SOCY

Module 5: Social Change

Topics

I. Population and Urbanization II. Collective Behavior and Social Movements III. Social Change

Achieving control over change, in respect to lifestyle, demands an engagement with the outer social world rather than a retreat from it.

—Anthony Giddens

Recall for a moment our focus in the past four modules. Modules 1 and 2 helped us to understand the self within a social context. Modules 3 and 4 shifted the focus from the individual to the social structure and the institutions that order behavior, accomplish goals, and play a significant part in shaping the behavior of individuals. This module takes us one step further by focusing first on the challenges and consequences that arise from population change and urban growth. Next, we turn to the understanding of collective behavior (e.g., crowds) and the evolution of social movements that seek change at the institutional level. Last, we try to characterize the processes of social change and consider the contribution that the discipline of sociology makes to understanding social change.

I. Population and Urbanization

Demography and the Factors that Shape Population

Demography refers to the analysis of the size, density, and composition of human populations, including their movement from place to place. Demography is closely related to sociology and largely focuses on the effects of population growth and its control.

The population of the world has grown slowly and steadily throughout human history. In fact, for centuries the world's population grew fairly steadily to reach about 1 billion by 1800 (PBS, http://www.pbs.org/sixbillion/studyguide/st-didyou.html). One hundred twenty-three years later, the world's population reached 2 billion (ibid.). It only took 33 years to add one more billion in 1960, and 13 years more (1974) to reach the 4 billion mark (ibid.). In the year 2000, the world had about 6.1 billion people (ibid.).

How and on what basis do demographers make their predictions? Demographers tend to focus on three basic concepts: fertility, mortality, and migration

Fertility is one of the main factors responsible for the number of people found in any population. Demographers study both the crude birth rate and the fertility rate to understand the reasons for a population's size and to predict future population projections. For example, the number of children in an average American family declined from 7.2 in 1800 to 3.5 a century later, and today it is about 2.1 children (CDC, MMWR, 1999, http://www.cdc.gov/epo/mmwr/preview/mmwrhtml/mm4838a2.htm). One reason for this decline is the move away from an agriculture-based economy (where children are assets) to a service-based economy where children are economic liabilities. One can compare fertility rates in less-developed countries such as Uganda (6.72), Zimbabwe (3.66) or Guatamala (4.660) to those of more developed countries such as Sweden (1.55) or Japan (1.37) (U.S. Census Bureau IDB Database, 2002, http://www.census.gov/ipc/www/idbprint.html) to better understand that the significance of children differs as one moves form from traditional agricultural societies to modern societies. In the former, children are prized for their domestic labor and as a means for old-age security. In the latter, children's labor is not needed in the household or to take care of elderly parents and, in fact, in modern societies, children represent an economic burden to the family.

Mortality is also one of the factors shaping population. The crude death rate in developing countries is fairly high compared to that in developed countries. The crude death rate in the United States in the year 2000 is much lower than it was in the eighteenth or nineteenth centuries. Mortality data are used to predict life expectancy or the average age that people are expected to live in a society. The number of years a newborn could expect to live in Medieval times was low (somewhere around 26 years of age) whereas today it is over 74 years of age (Geier Moulson, Associated Press http://www.s-t.com/daily/06-00/06-05-00/a14wn085.htm). This difference in life expectancy is partly due to the fact that it was common for babies to die before the age of one; that is, the infant mortality rate was high. In Europe and the United States, there has been a dramatic drop in the infant mortality rate in the past fifty years (CDC, 2002, http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/hus/tables/2002/02hus023.pdf).

Understanding the death pattern in populations helps us to account for why populations grow or remain the same. Of course, if mortality rates increase due to disease or disaster, they can also help to account for why populations decline. Two more factors affect population: the pull and push factors of migration. 

Migration is the third key to understanding population as a demographic variable. Sometimes, migration is voluntary, because it is fueled by the expectation of better jobs or opportunities. The advantageous conditions that draw migrants into to a new territory are called pull factors. At other times, migration is involuntary, because it is born of political unrest, war, natural disaster, or unemployment. Such factors are often called push factors, because the hardships experienced in a homeland can push people to seek new jobs elsewhere. Finally, there are times when migration is forced, as was the case, for example, when millions of native Africans were transported to the Western Hemisphere and made into slaves. 

