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OR Books Chapter Title: DIGGING BEHIND THE GAZA BLOCKADE Chapter Author(s): Nadia Hijab
Book Title: Midnight on the Mavi Marmara Book Subtitle: The Attacks on the Gaza Freedom Flotilla and How it Changed the Course of the Israel/Palestine Conflict Book Editor(s): Moustafa Bayoumi Published by: OR Books. (2010) Stable URL: https://www.jstor.org/stable/j.ctt207g7v3.25
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DIGGING BEHIND THE GAZA BLOCKADE
Nadia Hijab
Fact: Israel’s policy of sealing Gaza from the rest of the world predates the Hamas takeover of the Strip in June 2007 and its victory in the 2006 Palestinian parliamentary elections. It started in the early 1990s, long before Hamas became the movement it is today. A quick dip in the history of the confl ict helps understand what is going on in Gaza and the extent of the horror that human rights advocates have sought to challenge by sea.
A SNAPSHOT OF THE OCCUPATION
Soon aft er Israel occupied the West Bank, Gaza, and East Jerusalem in 1967, it began to integrate the economy and basic services of the territories into its own and to curtail their socioeconomic develop- ment, as Harvard scholar Sara Roy has carefully documented. Israel also attempted to crush resistance to occupation with an iron fi st. For example, former Prime Minister Ariel “Bulldozer” Sharon ordered hundreds of homes bulldozed in 1970 to carve a street straight and wide enough for Israeli troops and armored vehicles to move through a refugee camp to chase resistance fi ghters. Demolishing homes en masse became one of the ongoing features of Israel’s crush-and-con- trol policies and the subject of in depth reports by Human Rights Watch and other organizations.
Th e fi rst Palestinian intifada of 1987–1991 brought about a shift in
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132 3. THE BLOCKADE OF GAZA
Israel’s occupation policies. No longer able to control the population through the measures of the previous twenty years, Israel gradually began separating the Palestinian and Israeli populations. Th e “permit system” was introduced in Gaza in 1988, and the closure policy was fi rst imposed in 1991. Closures were institutionalized aft er March 1993, Gaza was sealed off by an electronic wall in 1994, and a “pass system” was introduced in 1994, with passes given to less than 3 per- cent of the population in 1995. And these were the best years of the Palestinian-Israeli peace process launched in September 1993.
Up until Israel’s redeployment from Gaza in the summer 2005, three blocs of Israeli settlements of some 6,000 Israeli settlers together with bypass roads and military bases directly controlled a third of the tiny Strip—twice the size of Washington, D.C.—leaving 1.1 million Palestinians in cantons in the remainder. Aft er its withdrawal, Israel continued to besiege Gaza from land, sea, and air. Th us it remains, under international law, accountable for the welfare of the civilian population.
Israel maintains that its policies are intended to ensure security for its population. Yet Israel can never hope to feel secure so long as it is besieging Gaza and settling its people in the West Bank and East Jerusalem, in violation of international law, while avoiding the root causes of the confl ict that began in 1948. Palestinians have resisted Israel’s violations of their human rights, both violently and nonvio- lently. In eff ect, the violence of Israel’s occupation has bred counter- violence. For example, it was on March 5, 2002, aft er thirty-fi ve years of occupation, that the fi rst Qassam rocket was launched into Israeli territory.
Th ere is a much easier, more eff ective, way to achieve security un- til a just peace can be reached: a ceasefi re. Ceasefi res between Israel and Hamas have worked for months on end. Indeed, a formal cease- fi re was in place before Israel launched its fi erce attacks on Gaza in December 2008. Under the agreement, Hamas was to end the rocket attacks and Israel to lift the blockade. Hamas ended the attacks and
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DIGGING BEHIND THE GAZA BLOCKADE 133
prevented smaller groups from fi ring rockets. But Israel actually tight- ened its blockade although the ceasefi re held for fi ve months, as even the powerful pro-Israel lobby in the United States acknowledged. U.N. supplies were restricted to such an extent that the U.N. was un- able to maintain its usual reserves and in November 2008 ran out of food for the fi rst time since it had set up operations.
THE BLOCKADE’S IMPACT
Th e blockade in its present form began aft er Hamas won parliamen- tary elections in 2006, and was tightened aft er Hamas-Fatah clashes in June 2007 left Hamas in control of the Strip. Israel’s measures were superimposed on an economy that was crumbling aft er forty years of occupation and siege. Humanitarian workers and human rights advocates have been warning since that the situation could tip from crisis to catastrophe at any time. For example, the New York Times reported on November 6, 2007, that Gazans faced a sewage disas- ter far greater than the overfl ow that killed fi ve people in March that year, one that could aff ect as many as 250,000 Gazans. Without con- struction materials and electricity, it has not been possible to manage Gaza’s sewage.
Th e blockade remained in place aft er Israel’s massive attack on Gaza in December 2008 and January 2009, making it impossible to reconstruct thousands of homes and schools destroyed during the fi ghting. Some human rights activists began to refer to it as a “slow genocide.” Th is may sound like an exaggeration, but the Palestinians in Gaza were already very vulnerable to disease, ill health, and mal- nutrition aft er years of siege, and were experiencing increases in can- cers, deformed births, and preventable deaths. Th e infrastructure was rotten and water and food were contaminated. Any epidemic could have pushed them over the brink. In other words, Israel’s blockade would not directly kill tens of thousands of Palestinians, but it would create the conditions for tens of thousands to die.
