Critical Thinking : Trade Barriers: Additional Issues
INTERNATIONAL ECONOMICS SEVENTEENTH EDITION
ROBERT J. CARBAUGH
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Chapter 5 Nontariff Trade Barriers
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2
CHAPTER OUTLINE (1 of 2)
Absolute Import Quota
Tariff-Rate Quota: A Two-Tier Tariff
Export Quotas
Domestic Content Requirements
Subsidies
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CHAPTER OUTLINE (2 of 2)
Dumping
Antidumping Regulations
Is Antidumping Law Unfair?
Other Nontariff Trade Barriers
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Absolute Import Quota (1 of 7)
Nontariff trade barriers
Policies other than tariffs that restrict international trade
Absolute quota
Physical restriction on quantity of goods imported during a specific time period
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Absolute Import Quota (2 of 7)
Import licenses
Government allocates import licenses to importers, permitting them to import product only up to prescribed limit, regardless of market demand
Global quota
Permits specified quantity of goods imported each year; does not specify from where product is shipped or who imports
Plagued by accusations of favoritism
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Absolute Import Quota (3 of 7)
Selective quota
Import quota allocated to specific countries
May lead to domestic monopoly of production and higher prices
Quotas may lead to domestic monopoly of production and higher prices
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Absolute Import Quota (4 of 7) Figure 5.1
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Absolute Import Quota (5 of 7)
Trade and Welfare Effects
Price increase
Decrease in consumer surplus
Redistributive effect (a)
Deadweight loss (b + d)
Protective effect (b)
Consumption effect (d)
Revenue effect (c)
Windfall profits, a.k.a. quota rent
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Absolute Import Quota (6 of 7)
Quotas versus Tariffs
When demand is growing, an absolute quota restricts volume of imports by greater amount than equivalent import tariff
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Absolute Import Quota (7 of 7) Figure 5.2
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Tariff-Rate Quota: A Two-Tier Tariff (1 of 5)
Tariff-rate quota
Two components
Allows specified number of goods to be imported at lower tariff rate (within-quota rate)
Any imports above this level face higher tariff rate (the over-quota rate)
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Tariff-Rate Quota: A Two-Tier Tariff (2 of 5)
Administration of tariff-rate quotas
License on demand allocation
If demand for licenses is less than quota, system operates on first come, first serve basis
If demand exceeds quota, import volume requested is reduced proportionally among all applicants
Allocation may also be based on historical market share or auctions
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Tariff-Rate Quota: A Two-Tier Tariff (3 of 5)
WTO requires members to convert all NTBs to tariffs; during transition, tariff-rate quotas permitted
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Tariff-Rate Quota: A Two-Tier Tariff (4 of 5)
Examples of U.S. Tariff-Rate Quotas
| Product | Within-Quota Tariff Rate | Import-Quota Threshold | Over-Quota Tariff Rate |
| Peanuts | $0.935/kg | 30,393 tons | 187.9% ad valorem |
| Beef | $0.44/kg | 634,621 tons | 31.1% ad valorem |
| Milk | $0.32/L | 5.7 million L | $0.885/L |
| Blue cheese | $0.10/kg | 2.6 million kg | $2.60/kg |
Source: From U.S. International Trade Commission, Harmonized Tariff Schedule of the United States, Washington, DC, U.S. Government Printing Office, 2017.
