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64 STRATEGIC IMPACT No. 1/2015

POLITICAL DIMENSION OF THE ART OF WAR BY SUN TZU AND ITS GAME-THEORETICAL

BACKGROUND

Mateusz HUDZIKOVSKI, PhD*

* Mateusz HUDZIKOWSKI, Ph.D. in Political Science, is the Head of game theory research team in Polish Geopolitical Society. E-mail: [email protected], [email protected]

The starting point of this research is the well-known methodological question about the mutual relations between human activity spheres. These domains are politics, war and economy. In particular, in this paper, politics and war are examined. Various academic sources show different standing points of researchers focused on this abstract and methodological issue. “The Art of War” by Sun Tzu, as one of the most ancient and most popular books on strategy, has been put into the central point of this paper as a case study. The Chinese classical text is often perceived as an universal handbook of efficient human acting (in terms of praxiology). Therefore, it is applied not only to military issues but – in the contemporary world - to the business and social relations. The main problem analysed in this research is the potential application of Sun Tzu strategic principles into politics and its implications. The political dimensions of “The Art of War” are examined through three perspectives. Direct references to politics have been shortly depicted at first, then praxiological core of Sun Tzu’s principles, and then some game-theoretical aspects that were developed into more complex problems.

The Art of War by Sun Tzu refers directly to politics in a few cases only and his remarks are clearly too limited to consider him as a political

thinker. However, a wider praxiological aspect of Sun Tzu’s ideas makes them suitable to be applied to other domains of social life. The main thesis of this article is that the meaning and the value of Sun Tzu’s book is far less important than its possible interpretation (or misinterpretation) by political and military actors.

Keywords: Sun Tzu, The Art of War, praxiology, game theory, strategy, politics, war.

Introductory landmarks

At the very beginning, I should explain the inspiration that has led me to writing this article.

In the year 2008 a paper concerning, inter alia, the application of Sun Tzu’s The Art of War strategy principles into business domain has been published (unfortunately, solely in Polish language). The article entitled (in translation) Three Sections of Praxiology was written by professor Mirosław Sułek from University of Warsaw who then used several arguments against using Sun Tzu’s thought in order to understanding the world of economy1. The author stated that the text of the Chinese scholar concerns only the

1 Mirosław Sułek, Trzy działy prakseologii, “Rocznik naukowy Wydziału Zarządzania w Ciechanowie Wyższej Szkoły Menedżerskiej w Warszawie”, z. 1-2, t. II, Ciechanów 2008, pp. 51-70.

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military strategy. He argued as follows: “(...) praxiology is divided into three sections

distinguished in accordance with the systems of human relations. These are: cooperation, struggle and rivalry. (...) Cooperation is a positive sum game and struggle is a negative sum game, while rivalry is a zero sum game (or constant sum game). The economics is a theory of cooperation - the art of war is a theory of struggle, however the theory of policy is the theory of rivalry. The cooperation and struggle are different systems of human relations, therefore it is not possible to apply the principles, worked out in theory of struggle to descript the economics of business, and inversely.”2

No matter whether we agree or not on this issue with M. Sułek, another question arises: What about politics, characterised in the quoted paper as “rivalry” and “zero sum game” or “constant sum game”? Can the principles of The Art of War, which is an example of “the art of war” in general, be applied to the politics (or – at least – to the political strategy or political conflicts)?

1. Theoretical background

Research methodology1.1. A part of the problem underlined by M. Sułek,

shortly explained in the beginning, is the starting point of my further research. 2 Ibidem, pp. 51-70.

In the summary of his article, the Polish author gives a partial and non-exhaustive answer to the question presented above. He describes the politics, especially the international relations, as rivalry which is the synthesis of struggle and cooperation. Depending on the range and weight of contradictive interests, the rivalry may contain more “struggle element” or more “cooperation element”. Accordingly to this reasoning, the rivalry seems to mean the struggle plus the cooperation. Should we then treat politics as the simple union of the military conflict and the economy? The politics is rather something more that the two domains characterised by struggle and cooperation taken together, although this problem has not been yet explained in the paper of the Polish researcher.

Probably the politics has predominant character with regard to the other two areas. That means that the politics controls both the military and the economy domains. On the other hand, it is also possible that they both somehow more or less influence the politics. Also from the perspective of the three systems of human relations (mentioned by M. Sułek), the politics seems to be placed “above” the two other systems, i.e. its role is predominant over the struggle (including its most typical example: armed struggle) and over the cooperation (i.e. economy). M. Sułek referred the politics as “the regulation sphere” (I presume that the term is a counterpart of “regulatory economics”), in contradiction to both military

Figure no. 1: Referring to the quoted article of M. Sułek, politics described as a domain characterised by rivalry interactions (mixed struggle and cooperation). Politics controls the two other

domains: war and economy. They both can be used to achieve political goals. The proposed scheme is only one of possible representations

of mutual relations between politics, war and economy.

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actions domain and economy domain, perceived as “the real sphere of human activity” (I presume that this term is an obvious counterpart of “real economics sphere”).

This is a rather methodological issue worth to be examined in another research. From the point of view of the topic of this paper, the most important conclusion is that the rivalry sphere refers sometimes to the struggle, so the struggle is from time to time present in the politics. As a result, the politics is not only based on cooperative (peaceful) behaviour but also turns into a “hard rivalry”, including armed struggle, violence and mortal combat. In this manner, every “art of war” (as theory of struggle) could have its political dimension and its rules may concern – to some extent – the universe of politics.

Getting back to the point, the subject of this article is to try to answer the question whether Sun Tzi’s The Art of War principles can be applied to politics. One has to research whether there are any premises for “building bridge” between these ancient Chinese strategy concepts and political relations. The thesis of this text is that such premises could be found (1) in direct references to the politics, (2) in more abstract rules which might be adapted to the world of politics and (3) in some game theory problems that may reveal similarities in cooperation, rivalry and struggle mechanisms in the military strategy and in the political strategy. As a result, there are three stages of analysis in this paper:

a.) Political: Does Sun Tzu clearly say something on politics?

b.) Praxiological: Can his military advice, in abstract terms, be related with politics as such? and, last but not least,

c.) Game-theoretical: Is game theory giving any explanation regarding this matter?

Thus, this case study of The Art of War can be an introduction to the wider problem of mutual relations between politics, economy and war (and their core characters).

What is The Art of War and why it is so 1.2. popular among Western non-military experts?

