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Editorial-Board_2014_Journal-of-Banking---Finance.pdf

JOURNAL OF BANKING AND FINANCE Editorial Board

Editors: C.O. Alexander University of Sussex, Brighton, England, UK

I. Mathur Southern Illinois University at Carbondale, Carbondale, IL, USA

Advisory Board: G.M. Constantinides University of Chicago, Chicago, IL, USA R. Engle New York University, New York, NY, USA

K.R. French Dartmouth College, Hanover, NH, USA C.M. James University of Florida, Gainesville, FL, USA

F. Moshirian University of New South Wales, Sydney, NSW, Australia R.W. Roll University of California at Los Angeles, Los Angeles, CA, USA

Associate Editors: L.F. Ackert Kennesaw State University, GA, USA C. Almeida Fundação Getulio Vargas, Rio de Janeiro, Brazil O. ap Gwilym Bangor University, UK T. Bali Georgetown University, Washington, DC., USA S. Bartram Warwick University, UK J.A. Batten Hong Kong University of Science &

Technology, Kowloon, Hong Kong A.N. Berger University of South Carolina, SC, USA A. Black University of Aberdeen, UK C. Bouwman Case Western Reserve University, OH, USA N. Branger University of Muenster, Germany R. Carmona Princeton University, NJ, USA L. Cathcart Imperial College Business School, UK P. Chelley-Steeley Aston Business School, Birmingham, UK R.-R. Chen Fordham University, NY, USA P.-H. Chou National Central University, Jhongli, Taiwan, ROC M.M. Cornett Bentley University, NA, USA V. Corradi University of Warwick, UK J. Cotter University College Dublin, Blackrock, Co. Dublin, Ireland D. Cumming York University, Toronto, Canada S. Datta Wayne State University, MI, USA D.W. Diamond University of Chicago, Chicago, IL, USA M. Dungey University of Tasmania, Australia V. Fernandez Universidad Adolfo Ibanez (UAI), Chile F. Fiordelisi Università di Roma Tre, Rome, Italy A. Fodor Ohio University, OH, USA

R. Fry-McKibbin Center for Applied Macroeconomic Analysis, Canberra, ACT, Australia

K. Giesecke Stanford University, Stanford, CA, USA C. Girardone University of Essex, UK M. Goergen Cardiff University, UK

M. Gordy Federal Reserve System, Washington, DC, USA M. Grasselli Fields Institute, Toronto, Canada A. Guariglia Durham University, UK A. Guettler EBS Business School, Wiesbaden, Germany M. Guidolin Bocconi University, Italy C.R. Harvey Duke University, Durham, NC, USA T. Hens Universität Zürich, Switzerland David D.B. Humphrey Florida State University, FLA, USA R. Ibragimov Harvard University, Cambridge, MA, USA V. Ivashina Harvard Business School, Boston, MA, USA B. Jacobsen Massey University, Auckland, New Zealand T. Jenkinson University of Oxford, Oxford, UK S.A. Johnson Texas A&M University, College Station, TX, USA A. Kaeck St Gallen University, Switzerland G.A. Karolyi Cornell University, Ithaca, NY, USA K. Koedijk Tilburg University, Netherlands B. Lambrecht University of Cambridge, UK M. Levy Hebrew University of Jerusalem, Jerusalem, Israel E. Liljeblom Hanken School of Economics, Helsinki, Finland S.C. Linn University of Oklahoma, OK, USA F. Longin ESSEC Business School, France B. Lucey Trinity College, Ireland C.T. Lundblad University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, NC, USA R. Matousek University of Sussex, UK J. Miffre EDHEC Business School, France P. Moyneux Bangor University, UK C. Neely Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, MO, USA M.A. Peterson Southern Illinois University at Carbondale, IL, USA M. Petitjean Université Catholique de Louvain, Belgium B. Phillips University of Waterloo, Canada M. Prokopczuk Zeppelin University, Germany

R.G. Rajan University of Chicago, Chicago, IL, USA

R. Rau University of Cambridge, UK

L. Renneboog Universiteit van Tilburg, Netherlands

P. Roosenboom Erasmus Universiteit Rotterdam, Netherlands

V. Salas-Fumás University of Zaragoza (Spain), Spain

J.M. Sarabia University of Cantabria, Spain

O. Scaillet Université de Genève and Swiss Finance Institute, Switzerland

T. Schmidt TU Chemnitz, Germany

L. Seco University of Toronto, Toronto, Canada

N. Seeger VU University of Amsterdam, Netherlands

M. Shackleton Lancaster University, UK

E. Sheedy Macquarie University, Australia

B. Simkins Oklahoma State University, OK, USA

G. Skiadopoulos University of Piraeus, Greece

B.M. Tabak Central Bank of Brasilia, Brasilia, Brazil

A. Tarazi Université de Limoges, Limoges, France

H. Tehranian Boston College, MA, USA

A.V. Thakor Washington University in St. Louis, St. Louis, MO, USA

M.G. Tsionas Athens University of Economics and Business, Greece

R. Tunaru University of Kent, UK

B.F. Van Ness University of Mississippi, MS, USA

R.A. Van Ness University of Mississippi, MS, USA

S. van Nieuwerburgh New York University, New York, NY, USA

S. Westgaard NTNU, Norway

E. Wu University of Technology, Sydney, Australia

A. Yan Fordham University, NY, USA

R. Zagst Technische Universität München, Germany

V. Zakamouline Universitetet i Agder, Kristiansand, Norway

A. Zalewska University of Bath, Claverton Down, Bath, England, UK

The-determinants-of-U-S--banks--international-a_2014_Journal-of-Banking---Fi.pdf

Journal of Banking & Finance 44 (2014) 233–247

Contents lists available at ScienceDirect

Journal of Banking & Finance

journal homepage: www.elsevier .com/locate / jbf

The determinants of U.S. banks’ international activities

http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jbankfin.2014.04.014 0378-4266/� 2014 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

⇑ Tel.: +1 315 859 4859; fax: +1 315 859 4477. E-mail address: [email protected]

1 These foreign banking activities generally bring efficiency and tech improvements to host countries’ financial markets (Xu, 2011). However, the arising from financial contagion from parent banks can destabilize host ec during crisis periods (de Haas and van Lelyveld, 2011).

Judit Temesvary ⇑ Department of Economics, Hamilton College, 198 College Hill Road, Clinton, NY 13323, USA

a r t i c l e i n f o a b s t r a c t

Article history: Received 9 November 2012 Accepted 15 April 2014 Available online 26 April 2014

JEL classification: C53 F37 G11 G15 G21

Keywords: International banking Bank behavior Affiliate lending Cross-border lending Bank regulation

This paper develops a model and structural dynamic estimation of bank behavior to map the relationship between U.S. banks’ choices of foreign banking activities, and bank and foreign market traits. This estima- tion framework is applied to a unique bank-level dataset compiled from regulatory sources, covering U.S. banks’ foreign activities in 83 host markets over the 2003–2013 period. Bank traits are better able to explain the evolving patterns of foreign banking than host market characteristics. After controlling for these traits, the post-financial crisis period shows a structural shift away from cross-border claims towards foreign affiliate activities. Structural estimates of foreign market entry costs and regulatory attitudes towards risk are derived. Simulation exercises confirm the strong impact of banks’ and regulators’ risk stance on bank profits and portfolio composition.

� 2014 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

1. Introduction

Global banking has become increasingly prevalent over the past several decades. The average share of foreign banks now reaches 20% in the OECD countries, with some as high as 50% (Claessens and van Horen, 2012). U.S. banks have also become more involved in foreign countries, with their foreign claims rising from 308 billion USD in 1998 to 3.4 trillion USD by 2012. Over this time period, U.S. banks invested an average of 18% of their portfolio in foreign claims.

Beyond its rising magnitude, the composition of this interna- tional exposure has changed substantially over the past decade. U.S. banks have noticeably moved away from cross-border claims (whereby U.S. banks acquire foreign assets directly from the U.S.) towards foreign affiliate claims (which are acquired via foreign affiliates established in host countries). In 2003, U.S. banks held only 15 cents in affiliate claims for each dollar in cross-border claims. By 2013, this number has risen to 33 cents per each dollar’s worth of cross border claim. A further interesting pattern is that of U.S. banks’ foreign affiliate participation. Since 2003, foreign market entries and exits averaged at 3.5 and 3.7 per

globally active U.S. bank, respectively. On average, U.S. banks have maintained an affiliate presence in one third of the countries they hold claims in.1

In light of these interesting patterns, the goal of this paper is to explore the determinants and characteristics of U.S. banks’ foreign activities over the course of the past ten years. The main contribu- tion of this paper is the development and estimation of a dynamic model of banks’ decisions concerning which countries to enter, and their choices of the volume and composition of claims to hold there. The model is estimated using a two-step structural dynamic method, which is applied to a newly compiled bank-level dataset on U.S. banks’ foreign activities. The estimation procedure is a version of the Bajari et al. (2007) dynamic structural two-step estimation method. The first stage estimates banks’ foreign claims volume choices, as well as banks’ choices of foreign market entry and exit, as functions of a broad set of bank and host market traits in a reduced-form setting. The second stage then uses the policy function estimates from the first stage to construct banks’ dis- counted sum of expected profits over time, corresponding to banks’

nological volatility onomies

234 J. Temesvary / Journal of Banking & Finance 44 (2014) 233–247

observed foreign choices as well as a range of alternate choices. Comparing these constructed values of the observed and alternate paths of action, the structural parameters (such as entry costs and banks’ and regulators’ attitudes towards market risk) are chosen so as to rationalize banks’ observed choices. The data set was compiled by merging various regulatory databases, banks’ balance-sheet data and host-country macroeconomic indicators. It covers 82 U.S. banks’ activities in 83 foreign countries between 2003 Q1 and 2013 Q1.2

This paper’s approach to the microeconomic modeling of banks’ activities has three advantages. Since it is dynamic, it captures the interactions between banks’ foreign market entry/exit and claims choices. These dynamic interactions are important: market entry enables banks to hold foreign affiliate claims in that market for many periods to come. This foreign market involvement will then influence banks’ future entry and claims choices in other markets as well (via diversification benefits, substitution effects, etc.). By being able to capture these interactions, this method goes beyond the reduced-form and static empirical methods applied in previous related literature (Focarelli and Pozzolo, 2001; Miller and Parkhe, 1998).

The analysis also accounts for banks’ choice of the composition of their claims as functions of bank and market traits. This is a step forward since the simultaneous cross-border and foreign affiliate claim choices are interconnected, yet respond to bank and market traits differently. For instance, banks tend to establish foreign affil- iates in host markets that have lower taxes, laxer regulatory restrictions on bank activities and a majority of retail clients (Cerutti et al., 2007), as well as substantial transfer risk (Cetorelli and Goldberg, 2008). On the other hand, cross-border claims, which can draw on parent banks’ capital base, are more suitable if the host country is less developed or smaller (Lehner, 2009), or if the majority of clients there are low-risk multinationals or sover- eigns. Home market conditions are also important in shaping the composition of foreign claims (de Haas and van Lelyveld, 2006; de Haas and van Lelyveld, 2010), especially when there are risks of regulatory arbitrage or financial contagion (Aiyar, 2011; Cetorelli and Goldberg, 2011; Buch, 2003; Magri et al., 2005). Bank traits matter as well: previous literature has highlighted bank size (Focarelli and Pozzolo, 2001) and the health of the balance sheet (Popov and Udell, 2012) as particularly important. In fact, results of the following analysis show that bank traits are better able to explain banks’ foreign activities than host market characteristics.

Since the estimation is structural, it enables the identification of parameters (such as entry costs and risk aversions) for which the reduced-form literature uses rough empirical proxies. Getting structural estimates of these attitudes towards risk is a step forward, in light of evidence that regulatory strictness matters: a lax bank-regulatory environment in the home country gives banks a competitive advantage in global banking, while a strict regulatory environment in the host market limits domestic and cross-border bank activity (Fidrmuc and Hainz, 2013; Chen and Liao, 2011). Results in this paper show that regulators have become more risk averse since the financial crisis, and confirms that banks have done so as well (de Haas and van Horen, 2010). The analysis also estimates the host-market specific fixed entry costs (brick and mortar expenses as well as administrative fees) that banks have to pay upon market entry, and the scrap value of these costs that banks can recover upon exit. These entry costs form barriers to banks’ foreign market entry (Lehner, 2009), and as such, can significantly affect the pattern of global banking. The following

2 The number of banks for which bank-level data is available is limited by regulatory reporting requirements. Only U.S. banks with claims in any given country in excess of 1% of total assets, or 20% of capital, are required to report foreign exposure.

analysis shows that entry costs have grown substantially since 2008.

The paper contributes to a growing volume of literature by examining the effect of the recent financial crisis on banks’ lending activities (Cotugno et al., 2013; Kleimeier et al., 2013; Ivashina and Scharfstein, 2010). Previous work has found that U.S. banks’ foreign activities have fallen significantly in the aftermath of the crisis (Cetorelli and Goldberg, 2009; Cetorelli and Goldberg, 2011). This paper’s findings add to the picture by implying that the post-crisis reduction in foreign activities is the result of banks’ response to deteriorating balance sheet and host market conditions. After con- trolling for the changes in bank and market traits over the crisis period, there is evidence of a shift in the composition of foreign banking: banks have shifted significantly away from cross-border loans towards foreign affiliate activities since the financial crisis.

The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 presents the model and characterizes banks’ optimal domestic and foreign claims choices as a Markov perfect equilibrium. Section 3 describes the data and discusses the estimation method. Section 4 describes the results of the estimation. Section 5 presents simulation exercises. Section 6 concludes.

2. Model

The dataset that the model is ultimately estimated on specifies the volumes of claims and liabilities at the level of bank-host country pairs, but does not break them down by type (e.g. loans or bonds as types of claims, or deposits as a type of liability). None- theless, for expositional purposes the following model treats loans, bonds and deposits as separate types of claims and liabilities, each with its own traits. The estimable claims equations described in Section 3 can be thought of as composites of the various types of assets detailed in the model below.

2.1. Setup and notation

This section describes the model of a bank’s foreign market entry/exit choices, as well as its decision on the volumes of loans to extend and deposits to take on. Let j ¼ 1 . . . J denote bank j. Each bank j is owned by shareholders, whose goal is to maximize the lifetime discounted sum of mean–variance utilities on the bank portfolio.3 Shareholders make foreign market entry/exit, as well as loan/deposit volume choices at the beginning of each period t. There are a total of T periods such that t ¼ 1 . . . :T. The bank can operate in any of I countries, such that i ¼ 1 . . . I. In what follows, the time indices t, the country indices i and bank indices j are suppressed.

In each country, there are several markets m available to the bank. Let m ¼ 1 denote the home (source-country) market. In each host (foreign) country, there are two markets available to the bank. First, the bank’s headquarters can extend cross-border loans directly from the home market to any host country. Let m ¼ 2 denote this cross-border loan market. Alternatively, the bank can make foreign affiliate (local) loans in the host country by establish- ing an affiliate there. Let m ¼ 3 denote this foreign affiliate market. In each of the I � 1 foreign countries, the bank can engage in two markets: cross-border and foreign affiliate. Since by definition, there is no cross-border loan market in the bank’s home, there are a total of 2 � ðI � 1Þ þ 1 markets available. In addition to making loans, the bank also has the option to take deposits in all markets. Foreign affiliate offices receive funding from their parent via internal capital markets (Cetorelli and Goldberg, 2009;

3 The mean–variance formulation, also employed by (Buch et al., 2010), is appropriate since evidence shows that banks look for higher returns and diversifi- cation opportunities in host markets (Focarelli and Pozzolo, 2005).

J. Temesvary / Journal of Banking & Finance 44 (2014) 233–247 235

Cetorelli and Goldberg, 2012). Let Km denote the amount of capital that shareholders choose to transfer to the host country’s market m at the beginning of the period. Since funds used to make cross-border loans originate from the home budget, the capitaliza- tion for the cross-border market m ¼ 2 is the same as for the home market m ¼ 1.

In each market, banking clients’ goal is to maximize utility over their lifetime. After solving their lifetime utility maximization problem (not explicitly modeled here), risk-averse banking clients in market m diversify by demanding a composite bundle of banking services from banks of all nationalities present in that market. As a result, banking markets m are monopolistically competitive.4 Banks in market m make loans lm to clients at interest rate rlm, and take deposits dm at rate rdm. Loan and deposit markets are subject to random and market-specific aggregate shocks. According to the Dixit-Stiglitz formulation, these shocks are captured by the market-specific composite return indices on loans and deposits, denoted by am and bm respectively. These return indices are composites of all banks’ rates operating in market m. ða; bÞ are determined at the market level within each market, but are exogenous and random from each individual bank’s perspective.5

Let bars over parameters denote expectations and V is the known variance–covariance matrix of return indices across all countries and markets. The return indices are assumed to be jointly normally distributed as follows.

am bm

� � �N

�am �bm

; V � �

ð2:1Þ

Shareholders observe the Dixit-Stiglitz type monopolistically competitive loan demand lm and deposit supply dm functions. Let �m denote the market-specific loan demand elasticity and gm is the elasticity on clients’ deposit supply. The loan demand and deposit supply the bank faces depend on how its rates ðrlm; rdmÞ fare relative to the composite loan and deposit indices in that market. ðam; bmÞ.

lm ¼ am rlm

� ��m ð2:2Þ

dm ¼ rdm bm

� �gm ð2:3Þ

In addition to taking deposits, the bank can also issue bonds Dm in international financial markets, in order to finance its activities. The bank is a price-taker in these competitive bond markets.6

Investors take the health of the bank’s balance sheet into account when they decide the rate at which they are willing to lend to the bank. The rate rDm at which the bank can sell bonds to investors increases with the volume of bonds outstanding, i.e. investors require a risk premium from banks with more debt. On the other

4 This choice is motivated by the facts that (1) most banking markets around the world are characterized by a high level of market concentration (Beck et al., 2004) and (2) the relationships that banks develop with customers provide them with informational capital, which translates into differentiated services and market power.

5 Based on the Dixit-Stiglitz formulation, the indices are given by

am ¼ Am R

n rlmnð Þ 1��n @n

h i�1 with �m > 1 and bm ¼ Bm

R n rdmnð Þ

1þxn@n h i

, where Am

and Bm are market-specific constants. The aggregation is over all banks of all nationalities operating in market m.

6 The assumption that banks are price-takers in bond markets but price-setters in deposit-markets follows from the structure of the model. Depositors in each market of each country are restricted to deposit in the limited number of banks that operate in the given market in the client’s country. The fact that only a limited number of banks are available in that market in that country gives banks market power in deposit markets. In contrast, bond markets are international – clients from any country can invest in the bonds of banks in any other country. As banks must compete with all other countries’ banks for bond financing, banks are price-takers in debt markets.

hand, a better-capitalized bank can issue bonds at a lower rate. How- ever, the bond rate can never fall below the pre-specified minimum rate of �rm.

rDm ¼ �rm 1þ Dm Km

� � ð2:4Þ

There are both fixed and variable costs associated with the bank’s activities. The bank must pay a fixed entry cost Cm when it enters market m in the host country. This entry cost captures all fixed costs of opening a foreign affiliate, such as brick and mortar costs, administrative fees, etc. Furthermore, the bank can recover scrap value Wm when it leaves the market (such that Wm 6 Cm). This fixed scrap value is the amount the bank can recover of the paid entry costs upon exit. As such, it includes the resale value of real estate, equipment, refunds, etc. In addition, the bank also incurs proportional (marginal) costs of lending and deposit-taking, denoted by clm and cdm, respectively. Some exam- ples of such incremental costs are: the expenses of processing a new loan application, meeting with clients, financial transaction taxes, etc.

Before making their portfolio choice, the bank’s shareholders observe a set of state variables P at the beginning of each period. These state variables consist of market-specific characteristics, bank traits and variables which pertain to bank-market pairs. As for market-specific state variables, shareholders observe the following set of exogenous and known state variables: the vector of proportional costs ðcdm; clmÞ, the foreign income repatriation tax xm, the vector of market and country-specific bank income taxes sm, the required reserve ratios and minimum capital ratio require- ments ðdm;jmÞ; the joint normal distribution N of return indices; and the market-specific fixed entry costs and scrap values ðCm; WmÞ.

In addition, shareholders can see a snapshot of the bank’s current international position. That is to say, at the beginning of the period shareholders can observe which markets the bank is currently active in (based on past entry and exit choices). Let ð{PÞm ¼ 1 if the bank is currently active in the host country’s market m, and ð{PÞm ¼ 0 otherwise. Shareholders can observe the vector of the bank’s status in each country and market, denoted by {P . Shareholders also observe K, which is the vector of market-specific capitalizations Km allocated to market m at the beginning of the period. Since profits are re-distributed to share- holders at the end of each period, the sum of these market-specific capitalizations is taken to be exogenous from the bank’s perspec- tive. Let ðem Pð Þ ¼ 1; em Pð Þ ¼ �1Þ denote the bank’s decision to enter and exit market m in the current period, respectively. Then the state vector at date t þ 1, denoted by Ptþ1, is drawn from a probability distribution K Ptþ1jet ;Ptð Þ. The dependence of this function on et means that time t entry/exit decisions affect the future strategic environment. However, not all states are influenced by past actions.

Since profits are redistributed to shareholders at the end of each period, shareholders choose loan and deposit volumes with only the current period in mind.7 As Km is the amount of capitalization present in market m at the beginning of the period, eK m denotes the value of the bank’s end-period operations in market m. Shareholders’ goal is to maximize their concave increasing expected utility function over the sum of the bank’s end-period capitalizations across all countries and all markets, given their expectations of the mean and variance–covariance of returns.

The random market shocks perturb loan demand and deposit supply, and therefore affect bank revenue. As a result, the coun- try-specific eK m’s are also random variables. Since cross-border

7 Whereas market entry and exit choices are made with multi-period consider- ations in mind, when fixed costs are present.

236 J. Temesvary / Journal of Banking & Finance 44 (2014) 233–247

loans all originate from the bank’s home budget, the bank’s home capitalization K1;2 takes the following form.8

eK 1;2 ¼ K1;2 þ 1� s1ð Þ � ðrl1 � cl1Þ � l1 � ðrd1 þ cd1Þ � d1 � ðrD1 � D1;2Þ½ � þ 1� s2ð Þ � rl2 � cl2ð Þ � l2 � ðrd2 þ cd2Þ � d2½ � � C2 1 : e2 ¼ 1ð Þ þ � 2 1 : e2 ¼ �1ð Þ ð2:5Þ

In (2.5), the first term in the home-market capitalization eK 1;2 is the initial home-market capitalization K1;2. The first square brack- ets contain domestic loan interest income net of costs, minus domestic deposit expenses and bond-borrowing costs. This home-market ’net revenue’ is adjusted for the domestic income tax rate s1. The second bracketed term contains the revenue from cross-border lending, net of costs and income taxes and cross- border deposit expenses. The last two terms are the costs of new cross-border market entry e2 ¼ 1ð Þ if applicable, and the scrap value collected from newly vacated markets e2 ¼ �1ð Þ.9

Recalling that m ¼ 3 denotes the foreign affiliate (local) market in the host country, the end-period value of the bank’s foreign affiliate is as follows.

eK 3 ¼ K3 þ 1� s3ð Þ � 1�x3ð Þ rl3 � cl3ð Þ � l3 � rd3 þ cd3ð Þ � d3 � rD3 � D3ð Þ½ � � C3 1 : e3 ¼ 1ð Þ þ � 3 1 : e3 ¼ �1ð Þ ð2:6Þ

In (2.6), the first term in eK 3 is the initial host market capitaliza- tion K3. The square brackets contain loan interest income net of costs, minus deposit expenses and bond-borrowing costs. This ’net revenue’ is adjusted for the host market income tax s3 and income repatriation rate x3 before it is added on to K3. Fixed entry costs C3 come out of the foreign affiliate’s budgets at the time of entry e3 ¼ 1ð Þ, which also recover scrap values � 3 in case of exit e3 ¼ �1ð Þ. Let eK denote the column vector of market and coun-

try-specific capitalizations, for all countries and markets. After all foreign income is repatriated to the bank’s source market, the bank’s end-period aggregate capital is then {eK ¼PiPm eK im.

At this point, it is instructive to point out that the Dixit-Stiglitz formulation implies that the loan revenue rlm � lm and deposit expenditure rdm � dm functions are linear in the jointly normally distributed composite indices ðam; bmÞ.10 Since ðeK 1; ~K3Þ are sums of these terms, the end-period random capitalizations are also jointly normally distributed.

Bank activities are subject to minimum reserve and capital ade- quacy requirements. The model considers the territorial approach to the regulation of U.S. bank affiliates in host countries. This approach, increasingly implemented by the U.S. Federal Reserve in its rulemaking, calls for the regulation of foreign bank subsidiar- ies at the host country level. This territorial approach to bank regulation subjects foreign affiliates to similar liquidity and capital requirements as domestic banks in the host market. While the territorial approach remains controversial it is increasingly likely to be adopted by the main financial centers of the world.

In line with the territorial approach, domestic and cross-border loans are subject to home country regulations. Furthermore, foreign affiliate operations are bound by the host country’s laws and regulations, since these operations are financed out of the budget of each foreign affiliate separately. Recall that ðd;jÞ denote

8 The double subsrcipts indicate the fact that domestic and cross-border lending both originate from the home country budget.

9 The bank is assumed to be always present in the home market, where its headquarters are located. This assumption implies that this study does not consider shareholders’ choice to set up a new bank or close an existing one.

10 Based on the Dixit-Stiglitz formulation, the loan revenue and deposit expenditure

functions in Eq. (2.6) take the forms rlm � lm ¼ amð Þ � lmð Þ �m�1 �m and rdm � dm ¼ bmð Þ�

dmð Þ gmþ1 gm respectively.

the required reserve ratio and the minimum capital adequacy ratio, respectively, and K3 is the initial capital allocated to the foreign affiliate. Then the budget constraints on the bank’s home and host country operations are as follows.

l1 þ l2 6 K1;2 þ D1;2 þ 1� d1;2ð Þ � d1 þ d2ð Þ ð2:7Þ l3 6 K3 þ D3 þ 1� d3ð Þ � d3 ð2:8Þ

The host country bank regulator considers the bank’s risk- weighted capitalization in its regulatory capital requirement, as outlined in the Basel Accords. Let ðh1;2; h3Þ denote the home and host country bank regulator’s stance on risk, respectively. This is the regulator’s risk aversion parameter, i.e. the weight the regula- tor assigns to the market risk associated with the fraction of the bank’s portfolio that originates from the bank regulator’s country of supervision. Let ðV1;2; V3Þ denote the variance–covariance matrix of the return indices within the home country and the host country, respectively.11 The risk-weighted capital requirements in the home country and host country are then

E eK 1;2h i� h1;22 � eK 01;2V1;2 eK 1;2� �P j1;2 � l1 þ l2ð Þ ð2:9Þ E eK 3h i� h32 � eK 03V3 eK 3� �P j3 � l3ð Þ ð2:10Þ

The budget and regulatory constraints must hold in each period and each country. At this point it is useful to re-introduce the time index t, country index i and bank index j.

Given the state Pt 2 P, banks choose actions simultaneously. The two types of actions are the period-by-period loan/deposit vol- ume choices and the dynamic foreign market entry/exit decisions. Let Et ¼ e1t . . . eJt

� denote the vector of all banks’ time t entry/exit

choices, and Ej ¼ ej1 . . . ejT �

denotes bank j’s actions over time. Then E ¼ E1 . . . EJ

� is the matrix of all entry/exit decisions. Before

choosing its actions, each bank j receives a private shock mjt , drawn independently across banks and over time from a distribution G �jPtð Þwith support m. For example, the private shock might derive from variability in managerial drive for international portfolio diversification. Let the vector mt ¼ m1t ; . . . ; mJt

� denote the private

shocks of all banks. The bank’s overall end-period capitalizations eK j is normally

distributed, since it is the sum of normally distributed random

variables. eK 0jV eK j� � is the variance–covariance of the bank’s portfo- lio. k is the bank’s constant risk aversion. Given its private shock, the entry/exit decision vector Ej and the set of state variables Pt , in each period t bank j chooses its loan and deposit volumes to maximize its mean–variance expected utility as follows.

max limj ;d

i mj ;D

i j ;K

i j

u ej;P; mj �

t ¼ E ~Kj � �

t � kj

2 � eK 0jV eK j� �

t ð2:11Þ

subject to the budget and regulatory constraints described in Eqs. (2.7)–(2.10).

Let c < 1 denote the time-invariant discount factor. Bank j makes foreign market entry and exit decisions to maximize its dis- counted sum of expected utilities over time as follows.

max e1j ;...;eMj

E XT t¼0

ctuj ej;P; mj �

tjPt

" # ð2:12Þ

11 V1;2 represents the variance–covariance matrix of the bank’s home country operations. Accordingly, it is the variance–covariance matrix of the returns on home country loans l1, home country deposits d1, cross-border loans l2 and cross-border deposits d2. Similarly, V3 stands for the variance–covariance matrix of the returns on the bank’s foreign country operations (foreign affiliate loans l3 and deposits d3). Based on these definitions, these country-specific covariance matrices are not the same as the overall variance–covariance matrix on the bank’s global portfolio, denoted by V in Eq. (2.1).

J. Temesvary / Journal of Banking & Finance 44 (2014) 233–247 237

The expectation is over bank j’s private shock in the current period, as well as over future values of the state variables P, actions Ej, and private shocks mj. The final aspect of the model is the transition between states. As described above, the state vector at date t þ 1 is denoted by Ptþ1, and is drawn from a probability distribution K Ptþ1jet ;Ptð Þ. The dependence of this function on et means that time t entry/exit decisions affect the future strategic environment. However, not all states are influenced by past actions.

The analysis of equilibrium behavior focuses on pure strategy Markov perfect equilibria (MPE). In a MPE, each bank’s behavior depends only on the current state. Formally, a Markov strategy for bank j is a function xj : P� mj # Ej. A profile of Markov strate- gies is a vector x ¼ x1; . . . ;xJ

� where x : ðP; m1; . . . ; mJÞ# E. If

behavior is given by a Markov strategy profile x, bank j’s expected utility over time, given a state P can be written recursively:

Vj P;xð Þ¼Em uj x P;mð Þ;Pt;mjt �

þc Z

Vj P 0;xð ÞdK P0jx P;ð Þ;Pð ÞjP

� � ð2:13Þ

In (2.13), Vj is bank j’s ex ante value function in that it reflects expected profits at the beginning of a period before private shocks are realized. The profile x is a MPE if, given the opponent profile x�j, each bank j prefers its strategy xj to all alternative Markov strategies x0j. That is, x is a MPE if for all banks j, states P, and Markov strategies x0j,

Vj P;xð ÞP Vj P;x0j;x�j � �

ð2:14Þ

It is assumed that all the conditions for the existence of such a MPE are satisfied. Given the entry cost and scrap value vectors of C and � , bank j’s optimal entry/exit rule is then as follows.

Enter if Vj eimj¼1;eim�j;P;x � �

�Cim PVj eimj¼0;eim�j;P;x � �

;

Exit if Vj eimj¼�1;eim�j;P;x � �

þ� im PVj eimj¼0;eim�j;P;x � �

;

Stay ‘put’ if otherwise:

8>>><>>>: ð2:15Þ

12 The sample captures an active period of U.S. bank mergers. In order to avoid the problem of big ‘jumps’ in balance sheets due to mergers, the issue is handled as follows. First, merger events are identified based on the FFIEC’s National Information Center’s Institution History feature. Starting with the time of merger, the merging banks are then eliminated from the sample. The merged banks are then considered as a newly created entity, which is assigned the original acquiring bank’s balance sheet and claims data from then on.

3. Data and estimation

3.1. Data

The estimation is based on a unique U.S. bank-level dataset newly created from the merger of regulatory balance sheet data and FFIEC 009a data on select U.S. banks’ foreign claims. This paper relies on two ‘versions’ of this dataset. The first, ‘unrestricted’ dataset contains detailed balance sheet data on all U.S. financial institutions subject to reporting requirements. The second, ‘restricted’ dataset contains balance sheet and country-specific foreign claims data for all U.S. financial institutions who report to the FFIEC on the 009a form. This is referred to as the ‘restricted’ dataset.

The ‘unrestricted’ dataset incorporates various types of banking organizations, including commercial banks, bank holding compa- nies, and edge and agreement corporations. The dataset was created by merging regulatory balance sheet data from the Call Reports with foreign claims data from the FFIEC 009a forms. As for the balance sheet data, data were collected from the Report of Condition and Income, as reported on the FFIEC Central Data Repository’s Public Data Distribution site (for commercials banks), from the FR Y-9C forms as reported on the Chicago Fed’s website (for bank holding companies) and from the FR 2886b and FFIEC 002 forms (for Edge and Agreement Corporations). This combined dataset consists of balance sheet and financial data for over

18,000 U.S. financial institutions. In order to identify those banks with significant foreign exposures, an indicator variable is created that takes on a value of ‘1’ if the bank reports on the FFIEC 009a form, and ‘0’ otherwise.

The ‘restricted’ dataset contains information on the subset of U.S. financial institutions that are required to report detailed infor- mation on international claims volumes and activities on the FFIEC’s 009a Data Report form. U.S. financial institutions are required to report foreign country-specific claims on this form (the volumes broken down into cross-border and foreign affiliate claims) if exposure to that given country exceeds 1% of the institu- tion’s total assets, or 20% of its capital. This dataset contains data on 82 FFIEC-reporting banks’s foreign claims in 83 host markets. Of the reporting U.S. banks, 59% are commercial banks, 28% are offices of bank holding companies, 7% are trade financing offices, and the remainder are in the business of investment banking and securities dealing or sales financing.12 Cross-border claims and foreign affiliate claims are reported separately for each host country-bank-time period combination.

The key dependent variables in the following econometric anal- ysis are: host country-specific cross-border claims, foreign affiliate claims and market entry/exit choices. Data for cross-border claims are taken as Column 4 in the FFIEC 009a forms, and defined as: ‘Amount of Cross-border Claims Outstanding After Mandated Adjustments for Transfer of Exposure (excluding derivative prod- ucts’ (Column 1) plus ‘Amount of Cross-border Claims Outstanding from Derivative Products after Mandated Adjustments for Transfer of Exposure’ (Column 3). Foreign affiliate claims are defined as ‘Amount of Net Foreign Office Claims on Local Residents (including derivative products)’ (Column 2). Total foreign assets in host coun- try i are therefore defined as the sum of the above three items. U.S. (home country) claims are calculated from the Call Reports as described in detail in Table 1. Importantly, the model above describes banks’ claims and liabilities as functions of bank and market-specific characteristics. In order to include data on bank traits (such as total capital and return on equity), the ‘restricted’ dataset is merged with data on the 82 FFIEC 009a-reporting banks’ balance sheets from the regulatory sources above. In order to incorporate data on host markets, the bank data is also merged with data on the macro-indicators of the 83 foreign countries that U.S. banks hold claims in. Country-specific macro data come from the IMF’s International Financial Statistics, OECD’s Statistics, the EIU’s Country Data and the World Bank’s Bank Regulation and Supervision database. The ‘restricted’ dataset therefore contains quarterly balance sheet, financial and country-specific foreign claims data for 82 banks in 83 foreign markets, broken down by claims type.

The choice of the time frame for the analysis is motivated by data availability considerations. On its website, the FFIEC makes 009a data available starting with the 2003 Q1 quarter. Therefore, both the ‘unrestricted’ and the ‘restricted’ datasets cover the period spanning from the first quarter of 2003 to the first quarter of 2013, a total of 41 quarters.

Some traits of this ‘restricted’ dataset warrants further discus- sion. First, the 009a form reports data on an ‘ultimate risk’ basis, i.e. adjusted for cross-country transfers of risk. As such, the reported claims reflect total claims acquired in that host market, minus the amount of claims for which the repayment responsibility has been

Table 1 Summary of Explanatory Variables.

Variable name Notation Empirical measure

Cross-Border Claims claims2 Cross-border claims, millions USD column 4 from the FFIEC 009a surveys Affiliate Claims claims3 Net Affiliate claims, millions USD from the FFIEC 009a Surveys U.S. Domestic Claims claims1 Sum of U.S. public claims, financial sector claims and non-financial private claims of banks

a

Foreign Market Presence {P Taken as 1 if claims3 > 0 on FFIEC 009a form, 0 otherwise Bank Capital Kj Bank’s total assets, millions USD RCON/RCFD/RIAD/RCFD 3210 from the regulatory datasets Expected Market Return �a Stockmarket return index, averaged over 3-quarter rolling windows from the IMF’s IFS & EIU’s Country Data GDP Deflator – From EIU’s Country Data Return on Equity – Calculated as RCON/RCFD/RIAD/RCFD (4340/3210) � 100 Capital-Asset Ratio – RCON/RCFD/RIAD/RCFD (3210/8276) � 100 Cost-Asset Ratio – RCON/RCFD/RIAD/RCFD (4093 or 4073)/2170 � 100 Foreign Owner Percent – RCON/RCFD/RIAD/RCFD 9325 Income Tax Rate s Corporate Tax Rate in host market used in structural stage only Minimum Capital Ratio and Reserve

Requirement ðj; dÞ Minimum Capital Adequacy & RRR from the World Bank’s Bank Regulation and Supervision database and

national central bank websites Host-U.S. covar. – Covariance between the U.S. and host stockmarket growth, over 3-quarter rolling windows Market Return Variance V Variance of stockmarket index growth rate taken over 3-quarter rolling windows Real GDP – From EIU’s Country Data Inverse Mills (first) MR Inverse Mills ratio calculated from the ‘reporting’ probit regression

Inverse Mills (second) MP Inverse Mills ratio calculated from the ‘market presence’ probit regression

Bank & Regulatory Risk Aversion, Entry & Scrap values

ðk; h; C; WÞ Estimated from Model

a Note: U.S. public claims are the sum of items 0090, 0371, 8636, 1918, 2107, 3532, g421, 8635. U.S. financial sector claims are the sum of items 0082, 1505, g418, 3171 minus c029). U.S. non-financial private claims are items 1761, 2182, g422, 1975 minus c028.

238 J. Temesvary / Journal of Banking & Finance 44 (2014) 233–247

transferred to other countries (outward transfer of risk), plus the amount of claims lent to other countries for which the given host country has taken responsibility (inward transfer of risk). As such, the actual amounts lent to any given country (on an ‘immediate counterparty’ basis) can be quite different from the amounts the country is responsible for repaying (on an ‘ultimate risk’ basis).13

Second, U.S. banks’ cross-border claims are reported on a ‘gross’ basis, but foreign affiliate (local) claims are reported ‘net’ of affiliate liabil- ities. Therefore, the bank level dataset does not allow for the separate analysis of liabilities, and the foreign affiliate claim equations are estimated using ‘net’ foreign affiliate claims as the dependent vari- able. Third, as mentioned above the FFIEC 009a reports data on ‘claims’ as opposed to ‘loans’. As a result, the reported volumes include assets other than loans (such as bonds, stocks, and derivative products). To reflect the structure of the dataset, loans l are hereon replaced with claims. The motivation for using stock market indices as measures of market returns comes from this composite nature of the dependent variable. These indices are likely to capture the average returns on the various types of assets that are reported as ‘claims’ on the FFIEC 009a form. Finally, the FFIEC 009a dataset does not provide information on the mode of foreign market entry, i.e. whether entry occurred via merger with an incumbent bank in the host market, or via greenfield investment. This distinction, however, should not matter for the following analysis since foreign acquisition and greenfield investment both imply the payment of some fixed costs. If entry occurs via foreign acquisition rather than greenfield investment, the scrap value of market exit can be interpreted as the value of the sale of foreign participation.14

3.2. Estimation method

The estimation consists of two stages. The first stage examines the role of a broad set of bank vs. market traits in claims volume and entry/exit decisions simultaneously. This, together with the correction for the various data reporting and market selection biases, is a step beyond previous practice. The second (structural) stage of the estimation addresses the question: what are banks’

13 Of course, at the global level the two types of exposure must equal. 14 Many thanks to the anonymous referee for making this point.

and regulators’ stance on risk, and the entry costs and scrap values of foreign bank entry? The gist of this step is to allow data to reveal the values of these parameters that would rationalize observed bank behavior. The following analysis proceeds under two main assumptions. First, the model described above represents banks’ true behavior. Second, the market entry/exit and claims volume choices observed in the data correspond to banks’ optimal actions. An important issue to address in the following estimation is that the second-stage structural parameters already enter the first- stage policy function. This is handled via an iterative formulation. First, the second stage of the estimation (described below) is run on actual bank data. This yields initial estimates for the structural parameters, used as data in the first stage estimations from then onwards. The iterations continue until the structural estimates converge. The second-stage structural estimators are consistent and asymptotically normal if the sufficient conditions specified in Appendix C are met.

3.2.1. First-stage estimation This section presents a brief outline of the estimation. The main

focus of the first stage is the reduced-form estimation of the rela- tionship between banks’ choices of foreign markets and claims vol- umes and the state variables in P. However, there are two important selection biases that arise at this first (reduced form) stage of the estimation, necessitating some auxiliary steps of cor- rection. One source of selection bias is the fact that only U.S. banks with significant foreign exposure are required to report on the FFIEC 009a form. Another source of selection bias is inherent in the market entry/exit choices. Since the chosen markets are funda- mentally more attractive, banks are likely to acquire significantly more claims in these markets than they would in the average market. Both biases are corrected via the Heckman-style two-step selection bias correction method.15 The reduced-form first stage of the estimation will consist of three steps: a probit equation of banks’ reporting/non-reporting status, a probit equation of the market entry/exit choice, and the claims volume choice equations.

15 In general, the two-step correction consists of (1) the calculation of the inverse Mills ratio from the selection equation and (2) the inclusion of this inverse Mills ratio as an extra estimator in the ‘biased’ equation.

J. Temesvary / Journal of Banking & Finance 44 (2014) 233–247 239

First, the reporting bias is considered. Let Nj denote the bank’s excess utility from holding claims in any given foreign country in excess of 20% of its capital or 1% of its assets.16 Nj is an unobserved function of bank traits. Let {Rj denote the indicator function that takes a value of 1 if the bank reports to the FFIEC via the 009a form, and 0 otherwise.17 Then the observation criterion is

Observe {Rj ¼ 1 if Nj ¼ / R �PRj þ eRj P 0

Observe {Rj ¼ 0 otherwise:

( ð3:1Þ

where PRj is the set of bank characteristics that affect banks’ report- ing vs. non-reporting status (i.e. whether they maintain a high enough foreign exposure to have to report). If eRj is normal, the prob- ability of reporting can be expressed as follows.

prob {Rj ¼ 1 � �

¼ Prob Nj P 0 �

¼ Prob / �Pj þ eRj P 0 � �

¼ U / �Pj �

ð3:2Þ

This equation is estimated via random-effects probit, to take account of the panel structure of the data. The dependent variable is an indicator variable that takes on a value of 1 if the bank reports on the FFIEC 009a form, and 0 otherwise. The set of bank traits included in pRj are as follows: total capitalization, Return on Equity, Post-financial crisis indicator variable, capital-to-assets ratio, cost-to-assets ratio, percent owned by foreigners, bank type (bank holding company, edge corporation, etc.), International Banking Facility indicator, bank’s age (in years) and bank’s risk aversion (kj).18 After the estimation, the inverse Mills ratio is calculated.19

Second, the market selection bias is examined. Recall that {Pj denotes the ‘indicator’ function that takes a value of 1 if bank j is ‘present’ in the market, and 0 otherwise. Information on {Pj is avail- able only if the bank reports on Form 009a, i.e. if it ‘passes’ the first stage selection with {Rj ¼ 1. Let X

i j denote bank j’s excess utility

from holding claims in country i, which is an unobserved function of bank, market and country-specific traits. The observation rule of {P;ij is then as follows.

Observe {P;ij ¼ 1 if X i j ¼ j � ½{

P;i j;t�1; P

P;i þ eP;ij P 0 and { R j ¼ 1

Observe {P;ij ¼ 0 otherwise:

( ð3:3Þ

where PP;ij is the set of bank and host market traits that affect banks’ choice of market presence. If eP;ij is normal, the probability of affiliate presence can be expressed as follows.

prob {P;ij;t ¼ 1 � �

¼ Prob j � ½{P;ij;t�1; P P;i j ; M

R� þ eP;ij P 0 � �

¼ U j � ½{P;ij;t�1; P P;i j ; M

R� h i

ð3:4Þ

where MR is the inverse Mills ratio from the estimation of Eq. (3.2). Eq. (3.4) is estimated via random-effects probit, to take account

of the panel structure of the data. The dependent variable is an indicator variable that takes on a value of 1 if the bank is present in the given host market that period, and 0 otherwise. The set of explanatory variables in pP;ij are: lagged presence indicator {

P;i j;t�1,

total capitalization, capital-assets ratio, return on equity, post-financial crisis indicator, gross domestic product, bank’s cost-to-assets ratio, percentage owned by foreigners, stockmarket growth (market return), variance of stockmarket returns,

16 The reporting threshold on Form 009a. 17 The superscript R stands for ‘Reporting’. 18 The variables that appear in this initial equation but not in any of the later-stage

equations (i.e. the identification variables) are: percent owned by foreigners, bank type, International Banking Facility indicator and bank’s age.

19 An important issue to address is that the second-stage structural parameter in H already enter the first-stage policy function. This is handled as described in the first paragraph of Section 3.2.

covariance of host market with U.S. stock market and GDP deflator. The following structural parameters are also included: fixed entry cost, scrap value, regulatory risk aversion and bank risk aversion. After Eq. (3.4) is estimated, marginal effects for the market entry subset with ð{P;ij;t ¼ 1j{

P;i j;t�1 ¼ 0Þ are calculated. Marginal effects for

the market exit subset with ð{P;ij;t ¼ 0j{ P;i j;t�1 ¼ 1Þ characterize banks’

market exit choice. After the estimation, predicted probabilities are calculated from Eq. (3.4). These are the transition probabilities for the ’market presence’ vector {P .

As a next step, the non-linear first order conditions taken from (2.11) are log-linearized around the perfectly competitive symmet- ric certainty equilibrium, the steps of which are shown in Appendix A and B. This log-linearization yields estimable reduced-form policy equations. In these log-linearized estimable equations, l is now replaced with claims to reflect the structure of the data. Suppressing the time subscripts, the observation criteria for the domestic, cross-border and foreign affiliate claims volumes are as follows.

For U:S: and foreign affiliate claims ðm¼1;3Þ : ðclaimsÞi1;3;j¼pi1;3;j �P

i 1;3;jþ�i1;3;j if {

R j ¼1 and {

P;i j ¼1

for cross-border claims ðm¼2Þ : ðclaimsÞi2;j¼pi2;j �P

i 2;mþ�i2;j if {

R j ¼1

8>>>><>>>>: ð3:5Þ

where ðP1; P2; P3Þ are the sets of explanatory variables and ð�1; �2; �3Þ are error terms for the domestic, cross-border and foreign affiliate claims volumes, respectively. Inclusion of the inverse Mills ratios from the two selection equations eliminates the selection bias from the cross-border and foreign affiliate claims regressions.

ðclaimsÞi1;3;j ¼ pi1;3;j � ½P i 1;3;j; M

R; MP � þ �i1;3;j ðclaimsÞi2;j ¼ pi2;j � ½P

i 2;m; M

R� þ �i2;j ð3:6Þ

The set of bank and market traits included in (3.6) are as fol- lows: total capitalization, return on equity, bank’s capital-assets ratio, post-financial crisis indicator, GDP, percent of foreign owner, minimum capital ratio, stockmarket growth, host market – U.S. market covariance, variance of stockmarket returns and GDP deflator. The following structural parameters are also included: regulatory risk aversion and bank risk aversion. Eq. (3.6) is estimated via random-effects maximum likelihood, to take account of the panel structure of the data.

A further important issue to address is: how do the state vari- ables in P evolve over time? In order to be able to use Eq. (2.12) to approximate bank j’s expected utility, one needs numerous predicted paths of the state variables in P to average over. Let Pz denote the zth state variable. If Pz has the Markov property, the following equation can be used to forward simulate values of Pz, given a starting value. Pz;t ¼ nz �Pz;t�1 þ ez ð3:7Þ

Empirical estimates of ½n̂z; ^varðezÞ� can be obtained by running the linear regression equation in (3.7) on the observed (actual) data for Pz. This regression yields coefficient estimates ½n̂z� and esti- mated sample variance of the error term ^varðezÞ. Given an initial value for Pz, the coefficients ½n̂z� and random error term draws from the normal distribution with moments Nð0; ^varðezÞÞ can be used to forward simulate N paths of Pz. Let Pn denote the set of state variables resulting from the n’th simulation. Plugging Pn into Eq. (3.4) and random error term draws based on the estimated var- iance ^varðePÞ then yield simulated paths of the market presence vector {̂P (the endogenous state variable). Finally, the Pn’s together with the policy function estimates /̂ from (3.4) and (3.6) are then plugged into Eqs. (2.11). Taking the discounted sum of utilities and averaging over all simulations in N then becomes the empirical approximation of the indirect utility in Eq. (2.12) as follows.

240 J. Temesvary / Journal of Banking & Finance 44 (2014) 233–247

bV P;x; Hð Þ ¼ 1 N

RNn¼1

E XT t¼0

ctu x̂n Pn:t; mn;tð Þ;Pn;t; mn;t; Hð ÞjP0 ¼ P; H " #

: ð3:8Þ

3.2.2. Second step: structural parameter estimates This second step of the estimation consists of finding the values

of the structural parameters in H that ensure that the bank’s observed claims and market entry/exit choices are rational (i.e. yield the highest expected lifetime value, as compared to other possible paths of action). The goal is to estimates these parameters for each country separately, i.e. to get estimates of Hi exploiting variation across banks, markets and time periods. This is done as follows.

Let bV j P;xj;x�j; H0� denote the predicted value of bank j’s expected lifetime value, corresponding to its optimal strategy x ¼ ðxj;x�jÞ. Let ðx0j;x�jÞ denote the strategy that consists of bank j taking a one-step deviation from its optimal strategy with all other banks’ strategies unchanged. For instance, suppose that one of the observed datapoints is that bank j entered market m at time t. A one-step deviation would be for this bank to enter market m at time t � 1 instead of t, all other actions unchanged. Let bV P;x0; Hð Þ denote the value of this one-step deviation, calcu- lated from Eq. (3.8). Let k ¼ 1 . . . K index the one-step deviations. For each one of these deviations k, the corresponding expected bank value can be calculated based on (3.8). If banks behave rationally, the value of the observed set of actions in Eq. (3.8) must have a higher value than any of the considered one-step deviations.

bV j P;xj;x�j; H0� P bV j P;x0j;x�j; H0� � ð3:9Þ There are a total of K ¼ 2 � ðT � 1Þ � J �M one-step deviations to

consider for any given country, across all banks, markets and time periods.20 The goal is to obtain country-specific estimates ^Hi that minimize violations of this K set of inequalities for each country i separately. 21

Let x denote the equilibrium conditions, and gð�Þ is the ‘excess value’ the bank gets from its optimal set of choices over the k’th sub-optimal path.

gj;k x; H; /̂ � �

¼ bV j P;xj;x�j; H; /̂; ĵ; p̂� � � bV j P;x0j;k; x�j; H; /̂; ĵ; p̂� � ð3:10Þ

Recall that /̂; ĵ; p̂ � �

denote the first-stage policy function estimates. Then the mean squared deviation from the optimality condition in Eq. (3.9) across all perturbations k ¼ 1 . . . K can be written as:

Q H; /̂; ĵ; p̂ � �

¼ 1 K � XK k¼1

min gk H; /̂; ĵ; p̂ � �

;0 n o� �2

ð3:11Þ

The best estimates of the structural parameters in H are such that

Ĥ :¼ arg min H

Q H; /̂; ĵ; p̂ � �

ð3:12Þ

The estimators are consistent and asymptotically normal if the sufficient conditions specified in Appendix C are met.

20 There are ðT � 1Þ � J entry and ðT � 1Þ � J exit possibilities to consider for each market.

21 Bank-specific kj are estimated from a first-pass at the model where variation across market, time and one-step deviations is used to identify kj ’s. These values are then used as given in the market-specific entry cost, scrap value and risk aversion estimations described in this section.

4. Estimation results

4.1. Market entry/exit choices and claims volumes

In the interest of space, detailed results on the FFIEC reporting/ non-reporting selection equation are not reported.22 It suffices to say that banks who report to the FFIEC on their foreign exposures (1) are bigger (in terms of total capitalization) and more cost- effective, (2) have a higher percentage of foreign ownership, (3) more likely to be international banking facilities, in particular edge or agreement corporations, and (4) younger, in terms of years since U.S. incorporation. Tables 1 and 2 describe and provide summary statistics for the explanatory variables used in the estimations, respectively.

The first two columns in Table 3 list the effects of the set of explanatory variables in PP on banks’ choice to set up (market entry) or close (market exit) a foreign affiliate in a host country. Bank size (as proxied by total capital) is by far the most important determinant of foreign market entry and exit. A 1% rise in total capital increases the probabilities of entry and exit by 1.73% and 3.41% points, respectively. Furthermore, less cost-effective and less profitable banks are significantly more likely to enter, and less capitalized banks are more likely to exit a host market. Among host market traits, a 1% increase in the co-movement of the U.S. and host financial markets raises the probability of exit by as much as 10.52% points. Interestingly, greater variance of host market returns makes banks more likely to set up an affiliate there – perhaps as a way to ensure closer monitoring of volatile projects. Among the structural variables, 1% increases in entry costs and the risk aversion of regulators make market entry significantly less likely (by 1.48% and 0.28% points, respectively). Greater scrap values raise the probability of market exit, whereas the bank’s risk stance does not play a significant role.

The effect of the financial crisis warrants further discussion. Recent literature has highlighted significant reductions in U.S. banks’ foreign activities since the financial crisis (as outlined in the Introduction). The results of this analysis qualify that state- ment: much of the documented reduction is directly attributable to detrimental changes in bank and market conditions. After con- trolling for changes in a broad set of market and bank traits over time, the positive coefficient on the post-crisis indicator variable remains significant and large – suggesting a structural shift towards foreign market entry. All else equal, banks are 5.72% points more likely to enter a new market in the period after 2008 Q3 than before.

The last two columns of Table 3 describe the cross-border claims and foreign affiliate claims estimation results. In the cross-border results of the third column, the dominance of bank traits is apparent. Larger, worse capitalized and less profitable banks hold significantly more cross-border claims. A 1% point increase in foreign ownership raises C–B claims by as much as 0.80%. Among market traits, only the home-market (U.S.) mini- mum capital ratio requirement (MCR) has a significant effect, whereas most host market traits enter with the expected signs but insignificantly. Controlling for changes in market and bank traits, U.S. banks acquire significantly less cross-border claims in the post-crisis period than before, in line with previous evidence (Cetorelli and Goldberg, 2009). Importantly, the correlation coeffi- cient qR is positive and significant, validating the importance of correcting the reporting bias. Those banks who report on the FFIEC 009a form have unobservable traits that make them lend 10.10% more in cross-border claims than the average U.S. bank would.

22 Detailed tables are available from the author upon request.

Table 2 Summary statistics of variables.

Name Minimum 25 ptile 50 ptile 75 ptile Maximum Mean Standard dev.

Cross-border claims (logs) 0.00 2.89 4.84 7.52 11.86 5.26 2.86 Affiliate claims (logs) �0.99 4.09 6.27 8.02 13.55 6.10 2.72 Foreign market presence 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 0.25 0.43 Bank capital (log) �6.91 3.85 5.67 7.81 13.43 5.80 3.16 Exp. market return (%) �25.12 �2.71 3.03 8.38 69.08 2.63 10.88 GDP deflator 77.16 99.3 105.18 112.37 470.93 118.04 50.39 Return on equity (%) �11.55 1.30 4.24 8.97 126.24 7.40 13.26 Capital-asset ratio (%) 0.57 11.80 15.39 21.24 60.59 18.10 9.99 Foreign owner percent 0.00 0.00 0.00 99.00 100.00 37.68 46.41 Min capital ratio 8.00 8.00 8.00 9.00 13.00 8.62 1.40 Host-U.S. covar. �43.68 13.52 33.28 81.46 229.53 51.60 52.83 Market return variance 0.31 20.59 50.24 111.65 484.13 77.90 78.54 Inverse mills (1st stage) 0.13 0.22 0.28 0.37 1.20 0.35 0.21 Inverse mills (2nd stage) 0.26 0.35 0.41 0.82 3.78 0.76 0.72 Real GDP (logs) 1.49 4.64 6.29 6.84 9.52 5.96 1.90 Cost-asset ratio (%) 0.00 1.25 2.49 4.15 38.22 3.66 4.78 Income tax rate (%) 0.00 22.00 28.00 33.00 44.00 26.25 8.81 Reserve reqmnt. (%) 0.00 0.00 2.00 13.00 60.00 8.08 14.30

Note: Variable definitions can be found in Table 1.

J. Temesvary / Journal of Banking & Finance 44 (2014) 233–247 241

Foreign affiliate claims results are reported in the last column of Table 3. Larger and better capitalized, as well as more profitable, foreign-owned and risk averse banks acquire significantly more foreign affiliate claims. As expected, greater variance of foreign market returns discourages foreign affiliate claims. All else equal, banks hold slightly (0.28%) more foreign affiliate claims in the post-crisis period. The positive and statistically significant correla- tion coefficients ðqR;qPÞ highlights the importance of correcting the selection bias. Those banks who report on the FFIEC 009a form hold 5.70% more foreign affiliate claims than the average U.S. bank would. Furthermore, the ‘entered’ markets have special unob- served traits that make the average U.S. bank hold 3% more claims in these markets than they would in the average foreign market. Ignoring these selection issues would lead to biased coefficient estimates.

Those variables which have different effects on the market entry vs. the affiliate volumes choices warrant special attention. In particular, banks with higher returns on equity (ROE) are signif- icantly less likely to enter a new market, but conditional on having entered, lend significantly more there. Similarly, banks are signifi- cantly less likely to enter host markets with strict bank regulators (higher values of the risk stance h), but lend significantly more in the presence of such regulators, conditional on having already entered. The effect of the covariance between the returns of the U.S. and host markets is also interesting. Stronger such covariance makes banks less likely to enter a host market, but lend significantly more there once entry occurs. To the extent that the covariance of returns is a measure of how closely integrated the host country financial market is with that of the U.S., the implica- tion is that financial integration provides a stronger lending motive than risk sharing considerations. However, it is the portfolio diver- sification motive that appears to drive the market entry/exit decision.

A key implication of the results is that the aftermath of the financial crisis has brought a compositional shift in foreign bank- ing, and not a general trend away from it. It appears that the well-documented reduction in U.S. banks’ foreign activities (as dis- cussed in the Introduction) is due to the deterioration of bank and market conditions in the aftermath of the financial crisis, and not attitudes against foreign involvement. The first-stage results imply that after controlling for market and bank balance sheet changes, U.S. banks have shown a strong tendency towards foreign affiliate banking away from cross-border banking over the past 5 years.

4.2. Risk aversions, market entry costs and scrap values

This subsection describes the estimation results for the struc- tural parameters of the model: banks’ risk aversion parameter kj, the country-specific regulatory risk stance hi, and the country- specific entry costs Ci and scrap values � i (which are common across banks and constant over time). The second stage of the model is estimated for the pre- and post-crisis period separately. All structural estimates are summarized in Table 4.

Bank risk aversion is the k term from the mean–variance objec- tive of the bank. As such, it captures the weight that the bank assigns to the market risk (global variance–covariance of returns) on its portfolio, relative to expected returns. The analysis yields a median estimate k ¼ 0:04 for the pre-crisis period, and k ¼ 0:07 for the post-crisis period. This value is significantly lower than previous risk aversion estimates for U.S. banks’ domestic activities, at around 0.20 (Nishiyama, 2007). It is, however, in line with expectations that the analysis of the global activities of large international banks would indicate more risk-loving behavior than results derived from the local activities of domestic U.S. banks of all sizes.

Regulatory risk stance h is the weight that the given country’s bank regulator attaches to the market risk on banks’ local (country-level) portfolios. This is the weight that appears in the risk-weighted minimum capital requirement in Eq. (2.9) and (2.10). Greater risk aversion (higher weight) means that banks are more limited in the amount of risk they can take on in their local portfolio. The median country’s bank regulator is more risk averse than the median bank in both the pre-and post-crisis periods. Looking across countries, the bank regulator is more risk averse than the median U.S. bank in 77% of the countries. The median country’s bank regulator’s risk aversion has increased since the financial crisis (from 0.07 to 0.16, respectively).

Entry costs represent all fixed costs of entering a new banking market, including brick and mortar costs, as well as administrative, bureaucratic and legal fees (such as costs of licences, permits and incorporation). Scrap values represent the amount that banks are able to recover of these entry costs (via sale of real estate, equip- ment, refunds, liquidation, etc.) upon exiting the market. Entry costs have increased threefold since before the financial crisis, whereas scrap values have remained relatively stable. Before the crisis, U.S. banks were able to recover 75% of entry costs in the form of scrap. Since the crisis, however, this share has fallen to only 25%.

Table 3 Estimation Results. Foreign market entry & exit and claims volume choices. Reported coefficients are elasticities and semi-elasticities (indicated by s superscript).

Independent variables Dependent variables

Probabilities Claim volumes

Market entry Market exit Cross-border Affiliate

Total capitalization 1.73⁄⁄⁄ 3.41⁄⁄ 0.77⁄⁄⁄ 0.28⁄⁄⁄

(0.58) (1.62) (0.03) (0.09) Capital-assets ratios �0.02 �0.51 �0.10⁄⁄⁄ 0.02⁄⁄

(0.07) (0.35) (0.01) (0.01) Return on equitys �0.33⁄⁄⁄ �0.15 �0.10⁄⁄⁄ 0.10⁄

(0.12) (0.42) (0.01) (0.06) Post-crisiss 5.72⁄⁄ �5.82 �0.17⁄⁄⁄ 0.28⁄

(2.61) (9.77) (0.06) (0.16) GDP 0.71 �2.00 0.11 0.10

(0.64) (3.03) (0.08) (0.30) Cost-to-assets ratios 0.66⁄⁄ 0.67 – –

(0.32) (1.41) Foreign owner percents – – 0.80⁄⁄⁄ 0.01⁄

((0.01) (0.01) Minimum capital ratios – – -0.05⁄⁄ �0.30

(0.02) (0.60) Market return 0.05 0.02 0.10 0.10

(0.05) (0.57) (0.10) (0.10) Host-U.S. return covariance �1.14 10.52⁄ 0.04 0.31⁄⁄

(0.94) (6.29) (0.04) (0.13) Variance of returns 1.48⁄ �1.34 �0.20 �0.13⁄

(0.90) (4.45) (0.40) (0.07) Fixed entry cost �1.48⁄ – –

(0.65) Regulatory risk aversion �0.28⁄⁄ 0.28 0.01 0.30⁄⁄⁄

0.12) (0.32) (0.01) (0.10) Fixed scrap value – 0.66⁄ – –

(0.38) Bank’s risk aversion 2.15 �8.28 �0.12 0.57⁄⁄

(4.20) (14.67) (0.19) (0.23) GDP Deflator – – 0.51⁄⁄ -0.02

(0.21) (0.25) Constant �0.84 �10.34 0.92 11.56⁄⁄⁄

(15.41) (15.95) (1.87) (3.83) qR: ‘Reporting’ bias 0.55 – 0.65⁄ 0.42⁄

(0.82) (0.36) (0.25) qP: ‘Market Choice’ bias – – – 0.11⁄⁄⁄

(0.04) Prob Pv2 0.01 0.06 0.00 0.00 No. of country-bank pairs 241 56 215 89 Observations 2232 1568 1985 1895

Notea: The left two columns present the results of the market entry/exit random-effects probit estimations, described in Eq. (3.4). The dependent variable is an indicator that equals 1 if the bank is present in the given host market in that time period, and 0 otherwise. For the market entry/exit estimations, the reported marginal effects should be interpreted as the % point change in the probability of entry or exit, in response to a 1 unit (in case of semi-elasticities marked by superscript s) or a 1% (in case of the unmarked variables) change in the explanatory variable. Noteb:The right two columns present the results of the cross-border claim and foreign affiliate claims random effects maximum likelihood estimations, described in Eq. (3.6).

The dependent variables are the logs of the total cross-border claims and net affiliate claims that banks report on the FFIEC 009a form, by country. For the cross-border and affiliate claim volume equations, the reported marginal effects should be interpreted as the percent change in the volume of claims, in response to a 1 unit (in case of semi-elasticities marked by superscript s) or a 1% (in case of the unmarked variables) change in the explanatory variable. All explanatory variables are as in Table 1. Notec: Reported coefficients are calculated elasticities and semi-elasticities (s). ⁄ Statistical significance at 10% levels. ⁄⁄ Statistical significance at 5% levels. ⁄⁄⁄ Statistical significance at 1% levels.

Table 4 Summary statistics for structural estimation results.

Estimated parameters Minimum Median Maximum Mean St. deviation Obs.

Bank risk stance 2003–2007 0.01 0.04 0.10 0.04 0.02 720 2008–2013 0.02 0.07 0.07 0.06 0.01 684

Entry cost 2003–2007 99.99 128.55 395.13 159.87 70.81 1444 2008–2013 244.00 395.19 1308.54 536.10 223.36 1368

Scrap value 2003–2007 5.54 96.38 193.11 – 46.97 1444 2008–2013 92.30 99.75 99.99 99.07 1.58 1368

Regulatory risk stance 2003–2007 0.03 0.07 0.42 0.12 0.12 2888 2008–2013 0.03 0.16 0.48 0.19 0.15 2736

Note: Summary statistics for estimated structural parameters, across all countries. The ’Obs.’ column indicates the number of simulated datapoints in the estimation.

242 J. Temesvary / Journal of Banking & Finance 44 (2014) 233–247

Table 5 Correlations with macroconomic and regulatory indicators.

Variable Entry cost Scrap value Entry – scrap Regulatory risk aversion

2003–2007 2008–2013 2003–2007 2008–2013 2003–2007 2008–2013 2003–2007 2008–2013

Entry cost 1.00 1.00 Scrap value 0.34⁄⁄⁄ 0.64⁄⁄⁄ 1.00 1.00 Entry – scrap 0.99⁄⁄⁄ 0.92⁄⁄⁄ 0.27⁄⁄⁄ �0.13⁄⁄ 1.00 1.00 Regulatory 0.14⁄⁄ 0.13⁄⁄ 0.20⁄⁄⁄ �0.06 0.12⁄ �0.14⁄⁄ 1.00 1.00 Risk Stance

Tax rate 0.12 0.26 �0.25⁄⁄⁄ �0.09 0.14⁄ 0.35 0.27⁄⁄ �0.32 Reserve req. �0.37⁄⁄⁄ �0.46 0.15⁄ �0.33 �0.37⁄⁄⁄ 0.27 0.35⁄⁄⁄ �0.68⁄⁄

Market return �0.27⁄⁄⁄ �0.11⁄⁄ 0.15⁄⁄⁄ �0.10⁄⁄ �0.29⁄⁄⁄ �0.09⁄ 0.07 0.15⁄⁄ Market variance 0.01 0.01 0.12⁄⁄ 0.08 �0.01 �0.03 0.37⁄⁄⁄ 0.09⁄ Real GDP �0.30⁄⁄⁄ 0.76⁄⁄⁄ �0.93⁄⁄⁄ 0.26⁄⁄⁄ �0.22⁄⁄⁄ 0.79⁄⁄⁄ �0.24⁄⁄⁄ �0.23⁄⁄⁄ Inflation �0.17⁄⁄⁄ �0.06 0.01 �0.17⁄⁄⁄ �0.17⁄⁄⁄ 0.03 0.26⁄⁄⁄ �0.03

Note: Reported values are correlation coefficients. ⁄ Statistical significance at 10% levels. ⁄⁄ Statistical significance at 5% levels. ⁄⁄⁄ Statistical significance at 1% levels.

J. Temesvary / Journal of Banking & Finance 44 (2014) 233–247 243

In order to shed light on the meaning behind these numbers, Table 5 examines how the structural estimates vary with economic and regulatory measures of markets. Countries with higher entry costs also offer significantly more in scrap values upon exit. Since part of the entry costs is regulatory compliance, it makes sense that countries with stricter bank regulators also have higher entry costs. High entry cost markets also offer significantly lower market returns. On the other hand, the entry-scrap difference (a measure of banks’ ability to recover fixed costs) is higher in these low return countries. Furthermore, results indicate that entry costs vary significantly more across markets and over time than scrap values do. As expected, regulators take a much stricter stance on banks’ ability to take on market risk in countries where the financial market is chronically volatile. This regulatory risk aversion tends to be lower in larger economies (as measured by GDP).

5. Simulation exercises

This section conducts two types of exercises. The first subsec- tion examines the effect of rising bank risk aversion k on the aver- age bank’s behavior, assuming all countries’ regulators hold their risk stances steady. The second subsection then explores the impact of increases in all foreign regulators’ stance on risk, assum- ing all banks’ and U.S. regulators’ risk aversions stay constant. The goal is to explore the effects of these two types of changes on (1) banks’ probability of entering a new host market; (2) the average bank’s expected value from operating in a host country, (3) the expected share of foreign assets, and (4) the expected ratio of affil- iate claims to cross-border claims in the average bank’s portfolio.23

Simulations are carried out for the pre- and post-crisis periods separately. As k and h are incrementally increased from 0.05 to 0.5, respectively, the model is re-estimated at each stage and the vari- ables of interest in (1) through (4) are recorded. Table 6 summarizes the information shown in Figs. 1 and 2.

24 Whereas controlling for changes in these bank and market conditions over time would show a trend towards foreign market entry.

25 This is the mean return minus the risk-weighted variance on the bank’s portfolio

5.1. Increasing bank risk aversion

The amount of risk that banks are willing to take on has very important implications for their profitability and choice of foreign exposure. The panels of Fig. 1 show how a rise in banks’ risk aver- sion k from 0.05 to 0.5 affects bank behavior. The top left panel shows that all else equal, banks are slightly less likely to enter a new market in the post-crisis period than before, due to the

23 ‘Expected’ implies that values are weighted by the probability of market entry.

worsening bank and market conditions over the crisis period.24

The pre- and post-crisis effects of rising bank risk aversion on entry probabilities are small and very similar.

The top right panel shows that the pre- and post-crisis periods are very different in how k affects banks’ average value from oper- ating in a host market.25 The rise in bank risk aversion lowers this value by over 4,000% in the post-crisis period, whereas the compara- ble effect is a 900% decline in the pre-crisis period. What explains this result? Given banks’ mean–variance utility, k affects the value of banks’ country-level operations in two ways. First, a rising k con- stitutes a larger weight on the variance term, lowering country value linearly. Second, k also affects the probability of market entry as well as the claims volume choices. Increasingly risk averse banks are more likely to enter new markets (as shown in the top left panel), and hold relatively more affiliate claims in those markets (lower right panel) – increasingly so in the aftermath of the crisis. The deterioration of foreign market conditions in the post-2008 period, combined with the response of increasingly risk averse banks to shift towards affiliate activities thus reduces, causes risk aversion to reduce country value faster in the aftermath of the crisis.26

The lower right panel shows that in the aftermath of the crisis, the expected share of affiliate to cross-border claims is lower than in the period leading up to it. This is partly due to the lower entry probabilities (as in the top left panel), and partly to the worsening of host market traits from before to after the crisis. This result is particularly interesting to put in the context of the first-stage result that if bank and market traits had remained the same as before, foreign affiliate claims would have actually increased relative to cross-border claims in the post-crisis period (the post- crisis line would be above the pre-crisis line in the lower right panel). Finally, the lower left panel highlights that the deteriorated bank and market conditions in the aftermath of the crisis have caused risk appetite to have a weaker positive effect on foreign investment.

5.2. Increasing foreign regulatory risk stance

Fig. 2 shows that increasing all foreign bank regulators’ risk aversion from 0.05 to 0.5 has significant effects on all four mea- sures of bank behavior and performance. In line with first-stage

in that host market. 26 There are no diversification opportunities as the affiliate claim is the only

available asset in the host country.

4

Bank Risk Aversion

Fig. 1. The impact of changes in bank risk aversion.

Table 6 Effects (in percent) of changes in risk aversion from 0.05 to 0.5.

Change in risk stance Affiliate to C–B ratio Share of foreign assets Prob. of market entry Country ops. value

2003–2007 2008–2013 2003–2007 2008–2013 2003–2007 2008–2013 2003–2007 2008–2013

Bank’s risk 9.80 13.34 26.06 60.32 0.31 0.36 �934.53 �4023 Stance k Foreign regulator’s �58.65 �60.09 7.33 �48.29 �0.30 �0.33 �59.97 �33.31 Risk stance h

Note: Percent changes in respective variables as average k and h change from 0.05 to 0.5. The median values of k and h are 0.08 and 0.07, respectively.

244 J. Temesvary / Journal of Banking & Finance 44 (2014) 233–247

results, a stricter foreign market bank regulator makes it less likely that a U.S. bank would enter the market, although the effects are very small in magnitude. The probability of market entry is slightly lower in the post-crisis period, due to the worsening of bank and market indicators.

It is instructive to recall from the first stage results in Table 3 that increases in regulatory h significantly lower the probability of foreign market entry, but promote affiliate lending conditional on market entry. The former result is confirmed by the top left panel of Fig. 2. Furthermore, the lower right panel indicates that the reductions in affiliate lending due to the extensive margin (forgone entry opportunities) dominate the positive effect of h on the intensive margin: the ratio of affiliate to C–B loans falls in

the portfolio as foreign regulators take a stricter stance on risk. The overall effect is that increasing h reduces the value of foreign market operations for banks, as shown in the top right panel of Fig. 2.

In addition, the pre-crisis patterns of bank behavior provide some evidence of regulatory arbitrage leading up to the financial crisis. The slight pre-crisis increase in the share of foreign assets in the lower left panel and the falling affiliate to C–B claim ratio in the lower right panel suggest that banks would have shifted slightly towards cross-border claims away from affiliate claims in response to stricter host market regulation (rising h) before the cri- sis. In the aftermath of the crisis such arbitrage opportunities appear more limited as banks would respond to higher h’s by turn- ing more towards their home market.

4

Bank Risk Aversion

Fig. 2. The impact of changes in foreign regulatory risk stance.

J. Temesvary / Journal of Banking & Finance 44 (2014) 233–247 245

The comparison of the effects of bank risk versus regulatory risk aversion highlights some interesting points about foreign affiliate banking. More risk averse banks tend towards entering new markets and holding higher foreign affiliate claim volumes there – however, similar increases in the risk aversion of host country bank regulators reverse this trend significantly.

6. Summary and conclusion

This paper has developed a two-stage dynamic structural estimation framework to examine the patterns of U.S. banks’ foreign activities over the past ten years, looking at the pre- and post-financial crisis periods separately. This estimation framework is applied to a unique bank-level dataset, compiled from various regulatory sources. This dataset of bank balance sheet, foreign market activity and host market characteristics covers 82 globally active U.S. banks’ operations in 83 foreign markets over the 2003 Q1–2013 Q1 period. The first stage of the estimation examines the empirical mapping between banks’ foreign market entry/exit and cross-border and foreign affiliate claims choices on the one hand, and a broad set of bank and market traits on the other. The second stage then uses these policy function estimates and data on banks’ observed behavior to find values of some key structural parameters (such as fixed

entry costs and regulatory risk stances) that rationalize banks’ observed choices.

The main results can be summarized as follows. First, the first-stage results show that bank traits are better able to explain the patterns of banks’ foreign activities than host market traits. In particular, larger and less profitable (as measured by return on equity) banks tend to be the most globally active. Better capitalized banks tend to prefer affiliate over cross-border claims. It is shown that foreign claim volumes suffer from significant reporting and market selection biases, which the current analysis was able to correct.

Second, results are also able to qualify recent literature’s con- clusion that U.S. banks have moved away from foreign markets in the aftermath of the global financial crisis. First-stage estimates imply that this trend only reflects banks’ response to deteriorating balance sheet and host market conditions, as opposed to a change in attitudes about going abroad. After controlling for bank and host market characteristics, there is evidence of a shift in bank portfolio composition away from holding cross-border claims towards entering foreign markets and holding affiliate claims there.

Third, structural estimates of bank and regulatory risk stances imply that on average, regulators take a stricter stance on market risk than banks do. Both banks and host country bank regulators have become more risk averse in the aftermath of the financial

246 J. Temesvary / Journal of Banking & Finance 44 (2014) 233–247

crisis. The fixed entry costs that U.S. banks must face when enter- ing a new market have increased threefold since the onset of the crisis, whereas scrap values have not increased.

Fourth, simulation exercises highlight the importance of the structural parameters and the pre- vs. post-crisis distinction. Increases in bank and host market regulatory risk aversions affect bank behavior more strongly in the aftermath of the crisis than in the period before the crisis. The opposing effects of bank vs. regu- latory risk aversion on affiliate activities is particularly interesting. More risk averse banks seek out more foreign affiliate claims, but host market regulators with a strict stance on risk substantially counteract this trend.

A valuable future extension of this work would be to estimate the model on a dataset that has information on the detailed types of banks’ liabilities (deposits, bonds, etc.) as well as assets (loans, bonds, etc.) at the host country level. Furthermore, if such data were available, the issue of mergers and acquisitions vs. greenfield investment as alternative forms of foreign market entry wsould warrant further investigation as well.

Acknowledgements

I would like to thank Karl Shell, George Jakubson and Nicholas Kiefer at Cornell University for their advice and helpful comments in this project. Special thanks to Karl Shell. I would also like to thank my colleagues at Hamilton College and participants at the 2011 Annual Conference of the Hungarian Society of Economics in Budapest, the 2011 Liberal Arts Macro Workshop at Vassar College and the Hamilton–Colgate Seminar Series at Hamilton College for helpful comments.

Appendix A. Functional forms

A.1. Revenues and variances

From Eq. (2.2), the total and marginal lending revenues in mar- ket m are:

TTRlm ¼ �aml �m�1 �mð Þ

m

MRlm ¼ �aml�1=�mm �m � 1 �m

� � ðA:1Þ From Eq. (2.3), the total and marginal deposit expenses in mar-

ket m are:

TTEdm ¼ �bmd gmþ1 gmð Þ

m

MEdm ¼ �bmd1=gmm gm þ 1

gm

� � ðA:2Þ Variance of the bank’s overall portfolio:

var eK� � ¼X mn

1� smð Þ 1� snð Þ 1�xmð Þ 1�xnð Þ½ �

cov am; anð Þl �m�1 �mð Þ

m l �m�1 �nð Þ

n

þcov am; bnð Þl �n�1 �mð Þ

m d gmþ1

gnð Þ n

þcov bm; bnð Þd gmþ1 gmð Þ

m d gnþ1 gnð Þ

n

266664 377775 ðA:3Þ

A.2. First order optimality conditions

This section describes the first-order optimality conditions taken with respect to the variables ðlmj; dmj; Dj; Kj in Eq. (2.11) and the entry/exit choices ðe1j; . . . ; eMj in Eq. (2.12), subject to the bud- get constraints in (2.7) and (2.8) and the regulatory constraints in (2.9) and (2.10). Recall that m ¼ 1 denotes the home (source)

market, m ¼ 2 is the cross-border lending market in the host coun- try, and m ¼ 3 is the foreign affiliate market. Let cm denote the multiplier on the budget constraint in market m, and /m denotes the multiplier on the regulatory constraint in market m.

MRl1�cl1ð Þ 1�s1ð Þ 1þ/1ð Þ� kþ/1h1;2ð Þ @var eK� �

@l1 �/1j1;2�c1¼0

ðA:4Þ

MRl2�cl2ð Þ 1�s1ð Þ 1þ/1ð Þ� kþ/1h1;2ð Þ @var eK� �

@l2 �/1j1;2�c1¼0

ðA:5Þ

MRl3�cl3ð Þ 1�s3ð Þ 1�x3ð Þ 1þ/3ð Þ

� kþ/3h3ð Þ @var eK� �

@l3 �/3j3�c3¼0 ðA:6Þ

MEd1 þ cd1ð Þ 1� s1ð Þ 1þ /1ð Þ

þ kþ /1h1;2ð Þ @var eK� �

@d1 � c1 1� d1ð Þ ¼ 0 ðA:7Þ

MEd3 þ cd3ð Þ 1� s3ð Þ 1�x3ð Þ 1þ /3ð Þ

þ kþ /3h3ð Þ @var eK� �

@d3 � c3 1� d3ð Þ ¼ 0 ðA:8Þ

c1 � 2 1� s1ð Þ�r1;2 1þ D1

K1;2

� � 1þ /1ð Þ ¼ 0 ðA:9Þ

c3 � 2 1� s3ð Þ 1�x3ð Þ�r3 1þ D3 K3

� � 1þ /3ð Þ ¼ 0 ðA:10Þ

c3þ/3þ 1þ/3ð Þ �r3D

2 3

K23

" # �c1�/1� 1þ/1ð Þ

�r1;2D21;2 K21;2

" # ¼0 ðA:11Þ

E eK 1;2� �� h1;22 var eK 1;2� �� j1;2 l1 þ l2ð Þ ¼ 0 ðA:12Þ E eK 3� �� h32 var eK 3� �� j3 l3ð Þ ¼ 0 ðA:13Þ K1;2 þ ðd1 þ d2Þ 1� d1;2ð Þ þ D1;2 � l1 � l2 ¼ 0 ðA:14Þ

K3 þ d3 1� d3ð Þ þ D3 � l3 ¼ 0 ðA:15Þ

Appendix B. Log-linearization

This section describes the log-linearization of the non-linear first-order optimality conditions described above. The log-lineari- zation is around the perfectly competitive symmetric certainty equilibrium. This is the equilibrium for an economy with � ¼ 0 and g ¼ 0. Furthermore, all elements of the variance–covariance matrix V in Eq. (2.1) are zero. The equations are log-linearized with respect to each model parameter x. The log-linearized equations presented below are generalized to many markets. Let subscript m denote market m ¼ ð1;2;3Þ (Home; Cross-Border; Foreign Affiliate) and subscript j denotes bank j. Let ðv;,;.;u; n; sÞ denote log-linearization constants. The log-linearized optimality condi- tions are as described in Eqs. (B.1)–(B.8) below.

v1ljm � v2 �am þ v3clm þ v4sm þ v5 X

m

ljm þ v6 X

m

djm þ v7cjm

þ v8jm þ v9/jm þ v10�m ¼ 0 ðB:1Þ

J. Temesvary / Journal of Banking & Finance 44 (2014) 233–247 247

,1djm þ ,2�bm þ ,3cdm þ ,4sm þ ,5 X

m

ljm þ ,6 X

m

djm ��,7cjm

þ ,8di þ ,9/jm � ,10gm ¼ 0 ðB:2Þ

.1�rm þ .2Djm � .3Kjm � .4sm � .5cjm þ .6/jm ¼ 0 ðB:3Þ

X m

u1cjm þu2/jm þu3�rm þ 2u4Djm � 2u5Kjm � � ¼ u1cjm þu2/jm þu3�rm þ 2u4Djm � 2u5Kjm ðB:4Þ

cjm þ Kjm þ djm � dm þ Djm � ljm ¼ 0 ðB:5Þ

/jm þ n1Kjm þ n2ljm þ n3 �am � n4clm � n5djm � n6�bm � n7cdm � n8

X m

ljm � n9 X

m

djm � n10�rm � n11Djm � n12sm � n13jm ¼ 0

ðB:6Þ

X m

Kjm ¼ Kj ðB:7Þ

V eK� � ¼ s1X m

�am þ s2 X

m

lm � s3 X

m

�bm � s4 X

m

dm � s5 X

m

clm

� s6 X

m

cdm � s7 X

m

sm � s8 X

m

dm � s9 X

m

jm � s10 X

m

�m

þ s11 X

m

gm � s12 X

m

�rm � s13 X

m

Dm þ s14K � s15Cm ðB:8Þ

Eqs. (3.3) and (3.5) in the body of the paper are the reduced- form equivalents of these log-linearized equations. The estimated coefficients in Section (3.2) are combinations of the log-linearization constants in the log-linearized equations above.

