Article review: The Transformation of NATO after the Cold War

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Time to Consolidate NATO?

Joshua Shifrinson

To cite this article: Joshua Shifrinson (2017) Time to Consolidate NATO?, The Washington Quarterly, 40:1, 109-123, DOI: 10.1080/0163660X.2017.1302742

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Joshua Shifrinson

Time to Consolidate NATO?

After two decades focused on the Middle East and Asia, American pol- icymakers are again paying significant attention to European security. Russian bel-

licosity has seemingly given new life to the transatlantic alliance, leaving the

North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) appearing more relevant and resili-

ent than ever. Indeed, despite pre-election rhetoric that painted NATO as “obso-

lete,” the Trump administration has moved in its early days to underscore the

United States’ continued “commitment to NATO,” to praise “the importance

of the alliance in troubled times,” and even to consider bringing additional

members into the alliance. 1

Concurrently, fears of American abandonment amidst Russian saber-rattling

have led NATO’s European members to seek a sustained American role on the

continent and even, in some quarters, to consider additional defense spending

for NATO activities. 2 These efforts, moreover, come after palpable worry over

Russian aggression spurred renewed efforts during the second Obama adminis-

tration to give teeth to NATO’s collective security provisions and defend

NATO’s East European members from external attack. 3 To this end, NATO

has begun deploying four battalions of troops in the Baltic states and Poland,

while rotating additional American forces onto the continent as a strategic

reserve and upgrading allied military capabilities. 4 Meanwhile, a sustained push

is underway to increase investment in the U.S. nuclear arsenal to craft a strategic

force able to make deterrence credible across the full spectrum of operations. 5 As

Joshua R. Itzkowitz Shifrinson is an Assistant Professor of International Affairs with the Bush

School of Government at Texas A&M University, where his research interests include inter-

national security, U.S foreign policy, and diplomatic history. His work has appeared in Inter- national Security, Foreign Affairs, and other policy and academic venues. He can be reached by email at [email protected].

Copyright © 2017 The Elliott School of International Affairs

The Washington Quarterly • 40:1 pp. 109–123 http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/0163660X.2017.1302742

THE WASHINGTON QUARTERLY ▪ SPRING 2017 109

then-President Obama noted in July 2016, NATO members “haven’t simply reaf-

firmed our enduring Article 5 obligations to our common security; we’re moving

forward with the most significant reinforcement of our collective defense any

time since the Cold War.” 6

Appearances are deceiving. President Trump’s occasional digs at NATO’s rel-

evance and calls for greater allied military spending aside, two decades of NATO

expansion have changed the strategic situation in Europe from what it was during

the Cold War. 7 Although these changes improve the military stability of Europe

on a day-to-day basis, they paradoxically undermine the credibility of the U.S.

commitment—as the alliance’s strongest member and main military guarantor—

to defend those NATO members most threatened by Russia. Put simply,

NATO has become a tiered alliance: the U.S. promise to defend the allies most

at risk of Russian aggression is ultimately implausible, while the pledge to

defend other NATO members, though cred-

ible, is of limited relevance. The resulting stra-

tegic arrangement carries large dangers, as the

United States risks having its promises revealed

as meaningless and its East European allies risk

being left isolated if Russia challenges the status

quo. The longer Washington deceives itself

into believing and acting otherwise, the more fraught this situation will become.

American Security Guarantees: Not Credible and Risky

The credibility of the U.S. commitment to its NATO allies has long been unclear.

At root, credibility hinges on the perception in the minds of foreign decision-

makers that a state has sufficient interest in a given issue that it is willing to pay

a certain—potentially large—cost to obtain or secure that objective. Owing to

the exorbitant prospective costs of a U.S.–Soviet nuclear exchange during the

Cold War, regular transatlantic crises revolved around the question of whether

the United States would trade “Boston for Bonn” in the event of a general Euro-

pean war. 8 So long as the United States retained sole control of NATO’s decision

to escalate past the nuclear threshold, U.S. policymakers faced a real problem in

making Soviet policymakers and American allies alike believe that they would

willingly take the nuclear plunge if events dictated. 9 As Thomas Schelling

noted long ago, it is inherently difficult to convince other actors that the

United States will commit suicide for other states. 10

Still, this problem was at least plausibly manageable during the Cold War. 11

Despite the prospective costs, the United States retained a large and pervasive

interest in keeping Western Europe’s economic and military potential beyond

Put simply, NATO has become a tiered alliance.

Joshua Shifrinson

110 THE WASHINGTON QUARTERLY ▪ SPRING 2017

Soviet control. These objectives, in fact, heavily shaped the United States’ Cold

War commitment to European security as the United States moved (1) to defend

Western Europe from potential Soviet machinations, and (2) to deter Soviet

adventurism against the area in the first place. 12

The alternative was clear: if

the Soviet Union were to dominate Europe’s war-making strength, it might tip

the balance of power against the United States, requiring a potentially ruinous

counter-mobilization and global competition that an isolated United States

might be unable to win. Geography reinforced this imperative, as failure to

deter or defend against a Soviet assault across the inner-German border meant

the USSR could quickly overrun the region. The result was a concerted effort

by the United States to make its promise to defend its NATO allies as credible

as possible by forward-deploying large military force and seeking ways to escalate

a contest with the USSR should it prove necessary. 13

Today, the situation is reversed. The grand bargain in which Washington kept

its finger alone on the nuclear button remains intact;

if the United States is to fully honor its treaty commit-

ments, it must ultimately be willing to engage in a

nuclear exchange with Russia for the sake of its

allies. However, where the United States could plau-

sibly claim to trade Boston for Bonn prior to 1991, no

amount of reassurance can make the promise to trade

Toledo for Tallinn credible today—the stakes of the

game are too low.