The Art of War is the title of an ancient Chinese military strategy manual. Various sources indicate, on average, the year 500 BC as the date of its creation. Its author, one of the most known Oriental thinkers, was probably a scholar, military commander and political advisor. One has to admit, however, that studies on The Art of War, as well as contemporary commentaries to the book, attached forewords and dictionary entries, very often give diverse and contradictory information. The genesis of the text, which is unclear, and its further popularity seems to have more common with some kind of a legend that with a confirmed fact3. E.g. English Wikipedia suggests (after S. Griffith) that one of the daimyo of Sengoku Jidai period in Japan, Takeda Shingen, said that the reading of Sun Tzu was more meaningful to his military victories than having guns4. According to the same source, surprisingly many of the XXth century military and political commanders are now suspected to read and apply The Art of War5. Such theses have to be treated with caution. Nevertheless, one fact is that the Chinese text spread during centuries to large part of Asia and to the Western world.

I have decided to treat the Chinese strategic text as an exemplification of mutual relations between military strategy and political strategy mostly because of its tremendous popularity. Certainly, the book of Sun Tzu has become a contemporary bestseller and an element of popular culture. There are plenty of modern editions of The Art of War. Other books, more or less grounded in it, are interpretation of this classical strategic thought and frequently concern domains that are rather far from its typical, military application. Business area or social relations are the most obvious examples. The politics is a separated problem. There

3 Krzysztof Gawlikowski, Strategie na konflikt i negocjacje. O Sztuce wojny Mistrza Sun. Reguły wojowania Mistrza Sun (fragmenty), Azja-Pacyfik 1/1998, pp. 207-224. 4 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/The_Art_of_War. 5 Ibidem.

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exists, however, far less texts than links The Art of War and the politics. The simplest answer is than political handbooks are less popular and attractive for an average reader than business books. Or maybe the linkage between The Art of War and the politics is so obvious that there is no need for any further transposition?

Nevertheless, Sun Tzu’s thoughts are common research topic among academic staff and other experts in the fields like security, strategy, military studies, geopolitics and so on. What is more important, political researchers sometimes also focus on this issue.

For sure, one important thing is that The Art of War is constantly treated as a classical book on strategy, and not only on military strategy, but also on business and political way of acting. And even if such wide application is not well grounded methodologically, common opinions on the usability of this book remaining a hard fact. Besides, not only Westerners are under charismatic influence of Sun Tzu. “His classical thoughts are immensely popular in modern China”, confirms one of his Polish translators, expert on Chinese culture, J. Zawadzki6. Thus, it is also an important element of Chinese culture7 (and maybe also a part of its political culture but this should be confirmed in another research). K. Gawlikowski claims that – in contemporary China – Sun Tzu’s principles are applied to other than military domains as well, even to everyday life’s issues or interpersonal relations8.

So where lies the origins of The Art of War’s fame in the West? Firstly, when the Western world was gradually discovering Oriental 6 Sun Tzu i inni, Sztuka wojny i 36 chytrych sztuczek, translated by J. Zawadzki, see the translator’s preface. Full text available at: http://tlumacz-literatury.pl/index. php?page=publikacje_sztukawojny. 7 Krzysztof Gawlikowski, “The Strategic Tradition as an Essential Part of Chinese Culture”, [in:] Opera in honorem venerandi Stanislavi Kuczerae natalia sua octogesima quinta celebrantis – Sinologi mira k jubileju Stanislava Kuchery. Sobranie trudov, ed. S.V. Dmitriev, “Uchionyje Zapiski Otdiela Kitaja Rossijskoj Akademii Nauk» vypusk 11, Moskva 2013, pp. 427-455. 8 Krzysztof Gawlikowski, Strategie na konflikt i negocjacje. O Sztuce wojny Mistrza Sun. Reguły wojowania Mistrza Sun (fragmenty), Azja-Pacyfik 1/1998, pp. 207-224.

culture, its elements seemed to be exotic titbits. But during the dynamic political and economic progress of East Asia countries (Japan was first, then so-called “Asian tigers”, like South Korea, and finally China), some Eastern solutions, e.g. in strategic management, became to be esteemed by Westerners as highly effective ones. And because their fundamentals were often built on Oriental traditions and philosophy, the attention of observers has been focused on such roots – and among them on The Art of War, which is the main ancestor of Eastern strategic thinking. Among political researchers the reason was similar: the rising power of modern China is a certain argument for reading Sun Tzu.

Secondly, some psychological aspects also were important. Every manual make a promise of teaching something useful. Strategy handbook in particular offers an opportunity of learning about achieving goals, acting efficiently and taking advantage of a situation. To put it mildly, in consciousness of an average human being such books give an important possibility of gaining victory and defeating opponent, no matter what domain is exactly concerned. The efficiency of this kind of books is tempting, however it is not always true. That notwithstanding, this is the logic of the free market. That is why the business, theoretically a domain of economic cooperation, is sometimes perceived as a battlefield and various strategic handbooks appropriate to the military affairs, are used as they could served to the businessmen. Regarding politics, every way to impose one’s will and to realize a political interest is good, so if there exists even a slight possibility of increasing chances to political success, such like gaining power and influence or simply overthrowing competitors, a skilful politician must use it.

What translation has been used and 1.3. why the translation has so important meaning in this case?

A French Jesuit missionary in China, Joseph Marie Amiot, made in the 18th century the first European translation of The Art of War (into

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French)9. Currently the research on the reception of Sun Tzu thought (and Chinese military strategy in extenso) in France is conducted by Yann Couderc10.

There are much more English translations of Sun Tzu. One of most known is the one of Lionel Giles (1910)11 which was used for the quotations in this paper.

Translation is one of the most important factors when a research based on a foreign source is being conducted. The difficulty is doubled in this case because (1) the Chinese languages12 are difficult for a Western user and (2) there are doubts when and how The Art of War was created and who exactly was the author. As a result, some methodological complications are present.

