-9 1 . 68. Redfield, Human Nature, 394. 69. Fu, Yiguandao Lishi, 278, 280. 70. Fu, Yiguandao Lishi, 308-9. 7 1 . Suemitsu, Shina no himitsu kessha to jizen kaisha, 266, 326-28; Takizawa, Mansha

no gaison shinko, 76-78; and Chan, Religious Trends, 164-67. 72. Li, Xianzai Huabei mimi zongjiao, 5 1-55. 73. By transcendent I do not refer to the philosophical idea of a noumenon beyond

Asianism and the New Discourse of Civilization ,-...., 1 27

knowledge and the realm of possible experience. Rather, in the Chinese or East Asian case, I use it to refer to the "other world" beyond mundane experience, but accessible by specialized techniques, faith, and other means.

74. SJHWZ, case 73, October 1 1 , 1 928; Otani Komme, Shakyo chosa shiryo (Materials from the survey of religions), vol. 2, Kitsurin, Kanto, Hinko, kakosho shokyo chosa hokoku (Repon on religious surveys of the various provinces ofJilin, Jiandao, and Binjiang) (Shinkyo: Minseibu, 1937), 69, 1 23; and Suemitsu, Shina no himitsu kessha to jizen kaisha, 25 1 , 255.

75. SJHWZ, case 86, n.d.: 1-6. 76. Duara, Rescuing History, 1 09-10. 77. SSjYB, 1 930: 251-54, 29 1-97; 193 1 : 296-300; and 1 932: 10 1-9. 78. Suemitsu, Shina no himitsu kessha to jizen kaisha, 25 1 . 79. Duara, Rescuing History, chap. 3. 80. Takizawa, Mamha no gaison shinko, 283. 8 1 . Warren H. Smith Jr., Confocianism in Modern Japan: A Study of Comervatism in

Japan s Intellectual History (Tokyo: Hokuseido, 1 959), 1 23-26. 82. Sheldon Garon, "Women's Groups and the Japanese State: Contending Approaches

to Political Integration, 1 890-1945," Journal of Japanese Studies 19 ( 1 993): 5-41 , 70-7 1 . 83. Garon, "Women's Groups and the Japanese State," 85-86. 84. Hasegawa, "Taisho chiiki tairiku kokka e no imeiji," 100. 85. Uchida Ryohei, Manmo no dokuritsu to Sekai Komanjikai no katsudo (The indepen­

dence of Manchuria-Mongolia and the activities of the World Red Swastika Society) (Tokyo: Senshinsha, 1932), 1 1 2, and Hasegawa, "Taisho chiiki tairiku kokka e no imeiji," 1 00.

86. Uchida, Manmo no dokuritsu to Sekai Komanjikai no katsudo, 1 08-9. 87. Quoted in Suemitsu, Shina no himitsu kessha to jizen kaisha, 3 1 7. 88. Uchida, Manmo no dokuritsu to Sekai Komanjikai no katsudo, 1 1 2, 129, and

Suemitsu, Shina no himitsu kessha to jizen kaisha, 3 1 0-20. 89. Hasegawa, "Taisho chiiki tairiku kokka e no imeiji," 100. Uchida Ryohei, himself a

source for information on the relationship between these two groups, became the leader of the World Red Swastika Society (Komanjz) and established many branches that exist to this day in Japan and Hawaii. When Uchida began to advocate violence in the 1930s, the Man­ chukuo Red Swastika Society disconnected itself from the Japanese groups and returned to a more universalist rather than pan-Asianist stance; see Takizawa, Mamha no gaison shinko, 285.

90. Tachibana, Dokyo to Shinwa Demetsu, 1-3, 13. 91. See Komagome, Shokuminchi Teikoku Nippon no Bunka logo, 265. 92. Takizawa, Mamha no gaison shinko, 284. 93. Shao, Zhongguo huiddomen, 32 1 . 94. Shao, Zhongguo huiddomen, 306-7. 95. Lin Anwu, "Yin dao yi Ii jiao--yi Wang Fengyi 'shierzi xinchuan' wei gaixin zhan­

kai" (Establishing "the Way" as religion: Explorations centered upon Wang Fengyi's "twelve character teachings"), in Zhonghua minzu zongjiao xueshu huiyi lunwen fobiao (Publication of the Conference on the Study of Chinese Religion) (Taipei: n.p., 1 989), 12.

96. Lin Anwu, "Yin dao yi I i jiao," 1 5-17. 97. Lin Anwu, "Yin dao yi Ii jiao," 13-15. 98. Lin Anwu, "Yin dao yi Ii jiao," 1 9. 99. Chaoyang xianzhi (Chaoyang County Gazetteer), compo Zhou Tiejing and Sun

Qingwei ( 1 930), juan 19: 14-1 6, juan 35:45-46; MDNJ, 8:23.

128 (-...J Chapter 3

100. Chaoyang xianzhi, 1 930, juan 35:46-47. 1 0 1 . Dongbei fongzhi renwu zhuanji ziliao suoyin: Liaoning juan (Index of biographical

materials from Northeast local gazetteers: Liaoning volume) (Shenyang: Liaoningsheng chu­ banshe, 1 991) , 10, 52 1 .

1 02. Takizawa, Mamhu no gaison shinko, 293. 1 03. MDNJ, 1 :2 1 . 1 04. Shao, Zhongguo huidaomen, 321 . 105 . MDNJ, 4:2. 106. MDNJ, 2:36-42; 4: 1 17, 1 18; 8:22-23. 107. Garon, "Women's Groups and the Japanese State," 7. See also Gluck,fapan s Modern

Myths, 1 03. 1 08. Takizawa, Manshu no gaison shinko, 82-86, 100-102. 109. Yamada Seizaburo, Manshukoku bunka kensetsuron (The theory of cultural construc-

tion in Manchukuo) (Shinkyo: Geibun shobo, 1 943), 91-92. 1 10. MSSJ, 1 : 1-5, 15 , 5 1 , 1 22 ; 2:55-56. I l l . MSSJ, I : I-5. 1 12. MSSJ, 1 : 12; 2 : 172-77, 19 1-95, and Yamada, Manshukoku bunka kensetsuron,

91-92. 1 13. Takizawa, Shukyo chosa shiryo, 82-83. 1 14. MDNJ, 2:4-51 . For example, the schedule for the tuition-free Pure World Girl's

School in Fengtian showed 2 hours per week were spent on self-cultivation; 3 on classics; 5 on art, needlework, and music; 8 on Chinese; 2 on Japanese; 2 on history; 2 on geography; 6 on mathematics; and 2 on nature study. See MDNJ, 2:5-6.

1 15. Mitani Takeshi, "Senzenki Nihon no Chugoku himitsu kessha ni tsuite no chosa" (Surveys of Chinese secret societies in prewar Japan), in Senzenki Chugoku jittai chosa shiryo no sogoteki kenkyu (Composite studies of prewar surveys of actual conditions in China), ed. Honjo Hisako (n.p., 1 998), 104.

1 16. Suemitsu, Shina no himitsu kessha to jizen kaisha, 208-9. 1 17. WWD, Archive 201 8. 1 1 8. WWD, Archive 2013: 303, 764, 767, 775. 1 19. WWD, Archive 2013: 773. 1 20. WWD, Archive 2013: 764. 1 2 1 . Takizawa, Shukyo chosa shiryo, 102-3. 1 22. But as long as the new nation was based upon allegedly Asiatic qualities, the Con­

cordia Association still needed a conception of Asiatic distinctiveness. As the "confrontation" thesis gained ground during the Pacific War, it became more difficult for the Concordia Asso­ ciation to play down Asiatic distinctiveness and sustain the original rhetoric of Manchukuo as a supramodern nation based on the synthesis of Eastern and Western civilizations.

1 23. Otani, Shukyo chosa shiryo, 27-32, 38, 46, and, on extraterritoriality, 58-60, 97 ff; and Takizawa, Shukyo chosa shiryo, 89-92.

1 24. Takizawa, Shukyo chosa shiryo, 95. 125 . Otani, Shukyo chosa shiryo, 70, 132, 1 37. 1 26. Suemitsu, Shina no himitsu kessha tojizen kaisha, 259, 103. 1 27. Suemitsu, Shina no himitsu kessha to jizen kaisha, 109-12 . 1 28. Suemitsu, Shina no himitsu kessha to jizen kaisha, 1 12, and Otani, Shukyo chosa shiryo,

44.

Asianism and the New Discourse of Civilization '--' 129

1 29. Suemitsu, Shina no himitsu kessha to jizen kaisha, 266-68. 130. This was, of course, precisely the kind of uncertainty the KMT feared. 1 3 1 . Otani, Shukyo chosa shiryo, 1 04-8, and Shao, Zhongguo huidaomen, 323-24. 132. Yamazaki, Nekka, Kinshu ryosho shukyo chosa, 98. 133. Yamazaki, Nekka, Kinshu ryosho shukyo chosa, 54-58, and Otani, Shukyo chosa shiryo,

62, 64. 134. Otani, Shukyo chosa shiryo, 77, 145. 135. Fukunaga Tadashi, Manshukoku no minzoku mondai (The nationalities problem of

Manchukuo) (Shinkyo: Manshii Fukuyamabo, 1 943), 91-92. He insisted that Japanese should not fear intermarriage because the Japanese stock would improve the lesser peoples (93).

136. Fukunaga, Manshukoku no minzoku mondai, 88-90. 137. Fukunaga, Manshukoku no minzoku mondai, 77-78. 138. Otani, Shukyo chosa shiryo, 1 40. 139. Otani, Shukyo chosa shiryo, 1 50. 140. ZTj, Archive 1 1 , case 1480, pp. 1-9. 1 4 1 . ZTj, Archive 1 1 , cases 1442-48. 1 42. ZTj, Archive 1 1 , case 1446. 143. For instance, the leader of the banned Tongshanshe, Peng Ruzun, who was hiding in

Sichuan, sent his son to Changchun in 1933 to tell the "emperor" Puyi that he wanted to train several hundred thousand spirit troops for him; see Shao, Zhongguo huidaomen, 286.

CHAPTER F O U R

Embodying Civilization: Women and the Figure of

Tradition within Modernity

How did the new civilizational discourse affect individuals as a source of personal authenticity? I explore this problem among a group of women of the Morality Soci­ ety in Manchukuo. These personal narratives, however, can only be grasped in the context of gender conceptions and roles in Manchukuo and more widely in China and Japan. This chapter is thus largely devoted to analyzing a patriarchal conception in the East Asia modern of woman as the figure of "tradition within modernity." In this conception, women were expected to embody "the truth" or "the Way" of the civilization. Whereas the search for authenticity is determined by the problem of time and identity, this chapter will probe more concretely how and why women come to represent this authenticity. What kinds of political forces create these repre­ sentations? How do they become enmeshed in projects of sovereignty and govern­ mentality? And how do the women negotiate these projects and their sense of personal truth?

In 1997, I had the opportunity to visit and interview one of these women, whom I shall call Mrs. Gu, in Taiwan. Born in 1 9 1 5, Mrs. Gu lived in Manchuria until the communists took over the mainland; she then moved to Taipei. Here she rees­ tablished the Morality Society and was its vice president at the time of our meeting. Today in Taiwan, although the Wanguo Daodehui still holds international confer­ ences, imparts moral education, and owns some splendid property, it is much reduced in scope and has become primarily a day care provider and a women's recre­ ation organization. Its role has been affected by changed ideas regarding the role of women and by the much more spiritually charismatic and socially active Buddhist societies.

Nonetheless, Mrs. Gu remained a highly dedicated and passionate activist for the cause. As she recounted the stoty of her life in the organization, surrounded by several

1 3 1

132 r--J Chapter 4

attentive younger members, her pride and reverence for this form of self-sacrificing activism, superior to any political loyalty, became evident. We will take up the politi­ cal question later; here let me present some of her own words to sound out the ironies in the concept of "tradition within modernity":

In 1933, I joined the Daodehui, when I was eighteen years old. Since my child­ hood, I have had a strong and independent personality and did not want to suffer the restraints of the old family system. I believed that women should be independent (ziti) , not be dependent on parents, husbands, or children. I never wanted ro marry.

At that time, my father was the village headman and since he had many connec­ tions with the KMT he was arrested by the Japanese. I was vety anxious, but luckily there was a member of the Daodehui called Mr. Zheng Zhidong who knew a Mr. Ono in the military police (xianbingduI). Through him, we were able to secure my father's release and save his life. Upon his release, we all joined the Daodehui. After this event, I was sent to Shenyang, Fujiao Lane, to receive training for six months. During the day, we turned the mill, washed the floors, cultivated patience, and in the evenings we studied the lectures. We cenainly did not believe the kind of talk about "virtue lay[ing] in women not having talents."

Once a group of seven of us (five girls, one man, and one leader) went out on a lecture tour and met some bandits on the way. We were terrified, and the young girls fled, but our leader lectured to them about Confucius's teachings, changed their hearts (ganhuale) and succeeded in getting them to give up their habits. In 1 934 and 1 935, every locality set up branches of the Society. I also resolved to set up ten lecture units. I already had a small reputation by then. When I was in Daxiguan, a scholar (xiucaz) wrote a poem for me. I returned to Shenyang after spending three years in a humble store. I lectured so much that I lost my voice . . . .

In 1 939, I was a lecture manager and lectured on the importance of female virtue (fodao), breast-feeding (rudao), women's education, and prenatal education (taijiao). I told my listeners that women should go out and suffer in order to be happy, should preserve the good hean in order to establish resolve and achieve great results . . . .

After Japan's defeat, I advocated the takeover of the Japanese shrine (lingmiao) for the Society as its Welfare Center and spent money to establish the management coun­ cil. When the new government took over the shrine, I protested the confiscation daily, saying "those who want to make revolution may have their heads chopped and their blood may flow, but they will not abandon the Northeast." The committee to oversee the reconstruction of postwar northeast China had no choice but to return the shrine to us. Later, even Mrs. Chiang Kai-shek summoned (zhaojian) me in recognition of my efforts . . . . The Society was popular in Shandong and Huabei and there were fifty­ eight units in the city of Shenyang alone. What it meant by Datong is world peace and opposition to struggle. It is a moral force (wuxingde wuqi, literally, a formless weapon). It cultivates the public heart (gongxin): to give up the private and preserve the public for the sake of the greater self and the masses. When people are old we realize that truth is in public service. Women should be wise mothers and virtuous wives.

To many contemporary readers this juxtaposing of the self-sacrificing and tradi­ tional against the fiercely independent and even revolutionary woman may sound a

Women and the Figure of Tradition within Modernity r--..J 133

little incongruous, but it was an important model of womanhood in much of China and Japan in the first half of the century. It is the figure of woman as embodying tradition within modernity, or as the KMT leader Wang Jingwei put it, "inheriting the past to enlighten posterity." In a lecture delivered at a girls' school in 1 924, Wang observed that the conflict between the old and the new in society could be seen as the clash between the school as the nucleus of the new thought and the family that preserved the old ways. In order for China to progress in this competitive world of nation-states, it was important for students to take control over society and reform its evil customs. He recognized that it was easy for girls to succumb to the control of the family and be assimilated into society, but he implored them not to take this path. It was particularly important for girls' schools to nourish a spirit of social reform among their students, since in their present state they stood as obstacles to national progress. I

Having framed his talk within the evolutionary discourse of modernity, Wang's second theme was the importance of choosing the right kind of education. Although Chinese tradition included a lot that was bad, it had one strength: the cultivation of a long tradition of willing self-sacrifice (xisheng) among females, whether for the sake of their parents in their natal home, of their husbands after marriage, or of their sons in old age. Doubtless, the old society often used blind self-sacrifice to bury women's freedom. But women should know that the responsibility of the individual was heavy and should not be exploited (/iyong) by society. If they genuinely felt (zhenz­ hende qinggan) the spirit of sacrifice, then such conduct was proper, and, indeed, highly admirable. The spirit of self-sacrifice actually formed the indispensable basis of all morality-Confucian, Buddhist, and Christian.

Chinese women are rich in the spirit of self-sacrifice. If we can properly direct this spirit towards [the collectivity] . . . and use it, then we can on the one hand perhaps preserve a little of the essence (jingsuz) of the teachings of several thousand years, and on the other still plant the roors of modern liberatory thought. In seeking education for girls I hope we can uphold our mission of inheriting the past to enlighten posterity [chengxian qihouV

The Chinese woman, for Wang, was both modern citizen and locus of unchanging authenticity. Nationalist patriarchy crafted the self-sacrificing woman as a symbol of national essence.

Compared to the writings on the emergence of the modern woman in China associated with the May Fourth movement 0 9 1 7-1921)-widely regarded as Chi­ na's Enlightenment-about the radically anti-Confucian, indeed antifamilial, nationalist woman, contemporary scholarly attention to the kind of woman Wang was trying to shape is still relatively rare. It is beyond the scope of this work to explore which model of the modern woman was more relevant to the middle classes in Republican China. Suffice it to say that the political establishment of the early twentieth century-including both the late Qing and the KMT regime-favored

1 34 � Chapter 4

Wang's model. This model of womanhood first emerged during the late Qing, when reformers and statesmen began to accept the importance of modern education for girls and a limited public role for them.

The Japanese influence on the emerging discourses and institutions of modern China during this period was particularly deep in this realm. During the middle years of the Meiji period ( 1 868-1912) , as the Japanese state consolidated and cen­ tralized its rule, it launched a series of laws denying women (together with other categories of people) political rights and barred them from joining political associa­ tions. Bureaucrats appealed to the Japanese ideal of the "good wife and wise mother," arguing that political involvement would only divert them from fulfilling these roles.3 In this way, the historical ideal of the self-sacrificing and frugal samurai woman became generalized in the Meiji era as the model of feminine virtue for the nation as a whole. Women were represented as having to transcend petty politics in their role as "officials" of the household, which, in the emergent family-state ideol­ ogy of the period, was seen as the microcosm of the nation-state.4

Recent work on late Qing education of girls in the first decade of the twentieth century has given us a detailed picture of how this Japanese model penetrated China among intellectuals and reformers as well as policy-makers. To be sure, this was a process of selective borrowing in China and had different consequences, but the ideology of the "good wife and wise mother" was enthusiastically received because, Joan Judge argues, as an amalgamation of East Asian and Western ideals, past and present values, ancient female ethics and contemporary nationalist concerns, Japan provided China with a most suitable gender ideology.5 The Japanese model was also less threatening to a still largely patriarchal Chinese elite than the more radical mod­ els of female education in the West--even as it satisfied this elite that the model was acceptable to a nation as modern as Japan.

The Japanese influence was transmitted by returning Chinese students educated in Japan, and most especially through the widespread translation of Japanese texts and their dissemination through specialized educational journals and the wider press including the highly influential Japanese-owned newspapers such as Shengjing Shi­ bao (from Mukden or Shenyang) and Shuntian Shibao (Beijing). There were also very great numbers of Japanese teacher trainers, educational advisors, and teachers active in schools in China, including those for female education.6 Perhaps the most significant single figure behind the transfer of role models for women was the educa­ tor Shimoda Utako.

Shimoda was dedicated to the task of creating a pan-Asian modernity and worked closely with Japanese and Chinese politicians to create educational institutions to instill East Asian values. Working within the civilizational discourse of East versus West, she was determined to "strengthen Asia" by extending education to all women while at the same time preserving the Confucian conception of female virtue. Thus Shimoda's ideal East Asian woman would simultaneously practice feminine virtues and serve the nation; she would serve the nation, not by rejecting traditional virtues of self-sacrifice, but, in a move that was echoed by Wang Jingwei and countless oth-

Women and the Figure of Tradition within Modernity ..-.. 1 35

ers, by reorienting these virtues towards patriotism. Shimoda was very influential among both official and unofficial circles concerned with educational reform for girls. This influence was evident in the conservative proposal of 1 904, "Memorial on Regulations for Early Training Schools and for Education on Household Mat­ ters," drafted by prominent statesmen such as Zhang Zhidong and others, and her ideas had a strong impact on the empress dowager, Cixi.7 In 1908, Zhao Jingru, the principal of Fengtian (Shenyang) Normal Girls' School, visited Japan and paid her tribute to Shimoda, declaring, "Since the condition of women's education and the fate of the nation are intimately connected, the spirit of peace [in East Asia] rests on the shoulders of Shimoda."8 Peace would turn out to be a distant dream, but the state in East Asia would find the controlled figure of woman as "tradition within moderniry" a highly desirable means of penetrating sociery and shaping the nation.

Modern Patriarchy

Women have been represented as the embodiment of the essential truth of a nation or civilization, not only in China and Japan but in many parts of the modern world. Recent studies of gender histories in the West (and especially in Latin America) have shown how women and their bodies, systematically excluded from the public sphere during much of the modern period, have served as a crucial medium for the inscrip­ tion and naturalization of power: "Explored, mapped, conquered, and raped, the female body and its metaphorical extension, the home, become the symbols of honor, loyalry, and puriry, to be guarded by men."9 Partha Chatterjee has drawn our attention to how modern nationalists in late-nineteenth-century India appro­ priated the middle-class production of a sphere that he calls the inner domain of sovereignry of nationalist ideology. Like Chinese nationalism, Indian nationalism was built upon a dualiry of the material versus the spiritual, and cultural. Thus, while the Indian nation had much to learn from the material and scientific civiliza­ tion of the West, in spiritual matters India had the upper hand and a contribution to make to world civilization. 1 0

Chatterjee's particular contribution is to show how this dualism was organized so as to create an inner realm of national life that could not be contested by the colonial power. Nineteenth-century Bengali middle-class intellectuals had reworked certain historical texts to define the "ideal woman" and distinguish her from depic­ tions of the "traditional" (that is, recent historical, rather than quintessential) Ben­ gali woman, from depictions of contemporary lower-class women, and from the figure of the Western, materialist, and masculinized woman. Modern Indian nation­ alism found this trope of the enlightened but quintessentially "traditional" woman highly congenial, and appropriated it as the core of the essential nation. Tradition thus came to mark a realm of inner sovereignry that was simultaneously demarcated as domestic, spiritual, and feminine. The Hindu nationalist representation of woman--educated and educating, but personifYing the spiritual virtues of domestic­ iry-gave body to this national essence. While on the one hand this lofty idealization

1 36 � Chapter 4

of the Hindu woman provided new aspirations for some women, we can assume that it was patriarchal because it was an image shaped by men for women to follow. I I

In East Asia, this representation of woman was less directly connected to colonial­ ism, but it was decidedly a response on the part of a patriarchal elite to manage the shift to a more Westernized society and changing relations between the genders, and between the domestic and public spheres. In China, we can understand this phenomenon precisely as the nexus between a global process and historical institu­ tions of gender relations. Most of the early nationalists and reformers emerged from the habitus of the gentty and inherited the patriarchal traditions of this society and its ideals of womanly virtue. The rhetoric of female virtue and sacrifice, exemplified most particularly in the cult of chaste widows and virtuous wives, was pervasive in late imperial China. 12 During the early twentieth centuty, when the increasing inte­ gration of China into global capitalism produced rapid change in gender relations among urban families, this patriarchal legacy surfaced in a novel context and was sustained in the heightened concern with preserving female virtues. "Virtuous and chaste girls' schools" (zhennu yixue, baonu yixueyuan) sprouted everywhere in this period, and the journals about women, such as the Funu Zazhi of the early 1920s, were filled with anxious essays about the problem of gender mixing. 13 Female virtue became a metonym for Chinese civilizational truths.

Nationalists made great efforts to improve the status of women, in order to attain the higher goal of national strengthening. Women's education, the abolition of foot­ binding, and the need for prenatal care became major issues in the reform movement of the turn of the centuty, led by Kang Youwei and his colleagues, because, as Kazuko Ono writes, these issues became "linked to the nation's survival or demise, its strength or weakness, through the education of chiidren."14 While there were some notable efforts by women writers themselves to undo the connection, 15 throughout most of the twentieth centuty the legitimacy of women's issues contin­ ued to remain dependent on the primacy of the national cause. As in many other early-twentieth-century patriarchal nationalisms, women were to be liberated for the nation. They were not to shape the nation in their own image, but rather to be shaped and protected by the nation in its image. This same primacy authorized nationalism to demand a self-sacrificing woman to incorporate its essence.

Women were doubtless hypostatized because of their institutionalized depen­ dence on men in China, as in most other historical cultures. But they were also perceived as key to maintaining the stability of the family, that bedrock of Confu­ cian society. Thus the figure of timelessness was also to serve as a performing role model. Needless to say, the pressures upon such a figure were enormous. As noted in chapter 1 , the human embodiment of authenticity-mirrors of the enduring self-is susceptible to the inevitable failure of human lives to live up to idealized representa­ tions. Strains arose not only from the impact of outside influences and market forces on the family and gender relations, but also because the reformist, developmental side of Chinese nationalism itself channeled women into the public sphere, thus exposing them to transformation and "contamination." For instance, nationalists in

Women and the Figure of Tradition within Modernity ..---.. 1 37

both China and Japan were mindful that women should not only be involved with reproduction functions in the domestic sphere, but also contribute to production in the modern sector in order to strengthen the nation. Weikun Cheng writes that even the involvement of females as students and teachers in the segregated girls' schools and professional associations entailed a certain level of participation in the public sphere. 1 6

Moreover, the alternative model of the progressive woman, backed by her increasingly acceptable status in the West, was readily available in the media and attracted many younger women. In Japan by the 1920s, the Modern Girl, active in the public sphere of work and politics, came to threaten "the patriarchal family and its ideological support, the deferring woman who was presented in state ideology as the 'Good Wife and Wise Mother.' " 17 According to Miriam Silverberg, she became the symbol of all that was non-Japanese and modern, in contrast to the Meiji image of the woman who served as " 'the repository of the past,' standing for tradition when men were encouraged to change their way of politics and culture in all ways." 1 8

The Modern Girl of the 1 920s became the target of conservatives appalled by rapid change all around them, but she became so only because she, no less than the Meiji woman, occupied a special place within the order of authenticity, a place she was beginning defiantly to transgress.

In China, the popularity of the model of the liberated woman reached its great height among educated young women in the May Fourth movement. Indeed, through the 1920s and beyond, perhaps the greatest threat to the conservative model of womanhood came from the May Fourth Westernized, antitraditional model of woman. The two models were intimately implicated in the political and ideological battles of the period, leading sometimes to a great deal of violence inflicted upon women. Afrer the split between the KMT and CCP in 1927, thousands of "mod­ ern" women were killed by the KMT forces because they were accused of "free love," or sometimes simply because they had bobbed hair, unbound feet, or a local reputation for opposing familial authority. 19 While they were surely killed because they were marked by these signs as communist (whether or not they were), the causal logic worked in both directions. Communism itself was illegitimate significantly because such women and their behavior despoiled the innermost purity of Chinese culture.

Aside from such dramatically violent episodes, the tension in gender conceptions underlying these conflicting models was pervasive in urban, middle-class China. The great May Fourth writer Lu Xun reflected deeply on the gender issues of his time and directed some of his most acid writing at modern gentry patriarchs like Kang Youwei (who became president of the Morality Society in the 1920s), who, he believed, employed the language of traditional essences to ultimately exploit and dominate women.20

There is perhaps no better description of the tension than his story "Soap." Lu Xun's protagonist Simin has bought a cake of foreign, scented soap for his wife. His wife is pleased but also embarrassed by the coded message that she should make

138 ..--..> Chapter 4

herself cleaner and more alluring. When Simin had insisted on opening the package of soap at the store to check its quality, he was taunted by some schoolgirls with bobbed hair using a foreign word he did not understand (it turns out to be "old fool"). Highly agitated, he now orders his school-going son to check its meaning and begins to rave and rant about the moral havoc that the new schools are wreaking on China, especially the schools for girls. He says,

Just think, it is already in very poor taste the way women wander up and down the streets, and now they want to cut their hair as well. Nothing disgusts me as much as these short-haired schoolgirls. What I say is: There is some excuse for soldiers and bandits, but these girls are the ones who turn everything upside down. They ought to be very severely dealt with indeed.2I

Simin then contrasts this behavior with that of a filial beggar girl of eighteen or nineteen, who turned over all the money she received begging outside a store to her blind grandmother. The crowds that gathered to watch the two not only did not give much money, but made jeering remarks about how the girl would not be bad at all if she were scrubbed up with two cakes of soap. Simin sees this as evidence of the catastrophic decline of morality in modern China. Later, at dinner, when Sim­ in's wife can no longer take Simin's irritability, she hints that he secretly longs for the beggar girl and is trying to cover this up by exalting her filial and self-sacrificing conduct. In utter frustration, she exclaims, "If you buy her another cake and give her a good scrubbing, then worship her, the whole world will be at peace." Later she adds, "We women are much better than you men. If you men are not cursing eighteen- or nineteen-yeat-old girl students, you are praising eighteen- or nineteen­ year-old girl beggars: such dirry minds you have."22

At this moment, Simin is rescued from this tirade by the arrival of some friends who have come to remind him about the urgent need to publicize an essay and poetry contest for their Moral Reform Literary Sociery (Yifeng Wenshe). The title for the essay had already been drafted as "To beg the President to issue an order for the promotion of the Confucian classics and the worship of the mother of Mencius, in order to revive this moribund world and preserve our national character." Thinking about the beggar woman, Simin suggests that the poem should be titled the "Filial Daughter," to eulogize her and criticize society. In the following exchange one of his friends laughs uproariously upon hearing the jeering comments about giving her a good scrubbing. Simin is acutely pained by his friend's laughter, because, as Lu Xun hints, it suggests to him the truth of his wife's words, which he had repressed.

Lu Xun sets up the duality between Chinese and foreign, East and West, old and new as the basic framework of the story. The foreign and new-schoolgirls, bobbed­ hair, modern education, English words, the heavy sound of leather shoes worn by Simin's son-are an intrusive and disruptive presence for Simin. Lu focuses our attention on the power of a new (if seemingly insignificant) commodity, soap, to disturb his protagonist by its capacity to arouse desire and throw his world out of

Women and the Figure of Tradition within Modernity r-J 139

kilter. It is clear that what Simin finds most disturbing is the unmooring of gender and sexual norms by the changes he sees around him. He responds vituperatively, denying the need for girls to go to school (thus keeping them within the domestic sphere) and valorizing the conduct of the pure and filial beggar woman. For Simin she represents everything that is eternal and pure in Chinese tradition and he wants the poetry contest to immonalize her puriry. This effon to restore the moral authen­ ticiry of the nation via the beggar woman thus has to exalt her poveny (filial even in desperate need) and desexualize her as the object of men's (especially his) desire.23

Although he satirizes it as a ridiculous failure, Lu Xun's jibe about the poem on the "Filial Daughter" incidentally reveals one of the means whereby the conservative model of woman sought to prevent her from "contamination" when she emerged from the home. Modern patriarchy permitted women's involvement outside the domestic space but sought to wrap the woman-in-public with the flag of civiliza­ tional authenticiry represented by the historical rhetoric of self-sacrifice and virtue. We might try to imagine this strategy spatially, as one where women's bodies move within a larger public space in rhetorically encased units. This perspective permits us to see how such a protective strategy was continuous with the organizational strat­ egy of segregation. Segregated organizations, such as virtuous girls' schools, women's professional associations, and even the women's wings of the redemptive societies, were the other way in which women's involvement in the public sphere was con­ tained in signifYing encasements. As we shall see, redemptive societies were for men extended means of monitoring and control; but for women this mode of involve­ ment in the public sphere could also be empowering. Women in these societies often desired separate organizations.

Take the case of the Red Swastika Sociery. Reports and queries from separate women's groups within this sociery begin to appear in the records around 1 932 from cities and towns in China and Manchukuo. The mother organization (muyuan) of the World Women's Red Swastika Society was created in Jinan in February of that year, and its headquarters later established in Beiping. A report from the women's group (nushe) of the Mouping Daoyuan to the general assembly insisted on the clari­ fication of the status of women's groups in the Society. It noted that while all the formal niceties of the new organization had been decided, the question of whether or not separate and parallel women's organizations should be established at each administrative level had not. The places for women to gather for self-cultivation and to conduct research and philanthropic activities were not ideal, since the women had to share these places with the original men's organization.24 Separately, the southeast branches headquartered in Hangzhou reported the difficulties in the procedures for conducting women's worship when originally women had not made offerings at the same altars (shenkan) . It also reported the need to expand the size of worship halls in order to accommodate the rising number of worshippers. 25

The Mouping proposal strongly urged that the organizations and locations be sep­ arated and the constitution of the Society be amended to reflect these changes. The assembly resolved that preparatory offices (choubeichu) and committees formed of

140 .--. Chapter 4

the leading women in the Beiping office and representatives from the localities be set up. They formulated the rules and bylaws for the seventy new women's branches that they hoped to set up. In addition to the general relief work and lectures that the women's organization shared with the men, its special philanthropic activities included managing schools, child care, and research, education, and mobilization around women's concerns.26 Judging from the reports and the large number of proud photographs of women-only branches in the records, it would appear that women favored segregated organizations, perhaps not only as the appropriate means to enter public life, but also to limit the interference of men in the organization. It was their conditioned engagement in the public world that would shape their understanding and practice of the civilizational pedagogy that sought to mold their lives and self-conceptions. At the same time, these signifYing "women's spaces" became targeted by regimes in Manchukuo, Japan, and China as the organizational means of penetrating and restructuring the family and redefining the relationship berween private and public, though these efforts were hardly always successfully.

Governmentality and Modern Patriarchy

Michel Foucault has suggested that in the West the status of the family transformed from a model of governance-for instance, in the thought of Machiavelli-into an object and instrument of govenmentality. 27 Later work has elaborated this process:

The everyday activities of living, the hygienic care of household members, the pre­ viously trivial features of interactions between adults and children, were to be anato­ mized by experts, rendered calculable in terms of norms and deviations, judged in terms of their social costs and consequences and subject to regimes of education and reformation. The family, then, was to be instrumentalized as a social machine--both made social and utilized to create socialiry-implanting the techniques of responsible citizenship under the tutelage of experts and in relation to a variety of sanctions and rewards.2s

State policies towards the family in inter-war East Asia followed a similar path, but the power of the historical representation of women in the domestic sphere ensured its conspicuousness in the ideology of state power, especially as the latter sought to penetrate, transform, and deploy the family as an instrument of governmentality.

Governmentality has the effect of nucleating, rationalizing, standardizing, and institutionalizing the family as a means to shape individual subject formation, whether to extend life, guide consumption, or channel political loyalty. In demo­ cratic regimes this function is distributed berween the state and relatively autono­ mous societal associations, whereas in nondemocratic regimes of the inter-war years the autonomy of social organizations was much reduced.29 Particularly noteworthy about the three regimes in Japan, KMT China, and Manchukuo were the common elements within the ideological and institutional means of this reshaping effort. The

Women and the Figure of Tradition within Modernity .--.. 1 4 1

elements relevant to this chapter are the ideological figure of woman as the self­ sacrificing representative of "tradition within modernity," the government-adminis­ tered mass organizations for women, and related civic societies such as the Daodehui. These elements carne together as the regimes sought to engage women activists in the transformation of family and society. Whether they were expected to embody the gendered ideology of womanhood or retain it in segregated organizations, these women were perceived as more susceptible to state directives than either the unedu­ cated working woman or the Westernized Modern Girl.

We have noted how the model of "good wife, wise mother" carne to stand for evetything that the Modern Girl in 1920s Japan was not: Japaneseness and the past, as well as the new, enlightened domesticity. 3D Silverberg believes that it was the threatened militancy of the working woman that generated the image of the Modern Girl, relentlessly depicted in the press as promiscuous and non-national. In contrast, the 1920s state cult of domesticity targeted the "housewife" of the rapidly proliferat­ ing middle-class, nuclear family to implement its policies of improving domestic life, encouraging rational consumption, fostering scientific attitudes, thrift, and the like.31 While women's associations were engaged in enhancing the public role for women, including the suffrage movement, the majority of these associations also appear to have voluntarily operated within the state's ideology of ideal womanhood. Indeed, women activists even argued that the Japanese women's movement was dif­ ferent from Western women's movements because the Japanese recognized the dif­ ference between men and women and the special role of the mother's love in social deveiopmentY In a context where motherhood was increasingly becoming the cen­ tral image of the 1930s revival of the Meiji period family-state ideology,33 such dec­ larations indexed the extent to which the family had become the instrument of a state-driven governmentality.

Sheldon Garon has suggested that the Japanese state was able to penetrate the household to achieve its goals of resource extraction and hygiene improvement to an unprecedented degree after the 1920s because of the emergence of women as intermediaries in the project of social management.34 Whether as housewives or in segregated associations, these women tended to conform to the ideology of woman­ hood contained and guided by the state-mandated demarcation of public and domestic as separate spheres for men and women. Although the KMT in China was a much weaker state, I believe we can see a similar strategy by this regime to utilize segregated women's organizations to extend the ideological roles and norms of domestic womanhood (nursing, educating, nurturing) into the public. Conversely, it sought to turn these women, contained ideologically in segregated organizations, back toward the family in order to achieve the goals of the state. Thus did the state seek to control the increasingly unstable boundaries between the public and the domestic.

To be sure, different women's groups and publications loosely affiliated with the KMT expressed radical and feminist points of view, but the dominant political ten­ dency represented the view of a modern patriarchy. A recent study by Karl Gerth

1 42 ......., Chapter 4

shows how the "national products" (guohuo) movement, led by the KMT to boycott foreign goods and encourage consumption of domestic products, spotlighted the authentic national woman, described as the xianqi liangmu (virtuous wife, good mother) . She was a figure who promoted national consumption not only by her own consumer practices but by guiding household consumption of domestically pro­ duced goods and reproducing nationally minded consumers. New Life women's associations were critical to the promotion of the movement of national consump­ tion in the family, and engaged in such tasks as organizing exhibits of national prod­ ucts for women in the provinces.35 The obverse of this figure, like the Modern Girl in Japan at the same time, was bitterly attacked for selfishly consuming foreign prod­ ucts and neglecting the family and national duties. Underscoring the trope of authenticity and purity associated with the Chinese woman, these women were denounced as prostitutes who had sold out to the outsider.36

The KMT's New Life movement, launched in 1 934, was a campaign to revive traditional values for the purposes of governmentality. It thus fits well the model of "tradition within modernity," which allowed the state to serve as the custodian of authentic tradition while deploying that tradition for the KMT's disciplinary project of modern subject formation. As Chiang Kai-shek put it, "Today we all recognize the important place of the (ancient) ideals of Ii, yi, lian, chi (propriety, justice, hon­ esty, and shame/modesty) in revolutionary nation building (gemingjianguo)."37 And Madame Chiang Kai-shek, better known in China as Song Meiling, described these Confucian ideals as the inner counterpart of spiritual and moral renovation (gexin) to outer political and economic reform.38 Founded initially to rehabilitate the com­ munist-dominated region of Jiangxi, which the KMT had ravaged, the campaign was extended to the entire country, drawing on ideals of self-discipline and moral regulation-allegedly the factors behind China's historical greatness-to produce a new citizenry dedicated to the collective. As Arif Dirlik says, "Its basic intention was to substitute 'political mobilization' for social mobilization, thus replacing revolu­ tionary change from the bottom (which threatened the social structure) with closely supervised change orchestrated from the top (which served the goals of the state)."39 Like other fascistic regime-administered mass movements, its ideal of mobilization included the total transformation of the individual through reform of customs and everyday practices relating to personal hygiene and moral improvement.

Women were particularly important in the New Life movement because so much of individual transformation was expected to take place in the family. Before the outbreak of war in 1 937, women were not particularly discouraged from working outside the home, but the overwhelming tone of the writings by political leaders and intellectuals celebrated the great contributions that women could make to the nation by focusing on their role as mothers. Song Meiling, the driving force behind the movement, recognized that "intelligent and educated" women should not have to restrict themselves to the home, but urged that the main task of women was to manage the household and the children's education. She appealed to them to infuse a spirit of self-sacrifice, extirpate the habits of ignorance and laziness, and manage

Women and the Figure of Tradition within Modernity � 1 43

the household in an orderly and scientific manner.40 From 1 937, when women were urged to come out of the home to panicipate in the war effort, Song clearly identi­ fied the patriotic and self-sacrificing woman-against both the comfort-seeking, par­ asitic, and unpatriotic women and the ignorant rural women-as one to target for productive service.41

Such New Life women's organizations as the Women's Service League (Funu Juwutuan) and Women's Life Improvement Society (Funu shenghuo gaijinhut) sought to play an important role in the institutionalization and standardization of domestic life. As the 1934 report on the Nanchang Women's Service League declared, the method for achieving the goals of the movement was first to develop professional (elite) women's organizations and then penetrate the domestic sphere (tui zhi jiaring shehut) through them. New Life groups sought to establish standard family guidelines regarding clothing, diet, hygiene, production, child-rearing, educa­ tion, economy, medication, and sociability (zuoren).42 The movement hoped to be able to educate and exhibit 200-1,000 "standard families" as models to be followed. New Life organizations intervened to regulate marriage age and registration, the pro­ motion of (economical) group weddings, the abolition of "superstitious" or "unhy­ gienic" rituals, and even the standardization of the kind (domestically made) and length of the qipao, or Chinese women's dress.43 The Women's Life Improvement Society also set up several subdivisions, such as the Domestic Affairs Study Society, handicraft cooperatives, the Women's Labor Service League, and others. During the war years, women's associations were expected to nurse wounded soldiers, attend to their families' needs, mobilize and train rural women in the production of various goods (especially textiles), and undertake educational and family improvement proj­ ects, as well as to educate and propagandize among local minority people in the wanime KMT regions.44

In Japan, as in China-and, as we shall see, in Manchukuo-the advent of war brought women out of the home in increasing numbers to fulfill the goals of the wanime state. But the fundamental conceptions of women and strategies for direct­ ing their role in society appear to have not so much changed as intensified, extended, and expanded to deal with the new circumstances. Women continued to be mobi­ lized through segregated organizations and to serve in gendered roles and functions; and these services continued to be directed at the family and other women's commu­ nities, such as textile workers. Through these means, the regimes sought to protect the gendered ideology of women as embodied cultural assets.

Different ministries in Japan sponsored several different women's mass organiza­ tions in the 1920s and 1 930s. The Greater Japan Federation of Women's Associa­ tions (Dainihon rengo Jujinkaz), sponsored by the Ministry of Education, flourished during the Great Depression as a means to promote the household economy, health, and morality. During the 1930s, it was gradually displaced by the Defense Minis­ try's National Defense Women's Association (Kokubo Jujinkaz), which advocated traditional morality and exhorted women to fight the "world economic war" and "world thought war" in the kitchen. As the war deepened, this defense association,

144 r--.-> Chapter 4

which counted 7.5 million members by 1938,45 brought the women out of the home to support the war effort through the segregated institutions that extended the mod­ ern ideology of domesticity into the public sphere. Women's associations were involved in the conscription effort through functions consonant with women's roles as nurturing wifes and, especially, as mothers.46 Members provided comfort packages for troops, visited hospitals and graves, educated soldiers, inspected youth training, and celebrated the departure and return from battle of every soldier. They reinforced the symbolism of the home and ideals of self-sacrifice by wearing plain white aprons that, according to Kasza, were designed to avoid "kimono competition" and other signs of luxuty consumptionY At the same time, they were expected to represent the state in resolving the crises of wartime families. They addressed family problems such as the not-unusual rape by the father-in-law of the absent soldier's wife and conflicts between the wife and the family of the dead soldier.48

Women in Manchukuo

The status of Chinese women in Manchuria into the early years of the twentieth century was greatly affected by the frontier circumstances of the settler population. Lattimore observed that among the older settlements in the southern regions of Liaoning province, the considerable influence of Manchu customs on Chinese women led to their being less dependent on the patriarchal system than in China proper. He cites as instances the early abandonment of bound feet among Chinese women and their relatively free interaction with men in this region.49 In the other regions of Manchuria, where the process of Chinese settlement had begun more recently, the relative scarcity of women led both to a greater valuation of women and to widespread prostitution-prevalent even in villages of forty or fifty house­ holds.50 The mushrooming of new towns and cities was, like the Western expansion in the United States, accompanied by a booming prostitution business. The city of Harbin, for instance, already a cosmopolitan city with an elegant downtown by the 1 920s, had a flourishing prostitution trade divided by class and ethnicity, with sepa­ rate quarters for Chinese, Korean, Russian, and Japanese prostitutes. Indeed, the Manchukuo government levied a progressive tax on brothels based on the class of their service and clientele.5 1

During the first few decades of the twentieth century, the formation of an urban middle-class cultural consciousness among the Chinese and the much smaller Japa­ nese communities led to a discourse on womanhood and a civilizing project to erase the stigma of the frontier. This discourse followed to a considerable degree the model of the figure of tradition within modernity that permitted a controlled and limited reform of women's conditions. Records of the Morality Society give us a glimpse of the beginnings of this development. In the 1930s, the Society sought to honor those among its members and their forebears who, during the first two dec­ ades of the century, had made contributions to the Society's ideal social vision. Most were local elites who expressed their social commitments, not as they had tradition-

Women and the Figure of Tradition within Modernity ........., 145

ally, by building and maintaining temples, but by establishing, managing, and con­ tributing money to the new "virtuous and chaste girls' schools."52 Virtuous girls' schools in the Manchurian context were not merely a means of containing (and managing anxiety about) women in the public sphere; they represented a civilizing strategy for the frontier.53 Segregation worked together with the application of a civi­ lizing rhetoric upon the bodies of these women. Thus, one woman claimed that she only really understood what it meant to read after her father transferred her from a regular school to a virtuous school. Learning to read was not true learning unless such reading could shape the body and its conduct (xing dao shemhang, na jiao shizt).54 The Morality Society, which honored the virtuous school-building elite, was thus also continuing the project of attaining civilized respectability.

The discourse of female virtue found here is clearly continuous with the cult of chaste widows and virtuous wives of late imperial times. 55 But inevitably, there was also a shift in its meaning. Just as nationalists like Wang Jingwei in the KMT reorga­ nized the role and meaning of the ideal woman, so too in Manchuria we find a new awareness of women's issues and their role in the public realm. The most widely read Chinese newspaper in the region, the Japanese-owned Shengjing Shibao, estab­ lished in 1906, registered this growing awareness. Coverage of women's education and their role in the family became frequent and systematic after 19 16, and picked up significantly after the May Fourth movement in 1919. During this period, reports and editorials in the newspaper tended to the more conservative view of women, but favored some reform. While they frequently praised filial and self­ sacrificing women as models of virtue, they also praised women's education insofar as it would strengthen and enlighten the family.56

Women's direct involvement in the public sphere frequently brought disapproval. The British American Tobacco Company, which employed hundreds of women workers, apparently attracted crowds of gawkers at the factory gate during shift changes. The paper found this most unseemly and recommended banning women's employment for the sake of public morals. Women walking around in bobbed hair and leather shoes invited the comment that the women's movement had only con­ verted them into men. Opposition to women's involvement in politics, especially in the student's movements of the early 1920s, was particularly vociferous. A Shengjing Shibao editorial entitled "Beijing University and Women Students" opined that this trend was an overreaction to the earlier closeting of women in the inner chambers. The commentator believed that the reform of women's condition should be encour­ aged in the family and society, but their participation in politics should be discour­ agedY These views were probably not inconsistent with those of the middle class elsewhere in China.

At the same time, the model of the modern, liberated woman also began to appear in the 1 920s and 1930s. The Chinese intelligentsia in Harbin was deeply affected by Russian emigre culture. Writers such as the feminist Xiao Hong and her partner Xiao Jun, nourished on Gorky, Gogol, and other European writers, pro­ duced a radical literary culture that survived even after their departure from the

146 r--> Chapter 4

region in 1934.58 Cities like Dalian also produced independent Japanese women. Perhaps the best known of these was the editor of the Dairen Women s Times maga­ zine and journalist with the Manchuria Daily, Hoshina Kiyoji, who wrote widely on women's conditions in Manchuria and advocated a greatly enhanced role for women in society. 59

Until 1937, this variety of views on gender issues was represented in Manchukuo newspapers. While the Shengjing Shibao continued to be conservative, others were more progressive. The Datongbao discussed women's issues in the 1930s, initially in a section called modeng (modern), which later changed to xiandai (contemporary) and finally appeared in a specialized segment simply called fUnii, or women. Letters, essays, and editorials in this section reflect a range of concerns, from health issues to the problem of arranged marriage. Some essays emphasized the need for women to understand that it was acceptable to serve society and the nation by producing good sons, citing such exemplary historical figures as the mothers of Mencius and Yue Fei.60 By and large, however, the editors denounced the traditional (zongfa) concep­ tion that women were to serve the extended family. A man who wondered if the upwardly mobile city girl he was considering marrying would be happy looking after his parents in the village received the firm response that marriage was not about the extended family, and that he should hire someone or look after his parents himself The editors exulted in a letter from a fifteen-year-old girl who opposed her parents' decision to force a marriage, writing, "we cannot suppress our marvel at how advanced women's consciousness has developed when we hear a fifteen-year-old say things like 'deciding my fate is a critical issue' or 'my mother did not seek my agree­ ment on the matter of my own marriage.' " When responding to this genre ofletters, the editors remarkably and frequently emphasized the illegality of forced marriage by parents, recommending that the women take legal or quasi-legal action by send­ ing their own letters to the man's side breaking the contract, and keeping copies of such letters as evidence.61 A two-part article written in October 1936 evaluating the old family system came out strongly on the side of the nuclear family and individual choice of partner. Although it urged people not to overlook the advantages of the old system-particularly its usefulness in caring for the old parents-the advantages it lists for the new family are ovetwhelming. The paper continued to carry sympa­ thetic essays about the struggle for women's rights in Europe and elsewhere.62

These views appeared to coexist with more conservative measures and policies undertaken by the Ministry of Culture and Education (Wenjiaobu). The Ministry pursued programs to honor filial children, virtuous wives, and chaste widows, although it also prescribed appropriate physical and athletic activities for schoolgirls to make them strong and healthy citizens.63 The Datongbao, of course, reported the Ministry's promotion of traditional virtues, but it was able to discuss these programs without relinquishing its views on the importance of the ability of women and youth to make independent choices.64 After 1937, and especially after 194 1 , the autonomy of the press in Manchukuo was severely curtailed, but even so, the regime's attitude toward women was by no means a mere return to the past. The ideal was not to

Women and the Figure of Tradition within Modernity ,.-.. 147

confine women to the home, but to contain and deploy them in the public in a way that would serve state and regime interests. For the moment, I want to note that the conservative model of women-as the essence of tradition within modernity-was not the only one available in Manchukuo, even though the regime sought to culti­ vate it. The women we shall discuss in the Morality Society were surrounded by images, views, and the reality of women making decisions and life choices in relative independence. In terms of the extant models of womanhood, there is no reason to think that the situation for women in Manchukuo through the 1930s was signifi­ cantly different than in other parts of China.

Although the May Fourth model of the Westernized woman cenainly existed, middle-class society and the rural elites were prepared to tolerate only limited reform of women's conditions and involvement in the public realm. Whereas cenain minis­ tries, such as Social Welfare or Defense, and the Concordia Association may have favored the model of "tradition within modernity" so as to deploy women in gov­ ernmentality, others, such as the Ministty of Culture and Education, emphasized the ideology of woman as the soul of East Asian civilization-in significant pan because of the common cause that it had made with this elite. Thus this model of woman served the regime's sovereignty claims.

We can imagine the extent to which the historical image of woman as embodying a precious and violable cultural essence pervaded the middle classes when we encounter it in the writings of even progressive nationalists in Manchukuo. In a shon stoty called "Children of Mixed Blood" (Hunxie er), written in 1943, Shi Jun reflects on the question of intercultural marriages in the region. His protagonist, a Chinese magistrate in a border town, helps out the Russian widow of a Chinese man and her children. Thinking about his conversations with her, the magistrate expresses his feelings about mixed marriage. He is gratified by the woman's praise of responsible Chinese men in contrast to drunkard Russian men. But a futy rages in his hean when she innocently inquires why it was alright for Chinese men to marry Russian women, but not for Chinese women to marry Russian men. The thought that the Han people, with their rich histoty and culture, could give up their women and progeny to such barbarians was deeply insulting to him. The Manchukuo police censors who regularly went through the writings of suspected Chinese nationalists by this time interpreted the stoty as a thinly veiled expression of anti-Japanese nationalism.65 Neither censors nor the predominantly male literary establishment seemed at all struck by this mercantilist characterization of women as precious national resources to be taken and not given. Whereas this model of woman may well have been deployed in an anti-Japanese allegoty, the Manchukuo government seems to have gambled on the strategy that supponing the conservative view of womanhood would yield more by way of a shared discourse than its occasional deployment for nationalist goals.

