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The father of just-war theory in the West

Traditionally Augustine is regarded as the father of what has developed as the Western theory of ‘just war’.1 That such a lofty title should be bestowed upon the man who, in Christian philosophical literature, also is widely known as the great ‘Doctor of the West’,2 the ‘Doctor of the Church’,3 or ‘the great African Doctor’,4 was designated by the medievals as ‘Doctor Gratiae’,5 and has been heralded as ‘the second founder of the faith’6 is, perhaps, something that one familiar with Augustinian literature would not find surprising. Nevertheless, the title deserves some explanation.

Augustine certainly is not the first person in the West to attach philosophi- cal significance either to ‘justice’ or to ‘war’. A significant number of pre- Augustinian philosophers discuss war in a moral-philosophical context. For example, Plato argues that ‘the state must be organized for violent survival in an unruly world’,7 and he assigns specific wartime roles to the state and its citizens. Plato’s ‘Athenian’ in the Laws observes that waging war is the prerog- ative of the state, and never that of its individual citizens – a theme that Augus- tine will emphasize repeatedly.8 In the Republic, Plato represents Socrates as holding that neither Greek civilians nor their habitations should be regarded as targets of wanton destruction (even if similar restraint was not deemed necessary when fighting non-Greeks).9 At war’s end, Greeks among the van- quished could not be reduced to slavery.10 These limitations thus accorded a special status to non-combatants – another theme Augustine will highlight. Xenophon, in his Cyropaedia, chronicles the measured response of Cyrus to an Egyptian division, which had lost all means to resist but continued fighting.11

Euripides, in the Heracleidae, notes constraints on the treatment of enemy pris- oners of war.12 Polybus offers a commentary on the ‘laws of war’13 that bears strong resemblance to the kind one encounters in Augustine’s expositions.14

These examples, among others that could be cited, plainly attest that many well before Augustine’s time – philosophers, historians, playwrights, and

Saint Augustine and the Just-War Tradition

Mattox, John Mark. Saint Augustine and the Theory of Just War, Bloomsbury Publishing PLC, 2006. ProQuest Ebook Central, http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/clevelandstate-ebooks/detail.action?docID=436707. Created from clevelandstate-ebooks on 2018-12-03 16:13:20.

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warriors – concerned themselves with the way in which wars justifiably could be initiated or prosecuted. Neither can one claim for Augustine the distinc- tion of having been the first person to use the words ‘just’ (or ‘unjust’) and ‘war’ in tandem (that distinction may well belong to Aristotle15).

Moreover, the idea of a just war is not an exclusively Western innovation. The ancient Chinese, the Egyptians, the Babylonians, the Hindu of India, and others discussed the moral dimensions of war in writings that antedate anything in the Latin West.16 For example, Laotse, Chinese philosopher and founder of the Tao religion, writing in the sixth century B C , argues that war should be undertaken only with the utmost reluctance; and even then, it should never be continued beyond the point minimally required to achieve the purpose for which it was initiated.17 The ancient Egyptians observed a sur- prising array of humanitarian practices in war.18 The ancient Babylonians ‘dis- tinguished those responsible for initiating the war from those soldiers who fought in it’19 in terms of the moral burden of responsibility that each should bear; the great Babylonian leader Sennacherib observed just such a distinction after the campaign against Jerusalem in 690 B C .20 The Hindu Book of Manu (c. fourth century B C ) contains detailed regulations regarding the humane conduct of warfare.21 Antedating all of these writings is one non-Western source to which Augustine had access: Deuteronomy chapter 20, which sets forth the laws of war revealed to Moses for the Israelite conquest of Canaan.

Some are content to designate Augustine by the title of ‘father of Christian just war doctrine’22 rather than by the more general title of ‘father of just war theory in the West’. However, this designation seems not to take account of the fact that just-war issues receive attention in the writings of earlier Church Fathers.23

In what sense, then, is Augustine fairly to be regarded as the father of just- war theory in the West? He is to be thus regarded in the sense that the whole Western just-war tradition that follows from the fifth century A D on, in both its Chris- tian and secular varieties, traces its roots not to Plato or Aristotle, nor even to earlier Church Fathers, but rather to Augustine. It may be that just-war theory has secured a permanent place in Western philosophy in part because a figure of Augus- tine’s stature deemed it of sufficient significance to address it repeatedly. Indeed, the fact that he addresses it lends a stature and a sense of philosophi- cal seriousness to the subject that otherwise might not have obtained in the West, perhaps for many centuries. For example, even though Aquinas later takes up the topic, he introduces it by quoting Augustine. In any case, it may be said that Augustine is to just-war theory in the West as Christopher Columbus is to the discovery of America: not the first to come in contact with it, but certainly the one whose contact with it, unlike all those who came before him, made a lasting impression upon the entire subsequent develop- ment of the Western world. That lasting impression comes as the direct result