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134 3. THE BLOCKADE OF GAZA
Does the siege, coming aft er years of occupation and de- development, constitute genocide? Th e Convention on the Preven- tion and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide—a clear, concise document adopted by the United Nations in December 1948—states that genocide is any of fi ve acts committed “with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group.”
Th ree acts appear to apply to the situation in Gaza: “(a) Killing members of the group; (b) Causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group; (c) Deliberately infl icting on the group condi- tions of life calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part.”
Legal scholars disagree about how to interpret the Convention’s articles and it has proven diffi cult, over the years, to defi ne crimes as genocide, let alone to prevent or end them. In line with the Bos- nia precedent—the only authoritative legal treatment of genocide to date—it would be necessary to establish deliberate intent for an accu- sation of genocide against Israel to stand up in court.
Israel’s leadership has not, of course, issued a declaration of in- tent. However, many leading Israeli offi cials can be said to have done so. For example:
• Putting the Palestinians of Gaza “on a diet”—Dov Weisglass, chief aide to Ariel Sharon, in 2006.
• Exposing them to “a bigger shoah (Holocaust)”—Matan Vil- nai, former deputy defense minister, in 2008.
• Issuing religious edits exhorting soldiers to show no mercy— the Israeli Army rabbinate during the December 2008–January 2009 confl ict.
Whether the siege constitutes genocide or not is still under discus- sion, but what is clear is that the blockade is collective punishment and as such a violation of international law so grave that it could constitute a crime against humanity. Th e September 2009 report by
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DIGGING BEHIND THE GAZA BLOCKADE 135
Justice Richard Goldstone and his team to the U.N. Human Rights Council said that depriving the Gaza Palestinians of their means of sustenance, employment, housing and water, freedom of movement, and access to a court of law, could amount to persecution and a com- petent court could fi nd “that crimes against humanity have been committed.”
By the spring of 2010, U.N. organizations had lined up to coun- ter Israeli claims that there was no “humanitarian crisis.” Th e World Health Organization warned that the health system was on the verge of collapse. Th e United Nations’ humanitarian coordinator in the Occupied Palestinian Territories said that Gaza’s agricultural sector was suff ocating and noted that the “absurdity” of a situation in which Gaza’s coastal population was forced to import fi sh through tunnels.
Th e most damning report of the time was that of the International Committee of the Red Cross. Th e ICRC rarely speaks out, but it clear- ly stated that the closure constituted collective punishment in clear violation of Israel’s obligations under international humanitarian law. And, should anyone need affi rmation that there is no such thing as a “better blockade,” the ICRC said the hardship facing Gaza’s Pales- tinians could not be addressed by providing more humanitarian aid: “Th e only sustainable solution is to lift the closure.”
ACTING TO END INJUSTICE
Nevertheless, and despite the ICRC report, America and Israel began trying to devise a kinder, gentler blockade of Gaza to off set world outrage about Israel’s May 31, 2010, attacks on the Freedom Flotilla of unarmed humanitarians challenging the illegality and immorality of the siege. As they tinkered with the edges, they ignored the much more fundamental way in which the unarmed humanitarians of the Freedom Flotilla challenged Israel’s policies.
For decades, Israel has used the same strategy to achieve its objec- tives and to rout all challengers: overwhelming force. When the world
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136 3. THE BLOCKADE OF GAZA
sees violence and counter-violence—even when Israel uses dispro- portionate force as in Beirut in 1982 and 2006 and Gaza in 2008—Is- rael claims self-defense and usually manages to spin the facts its way. And, as it has not yet been held to account in any meaningful way, it has seen no reason to change its strategy.
However, when Israel meets nonviolence with violence, the strat- egy backfi res. Israel is pitching the self-defense line to try to shield itself from criticism of its attack on the Freedom Flotilla—but it’s not working.
Th ings will continue to unravel because Israel only knows how to use force to try to get its way. Ironically, its overkill has made the use of force so costly for those who favor armed resistance that the stage has been left clear for those who believe it is more eff ective to use civil resistance against a vastly superior armed force. It should be noted that Palestinian civil resistance is not new, although it has recently been “discovered” by the mainstream media.
Th e fi rst Palestinian intifada was almost completely nonviolent and imposed itself on the world consciousness, making a powerful case for Palestinian rights. Unfortunately, the then Palestinian leader- ship did not know how to translate the power it generated into dip- lomatic gains. Th at uprising was just one of a series of major acts of civil resistance stretching back a century. In recent years, Palestinian villagers’ civil resistance against Israel’s illegal wall in the West Bank has also had an impact.
Since the December 2008 attack on Gaza, the boycott, divest- ment, and sanctions movement launched by Palestinian civil society in 2005 has gained momentum, imposing both a fi nancial and moral cost on Israel’s occupation and other violations of Palestinian human rights. Richard Falk, the U.N. Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in the Palestinian territories occupied since 1967, speaks of a battle of legitimacy that Israel is losing in spite of its mili- tary prowess.
Th e real dilemma for Israel is that all of the force it brings to bear
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DIGGING BEHIND THE GAZA BLOCKADE 137
is aimed at achieving the unachievable: keeping the territories it oc- cupied in 1967, illegal under international law; privileging Jews over non-Jews within Israel, in violation of the United Nations Charter and international conventions; and denying Palestinian refugees their right of return. Imaginations are fi red and energies rekindled by the power of nonviolence to limit the violence of power. Th ere are only two alternatives for Israel: to make its peace with justice and equality, or to experience growing and costly isolation.
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