The writer Liang Shanding, whose career and novel, Green Valley, we will discuss in more detail in chapter 6, was a nationalist and radical whose images of the femi­ nine nonetheless reflected some of the gender conceptions of the time. Green Valley

148 ,-...., Chapter 4

is about bandit heroes tested by life in the deep forests of Manchuria, whose mystery and truth they also embodied. Although there are many women in the novel, few have believable characters. Instead, feminine imagery plays a crucial role in the nov­ el's representational structures as a means of clarifYing its ideals. Thus, for instance, the land and the forest are depicted as the true and eternal mother, in contrast to the protagonist's biological mother, who has abandoned the land and succumbed to the temptations of the alienated city. Similarly, a simple, suffering peasant girl repre­ sents the purity of an orchid from the deepest forest, again in contrast to cheaply made-up city girls. Perhaps the only credible and strong female character who com­ plicates the simple dualism of women as either pure or contaminated is the protago­ nist's aunt. A paragon of self-sacrifice, she is named Shuzhen, which means virtuous and chaste. In order to maintain the honor of the lineage, she has refused to marry after the death of her fiance, but at the same time she has been having a lifelong affair with the foreman of the estate. Curiously, while the novel is now hailed in contemporary critical circles in the Northeast, the one aspect that continues to be singled out for particular criticism is Shanding's (acrually rather complex) admira­ tion of this sacrificing woman, seen as betraying a residual feudalism.

The controversy over the short story "Blood Lineage" (Xiezu) by the woman writer Dan Di, published after the fall of Manchukuo in December 1 945, reveals the extent to which the model of the self-sacrificing woman became implicated in the nationalist rhetoric of the period. The story is told from the point of view of a sickly younger sister who is forced by necessity to live with her impoverished and unhappy brother and his small family. The brother tries to improve their situation by raising chickens in the house, but without much success. In contrast, the chickens raised by their Japanese neighbors are plump and productive. As the hot-tempered brother becomes more and more frustrated, he vents his anger on the family and in a climactic scene beats his sister. She leaves the household and meets with her father, who advises her, even as she shows him her bleeding hand, not to let this sorrow enter her heart, because her brother is, after all, a blood relative (xiezu). It was the pressures of life that had made him so mean-spirited. When the brother shows up, she forgives him but resolves not to marry. 66

Dan Di was educated in Japan and is said to have exercised an important influ­ ence on women's literature when she returned to Manchukuo during its last years. While it is hard to fathom her literary impact, Dan Di's fictional account is remark­ ably continuous with the kind of letters to the editor that one finds in the women's section of Manchukuo newspapers, protesting or airing grievances by women wronged by their families. Dan Di herself suffered repeatedly at the hands of men who abandoned herY Here we glimpse how public writing by women across both genres was a mutually influential mode of self-expression and coping with modern patriarchy.68 Critics from the Northeast consider her writing to be melancholic and individualist, taking the reader into a feminine world where "women's feelers (nibcin­ gde chujiao) explore fantasies in a shattered reality."69 They have recently also included her among the group of progressive writers in the region, a coded designa-

Women and the Figure of Tradition within Modernity � 149

tion of her present (posthumous) acceptability,?o But Dan Di may have been most representative of the tragedy that befell writers during the tumultuous years of regime change, as she was imprisoned by each of the regimes in Manchuria from the 1940s: the Japanese, the KMT, and the CCP,?l Immediately upon publication, "Blood Lineage" was attacked in a mainland paper as reflecting the slavish mentality of the colonized for admiring the Japanese and speaking in the language of the Xiehe or Concordia. In response, Dan Di and a number of writers and readers from the Northeast defended the stoty as a critique ofJapanese imperialism and an expose of the miserable conditions for Chinese in Manchukuo. There were also angry responses protesting the spiteful nationalist tendency to charge as traitors those very people "who had suffered under the cold window."72

We will return to the problem of the literary production of Northeastern identity in our discussion of Shanding. I think we can safely agree with Dan Di and her defenders that the little story is more liable to be read as a critique of conditions in Manchukuo than a defense of Japanese imperial ideals. If so, might we be right in suspecting that the unmentioned eye of the storm in the story is none other than "blood lineage" itself? After all, the revelation of the cost of the blood tie could not have been comforting to a patriarchal nationalism. In The Field of Life and Death, the more famous Xiao Hong had also concluded her devastating critique of the vio­ lence in the Manchurian countryside-both of the animal struggle for existence and the brutal Japanese occupation-with a rape committed not by a Japanese soldier but by a Chinese man. Lydia Liu has shown how nationalists have tried to smooth over the tension between feminism and nationalism in the novel and to frame it entirely as a patriotic novel,?3 Dan Di's story can be seen as a critique of a patriarchy that was inherited by both Chinese nationalism and civilizational discourse in Man­ chukuo. It is a cruel irony that the nationalists attacked her for criticizing the very same patriarchal relationship that the Manchukuo regime had sought to utilize for its sovereignty claims.

State, Family, and Woman in Manchukuo

As in China and Japan, the model of woman as representing "tradition within modernity" was important to the regime in Manchukuo, both for its sovereignty claims and as a strategic lever to penetrate the family. Whether from the perspective of governmentality or the regime's immediate concern with its own stability, the family was of central importance in Manchukuo. The family-state imagery, derived from Japan, was pervasive, especially after the war in Asia, and the family became the root metaphor for loyalty to the state. Demands of unconditional loyalty to the nation-state were premised upon the unconditional loyalty of the individual to the family in official declarations.74 While the family formed the basis of the political community, it was also clear that the nuclear family was the norm of modern soci­ ety-and ought to be the norm in Manchukuo--whereas large families and lineages were characteristic of backward places without a modern nation-state,?5

1 50 ,-.. Chapter 4

Indeed, the regime revealed an enormous appetite for knowledge about the fam­ ily. Within a year of its establishment, the statistical department of the General Affairs Board of Manchukuo began its annual surveys of family structure and eco­ nomic life known as the Household Statistical Survey Reports (Jiaji diaocha baogao/ kakei chosa hokoku). These were extraordinarily detailed statistical reports, largely from urban areas, collected by data gatherers dispatched by city and county govern­ ment offices on a regular basis. After collection, meetings were held at different administrative levels to process the data into information.76 The declared purpose of the surveys was to obtain information on household income and consumption in order to evaluate the degree of satisfaction of urban households and the possibilities for economic growth. The surveys were relatively complex and differentiated spend­ ing patterns by generation and household size, among other criteria. It is also easy for us to imagine how through these and other intrusive means the family could become the target of surveillance and restructured to be made more responsive to the needs of the regime and govenmentality. The main agencies for penetrating, mobilizing, and reforming the family were the Concordia Association and the redemptive societies. As in China and Japan, the new regime seized the ideal of self­ sacrificing women for this task.

The Japanese military also tried to develop women's organization for its needs, although it was not very successful. Japanese women's groups in the leased territories appeared soon after the Manchurian Incident. Praised by the regime for their patri­ otic service toward their countrymen, soldiers, and even Koreans and Manchurians (meaning Chinese) affected by war, they became the core of the organization known as the All Manchukuo Women's Federation (Zenman fojin dantai rengokat).77 Mod­ eled in role and function on Japanese women's organizations of the time, they appeared, however, to be less responsive to the needs of the army and regime. These concerns were addressed in 1 933 in a letter to the federation by General Koiso Kuni­ aki, general chief of staff (sambocho) of the Guandong Army and second in com­ mand of the Japanese military (rikugun). While thanking them deeply for their self­ sacrificing service to society despite "their important and heavy burdens in the home as its managers, mothers, wives, and sisters," he pointed to divisions among these groups that prevented them from emerging as a united group and serving the new nation.78

It turned out that one of Koiso's principal problems was that Japanese women's groups resisted the effort to transform them into an organization serving all ethnic groups, which would make them into a national organization (under the military). Given the mainly Chinese personnel of the Manchukuo Army, the rhetoric of national service was clearly important. In building the new nation, he declared, the tasks of politics and economics naturally fell to the men; the role of women was to comfort and encourage them in these tasks. But Koiso recognized "the special role of women's kindness" in the task of melding the Japanese and Manchurians (nichi­ man yuwa). He emphasized the role of women in social welfare, the true meaning of which could only be grasped as the "encompassing love of the mother towards

Women and the Figure of Tradition within Modernity .-....J 1 5 1

humanity transcending national boundaries . . . something that a narrow national­ ism cannot understand."79 He said, "Without forgetting the [ethnic/national] self, there is no true spirit of self-sacrifice," and urged Japanese women's organizations to become the nurruring mother of the greater nationality (daikokumin) of Man­ chukuo.80

A consideration of the tasks of the Federation leads us to wonder if there were other reasons for the women's hesitation. The tasks included social work, comfort­ ing families of wounded and bereaved, managing mother's day, responding to wom­ en's public opinion, and managing soldiers' homes (heisha homu).81 The federation report of 1 933 discusses the soldiers' homes as places where women were expected to voluntarily take turns comforting Japanese soldiers as "mothers and sisters" did in their villages back home.82 Although the report mentions only preparation of baths, playing mah-jong, and writing letters, these "homes" may have been among the notorious sexual "comfort" stations for Japanese soldiers that developed during the foreign occupation and war. A systematic study of "comfort women" in Man­ chukuo has yet to be done.

After the invasion of the Chinese mainland, the Defense Ministty in Manchukuo organized the National Defense Women's Association (Manzhouguo guofongfonuren hui) in 1 938. Modeled on the Japanese National Defense Women's Association and coordinated by the Concordia Association, it did not seem able to recruit Chinese women in very large numbers. Membership, including that of Chinese women, in each of the rwenty-rwo provinces and several special cities and districts averaged only about six or seven thousand women in 1 938.83 By May 1 939, the association's sixty­ nine branches had a membership of only 1 50,000, among which the Japanese accounted for 70 percent, Chinese for 20 percent, and Koreans the remaining 10 percent.84 Its most important function was, of course, to supporr the war. Dressed in white aprons, members were instructed to build a nucleus around women; reas­ sure and calm the population; explain the goals of " self-defense"; disseminate infor­ mation; attend to wounded soldiers; and comfort, guide, and help the families of the war dead. Once in place, however, the activities of the organization were not restricted to military functions. The women were also expected to turn toward non­ military families, organizing local women and lecturing them about morality, improvement of domestic life, child rearing, health, frugality, and the need to increase production. Here again, women's associations were melded into the frame of governmentality.85 Thus, even though Chinese women may not have been suc­ cessfully recruited into these kinds of mass organizations, the organizations clarifY the role of women's associations in the regime's effort to control the interface berween the domestic and the public.

The story was quite different with the redemptive societies and their women's groups, which had a much closer relationship with the regime. Mrs. Gu, whose nar­ rative opened this chapter, thought of the relationship more as a partnership. She noted that "the important judge Feng Hanqing introduced the Daodehui to the Jap­ anese," and that the regime "supported the Daodehui and did not casually force

1 52 .--.. Chapter 4

women into labor service. They distributed food and supplies to us." In the remain­ der of this chapter, I examine more closely the relationship of the regime with the Moraliry Sociery, as a way to explore attitudes and policies towards gender, domes­ ticiry, and the public realm in Manchukuo. The Sociery not only focused a great deal of its activities on women, it had a large number of women activists whose views we have an opportuniry to hear.

Recall Wang Fengyi's success in reviving the Moraliry Sociery in Manchukuo in his mission to restore Chinese civilizational values and "transform the world" (huasht) Women were particularly important to the new sociery that Wang con­ ceived: one that would combine modern ideas with enduring Chinese ideals of self­ hood and the world.86 Wang had been at the forefront of the development of virtuous girls' schools, having established 270 of them by 1925; they all became part of the Moraliry Sociery when he joined it around that timeY While the importance of gender segregation doubtless derived from Wang's commitment to classical moraliry, he was also clearly committed to a conception of woman as linking the past to the future. He reported a conversation with a Christian pastor in which Wang exposes the insufficiency of historical religions. All religions certainly pointed to the same Way (dao), but they neglected or demeaned women in the education of the Way. He insisted that women be educated and independent (liye) so that they could understand the Way.88 If women's education and limited participation in the public sphere were necessary to the redemptive mission of the Sociery, such a role was quite compatible with the needs of the fascist regime. The two parties converged on an image of woman as representing a pristine East Asian traditionalism while she was simultaneously inserted into a program of modernization.

The Manchukuo regime stressed the Sociery's role as a mediator between state and family. The summit meetings of the Sociery drew such high-level figures as Tachibana Shiraki, now leader of the Concordia Association, and other top officials. The Manchukuo police were closely associated with the project for moral renewal of the citizenry. The head of the Capital Police Bureau declared that in order to attain national goals and renew the people, it was first necessary to cleanse the peo­ pie's hearts. While this was the indirect responsibiliry of the nation-state, it was more directly the responsibiliry of such jiaohua agencies as the Moraliry Sociery. These societies should bond the people to the state (guanmin yizht) by nourishing ethical attitudes and duties toward the family, sociery, and the nation.89 Employing an orthodox Confucian rhetoric, officials repeatedly emphasized the central importance of the five ethical relationships in constructing a chain of loyalry to the state.90 This is how Tachibana formulated the logic:

Superstition has no basis in morality, but morality is the basis of belief. The youth at home must believe in the elders, the wife in the husband, and the husband in the wife. If there is no harmony within the family, then there will be no harmony in society and no harmony in the nation. The Morality Society thus represents the progress (jinbu) of morality."'

Women and the Figure of Tradition within Modernity � 1 53

It was through the representation of the family, and the special role of women within it as repositories of the essence of tradition, that the new middle-class patriar­ chy made common cause with the Manchukuo state. Woman became the upholder of the "new family," which was the basis of citizenship. The new family was morally pure, selfless, and committed to the moral regeneration of the world by adhering to the "kingly way" (wangdao).92 Weddings were to be frugal and unostentatious, since the goal was to achieve love and righteousness among the couple.93 Women (and, to a lesser extent, men) were encouraged to rid themselves of jewelry and other accou­ trements so that they could come to know their inner selves.94 The Morality Society not only conducted lectures and ran schools, it organized many "family research groups" (jiatingyanjiushe) in which the roles of model wife and mother were investi­ gated. It is from these research societies that the righteous girls' schools received the knowledge to improve women's service to the family and nation without necessarily having to leave the home.95

In this representation, the goals of the nation-state could only be fulfilled when the family was strong, when husbands were righteous and wives obedient. The oral records of the morality seminars of the Third Manchukuo Morality Society (Disanjie Manzhouguo Daodehui daode jiangxi yulu, or DMDy), which were held in 1936 in Xinjing (Changchun), are an extraordinarily revealing text of over 300 pages of per­ sonal narratives and testimonials from members of the society who taught in its righ­ teous schools and traveled the country giving lectures on morality.96 Participants in the seminar made presentations about how their lives were guided by the appro­ priate moral doctrines of the Society. We hear the life stories of about twenty-five women and an equal number of men, including government officials. Within the family, the ideal moral roles for men and women were very different. From the speeches and narratives of the officials and leaders of the Society, we learn that the masculine vinues were loyalty, incorruptibility, bravery, and self-restraint. On sev­ eral occasions in their narratives, men recounted as virtue the self-control by which they restrained the urge to beat their wives. One of them indicated that in showing restraint he was expressing his filiality, because both his marriages had been arranged by his mother.97 Director Feng (Feng zhuren) was once faced with a serious moral crisis when his youngest wife threw his baby son on the floor: seized by a desire to avenge his progeny, he was about to strike her when he recognized the vinue of self­ restraint.98 Female vinue often entailed following the three obediences (sancong). The locus classicus of this doctrine is the Book of Rituals (Yili sangfuzhuan), which holds that a woman should obey her father before marriage, her husband upon mar­ riage, and her son upon the husband's death. But in the pedagogy of the Society, as we shall see, obedience on the pan of women did not necessarily entail confinement to the household. Rather, the ideal woman was shaped (or regulated) by the vinues of the family and by the reproduction of these vinues in the righteous schools and the Morality Society itself.

Having outlined the ways in which the pedagogy of the regime and the Society constituted women as subjects, let me turn to the personal narratives of the women.

1 54 .--, Chapter 4

The bulk of their narratives is organized around the five conducts (wuxing) drawn from the classical tradition, discussed in chapter 3 in the context of Wang's philoso­ phy. They are zhiming (to know your fate); zhixing (to know your nature); jinxin (to devote your heart and mind, to devote oneself); lishen (to establish your self or body), in turn divided into lizhi (to resolve your will) and liye (to fulfill an enterprise or profession); and finally zhizhi {to know your limits).99

My goal in retelling the stories of these women is to see them neither as unwilling victims of a fascist regime nor as collaborators with an alien power. Nationalism was clearly less important to them than being able to pursue their religious mission and personal goals, and there are also suggestions that they stopped cooperating when it became impossible to pursue their mission. Although it is difficult to evaluate their efficacy as agents of the state and the Society, they were clearly identified with the avowed goals of the regime. As a result, these women represented the relative success of an East Asian model of womanhood that became the means of ordering gender roles and domesticity. What interests me in their narratives is the extent to which these women fashioned their lives and actions in accordance with a pedagogy that sought to control them. To what extent is the technique of self-knowledge subordi­ nated to the pedagogy of the three obediences? What was the nature of the gap between the constituted subject and the enunciating subject? IOO I am not suggesting that we can find, in this gap, some kind of subaltern agency or independence from the structures of domination. Rather, I will try to show how the self is fashioned not only by the dominant representations of truth and power, but by a range of practices outside their ambit as well.

Women and Techniques of the Self

Who were the women who joined these societies, particularly as lecturers? As lectur­ ers, they must, at some level, have believed in the pedagogy. Like teachers every­ where, they expressed demoralization when few attended their lectures and were gratified by a large turnout. Many of them were women with much grief in their lives. There were those whose children had died young, those locked in loveless mar­ riages, those who sought solace because a younger wife or concubine had been brought in to replace them, younger wives bullied by older wives and in-laws, and many others. Many were devout Buddhists and found the Society to be basically compatible with their Buddhist faith. These were women for whom the Morality Society offered a rationalization or justification of their fate, a means of coping with their difficult lives, a missionary sublimation, and spiritual solace. A woman named Tu declares that hers is the fate (ming) of a stepmother. Neither the old nor the children treated her well, no matter how hard she tried. But she had come to under­ stand her fate and had resolved her will (lizht) . Whereas earlier she had been addicted to drugs, she had become a vegetarian and felt no need for drugs. Indeed, she had acquired such strength and influence in her household that no one there took drugs.lOl A Mrs. Zhao states simply that earlier she would be sad when people

Women and the Figure of Tradition within Modernity '-' 1 5 5

called her "wife number two" (er taitat). Now she had learned to live with her fate (tianming) and was happy. 102 Mrs. Liu's in-laws got a "little sister" (a concubine) for her husband who was filial and sisterly, and so she had to learn to be a good elder sister. She decided to make up to her in-laws and husband by performing service to society, and had done so for the past ten years. I03

But resignation, coping, and solace from grief and mistreatment were not the only meanings that women derived from their participation in the Morality Society. The narratives also reveal various strategies whereby women were able to maneuver the goals of the Society to secure advantage for themselves and for other women. This was hardly easy, as many women must have experienced the pedagogy as a form of objectification. Counter-representations of the modern, Westernized woman were readily available to these women. Newspapers in Manchukuo, we have seen, debated the issue of women's liberation, and until 1941 at least often carried positive images ofliberated, Western, and Westernized women. Indeed, it was the often unacknowl­ edged irruption of elements of this discourse into their own that enabled some of their maneuvers. Yet it is also clear that they accepted the virtue of filiality and even obedience to patriarchs. Most of all, they appeared to derive their inspiration and strength from the spirit of devotion and self-sacrifice-from that space of authentic­ ity sanctified by the pedagogy of the Society. How could they be true to their beliefs when they were surrounded by messages about their domination?

The first and perhaps most important difference between the discourse of these redemptive societies and the historical, Confucian, or patrilineal discourse on women was that the rhetoric of confining women to the home in these societies was balanced or countered by a valorization of public or social service. 104 Not only did these socie­ ties have an ideal of public service, they were themselves part of the new public sphere. As such, women who participated in them as members, as audience, or as lecturers were ipso facto involved in activities outside the home, albeit through seg­ regated organizations. Recall that even in the official articulations of society's duty to create a nested hierarchy of moral obligation linking the individual to the state, the family was not directly linked to the state. The relationship was mediated by the need to fulfill a moral obligation to society. The realm of society or shehui as a posi­ tively evaluated sphere of human-male and female-interaction represented a sig­ nificant, though not necessarily recognized, departure from earlier historical discourses containing women within the domestic sphere.I05 Mrs. Zhao was one who did recognize the significant difference:

Those of you under the age of forty have had the benefit of a modern education and may work outside of the horne. Those of us over forty are barely literate and we know little about affairs outside the horne. Now this Society allows us to exchange knowl­ edge. I can go to your home and you to mine; we are not restricted by being rich or poor . . . . From this it is clear that the future of women is bright. We can come and hear lectures every day; we can obtain morality. The young can be filial to the old and the old can be kind. I hope my sisters will strive to build the future. lo6

1 56 ,........., Chapter 4

The realm of the social, however, was rife with ambiguity and a dangerous capac­ ity to erode rhe virtues cultivated in domesticity. Even in Mrs. Zhao's comments, which reveal a deeply felt sense of liberation, moral development afforded by the emergence of the social was ultimately brought to bear to restore filiality. While many of the men acknowledged the importance of service to society, they believed that confining women (rhough not necessarily to the home) was the best possible way for society to develop. Just as the virtuous girls' school was the way to regulate the behavior of girls who were exposed to society, so too, for some of these men, women's participation in the Morality Society was itself an ideal way to control their activities outside the home. The director of the society, Mr. Feng, had four wives­ all of whom, he claimed, were happily involved with the Morality Society and regu­ larly ketou (kowtow) to its teachers. 107

However, this mode of containing women in the public sphere did not necessar­ ily result in the kind of abject dependence that Mr. Feng's words might lead us to believe. Takizawa Toshihiro, who investigated social welfare organizations in Man­ chukuo, reported an episode from one of the virtuous schools rhat he visited in 1937 in Liaoyuan county. The school and its dormitories were basically well maintained. The school derived its income from a wool-weaving workshop and a grain store. It had separate lecture halls for women citizens (!Unu shimin), appointed with a picture of the emperor Puyi and an altar to Confucius. On one of the days he was there, a vigorous discussion on the subject of "the spirit of nation-building and women in the family" (jianguo jingshen he jiatingfonu) followed a talk by a lecturer from Feng­ tian. Takizawa was impressed by the dedication of the students and teachers of the school to popular enlightenment, and rhe way they criticized rhe old-fashioned atti­ tude of rhe lecturer. Takizawa recommended rhat rarher than preach homilies to these children, the Society should emphasize rhe teaching of practical life skills. In this way, they would learn from the scienticization (kagakuka) of evetyday life. 108

The vety involvement of girls and women in a public organization, however seg­ regated, could transform domesticity and the self-image of the women. The positive evaluation of social or public service in modern discourse together with rhe ambiva­ lence of the leaders (contrast Feng's behavior with Wang's comment on religions restricting women), created opportunities for these women, which they seized and utilized to the fullest extent. A Mrs. Bai decided to give up the life of the inner quarters because she realized that the world of women was a vety grasping one in which one could not be ethical. By giving public lectures, she could make a living that permitted her to support borh her mother and mother-in-law. Thus she could be filial and moral without being dependent on anyone, neither husband nor chil­ dren. 1 09 A recently married woman described rhe foreordained nature of the daugh­ ter-in-Iaw: to serve all in the family wirh devotion-to be filial to her in-laws, help her husband attain a Buddhist nation, be kind to her children-and rid herself of vain desire. At rhe same time, women could follow rhe men and devote rhemselves to social good. Indeed, once one had satisfactorily served the in-laws, it was incum­ bent in the next phase to serve the world. 1 1 0

Women and the Figure of Tradition within Modernity .---.. 1 57

Mrs. Chen reveals rhe significance of public service and rhe independence that it can bring to women. She emphasizes the utility and value of women in rhe family and rhe importance of these qualities in purifYing rhe world and resolving to do good for society. She begins her narrative wirh an account of how her father-in-law brought her into rhe household because rhe education she received from her mother would bring good values into their home. These were rhe qualities rhat permitted lishen, rhe ability to establish oneself. In earlier periods, lishen, to the extent that it referred to women, referred to feminine bodily comportment wirhin the domestic sphere. In a booklet of moral instruction for women that circulated in the late impe­ rial period, lishen is described as a

way of being tranquil (qing) and chaste (zhen). Tranquillity brings purity (jie) and chas­ tity brings honor (rong). While walking, do not turn back your head; while speaking, do not expose your teeth; while sitting, do not move your knees; while standing, do not raise your voice. . . . When of necessity you have to go out, be sure to veil your face . . . . Only when you establish your body in such proper and upright ways can you be a person (/ishen duanzhengJang ke weiren) . 1 1 I

The close connection between personhood and bodily comportment has not dis­ appeared in the time of rhe Morality Society: recall rhe comment of rhe woman who learned rhe true meaning of reading only after applying it to her bodily conduct. But rhis is not how Mrs. Chen uses lishen. Personhood for her is dependent on material independence; the best means of lishen is to set up a livelihood of one's own (liye). Now rhat Manchukuo has entered rhe era of Datong or the Great Unity, Mrs. Chen avers, women have plenty of opportunity to make a livelihood. Once rhey have set up a living, rhey can devote rhemselves to rhe task of purifYing rhe world (huozhe neng sheshen shijie). In rhis way, because one would not be working for money or fame, one could rid oneself of greed. Was rhis not rhe best way to lishen?' 12

Several points in rhis personal narrative deserve attention. First, observe the ease wirh which the meaning of lishen in one context (home) is transferred to anorher (society), where it may be subversive of rhe original context. Crucial to this transfer (and subversiveness) is not simply the valorization of social service, but rhe corollary notion of financial autonomy. The notion of liye, often treated in these narratives as a subset of lishen, becomes one of rhe most important concerns of these women as they seek to establish a material base to enable rheir role as moral citizens of rhe Society and rhe world. Second, note the appropriation of rhe rhetoric of rhe Man­ chukuo state. Many women were purposeful in rheir use of state rhetoric and tended to seize any rhetorical openings to advance rhe condition of women. Finally, there is rhe conRation of service in the outside world and moral purification of it. This suggests rhat participation in rhe social world is subordinated to erhical and religious goals. These goals occupy rhe space of authenticity and inner meaning for rhe indi­ vidual woman, but it is a space framed by rhe new patriarchy of rhe middle class and rhe state.

1 58 ,-..., Chapter 4

The interweaving of these three elements-appropriation of the rhetoric; carving out a space, role, and basis for independent social action; and employment of this autonomy to achieve the moral and religious goals of the Society-is, adjusting for individual details, a recurring pattern in the women's narratives. Note how grand­ mother Cai elides her unfiliality in an era when universal education has become an unquestioned value. At the age of thirty-three, grandmother Cai confesses, she defied the wishes of the elders and went off to study. Now it is her responsibility to devote herself (jinxin) to the education of her children and grandchildren. She closes with the comment that she is a vegetarian, is deeply religious, and has tried to rid herself of vain desires. Here the value of women's education in wider society, both in the modernist rhetoric of the Manchukuo state and in the vision of the Morality Society, allows her to justify an earlier act of unfilial behavior. She finesses filiality, however, with recourse to the superior values of universal education and devotion to spiritual virtues. I 13

The strategy in these "games of truth" is to detach oneself from one kind of pedagogical value but continue to derive meaning from the constitutive representa­ tion by emphasizing another of its qualities or values. 1 14 Thus Mrs. Li, like several others, uses filiality to trump unquestioned obedience to her husband. Ever since she heard how a leader of the Society cared for his own mother, Mrs. Li determined to set up her own source of livelihood (fiye) to care for her ailing mother. Since she had to go out of the home, her husband yelled at her and accused her of being unfaithful. She says that she had never loved any man other than her husband. But now her loving heart had set. 1 1 5 Mrs. Sun had to care for her sick father and student brother. Her husband had problems at work and could not provide for all of them. She had been inspired by the wise words of Wang Fengyi-"In devoting herself, the woman must not weaty the husband; rather she should be able to help the husband obtain virtue" -to set up an independent means of livelihood. 1 16

The ideal of moral autonomy within lishen is sometimes interpreted in such a radical way that it subverts the very basis of the pedagogy: family values. Thus, one Ms. Liu declares that her understanding of lishen includes the philosophy of single living (dushen zhuyi sixiang)-the merits of remaining unmarried. I I? We also see a kind of feminist filiality overcoming patriarchy. A Mrs. Liu recalls that her mother was ordered back to her natal home. She and her brother were not permitted to visit her. Later she and her brother devoted themselves to restoring the family and she established a source oflivelihood for her mother. 1 1 8 This woman goes on to challenge the sages, who

ask us to follow the three male figures (sancong) and learn from our husbands. We listen to our husbands, but they do not hear us. My husband eats meat and is not very virtuous, whereas I have only eaten meat once and I am a filial daughter-in-law. Should I not be the one from whom he should learn the Way? But he has been formed early and I am incapable of helping him. Anyway, I am not much concerned about my marriage. I 19

Women and the Figure of Tradition within Modernity .--. 1 59

Note, however, even in this last episode, the filial link to the mother, as much as enlightenment in the Way, appears to be the driving sentiment for Mrs. Liu.

Perhaps the episode that best reveals the inseparability of the search for autonomy and commitment to the moral values of the Society is narrated by the same Mrs. Chen who urged women to take advantage of the job opportunities for them in Manchukuo.

I was once sent to Beijing to lecture, but my husband followed me and insisted that I return home. Why is it that men can bully women so? I asked the teacher (shanren) if I should return. He replied, "You may return. What do you have to fear? All you have to know is whether or not you have the will." I returned. In Tianjin I was asked whether I returned of my own will. I nearly wept. I had resolved to return because I remembered that I could not violate my parents' will (ming). The next time I left, I went away for four years. And so I am what I am today. The important thing is to know your own will (zht). It is how and why people make up their minds that is important, not the decision itself I believe it is important to be filial . . . . When you have an independent income you are not only, as the teacher says, the iron master (tie caizhu), you become the golden master (jin caizhu).120

I want to dwell on this complex narrative not because of the way in which these women have grasped the importance of outside service and financial independence, or because of the continued importance of filiality. Rather I am struck that the source of strength and resolve for this woman derives precisely from the very ideol­ ogy that constrains her in so many other ways. It is by knowing her mind and culti­ vating her resolve (/izht)-the Way-that she is able to establish her independence from her husband despite the constraints. The segment in the records of the pro­ ceedings of the conference that is most restricting for women is the one titled zhizhi, to know the limits. The doctrine that is invoked most often as a constraint, and indeed as self-constraint, is that of the three obediences, or sancong. When faced with such constraints, one as strong and gifted as Mrs. Chen can still pick her way around them, but that is not necessarily true for many other women. Mrs. Chen acknowledges the importance of the obediences but she does not dwell upon them at length. From our fathers, she says, we can know our nature, from our husbands our fate, and through our sons we can establish ourselves (/ishen). She does not elab­ orate upon what she means by lishen here, but moves immediately to the differences between the ways in which her parents were "good people" and the way she can be a morally pure person. Her parents were good people of a village or county; she is a good citizen of the entire nation, and indeed the world. 121 Once again she invokes the expanded community of moral service to elude constraints.

But not all the women were as skillful as Mrs. Chen. Mrs. Zhao says that her greatest aspiration is to be a man, so much so that she sometimes forgets that she is a woman. But her nature is that of a woman, her mind is that of a woman, and her body is that of a woman. She needs to remind herself constantly about these constraints. 122 Another woman cites the sages to acknowledge to herself that a

1 60 ,-....., Chapter 4

woman must recognize her limits in her duty to observe the three obediences. 1 23

Mrs. Liu believes that, having a woman's heart, she was not filial to her in-laws and did not obey her husband (congfu). Consequently, they brought a "sister" into the household. Now she has tried to be a good wife and obeys her husband dutifully. Although they are poor, they are pure inside. 124 Thus we are returned to the peda­ gogy of authenticity.

The figure of woman as the essence of "tradition within modernity" addresses most fundamentally the aporia of time, the anxiety faced by individuals and regimes in societies driven by a conception of historical time as the constancy of flux. As the anchor of an eternal, civilizational essence-guarded during her movement out of the home-woman was expected to function as the figure of authenticity for both individuals and the regime. I have tried to examine the relevance of the regime of authenticity in the lives of these mostly ordinary women of the Morality Society, and have found it to be quite complex. On the one hand, as our concluding passages indicate, the "truth" of the doctrine was a powerful source of the sense of the self and its mission. Even more, we have seen how the pedagogy did indeed shape the behavior of these women in ways that were intended. But a life is scarcely shaped by a pedagogy alone. Pedagogy is grasped in the environment of its performance, in the spaces and practices of evetyday life. Both the Society and the regime conceived of a modern role for women in public spaces, but they also sought to contain and control them through segregated organizations and an ideology of domesticity. Even with this limited participation in the public world, women could garner sufficient moral and economic resources to conceive the Way "strategically" and fashion their lives at some distance from the pedagogy. 125 This is how they learned to live by the authentic and live in their time.

For the regime in Manchukuo, as much as in China and Japan, the figure of woman as authentic--developed as part of its sovereignty claim-became a signifi­ cant constituent of the symbolic regime of authenticity. As its custodian, the state possessed the ability to deploy it for purposes both of govern mentality and short­ term regime goals. In particular, it sought to use segregated women's organizations to control and penetrate society, by manipulating the changing interface between domestic and public spaces-extending the domestic into the public and turning the domestic-in-public back toward re-forming the family. The sign of civilizational authenticity and the lever for state manipulation converged in the virtue of self­ sacrifice. The historical discourse of the self-sacrificing woman was inherited by modern patriarchies in all of the modern states in East Asia and represented a para­ digmatic model of individual self-sacrifice for the nation. A similar pattern of politi­ cal participation, in which state power sought to control the relationship between personal authenticity and sovereignty, linked nation building, state penetration, and citizenship in the three societies.

Indeed, as the work of Meng Yue and others shows, this pattern remained para­ digmatic for the communist state in China during much of the Maoist period.

Women and the Figure of Tradition within Modernity ..--.-> 161

According to Meng, in the literature of the People's Republic (PRC) before 1980, the triumph of class struggle was secured through the figure of woman as desexed, nonmaterial, and pure. Ideally, both men and women gained their sense of the authentic communist self (the self that realizes the abiding, if latent, collectivism and selflessness of the propertyless) through the model of the self-denying, sacrificing, sexless woman. Meng writes,

On the one hand, the state's political discourse translated itself through women into the private context of desire, love, marriage, divorce and familial relations, and on the other, it turned woman into an agent politicizing desire, love, and family relations by delimiting and repressing sexuality, self and all private emotions. '26

Meng Yue's analysis is not directly concerned with the problem of timeless authen­ ticity, but we can see that not only did such a woman enshrine all that was pure and true in communist discourse, she also symbolized that unchanging core-the still­ ness of the true-whereby communism could recognize itself in the march of change. It thus appears that the Maoist regime shared with the evidently different prewar regimes in East Asia a historical, if subterranean, conception of women as lacking political agency specifically as women. 127 In both Maoist China and non­ communist East Asia, it was women's passivity, their being spoken for, that repre­ sented the political meaning of their gender.

I have deliberately stressed the common elements in the discourse of and policies toward gender, domesticity, and the public realm in Japan, China, and Manchukuo in order to show how shared nation-work belies the narratives of national distinc­ tiveness that it produces. To be sure, there were several distinctive features regarding this cluster in Manchukuo, and others have begun to write about them. Perhaps most distinctive was the government's propaganda whereby cross-ethnic marriages and adoptions were seen as the expression of an ideal of ethnic harmony­ contradicted in practice by the considerable separation and hierarchy among ethnic communities, especially in relation to the Japanese. 1 28 A more subtle expression of this duplicity was the phenomenon of the cross-ethnic actress Li Xiangian, or Ri Koran. Of Japanese parentage but born and raised as Chinese in Manchuria and Beijing, Li acted as a Chinese in Japanese-produced films promoting themes of pan­ Asian womanhood, family values, and amity. Given her considerable popularity among Chinese audiences, who mostly did not know of her Japanese background, we are led to believe that national differences were probably not as salient as the common cultural and historical framework through which these films were viewed. 129 Perhaps just as distinctive of the gender-family complex in Manchukuo was the wide-ranging role played by women of the redemptive societies, particularly the Morality Society and the Red Swastika Society. In neither China nor Japan were such originally independent societal groups entrusted with such extensive functions of governmentality and loyalty building for the regime.

It is thus entirely possible to see the women's associations as collaborating with

162 ,--.. Chapter 4

an unmitigated evil, the occupying enemy force. But such a view derives from a nationalist perspective, and few of these women saw themselves from this perspective at the time. Indeed, most important for them was the Way, knowledge and practice of which would lead to the salvation, not just of the nation, but of the world. The rhetoric of the "kingly way" and "Great Unity" promoted by the regime suited the worldview of the redemptive societies, and the Manchukuo government was the first in recent histoty to have created a legitimate space for them to function and flourish. They-the women in particular-responded with considerable enthusiasm to the opportunity to serve their cause in public; however this may have also served the regime. Mrs. Gu, with whom we began the chapter, tended in fact to see the Japa­ nese as following the Daodehui rather than the other way around. She saw little contradiction in serving different regimes as long as she could continue her mission.

When after the Chinese war in 1937, and especially after the Pacific War in 194 1 , Manchukuo became increasingly subservient to the interests of the Japanese war machine, the regime became more oppressive and began to pose difficult choices for its allies like the redemptive societies. In this situation, many responded with noncooperation. We have pointed to instances of increasing suspicion about several of these societies or their branches by Japanese police. We also have complaints from the Concordia Association about members of redemptive societies refusing to take part in campaigns to increase production. Mrs. Gu notes that during the Pacific War the numbers of lecturers in her unit reduced from 140 to 20, although she was proud to be among those who did not shirk from the hardship.

However we view the politics of such an alliance-as collaboration or partner­ ship--it is undeniable that, as in China and Japan, the regime used these women for its purposes. At the same time, note that the women were also able to use the resources of the regime-ideological and institutional-to fashion their lives in a way meaningful to themselves and their ideals. Indeed, the nationalist condemna­ tion of such people poses a conundrum: Can a Chineseness be denied to those who seek their identity in their own cosmopolitan traditions? Ironically, as we will see in the next chapter, it is precisely the older, Confucian, cosmopolitan vision of Chi­ neseness that nationalists would invoke to bring into the fold those who may have had other loyalties.

Notes

1 . Wang Jingwei, "Duiyu niijiede ganxiang" (Reflections on women's world), Funu zazhi 10 ( 1 924) : 106-7.

2. Wang Jingwei, "Duiyu niijiede ganxiang," 1 08. The notion of self-sacrifice, of course, pervades this entire topic and deserves more discussion. Several scholars have argued that self-sacrifice is critical to establishing the claim to nationhood. See Renan, "What Is a Nation?"; Liisa H. Malkki, Purity and Exile: Violence, Memory, and National Cosmology among Hutu Refogees in Tanzania (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1 995), 216-18; and John D. Kelly, "Diaspora and World War, Blood and Nation in Fiji and Hawai'i," Public Culture

Women and the Figure of Tradition within Modernity r--.> 1 63

7 ( 1 995): 489. Martyrdom is the root sacrificial form that sanctions and sanctifies rights for the wronged. Historically, the sacrifice of the pure and authentic often redeemed the desire for wealth, lust, and power; see Richard Von Glahn, "The Enchantment of Wealth: The God Wutong in the Social Histoty of Jiangnan," Harvard Journal of Asiatic Studies 5 1 ( 1 99 1 ): 651-7 1 4. The same mechanism may perhaps be at work in the national martyr, but note that the sacrificial action also produces the authentic.

3. Sheldon Garon, Molding Japanese Minds: The State in Everyday Lift (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1 997), 1 1 9.

4. Sharon H. Nolte and Sally Ann Hastings, "The Meiji State's Policy Toward Women, 1 890-1 9 10," in RecreatingJapanese Women, 1600-1945, ed. Gail Lee Bernstein (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1 99 1), 1 57, 1 71-72.

5. Joan Judge, "Talent, Virtue, and the Nation: Chinese Nationalisms and Female Sub­ jectivities in the Early Twentieth Centuty," American Historical Review 106 Oune 2001) : 771 .

6. Saneto, Nihon bunka no Shina e no eikyo, 1 59-166, 260-4; Judge, "Talent, Virtue, and the Nation," 773-83; Weikun Cheng, "Going Public through Education: Female Reformers and Girls' Schools in Late Qing Beijing," Late Imperial China 2 1 (2000): 1 10-12, 1 1 7 n. 40; and Reynolds, China, 1898-1912, chap. 5.

7. Judge, "Talent, Virtue, and the Nation," 1 5-16; Cheng, "Going Public through Education," 1 20; Kazuko Ono, Chinese Women in a Century of Revolution, 1850-1950, trans. and ed. Joshua Fogel (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1 989), 54-59; and Reynolds, China, 1898-1912, 58-59. Judge discusses at some length the experience of Chinese women in Shimoda's school for them in Tokyo. Ironically, many of these women rejected much of Shimoda's pedagogy of traditional virtues and were more impressed by Japanese women's high levels of education.

8. Zhao Jingru, quoted in Saneto, Nihon bunka no Shina e no eikyo, 264. 9. Jennifer Schirmer, "The Claiming of Space and the Body Politic within National­

Security States: The Plaza de Mayo Madres and the Greenham Common Women," in Remapping Memory: The Politics of Time space, ed. Jonathan Boyarin (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1 994), 1 96. See also Ana Maria Alonso, "Gender, Power, and Historical Memoty: Discourses of Serrano Resistance," in Feminists Theorize the Political, ed. Judith Butler and Joan Scott (New York: Routledge, 1 992), 404-25, and Joan Landes, Women and the Public Sphere in the Age of the French Revolution (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1 988).

10. Partha Chanerjee, The Nation and Its Fragments: Cokmial and Postcolonial Histories (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1 993), chap. 6.

1 1 . Chatterjee, Nation and Its Fragments, chaps. 6 and 7. 1 2. Katherine Carlitz, "Desire, Danger, and the Body: Stories of Women's Virtue in Late

Ming China," in Engendering China: Women, Culture and the State, ed. Christina Gilmartin et al. (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1 994), 1 01-24; Susan Mann, Precious Records: Women in China's Long Eighteenth Century (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1 997), 37-56; and Mark Elvin, "Female Virtue and the State in China," Past and Present 104 ( 1984): 1 1 1-52.

13. Yan Shi, "Nannii tongxue yu lian'ai shang de zhidao" (Coeducation and guidance on amorous relationships), Funu zazhi 9, no. 10 ( 1 923) 1 8-19; and Wang Zhuomin, "Lun wuguo daxue shang buyi nannii tongxiao" (On the inappropriateness of coeducation in our universities), Funu zazhi 4, no. 5 ( 1 9 1 8) 1-8.

14. Ono, Chinese Women in a Century of Revolution, 27.

1 64 r---J Chapter 4

1 5 . Li Youning and Zhang Yufa, eds., Jindai Zhongguo nuquan yundong shiliao, 1842- 1911 (Documents on feminist movements in modern China, 1 842-191 1 ) (Taibei: Zhuanji wenxueshe, 1 975), 463-67.

16. Cheng, "Going Public through Education," 1 32. 1 7. Miriam Silverberg, "The Modern Girl as Militant," in Recreating Japanese Women,

1600-1945, ed. Gail Lee Bernstein (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1991) , 263. 1 8. Silverberg, "Modern Girl as Militant," 264. 1 9. Norma Diamond, "Women under Kuomintang Rule: Variations on the Feminine

Mystique," Modern China 1 ( 1 975): 6-7. 20. Lu Xun, "Wozhi jielieguan" (My views on chastity) , in Fen, Lu Xun Quanji ( 1 9 1 8;

reprint, Taipei: Tangshan, 1989), 1 : 1 01-13. 2 1 . Lu Hsiin [Lu Xun] , "Soap," in Selected Stories of Lu Hsun, trans. Yang Hsien-yi and

Gladys Yang (New York: Norton, 1960), 1 67. 22. Lu, "Soap," 1 7 1 . 23. I would like to acknowledge my debt to Carolyn Brown's reading o f "Soap," which

inspired my own analysis; see Brown, "Woman as Trope: Gender and Power in Lu Xun's 'Soap,' '' in Gender Politics in Modern China, ed. Tani E. Barlow (Durham: Duke University Press, 1 993), 74-89. Brown points out that the one person in "Soap" who is able to see through this trope of woman is none other than the only woman unrepresented by the male characters-Simin's wife. Brown writes, "with the character Mrs Sumin, he (Lu) empowers a semi-traditional woman with speech and the capacity to 're-read the male text,' making her the locus of his own value" (77). Thus, with characteristic irony, Lu Xun suggests a robust skepticism towards the project of authenticity among those, like Mrs. Simin, who could well have been objectified by this project. The reader will not miss the final irony of Mrs. Simin being given voice by Lu Xun, the man.

24. Jinan Daoyuan, ed., Li Daodayuan yishilu (Record of the virtuous events of the estab­ lishment of the Great Dao Yuan) Oinan, 1932), 74-78.

25. Tongshihui zhiyin (Management committee printed), Wansi Chungshantang zhuan- kan (Pamphlet of the Wansi Chungshan Lodge) (Hangzhou, 1 935), 1-2.

26. Jinan Daoyuan, Li Daodayuan yishilu, 77. 27. Foucault, "Governmentality," 92. 28. Nikolas Rose, "Governing 'Advanced' Liberal Democracies," in Foucault and Politi­

cal Reason: Liberalism, Neo-liberalism, and Rationalities of Government, ed. Barry Andrew, Thomas Osborne, Nikolas Rose (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1 996), 49.

29. The neo-Foucauldian view tends to minimize the relative autonomy of civil sociery and the importance of liberalism's critique of state power as a short-lived moment in the nineteenth century. It emphasizes the interdependence of state and social organizations in governmentality (albeit mostly in the post-World War II era) . See Barry Andrew, Thomas Osborne, and Nikolas Rose, eds. , Foucault and Political Reason: Liberalism, Neo-liberalism, and Rationalities of Government (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1 996), 8-1 0. In my view, the relative autonomy of societal organizations clearly had a different impact on people's lives than did governmentalities where regimes controlled mass organizations.

30. Silverberg, "Modern Girl as Militant," 263-64, and Garon, MoldingJapanese Minds, 1 20.

3 1 . Garon, Molding Japanese Minds, 1 26. 32. Garon, MoldingJapanese Minds, 1 3 1 , and Yoshiko Miyake, "Doubling Expectations:

Women and the Figure of Tradition within Modernity ,.-....., 1 65

Motherhood and Women's Factory Work under State Management in Japan in the 1 930s and 1940s," in Engendering China: Women, Culture and the State, ed. Christina Gilmartin et al. (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1 991) , 274-76.

33. Miyake, "Doubling Expectations," 27 1 . 34. Garon, Moldingjapanese Minds, 1 44-45. 35. Van Pinzao, "Nanchang mofan laodong fuwutuan fangwenji" (Record of a visit to

Nanchang's model labor service team), in XYDB, 5 and 6 (April 1 937), 1 14. 36. Karl Gerth, Nationalizing Comumer Culture in Modern China (Cambridge: Harvard

University Asia Center, forthcoming), 356, 366, 372. 37. Chiang Kai-shek (Huizhang), "Xinshenghuo yundong qizhounian jinian xunci"

(Exhortation speech commemorating the seventh anniversary of the New Life movement) ( 1 940), in GWXSY, 84. See also Kirby, Germany and Republican China, 1 76-8 1 .

38. Song Meiling, "Xinshenghuo yundong" (New Life movement) ( 1 936), in GWXSY, 1 1 2.

39. Arif Dirlik, "The Ideological Foundations of the New Life Movement: A Study in Counterrevolution," journal of Asian Studies 34 (August 1 975): 947.

40. Song Meiling, "Xinshenghuo yundong," 1 1 0-1 1 . 4 1 . Song Meiling, "Funii xinshenghuo yingyoude jingshen" (The spirit that women's

new life ought to have) ( 1 938), in GWXSY, 1 14-17. 42. MQX, 269-70. 43. MQX, 1 93, 197; Fujiansheng xinyunhui (Fujian province New Life committee),

"Fujian Lianjiang, Jiangyue xian hunsang lisu tiaocha" (Survey of wedding and funeral cus­ toms in Fujian's Lianjiang and Jiangyue counties) , in XYDB, 5 and 6 (April 1937), 58-59; Guangdongsheng xinyunhui (Guangdong province New Life committee), "Guangdongsheng Renhua deng xian lisu diaocha" (Survey of customs in Guangdong's Renhua and other coun­ ties), in XYDB, 5 and 6 (April 1937), 60-64; Van Pinzao, "Nanchang mofan laodong fuwu­ tuan fangwenji" (Record of a visit to Nanchang's model labor service team), XYDB, 5 and 6 (April 1 937), 1 06-8; and XSY, 1 2-17.

44. MQX, 585; GWXSY, 298-303, 303-10; and XSY, 24-28. 45. Kasza, Conscription Society, 89. 46. Miyake, "Doubling Expectations," 277. 47. Kasza, Comcription Society, 90-9 1 ; See also Garon, Moldingjapanese Minds, 1 42-43. 48. Kasza, Comcription Society, 99-100. 49. Lattimore, Manchuria, 268-69. 50. Lattimore, Manchuria, 269, and Lee, Manchurian Frontier, 86-9 1 . 5 1 . Clausen and Thogersen, Making of a Chinese City, 103-6. 52. DMDY, 1 : 1 0-58. 53. MDNJ, 7: 1 0-48, 8:23. 54. DMDY, 4: 1 42. 55. Elvin, "Female Virtue," 1 04; and Dorothy Ko, Teachers of the Inner Chambers:

Women and Culture in Seventeenth-Century China (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1994).

56. In praise of self-sacrificing women, see SjSB, March 19, 19 18 ; January 1 5, 1 6, and 24, 19 19; February 29, 1920. On women's education, see SjSB, February 1 2, 1 920.

57. SjSB, January 1 1 , 1 9 1 9; February 6 and 25, and March 20, 1920. 58. Lii Qinwen, "Dongbei lunxianqude wailai wenxue yu xiangtu wenxue" (Foreign and

1 66 ..........., Chapter 4

native-place literature in the literature of occupied northeast China), in Zhongri zhanzheng yu wenxue, ed. Yamada Keiw and Lil Yuanming (Changchun: Dongbei shifandaxue chubanshe, 1 992), 1 29-30.

59. Hoshina Kiyoji, Josei yo Manshu yo (To women and Manchuria) (Dairen: Dairen Fujin Taimuzu sha, 193 1-34).

60. DTB, March 23, 25, 28, 1 933; October 2, 4, and 10, 1936. 6 1 . DTB, March 4, 1 0, and 1 5, 1933. 62. DTB, October 8 and 1 5, 1 936. 63. WjYK, June 1 934, 5 1 , 53, 66. 64. DTB, March 21-23, 1 933. 65. Mita Masao, "Shukei tokuhihatsu" (Capital police special secret publication), no.

3650, November 29 (n.p.), submitted to the police headquarters Oing wu zongjil), 1943. I am very grateful to Howard Goldblatt for supplying me with these police reports on Manchu­ kuo writings.