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of the synthesis which Augustine achieves between the Western philosophical tradition – particularly Neo-Platonism – and fifth-century Christianity, which found itself confronted with the practical mandate to reconcile itself to the immediately pressing concerns of the mundane world of emperors and armies.

Over the course of the sixteen centuries that have passed since Augustine’s day, secular Western society has reorganized itself on the basis of operating assumptions very different from those used by Augustine. Nevertheless, even if most contemporary attempts to elucidate the theory of just war do not obvi- ously rely on Augustine’s assumptions, his influence becomes evident as one examines the similarities between Augustine’s actual statements on just war and contemporary statements on the same or similar issues. This is true even if earlier or later authors in diverse societies also addressed similar just-war themes, and in a more systematic way. Thus, one finds just-war literature peppered with observations like these:

No writer of the early Church has contributed more to the development of Christian attitudes regarding war, violence and military service than St. Augustine. (Swift)24

Augustine . . . treated the problem [of just war] more systematically than anyone before him, placing it in the context of a theological world-view that stressed the work of charity in transforming history; thus he shaped just war doctrine in a definitive and lasting way for those after him. ( Johnson)25

Augustine . . . was the first great formulator of the theory that war might be ‘just,’ which thereafter has mainly directed the course of Western Christian thinking about the problem of war. (Ramsey)26

Of all the giants of the Patristic Age, none . . . left so indelible a mark on Christian thought, indeed upon the entire intellectual development of the West, as Saint Augustine. Not the least of his accomplishments was the synthesizing of Ciceronian and Christian ideas about war. To this day, his synthesis is at the base of both Roman Catholic teaching and the teaching of the leading Protestant denominations. (Martin)27

St. Augustine is quite properly considered the founder of the Christian just war doctrine. It was he who synthesized the hesitant and oftentimes equivocal views of his Christian predecessors into a statement which justified participation by the Christian in the military profession. (Hartigan)28

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St. Augustine himself has given us the Christian theory of a just war. . . . Those knights, crusaders, of the Middle Ages – when they spoke of war, endeavoring to see if there might be a way to make wars and fighting less brutal – invariably cited the arguments of the Augustinian doctrine of just war. Those arguments were later taken up by St. Thomas [Aquinas], and he did not add anything to them or take anything away. (Bigongiari)29

The die for the medieval just war was cast by St. Augustine, who combined Roman and Judaeo-Christian elements in a mode of thought that was to influence opinion throughout the Middle Ages and beyond. (Russell)30

Indeed, the just-war ruminations of Augustine constitute the fons et orgio for the thoughts of a long line of just-war theorists that follow.31

The question of ‘theory’

Does Augustine actually have a theory of just war?

In spite of this recognition, surprisingly little has been done to provide a com- prehensive, systematic, treatment of Augustine’s writings on just war. The first explanation one generally encounters is that Augustine gives us no system to treat: ‘The just war in the work of Augustine was not a unified theory at all. Unlike Aquinas, Augustine never took up the problem directly nor did he present a unified, internally consistent position.’32 Similarly, ‘Nowhere do we find in his works anything that could be called a “theory of the just war” and we are on safer grounds if we speak about his attitudes and his approach to the issue rather than his “doctrine” of the just war.’33 The readiest support for claims like these comes from the fact that, of Augustine’s 116 extant works, not one of them deals exclusively, or even particularly, with just war. Moreover, none of his ten known but lost works bear titles that suggest they contain a particular treatment of the subject.34

It is not incorrect to say that ‘His remarks on the subject [of just war] are scat- tered through a great variety of his works including sermons, commentaries, letters and apologetic pieces, which were written over a period of more than thirty years.’35 As a result, the contexts in which the subject arises are equally varied. Sometimes he presents his views in the setting of a ‘formal treatise’.36