For citizens of the member states of the newly formed European Union, migration has become an intense concern. With open borders within the European Union, there is growing national concern about the in-migration of groups with different cultures, languages, religions, and skin color, and the resulting effects on the host country on job availability, the costs associated with social welfare and health care systems, and political and cultural change. In addition, another issue of concern is the trend toward younger generations leaving home to live in other EU countries. This drain may affect centuries-old traditional ways of life and other aspects of the home culture (http://europa.eu.int/comm/publications/booklets/eu_documentation/05/txt_en_5.pdf). 

Fertility, mortality, and migration all have a profound impact on a society's population and on the projected growth of countries throughout the world. In general, the rate of population growth is declining in such regions as North America, Europe, and Asia, while the population of Africa is growing rapidly (WRI, 2001, http://www.wri.org/wri/powerpoints/trends/sld003.htm). In the United States, the population has been increasing very slowly for a long time due to a low death rate, a declining birth rate, and the influx of new immigrants. The declining birth rate is largely a consequence of improved economic circumstances, changes in life style, better birth control techniques, and changes in values (such as the growing expectation of equality of men and women). 

Societies can and do influence their population sizes in a variety of ways. In countries where population growth is high, such as China, Japan, or India, fertility reduction can be achieved by incentives or forced family planning measures. Improvement of economic conditions and educational opportunities for women will also greatly influence the fertility decisions of couples. Improvement of agricultural practices, sometimes called the green revolution, could improve the capacity for poor populations to feed themselves and gain wealth. Last, some societies, such as Italy, Germany, or Sweden, are so worried about their low birth rates that they have adopted pronatalist policies that encourage procreation to increase their population. Such policies might include paid parental leave, sick-days for working parents, and secure jobs despite up to 3 years absence from the workplace when connected with the birth of a child. In addition, these countries are often forced to revise immigration policies to encourage the influx of skilled workers to temporarily meet workplace needs. 

Think about this…

A population pyramid shows the age structure of a country, that is, it is a representation of how many people there are by age group and sex. At the low end of the pyramid are the children; at the upper end are the oldest adults. A lot of children in a population pyramid usually indicate rapid population growth. Few children in a population pyramid usually indicates low population growth and increasing percentages of older adults, but can also reflect the effects of war or disease on younger people. Take a moment to view a few population pyramids at the US Census Bureau’s International database then compare the United States, Japan, and Germany with developing countries such as Afghanistan, Guatemala, or Nigeria. What factors can be at work to produce such different pyramids? 

Historical Views of Population Growth and the Theories that Explain It

Several major theories have been advanced to explain population growth. Four such theories will be discussed here: Malthusian, New Malthusian, Anti-Malthusian, and Marxist theories.

Thomas Malthus (1766–1834), an English economist, predicted that population growth would soon outpace the food supply and that population could be controlled only by natural means (e.g., disease, famine, or war) or by preventive checks such as birth control or abstinence. Malthus's discussion (Essays on the Principles of Population, 1798) is now a classic within the demographic literature. His ideas, which are generally referred to as the Malthus Theorem, are still debated.

A group that is still supportive of Malthus's Theorem are the so-called New Malthusians, who say that the threat of overpopulation will someday result in massive starvation. Exponential growth, or rapidly accelerating world growth, is the reason for this worsening situation. Malthus noted that population growth can be slowed by what he termed preventive checks, such as family planning or delayed marriage, or positive checks, such as war, disease, or famine. In general, however, Malthus thought that, in the end, these checks would be unable to stem population growth and, in general, the New Malthusians agree.

Demographers such as Paul and Ann Ehrlich (1972, 1978) have predicted worldwide catastrophe if we fail to act to halt the current population explosion. The United Nations Population Division estimates that world population in 2050 will reach about 8.9 billion (http://esa.un.org/unpp/), which the Ehrlichs say is far too many considering the environmental impact of such numbers on global warming.  

We often see television pictures of starving children that make us think that there is simply not enough food to feed people. In fact, most experts agree that the world food supply is adequate but poorly distributed. At the same time that people in some countries have inadequate food supplies, in other countries, people seem to have too much food. In these countries, such as the United States and Great Britain, obesity is a major health problem even though thinness is the aesthetic ideal. Not surprisingly, in countries where obesity is a problem, being overweight is often associated with power and wealth, while the rest of the population struggles to get enough calories to survive (Worldwatch Institute, 2000, http://www.worldwatch.org/press/news/2000/03/04/). 