Alliances function when states decide that their

mutual preservation adds to each side’s national security and can be attained at

a cost proportional to the benefit. For better or worse, NATO’s post-Cold War

enlargement altered this equation by notionally committing the United States

to defend a host of states in Eastern Europe of questionable relevance to U.S.

security. Indeed, those states most immediately threatened by Russia—Estonia,

Latvia, and Lithuania, followed by Poland—are among the least important allies

in crude geopolitical terms. The three Baltic states combined accounted for only

0.13 percent of total NATO defense expenditures and 0.26 percent of NATO

members’ GDP as of 2016; Poland represented 1.17 and 1.54 percent, respect-

ively. 14

American exchange with these states is similarly limited: trade with the

Baltic states as a whole came to less than $3 billion in 2015 against over $3.75 tril- lion in total U.S. trade.15 Baldly stated, these states could disappear without com- promising the United States’ economic security or NATO’s military viability. The

questionable value of these states alone thus renders the U.S. commitment to their

defense highly contestable. 16

The American public, meanwhile, seems to recog-

nize this very dynamic at some basic level, with 37 percent of U.S. citizens in a

No reassurance can make the promise to trade “Toledo for Tallinn” credible today.

Time to Consolidate NATO?

THE WASHINGTON QUARTERLY ▪ SPRING 2017 111

2015 Pew Global Attitudes survey expressing reluctance with aiding a NATO ally

threatened by Russia. 17

Political geography further compounds NATO’s problems. Not only can

countries threatened by Russia be lost without compromising NATO’s ability to

defend the rest of Europe, but even an expanded Russia would be poorly placed

to dominate the continent. Belarus and Ukraine, after all, lie across any Russian

advance into Central Europe, while simply retaining control of a unified

Germany affords NATO a defense-in-depth it never enjoyed during the Cold

War. Add in the reality that Russia is an economic, political, and military

pygmy compared to the Soviet Union everywhere except in the nuclear realm,

and the United States’ intrinsic interest in those states most immediately threa-

tened by Russia is substantially less than during the Cold War. 18

Simply put,

unlike the situation vis-à-vis the Soviet Union, Russian dominance over the

Baltic states, Poland, and other new(er) NATO members would not result in

the United States’ eviction from Europe and concomitant loss of the region’s econ-

omic or military strength.

Military pressures reinforce these dilemmas. Whereas a conventional defense of

Western Europe was at least a possibility prior to 1989–1991, distance, reinforce-

ment rates, and force-to-space ratios mean a conventional defense in Eastern

Europe is not a realistic option today. 19 War games by the Rand Corporation high-

light the problem in the Baltics context. To be sure, forces stationed in Eastern

Europe can serve as a tripwire to deter Russian aggression by seemingly promising

to bring NATO members’ collective strength to bear. 20

If deterrence fails,

however, and short of committing nearly all of NATO’s conventional ground

and air power to the theater, even heavily-armored NATO forces can only slow

down a Russian assault and promise a lengthy East–West conflict. Yet here,

NATO again faces real limits to fighting in and around NATO’s East European

members. 21

Though the United States can threaten conventional escalation, it

cannot credibly commit to fighting for states of low strategic value if doing so

risks a strategic nuclear exchange.

Nevertheless, the United States would undoubtedly face calls for precisely such

steps that might lead to nuclear escalation in any losing conventional fight. More-

over, since any sustained effort to defend or retake the Baltics requires NATO con-

ventional operations close to the Russian homeland, it risks attacks (accidental or

otherwise) on Russian territory that invite an escalatory response. Russian anti-

access and area-denial (A2/AD) assets used against reinforcements flowing into

the region—to say nothing of direct attacks on Poland—may also result in

strikes on Russian-owned Kaliningrad, generating a similar escalation problem.

In short, NATO cannot readily defend its Eastern flank through conventional

means, faces implausibly large strategic risks if it tries, and so confronts an insoluble

credibility crisis. 22 Indeed, that Estonia is now preparing to wage a lengthy guerilla

Joshua Shifrinson

112 THE WASHINGTON QUARTERLY ▪ SPRING 2017

war against a prospective Russian occupying force, while Lithuania is slowly moving

to reinstate a military draft suggests vulnerable states recognize the United States’

credibility dilemma and are hedging their security bets as best they can. 23

If anything, the main function of NATO deployments has been to antagonize a

Russia that has far more at stake in Eastern Europe for geographic and historical

reasons than the United States. 24

To be clear, NATO expansion in and of itself

did not cause East–West relations to deteriorate. 25

However, U.S.-backed efforts

to expand NATO eastward and subsequently deploy military forces to the

region have been met with Russian pushback—Russian overflights of NATO air-

space, diplomatic obfuscation, and military deployments have all accelerated in

recent years. 26

Assuming NATO efforts in Eastern Europe continue, Russian

leaders are prone to respond with further bellicosity that generates further

strains in NATO–Russian relations. 27

Paradoxically, the resulting insecurity

spiral increases the likelihood that efforts to deter Russia will result in deterrence

