


AT A CROSSROADS ▶

Court artists painted this 1588 Ottoman miniature to illustrate Suleiman the Magnificent's 1526 victory over Christian forces at the Battle of Mohacs, which left Hungary without a monarch and divided between the Habsburg and Ottoman empires. Traditional cavalry forces face off in the left foreground, but most prominent is the sultan himself in the upper right, on a white horse just behind a line of large Ottoman cannon. (Topkapi Palace Museum, Istanbul/ Giraudon/Bridgeman Art Library.)



Consolidation and Conflict in Europe and the Greater Mediterranean

1450–1750

In 1590, forty-three-year-old Miguel de Cervantes Saavedra, an office clerk working in the Spanish city of Seville, applied for a colonial service job in South America. Such assignments usually went to applicants with nobler connections than Cervantes enjoyed, but perhaps he hoped his military service would count in his favor. Cervantes had been wounded in a major naval conflict, the Battle of Lepanto, in 1571, fighting against the mighty Ottomans. He also suffered five years of captivity in Algiers as the prisoner of North Africa's Barbary pirates. Despite all of this, he was turned down.

Before taking up his desk job in Seville, Cervantes had tried his hand at writing, publishing a modestly successful novel in 1585. Spain at this time was a literary leader in Europe. The novels, plays, and poems of Spain's "Golden Century" drew on medieval models, but they were both enriched and transformed by the changes resulting from overseas colonization and religious upheavals. Playwrights and poets rewrote the conquests of the Aztecs and Incas as tragedies, and one writer, "El Inca" Garcilaso de la Vega, son of a Spanish conquistador and an Inca princess, thrilled his Spanish readers with tales of a

The Power of the Ottoman Empire, 1453–1750

FOCUS What factors explain the rise of the vast Ottoman Empire and its centuries-long endurance?

Europe Divided, 1500–1650

FOCUS What sparked division in Europe after 1500, and why did this trend persist?

European Innovations in Science and Government, 1550–1750


FOCUS What factors enabled European scientific and political innovations in the early modern period?

COUNTERPOINT: The Barbary Pirates

FOCUS Why were the Barbary pirates of North Africa able to thrive from 1500 to 1800 despite Ottoman and European overseas expansion?

BACKSTORY

Europe and the greater Mediterranean basin gradually recovered from the devastating Black Death of 1347–1350 (see Chapter 15), but the inhabitants of this geographically divided region faced many challenges at the start of the early modern period. Christian Europeans grew increasingly intolerant of religious diversity. In the most extreme case, Iberian Muslims and Jews were forced to convert to Catholicism or leave the peninsula after 1492, prompting a great diaspora, or scattering, largely into Morocco and Ottoman lands, but also into Italy, France, and northern Europe. Resource-poor and avid for Asian trade goods and precious metals, western Europeans raced to develop new technologies of war and long-distance transport to compete with one another as well as with non-Europeans abroad. In contrast, the Muslim Ottomans of the eastern Mediterranean had been expanding their tributary land empire since the fourteenth century. By the later fifteenth century they would take to the sea to extend their conquests into the Mediterranean and the Indian Ocean.



• 1453 Ottoman conquest of Constantinople

• 1492 Spanish take Granada, expel Jews

1545–1563 Council of Trent

• 1543 Nicolaus Copernicus, *On the Revolutions of the Heavenly Spheres*

• 1571 Battle of Lepanto

1450

1500

1550

1600

1520–1566 Reign of Ottoman Emperor Suleiman

• 1517 Martin Luther disseminates "Ninety-five Theses," sparking the Protestant Reformation

• 1540 Ignatius Loyola founds the new Catholic order of the Jesuits

• 1580 Philip II of Spain takes over Portuguese Empire

• 1572 St. Bartholomew's Day massacre

Edict of Nantes ends French Religious War 1598

vanished Inca paradise. He based his best-selling *Royal Commentaries of the Incas*, composed in the Spanish countryside, on stories told by his mother in Cuzco.

Cervantes never crossed the Atlantic, but he found plenty to inspire him in the vibrant crossroads city of Seville, Spain's largest city with over one hundred thousand inhabitants. Yet as Cervantes' 1605 masterpiece, *Don Quixote*, revealed, it was the author's experiences as a prisoner in Algiers that most prepared him to bridge cultures and upend literary conventions. Although regarded as the quintessential Spanish novel—set in the Spanish countryside, with poor Catholic villagers as its central characters—*Don Quixote* includes long passages describing the many peoples, especially forced converts to Christianity from Islam and renegade Christians living in North Africa, who routinely crossed borders and seas, risking their lives to find love or maintain family fortunes. Cervantes died in 1616, in the midst of a brief truce between Spain and its greatest rival of the day, the emerging Dutch Republic. “El Inca” Garcilaso died the same year.

Europe and the greater Mediterranean in the age of Cervantes was, like the Indian Ocean basin, home to diverse peoples who had long been linked by deep and multifaceted connections. Yet it was increasingly divided by political, religious, and ethnic conflict. Christians fought Jews and Muslims, and, in the movements known as the Protestant and Catholic reformations, one another. Emerging national identities based on language and shared religion began to harden, even as local and regional trade increased. Christian Europe viewed Ottoman expansion with alarm, and fear of growing Muslim power contributed to rising tension and conflict between Christians and Muslims. Piracy flourished from the Atlantic to the Indian Ocean, and war raged from the Low Countries to the Balkans, eventually engulfing nearly all of Europe by 1618. In the course of the Thirty Years' War that followed, Catholics and Protestants, led by ambitious princes, slaughtered each other by the tens of thousands. Economic woes compounded the chaos, exacerbated by a sudden drop in silver revenues from

MAPPING THE WORLD

Europe and the Greater Mediterranean, c. 1600

The Mediterranean was an ancient global crossroads, and its role in connecting Africa, Asia, and Europe only intensified during early modern times. After 1450, African gold and Spanish-American silver lubricated trade, but they also financed warfare, notably an increasingly bitter rivalry between the Ottoman and Habsburg empires. The period also witnessed the rise of the so-called Barbary pirates, based mostly in Algiers, Tunis, and Tripoli, who offered only a tenuous allegiance to the Ottomans against their Christian foes. Mediterranean trade, sea routes to the Indian Ocean, and overland routes to East Asia were all increasingly tied to Europe's North Atlantic trade. As trade grew, conflict became ever more intense.

ROUTES ▼

- Major trade route
- ➔ Voyages of Miguel de Cervantes Saavedra, c. 1571–1609
- ➔ Route of the Spanish Armada, 1588

1618–1648 Thirty Years' War

1642–1646 English Civil War

• 1687 Isaac Newton,
Principia Mathematica

• 1688 Glorious Revolution in England

1650

1700

1750

1643–1715 Reign of Louis XIV of France

• 1640 Portugal wins
independence from Spain

• 1683 Ottomans defeated in Vienna
by Polish-Austrian alliance

1701–1714 War of the Spanish Succession

the mines of Spanish America. Prolonged cold weather led to a cycle of failed harvests. Amid growing anxiety, large-scale rebellions broke out from Scotland to the Persian frontier.

Out of this prolonged period of religious, political, and economic instability, which some historians have labeled the “seventeenth-century crisis,” came profound and eventually world-changing innovations in science, government, and the economy. The combination of growing religious skepticism, deep interest in the physical world sparked by overseas discoveries, and new optical technologies led a small cluster of European intellectuals to turn to scientific inquiry, initiating what later would be hailed as a “scientific revolution.” Political innovations included absolutism and constitutionalism, two novel approaches to monarchy. Whatever their political form, nearly all of Europe’s competing states engaged in overseas expansion, using the Atlantic as a gateway to the wider world. With the support of their governments, merchants and investors in western Europe launched new efforts to challenge the long-established global claims of the Spanish and Portuguese.

Christian Europe’s overseas expansion was driven in part by the rise of its powerful Sunni Muslim neighbor, the Ottoman Empire. The Ottoman state, which by 1550 straddled Europe, the Middle East, North Africa, Arabia, and parts of Central Asia, was strategically located between three vast and ancient maritime trade zones. To the west lay the Mediterranean, Atlantic, and all of Europe; to the east and north, the Silk Road and Black Sea region; and to the south, East Africa, Arabia, and the vast Indian Ocean basin. Along with such major commercial crossroads as Istanbul (formerly Constantinople), Aleppo, and Cairo, the Ottomans controlled key religious pilgrimage sites, including Mecca and Jerusalem. No early modern European state approached the Ottomans’ size, military might, or cultural and religious diversity, and no contemporary Islamic empire, not even the mighty Mughals, did as much to offset rising Christian European sea power. The Ottomans were arguably the most versatile of the early modern “gunpowder empires.”

OVERVIEW QUESTIONS

The major global development in this chapter: Early modern Europe’s increasing competition and division in the face of Ottoman expansion.

As you read, consider:

1. To what degree was religious diversity embraced or rejected in early modern Europe and the greater Mediterranean, and why?
2. How did Christian Europe’s gunpowder-fueled empires compare with that of the Ottomans?
3. What accounts for the rise of science and capitalism in early modern western Europe?

The Power of the Ottoman Empire 1453–1750

FOCUS

What factors explain the rise of the vast Ottoman Empire and its centuries-long endurance?

Founded by mounted Turkic warriors in the early fourteenth century, the Ottoman Empire grew rapidly after its stunning 1453 capture of the Byzantine capital, Constantinople (see Chapter 15). As in Mughal India, gunpowder weapons introduced by Christian Europeans sped the Ottomans’

rise and helped them spread their dominions deep into Europe as well as the Middle East and North Africa. The Ottomans also took to the sea, challenging the Venetians, Habsburgs, and other contenders in the Mediterranean, as well as the Portuguese in the Indian Ocean. But it was arguably clever governance, minimal trade restrictions, and religious tolerance, not gunpowder weapons or naval proficiency, that permitted this most durable of Islamic empires to survive until the early twentieth century.

Tools of Empire

As we saw in Chapter 15, Mehmed II's conquest in 1453 of Constantinople not only shocked the Christian world but also marked a dramatic shift in the Ottoman enterprise. The sultans no longer viewed themselves as the roving holy warriors of Osman's day. Instead, they took on the identity of Islamic rulers with supreme authority over a multinational empire at the crossroads of Europe and Asia.

Like other expansive realms, the Ottoman state faced the challenge of governing its frontier regions. To maintain control over the provinces, the Ottomans drew on the janissary corps, elite infantry and bureaucrats who owed direct allegiance to the sultan. Within a century of the capture of Constantinople, the janissaries were recruited nearly exclusively through the *devshirme* (dev-SHEER-may), the conscription of Christian youths from eastern Europe. Chosen for their good looks and fine physiques, these boys were converted to Islam and sent to farms to learn Turkish and to build up their bodies. The most promising were sent to Istanbul to learn Ottoman military, religious, and administrative techniques. Trained in Ottoman ways, educated in the use of advanced weaponry, and shorn of all family connections, the young men recruited through the *devshirme* were thus prepared to serve as janissaries wholly beholden to the sultan and dedicated to his service. In later years the janissaries would directly challenge the sultan's power, but for much of the early modern era, these crack soldiers and able administrators extended and supported Ottoman rule. A few rose to the rank of Grand Vizier (roughly, "Prime Minister").

The *timar* system of land grants given in compensation for military service was another key means through which the Ottomans managed the provinces while ensuring that armed forces remained powerful. It was similar to Mughal India's *parganas* and Spanish America's *encomiendas* in that all three imperial systems were put in place to reward frontier warriors while preventing them from becoming independent aristocrats. Sultans snatched *timars* and gave them to others when their holders failed to serve in ongoing wars, an incentive to keep fighting. Even in times of stability, the *timars* were referred to as "the fruits of war." *Timar*-holders slowly turned new territories into provinces. Able administrators were rewarded with governorships. Although the *timar* and *devshirme* systems changed over time, it was these early innovations in frontier governance and military recruitment that stabilized and buttressed Ottoman rule in the face of succession crises, regional rebellions, natural disasters, and other shocks.

Expansion and Consolidation


Mehmed II's 1453 capture of Constantinople earned him the nickname "Conqueror." By 1464, Mehmed had added Athens, Serbia, and Bosnia to the Ottoman domain, and by 1475, the Golden Horde khanate of the Crimean peninsula was paying tribute to the Ottomans (see Map 20.1). In the Mediterranean, powerful Venice was put on notice that its days of dominance were coming to an end, and the Genoese were driven from their trading posts in the Black Sea. In 1480 the Ottomans attacked Otranto, in southern Italy, and in 1488 they struck Malta, a key Mediterranean island between Sicily and North Africa. At the imperial center, Constantinople, now named Istanbul, became a reflection of Mehmed's power, and also his piety. The city's horizon was soon dotted with hundreds of domes and minarets. With over one hundred thousand

Devshirme System

Timar System

devshirme The Ottomans' conscription of Christian male youths from eastern Europe to serve in the military or administration.

timar A land grant given in compensation for military service by the Ottoman sultan to a soldier.