In addition, when considering books loosely based on Sun Tzu’s text, such as The Art of War for Executives13 and its foreign language versions, the situation gets really difficult. First, we do not know, whether the author of The Art of War for Executives used original Chinese text or rather took advantage of any existing translation. Secondly, whether and to what extent a subjective interpretation process took place when the author applies The Art of War’s fragments to some decision-making problems (in this case into business management). Finally, his book has been translated into another language (in this case: Polish14). Such multi-stage operation increases the risk of an error or misinterpretation

9 Art militaire des Chinois, ou Recueil d’anciens traités sur la guerre, composés avant l’ère chrétienne, par différents généraux chinois... Traduit en franc̜ois, par le P. Amiot, missionnaire à Peking, revu & publié par M. Deguignes, A Paris, chez Didot l’aîné, 1772. Edition is available at http://gallica.bnf.fr/ark:/12148/ bpt6k298488s (Gallica. Bibliothéque numérique). 10 Yann Couderc, Sun Tzu en France, Nuvis, 2013. See also: http://suntzufrance.fr/. 11 Sun Tzu (Sun Wu), The Art of War, Translated with in- troduction and notes byLionel Giles, M.A., 1910. Full text available at Project Gutenberg. http://www.gutenberg.org/ ebooks/132. 12 There exists plenty of Chinese languages: Mandarin, Cantonese and so on. 13 D. G. Krause, The Art of War for Executives, New York, 1995. 14 D. G. Krause, Sztuka wojny w biznsie, Gliwice, 2004.

if we treat the output book as an academic or specialist reference.

Certainly, some risk exist even when using English translation of the original text or the original text itself. Nonetheless, the latter seems to be far less problematic.

Some other translation issues are presented by J. Zawadzki. Confusion about the name of the author of The Art of War (Sun Tzu, Sun Zi or Sun Wu?) is first of all caused by different transcriptions systems. The name Sun Tzu is written in Wade-Giles system, while Sun Zi is the same name depicted by hanyu pinyin transcription. Both means “Master Sun” (Sun as a last name). Tzu or Zi means “Master”; this was a title given to philosophers and thinkers. The first name of Sun Tzu15 was Wu, so Sun Tzu, Sun Zi and Sun Wu was (probably) the same person16.

Another important issue is that some strategic texts, authored by Sun Pin (Wade-Giles, Sun Bin in hanyu pinyin) are sometimes mistakenly assigned to Sun Tzu’s authorship. Works of both of them are frequently treated altogether and printed as one book. From time to time another Chinese strategic texts are included in one publication commonly known as The Art of War. This was even the case of Father Amiot’s translation.

2. Direct references to politics

At the beginning of the crucial part of this research, let us start with the basic inquiry: Does Sun Tzu say something directly related to politics? Are there any fragments in his text that support the thesis that his book should be treated not only as a classical military manual but also as a set of rules concerning political issues?

If the answer is positive, it would be a reason confirming the thesis of political applications of the Chinese strategic text. The remaining problems will be: How much Sun Tzu says on politics and whether his conclusions (made 15 Wade-Giles transcription of his name is more common. 16 Sun Tzu i inni, Sztuka wojny i 36 chytrych sztuczek, translated by J. Zawadzki, see the translator’s preface. Full text available at: http://tlumacz-literatury.pl/index. php?page=publikacje_sztukawojny.

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around 500 B.C.) are still useful in the 21st century. However, if the answer is negative or if it is not quite convincing, we should lead further research to the next point.

First and direct narration about politics can be found at the very beginning of the book:

“Sun Tzu said: The art of war is of vital importance to the State. It is a matter of life and death, a road either to safety or to ruin. Hence it is a subject of inquiry which can on no account be neglected.”17

This classic and well-known paragraph requires no further explication apart from some conclusions. The State can be interpreted as a symbol of politics. The war, because of its “vital importance”, is an element of the State’s policy. As a result, if something concerns war, it concerns the State’s policy at the same time. This resembles the thesis of Clausewitz that “war is merely the continuation of policy by other means”18. On the other hand, maybe more appropriate to quote would be the following concept of Mao Zedong: ““War is the continuation of politics.” In this sense, war is politics and war itself is a political action; since ancient times there has never been a war that did not have a political character… However, war has its own particular characteristics and in this sense, it cannot be equated with politics in general. “War is the continuation of politics by other… means.” When politics develops to a certain stage beyond which it cannot proceed by the usual means, war breaks out to sweep the obstacles from the way… When the obstacle is removed and our political aim attained the war will stop. Nevertheless, if the obstacle is not completely swept away, the war will have to continue until the aim is fully accomplished… It can therefore be said that politics is war without bloodshed while war is politics with bloodshed.”19 Nota bene, Mao was

17 Sun Tzu, The Art of War, Chapter 2: Laying Plans, Translated with introduction and notes byLionel Giles, M.A., Project Gutenberg, version pdf by Tomas Ukkonen available at https://archive.org/details/TheArtOfWarBySunTzu, p. 29. 18 Carl von Clausewitz, On War, New Jersey 1984, p. 87. 19 Zedong Mao, On Protracted War, Peking, 1966, Online Version: Mao Tse Tung Internet Archive (marxists.org)

highly interested in classical Chinese strategic thought20.

Another quote related to the State can be read when Sun Tzu analyses the costs of protracted war:

“Again, if the campaign is protracted, the resources of the State will not be equal to the strain.”21

and “Poverty of the State exchequer causes

an army to be maintained by contributions from a distance. Contributing to maintain an army at a distance causes the people to be impoverished.”22

In the following verses of this chapter, Sun Tzu advises to pay attention to the costs of military actions. The State and its citizens are bearing most of the war expenses. The war has obvious implications on political sphere and economy. Other interesting remarks that can be referred as economic thinking are clearly visible in the chapter four (Attack by Stratagem):

“Sun Tzu said: In the practical art of war, the best thing of all is to take the enemy’s country whole and intact; to shatter and destroy it is not so good. So, too, it is better to recapture an army entire than to destroy it, to capture a regiment, a detachment or a company entire than to destroy them.”23

This resembles a little the point of view of geo-economics. Takeovers of territories that pay dividends and control over infrastructure (especially transport corridors and power plants) are perceived as far better way to gain the domination than overt military struggle (on certain conditions). According to Sun Tzu, the 2000, https://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/mao/ works/red-book/ch05.htm. 20 Krzysztof Gawlikowski, “The Strategic Tradition as an Essential Part of Chinese Culture”, [in:] Opera in honorem venerandi Stanislavi Kuczerae natalia sua octogesima quinta celebrantis – Sinologi mira k jubileju Stanislava Kuchery. Sobranie trudov, ed. S.V. Dmitriev, “Uchionyje Zapiski Otdiela Kitaja Rossijskoj Akademii Nauk» vypusk 11, Moskva 2013, pp. 427-455. 21 Sun Tzu, The Art of War, Chapter 3: Waging War, p. 34. 22 Sun Tzu, The Art of War, Chapter 3: Waging War, p. 35. 23 Sun Tzu, The Art of War, Chapter 4: Attack by Strata- gem, p. 37.

