world history

The Ionian Revolt

Author(s): H. T. Wallinga

Source: Mnemosyne , 1984, Fourth Series, Vol. 37, Fasc. 3/4 (1984), pp. 401-437

Published by: Brill

Stable URL: https://www.jstor.org/stable/4431359

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Mnemosyne, Vol. XXXVII, Fase. 3-4 (1984)

THE IONIAN REVOLT ?

BY

H. T. WALLINGA

1. Introduction.

The importance of the Ionian revolt as a stage in the develop- ment of the relations between Persia and the Greek world is

generally recognized in modern studies of these relations and of the history of the Greeks. The bibliography of the revolt is accordingly extensive, that of recent years in particular (Tozzi enumerates some 125 titles, more than half of which date from the years after 1945). The lack of a full monograph, up to 1978 at least, is in that light rather curious: Tozzi's book is very welcome for that reason alone.

Interpretations of the revolt are very divergent, both with regard to its causes and with regard to the part played by the leading politi- cians. The reasons for this divergence are not far to seek: not only were the traditions concerning it recorded at a late moment, at least two generations after the event, but the recording took place in a situation which radically differed from that obtaining at the mo- ment the revolt broke out. In the meantime the Ionians and the

other Greeks in Asia Minor and those of the islands1) had been freed from the Persian domination. They owed their freedom not to their own exertions, but to the failure of the Persian attempt of 480/79 to conquer continental Greece (if indeed that had been the Persian objective), and this failure was entirely due to the continen- tal Greeks themselves. In so far as the Ionians had contributed

* Apropos of P. Tozzi, La rivolta ionica (Biblioteca di studi antichi, 15). Pisa, Giardini, 1978. 261 p. Anonymous quotations are all from Herodotos. For abbreviations of Greek authors' names I have followed Liddell-Scott-Stuart Jones. All dates are B.C. Modern literature is quoted by author's name and page: for titles see the bibliography at the end of the article.

1) Henceforth I shall speak of Ionians, meaning all these Greek subjects of Persia.

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402 THE IONIAN REVOLT

anything in 480, it had been?with few exceptions?on the Persian side (VIII 85, 1). No wonder therefore that Herodotos' spokesmen disapproved of the Ionians, considered their resistance to Cyrus futile, scorned the motives of their revolt, disparaged their achievements and felt contempt for their leaders; no wonder either that they viewed the revolt in the first place as the cause of the disasters (a??? ?a???: V 97, 3) Xerxes' expeditions brought over the European Greeks.

In view of the contrast between the success of the latter and the

failure of the Ionians, and in view of the power constellation of the middle of the fifth century, to which the Ionians owed their precarious freedom, it is understandable that in their account of the revolt Herodotus' spokesmen and Herodotus himself gave so much room to the Ionian efforts to enlist the services of Sparta and Athens and to the recent history of these poleis. Indeed, the situation of the later fifth century and especially the principal part played by Athens in the repulsion of the Persians could not but suggest that the Ionians on their own did not stand a chance and that their revolt

for that reason was an irresponsible adventure. Hence too the strong and somewhat self-excusing emphasis on the part of Aristagoras and Histiaios, which was represented as being decisive.

This emphasis continues in modern studies of the revolt, of which Tozzi's book is the culmination: the ancient evaluation of the

chances of the revolt is accepted and as a consequence hardly any notice is given to the problem of the relative power of the Asiatic Greeks and the Persians at the moment of the revolt, notwithstand- ing the utter implausibility of the current view of this matter.

2. Persian sea-power: an auxiliary system?

This current view is that in 500 at the start of the Naxian expedi- tion very considerable naval forces were in the hands of the Ionians. They possessed at least 200 triremes (V 31, 4, cf. van Groningen's commentary and Macan's remark on V 32) and put them at the disposal of the Persian satrap. This strength is considerable indeed: it is comparable to the largest Delian league fleet commanded by the Athenians (200 triremes: Meiggs, 77) and much larger than the peace-time patrols of 60 ships at most, with which Athens

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THE IONIAN REVOLT 403

dominated the Aegean (the Asiatic littoral included) after 478 (Meiggs, 427). And 200 triremes was not the full Greek naval potential in 500: we must add the many long ships of the Naxians (V 30, 4); at least fifty ships of the Athenians (//. II 556 and Jacoby's note at FGH 328 F 8, ?. 7; cf. Hdt. VI 89); as many of the Aiginetans (they had seventy in the war with Athens during the eighties of the fifth century: VI 92, 1) and not much less of the Eretrians (cf. Burn, 199). The problem is why a potential which is comparable to the naval arm of the continental Greeks in 480 and was centred upon the coast of Asia Minor should have been com- patible with the full subjection of the coastal poleis and the islands. The situation assumed for them was very different from that of

the Roman socii navales in the third century. The Italians too had been subjected by a territorial power without being able to bring their sea-power into play. In their case this territorial power had temporarily used their navies as auxiliary forces (Thiel, 26 ff., 34 ff.), but, as Thiel has shown (66 ff.), it abandoned this 'auxiliary system' at the moment it embarked upon major naval operations in a war. For this momentous step the Romans had several reasons: the numerical weakness of the allied navies (even in aggregate: Thiel, 34 ff.), the lack of the type of warships required in a war with Carthage?quinqueremes?and the undesirability, political and psychological, of leaving an essential part of a great war to subjects (Thiel, 67-68). Diametrically opposed to this was the evolution in the Persian

sphere, if the modern consensus is to be believed: the Persians held fast to the auxiliary system in the conquest of Egypt and Samos, in the Skythian and Naxian expeditions, and even after the Ionian revolt left powerful navies in the hands of their maritime subjects without any visible consequences for their relations with these peoples.

From the point of view of the historian of the Ionian revolt this is the basic problem in the relationship between the Persians and all their maritime subjects. If really the Ionians had the disposal of a fleet of 200 triremes (or more2)) in 500, and who knows in 525 or even earlier, how did this very substantial naval power affect the

2) In 494 they had 353 (VI 8, 2).

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404 THE IONIAN REVOLT

position of its possessors in the Persian empire? The same question can be asked concerning all the maritime subjects of that empire, the Phoenicians in the first place. One would expect some preferen- tial treatment: immunity from tribute or from non-naval service, or an otherwise privileged or semi-privileged status among the sub- jects as a whole. But of this there is no trace in Herodotus' sum- ming up of the imperial organization (III 90 ff.) and no one as far as I know has ever found such trace elsewhere. Yet it is strange that this basic problem has never been squarely faced and perhaps never been clearly envisaged: like everyone else Tozzi does not seem to be aware of any difficulty, as appears from his remarks on the dependence of the Persians on the Greek fleet (sic\ 126-7). It is strange especially, because enough indications have been preserved that the current consensus does not adequately reflect the historical realities.

3. Counterindications: a royal Persian navy.

There is, to begin with, the tradition that at the beginning of the Naxian affair all the military effectives were in the hands of the Per- sian satrap (V 30, 5) and that at the start of the hostilities in Cyprus the Cyprians did not have the disposal of ships (V 109, 2); there is the anomalous position in 500 of Miletos, which is said to be at the culmination of its prosperity (V 28), but was not able on its own to help the Naxians (V 30, 4), and even does not in this context seem to have a navy of its own. All these passages appear to imply that in 500 there was no question of an auxiliary system, and that the fleet made ready by Artaphrenes (V 32: pa?es?e??sat? ??? d????s?a? t????ea?) consisted of Persian ships, manned by subjects (Myndians among others: V 33, 2).

That this was the case in 480 is explicitly stated by Diodoros: ??e? d? at s??pasa? ?a??a? p?e???? t?? ?????? ?a? d?a??s???, ?a? t??t?? ??????de? t??a??s?a? ?a? e???s?, ta ??? p?????ata t?? a?d??? pa?e- ??????? t?? ???????, ta d? s??f? t?? ?as????? ????????t?? (D.S. XI 3, 7). This testimony would perhaps have little weight in isolation3), but in combination with Herodotos' indications it is

3) But it is well to remember that Ephoros, whom Diodoros is here following (cf. Schwartz, 59 f.), was considered by no less a critic than Polybios 'to have had

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THE IONIAN REVOLT 405

almost decisive, and is again corroborated by Herodotos himself, when he says that in 546 the Aegean islands were not in danger of subjection 'because the Phoenicians were not yet subject to Persia and the Persians were not yet sailors' (I 143, 1: ??te a?t?? ?? ???sa? ?a???ta?4)). In other words: what jeopardized the safety of the islanders was the creation o?a Persian navy manned by Phoenicians. Such an organization is also implied in the terms used by Ephoros for the Persian fleet at Eurymedon: t?? ?as?????? ?e?? (Plu. Cim. XII 5); and, in an interesting variant, for the fleet vanquished by Kimon in the Cyprian waters: F????ss?? ?e?? ?a? ????ss?? ?as?????? st???? (Plu. Cim. XVIII 5; cf. Nepos Milt. VII 4: classis regia). This organization appears to be entirely analogous to that of the Roman navy after 260. The auxiliary system of the modern consensus has of course been

suggested by Herodotos' use of such terms as pa???e??/-??es?a? ??a?, misleading terms indeed in view of the conclusion just arrived at. This usage therefore must be explained if that conclusion is to stand, and it can be explained. From Herodotos' description of Xerxes' armada at Doriskos it is clear that in the mobilization of

that fleet, if not indeed in its very organization, territorial divisions?squadrons Phoenician, Egyptian, Cyprian, Kilikian etc.?were fundamental (VII 89 ff.). That is to say that the various territories must have had a clear perception of the naval units for which they were expected to supply the crews, even to the point of the people referring to the ships and squadrons they supplied instead of to the crews they supplied. Such changes of expression are especially to be expected in the regions where people approved of the Persian naval policies?Phoenicia could be an instance5)?and where people in consequence were proud of * their' squadrons. In the Aegean area, moreover, where in Herodotos' times the larger members of the Delian league contributed their own ships to the league navy, contemporary usage may anachronistically have crept into the wording of traditions concerning the Persian navy. Samos

a certain notion about things naval' (XII 25fl). This niggardly praise could well be deserved. Ephoros will have picked up his notions in studying Kymaian oral tradition (for such oral tradition cf. Jacoby, 186; cf. below n. 10 and p. 417).

