Writing Assignment

10 ers. Although one can learn definitions favor- able to crime from law-abiding individuals, one is most likely to learn such definitions fiom delinquent friends or criminal family

A Theory of sociation members. with These delinquent studies typically others find is the that best as- Differential predictor of crime, and that these delinquent others partly influence crime by leading the

individual to adopt beliefs conducive to

Association crime (see Agnew, 2000; Akers, 1998; Akers and Sellers, 2004; Waw, 2001 for summaries of such studies).

Sutherland 's theory has also inspired Edwin H. Sutherland dnd much additional theorizing in criminology.

Theorists have attempted to better describe Donald R. Cressey the nature ofthose definitions favorable to vi-

olation of the law (see the next selection in Chapter 11 by Sykes and Matza). They have

Before Sutherland developed his theory, attempted to better describe the processes by crime was usually explained in t e r n ofmul- which we learn criminal behavior from oth- tiple factors-like social class, broken homes, ers (see the description o f social learning the- age, race, urban or rural location, and mental ory by Akers in Chapter 12). And they have disorder. Sutherland developed his theory of drawn on Sutherland in an effort to explain differential association in an effort to explain group differences in crime rates (see the Wolf- why these various factors were related to gang and Ferracuti and Anderson selections crime. In doing so, he hoped to organize and in this part). Sutherland's theory o f differen- integrate the research on crime u p to that tial association, then, is one of the enduring point, as well as to guide future research. classics in criminology (for excellent discus-

Sutherlandk theory is stated in the f o m o f sions ofthe current state o f differential asso- nine propositions. He argues that criminal ciation theory, see Matsueda, 1988, and Waw, behavior is learned by interacting with oth- 2001). ers, especially intimate others. Criminals learn both the techniques of committing crime and the definitions favorable to crime References from these others. The s k t h proposition> Agnew Robe*. '2000. "Sources of Mminality: which f o r n the heart of the theory, states Strain and Subcultural Theories." In Joseph F. that 'h person becomes delinquent because of Sheley (ed.), Criminology: A Contemporary , an excess of definitions favorable to law vio- Handbook, 3rd edition, pp. 349-371. Belmont, lation over definitions unfavorable to viola- CA: Wadsworth. tion oflaw."According to Sutherland, factors Akers, Ronald L. 1998. Social Learning and So- such as social class, race, and broken homes cia1 Structure: A General Theory of Crime and influence crime because they affect the likeli- Deviance. Boston: Northeastern University hood that individuals willdssociate with oth- Press. ers who present definitions favorable to Akers, Ronald L. and Christine S. Sellers. 2004. . crime. ' Criminological Theories: Introduction and

Sutherlandk theory has had a tremendous Evaluation, 4th edition. Los Angeles: Roxbury Publishing. influence on crime research and it remains Matsueda, Ross L. 1988. dThe State of one o f the dominant theories of crime. Differential Association Theory." Crime and Studies on the causes of crime routinely at- Delinquency 34: 277-306. tempt to determine whether individuals are wan; Mark. 2001. he Social Origins of Crime: associating with delinquent or criminal oth- Edwin Sutherland and the Theory of Differen-

122

Chapter 10 + A Theory of DzfferentialRrsociation 123 tial ~ssociation." In Raymond Paternoster and Ronet Bachman (ed.), Explaining Cn'mi- nab and Crime, pp. 182-191. Los Angeles: ~ ~ ~ b u q Publishing.

T h e following statement refers to the pro- eess by which a particular person comes to Engage in criminal behavior. - 1. Criminal behavior is learned. Nega- tively, this means that criminal behavior is jaot inherited, as such; also, the person who

already trained in crime does not in- vent criminal behavior, just as a person does not make mechanical inventions unless he has had training in mechanics.

I 2. Criminal behavior is learned in interac- tion with other persons in a process of com-

tion. This communication is verbal in many respects but includes also "the communication of gestures." - 3. The principal part of the learning of dminal behavior occurs within intimate personal groups. Negatively, this means that

. -he impersonal agencies of communication, such as movies and newspapers, play a rela- tively unimportant part in the genesis of criminal behavior.

- ,+, 4. When criminal behavior is learned, the teaming includes (a) techniques of commit- ting the crime, which are sometimes very complicated, sometimes very simple; (b) the specific direction of motives, drives, rational- izations, and attitudes. , 5. The specific direction of motives and { ~ v s is learned from definitions of the legal codes as favorable or unfavorable. In some societies an individual is surrounded by persons who invariably define the legal codes as rules to be observed, while in oth-

@ eys he is surrounded by persons whose defi- nitions are favorable to the violation of the legal codes. In our American society these definitions are almost always mixed, with the consequence that we have culture con- ac t in relation to the legal codes.

rson becomes delinquent because of cess of definitions favorable to violation

over definitions unfavorable to viola- law. This is the principle of differen-

tial association. It refers to both criminal and anti-criminal associations and has to do with counteracting forces. When per- sons become criminal, they do so because of contacts with criminal patterns and also because of isolation from anti-criminal pat- terns. Any person inevitably assimilates the surrounding culture unless other patterns are in conflict; a Southerner does not pro- nounce "r" because other Southerners do not pronounce "r." Negatively, this proposi- tion of differential association means that associations which are neutral so far as crime is concerned have little or no effect on the genesis of criminal behavior. Much of the experience of a person is neutral in this sense, e.g., learning to brush one's teeth. This behavior has no negative or positive ef- fect on criminal behavior except as it may be related to associations which are con- cerned with the legal codes. This neutral be- havior is important especially as an occu- pier of the time of a child so that he is not in contact with criminal behavior during the time he is so engaged in the neutral behav- ior.

7. Differential associations may vary in frequency, duration, priority, and intensity. This means that associations with criminal behavior and also associations with anti- criminal behavior vary in those respects. "Frequency" and "duration" as modalities of associations are obvious and need no ex- planation. "Priority" is assumed to be im- portant in the sense that lawful behavior de- veloped in early childhood may persist throughout life, and also that delinquent behavior developed in early childhood may persist throughout life. This tendency, how- ever, has not been adequately demon- strated, and priority seems to be important principally through its selective influence. "Intensity" is not precisely defined but it has to do with such things as the prestige of the source of a criminal or anti-criminal pat- tern and with emotional reactions related to the associations. In a precise description of the criminal behavior of a person these mo- dalities would be stated in quantitative form and a mathematical ratio be reached. formula in this sense has not been devel-

124 Part IV + Learning to Be a Criminal

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8. The process of learning criminal behav- ior by association with criminal and anti- criminal patterns involves all of the mecha- nisms that are involved in any other learning. Negatively, this means that the learning of criminal behavior is not restricted to the process of imitation. A person who is se- duced, for instance, learns criminal behav- ior by association, but this process would not ordinarily be described as imitation.

9. While criminal behavior is an expres- sion of general needs and values, it is not ex- plained by those general needs and values since. non-criminal behavior is an expression of the same needs and values. Thieves gener- ally steal in order to secure money, but like- wise honest laborers work in order to se- cure money. The attempts by many scholars to explain criminal behavior by general drives and values, such as the happiness principle, striving for social status, the money motive, or frustration, have been and must continue to be futile since they ex- plain lawful behavior as completely as they explain criminal behavior. They are similar to respiration, which is necessary for any behavior but which does not differentiate criminal from non-criminal behavior.

It is not necessary, at this level of explana- tion, to explain why a person has the associ- ations which he has; this certainly involves a complex of many things. In an area where the delinquency rate is high, a boy who is sociable, gregarious, active, and athletic is very likely to come in contact with the other boys in the neighborhood, learn delinquent behavior from them, and become a gang- ster; in the same neighborhood the psycho- pathic boy who is isolated, introverted, and inert may remain at home, not become ac- quainted,with the other boys in the neigh- borhood, and not become delinquent. In another situation, the sociable, athletic, ag- gressive boy may become a member of a scout troop and not become involved in de- linquent behavior. The person's associations are determined in a general context of so- cial organization. A child is ordinarily reared in a family; the place of residence of the family is determined largely by family

income; and the delinquency rate is in many respects related to the rental value of the houses. Many other aspects of social orga- nization affect the kinds of associations a person has.

The preceding explanation of criminal behavior purports to explain the criminal and non-criminal behavior of individual persons. As indicated earlier, it is possible to state sociological theories of criminal be- havior which explain the criminality of a community, nation, or other group. The problem, when thus stated, is to account for variations in crime rates and involves a comparison of the crime rates of various groups or the crime rates of a particular group at different times. The explanation of a crime rate must be consistent with the ex- planation of the criminal behavior of the person, since the crime rate is a summary statement of the number of persons in the group who commit crimes and the fre- quency with which they commit crimes. one of the best explanations of crime rates from this point of view is that a high crime rate is due to social disorganization. The term "social disorganization" is not entirely satisfactory and it seems preferable to sub- stitute for it the term "differential social or- ganization." The postulate on which this theory is based, regardless of the name, is that crime is rooted in the social organiza- tion and is an expression of that social orga- nization. A group may be organized for criminal behavior or organized against criminal behavior. Most communities are organized both for criminal and anti-crimi- nal behavior and in that sense the crime rate is an expression of the differential group organization. Differential group or- ganization as an explanation of variations in crime rates is consistent with the differ- ential association theory of the processes by which persons become criminals.