failure. 28 Combined with the possibility that a NATO–Russia crisis may see Russia

escalate the confrontation in order to de-escalate the situation, the risk of miscal-

culation is clear. 29

Collectively, this situation simultaneously invites Russian

actions designed to discredit the United States in the eyes of its allies, gives threa-

tened allies incentives to force events with Russia to tie American hands and

deepen the United States’ involvement, and increases the risk of an action-reac-

tion cycle. 30

The net result is a dangerous standoff. To deter aggression, NATO relies on a

collective security promise ultimately capped by the pledge that the United States

will risk its own survival by putting its nuclear forces to use on behalf of its allies.

For the Baltic states, Poland, and— potentially in the future—NATO’s other post-

Cold War additions, this pledge is no longer realistic on strategic or military

grounds. The steps the United States and its allies are taking to reassure the

most vulnerable members of NATO, however, increase the odds of a NATO–

Russia crisis. Yet if and when a crisis erupts, the clarifying effect of a prospective

nuclear exchange is apt to cause cooler heads to prevail and encourage U.S.

efforts to restrain the dogs of war—revealing that American security guarantees to Eastern Europe were not credible in the first place. The more the United States con- tinues pretending that its commitment to all NATO members is created equal, the

more it risks creating a situation that will reveal the shibboleth of the U.S.

commitment.

Managing NATO as a Tiered Alliance

NATO, in sum, is now a two-tiered alliance. 31 There are some members for whom

the United States might have an interest in risking nuclear war to protect; the

Time to Consolidate NATO?

THE WASHINGTON QUARTERLY ▪ SPRING 2017 113

majority, including those states challenged by Russia today, are not worth the cost.

The United States can, of course, threaten conventional escalation on the latter’s

behalf for a period of time, but doing so may (1) itself increase the risk of a deter-

rence failure by abetting a spiral with Russia, and (2) force a situation that reveals

the implausibility of American nuclear pledges. 32

Unless the United States is

interested in relinquishing dominance over NATO nuclear matters—a seminal

feature of NATO strategy since the early 1960s—the issue then becomes mana-

ging the dilemma. 33

Although rarely discussed by U.S. policymakers, three options are theoretically

possible. First, the United States might seek some way to push those states that it is

unlikely to defend to the last full measure out of NATO. 34

The benefit of this

option is clear: by reducing its formal commitment to these states, the United

States would presumably face fewer calls to put its own security on the line

(even if it would never actually do so in the first place). Moreover, to the

extent that some degree of NATO–Russian tension can be traced to NATO’s

creep into Eastern Europe and Russia’s resulting fear of NATO encirclement,

then reducing NATO’s East European presence may improve relations with

Russia and mitigate the chances of an East–West crisis in the first place. 35

Still, evicting members from NATO is likely a political non-starter. For one

thing, the alliance lacks a mechanism for eviction—states can decide to leave on

their own, but their partners cannot force them out. 36 Crafting an eviction mech-

anism, meanwhile, is likely to be a nigh-

impossible task. Since NATO political

decisions require allied unanimity, if the

United States were to propose creating an evic-

tion mechanism and have NATO Heads of

State endorse it, states on the chopping block

would understandably veto the option.

Notably, the same constraint would hold

even if the United States tried to create incen-

tives for states to withdraw from the alliance by, for instance, having NATO

mandate a minimum security contribution that the countries in question could

not meet: again, states threatened with the loss of NATO protections would be

able to use NATO’s consensual decision-making style to stymie any U.S.-led

effort. These practical difficulties are reinforced by the bureaucratic and ideologi-

cal realities that many elites on both sides of the Atlantic—including several

members of the Trump administration—continue to see the alliance as a corner-

stone of the post-1945 international order, and so have a personal and bureau-

cratic stake in keeping the alliance intact. 37

Second, the United States could endorse plans to transform NATO into a less-

explicitly military, and more political, alliance. This would see American

Evicting members from NATO is likely a political non- starter.

Joshua Shifrinson

114 THE WASHINGTON QUARTERLY ▪ SPRING 2017

policymakers gradually wind up the premium placed on NATO for European

security by reducing the diplomatic, financial, and doctrinal attention on transat-

lantic affairs. As a corollary, U.S. policymakers could privately clarify that they

interpret NATO Article V—calling on NATO members to consider an attack

on one an attack on all and take “such action as it deems necessary … to restore

and maintain the security of the North Atlantic area”—in narrow fashion.

Given that NATO’s founders intentionally left it ambiguous what assistance

states will “deem necessary” at any given point, U.S. leaders could here announce

they see the matter largely involving diplomatic and economic backing short of

force; this would be particularly true for countries geographically far removed

from the actual North Atlantic area. Unlike the first option, this approach

would thus use existing NATO structures to reduce the scope and function of

the alliance, thereby watering down American security commitments.