Appendix C. Sufficient conditions for consistent and asymptotically normal structural estimators taken from Assumption S2 of Bajari et al. (2007)

1. The inequalities Gj ¼ ðgj;1; . . . ; gj;k; gj;KÞ are independent and identically distributed.

2. For each gj;k, each V̂ j is computed using independent draws and

satisfies Eðð̂VjÞÞ ¼ Vj <1. In addition, with probability 1, bV is twice differentiable in h and the first-stage coefficient estimates /, and three times differentiable in h.

3. As the sample size h!1, both the number of simulations and one – step deviations ðn; kÞ ! 1 and h=n2 ! 0.

4. The set H is compact and h0 ¼ arg minHQ H; /̂0 � �

. 5. There exists a full-rank matrix B0, such that, for h near h0,

@

@h Q nðh; n̂Þ ¼

@

@h Q nðh0; p̂hinÞ þ ðB0 þ opð1ÞÞðh� h0Þ

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  • The determinants of U.S. banks’ international activities
    • 1 Introduction
    • 2 Model
      • 2.1 Setup and notation
    • 3 Data and estimation
      • 3.1 Data
      • 3.2 Estimation method
        • 3.2.1 First-stage estimation
        • 3.2.2 Second step: structural parameter estimates
    • 4 Estimation results
      • 4.1 Market entry/exit choices and claims volumes
      • 4.2 Risk aversions, market entry costs and scrap values
    • 5 Simulation exercises
      • 5.1 Increasing bank risk aversion
      • 5.2 Increasing foreign regulatory risk stance
    • 6 Summary and conclusion
    • Acknowledgements
    • Appendix A Functional forms
      • A.1 Revenues and variances
      • A.2 First order optimality conditions
    • Appendix B Log-linearization
    • Appendix C Sufficient conditions for consistent and asymptotically normal structural estimators taken from Assumption S2 of Bajari et al. (2007)
    • References

The-risk-of-financial-intermediaries_2014_Journal-of-Banking---Finance.pdf

Journal of Banking & Finance 44 (2014) 1–12

Contents lists available at ScienceDirect

Journal of Banking & Finance

journal homepage: www.elsevier .com/locate / jbf

The risk of financial intermediaries

http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jbankfin.2014.03.024 0378-4266/� 2014 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

⇑ Corresponding author. Tel.: +1 646 312 8278; fax: +1 646 312 8290. E-mail addresses: [email protected] (M.D. Delis), [email protected]

(I. Hasan), [email protected] (E.G. Tsionas).

1 This is recognized by Kim and Santomero (1988), Shrieves and Dah Diamond and Rajan (2000), Hughes et al. (2001), Dangl and Zechner (2004), and Rangan (2008), Freixas and Rochet (2008), Degryse et al. (2009), and Hu Mester (2011), among many others.

Manthos D. Delis a, Iftekhar Hasan b,⇑, Efthymios G. Tsionas c a Finance Group, Surrey Business School, University of Surrey, Guildford GU2 7XH, UK b Fordham University and Bank of Finland, 5 Columbus Circle, 11th Floor, New York, NY 10019, United States c Economics Department, Lancaster University, Management School, Lancaster LA14YX, UK

a r t i c l e i n f o

Article history: Received 10 July 2013 Accepted 15 March 2014 Available online 8 April 2014

JEL classification: C13 C33 E47 G21 G32

Keywords: Estimation of risk Profit function Financial institutions Banks Endogenous risk US banking sector

a b s t r a c t

This paper reconsiders the formal estimation of bank risk using the variability of the profit function. In our model, point estimates of the variability of profits are derived from a model where this variability is endogenous to other bank characteristics, such as capital and liquidity. We estimate the new model on the entire panel of US banks, spanning the period 1985q1–2012q4. The findings show that bank risk was fairly stable up to 2001 and accelerated quickly thereafter up to 2007. We also establish that the risk of the relatively large banks and banks that failed in the subprime crisis is higher than the industry’s aver- age. Thus, we provide a new leading indicator, which is able to forecast future solvency problems of banks.

� 2014 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

1. Introduction

The financial crisis that erupted in 2007 turned the spotlight onto financial institutions and their risks. A fundamental and timely question is how the risk of a financial intermediary should be measured. This paper proposes a new method to estimate banks’ risk using the variance of the profit function. The important element in our framework is that the variance of profits (risk) is allowed to be endogenous to a number of bank characteristics that determine bank profits and to profits themselves. In turn, these bank characteristics are also endogenous to risk and profits, yield- ing a system of equations where all the main bank managerial tar- get variables are determined endogenously. This novelty is essential because existing measures do not allow for this type of simultaneity, which is inherent in the banking business.

We model risk as the variance of the profit function, where the variance enters as a multiplicative component of the error term. In

this way, estimation of the profit function alone allows us to obtain point estimates of the variance of profits. We augment this frame- work with the implications of intermediation (banking) theory, which suggests that financial intermediaries make risky decisions simultaneously with the perception about expected profits and of the level of other bank characteristics, mainly capital and liquidity.1

To reiterate the endogeneity of bank risk, consider two banks with the same initial risk levels but different levels of capitali- zation or liquidity. In the next period the more liquid or more capitalized bank will be able to take on higher risk more easily, while the less liquid or less capitalized bank will have to lower its risk position. This simultaneity calls for a new model, where risk is jointly determined along with (i) other decisions made by the financial institutions (e.g., concerning their level of cap- italization and/or liquidity) and (ii) expected profits. In other words, the variability of profits should be endogenous to other

l (1992), Flannery ghes and

2 M.D. Delis et al. / Journal of Banking & Finance 44 (2014) 1–12

important bank-level variables, which are in turn endogenous to profits and their variability. Thus, an important advantage of the approach presented here is that technology, risk, and bank decisions can be modeled simultaneously.

Our new method is general and can be applied to any firm. Here, we focus on financial institutions, and on banks in particular, due to a variety of reasons, including: the clear implications of banking theory concerning the endogeneity discussed above; the important developments in the banking sector before and after the subprime crisis; and the key role banks play in the managerial, real, and monetary economic spectrums. An important concern for our mod- eling choice is not to impose more stringent data requirements on the researcher, other than the usual bank-level data required for the estimation of the profit function of banks. We estimate our model using the full panel of US banks over the period 1985q1– 2012q4. The estimation yields risk estimates at the bank-quarter level. The choice of the US banking sector allows an examination of the time path of bank risk that led to the banking crisis of the late 2000s.

The results indicate that the risk of the average in the U.S. bank- ing sector was relatively stable up to 2001 and has gradually increased by more than 200% since then. This pattern is robust, irrespective of the functional form used to estimate the profit func- tion and the variables included to tackle simultaneity. Thus, our measure captures the buildup of individual bank risk well before the eruption of financial turmoil in 2007, and this finding corre- sponds with perceptions about rising bank risk for a number of years before 2007. In contrast, a measure of risk obtained from a specification where the variance is not endogenous does not yield the same results.

We also show that bank risk is not the same across banks of dif- ferent classes of size, and this is especially true after 2004–2005. Notably, all banks have risk levels very close to the industry’s aver- age until 2004. From then onward, the small and very small banks have lower risk than the average, while the large banks’ risk sur- passes the industry average after 2005. The very large banks also see their risk increasing considerably after 2002, yet they are less risky than the average until 2009. An alarming finding is that in the last three years of our sample, the riskiness of these systemi- cally important banks is even higher than the industry’s average. This stylized fact is in line with concerns that another bubble can emerge from the persistently high credit risk in the US banking sector.

Finally, we demonstrate that our measure predicts the higher risk undertaken by banks that became insolvent during the period after the crisis (from 2007 onward) relative to the industry’s average. Our measure of bank risk therefore also qualifies as a new method to measure the probability of default and a leading indicator to forecast solvency problems of indi- vidual banks.

The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 provides some theoretical considerations and empirical facts on the esti- mation of bank risk. Section 3 presents the formal econometric model that underlines our new method. Section 4 discusses the application of the new method to the US banking sector and presents the empirical findings. Section 5 concludes.

2. Bank risk measurement and empirical facts

To measure risk, the majority of the empirical banking literature uses accounting-based ratios that are related to credit and/or liquidity risk, and mainly include the ratio of (i) non-performing loans to total loans and (ii) loan-loss provisions to total loans, and (iii) the ratio of risk-weighted assets to total assets (Casu et al., 2006). These measures are ex-post informative about how

risk evolves over time, but they do not seem to provide a good ex ante measure of bank risk.

Indeed, Fig. 1a and b shows that the bank-level average of the first two ratios reached an all-time low in the period just before the eruption of the subprime crisis, when bank risk was supposedly at its peak. In turn, Fig. 1c shows the equivalent trend in the risk- weighted assets ratio, which is the ratio used by regulators under the impact of Basel guidelines. The value of this ratio shows an increasing trend from 1986q4 to 1995q1; it then remains fairly sta- ble until 2007, and drops sharply between 2008 and 2012. How- ever, the risk-assets ratio has a number of interrelated shortcomings as a measure of risk. The most important of these shortcomings are that (i) risky assets are regulated, providing banks with incentives to underwrite these assets so as not to exceed the given threshold, and (ii) this ratio does not capture the perceived risk buildup that led to the financial crisis in 2007.

A related and more advanced strand of literature employs the variation in returns or profits as a more comprehensive risk mea- sure. Mitchell (1982, 1986) is probably the first to note theoreti- cally that the variance of returns or the variance of returns scaled by their mean (i.e., the coefficient of variation) is a valuable risk metric in banking, following directly from the theoretical con- siderations of Markowitz (1952) and Roy (1952). A recent line of empirical studies uses information from a fixed number of periods to calculate the variance in the return on assets, r(ROA), or the coefficient of variation as a measure of bank risk (e.g., DeYoung and Rice, 2004; Stiroh, 2004; Stiroh and Rumble, 2006; Lepetit et al., 2008; Chiorazzo et al., 2008; Fang et al., 2011; Delis et al., 2012; Jiménez et al., 2013, 2014).

An extension of these measures has been put forth by Hannan and Hanweck (1988) and Boyd and Runkle (1993), who formalize the use of the Z-score of the probability of insolvency. Since insol- vency is presumed to occur when current bank losses exhaust cap- ital, estimates of the likelihood of insolvency can be obtained by noting that this likelihood is equivalent to the probability that ROA < �EA, where EA is the equity capital to assets ratio. Then [E(ROA) + EA]/r(ROA) represents the number of standard devia- tions between the expected value of ROA and the negative values of ROA = �EA that yield insolvency.

One problem with the calculation of the Z-score, r(ROA) or the coefficient of variation as measures of bank risk is that they use information from a fixed number of periods in the past (or from the whole sample period) to calculate the variance component and, therefore, do not capture the short-term nature of bank risk. This is especially true when only annual data is available to the researcher, which is often the case with bank-level data. Given the notorious short-term fluctuations of bank risk, it is important that we have a measure that captures the actual short-term fluctu- ations in bank profits, and not the fluctuations encompassing infor- mation from three years before or more. Yet, besides this problem, and perhaps more importantly, the Z-score, r(ROA), and the coef- ficient of variation do not capture the endogeneity of bank risk to other bank characteristics.

Fig. 1d shows the evolution of the average Z-score = (ROA + EA)/ r(ROA), where ROA is the return on total bank assets and EA is the equity to assets ratio. Here, r(ROA) at quarter t is calculated using ROA information from the past 12 quarters (data are from the Call Reports). The Z-score is fairly stable in the period 1995–2006; thus, it does not capture the increase in the probability of bank default prior to the crisis of 2007.

The equivalent graph for the coefficient of variation is even nois- ier and, for aesthetic quality, we smooth the line using a kernel regression and a bandwidth equal to six. We present the resulting average by bank in Fig. 1e, which shows that risk has accelerated from about 2005 onward. We should state, however, that this mea- sure also seems to be affected by the time frame we use to construct

(a) Credit risk (loan loss provisions/total loans) (b) Credit risk (problem loans/total loans)

(c) Risky assets (risk-weightedassets/total assets) (d) Z-score (ROA+EA)/σ(ROA)

(e) Coefficient of variation σ(ROA)/ ROA

1985q1 1990q1 1995q1 2000q1 2005q1 2010q1 Year

1. 0 1. 4 1. 8 2. 2 2.. 6

Fig. 1. Evolution of various bank risk indices over the period 1985q1–2012q4. Notes: For graph (a) the industry average is calculated as (total industry equity at quarter t)/ (total industry assets at quarter t). Average by bank is calculated as the average of (total equity of bank i at quarter t)/(total assets of bank i at quarter t). The same definition of industry vs. bank average applies to all other graphs, except from graph e, where we only report the bank average.

M.D. Delis et al. / Journal of Banking & Finance 44 (2014) 1–12 3

the variance of ROA. If we increase this time frame beyond the 12 quarters currently used to construct r(ROA), then the increase in risk will begin earlier but its magnitude will be smaller. If we reduce the period to eight quarters, then the increase in risk will start in 2007 and will be larger. It is easily understood that the assumption on the number of periods to include for the construction of the var- iance component significantly affects the results.

Perhaps the most relevant studies for our new framework are those of Hughes et al. (2000, 2001), and DeYoung et al. (2001). These are the first empirical studies suggesting that risk is endogenous in models of bank production that also provide a

formal way for the estimation of bank efficiency and scale econ- omies under this premise. The main distinctive element of their modeling framework is that accounting measures of risk and/or capital like the ones discussed above are incorporated into the production technology of banks to form the demand system for banking products. Many other empirical papers have fol- lowed this modeling choice henceforth (e.g., Radic et al., 2012). In our setting we borrow a number of elements from these stud- ies, but we do not use specific variables to measure risk. Rather, we leave risk to be determined from the variability of the profit equation.

4 Panel data allow the possibility of dynamic models for the variance, which is not possible with cross-sectional data. However, provided that there are variables to

4 M.D. Delis et al. / Journal of Banking & Finance 44 (2014) 1–12

3. A new econometric model for bank risk

An important problem faced by empirical researchers in esti- mating technology functions of financial intermediaries is that risk should be endogenously determined (Hughes et al., 2000, 2001). The banking theory behind this issue is straightforward. The level of risk is set by bank managers in a way that encompasses informa- tion about the level of expected profits (or returns), the level of capital and liquidity that banks hold, and perhaps other important variables. Therefore, one cannot suggest that risk determines stricto sensu current bank profits or earnings. In fact, the perceived optimal level of bank risk is endogenously determined with cur- rent profits, taking into account other endogenous and predeter- mined variables. This modeling choice is absent in the empirical literature of bank risk, even though it seems fundamental for its robust estimation.

Here, we present a model that uses the profit function to esti- mate endogenous bank risk, as opposed to a model that uses the risk–return relation. This is in line with the economic theory on production economics, which models the representative bank as a firm producing loans and other financial services,2 and has the advantage that it models the whole operational process of the bank- ing firm (both risky assets and liabilities). Specifically, we essentially assume that risk is related to both risky assets (revenue side of the profit function) and liabilities (cost side). This is important, espe- cially if one considers that the prevailing view in the banking litera- ture is to consider deposits as banking inputs (Hughes et al., 2001), because their management is related to many types of bank risk. Fur- thermore, even the other forms of banking inputs are subject to organizational and other forms of risk. However, this choice usually comes with a disadvantage compared to models of the risk–return relation, namely the fact that models of production are usually static and, thus, assume away any holding-period related concerns. We relax this assumption somewhat by including some dynamics into our model, as well as by controlling for total assets. We revisit these issues below.

We consider a restricted normalized profit function:

yi ¼ b01xi1 þ b 0 izi þ riv i; for i ¼ 1; . . . N; ð1Þ

where yi represents profit of bank i, xi1 is a standard k � 1 vector of covariates in the profit function, zi is a G � 1 vector of endogenous variables, v i�

iid Nð0; 1Þ is the error term, and r2i is the variance of profits (point estimate of risk).3

Eq. (1) is specified as a function of input prices and output quan- tities, thus representing the so-called alternative profit function (e.g., Humphrey and Pulley, 1997; DeYoung and Hasan, 1998; Koetter et al., 2012), instead of the standard profit function that is specified in terms of output prices. This type of profit function is derived under the assumption that banks maximize profits for given output quantities and input prices, by choosing output prices (e.g. the lending rates) and input quantities. There are two main advantages of the alternative profit function, as described by Berger et al. (1996) and Humphrey and Pulley (1997). First, it rep- resents a better specification when banks have at least some mar- ket power, because it allows banks to choose their own output prices (Humphrey and Pulley, 1997). Second, it is well-known that output prices are less accurately measured compared to the output quantities, because the available databases are missing important information on the all-too-many lending and deposit rates. For these reasons the alternative profit function has become a very popular way of modeling bank profits.

2 Major contributions in this field are Hughes and Mester (1993), Berger et al. (1993), Hughes et al. (2001), DeYoung et al. (2001), and Hughes et al. (2000).

3 Of course, after the estimation one could consider only the downside variance of profits as a measure of bank risk.

The novelty in our framework is that the variance of profits enters Eq. (1) in the fashion of the stochastic volatility models (e.g., Taylor, 1994). These models arise naturally in the context of high frequency data. There are some applications in other areas (Kumbhakar and Tsionas, 2011) where they also arise naturally in low frequency data with equally plausible considerations. Such considerations are not related to the diffusion process, but rather to alternative models of the error term that go back to the litera- ture started by McElroy (1987). The models considered by Just and Pope (1978) and Pope and Just (1996) have properties of risk very similar to the ones used here. For example, Just and Pope pro- pose a production function of the form y = f(x) + g(x)v, where v � iid N(0,1), and g(x) is a positive function representing the standard deviation. We depart from this practice by adopting explicitly a stochastic volatility model. We believe that the application of such a model in our context is not so much motivated by considerations of frequency, but rather by considerations of what constitutes a reasonable model. Specifically, a key issue in our framework is to keep the dependent variable positive.

The estimation of Eq. (1) can give a point estimate for the vari- ance of the profit function as a measure of risk, and this alone is something not considered in the existing literature. Such a mea- sure would have the advantage over the r(ROA) measure discussed in Section 2 because the variance will be available for all the obser- vations in the sample (i.e., no assumption is needed about the time period over which the variance of a profitability measure is calculated).

However, Eq. (1) assumes that r is uncorrelated with the remainder disturbance v (i.e., r is exogenous). A first step to relax this assumption is to assume the following additional specification for the variance of the profit function:

r2i ¼ f ðzi; cÞ; ð2Þ

where zi is G � 1 vector of variables that determines the risk of banks, c is a vector of parameters to be estimated, and f(zi, c) is a functional form differentiable in zi. For example, f can take the form r2i ¼ z0ic or r2i ¼ expðz0icÞ, etc. Note that, despite the fact that we use a ‘‘cross-sectional notation,’’ panel data models of the form r2it ¼ f ðzit;r2i;t�1; . . . ;r2i;t�L; cÞ are fully nested within our general specification in Eq. (2).4 This also includes the formal possibility of incorporating fixed effects in (1) and (2).

Up to this stage, we formally identify risk with the variability of profits and explain this variability in terms of a vector of variables included in z. If these variables z are predetermined or exogenous, estimation of the profit function in (1) subject to (2) would be straightforward using the maximum likelihood method. Unfortu- nately, this is a very strong assumption for financial institutions’ risk-setting behavior, since the zs represent firm (bank) character- istics that are simultaneously determined with the level of risk in the following way:

zi ¼ f ðxi2; yi;r2i Þ; ð3Þ

where xi2 is a k2 � 1 vector of explanatory variables of z, which can include xi1. The intuition for the importance of Eq. (3) is that bank managers set not only the optimal level of risk from Eq. (2) given (1), but also the optimal level of capital/or liquidity (z) given infor- mation for the contemporaneous (or past) levels of risk and profits.

explain the variance, our framework can be applied to cross-sectional data. The central issue is that the variance (risk) depends on variables which are possibly endogenous. This can be dealt with in either cross-sectional or panel data through the use of the Jacobian in simultaneous equation estimation. The situation is somewhat peculiar in that it is the variance that depends on endogenous variables (along with the mean) but, as we show in Appendix A, the Jacobian can be derived nonetheless.

Table 1 Summary statistics of variables commonly used as measures of bank risk.

Variable Mean Std. dev. Min. Max.

Risky assets 0.631 0.053 0.294 0.698 Loan-loss provisions 0.015 0.010 0.002 0.064 Problem loans 0.005 0.008 0.000 0.053 Z-score 13.521 5.267 �0.327 71.302 Coefficient of variation 1.084 0.917 �4.952 4.418

Notes: The variables are defined as follows. Risky assets is risk-weighted assets/total assets. Loan-loss provisions is provisions for loan losses/total loans. Problem loans is non-performing loans (90 days and over)/total loans. Z-score is (ROA + EA)/ r(ROA), where ROA is profits before tax/total assets, EA is equity capital/total assets and r(ROA) is the standard deviation of ROA over a period of 3 years (12 quarters). Coefficient of variation is r(ROA)/ROA.

Table 2 Definitions of variables.

Variable Symbol Measure

Bank profits y Total profits before tax ($US) Output 1 out1 Commercial and industrial loans ($US) Output 2 out2 Loans to individuals ($US) Output 3 out3 Loans secured by real estate ($US) Output 4 out4 Other loans ($US) Output 5 out5 Other earning assets ($US) Output 6 out6 Off-balance sheet items ($US) Input price 1 w1 Salary expenses/total assets Input price 2 w2 Interest expenses/total deposits Input price 3 w3 Expenses on fixed assets/total fixed assets Capital z1 Equity capital/total assets Liquidity z2 Liquid assets/total assets Bank size ide1 Bank size: natural logarithm of total assets Efficiency ide2 Bank efficiency: total income/total cost Interest rate ide3 3-month T-bill rate (in %) Industrial production ide4 US industrial production index

Notes: Variables y, out1, out2, out3, out4, out5, out6, and ide1 are in real terms.

Table 3 Summary statistics.

Variable Mean Std. dev. Min. Max.

y 5416.7 121,52936 �1.81e+07 2.30e+07 out1 70,322.5 1,146,316 1 1.42e+08 out2 42,720.1 761,122.5 1 9.43e+07 out3 178,156.6 3,168,510 1 4.75e+08 out4 33,900.1 798,106.2 1 8.88e+07 out5 275,985.2 6,714,989 1 1.07e+09 out6 232,516.3 120,228.1 0 6.07e+08 w1 0.0098 0.0054 0.0017 0.0325 w2 0.0246 0.0146 0.0028 0.0733 w3 0.0027 0.0018 0.0002 0.0119 z1 0.0963 0.0300 0.0321 0.4600 z2 0.9413 0.0450 0.5945 0.9978 ide1 11.272 1.305 8.501 21.293 ide2 0.0085 0.0073 �0.0356 0.0312 ide3 4.532 2.056 0.070 8.533 ide4 75.564 14.628 54.706 100.44

Notes: Variables are defined in Table 2. y, out1, out2, out3, out4, out5, and out6 are in $US. The number of observations equals 872,174 for all variables.

M.D. Delis et al. / Journal of Banking & Finance 44 (2014) 1–12 5

Furthermore, r2 and z can also be affected by the regulatory or mac- roeconomic conditions prevailing at each point in time. Therefore, these elements might also have to be included in z or in xi2 based on the assumptions made by the researcher.

Estimation of Eqs. (1)–(3) is a non-trivial exercise and requires a new econometric model. A consistent and efficient way to estimate this system is with the method of maximum likelihood, which nat- urally requires a likelihood function and, in our case, computing the Jacobian transformation from vi to yi. We present this exercise in Appendix A.

4. Empirical application to the US banking sector

4.1. Empirical setup

We study the implications of our model using the full panel of US commercial banks over the period 1985q1–2012q4. We begin by using the complete sample of banks in the Call Reports but we apply two selection criteria. First, we exclude all observations for which data on any of the variables used in our study are miss- ing. Second, we apply an outlier rule to the variables used, corre- sponding to the 1st and 99th percentiles of the distributions of the respective variables. This excludes extreme values that may influence the results. The final sample consists of 872,174 bank- quarter observations (see Table 1).

We provide formal definitions for the variables used to estimate the profit function in Table 2 and summary statistics in Table 3. To define outputs and input prices we follow the intermediation approach (Sealey and Lindley, 1977; Hughes and Mester, 1998, 2011; Koetter et al., 2012). Under this approach, a bank uses labor and physical capital to attract deposits, which in turn are used to fund loans and other earning assets.5 Therefore, various categories of loans and other earning assets serve as bank outputs, while rele- vant ratios of salary expenses, interest expenses, and expenses on fixed assets serve as input prices. In essence, our approach considers the measurement of on-balance sheet risk. One could also include a disaggregation of securities and non-interest income or off-balance sheet (OBS) items as outputs. Thus, in sensitivity analysis, we also use off-balance sheet items as an additional bank output.

Given the above, we rewrite Eqs. (1)–(3) as follows:

yi ¼ b0 þ X5

1

b0kouti þ X2

1

b0lzi þ X2

1

b0mwi þ riv i; ð4Þ

5 Hughes et al. (2001) show that deposits are better modeled as inputs of production. We also experiment with a profit function that additionally includes the dollar value of deposits as an output. The risk measure remains qualitatively similar. We should mention that our model here is not used to estimate profit efficiency but bank risk. Thus, we do not split the error term to the efficiency component and the remainder disturbance. However, the aforementioned literature is invaluable in making robust assumptions for our estimation procedure.

r2i ¼ f ðzi; cÞ; ð5Þ

zi ¼ f ðxi2; yi;r2i Þ: ð6Þ

Eq. (4) is the general form of the alternative profit function, and Eqs. (5) and (6) are the equivalent to Eqs. (2) and (3), respectively. In this system of equations, y is profit before tax; out represents the five bank outputs listed in Table 2; z, r, and xi2 are as above; and w rep- resents the three input prices defined in Table 2. All variables are in logs.

We estimate the system of Eqs. (4)–(6) using the full-informa- tion maximum likelihood method proposed in Appendix A. We experiment with both a log-linear and a translog specification for the profit function. Furthermore, we impose linear homogeneity by dividing profits and input prices by w3. As profits contain both positive and negative values, taking logs of profits becomes an issue. Following Bos and Koetter (2011), we impose y = 1 for all y < 0 and construct a negative profit indicator variable, say y1 = |y|, which we use as an additional right-hand side variable. We also check the sensitivity of our results by (i) using only posi- tive profits, (ii) adding the maximum negative profits observed in our sample to all banks plus one (to make an index of only positive profits), and (iii) using a non-log specification.6

6 Our reporting here follows the approach of Bos and Koetter (2011). The rest of the results are available on request.

Table 4 Estimation results from the system of Eqs. (4)–(6).

Equation (1) Risk endogenous to z1 (2) Risk endogenous to z2 (3) Risk endogenous to z2 (4) Risk endogenous to z2 (5) OBS items as bank output Functional form Log-linear Log-linear Translog Translog Translog

Eq. (5): Dependent variable is r2

z1 0.026***

(21.55) z2 0.035*** 0.029*** 0.027*** 0.026***

(55.26) (59.96) (50.50) (47.93)

Eq. (6): Dependent variable is z y 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.001***

(29.37) (24.55) (21.98) (20.31) (13.76) r2 0.014*** 0.022*** 0.021*** 0.019*** 0.016***

(9.22) (11.91) (10.50) (8.42) (6.89) Fourth lag of ide1 0.001*** 0.013*** 0.013*** 0.008*** 0.005***

(15.88) (42.14) (42.11) (18.33) (10.45) Fourth lag of ide2 0.033*** 0.024*** 0.023*** 0.021*** 0.015***

(21.81) (23.39) (21.67) (20.06) (13.99) First lag of ide3 0.073*** 0.276***

(12.27) (29.47) First lag of ide4 0.035*** 0.036***

(19.44) (9.11)

Notes: The table reports estimation results (coefficients and t-statistics) for Eqs. (5) and (6) obtained from the joint estimation of Eqs. (4)–(6), using full-information maximum likelihood. In specifications (1)–(4), we use 872,174 bank-quarter observations, covering the period 1985q1–2012q4. Specification (5) is estimated on 292,266 bank-quarter observations, covering the period 2001q1–2012q4. In all specifications, Eq. (5) includes z1 or z2 as specified on the top of the table and Eq. (6) profits (y) and the variables ide1 to ide4. The variables are defined in Table 2. In specifications (1)–(3) the endogenous variables z1 or z2 are identified using the fourth lags of ide1 and ide2. In specifications (4) and (5) the first lags of ide3 and ide4 also identify z2. ⁄⁄⁄

statistical significance at the 1% level.

6 M.D. Delis et al. / Journal of Banking & Finance 44 (2014) 1–12

In Eq. (5), bank characteristics endogenous to r, that is, those used as z, are the basic equity capital ratio (total equity capital to total assets, denoted as z1) and/or the liquidity ratio (liquid assets to total assets, denoted as z2). Therefore, we assume that banks make risky decisions simultaneously with the levels of capitaliza- tion and/or liquidity in their balance sheets. This assumption is directly motivated from the theoretical modeling of the banking firm, where the variance of profits is endogenous to capital or liquidity (Hughes et al., 2001).7

We identify z in Eq. (6) using a number of variables x2. As dis- cussed in Section 3, these variables can determine the variance of profits or profits themselves in Eqs. (4) and (5), respectively. This implies that they can be correlated with the error term of Eq. (4). We name these variables ‘‘identifiers.’’ We run many alternative specifications, but resort to the inclusion of the fourth lags of bank size and efficiency that are observed at the bank level, as well as the first lags of the three month T-bill rate and the industrial pro- duction index as macroeconomic determinants of bank risk. Con- cerning the bank-level identifiers, the inclusion of bank size and efficiency is a reasonable assumption in the literature of the deter- minants of bank capital and liquidity (e.g., Flannery and Rangan, 2008). Also, controlling for size eases concerns with respect to scal- ing issues and brings our framework closer to the literature on the risk–return relation.

In particular, larger and more efficient banks are usually more closely followed by market investors. Thus, these banks may have better access to wholesale liabilities, loan sale markets, liquid assets, etc. With better access to these liquidity sources, larger banks may be required to hold less capital and liquidity. Alterna- tively, larger banks have more complex balance sheets and are more closely regulated. Thus, these banks might be optimally financed with a larger proportion of equity capital or might need a higher portion of liquid assets to meet unexpected demand. The two bank-level identifiers, denoted as ide1 and ide2, are lagged

7 One can in fact assume that the volatility of bank profits is endogenous to a number of other bank characteristics. Here we restrict our analysis to bank capital and liquidity, which are the two most important bank balance-sheet characteristics in a wide array of studies (e.g., Jiménez et al., 2013).

four times, as we assume that bank managers shape their capital and liquidity levels based on information on their size and effi- ciency in the previous year.8

The two macroeconomic variables, denoted ide3 and ide4, enter Eq. (6) lagged once (values of the previous quarter) to allow infor- mation to reach the market. By including these variables we cap- ture the fact that bank managers shape their risky behavior by observing, inter alia, the state of the macroeconomic environment. One can very easily experiment with other variables common to all banks to be included in Eq. (6) and examine the sensitivity of the results. We experiment with some regulatory dummies, character- izing major regulatory events, with institutional variables, etc. The results are unaffected and, as our main effort here is to estimate risk and not analyze an exhaustive list of its determinants, we decided to keep the empirical framework as simple as possible.

4.2. Main empirical results

Table 4 reports estimation results for Eqs. (5) and (6). Reporting the estimated coefficients from Eq. (4) is impractical, as the num- ber of estimated parameters for both the basic log-linear and the translog models is quite high. The results on the rest of the param- eters are available on request. We report the results for five spec- ifications. The first two are log-linear specifications, while the last three are translog specifications. All variables are statistically sig- nificant and bear the expected sign.

In particular, banks with higher levels of capital and liquid assets (higher z1 and z2, respectively) take on higher risk in the next period. With respect to capital, our finding reflects the trend of banks prior to the financial crisis to hold more capital, also given the more stringent capital requirements imposed under the Basel accords. This is a standard moral-hazard problem in which better

8 We use the values in the previous year and not the ones in the previous quarter to treat problems arising from the seasonality of bank-level data. We also explore the possibility of incorporating more dynamics in the model by using earlier lagged terms on z, y, and x2. This would further alleviate concerns about holding-period issues. We find that, at least in our sample, earlier lagged terms do not significantly affect our results.

M.D. Delis et al. / Journal of Banking & Finance 44 (2014) 1–12 7

capitalized banks feel quite safe and tend to take on more risk in the next period. The impact of liquidity is also intuitive. Liquid assets are risk-free and do not generate profits. Value- or profit- maximizing banks that hold a high level of liquid assets will use their excess liquidity to take on higher risks in the next period. The relevant coefficients are also economically significant. In col- umn (1), a one standard deviation increase in a bank’s equity-cap- ital ratio increases our risk measure in the next period by 0.026 points. Given that the average risk estimated in column (1) is 0.045, this is a very large increase. The economic significance of

(a) Risk endogenous to z1 (log-linear model)

(c) Risk endogenous to z2 (translog model)

(e) Estimation without z

Fig. 2. Evolution of bank risk (log of variance) over the period 1985q1–2012q4. Notes: Th from the specifications (1) to (4) of Table 4 and the specification without any variables

the liquid assets ratio documented in columns (2)–(5) is about the same if not larger. As the results from Eq. (6) indicate, the prof- its y and their variance r2 are significant determinants of the vari- ables z, also showing the importance of endogeneity in our model.

The findings of main interest are those on the variance of the profit function, which in our model represents individual bank risk. In Fig. 2a–d, we plot the quarterly average of the bank-quarter val- ues of risk (log of variance) obtained from the first four specifica- tions separately. We should note here, that our approach is not an effort to provide a measure of the overall banking and financial

(b) Risk endogenous to z2 (log-linear model)

(d) Risk endogenous to z2 (translog model)

e figures present the quarterly average of the bank-quarter values of risk as obtained z (risk simply calculated from the variance of the Eq. (4)).

Fig. 3. Evolution of bank risk estimated from the models with and without endogenous variables z. Notes: The figure presents the quarterly average of the bank-quarter values of risk as obtained from the specification (4) of Table 4 (solid line) and the quarterly average of the bank-quarter values of risk obtained as obtained from the specification without any z (risk simply calculated from the variance of the Eq. (4), dashed line).

Fig. 4. Bank risk with off-balance sheet items as a bank output. Notes: The figure presents the quarterly average of the bank-quarter values of risk obtained from the specification (4) of Table 4 (solid line) against the same specification with off- balance-sheet items as a bank output (dashed line).

8 M.D. Delis et al. / Journal of Banking & Finance 44 (2014) 1–12

stability. This would require a model where the risks of different banks are explicitly correlated, which is increasingly so during periods of distress. In other words, our approach is an effort to cap- ture the expected bank-level risk, but not the expected industry shortfall. However, the graphical representation of our results pro- vides some intuitive representation of our findings. Irrespective of the functional form used, or whether we specify capital or liquidity as an endogenous variable z, the average bank risk was fairly stable until 2001 and increased by more than 200% thereafter. Indeed, the pairwise correlation coefficients between the risk estimates of the first four specifications of Table 4 are above 0.89. Therefore, all models capture the perceived increase in the risk of the average bank that took place in the period following the attack on the World Trade Center and prior to 2007.

Consistent with our results for the risk of the average US bank, a number of recent studies suggest that certain exogenous shocks, which lead to lower informational asymmetries, trigger intensified competition and credit expansion, and create incentives for banks to search for higher yield in more risky projects. Rajan (2010) goes on to state explicitly that the source of such bank behavior could be an environment of low interest rates. Many scholars argue that the increase in bank risk prior to 2007 is largely attributed to increased political pressure to finance the economy in general and the hous- ing market in particular, and to consumers’ choices to lower the widening income inequality of the time (e.g., Stiglitz, 2009).

We identify only two different risk patterns through time among specifications (1)–(4) of Table 4. The first difference comes from the specification with liquidity as z (Fig. 2b) instead of equity capital (Fig. 2a). The specification with liquidity shows that the risk of the average bank reached a maximum as early as 2005 and remained at very high levels until 2009. In contrast, Fig. 2a shows an increasing trend in this risk until 2009. If we add both capital and liquidity as z in the same model, the results are very close to those reflected by line 2. The specification with liquidity shows a higher value of the average bank’s risk in absolute terms, which can be explained by the presence of capital requirements in the US banking sector as early as 1989. The capital requirement does not permit bank capital to fluctuate as much as liquidity, which is subject to only limited regulation. Therefore, bank liquidity is, probably, the most important factor in determining banks’ risk and is used in the rest of the specifications reported in Table 4.9

The second difference comes from using a translog specifica- tion, as opposed to a log-linear one. The flexibility of the translog profit function captures a larger decline in the variability of profits after 2009 (see Fig. 2c and d). This seems meaningful because banks started lowering their exposure to extremely risky assets as soon as they could after the eruption of the crisis, while pruden- tial regulation became more stringent with an increased number of inspection audits and sanctions (Delis et al., 2013). However, we should note that the risk of the average bank remains quite high, compared to the period before 2001. Given the above evidence, we favor the translog specification with liquidity as our z variable.10

We also estimate a simple model, where the variance is not endogenous to any variable. This is equivalent to the estimation of Eq. (4) alone and the derivation of the variance of profits there- from. We average the estimates of the variance across quarters and plot them in Fig. 2e. This specification captures an increase in bank

9 An alternative would be to use the distance of equity capital from the minimum requirement. When doing so, the results are indeed closer to those with the use of the liquidity ratio.

10 We also carry out a Ramsey test for functional form, which reveals that the translog model is the preferred specification (p-value = 0.038 for the translog, thus rejecting the presence of neglected non-linearity, and p-value = 0.189 for the log- linear specification, thus failing to reject the presence of neglected non-linearity).

risk after 2001 and a decrease in 2007. Yet the time pattern of this line is quite different, showing a large increase in 1992. Not inci- dentally, Basel I was enacted in 1992, which shows the special role of considering endogenous variables like capital when estimating bank risk. Also, similar to the accounting-based measures, the index reflects some seasonality, which is not smoothened by endogenous decisions of bank managers. Thus, the model where risk is not endogenous to bank characteristics is systematically dif- ferent and fails to capture all elements explaining the level of bank risk (see Fig. 3).

The specification presented in column (5) of Table 4 includes OBS items as the sixth bank output in a specification otherwise equivalent to that of specification (4). The estimation results from this exercise are very similar to those reported in our preferred specification (4). However, the variance of the profit equation is on average slightly higher when we include OBS items (see Fig. 4).

Overall, the value derived by the new method proves to be quite significant, given that all our specifications where r is endogenous capture the perceived increase in bank risk prior to the eruption of the subprime crisis in real time. This is the first measure of bank risk that achieves this goal.

(a) Risk of small and very small banks (b) Risk of large and very large banks

Fig. 5. Risk of small and large banks. Notes: The figures present the risk of small (smallest 25% banks), very small (smallest 10% banks), large (largest 25% banks), and very large (largest 10% banks) compared to the average risk of banks obtained from specification (4) of Table 4.

Fig. 6. Evolution of bank risk for banks that failed from 2007 onward. Notes: The figure presents the quarterly average of the bank-quarter values of risk obtained from the specification (4) of Table 4 for the banks that failed from 2007q1 onward (dashed line) relative to all the banks in the sample (solid line). It also shows the Z- scores for all banks and for the banks that failed.

11 The abrupt spikes in the risk of failed banks reflect the abrupt changes in risk of the banks that failed.

M.D. Delis et al. / Journal of Banking & Finance 44 (2014) 1–12 9

4.3. Heterogeneity owing to size and solvency

In this section we inquire into the heterogeneity of the risky behavior of banks based on their size and their solvency problems. We first consider the variability of risk according to bank size. In Fig. 5 we present the results for the risk of small (smallest 25% of banks in terms of total assets), very small (smallest 10% of banks), large (largest 25% of banks), and very large (largest 10% of banks) compared to the average risk of banks obtained from our preferred specification (4) of Table 4.

The findings are quite clear. Small and very small banks follow the average levels of risk until 2004. Their risk levels rise from that point on, but at a lower rate compared to the average. Large and very large banks are less risky than the average until 2005. From that point onward the large banks are riskier than the average, while the very large banks remain somewhat less risky than the average (even though their risk rises as well). Thus, it seems to be the large (and not the very large) banks that have been the most risky ones since 2005. However, an alarming finding is that the riskiness of very large banks increases somewhat after 2009. This stylized fact is in line with concerns about the riskiness of financial intermediaries even after the financial crisis (Rajan, 2010).

As a final exercise we examine the behavior of banks that became insolvent during the period 2007q1–2012q4. This informa- tion is obtained from the FDIC and the data are matched using the certification number of banks. Intuitively, the risk of these banks prior to their default should be considerably higher than the indus- try’s average. Again we use the results from specification (4) of Table 4 and plot the average risk of the banks that defaulted in Fig. 6. To compare our results with existing measures of bank risk, we also plot the equivalent Z-scores.

The results are as expected.11 The risk of banks that became insolvent during the financial crisis that began in 2007 is consider- ably higher than the industry average, especially since 2003. An interesting finding is that the risk of the failed banks peaks in the period 2005–2007, which is before the official eruption of the crisis, and decreases in 2008–2009, when problematic banks actually failed. Clearly, this exercise offers considerable evidence that our risk measure is a leading indicator of individual banks’ risk that provides early warning signals for bank problems.

5. Conclusions

This study proposes a new method for the estimation of bank risk, which is general and applicable to all firms. The model pro- poses the estimation of risk at the bank-quarter level using the var- iance of the profit function. Our main novelties are the point estimation of the variance component and the relaxation of the assumption that the variance is exogenous to profits and to other bank characteristics.

We estimate a three equation system. The first equation is the profit function, where the variance of profits (risk) enters as a mul- tiplicative component of the error term. From this equation we obtain point estimates of the variance component without having to calculate the variance from the variation of returns over a fixed number of past periods. The second equation is a function of the determinants of the variance of profits, in our case capital and/or liquidity of banks. In turn, in the third equation, these determi- nants are also endogenous to profits and the variance of profits (risk) and potentially to other bank and industry characteristics. This makes all the variables characterizing banking fundamentals, including risk, endogenous. Thus, following the banking theory on this issue, we assume that bank managers decide on the level of

12 The details are available on request from the authors. 13 One may think that specifying u2(w) = log(w) is better, since variances are

restricted to being positive. This is, of course, correct. However, a large part of the literature on GARCH models simply ignores this constraint and adopts the assump- tion u2(w) = w, using parametric restrictions (on c) to ensure positive variances.

10 M.D. Delis et al. / Journal of Banking & Finance 44 (2014) 1–12

risk that maximizes expected profits simultaneously with the level of capital and liquidity (and potentially other variables).

We apply this method to the full sample of US commercial banks over the period 1985q1–2012q4. The new method yields bank-quarter estimates of risk. The results show that our method is, to our knowledge, the first that captures the perceived increase in the risk of the average US bank after 2001 and before the erup- tion of the subprime crisis in 2007. More specifically, the results show that the average bank’s risk marginally increased from 1985 to 2001, while from 2001 to 2007 the increase was more than 200%. In contrast, the same model where the variance of profits is not endogenous (thus the second and third equations are dropped from the model) produces different results that are not in line with the perceived increase in risk. Further, we show that banks of dif- ferent size have different levels of risk, with larger banks being more risky after 2004 and very large banks showing considerable persistence of high risk even after 2009. Finally, by matching the risk measures obtained from our method with information for the banks that failed since 2007, we show that our measure is a reasonably good proxy for banks’ default risk.

Besides the banking firm, this model can be applied to any other type of financial intermediary or any other non-financial firm, with minor modifications. Furthermore, the model can be easily used to calculate the downside variance or look at the standard deviation of expected profits in a fashion similar to the coefficient of varia- tion. Finally, the model can be modified to measure connectedness of risk among banks in the fashion of Billio et al. (2012). This would also give an idea about contagion and, thus, systemic risk of the banking system as a whole, which is something we have not dealt with in this paper. As the present analysis is already quite lengthy, these ideas can be used as a basis for future research.

Acknowledgements

We are grateful to Robert DeYoung, Vasso Ioanidou, James Kolari, Steven Ongena, Fotios Pasiouras, Laura Spierdijk, Chris Tsoumas, Mark Watson, and Tianshu Zhao for valuable comments and suggestions. Special thanks go to Liuling Liu for assistance with the CDS data. We also grateful to participants of the FEBS confer- ence held in London in 2012, participants of the conference of the French Finance Association held in Strasbourg in 2012, and seminar participants at the Athens University of Economics and Business, Cass Business School, Brunel University, Essex Business School, and University of Surrey.

Appendix A

A.1. Formal derivation of the econometric model

Assume the following general simultaneous equation model:

Czi ¼ Bxi2 þu1ðyiÞk1 þu2ðr2i Þk2 þ ui; ui� iid N 0;Rð Þ; ðA:1Þ

Here, u1 and u2 are known univariate differentiable functions (e.g., uj(w) = w or uj(w) = log w, j = 1, 2) and k1 and k2 are G � 1 vectors of coefficients. C and B are G � G and G � k2, respectively, with B rep- resenting the matrix of coefficients on the predetermined variables and C representing the matrix of coefficients on the endogenous variables that appear in the system in standard simultaneous equa- tions model notation. Of course, restrictions are assumed in place for C and B in view of identification. For example, the diagonal ele- ments of C are assumed to be equal to one and this matrix must be nonsingular. Moreover, the variance r2i may depend on xi2 and yi. The Jacobian of transformation from vi to yi can be formally com- puted; this possibility has been recognized before by Rigobon (2003). This is very important because the researcher does not need

to identify a set of instrumental variables that are not correlated with vi; the xi1 and xi2 themselves are valid instruments.

For simplicity, we can write Czi ¼ Bxi2 þu1ðyiÞk1þ u2ðr2i Þk2 þ ui � B

�x�i2 þ ui. To begin with, we assume k1 ¼ k2 ¼ 0ðGx1Þ. Then,

pðyijziÞ ¼ ð2pr2i Þ �1=2

exp �ðyi � b 0 1xi1 � b

0 2ziÞ

2

2pr2i

" # ðA:2Þ

and

pðziÞ ¼ ð2pÞ�G=2jRj�1=2kCk exp � 1 2 ðCzi � B�x�i2Þ

0R�1 Czi � B�x�i2 � �� �

:

ðA:3Þ

Therefore, the joint distribution of the observed endogenous vari- ables is

pðyijziÞ ¼ ð2pÞ �Gþ12 f ðzi; cÞ�

1 2 exp �ðyi � b

0 1xi1 � b

0 2ziÞ

2

2pf ðzi; cÞ

" # � jRj�1=2

� kCk exp �1 2 ðCzi � B�x�i2Þ

0R�1ðCzi � B�x�i2Þ � �

ðA:4Þ

This likelihood function can be maximized using standard numeri- cal techniques. Formal concentration with respect to parameters B�

and R is also possible, so the problem can be simplified in terms of maximizing the log-likelihood function of the sample.12

In the general case, where k1; k2 – 0, the formulation of p(yi|zi) is straightforward, but the formulation of the inverse distribution p(zi|yi) or p(zi) is not trivial. The Jacobian of transformation is given by

Di ¼ @ðv i;uiÞ @ðyi; ziÞ

���� ���� ¼ f ðzi; cÞ�G=2 C�u02k2 @f ðzi; cÞ@z0i �u01k1b02

���� ����; ðA:5Þ

after accounting for the fact that the variance is dependent on endogenous variables (the zis). If r2i ¼ z0ic, then

@f ðzi ;cÞ @z0

i ¼ c0. If

r2i ¼ expðz0icÞ, then @f ðzi ;cÞ @z0

i ¼ expðz0icÞc0.

In this case, we have

pðyi; ziÞ ¼ ð2pÞ �Gþ12 f ðzi; cÞ�

G 2 exp �

yi � b01xi1 � b 0 2zi

� �2 2pf ðzi; cÞ

" #

� jRj�1=2 � C�u02k2 @f ðzi; cÞ @z0i

�u01k1b 0 2

���� ����

� exp �1 2 ðCzi � B�x�i2Þ

0R�1ðCzi � B�x�i2Þ � �

; ðA:6Þ

The simplest case is when u1(w) = u2(w) = w and f ðzi; cÞ ¼ z0ic. In this case the Jacobian term is simply kC� k2c0 � k1b02k, where k2c0 and k1b02 are rank-one G � G matrices. Of course, if k1 or k2 (or pos- sibly both) are zero, further simplifications arise. The typical case is to have profits yi, and the variance r2i , appearing as determinants of the zis. This may be partly because not all banks have positive prof- its; therefore, we cannot consider the log of yi. However, one may have u2(w) = log(w), with u02ðwÞ ¼ w�1. In that case, the Jacobian would be13

Di ¼ C� f ðzi; cÞ�1k2 @f ðzi; cÞ @z0i

� k1b02 ����

����: ðA:7Þ In terms of our model, it is instructive to provide a simple

econometric example to show that risk can also be a function of profits yi. Indeed, consider for simplicity the following

M.D. Delis et al. / Journal of Banking & Finance 44 (2014) 1–12 11

‘‘mean-scale’’ model yi = l + r(yi)vi, where v i� iid Nð0; 1Þ. The

Jacobian of transformation is

@v @y

���� ���� ¼ rðyÞ � r0ðyÞðy� lÞrðyÞ2

����� �����; ðA:8Þ

and the density of y would be

pðyÞ ¼ ð2pÞ�1=2 exp �ðy� lÞ 2

2rðyÞ2

" # � rðyÞ � r

0ðyÞðy� lÞ rðyÞ2

����� �����: ðA:9Þ

The Jacobian is nonzero, provided r(y) is not a solution of the difference equation r(y) � r0(y)(y � l) = 0, that is, r(y)2 should not be equal to C(y � l)2, where C is a constant. Other specifica- tions for the variance term would be acceptable, for example, r(y)2 = C1 + C2(y � l)2, C1 > 0. This shows that, in terms of our model, risk can be a function of profits y themselves, despite the fact that profits are also determined by risk. In that sense, we allow for joint determination of risk and profits.14 Suppose, indeed, that r2i ¼ z0icþ ayi. Then, the Jacobian term is kC�u02k2c0 � ðu01k1þ au02k2Þb

0 2k. If k2 = 0, the new formulation does not add anything to

the Jacobian, otherwise, the contribution depends on a ¼ @f ðzi;yi ;cÞ @yi

.

A process for the variance as discussed above is perhaps enough for practical purposes. However, one may want to explore the implications of stochastic risk or stochastic volatility for the profit function. Suppose we have a stochastic risk process of the form log r2i ¼ c0zi þ ni, where the new error term is ni�

iid Nð0;r2nÞ. Here, we explicitly assume log f ðzi; cÞ ¼ cz0i. The full model can now be written as follows:

yi ¼ b01xi1 þ b 0 2zi þ riv i;

Czi ¼ Bxi2 þu1ðyiÞk1 þu2ðr2i Þk2 þ ui; logr2i ¼ c0zi þ ni:

ðA:10Þ

In that form, we can formally consider volatility log r2i as an endog- enous (but latent) variable. Therefore,

pðyi; zi; logr2i Þ ¼ pðv i;ui; niÞ � @ðv i;ui; niÞ

@ðyi; zi; logr2i Þ

���� ����: ðA:11Þ

After computing the Jacobian term, the joint distribution is as follows:

pðyi; zi; logr2i Þ ¼ ð2pÞ �Gþ22 ðr2n Þ

�12ðr2i Þ �G2

� C�u01k1b 0 2 � cðu02k

0 2r

2 i þ 2eiu01k

0 1Þ

�� �� � jRj�

1 2 � exp �ðyi � b

0 1xi1 � b

0 2ziÞ

2

2pr2i

" #

� exp �1 2 ðCzi � B�x�i2ÞR

�1ðCzi � B�x�i2Þ � �

� exp � logr2i � c0zi � �2

2r2n

" # ; ðA:12Þ

where ei ¼ r�1i ðyi � b 0 1xi1 � b

0 2ziÞ. The simplest case is to have

u02 – 1, so that the Jacobian is independent of r2i . But still the den- sity of the observables is

pðyi; ziÞ ¼ Z p ðyi; zi; log r2i Þdr2i ; ðA:13Þ

which cannot be computed analytically. Of course, if u02 – 1, the integral is even more complicated and standard simulation

14 This is different from a GARCH-M type model, where the lagged variance, typically, enters into the mean equation. Here the current variance can also enter the mean equation, provided that a proper adjustment for the Jacobian term is made. This point seems to be unpublished, at least, to our knowledge.

techniques proposed in the aforementioned literature need consid- erable modification. A relatively simple case is when k1 = k2 = 0. In fact, the critical issue is whether k2 = 0. If not, then stochastic risk appears in the Jacobian terms of the sample likelihood, and formal or numerical integration is troublesome.

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  • The risk of financial intermediaries
    • 1 Introduction
    • 2 Bank risk measurement and empirical facts
    • 3 A new econometric model for bank risk
    • 4 Empirical application to the US banking sector
      • 4.1 Empirical setup
      • 4.2 Main empirical results
      • 4.3 Heterogeneity owing to size and solvency
    • 5 Conclusions
    • Acknowledgements
    • Appendix A
      • A.1 Formal derivation of the econometric model
    • References

The-impact-of-competition-and-information-on-int_2014_Journal-of-Banking---F.pdf

Journal of Banking & Finance 44 (2014) 55–71

Contents lists available at ScienceDirect

Journal of Banking & Finance

journal homepage: www.elsevier .com/locate / jbf

The impact of competition and information on intraday trading q

http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jbankfin.2014.03.026 0378-4266/� 2014 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

q Financial support from the EU Commission (TMR Grant HPMT-GH-00-00046- 08) and the Connaught Foundation is gratefully acknowledged. Andreas thanks the University of Copenhagen for its hospitality. We thank conference attendees at the Northern Finance Meeting 2007 and the MidWest Finance Meeting 2008, as well as Bruno Biais, Amil Dasgupta, Greg Durham, Li Hao, Rosemary (Gui Ying) Luo, Angelo Melino, Jordi Mondria, Christine Parlour, and Peter Norman Sørensen for helpful comments. An older version of the paper was circulated as ‘‘Bid-Ask Spreads and Volume: The Role of Trade Timing’’. ⇑ Corresponding author. Tel.: +1 416 978 5283.

E-mail addresses: [email protected] (K. Malinova), andreas.park@ utoronto.ca (A. Park).

1 The patterns differ across markets and across the analyzed time spans, b commonly, bid-ask spread decline and volume increases toward the en trading day. For instance, NYSE historically displayed U- or reverse J-shaped and volume (Jain and Joh, 1988; Brock and Kleidon, 1992; McInish and Woo Lee et al., 1993, or Brooks et al., 2003), but recent evidence (Serednyako suggests L-shaped spreads after decimalization; NASDAQ has L-shaped spr U-shaped volume (Chan et al., 1995); the TSX has U-shaped volume (McI Wood, 1990); the London Stock Exchange has L-shaped spreads and reverse volume (Kleidon and Werner, 1996 or Cai et al., 2004). See also Brockman an (1999) for the Hong Kong, Al-Suhaibani and Kryzanowski (2000) for the S et al. (2001) for the Taiwanese, Ding and Lau (2001) for the Singaporian, a et al. (2004) for the Australian stock exchanges. Du (2011) shows that the pr of informed trading (PIN) (see Easley et al., 1996) for DJIA stocks follows the p volume.

Katya Malinova ⇑, Andreas Park University of Toronto, Canada

a r t i c l e i n f o

Article history: Received 5 April 2012 Accepted 18 March 2014 Available online 28 March 2014

JEL classification: G10 G14

Keywords: Trading Market participation Intraday patterns Heterogeneous information PIN

a b s t r a c t

In a dynamic model of financial market trading multiple heterogeneously informed traders choose when to place orders. Better informed traders trade immediately, worse informed delay – even though they expect the market to move against them. This behavior generates intraday patterns with decreasing spreads, decreasing probability of informed trading (PIN), and increasing volume. We predict that policies that foster market entry improve the welfare of uninformed traders and lead to increased market partic- ipation by incumbent traders. Technological advances that lead to better signal processing also encourage market participation and increase volume but at the expense of uninformed traders’ welfare.

� 2014 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

1. Introduction

Over the last two decades, equity markets have become increas- ingly accessible. Improvements in technology allow investors to obtain information at lower costs and to access equity markets fas- ter. Moreover, reduced exchange and brokerage fees invite more activity. How do these changes affect trading behavior and through it, trading volume, liquidity, and price dynamics?

We develop a theoretical model to study the impact of changes in competition and information on trading behavior, trading prof- its, market participation, and volume. In our model, the strategic behavior of heterogeneously informed traders endogenously generates dynamic patterns in volume, bid-ask spreads, and the

probability of informed trading that are consistent with commonly observed empirical intraday patterns.1

The theoretical model underlying our analysis is in the tradition of Glosten and Milgrom (1985). Liquidity is supplied by a compet- itive, uninformed, and risk neutral market maker. Traders either place orders for reasons outside the model (e.g., to rebalance their portfolio), or they have private information about the security’s fundamental value. Adding to Glosten and Milgrom, we allow the informed traders to choose the timing of their trades, and we admit that the total number of traders is uncertain.

The critical component of a trader’s timing decision in our model is the information ‘‘slippage cost’’ of delay. Introduced by Rosu (2012), the ‘‘slippage cost’’ refers to the gradual loss of an

ut, most d of the

spreads d, 1992; v, 2005)

eads and nish and L-shaped d Chung

audi, Lee nd Kalev obability attern of

56 K. Malinova, A. Park / Journal of Banking & Finance 44 (2014) 55–71

informed trader’s informational advantage over time. This cost arises in our model when an informed trader is pre-empted by other informed traders.2 For an informed trader to delay, the bid- ask spread must thus decline over time to compensate this trader for the slippage cost. The adverse selection cost that the market maker faces (e.g., measured by the probability of informed trading) follows the pattern of the bid-ask spread and declines over the day.3 Finally, in our model, the intraday decreases in bid-ask spreads and adverse selection costs are accompanied by an intraday increase in volume.

We next study how these measures are affected by changes in key components of the model to generate testable predictions that shed light on several market developments of the past decade. Our first set of results determines the impact of an increase in the com- petition among traders. Recent years saw the enactment of many policies that encourage market entry such as the improvement of market access for international investors by simplifying cross- country clearing and settlement procedures, the removal of barri- ers to trading through new regulations (e.g., the establishment of so-called ‘‘exempt brokers’’ who can offer trading services to retail investors at lower fixed costs), or the establishment of direct mar- ket access for institutional investors. Our model predicts that, as the expected number of traders rises, the cost of delay increases and more traders act early to capitalize on their information. This behavior mutes the intraday increase in volume, and it leads to a steeper intraday decline in the spread. The steeper decline in spreads generates an increase in market participation, in the sense that each trader is more likely to trade. Consequently, competition for information rents does not deter but attracts market entry and allows traders to benefit, even if they have comparatively weak information.

Our second set of results addresses the impact of policies that lead to systematic improvements in private information. Such an improvement can occur, for instance, when a company adopts or a regulator imposes a new disclosure policy that fosters transpar- ency.4 Intuitively, a systematic shift in information quality leads to more competition among the informed traders because, on average, there are more traders with high quality information. Our model predicts that, ceteris paribus, such an improvement leads to higher market participation, higher total volume, and a muted increase in intraday volume. In contrast to the entry of new traders, an increase in competition that is driven by improvements in private informa- tion causes wider spreads.

When we study the effect of competition on the average per- trader profits, we observe that trader entry reduces the average profit per informed trader, but that private information improve- ments increase this profit. In our model, the informed traders’ rents come at the expense of the uninformed traders. We thus conclude that policies that foster market entry benefit uninformed traders whereas technological advances that lead to better private signal processing hurt uninformed traders.

The literature has developed several theoretical explanations for persistent patterns in observable variables. Most of this litera- ture is in the tradition of Kyle (1985) and focuses on the impact

2 In Rosu (2012) traders may choose between limit and market orders; limit order submitters incur the waiting cost and earn the spread whereas market order submitters pay the spread cost.

3 See Easley et al. (2002, 2010) and Duarte and Young (2009) for the importance of PIN for required rates of return; for recent empirical work on PIN estimation see Yan and Zhang (2012).

4 Related are many examples of incremental or even dramatic improvements in economy wide information quality, such as the advent of new data sources or new computing tools that allow faster processing of data; examples are the advent of machine-readable news packages such as Ravenpack or the introduction of linguistic algorithms. Our model then delivers testable predictions for event studies of such changes.

of the aggregate order flow on trading variables. Models in the tra- dition of Glosten and Milgrom (1985) explicitly capture the evolu- tion of bid-ask spreads, and we study the impact of timing in this context.

Admati and Pfleiderer (1988) analyze a setting with endoge- nous timing and attribute periods of concentrated trading to the timing decisions of discretionary liquidity traders. Informed trad- ers do not time their actions, as their information is viable for only one period. The period with highest activity is determined by exogenous parameters, and thus, in principle, their model admits any pattern. Foster and Viswanathan (1990) analyze a single informed trader model and show that inter-day variations in vol- ume and transaction costs arise when there are releases of public information.5 We complement their work and offer predictions on the impact of competition between differentially informed traders.

Holden and Subrahmanyam (1992) employ a multi-period auc- tion model with two insiders who receive identical signals at the beginning of the game. They trade aggressively and, as the difference between time periods vanishes, all information is revealed immedi- ately. In Foster and Viswanathan (1996) each trader’s information is a noisy signal of the asset value, and the correlation structure of sig- nals affects trading intensity, profits, and price informativeness. Back et al. (2000) analyze the continuous-time limit of Foster and Viswanathan (1996). Signals in these models are identically distrib- uted, and the focus is on the competition among ex ante identically informed traders. Bernhardt and Miao (2004) analyze a setting in which the information of early traders becomes stale compared to those who arrive later. They study how the arrivals of these differen- tially informed traders generate patterns in observables. We analyze the competition between ex-ante differentially informed traders who receive their information simultaneously, and we focus on the timing of trades and the market participation decisions. We further contribute by analyzing systematic improvements in information on trader behavior.

Employing an inventory-based trading model, Brock and Kleidon (1992) show that U-shaped volume can be caused by demand shocks that traders experience during periods of market closure. The monopolistic market maker then exploits this pattern and charges U-shaped spreads. Our analysis complements this line of work by studying competitive liquidity provision in a setting with asymmetric information.

Overview. Section 2 outlines the model, Section 3 derives the equilibrium. Section 4 studies the effect of an increase in competi- tion between traders on market participation. Section 5 discusses the patterns of spreads, volume, and the probability of informed trading. Section 6 analyzes several extensions such as the impact of a possible release of public information and the effect of system- atic improvements in private information, and it discusses trader revenues. Section 7 discusses the results. Appendix A provides more details on the information structure. Appendix B contains the proofs. A table at the end of the text summarizes the empirical predictions.

2. The model

2.1. Overview of the market structure

We formulate a stylized model of security trading, in which traders trade single blocks of a risky asset with a competitive market maker. Our model builds on Glosten and Milgrom (1985) (hereafter, GM) but we assume that more than one trader may

5 Other effects caused by the timing decision of a singleinformed trader have been analyzed in, for instance, Back and Baruch (2007) (order splitting), Chakraborty and Yilmaz (2004) (price manipulation), and Smith (2000) ((no-)timing in absence of bid- ask spreads).

Fig. 1. Timeline of events.

K. Malinova, A. Park / Journal of Banking & Finance 44 (2014) 55–71 57

arrive at the same time and we allow traders to time their transactions.

There are two trading periods. At the beginning of period 1, before trading commences, the fundamental value of the security is realized (but not revealed) and some investors receive private information about this value. These traders are rational and trade to maximize their expected profits. If not informed, a trader may experience a liquidity shock forcing him to buy or sell.6

Trading is organized by a competitive market maker who posts a schedule of prices that are conditional on the net order flow (buy and sell orders). The market maker sets prices competitively and earns zero expected profits on each trade.

The value of the security is revealed at the end of period 2, after the market closes. Traders who hold the asset obtain its cash value and consume. Short positions are filled at the fundamental value. Fig. 1 outlines the timing of events.

2.2. Model details

2.2.1. Security There is a single risky asset with a liquidation value V from a set

of two potential values V ¼ f0;1g. The two values are equally likely.

2.2.2. Market maker The market maker is risk-neutral and competitive. She does not

have private information and sets prices to break even, conditional on the information contained in the net order flow.

2.2.3. Traders With probability a there are two traders, with probability 1� a

there is only one trader. A trader is equipped with private informa- tion about the value of the security with probability l 2 ð0;1Þ. The informed investors are risk-neutral and rational.

If not informed (probability 1� l), a trader may experience a liquidity shock.7 To simplify the exposition, we assume that this liquidity shock occurs with probability 1, that it is equally likely to occur in either of the two trading periods, and that it forces the tra- der to buy or sell with equal probabilities.

6 Throughout the paper we will refer to market makers as female and investors as male.

7 Assuming the presence of traders who trade for exogenous reasons (‘‘noise’’, liquidity, or private benefits) is common practice in the asymmetric information literature to prevent ‘‘no-trading’’ as in Milgrom and Stokey (1982).

2.2.4. Informed traders’ information We follow most of the GM sequential trading literature and

assume that traders receive a binary signal about the security’s fundamental value V. These signals are private, and they are inde- pendently distributed, conditional on V. Specifically, trader i is told ‘‘with chance qi, the value is High/Low (h/l)’’ where

This qi is the signal quality. In contrast to most of the GM literature, we assume that these signals come in a continuum of qualities, and that qi is trader i’s private information. The distribution of qualities is independent of the security’s true value and can be understood as reflecting, for instance, the distribution of traders’ talents to analyze securities.

In what follows, we combine the binary signal (h or l) and its quality on ½1=2;1� in a single variable on ½0;1�, namely, the trader’s private belief that the security’s fundamental value is high (V ¼ 1). This belief is the trader’s posterior on V ¼ 1 after he learns his quality and sees his private signal but before he observes the public history. A trader’s behavior given his private signal and its quality can then be equivalently described in terms of the trader’s private belief. This approach allows us to characterize the equilibrium in terms of a continuous scalar variable (as opposed to the vector of traders’’ private information) and thus simplifies the exposition.

Trader i’s belief is obtained by Bayes Rule and coincides with the signal quality if the signal is h;pi ¼ PrðV ¼ 1jhÞ ¼ qi=ðqi þ ð1� qiÞÞ ¼ qi. Likewise, pi ¼ 1� qi if the signal is l. Appendix A fleshes out how the distributions of beliefs are obtained from the underlying distribution of qualities and provides several examples. Fig. 2 illustrates the structure of information and liquidity trading.

2.2.5. Public and private information The number of traders in the market is not revealed, except pos-

sibly through submitted orders. The identity of an investor (informed or liquidity), his signal, and his signal quality are his pri- vate information. Past trades and transaction prices are public information. We will use H to summarize the public information about everything that occurred in period 1.

2.2.6. Trading protocol There are two trading periods, t ¼ 1;2. As in GM, each trader

can post at most one market order to either buy or sell one unit of the security at prices determined by the market maker. An

Fig. 2. Illustration of signals and liquidity trading. This figure illustrates the structure of information and liquidity trading. First, it is determined whether a trader is informed (probability l) or uninformed (probability 1� l). If informed, the trader obtains a signal quality qi . Next, he receives the ‘‘correct’’ signal (h when V ¼ 1 and l when V ¼ 0) with probability qi and the ‘‘wrong’’ signal with probability 1� qi . (The draw of V is identical for all traders.) If the trader is not informed, he experiences a liquidity shock in periods 1 and 2 with equal probabilities.

8 Malinova and Park (2010) use a similar requirement in a single-period model with multiple traders.

58 K. Malinova, A. Park / Journal of Banking & Finance 44 (2014) 55–71

informed trader in our setting can additionally choose the period to submit his order in. Informed traders choose the period and the direction of their trade (or to abstain from trading) to maximize their expected profits. The market maker posts volume-conditional quotes that take into account the information in the net order flow. When submitting a market order, a trader accounts for the fact that the price at which his order is executed will depend on whether or not there is another trader and on that other trader’s action.

2.3. Trading equilibrium

2.3.1. Quotes At the beginning of period t the market maker posts a schedule

of prices that are conditional on the net order flow. In what follows, when discussing the bid-ask spread, we use the bid and ask prices that reflect the quotes for net order flow of single sell and buy orders, respectively. With zero expected profits, these quotes coincide with the market maker’s conditional expectations of the fundamental value

asktð1Þ ¼ EM½V j single buy; public info at t�; bidtð1Þ ¼ EM½V j single sale; public info at t�:

If only a single order arrives, then it trades at these bid and ask prices. If two orders arrive, then they both clear at the price that equals the market maker’s expectation, conditional on the net order flow. Since traders’ signals are conditionally independent, a second order reveals additional information about the fundamen- tal compared to the first order. Consequently, the price when there are two buy orders exceeds the ask price for a single buy order and the price when there are two sell orders is below the bid price for a single sell order. If a buy and a sell order arrive simultaneously, then in a symmetric equilibrium, the information that is revealed by the sell order exactly offsets the information that is revealed by the buy order, and both orders execute at the prior expectation of the fundamental.

The above discussion provides a rationale for the definition of the bid-ask spread by the prices of single buy and sell orders, as these lead to the tightest spread.

2.3.2. The informed investor’s choice An informed investor enters the market in period 1. He can sub-

mit a buy or a sell order in this period, or he can delay his decision until period 2. A trader who does not submit his order in either of the two trading periods makes zero profits. Fig. 3 illustrates the choices of an informed trader.

2.3.3. Equilibrium concept We restrict attention to monotone threshold decision rules.

Namely, we seek an equilibrium where traders with sufficiently encouraging (discouraging) signals buy (sell) in period 1 and those with information of lower quality choose to delay their decision until period 2. Further, we focus on a symmetric equilibrium, where quality thresholds are independent of the trader’s identity and, absent transactions, buyers and sellers require signals of the same quality to trade. If an equilibrium is not unique, we select the volume maximizing equilibrium.

More formally, we search for an equilibrium such that a trader buys in period 1 if his private belief pi 2 ½p1b ;1� and sells in period 1 if pi 2 ½0;p1s �, that he buys in period 2 if his private belief pi 2 ½p2bðHÞ;p1bÞ and sells if pi 2 ðp1s ;p2s ðHÞ�, and that he abstains from trading otherwise. The values p1b ;p1s ;p2bðHÞ;p2s ðHÞ are deter- mined in equilibrium and the period 2 thresholds p2bðHÞ;p2s ðHÞ may depend on the period 1 history H. Symmetry with respect to buying and selling implies that p1b ¼ 1� p1s and that, condi- tional on H ¼ \no transaction at t ¼ 1";p2bðHÞ ¼ 1� p2s ðHÞ. The volume maximizing equilibrium has the lowest p2b and the high- est p2s . In what follows, we omit the subscripts b and s, and we use p1 ¼ p1b and p2 ¼ p2b .

Since the market maker’s quotes condition on the aggregate order flow, traders do not know the price at which their market orders will be executed. We search for an equilibrium where trad- ers expectations are rational and where traders experience no regrets in equilibrium, in the sense that traders do not wish to change their actions upon observing the realized price.8

3. Equilibrium analysis

We proceed in three steps. We first outline general properties of the equilibrium. Second, we describe the equilibrium in the final (second) trading period. Third, we discuss the equilibrium in the first period. Fig. 4 summarizes the equilibrium decisions. When discussing a trader’s choice, we refer to an informed trader; noise traders act exogenously.

3.1. General properties

The probability of order history ot (excluding the trader’s own order), conditional on the security’s fundamental value being V ¼ v and the trader’s private information, is independent of the trader’s private belief, Prðot jV ¼ v ;pÞ ¼ Prðot jV ¼ vÞ. This property is implied by the threshold decision rules and the conditional inde- pendence of the traders’ signals. The trader’s expectation of the fundamental can then be written as

E½V jp; ot � ¼ pPrðo t jV ¼ 1Þ

pPrðotjV ¼ 1Þ þ ð1� pÞPrðotjV ¼ 0Þ ; ð1Þ

and it is increasing in the private belief, conditional on any order history. In a symmetric equilibrium, the expectation of a trader with private belief p ¼ 1=2 coincides with that of the market maker, E½V jot;p ¼ 1=2� ¼ EM½V jot�, for any order history. Consequently, the expectation of a trader with a private belief p > 1=2 exceeds that

Fig. 3. Decision possibilities and possible outcomes from the perspective of an informed trader. In each period, when ðaÞ there is no other trader, ðbÞ there is another trader who does not trade, or ðcÞ the other trader has already traded (applies only to period 2), the trader has to pay the volume-contingent ask price, asktðotÞ, or he will obtain the volume-contingent bid price, bidtðotÞ. If there is another trader who submits an order, then trading occurs at the price that takes into account the realized net order flow ot (where negative numbers refer to sales, and positive numbers to buys).

Fig. 4. Equilibrium behavior. This figure illustrates a trader’s equilibrium choices. An informed trader acts in period 1 if his private belief is sufficiently low or sufficiently high, and he delays otherwise; similarly in period 2. Noise traders’ decisions are determined exogenously.

K. Malinova, A. Park / Journal of Banking & Finance 44 (2014) 55–71 59

of the market maker, and the expectation of a trader with a private belief p < 1=2 is below that of the market maker. The above discus- sion together with the market maker setting prices at her expected value implies the following lemma.

Lemma 1 (Separation of Trading Decisions). A trader with private belief p > 1=2 never sells, a trader with private belief p < 1=2 never buys, and a trader with private belief p ¼ 1=2 never trades.

In what follows, we discuss the decision of a trader with private belief p > 1=2; the discussion for the case of p < 1=2 is analogous. Employing Lemma 1, at the beginning of period 1 a trader with private belief p > 1=2 chooses between submit- ting a buy order and delaying his trading decision until period 2. He will submit a buy order in period 1 only if he expects to (i) make non-negative expected trading profits in period 1 and (ii) these profits exceed those that he expects to make by

delaying until period 2. Therefore, this trader needs to first forecast his period 2 trading decision and profits, conditional on all possible period 1 transaction histories (a buy, a sale, or a no trade).

3.2. The trading decision in period 2

Fixing the belief threshold for the marginal trader who buys in period 1, p1, we search for the period 2 threshold p2. An informed investor with a private belief p > 1=2 submits a buy order in per- iod 2 if, conditional on his information and the period 1 transaction history, the expected ask price is at or below his expectation of the security’s fundamental value. By Lemma 1, he abstains from trad- ing otherwise.

Lemma 2 (Marginal Traders in Period 2). For any p1 2 ð1=2;1Þ and any history H, there exists a unique p2 2 ð1=2;p1Þ such that

60 K. Malinova, A. Park / Journal of Banking & Finance 44 (2014) 55–71

1. any trader with private belief p 2 ½p2;p1Þ buys in period 2, 2. any trader with private belief p 2 ð1� p1;1� p2� sells in period

2, and 3. any trader with private belief p 2 ð1� p2;p2Þ abstains from

trading.

Furthermore, p2 does not depend on H and it increases in p1.

3.3. The trading decision in period 1

The marginal buyer p1 in period 1 must be indifferent between buying in period 1 and delaying his trading decision to period 2. Consequently, the marginal buyer in period 1, p1, must solve the following indifference condition:

E½V�ask1jp1; I submit B at t¼1� ¼E E½V�ask2jp1;H; I submit B at t¼2�jp1 h i

;

ð2Þ

where trader p1 conditions on himself being the marginal buyer in period 1, on trader p2ðp1Þ being the marginal buyer in period 2, and on symmetric marginal sellers. Applying the Law of Iterated Expec- tations, we rewrite (2) as a condition on the expected ask prices

E½ask1jp1; I submit B at t¼1� ¼E E½ask2jp1;H; I submit B at t¼2�jp1 h i

:

ð3Þ

9 The situation with a ¼ 0 is degenerate in the sense that all informed types are indifferent between trading at any time. With competition, a > 0, non-marginal traders strictly prefer to trade in one period or the other.

10 This insight is in contrast to Smith (2000): under the information structure here, Smith would predict that a single trader always wants to trade early. The reason for the discrepancy is that in Smith (2000) a trader has no price impact and thus faces a zero bid-ask spread.

Theorem 1 (Existence of a Symmetric Equilibrium). There exist p1;p2 with 1=2 < p2 < p1 < 1 such that any trader with private belief p 2 ½p1;1� buys in period 1, any trader with private belief p 2 ½p2;p1Þ buys in period 2, and no trader with private belief p < p2 buys. Selling decisions are symmetric.

We have not been able to establish that the equilibrium is unique. In our analytical comparative statics, we focus on the equi- librium thresholds that maximize the trading volume, and in our numerical simulations, the equilibrium is always unique.

In our model, the signal qualities are drawn from a continuous distribution, and the continuity allows us to focus on threshold equilibrium decision rules for traders. An alternative approach would be to use discrete signal qualities. In such a setting, how- ever, the equilibrium would generally require that traders play mixed strategies across time, with the inherent interpretational difficulties. Conceptually, the pure strategy equilibrium in our continuous setup can be viewed as a ‘‘purification’’ result in the sense of Harsanyi.

4. Competition and market participation

4.1. The single trader benchmark

To better understand traders’ incentives, consider first the case when there is only one trader in the market, a ¼ 0. In a monotone equilibrium, this trader will buy in period 1 if his pri- vate belief p is at or above p1, and he will buy in period 2 if his private belief p is at or above p2 > 1=2 but below p1. Being alone in the market, the trader can perfectly forecast the period 2 ask quote. Further, by the Law of Iterated Expectations, the trader cannot expect his expectation of the fundamental to change from period 1 to period 2. Consequently, conditional on submitting a buy order, this trader will always submit his order in period 1 if the period 1 ask price is lower than the period 2 ask price, ask1 < ask2, and vice versa. For this trader to trade in either period, depending on his belief, we must have ask1 ¼ ask2. Since the spread depends only on the adverse selec- tion costs, these costs must coincide across periods. Lemma 5 in

Appendix B shows that this cost equalization uniquely deter- mines trader p1.9

Corollary 1 (Single Trader Equilibrium). If there is only one trader in the market, a ¼ 0, then prices in the first period are the same as in the second period, ask1 ¼ ask2 and bid1 ¼ bid2, and average volume is larger in period 2 than in period 1.

The equality of prices across time challenges the casual intui- tion that the bid-ask spread should be wider when the informed traders have higher quality information (in period 1). This casual intuition does not recognize, however, that in addition to the infor- mation quality spreads also depend on the chance that an informed trader with the relevant information exists. For prices to coincide, the market maker must be more likely to encounter an informed trader in period 2 than in period 1. In the single trader equilibrium, the information quality and informed trader scarcity effects exactly offset one another.10

4.2. Competition and the slippage cost

Now suppose that a trader faces potential competition from another trader, a > 0. The trader’s decision then depends on two factors: (i) the bid-ask spreads in each period and (ii) the potential loss of information, or the ‘‘slippage cost’’, which stems from the price impact of a competing order. Traders’ signals are independent (conditional on the fundamental), and therefore the probability that a trader assigns to a competing trade in the same direction (which in turn determines the slippage cost) is fully determined by this trader’s belief about the fundamental.

The first key observation is that the slippage cost is present for all informed traders (with the exception of a trader with p ¼ 1=2, who is effectively uninformed), because each informed trader expects the other trader to trade in the same direction. For instance, a trader with favorable information about the fundamen- tal believes that another informed trader, should he be present, is more likely to buy than to sell. This observation stems from two insights: (i) favorable signals, and therefore buys, occur more fre- quently when the fundamental is high than when it is low and (ii) a trader with favorable information updates his belief about the fundamental in favor of the high value.

The second key observation is that the slippage cost is higher for traders with higher signal quality. This monotonicity is due to the fact that traders with information of higher quality update their beliefs about the fundamental more strongly than those with infor- mation of lower quality. For instance, Eq. (1) illustrates that, for a trader who receives favorable information, a posterior belief that the value is high increases in his private belief (and therefore in his signal quality).

Finally, the third key observation is that the expected bid-ask spreads are determined by the equilibrium marginal traders and are thus independent of traders’ private beliefs.

