The Changing Role of the Police

Section1983ofthecivilrightactof1871topic1ref.pdf

Home >Law homework help >Criminal homework help >The Changing Role of the Police

Supreme Court Debates, a Pro & Con® Monthly | February 2010 (Vol. 13, No. 2) Prosecutorial Immunity

Kiyemba v. Obama — This case was granted certiorari on October 20, 2009, and is scheduled to be argued on March 23, 2010. At issue is whether a Federal district court judge has the power to order the release of Guantánamo Bay detainees into the United States. Renico v. Lett — This case was granted certiorari on November 30, 2009, and is scheduled to be argued on March 29, 2010. Before the Court is whether retrying an individual on the same charges after a jury was unable to reach a verdict in the first trial violates the defendant’s constitutional protection against double jeopardy. Certiorari Granted Christian Legal Society v. Martinez — This case was granted certiorari on December 7, 2009, and has yet to be scheduled for argument. To be decided is whether a public university law school may deny school funding and other benefits to a religious student organization because the group requires its officers and voting members to agree with its core religious viewpoints. City of Ontario v. Quon — This case was granted certiorari on December 14, 2009, and has yet to be scheduled for argument. At issue is whether the Fourth Amendment protects the privacy of text messages sent by a government employee on a government-issued electronic device. Doe v. Reed — This case was granted certiorari on January 15, 2010, and has yet to be scheduled for argument. To be decided is whether the Washington State Public Records Act, which allows for the release of names on ballot-measure petitions, is constitutional. Section 1983 of the Civil Rights Act of 1871 Federal Efforts to Enforce the Fourteenth Amendment Section 1983 of Title 42 of the United States Code was originally enacted by Congress as Section 1 of the Ku Klux Klan Act of April 20, 1871. Its purpose was to enforce the provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. The Act is also known as the Civil Rights Act of 1871. Section 1983 states in part:

Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress. …

Section 1983’s primary objective was to provide a means to enforce the provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment. Proponents of the bill argued that the States had no process by which persons could obtain redress for violations of constitutionally guaranteed rights and that Federal legislation was the means by which these rights could be enforced. Although the activities of the Ku Klux Klan were the primary evil that the bill was designed to remedy, the bill was not directed solely against the Klan and its members, but also against those persons who, in

Supreme Court Debates, a Pro & Con® Monthly | February 2010 (Vol. 13, No. 2) Prosecutorial Immunity

representing a State, were unable or unwilling to enforce a State law. Thus the bill was intended to protect not only the rights of African Americans who had recently been freed from slavery, but also the rights of all citizens against State-sponsored infringement of constitutional rights. For many years after its passage, few lawsuits were filed under Section 1983. However, beginning in the 1960s, Section 1983 was frequently relied upon to redress a number of issues. Basis of Liability Under Section 1983 In Monroe v. Pape (1961), the United States Supreme Court ruled that officials of a governmental body may be sued under Section 1983. In Monroe, the police searched the wrong house without a search warrant. Even though narcotics were found in the house, the search was deemed to be improper and the individuals arrested in the house were released. The individuals then brought suit in Federal court pursuant to Section 1983 alleging that the City of Chicago and the individual police officers had violated their rights against unreasonable search and seizure under the Fourth Amendment. The lower courts dismissed the suit. The United States Supreme Court reversed. The court went on to hold that the phrase “under color of” included acts of an official acting under color of State authority. To successfully prevail in an action under Section 1983, the courts have held that plaintiffs must allege and prove two essential elements. First, plaintiffs must show that the alleged conduct occurred under color of State law. Second, plaintiffs must show that the conduct deprived plaintiffs of rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the United States Constitution or a Federal statute. In Monell v. Department of Social Services (1978), the United States Supreme Court held that a city is a person for purposes of Section 1983. However, a State is not a “person” for purposes of Section 1983. In addition, State officials sued in their official capacities for damages or other retroactive relief are not persons for purposes of Section 1983. However, the court noted that a plaintiff may sue a State official for injunctive relief because that is prospective relief. While a State official may not be sued in their official capacity, the United States Supreme Court has held that State officials and local officials may be sued in their “personal” capacity where the suit seeks to impose individual, personal liability on the government officer for actions taken under color of State law with the badge of State authority. A plaintiff who brings an action under Section 1983 for violation of rights secured by the Fourteenth Amendment must establish that the violation resulted from State action and, thus, meets the statutory requirement of under “color of State law.” Independent contractors and other individuals who willfully participate in a joint activity with a State or a local agency may meet the requirements of acting under color of State law. Under Section 1983, a plaintiff must show that the challenged acts occurred under a governmental policy, custom, or usage. In Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co. (1970), the United States Supreme Court held that custom, for purposes of Section 1983, must have the force of law by virtue of the persistent practices of State officials. A political subdivision of the State may have a custom with force of law, even if that custom is not applied statewide. Plaintiffs may bring an action under Section 1983 if their rights privileges or immunities secured by Federal statutory law were violated. In Maine v. Thiboutot (1980), the plaintiffs claimed that the State of Maine had deprived them of welfare benefits to which they were entitled under the Federal Social Security Act. The Supreme Court rejected Maine’s argument that the phrase secured by the Constitution and laws in Section 1983 was limited to civil rights or