MAP 20.1

The Ottoman Empire, 1453–1683

Despite their humble origins as nomadic raiders, in early modern times the Ottomans developed one of the world’s most extensive and lasting empires. They did so in part by deploying gunpowder weapons developed by Europeans against their neighbors, both Muslim and Christian, but also by developing a formidable navy. What held the hugely diverse Ottoman Empire together, however, was its flexible bureaucratic structure, which frequently rewarded faithful conquered subjects and allowed loose tributary arrangements at the fringes. The Ottomans struggled most on the eastern frontier with the Shi’ite Safavids and in the northwest against the Habsburg Holy Roman Empire and other Christian kingdoms.

inhabitants by the time of the sultan’s death in 1481, Istanbul was one of the largest capitals in Eurasia.

The Ottomans turned newly obtained European artillery and highly trained janissary fighters on Islamic neighbors such as the Safavids and Mamluks in Syria and Egypt. Under Selim I (r. 1512–1520), called “the Grim,” both were overwhelmed, although the Safavids would continue to challenge Ottoman power. Ottoman influence now touched the shores of the Indian Ocean, where Selim and the Ottomans challenged Portuguese expansion. The Muslim holy cities of Medina and Mecca became Ottoman protectorates, a boon for the state’s religious reputation. Ottoman control of the Arabian peninsula would not be challenged until the end of the eighteenth century by the Wahhabi Saudis (discussed in Chapter 23).

Reign of Suleiman the Magnificent

Christian Europe again felt the sting of Ottoman artillery under Selim’s successor, Suleiman (soo-lay-MAHN) (r. 1520–1566), called “the Magnificent.” Suleiman ended

Istanbul's Skyline

When the former Constantinople became the capital of the Ottoman Empire, its rulers and court patrons soon transformed its architecture and overall skyline. The domes in the foreground make up part of the formerly Christian basilica Hagia Sophia, which was transformed into a mosque after 1453. In the distance rises Istanbul's imposing Blue Mosque, built between 1609 and 1616 for Sultan Ahmed I. (Photo by Ketan Gajria.)



the first year of his reign with the capture of two more symbolic prizes, Belgrade and Rhodes. The former feat gave Suleiman near-total control of eastern Europe, and the latter gave him effective rule over the eastern Mediterranean. In the western Mediterranean, the sultan supported Muslim pirates such as the Barbarossa brothers of Algiers, who targeted Europeans and held thousands of Christian captives for ransom (see Counterpoint: The Barbary Pirates). In 1565 the Ottomans laid siege to Malta. Though ultimately unsuccessful, this huge expedition provided yet another display of “the Great Turk’s” naval capacity.

As the siege of Malta and other gunpowder-fueled seaborne offensives attested, Suleiman was determined to challenge the Habsburg Holy Roman Empire, as was his successor, Selim II (r. 1566–1574). But the Ottomans were dealt a terrible blow in 1571 when Habsburg forces sponsored by Spain’s Catholic king Philip II (r. 1556–1598) overpowered Selim’s navy at the Battle of Lepanto off the Greek coast (see again Map 20.1). Some six thousand janissaries armed with matchlock handguns faced off against over twenty thousand similarly armed European recruits and missionaries, among them the future author of *Don Quixote*. The Christians prevailed and commemorated their victory against the “infidels” in artwork ranging from painting to tapestry.

Although the Battle of Lepanto marked the beginning of a general decline in Ottoman sea supremacy, Selim II’s will was far from broken. His forces managed to capture Tunis and Cyprus, and the navy was quickly rebuilt. A poet praised the sultan’s vision:

If it were not for the body of Sultan Selim,
This generous king, this source of happiness
The enemy would have occupied
The country from one end to the other
God would not have helped us.
Neither would he have granted us conquest.¹

Conflict with the Catholic Habsburgs

Battle with the Habsburgs reached a crescendo with the 1683 siege of Vienna. Ottoman gun technology had kept pace with that of western Europe, and some observers claimed that Ottoman muskets in fact had better range and accuracy than those used by Vienna's defenders. Heavy siege artillery was not employed here on the scale regularly practiced in Persia and Mesopotamia, however, and this may have proved a fatal mistake. Ottoman attempts to mine and blow up Vienna's walls failed just as tens of thousands of allies led by the Polish king arrived to save the day for the Habsburgs. At least fifteen thousand Ottoman troops were killed. Never again would the Ottomans pose a serious threat to Christian Europe.

Conflict with the Shi'ite Safavids

To the east, war with Persia occupied the sultans' attention throughout the sixteenth century. Since 1500, Safavid shahs had incited rebellions against Ottoman rule in outlying provinces, denouncing its Sunni leadership as corrupt and illegitimate. The Ottomans responded by violently persecuting both rebels and many innocents caught in between. Under Suleiman, campaigns against the Safavids in the 1530s and 1540s were mostly successful thanks to new guns, but territorial advances proved difficult to sustain. As one Ottoman eyewitness put it in the 1550s, "The territories called Persia are much less fertile than our country; and further, it is the custom of the inhabitants, when their land is invaded, to lay waste and burn everything, and so force the enemy to retire through lack of food."² The Safavids were just far enough away to prove unconquerable, leaving intermediate cities such as Baghdad as the key battlegrounds (see Reading the Past: Weapons of Mass Destruction: Ottomans vs. Persians in Baghdad).

Beginning in the late 1570s, Murad III took advantage of Safavid political instability to expand Ottoman influence beyond the frontier established by Suleiman. By the time a peace was arranged in 1590, the Ottomans controlled Mesopotamia and had established a firm presence in the Caucasus region. Still, the empire was rocked in the decades around 1600 by price inflation caused by a massive influx of Spanish-American silver, which flowed into the empire from Europe in exchange for Ottoman silks and spices. Ottoman attempts to fix prices of basic commodities and reduce the silver content of their coins only worsened the problem, and troops facing food shortages and poor pay rioted.

Some historians have argued that the Ottoman Empire was in decline following the reign of Suleiman the Magnificent, even though expansion continued into the seventeenth century, beginning with a long struggle for Hungary (1593–1606). Like Habsburg Spain, also said to be in decline in this era despite its vast size and wealth, Ottoman efforts to conquer new lands increasingly ended in stalemate, with military expenses far exceeding the value of the territory gained. The crushing weight of rising costs forced sultans and viziers to make humiliating concessions. Among the worst of these were losses to the Safavids that amounted to a total reversal of Murad III's gains. Frontier setbacks were not always evident from the center. Istanbul, with some four hundred thousand inhabitants by this time, was by far Eurasia's largest and most opulent city.

Sultanate of the Women

Murad IV (r. 1623–1640) managed to recapture Baghdad and several other eastern losses, but a crippling succession crisis ensued. Only after 1648 was the matter settled, with seven-year-old Mehmed IV (r. 1648–1687) on the throne. A child emperor required interim rule by regency, and in this case Mehmed's mother, Turhan, took control after fighting off challenges from other powerful women at court whose sons claimed a right to the throne. As a result of this direct feminine management of the Ottoman Empire, analogous to that of much tinier Aceh in these years (see Chapter 19), the period of Turhan's regency has been called "the Sultanate of the Women."

Indeed, as the Ottoman realm consolidated, court women became a powerful political force, despite their strict seclusion from society. First, the politics of succession dictated close control over the sultan's sexual life. Women came to dominate this key arena as early as the mid-sixteenth century. It was not seductive young wives and concubines who counted most, but rather elder women, particularly the Queen Mother. Second, much like

Weapons of Mass Destruction: Ottomans vs. Persians in Baghdad

In 1722 an Afghan army invaded the Safavid Empire from the east, seized the capital of Isfahan, and repulsed an Ottoman invasion from the west. The ambitious Afghan warlord Nadir Shah took over. Until his murder in 1747 Nadir attacked virtually all of Persia's neighbors, including the Mughals, but spent most of his energies fighting the Ottomans. Below is an excerpt from a chronicle of Nadir's campaigns written in around 1733 by an Armenian participant, Abraham of Erevan.

After laying siege to the city [Baghdad] for forty-eight days, Nadir received the twenty-five cannons that he had left behind in Zohab. They began to place the cannons and to fire on the city. Both sides exchanged cannon fire. Since the Ottoman cannons were larger than Nadir's, they were capable of hurtling larger cannon balls. One particular cannon, the largest, could hurl a cannon ball filled with approximately forty *okhas* [about one hundred pounds] of gunpowder. Although Nadir's forces were not concentrated in one area, such a cannon ball was fired from the fort. It exploded in the middle of the camp and killed one hundred troops. Seeing such casualties, Nadir moved the front further back. After that, the Ottoman cannon balls could not harm his troops, but neither could his cannon balls reach Baghdad. Thus they faced each other for fifty-five days without firing their artillery. The Ottomans then fired the large cannon once again, but the explosion damaged a wall of the fortifications and destroyed many houses, after which the Turks did not use it again. After fifty-five days of siege, the Ottomans, fully armed, made a sudden sortie with the intention of attacking the

Persians. . . . The Pasha, however, remained in the city and did not permit the citizens to leave either, for half of them were Persians and he suspected that they would join the troops of Nadir.

The minute Nadir saw that the Ottomans had attacked him, he moved his troops forward without his cannons. The Ottomans, who had brought ten loaded cannons with them, began to fire on the Persian forces. Nadir then divided his troops into four groups so that he would not subject his entire army to the cannon fire. Having used their guns, the Ottomans could not reload their cannons fast enough, and while they were busy reloading, the Persians fell upon them from four sides and stopped the enemy from using its firepower. The two armies clashed and began to slaughter each other with swords and muskets for some seven hours. Eight thousand Ottomans and six thousand Persians perished. The Ottoman army suffered a defeat and fled back into the fortress and did not venture out again.

Source: Abraham of Erevan, *History of the Wars (1721–1738)*, ed. and trans. George A. Bournoutian (Costa Mesa, CA: Mazda Publishers, 1999), 77–78.

EXAMINING THE EVIDENCE

1. What role did cities such as Baghdad play in the battles between the Ottomans and Persians?
2. How do battles such as this one reveal the advantages and drawbacks of heavy guns?

Nur Jahan in Mughal India, powerful Ottoman women were important patrons of the arts and of pious works, and they figured prominently in royal rituals and mosque and hospital construction. The sultan was the ultimate patriarch, but it was his larger family that constituted the model of Ottoman society. Documents reveal that the royal harem, source of much lurid speculation by Europeans, was in fact a kind of sacred, familial space, more haven than prison.

Daily Life in the Ottoman Empire

As in most early modern states, the vast majority of Ottoman subjects lived in the countryside and were peasants and herders. Urban society, by contrast, was hierarchical, divided by occupation. Beneath the Osman royal family was the *askeri* (AS-keh-ree),

Social Structure



Istanbul Street Scene

This rare sixteenth-century Ottoman street scene depicts men and women exchanging a variety of goods near the famous bazaar of Istanbul, formerly Constantinople. A proud merchant holds up a bouquet of flowers, and another weighs what may be almonds. Two women with different head coverings bring what appear to be ducks and bread for sale, while a woman in the left foreground seems to be making a cash purchase from a merchant balancing a basket of fruit or flowers on his head. The exchanges take place right next to the Column of Constantine, a relic of Roman rule under the city's namesake emperor. (The Art Archive/Museo Correr Venice/Alfredo Dagli Orti.)

Women's Experience

caravanserai A roadside inn for merchants on the Silk Road and other overland trade routes.

or “military” class, which was exempt from taxes and dependent on the sultan for their well-being. In addition to military leaders, the *askeri* included bureaucrats and *ulama*, religious scholars versed in Arabic and canon law. Whereas the Safavids considered religious authorities superior to the shahs, the Ottoman sultans only took the advice of their chief *ulama*—a distinction that persists today in Shi’ite and Sunni states. Beneath the *askeri* was a much broader class of taxpayers called *reaya* (RAH-ya), or “the flock.” The *reaya* included everyone from common laborers and artisans to traders and merchants. Thanks to a long-established Ottoman tradition of meritocracy and inclusion, provincial members of the lower classes could make considerable gains in status through education or military service.

