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Self: I as Mind PHIL 236-2408

Derek Parfit One of the most influential moral philosophers of the 20th and 21st century, Derek Parfit (1942-2017) was a British philosopher whose work on personal identity left a lasting impression. Parfit had written only two books, Reasons and Persons and the three volume On What Matters. The content of his book On What Matters were widely discussed long before its publication due to portions circulated in philosophical circles. Here, we will discuss an excerpt from his article The Unimportance of Identity.

For a glowing eulogy of Parfit, see: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=3lfioU278jE

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=3lfioU278jE

Derek Parfit, Reductionism and Personal Identity An excerpt from his article “The Unimportance of Identity, in Identity, edited by H. Harris (1995), pp.13-28, Oxford University Press.

Reductionism and Personal Identity

Parfit begins with a sci-fi inspired thought experiment on Teletransportation. On earth I enter a teletransporter. “When I press a button, a machine destroys my body, while recording the exact states of all my cells. The information is sent by radio to Mars, where another machine makes, out of organic materials, a perfect copy of my body. The person who wakes up on Mars seems to remember living my life up to the moment when I pressed the button” (consider Locke here), “and he is in every other way just like me.”

Parfit notes that for some teletransportation is merely the fastest way of travel. Others believe in teletransportation, I am no longer the person I was before. I become a Replica of myself.

The Teletransportation Dilemma

Reductionism and Personal Identity

For Parfit (p. 655), this is a disagreement about personal identity. We must, he argues, distinguish between two kinds of sameness.

● Psychological Sameness – the focus is the kind of person someone is; for example, when psychologist talk of identity crisis (more on this when

we discuss Erik Erikson in the coming weeks). Here, in teletransportation I am the same person. I am psychologically the same.

● Philosophical Sameness – the focus is on numerical identity. Here, in teletransportation, I am not the same person. I am numerically different.

For both, we are asking questions about identity over time.

Reductionism and Personal Identity What is the criterion of personal identity?

For some, it is bodily continuity (the replica would not be me). For others, it is psychological continuity (the replica would be me).

Though the answer is difficult to resolve, Parfit contends that there must be an answer. When we consider these imaginative scenarios, “we assume that our identity must be determinate” (Parfit, p.656). Referring to Descartes’ theory of the self, Parfit admits to the appeal, but is unable to find evidence to the belief.

As such, we must accept the general Reductionist view:

“A person’s existence just consists in the existence of a body, and the occurrence of a series of thoughts, experiments, and other mental and physical events” (Parfit, p. 656)

Reductionism and Personal Identity

Some reductionists claim that “persons just are bodies.” This is called Identifying Reductionism. Here, we may be able to identify persons solely through bodies.

Others claim, “a person is an entity that has a body and has thoughts and other experiences.” This is called Constitutive Reductionism. Here, a person is constituted by their bodies, thoughts, and experiences.

Still others argue, ”there really aren’t such things as persons: there are only brains and bodies, and thoughts and other experiences.” This is Eliminative Reductionism. Here, the self is believed to be an illusion.

Reductionism and Personal Identity Though Eliminative Reductionism is sometimes justified, as in the exemplary claim that there were really no witches (as an identity) only persecuted women, Parfit suggests, reductionism about some kinds of persons or entities doesn’t serve us well. That is, if we reduce persons to mere bodies or kinds, we assume that making distinctions allows for separate existence. Here, Parfit is emphasizing how bodies may not be separable from minds or consciousness.

And so, we should emphasize that a distinction does not presume independent existence. If you can make a distinction between someone’s bodily continuity and psychological continuity, it does not necessarily conclude that they must be separately existing entities.

Parfit (p. 657) concludes: “Though persons are distinct from their bodies, and from any series of mental events, they are not independent or separately existing.”

Reductionism and Personal Identity Consider Parfit’s point about teleportation and the physical spectrum.

Can the person still be who she originally was were only one cell to change in the teleportation process? What about two cells? What about 2% of bodily changes? 10%? 50%? 70%? At what percent of bodily change does that person no longer remain that same person? Is there a Yes or No answer to this?

For Parfit, it is not true that our identities must be determinate.

“How could it be neither true nor false that I shall still exist tomorrow? And, without an answer to our question, how could I know the full truth about my future?” (Parfit, p. 659)

Reductionism and Personal Identity

Reductionism has the answer, Parfit claims. For:

“Our question is not about different possibilities. There is only a single possibility, or course of events. Our question is merely about different possible descriptions of this course of events” (Parfit, p. 659).

He concludes that “in all cases, if we know the other facts, we should regard questions about our identity as merely questions about language.”

It is natural to assume that though we cannot currently answer this question, there nonetheless is a definitive answer. Such a question for Parfit would be empty because we do not yet have the facts before us to give a descriptive account of what would or would not constitute a self in such circumstances, whereas in circumstances that are less imaginative than the teletransporter scenario we do have, Parfit believes, answers to questions of the self.

The Question of the Self as an empty Concept

On Derek Parfit