To summarize, the cost of delay, or the slippage cost, is higher for traders with higher quality information, whereas the potential benefit in the form of the reduced bid-ask spread is constant. As a consequence, in equilibrium, traders with higher quality informa- tion trade immediately, those with lower quality delay.

We can use these insights to study the impact of competition. An increase in competition increases the risk that an informed

K. Malinova, A. Park / Journal of Banking & Finance 44 (2014) 55–71 61

trader loses his informational advantage to a competing trade in the same direction. The increase in the slippage cost then induces traders to act early. More informed traders acting early reduces the bid-ask spread in the second period, making trading attractive to those who choose to abstain in the absence of competition.

Proposition 1 (Competition and Market Participation). As the prob- ability a that another trader is present increases, market participation increases in period 1 and overall, p1 and p2 decrease.

Better informed traders impose a negative externality on weaker informed traders because the presence of better informed traders increases the bid-ask spread, making it unattractive for weaker informed traders to participate in the market. Competition alleviates this externality because it compels better informed trad- ers to act on their information earlier, allowing weaker informed traders to profitably enter the market in period 2.

We thus predict that policies that encourage the entry of new traders benefit the marginal, weaker informed traders and amplify the volume increase from the new entrants because existing trad- ers participate more in the market. Examples of policies that encourage market entry include the improvement of market access for international investors by simplifying cross-country clearing and settlement procedures, the removal of barriers to trading through new regulations (e.g., the establishment of so-called ‘‘exempt brokers’’ who can offer trading services to retail investors at lower fixed costs), or the establishment of direct market access for institutional investors.

5. Patterns in observables

Empirically, observable variables display intraday patterns. Spreads are L-shaped on most markets. Examples are NASDAQ (Chan et al., 1995), the London Stock Exchange (Kleidon and Werner, 1996 or Cai et al., 2004), Taiwan (Lee et al., 2001) and Singapore (Ding and Lau, 2001). Early evidence for NYSE suggested that spreads are reverse J-shaped (Jain and Joh, 1988; Brock and Kleidon, 1992; McInish and Wood, 1992; Lee et al., 1993, or Brooks et al., 2003) but there is evidence that the spread pattern has become L-shaped after decimalization (Serednyakov, 2005).

The patterns of volume differ across markets.11 On NYSE and NASDAQ volume is U- or reverse J-shaped. On the London Stock Exchange, volume is reverse L-shaped, with two small humps, one in the morning and the other in the early afternoon. Other world markets, for instance, the Taiwan and the Singapore Stock exchanges also have a reverse L-shaped volume or number of transactions.

Our model generates patterns in observable variables that are consistent with the above empirical observations. In what follows, we discuss these patterns and the impact of the level of competi- tion and changes in information quality on these patterns.

Spreads in our model are L-shaped because they decline from period 1 to period 2 to compensate traders who delay for the slip- page cost. The volume pattern depends on how short-lived the traders perceive their private information to be and the pattern depends on the level of competition. If the information is perceived to last through the trading day, then volume increases from period 1 to period 2 and is reverse L-shaped. If, however, traders believe that their information is very short-lived (for instance, due to the potential release of public information or due to intense competi- tion), then volume decreases from period 1 to period 2 and can be viewed as L-shaped.

In this section we continue to assume that traders’ private infor- mation lasts until the end of period 2. In Section 6, we relax this

11 The references are the same as for spreads.

assumption and investigate the effect of a possible release of public information after period 1.

5.1. Spread patterns

The bid-ask spread is the difference between the ask price and the bid price,

spreadt ¼ askt � bidt: ð4Þ

In models with asymmetric information, the size of the spread is associated with the implied adverse selection costs. To facilitate the comparison, we compare the prices that are quoted at the beginning of period 1 for a single unit with those that are quoted for a single unit at the beginning of period 2 in absence of transac- tions in period 1.

The dynamic behavior of spreads in our model is driven by the monotonicity of decision rules and the incentive compatibility of trading. As discussed in the previous section, traders who delay face the slippage cost, which stems from the potential loss of their informational advantage due to competing trades in the same direction. In equilibrium, the bid-ask spread must decline so as to compensate the delaying traders for the slippage cost, implying that the adverse selection costs in period 1 are higher than in per- iod 2. Further, as competition increases, the spread widens in per- iod 1 and it narrows in period 2.

Proposition 2 (Spreads).

1. For every level of competition a > 0, the spread in period 1 exceeds the spread in period 2, spread1 > spread2.

2. As competition intensifies (a increases), spread1 increases and spread2 decreases.

Proposition 2 implies, in particular, that the difference in spreads, spread1 � spread2, increases as competition increases. In other words, stronger competition leads to a more pronounced L-shaped spread pattern. In our setting, the more pronounced pattern increases the intraday variance of the bid-ask spread. Policies that encourage the entry of new market participants may thus lead to an increase in the so-called microstructure noise in transaction prices.12

5.2. Volume patterns

We proxy volume by the probability that a given market partic- ipant trades, which is the probability of a buy plus the probability of a sale,

volt ¼ Prða given trader buys at tÞ þ Prða given trader sells at tÞ: ð5Þ

As the competition parameter a increases, there will be more traders and thus more transactions, ceteris paribus. Our volume measure is not contaminated by this direct effect of an increased number of traders but instead captures volume per capita.

We perform our analysis of the relation of competition and pat- terns in volume numerically, based on the quadratic signal quality distribution that is outlined in (A.3) in Appendix A. In the previous section we argued that volume must increase from period 1 to per- iod 2 for the single trader case (a ¼ 0). The numerical analysis shows that the same holds for any a > 0. Further, by Proposition 1, as competition increases, more traders act in period 1 and overall.

12 See, for instance, Hansen and Lunde (2006) for a discussion of the impact of microstructure noise on realized volatility estimates.

62 K. Malinova, A. Park / Journal of Banking & Finance 44 (2014) 55–71

Our numerical results show that more traders act in period 1 relative to period 2 so that the reverse L-shaped pattern becomes less pronounced. Fig. 5 illustrates the following observation.

Observation 1 (Volume).

1. For each level of competition a � 0, volume in period 2 exceeds volume in period 1.

2. As competition intensifies (a increases), the volume difference across periods declines (vol1 � vol2 increases).

Proposition 1 showed that competition increases the overall volume in the sense that each existing trader is more likely to trade. The interpretation of Observation 1 is that increased compe- tition smoothes the intraday pattern of volume.

5.3. Patterns in the probability of informed trading

Adverse selection costs in the context of Glosten–Milgrom sequential trading models are commonly measured by the ‘‘proba- bility of informed trading’’ (PIN), introduced by Easley et al. (1996), defined as the ‘‘probability that any trade that occurs at time t is information-based.’’ In our framework, the probability that a given trader in period t is informed is

PrtðinformedÞ ¼ Prðtrader acts in tÞ � Prðtrader is a noise traderÞ

Prðtrader acts in tÞ

¼ vol t � 2k volt

: ð6Þ

We distinguish this measure for periods 1 and 2, where to facilitate the comparison, PrtðinformedÞ in period 2 assumes no transactions in period 1. Relation (6) implies:

Proposition 3 (The Fraction of Informed Trading). The probability that an observed trade stems from an informed trader, PrtðinformedÞ, displays the same intraday pattern as volume, volt .

Although PrtðinformedÞ is based on the verbal definition of PIN, it does not correspond to the PIN that is commonly estimated. The

Fig. 5. Volume patterns. competition parameter a is on the horizontal axis, vol1 � vol2 is on the vertical axis, the probability of an informed trader is set to l ¼ :4. Each line corresponds to a parameter of the quadratic quality distribution outlined in Appendix A; the parameters are h 2 f�6;0;6;12g. While the volume difference increases in a, it remains negative, and volume in period 1 is lower than in period 2.

reason is that PrtðinformedÞ actually does not properly measure adverse selection in our model. Generally, the market maker is adversely selected on the trades in the ‘‘right direction,’’ and adverse selection costs relate to the difference in the fraction of trades that are in the right vs. wrong direction. Denoting this dif- ference by

PrHt ðinformedÞ ¼ Prðtrade in correct direction at tÞ�Prðtrade in wrong direction at tÞ

Prðtrade at tÞ ;

ð7Þ

if signals are perfectly informative, as in Easley et al. (1996), then PrtðinformedÞ ¼ PrHt ðinformedÞ because only noise trades are in the wrong direction. In our model, signals are noisy and there are informed traders who trade in the wrong direction. Then PrtðinformedÞ and PrHt ðinformedÞ differ because PrtðinformedÞ includes the portion of trades that are based on incorrect signals.

Papers that use PIN to test for adverse selection effectively esti- mate PrHt ðinformedÞ because the estimations use the numbers of buys and sells or the difference of the two (see, for instance, Easley et al. (2008)). With a neutral prior, PrHt ðinformedÞ is, omitting time subscripts, ðPrðbuyjV ¼ 1Þ þ PrðselljV ¼ 0Þ � PrðbuyjV ¼ 0Þ � PrðselljV ¼ 1ÞÞ =ðPrðbuyÞ þ PrðsellÞÞ. Using Bayes rule, the ask price with a neutral prior is 1=2PrðbuyjV ¼ 1Þ=PrðbuyÞ, and with symmetric decisions, PrðbuyjV ¼ 0Þ ¼ PrðselljV ¼ 1Þ. Consequently, for neutral priors, PrHt ðinformedÞ coincides with the bid-ask spread.

Corollary 2 (PIN). The probability that the market maker is adversely selected, PrHt ðinformedÞ, displays the same L-shaped intraday pattern as the bid-ask spread.

Empirical analyses employ a number of measures to assess the extent to which liquidity providers are adversely selected. PIN is a widely accepted measure, but its estimation is data-intensive and challenging (see, e.g., Yan and Zhang, 2012). A second standard measure is the price impact, measured by the signed change in the midpoint of the bid-ask spread subsequent to a transaction. The price impact is part of the decomposition of the ‘‘effective’’ bid-ask spread into the sum of the liquidity provider benefits (the ‘‘realized’’ spread) and (twice) the price impact. In our model, the realized spread is zero (since the market maker is subject to perfect competition) and the price impact is proportional to the bid-ask spread. Thus, in our model patterns in the price impact are synonymous to patterns in PIN, and we provide a theoretical framework to understand the relation between these two impor- tant empirical measures of adverse selection.

6. Extensions

6.1. Systematic changes in the information structure

Our analysis of competition thus far has focussed on the expected number of traders. Traders, however, care not only for presence or absence of competition but also for the quality of infor- mation that the other trader may possess. We will now study how systematic changes in the distribution of information qualities affect observable variables.

Changes in information quality may occur when there is a per- sistent shift in the fraction of traders who are better informed or more capable at processing information. An example is an increase in analyst coverage for a stock, as this would improve the average trader’s information. A stock may also attract a better informed cli- entele when it gets included in an index, because major funds will add it to their portfolios. With such an inclusion, the company often faces additional disclosure requirements, further affecting the distribution of traders’ signal qualities. Many of these changes are observable and the predicted impacts can be tested empirically.

Fig. 6. Information quality: comparative static. The probability of an informed trader is set to l ¼ :4. Each line in each panel is a function of the information quality parameter h and corresponds to a level a 2 f0; :2; :5;1g. The top left panel plots spread1 (upper half of the lines) and spread2 (lower half of the lines). The top right panel plots the difference of the period 1 and 2 spreads (it contains three lines as the difference in spreads for a ¼ 0 is zero). The bottom left panel plots total volume, the bottom right panel plots the difference in volumes for periods 1 and 2. As can be seen, spreads, spread differences, total volumes, and volume differences all increase in h.

K. Malinova, A. Park / Journal of Banking & Finance 44 (2014) 55–71 63

Additionally, the quality of analysts’ earnings forecasts can serve as a proxy for the average information quality.

Formally, we model improvements in information quality by shifts in the underlying distribution of qualities in the sense of first order stochastic dominance (FOSD). A systematic improvement in information quality corresponds to a situation in which the ‘‘new’’ quality distribution first-order stochastically dominates the ‘‘old’’ one so that under the new distribution, traders have systematically higher quality information.

We base our analysis on the quadratic signal quality distribu- tion that is outlined in Appendix A. This class of distributions is parameterized by a parameter h. An increase in h invokes a first order stochastic dominance shift that we interpret as a systematic improvement in information quality. Fig. 6 illustrates the following observation.

Observation 2 (Information Quality). Fix a ¼ 1. As the information quality improves systematically, we observe that

1. spreads in both periods increase; 2. the spread difference becomes more pronounced,

spread1 � spread2 increases;

3. total volume ðvol1 þ vol2Þ increases; 4. the volume difference across periods becomes less pronounced,

vol1 � vol2 increases.

Observation 2 implies, in particular, that the L-shaped spread pattern becomes more pronounced, that the reverse L-shaped vol- ume pattern becomes less pronounced, and that market participa- tion increases as information quality improves.

Improvements in information quality effectively increase com- petition among traders, and the observed effects are similar to those observed when the number of traders increases. However, for policy and empirical analyses it is important to understand that the underlying mechanisms are different. When the increase in competition is due to an increase in the number of traders, a larger number (on average) of informed traders trade early, adverse selection costs and the bid-ask spread in period 2 decline, and trad- ers require lower information quality to trade in period 2. In con- trast, when the increase in competition is due to a systematic improvement in information quality, traders compete with on average better-informed peers. As a consequence, in the latter case, traders require higher quality information to trade, and thus bid- ask spreads increase in both periods. Furthermore, even though

Fig. 7. Information quality and competition: informed trader revenues. The probability of an informed trader is set to l ¼ :4. Each line in each panel is a function of the information quality parameter h and corresponds to a level a 2 f0; :2; :5;1g. The left panel plots profitðqÞ for fixed qualities q 2 f:6; :7; :8; :9;1g, where the lowest line corresponds to q ¼ :6 and the highest to q ¼ 1 (and revenues are otherwise monotonic). For every q, revenue is highest for lowest a; revenue for q ¼ :6 is 0 when this type of informed trader chooses not to trade. The right panel plots the average per-informed-trader revenue profit as a function of h. The average per-trader revenue decreases in a and it increases in the information quality parameter h.

64 K. Malinova, A. Park / Journal of Banking & Finance 44 (2014) 55–71

traders require higher quality information to trade, the aggregate volume increases because of the increase in the average informa- tion quality. We next analyze the impacts of increases in competi- tion that stem from trader entry and from improvements in information quality on trader revenues.

6.2. Informed trader revenues

Since the market maker earns zero expected profits on average, the payoffs of informed traders and noise traders are zero-sum. Consequently, if changes in competition or information quality improve the aggregate payoff for informed traders, then noise trad- ers lose. Furthermore, there is also a revenue redistribution among the informed.

We compute an informed trader’s trading revenue as follows. Fix a trader with signal quality q > 1=2. Since our model is sym- metric, before receiving any signal, this trader predicts that his belief will be p ¼ q > 1=2 and p ¼ 1� q with equal probabilities and he consequently predicts that he will buy and sell with equal probabilities.

Next, fix a trader with signal S ¼ h and quality q (the belief is then p ¼ q); by Lemma 1, this trader will not sell. The trader’s expected trading revenue is 0 if he does not trade, p� E½ask1jp1;p2; q; S ¼ h� if he submits a buy in period 1, and p� E½ask2jp1;p2; q; S ¼ h� if he submits a buy in period 2. We define

profitðqjS ¼ hÞ ¼maxf0;p� E½ask1jp1;p2; q; S

¼ h�;p� E½ask2jp1;p2; q; S ¼ h�g: ð8Þ

A symmetric formulation applies for S ¼ l, in which case the trader compares revenues from selling and from abstaining from trade, and profitðqjS ¼ hÞ ¼ profitðqjS ¼ lÞ.

Now consider the following benchmarks. First, a trader with perfect information quality and belief p ¼ 1 always loses when there are improvements in signal quality or increases in competi- tion because these changes increase the ask price. Second, consider the trader p2 who, for a given level of competition is just indiffer- ent between trading and not trading in period 2. With an increase in competition this trader strictly prefers to trade (by Proposition

1) and thus earns a positive profit. Consequently, increases in com- petition benefit some traders with sufficiently low quality informa- tion. Turning towards the noise traders, since spreads in period 1 increased and in period 2 decreased, it is not clear whether these traders, on average, gain or lose. Using the zero-sum nature of prof- its between informed and uninformed traders, we can determine the effect of changes in competition on uninformed traders by computing the average profits of informed traders. This average profit is obtained by integrating profitðqÞ ¼ ðprofitðqjS ¼ hÞ þ profitðqjS ¼ lÞÞ=2 over all signal qualities.

Numerically, for levels of competition a 2 f:1; :3; :6;1g we com- pute profitðqÞ for traders with signal qualities q 2 f:6; :7; :8; :9;1g and the average informed trader’s profit. We then make the follow- ing observation, illustrated in Fig. 7.

Observation 3 (Trader Revenue).

1. As competition intensifies (a increases), the average informed trader’s profit falls (profit decreases).

2. As the information quality improves systematically, for each level of signal quality q informed traders expect to earn less (profitðqÞ decreases).

3. As the information quality improves systemically, the average informed trader’s profit increases (profit increases).

Holding a trader’s information quality fixed, a trader loses if market-wide information quality improves because this trader is now relatively weaker informed. However, as information quality improves systematically, the average informed trader has higher- quality information and the average profit of informed traders then increases.

Technological improvements have made it easier and cheaper for people to access global markets. Technology has also improved the processing capabilities of traders who seek to trade on infor- mation advantages, arguably leading to a marketwide improve- ment in information quality. It is important for policy makers and regulators to understand the impact of these changes on unin- formed traders such as retail and on traders who have to trade

Fig. 8. Explicit discounting: comparative static. The probability of an informed trader is set to l ¼ :4. Each line corresponds to the parameter of the quadratic quality distribution outlined in Appendix A; the parameters are h 2 f�6;0;6;12g. The competition parameter is set to a ¼ 1. The discount factor d is on the horizontal axis. The left panel plots the difference of period 1 and 2 volumes, the right panel plots the difference of period 1 and 2 bid-ask spreads.

K. Malinova, A. Park / Journal of Banking & Finance 44 (2014) 55–71 65

in-and-out of positions for liquidity reasons (as is often the case for pension or index funds) and whose profits are inversely related to the profit of the average informed trader.

In the preceding subsection we argued that the entry of new traders and the systematic improvement in information quality both lead to an increase in competition but that they have subtly different impacts on the bid-ask spread. For trader revenues, the difference is more pronounced. An increase in competition due to the entry of new traders improves the welfare of uninformed trad- ers. In contrast, an increase in competition that is due to a system- atic improvement in information quality lowers the welfare of uninformed traders.

6.3. The impact of a public information release

In the analysis presented thus far, private information was assumed to be viable for two periods. We now relax this assump- tion and explore the possibility of a release of public information that eliminates the informed traders’ informational advantage after period 1. Private information may lose its value, for instance, because of a public announcement that perfectly reveals the funda- mental value. Denoting the probability of such an announcement by 1� d; d 2 ½0;1�, Eq. (2), which determines the marginal buyer p1, becomes13

E½V�ask1jp1; I buy at t¼1� ¼ d �E E½V�ask2jp1; Ibuyat t¼2� ���p1h i: ð9Þ

As before, the bid-ask spread in period 2 must be smaller than in period 1 for any d to compensate traders who delay for the potential loss of information. As the probability of the public infor- mation release increases (d decreases), intuitively, delay becomes costlier and more traders should act early to avoid the potential information loss. Our numerical simulations confirm this intuition.

We find that more informed traders choose to act early, increas- ing the adverse selection costs in period 1 and causing the L-shaped pattern in spreads to become more pronounced. When an information release is very unlikely (d is large), volume remains reverse L-shaped. When an information release is sufficiently

13 Our existence proof assumes d ¼ 1, but the proof can accommodate d < 1 with minor modifications.

likely, (d is sufficiently small), volume in period 1 exceeds volume in period 2 and the volume pattern becomes L-shaped. Fig. 8 illus- trates the following finding.

Observation 4 (Explicit Discounting). As a public information release becomes more likely (d decreases),

1. the spread difference becomes more pronounced, spread1 � spread2 increases;

2. the volume difference across periods becomes less pronounced, vol1 � vol2 increases.

3. There exists a dH such that volume in period 1 exceeds volume in period 2, vol1 > vol2 for all d 6 dH.

The possible release of public information that renders a tra- der’s private signal moot intuitively relates to the ‘‘slippage cost’’ that is inherent to the competition among informed traders. This latter cost arises because an informed trader who delays may be pre-empted by another trader and will then lose his informational advantage. Here, waiting has a direct cost because the true value may be publicly revealed.

7. Conclusion

The purpose of this study is to understand informed traders’ timing decisions and the impact of these decisions on major eco- nomic variables. We predict that the heterogeneity in traders’ informational advantages generates distinct intraday volume and spread patterns. The predicted behavior is consistent with the styl- ized facts that volume increases and spreads decline toward the end of the trading day on most international stock exchanges.

We contribute to the literature by identifying predictions on how competition and the informational environment affect total volume, market participation, trader profits, and the patterns in observables. These predictions are facilitated by our choice of the underlying model. Analyzing a framework in the tradition of Glosten and Milgrom (1985) with a continuous signal structure allows us to study an uncertain number of traders, to explicitly describe bid-ask spreads, and to provide novel predictions on pat- terns in the probability of informed trading, a common measure of adverse selection costs.

Fig. 9. Plots of belief densities and distributions. The left panel plots the densities of beliefs for an example with uniformly distributed qualities. The densities for beliefs conditional on the true state being V ¼ 1 and V ¼ 0 respectively are f1ðpÞ ¼ 2p and f0ðpÞ ¼ 2ð1� pÞ. The right panel plots the corresponding conditional distribution functions: F1ðpÞ ¼ p2 and F0ðpÞ ¼ 2p� p2.

66 K. Malinova, A. Park / Journal of Banking & Finance 44 (2014) 55–71

We believe that looking at market phenomena through the lens of our work can help market participants and regulators to better understand the impact of market developments and to predict the impact of envisioned policies.

For instance, technological improvements have made it easier and cheaper for people to access global markets. It is important for policy makers and regulators to assess the impact of this increase in competition on uninformed traders such as retail and on traders who have to trade in-and-out of positions for liquidity reasons (as is often the case for pension or index funds). We find that more traders participate in the market as competition increases, implying that marginal, uninformed traders benefit. Moreover, competition diminishes the average rents for informed traders, and thus uninformed liquidity traders are better off.

Our paper also provides predictions on the impact of advances in technology that lead to improvements in information processing capabilities and thus to market-wide improvements in information quality. Such developments increase the competition among informed traders, leading to higher spreads with a more pro- nounced intraday pattern and to higher volume with a muted pat- tern. Despite the increased competition, the improvements in signal processing benefit the group of informed traders and thus harm uninformed liquidity traders. We caution that establishing the impact of advances in signal processing empirically with a lon- gitudinal analysis is challenging. The technological progress in information processing went hand in hand with the automation of trading, which reduced the explicit cost of market making and arguably led to a technology-driven reduction in bid-ask spreads. The explicit costs of market making are typically not featured in information-based models such as ours.

There are a number of possible avenues for further research. The intuition for the trade-off in delaying between obtaining a bet- ter price and incurring the ‘‘slippage cost’’ extends to other set- tings, and future research may extend our model to accommodate some of the features from these settings. For instance, in Rosu (2012)’s model of a limit order book market, the ‘‘slippage’’ cost is incurred by traders who use limit orders. One extension of our model would be to allow traders a choice between market and limit orders, in addition to a timing choice. Another possible extension is to consider more than two trading periods, building on the insights from Chakraborty and Yilmaz (2004) who study a multi-period setting for the case of a single informed trader. Another topic of interest is the behavior of unin- formed traders. In our setting they are not strategic, and the impact of their behavior is an open question. Finally, our analysis of trad- ing profits reveals that competition may lower information rents and may thus affect the incentive to acquire information. It would thus be interesting to study the interplay of information acquisi- tion and competition.

Appendix A. Quality and belief distributions

The information structure used in this paper is as in Malinova and Park (2010). Financial market microstructure models with binary signals and states typically employ a constant common signal quality q 2 ½1=2;1�, with Prðsignal ¼ hjV ¼ 1Þ ¼ Prðsignal ¼ ljV ¼ 0Þ ¼ q. This parameterization is easy to interpret, as a trader who receives a high signal h updates his prior in favor of the high liquidation value, V ¼ 1, and a trader who receives a low signal l updates his prior in favor of V ¼ 0. We thus use the conventional description of traders’ information, with qualities q 2 ½1=2;1�, in the main text.

As discussed in the main text, to facilitate the analysis, we map a vector of a trader’s signal and its quality into a scalar continuous variable on ½0;1�, namely, the trader’s private belief. To derive the distributions of traders’ private beliefs, it is mathematically conve- nient to normalize the signal quality so that its domain coincides with that of the private belief. We denote the distribution function of this normalized quality on ½0;1� by G and its density by g, whereas the distribution and density functions of original qualities on ½1=2;1� are denoted by eG and ~g respectively.

The normalization proceeds as follows. Without loss of general- ity, we employ the density function g that is symmetric around 1=2. For q 2 ½0;1=2�, we then have gðqÞ ¼ ~gð1� qÞ=2 and for q 2 ½1=2;1�, we have gðqÞ ¼ ~gðqÞ=2.

Under this specification, signal qualities q and 1� q are equally useful for the individual: if someone receives signal h and has qual- ity 1=4, then this signal has ‘‘the opposite meaning’’, i.e. it has the same meaning as receiving signal l with quality 3=4. Signal quali- ties are assumed to be independent across agents and independent of the fundamental value V.

Beliefs are derived by Bayes Rule, given signals and signal qual- ities. Specifically, if a trader is told that his signal quality is q and receives a high signal h then his belief is q=½qþ ð1� qÞ� ¼ q (respec- tively 1� q if he receives a low signal l), because the prior is 1=2. The belief p is held by people who receive signal h and quality q ¼ p and by those who receive signal l and quality q ¼ 1� p. Con- sequently, the density of individuals with belief p is given by f1ðpÞ ¼ p½gðpÞ þ gð1� pÞ� when V ¼ 1 and analogously by f0ðpÞ ¼ ð1� pÞ½gðpÞ þ gð1� pÞ� when V ¼ 0. Smith and Sorensen (2008) prove the following property of private beliefs (Lemma 2 in their paper):

Lemma 3 (Symmetric beliefs, Smith and Sorensen (2008)). With the above signal quality structure, private belief distributions satisfy F1ðpÞ ¼ 1� F0ð1� pÞ for all p 2 ð0;1Þ.

Proof. Since f1ðpÞ ¼ p½gðpÞ þ gð1� pÞ� and f0ðpÞ ¼ ð1� pÞ½gðpÞ þ gð1� pÞ�, we have f1ðpÞ ¼ f0ð1� pÞ. Then F1ðpÞ ¼

R p 0 f1ðxÞdx ¼

R p 0 f0ð1� xÞdx ¼

R 1 1�p f0ðxÞdx ¼ 1� F0ð1� pÞ.

Belief densities obey the monotone likelihood ratio property as the following increases in p

f1ðpÞ f0ðpÞ

¼ p½gðpÞ þ gð1� pÞ�ð1� pÞ½gðpÞ þ gð1� pÞ� ¼ p

1� p : ðA:1Þ

One can recover the distribution of qualities on ½1=2;1�, denoted by eG, from G by combining qualities that yield the same beliefs for opposing signals (e.g., q ¼ 1=4 and signal h is combined with q ¼ 3=4 and signal l). With symmetric g;Gð1=2Þ ¼ 1=2, and

eGðqÞ ¼ Z q 1 2

gðsÞdsþ Z 1

2

1�q gðsÞds ¼ 2

Z q 1 2

gðsÞds

¼ 2GðqÞ � 2Gð1=2Þ ¼ 2GðqÞ � 1: ðA:2Þ

K. Malinova, A. Park / Journal of Banking & Finance 44 (2014) 55–71 67

An example of private beliefs. Fig. 9 depicts an example where the signal quality q is uniformly distributed. The uniform distribution implies that the density of individuals with signals of quality q 2 ½1=2;1� is ~gðqÞ ¼ 2q. When V ¼ 1, private beliefs p P 1=2 are held by traders who receive signal h of quality q ¼ p, private beliefs p 6 1=2 are held by traders who receive sig- nal l of quality q ¼ 1� p. Thus, when V ¼ 1, the density of private beliefs p for p 2 ½1=2;1� is given by f1ðpÞ ¼ PrðhjV ¼ 1; q ¼ pÞ~gðq ¼ pÞ ¼ 2p and for p 2 ½0;1=2� it is given by f1ðpÞ ¼ PrðljV ¼ 1; q ¼ 1� pÞ~gðq ¼ 1� pÞ ¼ 2p. Similarly, the density conditional on V ¼ 0 is f0ðpÞ ¼ 2ð1� pÞ. The distribu- tions of private beliefs are then F1ðpÞ ¼ p2 and F0ðpÞ ¼ 2p� p2. Fig. 9 also illustrates that signals are informative: recipients in favor of V ¼ 0 are more likely to occur when V ¼ 0 than when V ¼ 1.

Signal quality distributions for simulations. In our numerical simulations we employed a quadratic quality distribution, the den- sity of which is symmetric around 1/2.

gðqÞ ¼ h q� 1 2

� �2 � h

12 þ 1; q 2 ½0;1�: ðA:3Þ

The feasible parameter space for h is ½�6;12� and includes the uni- form density for h ¼ 0. Moreover, for h0 > h0; eGh0 first order stochas- tically dominates eGh as eGh0ðqÞ < eGhðqÞ for all q 2 ½1=2;1�. Appendix B. Omitted proofs

B.1. Some general results and notation

We will first introduce some notation and establish basic results that facilitate the analysis and proofs of our main results.

B.1.1. General notation for all proofs Using Bayes Rule and conditional independence of traders’ pri-

vate beliefs, an informed trader’s expectation of the security’s fun- damental value, conditional on his private information and the order flow, can be written as

E½V jp; ot � ¼ pPrðV ¼ 1jo tÞ

pPrðV ¼ 1jotÞ þ ð1� pÞð1� PrðV ¼ 1jotÞÞ : ðB:1Þ

In other words, a trader’s expectation of V can be expressed in terms of his private belief p and his prior p ¼ PrðV ¼ 1jotÞ (the probability that the value is V ¼ 1, conditional on the order history but not on the trader’s private belief), where the latter summarizes the infor- mation from the order flow that is relevant for estimating the fun- damental value. In what follows, we use EVðp; pÞ to denote a trader’s expectation of the fundamental, conditional on this trader’s private signal and his prior p.

Similarly, we use function aðp;p; pÞ to denote the liquidity pro- vider’s expectation of the security value, given prior p, conditional on a buy order that stems from either a noise trader drawn from a mass of size k, or from an informed trader drawn from a mass of size l and equipped with a private belief between p and p. Condi- tional on the true value being V ¼ v , the probability of such an order is bv ðp;pÞ ¼ kþ lðFv ðpÞ � Fv ðpÞÞ. Then, using Bayes Rule and rearranging,

aðp;p; pÞ ¼ 1þ 1� p p

b0ðp;pÞ b1ðp;pÞ

� ��1 : ðB:2Þ

This specification will allow us to compactly express the equilib- rium ask prices. Further, we use function p�ðp; pÞ to denote p that solves

EVðp; pÞ ¼ aðp;p; pÞ; ðB:3Þ

and we use PðpÞ to denote p that solves

EVðp�ðp; pÞ; pÞ ¼ aðp;1; pÞ: ðB:4Þ

Functions p�ðp; pÞ and PðpÞwill be useful in expressing the equilib- rium thresholds and their bounds. We study their properties in more detail in the next subsection.

B.1.2. Preliminary properties In what follows, it will often be mathematically convenient to

express the private belief distributions F1; F0 in terms of the under- lying quality distribution function G:

F1ðpÞ ¼ 2 Z p

0 s � gðsÞds; F0ðpÞ ¼ 2

Z p 0 ð1� sÞ � gðsÞds

) F1ðpÞ þ F0ðpÞ ¼ 2GðpÞ; ðB:5Þ

and integrating by parts,

F1ðpÞ ¼ 2pGðpÞ � 2 Z p

0 GðsÞds: ðB:6Þ

Lemma 4 (Properties of the equilibrium thresholds).

(a) For every p such that 1=2 < p < 1, there exists a unique p 2 ð:5;pÞ that solves Eq. (B.3). This solution is independent of prior p : p�ðp; pÞ ¼ p�ðpÞ. (b) p�ðpÞ increases in p: @p�=@p > 0. (c) For fixed p;p ¼ p�ðpÞ maximizes aðp;p; pÞ. Further, aðp;p; pÞ increases in p for p < p�ðpÞ and it decreases in p for p > p�ðpÞ.

Proof of ðaÞ: Eq. (B.3) can be rewritten as

p 1� p ¼

kþ lðF1ðpÞ � F1ðpÞÞ kþ lðF0ðpÞ � F0ðpÞÞ

: ðB:7Þ

Thus, the solution does not depend on the prior p. Using (B.5) and (B.6), we rewrite (B.7) as

2lGðpÞðp� pÞ � 2l Z p

p GðsÞds� kð2p� 1Þ ¼ 0: ðB:8Þ

Denote the left hand side of the above equation by wðp;pÞ. Then

(i) wðp;pÞ strictly decreases in p for p 6 p: @w=@p ¼ �2k� 2lðGðpÞ � GðpÞÞ < 0;

(ii) at p¼ 1=2;wð1=2;pÞ ¼ 2lGðpÞðp�1=2Þ�2l R p

1=2 GðsÞds> 0; (iii) at p ¼ p;wðp;pÞ ¼ �kð2p� 1Þ < 0.

Steps (i)–(iii) imply existence and uniqueness of p�ðpÞ. Proof of ðbÞ: Applying the Implicit Function Theorem and dif-

ferentiating both sides of Eq. (B.8) with respect to p, and using g to denote the density function of qualities, we obtain

@p�

@p ¼ 2lgðpÞðp� p

�ðpÞÞ 2lðGðpÞ � Gðp�ðpÞÞÞ þ 2k > 0; ðB:9Þ

since p�ðpÞ 2 ð1=2;pÞ and G is increasing. Proof of ðcÞ: The first order condition for maximizing aðp;p; pÞ

in p can be written as

b1ðp;pÞ b0ðp;pÞ

¼ @b1ðp;pÞ=@p @b0ðp;pÞ=@p

() b1ðp;pÞ b0ðp;pÞ

¼ p 1� p ; ðB:10Þ

where the last equality follows from Eq. (A.1). Observe that this last equality coincides with Eq. (B.7). Consequently, there exists a unique p that maximizes aðp;p; pÞ and thus p ¼ p�ðpÞ.

By (B.2), aðp;p; pÞ increases in p when b1ðp;pÞ=b0ðp;pÞ increases in p. Using (A.1), (B.5), and (B.6), it can be shown that ð@=@pÞðb1ðp;pÞ=b0ðp;pÞÞ > 0 when wðp;pÞ > 0. The desired slopes then follow from part ðaÞ.

68 K. Malinova, A. Park / Journal of Banking & Finance 44 (2014) 55–71

Lemma 5. For every prior p, there exists PðpÞ 2 ð:5;1Þ that solves equation (B.4). This solution is independent of p : PðpÞ ¼ P.

Proof. Eq. (B.4) can be rewritten as

p�ðp; pÞ 1� p�ðp; pÞ ¼

b1ðp;1Þ b0ðp;1Þ

: ðB:11Þ

By Lemma 4, p�ðp; pÞ ¼ p�ðpÞ, and the solution does not depend on the prior p. For the remainder of this proof, LHS refers to the left- hand side of (B.11) and RHS refers to the right-hand side of (B.11).

To prove that the solution exists and is unique, we apply Lemma 4 to observe that (i) for p 6 p�ð1Þ LHS < RHS, as p�ðpÞ=ð1� p�ðpÞÞ < p=ð1� pÞ 6 b1ðp;1Þ=b0ðp;1Þ ; (ii) at p ¼ 1 LHS > RHS, as p�ðpÞ=ð1� p�ðpÞÞ > 1 ¼ b1ðp;1Þ=b0ðp;1Þ and finally, (iii) LHS is increasing in p for all p, and RHS is decreasing in p for p > p�ð1Þ.

B.2. Existence: Proof of Theorem 1

The existence proof proceeds in four steps, by backward induc- tion. We first show that for any given marginal buyer in period 1, p1, there exists a unique marginal buyer in period 2, p2, who is indifferent between trading and abstaining from trade (proving Lemma 2). Step 2 verifies that monotone decision rules in period 2 are incentive-compatible. Step 3 shows existence of p1 2 ðp�ð1Þ;PÞ, and Step 4 verifies the incentive-compatibility of monotone decision rules in period 1.

Step 1: For all p1 2 ½1=2;1� there exists a unique period 2 mar- ginal buyer, p2, who is indifferent between submitting a buy order and abstaining from trade for any period 1 outcome (buy, sell or no trade). Further, p2 ¼ p�ðp1Þ and thus ddp1 p

2 > 0.

Proof. Suppose first that there is a buy in period 1. The market maker then knows that this buy order came either from a noise tra- der or from an informed trader with a private belief between p1 and 1. If a buy order also arrives in period 2, she will additionally learn that (i) there are 2 traders and (ii) the second trader is either a noise trader or an informed trader with a private belief between p2 and p1. Applying Bayes Rule, the ask price quoted for a single unit in period 2, ask2ðBÞ, can then be simplified to

ask2ðBÞ ¼ b1ðp 1;1Þb1ðp2;p1Þ

b0ðp1;1Þb0ðp2;p1Þ þ b1ðp1;1Þb1ðp2;p1Þ ¼ aðp2;p1; p1BÞ; ðB:12Þ

where p1B ¼ b1ðp1;1Þ=ðb1ðp1;1Þ þ b0ðp1;1ÞÞ. Likewise, conditional on a buy order in period 1, trader p2 updates his expectation to

E½V jB in 1; p2� ¼ p 2b1ðp1;1Þ

ð1� p2Þb0ðp1;1Þ þ p2b1ðp1;1Þ ¼ EVðp2; p1BÞ: ðB:13Þ

The indifference condition for the marginal buyer is then EVðp2; p1BÞ ¼ aðp2;p1; p1BÞ, and the marginal buyer is given by p2 ¼ p�ðp1Þ by Lemma 4. The case with a sale in period 1 is analo- gous, and p2 ¼ p�ðp1Þ.

Suppose now that there is no trade in period 1. A trader in period 2 must then account for the possibility that there may be a second block order. Denote the quoted period 2 ask price for a single unit, conditional on a buy order from a single trader, by ask2ðNTÞ and the quotes, conditional on the other trader buy and sell orders, respectively, by ask2BðNTÞ and ask

2 SðNTÞ. The zero

expected profit condition for the marginal buyer p2 can then be written as follows:

0 ¼ ð1� PrðB in 2jNT in 1; p2Þ � PrðS in 2jNT in 1; p2ÞÞ

� fE½V jNT in 1; NT in 2; p2� � ask2ðNTÞg þ PrðB in 2jNT in 1; p2Þ � fE½V jNT in 1; B in 2; p2�

� ask2BðNTÞg þ PrðS in 2jNT in 1; p2Þ � fE½VjNT in 1; S in 2; p2� � ask2SðNTÞg; ðB:14Þ

where the expectations and probabilities are with respect to trader p2’s information set. When computing these, the trader conditions on his private belief being the marginal one, as well as on the actions of the other trader (accounting also for the possibility of being alone in the market). Hypothetically, the marginal trader may be willing to, for instance, accept losses at the quoted price ask2ðNTÞ and expect to profit in the event that there is a second block order. We focus on equilibria where this does not occur, and where in equilibrium, a trader will not wish to change his decision. The marginal buyer p2 must thus be indifferent between trading and abstaining for any action of the second trader (as well as in the absence of the other trader). In the process, we will argue that this marginal buyer must satisfy p2 ¼ p�ðp1Þ.

The quoted ask price for a single unit, ask2ðNTÞ, reflects the market maker’s expectation of the fundamental conditional on (i) a buy order in period 2 and (ii) no other trade in either period. This occurs when (i) there is a single trader and he buys in period 2, or (ii) there are two traders, one of them buys in period 2 and the other elects to abstain from trading. In a symmetric equilibrium, the probability that a trader abstains from trading when V ¼ v is given by Fv ðp2Þ � Fv ð1� p2Þ, and by Lemma 4 it is independent of the fundamental V. The quoted ask price in period 2 can then be simplified to ask2ðNTÞ ¼ aðp2;p1; 1=2Þ.

Likewise, a trader in period 2 knows that his buy order will exe- cute at the initial quoted ask price, ask2ðNTÞ, when (i) he is alone in the market, or (ii) the second trader is present but chooses to abstain from trading. Importantly, the probability of receiving the ask price ask2ðNTÞ does not depend on the value of the fundamen- tal. The trader’s conditional expectation of the fundamental in this case is given by

E½V jNT in 1; NT in 2; p2� ¼ PrðNT in 1; NT in 2jV ¼ 1Þp 2

PrðNT in 1; NT in 2jp2Þ ¼ p 2

¼ EVðp2; 1=2Þ: ðB:15Þ

Lemma 4 then implies that any trader p2 > p�ðp1Þ whose order is executed at the initial quoted price ask2ðNTÞ will make positive expected profits when he is assumed to be the period 2 marginal buyer; any trader p2 < p�ðp1Þ will make negative trading profits in this scenario; and trader p2 ¼ p�ðp1Þ will make zero profits.

If two buy orders arrive in period 2, the market maker’s price ask2BðNTÞ conditions on the information from both orders. Denoting p2B ¼ b1ðp2;p1Þ=ðb1ðp2;p1Þ þ b0ðp2;p1ÞÞ, this ask price can be writ- ten as ask2BðNTÞ ¼ aðp2;p1; p2BÞ. Conditional on there being an addi- tional buyer in the market, trader p2’s expectation of the fundamental is given by E½V jNT in 1; B in 2; p2� ¼ EVðp2; p2BÞ.

Lemma 4 then implies that any trader p2 > p�ðp1Þ will make positive expected profits at the price ask2BðNTÞ, any trader p2 < p�ðp1Þ will make negative expected profits at this price, and the trader p2 ¼ p�ðp1Þ will be exactly indifferent between trading and abstaining. Analogously, the same decisions and profits obtain for the second period price in the event of one buy and one sale, ask2SðNTÞ.

We have thus shown that if trader p2 submits a buy order and is assumed to be the marginal trader, then (i) when p2 > p�ðp1Þ, he will make positive expected profits for any realization of the other trader’s actions (or in the absence of the other trader), (ii) when

K. Malinova, A. Park / Journal of Banking & Finance 44 (2014) 55–71 69

p2 < p�ðp1Þ, he will make negative expected trading profits if his order executes, and (iii) when p2 ¼ p�ðp1Þ, he will make zero prof- its in all cases. Consequently, p2 ¼ p�ðp1Þ is the unique marginal trader in period 2.

Step 2: Monotone decision rules in period 2 are incentive compatible in equilibrium: for given marginal traders p1;p2 ¼ p�ðp1Þ, (i) any trader p > p2 who finds himself in per- iod 2 will submit a buy order and is willing to buy irrespective of the second trader’s action and (ii) no trader p < p2 will buy.

Proof. Observe first that the quoted price depends only on the marginal traders, thus all traders receive the same quotes. Next,

by Step 1, for any realization of the trading history, these quotes coincide with the expectation of the marginal trader p2, condi- tional on this history. Step 2 then follows as traders’ expectations increase in private beliefs; see Eq. (1).

Step 3: There exists a period 1 marginal buyer, p1 2 ðp�ð1Þ;PÞ, who is indifferent between submitting a buy order in period 1 and delaying until period 2. Further, there does not exist a per- iod 1 marginal buyer outside these bounds.

Proof. Analogously to the argument in Step 1, we can show that any trader p1 < p�ð1Þ will make negative expected profits from submitting a buy order in period 1, when he is assumed to be the marginal buyer in period 1. It is thus necessary that p1 P p�ð1Þ. By the same argument, any trader p1 P p�ð1Þ will make non-negative profits in this scenario. Further, by Step 2, if trader p1, who is assumed to be the marginal trader in period 1, delays trading until period 2, then he will make positive expected profits from submitting a buy order then, as p1 > p�ðp1Þ.

The marginal buyer p1 in period 1 must be indifferent between submitting his buy order in period 1 and submitting it in period 2. The indifference condition for this trader is E½V � ask1jI submit B at t ¼ 1;p1� ¼ E½E½V � ask2jI submit B at t ¼ 2;p1;H1�jp1�. Submitted market orders are always filled by the market maker, and we can use the Law of Iterated Expectations and rewrite the indifference condition as

E½ask1jI buy in 1; p1� � E½E½ask2jI buy in 2; p1;H1�jp1� ¼ 0: ðB:16Þ

When computing these conditional expectations trader p1 accounts, in particular, (i) for himself being the marginal buyer in period 1 and (ii) for trader p2 ¼ p�ðp1Þ being the marginal buyer in period 2.

Denote the left-hand side of (B.16) by nðp1Þ. We will show ðaÞ that nðp�ð1ÞÞ > 0 and ðbÞ that nðPÞ < 0. The desired existence of p1 then follows by continuity. We will further show ðcÞ that there does not exist a marginal buyer p1 > P.

Part ðaÞWe show that nðp�ð1ÞÞ > 0. Set p1 ¼ p�ð1Þ. We can show, similarly to the proof of Step 1, that EVðp�ð1Þ;1=2Þ ¼ E½ask1jI buy in 1; p�ð1Þ�. Thus showing that nðp�ð1ÞÞ > 0 is equivalent to showing that

EVðp�ð1Þ;1=2Þ � E½E½ask2jI buy in 2; p�ð1Þ;H1�jp�ð1Þ� > 0: ðB:17Þ

We denote the realized total number of buys and sales in period 2 by b2; s2, respectively, and use H1 for the period 1 transaction his- tory. Using the Law of Iterated Expectations, we write (B.17) asX H1

X b2 ;s2

Prðb2; s2;H1ÞðE½V jb2; s2;H1; I buy in 2; p�ð1Þ;H1�

� EM½V jb2; s2;H1�Þ > 0: ðB:18Þ

The above inequality is satisfied, because, by Step 1, the market maker’s conditional expectation of the fundamental EM½V jb2; s2;H1� coincides with that of the period 2 marginal trader p2, and the latter is below the expectation of the marginal trader in period 1, E½V jb2; s2;H1; I buy in 2; p�ð1Þ;H1�, by Lemma 4, since p2ðp1Þ < p1, for any history.

Part ðbÞ We show that nðPÞ < 0. Set the marginal buyer in period 1 to be p1 ¼ P, and the marginal buyer in period 2 to be p2 ¼ p�ðPÞ. When the marginal buyer is perceived to be p1 ¼ P, the price impact of a trader’s action is the same in both periods:

b1ðP;1Þ b0ðP;1Þ

¼ b1ðp �ðPÞ;PÞ

b0ðp�ðPÞ;PÞ ¼ p

�ðPÞ 1� p�ðPÞ : ðB:19Þ

In a symmetric equilibrium, this implies, in particular, that the ask prices depend only on the total number of buy and sale block orders but not on the time of the order submission. Consequently, the only scenario, in which the price that the trader pays depends on the period that he submits his order in, is when (i) there are 2 traders and (ii) the second trader trades (buys or sells) in period 2.

To shorten the exposition, we omit the arguments from the function bv and use b

t v to denote the probability of a buy in period

t, conditional on V ¼ v (although, the price impacts coincide, b11=b

1 0 ¼ b

2 1=b

2 0, the conditional probabilities do not, b

1 v – b

2 v ). To

show that nðPÞ < 0, we need to show that the marginal buyer p1 ¼ P expects to pay more in period 2 than in period 1, condi- tional on there being 2 traders and the second trader trading in period 2 (where we use b11=b

1 0 ¼ b

2 1=b

2 0):

Pb21 þ ð1�PÞb 2 0

b21 þ b 2 0

1þ b 2 0

b21

!224 35�1 þ ð1�PÞb21 þPb20 b21 þ b

2 0

1 2

> 1þ b 2 0

b20

" #�1 : ðB:20Þ

Observe that (i) the price that the trader pays conditional on the other trader buying in period 2, ½1þ ðb20=b

2 1Þ

2� �1

, exceeds that paid conditional on the other trader selling, 1=2; (ii) probabilities of the other trader buying and selling in period 2, conditional on him trading in period 2 sum to 1; (iii) the marginal trader’s private belief P exceeds b21=ðb

2 0 þ b

2 1); and (iv) b

2 1=ðb

2 0 þ b

2 1Þ > 1=2. Replacing

P with b21=ðb 2 0 þ b

2 1) will thus decrease the weight on the larger ask

price and increase the weight on the smaller one (keeping the sum of these weights at 1), thereby decreasing the left-hand side of (B.20):

LHS of ðB:20Þ > ðb 2 1Þ

2 þ ðb20Þ 2

ðb21 þ b 2 0Þ

2 1þ b20 b21

!224 35�1 þ 2b20b21 ðb21 þ b

2 0Þ

2

1 2

¼ 1þ b 2 0

b20

" #�1 : ðB:21Þ

Part (c): We show that the marginal trader in period 1 must be p1 < P. We will argue that nðp1Þ < 0 for p1 > P. When p1 > P, the price impact of a trader’s buy order is stronger in period 2 than in period 1. Consequently, conditional on being alone in the market or on the other trader abstaining from trading, trader p1 expects to pay a higher price in period 2 than in period 1. We can also show, similarly to the argument at the beginning of Step 1, that condi- tional on the second trader being present and trading in period 1, trader p1 will prefer to submit his buy order in period 1. Hence, to argue that nðp1Þ < 0, it suffices to show that trader p1 expects to pay a higher price in period 2, conditional on the other trader

70 K. Malinova, A. Park / Journal of Banking & Finance 44 (2014) 55–71

being present and trading in period 2, or that the left-hand side of

(B.20) exceeds ½1þ ðb10=b 1 1Þ

2� �1

. This follows from Part ðbÞ, as

½1þ ðb20=b 2 1Þ

2� �1 > ½1þ ðb10=b

1 1Þ

2� �1

.

Step 4: The monotone decision rules in period 1 are incentive compatible in equilibrium: given marginal traders p1 and p2 ¼ p�ðp1Þ, (i) any trader p > p1 buys in period 1; (ii) no trader p < p1 will buy in period 1.

14 Chebyshev’s inequality states that if a1 P a2 P � � �P an and b1 P b2 P � � �P bn , then 1n

Pn k¼1 akbk P

1 n

Pn k¼1 ak

� � 1 n

Pn k¼1 bk

� � . Here we use n ¼ 2; a1 ¼ 1; a2 ¼ l1 and

b1 ¼ 1; b2 ¼ l2. 15 In the proof of Theorem 1, we omitted dependence on a.

Proof. First, by the proof of Step 3, any trader p > p1 will make positive expected profits from buying in either period.

To show that the monotone decision rules are incentive com- patible, it thus suffices to show that for given marginal traders fp1;p2g, the difference between the price that trader p expects to pay if he submits his buy order in period 1 and that if he submits his buy order in period 2 is decreasing in p. (A trader will buy in period 1 only if this difference is negative.)

The quotes that trader p receives are determined by the mar- ginal types and thus do not depend on p. Denote the difference between the ask price in period 1 and the ask quote in period 2, which are both conditional on the other trader buying in per- iod 1 (i.e., the ask price in period 1 is for two buys and the ask price in period 2 is for a single buy), by DðB1Þ; denote this differ- ence, conditional on the other trader selling in period 1 by DðS1Þ; likewise for the other trader trading in period 2 by DðB2Þ and DðS2Þ; and denote the difference between the initial price quotes in periods 1 and 2, conditional on no other trader acting, by DðNTÞ. Continue to use btv for the probability of a buy in period t, conditional on V ¼ v , given marginal buyers p1;p2 ¼ p�ðp1Þ, and use c to denote the (equilibrium) probability that a trader abstains from trading. The expected price difference for trader p is then given by

E½ask1jI trade in 1; p� � E½ask2jI trade in 2; p� ¼ ð1� aþ acÞDðNTÞ þ aðpb11 þ ð1� pÞb

1 0ÞDðB1Þ þ aðð1

� pÞb11 þ pb 1 0ÞDðS1Þ þ aðpb

2 1 þ ð1� pÞb

2 0ÞDðB2Þ þ aðð1

� pÞb21 þ pb 2 0ÞDðS2Þ; ðB:22Þ

where trader p conditions on traders p1 and p�ðp1Þ being the mar- ginal buyers. Differentiating the right-hand side, this difference is decreasing in p when

ðb11 � b 1 0ÞðDðB1Þ � DðS1ÞÞ þ ðb

2 1 � b

2 0ÞðDðB2Þ � DðS2ÞÞ < 0: ðB:23Þ

Observe that (i) bt1 > b t 0 for t ¼ 1;2; (ii)

DðB2Þ � DðS2Þ ¼ 1=2� ½1þ ðb20=b 2 1Þ

2� �1 < 0, as the quote in period 1

is unaffected by the other trader’s action in period 2. It suffices to show that DðB1Þ � DðS1Þ < 0. In what follows, we compress the notation further and denote the period t likelihood of a buy for V ¼ 0 relative to V ¼ 1 by lt ¼ bt0=b

t 1. Using this,

DðB1Þ ¼ 1=ð1þ ðl1Þ 2 Þ � 1=ð1þ l1l2Þ, and DðS1Þ ¼ 1=2� 1=ð1þ l2=l1Þ.

Step 3 implies that, in equilibrium 1 > l2 > l1, and it suffices to prove that

1

1þ ðl1Þ 2 �

1 2 <

1

1þ l1l2 � 1

1þ l2=l1 for l2 > l1: ðB:24Þ

Observe that (i) the left-hand side of (B.24) is independent of l2, and (ii) at l2 ¼ l1, the left-hand side coincides with the right-hand-side. To prove inequality (B.24), it suffices to prove that its right-hand side increases in l2 for fixed l1. Differentiating the right-hand side with respect to l2 and rearranging, the derivative is positive if and

only if 1þ l1l2 > l1 þ l2. The latter inequality is true by Chebyshev’s inequality.14

B.3. Competition: Proof of Proposition 1

For each level of competition a, we use nðp1;aÞ to denote the left-hand side of Eq. (B.16) and p1ðaÞ to denote the equilibrium period 1 marginal buyer.15 By Lemma 2, the second period marginal buyer p2ðp1Þ increases in p1 and the marginal seller is symmetric, 1� p2ðp1Þ. Consequently, (i) the volume maximizing equilibrium obtains for the lowest p1 that solves nðp1;aÞ ¼ 0, and (ii) it suffices to prove that p1 decreases in a. Take ~a > a. To show that p1

decreases in a, it suffices to show that nðp1ðaÞ; ~aÞ < 0, or that @n @a

�� p1¼p1ðaÞ < 0. For, since nðp

�ð1Þ; ~aÞ > 0 by Step 3 of Theorem 1, by continuity, there must exist ~p1 2 ðp�ð1Þ;p1ðaÞÞ such that nð~p1; ~aÞ ¼ 0.

We will now show that @n @a

�� p1¼p1ðaÞ < 0. First, rewrite Eq. (B.16) as

0 ¼ aðE½ask1jI buy in 1; p1;2 traders� � E½E½ask2jI buy in 2; p1;H1�jp1; 2 traders�Þ þ ð1� aÞðE½ask1jI buy in 1; p1;1 trader� � E½E½ask2jI buy in 2;p1;H1�jp1; 1 trader�Þ: ðB:25Þ

Observe that when the trader is alone in the market, he can perfectly forecast both ask prices, and the second term on the right-hand side is ð1� aÞðaðp2;p1; 1=2Þ � aðp1;1; 1=2ÞÞ. This term is positive at p1 ¼ p1ðaÞ because, by Step 3 ðcÞ of the proof of Theorem 1, p1ðaÞ < P and thus (i) by Lemma 4, aðp1;1; 1=2ÞÞ > aðP;1; 1=2ÞÞ, and (ii) by Lemmas 1 and 4, aðp2;p1;1=2Þ ¼ EVðp�ðp1Þ;1=2Þ< EVðp�ðPÞ;1=2Þ ¼ aðP;1;1=2Þ. For (B.25) to hold, the first term in (B.25) must then be negative at p1 ¼ p1ðaÞ. Finally, observe that, for a fixed p1, conditional expecta- tions in Eq. (B.25) are independent of a.

The partial derivative @n @a

�� p1¼p1ðaÞ is the partial derivative of the

right hand side of (B.25). The above discussion implies that it equals the first term in parentheses of (B.25) minus the second term in parentheses of (B.25), and that @n

@a

�� p1¼p1ðaÞ < 0.

B.4. Spreads: Proof of Proposition 2

The spread is defined as the difference between the ask and the bid price for single unit buy and sell orders, and to facilitate the comparison, in period 2 we look at the spread that obtains condi- tional on no transactions in period 1. In equilibrium, bidt ¼ 1� askt and spreadt ¼ 2askt � 1, and it suffices to show that (i) ask1 > ask2 and (ii) ask1 increases in a and ask2 decreases in a.

To see (i) observe that ask1 ¼ aðp1;1; 1=2Þ and, conditional on no transaction in period 1, ask2 ¼ aðp2;p1; 1=2Þ. The inequality then follows analogously to the proof of Proposition 1.

To see (ii) observe first that both p1 and p2 decrease in a by Proposition 1. By Step 3 of the proof of Theorem 1, p1 > p�ð1Þ; Lemma 4 then implies that aðp1;1; 1=2Þ decreases in p1 and thus increases in a. Further, by Step 1 of the same proof, aðp2ðp1Þ;p1; 1=2Þ ¼ p�ðp1Þ; it increases in p1 by Lemma 4 and thus decreases in a.

Summary of the model’s testable predictions.

Result Economic description Parameter Observable reaction

Proposition 1 (Market Participation) Competition increases a% vol1 % vol1 þ vol2 %

Proposition 2 (Spreads) Irrespective of the level of competition 8a > 0 spread1 > spread2 Competition increases a% spread1 %

spread2 & spread1 � spread2 %

Numerical Observation 1 (Volume) Irrespective of the level of competition 8a � 0 vol2 > vol1 Competition increases a% vol1 � vol2 %

Corollary 2 (PIN) PINt follows spreadt spread1 > spread2 PIN1 > PIN2

Numerical Observation 2 (Information Quality) Systematic information quality improvement

h% spread1 % spread2 % spread1 � spread2 % vol1 þ vol2 % vol1 � vol2 %

Numerical Observation 4 (Public Information Release)

Release of public information % d& vol1 � vol2 % spread1 � spread2 %

L-shaped volume 9dH s.t. 8d 6 dH vol1 > vol2

K. Malinova, A. Park / Journal of Banking & Finance 44 (2014) 55–71 71

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  • The impact of competition and information on intraday trading
    • 1 Introduction
    • 2 The model
      • 2.1 Overview of the market structure
      • 2.2 Model details
        • 2.2.1 Security
        • 2.2.2 Market maker
        • 2.2.3 Traders
        • 2.2.4 Informed traders’ information
        • 2.2.5 Public and private information
        • 2.2.6 Trading protocol
      • 2.3 Trading equilibrium
        • 2.3.1 Quotes
        • 2.3.2 The informed investor’s choice
        • 2.3.3 Equilibrium concept
    • 3 Equilibrium analysis
      • 3.1 General properties
      • 3.2 The trading decision in period 2
      • 3.3 The trading decision in period 1
    • 4 Competition and market participation
      • 4.1 The single trader benchmark
      • 4.2 Competition and the slippage cost
    • 5 Patterns in observables
      • 5.1 Spread patterns
      • 5.2 Volume patterns
      • 5.3 Patterns in the probability of informed trading
    • 6 Extensions
      • 6.1 Systematic changes in the information structure
      • 6.2 Informed trader revenues
      • 6.3 The impact of a public information release
    • 7 Conclusion
    • Appendix A Quality and belief distributions
    • Appendix B Omitted proofs
      • B.1 Some general results and notation
        • B.1.1 General notation for all proofs
        • B.1.2 Preliminary properties
      • B.2 Existence: Proof of Theorem 1
      • B.3 Competition: Proof of Proposition 1
      • B.4 Spreads: Proof of Proposition 2
    • References

How-does-public-information-affect-the-frequency-of-_2014_Journal-of-Banking.pdf

Journal of Banking & Finance 44 (2014) 26–38

Contents lists available at ScienceDirect

Journal of Banking & Finance

journal homepage: www.elsevier .com/locate / jbf

How does public information affect the frequency of trading in airline stocks?

http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jbankfin.2014.03.033 0378-4266/� 2014 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

⇑ Corresponding author. Tel.: +61 399058462; fax: +61 399055474. E-mail address: [email protected] (H.M. Anderson).

Sylwia Nowak a, Heather M. Anderson b,⇑ a International Monetary Fund, 700 19th Street N.W., Washington, DC 20431, United States b Department of Econometrics and Business Statistics, Monash University, Clayton, VIC 3800, Australia

a r t i c l e i n f o

Article history: Received 8 October 2013 Accepted 23 March 2014 Available online 4 April 2014

JEL classification: C22 C51 G14

Keywords: Trading frequency Hazard models Announcements effect

a b s t r a c t

This paper examines how firm specific and macroeconomic announcements affect transaction rates in U.S. airline stocks. Using a version of the autoregressive conditional hazard framework of Hamilton and Jordà (2002) that incorporates market microstructure variables, we show that on average, trading intensity spikes prior and consequent to macroeconomic announcements, but decreases around firm-specific releases. Further, when we use intraday crude oil futures returns as a proxy for industry relevant and globally important news we find that their effects are statistically significant, with higher oil futures returns increasing the probability of trade.

� 2014 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

1. Introduction

There is abundant evidence that news events affect intraday trading in financial markets. Numerous studies suggest a signifi- cant and instantaneous response of asset prices, return volatility, and trading volumes to macroeconomic and company news. Some- what surprisingly, the impact of information arrival on the time patterns in trade has not yet been extensively studied, despite the popularity of the autoregressive conditional duration (ACD) model that Engle and Russell (1998) developed to study the time between trades, and related work in Dufour and Engle (2000) that finds that time between trades informs the price discovery process. This paper studies the links between information arrival and the rate at which trading takes place, by assessing how news events and variables with information content affect the frequency of transactions.

The theoretical motivation for our study can be found in work by Bagehot (1971), Kyle (1985), Admati and Pfleiderer (1988), Easley and O’Hara (1992) and many others who have modeled the influence of informed traders on market liquidity. Such work assumes that market participants trade in response to changes in

their information set, and it follows that the rate at which this trade takes place then plays an important role in determining the subsequent dynamics of the market. Empirical study of time vari- ation in trading frequency is therefore of interest, not only because it provides a measure of news arrivals, but also because trade fre- quencies themselves carry information and influence how quickly prices, volatility, and volume will respond to news arrivals and how long a response might last.

The ACD model is specified in ‘‘transaction time’’, which is not well suited for incorporating information that arrives between trades. We circumvent this difficulty by working with the closely related Autoregressive Conditional Hazard (ACH) model proposed by Hamilton and Jordà (2002), which is set in calendar time. The ACH model enables the inclusion of conditioning variables (such as announcements) that occur at particular times, and it facilitates the calculation of impulse response functions, which are most eas- ily interpreted when graphed against fixed units of time. We use the ACH model in a high frequency setting to study the conditional probability of trade in U.S. airline stocks, and we condition on the occurrence of scheduled and unscheduled macroeconomic and company specific news events in addition to microstructure vari- ables. We also condition on crude oil futures returns, since they provide a readily quantifiable information source about a major component of U.S. passenger airline operating costs.

S. Nowak, H.M. Anderson / Journal of Banking & Finance 44 (2014) 26–38 27

Our work differs from previous work that assesses the effect of news on market liquidity because we focus on the link between information and the probability of trade. Further, we study equity rather than bond or foreign exchange markets,1 and we consider a broader range of news indicators. Related literature on equity mar- kets includes Adams et al. (2004) who consider market reactions to macroeconomic announcements, Patell and Wolfson (1984), who consider market reactions to the release of news on dividends and earnings news, and Brooks et al. (2003), who analyze the impact of unexpected negative company news events (such as plane crashes or plant explosions) on equity markets.

We study airline stocks, which to our knowledge have not yet been studied in a high frequency setting, and we supplement the usual types of macroeconomic and company specific announce- ments with intraday data on crude oil futures. We believe that oil price futures data is a particularly useful indicator of informa- tion in this context, because futures prices incorporate a broad spectrum of information that is relevant for investors, and oil price futures not only carry news about costs specific to the airline industry, but carry macroeconomic and global information as well.

The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 discusses the most important features of the ACH model and its usefulness in modeling the frequency of trade. Data and its statis- tical properties are described in Section 3. Section 4 presents model estimates and summarizes the effects of new releases and crude oil futures returns on trading frequency. Section 5 offers conclusions.

2. Modeling the impact of news on transaction rates

The autoregressive conditional duration (ACD) model Engle and Russell (1998) is designed to measure the expected waiting time between events, and it provides the standard way of modeling trade durations in financial transaction data. The ACD model is specified in transaction times because trades are observed irregu- larly, and the expected waiting time until the next trade is defined as a function of the past waiting times. The ‘‘transaction time’’ set- ting of the ACD model makes it difficult to include time specific variables such as announcements in the conditioning information set, because such variables are observed between trades. This diffi- culty partially explains why the empirical literature on the effects of news on the timing of trades has not developed very quickly.

Zhang et al. (2001) use a threshold ACD model to account for structural breaks that correspond to information events, but this approach is unappealing if one wants to study response times to many information events. Related to this is the question of interest, because although it might be useful to estimate the waiting time until the next trade given an information event, it might be more useful to estimate the likelihood of trade in the next 5 or 15 s, given that information event. The ACH framework concentrates on the latter question whilst also utilizing past durations as conditioning variables. The ACD and ACH frameworks are explained in detail in Engle and Russell (1998) and Hamilton and Jordà (2002), and we sketch the most important features of the ACH model in the con- text of modeling high-frequency data below.

2.1. Autoregressive conditional hazard model

The autoregressive conditional hazard (ACH) model of Hamilton and Jordà (2002) belongs to a class of models known as hazard models that are commonly used in statistics to analyze duration/

1 Well known examples based on bond markets include Ederington and Lee (1993), Fleming and Remolona (1999), Bollerslev et al. (2000) and Balduzzi et al. (2001), while examples based on foreign exchange markets include Bollerslev and Domowitz (1993) and Andersen et al. (2003).

survival data (for an excellent introduction see Lancaster (1990)). The hazard rate (or hazard function) is defined as a (limiting) condi- tional probability of an event occurring at time t (the next time period), given the information set Xt�1 known at time t � 1. Hamilton and Jordà (2002) and Demiralp and Jordà (2001) used the ACH model to predict the probability that the Federal Reserve Board would change the Federal Funds target rate, and Andersen et al. (2010) used it to predict the probability of jumps in S&P 500 futures and U.S. Treasury bond futures returns. In our case, we predict the probability of a trade occurring by the end of the time interval t, given information available at time t � 1.

Consider a stochastic process that is a sequence of trade arrival times t1; t2; . . . ; tnf gwith the nth trade arriving at the end of time tn and t1 < t2 < � � � < tn. Also consider an associated counting process NðtÞ, which is the cumulative number of trades that have occurred by the end of time t (so NðtÞ ¼ Nðt � 1Þ if a trade does not occur in the interval ðt � 1; t� and NðtÞ ¼ Nðt � 1Þ þ 1 if it does). The length of time (the interval) between the n� 1ð Þth and the nth trade arrival times is called a duration un, that is, un ¼ tn � tn�1. The ACD (p; q) model predicts that the conditional expectation of the duration un is a weighted average of p past durations and q past expectations, that are known at time tn�1. That is, given past obser- vations un�1;un�2; . . ., the ACD (p; q) model implies that

E½unjun�1;un�2; . . .� � wn ¼ xþ Xp j¼1

ajun�j þ Xq j¼1

bjwn�j: ð1Þ

Using the definition of the counting process, Hamilton and Jordà (2002) rewrite Eq. (1) as

wNðtÞ ¼ xþ Xp j¼1

ajuNðtÞ�j þ Xq j¼1

bjwNðtÞ�j; ð2Þ

where the expectation wNðtÞ is formulated at time tn�1. The expected conditional duration written as (2) is a step function that only changes if the trade occurs during time interval ðt � 1; t�, i.e. only when NðtÞ – Nðt � 1Þ. In this setting the hazard rate ht is defined as

ht � Pr xt ¼ 1jXt�1ð Þ ¼ Pr NðtÞ – Nðt � 1ÞjXt�1ð Þ; ð3Þ

where xt ¼ 1 if a trade occurs within ðt � 1; t� and xt ¼ 0 otherwise.2 As with the GARCH and ACD models, Eq. (2) can be easily gen-

eralized to account for linear effects of covariates zt�1 known at time t � 1, such as public news releases, crude oil futures returns, and market microstructure variables. However, the exogenous covariates can change even if a trade does not occur. Indeed, the attractive feature of the ACH model is its ability to study effects of information that arrives between trades. This implies that the expected conditional duration wt can change at the end of every (calendar) time interval, through

wt ¼ wNðtÞ þ dzt�1; ð4Þ

where d denotes a vector of parameters. The relationship between the hazard rate and the conditional

duration can be derived using properties of the geometric distribu- tion. The expected length of time until the next trade is

wt ¼ X1 j¼1

j 1� htð Þj�1ht ¼ 1 ht ; ð5Þ

or

2 We follow Hamilton and Jordà’s (2002) definition of the hazard rate. However, in the duration literature a definition of an instantaneous rate of event occurrence per infinitesimally unit of time is often used. That is hðtÞ ¼ limDt!0 Pr xtþDt¼1jXtð ÞDt . Scaling by Dt implies that the hazard rate can be any positive number. This is in contrast to the hazard rate implied by Eq. (3), which is bounded between 0 and 1.

28 S. Nowak, H.M. Anderson / Journal of Banking & Finance 44 (2014) 26–38

ht ¼ 1 wt : ð6Þ

The reciprocal relationship between the expected conditional duration and the hazard rate makes sense intuitively: if the expected length of time until the next trade is, for example, four minutes, then the probability of a trade within the next minute is 0.25. Of course, changing the units in which time is measured affects the magnitude of the expected conditional duration and the corresponding hazard rate. For instance, if the expected condi- tional duration is w ¼ 4 min or 240 s, then the probability of a trade within the next time period is 0.25 if time is measured in minutes, or 1/240 if time is measured in seconds. This highlights the need for avoiding lengthy time intervals, as the probability of a trade occurring within every such period is, uninterestingly, almost always equal to one.

Feasible estimation of the parameters of interest requires some model modification, because at the time of the ðn� 1Þth trade (when the expectation about wt is formulated) the value of NðtÞ is unknown, as are the values of uNðtÞ�j or wNðtÞ�j. To overcome this problem, Hamilton and Jordà (2002) specify the hazard rate as the reciprocal of the expected conditional duration lagged one period. In our case, this does not utilize all the data available at time t � 1, which prompts us to modify the model to obtain

ht ¼ 1 wt ; ð7Þ

wt ¼ xþ Xp�1 j¼0

aðjþ1ÞuNðt�1Þ�j þ Xq j¼1

bjwt�j þ dzt�1: ð8Þ

The parameters in this modified model can then be estimated using maximum likelihood techniques, with the conditional log-likeli- hood specified as

L hð Þ ¼ XT t¼1

xt log htð Þ þ 1� xtð Þ log 1� htð Þf g; ð9Þ

where h ¼ x;a0;b0; d0ð Þ0 denotes the vector of parameters.

3 This includes news relating to the August 10 terror attack in London. 4 These figures are not presented here for brevity, but can be obtained from the

authors. 5 The 2006 Israel-Lebanon conflict was often in the news during the summer of

2006, as was the Iranian uranium enrichment program. See Twin (2006), and Evans (2006), for discussion on how the first of these affected oil prices.

3. Data

Our empirical analysis is based on all stock transactions for shares in AMR Corporation (AMR), Southwest Airlines Co. (LUV), and U.S. Airways Group Inc. (LCC) over the period from August to September 2006. AMR, LUV and LCC were the top three U.S. airlines listed on the NYSE over this period (see Smallen, 2006), and all three stocks were very actively traded. On average, major U.S. air- line stock prices went up 15.3 percent between 20 August and 20 September, weathering the effects of the tighter security imposed after the terror incident in London on 10 August, and outperform- ing analyst rankings by 70–80 percent (Wenning, 2006). Mean- while, the Dow Jones Industrial Average rose to 11,669.39 on 26 September, the second-highest close of all time (Patterson, 2006). Crude oil prices reached a long-time peak of nearly USD 77 a barrel in early August 2006, and then fell more than USD 12 in mid-Sep- tember (NYMEX, 2006).

We focus on the airline industry because its importance within the economy is well recognized, and also because it is influenced by many factors, which include global and macroeco- nomic events as well as developments in the oil industry. The sample period of August and September 2006 was chosen because it is well before the onset of the global financial crisis, and it contains several days on which regular company announcements were made, a few days when unscheduled

‘‘interesting announcements’’ were released,3 and many control (non-announcement) days.

3.1. Airlines intraday data

The intraday transactions data was obtained from the NYSE Trade and Quote (TAQ) database. Appendix A describes the proper- ties of the TAQ database and the filters used to prepare the data, while the summary statistics of the filtered and aggregated data are given in Table 1.

All stocks are traded very frequently, with trade durations aver- aging between 7 and 11 s. An average transaction has a volume of 519 to 1144 shares and a bid-ask spread of 1 to 4 cents. We observe overdispersion in the distributions of trade durations and volumes (as the standard deviation exceeds the mean) and as well as strong positive skewness. All variables exhibit significant autocorrelation, as formally tested using Ljung-Box statistics. This is further docu- mented by the autocorrelation and partial autocorrelation func- tions of trade durations.4 We observe positive, highly significant, and very persistent dynamic dependencies, that are characteristic for many financial time series. Further, both durations and trade fre- quency reveal very strong diurnality (see Fig. 1). The probability of trade exhibits a U-shaped pattern over the course of the day, that is also characteristic for volatility, trade volumes, and bid/ask spreads. On average, trades are about twice as likely to occur during the opening auction and immediately prior to the market’s close than during lunch-time. Conversely, the time-of-day seasonality in trade durations exhibits an inverse U-shape, as first documented by Engle and Russell (1998).

3.2. Crude oil futures prices

There is a growing literature on the effects of oil prices on stock markets, and one of the more recent studies by Kilian and Park (2009) has estimated that demand and supply shocks in the global oil market jointly account for 22% of the long-run variation in US real stock returns. Oil prices are influenced by many factors and there are difficulties associated with identifying ‘‘oil shocks’’ and ‘‘oil related news’’ (Hamilton, 2003). However, it is recognized that movements in oil prices carry news about international events5

and macroeconomic developments within the US economy, as well as news that is specific to the oil industry itself. The overall effect of oil related news on a particular industry (and its associated stock returns) depends on the type of industry and whether the underlying oil shocks are supply or demand related. Kling (1985) found that increases in oil prices led to downturns in airline stock returns for 1972–1983, in an era when a large proportion of oil price move- ments could be considered as exogenous supply shocks. Nowadays, increased oil prices are often linked to positive demand shocks, and feedback between oil and other markets is often observed.

We include crude oil price futures in our analysis because it provides a broad proxy for oil related information that is relevant for investing in airlines. According to the efficient market hypoth- esis, these futures unbiasedly incorporate all relevant information about the oil market, and as discussed above, they reflect news about other markets as well. We expect that oil related information might be particularly important for analyzing news effects on air- line stocks because refined crude oil is used to produce fuels that are important inputs for this industry. Further, for our sample,

Table 1 Descriptive statistics of trade and quote data.

AMR LCC LUV

Sample size Number of trades (before aggregating

simultaneous trades) 158,392 108,102 123,747

Percentage of simultaneous trades (%) 16.22 14.56 19.07 Number of trades (after aggregating

simultaneous trades) 132,705 92,362 100,154

Trade durations (in seconds) Mean 7.291 10.473 9.662 Std. dev. 10.153 17.893 13.096 Skewness 3.942 5.685 3.593 Kurtosis 28.278 64.308 26.223 Ljung-Box Q (15) 16,457 10,551 13,132 Ljung-Box Q (100) 62,847 33,108 41,767

Bid/ask spread (US cents) Mean 1.668 3.496 1.192 Std. dev. 1.257 3.037 0.573 Skewness 4.798 3.600 8.319 Kurtosis 44.396 54.957 221.417 Ljung-Box Q (15) 67,187 47,864 30,626 Ljung-Box Q (100) 114,008 86,920 40,694

Trading volume (number of shares traded) Mean 1143.91 518.85 1023.07 Std. dev 3373.93 1149.03 2787.94 Skewness 38.730 17.480 50.908 Kurtosis 3265.08 559.01 7006.07 Ljung-Box Q (15) 2601 3025 1434 Ljung-Box Q (100) 5830 9258 3377

Proportion of buys (%) 55.24 55.28 54.11 Market value (billions USD) 4.497 3.833 13.788

This table reports summary statistics for AMR Corporation (AMR), U.S. Airways Group (LCC) and Southwest Airlines (LUV). The sample consists of NYSE trades and quotes occurring between 9.45 and 16.00 in August and September 2006 (Source: TAQ database). The Ljung-Box Q (15) and Q (100) statistics are v215 and v2100 under the null of no autocorrelation of orders 15 and 100. Test statistics in bold are sig- nificant at the 1% level of significance. Market value is stock capitalization (#shares outstanding by closing price) on August 1 2006 (Source: CRSP database).

S. Nowak, H.M. Anderson / Journal of Banking & Finance 44 (2014) 26–38 29

we also expect oil futures returns to reflect global news that affects airlines (see Footnotes 3 and 5).

We work with data relating to the NYMEX light sweet crude oil futures contract, obtained from Comprehensive Quotes and Graph- ics (CQG), an official NYMEX data vendor. This oil futures contract is the world’s most liquid and actively traded financial instrument on a physical commodity (NYMEX, 2006), and we use the associ- ated tick-by-tick quote data to construct high frequency returns, as explained in the Appendix. Since our oil futures returns are high frequency, they provide almost continuous updates on the eco- nomic environment in which the airline industry operates.

3.3. Macroeconomic announcements

We follow previous event studies in the literature, and focus on potentially influential announcements made by U.S. Federal agen- cies that relate to key macroeconomic indicators. We follow Goldman Sachs’s (2008) classifications of ‘‘medium’’ and ‘‘high’’ impact to determine which announcements are potentially influ- ential, but exclude announcements relating to inflation, unemploy- ment and GDP growth since these are made outside NYSE trading hours. Table 2 lists the set of macroeconomic news announcements that are considered in this study along with the sample sizes (the partitioning follows Goldman Sachs, 2008).

In addition to the release of macroeconomic indicators, our announcement data incorporates bulletins on the target Federal Funds rate and U.S. Treasury auctions, since existing studies docu- ment that interest rates and interest rate spreads can predict the business cycle (see Harvey (1988) and Stock and Watson (1989)).

We also record the release of two forward-looking measures—the University of Michigan Consumer Sentiment Index (reported as useful in predicting current changes in consumer purchasing behavior by Carroll et al. (1994)), and the Conference Board’s Con- sumer Confidence Index (found to have asymmetric effects on the returns and volatility of the Dow Jones Industrial Average by Gulley and Sultan (1998)), as well as various other measures of production and housing.

We analyze periods before, during, and after the announcements are made. We would prefer to follow Dwyer and Hafer (1989), Damodaran (1989), Balduzzi et al. (2001), Andersen et al. (2003) and analyze the effect of unexpected news, defined as the difference between expected and actual announcements. These studies use consensus specialist forecasts as proxies for market expectations regarding scheduled macroeconomic releases. However, the majority of company announcements are not quantitative (with the exception of earnings announcements), which implies that the reliable decomposition into expected and unexpected compo- nents for both government and company announcements is not feasible. Therefore, our news indicators simply record that a news event has occurred. In this aspect, our study is similar to DeGennaro and Shrieves (1997), Ederington and Lee (2001), and Chang and Taylor (2003).

3.4. Firm-specific news releases

Company announcement data has been collected from the NYSE website (http://www.nyse.com). The NYSE provides market partic- ipants with the latest company Securities and Exchange Commis- sion (SEC) filings, as well as news stories and press releases obtained from the Dow Jones Business News and PR Newswire. The times of the Dow Jones Business News announcements have been adjusted according to the dataset available from the Smith Barney webpage (http://www.smithbarney.com), where identical news items are systematically published fifteen minutes earlier than on the NYSE. The announcements data relates to the issue of analysts reports, as well as news releases on monthly traffic, fare increases, launches of new air routes, airline security and CEO changes. Information about the number of analyzed announce- ments for each company is provided in Table 3.

There are forty-two AMR related releases in August 2006, ten for U.S. Airways Group, and nine for Southwest Airlines. The sample sizes for September 2006 are considerably smaller, with fourteen, three, and one releases for AMR, LCC, and LUV, respec- tively. Leading up to our sample, we found only a few recorded announcements for June and July 2006, so it appears that August 2006 activity was higher than usual. In our empirical analysis, we partition firm-specific news into five groups: analyst reports, earnings related releases (such as new routes and fare announce- ments, or traffic reports), security related news, marketing announcements, and others. We then study the effect of each announcement individually and jointly with the other releases of the same type.

4. Empirical results

4.1. ACH estimates

The empirical analysis focuses on modeling the probability of a trade occurring within one-second intervals. This ultra-microstruc- ture approach is dictated by the data: all three stocks are fre- quently traded and about a fifth of all trade durations are equal to one second. The average trade duration ranges between 7.3 and 10.5 s. Working with one-second intervals allows us to pre- cisely estimate the effect of information arrival on market activity.

Fig. 1. Average intraday patterns of trade frequency and trade durations. Trade frequencies are illustrated on the left hand side while trade durations are illustrated on the right hand side. The time between trades is measured in seconds and the time of the day is measured in hours since midnight. The averages are based on five-minute intervals of trading activity.