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Tariff-Rate Quota: A Two-Tier Tariff (5 of 5)
Sugar tariffs are bittersweet
U.S. sugar growers receive government guaranteed minimum price for sugar, but this attracts imported sugar
To prevent imports, U.S. implements tariff-rate quotas
U.S. price of sugar almost twice world market price
Many candy firms that use sugar have left country; those that remain pass price on to consumers
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Export Quotas (1 of 2)
Export quotas
Governments enter as form of voluntary export restraint agreements
Moderates intensity of international competition; tend to be more costly than tariffs
Identical effect to equivalent import quotas, except implemented by exporting nation
In 1980s, 67% of costs to U.S. consumers of these restraints captured by foreign exporters as profit
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Export Quotas (2 of 2)
Japanese Auto Restraints Put Brakes on U.S. Motorists
U.S. & Japan agreed to limit Japanese exports for 3 years beginning in 1981; purpose to help U.S. auto industry
But large Japanese car makers largely unaffected; increased prices & earned record profits
In 1984, U.S. consumer paid extra $660 per Japanese auto and $1,300 per U.S. auto
44,000 U.S. jobs saved at cost of $100,000/job
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Domestic Content Requirements (1 of 2)
To limit outsourcing, labor lobbied for domestic content requirements
Minimum percentage of a good’s value must be produced locally to qualify for zero tariff rates
Pressure domestic/foreign firms to use domestic inputs/workers
Can result in higher input and product prices and loss of competitiveness
Subsidized by domestic consumers
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Domestic Content Requirements (2 of 2)
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Subsidies (1 of 4)
Subsidies
May take form of outright cash disbursements, tax concessions, insurance arrangements, and subsidized loans
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Subsidies (2 of 4)
Domestic Production Subsidy
Results in
Higher output
Redistributive effects – increase in producer surplus for more efficient producers
Deadweight loss - protective effect
Lower welfare losses than a tariff/quota
Financed by taxpayers
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Subsidies (3 of 4)
Export Subsidy
Whereas domestic production subsidy is granted to producers of import-competing goods, an export subsidy goes to producers of goods to be sold overseas
For both, net price received by producer equals price paid by purchaser plus subsidy, and subsidy revenue redistributed in form of producer surplus
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Subsidies (4 of 4)
Export Subsidy (cont’d)
Higher output and prices for exporters
Higher exports; lower domestic consumption
Domestic producers gain at expense of domestic consumers and taxpayers
Decrease in consumer surplus
Increase in producer surplus
Taxpayers bear cost of export subsidy
Deadweight losses (welfare)
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Dumping (1 of 4)
Dumping
A form of international price discrimination
Occurs when foreign buyers are charged lower prices than domestic buyers for identical product
Also, selling in foreign markets at a price below cost of production
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Dumping (2 of 4)
Forms of Dumping
Sporadic Dumping
A firm disposes of excess inventories in foreign markets by selling at price below domestic price
Predatory Dumping
Producer temporarily reduces price charged abroad to drive foreign competitors out of business
Persistent Dumping
Goes on indefinitely; to maximize economic profits, a producer may consistently sell abroad at lower price than at home
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Dumping (3 of 4)
International Price Discrimination
Producer charges more at home with less competition, and more overseas to compete
Submarkets’ demand conditions must differ
Different demand elasticities (home/foreign)
Firm must be able to separate submarkets
Prevent arbitrage (resale of goods at higher price)
Markets – easier to separate internationally
High transportation costs
Trade restrictions
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Dumping (4 of 4) Figure 5.5
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Antidumping Regulations (1 of 6)
Antidumping duty
Levied when
U.S. Department of Commerce determines foreign merchandise being sold at less than fair value (LTFV); and
U.S. International Trade Commission (ITC) determines that LTFV imports are causing or threatening material injury to domestic industry
Anti-dumping duties imposed in addition to the normal tariff
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Antidumping Regulations (2 of 6)
Margin of dumping
Amount by which foreign market value exceeds U.S. price
Foreign market value – two definitions
Priced-based definition
Dumping occurs when foreign firm sells good at price in U.S. below home price
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Antidumping Regulations (3 of 6)
Foreign market value
Cost-based definition (used when price-based definition cannot be applied)
Cost of manufacturing merchandise + general expenses (at least 10% of cost of manufacturing) + profit on home-market sales (at least 8% of manufacturing cost + general expense) + packaging merchandise for shipment to U.S.
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Antidumping Regulations (4 of 6)
Whirlpool Agitates for Antidumping Tariffs on Clothes Washers
93,000 employees, $21 billion in annual sales, and 70 manufacturing and technology research centers throughout the world in 2017.
