

This book uncovers a powerful dilemma, and offers an imperfect solution. A country's acknowledgment of its past atrocities is important to move relations forward with its former adversaries. However, coming to terms with the past is an unpredictable process that is as likely to antagonize as soothe relations with former victims. To be sure, a policy that compromises remembrance and justice in service of political reconciliation—in order to preemptively silence nationalist ire—will offend activists and individual victims such as Kim Hak-soon, the survivor of the sex slave program whose heartbreaking call for recognition opened this chapter. However, if the goal is international rather than individual healing, remembrance that is sensitive to the risks of backlash will be the most effective at promoting reconciliation.

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Remembrance and Reconciliation

The past is never dead. It's not even past.
—William Faulkner

Criticism of Japanese impenitence and praise for German contrition rest on an implicit and untested claim that remembrance affects international reconciliation. A theory linking remembrance to reconciliation—one that has clearly defined variables and causal mechanisms and makes testable predictions—is necessary to test this claim.

Countries might experience different stages of reconciliation ranging from a tense ceasefire to a true reconciliation that reflects friendship and trust. An essential first step toward the latter outcome is an absence of threat perception. In other words, before countries can start thinking of one another as friends, they must cease to see each other as enemies. The question of how countries might reach a deeper level of reconciliation (i.e., a strong sense of community and affinity) is beyond the scope of this work.¹ Rather, this book examines the momentous transformation from a state of fear and hatred between countries to a normal state of relations unencumbered by distrust. I posit that unapologetic remembrance (i.e., forgetting, denying, or glorifying past atrocities) elevates threat perception and inhibits reconciliation. Conversely, apologetic remembrance (or “contrition”) reduces threat perception and promotes reconciliation.

International relations scholars are divided on what drives threat perception. Neorealists argue that states perceive threats primarily from material capabilities: military power, national wealth, and geography.² Leaders make little effort to divine a state's intentions—and do not factor them heavily into threat assessments—because intentions cannot be reliably judged and may quickly change. Others argue that the neorealist emphasis on material capabilities is too narrow: that perceptions of a country's intentions also affect how threatening it appears.³

Scholars have highlighted several factors that convey information about a state's intentions. Democratic peace theorists focus on *regime*

type; according to John Oweri, for example, "Liberals believe that they understand the intentions of foreign liberal democracies, and that those intentions are always pacific toward fellow liberal democracies."⁴ Because democratic countries have greater trust in one another, they are less likely to experience the suspicion and fear that underpins the security dilemma.⁵ The benign effects of the democratic peace, however, would not be evident during a democratic transition: because democratizing states are prone to conflict, other countries are likely to be wary of their intentions.⁶

Scholars have also argued that a country's membership in *international institutions* signals information about its intentions: these institutions increase transparency, reduce miscalculations, and raise alarms when any one member adopts a more aggressive posture. In contrast to ad hoc interaction, writes Celeste Wallander, "an established framework of negotiation makes it easier for states to evaluate patterns of policies and thus intentions."⁷ Constraints imposed by institutions—for example, demilitarized zones, ceilings on armed forces, or restrictions on weapons purchases—decrease state power in the short term. Although a country still could decide to withdraw from an institution and build up its military power, the institution creates a potentially important time delay between potential and mobilized power. A state's willingness to accept such constraints thus signals that it probably does not intend to pursue aggression in the near future. In these ways, institutions promote trust among members.

Membership in institutions that do not impose real constraints on member behavior—"talk shops"—may contribute somewhat to a country's cooperative image but generally convey little information about intentions. If membership is without cost and might improve a country's image, peaceful and potentially aggressive countries alike would be willing to join; membership would not distinguish between them. Membership in institutions that make substantive demands on their members—and have mechanisms for monitoring compliance—provides a more reliable signal of a country's intentions.

States also judge each other's intentions on the basis of *territorial disputes*. Although such disputes might be resolved peacefully, the threat always exists that the claiming state might attempt to seize territory by force. Thus the owner of disputed territory will be suspicious of the other's intentions.⁸ Countries without land at stake in the dispute might also distrust the claiming state's intentions: Neighbors may fear that the existence of the dispute increases the likelihood of conflict; that the claiming state may expand its war aims beyond the acquisition of that one piece of territory; or that the use of force might have other unpredictable and destabilizing regional consequences.