Supreme Court Debates, a Pro & Con® Monthly | February 2010 (Vol. 13, No. 2) Prosecutorial Immunity

equal protection laws. The Supreme Court held that the Section 1983 broadly included violations of Federal statutory law as well as Federal constitutional law. Excerpted from the June 2003 Orange County Department of Education Report, Liability Under Section 1983. See http://www.ocde.k12.ca.us/downloads/legal/LIABILITY_SECT_1983.pdf. Accessed January 22, 2010. Lower Court Holding Decision of the Eighth Circuit U.S. Court of Appeals In 1978, Curtis W. McGhee, Jr. and Terry Harrington were convicted of murdering John Schweer, a retired police department captain who was working as a security guard. McGhee and Harrington were each sentenced to life imprisonment. In 2002, the Iowa Supreme Court reversed Harrington’s conviction and remanded for a new trial, finding the prosecutor committed a Brady v. Maryland (1963) violation by failing to disclose evidence of an alternative suspect. The current prosecutor, Matthew Wilber, concluded it would be impossible to retry Harrington and also agreed to move to vacate McGhee’s conviction. McGhee agreed to enter a plea to second- degree murder in exchange for a sentence of time served. With the agreements, McGhee was released. McGhee and Harrington both brought civil rights actions against Pottawattamie County, Iowa, and the former prosecutors and officers involved in the initial investigation and prosecution, arguing they used perjured and fabricated testimony and withheld evidence in violation of McGhee’s and Harrington’s constitutional rights. McGhee and Harrington also alleged Wilber defamed them. Defendants moved for summary judgment based on qualified and absolute immunity. The district court found some defendants were entitled to qualified immunity on certain claims and denied qualified immunity and absolute immunity on the remaining claims. Defendants Joseph Hrvol and David Richter filed a consolidated interlocutory appeal from the denial of qualified, absolute, and sovereign immunity, arguing the district court: (1) used an improper standard for determining probable cause in the absolute immunity analysis; (2) erred in waiving sovereign immunity for the prosecutors; and (3) erred in concluding McGhee and Harrington alleged a constitutional violation when the district court denied qualified immunity to Hrvol and Richter. We affirm in part and reverse in part. Sovereign Immunity Defendants assert the district court erred when it waived sovereign immunity for Hrvol, Richter, and Wilber, arguing they are shielded by the Iowa Tort Claims Act (ITCA) and/or the Iowa Municipal Tort Claims Act (IMTCA). Under the doctrine of sovereign immunity, a tort claim against a State employee, acting within the scope of his office or employment with the State, must be brought pursuant to the ITCA. The State of Iowa possesses sovereign immunity. As such, Iowa and its employees can only be sued to the extent Iowa expressly waives its immunity. The ITCA is a statutorily defined waiver of sovereign immunity allowing certain claims to be filed against Iowa that fit within the ITCA’s specified reach, and which do not fall within explicit exceptions where Iowa expressly retained its sovereign immunity.

or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission.

However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use.