Yet, while offering a backdoor to U.S. strategic adjustment, this second

approach carries with it the aforementioned problem of allied spoilers. Facing

an eroding American commitment, NATO allies on the front lines with Russia

would face stark and growing incentives to force a crisis in a bid to ratchet up ten-

sions and reverse the American withdrawal. 38

This effort may not work, but the

danger would exist as long as NATO’s transformation was ongoing. Furthermore,

it is worth recalling that it was precisely the idea that NATO after the Cold War

would be a transformed alliance more political than military in nature that helped

U.S. policymakers justify NATO’s eastward expansion, and so helped bring about

the present crisis in transatlantic credibility. 39 It is therefore questionable whether

policymakers, having recently decided to again treat NATO as a military vehicle,

can reverse course a third time and treat NATO as a political organization at a

moment when relations with Russia seemingly necessitate a military response.

Finally, American policymakers can pursue a third option by preparing for the

day after the shaky foundations of the United States’ security guarantees are revealed

while nominally maintaining existing American commitments. This may be a diffi-

cult task and rife with risks, but may be the best option available. The aftermath of a

crisis—such as a Russian invasion of the Baltics which the United States opts not to

escalate, a fait accompli akin to the Russian seizure of Crimea, or a limited seizure of Baltic territory that NATO did not fully contest—is liable to see pervasive questions

from remaining allies over the future of American security guarantees. Such ques-

tions are likely to be overlaid with domestic U.S. disputes over who “lost” the

ally or territory, alongside pressures from vested interest groups to showcase U.S.

resolve to its remaining partners. Although it cannot eliminate these issues, prep-

aration can ameliorate post-crisis dilemmas through a combination of public diplo-

macy, private engagement, and unilateral strategizing.

Day-after preparations consist of two elements. First, policymakers must be pre-

pared to offer remaining partners compelling explanations as to why the United

Time to Consolidate NATO?

THE WASHINGTON QUARTERLY ▪ SPRING 2017 115

States de facto abandoned one or more allies. Again, questions over the future credi-

bility of American security guarantees would abound in a post-abandonment world.

Still, this environment is also likely to see a growing sense of an even-more pressing

Russian threat. Among critical allies, policymakers should be prepared to use this

renewed sense of a Russian threat to beat back questions over the future of the

American pacifier. States, after all, tend to balance in the face of external threats

while husbanding resources to address those threats at the most propitious time

and place. Hence, American policymakers can use post-abandonment fears of

Russia to (1) reinforce solidarity among remaining NATO members, (2) remind

remaining allies that the United States now has a proportionally larger interest in

guaranteeing their security, and (3) explain prior American abandonment by point-

ing out the limited utility and difficulties of acting in those particular episodes. Just as

General Omar Bradley warned that a war against China over Korea in 1951 would

have been “the wrong war, at the wrong time, in the wrong place,” so should future

leaders be prepared to argue that defending all of Eastern Europe at unlimited cost

would be “the wrong operation, at the wrong time, in the wrong place.” 40

Second, and relatedly, U.S. policymakers must work among themselves to culti-

vate a domestic base of support to resist pressures to stand firm on every remaining

commitment. This requires not only discussions inside the U.S. government to

outline the steps that should be taken after abandoning states such as the Baltics

and Poland, but also quietly reaching out to key stakeholders in the think tank, uni-

versity, NGO, and media communities. Like conversations within the alliance, dis-

cussions should involve plans and procedures for (1) managing expectations going

forward and (2) using the Russian threat to buttress the newly-circumscribed alliance,

all while (3) calibrating the United States’ political-military response. The objective

throughout should be to generate thinking so that, if the American credibility bluff is

called, U.S. strategists would have guidelines in place to shape a cohesive response

focused on truly vital interests and backed by the requisite political support.

Of course, preparing for the day-after leaves open the question of where to draw

the line regarding future abandonment. This is not so much an issue of mana-

ging European concerns—so long as European actors feel threatened by

Russia, they have reasons to seek American

backing and overlook prior U.S. abandon-

ment—so much as the United States itself

considering what its interests in Europe

entail and where the boundary falls in defend-

ing them. There is no hard and fast answer,

since the solution will change over time

depending on NATO and Russian capabili-

ties, and Eastern Europe’s value to the United States in light of the distribution

of power.

Preparing for the day-after is a third option.

Joshua Shifrinson

116 THE WASHINGTON QUARTERLY ▪ SPRING 2017

Still, given Russia’s relative geographic isolation, economic and military weak-

nesses, and the European distribution of power, a NATO that simply contained all

the states that were in the organization in 1991 seems to be more than enough.

Even this “rump” NATO would enjoy significant defense in depth, control the

majority of Europe’s economic and military potential, and encompass most of

the United States’ main European trading partners. Again, recognizing that this

division exists does not mean ex ante abandoning NATO members beyond this line; after all, doing so might otherwise invite a Russian test of American

resolve, or steps by regional allies to precipitate a crisis and try to reverse American

retrenchment. Nevertheless, it does call for U.S. policymakers to shape their

internal plans and preparations in light of NATO’s two-tier status.

To be clear, none of these options are politically palatable. Moreover, any effort

to adjust the United States’ NATO commitments will be at once contentious and

politically expensive given the central role support for the alliance has played in

post-Cold War U.S. grand strategy debates. 41

Strategic stability, however, has

never been easy. Insofar as the United States is a member of NATO to ensure

its own well-being—and it cannot be otherwise—policymakers would thus be

better served getting ahead of the looming transatlantic crisis rather than

wishing away the problem. Ultimately, at a moment when the U.S. security guar-

antee is no longer credible for all of NATO, it is necessary to recalibrate the Amer-

ican role in continental security affairs.

