Critical Thinking : Trade Barriers: Additional Issues
INTERNATIONAL ECONOMICS SEVENTEENTH EDITION
ROBERT J. CARBAUGH
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Chapter 4 Tariffs
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2
CHAPTER OUTLINE (1 of 3)
The Tariff Concept
Types of Tariffs
Effective Rate of Protection
Tariff Escalation
Outsourcing & Offshore Assembly Provision
Dodging Import Tariffs: Tariff Avoidance & Tariff Evasion
Postponing Import Tariffs
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CHAPTER OUTLINE (2 of 3)
Tariff Effects: An Overview
Tariff Welfare Effects: Consumer Surplus & Producer Surplus
Tariff Welfare Effects: Small-Nation Model
Tariff Welfare Effects: Large-Nation Model
Examples of U.S. Tariffs
How a Tariff Burdens Exporters
Tariffs and the Poor: Regressive Tariffs
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CHAPTER OUTLINE (3 of 3)
Arguments for Trade Restrictions
Would a Tariff Wall Really Protect U.S. Jobs?
The Political Economy of Protectionism
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Tariffs
Free-Trade argument posits that open markets foster most efficient use of world resources
But free trade policies often meet resistance among companies and workers who face losses in income and jobs because of import competition
Policymakers torn between global efficiency and needs of voting public
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The Tariff Concept (1 of 3)
Tariff
A tax (duty) levied on a product when it crosses national boundaries
Import tariff
Tax levied on an imported product
Most common; collected before shipment can be unloaded in domestic port
Export tariff
Tax imposed on an exported product
Less common; illegal under U.S. Constitution
Commonly used by developing nations
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The Tariff Concept (2 of 3)
Protective tariff
Protects domestic producers from foreign competition
Facilitates increase in output of import-competing producers
Revenue tariff
Generates tax revenues by placing tariffs on either imports or exports
Now only 1% of total federal revenues in U.S.
Many developing nations rely on tariffs as major source of income
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The Tariff Concept (3 of 3) Table 4.1
Taxes on International Trade as a Percentage of Government Revenues, 2013: Selected Countries
| Developing Countries | Percentage | Advanced Countries | Percentage |
| Bahamas | 43.2 | New Zealand | 2.7 |
| Ethopia | 29.8 | Australia | 1.8 |
| Liberia | 28.1 | Japan | 1.7 |
| Bangladesh | 26.7 | United States | 1.2 |
| Grenada | 25.4 | Switzerland | 1.0 |
| Russian Federation | 25.8 | Norway | 0.3 |
| Philippines | 19.9 | Ireland | 0.2 |
| India | 14.1 | World average | 3.8 |
Source: From World Bank Data at http://data.worldbank.org. See also International Monetary Fund, Government Finance Statistics, Yearbook, Washington, DC.
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Types of Tariffs (1 of 3)
Tariffs may be specific, ad valorem, or compound
Specific tariff
Fixed amount of money per physical unit of imported product (Ex: 15 cents/unit).
Relatively easy to apply and administer
Degree of protection varies inversely with changes in import prices
Provides domestic producers increased protection during recession (with falling prices)
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Types of Tariffs (2 of 3)
Tariffs may be specific, ad valorem, or compound (cont.)
Ad valorem tariff
Primarily used with manufactured goods because can be applied to products with range of grade variations
Fixed percentage of the value of imported product (Ex: 15%/unit)
Maintains constant degree of protection for domestic producers through the business cycle
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Types of Tariffs (3 of 3)
Tariffs may be specific, ad valorem, or compound (cont.)