4) ?a???t?? is never used with the sense of * marine' (ep???t??)! 5) Cf. VI 6: t?? d? ?a?t???? F?????e? ??? ?sa? p??????tat?? ...

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406 THE IONIAN REVOLT

is one of the places where this could have happened: Herodotos may well have picked up the phrase there. Expressions like 'the Phoenician navy' (t? F??????? ?a?t???: Th. I 16), are not therefore in themselves sufficient foundation for the theory that Persian sea- power was based on an auxiliary system, and since there are no other data on which to base this theory, it must be abandoned in its entirety. In view of the indications I have enumerated for a dif- ferent organisation of Persian sea-power, the conclusion is in- escapable that the Persians had their own navy, organized like the Roman navy after 260.

4. The Persians and their navy.

Like the Romans the Persians appear to have created their own navy at the moment they had to wage a war in which their oppo- nent was a sea-power. Just as Thiel has assumed that the Romans in 260 'could not continue to transfer to their allies a task which had

... become essential' (Thiel, 68), we may surmise that the Persians, who never had made comparable demands upon their 'allies'6), could not begin demanding them to take upon themselves the naval war against Egypt in 525. The situation of 525 is indeed similar to that of 260 in more respects. This is a subject with which I cannot adequately deal in this context. Suffice it to say that there is no evidence that the poleis in the Persian empire?Phoenician or Greek?ever possessed navies which came up to the requirements, however modest, of their imperial master. The Greek navies of the sixth century were mainly composed of merchant galleys (Thukydides' p???a ?a???: I 14, 1 al.) which were available to the state for short periods only: such fleets?Phoenician as well as Greek?were unserviceable in the long-term policies of a big power. That is to say that in this respect the navies of the Persian subjects were in the same category as those of the Roman 'allies'7).

Moreover, just as one reason for the Romans to build their own navy had been the fact that the Carthaginians possessed quin- queremes, a type of ship not to be found in the allied navies (Thiel, 1954, 37, 68), so the Persians in 525 were confronted with powers

6) For the term 'allies' see below p. 417. 7) On the strength of the latter cf. Thiel, 34 ff. and 63-4.

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THE IONIAN REVOLT 407

possessing triremes (III 4, 2 and 44, 2), then a new type of ship (Davison, 23-4), which we must assume not to have been present in Greek and Phoenician navies except in very small numbers (Th. I 14, 1). The fleets of triremes later present in the Greek world must be seen as a consequence of the Persian threat, if not primarily as an answer to the Athenian naval armament launched in 483 by Themistokles, itself at least partially a reaction to the Persian menace (Th. I 14, 3; Plu. Them. IV 2)8). If the preceding argument is accepted, our conception of the Per-

sian domination of the Ionians and the other coastal peoples must be radically changed, the creation of the royal Persian navy (?as?????? st????) and all it entailed becoming an event of crucial significance. This and the elimination of the rival sea-powers of Egypt and Samos revolutionized the position of all the coastal sub- jects of the empire. In the Greek part of the empire recollection of this change was

indistinct. This curious fact must be explained as the consequence of the greater ?clat of more spectacular happenings, among others Darius' usurpation and his reorganization of the Persian empire and in particular the total disappearance of the Persian navy from the Aegean after 479. Nevertheless we have some clues, unmis- takable ones in my view.

5. The Persian navy and the tribute: Kambyses.

The first of these clues is to be found in the tradition that the

tributary system as instituted by Cyrus had been applied in a very harsh way by Kambyses (III 89). This tradition can be most readily explained by connecting it with the creation of the Persian navy by the second Achaimenid king.

That Kambyses was the creator of this navy is implied in another tradition, preserved by Herodotos (III 34,4), that the Persians had once judged Kambyses 'better than his father, because he had kept all Cyrus' possessions and acquired Egypt and the command of the sea\ This appreciation must have been widespread, or deeply felt by those who shared it, to survive the crystallizing of Kambyses'

8) I shall argue this thesis in a study devoted to the development of Greek ships and sea-power in the seventh and sixth centuries B.C.

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408 THE IONIAN REVOLT

later reputation of a tyrannical madman, but if the Persian navy really was a national, or royal, navy, it was fully justified. (Paren- thetically I remark that this tradition is another indication that Per- sian sea-power was not based on an auxiliary system; if it had been, Kambyses could not be said to have acquired the command over the sea: Cyrus would have had it already!) In combination these traditions suggest that Kambyses' Egyp-

tian expedition?his one great undertaking?put a very high strain on the financial strength of the empire. It could hardly be other- wise. The creation of a fleet of triremes, the building of which was itself a costly operation, involved far more than the mere building of the ships. At the very least holkoi must have been constructed (such as Necho's, which were permanent enough for Herodotos to see after a century and a half: II 159,1), but other installations, like gear-stores and defensive works, were indispensable too9). Regular naval bases must have been established from the beginning, such as Kyme appears to have become at a later stage of the development of the Persian navy10). Investments in ships and installations will have been heavy and

difficult to realize, especially if they had to be made in haste, as I believe was the case11), and on the basis of the existing tributary system (III 89,3): materials and skilled labour cannot have been in- cluded in the 'gifts' imposed by Cyrus and left unchanged by Kam- byses. So they had to be bought (hired), or requisitioned and then deducted from future 'gifts'. Since, moreover, shipbuilding materials and skilled labour were available in certain regions only,

9) Cf. the naval constructions undertaken by Thebes (D.S. XV 79, 1) and those begun by Alexander in Babylon: a naval harbour and ship-sheds (Aristoboulos FGH 139F55 = Arr. Anab. VII 19, 4). 10) Kyme was the basis of Xerxes' armada in 480 (D.S. XI 2, 3): after Salamis

the fleet returned there (VIII 130, 1 and D.S. XI 27, 1). It had a Persian governor (?pa????) who in 480 commanded a flotilla of 15 ships (VII 194, 1). Similar ?pa?- ??? are perhaps to be found in Sestos and Doriskos (VII 33 and 105): both places may well have been naval bases just as Myous (V 36, 4), Abdera (VI 48, 1), Aleion pedion (VI 95, 1 cf. Strabo's pa?a?? ?e???a: XIV 5, 10C672) and Aspendos (Th. Vili 81, 3al.). 11) For this view and for the creation of the Persian navy generally cf. H. T.

Wallinga, The Ancient Persian Navy and its Predecessors, sect. 4, which is to appear in H. Sancisi and I. Hendriks (eds.), The AchaemenidEmpire, Pubi. Inst. N?erl. Stam- boul 1984.

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THE IONIAN REVOLT 409

especially Phoenicia (III 19,3) and the adjacent areas such as Kilikia, this immediately raised the problem of the equitable appor- tionment of the resulting burdens: the coastal districts could not bear them on their own, probably were not even able to advance significantly (and because they would have to man the future fleet, overburdening them would be very bad policy!). For these reasons other parts of the empire had to contribute, and this necessarily led to changes in the tributary system: part of the traditional 'gifts' somehow had to be converted into naval materials and provisions (and/or wages) for the ship-builders, a conversion which must have been very difficult. No wonder that Kambyses' 'fiscal' reputation suffered.

6. The Persian navy and the tribute: Darius' reform.

If Herodotos' account of Darius' tribute reform is taken to the

letter, Kambyses did not take the obvious step of monetizing the tribute: this step is specifically ascribed to Darius (III 89). Never- theless one must consider it possible that the process of monetizing the tribute was started by Kambyses in the sense that a beginning was made with monetizing the accounting of the gifts: that is to say that the system was monetized, even if the tribute itself continued to consist in gifts. In my view this is clearly suggested by Herodotos in his account of Kambyses' subjection of the Libyans and the Greeks of Kyrene and Barke. These peoples were imposed aphoros and then sent gifts which, if Herodotos is to be believed^ were rated in terms of money (III 13, 3-4). Even if this rating is considered unhistorical, the combination of phoros and gifts in this tradition is striking, because the former is so emphatically presented as the novel element in Darius' reformed tribute system (III 89: ?p? ?a? ????? ?????t?? ?a? a?t?? ?a???se? ?? ?a?est???? ??de? f???? p???, ???a d??a ????e??).

In her fascinating study of the system of gifts, Sancisi has em- phasized two aspects of the system: the obligatory, not to say com- pulsory, character of the 'gifts', the quality they share with taxes; and on the other hand the social value which was attached to the

things given (145). With such a system it was possible for the king to press upon his subjects in order to increase the gross yield of the

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410 THE IONIAN REVOLT

tribute, but very difficult to change the nature of what was actually contributed, in particular to replace tribute in kind (gifts) by tribute in money: the social value of the gift would be lost in the replacement.