In the countryside, peasant farmers’ and pastoralists’ lives revolved around cycles of planting and harvest, seasonal movement of animal herds, and the rhythms of commerce and religious observance. Some men were drafted into military service, leaving women to manage households, herds, and farms. Women in both rural and urban contexts also engaged in export crafts such as silk weaving, carpet making, and ceramic manufacture. Thus, although few country folk of either gender experienced urban life for more than a few days in a lifetime, rural life in the Ottoman Empire was shaped by the larger forces of international trade and the demands of the Ottoman military.

More mobile by far were merchants, whose livelihood was considered highly respectable. The merchants of trading crossroads such as Aleppo, Damascus, Smyrna, and Cairo profited handsomely from their access to Asian and African luxuries. Ottoman taxes on trade were relatively low, and the empire rarely resorted to the burdensome wartime demands made by European states on their often less-well-regarded merchant communities. On the flip side, the Ottoman state invested little in trading infrastructure beyond maintenance of **caravanserais**, or travelers’

lodges located along otherwise desolate trade routes. Like the Inca roadside inns taken over by the Spanish after conquest in 1532, these structures also served a military purpose.

Recent research has revealed that ordinary women under Ottoman rule, much like court women, enjoyed more power than previously thought. Women had rights to their own property and investments, fully protected by *shari’a*, or Islamic law, before, during, and after marriage. This was, however, a rigidly patriarchal society. Women were expected to marry, and when they did they had few legal rights in relation to their husbands, who were permitted multiple wives and could divorce them at any time. Although women were treated as inferiors under Ottoman rule, it is worth noting that they had greater access to divorce than women in most early modern European societies.

The religious diversity of their subjects led the Ottomans to compromise in matters of gender. Islamic judges, or *qadis*, occasionally intervened in Christian married life, for example. Some Christian women won divorce by converting to Islam, as happened in the following case from Cyprus, decided in 1609: “Husna, daughter of Murad, Armenian wife, says before her husband Mergeri, son of Kuluk, Armenian: ‘He always treats me cruelly. I do not want him.’ He denies that. But now Husna becomes honored with Islam. After she takes the name Ayisha, her husband is invited to Islam, but he does not accept, so Ayisha’s separation is ordered.”³ Although such conversions could be insincere, it is certain that religious diversity and legal oversight under Ottoman rule increased the range of options for female victims of domestic oppression.

Although devoutly Muslim at its core, the Ottoman state, with some 40 million subjects by the mid-seventeenth century, was at least as tolerant of religious diversity as the Islamic Mughal Empire, with policies similarly dictated by a practical desire to gain the cooperation of its diverse subjects. Religious tolerance and coexistence were most tested in frontier districts such as Cyprus and the Balkans. A description of Belgrade from 1660 illustrates just how diverse a frontier city could be: “On the banks of the river Sava there are three Gypsy neighborhoods, and on the banks of the Danube there are three neighborhoods of Greek unbelievers [i.e., Christians], as well as Serbs and Bulgarians also living in three neighborhoods. Right by the fortress is a neighborhood of Jews, those belonging to the seven communities known as the Karaim Jews. There is also a neighborhood of Armenian unbelievers. . . . All the rest are Muslim neighborhoods, so that families of the followers of Muhammad possess all the best, the most spacious and the airiest parts, located on the high or middle ground of the city.”⁴ Converts to Islam gained tax benefits (plus residential preferences, apparently), but punitive measures to force subjects to convert to the state religion were never used.

Many Jews in the Ottoman Empire maintained their religious independence permanently. Some Jewish communities were centuries old and had local roots, but many more came as *Sephardim*, refugees from Iberian expulsions in the late fifteenth and early sixteenth centuries. Sephardic physicians, merchants, and tax collectors were a common sight in the capital city of Istanbul, and by the later sixteenth century many Ottoman towns had full-fledged Jewish communities. Members of the prominent Jewish Mendes family served as merchants, bankers, and advisers to the sultan in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries.

In large part because of its incorporative nature and flexible structures, the Ottoman state proved one of the most durable in world history. Gunpowder weapons, though always important, were most critical in the early phases of expansion. Individual rulers varied widely in terms of aptitude and ambition, but the state itself remained quite stable. Fierce allegiance to Sunni Islam and control of its key shrines lent the Ottomans religious clout, yet their system of governance did not persecute Jews, Christians, or others who followed the state’s rules regarding non-Muslims. Shi’ite Muslims faced more difficulties, by contrast, and this religious schism fueled a lasting rivalry with neighboring Persia.

Finally, in the realm of commerce, powerful merchants and trade guilds could be found in several Ottoman cities, notably Aleppo, but overseas ventures and entrepreneurial activities remained limited, at most sizable family businesses (see *Lives and Livelihoods: Ottoman Coffeehouse Owners and Patrons*). The state placed minimal restrictions on trade and provided some infrastructure in the form of caravanserais, but there was no policy equivalent to Iberian support of overseas commerce in the form of trading forts and convoys. In this regard the Ottoman Empire was profoundly different from the rising “merchant empires” of western Europe, where an increasingly global and highly competitive mercantile capitalism hitched state interests directly to those of bankers and merchants.

Religious Tolerance

Ottoman Rule: A Summing Up

LIVES AND LIVELIHOODS

Ottoman Coffeehouse Owners and Patrons



Ottoman Coffeehouse

This late-sixteenth-century miniature depicts a packed Ottoman coffeehouse. The patrons and serving staff all appear to be male, but they represent many classes and age groups, and possibly several religious traditions. In the upper middle, elite men with large turbans are conversing; a worker prepares a tray of cups in a small room to their right. In the lower middle, one man appears to be speaking as others turn their attention to a backgammon game under way near his feet. When rebellions or other political troubles brewed, coffeehouses were a source of concern for Ottoman authorities. (The Trustees of the Chester Beatty Library, Dublin.)

An institution of modern life in much of the world today, the coffeehouse, or café, originated on the southern fringes of the Ottoman Empire in around 1450. The coffee bean, harvested from a small tree that scientists would later call *Coffea arabica*, had long been roasted, ground, and brewed in the Ethiopian and Somali highlands of East Africa. At some point, coffee was transplanted to the highlands of Yemen, at the southern tip of the Arabian peninsula (see again Map 20.1). Here members of Sufi Muslim brotherhoods adopted coffee drinking to aid them in their all-night meditations and chants. Merchants sailing north on the Red Sea carried the new habit-forming beverage to Cairo and Constantinople. From there it spread quickly throughout the entire Mediterranean commercial world. By the late seventeenth century, there were coffeehouses in all the major cities of western Europe. By the early eighteenth century, coffee itself was planted in the tropical Americas.

Despite coffee's sobering effects, many *imams*, or religious scholars, were initially skeptical of its propriety. The

Europe Divided 1500–1650

FOCUS

What sparked division in Europe after 1500, and why did this trend persist?

Europe in the age of Ottoman ascendancy was diverse, fractured, and dynamic. By 1500, commerce and literacy were on the rise, populations were growing, and armies of craftsmen were perfecting technologies of warfare, manufacture, and navigation. Savvy publishers capitalized on demand for fiction long before Cervantes, but they also made available new thoughts on religion and science as well as new translations of classical works. Thus, the growth of literacy helped unsettle old notions of time, space, and human potential. A less visible transformation was taking place in the countryside, where traditional, reciprocal relationships tying peasants to feudal lords were increasingly replaced with commercial ones. Most notable in western Europe, especially in England, this shift entailed a rise in renting, sharecropping, and wage work, a proliferation of market-oriented farms owned by urban elites, and the privatization of lands formerly enjoyed as common community resources. Peasants displaced by this early capitalist restructuring of the countryside increasingly filled Europe's cities. Some went overseas to try their luck in the colonies.

word coffee apparently derives from *qahwa*, one of several Arabic terms for wine. Imams used this word since the beverage altered consciousness in a noticeable, if not necessarily debilitating, way. Eventually, coffee was decreed an acceptable drink in accordance with scripture, and was widely consumed during fasts such as Ramadan. Both men and women were allowed to drink coffee, but several *fatwas*, or religious prohibitions, were issued against female coffee vendors in the early sixteenth century. As a result, both the public sale and public consumption of coffee became male preserves in the Ottoman Empire.

Coffee's troubles were far from over. If coffee itself was declared wholesome, the places where it was commonly consumed were not. Coffeehouses, sometimes run by non-Muslims, proliferated in major market cities such as Cairo by the early 1500s, drawing hordes of lower-class traders, artisans, and even slaves. Unable to suppress the café even at the core of their empire, Ottoman religious leaders simply denounced them as places of iniquity, dens of sinners. Female musicians played and danced scandalously in some, conservative clerics argued, while other cafés promoted homosexual prostitution. Some coffeehouses served as well-known hangouts for opium and hashish addicts, further tainting their reputation. Then came the vice of tobacco smoking, introduced from the Americas by European merchants in the early seventeenth century.

For Further Information:

Hattox, Ralph. *Coffee and Coffee Houses: The Origins of a Social Beverage in the Medieval Near East*. Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1985.

Schivelbusch, Wolfgang. *Tastes of Paradise: A Social History of Spices, Stimulants, and Intoxicants*. Translated by David Jacobson. New York: Vintage, 1993.

As later proved true in Europe, there were other reasons to fear the coffeehouse. Ottoman officials suspected the cafés as hotbeds of insurrection and treason. Still, they proved impossible to suppress, and coffee vendors quickly sprang back into action when the authorities closed them down. The Ottomans finally relented, deciding that the coffeehouse was an ideal place to gauge popular reactions to state policy and planting spies. In an era before restaurants, and in a religious climate hostile to alcohol and hence taverns, the coffeehouse met a variety of social needs. It was first a place where traveling merchants far from the comforts of home could exchange information, buy their associates a few rounds of satisfying coffee, and perhaps relax with a game of backgammon and a water-cooled smoke. For men of the working class, the coffeehouse became a place of rest and collegiality, and occasionally of political ferment.

QUESTIONS TO CONSIDER


1. How did Islamic clerics' attitude toward coffee change? What factors might account for this shift?
2. How and why did the Ottoman state come to accept the coffeehouse as a social institution?

Everyday Life in Early Modern Europe

Historians estimate that Europe in 1492 had a population of about 70 million, or slightly more than the population of the Americas just prior to Columbus's arrival. By 1550, Europe counted some 85 million inhabitants, and it was still growing rapidly. This population increase was mostly due to reduced mortality rather than increased births. Unlike larger Ming China and Mughal India, Europe's high growth rate was not sustained. A series of epidemics and climatic events beginning in around 1600, coupled with the effects of the Thirty Years' War (1618–1648) and numerous other conflicts, led to population stagnancy and even decline. Europe's population in 1630 was below 80 million, and would not reach 100 million until just before 1700.

The Columbian Exchange was largely responsible for the sixteenth-century population increase. In both city and countryside, American crops radically altered European diets after 1500. Maize, potatoes, tomatoes, capsicum peppers, and many other foods reordered both peasant and elite tastes and needs. In some cases this sped population growth, and in others it simply spiced up an otherwise bland diet. Potatoes came to be associated with Ireland and

Changing Patterns of Consumption




paprika with Hungary and Spain, but these and other American foods were widely embraced and helped spur an increasingly sophisticated consumer culture. American-grown sugar, tobacco, and later chocolate, vanilla, and coffee also figured prominently in Europe's taste revolution, as did Asian-grown tea and a host of exotic spices. European consumers also demanded new drugs such as opium and quinine bark, and merchants who trafficked in these and other tropical goods often made enormous profits. Thus, Europe's new connection with the Americas had a profound impact on its population, culture, and economy (see Map 20.2).

Environmental Transformations

The rise of commercial farming and peasant displacement, as well as overseas expansion, transformed ecosystems. Throughout Europe, more and more forest was cleared. Some princes passed decrees to limit deforestation, usually to preserve hunting grounds rather than for the good of the forest itself, but peasants still entered reserves in search of fuel and timber. Laws against such common use did little to relieve the stress, turning environmental problems into social ones. Shipbuilders, metalsmiths, and construction workers consumed forest as well, and wars and fires destroyed still more. By 1500, many Mediterranean cities, and even some northern European ones, relied on imported wood, sometimes looking as far afield as the Americas for new supplies. Not all environmental transformations were negative, however. The Dutch improved transportation by building canals and reclaimed land for agriculture from the sea by erecting dikes and filling wetlands.

