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The Journal of North African Studies

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Becoming Amazigh: standardisation, purity, and questions of identity

Dris Soulaimani

To cite this article: Dris Soulaimani (2016) Becoming Amazigh: standardisation, purity, and questions of identity, The Journal of North African Studies, 21:3, 485-500, DOI: 10.1080/13629387.2016.1157481

To link to this article: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/13629387.2016.1157481

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Becoming Amazigh: standardisation, purity, and questions of identity Dris Soulaimani

Arabic Studies, New York University Abu Dhabi, UAE

ABSTRACT The status of Amazigh/Berber language and identity in Morocco has provoked multiple debates in recent years, including a debate on unifying the three main Amazigh varieties (Tashelhit, Tamazight, and Tarifit) into one standard language. This study discusses how the Amazigh language standardisation is socially constructed and profoundly connected to notions of identity, differentiation, and a pan-Amazigh imaginary. Few studies have analysed these sociolinguistic underpinnings within the framework of language ideologies. Most of these studies focus on activists working on Amazigh language issues. Drawing on theories of language ideologies and discourse analysis, this study investigates the process of Amazigh standardisation based on the views of both activists and non-activists, and discusses the social implications of this process. Informed by onsite fieldwork including questionnaire surveys and interviews, the study reveals a wide opinion divide, based on practicalities and language ideologies, between the country’s Amazigh activists and non-activists. Of equal importance, the study shows that Amazigh standardisation presents a case of linguistic erasure, which negatively affects native varieties at risk of losing their local intimate qualities as mother tongues. The outcome of this study is relevant not only to Morocco, but also to other North African nations where Amazigh language issues have been drawn into social and political conflicts.

KEYWORDS Standardisation; language ideologies; purism; Amazigh/Berber; Arabic; Morocco; North Africa; Maghrib

Introduction

Heated debates have emerged in recent years over the role and status of Amazigh/Berber1 identity in Moroccan society. Central to these debates is the Amazigh language, through which identity is reflected in linguistic issues such as script codification and language standardisation. Following a contentious debate over whether to adopt Arabic, Latin, or the ancient Tifi- nagh script for writing this indigenous Moroccan language, a government committee formed within IRCAM (the Royal Institute for Amazigh Culture)

© 2016 Taylor & Francis

CONTACT Dris Soulaimani [email protected] Arabic Studies, New York University Abu Dhabi (NYUAD), PO Box 903, New York, NY 10276, USA

THE JOURNAL OF NORTH AFRICAN STUDIES, 2016 VOL. 21, NO. 3, 485–500 http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/13629387.2016.1157481

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selected Tifinagh. Amazigh, with its different varieties, had been mainly an oral language until this official codification in 2003. This selection, however, did not stop debates over Amazigh. Indeed, new questions were raised over the process of language standardisation, particularly around the idea of creating a single, unified Amazigh language.2 This study investigates these recent debates, taking into account the views of both self-identified Amazigh activists and non-activists.

The act of standardisation is carried out by IRCAM, the governmental organisation whose members are Amazigh activists and researchers. The process involves unifying linguistic components of the three main Amazigh varieties in Morocco: Tarifit in the north, Tamazight in the Middle Atlas, and Tashelhit in the south. This is an ongoing process which started with IRCAM’s selection of Tifinagh in 2003 and continued up until today on mul- tiple levels including grammar, morphology, and lexicon. The institute works on spreading the standardised form mainly through publications, such as textbooks and dictionaries, that combine different Amazigh varieties, but at the same time it purges non-Amazigh elements, including Arabic terms and expressions that have become part of the language.

While standardisation might offer some benefit for using a single Amazigh language in schools, the new language negatively influences the local var- ieties, which will lose their intimate qualities as mother tongues. The standar- dised language, a mix of the different varieties, then presents a case of linguistic erasure, which dismisses sociolinguistic features that are incompati- ble with the prevalent language ideologies. As Irvine and Gal (2000) explained, erasure is a ‘process by which ideology, in simplifying the sociolinguistic field, renders some persons and activities invisible’ (Irvine and Gal 2000, 38).

