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Introduction

Redefining US ‘homeland security’ post-9/11: Extra- judicial measures, vigilantism and xenophobia

Security Journal (2015) 28, 109–149. doi:10.1057/sj.2015.3; published online 16 March 2015

The articles in this Special Issue entitled The United States, National Security, and Human Rights: Extra-Ordinary ‘Justice’ in the Post-9/11 Era examine the profound effect that US national security policies and related activities in the post-9/11 era have had on the human rights of all human beings residing within US borders. These measures were initiated in response to the execution of multiple suicide attacks within US borders that killed thousands of civilians on September 11, 2001. The attacks were executed by Al Qaeda (AQ), the radical global Islamist organization that was formed in 1988 to ‘purify’ and, hence, reclaim Muslim- dominated geographies in the Global South by ridding them of the morally corrupt influence of Western culture (Rajan, Al Qaeda’s Global Crisis, 2015). In the wake of these attacks, the United States immediately passed what is known as the 2001 USA Patriot Act, shorthand for Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism (USA PATRIOT) Act of 2001. This Act authorized the government to enhance its surveillance over any activities and people it deemed could be related to terrorism. These measures, which included tapping cell phones, encroached on the civil rights and privacy of those residing within the US. In describing the Act as ‘a key part – and often the leading role – in a number of successful operations to protect innocent Americans from the deadly plans of terrorists dedicated to destroying America and our way of life’, the Department of Justice (DOJ) conflated US security with the disruption of civil liberties (DOJ).

By June 2002 the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) had also launched the National Security Entry-Exit Registration System (NSEERS) program. The early stages of NEERS, known as Special Registration, launched in September 2002, specifically targeted noncitizen men 16 years of age and older who were present in the United States between September 2002 and January 2003 and who were from predominantly 25 Muslim-dominated countries, with the exception of North Korea – sites considered hostile to the United States.1

These men were required to meet with Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) officials who would assess their potential criminality. For example, immigrants found to be in violation of their visa permits were immediately detained and incarcerated without notification to family or friends. Many were permanently deported (‘removed’). Although Special Registration was officially halted in 2003, some of its aspects were continued to specifically police the US’s immigrant community. Muzaffar Chishti and Claire Bergeron describe the Program

as a series of controls designed to collect information, fingerprints, and photographs of certain noncitizens entering and living in the United States, and to monitor their status

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and movement once within the country’s borders. From its inception, it was determined that NSEERS would only target male noncitizens of a certain age from predesignated countries. (Chishti and Bergeron, 2011)

The DHS officially halted NEERS in April 2011 (Chishti and Bergeron, 2011). Yet the very continuation of NEERS throughout the decade plus since the 9/11 attacks reveals persistence in attempting to correlate non-citizens with criminality at a time when it was also bolstering domestic initiatives to fight terrorism. The result was a conflation of immigrants with criminality and terrorism – ideologies that continue to haunt US perceptions of foreign bodies (addressed later).

In 2001 the United States declared its War on Terror both domestically and globally to bolster its national security and, presumably, the security of civilians residing within its borders against further attacks by radical Islamists and other terrorists. In the immediate aftermath of the 9/11 attacks, the continued viability of AQ and the emergence of additional Islamist organizations, including the radical Islamic State, continue to threaten US and global security. As such, the US government continues to exercise these security measures in the decade plus following the 9/11 attacks.

The United States contends that these emergency policies and actions are critical to the interests of national security and, hence, to the security of non-terrorist civilians residing within its borders. Yet, ironically, as the articles in this Special Issue reveal, these tactics have only further undermined the security and human rights of all civilians residing within US borders – including those of undocumented individuals, non-US residents and even US citizens.2 These activities of the US government may come as a surprise given the US government’s promotion of itself as a proponent of democratic ideals and human rights globally. Yet, in fact, the 9/11 attacks did not force the United States to create any new laws to justify its execution of these draconian measures. Rather, as Adam Liptak observes, the United States had only to revive pre-existing legislation and judicial precedence excercized throughout US history: ‘By historic standards, the domestic legal response to 9/11 gave rise to civil liberties tremors, not earthquakes. And even those changes were largely a result of reordered law enforcement priorities rather than fundamental shifts in the law’ (Liptak, 2011). In light of The Patriot Act, DOJ observes that ‘in passing the Patriot Act, Congress provided for only modest, incremental changes in the [pre-existing] law. Congress simply took existing legal principles and retrofitted them to preserve the lives and liberty of the American people from the challenges posed by a global terrorist network’ (DOJ). Hence, the 2001 USA Patriot Act, NSEERS and the US government’s declaration of its War on Terror are legally justified because they are based upon [pre-existing] legislation and legal precedence exercised by the US government during moments of national crisis throughout US history. These laws, including the 1798 Alien and Sedition Act (addressed later), have authorized the government to execute a wide range of violence against any civilian residing within US borders it deems threatening to national security during times of national crisis (official and increasingly undeclared war).

This Introduction frames the articles in this Special Issue by exploring some of these laws and the precedence they have set in sanctioning the execution of violence against human beings in the US’s present War on Terror. To this point, we, the Editors, will also examine some disturbing manifestations of these laws in US history, including against Japanese citizens and non-citizens residing inside the United States during World War II, and why the laws have targeted some groups of people over others. We briefly touch upon how the War

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on Terror has compromised the human rights of socio-economically disenfranchised, non-White peoples residing within the United States. Although this group may not be classified specifically as a terror threat, because of certain racist stereotypes inherited about them from the recent Western colonial era they have been targeted by US law enforcement and judicial courts as potentially criminal. Their criminalization is directly informed by the general paranoia about terrorism siezing the United States in the post-9/11 era. Finally, we close by examining shifts in terms of who the government has classified as potential terrorists since the 9/11 attacks, from the undocumented and immigrants to US citizens.

Each of the articles in this issue extends this broad exploration by examining how US government activities in the post-9/11 era are directly responsible for the execution of human rights violations against certain communities – citizen or other – residing in the United States. We initiate this study by tracing the evolution and expansion of the categories of people who the US government has classified as threatening to US security in certain moments of US (and generally Western) history.

Imperial Iterations of Homeland Security

In conjunction with other US security-related entities and backed by the 2001 USA Patriot Act, the DHS, which was formed after the 9/11 attacks to bolster US domestic security, first targeted primarily racially non-white, religiously non-Christian individuals through hostile and ambiguous legal policies and on questionable grounds. These policies guided the targeting of the undocumented, immigrants, racially non-White immigrants and citizens, and permanent non-residents. Collectively, these people comprise the numerical minority communities residing in the United States and mainly those who are undocumented and from immigrant communities, such as Black, Latino, Arab Muslim and South Asian – those whose economic insecurity renders them vulnerable to such extrajudicial measures.

That the DHS initiated its attacks against these individuals post-9/11 is not surprising given that non-white, non-Christian individuals have generally been characterized in negative ways in Western history, including in the recent colonial era. These characteriza- tions have been heavily guided by the ‘scientific’ experiments that were conducted in the colonial era upon non-white bodies (mainly Black women) residing in geographies that Western empires were colonizing. In what is now labeled the Era of Scientific Racism, Western (US and European) ‘scientists’ examined and classified non-white human beings not only as morally inferior to racially white, Christian human beings, but as less evolved than the fully evolved, standard for human beings exemplified by racially white men. Western society surmised that the ‘animal qualities’ of the former signified their biological link to the animal world in the Great Chain of Being, the divine Christian hierarchy of all living beings from the medieval era (Gilman, 1985a). Experts (that is, Said, 1979, 1994; Gilman, 1985a) highlight how those experiments were corroborated by Western cultural productions produced and disseminated at the time. For example, paintings, plays and novels circulated narratives and visual images that projected non-white, non-Christian bodies as inherently deviant, violent, subversive, morally corrupt, and originators of disease and pollution that were detrimental to Western/European mores. These ideologies were further reinforced by religious narratives, for example, noted by Christian missionaries who traveled to predominantly non-Christian European colonies. Missionaries surmised that it was their

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duty, their ‘White Man’s Burden’, to save the native, heathen peoples from their condition and bring them out of the darkness that must be guiding their lives into the light of Christianity (see Gilman, 1985a; Jayawardena, 1995; McClintock, 1995). Of critical note is that even if the ‘heathens’ were to convert to Christianity, they could never fully escape the misfortune of their condition because of their race. This catch-22 situation proved advantageous to Western colonizers who could subjugate the natives they were attempt- ing to colonize without fear the those same natives could ever be in a position to subjugate Western colonizers.3

Collectively, these biased scientific, cultural, and religious narratives and visuals revealed the ‘threat’ that native, colonized peoples posed to Western imperial enterprises and security, and further, that the threat they posed must be mediated by executing excessive levels of violence against them. Consequently, at a time when Europeans were also pondering ideologies regarding the rights of man, the progenitor for human rights ideologies today, Europeans were also able to justify their dehumanization of native, colonized peoples, the exploitation of native geographies for their resources, and violence against native peoples for their labor in light of their more lofty goal and duty to expand and sustain a morally superior racially white, Christian empire.

Numerous postcolonial scholars (for example, Said, 1979, 1994; Spivak, 1988; Puar and Rai, 2002) have drawn parallels between racial and religious prejudices pre- sently guiding Western nations and those guiding the recent Western colonial era. Western imperial anxieties about the non-white, non-Christian peoples they colonized emerge presently in Western nations’ suspicions of and prejudices against non-white, non- Christian bodies in general, and particularly against those who are seen as having invaded Western national borders when they migrated (for whatever reason) to reside among the predominantly racially white, Christian Western demographic comprising Western nations today.

These prejudices are even more pronounced in times of national crisis. Historically, during imperial crises, Western anxieties about the viability of their empires (for example, due to shifting socio-economic conditions or wars) were displaced and projected onto the most vulnerable and therefore the easiest to scapegoat within the empire: native, colonized peoples; racially white Europeans/Americans of lower socio-economic status residing within Western empires; women; and non-heterosexuals (the latter addressed later). Western empires also displaced their anxieties onto non-Christian communities, particularly Jewish people residing within Europe and America (Gilman, 1985b; Franklin, 2003) and Muslims. The latter posed a different threat to Western empires. During these periods of paranoia, which eventually came to define imperial propaganda, imaginaries of non-White, non- Christian bodies – including Jewish and Muslim people – were prone to excessive exaggeration, for example, to the point that they became conflated with Western imperial definitions of madness, monstrosity and evil (see Gilman, 1985a, b; McClintock, 1995; Rajan, 2011).4 In the postcolonial era, a comparable logic continues to emerge in regard to establishing the security of Western nations. The rise of anti-Western Islamism since the 1960s and most acutely from 1979 onward has intensified Western anxieties about all Muslims residing within Western and sovereign territory (Rajan, Al Qaeda’s Global Crisis, 2015). It is for this reason that Muslims residing in the US are consistently policed and criminalized, rendering them more susceptible to epistemic and very real physical violence in their everyday lives.

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This violence intensifies during times of national crisis, as exemplified by the vigilante attacks executed against Muslims in the aftermath of the 1995 Oklahoma City Bombing. When the security of Western nations is challenged by any threat – even by a White, Christian male, as in the case of the Oklahoma City Bombing (addressed later) – national fears tend to immediately scapegoat non-white bodies and non-White, non-Christian bodies albeit in different ways briefly generically. Non-White bodies located in lower socio- economic-status portions of American society (read: African American, and to a degree Black immigrants because of their race) are regularly targeted and criminalized to manage their assumed potential ‘deviance’ within the nation to protect the more ‘privileged’ upper- class status Americans and to promote public safety (later). In contrast to some degree, non- White bodies designated as ‘foreign’ because they differ phenotypically from mainstream American society – for example in terms of skin color, and also in other ways, such as in their culture, the languages they speak and the religious beliefs to which they ascribe – tend to be criminalized in ways that associate them with national security, border, control and terrorism.5 Even if the latter are citizens of the United States, they are still marked as ‘foreign’ because they are presumed to have entered into Western society, where they continue to remain permanently ‘different’ in some way from the majority of US citizens. They remain distinct from, for example, African Americans who, while they are also policed and criminalized in the US, are assumed to be more familiar (less foreign) because they have a shared history with most mainstream White Americans, however disturbing that history was. This distinction renders African Americans more familiar to US culture, for example, in contrast to Native Americans, Japanese and Chinese civilians residing in the United States. Some prominent African Americans in the United States have made this same distinction by corroborating Western anxieties about the Muslim other in the United States. In October 2010, then NPR journalist and African American Juan Williams warned US TV talk show host Bill O’Reilly that while all Muslims should not be blamed for the 9/11 attacks, ‘[…] when I get on the plane, I got to tell you, if I see people who are in Muslim garb and I think, you know, they are identifying themselves first and foremost as Muslims, I get worried. I get nervous’ (Folkenflik, 2010).

This is why in times of national crisis members of non-White, non-Christian ‘foreign’ communities (among numerous others and often including Black immigrants to the United States who may also be perceived as ‘foreign’) are the first to be scapegoated and policed through extreme acts of violence, both legally sanctioned and vigilante, in the specific interests of national security. In the history of the United States, these bodies have been characterized as possessing unknown, incalculable traits that can and will spontaneously manifest themselves as not only criminal behavior, but as treason and sedition. Left unchecked, the agency of these individuals would eventually threaten the security of the privileged, which, in turn, signifies a threat to national security. US domestic security measures are hence affected mainly to safeguard the security of privileged bodies that are vulnerable to foreign threats and invasions.