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army has undeniable role in the State, though: “Now the general is the bulwark of the State;

if the bulwark is complete at all points; the State will be strong; if the bulwark is defective, the State will be weak.”24

Further paragraphs develop this idea, saying that the army should be properly managed in order to be an effective instrument in the hand of a political ruler. Sun Tzu does not criticise civilian control of the military. Instead, he suggests to let the experts lead the army and he rejects the ruler’s interference on military issues:

“There are three ways in which a ruler can bring misfortune upon his army.

(...) By attempting to govern an army in the same way as he administers a kingdom, being ignorant of the conditions which obtain in an army.”25

The role of a ruler should be restricted to hiring competent army staff. The autonomy of military actions has been underlined by strict statement:

“There are commands of the sovereign which must not be obeyed.”26

Sun Tzu, who probably was a military commander, presents opinions that are similar to realism paradigm in contemporary international relations theory:

“The art of war teaches us to rely not on the likelihood of the enemy’s not coming, but on our own readiness to receive him; not on the chance of his not attacking, but rather on the fact that we have made our position unassailable.”27

As a political realist, the Chinese thinker is conscious of constant danger that is present in international environment (although it is deniable whether one may refer to this term when thinking of ancient China):

“We cannot enter into alliances until we are acquainted with the designs of our neighbours.”28

Another important point concerns the intelligence that allows the State to react according

24 Sun Tzu, The Art of War, Chapter 4: Attack by Stratagem, p. 40. 25 Ibidem. 26 Sun Tzu, The Art of War, Chapter 9: Variation in Tactics, p. 70. 27 Sun Tzu, The Art of War, Chapter 9: Variation in Tactics, p. 72. 28 Sun Tzu, The Art of War, Chapter 8: Maneuvering, p. 63.

to changing situation and realize its strategy through political or military means. Hence, a crucial information factor appears in Sun Tzu reasoning. As we will see in next paragraphs, information plays critical role in game-theoretical aspects. The meaning of information is significant in game-theoretical perspective. The following verses can also be interpreted as an emphasis on the effective foresight and political analysis:

“Thus, what enables the wise sovereign and the good general to strike and conquer, and achieve things beyond the reach of ordinary men, is foreknowledge. (...) Knowledge of the enemy’s dispositions can only be obtained from other men. Hence the use of spies...(...) Hence it is only the enlightened ruler and the wise general who will use the highest intelligence of the army for purposes of spying and thereby they achieve great results.”29

These fragments are certainly an interesting example what the Chinese writer thinks of the State and war issues. As we can see, there are several quotations from Sun Tzu that refer directly to politics, although some of them need further interpretation. Thus, the purists of political science and international relations can argue that The Art of War is solely a military handbook and it cannot be applied to political thinking because these are different spheres and of distinctive nature. On the contrary, if we assume that politicians use war as a political instrument or war itself is the extension of policy but by different means, everything that concerns military subjects has also some political significance and might be treated as politics sensu largo.

To conclude, it is necessary to verify whether other premises in Sun Tzu’s texts suggest it could be applied to politics.

3. Praxiological rules

According to M. Sułek and several other authors, any art of war (in general), or theory of struggle, is all about several principles that can be boiled down to following issues: goals / assets parity, economy of forces, surprising, initiative,

29 Sun Tzu, The Art of War, Chapter 14: the Use of Spies, pp. 122-129.

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their cities without laying siege to them; he overthrows their kingdom without lengthy operations in the field.”34

Many other advices are emanation of the most important praxiological terms: economization (actions that decrease costs or increase productivity) and efficiency (achieve objectives with a minimum investment of resources)35. Hence, Sun Tzu advices to think economically, not to waste assets and energy. Simply said: maximum benefits, minimum work.

“Thus the highest form of generalship is to balk the enemy’s plans; the next best is to prevent the junction of the enemy’s forces, the next in order is to attack the enemy’s army in the field; and the worst policy of all is to besiege walled cities”36.

Some other verses say: “Unhappy is the fate of one who tries to win

his battles and succeed in his attacks without cultivating the spirit of enterprise; for the result is waste of time and general stagnation. Hence the saying: The enlightened ruler lays his plans well ahead; the good general cultivates his resources. Move not unless you see an advantage; use not your troops unless there is something to be gained; fight not unless the position is critical”37.

Here we can find the concepts that concern initiative and planning – central praxiological element – and saving resources The realization of a strategy transposes into advantageous strategic position which may prevent from enhancing unnecessary efforts. These principles introduced by Tadeusz Kotarbiński have been presented in praxiological publications38. And finally:

“Whoever is first in the field and awaits the coming of the enemy, will be fresh for the fight;

34 Sun Tzu, The Art of War, Chapter 4: Attack by stratagem, p. 39. 35 Paul T. McClure, Book Review of Praxiology: An Introduction to the Sciences of Efficient Action by Tadeusz Kotarbiński, Rand Corporation, 1970. 36 Sun Tzu, The Art of War, Chapter 4: Attack by stratagem, pp. 37-38. 37 Sun Tzu, The Art of War, Chapter 13: The Attack by Fire, pp. 119. 38 Konstanty Piłejko, Prakseologia – nauka o sprawnym działaniu, Państwowe Wydawnictwo Naukowe, Warszawa 1976, pp. 168-174, 183-201.

manoeuvre, synergy, sustainability30. Indeed, similar rules called “principles of war” (such as concentration of force, economy of effort, flexibility) are explained in defence doctrine documents of many countries, for instance: United Kingdom31 (some of these rules were introduced by Clausewitz in Principles of War32).

The Art of War is mirroring and extending principles of war. To some extent, it contains also more abstract praxiological rules that appear as capable of being assimilated by other domains of human activity. The concept of Chinese praxiology (xingweixue in the mainland) or xingdongxue in Taiwan) and its roots has been invented by Krzysztof Gawlikowski in 199033. Multiple paragraphs of Sun Tzu’s The Art of War can be analyzed from the praxiological point of view and, in this way, one can extract principles which will be applied to politics.

The next quote is about making material gains and using as little force as possible:

“In the practical art of war, the best thing of all is to take the enemy’s country whole and intact; to shatter and destroy it is not so good. (…) supreme excellence consists in breaking the enemy’s resistance without fighting.”