Sometimes just war is a principal topic of a chapter or section.37 At other times, the reference to just war is merely peripheral. At still other times, Augustine addresses the theme ‘in the manner which is suitable to the conversational familiarity of a letter’,38 so that the addressee might enjoy the discretion of selec- tively communicating the letter’s contents to those who are ‘prepared by the piety of faith to give ear to it’.39 ‘For’, says Augustine, ‘there are many things’

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from which the minds of the spiritually or philosophically ill prepared ‘may in the meantime shrink and recoil, which they may perhaps by and by be per- suaded to accept as true, either by the use of more copious and skilful argu- ments, or by an appeal to authority which, in their opinion, may not without impropriety be resisted.’40 Indeed, wherever his comments on just war appear, they are ‘concerned, for the most part, with other issues. This fact inevitably affected the kind of problems he chose to discuss and the way in which he handled them.’41 Moreover, ‘there is little in his writing on war which springs from theoretical musings or from a dispassionate examination of the question’.42

Although Augustine does not actually present a systematic treatment of the theory of just war, that concession does not lead unavoidably to the conclusion that Augustine does not have a system in mind. Although when viewed sepa- rately, his just-war statements may appear fragmentary, when woven together, they constitute a remarkable tapestry. Upon careful inspection of that tapestry, one cannot but be struck by the unity that is readily apparent in his just-war thought. Augustine also addresses a number of themes allied to the topic of just war (such as the use of violence by the state in the punishing of criminals or in coercing religious practice),43 which, if carefully considered in tandem with his just-war pronouncements, do much to illuminate his views on just war. The consistency evident in his expression of these varied but related ideas leads fairly to the assumption that Augustine’s just-war statements arise from a consistent set of premises, which guide him to his conclusions; in other words, they reveal the presence of an underlying, if unstated, theory.

Augustinian rhetoric

Augustine’s rhetorical method itself obscures theoretical structure that becomes discernible upon close examination. Gilson observes that ‘no Augus- tinian suffered as much as Augustine himself from his native inability to organize his thoughts’.44 Indeed, ‘although Augustine also has his technical moments, his usual style is rather the free flow of late-classical eloquence’.45

Moreover, ‘his terminology manifests a certain looseness and flexibility’46 such that terms like ‘societas, civitas, populus, res publica, regnum are frequently inter- changeable or at least so closely related that the meaning must be derived from context’.47

To Augustine’s great credit, virtually everything in his thought ‘stands together and holds together’.48 However, unfortunately for his readers, the resulting monolith is such that even Augustine himself ‘cannot lay hold of one link in the chain without drawing the whole chain’,49 and one ‘who tries to examine it link by link is in constant danger of putting too much strain upon it and breaking it wherever he sets a provisional limit’.50 Attempting to

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separate out the intricately interrelated ideas that constitute what has come to be called the ‘Augustinian complex’ of doctrines is like trying to separate the strands of a spider’s web: it can be done if great care is exercised, but not without the risk of doing damage to the whole. This problem applies not only to any attempt to systematize Augustine’s just-war theory, but also to Augus- tine’s writings in general – and indeed, to the writings of those philosophical figures later influenced by Augustinism. As Gilson observes, ‘it is a persistent fact in the history of philosophy that doctrines wherein Augustine’s inspiration predominates do not readily lend themselves to synthetic exposition’.51 ‘Digres- sion’, he adds, ‘is Augustinism’s natural method. The natural order of an Augustin- ian doctrine is to branch out around one center.’52 Often in the same passage – even in the same sentence – Augustine is prone to explore multiple themes, or the same theme from multiple perspectives, thus making the resulting mosaic one with which the beholder is reluctant to tamper. Nonetheless, if one is willing to venture, ‘Augustine’s spontaneous reactions, . . . as they appear at random in his sermons and letters, will often provide us with material that throws quite as vivid a light on his basic assumptions as do his professed formulations of political theory.’53

Augustinian priorities

Augustine the just-war thinker is also Augustine the philosopher and theolo- gian – although it is often difficult to tell from which vantage point he is writing at any given time. However, one must continually bear in mind that Augustine the philosopher and theologian is, first and always, a rhetorician and skilled polemicist. Hence, his points are often made in the form of refut- ations of his opponents’ arguments rather than as positive points intended to form the conclusion of arguments of his own making. Precisely because ‘much of his work is polemical in character . . . he often employs his opponent’s prin- ciples without holding them himself, while at the same time he may reject a particular application of an idea which is at home within his own thought’.54

Indeed, among his polemic excursions one finds expressions, which, in the light of the entire Augustinian project, reveal a great lot about his feelings with regard to the justified use of violence in war.