The Link between Remembrance and Intentions

As a state evaluates another country's intentions, it is likely to observe how that country remembers past violence. Remembrance might affect perceptions of intentions through at least three processes. First, remembrance can be viewed as a "costly signal" that a country does not intend to adopt an aggressive posture. Building on a large economics literature, international relations scholars distinguish between "cheap talk" and signals that are more credible because they require the sender to pay real costs or make real sacrifices (either economically or strategically).⁹ Most previous studies of costly signaling have focused on signals related to material power (e.g., disarmament). In principle, however, countries could also send costly signals through their ideas.¹⁰ According to this reasoning, if contrition is costly for aggressive countries, it will convey credible evidence that a country is no longer aggressive.

This mechanism posits that remembrance is a costly signal because of its link to domestic mobilization. Mobilizing a country for war requires not only weapons and troops but also support within the military and the general public.¹¹ To prepare a society to fight, leaders rally nationalistic and patriotic sentiment; in doing so, they often vilify the adversary while glorifying their own state's history, motives, and current goals.¹² Historically, countries that have been intent on aggression have mobilized their publics by whitewashing and glorifying their country's past violence and scapegoating the intended victim as the cause of the country's ills.¹³

Contrition complicates such rallying efforts by teaching the population about their country's past violence: conferring respect upon the victim, and delegitimizing violence against it. In countries schooled about their own past wrongs, "permissible lies" within public discourse are less common and less tolerated; whitewashed, mythologized versions of the past will encounter opposition.¹⁴ Nationalists wanting to mobilize the public will be forced to reeducate them in order to swing public opinion in favor of war. Reeducation may confront opposition from actors within the media, academe, or other independent evaluative institutions; at the very least, it delays mobilization.¹⁵ For this reason, countries that remember and atone for past violence are signaling that they are unlikely to adopt aggressive strategies. Contrition thus constitutes a costly signal because, as Robert Jervis has written, it is "behavior that is felt to be too important or costly in its own right to be used for other ends."¹⁶

It is important to note that this argument pivots on the assertion that contrition interferes with domestic mobilization. This may not be so; or the time delay required for reeducation may be negligible. In other words, if public opinion is easily and quickly malleable, a regime may be able to quickly reverse it.¹⁷ It is also possible that apologetic views of past violence

can coexist with a willingness to use force in defense of national interests or security. Because many—if not all—expansionist wars have been fought in the name of self-defense, contrition would not be much of a limiting factor if this were so. Finally, contrition would not inhibit domestic mobilization if it triggered domestic backlash. If the public opposes contrition, voters might choose to empower rightist politicians under the mandate of “restore our national pride” and “stop kowtowing to foreigners.” Such was the fear of a 1943 British Foreign Office policy paper, which argued that efforts to reeducate Germans would backfire because such interference would only “harden their unrepentant hearts.”¹⁸ If contrition provokes backlash, it could actually *increase* (not decrease) a state’s level of nationalistic mobilization.

Contrition could convey information about a country’s intentions through a second mechanism quite different from costly signaling. A growing body of international relations theory observes that interactions between countries are shaped by the way they perceive each other’s identities, as formed in particular historical and regional contexts. Countries do not view each other as “billiard balls” with identical or inscrutable intentions; rather, they learn through repeated interactions whom they can trust and whom they must fear.¹⁹ States that treat each other well can, over time, learn to trust each other; they can develop shared understandings and a sense of “we-feeling.”²⁰ According to this view, countries expect goodwill from those they consider friendly and expect hostility from those they view as enemies; they also interpret others’ behavior in a manner that is consistent with—and hence reinforces—these expectations.²¹

Remembrance may be a critical factor that shapes how states perceive each other’s identities.²² As Consuelo Cruz points out, “How we remember shapes *what* we imagine as possible.” If a country justifies or glorifies violent policies, others will fear that the country still considers them viable tools of statecraft. Refusals to offer contrition also convey disdain for the other country’s suffering and indifference toward bilateral relations. On the other hand, repudiation of past violence shows that the country considers such behavior outside the “field of imaginable possibilities” for national policy.²³ Contrition suggests that the country holds different values today than it did when it committed the acts. By offering recognition and respect for the other state’s suffering, a country shows it wants to restore good relations. Apologies and other acts thus can demonstrate the way a former adversary has changed, pave the way for the former victim to forgive, and help construct a new image of a former enemy.²⁴ In these ways contrition may help transform the images the two countries have of each other—and the nature of their relations—from adversarial to friendly.

It is possible, however, that contrition does not alter states’ identities as expected. Whereas some scholars emphasize the potential for identities to evolve, others emphasize that they are deeply rooted, self-reinforcing, and thus hard to dislodge.²⁵ Friendly acts from a trusted ally reinforce positive

feelings; the same friendly acts from an enemy often trigger suspicion. In this light, contrition from a former adversary may be seen as strategically motivated: designed to improve its international image, or perhaps to lull the former victim into complacency. Unless contrition is repeated, institutionalized, and sustained for decades, it may lack the power to transform deeply held antagonistic images.