The Commitment Myth Today

Proponents of the status quo will contend that the cure outlined here is worse than

the disease. Having undertaken commitments to defend Eastern Europe, the

United States cannot fail to back its allies lest it ruin its credibility, encourage

nuclear proliferation among insecure states throughout Europe (and potentially

beyond), and destroy NATO. To do this so the logic goes, the United States

should deploy forces to Eastern Europe that ensure that the United States has esca-

lation dominance in the conventional and nuclear realms to deter Russia in peace-

time, or force Russia to back down during a crisis. And, since Russia would risk its

own destruction by threatening states backed by American nuclear guarantees,

preparing to abandon parts of Eastern Europe is unnecessary since deterrence—

provided the United States is able and willing to escalate—can hold. 42

These arguments are flawed. In a world of robust second-strike nuclear forces,

escalation dominance can, at best, limit the damage that the United States

faces; it will not be zero. Moreover, in the net assessment of the interests at

stake, Russia would win out: Eastern Europe is important to the United States

for what it might say about U.S. credibility, but matters to Russian territorial

Time to Consolidate NATO?

THE WASHINGTON QUARTERLY ▪ SPRING 2017 117

security, national identity, and the political survival of Russia’s leaders. Combined,

asymmetry of interests and high costs means that it is neither easy to deter Russia,

even if a fuller range of military tools were available, nor a game American policy-

makers are likely to play. Simply put, if a crisis erupts, the balance of interests and

resolve would favor Russia no matter what assets are at the United States’ disposal.

As importantly, the notion that U.S. credibility will collapse and nuclear pro-

liferation take off if the United States backs away from existing NATO commit-

ments rests on shaky foundations. As research by Professor Daryl Press

highlights, allies and adversaries tend to see higher credibility in a state’s promises

the more a state’s interests are engaged in the

issue at hand and the greater its capacity to

advance or protect these interests. 43

Thus,

even if the United States abandons certain

allies, American credibility would remain

intact provided the United States has an inter-

est in the security of remaining partners and the

means to protect them. If anything, abandoning

certain allies may actually increase the credi-

bility of American security guarantees to

remaining NATO members, since the more

aggressive Russia becomes and further west it

moves, the proportionally larger the American stake is in remaining allies and

the stronger the American incentive is in holding the line. Added to the reality

that Central–West European states are apt to be even more interested in obtaining

allies if Russia expands, then the dangers of the United States backing down are

much reduced. Counterintuitively, a shrunken NATO recently witness to some

American abandonment and growing fears of Russia may actually be a NATO in

which the American commitment becomes more—not less—credible.

Time to Consolidate NATO

For nearly 30 years, American policymakers pushed NATO enlargement as a way

of consolidating the United States’ Cold War victory. They did so seemingly con-

vinced that the United States would never have to do that for which NATO was

originally intended—fight a war against an adversary capable of hurting the

United States. 44

Today, a variety of changes render war a possibility, calling

into question the credibility of American pledges undertaken at the height of

the post-Cold War era. Though many analysts seek means to make the American

promise to all NATO members credible, there are good reasons to doubt whether

Abandoning certain allies may actually increase the credibility of remaining U.S. security guarantees.

Joshua Shifrinson

118 THE WASHINGTON QUARTERLY ▪ SPRING 2017

any American pledge to commit national suicide for allies of dubious importance

will truly be viable.

Instead of struggling against the reality, a sounder course would recognize

NATO’s two-tiered status and accommodate U.S. diplomacy to this situation.

The key is not necessarily to preventively change formal American security com-

mitments. Instead, the United States must prepare politically and diplomatically

for the possibility that some state might call the American security bluff, while

accepting the constraints this risk imposes on American foreign policy. Carrying

out these steps will, in turn, require both careful coordination throughout the

U.S. government and foreign policy establishment, alongside efforts to sustain

relationships with those states deemed vital to American interests. If successful,

this course may ultimately allow for a more cohesive American policy vis-à-vis

Europe and Russia, while reducing the dangers of brinksmanship and crises in

the first place. Trading Toledo for Tallinn is not credible—but U.S. strategists

can still minimize the fallout from three decades of NATO enlargement that

has left the United States exposed in an increasingly conflictual Europe.

Notes

1. For criticism of NATO as “obsolete,” see Rainer Buergen and Toluse Olorunnipa, “Trump

Slams NATO, Floats Russia Nuke Deal in European Interview,” Bloomberg, January 15,

2017, https://www.bloomberg.com/politics/articles/2017-01-15/trump-calls-nato-obsolete-

and-dismisses-eu-in-german-interview. For the administration’s support for NATO, see

The White House, “Readout of the President’s Call with Chancellor Angela Merkel of

Germany,” January 28, 2017, https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2017/01/28/

readout-presidents-call-chancellor-angela-merkel-germany. On possible NATO enlarge-

ment, see Andrew Hanna, “Flynn to Recommend Trump back NATO Membership for

Montenegro,” Politico, February 6, 2017, http://www.politico.com/story/2017/02/trump- nato-montenegro-michael-flynn-234697.