Yet another reason cited as justification for the claim that Augustine does not actually have a theory of just war is the relatively minor role its discussion plays in the Augustinian corpus.55 Nevertheless, it is also true that his reflec- tions on war span the whole of his literary career – a period of over four decades. From as early as AD 388, the year after his baptism and the year when he began writing De libero arbitrio, until AD 429, the year before his death when he last wrote to Darius, he directly addresses just-war themes. Hence, if one views Augustine’s just-war writings merely as a ‘minor aspect’56 of his work, one

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runs the risk of missing the very significant point that war specifically, and issues related to the application of violence generally, occupy Augustine’s mind throughout his philosophically productive life.

The aim of Augustine’s just-war writings

Miller argues that Augustine does not seek to formulate ‘legal rules for regu- lating war’57 and that his doctrine does not ‘pretend to lay down principles for the law of nations’58 – rather, that his doctrine is intended merely to be ‘a workable ethical guide for the practicing Christian who also had to render unto Caesar his services as a soldier’.59 Certainly, Augustine does not seek to do anything that could be construed as an attempt to lay the foundations for international law. However, Miller’s observation might actually provide addi- tional justification for the position that Augustine does, in fact, have a theory of just war. If Augustine’s sole interest is nothing more than to provide ‘a workable ethical guide for the practicing Christian’,60 then, unless one is to accuse Augustine of gross inconsistency (a condition which, if it existed, should be patently obvious to any thoughtful reader of his collected just-war statements), one must assume that his just-war pronouncements were suffi- ciently cogent so as to make sense to the philosophically unreflective, but nevertheless earnest and pious, fifth-century Christian soldier. However, cogency of that kind is not possible without the existence of a commensurately cogent set of underlying, if unstated, assumptions. It is perhaps for this reason that Bainton is willing to argue a position diametrically opposed to that of Miller’s and go so far as to refer to Augustine’s just-war statements as Augus- tine’s ‘code of war’.61

Systematizing Augustine’s theory

In the phenomenal world, almost nothing overtly presents itself as a ‘system’; nothing comes ‘pre-classified’ in nature. In every case, we impose classifications. Sometimes those impositions are more successful than others, but they always are impositions, and even the best of these will have some limitations. Moreover, the very act of reducing to a two-dimensional expository description the multidimensional phenomena of human experience requires, by defini- tion, the adoption of some perspective, some frame of reference that inevitably will accentuate certain features of the phenomenon at the expense of others. This cannot be helped. The best that one can hope for, therefore, is to construct a theoretical framework that reveals the relevant features of the phenomenon in a way that minimally distorts the relationship of those features to one another and their relationship to the surrounding world. Among the fundamental tasks of the philosopher are to discern order, draw

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connections, and postulate systems for the purpose of representing interrela- tionships in a productive way.

Augustine’s genius lies, in part, in his ability to synthesize potentially disparate themes into unified wholes. There were many who came before Augustine and who had access to the same writings as he did but who failed to notice the subtle interconnections among biblical, patristic, and other philosophical writings in general, which constitute the foundation of Western just-war thought. If due consideration is given to these intricately woven inter- connections, one can dissect the web without destroying the pattern and conclude, with Markus, that Augustine’s ‘theory of the just war’ is actually quite ‘easy to isolate from the web of concepts, assumptions, and attitudes which go into the making of a man’s mind: particularly a mind as complex, subtle, and differentiated as Augustine’s’.62 In what follows, we shall seek to separate out the individual strands of Augustine’s just-war thoughts and organize them under headings corresponding to what have come to be the traditionally accepted principles of just-war theory – principles upon which the influence of Augustinism is clearly evident. Some may argue that such a struc- tural imposition claims for Augustine that which he does not claim for himself, and thereby runs the risk of distorting his intended meaning. Indeed, in fairness to Augustine, we must allow that, were he systematically to have presented his views on just war, he might well have produced a structure that differs from what we might attempt to reconstruct sixteen-hundred years later. However, anything short of such an attempt at reconstruction leaves one faced with the risk of failing to notice many or any of the important connections that transform merely random observations into a philosophical system; and it is difficult to conceive that a philosophical mind of the stature of Augustine’s operated merely on the basis of random observations.