It is through this logic that US domestic security broadly has become associated with the policing of and execution of violence against all non-White bodies, Christian and other. Security has come to require the random terrorization of the underprivileged, for example, through racial profiling, and by restricting their access to justice accorded the privileged, or by incarcerating and deporting them permanently for minor offenses. Such processes have created complex, interlocking racialized, religious, linguistic and

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gendered hierarchies within the United States that allow for violence against under- privileged communities to continue in visible and invisible ways (for example, Collins, 1996; Alexander, 2012).6

In conclusion, security measures post-9/11 have not only fostered a climate of xenophobia against non-White peoples of lower socio-economic status (i.e., African Americans), but also against individuals and communities designated as ‘foreign’ and, hence, threatening to US national security (including Muslims, Latinos, immigrants, undocumented and permanent residents).

It is critical to keep in mind the profound effect of these processes on other groups of people. For example, in patriarchal societies that consistently privilege masculinity over femininity, violence against women allows for the suppression of women’s agency in favor of masculine agency. In times of national crisis when that masculinity, is tested (signified by the patriarchal dynamics guiding the nation), women tend to experience a sharp increase in their insecurity, including a range of infringements on their human rights, including bodily integrity (see Bunch, 2002; Flanders, 2004). The heterosexual framework guiding patriarchal ideologies of gender conformity and sexual preference also sharply escalate violence against members of the LGBT community (see Puar and Rai, 2007).

Ultimately, the security of all civilians residing within the United States has deteriorated incrementally with the implementation of DHS domestic security policies since 9/11. Yet, unchecked surveillance of underprivileged bodies since 9/11 has expanded to impact also the civil rights of even US citizens. The post-9/11 era has witnessed a remarkable increase in the number of US citizens who have been arrested, detained and convicted/deported as terrorists or deemed criminal threats, mostly on questionable grounds (later). As noted, these trends domestically are further corroborated by the growing insecurity of US civilians and military residing abroad directly in response to US foreign activities in regard to its War on Terror at the international level. A growing number of US citizens are being kidnapped and/or beheaded by Islamist groups worldwide in direct response to the US military’s activities abroad. For example, before merging with AQ to form Al Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) in late 2004, Jordanian Abu Musab al-Zarqawi broadcast globally his execution of several Western civilians he had kidnapped in Iraq in response to the US military’s abuse of Iraqis in the Abu Ghraib prison facility in Iraq. The United States has pursued highly questionable initiatives in its War on Terror abroad that are compromising the security of US citizens in other ways. This is evidenced in the US government’s willingness to simply assassinate US citizens residing abroad deemed terror threats to US domestic security. This includes, for example, the US drone attack in Yemen that killed Islamist cleric and AQ operative Anwar al-Awlaki, who was an American citizen at the time, and his teenage son. Additionally, the US’s adoption of inconsistent, and therefore ambiguous, policies towards those it designates as terrorists is causing confusion as to who the United States regards as terrorists. This is evidenced in the US’s willingness to negotiate a prisoner exchange with the Afghan Taliban, the very group it had targeted in November 2001 for harboring AQ’s then-leader Osama bin Laden and in response to the very same AQ 9/11 attacks that had initiated the US War on Terror (Rajan, Al Qaeda’s Global Crisis, 2015).

US security efforts against terrorism both domestically and abroad are challenging the very principles upon which the United States was founded, mainly its civil and political

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rights as laid out in its Constitution, and international human rights legislation the United States has signed and ratified, including the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR). The US’s War on Terror in the post-9/11 era is further undermining the US’s self-representation as an international leader in promoting global human rights. Moreover, its domestic security measures have facilitated the conflation of US ‘security’ with xenophobia, extrajudicial violence, and a pattern of exceptionalism in domestic and foreign policy that it maintains is necessary for its sovereignty.

In this Introduction, we, the Editors, frame the articles comprising this collection first by exploring the significance of the 9/11 terror attacks to US security and why they in particular have guided major shifts in how the US defines national security. We then examine security policies implemented domestically in the United States since 9/11 and how they are complicit in the ‘legal’ violence executed by the judicial system against foreign others residing within US national borders, as well as by local and federal law enforcement. This violence has fostered (and quietly sanctioned) a rise in extra-judicial, vigilante violence executed against those same individuals and communities. Both strains of violence form part of a continuum of violence in US history aimed particularly against foreign Others (the main focus of this issue) during periods of ‘national crisis’. We conclude by exploring the impact of the rise of the Islamic State in 2014 on US security in the future, and how the articles included in this issue shed light on the potential manifestations of national security in the decades to come.

The 9/11 attacks: Revisiting terrorism, revising security

While the 9/11 attacks targeted only the United States, they have impacted how sovereign states globally –Western, Muslim-dominated7 and other – address national security because they challenged common global assumptions about where Islamists would execute terrorism, as well as commonly accepted profiles of who might execute such attacks against the West. In the US context, the suicide attacks forced the United States to re-visit its policies in regard to how it defined and affected ‘national security’ in general, not only against Islamists but against all ‘foreign’ others who could be related to the foreign threat that Islamists posed to US homeland borders. Hence, the 9/11 suicide missions also escalated pre-existing US anxieties about any and all other ‘foreign’ threats to its external borders.

The 9/11 attacks affected a focused surveillance over Muslim and South Asian8 immi- grants residing in the United States through the process of Special Registration. As it aimed to root out potential terrorists or those knowing of or harboring potential terrorists from among the immigrant population in the United States, the same surveillance was eventually applied to police other immigrant communities, even though they could not be associated with the 9/11 Islamist attacks, such as Latinos in and along the southwestern portion of the nation and all non-(Muslim) civilians, including immigrants, permanent residents, non-residents and undocumented residing in the United States (later).

This section explores the significance of the 9/11 attacks on US (and Western) assumptions about Islamist terrorism, the impact of the attacks on US postulations of national security post-9/11, and the racially biased reprecussions from US security policies against Muslims and South Asians, non-citizens, permanent residents and eventually even US citizens residing in the US in the post-9/11 era.

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The 9/11 attacks: Who are the terrorists and where are they?

Before 9/11, most high-level Islamist-executed suicide missions9 and other terror-related attacks were deployed in conflict situations based in the Global South, even when they targeted US military. Apart from the 1993 Islamist-executed attacks on the World Trade Center (noted later) and target Western airliners, Islamism had yet to evolve to the level of becoming the most significant terror threat to US borders. Prior to 9/11, AQ targeted mainly American military and government personnel stationed in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA). AQ executed its first attack against the United States on 29 December 1992, when it attempted to kill US servicemen in a hotel in Aden, Yemen, en route to Somalia (PBS Frontline). In October 1993, AQ was allegedly complicit in the murder of 18 US servicemen in Somalia during an incident since labeled ‘Black Hawk Down’. AQ’s attacks against the West have also included: twin bombings against US embassies in Dar-e-Salaam, Tanzania, and Nairobi, Kenya, on 7 August 1998, in which 10 were killed in the former, and 224 killed and approximately 4650 injured in the latter (CNN Library, Embassy Bombings); and suicide attacks against the US warship the U.S.S. Cole in Yemen in October 2000, which killed 17 and injured 38 US soldiers (New York Magazine).

The terror attacks executed on September 11, 2001, entirely shifted these trends because on that date AQ executed a suicide attack against only Western civilians (killing 2753) on Western soil inside US national borders (McIntyre, 1995; Leonnig, 2006; Wander, 2008; Issakof, 2010).10 Since then, Islamists (some related to AQ) have emulated this new pattern of terror attacks by more consistently executing or facilitating missions (suicide and other) to be carried out inside Western sovereign national borders. Furthermore, the success of these attacks has been bolstered by the phenomenon of what has been termed ‘homegrown terrorists’, defined as Western nationals with Islamist views who target Western civilians residing insideWestern borders. An increasing number of Islamist attacks since 9/11 against the West follow these new trends. For example, on 21 December 2001, British national Richard Reid attempted to deploy a bomb located in his shoe on American Airlines flight 63 en route from Paris to Miami (Michael, 2002). On 7 July 2005, British-born AQ operatives Hasib Hussain, Mohammad Sidique Khan and Shehzad Tanweer executed multiple suicide attacks in the London Underground, killing 52 and injuring over 770 in what is now known as the 7/7 attacks. These attacks were planned in the Taliban-controlled areas of Pakistan (Al Jazeera TV (Qatar), 2005).11 In April 2007, five Muslim British citizens were convicted for deploying multiple attacks against the United Kingdom using a fertilizer bomb (BBC News, 2007). In November 2010, 19-year-old Mohamed Osman Mohamud, a Somali naturalized citizen of the United States, was arrested in Portland, Oregon, USA, for planning to detonate a bomb during a public Christmas tree-lighting ceremony (McKinley and Yardley, 2010). In December 2010, Pakistani-American Faisal Shezad left a bomb to explode in a car in the middle of Times Square, New York City. On 15 April 2013, two Chechen Islamists – one a US citizen since September 11, 2012 (Dzhokhar Tsarnaev) – executed twin bomb attacks during the Boston Marathon killing 3 and injuring 264 (CNN). In May 2013, two men hacked British soldier Lee Rigby to death on a street in London to avenge Western-executed deaths of Muslims in Afghanistan and Iraq. When sentenced to life in prison in February 2014, the attackers also threatened US security (Memmot, 2014).

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The 9/11 suicide attacks also reoriented the profile of who might be an Islamist terrorist. Not only are such terror attacks being executed by Western nationals, since 9/11 a growing number of women have supported, participated in or executed Islamist-related terrorist activities against the West. AQ women supporters are using the Internet to chastise Muslim men for leaving vulnerable Muslim women to Western violence and to encourage them to become active in AQ terrorism (Bloom, 2013). Belgian Malika El Aroud began publically recruiting for Al Qaeda through her blog in 2008 and has given interviews to Western media about her perspectives (Sciolino and Mekhennet, 2008). Other AQ women supporters are challenging AQ’s heretofore ultra-conservative views about women, for example, that women should participate in AQ in less visible ways within the private social sphere.12 Other women are conversing through social media about how to participate in the activities of AQ, a group that espouses conservative views on women (Bloom, 2013). In response, AQ itself appears to be reorienting its traditional views about women, for example, by more openly recruiting women supporters for its cause, and by publically and directly marketing its ideologies to them. This is evidenced by AQ’s establishment of a magazine catering to AQ women, Al Shamika, on the Internet. Women are also actively supporting the Islamic State’s (IS) – the AQ splinter group – initiatives despite its highly misogynist ideologies and egregious violence against women in Iraq and Syria (Rajan, ‘Women, violence, and the Islamic State’, in press).

Racially White Islamists

The 9/11 attacks also affected a rise in the number of racially white women and men of Western descent who are joining Islamist groups and are planning to execute terror missions within Western borders (as well as in Islamist initiatives globally). This trend problematizes Western assumptions about Islamist terrorists because racially white terrorists resemble phenotypically those privileged in the West and assumed as only victims of terrorism. On 20 May 2002, 26-year-old Ukrainian Irena Polichik drove several suicide bombers, including her Palestinian husband Issa Badir, to execute a suicide attack in Rishon Le Zion, Israel, which killed two and wounded 51 (Skaine, 2006, p. 159). In October 2003, American Martinique Lewis was criminalized for economically supporting Islamists fighting against US forces in Afghanistan (Knickerbocker, 2010). On 9 November 2005, 38-year-old Belgian national Muriel Degauque deployed a suicide bomb against US troops in Baquba, Iraq, injuring one (Smith, 2005). Since 2006, American-born Adam Yahiye Gadhan (originally Adam Pearlman) has run AQ’s media wing, As-Sahab, and from time to time delivers speeches promoting AQ ideologies and initiatives (Montagne, 2006). In July 2009, American Bryant Neal Vinas was charged with attacking US military in Afghanistan and working with AQ in 2008 (Suddath, 2009; Robertson, 2010).

Western anxieties about this relatively small number of racially white Islamists have intensified Western paranoia and suspicion about Muslims in general, as well as about racially white men and women who convert to Islam and do not espouse Islamist ideologies. In reference to the former, Western fears of Islamist terrorism has misguided conflations of moderate practices of Islam – expressed by the majority of Muslims today – the radical or fundamentalist practices of Islamism/ists. The logic guiding such conflations is incorrect

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given that Islamists globally are in fact overwhelmingly disappearing, detaining and torturing, and directly targeting and murdering Muslims they construe as improper to the point of genocide in the post-9/11 era more than they are targeting any other people collectively internationally (Rajan, Al Qaeda’s Global Crisis 2015). To the latter point, Western anxieties about Islam have been bolstered by the number of racially white men and women who have converted to Islam, some from Christianity. A 2011 study conducted by the Swansea University for the charity Faith Matters estimated that approximately 100 000 people from all ethnic backgrounds had converted to Islam in the United Kingdom (Nye, 2011). This anxiety is perhaps legitimized by Islamist propaganda from the Middle East that has characterized these conversions in troubling ways. For example, in December 2010 Egyptian journalist Abd al-Aal noted, ‘These [racially white] converts adhere to Islam with total conviction. They become preachers themselves, and convince others to convert to Islam’. Aal insisted that the new anti-Western jihadi strategy should aim to convert Americans to Islam rather than preaching to pre-existing Muslims in the United States. He surmises that tactic will transform the United States into ‘an Islamic republic […] the most important place for the future of Islam, after Mecca and Medina […]’ (MEMRI, 2010).