Discussion of standardisation in this article is guided by the following ques- tions: (1) What are the language ideologies that motivate Amazigh standard- isation? (2) How is the process of standardisation viewed by Amazighs, both activists and non-activists, and what are the linguistic and social implications of this process? (3) To what extent does the process of standardisation match the linguistic realities on the ground?

Review of literature

Language standardisation is related to multiple ways of enforcing homogen- eity over language, which is considered inherently varied and diverse (Milroy 2001). Rather than being a purely linguistic process, language standardisation is shaped by socio-political values and is driven by different language ideol- ogies. These language ideologies, as Silverstein (1979) and Friedrich (1989) argued, represent the rationalisation that individuals offer to justify their lin- guistic practices. In this regard, Woolard (1998) noted that discussion of ideol- ogies should include linguistic analysis but also ideological representations

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(such as of identity). Irvine and Gal (2000) discussed the impact of ideological conceptions of language on structural and practical language change. Their study of the language situation in South Africa, language perceptions in Senegal, and political contestation in south-eastern Europe showed how par- ticipants’ ideologies led to linguistic shift.

Similarly, Hill’s (1998) study on Mexicano demonstrated how linguistic ideologies are part of political ideologies and value-laden concepts such as linguistic purity. In her study, Hill discussed how people map their perceptions iconically onto language in a way that displays the connection between language, on the one hand, and people’s beliefs and assumptions, on the other. Kroskrity (1998) analysed the Native American Tewa language situation, and concluded that the Tewa’s prohibition of foreign words indexes local identity and embodies indigenous purism. The notion of purism here is taken to be the endeavour of a speech community to preserve its language in an original and ‘unpolluted’ form, by way of removing particular loanwords or foreign linguistic influence (Bloomaert 1996, 242).

In the African context, Savà and Tosco (2008) discussed the issues of language standardisation in Ethiopia such as script selection and word cre- ation, and explained how this process is more political and ideological than linguistic. The Amazigh situation shows comparable language ideologies that are associated with questions of identity and linguistic differentiation. Based on a study of an Amazigh community in the Moroccan High Atlas, Craw- ford (2002) emphasises a distinctive contemporary Amazigh identity, which is not necessarily in conflict with the national Arabic identity. He describes the Amazigh activists as carriers of a political and cultural project, noting that their views might not conform to the views of the mostly illiterate people in the countryside. The current study confirms the role of identity and politics in Amazigh linguistic issues. However, it shows that it is not only rural illiter- ates who oppose the activists but also educated urban Amazighs.

Other studies have analysed Amazigh sociolinguistic issues, and provide important insight into the intricate forms of language ideologies and the driving forces in language change. Cornwell and Atia (2012) discussed dis- courses on Amazigh activism, which highlighted an Amazigh identity and a shared imagined geography. The authors analysed the ideological consider- ations surrounding the Amazigh orthography debate in Morocco and noted the equivocal function of IRCAM, a government body which both sustained and contained the Amazigh cause. The study also explored IRCAM’s role in Amazigh standardisation, for it was described by some as ‘a plastic language laboratory’ (Cornwell and Atia 2012, 268). Errihani (2006) also investigated the official Amazigh language policy in Morocco, noting how the Amazigh stan- dardisation process is characterised by improvisation and lack of solid plan- ning. Similarly, El Aissati, Karsmakers, and Kurvers (2011) described Amazigh language instruction in Moroccan elementary schools, and discussed

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challenges facing Amazigh classrooms such as insufficient teacher training. These authors noted the gradual introduction of a standardised form of Amazigh, and the difficulties inherent to combining different dialects.

The current study contributes to existing sociolinguistic research on Amazigh.3 In contrast to previous works which mostly focus on activists working on Amazigh language issues, this study takes into account a wide range of participants including Amazighs, non-Amazighs, activists, and non- activists from different areas of Morocco. These participants provide a more layered context for Amazigh linguistic practices, and bring new perspectives to the debate over standardisation.