Life Expectancy and Marriage Patterns

More people than ever crowded into European cities. Naples, London, and Paris were each home to more than two hundred thousand inhabitants by 1600. Nearly a dozen other



MAP 20.2

World Trade, c. 1720

Europeans progressively revolutionized global trade through maritime expansion and competition. Overland trade continued apace, but it was European seaborne merchants who were most responsible for bringing exotic goods to Europe, Africa, and the Americas, and for transporting tropical plantation products and precious metals to the rest of the world. The Atlantic slave trade was just one sector of Europe's increasingly global and deeply interconnected trading sphere. A byproduct of European maritime expansion was the so-called Columbian Exchange, the introduction of new foods, animals, and microbes to regions never exposed to them before. The effects were by turns devastating and phenomenally successful.

cities in Iberia, the Netherlands, and Italy were close behind, with populations over one hundred thousand. Still, the vast majority of Europeans remained in the countryside. Life for most, including the nobility, was short. A lucky few survived into their eighties and even nineties in both urban and rural settings, but high infant mortality yielded overall life expectancies of only eighteen to thirty-six years.

Most early modern Europeans did not rush to marry, nor were they compelled to enter arranged marriages, as in some Asian societies. Women were between twenty and twenty-five, on average, when they married. Men married slightly later, between twenty-three and twenty-seven, in part due to itinerant work and military obligations. Relatively few children were born out of wedlock, at least according to surviving church records, but many were conceived before marriage. Most partners could expect to be widowed within twenty years, in which time half a couple's offspring would probably also have died. Moreover, one in ten women died in childbirth. In Europe, as in much of the world at this time, the prospect of death was never far away.

Protestant and Catholic Reformations

Like Islam, Christianity had long been subject to disagreements and schisms. Yet the critiques of Roman Catholicism presented by several sixteenth-century northern European theologians marked the deepest split thus far. Catholic reformers beginning with the German monk Martin Luther argued that the church had so deviated from early Christian

teachings that only radical reform could save the institution. For such reformers, the evident corruption and worldliness of the church were symptoms of a much deeper problem. In their view, the church had drifted into profound doctrinal and theological error. Inspired by a newfound faith in the individual that had its roots in Renaissance humanism (see Chapter 15), Luther and his followers emphasized the individual's ability to interpret scripture and communicate directly with God, without the intercession of priestly intermediaries. Although their opposition to Church teachings was theological, its implications were profoundly political. Outraged Catholic officials branded Luther and his followers Protestant (or protesting) heretics, and much of Europe fell into a century of bloody conflict fueled by religious hatred (see Map 20.3).

The Protestant Challenge

The challenge mounted by Luther amplified old complaints. Many ordinary people had grown dissatisfied with the Roman Catholic Church, particularly in northern Europe. Widespread abuse of benefices, or parish territories, reached a breaking point in the years around 1500, with far too many church officeholders concerned only with the financial rewards associated with their positions.

In 1517 Luther circulated “Ninety-five Theses”—propositions for academic debate—in which he charged that church policy encouraged priests to ignore their parishioners, keep concubines, and concentrate on money-grubbing. Worse, according to Luther, the church had corrupted Christian teachings on sin and forgiveness by inventing Purgatory, a spiritual holding pen where the deceased were purged of their sins before entering Heaven. Luther denounced the widespread sale of **indulgences**, written receipts that promised the payer early release from Purgatory, as a fraud. Heaven, Luther claimed, was the destination of the faithful, not the wealthy or gullible. Such teachings struck a chord among oppressed German peasants, many of whom took up arms in a 1525 rebellion. A social conservative, Luther withheld support from the uprising, but the revolutionary potential of Protestant Christianity was now revealed.

Church fathers balked at the notion of reform and ordered Luther defrocked and excommunicated. He responded by breaking away to form his own “Lutheran” church. Critiques similar to Luther’s issued from the pens of the Swiss Protestant Ulrich Zwingli in 1523 and France’s John Calvin in 1537. By the 1550s, Protestantism in a variety of forms was widespread in northern Europe, and its democratic and antiauthoritarian undercurrents soon yielded radical and unexpected political results. Still, most Europeans remained Catholic, revealing a deep, conservative countercurrent. That countercurrent soon resurfaced with a vengeance, although Catholicism, too, would be transformed.

Anglican Protestant Church

Another major schism occurred in 1534 when England’s King Henry VIII declared his nation Protestant. Although Henry broke with the church for personal and political reasons rather than theological ones (the king wanted a divorce that the pope refused to grant), Anglican Protestantism was quickly embraced as the new state religion. Critics were silenced by Henry’s execution of England’s most prominent Catholic intellectual, Sir Thomas More, author of *Utopia* (1517). As in central and northern Europe, however, this early, mostly peaceful break hardly marked the end of Catholicism in England.

Founding of the Jesuit Order


The Catholic Church’s leaders responded to Protestantism first with stunned disbelief, then vengeful anger. Some among the outraged Catholic majority launched strong but peaceful assaults. In Spain, for example, a Basque soldier calling himself Ignatius of Loyola became a priest and in 1534 founded a new religious order. Approved by the pope in 1540, the Society of Jesus, or Jesuits, soon became the Catholic Church’s greatest educators and wealthiest property managers. More importantly for global history, they set out as missionaries to head off Protestant initiatives overseas. Within a few decades of Loyola’s founding of the order there were Jesuit preachers in places as far-flung as Brazil, West Africa, Ceylon, and Japan (see *Seeing the Past: Gift Clocks for the Emperors of China*). Others stuck closer to home and won back converts in central Europe on the eve of the Thirty Years’ War.

indulgence In early modern Europe, a note sold by the Catholic Church to speed a soul’s exit from Purgatory.

In the face of the Protestant challenge, some high officials within the church called for self-examination, and even the pope ultimately agreed that it was time for the church to

MAP 20.3 Protestant and Catholic Reformations in Europe

In the midst of early overseas expansion, a great schism among Christians emerged in Europe. What Protestants called the Reformation was a fundamental questioning of Roman Catholic doctrine and practice. The dispute quickly produced violence and led some kingdoms, such as England, to break entirely from papal authority. France dissolved into civil war pitting Catholics against Protestants, and Spain and Portugal used their Inquisitions to persecute Protestants as heretics. A Catholic Reformation sought to reform and strengthen the church, but conflict continued to bubble up, leading soon after 1600 to the disastrous Thirty Years' War, the most deadly for civilians yet experienced in world history.



- Predominant religion, c. 1560
- Lutheran
 - Anglican
 - Calvinist
 - Calvinist influenced
 - Roman Catholic
 - Mixed Protestant-Catholic
 - Site of St. Bartholomew's Day massacre, 1572

SEEING THE PAST

Gift Clocks for the Emperors of China



Courting the Qing: European Gift Clocks in the Forbidden City (The Palace Museum, Beijing/ChinaStock.)

With the exception of raw silver, China had little need of products introduced by Europeans hoping to trade for silk, porcelain, and eventually, tea. This presented a great problem for merchants short of silver, but it also challenged early modern European missionaries. The first Jesuits arrived in China in the 1550s, barely a decade after the pope's formal recognition of their order. They spent their first years trying to win poor converts inhabiting the cities along the South China Sea, but by the 1580s some Jesuit priests, such as the Italian Matteo Ricci, began working their way toward Beijing. Given China's huge population, it made sense to try to convert those at the top of the social order in hopes that they would mandate the conversion of their many millions of subjects. Chinese officials, courtiers, and princes were not easily swayed even by the most sophisticated philosophical arguments, but they were almost universally fascinated by advances in Western science and technology.

Aware of this, Ricci developed a special program of "Christian science," attempting to link Western cartography, optics, metallurgy, and clockmaking to notions of divine order. He carried a European clock to Beijing in hopes of wowing the emperor in 1601, and it proved a big hit. A Chinese chronicle from 1603 records the event as follows: "In the twenty-eighth year of the reign of Wanli of the Ming

dynasty, the great Westerner Li Madou [Matteo Ricci] presented a self-sounding bell, a mysterious and unknown art. The great bell sounds the hours, at midday, one sound."

The Chinese were relatively uninterested in Western notions of timekeeping in itself because they had their own means and units of measurement. Instead, the Chinese admired the clocks for their intricate mechanical construction and welcomed them as "high-tech" status symbols. The Jesuits were for many years allowed special access to Beijing's Forbidden City primarily as clock repairmen. Their efforts to link clockwork to godliness in a Western Christian sense failed, but they did eventually spawn royal workshops capable of producing elaborate if not particularly accurate timepieces

by the early eighteenth century. Under Qing rule, the Royal Office of Clock Manufacture opened in 1723. By this time, advances in English clock- and watchmaking coincided with increased British interest in China, leading to a new wave of gift timepieces meant to win favor at court. Those shown here are on display today in the Forbidden City, the Ming and Qing imperial palace in Beijing that now houses the Palace Museum. Gifts from a range of Western ambassadors, they reveal European states' centuries-long effort to curry favor with the powerful Chinese Empire.

Source: Catherine Pagani, *Eastern Magnificence and Western Ingenuity: Clocks of Late Imperial China* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2001).

EXAMINING THE EVIDENCE

1. Why did Western missionaries such as Ricci think that introducing European clocks to China would aid conversion efforts?
2. How did Chinese appreciation of these clocks reflect cultural differences between them and Europeans?

clarify its mission. The Council of Trent (1545–1563) yielded a new charter for the Roman Catholic Church. Far from offering compromises, however, Trent reaffirmed the Catholic Church's conservatism. Purgatory and indulgences were not eliminated, nor was priestly celibacy. Sacraments such as marriage were reinforced and sexual behavior more circumscribed than ever before. The church also policed ideas and banned books. Cervantes was fortunate to have only one sentence of *Don Quixote* removed. In some places, such as the staunchly Catholic Iberian world, the Holy Office of the Inquisition acted as enforcer of the new precepts, rooting out and punishing alleged deviance. Historians have shown that ordinary Catholics could be skeptical of the church's dogmatic claims, but much of what we know about these freethinkers comes from their Inquisition trial records.

In the wake of Trent, France's Catholics began persecuting Huguenots, as Calvinist Protestants were known in France, in earnest. This culminated in the Saint Bartholomew's Day massacre of 1572, in which tens of thousands of Huguenots were slaughtered and their bodies mutilated (see again Map 20.3). Just back from America, horrified Huguenot Jean de Léry wrote how "civilized" French Christians had proved themselves far more barbaric than Brazil's Tupinamba cannibals, who at least killed one another according to rigid honor codes. Hostilities ended only in 1598 when the French king Henry IV signed the Edict of Nantes granting Protestants freedom to practice their religion. It helped that Henry IV was a former Protestant, but the Huguenots' troubles were not over.

Council of Trent

French Wars of Religion

Imperial Spain and Its Challenges

With religiously and politically fractured kingdoms and duchies the rule in early modern Europe, unified Spain proved to be the exception. Largely financed by the wealth of their numerous overseas colonies, Spain's Catholic Habsburg monarchs sought to consolidate their gains in Europe, and more importantly, to challenge the much larger and more powerful Ottoman Empire to the east. As we have seen, the fight against the "Great Turk," to use the language of the day, forever altered the lives of veterans such as Miguel de Cervantes.

Philip II came to the throne of Spain in 1556, when his father, Holy Roman Emperor Charles V (r. 1516–1556), abdicated. The title of "Emperor" passed to Ferdinand, Charles's brother, but Philip inherited extensive holdings of his own. Taken together, his kingdoms were much larger and richer than his uncle's. Indeed, by 1598, the year of his death, Philip II ruled the world's first empire "upon which the sun never set." The distant Philippines were claimed and named for him in 1565. Still, governing a far-flung and culturally diverse empire brought more burden than pleasure. A forceful but pious monarch, Spain's so-called Prudent King would die doubting his own salvation.

One of Philip's first concerns, inherited from his father, was centralization in the core kingdoms. Castile and Aragon had been nominally united with the marriage of Isabella and Ferdinand in 1469, but local nobles and semiautonomous cities such as Barcelona continued to challenge royal authority. Charles's attempts to assert his will had sparked rebellions in the 1520s, and regional resentments in Iberia itself continued to fester throughout the period of overseas expansion. Philip responded in part by turning Madrid, formerly a dusty medieval crossroads in central Castile, into a world-class capital and Spain's unequivocal center. The capital's building boom was funded in large part by American treasure. Palaces, churches, monasteries, and residential structures proliferated, often blending traditional Castilian and northern European architectural styles. Envious neighbors joked that the Spanish had discovered a magic formula for turning silver into stone.

Thanks to New World treasure, Spain had become Europe's most formidable state by the second half of the sixteenth century. Among other successes, Philip's forces had beaten, as we have seen, the Ottoman navy at Lepanto in 1571. Philip's biggest setback was the revolt of the Netherlands, a politically and religiously divided region inherited from his father. The so-called Dutch Revolt, which began in 1566, taxed Iberian resources severely before its end in 1648. This was a war the Spanish lost, despite enormous effort.