Customs valuation: determining value of imported product; is complex, subject to disagreement
U.S. traditionally uses free-on-board valuation (FOB)⎯tariff applied to product’s value as it leaves exporting country
Europe traditionally uses cost-insurance-freight valuation (CIF)⎯tariffs levied as percentage of imported commodity’s total value upon arrival at final destination
Compound tariff
Applied to manufactured products composed of raw materials subject to tariffs
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Effective Rate of Protection (1 of 3)
Nominal and Effective tariff rates
Nominal tariff rate: rate published in country’s tariff schedule
Applies to value of finished product
Effective tariff rate: takes into account not only nominal tariff on finished good but any tariff applied to imported inputs
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Effective Rate of Protection (2 of 3)
Effective tariff rate (e) calculated as:
e = effective rate of protection
n = nominal tariff rate on final product
a = ratio of value of the imported input to value of finished product
b = nominal tariff rate on imported input
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Effective Rate of Protection (3 of 3)
If tariff on finished product is less than tariff on imported input
Effective rate of protection is less than nominal tariff (may even be negative)
Tariff protects domestic suppliers of raw materials more than domestic manufacturers
If tariff on finished product exceeds tariff on imported input
Effective tariff exceeds nominal tariff
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Tariff Escalation
Processed goods have higher import tariffs
Raw materials often imported at zero or low tariff rates; nominal and effective protection increases at each production stage
Tariff Escalations in Advanced and Developing Countries, 2012
AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTS
INDUSTRIAL PRODUCTS
| Country | Primary Products | Processed Products | Primary Products | Processed Products |
| Bangladesh | 17.5 | 23.0 | 9.1 | 15.4 |
| Uganda | 17.5 | 20.3 | 4.2 | 11.7 |
| Argentina | 5.7 | 11.5 | 2.9 | 9.5 |
| Brazil | 6.5 | 12.1 | 4.2 | 10.7 |
| Russia | 6.9 | 9.2 | 5.3 | 9.5 |
| United States | 1.0 | 2.8 | 1.3 | 2.8 |
| Japan | 4.5 | 10.9 | 0.5 | 1.9 |
| World | 12.0 | 15.1 | 5.6 | 7.7 |
Source: From World Bank Data at http://data.worldbank.org.
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Outsourcing & Offshore Assembly Provision
Outsourcing is key aspect of global economy
Ex: Electronic components made in the U.S. are shipped to another country with low labor costs for assembly into TV sets; assembled sets returned to U.S. for further processing or packaging & distribution
Each production stage in country where it incurs least cost
Offshore-assembly provision (OAP)
Provides favorable treatment to products assembled abroad from U.S.-made components
Incentivizes foreign manufacturers to purchase components from U.S. sources
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Dodging Import Tariffs: Tariff Avoidance & Tariff Evasion
Tariff avoidance
Legal utilization of tariff system to one’s own advantage
Tariff evasion
Evading tariffs by illegal means such as smuggling imported goods into a country
Ford strips its wagons to avoid high tariff
Ex: Ford strips its wagons to avoid high tariff
Ex: Smuggled steel evades U.S. tariffs
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Postponing Import Tariffs: Bonded Warehouse
Under U.S. tariff law, dutiable imports can be brought into U.S. and temporarily left in a bonded warehouse, duty free (up to 5 years)
Owners of warehouses must be bonded to ensure they will satisfy all customs duty obligations
Bonding company guarantees payment of custom duties if importing company unable to do so
When goods removed from warehouse, firm must pay duty on value at time of removal
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Foreign-Trade Zone (FMZ)
Area in U.S. where businesses operate without paying duties on imported products or materials as long as they remain in area and do not enter U.S. marketplace
In an FTZ, can do just about anything to merchandise – repair, repackage, assemble
FTZ program treats a product manufactured in FTZ as if it were imported, not made in U.S.