Gearing the tribute system to large-scale naval expenditure was bound, therefore, to lead to wide-spread unrest, if not downright resistance. Of such unrest we have a clear indication in the inscrip- tion of Behistan: '... Kambyses went to Egypt ... after that the peo- ple became evil. After that the Lie waxed great in the country, both in Persia and in Media and in the other provinces' (DB 1.32-35)12).

This unrest is explained by Dandamayev as a consequence of the bad working of the tribute system: 'Dieses System war ungeregelt und f?hrte in der Praxis zu ?berm?ssig hohen Abgaben ohne R?cksicht auf die wirtschaftlichen M?glichkeiten der dem per- sischen Reich angeh?rigen L?nder' (1976, 135). Dandamayev's only evidence for this statement is the exemption from military ser- vice and tribute decreed by the rebel Gaumata (III 67, 3) but, without specific clues for * ?berm?ssig hohen Abgaben', his case, although attractive enough in itself, is not strong, for Gaumata's act of grace can of course be explained in a different way: a rebel (or pretender) must try to win adherents. But the extremely long term for which the exemption was given?three years! ?p' etea t??a?must signify that Dandamayev is in the right in principle, that the unrest which followed Kambyses' departure for Egypt was the effect of his fiscal measures and that these measures were felt

as extortionate. In my opinion the large-scale naval construction to which I have concluded is a sufficient, and sufficiently specific, reason for Dandamayev's c?berm?ssig hohe Abgaben' to clinch the matter.

How serious this fiscal crisis was, is again indicated in the tradi- tion concerning Darius' reorganization of the tribute system. Whereas, as we saw, Kambyses in this context is called a despot, Darius is called a huckster (??p????: III 89,3). This curious title is explained by Olmstead (185) as a name of honour, given in recognition of Darius' great gifts as a financier, but in view of the semantic value of the Greek word, which certainly does not have the

12) Translation by R. G. Kent, Old Persian (1950), 119.

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THE IONIAN REVOLT 411

sense of 'great financier' this is extremely improbable. As Finley has argued with great force, the ??p???? was 'usually a local trader', 'commonly a retailer, perhaps usually so' and the verb ?ap??e?e?? employed 'to express the concept "trade" in its widest sense' though less often than e?p??e???a? and its derivatives13). When, therefore, Herodotos avers that Darius acted like a ??p???? in all (fiscal) matters (??ap??e?e p??ta ta p????ata), this must signify that Darius determined the amount of the tribute like a trader 'makes' a price, that is by bargaining with the subject peoples, more precisely?and in accordance with the local nature of the ??p?????with the local authorities. This unusual behaviour is again to be explained as a consequence of the severe difficulties caused by Kambyses' naval expenditure: the subjects had to be handled with kid gloves.

7. The tribute and the Ionian cities.

The tradition regarding Darius' reform is not especially con- cerned with its impact on the Ionian cities and certainly does not ascribe any special significance to these cities in this context. Still this special significance is undeniable and for that reason we must assume that Darius' reform had far-reaching consequences for these cities.

In the reformed system all the tribute was assessed in money, i.e. the system was monetized. That, however, does not mean that the tribute was actually paid in coin, although this is asserted in a re- cent description of the system: 'Alle Satrapien waren verpflichtet den ... Steuerbetrag in Geld abzuliefern'; because of this satrapies which did not have the disposal of silver mines had to procure the silver they had to pay 'indem sie ihre ... Erzeugnisse verkauften. Dies forderte die Entwicklung der Geldwirtschaft' (Dandamayev, 1972, 43). But the same author recognizes that the coinage created in connection with this reform by Darius was not in general use out- side Asia Minor (cf. Picard, 72), not even in fourth-century Phoenicia; that in the countries not bordering on the Mediterra- nean, including Babylon, coined money was hardly used at all

13) Finley 1935, esp. 334 ff.

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412 THE IONIAN REVOLT

before Alexander, and that the prominent coin of the realm during the sixth and fifth centuries was Greek (1972, 46). These facts militate against the notion that Darius' reform resulted in a degree of monetization such as has been postulated?and brilliantly substantiated?for the Roman empire by Hopkins, and must be assumed for the Delian league as well (Humphreys, 169 ff.). My conclusion would be that Herodotos' description of Darius' monetized tribute must be taken to mean that the accounting of the tribute was monetized?that is that the system applied by Kam- byses to his newly-conquered provinces (above, p. 409) was generalized?and that for many provinces this made no difference when the actual payment of the tribute was concerned. This is in- deed recognized by Dandamayev: 'Das System der Geschenke wurde zwar beibehalten. ... Auch bei den Geschenken setzte man

einen bestimmten Betrag fest. Sie wurden aber im Gegensatz zu den Steuern in Naturalien abgeliefert.' (1972, 43). But unlike Dan- damayev I would not restrict this practice to the frontier peoples (Kolchians, Aithiopians, Arabs, etc.). I would assume that except for the coastal areas the subject peoples did not pay in money, but continued to pay 'in Naturalien', that is in gifts. Among these gifts bullion will have become much more important under Darius and his successors as compared to Cyrus and Kambyses, but I doubt whether we can say with Picard 'que dans la majeure partie de l'Empire, le tribut est pay? en m?tal non monnay?' (72). I would indeed accept as substantially correct the short description of the system by Polykleitos of Larisa: '<the Persian kings > exacted silver from the people of the sea-board, and from the people in the interior such things as each country produced, so that they also received dyes, drugs, hair or wool, or something else of the kind, besides cattle' (FGH 128F3a = Str. XV 3, 21 C 735). If really bullion had been the rule, Polykleitos' distinction between the coastal districts and the rest of the empire would be groundless14).

14) Jacoby's comment on FGH 128F3a, that Polykleitos did not speak of the old tribute system of Darius I, 'sondern gab genaueres ?ber die naturalliefer- ungen, die die provinzen pa??? t?? f???? f?r den k?niglichen hofhalt zu liefern hat- ten' is wide off the mark, because it implies that the silver of the coastal districts was also pa??? t?? f????! Ed. Meyer's remark (82 ?. 1) that Polykleitos (whom he calls Polyklet) 'macht mit Unrecht einen fundamentalen Unterschied zwischen den westlichen Provinzen und dem Binnenland' begs the question.

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THE IONIAN REVOLT 413

The conclusion must be that full monetization of the tribute15) was restricted to the coastal districts and even predominantly to Asia Minor, where indeed the use of coinage originated and even Cyrus' gifts will have consisted of minted metal at least in part.

8. The Ionian cities and Darius' reform.

Because of the vital importance of the navy in the grand strategy of the Persian empire?a subject I hope to treat elsewhere (cf. ?. 11)?and that of the tribute in money for the maintenance of the Persian navy, the Ionian cities must have become key-places both in the strategy and in the tribute system. For this assertion there is no direct evidence, but it seems to me that it is confirmed by a striking synchronism. Darius' reform is dated to 518 and the following years16), that is to the time immediately after the quenching of the rebellions, very plausibly so because difficulties over the tribute had endangered the whole empire. In the same space of time the Per- sians conquered Samos (III 139-150). The synchronism is not very exact, for Herodotos' account of the first years of Darius' reign leaves much to be desired17), but there is no reason to doubt that the conquest of Samos was among the first 'peace-time' measures of the king. Its importance is accentuated by the appointment of one of the seven conspirators to the command of the expeditionary force (a fleet! ?a?t???? st??te??a: III 150, 1). In Herodotos' account this operation moreover is coupled with another undertaking, the scouting-expedition in the Mediterranean of fifteen Persian grandee's under the guidance of the Krotoniate doctor Demokedes (III 135-138). Both expeditions are to be considered as the outcome of one strategic concept18) which aimed at the establishment in the Aegean area of the Persian navy: the elimination of the naval potential of Samos was a necessary condition for this; the scouting-

15) I.e. including the monetization of the actual payments. 16) Dandamayev 1972, 45; Picard, 67 f. 17) This has been made abundantly clear by von Fritz, 320 ff. and 388 ff. 18) This strategic concept also included the Indian ocean, where Skylax of

Karyanda was sent on a mission which must have been similar to that of Demokedes* companions. This strategic concept was revived by Alexander (cf. Berve, 168). I have no doubt that the Phoenicians who sailed round Africa by order of Necho (IV 42, 2) primarily had the task to ascertain whether Necho's position in the Red Sea was threatened by a sea-power south of it.

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414 THE IONIAN REVOLT

expedition will have served to assess the aggregate naval power of the Greek poleis, an assessment on which the Persians' own arma- ment would be based.

9. The changed position of the coastal subjects.

There can be no doubt that the establishment in the Aegean area of Persian sea-power led to a profound change in the relationship between the Persians and the coastal subjects there, as it must have done c. 525 in the Phoenician area. Herodotos' spokesmen had no direct information on this change. Nevertheless Herodotos has preserved a few precious indications, all relating to Miletos and its position in the empire, which appears to have changed very radically.

When Cyrus had conquered Lydia, he concluded a treaty with Miletos alone among the Ionian cities on the same conditions as Croesus had done (I 141, 4 cf. 143, 1). The other Ionians and the Aiolians became tributary as under Croesus and now had to serve in war as well (I 171, 1 cf. II 1; III 1, 1 and 31, 1). Accordingly when Darius started his Skythian expedition, he gave them (and the Hellespontines) orders to make ready 600 ships (IV 83, 1 ; 87, 1 and 89, 1), with which they accompanied the land-forces and bridged the Danube.

