STRATEGIC MANAGEMENT ASSIGNMENT
shinyuan
SFBP-0415.pdf
UVA-BP-0415
This case was prepared by Pablo Ciano and Jean Gibbons under the supervision of Jeanne M. Liedtka, Associate
Professor of Business Administration. Copyright © 1999 by the University of Virginia Darden School Foundation,
Charlottesville, VA. All right reserved. It was written as a basis for class discussion rather than to illustrate the
effective or ineffective handling of an administrative situation. To order copies, send an e-mail to
[email protected]. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system,
used in a spreadsheet, or transmitted in any form or by any means-electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording,
or otherwise-without the permission of the Darden Foundation.
PIAGGIO (A)
Not many products reach the goal of a fifty-year life-span.… Vespa developed
from a utility vehicle, whose characteristics had been dictated exclusively by
criteria such as function and cost, into an international success, a protagonist of
the history of customs and the cinema, a “cult object” which has given rise to the
creation of associations and collectors’ guilds on a world wide scale.
—Giovanni Alberto Agnelli1
Introduction
During Giovanni Alberto Agnelli’s first three years as chairman of Piaggio, an Italian
motorbike manufacturer, he had received much praise for steering the company into renewed
health and profitability. His significant achievements included investing heavily in product
development to increase Piaggio’s model range and establishing a presence in fast-growing
international markets. Most importantly, Agnelli had also taken the company from a loss of
approximately (U.S. dollar) USD60 million in 1993 to earnings of USD11 million in 1995.
But even as the company was celebrating this success—and the 50th anniversary of its
popular Vespa scooter—significant competitive concerns threatened Piaggio’s future. Although
Piaggio was still the leading manufacturer of European scooters, Japanese manufacturers
continued to threaten its dominance in this market. Also, Italian competitor Aprilia had quickly
increased in popularity, focusing most of its resources on innovative design and marketing and
outsourcing parts production. This practice complemented fast-changing customer preferences,
which mandated increasingly broad product ranges and faster product introductions.
In this highly competitive environment, Piaggio faced the decision of whether to invest in
a new engine plant. The plant would produce “green” engines designed to meet increasingly
stringent regulatory requirements. Although the plans for the new engine plant were in place,
1 From the 50th anniversary Vespa book: Giorgio Sarti, Vespa: From Italy with Love (Milan: Giorgio Nada
Editore, 2002).
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Piaggio managers continued to wonder if sales of the engine would bring a sufficient return for
their time and investment.
Industry and Market Overview
The market environment
Powered two-wheelers (PTWs) gained popularity in Europe after World War II by
providing an inexpensive alternative to automobiles. (See Exhibit 1 for an explanation of
different types of PTWs.) After a major decline that began in the late 1960s, usage in Europe
started to increase in the mid-1990s. The year 1996 was expected to be a year of strong growth
for the European market.
Most industry experts agreed that there were two main forces driving the resurgence of
the scooter market. First, increased gridlock in many major cities made these inexpensive and
maneuverable vehicles the first choice for many commuters. Second, classic scooter models held
great fashion appeal. During the first eight months of 1996, registrations for motorcycles,
mopeds, and scooters were up 19% over 1994, with weekend riders fueling the growth.
Euromonitor, a global market research company, reported that sports motorbikes bought by
enthusiasts and leisure riders made up the largest percentage of sales in the motorbike market
sector. In 1994, these sales accounted for 39.1% of the total market.2 The scooter and moped
sector was expected to increase from 12.5% to 13.6% of the market by the end of the decade.
One British article described the increasing market appeal of scooters: “As Britain
becomes more cosmopolitan … scooters are as chic here as they always have been in Milan and
Barcelona.” The author continued, describing the effect this demand had on the types of models
being offered:
With so many people opting to put the nightmare of traffic jams behind them, the
Italians are investing heavily in ever-more dazzling scooter designs. Some of the
projects on the drawing boards of companies such as Piaggio, Aprilia and Italjet
would not look out of place in a Judge Dredd comic, and are sure to entice more
fashion-conscious urban kids to the joys of scootering. Fear not, for the Japanese
are working hard to upstage the Italian factories’ latest creations, and Honda’s
newest scooter is designed to shrug off the worst of British weather. It is called
the Cabin and has a roof, a windscreen, and a wiper.3
Sales targets for PTWs varied according to engine capacity. Mopeds and small
motorcycles (including scooters up to 125cc) were targeted toward teenagers and urban
commuters. Their sales were a function of demographics and economic conditions, as well as
weather patterns and traffic regulations.