66. Dan Di, "Xiezu" (Blood lineage), Dongbei Wenxue 1 , no. 1 ( 1 945): 4-3 1 . 67. Dan Di's real name was Tian Lin. For an account of her life, see Tian Lin, "Yiwei

baojing fengshuang de zuojia-fang ntizuojia Tian Lin" (A weather-beaten writer: An inter­ view with Tian Lin), interview by Feng Weiqun and Li Chunyan in Dongbei lunxian shiqi wenxue xinlun (New interpretations of the literature of occupied Dongbei) (Changchun: Jilin daxue chubanshe, 199 1) , 244-48.

68. Observe, for instance, how one woman presents herself as caught between patriarchal values and her own future. "My family is truly representative of this transitional era. My father is a reputable merchant who is half-for and half-against a modern-style relationship between men and women. Once my father introduced me to the son of a friend from his hometown. Later the boy wrote me an admiring letter and invited me to visit his school. My parents encouraged me to go, saying that there was no harm nowadays in a girl meeting a boy. Although we initially developed a friendship, I later realized how shallow he was and wanted to break it off. But my parents refused to let me, because we had already formed a relationship, and, besides, he has a picture of the two of us together. They say this can bring shame on us. Dear Editors: Our earlier age was a lot better. If I follow [my parents] , my future is finished; if ! don't, they will suffer. I feel I am riding a tiger I cannot get off"; DTB, March 2 1 , 1 933.

69. Huang Wanhua, preface to Dongbei xiandai wenxue daxi, 1919-1949 (Northeast Modern Literature Series) , vol. 1 1 , ed. Zhang Yumao (Shenyang: Shenyang chubanshe, 1 996), 12 . See also Wu Ying, "Manzhou nUxing wenxuede ren yu zuopin" (Female writers and their works in Manchuria) ( 1 944), in Dongbei xiandai wenxue daxi, 1919-1949 (North­ east Modern Literature Series), ed. Zhang Yumao (Shenyang: Shenyang chubanshe, 1 996), 1 :347-48.

70. Bai Changqing, preface to Dongbei xiandai wenxue daxi, 1919-1949 (Northeast Modern Literature Series), ed. Zhang Yumao (Shenyang: Shenyang chubanshe, 1996), 2:9.

7 1 . Tian Lin, "Yiwei baojing fengshuang de zuojia," 246-48. 72. Hua Min, "Guangfu yu wenren" (Recovery and writers) Dongbei Wenxue 1, no. 2

( 1946): 1 3 . See also Dan Di, "Guanyu nuhua sixiang ji weiman zuojia" (Regarding slavish thought and writers in puppet Manchukuo), Dongbei Wenxue 1 , no. 2 ( 1 946): 6-8, and other contributions to the same issue: Shao Ge, "Yougan yiti" (The topic of feeling), and Jin Hua, "Bushi pian" (Not literature) .

Women and the Figure of Tradition within Modernity C--' 1 67

73. Lydia Liu, "The Female Body and Nationalist Discourse: The Field of Life and Death Revisited," in Scattered Hegemonies: Postmodernity and Transnational Feminist Practices, ed. Inderpal Grewal and Caren Kaplan (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1995), 37-62.

74. Chianbu keisatsushi, Komin, 4 1 . Moreover, the same text says, "Just as a family can adopt a member, so too a nation can naturalize a citizen" (43).

75. Chianbu keisatsushi, Komin, 5-6. 76. jTB; MSSj, 2:50-56. 77. Ishikawa Shinobu, ed., Zenman JUjin dantai rengokai hokokusho (Report of the All

Manchukuo Women's Federation) (Dairen: Zenman fujin dantai rengokai, 1 933); DTB, October 10, 1936, 4.

78. Koiso Kuniaki, "Zenman fujin dantai rengokai kai'in shoshi ni tsugeru no sho" (Let­ ter to all our sisters of the All Manchukuo Women's Federation), in Zenman JUjin dantai rengokai hokokusho (Report of the All Manchukuo Women's Federation), ed. Ishikawa Shi­ nobu (Dairen: Zenman fujin dantai rengokai, 1 933), 5. Koiso, who would become prime minister of Japan during World War II, was, according to Tak Matsusaka, the chief architect of the idea of "strategic autarky"; see Matsusaka, Making of japanese Manchuria, 2 14-23.

79. Koiso, "Zenman fujin dantai rengokai kai'in shoshi ni tsugeru no sho," 6. 80. Koiso, "Zenman fujin dantai rengokai kai'in shoshi ni tsugeru no sho," 7. 8 1 . Ishikawa, Zenman JUjin dantai rengokai hokokusho, 8-9. 82. Ishikawa, Zenman JUjin dantai rengokai hokokusho, 1 1 . 83. MGFH, I-20. 84. Shen Jie, "Japanese Women and Their War Responsibility: Regarding Fascist Female

Organizations in the Spurious Manchuria Country," paper presented to the International Federation of Women's Historians Conference, University of Melbourne, 1997, 4.

85. MGFH, 13-20; Shen, "Japanese Women and Their War Responsibility," 4-5. 86. In some ways, Wang's ideas were remarkably similar to those of the earlier nationalist

reformers. He believed that if women did not understand the Way, they would give birth to ignorant children, ignorance being handed on to ignorance, so that the whole world would end up ignorant; see Shao Yong, Zhongguo huidaomen (China's religious societies) (Shanghai: Remmin chubanse, 1 997), 307. Note here how the language is close to that of the early nationalist reformers, but where the cause for them was the nation, for Wang it is the world.

87. Shao Yong, Zhongguo huidaomen, 306-7. 88. DMDY, 4:207. The gazetteer recorded how his female devotees went to hear him

lecture on the way of "ordering the home and managing the country"; see Chaoyang xianzhi (Chaoyang Counry Gazetteer) , compo Zhou Tiejing and Sun Qingwei ( 1930), juan 35:47a.

89. DMDY, 3:4-5, 38. 90. Three of these relationships-between father and son, older and younger brothers,

husband and wife--concern stabilizing family ties; the fourth relationship, between friends, connects horizontally across families; and the fifth, between subject and monarch, links the family to the state.

91 . MDNJ, 1 1 :29. 92. DMDY, 4: 1 34. 93. MDNj, 10:6, 12 :24. 94. DMDY, 4: 1 5 1 . 95. MDNJ, 2:41 , 4:27.

1 68 ......., Chapter 4

96. Note that these materials are from a time ( 1 936) before the war on the mainland. 97. DMDY, 4:221-23. 98. DMDY, 4:97. 99. The Hanyu Da Cidian quotes passages from the representative texts in which these

categories occur: the first can be found in the Yijing, the second and third in the Mengzi, the fourth in the Xiaojing, lizhi in the Hou Hanshu, liye in the Hanji, and zhizhi in the Liji.

1 00. See Homi Bhabha on enunciation: "The reason a cultural text or system of meaning cannot be sufficient unto itself is that the act of cultural enunciation-the place of utter­ ance-is crossed by the difference of writing . . . . It is this difference in the process of language that is crucial to the production of meaning and ensures, at the same time, that meaning is never simply mimetic or transparent"; The Location of Culture (London: Routledge, 1 994), 36.

1 0 1 . DMDY, 4:90. 102. DMDY, 4:94. 103. DMDY, 4: 138. 104. For patrilineal discourse, see Charlotte Furth, "The Patriarch's Legacy: Household

Instructions and the Transmission of Orthodox Values," in Orthodoxy in Late Imperial China, ed. Kwang-ching Liu (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1990), 1 87-2 1 1 , and Mann, Precious Records. To be sure, the recent work of Susan Mann and others has shown that the high moralism confining women to the home was a consequence of the Confucian "classical revival" of the eighteenth centuty and should not be viewed as an eternal feature of imperial society; see Mann, Precious Records, 22-3 1 . This work has also shown that despite all the rhetoric and measures designed to confine women to the home, there was still a great deal of physical mobility among women in late imperial society.

105. Furth, "Patriarch's Legacy." 1 06. MDNJ, 1 1 :30. 107. DMDY, 4:53. 1 08. Takizawa, Shukyii chiisa shiryii, 94-95. 1 09. DMDY, 4: 185. 1 1 0. DMDY, 4: 1 34-35. 1 1 1 . Song Ruohua, Nit Lunyu (The analects of women) (ca. 780; Shanghai: Shanghai daz-

hong shuju, 1936). 1 1 2. DMDY, 4: 1 8 1 . 1 1 3. DMDY, 4: 1 37. 1 14. Michel Foucault introduces the idea of "games of truth": "what I have tried to main­

tain for many years, is the effort to isolate some of the elements that might be useful for a history of truth. Not a history that would be concerned with what might be true in the fields of learning, but an analysis of the 'games of truth,' the games of truth and error through which being is historically constituted as experience"; see The Use of Pleasure, in The History of Sexuality, vol. 2., trans. Robert Hurley (New York: Vintage, 1 990), 6-7.

1 1 5. DMDY, 4:140. 1 16. DMDY, 4: 1 39. A Mrs. Zhu recalled being so driven by anxiety when her stepmother

arrived after her mother's death that she wore out fifteen pairs of shoes. Later she realized that her stepmother was not unkind and she herself had been unfilial. So in order to make up, she set up a business together with her stepmother and her selfish feelings have dissolved; DMD Y, 4: 130.

1 1 7. DMDY, 4: 1 88. 1 1 8. DMDY, 4:231 . 1 1 9. DMDY, 4:231 .

Women and the Figure of Tradition within Modernity .----.. 1 69

1 20. DMDY, 4: 1 8 1-82. 1 2 1 . DMDY, 4:227-28. 1 22. DMDY, 4:219 . 1 23. DMDY, 4:220. 1 24. DMDY, 4:236. 1 25. "Strategically," that is, in Foucault's sense of the "games of truth." 1 26. Meng Yue, "Female Images and National Myth," in Gender Politics in Motkrn

China, ed. Tani E. Barlow (Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 1 993), 1 18. 1 27. Mayfair Mei-hui Yang, "From Gender Erasure to Gender Difference: State Femi­

nism, Consumer Sexuality, and Women's Public Sphere in China," in Spaces of Their Own: Women! Public Sphere in Transnational China, ed. Mayfair Mei-hui Yang (Minneapolis: Uni­ versity of Minnesota Press, 1999), 44-46.

128. Shao Dan, "Gender in the Construction and Deconstruction of Manchoukuo," (unpublished paper, 200 1), 5-6.

1 29. Shelley Stephenson, "The Occupied Screen: Star, Fan, and Nation in Shanghai Cin­ ema, 1937-1945" (Ph.D. diss., University of Chicago, 2000), chaps. 6 and 7.

PAR T THR EE

T HE AUT HENT ICITY OF SPACES

The complex of time, identity, and sovereignty that I have sought to analyze in this book comes to be rooted in Manchuria, as a space and place. 1 The next two chapters focus on certain spatial practices and symbolizations of the region that represent another war-for the loyalties and identities of the people with the land. These chapters show how political forces, especially the Manchukuo regime, but also oth­ ers, seek to produce and mobilize, and in turn are mobilized by, spatial representa­ tions that embed claims upon places and people, or peopled-places. We know how the depiction of places, such as the Holy Land, Heimat, or lands claimed through Manifest Destiny, can fire the passions, steel the will, and demand life itself. Spatial representations can also negate or preempt claims; thus the idea of the dream time among the Australian aborigines produced a discourse among settlers alleging the aborigines' unreal connection with the land and sanctioning their brutal disposses­ sion.2 If the authenticity of civilization discussed in part II was designed to appeal to the principally Chinese population of Manchuria, the Japanese representation of the region as a natural place sought to limit the claims of this population. Chinese counter-representations of the region as both frontier and homeland did not take long to appear.

Images of authenticity typically occupy the heart of spatial representations. They can nourish sentiments of nostalgia and loyalty that political forces try to channel to their goals, whether to win a war or produce a claim to sovereignty. But the con­ test over the authentic--or, more accurately, over the production of the authentic as a political resource-is not fixed. In Manchuria, as the key players changed over time, the authenticity of the region came to serve other political projects and visions. However, the representation of the region, whether as frontier or heartland, fre­ quently concealed the violence whereby the land was depleted and indigenous peo­ ple were decimated.

As we have seen, the distinct identity of Manchuria in the eighteenth century was to a great extent fostered by the Manchus, but the region itself was scarcely homogeneous. Manchuria was constituted by several different spaces: by grasslands

17 1

1 72 ..---.. Part III

and nomadic life in the west, settled agriculture in the southern valleys, and the forests and mountains in much of the rest. Despite the Qing effort to freeze it, the relationship between these spaces was quite dynamic. Imperialism by the railroad from the second half of the nineteenth century so radically re-spatialized the entire region that we can hardly grasp major internal events and changes without reference to developments outside Manchuria. World market prices for lumber or soya beans, the plague and other diseases, imperialist rivalries, and warlord politics in China were merely some of the obvious factors affecting demographic movements, land use patterns, and political relationships in the area. By dint of Manchuria's rapid integration with the outside world, differences within became increasingly effaced, as agriculture and industry replaced the forest and grasslands. Green Valley applies a microscope to the impact of this re-spatialization upon a communiry where we can still glimpse patterns of earlier relationships. Shanding, author of the novel, uses the motif of the railroad as the central force penetrating the valley and forest. Although it is not surprising that it would have such an unprecedented transforming effect upon a landscape, the railroad was particularly significant in Manchuria, as a largely landlocked region made relatively impenetrable by physical, climactic, and political factors. Penetration by the railroad was not only a technical breakthrough, it was an imperialist action. It was designed to open up a closed land, exploit its resources, and change the economic landscape for the benefit mostly of others. As it turned out, the railroads enabled the settlement of the Chinese agricultural communiry, which became the major force reshaping the environment. But many of the intellec­ tual representatives of this communiry, such as Shanding, were quite ambivalent about the railroad, because in the form of the South Manchurian Railroad it repre­ sented Japanese imperialism. They also believed that by sucking out the resources of the region, the railway destroyed livelihood and landscape.

The network of railroads built around the two major trunk lines, the Russian Chinese Eastern Railroad (CER) and the Japanese South Manchurian Railroad, pro­ duced enormous changes simply by their own consumption needs. Forests were felled for the wood to construct the lines, provide fuel for the trains, and supply the towns that grew around them. According to a CER report warning of the need for rational management of forests, railroads themselves consumed from 40 to 70 per­ cent of the total estimated output of the forest regions after 1922.3 By 1937, export oflumber from Manchukuo outstripped that of Canada, which had been the second largest exporter (after the United States) in the world.4 But of course the effects of railroads were more extensive and deeper. Railroads brought with them towns, commerce, industry, new rhythms of life, the promise of progress, and the threat of destruction. They also led to less visible changes, such as in the spatial foundations of political power. We saw how the pattern of agricultural settlement of the hinter­ land enabled by the railroad made Manchuria a different place from the Chinese mainland. While language and customs, temples and schools made the villages cul­ turally much like those in north China, the coextensiveness of economic and politi­ cal spheres enhanced the technology of administrative control and produced new

The Authenticity of Spaces r--J 173

types of regimes. 5 In "Railway of Annihilation," the avant-garde poet from Dalian, Kitagawa Fuyuhiko, had already linked the railroad directly with the military state in 1929.

The militaty state's railway progressed through the frozen desert planting numberless teeth, numberless teeth that sprouted spikes.

The railway will only be completed with pain to human beings. Human arms change shape beneath the railroad ties. More readily than a rotting leaf separating from a tree.

In the end, the militaty state, wearing away this one scab, extends its arm.

Toward ruin.6

The novel spatial practices, relationships, and modes of power that carne with the railroad bore an oblique relationship to the simultaneously emergent representa­ tions of the landscape and people. Despite the new and myriad linkages to the out­ side world, these representations tended, first of all, to view the region as a distinctive space. Such distinctiveness appears to have served as a precondition for identifying the sites and narratives of authenticity. But each representation was differently con­ toured and bounded, whether for the Japanese, the Chinese, or the Koreans. Early­ twentieth-century Korean nationalist writings depicted Manchuria and present-day Korea as the stage of Korean history-the land of Tangun. 7 This territory was cen­ tered on Changbai Mountain, the putative ancestral birthplace of the Korean nation that nationalists like Ch'oe Namson wanted to sacralize by "reviving" a religion of the "Way of the Park." Ch'oe's concept of a "northeast Asian cultural sphere" incor­ porating Manchuria stressed Korean-as opposed to Japanese or Chinese­ leadership of this sphere.8 Even today, Andre Schmid argues, such ideas foster an irredentism among Korean nationalists.9 Recently, official anthropology in the PRC, which has denied a Korean ethnic link with the ancient kingdom of Koguryo in Manchuria, has revised the understanding of the Koguryo heritage to confirm Chi­ na's rights to those territories, and has limited Korean access to the physical remains of that heritage.lO My goal in these chapters is to see how narratives of authenticity relate to the contesting Japanese and Chinese spatial projects, and how the authen­ ticity of a place and/or its people carne to serve a succession of regimes.

We have already examined the spatial representation woven into the Japanese historical narrative sketched by NaitO Konan. To some extent this was selectively developed in relation to the eighteenth-century Manchu narrative of the distinctive­ ness of the region and the autonomy of Manchu imperial traditions. This narrative portrayed a land with three thousand years of history developing outside agricultural civilization and around grasslands and primeval forests and mountains. In the Japa­ nese popular imagination, Manchuria in this period emerged as a romance of "end-

174 ,--..., Part III

less sky canopying a land inhabited by bandits, horse thieves, rebels and mysterious heroes," a land of danger and opportunity like the Wild West. I I Japanese ron in wan­ dered this land, aiding bands of revolutionaries in 1 9 1 1 or leading bandit gangs who fought the Chinese settlers. 12 In Manchukuo, Japanese visual or literaty depictions of the land and people tend to erase or marginalize the role of agriculture and the Han agricultural population. The vigorous film industry (Manei), the hundreds of picture books, and other propaganda materials that its many institutions churned out in several languages portrayed the grasslands and herdsmen; aboriginals and the forest; the variety of ethnic communities, including Japanese agricultural settlers; traditions and religions; modern cities and industrial power. The innocent observer might hardly be aware that over 80 percent of the population consisted of Chinese agriculturists. 1 3 Even the radical poet Kitagawa, quoted above, participated in the myth of Manchuria as an unpopulated frontier when he depicted the vast lands­ much of which was already converted into agricultural fields-as the "frozen desert."

As an institutional condensation of the historical and spatial nation, the National Manchukuo Central Museum (Manshukoku kokuritsu chuo hakubutsukan) revealed a vision consistent with the marginalization of the Chinese. Established in 1938, the museum coordinated the activities of all museums in the country and housed a major collection. It was recognized as the pioneer of the "new museum" and subse­ quently became the model for postwar Japanese museums. Designed not simply for viewing, it engaged in research and extension activities, including teaching, perform­ ances, film viewing, special exhibitions, friendship societies for science education, and so forth. The museum reflected a split vision of the nation and the world: on the one hand, the collections, publications, and programs of the museum and its branches were concerned with the natural resources, indigenous peoples, and histori­ cal kingdoms of Manchuria; on the other, the artifacts and materials linked Man­ chukuo to a pan-Asian civilization, deriving particularly from non-Han sources of Chinese empires, such as the Mongols or Turfan in the Tang Dynasty. 14 As a new type of museum, it sought to integrate this vision with the public and society to a much greater degree than previously. Thus, the museum was not only a simulacrum of civilization guiding recognition and self-location, 15 it sought to be an active force in the remaking of society according to a wartime vision of pan-Asianism.

The driving force and spirit behind the museum was its prolific deputy director, Fujiyarna Kazuo. Fujiyarna, among the more visionary of Manchukuo bureaucrats, sought to reconcile his original adherence to Shingon Buddhism with his adoption of Christianity. A naturalist by training, he was deeply influenced by Emerson and Thoreau, by Danish theories of agriculture and German romantic philosophy of the forest. As a public figure and museum official, Fujiyama sought to initiate several projects. He envisioned a separate folkways museum (minzoku hakubutsukan) as an open-air, recreational theme park to showcase the cultures of the many different people in Manchukuo and the ways they had adapted to the natural landscape and environment. Museum construction had barely begun before it ran into wartime

The Authenticity of Spaces '---' 1 75

financial problems, but Fujiyama sought to install scale reproductions of scenes from everyday life and architectural forms, such as a Mongolian yun, a Chinese temple, an Oroqen tent, or a Russian church. His goal, which the regime opposed, was to encourage the Japanese rural settler communiry to learn ways of adapting to the environment from the indigenous communities.16 Fujiyama also launched a cam­ paign for the greening of Manchuria. His ideas and advocacy of a rational forest management policy reflected both his religious sentiments and awareness of the cur­ rents of environmental thinking in the West. As environmental policy and critique of the lumber industry, his ideas were perfectly consonant with progressive thoughtY

However, the narrative and rhetorical dimensions of his environmental policy reveal its political implications; they tell a story about the production of a landscape in which the forest has far greater value and visibiliry than the farm. Even the folk­ ways museum plan presented as representative of Manchukuo lifesryles that were rapidly disappearing under the pressures of urbanization and Chinese settlement. The environmental story pits not merely the Chinese farmer, but a whole culture that is allegedly grossly insensitive to the natural environment and its treasure, the forest, against both the aboriginal and the civilized modern nations (read, Germany and Japan). Fujiyama warned that Manchuria was rapidly on its way to suffering the same fate as the loess belt of north China, whose dry plains and bare hills, he claimed, were covered by dense forests less than a thousand years ago. Unless the forest and the ways of the indigenous people who live in it are protected, Manchu­ kuo would be overtaken by the Gobi Desert creeping in from the west.18 In this way, even while the SMR and other Japanese interests were practically involved in its destruction, the receding forest stood at the center of the moral landscape of Manchukuo ideology.

If the Japanese representation of the true Manchuria centered on the forest was implicated in an ideological attack upon the Chinese agriculturalist, Chinese depic­ tions of the land erased the vestiges and memory of tribal cultures. Shanding's Green Valley, which derives its strength from the author's quasi-mystical search for a bal­ ance between agriculture and the primeval forest, is nonetheless remarkably silent about the people who were there when the Chinese peasant, merchant, fortune­ seeker, and bandit arrived on the scene, subjected them to chattel slavery, and drove them to oblivion. To simplify somewhat, it is possible to see these two representa­ tions of the land and people as embodying the authenticity of two kinds of spaces, both important components of the nation but also problematic for it: 1) the fron­ tiers and peripheries of the national territory, and 2) the locality or the countryside, in which the "native place" possesses a special "structure of feeling." In the gaze of the modern city, both spaces are timeless, or at least belong to a different temporality from that of the city. Whereas the "primitive" in the periphery is frequently roman­ ticized to represent a lost human nature, the peasants occupying the timeless heart­ lands often embody ancient civilizational values that the modern nation is in the process of losing. The deeply contested nature of the Manchurian landscape, how-

176 .---.. Part III

ever, meant that the disappearing primitive would come to represent a lost Japanese nature, and the description in Shanding's novel of Manchuria as a repository of (threatened) Chinese heartland traditions was itself a complex displacement of the region as a frontier zone or borderland.

These chapters also attend to the modes of producing knowledge about-and policies towards-the spaces and people of this region. The institutionalized produc­ tion of modern knowledge infthrough/of history, literature, anthropology, geogra­ phy, and folklore (and touching on geology, archaeology, eugenics, and journalism) in East Asia mostly derived its methods and objects of study from globally circulat­ ing sources and the nation-state system. To be sure, these disciplines necessarily interacted with highly developed historical modes of knowledge production, such as Confucian evidential and historical scholarship or Tokugawa ethnographical and geographical writings, and these mediations set the region apart from much of the rest of the world. At the same time, the global stimuli and resources that shaped social scientific and humanistic knowledge in this period were also appropriated into categories that tended to view trends, processes, and effects as immanent. Perhaps among the most prominent of these categories was the bounded notion of "culture" and "civilization," which bore a distinct, if complex, relationship with the space of the nation and empire. Culture as a field of knowledge was where the quest for identity, authenticity, and their custodianship was situated. The cultural investment of the place as the locus of authenticity turned out to be more enduring than the regimes that staked their claims of sovereignty and control upon it. It continues to shape subjectivity and identity to this day.

Notes

1 . By space, I refer (0 the mutual determination of the environment and social relation­ ships. This includes the determinative role of spatial representations as well as the role of geographical or built relationships in the reproduction or transformation of social relations. By place, I refer to the particularization of this mutual determination within a geographical area.

2. Patrick Wolfe, "The Dreamtime in Anthropology and in Australian Settler Culture," Comparative Studies in Society and History 33 ( 1991) : 197.

3. 1. A. Mihailoff, ed., North Manchuria and the Chinese Eastern Rszilway (Harbin: CER Printing Office, 1924), 1 97.

4. Fujiyama Kazuo, Mansha no shinrin to bunka (Shinkyo: Toho Kokumin Bunko, 1 937), 1 39.

5. Yasu(Omi Ayumu, "Teikiichi (0 kenjo keizai-1930 nen zengo ni okeru Manshii noson shijo no (Okucho" (The rural marketing system in Manchuria around 1 930: Periodic markets and the economy of the county (Own) (paper submitted (0 Ajia Keizai, 2002), 1-9.

6. Kitagawa Fuyuhiko, "Railway to Annihilation," quoted in William O. Gardener, "Colonialism and the Avant-Garde: Kitagawa Fuyuhiko's Manchurian Railway," Stanford Humanities Review 7 ( 1 999): 16-17. The translation is Gardener's.

The Authenticity of Spaces ...--.. 177

7. Andre Schmid, "Rediscovering Manchuria: Sin Ch'aeho and the Politics of Territorial Histoty in Korea," Journal of Asian Studies 56 (1 997): 34.

8. Chizuko T. Allen, "Northeast Asia Centered around Korea: Ch'oe Namson's View of Histoty," Journal of Asian Studies 49 (1 990): 796, 799, 800-803.

9. Schmid, "Rediscovering Manchutia," 42. 1 o. Mark E. Byington, "Claiming the Kogutyo Heritage: Territorial Issues in the Manage­

ment of Kogutyo Archaelogical Sites in Northeast China" (paper presented at the Second Worldwide Conference of the Society for East Asian Archaeology, Durham, England, 2000), 18-19.

1 1 . Faye Yuan Kleeman, "Mysticism and Corporeality: Re-envisioning Manchuria in a Postcolonial Japan" (paper presented at the conference on Contemporaty Japanese Popular and Mass Culture, Montreal, Canada, 1999), 2.

12. Kleeman, "Mysticism and Corporeality," 2-3. 1 3. The representation was consistent with the active policy of the Manchukuo govern-

ment to discourage Chinese rural immigration; see Jones, Manchuria since 1931, 167-69. 14. SHT, 63-67, 90-9 1 , 1 14-1 5. 15. Timothy Mitchell, Colonising Egypt (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1991). 16. Kawamura Minato, Manshu Hokai: "Daitoa bungaku " to sakkatachi (The collapse of

Manchukuo: Writers and "Greater East Asia literature") (Tokyo: Bungei shunju, 1998), 77- 79. Even earlier, Fujiyama ran afoul of the militaty government because he objected to its Japanese settler policies. He was transferred for his views; see SHT, 83-84.

17. Fujiyama, Manshu no shinrin to bunka, 5-6. 1 8. Fujiyama, Manshu no shinrin to bunka, 1 37-4 1 .

CHAPTER F I V E

Imperial Nationalism and the Frontier

The system of modern-and perhaps early modern-states is built on the impera­ tive that all global resources be controlled by territorially sovereign polities, whether nations or empires. It was this logic that transformed the fuzzy frontier zones of the historical empires into the militarized boundaries of the modern "geo-body." l The rulers of modern empires, such as the British, the French, or the Japanese, were obsessed by the need to maximize their territories and militarize their boundaries, often in remote, unprofitable regions. Their actions provided the impetus for emer­ gent nation-states like China, India, and Thailand to maximize and militarize their territories. Such massive investment of state resources in these areas often contrasted markedly with the informal arrangements, multiple sovereignties, forbidden lands, and imagery of barbarian wildernesses that had characterized them in the old empires. Modern states have tended to incorporate contiguous, alien territories and peoples wherever possible, thereby blurring the practical distinction between imperi­ alism and nationalism in these areas.

At the same time, the vision and interests of the dominant power shaped the particular image and institutions of frontier integration. Indeed, the Japanese inte­ gration of Manchukuo as a national space sought to retain or reproduce the repre­ sentation of the natural frontier, as exemplified by the incorporation of the Oroqen, studied below. Further, by studying the Chinese nation-state's response to this mode of integration, in its approach to other frontier peoples and regions, we can gain a historical understanding of the spatial formation of the nation in East Asia.

If in this era imperialism was forced to adopt nationalist rhetoric and technolo­ gies to accommodate its expansionism, nationalism also had to develop other strate­ gies to deploy its territorial imperative. The impact of the new rules on latecomers to the old imperialist game, such as Germany and Japan, as well as on emergent nation-states in the twentieth century led not simply to a new language designed to conceal expansionism, but to new spatio-political forms to channel this territorial imperative. These forms, such as the "multicultural/multinational" or the "anthro­ pogenetic" nation (discussed below), were premised upon a representational princi-

1 79

180 .-> Chapter 5

pie different from that of old-style colonialism: they sought to transform the difference between "primitive" and "civilized" into a commonality of co-nationals. Three elements, not always separable, comprised these forms: the ethnological-or ethno-historical--discourse of ethnographers, historians, bureaucrats, and national­ ist intellectuals, which produced the fundamental assumptions regarding "primi­ tives" and their environment; administrative technologies to incorporate the "primitive" and the borderlands; and cultural technologies to naturalize and subjec­ tivize the claim to them among the citizens of the national core. These forms did have consequences that were different from those of old-style colonialism, but the encapsulation of "peripheral" peoples, cultures, and regions by both the Japanese and Chinese state-builders also produced the (imperialistic) domination of the periphety by the center, or, frequently, peripherialized once-autonomous regions.

Ethnology and the Oroqen in Manchukuo

The Oroqen (Elunchun in Chinese, and Oronjon or Orochon in Japanese) appear at the center of a broad ethnological discourse of Japanese racial-cultural origins in which not only professional anthropologists but self-styled folklorists, journalists, and even security officers took part. The Oroqen were a hunting tribe that lived in the forests of the Xing' an mountains in northern Manchuria. Estimates of their population over the last hundred years indicate a high of 1 8,000 in 1 895, declining to about 4,000 in 1 9 1 7 and to approximately 3,000 by the 1 930s. In the early 1 950s, their numbers stood at 2,000.2 Despite these small numbers, the works on the Oroqen in Japanese exceeded twenty, testifYing to their significance in the Japa­ nese narrative of Manchukuo.3

Before analyzing the role of the Oroqen in Japanese narratives of Manchukuo, I will attempt to extract a history of them from precisely those Chinese and Japanese sources that have framed them within their interested narratives. Before the seven­ teenth century, the Oroqen were hunters who occupied both banks of the Heilongji­ ang River. T sarist expansion into this area pushed them mostly to the southern bank of the river, and by the mid-seventeenth century they came under the control of the Qing in the Xing'an Mountains.4 In Qing times ( 1644-19 1 1 ) the Oroqen were organized into banner forces and in 1 875 they were trained in gunfire by the govern­ ment of Heilongjiang to fight bandits. They were also used to suppress the Boxers in 1 900 and the mutinies of the 1 9 1 1 Republican revolution.5 The Qing representa­ tive who dealt with them was known as the yinda or anda. He was responsible for the collection of fur as tribute to the Qing, and by the nineteenth century was noto­ rious for his cruel exploitation of the Oroqen.6

The most significant element of Oroqen history in the modern period, since the domination of Manchuria by the Russian, Chinese, and Japanese powers in the 1880s, is the rapid decline in their population as seen in the figures above. All accounts point to exploitation by the foreign powers and the Han population, who denuded the forests that were their principal source of existence, and the spread of

Imperial Nationalism and the Frontier r--J 1 8 1

opium addiction and o f diseases as the chief reasons for this decline.? Hunting was increasingly commercialized as Manchuria became settled by the Han population and the Oroqen came under the control of Han merchants, referred to in Chinese communist sources as jianshang, or dishonest merchants, merchants whose exploita­ tion had both a class and an ethnic (minzu) character.8 In rhese accounts, the mer­ chants first made "friends" with the Oroqen, giving them wine, food, and gifts. Subsequently, they trapped them in debt bondage by depressing the prices of skin and fur and depleted rhe community by depriving them of their guns-rheir chief means of livelihood-and women.9 Opium addiction played a role in the depopula­ tion and it was no coincidence that the name for opium in rheir language, honokata, was the same as for the Han people who purveyed it to them. lo

During the 1 920s, rhe warlord government of Manchuria sought to organize rhem into a border security force to fight the Russians and to serve as guides to the forests and mines. This reorganization appears to have worsened their condition, because while on the one hand rhey were forced to abandon hunting, rheir salaries as soldiers were inadequate and much of it never reached them. 1 1 However, it is not at all clear how successfully rhe warlord regime was able to implement the reorgani­ zation; many of rhe Oroqen appear to have avoided militaty service, retained their old banner structure, and continued hunting. 12 In 1 924, rhe Oroqen, led by a ban­ ner leader called Gang Tong in rhe Chinese sources, rose against the merchants, killed several dozen of them, and disappeared into rhe forests with rheir grain. The government bureau established and run for four years after rhe uprising, ostensibly to address the special problems of the Oroqen, actually rurned out to provide a way for the warlord bureaucrats and merchants to further monopolize and exploit Oro­ qen business.13

Japanese imperialism contributed to the depopulation and decline rhrough the deforestation caused by the Japanese lumber and mining industries and by the monopsonistic purchase of furs under the Manchukuo regime ( 1 931-1945). 14 The Manchukuo government also continued the practice of using the Oroqen in the border forces (shanlinduzJ, and they were forced to undergo two months of military training each year. This military training was a great hardship for rhe Oroqen because it coincided with the hunting season and contributed to a decline in their income from that source. 15 They were also forced to work as spies for rhe Manchu­ kuo government in rhe Soviet Union, although the Japanese army suspected them of counterespionage. 16 Most significantly, state intrusion in the lives of the Oroqen was much more far-reaching under Japanese occupation than it had been under the warlord regime; and ironically, rhis intrusion took place in rhe name of preserving their original culture.

The basic strategy of the Manchukuo state was to isolate and concentrate the various tribes. In 1 934, they overhauled the administrative system: Heilongjiang and Inner Mongolia were subdivided into fourteen provinces, and two of which, the Eastern Xing' an and Western Xing' an provinces, were to be the homeland of the Oroqen. When the ethnographer Akiba Takashi visited the Xing'an provinces, he

1 82 ,-....., Chapter 5

found the Oroqen to be concentrated in about fifteen camps running east-west along the Xingan range. I? Morever, their banner structure was dismantled and they were brought under the direct rule of an administration staffed by Oroqen, Han, and Japanese officials. IS

The aim of the new dispensation was to prevent the assimilation of Oroqen into the wider Han agrarian population and to restore their old modes of life by seques­ tering them. These arrangements also conformed to Manchukuo's ideology of the Concordia of Nationalities (minzu xiehe, minzoku kyiJwa), which involved organiz­ ing ethnic groups into separate collectivities. PRC researchers claim that the new dispensation was a particularly regressive step because, by the 1930s, many Oroqen had become partial agriculturists under the influence of the surrounding Han and other peoples. By forcibly moving them off farmland and forbidding the practice of agriculture and marriage with other peoples, Japanese policy must have been at the least a terribly wrenching process. 1 9 In effect, this policy not only isolated them, it sought to return them to their "primitive" status. The strategic ideology of harmony among the races thus required the state to reverse the pervasive process of Siniciza­ tion among minorities and construct "pure" races in order to implement the very program of racial harmony. But in addition to this factor and the need for spies, the incorporative technology of the Manchukuo state has to be understood in terms of a Japanese discourse of race and culture in Manchuria.

In the Japanese ethnic classifications prevalent in Manchuria, the Oroqen repre­ sented the most primitive and ancient subgroup of the Tungusic people. In this scheme, which was not without variations, the Japanese and Koreans represented the Southern Tungus; the Daurs, the Solons, the Yellow River Tungus, and the original Shandong peoples represented the Mongol Tungus; the Manchus, the Goldi (the Fishskin Tartars), represented the Manchurian Tungus; and the Oroqen represented the Siberian Tungus.20 The idea of a Tungusic or pan-North Asian people, as a great Asiatic people constructed as the mirror image of the Indo-European people, was derived from the "Ural-Altaic thesis," popular first in Europe and Russia in the nineteenth century and then in Japan by the turn of the twentieth. Fragments of language and religious practices were systematized into a theory of common racial/ ethnic origins for a vast group of peoples including the Turks, the Mongols, and the Tungus. Historian Shiratori Kurakichi appealed to the Ural-Altaic thesis as early as the 1 890s to demonstrate Japan's roots in northeast Asia even while constructing Japan's superiority over other members of this familyY

The Ural-Altaic thesis was paradigmatic ofjapanese ethnological discourse in the early twentieth century. In contrast to Western colonial anthropology, which self­ confidently took the colonized Other to be the object of its analysis, Japanese anthropology did not clearly demarcate colonial from national concerns. As Shimizu Akitoshi has suggested, Japanese ethnography emerged at a time when Japanese membership in the club of nation-states was still uncertain and Japan was itself an object of ethnographic analysis. It was perhaps due to this circumstance that despite a highly developed Tokugawa tradition of ethnography, Japanese anthropology was

Imperial Nationalism and the Frontier r--> 1 83

basically shaped by Western concerns. Although the pioneering Japanese ethnogra­ phers, among them Tsuboi Shogoro and Torii Ryiizo, did not always acknowledge this inheritance, in terms of method, classification systems, and object of analysis the research problematic was heavily indebted to European and, even more, to Russian scholarship.22 We may see in this process the nationalization of a global discourse.

The first sustained debate that fundamentally shaped Japanese anthropology was triggered by Edwin Morse's 1 877 discovery of the "Omori shell mounds," and con­ cerned the origins of the Japanese among cannibals who came from outside the islands.23 Tsuboi, Torii, and others continued to search out these origins in their researches on the Ainu of Japan and the tribes of Siberia, northeast Asia, and the South Seas. Japanese anthropology remained tied to the search for Japanese origins in "racial contact, migration and assimilation in Asia,"24 and in places as far afield as Okinawa, Hokkaido, Indonesia, Korea, and elsewhere. But notably these were also places of Japanese expansion and colonialism. Despite the diversity within it, and whatever its relationship to global systems of knowledge production, Japanese anthropology succeeded in displacing the quest for the barbarian or primitive origins of the Japanese onto zones that the state either controlled or sought to control. In this way, Japanese ethnology contributed to a peculiarly nationalist claim upon peo­ pled-places at the borders of and beyond the national territory.25

Torii, whose work tended to follow the northward expansion ofJapan, subscribed to the view that northeast Asia was the ancient meeting ground of all the Far Eastern races. Following Russian ethnic/racial categorizations, he and others believed that the indigenous inhabitants of the Siberian-Manchurian region had remained basi­ cally unchanged since "prehistoric times."26 Torii hoped to develop an integrated view of Asia with Japan at the center, and suggested that shamanism had provided a common feature and source for the indigenous religions in northeast Asia, includ­ ing those of Korea and Japan.27 But the principal architect of the Ural-A1taic theory in the Japanese context was Torii's associate and coadvocate of a Japanese field of Oriental studies (Ajia Gakkaz), the historian Shiratori Kurakichi. According to Ste­ fan Tanaka, the theory permitted Shiratori to construct a new philosophy of history that saw the A1taic peoples of Asia, especially the Mongols, as "key to the unfolding of world history."28 At the same time, by connecting the Japanese to the Turks, Tungus, and Mongols, Shiratori's version of the theory "separated Japanese essence and spirit from China."29

In Manchukuo, the theory also had the effect of furnishing Japan with a special link to and role toward the indigenous people. The notion of a common or closely related family and social structure among the Tungusic peoples was frequently invoked to suggest a unified cultural foundation for Manchukuo. Writer after writer, and not only those writing in an official or semiofficial capacity, stressed the com­ monality of the Tungusic race and the place of Manchuria as the original homeland of the Tungusic peoples.30 Given that the Japanese regarded themselves as the south­ ern branch of the Tungusic peoples, the obvious effect of this argument was, by means of a racial logic, to give Japanese rule an anthropogenetic claim in Manchuria.

1 84 ........., Chapter 5

The discursive landscape in which Japanese ethnographers elaborated their depic­ tions of peoples in Manchuria called for the imbrication of race and culture. Where the racial principle could not be stretched adequately to frame the community, an allegedly common culture was invoked as a supplement to race. The various non­ Han peoples were classified as Tungusic and their cultural practices were compared not only with each other, showing various degrees of relationship, but also with Japanese practices. For instance, rhe Koreans were said to be linguistically and cul­ turally very close to the Japanese, especially to the "ancient Japanese culture," and although rhe Chinese influence on the elite was very strong, the ordinary people had strong Tungusic traditions in their family structure and traditions. 3 1

Some scholars, such as Oyama Hiko'ichi, a professor of Jianguo University in Xinjing, focused on the gemeinschaft character of Manchu families, based upon the authority structure of the lineage, its collective traditions, and, most importantly, shamanism, which emerged as the symbol of racial-cultural unity transcending lan­ guage roots and physical type. Many studies of this practice in Manchuria were con­ ducted, comprising thousands of pages and often accompanied by detailed photographs. They depicted such forms as Siberian shamanism, Mongol Lamaist shamanism, Manchu family shamanism, professional shamanism, high and primi­ tive shamanism, female shamanism, and others. This great variety reflected the dif­ ferent levels of cultural evolution of the different peoples, but at the same time shamanism also represented the distinctiveness of the culture of northeast Asia. Indeed, the culture of Man-Mo (Manchuria and Mongolia) was said to serve as rhe point of contact berween the culture of north Asia Gapan and Korea) and that of China and southeast Asia.32

Turning specifically to the Oroqen, the definitive scholarly work was that of S. M. Shirokogoroff, Social Organization of the Northern Tungus, first published in 1 933 and translated into Japanese.33 It was the major inspiration for the ethno­ graphic work of Akamatsu Chijo and Akiba Takashi known as Manmo no minzoku to shukyo (The peoples and religion of Man-Mo). Akamatsu and Akiba were at Seoul Imperial University and had been active in research on folk religion and shamanism in Korea.34 In turn, the work of rhese rwo ethnographers became the most important reference point for writers in Manchukuo. The actual fieldwork on the Oroqen was done by Akiba Takashi in 1 935, and it is instructive to pause for a moment on the narrative structure through which he presents his materials. The diary form of Aki­ ba's account dramatizes his travel to the Oroqen camps: it is a dangerous and awe­ filled journey into a different timespace-the deprhs of the primeval Xing' an for­ ests-in search of the primitive, indeed primeval, Oroqen, the living ancestors of the Tungus peoples. He happens to travel with a Japanese forest ranger, his wife, and rheir young children, who keep rheir courage in the dangerous forests by their Christian faith. The first vision of the Oroqen appears as in a dream, when Akiba sees their campfire in rhe dim light of dawn. The mixture of awe and terror remains as he describes the blood-stained clorhes and the game of a hunter who was reputed to have also killed seven men. Everywhere he is attentive to the exotic details of

Imperial Nationalism and the Frontier r--.J 185

Oroqen mythology, customs, and personality. The romance of a journey of discov­ ery highlights the exotic quality of primitivity.

But in additon to the exotic, Akiba presents us with a complex account of the Oroqen's contemporary situation, their material life, and their relations with outsid­ ers. He declares,

While we may think of the Xing' an mountains as an enchanted fairyland, cut off from the human world, it is a place where many peoples have come into contact and a com­ posite culture has emerged. Now the Oroqen are in the process oflosing their primitiv­ ity. What the shape of their nonprimitiviry will be in the future is a major question facing all of the peoples of Man-Mo.35

Thus, in addition to the exotic quality of Oroqen primitivism, Akiba is particularly attentive to the question of a composite culture-to the way in which details of Oroqen culture, especially shamanism, are related to a wider culture of various Tun­ gus communities. The names and functions of the gods are related to the Mongol's and especially the Korean's gods; the clothes of the shaman (mukunda) are like the Daur's, his drums and bells like the Manchu's; the community deity inhabits the house of the shaman as it does the house of the Korean madang; the structure of the tent with indwelling divinity is like the Japanese jinja; and the great shamanic cere­ mony devoted to the Protector of Horses every three to five years resembles the Japanese communal fox prayer.36

To be sure, Akamatsu and Akiba's preoccupation with shamanism signaled some­ thing wider than the political, and they engaged the topic in scholarly terms that were too wide to accommodate an oven political agenda. For instance, in their view shamanism was also prevalent among the Han peoples in the Northeast, and thus it transcended the purely racial. But on closer reading it is apparent that Han shaman­ ism was considered to be a Manchu influence on the Han, first appearing among the Han bannermen or HanjunY The authors were torn between two separate con­ clusions: to the extent that they were influenced by Japanese imperialist discourse, they concluded that shamanism was distinctive to the race and culture of northeast Asia; attending to global, especially Russian, scholarship, they were forced to con­ clude that shamanism could hardly be so confined by race or area. They resolved their dilemma thus: "Shamanism has a specific, local meaning among the Nonh Asian peoples, but also a wider scientific meaning that incorporates the cultures of other Asian and non-Asian peoples."38

Another influential ethnography of the Oroqen was, however, much more clearly subordinated to the political imperatives of the state. As chief investigator of the Security Bureau of the Manchukuo General Staff, Nagata Uzumaro's researches on the Oroqen, conducted from 1 937 to 1 938, dealt, of course, with administrative and security issues. But they also went far beyond these topics to include a full­ fledged ethnography embedded within the ethnological discourse we have alluded to above. In addition to administrative history and current social and medical prob-

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lems, the ethnography includes the detailed analysis of physical type, psychological nature, social structure, customs and ceremonies, and, not least, shamanism. Sha­ manism reflects Oroqen primitivity, but is also among their most distinctive Tun­ gusic features. Indeed, Nagata cites recent Japanese research to the effect that the vety word "shaman" derives not from the Sanskrit sramana, as the standard etymol­ ogy alleged, but from the Tungus language.

Nagata also elaborates on the Oroqen's extraordinarily strong primitive sense of community cooperation (kyodoteki), egalitarianism, and respect for elders, which ironically and amazingly make them resemble the civilized peoples-doubdess the Japanese.39 At various points, he draws attention to the practices among the Oroqen that resemble those of the Japanese: the role of the women in the management of the home where the division of labor is very strict; their family structure and respect for elders; the absolute power of the family head; and their strong sense of individual honor combined with a cooperative spirit.40 And yet, of course, this urge to see the Self in the primitive Other is countered and contained by the dominant narrative of evolutionism, in which Oroqen family life is regarded as having been frozen for over two thousand years (this despite considerable discussion of historical change). Nagata writes, "we can see the true form of the life of the Tungus race only among the Oroqen, and we can imagine the lives of the ancestors of the Japanese from this."41 Japanese evolutionist discourse had mastered the trope whereby one could be advanced, but still claim the privilege of primordiality.

Nagata's ethnology is closely tied to the Japanese state program for the Oroqen. He justifies the state policy of separating and isolating the Oroqen, the ban on their practice of agriculture, the prohibition of opium, and the rejection of a "life of dependence" (on commercialized Han society) in favor of a "self-sufficient, inde­ pendent life."42 In addition to recounting the history of their exploitation by outsid­ ers, he invokes the incompatibility of modern laws with their customs and ways. He cites the case of a quarrel between two Oroqen youth over a mere mantou (steamed bread roll), which led to a brawl in which one youth killed the other. The surviving youth casually returned home and the families concluded the matter among them­ selves. But the police, exercising the law of the state, arrested the youth and charged him with murder. According to Nagata, this law of civilized society, which left the family of the killer without its breadwinner, was viewed as terrifYing by the Oroqen. Isolating the Oroqen was a means of protecting them from the ravages of modernity.

Nagata also urges isolation and the return to self-sufficiency as a way to reverse the decline in numbers of the Oroqen. As the forest disappeared and they came increasingly into contact with others, opium and new civilized (bunmeitekt) diseases, particularly eye and venereal infections, had affiicted the entire population: "Earlier the Oroqen were proud of their health and boasted that they lived in heaven. They hated the city and complained of headaches and nausea whenever they went there. Now the civilized and cultured diseases are attacking their virgin lands (shojochi) with their germs."43 Finally, Nagata reports a decline in school attendance since the establishment of Manchukuo. Before 1 93 1 , there were eighty Oroqen students

Imperial Nationalism and the Frontier .--..... 1 87

enrolled in primary school and twenty in high school. Now there were only twenty­ seven students in all. But Nagata does not apologize for this decline. He believes that the schools were ineffective and the youth learned much more from their homes in the forest environment where the elders taught the youth under a vety strict reg­ imen.44

Nagata's strategy for returning the Oroqen to the forest-their virgin lands­ recalls the representation of the forest in the Japanese historical accounts of Manchu­ ria by Inaba and others. Fujiyama Kazuo also staked the Japanese duty to preserve the forest upon a non-Chinese history of the region. The historical kingdoms and empires of Manchuria, such as the Koguryo, Bohai, Khitan, Jurchen, and Manchu, ruled communities for whom the forest was cradle, grave, and soul. But the agricul­ tural Chinese population had, in a short period, torched the primeval forests and violently forced the aboriginal peoples off their lands.45

Fujiyama derived his logic of the deep physical and spiritual influence of forests upon a nation from German romanticism, particularly Goethe, finding the strength of German character in the resilience and resources of the natural environment and German attitudes to it. He claimed to be able to identifY similar links between indig­ enous and aboriginal religion and the Manchurian forest. Manchu shrines and gravesites were surrounded by pine groves; Lamaist temples were enveloped by thick forests. Fujiyama invokes Manchu legends and myth, including the myth of Man­ chu origin in Lake Tianchi by Changbai Mountain (also claimed as the place of origin of the Korean people), where a divine maiden gave birth to Aisin Gioro after a bird placed a fruit in her mouth.46 He attributes the Manchu interdiction on the felling of trees to this spiritual connection (ignoring the economic and political dimensions of this ban)Y Among his practical projects, he advocated reforestation, botanical research, and tree-planting festivals that would take place during regular memorial services around monuments, shrines, and graves of loyal soldiers and heroes. In this way, Fujiyama sought to develop a cult of the forest with the state as guardian of its true spirit.

The representation of the sacred forest and the ethnological discourse of a com­ mon Tungusic race and culture come together in the life of the Oroqen. They emerge at this point of intersection as the embodiment of a "primitive authenticity." This authenticity was not only useful for the Manchukuo state, it shaped the realities of Oroqen life. The "authenticity" refers, of course, less to the primitive, than to the colonizer himself-to a yearning to see his true self in the primitive, through a glass darkly. As such, "primitive authenticity" was a technique that linked the self to the primitive even while it distanced itself in the security of civilized status-a technique enabled by the narrative of History.48 This technique is different from the detached gaze of the colonialist with which we are familiar from nineteenth-century North-South colonialism, and grants the colonizer a different kind of right, a right to make a claim on the basis of shared race and culture.49 It was a technique consis­ tent with the decline of imperialist justifications of alien rule and with the new administrative technologies to encapsulate alien territories and communities. The

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Oroqen were no longer primitive in the manner of an anachronism to be done away with; rather, they represented a valued part of our lost selves, to be protected and preserved. The technique grants us the sovereign's charge to protect and preserve.

That this political form did little to alleviate the exploitation of the Oroqen dur­ ing the Manchukuo years has been plain to see. Indeed, their status as authentic primitives forced a radical reorganization of their society and a forced uprooting of the people. But if this was an undeniably instrumentalist policy, the arguments pre­ sented by such state representatives as Nagata, promoting, in effect, the idea of a reservation for aboriginals, was hardly unique to Manchukuo. We can find some recognizable form of it all the way from the United States to independent India. Ethnological discourse in the era of nationalism enabled the state to make claims on alien peoples and territories by producing the latter as primordial objects of care­ taking.