Reprinted from Edwin H. Sutherland and Donald R. Cressey, "A Theory of Differential Association" in -Principles of Criminology, 6th edition. Copyright O 1960 by Elaine S. Cressey. Reprinted by permission of Elaine S. Cressey.

Chapter 10 + A Theory of Dt~ererztialRFsociution 125

Discussion Questions 3. Strain theorists, described in the next section, argue that frustration is a ma-

1. What does Sutherland mean by "defini- jor cause of crime. How would Suther- tions favorable to violation of law"? land respond to this argument? Give examples of such definitions. 4. What policy recommendations might

2. &cording to Sutherland, our associa- Sutherland have made for controlling tions do not carry equal weight; some crime? + are more influential than others. What types of associations carry the greatest weight in influencing our behavior?

Techniques of Neutralization

Gresham M. Sykes and David Matm

Sykes and Matza, like Sutherland, feel that criminal behavior is learned. And like Suther- land, they feel that part of that learning in- volves "motives, drives, rationalizations, and attitudes favorable to violation o f law." They state, however, that the specific content of these rationalizations, attitudes, etc. has not received much attention. When they wrote their article in 1957, the dominant view was that delinquents held values which were the opposite of middle-class values. Delinquents, in particular, were said to generally approve of acts such as theft and fighting. This posi- tion, represented in the work ofAlbert Cohen (see Chapter 16 in Part V), is attacked by Sykes and Matza (also see Matza, 1964).

The first part of their article presents evi- dence suggesting that delinquents do not gen- erally approve of delinquency. The second part of their article presents an alternative formulation, in which they contend that de- linquents are able to engage in delinquency by employing certain "techniques o f neutraliza- tion." Although delinquents believe that de- linquency is generally bad, they claim that their delinquent acts are justified for any one o f several reasons (e.g., the Qictim had it com- ing, they didn't really hurt anybody). These justifications are said to be used before the delinquent act, and they make the delinquent act possible by neutralizing the individual2 belief that it is bad.

Data provide some support for neutraliza- tion theory. Much evidence suggests that of- fenders commonly justify or excuse their .

crimes using the neutralizations described by Sykes and Matza, as well as additional neu- tralizations identified by others (see Maruna and Copes, 2005). This is true of rapists (Scully and Marolla, 1984), white-collar criminals (Benson, 1985), and others. Fur- ther, studies indicate that individuals differ in the extent to which they accept the neutraliza- tions. Those individuals who accept more neutralizations usually engage in more crime. Some argue that this is because of- fenders use neutralizations to justify or ex- cuse their crimes after the fact, but a few studies using longitudinal data have found that individuals who accept more neutraliza- tions engage in more subsequent crime (see Agnew, 1994). Studies also suggest that the effect of neutralizations on crime is influ- enced by several factors (see Agnew, 1994). Neutralizations, for example, are more likely to lead to crime among individuals who asso- ciate with delinquent peers. Such findings re- flect the fact that neutralizations do not so much cause crime as make it easier for moti- vated individuals to engage i n crime (by re- ducing their guilt).

The data, then, do suggest that the tech- niques of neutralization may well be a "cru- cial component" of Sutherland's "definitions favorable to violation of law." Maruna and Copes (2005) provide a n excellent overview of the research on neutralization theory and provide several suggestions for further re- search. For example, they suggest that some neutralizations may be more likely than oth- ers to foster crime.

References Agnew, Robert. 1994. "The Techniques of Neu-

tralization and Violence." Criminology 32: 555,580.

Benson, Michael L. 1985. "Denying the Guilty Mind: Accounting for Involvement in White- Collar Crime." Criminology 23: 583-608.

Maruna, Shadd, and Heith Copes. 2005. "What Have We Learned From Five Decades of Neu- trali2ation Research?" Crime and Justice 32: 221-320.

Matza, David. 1964. Delinquency and Drift. New York: Wiley.

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Chapter 11 + Techniques of Neutralization 127 n

Scully, Diana, and Joseph Marolla. 1984. "Con- victed Rapists' Vocabulary of Motive: Excuses and Justifications." Social Problems 3 1 : 530-

' " 544.

I n attempting to uncover the roots of juve- nile delinquency, the social scientist has long since ceased to search for devils in the mind or stigma of the body. It is now largely agreed that delinquent behavior, like most social behavior, is learned and that it is learned in the process of social interaction.

The classic statement of this position is found in Sutherland's theory of differential association, which asserts that criminal or

, delinquent behavior involves the learning of (a) techniques of committing crimes and (b) motives, drives, rationalizations, and atti- tudes favorable to the violation of law. Un- fortunately, the specific content of what is learned-as opposed to the process by which it is learned-has received relatively little attention in either theory or research. Perhaps the single strongest school of thought on the nature of this content has centered on the idea of a delinquent sub- culture. The basic characteristic of the de- linquent sub-culture, it is argued, is a sys- tem of values that represents an inversion of the values held by respectable, law-abiding society. The world of the delinquent is the world of the law-abiding turned upside down and its norms constitute a counter- vailing force directed against the conform- ing social order. Cohen sees the process of developing a delinquent sub-culture as a matter of building, maintaining, and rein- forcing a code for behavior which exists by opposition, which stands in point by point contradiction to dominant values, particu- larly those of the middleqclass. Cohen's por- trayal of delinquency is execut good deal of sophistication, an f he with care- a fully avoids overly simple explanations such as those based on the principle of "follow the leader" or easy generalizations about yemotional disturbances." Furthermore, he does not accept the delinquent sub-culture as something given, but instead systemati-

cally examines the function of delinquent values as a viable solution to the lower- class, male child's problems in the area of social status. Yet in spite of its virtues, this image of juvenile delinquency as a form of behavior based on competing or counter- vailing values and norms appears to suffer from a number of serious defects. It is the nature of these defects and a possible alter- native or modified explanation for a large portion of juvenile delinquency with which this paper is concerned.

The difficulties in viewing delinquent be- havior as springing from a set of deviant values and norms-as arising, that is to say, from a situation in which the delinquent de- fines his delinquency as "right"-are both empirical and theoretical. In the first place, if there existed in fact a delinquent sub-cul- ture such that the delinquent viewed his il- legal behavior as morally correct, we could reasonably suppose that he would exhibit no feelings of guilt or shame at detection or confinement. Instead, the major reaction would tend in the direction of indignation or a sense of martyrdom. It is true that some delinquents do react in the latter fashion, al- though the sense of martyrdom often seems to be based on the fact that others "get away with it" and indignation appears to be di- rected against the chance events or lack of skill that led to apprehension. More impor- tant, however, is the fact that there is a good deal of evidence suggesting that many de- linquents d o experience a sense of guilt or shame, and its outward expression is not to be dismissed as a purely manipulative ges- ture to appease those in authority. Much of this evidence is, to be sure, of a clinical na- ture or in the forrn of impressionistic judg- ments of those who must deal first hand with the youthful offender. Assigning a weight to such evidence calls for caution, but it cannot be ignored if we are to avoid the gross stereotype of the juvenile delin- quent as a hardened gangster in miniature.

In the second place, observers have noted that the juvenile delinquent frequently ac- cords admiration and respect to law-abid- ing persons. The "really honest" is often re- vered, and if the delinquent is sometimes

128 Part N + Learning to Be a Criminal overly keen to detect hypocrisy in those who conform, unquestioned probity is likely to win his approval. A fierce attachment to a humble, pious mother or a forgiving, upright priest (the former, according to many observers, is often encountered in both juvenile delinquents and adult crimi- nals) might be dismissed as rank sentimen- tality, but at least it is clear that the delin- quent does not necessarily regard those who abide by the legal rules as immoral. In a similar vein, it can be noted that the juve- nile delinquent may exhibit great resent- ment if illegal behavior is imputed to "sig- nificant others" in his immediate social environment or to heroes in the world of sport and entertainment. In other words, if the delinquent does hold to a set of values and norms that stand in complete opposi- tion to those of respectable society, his norm-holding is of a peculiar sort. While supposedly thoroughly committed to the deviant system of the delinquent sub-cul- ture, he would appear to recognize the moral validity of the dominant normative system in many instances.

In the third place, there is much evidence that juvenile delinquents often draw a sharp line between those who can be victimized and those who cannot. Certain social groups are not to be viewed as "fair game" in the performance of supposedly approved delinquent acts while others warrant a vari- ety of attacks. In general, the potentiality for victimization would seem to be a func- tion of the social distance between the juve- nile delinquent and others and thus we find implicit maxims in the world of the delin- quent such as "don't steal from friends" or "don't commit vandalism against a church of your own faith." This is all rather obvi- ous, but the impli~ations~have not received sufficient attention. The fact that suppos- edly valued behavior tends to be directed against disvalued social groups hints that the "wrongfulness" of such delinquent be- havior is more widely recognized by delin- quents than the literature has indicated. When the pool of victims is limited by con- siderations of kinship, friendship, ethnic group, social class, age, sex, etc., we have

reason to suspect that the virtue of delin- quency is far from unquestioned.