In the post-9/11 era, trends in Islamist terrorism have increased in response to 9/11 attacks, but also to US-led military initiatives in Muslim-dominated geographies globally (noted earlier). This in turn has guided the US’s focus on security measures against Islamists, which in turn has fostered excessive levels of paranoia against foreign others in the United States. These dynamics have intensified the DHS’s surveillance and criminalization of foreign others residing within US borders. These official policies have also fostered an escalation in vigilante hate crimes against foreign others throughout the United States, as explored subsequently.

Policing the ‘foreign’ other

The 9/11 attacks fostered a climate of xenophobia in the United States against Muslims and South Asians for over a decade, but also generally against all individuals who can be classified as ‘foreign’ to the United States. In its efforts to bolster national security against mainly AQ and broadly any foreign Islamist threats, the US government concretized this climate of xenophobia by adopting certain policies. While the intent of these policies was to discern, police and manage those considered to be terror threats to the nation, the scope of these laws and their various appropriations and applications at the federal, state and local levels eventually compromised the security of all individuals who could be classified as ‘foreign’ residing in the United States, whether or not they were citizens.

In the decade-plus since 9/11, these individuals in particular have been vulnerable to being criminalized and experiencing a wide range of violence due to these security measures. This violence includes denying those who have been arrested due process, namely, the writ of habeas corpus (‘that you have the body’), which requires custodians to legally justify their detention of a person to guard against their illegal detention, or detention without a valid cause (Cornell Law School). The following section expands on government initiatives that are compromising the security of Muslim and Latino individuals and communities residing inside US borders.

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The search for ‘Arab/Muslim’ terrorists

Almost immediately after the 9/11 attacks, the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) initiated PENTBOM, the code name for its investigation into the attacks. These investiga- tions involved monitoring the lives and activities of the 9/11 attackers prior to their mission as well as their support networks. Concurrently, the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) – which has since been renamed Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) and is now an enforcement agency under the DHS – began detaining and interrogating all immigrants it suspected of being associated with the 9/11 attacks. In fall 2002 through the process known as Special Registration, ICE summoned and interrogated approximately 82 000 men who were 16 years of age and older and who were residing in the United States on visas from predominantly Middle East and North Africa (MENA) and Central/South Asian nations, including Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Syria and Palestine (Gabriel, 2006, p. 111). Despite these efforts, these round-ups proved futile as they failed to lead to terrorism-related convictions on high-level charges. Instead, they tied up federal prosecutors who were forced to work on minor cases regarding immigrant document fraud and other low-level crimes (Greenberg, 2011).

Immigrants who were in violation of their visa permits or who presented any criminal record, even misdemeanors, were immediately detained and incarcerated. These policies were even executed against immigrants whose records had been cleared, as reflected by the case of Hemnauth Mohabir. Mohabir is an ethnic Indian from Guyana who was in his early forties when he was detained through Special Registration. In 1993 Mohabir immigrated to the United States; he spent his time working as a musician and volunteering for local church activities. He was detained because his record revealed a misdemeanor charge from over 5 years prior to his detention that had been subsequently cleared. In 1997, a homeless man asked Hemnauth for money to buy drugs. Having been raised in a staunch Christian background, at first Hemnauth refused and walked away from the man, but later, out of charity, returned to give the man some money. The man, however, turned out to be an undercover cop, who arrested Hemnauth on the spot. In a letter from the Hudson County Jail in New Jersey where he was being detained, Hemnauth recalls, ‘I went to trial with the police and basically won the case. They slipped in a misdemeanor charge, which my lawyer said that I should take. They never told me that it would violate my resident status. I paid a fine of $250, and the two felonies were dismissed at the trial’. Yet 5 years later, post-9/11, Mohabir was immediately arrested at JFK Airport when he was returning from Guyana where he had been visiting his sick mother. He describes the experience: ‘I was arrested and chained at the feet and the hands. They kept me at JFK airport for 24 hours […]. The INS came and walked me through the airport. I never felt so humiliated in my all my life, everyone staring at me. I guess all kinds of things were going through their minds’ (Rajan, 2003, p. 57).

All ‘9/11 detainees’, like Mohabir, were denied due process, including the writ of habeas corpus, as well as access to court-appointed attorneys. Bryan Lonegan was the sole Legal Aid Attorney to provide representation to several hundred immigrant detainees held in county jails in the New York metropolitan area in the immediate period after the 9/11 missions. In November 2007 Lonegan characterized the detentions as a violation of human rights: ‘Countries have a right to control their borders, but our policies have become so harsh. I think it’s beyond a question of national sovereignty or even security and has become a real human rights crisis’ (Lonegan and Williams, 2007). In 2003 the DHS’s Office of the

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Inspector General (OIG)13 published a Report investigating the 9/11 detentions that corroborated Lonegan’s perspective to a degree. The Report highlights some descriptions to the media provided by the detained in cooperation with their lawyers concerning the conditions of their incarceration such as the following:

that the detainees were not informed of the charges against them for extended periods of time; were not permitted contact with attorneys, their families, and embassy officials; remained in detention even though they had no involvement in terrorism; or were physically abused, verbally abused, and mistreated in other ways while detained. (Office of Inspector General, 2003)

The Report further revealed a trend in racial profiling that targeted for detention approximately 1200 citizens and ‘aliens nationwide’ for interrogation by November 2001.14 Despite these findings, the OIG ultimately surmised that these incidents were exceptions to the rule rather than the norm (Gabriel, 2006).

The findings of the OIG and their subsequent dismissal reveal the government’s blatant disregard and lack of accountability for what are illegal actions, mainly related to the United States’ foundational document on rights: The Constitution. In direct relation to the 9/11 detentions, the Fourth, Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments of the US Constitution do not distinguish between the rights of citizens and non-citizens; hence, all detainees (citizens and other) should have access to due process. Yet in violation of those Amendments, immigrants who, for example, presented visa violations during the interrogation process were immediately detained without their relatives being notified. Furthermore, the detained were arbitrarily shifted from one detention center to another throughout the United States, which problematized their ability to seek consistent legal assistance outside of the jail and to be in contact with their relatives. Numerous immigrants were then summarily deported from the United States with no possibility of returning, a process termed ‘removal’ (Gabriel, 2006, pp. 114–115, fn. 135).

The effects of the Special Registration process on immigrants residing in the United States reveal a conflation of US perspectives about terrorists, or individuals who are threatening the borders of the nation, and immigrants, or those who have penetrated the borders of the nation. This conflation projects immigrants (criminalized or not) on par with individuals the United States deems a terror threat to its national borders. The motivation to criminalize immigrants, however, possibly reveals that the Special Registration process, which was initiated to target terrorism, was also used to criminalize immigrants so that they could be detained, interrogated and eventually deported from the country permanently (later). This conflation further corroborates and legitimizes pre-existing prejudices in the United States against foreign bodies.

An additional problematic aspect of the 9/11 detentions concerns detainees whose countries of origin are not recognized by the United States as sovereign states. Groups of detainees found themselves in a political limbo because they literally had no way to escape detention even through deportation because of the US’s refusal to acknowledge their home states as sovereign nations. These immigrants, termed ‘lifers’, were from countries that are no longer in existence, such as Yugoslavia and the former Soviet Union; countries that refused to accept them, such as Cambodia, Laos, Vietnam, Iraq and Iran; or countries that are not recognized as such by the United States, such as Palestine and Cuba. Immigrants who immigrated from countries that had collapsed politically and that had no government, such as Somalia, were also not deportable. Unable to even be deported, these groups of immigrants

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found themselves caught in a web of endless detention and trapped in jail without access to legal remedies in clear violation of habeas corpus. The Zadvydas v Davis decision decided by the US Supreme Court in February 2001 called for the release of detainees after 90 days if they could prove deportation was not possible. Yet that legislation was obscured in the post- 9/11 anti-Muslim environment. This is exemplified by the case of Farouk Abdel-Muhti, a Palestinian human rights activist who was detained on 26 April 2002, based on an outstanding deportation order even though he had lived in New York City since the 1970s. During his two years in detention, Abdel-Muhti was relocated to more than eight different immigration facilities; this includes his detention in solitary confinement for nine months in York County Jail, even though he was never charged with a crime (Italie, 2004). He was held in detention under harsh conditions until 12 April 2004, when a federal judge finally ruled that he was stateless and hence could not be deported within the foreseeable future. Three months later, however, Abel-Muhti collapsed and died of a heart attack.

Some research suggests that the length of time that detainees could be held appears to have decreased in the decade-plus since 9/11. Yet that data conflates summary removal cases, in which immigrants are immediately deported or voluntarily departed/returned, with cases where detainees are challenging the legality of their deportation through the Bureau of Immigration Appeals Courts. By December 2011 the average length of detention had dropped to under 28 days; however, for detainees in formal removal cases the average detention, for example, for New York cases is 205 days. A report issued in 2013 found that detainees waiting for hearings were detained on average 14 months and that 33 per cent of these detainees won their cases (Noferi, 2014).

A history of policing and deporting aliens and managing sedition: 1798–

The mass detention and permanent deportation of immigrants in the post-9/11 era has been facilitated by pre-existing legislation. In the past, the US government has used these laws to justify criminalizing and detaining peoples it believes to be fostering sedition, or conspiring against the government, in the name of national security – which is a subjective interpretation based on the shifting political agenda of those in power at the time. The most notable of these laws, briefly discussed, were passed in 1798, 1986 and 1996. This legislation, among others, collectively provided the language used in the present to define foreign nationals, for example, as aliens. These laws also set judicial precedent, even when not enforced at the time, that has facilitated the government’s ability to distinguish between civil liberties of citizens and non-citizens, as well as to detain and deport aliens deemed a threat to national security.

The Adams Administration in 1798

On 18 June 1798, the second US President, John Adams, a Federalist, passed the Naturalization Act, the first of four Acts that collectively comprise the Alien and Sedition Acts. At the time, America was faced with a potential war with France. Fearing the presence of foreign nationals (then mainly French) within US borders who might conspire to overthrow the government, the Naturalization Act suddenly placed limits on who could

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access US citizenship, as the document states, ‘to establish an uniform rule of naturalization and to repeal the act heretofore passed on that subject’ (Fifth Congress of the United States of America, Session 2, Chapter 54, Section 1, 1798a,b, pp. 566–567). The Naturalization Act allowed aliens (foreign nationals) who were not subjects of US enemies and who had been residing in the United States for 5 years to apply for naturalization, for example, to have the right to vote. They would be granted naturalization upon their fourteenth year of residence inside the United States, in comparison to the previous 5-year residency requirement (US Immigration Legislation Online).

While the Naturalization Act was not enforced during the Adams Administration, it set a legislative precedent that allowed the government to distinguish between the human rights (civil liberties) accorded citizens and non-citizens residing within US borders. Indeed, the Federalists at the time surmised that non-citizens residing inside US borders were not included in the US Constitution’s opening phrase ‘We the People’ – a debate that continues in regards as to who has the right to civil liberties in the United States (Stone, 2004). This perspective heavily informs the content of the next two Acts passed, generally known as the Alien Acts. On 25 June of that same year, Congress passed what has now become the most detrimental act to civil and political liberties in the US: the Alien Friends Act. This Act authorized the government that:

whenever there shall be a declared war between the United States and any foreign nation or government or any invasion or predatory incursion shall be perpetrated, attempted, or threatened against the territory of the United States, by any foreign nation or government, and the President of the United States shall make public Proclamation of the event, all natives, citizens, denizens [an inhabitant of a space], or subjects of the hostile nation or government, being males of the age of fourteen years and upwards, who shall be within the United States, and not actually naturalized shall be liable to be apprehended, restrained, secured and removed, as alien enemies. (Fifth Congress of the United States (1798a, b), Session 2, Chapter 66, p. 577)

Furthermore, the Alien Friends Act granted the President the authority to determine how these processes could be executed in the name of ‘public safety’, for example, in the US judicial system (Fifth Congress of the United States (1798a, b), Session 2, Chapter 66, p. 577).

For 2 years after the Alien Friends Act was passed, the US government – in the interests of US national security both during war and peacetime – was able to criminalize, deport and/or detain for up to 3 years any aliens it suspected of treason, spying, and/or conspiring against the US government in conjunction with any potential enemy of the US. Aliens convicted of any of these charges were permanently denied naturalization (US Immigration Legislation Online).

The final two acts passed in 1798 reinforced aspects outlined in the previous acts. The Alien Enemies Act, which Adams signed on 6 July, facilitated the criminalization of alien men 14 years and older whom the government surmised threatened national security. Aliens could be detained for criminal activities if convicted of threatening public safety or immediately deported from the United States. Finally, the Sedition Act passed on 14 July criminalized anyone (citizen and other) who criticized the President, his administration and/ or the Congress. The Act directly challenged the right to free speech in the Constitution’s First Amendment. At the time the Adams Administration passed the Sedition Act to mediate

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against the election of Adams’ opposing political party, the Republican-Democrats led by Thomas Jefferson, to the Presidency in 1800. The Sedition Actwas legal for the next 50 years until it was declared unconstitutional ‘in the court of history’ (US Immigration Legislation Online; Stone, 2004).