In analysing the Amazigh language situation in Morocco, Ait Lhou (2011) touches on the issues of standardisation, and criticises the process of language unification, seen as an imposition of an ‘unreal language’ on Moroc- cans (Ait Lhou 2011, 31). Similar findings are noted in this paper, with more focus on the sociolinguistic aspects of the debate and the implications of the process. The study engages with Amazigh language ideologies and explores a different type of linguistic purity, which avoids loanwords but at the same time adopts other linguistic features of the foreign language, in this case Arabic.

Context and background

Morocco is a land of great linguistic complexity, in which a number of languages and language varieties are in play. These languages and varieties occupy different domains of use (Abbassi 1977; Errihani 2007). Classical Arabic is the language of Islamic education and the religious texts. Modern Standard Arabic is the language of media, formal speech, and literacy. Moroc- can Arabic, also known as darija (‘a dialect’), is the medium of everyday con- versation for Arabic speakers. Amazigh is also used in daily communication, and normally refers to the three major varieties (Tashelhit, Tamazight, and Tarifit). In Ennaji’s (2005) study, Arabic and Amazigh are found to be compet- ing for similar domains. Errihani (2007), however, notes that the different sta- tuses of these languages do not result in ‘language conflict’, mainly because of the admiration that Classical Arabic enjoys among all Moroccans, Arabs, or Amazighs (Errihani 2007, 56).

French was introduced in 1912 following the establishment of the French protectorate over Morocco, and it continued to expand even after indepen- dence. Today, French is the language of business and science. It is also con- sidered the language of status and modernity (Bentahila 1983; Ennaji 2005; Chakrani 2013; Soulaimani 2015). Spanish has a presence in the country due to its proximity and the fact that Spain also colonised parts of Morocco (Errihani 2007).

The latest uprisings in the Arab world left an imprint on the already complex language situation in Morocco. This resulted in intensified debates

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over the status of Amazigh (Soulaimani 2015). In 2011, activists joined the Feb- ruary 20th protest movement (Maghraoui 2011), making demands to revita- lise Amazigh and recognise it in the constitution. These demands were taken into account in the 2011 constitution, which confirmed that ‘the Arabic language remains the official language of the state’, but added that ‘Amazigh is also an official language of the state, as a common heritage to all Moroccans without exception’ (Lafrouji 2011, 19). Additionally, the new constitution promoted the cultural diversity of Morocco, which it described as including Hassani (Saharan), African, Andalusian, Hebraic, and Mediterra- nean components.

Despite this linguistic recognition and cultural celebration, some Amazigh activists remained dissatisfied. They criticised the wording of the amendment as entailing a superiority of Arabic (‘the official language’) over Amazigh (‘an official language’); they were also displeased with the use of the word ‘also’, which they saw as indicating the inferior status of Amazigh. Such remarks show how the Moroccan language situation is dynamic, and also how linguis- tic structures become contested in public social life.

Methodology

This study is informed by onsite fieldwork between September 2011 and August 2012 in multiple settings within Morocco, including educational insti- tutions in Amazigh- and Arabic-speaking regions. These institutions serve large student bodies pursuing degrees in various specialisations including sciences, literature, law, economy, Islamic studies, Arabic, English, and Amazigh studies. The first site is a southern city in a Tashelhit-speaking area, also known for being a stronghold for Amazigh activism. The second is a western urban site in an Arabic-speaking area, selected here to provide a balance to the Amazighophone location. The Moroccan higher education system requires students to attend the public universities within their regions, unless these universities lack the specialties that the students are seeking. Because of this, more Arabic-speaking students should be found in the Arabic area and more Amazigh-speaking students in the Amazigh region.

Seeking the opinion of these academically and linguistically diverse groups was meant to engage literate participants somewhat familiar with the issues of standardisation and language writing. Empirical data were gathered based on observation, group interviews, individual audio-recorded and videotaped interviews, and questionnaire surveys. The questionnaires were distributed to 460 respondents, including 203 males, 250 females, and seven respondents who did not specify their gender.

As a method for collecting data, questionnaire-based surveys are useful for presenting an up-to-date language situation (Codó 2008) and for gauging speakers’ views, attitudes, and preferences (Gravel 1979; Hammersley 1992;

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Marley 2004, among others). In this study, the questionnaires, which the researcher hand-delivered to participants, included wide-ranging questions, seeking to collect demographic information like gender, age, residence, and language proficiency. Other questions investigated the degree of respon- dents’ agreement with certain statements such as one on the appropriateness of the standardisation process.