6 Javed and Mantalos (2013) demonstrate that BIC can perform quite poorly in GARCH type settings, even when samples contain up to two thousand observations. However, our samples are much larger, with almost one million observations, and our test results support the specifications suggested by BIC.

30 S. Nowak, H.M. Anderson / Journal of Banking & Finance 44 (2014) 26–38

However, this precision comes at a cost, as the dataset grows from an average of 108,407 tick-by-tick observations over the two month period to 967,500 one-second observations.

Empirical researchers often choose to first filter out the deter- ministic time-of-the-day effects, using cubic splines (inter alia Engle and Russell, 1998 and Bauwens and Giot, 2003) or Fourier flexible forms (Andersen and Bollerslev, 1997, 1998). This approach is not feasible in our case, because our dependent var- iable is binary. Thus we adopt a two stage modeling approach, in which we first work with a standard ACH (1,1) model and choose a set of time indicators that can account for intraday sea- sonality in this context, and then incorporate these indicators along with our other covariates as we choose the lag structure for the ACH component of our specification. The set of time indi- cators that we consider consists of one hour dummies as well as various combinations of these dummies, while we consider p 2 f1;2g and q 2 f1;2g when choosing the lag structure. We use BIC proposed by Schwarz (1978) for both specification

searches, supplementing the latter with results obtained from likelihood ratio tests.6

Our resulting baseline ACH model is an ACH (2,1) model that incorporates additional variables to account for intraday seasonal- ity, market microstructure effects, and news monitoring as reflected by the oil futures returns. This model is given by

ht ¼ xþ a1uNðt�1Þ þ a2uNðt�1Þ�1 þ b1wt�1 þ X4 j¼1

cjIt2s jð Þ þ dzt�1

" #�1 ;

ð10Þ

where It2s jð Þ denotes the time indicators with j ¼ (9:45–10:59), (11:00–11:59), (12:00–13:59), and (14:00–14:59) (the last hour of

Table 2 U.S. macroeconomic news announcements.

Announcement Source August 2006

September 2006

Production, orders & inventories ISM manufacturing index ISM 1 1 ISM non-manufacturing index ISM 1 1 Business barometer index NAPM 1 1 Business outlook PhilFED 1 1 National activity index ChFED 1 1 ‘‘Beige Book’’ FRB 1 1 Crude oil inventories report EIA 5 5 Natural gas report EIA 5 4

Consumer spending confidence Consumer confidence index CB 1 1 Consumer sentiment index UM 1 3

Housing construction New single-family home sales DC 1 1 Existing home sales NAR 1 1 Pending home sales index NAR 1 1 Housing market index NAHB/

WF 1 1

Federal reserve policy Target federal funds rate FRB 1 1

Federal government finance Treasury bill auctions DT 9 8 Treasury bond auctions DT 5 3

This table lists the U.S. macroeconomic news announcements included in the study and the number of releases made during the sample period from 01 August to 30 September 2006. The data sources are: Conference Board (CB), Department of Commerce (DC), Department of Treasury (DT), Energy Information Administration (EIA), Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago (ChFED), Federal Reserve Bank of Philadel- phia (PhilFED), Federal Reserve Board (FRB), Institute for Supply Management (ISM), National Association of Home Builders/Wells Fargo (NAHB/WF), National Associa- tion of Purchasing Managers Chicago (NAPM), National Association of Realtors (NAR) and University of Michigan (UM). The grouping of the announcements fol- lows (Goldman Sachs, 2008).

Table 3 Firm specific news releases.

August 2006 September 2006

AMR Corporation Analysts reports 6 0 Earnings related news 8 4 Security related news 16 1 Marketing announcements 10 6 Other releases 2 3

U.S. Airways Group Analysts reports 1 0 Earnings related news 2 1 Security related news 5 0 Marketing announcements 1 0 Other releases 1 2

Southwest Airlines Analysts reports 3 0 Earnings related news 3 1 Security related news 0 0 Marketing announcements 0 0 Other releases 3 0

This table lists types of firm specific news announcements included in the study and the number of releases made between 9.45 and 16.00 during the sample period from 01 August to 30 September 2006 (Data Source: NYSE).

Table 4 Parameter estimates of ACH (2,1) models with crude oil futures returns, market microstructure variables and time indicators.

AMR LCC LUV

- 0.0186 0.0442 0.0433 [0.0019] [0.0049] [0.0092]

a1 0.0009 0.0010 0.0013 [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001]

a2 0.0010 0.0010 0.0011 [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0002]

b1 0.9973 0.9968 0.9953 [0.0002] [0.0003] [0.0009]

oilt�1 �0.0007 �0.0017 0.0001 [0.0002] [0.0003] [0.0004]

returnt�1 0.0023 0.0124 �0.0160 [0.0012] [0.0024] [0.0071]

volumet�1 �0.0030 �0.0061 �0.0069 [0.0003] [0.0006] [0.0013]

spreadt�1 0.0001 0.0028 0.0030 [0.0001] [0.0004] [0.0006]

It�ð9:45�10:59Þ 0.0005 0.0005 0.0021 [0.0001] [0.0003] [0.0002]

It�ð11:00�11:59Þ 0.0005 0.0014 0.0049 [0.0001] [0.0003] [0.0012]

It�ð12:00�13:59Þ 0.0018 0.0024 0.0071 [0.0002] [0.0004] [0.0019]

It�ð14:00�14:59Þ 0.0006 0.0006 0.0028 [0.0002] [0.0003] [0.0010]

Log likelihood �378,707.3 �298,157.2 �317,386.1 % Correct predictions 58.87 60.90 57.56

The conditional probability of trade (ht) in each stock is modeled as ht =

xþ a1uNðt�1Þ þ a2uNðt�1Þ�1 þ b1wt�1 þ P4

j¼1cjIt2s jð Þlþ dzt�1 h i�1

, where the It2s jð Þ are

time indicators, oilt�1 are oil returns, returnst�1 are own stock returns, volu met�1 (logarithm of traded shares), and (the relative bid ask) spread. All covariates are scaled to have unit variance. Coefficient estimates in bold are significant at the 5% level, and robust standard errors are in square brackets. The sample consists of 967,500 one second observations based on NYSE and NYMEX trades that occurred between 9.45 and 16.00 during August and September in 2006 (Data from TAQ and CQG).

7 Andersen et al. (2010) use the ACH (1,1) model to study the occurrence of jumps in five-minute financial returns, and report similar coefficients.

S. Nowak, H.M. Anderson / Journal of Banking & Finance 44 (2014) 26–38 31

trade is used as the reference) and zt�1 denotes a vector of market microstructure covariates and crude oil futures returns. We use rel- ative bid/ask spreads, logarithmic trade volumes and returns to account for market microstructure effects (see Dacorogna et al., 2001, for definitions and stylized facts). The market microstructure covariates at time t � 1 are assumed to be equal to their value at the last observed trade tn�1. Crude oil futures returns at time t � 1 are

equal to their most recent value at that time. Table 4 reports param- eter estimates for this model.

The parameter estimates in Table 4 are all statistically signifi- cant (a quasi-maximum likelihood estimator is applied to obtain robust standard errors) and similar to coefficients reported in intraday GARCH and ACD studies, with infrequent updating (small a1 and a2), long memory in expected conditional hazards (b1 close to one), and considerable persistence (a1 þ a2 þ b1 very close to one).7 The model does well in predicting whether a trade will occur within the next time interval. The proportion of correct predictions is 58.87% for American Airlines, 60.90% for U.S. Airways Group and 57.56% for Southwest Airlines.

The model provides an accurate approximation to trade fre- quency dynamics, as documented in Fig. 2 (the top panel) that plots the average observed and fitted hazard rates. The diagnostic analysis of the standardized binary residuals, defined as

êt ¼ xt � ĥtffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffi

ĥt � 1� ĥt � �r ; ð11Þ

indicates that the model accounts for the diurnal seasonality and almost all of the dynamic dependencies in the data (see the other panels of Fig. 2).

The coefficients on the past trade volume are negative and strongly significant for all stocks, which implies that a higher

Fig. 2. Model diagnostics for ACH (2,1) models. The first panel shows the fitted and observed average intraday patterns of trade frequency (the solid and dashed lines, respectively). The averages are based on five-minute intervals of trading activity. The next three panels provide diagnostics of the standardized binary residuals; the fitted intraday patterns (second panel), the ACF (the third panel) and the PACF (fourth panel).

32 S. Nowak, H.M. Anderson / Journal of Banking & Finance 44 (2014) 26–38

volume per trade shortens the next conditional duration. This is consistent with the Easley and O’Hara (1992) model and previous empirical results of Bauwens and Giot (2000), Dufour and Engle (2000), and Dungey et al. (2013). However, in contrast to predic- tions from the Easley and O’Hara (1992) model, but consistent with the Admati and Pfleiderer (1988) model, we find that trades are more likely to occur as the bid/ask spread narrows. This finding is in line with Dow (2005), who shows that the wide bid/ask spread is associated with a decline in trading intensity. The empirical work in Dufour and Engle (2000) also finds that if there is any rela- tionship between trade durations and bid/ask spread, it is positive, but statistically weak.

The evidence on how lagged returns affect trade frequency is mixed. The estimate for Southwest Airlines suggests that as prices rise, the conditional probability of trade significantly increases. This provides evidence in support of the Diamond and Verrecchia (1987) analysis, where positive returns are associated with shorter

trade durations. However, opposite results are obtained for Amer- ican Airlines and U.S. Airways Group.

We find that crude oil futures returns are significant in model- ing the frequency of trading in AMR and LCC stocks, with higher crude oil futures prices significantly increasing hazard rates. This result is consistent with the view that higher oil prices signal higher aggregate demand and growth in the economy, and con- trasts with Sadorsky (1999) and Papapetrou (2001), who find that oil price increases can depress monthly stock returns. However, for Southwest Airlines we find no significant short-run spillovers from crude oil futures markets. Interestingly, Southwest Airlines are well known for their very effective ‘‘forward buy’’ jet-fuel futures program (Mandaro, 2008), and they did not break the USD 100 per barrel threshold until 2008 (Cox, 2005). The immunization to short-run changes in crude oil prices implies that, in the case of this airline, the changes in crude oil futures returns do not affect the probability of trade.

Table 5 Impact of macroeconomic announcements on the probability of trade.

Before h�1 During h0 After h1 Total P1

s¼�1hs Log likelihood LR stat

AMR Corporation ISM manufacturing index �0.0082 0.0249 0.0003 0.0169 �378,702.0 10.5 ISM non-manufacturing index �0.0040 �0.0035 �0.0017 �0.0092 �378,700.0 14.5 Business barometer index 0.0121 �0.0345 0.0021 �0.0203 �378,702.4 9.8 ‘‘Beige Book’’ �0.0002 �0.0519 0.0002 �0.0519 �378,703.3 7.9 Crude oil inventories report �0.0017 �0.0093 �0.0009 �0.0120 �378,687.4 39.8 Natural gas report 0.0017 �0.0203 0.0016 �0.0169 �378,702.6 9.3 Consumer confidence index 0.0051 �0.0656 �0.0010 �0.0615 �378,685.5 43.6 New single family home sales 0.0156 �0.0933 0.0047 �0.0730 �378.697.9 18.8 Pending home sales �0.0082 0.0249 0.0003 0.0169 �378.702.0 10.5 Federal reserve target rate �0.0124 �0.0111 0.0023 �0.0212 �378,690.4 33.7 Treasury bond auctions 0.0069 �0.0215 0.0046 �0.0100 �378,698.9 16.8

U.S. Airways Group National activity index 0.0105 �0.1522 0.0011 �0.1406 �298,143.2 28.0 ‘Beige Book’ 0.1439 �0.5028 0.0225 �0.3363 �298,149.4 15.7 Crude oil inventories report 0.0028 �0.0221 �0.0020 �0.0213 �298,150.8 12.9 Natural gas report 0.0087 �0.0599 0.0048 �0.0464 �298,152.0 10.3 Consumer sentiment index – 0.0738 �0.0063 0.0675 �298,150.3 13.9 New single family home sales �0.0131 0.0166 �0.0036 �0.0001 �298,151.1 12.3 Existing home sales 0.0180 0.0576 �0.0221 0.0535 �298,141.7 31.0 Federal reserve target rate �0.0145 �0.0358 �0.0034 �0.0537 �298,147.4 19.6 Treasury bond auctions 0.0259 �0.0806 0.0136 �0.0411 �298,139.0 36.4

Southwest Airlines ISM manufacturing index �0.0147 0.0179 �0.0055 �0.0024 �317,381.5 9.1 Business barometer index �0.0111 �0.0304 0.0089 �0.0327 �317,380.2 11.7 Business outlook 0.0215 �0.1491 0.0112 �0.1165 �317,380.5 11.2 ‘Beige Book’ 0.0012 �0.1532 0.0164 �0.1355 �317,380.0 12.2 Consumer sentiment index – 0.0584 �0.0053 0.0531 �317,381.0 10.2 New single family home sales �0.0221 0.0700 �0.0080 0.0400 �317,377.6 16.9 Pending home sales �0.0147 0.0179 �0.0055 �0.0024 �317,381.5 9.1 Federal reserve target rate �0.0369 �0.0224 �0.0053 �0.0646 �317,344.6 82.9 Treasury bill auctions 0.0078 �0.0346 0.0117 �0.0150 �317,371.9 28.3 Treasury bond auctions 0.0121 �0.0767 0.0155 �0.0491 �317,377.3 17.6

We estimate ht ¼ ½xþ a1uNðt�1Þ þ a2uNðt�1Þ�1 þ b1wt�1 þ P4

j¼1cjIt2s jð Þ þ dzt�1 þ P1

s¼�1hsAt; s� �1

, where ht is the conditional probability of trade, At; �1 indicates the five- minute periods before each announcement in the group, At; 0 indicates the minutes that the announcements in the group occurred and At; 1 indicates the subsequent ten minute periods for these announcements. The LR statistic tests the joint significance of the three announcement indicators. Statistics in bold are significant at the 10% level.

S. Nowak, H.M. Anderson / Journal of Banking & Finance 44 (2014) 26–38 33

4.2. Effects of public announcements

How do public announcements affect the frequency of trading in stocks? To answer this question within the ACH framework, we include three announcement variables in Eq. (10), to denote observation windows of five minutes before announcements (At;�1), the minutes during which announcements are made (At;0 ), and ten minutes after announcements are made (At;1). Our choice of the lengths of observation windows is similar to Simonsen (2006), who studies the impact of news arrival on trade durations in Swedish stocks and reports that the 5-1-10 observation win- dows provide an adequate data fit as well as the largest number of significant parameters. As in Simonsen (2006), we find that changing the before-during-after time intervals to 15-5-20 min does not markedly vary the results, although less significant coef- ficients are obtained. Tables 5 and 6 present the empirical results for the 5-1-10 observation windows. The first of these tables reports the impact of various types of macroeconomic announce- ments on the probability of trade in airline stocks, while the second presents the results relating to individual firm specific announcements.

The first three columns of each table report the estimates of the before, during, and after coefficients. The fourth column reports the total (accumulative) impact of an announcement over the entire observation window (16 min), calculated as the sum of the news coefficients i.e.

P1 s¼�1hs.

8 Note that the news has a positive effect

8 The release of the Consumer Sentiment Index coincided with two firm specific announcements, and we addressed this by treating the CSI before and during dummies as a single indicator.

on the frequency of trade when the sum of hs is negative. The total likelihood of each model is provided in the sixth column, followed by the likelihood ratio statistic that tests the joint significance of the announcement indicators (the restricted model is reported in Table 4). All coefficient estimates and test statistics provided in bold are significant at the 10% level. Parameter estimates of coefficients for durations, conditional durations, market microstructure vari- ables, crude oil futures returns, and time indicators are not reported in the tables, although the relevant explanatory variables are included in all estimated models. In general, the ACH and exogenous covariate coefficients do not vary markedly from the baseline values reported in Table 4, and all results are robust to excluding market microstructure variables and crude oil futures returns.

4.3. Response to macroeconomic announcements

Consistent with the market microstructure theory that inves- tors trade on information (Easley and O’Hara, 1992), we find that macroeconomic news inflow induces anticipatory, contemporane- ous and reactionary changes in trading activity. Table 5 reports the estimated effects of different types of macroeconomic announce- ments on the probability of trades, for all cases in which the three types of announcement indicators are jointly significant at the 5% level. On average, the estimates of the news indicator coefficients and their sums are negative, implying shorter trade durations and larger hazard rates over the entire observation window (16 min). This is consistent with the market microstructure theory that investors trade on information (Easley and O’Hara, 1992). Haz- ard rates usually return to their pre-announcement levels within about 30 min. For several macroeconomic announcements that

Table 6 Impact of firm-specific news releases on the probability of trade.

Before h�1 During h0 After h1 Total P1

s¼�1hs Log likelihood LR stat

AMR Corporation All Company News (56) 0.0011 �0.0067 0.0005 �0.0051 �378,705.2 4.2 Earnings, Aug 4th at 11:00 0.0224 0.1430 0.0096 0.1750 �378,694.0 26.4 Security, Aug 10th at 15:30 �0.0123 0.0300 0.0065 0.0241 �378,695.7 23.2 Ticket Prices, Aug 18 at 12:10 0.0450 �0.2664 0.0373 �0.1841 �378,697.2 20.1 Security, Aug 10th at 10:05 0.0003 0.0806 �0.0042 0.0766 �378,697.6 19.3 Security, Aug 10th at 9:53 �0.0009 �0.0027 0.0067 0.0031 �378,698.0 18.5

U.S. Airways Group All Company News (13) 0.0077 �0.0052 0.0047 0.0071 �298,151.9 10.6 Earnings Related News (3) 0.0224 �0.0226 0.0321 0.0318 �298,145.9 22.6 Security Related News (5) 0.0320 0.0460 0.0091 0.0871 �298,137.4 39.6 Other Releases (2) �0.0055 �0.0497 �0.0044 �0.0596 �298,146.6 21.2 Ticket Prices, Aug 29th at 11.00 0.0610 0.0390 0.0477 0.1477 �298,135.0 44.5 New CEO, Sept 14th at 11:30 �0.0261 �0.0102 �0.0039 �0.0401 �298,143.3 27.9 Security, Aug 10th at 12:57 0.0208 0.0856 0.0278 0.1341 �298,146.1 22.2 New Routes, Sept 22nd at 14:44 �0.0810 0.0936 0.0161 0.0287 �298,149.6 15.1 Security, Aug 25th at 15:16 �0.0613 0.1228 0.1130 0.1745 �298,150.7 13.0

Southwest Airlines All Company News (10) �0.0124 0.0792 �0.0152 0.0516 �317,323.1 125.9 Analysts Reports (3) �0.0103 0.0285 �0.0201 �0.0019 �317,256.6 258.9 Earnings Related News (4) �0.0146 0.0457 0.0040 0.0351 �317,377.2 17.7 Other Releases (3) �0.0022 �0.0138 0.0230 0.0070 �317,376.6 18.8 Analyst Report, Aug 3 at 15:34 0.0324 �0.1131 0.0223 �0.1030 �317,203.0 366.2 Ticket Prices, Sept 12 at 10:00 �0.0205 0.0454 0.0056 0.0304 �317,373.3 25.6 Analyst Report, Aug10 at 15:26 �0.0208 0.0391 �0.0075 0.0108 �317,373.3 25.4 Energy Policies, Aug 2 at 14:03 �0.0166 0.0106 0.0262 0.0203 �317,380.5 11.2 New CEO, Aug 30 at 15:00 0.0014 �0.0151 0.0234 0.0097 �317,382.1 7.9

We estimate ht ¼ ½xþ a1uNðt�1Þ þ a2uNðt�1Þ�1 þ b1wt�1 þ P4

j¼1cjIt2s jð Þ þ dzt�1 þ P1

s¼�1hsAt; s� �1

, where rmht is the conditional probability of trade, At; �1 indicates the five- minute periods before each announcement in the group, At; 0 indicates the minutes that the announcements in the group occurred and At; 1 indicates the subsequent ten minute periods for these announcements. When the group contains more than one announcement, the number of announcements in that group is given in parentheses after the announcement description The LR statistic tests the joint significance of the three announcement indicators. Statistics in bold are significant at the 10% level.

34 S. Nowak, H.M. Anderson / Journal of Banking & Finance 44 (2014) 26–38

have important effects on trade in all these stocks, the likelihood of trades occurring during the release is two to six times greater than the usual likelihood of trades occurring (see the first four panels in Fig. 3). In particular, announcements of the Federal Reserve target rate induce a significant spike in the hazard rates of all stocks. This result is intriguing as during the analyzed sample period the changes in monetary policy were in line with market expectations and as such ‘‘market efficiency would dictate that the expected portion of an announcement should have no impact’’ (Almeida et al., 1998).

While most macroeconomic news increases the probability of trade, important exceptions relate to releases of the Consumer Sen- timent Index. The third panel in Fig. 3 shows clear dips in the prob- ability of trade prior to these releases, and decreased rates of trade for up to half an hour thereafter. The release of home sales data has mixed effects on the probability of trade, and although these announcements have a statistically significant effect on this prob- ability for each of the three stocks, the characteristics of how this effect evolves are quite different. Further, the Housing Market Index does not have a statistically significant effect on the proba- bility of trade in any of these three airline stocks.

It is interesting to note that Crude Oil Inventories and Natural Gas Reports are good predictors of the probability of trade in AMR and LCC stocks, but not in LUV stock. This is in line with our earlier observation that crude oil futures returns are insignifi- cant when modeling the frequency of trading in LUV stock, and yet they matter when analyzing the other airline shares. Given our finding that neither the sign nor significance of any of the announcement variables (including the oil and gas announce- ments) change when the crude oil futures returns are excluded from the models, it appears that the information contained in the fuel reports is quite different from that contained in crude oil futures returns.

A detailed look at the coefficients of announcements that are released early suggests that timeliness matters to some extent. That is, statistics that are released shortly after the period they cover, such as the Consumer Confidence Index, New Home Sales or the Business Barometer have a larger impact on the probability of trade than less timely indicators (see Fleming and Remolona, 1999; Andersen et al., 2003, and Veredas, 2006, for related evi- dence from fixed interest and foreign exchange rates markets).

4.3.1. Response to company specific announcements The impact of company specific news on trading frequency

depends on the company and how the announcements under con- sideration have been grouped. The overall response to all announcements is given in the first line relating to each company in Table 6, and is illustrated in the last panel of Fig. 3. Company dif- ferences are readily apparent. For AMR there is little overall effect, with only a small increase in the probability of trade being observed during the same minutes that announcements are released. The overall effect of U.S. Airways Group announcements is statistically significant, although the accumulated response over time is not. Here, the probability of trade slightly declines prior to announcements, rises a little during the same minutes that announcements are made but then declines again in the subse- quent ten minute periods. In contrast, the overall effect of South- west Airlines’ announcements is very striking, with strong rises in the probability of trade both before and after announcements, and an even stronger decline in hazard during the minutes in which announcements are made. The accumulated impact of all news announcements on durations for Southwest Airlines lowers the probability of trade - in contrast to the accumulated impact of macroeconomic announcements on these stocks and in line with the learning model of Kim and Verrecchia (1991) and the empirical evidence from the Treasury futures market of Li and Engle (1998).

Fig. 3. Trading frequency responses to announcements. The solid lines represent the median behavior of trading frequency in the presence of public releases and the dashed lines represent the 95% confidence intervals. Both estimates are obtained using Monte Carlo simulations based on the parameters reported in Tables 5 and 6. The x-axis denotes time in minutes, with the announcement time fixed at zero.

S. Nowak, H.M. Anderson / Journal of Banking & Finance 44 (2014) 26–38 35

These latter papers argue that investors process the information from unscheduled news (such ad hoc company announcements) less quickly than regularly scheduled macroeconomic news.

The results for the statistically significant groupings of announcements are reported in Table 6, immediately under the

results relating to all company news. None of the various catego- ries of AMR specific news are jointly significant (so they are omit- ted from the Table), and we see that the evidence for U.S. Airways is quite mixed; security (earnings) related releases induce a decrease in hazard rates before (after) the release, while the group

36 S. Nowak, H.M. Anderson / Journal of Banking & Finance 44 (2014) 26–38

of other releases induce a strongly positive accumulated increase in hazard rates. For Southwest Airlines, trading intensity tends to increase before news releases, as predicted by the information asymmetry model of Kyle (1985), in which monopolistic informed traders place orders before their (insider) information becomes common knowledge in order to maximize their profits. Kim and Verrecchia (1997) also argue that anticipated announcements should induce higher pre-announcement activity than unantici- pated announcements, and it is interesting to note that all releases made by Southwest Airlines (apart from analyst reports) were pub- licly pre-advertised. On the other hand, the information sets for the other two companies include many unanticipated ‘‘breaking news’’ stories, such as security releases concerning the terrorist threat at London airport (10 August 2006), and these are not associated with the same sort of preannouncement effect.

The observation that the overall effects of all company news for AMR were negligible even though AMR released many items of news suggested that some individual releases may have had differ- ent informational content than others, leading to mutual cancel- ation effects. This led to an analysis of the impact of each company announcement for each of the three companies. We report fifteen of these (the five most significant individual releases (i.e. those with the highest LR statistics) for each company). In con- trast to the aggregated results discussed above, we observe that many individual news releases have a significant effect on the fre- quency of trading in stocks. Unscheduled airline security releases and announcements that are directly related to past or future earn- ings, such as traffic reports or favorable analysts’ reports, have the largest impact on the conditional probability of trade.

The news dummy coefficients for individual announcements are mostly positive, (with many being statistically significant), implying that there is a significant decline in the trading frequency around the time that companies release news. This effect is not strong before the release, but it becomes stronger as the release is made. During announcements, traders often seem to ‘‘pause’’ (indicated by positive coefficients), and for LUV stock the probabil- ity of trade remains significantly lower during the ten-minute interval subsequent to a news arrival. Green (2004) suggests that lower trading intensity following information flow indicates that uninformed (liquidity) traders are patient with their orders. In con- trast, the after coefficients for American Airlines and U.S. Airways Group are mostly insignificant. This implies the intensity of trading returns quickly to the pre-announcement levels and also suggests that market participants absorb new information almost immedi- ately, as in the multiple informed trader model of Holden and Subrahmanyam (1992).

Why do market participants react differently to the same type of announcements? Kim and Verrecchia (1997) argue that since investors vary in skill at interpreting public information, news releases actually increase information asymmetry. Moreover, while the impact of individual firm-specific announcements is not systematic, there seems to be some evidence that good news increases the conditional probability of trade, whereas bad news induces a slow-down in trading activity. Examples of announce- ments that reduced the intensity of trading include AMR and LCC related security releases following the alleged terror plot at London airport (10 August) and then two jet diversions because of security concerns (25 August). On the other hand, favorable traffic reports, new routes announcements and affirmative analyst reports all tend to raise hazard rates.

We close with a comparative observation relating to a Standard & Poor’s (S&P) Equity Research Services report on 10 August. The 10.05 news on this date contained information about American Airlines being specifically targeted by terrorists. After a series of subsequent releases and updates, S&P Equity Research lowered its fundamental outlook on the airline sub-industry at 15.26. The

frequency of trading in AMR declined shortly thereafter. However, the S&P report affected the probability of trade in Southwest Air- line stock in a positive way. The attempted terrorist attacks of the day and high oil prices were the main reasons for the down- grade. However, Southwest Airlines is a domestic carrier that is well known for its successful jet-fuel hedging strategy, so it is not surprising that investors were prompted to trade in this com- pany’s stocks more frequently.

5. Conclusions

We modify the ACH framework of Hamilton and Jordà (2002) to study the impact of public news releases, crude oil futures prices and key microstructure features of market activities on trading fre- quency in airline stocks. We find that company and U.S. macroeco- nomic announcements significantly change the conditional probability of trade, but traders’ reactions depend on the news informational content. On average, macroeconomic statistical releases increase the frequency of trading in stocks, in line with the theoretical model of Easley and O’Hara (1992). The impact depends on news timing, with indicators published earlier produc- ing stronger response. In contrast, firm-specific announcements tend to decrease trading intensity, especially when analyzed indi- vidually. The effect is most pronounced for unscheduled airline security releases and other bad news. By comparison, good news such as favorable analysts’ reports tend to increase the conditional probability of trade.

Our results clearly indicate that tick-by-tick crude oil futures returns are highly relevant for modeling the probability of trade within the next time period, with a notable exception of Southwest Airlines, renowned for their successful jet-fuel hedging program. This finding highlights the future potential for using crude oil futures prices as a general proxy for information in other contexts. Drawing on the current findings, it is reasonable to suppose that the crude oil futures prices would effectively incorporate informa- tion relevant to modeling the intraday behavior of car and energy industries. Additional insights would come from assessing empiri- cally whether the effectiveness of crude oil prices as a continuous information measure extends to the economy as a whole. We leave these issues for future research.

We provide evidence that the ACH model allows for efficient and flexible modeling of the conditional probability of trade in the next time interval. However, another interesting direction for future research would be to extend the model so that it can account for non-linearities and asymmetry in the response of stock prices to information (asymmetries in adjusting to good/bad news are reported for example by Gosnell et al. (1996), in their study of dividend announcements). A smooth transition ACH framework could be developed for this purpose, in line with the research work of Teräsvirta and Anderson (1992), Anderson and Vahid (1998, 2001) and Anderson et al. (1999). Further extensions of the model could also include semiparametric and non-parametric estimation techniques, as in the closely related framework of Gerhard Hautsch (2001).

Acknowledgements

We thank Mardi Dungey, Òscar Jordà, Vance Martin, Daniel Smith, Tom Smith, Sirimon Treepongkaruna, Farshid Vahid, semi- nar participants at the Australian National University and the Uni- versity of Melbourne, and participants of the Econometric Society Australasian Meetings for useful comments and suggestions. We also acknowledge the financial support of Grants DP0449995 and RN0460246 awarded by the Australian Research Council.

S. Nowak, H.M. Anderson / Journal of Banking & Finance 44 (2014) 26–38 37

Appendix A. Data filtering

The transactions data was obtained from the NYSE Trade and Quote (TAQ) database, supplied by Wharton Research Data Ser- vices. TAQ contains time-stamped historical details of all individ- ual trades and orders placed on U.S. stock markets. Each transaction contains a time stamp that reflects the time at which the transaction occurred, details of the actual trade price, the trans- action volume (i.e. the total number of shares of a stock bought/ sold), and the sales condition. Each quote record includes the order’s date and time, bid price and size, offer price and size, and quote condition. We made several adjustments to prepare the data for analysis, and these are described below.

Firstly, we removed trades and orders posted on exchanges other than the NYSE, in line with the arguments presented in (Blume and Goldstein, 1997) and Engle and Patton (2004). Next we remove trades that are out of time sequence or canceled (TAQ’s CORR field other than zero or one) or have a non-standard sales condition such as delivery of the stock at some later date (TAQ’s COND field not blank nor E). We also eliminate quotes that do not arrive under normal trading conditions but we keep those that arrive during news arrival times (TAQ’s MODE field must be equal to 1, 2, 3, 4, 6, 10, 11, 12, 19, 20, 27, or 28). Further, we exclude trades and quotes with non-positive prices, or observations for which the bid/ask/trade price is greater (less) than 150% (50%) of the previous bid/ask/trade price (Boehmer et al., 2005). Finally, we eliminate quotes with spreads larger than USD 4.00 or less than USD 0.00 (Huang and Stoll, 1994).

Once the data has been cleaned, we then match trades and quotes using the ‘‘two seconds rule’’ proposed by Lee and Ready (1991) and recently updated by Vergote (2005). We then removed transactions outside NYSE regular trading hours and in the first 15 min of each trading days. Finally, we merge trades that have exactly the same timestamp by constructing volume-weighted average prices and summing up the total volume of the trades. Simultaneous trades arise due to split-transactions (large orders on one side of the market automatically matched against several smaller orders on the other side of the market, Hautsch, 2004) and retail traders’ tendency to execute orders at the round prices (Veredas et al., 2007). The occurrence of split-transactions justifies eliminating zero trade durations (see for example Engle and Russell (1998), Engle and Patton, 2004), though aggregation of the simultaneous trades mutes the information effects (Gunn, 2007).9

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Vergote, O., 2005. How to Match Trades and Quotes of NYSE Stocks? Center for Economic Studies Discussion Paper DPS 05.10., K.U. Leuven.

Wenning, T., 2006. Airline Stocks Are Flying High. Motley Fool, 21 September. Zhang, M.Y., Russell, J.R., Tsay, R.S., 2001. A nonlinear autoregressive conditional

duration model with applications to financial transaction data. J. Econometr. 104 (1), 179–207.

  • How does public information affect the frequency of trading in airline stocks?
    • 1 Introduction
    • 2 Modeling the impact of news on transaction rates
      • 2.1 Autoregressive conditional hazard model
    • 3 Data
      • 3.1 Airlines intraday data
      • 3.2 Crude oil futures prices
      • 3.3 Macroeconomic announcements
      • 3.4 Firm-specific news releases
    • 4 Empirical results
      • 4.1 ACH estimates
      • 4.2 Effects of public announcements
      • 4.3 Response to macroeconomic announcements
        • 4.3.1 Response to company specific announcements
    • 5 Conclusions
    • Acknowledgements
    • Appendix A Data filtering
    • References

Risk-models-at-risk_2014_Journal-of-Banking---Finance.pdf

Journal of Banking & Finance 44 (2014) 72–92

Contents lists available at ScienceDirect

Journal of Banking & Finance

journal homepage: www.elsevier .com/locate / jbf

Risk models-at-risk

http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jbankfin.2014.03.019 0378-4266/� 2014 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

⇑ Corresponding author. Address: Univ. La Reunion, CEMOI, 15 avenue Réné Cassin, CS 92003, 97744 Saint-Denis Cedex 9, France. Tel.: +33 686431914.

E-mail addresses: [email protected] (C.M. Boucher), j.daniels- [email protected] (J. Daníelsson), [email protected] (P.S. Kouontch- ou), [email protected] (B.B. Maillet).

1 VaR is defined as the maximum expected loss on an investment over a specified horizon at a particular confidence level. As is widely known, the a-VaR is the (1� a)- quantile of the portfolio’s return distribution, where generally :5 < a < 1; that is, the minimum potential loss that will be sustained with a probability a. Since the BIS accords, VaR follow-ups play a central role in financial risk measurement and management. For a review of the literature of the VaR calculations, please see Engle and Manganelli (2001) and Jorion (2007).

2 In the finance literature, the term ‘‘model risk’’ frequently applies to un about the risk factor distribution (e.g. Gibson, 2000; Jorion, 2009a,b), alth term is sometimes used in a wider sense (e.g. Derman, 1996; Crouhy et al.,

Christophe M. Boucher a,b, Jón Daníelsson c, Patrick S. Kouontchou b, Bertrand B. Maillet a,d,⇑ a A.A.Advisors-QCG (ABN AMRO), France b Variances and Univ. Lorraine (CEREFIGE), France c Systemic Risk Centre and London School of Economics, United Kingdom d Variances, Univ. La Reunion and Orleans (CEMOI, LEO/CNRS and LBI), France

a r t i c l e i n f o

Article history: Received 24 July 2012 Accepted 10 March 2014 Available online 21 March 2014

Jel classification: C50 G11 G32

Keywords: Model risk Value-at-risk Backtesting

a b s t r a c t

The experience from the global financial crisis has raised serious concerns about the accuracy of standard risk measures as tools for the quantification of extreme downward risks. A key reason for this is that risk measures are subject to a model risk due, e.g. to specification and estimation uncertainty. While regula- tors have proposed that financial institutions assess the model risk, there is no accepted approach for computing such a risk. We propose a remedy for this by a general framework for the computation of risk measures robust to model risk by empirically adjusting the imperfect risk forecasts by outcomes from backtesting frameworks, considering the desirable quality of VaR models such as the frequency, indepen- dence and magnitude of violations. We also provide a fair comparison between the main risk models using the same metric that corresponds to model risk required corrections.

� 2014 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

1. Introduction

Recent crises have laid bare the failures of standard risk models. High levels of model risk caused models to under forecast risk prior to crisis events, to be slow to react as a crisis unfolds, and then slow to reduce risk levels post-crisis. It is as if the risk models got it wrong in all states of the world. Addressing this problem provides the main motivation for our work. In particular, we explicitly adjust risk forecasts for model risk by their historical performance, so that a risk model learns from its past mistakes. While our focus is on Value-at-Risk (VaR),1 the analysis applies equally to other risk measures such as expected shortfall (ES).

While there is no single definition of model risk.2 it generally relates to the uncertainty created by not knowing perfectly the true data generating process (DGP). This inevitably means that any prac- tical definition is linked to such an uncertainty and thus is context dependent. In our case, the end product is a risk forecast, so model risk is the uncertainty in risk forecasting arising from estimation error and the use of an incorrect model. This double uncertainty is responsible both for the range of plausible risk estimates (see, e.g. Beder, 1995), and more generally the inability to forecast risk with acceptable accuracy.

To formalize this, in our view a risk forecast model should meet three desirable criteria: the expected frequency of violations, the absence of violation clustering and a magnitude of violations consistent with the underlying distributional assumptions. These three criteria provide the lens through which to view our empirical results.

We can motivate our contribution by means of an example represented in Fig. 1, where, for each day in a sample of the Dow Jones (DJIA) index over a century, we show the outcomes from applying state of the art VaR forecast methods. We also show periodically which method generated the highest and the lowest

certainty ough the 1998).

1904 1911 1919 1927 1934 1942 1950 1957 1965 1973 1980 1988 1996 2003 2011 −40%

−20%

0%

20%

Va R

L ev

el

Dates

G

CV

G

CV

CV

RM RMRM RM RMRM RMRM

CF

RMRM RMRM

RM GPDCF

RMRM RMRMRM

G G G

RM RM

GCF GG G G GG

RM RMG

RM

G

RM RM

RMCF

1904 1911 1919 1927 1934 1942 1950 1957 1965 1973 1980 1988 1996 2003 2011 0

1

2

3

x 104

Pr ic

e

MinVaR MaxVaR

DJI (right axis)

Fig. 1. DJIA and the range of daily 99% VaR forecasts. Daily DJIA index returns from the 1st January, 1900 to the 20th September, 2011. We use a moving window of four years (1040 daily returns) to dynamically re-estimate parameters for the various methods. The letters ‘‘H’’, ‘‘N’’, ‘‘t’’, ‘‘CF’’, ‘‘RM’’, ‘‘G’’, ‘‘CV’’, ‘‘GEV’’, ‘‘GPD’’ stand for, respectively, historical, normal, Student, Cornish–Fisher, exponential weighted moving average (EWMA or RiskMetrics), GARCH, CAViaR, GEV and GPD methods for VaR calculation.

C.M. Boucher et al. / Journal of Banking & Finance 44 (2014) 72–92 73

forecasts. By highlighting the wide disparity between the most common risk forecast methods, the figure illustrates one of the biggest challenges faced by risk managers. Typically, the VaR does not vary much, but when it does, it reacts sharply and belatedly to extreme returns. The range of plausible VaR forecasts is large, where the models producing the highest and lowest forecasts frequently change position across time. Even right after WWII, during a relatively quiet period for financial markets, the most conservative VaR was four times the most aggressive one.

As in Daníelsson et al. (2014) and Daníelsson (2002) the main conclusion from this brief analysis is that risk managers face a large range of plausible forecast methods and their associated model risk, having to choose between desirable criteria such as performance, degree of conservativeness or forecast volatility. This challenge motivates our main objective where we propose a general method for the correction of imperfect risk estimates, whatever the risk model.

We illustrate our approach by considering events around the Lehman Brothers’ collapse, as presented in Fig. 2 for the period of January 1st, 2007 to January 1st, 2009. The Figure displays peaks-over-VaR for one-year rolling daily historical 99% VaR on the S&P 500 index.

The figure shows that the hits are excessively frequent, highly autocorrelated and, around October 2008, far from the estimated VaR, even if it progressively adjusted after the hits. This suggests that an optimal buffer would make the VaR forecast more robust.

However, it is not trivial to calculate the buffer, after all, the properties of hits are significantly different in terms of frequency, dependence and size, depending both on the underlying VaR model and probability level as well as the magnitude of the buffer. A large (respectively small) buffer correction will lead to a too conserva- tive (too little) protection. The question for the risk manager is then how to ex ante fix the size of this buffer, as illustrated by the three arbitrary correction factors labelled #1, #2 or #3, on the right-hand side y-axis in Fig. 2.

In the financial literature, a number of papers have considered estimation risk for risk models, see for instance Gibson et al., 1999; Talay and Zheng, 2002. The issue of estimation risk for VaR has been considered for the identically and independently distributed return

case by, for example, Pritsker (1997) and Jorion (2007). Estimation risk in dynamic models has also been studied by several authors. Berkowitz and O’Brien (2002) observe that the usual VaR estimates are too conservative. Figlewski (2004) examines the effect of estima- tion errors on the VaR by simulation. The bias of the VaR estimator, resulting from parameter estimation and misspecified distribution, is studied for ARCH(1) models by Bao and Ullah (2004). In the iden- tical and independent setting, Inui and Kijima (2005) show that the nonparametric VaR estimator may have a strong positive bias when the distribution features fat-tails. Christoffersen and Gonçalves (2005) study the loss of accuracy in VaR and ES due to estimation errors and constructed bootstrap predictive confidence intervals for risk measures. Hartz et al. (2006) propose a re-sampling method based on bootstrap to correct the bias in VaR forecasts for the Gauss- ian GARCH model. For GARCH models with heavy-tailed distribu- tions, Chan et al. (2007) derive the asymptotic distributions of extremal quantiles. Escanciano and Olmo (2009, 2010, 2011) study the effects of estimation risk on backtesting procedures. They show how to correct the critical values in standard tests used, when assessing the quality of VaR models. Gouriéroux and Zakoïan (2013) quantify in a GARCH context the effect of estimation risk on measures for estimation of portfolio credit risk and show how to adjust risk measures to account for estimation error. Gagliardini et al. (2012) propose estimation and granularity adjustments for VaR, whilst Lönnbark (2010) derives adjustments of interval fore- casts to account for parameter estimation.

In the context of extreme risk measures, our work also relates to Kerkhof et al. (2010), who first propose an incremental market risk capital charge calibrated on the backtesting framework of the regulators. Our present work documents the proposed methodol- ogy and complements their approach, generalizing the tests used for defining the buffer. Alexander and Sarabia (2012) also explicitly deal with VaR model risk by quantifying VaR model risk and propose an adjustment to regulatory capital based on a maximum relative entropy criterion to some benchmark density. In a similar manner, Breuer and Csiszár (2013, 2014) and Breuer et al. (2012) define model risk as an amplified largest loss based on a distribu- tion which is at a reasonable, Mahalanobis or Kullback–Leibler, distance to a reference density.

02/07 04/07 06/07 08/07 10/07 12/07 02/08 04/08 07/08 09/08 10/08 01/09 −10.0%

−8.0%

−6.0%

−4.0%

−2.0%

0.0% (a) Negative Returns and One−year rolling VaR at 99%

Negative Returns 1−year rolling historical VaR99%

02/07 04/07 06/07 08/07 10/07 12/07 02/08 04/08 07/08 09/08 10/08 01/09 0.0%

1.0%

2.0%

3.0%

4.0%

5.0%

6.0% (b) Exceptions and various Adjusted Estimated VaR

← 1−year rolling historical VaR99%

← Adjusted VaR99% #1

← Adjusted VaR99% #2

← Adjusted VaR99% #3

Fig. 2. S&P500 negative returns and daily 99% VaR forecasts around the 2008 Lehman Brothers’s event. Daily S&P500 index from the 1st January, 2003 to the 1st January, 2009. The figure presents peak-over-VaR based on the four-year rolling daily historical 99% VaR on the S&P 500 index, as well as corrected VaR estimates with various ad hoc incremental buffers (numbered from #1 to #3).

74 C.M. Boucher et al. / Journal of Banking & Finance 44 (2014) 72–92

We start with a controlled experiment, whereby we simulate an artificial long time-series which exhibits the salient features of financial return data. We then estimate a range of VaR forecast models with this data, both identifying model risk and more importantly dynamically adjusting the risk forecasts with respect to such risk.

The conclusions from this exercise lead us to a number of inter- esting conclusions. First, by dynamically adjusting for estimation bias we significantly improve the performance of every method, suggesting that such an approach might be valid in routine appli- cations of risk forecasting. Second, the model bias is large in gen- eral, and sometimes to the same order as the VaR measure itself, and very different across methods. Finally, the bias strongly depends upon the probability confidence level. This suggests that a commonly advocated approach of probability shifting—whereby we estimate a model with one probability to better estimate a VaR with a less extreme probability—is not valid.

The Monte Carlo results motivate our main contribution, the development of a practical method for dealing with model uncer- tainty. Since we do not know the ‘‘true’’ model, we instead learn from history by evaluating the historical errors in order to use them to dynamically adjust future forecasts. We reach a range of empirical conclusions from this exercise.

1. The magnitude of corrections can sometimes be large, espe- cially around the 1929 and 2008 crises, ranging from 0% to 15% for some methods to more than 100% in some circumstances.

2. The EWMA3 and GARCH VaR are among the preferred models, since the minimum correction to pass main backtests are among the smallest.

3 The Exponentially Weighted Moving Average (EWMA) refers to JP Morgan’s RiskMetrics proposed method (RiskMetrics, 1996), which consists of placing more weight on the most recent observations than on the older ones when calculating volatility (using an exponential moving average with an exponential factor tradi- tionally fixed at .94 with daily data).

3. Regardless of the model, a ten year sample period is needed to have a fairly good idea of the magnitude of the required correction.

4. The model risk of the correction buffer can be measured and the buffer fine-tuned according to the link between the confidence level on the required correction. This enables risk managers to explicitly tailor the buffer to major financial stress episodes such as the Great Depression of 1929 or the 2008 crisis, if they choose to do so.

5. By considering multivariate indexes and portfolios, we find that the model risk adjustment buffer is in line with the multiple k imposed by regulators (from 3 to 5).

6. The general methodology can be used to gauge the plausibility of traditional handpicked stress-test scenarios.

The outline of the paper is as follows: Section 2 evaluates the extent to which elementary model risks affect VaR estimates based on realistic simulations. Section 3 proposes a practical method to provide VaR estimates robust to model risk. Section 4 finally con- cludes, whilst the Appendix follows, outlining some description and examples of model risks and the main backtesting methods used in the paper.

2. Analysis of estimation and specification errors

Consider a general setting where we know the ‘‘true’’ VaR (best case scenario), but where the sample size is so small that it entails some estimation problems. In this case, the estimated VaR will inevitably be an imperfect estimate of the theoretical (‘‘true’’) VaR. In particular, there exists a bias function, denoted biasðh0; ĥ;aÞ, that makes the equality between the theoretic and empirical exact4:

ThVaRðh0;aÞ ¼ EVaRðĥ;aÞ þ biasðh0; ĥ;aÞ; ð1Þ

4 The bias function is implicitly defined from Eq. (1). See the Appendices for examples of such bias functions in various contexts of model risks.

5 See Hamilton and Susmel, 1994; Gray, 1996; Klaassen, 2002; Haas et al., 2004, for more details on the process.

6 As a complement (not reported here for space reasons, but available on demand in a web Appendix), we also made use of other alternative frameworks: a Student versus a normal density, as well as Brownian, Lévy and Hawkes processes, with the same qualitative response with a relative model error for VaR ranging from 5% to 15% in the simplest cases (Gaussian estimation risk with 250 observations) to as large as 200% when the process is complex and the sample small (the case of Hawkes processes).

7 The estimated parameters of the MS(2)-GARCH(1,1) model on the DJI Index are x1 ¼ 3:1699e�006; b1 ¼ 0:90801, a1 ¼ 0:0733081; x2 ¼ 2:509e�005, b2 ¼ 0:10453; a2 ¼ 0:0064734; l1 ¼ 0:00, l2 ¼ 0:00; t ¼ 5:56; p11 ¼ 0:99654 and p22 ¼ 0:99328. Bauwens et al. (2010) obtain approximately the same results on the S&P. This estimation is crucial since the transition probabilities between states and auto-regressive parameters both affect the persistence of the simulated processes. Our estimates are here very similar to those exhibited in the literature (e.g. Bauwens et al., 2010; Billio et al., 2012; Frésard et al., 2011). Moreover, when artificially considering different probabilities related to the second state, we find the same qualitative results in what we are interested in: model risk of risk models. Last but not least, when we have adopted other representations of financial returns (either using processes or densities), we again reach the same order of magnitude of the worst errors of forecasting (additional results available upon request).

C.M. Boucher et al. / Journal of Banking & Finance 44 (2014) 72–92 75

where ĥ denotes the estimated parameters, h0 the true parameters and a the probability level of the VaR. The theoretic true VaR is denoted by ThVaRðh0;aÞ and the estimated VaR by EVaRðĥ;aÞ.

This general Eq. (1) can be written more precisely in the context where we know the DGP (up to the parameter h0)’’, e.g. in simula- tion exercises. In this case, we can also know the general bias which depends on some parameters so that this bias is now denoted biasðh0; ĥ;aÞ. In this setting (when the DGP is known), we also know the bias function, and thus the Perfectly Estimated Adjusted VaR is indeed estimated via the bias, which itself depends upon some nuisance parameters (such as, for instance, the window length for the dynamic estimation. . .). We can therefore obtain the perfect estimation adjusted VaR (PEAVaR), with the estimated VaR (EVaRðĥ;aÞ), by:

PEAVaRðĥ; h0;aÞ ¼ EVaRðĥ;aÞ þ biasðh0; ĥ;aÞ: ð2Þ

As a general rule, the smaller a is, the better we forecast VaR and identify the bias function. The reason is that, for a given sam- ple size, the number of quantiles increases along with decreasing a, so the effective sample size used in the forecasting exercise increases. As the probabilities become more extreme, the accuracy of the VaR forecasts decreases, for example, because fewer obser- vations are used in the estimation. Consequently, it is harder to model the shape of the tail than the shape of the interior distribu- tion. For this reason, it might be tempting to forecast VaR slightly closer to the center of the distribution, perhaps at a ¼ 95%, and then use those estimation results to get at the VaR for more extreme probability levels, like a ¼ 99% or a ¼ 99:9%. This is often referred to as probability shifting.

2.1. Probability shifting

We can analyze the impact of probability shifting within our framework by defining two random probabilities, ~a� and ~a��, so that:

PEAVaRðĥ; h0;aÞ ¼ EVaRðĥ; ~a�Þ ¼ ThVaRðh0; ~a�Þ EVaRðĥ; ~a��Þ ¼ PEAVaRðĥ; h0;aÞ ¼ ThVaRðh0;aÞ;

( ð3Þ

or equivalently, with Fð�Þ and bFð�Þ representing, respectively, the theoretic and estimated cumulative density functions:

~a� ¼ F½bF�1ðaÞ� ~a�� ¼ bF ½F�1ðaÞ�;

( ð4Þ

with bF�1ðaÞ ¼ EVaRðĥ;aÞ and F�1ðaÞ ¼ ThVaRðh0;aÞ. If one were to use ~a� instead of a, the bias adjusted VaR results,

whilst ~a�� achieves the opposite, mapping the probability corresponding to the biased VaR, to the theoretic VaR.

It follows that if ~a� > a > ~a��, the estimated VaR is biased towards zero, whilst if ~a� < a < ~a��, it is biased towards minus infinity.

2.2. Monte Carlo examination

Many potential sources of error can significantly impact on the accuracy of risk forecasts. The sources one is most likely to encoun- ter in day-to-day risk forecasting, and certainly in most academic studies, are estimation and specification errors. For this reason, we investigate these two in detail by means of Monte Carlo experiments.

We consider below the distribution of the errors between the poorly estimated VaR and the true VaR when considering, alterna- tively, estimation risk, specification uncertainty or both. We first specify a DGP from which we generate data. We then treat the DGP as unknown and forecast VaR for the simulated data.

As before, the true parameters are h0, but we now also have the true parameters of the misspecified model, indicated by h1, as well as its estimate ĥ1. In this case, we indicate the estimated VaR by EVaRðĥ1;aÞ and define the perfect model risk adjusted VaR (denoted herein PMAVaR) by:

PMAVaRðĥ1;aÞ ¼ EVaRðĥ1;aÞ þ biasðh0; ĥ1;aÞ: ð5Þ

We first present the theoretical framework related to the correction procedure in a static setting for the sake of simplicity. However, in the subsequent empirical application, we also con- sider the dynamic properties of our correction procedure that is proposed at date t based on the conditional information available at date t � 1.

2.2.1. The true model The DGP needs to be sufficiently general to capture the salient

features of financial return data. Because we are not limited by the need to estimate a model, we can specify a DGP that might be difficult, to the point of impossible, to estimate in small samples. The DGP we employ is a second order Markov-switching generalized autoregressive conditionally heteroskedastic with Student-t disturbances (hereafter denoted MS(2)-GARCH(1,1)-t)5

as in Frésard et al. (2011) in a VaR context.6

More precisely, the DGP is:

rt ¼ lst þ rst zt ; ð6Þ

where the zt innovations series are independently and identically distributed as a standard Student distribution with t degrees of freedom (zt � iidStð0;1; tÞ), and r2st ¼ xst þ ast e

2 t�1 þ b

2 st r

2 st�1

, with st 2 f1;2g characterizes the state of the market, lst is the mean return and with t degrees of freedom, and where xst > 0; ast P 0; bst P 0 are the parameters of the GARCH(1,1) in the two states, and et ¼ rt � lst the return innovations with the fat tails of a Student density with a t degree of freedom.

The state is modelled with a Markov chain whose matrix of transition probabilities is defined by pij ¼ Prðst ¼ jjst�1 ¼ iÞ. Appro- priately chosen restrictions on the GARCH coefficients ensure that r2t is strictly positive.

Using this DGP, we first simulate a long artificial series of 360,000 daily returns with estimated parameters on the daily DJIA from the 1st January, 1990 to the 20th September, 2011.7 We then forecast various VaRs using 1000 observations, and finally compute main statistics of the forecast error, measured by differences between the asymptotic VaR (computed with the true simulated DGP on 360,000 observations) and empirical ones recovered from limited samples.

Table 1 Conditional simulated errors associated with the 95%, 99% and 99.5% VaR: GARCH (1,1) versus MS(2)-GARCH (1,1)-t.

Probability (%) Mean estimated VaR (%) Perfect VaR (%) Mean bias (%) Median bias (%) Min. bias (%) Max. bias (%)

Pair Panel A. GARCH (1,1) DGP and GARCH (1,1) VaR with estimation error a = 95.00 �36.16 �36.16 .00 .02 �19.53 19.60 a = 99.00 �59.70 �59.70 .00 .04 �32.66 32.02 a = 99.50 �70.99 �70.99 .00 .06 �38.35 38.03

Panel B. MS(2)-GARCH (1,1)-t DGP and GARCH (1,1) VaR with specification error a = 95.00 �30.78 �36.16 �5.38 �5.38 �5.38 �5.38 a = 99.00 �43.83 �59.70 �15.87 �15.87 �15.87 �15.87 a = 99.50 �48.61 �70.99 �22.38 �22.38 �22.38 �22.38

Panel C. MS(2)-GARCH (1,1)-t DGP and GARCH (1,1) VaR with specification and estimation errors a = 95.00 �28.97 �36.16 �7.19 �8.83 �21.70 18.99 a = 99.00 �41.28 �59.70 �18.42 �20.76 �38.88 18.02 a = 99.50 �45.78 �70.99 �25.20 �27.79 �47.84 15.03

Daily DJIA index from the 1st January, 1900 to the 20th September, 2011. These statistics were computed with the results of 360,000 simulated series of 1,000 daily returns according to a specific DGP (rescaled GARCH (1,1) for Panel A and MS(2)-GARCH (1,1)-t for Panels B and C) using an annualized Normal GARCH VaR (in all Panels). The columns represent, respectively, the average adjusted VaR according to specification and/or estimation errors, the theoretical VaR, the average, the minimum and the maximum value of the adjustment terms. A negative adjustment term indicates that the estimated VaR (negative return) should be more conservative (more negative). Panel A presents GARCH (1,1) DGP and/or estimated GARCH VaR; Panel B relates to a MS(2)-GARCH (1,1) DGP with estimated GARCH VaR; Panel C refers to an estimated MS(2)- GARCH (1,1) DGP with results from an estimated GARCH VaR.

76 C.M. Boucher et al. / Journal of Banking & Finance 44 (2014) 72–92

2.2.2. Misspecification and a parameter estimation uncertainty Our focus is on the annualized daily 95%, 99% and 99.5% VaR.

Table 1 illustrates the model risk of VaR estimates, defined as the implication of model misspecification and a parameter estimation uncertainty. We examine this model risk by comparing simulations and estimates corresponding to a normal GARCH(1,1) and a MS(2)- GARCH(1,1)-t. The columns represent respectively the average adjusted VaR according to specification and/or estimation errors, the theoretic VaR, the average, the minimum and maximum values of the adjustment terms. Note that a negative adjustment term indicates that the estimated VaR (which is a negative return) should be more conservative (more negative).

We present the estimation bias ðbiasðh0; ĥ;aÞÞ, in Panel A of Table 1, when we simulate a simple model (Normal GARCH(1,1)) and use the appropriate methodology for computing the VaR (Nor- mal GARCH VaR). This bias arises only due to the small estimation sample size (1000) and is zero for the full 360,000 sized sample. However, the dispersion of this estimation bias is quite large since the minimum and the maximum values of the bias (or adjustment term) represent about 50% of the true VaR. For example, with a ¼ 99%, the minimum and maximum biases are respectively equal to �33% and +32% for a true VaR of �60%.

The specification bias (biasðh0; h1;aÞ) is presented in Panel B of Table 1, where the quantiles were modelled by a GARCH(1,1) VaR. Within this specific illustration, the risk model is fully explained by the discrepancy between the DGP and the assumed simple risk model used (since the parameters are here known and the estimation bias is zero by definition); the specification bias is thus constant and depends upon the choice of the risk model specification. The average specification bias is large here; it is negative and increases in absolute terms with a, which indicates that extreme risks of the MS(2)-GARCH(1,1)-t DGP are generally underestimated by the GARCH(1,1) parametric VaR model.

The estimation and specification biases are captured simulta- neously in Panel C. These components of model risk are jointly considered and, in the worst cases, they merely add up in an inde- pendent manner. We compute the global error—denoted biasðh0; h1; ĥ1;aÞ in its most general formulation—as the difference between the true VaR and the estimated VaR according to a mis- specified VaR model estimated on a limited sample. As in Panel B, where a normal GARCH(1,1) VaR is used with a simulated MS(2)-GARCH(1,1)-t, the average bias is negative and increases in absolute terms with a. The mean errors are thus equivalent to

the specification bias component, but the dispersion of the model risk realizations is inflated by the estimation bias.

2.2.3. Probability shifting We illustrate the impact of probability shifting and model risk

in Table 2, which shows the two modified probability levels ~a�

and ~a��. The former is associated to the true density and corre- sponds to the (mis-) estimated ð1� aÞ-VaR, whilst the latter, asso- ciated to the estimated VaR, corresponds to the ð1� aÞ-VaR without model error.

The gap between ~a� and a can be interpreted as a measure of the model risk of the risk model. The gap between ~a�� and a can also be analyzed as the probability shift that we should apply using a specific model of VaR to reach the true VaR.

This alternative representation of the model risk of risk models shows that ~a�� is often unreachable and cannot be used for correct- ing the estimated VaR. For instance, the maximum associated with the 99.5% VaR in Panel C has to be superior to 100%, which cannot in practice be discriminated from the maximum, i.e. when associ- ated with the 100% probability. More generally, ~a�� is frequently superior to a, (and ~a� generally inferior to a) which can be inter- preted as an under-estimation of the risk using the proposed model of VaR (the estimated VaR is too aggressive).

This suggests that the recent call of some authorities for more extreme quantiles (see, e.g. FSA, 2006), i.e. VaR 99.5% or 99.9%, is not warranted since in some cases the real VaR appears below the worst estimated return.

Finally, our results show, surprisingly, that the mean bias is not a simple increasing function of the VaR and, accordingly, of the level of probability associated to the VaR. The expected adjustment associated to the 99.5% (99%) probability level is, for instance, four (two) times larger than the expected adjustment associated to the 95% probability level and represents an increase of nearly 15% (10%). The relation between the model risk and the probability associated to the VaR is not linear and depends on several components.

The implemented estimated VaR should be corrected by an adjustment corresponding to the global bias linked to the potential model risk error. However, the true perfect VaR is generally unknown by definition. The proposed adjustments are thus impos- sible to quantify accurately outside a pure academic simulation exercise.

Table 2 Probability shifts associated with 95%, 99% and 99.5% annualized VaR: GARCH (1,1) versus MS(2)-GARCH (1,1) quantiles.

Estimated VaR Probability ~a� associated to the true density corresponding to the (mis- )estimated VaR

Probability ~a�� associated to the biased empirical density corresponding to the perfect VaR

Mean shift Median shift Min shift Max shift Mean shift Median shift Min shift Max shift

Panel A. GARCH (1,1) DGP and GARCH (1,1) VaR with estimation error a = 95.00 94.19 94.24 90.37 99.31 94.51 94.26 94.36 99.88 a = 99.00 98.92 98.95 96.83 99.92 99.05 99.08 98.49 99.99 a = 99.50 99.25 99.38 98.71 99.97 99.47 99.09 99.98 N.R.

Panel B. MS(2)-GARCH (1,1)-t DGP and GARCH (1,1) VaR with specification error a = 95.00 95.81 95.81 95.81 95.81 97.29 97.29 97.29 97.29 a = 99.00 98.64 98.64 98.64 98.64 99.92 99.92 99.92 99.92 a = 99.50 99.07 99.07 99.07 99.07 99.99 99.99 99.99 99.99

Panel C. MS(2)-GARCH (1,1)-t DGP and GARCH (1,1) VaR with specification and estimation errors a = 95.00 94.15 94.29 82.43 99.44 97.44 98.47 85.69 N.R. a = 99.00 97.71 97.94 89.81 99.88 99.78 99.98 96.27 N.R. a = 99.50 98.35 98.56 91.71 99.92 99.93 N.R. 98.32 N.R.

Daily DJIA index from the 1st January, 1900 to the 20th September, 2011. These statistics were computed with the results of 360,000 simulated series of 1000 daily returns according to a specific DGP (rescaled GARCH (1,1) for Panel A and MS(2)-GARCH (1,1)-t for Panels B and C) using an annualized Normal GARCH VaR (in all Panels). The columns represent, respectively, the average Estimated VaR according to specification and/or estimation errors, the mean, the minimum and the maximum of the modified probability level ~a� , the mean, the minimum and the maximum of the modified probability level ~a�� . The letters N.R. stand for ‘‘Not Reached’’, i.e. condition on bounds is not met even for 100.00%. Panel A presents GARCH (1,1) DGP and/or estimated GARCH VaR; Panel B relates to a MS(2)-GARCH (1,1) DGP with estimated GARCH VaR; Panel C refers to an estimated MS(2)-GARCH (1,1) DGP with results from an estimated GARCH VaR.

8 Note that the Basel ‘‘traffic light’’ backtesting framework is directly inspired by this unconditional coverage test. However, Escanciano and Olmo (2009), Escanciano and Olmo, 2010, Escanciano and Olmo, 2011 and Escanciano and Pei (2012) note tha the Eq. (9) is ‘‘asymptotically correct’’ only if the in-sample size is infinitely large relative to the out-of-sample one. To deal with this issue, we present later on in this article (in Table 3), the results of our risk model correction method based on the bootstrapped version of several tests as proposed by Escanciano and Olmo (2009 2010, 2011).

C.M. Boucher et al. / Journal of Banking & Finance 44 (2014) 72–92 77

3. An economic valuation of model risk

While the illustration above is focused on the controlled exper- iment where the modeller knows the true model, in reality the true model is not known. To address this, we propose a practical method for dealing with model uncertainty, that makes use of past historical errors related to specific estimated models. While it is not possible to optimally adjust for biases, we can approximate them by adjusting the VaR forecasts by the model’s historical per- formance. More concretely, historical errors are used to adjust future forecasts by identifying the minimum correction factor needed to pass backtest criteria.

Recall the general Eq. (1) that defines the theoretical VaR as the estimated VaR plus an error term. We can rewrite this general for- mulation in another setting where we cannot be sure of the future DGP (in an uncertain context). Hence, we define the imperfect model adjusted VaR (IMAVaR) as (with previous notations):

IMAVaRðĥ1;aÞ ¼ EVaRðĥ1;aÞ þ adjðh0; h1; ĥ1;aÞ; ð7Þ

where EVaRð�Þ is an estimated VaR at the level a with a specific risk model, ĥ1 are model parameters estimated with T observations, and adjð�Þ the minimum VaR adjustment for the risk model, so that:

IMAVaRðĥ1;aÞ ¼ sup|{z} VaR2R

fVaRðaÞ�g; ð8Þ

where the symbol R refers to the real numbers set, VaRð�Þ� is a set of corrected VaR built from a model, and IMAVaRð�Þ is the highest limit VaR (the less conservative VaR) that can be validated by the super- visor (and all other more aggressive VaR rejected).

The IMAVaRð�Þ is thus the lowest acceptable VaR where the term ‘‘acceptable’’ means that this VaR has the main good expected qualities such as, for instance, a right hit frequency (and/or a fair dependence, and/or a reasonable magnitude) of hits. Imagine two polar cases. The VaR is �100.00% (the asset price is then equal to zero); in this case, there is no hit and then no bad properties of hits, but the estimated VaR is too conservative. If the VaR is +100.00% (in this case, the VaR is too aggressive), we have numerous hits with very bad properties. The IMAVaRð�Þ corresponds to a ‘‘model risk robust’’ VaR that serves to calculate the correction we apply to the Estimated VaR. Hence, the IMAVaRð�Þ is the highest VaR (the less conservative VaR) that can be both validated by the

regulator (regarding the properties of its hits) and accepted by the asset manager based on a consensual criterion.

3.1. General backtest procedures

A variety of tests have been proposed in the literature to gauge the accuracy of VaR estimates (see Pérignon and Smith, 2010). In our view, there are three desirable properties that should be met by a risk model: the expected frequency of violations, the absence of violation clustering and the consistency of exception magni- tudes to the underlying statistical model in the parametetric case.

3.1.1. Frequency The unconditional coverage test (Kupiec, 1995) is based on

comparing the observed number of violations to the expected. The hit variable, obtained from the ex post observation of EVaRð�Þ violations for threshold a and time t, denoted IEVaRt ðaÞ, is defined as:

IEVaRð�Þt ðaÞ ¼ 1 if rt < �EVaRðĥ;aÞt�1 0 otherwise;

( where rt is the return at time t, with t ¼ ½1;2; . . . ; T�.

If we assume that IEVaRt ð�Þ is iid, then, under the unconditional coverage hypothesis (Kupiec, 1995), the total number of VaR

exceptions, denoted HitEVaRt ðaÞ, follows a binomial distribution (Christoffersen, 1998), denoted BðT;aÞ:

HitEVaRð�Þt ðaÞ ¼ XT t¼1

IEVaRð�Þt ðaÞ � BðT;aÞ: ð9Þ

Under the null hypothesis, the likelihood ratio, LRuc, has the asymp- totic distribution8:

LRucI VaRð�Þ t ðaÞ ¼ 2 log baTI 1� baT�TI� �� �� log aTI 1� aT�TI� �� �� �!d v2ð1Þ;

ð10Þ

t ,

,

9 Theoretically, two interesting and limited situations may happen: an empty set of T ðaÞ (no correction can fit the output to the test) and an AT ðaÞ which is null (no rrection needed. In the empty case, no correction is acceptable for fulfilling the test ndition (the model is just so bad that it cannot be corrected). This could arise from a

tuation in which a numerical solution cannot be reached (because the grid-search is o large) or, more importantly, from a more annoying situation corresponding to a ilure of the VaR model under study. For instance, let us imagine a theoretical tuation in which the series of hits are exactly equal (all exceptions are of equal size): en there is no correction that leads to being in accordance with the confidence level ither the correction leaves the hits unchanged in terms of frequency – if not severe,

r makes all hits disappear – if too strict). However, in our estimation (see Fig. 4), a se of an empty set of AT ðaÞ never happened, and a nil correction (with a two digit

ccuracy) occurred only in fewer than 5% or so of the cases in the sample of 27,842 bservations (whatever the method of VaR computation). 0 We used a looped grid-search algorithm, adding successively a small increment

n the top of the VaR (+.1% of the EVaR at each step of the loop), starting from the aximum positive value and increasing until the test is finally passed at a given

robability threshold. 1 A generalization of the basic procedure leads to simple time-varying corrections,

here the original sequence is modified as VaRt1 ðĥ1;aÞ þ q1 : t1 ¼ ½1; . . . ; T1�; n

. ;VaRtk ðĥk;aÞ þ qk : tk ¼ ½k; . . . ; T1 þ k� 1�; . . .g and the optimization is done in all e arguments ðq1; . . . ; qk; . . .Þ, with the optimal adjustment at the end being the aximum of the sequence ðq1; . . . ; qk; . . .Þ.

78 C.M. Boucher et al. / Journal of Banking & Finance 44 (2014) 72–92

where the symbol!d denotes the convergence in distribution of the test statistic, TI ¼ T � E IEVaRð�Þt

h i is the number of exceptions andba ¼ TI=T is the unconditional coverage.

3.1.2. Independence Christoffersen (1998) proposed a test for the independence of

violations:

LRindI EVaR t ðaÞ ¼ 2 log LI

EVaR t ðaÞðp01;p11Þ � log LI

EVaR t ðaÞðp;pÞ

h i !d v2ð1Þ;

ð11Þ

where pij ¼ Pr IEVaRt ðaÞ ¼ jjI EVaR t�1 ¼ i

h i is a Markov chain that reflects

the existence of an order 1 memory in the process IEVaRt ðaÞ, LI

EVaR t ðaÞðp01;p11Þ ¼ ð1� p01ÞT00pT1001 ð1� p11Þ

T10pT1111 is thus the likeli- hood under the hypothesis of the first-order Markov dependence, LI

EVaR t ðaÞðp;pÞ is the likelihood under the hypothesis of independence,

such as p01 ¼ p11 ¼ p, with Tij the number of observations in the state j for the current period and at state i for the previous period, p01 ¼ T01=ðT00 þ T01Þ;p11 ¼ T11=ðT10 þ T11Þ and p ¼ ðT01 þ T11Þ=T .

3.1.3. Magnitude A third class of tests focuses on the magnitude of the losses

experienced when VaR limits are violated. While this is not relevant for methods such as historical simulation, it provides a useful evaluation of the parametric approaches. Berkowitz (2001), for instance, proposes a hypothesis test for determining whether the magnitudes of observed VaR exceptions are consistent with the underlying VaR model, such as:

LRmagctþ1 ¼ 2 Lctþ1magðl;rÞ � L ctþ1 magð0;1Þ

h i !d v2ð2Þ; ð12Þ

where ctþ1 is the magnitude variable of the observed VaR excep- tions, l and r are unconditional mean and standard deviation of ctþ1 series, and where

Lctþ1magðl;rÞ¼ X

fctþ1¼0g log 1�U U

�1ðaÞ�l r

( )( )

þ X

fctþ1–0g �1

2 logð2pr2Þ�ðctþ1�lÞ

2

2r2 � log U U

�1ðaÞ�l r

( )( )( ) :

For both unconditional and conditional coverage tests, Escanciano and Olmo (2009, 2010, 2011) alternatively approxi- mate the critical values of these tests by using a sub-sampling bootstrap methodology, since they show that the coverage VaR backtest is affected by model misspecification. Note that, interest- ingly, the bootstrapped versions of the tests always lead to lower VaR corrections, i.e. a dynamically corrected VaR which is less conservative.

3.2. A desirable VaR and the backtests

Under the H0 hypothesis, a desirable VaR passes each of these three test criteria:

LRucI VaRð�Þ t ðaÞ !d v2ð1Þ for the hit test;

LRindI VaRð�ÞðaÞ

t ! d v2ð1Þ for the independence test;

LRmagctþ1ðaÞt ! d v2ð2Þ for the exception magnitude test:

8>>><>>>: ð13Þ We now have to search for the minimal adjustment value q�

that allows us to pass all the tests (one-by-one, or jointly). For a given VaR forecast and the bounding range for the tests above, we can obtain the IMAVaR that respects conditions (10), (11) and/or (12) (or their sub-sampled versions). More precisely, given a sequence of predictions fVaRtðĥ;aÞ : t ¼ ½1; . . . ; T�g, we construct the set of values q 2 R such that the sequence

fVaRtðĥ;aÞ þ q : t ¼ ½1; . . . ; T�g passes several backtests. If we denote the set of accepted adjustments by ATðaÞ, the optimal adjustment is given by9:

q�T ¼ arg min|ffl{zffl} q2AT ðaÞ

fqg: ð14Þ

We use a numerical optimization technique to solve the program (14 ): During the adjustment process, we search for the optimal adjustment, starting with a large negative value of q�, increasing it slowly, until the adjusted VaR allows us to pass all the tests.10

The program (14) gives the optimal value of adjustment of the imperfect VaR estimation to become a desirable VaR. This means that the H0 hypothesis is true for the selected backtest method, so that the test statistic is lower than critical values for all tests at the threshold a. In what follows, in order to distinguish the effect of each test, we provide each correction separately, corre- sponding to each of the tests taken alone.11

As a first illustration, Fig. 3 provides the minimum adjustments (errors), denoted q� as solutions to the program (14). We first only consider the hit test, for the historical, the Gaussian and the GARCH VaRs computed on the DJIA over one century of daily data. The figure represents the minimal adjustment (in a percentage of the underlying VaR) necessary to respect the hit ratio criteria accord- ing to the VaR level of confidence (95–99.5%). This minimal adjust- ment is here considered as a proxy for the economic value of the model risk; it is expressed as a proportion of the observed average VaR.

In other words, we show the minimal constant that should be added to the quantile estimation for reaching a VaR sequence that passes the hit test at all times (here with full information at time T). We can see that the corrections range from (almost) 0% to 140% and increase with the quantile. The comparison between the three methods favors the GARCH method, since the error is lower for all quantiles and the difference between methods (with full information about the total sample) is quite similar and rather independent of the confidence level.

3.3. VaR model comparisons

We apply the general adjustment method presented above, obtained for the daily DJIA index from January 1st, 1900 until March 2nd, 2011 (29,002 daily returns). We use a moving window of four years (1040 daily returns) to re-estimate parameters dynamically for the various methods. Forecasted VaR are

A co co si to fa si th (e o ca a o

1

o m p

1

w

. .

th m

95.0% 95.5% 96.0% 96.5% 97.0% 97.5% 98.0% 98.5% 99.0% 99.5% −0.2

0.0

0.2

0.4

0.6

0.8

1.0

1.2

1.4 Historical Normal GARCH

Fig. 3. Minimum model risk adjustment factor for the hit test associated with historical, Gaussian and GARCH VaRs on the DJIA, for a range of probabilities. Daily DJIA index from the 1st January, 1900 to the 20th September, 2011. This figure represents on the y-axis the minimal adjustment (in a percentage of the underlying VaR) necessary to respect the hit ratio criterion according to the VaR level of confidence (x-axis). This minimal adjustment is here considered as a proxy of the economic value of the model risk; it is expressed as a proportion of the observed average VaR. The historical VaR is here computed on a weekly horizon as an empirical quantile using 5 years of past returns. The Gaussian and the GARCH VaRs are here computed on a weekly horizon as a parametric quantile using 5 years of past returns to estimate the parameters.

C.M. Boucher et al. / Journal of Banking & Finance 44 (2014) 72–92 79

computed dynamically for each method for the final 29,957 days (about 108 years). The out-of-sample exercise consists in a rolling forecast scheme with a window of four years (1040 daily returns) to re-estimate parameters dynamically. Then, we use one year of out-of-sample daily forecasts to calibrate the correction based on the backtesting procedures. The backtesting experiment to correct the risk model of VaR estimates is then based on a ratio of the out- of-sample to in-sample size equal to.24, i.e. 250/1040), which is sufficiently close to zero, as required for a valid out-of-sample exercise as shown by West (1996), McCracken (2000), Escanciano and Olmo (2010), Escanciano and Pei (2012). This comparison con- siders daily estimation of the 95%, 99% and 99.5% conditional VaR.

This leaves the choice of the VaR forecast method. While there is a large number of techniques that could be used, we restrict our- selves to the most common in practice, in particular historical sim- ulation and several parametric approaches based on Gaussian or Student-t return distributions, as well as the Cornish–Fisher VaR; see Cornish and Fisher, 1937; Favre and Galeano, 2002). We also employ three dynamic methods, EWMA, GARCH(1,1) and CAViaR (Engle and Manganelli, 2004). Finally, we complement these meth- ods by using two extreme densities for the returns, such as the GEV distribution and the GPD (see e.g. Engle and Manganelli, 2001).

Fig. 4 shows the optimal adjustment factor for the various risk models for a 95% VaR estimated with the DJIA, in particular the daily correction factors that pass the hit test over the past year of daily returns (over the period from t � 250 to t). The magnitude can sometimes be large (specifically around the 1929 and 2008 cri- ses), ranging from 0 to 15% EWMA or to more than 100% in some circumstances (for the Cornish–Fisher VaR). We also see that the most extreme VaR violations happened during the Great Depres- sion for all measures. Dynamic measures, such as EWMA, GARCH and CAViaR, also demonstrate some superiority over unconditional parametric methodologies.

Fig. 5 illustrates the evolution of the maximum required correc- tions for all VaR methods under consideration (maxima of the his- torical correction record needed from January 1st, 1900 to the current date t, which were already represented in Fig. 4).12 These corrections are for the hit test, from the general program aiming to correct today’s VaR with the historical maximum of the minimum correction that has been necessary since the beginning of the series (expressed here in relative terms compared to the level of VaR).

Fig. 6 illustrates the minimum dynamic adjustment required for

12 We did the same estimation and backtesting with a 10-year sample for VaR. We obtained the same qualitative results and saw that the choice of the size for VaR estimation is not crucial in our case. The results are available on demand.

passing the hit test for a randomly chosen first date of implemen- tation. More precisely, the exercise consists of choosing a first date and then computing the dynamic adjustment until the end of the sample; repeating this exercise 30,000 times, whilst ultimately keeping, for each horizon, the minimum correction obtained. The optimal adjustments are here expressed in terms of a percentage of their maximum value over the whole sample. For each horizon (x-axis in Fig. 6), the correction (on the y-axis) thus corresponds to the worst case scenario, i.e. the smallest correction required in the various samples of the same horizon).

The figure shows that, depending on the VaR method, the time period length for having almost all of the maximum correction fac- tors varies from 18 years (GEV) to 46 years (CAViaR). Moreover, regardless of the model, the major part (80% or so) of the correction factors is reached after 10 years. This means that, whatever the VaR model, most of the greatest surprises have been faced after a dec- ade of history (even in the worst scenario when the sample is amongst the least turbulent ones). In other words, at least ten years are needed to have a fairly good idea of the magnitude of the required correction factors.

We next consider the three main qualities of VaR models as a generalization of the approach by Kerkhof et al. (2010). Table 3 reports the various minimum required corrections related to the three main categories of tests, together with their Escanciano and Olmo (2009, 2010, 2011) bootstrapped corrected versions. We first note that the hit test is less permissive when the bootstrapped crit- ical values are used, whilst the tests of independence and magni- tude impose very severe corrections (to the order of 100% in relative terms for some tests).

According to the the unconditional coverage test at a 5% level, EWMA is the best model for estimating the DJIA index 95% VaR, fol- lowed by GARCH and then GEV. The independence test favors the conditional methods, with the best result for the GARCH model. Finally, when considering the magnitude of the violations—the most severe test—once again the dynamic measures show some superiority, whilst the extreme density VaR exhibits weakness.

3.4. Generalized model risk of model risk

Finally, we compare our method with classical stress-test exer- cises. We first present the extent to which the required calibrated correction factors can provide an insurance against major historical financial crises. Then, we compare the correction factors implied by the various backtests to correct the model risk of risk models, to a typical stress-test scenario.

1907 1922 1936 1951 1966 1981 1996 2011 −8.0% −4.0%

0.0% 4.0%

Historical

0.0% 4.0%

Normal −8.0% −4.0%

0.0% 4.0%

Student

−8.0% −4.0%

0.0% 4.0%

Cornish −Fisher −8.0% −4.0%

0.0% 4.0%

RiskMetrics

−8.0% −4.0%

0.0% 4.0%

GARCH −8.0% −4.0%

0.0% 4.0%

CAViaR

1908 1933 1959 1985 2011 −8.0% −4.0%

0.0% 4.0%

GEV

1908 1933 1959 1985 2011 −8.0% −4.0%

0.0% 4.0%

GPD

−8.0% −4.0%

Fig. 4. Dynamic optimal adjustment on the daily 95% VaR. Daily DJIA index from the 1st January, 1900 to the 20th September, 2011. We use a moving window of four years (1040 daily returns) to re-estimate parameters dynamically for the various methods.

1907 1922 1936 1951 1966 1981 1996 2011 0.0%

5.0% Historical

0.0%

5.0% Normal

0.0%

5.0% Student

0.0%

5.0% Cornish −Fisher

0.0%

5.0% RiskMetrics

0.0%

5.0% GARCH

0.0%

5.0% CAViaR

1908 1933 1959 1985 2011 0.0%

5.0% GEV

1908 1933 1959 1985 2011 0.0%

5.0% GPD

Fig. 5. Optimal dynamic absolute value of minimum negative adjustments for the hit test for different methods and the 95% VaR. Daily DJIA index from the 1st January, 1900 to the 20th September, 2011. We use a moving window of four years (1040 daily returns) to re-estimate parameters dynamically for the various methods.

80 C.M. Boucher et al. / Journal of Banking & Finance 44 (2014) 72–92

Three implicit levels of confidence are required: the probability level of the VaR under consideration, the thresholds in the various tests applied for computing the required correction and, finally, the degree of confidence we want to put on the solidity of the buffer. Typically, a high probability VaR focus will increase the model risk, whilst a more severe test level leads to a lower risk. Consequently, a high incremental buffer leads to a high protection against the model risk that is realized during extreme events in the market. By contrast, a reduced buffer decreases the insurance against these major turbulent episodes and, then, ultimately increases failures of (corrected) risk models.