“Therefore the skilful leader subdues the enemy’s troops without any fighting; he captures

30 Mirosław Sułek, Trzy działy prakseologii, “Rocznik naukowy Wydziału Zarządzania w Ciechanowie Wyższej Szkoły Menedżerskiej w Warszawie”, z. 1-2, t. II, Ciechanów 2008, s. 51-70. 31 Joint Doctrine Publication 0-01 (JDP 0-01) (4th Edition) dated November 2011, http://www.mod. uk/NR/rdonlyres/FDB67DF9-5835-47FD-897D- CA82C17EC7A5/0/20111130jdp001_bdd_Ed4.pdf 32 Principles of war by Carl von Clausewitz Translated and edited by Hans W. Gatzke Copyright September 1942, The Military Service Publishing Company, http://www. clausewitz.com/readings/Principles/index.htm 33 At a symposium in China (1990) and later in the paper : Sun Wu as the Founder of Chinese Praxiology, Theory of Struggle and Science, Hemispheres (Warsaw), no 9 (1994), pp. 9-22. Such claim has been found in: Krzysztof Gawlikowski, “The Strategic Tradition as an Essential Part of Chinese Culture”, [in:] Opera in honorem venerandi Stanislavi Kuczerae natalia sua octogesima quinta celebrantis – Sinologi mira k jubileju Stanislava Kuchery. Sobranie trudov, ed. S.V. Dmitriev, “Uchionyje Zapiski Otdiela Kitaja Rossijskoj Akademii Nauk» vypusk 11, Moskva 2013, pp. 427-455.

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whoever is second in the field and has to hasten to battle will arrive exhausted”39.

This quotation from The Art of War is almost identical in meaning with another one from a contemporary book on praxiology40: “Position. It is easier to keep one’s position than to seize it. First come, first served. To defence is much easier than to attack”41.

The thesis on the existence of universal praxiological principles behind the words of Sun Tzu must be confirmed then. Would these rules be useful for a conscious political decision- maker or at least for an academician seeking to describe and to explain politicians’ behaviour? If we agree than political activity is a particular example of human activity, and that efficiency in politics has the same praxiological dimension as efficiency in human acting, then the core sense of quoted advices may be applied to politics and there is no contradiction here. It is obvious as far as focusing on priorities, economy of force, good planning and similar issues are concerned.

The problem appears at the more complex level of analysis. In the case of a hypothetical situation where for example a cooperative behaviour is required as a good solution of a problem, antagonistic attitude would be counter- effective (or unfavourable) for at least one of agents, and sometimes even for all participants. And such attitude may have its sources in treating political interactions like war manoeuvres, when some kind of “theory of struggle” is adapted to where it should not be used. Even simple misinterpretation of a text like The Art of War can imply: ineffective strategy, wrong decisions, losses of potential benefits for one or all sides, escalation of conflict and so on. For example, although Sun Tzu does not teach to make total war and to destroy the enemy completely, a reader can understand him conversely and then perceive his political opponent as a foe, not as a rival in the political game or e.g. negotiations

39 Sun Tzu, The Art of War, Chapter 7: Weak Points and Strong, p. 53. 40 A.N.: that has nothing to do with Sun Tzu, it refers only to T. Kotarbiński. 41 Konstanty Piłejko, Prakseologia – nauka o sprawnym działaniu, Państwowe Wydawnictwo Naukowe, Warszawa 1976, p. 193.

partner. That is why the interpretation matters. Perception seems to be a decisive factor from the game-theoretical point of view and this problem will be handled in next paragraphs.

4. Selected Game-Theoretical Aspects

4.1. Fundamentals The military applications of game theory are

almost as old as the game theory itself. Usefulness of this method in military studies (at least in some cases) has been proved since the beginning of the Cold War42. Currently game theory is one of the dominant paradigms in political science and international relations43. Nonetheless, “core theoretical principles of game theory are limited, both in terms of the domains where it is applicable and in terms of its explanatory power in those domains”, assessed G. L. Munck regarding comparative politics44. In my opinion, the same remark might refer to international relations and any related field.

The Art of War and similar texts have been already examined through the lens of the game theory45. Some games (in terms of game theory) can be easily built basing on the text of Sun Tzu. It is not surprising, considering the fact that game theory is concerned with mathematical models of conflicts. The question still is: Are there any more 42 While John von Neumann and Oskar Morgenstern’s book Theory of Games and Economic Behavior, published in 1944, is commonly considered as the beginning of studies on game theory, there were, however, multiple studies that preceeded this book. 43 Błażej Sajduk, Tradycyjne metody analizy polityki zagranicznej [in:] Podmiotowość geopolityczna. Studia nad polską polityką zagraniczną, ed. Krzysztof Szczerski, Krajowa Szkoła Administracji Publicznej, Warszawa, 2009, p. 59-86. See also: Błażej Sajduk, Główne nurty analizy politycznej, “Przemyskie studia politologiczne” nr 1 (1) 2007, Przemyśl 2007. 44 Gerardo L. Munck, Game theory and comparative politics. New Perspectives and Old Concerns, World Politics 53 ( January 2001), pp. 173-204. 45 See: Emerson M. S. Niou, Peter C. Ordeshook, A Game- Theoretic Interpretation of Sun Tzu’s The Art of War, Journal of Peace Research May 1994 vol. 31 no. 2, p. 161- 174; Christopher COTTON, Chang LIU, 100 Horsemen and the empty city. A game theoretic examination of deception in Chinese military legend, Journal of Peace Research March 2011 vol. 48 no. 2, pp. 217-223.

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Table no. 1: Examples of various types of strategic games in war and in politics

Source: Author’s own source based on Dixit and Skeath’s classification.

* In addition, they can be repeated with the same player or with others. ** Although A. Dixit and S. Skeath do not handle with this issue, there are games of complete, perfect, certain and symmetric information: Eric Rasmusen, Games and information, An Introduction to Game Theory, 4th Edition, Wiley-Blackwell, 2006. The information problem in game theory makes analysis more complex. On the other hand, it is an interesting point of view to what players know about each other and their movements, how it influences their choices and how psychology factors affect the game.

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reasons for connecting the Art of War and politics than simple textual interpretation or extracting more general rules of acting? On the other hand, maybe the game theory denies that they should be connected?