The Ethnology and History of the Chinese Geo-body

The Japanese conquest of Manchuria and the mode of incorporating peripheral spaces and indigenous people discussed above fundamentally reshaped Chinese ideas, practices, and policies regarding the formation of national space. Older con­ ceptions of unwelcoming, barbarian frontier regions, whether in the Northeast, West or Southwest-and covering over half the Qing empire-were transformed, and the regions produced anew as vital national territories. Anthropology, history, and geog­ raphy, as academic disciplines and as popular discourse, became engaged in the pro­ duction of these places and people within the national narrative. In the remainder of this chapter, I fold the study of Manchuria into a discussion of the Chinese response to imperialist, particularly Japanese, penetration of the Qing imperial peripheries more generally. 50

Scholars and administrators became preoccupied with transforming the empire into the national geo-body soon after the ascendancy of the KMT in 1 927, but the process became more urgent after the Japanese invasion of 1 937. While the idea that the territory of the modern nation would be coextensive with the limits of the Qing empire was taken for granted by the nationalists, the problems of dealing with the peoples, loyalties, and powers in the vast regions of the empire turned out to be much more complex. As Fang Qiuwei put it, "historical change-the changing of space with time (shijian tong kongjian de bianhua)--demonstrates the mistake of disregarding the border regions, an enormous mistake that cannot be erased from history."51 Nation-builders enumerated and lamented the causes of the frontier regions' neglect, which had permitted imperialists to encroach upon the territory from all sides: There was no Chinese military presence in these regions and officials used to be sent there as a kind of banishment. There was no awareness or study of the peoples, customs, languages, geography, and economies of these areas. Indeed, to travel from China to Yunnan, it was best to take a boat to Vietnam and cross back into Yunnan on the French railroad; to travel to Xinjiang one had best take

Imperial Nationalism and the Frontier --' 1 89

the trans-Siberian railroad and go through Soviet territory; Tibet was most accessible via India; and so On.52 The spatial ideal of the homogeneous national territory was symbolized on the jacket of Borderlands Newsletter (Bianjiang tongxun), where a blank map of China was covered by communication lines radiating directly from Nanjing to the boundaries.

The establishment of the KMT regime led to the institutionalization of the new forms of knowledge production. In 1927, a group of prestigious scholars, closely associated with Chiang Kai-shek and influenced by the French educational model, established Academia Sinica as the premier research institution of the nation-state. 53 Designed as much to legitimate state power as to institutionalize scholarship, the institution contributed much to the production of modern knowledge for the nation. Chiang himself became acutely aware of the teaching of "Chinese History" and "Chinese Geography" as a means to produce "a citizen who loves his country more than his own life."54 KMT leader Chen Yifu wrote in his introduction to the work of noted geographer Wu Meiji that geography was none other than the mother of the nation, its politics and its livelihood. Wu himselflinked the future progress of China to the development of systematic knowledge of its geographical evolution. 55

Unlike Japan where anthropology had had a history of several decades by the 1930s, anthropology in China had barely made an appearance. But by the mid- 1930s, responding in great part to the Japanese military and discursive thrust, anthropology burgeoned and rallied to the national cause in both the academic and the political establishments. The study of the primitive peoples of the world sud­ denly became relevant to understanding and reclaiming the primitive peoples on China's peripheries who were being lured by Japanese propaganda.

The founding of anthropology in China was most closely associated with the name of Cai Yuanpei, president of Beijing Universiry and an academic trained in aesthetics and ethnology in Germany. But apart from a few courses that Cai himself offered at Beida, anthropology had no institutional presence in China until 1927, when Cai, the leading scholar responsible for the establishment of Academia Sinica, incorporated an ethnology section in its Institute of Social Sciences. 56 Cai served as director of the institution from 1928 until 1940,57 and doubtless associated the establishment of anthropology with nation building. Indeed, he chose to follow the Japanese practice of naming the subject minzuxue, translating ethno- « ethnos) with minzu and -logy « logos) with xue.58 He preferred the term to renzhongxue or ren­ leixue (also extant Japanese terms), which he believed referred to the study of the physical and mental qualities of humans as a species, or to mimuxue, which was folklore. Minzuxue was to be the branch of anthropology that compared differences in human cultures, or, in other words, cultural anthropology. 59 Note that minzu was also the term for nation or nationality, and the subliminal association of culture with nationality was unavoidable and telling.

Cai's conception of anthropology emerged in his discussion of its relation to soci­ ology. Sociology was the study of contemporary society; but it was clear that con­ temporary society could not be understood apart from its evolution, and the

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historiography of civilized society yielded a very poor understanding of its prehistori­ cal past. What was needed was anthropology in all its branches. Naturally, archaeol­ ogy was important, but so was the study of contemporary uncivilized societies (weikaihua minzu). Cai furnished several examples to show how the study of primi­ tive cultures both in and outside China could deepen the understanding of ancient Chinese practices such as totemism or matriarchy.60 At the same time, the study of primitive cultures could also help distinguish the signs of evolved civilization among the Europeans, Japanese, and Chinese.61

Cai's anthropology, still firmly in the grip of an evolutionism, was classically allo­ chronic with regard to its object of study: the primitive as a survival from another time.62 As such, at this stage-Cai lectured mostly in the 1 920s-the novel dimen­ sion of nationalist ethnology, namely the desire to produce a sense of national one­ ness, had not yet emerged with clarity. The goal was to study the non-Han peoples in order to reflect on the Han. By the mid- to late 1 930s, with the onset of the Sino­ Japanese war, anthropology in China took on a new urgency and the study of primi­ tive peoples within China was undertaken increasingly in order to make a claim upon the frontier territories that these peoples had historically occupied. In 1 934, academic anthropologists under the guidance of Cai formed the Chinese Ethnologi­ cal Association (Zhongguo minzuxuehuz), and in 1 936 launched their professional journal, Ethnological Research (Minzuxue Yanjiu jikan). Two prominent academic anthropologists, Huang Wenshan and Wei Huilin, served as its editors.63

The political concerns of this professional journal were evident in the first issue. Huang Wenshan perceived a nationalist role for anthropology that went beyond Cai's vision. To be sure, minzuxue was for Huang the science of the natural presence (ziran biaoxiang) of the lives of the people outside the civilized areas of Europe and Asia; it was the study of nonliterate cultures.64 But it was a colonial discipline for a national project.65 Citing Sun Yat-sen's Three People's Principles, Huang identified the national problem of the peripheral peoples, who, having been beguiled (youhuo) by Western influences and Oapanese) imperialism, had continuously embraced sepa­ ratist movements ([ixin yundong).66 In his survey of ethnographic research in Man­ churia, Huang discussed various works, including that of Shirokogoroff and Japanese researchers. Commenting on the extensive research of the SMR, he con­ cluded that Japanese intentions in China were long-term and sinisterP Huang, who was trained in America as a Boasian and sought to adapt ideas of cultural and histori­ cal particularism, believed that it was up to anthropologists, using the theory and practice of ethnology, to renew the belief of these peoples in the idea of zhonghua minzu or a China of different nationalities.68

But the extent to which academic ethnology, such as represented by Huang, par­ ticipated in the ethnological discourse emanating from the political center is quite remarkable. The journal Xinyaxiya, or New Asia, perhaps best exemplified such a center of discursive production. It was begun in 1 930 by Dai Jitao, a KMT leader and theorist, and one-time socialist. Dai and his group viewed the mission of the journal from a pan-Asiatic perspective and Dai was among the few Chinese leaders

Imperial Nationalism and the Frontier � 1 9 1

who believed that the Chinese had much to learn from studying Japan for its own sake, and not simply to learn about the West.

The relationship between Dai's pan-Asianism, nationalism, and the ethnological project was a complex one, as can be seen from the mission of the journal. The mission statement joined the goal of the liberation and revival of the nations of the East with the reconstruction of China and study of its border regions. "In order to reconstruct China it is necessary to develop China's border areas; in order to liberate the nationalities (minzu) of Zhonghua, it is necessary to liberate the nationalities of the East in the same stroke."69 Pan-Asianism meant a great number of things to the writers in the journal. The inspiration for the journal came from the speech on Great Asianism that Sun delivered in Japan in 1924, calling for the unity of the Asian peoples. Sun, who had acknowledged the influence of both Wilsonian and Soviet ideas of self-determination, grounded Asian unity in the common circumstance of oppression by Western imperialism, an allegedly common culture, and a common bond of race or coloredness (yousede minzu).?o Similarly, the many essays promoting this Asianism ranged from careful studies of anti-imperialism in India or Vietnam to fanciful narratives of the shared cultural and racial origins of the various Asian societies, to the celebration of the anti-imperialist, racial fraternity with the Chinese overseas.

The nationalist interest of the journal was evident in two ways. First was the manner in which several of the framing essays, including Sun's own, depicted Chi­ nese ideals or ideas, such as wangdao (the "kingly way") or the Three People's Princi­ ples, as the guiding means of saving or liberating the rest of Asia.?! Second, and not dissimilar to the Japanese case, pan-Asianism furnished a framework to incorporate the peripheral peoples of the borderlands into the newly territorialized nation-state in a way that utilized the vagueness of the discourse. Early Chinese nationalism, as during the Republican revolution of 19 1 1 , was built securely upon global, social Darwinist ideas of a racially cohesive nation that would triumph over inferior and mixed races that lacked history; by the 1920s, however, nationalism drew upon the new global discourse, which reflected an unstable mix of racialist ideas and an anti­ imperialism that validated a unity based upon a shared culture and history (of anti­ imperialism). This new nationalism ironically needed more than ever a wider trans­ national redemptive model-redeeming ancient Asiatic goals-to ground its author­ ity.72 At the same time, however, the nation-state could deploy incorporative notions of shared history and culture (avoiding oven reference to race) among the "primitive peoples" without abandoning the premise of assimilation to create the cohesive nation.

This volatile combination of different political principles underlying the national idea fed an ethnological discourse that functioned to produce the "border areas" and "frontier peoples" as a marked but inalienable part of the nation. By supplement­ ing--or even displacing-race with culture, nationalists could more easily justifY the incorporation of these people and territories. Not only did such a discourse under­ gird the ideas of professional anthropologists like Huang Wenshan, but it informed

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the various journals about the border regions that proliferated in the 1 930s, such as Bianzheng gonglun (Frontier Affairs), Yu gong ( Tribute to Yu), and the more popularly oriented Bianjiang tongxun (Borders Newsletter) or Zhibian Yuekan (Frontier Settle­ ment Monthly) .

These writings were rife with the tension between extending a measure of respect for the cultures of fellow Asiatics within China's boundaries on the one hand, and assimilation on the other. A prolific reporter of the Northwest, Ma Hongtian, tended towards the aggressively assimilationist strategy, although even he could be disarmingly naive about this project. In his discussion of the founding of the China Border Regions Institute, a group established in Nanjing to study the problems of border areas and which included many of the editors and contributors to New Asia, Ma commented that the original name chosen for the institute was the China Settle­ ment and Colonization Institute (Zhongguo Tuozhisuo).

[The Chinese character] tuo suggested opening up, and zhi, cultivation. Since both words suggested something natural, it was felt that it would be a good name. But then some feared that this name would lead to misunderstanding among the local peoples of these areas, who might resist. So it was decided that the name be changed to the China Border Regions Institute,73

But despite the change of nomenclature, Ma saw the Northwest as a land of "des­ olation and wilderness" that would have to be colonized by the Han people, who could bring progress to the area and also relieve the problem of overpopulation in the hinterland of China. For Ma, the Tibetans, Mongols, and other primitive peo­ ples had "not been able to escape a life from antiquity and the Middle Ages; they are so backward that they shame us Chinese."74 He believed that the policy of improving their lives had not been successful in the past because only vagrants, sol­ diers, and bandits had been sent to these peripheries. He urged that

solid, honest working families and enterprising people be sent to plan for progress. Up until now, only bad types have gone over there and have cheated and exploited the border peoples, who have resisted them. If we send good people to these regions and educate the border peoples, we can reform their old customs and restore their basic nature (foxing benxing). We love the people of the Northwest and want to benefit them. We also want to solve our internal and external problems; we hope our brothers (tongbao) will understand."

Indeed, the contradictions were apparent at the very heights of the KMT regime. Although the Republic of 1 9 1 2 was founded upon the unity of China as a Republic of Five Peoples, the KMT abandoned the commitment to the autonomy of the "five nationalities" soon after the outbreak of the Sino-Japanese War. In 1 939, a KMT ordinance asserted that "in our country, the racial, cultural, and blood fusion (hunhe) among different groups has long been completed and should not be arbi­ trarily analyzed."76 In 1 943, Chiang Kai-shek declared in China's Destiny that "the

Imperial Nationalism and the Frontier r--> 1 93

Chunghua nation . . . has grown by the gradual amalgamation of various stocks into a harmonious and organic whole."77 By the 1 947 edition, the idea had been added that these various stocks were "originally of one race and lineage" and that "the distinction berween the five stocks is territorial as well as religious, but not ethnolog­ ical."78 Certainly, KMT military administration in these regions tried to assimilate (tonghua) the "frontier peoples" by Sinicizing language, customs, and even clothing and hairsryles.79 However, even in the Southwest, where the KMT was headquar­ tered during the war, the practical policies of nation building and assimilation did not succeed in Sinicization, but rather in forcing the people back into the poorer lands.80 Owen Lattimore, who served as personal advisor to Chiang for over a year from 1 94 1 , was severely critical of the "frontier policy," but his advice was roundly ignored.8 1 The fuller integration of these vast peripheries would have to await the PRe, although here too the process was hardly without tensions.

Among professional anthropologists there was some difference regarding technol­ ogies of incorporation. An associate editor of Ethnological Research, Wei Huilin, rec­ ommending a posrwar policy for the nationalist government toward the border regions and cultures in 1 944, revealed a most liberal position.82 He proposed revis­ ing the assimilationist tonghua policy to a more multicultural ronghe one. He advo­ cated regional autonomy and self-government, a dual-language policy, respect for the culture or region's original nature (yuanshi tezhz), and the pursuit of industrial and immigration policies in the area for the benefit of the region, among other mea­ sures.83 By and large, however, such policy prescriptions did not appear frequently in Ethnological Research, and a policy essay from 1 948, by Ma Zhangshou, appeared to fully endorse the project of assimilation. Ma's position contrasts in almost every respect with Wei Huilin's. Ma recommends the deployment of the military capacities of the border areas for the sake of national defense (bianjiang wuli de guofonghua); the rapid assimilation of the minorities (who, he believes, welcome assimilation); the exclusive implementation of the Chinese national language in education and government; and a rational, uniform bureaucratic structure, or in other words a strong state presence.84 Huang Wenshan too backed the policy of "assimilating (ton­ ghua) the backward peoples (qianhua minzu) with the relatively advanced Han peo­ ples," but, aware of the sensitivities in this regard, he called for each culture to absorb Han elements "at its own level"(sic).85

We need to grasp the importance of both the theory and practice of frontier incorporation. Given the imperialist connotations of the idea of race, there was a transition, however complex, to the "culture" idea in the understanding of the national communiry. This transition should not be dismissed as merely rhetorical, since it would produce changes in assumptions and expectations of citizenship rights over the long term.86 The Chinese national project (like the Japanese imperial proj­ ect) would have to diminish the difference berween the dominant population and the indigenous or ethnic populations so that they could all be seen to belong to the same national communiry. But the transition did not immediately affect the practi­ cal efforts to produce a homogenized nation by military-administrative and other

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nonvoluntary means of incorporation. Where Japanese expansionism had used both cultural pan-Asian ism and the common origins/race ideas of the Ural-Altaic theory to incorporate the lesser Others, a Chinese theory of incorporation was still at the experimental stage before the war. When it did emerge more fully, the narrative was put together from the vast storehouse of Chinese historiography, and anthropolo­ gists and other social scientists came to locate their understandings of culture within this historical narrative.

The only major Chinese ethnographic study of Manchuria before 1 945 dealt with a Tungusic people along the rivers of northern Manchuria called the Goldi, known in China since the end of the nineteenth century as the Hezhezu, and by Westerners as the Fishskin Tartars. The study was conducted by Ling Chunsheng, who had been trained at the Universiry of Paris and served as the head of the ethnol­ ogy section of Academia Sinica's History and Philology InstituteY Undertaken in 1 930 but published in 1 934, the study represented a model for ethnographic research and writing in the profession. Although Shirokogoroff had reported in 1 9 1 5 that there were 1 0,000 Hezhezu in Siberia and 8,000 in Manchuria, and that their numbers had declined by 25 percent since 1 897, Ling could only find about 1 ,200 Hezhe individuals scattered along the Sungari River in the 1 930s.88 Ling's analysis of the decline does not sound the note of pretentious paternalism that we found in Nagata with regard to the Oroqen. Nor does he sound particularly sympa­ thetic. He declares that the Hezhezu have no discipline and are promiscuous and unhygienic. They squander their money on drink and opium in which even the women and children indulge. They have a high child mortality rate, and since many of their women are married to the Han, the procreative level of the people has pre­ sumably declined.89

The most striking aspect of the study is the extensive historical analysis that frames the ethnography. The history draws from classical Chinese texts, but also refers to contemporary historical research and controversies. Ling denies the claim of the nineteenth-century German Volksgeist scholar Heyman Steinthal that anthro­ pology is the study of a people without history. A people, he argues, do not live apart from neighbors, and if the culture of the neighbor is high and literate, then the scholar can find some fragments of their history in the neighbor's.9o Ling seeks to understand the Hezhezu in the context of Chinese and Tungus historical rela­ tions, and his ethnological conclusions are significantly driven by the historical nar­ rative he constructs.

Ling's immediate goal is to distinguish the Donghu of the ancient Chinese texts from the Tungus. He attributes the mistaken conflation of the two to Western Sinol­ ogists and takes on a number of them, from Abel Remusat to Otto Franke, to Shiro­ kogoroff. More importantly, he challenges the Japanese scholars, Shiratori and Torii.91 But despite the length and complexity of these arguments, what impresses the present-day reader of this debate is the utterly fragmentary and inconclusive nature of the textual evidence that Ling and the Japanese scholars cite from the ancient Chinese historical records. Huang Wenshan, although committed to histori-

Imperial Nationalism and the Frontier ,--..., 195

cal particularism, had once admonished scholars to eschew dubious historical allu­ sions and promote ethnographic research.92 But the actual ethnographic tradition continued to rely heavily on history in the representation of the "primitive peo­ ples."93 One suspects that other issues were involved in the convoluted and passion­ ate debate as to whether the Donghu are the same as the Tungus. Indeed, Ling seeks to distinguish the Donghu from the Tungus for the same reason, perhaps, that Shira­ tori sought to conflate them. By identifYing the Donghu and the Xiongnu with the Tungus (who according to Ling appear later in the Northeast), Shiratori could pre­ sumably show that the Tungus were continuously dominant in the Northeast.94

Ling's argument proceeds by exploding several other myths as well. He follows the new research of historians like Gu Jiegang and Feng Jiasheng, who deny that the Chinese have a single origin.95 Evidence shows that the Shang and the Zhou had different ancestors, and the idea that the Shang came from the west was merely a Jesuit myth. The Shang were really among the autochthonous eastern people that included the Hui and the Mo of Manchuria and the Koryo of the Korean Peninsula. Here he attacks Torii, who in 1 9 1 5 declared the Hui, Mo, and Koryo to be Tungus. Rather, these were the ancient Asians (guyazhouren) who lived in Manchuria, Korea, and the Bohai Bay area or in mainland northeast Asia (excluding therefore the Japa­ nese archipelago), and were all one people and covered by the ancient appellation Dongyi.96 The Tungus came from elsewhere.97 The Chinese people call themselves the descendants of Huangdi or the Yellow Emperor, but they do not know that Huangdi was also a Dongyi. The true Chinese people who created Chinese culture in pre-Shang times were the people who lived in the east and were the ones whom the Zhou called the eastern barbarians, or Dongyi. In this way, Ling excludes the Tungus and connects the origins of Chinese culture to the northeastern region.98

Ling's ultimate argument depended not on an overt notion of racial unity or commonality among the peoples in China, but rather on the idea of an evolving historical culture that was compatible with both anti-imperialism and pan-Asianism as much as with Anglo-American ideals. It presented nationalists with an alternative to the history of China as a preconstituted unity. The most articulate statement of this perspective that I have found was by Yao Congwu, a historian renowned for his work on the Chinese Northeast. Yao, who had studied in Germany, presented his views in a series of lectures to the Society of the Friends of the United Nation in Taipei in 1947 (lianheguo tongzhihuz), even though the idea appears to have been around for a couple of decades.99 Thus, his ideas are also significant as a justification of the principle underlying Chinese nationhood in the late Republic, and are consis­ tent with the new principle of nationhood attending the rise of the United States and the defeat of racist nationalism in World War II. Indeed, Yao's interpretation of the evolving history of China as a cultural unity is reminiscent of the American "melting pot," an expression explicitly used by Chiang Kai-shek in China's Des­ tiny. lOo

According to Yao, the modern Chinese nation (zhonghua minzu) should not be thought of as a racial nation or the territory of a single nationality. Rather, it was

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the cultural unity of various tributary cultures of the minorities, which could be subsumed under the rubric of "The Central Plains Confucian Culture of the Great Unity" (zhongyuan rujiao datong wenhua), or Great Unity for short. Confucianism had the ability to civilize and induce the voluntary absorption of peripheral peoples because of its universal acceptance of outsiders. Indeed, according to Yao, even such stalwart Chinese dynasties as the Ming and the southern Song could not be consid­ ered representative of the culture of Great Unity, precisely because they emphasized Han nationalism. The Qin-Han, the Mongols, and the Manchus were more pure expressions of this unity, since their own traditions were absorbed by the evolving culture.

Yao's narrative was premised upon a core territorial space shaping this culture­ the central plain. History became closely intertwined with geography as the new authority of spatial knowledge. I have alluded to the geography that linked the rivers and mountains of Manchuria to those of the mainland, and Wu Shangquan's claim that the Northeast had been a part of the "nine zhou" since the time of the Yellow Emperor (Huangdi, 2,698 B.C.) . This position was consistent with Chiang Kai­ shek's view that the physical configuration of mountains and rivers, including the Pamir Plateau and the Amur River valley, formed one integral and inseparable sys­ tem.lOl But the principal physiographical factor shaping the culture of the Chinese nationality (zhongguo minzu), according to professional geographers of the time, was the central plain (zhongyuan), the birthplace of the Han. The Chinese national­ ity-or even its principal constituent, the Han-ought not to be seen as a blood group, but as a cultural formation that had been historically assimilating a variety of other races such as the Tungus, the Mongols, and the Tibetans. The primaty force behind this continuing formation was the environment of the great plain and its rivers, which nourished a peace-loving agricultural people forced by political and economic circumstances to spread outward, to the south, northwest, and northeast, thus either absorbing other people or pushing them to the mountains. 102

It was from this perspective that Zhang Qiyun declared that Manchuria had long represented the natural (tianliu) granaries and lifeline (shengmingxian) of north China, an argument that was remarkably parallel to the Japanese "lifeline" argu­ ment. 103 Moreover, just as Japanese ideologues denied the Chinese a sense of territo­ rial nationhood, geographer Wu Shangquan believed that the indigenous inhabitants had no sense of territorial belonging, since they were nomadic, lacked a literate culture, and identified only with a "banner." The Tungus, he states, started to become a nation only after contact with the Han. But by that time they had already become Sinicized and the region thoroughly integrated with China. The true national subject is presented as a spatial formation, but it nonetheless completes Yao's theory of a cultural nation by sanctioning assimilation as the historical destiny of the people surrounding it. 104

Yao's historical narrative also drew from the ideas of his German mentor, the Sinologist Otto Franke, and his son Wolfgang Franke. But his ingenuity is evident when the narrative is placed in the context of the extant historiography of China's

Imperial Nationalism and the Frontier ,--..J 197

general history (tongsht). Yao was able to resolve the narratological problems faced by such writers as Fu Sinian and Lei Haizong (as well as the Japanese historian Fu was responding to, Kuwabara Jitsuzo) in one fell stroke.105 Fu and Lei had developed their histories of China as the history of the Han race (even as late as 1 937); when faced with the glories of the non-Han dynasties, they were often forced to elaborate textual strategies that would allow them to smooth over the narrative impediment. lOG

Instead, Yao was able to constitute the history of China as a seeded geo-body: an expanding, absorbing subject that could still acknowledge contributions of other people. While this cultural narrative was compatible with Chiang Kai-shek's formu­ lation of an "enduring and all-embracing culture," by 1 947 Chiang had added that a common ancestry "can be traced as far back as to Huang-ti." 107 Perhaps race was still a supplement to culture.

For anthropologists like Ling, the narrative of the Central Plains Confucian Cul­ ture of Great Uniry addresses the dilemma outlined above: it permits the idea of contributions from different historical sources, but at the same time directs these contributions into the overarching Greater Confucian Unity. Thus one could have incorporation and at the same time show respect for different peoples' histories in China. The important device enabling this strategy is the notion of "historical assim­ ilation." Confucianism engaged in a civilizing project; because it offered a higher ideal, it historically attracted lesser peoples to assimilate voluntarily. The task of the anthropologist in this regard was to show how, despite their wholeness as peoples, these groups had historically assimilated various Chinese practices and traits. 108

In the ethnography itself, the anthropologist took great care to show the assimila­ tion of Chinese practices among the neighboring peoples. In the folktales of the Hezhezu, for instance, the storytelling methods were like those in north and south China, where both singing and talking without accompaniment were practiced. Ling writes that "since they live within China's borders their relations with the Chinese are close . . . and they have mostly absorbed Chinese culture through the Man­ chus."lo9 Ling also speculates that since some of the stories and practices that show a commonality with Chinese stories (such as those involving fox fairies) may be found in Chinese histories as well as among the Chinese people (minjian), it is possi­ ble that their stories emerged from the "womb" (tat) of Chinese culture. I 1 0 The fox fairy stories were also precisely the ones that Japanese ethnographers used to draw links to the Tungus. Indeed, the procedure of exposing connections between the cultural practices of different peoples was, as we have seen, a common Japanese prac­ tice. Whereas in the Japanese case it revealed an allegedly primordial connection, in the Chinese, the alleged linkage revealed a process of voluntary absorption of Chi­ nese culture since ancient times.

Whence the importance of culture? Culture, expressed in cultural nationality, introduced an element of porousness, voluntarism, and volition that gained impor­ tance because it was tied to a global discourse of nationaliry rights. Yao's formula­ tion, made in the context of the Friends of the United Nation, ensured the compatibility of his narrative with the organization's purpose. Many of the scholars,

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especially the anthropologists we have considered, were educated in the metropoli­ tan centers of the West and accepted the premise that the objects of their study were culturally bounded communities. What distinguished these anthropologists from a Boas or a Radcliffe Brown was their perception that the ultimate "culture area" that shaped these communities happened to be coextensive with the national geo-body. This discourse presumed rwo levels of culture: one was that of the individual nation­ alities, whether these be small, such as the Goldi or the Yi, or numerous, such as Tibetans or Mongols; the other, a wider, even civilizational conception covering the nation-state and expressed in the nomenclature of zhonghua minzu. In a way, the historians had reconstructed an old Confucian civilizing discourse (again, not with­ out interactions with global, especially Germanic, Sinology) for the purposes of the modern territorial nation-state. The parallel berween this civilizing strategy and kyoka, like the parallel berween Japanese and Chinese pan-Asianism--of New Asia, for instance-suggests a repertoire of strategies that may be classified in the East Asian modern.

Finally, the granting of a measure of rhetorical autonomy to national cultures was necessitated by the reality of many antigovernment movements with nationalistic aspirations, produced at least in part by the spreading ideology of nationality rights. Soon after the establishment of the Republic the Mongols had claimed indepen­ dence, based on the idea that their relation with the last Manchu empire-the pure embodiment of the Great Unity-had been a relationship of ritual suzerainty within a Central Asian empire, and not a submission to the sovereignty of China. I I I During the Republic, wars, uprisings, movements, or incidents occurred in virtually evety part of what was Qing central Asia and the Southwest.1 12 From the perspective of the peripheries, the narrative of the Great Confucian Unity must have still sounded a great deal like subjugation, since the practical problem of assimilation and what the "frontier peoples" actually felt and wanted, remained.

Thus, while it was important to educate the indigenous peoples in the ways of the Chinese nation, in the meanwhile, nationalists had to develop technologies of territorial incorporation that could bypass the will of the peoples in these territories. One such means was evident in the strategy of journals like New Asia, which gave new meaning to the peripheries. The goal was to invest these territories with a cer­ tain cultural and psychic density in the landscape of the national imaginary and thus produce the geo-body within the subjectivity of the citizen inside China proper (neidz). l l 3 These modes of incorporation did not involve construing the local peoples as embodying authenticity, at least not at this time. Rather, they represented an institutional effort by nationalists to create the cultural infrastructure for such an imaginative cathexis.

The building of this infrastructure could be divided, according to Fang Qiuwei, into rwo parts. First is the development of scholarly and research enterprises­ particularly by agencies like Academia Sinica-to enhance knowledge of the history, people, and resources of the regions. Second, Fang calls for a wider, more popular mode of dissemination designed to stimulate interest in and feelings for these spaces.

Imperial Nationalism and the Frontier ,--, 1 99

Textbooks at every level of the school system were required to contain materials about the problems of the border regions, and Fang encourages the development of popular media, such as the cinema and slide shows, with the customs and conditions of the local people as the subject matter. I 14

In the third volume of New Asia, editorial commentary called upon readers to transform their view of the peripheries from the cliched imagery of desolation to an appreciation of their "limitless mysteries" and "inexhaustible treasures." It called for photographs of the landscapes and peoples of those regions, so that readers could become more familiar with them. 1 15 Apart from the many ethnographic and descrip­ tive essays that already filled its pages, the journal called for a special rype of fiction writing not found elsewhere, concerned with recording the customs of the peripher­ ies or travels to Asian lands: "What we need is the 'travelog-ization of fiction' (youji­ huade xiaoshuo) or 'the fictionalization of travel writing' (xiaoshuohuade youjZ) ." 1 16

Although some readers were mystified by this new genre, there was no shortage of the kind of writing and photography that the editors desired. I II

Take, for instance, the travel diary of a journey through Guizhou undertaken by a team from the biology department of Sun Yat-sen Universiry in Canton (of which Dai Jitao was the president). Melding nature and culture, the travelogue recorded ethnographic and botanical details of this frontier region. It compared the physical resources and social customs of Guizhou and the team's native Guangdong, noting in particular the extent of Sinicization among Guizhou's many non-Han groups. Vaguely reminiscent of Akiba's account, the travelogue mixed the exotic with the recognizable in a way that gave the region its unique place within the national land­ scape. And not least, it was animated by the drama and adventures of journeying through bandit-infested forests. I IB This was perhaps the kind of personal investment in the production of the geo-body that the editors desired.

The moral authority of new nation-states has often been built upon the distinction between "imperialism" and "nationalism" as discrete and oppositional forces repre­ senting "alien rule by conquerors" versus "self-rule." While acknowledging the his­ torical role that nationalism has played in opposition to imperialism, it is just as important to reveal the territorial imperative underlying the modern state form com­ mon to both. Nowhere is this more visible than in the frontiers and borderlands and the fate of peoples who inhabit them.

In East Asia, as in many other parts of the world, these regions and their inhabi­ tants typically became subject to the modern state's program of territorial adminis­ tration and surveillance. They were brought under the jurisdiction of civil, military, or special administration, and were integrated into the state by modern means of communication and institutions of survey, classification, enumeration, education, and other forms of governmentaliry. But because territorial incorporation was a response to or simultaneous with their emergence as contested borderlands, these regions were transformed from dark frontiers into hot spots. They became political

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spaces where the effort to invest sovereignty and defend it was most densely concen­ trated.

At the same time, the circumstances under which the state sought to bring these regions and people under its control reproduced their subordination. The relatively disadvantaged indigenous or local populations were subject to the practically assimi­ lative, exploitative, and imperialistic attitudes of the dominant group, whether the Japanese in Manchukuo or the Han Chinese in the peripheries. Despite the tacit promise contained in the concept of nationality, incorporation often confronted them directly with new conditions of inequality and endangerment.

Although the logic of frontier transformation has systemic features, each place, of course, is distinctive, and none more so than Manchuria. We have described its complexity in the "frontier as reservoir" formulation. The Japanese, who had extended the territorial basis of their control through the railroad even before creat­ ing Manchukuo, sought to conserve the spatial image of the area as a nonagricultural frontier-a virginal forest land, a frontier of the modern-at the vety heart of the national imaginary. Such an imaginary also well suited the Concordia doctrine of equal nationality rights, enabling them to ignore the numerical preponderance of the Chinese and the reality of Japanese control. At the same time, the discourse of the primitive, even primordial authenticity of the Oroqen enabled a technology of cultural investment among Japanese that tied Manchukuo back to Japan. The authenticity of Manchukuo as a frontier nation was produced in a way that required Japanese custodianship.

After 1 93 1 , the Chinese nationalists, of course, no longer had the political capac­ ity to institutionalize the national imaginaty of the Northeast within Manchuria. Instead, I have considered the intertwined historical, ethnographic, and geographical narrative transfiguring the Qing frontier regions and peoples into a national space. Manchuria was understood as the original homeland of the Chinese and as the natu­ ral extension, outlet, and lifeline for Chinese agricultural society. These ideas were developed in tandem with a narrative in which the assimilation of frontier peoples by a civilizing Confucianism became their historical destiny. In the next chapter we will see how Shanding sought to integrate the distinctiveness of the region with agrarianism and popular Chinese values.

Although the civilizing narrative was developed out of the resources of Chinese historiography, it was a response to Japanese modes of claiming territories and peo­ ple, and both understandings were conditioned by globally derived knowledge of such people and spaces. The new anthropology, geography, or progressive histoty had vast and varied epistemological effects, but this knowledge was also mobilized for the nation, often through representations of a distinctive space or culture area. Ancestral shamanism or the folkways of agrarian civilization, for instance, came to identify and symbolize the authenticity of culture.

These cultural projects also sought to produce the frontier anew within the national imaginary. Japanese and Chinese citizens would have to learn to see these contested territories as inalienable parts of their national being. The technique of

Imperial Nationalism and the Frontier r--J 201

"primitive authenticity" and the cultural investment of the border landscape pro­ duced a psychic value for these areas that continues to have important consequences. The relentless drive to extend, "stabilize," and militarize modern state boundaries in these remote, often unprofitable regions entails massive investments of state resources, as for instance in Xinjiang or Tibet (or Kashmir) . 1 19 Ironically, not only do the projected economic gains from these investments frequently go unrealized, but the strategic defensive considerations driving border buildup between states are governed by a mutually reflexive and self-perpetuating process. In other words, the impact of territorial loss in these frontier zones is often not principally economic but psychic. The cost of allaying these psychic fears, which in this recursive mode actu­ ally amounts to feeding them, is not only high economically and militarily, but con­ tinues to have human and cultural consequences for the peoples who live in these peripheries.

And what of the "primitive," who has appeared in this chapter only as the effect of another's narrative strategy and policy? To be sure, there are some accounts remarkable for their sympathy and understanding.l 2O At the same time, there is no denying that our historical knowledge of them is inevitably conditioned by the larger forces of state building and incorporation. I have pointed to a difference between the Japanese and the Chinese modes of incorporation. The romanticization of the authentic primitive in the manner of the Japanese attitude toward the Oroqen­ which also appears, for instance, among the French avant-garde in relation to Mri­ cans-appears, with a few notable exceptions, to be absent in Republican China. 12 1 Revealingly, this romanticization begins to appear with the consolidation of state power in the Chinese periphery in the writings and films about the primitive begin­ ning in the 1 960s. In this context, we will touch upon the Oroqen stories of Zheng Wanlong in the next chapter. The trend gets fully underway in the spate of writing and films after the ravages of the Cultural Revolution ( 1966-1976), when the prim­ itive is depicted as having a purity that is beyond, or held hostage by, the horrors of modern totalitarianism. 122 Interestingly, this is also the period when the "primitives" themselves become incorporated as citizens and try (against considerable odds) to take advantage of the rights of citizenship promised by the new political forms. Thus it is that the voice of the primitive is heard as the cry of our redemption, but only at the moment of her disappearance.

Notes

1 . See chap. 1 , n. 38. 2. EfB, 3. 3. Nagata Uzumaro, Manshu ni okeru Oronjon no kenkyu (Studies of the Oroqen in

Manchuria), vo!' 1 (Shinkyo: Chianbu Samboshi chosaka [Investigative Division of the Security Bureau of the General Staff] , 1939), 89-9 1 , and Sasaki Toru, "Nihon ni okeru Oro­ chon in kansuru minwkugakuteki hokoku no hikaku kenkyu-'Orochon no jisso' 0 choshin to shite" (A comparative study of Japanese ethnological reports regarding the Orochon, with

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particular reference to "The Real Facts about the Orochon"), Hokkaidoritsu Hoppo Minzoku Hakubutsu Kenkyu kiyo 3 ( 1994): 94.

4. Lu Kuangbin, Han Youfeng, and Du Yongji, eds., Elunchunzu sishinian, 1953-1993 (Forty years of the Oroqen nationality) (Beijing: Zhongyang minzu daxue chubanshe, 1994), 6-8.

5. Nagata, Manshii ni okeru Oronjon no ken/ryii, 8-10. 6. Lu, Han, and Du, Elunchunzu sishinian, 7, 1 1-12. 7. EJB, 4; Akamatsu Chijo and Akiba Takashi, Manmo no minzoku to shii/ryo (Peoples

and religions of Manchuria and Mongolia) (Tokyo: n.p., 1939), 90, 97. 8 . EJB, 93-95. 9. Lu, Han, and Du, Elunchunzu sishinian, 1 2-13.

1 0. Akamatsu and Akiba, Manmo no minzoku to shii/ryo, 96-97. 1 1 . EJB, 8 1-85. 1 2. EJB, 84. 13 . EJB, 95-97; Lu, Han, and Du, Elunchunzu sishinian, 1 2-14, 26-27. 14. EJB, 1 28. 1 5 . EJB, 1 26-28. 16. Nakao Katsumi, "Shokuminchishugi to Nihon minzokugaku," Chiigoku-Shakai to

Bunka 8 Gune 1 993): 234-35, and Sasaki, "Nihon ni okeru Orochon in kansuru minzokuga­ kuteki hokoku no hikaku kenkyu," 1 23-25.

17. Akamatsu and Akiba, Manmo no minzoku to shii/ryo, 1 02. 18. EJB, 1 2 1-24. 19. Lu, Han, and Du, Elunchunzu sishinian, 9-10. 20. Nagata, Manshii ni okeru Oronjon no ken/ryii, 4. 2 1 . See Otsuka Kazuyoshi, "Shiberia-Nihon ni okeru minzoku kenkyu," in Nihon min­

zokugaku no genzai, ed. Joseph Kriner (Tokyo: Shin'yosha, 1996); Kawamura Minato, "Dai­ toa minzokugaku " no /ryojitsu (The truths and falsehoods of "Great East Asian folklore") (Tokyo: Kodansha, 1 996), 76; Hyung-il Pai, "Japanese Anthropology and the Discovery of Prehistoric 'Korea,' '' Journal of East Asian Archaeology 1 ( 1999): 366; and Tanaka, Japan s Orient, 84-93.

22. Akitoshi Shimizu, "Colonialism and the Development of Modern Anthropology in Japan," in Anthropology and Colonialism in Asia and Oceania, ed. Jan van Bremen and Aki­ toshi Shimizu (Surrey, England: Curzon Press, 1999), 125-26; Tessa Morris-Suzuki, "Through Ethnographic Eyes" (unpublished paper, n.d.), 1 1-12; and Paul Barclay, "A Tale of Two Meiji Ethnologists: Ino Kanori and Torii Ryuzo in Taiwan" (paper presented to the Associa­ tion of Asian Studies, San Diego, Calif., 2000, 8-9). See also Paul Barclay, "An Historian among the Anthropologists: Ino Kanori and the Legacy of Japanese Ethnography in Taiwan," Japanese Studies 21 (200 1): 1 17-37.

23. Shimizu, "Colonialism and the Development of Modern Anthropology in Japan," 1 22-25.

24. Barclay, "Tale of Two Meiji Ethnologists," 8. 25. However, the "native ethnology" ofYanagita Kunio and others, which has been iden­

tified with a specific concern with the question of origins and tradition within Japan, cannot be confined to this formulation. As Kawamura Minato has demonstrated, despite the official stance of this movement and Yanagita himself, there were plentiful links between "native" ethnology and colonial, and even officially sponsored, ethnography. By the time of the Pacific

Imperial Nationalism and the Frontier ,--...., 203

War, and perhaps even before, a far-flung network of researchers linked the peripheries of the empire to Yanagita's research center in Tokyo. Moreover, the research in these areas was not really for the self-understanding of the indigenous culture, as Yanagita had stressed for Japan itself. Rather, these cultures came to be judged by how dose they were to Japanese culture. See Kawamura, "Daitoa minzokugaku " no kyojitsu, 1 0-1 1 , 74-85.

26. Pai, "Japanese Anthropology and the Discovery of Prehistoric 'Korea,' '' 355, and Morris-Suzuki, "Through Ethnographic Eyes."

27. Allen, "Northeast Asia Centered around Korea," 795; Shimizu, "Colonialism and the Development of Modern Anthropology in Japan," 1 30-33; Otsuka, "Shiberia"; and Sasaki, "Nihon ni okeru Orochon in kansuru minwkugakuteki hokoku no hikaku kenkyu."

28. Tanaka, Japan s Orient, 88. 29. Tanaka, Japan s Orient, 88-93. For details of the "Ural-Altaic hypothesis" in the

nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, and a devastating critique of its assumed relation­ ships between linguistic and racial origins, see S. M. Shirokogoroff, "Ethnological and Lin­ guistic Aspects of the Ural-Altaic Hypothesis," Qinghua Xuebao ( Tsinghua Journal) 6, no. 3 (193 1): 199-396. Shirokogoroff tellingly remarks how the centraliry of this whole discussion in Japan diverted attention from another source of the Japanese lexic complex, the Chinese language (389). It is evident that the Japanese researchers in Manchuria who so admired Shir­ okogoroff were ignorant of, or chose to ignore, this piece. Incidentally, the idea of Japanese and Korean descent from ancestors in Manchuria persisted. As recently as 1964, Egami Namio sought to demonstrate that horsemen from northeast Asia (by way of Korea), related to the Koguryo and Donghu, conquered Japan, spread their culture, and unified the state; see "The Formation of the People and the Origin of the State in Japan," Memoirs of the Research Department of the loyo Bunko, no. 23 ( 1 964): 49-50.

30. Fukunaga Tadashi, Mamhukoku no minzoku mondai (The nationaliry question of Manchukuo) (Shinkyo: Mansho Tomoyamabo, 1 944), 60-65.

3 1 . Fukunaga, Mamhukoku no minzoku mondai, 58-60. In Korea the Ural-Altaic thesis may have acquired even greater power as the foundation of a national myth. Ch'oe Namson, who taught in Manchukuo's Jianguo Universiry, also developed his ideas about a "northeast Asian cultural sphere" from notions of a common Altaic language and the practice of shaman­ ism (see below). Whereas most Japanese accounts stressed Korean subordination to Manchu­ ria or Japan within this northeast Asian sphere, Korean, and especially Ch'oe's, narrative located Korea at the center, and thus as the leader of a tradition that was independent of both the Chinese and Indo-European traditions. See Allen, "Northeast Asia Centered around Korea," 788, 800-803, and Roger L. Janelli, "The Origins of Korean Folklore Scholarship," Journal of American Folklore 99 ( 1 986): 31-32. Together with some Japanese ethnographers in Korea, Korean folklorists distinguished the "northern" shamanism associated with the cul­ ture of pastoral and hunting societies of the Northeast from the "southern" Oapanese) sha­ manism; see Kawamura, "Daitoa minzokugaku " no kyojitsu, 76. Another folklorist who studied shamanism, Yi Nung-hwa, also emphasized Korea's connection with Manchuria rather than Japan, arguing that ancient Choson was an enormous territory encompassing much of present-day Manchuria; see JaneIli, "Origins of Korean Folklore Scholarship," 33.

32. Akamatsu and Akiba, Manmo no minzoku to shukyo, 22-40; Oyama Hikoichi, Samankyo to Manshuzoku no kazoku seitlo (Xinjing: Jianguo daxue yanjiuyuan, 1942), 3-4; Nagata, Mamhu ni okeru Oronjon no kenkyu, 6 1-64.

33. Although ShirokogoroWs book was only translated into Japanese in 1941 , Japanese

204 r--.J Chapter 5

scholars were familiar with the original. Incidentally, Shirokogoroff, who taught at Beijing's Qinghua Universiry, was widely respected by many of the Chinese anthropologists who stud­ ied with him. His most famous student was probably Fei Xiaotong, who admired him greatly. However, Francis Hsu, who also studied with him, believed that Shirokogoroff "was obsessed with the Tungus and knew nothing else." See Gregory E. Guldin, The Saga of Anthropology in China: From Malinowski to Moscow to Mao (New York: Sharpe, 1994), 45-46.

34. See Shimizu, "Colonialism and the Development of Modern Anthropology in Japan," 1 36-37.

35. Akamatsu and Akiba, Manmo no minzoku to shakyo, 1 26. 36. Akamatsu and Akiba, Manmo no minzoku to shakyo, 1 03-1 1 . 37. Akamatsu and Akiba, Manmo no minzoku to shakyo, 367. 38. Akamatsu and Akiba, Manmo no minzoku to shakyo, 22-29. 39. Nagata, Mamha ni okeru Oronjon no kenkya, 61-65. 40. Nagata, Mamha ni okeru Oronjon no kenkya, 44, 54, 64-66. 41 . Nagata, Mamha ni okeru Oronjon no kenkya, 53. 42. Nagata, Mamha ni okeru Oronjon no kenkya, 39. 43. Nagata, Mamha ni okeru Oronjon no kenkya, 57-58. 44. Nagata, Mamha ni okeru Oronjon no kenkya, 78. 45. Fujiyama Kazuo. Mamha no shinrin to bunka (Shinkyo: Toho Kokumin Bunsho,

1937), 32-33. 46. For a more detailed and different version of Manchukuo's origins, see Mark C.

Elliott, The Manchu way: The Eight Banners and Ethnic Identity in Late Imperial China (Stan­ ford: Stanford Universiry Press, 200 1) , 44.

47. Fujiyama, Mamha no shinnn to bunka, 88-89. 48. Duara, Rescuing History. 49. The technique is tied to the persistent dualistic description of the Oroqen as noble

or even refined, on the one hand, and childlike--egotistical and temperamental--on the other. Note for instance Akiba's description of the childlike reaction of Oroqen to the guns and uniforms supplied by the Japanese; Akamatsu and Akiba, Manmo no minzoku to shakyo, 97. It is an ironic representation that mandates paternalistic control and guidance (over the "ancestors") and denies the Oroqen any agency.

50. Given that the Chinese state and professionals could not directly control or access the region, their efforts were largely discursive and are best understood in a comparative context.

5 1 . Fang Qiuwei, Feichang shiqizhi bianwu (Frontier affairs during the emergency period) (Hong Kong: Zhonghua shuju, 1 937-38), 2.

52. Fang, Feichang shiqizhi bianwu, 1 0 53. Chen Shiwei, "Legitimizing the State: Politics and the Founding o f Academia Sinica

in 1927," Papers on Chinese History 6 (1 997): 36-38. 54. Chiang Kai-shek, quoted in Richard Wilson, Learning to be Chinese: The Political

Socialization ofChikiren in Taiwan (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1 970), 276. 55. Wu Meiji, Zhongguo renwen dili (Human geography in China) (Nanjing: Nanjing

Zhongshan shuju, 1 929), 2-3. 56. He Liankai, "Sishinianlaizhi Zhongguo minzuxue" (Forty years of ethnology in

China), Zhongguo minzuxuebao 1 ( 1 955): 6. 57. He Liankai, "Cai Jiemin xiansheng duiyu minzuxuezhi gongxian" (The contribu­

tions of Mr. Cai Yuanpei to ethnology) ( 1 959), introduction to Cai Yuanpei minzuxue lunzhu

Imperial Nationalism and the Frontier � 205

(Cai Yuanpei discourses on ethnology), ed. Zhongguo minzu xuehui (Taipei: Zhonghua Shuju, 1 962), 2.

58. Cai Yuanpei, "Shuo minzuxue" (On ethnology) ( 1 926), in Cai Yuanpei minzuxue lunzhu (Cai Yuanpei discourses on ethnology), ed. Zhongguo Minzu Xuehui (Taipei: Zhon­ ghua Shuju, 1962), 1 .

59. Cai, "Shuo minzuxue," 7 60. Cai Yuanpei, "Shehuixue yu minzuxue" (Sociology and ethnology) (1930), in Cai

Yuanpei minzuxue lunzhu (Cai Yuanpei discourses on ethnology), ed. Zhongguo Minzu Xuehui (Taipei: Zhonghua Shuju, 1962), 1 2-13.

61. Cai, "Shehuixue yu minzuxue," 22; Huang Wenshan, "Minzuxue yu Zhongguo minzu yanjiu" (Ethnology and the study of China's peoples), Minzuxue Yanjiu jikan 1 ( 1936): 1 .

62. On the term allochronic, see Johannes Fabian, Time and the Other: How Anthropology Makes Its Object (New York: Columbia University Press, 1 983).

63. He Liankai, "Jieshao Zhongguo minzuxuede wenxian yu gongzuo" (Introduction to materials and works in Chinese ethnology), in Minzuwenhua yanjiu (Research of nationality cultures), selected by He Liankai (n.p., 1 95 1) , 1 08-9. See also He Liankai, "Sishinianlaizhi Zhongguo minzuxue."

64. Huang, "Minzuxue yu Zhongguo minzu yanjiu," 2. 65. In 1 944 a bibiliography of hundreds of items of ethnographic research in Chinese

since the beginning of the war with Japan listed only about twelve entries on the Han peoples, most of which had to do with "folk customs" (mimu) or language; see Gu Jinshi, ed., "Kangz­ hanyilai woguo minzuxue xuanmu," Minzuxue Yanjiu jikan 4 ( 1944): 1 29-69.

66. Huang, "Minzuxue yu Zhongguo minzu yanjiu," 22. 67. Huang, "Minzuxue yu Zhongguo minzu yanjiu," 14 68. Huang, "Minzuxue yu Zhongguo minzu yanjiu," 22-23, and Guldin, Saga of

Anthropology in China, 6 1 . 69. "Xinyaxiyazhi shiming" (The mission o f New Asia), preface to Xinyaxiya (New Asia)

1, no. 1 ( 1 930). 70. Sun Yat-sen, "Da Yaxiyazhuyi" (Great Asianism), Xinyaxiya 1 , no. 1 ( 1930): 1-7. See

also David M. Deal, "Policy towards Ethnic Minorities in Southwest China, 1 927-1965," in Nationalism and the Crises of Ethnic Minorities in Asia, ed. Tai S. Kang (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood, 1 979), 33.

7 1 . Prasenjit Duara, "Transnationalism and the Predicament of Sovereignty, China 1 900-1945," American Historical Review 102 (October 1997): 1030-5 1 . The editors of the journal also had to contain the ambiguity embedded in the title of Sun's original speech in Japan, which was called not "Xin Yaxiya," or New Asia, but "Da Yaxiya," or Great Asia. According to one of the editors, some people had misconstrued the title as suggesting that China should recover most of Asia as its historical territoty. The editor pointed out that this was not at all Sun's intent, because he spoke of such moral values as benevolence and the "kingly way." Thus, in order to avoid such misunderstandings, the editors chose to name the journal New Asia. See Ma Hongtian, "Guanyu 'Dayaxiya' yu 'Xinyaxiya' timingde huiyi" (Remembering the titles of Great Asia and New Asia), Xinyaxiya 1 , no. 1 ( 1930), 139.