2. For European efforts to reinforce NATO, see Peter Baker and Andrew E. Kramer, “Trump

and Putin Connect, but Avoid Talk of Lifting U.S. Sanctions,” New York Times, January 28, 2017, https://www.nytimes.com/2017/01/28/us/politics/trump-putin-russia-sanctions.

html?_r=0. On calls for increased European defense spending, see Alex Morales and

John Ainger, “U.K.’s Johnson Sides with Trump on NATO Defense Spending,” Bloomberg, December 2, 2016, https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2016-12-02/u-k-s-johnson-

and-trump-see-eye-to-eye-on-nato-defense-spending.

3. See, e.g., Michael O’Hanlon, “NATO After Crimea: How the Alliance Can Still Deter

Russia,” Foreign Affairs (snapshot), April 17, 2014, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/ articles/baltics/2014-04-17/nato-after-crimea.

4. Julian E. Barnes, and Drew Hinshaw, “U.S to Deploy Tanks to the Baltics,” The Wall Street Journal, January 30, 2017, https://www.wsj.com/articles/u-s-to-deploy-tanks-to-the-baltic- 1485796467; Rick Lyman and Joanna Berendt, “As Trump Reaches Toward Putin, U.S.

Troops Arrive in Poland,” New York Times, January 12, 2017, https://www.nytimes.com/ 2017/01/12/world/europe/as-trump-reaches-toward-putin-us-troops-arrive-in-poland.html.

Time to Consolidate NATO?

THE WASHINGTON QUARTERLY ▪ SPRING 2017 119

Notably, key members of the Trump administration appear to support the preceding

administration’s efforts: see Austin Wright and Jeremy Herb, “Trump’s Defense Pick

Backs Permanent US Troops in Baltics,” Politico, January 12, 2017, http://www.politico. eu/article/donald-trump-defense-james-mattis-backs-permanent-us-troops-in-baltics/.

5. John M. Donnelly, “Pentagon Pane Urges Trump Team to Expand Nuclear Options,” Roll

Call, February 2, 2017, http://www.rollcall.com/news/policy/pentagon-panel-urges-trump-

team-expand-nuclear-options.

6. Barack Obama, “Press Conference by President Obama after NATO Summit,” The White

House, July 9, 2016, https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2016/07/09/press-

conference-president-obama-after-nato-summit.

7. Cassandra Vinograd, “Donald Trump Remarks on NATO Trigger Alarm Bells in Europe,”

NBC News, July 21, 2016, http://www.nbcnews.com/storyline/2016-conventions/donald-

trump-remarks-nato-trigger-alarm-bells-europe-n613911; The White House, “Call with

Merkel”.

8. Eric A. Nordlinger, “America’s Strategic Immunity: The Basis of a National Security Strat-

egy,” in Soviet-American Relations After the Cold War, ed. Robert Jervis and Seweryn Bialer (Durham: Duke University Press, 1991), 252.

9. Marc Trachtenberg, A Constructed Peace: The Making of the European Settlement, 1945- 1963 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1999).

10. Thomas C Schelling, Arms and Influence (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2008 ed). 11. For a good ex post assessment, see David Yost, “The US Debate on NATO Nuclear Deter-

rence,” International Affairs 87, no. 6 (2011): 1401-1438. 12. John L. Gaddis, Strategies of Containment: A Critical Appraisal of Postwar American National

Security Policy (New York: Oxford University Press, 1982); Timothy P. Ireland, Creating the Entangling Alliance: The Origins of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (Westport, Ct: Greenwood, 1981).

13. John J. Mearsheimer, “Why the Soviets Can’t Win Quickly in Central Europe,” Inter- national Security 7, no. 1 (July 1, 1982): 3–39; Barry R. Posen, Inadvertent Escalation (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1991).

14. Author’s calculations from Tables 2 and 4, NATO Public Diplomacy Division,

“Defence Expenditures of NATO Countries, (2008-2015),” January 28, 2016, http://

www.nato.int/nato_static_fl2014/assets/pdf/pdf_2016_01/20160129_160128-pr-2016-11-

eng.pdf#page=2

15. Author calculations from U.S. Census Bureau, “US Trade in Goods by Country,” https://

www.census.gov/foreign-trade/balance/index.html Author calculations from https://www.

census.gov/foreign-trade/balance/index.html#E.

16. Dianne Pfundstein Chamberlain, “NATO’s Baltic Tripwire Forces Won’t Stop Russia,”

The National Interest, July 21, 2016, http://nationalinterest.org/blog/the-skeptics/natos- baltic-tripwire-forces-wont-stop-russia-17074

17. Jacob Poushter, Katie Simmons, and Bruce Stokes, “NATO Publics Blame Russia for

Ukrainian Crisis, but Reluctant to Provide Military Aid,” Pew Research Center, June

10, 2015, http://www.pewglobal.org/2015/06/10/nato-publics-blame-russia-for-ukrainian-

crisis-but-reluctant-to-provide-military-aid/. Only 56 percent were in favor of action,

while an additional 7 percent did not know their preferences.

18. Jonathan Marcus, “NATO Sends a Message to Russia,” BBC News, October 27, 2016,

http://www.bbc.com/news/world-37794131; also, comments by NATO Secretary

General Jens Stoltenberg in “Standing Up for NATO: A Conversation with Jens

Joshua Shifrinson

120 THE WASHINGTON QUARTERLY ▪ SPRING 2017

Stoltenberg,” Foreign Affairs (snapshot), April 6, 2016, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/ interviews/2016-04-06/standing-nato.