Reign of Philip II

Annexation of Portugal

Two other key events in Philip II's reign were the assumption of the Portuguese throne in 1580 and the 1588 attempt to invade England by sea. Both events had global significance. Portugal's King Sebastian died without an heir in 1578, and the subsequent succession crisis ended only when Philip, whose mother was Isabella of Portugal, stepped in to take the crown. Legitimate or not, Philip's move required an armed invasion, and the Portuguese always regarded Spanish rule, which lasted from 1580 until 1640, as unlawful and oppressive. In global terms, Spanish-Portuguese union meant that one monarch now ruled a substantial portion of Europe, much of the Americas, and dozens of far-flung Asian and African ports, islands, and sea routes. No European challenger was even close.

Philip knew this, and he assumed his good fortune was a reflection of divine will. Like many powerful individuals at their peak, Philip overstretched his mandate. Irritated by English harassment of the Spanish in the Americas and by English aid to the Dutch rebels, and motivated first and foremost by a determination to bring England back into the Catholic fold, Philip decided to launch a full-scale invasion of the British Isles. Such an undertaking would require the concentration of an enormous amount of military resources, and as at Lepanto, the stakes were correspondingly huge.

The Spanish Armada

The Spanish **Armada** of 1588, the largest and most expensive naval force assembled up to

that time, appears in retrospect to have been an ill-considered enterprise. Means of communication were few and slow, and most Spanish sailors were poorly equipped for foul weather. Neither side regarded the invasion as foolish at the time, however, and ultimately it was defeated due to a host of factors, only some of them within Spanish control. The Spanish stockpiled supplies for years, and even Cervantes took part, as a clerk charged with cataloguing stores of olive oil and other foods. When it came time to fight, English defenders such as the famous pirate Francis Drake, aided by numerous Dutch allies, were critical; they knew the English Channel and understood Spanish tactics and technology. English guns were also powerful, carefully placed, and well manned. Aiding this defense were harsh weather, contrary winds, poorly mounted cannon, and numerous other complications. Spanish luck went from bad to worse.

Ships not sunk by English and Dutch artillery were battered by waves and drawn off course by fierce gusts. The great Spanish fleet scattered, and the remaining vessels were forced to sail north around Scotland to avoid capture. Here in the cold North Atlantic, Spanish sailors died by the hundreds of hunger and exposure. Some survivors were captured off the coast of Ireland. The English, hardly the sea power they would later become, were jubilant. Subjects of the fiercely Protestant Elizabeth I had proved that mighty Philip and his great armada were not invincible after all.

Spain's misfortunes only compounded in the wake of the armada disaster, and although the world's most extensive empire was hardly crumbling, Philip II's successors faced a potent new competitor in the form of the breakaway Dutch Republic. The Dutch projected their power overseas beginning in the 1590s, and by 1640 the Dutch East and West India companies took over many of the key trading posts held by the joint Spanish-Portuguese Empire from the Caribbean islands to Japan. Beginning in 1630, the West India Company occupied northeastern Brazil, calling this vast territory New Holland. What the Dutch did not know was that at precisely this time the main sources of Spanish wealth, the great silver mines of Potosí in present-day Bolivia, were petering out.

Much of the world was deeply affected. Declining silver revenues combined with other chance factors sparked what has become known as "the seventeenth-century crisis" (see Figure 20.1).



armada A fleet of warships; usually used in reference to the Spanish naval fleet defeated by England in 1588.



Defeat of the Spanish Armada

Gunpowder weapons are very much on display in this dramatic 1601 painting by Dutch marine artist Hendrik Cornelisz Vroom of the 1588 Anglo-Dutch defeat of the Spanish Armada in the English Channel. High winds, shown by the stretched sail canvas, helped English and Dutch forces to outmaneuver and trap Spanish ships, which they blasted with their superior cannon. Several large vessels went down, and all on board drowned. Surviving Spanish ships sailed north around Scotland, where many crewmembers died of exposure. Others were captured in Ireland. It was one of the greatest naval defeats of early modern times. (Scala/White Images/Art Resource, NY.)

The Seventeenth-Century Crisis

Few topics have generated as much debate among historians as the seventeenth-century crisis, a complex series of events and trends that affected much of Europe and the Mediterranean basin from about 1600 to 1660. Some scholars have even claimed that no general crisis occurred, only a cluster of unrelated catastrophes. In any case, Europe's post-1660 rebound and push toward global maritime dominance seems remarkable.

How did one of the world's most politically divided, religiously intolerant, and economically fractured regions give rise, in a relatively short time, to secular models of government, rational scientific inquiry, and financial capitalism, all hallmarks of modernity?

Historians focus on different causes, depending on their interpretive bent. Political and military historians focus on the "modern" horrors and early nationalism of the Thirty Years' War and related conflicts. Here, unlike in Asia and North Africa, gunpowder led to the dissolution rather than consolidation of empires. Economic historians focus on the shifting influx of American silver and its effects on food and other commodity prices. Some argue that inflated prices and economic depression had both negative and positive effects, sparking riots while prompting technical and financial innovations. Still other historians, informed by modern scientific techniques, focus on climate, analyzing ice cores and tree rings, along with traditional historical sources, to document the extent of the so-called Little Ice Age, which, as we will see, enveloped Europe from about 1550 to 1700. In the end it is hard to say which of these factors was most responsible for either the widespread turmoil or the swift turnaround that followed, but most historians agree that something transformative had occurred.

In the midst of a twelve-year truce between the Spanish and Dutch, the Thirty Years' War (1618–1648) broke out in




FIGURE 20.1 The Rise and Fall of Silver Imports to Spain, 1550–1660

The Thirty Years' War

Dutch artist Jan Maertzen de Jonghe graphically depicts the horrors of the battlefield in this 1634 rendering of the 1627 Battle of Dirschau, near Gdansk, Poland. The battle pitted Swedish king Gustav II, whose slain body appears in the foreground, against Polish-Lithuanian forces led by General Stanislaw Koniecpolski, shown here astride a chestnut horse. Soldiers and horses lie dead or wounded in this picture, but later in the Thirty Years' War, it was civilian casualties that reached levels not seen before in Europe. The Battle of Dirschau was one of several bloody encounters leading to stalemate in 1629, and this painting emphasizes the war's chaos and destruction more than its heroism. (akg-images.)



The Thirty Years' War

central Europe. This complex conflict pitted Christian factions against one another in a civil and international war that radically reshaped Europe's borders. The Thirty Years' War was devastating for civilians. Caught in the crossfire, they were forced to support occupying troops, only to be massacred for doing so when the tide turned and the other side's troops moved in.

In essence, the Thirty Years' War was over the internal politics of the Holy Roman Empire in central Europe (see again Map 20.3). This was really only a loose confederacy—since the days of Emperor Charles V, substantial autonomy had been ceded to an increasing number of Lutheran and Calvinist principalities and duchies. Inhabitants of these Protestant enclaves rightly feared a more assertive Catholic emperor. Emperor Ferdinand II was such a person, an ambitious, Jesuit-educated militant. When it became clear that Ferdinand might re-Catholicize central Europe, the various enemies of the Habsburgs sent aid, then joined the fray.

Before the war ground to a close, a variety of German and Bohemian princes, the kings of Denmark, Poland, and Sweden, plus the English, French, Dutch, and finally the Spanish had all been drawn into the conflict. Contemporary engravings and paintings from its last phase depict the full range of human cruelty, a blatant reminder, like the Saint Bartholomew's Day massacre, that Europeans were as capable of savagery as America's famous warrior cultures. At war's end at least a third of the population of Germany had died, and the region's infrastructure lay in ruins. From population decline to decreased agricultural production, the war was a manifestation of the seventeenth-century crisis.

Silver and Depression

It was also enormously costly in terms of money, the supply of which was shifting. Economic historians have found that throughout Europe prices rose even as demand fell. In one interpretation, an overabundance of silver in the late sixteenth century drove prices up, after which a sequence of plagues, droughts, wars, and other disasters killed off both consumers and suppliers of basic goods throughout Europe, leading to depression. A sustained drop in silver income beginning in around 1600 made hard money scarce when it was already overvalued, forcing many people to resort to barter. Thus, the fabulous wealth of the Americas proved both a blessing and a curse, shifting the global balance of power in Europe's favor at the same time that it led to dangerous and destructive economic volatility.

The Dutch Exception

Hard times for the masses could be good for some, and it appears that the Dutch fared rather well, particularly in comparison with the Spanish and Portuguese. The Netherlands' unique mix of financial capitalism, religious toleration, and overseas conquest seemed to

An Exiled European Muslim Visits the Netherlands

After an Ottoman-supported rebellion in Andalusia from 1569 to 1571, Spain's remaining forced converts to Christianity from Islam, or Moriscos, faced increasing persecution. Many fled to Morocco, Algeria, and other Muslim havens in North Africa, especially during a last wave of expulsions ordered by Philip III from 1609 to 1614. Among the refugees was Ahmad Ibn Qasim al-Hajari, born with the Spanish surname Bejarano in around 1569 in a village in Extremadura, not far from the birthplaces of Francisco Pizarro and Hernando Cortés. Al-Hajari went on to become a major spokesman for the Morisco community in exile, and he wrote and traveled widely. His best-known work, composed and circulated in both Arabic and Spanish, is called *The Supporter of Religion Against the Infidel* (c. 1637). In this passage, al-Hajari describes his visit to the Netherlands.

About the Netherlands: You should know that I set out for that country deliberately, although it lies farther from our own country than France. But a man should seek protection from others or from himself, and after I had experienced the way French sailors were treating Muslims, I said: I will not return to my country in one of those ships, but I will go to the country of the Netherlands, because they do not harm Muslims but treat them well. . . .

After I reached the City of Amsterdam, I marveled at the beauty of its architecture and the style of its buildings, its cleanness and the great number of its inhabitants. Its population was almost like that of the City of Paris in France. There is no city in the world with so many ships as it has! One says that the total number of its ships, including the smaller and the bigger ones, is six thousand. As for the houses, each of these is painted and decorated with marvelous colors from top to bottom. Not one resembles another in the

art of its painting. All the streets are made of paved stones. . . .

One should know that the Netherlands consists of seventeen islands, all of which used to belong to the Sultan of al-Andalus [the king of Spain]. At a certain time, a man appeared in those lands who was held as a great scholar by them, called Luther, as well as another scholar called Calvin. Each of them wrote his view of the corruption and deviation from the religion of our lord Jesus and the Gospel that had come about in the religion of the Christians. They said the popes in Rome misled the people by worshiping idols and by the additions they introduced into the faith by forbidding priests and monks to marry, and many other things. All the people of the Netherlands . . . embraced this doctrine and they rose up against their sultan until today. The people of the Sultanate of the English also follow this doctrine. There are also many of them in France. Their scholars warn them against the popes and the worshiping of idols. They tell them they should not hate Muslims because they are the Sword of God on His earth against the worshipers of idols.

Source: Ahmad Ibn Qasim al-Hajari, *The Supporter of Religion Against the Infidel*, ed. and trans. P. S. Van Koningsveld, Q. al-Samarrai, and G. A. Wieggers (Madrid: Consejo Superior de Investigaciones Científicas, 1997), 194–195.

EXAMINING THE EVIDENCE

1. What aspects of the Netherlands most impress al-Hajari?
2. How clear is al-Hajari's understanding of the Protestant Reformation?

offset many of the difficulties faced by other states (see Reading the Past: An Exiled European Muslim Visits the Netherlands). The Dutch East India Company's spice-island takeovers in Southeast Asia were critical, as seen in Chapter 19, but Dutch pirates, many sponsored by the West India Company, were also busy capturing Spanish silver fleets in the Caribbean.

Historians have long suggested that the climatic change known as the Little Ice Age may have spurred rebellion and even war during the seventeenth century, but only recently have enough data been assembled to generate a fairly clear picture of the century's weather cycles. It now appears that four of the five coldest summers ever recorded in the Northern Hemisphere occurred in the seventeenth century, and that global volcanic activity was probably a major contributing factor to the cooldown. Global cooling shortened growing seasons just as Europeans were pushing into more marginal and thus vulnerable agricultural lands. In alpine valleys, for example, peasants and herders were driven from their highland homes by advancing glaciers. Unprecedented droughts ravaged traditionally wet regions such as Scotland in the 1630s and 1640s, sparking violent uprisings in the midst of an already unstable political climate.

Little Ice Age

Increased Persecutions

The Little Ice Age affected regions far beyond European borders. The worst drought in five hundred years was recorded on the Yangzi River between 1641 and 1644, probably contributing to the 1644 fall of the Ming dynasty in China (discussed in Chapter 21). Ottoman territories were also hit: Egypt's Nile River fell to its lowest recorded levels between 1640 and 1643. Troops on the Persian frontier rebelled when their pay in silver coin proved insufficient to buy food.