In the fourth place, it is doubtful if many juvenile delinquents are totally immune from the demands for conformity made by the dominant social order. There is a strong likelihood that the family of the delinquent will agree with respectable society that de- linquency is wrong, even though the family may be engaged in a variety of illegal activi- ties. That is, the parental posture conducive to delinquency is not apt to be a positive prodding. Whatever may be the influence of parental example, what might be called the "Fagin" pattern of socialization into delin- quency is probably rare. Furthermore, as Red1 has indicated, the idea that certain neighborhoods are completely delinquent, offering the child a model for delinquent be- havior without reservations, is simply not supported by the data.

The fact that a child is punished by par- ents, school officials, and agencies of the legal system for his delinquency may, as a number of observers have cynically noted, suggest to the child that he should be more careful not to get caught. There is an equal or greater probability, however, that the child will internalize the demands for con- formity. This is not to say that demands for conformity cannot be counteracted. In fact, as we shall see shortly, an understanding of how internal and external demands for con- formity are neutralized may be crucial for understanding delinquent behavior. But it is to say that a complete denial of the valid- ity of demands for conformity and the sub- stitution of a new normative system is improbable, in light of the child's or adoles- cent's dependency on adults and encircle- ment by adults inherent in his status in the social structure. No matter how deeply en- meshed in patterns of delinquency he may be and no matter how much this involve- ment may outweigh his associations with the law-abiding, he cannot escape the con- demnation of his deviance. Somehow the demands for conformity must be met and answered; they cannot be ignored as part of an alien system of values and norms.

In short, the theoretical viewpoint that sees juvenile delinquency as a form of be-

Chapter 11 + Techniques of Neutralization 129 hador based on the values and norms of a deviant sub-culture in precisely the same way as law-abiding behavior is based on the values and norms of the larger society is open to serious doubt. The fact that the world of the delinquent is embedded in the larger world of those who conform cannot be overlooked nor can the delinquent be equated with an adult thoroughly socialized into an alternative way of life. Instead, the juvenile delinquent would appear to be at least partially committed to the dominant social order in that he frequently exhibits p i l t or shame when he violates its proscrip- tions, accords approval to certain conform- ing figures, and distinguishes between ap- propriate and inappropriate targets for his deviance. It is to an explanation for the ap- parent paradoxical fact of his delinquency that we now turn.

As Morris Cohen once said, one of the most fascinating problems about human behavior is why men violate the laws in which they believe. This is the problem that confronts us when we attempt to explain why delinquency occurs despite a greater or lesser commitment to the usages of confor- mity. A basic clue is offered by the fact that social rules or norms calling for valued be- havior seldom if ever take the form of cate- gorical imperatives. Rather, values or norms appear as qualified guides for action, limited in their applicability in terms of time, place, persons, and social circum- ?stances. The moral injunction against kill- ing, for example, does not apply to the enemy during combat in time of war, al- though a captured enemy comes once again under the prohibition. Similarly, the taking and distributing of scarce goods in a time of ,acute social need is felt by many to be right, although under other circumstances pri- vate property is held inviolable. The norma- tive system of a society, then, is marked by what Williams has termed flexibility; it does not consist of a body of rules held to be binding under all conditions. 'b. This flexibility is, in fact, an integral part 'of the criminal law in that measures for "de- fenses to crimes" are provided in pleas such as nonage, necessity, insanity, drunkenness, compulsion, self-defense, and so on. The in-

dividual can avoid moral culpability for his criminal action-and thus avoid the nega- tive sanctions of society-if he can prove that criminal intent was lacking.

It is our argument that much delinquency is based on what is essentially an unrecog- nized extension of defenses to crimes, i n the form of justifications for deviance that are seen as valid by the delinquent but not by the legal system or society at large.

These justifications are commonly de- scribed as rationalizations. They are viewed as following deviant behavior and as pro- tecting the individual from self-blame and the blame of others after the act. But there is also reason to believe that they precede deviant behavior and make deviant behav- ior possible. It is this possibility that Sutherland mentioned only in passing and that other writers have failed to exploit from the viewpoint of sociological theory. Disapproval flowing from internalized norms and conforming others in the social environment is neutralized, turned back, or deflected in advance. Social controls that serve to check or inhibit deviant motiva- tional patterns are rendered inoperative, and the individual is freed to engage in de- linquency without serious damage to his self image. In this sense, the delinquent both has his cake and eats it too, for he re- mains committed to the dominant norma- tive system and yet so qualifies its impera- tives that violations are "acceptable" if not "right." Thus the delinquent represents not a radical opposition to law-abiding society but something more like an apologetic fail- ure, often more sinned against than sinning in his own eyes. We call these justifications of deviant behavior techniques of neutral- ization; and we believe these techniques make up a crucial component of Suther- land's "definitions favorable to the violation of law." It is by learning these techniques that the juvenile becomes delinquent, rather than by learning moral imperatives, values or attitudes standing in direct con- tradiction to those of the dominant society. In analyzing these techniques, we have found it convenient to divide them into five major types.

130 Part IV + Learning to Be a Criminal

The Denial of Responsibility In so far as the delinquent can define

himself as lacking responsibility for his de- viant actions, the disapproval of self or oth- ers is sharply reduced in effectiveness as a restraining influence. As Justice Holmes has said, even a dog distinguishes between being stumbled over and being kicked, and modern society is no less careful to draw a line between injuries that are unintentional, i.e., where responsibility is lacking, and / those that are intentional. As a technique of neutralization, however, the denial of re- sponsibility extends much further than the claim that deviant acts are an "accident" or some similar negation of personal account- ability. It may also be asserted that delin- quent acts are due to forces outside of the individual and beyond his control such as unloving parents, bad companions, or a slum neighborhood. In effect, the delin- quent approaches a "billiard ball" concep- tion of himself in which he sees himself as helplessly propelled into new situations. From a psychodynamic viewpoint, this ori- entation toward one's own actions may rep- resent a profound alienation from self, but it is important to stress the fact that inter- pretations of responsibility are cultural constructs and not merely idiosyncratic be- liefs. The similarity between this mode of justifying illegal behavior assumed by the delinquent and the implications of a "socio- logical" frame of reference or a "humane" jurisprudence is readily apparent. It is not the validity of this orientation that concerns us here, but its function of deflecting blame attached to violations of social nonns and its relative independence of a particular personality structure. By learning to view himself as more acted upon than acting, the delinquent prepares the way for deviance from the dominant normative system with- out the necessity of a frontal assault on the norms themselves.

The Denial of Injury A second major technique of neutraliza-

tion centers on the injury or harm involved in the delinquent act. The criminal law has

long made a distinction between crimes which are mala in se and mala prohibita- that is between acts that are wrong in them- selves and acts that are illegal but not im- moral-and the delinquent can make the same kind of distinction in evaluating the wrongfulness of his behavior. For the delin- quent, however, wrongfulness may turn on the question of whether or not anyone has clearly been hurt by his deviance, and this matter is open to a variety of interpreta- tions. Vandalism, for example, may be de- fined by the delinquent simply as "mis- chief'-after all, it may be claimed, the persons whose property has been destroyed can well afford it. Similarly, auto theft may be viewed as "borrowing," and gang fight- ing may be seen as a private quarrel, an agreed upon duel between two willing par- ties, and thus of no concern to the commu- nity at large. We are not suggesting that this technique of neutralization, labelled the de- nial of injury, involves an explicit dialectic, rather, we are arguing that the delinquent frequently, and in a hazy fashion, feels that his behavior does not really cause any great harm despite the fact that it runs counter- to law. Just as the link between the individual and his acts may be broken by the denial of responsibility, so may the link between acts and their consequences be broken by the denial of injury. Since society sometimes agrees with the delinquent, e.g., in matters such as truancy, "pranks," and so on, it merely reaffirms the idea that the delin- quent's neutralization of social controls by means of qualifying the norms is an exten- sion of common practice rather than a ges- ture of complete opposition.

The Denial of Victim Even if the delinquent accepts the re-

sponsibility for his deviant actions and is willing to admit that his deviant actions in- volve an injury or hurt, the moral indigna- tion of self and others may be neutralized by an insistence that the injury is not wrong in light of the circumstances. The injury, it may be claimed, is not really an injury; rather, it is a fonn of rightful retaliation or

Chapter 1 1 + Techniques of Neutralization 13 1 wshrnent . By a subtle alchemy the delin- quent moves himself into the position of an

-avenger and the victim is transformed into a wrong-doer. Assaults on homosexuals or suspected homosexuals, attacks on mem-

/ bers of minority groups who are said to have gotten "out of place," vandalism as re- f venge on an unfair teacher or school offi- - cial, thefts from a "crooked store owner- ! may be hurts inflicted on a transgressor, t in the eyes of the delinquent. As Orwell has

pointed out, the type of criminal admired by h e general public has probably changed over the course of years and Raffles no lon- ger serves as a hero; but Robin Hood, and his latter day derivatives such as the tough detective seeking justice outside the law,

i capture the popular imagination, and the delinquent may view his acts as part of a similar role. To deny the existence of the vic- tim, then, by transforming him into a per- son deserving injury is an extreme form of a phenomenon we have mentioned before, namely, the delinquent's recognition of ap- propriate and inappropriate targets for his

- delinquent acts. In addition, however, the existence of the victim may be denied for the delinquent, in a somewhat different sense, by the circumstances of the delin- quent act itself. Insofar as the victim is physically absent, unknown, or a vague ab- straction (as is often the case in delinquent acts committed against property), the awareness of the victim's existence is weak- ened. Internalized norms and anticipations bf the reactions of others must somehow be activated, if they are to serve as guides for behavior; and it is possible that a dimin- ished awareness of the victim plays an im- Portant part in determining whether or not this process is set in motion.