19. This problem is widely recognized among NATO planners; see “Hard for NATO to defend

Baltic states from Russia – Spiegel,” Reuters, May 18, 2014, http://uk.reuters.com/article/

uk-ukraine-crisis-nato-idUKKBN0DY0MI20140518. Indeed, even those calling for rein-

forcing NATO’s eastern flank do not argue that additional forces can defeat Russia so

much as aid deterrence; Elbridge Colby, “Step Up to Stand Down: The United States,

NATO, and Dissuading Russian Aggression,” Foreign Affairs (snapshot), August 13, 2015, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/poland/2015-08-13/step-stand-down.

20. Michael Johnson and David A. Shlapak, Reinforcing Deterrence on NATO’s Eastern Flank: Wargaming the Defense of the Baltics (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2016). See also Philip Breedlove, “NATO’s Next Act: How to Handle Russia and Other Threats,”

Foreign Affairs 95, no. 4 (July/August 2016), 104; Giampaolo di Paola et al., Alliance at Risk: Strengthening European Defence in an Age of Turbulence and Competition (Washington: Atlantic Council, 2016).

21. For additional discussion, see Elisabeth Braw, “A Schengen Zone for NATO,” Foreign Affairs (snapshot), June 6, 2016, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/russian- federation/2016-06-06/schengen-zone-nato.

22. For elaboration, see Kirk Bennett, “Can NATO Defend the Baltics?” The American Inter- est, July 13, 2016, http://www.the-american-interest.com/2016/07/13/can-nato-defend- the-baltics/; Michael Kofman, “Fixing NATO Deterrence in the East: Or, How I

Learned to Stop Worrying and Love NATO’s Crushing Defeat by Russia,” War on the

Rocks, May 12, 2016, http://warontherocks.com/2016/05/fixing-nato-deterrence-in-the-

east-or-how-i-learned-to-stop-worrying-and-love-natos-crushing-defeat-by-russia/.

23. Andrew E. Kramer, “Spooked by Russia, Tiny Estonia Trains a Nation of Insurgents,”

New York Times, October 31, 2016, http://www.nytimes.com/2016/11/01/world/europe/ spooked-by-russia-tiny-estonia-trains-a-nation-of-insurgents.html; “Lithuania to Reintro-

duce Conscription over Security Concerns,” BBC, February 24, 2015, http://www.bbc.

com/news/world-europe-31607930; Nadia Khomani, “Return of Conscription in Lithua-

nia Sparks Debate over Gender Roles,” The Guardian (UK), June 4, 2015, https://www. theguardian.com/world/2015/jun/04/lithuanian-army-conscripts-moving-photography-

project.

24. For similar discussion, see Ted Galen Carpenter, “Why Russia Fears NATO,” The National Interest, October 10, 2016, http://nationalinterest.org/blog/the-skeptics/why-russia-fears- nato-17999.

25. For discussion, see John J. Mearsheimer, “Why the Ukraine Crisis Is the West’s Fault,”

Foreign Affairs 93, no. 5 (October 9, 2014): 77–89; Kathryn Stoner and Michael McFaul, “Who Lost Russia (This Time)? Vladimir Putin,” The Washington Quarterly 38, no. 2 (April 3, 2015): 167–87, http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/0163660X.

2015.1064716.

26. Eric Baden Montgomery, Extended Deterrence in the Second Nuclear Age: Geopolitics, Pro- liferation, and the Future of U.S. Security Commitments (Washington: Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, 2016), 20-21.

27. For insight on how Russian domestic politics may reinforce this tendency, see Kimberly

Marten, “Putin’s Choices: Explaining Russian Foreign Policy and Intervention in

Ukraine,” The Washington Quarterly 38, no. 2 (April 3, 2015): 200–201, http://www. tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/0163660X.2015.1064717.

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28. Mark Galeotti, “Putin’s Chaos Strategy Is Coming Back to Bite Him in the Ass,” Foreign Policy, October 26, 2016, http://foreignpolicy.com/2016/10/26/putins-chaos-strategy-is- coming-back-to-bite-him-in-the-ass/.

29. Olga Oliker, “No, Russia Isn’t Trying to Make Nuclear War Easier,” The National Interest, May 23, 2016, http://nationalinterest.org/feature/no-russia-isnt-trying-make-nuclear-war-

easier-16310.

30. Offering a similar analysis is Richard Sokolsky, “Not Quiet on NATO’s Eastern Front:

How the Alliance Can De-Escalate with Russia,” Foreign Affairs (snapshot), June 29, 2016, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/russian-federation/2016-06-29/not-quiet-

natos-eastern-front.

31. Timo Noetzel and Benjamin Schreer, "Does a Multi-Tier NATO Matter? The Atlantic

Alliance and the Process of Strategic Change," International Affairs 85, no. 2 (2009): 211. 32. Stoltenberg in “Standing Up for NATO;” also, Ted Galen Carpenter, “Are the Baltic

States Next?” The National Interest, March 24, 2014, http://nationalinterest.org/ commentary/are-the-baltic-states-next-10103?page=2.