2 “Growth Cycle,” Marketing Week (September 27, 1996).
3 “Growth Cycle.”
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Large motorcycles were mainly used for sport and touring. Their diffusion was
essentially linked to economic conditions; the largest numbers were sold in countries with high
purchasing power (Germany and Switzerland). Collectively, however, PTW sales were linked to
overall economic conditions, because they were not purchased as a substitute for cars. In Italy,
more than 50% of car owners also owned a moped or a motorcycle.
Demand
In 1996, world demand for mopeds and motorcycles was estimated to be 14 million
vehicles per year. The European market accounted for 12% of world demand, or about 1.7
million vehicles. The number of scooters sold in Europe had increased dramatically since 1991.
Sales volume in units doubled over the five-year period to 866,000 and quadrupled in Italy alone,
to reach 470,000.4
Demand in Asia (Japan excluded) accounted for 70% of the vehicles sold. China alone
accounted for 30% of worldwide sales, and represented significant potential for growth. Only
three out of 1,000 Chinese owned a motorcycle compared with 420 owners per 1,000 inhabitants
in Taiwan. (See Exhibit 2 for European country comparisons.) This low density, combined with
China’s large population, made it the world’s largest motorcycle market.
In 1996, European producers were virtually absent from the Asian market, while
Japanese firms had already gained a strong foothold. By the year 2000, the world market was
expected to grow to more than 18 million vehicles. This growth was expected to take place
entirely in China and Southeast Asia, while European demand was expected to remain steady.
Production
By global standards, even the largest EU firms were considered only moderately sized,
compared with Japanese firms. One of the largest problems for the European manufacturers was
structural overcapacity; they did not enjoy the cost advantages and the large-scale production
structure that their Japanese counterparts did. Considering that the minimum scale dimension for
an automated engine plant was 400,000 pieces a year, the 1.7 million unit European market was
too small to sustain so many competitors and so many models.
The European PTW manufacturers also suffered because of the lack of availability of
competitive component suppliers. For a number of key components, EU manufacturers were
entirely dependent upon non-EU technology. Moreover, most component suppliers within the
EU were relatively small firms that did not have the production efficiencies of larger firms. The
resulting higher costs were transferred to end manufacturers, damaging their global
competitiveness.
Italy was the second-largest producer of motorcycles behind Japan, and it dominated the
European moped and motorcycle market with about 46% of value added, followed by Germany
4 Charles P. Wallace, “The Next Mr. Fiat?” Fortune (October 14, 1996): 182–6.
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(19%) and France (16%). In terms of units manufactured, Italy maintained its leadership with
52% of the EU’s production, followed by France (24%) and Spain (18%). Three companies
accounted for approximately 60% of EU moped and motorcycle productions: Piaggio, Peugeot
MTC (France), and MBK (France). Experts estimated that Japan controlled about 15% of total
European production through license agreements and financial holdings in local plants.
Assembly operations of Honda, Yamaha, and Suzuki accounted for one-third of Spanish
production alone.
Changing market requirements
By the year 2000, the European Union was expected to implement a program for
harmonization of manufacturing and specifications for PTWs in Europe. Improved standards
were needed, in particular because of the increasing traffic and pollution problems throughout
Europe. One British article described:
The unstoppable growth of traffic in Europe, up nearly a third from 1985 to 1992,
is saturating highways, leaving commuters fuming and forcing industry to
scramble to maintain “just-in-time” goods deliveries. However, the possibility of
building new roads to carry the load is rapidly diminishing because of tight
government budgets and mounting public opposition to vehicle noise and
pollution.5
The article further noted that the problem was complicated by people’s desire to continue
using their own transportation: “More than four-fifths of all passengers travel by car. A study
sponsored by the Department of Transport in Britain found that slashing public transport fares by
50% would cut car traffic and emissions by no more than 2%.”
Proposed solutions varied but included the possibility of charging vehicle taxes based on
emissions and weight.
The first phase of implementation for the new requirements would include changes in the
areas of pollution and emission standards. Many manufacturers were creating environmentally
sound parts in anticipation of the new standards. Although the technology to produce a low-
pollutant engine was already available, manufacturing costs for the “green” engine were very
high and had, thus far, translated into a higher market price. Industry experts agreed that the
availability of an affordable green engine would shape competition in the next 10 years. Several
manufacturers were making plans for the production of these engines.