The ~ondemktion of the Condemners

A fourth technique of neutralization would appear to involve a condemnation of the condemners or, as McCorkle and Korn have phrased it, a rejection of the rejectors. The delinquent shifts the focus of attention . .

,. born his own deviant acts to the motives

and behavior of those who disapprove of his violations. His condemners, he may claim, are hypocrites, deviants in disguise, or im- pelled by personal spite. This orientation to- ward the conforming world may be of par- ticular importance when it hardens into a bitter cynicism directed against those as- signed the task of enforcing or expressing the norms of the dominant society. Police, it may be said, are corrupt, stupid, and brutal. Teachers always show favoritism and par- ents always "take it out" on their children. By a slight extension, the rewards of confor- mity-such as material success-become a matter of pull or luck, thus decreasing still further the stature of those who stand on the side of the law-abiding. The validity of this jaundiced viewpoint is not so impor- tant as its function in turning back or de- flecting the negative sanctions attached to violations of the norms. The delinquent, in effect, has changed the subject of the con- versation in the dialogue between his own deviant impulses and the reactions of oth- ers; and by attacking -others, the wrongful- ness of his own behavior is more easily re- pressed or lost to view.

The Appeal to Higher Loyalties Fifth, and last, internal and external so-

cial controls may be neutralized by sacrific- ing the demands of the larger society for the demands of the smaller social groups to which the delinquent belongs such as the sibling pair, the gang, or the friendship clique. It is important to note that the delin- quent does not necessarily repudiate the imperatives of the dominant normative sys- tem, despite his failure to follow them. Rather, the delinquent may see himself as caught up in a dilemma that must be re- solved, unfortunately, at the cost of violat- ing the law. One aspect of this situation has been studied by Stouffer and Toby in their research on the conflict between particular- istic and universalistic demands, between the claims of friendship and general social obligations, and their results suggest that "it is possible to classify people according to a predisposition to select one or the other

132 Part TV + Learning to Be a Criminal horn of a dilemma in role conflict." For our purposes, however, the most important point is that deviation' from certain norms may occur not because the norms are re- jected but because other norms, held to be more pressing or involving a higher loyalty, are accorded precedence. Indeed, it is the fact that both sets of norms are believed in that gives meaning to our concepts of di- lemma and role conflict.

The conflict between the claims of hiend- ship and the claims of law, or a similar di- lemma, has of course long been recognized by the social scientist (and the novelist) as a common human problem. If the juvenile delinquent frequently resolves his dilemma by insisting that he must "always help a buddy" or "never squeal on a friend," even when it throws him into serious difficulties with the dominant social order, his choice remains familiar to the supposedly law- abiding. The delinquent is unusual, per- haps, in the extent to which he is able to see the fact that he acts in behalf of the smaller social groups to which he belongs as a justi- fication for violations of society's norms, but it is a matter of degree rather than of kind.

"I didn't mean it." "I didn't really hurt anybody." "They had it coming to them." "Everybody's picking on me." "I didn't do it for myself." These slogans or their variants, we hypothesize, prepare the juvenile for de- linquent acts. These "definitions of the situ- ation" represent tangential or glancing blows at the dominant nonnative system rather than the creation of an opposing ide- ology; and they are extensions of patterns of thought prevalent in society rather than something created de novo.

Techniques of neutralization may not be powerful enough to fully shield the individ- ual from the force of his 'own internalized values and the reactions of conforming oth- ers, for as we have pointed out, juvenile de- linquents often appear to suffer from feel- ings of guilt and shame when called into account for their deviant behavior. And some delinquents may be so isolated from the world of conformity that techniques of neutralization need not be called into play.

Nonetheless, we would argue that tech- niques of neutralization are critical in lessening the effectiveness of social controls and that they lie behind a large share of de- linquent behavior.

Empirical research in this area is scat- tered and fragmentary at the present time, but the work of Redl, Cressy, and others has supplied a body of significant data that has done much to clarify the theoretical issues and enlarge the fund of supporting evi- dence. Two lines of investigation seem to be critical at this stage. First, there is need for more knowledge concerning the differential distribution of techniques of neutralization, as operative patterns of thought, by age, sex, social class, ethnic group, etc. On a pri- ori grounds it might be assumed that these justifications for deviance will be more readily seized by segments of society for whom a discrepancy between common so- cial ideals and social practice is most appar- ent. It is also possible however, that the habit of "bending" the dominant normative system-if not "breaking" it--cuts across our cruder social categories and is to be traced primarily to patterns of social inter- action within the familial circle. Second, there is need for a greater understanding of the internal structure of techniques of neu- tralization, as a system of beliefs and atti- tudes, and its relationship to various types of delinquent behavior. Certain techniques of neutralization would appear to be better adapted to particular deviant acts than to others, as we have suggested, for example, in the case of offenses against property and the denial of the victim. But the issue re- mains far from clear and stands in need of more information.

In any case, techniques of neutralization appear to offer a promising line of research in enlarging and systematizing the theoreti- cal grasp of juvenile delinquency. As more information is uncovered concerning tech- niques of neutralization, their origins, and their consequences, both juvenile delin- quency in particular, and deviation from normative systems in general may be illu- minated.

Chapter 1 1 + Techniques of Neutralization 133 F. I Reprinted from Gresham M. Sykes and David Matza, ! "Techniques of Neutralization: A Theory of Delin- ! - quency" in the American Sociological Review 22. Copy-

right O 1957.

Discussion Questions 1. In their article, Sykes and Matza para-

phrase Monis Cohen: "one of the most fascinating problems about human be- havior is why men violate the laws in which they believe." What solution do Sykes and Matza offer to this problem?

2. Most students disapprove of cheating on exams, but many nevertheless cheat.

List possible justifications such stu- dents might give for their cheating be- havior. Which techniques of neutraliza- tions do these justifications illustrate?

3. Sykes and Matza argue that the tech- niques of neutralization are learned from others. They do not, however, describe those groups or types of individuals that are most likely. to employ the tech- niques of neutralization. What groups or categories of individuals do you think are most likely to employ the tech- niques of neutralization (and why)? +

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Social b Bond ,' Theory I

&though Causes of Delinquency is a com- plex book filled with intricate theoretical dis- cussions and numerous statistical analyses, ~ i ~ s c h i k theory has an appealing quality: It can be simply stated and thus easily under- stood and studied by criminologists. Indeed, his theory can be reduced to two proposi- tions. First, delinquency and social bonds are inversely related. Second, the concept of so- cial bonds has four elements-attachment, commitment, involvement, and belief- which independently and in combination re- strain criminal conduct.

But how exactly do these bonds exert con- trol over youngsters? Hirschi argued that youths could be attached to peers, teachers, and other adults, although relationships with parents are most crucial. Attachment in- volves an emotional connection to another person. When such a relationship exists, youths will be more likely to care what that other person thinks of them. In turn, when in a situation where the opportunity for trouble presents itself; they will be restrained from de- linquency if they are concerned that such ac- tion will disappoint the other person or dis- rupt this relationship.

The importance of attachment is that dur- ing the teenage years, yoyths are frequently outside their parents' watchful eyes. In such instances, parents cannot exert "direct con- trol"-that is, personally supervise their chil- dren and punish misconduct when it occurs. They can, however, exert 'lindirect control" if youths take into account theirparents'prefer- ences. When attachment is strong, observed Hirschi, "the parent is psychologically pres-

ent when temptation to commit a crime ap- pears. If; in the situation of temptation, no thought is given to parental reaction, the child is to this extent free to commit the act" (1 969: 88).

Much like rational choice theory (see Part X), Hirschi suggested that there is a "rational component" to conformity, which he calls l'commitment.'l Juveniles who are doing well in school and have bright prospects ahead are less likely to engage in acts that will jeopar- dize their future. Conversely, uncommitted youths-those with little or no stake in con- formity-have nothing t o lose and thus are freer to break the law.

Hirschi also contended that the mere in- volvement in conventional activities facili- tates control. If idleness presents opportuni- ties for crime, filling up a youth's day with wholesome activities-such as school and recreational pursuits-leaves little time for getting into trouble.

Finally, Hirschi (1 969: 26) argued that youths who believe that they should "obey the rules of society" are less likely to violate them. The social bond of "belief' is controversial be- cause such beliefs or "definitions" are also central to differential association theory (or what Hirschi called "cultural deviance" the- ory). Hirschi contended, however, that an im- portant analytical distinction could be made: While cultural deviance theorists like Suther- land (Chapter 10) focus on beliefs that posi- tively value crime ("definitions favorable to violation of the law'y, control theorists focus on beliefs that proscribe crime. "Delinquency is not caused by beliefs that require delin- quency," noted Hirschi (1 969: 198)) "but rather made possible by the absence of (effec- tive) beliefs that forbid delinquency."