A second group that responds to Malthus's original theorem is the Anti-Malthusians, who are more optimistic about the future than are the New Malthusians. According to economist Julian Simon (1992, 1993), Malthusian projections about unchecked population growth fail to take into account the need for and meaning of children and the subsequent family planning choices that people might make. This means that when social, economic, or political conditions make children more costly—or alternatively, reduce the need for children as domestic labor in the household, people will have fewer children.

Anti-Malthusians look at the historical example of what's called the demographic transition, an idea based on the patterns of growth experienced in America and Europe during the Industrial Revolution. This idea says that exponential growth will not continue. Here is the logic behind this idea. Both Europe and America had high birth and death rates prior to the Industrial Revolution. Birth rates were high, but many children died before reaching adulthood and life expectancy was low by today's standards. Thus, because about as many people were born as died, and because migration was fairly stable, the rate of growth remained relatively unchanged. As a result of advancements in agriculture, there was accumulation of wealth as well as improvements in health and living standards in the mid-1800s; hence death rates declined rapidly. People continued, however, to have big families for some time thereafter. The perceived need for big families was supported by ideological, religious, and practical beliefs about the value of children and the role of women in the home. As wage labor replaced agriculture, as people moved to the cities and educational opportunities spread, and as birth control methods and health status improved, the number of children dying decreased. In addition, the need for big families declined. Eventually, birth and death rates tended to balance each other out again, so population remained relatively stable. Today, the United States, Canada, and most of Europe are experiencing relatively stable growth rates. 

In some countries, such as Japan and Italy, death rates are constant but birth rates are so low that their populations are slowly declining. Further, in countries like Germany where birth rates are low but stable, it is projected that there won't be enough children born to fill the number of jobs projected in the coming years. In such countries, pronatalist policies have been introduced by governments that provide incentives for couples to have children. Such incentives might include free childcare, paid parent leave and job security, and quarterly cash subsidies for each child. In the long run, governments hope that such policies will increase the number of citizens necessary to meet the conditions of a growing economy. 

Think about this…

Read this International Union for the Scientific Study of Population report: International Perspectives on Low Fertility: Trends, Theories and Policies and learn the reasons for fertility trends and the possible consequences of such trends at http://www.iussp.org/Activities/wgp-low/low-report01.php

In contrast to the above theories about population change, Marxist Theory provides an altogether different argument. According to Marxist theory, there would be adequate resources for an expanding population if resources were more equitably distributed rather than located primarily in the upper (or "ruling") class. One can see this theoretical perspective used today in national politics. For example, church leaders in Roman Catholic countries such as the Philippines have claimed that it is poverty and the unequal distribution of wealth in the country that causes individuals with large families to be poor. If there were a more even distribution of wealth, large families would have enough resources to flourish (Sison, 2003, http://www.pcij.org/stories/2003/population2.html). 

In sum then, population size is not simply a matter of births, deaths, and migration. Social factors such as as wars, disease, the meaning and value of children, the availability of birth control, religious and cultural factors, and governmental policies can all have an effect on the size and growth of a country's population. This makes predicting future growth somewhat risky. 

How Urban Society Developed and Its Impact on People

As Kingsley Davis pointed out nearly a half century ago (Davis, 1955, 429), cities as we know them, i.e., as areas where a "sizeable proportion of the people live," are quite recent in origin and stem largely from the period of the Industrial Revolution.

Prior to the Industrial Revolution, however, those cities that did exist were largely surrounded and supported by communities and towns with populations of fewer than 500 people. Spurred by the Industrial Revolution, however, in which scientific and technological advances were applied to the production and distribution of clothing, food, and other goods, first England and then the United States underwent an urban transformation. This revolution created new forms of work, new classes, and new institutions—and it supported the development of machines such as the steam engine and other transport which made established cities as centers of trade and commerce. Workers moved to live near the places they worked and, as a result, industrial cities appeared. 