5 Tom Buerkle, “Bumpy Road for Europe Traffic,” International Herald Tribune, July 23, 1996, 1.
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Piaggio
Piaggio was best known in Italy and throughout the world for the creation of the Vespa
scooter. The idea for the Vespa came from Enrico Piaggio, the son of a leading military aircraft
maker. World War II had left the Piaggio family close to ruin; its airplane factory in Pontedera
(near Florence) had been bombed, and the demand for fighter planes had virtually disappeared.
Piaggio decided to use the skills of his technicians to develop a scooter and provide a cheap
means of transportation. He enlisted top design engineer Corradino D’Ascanio to bring the new
project to life. The revolutionary model that resulted was the Vespa. Italian for wasp, the name
fit the buzzing of its engine and the rear-end swellings of its pressed-steel frame. Just 10 years
after its introduction in 1946, the Pontedera factory had turned out one million scooters. In 1956,
the Vespa was the best-selling scooter in 114 countries and was built under license in Belgium,
Brazil, Britain, France, Germany, India, and Spain.
In the 50 years since the first Vespa was unveiled, 15 million had been sold; 200,000
Vespas were sold in 1996 worldwide. The scooter first found popularity among families
searching for inexpensive transportation and later became popular with adolescents, who were
looking for a symbol of their freshly discovered freedom. Finally, the Vespa was used by urban
commuters looking for ways to beat traffic jams.
A lack of focus within Piaggio had placed it close to bankruptcy during the 1980s, when
it had expanded into everything from robots to car mats. Competition from Japanese
manufacturers intensified, and by 1993, Piaggio’s financial position was perilous, with an annual
loss of (Italian lira) ITL91 million (about USD60 million); however, under new leadership, the
company began to turn around that year. By 1996, Piaggio was again the leading scooter
manufacturer in Europe, capturing 45% of the estimated USD2.8 billion European scooter
market and 32% of the European two-wheeled vehicle market. But it was fourth worldwide
behind Japanese manufacturers Honda, Suzuki, and Yamaha.
Leading the redesign efforts was Giovanni Agnelli, Piaggio’s 32-year-old chairman.
Agnelli was interested both in meeting market trends and spearheading responsible development
of the market, even when the two conflicted. As an example, Agnelli spoke out against kits sold
to scooter owners, which allowed users to increase travel speed to 100 km/h rather than the 45
km/h for which the scooters were designed. Agnelli commented, “Scooters are beginning to have
a not-so-positive image because of the noise and speed problem more as urban utility vehicles
than as motorcycles. Now that we are bigger, we need to be a little more politically correct.”6 As
president of the Association des Constructeurs Européens de Motorcycles (ACEM), Agnelli
represented all major motorcycle manufacturers in the European Union as well as their
component suppliers, and sales and service retailers.
In 1996, five out of six Piaggio scooters were sold in Western Europe. But Piaggio had
plans to further expand into rapidly growing international markets. In 1993, Piaggio had created
6 Charles P. Wallace, “Scooters on a roll again; Vespa leads the way as the cheap and cheerful machines return
in style—and to record sales,” Time International (September 23, 1996): 38.
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a joint venture with the Fosti Motorcycle Company in China’s Guangdong Province. Piaggio
sold more than 130,000 mopeds in the Shanghai market in 1994, and in 1996, expanded into the
provinces of Jiangsu, Shandong, and Zhejiang.7 But this expansion proceeded much more slowly
than anticipated when the central government initiated a credit squeeze, and the government
banned the sale of mopeds and motor scooters in some parts of China. Sales in China in 1995
totaled USD36 million. Piaggio had fared better in its venture with an Indian company, which
brought USD200 million in sales in 1995 and anticipated production of 250,000 scooters in that
facility in 1996.8
In the European market, Piaggio had responded to the market upswing with a range of
new products. Since 1995, Piaggio had launched 35 new models, from the basic 50cc scooter to
the trendy Typhoon Benetton. In further efforts to connect to the trend of scooters as fashion
items, Piaggio launched a sponsorship deal with Miss Selfridge and C&A (fashion stores) in
1994.