Alternatively, remembrance could influence perception of intentions through its cognitive or emotional effects on observers. The way a country remembers or forgets past violence leads others to have positive or negative feelings about that country. Neta Crawford argues that if a state is viewed positively, observers frame its ambiguous behavior as “neutral, positive, or motivated by circumstances other than hostile intentions.” Conversely, resentment about the way a country denies or forgets its past violence may lead to negative evaluations of ambiguous behavior. A desire for cognitive consistency is said to exacerbate this tendency.²⁶

According to this mechanism, remembrance—specifically, unapologetic remembrance—influences perception of a country’s intentions because of its powerful effects on the cognition or emotions of observers. Contrition acknowledges the suffering and the humanity of victims. Apologies, reparations, and so on are signs of respect: they reflect a belief that a country is too important to treat poorly. By contrast, a country’s denials, glorification, or whitewashing of past atrocities signal contempt for a people, for their country’s status, and for the future of the bilateral relationship. This affront triggers emotions of anger and wounded pride among victims, creating hostility toward the other state that will influence assessments of its policies or military capabilities.

This mechanism (unlike the others) should not be expected to work in both directions. In other words, although unapologetic remembrance should be expected to generate a powerful negative response, feelings of goodwill generated by contrition are unlikely to be as intense. Victims feel that they deserve recognition of their suffering; receiving it is seen as proper and right. It is precisely the perceived violation of this social norm that creates such strong emotion when such gestures are withheld.

The mechanisms described here link remembrance to threat perception in very different ways; through costly signaling, through an evolution in countries’ intersubjective identities, or through the emotional and cognitive responses of observers. The empirical cases in this book test these causal processes as they evaluate the connection between remembrance and threat perception.

CONCEPTUALIZING REMEMBRANCE

What constitutes “remembrance”? Countries remember past violence through both official and unofficial channels. Because other countries are

interested in assessing a government's intentions (i.e., whether or not a regime might pursue aggression), observers will assess government policies related to remembrance. Government policy is also the most transparent and accessible indicator of how a country remembers. But observers will also be interested in gauging the views of the broader society. If the population remembers the past in ways very differently than its government, leaders will have to work harder to gain popular support as they pursue their policy goals. Moreover, the views of wider society are relevant because a regime may be one election or coup away from leaving office.²⁷

Official Remembrance. Governments reveal their interpretations of past violence through numerous instruments. Leaders' *statements* are one example. One might contend that statements are not a credible signal; for example, they may not reflect popular sentiment, they might be offered for strategic reasons, or they might only be fleeting gestures. However, such statements should not be dismissed: They influence a country's official historical record and provide leadership in other areas in society (for example, setting agendas for scholarly research and civic activism, shaping textbook coverage, and influencing litigation). Reactions to statements also serve as credible signals; if a politician is fired or demoted as a result of something he or she said, this action clarifies what a government believes are acceptable views about the past. An example is the 2002 resignation of Trent Lott as U.S. Senate majority leader after his statements that appeared to express support for racial segregation.

Remembrance that will influence observers' views the most is that which is institutionalized within laws or policies. Institutionalization reflects a certain level of national support for a given historical interpretation (because it requires laws to be passed) and shows that the interpretation will be transmitted to future generations. The historical interpretation, in other words, is not only currently prevalent but is likely to be around for some time. One example is national *reparations* paid to former victims. Parliamentary reparations require agreement among a majority of elected officials; their support for such legislation likely reflects confidence in their constituents' support. The U.S. government's decision to pay reparations to Japanese-American citizens interned during World War II constitutes official government condemnation of the wartime policy of internment; it confirms the existence of the event and clarifies it as unjust for the official historical record.

Governments may also decide to hold perpetrators of past violence accountable in *legal trials*. Some scholars argue that trials reduce the chance that a country will engage in future violence through preemption (the removal of potential recidivists from society through imprisonment) and through deterrence (e.g., of potential human rights violators through threat of future punishment).²⁸ Trials help establish an official historical record by

uncovering and disseminating evidence about past violence. Israeli leader David Ben-Gurion advocated the 1961 trial of Holocaust planner Adolf Eichmann for this reason; indeed, it was only after this trial that a more comprehensive understanding of the Holocaust became widely publicized within Israel and throughout the world.²⁹