Customs duties are due when goods are transferred from FTZ for U.S. consumption
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Tariff Effects: An Overview
As taxes on imports, tariffs make items more expensive for consumers, reducing demand
Buyers pay more for U.S.-made goods than they would for imported goods under free trade
Job loss in retail and transportation sectors that import foreign-made goods
Job loss in any domestic industry that suffers retaliatory tariffs
Additional costs of imported inputs passed on to consumers through goods and services that use such inputs in production process
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Tariff Welfare Effects: Consumer Surplus & Producer Surplus (1 of 2)
Consumer Surplus (CS)
Difference between what buyers are willing & able to pay and the amount they actually pay
Inverse relationship between change in market price and CS
Producer surplus (PS)
Difference between what producers are willing and able to receive and the amount they actually receive
Direct relationship between change in price and PS
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Tariff Welfare Effects: Consumer Surplus & Producer Surplus (2 of 2) Figure 4.1
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Tariff Welfare Effects: Small-Nation Model (1 of 4)
Small nations import very small portion of world market supply; unable to impact market price
Is a price taker, facing constant world prices for products it imports
Tariff effects
Raises home price of imported good by full amount of duty
Results in higher domestic production & PS
Lowers domestic consumption & decreases CS
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Tariff Welfare Effects: Small-Nation Model (2 of 4) Figure 4.2
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Tariff Welfare Effects: Small-Nation Model (3 of 4)
A small nation tariff effects on nation’s welfare:
Consumer surplus falls
Additional tax revenues
Benefits domestic producers
Wastes resources
Revenue effect (Area “c”)
Government’s collections of duty
Redistributive effect (Area “a”)
Transfer of consumer surplus to domestic producers
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Tariff Welfare Effects: Small-Nation Model (4 of 4)
A small nation tariff effects on nation’s welfare: (cont.)
Protective effect (Area “b”)
Loss to domestic economy from wasted resources used to produce at increasing unit costs
Consumption effect (Area “d”)
Decrease in consumption resulting from tariff’s artificially increasing price
Deadweight loss (Area “b” + “d”)
Protective effect and consumption combined
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Tariff Welfare Effects: Large-Nation Model (1 of 3)
Tariffs may increase national welfare when imposed by importing nation large enough that changes in its quantity of imports influence world price (ex: U.S., Japan, EU)
U.S. imposes tariff on automobile imports
Prices increase for American consumers, quantity demanded decreases
Effect shared between U.S. consumers, who pay higher price, and Japanese firms, which receive lower price than under free trade
Terms of trade improve for U.S. at Japan’s expense
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Tariff Welfare Effects: Large-Nation Model (2 of 3) Figure 4.3
If e > (b + d)
National welfare is increased
If e = (b + d)
National welfare remains constant
If e < (b + d)
National welfare is diminished
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Tariff Welfare Effects: Large-Nation Model (3 of 3)
Economic effects of an import tariff
Redistributive effect
From domestic consumers to domestic producers
Deadweight loss
Consumption effect
Protective effect
Revenue effect
Domestic revenue effect
Terms-of-trade effect
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Donald Trump’s “Border Tax” How to Pay for the Wall
Trump wants Mexico to pay for the border wall
Mexico refused
Trump declared a 20 percent border tax on Mexican imports
Violated NAFTA and WTO agreements
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The Optimum Tariff & Retaliation
Optimum tariff
Maximizes positive difference between gain of improving terms of trade (Area “e”) and loss in economic efficiency from the protective effect (Area “b”) and consumption effect (Area “d”)
Only beneficial to importing nation
Beggar-thy-neighbor policy; could invite retaliation
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Examples of U.S. Tariffs (1 of 3)
Obama’s Tariffs on Chinese Tires
As condition of entry to WTO in 2001, China agreed that other nations could clamp down on surges of imports from China without having to prove unfair trade practices
In 2004–2008, China increased tire shipments to U.S. by 300%; four U.S. tire plants closed, 4,500 jobs lost; Obama imposed tariffs for 3 more years
Obama administration maintained tariffs would enforce rule China agreed to; significantly reduce tire imports; boost U.S. sales, prices, profitability; and have little or no impact on production
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Examples of U.S. Tariffs (2 of 3)
Obama’s Tariffs on Chinese Tires
Critics argued
Action opposed by U.S. tire firms because already had abandoned making low-cost tires
Not profitable to produce cheap tires in U.S. because of competition from foreign companies
To compete, U.S. manufacturers would have to revamp factory lines to produce tires
If Chinese tires blocked, Brazil, Indonesia, others will supply, but will take time; in meantime, will be shortages of low cost tires in U.S. & prices rising by 20–30%
Tariff produced mixed results
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Examples of U.S. Tariffs (3 of 3)
Should Footwear Tariffs be Given the Boot?