'Hirschik social bond theory has been sub- jected to numerous empirical tests-perhaps more than any other theory. Although empiri- cal confirmation of the theory varies by such factors as a study's methodology (Agnew, 1985; Costello and Vowell, 1999; Kempf; 1993; Krohn, 2000), overall there is fairly consistent support for the general thesis that weak social bonds increase the risk of being involved in criminal behavior (Akers and Sellers, 2004; Sampson and h u b , 1993

220 Part VI + Varieties of Control Theory [Chapter 22 in this part]). Hirschik claim that competing perspectives-especially "cul- tural deviance" theories--are not empirically viable, however, is mistaken (Akers and Sellers, 2004; Krohn, 2000). A further limita- tion is that HirschiS approach is largely astructural and ahistorical. Unlike Shaw and McKay (Chapter 7)) he does not examine how macrosocial changes occurring in the United States affect the strength of social bonds for people located in different sectors of Ameri- can society (see also, Sampson and Wilson, 1995 [Chapter 8 in this volume]; Sampson and h u b , 1994).

References Agnew, Robert. 1985. "Social Control Theory

and Delinquency: A Longitudinal Test." Crimi- nology 23: 47-6 1.

Akers, Ronald L. and Christine S. Sellers. 2004. Criminological Theories: Introduction, Evalua- tion, and Application, 4th edition. Los Angeles: Roxbury.

Costello, Barbara J. and Paul R. Vowell. 1999. "Testing Control Theory and Differential Asso- ciation: A Reanalysis of the Richmond Youth Project.Data." Criminology 37: 8 15-842.

Hirschi, Travis. 1969. Causes o f Delinquency. Berkeley: University of California Press.

Kempf, Kimberly L. 1993. "The Empirical Sta- tus of Hirschi's Control Theory." In Freda Adler and William S. Laufer (eds.), New Direc- tions in Criminological Theory: Advances in Crimino2ogical Theory, Volume 4, pp. 143-185. New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction.

Krohn, Marvin. 2000. "Control and Deterrence Theories of Criminality." In Joseph F. Sheley (ed.), Criminology: A Contemporary Handbook, 3rd edition, pp. 372-399. Belmont, CA: Wads- worth.

Sampson, Robert J. and John H. Laub. 1993. Crime in the Making: Pathways and Turning Points Through Life. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

-. 1994. "Urban Poverty and the Family Con- text of Delinquency: A New Look at Structure and Process in a Classic Study." Child Develop- ment 65: 523-540.

Sampson, Robert J. and William Julius Wilson. 1995. "Toward a Theory of Race, Crime, and Urban Inequality." In John Hagan and Ruth D. Peterson (eds.), Crime and Inequality, pp. 36- 54. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.

Three fundamental perspectives on delin- quency and deviant behavior dominate the current scene. According to strain or moti- vational theories, legitimate desires that conformity cannot satisfy force a person into deviance. According to control or bond theories, a person is free to commit delin- quent acts because his ties to the conven- tional order have somehow been broken. According to cultural deviance theories, the deviant conforms to a set of standards not accepted by a larger or more powerful soci- ety. Although most current theories of crime and delinquency contain elements of at least two and occasionally all three of these perspectives, reconciliation of their assumptions is very difficult. If, as the con- trol theorist assumes, the ties of many per- sons to the conventional order may be weak or virtually nonexistent, the strain theorist, in accounting for their deviance, builds into his explanation pressure that is unneces- sary. If, on the other hand, it is reasonable to assume with the strain theorist that every- one is at some point strongly tied to the con- ventional system, then it is unreasonable to assume that many are not (control theo- ries), or that many are tied to different "con- ventional" systems (cultural deviance theo- ries). . . .

Control theories assume that delinquent acts result when an individual's bond to so- ciety is weak or broken. Since these theories embrace two highly complex concepts, the bond of the individual to society, it is not surprising that they have at one time or an- other formed the basis of explanations of most forms of aberrant or unusual behav- ior. It is also not surprising that control the- ories have described the elements of the bond to society in many ways, and that they have focused on a variety of units as the point of control. . . .

Elements of the Bond Attachment

In explaining conforming behavior, soci- ologists justly emphasize sensitivity to the opinion of others. Unfortunately, as sug-

elin- z the noti- that rson 3ond .elin- wen- )ken. ;, the 3 not soci- !S of Its of ?e of their con- ' per- weak orist, ; into eces- de to very- con-

~ l e to theo- "con- theo-

pent ;o SO- :ones 5, the s not )r an- ns of ehav- 11 the- ,f the t they .s the

soci- :o the ; sug-

gested in the preceding chapter, they tend to suggest that man is sensitive to the opinion of others and thus exclude sensitivity from their explanations of deviant behavior. In explaining deviant behavior, psychologists, in contrast, emphasize insensitivity to the opinion of others. Unfortunately, they too tend to ignore variation, and, in addition, they tend to tie sensitivity inextricably to other variables, to make it part of a syn- drome or "type," and thus seriously to re- duce its value as an explanatory concept. The psychopath is characterized only in part by "deficient attachment to or affection for others, a failure to respond to the ordi- nary motivations founded in respect or regard for one's fellows"; he is also charac-

; terized by such things as "excessive aggres- I siveness," "lack of superego control,'' and

"an infantile level of response." Unfortu- . nately, too, the behavior that psychopathy is

used to explain often becomes part of the definition of psychopathy. As a result, in

: Barbara Wootton's words:

t. [The psychopath] is . . . par excellence, and without shame or qualification, the model of the circular process by which mental abnormality is inferred from an-

- ti-social behavior while anti-social be- havior is explained by mental abnormal- ity.

The problems of diagnosis, tautology, and name-calling are avoided if the dimen- sions of psychopathy are treated as causally and therefore problematically interrelated, rather than as logically and therefore neces- sarily bound to each other. In fact, it can be argued that all of the characteristics attrib- uted to the psychopath follow from, are ef- fects of, his lack of attachment to others. To say that to lack attachment to others is to be free from moral restraints is to use lack of attachment to explain the guiltlessness of

. the psychopath, the fact that he apparently has no conscience or superego. In this view, lack of attachment to others is not merely a symptom of psychopathy, it is psychopathy; lack of conscience is just another way of saying the same thing; and the violation of

; . norms is (or may be) a consequence.

Chapter 20 + Social Bond Theory 221 For that matter, given that man is an ani-

mal, "impulsivity" and "aggressiveness" can also be seen as natural consequences of freedom from moral restraints. However, since the view of man as endowed with nat- ural propensities and capacities like other animals is peculiarly unpalatable to sociolo- gists, we need not fall back on such a view to explain the amoral man's aggressiveness. The process of becoming alienated from others often involves or is based on active interpersonal conflict. Such conflict could easily supply a reservoir of socially derived hostility sufficient to account for the ag- gressiveness of those whose attachments to others have been weakened.

Durkheim said it many years ago: "We are moral beings to the extent that we are social beings." This may be interpreted to mean that we are moral beings to the extent that we have "internalized the norms" of so- ciety. But what does it mean to say that a person has internalized the norms of soci- ety? The norms of society are by definition shared by the members of society. To violate a norm is, therefore, to act contrary to. the wishes and expectations of other people. If a person does not care about the wishes and expectations of other people-that is, if he is insensitive to the opinion of others-then he is to that extent not bound by the norms. He is free to deviate.

The essence of internalization of norms, conscience, or super-ego thus lies in the at- tachment of the individual to others. This view has several advantages over the con- cept of internalization. For one, explana- tions of deviant behavior based on attach- ment do not beg the question, since the extent to which a person is attached to oth- ers can be measured independently of his deviant behavior. Furthermore, change or variation in behavior is explainable in a way that it is not when notion of internalization or superego are used. For example, the di- vorced man is more likely after divorce to commit a number of deviant acts, such as suicide or forgery. If we explain these acts by reference to the superego (or internal control), we are forced to say that the man "lost his conscience" when he got a divorce;

222 Part VI + Varieties of Control Theov and, of course, if he remarries, we have to The idea, then, is that the person invests conclude that he gets his conscience back. time, energy, himself, in a certain line of ac-

his dimension of the bond to conven- tivity-say, getting an education, building tional society is encountered in most social up a business, acquiring a reputation for control-oriented research and theory. F. virtue. When or whenever he considers de- Ivan Nye's "internal control'' and "indirect viant behavior, he must consider the costs control" refer to the same element, al- of this deviant behavior, the risk he runs of though we avoid the problem of explaining losing the investment he has made in con- changes over time by locating the "con- ventional labor. science" in the bond to others rather than If attachment to others is the sociological making it part of the personality. Attach- counterpart of the superego or conscience, ment to others is just one aspect of Albert J. commitment is the counterpart of the ego Reiss's "personal controls"; we avoid his or common sense. To the person committed problems of tautological empirical obsewa- to conventional lines of action, risking one tions by making the relationship between to ten years in prison for a ten-dollar holdup attachment and delinquency problematic is stupidity, because to the committed per- rather than definitional. Finally, Scott Briar son the costs and risks obviously exceed ten and Irving Piliavin's "commitment" or dollars in value. (To the psychoanalyst, such "stake in conformity" subsumes attach- an act exhibits failure to be governed by the ment, as their discussion illustrates, al- "reality-principle.") In the sociological con- though the terms they use are more closely trol theory, it can be and is generally as- associated with the next element to be dis- sumed that the decision to commit a crimi-

nal act may well be rationally detennined- that the actor's decision was not irrational