Governments also remember the past through *commemoration*: national monuments, museums, ceremonies, and holidays. By deciding to erect a monument, build a museum, or commemorate a national holiday in honor of a person or event, a government confers recognition and honor. Because commemoration is scarce—countries can have only so many monuments in their capital cities and a limited number of national holidays—and because numerous candidates compete for memorialization, the people and events that a country chooses to honor are important indicators of prevailing political opinion and national priorities.³⁰

One of the most important ways countries institutionalize remembrance of past violence is through history *education*. Leaders' statements may be ephemeral and may not represent the views of the country as a whole; textbooks, on the other hand, are the central vehicle through which a government transmits national identity to a country's young people.³¹ Charles Merriam notes that although citizens are educated in many ways, public education is designed to be the most systematic and organized effort to influence the next generation.³² According to David Mendeloff, textbooks shape a country's view of itself and others. "Answers to central questions such as 'Why have we gone to war in the past, and who was to blame?' 'Why have other countries attacked us?' and 'Why have we attacked other countries?' define a nation's self-image, and its image of others. These are essentially simple, yet fundamental questions that lie at the core of a nation's self-image."³³ As noted earlier, historically regimes intent on aggression have used their educational systems to deploy nationalist myths that whitewash past aggression and scapegoat intended victims. Because of the link between history education, national self-image, and national policy, battles over textbooks—between groups with different visions of patriotism and different policy goals—are common all over the world.³⁴ The centrality of textbooks to national identity and policy make them an important indicator of a country's intentions. In sum, governments shape national remembrance through all of these various policy instruments, which are highly credible indicators of how the current government interprets past violence and, because of institutionalization, show how the country is likely to remember its past for years to come.

Remembrance in Wider Society. To get the most representative picture of a country's attitudes, observers will also assess how the broader society remembers past violence. Although official policies strongly affect how people remember, a government does not have complete control over national

discourses; leaders who try to "instrumentalize" remembrance may spark public debates that evolve in unanticipated and disadvantageous ways.³⁵ It is precisely this imperfect control that makes remembrance in wider society a highly credible signal of national sentiment. As Robert Jervis maintains, a signal is more credible when a government is unable to control that aspect of its behavior.³⁶ Wider society both reacts to government policy and engages in its own discussions of the past; in such debates, participants delineate the acceptable range of discourse about past violence.

To assess societal views, I examine the statements and writings of mainstream opinion leaders: members of the political opposition and public intellectuals. I do not incorporate the views of actors on the fringes that exist in every society (e.g., neo-Nazis on the far Right; anarchists on the far Left). Rather, I endeavor to assess the range of respectable opinion within a society.

To be clear, remembrance as I define it is only a subset of phenomena that could be categorized as "national" or "collective" memory.³⁷ This book explicitly focuses on (1) official statements and policies about past violence and (2) statements by individuals in wider society; and tests their effects on observers' perceptions. My coding of remembrance does not attempt to capture the full complexity of a country's collective memory or strong variations in views, feelings, or sense of culpability within the society. Rather, I seek to determine whether the most observable expressions of the ways a people remember past violence affect others' perceptions of their country's intentions.

WHAT IS "APOLOGETIC"?

Different cultures have different protocol surrounding apologies—both in what offenses require an apology and how apologies should be offered. Americans, for example, do not offer apologies with the deep bow required of a Japanese. But social psychologists have identified core components of apologies that transcend cultures; an apology requires admitting past misdeeds and expressing remorse for them.³⁸

The most apologetic remembrance is that which thoroughly addresses both admission and remorse. The events in question are enumerated and explained in detail; agency is clear (i.e., *I did this to you*); remorse is conveyed through the tone, scale, or symbolism of the gesture. An example of an apology is a statement by F. W. de Klerk in 1993: the South African leader acknowledged that apartheid had forced people from their homes, restricted their freedom and jobs, and attacked their dignity. He said that he and his party "deeply regretted" the misery of apartheid.³⁹ Remembrance might be somewhat apologetic: it might convey some regret while offering a vague or incomplete list of past violence. For example, Serbian President Svetozar Marovic stated in 2003, "I want to apologize for all evils that any

citizens of Serbia and Montenegro inflicted upon or committed against anyone in Croatia."⁴⁰ This statement reflects remorse but specifies no wrongdoing. Moving toward the middle of the continuum, countries might acknowledge that they committed harmful violence against another country, but not apologize for having done so (i.e., admission without remorse).