Now the curious thing is that the Milesians not only participated in this armada, but that they did so on the same footing as the other Greeks. This is apparent not only from the fact that Herodotos nowhere distinguishes their contribution as more voluntary than that of others, but their equal standing is emphasized in the argu- ment with which their tyrant, Histiaios, is said to have dissuaded his fellow-tyrants from following the advice, ascribed to Miltiades, to break up the bridge of boats over the Danube and so to leave Darius and his army at the mercy of the Skythians: to do so would be to jeopardize their own position, that of Histiaios himself includ- ed, all of them being creatures of the king (IV 137, 2). Here there is no question of any privileged position of Miletos, just as in the tradition concerning the abortive Persian attack on Naxos the Mile- sian contingent merges in the Ionian forces (V 33, 1). The con- tradiction between this tradition and that concerning Miletos'

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THE IONIAN REVOLT 415

privileged position clearly escaped the notice of Herodotos' spokesmen, but this is understandable if that position had been lost as the automatic consequence of the shift in relative power brought about by the establishment of the Persian navy in the Aegean area. There can be no doubt that this shift was dramatic, because the sea- power of Greek poleis, Miletos included, was no match for this new fleet of triremes (cf. above, p. 406). Whether this led to formal changes in Miletos' status, and particularly whether Miletos became tributary like the other poleis, must remain uncertain. Naval service was in any case a new obligation for all the subjects and may have been imposed on Miletos without existing privileges being affected, at least in as far as they were compatible with the new situation. It would have been bad policy to impose the new burden in a high-handed fashion, without considering the interests of the subjects and sparing their sensibilities. Even if the new navy made the Persian position vis-?-vis the coastal subjects much stronger, the fact that the subjects would have to man the ships compelled the Persians to treat them very cautiously. There will have been several elements in the new situation which demanded

such caution.

10. Implications of naval conscription.

For one thing the new burden of naval service devolved upon a class of citizens which up to this moment had hardly, and perhaps not at all, been liable to military service19). This must have had consequences of considerable import, not only socially, but also financially. The Ionian 'thetes', who like their Athenian counter- parts of later years, must have been lacklands for the most part, had to be compensated for lack of income when serving, either by their polis or by the Persian authorities. If the Persian navy, like its

19) Cf. Busolt GS, 571, who assumes that the poorer citizens served in pa?d??e? mobilizations only and as 'irregul?res, leichtbewaffnetes Volk'. There is, however, very little early evidence: Busolt quotes Tyrtaios (XI, 35 = XII 35 West) only, and that such pa?d??e? mobilizations were very exceptional is more than probable in my view (cf. Vidal-Naquet's reminder that in 490 'En pr?sence d'un danger formidable, mena?ant l'existence m?me de la cit?, la jeune d?mocratie ath?nienne n'a donc "mobilis?" que moins du tiers des effectifs disponibles: le gaspillage a quelque chose d'effarant': 170). I assume that in this respect the Io- nian poleis were similar to Athens.

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416 THE IONIAN REVOLT

Delian counterpart, kept up peace-time patrols, this resulted in a regular budget-item of considerable magnitude20). Since moreover, the rowers of the triremes all had to be trained oarsmen (SSA W 104), most of them will have been professional sailors: drafting a large number of them into the Persian navy would be injurious to the trade of the Greek and Phoenician cities, and in the case of large fleets being mobilized for long periods, as for the Skythian expedi- tion, not to speak of the campaign of 480, could be very injurious indeed. Arrangements must for this reason have been made be- tween the poleis and the Persian authorities concerning the number of citizens which could be called up and the time they could be made to serve.

11. Arrangements concerning conscription.

Direct evidence for such arrangements has been preserved in traditions concerning the operations of the Persian navy in 480 and 479. Diodoros asserts that when Xerxes had put to death a number of Phoenician commanders, held responsible for the defeat in the battle of Salamis, the Phoenicians in fright set sail for Asia (XI 19,4 cf. 27,1); and Herodotos states that the Persian commanders at Mykale sent home the Phoenician contingent in their fleet when they had decided not to risk a sea-battle (IX 96, 2). In my opinion both these traditions are credible, if not equally. The second has been generally accepted as historical, the first equally generally rejected21). I would indeed consider the second beyond all doubt; there must have been hundreds of Ionian eye-witnesses of the event. As to the first tradition I would draw a distinction between

three elements in it: 1. the absence of the Phoenician fleet from the

winter-quarters in Kyme (D.S. XI 27,1); 2. the departure of the fleet for Phoenicia immediately after the battle of Salamis (Id., XI 19,4) and 3. the immediate cause for this departure alleged by Diodoros (ibid.). The first of these elements seems to deserve credit, even if it is absent from Herodotos' account: Herodotos had

20) For the peace-time patrols of the Delian league cf. Meiggs, Endnote 13, p. 427.

21) Busolt GG, 708 n. 2; Meyer, 392; Bury-Meiggs, 185; Hignett, 246. I have not aspired to completeness.

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THE IONIAN REVOLT 417

no particular reason to go beyond the affirmation that the (whole) Persian fleet wintered in Kyme (VIII 130, 1). The absence of the Phoenicians was of course remembered locally and, like other details supplemented by Ephoros, entirely credibly so (cf. ?. 3). That the Phoenicians had gone home may be no more than a con- clusion of the same Ephoros, and could then be based on lack of in- formation about this squadron, but more likely is another genuine tradition preserved in Kyme. The third element may be partly true: the Phoenicians may have taken fright as a consequence of execu- tions; but that the principal squadron of the whole fleet should have been able to desert in such a situation is very improbable. In view of what happened at Mykale it seems probable that the Phoenicians could claim to be sent home as soon as the operations had ended and that this was also the reason why they departed after the battle of Salamis.

Some such arrangement must have been made between the Per- sian authorities and the trading-towns of Ionia and Phoenicia to enable the former to mobilize large numbers of sailor-citizens of the latter without bringing ruin over them. Other indications for the prudence with which the Persians treated their subjects and took care of their interests are more indirect, but as unmistakable.

12. Compensations for naval service.

In his account of the Naxian affair Herodotos says that, when Darius had attached his fiat to the undertaking, Artaphrenes made ready 200 triremes and a very large force of Persian and allied per- sonnel (V 32: p????? d? ???ta ?????? ?e?s??? te ?a? t?? ????? s???????). Here the term 'allies' (s???????) is very striking, for of course no allies took part in the expedition, only subjects (apart from the Persians). The term must remind of the Latin analogy "socii", both being euphemisms used by rulers who were anxious to spare the sensibilities of subjects whom they needed as soldiers or rowers. But the Persians in my opinion went further than this and actually promoted their subjects' interests, as, incidentally, did the Romans22). Comparing the Skythian expeditions of Darius and Philip of Maced?n, Momigliano long ago concluded that Darius'

22) Witness the Illyrian wars: cf. Thiel, 344 f.

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418 THE IONIAN REVOLT

expedition was very much in the interest of the Ionians and Hellespontines who participated in it. According to this view the Greeks of Asia Minor attached great importance to the incorpora- tion of their colonies in Thrace and Skythia in the Persian empire: this would strengthen the bonds between colonies and mother cities and intensify the commercial relations between them, the more so as Thracian and Skythian interference23) would be discouraged. With this view I am in wholehearted agreement. It is reasonable to assume that this interest on the part of their subjects influenced the decision-making of the Persians, perhaps to a high degree. Tozzi is quite right in remarking (126) that it is difficult to find a 'Persian' reason for the expedition. If my thesis that after the creation of the Persian navy and Darius' reform of the tribute system the Ionian cities because of their coinage must have become cardinal factors in relation to both is on the right lines, it is arguable that one impor- tant objective of the Skythian (really Thracian)24) expedition was the conquest of the mines of the Pangaios region. Herodotos' tale of Histiaios' attempt to get control of this territory (V 11, 2) is evidence of the Ionian interest. Here I would conjecture that col- onization of the region was part of the original Persian plan, not the afterthought of the cunning Histiaios. However, it is probable enough that Histiaios will have been an important consultant in the planning of the whole operation, if he was not the initiator. In view of the fact that during the Ionian revolt Aristagoras chose Myrkinos as his base, it is natural to assume that the Greek exploitation of the mines there had continued when Histiaios had been relegated to Susa (see below, p. 423). At any rate the rebellious Ionians had the disposal of miniing silver (cf. Tozzi, 81 ff), though that may have come from Attika25). The Ionian interest in controlling, or at least

23) A glaring picture of such interference is to be found in the decree of Olbia in honour of Protogenes, who had come to the city's rescue pa?a?e??????? Sa?taf????? t?? ?as????? ... ?a? apa?t???t?? ta d??a t?? pa??d??: Syll3.495 s. ??/??: note Dittenberger's commentary 'Dona quae ei danda erant quotiens prope Olbiam accedebat. Nam ius aliquod usu diuturno stabilitum significan articulus ta d??a indicat' (my italics). The usus diuturnus may well have reached back to the sixth century. 24) Momigliano, 501f., esp. 504 f. 25) The provenance of the silver in the Ionian coinage is a subject in very

urgent need of thorough investigation (cf. below, n. 45).