It seems obvious that some game-theoretical problems may become common factors when comparing The Art of War principles and political issues. As Avinash Dixit and Susan Skeath stated: “Similar games (similar to social interactions - M. H.) are played in business, politics, diplomacy, wars – in fact, whenever people interact to strike mutually agreeable deals or to resolve conflicts. Being able to recognize such games will enrich your understanding of the world around you, and will make you a better participant in all its affairs. (...) Political science is rapidly catching up. (...) Psychology and philosophy also interact with the study of games of strategy. Game theory has become a provider of concepts and techniques of analysis for many disciplines, one might say all disciplines except those dealing with completely inanimate objects”46.

Based on strategic games classification suggested by A. Dixit and S. Skeath I try to compare various types of games and their examples characteristic to war and politics. The authors quoted above suggest to ask the following questions in order to classify a game: (1) Are the game moves sequential or simultaneous? (2) Are the players’ interests in total conflict, or there is some commonality? (3) Is the game played once or repeatedly, and with the same or changing opponents? (4) Do the players have full or equal information? (5) Are the rules of the game fixed or manipulable flexible? (6) Are agreements to cooperate enforceable?47

As we can see, various types of strategic games are noticed both in war and in politics. Therefore, it is not tenable to assume that war (including military actions,) can be described as only one type of game in terms of game theory, such as struggle, rivalry or cooperation. Considering that politics is the only field where game theory is applied is misleading. Thus, we shall consider that war covers some game-theoretic mechanisms 46 Avinash Dixit, Susan Skeath, Games of Strategy, New York, London, 1999, pp. 1-2. 47 Ibidem, pp. 18-23.

and they can be of a various nature. War is not the only game – it can reveal some games. Per analogiam, various games can also be found in politics. But also politics is not a single field where game theory applies.

4.2. The most important problem: zero-sum games or non zero-sum games?

Starting from the statement given in previous paragraph, we are able to settle the dilemma whether Sun Tzu’s book as an example of “theory of struggle” can be applied to politics which is a phenomenon of a different nature than war.

In his paper, M. Sułek indicates three types of games (in terms of game theory). This is background to the further division between economics, politics and war and their different characters as they represent different types of games. Unfortunately, the idea has not been developed in the referred article, so we can only take it as a point of reference, not as a complete theory. According to the Polish researcher, economic (cooperation) is a positive-sum game where each participant wins, although different sides of this relation may get different payoffs (always greater than zero). Neither one nor the other loses (in mathematical terms, see a paragraph below).

Secondly, war (struggle) should be considered as a negative-sum game. It means that each side of the game characterised by struggle gets a negative payoff. Here, neither one nor the other is able to achieve a result greater than zero. Everyone loses in mathematical terms.

Finally, the politics (rivalry) is a zero-sum game (or constant-sum game) because a victory of one player is at the same time a defeat of his counter-part. What one gains, the other loses. Nevertheless, “though similar, these terms (zero- sum, positive-sum, negative-sum – M.H.) differ from the terms “win-win, win-lose, and lose- lose” which refer to wins or loses relative to expectations”, says Brad Sprangler48. In fact, this is rather a material perspective that lacks deeper

48 Brad Spangler, Positive-Sum, Zero-Sum, and Negative- Sum Situations. Beyond Intractability. Eds. Guy Burgess and Heidi Burgess. Conflict Information Consortium, University of Colorado, Boulder. Posted: October 2003 <http://www.beyondintractability.org/essay/sum>.

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analysis of psychological dimension. A simply conclusion is that every side of a conflict loses when making war. Such reasoning is attractive but doubtful. We could easily find examples of different games within the phenomenon called war, as presented in the table above. Furthermore, wars are equally characterized by game theory researchers as zero-sum game, not a negative- sum game49.

There is also a problem of demarcation line between politics and war (see Table no. 1). Such system allows playing “multi-level games”. It is possible to imagine a situation when a political leader agrees to begin a war that will be certainly lost and he knows that. At the same time, his other goals (and other payoffs) equalize the military defeat. From this perspective, a war is not confined to military actions only but it is a part of a larger phenomenon (politics). For this player, the loss in a negative sum game is compensated by a positive payoff in another game (which is likely to be of a different type). In such case, defeat here, victory there, the combination is a kind of strategic sacrifice, like in the game of chess or Go, and both played games – won and lost – are at the same time a part of another “greater game”. But are we able to conclude where the struggle ends and the rivalry starts and vice versa?

This problem shows how complicated is analysis of the nature of strategic thinking when comparing political, war and economy fields altogether. Alternative conclusions may appear when we change the model depicted on Fig. no 1. Any initial assumption of this kind: politics equals war, politics is only a part of war, war is only a part of politics, influences immediately the considerations of game-theoretic character of both phenomena. Restricted, technical perspective is certainly perceived as a way to simplifying scientific problems, making soluble “models of reality” as game theory wants it. An a priori assumption that politics is always a zero-sum game and so forth eliminates wider discussion. On the other hand, however, this methodological approach can easily disregard important factors 49 For example: Ziemowit M. Pietraś, Teoria gier jako sposób analizy procesów podejmowania decyzji politycznych, Lublin 1997, s. 51.

and ignore more complex relations. There is a case of a lose-lose game in The

Art of War: prolonged wars that are certainly presented as some kind of a negative-sum game. Sun Tzu says:

“There is no instance of a country having benefited from prolonged warfare.”50

In such case is imaginable that financial expenditures, human and material casualties are so considerable than any benefit from even victorious war cannot counter-balance them. A. Dixit and S. Skeath highlight the same problem51. On the other hand, however, we find in The Art of War such advice:

“When you surround an army, leave an outlet free. Do not press a desperate foe too hard. Such is the art of warfare.”52

Do not push too hard. Should not the enemy be destroyed? Again, interpretation can vary. Some readers will claim that it is an example that “win-win” situation at war are possible and maybe that it is easier to defeat an opponent when his loss is not total. Clearly, at least one side is victorious in quoted paragraph, so it is not an example of a negative-sum game. Sun Tzu does not appear as an aggressive warrior trying to crush enemy forces at any expense. He does not seem to perceive military actions as zero-sum game. While sometimes he is conscious that both opponents can suffer unnecessary casualties, he also suggests “softer” tactics in some cases:

“Hence to fight and conquer in all your battles is not supreme excellence; supreme excellence consists in breaking the enemy’s resistance without fighting.”53

Every generalization on the nature of war and politics would be vicious. The understanding of players’ payoffs, and, as a result, the indication of a proper game-theory model is crucial when searching for an effective strategy. Therefore, there are examples of various game models in the text of the Chinese commander. If such model 50 Sun Tzu, The Art of War, Chapter 3: Waging War, p. 34. 51 Avinash Dixit, Susan Skeath, op. cit. p. 19. 52 Sun Tzu, The Art of War, Chapter 8: Naneuvering, pp. 67-68 53 Sun Tzu, The Art of War, Chapter 4: Attack by Stratagem, p. 37.