In 1996, after a USD21 million investment and three years of development, Piaggio
launched new 50cc and 125cc Vespa models. Piaggio Chairman Agnelli commented, “The
challenge we face is to reinterpret not just the legend but also the function of the Vespa in
today’s post-industrial society.”9 The 50cc model ran on the world’s first fuel-injection, two-
stroke engine and was the first and only scooter to meet 2000 EU requirements for exhaust and
noise emissions. And while the original Vespa barely reached downhill speeds of 40 mph, the
125cc model could easily reach speeds of 60 mph. Piaggio hoped to sell 50,000 to 60,000 of
these models in Europe in 1997.
Piaggio also planned to launch a new version of the 50cc Vespa with a revolutionary
green engine in 1997. The engine was powered by an innovative direct-injection system,
internally developed by Piaggio engineers. Piaggio estimated that the engine would reduce fuel
consumption by 30% and pollution by 70%, but would translate into a 15% price increase of
ITL500,000 or USD350.
Production
Piaggio’s manufacturing process was almost completely vertically integrated. Its practice
had always been to develop the entire scooter design internally. A team of 700 engineers (out of
a total of 5,000 employees) would typically be involved in the design of any single piece of the
scooter.
When Piaggio began manufacturing scooters, it possessed all of the technical capabilities
in-house, and the component-suppliers market did not exist. As demand grew, however, Piaggio
fostered the development of an Italian component-suppliers sector. This group of small
companies was largely clustered around Pontedera.
7 “China: Motorcycle maker plans accelerated expansion,” China Daily, December 14, 1998.
8 Wallace “The Next Mr. Fiat?”
9 Jude Webber, “Italy’s Vespa scooter turns 50 with pizzazz,” Chicago Sun Times, September 29, 1996.
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Because Piaggio was the only large manufacturer purchasing from these small suppliers,
the bargaining relationship had always been clearly unbalanced in favor of Piaggio. Piaggio
evenly granted its orders among the suppliers to protect against the risk of component
unavailability. Piaggio also limited its risk by forcing slack capacity onto the component
suppliers when sales were low.
While Piaggio purchased its low value-added components, such as shock absorbers,
brakes, headlights, speedometers, and seats, it maintained production of all of the key strategic
components. Piaggio was one of the few European manufacturers with the skills and scale to
produce its own engines, which typically accounted for approximately 30% of the overall
manufacturing costs. Although the engine was not a differentiating factor for customers, and the
European engine models were of similar quality, Piaggio believed that the risk of purchasing a
poorly performing engine could seriously damage its reputation.
Piaggio’s strategy for new products had been to produce only a few carefully designed
models that would last several years. Because of its heavy investment in design, Piaggio’s
success was linked to sales volume. The current plan to build its own green engine would place
an even larger burden on Piaggio to maintain or increase sales and to sell the new engine to its
competitors.
Aprilia
Piaggio’s most recent competitive threat had not come from Honda or Peugeot, as might
have been expected, but from a small motorcycle maker based in Noale, Italy, 18 km from
Venice. In 1996, Aprilia was the second-largest motorcycle, moped, and scooter manufacturer in
Europe and distinguished itself as the only European firm to cover the entire range of two-
wheelers, from 50cc scooters to 1000cc open-class motorcycles. Further, Aprilia was the fastest-
growing motorbike company in Europe, taking on bigger rivals such as Italy’s Piaggio, France’s
Peugeot, and Japan’s Honda. In 1996, the company was expecting sales of USD500 million, a
400% increase over sales in 1992,10 and sales volume had increased from 55,000 to 165,000 from
1992 to 1995 (see Exhibit 3).
Company president Ivanno Beggio created Aprilia in the late 1970s by retooling his
father’s small bicycle shop. With the support of a group of friends who were also passionate
about motorcycle racing, he decided to design a racing bike. Success came first with several
world championships in the 125cc category followed by an explosion in commercial demand.
A company spokesman noted that Aprilia was built on a sense of wonder as much as on
its ability to produce motorcycles. “[The] sense of wonder is Aprilia’s ability to surprise in
everything we do; whether it is with new models, innovative design, performance, or racing
10
John Rossant, “Aprilia’s leader of the Pack,” BusinessWeek (June 10, 1996).
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success.”11 Beggio (who personally owned 57 motorcycles, including several classic Harley-
Davidsons and valuable models from the 1930s) added:
We have built our success by grafting imagination, creativity, and innovation onto
a solid base of high-quality production. We have not resorted to any particular
industrial strategies. Instead, the real secret of our success is everyone’s
enthusiasm, from that of the president, engineers, mechanics, and designers to our
most recent factory floor workers.