On the other side of the spectrum is unapologetic remembrance, which either fails to admit past wrongdoing or fails to express remorse for it. The classic nonapology among scandal-ridden politicians or corporate leaders is: "If my remarks gave anyone offense, I regret it." U.S. Senator Robert Packwood—accused of sexually harassing a dozen female staffers—said in 1994, "I'm apologizing for the conduct that it was alleged that I did." Unapologetic remembrance might justify past violence (admission without remorse), or deny it (no admission, no remorse). Unapologetic remembrance may glorify past actions (admission and praise rather than remorse). Or countries may simply not remember past violence at all; they might obscure the past through "passive collusion" not to discuss a particular episode in public. Such amnesia may include focusing on one's own suffering rather than on the suffering of victims.⁴¹

Unapologetic remembrance in all of its guises—historically the norm—remains common across the world. Amnesia was rampant in Western Europe after World War II; Tony Judt argues that countries substituted forward-looking "founding myths" about the idea of Europe for painful memories of collaboration and culpability. Turkey does not recognize as a genocide the ethnic cleansing and killing of a million Armenians from 1915 to 1917 (indeed, calling these killings a "genocide" is punishable under Turkish law). Iranian president Ahmadinejad calls the Holocaust a "myth." For many years, American education glorified westward expansion and mythologized that Native Americans died from disease instead of war and ethnic cleansing. Contemporary Russian textbook guidelines celebrate Joseph Stalin as "the most successful leader of the USSR" while ignoring his mass deportations and killings of millions of people. Chinese textbooks laud Mao Zedong's leadership and neglect to mention the tens of millions of Chinese people who perished in the famines and forced relocations caused by his policies.⁴²

Assessing the quality of a country's remembrance during a given time period requires a method of aggregating official and societal remembrance. Remembrance is most *apologetic* when a government pursues a wide spectrum of apologetic policies (e.g., statements, reparations, commemoration, and education), and the statements and actions of wider society also reflect contrition. Remembrance is somewhat apologetic when a government admits and repudiates past violence through a few isolated policies (e.g., a major treaty or apology), and the wider society endorses these policies.

A country's remembrance is somewhat *unapologetic* if minimal government efforts to atone are met with uninterest or skepticism in society. Lack

of interest might stem from people's preoccupation with their own suffering or from the belief that the country, and its relationships with others, is better served by looking forward rather than backward. Still further toward the unapologetic end of the spectrum is a society that responds to government contrition with denunciations and outright denials. At the most unapologetic extreme, neither the government nor the broader society admits or repudiates past violence; they may deny that it occurred or glorify it as heroic.

The theory developed here makes predictions about the effect of remembrance on threat perception. The more that a country's remembrance is apologetic, the more positively others should view its intentions. *Ceteris paribus*, a country's intentions should be judged as friendly if a government pursues a range of apologetic policies and if the broader society endorses and defends such contrition. If official contrition meets with indifference or skepticism among the population, this should neither be particularly reassuring nor alarming. Remembrance *should* be alarming, however, if official contrition provokes justifications, denials, or glorification in wider society. For in this scenario contrition is associated only with the present regime; an unrepentant (and potentially hostile) government is a mere election or coup away. A country's intentions will appear the most hostile when *both* official and societal remembrance denies or glorifies past violence.

AVOIDING CODING PITFALLS

To assess the extent to which a country is apologetic about past misdeeds, I code its official and societal remembrance. Critics of this approach may maintain that this method misses a critical dimension: the *victim's* perspective. An apology is an inherently intersubjective act, one might argue; only a victim can decide when a gesture is apologetic.

Although it is reasonable to speculate that a victim's willingness to accept an apology influences the likelihood of reconciliation, using aspects of the victim's *response* to an apology to measure the *existence* of an apology invites serious problems of inference. Namely, evidence disconfirming the connection between apologies and reconciliation would be systematically overlooked. For example, imagine that victims typically reject apologies, and apologies therefore have little effect on reconciliation. But if scholars only considered remembrance to be "apologetic" when the victim accepts apologies, they would overlook a great deal of disconfirming evidence by treating most cases—those in which the apology was rejected by the victim—as if no apologies had been offered in the first place. In other words, allowing victims to determine when an apology has been issued would conflate *acceptance* of an apology with the *issuance* of an apology, biasing findings in favor of the theory that apologies facilitate reconciliation.

One might also argue that remembrance should be judged based on the motivations behind it. For example, one might dismiss Japan's post-World

War II reparations to Southeast Asia as not apologetic because Tokyo was only seeking to build markets for its exports. The problem with this method, however, is that it is impossible to reliably ascertain the intentions behind a given policy at the time: let alone decades later. The criteria described here for evaluating remembrance, especially the use of societal responses to government policy, are likely to distinguish cynical gestures from sincere ones.