Within Europe, the seventeenth-century crisis took on more sinister social dimensions with the rise of witchcraft trials and Inquisition prosecutions. In Protestant Europe, thousands of women were executed for alleged acts of sorcery, and in Catholic Spain and its colonies an unprecedented number of Jews were killed by order of the Inquisition between 1637 and 1649. It is difficult to know why these repressive outbursts occurred in the midst of war, famine, and other problems, but the tendency to scapegoat vulnerable persons in uncertain times has been documented elsewhere. More positive outcomes of the seventeenth-century crisis included scientific discoveries and novel political ideas that eventually took on global importance.

European Innovations in Science and Government 1550–1750

FOCUS

What factors enabled European scientific and political innovations in the early modern period?

In the aftermath of the religious wars of the sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries, a new wave of political consolidation took place in northern and central Europe in the form of absolutist and constitutionalist monarchies. Many of these states, like their Spanish, Portuguese, and Dutch predecessors, took their expansionist energies overseas. Global expansion, as these earlier players had learned, entailed great risks and huge defense costs. In addition to building professional navies, states created licensing agencies and sponsored monopoly trading companies. Financial innovations included stock markets and double-entry accounting, essential ingredients of modern capitalism. Also emerging from the divided world of Europe was a new development aided by the printing press and other technologies: the “scientific revolution.” Although restricted for many years to a small number of theorists and experimenters who shared their work in Latin treatises, Europe's embrace of science was to prove globally significant.


The Scientific Revolution

The rise of modern Western science is often described, rather like the Protestant Reformation, as a heroic struggle against a hidebound Catholic tradition. Certainly church patriarchs clung to traditional ideas when challenged by the new science. Still, it was very often Catholic-educated priests and seminarians, along with the odd basement alchemist, who broke the mold in early modern times. Even the Protestants' access to scientific books owed everything to the labors of countless Catholic monks who over centuries had transcribed, translated, and sometimes composed key treatises. They were in turn indebted to numerous medieval Islamic scholars based in cities such as Baghdad and Córdoba. Finally, in early modern times, the printing press and a general interest in technical improvements helped give thousands access to knowledge.

As with the “seventeenth-century crisis,” historians have long debated whether or not Europe experienced a genuine “scientific revolution” in the early modern era. Skeptics argue that the key innovations of the period were too restricted to educated elites and court patrons to justify the term *revolution*. In contrast, proponents describe an unprecedented shift in worldview that resonated beyond the small circle of known “scientific rebels.”

Call it what we may, European intellectuals after about 1550 increasingly expressed skepticism about received wisdom and began to employ mathematical formulas and empirical (observable) data in an effort to discover the rules by which nature operated. Inductive and deductive reasoning were guiding principles in their efforts. Inductive reasoning—deriving general principles from particular facts and empirical evidence—was most clearly articulated by the English statesman and writer Sir Francis Bacon. Its complement, deductive reasoning—the process of reasoning from a self-evident general principle to a specific fact—was the contri-

geocentrism The ancient belief that the earth is the center of the universe.



The Copernican Universe

The earth still appears quite large in relation to other planets in this 1660 rendering of a heliocentric, or sun-centered, cosmos, but the breakthrough initiated by Nicolaus Copernicus in 1543 is fully evident. Copernicus did not know that planets such as earth traced elliptical rather than perfectly circular orbits, but this was a minor error compared to the older view of a geocentric universe claimed since the days of the great ancient Greek philosopher Aristotle. (akg-images/historic-maps.)

tribution of French thinker and mathematician René Descartes. One result of this new search for universal rules was a developing understanding of the way things worked, including the cosmos. Since this was akin to describing “Heaven” in a secular way, many churchmen bristled.

The first breakthroughs were made by a Polish monk, Nicolaus Copernicus. Copernicus was the first to systematically question the ancient Ptolemaic model of the cosmos, which was geocentric, or earth-centered. Copernicus’s collected observations of solar, lunar, and planetary movements did not support **geocentrism**, suggesting instead that the stars and planets, including the earth, revolved around a fixed sun. Fearing ridicule, Copernicus did not publish his *On the Revolutions of the Heavenly Spheres* until 1543, the year of his death. Following Copernicus, the Danish astronomer Tycho Brahe compiled a wealth of “eyeball” data relating to planetary and stellar movements. This data was precise enough to help the German Johannes Kepler work out an elegant if not yet persuasive heliocentric, or sun-centered, model in which the planets circled the sun in elliptical orbits.

Many of Europe’s most probing minds were open to the truth of **heliocentrism**, and some went on to risk not only reputations but lives to advance the project of wedding mathematics to observed phenomena. In works such as *The Advancement of Learning* (1605), Sir Francis Bacon attacked reliance on ancient writers and ardently supported the scientific method based on inductive reasoning and empirical experimentation. Bacon had his critics, but he was shielded from persecution by the Protestant English state, which he served as lord chancellor. By contrast, the Italian scientist Galileo Galilei is best remembered for his insistence, against an unforgiving Catholic Church, that nature was governed by mathematical laws. Although the Inquisition placed Galileo under house arrest, his use of new, high-grade telescopes to observe the moons of Jupiter furthered the cause of heliocentrism and challenged reliance on received wisdom.

Ultimately, minor deviations between Kepler’s model and careful empirical observation were worked out in large part by the English scientist Isaac Newton. The elliptical planetary orbits discovered by Kepler, Newton argued through word and formula in *Principia Mathematica* (*Mathematical Principles*, 1687), resulted from the laws of motion, including the principle of gravity, which explained the forces that controlled the movement not only of

Early Breakthroughs

Newton’s Synthesis

heliocentrism The early modern discovery that the sun is the center of our solar system.

Advance of the New Science Beyond Europe

planets but of objects on earth. The whole universe was brought together in one majestic system. Whereas Copernicus had feared publishing his findings in his lifetime, Newton faced a much more receptive audience. His synthesis would prevail until the twentieth century.

Other educated Europeans were testing boundaries in distant corners of the world. In the last years of the sixteenth century the Italian Jesuit Matteo Ricci stunned the Ming court with his vast knowledge of mechanics and mathematics. The Spanish-American metallurgist and parish priest Alvaro Alonso Barba went further, challenging received wisdom through experimentation in his 1627 treatise, *The Art of Metals*. Here in the remote silver mines of Potosí, high in the mountains of what is today Bolivia, Barba was sufficiently informed to comment on Galileo's observations of the moons of Jupiter as outlined in his 1610 publication, *Sidereus Nuncius* (*The Starry Messenger*).

The Emergence of Capitalism

Another great puzzle of early modern Europe regards the emergence of **capitalism**—an economic system in which private individuals or groups make their goods and services available on a free market and seek to take advantage of market conditions to profit from their activities. In developing a capitalist economic system, Europe diverged from the rest of the world, especially after 1650. To be sure, the desire to accumulate wealth and realize profits was by no means new. Ever since the introduction of agriculture and the production of surplus crops, some individuals and groups had accumulated great wealth. As we saw in Chapter 15, merchants in the fifteenth-century “global bazaar” avidly pursued profits from overseas trade. During early modern times, however, European merchants and entrepreneurs transformed their society in a way that none of their predecessors had.

Role of Trading Companies

Historians and economists remain divided as to how capitalism came about, as well as where it started. Most agree, however, that there were two overlapping stages: first commercial, and later industrial. Large trading companies such as the English East India Company and its Dutch competitor, the VOC, were especially important institutions in the commercial stage of capitalism. They spread the risks attached to expensive business enterprises and also took advantage of extensive communications and transportation networks. The trading companies organized commercial ventures on a larger scale than ever before in world history. They were supported by an array of businesses and services. Banks, for example, appeared in all the major commercial cities of Europe to safeguard funds and to grant loans to launch new ventures. Insurance companies mitigated financial losses from risky undertakings. Stock exchanges provided markets where investors could buy and sell shares in the trading companies, and they dealt in other commodities as well. Thus, innovative financial institutions and services created new connections among Europeans that facilitated expansion into global markets.

Rise of Wageworkers and the Bourgeoisie

In the countryside, meanwhile, innovations in mechanization and transport led to gains in productivity that exceeded population growth, especially in northwestern Europe. The arrival of potatoes and other New World crops boosted yields and filled peasant bellies. American sugar was increasingly used to preserve fruits through the long winter. Better food security enabled some peasants to sell their surplus labor for cash wages. Wages made peasants small-scale consumers, a new kind of market participant.

More dependable food supplies came with a social cost, however, most immediately felt by English peasants. Only landowners with secure titles to their property could take advantage of the new crops to practice commercial farming. Rich landowners therefore “enclosed” the land—that is, consolidated their holdings—and got Parliament to give them title to the common lands that in the past had been open to all. Land enclosure turned tenant farmers and sharecroppers into landless farm laborers. Many moved to the cities to seek work.

Cities became increasingly home to merchants, or burghers, as well as to wageworkers. The burghers, or **bourgeoisie**, grew to compete with the old nobility, particularly in England, the Netherlands, and parts of France, Germany, and Italy, as consumers of luxury goods. Especially after 1660 their economic power was boosting their political power.

capitalism In early modern Europe, a new way of conducting business by pooling money, goods, and labor to make a profit.

bourgeoisie In early modern Europe, a new class of burghers, or urban-dwelling merchants.

Europe's manufacturing sector was also deeply transformed. Beginning in the late Middle Ages, rising demand for textiles led to expanded production of woolen and linen fabrics. The major growth of the cloth industries took place in northern Europe beginning in the sixteenth century, when Spanish-American silver flowed through Spain to France, England, and Holland, despite ongoing conflicts. Asians did not much care for Europe's products, but colonists did. Millions of bolts of Dutch and French linens, as well as English woolens, were sent across the Atlantic, and even the Pacific, to Spanish and Portuguese colonies. Global interdependence grew ever tighter through the circulation of fabrics and silver. Europe's textile manufacturers begged Amsterdam and London merchants for Spanish-American dyes, along with Brazilian and Central American dyewood. Profits from growing international trade in textiles were then reinvested in more land for flax growing, larger weaving shops, and wages for increasing numbers of specialized workers. With the application of scientific principles and ever more innovative mechanical apparatus by the early eighteenth century, the stage was set for the emergence of industrial capitalism in England (discussed in Chapter 24).

England's commercial leadership in the eighteenth century had its origins in the mercantilism of the seventeenth century. European **mercantilism** was a system of economic regulations aimed at increasing the power of the state. It rested on the general premise that a nation's power and wealth were determined by its supply of precious metals, which were to be acquired by increasing exports (paid for with gold) and reducing imports to achieve domestic self-sufficiency. What distinguished English mercantilism was the notion that government economic regulations could and should serve the private interests of individuals and groups as well as the public needs of the state. For example, the Navigation Acts of the seventeenth century required that English goods be transported in English ships and restricted colonial exports to raw materials, enriching English merchants and manufacturers as well as the Crown.

Cornering the Atlantic slave trade and Indian Ocean cloth trade were England's two key overseas commercial objectives in the eighteenth century, and profits from both fueled industrial growth at home. As we will see in Chapter 22, English settlers amassed huge plantations in the Caribbean and North American mainland, based primarily on the labor of enslaved Africans, the profits from which they mostly sent home. English inroads in the Indian Ocean trade circuit, meanwhile, grew to eclipse all other European competitors. Capital that had been accumulated in the slave trade, Atlantic plantation complex, and East India monopolies was soon invested in industrial production in several English cities. Goods thus manufactured were subsequently forced on buyers in captive overseas markets, such as the North American colonies, enabling still greater capital accumulation in the imperial center. State power was exercised at every step, from the seizure of native American lands to the sale of African bodies, harsh reminders that the rise of industrial capitalism in England was not a magical or even a natural process, but rather the result of concerted applications of force in many parts of the world.

New Political Models: Absolutism and Constitutionalism

Europe in the wake of the Thirty Years' War witnessed the rise of two new state forms: absolutism and constitutionalism. Worn out by the costs of conflict, the Habsburg Empire fell into decline. A number of challengers sought to fill the void, including the commercially savvy Dutch, but it was the French under the Bourbon king Louis XIV who emerged pre-eminent. Not far behind, however, were the English, who despite a midcentury civil war moved to consolidate control over the British Isles and many overseas possessions by the early eighteenth century. As the great imperial rivals of the time, Britain and France developed distinct systems of governance later copied and modified by others. The monarchs of England found themselves sharply restricted by elected parliaments, whereas those of France sought absolute authority and claimed quasi-divinity. Despite their differing models of rule, the British and French managed to create the largest, most heavily armed, and widest-ranging navies yet seen in world history.