Fig. 7 below illustrates this link between the level of the buffer, here translated into protection against the more severe historical crises, and the degree of confidence associated to the buffer. The Figure represents the cumulative density functions of required adjustments (in the last century of the DJIA) for, respectively, the historical and GARCH(1,1) VaR at a 95% confidence level, with a threshold for the hit test fixed at 5%. The series of dates stand for

years corresponding to the largest exceptions for the two VaR methods for certain levels of confidence (on the y-axis) and related corrections (on the x-axis). We note here that the GARCH VaR leads to smaller corrections in general. We also see that if we accept a 5% model risk, we are, unsurprisingly, not protected anymore against the 5% biggest shocks in the data (such as, for instance, those of 1929, 1930, 2008 and 2009 for the historical method).

We then compare the correction applied to assess the robust- ness of risk estimates with the correction implied by a typical stress test exercise for usual portfolio profiles by imposing hand- picked shocks for each investment class. We provide these compar- isons in terms of factor k used by regulators for determining capital (k being between 3 and 5).

Thus, we first present in Table 4 (Panel A and B) the various (model risk free) minimum corrections corresponding to the three tests (frequency, independence and magnitude) at a 5% confidence level for a 95% GARCH VaR applied to financial series of daily return on indexes and profiled portfolios in the period from December

0 10 20 30 40 50 0%

50%

100%

Historical

0 20 40 60 0%

50%

100%

Normal

0 20 40 60 0%

50%

100%

Student

0 20 40 60 0%

50%

100%

Cornish Fisher

0 20 40 60 0%

50%

100%

RiskMetrics

0 20 40 60 0%

50%

100%

GARCH

0 20 40 60 0%

50%

100%

CAViaR

0 20 40 60 0%

50%

100%

GEV

0 20 40 60 0%

50%

100%

GPD

Fig. 6. Optimal dynamic relative adjustment for the hit test for different starting dates and 95% VaR by horizon (in years). Daily DJIA index from the 1st January, 1900 to the 20th September, 2011. We use a moving window of four years (1040 daily returns) to dynamically re-estimate parameters for the various methods. This figure illustrates the dynamic negative adjustment required for passing the hit test (see Fig. 4), having randomly chosen the first date of implementation. Optimal relative negative adjustments are here expressed in terms of percentage of their maximum value over the whole sample.

Table 3 Minimum model risk for 95% daily VaR models for various validity tests with a 5% confidence level.

Method Mean VaR (%)

q1 (%) q�1 (%) q2 (%) q � 2 (%) q3 (%) q

� 3 (%)

Historical �1.60 �2.61 �2.03 �4.85 �3.24 �3.10 �5.90 Normal �1.68 �2.66 �1.86 �4.62 �2.76 �2.76 �5.49 Student �1.89 �2.49 �1.86 �4.25 �2.85 �3.11 �6.30 CF �1.26 �8.29 �7.48 �8.40 �8.86 �8.40 �8.86 EWMA �1.59 �.98 �.65 �2.03 �1.02 �1.02 �2.89 GARCH �1.61 �1.13 �.96 �2.57 �1.15 �1.20 �2.46 CAViaR �1.66 �1.87 �1.55 �2.59 �2.22 �2.08 �2.56 GEV �1.84 �2.42 �1.99 �4.47 �2.99 �2.80 �6.97 GPD �2.11 �2.35 �1.67 �4.43 �2.63 �2.71 �6.51

Daily DJIA index from the 1st January, 1900 to the 20th September, 2011. We use a moving window of four years (1040 daily returns) to dynamically re-estimate parameters for the various methods. The variable q1 refers to the hit test; q2 to the independence test; q3 to the magnitude test; and q�1; q

� 2, q

� 3 correspond to their

resampling versions, following Escanciano and Olmo (2009, 2010, 2011).

C.M. Boucher et al. / Journal of Banking & Finance 44 (2014) 72–92 81

31st, 1986 to November 28th, 2011. We consider four asset classes as well as three investment profiles combining these asset classes (defensive, balanced and aggressive portfolios).13

We express the outcomes as a percentage of VaR in Table 4 (Panel A), whilst presenting them as k ratios of corrected VaR out of estimated VaR in Panel B of Table 4. The correction factors in Panel A of Table 4 for single indexes range from �3.65% (for q3— magnitude correction for the commodity index) to �63.83% (for q�3—bootstrapped magnitude correction for the real estate index). For the various profiles, we see that the correction factor is lower than 1% for the defensive profile and goes to 10% or so for the aggressive one (and to �35.05% when considering the most severe test of magnitude). When these correction factors are expressed in terms of k ratios in Panel B of Table 4, they range from 1.01 to 3.66 which is in line with the official k ratio between 3 and 5.

We can now compare the correction factors, calibrated based on our framework, with a standard stress–test approach supposing some typical shocks on various asset classes. As underlined by Breuer and Csiszár (2014), stress tests with hand-picked scenarios are subject to two significant criticisms. First, arbitrary severe sce- narios may be too implausible. Second, some other stress scenarios leave open the question of whether there are more severe scenar- ios of similar plausibility. If the considered scenarios are harmless, either because stress testers lack proficiency or wish to hide risks, stress tests convey a feeling of safety which might be false. If they are merely unrealistic, they lead falsely to excessively high capital. Our proposed strategy can help to gauge the severity (and plausi- bility) of an ad hoc handpicked specific scenario.

Focusing indeed on the k ratios, Panel C of Table 4 reports the implied corrections on annual 95% GARCH VaR in the case of a hypothetical stress. With the given intensity of shocks considered here14 (�30% for the equity index, �40% for the real estate, �30% for commodity and �20% for bonds over a one-year horizon), k ratios

13 For the bonds, we use the ‘‘Merrill Lynch U.S. Treasuries/Agencies-Master AAA’ index before 01/01/1998 and the ‘‘J.P. Morgan EMU Global Aggregate Bond AAA Al Maturities’’ after; for the equity class we use a composite index ‘‘95% MSCI Europe Index +5% MSCI World Index’’; for the real estate class we get the ‘‘European Rea Estate Investment and Services Index’’ and for commodity, the ‘‘CRB Spot Index’’.

14 The amplitude of the shocks is directly inspired from recommendations of the Committee of European Insurance and Occupational Pensions Supervisors (CEIOPS).

’ l

l

vary from 1.90 (for q2 – independence correction for the equity index) to 4.99 (for q3—magnitude test for the real estate index) for the single indexes, and from 1.54 (for q2 – independence correction for the balanced profile) to 6.10 (for q3—magnitude test for the aggressive portfolio).

If we now compare the results in Panel C of Table 4 (ad hoc stress tests) to those in Panel B of Table 4 (calibrated empirical corrections), the arbitrary implied corrections of the stress test scenarios appear to be far more severe for almost all indexes and portfolios (except for the balanced one and the independence test). We thus conclude that this illustrative stress-test is very conserva- tive. In other words, because k ratios are almost higher in Panel C of Table 4 than in Panel B of Table 4 (on average by 80%), this stress- test seems to be relatively robust to the impact of model risk for the risky assets.

Taken altogether, our results suggest that some VaR models are preferred (e.g. the dynamic approaches such as the EWMA, CAViaR and GARCH models), whilst others should be avoided (e.g. the Cornish–Fisher VaR or extreme distribution based VaR) when com- paring the minimum correction to pass the frequency/hit test. Moreover, the independence and the magnitude tests lead to more

−4.0% −3.5% −3.0% −2.5% −2% −1.5% −1.0% 0.0%

1.0%

2.0%

3.0%

4.0%

5.0%

6.0%

7.0%

8.0%

9.0%

10.0%

1920; 1931; 1932; 1933; 1937; 1938; 1946; 1947; 1987; 1988

1929; 1930; 2008; 2009

1907; 1908; 1920; 1921; 1926; 1932; 1933; 1937; 1988; 2008; 2009

1920; 1929; 1930; 1938

Historical GARCH

Fig. 7. The empirical cumulative density function of optimal adjustment values for the hit test of a 95% daily historical and GARCH VaR. Daily DJIA index from the 1st January, 1900 to the 20th September, 2011. We use a moving window of four years (1040 daily returns) for computing the VaR. The threshold for the hit test is here fixed at 5% and we use a Gaussian kernel smoothing density (see Bowman and Azzalini, 1997).

Table 4 Minimum model risk for a 95 GARCH-VaR, k ratio model risk confidence levels for a 95 GARCH-VaR and 95% stress-VaR for 5% validity tests on various portfolios.

Portfolio q1 q�1 q2 q � 2 q3 q

� 3

Panel A. Minimum annualized model risk for a 95% GARCH-VaR Equity �10.15% �7.14% �9.86% �15.12% �44.80% �16.44% Real estate �12.65% �10.32% �16.53% �18.93% �63.83% �25.03% Commodity �6.39% �6.25% �5.29% �6.99% �13.76% �3.65% Bond �9.89% �9.62% �10.27% �10.54% �18.44% �13.62%

Defensive profile �.08% �.08% .00% �.21% �1.04% �.26% Balanced profile �4.63% �4.36% �5.88% �6.52% �15.79% �8.74% Aggressive profile �9.28% �8.38% �8.52% �11.62% �35.05% �12.72%

Panel B. Minimum k ratio model risk confidence levels for a 95% GARCH-VaR Equity 1.35 1.25 1.34 1.53 2.56 1.57 Real estate 1.40 1.33 1.53 1.60 3.03 1.80 Commodity 1.65 1.64 1.54 1.72 2.41 1.37 Bond 2.43 2.39 2.48 2.52 3.66 2.97

Defensive profile 1.15 1.15 1.01 1.40 3.00 1.50 Balanced profile 1.45 1.42 1.57 1.63 2.52 1.84 Aggressive profile 1.42 1.38 1.38 1.52 2.58 1.57

Panel C. Minimum k ratio model risk confidence levels of 95% stress-VaR Equity 2.54 2.25 1.90 2.71 4.81 3.29 Real estate 3.11 2.84 3.18 3.80 4.99 4.84 Commodity 2.89 2.89 3.27 2.92 3.83 3.19 Bond 3.51 3.50 3.52 3.56 4.04 3.76

Defensive profile 2.11 2.11 2.11 2.12 2.20 2.16 Balanced profile 2.63 2.50 1.54 2.63 5.10 3.81 Aggressive profile 3.08 2.94 1.83 3.78 6.10 4.94

Datasource: DataStream and Bloomberg. Daily data from the 31st December, 1986 to the 28th November, 2011; computations by the authors. The asset classes as detailed in Footnote 13. A moving window of four years (1040 daily returns) is used to re-estimate parameters dynamically for the various methods. ‘‘Defensive Profile’’ corresponds to a mixed portfolio compound with 10% bond + 90% Liquidity; ‘‘Balanced Profile’’ 30% equity + 10% Real Estate + 10% commodity + 40% bond + 10% liquidity; and ‘‘Aggressive Profile’’ 70% equity + 15% real estate + 15% commodity. The variable q1 refers to the hit test; q2 to the independence test; q3 to the magnitude test; and q�1; q

� 2, q

� 3 correspond

to their resampling versions, following Escanciano and Olmo (2009, 2010, 2011). Panel A gives the minimum annualized corrections for backtest at 5% confidence level on a 95% GARCH-VaR, Panel B the minimum k-ratio (adjustment/VaR) for a 95% GARCH-VaR and Panel C the minimum k ratio model in the stress-VaR context for 5% validity tests. The following shocks are considered for Panel C: �30% for the equity index, �40% for the real estate, �30% for commodity and �20% for bonds over a one-year horizon.

82 C.M. Boucher et al. / Journal of Banking & Finance 44 (2014) 72–92

severe corrections on the estimated VaR than the frequency test does. But whatever the model, the magnitude of the correction factors can be sometimes exceptionally large, especially during major financial crisis episodes such as the Great Depression of 1929 or the crisis of 2008. This is why there is a direct link between the confidence level on the required ex post correction (on the full historical sample), and the insurance against these major historical financial turmoils. However, we also show that a 10 year sample of

observations for calibrating the minimum correction to be added, is sufficient to have a fairly good idea of the magnitude of the model risk of risk models.

4. Conclusions

Standard risk measures failed to forecast extreme risks and reg- ulators require that financial institutions quantify this model risk

C.M. Boucher et al. / Journal of Banking & Finance 44 (2014) 72–92 83

of risk models. We propose to adjust risk forecasts for model risk by the historical performance of the model. In other words, the risk model learns from its past mistakes.

We first examine standard risk models by assessing how well they forecast risk from a simulated process, designed to realisti- cally capture the salient features of financial returns. The experi- ment shows that model risk is significant and ever present, in some cases, so large that it exceeds the actual risk forecast.

In our main contribution, we then propose a methodology for explicitly incorporating model risk corrections into risk forecasting by taking into account the models’ performance on a range of stan- dard back testing methodologies.

The general setup also enables us to evaluate the performance of standard risk forecast models, by applying the basic principle that the lower the model risk correction factor, the lower the model risk and, therefore, the better the model. The results show that dynamic methods, such as EWMA, CAViAR and GARCH VaR, have an advantage over static approaches such as Gaussian and extreme density approaches. Somewhat surprisingly, the very sim- ple historical simulation approach is, if not the best method, close to the best.

We conclude by proposing an approach that provides a tailored methodology for risk managers where they can explicitly relate the degrees of confidence in the correction factor to the distribution of past violations. In this, the manager addresses three concerns: the VaR probability, the severity of tests and the trust we want to put into the correction buffer. This can, for example, enable a risk man- ager to explicitly consider extreme events, such as 1929 and 2008, or alternatively disregard their impact on risk forecasts.

The Basel Committee has recently proposed (BCBS, 2013) the use of a stressed risk forecast as the main input into the current risk forecast. Such an approach is an improvement over the exist- ing methodology, and is partially consistent with our methodology. The Committee indeed proposes to rescale the risk forecasts by the ratio of the stressed and unstressed risk factors, such as the adjusted current risk forecast becoming more conservative and thus less prone to exceptions. However, our proposal deals with this in a more precise way. First, we adjust risk forecasts by their past errors, which mainly come from these distressed periods. Sec- ond, we consider a confidence level about the required correction factor, linked to the insurance against major financial stress episodes. Finally, we define proper criteria for adjusting the risk forecasts based on some properties of forecast errors such as their frequency, their independence and their magnitude. In our view, the Basel Committee proposal still ignores the model risk of risk forecasts and consists of an adjustment of the current risk without an explicit criterion.

Our work can be extended in several ways. Our general correc- tion framework can be used when comparing the various tests of a desirable VaR proposed in the literature (Berkowitz et al., 2011). The second extension could be to apply some specific VaR models when judging the riskiness of some non-linear products using, this time, several pricing models. In the same vein, evaluating the impact on asset allocation of integrating the model risk of risk measures could be of interest, especially for asset allocation para- digms depending on risk budgets, e.g. safety first criteria. The third extension could be found in generalizing the comparison consider- ing several time-horizons (e.g. Cheridito and Stadje, 2009; Hoogerheide et al., 2011) or several quantile levels (Colletaz et al., 2013). The fourth extension is about alternative backtests when calibrating our model risk correction (see Appendix for a list of tests), in particular when the VaR violations are clustered. For this purpose, the recent D-test of Escanciano and Pei (2012), the MCS-tests by Ziggel et al. (2013), the Geometric-VaR test by Pelletier and Wei (2014), and the Multi-level VaR test by Leccadito et al. (2014), because of their shown finite-sample size

and power properties, might be of interest as complementary backtest criteria for strengthen the safety of the buffer for model risk. Another approach would be to adopt the same methodology leading to an estimated multi-VaR, built as a portfolio of various VaR models (see Abdous and Remillard, 1995), directly aiming to minimize the model risk (McAleer et al., 2013). Finally, using the same metric of corrections, the quality of other VaR based mea- sures in a context of systemic risk measures (such as Marginal Expected Shortfall or CoVaR) would be worth considering (e.g. Daníelsson et al., 2014; Benoit et al., 2013; Löffler and Raupach, 2013).

Acknowledgements

We thank Carol Alexander, Arie Gozluklu, Monica Billio, Thomas Breuer, Massimiliano Caporin, Rama Cont, Christophe Hurlin, Christophe Pérignon, Michaël Rockinger, Thierry Roncalli and Jean–Michel Zakoïan for suggestions when preparing this article, as well as Benjamin Hamidi for research assistance and joint col- laborations on collateral subjects. Authors thank the Global Risk Institute for support; the second author gratefully acknowledges the support of the Economic and Social Research Council (UK) [Grant No.: ES/K002309/1] and the fourth author the support of the Risk Foundation Chair Dauphine–ENSAE–Groupama ‘‘Behav- ioral and Household Finance, Individual and Collective Risk Attitudes’’ (Louis Bachelier Institute). Some extra materials related to this article can be found at: www.riskresearch.org. The usual dis- claimer applies.

Appendix A. Model risk when forecasting risk

Financial risk forecast models, just like any other statistical model, are thus subject to model risk. In spite of this, almost all presentations of risk forecasts focus on point estimates, omitting any mention of model risk, not even mentioning estimation risk. They are, however, subject to the same basic elements of model risk as any other model, and are also subject to unique model risk factors because of the specific application.

In order to formally identify the model risk factors, we propose a five level classification scheme:

1. Parameter estimation error arises from uncertainty in the parameter values of the chosen model.

2. Specification error refers to the model risk stemming from inappropriate assumptions about the form of the data generating process (DGP) for the random variable.

3. Granularity error is based on the impact of undiversified idiosyncratic risk on the portfolio VaR.

4. Measurement error relates to the use of erroneous data when measuring the risks and testing the models.

5. Liquidity risk is defined as the consequence of both infre- quent quotes and the inability to conduct sometimes a transaction at current market prices because of the too large size of the transaction.

The ultimate objective is to forecast VaR, where we indicate the estimate by ‘‘estimated VaR’’ (denoted EVaR). It is a function of the portfolio size and the true model parameters h0. In what follows, VaR is the ð1� aÞth quantile (with a > :50Þ of the profit and loss distribution, so that the VaR is negative (and expressed hereafter as a return for the sake of simplicity). We also indicate the theoret- ical (or true) VaR by ThVaRðh0;aÞ. Thus, when comparing the esti- mated VaR with the theoretical VaR (i.e. EVaR and ThVaR respectively), we present both the buffer needed to directly adjust the EVaR and the probability (or quantile) shift required. Our

84 C.M. Boucher et al. / Journal of Banking & Finance 44 (2014) 72–92

objective is to approximate the errors or ‘‘biases’’ of VaR estimates since we do not know the ‘‘true’’ DGP with real data. Biases defined hereafter are ‘‘errors’’ (that can be repeated) that come mainly from the use of a wrong model and/or the wrong specification regarding the ‘‘true’’ (assumed DGP). Our proposed procedure consists of approximating these errors, based on the minimum cor- rection needed not to reject a predefined consensual backtest. In the following sub-sections, we detail these specific model risks that impact VaR forecasts and provide some examples.

A.1. Estimation risk

Estimation risk occurs in every estimation process. Relatively small changes in the estimation procedure or in the number of data observations can change the magnitude and even the sign of some important decision variables. Thus, estimation risk is the risk associated with an inaccurate estimation of parameters, due to the estimator quality and/or limited sample of data (past and/or future), and/or noise in the data.

If PEAVaR denotes the perfect estimation adjusted VaR, EVaRðĥ;aÞ the estimated VaR and biasðĥ; h0;aÞ the bias function, where ĥ are the estimated parameters, we have:

PEAVaRðĥ; h0;aÞ ¼ EVaRðĥ;aÞ þ biasðĥ; h0;aÞ: ðA:1Þ

Example 1. As an illustration, assuming an ARCH model, the estimation risk (denoted herein ERð�Þ) is expressed in Gouriéroux and Zakoïan (2013), as (with the previous notations):

EVaRðĥ;aÞ ¼ ThVaRðh0;aÞ þ ERðThVaRðh0;aÞ; ĥ;aÞ;

with

ER½ThVaRðh0;aÞ; ĥ;a� ¼ �ð2TÞ�1h½ThVaRðh0;aÞ; ĥ;a� þ oðT�1Þ;

where T is the length of the estimation period, oðT�1Þ converges to a term of order T�1 and:

h½ThVaRðh0;aÞ; ĥ;a� ¼ @2g�1

@r2 ðrt�1;h;rÞ�ThVaRðh0;aÞ

@g�1

@r ðrt�1;h;rÞ

2( )( )

� @g @h0

rt�1;h;ThVaRðh0;aÞ½ �Xðh0Þ @g @h0 ½rt�1;h;ThVaRðh0;aÞ�

þ@g �1

@r ðrt�1;h;rÞTr Xðh0Þ

@2g @h@h0

½rt�1;h;ThVaRðh0;aÞ� ( )

;

and r ¼ g½rt�1; h; ThVaRðh0;aÞ�;XðhÞ the variance–covariance of parameters in h; gð:Þ a continuous function, strictly increasing with respect to the VaR parameter and g�1ð:Þ its inverse.

A.2. Specification risk

Specification error arises from using inappropriate assumptions about the form of the DGP. We propose denoting the strong form of specification risk as the risk from using a risk model which cannot capture the true unknown DGP. The weak form of specification risk then corresponds to the risk of using a risk model inadequate with the assumed, and hence known, DGP.

Consider the special case of knowing the true model parame- ters, but not knowing the model. In this case, we can define the perfect specification adjusted VaR (PSAVaR) as:

PSAVaRðh0; h1;aÞ ¼ EVaRðh1;aÞ þ biasðh0; h1;aÞ; ðA:2Þ

where h1 are known parameters, defined so that we can link the misspecified model to the true model, with some mapping h0 ¼ f ðh1Þ.

Example 2. A simple measure of the specification risk (denoted as SRð�Þ) associated to the expansion of the unknown ‘‘true’’ theoret- ical model of VaR (denoted ThVaRðh;aÞ), can be written as:

EVaRðĥ;aÞ ¼ ThVaRðh;aÞ þ SR½ThVaRðh;aÞ; ĥ;a�;

with

SR½ThVaRðh;aÞ; ĥ;a� ¼r 6

AVaRðĥ;aÞ�l r

" #2 �1

8<: 9=;Sk

þ r 24

AVaRðĥ;aÞ�l r

" #3 �3 AVaRðĥ;aÞ�lr

" #8<: 9=;Ku

� r 36

2 AVaRðĥ;aÞ�l

r

" #3 �5 AVaRðĥ;aÞ�l

r

" #8<: 9=;Sk2

þoðT�1Þ;

where ThVaRðh;aÞ is the ‘‘true’’ theoretical model of VaR, AVaRðĥ;aÞ is the asymptotic a-quantile of the approximate model in use, SRð�Þ is the specification error associated to this specific model and parameters l, r; Sk and Ku stand, respectively, for the mean, the standard deviation, the skewness and the kurtosis of the return distribution.

A.3. Granularity error

Granularity error is caused by the bias resulting from a finite number of assets in portfolios and then by the resulting residual idiosyncratic risk, see e.g. Gordy (2003) and Wilde (2001). The granularity principle yields a decomposition of such risk measures that highlights the different effects of systematic and non-system- atic risks.

More precisely, any portfolio risk measure can be decomposed into the sum of an asymptotic risk measure corresponding to an infinite portfolio size and 1=n times an adjustment term where n is the portfolio size (number of assets). The asymptotic portfolio risk measure, called the cross-sectional asymptotic risk measure, captures the non-diversifiable effect of risks on the portfolio. The adjustment term, called granularity adjustment, summarizes the effect of the individual specific risks and their cross-effect with systematic risks, when the portfolio size is large, but finite.

Suppose the theoretical VaR is based on an asymptotic factorial model, valid asymptotically. In this case, we can apply a similar adjustment factor to arrive at the perfect granularity adjusted VaR (PGAVaR) so that:

PGAVaRðh0;a;nÞ ¼ EVaRðh0;a;NÞ þ biasðh0;a;nÞ; ðA:3Þ

where n is the number of assets in the portfolio under study and N a large number of assets for which the asymptotic model is valid.

Example 3. As an illustration, and following here Gagliardini and Gouriéroux (2013), in the special case of independent stochastic drift and volatility, the granularity risk (denoted below GRð�Þ) that impacts the estimated VaR can be expressed as (with the previous notations):

EVaRðh;a;NÞ ¼ ThVaRðh;a;nÞ þ ðn�1ÞGRðaÞ þ oðn�1Þ;

with

GRðaÞ ¼ �ð2�1ÞEfr2½q�g � dlogf ðqÞ dq

� � ;

where n is the number of assets in the portfolio under study, N a large number of assets for which the asymptotic model is valid,

Table B.1 A road map of the main risk model validation tests.

C.M. Boucher et al. / Journal of Banking & Finance 44 (2014) 72–92 85

q ¼ EVaRðh0;a;NÞ is the quantile of a factor G and f ð�Þ is its density function.

Exception frequency tests Intuition: test the violation frequency that should be equal to the probability

threshold An Unconditional Coverage Test – Kupiec (1995) A GMM Duration Test – Candelon et al. (2011) A Z-test – Jorion (2007) A Multi-variate Unconditional Coverage Test – Pérignon and Smith (2008) A D-test – Escanciano and Pei (2012) A MCS Test – Ziggel et al. (2013)

Exception independence tests Intuition: test the violations associated to the VaR forecasting that should be

independent (not clustered and/or no forecasting power via a time-series model for extremes) An Independence Test – Christoffersen (1998) A Violation Duration-based Test – Christoffersen and Pelletier (2004) A Discrete Violation Duration-based Test – Haas (2005) A Dynamic Quantile Test – Engle and Manganelli (2004) A Dynamic Quantile Test – Gaglianone et al. (2011) A GMM Duration Test – Candelon et al. (2011) A Multivariate Test of Zero-autocorrelation of Violations – Hurlin and Tokpavi

(2006) An Estimation-risk adjusted Test – Escanciano and Olmo (2009, 2010, 2011) A MCS Test – Ziggel et al. (2013)

Exception frequency and independence of violations tests Intuition: test jointly the hit ratio and the independence of VaR violations A Conditional Coverage Test – Christoffersen (1998) A GMM Duration Test – Candelon et al. (2011) A Dynamic Binary Response Test – Dumitrescu et al. (2012) A Geometric-VaR Test – Pelletier and Wei (2014) A MCS Test – Ziggel et al. (2013) A Multilevel Test – Leccadito et al. (2013)

Exception magnitude tests Intuition: test the amplitude of VaR violations (that should be small)

A.4. Measurement error

Financial data are prone to measurement errors caused by var- ious phenomena such as non-synchronous trading, rounding errors, infrequent trading, micro-structure noise or insignificant volume exchanges. In addition, observed data might be subject to manipulations (smoothing, extra revenues, fraudulent exchanges, informationless trading, etc).

Measurement error risk can strongly distort backtesting results and significantly affects the performance of standard statistical tests used to backtest VaR models. Frésard et al. (2011) extensively document the phenomena and report that a large fraction of banks artificially boost the performance of their models by polluting their ‘‘true’’ profit and loss with extra revenues that cause under-esti- mation of the true risk.

Example 4. Certain financial institutions report a contaminated P&L (denoted PLct ) with extraneous profits (denoted pt)) such as intraday revenues, fees, commissions, net interest incomes and revenues from market making or underwriting activities as such:

PLct ¼ PLt þ pt;

with PLt the true profit at time t. So, the estimated VaR is impacted by a contamination risk

(denoted CRð�Þ) that reads:

EVaRðh;a;pÞ ¼ ThVaRðh;aÞ þ CRðpÞ:

A Magnitude Test (under normality assumption) – Berkowitz (2001) A Test based on a Loss Function – Lopez (1998, 1999) A Two-stage Test (Coverage Rate and Loss Function) – Angelidis and

Degiannakis (2007) A Double-threshold Test – Colletaz et al. (2013)

Exceedances for expected shortfall test Intuition: Measure the observed ES, then compare to a local approximated value (and the difference should be small) A Saddlepoint Technique Test for ES – Wong (2008, 2010)

See, among others, Campbell (2007), Nieto and Ruiz (2008) and Berkowitz et al. (2011) for comprehensive surveys.

A.5. Liquidity risk

While liquidity has many meanings, from the point of view of risk forecasting, the most relevant are some aspects of market liquidity, as defined by the BCBS (2010), such as the ability to quickly trade large quantities, at a low cost, without impacting the price. These directly follow from Kyle’s (1985) three dimen- sions of liquidity: tightness, depth and resilience.

For portfolios of illiquid securities, reported returns will tend to be smoother than true economic returns, which will understate volatility and increase risk-adjusted performance measures such as the Sharpe ratio. As an extreme example of illiquidy, we can mention that the NY stock exchange remained shut for more than four months at the beginning of the First World War (from the 31st July, 1914 to the 12th December, 1914) and that the re-opening brought the largest one-day percentage drop in the DJIA (�24.4%).15

Getmansky et al. (2004) propose, for instance, an econometric model of illiquidity exposure and develop estimators for the smoothing profile as well as a smoothing-adjusted Sharpe ratio (that basically leads to the intensification of the measured smoothed volatility by a factor to recover a proxy of the true underlying volatility). Measures for gauging illiquidity exposure of several asset classes are presented in Chan et al. (2006). Liquidity aspects enter the Value-at-Risk methodology quite naturally. The VaR approach is built on the hypothesis that ‘‘market prices represent achievable transaction prices’’ (Jorion, 2007). In other words, the prices used to compute market returns in the VaR models have to be representative of market conditions and traded volume. Consequently, the price impact of portfolio liquidation has to be taken into account. Chordia et al. (2001) find a significant cross-sectional relation between stock returns and the

15 See e.g. Silber (2005).

variability of liquidity, which is approximated by measures of trad- ing activity such as volume and turnover. Giot and Grammig (2005), using a weighted spread in an intraday VaR framework, show that accounting for liquidity risk becomes a crucial factor and that the traditional (frictionless) measures severely underesti- mate the true VaR.

Example 5. As a simple illustration, we can formalize that risk using the following relation (with the previous notations):

P̂Lt ¼ PLt þ p1;t þ 1ILep2;t ;

where p1;t is a factor that contributes to the smoothing of the released prices and p2;t a liquidity risk premium that only occurs when a liquidity event happens (denoted Le, such as quotation interruption, due to large movement in the market related to an exogenous shock: war, terrorist attack, a large collapse . . .), mod- elled here thanks to a Heaviside function (1I�) that takes the value 1when the event happens, which leads to a biased estimated VaR with a liquidity risk (denoted LRð�Þ) as:

EVaRðh;a;p1;p2Þ ¼ ThVaRðh;aÞ þ LRðp1;p2Þ:

Table C.1 Illustrations of unconditional simulated errors associated to the 95%, 99% and 99.5% annualized VaR: Gaussian versus t-Student quantiles.

Probability Mean estimated VaR Perfect VaR Mean bias Median bias Min. bias Max. bias

Panel A. Gaussian DGP and Gaussian VaR with estimation error a = 95.00 �29.49 �29.49 .00 .00 �7.93 7.24 a = 99.00 �41.88 �41.88 .00 .00 �9.92 9.17 a = 99.50 �46.41 �46.41 .00 .00 �12.45 10.16

Panel B. t-Student(5) DGP and Gaussian VaR with specification error a = 95.00 �29.49 �36.22 �6.73 �6.73 �6.73 �6.73 a = 99.00 �41.88 �60.75 �18.87 �18.87 �18.87 �18.87 a = 99.50 �46.41 �72.87 �26.46 �26.46 �26.46 �26.46

Panel C. t-Student(5) DGP and Gaussian VaR with specification and estimation errors a = 95.00 �29.49 �36.22 �6.73 �6.73 �13.97 1.20 a = 99.00 �41.88 �60.75 �18.87 �18.87 �28.04 �8.95 a = 99.50 �46.41 �72.87 �26.46 �26.46 �36.62 �14.01

Source: Bloomberg; daily data of the DJIA index in USD from the 1st January, 1900 to the 20th September, 2011. These statistics were computed with the results of 100,000 simulated series of 250 daily returns according to a specific DGP (Gaussian for Panel A and t-Student(5) for Panel B and C) and using an annualized parametric VaR. The columns represent, respectively, the average Estimated VaR with specification or/and estimation errors, the Theoretical VaR, and the average-minimum–maximum of the adjustment terms of all samples. A positive adjustment term indicates that the Estimated VaR (negative return) should be more conservative (more negative).

Table C.2 Estimated annualized VaR and model-risk errors (%) in the Brownian case.

Probability (%) Mean estimated VaR (%) Perfect VaR (%) Mean bias (%) Median bias (%) Min. bias (%) Max. bias (%)

Panel A. Gaussian DGP and Gaussian VaR with estimation error a = 95.00 �24.78 �24.78 .00 .00 �8.69 10.16 a = 99.00 �35.74 �35.74 .00 .00 �14.21 20.70 a = 99.50 �39.95 �39.95 .00 .00 �16.04 28.92

Panel B. Brownian DGP and Gaussian VaR with specification error a = 95.00 �29.49 �36.22 �6.73 �6.73 �6.73 �6.73 a = 99.00 �41.88 �60.75 �18.87 �18.87 �18.87 18.87 a = 99.50 �46.41 �72.87 �26.46 �26.46 �26.46 26.46

Panel C. Brownian DGP and Gaussian VaR with specification and estimation errors a = 95.00 �29.49 �36.22 � 6.73 �6.73 �13.97 1.20 a = 99.00 �41.88 �60.75 �18.87 �18.87 �28.04 �8.95 a = 99.50 �46.41 �72.87 �26.46 �26.46 �36.62 �14.01

Three price processes of the asset returns are considered below, such as for t ¼ ½1; . . . ; T� and p ¼ ½1;2;3�:

dSt ¼ St ldt þ rdWt þ Jpt dNt � �

;

with J1t ¼ 0 for Brownian, where St is the price of the asset at time t; Wt is a standard Brownian motion, independent from the Poisson process Nt , governing the jumps of various intensities Jpt (null, constant or time-varying according to the process p). Source: simulations by the authors. Errors are defined as the differences between the ‘‘true’’ asymptotic simulated VaR and the Estimated VaR. These statistics were computed with a series of 250,000 simulated daily returns with specific DGP (Brownian), averaging the parameters estimated in Aït-Sahalia et al., 2013Aït-Sahalia et al. (2013, Tabel 2, i.e. b = 41.66%, k3 = 1.20% and c = 22.22%), and ex post recalibrated for sharing the same first two moments (i.e. l = .12% and r = 1.02%) and the same mean jump intensity (for the last two processes – which leads after rescaling here, for instance, to an intensity of the Lévy such as: k2=1.06%). Per convention, a negative adjustment term in the table indicates that the Estimated VaR (negative return) should be more conservative (more negative).

86 C.M. Boucher et al. / Journal of Banking & Finance 44 (2014) 72–92

Appendix B. Main backtest procedures

We present hereafter three tests proposed in the literature to gauge the accuracy of VaR estimates.

The first test for a good VaR is the so-called ‘‘traffic light’’ approach in the regulatory framework, related to the Kupiec (1995) Proportion of Failure Test. The Unconditional Coverage test (Kupiec, 1995) attempts to determine whether the observed fre- quency of exceptions is consistent with the expected frequency of exceptions according to a chosen VaR model and a confidence interval (an exception occurs when the ex post return is below the ex ante VaR).16 We define IEVaRt ðaÞ as the ‘‘hit variable’’ associated

16 Note that the Basel ‘‘traffic light’’ backtesting framework is directly inspired by this unconditional coverage test. Escanciano and Pei (2012) show, however, that this unconditional test is always inconsistent in detecting non-optimal VaR forecasts based on the historical method. In the following, nevertheless, we consider for our adjustment procedure three of the main tests (including the unconditional coverage test), as well as their bootstrapped corrected versions.

to the ex post observation of EVaRð�Þ exceptions at the threshold a at date t, so that (with previous notations):

IEVaRð�Þt ðaÞ ¼ 1 if rt < �EVaRðĥ;aÞt�1 0 otherwise;

( ðB:1Þ

where rt is the return on portfolio P at time t, with t ¼ ½1;2; . . . ; T�. If we assume that the IEVaRt ð�Þ variables are independently and

identically distributed, then, under the Unconditional Coverage hypothesis of Kupiec (1995), the cumulated number of VaR viola- tions follows a Binomial distribution, denoted BðT;aÞ, as (see Christoffersen, 1998):

HitEVaRð�Þt ðaÞ ¼ XT t¼1

IEVaRð�Þt ðaÞ � BðT;aÞ: ðB:2Þ

A perfect sequence of (corrected) empirical VaR in the sense of this test (not too aggressive, but not too confident), is such that it respects condition (B.2).

Table C.3 Estimated annualized VaR and model-risk errors (%) in the Lévy case.

Probability (%) Mean estimated VaR (%) Perfect VaR (%) Mean bias (%) Median bias (%) Min. bias (%) Max. bias (%)

Panel A. Gaussian DGP and Gaussian VaR with estimation error a = 95.00 �24.78 �24.78 .00 .00 �8.69 10.16 a = 99.00 �35.74 �35.74 .00 .00 �14.21 20.70 a = 99.50 �39.95 �39.95 .00 .00 �16.04 28.92

Panel B. Lévy DGP and Gaussian VaR with specification error a = 95.00 �29.49 �36.22 �6.73 �6.73 �6.73 �6.73 a = 99.00 �41.88 �60.75 �18.87 �18.87 �18.87 �18.87 a = 99.50 �46.41 �72.87 �26.46 �26.46 �26.46 �26.46 Panel C. Lévy DGP and Gaussian VaR with specification and estimation errors a = 95.00 �29.49 �36.22 �6.73 �6.73 �13.97 1.20 a = 99.00 �41.88 �60.75 �18.87 �18.87 �28.04 �8.95 a = 99.50 �46.41 �72.87 �26.46 �26.46 �36.62 �14.01

Three price processes of the asset returns are considered below, such as for t ¼ ½1; . . . ; T� and p ¼ ½1;2;3�:

dSt ¼ St ldt þ rdWt þ Jpt dNt � �

;

with J2t ¼ k2expð�k2tÞ for Lévy, where St is the price of the asset at time t; Wt is a standard Brownian motion, independent from the Poisson process Nt , governing the jumps of various intensities Jpt (null, constant or time-varying according to the process p), defined by parameters, k2, which is a positive constant. Source: simulations by the authors. Errors are defined as the differences between the ‘‘true’’ asymptotic simulated VaR and the Estimated VaR. These statistics were computed with a series of 250,000 simulated daily returns with specific DGP (Lévy), averaging the parameters estimated in Aït-Sahalia et al., 2013Aït-Sahalia et al. (2013, Table 2, i.e. b = 41.66%, k3 = 1.20% and c = 22.22%), and ex post recalibrated for sharing the same first two moments (i.e. l ¼ :12% and r = 1.02%) and the same mean jump intensity (for the last two processes – which leads after rescaling here, for instance, to an intensity of the Lévy with k2 = 1.06%). Per convention, a negative adjustment term in the table indicates that the Estimated VaR (negative return) should be more conservative (more negative).

Table C.4 Estimated annualized VaR and model-risk errors (%) in the Hawkes case.

Probability (%) Mean estimated VaR (%) Perfect VaR (%) Mean bias (%) Median bias (%) Min. bias (%) Max. bias (%)

Panel A. Gaussian DGP and Gaussian VaR with estimation error a = 95.00 �24.78 �24.78 .00 .00 �8.69 10.16 a = 99.00 �35.74 �35.74 .00 .00 �14.21 20.70 a = 99.50 �39.95 �39.95 .00 .00 �16.04 28.92

Panel B. Hawkes DGP and Gaussian VaR with specification error a = 95.00 �29.49 �36.22 �6.73 �6.73 �6.73 �6.73 a = 99.00 �41.88 �60.75 �18.87 �18.87 �18.87 �18.87 a = 99.50 �46.41 �72.87 �26.46 �26.46 �26.46 �26.46

Panel C. Hawkes DGP and Gaussian VaR with specification and estimation errors a = 95.00 �29.49 �36.22 �6.73 �6.73 �13.97 1.20 a = 99.00 �41.88 �60.75 �18.87 �18.87 �28.04 �8.95 a = 99.50 �46.41 �72.87 �26.46 �26.46 �36.62 �14.01

Three price processes of the asset returns are considered below, such as for t ¼ ½1; . . . ; T� and p ¼ ½1;2;3�:

dSt ¼ St ldt þ rdWt þ Jpt dNt � �

;

with J3t ¼ k3 þ bexp½�cðt � sÞ� for Hawkes, where St is the price of the asset at time t; Wt is a standard Brownian motion, independent from the Poisson process Nt , governing the jumps of various intensities Jpt (null, constant or time-varying according to the process p), defined by parameters, k3; b and c, which are positive constants with s the date of the last observed jump. Source: simulations by the authors. Errors are defined as the differences between the ‘‘true’’ asymptotic simulated VaR and the Estimated VaR. These statistics were computed with a series of 250,000 simulated daily returns with specific DGP (Hawkes), averaging the parameters estimated in Aït-Sahalia et al., 2013Aït-Sahalia et al. (2013, Table 2, i.e. b = 41.66%, k3 = 1.20% and c = 22.22%), and ex post recalibrated for sharing the same first two moments (i.e. l = .12% and r = 1.02%) and the same mean jump intensity. Per convention, a negative adjustment term in the table indicates that the Estimated VaR (negative return) should be more conservative (more negative).

C.M. Boucher et al. / Journal of Banking & Finance 44 (2014) 72–92 87

The second test for a good VaR concerns the independence of forecasting errors. The independence hypothesis is associated to the idea that if the VaR model is correct then violations associated to VaR forecasting should be independently distributed, it is also the independence of exceptions hypothesis. If the exceptions exhi- bit some type of ‘‘clustering’’, then the VaR model may fail to cap- ture the profit and loss variability under certain conditions, which could represent a potential problem down the road. Christoffersen (1998) supposes that, under the alternative hypothesis of VaR inef- ficiency, the process of IEVaRt ðaÞ violations is modelled with a Mar- kov chain whose matrix of transition probabilities is defined by:

P ¼ p00 p01 p10 p11

� ; ðB:3Þ

where pij ¼ Pr IEVaRt ðaÞ ¼ jjI EVaR t�1 ¼ i

h i . This Markov chain reflects the

existence of an order 1 memory in the process IEVaRt ðaÞ. The proba- bility of having a violation (not having one) for the current period depends on the occurrence or not of a violation (for the same level of coverage rate) in the previous period. Christoffersen (1998) shows that the likelihood ratio for the test is:

LRindI EVaR t ðaÞ ¼ 2 log LI

EVaR t ðaÞðp01;p11Þ � log LI

EVaR t ðaÞðp;pÞ

h i !d

> v2ð1Þ; ðB:4Þ

where LI EVaR t ðaÞðp01;p11Þ is thus the likelihood under the hypothesis of

the first-order Markov dependence, and LI EVaR t ðaÞðp;pÞ is the likeli-

hood under the hypothesis of independence p01 ¼ p11 ¼ p as:

Table C.5 Dates of the maximum adjustment for different 95% VaRs and backtest models at 5% confidence level.

VaR methods Dates q1 (%) Dates q�1 (%) Dates q2 (%) Dates q � 2 (%) Dates q3 (%) Dates q

� 3 (%)

Historical 1 02/09/2009 42.02 01/16/2009 32.80 09/08/1930 78.26 04/06/2009 52.18 08/24/2009 49.91 09/08/1930 95.06 2 11/28/2008 40.60 01/06/1930 31.94 04/06/2009 46.46 08/24/2009 42.02 09/08/1930 48.91 04/21/1930 78.26 3 10/16/1930 39.97 01/05/1933 21.73 07/25/1988 42.52 04/21/1930 40.15 04/06/2009 47.68 12/02/1929 72.61 4 12/11/1929 37.75 01/06/1931 19.87 03/07/1988 40.82 12/02/1929 37.79 11/17/2008 46.46 04/06/2009 65.07

Normal 1 11/28/2008 42.86 01/16/2009 30.07 09/08/1930 74.43 08/24/2009 44.46 04/06/2009 44.46 09/08/1930 88.47 2 12/11/1929 38.57 01/06/1930 25.55 07/25/1988 39.56 11/17/2008 42.86 11/17/2008 42.86 12/02/1929 74.43 3 09/14/2009 38.07 01/05/1933 17.88 12/02/1929 38.57 09/08/1930 42.45 12/02/1929 38.86 11/17/2008 62.83 4 11/11/1929 36.69 01/06/1938 14.92 03/07/1988 34.42 12/02/1929 38.86 04/21/1930 38.57 04/21/1930 59.24

Student 1 11/28/2008 40.16 01/16/2009 30.02 09/08/1930 68.50 04/06/2009 45.93 09/08/1930 50.18 09/08/1930 101.52 2 12/11/1929 33.06 01/06/1930 18.40 12/02/1929 68.18 08/24/2009 40.27 04/06/2009 44.50 11/17/2008 86.13 3 09/14/2009 32.85 01/05/1933 14.25 07/25/1988 35.52 12/02/1929 35.86 12/02/1929 33.57 03/07/1988 71.79 4 11/11/1929 31.43 01/13/1975 11.14 03/07/1988 30.26 09/08/1930 34.80 04/21/1930 33.06 12/02/1929 68.50

Cornish 1 05/13/1915 133.65 01/04/1916 120.56 02/14/1916 135.43 09/27/1915 142.87 09/27/1915 135.43 09/27/1915 142.87 Fisher 2 05/07/1915 133.36 01/04/1915 106.47 09/27/1915 133.86 05/10/1915 133.86 05/10/1915 133.86 05/10/1915 130.22

3 05/06/1915 131.48 01/03/1917 82.83 05/10/1915 133.65 02/14/1916 114.82 02/14/1916 117.67 04/09/1917 111.55 4 05/04/1915 130.22 01/14/1988 76.04 09/08/1930 93.47 07/03/1916 90.03 03/07/1988 90.73 09/08/1930 93.47

Risk 1 03/28/1938 15.85 01/04/1921 10.50 05/10/1915 32.76 12/02/1929 16.43 12/02/1929 16.43 03/21/1932 46.62 Metrics 2 10/28/1929 15.02 01/06/1938 9.14 12/02/1929 31.91 05/03/1920 16.33 05/09/1938 16.04 12/20/1937 32.36

3 03/15/1938 14.80 01/02/1908 7.88 04/21/1930 30.51 09/26/1938 15.85 12/20/1937 14.57 03/07/1988 31.92 4 01/25/1938 14.57 01/06/1930 5.64 07/25/1988 26.69 09/08/1930 15.02 05/03/1920 14.35 12/02/1929 31.91

GARCH 1 03/24/1938 18.24 01/06/1930 15.50 09/08/1930 41.44 05/09/1938 18.48 12/02/1929 19.42 05/09/1938 39.61 2 04/06/1938 18.15 01/06/1938 9.28 12/02/1929 34.12 12/20/1937 18.24 05/03/1920 18.55 11/02/1931 35.40 3 10/28/1929 17.17 01/02/1908 8.09 07/25/1988 32.49 09/26/1938 18.15 05/09/1938 18.48 12/20/1937 34.98 4 03/15/1938 16.78 01/17/2008 7.01 03/07/1988 30.73 12/02/1929 17.17 09/08/1930 17.17 03/07/1988 33.59

CAViaR 1 01/21/1994 30.10 01/17/2008 24.96 09/24/2007 41.75 02/11/2008 35.73 09/24/2007 33.48 03/21/1932 41.32 2 06/06/2007 29.81 01/14/1994 20.53 09/08/1930 41.44 04/25/1994 32.95 04/25/1994 31.72 11/30/1998 38.82 3 02/26/2008 28.11 01/17/2006 15.47 12/02/1929 34.12 09/24/2007 32.64 04/19/1999 23.31 10/19/1987 33.59 4 03/11/2008 26.93 01/15/1999 13.87 07/25/1988 32.49 09/12/1994 31.72 07/31/2006 19.50 04/19/1999 31.35

GEV 1 11/28/2008 39.05 01/06/1930 32.12 09/08/1930 72.11 08/24/2009 48.25 04/06/2009 45.07 04/21/1930 112.42 2 12/11/1929 36.82 01/16/2009 29.52 12/02/1929 61.01 04/06/2009 41.84 08/24/2009 41.84 09/08/1930 75.87 3 11/11/1929 35.24 01/05/1933 14.55 03/07/1988 34.35 04/21/1930 37.15 04/21/1930 39.52 12/02/1929 72.11 4 09/14/2009 33.32 01/08/1947 13.62 11/17/2008 29.52 12/02/1929 35.24 11/17/2008 39.05 11/17/2008 56.53

GPD 1 11/28/2008 37.89 01/16/2009 26.98 09/08/1930 71.38 11/17/2008 42.33 04/06/2009 43.75 04/21/1930 105.01 2 09/14/2009 34.58 01/06/1930 25.64 04/06/2009 42.33 04/21/1930 35.69 08/24/2009 42.33 09/08/1930 71.38 3 12/11/1929 32.86 01/06/1931 10.30 12/02/1929 32.86 12/02/1929 32.86 04/21/1930 32.86 12/02/1929 67.67 4 07/18/1930 32.80 01/05/1933 7.67 07/25/1988 31.95 05/09/1938 29.66 09/08/1930 32.80 11/17/2008 52.51

Source: Bloomberg; daily data of the DJIA index in USD from the 1st January, 1900 to the 20th September, 2011. We use a moving window of four years (1040 daily returns) to re-estimate parameters dynamically for the various methods. The variable q1 refers to the hit test; q2 to the independence test; q3 to the magnitude test; and q�1; q

� 2; q

� 3

correspond to their resampling versions, following Escanciano and Olmo (2009, 2010, 2011).

Table C.6 Minimum k ratio model risk for 95% annualized value-at-risk models for various validity tests with 5%.

VaR methods Mean VaR (%) q1 q�1 q2 q � 2 q3 q

� 3

Historical �25.78 2.37 2.08 3.29 2.53 2.59 3.79 Normal �27.09 2.26 1.84 2.84 2.31 2.32 3.18 Student �30.52 2.02 1.73 2.52 2.04 2.04 3.31 Cornish–Fisher �20.25 3.45 3.73 4.88 4.76 3.72 4.88 RiskMetrics �25.67 1.71 20.77 57.18 41.47 36.84 101.69 GARCH �25.99 1.59 1.75 2.65 1.85 1.94 2.35 CAViaR �26.84 10.95 9.82 23.89 8.9 8.55 7.6 GEV �29.71 2.01 1.72 2.37 2.13 2.06 3.24 GPD �33.97 2.04 1.69 2.64 2.21 2.01 3.63

Source: Bloomberg; daily data of the DJIA index in USD from the 1 st January, 1900 to the 20th September, 2011. We use a moving window of four years (1040 daily returns) to dynamically re-estimate parameters for the various methods. The variable q1 refers to the hit test; q2 to the independence test; q3 to the magnitude test; and q�1; q

� 2; q

� 3

correspond to their resampling versions, following Escanciano and Olmo (2009, 2010, 2011).

88 C.M. Boucher et al. / Journal of Banking & Finance 44 (2014) 72–92

LI EVaR t ðaÞðp01;p11Þ ¼ ð1� p01ÞT00pT1001 ð1� p11Þ

T10pT1111 ;

and

LI EVaR t ðaÞðp;pÞ ¼ ð1� pÞT00þT10pT01þT11 ;

with Tij the number of observations in the state j for the current per- iod and at state i for the previous period, p01 ¼ T01=ðT00 þ T01Þ; p11 ¼ T11=ðT10 þ T11Þ and p ¼ ðT01 þ T11Þ=T .

A perfect sequence of corrected (empirical) VaR in the sense of this test (i.e. not too reactive, but not too smooth) is such that it respects condition (B.4).

A third category of tests considers the magnitude or size of vio- lation. This class of tests is based on the intuition that VaR excep- tions are treated as continuous random variables. For this test, Berkowitz (2001) transforms the empirical series into a standard normal ztþ1 series. He defines the observed quantile qtþ1 with the distribution forecast ftþ1 for the observed portfolio return rt as:

Fig. C.1. Risk map for maximum annualized adjustment values at 5% confidence levels for tests for 95% and 99% value-at-risk models (see Colletaz et al., 2013). Source: Bloomberg; daily data of the DJIA index in USD from the 1st January, 1900 to the 20th September, 2011; computations by the authors. We use a moving window of four years (1040 daily returns) to dynamically re-estimate parameters for the various methods. The variable q1 refers to the hit test; q2 to the independence test; q3 to the magnitude test; and q�1; q

� 2; q

� 3 correspond to their resampling versions, following Escanciano and Olmo (2009, 2010, 2011).

1923 1938 1953 1968 1983 1998 2013

−2.0% 0.0% 2.0%

Historical

−2.0% 0.0% 2.0%

Normal −2.0% 0.0% 2.0%

Student

−2.0% 0.0% 2.0%

Cornish − Fisher −2.0% 0.0% 2.0%

RiskMetrics

−2.0% 0.0% 2.0%

GARCH −2.0% 0.0% 2.0%

CAViaR

1935 1961 1987 2013

−2.0% 0.0% 2.0%

GEV

1935 1961 1987 2013

−2.0% 0.0% 2.0%

GPD

Fig. C.2. Dynamic optimal adjustment on the daily 95% VaR related to the hit test for 10-year sample estimation data. Source: Bloomberg; daily data of the DJIA index in USD from the 1st January, 1900 to the 7th October, 2013; computations by the authors. We use a moving window of ten years (2600 daily returns) to re-estimate parameters dynamically for the various methods.

C.M. Boucher et al. / Journal of Banking & Finance 44 (2014) 72–92 89

qtþ1 ¼ Z rtþ1 �1

ftþ1ðrÞdr: ðB:5Þ

The ztþ1 values are then compared to the normal random vari- ables with the desired coverage level of the VaR estimates:

ztþ1 ¼ U�1ðqtþ1Þ; ðB:6Þ

where U�1ð�Þ is the quantile function of the standard normal density.

If the VaR model generating the empirical quantiles is correct, then the ctþ1 series should be identically distributed with the

unconditional mean and standard deviation, denoted ðl;rÞ and should equal ð0;1Þ, as such:

ctþ1 ¼ ztþ1 if ztþ1 < U�1ðaÞ 0 otherwise;

( ðB:7Þ

where Uð�Þ is the standard normal cumulative distribution function. Finally, the corresponding test statistic is:

LRmagctþ1 ¼ 2 Lctþ1magðl;rÞ � L ctþ1 magð0;1Þ

h i !d > v2ð2Þ; ðB:8Þ

where

1923 1938 1953 1968 1983 1998 2013 0.0%

2.5% Historical

0.0%

2.5% Normal

0.0%

2.5% Student

0.0%

2.5% Cornish − Fisher

0.0%

2.5% RiskMetrics

0.0%

2.5% GARCH

0.0%

2.5% CAViaR

1935 1961 1987 2013 0.0%

2.5% GEV

1935 1961 1987 2013 0.0%

2.5% GPD

Fig. C.3. Optimal dynamic absolute value of minimum negative adjustments for the hit test for different 95% VaR – 10-year sample estimation data. Source: Bloomberg; daily data of the DJIA index in USD from the 1st January, 1900 to the 7th October, 2013; computations by the authors. We use a moving window of ten years (2600 daily returns) to re-estimate parameters dynamically for the various methods.

0 10 20 30 40 50 50%

100%

Historical

0 10 20 30 40 50 50%

100%

Normal 0 10 20 30 40 50

50%

100%

Student

0 10 20 30 40 50 50%

100%

Cornish Fisher 0 10 20 30 40 50

50%

100%

RiskMetrics

0 10 20 30 40 50 50%

100%

GARCH 0 10 20 30 40 50

50%

100%

CAViaR

0 10 20 30 40 50 50%

100%

GEV 0 10 20 30 40 50

50%

100%

GPD

Fig. C.4. Optimal dynamic relative adjustment for the hit test for different starting dates and 95% VaR by horizon (in years) – 10 years sample estimation data. Source: Bloomberg; daily data of the DJIA index in USD from the 1st January, 1900 to the 7th October, 2013; computations by the authors. We use a moving window of ten years (2600 daily returns) to dynamically re-estimate parameters for the various methods. This figure illustrates the dynamic negative adjustment required for passing the hit test, having randomly chosen the first date of implementation. Optimal relative negative adjustments are here expressed in terms of the percentage of their maximum value over the whole sample.

90 C.M. Boucher et al. / Journal of Banking & Finance 44 (2014) 72–92

Lctþ1magðl;rÞ¼ X

fctþ1¼0g log 1�U U

�1ðaÞ�l r

( )( )

þ X

fctþ1–0g �1

2 logð2pr2Þ�ðctþ1�lÞ

2

2r2 � log U U

�1ðaÞ�l r

( )( )( ) :

A perfect sequence of (corrected) empirical VaR in the sense of this test ( i.e. not too conservative, but not too over-confident) is such that it respects condition (B.8).

For unconditional and conditional coverage tests, Escanciano and Olmo (2009, 2010, 2011) approximate the critical values. Thus, they propose to use robust sub-sampling techniques to approxi- mate the true distribution of these tests. However, they also show that although the estimation risk can be diversified by choosing a large in-sample size relative to an out-of-sample one, the risk asso- ciated to the model cannot be eliminated using sub-sampling.

Indeed, let GxðxÞ denote the cumulative distribution function of the test statistic k for any x 2 IR, and, kb;t ¼ Kðt; t þ 1; � � � ; t þ b� 1Þ, with t ¼ ½1;2; � � � ; T � bþ 1�, the test statistic computed with the subsample ½1;2; � � � ; T � bþ 1� of size b.

Hence, the approximated sampling cumulative distribution function of k, denoted Gkb ðxÞ, built using the distribution of the val- ues of kb;t computed over the ðT � bþ 1Þ different consecutive subsamples of size b is given by:

Gkb ðxÞ ¼ ðT � bþ 1Þ �1 XT�bþ1

t¼1 1Ifkb;t<xg: ðB:9Þ

The ð1� sÞth sample quantile of Gkb , is given by: (see Table. B.1)

ckb ;1�s ¼ inf|{z} x2IR

fxjGkb ðxÞP 1� sg: ðB:10Þ

0 10 20 30 40 50 50%

100%

Historical

0 10 20 30 40 50 50%

100%

Normal 0 10 20 30 40 50

50%

100%

Student

0 10 20 30 40 50 50%

100%

Cornish Fisher 0 10 20 30 40 50

50%

100%

RiskMetrics

0 10 20 30 40 50 50%

100%

GARCH 0 10 20 30 40 50

50%

100%

CAViaR

0 10 20 30 40 50 50%

100%

GEV 0 10 20 30 40 50

50%

100%

GPD

10 years 4 years

Fig. C.5. Optimal dynamic relative adjustment for the hit test for different starting dates and 95% VaR by horizon (in years) – 4 years and 10 years VaR estimation. Source: Bloomberg; daily data of the DJIA index in USD from the 1st January, 1900 to the 7th October, 2013; computations by the authors. We use a moving window of four and ten years to dynamically re-estimate parameters for the various methods. This figure illustrates the dynamic negative adjustment required for passing the hit test, having randomly chosen the first date of implementation. Optimal relative negative adjustments are here expressed in terms of the percentage of their maximum value over the whole sample.

0 10 20 30 40 50

0.7 0.8 0.9

Historical

0 10 20 30 40 50 0.5

1

1.5

Normal

0 10 20 30 40 50 0.5

1

1.5

Student

0 10 20 30 40 50 0.5

1

1.5

Cornish Fisher 0 10 20 30 40 50

0

2

4 RiskMetrics

0 10 20 30 40 50 1

2

3

GARCH

0 10 20 30 40 50 1

2

3

CAViaR

0 10 20 30 40 50 1

1.2

1.4

GEV

0 10 20 30 40 50 0

1

2

GPD

Fig. C.6. Ratio ten/four year optimal dynamic relative adjustment for the hit test for different starting dates and 95% VaR by Horizon (in years). Source: Bloomberg; daily data of the DJIA index in USD from the 1st January, 1900 to the 7th October, 2013; computations by the authors. We use a moving window of four and ten years to dynamically re- estimate parameters for the various methods. This figure illustrates the dynamic negative adjustment required for passing the hit test, having randomly chosen the first date of implementation. Optimal relative negative adjustments are here expressed in terms of the percentage of their maximum value over the whole sample.

C.M. Boucher et al. / Journal of Banking & Finance 44 (2014) 72–92 91

Appendix C. Miscellaneous complementary results

See Tables C.1, C.2, C.3, C.4, C.5 and C.6. See Figs. C.1, C.2, C.3, C.4, C.5 and C.6.

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  • Risk models-at-risk
    • 1 Introduction
    • 2 Analysis of estimation and specification errors
      • 2.1 Probability shifting
      • 2.2 Monte Carlo examination
        • 2.2.1 The true model
        • 2.2.2 Misspecification and a parameter estimation uncertainty
        • 2.2.3 Probability shifting
    • 3 An economic valuation of model risk
      • 3.1 General backtest procedures
        • 3.1.1 Frequency
        • 3.1.2 Independence
        • 3.1.3 Magnitude
      • 3.2 A desirable VaR and the backtests
      • 3.3 VaR model comparisons
      • 3.4 Generalized model risk of model risk
    • 4 Conclusions
    • Acknowledgements
    • Appendix A Model risk when forecasting risk
      • A.1 Estimation risk
      • A.2 Specification risk
      • A.3 Granularity error
      • A.4 Measurement error
      • A.5 Liquidity risk
    • Appendix B Main backtest procedures
    • Appendix C Miscellaneous complementary results
    • References

The-good-and-bad-news-about-the-new-liquidity-rules-of_2014_Journal-of-Banki.pdf

Journal of Banking & Finance 44 (2014) 13–25

Contents lists available at ScienceDirect

Journal of Banking & Finance

journal homepage: www.elsevier .com/locate / jbf

The good and bad news about the new liquidity rules of Basel III in Western European countries

http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jbankfin.2014.03.041 0378-4266/� 2014 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

⇑ Corresponding author. Tel.: +41 41 757 67 46. E-mail addresses: [email protected] (A. Dietrich), [email protected] (K. Hess),

[email protected] (G. Wanzenried).

Andreas Dietrich a,⇑, Kurt Hess b, Gabrielle Wanzenried a a Institute of Financial Services IFZ, Lucerne University of Applied Sciences, Grafenauweg 10, 6304 Zug, Switzerland b Independent Credit View, Zurich, Switzerland

a r t i c l e i n f o

Article history: Received 15 July 2013 Accepted 27 March 2014 Available online 4 April 2014

JEL classification: G21 G28 G38

Keywords: Banking regulation Financial stability Net stable funding ratio Liquidity ratio Basel III

a b s t r a c t

New liquidity rules phased in under Basel III define the new net stable funding ratio (NSFR) to promote sustainable funding structures at financial institutions. In this paper, we analyze characteristics and driv- ers of NSFR for a sample of 921 Western European banks between 1996 and 2010. We find that a majority of banks have historically not fulfilled NSFR minimum requirements, in particular larger and faster grow- ing institutions as well as banks also active in asset management and investment banking. Many of them have started increasing NSFR with the onset of financial crisis 2008 while this ratio had been sliding in earlier years. Interestingly, potential advantages in funding costs for low NSFR banks do not seem to translate into higher profitability and results of these banks are more volatile.

� 2014 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

1. Introduction (2) The net stable funding ratio (NSFR) is designed to ‘‘promote

The recent financial crisis has highlighted shortcomings in the funding and liquidity management at financial institutions, which motivated the creation of new liquidity rules under the Basel III regulatory framework for banks. Principles for liquidity risk man- agement had already existed at national levels before the recent financial crisis, but the new Basel III rules published in late 2010 by the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS, 2010a) pro- pose a more comprehensive set of global standards measures to address mismatches in both short-term and long-term liquidity.

(1) The liquidity coverage ratio (LCR) requires banks to maintain an adequate level of ‘‘unencumbered, high-quality liquid assets that can be converted to cash to meet needs for a 30 calendar day time horizon under severe liquidity stress con- ditions specified by supervisors’’ (BCBS, 2010a, p.3). The standard requires that the value of the ratio should be no less than 100%, i.e. the stock of high-quality liquid assets should at least equal total projected net cash outflows.

longer-term funding of the assets and activities of banking organizations by establishing a minimum acceptable amount of stable funding based on the liquidity of an insti- tution’s assets and activities over a one-year horizon’’ (BCBS, 2010a, p.22). The ratio is defined as a bank’s available stable funding (ASF) divided by its required stable funding (RSF), which is required to be at least 100 per cent.

The new liquidity rules are expected to affect banks in sig- nificant ways. Their implementation is said to lead to more capital- and liquidity-efficient business models and products (Härle et al., 2010). In particular, the rules relating to NSFR will limit a bank’s ability to do maturity transformation, one of the core functions of banks. Accordingly, complying with the new standards might also have an impact on bank performance, such as reduced profitability and a squeeze on lending margins, as well as systemic effects (Macroeconomic Assessment Group, 2010).

In this paper, we focus on the net stable funding ratio, which aims at a more sustainable funding of medium- and long-term assets, including off-balance-sheet exposures, thereby reducing the extent of balance sheet maturity imbalances. We expect NSFR to have the most tangible impact on banks as it might force them

14 A. Dietrich et al. / Journal of Banking & Finance 44 (2014) 13–25

to use alternative funding sources, which in turn could provoke major shifts in their business models.

To gauge potential effects of new NSRF rules in future, we look back and analyze what has driven this ratio in the past and how it has affected performance of banks and the banking industry more generally. Specifically, we consider a sample of 921 Western Euro- pean banks over the period from 1996 to 2010 and study (1) how NSFR has developed over time, (2) which bank-specific, respec- tively outside factors have driven the level of NSFR and, finally, (3) whether and how NSFR has affected banking industry perfor- mance in a broad sense including financial as well as macroeco- nomic outcomes. In summary, it is the purpose of this research to explore potential impacts of the prescribed funding structures under Basel III on the performance of the banking industry in Wes- tern Europe.

We are able to conduct this analysis for NSFR because this ratio can quite reliably be estimated based on historical financial infor- mation published by the above banks, as has been done by other researchers such as Ötker-Robe and Pazarbasioglu (2010). A corre- sponding analysis of LCR does not seem feasible since an estima- tion of this ratio would require detailed information on composition and duration of liquid assets and 30-day liabilities, which would not normally be found in standard bank financial statements.

Given the recent creation of the new liquidity standard, there exist so far just a few mostly descriptive studies on this issue, but no research has, to our knowledge, investigated which specific factors have driven NSFR in the past and in what way NSFR would potentially influence bank and banking system performance. Hence, this paper explores at least four novel aspects:

(1) It is the first research to compile a simulation of historical NSFRs for a large sample of banks over an extended time per- iod including the recent financial crisis. It will thus be better suited to explore the dynamics and the determinants of NSFR.

(2) It is based on a sample of Western European banks which are expected to be more strongly impacted by the Basel III liquid- ity requirements than banking institutions elsewhere, in par- ticular in the US (Härle et al., 2010; Ötker-Robe and Pazarbasioglu, 2010, p.19). This is, among other reasons, because the US banking industry has less proportional weight in its national financial system than European banks and US banking has been subject to liquidity rules for some time.

(3) Our NSFR analyses do not only focus on a few very large banks as in the IMF study of Ötker-Robe and Pazarbasioglu (2010), respectively a set of 15 ‘‘representative’’ banks con- structed from balance sheet data of banks in total of 15 countries (King, 2013). Accounting also for small and med- ium-sized banks helps us better understand the impact of the new liquidity rules on commercial banking more generally.

(4) We use a regression framework in which we analyze the effects of the new liquidity rules on bank performance. We apply the GMM methodology, which also accounts for potential endogeneity problems in our model specifications. Some of the existing studies on that topic have used dynamic general stochastic equilibrium models (e.g. Macroeconomic Assessment Group, 2010; BCBS, 2010b).1

1 According to Lucas (1976), one of the problems with the dynamic general stochastic equilibrium approach is that these models are very complex and depend on a large set of assumptions, which in turn are based on past correlations between macroeconomic variables. Therefore, the results of the models and their predictions in particular then directly depend on these assumptions. This might no longer be valid due to the introduction of new policies and/or other unforeseen market events.

The main results of our paper are as follows. Overall, the aver- age NSFR amounts to about 97%, but 60% of the banks in our sam- ple do not (yet) fulfill the new Basel III NSFR requirement and have an NSFR value below 100%. We find that NSFR generally deterio- rated before the crisis for larger banks and to a lesser extent for medium-sized banks. On the other hand, the group of smallest banks in our sample has significantly improved NSFR since the start of the crisis and had an average NSFR of more than 110%. Finally, there exist significant differences between banks with NSFR P 100% and the ones with NSFR < 100% with respect to bank- and market-specific characteristics considered in our models.

In our regressions we find, among other interesting results, that safer banks, i.e., those with higher capital ratios, do also have a stronger structural liquidity. By contrast, banks with more rapid past growth have lower NSFRs. As expected, the business model does also have a significant impact on NSFR. In particular, tradi- tional banks focusing on the lending / deposit taking business have a higher NSFR than financial institutions with a high proportion of non-interest income, e.g. from asset management or investment banking activities.

As to the impact of NSFR on bank performance, we provide empirical evidence that NSFR does not have any statistically signif- icant influence on individual bank profitability as measured by returns on assets and equity or net interest margin. This result con- trasts with some studies, which expect a negative impact on bank performance (e.g. Härle et al., 2010; Allen et al., 2012). At the same time, low NSFR banks show more volatile results, which would support the case for introducing the new liquidity standards in order to make the banking system more resilient.

The paper is structured as follows. In Section 2, we briefly review the literature on the new liquidity regulations, followed by a description of our data in Section 3. Methodology and model specifications are in Sections 4 and 5 includes our results. We pro- vide a summary and conclusions in Section 6.

2. Related literature

Funding risks in banking as they became apparent with the start of the 2007–2008 financial crisis are no new phenomenon and banks have endured periodic liquidity crises all through history. As documented by Bordo (2008), they are part of a perennial pat- tern regardless of how much individual bank and systemic risk control systems have progressed over time. The root cause seems to lie deep in the banks’ core ‘‘transformation’’ service described by Bhattacharya and Thakor (1993). Due the banks’ role as liquidity providers (Kashyap et al., 2002), most of their funds are tradition- ally associated with comparably short-term deposits from third parties. Such liquid claims allow depositors to intertemporally optimize their consumption preferences, but leave banks exposed to the risk of bank runs (Diamond and Dybvig, 1983).

There is indeed ample empirical evidence that not just high leverage but also the reliance of banks on unsustainable funding structures to finance the expansion of their balance sheets are a key factor in the buildup of systemic risks and the propagation mechanism. Berger and Bouwman (2008, 2009) point to periods of abnormal liquidity creation that have preceded banking crises in the US. For the recent crisis, it was similarly found that the higher the banks’ reliance on non-deposit wholesale funding, the weaker the performance of their stock (Raddatz, 2010), the lower their return on assets (Demirguç-Kunt and Huizinga, 2009) and, very importantly, banks with weaker structural liquidity in the pre-crisis period were more likely to fail subsequently (Bologna, 2011; Vazquez and Federico, 2012).

Basel III liquidity regulations (BCBS, 2010a) represent another attempt to rein in the risks of such sudden funding crises. Starting

A. Dietrich et al. / Journal of Banking & Finance 44 (2014) 13–25 15

with the comprehensive work of the Macroeconomic Assessment Group (2010), a strand of research to study potential effects of the new Basel III rules has emerged, mostly however dealing with the impact of capital and leverage regulations. The following liter- ature review thus focuses on the relatively fewer pieces of analysis, many of them authored by policy making bodies and industry con- sultants, which have explored specific effects of the new global minimum liquidity standards.

The impact on lending spreads is an initial aspect discussed by researchers as both low-yielding liquidity and longer-term funding would be costly to banks. It is generally agreed that they will decrease (Härle et al., 2010; King, 2013), at least as a transitory effect (Macroeconomic Assessment Group, 2010). King (2013), who explores the most cost efficient strategies to meet the new NSFR rule for sample of 15 synthetic banks representing 15 coun- tries, finds a potential reduction of net interest margins by 70–88 basis points on average, which, for perspective, represents about 40% of the 2009 average margin of these banks. More specific esti- mates are in the McKinsey study of Härle et al. (2010, p. 9) who project higher funding and liquidity costs for loans of up to 40 basis points but additional cost of up to 90 basis points for the funding of off-balance sheet lending products and the fixed income trading book.

One obvious effect of depressed lending margins would be pres- sure on banks’ return on equity which Härle et al. (2010) expect to decline by an average 4% in Europe, respectively 3% in the United States. Whilst the authors attribute most of this decrease to new capital and leverage rules, they foresee a 0.9% decline of returns solely due to new liquidity and funding standards. The results of Bordeleau and Graham (2010), based on a 1997–2009 sample of US and Canadian banks, suggest that profitability is improved for banks that hold some liquid assets, however, there is a point at which holding further liquid assets diminishes a bank’s profitabil- ity. There thus seems to be a tradeoff between short-term profit- ability gains of lower liquidity holdings and longer-term performance benefits of insurance against liquidity shocks. More- over, the authors note that this relationship seems to vary depend- ing on a bank’s business model and the state of the economy.

The aspect of business models, respectively how banks would potentially adapt their strategies to the new regime, has in fact been another focus of researchers. According to Ötker-Robe and Pazarbasioglu (2010), many financial institutions will be forced into such adaptions as they are still well below required NSFR lev- els. Härle et al. (2010) together with many other researchers see the biggest impact on banks with substantial capital markets and trading businesses. To meet the new NSFR target, they will have to increase their base of stable funding, via optimized deposit gath- ering, secured funding instruments and stronger investor coverage to help them place long-term unsecured issuances. A fundamental shift in strategy is also foreseen by Allen et al. (2012) based on their analysis of the UK banking market. They contend that Basel III will compel banks to revert towards the kind of liability-driven asset management that characterized banking in the 1960s, before global financial de-regulation. This strategy could in turn lead a limited availability of credit and thus reduce economic activity.

Margin pressures for banks and expected shifts in their strate- gies are thus thought to have systemic effects mainly through a negative impact on economic growth when lending to the produc- tive sector becomes scarcer. Researchers in fact generally foresee a negative impact on economic output which Angelini et al. (2011) estimate at 0.08% loss for each percentage point increase in NSFR. These negative effects are considered transitory, however, and the authors of the Macroeconomic Assessment Group (2010) reason that as banks become less risky, both the cost and quantity of credit should recover, reversing the initial negative impact on con- sumption and investment. Gambacorta (2011), who estimates

long-run relationship among a set of US macro-variables from 1994 to 2008, likewise shows that tighter capital and liquidity requirements have negative (but rather limited) effects on the level of long-run steady-state output. Studies of BCBS (2010b) and Yan et al. (2011), finally, argue that new regulations will lower proba- bility and severity of future banking crises and associated losses of economic output. On balance, they thus foresee a significant net positive long-term effect on economic activity.

Overall, effects of Basel III funding standards remain a relatively scarcely researched topic and this paper thus attempts to help clos- ing this gap. Most authors appear to focus their attention on capital and leverage rules as it is clear that capitalization determines a bank’s resilience in the long-run. By contrast, our research is moti- vated by the fact that unsustainable funding structures during the recent crisis have proven a more immediate threat to the survival of even well capitalized financial institutions.

3. Data

This section presents the data employed in this research includ- ing a description of (1) sources, (2) methodologies to derive the NSFR data series for the subsequent empirical analysis as well as (3) data filters and sample selection criteria applied. It concludes with bank level data summary statistics and illustrations of selected characteristics of the data analyzed.

To conduct this study, we use data for the bank-specific charac- teristics and the ownership structure from the Fitch-IBCA Bank- scope (BSC) database, which provides annual financial information for banks in 179 countries around the world. Coverage by the Bankscope database is comprehensive in most countries, with the banks included accounting for roughly 90% of the assets of all banks. Macroeconomic factors are taken from various sources including IMF World Economic Outlook, the World Bank and OECD.

The key factor explored in this study is NSFR, which we have introduced in Section 1. This ratio has been defined quite recently (see BCBS, 2010a, p. 25–31) and we thus need raw balance sheet and off-balance sheet data to reproduce NSFR time series for the past. Unfortunately, some data elements required for a precise cal- culation of NSFR have not been reported historically. An example would be a breakdown of customer deposits into a stable and less stable component. However, a good approximation of NSFR seems feasible. Our approach is inspired by Ötker-Robe and Pazarbasioglu (2010, Annex 2, p.37), who derive their NSFR time series in a com- parable way.

The Net Stable Funding Ratio (NSFR) is a ratio of available to required stable funding (BCBS, 2010a, p. 25–31). The available sta- ble funding (ASF) is a weighted sum of funding sources according to their stability features. Similarly, the required stable funding (RSF) is a weighted sum of uses of funding sources according to their liquidity. To calculate the required amount of stable funding, specific RSF factors are applied to balance sheet assets and off bal- ance sheet activity. The RSF factor represents the proportion of the exposure that should be backed by stable funding: the more liquid the asset, the lower the RSF factor. Table 1 provides a summary of ASF and RSF factors as applied in this research. It represents a sim- plified version of BCBS (2010a) rules and is, in line with the method applied in Ötker-Robe and Pazarbasioglu (2010, Annex 2, p.37), guided by general availability of past bank financial data.

Our initial raw data sample includes financial data of 8619 Wes- tern European banks for the period from 1996 to 2010. For our econometric analyses, we subsequently narrow it down to achieve a more homogeneous sample of 921 banks from seven Western European countries including Germany, France, Switzerland, Aus- tria, Belgium, the Netherlands and Luxembourg.

The main motivation for narrowing the sample is twofold. For one, there is good data quality for banks in these markets

Table 1 Funding factors used for calculation of NSFR. Source: Bankscope data item structure.

Available stable funding (ASF) ASF factors (%)

Equity Total equity 100 Pref. shares and hybrid capital accounted for as debt

100

Pref. shares and hybrid capital accounted for as equity

100

Non-controlling interest (minorities)a �100

Liabilities Total customer deposits 90 Deposits from banks 0 Repos and cash collateral 50 Other deposits and short-term borrowings 0 Total long term funding 60 Reserves for pensions and other 100 All other liabilities and equity 0

Required stable funding (RSF) Data item RSF factors

(%) Loans Residential mortgage loans 65

Other mortgage loans 65 Other consumer/retail loans 85 Corporate and commercial loans 85 Other loans 100

Other Loans and advances to banks 0 Total securities 40 Investments in property 100 Insurance assets 100 Other earning assets 100 Cash and due from banks 0 All other non-earning assets 100

Off-balance sheet

Guarantees 5

Acceptances and documentary credits reported off-balance sheet

5

Committed credit lines 5 Other contingent liabilities 5

a Minus factor to eliminate ASF related to non-controlling interests, which were added as component of total equity.

16 A. Dietrich et al. / Journal of Banking & Finance 44 (2014) 13–25

throughout the sample period. This includes contiguous series of observations, which are crucial for the exploration of dynamic effects. In particular, disclosure of banks in some of the countries

Table 2 Bank selection and NSFR data filer criteria.

Filter criteria

Bank level criteria Bank specializations Only institutions from Bankscope specializati

Bank, Real Estate & Mortgage Bank, Savings B

Countries Only institutions from Germany, France, Swit

Size Total assets (most recent number reported) e OR the institution is among the top 10 in terms

Balance sheet structure On average, at least 30% of assets must be cate

NSFR data criteria Minimum and maximum NSFR NSFR must exceed 25% but must not exceed

(1) peculiar balance sheet structures and/o (2) potential data quality problems in the B

Contiguity of observations There must be at least 6 contiguous annual NS study of lead and lag effects from explanator

Continuity of balance sheet structure NSFR values for a certain institution must exh exceed 20% This is to exclude institutions with

(1) reporting discontinuities and/or (2) effects from merger and acquisition act

The table lists the detailed data filters applied to extract a panel of 921 European banki

does not allow a consistent retrospective calculation of NSFR over the whole sample period. Likewise important, the countries stud- ied here are comparable in terms of banking tradition and culture, the economy and geography as well as the political and regulatory environment. There should thus be less need for system- and coun- try-specific control parameters in our analysis framework. Quite clearly, the constricted sample will not allow us to draw definite conclusions for the whole of Europe or even the global banking sys- tem. It nevertheless allows us explore our research questions for a substantial and in many respects representative swathe of the European financial market.

Further filter criteria applied include size limits, asset structure criteria (lending business of institution must be material) as well as only selected activity specializations as defined by Bankscope. The latter criterion is meant to exclude specialized financial insti- tutions such as investment banks, security firms or finance compa- nies. Once banks are chosen, we apply additional criteria to ensure NSFR data derive as described above (1) are available with a certain consistency and (2) satisfy minimal data quality standards. As a reference, all of the above data filter criteria are shown in Table 2 in the appendix.

The graphs below illustrate some salient properties of banks analyzed in this paper. While most observations are from banks with total assets below USD 5 billion, the group of very large banks with assets above USD 200 billion contribute by far the bulk of combined assets, particularly in the second half of the sample per- iod (see Fig. 1).

In terms of countries, with 73.4% of the number of observations, German financial institutions dominate the sample, which is a reflection of the fragmented nature of this banking market. Aver- age USD assets of German banks represented a mere USD 11 bil- lion, whereas French banks had average assets of USD 62 billion. Even larger are Belgian and Dutch banks in the sample with total average assets far above USD 100 billion. The number of observa- tions per country is presented in Table 3.

Note that our sample is unbalanced. The reason for the missing data is that the Fitch-IBCA Bankscope (BSC) database does not report observations for all the variables in all years. Based on Lit- tle’s test (Little, 1988 and Allison, 2002), we conclude that the assumption of observations missing completely at random (MCAR) holds, and the safe solution is to just use the observed cases, as

on groups Bank Holding & Holding Companies, Commercial Banks, Cooperative ank, Specialized Governmental Credit Institution

zerland, Austria, Belgium, Netherlands and Luxembourg

xceeds USD 1 billion

of total assets in its respective country

gorized as loans. This is to exclude institutions without material lending business

250% in any period. This is to exclude banks with r ankscope data base (essential balance sheet data missing in database)

FR observations for an institution to be included in the sample. This facilitates the y data series on NSFR or vice versa ibit a certain stability and standard deviation of NSFR values observed should not

ivities which strongly change the nature of the bank’s business

ng institutions over the 15-years time period considered from 1996 to 2010.