The traditional criteria for a just war

The modern theory of just war typically is presented under two major headings: jus ad bellum and jus in bello. Jus ad bellum, or ‘the justice of war’, seeks to specify principles which define the right of one sovereign power to engage in violent action against another. In contrast, jus in bello, or ‘justice in war’, specifies the limits of morally acceptable conduct in the actual prosecution of a war – in support of the claim that ‘it is not permitted to employ unjust means in order to win even a just war’.63

The traditional list of jus ad bellum and jus in bello principles typically varies in minor degree from author to author. This is not so much due to a basic dis- agreement as to what the principles should be as it is to one of presentation. Some authors tend to combine multiple principles under a rather more

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general heading, while others opt for a greater range of distinctions. We shall tend to the latter approach inasmuch as this will enable us to examine the specific details of the theory of just war with a much higher degree of resolu- tion than otherwise would be possible.

Jus ad bellum principles

Just cause The reason for resorting to war must, itself, be a just reason. Tra- ditionally, just causes have included the defence of the innocent against armed attack, the recovery of persons or property wrongly taken, or the punishment of evil.

Comparative justice Although war exists as an ethical possibility, there also exists a strong presumption against the resort to war as a means to resolve difficulties. Comparative justice requires – in addition to a state’s having a just cause for the prosecution of war: a position which, for good or ill, both (or multiple) parties to a conflict are likely to claim – that the claims of an aggrieved party also must be of such magnitude that the presumption against war is overridden.

Right intention The outward disposition of parties contemplating war is not a sufficient guide as to whether the resort to war is actually justified; the invisible (but no less real) inward disposition is also important. The internal motivation must itself be just. Evidence of right intention might include the pursuit of peace negotiations to avoid war, the avoidance of potentially unreasonable demands, etc. A right intention would not involve the desire for territorial expansion, intimidation or coercion, and it would be devoid of hatred for the enemy, implacable animosity, or a desire for vengeance or domination.

Competent authority The decision to go to war can be weighed and declared only by that person, or body of persons generally recognized, by virtue of position in the social framework, to possess authority to make such a declara- tion, namely, that person or body with no political superior.

Last resort Not even those authorized to declare war are justified in doing so if there be any reasonable means to avoid it. That is, the prevailing circum- stances must clearly indicate that no means short of war would be sufficient to obtain satisfaction for just grievances or wrongs against the state.

Public declaration The aggrieved state must set forth the reasons that impel it to war as an indispensable part of its demonstration that all other means for

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peaceful resolution short of war have been exhausted. Such a declaration serves, among other things, as an occasion for national reflection as to whether all means short of war truly have been exhausted prior to the com- mitment to the enterprise of the nation’s resolve, energies, and resources. The declaration may come in the form of an ultimatum, which sets forth those remedies short of war that remain available, with the requirement that the offending party avail itself to those remedies prior to a specified time.

Reasonable probability of success Unless the cause that impels military action is of such importance as to merit defence even in the face of seemingly over- whelming odds, a war that presents little or no hope of serving as a vehicle for obtaining satisfaction for just grievances is not morally justifiable.

Proportionality The moral good expected to result from the war must exceed the amount of evil expected naturally and unavoidably to be entailed by war.

Peace as the ultimate objective of war The end of violence, the avoidance of future violence, and, to the greatest extent possible, the establishment or restoration of happiness and human flourishing – in short, a just and lasting peace – must be the end toward which the war is fought.

These nine principles, or similar expressions of them in different combina- tions, traditionally are taken to specify the permissibility criteria for a just war. That is, given that the conditions specified by these nine principles are met, a state normally would thereby be considered to have acquired moral licence to engage in war, although not necessarily the moral obligation to do so.

Jus in bello principles

The fundamental assumption of jus in bello is that even a just war can cease to be a just war if it is not fought in a just manner. Two jus in bello principles traditionally define the moral boundaries for the just application of force in a conflict already begun.

Proportionality Only minimum force, consistent with ‘military necessity’, may be used – and even then, only with an eye toward bringing the conflict to a just conclusion as quickly as possible. Violent means which cause gratuitous suf- fering or otherwise cause unnecessary harm fall outside the scope of what is ‘proportional’. This principle prohibits torture and traditionally has served to justify limitations on, for example, the kinds of weapons that can be used. (This jus in bello principle differs from the jus ad bellum principle by the same name in that the latter is essentially a utilitarian calculation of expected

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outcomes before the decision is made to go to war, whereas the former pertains to actions permissible to be taken once a war has begun.)