33. For details on American efforts, see Gene Gerzhoy, “Alliance Coercion and Nuclear

Restraint: How the United States Thwarted West Germany’s Nuclear Ambitions,” Inter- national Security 39, no.4 (Spring 2015): 91-129; Hal Brands, “Non-Proliferation and the Dynamics of the Middle Cold War: The Superpowers, the MLF, and the NPT,” Cold War History 7, no. 3 (August 2007): 389-423; Francis J. Gavin, “Strategies of Inhibition: U.S. Grand Strategy, the Nuclear Revolution, and Nonproliferation,” International Security 40, no. 1 (Summer 2015): 9-46. U.S. nuclear relations with Britain and France, as nuclear-

armed states themselves, are clearly different, but the United States still uses cooperation

as a means of shaping Anglo-French programs; see Jeffrey Lewis and Bruno Tertrais,

“Deterrence at Three: US, UK, and French Nuclear Cooperation,” Survival 57, no. 4 (August-September 2015): 29-52; Lawrence Freedman, The Evolution of Nuclear Strategy (New York: St. Martin’s, 1981): 303-329; William Burr, “U.S. Strategic Assistance to

the French Nuclear Program, 1969-1975: From ‘Fourth Country’ to Strategic Partner,”

Wilson Center, Nuclear Proliferation International History Project, July 12, 2011,

https://www.wilsoncenter.org/publication/us-secret-assistance-to-the-french-nuclear-

program-1969-1975-fourth-country-to-strategic.

34. Ted Galen Carpenter, “It’s Time to Prune America’s Overgrown Alliance Network,” The National Interest, June 10, 2016, http://nationalinterest.org/blog/the-skeptics/its-time- prune-americas-overgrown-alliance-network-16544.

35. As noted, there remains significant debate whether NATO enlargement in the 1990s and

2000s caused Russian bellicosity in and around Eastern Europe starting in the mid-2010s by

contributing to an East-West insecurity spiral. Without access to Russian deliberations,

there is no way to resolve the matter. At minimum, it seems that NATO enlargement

antagonized Russian policymakers starting in the 1990s and, in doing so, created con-

ditions in which Russian leaders were more likely to contemplate aggression when East-

West interests clashed. For background, see Joshua R. Itzkowitz Shifrinson, “Deal or No

Deal? The End of the Cold War and the 1990 Offer to Limit NATO Expansion,” Inter- national Security 40, no. 4 (Spring 2016): 7-44. Thanks also go to Dr. Andrew Radin for help on this point.

36. “The North Atlantic Treaty,” NATO, April 4, 1949, http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/

official_texts_17120.htm; Jonathan Manthorpe, “What Would it take to Kick Turkey out

Joshua Shifrinson

122 THE WASHINGTON QUARTERLY ▪ SPRING 2017

of NATO?” iPolitics Blog Post, March 16, 2016, http://ipolitics.ca/2016/03/16/what-

would-it-take-to-kick-turkey-out-of-nato/.

37. For views of elites in the United States, Kristina Wong, “Defense Secretary Speaks with

NATO Leader on First Full Day,” The Hill, January 23, 2017, http://thehill.com/policy/ defense/315781-defense-secretary-mattis-speaks-with-nato-leader-on-first-full-day-in-

office; Seung Min Kim, Burgess Everett, and Austin Wright, “McConnell to Trump: Do

Noft Lift Sanctions on Russia,” Politico, January 27, 2017, accessed February 6, 2017, http://www.politico.com/story/2017/01/mitch-mcconnell-trump-russia-sanctions-234281;

White House, “Call with Merkel.”

38. Relatedly, periods in which the American commitment to Eastern Europe was unclear saw

public and private calls by East European leaders to spur greater American engagement,

alongside efforts at portraying a Russian menace; see Mark Weber, Ellen Hallams, and

Martin A. Smith, “Repairing NATO’s Motors,” International Affairs 90, no. 4 (2014): 773-793; Michael Weiss, “Can Radek Sikorski Save Europe?” Foreign Policy, April 30, 2014, http://foreignpolicy.com/2014/04/30/can-radek-sikorski-save-europe/ .

39. On NATO’s post-Cold War “transformation,” see NATO’s July 1990 London Declara-

tion, at http://www.nato.int/docu/comm/49-95/c900706a.htm. For context, see George

Bush and Brent Scowcroft, A World Transformed (New York: Knopf, 1998). 40. Omar N. Bradley and Clay Blair, A General’s Life (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1983),

p. 640.

41. Michael Mastanduono, “Preserving the Unipolar Moment,” International Security 21, no. 4 (Spring 1997): 49-88; Barry R. Posen and Andrew L. Ross, “Competing Visions for U.S.

Grand Strategy,” International Security 21, no. 3 (Winter 1996-1997): 5-53. 42. See, e.g., Matthew Kroenig, “Facing Reality: Getting NATO Ready for a New Cold War,”

Survival 57, no. 1 (2015): 49-70. 43. Daryl G. Press, Calculating Credibility: How Leaders Assess Military Threats (Ithaca: Cornell

University Press, 2005), 8-41.

44. Ted Galen Carpenter, “Biden’s Baltic Bombast,” The National Interest, August 25, 2016, http://nationalinterest.org/blog/the-skeptics/bidens-baltic-bombast-17471?page=2.

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