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THE IONIAN REVOLT 419

in participating in, the exploitation of the region must have become very keen when the Persian king claimed a sizable portion of the cities' coinage every year. And here the cities' interest evidently also was that of the king. The same community of interest may be assumed when the Per-

sian conquest of Samos is concerned. Samos had preyed on its neighbours' trade at least since the times of Croesus (I 70) and this preying had become much worse under Polykrates (III 39, 4)26). Miletos had concluded an alliance with Lesbos to put down the menace, but although Lesbos had mobilized all its ships (pa?st?at??)27), the allied effort came to nothing because Polykrates succeeded in preventing the joining of the allied forces and utterly defeated the Lesbians (III 39, 4). The absence of Persia from this tale of woe is evidence that it was not able to assert itself in the naval

sphere (it may of course have been behind the alliance of Miletos and Lesbos). That Polykrates finally had to be eliminated by way of treachery corroborates this: only when the Persian navy had entered in the Aegean area could Samos be crushed (above, p. 413). Just as in the case of the conquest of Thrace the Persian conquest of the island was very much in the interest of the neighbouring Io- nian cities: the vital trade-routes in the Aegean would henceforth be secure. For that reason the cities may have been prepared to take part in Otanes' expedition, but Herodotos' silence seems to imply that they did not and that in this case the ships were manned by Phoenicians. This will have been dictated by sound strategical con- siderations: Samos had to be eliminated before a Persian fleet based

on Ionia could be organized; and the unexpected appearance of the Eastern fleet in the Aegean waters would stifle all possible attempts at collaboration with Samos.

Less clear is the case in the Naxian affair. From Herodotos'

reports it is apparent that the Ionian tradition described the Naxos of the end of the sixth century as very prosperous (V 28), and possessing a strong army of 8000 hoplites and a fleet of many (mer- chant)28) galleys (V 30, 4): it was the central power of the Cyclades

26) Cf. Jeffery, 216. 27) Not a 'flotilla', as Jeffery would have it (216). 28) Above, p. 406.

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420 THE IONIAN REVOLT

(V 31, 2; cf. 30, 6). Its hegemony, as it existed in 500, must in my view be taken as succeeding to Polykrates' thalassocracy: if it had been contemporary with it, Polykrates' attempts to dominate 'the islands' (Hdt. Ill 39, 4; 122, 2; Th. I 13, 6) could not have failed to provoke Naxian reactions. Naxos must have profited by Polykrates' elimination. It may have used its many long ships, as Polykrates must have used his29) one hundred pentekontors, i.e. for piracy, but Herodotos' silence goes against this idea: therefore it is more probable that the Naxians primarily engaged in trade. In that case they will have been formidable rivals of the Ionians. Its sea- power, moreover, may well have been a threat to the Persian posi- tion, or at least on the way of becoming a threat through the introduction of a growing number of triremes (Th. I 14,1). This strategic aspect of the situation has been stressed by Burn,

who considers Naxos to have been a Spartan tool: on the basis of the thalassocracy-list (D.S. VII 11), which after the disappearance of Samian sea-power 'records a two-year thalassocracy (i.e. control of the central Aegean) by Sparta herself followed by 'a fifteen-year sea-power of Naxos' (173), Burn devises a Spartan masterplan to prevent Persia 'to engage in further raids like that which had won Samos' by means of a Naxian 'lordship of the Archipelagos, such as had been held in his time by Polykrates'. Such big-power politics, however, although not entirely inconceivable for the Spar- ta of this time (the reign of Kleomenes)30), have too little support in first-rate tradition to be readily acceptable. The use, moreover, of the thalassocracy-list to supplement and define Herodotos' report is methodically unsound, because in the part relevant to the second half of the sixth century the list may be (and in my view is) no more than the elaboration of the very meagre evidence preserved in Herodotos' narrative.

Nevertheless Burn may well be right in thinking that Naxian sea- power came into being in part as an answer to the establishment of

29) I emphasize that Polykrates' pentekontors were his, not the 'Samians': after his Machtergreifung 'e?t?t? d? pe?t????t????? e?at?? ... (Ill 39, 3). I suspect that Polykrates' naval program was heavily subsidized by his ally Amasis (cf. my study mentioned in n. 11).

30) For the Spartan policy of this period cf. Hendriks, 14, 44, 52, 55, 82; ch. 2, n. 3; ch. 5, n. 4.

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THE IONIAN REVOLT 421

the Persian navy in the Aegean waters. Whether its strength was attuned to that of its rival, so that it could be considered a direct threat to the Persian position, is another matter. Perhaps the democratic regime (V 30,1) may be taken as an indication that the Naxian navy was important enough for its crews to become politically influential, just as the Athenian thetes after 483. In any case there appears to be reason enough to assume that

both the Ionians and the Persians had cause to eliminate Naxos as

an independent sea-power in the Aegean. And this in fact is what Herodotos' spokesman told him. The later quarrel does not alter the initial consensus.

13. Benefits of collaboration: the real beneficiary.

If we assume that such undertakings as the conquest of Thrace and the Naxian campaign did not originate in Persian ambitions only, but had as much to do with the needs and desires of the sub- jects, this does not of course imply that the progress of the opera- tions and their outcome were equally to the liking of both partners. However much the Ionians may have favoured the strengthening of their bonds with the colonies in Thrace and Skythia, and ap- plauded the terrorizing of robbers preying on their trade, they may have violently objected to the way in which the Persians con- solidated their position. Making Thrace into a satrapy (or whatever its precise administrative status was) may not at all have been what they desired (as Momigliano has said, Darius may have had himself more to heart than the Ionians: 508). They surely will have prefer- red the vassalizing of the Thracian rulers with whom they no doubt had relations already: in particular they will have dreaded the con- sequences for their trade of the imposition of tribute. Disagreement (or at any rate dissatisfaction) on this score may well have led to violent reactions, even rebellion, as indeed broke out at the end of the 'Skythian' expedition. To me this seems to be a more convinc- ing explanation of the rebellion of the cities on the Propontis than disappointment in the result of the expedition. If the expedition was intended to open Skythia to Greek traders (Momigliano, 508), its failure could not have been immediately evident (although suspi- cions could have been prompt). But if the Greeks had wished to

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422 THE IONIAN REVOLT

have an entirely free hand in their dealings with the Thracians and now found that they would have to put up with a Persian governor who might well interfere with their business, they will have deeply regretted their collaboration, which they may have considered more voluntary than the Persians. This applies to the Hellespontine cities in particular: for them the Skythian expedition will have been their first confrontation with Persian sea-power. Until that moment they will have enjoyed relative independence, as the Ionians (the islanders and Miletos in particular) had enjoyed before the con- quest of Samos31). For the Hellespontines the intensification of Per- sian control through the establishment of the navy will have been doubly agonizing, when it transpired to them that the new oppor- tunities in the Black Sea area would also be less unrestrained than

they had expected. And their reaction will have been the more im- moderate, if they had been under the illusion that their contribu- tion to the expedition was that of allies, not of subjects. Given a high degree of disillusionment on this score, even the slightest doubt concerning the success of the expedition as a whole could cause an explosion, even if such doubt was unfounded32).

The rebellion of the Hellespontines was not joined by the Io- nians. As Momigliano has rightly remarked, Darius' prompt measures are sufficient explanation of that: the Ionians' aloofness cannot be taken to mean that they were satisfied with the result of the expedition, for the discontent which led to the Ionian revolt will in part have been caused by the failure of the Skythian expedition (508/9). This is no doubt true. In Miletos, moreover, the loss of control, even if it was not total (cf. above, p. 418), of the Pangaios area will have caused great disappointment, not only to Histiaios himself. This is a point which merits closer examination.

Herodotos tells us that Histiaios obtained Myrkinos to found a polis there (V 11, 2). When shortly afterwards the Persian general

31) Very probably the Skythian expedition marks the completion of the Aegean fleet of the Persian navy. The organization ofthat fleet?and the whole infrastruc- ture going with it?will anyhow have taken several years to accomplish. The Skythian expedition will therefore have sealed the end of that relative in- dependence for both the islanders and the Hellespontines.

32) The tradition must be based?at least in part?on the propaganda generated by the Hellespontine and Ionian revolts.

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THE IONIAN REVOLT 423

Megabazos, who was charged with organizing the new conquests in Thrace (V 10; 12, 1), became aware of the strategical resources of the region?in particular its wealth of timber for shipbuilding?and found a multitude of settlers, Greek and non-Greek, ready to follow a leader, he immediately and forcibly expressed his dissatisfaction with the king's arrangement (V 23, 2). And indeed the king realiz- ed his mistake and kicked Histiaios upstairs (V 24 and 25, 1), perhaps without undoing what the man had accomplished (cf. above, p. 418)33), but making sure that the area was under control of his governor. I would assume that what was evident to Megabazos had not

been missed by Histiaios, and that this was at least part of his reason to ask for the gift of Myrkinos (or to accept the king's order to organize the exploitation of the mines: cf. above, p. 418). I hard- ly doubt that Histiaios' ulterior motive was to strengthen Miletos' position vis-?-vis the Persians. The relative independence which Miletos had lost as a consequence of the establishment of the Per- sian navy could in this way be recovered: if it came to a rupture with the Persians, the Pangaios area would be available as a strategic basis. I am sure that this was Megabazos' estimation and to my mind this reasoning is corroborated by Aristagoras' behaviour as a leader of the Ionian revolt.