Commitment I given the risks and costs he faces. Of course, , "Of all passions, that which inclineth as Becker points out, if the actor is capable i

men least to break the laws, is fear. Nay, ex- of in some sense calculating the costs of a

cepting some generous natures, it is the line of action, he is also capable of calcula-

only thing, when there is the appearance of tional errors: ignorance and error return, in

profit or pleasure by breaking the laws, that the control theory, as possible explanations makes men keep them." Few would deny of deviant behavior.

that men on occasion obey the rules simply The concept of commitment assumes

from fear of the consequences. This rational that the organization of society is such that

component in conformity we label commit- the interests of most persons would be en-

ment. What does it mean to say that a per- dangered if they were to engage in criminal

son is committed to conformity? In Howard acts. Most people, simply by the process of

S . Becker's formulation it means the follow- living in an organized society, acquire goods, reputations, prospects that they do not want to risk losing. These accumula-

First, the individual is in a position in tions are society's insurance that they will which his decision with regard to some abide by the rules. Many hypotheses about particular line of action has conse- the antecedents of delinquent behavior are quences for other interests and activities based on this premise. For example, Arthur not necessarily [directly] related to it. L. Stinchcombe's hypothesis that "high Second, he has placed himself in that school rebellion . . . occurs when future sta- position by his own prior actions. A third element is present though so obvi- tus is not clearly related to present perfor- ous as not to be apparent: the committed mance" suggests that one is committed to person must be aware [of other inter- conformity not only by what one has but ests] and must recognize that his deci- also by what one hopes to obtain. Thus "am- sion in this case will have ramifications bition" and/or "aspiration" play an impor-

tant role in producing conformity. The per-

:sts ac- ing for de- )Sts j of on-

ical Ice, ego :ted one UP 3er- ten uch the :on- as-

imi- :d- ma1 rse, able . of a ula- I, in ions

mes that : en- linal ;s of uire Y do ~ula- will bout : are thur high : sta- rfor- !d to , but 'am- lpor- per-

son becomes committed to a conventional line of action, and he is therefore commit-

C'

ted to conformity. Most lines of action in a society are of

course conventional. The clearest examples are educational and occupational careers. Actions thought to jeopardize one's chances in these areas are presumably avoided. In- terestingly enough, even nonconventional commitments may operate to produce con-

" ventional conformity. We are told, at least, that boys aspiring to careers in the rackets or professional thievery are judged by their "honesty" and "reliabilityn-traits tradition- ally in demand among seekers of office boys.

Involvement Many persons undoubtedly owe a life of

virtue to a lack of opportunity to do other- wise. Time and energy are inherently lim- ited: "Not that I-would not, if I could, be both handsome and fat and well dressed, and a great athlete, and make a million a

. year, be a wit, a bon vivant, and a lady killer, . - - as well as a philosopher, a philanthropist, a

statesman, warrior, and African explorer, as well as a 'tone-poet' and saint. But the thing is simply impossible." The things that Wil-

- liam James here says he would like to be or do are all, I suppose, within the realm of conventionality, but if he were to include il- licit actions he would still have to eliminate some of them as simply impossible.

Involvement or engrossment in conven- tional activities is thus often part of a con- trol theory. The assumption, widely shared, is that a person may be simply too busy doing conventional things to find time to engage in deviant behavior. The person in- volved in conventional activities is tied to appointments, deadlines, working hours, plans, and the like, so +e opportunity to commit deviant acts rarely arises. To the ex- tent that he is engrossed in conventional ac- tivities, he cannot even think about deviant acts, let alone act out his inclinations. - This line of reasoning is responsible for

. the stress placed on recreational facilities in many programs to reduce delinquency, for

[ much of the concern with the high school

Chapter 20 + Social Bond Theory 223 dropout, and for the idea that boys should be drafted into -ihe Army to keep them out of trouble. So obvious and persuasive is the idea that involvement in conventional activ- ities is a major deterrent to delinquency that it was accepted even by Sutherland:

In the general area of juvenile delin- quency it is probable that the most sig- nificant difference between juveniles who engage in delinquency and those who do not is that the latter are provided abundant opportunities of a conven- tional type for satisfying their recre- ational interests, while the former lack those opportunities or facilities.

The view that "idle hands are the devil's workshop" has received more sophisticated treatment in recent sociological writings on delinquency. David Matza and Gresham M. Sykes, for example, suggest that delin- quents have the values of a leisure class, the same values ascribed by Veblen to the lei- sure class: a search for kicks, disdain of work, a desire for the big score, and accep- tance of aggressive toughness as proof of masculinity. Matza and Sykes explain delin- quency by reference to this system of val- ues, but they note that adolescents at all class levels are "to some extent" members of a leisure class, that they "move in a limbo between earlier parental domination and future integration with the social structure through the bonds of work and marriage." In the end, then, the leisure of the adoles- cent produces a set of values, which, in turn, leads to delinquency.

Belief Unlike the cultural deviance theory, the

control theory assumes the existence of a common value system within the society or group whose norms are being violated. If the deviant is committed to a value system different from that of conventional society, there is, within the context of the theory, nothing to explain. The question is, "Why does a man violate the rules in which he be- lieves?" It is not, "Why do men differ in their beliefs about what constitutes good and de- sirable conduct?" The person is assumed to

224 Part VI + Varieties of Control Theo y have been socialized (perhaps imperfectly) into the group whose rules he is violating; deviance is not a question of one group imposing its rules on the members of an- other group. In other words, we not only as- sume the deviant has believed the rules, we assume he believes the rules even as he vio- lates them.

How can a person believe it is wrong to steal at the same time he is stealing? In the strain theory, this is not a difficult problem. (In fact, as suggested in the previous chap- ter, the strain theory was devised specifi- cally to deal with this question.) The moti- vation to deviance adduced by the strain theorist is so strong that we can well under- stand the deviant act even assuming the de- viator believes strongly that it is wrong. However, given the control theory's assump- tions about motivation, if both the deviant and the nondeviant believe the deviant act is wrong, how do we account for the fact that one commits it and the other does not?

Control theories have taken two ap- proaches to this problem. In one approach, beliefs are treated as mere words that mean little or nothing if the other forms of control are missing. "Semantic dementia," the dis- sociation between rational faculties and emotional control which is said to be char- acteristic of the psychopath, illustrates this way of handling the problem. In short, be- liefs, at least insofar as they are expressed in words, drop out of the picture; since they do not differentiate between deviants and non- deviants, they are in the same class as "lan- guage" or any other characteristic common to all members of the group. Since they rep- resent no real obstacle to the commission of delinquent acts, nothing need be said about how they are handled by those committing such acts. The control theories that do not mention beliefs (or valqes), and many do not, may be assumed to take this approach to the problem.

The second approach argues that the de- viant rationalizes his behavior so that he can at once violate the rule and maintain his belief in it. Donald R. Cressey has advanced this argument with respect to embezzle- ment, and Sykes and Matza have advanced it with respect to delinquency. In both Cres-

1 1 sey's and Sykes and Matza's treatments,

these rationalizations (Cressey calls them i "verbalizations," Sykes and Matza term them "techniques of neutralization") occur prior to the commission of the deviant act. ~f the neutralization is successful, the per- son is free to commit the act(s) in question. Both in Cressey and in Sykes and Matza, the strain that prompts the effort at neutraliza- tion also provides the motive force that re- sults in the subsequent deviant act. Their theories are thus, in this sense, strain theo- ries. Neutralization is difficult to handle within the context of a theory that adheres closely to control theory assumptions, be- cause in the control theory there is no spe- cial motivational force to account for the neutralization. This difficulty is especially noticeable in Matza's later treatment of this topic, where the motivational component, the "will to delinquency" appears after the moral vacuum has been created by the tech- niques of the neutralization. The question thus becomes: Why neutralize?

In attempting to solve a strain theory problem with control theory tools, the con- trol theorist is thus led into a trap. He can- not answer the crucial question. The concept of neutralization assumes the exis- tence of moral obstacles to the commission of deviant acts. In order plausibly to ac- count for a deviant act, it is necessary to generate motivation to deviance that is at least equivalent in force to the resistance provided by these moral obstacles. How- ever, if the moral obstacles are removed, neutralization and special motivation are no longer required. We therefore follow the implicit logic of control theory and remove these moral obstacles by hypothesis. Many persons do not have an attitude of respect toward the rules of society; many persons feel no moral obligation to conform regard- less of personal advantage. Insofar as the values and beliefs of these persons are con- sistent with their feelings, and there should be a tendency toward consistency, neutral- ization is unnecessary; it has already oc- curred.