Aprilia engineers relied heavily on external suppliers, co-engineering the model, and
outsourcing all of the components. Resources that other competitors used for the manufacture of
parts went instead to design, marketing, and assembly. “It means we can be increasingly flexible
and reduce costs,”12 said Beggio. The result was one of the best examples in Europe of lean,
network manufacturing, or the “empty factory” as it was called by Italian organization experts.
Aprilia worked closely with some 150 outside suppliers who furnished everything from engines
and headlights to spokes and frames. Aprilia purchased an engine manufactured by Minarelli
under license from Yamaha. These engines had proved reliable and relatively cheap and were
produced on a very large scale.
In the past 10 years, Aprilia had brought more than 40 different models to market—
sometimes in as few as 12 months from initial concept. No other European or Japanese
manufacturer had the capability to bring motorcycles into full production that quickly. With
motorcycles fast becoming a fashion item, and the life cycle of scooter models shortening,
Aprilia’s ability to launch models when opportunities were perceived and carefully target a niche
segment of consumers provided a significant competitive advantage. In 1996 alone, Aprilia sold
18 models, each a top seller in its category.
One of Aprilia’s top-selling models was the Scarabeo 50cc scooter. Designed by an in-
house team to address the commuting needs of young urban professionals, the Scarabeo quickly
became the best-selling motor scooter in Italy after it was introduced in 1993. It smartly
combined functionality for the dense traffic of Italian city centers with a nostalgic look, which
contributed to the transformation of the scooter into a fashion item. The success of Scarabeo and
its fashionable retro look was so great that large manufacturers, Piaggio included, had to react
quickly by introducing old-fashioned-looking models.
Japanese Manufacturers
Japanese manufacturers had gained control of the scooter market in the 1980s with the
introduction of high-tech models that suited a larger percentage of market requirements.
Japanese “global products” were developed based on identifying the homogeneous needs across
world markets and then building on those common points to offer a mass-produced product with
11
“A sense of wonder: Aprilia’s voyage of discovery,” Dealernews, February 1998.
12
Rossant.
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superior quality and low manufacturing costs. The reduced manufacturing costs often translated
into competitive prices or higher margins. Further, the focus on “global products” led to a longer
product life than that of the niche products. And the broad range of models, from mopeds to
motorcycles, helped to establish customer loyalty. Younger customers who purchased less-
expensive bikes and were happy with them were more likely to return to the same company for
their next purchase.
This global strategy for both markets and products also allowed Japanese manufacturers
to gain substantial economies of scale in the production of their models. A Japanese model was
regarded as successful after it passed the 140,000 units-per-year mark, whereas a European
model was a hit after 50,000 units per year.
More than 50 kinds of motorcycles sold in Europe were imports, mainly from Japan
(56% of 1994 imports). The percentage of imports from Japan was declining largely because
Japanese manufacturers had transferred productive assets for large motorcycles to the East Asian
newly industrialized countries (see Exhibit 4 for production and export volume). Mopeds and
scooters had a low unit value that did not justify the transportation costs of the finished product.
Consequently, three Japanese manufacturers—Honda, Yamaha, and Suzuki—had developed
European manufacturing and assembly facilities, both through ventures with local manufacturers
and fully owned plants.
Experts estimated that Japan controlled about 15% of total European production through
license agreements and financial holdings in local plants. Assembly operations of Honda,
Yamaha, and Suzuki accounted for one-third of Spanish production alone. Most successful
Piaggio competitors in Italy (Aprilia, Malaguti, etc.) purchased 50cc engines produced by Italian
manufacturer Minarelli, under license from Yamaha.
Yamaha also controlled French manufacturer MBK and produced components in
cooperation with other companies. Announcing an agreement to manufacture starter motors with
Ducati Energia (an Italian motorcycle company) in 1995, the CEO of Yamaha Europe noted,
“This is the first step in our strategy of transferring production of components from Japan to
Europe.”13
Similarly, Honda owned and managed a facility in southern Italy and owned a 25% share
of Peugeot MTC. In June 1996, Honda announced it was establishing Honda Europe Motorcycle
in Rome to “oversee its motorcycle production and marketing operations in Europe.”14 The
company would also manage R&D activities for European operations. In 1995, Honda began
producing 50cc and 100cc scooters at a rate of 34,000 vehicles per year. Throughout 1996, the
company added four additional scooters in the 250cc to 650cc range, and Honda planned to
double production to 94,000 units in fiscal year 1996.15
13
Ruth Sullivan, “Yamaha drives for expansion in Europe,” European (June 2, 1995): 24.