The questionnaires also included two sections for comments that allowed respondents to write additional remarks as they completed the surveys. The questionnaires were written in three different languages (Arabic, French, and English), allowing respondents to select any version they wanted. The questionnaires were not, however, written in Amazigh using any of the scripts that are known in Morocco. It was impractical to write a questionnaire in Amazigh using the newly developed Tifinagh script, since very few Moroc- can adults know how to read or write in this script. At the same time, writing Amazigh in Arabic or Latin might have been seen as an inherent bias that favoured one of these two scripts over Tifinagh.

Discussion of questionnaire data is also supported by material from 50 interviews recorded in multiple Moroccan cities, as part of a larger study on the Amazigh language situation in Morocco. In addition to clarifying ambigu- ities that might occur in questionnaires, interviews provide a controlled environment for answering complex questions related to issues of identity and affiliations (Widdicombe 1998). The researcher conducted interviews in multiple languages including Amazigh (mainly Tashelhit), Arabic, or French, depending on participants’ preferences. As a way of varying methodological tools, the researcher also conducted group interviews, allowing for an open setting and less-controlled conversations. The average number in each group was six participants, stimulating lively discussions. As recommended by the literature for data collection (Stewart, Shamdasani, and Rook 2007), the interviews involved the researcher and homogeneous groups of partici- pants. Homogeneity, however, does not mean that conflicting opinions were absent. Indeed, members within each group expressed opposing views regarding the question of Amazigh standardisation.

Discussion

In this study, the questionnaires measure participants’ attitudes and investi- gate the rationalisations used to select particular answers or comments. Using the Statistical Package for the Social Sciences (SPSS) program, the results quantify respondents’ answers, and provide correlations between their prefer- ences and other mentioned information such as linguistic background, when rel- evant. The question on Amazigh standardisation read as follows:

To what extent do you agree or disagree with the following statement?

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Statement: Standardization4 will preserve Amazigh. Possible answers: strongly disagree, disagree, neutral, agree, or strongly agree.

The data revealed that 11.1% of respondents strongly agreed with the state- ment, 21% agreed, 19.6% were neutral, 23.5 disagreed, and 24.8% of respon- dents strongly disagreed. For the sake of simplicity, the strongly agree and agree answers, and the strongly disagree and disagree answers were combined. Accordingly, 32.1% of respondents agreed that standardisation would pre- serve Amazigh, 48.3% disagreed with the same statement, while 19.6% remained neutral on the issue. These results included views of both Amazigh and non-Amazigh (Arabic) speakers (Table 1).

The numbers thus show that more participants disagree than agree with the statement that standardisation will preserve the Amazigh language. Com- paring the answers of the Amazigh speakers to those of the non-Amazigh speakers (i.e. Arabic speakers), however, yields important results. This com- parison was possible through categorising respondents based on their self- reported language proficiency. The results show that most of those who dis- agreed with standardisation were actually Amazigh speakers. Thus, 65.5% of Amazigh speakers (a clear majority) disagreed with the statement that stan- dardisation would preserve Amazigh, while only 19.6% agreed, and 14% of participants were neutral on the question.

In contrast, the views of non-Amazigh speakers were split almost evenly. Perhaps surprisingly, they showed a more favourable opinion of standardis- ation than did the Amazigh speakers in general. Thus, 38% of non-Amazigh speakers disagreed while 40.1% agreed that standardisation would preserve the language. The percentage of the non-Amazigh speakers who had a neutral opinion was 21.9%, which was greater than the Amazigh speakers’ 14.9%. The relatively high number of neutral opinions among non-Amazigh speakers might be predicted if the issue was considered less relevant to them (Table 2).