According to Herodotos he had a discussion with his brothers-in- arms on alternative refuges in case Miletos could not be held against the Persian army. He himself favoured Myrkinos, Hekataios proposed to fortify Leros (V 124-5). Herodotos suggests that this discussion was held after the Ionians had suffered their first

reverses and that Aristagoras because of this had lost heart. This has been accepted all too readily by modern students (cf. Tozzi, 190 and nn. 63-65), for it seems certain that very many problems of strategy and logistics had to be considered from the beginning by the rebels and the choice of a refuge in view of possible repulses may well have been among these. The mention, moreover, in this connection of Myrkinos must make one pause, since it must be clear that Myrkinos was not just a refuge. When the rebels decided

33) That Histiaios had been active in Myrkinos for some time is proved by the fact that when he was recalled he was engaged in building the walls (V 124, 2).

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424 THE IONIAN REVOLT

not to seize the treasures of the temple at Branchidai, as had been proposed, again by Hekataios34) (V 36, 2-4), possession of the Pangaios mines became a necessary condition for the success of the revolt. As Hekataios saw?an insight which must have been shared by Aristagoras?control of the sea would depend on a well-filled war-chest: apart from other costs, the rowers of the ships would have to be paid (just as the Persians had had to pay them, cf. above p. 415).

We must assume that Thrace, and with it the Pangaios area, was temporarily lost to the Persians during the rebellion (cf. Busolt, 569). Aristagoras himself is said to have assisted in the return of the Paionians whom Darius had moved to Phrygia in connection with the conquest of the area (V 98). But the defection of Thrace and the return of the Paionians clearly did not mean that the Greek rebels could dispose of the mines at will, and even if the Thracians were prepared to leave them a free hand, a lot of organizing will have been necessary. The Persians will not have evacuated the min- ing area without doing their best to cripple the installations: they had not to be told what would be the value of the mines to the in-

surgents (cf. above p. 418)! There is no reason, therefore, to follow Herodotos and ascribe

Aristagoras' departure for Myrkinos to cowardice: the place was essential to the success of the revolt (for all we know the destruction of Aristagoras and his army may have contributed significantly to the failure of the revolt).

Looking back we must judge Histiaios' choice of Myrkinos as the reward for his services (or however he managed to obtain the 'gift': cf. above p. 418) a very clever coup. Appraising it as such presup- poses that the Persian subjection of the Thracian area would not be very thoroughgoing and the freedom of action of the Greeks accord- ingly wide. Such a presupposition on the part of the Greeks may now seem naive, but I do not think it was. Even in 500 Aristagoras is said to have expected to be lord of Naxos, if he helped to reinstall the exiles (V 30,3: ?? ... a??e? t?? ?????). This also may be con-

34) Tozzi considers Hekataios' proposal as ex eventu and makes it go back to 'quella idea di talassocrazia che lo storico ha espresso altrove', but in view of the fact that at the moment the proposal was made the Ionians effectively were masters of the sea the proposal is entirely credible (cf. von Fritz, Anm. 166-7, n. 281).

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THE IONIAN REVOLT 425

sidered naive (see for instance the remarks of de Sanctis, Aristagora, 65), but to me it seems better to reserve judgment in view of our ignorance concerning the Persian intentions in the Aegean. Any change at the borders of the empire, whether initiated by the Per- sians themselves or suggested (requested) by their subjects, will have been accompanied by speculations as to the precise nature of the change and the opportunities the new situation would leave or offer. Men like Histiaios, who owed their position to the Persians at least in part and were thought dangerous enough to merit gilded relegation, will not have been naive, although even they could misread the signs. I have no doubt at all that there must have been some room for speculation and for jockeying for an advantageous position, because the Persians on their part had reason to humour their 'allies'. How important that was had been borne out at the end of the Skythian campaign: combined with the Hellespontine revolt the triumphant Skythians could have become very dangerous indeed. That they did not press their advantage, may have been caused by the fact that the Ionians remained loyal (and this loyalty may well have been induced by the 'gift' of Myrkinos)35).

14. The outbreak of the Ionian revolt.

It is in this light that I now wish to look at the train of events which led to the Ionian revolt. When Aristagoras in 500 was asked to help reinstall the Naxian exiles, he intended to accomplish this by a show of force. Herodotos affirms that the exiles expected that they would be obeyed as soon as they appeared in Naxos (V 30,6: ?ta? ?p?fa???s? ?? t?? ?????, p??ta p???se? t??? ?a????? ta a? a?t?? ?e?e???s?). Aristagoras thought one hundred triremes suffi- cient for the purpose (V 31,3), and went to the Persian satrap to ask for his help, offering to pay for the whole undertaking. Ar- taphrenes granted the request, but doubled the number of ships to be mobilized (V 31,4: a?t? d? e?at?? ?e?? d????s?a? t?? ?t????? ?s??ta? a?a tf ea??). In addition the king had to be asked for permission.

35) And other benefits: the tradition that Miletos had reached the peak of its prosperity in 500 (V 28) may well signify that the Skythian expedition had brought in considerable returns!

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426 THE IONIAN REVOLT

Such are the facts in Herodotos' account. Are they to be taken seriously, or to be discounted, like the details of the colloquy between Aristagoras and Artaphrenes36)? In my opinion the data mentioned must be considered facts: many Naxian aristocrats and enough Milesians will have been in the know. The estimate of the strength needed surely will have been made by the Naxians themselves: they were in possession of all the facts. The force of 200 ships that came out next spring must have been seen by thousands of sailors and soldiers. The original plan for the coup again will have been devised by the Naxians themselves: the tradition that they believed that a show of force actually would be enough, must be due to them too. So what do these facts signify?

First the one hundred triremes: in what sense was this sufficient

strength? Here, I repeat, we must assume that the Naxian sea- power consisted?in Thukydides' words (I 14,1)?of some few triremes and for the rest of merchant galleys (cf. above p. 406), the latter in great numbers according to Herodotos (p???a ?a??? p????: V 30,4). Let us suppose that this fleet was larger than the contem- porary navies of Athens and Aigina (50 to 70 ships: cf. above p. 403), say 80 or 90 ships, pentekontors and smaller galleys for the most part. Let us also assume that the whole of this fleet could not be mobilized at the same time as the army: I know of no Greek polis able to do this. On the face of it one hundred triremes seem more

than a match for such a fleet, and no doubt they were, but not in a simple way.

Triremes could be fitted out as transports or as ships of the line (cf. e.g. Th. VI 43)37)). The fleet actually mobilized took on board a large army of Persians and 'allies' and the 'Ionian force' (V 32). Part of the triremes in it must therefore have served as transports and, as a transport had a capacity of some 100 men38), clearly a considerable part: since the army transported had to be a match for the 8000 Naxian hoplites, at least 80 of the 200 triremes.

36) Cf. De Sanctis, 69: 'di quel che si discorse tra Aristagora e Artaferne a Sar- di noi non sappiamo nulla, come nulla poteva sapere di certa scienza Erodoto'.

37) ??e? ta?e?a? and ?. st?at??te? or ?p??ta?????: cf. Wallinga, 468 ?. 38) Th. VI 43: at least 54 transports, 40 Athenian and 14, or more, allied, car-

ried 5100 hoplites, 480 archers, 700 slingers and 120 light-armed soldiers, a total of 6400.

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THE IONIAN REVOLT 427

In the original plan the land forces cannot have been much less numerous, nor consequently the transports. If 80 transports carried 8000 soldiers, 20 line-of-battle triremes could have been planned to form a striking force which eventually could be reinforced with a number of transport triremes: these could be converted to ships of the line by concentrating the crews39). Since the trireme was a novelty, until then hardly used in any Greek navy?only by 485 were triremes used in Greek navies in any numbers?the versatility of a large fleet of triremes must have made it extremely terrifying. Twenty line-of-battle triremes plus eighty transports must therefore have been equal to many more pentekontors, not to mention smaller merchant-galleys: in sum, more than a match for the Nax- ian navy. In this light the plan of action of the conspirators appears adequate enough. Then why the drastic increase brought about by Artaphrenes?

Two answers to this question immediately suggest themselves: the fleet was increased either because Artaphrenes had more far- reaching plans than the simple reinstatement of a local aristocracy, or?if for Artaphrenes also this was the ultimate objective of the expedition?because he reckoned with the interference of other Greeks. Both seem real possibilities. A Persian attack on Naxos, however restricted in scope, would

at the very least provoke profound misgivings among the neighbouring poleis. When, after the outbreak of the Ionian revolt, Athens and Eretria were willing to support the insurgents, this wil- lingness will have been induced as much by the shock caused by the Naxian expedition, as by Athens' earlier experience of Persian pretensions (V 73) or Eretria's need to acquit an old debt (V 99,1: cf. Tozzi, 166 ff.). The Persians will not have needed information about the Lelantine war to be able to visualize Greek collaboration

on some scale and, as I suggested above (p. 413), they must have determined the strength of their own navy in the Aegean on the basis of estimates of the aggregate Greek sea-power, presuming that collaboration was feasible. The danger of such co-operation should not be underestimated. In the case of the attack on Naxos it could

cause serious complications, not only by stiffening Naxian

39) Cf. Wallinga, 467 f.