Several centuries later, the Alien Friends Act in particular cases continues to be legally viable. It has been used to manage potentially threatening aliens residing in the United States. In 1941, President Roosevelt signed Proclamation 2525, which expanded his authority under the Alien Friends Act, to not only detain aliens but to seize their property. This resulted in the relocation and incarceration of tens of thousands of Japanese, citizen and non, as well as the arrest of a far lower number of Germans and Italians residing within US national borders after Japan bombed the US naval base Pearl Harbor in Hawaii in December 1941 (Nakamura). It has also been central to the 1986 and 1996 laws targeting immigrants, mainly Muslims and South Asians, for detention, criminalization and deportation.

In 1986 the United States passed the Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986 (IRCA). Also known as the MacKay Amendment, the IRCA facilitated the mass deportation of immigrants convicted of what was construed as a deportable offense; these offenses included remaining in the United States past the length of stay granted by their visas, which thereafter rendered them undocumented. The IRCA also imposed sanctions against anyone who employed the undocumented and furthermore increased the surveillance of US national borders (Giovagnoli, 2013; DHS).

A decade later in 1996, President Bill Clinton signed the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA) and the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsi- bility (IIRIR) Act subsequent to both the 1993 World Trade Center Bombing and the 1995 Oklahoma City Bombing. In the former, a bomb was detonated by a group of seven Islamists on 26 February 1993. The mission killed six and injured upwards of 1000. While one of the bombers, Ramzi Yousef, participated in the bombings in retribution for US support of Israel to the detriment of Palestinian security, none of the bombers have been confirmed to be associated with AQ (CNN Library, World Trade Center). Those attacks escalated fears of additional attacks by Islamists within US borders, but also initiated fears of all non-White bodies within US borders (discussed later).

Two years later, the Oklahoma City Bombing killed 167 and injured upwards of 500 Americans in the heartland of the United States: Oklahoma City, Oklahoma (University of Missouri-Kansas City). Even when former US military Timothy McVeigh, a white, heterosexual male, was convicted of the bombing and put to death for it, American anxieties about Islam and the foreign Other persisted. These anxieties are evidenced in the passage of the legislation one year after the Bombing in 1996 that continued to target the immigrant population in ways that criminalized them and justified their removal, or permanent deportation. The 1996 laws allowed the government to redefine petty crimes committed only by immigrants, such as shoplifting, as serious crimes labeled as ‘aggravated felonies’. The term ‘aggravated felony’ was legislated in 1988 to include the following crimes: murder, drug trafficking (federal), and the trafficking of (illegal) firearms and destructive devices, such as bombs. Whereas US citizens charged with aggravated felonies are typically granted a trial to gauge their innocence or culpability with respect to those specific crimes, this is not the case with immigrants. While immigrants may have been charged and convicted specifically for petty crimes, the 1996 laws gave US judges the discretion to legally translate these petty crimes into aggravated felonies at their discretion – even if the immigrant in

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question had never committed any of the crimes defined as aggravated felonies. These laws were also retroactive. This allowed judges the discretion to alter the criminal record of immigrants who had already paid the penalty for having been convicted for petty crimes as having committed aggravated felonies. Additionally, immigrants convicted of an aggravated felony who had served time for that crime were to be immediately detained upon their release by the DHS (Immigration Policy Center).

The collective processes facilitated the criminalization of as many immigrants without trial as possible, without recourse to asylum, and with the intention of permanently remov- ing as many immigrants from the United States as possible. Between October 1995 and September 1996, 70 000 immigrants were deported. In the following year, when the 1996 laws were implemented, that number climbed to 114 000. Nearly a decade later in 2012, 419 384 were deported. Under President Obama more immigrants have been deported than under any of his predecessors, closing in at nearly 2 million by September 2013 (Immigration Policy Center).15 Those presenting any criminal records were automatically removed en masse with no right to return to the United States; this includes approximately 100 000 parents of US-born children between 1997 and 2007. This specific targeting of parents with US-born, and therefore US citizen, children reflects perhaps the government’s efforts to counter the myth of undocumented immigrants who have so-called ‘anchor-babies’, babies who by virtue of their birth in the US are automatically granted US citizenship. The stereotypical assumption is that the undocumented parents would attempt to ‘take advantage’ of (and, hence exploit) the citizenship status of their children to persuade the United States to also grant them residence status or citizenship. Such stereotypes perpetuate common assumptions about the undocu- mented immigrants in the United States as morally questionable, and as the ACLU observes ‘that immigrants are more likely to commit crime [than US citizens]’ (Rabinovitz, 2013). ICE now even references these immigrants as ‘criminal aliens’ to morally differentiate them from ‘proper, moral’ citizens of the United States (ICE: Secure Communities).

Criminalizing the veil: Implicating gender norms in national borders

Relevant to US ideologies of security are Western anxieties about the veiled, Muslim woman, discussed briefly here.16 Cynthia Enloe writes that in the French Algerian colonial context ‘the image of the tantalizingly veiled Muslim woman was a cornerstone of this [Algerian] ideology and of the imperial structure it supported’ (Enloe, 1989, p. 44). Penetrating and, thus, controlling the veiled women would signify Western control over Islam and over the Muslim spaces it sought to colonize. Yet Ann McClintock argues that the inability of Western society to penetrate the veil of the veiled woman in colonized, Muslim societies also corroborated Western frustrations over being unable to penetrate, and therefore to dominate, Muslim societies (McClintock, 1995, p. 23). As such, the presence of the veiled woman within the colonized space symbolized the threat that Islam posed to Western society. To that point, Ania Loomba further surmises that ‘[t]he veil becomes a symbol of colonial frustration for it lets the woman gaze upon the world while shielding her from their prying eyes’ (Loomba, 1998, p. 193). The imagined violent potential of the veil was countered by the West through what Frantz Fanon observes as a reciprocal form of gender violence by European men against veiled woman: the rape of the veiled woman. He writes, ‘The rape of the Algerian woman in the dream of the European is always preceded by the

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rending of the veil’ (Fanon, 1965, p. 44); the specific attention to ‘rape’ denotes the Western masculine need to violently control the veiled woman sexually because she threatens his masculinity.

These anxieties about the veil continue to guide Western projections of Islam as a threat to the predominantly Christian West in the post-9/11 era. Joan Wallach Scott writes that the veil represents to the West ‘an emblem of radical Islamist politics’. In the post-9/11 era, these fears have manifested themselves in European attempts to impose restrictions on the agency and security of veiled, Muslim women residing in Europe as a means of restricting the agency of Islam within Europe. This surfaces, for example, in debates in European nations as to the signification of the veil within Western national borders. Bronwyn Bishop, Australian Member of Parliament, stated outright that the veil ‘has become the icon, the symbol of the clash of cultures, and it runs much deeper than a piece of cloth’ (Scott, 2007, p. 4). This manifests itself in France’s different, logically questionable, explanations for banning Muslim girls from veiling in France’s primary and secondary public schools. On the one hand, France explains this ban as motivated by French interpretations of the veil as a sign of Islam’s patriarchal oppression of Muslim women and, hence, the denial of Muslim women’s human rights. Yet Scott writes that while this logic may gain credibility to a degree, it is eclipsed by another competing French narrative that believes that the veiled, Muslim girls also ‘[…] embodied the very peril from which vulnerable [European] children needed to be protected: they carried the virus, as it were, of religion into the schools’ – here, the virulent nature of the religion of Islam (Scott, 2007, p. 107).

Western prejudices against the veil further surface in the legislation banning women from veiling in public passed in France, Belgium, Australia, Holland, Bulgaria and most recently Italy in the post-9/11 era. For example, French government officials initially framed banning Muslim women from veiling in public as a matter of fighting for Muslim women’s human rights (Scott, 2007, p. 2). They argued that veiling could only signify Islam’s oppression of Muslim women and, as such, France would not participate in or condone this violation of Muslim women’s human rights. Eventually, however, French politicians admitted their legislation was guided more by French anxieties that the veil signified the presence of Islam within European borders and, hence, the threat that Islam posed to Western culture. French Prime Minister Nicolas Sarkozy noted that it was France’s ‘moral responsibility’ to maintain European culture against the Muslim population in France (Cody, 2010). A Report produced by the French Parliamentary Committee in January 2010 on legislation banning Muslim women from veiling in public corroborated these sentiments by characterizing the veil as a ‘visible sign “of radical religious practice,” and stating that “[…] wearing of the full veil [is] a challenge to our republic. This is unacceptable. We must condemn this excess”’ (BBC News, 2010).

European biases against the veil hence present a convoluted logic. This logic presumes that the presence of the veiled, Muslim woman within Western borders signifies the presence of violent Islam. Even as European narratives also assume that veiled, Muslim women must be oppressed by that same violent Islam, they also believe that policing veiled, Muslim women and criminalizing them within European borders is critical to managing the threat that Islam poses to Western society.

Comparable anxieties about the veil have surfaced within United States borders in the post-9/11 era. Haddad et al observe that in America ‘the elaboration of the difference between Islam and the west has often centered on the status of women in the Muslim World.

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The likeness of a veiled Muslim woman appears to many Americans to be stark in contrast to the freedoms of western democracy’ (p. 23). These biases were in existence prior to the 9/11 missions and are exemplified in how the US culture was fascinated by the need to unveil, and hence to free, Muslim women from the oppression of Islam in foreign lands. Haddad et al note that in the mid-1990s, press coverage of women in the Middle East by The New York Times ‘virtually always has featured male images associated with “hard” news about conflict and politics’ to underscore as common a link between violence and Muslim men. Haddad et al also observe that around the same time period about two-thirds of the photos taken of Muslim women in the Middle East were of women who were veiled. These projections collectively underscore American assumptions about Muslim men and women, and Islam in general. These projections imply that Muslim men are excessively violent in relation to non-Muslim men and, hence, that they must always be violently oppressing Muslim women. The oppressive nature of Muslim men, and hence of Islam, is signified by the veiled woman, because for what other reason would a woman veil? By that same logic, because Western women do not veil, they are more free to enjoy their human rights; the unveiled woman thus signifies the moral superiority of Western men and the progress of the West as a whole in relation to Islam (Haddad et al, 2003, p. 31).

While this logic acknowledges that the veiled, Muslim woman is vulnerable to Islam, by the same token, US security initiatives and biases surmise that American security is also dependent to a degree on policing these same women. This perspective is evidenced in the experiences of veiled, Muslim women residing in the United States even before 9/11, as in the case of Maysa Mounla-Sakkal. Mounla-Sakkal was accepted into Case Western Reserve’s prestigious Pediatric Residency Training program in Cleveland, OH, in 1994. Yet to her shock, her contract was not renewed at the end of the first year. In a lawsuit she brought against the Hospital regarding her dismissal from the program, Mounla-Sakkal provided a series of allegations against the program that she argued may have impacted the Hospital’s decision not to renew her residency. These allegations included: a woman physi- cian on the teaching staff who informed Mounla-Sakkal that her renewal was contingent on whether she would agree not to pray in public and not to wear her headscarf. Mounla-Sakkal was told that ‘babies are afraid’ of the headscarf. In her lawsuit, Mounla-Sakkal further alleged that the staff was interested in her political leanings, for example, on which side her loyalties fell with regard to the Arab–Israeli issue (Haddad et al, 2003, p. 101).

Re-Affirming the ‘criminal’ Latino/a

This xenophobic climate was enhanced by ICE’s implementation of the Secure Communities (S-Comm) initiative in 2008. S-Comm encouraged American civilians to police their communities (read: Muslims, South Asians and other non-white bodies) for any suspicious behavior that could be detrimental to US national security. By fall 2010, ICE had also developed the Alien Criminal Response Information Management System (ACRIMe), a comprehensive system that enhanced coordination between law enforcement and immigra- tion databases ‘to prove and modernize efforts to identify aliens convicted of a crime, sentenced to imprisonment, and who may be deportable, and remove them from the United States, once they are judged deportable’ (United States General Accountability Office, 2012, p. 6). ACRIMe was quietly initiated under the Bush administration in 14 jurisdictions that

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were already collecting the fingerprints of everyone arrested through S-Comm. The data collected from S-Comm was then compared with the data comprising ICE’s database IDENT, which maintains records of immigrant applicants and people considered potential terrorists. This combined process allowed ICE to increase its potential to criminalize even more people suspected by the American public of being threats to US security. By 2012, the Obama administration had expanded the program to be executed in over 1595 communities, which has since affected record numbers of immigrant deportations.17

S-Comm has come under scrutiny by legal experts who have challenged its effective- ness while at the same time expressing concern over its intrusion into civil liberties, the foundation of the US Constitution. A critical concern is that the program has increased the criminalization of Latino communities in particular. A 2011 study conducted by the Chief Justice Earl Warren Institute on Law on Policy at the Berkeley Law School concluded that Latinos make up 93 per cent of the individuals arrested under S-Comm even though they constitute 77 per cent of the undocumented population in the nation. In addition, the study concluded that S-Comm posed significant threats to civil liberties; for example, while only 52 per cent of those arrested under the program were granted a hearing before an immigration judge, only 24 per cent were provided access to an attorney. A 2012 study published by the Governmental Accountability Office (GAO) concerning the potential abuses affected by the S-Comm program failed to acknowledge the overrepresentation of Latinos or their inadequate legal representation under S-Comm (Kohli et al, 2011).