Although Spain's Philip II and other Habsburgs had acted in autocratic and grandiose ways since the mid-sixteenth century, no European monarch matched the heady blend of

Role of Textile Manufacture

Capitalism and Politics

mercantilism A system of economic regulations aimed at increasing the power of the state.

Absolutism in France

state drama and personal charisma of France's Louis XIV (r. 1643–1715). The “Sun-King,” as he came to be known, personified the absolutist ruler who shared power with no one. Louis XIV spent much of his long reign centralizing state authority in order to make France a global contender. Though successful in the short run, Louis's form of **absolutism**—propped up in large part by rising taxes and a general contempt for the common masses—sowed the seeds of its own destruction.

Louis XIV came to the throne as a five-year-old, and his mother, Anne of Austria, and her Italian-born adviser and rumored lover, Cardinal Mazarin, ruled in his name. Under the regency, resistance quickly emerged in the form of the *Fronde*, a five-year period of instability from 1648 to 1653 that grew from a regional tax revolt into a potential civil war. Critics coined the term *Fronde*, French for a child's slingshot, to signify that the revolts were mere child's play. In fact, they posed an unprecedented threat to the Crown. Historians of the seventeenth-century crisis have often linked the uprisings to climate change, agricultural stresses, and price fluctuations. Whatever the *Fronde*'s causes, nobles and district courts, or *parlements* (PARLE-mohn), asserted their power against the regency. In the end, the revolt was put down, and when Mazarin died in 1661, Louis XIV assumed total control. He would not forget the *Fronde*, drawing from it the lesson that the independent power of the French aristocracy must be eliminated and that all power and authority in France must derive from the king.

Like many other monarchs faced with entrenched power structures, Louis XIV spent the next several decades co-opting nobles and potential religious opponents through a mix of patronage and punishment. His rule was authoritarian, and like that of his Spanish Habsburg precursor, Philip II, intolerant of religious difference. After persecuting non-conformist Catholics in the 1660s, Louis exiled the country's remaining Huguenots, French Protestants whose protection had been guaranteed by Henry IV in the Edict of Nantes of 1598. Absolutism was extended to the press as well, with pro-state propaganda and harsh censorship of criticism the order of the day.

The French absolutist state also relied on loyal crown officers, called *intendants* (ON-tohn-don), whose authority superseded that of local *parlements* and nobles. These officials governed districts, or departments, in the king's name, administering justice, collecting taxes, and organizing defense. Loyal bureaucrats also included high-ranking commoners such as Jean-Baptiste Colbert, Louis's minister of finance. As a trusted favorite, Colbert also oversaw naval and overseas trade affairs, taking a close interest in French expansion in the Caribbean and North America. As the Ottomans had already shown, rewarding merit-worthy commoners with high office was as much a part of early modern government as containing the aspirations of high nobles. Building an overseas empire greatly expanded the scope of patronage politics.

More than any other early European monarch, Louis XIV arranged court life to serve as a sort of state theater. As in Inca Peru or Ming China, the ruler was allegedly divine, and physical proximity to him was regarded as both desirable and dangerous. A constant stream of propaganda in the form of poems, processions, statues, and medals celebrated the greatness of the monarch. “The state?” Louis asked rhetorically. “It is I.”


To house his bulging court, which included growing numbers of fawning and reluctantly drafted nobles, Louis XIV ordered thousands of artisans and laborers to construct a palace befitting his magnificence. Built between 1662 and 1685, Versailles, just outside Paris, was to exceed the ambitious dimensions of Philip II's Escorial. Though hardly the pleasure dome outsiders and common folk imagined it to be, and far less opulent than the palace of Louis's near contemporary, Mughal emperor Shah Jahan, Versailles set a new model for European court grandeur. It was also a physical embodiment of Louis's political ideology. Versailles was a central point from which, at least in theory, all political power and authority flowed.

Tax increases helped to cover the costs of building and maintaining Versailles. The point of raising taxes during Louis XIV's rule was not simply to underwrite court opulence, however. More costly by far were the armed forces. Naval construction grew tremendously under Colbert's direction, but the professionalization and reorganization of land forces was even more extensive. By 1700 France, a country of some 20 million people, could field three hundred thousand soldiers. This was more than ten times the number of soldiers in England, a country with about half of France's total population.

Court Culture and State Power

absolutism A political theory holding that all power should be vested in one ruler; also such a system of government.

constitutionalism An early modern system of government based on a written charter defining a power-sharing arrangement between a monarch and representative bodies, or parliaments.



Palace of Versailles

In this 1668 aerial view of Versailles, painter Pierre Patel seeks to encompass the full grandeur and orderliness of French king Louis XIV's famous palace and retreat. Begun in 1661, Versailles instantly became a symbol of absolutist power, a virtual city unto itself. Many early modern rulers ordered the construction or expansion of similarly opulent structures, such as the Ottomans' Topkapi Palace in Istanbul and the Mughals' Red Fort complex in Delhi. (akg-images.)

Louis used his army and navy primarily to confront his powerful Habsburg neighbors to the east and south, although his aggression upset many others, including the English, Swedes, and Dutch. First were incursions into the Spanish Netherlands in the 1660s and 1670s, then into Germany in the 1680s and 1690s. Both conflicts ended with only minor gains for France, but Louis was feared enough to be dubbed the “Christian Turk.” Meanwhile, the Crown sponsored French trading companies that vied with their Dutch and English counterparts to penetrate the markets of Africa, the Middle East, India, and Southeast Asia.

Most important in global terms was the War of the Spanish Succession (1701–1714). This long, bloody, and complex conflict proved disastrous for the French because most of Europe allied against them, fearing the consequences of French control over Spanish territories. It ended with England the ultimate victor and France forced to cede exclusive trading privileges with Spanish America (see Map 20.4). Military service, meanwhile, became a standard feature of life for French commoners, along with high taxes and periodic food shortages. Absolutism was good for centralizing authority, but not, as it would turn out, for keeping the peace.

The turmoil of seventeenth-century Europe resulted in both absolute monarchy and a lasting alternative form of government. **Constitutionalism** requires rulers to share power with representative bodies, or parliaments. In England, birthplace of constitutionalism, taxation was always at issue, but so were other matters such as religious freedom and class representation.

Constitutions were charters guaranteeing subjects certain rights, but which subjects and what rights? For a time, it was mostly elites whose economic and religious interests won out. Indeed, far from being democratically elected representatives of the popular classes, members of the constitutionalist parliament—whether in England, Holland, or Poland—were generally landlords and merchants. Some were prominent clergymen. None were artisans or peasants.

English constitutionalism did not emerge peacefully. Instead, when in 1641 King Charles I (r. 1625–1649) attempted to play absolutist monarch before England's centuries-old Parliament of wealthy property owners, he met a resistance so violent it cost him his life. Charles's timing, as historians of the seventeenth-century crisis have pointed out, could not have been worse: thousands were starving after a sequence of failed harvests. In what was surely among the most startling if not revolutionary acts of the early modern period, subjects decided that if the king was judged to be acting out-of-bounds, he should go.

England's showdown with the king had a long backstory. Charles had distrusted Parliament from the start of his rule and refused to call it into session throughout the 1630s.

Wars of Expansion


Constitutionalism in England

English Civil War

MAP 20.4

War of the Spanish Succession, 1701–1714

Unlike the Thirty Years' War of the previous century, the War of the Spanish Succession was openly understood to be a global power contest rather than a conflict over religious faith. With the Ottomans, Iberians, and even the Dutch in decline, the main contestants were Great Britain and France. Great Britain and its allies won the war, but in the Treaty of Utrecht they allowed the French prince to take the throne as Philip V in exchange for a monopoly on the slave trade to Spanish America and other concessions, such as the strategic Mediterranean post of Gibraltar and the island of Minorca.



Unconventional taxes and religious edicts eroded the king's support in England and provoked a rebellion in Scotland. Parliament was called in 1640 to meet this last crisis, but representatives surprised the monarch by demanding sweeping reforms. Many Protestants felt that the king supported Catholicism, the religion of his French wife, and the most radical among them, the Puritans, pushed hardest for checks on royal power. Charles reacted with force, touching off the English Civil War of 1642 to 1646.

After intense fighting, the Puritan faction under Oliver Cromwell emerged victorious. Cromwell and his Puritan supporters took over Parliament and brought Charles to trial. The king was convicted of tyranny and executed by beheading in 1649.

Cromwell, who styled himself "Lord Protector," proved instead to be a military dictator. Dissenters were killed or oppressed, and Cromwellian forces subjugated Scotland and Ireland with terror and mass displacement. Overseas conflicts with the Dutch and French resulted in few victories and expanded taxes. When Cromwell died in 1658, few English subjects mourned his passing. Instead, the reaction was a sweeping revival of Anglicanism and restoration of the monarchy in 1660.

King and Parliament, however, soon resumed their conflicts. After coming to power in 1685, James II ran afoul of Parliament with his absolutist tendencies and apparent desire

The Cromwell Dictatorship and Restoration

The Glorious Revolution

to impose his and his wife's Catholicism on English subjects. In 1688 Parliament deposed James, an act that proved far less bloody than the removal of Charles I, and invited James's Protestant daughter Mary (r. 1689–1694) and her Dutch husband, William of Orange (r. 1689–1702), to assume the throne. The event was called the Glorious Revolution since it entailed the monarchs' signing an agreement to share power with Parliament. A genuine constitutional system, much copied worldwide in later years, was now in place.

COUNTERPOINT

The Barbary Pirates

To the vast land empire of the Ottomans and the fractured states of Europe, Africa's north coast, or Maghreb, offers a dual counterpoint. The early modern Maghreb consisted of sea-hugging city-states and tribal enclaves stretching from Morocco to present-day Libya. Although fiercely Islamic and sympathetic to the Ottoman cause against the Habsburgs and their allies, no Maghribi city ever fell completely under the sway of the Ottoman Empire. Instead, the greatest threats to this centerless region's autonomy came from Christian Europe, whose merchants had long traveled to Africa in pursuit of slaves and gold. Energized by its gunpowder-fueled 1492 conquest of Granada, Spain invaded North Africa with fury, but struggled mightily and at great cost to hold onto a few rocky outposts. Subsequent European interlopers fared little better.

Reign of the Sea Bandits


After 1500, sea banditry flourished along what Europeans called the Berber, or Barbary, Coast. Early pirate leaders of great renown included Oruç and Hayreddin Barbarossa, Greek brothers from the island of Lesbos who settled in Algiers and ruled it from 1516 to 1546. The Barbarossa (Italian for "red beard") brothers were already famous for their bold raids on the coast of Italy. They briefly combined forces with neighboring Tunis to launch large-scale attacks and share out booty, but regional jealousies prevailed and the cities again competed. The raiders focused on capturing merchant vessels at sea, but what made the Barbarossas household names were their increasingly audacious land attacks and kidnappings. Hayreddin later strengthened ties to the Ottomans, but he remained independent of the sultan's orders.

As Ottoman sea power declined after 1580 and Atlantic shipping ballooned, other pirate bases sprang up along the west coast of Morocco. Key after 1600 was the tiny city of Salé (sah-LAY), whose pirate attacks on Spanish and Portuguese shipping were financed and sometimes manned by exiled Iberian Jews and Muslims. Some such foreign-born pirates were deeply involved in European court intrigues, acting as double agents and seeking support for pretenders to the Spanish-held Portuguese throne. Others were simply outlaws hoping to get rich at the expense of their former tormentors. Aside from these vengeful European "renegades," as they were called, a number of Morocco's own seafaring Berber tribes engaged in piracy and extortion as an extension of their culture. Countless young men came of age beneath the pirate flag.

By the time Miguel de Cervantes was held captive in Algiers in the late 1570s, Maghribi hostage trafficking and extortion rackets formed the core of a sophisticated business. The pirates used swift sailing vessels and state-of-the-art European guns to steal money and merchandise, but mostly they kidnapped Christian Europeans, preferably men and

FOCUS

Why were the Barbary pirates of North Africa able to thrive from 1500 to 1800 despite Ottoman and European overseas expansion?



The Barbary Coast, c. 1560

Ransoming Christians

Piracy in the early modern Mediterranean entailed many daring captures at sea, along with several audacious ones on land. Unlike in the Americas, where piracy also thrived at this time, the Barbary pirates of Africa's north coast specialized in kidnapping and extortion. The ransom of Christian captives held in cities such as Algiers and Tunis was organized by Catholic religious orders, who collected sums from as far away as Spanish America to free men and women whose relatives in Spain, Italy, France, and elsewhere could produce no ransom. This seventeenth-century European engraving depicts Catholic priests heroically carrying ransom money, while Christian prisoners appear as cruelly mistreated victims cowering behind their Muslim captors. (The Art Archive.)



women of high status. Some hostages were mistreated and forced to do hard labor, but as Cervantes describes in *Don Quixote*, most were allowed to send letters to friends and relatives on the other side of the Mediterranean in hopes that they would raise sufficient ransom money. Barbary Coast extortion also consisted of selling safe passage to European shippers—that is, promising *not* to kidnap them or steal their merchandise in exchange for money, arms, and shipbuilding materials.