14
“Honda targets enhanced presence in European motorcycle market,” Nikkei English News, June 25, 1996.
15
“Honda (7267) expands European scooter business,” Nikkei English News, December 10, 1996.
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UVA-BP-0415
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The Decision
During 1996, Piaggio had devoted its resources to the development and engineering of an
engine with low pollution and affordable manufacturing cost, and resources had already been
committed to build a new automated plant for the engine’s manufacture. The introduction of this
green engine seemed the likely key element both to competition with Japanese manufacturers,
who were expected to introduce it very soon and with European competitors, who did not have
the resources to develop it.
Still, Agnelli and company management were not convinced that internal production of
the engine was the best use of the company’s resources. The sales forecast for the Vespa (in
Europe) was for around 350,000 units per year—a figure less than the minimum production
required for the engine’s profitability. Piaggio’s competitors were already beginning to equip
their scooters with a similar Yamaha engine, signaling that Piaggio would have to quickly decide
whether to follow through with its current plan.
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UVA-BP-0415
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Exhibit 1
PIAGGIO (A)
Powered Two-Wheeled Vehicles—Definitions and Characteristics
Model Description
Mopeds
Popular throughout Europe, mopeds are essentially bicycles with a
supplemental motor, suitable for riding on short trips. Mopeds are simple-
structured, cheap, and reliable vehicles. Though the sales of these vehicles
may be considerably influenced by several external factors, the total number
of mopeds sold annually in the European Union was 1.2 million units in 1995.
Scooters
Scooters typically feature a step-through frame and wraparound protection,
which enhances their appeal to urban riders looking for a comfortable, sturdy,
motorized two-wheeler. Scooters are also ideal for suburban commuting.
Engine capacity generally varies from 50cc to 200cc.
Light motorcycles
Light motorcycles, whose engine capacity does not exceed 125cc, feature
more power and a stronger frame than scooters, Because driver’s license age
restrictions are often lower for light motorcycles than for other vehicles, light
motorcycles are popular with European teenagers. Models vary in suitability
for different conditions: some are good for urban and suburban commuting,
while others are also used as off-road vehicles.
Large motorcycles
Whether built for comfort or built for speed, large motorcycles attract buyers
looking for an economical and versatile vehicle they can ride both short and
long distances, whether as a daily vehicle or as a touring or sport bike.
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UVA-BP-0415
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Exhibit 2
PIAGGIO (A)
Powered Two-Wheelers—Vehicles per 1,000 in Population
Country 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995
Austria 71 68 67 66 66 68
Belgium 48 47 48 47 49 49
Denmark 34 35 36 35 35 35
Finland 34 33 33 32 31 30
France 57 55 53 52 52 53
Germany 41 52 48 44 46 49
Greece 38 43 49 56 56 58
Ireland 23 24 24 24 24 24
Italy 119 125 130 131 133 136
Luxembourg 31 35 42 51 49 49
Netherlands 44 43 44 44 50 52
Norway 48 47 47 46 45 44
Portugal 84 86 91 92 92 93
Spain 77 82 86 86 86 86
Sweden 28 28 28 28 28 28
Switzerland 112 109 105 103 101 101
UK 14 13 10 12 11 11
EUR 17 58 61 59 60 61 62
Source: “Solving the Urban Transport Dilemma: Powered Two-Wheelers—A Practical Alternative,” by Dr. Achim
Diekmann, Universität Köln, Germany, March 1997.
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UVA-BP-0415
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Exhibit 3
PIAGGIO (A)
Aprilia’s Sales Volume (1992–95)
Source: Created by case writer from Aprilia data.
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UVA-BP-0415
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Exhibit 4
PIAGGIO (A)
Japanese Domestic Production, Sales and Exports, 1993–1995
Domestic Production
Year 50cc 51–125cc 126–250cc 251cc– Total
1993 972,362 1,182,554 231,159 637,079 3,023,154
1994 874,919 1,062,560 237,368 550,421 2,725,286
1995 951,803 1,038,938 217,738 544,760 2,753,239
Exports
1993 138,690 925,447 136,325 519,248 1,719,710
1994 88,002 741,486 132,850 445,518 1,407,856
1995 61,627 691,433 129,961 442,689 1,325,710
Source: http://www.japanauto.com/library/nfjm/nfjm v2n1 01.html (accessed November 30, 1999).
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