Interestingly, increased paranoia about Middle Eastern/South Asian terrorists post-9/11 eventually impacted the DHS’s surveillance of foreign bodies along the US’s southwestern border with Mexico. By 2005 the DHS had implemented Operation Streamline, which would eventually increase surveillance along multiple patrol borders along the southwestern border.18 The Operation facilitated the CBP’s (Customs and Border Protection) authority to exercise a ‘zero tolerance’ policy in apprehending, charging and convicting individuals who had crossed illegally into the United States, with the ultimate goal of legally justifying their removal from the US. Operation Streamline further compromised the individual due process of people charged under Operation Streamline by allowing judges to review up to 12 immigration cases at a time to allow for the simultaneous removal of multiple migrants en masse. The Operation has facilitated the removal of migrants illegally crossing the US border with Mexico. By 2009, 92 per cent of the 91 899 prosecuted under Operation Streamline were tried and convicted of ‘illegal entry’ and/or ‘illegal reentry’ into the United States (Kerwin and McCabe, 2010). The sudden increase in the number of unaccompanied children as young as 5 years of age who have crossed into the United States since 2012 has further problematized US cultural stereotypes that project all Latinos as criminals. This phenomenon is raising concerns about how the US plans to maintain national security along the US–Mexican border while dealing ‘humanely’ with scores of vulnerable children who, in many cases, would rather risk their lives to cross into the United States than experience excessive degrees of violence in their home nations (Gordon, 2014).

Collectively, these security policies criminalizing immigrants are shaping the demo- graphic composition of trials held in US federal courts. There has been a dramatic increase in felony cases tried in federal courts concerning the illegal re-entry of immigrants into the United States who have previously been deported from the United States. In March 2014, the Pew Research Center found that the significant rise in cases being tried in federal courts between 1992 and 2012 paralleled a dramatic rise in the number of cases concerning the

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conviction of immigrants who have illegally re-entered the United States. In 1992, 690 of the 36 564 cases tried in federal courts concerned the illegal re-entry of migrants into the United States (undocumented). By 2012 this statistic had climbed to 19 463 of 75 867 cases tried in federal courts. This rise paralleled an increase in the number of Latinos and undocumented peoples targeted: in 1992, 23 per cent of those convicted were Latino in comparison to 48 per cent by 2012 (Light et al, 2014).

A History of xenophobia and violence as nation-building

These security policies and practices are the latest in a continuum of violence executed against foreign bodies – whether citizens, immigrants or non-resident aliens – throughout American history. This violence is based on increasing correlations among foreign others and negative stereotypes, as the ACLU observes, for example, leading to assumptions ‘that immigrants are more likely to commit crime [than are US citizens]’ (Rabinovitz, 2011). These biases are reflected in ICE’s identification of the immigrants it has criminalized as ‘criminal aliens’, which highlights their moral distinction from US citizens (ICE Secure Communities’). Collectively, such projections justify restricting, and even completely denying, immigrants access to human rights and, hence, fostering their dehumanization. The lack of internal accountability in DHS systems, for example concerning the generic treatment of cases that should be adjudicated on an individual basis, allows serious mistakes (violations of human rights) to be made with impunity because US security legislation is biased against immigrants.

As noted earlier, US history reveals a pattern of systemic violence against foreign others to the point of criminalization; this violence is intensified in times of national crisis. Anxieties about national security have legitimized the immediate targeting, policing and criminalization of non-white, non-Christian bodies through racial profiling, and their exclusion from the broader American community whether through forced relocation, detention or internment. This is exemplified by the US policies against Native American and Japanese communities residing in the United States, very briefly and generally explored.

Native Americans and Asian Americans

Indigenous to the land on which the United States was eventually established, Native Americans had both physically and symbolically threatened the government’s claims to and initiatives on US soil for centuries. The United States managed this threat by consistently displacing Native Americans inside the United States and eventually onto reservations. Native Americans were also policed through a series of laws that restricted their right to US citizenship. In 1790 the United States passed the Naturalization Act, which prohibited Native Americans from gaining citizenship mainly because they were not considered to be racially white. In 1867, the Congress-created Indian Peace Commission allowed Native Americans citizenship only if they would repudiate their native traditions and embrace Christianity. All Native Americans were eventually granted citizenship by 1924 only after the United States acquired much of their land and forced much of the community through the process of deculturalization. The process required Native American children to leave their families to attend boarding schools throughout the United States designed to correct the ‘deviance’

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inherent in these ‘foreign heathens’. From 1875 through the mid-twentieth century, tens of thousands of Native American children were forcibly transferred to the nearly 100 boarding schools across America. During their stay, many endured years of sexual molestation, hard physical labor and consistent humiliation (Bear, 2011). Joel Spring describes these schools as ‘a paramilitary form of organization […] supported by the labor of their students. […] The children were constantly drilled and given little time for recreation. […] For punishment, children were flogged with ropes, and some boarding schools contained their own jails’ (Spring, 2003, p. 31).

Native Americans were finally naturalized in 1924 at a time when the nation appeared to be distracted by another threat: Asian Americans. US anxieties surrounding Asian Americans were initiated upon their immigration into and their economic success within the United States as far back as the mid-nineteenth century mainly in relation to the Gold Rush in the West. To mediate what it perceived as growing, excessive Chinese agency in the United States, the US government passed several laws, including the 1870 Naturalization Act, that prevented the Chinese from becoming American citizens. These laws also denied Chinese immigrants the right to bring their wives to the United States, most likely to emasculate them and prevent them from establishing home spaces in the United States. In 1882, the Chinese Exclusion Act halted Chinese immigration to the United States and underscored further that the Chinese could not be naturalized – this extended to their American-born children. C.N. Lee observes that this was ‘the first time in US history […] [that] a specific ethnic group was singled out and forbidden to enter the US’ (Asian Nation).

Ironically, the Chinese were offered citizenship only in 1943 most likely to win their communal support for the US’s initiatives against another Asian community that was even more immediately threatening to the US at the time: the Japanese. US anxieties about Japanese individuals residing inside US borders soared immediately upon the Japanese bombing of the US naval base in Hawaii, Pearl Harbor, on 7 December 1941. The bombing immediately drew the United States into World War II against the Axis Alliance, which included Germany, Japan and Italy. Almost immediately thereafter and under Executive Order 9066, the US government justified the ‘relocation’ of all persons deemed threatening to US national security (read: the Japanese) away from military bases on the West Coast, which were in proximity to Japan, to internment camps inland (Greenberg, 1995, p. 3).

Most likely to mediate against being compared with Adolf Hitler’s relocation of Jewish people to concentration camps during the same time period in Europe, in 1942 the US’s War Activities Committee of the Motion Picture Industry released a film to the American public explaining the government’s justification for relocating Japanese residing in America to what it labeled carefully as War Relocation Camps (WRA Camps). In this documentary, Milton S. Eisenhower, who narrates the documentary and was Director of the War Activities Committee, assured the American public that the removal of approximately 100 000 Japanese residents, of whom two-thirds were US citizens, from the West coast was a necessity: ‘We knew that some among them were potentially dangerous. Most were loyal. But no one would know what would happen among this concentrated population if Japanese forces were to try to invade our shores’. Eisenhower explained that notices posted publically required all Japanese to register with the government as part of the relocation process, and that the ‘Japanese themselves cheerfully handled the enormous paperwork involved in the migration’ (Japanese Relocation). This propaganda neatly eclipsed the government’s true motivations for relocating all Japanese to these camps, including citizens: to police and

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criminalize all Japanese as they were deemed a threat to national security. Yet this relocation was not enough to assuage US suspicions of Japanese loyalty to the United States. In January 1943, the United States consented to Japanese enlistment in the US military but only as a segregated component. By February, the government required all Japanese men and women 17 years old and above to prove their loyalty to the United States by completing what was termed a ‘Loyalty Questionnaire’. This included two critical questions:

Question #27: Are you willing to serve in the armed forces of the United States on combat duty, wherever ordered?

and Question #28: Will you swear unqualified allegiance to the United States of America and faithfully defend the United States from any and all attack by foreign or domestic forces, and forswear any form of allegiance to the Japanese Emperor or any other foreign government, power, or organization? (A More Perfect Union)

The United States surmised that the ‘good’ Japanese would always reply ‘yes’ to both questions.19 While American residents of German and Italian descent, associated with the European nations who were also main enemies of the Allies in World War II, did experience arrests and detentions to a degree, neither community was forcibly relocated or subjected to the same degree of suspicion by the US government. Cheryl Greenberg observes, ‘Those who noticed the discrepancy generally explained it with reference to race, claiming that unlike European whites, Japanese could never overcome the untrustworthy nature of their genes’. It is hence the non-white body that remains permanently suspect in a nation that privileges the racially white, heterosexual Christian male (Greenberg, 1995, p. 3).

Vigilantism as xenophobia: Taking the law into their own hands

Since 9/11 several US politicians have made statements alluding to historic US prejudices against the foreign Other. In the 2012 Presidential race, candidate Herman Cain called for the re-establishment of the loyalty oath the United States had once demanded of the Japanese nearly a half-century earlier, this time to address his suspicions of all Muslims residing in the country. He proclaimed that he would not allow Muslims to work in his administration unless they had signed a loyalty oath, because, he surmised that ‘[m]any of the Muslims, they’re not totally dedicated to this country’ (Gerson, 2010).

The climate that ensued after AQ’s 9/11 missions encouraged other politicians to expand their definitions of terrorism to include distinctions between what they considered deviant and improper and normal and proper sexual behavior in the United States. In April 2003, the Supreme Court was actively considering the case of Lawrence v Texas, which concerned the privacy of sexual expression in the home space. The case was initiated when two gay men, John Lawrence and Tyron Garner, were arrested under a Texas anti-sodomy law for having anal sex in the privacy of their apartment. In response to that deliberation, then Republican Senator Rick Santorum suggested that homosexuality be criminalized by directly relating it to national security:

If the Supreme Court says that you have the right to consensual sex within your home, then you have the right to bigamy, you have the right to polygamy, you have the right to

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incest, you have the right to adultery. You have the right to anything. […] Does that undermine the fabric of our society? I would argue yes, it does. (Libow, 2003)

In July 2004 Santorum re-affirmed this perspective when articulating his definition of marriage as a heterosexual union between a man and woman. Guarding this dynamic, he surmised, was tantamount to national security: ‘I would argue that the future of America hangs in the balance, because the future of the family hangs in the balance. Isn’t that the ultimate homeland security, standing up and defending marriage?’(Pittsburgh-Post Gazette, 2004).

Later, in March 2008, Oklahoma State Legislator Republican Sally Kern echoed Santorum’s anxieties when she stated that homosexuality posed a threat greater than that posed by Islamist terrorism to the United States. After describing ‘homosexuality […] [as] the death knell of this country’, she likened homosexuality to a cancer and further projected it as ‘the biggest threat our nation has, even more so than terrorism and Islam […]’ (Oklahoma state rep, 2008).

The degree of visibility these statements have gained, in addition to the national legislation and the law enforcement activities executed against certain immigrant commu- nities post-9/11 that corroborate their biases, has increased American anxieties about who might be construed as a terrorist. Fueled by this xenophobic climate, vigilante groups throughout the United States have assumed what they believe is their responsibility to participate in the management of their own security and of the nation. Most often, this vigilantism manifests itself when civilians police and execute extra-legal violence of their own accord against foreign bodies the nation has already singled out as potential terrorists.

Vigilantism against Muslims surfaced even before the 9/11 attacks, as evidenced in the hate crimes executed by white US civilians against Muslims residing in the United States after the Oklahoma City Bombing. Even though a white male was convicted and eventually put to death for that bombing, US citizens throughout the nation committed vigilante attacks against Muslims and Arabs. Many Arab/Muslim organizations received death and bomb threats and phone calls demanding that they leave the United States. This abuse was initiated by statements made by the INS previous to the capture of McVeigh; in one such press release, the INS stated that it was on the lookout for men of ‘Middle Eastern appearance’ and that it had detained several suspicious men of ‘Middle Eastern origin’ in relation to the bombing (Reuters, 1995).

Vigilante ‘justice’ against Muslims and South Asians

American anxieties about the infiltration of more alien, foreign Others into Oklahoma, considered the heartland of the United States, led to a series of violent attacks against Muslims and South Asians in 1995. Before McVeigh was caught and charged with the bombing, law enforcement was complicit in targeting Muslims. For example, a Muslim woman was mistakenly arrested for the Oklahoma Bombing while she was in London. These government initiatives fostered vigilante attacks against Muslims throughout Oklahoma. For example, seven-months pregnant Suhair Al Mosawi was playing with her children in her home when someone threw an object through the window. After she quickly moved her children to the bathroom, she realized she was cramping, and eventually lost her baby.

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Vigilantes even targeted Muslim children. Fifth-grader Asif Ali observed, ‘Some people made fun of me and stuff, and they said, “Go back to where you came from,”and stuff. […] it made me feel unincluded and like people didn’t like me’ (Henneberger, 1995).

This xenophobia against foreigners, particularly Arabs and Muslims, soared in the post-9/ 11 era, engendering additional attacks against related communities. On 10 August 2012, Wade Michael Page walked into a Sikh temple in Oak Creek, WI, and opened fire during Sunday afternoon services when the temple was crowded. Six people died, including the temple president and three priests, and many were injured. Page had been steeped in white nationalism during the time he spent at Fort Bragg in the 1990s when the National Alliance, considered the most dangerous neo-Nazi group in the country at the time, had a visible presence on and near the base. Page was shot at the scene and subsequently took his own life. This hate crime had a chilling effect on the Sikh community and mobilized activism to respond to anti-Muslim attacks that were being launched against this community.