Does this merely push the question back a step and at the same time produce conflict with the assumption of a common value

:s, rn m UT 3. fr- ln. he :a- :e- :ir :o- ile XS

3e- ?e- :he J ~ Y his .nt, the ch- ion

D r y on- an- rhe xis- ion ac- to ; at nce OW-

led, are the love .any pect ions ard- the

:on- ~u ld tral- ' OC-

system? I think not. In the first place, we do not assume, as does Cressey, that neutral- ization occurs in order to make a specific - criminal act possible. We do not assume, as do Sykes and Matza, that neutralization oc- curs to make many delinquent acts possi- ble. We do not assume, in other words, that the person constructs a system of rational- izations in order to justify commission of acts he wants to commit. We assume, in contrast, that the beliefs that free a man to

deviant acts are unmotivated in the sense that he does not construct or adopt them in order to facilitate the attainment of illicit ends. In the second place, we do not assume, as does Matza, that "delinquents concur in the conventional assessment of delinquency." We assume, in contrast, that there is variation in the extent to which peo- ple believe they should obey the rules of so- ciety, and, furthermore, that the less a per- son believes he should obey the rules, the more likely he is to violate them.

In chronological order, then, a person's beliefs in the moral validity of norms are,

- - for no teleological reason, weakened. The probability that he will commit delinquent acts is therefore increased. When and if he commits a delinquent act, we may justifi- ably use the weakness of his beliefs in ex- plaining it, but no special motivation is re- quired to explain either the weakness of his beliefs or, perhaps, his delinquent act.

5 The keystone of this argument is of course the assumption that there is varia- tion in belief in the moral validity of social

- rules. This assumption is amenable to di- rect empirical test and can thus survive at least until its first confrontation with data. For the present, we must return to the idea of a common value system with which this Section was begun.

- The idea of a common (or, perhaps better, a single) value system is consistent with the fact, or presumption, of variation in the

i strength of moral beliefs. We have not sug- 1 gested that delinquency is based on beliefs E counter to conventional morality; we have

not suggested that delinquents do not be- '(. -%e delinquent acts are wrong. They may

well believe these acts are wrong, but the meaning and efficacy of such beliefs are

Chapter 20 + Social Bond Theory 225 contingent upon other beliefs and, indeed, on the strength of other ties to the conven- tional order.

Where Is the Motivation? The most disconcerting question the con-

trol theorist faces goes something like this: "Yes, but why do they do it?" In the good old days, the control theorist could simply strip away the "veneer of civilization" and expose man's "animal impulses" for all to see. These impulses appeared to him (and ap- parently to his audience) to provide a plau- sible account of the motivation to crime and delinquency. His argument was not that de- linquents and criminals alone are animals, but that we are all animals, and thus all nat- urally capable of committing criminal acts. It took no great study to reveal that chil- dren, chickens, and dogs occasionally as- sault and steal from their fellow creatures; that children, chickens, and dogs also be- have for relatively long periods in a per- fectly moral manner. Of course the acts of chickens and dogs are not "assault'' or "theft," and such behavior is not "moral"; it is simply the behavior of a chicken or a dog. The chicken stealing corn from his neigh- bor knows nothing of the moral law; he does not want to violate rules; he wants merely to eat corn. The dog maliciously de- stroying a pillow or feloniously assaulting another dog is the moral equal of the chicken. No motivation to deviance is re- quired to explain his acts. So, too, no special motivation to crime within the human ani- mal was required to explain his criminal acts.

Times changed. It was no longer fashion- able (within sociology, at least) to refer to animal impulses. The control theorist tended more and more to deemphasize the motivational component of his theory. He might refer in the beginning to "universal human needs," or some such, but the driv- ing force behind crime and delinquency was rarely alluded to. At the same time, his explanations of crime and delinquency left the reader uneasy. What, the reader asked, is the control theorist assuming? Albert K.

226 Part VI + Varieties of Control Theory Cohen and James F. Short answer the ques- tion this way:

. . . it is important to point out one important limitation of both types of theory. They [culture conflict and social disorganization theories] are both con- trol theories in the sense that they ex- plain delinquency in terms of the ab- sence of effective controls. They appear, therefore, to imply a model of motiva- tion that assumes that the impulse to de- linquency is an inherent characteristic of young people and does not itself need to be explained; it is something that erupts when the lid-i.e., internalized cultural restraints or external author- ity-is off.

There are several possible and I think reasonable reactions to this criticism. One reaction is simply to acknowledge the as- sumption, to grant that ,one is assuming what control theorists have always assumed about the motivation to crime-that it is constant across persons (at least within the system in question):

There is no reason to assume that only those who finally commit a deviant act usually have the impulse to do so. It is much more likely that most people expe- rience deviant impulses frequently. At least in fantasy, people are much more deviant than they appear.

There is certainly nothing wrong with mak- ing such an assumption. We are free to as- sume anything we wish to assume; the truth of our theory is presumably subject to em- pirical test.

A second reaction, involving perhaps something of a quibble, is to defend the logic of control theory and to deny the al- leged assumption. We can say the fact that control theory suggests the absence of something causes delinquency is not a proper criticism, since negative relations have as much claim to scientific acceptabil- ity as do positive relations. We can also say that the present theory does not impute an inherent impulse to delinquency to anyone. That, on the contrary, it denies the necessity of such an imputation:

The desires, and other passions of man, are in themselves no sin. No more are the actions, that proceed from those pas- sions, till they know a law that forbids them.

A third reaction is to accept the criticism as valid, to grant that a complete explana- tion of delinquency wodd provide the nec- essary impetus, and proceed to construct an explanation of motivation consistent with control theory. Briar and Piliavin provide situational motivation:

We assume these acts are prompted by short-term situationally induced desires experienced by all boys to obtain valued goods, to portray courage in the pres- ence of, or be loyal to peers, to strike out at someone who is disliked, or simply to "get kicks."

. . . There are several additional accounts of "why they do it" that are to my mind per- suasive and at the same time generally com- patible with control theory. But while all of these accounts may be compatible with control theory, they are by no means deduc- ible from it. Furthermore, they rarely im- pute built-in, unusual motivation to the de- linquent: he is attempting to satisfy the same desires, he is reacting to the same pressures as other boys (as is clear, for ex- ample, in the previous quotation from Briar and Piliavin). In other words, if included, these accounts of motivation would serve the same function in the theory that "ani- mal impulses" traditionally served: they might add to its persuasiveness and plausi- bility, but they would add little else, since they do not differentiate delinquents from nondelinquents.

In the end, then, control theory remains what it has always been: a theory in which deviation is not problematic. The question "Why do they do it?" is simply not the ques- tion the theory is designed to answer. The question is, "Why don't we do it?" There is much evidence that we would if we dared.

Reprinted by permission of Transaction Publishers. Travis Hirschi, "Social Bond Theory" from Causes of Delinquency. Copyright O 1969 by Transaction Pub- lishers.

Chapter 20 + Social Bond Theory 227

Discussion Questions Why does Hirschi say that the key ques- tion for criminologists to answer is "Why don't they do it?" as opposed to 'Why do they do it?" How does control theory differ from strain theory and cultural deviance (i.e., differential association) theory?

What are the four elements of the social bond? How does each one help to con- trol a youth from engaging in delin- quency? What factors in American society might cause social bonds to be weaker in inner-city neighborhoods? +

Lec- .ylva-

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ti.

Primary and Secondary Deviance

Edwin M. Lemert

Although LemertS (1 951) Social Pathology was over 450 pages long, it was his short dis- cussion of primary and secondary deviance that, ironically, proved to be the lasting con- tribution of this volume. Not surprisingly, then, Lemert eventually addressed these con- cepts in considerably more detail in a later work, Human Deviance, Social Problems, and Social Control (1972). I n the process, k m e r t both advanced and criticized labeling theory.

Lemert realized that in cruder versions of labeling theory, people were portrayed as in- nocent victims who, unfairly labeled by oth- ers, are driven in a very deterministic way into a life in crime. For Lemert, however, be- coming firmly rooted in crime or deviance was not a random occurrence in which the labeled person played no role. Instead, Lemert envisioned an interactionist process in which individuals deviated, were sanctioned by oth- ers, made choices that further embedded them in deviance, experienced more reactions fiom others, and eventually came to accept and act consistently with their public desig- nation as a "deviant."

In Lemert's (1972: 62) framework, pri- mary deviance "is polygenic, arising out of a variety o f social, cultural, psychological, and physiological factors." This kind of wayward- ness "has only marginal implications for the status and psychic structure of the person concerned" (p. 62). Deviations have more profound impacts o n people S lives, however,

when they inspire societal reactions. As peo- ple are stigmatized, punished, segregated, and controlled, the "general effect is to differenti- ate the symbolic and interactional environ- ment to which the person responds, so that early or adult socialization is categorically changed" (p. 63). They now come to be de- fined differently, which in turn affects their identity or conceptions of themselves and narrows their ability to choose conventional over wayward paths. Their "life and identity are organized around the facts of deviance," a reality that makes continued deviation likely (p. 63). Lemert calls their deviance "second- ary," because this conduct is not generated by the original causes of primary deviance but rather falls into a "special class of socially de- fined responses which people make to prob- lems created by the societal reaction to their deviance" (p. 63).