72. Duara, "Transnationalism and the Predicament of Sovereignty." 73. Ma Hongtian, "Zhongguo tuozhi xuehui yu Zhongguo biandi xuehuizhi taolun yu

shoubei" (The planning and discussion of the China Settlement and Colonization Institute and the China Border Regions Institute), Xinyaxiya 1 , no. 1 ( 1 930): 1 4 1 .

206 ........, Chapter 5

74. Ma Hongtian, "Kaifa xibei shi jiejue Zhongguo shehui minsheng wentide genben fangfa" (Opening up the Northwest is a basic means of solving the problem of livelihood in Chinese society), Xinyaxiya 1 , no. 1 ( 1 930): 37.

75. Ma Hongtian, "Kaifa xibei shi jiejue Zhongguo shehui minsheng wentide genben fangfa," 38-39.

76. Quoted in Liu Xiaoyuan, "The Chinese Communist Party and the 'Nationality Question,' 192 1-1945" {unpublished paper, 1 999), 38 n. 2.

77. Jiang Zhongzheng (Chiang Kai-shek), Zhongguozhi mingyun (China's destiny) {n.p.: Zhengzhong shuju, 1943), 2.

78. Chiang, China's Destiny, trans. Wang Chung-hui {New York: Macmillan, 1 947), 4, 12, 239 n. 1 .

79. Fang, Feichang shiqizhi bianwu, 63-74; Siu-woo Cheung, "Subject and Representa­ tion: Identity Politics in Southeast Guizhou" (Ph.D. diss., University of Washington, Seattle, 1996), 108-20.

80. Deal, "Policy towards Ethnic Minorities in Southwest China," 34. 8 1 . Liu Xiaoyuan, "The Kuomintang and the 'Mongolian Question' in the Chinese Civil

War, 1945-1949," InnerAsia 1 ( I 999): 1 74-76. 82. Wei Huilin, "Zhanhou Zhongguo minzu zhengce yu bianjiang jianshe," Minzuxue

Yanjiujikan 4 (I944): 1-6. 83. Wei Huilin, "Zhanhou Zhongguo minzu zhengce yu bianjiang jianshe". 84. Ma Zhangshou, "Shaoshu minzu wenti," Minzuxue Yanjiu jikan 6 (I948): 20-2 1 ,

23. 85. Huang, "Minzuxue yu Zhongguo minzu yanjiu," 22. 86. Clearly, the goal of assimilating different peoples into a single national ideal domi­

nated by the most advanced race/nationality (minzu), the Han, suggests a continuity with the social Darwinist ideal of "one nation, one race." The repeated references to "brotherhood" (tongbao), for instance, point to vestiges of this construct.

87. See Guldin, Saga of Anthropology in China, 3 1 . 8 8 . Ling Chunsheng, Sonhuajiang xiayoude Hezhezu (The Hezhe people downstream on

the Sunghua river) {Nanjing: Guoli zhongyang yanjiuyuan lishi yuyan yanjiusuo, 1934), 60. 89. Ling, Sonhuajiang xiayoude Hezhezu, 61-62. 90. Ling, Sonhuajiang xiayoude Hezhezu, 28 1 . 9 1 . Ling disagrees with Shirokogoroff's idea that proto-Tungus occupied the central

plain of China itself in 4,000 B.C. and were gradually pushed into Manchuria. 92. See Huang, "Minzuxue yu Zhongguo minzu yanjiu," 1936. 93. Huang Wenshan sought to displace or limit the hegemonic role of history in national

governance. He notes that China has had a very powerful historical tradition, which it has used to govern the world (tianxia). Previously, historians had evoked the principle of "grasp[­ ing] the past to understand the present" (xian tonggu hou tongjin), but at the time of Huang's writing it was clear that there were too many gaps and deficiencies in the historical records to do this adequately. More recently, anthropologists had reversed the slogan, to say one must "grasp the present to understand the past" through the methods of anthropology. By reread­ ing ancient histories, discovering ancient artifacts, and researching contemporary primitive culture, the nation could gain a much better understanding of the evolution of its people than previous historians ever imagined. See Huang, "Minzuxue yu Zhongguo minzu yanjiu," 1 .

94. Curiously, Ling even chooses to draw evidence from Huangdi and Yu, figures that

Imperial Nationalism and the Frontier � 207

his contemporaty Gu Jiegang had established were mythical figures; see Ling, Sonhuajiang xiayoude Hezhezu, 9-1 1 .

95. Ling, Sonhuajiang xiayoude Hezhezu, 2-7. 96. Ling, Sonhuajiang xiayoude Hezhezu, 4 1 . 97. According to Ling, these ancient Asiatic peoples came ro be oppressed by the Zhou,

the Tungus, and the Mongols. One pan of them was assimilated by these invaders, while another pan was pushed into the extreme northeast corner of Asia and are recognizable as the Chuckchee, the Koryak, Eskimo, Karnchedal, Ainu, and others. Ling, Sonhuajiang xiayoude Hezhezu, 34.

98. Cf. Li Changdan, who develops a complicated argument to prove the racial mixing of the peoples of north and northeast China since ancient times. Li's strategy is to show that since the Zhou dynasry, every time there was major warfare in north China, militaty and refugee movements took large numbers of people to the Northeast and Korea, where they mixed with the people there. Indeed, whether because of the nature of the sources or a desire to make claims on Korea, Li makes his argument for the Northeast largely in the process of showing how Korea was settled by Han Chinese. Choosing between two conflicting accounts from the Shiji and the Shangshu, Li suggests that Jizi (Kija in Korean), a loyal courtier of the Yin (the late Shang, ca. twelfth century B.C.), fled the Zhou conquest, taking with him five thousand people of Yin across the Liao River to Korea. Li prefers the Shangshu account, which suggests that Jizi was enfeoffed by the Zhou after he had set up rule in Korea with his people, and did not merely administer a colonial outpost of the Zhou as suggested in the Shiji. It was also in the process of moving to Korea that the Yin peoples were melded together with the Eastern barbarians in the Liaodong area through their common opposition and resistance to the Zhou. Similarly, the violent Qin-Han transition (third century B.C.) also saw the king of Yan fleeing to Liaodong. Sensing the need to strengthen these claims, Li appeals to archaelogi­ cal finds in Liaoning, including skeletal remains that he says were the same as those of the ancestors of the Han on the mainland. However, the Japanese archaeologists he cites claim only that while these discoveries show some relation to present-day Chinese and Koreans, they are much closer to neolithic man. See Li Changdan, "Dongbei yuanshi minzu he zhong­ guo benbuminzu zai renzhongshangde guanxi" (Racial relationships between the primitive peoples of the Northeast and the peoples of China proper), Xinyaxiya 1 1 , no. 4 ( 1 936): 3 1-35.

99. Yao Congwu, Dongbei shi lun cong, (Collection of historical essays on the Northeast) vol. 1 (Taipei: Zhengzhong shuju, 1959), 26.

1 00. Chiang, China 's Destiny ( 1947), 6. 1 0 1 . Chiang, China's Destiny ( 1 947), 8-9; Wu Shangquan, Dongbei dili yu minzu sheng­

cunzhi guanxi, 2-3. 1 02. Zhang Qiyun, Zhongguo rendi guanxi gailun (An introduction to relations between

humans and land in China) (Shanghai: Dadong shuju, 1947), 1-4. 1 03. Zhang Qiyun, Zhongguo rendi guanxi gai/un, 2. 1 04. See Wu Shangquan, Dongbei diN yu minzu shengcunzhi guanxi, 25-26. 105. Yao, Dongbei shi fun cong, 16-17. See also Duara, Rescuing History, chap. 1 . 106. Duara, Rescuing History, 36-42. 1 07. Chiang, China's Destiny ( 1 947), 13. 1 08. Cheung, "Subject and Representation: Identiry Politics In Southeast Guizhou,"

78-83.

208 � Chapter 5

1 09. Ling, Sonhuajiang xiayoude Hezhezu, 288. 1 1 0. Ling, Sonhuajiang xiayoude Hezhezu, 289. I l l . Tatsuo Nakami, "A Protest against the Concept of the 'Middle Kingdom': The Mon­

gols and the 191 1 Revolution," in The 1911 Revolution in China, ed. Eto Shinkichi and Harold Z. Schiffrin (Tokyo: University of Tokyo Press, 1984), 146-47.

1 1 2. Liu Xiaoyuan, "The Chinese Communist Party and the 'Nationality Question,' 1921-1945" (unpublished paper, 1999), 4 1 n. 22; Cheung, "Subject and Representation," 1 19; and Nakami, "A Protest against the Concept of the 'Middle Kingdom.' "

1 1 3. Fang, Feichang shiqizhi bianwu, 73. 1 14. Fang, Feichang shiqizhi bianwu, 70-74. 1 1 5. Postscript to Xinyaxiya (New Asia) 1, no. 3 (1930): 1 5 . 1 16. Postscript to Xinyaxiya (New Asia) 1 , no. 3 (1930): 16. 1 17. Chen Yin, " 'Xiaoshuo youjihua' de jieshi" (Explanation of the conversion of fiction

into travel writing), Xinyaxiya 1, no. 6 ( 1931) : 1 5 1-52. 1 1 8. He Guanzhou, "You Qian zaji" (Random notes on travels in Guizhou), Xinyaxiya 5,

no. 5 ( 1 933): 135-48. 1 1 9. Solomon M. Karmel, "Ethnic Nationalism in Mainland China," in Asian National­

ism: China, Taiwan, Japan, India, Pakistan, Intklnesia, The Philippines, ed. Michael Leifer (New York: Routledge, 2000), 47-50.

120. V. K. Arseniev's stoty of the Goldi trapper Dersu is perhaps the most remarkable. 1 2 1 . See Marie Denis-Shelton, "Primitive Self: Colonial Impulses in Michel Leiris's

'L'Afrique fantome,' " in Prehistories of the Future: The Primitivist Project and the Culture of Modernism, ed. Elazar Barkan and Ronald Bush (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1 995), 326-38. The most conspicuous exception from Republican China is the writer Shen Con­ gwen.

1 22. See, for instance, the writings of novelists Bai Hua and Han Shaogong and the film Sacrificed Youth.

CHAP T ER S I X

Local Worlds: The Poetics and Politics of the Native Place

A "native-place literature" fever that raged all over China following the Mao era has continued unabated in the Northeast. In response to my inquiries about this fever, the most prominent literary expen on the native place in the Northeast, Professor Sun Zhongtian, described it as a reaction to the dry and formulaic writings of the Maoist period and reflected a long-buried yearning among readers for community, whether of the hometown or home regions (jiaxiang he diyu) . It occurred to me that the fever represented another moment in the expression of attachment to the local or regional that I had been studying in Manchukuo. While the area had seen several different regimes and the nature of regional representation had doubtless also changed, what had endured was the production of the local as sentiment and object of identity.

The preoccupation with the "hometown" or "native place" (guxiang, xiangtu in Chinese; kyodo, furusato in Japanese) was a significant component-often symbolic or metonymic-of the modern representation of the local or the regional (Chinese dijang, diyu; Japanese chiho, chiiki) not only in Manchuria, but in twentieth­ century East Asia more generally. As in many other parts of the world, this sense of the local was pervasively represented as a site of authentic values of a larger forma­ tion, such as the nation or civilization, frequently threatened by ascendant capitalist, modern, and urban values. As such, nationalists or the state were moved to protect this site of authenticity from the corrosive and homogenizing forces of capitalism, as much as to reform it.

As the local became (globally) a focus of cultural authenticity, its discourse appeared through a variety of media. In East Asia, the local as repository of the heartland traditions was produced through folklore studies, geography, local histor­ ies, and native-place literature; in such visual representations as the woodblock print, landscape art, the postcard, or the calendar; in social trends such as the folk art and ecotourism movements in Japan; and to some extent in political practices, such as

209

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the rural reconstruction movements and Maoist populism, which posited a primor­ dial community estranged by class conflict. These disciplines and practices temporal­ ize the local space as belonging to another time than the reader or viewer, consistent with the cycles of nature or with a civilization enduring from antiquity. In this genre of knowledge, the local becomes an authentic and (heretofore) enduring object to be investigated, restored, and/or reformed.

The local is therefore subject to a politics that I will try to grasp by examining its production and reception historically in Manchukuo. First, what was the nature of the local that was being produced? The Japanese representations of Manchuria as native place and region were continuous with the image of the virginal and natural frontier that we have already seen. For the Chinese, representation of it would have to transform a frontier into the heartland. Thus, Manchukuo presented the paradox of a spatial representation that had to serve both as frontier and heartland. Second, while the production of the local generates sentiment and identity, the case of Man­ churia reveals that the relationship of this spatial identity to a wider polity-as nation, part of nation, civilization, empire, or even transnational region-is neither given nor fixed.

The local or regional in modern China has typically been seen as politically and culturally part of the national. As Bryna Goodman's work shows, local consciousness at the turn of the century-in native-place associations, for instance-reveals a rela­ tively novel if strong sense of national loyalty. 1 Although national incorporation of the local is undeniable, I prefer to see it as one factor or phase in a wider process of the formation of the local. The local may best be viewed in a field of multiple forces-nationalism, imperialism, transnational cultural ideologies, social networks, capital, and local forces themselves---contending to appropriate its meaning and resources. This view releases the local from a naturalistic fixity within the nation, so that it can be treated as process. The local is not a reality fully distinct from the different forces that seek to stabilize its meaning at any time, nor is its meaning unchanging over time.

The Native Place in Sino-Japanese Discourse

What was the historical understanding of the local in late imperial China, and what kind of relationship can we expect between the historical and the contemporary ( l900-1949)? There is astonishingly little written about late imperial perceptions of the locality. However, we are lucky to have a recent, insightful introduction to the problem by Kishimoto Mio. Examining the notion of fengsu (local custom) during the Ming-Qing transition (sixteenth-seventeenth centuries) , she notes that states­ men like Gu Yanwu and Wang Fuzhi, who had different views on the problem of local autonomy (the fengjian-junxian debate), shared the notion of a locality as hav­ ing distinctive characteristics and customs. But the distinctiveness of rhe locality did not yield a conception of irreducible value embedded in the modern notion of cul­ ture or Kultur, or, as we shall see, in heartland writings. Instead, whether by means

Local Worlds: The Poetics and Politics of the Native Place '-' 2 1 1

o f state leadership (for Wang) or of the local Confucian elite (for Gu), the su (cus­ toms) of the locality had to be transformed (jiaohua) and revitalized by the moral leadership (feng) of upright men. Good fengsu was represented by people who led simple and honest lives, though neither ignorance nor poverty was acceptable in the name of simplicity. For both Gu and Wang, fengsu had declined terribly in their times (the seventeenth century), when urbanization, social division, and commodi­ fication had eroded the simple but stable life of village society. In Gu's view, the decline of fengsu, which was comparable to the moral decline during the barbarian invasions of the Wei-Jin period, represented the decline not simply of a dynasty but of a civilizational order (wang tianxia).2

Thus, in an orthodox Confucian view, locality was seen less as a source of value than as the index of this value and object of cultivation. We need to supplement this orthodox view with the view from vernacular popular culture, which celebrated the local upholders of justice-the jianghu or liilin-against corrupt bureaucrats and elites. This countertradition, while thoroughly interwoven with popular and subal­ tern ideas and imagery, likely did not refer to a distinct place or locality as a source of value, but rather to a utopian space also defined by orthodox moral values (zhongyz). Nonetheless, the twentieth-century historical and literary celebration of the locality derived, as we shall see, great inspiration from it.

If tradition provided the vocabulary and symbolism for modern Chinese writing about the locality, this writing also drew from a number of global sources to reinter­ pret historical conceptions and sentiments of the local. Among these sources were nineteenth-century Russian writers such as Chekhov and Turgenev (see their impact on Shen Congwen);3 the anthropological writings of James Frazer, Andrew Lang, and others; and the Germanic literature of the homeland. The Japanese influence was also very significant. Chinese and Japanese have the same ideographs for the signifiers "native-place studies or literature," Oapanese kyodo kenkyu; Chinese xian­ gtu yanjiu, xiangtu wenxue) and "folklore studies," Oapanese minzokugaku; Chinese minsuxue). The Japanese influence-and that of Japanese translations of Western sources-was especially profound upon the two great writers of the Chinese Repub­ lic, the brothers Lu Xun and Zhou Zuoren. The two had, in very different ways, an enormous impact upon the genre (both literary and nonliterary) of the local.

The status of Yanagita Kunio in Japanese folklore and native-place studies is much larger than life and the movement he spawned was extremely influential in China as well. Yanagita had begun the study of the native place in order to salvage a people and a locality's way oflife from the pulverizing onslaught of commodifica­ tion, modernity, and state building. It has been suggested that the study of the native place gradually changed to folklore studies among Yanagita and his cohorts around the 1 930s and the "native place" became a metonym for Japan as a whole.4 Thus the irreducibility of the local (in the face of state building) metamorphosed into the irreducibility of the national. Some believe that in this way Yanagita distinguished and rescued Japanese folklore from the dominant, imperialistic folklore studies pur­ sued in the West by scholars like Frazer and Lang, which emphasized evolutionism

2 1 2 ..-...... Chapter 6

and the comparative method. For Yanagita, the purpose of investigating the folklore of a society was not to probe the survival of barbarisms (and thus participate in an evolutionary scheme for cultures), but to understand the history of a people's cul­ tural ethos in order to solve their present problems. He thus employed folklore to critique the notion of civilizational progress embedded in History. The emphasis on spiritual, subjective cultural traditions-the search for a nation's "collective doubt lurking beneath their hearts"-thus led him to focus on the special characteristics of each country's folklore as a manifestation of its interior and authentic life.5

During the early 1 920s, when he was involved in the folklore studies journal Geyao, Zhou Zuoren was perhaps more impressed by the evolutionism of Frazer than by Yanagita, whose work became much more important for him later (even though he was well aware of it and had acquired all of Yanagita's work and every volume of KyiJdo Kenkyu since its appearance in 1 9 14) . He believed that much of contemporary folklore was a barbaric remainder from ancient times and drew upon Frazer's notion of primitive magic to criticize both the Confucian tradition, and especially Daoism, as a survival from primitive thought.6 Yanagita's work began to dominate his ideas from the second half of the 1 920s, particularly upon witnessing the violence of national revolution ( 1925-1 927). As he turned more and more to Yanagita's writings, Zhou came to see in folklore the spirit of a people that existed outside the orthodox historical records and state forms. During this later phase, he explored such themes as the popular cult of the Unbegotten Venerable Mother, or Wushenglaomu, and the Daoist doctrine of forgiveness and understanding, liangjie, which he understood as an aspect of renqing, the popular and historical Chinese conception of human sentiment underpinning the social order. Zhou began to per­ ceive folklore from a sympathetic perspective akin to cultural anthropology and to understand it as a history of a people's spiritual life.7 Just as Yanagita critiqued state Shinto and regarded village shrines as the true basis of national culture, so too Zhou modeled the idea of popular Daoism and shamanism as the cultural foundation of the nation and an alternative to Confucianism, the culture of the elite and bureau­ cracy.

As early as 1 923, in the essay "Locality and Literature," Zhou urged contempo­ rary writers not to yield to the abstract and homogenizing tendency in literature, but to retain the plurality and creative energy inherent in local traditions and history.8 Citing Nietzsche, he urged the new generation of writers, especially in his native Zhejiang, to be "loyal to the land," because the locality (jengtu) had the power to nourish the character of the "sons of the land": "Only when the breath of the soil and the flavor of the earth penetrates their veins and finds expression in their writing can we have authentic thought and literature."9 We also see in Zhou a particularly clear expression of the articulation oflocality with tradition or history. Zhou rejected the accusation that his was a conservative view of "national essence." He believed that there were two parts to "national essence": one was a living essence that flowed in the veins-our inherited flavor (quwez)-which we are powerless to determine, but which naturally reveals itself in all our words and actions and has no need to be

Local Worlds: The Poetics and Politics of the Native Place ..--.-.. 213

conserved; the other, dead part comprised those morals and customs of the past inappropriate and unnecessary to the present. He hoped that a new national litera­ ture could have the capaciousness to give play to the special, historical character of the region. 1 0

However, just as with Yanagita, it is also possible to interpret Zhou's concern with the local as effectively preserving existing power relationships. According to Harry Harootunian, Yanagita's "native ethnology" became a means "to preserve older forms of relationships and practice before rheir elimination (amidst rural ruin) as a necessary condition for seeking a solution to the question of division, fragmenta­ tion and conflict." l l Japanese folklore studies sought to combat conflict by offering an image of naturalized folk custom tied to a timeless place beyond mere history. Zhou Zuoren's New Village movement of the 1920s, inspired by Japanese utopian socialism, had sought to build a community based on indigenous notions of self­ help and personal ethical cultivation. Through this movement, Zhou sought to avoid the struggles and bloodshed associated wirh revolutionary, particularly com­ munist, movements. According to Ozaki Fumiaki, the New Village movement advocated by Zhou initially appealed to youth, but rhe practical difficulties of imple­ menting its goals, together with the growing attractiveness of bolshevism and eugen­ ics, made such a movement appear impractical and retrograde, and it lost favor. 12 Both Yanagita and Zhou sought to find in the local a source of aurhentic value and to protect it (Zhou's "living essence") from the depredations of capitalist modernity and state building; at the same time, however, this very identitarian project-the search for an alternative, indigenous order-was susceptible to appropriation by national and imperialist ideologies.

Manchukuo also served as a space for several Japanese idealists and community activists to realize their projects. We have referred to Fujiyama Kazuo's vision of transforming the Japanese settler community's relationship to the land and environ­ ment through his folkways museum. As a Christian, he was particularly drawn to the fairh-based village community built around the Russian log cabin church-the only model rhat he felt could give spiritual and social sustenance to the new settler communities. I 3 Many Japanese leftists forced to flee Japan in rhe 1 930s also sought to realize their ideals in rural Manchukuo, working wirh impoverished Chinese peas­ ants in the Norrhern Manchuria Cooperative Society movement. Those for whom the locality carried a special meaning were activists like Sata Daishira, inspired by Tachibana and pan-Asianist ideals of agrarian socialism as much as by Marxism. They believed rhat by organizing poor peasants into credit and marketing coopera­ tives and challenging the economic stranglehold of merchants from below they could achieve the ideals of the kingly way and Concordia. 14 The poet and activist Nogawa Takashi drifted away from rhese ideals as he became more interested in understanding the peasants than teaching them. He collected and adapted rhe Chi­ nese folk songs of the area and wrote poetry whose sources and inspiration lay in peasant life. The ideals of these activists did not sit well wirh the wartime regime's notions of idyllic village communities (!ryodotaz), as we shall see. Sata and Nogawa

214 .--.-.. Chapter 6

were among the twenty-six Japanese leftists imprisoned by the increasingly intoler­ ant and anticommunist regime in the early 1 940s. Both died in prison. 1 5

The trend to understand the local as a site of enduring value was not confined to utopian, conservative, folkloric, literary, or historical practices; it was secured just as much by the modern scientific disciplines. We have seen how anthropology, archeol­ ogy, geography, and other fields contributed to the knowledge of national space. To some extent, disciplines such as sociology, anthropology, and geography in Japan and China also became involved during the 1 930s in scientifically explaining the reproduction of enduring values in the village or locality (xiangtu).

The global emergence during the inter-war era of a scientific, geographical deter­ minism was tied to German ideas of Lebensraum and "geopolitics." While both expressions had been associated since the end of the nineteenth century with the names of Friedrich Ratzel and the Swedish journalist Rudolf Kjellen, it was the defeat of Germany in World War I that stimulated a popular explosion of geopoliti­ cal thought. The critical notion of raum, denoting space or area in German but piled with "thick layers of nearly mystical connotations," combined topography, climate, and other physical elements with a specific people, or Volk, to create a mystical unity that produced the state. The idea of Lebensraum came to be associated with the necessity of an eternal struggle for a space sufficient for the autarkic existence of the German state both in central Europe and overseas. 16

Geopolitical ideas rapidly became part of Japanese geographical knowledge­ both academic and military-bureaucratic-between the 1 920s and 1 940s. Geo­ graphical determinism was employed to produce a timeless rural authenticity in the "battle against urbanism in modern capitalist civilization."I? The rhetoric of the native place, long important in Japanese geographical pedagogy for, among other purposes, the development of nationalist identity, intensified during the rural crisis of the late twenties and thirties, leading to a kind of cult of the native place lfurusato) as the moral alternative to modern capitalism. 18 After the establishment of Manchu­ kuo, some leaders spoke of Asia as the theater of a kind ofJapanese Lebensraum, and during the Pacific War geographical determinism was freely employed to describe occupied territories. Leading sociologists, economists, and legal scholars adapted the ideas of Karl Wittfogel to discover mythological Chinese villages embodying the pristine Asiatic values of cooperation (kyodotat) ' 19

Although he criticized the relationship between geopolitics and the totalitarian state, the philosopher Watsuji Tetsuro produced in Climate and Culture ( 1 935) per­ haps the most influential geographical determinist argument of the time.20 Accord­ ing to Susan Daruvala, Watsuji's understanding of Judo or fengtu (a historical Chinese expression referring to the character of a place, shaped by both natural and social conditions) influenced Zhou Zuoren's idea of mingyun (destiny) through which the latter viewed the relationship between heredity and environment dialec­ tically. Zhou found in Watsuji an important foundation for his own ideas about place and self-understanding.21

The geographical determinism of the local or regional also appeared in geograph-

Local Worlds: The Poetics and Politics of the Native Place ,.-., 2 1 5

ical knowledge in China during the 1 930s and 1 940s. Jin Qisan elaborated upon the geologist Baron von Richtofen's division of China into rwo distinct geological formations, in the north and the south. Jin marshalled geographical as well as racial and linguistic evidence to argue for enduring cultural differences berween the rwo regions and explain history by means of geography.22 In turn this north-south divi­ sion became the basis of scholarly and popular understandings of culture, such as Lin Yutang's My Country and My People. Note that geographical determinism of the region or locality did not automatically yield to national determination, although nationalists did not find it difficult to frame the local within the national. A goal of this chapter is to show how the local was susceptible to framing within different scales of identity.

More strictly geographical education also contributed to the understanding of the local as productive of abiding values. An introductoty text entitled "The Research Methods of Community Geography" (Xiangtu Dili Yanjiufo) was pub­ lished by a professional geographer, Ge Suicheng, in 1 939. Ge acknowledged his indebtedness to American, German, and Japanese geographers, particularly Sasaki Seiji. Indeed, the Japanese title of Sasaki's work is virtually identical to Ge's Chinese. It is no small irony that Ge wrote this work biding time in his home village, to which he had fled to escape the Japanese occupation of Shanghai. Ge uses xiangtu to translate the expressions "region," "home geography," and "Heimat." His goal was to transform the old geography of the locality, which described the various items of climate, soil, settlement, and so on discretely, in isolation from each other, into an analysis of the dynamic engagement berween the environment and human culture in a place. The significance of "community geography" is its comprehensive under­ standing of the "cultural traits" (a term he deploys originally in English) produced by a village society living under particular environmental conditions.23 Although Ge is more concerned with identifYing the ways in which the environment shapes the positive and negative features of a community, the weighty role in his study of the environmental determination of rural space contributed to the constitution of this space as an enduring object.24 We shall see how the novelist Liang Shanding employs scientific geography and geological conceptions of time to naturalize the local com­ munity.

The noted sociologist and anthropologist Fei Xiaotong also wrote a number of popular essays in the 1 940s about the locality and native place that reflected the ways in which the discourse of the local spoke through him. The first essay in Xian­ gtu Zhongguo (Village China) is entitled "xiangru bense," which may be translated as "the 'true color' of rural society." The notion of bense is also very important in Zhou Zuoren, and according to Daruvala refers to the natural color one finds, for instance, upon wiping off makeup. 25 The expression distinctly partakes of authentic­ ity. Fei points to the deep-rooted relationship that the Chinese peasant-whom he often refers to as laogen, or "old roots"-has to the soil, revealed for instance in the universal worship of the earth god in China and the reluctance to move out of the isolated group or village. Everywhere Fei uses the metaphor of a tree or plant that

2 1 6 ,.-.. Chapter 6

continues to grow in one place, likening even forced migration (the only kind) because of disaster or famine to the "seeds blown from the old tree."26

The second half of Fei's essay is designed to show how rootedness and isolation, which he also sees as the richness of difongxing, or 10calness,27 produce those endur­ ing habits and values that, while they can be understood in terms of the sociological distinctions between Gemeinschaft and Geselfschaft and between Durkheimean mechanical and organic solidarity, are perhaps best understood in Confucian terms. He says, "in our own language, it is the difference between the society of rites and custom (lisu shehuz) and the society of law ifalu shehuz) ."28 Familiarity develops through a closeness refined through enduring patterns of everyday interactions. According to Fei, this process is expressed in the word for practice (XZ) in the first sentence of the Analects of Confucius. In a society steeped in familiarity, we are able to gain a level of freedom in which desire arises from the heart and flows with the norms-without violating them. This is vety different from the society where free­ dom is guaranteed by law. Norms are not laws; they are rites and customs that arise from practice. And since they arise from practice, they arise from the heart. In other words, here the society and the individual develop an intimate understanding. 29

Fei frequently invokes Confucius in the instances he cites of traditional practices, habits, values, and mentalities among the rural folk. In this way, it is clear that while the social sciences may, in part, be applied to understand them, the peasants repre­ sent the "old roots" of a distinctively Chinese tradition that can best be understood through an age-old conceptual language. This is possible precisely because of an enduring relation between a people and their space. Fei concludes the essay by decry­ ing the loss and abuse of these authentic values by modern developments, a lament consonant with his well-known call to reverse the erosion of rural communities.

The curious part of it all is that in most of his work, Fei did not find it necessary to either maintain or reject Confucianism as the repository of authentic value, as it may have been for Liang Shuming. Nor, as he indicates in the essay and elsewhere, did he necessarily find these rural values to be virtues that should be preserved. Yet he depicted the peasant, and especially his relationship to the soil, in a distinctly timeless way. Fei certainly overstated the isolation and rootedness of the peasants, as the later research of G. W. Skinner and others has shown. Even more significantly, Fei's biographer, David Arkush, has pointed out that Fei's own research did not reveal Chinese villages as radically isolated communities.30 Perhaps the discursive need to find authentic Chinese civilizational values in the people may have com­ pelled Fei to overemphasize the abiding, almost timeless relationship between the old roots and their environment.

Fei Xiaotong's writings reveal that whether or not the objective conditions for the production of the local as a site of enduring values actually exist, such a notion is ultimately determined discursively and, most specifically, through its writing. Lit­ erary writing of the native place, then, is not only a significant means of its produc­ tion, but together with the criticism and debates that accompany this writing reveals the fault lines of the local as a site of authenticity most sharply. Current writing on

Local Worlds: The Poetics and Politics of the Native Place .-....., 217

the history of native-place literature in the People's Republic of China identifies three trends: the "conservative romanticist" writings of Shen Congwen and the jing­ pai school associated with Zhou Zuoren; the radical tradition pioneered by Lu Xun; and the nationalist tradition associated with the resistance to the Japanese occupa­ tion of China.

I will take up the "national resistance" strain-perhaps the one most productive of the local as authentic-in an analysis of Liang Shanding's Green Valley in the next section. I have touched on the ideas of the leader of the allegedly conservative and romantic school, Zhou Zuoren, and a great deal of commentary exists on these writ­ ers, especially Zhou and Shen Congwen. This school has been criticized, as Yanagita was, for depoliticizing the locality or countryside, and at worst enabling collabora­ tion with the occupying forces. But there is also a more sympathetic judgement, which emphasizes their resistance to the pulverizing effects of modern state- and nation-making and their effort to discover, recover, or recreate the local as a different way of constructing the self and its relation to the nation or civilization.31

I find that I cannot disagree strongly with either of these readings of native-place literature. Both Zhou and Yanagita may have wanted to preserve the value of the local, but Yanagita also spoke of the local place as a metonym for Japan, and Zhou never lost sight of the locality's belonging in the nation. At the same time, Zhou also collaborated with the Japanese imperialists and the evidence of Yanagita's involvement is growing. The scales framing the locality's meaning were not consis­ tent over their lifetimes, nor was there much consistency within the groups they allegedly represented.32 My concern here is less with their politics, or even with the politics of the genre per se, as with the wider political struggle over the local as authentic object. I wish to examine how the writing of these individuals contributed to the discourse of the authenticity of the local, to the sentimental investment of the village as the bedrock of abiding values. Different forces-national, regional, transnational-working for different conceptions of political community as much as for different interests, sought to seize the object of this writing to pitch their claims on the authentic.

Lu Xun and Native-Place Writing

Lu Xun has arguably written more deeply and interestingly about native-place writ­ ing than any other writer in China. PRC writers often cite Lu's introduction to a 1 935 collection of essays as proof of his view of the native place, in opposition to the nostalgic one, as a site for reforming superstition and backwardness. This is undoubtedly true. But despite his prescient critique of native-place writing, Lu Xun too could not be disassociated from the sentimental investment of the native place. I want to trace Lu's argument and the historical route to his conclusion, in order to suggest that his is a most complex and productive view of the native place.

Lu's 1 935 introduction discusses a group of writers from the early 1 920s, such as Jian Xian' ai, Pei Wenzhong, Xu Qinwen, and Wang Luyan, whose stories he iden-

2 18 ......, Chapter 6

tifies as "native-place writings" (xiangtu wenxue).33 Lu identifies two types of writing about the native place, and he is extremely critical of one style, which is immersed in nostalgia, loss, and indeed death. Lu suggests that the absence of these authors, writing in Beijing, from their native places often causes them to dwell on darkly nostalgic memories. Some writers seek to retreat into childhood memories or into the mother's bosom, and others abhor the city-especially Beijing-and indulge themselves in a useless nihilism. Driven out of his village by circumstances, Xu Qin­ wen can only recall his father's garden and mourn the things that do not exist any­ more. Xu consoles himself with the memory of things that are gone, rather than things that clearly exist but that he cannot approach. Lu is sharply critical of writing that is obsessed with memories and incapable of action. These writers have a certain cold detachment (lengjing) that produces a worrying laughter and seeks characters full, not of opinions and life, but of death.34

While Lu Xun's impatience toward this nostalgic brand of native-place writing sharpened during the last, radical phase of his life, it is not inconsistent with his earlier reflections on loss and death in the native-place stories, such as "My Old Home" (Guxiang), "In the Wine Shop" (ZaiJiuloushang), "The New Year's Sacri­ fice" (Zhuju), and "Village Opera" (Shext), that he wrote between 1 92 1 and 1 924. I will not engage a detailed treatment of these stories, but while one can read a message similar to that of his 1 935 essay in the conclusions to some of them, these stories are by no means univocal. Taken together, the stories examine memory as the medium of apprehending the native place and explore its preoccupation with loss and death. Lu Xun is well aware of the deception and tricks played by memory­ particularly when "dawn blossoms [are] plucked at dusk."35 This is clear at the start of some of the stories: the narrator, upon returning to the childhood scene, finds it to be different from the way he remembered it, only to realize that it is he who has changed. "Village Opera" is actually structured around the tricks of memory. The adult narrator thinks that he remembers liking the open-air village opera he went to see as a child. As it turns out, what he really enjoyed was not the opera but the adventure of his outing with his country cousins. For Lu Xun, writing is the means to both play and reveal the tricks of memory.

"In the Wine Shop" and "New Year's Sacrifice," written one week apart in 1 924, probe the nexus of memory, death, and ritual mourning. In "New Year's Sacrifice," the story ofXianglin's widow, a miserable wretch driven to death by misfortune and the systemic victimization of unprotected women, is narrated by a modern, urban outsider. In part because of her victimhood, Xianglin's widow is cruelly rejected by the village, and Lu treats her death metaphorically as a communal sacrifice during the New Year celebrations. The ritual cleanses the community of the memory of its inhumanity and erases the narrator's nagging existential uncertainty. Although "Sacrifice" is an enormously complex story in many ways, its view of (ritual) sacrifice as erasure of bad memory is relatively straightforward, and Lu appears to want it to serve an edifying purpose.

Mourning ritual in "In the Wine Shop" appears in a more dialogical mode. The

Local Worlds: The Poetics and Politics of the Native Place � 219

narrator, who decides to stay overnight in a sad, rural town from his youth, runs into an old friend, Wei-fu, who is also visiting the town. Over drinks at the wine shop, Wei-fu tells him the story of his life since they last met and it is one of disap­ pointments and failures. He reveals that the purpose of his visit is to satisfY his moth­ er's wish to rebury the corpse of his brother, who died aged three. Upon unearthing the old grave, Wei-fu encountered an utterly empty, rotting coffin, but decided to go ahead with the reburial ritual, "to deceive my mother and put her mind to rest."36 The experience of loss is heightened by Wei-fu's second encounter with death in the same visit, that of a suffering young girl for whom he had brought some artificial flowers that she had longed for. At the heart of this story is the question of what we do when we come face to face with (the absolute loss of) death. Ritual presents us with a deception, but our only source of solace. We cannot but feel deeply empa­ thetic toward this man in his encounter with death and loss, and sympathize with his gestures. Yet as the story comes to a close, Lu Xun shows Wei-fu as one sunk in his past and his failures, with no hope forlin the future. When the two part com­ pany, the narrator is refreshed by the snow beating upon his face as he walks away from the scene of the town that is becoming enveloped in snow. The simplicity of the story's conclusion belies the complexity of understanding the narrator has depos­ ited, that is, as Derrida has said, posited and provisionally abandoned.

For Lu in 1 935, the local is not the place to encounter the past, particularly not in the mode of nostalgic dwelling or mourning its loss. He has been there and he knows writing's memory tricks and the deceiving rituals that cause us to linger there. So how does Lu want us to see the local? Not as the lost past to be restored or preserved, but as the past to be reformed and transformed. The local is where today's peasants and gentry, mired in feudalism, must become tomorrow's modern citizens. In the 1 935 introduction, Lu writes admiringly of two native-place authors, Jian Xian'ai and Tai Jingnong. Jian gives us a full view of cruel village customs in Guiz­ hou, but he is able to show how the greatness of motherly love issues out from within this cruelty. Lu is also full of praise for Tai, who is able to transfer the subject of "death and life in the village, the breath of the soil (nitude qixz) onto paper. There are no better, no more industrious writers than this one."37 These writers are good precisely because they do not wallow in nostalgia, because they work hard to interest and engage us with the misery of rural life.

But we might ask, Why write about the local? Why is the native place important at all? I am convinced that Lu Xun experimented sufficiently with memory and mourning for the native place to know that the kind of power exercised by the native place was generated less by the place itself than by the desire among writers and readers to (re) connect with it. Lu Xun recognized that, whether because of the tricks of memory or the reader's alienation, the power of this attachment was generated and mobilizable by the technology of writing about the native place. No matter how distant, good writing about a particular timespace can cathect universally. Lu says that Jian Xian'ai's story about motherly love shows us that "although Guizhou is a faraway land, the human condition is everywhere the same."38 As in the cultural

220 .-, Chapter 6

investment of the frontier, evocative writing about a native place can produce empa­ thy in the reader by generating a desire to (re)connect with the timespace, to recog­ nize oneself in the place. For Lu, the native-place stoty becomes a means of imagining a community of sentiment as much as one of purpose.

Lu's project of the local is thus twofold. First, it must depict the sorrow and the misety so that reform can be implemented and the nation strengthened. But in order to motivate his compatriots to engage in this task, the writing of the local also has to cathect the imagined community of the nation via the locality. It is through the particularity of the locality-in the sympathy and nostalgia for it-that an empa­ thetic identification is built in the reader. If this emotional power is to be mobilized for the sake of nation building, Lu Xun tells us, we have to resist mourning, that overpowering urge to be absorbed by our loss. Mourning, however, is not the only problem Lu Xun's project encounters. For this mode of writing to work, the writer must also be able to identifY or redeem some primordial worth from a locality that is otherwise covered in misety-perhaps something like the mother's love amidst pervasive cruelty in a Guizhou village. Yet, a couple of pages later in the same essay, Lu is critical of the writing of Wang Luyan, who seeks to become human by return­ ing his heart to his mother and shutting out the rest of the world.

The danger in seeking out the source of attachment, the primordial worth, is that this worth can become an end in itself and subvert the program of action on behalf of other forces, such as the nation. We are reminded of the leftist activist and poet, Nogawa Takashi, who decided that it was better to learn from the peasants than to teach them. Note also how Lu's own stories exemplifY this difficulty. At the end of the hometown stories, the protagonist is often relieved or refreshed as he walks away from the place of the past, but the power of these stories lies less in the endings than in the images of the past that haunt us. The writer who follows Lu Xun's project has to walk a vety fine line to transform this attachment into improvement, because improvement will involve transformation of the object of attachment.

Thus, while there are real differences between the nostalgic or romantic mode of native-place writing and Lu Xun's demand for a grim realism, it is also important to recognize that both use writing to generate a desire for attachment and identifica­ tion. Indeed, given the status of the discourse of the local in the modern world, it cannot but be so. Let us recall that in our analysis the local is the site of tension between market and modernizing forces (which transform or erode it) and national­ ism (which needs, in part, to preserve it as authentic identity). Some scholars have recently demonstrated that the logic of nostalgia resembles the Freudian analysis of the fetish: it represents an effort to make whole by a substitute representation of the lost object, even as the representation signifies that the lack perdures.39 However, the fetishization of the local itself has to be understood within the problem of time constitutive of modern nations and the demands of the regime of authenticity. Lu Xun's project of native-place writing reproduces the aporia in which the local must embody some abiding worth, but is in need of urgent renovation to serve as the basis of the modern nation. It seeks a new and difficult transformation of the local

Local Worlds: The Poetics and Politics of the Native Place � 221

without eroding it; or, in other words, the ability to recognize the self in the local without preserving it.

Liang Shanding's Green Valley

Liang Shanding (pen name, Shanding) wrote his only novel, Green Valley (Liisede Gu), in Manchukuo in 1942.40 It is a classic native-place novel that dramatizes the tension I have probed in the discussion ofLu Xun and others above. While the novel succeeded admirably in producing the local as an abiding source of value, the great unasked question that haunted its afterlife carne to be: of what did it represent the truth? Unasked, because each successive reading of the novel by regimes and intellec­ tuals, including the author himself, presupposed a different answer, and in this way appropriated the meaning and affect of the native place. The novel, its historical background, and its contentious reception will serve as our guide in exploring the locality as product and process.

The principal plot of the novel revolves around the youthful heir to the Lin fam­ ily estate, Lin Xiaobiao, and his movements between the village in the valley of Lan­ ggou, the city ofNanmanzhan (South Manchurian station, a likely play on the SMR Company), and the primeval forests of the mountains and valleys of Manchuria, which I shall refer to as primeval forests (yuanshi lin). The entire novel takes place in these three spaces, viewed topographically at the beginnings and endings of their respective descriptions and also throughout the novel. Sometimes the topographical view is achieved from the narrator's location on a mountaintop and sometimes from the air. In the underlying structure of the novel, each of the spaces acts upon the other, producing profound moral and political consequences that are woven together into a complex narrative of corruption and redemption. Relationships of class, community, and gender shaped by these spaces serve as motivating ideals or forces, driving the characters to actions that transform the spaces and the relations between them. In other words, each of the spaces generates or sustains a temporality, a mode of production, a lifestyle, and a morality, and during the time covered by the novel (roughly 19 14 to 1931) the equilibrium between the three spaces is threat­ ened with impending collapse.

Lin Xiaobiao has to leave the estate in Langgou Valley for the city (Nanmanzhan) when his father, a modern military officer in the army of the warlord of Manchuria, Zhang Zuolin, is killed in the Fengzhi wars of the mid-I920s. Xiaobiao's mother is forced by her own father to remarry a comprador, or agent of a Japanese company in the city, Qian Rulong, and the eleven-year-old Xiaobiao has to move with them. Xiaobiao reveals an early and stubborn hatred toward this decision to leave Langgou and for his mother's remarriage, especially to a greedy and power-hungty man. Despite an early revelation of the strength of his character, in the city Xiaobiao becomes an idealistic, dreamy intellectual with a tendency to lapse into an effete dandyism and cowardliness, especially in regard to women. Thus, on a visit back to Langgou, he falls in love and has a relationship with a poor tenant girl, Xiaolian. He

222 ,--...., Chapter 6

likens her to the purest orchid in the heart of the forest and contrasts her with the cheaply made-up city girls, but at the time of her greatest need he abandons her.

When Xiaobiao returns after graduating from high school, he considers staying on as lord of the estate, which in the meantime had been managed by his aunt Lin Shuzhen and the foreman of the estate, Huofeng, who is also her not-so-secret lover. He feels a certain paternalism towards the peasants and regards the valley as his true mother against the one who remarried and left for the artificial and corrupt city. But despite the beauty of the land and authenticity of the people, he is also stifled by its feudal insularity. The time is the late 1 920s and there is a property issue fomenting unease in the valley. Xiaobiao's stepfather Qian wishes to sell some of Langgou's barren, stony lands by the river to his Continental Company so that a railroad may be built in the area. From the perspective of the landlords of the region, such a development would catapult the value of the land, and each lobbies for the railroad to be built through their lands. Lin Shuzhen is keen on the sale so as to pay for Xiaobiao's higher education, but the tenants and Huofeng are opposed because it would deprive them of their livelihood. Xiaobiao, who views the land less as his patrimony than as his true mother, is confused.

At this point Xiaobiao decides to marry Yoshiko, a modern, idealistic Sinophile and the daughter of his stepfather's boss, the Japanese manager of the Continental Company. The boss has lived in Manchuria for thirty years and is devoted to things Chinese. Xiaobiao resolves to return to his beloved Langgou together with Yoshiko once he has completed his higher studies in Japan. The couple plan a farewell trip to Langgou before leaving for Japan, but unbeknownst to them the stepfather Qian and his investment partner are visiting Langgou at the same time to clinch the sale of the land. Before the young couple arrive, Qian and his coinvestor are witness to a great show of communal solidarity in Langgou when, upon a threatened bandit attack on the estate and the valley, Huofeng persuades Shuzhen to permit the ten­ ants and their families to seek refuge in the estate compound while their men defend the estate. In the meantime, the hunter-bandit gang, led by Big Bear Paw, find an opportunity in kidnapping Xiaobiao and Yoshiko and demanding a huge ransom. Yoshiko is released but there is no news of Xiaobiao for several months. Xiaobiao's biological mother and Shuzhen seek to raise money for his ransom, and Qian Rulong hits upon the fiendish plan to do so by selling the barren land. Railway construction begins in the valley. Meanwhile, Big Bear Paw has a change of heart and helps Xiaobiao escape; together they spend several weeks seeking an uncharted way through the primeval forests. The ordeal, during which Xiaobiao develops an immense respect and fondness for Big Bear Paw, emerges as the ultimate test of Xiaobiao's endurance and his true learning of the secret power of the forest and the secret societies that live in it. When they finally find their way back to Nanmanzhan, the Qian house is locked up, most of the key players are ruined or imprisoned, and the city has been devastated by economic and moral collapse. Xiaobiao decides to return to Langgou, give up all his remaining property to the tenants, and embrace the valley, his true mother.

Local Worlds: The Poetics and Politics of the Native Place ,--..., 223

From the moment of its publication, most readings of the novel have located its ultimate significance outside the locality. This is even true of Liang Shanding's own reading of it in an 1 987 postscript, written in light of having suffered twenty-two years of incarceration (from 1 957 to 1 979), in great part because the novel had been translated into Japanese. Indeed, the salient features of Shanding's life present us with the strongest evidence of the novel's historical reception. Born in 1914 (the same year as the fictional Xiaobiao), Shanding grew up in Harbin-a city he has called the "hometown of literature" -and was part of its thriving literary culture, profoundly shaped by modern Russian literature.41 Together with his more famous and older colleagues Xiao Jun and Xiao Hong, he joined the anti-Japanese literary movement in Harbin after the Japanese occupation of Manchuria. While most of the important members of this resistance movement had fled south of the pass by 1934, Shanding continued to write in Manchukuo till 1 943. Shanding wrote Green Valley in 1 942 and the following year it was translated into Japanese. However, the Manchukuo government censored passages in the novel that implied criticism of the government and its extraction of rural resources conducted under the cover of Manchukuo political pieties. He was also harassed politically by the police after its publication and ultimately had to flee Manchuria for the interior. In the People's Republic, Shanding was charged in the anti rightist campaign of 1 957 as a traitor (hanjian) because of the Japanese translation and recognition of his work, and as a "rightist" he was subject to labor reformY He was rehabilitated in 1 979 and Green Valley was included in a Contemporary Chinese Literature reprint series undertaken by the Institute of Contemporary Literature of the Chinese Academy of Social Sci­ ences.43

Green Valley in History The study of the native place was initially fostered in Manchukuo for Japanese schoolchildren, but was ultimately extended to the wider school system. A middle school textbook in Japanese-language education published in Dalian in 1 935 praised the pedagogy of the native place as a means of cultivating love for the region by describing the beauty of the land and its "natural peoples" (shizen ningen). Two strains of identity construction run through the textbook essays. One emphasized the identity of Japan and Manchuria, or rather an effort to comprehend the differ­ ences within a common framework of understanding. Thus an essay on the four seasons of Manchuria compares the sounds, sights, and feelings of each season with those in Japan, framing center and periphery in familiar categories of knowledge.

A contrapuntal theme in the textbook stressed the utopian and essentially natural character of Manchuria. A traveler strikes up a conversation with a young Japanese boy at Fengtian station. When asked if he would ever go back to live in Japan, the boy replies that he could not bear the dirty and crowded cities, the narrow streets and homes of Japan. He also claims to get along well with Chinese boys at school. This triggers a wellspring of emotions (and tears) in the interlocutor, whose mind

224 ,--...., Chapter 6

roams over the vast and unspoiled wilderness that once was Japan and the good fortune of those who could continue to live so naturally in Manchuria. As the train speeds by a Lamaist tower soaring into the clouds, he envisions the young boy as a mountain goat roaming the vastness of nature. The images of vastness and freedom established the authenticity of a natural place continuous with the representation of the frontier space. Despite the common emphasis on nature, this was certainly a different kind of native place than that depicted by Shanding. But as an exemplaty production of the native place, Green Valley could hardly escape the attention of the state.