Fig. 1. Number of observations in each bank size category 1996 to 2010.

Table 3 Number of observations and bank assets by country.

Country No banks in % No observations in % Total assets (in USD trillion)a

in %

Austria 52 5.6 601 5.2 11.0 5.7 Belgium 16 1.7 152 1.3 21.0 11.0 France 136 14.7 1301 11.2 49.7 26.0 Germany 625 67.9 8547 73.4 67.2 35.2 Luxembourg 4 0.4 36 0.3 1.1 0.6 Netherlands 21 2.3 157 1.3 34.3 18.0 Switzerland 67 7.3 855 7.3 6.7 3.5

Total 921 100 11,649 100 191.0 100

The table reports on the number of pooled observations and total pooled bank assets in the sample over the full sample period 1996 to 2010. a Latest figure reported.

A. Dietrich et al. / Journal of Banking & Finance 44 (2014) 13–25 17

these lead to unbiased estimates with correct inference. Further- more, extracting a balanced panel out of the unbalanced panel would lead to a significant loss of observations.

4. Methodology and model specification

As illustrated in Fig. 2, we conduct our analysis in two steps. In step one, we investigate how environmental, market and owner- ship factors as well as bank-specific characteristics affect the level of NSFR. This is followed by step two, where we analyze the impact of all of the above factors jointly with NSFR as additional explana- tory variable on bank performance. We thereby define bank perfor- mance broadly to include dimensions of traditional financial performance but also macro-prudential outcomes such as mea- surements of credit loss performance or volatility of returns (see, e.g. Vander Vennet, 1996; De Haan and Poghosyand, 2012; Hirtle and Stiroh, 2007).

Specifically we explore in step one potential determinants of NSFR employing both a univariate and a multivariate approach. For the univariate method, we classify bank-year observations into two

Fig. 2. Two-step analyses.

categories based upon whether they already fulfill NSFR require- ments (NSFR P 100%) or whether they do not (NSFR < 100%). Once we have classified our sample banks, we calculate descriptive statis- tics for the two groups and test for significant differences across our variables. We then conduct multivariate tests on the data, using GMM technique to estimate models as described under Section 4.1. Section 4.2 provides a discussion of variables considered for the mul- tivariate ‘‘Model 1 specification’’ to explore drivers of NSFR with detailed definitions of the variables shown in Table 4.

For step two we employ an analogous multivariate approach to analyze in what way NSFR in conjunction with bank characteristics and macro variables influences bank performance in a broad sense including profitability measures, funding costs, loan quality and the volatility of the above profitability measures. Section 4.3 pro- vides a discussion of variables considered for this ‘‘Model 2 speci- fication’’, again with detailed definitions of all variables listed in Table 4.

4.1. Multivariate modelling technique

We follow Athanasoglou et al. (2008), García-Herrero et al. (2009) as well as Delis and Kouretas (2011) and use a dynamic lin- ear model as

NSFRit ¼ dNSFRi;t�1 þ XJ

j¼1 bjX

j it þ

XM

m¼1 bmX

m it þ eit

with jdj < 1 ð1Þ

NSFRi,t is the net stable funding ratio of bank i at time t, with i = 1,. . .,N, t = 1,. . ., T, c is a constant term, Xjit are the bank-specific and Xmit the macroeconomic variables as defined in Table 4, and eit is the disturbance, with mi the unobserved bank-specific effect and uit the idiosyncratic error. This is a one-way error component regression model, where mi � (IIN(0, r2v) is independent of uit � (IIN(0, r2u).

Table 4 Definition of variables.

Variable Description Type

Capital Ratio Equity over total assets (in %) Firm characteristics Dummy Crisis Dummy variable: Financial crisis years are the years 2007 to 2010 Market/environmental Foreignowned Dummy variable with a foreign owner, if more than 50%; otherwise domestic owned Owner characteristics Funding Costs Interest expenses over averagea total deposits (in %) Performance Gdp Growth The yearly real GDP growth (in %) Market/environmental Growth Netloans Annual growth of net loans (in %) Firm characteristics Loan Loss Ratio Period loan loss provisions over total loans (in %) Performance Net Interest Margin Net interest margin (in %), defined as net interest income divided by total averagea assets Performance Non Interest Share Total non-interest income over total income (in %) Firm characteristics NSFR Ratio is defined as a bank’s available stable funding (ASF) divided by its required stable funding

(RSF) (in %). ASF and RSF are calculated based on funding weights shown in Table 1 Firm characteristics

Overhead/Total Assets Overhead expenses over averagea total assets (in %) Firm characteristics ROA Net profits over averagea total assets (in %) Performance ROE Net profits over averagea total equity (in %) Performance Size (ln assets) Bank size, measured by the natural logarithm of the USD accounting value of the bank’s total assets Firm characteristics Stateowned Dummy variable if more than 50% of the bank is owned by the state Owner characteristics Stdev ROA 3y Standard deviation of ROA calculated over the last three years Performance Yield Curve Difference between a 10 year reference government bond rate and a short-term rate (money market

type instruments) compiled by the OECD. OECD sources these data from national central banks Market/environmental

a Average of beginning and end of year reported value.

18 A. Dietrich et al. / Journal of Banking & Finance 44 (2014) 13–25

We expect the liquidity structure of a bank to persist over time, as this balance sheet structure cannot be adjusted quickly. There- fore, we specify a dynamic model by including a lagged dependent variable among the regressors. NSFRi,t�1 is the one-period lagged NSFR and d the speed of adjustment to equilibrium. A value of d between 0 and 1 implies persistence of NSFR, but they will eventu- ally return to their normal level.

Given the dynamic nature of our model, least squares estima- tion methods produce biased and inconsistent estimates (see Baltagi, 2001). Therefore, we use techniques for dynamic panel estimation that are able to deal with the biases and inconsistencies of our estimates.

A further challenge for the estimation of NSFR relates to poten- tial endogeneity problems. For example, banks with a higher capi- tal ratio tend to have higher NSFR as equity enters the NSFR calculation as 100% weighted stable funding. However, the causal- ity could also go in the opposite direction, when banks consciously choose a solid NSFR in times of crises, which in turn affects the lev- els of capital held.

Following García-Herrero et al. (2009) as well as Delis and Kouretas (2011), we address these problems by employing the Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) for dynamic panel data put forward by Arellano and Bover (1995) and Blundell and Bond (1998). As Delis and Kouretas (2011) outline, the Blundell–Bond estimator is well suited to account for the dynamic structure of the model and it has two more additional properties that seem highly relevant for our data. First, it does not break down in the presence of unit roots (see Blinder et al., 2003 for the proof). Sec- ond, it accommodates the possible endogeneity between our dependent variables and some of the explanatory variables in our models by means of appropriate instruments. In particular, the sys- tem GMM estimator uses lagged values of the dependent variable in levels and in differences as instruments, as well as lagged values of other regressors, which could potentially suffer from endogene- ity. The latter problem would lead to a correlation between those endogenous variables and the error term and to inconsistent esti- mates if not properly taken care of.

With respect to the potential endogeneity of our regressors, we have good reasons to believe that at least some of our explanatory variables (in addition to the lagged dependent variable) are endog- enous. We follow Hayashi (2000) and Baum et al. (2003, 2007) in order to determine which variables are endogenous and which are exogenous. In concrete terms, we use a modified version of the Durbin–Wu–Hausmann test (Hayashi, 2000; Baum et al.,

2003, 2007) and determine which variables have to be treated as endogenous. For those endogenous variables, which appear in ital- ics in the tables with the regression results, we use their lagged values as instruments, as discussed in Arellano and Bover (1995) and Blundell and Bond (1998). The number of lags used are indi- cated in table legend. Note that the system GMM estimator also controls for unobserved heterogeneity and for the persistence of the dependent variable. Overall, this estimator has been found to yield consistent estimations of the parameters (see, e.g., Delis and Kouretas, 2011).

All our results are based on the one-step system GMM estima- tor, using robust standard errors. Even though the two-step esti- mator is asymptotically more efficient, the two-step estimates of the standard errors tend to be severely downward biased (Arellano and Bond, 1991; Blundell and Bond, 1998).

4.2. Model 1 specification

In our Model 1 we analyze which factors affect the level of NSFR. Such drivers include bank characteristics and ownership fac- tors as well as control variables for the crisis and for country-spe- cific macroeconomic conditions. Table 4 provides a detailed definition of all variables employed in this Model 1 specification.

4.2.1. Bank characteristics Bank characteristics include the capital ratio, the growth rate of

loans, bank size as measured by the log of total assets and the busi- ness model as proxied by non-interest income over total income.

In order to check for the relationship between capital and struc- tural liquidity, we use the equity to assets ratio as our capital ratio in line with Basel III leverage rules. Banks with stronger capitaliza- tion can be expected to have a higher NSFR because we presume that safer banks will aim for both stronger capital ratios and a more resilient, sustainable funding structure. Besides that, this relation- ship is also influenced by a technical fact as more equity automat- ically helps to improve NSFR as the ASF-factor of equity is 100%.

For the loan growth variable as a proxy of past credit expansion, we hypothesize that banks with a more aggressive credit expan- sion have a lower NSFR as they might use more short-term money in order to support their funding.

We consider the log of bank assets as proxy to control for pos- sible data distortions due to size heterogeneity within our sample. Small banks are usually more focused on traditional intermedia- tion activities (Berger and Bouwman, 2009) and might take less

A. Dietrich et al. / Journal of Banking & Finance 44 (2014) 13–25 19

advantage of the availability of wholesale funding or central bank financing than larger banks. Furthermore, bank size accounts for possible ‘‘too big to fail’’ status of large banks that could lead to moral hazard behavior and excessive risk taking, e.g. by compro- mising on the asset-liability maturity match in the balance sheet, namely by an over-reliance on short-term wholesale funding to finance long-term assets. We thus expect a negative relationship between bank size and NSFR.

Finally, we do not expect NSFR to be ‘‘business model neutral’’. Banks with more diversified income streams, e.g. also active in asset management and investment banking are more likely to use alternative funding sources including wholesale funding.

4.2.2. Owner characteristics Since we surmise that bank governance and liquidity manage-

ment mechanisms are at play, we include a dummy variable regarding foreign and domestic ownership and private and state ownership, respectively. The company is ‘‘foreign-owned’’ if pri- vate foreign individuals, companies or organizations own 50% or more of the bank. We classify a bank as state-owned if public sec- tor ownership exceeds 50%.

State-owned banks might have a higher NSFR because their owner(s) are possibly more risk averse and attach greater weight to the security aspect than to the potential of additional maturity transformation profits. Conversely, these banks might show moral hazard behavior, e.g. by the taking of excessive risks, since their funding benefits from an explicit or at least implicit guarantee by its public sector shareholders.

Foreign banks, on the other hand, might have a stronger reli- ance on wholesale funding because they would not be established enough to attract sufficient traditional deposits. On the other side, foreign banks might draw on deposits from their parent and thus benefit from lower funding costs also for long-term funding. The overall effect of these ownership variables is thus indeterminate from a theoretical point of view and needs to be investigated empirically.

4.2.3. Market/environmental characteristics The existing empirical literature about liquidity and liquidity

creation outlines the relevance of macroeconomic factors (see, e.g., Distinguin et al., 2013). We thus account for potential effects of macroeconomic developments by including variables for GDP growth, the yield curve spread and a dummy variable for the recent financial crisis.

Including the GDP growth variable allows us to control for busi- ness cycles effects that might impact the funding of banks. In eco- nomically prosperous times, banks would possibly more readily accept risks associated with maturity mismatches and thus rely on quickly available short-term funding to meet an increasing demand for loans. They might also have less customer savings as booming markets offer alternative higher yielding investment opportunities for customers. Therefore, we expect GDP growth to have a negative relation with NSFR.

We include the yield curve spread between long and short-term rates because bank lending and borrowing as well as banks’ profit margins strongly depends on the term structure of interests. The steeper the yield curve, i.e. the higher the yield curve spread, the more banks will expand attractive short-term funding. We thus foresee this maturity premium proxy to be in a negative relation- ship to NSFR.

In order to take into account the impact of the financial crisis on NSFR, we build a dummy variable, which takes the value of one for the years 2007–2010, and zero for the sample years before 2007. The financial crisis, which began in August 2007, had a significant impact on banks around the world. Before the crisis and under Basel II rules, potential threats related to issues of bank liquidity

were widely ignored and so many banks were incentivized to bor- row short-term from the markets rather than by means of more stable, yet more difficult to attract customer deposits. While this business model had a positive impact on profits during prosperous times, it had a negative impact starting 2007 when liquidity dried up abruptly for many banks. Banks realized that keeping higher liquidity reserves provided them with a greater cushion and would enable them to better absorb losses and liquidity pressures. Lack of funding typically forced them to shrink their balance sheets, which likewise would have had a beneficial impact on NSFR. There are also potential impacts of cheaper long-term funding sources avail- able under the ECB’s LTRO funding program, which provides some relief to banks cut off from the funding markets. Overall, we expect a positive sign for this variable, i.e. that NSFR has increased with the onset of the financial crisis.

4.3. Model 2 specification

In our step two model, we analyze whether NSFR influences bank performance in a broad sense including profitability mea- sures (namely returns on asset and equity, net interest margins), the funding costs, loan quality, as measured by the ratio of loan loss provisions over total loans, and the standard deviation of ROA. As a reminder, Table 4 includes a detailed definition of all variables employed in the following Model 2 specification.

4.3.1. Dependent variables Dependent performance measures include firstly the return on

average asset ratio (ROA) defined as the ratio of net profits to the average beginning and end of year total assets expressed as a per- centage. As alternative profitability measures, we use return on average equity (ROE), the ratio of net profit to average equity, as well as the net interest margin (NIM), defined as net interest income divided by average total assets. Funding costs, defined as interest expenses over average total deposits, are considered as they might well be affected by NSFR besides other market and bank-specific factors. The final two variables represent perfor- mance outcomes mainly relevant for regulators and policy makers. These are the loan quality, proxied by the loan loss provisions over total loans, as well as the standard deviation of ROA, a pertinent proxy for the riskiness of a bank’s earnings (see, e.g. Shehzad et al., 2009).

4.3.2. Independent variables As mentioned above, we include the net stable funding ratio

(NSFR) defined before as our central explanatory variable to inves- tigate whether it significantly influences bank performance. We expect NSFR to be negatively related to bank performance, i.e. that banks with a lower NSFR are more profitable. In times of ‘‘normal yield curves’’, long-term debt is more costly than short-term fund- ing and banks relying more on long-term funding thus pay a term premium, which in turn lowers their profitability, respectively increases their funding costs.

Furthermore, faster growing banks might rely more heavily on short-term funding, but this excessive credit growth might subse- quently lead to higher loan losses. We thus expect NSFR to have a negative influence on our loan loss provisions variable. In a similar vein, a more stable funding concept might contribute to less vola- tile profits and we thus expect NSFR to be inversely related to the volatility of ROA.

Following the literature, we include both internal and external control variables in our models where various bank performance proxies are our dependent variables. In most studies, variables such as bank size, loan quality, the capital ratio, the overhead costs, and a business model variable serve as internal determinants of banking profitability.

20 A. Dietrich et al. / Journal of Banking & Finance 44 (2014) 13–25

On one hand, we could expect a positive and significant rela- tionship between the size and the profitability of a bank as larger banks might profit from economies of scales and scope advantages. On the other hand, authors, such as Berger et al. (1987) have found that increasing the size of a bank produces only trivial cost savings and that very large banks often face scale inefficiencies. As to the impact of the capital ratio on bank performance, empirical evi- dence from Demirguç-Kunt and Huizinga (1999) and Goddard et al. (2004) indicate that the best performing banks are those, which maintain a high level of equity relative to their assets.2 Over- head costs are an important determinant of profitability, i.e., the higher the overhead costs in relation to the assets, the lower the profitability of a bank. Banks with a higher share of interest income relative to the total income are usually less profitable, because profit margins of fee, commission and trading operations are usually higher than profit margins in interest operations (see, e.g., Dietrich and Wanzenried, 2011). Finally, we expect a negative effect from the loan loss provisions relative to total loans on bank performance.

As suggested by the literature, we use several macroeconomic variables as external controls that are likely to affect bank perfor- mance. In particular, we include the growth of real gross domestic product (GDP) as a proxy of the business cycle into our models. Most studies (e.g. Bourke, 1989; Molyneux and Thornton, 1992; Demirguç-Kunt and Huizinga, 1999; Athanasoglou et al., 2008) have found a positive relationship between GDP growth and bank performance. Cyclical downswings often decrease the demand for borrowing and credit risk will increase due to uncertainty and vol- atility in the markets. Accordingly, during cyclical downswings the loan quality deteriorates and provisions for non-repayments increase, hence lowering banks’ profitability. Just as in Model 1 specification, we finally include the dummy variable for the recent financial crisis into our models.

5. Results

5.1. Descriptive statistics and univariate results

Table 6 presents descriptive statistics for the full sample (col- umn 2), and, separately, for bank-year observations that have NSFR less than 1 (i.e. 100%) and bank-year observations with NSFR greater than or equal to 1, respectively (columns (3) and (4)), along with the difference in means between the two groups and the asso- ciated t-test in columns (5) and (6). Table 7 reports correlation coefficients between these variables, showing that correlations are all on acceptable levels.

The average net stable funding ratio over all banks in our sam- ple amounts to 96.9%. The minimum value of NSFR in our sample is 20.8% while the maximum value is 208.5% (not reported). Note that 60% of all bank-year observations have an NSFR value of less than 100% and, therefore, do not (yet) fulfill the new Basel III NSFR requirements.

Before looking in detail at the explanatory variables and how they differ between the two NSFR groups, it is worth analyzing NSFR by bank size. Fig. 3 shows the development of NSFR by bank size over the time period considered. The maturity mismatches, as proxied by NSFR, became more pronounced before the crisis, above all for larger banks (banks with more than 200 USD billion in assets) and – to a lesser extent – for medium-sized banks. The average NSFR ratio for our large bank group was around 80% before the crisis, worsened in 2008, before improving again in 2009 and 2010, with the ratio climbing to about 85%. Interestingly, the med- ium-sized banks had a declining NSFR since the onset of the crisis.

2 The authors explain this relation with the observation that banks with higher capital ratios tend to face lower costs of funding due to lower prospective bankruptcy costs.

This might be explained by the recently observed shortening in the maturity profile of some medium-sized banks, which is related to a shorter-term funding structure, including the assumption of read- ily available and inexpensive central bank financing. Our break- down by size also shows that the smallest bank group in our sample (banks with less than 5 billion USD assets) have signifi- cantly improved their NSFR over the last years with an average value in excess of 110% in 2010. Note that NSFR of banks with USD assets between 5 and 20 billion remained stable during the crisis. Overall, we observe a wide dispersion across the different bank sizes with respect to the level of NSFR and the development over time.

Similarly, the difference between the available and required sta- ble funding in terms of USD varies widely by country. Table 5 reports the sum of total required equity by country for banks in the sample with NSFR < 100% in order to close the gap between the available and required stable funding based on data in 2010. While the Swiss banks in our sample already have a sustainable funding structure, French banks, among others, are characterized by a huge gap between the available and the required stable fund- ing. In order to fill this gap, the French banks in our sample would have to raise, all other things being equal, an additional USD 2.1 trillion in equity, which, for perspective, is equal to more than four times the sum of their current total equity. Of the 700 banks in the 2010 sample, 256 show an NSFR value of less than 100% and they would need USD 3.05 trillion in order to achieve the required sta- ble funding in line with the new liquidity framework of Basel III.

Looking at the mean values of our explanatory variables as out- lined in Table 6, the average bank in our sample has a return on average assets (ROA) of 0.32%, a return on average equity (ROE) of 5.32%, and a net interest margin of 2.44%. Note that banks in the group with NSFR below 100% appear more profitable compared to the group with NSFR above 100%, and this holds for all three measures of bank profitability. As to the funding costs ratio, the average is 1.84%, and the group with NSFR below 100% has signif- icantly lower funding costs. Overall, the credit allocation efficiency seems to be high as the stock of loan loss provision amounts to a mere 0.7% of total loans. This is quite a low number against the backdrop of an average annual loan growth of 8.78% over the sam- ple period. Note, however, that low NSFR banks exhibit signifi- cantly higher loan-loss provisions relative to total loans.

We use the volatility of return on assets as a proxy for the risk- iness of a bank’s earnings. With an average value of 10.9% (median 4.3%) for the three-year period, we conclude that profits are quite widely dispersed overall. Interestingly, the sub-sample with NSFR P 100% exhibits a significantly higher variability and thus also a higher risk in earnings.

The equity ratio amounts to 5.75%, on average. Unsurprisingly, the sub-sample with NSFR P 100% has a significantly higher capital ratio than the sub-sample with NSFR below 100%. As to bank size, the average bank has USD 17.2 billion in assets but a median value of a mere USD 1.8 billion. This reflects the skewed size distribution with a predominance of smaller banks and a few large institutions driving up the mean value statistics. There is, however, no statistically significant difference between the two NSFR sub-samples with respect to bank size.

Almost 85% of all income stems from interests, which is not sur- prising given that we focus our analyses on a sample of banks that generate a material share of their total income through traditional commercial banking activities (balance sheet business) and only to a lesser extent through ‘‘fee and commission income’’ and ‘‘trading operations’’. The non-interest income share for the sub-sample with NSFR < 100% is significantly lower than the one of the other sub-sample. Looking at the overhead costs relative to assets, one finds a value of 2.11% for whole sample, but a significantly higher ratio for the sub-sample having NSFR < 100%.

Table 5 Required equity for banks with NSFR < 100% in our sample in order to close the gap between available and required stable funding by country in 2010.

Country Number of bank in 2010s

Available stable funding

Required stable funding

Excess (shortfall)

Total bank assets

Total bank equity

Shortfall as % of equity

France 75 4177 6294 �2116 8817 447 473.8 Austria 30 707 801 �94 1191 90 104.0 Belgium 10 1176 1548 �372 2285 79 473.7 Switzerland 6 18 20 �2 25 2 107.9 Germany 128 1676 1994 �319 3345 107 297.5 Luxembourg 1 64 82 �19 118 9 220.5 Netherlands 6 1813 2394 �581 3415 117 494.8

Total 256 9631 13,133 �3503 19,196 851 411.8

Currency figures in USD billion.

Table 6 Descriptive statistics for the full sample and, separately, for banks with NSFR < 100% and banks with NSFR P 100%.

(1) Variable (2) All (3) NSFR < 100% (4) NSFR P 100% (5) Difference (6) t-Statistic

Nb. of observations 11,648 7034 4614 Bank specific factors NSFR 0.969 ROA 0.315 0.321 0.308 �0.013 �1.66** ROE 5.320 5.385 5.224 �0.161 �1.02 Net Interest Margin 2.439 2.541 2.286 �0.255 �15.27*** Funding Costs 1.838 1.804 1.889 0.085 1.72**

Loan Loss Ratio 0.007 0.007 0.006 �0.001 �6.36*** Stdev ROA 3y 10.90 11.10 10.50 �0.60 �1.35* Capital Ratio 5.753 5.661 5.890 0.229 3.45***

Growth Netloans 8.784 9.242 8.118 �1.124 �2.46**

Size (ln assets) 14.739 14.740 14.739 �0.001 �0.05 Non Interest Share 0.142 0.140 0.144 0.004 2.79***

Overhead/Total Assets 2.114 2.196 1.993 �0.203 �12.28*** Foreignowned 0.037 0.036 0.038 0.002 0.28 Stateowned 0.518 0.609 0.398 �0.211 �21.00***

Market characteristics GDP Growth 3.552 3.672 3.428 �0.244 �6.01***

Yield Curve 1.288 1.311 1.252 �0.059 3.475*** Dummy Crisis 0.266 0.189 0.347 0.158 21.32***

The table reports the means for the variables in our models as defined in Table 4. Column 2 presents the mean for all banks in our sample. We then split NSFR in two groups and create a binary variable that takes on a value of 1 if the bank has NSFR P 1 and a value of 0 if the bank has NSFR < 1. For each variable in column 1, column 3 shows the mean for all banks with NSFR < 1 and column 4 shows the means of banks with NSFR P 1. Column 5 presents the difference in the means of the banks with NSFR < 1 and P 1, respectively. Column 6 presents the results of t-tests for significance of the differences in means. Variables are defined in Table 1. Data are Bankscope, x and y, and include 12,722 observations from 7 countries over the 1996–2010 period. * Statistical significance at the 0.10 level. ** Statistical significance at the 0.05 level. *** Statistical significance at the 0.01 level.

A. Dietrich et al. / Journal of Banking & Finance 44 (2014) 13–25 21

By ownership, more than 96% of banks are domestically con- trolled and 52% of them are owned or co-owned by states. Note that we have numerous state-owned German ‘‘Landesbanken’’ and ‘‘Sparkassen’’ (savings banks) in our sample, which mainly

Fig. 3. NSFR by

drive this distribution. We find that state-owned banks are less likely to fulfill the minimum NSFR ratio.

In terms of market characteristics, the average GDP growth of the seven countries in our sample is 3.55%. The yield curve

bank size.

Table 7 Correlation matrix of explanatory variables of Model 1.

Capital Ratio

Growth Netloans

Size (ln assets)

Non Interest Share

Foreignowned Stateowned Dummy Crisis

Yield curve

GDP Growth

Capital Ratio 1.00 Growth Netloans 0.0156 1.00 Size (ln assets) �0.1278 0.0059 1.00 Non Interest Share 0.4615 0.0211 �0.0877 1.00 Foreignowned 0.2219 0.0702 0.1077 0.0817 1.00 Stateowned �0.1579 �0.0874 0.1207 �0.1496 �0.1927 1.00 Dummy Crisis 0.2029 �0.0740 0.2443 0.0972 0.0033 �0.0188 1.00 Yield curve �0.0061 0.0539 �0.0217 0.0063 0.0032 �0.0037 �0.2509 1.00 GDP Growth 0.0191 �0.0361 �0.0294 0.0627 0.0403 �0.0221 �0.2147 �0.4422 1.00

The table reports correlation coefficients of the explanatory variables of Model 1 with NSFR as dependent variable. The variables are defined as outlined in Table 4. The period covers the years 1996–2010.

22 A. Dietrich et al. / Journal of Banking & Finance 44 (2014) 13–25

variable, which measure the yield premium of a 10 year govern- ment bond over short rates, amounts to an average of 129 basis points. Our data thus tell us that a bank with a lower NSFR is more likely to be located in a country with a higher GDP growth, respec- tively a steeper yield curve. Looking at the distribution by survey year, 26.6% of the bank-year observations refer to 2007–2010, which we define as crisis period.

Table 8 Regressions results explaining the different NSFR levels among banks (Model 1 specification).

Explanatory variables NSFR

L.NSFR 0.796***

(0.049) Capital Ratio 0.002***

(0.001) Growth Netloans �0.001***

(0.000) Size (ln assets) �0.001

(0.001) Noninterestshare �0.057***

(0.016) Foreignowned �0.045***

(0.012) Stateowned �0.008

(0.005) Dummy Crisis 0.038***

(0.007) Yield Curve �0.020***

(0.004) GDP Growth �0.008***

(0.001) Constant 0.089**

(0.044)

Observations 7566 Number of banks 643 F-test 1679.20***

AB test AR(1) (p-val.) �16.10 (0.000) AB test AR (2) (p-val.) �0.20 (0.201) Hansen 0.72 (0.395)

The table reports results from one-step system GMM estimations of the effects of bank- and market-specific characteristics on NSFR. The dependent variable is NSFR as calculated and explained above. For the notation of the variables see Table 4. The period covers the years 1996–2010. Variables in italics are instrumented through the GMM procedure following Arellano and Bover (1995), with L.NSFR lagged at 2, Capital Ratio lagged at 1, and Growth Netloans lagged at 1. Robust standard errors are in brackets. The Hansen test is the test for over-identifying restrictions in GMM dynamic model estimation. AB test AR(1) and AR(2) refer to the Arellano–Bond test that average autocovariance in residuals of order 1 resp. of order 2 is 0 (H0: no autocorrelation); p-values in brackets. �Coefficients that are significantly different from zero at the 10% level. ** Coefficients that are significantly different from zero at the 5% level. *** Coefficients that are significantly different from zero at the 1% level.

5.2. Multivariate results

5.2.1. Which factors influence the NSFR ratio? In Table 8, we present our multivariate results, using NSFR as

LHS-variable, as described in Model 1 specification in Section 4. Unsurprisingly, there is significant persistence of our dependent

variable NSFR. The structure of the balance sheet is not signifi- cantly changing every year but remains rather stable. Among firm characteristics, our results show that banks with a higher capital ratio also have a higher NSFR. Safer bank in terms of having more equity also have a statistically higher structural liquidity ratio. Besides the ‘‘safety aspect’’ and as discussed in the previous sec- tion, this relationship is also influenced by the fact that more equity automatically raises NSFR as the ASF-factor of equity is 100%.

Our results confirm the expectation that banks that are more aggressive in terms of credit expansion have a lower NSFR as they might rely more on short-term funds in order to support loan growth. With respect to size, larger banks do not have a statisti- cally different NSFR from smaller firms. The business model of a bank also significantly affects NSFR. Banks focusing on interest business have higher NSFRs than banks that are also active in the field of asset management or investment banking. This result con- firms our predictions that banks with a more diversified income structure are more likely to use alternative funding sources includ- ing wholesale funding. Therefore, the new liquidity rules would have a stronger effect on investment and universal banks, by reducing the NSFR differences between different business models.

The coefficient of our first owner characteristics variable, the state-owned or privately held banks, is statistically not significant. Accordingly, state ownership does not seem to affect NSFR. Con- versely, foreign banks have a statistically significant lower NSFR than domestically owned banks, which points to the fact that for- eign-owned banks might have a stronger reliance on wholesale funding because they are not established enough to attract suffi- cient traditional deposits in foreign markets.

We find a positive effect of our dummy variable for the financial crisis on NSFR. Since the financial crisis, banks have thus signifi- cantly improved their NSFR, quite likely in response to the growing awareness of general risks and refinancing risks associated with bulk funding in particular. This would also have pushed them to strengthen their equity ratios and thus raise their NSFR. Yet not

all banking groups have been acting in a similar way, as discussed in Section 4 (see also Fig. 3). This confirms our univariate result that banks have started increasing their long-term deposit funding with the times of turmoil and possibly also shrinking their asset base.

The slope of the yield curve and GDP growth have both a nega- tive impact on the level of NSFR. It is clear that banks prefer short- term over long-term funding if maturity premiums are. Banks might likewise have depressed levels of customer deposits in

Table 9 Regressions results explaining profitability measures with NSFR and control variables (Model 2 specification).

Explanatory (1) (2) (3)

A. Dietrich et al. / Journal of Banking & Finance 44 (2014) 13–25 23

prosperous times, as many savers prefer alternative higher yielding investments. high. In economically good times, banks require more short-term funding in order to meet the increasing demand for credit.

variables ROA ROE Net Interest Margin

L.ROA 0.191***

(0.053) L.ROE 0.310***

(0.100) L.Net Interest Margin 0.629***

(0.075) NSFR �0.046 0.070 0.741

(0.126) (3.999) (0.490) Loan Loss Ratio �0.154*** �3.090*** �0.799***

(1.688) (59.34) (29.76) Capital Ratio 0.040*** 2.202 �0.002

(0.008) (1.460) (0.052) Overhead/Total Assets �0.009 3.289* 0.238

(0.026) (1.685) (0.216) Size (ln assets) 0.007 0.830 �0.080**

(0.008) (0.550) (0.034) Noninterestshare 1.089*** �0.744* 2.936

(0.329) (38.43) (3.143) GDP Growth �0.001 0.069 0.073

(0.001) (0.047) (0.105) Dummycrisis �0.152*** �1.713** �0.008

(0.032) (0.741) (0.185) Constant �0.021 �15.32 0.740

(0.204) (15.25) (0.842)

Observations 9780 9780 9777 Number of banks 921 921 921

F-test 48.56*** 16.71*** 108.91***

AB test AR(1) (p-val.) �6.36 (0.000) �3.60 (0.000) �4.55 (0.000) AB test AR(2) (p-val.) 1.28 (0.200) �0.97 (0.331) �1.22 (0.221) Hansen test (p-val.) 2.45 (0.118) 0.91 (0.633) 0.72 (0.395)

The table reports results from one-step system GMM estimations of effects of NSFR as calculated and explained above, bank- and market-specific characteristics on bank performance. The dependent variables approximating bank performance are the ROA, ROE and the net interest margin. The variables are defined in Table 4. The period covers the years 1996–2010. Variables in italics are instrumented through the GMM procedure following Arellano and Bover (1995), with all instrumented variables L.ROA, L.ROE, L.Net Interest Margin, NSFR, Loan Loss Ratio, Capital Ratio and Overhead/Total Assets lagged at 1. Robust standard errors are in brackets. The Hansen test is the test for over-identifying restrictions in GMM dynamic model estimation. AB test AR(1) and AR(2) refer to the Arellano–Bond test that average autocovariance in residuals of order 1 resp. of order 2 is 0 (H0: no autocorrelation); p-values in brackets. * Coefficients that are significantly different from zero at the 10% level. ** Coefficients that are significantly different from zero at the 5% level. *** Coefficients that are significantly different from zero at the 1% level.

5.2.2. What is the influence of NSFR on Bank performance measures? With our Model 2 specification we investigate to what extent

NSFR and control parameters affect bank performance. Table 9 shows the regression results of the profitability measures return on assets (column 2), return on equity (column 3) and net interest margin (column 4). Again, our estimation results have stable coef- ficients. The Wald-test indicates fine goodness of fit for the esti- mated model and the p value for the Hansen test shows no evidence against the validity of the moment restrictions. Further- more, there is no second-order correlation (AR 2 errors), which confirms the consistency of the GMM estimator. The magnitude and significance of the coefficient on our lagged dependent variables return on assets, return on equity, and the net interest margin in all models vindicate the use of a dynamic GMM-model as we report a high degree of persistence of these measures.

NSFR aims to promote more medium- and long-term funding of the assets and activities of banks, and should thus reduce the extent of maturity mismatch at the bank. In theory, we would thus anticipate a negative impact on bank profitability as the extent of this mismatch is expected to be positively related to the profits of a bank. Contrary to this expectation, our results show that NSFR does not have a statistically significant influence on our profitabil- ity measures ROA, ROE and net interest margin. It seems that low NSFR banks have offsetting disadvantages such as comparably higher loan loss provisions, higher loan growth rates (which in turn depresses lending rates) and also higher overhead costs. All these factors depress their profitability and thus neutralize potential advantages of lower funding costs.

In fact, the level of profitability of the banks in our sample appears driven by a number of other factors. The capital ratio, for example, has a positive and significant effect on bank profitability as measured by the return on assets. Banks with a higher capital ratio are safer and may thus benefit from lower funding costs. Even though we expect institutions with a lower equity ratio to be more risky, which should lead to higher returns, safer banks are more profitable (see e.g. Pasiouras and Kosmidou, 2007). Similarly, the non-interest income share, a proxy for the business model, posi- tively affects the return on assets variable. The significant and posi- tive sign of this business model variable shows that income diversification of banks has a positive effect on profitability as profit margins of fee, commission, and trading operations are usu- ally higher than profit margins in interest operations margins. In contrast, the level of the loan loss provisions as well as the crisis years have negative impacts on the ROA as expected. Overall, these results are in line with other research results analyzing Western European bank samples such as Staikouras and Wood (2004) and Dietrich and Wanzenried (2011).

Besides pure profitability measures, we also investigate the effects of the NSFR ratio on other relevant bank-specific perfor- mance variables. In Table 10, we present our regression results analyzing potential effects on the funding costs (column 2), the loan loss provision over total loans variable (column 3) and the vol- atility of the return on assets for three years (column 4). Again, our estimation results have stable coefficients. The Wald-test indicates fine goodness of fit for the estimated model and the p value for the Hansen test shows no evidence against the validity of the moment restrictions. Furthermore, there is no second-order correlation (AR 2 errors), which confirms the consistency of the GMM estimator. The magnitude and significance of the coefficient on our lagged dependent variables in all models confirm the use of a dynamic

GMM-model as we report a high degree of persistence of these measures.

Our results reveal that higher NSFR leads to (1) less favourable funding costs, with the coefficient being statistically significant at the 5% level, (2) lower loan loss provisions and (3) a reduction in the variability of profits as a proxy for the risk in bank earnings.

The unfavourable impact of a high NSFR on funding costs stands in line with our expectations and reflects the standard macroeco- nomic relationship that banks that rely more on less costly short- term funding (and thus have a lower NSFR) benefit from lower funding costs. This holds as long as yield curves are upwards slop- ing, i.e. the longer the maturity, the higher the yield.

The effects on the loan loss performance are shown in column 2 of Table 10 and we note that the coefficient of NSFR, of which we included the second lag due to the expected slow adjustment pro- cess, is significantly negative at the 1% level. In order to achieve faster growth, banks seem to rely more heavily on short-term funding (see also the result in Tables 6 and 8) and thus reduce their

Table 10 Regressions results explaining funding costs, loan loss provisions and return volatility with NSFR and control variables (Model 2 specification).

Explanatory variables (1) (2) (3) Funding Costs Loan Loss Ratio Std ROA 3y

L.Funding Costs 0.910***

(0.134) L.Loan Loss Ratio 0.312***

(0.036) L.Stdev ROA 3y 0.944***

(0.028) NSFR 0.865*** �0.163***

(0.210) (0.039) L2.NSFR �0.005***

(0.002) Capital Ratio �0.069 �0.002 �0.001

(0.044) (0.001) (0.002) Overhead/Total Assets 0.139*** 0.005 0.028***

(0.028) (0.005) (0.007) Size (ln assets) 0.022 0.001 0.009***

(0.040) (0.001) (0.003) Non Interest Share �0.220 0.149** �0.145**

(0.482) (0.069) (0.066) GDP Growth 0.068*** 0.001

(0.003) (0.001) L.GDP Growth 0.001**

(0.000) Dummy Crisis 0.059 �0.001

(0.065) (0.001) Constant �1.393** �0.025 �0.006

(0.600) (0.027) (0.069)

Observations 9769 9475 8960

Number of banks 920 921 918 F-test 538.79*** 12.99*** 229.32***

Hansen test (p-val.) 5.10 (0.165) 1.39 (0.499) 1.85 (0.396) AB test AR(1) (p-val.) �2.94 (0.003) �3.30 (0.001) �3.22 (0.001) AB test AR(2) (p-val.) �1.06 (0.291) �0.42 (0.673) �0.42 (0.671)

The table reports results from one-step system GMM estimations of effects of NSFR as calculated and explained above, bank- and market-specific characteristics on the funding costs, the loan loss provisions over total loans, and the return volatility as measured by standard deviation of the ROA over 3 years. The variables are defined as outlined in Table 4. The period covers the years 1996–2010. Variables in italics are instrumented through the GMM procedure following Arellano and Bover (1995), with L.Funding Costs lagged at 3, L. Loan Loss Ratio lagged at 2, L.Stdev ROA 3y lagged at 1, NSFR lagged at 1, L2.NSFR lagged at 1, Capital Ratio lagged at 1, and Overhead/Total Assets lagged at 1. Robust standard errors are in brackets. The Hansen test is the test for over-identifying restrictions in GMM dynamic model estimation. AB test AR(1) and AR(2) refer to the Arellano–Bond test that average autocovariance in residuals of order 1 resp. of order 2 is 0 (H0: no autocorrelation); p-values in brackets. �Coefficients that are significantly different from zero at the 10% level. ** Coefficients that are significantly different from zero at the 5% level. *** Coefficients that are significantly different from zero at the 1% level.

24 A. Dietrich et al. / Journal of Banking & Finance 44 (2014) 13–25

NSFR. Increased credit losses then seem to follow such rapid expansion of the loan portfolio.

Remarkably, we find that the volatility of bank earnings, as mea- sured by standard deviation of bankprofitability over 3 years, increases with lower NSFR, the coefficient being significant at the 1% level. Whilst NSFR does not seem to have any significant effect on the level of prof- itability, profits appear more variable for low NSFR banks. This finding has major implications not just for policy development and macropru- dential regulation but also for investment decisions.

As a robustness test, we also run the regressions separately on each country subsample. The results reconfirm that NSFR does not significantly affect profitability measures return on assets, return on equity, and the net interest margin in any of the seven countries. Results vary slightly among countries for the variability of the ROA, the loan loss provisions and the funding costs, as the above relationship turns out statistically insignificant in Austria, Belgium and Luxemburg only.

6. Conclusions

Under Basel III, individual banks will have to maintain higher and better-quality liquid assets and to better manage their liquid- ity risk. Therefore, the net stable funding ratio (NSFR) was designed to promote stable sources of funding on an ongoing structural basis. In this paper, we analyze how NSFR for 921 banks from seven Western European countries have developed between 1996 and 2010, which factors influence this ratio and in what way NSFR is impacting various bank performance indicators.

Our findings include both good and bad news for banks them- selves and the economy more generally. To start with the bad news, we find that 60% of all bank-year observations in our sample do not (yet) fulfill the new Basel III NSFR requirements by having an NSFR value below 100%. For some banks in our sample that do not yet meet the criteria, the liquidity gap is limited and possi- bly manageable. However, there are a number of Western Euro- pean banks that will be strongly affected by the NSFR requirement as they essentially rely on wholesale funding and thus report high loan-to-deposit ratios. In 2010, 256 banks in our sam- ple had an NSFR value of less than 100% and 207 of them even a value below 95%. As a model calculation, we determine the long- term liquidity gap of the banks with NSFR of less than 100% in the 2010 sample. Had these banks been forced to close the long- term liquidity gap purely by raising more equity, they would have required USD 3.05 trillion of new equity, representing a massive 4.1 times of total equity of these banks outstanding at the time. As discussed in the next paragraph, it is clear that NSFR adjust- ments would be achieved by a combination of balance sheet mea- sures, i.e. not purely by additional equity capital. These calculations nevertheless illustrate the significance of the NSFR shortfall for the Western European banking industry.

To improve their funding profiles and meet the NSFR require- ment, banks will have basically two options. The first option is to change the funding mix by lengthening the duration of their fund- ing, attempting to attract more customer deposits and/or increas- ing equity. All these measures will have their price. Long-term debt and equity funding are more costly and with more vigorous competition for customer deposits, one would expect higher sav- ings (interest) rates. We would thus see bank profits decline, which could ultimately even affect the resilience of the banking system.

The second option for these banks is to shrink their asset base, which might in turn negatively affect the economy through reduced lending volumes. Again, rationing interest-bearing assets means lost earning opportunities, foregone market share and thus decreasing profitability. Most likely, banks will adopt a combina- tion of these two options in order to meet the new Basel III liquid- ity requirements.

Bad news would also include the result that NSFR of banks not only depends of their business models (banks more active in asset management and investment banking have a lower NSFR than banks focusing on the interest business) but also capital ratios (bet- ter capitalized banks have stronger NSFR). We find evidence that quite a few banks have indeed started using more short-term funds in order to grow their long-term loan portfolio. In this respect, our research for the first time quantifies the extent of this phenomenon in the Western European banking system, which has led to wide- spread refinancing problems for banking institution with the onset of the financial crisis. Besides that, macroeconomic factors, namely the GDP growth rate and the maturity premium, appear to deter- mine NSFR shortfalls of banks. As expected, banks prefer short-term funding over long-term funding in a steep yield curve environment and higher NSFR do lead to higher funding costs.

As to good news from our study, our results do not confirm that lower NSFR in fact have negatively influenced profitability measures such as the return on assets, the return on equity, and

A. Dietrich et al. / Journal of Banking & Finance 44 (2014) 13–25 25

the net interest margin, even though the funding costs for banks with a lower NSFR are – as expected – significantly lower. This would mean that there are business models relying on a balanced funding structure that will not achieve lower profits in the long run even though there would be some apparent funding cost disadvan- tages in the short run. At the same time, there is clear evidence that low NSFR banks exhibit higher earnings volatility so from the per- spective of a policymaker the new liquidity framework might have beneficial impacts on the stability and resilience of the banking system. As such, the framework would complement more heavy- handed measures to restrain banks from risky activities.

Taking all this together, it is clear that the new liquidity rules, particularly the long-term NSFR, will limit the banks’ ability to do maturity transformation – a core function of banks – and hence enforce a shift in some business models. While our research has shown that only a few of the larger commercial banks are signifi- cantly affected by the new funding rules, these institutions tend to have some systemic importance and there is thus the potential of reduced lending capacity and higher interest rates. NSFR did not have a significant impact on profitability in the past but with all banks forced into similar balance sheet structures, the earnings dynamics might not be the same in future. This is because with the introduction of NSFR, shareholder pressure for high returns will not abate and banks might seek excessive risks yet in other areas. While our research thus provides some new insights, impli- cations of the Basel III liquidity framework undoubtedly warrant further exploration.

Acknowledgements

We would like to thank the participants of the 2013 Midwest Finance Association Conference in Chicago, the participants of the World Finance Conference 2013 in Cyprus, Horst Bienert, Martin Lettau, Yvonne Seiler Zimmermann, Johan Walden, and the anony- mous reviewers for valuable comments.

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  • The good and bad news about the new liquidity rules of Basel III in Western European countries
    • 1 Introduction
    • 2 Related literature
    • 3 Data
    • 4 Methodology and model specification
      • 4.1 Multivariate modelling technique
      • 4.2 Model 1 specification
        • 4.2.1 Bank characteristics
        • 4.2.2 Owner characteristics
        • 4.2.3 Market/environmental characteristics
      • 4.3 Model 2 specification
        • 4.3.1 Dependent variables
        • 4.3.2 Independent variables
    • 5 Results
      • 5.1 Descriptive statistics and univariate results
      • 5.2 Multivariate results
        • 5.2.1 Which factors influence the NSFR ratio?
        • 5.2.2 What is the influence of NSFR on Bank performance measures?
    • 6 Conclusions
    • Acknowledgements
    • References

Investment-performance-of--environmentally-friendly--firm_2014_Journal-of-Ba.pdf

Journal of Banking & Finance 44 (2014) 177–188

Contents lists available at ScienceDirect

Journal of Banking & Finance

journal homepage: www.elsevier .com/locate / jbf

Investment performance of ‘‘environmentally-friendly’’ firms and their initial public offers and seasoned equity offers q

http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jbankfin.2014.04.006 0378-4266/� 2014 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

q We would like to thank the anonymous referees for their helpful and insightful suggestions. Pak To Chan would like to thank Veronique Lafon-Vinais and Entela Benz for their valuable discussions and comments. ⇑ Corresponding author. Tel.: +61 (2) 90367991; fax: +61 (2) 93516461.

E-mail address: [email protected] (T. Walter).

Pak To Chan a, Terry Walter b,⇑ a Department of Finance, The Hong Kong University of Science and Technology, Hong Kong b Discipline of Finance, The University of Sydney Business School, The University of Sydney, NSW 2006, Australia

a r t i c l e i n f o a b s t r a c t

Article history: Received 24 April 2013 Accepted 4 April 2014 Available online 18 April 2014

JEL classification: G14 G15 G39

Keywords: Environmentally-friendly firm performance IPOs SEOs Event study

We employ a sample of 748 environmentally-friendly (or ‘‘green’’) firms listed on U.S. stock exchanges to extend studies of the effects of socially responsible investment (SRI) on stock investment returns and the performance of initial public offerings (IPOs) and seasoned equity offerings (SEOs). Our empirical tests document positive and statistically significant excess returns for our environmentally-friendly firms and their IPOs and SEOs, in contrast to our control IPO and SEO samples which underperform. In summary, a ‘‘green’’ equity premium is evident in returns calculated from a variety of benchmarks.

� 2014 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

1. Introduction

We investigate whether investment in environmentally- friendly companies and their IPOs and SEOs is good for your wealth. We examine this issue empirically, because existing theory makes equivocal predictions. Our empirical results show that environmentally-friendly firms have positive risk-adjusted returns in the majority of our empirical investigations. In short, these investments are good for your (risk-adjusted) wealth. Our portfo- lios of environmentally-friendly firms outperform by approxi- mately 7% per annum. The frequently documented post-IPO performance decline is not present for environmentally-friendly IPOs, and the post-SEO drift is also not present. These drifts are however present in matched (control) samples of firms that do not qualify as environmentally-friendly.

Two hypotheses are frequently investigated when SRI and conventional fund returns are compared; an underperformance hypothesis and an over-performance hypothesis. In support of

arguments of having higher cost structures for environmentally- friendly practices, the underperformance hypothesis predicts that the risk-adjusted returns for the SRI firms should be lower than those of conventional firms because the investment opportunity set for SRI firms is restricted by non-financial criteria. SRI investors must accordingly be willing to accept suboptimal mean–variance efficient portfolios if they select companies with higher environ- mental, social responsibility, and corporate governance standards. This stock screening process violates classical finance theory which proposes that investors should maximize return subject to risk optimization. In contrast, the over-performance hypothesis indi- cates that this screening process may generate excess returns for SRI firms relative to conventional firms in the long run. The hypothesis argues that companies with higher corporate social responsibility standards can avoid potential costs of corporate social crises and environmental disasters. Hence, companies that ignore environmental responsibility may destroy long-term share- holders’ wealth due to reputation losses or potential litigation costs, or both.

Prior studies have investigated the association between stock returns and environmental rankings. For example, Yamashita et al. (1999) report the relationship between environmental conscientiousness (EC) scores ranked by the 1993 Fortune maga- zine, and show that those companies with the worst EC scores have

1 We recognize that our sample selection for the period prior to an index development involves a strategy that is not implementable in actual trading, however our main purpose is to investigate whether environmentally-friendly firms have returns in excess of their risk-adjusted expectation. As a robustness test, we also conducted our analysis where this backward identification is eliminated. By definition, IPOs cannot be modelled, because all firms must be listed before they are included in an environmentally-friendly fund. The return analysis for this reduced sample is highly consistent with our results reported in Table 1. The results for this reduced set of SEOs are structurally similar to those in Table 3, through somewhat weaker in statistical significance. These results are available on request to the corresponding author.

178 P.T. Chan, T. Walter / Journal of Banking & Finance 44 (2014) 177–188

lower than average performance. Klassen and McLaughlin (1996) observe significant positive returns for strong environmental man- agement as indicated by environmental performance awards, and significant negative returns for weak environmental management, indicated by environmental crises. Derwall et al. (2004) employ a Carhart (1997) four-factor model based on ‘‘eco-efficiency’’ scores provided by Innovest Strategic Value Advisors and show that a portfolio of firms with high environmental scores outperformed a portfolio of firms with low scores by 6% per annum over the period 1997–2003. They argue that the market undervalues environmen- tal news.

Previous research in the area of social responsibility has focused on SRI fund returns and the majority of these papers have either supported the underperformance hypothesis or found no signifi- cant difference in performance. For example, Hamilton et al. (1993) find that socially responsible mutual funds do not earn sta- tistically significant excess returns and that their performance is statistically indistinguishable from conventional mutual funds. Cohen et al. (1997) construct two industry-balanced portfolios and compare accounting and market returns for a ‘‘high polluter’’ and ‘‘low polluter’’ portfolio. Overall, they find either no ‘‘penalty’’ for investing in the environmentally-friendly portfolio, or a positive return from green investing. Bauer et al. (2005) document evidence of insignificant differences in risk-adjusted returns between ethical and conventional funds. They adopt the Carhart (1997) multi-factor model. They suggest that ethical mutual funds undergo a ‘‘catching up phase’’ before achieving financial returns similar to those of con- ventional funds. Geczy et al. (2005) compare SRI portfolios to those constructed from the broader fund universe and reveal that the costs of imposing a SRI constraint are substantial. Renneboog et al. (2008) document that SRI funds in the U.S., the U.K., and in many continental European and Asia–Pacific nations underperform their domestic benchmarks by between �2.2% and �6.5%.

Instead of comparing returns of SRI funds and conventional funds, some papers investigate whether there is return difference in broad indexes. For instance, Sauer (1997) compares the raw and risk-adjusted performance of the Domini 400 Social Index (DSI) with two unrestricted, well-diversified benchmark portfolios and suggests that effect of social responsibility criteria on perfor- mance is negligible. Statman (2000) also finds that the DSI per- forms as well as S&P500. The risk-adjusted returns of the DSI are slightly lower than those of the S&P500, but the difference is not statistically significant.

Contrary to the previous literature, our results support the over- performance hypothesis. This paper makes the following contribu- tions to the existing literature: First, instead of comparing SRI and conventional fund returns, this paper constructs a pool of environ- mentally-friendly companies based on the constituents of environ- mental service indices or exchange-traded (ETF) funds listed on U.S. stock exchanges. This approach avoids the confounding effects of transaction costs and management fees that are prevalent when mutual fund returns are compared. While prior research (Derwall et al., 2004) obtains eco-efficiency scores for companies from Inno- vest Strategic Value Advisors, we create a database based on pub- licly available information, thus reducing the search costs to discover environmentally-oriented companies. We find that these portfolios, when investigated using a Carhart (1997) model, have approximately 7% excess returns per annum.

Second, this paper extends the investigation of environmentally- friendly investment to IPOs and SEOs. We select ‘‘control’’ compa- nies which are matched with our environmentally-friendly IPO and SEO companies based on firm-specific characteristics. Astonish- ingly, long-term underperformance exists for the ‘‘control’’ sample, while no such evidence is found for our environmentally-friendly (or ‘‘green’’) IPOs and SEOs. For example, the one-year mean BHARs for the environmentally-friendly and ‘‘control’’ IPOs are 12.4% and

�7.1% respectively, while the one-year BHARs for the environmen- tally-friendly and ‘‘control’’ SEOs are 2.5% and �3.5% respectively, after controlling for size, book-to-market and momentum. A ‘‘green premium’’ exists primarily because environmentally-friendly investments have lower risks than ‘‘control’’ firms.

Third, we perform cross-sectional regressions for the environ- mentally-friendly and ‘‘control’’ samples and test several IPO and SEO hypotheses that have been advanced to explain short-term underpricing and longer-term underperformance. We include a ‘‘green’’ dummy variable and examine whether the environmen- tally-friendly sample behaves differently to the ‘‘control’’ sample. For the long-term performance of IPOs and SEOs (i.e., 12 months or more), the coefficients for our environmentally-friendly dummy variable are always positive and statistically significant, while there is no evidence of short-term underpricing differences for both our IPO and SEO samples.

This remainder of this paper is organized as follows: Data selection methods for the environmentally-friendly and ‘‘control’’ samples and empirical methods are described in Section 2. Sec- tion 3 presents the results for the portfolio returns for the environ- mentally-friendly companies. Section 4 presents the IPO and SEO results based on size, book-to-market, and momentum adjusted portfolios returns and cross-sectional regressions to explain both short-term and long-term equity returns. Conclusions and sugges- tions are offered in Section 5.

2. Data and methodology

2.1. Data selection

We develop a comprehensive database of all environmentally- friendly companies and their IPOs and SEOs in the period 1990– 2012. Our environmentally-friendly observations are selected based on constituents in environmentally-friendly (or ‘‘green’’) exchange-traded funds (ETFs) or indices which are listed on the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE), American Stock Exchange (AMEX) and NASDAQ. Our sample also considers stocks which are listed in global indices. However, we only study those global environmentally-oriented companies which are listed in the U.S. in the form of common shares or American Depository Receipts (ADRs). Descriptions of each environmentally-friendly index or exchange-traded fund are shown in Appendix A. A company is included as a sample observation if it is a constituent in one of the environmentally-friendly indices at the date this index is first published. Going forward in time, the company remains as a valid observation until it is dropped from the index. On the other hand, we retain an observation going backward in time for our return analysis if the observation does not change its Standard & Poor’s Industry Classification Codes (SICCD). Since the earliest inception date of an environmentally-friendly index is 31 December 1999, the return calculations in the pre-1999 period are returns for a sample of firms that are based on an assumption that if they were environmentally-friendly in 1999 (for example) and they do not change the fundamental nature of their SICs, then they are also environmentally-friendly prior to 1999.1 The main reasons for

P.T. Chan, T. Walter / Journal of Banking & Finance 44 (2014) 177–188 179

adopting this back-dating approach are: (1) to extend the investigat- ing period; (2) to allow us to calculate returns for longer investment horizons, for example three, four, and five years; and (3) to ensure that we capture firms that form part of the portfolios of environmen- tally-friendly index service providers during periods in which such firms develop their environmental track record. By adopting this approach, our sample size has increased from 363 to 748 observa- tions in the period of 1990–2012.

We obtain stock return data and firms’ annual accounting infor- mation from the Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP) daily and monthly stock files and the Standard and Poor’s Compustat database respectively. The IPO and SEO data are obtained from SDC Platinum.

2.2. Methodology

In this sub-section, we present our approaches to measuring initial performance of environmentally-friendly companies and the short-run and long-run returns after their IPOs and SEOs. First, our buy-and-hold abnormal returns (BHARs) are based on equally- weighted market portfolios and portfolio benchmarks developed by Daniel et al. (1997, henceforth DGTW).2 The DGTW method controls for the effects of size, book-to-market and momentum in computing abnormal returns. The DGTW method is advocated as being superior to the two-factor (i.e., size and book-to-market) model of Fama and French (1992). The portfolios are reconstituted at the end of each June.

The BHAR for period s is defined as

BHARks ¼ Ys

t¼1 ð1þ ERitÞ �

Ys

t¼1 ðI þ CRjtÞ ð1Þ

where BHARks is the buy-and-hold abnormal return for k sets of comparison; ERit(CRit) is the buy-and-hold investment return for the event firm i and benchmark portfolio j at daily (or monthly) t. For each event window, a conventional t-statistic based on the cross-sectional standard deviation of the firm’s abnormal returns is calculated. The conventional t-statistic is defined as

tBHAR ¼ BHARp=ðrðBHARpÞ=sqrtðnÞÞ ð2Þ

where BHARp is the sample average and r(BHARp) is the cross-sec- tional sample standard deviation of the BHARs for n firms. For panel data, Petersen (2009) notes that residuals may be correlated across firms or across time, and thus OLS measures can be biased. There- fore, we modify our approach and calculate clustered standard errors in two-dimensions (industry and time) as an alternative to conventional t-statistics.3

Second, this paper estimates long-run abnormal returns via a calendar-time portfolio approach based on Carhart’s (1997) four- factor model.4 For each calendar month, we calculate the equally-

2 We briefly discuss the benchmark construction procedure here and refer the reader to DGTW for further details. We start with all stocks having book equity values listed in Compustat, and stock returns and market capitalization of equity listed in CRSP. We then rank these stocks based on their market capitalization and assign them to size quintiles (using NYSE size quintile breakpoints). Within each size quintile, we further rank stocks based on their book-to-market ratios (industry adjusted), and assign them to book-to-market quintiles, yielding a total of 25 size- and book-to- market sorted fractiles. We further sort stocks in each of these 25 fractiles into quintiles, based on the prior 12-month return of each stock. This results in a total of 125 fractiles; monthly benchmark portfolio returns are then computed as the value- weighted holding period buy-and-hold abnormal returns (BHARs) of each of the 125 fractile portfolios.

3 To control for time and firm effects, Petersen (2009) clusters by firm and time in his two dimension setting. As ‘‘green’’ funds or index providers have adopted the ‘‘best-in-class’’ approach to select companies with good environment practices in each sector, we cluster the standard errors by industry (i.e., SICCD) and time in order to fit our selection criteria.

4 The advantages of adopting the calendar-time portfolio approach are discussed in Barber and Lyon (1997) and Barber et al. (1999).

weighted portfolio returns. The number of firms in the calendar-time portfolio varies from month to month. The calendar-time excess returns on these portfolios are then used to estimate the following regression:

Rpt�Rft ¼aiþbiðRmt�RftÞþ siSMBtþhiHMLtþmiMOMtþeit ð3Þ

where Rpt is the monthly return on the equally-weighted calendar- time portfolio, Rft is the monthly return on the risk-free asset; Rmt is the return on the value-weighted market portfolio; SMBt is the difference in returns of value-weighted portfolios of small stocks and big stocks; HMLt is the difference in returns of value-weighted portfolios of high book-to-market stocks and low book-to-market stocks; MOMt is the difference in returns of value-weighted portfo- lios of high-momentum and low-momentum stocks.5 The estimate of the intercept term (ai) provides a test of the null hypothesis that the mean monthly excess return on the calendar-time portfolio is zero.

For the cross-sectional regressions on equity returns, we analyze whether underpricing, short-run and long-run stock return underperformance, which are documented by most prior IPO and SEO studies, are present in the environmentally-friendly and ‘‘con- trol’’ samples. For initial performance of IPOs and SEOs, we estimate the following regression:

UnderpricingiðSEO DiscountiÞ ¼ a1 þ b2 ln ðamtÞi þ b3Ranki þ b4Rev isioni þ b5NUMi þ b6RETi þ b7Bubblei þ b8Techi þ b9EPSi þ b10NYSEi þ b11ADRi þ b12Greeni þ e ð4Þ

For short-run (i.e., less than 12 months) and long-run (i.e., 12 months or more) performance of the IPOs and SEOs, we esti- mate the following regression:

BHARt ¼ a1 þ b2 ln ðamtÞi þ b3UnderpricingiðSEO DiscountiÞ þ b4Ranki þ b5Rev isioni þ b6NUMi þ b7RETi þ b8Bubbleþ iþ b9Techi þ b10EPSi þ b11NYSEi þ b12ADRi þ b13Greeni þ e; ð5Þ

where Underpricingi (SEO Discounti) is measured from the offer price to the first-day closing price; BHARt is the buy-and-hold abnormal return based DGTW benchmarks; amti (millions of dollars) is the dollar value of the amount of stock sold in the offering; Ranki is the rank of the lead underwriter using Loughran and Ritter (2004)6; following Hanley (1993), Revisioni is the difference between the offer price and mid-point of the initial filing price relative to the mid-point of the initial filing range.7 Many authors suggest that the frequency of IPOs/SEOs and the magnitude of underpricing tends to increase during a bull market. To consider the economic and market conditions at the time of the filing, we include two control variables: NUMi and RETi. NUMi captures the number of firms going public or issuing additional equity during the previous 30 days, whereas RETi is the BHAR based on value-weighted market portfolio benchmarks 3 months prior to the offer date for an IPO or SEO. Ritter and Welch (2002) report that the average underpricing increases dra- matically during the internet bubble. To account for the especially high initial returns during this period we include a dummy variable Bubblei which is equal to one if the offer date occurs during 1999 and

5 Size, book-to-market, and momentum factors are obtained from KenFrench’s website. http://mba.tuck.dartmouth.edu/pages/faculty/ken.french/data_library.html.

6 Ranki is defined as the maximum rank if there is more than one underwriter. 7 Benveniste and Spindt (1989) present a model in which underwriters induce

investors (or subscribers) to honestly reveal their information regarding the true value of the securities being issued prior to the final pricing.

Table 1 Return analysis of the ‘‘green’’ sample.

Year Obs. Median Mean S.D. t-Statistic

Panel A: The BHARs based on size, book-to-market, and momentum on a yearly basis

1990 363 0.018 0.066 0.391 3.22***

1991 380 0.039 0.145 0.487 5.81***

1992 414 0.058 0.127 0.441 5.84***

1993 442 0.044 0.119 0.400 6.24***

1994 467 0.013 0.049 0.413 2.55**

1995 488 �0.038 0.029 0.641 0.99 1996 512 �0.009 0.028 0.393 1.59 1997 542 0.001 0.056 0.523 2.45**

1998 566 �0.156 �0.049 0.671 �1.72* 1999 586 �0.198 0.057 1.251 1.10 2000 606 0.249 0.357 0.772 11.37***

2001 627 0.139 0.244 0.628 9.72***

2002 633 0.130 0.129 0.472 6.85*** ***

180 P.T. Chan, T. Walter / Journal of Banking & Finance 44 (2014) 177–188

2000, and zero otherwise. According to information asymmetry the- ories, initial returns will be higher for riskier firms, which suggests that firms in technology industries will be more underpriced. There- fore, we include a dummy variable Techi which is equal to one if the firm is in a high technology industry as identified by Loughran and Ritter (2004); EPSi is equal to one if the earnings per share is greater than zero, and zero otherwise; NYSEi is equal to one if the IPO/SEO firm is listed on the New York Stock Exchange; A portion of stocks included in the environmental-oriented IPO and SEO samples are overseas companies. In order to capture the potential impact of non-U.S. domiciled firms on our results as suggested by Bell et al. (2012), we include a dummy variable ADRi which is equal to one if the non-U.S. domiciled firm is listed on the U.S. stock exchanges in the form of American Depository Receipts (ADRs); Greeni is equal to one if the IPO/SEO firm is defined as an environmentally-friendly IPO/SEO, and zero otherwise.

2003 641 0.023 0.182 0.575 8.03 2004 664 0.056 0.099 0.322 7.93***

2005 683 0.011 0.091 0.535 4.46***

2006 709 0.015 0.046 0.287 4.24***

2007 743 �0.006 0.097 0.534 4.96*** 2008 748 0.019 0.026 0.438 1.64*

2009 738 0.021 0.218 0.892 6.63***

2010 741 0.024 0.075 0.354 5.78***

2011 738 �0.025 �0.051 0.306 �4.54*** 2012 736 �0.011 0.005 0.353 0.37

R(Green)– RF(t)

a RMRF(t) SMB(t) HML(t) Mom(t) Adj-R2

(%)

Panel B: Cahart four-factor regressions for the ‘‘green’’ portfolios All 1990–2012 0.62*** 1.02*** 0.37*** 0.30*** �0.12*** 94.0

(0.08) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.02) 1995–2012 0.57*** 1.02*** 0.38*** 0.34*** �0.13*** 94.0

(0.09) (0.02) (0.03) (0.03) (0.02) 2000–2012 0.67*** 1.03*** 0.34*** 0.36*** �0.11*** 93.7

(0.12) (0.03) (0.04) (0.04) (0.02) 2005–2012 0.39*** 1.13*** 0.53*** �0.04 �0.12*** 96.8

(0.11) (0.03) (0.06) (0.05) (0.02)

In Panel A, we calculate BHARs based on the size, book-to-market, and momentum adjusted portfolios for the ‘‘green’’ sample with prices available in the Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP) historical daily stock price data and COMPUSTAT historical annually industrial and accounting data. The ‘‘green’’ companies are constituents from one of the environmentally-friendly exchange-traded funds defined in Appendix A. In Panel B, we estimate four-factor regressions of equal- weighted monthly returns for portfolios of ‘‘green’’ companies. The explanatory variables are RMRF, SMB, HML, and Mom. Size, book-to-market, and momentum factors are obtained from Ken French’s website. These variables are the returns to zero-investment portfolios designed to capture market, size, book-to-market, and momentum effects, respectively. The sample period is from January 1990 through December 2012. t-Statistic that the BHAR equals zero. * Standard errors are reported in parentheses and significance at a = 0.10 level (two-tail test). ** Standard errors are reported in parentheses and significance at a = 0.05 level (two-tail test). *** Standard errors are reported in parentheses and significance at a = 0.01 level (two-tail test).

3. Return analysis of the environmentally-friendly sample

Panel A of Table 1 reports BHARs based on DGTW benchmarks for the environmentally-friendly sample. The environmentally- friendly sample grows from 363 observations in 1990 to 748 in 2008, before falling slightly to 736 observations in 2012. The excess returns are positive and statistically significant in most, but not all, years; thus the so-called ‘‘green’’ premium is not persis- tent across time. For example, the median and mean BHAR in 1998 was �15.6% and �4.9%, respectively and statistically significant positive excess returns do not exist in 1995–1996, 1998–1999 and 2011–2012.8 While the ‘‘green’’ premium is not evident in 2011–2012, positive excess returns are found between 2000 and 2010 where the average BHAR is 12.4%.

Panel B of Table 1 applies the Carhart (1997) four-factor model for monthly returns for our portfolios of environmentally-friendly companies. We further partition our samples into different periods to investigate whether the persistence of the ‘‘green’’ premium exists over time. Panel B depicts results that suggest the environ- mentally-friendly sample performed better than the portfolio benchmark over the whole period; alpha is 0.62% per month (the t-statistic is statistically significant at the 1% level).9 The environ- mentally-friendly (or ‘‘green’’) beta is 1.02. The coefficients for SMB and HML are 0.37 and 0.30 respectively, both of which are sig- nificant, implying that the environmentally-friendly portfolio has an exposure to smaller growth-oriented stocks. Renneboog et al. (2011) find that ethical money chases past returns, however, our results do not support this argument because the momentum factor is negative and statistically significant.

Bebchuk et al. (2013) and Borgers et al. (2013) both suggest that the positive abnormal returns due to errors in investors’ expecta- tions will mitigate as information about this superior performance disseminates within the market. Our findings support this argu- ment. For instance, in Panel A of Table 1, the BHARs for 2011 and 2012 are �0.051 (t-statistic �4.54) and 0.005 (t-statistic 0.37), respectively. Further, the alpha in Cahart four-factor model drops to 0.39 per month in the period of 2005–2012, which is somewhat lower than 0.67 per month in the period of 2000–2012. Hence, our findings support the view that over time learning takes place and errors in investors’ expectations diminish.

To conclude, our results in Table 1 suggest mainly positive excess returns for our environmentally-oriented companies. The results so far are based on classifications that can be made from

8 Returns in 2011 are in fact significantly negative, though this is the only year where returns are negative.

9 The estimated alpha for the 2000–2012 period for environmentally-friendly firms that are included in the sample only after they are first identified in a fund is 0.65, significant at 1%.

publicly available information; accordingly developing portfolios of environmentally-friendly investments does not involve high search costs, which gives us a strong motivation to use the envi- ronmentally-friendly sample to investigate questions relating to their IPO and SEO financing. We now turn to these matters.

4. Event studies: IPOs and SEOs

4.1. Descriptive statistics for environmentally-friendly and ‘‘Control’’ firms

Table 2 presents summary descriptive statistics for environ- mentally-friendly and ‘‘control’’ IPO and SEO firms for the period

Table 2 Descriptive statistics for ‘‘green’’ and ‘‘control’’ samples.

Green sample Control sample

Median Mean S.D. Median Mean S.D. z-Test

Panel A: Descriptive statistics for ‘‘green’’ and ‘‘control’’ samples of IPOs Offer price (dollars) 15.00 15.83 5.28 15.00 15.22 4.84 3.00***

Underpricing (%) 9.81 15.57 21.98 8.61 16.10 29.02 �0.11 Amount (millions) 97.75 183.91 241.05 84.60 135.11 135.85 39.28***

Money left on the table (millions) 7.88 26.14 51.04 2.97 7.22 46.16 29.88***

Revision (%) 0.00 �0.33 9.44 0.00 0.54 9.03 �0.31 Underwriter rank 9.00 8.42 1.02 9.00 8.22 1.28 1.99**

Dilution (%) 21.59 22.98 14.45 27.29 32.75 21.30 �22.84***

Gross spread (%) 7.00 6.42 0.95 7.00 6.55 0.87 �1.45 EPS (dollars) 0.49 0.31 0.97 0.34 0.14 1.52 1.60 PE ratio 23.98 36.37 40.16 23.16 33.71 32.11 3.68***

IPONUM 36.00 39.88 22.92 34.50 39.57 23.04 0.71 RET (%) 2.96 2.96 4.52 2.79 2.80 4.57 0.08

Panel B: Descriptive statistics for the ‘‘green’’ and ‘‘control’’ samples of SEOs Offer price (dollars) 28.00 31.12 19.13 24.75 26.91 16.53 23.61***

SEO discount (%) 1.13 2.37 4.36 0.63 1.93 4.27 0.46 Amount (millions) 148.40 250.10 276.62 129.55 203.65 208.70 70.81***

Money left on the table (millions) 0.75 �2.93 38.47 0.00 �37.89 115.24 92.69*** Revision (%) �2.41 �3.04 9.33 �3.10 �3.69 9.33 0.51 Underwriter rank 9.00 8.52 0.82 9.00 8.32 0.96 4.76***

Dilution (%) 6.42 8.14 6.31 10.14 12.62 9.17 �32.91*** Gross spread (%) 4.00 3.94 1.37 4.50 4.28 1.30 �6.39*** EPS (dollars) 1.04 1.03 1.39 0.88 0.78 1.55 4.52***

PE ratio 21.49 26.85 17.33 20.54 26.40 21.46 1.84*

SEONUM 52.00 53.75 22.40 53.00 54.02 22.99 �1.32 RET (%) 3.73 3.42 6.46 3.66 3.45 6.21 �0.03

This table presents descriptive statistics for ‘‘green’’ and ‘‘control’’ samples of IPOs and SEOs, respectively. Underpricing (SEO discount) is measured from the offer price to the first-day closing price. Amount (millions of dollars) is the dollar value of the amount of stock sold in the offering. Money left on the table (millions of dollars) is calculated as the number of shares issued times the change from the offer price to the first-day closing price. Revision is the difference between the offer price and mid-point of the initial filing price relative to the mid-point of the initial filing range. Underwriter Rank is the rank of the lead underwriter using Ritter’s updated Carter-Manaster ranking, where nine is the highest rank and one is the lowest rank. Dilution is the reduction in the ownership percentage of current investors, founders, and employees caused by the issuance of new shares. Gross spread is defined as total expenses (underwriting fees, management fees, re-allowances and selling concessions) as a percentage of total proceeds. EPS (cents) is the earnings per share for the fiscal year prior to the offer date. PE ratio is the first-day closing price divided by EPS for the fiscal year prior to the offer date. IPONUM (SEONUM) is the number of firms going public (issuing equity) during the previous 30 days; RET is the BHAR based on the value-weighted market portfolios benchmarks 3 months prior to the offer date for an IPO or SEO. * Significance at 10% level. ** Significance at 5% level. *** Significance at 1% level.

10 If EPS is negative, we do not calculate a PE ratio and thus treat the observation as missing.

11 As shown in Table 2, the medians gross spread for our ‘‘green’’ and ‘‘control’’ IPO samples are 7.0%. This result is consistent with the findings in Cliff and Denis (2004) which show that underwriter spreads in IPOs are clustered at 7% for all but the very smallest and very largest offerings.

P.T. Chan, T. Walter / Journal of Banking & Finance 44 (2014) 177–188 181

1990–2012. The environmentally-friendly IPO and SEO companies are defined using the procedures described in Appendix A. ‘‘Con- trol’’ IPO and SEO companies are constructed by matching on (i) time of the capital raising, (ii) industry sectors, and (iii) market capitalization. In order to fulfill this requirement, the environmen- tally-friendly and ‘‘control’’ IPO and SEO firms must be listed/have an issue in the same month and year. In addition, ‘‘control’’ firms are selected from the same 3-digit industry codes as environmen- tally-friendly firms. If a corresponding ‘‘control’’ firm cannot be found, the same 2-digit industry codes are used. Firms are matched on size using the firm closest in size in the range of 25% and 200% of the environmentally-friendly firm’s size, measured at the end of each year. The Underpricing or SEO discount is measured from the offer price to the first-day closing price. Amount (millions of dol- lars) is the dollar value of the amount of stock sold in the offering. Money left on the table (millions of dollars) is calculated as the number of shares issued times the change from the offer price to the first-day closing price. Following Hanley (1993), we define Revision as the difference between the offer price and mid-point of the initial filing price scaled by the mid-point of the initial filing range. Underwriter Rank is the rank of the lead underwriter as adopted by Loughran and Ritter (2004). These rankings are on a zero to nine scales, with nine representing the most reputable underwriters. Dilution is the reduction in the ownership percent- age of current investors, founders, and employees caused by the issuance of new shares. Gross spread is defined as total expenses (underwriting fees, management fees, re-allowances and selling concessions) as a percentage of total proceeds. EPS (cents) is the

earnings per share for the fiscal year prior to the offer date. The PE ratio is the first-day closing price divided by EPS for the fiscal year prior to the offer date.10 IPONUM (SEONUM) is the number of firms going public (issuing equity) during the previous 30 days. In order to control for the market movement prior to an IPO, Cook et al. (2006) compute the NASDAQ return prior to the offering date. Instead, we define RET as the BHARs based on the value-weighted market portfolios benchmarks 3 months prior to the offer date for an IPO or SEO.

For both samples of IPOs, there is clear evidence of underpric- ing, with the initial returns for the environmentally-friendly and ‘‘control’’ IPOs being 15.57% and 16.10%, respectively. These initial returns are statistically indistinguishable. The dollar value of the amount of stock sold in an environmentally-friendly offering is sig- nificantly larger than that of ‘‘control’’ firms. Similar results pertain to money left on the table. Environmentally-friendly IPOs attract higher-reputation investment banks for their IPOs, and these banks charge lower underwriting fees, resulting in a lower gross spread.11

Interestingly, the median and mean EPS for environmentally- friendly firms are 0.49 and 0.31, respectively, which suggest that environmentally-oriented companies are profitable stocks when they first list.

182 P.T. Chan, T. Walter / Journal of Banking & Finance 44 (2014) 177–188

When environmentally-friendly firms go back to the market with a SEO the offer price has doubled compared to the IPO offer price. Shares are fairly priced with no money left on the table. Sub- scribers are less willing to buy both environmentally-friendly and ‘‘control’’ SEOs, as indicated by negative price revisions for their SEOs. Similar to the IPO results, environmentally-friendly SEOs use more prestigious underwriters, who again have a lower gross spread. The mean EPS for the environmentally-friendly SEOs has tripled compared that of IPO firms.

4.2. BHARs for IPOs and SEOs

The post-IPO and post-SEO BHARs based on DGTW (1997) port- folios are presented in Panels A and B of Table 3, respectively. We calculate 1 month and up to five years post-event returns after IPOs and SEOs. The main finding of Table 3 is that the ‘‘control’’ sample of IPO stocks underperform in the long-run. However, sur- prisingly, positive and statistically significant excess stock returns are observed for the environmentally-friendly IPO stocks after list- ing. The median and mean of the 1-month BHARs are 1.3% and 3.8%, respectively. For investors who purchase environmentally- oriented stocks through the IPOs and sell the stocks one year after listing, they make 12.4% excess returns on average. The median of the one year return is 8.1%. The divergence of median and mean return series is more severe in the long-run horizons, as the 5-year median and mean are 9.1% and 49.7%, respectively. The large return differential between median and mean returns indicates that the return distribution is positively skewed. For the ‘‘control’’

Table 3 BHARs for the sample of IPOs and SEOs.

Periods 1-month 3-month 6-month 12-month

Panel A: The ‘‘green’’ and ‘‘control’’ samples of IPOs (i) The ‘‘green’’ sample of IPOs Median 0.013 0.033 0.078 0.081 Mean 0.038 0.083 0.125 0.124 S.D. 0.146 0.284 0.385 0.506 t-Statistic 4.02*** 4.54*** 5.03*** 3.75***

(ii) The ‘‘control’’ sample of IPOs Median 0.004 �0.022 �0.023 �0.094 Mean 0.004 �0.005 �0.031 �0.071 S.D. 0.123 0.230 0.316 0.418 t-Statistic 0.50 �0.30 �1.49 �2.53**

Difference 0.034 0.088 0.130 0.195 z-Statistic 1.00 1.88* 3.06*** 3.07***

Panel B: The ‘‘green’’ and ‘‘control’’ sample of SEOs (i) The ‘‘green’’ sample of SEOs Median �0.004 0.008 0.015 0.000 Mean 0.002 0.018 0.022 0.025 S.D. 0.104 0.171 0.256 0.354 t-Statistic 0.57 3.46*** 2.81*** 2.34**

(ii) The ‘‘control’’ sample of SEO Median �0.009 �0.013 �0.017 �0.044 Mean 0.002 �0.007 �0.016 �0.035 S.D. 0.121 0.178 0.265 0.365 t-Statistic 0.60 �1.19 �1.86* �2.91***

Difference �0.001 0.025 0.038 0.061 z-Statistic �0.04 1.34 1.67* 2.24**

Post-announcement BHARs based on size, book-to-market, and momentum portfolios wit stock price data are presented. The ‘‘green’’ IPO and SEO companies are constituents of on SEO companies are constructed by matching on the market capitalization at the time of cross-sectional standard deviation of rated firms’ abnormal returns is calculated. The le book-to-market, and momentum portfolio returns is tested. The z-statistic based on the d are 241 and 1124, respectively. t-Statistic (z-statistic) that the BHAR equals zero (i.e., that the (green-control) BHAR is d * Significant at a = 0.10 (two-tail test). ** Significant at a = 0.05 (two-tail test). *** Significant at a = 0.01 (two-tail test).

IPO sample, no statistically significant abnormal returns are encountered in short-term horizons. However, underperformance of IPO ‘‘control’’ stocks is found in the long-run. The 1-year, 2-year, 3-year, and 4-year post-IPO returns are �7.1%, �18.8%, �15.6% and �11.4% with t-statistics �2.53, �5.08, �3.52 and �2.04, respec- tively. In contrast to environmentally-friendly IPO stocks, the return distribution for the ‘‘non-green’’ IPO stocks is negative skewed. The return differential between environmentally-friendly and ‘‘control’’ samples diverge from 3.4% 1 month after listing to 57.5% for a five-year investment horizon. Additional tests reveal that the differences in mean returns between the environmen- tally-friendly and ‘‘control’’ stocks are significantly different in all time partitions, with the sole exception being the 1-month period.

In Panel B of Table 3, positive and statistically significant abnor- mal returns are also found for environmentally-friendly SEO stocks. The 1-month BHAR is 0.2% after a new issuance of stock. For subscribers who purchase environmentally-oriented stocks through an SEO and hold them for five years, they earn 22.1% excess returns on average. Similar to the ‘‘control’’ IPOs, underper- formance of ‘‘control’’ SEO stocks is observed one year after issuance. The 1-year, 2-year, 3-year, 4-year and 5-year BHARs for the ‘‘control’’ sample are all significantly negative, ranging in magnitude from �3.5% to �13.2%; these results are consistent with earlier studies. The z-statistics also suggest that the environmen- tally-friendly SEO sample is significantly different to the ‘‘control’’ SEO sample in all long-run partitions.