The distinction between primary and sec- ondary deviance is conceptually appealing, but Lemertk assertion that they have different causes is problematic. Similar to other label- ing theory arguments, a key issue is whether societal reaction is in fact required to create offenders who are deeply embedded-both psychological1y and behaviorally-in a crimi- nal lifestyle. Current criminologi~al theory and research would suggest that stable in- volvement in crime is rooted more fully in in- dividual differences and in family, school, and community life (see, e.g., Gottfredson and Hirschi, 1990 [Chapter 211; Mofitt, 1993 [Chapter 441; Sampson and h u b , 1993 [Chapter 221). Still, societal reaction is not inconsequential. While it may not be the main source of persistent criminality, soci- etal reaction can reinforce a criminal lifestyle and make desistance from crime more diffi- cult.

References

Gottfredson, Michael R. and Travis Hirschi. 1990. A General Theory o f Crime. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.

Lemert, Edwin M. 195 1. Social Pathology: A Sys- tematic Approach to the Theory of Sociopathic Behavior. New York: McGraw-Hill.

274 Part VII + Labeling, Intermtion, and Crime - 1972. Human Deviance, Social Problems,

and Social Control, 2nd edition. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall.

Sampson, Robert J. and John H. Laub. 1993. Crime in the Making: Pathways and Turning Points Through Life. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

Types of Deviation

T h e r e has been an embarrassingly large number of theories, often without any rela- tionship to a general theory, advanced to ac- count for various specific pathologies in hu- man behavior. For certain types of pathology, such as alcoholism, crime, or stuttering, there are almost as many theo- ries as there are writers on these subjects. This has been occasioned in no small way by the preoccupation with the origins of pathological behavior and by the fallacy of confusing original causes with effective causes. All such theories have elements of truth, and the divergent viewpoints they contain can be reconciled with the general theory here if it is granted that original causes or antecedents of deviant behaviors are many and diversified. This holds espe- cially for the psychological process leading to similar pathological behavior, but it also holds for the situational concomitants of the intitial aberrant conduct. A person may come to use excessive alcohol not only for a wide variety of subjective reasons but also because of diversified situational influ- ences, such as the death of a loved one, busi- ness failure, or participating in some sort of organized group activity calling for heavy drinking of liquor. Whatever the original reasons for violating the norms of the com- munity, they are important only for certain research purposes, such as,assessing the ex- tent of the "social problem'' at a given time or determining the requirements for a ratio- nal program of social control. From a nar- rower sociological viewpoint the deviations are not significant until they are organized subjectively and transformed into active roles and become the social criteria for as- signing status. The deviant individuals must

react symbolically to their own behavior ab- errations and fix them in their sociopsycho- logical patterns. The deviations remain pri- mary deviations or symptomatic and situa- tional as long as they are rationalized or otherwise dealt with as functions of a so- cially acceptable role. Under such condi- tions normal and pathological behaviors re- main strange and somewhat tensional bedfellows in the same person. Undeniably a vast amount of such segmental and par- tially integrated pathological behavior ex- ists in our society and has impressed many writers in the field of social pathology.

Just how far and for how long a person may go in dissociating his sociopathic ten- dencies so that they are merely troublesome adjuncts of normally conceived roles is not known. Perhaps it depends upon the num- ber of alternative definitions of the same overt behavior that he can develop; perhaps certain physiological factors (limits) are also involved. However, if the deviant acts are repetitive and have a high visibility, and if there is a severe societal reaction, which, through a process of identification is incor- porated as part of the "me" of the individ- ual, the probability is greatly increased that the integration of existing roles will be dis- rupted and that reorganization based upon a new role or roles will occur. (The "me" in this context is simply the subjective aspect of the societal reaction.) Reorganization may be the adoption of another normal role in which the tendencies previously defined as "pathological" are given a more accept- able social expression. The other general possibility is the assumption of a deviant role, if such exists; or, more rarely, the per- son may organize an aberrant sect or group in which he creates a special role of his own. When a person begins to employ his deviant behavior or a role based upon it as a means o f defense, attack, or adjustment to the overt and covert problems created by the conse- quent societal reaction to him, his deviation is secondary. Objective evidences of this change will be found in the symbolic appur- tenances of the new role, in clothes, speech, posture, and mannerisms, which in some cases heighten social visibility, and which in

Chapter 24 4 Primavy and Secondary Deviance 275

)n n- le ot n- ne PS .re :ts nd :h, )r- id- lat is- on in 2ct on ole led Pt - r a1 ant ler- 'UP Nn.

ant s of lert zse- ion :his )ur- :ch, )me h in

some cases serve a-s symbolic cues to profes- sionalization.

llir.

Role Conceptions of the Individual Must Be Reinforced by

Reactions of Others It is seldom that one deviant act will pro-

voke a sufficiently strong societal reaction to bring about secondary deviation, unless

f in the process of introjection the individual imputes or projects meanings into the so- cial situation which are not present. In this case anticipatory fears are involved. For ex- ample, in a culture where a child is taught sharp distinctions between "good" women and "bad" women, a single act of question- able morality might conceivably have a pro- found meaning for the girl so indulging. However, in the absence of reactions by the person's family, neighbors, or the larger community, reinforcing the tentative "bad- girl" self-definition, it is questionable whether a transition to secondary deviation would take place. It is also doubtful whether a tem- porary exposure to a severe punitive reac- tion by the community will lead a person to identify himself with a pathological role, unless, as we have said, the experience is highly traumatic. Most frequently there is a progressive reciprocal relationship between the deviation of the individual and the soci- etal reaction, with a compounding of the so- cietal reaction out of the minute accretions in the deviant behavior, until a point is reached where ingrouping and outgrouping between society and the deviant is manifest. At this point a stigmatizing of the deviant occurs in the form of name calling, labeling, or stereotyping.

The sequence of interaction leading to secondary deviation is roughly as follows: (1) primary deviation; (2') social penalties; (3) further primary deviation; (4) stronger penalties and rejections; (5) further devia- tion, perhaps with hostilities and resent- ment beginning to focus upon those doing the penalizing; (6) crisis reached in the tol- erance quotient, expressed in formal action by the community stigmatizing of the devi-

ant; (7) strengthening of the deviant con- duct as a reaction to the stigmatizing and penalties; (8) ultimate acceptance of devi- ant social status and efforts at adjustment on the basis of the associated role.

As an illustration of this sequence the be- havior of an errant schoolboy can be cited. For one reason or another, let us say exces- sive energy, the schoolboy engages in a classroom prank. He is penalized for it by the teacher. Later, due to clumsiness, he cre- ates another disturbance and again he is reprimanded. Then, as sometimes happens, the boy is blamed for something he did not do. When the teacher uses the tag "bad boy" or "mischief maker" or other invidious terms, hostility and resentment are excited in the boy, and he may feel that he is blocked in playing the role expected of him. Thereafter, there may be a strong tempta- tion to assume his role in the class as de- fined by the teacher, particularly when he discovers that there are rewards as well as penalties deriving from such a role. There is, of course, no implication here that such boys go on to become delinquents or crimi- nals, for the mischief-maker role may later become integrated with or retrospectively rationalized as part of a role more accept- able to school authorities. If such a boy con- tinues this unacceptable role and becomes delinquent, the process must be accounted for in the light of the general theory of this volume. There must be a spreading corrob- oration of a sociopathic self-conception and societal reinforcement at each step in the process.

The most significant personality changes are manifest when societal definitions and their subjective counterpart become gener- alized. When this happens, the range of major role choices becomes narrowed to one general class. This was very obvious in the case of a young girl who was the daugh- ter of a paroled convict and who was attend- ing a small Middle Western college. She continually argued with herself and with the author, in whom she had confided, that in reality she belonged on the "other side of the railroad tracks" and that her life could be enormously simplified by acquiescing in

I !',I l { t , l 276 Part VII + Labeling, Interaction, and Crime

1 1 1 , this verdict and living accordingly. While in Discussion Questions her case there was a tendency to dramatize her conflicts, nevertheless there was enough societal reinforcement of her self- 1. What is the difference between primary

ent she received in and secondary deviance? er father and On 2. What is meant by the concept of a "soci- o lend it a painful eta1 reaction"? How do the reactions of

! I , ~ L L L LLVGU W ~ L I I LLGI LaLucl, WILV w a a VLLGLL ILL a I ? drunken condition, they abruptly stopped in Lemert's words, to "secondary devi- 11 ;I seeing her again or else became sexually ance"? I - , I ! , presumptive. . . . , , 3. What are the policy implications of ! Lemert's theory? For example, what

Reprinted from Edwin M. Lemert, "Primary and Sec- ondary Deviance" in Social Pathology. Copyright O would be the best way to respond to 1952 by The McGraw-Hill Com~anies. Re~rinted bv youths who are caught committing de- , permisiion of The McGraw-Hill 'Cornpanie;.

-

linauent acts? +