Finally, one might criticize the narrowness of my definition of remembrance. After all, countries also show their interpretations of the past through the activities of citizens' groups and in their art, literature, and film; such activities are not represented in my coding. There are good reasons to include such factors; doing so paints a richer picture of memory within a country. There are also downsides to including these factors, however. More nuanced codings are more difficult to replicate and more difficult to aggregate. The advantage of my approach is that—by including both official and societal elements—it captures a broad segment of remembrance within a country; however, by relying on the most observable indicators of memory, it lends itself better to replication.

Methods

One essential step toward reconciliation between former enemies is a substantial reduction in the level of threat they perceive from each other. To explore the link between remembrance and threat perception, I evaluate (1) the extent to which remembrance affects perceptions of a country's intentions and (2) the extent to which remembrance—relative to other signals of intentions and to capabilities—drives overall threat assessment.

To evaluate how one country perceives another country's intentions, I examine the *statements* made by the general public and elites and look for indications of trust or suspicion. For public "statements" I rely on public opinion polls and media coverage;⁴³ for elite statements I consult archival documents, secondary sources, memoirs, and elite-authored scholarly articles and op-eds. To assess contemporary perceptions, I conducted interviews with government officials, academics, journalists, and think-tank analysts. In the written documents and interviews, I look for evidence that the author or interviewee believes the other state has benign, uncertain, or hostile intentions toward his or her country. Indications that a person feels affinity, trust, or a general sense of community with a former enemy state suggest that they perceive benign intentions. At the opposite end, observers perceive hostile intentions when they say they dislike and distrust a state.

To examine how strongly remembrance affects overall threat perception I look at public and elite *statements* (using sources similar to those above) to determine whether or not people believe the other country to be a security

threat. I also assess *state policy* (defense policy, diplomacy, etc.) for what it conveys about threat perception. For example, against whom is the state configuring its military forces? Against whom, and with whom, does it seek alliances? I evaluate whether a state's diplomacy tries to punish, isolate, or support the other country, and whether its policies reflect concerns about relative gains.

In countries with *low* threat perception, the public and elites express no concern about a military conflict between the two states; no one expects disputes to escalate to the military level. People do not fear the other country's military or economic gains. State policy reflects similar equanimity; the state does not configure military forces or cultivate allies to defend itself against the other country. At the other extreme, *high* threat perception is evident in statements expressing the fear that the other country is an imminent threat. People worry that bilateral disputes will be resolved through force. State policy is adversarial: The state configures military forces against the other country; it finds allies to protect itself; through diplomacy it attempts to weaken and alienate the other country. In between these two extremes are countries with *moderate* threat perception; public and elite statements express uncertainty about whether or not the other state is a security threat; state policy reflects hedging, with perhaps some sensitivity to relative gains. Diplomacy may be cooperative in some areas and competitive in others.

One criticism of this method—specifically of the use of policies to measure perceptions of intentions and threat—is that governments adopt policies for a multitude of reasons. A government's decision to procure certain military capabilities, to pursue hard-line or conciliatory diplomacy toward another state, or even to use military force might be motivated by domestic factors rather than by its perceptions of another state.⁴⁴ For example, perhaps a country's decision to acquire aircraft carriers reflects not fear of a nearby maritime power but rather the navy's influence in the domestic policymaking process. Or a regime's competitive diplomacy—for example, opposing another state's leadership in international institutions, lobbying for sanctions against it, or canceling summits or other diplomatic activities—may not be the result of distrust or threat perception: rather, it may stem from the government's desire to scapegoat the other country for its own domestic political purposes.

The possibility that policies may not accurately reflect a government's perceptions of threats and intentions from another power is an important caveat when relying on policies as an indicator of sentiment, and I discuss it further in the cases of South Korea and China (chapters 2 and 4). However, I use multiple indicators to assess perceptions of intentions and threat: in effect "triangulating" perceptions by relying not only on policies but also on private and public statements of leaders and on popular sentiment. Although it may be true that some policies are undertaken for reasons

unrelated to levels of distrust, the use of multiple indicators—particularly statements conveyed in private communications such as interviews—increases our confidence that this evidence is a legitimate signal of perceptions of intentions and threat.

TESTING THE THEORY

To test the effects of remembrance on perceptions of intentions and threat, I rely on congruence procedure using multiple within-case observations as well as extensive evidence about the reasoning of government officials, journalists, scholars, and the public.⁴⁵ For the congruence testing, I divide the post-World War II era into smaller time periods, which creates more observations on the independent variable (remembrance) and thus more tests of the theory. To draw valid inferences from the evidence, I define the periods so that they do not span a time during which there was significant fluctuation in the value of the key independent variable. For example, consider a situation in which a country's remembrance was *unapologetic* between 1940 and 1950 and its intentions were seen as hostile; remembrance was *apologetic* between 1950 and 1960 and intentions were seen as friendly. It would be unsound to create a period that spans 1940–1960, because this would lead the values to be "averaged out," obscuring otherwise clear congruence between remembrance and perceptions of intentions. In general, periods should be defined to encompass a time in which the independent variable did not vary significantly; as long as this is the case, periods may be further subdivided without biasing findings.