Cultural control in Manchukuo intensified dramatically after September 1 940, when Japan allied militarily with Germany and Italy and the Pacific War became imminent. Until then, cultural control had been relatively lax and did not intrude into all dimensions of cultural production. In March 1 94 1 , the Hongbaochu (or Hongbao office), which reported directly to the General Affairs Board, brought out the "Summary of Guidelines to Art and Literature," fundamentally transforming the role of arts and culture in the state.44 The Hongbao was originally a propaganda organ, but its office soon became the principal instrument of cultural control in Manchukuo, monitoring publications, broadcasts, libraries, news agencies, film, and the arts, among other activities. After 1 940, its control tightened and began to extend through local governments. The older, voluntarily organized associations of writers (many of them leftists) , journalists, and other professionals came to be replaced by new organizations controlled by the Hongbao office, such as the Man­ chukuo Writers and Artists Concordia (Manzhou wenyixiehut) created in 1 94 1 .45

One goal of the Guidelines to Art and Literature was to centralize surveillance of all the arts, including cinema and radio. Another, more proactive goal was to provide direction to the arts and thus coordinate the "project of spiritual construction with the more advanced material construction of the nation."4G These goals were, of course, consonant with the fascist military state's wartime needs, but also spelled a more active role for the state in the production of culture and, ultimately, identity. A core dimension of this cultural production was the depiction of the land through the independent native traditions of Manchuria. Whereas, in a debate with Shand­ ing as late as 1 937, well-known pro-Manchukuo writers like Otani Takeo and Gu Ding had ridiculed native-place writing as simplistic and limited, by 1 943 the regime was aggressively promoting the native-soil literature of Manchukuo, publiciz­ ing it in the newspapers and incorporating the study of "independent" Manchuria's native traditions, simplicity, vigor, and natural beauty in school textbooksY

The military fascists' new activism in culture entailed the sponsorship of several literary and arts (wenyt) conferences, including those encompassing the Greater East Asian Co-prosperity Sphere. Two Greater East Asian literature conferences were held in Tokyo ( 1 942 and 1 943) and one in Nanjing ( 1944) . The fourth, planned for Manchukuo in 1 945, needless to say, did not materialize.48 But Manchukuo had no shortage of various national conferences, including a 1 944 seminar on native-place literature called "How to Write about Manchuria?" (Zenme xie Manzhou?) .49 The

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participants celebrated the "spirit of blood and soil" promoted by German and Ital­ ian fascists in native-place literature. In this conception, critical realism was valued far less than the portrayal of the land as the source of a distinctive people. The iden­ tification of the author with the particular place, it urged, was absolutely essential to the production of a genuinely creative literature capable of generating such great symbols of the land as Japan's Mount Fuji.50

Shanding's work was appropriated in the context of this new activism. PRC scholars have noted that the Manchukuo state sought to assimilate Shanding's work and native-soil literature within a trajectory that extended from the locality to the nation-state, to a pan-Asianist cosmopolitan is mY In the official conception of the native place, the question of identity with the Chinese nation was bypassed, even as this conception established the superiority of the Japanese in Manchukuo. The Guidelines had declared,

In order to establish the spirit of nation building, we have to embody the great spirit of [the phrase] "the world is one family" (hakko-ichiu) . We use the transplanted Japanese literature as the warp and the literature of the several original peoples as the weft, thus achieving a cosmopolitan cultural transformation and creating a pure and independent literature. 52

One of the most important China experts In the cultural sphere was Ouchi Takayoshi, a 1 929 graduate of To a Dobun shoin (the East Asian Culture Academy) in Shanghai, who wrote extensive surveys of literary and cultural trends in Manchu­ kuo that incorporated information about the participants in literary circles and debates. Ouchi held powerful positions in the cultural bureaucracy, including head of the section on literature and art in Man' ei, chief editor of the Manchuria Journal, and chief of the government's editorial office. 53 His detailed surveys were clearly important for surveillance and censorial agencies such as the Hongbaochu. Ouchi quoted extensively from Shanding's work and covered the debates he had provoked on native-place writing. Distinctly aware that under the melancholic and sentimen­ tal mood of native-place literature lay a left-wing and nationalist tone, Ouchi none­ theless found much merit and a strong nativist sensibility in Shanding's work. Most significantly, Ouchi translated Green Valley into Japanese in 1 943.54

While cultural bureaucrats like Ouchi found value in Shanding's depiction of the Manchurian landscape from a discursive perspective, politically Shanding remained under surveillance. He was among nine writers, including Dan Di and Shi J un, whose works were singled out in 1 943 for censorship and surveillance. They were often forced to rewrite their views. 55 Just before he fled Manchukuo in 1 943, Shand­ ing published a poem celebrating pan-Asianism. In all likelihood he was compelled to write this (given that he had been under close surveillance since 1 942) to demon­ strate his loyalty to the official cosmpolitanism.56 Small wonder that he fled Man­ chukuo. He shared a discourse of local authenticity with his political enemy. If the gap between his politics and discourse became too obvious, the regime would surely get him to bridge it on its terms.

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In the 1 987 postscript to the novel and in his later writings, Shanding depicts Green Valley as an anti-Japanese, nationalist novel written during the darkest period ofJapanese rule in 1 942. He points to the censorship and harassment by Manchu­ kuo authorities. The communist authorities in the PRC had critiqued the novel along class as well as nationalist lines. According to Huang Wanhua, the peasants are depicted in the novel as feudal because they side with the landlord against the anti-Japanese bandits of the yiyongjun, or the resistance armyY In the postscript, Shanding seeks to persuade the reader that the novel does attend to the oppression of the peasants, but as the work was constrained by its time and circumstances the peasants could not be shown to stand up for their rights, particularly because there was no Communist Party in the Manchuria of the 1920s. In other words, Shanding provides alibis for the absent nationalism and class consciousness in the novel.58

Despite Shanding's enduring involvement in the anti-Japanese literaty move­ ment, nationalism is for whatever reasons not a major concern of the novel, in my reading of it. On the other hand, the conflict between capital and community is central to it. To be sure, the critique of capitalism implies a criticism of Japanese capital-the zaibatsu are occasionally named; the chief villain, Qian Rulong, is a comprador (maiban) of a Japanese company; and the Continental Company is vety probably the Oapanese) South Manchurian Railroad Company-but it is capital that is attacked as a destructive mode of being, and no particular form of national or imperialist capital is singled out. Indeed, virtually all the unsavoty rich people are Chinese and the two Japanese figures (Yoshiko and her father) are extremely sympa­ thetic Sinophiles. Most importantly, the drama of class conflict does not unfold according to the standard communist narrative; rather, it emerges from a deeper anchoring of relations of production and class in sharply conflicting modes of times­ pace and moral ethos-between urban capitalism, whose temporality destroys a sense of belonging, and a place whose naturally rooted culture governs the experi­ ence of time.

Within the discursive terrain of the novel, class conflict is expressed through the activities of the bandit heroes of the primeval forest (lalin haohan), as Shanding him­ self attests in the postscript. For these bandit heroes, however, the fight against social injustice is associated not necessarily with class position, but with personal rectitude, resolve, and loyalty. This is dramatized in the final episode of the novel, during which a bond of loyalty is forged between Big Bear Paw and the heir to the land, Xiaobiao, during their escape through the forest. These values are associated with the moral ethos, not of a mode of production, but of a mode of being in relation to nature.

A nationalist reading of the novel is favored by the current literaty establishment of the Northeast, or erstwhile Manchukuo. It is this establishment that worked for the rehabilitation of Shanding's reputation, and in the case they make for native­ place literature they reveal a complex relationship between nationalism and regional­ ist sentiment. These scholars tend to emphasize the distinctiveness of native-place writing in the Northeast, which followed neither the romantic school of Zhou

Local Worlds: The Poetics and Politics of the Native Place .--...." 227

Zuoren and Shen Congwen nor only Lu Xun's hard prescription of the analysis of internal social contradictions. It represented, rather, a deliberate and programmatic opposition to Japanese imperialism, and Green Valley is the exemplar. This national­ ist tradition of native-place writing resembles that of colonies and occupied nations all over the world, but especially the native-place writing of Taiwan and East Europe under foreign control. Naturally, this nationalism could not be expressed direcrIy, but was covert and disguised. A proper reading of this writing calls for a decoding of the text.59

According to these present-day authors, opposition to colonial rule is expressed in the realist techniques and unadorned writing through which Shanding exposes the grim realities of life under colonialism. We have seen how the regime heightened repression of cultural producers and others after 1 94 1 . We have also noted the evi­ dence that Liang Shanding was strongly opposed to Japanese rule. After 1 934 he was among the few literary figures remaining in Manchuria who kept up the spirit of the Harbin resistance literature in the newsletter Manzhou Wenxue. In 1 937 an antitraditional group of Chinese writers joined with Japanese writers (born or set­ rIed) in Manchuria to advocate a new literature, creating a split among Chinese writ­ ers.60 Those who joined with Japanese writers, the Literary Records group (yiwenzhipaz), were bitterly criticized by Shanding. He satirized them for currying favor with the Japanese, saying that they cherished the writers of another country but not the rural folk of their own land, or even the newly settled Japanese villagers in Manchuria. He urged writers to write about the land, which would survive the Japanese occupation.61

Professor Sun Zhongtian of Northeast Normal University has argued that the real spirit of native-place literature is nationalism and patriotism. The commitment to the locality cannot but entail patriotism, because the concern of this form with traditional literature and the very embeddedness of language in a common culture produces an inseparabiliry of the native and the national: "one cannot cut the veins of the culture of the fatherland."62 A similar kind of automaticity is assumed by another authority from the Northeast, Lii Qinwen. In Lii's view, the native-place literature of the Northeast written by Xiao Jun and Shanding was deeply influenced by the Russian writings of Gogol and Gorky, communicated through the emigrant communiry in Harbin.63 In Russian, he observes, the word for native place and the fatherland (in Chinese, xiangtu and zuguo, respectively) is the same, and thus the nation is embedded in the very signifier of the 10cality.64 Such a view tends to natu­ ralize the relationship between locality and nation, which is by no means given.

While I acknowledge that Shanding was politically a nationalist, it is hard to prove that the novel is overrly or covertly nationalist. One might say that exposing the grim realities of rural life could yield a critique of whatever power structure existed, not only of colonial power (indeed, such a critique became a dominant trend in mainland literature in the 1 920s and after). As far as whether the critique of power in the novel is anticolonial or nationalist, I do not believe Shan ding reveals a particular point of view. Whether or not this is because he had no means of political

228 ........, Chapter 6

expression, from a literary and philosophical perspective these larger political identi­ fications seem irrelevant in the work. More particularly, even if the novel is national­ ist, Shanding's use of certain popular cultural traditions defies modern nationalist conceptions advocated by May Fourth activists and the CCP. This gap between his vision and modern nationalist ones returns us to the predicament of native-place writing that we encountered with Lu Xun.

Professor Sun has suggested that the power of the novel derives from an aesthetic that lends a mythic power to the valley and people. The evocation of the "ancestral memory" is crucially important for the nationalist argument that PRC critics today need to make,65 not only in response to the party's critique of 1 957, but also as a reaction to the reception of the novel in Manchukuo, where its significance was extended beyond the nation to a civilizational mission. Yet this evocation cannot be allowed to go too far. In invoking and idealizing the "ancestral memory," Professor Sun notes that Shanding sometimes slips into a "feudal" mode of writing. Shaman­ ism and magic may be part and parcel of the mythic power of the valley, but when Shuzhen is praised for preserving her chastity a nativist cathexis has gone too far. 66 Indeed, a fuller version of this nativism-emphasizing ancestral, popular cultural elements-yields many associations with Eastern civilizational ideals emphasized by the Manchukuo regime, which the PRC scholars have to de-emphasize. The predic­ ament of native-place writing (which has to be both evocative and reformist) for nationalism becomes especially acute and untenable for present-day PRC writers.

PRC scholars focus their critical ire on the Literary Records group, led by Gu Ding. This group is identified as clearly collaborationist, and scholars today particu­ larly point to their attack on Shanding and native-place literature as parochial, regionalist, and lacking in cosmopolitanism.67 We will recall Shanding's criticism of the Literary Records group for their lack of interest in rural society. The personal careers of these writers offer evidence that many of them engaged in opportunistic collaborationism.68 At the same time, the leading Japanese authority on literature in Manchukuo, Okada Hideki, reveals that their writings were often stridently reform­ ist and their critique of rural society had more in common with the May Fourth tradition than with writings that sought to find an authenticity within the locality.69 We are thus faced with a complex irony: while the group had collaborationist ele­ ments but was intellectually autonomous from the dominant paradigms of Japanese and Manchukuo writing of the native place, Shanding, who once had a clear politi­ cal position, was intellectually and discursively much more part of the world of this writing. The predicament of native-place writing would generate tortuous conse­ quences.70

The Representational Structures of the Local

Most readings of Green Valley have sought to identify the overt or alleged covert political references in the novel (such as those objected to by the Manchukuo cen­ sors) as the anchors of their interpretations. Also important, especially for the Mao-

Local Worlds: The Poetics and Politics of the Native Place ......., 229

ists, is the novel's translation into the Japanese-its textual form. At the referential level of event and description alone, the meaning of the novel is necessarily open to different contemporary and historical appropriations, because Shanding offers no coherent or programmatic politics. Rather, the significance of the novel derives from the way in which it produces the local as an object of identification and hence as an object of political desire by the powerful. In order to fully grasp it as such, we need to attend to three levels: the representational structures of the novel (the point of view and spatiotemporal schemes that structure the narrative), its descriptive and referential aspects, and the different political readings it has received. All three are part of the historical process of the production of local space.

The principal representational structures of the novel are constituted by its three chronotopes. The primeval forest is governed by a natural, cyclical time outside of linear history. It is a time of life, decay, and renewal-a return to childhood, to the mysterious and eternal source of life, and to the fount of justice and loyalty. We have seen the spiritual and political significance of the forest in Manchu understand­ ings, and its tropic significance in the Japanese accounts of Inaba, Nagata, Fujiyama, and others. It has also been important for other Chinese authors from the Northeast, like Xiao Jun and the contemporary writer Zheng Wanlong.

In Green Valley, the fertilizing decay of the forest emits a vaporous, mysterious fog that shrouds the secret pact between bandit heroes (litlin haohan). They are its human agents, who live outside of social time but are necessary to justice in the community, to the forces renewing life against those corrupting and destroying it. This timespace also has a distinct gender profile: it is the realm of strong, loyal, and resolute men whose physique microsmically reproduces the attributes of the prime­ val forest. Xiaobiao's test of endurance in the forest teaches him more about living than any university can. Women are excluded from this realm. Big Bear Paw's wife, who is the liaison, always leaves it when dramatic things are about to happen. But the land itself is repeatedly figured as the mother: the eternal producer of life and one in whose bosom a child feels limitless warmth. Thus, in its representational scheme the novel reveals the truth of nature, and to the extent that human life in the valley or locality accords with the timeless cycles of nature it is an authentic life. We may also deduce that it finds truth in the often suppressed philosophical tradi­ tion of Daoism and the folk heroes of the "rivers and marshes" who celebrate this accordance.

Langgou Valley, the second chronotope, carries within it a class fracture that is visualized spatially as the division between the Lin family compound at the top of the ridge (shangkan) and the shantytown shacks of the Lin estate's tenants and hired hands at the bottom of the ridge (xiakan) . This spatial visualization of social stratifi­ cation is repeatedly invoked, particularly when exploring the feelings of liminal fig­ ures like the foreman, Huofeng, who as servant and lover is torn between these two spaces. For Shanding, the poor folk at the bottom of the ridge lead a life built around the natural, agricultural rhythms, and this mode of life has a close relationship with that of the primeval forest; they depend on the power and virtue of the forest for

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justice and renewal. The ridge-bottom community is, however, also tied to the city by the cash nexus, upon which it depends for the sale of its harvest and the purchase of its necessities.

The gentry residents of the Lin family compound-who own all the land in the valley-have, over the last 1 50 years or so since they settled the land, had a dual orientation: as paternalistic landlords, they have looked toward their estate and home in the valley, and, as elites who have served in the bureaucracy and the military from the Qing through the early Republic, they have looked toward the centers of national power. Xiaobiao's father's name, Guowei, means "national prestige," whereas the name of his villainous brother Guorong means "national glory." When the narrator tells us the history of the locality from the lives of this elite-about their roles in the Republican revolution of 1 9 1 1 , the Yuan Shikai presidency, the various warlord wars-the locality is brought into the linear time of the nation. But those at the bottom of the ridge neither understand nor care about these momentous mat­ ters; they can only remember the panicked evacuations during the Russo-Japanese War and are dejected by news of the continuing fall of the local currency under the warlords. When Xiaobiao decides all of a sudden to leave the valley for a second time to pursue his studies at the university, he addresses the disappointed young hired hands and tenants, who have developed a fondness and gratitude for him, with a halting and confused speech. The speech is full of such "foreign," temporal phrases as "historically speaking" and "in the present stage," and as Xiaobiao utters them he sees the tenderness of the laborers toward him suddenly evaporate. He wonders if they suspect and hate these words; he hastens to conclude by saying that "the land is our life; no matter who you are, to leave the land is to commit suicide."?!

This passage not only attests to the two kinds of time that increasingly separate the two classes within the valley, it also contains the central tension that governs relations between the two parts: the tension between community and class. It is per­ haps here, in the highly complex and contradictory feelings and consciousness of the two classes with respect to each other, and the even more elaborated attitudes of those class and gender fragments in between, that Liang Shanding delivers his most penetrating social insights, in marked contrast, as we shall see, to his depiction of urban society. These relations are explored in the direct encounter between the classes, in the romance ofXiaobiao with the tenant girl Xiaolian: in his callous treat­ ment of her and the unresolved, violent swings in her attitude toward him and his family; in the uncompromising self-sacrifice of the aunt for the sake of the honor and wealth of the patriarchal lineage, even as she develops a shame-filled relationship with her servant.

Shanding seems to be saying that the best of the landed classes take their paternal­ ism to heart and even when they scheme and deceive, they may be forced to act in the interests of their community. As for the poor, they can love and need their lord, even though they may know exactly what schemes he may be up to. Once the rail­ road line has been established and part of the land has been sold through chicanery

Local Worlds: The Poetics and Politics of the Native Place ,.--...., 23 1

to the railroad company, the tenants are outraged and feel greatly betrayed. The Mongol Huang says of the landlords,

["]We depend on them, we depend on the land; how can we live without the land? . . . We have nourished the land as we have our children; we have even trans­ formed barren lands into ripe fields, and now we have been cast aside."

Huofeng felt a bottomless sympathy for these sincere (chengshz) peasants, but he also felt that sincerity was nothing but a symbol of a kind of servility (xunfo). Having served and obeyed for several generations, they had suffered on account of this sincerity and also been deluded for several generations by the promise of the "future world," which they could never cast off. Their fatalism and sincerity appeared to be destined for each other. Suddenly, Huofeng realized that he too was such a person and it made him feel extremely uneasyJ2

This is clearly no pastoral idyll, nor is it simply a case of false consciousness, because for Shanding, as for Huofeng, the sincerity of the peasants has value despite its susceptibility to abuse. It is the quality that Fei Xiaotong called bense, and that he tied so insistently to the rootedness of the people in land and place. Shanding gives us several instances of its liability to appropriation. When the comprador Qian Rulong devises a cunning plan to mortgage the land in order to borrow the hostage money for Xiaobiao's release (thereby releasing the land for his purposes) , he plays up the virtues of the peasants of Langgou to the Japanese manager-precisely those qualities of simplicity, honesty, patience, communal solidarity, and landlord pater­ nalism.73 And yet this sincerity-the bense-for Shanding is perhaps the only resource with which to build and rebuild the community, as revealed by the episodes in which the peasants resist the bandits and stand steadfastly for the community. It is in the quality of their sincerity, the tension between its virtue and susceptibility to abuse, that the contradiction in native-place writing that we observed in Lu Xun is concentrated. The true color has to be both preserved and superseded.

The third chronotope is that of the city, Nanmanzhan. Shanding's social and psychological depiction of characters that belong to the city is perhaps the weakest part of the novel. They are, for the most part, stereotypes of cigar-puffing, scheming businessmen and their obsequious hangers-on; of languorous ladies playing cards and smoking opium late into the night; of back-street brothels and the like. But the spatial description of the city is quite striking. Chapter 5, where the city is first described, opens with an account from a bird's-eye view of the network of roads, electrical and telegraph lines, and nodes of business activity and speculation. In between these urban nodes, the unconnected places are like silted-up spaces, noisy but without purposeful conversation. Thereafter, the spatial description itself tends to become de-spatialized, as the author follows the course of electrical and telegraph lines all the way north to the borderless wilds and south to the harbor. From the harbor, information can be communicated to the dealers and speculators in a single minute.

This insight into the loss of place as a site of reference, generated by the accelerat-

232 � Chapter 6

ing pace of capitalist change (or what is now called time-space compression), is dramatized by Shanding's observation of the city's preoccupation with speculatory capital, the market in agricultural futures. Manchuria had become a most important agricultural supplier for the Japanese market, and the futures market included not only brokers and speculators, but landlords and property dealers who drove up prop­ erty prices with the promise of increased access by the extension of the railroad to such lands. In this market where speculators and futures traders "buy and sell no thing" (maikong maikong), people live neither in the past nor the present, but in the future. For such people, the time of the present and the past (which for the author is the time of community and authenticity) is irrelevant.

The ultimate drama in Green Valley is played out at the level of its representa­ tional structures, by moralized representatives of the chronotopes. Authenticity inheres among the people of the valley, whose life hews closely to the rhythms of nature in the timespace of the primeval forest. It is an authenticiry that emerges from the acceptance of the cyclical time of natural regeneration, and is recognizable in simplicity and a capacity for suffering. This time of the locality is directly opposed to the linear time of capitalist, urban moderniry, and the novel tracks the corrosive and destructive power of the latter upon both the valley and the forest. But this force is also self-destructive, as the market collapses and Nanmanzhan is left a ghost town. In the last scene, our protagonists celebrate the victory of the valley's rebirth and the natural principle of regeneration.

Although the novel is a moral narrative told through its representational struc­ tures, its importance derives from the way Shanding creatively refashions historical discourses of the region, including events, processes, and popular imagery, to his purposes/4 The Chinese pioneer and bandit played a major role in the settlement of Manchuria and an even more overwhelming role in popular historical consciousness. Through much of the nineteenth century, Chinese woodsmen, goldminers, ginseng diggers, and others had crossed the mountains and rivers as far as the distant banks of the Ussuri in search of the forest's wealth. Given the imperial ban on their activi­ ties, they were as much bandits as entrepreneurs, forming fugitive communities in the remote forests and ruling satellite settlements in the valleys by the code of the forest/5 Even as late as 1 887, the area around the Manchu's ancestral Changbaishan continued to remain out of bounds for Chinese. Here H. E. M. James found such outlaw "little republics," fully self-governing, with presidents and councils that pos­ sessed "the power of life and death."76 Perhaps the most famous of these was the "little forest kingdom" founded by Han Bianwai, or "Han of the frontier," which expired after fifty years in 1 925.77

In general, by the late nineteenth century, many of these outlawed communities were in the process of becoming recognized settlements controlled by the bandit­ turned-landlord, who sometimes cooperated with or operated within the shell of the extending Qing administration.78 As an early-twentieth-century observer wrote, "a man is sometimes bandit, merchant, and magistrate all at once."79 Certainly ban­ ditry also offered military-political careers in this unsettled borderland, where even

Local Worlds: The Poetics and Politics of the Native Place r--> 233

apex warlords like Zhang Zuolin carved a career by playing off contesting powers and building upon the deadly politics of sworn brotherhood.80 Nonetheless, the figure of the Manchurian bandit, or Red Beard (honghuzz), continued to be legend­ ary not only within Manchuria and China, but in Japan as well. Indeed, Lattimore still saw the Manchurian bandit as "the true frontiersman" whose independence was pitted against powerful propertied interests.8!

Quite apart from the pioneer bandits, the war-torn and frequently anarchic his­ tory of this contested borderland in the twentieth century more commonly pro­ duced desperate and ruthless bandit gangs. Their vast numbers included railroad coolies, demobilized soldiers, and ordinary peasants confronted with a highly unequal land-ownership system. Alice Tisdale wrote in 1 9 1 7, "In the early fall in Manchuria, there is a sort of presto change from farmer into bandit. It seems a trifle of a psychological somersault-one day a plodding farmer, the next a highway­ man."82 Their ranks, though, swelled in years of chaos and difficulty, such as during the many local and international wars, the fall of the Qing, and the annexation of Korea.83

Given the severe effects of the worldwide depression of the 1 930s on the com­ mercialized rural economy of Manchuria, many peasant-bandits, including secret societies such as the Red Spears and the Big Swords, were mobilized to oppose the Japanese. The Korean border regions of Manchukuo, including Tonghua and Jian­ dao Provinces, had long been hotbeds of bandit and rebel activity, and the anti­ Japanese movement-both Chinese and Korean-flourished there through the early 1 930s.84 However, many of these patriotic resistance bands became alienated from the population, not only because of Japanese counterinsurgency measures, but also because most were not disciplined revolutionary forces. Their demands on the local communities were arbitrary and heavy, and their behavior often rapacious.85 None­ theless, the romantic image of the bandit grew during this period.

Several Chinese writers before Shanding had already transfigured the Manchu­ rian bandit into a symbol of the region's authenticity. Xiao Jun and Duanmu Hong­ liang found in the bandit the incarnation of the vital forces of the region: wild, ruthless, but innately good. In their stories, it is often through the nationalist narra­ tive of selfless service in the patriotic cause that the gangster is ultimately redeemed and his inner virtue restored. Note that both these authors left Manchukuo soon after its establishment, and so wrote about the resistance from afar.86 To whatever extent the Manchurian bandit may have retained a spirit of resistance and indepen­ dence, Shanding's imaginative deployment of this historical background did not uti­ lize an explicitly nationalist narrative. While the bandit gang is romanticized, the romance derives from the authenticity of the forest and valley in opposition to capi­ talism and the city. Shanding invests the bandit myth with the legendary values of the vernacular novel, Water Margin-which we might note is set in Shan dong, the homeland of most immigrantsY The "knight-errant" tradition celebrated in this novel also dominated Chinese popular culture, and remarkably, the self-perceptions of secret societies since Ming and Qing times. By investing the Manchurian land-

234 ,--...., Chapter 6

scape with the core ideals of popular Chinese culture, he brings it into the Chinese world. At the same time, by depicting the bandits as embodiments of the natural and timeless authenticity of the primeval forests, he seeks to capture the difference of Manchuria. 88

What is lost in Shanding is an older history. The Russian surveyer and naturalist Arseniev, who with the Goldi guide Dersu explored the region around the Ussuri at the turn of the twentieth century, has left behind a remarkable travelogue. Dersu the Trapper-and the film version, Dersu Uzala, made by Akira Kurosawa-whose fuller exploration must await another occasion, is perhaps one of the most haunting accounts of the "authentic primitive" I have encountered. But Dersu is also a valu­ able record of the relations between the tribespeople and the Chinese. To be sure, Arseniev provides vivid descriptions of exploitation and culture loss, and there is evidence of tribal resistance and the plundering of Chinese settlements. But Arseniev also describes the interpenetration of cultures, as the animistic cults of the tiger or the mountain enter the lives of Chinese forest-dwellers.89 The early pioneers often attached themselves to Mongol, Manchu, or other non-Chinese tribes, and bandit heroes such as the famed Chan-bao commanded bands of mixed ethnicity, with equal influence and authority over Chinese and aboriginal alike.90 Shanding regarded Manchuria as something of a wasteland before the Chinese settlers brought history and literature to the region.91 The principal traces of the indigenous people in his story are of a disappearing culture, expressed in occasional references to their malevolent shamans.

The production of the local in the form of the pastoral-of idylls threatened by encroaching modernity-has been described for many parts of the world.92 In evok­ ing the vernacular tradition of the "rivers and lakes," the author is able to infuse this global concern and form with meaning from the moral narratives and symbolism of Chinese popular culture. In this respect, it is interesting to compare Green Valley with the pastoralism of Shen Congwen, who wrote about his native western Hunan and the Miao. Shen deployed the figure of the primitive Miao (the Miao woman, in particular) to revitalize mainstream Chinese society with the energy of the fron­ tier, even as the idyllic landscape was being ravaged. Despite the European prove­ nance of Shen's pastoral trope, Timothy Oakes has suggested that the meaning of Shen's literary work has to be understood in the context of the transformation of the Confucian anxiety about the frontier.93 But if Shen sought to vitalize Chinese culture with the primitive authenticity of the Miao, Green Valley identifies not the primitive but the Chinese bandit as possessing the life-giving power of the primeval forests. If in Shen the frontier will save the heartland, in Green Valley, the frontier was already none other than the heartland.

We are accustomed to think of regions as evolving naturalistically within the forma­ tion of states. While there are certainly historical forces that tie regions and localities to higher centers and larger formations for extended periods, there is nothing deter­ ministic about these relationships, nor is it predetermined as to what kinds of politi-

Local Worlds: The Poetics and Politics of the Native Place ........., 235

cal formations-nations, empires, civilizations-may attach to the region. During much of the twentieth century, the localiry, which occasionally symbolized an entire region, would have to be produced as part of a sovereign formation through metro­ politan cultural discourses and practices. The contradictory imperatives for identit­ arian states to modernize and simultaneously produce an authentic, timeless essence drove them and cultural producers to treat the localiry as objects both of develop­ ment and of identiry. Thus, even when Lu Xun or Fei Xiaotong sought to employ native-place writing for reformist goals, they could not avoid a nativist cathexis, a poetics of identiry.

My study of Shanding's Green Valley shows us how the local as space and senti­ ment is created through the relationship between a novel's representational struc­ tures, its re-figuration of historical imagery, and the politics of its reception. Through this procedure, we also see the stakes involved in the production of authen­ ticiry. The competing claims on the localiry-as the metonym for Manchuria-by various political forces derived from the logic of controlling a place by controlling its representation. In the identity-based polities of the modern era, control of terri­ tory is critically dependent on the subjective production of its space as an object of identification. Of course, Shanding could never fully control the sentiment for the local that he helped generate; the particular representation of the locality would be shaped, among other factors, by a regime with a particular constituency and ideol­ ogy. Despite the author's projection of heartland traditions into the frontier, the celebration of nature permitted the novel's absorption by Japanese authorities into the regime's representation of Manchukuo as a natural space. Even more, in its cele­ bration of folk countertraditions, the "ancestral aesthetic" could come to serve the non-national, East Asian civilizational traditions so important to Manchukuo ide­ ology.

Manchuria continues to occupy an important place in the Japanese cultural imag­ ination. It remains an important icon for contemporary writers such as Murakami Haruki and Nakagami Kenji.94 Tourist sites in the Northeast are still crowded with Japanese visitors, although those with personal memories of the place are obviously dwindling. But to return to where we began this chapter, in the Northeast itself the region's identity is being produced in a complex dialectic with the memory of Manchukuo. In the current rage of native-place writing, readers avidly consume writings both contemporary and from the Manchukuo period. The republications of his work reveals that interest in Shanding, while not as great as in Xiao Hong or Xiao Jun, is considerable. Let us consider, briefly and finally, the writings of one of the most popular contemporary writers of the Northeast within this framework of landscape and identity.

Among the most celebrated xungen or "searching for roots" writers of the 1 980s, Zheng Wanlong, hails from Heilongjiang and, interestingly enough, writes about the Oroqen. His stories have been reprinted in many anthologies of contemporary fiction. In the introduction to the translated collection called Strange Tales from Strange Lands (Yixiang yiwen), Kam Louie argues that Zheng is really writing, like

236 r----J Chapter 6

all xungen writers, about the truth of the self, the nation, and the human condition. In particular, Zheng, a Han who left the Northeast at the age of eight, utilizes the practices and rituals of the Oroqen and the landscape of the region to discuss themes of alienation centered on the masculinist ethos of rugged loners in the wilderness. Countering PRC critics who argue that Zheng represents the authenticity of the primitive in his descriptions of their passion and immersion in nature, Louie believes that Zheng finds fatalism and despair in savage society and a still greater alienation among these individuals, whose lives frequently end in senseless savagery.95

One cannot doubt that Zheng's intellectual message contains ironic, critical, and even dystopic elements. However, the dominant representational structure of the stories emphasizes the landscape and the individuals who live and die by it. The physical features of the region are massively foregrounded and the stories of individ­ uals gain meaning from the precarious life that they fashion within this environ­ ment. Deep ancient forests, mighty rivers (alternately frozen and torrential), and volcanic mountains (both icy and fiery) produce a space that overwhelms the time of history. We can only guess from stray references that the stories are set sometime in the first half of the twentieth century. From this perspective, the stories are not principally about tribals or Han, but about the meaning of a landscape. No one knows whether the terrifYing Three Kick Chen, who drapes a large leopard skin around his shoulders, is a Han Chinese or a Daur. He returns to die in Xiaosu Gully, where the snow will seal him in for the long winter. On his way, however, he passes on his dog-faced ring to a steely-eyed village boy who vows to honor his debts.96

Savagery (of different kinds, to be sure) exists on both sides, Han and non-Han. Vengeful shamans, tribal victimization of women, exploitative merchants all occupy the canvas, but the landscape and the individuals who are locked in it-fugitives and exiles, bandits and adventurers, miners and woodsmen-have a special place in these stories. In "The Gorge," a certain Shenken has been banished from the Oro­ qen tribe because he laughed at the exposed buttocks of a shaman during a ritual performance. When he encounters a couple of city-struck Oroqen youth in the mountain, he refuses to let them use their guns to kill a pregnant bear. Suddenly attacked by the bear, he dies in her embrace as he kills her with a knife. When the youths carrying the stretcher bearing Shenken and parts of the bear emerge from the mountain, they feel an incredible lightness and recognize that the souls of Shenken and the bear-totem of the Oroqen-have been left behind on the mountain.97

The stories reveal an evolution in the national incorporation of Manchuria since Green Valley. Zheng draws from older Chinese representational structures: the leg­ ends of the pioneers, the vows of secret brotherhood, the upholding of righteousness. At the same time, there is a greater self-confidence in incorporating tribal cultural elements such as shamanism, totemism, and animism-in particular the worship of mountain and animal spirits-even if they are processed through social scientific understandings. On the referential level, the preeminent theme in the stories con­ cerns nature's challenge to culture-a composite culture of Han and non-Han-in which culture fails miserably. However, in the process of depicting this challenge,

Local Worlds: The Poetics and Politics of the Native Place .--.. 237

where loyalty, brotherhood, righteousness, and animism yield to nature--dying heroically in the embrace of the bear, or passing on one's honor before being swal­ lowed by the snow-nature itself is made meaningful by a set of cultural categories that continue the project of region making exemplified by Shanding.

Whence the continuing search for regional identity? Many complicated factors have contributed to this brew of regional sentiment, including several historical ones. Among them is a persistent sense of the cultural backwardness of a recently settled frontier; the memoty of the region as having been abandoned by the nation­ alists and world powers; and the lingering resentment that exploitation by the Japa­ nese and the rampaging Soviet occupation was followed by victimization and allegations of collaboration and contamination. The loyalty of the Northeast to the nation was questioned even in the 1 950s, when Gao Gang, the top party leader from the Northeast, was accused by the 1955 National Party Conference of the CCP of attempting "to make an independent kingdom."98 But common histoty alone does not make a region. The distinctiveness of regional society and culture in the North­ east builds upon the successive, even if contestatory, representations of the region, from Manchu ideas and policies to the historical reception of Shanding and Zheng Wanlong.

The state response to this welling up of sentiment for community and place in the aftermath of the Mao era was almost immediate.99 Soon after he became deputy director of Liaoning Party Cultural Department, Zhang Yumao, a one-time profes­ sor of literature and deputy mayor of Shenyang, invited the recently rehabilitated Shanding to edit the first collection of Manchukuo literature. Zhang subsequently sponsored the publication of the canonical fourteen-volume series "Modern Litera­ ture of the Northeast, 1 9 19-1949." In his introduction to the series, Zhang under­ scores the regional quality of the literature. In particular, he regards native-place literature not only as the dominant genre, but as the most significant, since it is what makes the region a region. In a gesture designed to heal festering wounds, Zhang reaches out to the writers of the time, declaring that there were only a handful of real collaborators among them. Most had a complex attitude, being opposed to Japanese colonial literature but also deeply indebted to progressive Japanese writers and their translations of literature about the oppressed around the world. loo Through efforts like Zhang's, the divisive politics of the past have ceased to haunt the literary public of the Northeast. What remains, however, is a sense of the land as brimming with sentiment, a continuing source of attachment and authenticity.

Notes

1 . Bryna Goodman, Native Place, City and Nation: Regional Networks and Identities (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1 995). While the Republican era ( 1 9 1 2-1949) was dominated by the growing ideological hegemony of nationalism, it was characterized by the reality of weak political control. The nation-state was thus not only forced to grant substantial de facto autonomy politically and economically, but also to tolerate alternative discursive and

238 r--.> Chapter 6

ideological defenses of the local against the nation, such as the rural education movement of Liang Shuming and others, or the federalist movement.

2. See Kishimoto Mio, " 'Fengsu' to Jidaikan-Minmatsu Shinsho no keiseironsha kara mita So, Gen, Minsho" (Chinese history in "fengsu" perspective: The Song-Yuan-Ming tran­ sition and statecraft discourse in the sixteenth century) (paper presented to the Song-Yuan­ Ming Transition in Chinese History Conference, Lake Arrowhead, Calif., June 5-1 1 , 1 997).

3. David Der-wei Wang, Fictional Realism in Twentieth-Century China: Mao Dun, Lao She, Shen Congwen (New York: Columbia University Press, 1 992), 28 1 .

4 . H . D. Harootunian, "Disciplinizing Native Knowledge and Producing Place: Yanag­ ita Kunio, Origuchi Shinobu, Takata Yasuma," in Culture and Identity: japanese Intellectuals during the Interwar Years, ed. J. Thomas Rimer (Princeton: Princeton Universiry Press, 1 988), 1 04.

5. See Zhao Jinghua, "Shu Sakujin (Zhou Zuoren) to Yanagita Kunio: Koyo shinko o chushin to suru minzokugaku" (Zhou Zuoren and Yanagita Kunio: Folklore centered on traditional beliefs), Nihon Chugoku gakkaiho 47 ( 1 995): 1 96-97.

6. Zhao, "Shu Sakujin (Zhou Zuoren) to Yanagita Kunio," 1 98. 7. Zhao, "Shu Sakujin (Zhou Zuoren) to Yanagita Kunio," 200-204. 8. Zhou Zuoren, "Difang yu wenyi" (Localiry and literature) (1 923), in Zhou Zuoren

zaoqi sanwenxuan, (Shanghai: Shanghai wenyi chubanshe, 1 984), 308-9. 9. Zhou Zuoren, "Difang yu wenyi," 3 1 0.

10. Zhou Zuoren, "Difang yu wenyi," 3 1 1 . 1 1 . Harootunian, "Disciplinizing Native Knowledge and Producing Place," 1 0 1 . 1 2 . Ozaki Fumiaki, "Shu Sakujin (Zhou Zuoren) no shinson teisho to sono hamon"

(Zhou Zuoren's advocacy of the New Village movement and its ripples) , in Meiji Daigaku Kyoyo Ronshu 207 ( 1988): 1 1 9-36; 237 ( 1 991) : 67-85.

13. See Kawamura Minato, Mamhu Hokai: "Daitoa bungaku " to sakkadachi (The collapse of Manchukuo: Writers and "Greater East Asia literature") (Tokyo: Bungei shunju, 1 998), 85-86.

14. Kawamura Minato, Mamhu Hokai, 45-48. 15 . Kawamura Minato, Mamhu Hokai, 53-67. 16. David T. Murphey, "Space, Race, and Geopolitical Necessity: Geopolitical Rhetoric

in German Colonial Revanchism, 1 9 1 9-1 933," in Geography and Empire, ed. Anne Godlew­ ska and Neil Smith (Oxord: Blackwell, 1 994), 1 77-78.

1 7. Keiichi Takeuchi, "The Japanese Imperial Tradition, Western Imperialism and Mod­ ern Japanese Geography," in Geography and Empire, ed. Anne Godlewska and Neil Smith (Oxford: Blackwell, 1 994), 195.

1 8. Karen Wigen, "Teaching about Home: Geography at Work in the Prewar Nagano Classroom," journal 0/ Asian Studies 59 (2000): 56 1 .

19. Hatada, Chugoku sonraku to kyodotai riron. Japanese folklorists and ethnographers in different parts of the empire, inspired by Yanagita, coined the expression Daitoa minzokugaku, or Greater East Asian Folklore Studies (Asian Folklore, for short), which became a part of the larger ideology of pan-Asianism and its official counterpart, the Greater East Asian Co­ prosperity Sphere. Pan-Asian Folklore employed the historical framework of the imperial Chinese huayi order underlying the imperial tribute system; see Kawamura Minato, "Daitoa minzokugaku " no kyojitsu (The truths and falsehoods of "Great East Asian folklore") (Tokyo: Kodansha, 1 996), 1 2-13. Its chief methodology was to establish Chinese civilizational cul-

Local Worlds: The Poetics and Politics of the Native Place ..--... 239

tures-Chinese, Japanese, and Korean-at the core and locate other cultures beyond it in concentric circles. Needless to say, the center of the core was no longer China, but Japan. The idea was to intensify the study of the folklore of the core so as to radiate the ethos of the center to the peripheries. To be sure, Asian Folklore continued to distinguish itself from the Western methodology of comparative folklore studies. In theory, each of the cultures of Greater East Asia was to reflect its own distinctiveness even as each revealed its connections with Greater East Asia. But a hierarchy was also built in to the idea of distinctiveness, because each nationaliry's individual folklore was tied to its stage of evolution and hence dependent on the leadership of Japan. The characteristic Japanese formulation of combining uniqueness with evolutionary hierarchy was thus extended to folklore studies in order to secure Japan's special superioriry.

20. Watsuji Tetsuro, Climate and Culture: A Philosophical Study, trans. Geoffrey Bownas ( 1 935; reprint, New York: Greenwood Press in cooperation with Yushodo Co., 1 988). See also Takeuchi, "The Japanese Imperial Tradition," 200.

2 1 . Susan Daruvala, Zhou Zuoren and an Alternative Chinese Response to Modernity (Cam­ bridge: Harvard University Press, 2000), 1 05, 106.

22. Jin Qisan, "Woguo nanbei zhi dili guandian" (Geographical perspectives on the north and south of our nation), Fangzhi Yuekan 8 ( 1935).

23. Ge Suicheng, Xiangtu Dili Yanjiufo (The research methods of community geography) (Shanghai: Zhonghua shuju, 1 939), 3-4.

24. Ge Suicheng, Xiangtu Dili Yanjiufo, 8-10. 25. Daruvala, Zhou Zuoren, 1 52-54. 26. Fei Xiaotong, "Xiangtu bense," in Xiangtu Zhongguo (Rural China) (Shanghai:

Guanchashe, 1 947), 3. The essay has been translated by Gary Hamilton and Wang Zheng, but the translators tend to ignore the poetics that is critical to it. Thus for instance, Hamilton and Wang translate berne as "special characteristics." See Fei Xiaotong, "Special Characteris­ tics of Rural Society," in From the Soil: The Foundations of Chinese Society--A Translation of Fei Xiaotong's 'Xiangtu Zhongguo, " trans. Gary G. Hamilton and Wang Zheng (Berkeley: Universiry of California Press, 1 992), 37-44.

27. Hamilton and Wang's translation of difongxing as "parochialism" imparts a negative feeling; see Fei, "Special Characteristics of Rural Society," 4 1 . It is interesting that English has no positive term for local orientation.

28. Fei, "Xiangtu bense," 5. 29. Fei, "Xiangtu bense," 6-7. 30. R. David Arkush, Fei Xiaotong and Sociology in Revolutionary China (Cambridge,

Mass. : Council on East Asian Studies, 1 981 ), 145-46. 3 1 . Daruvala, Zhou Zuoren, and Wang, Fictional Realism in Twentieth-Century China. In

addition, drawing attention to the textual dimension in Shen or Yanagita, scholars like David Wang have noted that the nostalgic writing of the native place hinges on the simultaneous "(re)discovery and erasure of the treasured image of the homeland." David Wang also finds value in Shen Congwen's native-place fiction which by means of displacement "makes possi­ ble the (re)definition of something either irretrievable or unspeakable" and thus enriches what is impoverished in memory. See Wang, Fictional Rt:alism in Twentieth-Century China, 250, 252, 276. For Yanagita, see Ivy, Discourses of the Vanishing, 1 995.

32. Christy, "Representing the Rural." 33. Lu Xun, introduction to Xiaoshuo erji (Second collection of fiction), ed. Lu Xun

(Shanghai: Liangyou gongsi, 1 935), 9.

240 ,--...., Chapter 6

34. Lu, introduction to Xiaoshuo erji, 9-10. 35. This refers to the collection ofLu Xun's [Lu HstinJ writings, Dawn Blossoms Plucked

at Dusk, trans. Yang Hsien-yi and Gladys Yang (Beijing: Foreign Languages Press, 1976). 36. Lu, "Zai Jiuloushang" (In the wine shop), in Panghuang Lu Xun Quanji ( 1 924;

reprint, Taipei: Tangshan, 1989), 4:38. 37. Lu, introduction to Xiaoshuo erji, 16. 38. Lu, introduction to Xiaoshuo erji, 8. 39. See, for instance, Ivy, Discourses of the Vanishing, 1 06-7. 40. Liang Shanding, Liisede Gu (Green valley) ( 1942; reprint, Shenyang: Chunfeng

Wenyi chubanshe, 1987). 4 1 . Liang Shanding, "Wenxuede guxiang" (The hometown of literature), in Dongbei

xiandai wenxue shiliao (Historical materials from modern literature of the Northeast), vol. 2 (Shenyang: Liaoning shehui kexueyuan, 1 980), 93-99.

42. Okada Hideki"Mansho no kyodo bungei-Shan Ding 'Ltisede gu' 0 jiku toshite" (Native-place literature in Manzhouguo, with reference to Shan Ding's Green Valley), Nogusa 44 ( 1989): 29.

43. Liang Shanding, Lmede Gu, 235. 44. Feng Weiqun, " 'Wenyi zhidao gangyao' chulong yihou" (After the appearance of the

"Summary of Guidelines to Art and Literature") in Weiman wenhua, ed. Sun Bang et al., Weiman shiliao congshu (Series of Manchukuo historical materials) (Changchun: Jilin ren­ min chubanshe, 1993), 1 3-14.

45. Feng, '' 'Wenyi zhidao gangyao' chulong yihou," 15-16; Jie Xueshi, "Riwei shiqide wenhua tongzhi zhengce" (Cultural control policy in the period of Manchukuo), in Dongbei lunxian shiqi wenxue (Literature of the occupation period in the Northeast) , ed. Feng Weiqun et al. (Shenyang: Shenyang chubanshe, 1992), 1 82-98.

46. Quoted in Feng, " 'Wenyi zhidao gangyao,' '' 14. 47. SjSB, December 14, 1 943, 447; Lti Qinwen, "Dongbei lunxianqude wailai wenxue

yu xiangtu wenxue" (Foreign and native-place literature in the literature of occupied north­ east China), in Zhongri zhanzheng yu wenxue, ed. Yamada Keizo and Lti Yuanming (Chang­ chun: Dongbei shifandaxue chubanshe, 1992), 1 53-54.

48. See Kawamura Minato, Manshu Hokai, 7-32. Quoted in Lti Qinwen, "Dongbei lun­ xianqude wailai wenxue yu xiangtu wenxue," 1 52.

49. "Zenme xie Manzhou?" (How to write about Manchuria?) [seminar transcription], Yiwenzhi (Literary records) 1 , no.3 ( 1944): 27-37.

50. "Zenme xie Manzhou?" 29, 34. 5 1 . Lti Qinwen, "Dongbei lunxianqude wailai wenxue yu xiangtu wenxue," 147. See also

Sun, "Lusede gu yu xiangtu wenxue," (Green Valley and native-place literature), in Dongbei lunxian shiqi wenxue (Literature of the occupation period in northeast China), ed. Feng Wei­ qun et al. (Shenyang: Shenyang Chubanshe, 1992), 225; and Pang Zengyu, "Dongbei lunxi­ anqi xiangtu wenxue yu Zhongguo xiandai wenxue shishang xiangtu wenxue zhi bijiao" (Comparison of occupied Northeast native-place literature and native-place literature in mod­ ern Chinese literary history), in Dongbei lunxian shiqi wenxue (Literature of the occupation period in northeast China), ed. Feng Weiqun et. al (Shenyang: Shenyang Chubanshe, 1 992), 65.

52. Hongbaochu, "Summary of Guidelines to Art and Literature," quoted in Sun Zhon­ gtian, "Ltisede gu yu xiangtu wenxue," 225. See also Feng, " 'Wenyi zhidao gangyao,' '' 14.

Local Worlds: The Poetics and Politics of the Native Place ,--...., 241

53. Liaoning shehui kexueyuan wenxue yanjiusuo (Liaoning Province social science acad­ emy literarure research instirute) et aI., ed., Dongbei xiand4i wenxue shiliao (Hisrorical materi­ als from modern literarure of the Northeast), vol. 1 (Shenyang: Liaoning shehui kexueyuan. , 1 980), 1 1 5.

54. See Ouchi Takayoshi, "Dongbei wenxue ershinian" (Twenty years of Northeast liteararure) ( 1 944), selections trans. Wang Wenshi, and "Zuijin Zhongguoren de wenxue" (Recent literarure by Chinese people) ( 1939), trans. Wang Wenshi, in Dongbei xiand4i wen­ xue shiliao (Hisrorical materials from modern literarure of the Northeast), ed. Liaoning shehui kexueyuan wenxue yanjiusuo et al., vol. 1 (Shenyang: Liaoning shehui kexueyuan, 1980), 87-1 1 5.

55. Lii Qinwen, "Dongbei lunxianqude wailai wenxue yu xiangru wenxue," 1 52-53. 56. Okada, "Manshii no kyodo bungei," 30-31 . Writers under state surveillance proba­

bly also had litrie choice bur ro auend the various literary conferences. Several of them, including Shanding, did auend these, although there is also evidence that by 1944 they were merely going through the motions of participation. See Kawamura, Manshu Hokai, 26-27.

57. Huang Wanhua, "Liang Shanding he tade 'Liise de Gu' " (Liang Shan ding and his Green Valley), in Dongbei wenxue yanjiu shiliao (Northeast literarure research materials), vol. 5 (Harbin: Harbin wenxueyuan, 1986), 1 1 .

58. Liang Shanding, Lmede Gu, 235-36. See also Liang Shanding, "Wenxuede guxiang," 94.

59. Pang, "Dongbei lunxianqi xiangtu wenxue," and Lii, "Dongbei lunxianqude wailai wenxue yu xiangtu wenxue."

60. Pang, "Dongbei lunxianqi xiangru wenxue," 66. 6 1 . See Okada, "Manshii no kyodo bungei," 1 1 , and Lii, "Dongbei lunxianqude wailai

wenxue yu xiangru wenxue," 1 37-45. 62. Sun, "Liisede gu yu xiangtu wenxue," 225. 63. Lil, "Dongbei lunxianqude wailai wenxue yu xiangru wenxue," 1 29-30. 64. Lil, "Dongbei lunxianqude wailai wenxue yu xiangru wenxue," 144. 65. Sun, "Lilsede gu yu xiangru wenxue," 233. 66. Sun, "Lilsede gu yu xiangru wenxue," 234. 67. See Lil, "Dongbei lunxianqude wailai wenxue yu xiangru wenxue," 144-45. 68. Okada Hideki, "Geibunshi ha no bungaku kiseki-Manshii ni okeru Chiigokujin

sakka" (Tracks of the Literary Records group: Chinese writers in Manchuria), Nogusa 39 ( 1987): 96-101 .

69. Okada, "Geibunshi ha no bungaku kiseki," 87-92, 95. 70. However, Okada, who is often sympathetic to the PRC scholars and Shanding,

insists that Japanese writers in Manchuria such as Otani actually sought ro cuirivate a vision of Manchuria independent of Japan, and shared Shanding's desire for a regional literarure of the Northeast reflecting its special qualities for both Chinese and Japanese writers. See Okada Hideki, "Geibunshi ha no bungaku kiseki-Manshii ni okeru Chiigokujin sakka" (Tracks of the Literary Records group: Chinese writers in Manchuria), Nogusa 38 ( 1986): 2-3, and "Wei Manzhouguo wenyi zhengcede zhankai-cong 'wenhuahui' dao 'yiwen lianmeng' " (The development of literary policy in the puppet state of Manzhouguo: From "cultural associa­ tion" ro "literary federation"), in Dongbei lunxian shiqi wenxue (Literarure of the occupation period in northeast China), ed. Feng Weiqun et al. (Shenyang: Shenyang chubanshe, 1992), 1 59-6 1 . Okada also believes that PRC scholars from the region have not fully acknowledged

242 r--> Chapter 6

rhis fact. However, see Zhang Yumao, "Zongxu" (General introduction), in Dongbei xiandai wenxue daxi, 1919-1949 (Modern literature of rhe Norrheast, 19 19-1949), 14 vols. , ed. Zhang Yumao (Shenyang: shenyang chubanshe, 1 996), 1 : 1-24. Okada is perhaps right in pointing to rhe nationalistic exaggerations of rhe PRC scholars, particularly in relation to Japanese writers. But he fails to see rhat quite apart from what Shanding and rhe Japanese writers may have desired, rheir effon to produce an authenticity in rhe region was easily appropriable by metropolitan interests.