During 1930s, tariffs introduced to protect rubber & canvas shoe industry
Although other tariffs eliminated since 1930s, footwear tariffs have continued
U.S. footwear industry now nearly extinct; almost 99% of footwear sold in U.S. imported
Affordable Footwear Act introduced in 2013
Attempts to abolish most severe footwear tariffs and lower prices of shoes
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How a Tariff Burdens Exporters
Effects of import tariffs on exporters
Higher production costs from imported inputs and reduction in CS
Can result in higher prices and, depending on elasticity of demand, reduce overseas sales
Raise cost of living
International repercussions lead to reduction in domestic exports
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Tariffs and the Poor: Regressive Tariffs (1 of 2)
Tariffs are inequitable
Impose most severe costs on low-income families – tend to be regressive
Higher tariffs imposed on cheap goods than on luxuries
Affect different countries in different ways
Tend to burden countries (e.g., poor countries in Asia and Middle East) that specialize in production and sale of cheaper goods
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Tariffs and the Poor: Regressive Tariffs (2 of 2) Table 4.7
U.S. Tariffs Are High on Cheap Goods, Low on Luxuries
| Product | Tariff Rate (percent) |
| Men’s knitted shirts | |
| Synthetic fiber | 32.5 |
| Cotton | 20.0 |
| Silk | 1.9 |
| Handbags | |
| Plastic-sided | 16.8 |
| Leather, under $20 | 10.0 |
| Reptile leather | 5.3 |
Source: From U.S. International Trade Commission, Tariff Schedules of the United States, Washington, DC, Government Printing Office, 2013, available at http://www.usitc.gov/taffairs.htm.
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Arguments for Trade Restrictions (1 of 9)
Free-trade argument
If each nation produces what it does best and permits trade, in long term, there will be lower prices and higher levels of output, income, and consumption
Job protection argument
Job gains less visible than job losses
Trade restrictions result in job gains for few industries; job losses are spread out
Saved jobs costs more than worker’s salary
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Arguments for Trade Restrictions (2 of 9)
Protection against cheap foreign labor
Low wages abroad makes it hard for U.S. firms to compete with firms using cheap foreign labor
Fails to recognize links among efficiency, wages, and production costs
Low wages do not guarantee low costs
Low-wage nations have competitive advantage only in goods requiring greater labor and few other factor inputs
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Arguments for Trade Restrictions (3 of 9) Table 4.9
Hourly Compensation Costs in U.S. Dollars for Production Workers in Manufacturing, 2015
| Country | Hourly Compensation (dollars per hour) |
| Norway | 49.67 |
| Germany | 42.42 |
| United States | 37.71 |
| United Kingdom | 31.44 |
| Japan | 23.60 |
| Taiwan | 9.51 |
| Mexico | 5.90 |
| Philippines | 2.16 |
Source: From The Conference Board, International Comparisons of Hourly Compensation Costs in Manufacturing, 2015, April 12, 2016, available at www.conference-board.org.
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Arguments for Trade Restrictions (4 of 9) Table 4.10
Productivity, Wages, and Unit Labor Costs, Relative to the United States: Total Manufacturing (United States = 1.0)
| Country | Labor Productivity Relative to United States | Wages Relative to United States* | Unit Labor Cost Relative to United States | |
| Hong Kong (2008) | 0.21 | 0.44 | 2.09 | |
| Mauritius (2007) | 0.06 | 0.12 | 2.00 | |
| South Africa (2008) | 0.14 | 0.27 | 1.93 | |
| European Union (2009) | 0.46 | 0.84 | 1.83 | |
| United Kingdom (2009) | 0.50 | 0.84 | 1.68 | U.S. More Competitive |
| Singapore (2008) | 0.40 | 0.61 | 1.53 | U.S. Less Competitive |
| Japan (2008) | 0.67 | 0.72 | 1.07 | |
| Mexico (2009) | 0.18 | 0.17 | 0.94 | |
| South Korea (2006) | 0.71 | 0.61 | 0.86 | |
| Poland (2006) | 0.26 | 0.20 | 0.77 | |
| China (2008) | 0.12 | 0.08 | 0.67 |
*At market exchange rate.