Discrimination Belligerent parties must distinguish between combatants and non-combatants, with the former normally constituting the only acceptable objects of violent action. Traditionally, non-combatants have included wounded soldiers, prisoners of war, clergymen, women not in the military, children, the aged, and the infirm, all of whom are presumed not to be engaged in the war effort.64

To these two jus in bello principles we may add a third (as Augustine appears to do), namely, the requirement to maintain good faith with the enemy by keeping promises made to the enemy, observing treaty obligations, etc.

Notes

1 Paul Christopher, The Ethics of War and Peace (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1994): 30. The author is particularly indebted to Professor Christopher for his insights concerning the antiquity of the just-war tradition. See also Louis J. Swift, The Early Fathers on War and Military Service (Wilmington, Delaware: Michael Glazier, Inc., 1983).

2 O. J-B. Du Roy, ‘Augustine, St.’, in The New Catholic Encyclopedia, 1967 edn. 3 Etienne Gilson, The Christian Philosophy of Saint Augustine, trans. L. E. M. Lynch

(New York: Random House, 1960): ix. 4 Frederick Copleston, A History of Philosophy (New York: Bantam Doubleday

Dell Publishing Group, Inc., 1985): Book 1, vol. 1, 40. 5 Albert C. Outler, ‘The Person and Work of Christ’, in A Companion to the Study

of St. Augustine, ed. Roy W. Battenhouse (New York: Oxford University Press, 1955): 359.

6 See Richard N. Ostling, ‘The Second Founder of the Faith,’ Time, 29 Septem- ber 1986, 76.

7 Paul Edwards, ed., Encyclopedia of Philosophy (New York: Macmillan Publishing Company and The Free Press, 1972): s.v. ‘Peace, War, and Philosophy’, by F. S. Northedge.

8 Plato, Laws XII 955b9–c6 in Plato: The Collected Dialogues, ed. Edith Hamilton and Huntington Cairns (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1961): 1500.

9 Plato, Republic V 471a5–b5 in Plato: The Collected Dialogues, ed. Edith Hamilton and Huntington Cairns (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1961): 710.

10 Coleman Phillipson, The International Law and Custom of Ancient Greece and Rome, vol. II (London: Macmillan and Co., Limited, 1911): 192–3.

11 Xenophon, Cyropaedia, or Institution of Cyrus, and the Hellenics Book VII, 1, 41–2 (London: George Bell and Sons, 1891): 208.

12 Euripides, Heracleidae 960–974 in The Complete Greek Tragedies, trans. Ralph Gladstone, ed. David Greene and Richmond Lattimore, vol. III: Euripides (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1959): 152–3.

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13 Polybus, The Histories of Polybus Book V, 9, trans. from the text of F. Hultsch by Evelyn S. Shuckburgh (Westport, Connecticut: Greenwood Press, 1974), vol. 1, 366.

14 Ibid., 369. 15 Lenihan is willing to state unequivocally that ‘Aristotle . . . is the earliest

recorded Western source to use the actual words “just war”.’ See David A. Lenihan, ‘The Origins and Early Development of the Notion of a Just War: A Study in the Ideology of the Later Roman Empire and Early Medieval Europe’ (PhD diss., University of Massachusetts-Amherst, 1995): 15. See Aristotle, Politics Book I 1256b21–5 in The Complete Works of Aristotle, vol. 2 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1985): 199. Also Aristotle, Rhetoric to Alexander 1425b12, 13 in The Complete Works of Aristotle, vol. 2 (Princeton: Princeton Uni- versity Press, 1985): 2278. Without dwelling on the debate over whether the Rhetoric should be attributed to Aristotle or to his contemporary, Anaximenes of Lampsacus, let us note that, in either case, the reference clearly antedates Augustine and is sufficient to support the present claim concerning the antiq- uity of the just-war tradition.

16 Christopher 1994, Chapter 1. 17 Laotse, The Wisdom of Laotse (New York: Random House, Inc., 1948) in Classi-

cal Selections on Great Issues, Series One, vol. V: War and Peace (Washington: Uni- versity Press of America, 1982): 562. See also A Source Book in Chinese Philosophy, trans. and ed. Wing-Tsit Chan. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1963): 154–5.