Modern industrial cities tend to be large, expansive settlements with no clear physical borders. These cities tend to be focused around an economic or business center and physically organized around transportation routes. As the city spreads out, urbanization occurs, or the gradual concentration of population in a specific area. According to the U.S. Census Bureau, an urbanized area is a city plus the densely populated area surrounding it with a combined population of 50,000 or more; whereas a metropolitan area has a core city that is socially and economically integrated with adjacent communities (U.S. Census Bureau, 2003, http://www.census.gov/population/www/estimates/metroarea.html). Large metropolitan areas, and cities such as New York, London, or Rome, are often described as metropolises, precisely because of their sprawl. The growth of suburbs around a center city is a historically recent phenomenon that greatly affects the economic and political forces within cities. For example, Atlanta, Georgia, officially has a city population of 420,000, but an estimated 3,600,000 people are living in the areas around the city, requiring enormous transportation networks that are causing huge environmental problems (Fodors.com, 2003, http://www.fodors.com/miniguides/mgresults.cfm?destination=atlanta@15). The term megalopolis is often used to describe two or more overlapping metropolises connected physically, economically, and even politically. Among the world's biggest megolopolises are Tokyo-Yokohama, Mexico City, and Sao Paulo (Brazil), each with over 20 million inhabitants.

Think about this…

American cities have tended to sprawl outward, leaving huge metropolitan areas around them. European cities, in contrast, have remained rather compact. What historical factors have driven these two trends in city growth and what do each of these trends have to do with the life quality and social problems in cities? What lessons can be drawn from the European experience? See the Brookings Institution article entitled Fit for Fat City: A "Lite" Menu of European Policies to Improve Our Urban Form by Pietro S. Nivola (January 1999) at http://www.brookings.edu/papers/1999/01metropolitanpolicy_nivola.aspx.

The process of urban growth is of special importance in the study of human ecology. To explain how cities expand, Ernest Burgess (1925) proposed the concentric zone model to explain how city development seems to grow radially from a central business district outward. An alternative theory, the sector model, proposed by urban ecologist Homer Hoyt (1939, 1971), observed that rather than expanding zones, city development is based on the dynamic competition for space. An example of this can be seen when rundown neighborhoods undergo gentrification or when middle-class people move away from areas experiencing influx of immigrants. Another theory, the multiple nuclei theory, proposed by Chauncey Harris and Edward Ullman (1970), states that cities have several centers that tend to specialize in some kind of activity. A familiar example of this is when fast-food restaurants, car dealerships, and shopping centers tend to cluster together to draw more customers. Each of these theories attempts to describe the process of urban growth. 

Many scholars have written about the vast difference between urban and rural environments. For example, an early (1855–1936) and noted German sociologist, Ferdinand Tönnis, wrote about the differences between  Gemeinschaft  and  Gesellschaft . Gemeinschaft is commonly found in rural life, whereas Gesellschaft is more a feature of urban life. To cite a second example, the American sociologist, Louis Wirth, analyzed interactional differences between urban and rural areas and found considerable differences in the quality of social life people experienced, with these differences depending on population size, population density, and social diversity (Wirth, 1938). Moreover, according to Wirth, alienation is a common feature in a city because city life is anonymous and full of superficial encounters. Thus, people grow aloof from each other and cease to care about the personal problems of others. A final example, however, focuses an altogether different perspective on urban life, namely, that cities can be more than a mosaic of distrustful and disconnected strangers. Thus, Herbert Gans' study, Urban Villagers (1962), showed that even rundown areas could provide a sense of belonging and community.

Think about this…

To get an idea about how five American cities compare in terms of their urban sprawl, visit this Brookings Institution Article entitled Who Sprawls Most? How Growth Patterns Differ Across the U.S. Of the five cities overviewed, which one would you want to live in, and why? What problems might you encounter in these cities? (Reading this file requires an Acrobat Reader: http://www.solimar.org/pdfs/whosprawlsmost/wsm_casestudies.pdf.

II. Collective Behavior and Social Movements

What Is Collective Behavior?

Collective behavior refers to behavior of relatively large numbers of people that is spontaneous and of limited duration. Such behavior occurs in situations of ambiguity, when existing social norms are weak or not yet established. An example will help to illustrate this point. Consider the taken-for-granted assumption that people on their way to an ice hockey game presumably share the same norms of acceptable behavior. As game after game illustrates, however, strange behavior can seemingly erupt during the game, where fights, brawls, property destruction, laughter, acts of kindness, or even stripteases can occur. In fact, many of us go to ice hockey games precisely because "anything can happen."