Source: The author wishes to thank Professor Steven Golub of Swarthmore College, who provided data for this table. Refer to his CESifo Working Paper at the Center for Economic Studies, University of Munich, Munich, Germany, 2011. See also Janet Ceglowski and Stephen Golub, “Are China’s Labor Costs Still
Low?” This paper was prepared for the CESifo conference on China and the Global Economy Post Crisis, held in Venice, Italy, July 18–19, 2011.
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Arguments for Trade Restrictions (5 of 9)
Fairness in Trade: Level Playing Field
Domestic producers say import restrictions need to offset foreign advantages, to create level playing field
Rationale for restrictions is that foreign governments play by different rules, giving foreign firms unfair competitive advantage
Trade benefits domestic economy even if foreign nations impose trade restrictions
Fair trade argument overlooks potential impact of trade restrictions on global trade
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Arguments for Trade Restrictions (6 of 9)
Maintenance of the Domestic Standard of Living
Advocates of trade barriers often contend tariffs are useful in maintaining high level of income and employment in home nation
However, one nation imposes a tariff that improves its income and employment at the expense of its trading partner’s living standard (beggar-thy-neighbor policy)
May spark retaliatory tariffs, resulting in lower level of welfare for all nations
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Arguments for Trade Restrictions (7 of 9)
Equalization of Production Costs
Scientific tariff - to eliminate unfair competition from abroad
Problems
Different costs across business
Higher domestic prices
Benefit efficient domestic companies
Domestic consumer subsidizing inefficient production
Scientific tariff approximates prohibitive tariff
Completely contradicts notion of comparative advantage & eliminates basis/gains for/from trade
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Arguments for Trade Restrictions (8 of 9)
Infant-Industry Argument
Trading nations temporarily shield newly developing industries from foreign competition
If protective tariff imposed, difficult to remove
Special-interest groups - convince policy makers that further protection is justified
Difficult to determine which industries will realize comparative advantage in long-run
Not valid for mature, industrialized nations
Alternative=providing domestic industry subsidy
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Arguments for Trade Restrictions (9 of 9)
Noneconomic Arguments
National security argument
Protect essential industries
What constitutes an “essential” industry?
Cultural and sociological considerations
Assumption that national and individual’s welfare enhanced by tariffs
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Would a Tariff Wall Really Protect U.S. Jobs?
Trade protectionism political priority in 2016 presidential election
Tariffs on imported steel tend to have a positive, direct effect on jobs for American steel workers, but can have less visible, indirect effects on others
Tariff-related gains for Americans is a complex issue
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Political Economy of Protectionism
Elected officials formulate policies to maximize votes and remain in office
Bias in the political system favors protectionism
Protection-biased sector
Import competing producers
Labor unions - in protected industry
Suppliers of producers in protected industry
Established firms in aging industry that could lose their comparative advantage
Free-trade-biased sector
Exporting producers, their workers, and their suppliers
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A Supply & Demand View of Protectionism (1 of 3)
Though protectionism provides benefits to domestic producers, society as whole pays costs
Losses of consumer surplus because of higher prices
Resulting deadweight losses
Lost economies of scale as further opportunities are lost
Loss of incentive for technological development provided by import competition
The higher the costs of protection, the less likely a government is to shield an industry from import competition
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A Supply & Demand View of Protectionism (2 of 3)
Supply of protectionism increases, depending on:
Political importance of import-competing industry
Whether domestic firms and workers face large costs of adjusting to rising import competition
Public sympathy for a group of domestic businesses or workers
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A Supply & Demand View of Protectionism (3 of 3)
Demand for protection rises with:
Intensification of domestic industry’s comparative disadvantage
Higher levels of import penetration
Concentration of domestic production
Degree of export dependence
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