18 Sir John Gardner Wilkinson, The Manners and Customs of the Ancient Egyptians, vol. 1. (New York: Scribner and Welford, 1878): 264.

19 Christopher 1994, 9. 20 Leon Friedman, ed., The Law of War: A Documentary History, vol. 1. (New York:

Random House, 1972): 3. 21 Ibid. 22 James Turner Johnson, The Quest for Peace (Princeton: Princeton University

Press, 1987): 50, 57, italics added. 23 Ibid., 50–6. 24 Swift 1983, 110. 25 James Turner Johnson, Just War Tradition and the Restraint of War: A Moral and

Historical Inquiry (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1981): xxiv, xxv. 26 Paul Ramsey, ‘The Just War According to St. Augustine’, in Just War Theory, ed.

Jean Bethke Elshtain (New York: New York University Press, 1992): 8. 27 Albert Marrin, ed., War and the Christian Conscience: From Augustine to Martin

Luther King, Jr. (Chicago: Henry Regnery Company, 1971): 52. 28 Richard Shelly Hartigan, ‘Noncombatant Immunity: Reflections on its Origins

and Present Status’, The Review of Politics 29, no. 2 (April 1967): 207–8. 29 Dino Bigongiari, appendix in The Political Writings of St. Augustine, ed. Henry

Paolucci (Chicago: Regency Gateway, 1962): 353. 30 Frederick H. Russell, The Just War in the Middle Ages (Cambridge: Cambridge

University Press, 1975): 26. 31 Jonathan Barnes, ‘The Just War’, in The Cambridge History of Later Medieval

Philosophy, ed. Norman Kretzmann, et al. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982): 771.

32 Lenihan 1995, 234.

Saint Augustine and the Theory of Just War12

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33 Swift 1983, 111, italics added. 34 Ibid. For a comprehensive, chronological listing of Augustine’s works, see

Du Roy, 1967. 35 Swift 1983, 110. 36 Augustine, Letter 138.1, NPNF I, 481. 37 See, for example, Augustine, City of God XIX, trans. Henry Bettenson

(London: Penguin Books, 1984). 38 Augustine, Letter 138.1, NPNF I, 481. 39 Ibid. 40 Ibid. 41 Swift 1983, 110, 111. 42 Ibid., 111. 43 On this latter point, see P. R. L. Brown, ‘St. Augustine’s Attitude to Religious

Coercion’, The Journal of Roman Studies, LIV (1964): 107–16. 44 Gilson 1960, 235. 45 Ibid., x. 46 Thomas M. Garrett, ‘St. Augustine and the Nature of Society’, The New Scholas-

ticism 30 (January, 1956): 17. 47 Ibid. 48 Gilson 1960, 236. 49 Ibid. 50 Ibid. 51 Ibid., 235. 52 Ibid., 237, Gilson’s italics. 53 P. R. L. Brown, ‘Political Society’, in Augustine: A Collection of Critical Essays, ed.

R. A. Markus (Garden City: Doubleday and Company, Inc., 1972): 313. 54 Garrett 1956, 17. 55 See, for example, Lenihan 1995, 235. 56 Ibid. 57 Lynn H. Miller, ‘The Contemporary Significance of the Doctrine of Just War’,

World Politics 16 ( January 1964): 255. 58 Ibid. 59 Ibid. 60 Ibid. 61 Roland H. Bainton, Christian Attitudes Toward War and Peace: A Historical Survey

and Critical Re-Evaluation (Nashville: Abingdon Press, 1960): 95. 62 R. A. Markus, ‘St. Augustine’s Views on the Just War’, The Church and War:

Papers Read at the Twenty-First Summer and the Twenty-Second Winter Meeting of the Ecclesiastical History Society, ed. W. J. Sheils (London: Basil Blackwell, 1983): 11.

63 Hartigan 1967, 204. 64 Philip J. Murnion, ed., Catholics and Nuclear War (New York: Crossroad Pub-

lishing Co., 1983): 280; James Turner Johnson, ‘The Just War Idea and the Ethics of Intervention’, address delivered at the United States Air Force Academy on 17 November 1993, The Joseph A. Reich, Sr. Distinguished Lecture on War, Morality, and the Military Profession, no. 6 (Colorado Springs: United States Air Force Academy, 1993): 23.

13Saint Augustine and the Just-War Tradition

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