What sociologists see in this example is a complex set of interactions between what is going on in the game and what is going on in the crowd, such that their mix, as it were, can temporarily suspend commonly held social norms and allow new behavior to develop (at least until people go home!). This apparently spontaneous behavior raises an interesting question, namely, under what conditions can well-socialized people, who know and follow common norms of behavior, be transformed by the situation to suddenly go outside of those norms? Or, one could also ask, how do fights, brawls, stampedes, and other types of non-expected behavior arise in crowds? We will return to this example later.

What Theories Seem to Explain Collective Behavior?

Several theories have been put forth to explain the dynamics of crowd behavior. Value Added Theory (Smelser, 1963) helps us to understand the kinds of conditions that can give rise to collective (or crowd) behavior. As viewed by Smelser, crowd behavior seems to occur under six conditions, each dependent on the other. First, there needs to be structural cohesiveness, or a situation that could allow conflict to develop. Second, there is structural strain, or the convergence of general perceptions of wrong. Third, general perceptions of wrong can lead to the growth of a new and generalized belief, or a shared view of an adverse condition that requires some form of action. Fourth, one or more precipitating factors can provide the trigger for collective action. Fifth, the precipitating factors can galvanize the group and lead to the mobilization of participants in to a single mass. Last, the perceptions and evidence of social control can determine whether all these preceding factors will lead to collective behavior. Social control can affect the type, duration, and intensity of the collective behavior expressed.

To return to the example of the ice hockey game, fans go to the game in part anticipating non-normative behavior to occur (structural cohesiveness); a bad call from a referee can cause a reaction to ripple through the team players and crowd (structural strain). A shared belief of unfairness and the outward aggressive behavior of team leaders can inspire fans to act in new ways, say, with aggression, boos, or throwing things on to the rink. The real or imagined perception of weak social control (security guards, police, or the lack thereof) can add to the likelihood that behavior gets out of hand.

Other theories also attempt to explain what happens during the course of crowd behavior. For example, Contagion Theory (Le Bon, 1896) says that feelings, attitudes, and actions rapidly disseminate through a crowd in ambiguous situations to create a mob mentality that seems to overpower and submerge the usual tendency of individuals to conform to social norms. Alternatively, Convergence Theory (Cantril 1941) can be described by the cliché Birds of a feather flock together, that is, that those people joining crowds are the statistical minority who share the same economic and social characteristics and join together to express discontent with the status quo.

Finally, as with Convergence Theory, Emergent Norms Theory (Turner, 1964, Turner and Killian, 1972) focuses on the lack of unanimity in motives, attitudes, and actions of individuals in crowd situations. Thus, under conditions of uncertainty, people search for clues for acceptable behavior and, eventually, the new behavior becomes the new standard for behavior that is then reinforced by the crowd. Again, to return to the ice hockey example, the collective reaction to a bad referee call can inspire new non-normative behavior to erupt from fans (e.g. throwing things on the rink, booing, or fighting). All three perspectives help to explain crowd behavior in different ways.

In addition to crowds, other examples of collective behavior include fads, crazes, public opinion, panic, and mass hysteria. Sociologists seek to characterize such behavior and to understand how it develops. These forms of collective behavior are typically short-lived. A more focused type of collective behavior (namely, social movements) is what is needed to change or alter both institutions and individuals over the long haul.

What Are Social Movements and How Do They Develop?

One form of collective behavior is more organized the others. This form, social movements, is typically of longer duration and involves people organized to promote or resist some type of social change that either exists or is expected to occur. Rather than sit by and passively accept change, people organize to actively shape change. Social movements promoting civil rights, peace, anti-slavery, or labor rights, to name but a few concerns, have profoundly changed modern—especially Western—society.

Typically, social movements are supported by a set of beliefs (an ideology) and a set of tactics for reaching their goal. Ideologies unite people under a single goal and give higher meaning to sacrifices that must be endured. Social movements also tend to progress through a natural history. 

Several theories have been advanced to explain why social movements form and, in some cases, how likely they are to develop. For example: Relative Deprivation Theory says that social movements occur when people perceive a gap between what they actually have and what they have come to expect. The American Civil Rights Movement, for example, resulted when African Americans experienced a growing sense of deprivation relative to what they perceived around them. African Americans did not share in the Post-World War II prosperity of the 1950s and 1960s, and when they compared this perceived prosperity of the rest of the U.S. population to the discrimination, low pay, and poor housing they experienced, many developed realistic hopes that it was possible for them to have a better life. In turn, this new hope united people into a formal Civil Rights Movement. 