The Oak Creek shooting pressured the government to begin tracking other hate crimes against Sikhs, Arabs and Hindus and to collect federal data on these hate crimes. Family members of the victims of the Oak Creek massacre testified at Senate Judiciary Hearings and called on the DOJ to consider including this data. On the one-year anniversary of the Sikh temple shooting, the DOJ announced that it would establish a hate crime initiative concerning the Sikh community in the United States and that the FBI would begin tracking hate crime data concerning Sikhs, Arabs and Hindus in 2015. However, hate crimes against these groups continued to escalate, and this has forced community organizations to take matters into their own hands, for example, by establishing better communication and coordination of information among themselves about vigilante organizations that have executed hate crimes against Sikhs (Qurimbach, 2013; Iyer, 2014).

Hate crimes against Muslims spiked again upon the formation and rise of AQ’s splinter group the Islamic State (formerly known as ISIS) in Syria and Iraq in early 2014. ISIS’s activities paralleled a rise in hate crimes in the US in 2014. Between 1 January and 14 September 2014, hate crimes against Muslims and South Asian communities in Brooklyn, New York, jumped by 30 per cent. On 30 July 2014, Sandeep Singh, a Sikh businessman, was verbally attacked by a driver on 99th Street in Queens and called a ‘terrorist’. He was then hit by the truck and subsequently dragged for several feet down the street. The Sikh Coalition held a protest five days later while Singh remained in the hospital. The protest called on the NYPD to find the man who had carried out the hate crime. The Sikh community continued to protest for another three weeks until the NYPD arrested Joseph Caleca for hitting and dragging Singh with his pickup truck. A few days later, another Sikh family was targeted by violence on Roosevelt Island. Dr. Jaspreet Singh and his mother were verbally attacked and called ‘terrorists’. The Sikh Coalition has since urged present Mayor de Blasio and the NYPD to develop an action plan to address anti-Sikh violence and discrimination (Sikh Coalition, 2013; Singh, 2014).

In August 2014, American journalist James Foley was beheaded by the Islamic State. This beheading initiated another wave of attacks against Arab communities residing in the United States. In early September 2014 in Bay Ridge, Brooklyn – a neighborhood with a high concentration of Arabs – two women were attacked outside their office at the Arab American Association of New York. Linda Sarsour, the Executive Director of the Association and a colleague, stated that they were chased down the street by Brian Boshell who threw a trash can at them while screaming, ‘You’re cutting people’s heads off!

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I’m going to cut your head off and see how your people feel about it!’ The police failed to respond to the incident for over 45 minutes. An internal investigation was launched only after Sarsour testified at a public meeting with NYPD leaders (Glenza, 2014). On 23 September 2014, public advocate Letitia James set up an emergency task force to fight discrimination in light of this increase in hate crimes targeting Muslim and even Jewish New Yorkers. This was in direct response to ads released by conservative blogger Pamela Geller. These ads targeted Islam, for example, by featuring images of James Foley just before he was beheaded by ISIS. The ads claim that two-thirds of all US money is sent to Muslim countries, directly implying the Arab exploitation of the United States: not only were Arabs receiving most of America’s money but they were also publicizing their killing of Americans on the global stage with seeming impunity. Geller insisted that the ads were part of an educational campaign to warn of the problem that Arabs presented to the United States in relation to American stereotypes and fears of jihad and sharia law (Lovett, 2014).

Vigilante ‘justice’ along the Mexican border

Since 9/11 vigilante activity has been erratic along the US–Mexico border. Vigilante groups along the border initiated their activities in approximately 2005 and peaked to 319 groups in 2010. In January and February 2007 vigilantes were responsible for two separate incidents near Eloy, Arizona, that resulted in the deaths of four migrants. While these murders remain unsolved, a DHS internal report concerning them concluded, ‘It appears the same group (unnamed) (Southern Poverty Law Center, 2012) of individuals is working in concert to intentionally kill IAs (illegal aliens)’. In April 2012 two more migrants were killed in the same area when four white men wearing camouflage opened fire on a truck carrying undocumented immigrants across the border. While these murders have also not been solved, it is telling that the men who murdered the migrants wore camouflage perhaps because they saw themselves as militia whose activities against migrants righteously complemented those executed by official law enforcement in the interests of US security.

Interestingly, the number of vigilante groups along the US–Mexico border dramatically decreased from peaking in 2012. Much of this may be related to the negative media surrounding the high-profile case of the 2009 murders of Raul Flores and his nine-year-old daughter Brisenia in their home in Arivaca, AZ. The attack was carried out by the Minutemen American Defense (MAD), which came into existence after 2005. This scandal was compounded by the arrest of the leader of the Minutemen Civil Defense Corps on charges that he had molested children and also murdered Barbara Coe, the founder and leader of the California Coalition for Immigration Reform who spearheaded the passage of Proposition 187 in California, which prohibits the undocumented from accessing public assistance (Balletpedia.org, 2014). The Southern Poverty Law Center (SPLC), however, ascribes this reduction in vigilante activity to the Arizona and Alabama legislatures’ adoption of many of the vigilante movement’s (Minutemen and other) goals as well as the shift in the movement’s goals to become more politically mainstream and, therefore, more politically legitimate (SPLC, 2014).

The number of hate crimes has continued to increase throughout the nation. This is evidenced in the FBI’s annual Hate Crime Victimization Report, which compiles crimes motivated by the offender’s bias against certain variables such as race, religion, sexual

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orientation, ethnicity/national origin and disability that are reported by each state. Overall, data reveals that while the number of hate crimes committed in the United States has remained steady since 2004, the demographic of those targeted by these crimes has shifted. In 2010, 66.6 per cent of the victims of ethnically motivated hate crimes were Latino – this represents an increase of 45 per cent from the previous year. The Hate Crimes Victimization Report for 2012 indicated that attacks against the Latino community had tripled from the previous year. The type of hate crimes targeting Latinos is exemplified by an incident that took place in Suffolk County, New York, in 2008 when a group of seven teenagers who decided to go out ‘beaner hopping’ attacked two Latinos. One was Ecuadoran immigrant Marcelo Lucero, who was stabbed in the chest and left to bleed to death (SPLC, 2011; Sanchez and Rodriguez, 2013; Haglage, 2014). The SPLC believes that these statistics are skewed further by endemic underreporting among undocumented communities (Rivas, 2012).

The 2012 data also showed a concurrent increase in the number of hate crimes targeting Muslims in the United States. This trend has continued since peaking in 2010, wherein the 160 hate crimes reported represented an increase of 50 per cent over statistics from the previous year. After President Obama announced the death of Osama bin Laden in May 2011, a series of vigilante attacks were carried out against mosques throughout the country. These attacks include the desecration of the Maine Muslim Community Center with graffiti making statements such as ‘Osama today, Islam tomorrow’. In another incident, perpetrators left pork on the handle of the Bossier Mosque in Shreveport, Louisiana. Masked men tried to douse a mosque in Houston, Texas, with gasoline with the intention of setting it on fire.

Hate crimes against Muslim individuals also increased, as evidenced in the case of Masudur Rahman and Mohamed Zaghloul. Both men were traveling by air from Nashville, TN, to Charlotte, NC, for a conference on anti-Muslim discrimination when the airline on which they were flying, Delta, forced them to disembark. The Delta pilot refused to fly with them because, as he stated, their presence on the flight might make other passengers feel uncomfortable. The two men later sued Delta Airlines in federal court. Hate crimes committed against those perceived as Islamist terrorists continues at a slower, but steady, rate (Steinback, 2011; Loller, 2011; Sanchez and Rodriguez, 2013).

Impact on US citizens

Ironically, the surveillance of non-white, non-Christian bodies (citizen and other) eventually expanded to impact the security of US citizens and permanent residents in the US’s War on Terror domestically. Syracuse University’s Transactional Records Access Clearinghouse discovered that between 2008 and 2012, 834 US citizens and 28 489 permanent residents had been mistakenly detained within the immigration system. One extreme case involved the detention of Davino Watson, a Jamaican-born US citizen. Watson was held in the Buffalo Detention Center for three and a half years, from 2008 to 2011, because officials refused to acknowledge his repeated claims that he is a US citizen. He has since sued the DHS (Rosenberg, 2011). Other incidents are equally disconcerting, including one concerning the detention of an 11-year-old boy who is a US citizen for over a month in an immigration detention center in New Mexico in August 2014. In that vein, the government chose to fast- track the cases of the 63 000 Central American children who have flooded the immigration

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system over the past year only when it became a public relations disaster for the DHS. Laura Lichter, a former president of the American Immigration Lawyers Association, has been providing free counsel to detained children from Central America. She pointed out the lack of due process within the system:

I think the fact that a US citizen was detained and for this long before anyone actually realized that there was even the possibility that they had detained a US citizen shows you how little respect and attention is given to people’s cases. What this shows you is that there really is no due process here and the system is only working in a way to deport people from the country. It is not working to protect people’s claims. (Beadle, 2014)

US government policies in the post-9/11 era have compromised the rights automatically accorded US citizens in other ways. This has been a volatile topic especially in regard to the US government assassinations of three US citizens, Anwar al-Awlaki, Samir Khan and Awlaki’s 16-year-old son, Abdulrahman. The three attacks occurred within weeks of one another beginning on 30 September 2011, and were accomplished through drone strikes – it is critical to note that the murder of Abdulrahman was unintentional. Prior to his death, Awlaki had been one of the most influential clerics for AQ and complicit in terror attacks against the United States. He was especially noted for his ability to convert Muslim youth residing in Western nations to his anti-Western jihadist ideologies. For example, when Awlaki was an imam at a mosque in San Diego, CA, in the 1990s, he convinced two men to participate in the 9/11 attacks against the United States. He continued his recruitment strategies between 2002 and 2004 in the United Kingdom, and thereafter began recruiting through the Internet from Yemen as a leading member of AQAP (Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula). Through the Internet, he guided Muslim youth to execute several terror attacks against the United States, including the attempted Christmas Day bombing, the printer bombs sent through airplanes in 2010, the Fort Hood shootings in Texas, and the attempted 2010 Times Square car bombing (BBC News, 2011).

Experts note that such assassinations, wherein the United States willingly killed other US citizens, are precedented only by government-sanctioned attacks against US citizens in the US Civil War (1861–1865). Hence, Awlaki’s assassination by the US government has come under fire mainly because Awlaki, despite his involvement in anti-US terror attacks, was still a US citizen at the time of his death and hence he should have been captured, charged with treason and given a trial. That he was denied this process is further problematized by the fact that other US citizens who were racially white and charged with treason were granted due process. This includes John Walker Lindh, who had fought on the side of the Afghan Taliban against the United States upon the US invasion of Afghanistan in fall 2001. After his capture, the United States returned Lindh to the United States for trial – albeit under highly questionable circumstances, including severe torture, which raises yet another red flag regarding US-sanctioned activities against US citizens. In the case of Awlaki, the United States might argue that given the immediate terror threat Awlaki posed to national security, the government had no other choice but to kill Awlaki because it could not apprehend him. Even if this were the case, the glaring question remains: Is this enough of an excuse for the United States to justify assassinating its own citizens? The US’s decisions in the case of Awlaki and Khan call into question the other Constitutional boundaries and rights of US citizens that the US government might willingly transgress in the interests of national security in the future (Mazzetti, 2013).

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Canaries in the mine: Whistleblowers languish in prison

Perhaps the most chilling attack on civil liberties under the Obama administration in its War on Terror has been its targeting of whistleblowers, or US citizens who have publically revealed, and therefore publically interrogated, the covert, illegal activities of the govern- ment. While the rights of these citizens should be protected, this has not been the case historically in the US. Historians note that one of the darkest periods in regard to civil liberties took place during World War I. The anxieties exposed by a war of that magnitude on a global scale affected a sharp rise in xenophobic vigilante biases and activities throughout, and concurrent institutionalized repressive activities in, the United States. Two months after Congress declared war on Germany on 6 April 1917, Congress passed the Espionage Act. This law penalized individuals residing within the United States who made statements during the war that could be construed as intentionally attempting to interfere with the US military initiatives with fines up to $10 000 and incarceration for up to 20 years. The Sedition Act was passed a year later. This law built upon the Alien and Sedition Act of 1789, noted earlier, and further expanded upon the Espionage Act by making illegal any activities and statements construed as even ‘attempt[ing] to obstruct’ or to attack government activities. These attacks largely policed political dissent within the nation by socialists, including Victor Berger, who was elected to Congress in Wisconsin and the House of Representatives. Berger was initially refused a seat in Congress until after the Supreme Court had overturned his conviction and those of the International Workers of the World (IWW) leadership, including Big Bill Haywood and famous Communists, including Emma Goldman and Julius and Ethel Rosenburg (Burton, 1994).

Unfortunately, these laws remain legally viable. While the Sedition Act was overturned in early 1921, portions of the Alien and Sedition Acts and the Espionage Act noted earlier are still enforceable. At present, they are emerging in new ways to assist in managing the xenophobia characterizing the post-9/11 era under the Obama Administration. Only 10 people in American history have been charged with espionage for leaking classified information. Seven of them have been charged by the Obama Administration. They are known as the ‘Obama Seven’. This is an ironic turn of events since when Obama was a senator he had campaigned for the presidency as a defender of whistleblowers. As President, he even signed both the 2012 Whistleblower Protection Enhancement Act and the 2013 National Defense Authorization Act. Despite these actions, President Obama has since aggressively negotiated both the Espionage Act and the Intelligence Identities Protection Act to convict whistleblowers.