After dividing the post-World War II era into smaller time periods, I code remembrance and threat perception and compare their covariation over time to determine whether more apologetic remembrance corresponds with more benign perceptions of intentions and with lower levels of threat perception.

One cannot draw conclusions from congruence procedure alone because, as noted, other factors influence threat perception. Understanding the relative influence of remembrance thus requires monitoring changes in *alternate variables*. With this in mind I monitor territorial claims, regime type,⁴⁶ institutional membership, and capabilities.

I define capabilities as the power that one state can bring to bear against another. Power includes *potential power*, which I define as wealth (measured by GDP) and population; it also includes *mobilized power*, defined as military expenditure and the number of standing military forces. The capabilities a state can bring to bear are also affected by *constraints*. Constraints include the presence of an occupier, an "offshore balancer," or a balancing coalition.⁴⁷ Another constraint might be the existence of a threat that ties up military forces on one front or otherwise consumes resources, reducing the state's ability to menace others. A strong constraint would be the presence of an occupier's or offshore balancer's military forces stationed within a

country and the existence of an institutionalized security agreement. The strength of constraints imposed by other security threats is measured in terms of the military power of those other states; namely, State A is more constrained in its ability to menace State B if facing other powerful adversaries. In sum, a country with a high level of capabilities enjoys a high level of both potential and mobilized power that is unconstrained by either security threats or the presence of foreign military forces. As I test for the effects of remembrance, I monitor changes in capabilities—as well as changes in alternate variables affecting perceptions of intentions—to determine whether these other factors might be driving fluctuations in threat perception.

To bolster the congruence testing, I examine the reasoning of government officials, journalists, scholars, and members of the public as they explain their views about the former adversary's intentions and threat. If remembrance really does affect perceptions of intentions, then observers should say so: in other words, they should specifically link their views of the other state to its remembrance of past violence. People should say, for example, that a country's denials, glorifications, and justifications of past violence make it appear hostile today. Conversely, they should connect their trust of a former adversary to that country's contrition.

Different versions of the hypothesis that remembrance affects threat perception are possible. One formulation (which I call the "strong" version) expects that a country's remembrance will dominate other signals that influence threat perception. This version of the theory would work through the cognitive/emotional mechanism discussed earlier. It predicts that if a country denies or glorifies its past atrocities, the outrage these denials create will overwhelm efforts to coolly assess capabilities, territorial issues, and so forth. In other words, because observers are so angry about a country's denials, they exaggerate the malignance of its capabilities or policies. According to this version of the theory, unapologetic remembrance should correlate with distrust and high threat perception. Discussion of remembrance should also be a major theme in observers' reasoning.

A "weak" version of the theory expects observers to evaluate remembrance along with a myriad of other factors as they assess threat. This version of the theory might work through the other mechanisms posited earlier (i.e., related to domestic mobilization or identity). It predicts that if a country's remembrance is unapologetic, *ceteris paribus*, distrust and threat perception will be elevated. However, if other factors are reassuring, threat perception will not necessarily be high. Conversely, if a former adversary has shown a great deal of contrition, but has also amassed powerful offensive military capabilities and pursued hard-line policies in its territorial disputes, it may be perceived as threatening. In other words, contrition will be reassuring, but not to the extent that it outweighs concerns about other alarming signals.

The strong version of the theory fails if an unapologetic country is not feared. However, the weak version of the theory is not falsifiable using congruence evidence alone. Given a contrite country, either low or high threat perception would be consistent with the theory. The weak version of the theory can, however, be falsified using process tracing: it fails if observers discussing the other state do not link their perceptions to remembrance, but instead discuss alternate variables.

CASE SELECTION

This book conducts two case studies: the effects of Japan's remembrance on its relations with South Korea and the effects of German remembrance on Franco-German reconciliation. I selected the Japanese and German cases for several reasons. They are the classic cases through which the topic of apologies has entered the lexicon of international relations, and they provide substantial variation in remembrance. In addition, choosing to study Japanese and German remembrance controls for many factors: both countries suffered defeat during World War II, both gradually gained autonomy after a period of occupation, and both were allied with the United States in the Western alliance system. Finally, Germany is the strongest regional power in Europe, and Japan is its Asian counterpart: studying these countries is important simply because they are great powers that play a pivotal role in regional stability in Asia and Europe.