The positive response that standardisation received among Arabic speak- ers might be due to their lack of sufficient knowledge regarding the linguistic reality of the Amazigh dialects, which are multiple and mostly dissimilar. Their views might also be affected by their personal experience with Standard Arabic (SA), which coexists with darija, the Moroccan Arabic dialect. They were possibly envisioning a similar relationship between the local Amazigh dialects and the proposed standardised form. In contrast, the views of the majority of Amazighs who disagreed with the statement were based on their knowledge of the Amazigh linguistic situation. They most likely foresaw the difficulty of combining different dialects. As illustrated in their

Table 1. Views on Amazigh standardisation. Standardisation will preserve Amazigh → Agree (%) Neutral (%) Disagree (%)

32.1 19.6 48.3

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comments, the respondents were aware that the creation of a standard language would negatively affect their local dialects and possibly lead to these dialects’ attrition instead of preservation.

A ‘mixed pot’ of Amazigh dialects

Questionnaire results showed the ways in which non-activist Amazighs dis- agreed with standardisation. Participants highlighted their opposition to Amazigh standardisation for its dialect mixing. For example, a 21-year-old female native speaker of Tashelhit commented:

What has been termed as Amazigh [ … ] is nothing but a mixed pot of various dialects found all over the country. Tashelhit speakers of Souss will not accept Tarifit and people of the Atlas will not speak Tashelhit. So, if they want to give each region its rights, better let them stay the way they are with no additions or dialect mixing.

Similarly, another 21-year-old female Tashelhit speaker said that ‘standardis- ing Amazigh will not contribute to preserving it. The opposite will happen, since it will lead to losing the Amazigh heritage of each region’. A 22-year- old student added, ‘In my view, each region has a language of its own [ … ] For example we can’t make Tamazight [the Atlas variety] similar to Tarifit because they have different vocabularies.’ From these comments, non-acti- vists seem to contest standardisation mainly because of dialect mixing. This means a clear opposition to the process carried out by IRCAM to combine the different Amazigh varieties into a common language. It is also significant that none of those who agreed with the standardisation process provided comments on their selections, perhaps pointing to their lack of familiarity with the topic.

Interviews with non-activists provided further context for the negative views towards standardisation. As mentioned earlier, non-activist refers to interviewees, Arabic or Amazigh speakers, who did not self-identify as activists (normally activists speak one of the Amazigh varieties). One of these intervie- wees was Jawad,5 a college student and Tashelhit speaker from the south. Jawad criticised the mixing of all dialects, and therefore did not foresee a stan- dard language that would encompass more than one variety: ‘Tarifit is a diffi- cult dialect, Tashelhit as well, so it is not easy to combine both in one.’ In fact, these dialects are related but it can be hard for the speakers of the different dialects to understand each other, and this is perhaps the reason why native

Table 2. Views of Amazigh vs. non-Amazigh speakers. Standardisation will preserve Amazigh → Agree (%) Neutral (%) Disagree (%)

Non-Amazigh speakers 40.1 21.9 38 Amazigh speakers 19.6 14.9 65.5

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speakers like Jawad seem unpersuaded to accept this combination or indeed start using it.

Youness, a university professor from the Atlas, cautioned against proceed- ing with the standardisation process. For him, this would ‘end the natural inti- macy of these languages or these Amazigh dialects’. He also considered the Amazigh issue a struggle of the elite who are not concerned with real Amazigh issues in rural areas, whether illiteracy, poverty, or lack of opportu- nity. The Moroccan government is often criticised for the high rate of illiteracy in Amazigh areas. Activists see this as an indication of Amazigh marginalisa- tion. Of course, illiteracy affects not only Amazighs but also Arabic speakers in rural Morocco, and so the literacy issue, as Youness rightly noted, is high- lighted to legitimate the activists’ political struggles.

While the efforts of the activists have helped bring Amazigh language issues into focus, their views and beliefs are usually inconsistent with those of the wider Amazigh community. For instance, they call for secularisation, and they see this as the only way to modernise the country and protect human rights (Ben-Layashi 2007). This, however, contradicts the Moroccan reality in which religion plays a role in public life. This contradiction also creates an increasing distrust among the Amazigh community towards the elite activists, who are often accused of promoting imported ideologies from the former French coloniser (al-Uraghi 2010).