In summary, both environmentally-friendly IPOs and SEOs yield positive excess returns in the long run, while the ‘‘control’’ IPOs

24-month 36-month 48-month 60-month

0.057 0.099 0.068 0.091 0.278 0.386 0.482 0.497 0.917 1.145 1.400 1.400 4.55*** 4.94*** 4.98*** 5.08***

�0.293 �0.307 �0.315 �0.306 �0.188 �0.156 �0.114 �0.078

0.519 0.575 0.678 0.765 �5.08*** �3.52*** �2.04** �1.15

0.466 0.541 0.597 0.575 5.69*** 5.79*** 5.61*** 5.07**

�0.007 0.011 0.036 0.047 0.052 0.098 0.159 0.221 0.511 0.591 0.687 0.791 3.23*** 5.07*** 6.60*** 7.79***

�0.146 �0.165 �0.191 �0.180 �0.114 �0.113 �0.132 �0.105

0.455 0.538 0.548 0.590 �7.08*** �5.55*** �5.63*** �3.95***

0.166 0.212 0.290 0.326 5.06*** 5.64*** 6.77*** 6.93***

h prices available in the Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP) historical daily e of the environmental services indices defined in Appendix A. The ‘‘control’’ IPO and issuance. For each event window of interest, a conventional t-statistic based on the vel of significance on the abnormal returns calculated by BHARs based on the size, ifferences in mean returns is also presented. The numbers of ‘‘green’’ IPOs and SEOs

ifferent from zero).

13 To examine the relationship between underpricing and price revision, we include the interaction terms in the multivariate regression (not shown in Table 4), except for the term (GREEN�Revision) which is negative and statistically significant at 1% level, all other interaction terms with the green dummy are not statistically significant, which implies that the effects of higher price revision and more underpricing will be diminished in the presence of a ‘‘green’’ IPO.

14 The coefficient of the interaction term (Green�RET) is negative and statistically

P.T. Chan, T. Walter / Journal of Banking & Finance 44 (2014) 177–188 183

and SEOs do not. Our results support the over-performance hypothesis which implies that investors believe companies with higher environmental standards can create long-term shareholder value; thus perform better than non-environmental companies. We find ‘‘green’’ premiums for after listing/after issuance for both IPOs and SEOs.

4.3. Cross-sectional regressions for IPOs and SEOs

In this section, we investigate whether the ‘‘green’’ premium still exists after controlling for other factors by performing cross- sectional regressions with equity returns for the environmen- tally-friendly IPO and SEO samples as the dependent variable. In Table 4, we include dummy control variables,12 and test several IPO and SEO hypotheses which have been shown by previous litera- ture to explain IPO and SEO underpricing and short-run BHARs (in Panel A of Table 4) and the long-term (i.e., 12 months and more) IPO and SEO performance (in Panels B and C of Table 4), respectively. We run a multivariate regression with all explanatory variables included to investigate whether environmentally-friendly firms are dominant in explaining IPO and SEO effects.

In Panel A of Table 4, the dependent variable is either (i) Under- pricingi/SEO Discounti, which is measured from the offer price to the first-day closing price, or (ii) short-run BHARi. The independent variable of interest is the dummy variable Greeni, which is equal to one if the listing firm or additional issuing firm is classified as an environmentally-friendly IPO/SEO. The variable ln(amt)i cap- tures the size effect. To attract investors to subscribe for a large amount of stock sold in the offering, higher discounts might be offered to subscribers. Therefore, a negative coefficient is expected for the variable ln(amt)i. Loughran and Ritter (2004) argue that underwriter rank should be positively related to underpricing because issuers want to attract the best underwriters who will underprice and allocate the IPO shares to current or potential future investment banking clients. Subscribers show their inten- tion to subscribe for IPO/SEO shares during the book-building pro- cess (see for example, Benveniste and Spindt (1989)). If the offer price is near the top of the initial filing price range, this implies that subscribers are willing to acquire the IPO/SEO shares at a relatively high offering price. If the demand for the IPO/SEO shares is high, the proportion of shares allocated to subscribers will be small. Sub- scribers might, in such circumstances, purchase ‘‘hot’’ IPOs/SEOs in the aftermarket and boost the share price. Therefore, the predicted sign for the coefficient of variable Revisioni should be positive for IPOs/SEOs with higher price revisions during the book-building process. Finally, many authors have suggested that the frequency of IPOs and the overall stock-market returns before the IPO listings are positively related to underpricing (see, for example, Hanley (1993) and Loughran and Ritter (2004)). In order to test the market timing hypothesis suggested by Jain and Kini (1994), the indepen- dent variables NUMi and RETi reflect whether the issue was made during a bull market.

In Panel A of Table 4, the coefficients for the dummy variable Greeni are generally not statistically significant. The only exception is the 6-month BHAR for IPO firms. Therefore, there is no evidence of statistically different underpricing or short-run post-issue returns for our environmentally-friendly IPO and SEO samples. In the IPO underpricing regression, consistent with the partial adjust-

12 The control dummy variables are Bubblei, Techi, EPSi, NYSEi, and ADRi. The predicted signs for the coefficients of variables Bubblei and Techi are positive, since it is hard to evaluate the intrinsic values of the IPO firms listed during the IT bubble period and technology firms normally have more intangible assets and more risk. Profitable IPO/SEO firms and firms listed on the NYSE should have less underpricing, therefore, the predicted sign for both coefficients of variables EPSi, and NYSEi should be negative. No prediction is made for the sign of ADRi, as the potential SRI impact on the non-U.S. domiciled firms is not known.

ment phenomenon indicated by the previous literature, the coeffi- cient of variable Revisioni has the predicted sign and is statistically significant at 1% level.13 For the dummy variables, the coefficients for the variable Bubblei and EPSi are positive and statistically signif- icant at a 1% level. Techi is positive and significant at a 5% level, while NYSEi is significantly negative. Therefore, we observe some evidence of higher underpricing for technology firms and lower underpricing for firms listed on the NYSE in our regressions. In the SEO test, we also find that there is no positive relationship between underpricing and the frequency of SEOs.14 Inconsistent with the previous litera- ture, the coefficient of the variable Ranki is negative and statistically significant at 5% level and a partial adjustment phenomenon cannot explain for the SEO issue discount. Our tests of short-run returns following IPOs are generally inconclusive. It is worth noting however that the ‘‘green’’ dummy is significant for the 6-month BHAR regres- sion, and that 1-month and 6-month returns in the ‘‘bubble’’ are significantly positive. Short-run SEO returns are significantly higher for larger issues, the larger is the SEO discount, the higher is the underwriter rank and the greater is the revision. However the ‘‘green’’ dummy is insignificantly different from zero for the short- run SEO BHARs.

Panel B presents the cross-sectional regression results for the long-term performance of IPOs. Similar to Panel A, we adopt the same explanatory variables in these regressions. Furthermore, we include the variable Underpricingi as an independent variable in order to explore the relationship between short-term underpricing and long-term stock return performance. Our results in Panel B suggest that the ‘‘green’’ IPO premium exists and is persistent over time. In all long-run event windows the coefficients for Greeni are positive and statistically significant, which reflects that the ‘‘green’’ factor is an important determinant of future stock price perfor- mance. There is some evidence of a negative relationship (in the 48-month and 60-month) between long-term stock return perfor- mance and amount of issuance, while there is a positive associa- tion between underwriters’ ranking and these long-term BHARs. Our results also support the marking timing hypothesis, as expressed by the variable NUMi. Furthermore, NYSE listed IPOs per- form better than non-NYSE listed IPOs in the 5-year returns, as too do the IPOs which are listed during the internet bubble period. EPSi is also positive and statistically significant at 5% level for the 60- month event window, while for the other investigation periods, a green premium exists even in the absence of positive earnings.15

In Panel C of Table 4, we present cross-sectional regression results for the long-term performance of SEOs. The main variable of interest is again Greeni. We find that the coefficients for Greeni are always positive and statistically significant. For example, while holding other factors constant, the environmentally-friendly SEOs earn 12.8% and 16.8% more than the ‘‘control’’ sample in the 2-year and 3-year investigation periods, respectively. However, the coefficients for the variable EPSi are positive but not statistically

significant at 5% level, which implies that the effects of market timing hypothesis will be reduced in the presence of a ‘‘green’’ SEO.

15 Previous research has argued about directional causation between environmental performance and firm profitability (i.e., some scholars suggest that firms adopting higher environmental standards can avoid potential costs of environmental disasters, therefore, they generate higher profits; while others argue that only high profit generating firms can implement stringent environmental standards, as additional costs are incurred by adopting environmental policies). However, we cannot draw a final conclusion on the causal relationship between environmental performance and firm profitability based on our regression results.

Table 4 Initial return, short-term and long-term performance of IPOs/SEOs: Cross-sectional regression on equity returns.

Intercept Ln(amt) Underpricing Rank Revision NUM RET Bubble Tech EPS NYSE ADR Green Adj R2 (%)

Panel A1: Initial return, short-term performance of IPOs: Cross-sectional regression on equity returns IPO 0.174** �0.001 �0.005 0.553*** �0.000 0.176 0.171*** 0.155** 0.080*** �0.044* �0.015 �0.028 14.95 Underpricing (0.08) (0.01) (0.01) (0.13) (0.00) (0.19) (0.03) (0.07) (0.02) (0.03) (0.05) (0.03) 1-month 0.063 �0.021** �0.023 0.002 �0.091** �0.000 0.084 0.032*** 0.017 0.030** 0.018 0.023 0.024 4.47 BHAR (0.06) (0.01) (0.03) (0.01) (0.04) (0.00) (0.12) (0.01) (0.04) (0.01) (0.01) (0.03) (0.02) 3-month �0.050 �0.021 �0.039 0.018 �0.201* �0.000 0.202 0.021 0.011 0.031 0.012 0.055 0.048 3.19 BHAR (0.08) (0.02) (0.04) (0.02) (0.11) (0.00) (0.22) (0.02) (0.07) (0.02) (0.02) (0.07) (0.03) 6-month �0.075 �0.024 �0.169** 0.019 �0.060 0.000 �0.227 0.085** 0.039 0.026 0.076* 0.024 0.123** 5.95 BHAR (0.10) (0.02) (0.07) (0.02) (0.11) (0.00) (0.32) (0.04) (0.10) (0.03) (0.04) (0.09) (0.05)

Panel A2: Initial return, short term performance of SEOs: Cross-sectional regression on equity returns SEO 0.045*** 0.001 �0.003** �0.004 0.000 0.026 0.005* 0.006 �0.005* �0.010*** �0.010** 0.003 4.34 Discount (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.02) (0.03) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) 1-month �0.102*** 0.013*** 0.898*** 0.007** 0.292*** �0.000* �0.022 �0.027** �0.004 0.009 �0.013* �0.007 �0.007 22.67 BHAR (0.02) (0.00) (0.11) (0.00) (0.03) (0.00) (0.04) (0.01) (0.03) (0.01) (0.01) (0.03) (0.01) 3-month �0.234*** 0.015** 1.046*** 0.015*** 0.241*** �0.000 0.026 0.008 �0.035 0.058*** �0.009 �0.020 0.004 12.45 BHAR (0.04) (0.01) (0.15) (0.00) (0.05) (0.00) (0.08) (0.01) (0.05) (0.02) (0.01) (0.04) (0.01) 6-month �0.209*** 0.003 1.163*** 0.019*** 0.267*** �0.001** 0.120 0.004 �0.079 0.040 0.019 0.027 0.020 6.92 BHAR (0.04) (0.01) (0.18) (0.01) (0.07) (0.00) (0.12) (0.02) (0.07) (0.03) (0.02) (0.05) (0.02)

Panel B: long-term performance of IPOs: Cross-sectional regression on equity returns 12-month �0.056 �0.037 �0.114 0.019 0.122 �0.001 �0.073 �0.167** 0.333 0.110 0.166*** �0.014 0.121** 7.86 BHAR (0.26) (0.04) (0.10) (0.03) (0.19) (0.00) (0.45) (0.07) (0.21) (0.07) (0.05) (0.08) (0.06) 24-month �0.518** �0.043 �0.149 0.074** 0.044 �0.002 �0.501 0.056 0.524 0.087 0.117 �0.168 0.342*** 7.95 BHAR (0.23) (0.05) (0.19) (0.03) (0.35) (0.00) (0.81) (0.19) (0.45) (0.11) (0.10) (0.12) (0.08) 36-month �0.077 �0.062 �0.116 0.049 �0.275 �0.006*** 0.390 0.147 �0.073 0.020 0.202 0.021 0.551*** 9.19 BHAR (0.33) (0.06) (0.18) (0.03) (0.38) (0.00) (0.99) (0.13) (0.29) (0.14) (0.19) (0.22) (0.11) 48-month �0.641 �0.138* �0.191 0.144** �0.421 �0.004 0.718 0.308 1.075 0.180 0.298 �0.103 0.489*** 8.16 BHAR (0.52) (0.08) (0.37) (0.06) (0.81) (0.00) (1.50) (0.22) (0.76) (0.19) (0.21) (0.32) (0.12) 60-month �0.740** �0.173** �0.148 0.186*** �1.221 �0.007* 0.367 0.521** 0.485* 0.413** 0.403* �0.424 0.384*** 10.18 BHAR (0.37) (0.07) (0.40) (0.05) (0.96) (0.00) (1.62) (0.26) (0.28) (0.21) (0.24) (0.32) (0.10)

Intercept Ln(amt) SEO Discount Rank Revision NUM RET Bubble Tech EPS NYSE ADR Green Adj R2 (%)

Panel C: long-term performance of SEOs: Cross-sectional regression on equity returns 12-month �0.341*** 0.001 0.943*** 0.034*** 0.209** �0.001* 0.047 �0.026 �0.149* 0.041 0.060 �0.057 0.047* 5.38 BHAR (0.06) (0.02) (0.29) (0.01) (0.08) (0.00) (0.18) (0.02) (0.09) (0.04) (0.04) (0.07) (0.03) 24-month �0.288** �0.017 0.543* 0.028** 0.103 �0.002** �0.016 0.040 �0.089 0.082 0.131*** �0.108 0.128*** 6.26 BHAR (0.11) (0.02) (0.29) (0.01) (0.10) (0.00) (0.28) (0.11) (0.09) (0.06) (0.04) (0.11) (0.04) 36-month �0.144 �0.033 0.808** 0.017 0.108 �0.001 �0.331 �0.111 �0.015 0.061 0.198*** 0.008 0.168*** 6.18 BHAR (0.16) (0.03) (0.32) (0.01) (0.15) (0.00) (0.35) (0.11) (0.13) (0.08) (0.04) (0.19) (0.04) 48-month �0.042 �0.054 0.995** 0.018 0.257 �0.002 �0.417 �0.058 0.003 0.081 0.148** 0.230* 0.231*** 5.05 BHAR (0.20) (0.03) (0.37) (0.02) (0.19) (0.00) (0.38) (0.11) (0.12) (0.09) (0.06) (0.13) (0.05) 60-month �0.096 �0.053* 1.643*** 0.012 0.286 0.000 �0.033 �0.015 0.083 0.109 0.180** 0.102 0.253*** 4.68 BHAR (0.23) (0.03) (0.51) (0.03) (0.22) (0.00) (0.48) (0.11) (0.14) (0.10) (0.08) (0.21) (0.06)

This table presents regression results from estimating the following equations: Underpricingt=SEO Discountt ¼ a1 þ b2 lnðamtÞ þ b3Rankþ b4Revisionþ b5NUM þ b6RET þ b7Bubbleþ b8Techþ b9EPSþ b10NYSEþ b11ADRþ b12Greenþ e BHARt ¼ a1 þ b2 lnðamtÞ þ b3ðUnderpricing=SEO DiscountÞ þ b4Rankþ b5Revisionþ b6NUM þ b7RET þ b8Bubbleþ b9Techþ b10EPSþ b11NYSEþ b12ADRþ b13Greenþ e; where Underpricingt/SEO Discountt is measured from the offer price to the first-day closing price; BHARt is the buy-and-hold abnormal return based on size, book-to-market and momentum portfolios benchmarks; Amt (millions of dollars) is the dollar value of the amount of stock sold in the offering; Revision is the difference between the offer price and mid-point of the initial filing price relative to the mid-point of the initial filing range; Rank is the rank of the lead underwriter using Ritter’s updated Carter-Manaster ranking; Bubble is equal to one if the offer date occurs during 1999 and 2000, and zero otherwise; Tech is equal to one if the firm is in a high technology industry as identified by Loughran and Ritter (2004); EPS is equal to one if the earnings per share is greater than zero, and zero otherwise; NYSE is equal to one if the IPO/SEO firm is listed on the New York Stock Exchange; NUM is the number of firms going public or undergoing seasoned equity offerings during the previous 30 days; RET is the BHARs based on the value-weighted market portfolios benchmarks 3 months prior to the offer date for an IPO/SEO; ADR is equal to one if the observation is the American Depository Receipt (ADR), and zero otherwise; Green is equal to one if the IPO/SEO firm is defined as a green IPO/SEO, zero otherwise. Standard errors based on Petersen (2009) and modified by clustering by industry and year are reported in parentheses. Panel A.1 and Panel A.2 show the short-term performance of the IPOs and SEOs, respectively. The BHARs based on different time windows of interest for the IPO and SEO samples are presented in Panel B and Panel C, respectively. Standard errors are reported in parentheses. * Significance at 10% level. ** Significance at 5% level. *** Significance at 1% level.

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significant for all long-term horizons; which imply that a ‘‘green’’ premium can exist in the absence of positive earnings. The variable SEO Discount is positive and statistically significant in all investiga- tion periods, while the variable NUMi is negative and statistically significant in the 12-month and 24-month horizons; this supports the market timing hypothesis.

In summary, our results in Table 4 reveal that an investor can earn 12.1% excess return one year after listing if he/she can clearly distinguish ‘‘green’’ and ‘‘non-green’’ IPOs and buy the former/ short the latter. A similar premium of 12.8% exists for ‘‘green’’ SEOs two years after issuance.

5. Conclusion

This paper tests whether investment in environmentally- friendly companies and their IPOs and SEOs is good for your wealth. The prior literature proposed two hypotheses in explaining stock return performance of environmentally-friendly companies. The underperformance hypothesis suggests that environmen- tally-friendly companies will perform poorly in the short-run because their investment opportunity set is restricted by non- financial criteria. In order to fulfill higher environmental standards, extra costs are incurred in designing clean technology systems and manufacturing environmentally-friendly products. However, in the long-run, companies with higher environmental standards can avoid the potential costs of corporate social crises and environ- mental disasters. This is valuable not only to shareholders, but also benefits other stakeholders, namely employees, customers, local communities and the environment. Thus, environmentally-friendly companies will over-perform in the long-run (i.e., the over-perfor- mance hypothesis).

Exchange-traded funds Ticker Nos. of stocks Indices

AdvisorShares Global Echo ETF GIVE 74 (IPO – 2

Claymore-LGA Green ETF GRN 179 Eco�Ind October

First Trust Global Wind Energy ETF

FAN 51 ISE Glob Index (0

First Trust ISE Water Index Fund

FIW 36 ISE Wat Novemb

Based on publicly available information, we identify 748 envi- ronmentally-friendly companies being constituents of environ- mental indices listed on the NYSE, AMEX, and NASDAQ during the period 1990–2012. Consistent with the results in Derwall et al. (2004), our Carhart (1997) four-factor model shows that envi- ronmentally-friendly companies earn approximately 7% excess returns per year. The previous literature has documented long- term underperformance of IPOs and SEOs. Astonishingly, we observe positive and statistically significant BHARs for our envi- ronmentally-friendly IPOs and SEOs in both short-term and long- term horizon tests. For instance, we find that the one-year BHARs for environmentally-friendly and ‘‘control’’ IPOs are 12.4% and �7.1%, respectively, while the one-year BHARs for environmen- tally-friendly and ‘‘control’’ SEOs are 2.5% and �3.5% after control- ling for size, book-to-market, and momentum factors. From our cross-sectional regressions, the underpricing of environmentally- friendly IPOs and SEOs does not differ significantly from ‘‘control’’ firms. The long-term performance tests show that the ‘‘green’’ dummy variable is always positive and statistically significant; thus a ‘‘green’’ factor is important in explaining long-term stock return performance following IPOs and SEOs. Our results support the over-performance hypothesis that proposes companies with higher environmental standards create shareholders’ wealth in the long run. Hence, a ‘‘green’’ premium exists and this persists, thought it is somewhat mitigated, over our sample period.

Appendix A. The major environmentally-friendly exchange- traded (ETF) funds listed on the NYSE, AMEX and NASDAQ

This appendix presents descriptions of each environmentally- friendly exchange-traded funds that are traded on the NYSE, AMEX, and NASDAQ.

(listing date) Descriptions

4 May 2012) GIVE is a multi-manager, multi-strategy, broadly diversified, and actively managed ETF with a focus on Sustainable Investing. The fund invests primarily in U.S. and foreign equity securities. The fund may take both long and short positions

ex™ Index (10 2006)

GRN designs to capture the performance of U.S. listed large-cap companies for their having better than average environmental performance relative to their industry peers. The initial benchmark value is 1000.00 at close of trading October 10, 2006

al Wind Energy 6 June 2008)

FAN will invest at least 90% of its net assets (plus the amount of any borrowings for investment purposes) in common stocks that comprise the index or in depositary receipts representing securities in the index. FAN invests in sectors, which include Consumer Discretionary, Energy, Industrials, materials and Utilities

er Index (20 er 2006)

FIW consists of 36 stocks that derive a substantial portion of their revenues from the potable and wastewater industries. FIW invests at least 90% of its assets in common stocks that comprise the index

(continued on next page)

Appendix A (continued)

Exchange-traded funds Ticker Nos. of stocks Indices (listing date) Descriptions

First Trust NASDAQ Clean Edge Green Energy Index Fund

QCLN 43 Clean Edge U.S. Liquid Series Index (17 November 2006)

QCLN invests on the companies that are primarily manufacturers, developers, distributors and/or installers of clean energy technologies, as defined by Clean Edge

First Trust NASDAQ Clean Edge Smart Grid Infrastructure Index Fund

GRID 31 NASDAQ OMX Clean Edge Smart Grid Infrastructure Index (22 September 2009)

GRID is designed to track the performance of common stocks in the grid and electric energy infrastructure sector. The fund includes companies that are primarily engaged and involved in electric grid, electric meters and devices, networks, energy storage and management, and enabling software used by the smart grid infrastructure sector

Guggenheim S&P Global Water Index ETF – formerly Claymore S&P Global Water Index ETF

CGW 51 S&P Global Water NR Index (22 February 2007)

CGW consists of approximately 50 equity securities selected based on investment and other criteria, from a universe of companies listed on global developed market exchanges. The fund is designed to have a balanced representation from different segments of the water industry consisting of two clusters: 25 water utilities and infrastructure companies and 25 water equipment and materials companies based upon Standard & Poor’s Capital IQ industry classification. The fund will invest at least 90% of its total assets in common stock and American Depositary receipts that comprise the index depositary receipts representing common stocks included in the Index

Guggenheim Solar ETF – formerly Claymore/MAC Global Solar Energy Index ETF

TAN 28 MAC Global Solar Energy Index (15 April 2008)

TAN consists of approximately 25 stocks selected based on the relative importance of solar power within the Company’s business model, as determined by MAC Indexing LLC. The fund is designed to track companies within the business segments of the solar energy industry, which include companies that produce solar power equipment and products for end users, companies that produce fabrication products (such as the equipment used by solar cell and module producers to manufacture solar power equipment) or services (such as companies specializing in the solar cell manufacturing or the provision of consulting services to solar cell and module producers) for solar power equipment producers

Huntington Ecological Strategy ETF

HECO 50 (IPO – 20 June 2012) HECO is an actively managed exchange- traded fund and, under normal conditions, will invest at least 80% of its net assets in the exchange-listed equity securities of ecologically-focused companies

iShares MSCI KLD 400 Social ETF – formerly iShares FTSE KLD 400 Social Index Fund

DSI 398 MSCI KLD 400 Social Index (02 January 2007)

DSI consists of approximately 400 companies identified by MSCI from the universe of companies included in the MSCI USA IMI Index, which consists of NYSE and NASDAQ listed United States equities

Exchange-traded Funds Ticker Nos. of Stocks Indices (Listing Date) Descriptions iShares S&P Global Clean

Energy Index Fund ICLN 32 iShares S&P Global Clean

Energy Index (24 June 2008)

ICLN includes clean energy production companies, clean energy equipment and technology providers. For these purposes, the ‘‘clean energy’’ universe includes biofuel and biomass, ethanol and fuel alcohol,

186 P.T. Chan, T. Walter / Journal of Banking & Finance 44 (2014) 177–188

Appendix A (continued)

Exchange-traded funds Ticker Nos. of stocks Indices (listing date) Descriptions

geothermal energy, hydroelectricity, solar and wind energy

Market Vectors – Solar Energy ETF

KWT 33 Ardour Solar Energy Index (SOLRX) (31 December 2004)

KWT invests in a portfolio of securities that generally replicates SOLRX. SOLRX calculated and maintained by Dow Jones Indexes on behalf of Ardour Global Indexes LLC. The fund provides exposure to publicly traded companies from around the world that derive at least 66% of their revenues from solar power and related products and services. On a weighted basis, the companies in the fund derive in excess of 90% of their revenues from the solar industry

Market Vectors Environmental Services Index Fund

EVX 27 NYSE Arca Environmental Services Index (31 December 2003)

EVX consists of publicly traded companies that are involved in the management, removal and storage of consumer waste and industrial by-products and related environmental services. The fund is passively managed and may not hold each index component in the same weighting as the index. The fund may not exactly replicate the performance of the index

Market Vectors Global Alternative Energy ETF Trust

GEX 30 Ardour Global Index (Extra Liquid) Index (01 January 2001)

GEX tracks the overall performance of a global universe of listed companies engaged in the alternative energy industry. The fund comprises a globally diversified group of companies engaged in the production of alternative fuels and/or related technologies. Companies eligible for inclusion should be engaged in the alternative energy industry with market cap exceeding $100 million and should have 3-month average daily trading price greater than $1 per share

PowerShares Cleantech Portfolio

PZD 60 Cleantech Index (31 December 1999)

PZD invests at least 90% of its total assets in securities that comprise the Index and American Depository Receipts (ADR) based on the stocks in the index. The fund invests in securities, such as consumer discretionary, health care, industrials, materials, utilities and information technology. The initial value was 500 at market close, 31 December 1999

PowerShares Global Clean Energy Portfolio

PBD 97 WilderHill New Energy Global Innovation Index (01 January 2006)

PBD invests at least 90% of its total assets in the equity securities that comprise the Index and American Depository receipts (ADR) that are based on the securities in the index. The index seeks to deliver capital appreciation and is composed of companies that focus on greener and generally renewable sources of energy and technologies facilitating cleaner energy. The fund will invest in consumer discretionary, consumer staples, energy, industrials, information technology, materials and utilities sectors

PowerShares Global Water Portfolio

PIO 36 NASDAQ OMX Global Water Index (13 June 2007)

PIO invests at least 90% of its total assets in the equity securities that comprise the Index and American Depository receipts (ADR) that are based on the securities in the index

PowerShares Water Resources Portfolio

PHO 29 NASDAQ OMX US Water Index (06 December 2005)

PHO invests at least 90% of its total assets in common stocks that comprise the underlying index. The index seeks to track

(continued on next page)

P.T. Chan, T. Walter / Journal of Banking & Finance 44 (2014) 177–188 187

Appendix A (continued)

Exchange-traded funds Ticker Nos. of stocks Indices (listing date) Descriptions

the performance of the U.S. exchange-listed companies that create products designed to conserve and purify water for homes, business and industries. The fund invests in the sector such as industrials, utilities, healthcare, information technology and materials

PowerShares WilderHill Progressive Energy Portfolio

PUW 55 WilderHill Progressive Energy Index (13 October 2006)

PUW invests at least 90% of its total assets in common stocks that comprise the index. The index is comprised the United States-listed companies that are involved in transitional energy bridge technologies, with an emphasis on improving the use of fossil fuels. The fund invests in the sectors, such as consumer discretionary, industrial, information technology, materials, utilities, energy and consumer staples

PowerShares WilderHill Clean Energy Portfolio

PBW 51 WilderHill Clean Energy Index (16 August 2004)

PBW invests at least 90% of its total assets in common stocks that comprise the index. The index is designed to deliver capital appreciation through the selection of companies that focus on greener and generally renewable sources of energy and technologies that facilitate cleaner energy. The fund invests in the sectors, such as consumer discretionary, industrial, information technology, materials, utilities, energy and consumer staples

188 P.T. Chan, T. Walter / Journal of Banking & Finance 44 (2014) 177–188

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  • Investment performance of “environmentally-friendly” firms and their initial public offers and seasoned equity offers
    • 1 Introduction
    • 2 Data and methodology
      • 2.1 Data selection
      • 2.2 Methodology
    • 3 Return analysis of the environmentally-friendly sample
    • 4 Event studies: IPOs and SEOs
      • 4.1 Descriptive statistics for environmentally-friendly and “Control” firms
      • 4.2 BHARs for IPOs and SEOs
      • 4.3 Cross-sectional regressions for IPOs and SEOs
    • 5 Conclusion
    • Appendix A The major environmentally-friendly exchange-traded (ETF) funds listed on the NYSE, AMEX and NASDAQ
    • References

Of-religion-and-redemption--Evidence-from-default-_2014_Journal-of-Banking--.pdf

Journal of Banking & Finance 44 (2014) 141–159

Contents lists available at ScienceDirect

Journal of Banking & Finance

journal homepage: www.elsevier .com/locate / jbf

Of religion and redemption: Evidence from default on Islamic loans

http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jbankfin.2014.03.005 0378-4266/� 2014 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

⇑ Corresponding author. Tel.: +31 13 4663257; fax: +31 13 4662875. E-mail addresses: [email protected] (L. Baele), [email protected]

(M. Farooq), [email protected] (S. Ongena). 1 Tel.: +968 2477 7580; fax: +968 2477 7767. 2 Tel.: +41 44 634 3954; fax: +41 44 634 49 03.

Lieven Baele a,⇑, Moazzam Farooq b,1, Steven Ongena c,2 a Netspar, CentER – Tilburg University, PO Box 90153, NL 5000 LE Tilburg, The Netherlands b Central Bank of Oman, PO Box 1161, 112 Ruwi, Oman c University of Zurich, SFI and CEPR, Department of Banking and Finance, Plattenstrasse 32, CH-8032 Zürich, Switzerland

a r t i c l e i n f o

Article history: Received 9 October 2012 Accepted 4 March 2014 Available online 21 March 2014

JEL classification: A13 G21 G32 G33 Z12

Keywords: Loan default Islamic loans Religion Duration analysis

a b s t r a c t

We compare default rates on conventional and Islamic loans using a comprehensive monthly dataset from Pakistan that follows more than 150,000 loans over the period 2006:04 to 2008:12. We find robust evidence that the default rate of Islamic loans is less than half the default rate of conventional loans. Islamic loans are less likely to default during Ramadan and in big cities if the share of votes to religious-political parties increases, suggesting that religion – either through individual piousness or network effects – may play a role in determining loan default.

� 2014 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

0. Introduction

Islamic banking is one of the fastest growing parts of the finan- cial sector. Doubled in size since 2006 and already accounting for $900 billion or more than 1% of the global banking market (Financial Times, May 12, 2011), ‘‘the global potential of the Islamic banking market is conservatively estimated at $4000 billion, according to Moody’s Investor Service’’ (Financial Times, July 8, 2008). The financial crisis may have spurred its growth and poten- tial market share even further, as observers claim the ‘‘principles based on religious law insulate the industry from the worst of the financial crisis’’ (Washington Post, October 31, 2008; see also the International Monetary Fund report by Hasan and Dridi (2010)). In particular, the asset-based and risk sharing nature of

Islamic finance as well as the obligation to only engage in products that limit excessive leverage and disruptive financial innovation may have shielded Islamic banking from the impact of the crisis.

Yet despite the fast growth of Islamic banking and the impera- tive claims made about the built-in protection against excessive risk-taking by financial institutions, no research (we are aware of) so far has investigated the default rate of individual conven- tional versus Islamic loans. This lack of evidence should not come as a surprise, because the identification challenges, and corre- sponding data requirements, faced by such an analysis are steep. Borrowers seeking Islamic financing and banks granting it may dif- fer from their conventional counterparts in many observable and unobservable characteristics. Whether therefore the difference in credit risk in conventional and Islamic financing is mainly due to compliance with the principles of Islamic law (the Shari’ah) per se, or is due to borrower, loan contract and/or bank characteristics that are independent of any Islamic rulings remains an open ques- tion we aim to address in this paper.

The data set we employ covers all business loans that were outstanding in Pakistan during the period 2006:4 to 2008:12. The Credit Information Bureau (CIB) database, that we use, is main- tained by the Consumer Protection Department of the State Bank of Pakistan and is also analyzed in Khwaja and Mian (2005,

142 L. Baele et al. / Journal of Banking & Finance 44 (2014) 141–159

2008), Mian (2006) and Zia (2008) for example. The country and sample period provide a unique setting to analyze the credit risk in Islamic loans.3

Pakistan may be one of the few countries in the world where both well-developed conventional and Islamic banking sectors have co-existed for a considerable period of time. Though the characteristics of borrowers, loan contracts and banks may differ between conventional and Islamic loans, their co-existence in Paki- stan offers a unique opportunity to assess the effect of religion on the loan default rate. The majority of Islamic loans granted in Pakistan are simple and standard equivalents to conventional loans, and therefore comparable to these conventional loans and to similar Islamic loans in other countries. In fact, the pure profit-loss sharing contracts, i.e., Mudaraba and Musharakah, con- stitute less than 3% of all loans in our sample, compared to 43% for Murabahah financing (which is most similar to a term loan), 22% for Diminishing Musharakah (most similar to mortgage finance or hire purchase), and 24% for Ijarah and Ijarah wa’Iqtina (most similar to a leasing contract). We discuss those contracts in more detail below. Another unique feature of our dataset is that quite a few firms and banks repeatedly and concurrently engage in both conventional and Islamic type financing providing unique opportu- nities for advanced empirical identification.

Estimating a variety of empirical models that contain pertinent combinations of borrower, loan contract and bank characteristics, and even when saturating the models with year �month, bor- rower, bank and borrower � bank fixed effects, we find robust evi- dence that Islamic loans are less likely to be overdue for 90 (or 180) days on their payments than conventional loans. This estimated wedge in these default rates is not only statistically significant, but also economically relevant. In duration models the hazard rate on Islamic loans is estimated to be less than half the hazard rate on conventional loans.

The specifications saturated with borrower � bank fixed effects rule out the possibility that observed and/or unobserved borrower, bank and/or borrower–bank relationship heterogeneity are poten- tial explanations for the large observed default differential. Differ- ences in loan characteristics can also be ruled out because – as indicated earlier – the contracted cash flows for the bulk of the Islamic loans in Pakistan are exactly the same as those of their equivalent conventional loans. Indeed, even when pairing simple and common Murabahah loans with their most similar conven- tional counterparts (i.e., term finance and working capital loans) of the same maturity (i.e., shorter than one year) and of the same collateralization status, the large default differential remains present.

Our hypothesis, which we develop in detail in Section 1.3, is that the lower default rate on Islamic loans is due to the more acute conflict that pious borrowers have with their individual reli- gious beliefs or those of their fellow believers when defaulting on an Islamic loan (Iannaccone, 1998; Guiso et al., 2006).

While the most fervent religious believers may obtain Islamic loans only, intermediate believers may mix conventional and Isla- mic borrowing (a widely observed practice which permits our esti- mations with borrower fixed effects). Though mixed borrowers may default due to nature or their own actions (Bolton and Scharfstein, 1996), the more pious ones among them may choose

3 Consistent with the practices of the Credit Information Bureau (CIB) of the State Bank of Pakistan, we henceforth employ the terms ‘‘conventional’’ and ‘‘Islamic loan’’, despite that because they involve no interest payments and almost always consist of multiple underlying contracts, scholars are often hesitant to label many of the Islamic financial products we will study as ‘‘loans’’ (Kuran, 2004) or even as ‘‘Islamic’’ (see the discussion in Pepinsky (2010) and Khan (2010b) for example).

(and are legally and observably able) to default on their conven- tional rather than on their Islamic loans. Our finding that the hazard rate on Islamic loans of the same borrower taking both con- ventional and Islamic loans from the same bank is only one fifth the hazard rate of conventional loans confirms the second hypoth- esis that we develop, i.e., that the same borrower is less likely to default on an Islamic than on a conventional loan.

Suggestive of religious motivation is further our finding that Islamic loans are less likely to default during Ramadan, a period of greater religious orientation, and in big cities if the share of votes to religious-political parties increases. Family and related social networks may be weaker in big cities and the increase in the share of votes to religious-political parties, which in cities are even more distinct from other political parties than in rural areas, strengthens the role of alternative religious-social networks. Prospective bor- rowers and loan officers may meet at mosques, for example, which may serve as informal credit registries. Khwaja et al. (2011) esti- mate the value of membership in such large yet diffuse networks – in their case a business network – for access to bank credit and financial viability using 1999–2003 data on the composition of the boards of directors of all firms in Pakistan.4

The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 1 explains the basic tenets of Islamic banking. This section also introduces our corresponding theoretical framework on loan default and the resultant testable hypotheses. Section 2 introduces the data and the methodology. Section 3 discusses the empirical results. Sec- tion 4 concludes.

1. Islamic banking and loan default

1.1. Islamic banking

Islamic Banking refers to a system of banking or banking prac- tices that is consistent, both in objectives and operations, with the Shari’ah. The main principles are either directly based on the Qur’an and the sayings and actions of the prophet Mohammed, or on a growing body of Islamic jurisprudence that is being developed by Islamic scholars. The key distinguishing features of Islamic Banking – the prohibition of interest (riba), excessive leverage, and its focus on risk sharing – may make Islamic banks quite different from con- ventional banks. Recently published and ongoing has found that Islamic banks may be less efficient, but at the same time also less exposed to credit risk than conventional banks and that many Isla- mic banks have high-quality assets and are therefore more stable than their conventional counterparts (Abedifar et al., 2013; Beck et al., 2013; Pappas et al., 2013; Van Wijnbergen and Zaheer, 2013; see also Table 1).

1.2. Islamic loan contracts

Ideal modes of Islamic financing are based on the profit-and- loss sharing (PLS) paradigm. Examples of such arrangements include Musharakah which is a partnership where all partners invest both money and expertise and Mudarabah which is a partnership with some partners investing only money and others only their skills/labor (we provide details on the different types of Islamic financing in (online) Appendix A). The ex-ante fixed rate

4 The common bond present in credit unions around the world may fulfill a similar role (McKillop and Wilson, 2011). Ostergaard et al. (2013) for example find that savings banks located in Norwegian communities with high social capital have a higher probability of survival and lower loan losses, though they stress the role social capital plays in facilitating collective decision-making at these banks.

Table 1 The table summarizes selected empirical work on Islamic banking.

Paper Sample Analysis

Countries Period # Obs. At level Explains Finds (w.r.t. differences between conventional and Islamic banks/ loans)

Imam and Kpodar (2010) 117 1992–2006 1520 Country – Year

Presence Identifies various factors of diffusion

Mohamad et al. (2008) and Bader et al. (2008)

21 1990–2005 80 Bank Efficiency No differences

Chong and Liu (2009) Malaysia 1995:04–2004:04 109 Month Average interest rates

Islamic deposits are not interest-free, but are closely pegged to conventional deposits

Čihák and Hesse (2010) 18 1993–2004 2347 Bank – Year Z-score Small Islamic > small commercial Bank strength Large commercial > large Islamic

Small Islamic > large Islamic Abdul-Majid et al. (2010) 10 1996–2002 Bank – Year Technical

inefficiency Islamic banks are more technically inefficient

Pepinsky (2010) Indonesia 2008:05/06 2548 Consumers Views on Islamic Finance

Islamic identity matters, not piety

Weill (2011) 17 2000–2007 1301 Bank – Year Bank market power (Lerner)

Islamic banks have somewhat less market power

Ongena and S�endeniz-Yüncü (2011) Turkey 2008 16,056 Bank – Firm Firm bank choice Islamic banks deal with young, multiple-bank, industry-focused and transparent firms

Ghannouci et al. (2012) 2000–2006 1505 banks Bank – Year Technology No technology differences (same cost efficiency)

Weill and Godlewski (2012) 6 2001–2009 231 loans Loans Islamic Choice for Islamic versus conventional syndicated loans by large firms driven by country-level religiosity and institutional quality, not firm-level quality

Abedifar et al. (2013) 24 1999–2009 553 banks Bank – Year Loan risk, bank stability

Small Islamic banks that are leveraged or based in countries with predominantly Muslim populations have lower credit risk than conventional banks. Small Islamic banks also appear more stable

Beck et al. (2013) 22 1995–2009 510 banks Bank – Year Various bank measures

Islamic banks are less cost-effective, but have a higher intermediation ratio, higher asset quality and are better capitalized, also during the crisis

Pappas et al. (2013) 20 1995–2010 421 banks Bank – Year Survival Islamic banks survive longer Khan and Khanna (2012) Pakistan 2008 9078 Customers at

two banks Opening bank account

Religiosity and wealth matters when opening an Islamic bank account

Khan (2010a) Pakistan 2006:06–2009:03 995 Bank - Account

Growth deposit accounts

Islamic deposit accounts grow faster than conventional ones

Van Wijnbergen and Zaheer (2013) Pakistan 2002:02–2010:08 1696 Bank (Branch) – Quarter

Asset quality, stability

Islamic bank > conventional bank

Islamic branch > conventional branch of the same bank (except when small)

Zaheer et al. (2013) Pakistan 2002:II-2010:I 756 Bank – Quarter

Credit growth Credit channel of monetary policy through the Islamic banking sector is less potent than through the conventional part

This paper Pakistan 2006:04–2008:12 603,677 Loan-Month Loan default Islamic loans less likely to default

L. Baele et al. / Journal of Banking & Finance 44 (2014) 141–159 143

of return common in conventional loan products is replaced by a return that is uncertain and dependent on the borrowing com- pany’s realized profits, which make these two financing structures compatible with Shari’ah principles. Notice that both Musharakah and Mudarabah bear very little resemblance with interest-bearing contracts in conventional banking, which would make it problem- atic to compare their respective default rates. In practice, however, PLS contracts only constitute a small share of the market for Isla- mic loans products. In fact, in our sample, less than 3% of all Islamic loans are based on the PLS principle.5 The low share of PLS lending contracts is not specific to Pakistan. Chong and Liu (2009), for

5 Often quoted reasons include agency problems, lack of well-defined property laws, the restrictive role of shareholders in management, or a disadvantageous tax treatment. Many banks, facing competition from conventional banks, may consider PLS contracts as being too risky.

instance, find that only 0.5% of Islamic loans in Malaysia adopt the PLS paradigm.

Instead, Islamic banks have developed lending structures that, while being Shari’ah compliant, largely mimic the characteristics of conventional lending products. In a Murabahah contract (which is the contract most equivalent to a term loan), the bank first pur- chases a real asset from a supplier, and consequently sells it on credit in a different contract at a marked-up price to the borrower. Interest rate payments are implicit as the borrower pays the marked-up price in installments over a period of time or in lump sum at maturity of the contract. This contract is permissible because trade in general is allowed and also the bank is technically exposed to risk between the moment it takes legal possession of the underlying asset (first contract) and the moment it transfers the asset to the borrower (second contract), even if in practice this moment is often very short.

Box 1 Religiosity and loan default.

Based on (the notation in) Fig. 1 the default probabilities of

the granted Islamic and conventional loans, i.e., pi and pc, equal respectively:

pi ¼ rxakþð1�rÞycmrxaþð1�rÞyc pc ¼ rð1�xÞblþð1�rÞð1�yÞdnrð1�xÞbþð1�rÞð1�yÞd We now make a number of straightforward assumptions

based on the fundamental nature of Islamic banking that

were outlined in the main text (for simplicity we denote

Islamic banks and Islamic branches of mixed banks as Isla-

mic financiers for now but differentiate again later).

Assumption 1: A devout applicant is more likely to apply for a loan from an Islamic financier than a secular applicant is

144 L. Baele et al. / Journal of Banking & Finance 44 (2014) 141–159

Similarly, Islamic leasing products have been developed. In case of Ijarah, the bank buys an asset for a customer and then leases it to the customer for a certain period at a fixed rental charge. Islamic law allows rent to be charged because the cus- tomer enjoys the usufruct of the good while the bank bears the risk of ownership. Ijarah wa’Iqtina is similar to an Ijarah contract except that it allows for the possibility that the customer becomes owner of the good at the end of the lease contract, either for free (gift) or at a pre-agreed price. Finally, in a diminish- ing Musharakah contract, a financier and her client participate either in the joint ownership of a property or an equipment. What is different, however, is that the share of the financier is divided into a number of units, which at pre-agreed moments in time are purchased by the client. Each period, the client’s share increases until all units are bought and she fully owns the property or asset. Rent is paid to the financier according to her remaining share in the project.

(notice that it is possible also for secular applicants to

apply for an obtain Islamic loans, i.e., y P 0).

x ¼ ay; with 1y P a > 1

Assumption 2: An Islamic financier is more likely to accept an application (which de iure is always for an Islamic loan) from a devout applicant than from a secular

applicant.

a ¼ bc; with 1c P b > 1

Assumption 3: An Islamic financier is more (less) likely to accept an application (which de iure is always for an Isla- mic loan) from a devout (secular) applicant than a conven-

tional financier is.

a ¼ cb; with 1b P c > 1 d ¼ dc; with 1c P d > 1

Assumption 4: Given a similar loan, a devout borrower is less likely to default on a loan than a secular borrower:

m ¼ hk; with 1k P h > 1 n ¼ hl; with 1l P h > 1

Assumption 5: A devout borrower is less likely to default on an Islamic loan than on a conventional loan:

l ¼ lk; with 1k P l > 1

So that n = dlk. Given these assumptions, the default probabilities of the

granted Islamic and conventional loans equal:

pi ¼ k rða�1bhÞþ

1 bh

rða�1bÞþ 1 b

pc ¼ kl r ð1�ayÞ1c�ð1�yÞd1bh½ �þð1�yÞd1bh

r ð1�ayÞ1c�ð1�yÞd1b½ �þð1�yÞd1b When all borrowers are secular (r = 0) the probabilities equal pi = kh and pc = klh, and pc > pi and pc � pi = kh(l � 1) > 0. When all borrowers are devout (r = 1) the probabilities equal pi = k and pc = kl, and again pc > pi and pc � pi = k(l � 1) > 0. Given how increases in r proportionally decreases the dif- ferential default probabilities by a factor h, and given that analytically it can be shown that dpidr < 0 and

d2pi dr2 > 0, and

after extensive simulations for many parameter values of

both default probability schedules, we conclude that for

all r:pc > pi. Hypothesis 1. Across all borrowers, ceteris paribus, Isla-

1.3. Theoretical framework regarding default on conventional and Islamic loans

The previous section showed that the most popular Islamic lending products are functionally identical to conventional loan products.6 Does this mean that we should also expect their default rates to be similar? Clearly, Islamic loans are structured differently and are governed by different contracts than conven- tional loans. Moreover, there can be different motivations to prefer one form of banking over the other. For example borrowers may choose conventional over Islamic banks because of easy accessibility or specific product needs. If proximity of the closest bank branch or suitability of product is the overriding reason to choose one type of loan over the other, we do not necessarily expect that the default rate of either type of loans will systemat- ically differ.

Nevertheless we think that interesting testable hypotheses can be formed regarding the motivation for preferring one form of credit over the other and the expected default rates associated with that choice. The existence of Islamic banking per se is based on religion and for borrowers taking an Islamic loan plainly is a real economic decision (i.e., ‘‘putting your money where your mouth is’’). An Islamic loan is – after all – a financial product with certain characteristics one of which is its accordance with the Shari’ah. The text that prohibits interest payments, i.e., Al Quran and Hadith, also prohibits the misappropriation of other people’s properties (i.e., ‘‘the eating other people’s money in an unlawful way’’). Those who choose to stick to one rule (i.e., the avoidance of interest payments) are expected to have a higher propensity to follow the other rule (i.e., do not default) as well. Put differently, borrowers are likely to base their borrowing and default decisions on a rational comparison of the associated costs of the respective loan contracts. They, when choosing a loan, also take into account the expected cost of default which in the case of a default on an Islamic loan will include possibly acute negative feelings of discordance between intimate religious beliefs and loan outcome.

Following this fundamental prior we propose the following sim- ple framework on the basis of which we derive three distinct test- able hypotheses (Fig. 1 summarizes the main building blocks and the three testable hypotheses; a model in Box 1 illustrates the main intuition).

mic loans are less likely to default than conventional

loans.6 Apart from being functionally identical, conventional and Islamic loans are also subject to a similar tax treatment in Pakistan, in contrast to Malaysia for example where Islamic financing enjoys tax advantages.

Box 1 Religiosity and loan default. (continued)

Notice that Islamic loans granted by Islamic branches of

mixed banks could be considered more similar to con-

ventional loans granted by conventional banks. When

such loans would be considered perfect substitutes, i.e.,

when:

a ¼ b ¼ c ¼ d ¼ l ¼ 1;

then (trivially):

pi ¼ k½rð1� hÞ þ h� ¼ pc Hypothesis 1.1. If Islamic loans from Islamic banks are con- sidered to be more in accordance with religious tenets than

Islamic loans from Islamic branches then loans from Islamic

banks are even less likely to default than Islamic loans from

Islamic branches.

Notice that one alternative reading of the model tree is that

we are dealing with the same borrower who is in-between

being a devout and a secular person. In the case of multiple

granted loans such a person would have been applying for

(and then servicing) the loan with a probability r as a devout and with a probability 1 – r as a secular person. In that case multiple loans in the portfolio of this borrower may have a

different type and will have a difference in default probabil-

ity according to their type and in what mode the person is

acting. But as before, as Islamic financiers are more likely

to accept the loan application if the borrower acts as a

devout, the default rates on the granted Islamic loans will

be lower on average than the default rates on the conven-

tional loans.

Hypothesis 2. For the same borrower, an Islamic loan is less likely to default than a conventional loan.

While it is possible that there are Islamic loans in a person’s

portfolio that would be taken when this person was acting

as a secular person, that possibility decreases in likelihood

as a person acts more and more as a devout. Therefore if

a person is personally very pious or religiously networked

(r ? 1) then it is simple to show that a majority of the Isla- mic loans taken by this person will be while acting as a

devout and that their default probabilities will be commen-

surately lower.

Hypothesis 3. For more personally pious or religiously net- worked borrowers, ceteris paribus, Islamic loans are less

likely to default.

7 Banks may also be concerned about the differential judicial risk in Islamic lending (Jobst, 2007), as can turn both to Shari’ah courts, which rule on a case-by-case basis and to regular courts which may also turn the Shari’ah when faced with an Islamic loan. To avoid this ‘‘double jeopardy’’ banks may screen Islamic loan applicants more strictly or evergreen non-performing Islamic loans by rolling them into new Islamic loans or even conventional loans. All these actions will likely mitigate (or at least delay) Islamic loan default. On the other hand, conventional loans can also be challenged on the basis of the Shari’ah. Moreover, most (conventional and Islamic) loans in our dataset are highly standardized and hence carry minimal judicial risk, and our definition of loan default (i.e., a 90-day non-performance) far pre-dates any possible judicial activity. For all these reasons we can all but rule out the practical relevancy of differential judicial risk for our estimates.

8 As the financial sector still maintains limited, albeit growing, linkages with global financial markets, Pakistan has been relatively well-insulated against contagion coming from international financial markets (Mansoor Ali, 2009). In fact, discount rates remained rather high for the entire sample period to address significant macroeconomic imbalances in the domestic economy.

L. Baele et al. / Journal of Banking & Finance 44 (2014) 141–159 145

We start from the premise that if a person is more personally pious or religiously networked she is ceteris paribus more likely to apply for an Islamic loan than for a conventional loan. To obtain an Islamic loan the applicant has to approach either an Islamic bank or an Islamic branch of a mixed bank which uniquely grant this type of loans. For a conventional loan, on the other hand, the (possibly more secular) applicant needs to approach either a con- ventional bank or a conventional branch of a mixed bank which uniquely grant that type of loans.

We further posit that an Islamic bank or branch is ceteris paribus more likely to grant a (Islamic) loan to a more personally pious or

religiously networked person.7 From this we can deduce that the more personally pious or religiously networked are more likely to have Islamic loans granted by an Islamic bank or branch (which by no means exclude the possibility that these borrowers may also have some conventional loans).

Next, we presume that a more personally pious or religiously networked borrower is less likely to default on a loan (i.e., on any loan) than a more secular borrower. We further posit that if a more pious or networked borrower has multiple loans outstand- ing she is less likely to default on those loans that are deemed to be in closest accordance with her religious tenets. Islamic loans should clearly be considered to be more in accordance with her religious tenets than conventional loans, while Islamic loans from Islamic banks are likely to be considered to be more so than Islamic loans from Islamic branches (as these branches will be part of a mixed bank).

In sum, the outlined direct match between applicants, banks and contracts suggests the following three testable null hypotheses (between parentheses we mention for simplicity a one-sided alter- native hypothesis though we will conservatively test its two-sided equivalent):

Hypothesis 1. Across all borrowers, ceteris paribus, Islamic loans are equally (less) likely to default than conventional loans. This is also (especially) the case for those Islamic loans that are granted by an Islamic bank. Hypothesis 2. For the same borrower, any Islamic loan taken is equally (less) likely to default than any conventional loan that is taken. Hypothesis 3. For more personally pious or religiously net- worked borrowers, ceteris paribus, Islamic loans are equally (less) likely to default.

To test these hypotheses our analysis will need to rely on a vari- ety of borrower, loan contract and bank controls and fixed effects to account for both observed and unobserved borrower, loan con- tract and bank heterogeneity.

2. Data and methodology

2.1. Data description

We analyze loan level data obtained from the Consumer Protec- tion Department (CPD) of the State Bank of Pakistan that maintains the domestic credit registry, i.e., the Credit Information Bureau (CIB). The monthly available data covers all business loans out- standing in Pakistan from 2006:4 to 2008:12, including both the run-up to and the financial crisis itself (for 16 months each if one takes 2007:08 as the start date of the crisis).8 All loans were granted

Devout

devout

Fig. 1. The figure displays the extensive form of the loan application, decision and outcome process for devout and secular borrowers. A precise explanation of each node and the demarcation of the three stages is provided below the tree. The probability a branch is taken is indicated in italics. 0 6 r, x, y, a, b, c, d, k, l, m, n 6 1. The area in light gray is unobservable to us. For simplicity we denote Islamic banks and Islamic branches of mixed banks as Islamic financiers.

146 L. Baele et al. / Journal of Banking & Finance 44 (2014) 141–159

in the local currency, the Pakistani rupee (code: PKR. 1 USD � 79 PKR, 1 EUR � 110 PKR on December 31st, 2008).

All banks in Pakistan are required to consult the CIB to verify the credit history of a loan applicant if the application exceeds PKR 500,000, and this requirement is similar for conventional and Isla- mic loans. The CIB data set is also, therefore, thought to be of good quality and has already been studied in different contexts by Khwaja and Mian (2005, 2008), Mian (2006) and Zia (2008) for example.9

For each loan contract the CIB records the identity code and total exposure of the borrower and her location and industry. While we do not have financial information on the borrowers other than the precise loan characteristics, we do know that each bor- rower meets a specific threshold of financial soundness and is required to have a debt to equity ratio of 4:1 or better, and a cur- rent ratio of at least 1. Deviations from these requirements are allowed only in exceptional cases.

The CIB further reports key loan characteristics, such as the exact financial loan product name, default status, maturity, collat- eralization, whether cash is immediately disbursed or whether the loan is contingent, loan use for export or agricultural purposes, the approved limit and the remaining outstanding amount. The loan

9 As in these papers we do not observe loan need and/or demand to account for the ‘‘double’’ selection bias. Neither do we observe loan applications to study the approval of applications and/or loan granting. But we are mainly interested in the differential loan default probabilities and control for observed and unobserved loan contract, borrower, bank, borrower–bank and time heterogeneity with combinations of characteristics and fixed effects.

rate is also available for a subset of loans. Finally, the CIB records a unique and matching code for the lending bank and the branch where the loan is granted.

Our analysis of individual loan performance commences from the point when a unique credit decision is made. We therefore focus on new loans and loans that are renewed, extended or altered during the sample period. If a borrower obtains two different credit lines for example then both are considered as separate loans. Dur- ing our 32-month sample period there are 1,238,574 loan-months related to distinct new loans out of a total of almost 4 million loan-months involving 107 financial institutions. Table 2 provides the sample details.

We discard all loans given to the federal, provincial or local gov- ernments, financial intermediaries, autonomous bodies and public sector enterprises because these non-corporate borrowers either cannot default on domestic currency loans, or have different default dynamics that are beyond the scope of this paper. We also exclude from our analysis micro-loans of less than PKR 50,000 (retaining them does not alter results), loans larger than PKR 419,000,000, infrastructure and other special loans, and loans granted by financial institutions that are not registered as banks.

Our final dataset consists of 603,677 complete loan-month observations, which corresponds to 152,730 loans granted to 22,723 borrowers by 40 different banks.10 Around 5% of our sample involves Islamic loans (32,199 loan-months), that are granted either

10 This attrition we face (which is also caused by data availability) from 107 financial institutions to 40 banks is similar to Khwaja and Mian (2008) who study 42 banks out 145 financial institutions.

Table 2 Sample composition.

Variable Number of observations

Unit

All new loans granted 1,238,574 Loan- months

Minus loans to non-corporates 363,221 Loan- months

Minus micro, special and non-bank loans

252,047 Loan- months

Sample loans observed each month 603,677 Loan- months

Conventional 571,478 Loan- months

Islamic 32,199 Loan- months

Loans 152,730 Loans Borrowers 22,723 Borrowers Banks 40 Banks

The table reports the composition of the sample. The sample period runs from 2006:04 to 2008:12. Loans to non-corporates include loans to financial interme- diaries, public sector enterprises, local, provincial or federal governments, and other autonomous bodies. Micro, special and non-bank loans comprise loans smaller than PKR 50,000, loans larger than PKR 419,000,000, infrastructure and other special loans, and loans granted by financial institutions that are not registered as banks. PKR = Pakistani Rupee. 1 USD � 79 PKR, 1 EUR � 110 PKR (December 31, 2008).

Table 3 Samples for borrowers and banks by loan types.

Loans observed each month

Granted by banks that offer loans that are Totals

only conventional

conventional and Islamic

only Islamic

Obtained by borrowers with loans that are Only conventional 172,120 331,675 – 503,795 Conventional and

Islamic 37,755 44,946 8307 91,008

Only Islamic – 2028 6846 8874

Totals 209,875 378,649 15,153 603,677

The table reports the number of loan-months for the samples of borrowers and banks by loan type.

11 The higher average loan rate on Islamic loans is not inconsistent with its Islamic character, as borrowers may be willing to pay extra for the extra utility they get from the loans being ‘Islamic’. The 2% yield difference seems (far) too large to be explained only by the somewhat larger contractual/legal uncertainty embedded in Islamic relative to conventional loans.

L. Baele et al. / Journal of Banking & Finance 44 (2014) 141–159 147

by one of the six Islamic banks in our sample (15,153 loan-months) or by an Islamic branch or subsidiary of one of the twelve ‘‘mixed’’ banks that offer both conventional and Islamic loans (17,046 loan- months). All bank names (and types) are listed in (online) Appendix B. As of December 2008 there were 8225 conventional and 514 Isla- mic bank branches.

About 43% of the Islamic financing in our sample is Murabahah financing, about 22% is Diminishing Musharakah, and about 24% is Ijarah and Ijarah wa’Iqtina. The pure profit and loss sharing (part- nership) contracts, Mudaraba and Musharakah, constitute a very small fraction of the market, i.e., only 2% and 1%, respectively.

Crucial for our identification strategy is the observation that within the sample period quite a few borrowers and banks have balance sheets containing both conventional and Islamic loans. As indicated in Table 3 in total 91,008 loan-months involve borrowers that obtain both loan types, while in total 378,649 loan-months involve one of the twelve mixed banks. For 17,381 loan-months the same borrower within the sample period obtains conventional and Islamic loans from the same bank.

Table 4 reports detailed summary statistics for both conven- tional and Islamic loans. Crucial for our analysis is the definition of default. We define default to occur if 90 days after the maturity date or the date of an interest payment and/or installment, the debt balance remains unpaid. This definition for default is standard and identical for conventional and Islamic loans. In both cases default is not only self-reported by the banks upon prescription of the supervisor, but also carefully checked by the supervisor (every year around 80% of loans are randomly checked by supervi- sors, also for telltale signs of evergreening which if discovered carries penalties for the bank). Later on, we confirm the robustness of our findings if we define default to occur if loans payments are overdue for 180 days rather than 90 days.

We observe a substantially lower monthly default rate for Isla- mic compared to conventional loans. This difference (0.5% versus 0.9%) is not only statistically significant but also economically important. The difference in monthly default rate of Islamic loans granted by an Islamic branch or subsidiary of a conventional bank or by an Islamic bank (0.7% versus 0.2%) is not statistically signifi- cant. For completeness the table also reports the right-censored loan duration, i.e., the time to repayment, default or end of the sample period.

We measure the size of the borrower as the natural log of the sum of all credit facilities (loan limits) that are granted to a bor- rower by all banks. Borrowers with Islamic loans are larger and are located more often in big cities than other borrowers.

Conventional and Islamic loans statistically differ in all contract characteristics at the 1% level, though the differences are often eco- nomically small. According to the means conventional loans have a shorter maturity (15 versus 18 months), are less likely to be collat- eralized (93% versus 99%) and to involve an immediate cash dis- bursal (74% versus 82%) or a durable/fixed asset (14% versus 27%), are more likely to be for export or agricultural purposes (11% versus 4% and 4% versus 0%), and are smaller (PKR 23 versus 35 million) than Islamic loans. Interest rates, which we observe for 239,943 loan-months (i.e., 40% of our sample), are on average 2 percentage points lower for conventional than for Islamic loans.11

The medians point in a similar direction. Both conventional and Isla- mic loans can have a fixed or a variable ‘‘interest rate’’ (called ‘‘mark- up rate’’ in case of Islamic loans).

Conventional loans are proportionally more often granted by government, specialized, domestic or large banks than Islamic loans. In absolute terms most conventional and Islamic loans are granted by privately (often internationally) owned and domesti- cally incorporated banks, such as Meezan, Standard Chartered, RBS, Dubai Islamic, Emirates Global for example.

2.2. Methodology

This sub-section briefly discusses the econometric methodology employed in analyzing the time until repayment or default of the individual bank loans. The hazard function in duration analysis provides us with a suitable method for summarizing the relation- ship between the time to default and the likelihood of default. The hazard rate effectively has an intuitive interpretation as the per-period probability of loan default provided the loan ‘‘survives’’ up to that period. Compared to simple binary default models, dura- tion models explain the time to default, while accounting for the variation in loan maturity. We therefore report estimates based on duration models. In particular we rely on so-called parametric Weibull specifications to determine the shape of the hazard func- tion with respect to time, but resort to Cox (1972) proportional hazard models to handle inclusion of many fixed effects. Yet, our analysis commences with two representative logit specifications, whose estimates – despite the potentially serious limitations of these models – turn out to be qualitatively similar.

Repayment of a loan or the sample period’s end may prevent us from ever observing a default on this loan. Such a loan can be

Table 4 Summary statistics on conventional and Islamic loans.

Variable Definition Unit Number Mean St. dev. Median Minimum Maximum

Islamic loan =1 if loan is an Islamic loan, =0 otherwise 0/1 32,199 0.053 0.225 0 0 1 by Islamic Branch/Subsidiary =1 if the Islamic loan is granted by an Islamic branch or subsidiary of a conventional bank, =0 otherwise 0/1 17,046 0.028 0.166 0 0 1 by Islamic Bank =1 if the Islamic loan is granted by an Islamic bank, =0 otherwise 0/1 15,153 0.025 0.156 0 0 1

Murabahah =1 if Islamic loan is a Murabahah loan, =0 otherwise 0/1 13,869 0.023 0.150 0 0 1 Diminishing Musharakah =1 if Islamic loan is a Diminishing Musharakah loan, =0 otherwise 0/1 7219 0.012 0.109 0 0 1 Ijarah or Ijarah wa’ Iqtina =1 if Islamic loan is a Ijarah or Ijarah wa’ Iqtina loan, =0 otherwise 0/1 7794 0.013 0.113 0 0 1 Other =1 if Islamic loan is an other Islamic loan type, =0 otherwise 0/1 3317 0.005 0.074 0 0 1

Variable Definition Unit Number Mean St. dev. Median Minimum Maximum

Convent. loan (Bank)

Islamic loan (Bank)

Convent. loan (Bank)

Islamic loan (Bank)

Diff. Convent. loan (Bank)

Islamic loan (Bank)

Convent. loan (Bank)

Islamic loan (Bank)

Convent. loan (Bank)

Islamic loan (Bank)

Convent. loan (Bank)

Islamic loan (Bank)

Loan performance Loan

Default =1 if the loan defaults in a certain month, =0 otherwise

0/1 571,478 32,199 0.009 0.005 –*** 0.092 0.068 0 0 0 0 1 1

if the Islamic loan is granted by an Islamic branch or subsidiary of a conventional bank (Convent.) or by an Islamic bank (Islamic)

0/1 17,046 15,153 0.007 0.002 0.083 0.045 0 0 0 0 1 1

Duration time to repayment, default or end of sample period months 571,478 32,199 4.958 4.906 –** 4.541 4.473 3 3 1 1 33 32 if the Islamic loan is granted by an Islamic branch or subsidiary of a conventional bank (Convent.) or by an Islamic bank (Islamic)

months 17,046 15,153 4.626 5.221 4.159 4.783 3 4 1 1 30 32

Borrower characteristics Size The sum of all loans granted by all financial

institutions to a borrower mln. PKR

571,478 32,199 329.000 433.000 1220.000 1160.000 25 52 0 0 80,900 19,100

ln(Size) The natural log of borrower size – 571,478 32,199 16.849 17.618 –*** 2.475 2.143 16.816 17.523 10.820 10.820 25.109 23.659 Region Location in province or other distinct region 1 of 8 560,822 30,232 1.969 1.972 2 2 Industry Affiliation to industry 1 of 68 556,848 29,893 31.446 31.814 36 34

Loan characteristics Maturity Period for which loan is granted months 571,478 32,199 15 18 –*** 14 20 12 12 1 1 180 236 Collateral =1 if loan is collateralized, =0 otherwise 0/1 571,478 32,199 0.929 0.991 –*** 0.257 0.096 1 1 0 0 1 1 Cash =1 if loan involves immediate cash disbursal, =0

otherwise 0/1 571,478 32,199 0.739 0.817 –*** 0.439 0.387 1 1 0 0 1 1

Export =1 if loan is used for export, =0 otherwise 0/1 571,478 32,199 0.106 0.038 –*** 0.308 0.192 0 0 0 0 1 1 Agricultural =1 if loan is used for agricultural activities, =0

otherwise 0/1 571,478 32,199 0.037 0 –*** 0.189 0 0 0 0 0 1 0

Seniority of Charge

=1 if loan taken is the only one outstanding, =0 otherwise

0/1 571,478 32,199 0.379 0.360 –*** 0.485 0.480 0 0 0 0 1 1

Durable =1 if loan is granted for durable/fixed asset, =0 otherwise

0/1 571,478 32,199 0.142 0.266 –*** 0.349 0.442 0 0 0 0 1 1

Interest Rate

The interest rate on the loan % 234,398 5,545 12.695 14.795 –*** 4.214 2.301 13.50 14.63 1.000 1.000 42.80 42.05

Amount The amount of cash disbursed or the granted limit 000 PKR

571,478 32,199 22,900 34,900 –*** 50,400 58,000 4800 11,400 50 50 419,000 418,000

New Bank Branch

=1 if loan is granted by a bank branch opened after 2006:06, =0 otherwise

0/1 571,478 32,199 0.021 0.131 –*** 0.142 0.337 0 0 0 0 1 1

Bank characteristics Government =1 if bank is government-owned, =0 otherwise 0/1 571,478 32,199 0.133 0.087 –*** 0.340 0.282 0 0 0 0 1 1 Specialized =1 if bank is a specialized bank, =0 otherwise 0/1 571,478 32,199 0.038 0.000 0.191 0.000 0 0 0 0 1 0 Foreign =1 if bank is foreign-owned, =0 otherwise 0/1 571,478 32,199 0.018 0.174 –*** 0.132 0.379 0 0 0 0 1 1 Large =1 if bank is 1 of the 5 largest by loan volume, =0

otherwise 0/1 571,478 32,199 0.367 0.055 –*** 0.482 0.227 0 0 0 0 1 1

148 L.Baele

et al./Journal

of Banking

& Finance

44 (2014)

141– 159

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L. Baele et al. / Journal of Banking & Finance 44 (2014) 141–159 149

considered right censored. Not knowing when the default would occur, means we are unable to observe the ‘‘true’’ time to default for these loans. With no adjustment to account for censoring, max- imum likelihood estimation of the proportional hazard models produces biased and inconsistent estimates of model parameters. Accounting for right-censored observations will be accomplished in duration analysis by expressing the log-likelihood function as a weighted average of the sample density of ‘‘completed’’ loans and the survivor function of ‘‘uncompleted’’ loans. As the sample period runs from 2006:04 to 2008:12, but the median loan matu- rity is only twelve months, about 5% of all loans are right-censored because of the sample period’s end. As our sample consists out of only new loans granted from 2006:04 onwards, there is no left cen- soring problem.

3. Empirical results

3.1. First specifications

Table 5 presents maximum likelihood estimation results for dif- ferent duration models. As a starting point, however, we first report estimates from parsimonious logit specifications (Models I to III). The dependent variable in Model I equals one if the loan defaults and equals zero otherwise and we retain only those 122,331 loans that are either repaid or defaulted within the sample period. The dependent variable in Models II and III equals one if the loan defaults in a certain month, and equals zero otherwise, and in this specification all 152,730 loans (also those that are right- censored) are included given that the estimation in this case is done at the loan-month level (there are 603,677 loan-months).

The estimated intercept terms in Models I and II that equal �3.228��� and �4.752���,12 respectively, imply a probability of default for conventional lending that equals 4.3% per loan (= e�3.228/ [e�3.228 + 1]) and 0.9% per loan-month (= e�4.752/[e�4.752 + 1]), which equals the mean probability of default per month of conventional loans reported in Table 4. The estimated coefficients on the Islamic Loan dummy that equal �0.500��� and �0.612���, respectively, sug- gest that the odds ratio almost halves when a loan is Islamic to 2.6% and 0.5%, respectively (e�3.228 to 0.500/[e�3.228 to 0.500 + 1] and e�4.752 to 0.612/[e�4.752 to 0.612 + 1]). Results are unaffected when we add borrower, loan, and bank characteristics to the logit specification in Model III.

Because we want to account for duration dependence, our main empirical results are established using duration models. Columns IV to VII report results from a duration model that uses the Weibull distribution as a baseline hazard function.13 In all parametric mod- els errors are clustered at the borrower level. Model IV features only the Islamic loan dummy (and an intercept) and in Model V we add borrower size as well as 7 borrower region and 67 borrower industry dummies (all regions and industries are listed in (online) Appendix C) and loan characteristics. In Model VI, we additionally control for bank type and time (i.e., year �month) fixed effects. In Model VII, we distinguish between Islamic loans that are granted by Islamic branches/subsidiaries of conventional banks and Islamic loans that are granted by Islamic banks.

The coefficient for the Islamic Loan dummy is negative and highly statistically significant in all specifications. This is the first main result of our paper: The hazard rate is substantially lower for an Islamic than for a conventional loan, allowing us to reject our first null hypothesis (H1) which states that across all

12 As in the Tables, �, ��, and ��� indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.

13 In the next step we employ Cox proportional hazard models where the baseline hazard is left un-parameterized (we also estimate accelerated failure time models with a log-logistic distribution; results are similar and not further reported).

150 L. Baele et al. / Journal of Banking & Finance 44 (2014) 141–159

borrowers, ceteris paribus, Islamic and conventional loans are equally likely to default.

This effect is robust (we will show) to many additional controls, including borrower, bank, and borrower � bank fixed effects and is economically large. Though we return later to economic relevancy in more detail, by way of preview: The coefficient in Model VI for example implies that the hazard rate of an Islamic loan is only 2/ 3rd (= e�0.402) of the hazard rate of a conventional loan.

Model VII further shows that especially Islamic loans granted by Islamic banks have a lower hazard rate (allowing us to reject the second part of H1 as well). The hazard rate of Islamic loans issued by Islamic branches or subsidiaries of conventional banks, though

Table 5 All banks.

Models I II II Estimation Logit Dynamic logit D Dependent variable Loan default

0/1 Loan-month default 0/1

L d

Islamic Loan �0.500*** �0.612*** � (0.148) (0.144) (0

– by Islamic branch or subsidiary of conventional bank

– by Islamic Bank

Borrower characteristics ln(Size) 0

(0

Loan characteristics Maturity 0

(0 Collateral �

(0 Cash 2

(0 Export 0

(0 Agricultural �

(0

Bank characteristics Government 0

(0 Specialized �

(0 Foreign �

(0 Large 0

(0 Intercept �3.128*** �4.752*** �

(0.0620) (0.0608) (0

Borrower Region dummies (7) No No Y Borrower Industry Dummies (67) No No Y Year �Month Fixed Effects No No N Borrower Fixed Effects No No N

Log Pseudolikelihood �20,995 �29,115 � a (Duration Dependence) – – – Chi2(k) [LR in VI, VII, IX & XIII, Wald in

others] 11 18 1

Number of regressors minus one (k) 1 1 8

Number of Loan-Months – 603,677 5 Number of Loans 122,331 152,730 1 Number of Borrowers 19,063 22,723 2

The table reports the maximum likelihood estimation results of logit and duration mode otherwise. The dependent variable in Model II equals one if the loan defaults in a certain hazard rate. The estimations in Models I and II employ logit models. The estimations in M includes a parameter of duration dependence. Model VII reports the results of a Cox-prop from 2006:04 to 2008:12. For each variable in the specification the table reports the parentheses). In all estimations involving parametric models, standard errors are cluste * Significance at 10% level, two-tailed. ** Significance at 5% level, two-tailed. *** Significance at 1% level, two-tailed.

lower, is not statistically different from that of all conventional loans. However, our analysis in Table 7 will show that the hazard rate of Islamic loans issued by Islamic branches or subsidiaries of these mixed banks is statistically lower than the hazard rate of the conventional loans issued by these mixed banks. Hence the pic- ture that arises is that Islamic loans issued by Islamic banks have the lowest hazard rate and that conventional loans issued by purely conventional banks have a lower hazard rate than those issued by mixed banks.

Before further model developments, however, we briefly review the estimated coefficients on the control variables. In our sample, we do not find a robust relationship between borrower size and

I IV V VI VII VIII ynamic logit Weibull Weibull Weibull Weibull Cox oan-month efault 0/1

Hazard rate

Hazard rate

Hazard rate

Hazard rate

Hazard rate

0.455*** �0.581*** �0.725*** �0.402** �0.508*** .158) (0.144) (0.157) (0.158) (0.193)

�0.262 (0.189) �0.781*** (0.238)

.0107 �0.00934 0.0148 0.0145 .0275) (0.0223) (0.0247) (0.0247)

.00776*** 0.00504** 0.00462* 0.00472** 0.00909***

.00228) (0.00222) (0.00238) (0.00238) (0.00138) 0.183 �0.233** 0.0462 0.0476 �0.109 .127) (0.114) (0.136) (0.136) (0.105)

.217*** 2.302*** 2.185*** 2.181*** 1.509***

.111) (0.109) (0.111) (0.112) (0.109) .0371 �0.0152 0.00793 0.00947 �0.199*** .213) (0.211) (0.204) (0.204) (0.0654) 0.244 �0.701** �0.302 �0.301 0.245 .247) (0.318) (0.251) (0.251) (0.381)

.259** 0.216* 0.213* 0.503***

.129) (0.123) (0.123) (0.121) 0.110 �0.113 �0.114 0.191 .299) (0.305) (0.305) (1.322) 0.768** �0.828** �0.745** �0.552 .339) (0.339) (0.335) (0.374)

.763*** 0.719*** 0.718*** 0.575***

.164) (0.154) (0.153) (0.0984) 7.425*** �4.759*** �6.689*** �8.752*** �8.745***

.647) (0.0995) (0.476) (1.169) (1.168)

es No Yes Yes Yes No es No Yes Yes Yes No o No No Yes Yes Yes o No No No No Yes

26,525 �25,121 �23,013 �22,157 �22,154 �9510 0.978 0.983 0.962 0.962 –

055 16 4009 4479 4437 1631

1 1 81 117 118 42

81,620 603,677 582,759 582,759 582,759 603,677 46,849 152,730 149,302 149,302 149,302 152,730 1,848 22,723 21,866 21,866 21,866 22,723

ls. The dependent variable in Model I equals one if the loan defaults and equals zero month, and equals zero otherwise. The dependent variable in all other models is the

odels III to VI employ parametric duration models with a Weibull distribution that ortional hazard model and includes borrower fixed effects. The sample period runs estimated coefficient, statistical significance level and standard error (below in

red by borrower.

Table 6 All banks: robustness.

Models I II III IV V VI VII VIII IX X Alteration Only cash

loans Seniority added

Durable added

Interest rate added

Loan amount added

By Islamic loan type

Murabahah and similar conv.

Murabahah and similar conv. Maturity < 1 Year Collateral = 1

180-Days default

New bank branch

Islamic Loan �0.535*** �0.509*** �0.498*** �0.406** �0.506*** �0.554* �0.587* �0.740** �0.259*

(0.203) (0.193) (0.193) (0.192) (0.193) (0.298) (�0.352) (0.308) (0.158) Murabaha �0.445*

(0.240) Diminishing Musharakah �0.886*

(0.469) Ijarah �0.558*

(0.310) Other �0.263

(0.456) Islamic Loan � New Bank Branch �2.384**

(1.058)

Borrower characteristics ln(Size) 0.0181

(0.0247)

Loan characteristics Maturity 0.00653*** 0.00907*** 0.00950*** 0.00510* 0.00872*** 0.00924*** 0.00966*** 0.00243 0.0111*** 0.00485**

(0.00150) (0.00138) (0.00142) (0.00305) (0.00138) (0.00140) (0.00208) (0.0156) (0.00190) (0.00233) Collateral �0.0968 �0.110 �0.110 �0.244 �0.105 �0.111 �0.323** �0.167 �0.0429

(0.115) (0.105) (0.105) (0.157) (0.105) (0.105) (0.158) (0.139) (0.135) Cash 1.509*** 1.518*** 1.161*** 1.500*** 1.505*** 1.543*** �2.203***

(0.109) (0.109) (0.338) (0.109) (0.109) (0.151) (0.112) Export �0.207*** �0.199*** �0.204*** 0.156 �0.192*** �0.200*** �0.214*** 0.00234

(0.0662) (0.0654) (0.0654) (0.128) (0.0650) (0.0654) (0.0793) (0.203) Agricultural 0.267 0.246 0.215 0.385 0.247 0.243 �0.631 �0.300

(0.386) (0.381) (0.382) (0.581) (0.380) (0.381) (0.671) (0.251) Seniority of Charge 0.0204

(0.0916) Durable �0.112

(0.0878) Interest Rate 0.0277**

(0.0116) Amount 0.001***

(0.0005) New Bank Branch �1.199***

(0.293)

Bank characteristics Government 0.533*** 0.503*** 0.498*** 0.383 0.442*** 0.504*** 0.561*** 1.414*** 0.202 0.199

(0.125) (0.121) (0.121) (0.279) (0.123) (0.121) (0.186) (0.306) (0.162) (0.123) Specialized 0.0772 0.187 0.239 0.145 0.191 �0.419 �36.03 �0.138

(1.440) (1.321) (1.343) (1.315) (1.322) (0.443) (38.000) (0.305) Foreign �0.529 �0.551 �0.558 �0.201 �0.554 �0.507 �0.596 0.189 �0.908***

(0.401) (0.374) (0.374) (0.553) (0.372) (0.379) (0.674) (0.481) (0.339) Large 0.570*** 0.574*** 0.568*** 0.984*** 0.566*** 0.578*** 0.528*** 0.157 0.774*** 0.694***

(0.102) (0.0983) (0.0984) (0.195) (0.0984) (0.0985) (0.138) (0.205) (0.130) (0.150) Intercept �8.206***

(1.153)

Borrower Region dummies (7) No No No No No No No No No Yes Borrower Industry Dummies (67) No No No No No No No No No Yes

(continued on next page)

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152 L. Baele et al. / Journal of Banking & Finance 44 (2014) 141–159

hazard rates. With respect to loan characteristics, we find the haz- ard rate to be higher for loans with a longer maturity and those involving an immediate cash disbursal (in which case borrowers likely have to start paying back sooner), but lower for collateralized and agricultural loans (though the statistical significance of these findings later disappears somewhat).

Hazard rates are significantly higher for loans issued by govern- ment banks and by those belonging to the largest five banks by loan volume, but lower for loans issued by foreign banks. Our find- ing of higher hazard rates for loans issued by government banks is consistent with results in Khwaja and Mian (2005), who find that loans given to politically connected firms by government banks in particular tend to have to up to 50% higher default rates. Note that at this point we do not include bank fixed effects (yet) because these effects would be perfectly correlated with the Islamic loan dummy for (loans granted by) the purely conventional or Islamic banks. We include bank fixed effects later on when we focus on the mixed banks (Section 3.3, Table 7). Finally, we note that the parameter a is measuring the duration dependence in the baseline hazard specification and that this estimated parameter is not sig- nificantly different from one, indicating that there is neither posi- tive nor negative duration dependence.

Borrower, loan and/or bank characteristics that differ between conventional and Islamic loans may be responsible for the esti- mated difference in the hazard rates. We now systematically inves- tigate each of these possible sources of variation.