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428 THE IONIAN REVOLT

resistance, but even more by making diversions, e.g. attacking the Persian naval bases. Such possibilities must indeed have disposed the Persians to eliminate any sea-power of some importance on their sea-front. They had eliminated Samos: if as I suggested (p. 421) Naxos had to some degree taken its place, they had to con- sider eliminating Naxos too. The possession of naval power necessarily led to such considerations, which may have been rein- forced by 'imperialistic' motives40), but in themselves are sufficient explanation of Persian behaviour in 500. Apart from these considerations the Persians may have had other

motives to make the expeditionary force as strong as 200 triremes. Triremes were fragile. As I have shown elsewhere41), large naval expeditions normally included a number of reserves, which had skeleton crews and could be used as transports. The Persian navy which engaged the Ionians off Lade counted 600 triremes: yet the commanders are said to have taken alarm when informed of the Io-

nian strength of 353 (VI 8, 2 f.). Evidently the number of their line- of-battle ships was not much bigger than 350, the reserves amount- ing to 25042): in view of the distance between Lade and the bases of this navy (Phoenicia, Cyprus, Kilikia, Egypt: VI 6) and the issues at stake not an impossible number. The 200 triremes in the Naxian expedition may therefore have included even more reserves than the 80 transports which I assumed above (p. 426). And the Persian commanders may have preferred a very large numerical majority over the Naxians and their eventual allies from exag- gerated caution. After all this was the first time the Persian navy faced combat. The fighting might well work out contrary to plan, to say nothing of possible treason among the 'allied' crews.

This latter point brings me to a most fundamental problem fac- ing the Persian naval commanders. The moment they decided to mobilize the navy they had to reckon with the possibility that the crews would try to take over the ships. Even when such an action was initially restricted to only part of all the ships available, for in- stance to a squadron mobilized for a particular assignment (such as

40) Such as are assumed by e.g. Grundy, 81 and Bengtson 156 ff., far too easily in my view.

41) Cf. Wallinga, 468 ff. 42) This is a ratio of 5:7. In the Sicilian expedition it was 4:6 (Th. VI 43).

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THE IONIAN REVOLT 429

the one hundred ships Aristagoras had asked for in the first in- stance), it could easily go on to involve the whole navy, especially if the originators acted very fast and fell upon the other squadrons (or bases) before the authorities were alarmed. This danger prob- ably was smaller in the eastern fleet, because collaboration between Kilikians, Phoenicians and Egyptians must have been less easy to bring about than among the Aegean crews (most of them Greeks and the Karians hellenized at least in part)43). Certainly such a coup never can have been very easy. But it was a possibility against which the Persians had to be on their guard. One way to lessen the danger was to make the crews as mixed a lot as possible, so that community of interests was minimal. The crews of the Naxian ex- pedition were so mixed: Karians, Lesbians, Aiolians from Kyme, Ionians (see the list of their commanders, Ionians excepted: V 37,1), as were those in the Persian fleet at Lade (VI 6). This, it seems to me, was well-considered policy, which in itself may have led to the mobilization of more ships than the occasion really re- quired. So after all Artaphrenes' decision to mobilize 200 ships need not imply more than great caution. What I said just now also means that the mobilization of the Per-

sian navy offered a unique occasion to potential rebels. Indeed one may even ask if it had not become the necessary precondition for rebellion from the moment the Persian navy was in existence. As I argued above (p. 414), its creation led to a drastic change in the position of the coastal subjects, Persian control becoming much tighter. From the point of view of potential insurgents the most im- portant consequence of this was that rebellion of one city, or even

43) The problem of the early hellenization of the Karians has been treated with great caution by Hornblower (ch. I: 'Karia before the Hekatomnids', esp. 14 ff.): Greek penetration into sea-side Karia was early (Mycenean and Protogeometric periods); inland Karia shows Greek influence from Geometric times; subjection of both Ionia and Karia by Lydia may 'have increased Karia's ... receptiveness to hellenism' (o.e., 16). The association of Ionians and Karians as mercenaries in the service of Egypt and the prominence in this army of a citizen of Halikarnassos (I 163 al.; Ill 4) are so many signs of growing assimilation, as are cases high- society intermarriage (D.L. I 22; Hdt. VII 99, 2; Plu. Them. I 2 - Phanias F 23 Wehrli), adoption of Greek names like Skylax, and Greek-type literary activities (in Greek!) like those of Skylax of Karyanda. All this, and the joint revolt, suggests that by 500 the assimilation/hellenization was considerable.

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430 THE IONIAN REVOLT

of one restricted area, had become impossible, because the Persians could use the fleet to rapidly move and concentrate troops (and of course to blockade the sea-side approaches). Chances of success in a rebellion would depend on the early elimination, i.e. seizure, of at least the greater part of the Persian ships. The difficulty here was that in all probability the majority of the marines in these ships were Persians44) and that the naval bases probably were guarded by Persian troops. The seizure of the Persian fleet must for that reason have been a very difficult operation which required great prudence and determination. It had to be accomplished under the very eyes of the Persians: the man who managed this job had to be able to move freely from ship to ship and from squadron to squadron without arousing suspicions, that is to say that he had to be closely associated with the Persian naval organization, e.g. in a technical capacity. Accordingly the Ionian revolt began with the seizure of the Per-

sian navy, then returned from Naxos and docked at Myous, which presumably was one of the naval bases in the Aegean (V 36, 4). After the insurgents had decided to 'defect' their first measure was to send one Iatragoras to 'arrest the commanders who were on board of the ships' (s???a????e?? .... t??? ?p? t?? ?e?? ep?p????ta? st?at?????: V 36, 4). Only when this action had been successful, the rebellion broke forth openly (V 37, 1). Unfortunately Hero- dotos' spokesmen did not distinguish between the arrest of the commanders?who are revealed to be tyrants in the sequel (V 37, 2)?and the seizure of the ships, and the most difficult part of Iatragoras' assignment is thus glossed over. The repeated associa- tion, however, between the tyrants and the ships (as in the Skythian expedition: IV 137-8) must be taken as a sign that the seizure was implied in the traditions. This shift of emphasis from the main thing to the spectacular side issue I would explain as a sign that Iatragoras had done his job in an efficient manner and without any stir. He must have been an extremely cunning operator; the preser- vation of his name is scant credit for his merits.

44) As they were in 480: VII 184, 2, cf. V 32.

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THE IONIAN REVOLT 431

15. Conclusion.

If the new hypothesis concerning Persian sea-power I have pro- posed is accepted, it follows that the interpretation of the Ionian revolt must be thoroughly reconsidered. Two problems in par- ticular must be faced: in the first place how the Ionians ad- ministered and financed the enormous sea-power which they had appropriated; in the second place how the originators of the revolt proposed to use this force, both problems of course being inter- related.

That some thought was given to the first problem seems to follow from the tradition about Hekataios' proposal to seize the treasures of Branchidai (V 36, 3) and Aristagoras' attempt to occupy Myrkinos (V 126, 1; cf. above, p. 423). But financing the navy, though important45), cannot have been the most urgent problem: collaborating in manning and using the ships and creating a unified 'Panionian' naval command was. On this point we have no infor- mation, but what Herodotos tells us about the situation on the eve of the battle of Lade (VI 11 ff.) suggests that such a central naval command did not in fact come into being, not even when it was clear that decisive naval action was imminent: Dionysios of Phokaia never was anything like commander-in-chief46). On the other hand I would judge that some kind of naval organization, or at any rate concerted action, was realized, because most probably new ships were built. Just before Lade the Ionians had 353 triremes (VI 8, 2). The ships they seized probably did not number more than three hundred47). It seems certain, moreover, that no polis

45) It has been argued that 'the issue by the rebel cities of a confederate coinage shows a wide measure of unity and determination in the revolt' (Bury-Meiggs, 243, cf. Meiggs, Endnote 25, 441-2 and Tozzi, 81 ff.). The extensive literature on this subject unanimously fails to take account of the possibility that this coinage has nothing to do with the Ionian revolt, but was issued in connection with the monetization of the Persian tribute.

46) Such as is assumed by, among others, Burn: 'The Ionians had appointed a Supreme Commander at Sea ...' (211). But Herodotos' ?? ????e? ?p?t??p??s? sf?a? a?t??? t? ?????s?? cannot in my view be thus interpreted. 'To appoint com- mander' is ?p?t??pe?? t?? a???? (or ?a?a??(a?: cf. II 7, 4) or ?. t??? ????e?? (cf. IX 10, 1). Dionysios is to be considered as no more than a trainer.

47) The tradition concerning the Persian navy consistently defines its strength in multiples of 300: 600 ships in the Skythian expedition (IV 87, 1), 600 at Lade (VI 9, 1), 600 triremes under Datis (VI 95, 2) and 1200 in Xerxes' expedition (VII

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432 THE IONIAN REVOLT

subject to Persia had been allowed to possess its own triremes: Thasos' submission in 492 immediately led to the seizure of its triremes (VI 46, 1; 48, l)48). For these reasons I assume that 53 triremes at least had been built by the Ionians after the revolt had begun and this I consider a clear indication of concerted action. How this action was organized, however, how and by whom the decision was made, has not been transmitted. Concerning the strategy of the Ionians and the use they intended

to make of their sea-power, our information is as defective. Apart form the battle of Lade we hear about two large-scale actions (V 103, 2; 112, 1), the objective of which is no problem, but for the way in which the Ionians intended to maintain their new-won in- dependence in the long run we have very few indications indeed. However, an echo of discussions of strategy has been preserved in the proposal ascribed to Hekataios to fortify the island of Leros in case Miletos would have to be given up. As Tozzi points out (190, n. 62), this proposal has been connected by several scholars (Grote, Ed. Meyer, Burn, von Fritz) with the maritime superiority of the rebels, and rightly so (though he thinks not). Herodotos places Hekataios' proposal in the context of Ionian defeatism, but I would connect it with Hekataios' other proposal concerning the treasure of Branchidai (V 36, 3) and make both part of a general discussion of strategy. As I said earlier (above, p. 423), discussions of many problems of strategy and tactics must be supposed to have taken place from the very beginning of the revolt, including the problem of a temporary evacuation of Miletos itself. In these discussions Hekataios is said to have taken up a position which is comparable to that ascribed to Themistokles by Thukydides: ?? ??a p?t? ?at?