Hamid, a graduate student from the south, was also sceptical about the motives of the activists and the benefits of combining all dialects. In his opinion the efforts for Amazigh revitalisation ‘took a complicated route by not relying on historical facts’. He added that ‘we should not base our assump- tions on archaeological elements because they are mere justifications for writing it [Amazigh] that way’. Hamid is here comparing the efforts of standar- dising the language to the earlier process of selecting a script. His comment on archaeology refers to the contested Tifinagh script, which was adopted seemingly based on archaeological findings in North Africa.

Indeed, the Tifinagh script selection had been a political compromise, avoiding possible clashes between Amazigh activists, who supported the Latin script, and members of political parties such as the nationalist Indepen- dence Party or the Islamist Justice and Development Party, who supported the Arabic script. Similar to the Tifinagh decision, the standardisation process comes in response to political exigencies. Activists have a great deal at stake in having a single language that unifies speakers of Amazigh in Morocco. They benefit politically from presenting a unified front especially after the 2011 inclusion of Amazigh in the constitution as an official language. Political parties have begun writing their names and slogans in standardised Amazigh, alongside Arabic or French, and IRCAM, whose goal is to carry out projects that preserve Amazigh, is at the forefront of this operation.

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Non-activists, however, look at the way standardisation is performed as a top-down policy, which does not take into account the acceptability of this process among Amazigh speakers. The process, as Hamid noted earlier, over- looks historical factors, including the centuries’ old manuscripts in which the Amazigh language is written in Arabic script (Ennahid 2011). These docu- ments could be examined and taken as a point of departure towards develop- ing local Amazigh varieties such as Tashelhit. Forcing a unified language might actually be a setback since the newly developed language, as indicated in the interviews, does not seem to be a preferred option by most.

Amazigh: a scattered broken glass?

Not all interviewees had negative perceptions of Amazigh standardisation. For instance, Zayna, a student majoring in Amazigh, was enthusiastic about the process, which she described as a tool for revitalising the language. Zayna said, ‘Just in these first days [of study] we learned a lot of information about Tashelhit, which I did not know even though I spoke it. Amazigh will benefit from standardization.’ She expressed her hope for all Moroccans to learn the standardised language, whether or not they spoke one of the Amazigh varieties. Zayna’s favourable opinion of standardisation might be attributed to her desire to see the language advance. Unlike Jawad, who only spoke Tashelhit, Zayna with her Amazigh major is probably able to draw commonalities between different Amazigh varieties. Her view, however, might also be guided by her area of study. After all, it is common to find a correlation between language majors and overt language attitudes (Murad 2007; Chakrani 2015). Her call for all Moroccans to study the language is related to an official discourse supported by the new constitution, which treats Amazigh language as a common heritage which therefore should be taught in both Amazigh- and Arabic-speaking areas.

Like Zayna, most activists saw Amazigh standardisation as a step necessary for developing the language. For these activists, unifying the dialects is a sen- sible measure, with the underlying assumption that any dialect must have come from a single language. In fact, this is only one of the theories regarding the origins of Amazigh, and it is hard to prove that all Amazighs spoke a single language at some point in the distant past. The realities on the ground show that different Amazigh varieties are spoken today, and are in many cases mutually unintelligible. For this reason, efforts for creating a common language are constantly criticised for being based on reviving an imaginary language (al-Uraghi 2010; Ait Lhou 2011).

A female researcher and activist from the Atlas, however, believed in the one language theory. She explained this by comparing Amazigh to a scattered broken glass that needed to be fixed. In her words, ‘Amazigh is like a glass that broke and you have pieces that are scattered. Now it’s time to put them

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together.’ This quote summarises the activists’ views, who see their task to be not only revitalising but also reconstructing the language, by bringing it back to its supposed original form.

Specialists at IRCAM, the official Amazigh institute, confirmed this account and referred to their ongoing workshops and the lexical standardisation, despite issues of word selection and word creation. Their current focus, they explained, is on publishing special dictionaries for various sectors such as education and media. They expressed satisfaction with the process, noting that their goal is to unite the language and eliminate differences among the Amazigh varieties (personal communication, November 16, 2011).