71 . Liang Shanding, Liisede Gu, 75. 72. Liang Shanding, Liisede Gu, 1 87. 73. Liang Shanding, Liisede Gu, 1 66. 74. My understanding of the relationship between histoty and fiction is inspired by Paul

Ricoeur. See his analysis of event (figuration), historiography (con-figuration) and fiction (re­ figuration) in historical process in Time and Narrative, vols. 1 and 2 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1 984-85), and his shoner piece, "The Function of Fiction in Shaping Real­ ity," in Reflection and Imagination: A Paul Ricoeur Reader, ed. Mario J. Valdes (Toronto: Uni­ versity of Toronto Press, 1 991) , 1 17-36.

75. H. E. M. James, The Long White Mountain or journey into Manchuria (London: Longmans, Green, 1 888), 14, and R. Lee, Manchurian Frontier, 1 10.

76. James, Long White Mountain, 252-53. 77. R. Lee, Manchurian Frontier, 9 1-92. 78. James, Long White Mountain, 306, 3 18. 79. Alice Tisdale, Pioneering Where the World Is Old (New York: Henty Holt, 19 17), 25. 80. McCormack, Chang Tso-lin, 17-19, 43. 8 1 . Lattimore, Manchuria, 234. 82. Tisdale, Pioneering Where the World Is Old, 24. 83. Ma Zhengfu, "Dongximeng Menggu shiji (xu)" (Investigations in Eastern and West­

ern Mongolia [continued)) Xibei zazhi (Norrhwest miscellany), no. 2 (Beijing: Xibei xiejing hui [Norrhwest coordination association] ' 19 12), 35-41 .

84. SjSB, March 3-25, 1 943, 430, 439, 446, 454, 462. 85. For a detailed account of rhis resistance, see Lee Chong-sik, Counterinsurgency in

Manchuria: The japanese Experience, 1931-1940 (Santa Monica, Calif. : Rand Corporation, 1 967), 6-10. Lee also discusses the changed relationship between Korean and Chinese resis­ tance forces after the establishment of Manchukuo ( 1 8-19). See also Willard Price, "Japan Faces Russia in Manchuria," National Geographic, November 1 942, 603-14.

86. Pang Zengyu, Heitudi wenhua yu dongbei zuojia qun (Black soil culture and a group of Norrheastern writers) (Changsha: Hunan jiaoyu chubanshe, 1995), 1 19-49.

87. Shih Nai-an, water Margin, trans. J. H. Jackson (reprint, New York: Paragon, 1 968). 88. Where the sworn brotherhood of the Water Margin occupied the marshes at the foot

of the mountains (shanpo), Shanding (which translates as "mountain peak") has them occupy the mountaintop.

89. Arseniev, Dersu the Trapper, 1 36, 143, 176, 185, 2 1 3-14, 224-25. 90. Lattimore, Manchuria, 224; Arseniev, Dersu the Trapper, 179-80. 9 1 . See his "Manzhou wenxue bitan" (Chatting about Manzhou literature), quoted in

Ouchi Takayoshi, "Dongbei wenxue ershinian," 99. 92. Williams, Country and the City, and Leo Marx, The Machine in the Garden: Technol­

ogy and the Pastoral Ideal in America (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1 964).

Local Worlds: The Poetics and Politics of the Native Place ,-..., 243

93. Timothy S. Oakes, "Shen Congwen's Literary Regionalism and the Gendered Land­ scape of Chinese Modernity," Geograjiska Annakr 77, no. 2 ( 1995): 93-107; see also Shen Congwen, Imperfect Paradise: Stories by Shen Congwen, ed. Jeffrey Kinkley, trans. Jeffrey Kin­ kley et al. (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1995), especially the section entitled, "The Vitality of the Primitive," 81-1 18.

94. See Kawamura, Mansha Hokai, 68-76; Kleeman, "Mysticism and Corporeality." 95. Kam Louie, introduction to Strange Tales from Strange Lands: Stories by Zheng

Wanlong, ed. Kam Louie (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1 993), 1-22. 96. Zheng Wanlong, Strange Tales from Strange Lands, 35-44. 97. Zheng Wanlong, Strange Tales from Strange Lands, 45-58. 98. Cited in Mineo Nakajima, The &0 &ng Affoir and Sino-Soviet Relations, Review:

The Study of Communism and Communist Countries in Japan, no. 44 (Tokyo: Japan Insti­ tute of Internationai Affairs, 1977), 2. In 1 954, a power struggle within the CCP led to the purge of Politburo member Gao Gang and Party Organization Depanment head Rao Shushi (from East China) on the charge that they were illicitly ttying to seize control of the party. Gao Gang, who had been the top party, government, and military leader in the Northeast, was alleged to have a special, even colonial, relationship with Stalin. While the purge repre­ sented an inner-party struggle, the incident suggests that Gao Gang may have continued to pursue power on the contested borderlands pattern of the region in his bid for national power. See also Frederick C. Teiwes, Politics at Mao 's Court: Gao Gang and Party Factionalism in the Early 1950s (Armonk, N.Y.: Sharpe, 1990).

99. This and the information on contemporary Northeastern literature below was related to me by Professor Sun Zhongtian and Dr. Lii Qinwen, Deputy Director, Party Propaganda Depanment of Jilin Province, previously Deputy Director, Jilin Academy of Social Sciences.

1 00. Zhang Yumao, "Zongxu" (General introduction), 1 : 1 2-13.

Conclusion

My concluding remarks fall into three parts. The first seeks to explore the signifi­ cance of Manchukuo in the changing relationship between imperialism and nation­ alism in the world and to discern the distinctiveness of Japanese imperialism in the inter-war period. The second marshals the findings of this study to reflect upon the relationship between authenticity and sovereignty in the East Asian modern. Finally, the study of Manchukuo presents an opportunity to probe the relationship between the globally circulatory notion of culture (and civilization), transnational identities, and nationalist ideology in the twentieth century.

Manchukuo and Imperialism

European colonial states in Asia and Africa did not resemble the modern govern­ mental state until well into the inter-war years and later. Meghan Vaughan has explored the differences between the more repressive types of power exercised in colonial regimes and the more "productive" power of governmentality. Of course, the distinction is not absolute, and in my reading of Foucault modern power is also repressive: it is based as much upon surveillance and discipline as upon care for the population. Nonetheless, one can agree with Vaughan that in the European colonies power was overwhelmingly repressive and sought to reproduce the difference between colonizers and colonized on racial grounds. Moreover, while it introduced new forms of enumeration and classification, this power frequently served the needs of the capitalist metro pole by reproducing or articulating with older modes of pro­ duction and practices in the colonies. 1

While several scholars show that Japanese imperialism was different in certain ways, it also shared a great deal with European colonialism--certainly in violence and repressiveness-until World War I and the March 1 9 1 9 Korean movement.2 Komagome Takeshi has argued that Japanese imperialism reflected the extension of the principles underlying national integration. Japanese nationalism was a contradic-

245

246 .--...... Conclusion

tory affair composed not only of the principle of "blood descent," but also of com­ mon language and culture (or civilization). Whereas language and culture created possibilities for integrating the colonized based on assimilation or alliance, histori­ cally, the exclusionary principle of blood descent raised its head by inventing new ways-institutional, legal, or attitudinal-to circumvent the incorporation of non­ Japanese in the empire as citizens. Colonial laws in Korea and Taiwan before 1 920 reflected the European conception that civilized laws were not necessarily suited to the colonized, and the colonial regimes endorsed various historical and bodily forms of coercion. In Korea, for instance, flogging-modeled on the flogging law in Tai­ wan-remained the central method of punishment until 1920.3 Nonetheless, Komagome traces a trajectory in Japanese expansionism whereby experiments with the forms of empire led to the increased visibility of models of assimilation and alli­ ance. After the 1 9 1 9 independence movement in Korea, groups within the colonial regime pointed to the necessity of overhauling the existing colonial government. Responding equally to the new nationalism and to a growing awareness of new mod­ els of reform and international development, the regime experimented with liberaliz­ ing the multinational state during what is known as the period of Cultural Rule in Korea in the 1 920s. But the experiment was not sustained and the ideas and energies were transferred to Manchukuo.4

While Manchukuo evolved out of the trajectory of Japanese colonialism, it also represented a beginning, the first step in the realization of the autarkic sphere that included a pan-Asianist alliance, the yen bloc, and new strategies of development and mobilization. Pan-Asianism, which flourished as part of the civilizational dis­ course of the inter-war period, seemed to predestine Japan's mission on the main­ land for many Japanese. Without reference to this discourse, we cannot fully grasp how an Ishiwara Kanji conceived of Manchukuo not simply as a colony, but as the nucleus of an anti-Western alliance of East Asian states (Tria remmet), thus establish­ ing the conceptual basis for a strong, developmental state. The idea of a pan-Asianist alliance produced a different kind of tension in Manchukuo than that which domi­ nated the Japanese relationship with Korea and Taiwan. Manchukuo was under­ mined by the contradiction between an alliance based on independence-hence the quest for sovereignty-and the imperialist power structure, whereas in Korea and Taiwan the tension developed chiefly between assimilation and exclusion. This would have different implications for identity projects, especially in the 1 930s, when the kominka movement in the colonies sought to produce the colonized as imperial Japanese subjects. Such projects were officially rejected in Manchukuo.

Indeed, Manchukuo signals fundamental changes in the nature of the Japanese empire. The truly intensive phase of industrialization and development in Korea and Taiwan came after 1 93 1 and emerged as part of the plan for strategic autarky cen­ tered on Manchukuo. The rapid growth in industrialization, education, and other aspects of development in Korea and Taiwan began mostly in the early 1930s, and accelerated with the invasion of China in 1 937.5 Even in rural Korea, where land­ lord-based local control continued through the 1 920s, new patterns of state-led cor-

Conclusion r--.J 247

poratist mobilization led to the restraining of landlord power and implementation of reforms by the 1 930s.6 War, as global competition by other means, had led, as in World War 1, to the mobilization of resources and identity. This time the Self that was the object of integration was not merely wider than the nation, it had already been or was in the process of becoming shaped by regimes of national authenticity for all parties concerned-Japanese, Chinese, and Korean. Integration on the basis of assimilation and alliance would still confront enormous challenges.

To be sure, the strategy of alliance also reflected other historical circumstances of the time and place. Rana Mitter has persuasively argued that factors ex-centric to the Japanese metropole were central to Japanese rule in Manchukuo.7 Ronald Rob­ inson's formulation of "ex-centric imperialism" explains this rule as an expression not only of metropolitan impulses, but of the circumstances of local allies who would "bargain" with imperial powers.8 Indeed, I would argue that Manchukuo represented the endgame for imperialists and their allies in the face of rising nation­ alism. Confronted by the ascendancy of the KMT and its impending integration of Manchuria, the Guandong Army and the regional power structure forged an alliance with local elites, redemptive societies, and the old power structure. These allies had few choices given the reality of Japanese military power, but it was also clear to the Japanese that some kind of autonomous "national" status would be necessary to maintain the alliance. In this respect, Manchukuo was consistent with global imperi­ alism in the inter-war years, when direct rule by' aliens and sheer exploitation gave way to alternatives such as indirect rule, collaborative arrangements with local elites, self-government, quasi independence, and other means to secure imperialist inter­ ests.9

In its quest for modernity and formal sovereignty, however, Manchukuo repre­ sented something more than the sum of these inter-war arrangements. It foreshad­ owed the imperialism of the postwar period--especially of the Cold War-when, despite the independence declared by many countries, the new "imperial" powers retained considerable economic and military control over their client nation-states. While the Soviet Union controlled many socialist nations tightly, the Anglo-Ameri­ can empire-whether in Iraq until 1 958, Congo, or Vietnam, to cite just a few examples--developed new patterns of dominance. In the words of Roger Louis and Ronald Robinson, the new imperialism "needed a good deal of old-fashioned impe­ rial and financial intervention along with [thel economic attraction. Such was the imperialism of decolonization."10 Manchukuo not only prefigured this kind of client state, the actions of the state in these changed circumstances-increased bargaining power of local groups, rights discourse, new strategies of control, new institutions of governmentality, and most of all, the institutionalization of identity-building proj­ ects-made for a new type of society.

Manchukuo and the East Asian Modern

The contradiction between sovereignty claims and an imperialist power structure that shadowed Manchukuo from its birth became increasingly intolerable over the

248 r-...J Conclusion

war years, and the entire enterprise started to fall apart after the outbreak of the Pacific War. The troubles with the redemptive societies evident in this period reveal that even the pact with civilizational groups was increasingly overtaken by militarist goals. In this sense, while this book has deepened and fleshed out the historical pic­ ture of Manchukuo, the principal narrative of a puppet state increasingly dominated by an imperialistic power structute remains in place.

If we look beyond such a narrative, however, the paradoxes of Manchukuo pro­ voke questions relevant to understanding modern nation formation in East Asia and the wider nation-state system in the post-World War I period as well. First, the indubitable expansion of state power and fascistic governmentality raises questions about the relationship between modern state- and nation-formation. The kind of state building we see in Manchukuo reflects, in many respects, the most sophisti­ cated and powerful technologies of state expansion of the time. Since most of these states-for instance, Japan, Germany, and the Soviet Union-were also constructed as nation-states, the question arises as to whether such forms of state building and governmentality could develop without reference to the identities and loyalties of its citizens. Even in the earlier part of the nineteenth century, before nationalism became the norm for defining the body politic, the European nation-states had, as Giddens points out, "an administrative and territorially ordered unity which they did not possess before." This unity could not remain purely administrative if only because "the very co-ordination of activities involved presumes elements of cultural homogeneity." l l We can imagine how much more acute this tension was for state­ builders in Manchukuo, which was founded upon and continued to invoke the rhet­ oric of nation. Indeed, when the Japanese power structure, subservient to a suicidal military expansionism, ovetwhelmed the national interests of Manchukuo, it led to the destruction of a laboriously constructed machinery of social power in Manchu­ ria, as in Japan.

Specifically, Manchukuo became linked to the identity projects of nationalism through the state's immersion in a historicist discourse, in its self-perception as a subject progressing in historical time. This immersion produced the tension, familiar to modern nationalism, between commitment to modernization (including associ­ ated notions of governmentality, mobilization, and rights discourse) and the search for identity and authenticity. Out of this tension emerged a symbolic regime of authenticity, control of which was necessary for the state to achieve its goals of order, mobilization, and sovereignty. Conversely, these needs of the state required the maintenance of the symbolic regime.

Manchukuo state-builders certainly recognized the importance of identity forma­ tion, both for purposes of mobilization and control and for its domestic and interna­ tional sovereignty claims. Their problem was that they could not, to any great extent, build a strong nationalist identity that either excluded the interests of Japan or compromised the ingrained colonial sense of superiority among the Japanese in the region. Hence the identity they sought to cultivate tended to be weakly territo­ rial, expressed in ethnic nationality within the Concordia framework, in Asian civili-

Conclusion ,.-.. 249

zational forms, and in the spatial representation of a frontier nation built around the forest. Whereas the regime sanctioned Asian civilizational forms, including Confu­ cianism and the syncretic notions of the redemptive societies, to appeal to the major­ ity Chinese population, the representation of Manchukuo as a natural frontier appeared to limit Chinese claims and endorse the Japanese as caretakers of the autochthonous peoples and primeval nature. While different efforts were made to harmonize these contradictoty conceptions of authenticity, the regime seemed sim­ ply to juggle them most of the time.

In some ways, the authenticity of a natural space served as a pivot in Manchukuo ideology. As the primeval home of the Tungus, the region became linked, via the Ural-Altaic myth, to the Japanese. The forest also hinged the representation of the frontier with Chinese heartland traditions, as we saw in Green Valley and its fram­ ings. Shanding bridged the contradiction from his own perspective: he found authenticity in a natural place, but with Chinese characteristics, as it were. In the historical narrative of the state, Manchuria as natural place was the birthplace of nonagricultural empires that engendered a non-Chinese imperial tradition. When this empire extended over China, especially with the Manchus, it had controlled an ethnic alliance and a Confucian universalism that shaped the loyalties of many Chi­ nese. Manchukuo state-builders evidently took a leaf from this imperial histoty in its model of the multinational state. Each of these representations was imbricated with the other to design loyalty to a state that was not quite nationalist. But this state possessed and deployed the means to produce identity, like any other nation­ state.

Precisely because it was such a self-consciously constructed project, Manchukuo reveals the process of identity formation with relative clarity. Globally circulating concepts and practices of governmentality and fascistic mobilization, nationality, civilization and womanhood, indigeneity and nativism, were often transformed by the use of historical imagety, models, and language into immanent traditions. The specification of a realm of authenticity, whether through the identification of classi­ cal traditions or shamanism, the figure of the self-sacrificing woman, the native place, or the sacred forest, was designed-for different segments of the popula­ tion-to secure the custodial sovereignty of the new nation-state. Such designation of the authentic also often served to justifY the penetration of state power, as we have seen with the state's reshaping of the redemptive societies and women's groups as repositories of Eastern tradition, the reservation system for the Oroqen, and the state's effort to frame native-place cultural production. There were still other ways in which the regime sought to represent the authenticity of the polity and its rule: for instance, in Confucian state rituals and patronage of Mongol Lamaism. The highly deliberate and urgent search for authenticity belied its anxiety and must have seemed parodic to many-the discourse of an over-imagined nation.

How did Manchukuo exemplifY what I have called the East Asian modern? I have tried to probe the ways in which institutional innovations were indigenized, and occasionally even shaped, by historical symbols and ideologies of the region.

250 ......., Conclusion

Historical resources were evoked to moralize state initiatives and subordinate civil society and family for purposes of state making and governmentality. New Life Con­ fucianism and "moral suasion" permitted mobilization through state-administered mass organizations, and the cultural investment of the periphery was interiorized by extending heartland traditions to these zones. In these ways, the experience of Manchukuo was consistent with that of Japan, Korea, and China.

Further, Bruce Cumings has identified an East Asian model of development, which he traces to the experience of Japanese modernization and its extension to the colonies in Korea and Taiwan. What he calls "the bureaucratic-authoritarian industrializing regime" comprises a bureaucratic state combining Confucian state­ craft traditions with European-style civil service, high levels of mass education, state direction of the economy, total surveillance, involvement in the regional political economy, and an ideology of national essence. 12 Several features of this model out­ side Japan derive, I believe, principally from the period of strategic autarky in which Manchukuo and its pattern of industrial development, corporatist organization, sur­ veillance, and mobilization played a central role. Indeed, postwar state-builders in South Korea were deeply shaped by their experiences in Manchukuo. 13 The particu­ lar cultural deployment, during this period, of the East Asian modern-enabling exaltation of the state, commitment of the bureaucracy, appeals to discipline and self-sacrifice, and "moral suasion," among other developments-is a significant pre­ condition of the East Asian model.

But just as significant, Manchukuo exemplified what was excised from the domi­ nant representations of the modern nation-state in Japan and China. With respect to Japan, Manchukuo served as a laboratory for what was not possible to achieve within Japan itself. Militarists, state-planners, economists, scientists, technocrats, modernist architects, city-builders, museum designers, forest conservationists, and germ warfare experimentalists sought to realize their designs, visionary and mon­ strous, here. That they were able to implement some of these ideas and plans in Japan in the openings provided by the postwar situation is a measure of the continu­ ing role of Manchukuo in the formation of Japanese modernity, as is only now being revealed. 14

With respect to China, state-builders in Manchukuo fostered in rhetoric and pol­ icy, if not always in practice, precisely those elements that had been problematic for modern Chinese nationalism. This nationalism had opposed the redemptive and popular religious societies and tried to rapidly assimilate various ethnic and indige­ nous groups. By unleashing the activism of redemptive and sectarian societies, first in Manchukuo and subsequently in China proper (guannet) , the Manchukuo model of governance, which sought to reconcile traditionalism with fascistic mobilization, revealed a gaping hole in Chinese nationalist mobilization. The Chinese state's refusal to accept the conception of transcendence and self-empowerment in these societies has continued to haunt it to this day.

While Chinese policies towards non-Han ethnic groups during the Republic basically reflected the praxis of a homogenizing and assimilationist nation-state, this

Conclusion r--> 251

praxis had to accommodate an understanding of the rights of nationality and minor­ ity groups. Consciousness of these rights, of course, circulated globally, but it was brought home with decisive clarity by Manchukuo and other claims on peripheral territories during the war. A historical, Confucian model of voluntary assimilation­ much like jiaohua-emerged as a response to the challenge posed by this wartime experience.

Sovereignty and the Scales of Identity

The curious phenomenon of Manchukuo as a modern identity project that culti­ vated sub- and transnational identities presents us with an opportunity to explore the dynamics of identity formation across different scales more widely in the nation­ state system of the early twentieth century. "Civilization" in the identity projects of Manchukuo represented modes of self-fashioning that combined modern ideas with historical, religious, and civilizational conceptions of community not always com­ patible with territorially de-limited national models. We have seen how notions of transcendence and faith embedded in such conceptions could produce highly moti­ vated subjects among the men and women of the redemptive societies. At the same time, civilization, which Redfield defined as a subset of culture, retained and realized the potential to define a community sharply against an Other, as in the war of the East against the West. 15

We can see in the early twentieth century the growing importance of the principle of culture-the repository of authenticity-as the basis of the sovereign community over much of the world, as in Manchukuo. If the notion of culture was ever once simply "received tradition," by the end of World War I it no longer possessed that innocence. Neither did culture refer to an upper-class formation relatively unrestric­ ted by territory, nor principally to a methodology of meaning production,16 but to a bounded and holistic set of ideas, institutions, and practices that constituted and distinguished a people. Epistemologically it had become rewired to serve identity. With the ascendancy of several critical intellectual and political forces-the (origi­ nally German) counter-evolutionary tradition, the Soviet model of cultural national­ ity, the Wilsonian ideal of linguistic nationality, and anti-imperialist nationalism itself-this notion of culture/civilization became a globally produced knowledge.

The novelty of the relationship between culture and rights (of which authenticity and sovereignty are specifications), particularly during the inter-war period, does not lie in the equation or congruence of culture with the nation-state. Culture became an identificatory concept, an identified entity, and a potential object of identity, all of which could be either greater or lesser than the nation-state. Cultures could be as small as Boas's autochthonous communities or as vast as Asian or Islamic civiliza­ tion; but once identified, cultures became vehicles of potential subjecthood and rights. When they became objects of identity, they also seeded a regime of authen­ ticity.

While in the post-World War I period much political energy was expended and

252 ......., Conclusion

violence committed in seeking to match linguistic and cultural nationality with nation-state boundaries in Europe, the dynamics of scalar identity were being tested in the Soviet Union and Asia. Here, nationalizing states that sought to inherit empires-motivated perhaps by the conditions of rights awareness in the regions­ experimented with alternative relationships between cultural nationality and state. In 19 12, even before the appearance of the multinational Soviet Union, the Repub­ lic of China declared itself a Republic of Five Nationalities. Japanese state-builders in Manchukuo were not only informed by their own colonial experiments with nationality, they were influenced by Chinese Republican and Soviet ideas. The prob­ lems the model of the multinational state encountered in Manchukuo were distinct because of the minority, Japanese-dominated power structure. But the form of the new nation-state was continuous with that in the Soviet Union and China.

In all of these societies and in many postwar nations, old and new, the idea of nations as homogenous, organic entities gave way to a multinational or multicultural idea that forced the nation-state to acknowledge, and sometimes to foster, minority ethnic or nationality rights. The implicit rationale may be expressed as a contract wherein cultural subjecthood is granted in exchange for loyalty to the nation-state. Such a development should be seen as a response to various factors. The spread of rights consciousness and anti-imperialist ideology were among them, as was the rapid construction of bounded nation-states from heterogeneous social formations, in particular where such nation-states sought to inherit old empires, but also where more recent demographic movements had produced new populations, such as the Chinese in southeast Asia or the Koreans in Manchuria. In many ways, the multina­ tional idea was itself a circulating response to the quickening circulation of people, ideas, and resources that was designed to stabilize the nation as a viable, competitive, and moral power. The problem of authenticity, of course, did not disappear.

Permitting as they do a measure of voluntarism and porousness, nations as cul­ tural formations lack the predeterminism and exclusivism of racial nationalism. The cultural nation has the capacity to develop into the multicultural nation organized around two scales of identity, which we may think of as "territorial-national" versus "sub- and transnational." These two scales, embedded in different narratives and institutions, ought to be compatible, normatively speaking. But whether because of global competitiveness, rights consciousness, or the reaction to this consciousness, the identities are still susceptible to the politics of closure, and the two scales are not infrequently at odds. In the Japanese case, we have seen how the racialized ideal of the Yamato nation consistently subverted the wider goal of assimilation into an alli­ ance with a common culture and civilization that the Japanese state also sought to build. While this common culture and civilization was conceived, in part at least, as necessaty for dominance in a competitive world, the regime of authenticity built around the racialized nation tended to trump this goal. The Chinese Republic revealed a pattern where, although scholars and nationalists also worked with the idea of autochthonous and separate nationalities, they consistently emphasized assimilationist institutions, narratives of voluntaty assimilation, and the cultural

Conclusion r--> 253

investment of peripheral spaces as part of the national imaginary. The Republic col­ lapsed in the face of a revolutionary uprising, but its institutional and cultural efforts at nationalizing the peripheries served as the foundation for the PRe's consolidation of these regions in its version of the multinational state. I?

The multinationalism of Manchukuo, inspired by the Soviet model and institu­ tionalized through the Concordia Association, did not often clarifY the relationship between (ethnic) nationality and the larger nation-state, or what General Koiso Kuniaki called Daikoku. A classified document circulated anonymously in 1 940 (cited in chapter 2) engaged a Hegelian discussion of Soviet nationality. It argued that "the spirit of universal citizenship" embodied in the state "moves from the out­ side to the inside" of nationalities; in this movement, the culture of the individual nationalities becomes the basis for the realization of spirit. 18 Texts like this acknowl­ edge, however philosophically, the reality of the subordination of nationality {it is unclear if this included the Japanese} to the Manchukuo state. At the same time, as Suk-jung Han has argued, the rhetoric of state building (kenkoku or jianguo) replaced that of the "kingly way" over time, signaling the ascendancy of statism and loyalty to the state over civilizational ideals. As the terrible costs of war bore down on Manchukuo society, the state become increasingly alienated from its own sub­ and transnational identity projects. Since, from the beginning, it had a weak sense of territorial nationality, Manchukuo ended as a strong-military fascist-state that represented only itself. 19 We are reminded of the Soviet Union at its end. Rogers Brubaker has suggested that, in contrast to the various nationalities that became the focus of identity formation, the Soviet state never succeeded in generating its own narrative or symbolism of nationhood.20 The legitimacy of the twentieth-century state, no matter how strong and modern, appears to have been built around narra­ tives of identity.

Nations are continuously produced by global competition and globalizing forces; they are also simultaneously the moral constructs empowered to regulate, contain, and sometimes combat these forces. It is in order to escape the paralyzing effects of this contradiction that their authority tends to be located beyond the system, in the immanence of the symbolic regime. The different scales of identity reflect to some extent this tension between the universal and the particular, and by no means do all identities come to be imbued with authority or controlled by power. At the same time, as the ur-form and model of identity politics, nationalism and its regime of authenticity frequendy become reproduced in identities at different levels. It is not yet clear whether the new turn in the current globalization will cause identity politics to wither or futther empower it to develop beyond the need even for a state.

In the course of writing this book, I have become aware that the critique of nationalism as a symbolic regime of power is beset by an acute moral quandary. When faced by a monsttous imperialism or terror, nationalism may represent the only available means of self-defense in a world of nation-states. I faced this quandary with the Chinese resistance to a brutal Japanese occupation, where there were few alternatives but for the resistance to mobilize as nationalism. We continue to

254 .--..,., Conclusion

encounter this dilemma in relation to communities weak or strong, whether it be the nationalization of an indigenist movement, crafted as a survival strategy, or nationalism as the reaction of a global power to an indefensible terrorism. Moreover, for some liberal nationalists in the world, the idea of an authentic culture may also be the precondition of cosmopolitanism. Should we then grasp these differences through the distinction berween good and bad nationalisms?

The character of nationalism does not appear to be fixed. Rather, all nationalisms contain the potential to convert an enabling, context-based, and coalitional under­ standing of the self into a deep history of belonging and/or an exclusivist moral force. This transformation is, of course, most evident in the case of Japanese nation­ alism. I have also tried to grasp the moment at which militarism converted the uni­ versalism of redemptive societies in Manchukuo, and have pointed to ways in which Chinese nationalism transformed a practical defense and alliance into a deep history of inalienability. There must surely be a place in our understanding of nationalism in the real world that is strategic or coalitional in character.

But while recognizing the limits of a historical situation, it is also the responsibil­ ity of scholars to grasp when, how, why, and with what consequences nationalism as alliance can be converted into a deep history. The deep nation is secured by a regime of authenticity that, no matter how frail or defensive, has the potential to harden boundaries and shut out the world morally. I write in the hope that isolating the dynamic, context, and moment of the realization of this potential is not a useless venture.

Notes

1 . Megan Vaughan, Curing Their Ills: Colonial Power and African Illness (Cambridge, England: Polity Press, 1991) , 8-12; Michel Foucault, The History of Sexuality, vol. 1 , An Introduction (New York: Pantheon, 1978), 12.

2. For similarities and differences see Myers, "Creating a Modern Enclave Economy," 137-39. See also Mark Peattie, introduction to The Japanese Colonial Empire, 1895-1945, ed. Ramon H. Myers and Mark Peattie (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1 984); Bruce Cumings, "Colonial Formations and Deformations," 73-74; and Gi-Wook Shin and Michael Robinson, eds., Colonial Modernity in Korea (Cambridge: Harvard University Asia Center, 1 999).

3. Komagome, Shokuminchi Teikoku Nippon no Bunka TOgo. 356-70. Chulwoo Lee, "Modernity, Legality, and Power in Korea under Japanese Rule," in Colonial Modernity in Korea, ed. Gi-Wook Shin and Michael Robinson (Cambridge: Harvard University Asia Cen­ ter, 1999) , 3 1-34.

4. Komagome, Shokuminchi Teikoku Nippon no Bunka TOgo. 359-60. See also Michael A. Schneider, "The Limits of Cultural Rule: Internationalism and Identity in Japanese Responses to Korean Rice," in Colonial Modernity in Korea, ed. Gi-Wook Shin and Michael Robinson (Cambridge: Harvard University Asia Center, 1 999), 98-100.

5 . Soon-Won Park, "Colonial Industrial Growth and the Emergence of the Korean Working Class," in Colonial Modernity in Korea, ed. Gi-Wook Shin and Michael Robinson

Conclusion .---... 255

(Cambridge: Harvard University Asia Center, 1999), 143-47. Park shows that the overall elementary school enrollment rate in Korea doubled in the 1 930s, from 14.5 percent in 1 930 to 33.8 percent in 1 940. In Meiji Japan the enrollment rate was 62 percent in 1 886 ( 147); see Myers, "Creating a Modern Enclave Economy," 1 37-39, and Cumings, "Colonial For­ mations and Deformations," 76-79. In 1 940, Manchukuo authorities claimed that 43 per­ cent of school-age children were receiving some form of education; see Jones, Manchuria since 1931, 49.

6. Gi-Wook Shin and Do-Hyun Han, "Colonial Corporatism: The Rural Revitalization Campaign, 1 932-1940," in Colonial Modernity in Korea, ed. Gi-Wook Shin and Michael Robinson (Cambridge: Harvard University Asia Center, 1999), 70-96.

7. Mitter, Manchurian Myth, 1 6-19. 8. Ronald Robinson, "The Ex-centric Idea of Imperialism, with or without Empire," in

Imperialism and After: Continuities and Discontinuities, ed. Wolfgang G. Mommsen and Jur­ gen Osterhammel (London: Allen and Unwin, 1986), 267-89.

9. Barraclough, Introduction to Contemporary History, 166-67. 1 0. Louis and Robinson, "Empire Preserv'd," Times Literary Supplement, May 5, 1 995,

1 6; see also Suk-Jung Han, "The Problem of Sovereignty: Manchukuo, 1932-1937" (fotth­ coming in Positions) .

1 1 . Giddens, Nation-State and Violence, 219. 12. Cumings, "Colonial Formations and Deformations," 88-92. 13. Suk-jung Han, "Those Who Imitated the Colonizers: The Influence of State-Making

from Manchukuo to South Korea" (paper prepared for the conference volume,fapanese Colo­ nialism in Manchuria), University of California at Los Angeles, January 2001 .

14. See Kobayashi Hideo, "Nihon kabushiki gaisha" 0 tsukutta otoko: Miyazaki Masayoshi no shogai (The man who created "Japan, Inc.": The career of Miyazaki Masayoshi) (Tokyo: Sh6gakkan, 1995); Janis Mimura, "From 'Manchukuo' to Japan's 'New Order' " (unpub­ lished paper, n.d.); and Young, Japan's Total Empire. On the origins of the postwar Japanese "construction state" in Manchukuo, see Tucker, "Building 'Our Manchukuo.' ''

1 5. Having already written at length about nationalism, I had embarked on the Manchu­ kuo project to explore regional and transnational processes and identities. While this topic did indeed provide such an opportunity, as an early-twentieth-century phenomenon, the problem of nationalism unavoidably returned to primacy. The discourses of civilization, local­ ity, and religion could not be grasped apart from nationalism or national structures, whether in Japan, China, or even Manchukuo.

1 6. See Raymond Williams, The Country and the City, for the former, and Clifford Geertz, The Interpretation of Cultures (New York: Basic, 1973), for the latter.

17. Liu Xiaoyuan, "The Chinese Communist Party and the 'Nationality Question,' 1921-1945."

18. Soren no minzoku seisaku (Soviet nationality policy), Publication of the Research Insti­ tute of the National Foundation University (Shinky6: Kenkoku Daigaku kenkyuin kan, 1 940), 1-2.

1 9. Suk-jung Han, "The Problem of Sovereignty." 20. Rogers Brubaker, Nationalism Reframed: Nationhood and the National Question in the

New Europe (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 24-35.

Glossary of Chinese Terms

Note: The Chinese terms are followed by Japanese pronunciation, where relevant.

badao fiil1 baihua S� bang .

baojia 1li/:EJ3 baojing anmin yundong

1li/:ijl��j)J!1/J baonii yixueyuan 1li/::tl:JUJII% bense Jli:ts Bianjiang tongxun �.�m

bianjiang wuli de guofanghua

�.�jJa9IlW51t

Bianzheng gong/un �iI&i}ilfB

Bohai l'IJ#i Cai Yuanpei �7tm

Chahar sheng �1IffM� Changbai (Mountain) � S ( Ill ) Changchun ��

Chen Duxiu 1f.!IHIJ3§' Chen Tianhua 1lili5*(. Chen Yifu H�

chengshi �. chengxian qihou

.$t;!f� chi lk) choubeichu •• � Chu � Cixi �m congfu �� Da Yaxiyazhuyi ::k!lli*HI!lli±.fi

DaHan ::kj!f! Dairen

datong ::k1i'lJ

Datongbao ::k1i'lJ�

Datong weiyi shijie ::k1i'lJ1l(E-t!!::W

Dai Jitao _*1IOiJ

Dan Di ff!.� dao il1 Daodehui iI1flflt"

daotong m�

Daoyuan iI1l1% difang :J:t!!::1:J chiho

257

258 r-.J Glossary of Chinese Terms

difangxing jl!rn� diyu J'I!!� chiiki Dongbei Jiuguo Hui JiIii�t�lI* Dongfangzazhi Jilii1:1Mii& Donghu Jiliii!i§ Du Yaquan tI:52� Duanmu Hongliang 1IIfil* _,Ill

dushen zhuyi sixiang

JMf'±:fl,�,:m Elunchun �f*� Oroqen

(OrochonlOro�on)

er taitai =** falu shehui 7!$it1t fanbang "

Fei Xiaotong .;f:ii

Feng Y oulan ��JJJ Feng zhuren �±'A feng JOO. fengjian :f;f@

fengjian-junxian debate :f;f@W.

fengjin :f;f�

fengsu JJ.m.

fengtu JJ.± fudo

foxing f�� Fu Sinian 1'fWT�

fudao fIliilll

Funufuwutuan @:tl:gIU�1II

FunU shenghuo gaijinhui

@:tl:1:7I!iQll::l1Ut

funii shimin f!ii:tl:rfj �

Funu Zazhi lfm:tl:Mii& funii I!iif:tl:

fuxing benxing m�� ganhuale �1t7

Gaoli if611 Koryo Ge Suicheng .�nlG

Gelaohui l!f�1t gemingjianguo 1i£$@11

geming 1i£$

gexin 1i£ii'

Geyao U gongxin i}/L., Gu Ding ET Gu Hongming .��

Gu liegang .liarilllU Gu Yanwu _:1ft

Guandi 111* Guandongjun IIIJlfiJ KantOgun

guanmin yizhi g �-9&

guannei III p;j Guizhou (sheng) .1+1 ( ttl )

guohuo II:W Guorong 1iIJ� Guowei 118IlG

Guxiang t&. guxiang t&. kyOdo guyazhouren E52�A guyou renxin IliItfA/L.' Han Dynasty .�

hanjian rJfif Hanjun rJ:iIl Hanyu Dacidian .m*.�

Harbin 1I€t.� Hebei sheng ��t� Heilongjiang sheng lIlmtr:tt1 Hezhezu �

Hongbaochu ��

honghuzi *IllT

Hongwanzihui tiI:it!*ft Hu Shi jIjij. hua ft

huashi fttlt

Huang Wenshan Ji3tlll

Hunan (sheng) m.I� ( � ) hunhe �-ft Hunxie Er �lfn.5C

huozhe neng sheshen shujie

m�lt�� Jiaji diaocha baogao

�3t.d� Kakei cOOsa hOkolru

Jiali tongxiang jiujihui

��jRJ�ft Jiali n jiating yanjiushe �J£if�iI:. jiaxiang he diyu �.1IJ� Jian Xian'ai • $'iJt Jiandao fill. jianguo jingshen he jiating funii

Ttlilft�®�_:tl:: Jianguo xuongaD @il11l� jianguo Ttlil kenkoku jianshang �im

jianghu n:mJ jiaohua IXft kyoka

jie � jie � Jilin sheng E:f*�

jin caizhu �M.:l:.

jinbu �?y

jinhua �tt

Glossary of Chinese Terms .--- 259

jinxin .,L' jingpai *� jingsui ft. jiuji �a

jiuren � Jiushi Fotuan H�1Il Jiushi Xinjiao Hft jiushi �tlt kyiisei

Jurchen (lin) :tl::. ( � ) kaiming MIJij

Kang Youwei f1tlff.$ ketou _ Khitan �:Pf Langgou m. laogen �m

laozi zhi ling �r iZ.. letu .± Lei Haizong •• * lengjing �MI Li Dazhao **jrj Li Xiangian *WII1 Ri KOran Ii • lian •

lianheguo tongzhihui

.-ftiljRJ;l;ft L Liang Qichao � �m

Ryo Keicho

Liang Shanding �UsT Liang Shuming m lI:� liangjie �. Jiangxin lli'L' Liao jI

Liji 113c

260 � Glossary of Chinese Terms

Lijiaoke mllXf4 lishen duanzbeng fang ke weiren

:lL��lE1JiiJ�A

lishen :lL�

lisu shehui lIf1tlfr1!t lixin yundong IillH,\�1IJ

liye :lL�

liyong �ljffl

lizhi iLitf. Lin Yutang #00#

lingmiao a. Lu Xun .m liilin haohan *f<#W-il

Liisede gu *f<fSl'!9-t:t­

maiban 'lUR maikong maikong J!!�.�

mantou atill!i Manzhou shehui shiye lianhehui

lIi1i'fIfr •••• -El1t Manzhou Wemue lIi1i'f3t�

Manzbou Wenyixiehui

lIim3tlifG*

Manzbouguo guofang funiiren hui

ltIimlJlJllJ.if!i:t(A*

Manzbouguo lli1tlIJ Manchukuo Manzu ltIi� ManshY

Miao ffi ming $

mingyun $�

minjian �oo

Minshengbu �1:$

minsuxue �� minzokugaku

Minzhengbu �i&:$

minzu xiehe

��fGf[J minzoku kyowa

minzu �� minzoku

Minzuxue Yanjiuji!«Jn

��fif�*fU

minzuxue ���

modeng JJJJ't Fengtian (Mukden) .:R

muyuan a�

Nanmanzhan (Nanzban)

�lli14S (�14S) neidi P3� neisheng P3� Niangniang �� nitude qixi �±l'!9$;!1,� niishe :t(1fr niixingde chujiao :t(ttl'!9.� Pei Wenzhong � 3t9='

Pingfang 2JS.m Puyi ?ttl qipao 1lJ(:Jifi! qianhua minzu iW1t��

Qin Dynasty .�

qing � quwei _ Rehe sheng i\lMiiJ �

renleixue A.�

renqing A 11f renzhongxue A.�

rong � ronghe Mil rudao ,Ult sancong :::'11E

san gang :=. .. sanjiaoheyi :='Il�­

Shandong sheng WU�� shanlindui t1I*",� shanren !fA Shang I@ shangkan _UX shangx.in f�H.\ Shehui yundong zhidao weiyuanhui

*1:.II_.�A. shehui *1:. Shexi M Shen Congwen tt ftE3t shen ,!i- shenkan �a Shengjing Shibao .Jjt�� shengmingxian 1:.1trt� Shengyihui jiangchang

� •• U shi ± Shi Jun Eill shijian tong kongjian de bianhua

�rmliiJ�rm�1Ht shijie datong tltw.*1iiJ

Shijie Zongjiao Datonghui

tltW.*Il*IiiJ. Shun �

Shuntian Shibao U7i:��

Sima Qian a.JM. siahu fAl! Song Melling *�M su #:t tai Iff3

taijiao Iff3Il

Glossary of Chinese Terms r--J 26 1

tianliu 7i: Wi

tianming 7i:RJJ

tianxing 7i:t.E

tie caizhu .M.t:

tongbao IiiJ JIfq

tonghua liiJ{t tongjiao IiiJIl dOkyo

Tongshanshe 1iiJ§*1:

tongshi ��

tongwen FR./3t dObun

tongye FR./�

tongzhong 1iiJ& doshu

tui zhi jiating shehui

If!z��ifht waiwang 11-x: Wanguo Daodehui .iUm •• wanyou genyuan _"ill Wang Fengyi x:. ... Wang Fuzhi X:;1;:Z Wang Jingwei n: .. .r Wang Luyan X: .� wang tianxia L::7i:1'

wangdao U 0d0

wei Manzhouguo fiil¥i1tliU weikaihua minzu *lmft��

wen 3t

wenhua 3t {t bunka

Wenjiaobu 3t1l$

wenming 3t1lJ3

wenyi 3t1li

wenzhijiaohua 3t�Il{t

wenzhipai 3t��

Wu � Wushanshe �*tt

262 .-J Glossary of Chinese Terms

Wushenglaomu ��:f!e wusi �fJ,. wuwei �m wuwo �£lG wuxing litE wuxing lift wuxingde wuqi ��I¥JJi:t� wuyii �� xi � Xia J[

xiakan ""f:I:X

xianbingdui .�� xiandai mit xianqi Iiangmu JlJt�e

ryOsaikenbo

xiangtu hense M!II±*t5 Xiangtu Dili Yanjiufa

M!II±�J.!IHrf�7! xiangtu wenxue M!II±3t�

xiangtu yanjiu

M!II±Iif� kyOdo kenkyii

}(jangtu Zhongguo .±q:rll

xiangtu M!II± kyOdo

Xiao Hong .til: Xiao ]un •• xiaoshuohuade youji

IN�tf.tl¥JiI�c

Xiehehui fG� Kyowakai }(jezu d xiezu nn�

xisheng �

}(jn YaxQia �H!m

Xinjiang �.

Xinjing �J.l'( Shinkyo

Xinminhui ��*

xing dao shenshang, na jiao shizi

fffQ,!l J:»I5IlJ.l_* xing tE Xing'an Mountains .�� Xingyayuan ft!m1f1C Xiong Xiling � 1iiti Xiongnu �� xiucai �:t xiudao ��

xiushen �,!l

Xu Qinwen ff�3t

xunfu IJrrH� xungen g

Yao � yi it Yiguandao -.�

YUisangtUzhuan tIiI��� yiqi ft1iit yisheng .� yiwenzhipai .3t��

Yixiang yiwen �M!II�3t

Yixin tiandao longhua shengjiao

-/C.\X� •• �#X Yiyongjun ft�.

youhuo �� youjihuade xiaoshuo

��c1tI¥J/J��

yousede minzu :fffSl¥J��

Yu Chonghan -T-?tts1!4 Yu gong �Jt

Yuan ]inkai .J{�� Yuan Shikai llt!!:l6l.

yuan III yuanshi lin �tta;f;f

yuanshi tezhi JeMW Yue $I

Zat Jluloushang m •• J:.

Zaijiali tfd zanuilo .. Zq Shiyl .. Zhang JtJ.lrItmIIttN •• lIm Zhang BlnaUD (zhIDa Taiyan)

. - (. *�) Zhang Dongsun m .�

Zhang Jinghui mllll

Zhang Xueliang m'll

Zhang Zhidong 5&iZlIiIJ

Zhang Zuolin !1If'F. zhaojian BJi zlten � zlten ..

zltennu yixue .� ••

zltenzhende qinggan •• d<J ••

Zheng Wantong IISlJJi

Zheng Xiaoxu "W

zhengfu zuzhifa iL3cJ(if1lJil$;

zhengshen IE.

zhengyi IEII seigi

zhi ii!;;

Zhibian Yuekan M.fJflJ

Glossary of Chinese Terms r-.> 263

zhiming �$

zhixing �'M: zhizhi �Jt.

Zhongguo minzuxuehui

rfliIJfj!P. Zhongguo Tuozhisuo rflll16MJifi Zhonghua minzu rfl.fj!�

Zhongtongju rflU

zhongyi �.

Zhongyuan rujiao datong wenhua

rflmllllX::kIaJ3t1t zhongzu fI� shuzoku

Zbou NS

zhou ;t1

Zhou Zuoren NSf!:.A.

ZhuJu �:tI zhuren ::t::A. zhuxia alJl

zjji xiuyang gj a�.

zili

ziran biaoxiang gj��.

zizhi zhidaobu � �m.$

zongfa *�

zongjiao *IX shiikyo

zongwuting MH. zu �

zuguo I!.II

zuoren ffx..A.

Glossary of Japanese Terms

Note: The Japanese terms are followed by Chinese pronunciation, where relevant.

ajia gakkai .,. :)"''!f!� Akamatsu Chijo $�.:!$ Akiba Takaahi fJI:.'" Amateraau .xli« Ayukawa Yoshisuke tliJI I.1l' bunka Je 11::: wenhua bunmei kaib Jelfl1JW11::: bunmeiteki JeIJJtJE.J bushido /it±jJ chiho J&JJ difang chiiki J&� diyu Daikoku *mI

daikokumin *II� Dainihon rengo fujinkai

* 13 *it�.A� Dairen ::kit Dalian Dai-Taa Kyaeiken ::k:�{ll£;jI:�1I Daiyiihokai *ifi.� datsua Mt.e£ Deguchi Nao I±l r:l �

Deguchi Omotokyo I±l r:l **ft dentOteki seibtsu shisO

����ffl.�� dobun IRI Je tongwen doken kokka .±JImI�

dOkyo IRIft tongjiao dOshu 1i!Il. tongzhong fudo J!ID.± fengtu Fujiyama Kazoo ./lJ-ifi Fukuzawa Yukichi tllR,*e furusato i!Jfc. guxiang GenYOsha �f1(:t± hakko..ichiu JI.*iJ;-� heisha hOmu �;f*-A Hisama Jiigi tA.1II'J+1I Hitonomichi A(1)jJ hoken !1!4". fengjian honshitsu *_ Inaba Kunzan •• �/lJ Ishiwara Kanji ;Prnl:�.

265

266 .--...- Glossary of Japanese Terms

Isshinkai -,L.'�

jinja ¥f!�±

junsuisei �M Kada Tetsuji 1JOlBtu= kagakuka #�{I:; kakei chosa hokoku �ft"JE.a�

kakumei .� geming KantOgun MJIUf Guandongjun Kasagi RYOmei �*�I!J'I KatO Hiroyulci 1JO.�I.Z Kayahara Kazan � DIUiI ill kenkoku _m jianguo ketsuzoku 1fn.� Kitagawa Fuyuhiko �t) I I�� Koiso Kuniaki, General IN.mag kokubO fujinkai m615!11A� Kamin �a!; kominka � a!;{1:; kosei .:i: kyOdo kenkyii

.±iJf� xiangtu yanjiu kyOdo .± xiangtu kyOdOtai ;tt:fi!ij� kyOdOteki ;Jt fi!ij (fJ kyoka �{I:; jiaohua KyoWQ undo �fn�1b kyowa �fn kyowakai �1rJ� xiehehui kyiisei lJ\fcilt jiushi Mamiya Rinzo 1Vl1f#. Manei .f!lI!: Manmo no minzoku to shukyo

_Itq)a!;� t *tt Manmo -mit

Manshii Hyoron la�tlB¥. Manshii Seinen Renmei

Manshiikoku kokuritsu chiiO

hakubutsukan

.1+1mm!Lr:p:k:��. Mantetsu Shainkai .��±. �

Meiji I!J'I� minkan �1Vl minzoku kyowa

���� minzu xiehe minzoku a!;� minzu minzokugaku ��� minzuxue minzokuggaku �m� minsuxue Murakami Haroki ;jot .1: •• Nagata Uzumaro *IB�. NaitO Konan F'<JRimifti Nakagami Kenji r:p .1:_= nichiman yiiwa 13 _i8fn nihonjinron 13 *AM Nippon Sangyo Kaisha

l3 *if.��±

Nogawa Takashi If) II � nohonshugi _*::t.

000 ::Eil wangdao Okakura Tenshin 1il*A:IL.' Okawa Shiimei *)I I)l!iJ� Omotokyo **tt OrochoniOronjon ;t p � V: ::I �

(ElunchuniOroqen)

Otani Takeo *�.*= Ouchi Takayoshi *r"JJ!i. Ozaki Hotsumi �_3'§� rikugun �.

ronin �A

ryosai kenbo

A •• re: xianqi liangmu sambOcho __ • Sat<> Daishiro 1£.*IlYR� seigi lE. zhengyi seken seikatsu i!t,,"�t.S Shibunkai Mx�

Shimoda Utako rlBlJ:.:r shinjitsusei .�� Shinmei Masamichi tT� lEi! Shiratori Kurakichi 13 .""*-S shojochi �*!f!! shiikyo *fk zongjiao shuzoku � zhongzu Soka Gakkai jIj1illi��

Suemitsu Takayoshi *Jltili.

Glossary of Japanese Terms <--I 267

Suenaga Misao *7k1l'i Tachibana Shiraki •• Taisho *lE Takizawa Toshiro jftH� Too DObun shoin JI(�Iii'JX.� Toa kyOdOtai .�;Jt:Iii'J-f*: Too renmei Jl(3EilBli

Tokugawa l$JI I TorH RyiizO .""� ... Tsuboi ShOgoro j)J!*FlE:ER� Uchida Ryohei � IB A lJZ Watsuji Tetsuro fo;i±§'R� Yanagita Kunio �1B1ilI!Jj zaibatsu MIM Zenman fujin dantai rengOkai

� •• AB'I-f*:il.g.�

Bibliography

Abbreviations

DMDY Manzhouguo Daodehui bianjike (Manzhouguo Morality Society editorial department), ed. Disanjie Manzhouguo Daotkhui daotk jiangxi yulu (Oral records of morality seminars of the Third Manzhouguo Morality Society). Xinjing: Manzhouguo Daodehui huijike, 1936.

DTB Datongbao (Great Unity Daily). Xinjing.

EJB Elunchunzu jianshi bianxiezu (Editorial committee of the Brief Histoty of the Oroqen), ed. Elunchunzu jianshi (Brief histoty of the Oroqen). Huhehote: Neimenggu renmin chu­ banshe, 1983.

GWXSY Committee on Party History, Central Committee, Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT), ed. Geming Wenxian: Xin Shenghuo yundongshi (Revolutionary documents: Historical materials on the New Life movement). Vol. 68. Taipei: Zhongyang wenwu gongyingshe, 1 976.