A second theory about the origins of social movements is Resource Mobilization Theory, which takes the approach that shared injustice and discontent are not sufficient to start a social movement. Rather, what sparks social movements, according to this theory, are the availability of resources and a network of new or existing interpersonal relationships around which and through which the movement can be structured. For example, the efforts of social activists to counter political stands against stem cell research have led to the development of interdisciplinary networks and the use of notable personalities, including Christopher Reeve as spokesperson, to articulate and advance their cause. Although it is too early to see the full effects of such efforts, the example clearly shows the strategy of mobilizing resources for a social cause. 

Several types of social movements exist and such movements are characterized by the amount of change they seek. For example, in reform movements, members join together to change certain aspects of a society without changing the dominant value system. An example of this kind of movement is the welfare reform movement. In revolutionary movements members wish to change or modify an existing value system, for example, gay rights organizations seek an end to institutional and personal discrimination. Resistance movements aim to block, resist, or eliminate social change. Coalition groups to prevent government approval of abortion, cloning, or stem cell research claim that such technologies should be banned on ethnical, moral, and religious grounds. Counter coalition groups have formed to block their efforts. Last, expressive movements seek to inspire reaffirmation or renewal of their members from within, rather than change aspects of a society as a whole. An example is the Million Man March (in 1995), which was generally intended to be a movement to raise the consciousness of African American men about their duties to family and community. 

Terrorism is an extreme tactic that can be used in revolutionary and resistance movements to force a desired change. It includes the illegal use or threatened use of force or violence for the purpose of inducing fear in governments and individuals and the use of political and/or ideological motives and justifications for their acts (Committee on Science and Technology for Countering Terrorism, 2002). The events of September 11 easily call to mind an example of the terrorism that exists at international level, but terrorist tactics have been used by domestic groups as well. For example, the Ku Klux Klan and some anti-abortion groups have used terrorism to block change in American society, whereas the Oklahoma City bombing was the work of members of a militia group hostile to their own government (Stern, 1996; Johnson and Sharn, 1997). Social movements are an important source of positive change in society. Your textbook will discuss additional details and examples of social movements briefly described above. 

III. Social Change

What Major Changes Are Taking Place in Society?

As so much of what this module has either said or presumed, social change refers to a substantial shift in cultural and social patterns in a society such that it leads to alteration in the social behavior of the society's members. Change can come from a variety of sources. Below are examples of areas of change facing us as individuals, families, communities, and societies:

· Changes in the physical environment

· For example, concerns over global warming and pollution have the potential to greatly affect social, economic, and political life.

· Changes in cultural environment

· As already explained, communications technology has a profound impact on our culture and the symbols, values, and behaviors that we share.

· Changes in social structural arrangements

· After the events of September 11, a wide range of substantial changes in government and legal practices (as in the Patriot Act) have resulted in significant changes in American citizens lives.

· Change in the size, density or composition of populations

· Greater proportions of older adults in the United States and other Western societies have important implications for national health care costs and social welfare benefits. The voting clout of older adults also shapes the political and economic landscape.

· Science and technology developments

· The development of genetically engineered corn and other grains is a scientific advancement that is both hailed by scientists as a great advancement in feeding a hungry world and strongly criticized by those that fear its long-term effects on the food chain.

· Changes in the economy

· Boom-and-bust economies, of course, affect not only companies and political relations, but individual families and the future of children.

This ever-changing social landscape depends in part on historical factors. In both this and earlier modules, we have discussed several historical aspects that have resulted in social change, including the shift from agricultural economies to capitalism and industrialization, and the shift from Gemeinshaft to Gesellschaft, as people moved from small intimate groups to larger impersonal settings. Modernization also requires massive social change. Modern societies are fast-paced, highly technological, and dependent on computers, the Internet, faxes, and high-tech medicine. This situation necessitates individual change and adaptation in businesses, homes, schools, and workplaces. Thus, technological changes aren't just about learning to use new machines; they are also about the way we think, what we believe, and how we value and spend our time.