The same positive view was shared by other activists like Mustafa, who said, ‘We are going in a direction toward creating a standardized language which will be taught [at schools].’ He noted, however, that this process is ‘neither a better nor a worse solution than having Tarifit, Tashelhit, or Tazayanit [Tama- zight] develop on their own’. This is a reflection of an old conflict among the activists themselves. Following the script selection in 2003, a textbook named Tifawin a Tamazight was published in the three Amazigh varieties, but it was later criticised by the activists for not conforming to the unified Amazigh policy, and for not purging foreign words (mainly Arabic) from the language (Mazagan 2009). Purging Arabic words is part of some activists’ efforts to dis- sociate Amazigh from Arabic components. Rejection of Arabic terms reflects a widespread discourse within activists’ circles, which resents Arabic and con- siders it hegemonic in the country. This shows how the standardisation process is dependent on political and ideological considerations rather than linguistic realities and practicalities.

Mustafa, for his part, confessed to the political aspect of standardisation, noting that the newly developed language was meant to unify Amazighs pol- itically within Morocco and elsewhere.6 He also said that standardisation ‘has its limitations because Amazighs do not exist only in Morocco; they are in Algeria, Libya, Tunisia, and Egypt [ … ] This means that standardising Amazigh needs to occur in all of these countries’.

Turia, a young female activist, also spoke about the similarities between the Amazigh dialects all over North Africa, and recommended unifying these dia- lects across the region. Although these varieties are linguistically related and might seem similar from the activists’ perspectives, they remain, in many cases, mutually incomprehensible. It seems that the activists’ goal for a common Amazigh language in North Africa is strongly motivated by an emer- ging pan-Amazighist sentiment (Cornwell and Atia 2012; Soulaimani 2012), which considers Morocco part of Tamazgha,7 the imagined Amazigh land, in which Amazighs could come together and speak one language. This com- plicates government efforts to contain the Amazigh issue within the Moroc- can borders, and risks dragging it into more divisive political conflicts in other areas of North Africa.

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Among all activists interviewed, only one thought the process of standard- isation should be approached with caution. Ali, an educator from the Middle Atlas, believed that standardisation was a feasible project, but ‘we cannot start by imposing a language that is neither from the north nor from the south; neither from the east nor from the west. Nobody will understand this language!’ Ali confirmed the political aspect of the process, noting that ‘each one needs to express himself in his mother tongue’. Indeed, combining the major varieties of Amazigh is a complicated task, and the prospects of this project are uncertain given the views of educated non-activist Amazighs, who mostly oppose the standardisation process and the way it has been handled.

Khalid, a political activist from the south, suggested a slightly different and less popular approach, which promotes one dialect with greater potential to be used as a standard for all Amazighs. He is a Tashelhit speaker, and pro- posed developing Tashelhit to become the lingua franca of Amazighs in Morocco. This proposal stems from a belief that Tashelhit is ‘purer’ and more widely used. Khalid said, ‘You find an Asoussi8 who speaks his normal language [ … ] using the vocabulary that is Amazigh, purely Amazigh [ … ] as opposed to other regions, which have lost much of their vocabulary.’

This quote, which reflects favouritism towards one’s own language, advo- cates linguistic purism. This was conveyed in a Tashelhit conversation that included multiple Standard Arabic expressions and loanwords (e.g. ‘a:diya ‘normal’; shari‘ ‘street’; mustalahat ‘vocabulary’; manatiq ‘regions’). This is a normal practice among native speakers of Tashelhit, given the centuries- long contact between the two languages, and the common function of SA as a language of formal context. What is unusual, however, is Khalid’s way of speaking, which contained foreign words in spite of his advocacy of the purity of his language. This is perhaps an indication of how ideological rep- resentations such as purism can be adopted but not necessarily implemented.

In a related case, Mbarek, a prominent political activist, discussed the issue of standardisation and expressed the need for a common language other than Arabic that would allow Amazighs ‘to communicate [ … ] wherever they are all over the world’. This quote is important for insight into other aspects of Amazigh linguistic purism. In the original language, Mbarek used semantic extensions such as aniyalkam ‘communicate’ and neologisms such as amadlan ‘world’. Aniyalkam is a newly adopted word with a reciprocal conno- tation, which comes from the already existing verb lkem ‘arrive’, and extended to the meaning of ‘communicate’. This word derivation is actually adopted from Arabic, in which the reciprocal word tawasal ‘communicate’ comes from wasal ‘arrive’. It appears that while Mbarek is trying to avoid direct bor- rowings, his Tashelhit talk remains under the linguistic influence of Arabic.