HZN Xingya zongjiao xiehui (Revive Asian Religions Association), ed. Huabei zongjiao nianjian (Yearbook of the religions of north China). Beiping: Xingyayuan Huabei lianluobu, 1 94 1 .

JG Jilinsheng gongshu xunling Oilin provincial government order) 480.44. June 12, 1936; 06.95, June 29, 1 936. Jilin Provincial Archives, Changchun.

JTB Jiaji tiaocha baogao/Kakei cMsa hokoku (Household statistical survey reports) . Compiled by Guowuyuan, Zongwuting tongjichu (General Affairs Board, Statistical Office). Xingjing: Kangde tushu yinshwa suo, 1 935.

MDNJ Wanguo Daodehui Manzhouguo zonghui bianjike (Editorial department of the head office of the World Moraliry Sociery of Manchukuo), ed. Manzhouguo Daotkhui nianjian (Year-

269

270 r--J Bibliography

book of the Manzhouguo Morality Society). Xinjing: Wanguo Daodehui Manzhouguo zonghui bianjike, 1 934.

MGFH Manchukuo Guofongfunuren hui (National Defense Women's Association). Dalian: Man­ chukuo Guofang funiirenhui zongbenbu (Manchukuo National Defense Women's Associ­ ation general headquarters), 1 938-39.

MQX Xinshenghuo zujin zonghui (New Life Promotion general committee), ed. Minguo Ershi­ sannian quanguo xinshenghuo yundong ( 1934 National New Life movement). Nanjing: Xin­ shenghuo zujin zonghui, 1 934.

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Index

Note: Page numbers given in italics indicate a figure.

Aaron, Stephen, 49 Academia Sinica, 1 89, 1 94, 1 98 Adas, Michael, 94 Adelman, Jeremy, 49 agrarian communitarianism, 1 19 Akamatsu Chijo, 1 84, 185 Akiba Takashi, 1 8 1 , 1 84-85, 1 99, 204n49 Akira Kurosawa, 234 All Manchukuo Women's Federation,

1 50-5 1 Anderson, Benedict, 12, 47, 59 anthropogenetic nation, 179 anthropology. See ethnology antireligion campaign of 1 928, 90, 1 09-1 1 ,

1 13 Aoki-Kimberley treaty, 96 Arendt, tIannah, 13, 33 Arkush, David, 2 1 6 Arrighi, Giovanni, 1 1 Arseniev, V. K., 47, 234 Asia, East. Su East Asia Asianism: Asian civilization in Japan and

China, 96-103; and the new discourse of civilization, 89-129; Sun Vat-sen on Great Asianism, 1 9 1 , 205n7 1 . Su also pan-Asianism

Asian People's conferences, 1 02 assimilation, 1 7, 77, 1 82, 1 92, 193, 252 authenticity: and capitalism, 29; civilization

and, 9 1 , 95; as embodied in living per­ sons, 3 1 ; in Liang Shanding's Green val­ ley, 232; the local as site of, 209, 2 1 3; modernization versus, 248; nationhood requiring, 23; primitive, 1 87-88, 200, 20 1 ; spatial representations in, 1 71-77; and timelessness, 28, 29, 30. See also regimes of authenticity

Ayukawa Yoshisuke, 69

badao, 1 02 Bai Yongzhen, 1 1 4 bandits, 232-34 banner system, 42, 44, 47, 1 80, 1 82 baojia system, 74 baojing anmin movement, 50, 53, 64 Bartleson, Jens, 20, 37n38 Bechen, tIeinz, 92 Bell, Daniel, 29 Bhabha, tIomi, 1 68n 1 00 Black Dragon Society, 99 "Blood Lineage" (Dan Di), 1 48-49 Boas, Franz, 1 07, 1 90, 1 98 Bohai, 57, 1 87 Book o/Rituals (YiN sangfozhuan), 1 53 borderlands. See frontier zones Boxer uprising, 47, 49, 1 80 British American Tobacco Company, 145 Brown, Carolyn, 1 64n23

293

294 r--J Index

Brubaker, Rogers, 253 Buckle, Henry, 1 00 Buddhism: as civilization, 92, 95, 96; as

oppositional, 1 1 9; redemptive societies and, 1 03, 104, 1 09, 1 54; revolutionary soldiers turning to, 1 1 0; Wang Fengyi on, 1 14; welfare programs of, 1 1 5

bunmei kaika, 96

Cai Yuanpei, I S9-90 capitalism: authenticiry and, 29; and gender

roles, 1 36; linear time of, 26, 29, 3Sn62; the local as defense against, 2 1 3; nation­ state system and, 1 7; print capitalism, 12; redemptive societies on, I l l ; and regimes of authenticiry, 32; territorial and capital­ ist logics in, 1 1

Carter, James H., SOn37 CCP. See communists Chan, Wing-tsit, 1 03 Changbai Mountain, 42, 1 73, I S7, 232 Changchun, 66 Chao, Kang, SOn22 Chatterjee, Partha, 135-36 Chen Duxiu, 101 Chen Lifu, 1 02 Chen Tianhua, 25 Chen Yifu, I S9 Chiang Kai-shek, 70, 109, 142, I S9, 1 92-

93, 1 95 , 1 96 "Children of Mixed Blood" (Shi Jun), 147 China: antiforeignism in, 52, 54, 55; Asian

civilization in Japan and, 96-1 03; Boxer uprising, 47, 49, I SO; the Chinese impe­ rium, 4; civilization and territory in, 95; economic nationalism appearing in, 12; ethnology and history of the Chinese geo-body, I SS-99; German war econ­ omy as model for, 1 3; Japan as source of modern knowledge in, 100; Lytton Com­ mission on, 52; militarizing frontier zones, 179; misrecognition in, 25; native place in Sino-Japanese discourse, 2 1 0-17; representational practices in, 30; as Republic of Five Nationalities, 63, 192-93, 252; rights deferred in, 1 6; Sino-Japanese interaction, 2, 3, 4, S2n63;

Sino-Japanese War of I S95, 47; in social­ ist bloc, 4; sovereignry claims of, 2; Twenry-one Demands, 4S, 9S; two geo­ logical formations in, 2 1 5 ; uti possidetis doctrine, I S. See also Han Chinese; Man­ chu (Qing) dynasry; Manchuria

China Border Regions Institute, 1 92 Chinese Communist Parry. See communists Chinese Eastern Railroad, 47, 56, 66, 172 Chinese Ethnological Association, 1 90 Ch' oe Namson, 1 73, 203n3 1 Chow, Rey, 30 Christianity, 90, 9 1 , 93, 1 1 0, 1 12, 1 1 6 citizenship rights, 14-1 5 city planning, 71 civilization: Asian civilization in Japan and

China, 96-103; Asianism and the new discourse of, S9-129; civilizing mission, 9 1 , 94; Confucianism as civilizing proj­ ect, 1 97, 19S, 200; defined, 9 1 , 1 25n57; ethnographic conception of, 92, 106, 126n64; genealogy of, 91-96, 105; in legal form, 122n6; in Manchukuo iden­ tity projects, 25 1 ; in popular society, 105-1 1 ; principal connections and exclu­ sions in discourse of, 106; redemptive societies and civilizational discourse, 1 03-5; singular conception of, 91 ; as state and process, 95-96, 105-6; wen­ ming, 92, 97, 106, 1 24n36; women and the figure of tradition, 131-69. See also Western civilization

Clarke, M. Desmond, 1 5 Clausen, Soren, 56 colonialism: detached gaze of colonialist,

I S7; imperialism becoming identified with, 20; internal, I S; Japanese imperial­ ism and European, 245; justification of sovereignty over colonies, 2 1 ; "night watchman" states, 77; Tocqueville on, 1 5. See also imperialism

"comfort" women, 1 5 1 communists: competing with redemptive

societies, 1 16; Concordia Association contrasted with, 73; Kayahara influenc­ ing, 1 00; on Liang Shanding's Green Vtzl-

ley, 226, 228; on Lytton Commission report, 52, 53; "modern" women and, 1 37; resistance to Japanese occupation, 70; women as represented by, 1 6 1

Concordia Association, 73-76; as anticapi­ talist and anticommunist, 74; Chinese cooperation enforced by, 65, 67; and cor­ poratist organization of society, 68, 73- 74, 76; kyowa in, 63; in mobilizing the family, 1 50; multiculturalism of, 6 1 , 70, 73; multinationalism and, 253; and National Defense Women's Association, 1 5 1 ; in Pacific War, 75-76; redemptive societies opposed by, 1 1 8, 1 28n 1 22; reli­ gion contrasted with, 120; Tachibana in building of, 64; on women's role, 147

Concordia of Nationalities, 63, 73, 99, 1 82, 2 1 3, 248

Concordia Youth League, 73 Confucianism: as Asian civilizational form,

94, 95, 96, 1 97, 1 98, 200, 249; Confu­ cian Great Unity, 1 96, 1 98; in East Asian modern, 24; Fei on, 1 07; Japanese socie­ ties and, 1 1 1 ; KMT and, 102, 122, 250; on locality, 2 1 1 , 2 1 6; redemptive socie­ ties and, 1 03, 104, 1 08, 1 09, 1 16, 120, 126n60; Wang Fengyi on, 1 1 3; women and family stability in, 1 36; the yangban, 99; Zhou Zuoren criticizing, 212

corporatism, 68 , 73-74, 76 Crowley, James, 82n75 cult of domesticity, 141 culture: in anti-imperialist nationalism, 17;

culture areas, 1 98; holistic conception of, 1 06-7; and identity, 25 1 ; in Japanese ethnology of Manchuria, 184; sover­ eignty and, 20-21 ; Spengler on, 92-93; in Sun Yat-sen's Great Asianism, 1 9 1 ; for understanding national community, 1 93-99; wenhua, 1 24n36

Cumings, Bruce, 250

Dai Jitao, 1 02, 1 90-9 1 , 199 Dairen (Dalian), 48, 146 Dairen Women s Times (newspaper) , 146 Daiyuhokai, 62, 69 Dan Di, 1 48-49, 1 66n67, 225

Index r--.> 295

Daodehui. See Morality Society Daoism, 90, 1 03, 1 04, 1 08, 1 09, 1 1 4, 212 Daoyuan (Society of the Way), 103 , 1 08,

1 1 0, 1 1 2, 1 1 3 Daruvala, Susan, 214, 2 1 5 Datong (Great Unity) , 102, 1 10, 1 1 2, 1 13,

1 1 9, 1 57, 1 96 Datongbao (newspaper), 146 Daurs, 74, 75, 1 1 8, 1 82, 185 Deguchi Nao, I I I Deguchi Onisaburo, I I I Derrida, Jacques, 27, 28, 39n69, 219 Dersu the Trapper (Arseniev), 234 Deutsch, Karl, 12 development, 2, 24, 250 Dirlik, Arif, 142 Doihara Kenji, 61 doken kokka, 71 Dongfangzazhi (journal), 1 00-10 1 Donghu, 194, 1 95 Duanmu Hongliang, 233 Du Weiming, 1 26n64 Du Yaquan, 1 00, 1 0 1 , 107

East Asia: as historical and changing, 4; inequality of flow from West to East, 3; Japan becomes dominant power in, 48; Manchukuo as window to modern nation-making in, 2; women as repre­ sented in, 1 36. See also Asianism; China; East Asian modern; Japan; Korea

East Asian Community, 62 East Asian League, 62 East Asian modern, 2, 6n6; as analytical and

substantive categoty, 3; Concordia Asso­ ciation using, 76; Confucian civilizing discourse in, 1 98; East Asian model of development rooted in, 24, 250; Man­ chukuo and the, 247-5 1 ; misrecognition as enabled in, 25; top-down reconstruc­ tion of tradition in, 1 2 1 ; women and the figure of tradition in modernity, 1 3 1-69

economic bloc, 6 1 , 62, 84n107 education: native place in, 223; of Oroqen,

1 86-87; for women, 1 33, 1 34, 136, 145, 1 52

Egami Namio, 203n29

296 .--, Index

Elias, Norbert, 95, 1 05, 1 23n20 Elliott, Mark, 42 equality, 63, 99 Escarra, M., 53 Ethnological Research (journal), 1 90, 1 93 ethnology: in China, 1 89-90; and history of

the Chinese geo-body, 1 88-99; in Japan, 1 82-83; and local values, 2 14; as min­ zuxue, 1 89; native ethnology, 202n25, 2 13; and Oroqen in Manchukuo, 1 80-88

expectation, versus experience, 27, 28

family: family-state imagery in Manchukuo, 149-54; in Oroqen, 1 86; state policies towards, 1 40-44; women seen as bed­ rock of, 1 36, 1 53

Fang Qiuwei, 1 88, 1 98-99 Febvre, Lucien, 92, 106 Federation of Social Enterprises, 1 1 5 Fei >Gaotong, 107, 204n33, 2 1 5-16, 23 1 Fellowship of Goodness (Tongshamhe), 1 03,

1 10 Feng Hanqing, 1 5 1 Feng Jiasheng, 55, 195 fengjin policy, 41 fingsu, 2 10-1 1 Feng Youlan, 1 0 1 Ferrara, Alessandro, 29 folklore, 209, 2 1 1-13, 238n1 9 footbinding, 1 36, 1 37 forests, 1 72, 1 75, 1 80, 1 84, 1 87, 229, 249 Foucault, Michel, 1 6, 24, 36n30, 7 1 , 140,

168n 1 l 4 fox fairy stories, 197 France, 1 3, 1 4, 95, 1 79 Franke, Otto, 194, 196 Franke, Wolfgang, 1 96 Frazer, James, 2 1 1 , 2 1 2 frontier wnes: borderland model, 49; Chi­

nese neglect of, 1 88-89; journals about, 1 92; Manchuria as, 5, 41-5 1 , 200; mili­ tarization of, 1 79, 199-200; nationalists on incorporating, 1 91-94, 1 98-99

Fujiyama Kazuo, 174-75, 1 87, 2 13, 229 Fukui Chie, 65 Fukunaga Tadashi, 1 1 9-20, 1 29n135

Fukuzawa Yukichi, 92, 97 Funu Zazhi (journal), 1 36 Fu Sinian, 55, 1 97 Fu Zhong, 1 26n60

Gang Tong, 1 8 1 Gao Gang, 237, 243n98 Garon, Sheldon, 1 1 1 , 1 1 5, 1 4 1 Gelaohui, 1 2 1 Gellner, Ernest, 10, 1 2 General Affairs Board (zongwuting), 67, 1 50 geo-body, 55, 1 09, 1 79, 1 88, 197, 1 98, 1 99 geographical determinism, 2 1 4- 1 5 geography, 1 89, 1 96, 2 1 4, 2 1 5 geopolitics, 2 1 4 Germany, 1 2-13, 1 79, 1 87, 2 1 1 , 2 1 4 germ warfare experiments, 70-71 Gerth, Karl, 1 41-42 Ge Suicheng, 2 1 5 Giddens, Anthony, 2 1 , 24, 36n30, 248 girls' schools, 1 33, 1 36, 1 37, 1 38, 1 39, 145,

1 52, 1 56 Goldi (Hezhezu; Fishskin Tartars), 1 82, 1 94,

1 97 Goodman, Bryna, 2 1 0 "Good Wife and Wise Mother" ideology,

1 37, 141 governmentality: Foucault on, 1 6, 24, 7 1 ;

functions of, 71-72; modernization and, 23-24; and modern patriarchy, 140-44; regimes of authenticity for, 33

Great Britain, 12, 95, 97, 1 70 "Greater Asianism" (Sun Yat-sen), 1 01-2 Greater East Asian Co-prosperiry Sphere, 62,

224, 238n1 9 Greater East Asian Folklore Studies, 238n1 9 Greater East Asian literature conferences,

224 Greater Japan Federation of Women's Asso­

ciations, 1 43 Great Unity (Datong), 1 02, 1 1 0, 1 1 2, 1 13,

1 19, 1 57, 1 96 Green Valley (Liang Shanding), 221-34; con­

tinued interest in, 235; feminine imagery in, 147-48, 229; forests in, 229, 249; in history, 223-28; on Manchuria as bor­ derland, 1 75-76; nationalist reading of,

226-28; national resistance in, 2 17, 226; plot of, 221-22; postscript of 1 987 to, 223, 226; railroad motif in, 1 72, 221 , 226, 230-31 ; represenrational structures of the local in, 228-34; translation into Japanese, 223, 225, 229

Gu, Mrs., 13 1-32, 1 5 1 , 1 6 1 Guandong Army: allying with key groups in

Manchuria, 6 1 , 65, 247; and Concordia Association, 73; and Japanese govern­ ment, 77; and the landed classes, 64; in Manchurian Incident, 5 1 ; rapidity of conquest by, 46; and redemptive socie­ ties, 1 1 1 ; and Tachibana's national assembly plan, 85n 1 3 1 ; and visionary groups, 69; and women's organizations, 1 50

Gu Ding, 224, 228 Gu Hongming, 101 Gu Jiegang, 55-56, 58-59, 1 95, 206n94 Gu Yanwu, 2 1 0-1 1

Hailuftng zhangtang, 1 2 1-22 Han Bianwai, 232 Han Chinese: in banner system, 44; as cul­

tural formation, 196, 1 97; Manchu emperors restricting immigration by, 4 1-42; and Oroqen, 1 80-8 1 , 1 82; redemptive societies and, 1 1 9; settlement in Manchuria, 44, 47, 53, 55, 57, 58; shamanism among, 1 85

Han, Suk-jung, 72, 77, 253 Harbin, 48, 56, 71, 1 18, 1 44, 1 45, 223, 227 Harootunian, Harry, 2 1 3 Hashikawa Bunso, 98 Hezhezu (Goldi; Fishskin Tartars), 1 82, 194,

1 97 Hinduism, 92, 1 23nl0, 135-36 Hinsley, F. H., 20 history: Chiang Kai-shek on teaching of Chi­

nese, 1 89; cyclical, 26; in debate over Manchukuo nationhood, 55; Huang Wenshan on role of, 206n93; linear, 26- 27, 29, 93; societies learning to see them­ selves in, 23

Hitonomichi, 1 1 1 Hobsbawm, Eric, 10, 22

Holston, James, 75 Hongbaochu, 224, 225 Hoshina Kiyoji, 1 46 Howland, Douglas, 4, 92

Index r---> 297

"How to Write about Manchuria" confer­ ences, 224-25

Hsu, Francis, 107, 204n33 Huangdi (Yellow Emperor), 1 95, 196, 197,

206n94 Huang Wanhua, 226 Huang Wenshan, 190, 1 9 1 , 1 93, 1 94,

206n93 human rights, 14, 22 Huntington, Samuel, 96 Hu Shi, 101

identity: and culture, 251 ; global forces of transformation eroding, 30; nationalism and, 2, 1 1 , 1 8-19; nation-building requiring, 248-49; sovereignty and, 25 1-54; and time, 26, 27-28

imperialism: anti-imperialist nationalism, 9, 1 6-20, 2 1 , 22, 32, 33; becoming identi­ fied with colonialism, 20; as civilizing mission, 9 1 , 95; defined, 34nl ; "ex-cen­ tric," 247; imperialist nationalism, 13, 77, 1 79-208; interwar period shaping, 1-2; Japanese, 77-78, 86n144; logic of rights and, 1 6; Manchukuo and, 245-47; and nationalism in twentieth century, 9-40; nation-state system entailing, 19; in regional economic blocs, 1 4; World War I weakening, 1 0. See also colonialism

Inaba Kunzan, 57, 229 India: civilization and territoty in, 95; eco­

nomic nationalism appearing in, 1 2; mili­ tarizing frontier zones, 1 79; nationalism on women, 135-36; question of Muslim participation in, 18 ; sovereignty claims of, 2; uti possidetis doctrine, 18 ; World War I weakening imperial control in, 1 0

individual rights, 1 5 Inner Mongolia, 48, 1 8 1 international system o f states, 16-17, 19, 20,

2 1 , 93, 1 79 "In the Wine Shop" (Lu Xun), 2 1 8-19 Ishii Shiro, 71

298 (-...J Index

Ishikawa Yoshihiro, 97, 100, 101 Ishiwara Kanji, 6 1 , 62, 63, 73, 82n69, 98,

246 Islam, 94, 1 10 Isshinkai, 99 Itagaki Seishiro, 6 1

James, H . E . M . , 232 Japan: allying with United States in Cold

War, 4; Aoki-Kimberley treaty, 96; Asian civilization in China and, 96-103; becomes dominant regional power, 48; East Asian model of development in, 250; imperialism of, 77-78, 86n144; inroads in China in early twentieth cen­ tuty, 47; investment in Manchukuo, 68; investment in Manchuria, 48-49; as leader of Asian federation, 95, 97, 98, 1 1 9-20; League of Nations and, 22, 53; and Lytton Commission report, 5 1-53; Manchukuo and imperialism of, 245-47; Manchukuo as laboratoty for, 250; mass organizations emerging in, 13 ; Meiji period, 96, 1 33, 14 1 , 255n5; modernity forged in regional matrix, 4; nationalism in, 12, 33-34, 252; native place in Sino­ Japanese discourse, 2 10-17; "outer terri­ tories" of, 1 8; representational practices in, 30; Russo-Japanese War, 47, 49, 96, 98; search for Japanese origins, 1 82-83; Sino-Japanese interaction, 2, 3, 4, 82n63; Sino-Japanese War of 1 895, 47; as source of modern knowledge in China, 1 00; Twenty-one Demands, 48, 98; women's role in, 1 34-35, 137, 14 1 , 143-44; and Zhang Zuolin, 49-50

Jiali, 1 1 8, 1 1 9 Jiali Native Place Charitable Association,

1 1 8 jianguo (kenkoku), 65 Jianguo University, 78 Jian Xian'ai, 2 17, 2 19 jiaohua (kyaka), 106, 1 13 , 1 14, 1 1 5, 1 2 1 ,

1 52, 198, 2 1 1 , 25 1 Jin Qisan, 2 1 5 Jones, Charles, 1 5 Judge, Joan, 1 63n7

junsuisei, 30 Jurchen Gin) dynasty, 43, 57, 187

Kada Tetsuji, 62 Kam Louie, 235-36 Kang Youwei, 1 04, 1 13, 1 36, 137 Kasagi Ryomei, 63 Kasza, Gregory, 13 , 72, 144 Kato Hiroyuki, 97 Kawamura Minato, 202n25 Kayahara Kazan, 100 Kazuko Ono, 1 36 Ketelaar, James, 92 Khitan dynasty, 43, 57, 1 87 kingly way. See wangdao Kishimoto Mio, 2 1 0 Kitagawa Fuyuhiko, 173, 1 74 Kjellen, Rudolf, 214 KMT (Kuomintang Party): Academia Sinica

founded under, 189; antireligion cam­ paign of 1928, 1 13; on East-West binary, 102; and five nationalities, 192-93; on Lytton Commission report, 52, 53; Man­ chukuo governmentality emulated by, 72; New Life movement, 30, 102, 1 10, 120, 142-43, 250; Northern Expedition, 90; redemptive societies banned by, 109- 1 1 , 1 16, 121-22; and women, 133-34, 1 3 7, 14 1-42; Zhang Xueliang and, 5 1 , 53

Koguryo period, 56, 57, 1 73, 1 87 Koiso Kuniaki, 1 50-5 1 , 253 Komagome Takeshi, 76-77, 82n7 1 ,

86nI44, 245-46 Kamin, 57 kominka, 2, 246 Konoye, Prince, 90 Korea: bandits in border regions, 233;

Changbai Mountain, 42, 1 73, 1 87; East Asian model of development in, 250; Jap­ anese annexation of, 48, 56, 246-47, 254n5; in Japanese representations of national security, 34, 56; Koreans in Jap­ anese ethnology of Manchuria, 1 83, 1 84; in Li Changdan's theory of racial mixing, 207n98; Manchukuo compared with,

77-78; shamanism, 1 83, 203n3 1 ; Tan­ gun, 173; Ural-Altaic thesis in, 203n31

Koryo (Gaolz) nation, 99 Koselleck, Reinhart, 27, 28 Kuomintang Parry. See KMT Kuwabara Jitsuzo, 1 97 kyoriotai, 74, 213 kyowa, 62-63

Land Records Bureau, 64, 70 Lang, Andrew, 2 1 1 Laozi, 89, 90, 1 1 3 Lasch, Christopher, 29 Laski, Harold, 2 1 Lattimore, Owen, 43, 44, 48, 49, 57,

84n107, 1 07, 144, 1 93, 233 League of Nations: Japan withdraws from,

53; Lytton Commission, 2 1 , 4 1 , 5 1-53, 58; Manchukuo independence rejected by, 1 , 5 1-53, 72; nationalism and impe­ rialism in tension in, 21-22

Lee Chong-sik, 70 Lee Kuan-yew, 95 Lei Haizong, 1 97 Liang Qichao, 96-97, 1 0 1 , 1 07 Liang Shanding: in anti-Japanese literary

movement, 223, 225; edits first collection of Manchukuo literature, 237; incarcera­ tion of, 223; as nationalist and radical, 1 47; pan-Asianist poem of, 225; scientific geography used by, 2 15 . See also Green Valley

Liang Shuming, 1 0 1 , 1 07, 2 1 6, 238n1 Liao dynasry, 43 liberalism, 1 5, 22 Li Changdan, 207n98 Li Dazhao, 1 00, 1 0 1 Li Shiyu, 1 03 Li XiangIan (Ri Koran), 161 Lin Anwu, 1 1 3, 1 14 Lin Yutang, 2 1 5 linear history, 26-27, 29, 93 Ling Chunsheng, 1 94-95, 197, 206n94,

207n97 lishen, 157-58, 1 59 List, Friedrich, 35n6 Literary Records group, 227, 228

Liu, Lydia, 3, 149 Liu Shuquan, 1 14 localiry. See native place

Index ..--.. 299

"Localiry and Literature" (Zhou Zuoren), 2 1 2

Louis, Roger, 247 lumber, 1 72, 1 75 Lu Qinwen, 227 Lu Xun, 97, 137-39, 1 64n23, 2 1 1 , 2 17-2 1 ,

227 Lytton Commission, 2 1 , 4 1 , 5 1-53, 58

Ma Hongtian, 1 92 Ma Zhangshou, 193 Ma Zhanshan, 70 Mamiya Rinzo, 46 Manchu (Qing) dynasry: as assimilated into

Chinese culture, 55; cultural isolation policy of, 41-42, 43, 54, 57; federated empire idea of, 63; Manchuria as labora­ tory for reforms of, 47; model of woman­ hood of, 1 33-34; modern nation as coextensive with empire of, 1 88, 200; myth of Manchu origins, 1 87; Oroqen come under control of, 1 80; religion as basis of unification of, 1 10; tribal groups and, 46-47

Manchukuo: as abomi-nation, 59; agricul­ tural and natural features of, 45; Asian­ ism and the new discourse of civilization, 89-129; brutaliry of, 70-71 , 85n123; Chinese support for, 64; citizenship in, 67-68; as constructed entiry, 2, 249; and the East Asian modern, 247-5 1 ; eco­ nomic development in, 68-70; funda­ mental law of, 67; German war economy as model for, 13; governmentaliry in, 71-72; historical overview of, 41-86; and imperialism, 245-47; independence proclaimed, 5 1 , 59, 6 1 ; inequaliry between Chinese and Japanese in, 70, 77; Japanese settlement in, 68, 84n1 03; as laboratory for Japan, 250; land and peo­ ple as depicted in, 174; League of Nations rejects independence of, 1 , 5 1- 53, 72; Lytton Commission report, 2 1 , 5 1-53, 58; Manchukuo Empire declared,

300 r---.-> Index

75; multinationalism of, 253; as nation­ state, 1 , 34, 6 1 , 79; native place in, 209-43; Oroqen in, 1 80-88; paradoxes of, 1 , 248-49; police force of, 72; politi­ cal structure of, 60-61 , 65-73; prov­ inces, cities, and principal railroads of, 66; as puppet state, 59-60; Puyi as head of state of, 65-66, 75, 83n9 1 ; rights as conceived in, 1 6; rural population in, 1 9; as supply base for Japanese war machine, 66-67, 69, 1 6 1 ; rwo faces of, 7 1 , 85n124; utopian vision for, 6 1 , 62; women in, 1 44-54. See also Guandong Army

Manchukuo Writers and Artists Concordia, 224

Manchuria: agrarianization of, 46, 47, 1 75, 1 87, 232; Chinese historical scholarship on, 55-56; Chinese settlement in, 44, 47, 53, 55, 57, 58; as contested borderland, 5, 41-5 1 , 200; debate over sovereignty in, 53-59; diversity of, 43; economy of, 48; emergence as separate territorial entity, 42-43; integration into China, 4 1 , 47, 49; in Japanese cultural imagina­ tion, 235; Japanese historical scholarship on, 56-58; in Japanese representations of national security, 34, 56, 6 1 ; in Japan's Twenty-one Demands, 48; land distribu­ tion in, 64; as lifeline of North China, 1 96, 200; Lytton Commission on, 52, 58; "Man-Mo," 64, 74, 1 84; as original homeland ofTungusic peoples, 1 83, 249; as "reservoir," 43, 47, 49, 200; sense of independence in, 43; Sinicization of, 44- 45, 49; spatial representations of, 171-77; "turning back" to China, 44, 47; women in, 1 44. See also Manchukuo

Manchurian Incident, 46, 5 1 , 63, 65, 82n75, 90, 1 1 3

Manchurian Youth League, 62-63, 64, 69 "Man-Mo," 64, 74, 1 84 Mann, Susan, 1 68nl04 Mantetsu Shainkai, 62, 69 Manzhou Wenxue (newsletter) , 227 marriage, 1 43, 1 46, 1 47

Marshall, T. H., 1 5 Marxism, 1 1 1 , 2 1 3 mass organizations, 1 3 , 72, 1 4 1 , 1 43 Matsuoka Yosuke, 53-54, 56, 58 Matsusaka, Yoshihisa Tak, 6 1 , 78 May Fourth movement, 133, 1 37, 1 45, 147,

228 McCormack, Gavan, 49, 50, 73, 83n75 Meng, Chih, 54-55, 58 Meng Yue, 1 60-6 1 Meyer, John, 23 Ming dynasty, 44, 1 96 misrecognition, 25, 33 Miner, Rana, 37n48, 65, 70, 247 Modern Girl, 1 37, 1 4 1 , 1 42 modernity: the authentic mobilized against,

32; Concordia Association incorporating, 75; as encompassing and superseding the past, 3; Japan bringing to Asia, 98; modernity-of-tradition, 76; modern patriarchy, 135-40; regime of authentic­ ity and tradition-modernity binaty, 39n72; women and the figure of tradition in, 131-69. See also East Asian modern

modernization, 23, 52, 59, 82n68, 1 2 1 , 248, 250

Mongolia: Inner Mongolia, 48, 1 8 1 ; in Japa­ nese representations of national security, 34, 56; "Man-Mo," 64, 74, 1 84; as radi­ cally different from China, 43

Mongols: in Confucian Great Unity, 1 96; Han agriculture affecting, 46, 47; inde­ pendence claimed by, 1 98; Khitan and Liao dynasties, 43; and National Man­ chukuo Central Museum, 1 74; as primi­ tive, 1 92; Qing alliance with, 42; redemptive societies opposed by, 1 1 8; in Ural-Altaic thesis, 1 82, 1 83

Morality Society (Daodehuz), 1 03; Japanese civilizational societies contrasted with, 1 1 2; Kang Youwei as president of, 1 04, 1 1 3, 1 37; KMT banning, 1 1 0; member­ ship of, 125n43; in the provinces, 1 17; and secret societies, 1 1 8; and state in Manchukuo, 65, 1 1 3, 1 1 4-1 5 , 1 16; as stronger after Japanese occupation, 90; as

synthesizing Eastern and Western out­ looks, 1 04; and virtuous-school building, 1 44-45; Wang Fengyi in, 1 13-14, 1 52; welfare programs of, 1 1 5; women in, 1 3 1-32, 1 5 1-60

Morefield, Jeannie Marie, 22 Morse, Edwin, 1 83 Mukden, 42, 43, 50 multiculturalism, 36n32, 6 1 , 70, 73, 1 79,

1 93, 252 Multilateral Treaty of Paris, 2 1 multinationalism, 2 , 1 79-80, 252, 253 Murakami Haruki, 235 Muto Nobuyoshi, 67 Myers, Ramon, 4, 68 "My Old Home" (Lu Xun), 2 1 8

Nagata Uzumaro, 1 85-87, 1 88, 194, 229 NaitO Konan, 56-57, 82n63, 1 73 Nakagarni Kenji, 235 National Defense Women's Association

(Kokubo fojinkat), 1 43-44, 1 5 1 National Defense Women's Association

(Manzhouguo guofongfoniiren hut), 1 5 1 national economy, 35n6 nationalism: anti-imperialist, 9, 1 6-20, 2 1 ,

22, 32, 33; challenge to Britain i n emer­ gence of, 1 2; and civilization, 93, 94, 1 02; Concordia of Nationalities and, 73; disciplinary power in, 24; as driving force behind expansionism, 9; economic, 1 2; as emerging in late nineteenth centuty, 10 , 1 2; and imperialism in twentieth centuty, 9-40; imperialist, 1 3, 77, 1 79-208; intetwar period shaping, 1-2; and linear histoty, 27; mass mobilization in, 1 2; moral quandary regarding, 253-54; patriarchy of, 1 33, 1 35-40; rights as related to, 1 6; on sovereignty, 20, 24-25; territorial state and, 1 1-12

National Manchukuo Central Museum, 1 74-75, 2 1 3

"national products" (guohuo) movement, 142

national rights, 1 4, 1 5, 1 6, 27 national symbols, 25 nation-states: boundaries coinciding with

Index '--' 301

language and nationality, 22, 252; and civilizations, 94, 95; cognitive and ideo­ logical dimension of, 23; disciplinary power in, 24; historical unity of, 32-33; histoty in claims of nationhood, 55; iden­ tity in nation building, 248-49; imperi­ alism of nineteenth-centuty, 1 7-18; international system of states, 16-17, 19, 20, 2 1 , 93, 1 79; liberalism requiring, 1 5; linear histoty in constituting nationhood, 27; as model of power in the world, 17; race blurring with, 16; sovereignty and, 20

native place, 209-43; in education, 223; in Liang Shanding's Green Valley, 221-34; Lu Xun and native-place writing, 2 1 7-21 ; in Sino-Japanese discourse, 2 1 0-17; as source of abiding values, 2 1 5

New Asia (journal), 1 90, 1 92, 1 98, 1 99, 205n71

New Life movement, 30, 1 02, 1 10, 1 20, 1 42-43, 250

New Peoples Society, 1 16 New Religion to Save the World, 1 04 New Village movement, 2 1 3 "New Year's Sacrifice, The" (Lu Xun), 2 1 8 Nihonjinron, 30 Nine Power Treaty (1 922), 55 Nishimura Shigeo, 56, 71 Nissan, 69 Nogawa Takashi, 2 1 3-14, 220 nohonshugi, 34, 1 1 9 Northeast National Salvation Society, 5 1 Northern China Cooperative Society, 2 1 3

Oakes, Timothy, 234 Okada Hideki, 228, 241 n70 Okakura Tenshin, 97, 98 Okawa Shumei, 98 Okinawa, 1 8, 1 83 Omotokyo, 98, 1 1 1-12 One Heart Heavenly Way Longhua Sagely

Teaching, 1 17 opium, 1 05, 1 8 1 , 1 94 Oroqen, 1 80-88; family structure of, 1 86;

history of, 1 80; isolation of, 1 8 1-82, 1 86, 1 88; population decline of, 1 80; as

302 ......., Index

primitive, 1 82, 185, 1 86, 187-88, 200, 201 ; Zheng Wanlong writing on, 235, 236

Otani Komei, 1 1 8, 1 1 9 Otani Takeo, 224, 24 1n70 Other, the, 1 1 , 9 1 , 94, 1 86, 251 Ouchi Takayoshi, 225 Ownby, David, 1 08, 125n43 Oyama Hiko'ichi, 1 84 Ozaki Fumiaki, 2 13 Ozaki Hotsumi, 62

Pacific War: Concordia Association in, 75-76; confrontation of civilizations in, 98; geographical determinism and, 2 14; Manchukuo as Japanese supply base dur­ ing, 66-67, 161

pan-Asianism: in China, 99-100, 1 02; of Chinese ethnologists, 1 90-91 ; of Con­ cordia Association, 74-75; Greater East Asian Folklore Studies, 238n 1 9; imperi­ alism as basis ofJapanese, 14, 78, 98; Ishiwara as convert to, 62; in Japanese ideology for Manchukuo, 2, 34, 62, 1 74, 246; in Liang Shan ding' s Green Valley, 225; of Omotokyo, 1 1 1

Park, Soon-Won, 254n5 patriarchy: governmentality and modern,

140-44; modern, 135-40; nationalist, l33

peace maintenance committees, 64, 65 peasants, 1 9, 3 1 , 72, 107, 215 , 220, 23 1 Peattie, Mark, 82n69 Pei Wenzhong, 217 Peng Ruzun, 1 29n143 Pingfang, 7 1 Pocock, J. G. A., 38n64 police, 72 Postone, Moishe, 38n62 power, 24, 26, 60, 135 primitive peoples, 1 80, 187-88, 1 90, 195,

200, 20 1 Proclamation of the Establishment of the

State ( 1932), 67 progress, 23, 27, 29, 30, 93, 106 prostitution, 144

Puett, Michael, 26 Puyi, 65-66, 75, 83n91

Qing dynasty. See Manchu (Qing) dynasty qipao, 143

race, 1 6, 17, 9 1 , 184, 1 9 1 , 252 railroads: Chinese Eastern Railroad, 47, 56,

66, 172; and Manchukuo village pattern, 45; principal railroads of Manchukuo, 66; as re-spatializing Manchuria, 172-73; Russia and Japan building, 47, 200; Zhang Xueliang building, 62. See also South Manchurian Railroad

"Railway of Annihilation" (Kitagawa), 173 Ratzel, Friedrich, 1 00, 214 redemptive societies: ban on, 90, 109-1 1 ,

1 1 6, 121-22; and civilizational discourse, 1 03-5; cooperation with Japanese, 65; and corporatist organization of society, 68, 76; doctrines of, 1 26n60; Han con­ sciousness in, 1 1 9; after Japanese invasion of China, 1 16; membership of, 1 03, 125n43; in mobilizing the family, 1 50; oppositional character of, 1 1 9, 248; opposition to, 1 1 7-18; in Pacific War effort, 76; on self-cultivation, 1 08-9; and the state in Manchukuo, 65, 1 1 1-20; syncretism of, 103, 249; Tachibana on, 1 1 2; transformed into jiaohua organiza­ tions, 1 1 5; transnational spiritualism of, I l l ; women's wings of, l39, 1 5 1-60

Redfield, Robert, 1 07, 1 08, 25 1 Red Swastika Society (Hongwanzihuz) , 1 03;

Han consciousness in, 1 19; KMT allow­ ing to operate, 1 1 0; Omotokyo and, 1 1 2; Red Cross Society as model for, 1 04; report on Japanese occupation, 89-90; and secret societies, 1 1 8; and state in Manchukuo, 65, 1 1 4; Uchida establish­ ing branches of, 1 27n89; welfare pro­ grams of, 1 1 5; women's groups in, l39-40

regime form, 60 regimes of authenticity, 29-33; agents of,

31-32; and capitalism, 32; civilization and, 95; nationalism drawing moral

authority from, 9; sovereignty and, 25; and tradition-modernity binary, 39n72; and two faces ofManchukuo, 7 1 ; women in, 1 60-61

religion: antireligion campaign of 1928, 90, 109-1 1 , 1 13; Christianity, 90, 9 1 , 93, 1 10, 1 12, 1 16; Daoism, 90, 103, 104, 108, 109, 1 14, 2 1 2; Hinduism, 92, 1 23nlO, 135-36; Islam, 94, 1 10; sha­ manism, 42, 75, 1 83, 184, 1 85, 203n31 , 2 1 2; Shinto, 92, 1 1 1 , 212. See also Buddhism; Confucianism

Remusat, Abel, 194 Renan, Ernest, 28 Revive Asia Association, 1 16 Ricoeur, Paul, 27, 28, 39n69, 242n74 rights: citizenship, 14-1 5; culture and, 251 ;

human, 14, 22; national, 14 , 1 5, 16, 27; social, 1 5; in unequal treaties, 91

Robinson, Ronald, 247 Russia: inroads in China in early twentieth

centuty, 47, 56; native place in, 227; Russian-Chinese marriages, 147; Zhang Zuolin and, 49. See also Soviet Union

Russo-Japanese War (1904-1905), 47, 49, 96, 98

sancong, 1 58, 1 59 Sasaki Seiji, 2 1 5 Sato Daishiro, 213-14 Schmid, Andre, 173 secret societies, 104, 105, 1 16, 1 18, 1 26n60 self-cultivation, 105, 108-9 self-determination, 1 0, 1 5 , 22, 94, 191 Self-Government Guidance Department,

63-64 selfhood: authenticity and, 30; lishen, 1 57-

58, 1 59 self-sacrifice, 1 33 shamanism, 42, 75, 1 83, 184, 185, 203n31 ,

2 1 2 Shao Yong, 103, 125n43 Shen Congwen, 208n121 , 2 1 1 , 217, 227,

234, 239n31 Shengjing Shibao (newspaper), 145, 146 Shibunkai, 1 1 1 Shi Jun, 147, 225

Index .--.. 303

Shimizu Akitoshi, 1 82 Shimoda Utako, 1 34-35, 163n7 Shinmei Masamichi, 62 Shinto, 92, 1 1 1 , 2 12 Shiratori Kurakichi, 182, 1 83, 195 Shirokogoroff, S. M., 184, 190, 194,

203n29, 203n33 Showa Restoration, 32, 34 Silverberg, Miriam, 137 Sima Qian, 26 Sino-Japanese War ( 1895), 47 Skinner, G. W., 44, 216 SMR. See South Manchurian Railroad "Soap" (Lu Xun), 137-39, 164n23 social Darwinism, 16, 1 7, 9 1 , 92, 191 socialism, 17, 64, 2 1 3 Social Movements Guidance Department,

1 17 social rights, 1 5 Society for the Great Unity of World Reli­

gions (Shije Zongjiao Datonghut), 103 Society of the Way (Daoyuan), 103, 108,

1 10, 1 12, 1 13 Soka Gakkai, 94 soldiers' homes, 1 5 1 Song Meiling (Madame Chiang Kai-shek),

142-43 South Manchurian Railroad (SMR), 48;

Japan acquires lease on, 47; Japanese investment in, 48-49; in Liang Shan­ ding's Green Valley, 221 , 226; Nissan supplanting, 69; principal railways of Manchukuo, 66; as re-spatializing Man­ churia, 1 72, 1 75; Shinmei sponsored by, 62; Tachibana working for, 63; Yu Chonghan associated with, 64; Zhang Xueliang building competitive lines, 5 1

sovereignty, 20-21 ; Concordia Association claims to, 74, 75; debate over Manchu­ rian, 53-59; and identity, 25 1-54; Japa­ nese having power but not, 50; League of Nations on Manchurian, 5 1-53; Man­ chukuo sovereignty claims, 60-61 ; mod­ ern notion as eighteenth-century development, 37n38; regimes of authen­ ticity and, 25

304 r--J Index

Soviet Union: German war economy as model for, 13; as "imperial" power, 247; Li Dazhao on Russian revolution, 100; as multinational state, 252, 253; national independence supported by, 10; sover­ eignty claims of, 2; uti possidetis doctrine, 18 ; Zhang Zuolin entering into treaties with, 50

soya, 46, 48, 172 Spengler, Oswald, 92-93, 94, 1 07 Spring Youth (Li Dazhao), 1 00 Sri Lanka, 92, 95 state form, 60 Steinthal, Heyman, 194 strategic autarky, 6 1-62, 78 Suemitsu, Takayoshi, 108, 1 12, 1 1 6, 1 1 8 Suenaga Misao, 99 Suleski, Ronald, 80n33 Sun, Kung-tu, 68 Sun Yat-sen, 63, 101-2, 190, 1 9 1 , 205n71 Sun Zhongtian, 209, 228, 229

Tachibana Shiraki, 63-64, 73, 74, 85n 1 3 1 , 90, 1 1 2, 1 52-53

Tai Jingnong, 219 Taiwan, 77, 37n52, 82n68, 246, 250 Takizawa Toshihiro, 90, 105, 1 1 2, 1 1 7, 1 56 Tanaka, Stefan, 1 83 Tangun, 173 Teaching of the Abiding Principle (Zailijiao),

1 03, 1 05, 1 1 2, 1 1 5, 1 1 8-19 Theosophical Society, 92, 123nl0 Thogersen, Stig, 56 Three People's Principles, 1 90, 1 9 1 Tibet, 18 , 1 89, 192, 201 time: Christian and Renaissance conceptions

of, 38n64; identity and, 26, 27-28; lin­ ear, 23, 26-28, 29, 38n62

timelessness, 27-28, 29, 30, 33, 1 75 Tisdale, Alice, 233 Tomiyama Ichiro, 1 8 tongjiao (dokyo), 92 Tongshanshe (Fellowship of Goodness), 103,

1 1 0 tongwen (dobun), 92 tongzhong (doshu), 92 Torii Ryiizo, 1 83, 195 Toynbee, Arnold, 22, 93-94, 1 07

tradition: Concordia Association's tradition­ alism, 74, 76; the local as repositoty of, 209; modernity-of-tradition, 76; regime of authenticity and tradition-modernity binaty, 39n72; top-down reconstruction of, 1 2 1 ; women and the figure of tradi­ tion in modernity, 13 1-69

Tsuboi Sh6gor6, 1 83 Tucker, David Vance, 85n 127 Tungus: agriculture affecting, 46; the Goldi,

194-95; in Japanese representation of Manchuria, 1 1 9, 1 82, 1 83, 1 84, 1 86, 249; Jurchen dynasty, 43; Qing alliance with, 42, 46; Wu Shangquan on, 1 96

Twenty-one Demands, 48, 98

Uchida Ry6hei, 99, 1 27n89 unequal treaties, 9 1 , 96 United Nations, 1 5 United States: anti-immigration legislation

of, 78, 98, 99; as "imperial" power, 247; and League of Nations, 22; "melting pot," 1 7, 1 95; national independence supported by, 1 0; nationalism associated with the state in, 1 2; voluntarist para­ digm in, 36n32; Wilson, 1 0, 22, 37n48, 94

Unit 73 1 , 71 Ural-Altaic thesis, 182, 1 83, 1 94, 203n29,

203n3 1 , 249 uti possidetis doctrine, 1 8

Vattel, Emmerich de, 1 9 "Village Opera" (Lu Xun), 218 villages: as bedrock of abiding values, 21 7;

Fei Xiaotong on, 2 1 5-16; reproducing values of, 214

voluntarism, 17, 36n32

Wallerstein, Immanuel, 1 1-12 Wang, David, 239n3 1 wangdao (kingly way): the family and, 1 53;

Japanese leftists and, 213; Manchukuo state deploying, 64, 1 02; Morality Soci­ ety and, 1 14; state building replacing, 253; Sun Yat-sen appealing to, 63, 1 02, 1 9 1 ; Tachibana on Western values and, 74, 1 1 2; Yu Chonghan appealing to, 64, 65

Wang Fengyi, 1 1 3-14, 1 52, 1 56, 1 67n86 Wang Fuzhi, 210-1 1 Wang Guohua schools, 1 14 Wang Jingwei, 1 1 7, 133-34, 145 Wang Luyan, 21 7, 220 Wang Yongjiang, 50, 80n33 warlord armies, 70, 7 1 Water Margin (Shih Nai-an), 233 Watsuji Tetsuro, 214 Way of Pervading Unity (Yiguandao), 1 03,

104, 1 08, 1 09 Wei Huilin, 190, 1 93 Weikun Cheng, 1 37 wenhua, 124n36 wenming, 92, 97, 106, 1 24n36 wenzhipai, 64 Western civilization: Asian civilization con­

trasted with, 97, 98, 99; denounced after World War I, 94; Japan as mastering, 95, 98; moral authority generated by critique of, 1 0; redemptive societies on, 1 04

Willoughby, Westel W., 54 Willow Palisade, 41-42 Wilson, Woodrow, 10, 22, 37n48, 94 Wittfogel, Karl, 214 women: "comfort" women, 1 5 1 ; education

for, 1 33, 134, 1 36, 145, 1 52; and the family, 1 36, 1 53; and the figure of tradi­ tion in modernity, 13 1-69; "Good Wife and Wise Mother" ideology, 137, 141 ; in Japan, 1 34-35, 1 37, 1 4 1 , 143-44; in KMT, 14 1-42; in Manchukuo, 144-54; the Modern Girl, 137, 1 4 1 , 142; modern patriarchy, 135-40; in New Life move­ ment, 142-43; in redemptive societies, 1 39, 1 5 1-60; self-sacrifice by, 1 33, 1 50, 1 55, 1 60; women's movements, 141

Women's Life Improvement Society, 143 Women's Service League, 143 world culture, 2, 23-25 World Women's Red Swastika Society, 139 Wu Meiji, 1 89 Wu Shanquan, 56, 196

Xiao Hong, 145, 149, 223, 235 Xiao Jun, 145, 223, 228, 229, 233, 235

Index r--.> 305

Xing' an provinces, 181-82 Xinjiang, 188-89, 201 Xinjing, 71 Xin Yaxiya (journal), 102 Xiongnu, 106, 195 Xiong Xiling, 109-10 Xi Xia, 64 Xu Qinwen, 217, 2 1 8 Xu Shichang, 50

Yamaguchi Jiiji, 62, 64, 73 Yamamoto Shichihei, 30 Yamamuro Shinichi, 62, 67, 76-77, 83n91 Yanagita Kunio, 202n25, 2 1 1-12, 2 1 3, 217,

238n19 yangban, 99 Yao Congwu, 195-97 Yasutomi Ayumu, 44-45, 46, 65 yen bloc, 68, 77, 246 Yiguandao (Way of Pervading Unity), 103,

104, 1 08, 109 Yi Nung-hwa, 203n3 1 Young, Louise, 68, 77, 83n75 Yuan Jinkai, 64, 1 1 2, 1 14 Yu Chonghan, 64-65, 1 1 2

Zaibatsu capitalists, 69 Zailijiao (Teaching of the Abiding Principle),

1 03, 105, 1 12, 1 1 5, 1 1 8-1 9 Zang Shiyi, 64, 72 Zhang Binglin, 97 Zhang Dongsun, 101 Zhang Jinghui, 64, 67, 1 1 2, 1 14 Zhang Qiyun, 196 Zhang Taiyan, 30 Zhang Xueliang, 5 1 , 53, 70 Zhang Yumao, 237 Zhang Zhidong, 135 Zhang Zuolin, 46, 49-50, 78 Zhao Jingru, 135 Zheng Wanlong, 20 1 , 229, 235-37 Zheng Xiaoxu, 67, 75, 83n9 1 , 1 12, 1 1 5 zhizhi, 1 59 zhonghua minzu, 1 95, 198 Zhou Zuoren, 2 1 1 , 212-13, 214, 2 15 , 2 17,

226-27 Zimmern, Alfred, 22

About the Author

Educated in India and the United States, Prasenjit Duara is currently professor of history and East Asian languages and civilizations at the University of Chicago. He is the author of Culture, Power, and the State: Rural Society in North China, 1900- 1942, which won the American Historical Association's J. K. Fairbank Prize for 1 989 and the Association of Asian Studies' Joseph R. Levenson Prize for 1 990. He is also the author of Rescuing History from the Nation: Questioning Narratives o/Mod­ ern China ( 1995). His work has been widely translated into Chinese and Japanese.

Duara has also contributed to volumes on historiography and historical thought. His most recent essays are "Transnationalism and the Challenge to National Histor­ ies," in Rethinking American History in a Global Age, edited by Thomas Bender (2002), and "Postcolonial History," in A Companion to Western Historical Thought, edited by Sarah Maza and Lloyd Kramer (2002). He is currently editing a reader on decolonization.

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