In 2011, Whirlpool filed anti-dumping and anti-subsidy petitions against Samsung & LG, which it contended were selling in U.S. at prices substantially less than fair value
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Antidumping Regulations (5 of 6)
2016: Whirlpool filed again
2017: U.S. International Trade Commission approved Whirlpool’s petition for safeguard protection
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Antidumping Regulations (6 of 6)
Vaughan-Bassett Furniture Company: Furniture Dumping from China
Vaughan-Bassett Furniture and other U.S. furniture manufactures (over opposition of many U.S. furniture retailers) filed antidumping complaint against China
In 2005, U.S. government imposed dumping duties of on most Chinese furniture shipped to U.S.
Resulted in decrease in Chinese furniture sold in U.S.
However, imports from Vietnam, Indonesia, and other countries filled vacuum
Returned Vaughan-Bassett Furniture to profitability; is now largest wood bedroom manufacturer in U.S.
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Is Antidumping Law Unfair? (1 of 4)
Antidumping laws
Supporters claim such laws needed to ensure level playing field by offsetting artificial sources of competitive advantage
Critics note that although protected industries gain, consumers lose more and economy as whole therefore suffers net loss
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Is Antidumping Law Unfair? (2 of 4)
Should Average Variable Cost be the Yardstick for Defining Dumping?
Economists argue that fair value should be based on average variable cost rather than average total cost, especially when domestic economy experiences temporary downturns in demand
Under competitive conditions, firms price goods at average variable cost
Antidumping laws punish competitive behavior
U.S. firms selling at home not subject to same rules
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Is Antidumping Law Unfair? (3 of 4) Table 5.3
Dumping and Excess Capacity
| No Dumping | Dumping | |
| Home sales | 100 units @ $300 | 100 units @ $300 |
| Export sales | 0 units @ $300 | 50 units @ $250 |
| Sales revenue | $30,000 | $42,500 |
| Less variable costs of $200 per unit | −20,000 | −30,000 |
| $10,000 | $12,500 | |
| Less total fixed costs of $10,000 | −10,000 | −10,000 |
| Profit | $0 | $2,500 |
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Is Antidumping Law Unfair? (4 of 4)
Should Antidumping Law Reflect Currency Fluctuations?
Fluctuations in exchange rate can cause a foreign producer to “dump,” according to legal definition
Are Antidumping Duties Overused?
Now, nations small and large bring antidumping cases, leading to retaliation
In many cases where imports were determined to be dumped, they would not have been questioned under the same countries’ antitrust laws
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Other Nontariff Trade Barriers (1 of 5)
Government procurement policies: “Buy American”
1933, Buy American Act
Requires federal agencies to purchase materials and products from U.S. suppliers if prices not “unreasonably” higher than foreign
“Domestic product,” must 50% domestic component content and be USA manufactured
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Other Nontariff Trade Barriers (2 of 5)
Government procurement policies (cont.)
1933, Buy American Act
U.S. suppliers of civilian agencies – preferences over foreign firms
6-12% preference margin
50% preference margin for Department of Defense
Preferences waived if U.S.-produced good is not available in sufficient quantities or is not of satisfactory quality
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Other Nontariff Trade Barriers (3 of 5)
Social Regulations
Correct a variety of undesirable side effects markets ignore
Health, safety, and the environment
CAFÉ Standards
Corporate average fuel economy standards
Passenger cars: 37.8 miles per gallon (2016)
Light trucks: 28.8 miles per gallon (2016)
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Other Nontariff Trade Barriers (4 of 5)
Europe Has a Cow over Hormone-Treated U.S. Beef
Ban on hormone-treated meat
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Other Nontariff Trade Barriers (5 of 5)
Sea transport and freight regulations
U.S. shipping companies serving Japanese ports complained of highly restrictive system of port services
Required to clear every detail of visits with Japan’s stevedore-company association
Dockworkers available only 18 hours a day or less
Made U.S. goods more expensive in Japan
In 1997, U.S. and Japan, on brink of trade war, reached agreement to liberalize port services in Japan
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