Explaining Social Change and Predicting When It May Occur

Several major theories have been advanced to explain the nature of social change. Ogburn's Theory of Social Change (1961, 1964) states that new inventions (the combination of existing things to form new ones, e.g., computer chips or business practices), discovery (new ways of seeing reality, new vaccines or new stars in the solar system), and diffusion (the spread of one inventive idea or practice, e.g., the idea that smoking is harmful to one's health) are processes that require that people not only do things differently but to think differently. Because change is often hard to make at individual and societal levels, Ogburn used the term cultural lag to refer to how human behavior often is slow to adapt to technological changes. For example, through a combination of innovative agricultural practices and the discovery of new techniques in gene manipulation, genetically engineered foods are now a reality. What is more, many such foods (particularly, those made with engineered corn) are becoming common on the shelves of American households. A fierce debate has ensued regarding the use of such foods in the United States and Europe. Although many experts claim that they are safe, many Americans are reluctant to accept genetically engineered foodstuffs. The European Union has banned such foods from imports and the pros and cons of consuming such food are currently debated by activists and experts (including medical experts). Other theories of social change include evolutionary, cyclical, and conflict theories.

· Evolutionary theories see progress as the movement from simple to complex or differentiated states. Like the stepwise maturity we expect to see as a child matures into an adult, so societies are seen to progress from uncivilized, simple forms to civilized, complex forms in a logical path. Critics of evolutionary theory take exception to the idea that the United States and Great Britain provide the ideal example of how societies change over time.

· Cyclical theories try to address social change across entire civilizations. One lesson from World War II is how Germany rose and fell, and then rose again to become one of the most powerful countries in the world and a member of the G-8 nations. This and other historical examples show that societies can change and adapt (Spengler, 1963).

· Conflict theories see social change as a dialectical process, or a struggle between what Karl Marx called the thesis (the status quo) and the antithesis (opposition to the status quo). As a result of the struggle, a synthesis or new equilibrium is reached. This new synthesis then becomes the basis for new struggles. A recent example of this process can be seen in the 2002–2003 conflict between the United States government and the United Nations regarding the war in Iraq. The United States-led war, conducted without the backing of the United Nations, has engendered debate about the future role of the United Nations in world conflicts. 

One result of social change is modernization. Modernization has not reached all the parts of the world, nor has it had a uniform effect. So-called Third Worldcountries are those societies that have not experienced as extensive modernization as Western industrial societies have. Modernization Theory proposes that to enhance economic efficiency and productivity, there must be the appropriate economic structures in place to facilitate development, innovation, and technological advances. As with the ideas behind the Demographic Transition, Modernization Theory suggests that the modernization of a country follows from appropriate developmental support and that such changes bring about changes in beliefs, ideologies, and personal behavior in the population. Convergence Theory suggests a growing similarity in the nature of societies undergoing modernization. The formation of the European Union was possible in part because of the convergence of political, social, and economic practices of its member nations. Why are some countries rich while others remain poor? Dependency Theory provides a conflict-oriented theoretical approach to modernization. This theory says that the industrial countries dominate the world and use Third World countries for their own ends, keeping them dependent. Immanuel Wallerstein (1979, 1984) has proposed World Systems Theory as a framework for understanding such dependency. He suggests that the world is divided into core, periphery, and semi-periphery states and argues that Third-World countries are on the periphery because they are dependent on the exports of the "first world" and are thereby caught in a debt trap to core countries and their multinational corporations.

No one theory alone explains social change. Each theory mentioned above has contributed to our understanding of the origins and process of change.

The Sociology of Predicting Change

Sociologists cannot predict with accuracy major societal changes such as wars, riots, or revolutions, yet many facets of social change can be predicted with some degree of accuracy. For example, we can make population predictions based on current birth, death, and migration data, noting at the same time that the rise in cohabitation and out-of-wedlock births makes it difficult to say for certain if the family as an institution is on the decline or simply changing in its form. Does this caveat nullify sociology's insight and/or predictive power? Hardly, for the discipline of sociology can make a substantial contribution to our understanding of the familiar world around us. In addition, it can provide a new perspective about the parts that individuals, groups, and institutions play in the world. Thus, the insights gained from the study of social structure help us view individual feelings and actions in a larger context. In sum, the study of sociology gives us unique skills for living in an ever-changing world filled with uncertainty.

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