Unable to engage in the expensive conquest enterprises tried by the Spanish and Portuguese, northern European merchants, who were more answerable to shareholders than to kings after about 1600, struck deals with various sultans and tribal leaders in the Maghreb in exchange for safe passage. Maghribi leaders mostly welcomed these Protestant newcomers, because they had access to advanced weapons and shared their hatred of Catholic Iberians. Still, failure to pay for protection led to harsh reprisals. Some pirates raided as far away as the English Channel in the early 1600s, and before long thousands of northern Europeans languished, like the Spaniard Cervantes before them, in the jails of Algiers, Tunis, and Tripoli. In time, England, France, and the Netherlands funded permanent embassies in these and other competing city-states, but their primary purpose was to gather information and keep allied Muslim princes happy, not to seek the release of unlucky Christian subjects. After 1660, the English became a permanent presence in the Moroccan city of Tangier, a strategic base won from the Portuguese through royal marriage.

The Barbary Wars

Although internal divisions and poor leadership among Maghribi sovereigns became more evident over time, it was sustained rivalry among the Europeans that prevented any coordinated attack on the Barbary pirates until the early nineteenth century. Only then, when merchants from the fledgling United States reacted angrily to demands for protection money, did the Barbary pirates see a reversal in fortune. Outraged by what the merchants considered

hypocrisy in an era of loudly proclaimed free trade, they proposed a new approach to the Mediterranean's piracy problem. In a pet project of President Thomas Jefferson, the United States won the support of traditional European powers, most significantly the French, to bomb the Barbary pirates into submission. The so-called Barbary Wars' unexpected result was near-total French takeover of North Africa, which ended only in the 1960s.

Conclusion

Fueled by gunpowder, silver, and religious fervor, Europe and the Mediterranean basin exploded after 1500 as the world's most belligerent region, but it was also the most commercially dynamic. Relative resource poverty had long compelled Europeans to trade with one another, but regional identities, exacerbated by religious differences, had led them to fight as often as they cooperated. This trend only continued in the late sixteenth century, when nationalist loyalties were hardened by the Protestant Reformation and its aftermath.

By contrast, in these years the Sunni Muslim Ottomans built a vast land empire encompassing eastern Europe, Southwest Asia, Egypt, and much of Arabia. They did so with force, but also by cleverly integrating new subjects into the ranks of government and the armed forces. Ottoman pragmatism also included a policy of religious tolerance. The Ottoman world became a haven for many of Europe's persecuted Jews, and conquered Christians were not forced to convert to Islam. Chronic wars with the Habsburgs and Safavids provided many opportunities for social advancement, but they also absorbed a huge portion of state resources, eventually bogging the empire down.

A battered Europe emerged from its seventeenth-century crisis to begin a new phase of national division. The century between 1650 and 1750 was no less bloody than the one before, but it marked the beginnings of three globally significant trends: a new science based on direct observation and experimentation, an increasingly capitalist economy, and increasingly centralized, national government. All of this sounds quite modern, but western Europe's competing kingdoms still saw the quest for wealth and power as a zero-sum game, in which gain by one side meant loss by the others, driving them to seek monopolies over resources and lay claim to ever more distant lands and peoples. To a degree, Europeans saw the world through the same mercantilist lens as the Portuguese of previous centuries, but the languages of science and rational economics, rather than religion, were increasingly used to justify conquest of traditional societies. Soon after, in the first years of the nineteenth century, it was a new language, that of free trade, rather than religious animosity that drove the fledgling United States and its European allies to attack the Barbary Coast pirates. Former Barbary captive Miguel de Cervantes of Spain could hardly have known what lay ahead for Europe and the greater Mediterranean, but his vision of a newly interconnected world continued to inspire his imagination. In the opening to the second part of *Don Quixote*, published in 1615, Cervantes jokingly claimed that he had received a letter from the Chinese emperor inviting him to establish a Spanish school at court for which his "world-famous" novel would be the main text. Cervantes claimed that he had declined the offer only because he was ill and could not afford the trip.

NOTES

1. Celalzade, Mustafa, *Selim-name* [In praise of Selim] (eds. Ahmet Uđur, Mustafa Huhadar), Ankara 1990; as it appears in Halil Bertkay and Bogdan Murgescu, *The Ottoman Empire* (Thessaloniki: CDRSEE, 2005), 53.
2. Habsburg ambassador Ghiselin de Busbecq, quoted in Gérard Chaliand, ed., *The Art of War in World History from Antiquity to the Nuclear Age* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1994), 457.
3. Jennings, Ronald C., *Christians and Muslims in Ottoman Cyprus and the Mediterranean World, 1571-1640*, New York – London 1993; as it appears in Halil Bertkay and Bogdan Murgescu, *The Ottoman Empire* (Thessaloniki: CDRSEE, 2005), 116.
4. Evlija Celebi, Putopis. *Odlomci o jugoslovenskim zemljama* [Travel-records. Fragments about Yugoslav Countries], Sarajevo 1996; as it appears in Halil Bertkay and Bogdan Murgescu, *The Ottoman Empire* (Thessaloniki: CDRSEE, 2005), 82.

RESOURCES FOR RESEARCH

General Works

Few historians have attempted to treat early modern Europe and the wider Mediterranean in a global context, but the following books are some of the best general syntheses in the field. Braudel remains the grand inspiration. Crosby challenges us to see what was special about growing European interest in numbers and calculation, which owed much to Islamic precedent.

Braudel, Fernand. *The Mediterranean and the Mediterranean World in the Age of Philip II*. 2 vols. Translated by Sian Reynolds. 1996.

Crosby, Alfred W. *The Measure of Reality: Quantification and Western Society, 1250–1600*. 1997.

Elliott, John H. *Spain, Europe, and the Wider World, 1500–1800*. 2009.

Elliott, John H. *Europe Divided, 1556–1598*, 2d ed. 2000.

Kamen, Henry. *Early Modern European Society*. 2000.

The Power of the Ottoman Empire, 1453–1750

Ottoman history is a vibrant field, and new work continues to link the empire to both West and East. A recent wave of regional studies of Ottoman Egypt and Syria joins better-known work on Ottoman eastern Europe and Anatolia. Giancarlo Casale's book takes the Ottomans overseas.

Casale, Giancarlo. *The Ottoman Age of Exploration*. 2010.

Goffman, Daniel. *The Ottomans and Early Modern Europe*. 2002.

Kafadar, Cemal. *Between Two Worlds: The Construction of the Ottoman State*. 1995.

Mansel, Philip. *Constantinople: City of the World's Desire, 1453–1924*. 1996.

Pierce, Leslie. *The Imperial Harem: Women and Sovereignty in the Ottoman Empire*. 1993.

Europe Divided, 1500–1650

Histories of the “seventeenth-century crisis” have come back into vogue in recent years, and now stress global linkages in trade, climate, and other spheres. Other authors, such as Davis and Schwartz, have expanded the study of women's self-fashioning and the popular religious toleration that existed despite harsh decrees from above.

Cunningham, Andrew, and Ole Peter Grell. *The Four Horsemen of the Apocalypse: Religion, War, Famine and Death in Reformation Europe*. 2000.

Davis, Natalie Zemon. *Women on the Margins: Three Seventeenth-Century Lives*. 1995.

“Introduction.” AHR Forum: The General Crisis of the Seventeenth Century Revisited. *The American Historical Review*

113, no. 4 (October 2008): 1029–1030. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/10.1086/ahr.113.4.1029>.

Parker, Geoffrey. *Europe in Crisis, 1598–1648*, 2d ed. 2001.

Schwartz, Stuart B. *All Can Be Saved: Religious Tolerance and Salvation in the Iberian Atlantic World*. 2008.

Sturdy, David J. *Fractured Europe, 1600–1721*. 2002.

European Innovations in Science and Government, 1550–1750

Historians of science continue to debate the meaning and timing of the so-called Scientific Revolution, but when seen in a global context, the changes initiated in sixteenth-century Europe appear starkly important. Economic historians are even less in agreement with regard to the origins of modern capitalism, but the topic remains huge, and as treated by Chaudury, Pomeranz, and others, it has become more globally integrated.

Beik, William. *Louis XIV and Absolutism: A Brief Study with Documents*. 2000.

Chaudury, Sushil, and Michel Morineau, eds. *Merchants, Companies, and Trade: Europe and Asia in the Early Modern Era*. 1999.

Edwards, Philip. *The Making of the Modern English State, 1460–1660*. 2001.

Henry, John. *The Scientific Revolution and the Origins of Modern Science*, 2d ed. New York: Palgrave, 2002.

Pomeranz, Kenneth. *The Great Divergence: China, Europe, and the Making of the Modern World Economy*. 2000.

Smith, Pamela H., and Paula Findlen, eds. *Merchants and Marvels: Commerce, Science, and Art in Early Modern Europe*. 2002.

Smyth, Jim. *The Making of the United Kingdom, 1660–1800*. 2001.

COUNTERPOINT: The Barbary Pirates

The Barbary pirates have been a source of many legends, but serious historical research has also been undertaken. Braudel's classic study of the Mediterranean, cited above under General Works, includes considerable information on the sixteenth-century pirates, whereas Heers and Wolf provide more scope and detail.

Heers, Jacques. *The Barbary Corsairs*. 2003.

Pennell, C. R. *Bandits at Sea: A Pirates Reader*. 2001.

Vitkus, Daniel J., and Nabil Matar, eds. *Piracy, Slavery, and Redemption: Barbary Captivity Narratives from Early Modern England*. 2001.

Wolf, John B. *The Barbary Coast: Algeria Under the Turks*. 1979.

► For additional primary sources from this period, see *Sources of Crossroads and Cultures*.

► For Web sites, images, and documents related to topics in this chapter, see Make History at bedfordstmartins.com/smith.

The major global development in this chapter ▶ Early modern Europe's increasing competition and division in the face of Ottoman expansion.

IMPORTANT EVENTS

1453	Ottoman conquest of Constantinople
1492	Spanish take Granada, expel Jews
1517	Martin Luther disseminates "Ninety-five Theses," sparking the Protestant Reformation
1520–1566	Reign of Ottoman emperor Suleiman
1540	Ignatius Loyola founds the new Catholic order of the Jesuits
1543	Nicolaus Copernicus, <i>On the Revolutions of the Heavenly Spheres</i>
1545–1563	Council of Trent
1571	Battle of Lepanto
1572	St. Bartholomew's Day massacre
1580	Philip II of Spain takes over Portuguese Empire
1598	Edict of Nantes ends French Religious War
1618–1648	Thirty Years' War
1640	Portugal wins independence from Spain
1642–1646	English Civil War
1643–1715	Reign of Louis XIV of France
1683	Ottomans defeated in Vienna by Polish-Austrian alliance
1687	Isaac Newton, <i>Principia Mathematica</i>
1688	Glorious Revolution in England
1701–1714	War of the Spanish Succession

KEY TERMS

absolutism (p. 674)	devshirme (p. 651)
armada (p. 666)	geocentrism (p. 670)
bourgeoisie (p. 672)	heliocentrism (p. 671)
capitalism (p. 672)	indulgence (p. 662)
caravanserai (p. 656)	mercantilism (p. 673)
constitutionalism (p. 674)	timar (p. 651)

CHAPTER OVERVIEW QUESTIONS

1. To what degree was religious diversity embraced or rejected in early modern Europe and the greater Mediterranean, and why?
2. How did Christian Europe's gunpowder-fueled empires compare with that of the Ottomans?
3. What accounts for the rise of science and capitalism in early modern western Europe?

SECTION FOCUS QUESTIONS

1. What factors explain the rise of the vast Ottoman Empire and its centuries-long endurance?
2. What sparked division in Europe after 1500, and why did this trend persist?
3. What factors enabled European scientific and political innovations in the early modern period?
4. Why were the Barbary pirates of North Africa able to thrive from 1500 to 1800 despite Ottoman and European overseas expansion?

MAKING CONNECTIONS

1. How did battles for control of the Mediterranean compare with those for control of Indian Ocean trade (see Chapter 19)?
2. How globally important was the Protestant Reformation?
3. In what ways were the Barbary pirates similar to the Atlantic slave traders (see Chapter 18)? How were they different?