The first of the Obama Seven to be charged with espionage is Thomas Drake, a former senior official at the National Security Agency (NSA). Drake was indicted for purportedly retaining classified documents about a data mining program that he was planning to release to a journalist who worked for the Baltimore Sun. Drake believed he would be exposing contractor waste and voicing his concerns that privacy protections in regard to this program had been stripped away. He eventually pled guilty to a misdemeanor charge. Shamai Leibowitz was the first of the Obama Seven to be convicted under the Espionage Act and he was sentenced to 20 months in jail. Leibowitz was an FBI linguist who had provided transcripts of wiretapped conversations carried out among Israeli officials at their embassy to a blogger. The content of the taped conversations led Leibowitz to believe that Israel had too much influence over members of the US Congress and public opinion (Groll, 2013).

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The third of the Obama Seven is Stephen Jin-Woo Kim, a State Department analyst. Kim gave Fox News a classified intelligence report concerning North Korea’s response to UN sanctions against North Korea in regard to its nuclear capabilities. He was indicted in 2010. While he initially pled ‘not guilty’, he eventually changed his plea to ‘guilty’ in February 2014 and was sentenced to 13 months in prison ((Marimow, 2014).

One of the most famous of the Obama Seven is Chelsea (formerly Bradley) Manning, an army private who leaked hundreds of thousands of classified military reports and diplomatic cables to Wikileaks. While Manning was acquitted of aiding the enemy, she was eventually convicted on six counts of violating the Espionage Act and sentenced to 35 years in prison. The ACLU challenged the Obama Administration’s use of the Espionage Act in the Manning case by stating, ‘We’ve long held the view that leaks to the press in the public interest should not be prosecuted under the Espionage Act’ (Gerstein, 2013).

The fifth individual of the Obama Seven to be charged with espionage is Jeffrey Sterling. Sterling is a former undercover CIA agent who is accused of leaking information about Operation Merlin, which is a mission that involved using a Russian scientist to pass flawed nuclear weapons blueprints to Iran. The US government is currently pressuring New York Times reporter James Risen to identify Sterling as his confidential source for the stories Risen has published about this case. Sterling has pleaded ‘not guilty’ and the federal government is now appealing evidence rulings (Solomon and Wheeler, 2014).

The sixth individual to be charged under the Obama Administration is John Kiriakou, a CIA counterterrorist specialist who sought to expose the US’s use of waterboarding torture techniques during its interrogations of terror suspects. In 2007 Kiriakou went on television to provide a detailed explanation of how waterboarding was being used at the US detention facility at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, which continues to detain US prisoners of war (mainly Afghan Taliban and AQ affiliates) secured from the US invasion of Afghanistan in fall 2001. Kiriakou is currently serving a 30-month prison sentence for exposing the govern- ment’s torture techniques, which ironically the government itself finally acknowledged in winter 2014.

Perhaps the most notorious of the Obama Seven is the seventh and final citizen to be charged with espionage, Edward Snowden. The Obama Administration has been trying to convict Snowden under the Espionage Act for revealing information about the US’s mass surveillance programs. Snowden has been charged with espionage and theft of the government’s property. He has been granted temporary asylum in Russia. In regard to this case, the journalism community has been deeply dismayed by President Obama’s unilateral use of power to police and intimidate journalists, as well as his misuse of the Espionage Act, which was designed as a temporary repressive measure to be used only during times of (declared) war (Van Buren, 2012).

US homeland security beyond 9/11: From Al Qaeda to the Islamic state

As explored, AQ’s suicide missions against the United States on 9/11 have profoundly impacted how the United States (and the global community) discerns and responds to terrorism and potential terrorists. Revisions of old laws and the initiation of new ones in regard to homeland security since the attacks have to varying degrees undermined the civil liberties of all persons residing within US domestic borders.

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Yet while the US’s assassination of AQ leader Osama bin Laden in May 2011 may have impacted AQ’s terror potential against the United States and globally, that same assassina- tion ironically sparked the initiation of an entirely new phenomenon of radical Islamism fostered and promoted by the so-called Islamic State (IS). The assassination of bin Laden left AQ to be governed by bin Laden’s successor, the less effective Ayman al-Zawahiri. Zawahiri’s inability to lead and manage AQ’s subordinate in Iraq, formerly known as Al Qaeda in Iraq and now the IS, contributed to the IS’s growing fissures with AQ since May 2013 and its eventual break from AQ in February 2014 (Rajan, Al Qaeda’s Global Crisis, 2015). That break almost immediately appeared to revive a more radical brand of Islamism globally as Islamist organizations and individuals one by one began to offer support to the IS and some to even publically criticize Zawahiri. For example, in January and June 2014, Sheikh Mamoun bin Abd al-Hamid Hatem, a senior leader of AQAP, publicized his support for IS leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi and further warned that any attacks against the IS would be the work of the devil (Channel 4 News, 2014). Hence, while the bin Laden-led AQ the world had known since 1988 may be experiencing a crisis regarding its viability (Rajan, Al Qaeda’s Global Crisis, 2015), its basic anti-Western, pro-Islamist rhetoric has been co-opted and appropriated by more excessively radical affiliates globally, mainly the IS, to meet their agendas locally and regionally in what Bruce Reidel has labeled the newly emerging trend of ‘Al Qaedisms’ (Riedel, 2014).

Now in 2015, over a decade after the 9/11 attacks, the rapid rise of the IS in MENA is startling. The IS’s growth is also profoundly disturbing as it is responsible for manifesting an excessively disturbing range of human rights violations that it commits with impunity in its efforts to resurrect the ancient (Arab) khilafa (anglicized ‘caliphate’), or Muslim empire established by the first khalif (anglicized ‘caliph’) upon the Prophet Muhammed’s death in 632 AD, upon the very lands on which the first caliphates were erected. To manifest its version of this caliphate – which includes only Muslims and, more narrowly, only pro-Wahabbi (Sunni) Muslims who ascribe to its ideologies – the IS is executing violence at a level the international community finds difficult to comprehend, let alone manage, including: the mass sexual violence, torture, enslavement, and live burial of women and girl children; the torture (including disfigurement and beheadings), genocide and disappearance of all non-Muslims and non-Sunni Muslims, civilian and other, including children; and the enforcement of its highly radical interpretation of pro- Wahabbi sharia on Sunni Muslims, which has included public stonings, crucifixions and dismemberment (Rajan, Al Qaeda’s Global Crisis, 2015; Rajan, “Women, Violence, and the Islamic State”, forthcoming).

Most critically, the IS’s success in MENA is directly proportional to its terror potential against the global community, especially the West. This is evidenced in the how the IS’s activities against human beings in MENA is directly proportional to the rise in its public beheadings of specifically Western civilians; highly successful recruitment of Western nationals who ascribe to the IS’s pro-Wahhabi sentiments; and successful encouragement of vigilante attacks by lone wolf actors in Western nations, briefly explored here.

Securing US borders against Islamist threats is now further problematized by what may be construed as a reverse trend in homegrown terrorism since 2012/13. The initiatives mainly of the IS in Syria and Iraq (as well as AQ’s affiliate in Syria, Jabhat an-Nus.rah li-Ahl ash-Shām [JAN]) have attracted many foreign fighters to the IS jihad in Syria and Iraq (Markman, 2014). As of May/June 2014, approximately 500 British, 150 Australian and 50 American

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nationals had left their nations to join mainly the IS and/or JAN in Syria and Iraq (Tadros, 2014). They comprise some of the nearly 7500 foreign nationals (as of May 2014) from 50 different nations already fighting in the Syrian and Iraqi civil wars. Officials of Western nations fear that if they cannot detect and intercept these operatives should they return to the West, the operatives will facilitate and promote IS terror initiatives inside of Western national borders – surfacing an interesting dimension to the deployment of lone wolves.

The potential for IS operatives who are also Western nationals to return to their respective Western nations to execute terrorism has escalated the terror alert in Western nations. In response United States and Western nations have intensified pre-existing legislation allowing for the policing and criminalization of non-white bodies within their borders and globally. This is evidenced in the arrest of American citizen Rahatul Ashikim Khan for recruiting jihadists to join the Islamic State and others in Syria between March 2011 and January 2012 (Bratu, 2014). In late October, three girls from Denver, Colorado, were en route to join the IS when they were apprehended at the Frankfurt Airport by US security (Hodges, 2014).

The IS has added yet another dimension to the West’s security nightmare against Islamism. This involves a very credible terror threat affected by racially white American men and women who are supporting the IS. Recently, several racially white US citizens have been arrested on terror-related charges associated with the IS. On 8 April 2014, the FBI arrested Shannon Maureen Conley of Denver when she attempted to board a plane to Turkey to join the IS in Syria. In late June 2014, US officials arrested Michael Wolfe before he traveled abroad to fight with the IS (Bratu, 2014; Paul, 2014).

Unlike the terror threat that AQ had posed to the world, the seemingly unmanageable agency of the IS is not only forcing the United States to revisit how it defines, approaches and manages terrorism domestically, but also to recognize more fully how global insecurity directly impacts US domestic security. How the United States will reconfigure its security measures to deal with this new set of highly complex dynamics is yet to be seen. One thing is certain: the United States can no longer afford to treat its security measures in a vacuum, as separate from the global community. Instead, it must recognize that its homeland security resonates with the security of individuals, communities and nations globally. This point drives home the 1994 UNDP Human Development Report’s definition of security as ‘[w]hen the security of people is attacked in any corner of the world, all nations are likely to get involved. Famines, ethnic conflicts, social disintegration, terrorism, pollution and drug trafficking are no longer isolated events, confined within national borders. Their conse- quences travel the globe’ (UNDP, 1994, p. 3). While the events of 9/11 underscored this point a decade ago, the IS has rendered this relationship an inextricable and permanent aspect of US domestic security in the future.

Overview of articles

The articles in this Special Issue expand upon the broad strokes explored in the Introduction. Each piece examines how US security practices implemented post-9/11 are compromising the security/human rights of certain minority groups in the United States including Muslims, Latinos along the Southwest border, and gender non-conforming persons. While they address disparate topics, they all underscore the 1994 UNDP Report’s definition of security,

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namely, how the insecurity of one person or a group of people anywhere in the world will in time impact the security of all peoples globally.

Joshua J. Kurz and Damon S. Berry examine historical frameworks and stereotypes about Latinos along the US border in the southwest to explore new understandings of border realities in post-9/11 United States. In ‘Normalizing Racism: Vigilantism, Border Security, and Neo-Racist Assemblages’, the authors develop a historical genealogy of border security beginning with the Treaty of Hidalgo in 1848, and further examine how historic definitions of security have shifted with the construction of American nationalism since. In considering how national security systems have been developed in relation to the physical borders of nations, Kurz and Berry argue that the security state normalizes and reinforces racialized realities as the need to concretize and police these physical borders becomes increasingly central to ideologies of national stability. While historically the Mexican population in the US was largely seen as a policy nuisance related to labor market flows, the Drug War has since reshaped and reconceptualized the Southern border as a militarized zone. Now the border symbolizes a bulwark against not only migrants but a range of criminal activities including drugs and potential terrorism in contradistinction to what has been projected as the more morally lofty people residing within US borders and away from such ‘dangers’. Border security implies that if the United States does not heavily police these borders, that these activities will penetrate US borders to the detriment of national security.

Interestingly, the federal government has escalated its militarized presence along this same Mexican border in response to the increased xenophobia surfaced by Islamist terrorism post-9/11 throughout the United States. This reveals the US’s tendancy to conflate its fears of various foreign others, whether they be Islamist terrorists attempting to execute terror attacks against the United States or criminal others who attempt to penetrate US borders and exploit the United States economically.

This has fostered a slippage between the type of terrorism of which Islamists are capable and of which ‘illegal’ migrants attempting to illegally enter the United States are capable. This conflation has emboldened a new generation of vigilantism along the southwestern border to police this new aspect of terror. The xenophobia of the post-9/11 climate has fostered and facilitated vigilante activists to legitimize conjecture that terrorist plots can and must be found among Latino populations. Consequently, vigilantes regard themselves as a necessary, albeit extra-judicial, counterpart to establishing national security, to taking matters into their own hands where they feel the governmental authorities have been incompetent. This, they feel, signifies their patriotism to the United States. Kurz and Berry conclude that the juxtaposition of nationalism and racism in the post-9/11 state legitimize radical projections of vigilantism as the pinnacle of patriotism. Their focus in this issue demands additional inquiries, for example, into how US border security has reinforced Western colonial stereotypes of non-white bodies as inherently criminal, indicative of Third World chaos and violence, and parasitic in regard to First World nations. There is no doubt that such views affect the further dehumanization of peoples attempting to cross US borders, which will impact how the US deals with those they presume are both criminals and terror threats to US security.