I selected *South Korean* perceptions of Japan and *French* perceptions of Germany on the basis of several criteria. First, South Korea and France were significantly victimized. One would expect such countries to be highly attuned to threats—or lack thereof—from their former adversaries. Second, these dyads are strategically significant: relations between France and Germany and between South Korea and Japan have important regional security implications. Finally, the cases are "study-able" from the standpoint of availability and accessibility of evidence.

This research design might prompt a variety of critiques. One criticism might be that the two cases are too disparate for a comparison to be useful. Although the French were brutalized in many ways, they suffered less during their occupation than did Koreans. The Germans did not attempt to eradicate French identity and culture. The occupations were also very different in length: Whereas Korea experienced thirty-five years of Japanese colonization, France was occupied for four.

No comparison of cases is perfect: Korea probably suffered more material and emotional hardships than did the French. But in some ways French reconciliation with Germany should have appeared a more remote possibility than Korean reconciliation with Japan. The French had recently fought three wars with Germany. Following World War II, they knew about the atrocities the Germans had committed across Europe. In 1945 there was

little reason to hope the Germans would change their ways, and apparently no limit to the cruelties the Germans were willing to commit. For all the French knew, the Germans might try to do in the future to the French what they had done to the Jews and Slavs. Only the benefit of hindsight makes the Germans look easy to forgive by comparison to the Japanese; in 1945, it would have been quite natural to expect that Franco-German relations would be poisoned for decades.

Future studies might build on this project, use my data on German and Japanese remembrance, and evaluate the theory in countries that experienced extreme brutality. In the case of Germany, such countries might include Russia and Poland. These studies would have merit, but there are good reasons to begin, as I did here, with France. First, because of restrictions on the media throughout the Warsaw Pact, German contrition was not widely reported; contrition cannot reconcile enemies if their leaders, journalists, and other opinion elites are denied critical information about another country's contrite behavior. Second, efforts to measure perceptions of intentions and threat would be difficult in cases involving Cold War enemies. At various times in the Cold War, Warsaw Pact countries sought to portray West Germany as a hotbed of neo-Nazi militarism; at other times, they sought to reach out to Bonn to divide it from NATO. Both of these motivations complicate efforts to measure true sentiments in Russia or Poland about a German threat. Finally, studies that track the perceptions of Cold War enemies will inevitably risk conflating the animosities arising from Cold War disputes with the hatreds stemming from past atrocities. To be clear, evidence from these cases may be illuminating and should be gathered; however, there are strong reasons to begin the process of theory testing with cases that minimize these problems.

One might also critique this research design because of concerns about selection bias. Indeed, the cases studied here are not typical; they involve some of the most egregious violence in world history. This fact biases some of the empirical conclusions. The good news is that the direction of the bias is predictable, and it works to reinforce my findings. Specifically, domestic backlash to contrition will be more likely if a country's culpability is ambiguous (and certainly if it is manufactured); denials will be less likely if events are widely known and well documented. Furthermore, egregious violence is more difficult to glorify than morally ambiguous actions. Thus by studying Korean and French perceptions of Japanese and German remembrance of violence during World War II, I study a set of events for which domestic backlash should be relatively unlikely to occur. My finding that contrition tends to trigger backlash is therefore reinforced by the egregious nature of the violence committed by Japan and Germany. I discuss this issue in greater detail in the conclusion.

One might also criticize this research design by arguing that any generalization about remembrance and reconciliation will be impossible from the

small number of cases examined. For example, one might argue that findings from the Korea-Japan case are idiosyncratic: that is, related to factors unique to the Korea-Japan historical experience or to factors unique to either country, such as domestic politics or culture. With this in mind, I examine three additional cases—Chinese and Australian perceptions of Japan and British perceptions of Germany—to see whether my findings appear to be upheld elsewhere. These cases provide broader support for my findings.

As a "small-n" case study, the results from this project cannot serve as the last word on the effects of remembrance on interstate reconciliation. Further testing is needed to determine whether its findings and implications are broadly generalizable in relations between states and whether the findings might also apply to relations between subgroups.⁴⁸ Nonetheless, this book makes important contributions to literature on both memory and international relations. It offers a conceptualization and operationalization of national remembrance and apologies; it theoretically develops and outlines mechanisms through which remembrance might affect reconciliation; it empirically tests a theory of remembrance and reconciliation in prominent case studies; and it explores the plausibility of findings in additional cases.