89, 1; D.S. XI 3, 7). These figures I would explain as follows: after the establish- ment of the Aegean fleet (cf. above, p. 413) the total strength of the Persian navy was 600 triremes, 300 in the Levant, 300 in the Aegean; when the latter had fallen into Ionian hands at the beginning of the revolt, several reasons (the great distance; the possibility that the Ionians would build more ships, and that they would continue to be supported by Eretria and Athens) forced the Persians to rein- force the Levantine fleet, eventually to 600 ships (VI 9, 1), but in 490 the strength mobilized again was 600 triremes with Levantine and Greek crews (VI 95, 2 and 98, 1). 300 + 300 therefore seems to have been the formula of the Persian naval organization (cf. Wallinga, 476 ff.). 48) Thasos' navy must have consisted of triremes, because it had been created

to ward off an attack by Histiaios, who had triremes (VI 5, 3 and 46, 2).

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THE IONIAN REVOLT 433

??? ??as??s? ?ata???te? e? a?t?? (t?? ?e??a?? for Themistokles, t?? ????? for Hekataios) ta?? ?a?s? p??? apa?t?? ????stas?a? (Th. ? 93, 7). That he did so at the beginning of the revolt and not at the dramatic moment at which Herodotos (or his source) places his ut- terance, is borne out by a detail of Hekataios' proposal: after the fortification of Leros and evacuation of Miletos he advised ?s????? a?e??, to 'sit tight' (V 125)49). Such an advice seems utterly misplaced at the moment of crisis, but fitting at the beginning of the revolt. For it presupposes that the Ionians could sit tight, because they had nothing to fear from the sea-side, and such was indeed the situation at the beginning of the revolt: the eastern fleet of the Persian navy was then far away, it would have to be rein- forced before it could take action in the Aegean (cf. above, n. 47) and even then would not necessarily be incomparably superior50).

If we assume that this was Hekataios', or at least a contem- porary, view, the question is whether the Ionians followed it or not. Here I would suggest that they did. It is a striking feature of the revolt that the Ionians were involved in only three actions against the Persians for which they took the initiative: the move against Sardis, the enlisting of the Hellespontines, and the assistance given to the Cyprians. For a revolt which lasted some five years this sure- ly is ?s????? a?e??. What really is amazing is that they did not come to the rescue of the Hellespontine cities, which they had compelled to take their part (V 103, 2), and clearly did not even try to win back after they had been reconquered by the Persians. Even more

49) Cf. Th. II 65, 7 where Thukydides puts Perikles' strategy in the following words: ?s??????ta? te ?a? t? ?a?t???? ?e?ape???ta? ?a? a???? ?? ?p??t??????? ?v t? p????? ??d? t? p??e? ???d??e???ta? ef? pe???ses?a?. Here ?s??????ta? must not be taken in the sense of 'keeping quiet', 'being patient' (Gomme ad loc., cf. de Romil- ly: 'restant tranquilles'), but as 'waiting for the offensive actions of the enemy', cf. Th. IV 73, 1 where Brasidas and his army pa?ata???e??? ?s??a??? ????e??? sf?s?? ?p???a? t??? '????a????: here the context is more tactical than strategical (other parallels for this usage: I 52, 2; III 102, 7; IV 71, 1; 104, 3; V 6, 2; VI 3, 3; 11, 3). Thukydides does not ascribe to Perikles an outright defense of doing nothing, nor, pace Gomme, an unqualified repudiation: t? ?a? ?p?a???? ?? s??eta? ?? ?et? t?? d?ast????? teta?????? (? 63, 3); P. was d?ast????? tactically, ?p?????? strategically.

50) In view of the importance of the Ionian cities and their coinage in Darius' naval organization the building of 300 extra ships for the eastern fleet must be con- sidered record-breaking.

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434 THE IONIAN REVOLT

amazing is their failure to assist Kyme and Klazomenai, when these cities were attacked and conquered (V 123). When the strategic potential of the Ionians is considered, their passivity is in fantastic contrast with the dynamism of the Athenians who after Mykale liberated the Hellespontine area and Ionia in what Meiggs (71) assesses as minor operations51): the Athenian strategic potential hardly exceeded that of the Ionians' 300 or more triremes. This passivity of the Ionians?which of course is not what a sen-

sible man, Hekataios for instance, would have meant by ?s????? a?e??52)?is the real crux of the Ionian revolt. I do not pretend to be able to offer a solution, although I am sure of the direction in which it must be sought. S. C. Humphreys has written illuminating pages on the * complex

way' in which the Athenian empire succeeded in integrating surplus free manpower into the economy of the city state by means of profits derived from war and trade ... A new cycle of production and exchange came into being, regulated by the Athenian demand for cash tribute from her allies and for food, slaves, and other goods to be purchased in the market by the Athenian d?mos, who received the tribute as military pay ... and by the Athenian political elite whose profits from empire far exceeded those of the demos ...' (Humphreys, 169 ff.). The resulting system is rightly compared by Humphreys to Sparta's 'peculiar economic system' (Id., 171), but of course it was analogous to, and no doubt to a high degree im- itated from, the Persian imperial system as well. These systems enabled Sparta to keep a quasi-professional army in permanent preparedness and Persia and Athens to permanently keep afloat large navies of triremes. Conversely, such a navy required such a system. Because it had

to be kept in permanent preparedness, an organization with a per- manent budget had to be created. That is to say that when the Io-

51) Thukydides is entirely silent about these operations: that may be taken as a sign that they were minor at most, but in view of the total absence of the Persian navy from the Aegean after Mykale and the absolute mastery of the Athenians in that area I prefer to think that the Persian position on the coast had become untenable in 479 and that the Athenians took over without striking a blow. 52) Just as Perikles was not entirely inactive: cf. De Wet, The so-called defensive

policy of Pericles, Acta Classica 12 (1969), 103 ff.

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THE IONIAN REVOLT 435

nian poleis appropriated the Aegean fleet of the Persian navy they had to provide for an equivalent of the Persian organization, in other words something like Humphreys' 'system'. But of this there is no trace in the tradition: in particular there is no evidence of any continuous use by the Ionians of their navy, nor even of the institu- tion of a unified naval command.

To judge from Herodotos' account of the battle of Lade what was done was to share out the ships among eight Ionian poleis and Lesbos53) and to leave all naval administration to them. Because the resulting squadrons have always been assumed to have been the original Milesian etc. fleets, the difficulty of financing such fleets has not been raised and the possibility generally taken for granted, very wrongly so. The grave financial burden involved in the mobilization of even small squadrons of triremes for extended periods has been very properly emphasized by Meiggs (427) and Finley (1978, 112) and, although one of their premises?that the crews invariably were 200 men strong?must be rejected (Wal- linga, 471 al.), Finley's calculation for Mytilene's squadron often triremes in 428 (five, read three to four54), talents a month in pay in addition to the cost of maintenance and repair) makes very clear how enormous the cost of a squadron of 70, let alone 100, must have been. For that reason some 'system' absolutely was required55). It is the more significant that there is no trace of such a system in the tradition, because in a sense it was already present, imposed as it had been by the Persians when they imposed tribute in money, and could have been taken over by the Ionians together with the fleet for which that tribute had been instituted. But precise- ly because it was a Persian institution, the system will have been a major factor in the unrest which was at the bottom of the revolt, and for that reason could not be adopted by the Ionians.

53) The crews will have been recruited in a wider area: cf. D.S.X 25, 3 where Karians and Milesians man 'the triremes'. This fragment is plausibly taken to refer to the Ionian revolt (cf. Hornblower, 21 and note 124).

54) I would expect the flotillas of the ship-contributing members of the Delian league to be more fully manned than Athenian ships, estimating an average crew at some 100 rowers, as in the Troizen inscription.

55) It is for this reason that the notion that the trireme was invented in the world of the polis (Greek or Phoenician) and first used there is utterly incredible, and that any hypothesis concerning its invention and introduction which does not take account of its financial side is inadequate.

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436 THE IONIAN REVOLT

This failure of the Ionian leaders to reintroduce the Persian

'system' for their own account (i.e. to override the people's aver- sion to it) in my view was the chief reason that the revolt miscar- ried. Awareness of this failure?perceived as a low level of proficiency and inept leadership56)?will have led to the disintegra- tion of the naval forces at Lade more than Dionysios of Phokaia's heavy training programme (although the young marines and oarsmen who became Herodotos' informants will have had more

lively recollections of the complaints about the latter!). The Ionian revolt as I said will have to be reconsidered and

restudied in this perspective. I am well aware that the few remarks I have made can only be a modest beginning, but I feel that I have made a beginning under favourable signs because Tozzi's book is there as a sure foundation for further work.

Utrecht, Tacituslaan 1

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