In ‘From Surveillance to Torture: The Evolution of US Interrogation Practices during the War on Terror’, Ivan Greenberg explores how US appropriations and expropriations of torture, including ‘enhanced interrogation’ techniques developed and applied after 9/11, are being justified, and even applauded, in the name of national security. The government’s

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legitimization of torture techniques such as waterboarding has facilitated the dehumanization of terror suspects – a label that may be assumed by anyone within the United States or attempting to enter the United States even legally. US-sanctioned torture of suspected terrorists, in turn, draws attention to US exceptionalism, mainly US representations of itself as a leader in human rights globally and domestically to the point that it may be exempted from following international rules of law. Greenberg contends that although enhanced interrogation is no longer permitted, the US conservative perspective still views it as legitimate conduct and ignores its likely potential to victimize innocent people misidentified as terrorists.

The United States has signed various legally binding international documents concern- ing the rules of engagement in warfare, namely, the Geneva Conventions and their Associated Protocols. These laws are meant to protect military POWs (prisoners of war) as well as civilians during wartime who may be captured by the enemy. In particular, we draw attention to Article 3, which, the Council on Foreign Relations observes, ‘bars torture, cruel, inhumane, and degrading treatment, as well as outrages against the human dignity of prisoners of war, or POWs’. Subversions of Article 3 may result in charges of war crimes. Until July 2006, the United States dismissed Article 3. But it continued to execute torture against terror suspects through extraordinary rendition and abusing POWs in Guantanamo Bay with virtual impunity by interpreting the Article as inapplicable to CIA investigators not residing within the United States. Hence, CIA interrogators are authorized to apply enhanced torture techniques to terror suspects if outside of US sovereign territory. In July 2006, the US Supreme Court (Hamden) ruled these techniques as illegal (Beehner, 2006).

Greenberg’s piece draws attention to the ways in which the United States has sought to manage national security by negotiating national and international laws against torture, for example, by finding loopholes and caveats in legislation barring torture, as well as by using terminology, such as enhanced interrogation techniques, to mask what can only be defined as torture by basic human rights standards. Greenberg’s piece raises additional inquiries in regard to US national security. For example, if the US subverts international laws regarding POWs and civilians in the interests of national security, how can it distinguish its activities, which are clearly forms of torture and terror, from those we label as terrorists? Furthermore, how can we expect that our military stationed abroad and our civilians at home will be secure if we ourselves willingly compromise the security of other human beings?

Excessive prejudice against Muslims and South Asians justified by the government in collaboration with law enforcement informs Rachel Meeropol’s argument in ‘Muslim until Proven Innocent: The Post-9/11 Ashcroft Raids’. In this piece Meeropol examines the impact of former Attorney General John Ashcroft’s initiation and justification of what would otherwise be construed as extralegal security measures to combat terrorism in the post-9/11 era in the interests of national security and public safety. Meeropol points to various measures justified by the US government in response to the 9/11 attacks that have undermined the very basis of human rights. This is exemplified by the mass round-ups of Muslims through racial profiling and mass detentions in Special Registration (noted earlier) who happen to fit the racial/religious profile of the 9/11 attackers. As noted earlier, US security has been manifested through the execution of constant violence against immigrants from those communities that, for example, remained in the United States in violation of civil

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immigration laws. These individuals were immediately criminalized through arrest, deten- tion and in some cases torture. Maximum pressure was placed on them to cooperate with and corroborate US assumptions about their own terror potential and about others the United States defines as terrorists.

In general, the US government has either hidden these measures from the American people or has assured them that such actions are necessary to US security. Ironically, despite such persuasions these same tactics have eventually come to affect the rights of all human beings residing in the United States, citizen and other. Meeropol’s piece poses a very basic question: If we, as Americans, believe all human beings to be equal and as ideally having equal access to human rights, will turning a blind eye to our complicity in denying certain human beings their human rights eventually impact our ability to access our own human rights in the United States? The answer is inevitably ‘yes’.

In the final piece in this Special Issue, Laura Sjoberg addresses how the post-9/11 climate has impacted US citizens who are already disenfranchised in the nation because they do not conform to the patriarchal-based, heteronormative ideologies of gender and sexuality that generally guide cultures internationally. In ‘(S)he Shall Not Be Moved: Gender, Bodies, and Travel Rights in the Post-9/11 Era’, Sjoberg examines how members of these communities are further marginalized by nationalist, patriotic ideologies of security that have historically been enunciated through bi-gendered patriarchal ideologies of sexuality. These ideologies have come to define the productions, processes and heteronormative racial, gendered and linguistic infrastructure/fabric of the United States. In times of national crisis, bodies that do not conform to patriarchal norms of femininity and masculinity are highlighted by the same spotlight of suspicion placed on other ‘foreign’ bodies. This spotlight has been exacerbated by the xenophobic climate that seized the United States in the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks. Sjoberg examines the effects of this xenophobia by analyzing examples from the gendered targeting of airport security assemblages post-9/11 to determine which bodies are travelable because they are familiar and therefore deemed ‘safe’ to cross national boundaries and which bodies are deemed ‘untravelable’ and therefore unauthorized to cross US national borders because of their ‘unfamiliar’ nature.

Bodies discerned as unfamiliar draw suspicion because they do not conform to Western bi-gendered norms. This is why they are flagged by airport security as untravelable. Sjoberg re-examines traditional security views that project the travelable body as (heterosexual) straight; healthy; identifiable in sex, gender and race; not clearly religious; and, depending on where it is in the world, of a particular race and/or ethnicity. She builds on Cynthia Enloe’s use of the idea of secure states containing insecure women to critique both the actual security of the state and women’s position in it to argue that the gendered violations of people’s rights to movement and bodily integrity post-9/11 is a step backwards both for human security within the state and for the national security of the state.

Sjoberg’s piece is critical in that it draws attention to the violence executed against the LGBT community in the US in the post-911 era. As noted earlier, this community has been defined as a terror threat by various US politicians, some observe, as even more excessive than the threat posed by Islamist groups, such as AQ and the Islamic State, to US security. The excessive degree of suspicion projected onto members of the LGBT community not only contributes to their dehumanization, but also makes light of their life experiences by denying them their dignity. Most recently, this denial was evidenced in press coverage of the whistle- blower Chelsea Manning (noted earlier). Sensationalized press coverage of Manning’s deci- sion to become a woman seemed to eclipse reports of even her anti-governmental activities.

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The xenophobic climate of the post-911 era fostered suspicions of Manning’s tendancy toward deviant behavior in general, whether she engaged in treason or decided to change her gender. This conflation surfaced in August 2013, during Manning’s trial wherein he own attorneys attributed Manning’s unwillingness to maintain her loyalty to the United States to her ongoing conflicts about her gender identity. Scott Stump surmised that the conflict

suggested his struggles with gender identity as a gay soldier were a factor in his decision to leak. His attorneys presented an email to a former supervisor from April 2010 in which he said he was transgender and joined the Army to ‘get rid of it.’ The email, which had the subject line “My Problem,” also included a photo of Manning in which he is wearing a blonde wig and lipstick. (Stump, 2013)

This logic underscores the broader heteronormative ideologies guiding what constitutes ‘deviance’ within any nation-state and the belief that any and all forms of deviance can and will undermine national security. Manning’s decision to change her gender is thus seen as a natural extension of her gender/sexual deviant, subversive nature.

Notes

1 These 25 nations included: Afghanistan, Algeria, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Egypt, Eritrea, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Libya, Morocco, North Korea, Oman, Pakistan, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Somalia, Sudan, Syria, Tunisia, United Arab Emirates and Yemen (Chishti and Bergeron, 2011).

2 In this article we reference the term ‘security’ as defined by the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) in its 1994 Human Development Report. This Report inextricably links the security of nations to the security of persons both residing within those nations and globally. As such, the Report acknowledges that ‘[w] hen the security of people is attacked in any corner of the world, all nations are likely to get involved. Famines, ethnic conflicts, social disintegration, terrorism, pollution and drug trafficking are no longer isolated events, confined within national borders. Their consequences travel the globe’. The Report also defines human security as ‘freedom from fear’ and ‘freedom from want’ (UNDP, p. 3).

3 For more on this topic and how it served to bolster native masculine agency to the detriment of native, colonized women, see Mani (1988), Chatterjee (1990) and Jayawardena (1995).

4 Said (1979) observes that present tensions between Christianity and Islam are rooted in the historic tensions between these religions during the Crusades, where Christians and Muslims battled for control over the Holy Land from the eleventh to thirteenth centuries. Since then, Christian fears of Islam have affected projections of Islam as a nemesis of Christianity. Christianity regarded Islam as the only other monotheistic religion that was comparable, and therefore threatening, to Christianity in terms of its military, economic and cultural prowess globally. After the Prophet Mohammed, the founder of Islam, died in 632 A.D. Islam spread widely. By the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries, Islam had impacted the Middle East, North Africa, Spain, Sicily, Indonesia, China, and parts of France and India. The threat that Islam posed to Christianity and eventually Western imperialism globally is evidenced in Western cultural representations of Islam as, Said notes, an entity of ‘terror, devastation, the demonic, [filled with] hordes of hated barbarians […] a lasting trauma’ (1979, p. 59).

5 This ‘foreign’ aspect is raised against black immigrant communities. These same immigrants may also experience the distinct range of violence that African Americans experience in the United States (later).

6 A parallel discussion may address how gratuitously violent law enforcement policies against civilians of lower- economic class status, undocumented and non-residents residing within Western borders exposes a comparable phenomenon of ‘terror’ management within the United States. This includes excessive police force against young black men, as highlighted by the case of Michael Brown (for gratuitous police force against minority groups in the United States, see Collins, 1996). This increase in violence against these groups of individuals has paralleled the rise in US anxieties about the foreign other residing within its borders immediately following the 9/11 attacks.

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7 AQ’s terrorism post-9/11 has most profoundly impacted nations in the Global South, particularly Muslim- dominated nations. Elsewhere Rajan has examined how AQ-backed affiliates are affecting a genocide of Muslims in Iraq, Syria, Pakistan and Afghanistan (Al Qaeda’s Global Crisis, 2015).

8 Several of the attackers were from South Asia. 9 While the West continues to associate suicide attacks mainly with Islamism and Islam, suicide attacks in the

postcolonial era were initially perfected by the predominantly Hindu, ethnically Tamil, Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) in its multi-decade civil war against the Sinhalese, Buddhist Sri Lankan government (Rajan, 2014).

10 The June 1996 attack on the Khobar Towers in Saudi Arabia is linked to Hezbollah and Iran, but also potentially to AQ.

11 The Pakistani Taliban have grown mainly in response to the US invasion of Afghanistan, as well as US drone attacks in Pakistan’s tribal areas targeting AQ operatives and mainly Pakistani Taliban warlords since 2004. The 7/7 attacks evidence howWestern military activities abroad are affecting reciprocal responses of violence against Western domestic borders.

12 For more on women suicide bombers, see Rajan, 2011. 13 The OIG’s mission is to render efficient DHS activities, including to: ‘1. Prevent Terrorism and Enhance

Security, 2. Secure and Manage Our Borders, 3. Enforce & Administer Our Immigration Laws, 4. Secure and Safeguard Cyberspace, and 5. Insure resilient Response to Disasters’ (OIG, nd).

14 Interestingly, thereafter, the senior official in the Department’s Office of Public Affairs apprised the OIG that it had stopped collecting additional statistics regarding detention procedures as the figures became ‘too confusing’ (OIG, 2003, p. 1).

15 These numbers include the deportation of immigrants detained at the US borders even for 48 hours. Vicens (2014) stresses that this stastic of 2 million reflects the total number of times that an immigrant has been deported from the United States, which includes also the potential that one person may have been removed several times.

16 See Rajan, 2011. 17 DHS data indicates that throughout 2012 President Obama removed and returned over 2 million immigrants

(Department of Homeland Security, 2012). 18 By April 2010 CPB had implemented the Operation in five border patrols: Border Patrol’s Del Rio, TX

(December 2005); the Yuma, AZ (December 2006); Laredo, TX (November 2007); Tucson, AZ (January 2008) and Rio Grande Valley, TX (June 2008).

19 For more on this loyalty questionnaire and those Japanese who answered ‘no’ to both questions, see John Okada’s 1978 novel No-No Boy.

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V. G. Julie Rajan Department of Women’s and Gender Studies, Rutgers University

162 Ryders Lane, New Brunswick, New Jersey 08901, USA

Jeannette Gabriel Social Studies Education, University of Iowa, N285 Lindquist Center

Iowa City, Iowa 52242, USA

Introduction

149© 2015 Macmillan Publishers Ltd. 0955-1662 Security Journal Vol. 28, 2, 109–149

  • Redefining US ‘homeland security’ post-9/11: Extra-judicial measures, vigilantism and xenophobia
    • Imperial Iterations of Homeland Security
    • The 9/11 attacks: Revisiting terrorism, revising security
    • The 9/11 attacks: Who are the terrorists and where are they?
      • Racially White Islamists
    • Policing the ‘foreign’ other
      • The search for ‘Arab/Muslim’ terrorists
    • A history of policing and deporting aliens and managing sedition: 1798–
      • The Adams Administration in 1798
      • Criminalizing the veil: Implicating gender norms in national borders
      • Re-Affirming the ‘criminal’ Latino/a
    • A History of xenophobia and violence as nation-building
      • Native Americans and Asian Americans
    • Vigilantism as xenophobia: Taking the law into their own hands
    • Vigilante ‘justice’ against Muslims and South Asians
    • Vigilante ‘justice’ along the Mexican border
    • Impact on US citizens
    • Canaries in the mine: Whistleblowers languish in prison
    • US homeland security beyond 9/11: From Al Qaeda to the Islamic state
    • Overview of articles
    • Notes
    • References