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is properly referred to any similar issue in the warfare, or even in politics, it can be useful. To conclude, some Sun Tzu’s methods seem to be effective under given conditions. As a result, several The Art of War case studies appear as able to be interpreted in terms of politics.

4.3. Further game-theoretical issues From game-theory perspective, there are

many interesting points in The Art of War which refer to well-known aspects of game theory. The most obvious seems to be the case of information and psychological warfare. Sun Tzu advises to mislead the opponent by disinformation, deception and surprise:

“All warfare is based on deception. Hence, when able to attack, we must seem unable; when using our forces, we must seem inactive; when we are near, we must make the enemy believe we are far away; when far away, we must make him believe we are near. Hold out baits to entice the enemy. Feign disorder, and crush him. If he is secure at all points, be prepared for him. If he is in superior strength, evade him. If your opponent is of choleric temper, seek to irritate him. Pretend to be weak, that he may grow arrogant. If he is taking his ease, give him no rest. If his forces are united, separate them. Attack him where he is unprepared, appear where you are not expected.”

There are several important conclusions here: (1) deception is a part of play (2) disinformation is a mandatory element which prevents from having proper information on the game (3) psychological warfare is superior than overt clash, because gives higher payoffs at lower cost (4) the opponent must be made to act irrationally and (5) the optimal strategy must be chosen. As we can see, games with full information are rather impossible to find in reality and they are only theoretical models. Examples of the complete or perfect information games, however, are more likely to be found in armed struggle or political conflicts. Either way, it looks like turning a game with more pieces of information into “the fog of war” game, to refer to Clausewitz54. Although 54 Carl von Clausewitz, On War, New Jersey, year of edition unknown, Chapter 3, p. 101: War is the realm of uncertainty; three quarters of the factors on which action

politics seems to be a domain where it is not so hard to find information (although it is still not an example of a game with full information), the remarks of Sun Tzu could be applied in this field. It is good to be better informed than a political opponent; it is good to mislead him in case of conflict or rivalry.

The question of mutual knowledge and information has been also depicted in one of the most famous verses of The Art of War:

“Hence the saying: If you know the enemy and know yourself, you need not fear the result of a hundred battles. If you know yourself but not the enemy, for every victory gained you will also suffer a defeat. If you know neither the enemy nor yourself, you will succumb in every battle.”55

“Know yourself” might be understood as call to rational thinking: assessing owns position, desired goals, possible strategy and choosing optimal solution in both military and political domain.

A counterpart of the information warfare in politics is public relations, political propaganda and political discourse (fighting by words, not by violence). In addition, politicians very often try to irritate their antagonists, to provoke them in order to make them act as they want it. The similarity is obvious.

There is also another paragraph where Chinese thinker refers to emotions and irrationality:

“No ruler should put troops into the field merely to gratify his own spleen; no general should fight a battle simply out of pique. If it is to your advantage, make a forward move; if not, stay where you are. Anger may in time change to gladness; vexation may be succeeded by content. But a kingdom that has once been destroyed can never come again into being; Hence the enlightened ruler is heedful, and the good general full of caution. This is the way to keep a country at peace and an army intact.”56

in war is based are wrapped in a fog of greater or lesser uncertainty. 55 Sun Tzu, The Art of War, Chapter 4: Attack by Stratagem, p. 42. 56 Sun Tzu, The Art of War, Chapter 13: the Attack by Fire, pp. 119-120.

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The conclusion is simple: Control your emotions, otherwise your damage will be considerable. Is it a call for the rational choice? Here we come to weak points of game theory: the assumption of rationality of players and the problem of quantification. Both of them are frequently highlighted in discussions on game theory application in social sciences. The main problem is that emotions, perception and cognitive biases are important issues to deal with in decision-making process in general. These factors influence any decision-maker. As far as military or political leaders are concerned, their importance cannot be excluded. Similarly, the political or intelligence analysis does not remain untouched. Simple human mistakes can have huge impact on the perception of international environment and, as a result, wider political or military implications57. Thus, the words of Sun 57 Wojciech zajączkowski, Zrozumieć innych. Metoda analityczna w polityce zagranicznej, Warszawa 2011, pp. 75-82, 102-111.

Tzu remain merely a good advice. The problem of rationality is even much more complicated: what does it mean to be rational? It is a good question. To choose the best possible strategy (objectively) or rather the strategy considered as an optimum (from the point of view of a player)?

Another big issue of game theory which appears in Sun Tzu’s book is quantification.

“Now the general who wins a battle makes many calculations in his temple ere the battle is fought. The general who loses a battle makes but few calculations beforehand. Thus do many calculations lead to victory, and few calculations to defeat: how much more no calculation at all! It is by attention to this point that I can foresee who is likely to win or lose.”58

So Sun Tzu advises to calculate. Is everything quantifiable as game theorists want it? As we know, normal-form games are represented by a payoffs matrix. The payoffs value is crucial because, from the mathematical perspective it allows to asset properly the choice of strategy. The main problem remains the value of payoffs. How it can be measured in all cases? Even if we assume that Sun Tzu thought about planning rather than quantification, another question is revealed: forecasting and foresight. Same planning is not enough in certain conditions; the planner has also to try to predict some factors, including players’ movements and behaviour. That concerns both military and political affairs. Although future studies have been developed for many years, with the use of supercomputers and artificial intelligence software, they still have some methodological limitations59.

Finally, no matter whether the use of The Art of War is well founded from the perspective of methodology, and no matter to which domain it is applied, another questions of rather psychological and cognitive character appear on the horizon. What if this text is applied (even improperly) to the domains different from military matter? What problems it may cause? Assuming that the ways

58 Sun Tzu, The Art of War, Chapter 2: Laying Plans, p. 32. 59 Błażej Sajduk., Czy w nauce o stosunkach międzynaro- dowych możliwe jest efektywne prognozowanie? [w:] Po- dejścia badawcze i metodologie w nauce o polityce, (red.) B. Krauz- Mozer, P. Ścigaj, Księgarnia Akademicka, 2013: 93-118.