New words like amadlan ‘world’ and aniyalkam ‘communicate’ make up an important part of the standardised Amazigh. Even words adopted from Arabic such as ddunit ‘world’ or lektab ‘book’ are being purged and replaced with

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neologisms or new vocabularies from different Amazigh dialects in Morocco and elsewhere. In describing this situation, one of the non-activist intervie- wees exclaimed, ‘This is not our language that we knew!’ The current process as it stands makes Amazigh an artificial language that is foreign and alien even to its native speakers.

Conclusion

Within language ideologies, different semiotic processes through which people make ideological representations can lead to linguistic erasure. The process of standardisation has broad implications: it promotes homogeneity, but at the same time erases the social life of Amazigh varieties such as Tashelhit. Although standardisation might offer the advantages of a unified Amazigh language that could be used as a standardised school language, standardisation threatens the linguistic distinction of each Amazigh variety. In the Moroccan context there are at least three Amazigh varieties considered by some to be languages on their own (al-Uraghi 2010). In addition to neologisms and lexical extensions, the newly standar- dised form combines these independent varieties based on a political unifi- cation (Bourdieu and Thompson 1991). The mixing of these varieties is ideologically motivated by discourses of a common language in Tamazgha, a pan-Amazigh land that covers North Africa and parts of sub-Saharan Africa. And despite the enthusiasm of some interviewees (mostly activists), the pro- posed standardisation poses many potential problems, such as the burden of learning a newly developed language for Moroccan children, even those who already speak one of the varieties of Amazigh. The creation of a new language also obviously necessitates a great deal of resources, including time, energy, and a long-term commitment.

The different local Amazigh varieties can alternatively be preserved and developed separately, benefitting from all the work already conducted for centuries. For example, scholars could examine Tashelhit historical documents written in Arabic script and take these as the base for codifying the language and advancing it locally. There are existing groups, associations, and institutions that could turn attention towards this project. Keeping loanwords and struc- tures that have become part of the linguistic repertoire of Amazigh varieties would also facilitate the transition towards more accepted forms of Amazigh.

Notes

1. Amazigh people in Morocco refer to their languages following their geographi- cal areas or the varieties they speak (e.g. Tashelhit in the south and Tarifit in the north). Tamazight is also a common term for Berber, but it is the name for one of the Berber varieties as well. To avoid confusion, I will use the word Amazigh (pl.

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Amazighs) for Berber, and Tamazight to refer exclusively to the Berber variety spoken in the Middle Atlas.

2. For further discussion of the Tifinagh script debate in Morocco, see, for example, Errihani (2007) and Soulaimani (2015).

3. Other relevant studies include Crawford and Hoffman (2000), El Aissati (2005), and Silverstein (2011).

4. The original questionnaire included the following note defining standardisation for participants: “Standardization means unifying all Moroccan Amazigh varieties into one language with the same script, lexicon and grammar rules.”

5. Names and identifying details of participants have been changed to protect their identities.

6. Other studies have shown the importance of standardisation for activists and their political claims. See, for example, Pouessel (2008).

7. Tamazgha is a fairly recent concept used by activists within the Amazigh move- ment to describe geographical areas that are originally Amazigh. It usually refers to the region covering most of North Africa in addition to the Canary Islands and parts of Egypt and sub-Saharan Africa. The Amazigh activists referred to this concept frequently during interviews and informal discussions.

8. Asoussi (also Soussi) is a person from the Souss region in southern Morocco where the Tashelhit variety is spoken. It also refers to a form of Tashelhit.

Acknowledgements

I am grateful for all participants who took part in this study. I would also like to thank the editor and two anonymous reviewers who provided valuable feedback on earlier versions of this article.

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author.

Funding

This research was supported by funding from the University of California, Los Angeles Graduate Division and the American Institute for Maghrib Studies.

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