Figure no. 2: The Chicken game matrix presenting Cuban Missile Crisis (1962). Payoffs

values are easier to be assessed in case of military conflicts models (or models

of political conflicts likely to be turned out into military conflicts) where potential casualties are quantifiable. In case of purely political decisions payoffs seem to be incalculable; as a result, they

are often presented in arbitrary way. Source: Blake Kaplan, Creating and Solving the Cuban Missile Crisis, Math 89S: Game Theory and Democracy, Duke University, 2014. About abuses of theory of moves in international realations see also: Randall W. STONE, The Use and Abuse of Game Theory in International Relations. Theory of moves, The Journal of Conflict Resolution, April 2001 vol. 45 no. 2 216-244.

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of acting described by Sun Tzu are effective, they are likely to give a kind of “praxiological advantage” to one of the actors. If they are ineffective, it should not have influence to the positions of actors (or players, in terms of game strategy). In a worse case scenario, it can worsen the situation of the unfortunate user.

As we can see in the Figure no. 3, inefficient use of these praxiological rules does not influence the game and it has results equal to not using at all. Aside from self-harming by improper use (e.g. when applying to domains where it would be counter-productive), it is always better to apply The Art of War in case where the antagonist takes advantage of the book. This conclusion has been illustrated by a non zero-sum game model, built with the help of the table above, which is shown in Fig. no. 4.

According to the assumption that the efficient

use of The Art of War is profitable for a user (gives him advantage = one point) and that the inefficient use harms nobody. There is no prisoner’s dilemma here (cooperation/rivalry alternative). In addition, the payoffs are kept as simply as possible (advantage is one point, harm is minus one point, the rest is null). Obviously, any change of arithmetical values of payoffs may have impact of game results. The Nash equilibrium shown above is at once its Pareto optimality, which means that “an outcome of a game is Pareto optimal if there is no other outcome that makes every player at least as well

off and at least one player strictly better off. That is, a Pareto optimal outcome cannot be improved upon without hurting at least one player”60. Therefore common applying of The Art of War under given conditions is not only justified but also is the most stable position in such game. This simple model might explain in terms of game theory the popularity of this core book of Chinese strategic thought?

The model gets more complicated if the information factors are introduced. The mutual thinking: “He knows that I know that we both read Sun Tzu” is an example of “he-thinks-that- I-think” regresses, to quote Peter Ordeshook61. In the model seen in Fig. no. 5, having information that the other side read this book gives us advantage only when we assume that the reader use it efficiently at the same time and we also decide to use it in order to counter-balance his

advantage. The lack of knowledge whether the other player is skilful practitioner of Sun Tzu’s methods has no influence (except for simple confusion).

It is easy to imagine further development of this model: penalty for conflict escalation if only one player is “warlike hawk” and the second is “dove”; possibility that improper use by one player harms both sides, different levels of 60 http://www.gametheory.net/dictionary/ParetoOptimal. html. 61 Peter Ordeshook, Game Theory and Political Theory: An Introduction, Cambridge University Press, 1986, p. 143.

Figure no. 3: A simple game matrix showing the confrontation of two players (A and B) using or not using Sun Tzu’s principles. For each of them, there are four possible cases: 1) a player uses Sun Tzu’s principles, 2) he uses them but either they are ineffective or a player is not skilful enough to

use them efficiently, 3) he uses them but he damages his own strategy (the worst case) or 4) a player simply does not use it.

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payoffs, random factors and so forth. Certainly, our reasoning can be even far more complex. Another complication we can add is the question: “He read Sun Tzu. He uses it always, sometimes,

seldom or never?” with a proper model describing this “battle of wits” which turns armed struggle or political conflict into psychological game.

To conclude, what if someone follows The Art of War principles when making politics? What impact it may have, even if we assume the rules are ineffective or inappropriate for politics? A good deal of implications depends on the external perception of such strategy. If it is aggressive (by the reason of behaviour of an warlike player) or if it is perceived as an aggression (because some of players considers The Art of War as a hostile strategy adapted to war conditions and not to political relations), an escalation of a conflict

may occur. Cooperative attitudes are likely to give place to non-cooperative ones.

Conclusions

The Art of War by Sun Tzu refers directly to politics in a few cases only. It presents an interesting point of view of classical Chinese thought on the role of the State and war. This could be also an element of wider discussion on the three spheres of human activity: mutual relations between political sphere, war sphere and economy sphere, their features and principles of acting within these domains. Still, the Sun Tzu’s references to politics are too limited to conclude that he was a political thinker, although his ideas are crucial as far as strategic thinking

Figure no. 4: A non zero-sum game model explains why it is always better efficiently use the methods of Sun Tzu in the areas where it is methodologically justified. The Gambit software indicates that the strategy (B uses it, A uses it) (marked in grey) is the Nash equilibrium for this game (no player

has anything to gain by changing his own strategy only).

Figure no. 5: If Sun Tzu’s strategy is effective (and it is effective at the model), it is better to use it just in case. Even if we know whether the other player applies it or not, but we do not apply it

ourselves, he may gain advantage.

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is concerned. A political leader and a political researcher should, however, know this book for war “is of a vital importance to the State”.

The sense of several further fragments is related with the core of abstract praxiological rules of efficient acting. Thus, the principles of The Art of War contain, in some cases, a meaning that allows to apply them to other domains. Politics is just one example. Of course, such interpretation and transfer are not always methodologically correct, considering strict, almost technical character of many passages in The Art of War that concerns mostly military issues. Nevertheless, we observe a great popularity of this book among non-military readers (and users).

As a result, cognitive side of the phenomenon seems to be a key to understanding what impact may have following The Art of War principles when making politics. The question whether it is justified to follow the theory of struggle contained there, even when somebody’s strategy of acting does not concern armed struggle or any aspect of military conflict, is rather theoretical. The fact is that the Sun Tzu’s book is often used in other domains. Therefore, we should rather ask what is happening when a fascinated fan of The Art of War makes use of it when he should not (from the methodological point of view). Is it efficient for his strategy or have it any influence of possible conflict escalation?

Game theory appears as fundamental background for this kind of problems. Here, the interpretation of a situation, conducted by players, seems to be the one of the most crucial factors, along with such elements as information, perception, players’ rationality and so on. Psychological game that takes place in opponent’s minds is as important as the material side of conflict. Eventually, in many cases, the players decide what game they play: subtle non zero-sum rivalry or just brutal zero-sum conflict.

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