3.2. Differences between borrowers that obtain conventional and Islamic loans?

Models V and VI in Table 5 control for borrower size, region, and industry, for example, yet these controls may not capture all borrower heterogeneity. In Model VIII we, therefore, include bor- rower fixed effects to capture all time-invariant unobservable and observable borrower heterogeneity in a Cox proportional haz- ard model that leaves the baseline hazard un-parameterized (including this many fixed effects in a Weibull specification is tech- nically impossible in our setting). We designate this specification as our benchmark. Notice that we are able to control for borrower fixed effects because our dataset includes borrowers that have both conventional and Islamic loans (we label such borrowers as ‘‘mixed borrowers’’), some of which default on one or more loans but not on others (this is possible given our 90 days loan-specific definition of non-performance).

We find that the parameter estimate for the Islamic loan dummy remains negative and statistically significant. Moreover, its magnitude is comparable to the other specifications, and even slightly more negative than in the previous most complete specifi- cation without borrower fixed effects (in Model VI). Hence these estimates indicate that within the 32-month sample period (but controlling for year �month fixed effects) the same borrower is more likely to default on a conventional loan than on an Islamic loan, allowing us also to reject our second null hypothesis (H2) which states that for the same borrower, default on Islamic and conventional loans is equally likely. We revisit this finding, and especially its potential relationship with religion, in Section 3.5.

For our benchmark Model VIII we more closely assess the eco- nomic relevancy of our findings for a one-year (median), collater- alized, cash loan that is not for export or agricultural purposes, or granted by a government, specialized, foreign or large bank. Fig. 2 displays the resulting schedule of the cumulative hazard of conventional and Islamic loans respectively. After one year (the median loan duration), the difference in the cumulative hazard is already more than 2%. This first-year cumulative hazard rate of conventional loans equals 5.2%, not uncommon for loans in a developing economy, while the first-year cumulative hazard rate

Table 7 Mixed banks.

I II III IV V VI VII

Islamic Loan �1.601*** �1.869*** �1.654*** �2.015** �1.554* �1.374*** (0.358) (0.384) (0.381) (0.865) (0.928) (0.326)

– Borrowers with conventional and Islamic loans

0.196 (0.580)

– Borrowers with only conventional loans

1.184***

(0.426) – Borrowers that switch to

Islamic loans (from conventional) �0.877* (0.464)

– Borrowers that switch to conventional loans (from Islamic)

�0.350 (0.956)

Borrower characteristics ln(Size) 0.0147 0.0345 0.0431 0.0429

(0.0288) (0.0291) (0.0302) (0.0304)

Loan characteristics Maturity �0.00446 �0.00799* 0.00500* 0.0071*** �0.00807* �0.00804*

(0.00390) (0.00429) (0.00256) (0.00276) (0.00429) (0.00429) Collateral �0.479*** �0.559*** �0.204* �0.238* �0.551*** �0.552***

(0.137) (0.136) (0.123) (0.127) (0.137) (0.137) Cash 2.485*** 2.357*** 1.800*** 1.786*** 2.350*** 2.358***

(0.148) (0.160) (0.169) (0.178) (0.159) (0.159) Export �0.0254 �0.0608 �0.239*** �0.173** �0.0558 �0.0611

(0.255) (0.238) (0.0757) (0.0790) (0.236) (0.237) Agricultural 0.238 0.0639 0.700 0.523 0.0591 0.0642

(0.193) (0.199) (0.443) (0.444) (0.199) (0.199) Intercept �4.734*** �6.657*** �6.907*** �8.162*** �7.004***

(0.130) (0.614) (1.224) (1.286) (1.232)

Borrower Region dummies (7) No Yes Yes No No Yes Yes Borrower Industry Dummies (67) No Yes Yes No No Yes Yes Year �Month Fixed Effects No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Borrower Fixed Effects No No No Yes No No No Bank Fixed Effects No No Yes Yes No Yes Yes Borrower � Bank Fixed Effects No No No No Yes No No

Log Pseudolikelihood �17,336 �15,824 �14,695 �6863 �7031 �14,679 �14,674 a (Duration Dependence) 1.009 1.026 By bank – – By bank By bank Chi2(k) [LR in VI–X, Wald in other] 20 6334 7390 1280 1019 7768 7819 Number of regressors minus one (k) 1 81 123 46 36 124 125

Number of Loan-Months 378,649 372,415 372,415 378,649 378,649 372,415 372,415 Number of Loans 109,157 107,944 107,944 109,157 109,157 107,944 107,944 Number of Borrowers 15,653 15,355 15,355 15,653 15,653 15,355 15,355

The table reports the maximum likelihood estimation results of duration models. Models I to III and V to VII employ parametric duration models with a Weibull distribution that includes a parameter of duration dependence. Model IV reports the results of a Cox-proportional hazard model and includes borrower fixed effects. The sample includes only loans given by banks that grant both conventional and Islamic loans and the sample period runs from 2006:04 to 2008:12. The dependent variable is the hazard rate. For each variable in the specification the table reports the estimated coefficient, statistical significance level and standard error (below in parentheses). In Models I to III and V to VII standard errors are clustered by borrower. * Significance at 10% level, two-tailed. ** Significance at 5% level, two-tailed. *** Significance at 1% level, two-tailed.

L. Baele et al. / Journal of Banking & Finance 44 (2014) 141–159 153

for Islamic loans equals 3.1%, more comparable to the default rates on loans commonly observed in developed economies.

3.3. Differences in the loan contracts?

Despite the controls for the loan maturity, collateralization, cash disbursal, and the export or agricultural purpose of the loan, it is still possible that differences in loan contract characteristics between conventional and Islamic loans would explain the differ- ence in hazard rates. In Table 6 we report a set of specifications that addresses this possibility.

We start by excluding the 45,254 non-cash facilities that may differ more between conventional and Islamic loans in other loan characteristics. We are left with 107,476 loans and re-estimate all duration models in Table 5. Model I in Table 6 reports the esti- mates for the representative benchmark specification. Results are almost unaffected.

Our data set does not include loan seniority, possibly because seniority of small business loans is often by default based on their

precedence in time. In Model II we therefore include a variable Seniority of Charge that equals one if the loan is the only one out- standing, and equals zero otherwise. The coefficient on this new variable is insignificant, while the coefficient on Islamic loan is unaffected.

One variable we have not included yet in the specifications, as we know it is rather coarsely measured, is the durability or fixity of the asset that is financed with the loan. The bank’s ownership claim in a Murabahah contract will be quite limited (in time) if the financed asset is for example an inventory of raw materials that is being used in the production process (recall that almost all Islamic loans are in addition also collateralized). Model III in Table 6 includes the vari- able Durable that equals one if the loan is granted for a durable or fixed asset, like a plant, machinery, real estate or automobile for example, and equals zero otherwise, in the representative bench- mark model. The coefficient on this new variable is also insignifi- cant, while the coefficient on Islamic loan is again unaffected.

Next, and to account at once for other loan characteristics that are not recorded and for time-varying borrower heterogeneity that

Table 8 Religion as a motivator to perform on loans.

Models I II III IV V

Share = Religious political parties Share = Post-natal private care

Islamic Loan �0.569*** �0.463 �0.859 �2.133** �1.667 (0.191) (0.450) (0.715) (0.925) (1.185)

Islamic Loan � Ramadan �0.696* (0.363)

Islamic Loan � Share 0.0399** 0.0429 13.13** 9.050 (0.0169) (0.0269) (6.533) (9.136)

Islamic Loan � Big City 0.0108 0.206 0.923 �0.331 (0.511) (0.907) (1.004) (1.360)

Islamic Loan � Share � Big City �0.0474** �0.170*** �10.830 �10.300 (0.0202) (0.0567) (6.666) (9.384)

Added variables Ramadan �0.0481

(0.0600) Share 0.00588 0.00687 0.324 �0.767

(0.00462) (0.00525) (0.837) (0.870) Share � Big City 0.000510 0.00193 �0.268 1.350

(0.00676) (0.00756) (1.021) (1.100)

Loan characteristics Maturity 0.0125*** 0.00396* �0.00912** 0.00397* �0.00828**

(0.00133) (0.00238) (0.00418) (0.00239) (0.00417) Collateral 0.331*** �0.022 �0.593*** �0.0253 0.577***

(0.0990) (0.134) (0.134) (0.133) (0.133) Cash �1.617*** 2.256*** 2.482*** 2.240*** 2.454***

(0.107) (0.113) (0.163) (0.113) (0.162) Export �0.192*** �0.0536 �0.127 �0.0558 0.113

(0.0620) (0.204) (0.239) (0.205) (0.237) Agricultural 0.217 �0.173 0.247 �0.177 0.218

(0.368) (0.262) (0.202) (0.265) (0.202)

Borrower characteristics ln(Size) 0.0267 0.0462 0.0285 0.0455

(0.0465) (0.0626) (0.0469) (0.0636) Big City 0.395*** 0.486*** 0.470** 0.367⁄

(0.126) (0.143) (0.183) (0.198)

Bank characteristics Government 0.353*** 0.239* 0.229*

(0.115) (0.124) (0.128) Specialized �0.505 �0.0259 �0.0512

(1.161) (0.318) (0.314) Foreign �0.515 �0.855** �0.847**

(0.360) (0.337) (0.337) Large 0.659*** 0.823*** 0.803***

(0.0967) (0.158) (0.152) Intercept �7.145*** �5.799*** �7.141*** �6.010***

(1.308) (1.535) (1.308) (1.561)

Region dummies (7) No No No No No Industry Dummies (67) No Yes Yes Yes Yes Year �Month Fixed Effects d(Quarter) Yes Yes Yes Yes Borrower Fixed Effects Yes No No No No Bank Fixed Effects No No Yes No Yes

Log Pseudolikelihood �10,013 �21,928 �14,477 �21,932 �14,554 a (Duration Dependence) – 0.971 1.021 0.970 1.045 Chi2(k) [LR in VI, VII, IX & XIII, Wald in others] 625.8 4179*** 6268*** 4166.30*** 6529.89***

Number of regressors minus one (k) 15 116 122 116 122

Number of Loan-Months 603,677 578,809 369,816 579,144 370,063 Number of Loans 152,730 148,316 107,215 148,397 107,282 Number of Borrowers 22,723 21,574 15,144 21,586 15,153

The table reports the maximum likelihood estimation results of duration models. All estimations except in Model I employ parametric duration models with a Weibull distribution that includes a parameter of duration dependence. Model I reports the results of a Coxproportional hazard model and includes quarter dummies and borrower fixed effects. Estimations in Models II to V include only those loans that are granted in the four provinces and the federal capital (i.e., regions where Pakistani political parties can operate and key statistics are recorded) and exclude loans in other regions administered by Pakistan. The sample period runs from 2006:04 to 2008:12. The dependent variable is the hazard rate. For each variable in the specification the table reports the estimated coefficient, statistical significance level and standard error (below in parentheses). In all estimations below involving parametric models, standard errors are clustered by borrower. * Significance at 10% level, two-tailed. ** Significance at 5% level, two-tailed. *** Significance at 1% level, two-tailed.

154 L. Baele et al. / Journal of Banking & Finance 44 (2014) 141–159

is also unobservable to us but that may be observable to the bank, we add the loan rate (Interest Rate) in Model IV or the individual loan amount (Amount) in Model V. As described in the data section, we have the interest rate for only 40% of our sample observations.

As expected, we find a positive relation between the loan rate or size, and the probability of default. However, the estimate for the Islamic loan dummy remains almost unaltered, i.e., �0.406�� and �0.506���, respectively.

Fig. 2. The figure displays the cumulative hazard based on the estimated coefficients of Model VIII in Table 5 for a one-year (median) conventional or Islamic loan with all other covariates set at their mean. The cumulative hazard after 12 months (i.e., the vertical line at t = 12) for a conventional loan equals 5.2%, for an Islamic loan it equals 3.1%.

L. Baele et al. / Journal of Banking & Finance 44 (2014) 141–159 155

Next, we perform additional robustness checks with respect to collateralization and Islamic loan type (to conserve space we chose not to tabulate the estimated coefficients). Banks possibly adjust collateralization depending on borrower condition or additional financing, and may do so differently – if not in principle, then in practice – for the two types of loans. To account for this possibility we simply remove collateral from the benchmark specification. The coefficient on the Islamic loan dummy remains virtually unaffected. To account for the potentially differential nature of collateral in conventional and Islamic lending we add an interac- tion between the Collateral and Islamic loan dummies to our benchmark specification. The interaction effect is, however, not statistically significant, and the coefficient on the Islamic Loan dummy remains again unaffected. Similarly we add interactions between all loan contract characteristics and the Islamic loan dummy. With the exception of the negative coefficient on the interaction with maturity, none of the estimated coefficients on the other interactions is statistically significant, and Islamic loans are still found to default less likely than conventional loans.

To account for the different types of Islamic loan contracts, in Model VI we split the Islamic Loan dummy into four loan type dummies, i.e., Murabahah, Diminishing Musharakah, Ijarah or Ijarah wa’Iqtina, and Other Islamic loans (which includes Mudarabah loans for example). The estimated coefficients on the four dum- mies equal �0.445�, �0.886�, �0.558�, and �0.263, respectively, confirming our findings so far.

We further exclude Musharakah and Mudarabah contracts (both types are more similar to equity financing than to conventional bank credit, and constitute only a tiny fraction of the Islamic loan market). The Islamic Loan coefficient equals �0.500�� (untabulat- ed). In Models VII and VIII we restrict the sample to Murabahah loans and similar conventional loans, i.e., term finance and working capital (excluding all other credit facilities such as mortgage finance, leases, export finance, agricultural finance and off-balance financing for example). In Model VIII we further require that the loan maturity is shorter than one year and the loan is collateral- ized.14 In both cases results are unaffected with estimated Islamic

14 Islamic loan contracts may (for technical legal reasons) in some cases result in a swifter loss of access for the borrower to the financed object (a car, for example) than a conventional loan, but in many instances the difference in the timing of the loss of access will be small.

Loan coefficients that equal �0.554� (Model VII) and �0.587� (Model VIII), respectively. Notice that the last model is very demanding given the very restricted set of loans that is retained (i.e., 44,335 out of 152,730 loans), yet it still manages to include loan maturity, two bank controls, and a full set of time and borrower fixed effects. Hence this specification shows that for the same borrower having both types of loans outstanding, with a maturity shorter than one year and collateralized, the hazard of the Murabahah loans is about half the hazard (= e�0.587) of very similar conventional loans. On the basis of these specifications we consider it unlikely that loan characteristics by themselves can explain the hazard differential between Islamic and conventional loans.

In Model IX in Table 6 we redefine default to occur only after 180-days. Shorter duration or – when present – tighter covenants for example could result in earlier non-performance. But results are again unaffected (note that though the number of loans remains equal to 152,730, the number of loan-months increases to 613,218, because non-performing loans are now right-censored 90 days later).

Finally, in Model X we study the default on the new loans orig- inated at bank branches that were opened after 2006:06, i.e., the month with the first six-monthly listing of bank branches within our sample period (4061 new loans that were originated before this first listing were removed). Loans at new branches may have different characteristics, but of course also the characteristics of the borrowers and loan officers there may differ. Unfortunately because of multicollinearity we have to drop the borrower fixed effects.

At new bank branches the hazard of conventional loans is one third (= e�1.119) and the hazard of Islamic loans one tenth (= e�2.384) of the hazard of conventional loans at existing branches. Yet, at existing branches the hazard of Islamic loans is now three-quarters (= e�0.259) of the hazard of conventional loans at existing branches. So it seems that especially new Islamic branches attract re-paying borrowers. Alternatively, if the new branches would attract worse customers, the loan officers there are aware of the externality of the other banks’ screening (Broecker, 1990) and screen themselves more strictly, but then especially so when the branch is Islamic and grants Islamic loans.

In sum, it does not seem to be the case that only differences in loan contract characteristics between conventional and Islamic loans can explain their difference in hazard rates.

3.4. Differences in the banks that grant the conventional and Islamic loans?

While we do correct for bank type, our dataset does not include more detailed bank characteristics, such as efficiency, capital ratios, overall riskiness of the loan portfolio, and/or liability struc- ture, for example. Controlling for (time-invariant) bank fixed effects may be important, as default rates may be due to bank-spe- cific clientele effects, risk-taking incentives, and/or screening and monitoring technology.

We therefore include bank fixed effects in a variety of models estimated on the set of loans that are issued only by mixed banks that offer both conventional and Islamic loans. This reduces our sample to 378,649 loan-month observations (15,653 borrowers for a total of 109,157 loans). Estimation results are tabulated in Table 7 and the model line-up is similar to that of Table 5.

Models I and II in Table 7 are comparable to Models III and IV in Table 5, except that the estimation results are based on the reduced sample. While the parameter estimates on the controls are mostly similar, we find a substantially stronger Islamic loan effect in the reduced compared to the full sample. This strong effect remains when we first introduce bank fixed effects (and a bank-specific parameter of duration dependence) in Model III, then

156 L. Baele et al. / Journal of Banking & Finance 44 (2014) 141–159

both borrower and bank fixed effects in Model IV, and finally bor- rower � bank fixed effects in Model V. In the latter model the haz- ard rate of Islamic loans is only one fifth of the hazard rate of conventional loans (= e�1.577). Hence the same borrower obtaining conventional and Islamic loans from the same bank within the sample period is five times more likely to default on the conven- tional loan(s) than on the Islamic loan(s).

In Model VI we contrast these mixed borrowers with those hav- ing only conventional loans from the mixed banks. The latter type of borrowers are three times more likely to default on their con- ventional loans than the mixed type of borrowers on their loans (= e1.184), while the mixed and Islamic-only borrowers do not differ on average.

In sum, these findings combined suggest that at mixed banks the hazard rates increase as follows: (1) Islamic loans by mixed borrowers, (2) Islamic loans by Islamic-only borrowers, (3) conven- tional loans by conventional-only borrowers, and (4) conventional loans by mixed borrowers. Or put differently, at mixed banks the difference in hazard rates between conventional and Islamic loans for mixed borrowers is larger than the difference in hazard rates between conventional loans for conventional-only borrowers and the Islamic loans for Islamic-only borrowers.

Why this wider difference in hazard rates? One possible explanation could reside in the penalties banks charge in case of default.15 These penalties flow to the bank in case of non-per- formance on a conventional loan yet to a charity in case of an Isla- mic loan. In case banks would set penalties optimally (but disregarding other loan terms) they may set the penalties on con- ventional loans lower than on Islamic loans, especially for borrow- ers that mix loan types and that are of an intermediate credit quality.16

Yet, we do not think differential penalties are the explanation here. First, anecdotal evidence from supervisors with ample field experience in Pakistan suggests that banks may actually set the penalties on conventional and Islamic loans equal to each other. In (online) Appendix D we report the penalties we gleaned from bank websites recently for different household loan types; while not necessarily equal to those specified on the business loans in our study, the penalties the banks list on their website suggest that the penalties on Islamic loans may – if anything – even be lower than those on conventional loans.

Second, when introducing in a variety of specifications the interactions of the Islamic loan dummy with – as a proxy for bor- rower quality – the observed loan rate and the rate squared, the estimated coefficients on the interaction terms are statistically insignificant but are actually pointing in an opposite direction (i.e., for intermediate loan rate borrowers the difference in the haz- ard rate between conventional and Islamic loan is minimal not maximal as we would expect if penalties are set optimally).

15 Borrowers may also maintain other conventional and Islamic bank products (deposits for example) that are priced jointly with the conventional and Islamic loans respectively by a separate conventional or Islamic bank desk. Any cross-selling across products taken by borrowers or any cross-subsidization across borrowers done at the bank level is absorbed by the borrower � bank fixed effects however. Hence, while interesting per se different funding costs due to different deposit contracting, other variations in product mixes, different bank organization and objectives, etc. at these banks cannot be the sole explanation for our findings.

16 In this way banks would entice non-performance on conventional loans and not only capture the penalties (when paid) on the non-performing conventional loan(s), but also assure continued payment of the higher loan rates on the Islamic loan(s). This penalties strategy may be optimal for borrowers of an intermediate quality, who with a probability between zero and one pay the penalties and repay both loans. For really bad or really good mixed borrowers differentiating penalties between conventional and Islamic loans may be marginally less important. Of course, ex ante banks likely set penalties jointly with the interest (mark-up) rate and other loan terms and/or could provide for example repayment boni.

3.5. Borrower, bank or loan characteristics? Or religion?

Until now, we have found consistent evidence that the same borrower is less likely to default on Islamic than on conventional loans obtained from the same bank, and that when borrowing from a mixed bank the difference in hazard rates between conventional and Islamic loans for these mixed borrowers is larger than the difference in hazard rates between conventional loans for conven- tional-only borrowers and the Islamic loans for Islamic-only borrowers.

One possible explanation for these robust findings is that bor- rowers may choose not to default on Islamic loans because of their individual religious beliefs. As discussed in the aforementioned Box 1, the motivation to take the Islamic loan may also discourage the borrower from defaulting on it. Alternatively, to the extent that local piousness affects local culture, even relatively less pious bor- rowers may tend to default less in areas of high religious fervency.

As a first test, in Model VII in Table 7 two variables are intro- duced that capture whether borrowers (that have both type of loans) during the sample period switch to Islamic or to conven- tional borrowing, i.e., whether during the sample period conven- tional loans were obtained first or later than Islamic loans. Those borrowers that switch to Islamic borrowing may be, given the recency of their decision, even more motivated not to default on their Islamic loans.

For this exercise the start of the sample period presents a severe left-censoring problem, i.e., we cannot observe those loans that are no longer outstanding. One additional caveat when interpreting the estimates is that the tighter right-censoring for loans that are recently granted may bias the estimated hazard for new loans downward if duration dependence is convex. Hence one has to compare the difference between the two switching coefficients. Though not statistically different, the estimates suggest that indi- vidual motivation may play a role. Those borrowers that only recently turned to Islamic loans are even less likely to default on their Islamic loans than those that switched to conventional loans.

While the most fervent religious believers may prefer to obtain Islamic loans only, intermediate fervency may result in mixed bor- rowing.17 Hit by a negative shock large enough to overwhelm their religious resistance to loan default, Islamic-only borrowers have no choice but to default on one of their Islamic loans. On the other hand mixed borrowers do have a choice and despite their lower fervency may on the margin more often decide not to default on their Islamic loans than on their conventional loans. In sum, we think this evi- dence collected so far is inconsistent with the first part of our third hypothesis (H3) which states that for more personally pious borrow- ers, ceteris paribus, Islamic loans are equally likely to default.

However, to establish beyond any doubt that religious beliefs matter for loan default one would need an objective measurement of religiosity for each individual borrower. As far as we are aware no existing research has had access to such a measure,18 and neither do we. In Table 8 we therefore introduce a number of

17 We do not think that intermediate piousness and mixed borrowing per se negates religion as a possible determinant of lower Islamic loan default (‘‘some people pray but do not fast’’). Of course mixed borrowing may also arise from specific credit needs such as corporate credit cards, export finance supported by the SBP and specific discounting of bills. Many Islamic scholars would even argue that borrowing at some interest is allowed if the borrower is dealing with hardship and needs to obtain life’s necessities such as food and shelter.

18 Al-Azzam et al. (2012) find that the repayment delay on 160 group loans in Jordan is negatively affected by the percentage of group members who pray five times a day. More broadly Guiso et al. (2013) document that homeowners that find it ‘‘morally wrong to walk away’’ are less likely to say that they are willing to default when the value of their home equity falls below a certain threshold even if they can afford to pay the monthly mortgage costs.

L. Baele et al. / Journal of Banking & Finance 44 (2014) 141–159 157

specifications that take further steps in identifying how religion may matter for loan default in this setting.

Model I in Table 8 introduces a variable Ramadan that equals one if the month is in the Ramadan period and equals zero otherwise.19 If either (1) the local network effect of religious activity, and/or (2) the identification of the borrower with Islamic tenets, plays a role in explaining the lower hazard rate of Islamic loans, one would expect this differential between conventional and Islamic loans to widen during the holy Islamic month.20 The estimated coef- ficient on the interaction between Islamic loan and Ramadan is indeed negative and sizeable, i.e., �0.696�, implying that during Ramadan months default on Islamic loans drops by more than half (= e�0.696).

In case the network effect of religious activity plays a role, the location of the borrower (and/or the bank) may matter. In rural areas (and small towns) there may be more inherent social pres- sure to repay and more informal help from family and friends in case a borrower faces financial difficulties, and religious affiliation and practice may provide few or no extra network benefits. The distinction between religious and other political parties in rural areas and small towns may also be less acute than in big cities because rural dwellers may in general be more religious.

We introduce a dummy variable Big City that equals one if bor- rower is located in a city with more than one million inhabitants and equals zero otherwise. To measure local religious fervency we rely on a variable Share Religious Political Parties, which equals the percentage of total votes obtained for National Assembly seats by the coalition of six religious-political parties in the General Elec- tions of 2002 in the district where the borrower is located.21

We interact the Share variable with the Big City dummy. We expect that if the network effects of religion matter the hazard dif- ferential between Islamic and conventional loans will increase in the share of religious political parties in big cities (i.e., we expect the estimated coefficient on Islamic Loan � Share � Big City to be negative).22

We report the estimates with the Share of Religious Political Parties and Big City variables in Models II and III in Table 8. Notice that the sample now includes only those loans that are granted in the four provinces and the federal capital (i.e., regions where Pakistani political parties can operate) and exclude loans in other regions administered by Pakistan. The results are very interesting. The estimated coefficients in Model III (which includes bank fixed effects) for example suggest that in big cities: (1) the loan hazard rate is on average almost 50% higher than in rural areas (i.e., the coefficient on Big City equals 0.486���); (2) Islamic loans are

19 During the sample period Ramadan took place from September 23rd, 2006, to October 22nd, 2006, from September 13th, 2007, to October 12th 2007, and from September 1st, 2008, to October 1st, 2008. In 2006 and 2007 we consider September and October Ramadan months, in 2008 only September. Given this partial overlap in months we cannot entirely exclude the possibility of a seasonal effect, but it would have to affect conventional and Islamic loans differentially to explain our findings.

20 Ramadan is a fundamentally shared experience, both within the local community and with other Muslims across the world, and may hence result in both a (temporary) strengthening of local social networks and a surge in the identification with the Muslim world and its practices. Clingingsmith et al. (2009) show that identification with the global Muslim community may also strengthen following participation in the Hajj, but we lack individual Hajj participation data to test this conjecture in this context. Following Frieder and Subrahmanyam (2004), Bialkowski, Etebari and Wisniewski (2010) show that equity returns in 14 Muslim markets are substantially higher during Ramadan, while volatility is markedly lower (see also Bialkowski et al. (2013)). These findings can possibly be attributed to the sentiment of Islamic investors and their trades during this period.

21 We use the poll results from the 2002 General Election because 5 of the 6 religious-political parties boycotted the 2008 edition.

22 Borrower size may also be positively correlated with possible religious network effects. In various specifications we indeed find that the coefficient of our measure of borrower size interacted with the Islamic Loan dummy is negative, statistically significant, and economically sizable.

relatively more likely to default than in rural areas (i.e., the coeffi- cient on Islamic Loan � Big City equals 0.206, hence is positive and sizeable though not significant); and (3) Islamic loans are relatively less likely to default if the share of religious parties grows while this is not the case in rural areas (i.e., the coefficient on Islamic Loan � Share � Big City equals �0.170���, while the coefficient on Islamic Loan � Share equals 0.0429).

This evidence suggests that difference in loan performance of conventional and Islamic loans, especially among urban dwellers that in general may be less pious, may be explained by the network effect of religious activity. Hence, this evidence refutes the second part of our third hypothesis (H3) which states that for more reli- giously networked borrowers, ceteris paribus, Islamic loans are equally likely to default.

In robustness we replace the Share of Religious Political Parties with Religious School Enrollment we glean from Andrabi et al. (2006). They define this variable as the number of children enrolled in religious schools as a percentage of total school enrollments in each district (we use the mid-points for the ranges they report). Results (we do not tabulate) again suggest that network effects of religion play a role in determining the differential probability of conventional and Islamic loan repayment, though now the effect is more muted in big cities than in rural areas. Possibly the increased possibilities for pupils to commute in big cities may weaken the correspondence between this measure of local religios- ity and the differential in hazard rates.

Pepinsky (2010) argues that the demand for Islamic banking products is determined more by a quest by individuals to claim or maintain a Muslim identify, rather than by religiosity itself. The need for identification tends to be stronger for middle-class borrowers, who are more vulnerable to social dislocation problems induced by modernization and globalization, especially when located in a big city. We hypothesize that in particular these mid- dle-class borrowers that look to strengthen their Muslim identify not only demand more Islamic banking products but also have a lower propensity to default on them, especially in big cities.

To test this conjecture, we introduce a variable Share of Post- Natal Private Care which equals the percentage of women that used private (and not public) hospitals or clinics for their post-natal care in the district of the borrower captures the local consumption of a luxury good by the middle class. Models IV and V feature this new Share variable and its interactions. The estimated coefficient on the triple interaction term (almost marginally significant, its p-value equals 0.104) suggests that in big cities Islamic loans are less likely to default than conventional loans if the share of post-natal private care grows.

In sum, the reported estimated coefficients suggest that in addition to borrower, loan and/or bank loan characteristics, also religion may play some role in determining the differential repayment performance of conventional and Islamic loans, through individual piousness, network effects and maybe also group identification.

4. Conclusions

Using a comprehensive monthly dataset from Pakistan that fol- lows more than 150,000 loans over the period 2006:04 to 2008:12, we find compelling evidence that (1) Islamic loans are less likely to default than conventional ones, that (2) the same borrower that has both types of loans is less likely to default on the Islamic loan, and (3) that default propensities are lower for individually pious or religiously networked borrowers. The effects we find are not only statistically significant but also large in economic terms: The hazard rate of Islamic loans is less than half the hazard rate of conventional loans, across many duration models that include a

158 L. Baele et al. / Journal of Banking & Finance 44 (2014) 141–159

variety of loan contract, borrower, and bank characteristics, where possible combined with time, borrower, bank and/or bor- rower � bank fixed effects. Similarly, the same borrower obtaining conventional and Islamic loans from the same bank is five times more likely to default on the conventional loan(s) than on the Islamic one(s). Consistent with our third hypothesis, we find that defaults are less likely during Ramadan and in big cities where reli- gious parties poll well.

Our paper establishes a link between religiosity and default rates, contributing to a wider literature on the impact of religion on economic outcomes. The co-existence of Islamic and conven- tional loans (banks) offers a unique opportunity to investigate this link, something that would be much harder to do for other reli- gions where no religion-based financial products exist, at least not on the same scale. Of course, one should be careful in transfer- ring our results towards other religions or value systems, and pos- sibly even to other countries with different regulation and/or banking landscape.

It is important to notice that our study does not aim to address the broader question if conventional or Islamic finance is ‘‘better’’ from either the borrower’s, bank’s or even society’s perspective. Such individual, institutional and public welfare analyses would require for example the collection of detailed data on individual motivations for loan repayment and the aggregation at the bank level of micro-level data, not only on individual bank loans but also on deposits and other bank products, bank organization and pro- cesses, among other dimensions.

Our results should also not be interpreted as evidence in favor of a top-down ‘‘imposed’’ Islamic banking system. We believe that the voluntary nature of the current mixed banking system in Paki- stan, where candidate borrowers can self-select in either type of borrowing, is key to our understanding of the differential default rates. Imposing Islamic lending across the board would likely change the nature of the game completely (à la ‘‘Lucas Critique’’).

Acknowledgements

We thank an anonymous referee, Nafis Alam, Thorsten Beck, Martin Brown, Estelle Cantillon, Elena Carletti, Paola Conconi, Oliv- ier De Jonghe, Hans Degryse, Muhammed-Shahid Ebrahim, Zuzana Fungáčová, Laurent Gheeraert, Alexandra Girod, Iftekhar Hasan, Vasso Ioannidou, Asim Khwaja, Robert Kollmann, Patrick Legros, Alberto Manconi, Ike Mathur (the editor), Atif Mian, Phil Molyneux, Thomas Mosk, Charlotte Ostergaard, María Fabiana Penas, Gérard Roland, Omar Salah, Koen Schoors, _Ilkay S�endeniz-Yüncü, Ahmed Ali Siddiqui, Johannes Spinnewijn, Nora Srzentic, Eva Terberger, Maurizio Zanardi, Chen Zhou, Bilal Zia, participants at the Harvard University Conference on ‘‘Islam and Muslim Societies: An Analyt- ical Examination’’, the DIW – Boston College – FCM – Deutsche Bundesbank Conference on ‘‘The Role of Finance in Stabilizing the Past, Present, and Future Real Economy’’, the Bangor University Conference on Financial Sector Performance and Risk, the UCSIA Conference on ‘‘Morals and Banking’’, the CAREFIN Workshop ‘‘Banking on Ideas’’, and seminar participants at the Bank for Inter- national Settlements, the Bank of Finland Institute for Economies in Transition, BI – Norwegian School of Management, CREATES at Aarhus University, De Nederlandsche Bank, Durham University, ECARES at the Université Libre de Bruxelles, the European University Institute (Florence), Ghent University, the Luxembourg School of Finance, the Manchester Business School, the Rotman School of Management at the University of Toronto, Tilburg University, and the Universities of Lugano, St. Gallen, and Piraeus for valuable com- ments. We are utmost grateful to the State Bank of Pakistan for providing the data used in this paper. The results in this paper do not necessarily represent the views of the Central bank of Oman or the State Bank of Pakistan.

Appendix A. Supplementary material

Supplementary data associated with this article can be found, in the online version, at http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jbankfin.2014.03. 005.

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  • Of religion and redemption: Evidence from default on Islamic loans
    • 0 Introduction
    • 1 Islamic banking and loan default
      • 1.1 Islamic banking
      • 1.2 Islamic loan contracts
      • 1.3 Theoretical framework regarding default on conventional and Islamic loans
    • 2 Data and methodology
      • 2.1 Data description
      • 2.2 Methodology
    • 3 Empirical results
      • 3.1 First specifications
      • 3.2 Differences between borrowers that obtain conventional and Islamic loans?
      • 3.3 Differences in the loan contracts?
      • 3.4 Differences in the banks that grant the conventional and Islamic loans?
      • 3.5 Borrower, bank or loan characteristics? Or religion?
    • 4 Conclusions
    • Acknowledgements
    • Appendix A Supplementary material
    • References

Analytical-pricing-of-discrete-arithmetic-Asian-optio_2014_Journal-of-Bankin.pdf

Journal of Banking & Finance 44 (2014) 130–140

Contents lists available at ScienceDirect

Journal of Banking & Finance

journal homepage: www.elsevier .com/locate / jbf

Analytical pricing of discrete arithmetic Asian options with mean reversion and jumps

http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jbankfin.2014.04.011 0378-4266/� 2014 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

⇑ Corresponding author. Tel.: +852 3943 8520; fax: +852 2603 5188. E-mail addresses: [email protected] (S.F. Chung), [email protected].

hk (H.Y. Wong).

Shing Fung Chung, Hoi Ying Wong ⇑ Department of Statistics, The Chinese University of Hong Kong, Shatin, Hong Kong

a r t i c l e i n f o a b s t r a c t

Article history: Received 24 July 2013 Accepted 9 April 2014 Available online 19 April 2014

JEL classification: G12 G13

Keywords: Asian options Fourier transform Mean reversion Jump diffusion

Empirical evidence indicates that commodity prices are mean reverting and exhibit jumps. As some commodity option payoffs involve the arithmetic average of historical commodity prices, we derive an analytical solution to arithmetic Asian options under a mean reverting jump diffusion process. The analytical solution is implemented with the fast Fourier transform based on the joint characteristic function of the terminal asset price and the realized average value. We also examine the accuracy and computational efficiency of the proposed method through numerical studies.

� 2014 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

1. Introduction

Asian options are derivatives whose payoff depends on the average of the prices of the underlying asset within a specified time interval. This average can be measured with different monitoring frequencies, such as daily, weekly or monthly. Asian options first appeared in 1987 when the Banker’s Trust Tokyo office developed a commercially used pricing formula for options on the average crude oil price, hence the name ‘‘Asian’’ options. Asian options could reduce the risk of market manipulation in the underlying at maturity as the payoff depends on the average of price across time. Furthermore, Asian options are now widely used in the com- modity market as a hedging device. Eydeland and Wolyniec (2003) report that many delivery companies in the gas market rely on Asian options for risk management. These kinds of securities are often used in the oil markets to stabilize the cash flows that stem from meeting obligations to clients. Boyle and Boyle (2001) briefly introduce the history and evolution of Asian options.

In addition to being popular in the commodity market, Asian options have attracted a great deal of academic attention. Boyle and Potapchik (2008) provide a summary of the different methods

of pricing Asian options and the approaches for computing price sensitivities. The methods discussed include Monte Carlo simula- tion, finite difference approach and various quasi analytical approaches and approximations. Asian options can be divided into two main categories: the geometric Asian option and arithmetic Asian option. In practice, most Asian options use the arithmetic average. In this case, no closed-form solution exists. Because the distribution of the sum of log normally distributed random variables is analytically intractable, the problem of pricing arith- metic Asian options is computationally challenging even in a rather simple model such as the Black–Scholes model.

When analyzing the price dynamics of commodity products, important empirical features of commodity prices need to be con- sidered. The most prominent feature is the property of mean rever- sion. Numerous empirical studies support that commodity prices return to their mean level rather than increasing exponentially. Bessembinder et al. (1995) find significant evidence supporting mean reversion in nine commodity markets. In addition, strong patterns have been shown in agricultural commodities and crude oil while weak patterns have been shown in metals. Schwartz (1997) reveals strong mean reversion for both copper and oil. Casassus and Collin-Dufresne (2005) confirm the existence of mean reversion in the crude oil, copper, gold and silver markets. Geman and Roncoroni (2006) discover that the power prices in most US power markets exhibit both the mean reversion effect

Table 1 Payoff functions for different options.

Option type Payoff

European call maxfSnD � K;0g European put maxfK � SnD;0g Fixed strike Asian call maxfAvgn � K;0g Fixed strike Asian put maxfK � Avgn;0g Floating strike Asian call maxfSnD � Avgn � K;0g Floating strike Asian put maxfK þ Avgn � SnD ;0g

S.F. Chung, H.Y. Wong / Journal of Banking & Finance 44 (2014) 130–140 131

and spikes in trajectories. Numerous studies have examined the effect of mean reversion on option pricing. Wong and Lo (2009) propose the mean reversion stochastic volatility model for option pricing. They derive the analytical solution for European options and introduce the bivariate trinomial lattice approach for path- dependent options. Wong and Zhao (2010) extend the mean rever- sion model with a stochastic volatility of Wong and Lo (2009) to a multi-scale stochastic volatility model. Ewald et al. (2013) also consider stochastic volatility model and find that Australian options are equivalent to fixed or floating strike Asian options. By studying the two types of option in parallel, much of the problems could be solved effectively. Instead of considering stochastic vola- tility, we incorporate jumps into the mean reversion for pricing discrete Asian options. Specifically, our model is a jump-diffusion extension of the one proposed by Fusai et al. (2008).

The extended model is motivated by the numerous empirical studies that commodity prices exhibit jumps. Deng (2000) points out that the price dynamics of energy commodities contain jumps, especially when the commodity is costly to store and the demand has low elasticity, for example, electricity. In this case, the mar- ginal cost curve of the electricity supply almost always has a kink at a certain capacity level. Once the demand exceeds that particu- lar level, a jump in price will be formed. Hilliard and Reis (1999) find that adding a jump to soybean prices can thicken the distribu- tion tails of the futures and reduce the price discrepancy for deeply out-of-the-money options. Schmitz et al. (2013) investigate the corn, soybean and wheat markets in the US and show that the addition of a jump component to the spot price dynamic has a sig- nificant effect through a Bayesian approach. Many studies have been done on option pricing under jump diffusion process. For example, Fuh et al. (2013) price path-dependent options under a double exponential jump-diffusion model by applying continuity correction. This method is especially well when the jump volatility is small compared to the total volatility.

The remainder of this paper is arranged as follows. In Section 2, we introduce the proposed mean reverting jump diffusion model and the procedures for deriving the joint characteristic function of the terminal asset value and the arithmetic average of the asset val- ues. We then extend this model to better incorporate information available in the market. The extended model is presented in Sec- tion 3. The joint characteristic function for the terminal asset value and the arithmetic average of the asset values under the extended model is also derived in this section. Section 4 describes the analyt- ical solution for Asian option prices in terms of the Fourier trans- form. We also explain the use of the fast Fourier transform technique in calculating the analytical price for Asian options. In Section 5, we examine the performance of the proposed analytical solution through numerical experiments. We first evaluate the accuracy and efficiency of the pricing mechanism by benchmarking against simulation. We then proceed to investigate the price sensi- tivity in relation to different parameter values and the payoff struc- ture. The averaging effect of Asian options is also studied. Section 6 provides a brief summary of the paper. In Appendix A, we discuss the case of a normal jump size. Finally, we will explore using level dependent jump to generate both upward and downward jumps while maintaining the asset price to be positive.

2. Model with constant parameters

2.1. Model specification

The model of Fusai et al. (2008) considers spot price dynamics as a square root process driven by Brownian motion. We extend this approach to include a jump part in which the jump size follows the exponential distribution. The arrival of jumps is modeled by a Poisson process. We assume the Brownian motion,

jump rate and jump size to be independent of each other. This is the CIR model with exponential jump extension. The dynamic under the risk-neutral probability measure is:

dSt ¼ b g� lk b � St�

� � dt þ r

ffiffiffiffiffiffiffi St�

p dWt þ JdNt ; ð1Þ

where J � ExpðlÞ and Nt � PoiðktÞ. Hoepfner (2009) considers a time inhomogeneous Cox–Inger-

soll–Ross diffusion with positive jumps and prove the existence of unique strong solution by imposing restrictions on the jump measure. Beliaeva and Nawalkha (2011) also consider jumps in the CIR model for modeling interest rates and use two kinds of jump distribution: the exponential jump and the lognormal jump. They argue that the exponential jump extension is useful during periods when positive jumps are expected to dominate negative jumps. Alternatively, the lognormal jump is the only known exten- sion in the literature that allows both positive and negative jumps for the CIR model. Although this set up is more realistic, no analyt- ical solution can be deduced. To examine the effects of positive and negative jumps on Asian option pricing, we further consider the case of using normal distributed jumps. An analytical solution still exists under this setup but the asset value may fall below zero. We discuss this separately in Appendix A. Apart from normal distrib- uted jumps, we explore the use of level dependent jumps in Appendix B, which also generates both upward and downward jumps. We do not specify the exact distribution of the jumps but will show that by imposing certain restriction on the jump distri- bution will lead us to an analytic solution of Asian options.

There are two reasons for using the CIR model as the base model. First, the CIR model is widely used in interest rate modeling and the characteristic function for

R T 0 rt dt exists. Here, we try to

price the arithmetic Asian option, which involves the arithmetic average of asset prices resembling

R T 0 rt dt. Second, by choosing

suitable parameters satisfying the Feller condition, the CIR model allows the asset price to be modeled directly instead of the log asset price, while still maintaining the positivity of the asset value. Once the exponential distribution jump extension is introduced into the CIR model, the jump sizes are always positive and hence the positivity characteristic is maintained.

The setup of the problem is as follows. We are now standing at time 0 and try to price an option which matures at time T. As the goal is to price discretely monitored Asian options, we consider the underlying asset price being recorded at some regular time interval. Hence, the time horizon ½0; T� is split into nþ 1D-spaced monitoring dates. These include 0;D; . . . ;nD ¼ T. Under this setup we are able to compute the analytic solutions for options with pay- off depending on the terminal asset value SnD and the arithmetic average value Avgn ¼

Pn j¼0ajSjD, where aj is the weight put on SjD

such that Pn

j¼0aj ¼ 1. Notice that weights here do not necessarily need to be all equal. Table 1 shows the different types of options that can be priced analytically under this model.

2.2. Joint characteristic function

To obtain the analytical price of Asian options, we need the joint characteristic function for the pair SnD and Avgn. Therefore, we first

132 S.F. Chung, H.Y. Wong / Journal of Banking & Finance 44 (2014) 130–140

compute the characteristic function for StþD given the market infor- mation up to time t.

Lemma 2.1. Under the spot price dynamics (1), the characteristic function of StþD given the market information available at time t is given by

VH1t;St ð1;D; n;0Þ ¼ Etðe inStþD Þ ¼ e�AH1 ðD;nÞSt�BH1 ðD;nÞ; ð2Þ

where

AH1 ðD; nÞ ¼ r2 2b ðebD � 1Þ � e

bD

n i r4 4b2 ðebD � 1Þ2 þ e2bD

n2

; ð3Þ

BH1 ðD;nÞ¼b g�lk b

� �Z D 0

AH1 ðs;nÞds�k Z D

0

1 1þlAH1 ðs;nÞ

�1 !

ds;

ð4Þ

with the parameter set

H1 ¼ fb;l; k;g;rg: ð5Þ

Proof. Let f H1 ðt; StÞ ¼ EtðeinStþD Þ. We transform the SDE problem into the following PIDE problem according to the Feynman–Kac representation illustrated by Cont and Tankov (2004):

@f H1

@s ¼ @f

H1

@Su b g� lk

b � Su

� � þ 1

2 @2f H1

@S2u r2Su

þ k½Eðf H1 ðu; Su þ JÞÞ � f H1 ðu; SuÞ�; ð6Þ

with the terminal condition

f H1 ðt þ D; StþDÞ ¼ einStþD ; ð7Þ

for u 2 ½t; t þ D� and s ¼ t þ D� u. Consider the exponential affine form for the characteristic

function, f H1 ðu; SuÞ ¼ e�A H1 ðs;nÞSu�BH1 ðs;nÞ, we have:

f H1 ðu;SuÞðAH 0 1 ðs;nÞSuþBH

0 1 ðs;nÞÞ� f H1 ðu;SuÞAH1 ðs;nÞb g�

lk b �Su

� �

þ1 2

f H1 ðu;SuÞAH12ðs;nÞr2Suþkf H1 ðu;SuÞ½Eðe�A H1 ðs;nÞJÞ�1� ¼0:

ð8Þ

By matching the characteristic function of exponential distribution,

Eðe�AH1 ðs;nÞJÞ ¼ 1 1þlAH1 ðs;nÞ. After grouping terms with and without Su,

we have:

Su A H01 ðs;nÞþAH1 ðs;nÞbþ1

2 AH12ðs;nÞr2

� � þBH

0 1 ðs;nÞ

�AH1 ðs;nÞb g�lk b

� � þk 1

1þlAH1 ðs;nÞ �1

! ¼0: ð9Þ

This yields the ODEs:

AH 0 1 ðs; nÞ þ AH1 ðs; nÞbþ 1

2 AH12ðs; nÞr2 ¼ 0; ð10Þ

BH 0 1 ðs; nÞ � AH1 ðs; nÞb g� lk

b

� � þ k 1

1þ lAH1 ðs; nÞ � 1

! ¼ 0; ð11Þ

with the initial conditions AH1 ð0; nÞ ¼ �in and BH1 ð0; nÞ ¼ 0. The differentiations are taken with respect to s. The result follows by solving AH1 ðD; nÞ from the Bernoulli equation and BH1 ðD; nÞ with straightforward integration. h

Using the characteristic function for StþD, numerical scheme can be constructed to compute the Asian option price such as the one proposed by Wong and Guan (2011). However, the computational

efficiency can be greatly enhanced by deriving an analytical solu- tion. To this end, we determine the joint characteristic function for the pair SnD and Avgn.

Proposition 2.1. Under the spot price dynamics (1), the joint characteristic function of the pair SnD;

Pn j¼0ajSjD

� � given the market

information available at time 0 is

VH10;S0 ðn;D;/;cÞ¼ E0 e i/SnDþic

Pn j¼0

ajSjD � �

¼ e iK

H1 0 ðD;/;cÞS0�

Xn�1 j¼0

BH1 ðD;KH1 jþ1ðD;/;cÞÞ

;

ð12Þ

where the function KH1j ðD; /; cÞ satisfies the recursive equation:

KH1j ðD; /; cÞ ¼ iA H1 ðD; KH1jþ1ðD; /; cÞÞ þ caj ð13Þ

for j = n-1,n-2,. . .,0, with starting value:

KH1n ðD; /; cÞ ¼ /þ can: ð14Þ

Proof. By repeating the law of iterated expectation and using the result in Lemma 2.1, we can derive the joint characteristic function as follows:

VH10;S0 ðn;D; /; cÞ ¼ E0 e i/SnDþic

Pn j¼0ajSjD

� �

¼ E0 Eðn�1ÞDðeið/þcanÞSnD Þe ic Pn�1

j¼0 ajSjD

� �

¼ E0 e �AH1 ðD;/þcanÞSðn�1ÞDþic

Pn�1 j¼0

ajSjD � �

e�B H1 ðD;/þcanÞ

..

.

¼ eiK H1 0 ðD;/;cÞS0�

Pn�1 j¼0 B

H1 ðD;KH1 jþ1ðD;/;cÞÞ ð15Þ

where the function KH1j ðD; /; cÞ satisfies Eqs. (13) and (14). h

3. Model with time-dependent parameters

Commodity derivatives ought to be priced consistently by mak- ing use of all the available market information. Commodity prod- ucts are not liquidly traded on the market. What most people trade are commodity futures instead of the commodities them- selves. Therefore, it is indispensable to incorporate the information of the futures price curve into the commodity option prices. A time- dependent long term mean level serves to super-calibrate the mean level value to match the term structure of the futures. This change serves an additional purpose than simply fitting to the futures price curve. Some commodity prices are known to have seasonal effects. Incorporating the seasonal pattern of the commodity price into the time-dependent mean level could be an alternative motivation for calculating the time varying mean level. This is useful when the futures price quotes are not available or when the futures price curve is not reliable. Furthermore, any possible time pattern dis- played by the historical volatility or the term structure of the implied volatility of the commodity product should also be taken into account, because commodity prices often display time chang- ing volatility, which plays an important role in option pricing. For instance, Richter and Sorensen (2003) document seasonality pat- terns in spot prices and volatility in the corn, soybean and wheat markets. Accordingly, our extended model can accommodate sea- sonality patterns in both spot prices and volatility.

3.1. Model specification

The extended model (1) differs from the original model in two ways: We replace the long term mean level g and the volatility part

S.F. Chung, H.Y. Wong / Journal of Banking & Finance 44 (2014) 130–140 133

r with two time-dependent functions. This enables the two afore- mentioned effects to be captured simultaneously. Hence, the dynamic under the risk neutral measure is:

dSt ¼ b gt � lk b � St�

� � dt þ rt

ffiffiffiffiffiffiffi St�

p dWt þ JdNt; ð16Þ

where J � ExpðlÞ and Nt � PoiðktÞ.

3.2. Joint characteristic function

We now demonstrate how the model is fit to the term structure of futures contracts. The function value of gt is obtained by super- calibrating it to the futures price curve for the underlying asset quoted on the market. Hence, the information of the futures price curve is incorporated into the pricing procedure through the func- tion gt . We know that the expected asset price at time u under the risk neutral probability measure equals the future price for the asset maturing at time u:

E0ðSuÞ ¼ F0;u: ð17Þ

By It�o’s lemma, the differential of ebsSs implies that

Su ¼ e�buS0 þ be�bu Z u

0 ebs gs �

lk b

� � dsþ e�bu

Z u 0

ebsrs ffiffiffiffiffi Ss

p dWs

þ e�bu Z u

0 ebsJ dNs: ð18Þ

Taking expectation on both sides yields

E0ðSuÞ ¼ e�buS0 þ b Z u

0 e�bðu�sÞgs ds: ð19Þ

Differentiating it with respect to u produces

gu ¼ F0;u þ 1 b

d du

F0;u: ð20Þ

Therefore, to determine the value of gu, we only need to find the futures price curve for the underlying asset up to time u.

Similar to the previous model, we want to derive the joint char- acteristic function for the pair SnD and Avgn. We begin with the characteristic function for StþD given the market information up to time t.

Lemma 3.1. Under the spot price dynamics (16), the characteristic function of StþD given the market information available at time t is given by

VH2t;St ð1;D; n;0Þ ¼ Etðe inStþD Þ ¼ e�A

H2 t ðD;nÞSt�B

H2 t ðD;nÞ; ð21Þ

where

AH2t ðD; nÞ ¼ e�bD

R t 0

r2s 2 e �bsds� 1n i

� � R t

0 r2s 2 e �bsds

� �2 þ 1

n2

; ð22Þ

BH2t ðD; nÞ ¼ �inF0;tþD � A H2 t ðD; nÞF0;t �

1 2

Z D 0

F0;uA H22 u ðs; nÞr2uds

� lk Z D

0 AH2u ðs; nÞds� k

Z D 0

1 1þ lAH2u ðs; nÞ

� 1 !

ds;

ð23Þ

with the parameter set

H2 ¼ fb;l; k;gu;ruju 2 ½0; T�g: ð24Þ

Proof. Let f H2 ðt; StÞ ¼ EtðeinStþD Þ. We transform the SDE problem into the following PIDE problem according to the Feynman–Kac representation illustrated by Cont and Tankov (2004):

@f H2

@s ¼ @f

H2

@Su b gu �

lk b � Su

� � þ 1

2 @2f H2

@S2u r2uSu

þ k½Eðf H2 ðu; Su þ JÞÞ � f H2 ðu; SuÞ�; ð25Þ

with the terminal condition

f H2 ðt þ D; StþDÞ ¼ einStþD ; ð26Þ for u 2 ½t; t þ D� and s ¼ t þ D� u.

Consider the exponential affine form of the characteristic function, f H2 ðu; SuÞ ¼ e�A

H2 u ðs;nÞSu�B

H2 u ðs;nÞ. This yields the ODEs:

AH2 0u ðs; nÞ þ A H2 u ðs; nÞbþ

1 2

AH22u ðs; nÞr2u ¼ 0; ð27Þ

BH2 0u ðs; nÞ � A H2 u ðs; nÞb gu �

lk b

� � þ k 1

1þ lAH2u ðs; nÞ � 1

! ¼ 0;

ð28Þ

with the initial conditions AH2tþDð0; nÞ ¼ �in and B H2 tþDð0; nÞ ¼ 0. The

differentiations are taken with respect to s. AH2t ðD; nÞ can be solved easily from the Bernoulli equation. After solving for AH2t ðD; nÞ, we can solve for BH2t ðD; nÞ. By straightforward integration, we obtain

BH2t ðD;nÞ¼b Z D

0 AH2u ðs;nÞ gu�

lk b

� � ds�k

Z D 0

1 1þlAH2u ðs;nÞ

�1 !

ds:

ð29Þ

Substituting gu ¼ F0;u þ 1b ddu F0;u into (29) yields (23). h

Proposition 3.1. Under the spot price dynamics (16), the joint char- acteristic function of the pair SnD;

Pn j¼0ajSjD

� � given the market infor-

mation available at time 0 is

VH20;S0ðn;D;/;cÞ¼ E0 e i/SnDþic

Pn j¼0

ajSjD � �

¼ e iK

H2 0 ðD;/;cÞS0�

Xn�1 j¼0

B H2 jD ðD;KH2

jþ1ðD;/;cÞÞ

;

ð30Þ where the function KH2j ðD; /; cÞ satisfies the recursive equation:

KH2j ðD; /; cÞ ¼ iA H2 jD ðD; K

H2 jþ1ðD; /; cÞÞ þ caj; ð31Þ

for j ¼ n� 1;n� 2; . . . ;0, with starting value:

KH2n ðD; /; cÞ ¼ /þ can: ð32Þ

Proof. The proof follows that for Proposition 2.1, except we now use the parameter set H2 instead of H1. h

4. Fast Fourier transform on Asian option prices

Carr and Madan (1999) recommend using a fast Fourier trans- form for option valuation when the characteristic function for the return is known analytically. Having derived the joint charac- teristic function for the pair SnD and Avgn, we use a fast Fourier transform to price Asian options. Consider a contingent claim with payoff maxðxYT � k;0Þ at time T, where k ¼ xK;x ¼ þ1 for call and x ¼ �1 for put. This includes plain vanilla options ðYT ¼ SnDÞ, fixed strike Asian options ðYT ¼

Pn j¼0ajSjDÞ and floating

strike Asian options YT ¼ SnD � Pn

j¼0ajSjD � �

. Assuming the risk neu-

tral density of xYT as qxYT ðuÞ, the arbitrage free option price at time 0 is

CT;x0;S0 ðkÞ ¼ e �rT Z 1 �1

maxðu� k;0ÞqxYT ðuÞdu

¼ e�rT Z 1

k ðu� kÞqxYT ðuÞdu: ð33Þ

Table 2 E0 ½eðimþaÞxYT � for different options.

Option type YT / c

European SnD ðm� aiÞx 0 Fixed strike Asian

Pn j¼0ajSjD 0 ðm� aiÞx

Floating strike Asian SnD � Pn

j¼0ajSjD ðm� aiÞx ðai� mÞx

134 S.F. Chung, H.Y. Wong / Journal of Banking & Finance 44 (2014) 130–140

We require a function to be square integrable if we want to perform a Fourier transform. However, because CT;x0;S0 ðkÞ does not converge to 0 when k tends to �1, it is not square integrable over R. Thus, we need to include a dampening factor. Consider a modified call option price CT;x0;S0 ðk; aÞ ¼ C

T;x 0;S0 ðkÞeak, with a > 0. The corresponding Fourier

transform is

cT;x0;S0 ðm; aÞ ¼ Z 1 �1

eimkCT;x0;S0ðk; aÞdk ¼ e�rT

ðimþ aÞ2 E0½eðimþaÞxYT �: ð34Þ

The option price can be recovered by Fourier inversion

CT;x0;S0 ðkÞ ¼ e�ak�rT

2p

Z 1 �1

e�imk

ðimþ aÞ2 E0½eðimþaÞxYT �dm

¼ e �ak�rT

p

Z 1 0

Re e�imk

ðimþ aÞ2 E0½eðimþaÞxYT �

! dm; ð35Þ

where E0½eðimþaÞxYT � can be obtained by VH10;S0 ðn;D; /; cÞ in (12) or VH20;S0 ðn;D; /; cÞ in (30). We also need to substitute suitable values

Table 3 Model parameter values for the numerical experiment.

S0 ¼ 1 b ¼ 0:3 g ¼ 1:05 r ¼ 0:7 k ¼ 5 l ¼ 0:1 T ¼ 1 r ¼ 0:04 aj ¼ 1nþ1

Fig. 1. Fixed strike Asian options for varying str

for / and c according to Table 2. The second equality holds because CT;x0;S0 ðkÞ is real, thus the integrand must be even in the real part and odd in the imaginary part.

5. Numerical results

5.1. Comparison of the analytical solution and Monte Carlo simulation

In this section, we compare the performance of the analytical solution with that of a simulation. We use the constant parameters model for easier demonstration. Because the price dynamic may fall below zero after discretization, the dynamic needs to be mod- ified by the absorption principle when performing the simulation:

Stm ¼max Stm�1 þb g� lk b �Stm�1

� � dtþr

ffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffi Stm�1 dt

q Zm�1þ JnYm�1;0

� � ð36Þ

for m ¼ 1;2; . . . ; Tdt. Also, dt is the time length per simulation step, Zm�1 � N ð0;1Þ;Ym�1 � BernoulliðkdtÞ approximates the Poisson pro- cess and Jn � ExpðlÞ is the jump size. The remaining parameters fol- low the definition in the continuous model. The parameter values for the numerical experiment are reported in Table 3.

Because the objective of this paper is to compute the analytical solution for arithmetic Asian options, we compare the analytical solution with the simulation solution for both fixed strike Asian options and floating strike Asian options. We make the comparison across different monitoring frequencies n, where n ¼ 4, 12, 26, 52 and 252. This corresponds to quarterly, monthly, biweekly, weekly and daily monitoring setups. We also span the option maturity into 252� 26 ¼ 3276 subintervals in the simulation, so the monitoring asset price can always be obtained from the simulation. The num- ber of simulation paths taken is 1 million. The relative difference with respect to the simulation price results is shown in Figs. 1 and 2.

As we can see, the analytical solutions for both fixed strike Asian options and floating strike Asian options are close to the

ike prices K and monitoring frequencies n.

S.F. Chung, H.Y. Wong / Journal of Banking & Finance 44 (2014) 130–140 135

simulation results. The pricing errors are in the order of between 0.01% and 0.1%, which indicates high analytical solution accuracy. The analytical solution performs excellently on accuracy and on efficiency. The analytical solution takes much less time to compute than the simulation. Using a computer equipped with the Intel (R) Core (TM) i7–2600 CPU having clock speed at 3.40 GHz, it takes 0.2–10 s to compute the analytic price, depending on the monitor- ing frequency of the Asian option, while the simulation requires 6 min.

Fig. 2. Floating strike Asian options for varying s

Fig. 3. Plot of Asian option pri

5.2. Price sensitivity and model parameters

In this paper, we advocate the use of the jump process, time-dependent mean level and time-dependent asset volatility when modeling the commodity price dynamic. Therefore, we investigate the effects on Asian option prices when these parameters change in value. We plot the Asian option prices with respect to different values of these three parameters. The parameter values in Table 3 serve as the base case and we

trike prices K and monitoring frequencies n.

ce against jump intensity.

136 S.F. Chung, H.Y. Wong / Journal of Banking & Finance 44 (2014) 130–140

change the value of each specific parameter over a specified range. Here, we put K ¼ S0 for the fixed strike Asian options and K ¼ 0 for the floating strike Asian options. The results are plotted in Figs. 3–5.

As seen from the figures, the prices of the options increase with the jump intensity. This is reasonable as increasing the number of jumps can increase the variability of the asset price dynamic and thus increase the value of the options. Furthermore, because we are now considering call options, the option prices increase with the long term mean level of the asset price. A higher long term mean level implies the asset price tends to stay at a higher level. Therefore, this boosts the value of the Asian call options. If we con- sider Asian put options instead, the result will be the opposite. Lastly, the option prices increase with increased asset volatility because greater volatility introduces more variability into the asset price path and hence increases the option price.

0.6 0.8 1.0 1.2 1.4

0. 12

0. 14

0. 16

0. 18

Fixed strike Asian call options

η

Pr ic

e

● n=4 n=12 n=26 n=52 n=252

Fig. 4. Plot of Asian option p

0. 08

0. 10

0. 12

0. 14

Fixed strike Asian call options

σ

Pr ic

e

● n=4 n=12 n=26 n=52 n=252

0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7

Fig. 5. Plot of Asian option pri

In sum, the Asian option price is sensitive to the changes in the values of these parameters, hence supporting the use of the jump process, time-dependent mean level and time-dependent asset volatility when modeling the commodity price dynamic.

5.3. Price sensitivity and payoff structure

Apart from the model parameters, the prices of options are also affected by the contract specifications. Specifically, we are inter- ested in the effect of different monitoring frequencies on the prices of fixed strike Asian options. We also introduce the forward start

fixed strike Asian option, with payoff maxðAvgf :s:n � K;0Þ, where Avgf :s:n ¼

Pn j¼1ajSjD ¼

Avgn�a0S0Pn j¼1

aj . The forward start fixed strike Asian

option is examined to remove the effect of S0 in the payoff. The parameter values in Table 3 are used for this numerical study

0.6 0.8 1.0 1.2 1.4 η

0. 12

0. 14

0. 16

0. 18

Pr ic

e

Floating strike Asian call options

● n=4 n=12 n=26 n=52 n=252

rice against mean level.

0. 08

0. 10

0. 12

0. 14

Pr ic

e

0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7

Floating strike Asian call options

σ

● n=4 n=12 n=26 n=52 n=252

ce against asset volatility.

Fig. 7. Plot of option price difference against strike level.

S.F. Chung, H.Y. Wong / Journal of Banking & Finance 44 (2014) 130–140 137

and we put K ¼ S0 for both the original fixed strike Asian options and forward start fixed strike Asian options. Fig. 6 shows how the monitoring frequency affects the prices of these options.

For the original fixed strike Asian options, the option price increases with the monitoring frequency. This result seems coun- terintuitive but the reasoning is as follows. Notice S0 is the only known constant in the payoff. When we increase the monitoring frequency, more future asset prices will be included in Avgn and the weight on S0 is lowered. Hence, the variability of Avgn increases with the number of n, causing the option price to increase. Fusai et al. (2008) also consider arithmetic Asian options with payoff including the initial asset price and find the same rela- tionship between price and monitoring frequency.

However, for the forward start fixed strike Asian options, the option price decreases as the monitoring frequency increases. In this case, because all the asset prices in the payoff are random, increasing the number of n can lower the variability of Avgf :s:n through the averaging effect. In practice, market trades this type of Asian option as we want to lower the option price by increasing the sampling frequency, thus providing a cheaper alternative than European options. Notice the two option prices converge when the sampling frequency is high because the stability effect of the initial asset price is negligible when the weight on the price is small. The two options converge to the continuously monitored Asian option with fixed strike. Carr et al. (2008) show that the price of continu- ously monitored Asian option with fixed strike increases with its maturity. Baker and Yor (2009) prove the same results by con- structing a martingale having the same marginal as the arithmetic average of geometric Brownian motion.

As aforementioned, the forward start Asian option does not con- tain the initial asset price in the payoff, and is better at demon- strating the averaging effect. Therefore, we further investigate the averaging effect in this type option by comparing the price change for this option and the European option before and after introducing jumps into the model dynamic. We continue to use the parameter values listed in Table 3, except for when there is no jump, in which case k ¼ 0. The absolute difference in price change before and after introducing jumps is shown in Fig. 7.

We can see that although Asian options and European options both increase in value after introducing jumps, the Asian options

0.0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0

0. 12

0. 14

0. 16

0. 18

0. 20

0. 22

0. 24

0. 26

Monitoring time step (1/n)

Pr ic

e

Original Forward start

Fig. 6. Plot of Asian option price against monitoring time step.

increase less than the European options. This further confirms that the averaging effect exists in Asian options. Notice that the averag- ing effect diminishes marginally as the monitoring frequency increases. This reduction occurs because the increase in price is bounded below by that of the continuous monitoring Asian option.

6. Conclusion

In this paper, we propose the mean reverting jump diffusion process for modeling commodity price dynamics. We derive the joint characteristic function of the terminal commodity price and the arithmetic average of commodity prices. We then derive the analytical solution for arithmetic Asian options using the fast Fou- rier transform technique. The numerical experiments show that the analytical solution is more accurate and efficient than the Monte Carlo simulation. We further investigate the price sensitiv- ity of Asian options in relation to different parameters. The results also support the introduction of jumps into the price dynamic, as well as the use of the time varying mean level and asset volatility. We then compare the price differences for fixed strike Asian options under different payoff structures. We conclude that includ- ing the initial asset price in the average in the option payoff greatly affects the option price when the monitoring frequency is low, but makes little difference when the monitoring frequency is high. We further study the option price change after introducing jumps and confirm the existence of the averaging effect for Asian options.

Acknowledgment

We thank Ike Mathur (editor) for handling this submission and an anonymous reviewer for his/her constructive comments which enhance the quality of this paper. H.Y. Wong acknowledges the support by the Research Grant Council of Hong Kong with GRF Pro- ject No. 403511.

Appendix A. Normally distributed jump size

In addition to exponential jumps, we also consider the normal jump size. The analytical solution for arithmetic Asian options in

Fig. 8. Fixed strike Asian options for varying strike prices K and monitoring frequencies n.

138 S.F. Chung, H.Y. Wong / Journal of Banking & Finance 44 (2014) 130–140

the sense of fast Fourier transform still exists under this setup, and the dynamic is able to generate both upside and downside jumps. However, this setup suffers from the shortcoming that the under- lying asset price may fall below zero. A possible remedy is to min- imize this probability by imposing appropriate parameter constraints. The dynamic under the risk-neutral probability mea- sure is:

dSt ¼ b g� lk b � St�

� � dt þ r

ffiffiffiffiffiffiffi St�

p dWt þ JdNt ; ð37Þ

where J � N ðl; h2Þ and Nt � PoiðktÞ. We require the joint characteristic function for the pair SnD and

Avgn for the analytical pricing. Again, we first derive the character- istic function for StþD given the market information up to time t.

Lemma A.1. Under the spot price dynamics (37), the joint charac- teristic function of StþD given the market information available at time t is given by

VH3t;St ð1;D; n;0Þ ¼ Etðe inStþD Þ ¼ e�AH3 ðD;nÞSt�BH3 ðD;nÞ; ð38Þ

where

AH3 ðD; nÞ ¼ r2 2b ðebD � 1Þ � e

bD

n i r4 4b2 ðebD � 1Þ2 þ e2bD

n2

; ð39Þ

BH3 ðD; nÞ ¼ b g� lk b

� �Z D 0

AH3 ðs; nÞds

� k Z D

0 e�lA

H3 ðs;nÞþ12h 2AH32ðs;nÞ � 1

� � ds; ð40Þ

with the parameter set

H3 ¼ fb;l; h; k;g;rg: ð41Þ

Proof. Let f H3 ðt; StÞ ¼ EtðeinStþD Þ. We transform the SDE problem into the following PIDE problem according to the Feynman–Kac representation illustrated by Cont and Tankov (2004):

@f H3

@s ¼ @f

H3

@Su b g� lk

b � Su

� � þ 1

2 @2f H3

@S2u r2Su

þ k½Eðf H3 ðu; Su þ JÞÞ � f H3 ðu; SuÞ�; ð42Þ

with the terminal condition

f H3 ðt þ D; StþDÞ ¼ einStþD ; ð43Þ

for u 2 ½t; t þ D� and s ¼ t þ D� u. Consider the exponential affine form for the characteristic

function, f H3 ðu; SuÞ ¼ e�A H3 ðs;nÞSu�BH3 ðs;nÞ. This yields the ODEs:

AH 0 3 ðs; nÞ þ AH3 ðs; nÞbþ 1

2 AH32ðs; nÞr2 ¼ 0; ð44Þ

BH 0 3 ðs; nÞ � AH3 ðs; nÞb g� lk

b

� � þ k e�lAH3 ðs;nÞþ12h2AH32ðs;nÞ � 1 � �

¼ 0;

ð45Þ

with the initial conditions AH3 ð0; nÞ ¼ �in and BH3 ð0; nÞ ¼ 0. The dif- ferentiations are taken with respect to s. The ODEs are similar to those in (10) and (11), except now we are considering normal dis- tribution jump instead of the exponential distribution jump. Hence,

we have Eðe�AH3 ðs;nÞJÞ ¼ e�lAH3 ðs;nÞþ12h2AH32ðs;nÞ. The result follows by solving AH3 ðD; nÞ from the Bernoulli equation and BH3 ðD; nÞ with straightforward integration. h

After deriving the characteristic function for StþD, we are now ready to determine the joint characteristic function for the pair SnD and Avgn.

Proposition A.1. Under the spot price dynamics (37), the joint

characteristic function of the pair SnD; Pn

j¼0ajSjD � �

given the market

information available at time 0 is

VH30;S0 ðn;D;/;cÞ¼ E0 e i/SnDþic

Pn j¼0

ajSjD � �

¼ e iK

H3 0 ðD;/;cÞS0�

Xn�1 j¼0

BH3 ðD;KH3 jþ1ðD;/;cÞÞ

;

ð46Þ

S.F. Chung, H.Y. Wong / Journal of Banking & Finance 44 (2014) 130–140 139

where the function KH3j ðD; /; cÞ satisfies the recursive equation:

KH3j ðD; /; cÞ ¼ iA H3 ðD; KH3jþ1ðD; /; cÞÞ þ caj ð47Þ

for j ¼ n� 1; n� 2; . . . ;0, with starting value:

KH3n ðD; /; cÞ ¼ /þ can: ð48Þ

Proof. The proof follows that for Proposition 2.1, except the parameter set H3 is now used instead of H1. h

After deriving the joint characteristic function, we can price the Asian options using the fast Fourier transform. Again, we compare the performance of the analytical solution with that of a simulation. We use the parameter values in Table 3 and fur- ther specify h ¼ l ¼ 0:1, so the first and second moments of the exponential and normal distributions match each other. This allows us to make a fair comparison. The relative difference with respect to the simulation price for fixed strike Asian options are given in Fig. 8. The number of simulation paths taken is 1 million.

As the results show, the analytical solutions closely match the simulation results. This means the analytical solution is also accurate under a normal distribution jump. The analytical computation time is also shorter than the simulation time. It takes 0.2–10 s to compute the analytic price, depending on the monitor- ing frequency of the Asian option. The simulation requires up to 3.5 min. Another noticeable result is that the option prices under the normal jump are similar to those for the exponential jump, with the latter being only slightly lower in value. Here, the match- ing of the first two moments for the jump distribution is reflected in the similar option prices.

Appendix B. Level dependent jump size

Our consideration of using exponential jumps ignores down- ward jumps while normal jumps make the asset price possibly goes negative. To overcome the shortcomings, one may consider the level dependent jumps.1 We will explore the condition when analytic solution for Asian option exists. The dynamic under the risk-neutral probability measure is:

dSt ¼ b g� lk b � St�

� � dt þ r

ffiffiffiffiffiffi St�

p þ �St� ðeJ � 1ÞdNt ð49Þ

where � 2 ½0;1� is a real constant, J 2 ð�1;1Þ is a random variable and Nt � PoiðktÞ.

This process can generate both upward and downward jumps depending on the positivity of J. This model enforces jumps to be bounded so that the asset price does not fall below zero if a Feller-type condition is satisfied, and the jump size can be fur- ther controlled by the positive constant �. Once the jump distri- bution satisfies certain technical conditions, an analytic solution for Asian options can be derived by following previous proce- dures. Although we do not specify the jump distribution for a general discussion, an obvious example uses J ¼ Jþ with proba- bility p and J ¼ J� with probability 1� p where J� < 0 < Jþ are constants and 0 < p < 1.

Proposition B.1. The characteristic function for StþD given the market information up to time t exists if

wðtÞ ¼ EðexpðiteJÞÞ ¼ eitðxt þ yÞ; ð50Þ

where x and y are constants.

1 We thank an anonymous referee of suggesting this model.

Proof. Let f H4 ðt; StÞ ¼ EtðeinStþD Þ, with the parameter set H4 ¼ fb;l; k;g;r; �g. We transform the SDE problem into the fol- lowing PIDE problem according to the Feynman–Kac representa- tion illustrated by Cont and Tankov (2004):

@f H4

@s ¼ @f

H4

@Su b g� lk

b � Su

� � þ 1

2 @2f H4

@S2u r2Su

þ k½Eðf H4 ðu; Su þ �SuðeJ � 1ÞÞÞ � f H4 ðu; SuÞ�; ð51Þ

with the terminal condition

f H4 ðt þ D; StþDÞ ¼ einStþD ; ð52Þ

for u 2 ½t; t þ D� and s ¼ t þ D� u. Consider the exponential affine form for the characteristic

function, f H4 ðu; SuÞ ¼ e�A H4 ðs;nÞSu�BH4 ðs;nÞ, we have:

Su A H04 ðs;nÞþAH4 ðs;nÞbþ1

2 AH42ðs;nÞr2

� � þBH

0 4 ðs;nÞ

�AH4 ðs;nÞb g�lk b

� � þ k Eðexpð�AH4 ðs;nÞ�SueJÞÞeA

H4 ðs;nÞ�Su �1 � �

¼ 0: ð53Þ

To solve Eq. (53), we need Eðexpð�AH4 ðs; nÞ�SueJÞÞeA H4 ðs;nÞ�Su to be

linear in Su so that we can group the terms and solve for two ODEs. By choosing restricting the distribution of J such that EðexpðiteJÞÞ ¼ eitðxt þ yÞ,

Eðexpð�AH4 ðs; nÞ�SueJÞÞeA H4 ðs;nÞ�Su ¼ wðiAH4 ðs; nÞ�SuÞeA

H4 ðs;nÞ�Su

¼ xiAH4 ðs; nÞ�Su þ y; ð54Þ which is linear in Su. h

The option price can be obtained by following the same approaches as before. The analytic solution could be compared against simulation once we specify the exact distribution of the jump size.

References

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  • Analytical pricing of discrete arithmetic Asian options with mean reversion and jumps
    • 1 Introduction
    • 2 Model with constant parameters
      • 2.1 Model specification
      • 2.2 Joint characteristic function
    • 3 Model with time-dependent parameters
      • 3.1 Model specification
      • 3.2 Joint characteristic function
    • 4 Fast Fourier transform on Asian option prices
    • 5 Numerical results
      • 5.1 Comparison of the analytical solution and Monte Carlo simulation
      • 5.2 Price sensitivity and model parameters
      • 5.3 Price sensitivity and payoff structure
    • 6 Conclusion
    • Acknowledgment
    • Appendix A Normally distributed jump size
    • Appendix B Level dependent jump size
    • References

How-do-asset-encumbrance-and-debt-regulations-affect_2014_Journal-of-Banking.pdf

Journal of Banking & Finance 44 (2014) 39–54

Contents lists available at ScienceDirect

Journal of Banking & Finance

journal homepage: www.elsevier .com/locate / jbf

How do asset encumbrance and debt regulations affect bank capital and bond risk?

http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jbankfin.2014.03.043 0378-4266/� 2014 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

⇑ Corresponding author. E-mail addresses: [email protected] (S. Helberg), [email protected].

no (S. Lindset). 1 In banking, the term capital has come to have the meaning of equity. We will use

these terms interchangeably. We use bond debt as a term covering all bank debt besides insured deposits.

Stig Helberg ⇑, Snorre Lindset Norwegian University of Science and Technology (NTNU), Department of Economics, Dragvoll, NO-7491 Trondheim, Norway

a r t i c l e i n f o a b s t r a c t

Article history: Received 10 January 2014 Accepted 30 March 2014 Available online 12 April 2014

JEL classification: G21 G28 G32

Keywords: Asset encumbrance Bank debt regulations Optimal bank capital Bond risk

We study how optimal bank capital and bond risk are influenced by asset encumbrance, depositor preference, and bail-in resolution frameworks. Due to changes in optimal capital structure, the net effect on bond debt risk and valuation is small. The effects on shareholder value and public sector liability value are significant. A gap between optimal and required capital represents a cost to shareholders and increases the risk of regulatory arbitrage. The features of bank debt financing we analyze here may explain the stable cross-sectional variation in bank capital documented in literature. Based on a small sample of European banks, we find support for the central model predictions.

� 2014 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

1. Introduction

The use of collateral in financial markets has risen following the financial crisis, and has led to higher bank asset encumbrance. It is well known qualitatively that this pledging of assets to one group of bank creditors tilts risk towards depositors and ultimately the deposit insurer. This paper aims to quantify this relationship and analyze how asset encumbrance in this respect compares to other specific bank features.

In order to quantify the implications for bank capital and bond risk, we extend the structural model of default risk of Leland (1994).1 We compare six structural and regulatory banking regimes, representing recent trends in banking and bank regulation. Based on a small sample of banks, as well as earlier large sample studies, we find support for the model predictions.

We use our model predictions to comment on several important questions regarding bank regulations and bank financing. Why introducing depositor preference in Europe is smart. Why it is costly

to introduce covered bonds in the US. Why introduction of bail-in regimes may lead to less bank capital. Why some of the regulations have counteracting effects. Why banks’ creditors may be unaffected by both depositor preference and asset encumbrance. Why the banks’ reaction to the regulations may create the next crisis.

Details are provided later, but our key findings are as follows:

� Asset encumbrance and debt regulations have a strong influ- ence on optimal bank capital. So large, that banks’ debt struc- ture and the regulatory environment may explain the stable cross-sectional variation in capital structure documented by Gropp and Heider (2010). � Asset encumbrance, implicit guarantees, depositor preference,

and bail-in features, all change the expected pay-off to bond- holders in a bank failure. The changes have an immediate, first-order effect on bond debt risk. However, the subsequent changes in optimal bank capital counter the effect on bond debt risk; a second-order effect. Shareholders and the public sector are most influenced by the combined effects, not bondholders. This result is in contrast to the opinion that asset encumbrance and bank debt regulations have a material impact on bank bond debt risk, based on the first-order effect only, see e.g., the IMF Working Paper ‘‘Bank Debt in Europe: Are Funding Models Broken?’’, Leslé (2012).

40 S. Helberg, S. Lindset / Journal of Banking & Finance 44 (2014) 39–54

� A gap between optimal capital and required capital represents a cost to the shareholders and strengthens the incentive to under- take regulatory arbitrage. The incentive reduces the reliability of the regulations and undermines the usefulness of formal cap- ital requirements as a prudential policy tool. This relationship must not be forgotten in the ongoing outcry for more bank cap- ital, see e.g., Admati et al. (2011) and Miles et al. (2012). Enhancing capital requirements, and at the same time allowing asset encumbrance or adopting debt regulations that reduce the private optimal capital, is to gain some and lose some in terms of financial stability. Higher minimum capital requirements force banks to increase capital. In contrast, debt regulations like depositor preference, motivate banks to increase capital.

Our model is related to the market discipline literature, in which private sector agents – shareholders and debtholders – face costs that increase as banks take risk, and take action as a result of these costs.

Insured depositors are risk insensitive,2 and do not object to increased bank leverage. Insuring deposits to prevent bank runs has, thus, the unintended side effect of increasing financial risk among banks, and less capital increases bond debt risk. Further, expectations of a public sector rescue of a distressed bank, an implicit guarantee, make senior bondholders less risk sensitive and less con- cerned of the bank’s financial risk. As deposit insurance, implicit guar- antees work as an accelerator on risk by reducing optimal capital.

A bailout reduces the loss given default on bank bonds, but there is also a substantial increase in the risk of default from higher leverage. In the model’s numerical base case, these effects cancel each other out, leaving bond debt risk unchanged. More leverage increases firm value, and the implicit guarantee ends up as increased shareholder value. Consequently, too-big-to-fail is a sub- sidy of bank shareholders.

Depositor preference covers different legislative actions giving depositors a preferential claim on bank assets in a failure. Senior bondholders become more risk sensitive when they must take loss before depositors. The incentive to increase leverage, caused by deposit insurance and/or implicit guarantees, is weakened.

Due to the subordination of senior bonds, depositor preference is often seen as negative to bondholders and subsequently to bank financing.3 The argument is incomplete, omitting the market influ- ence on the bank’s financial decisions. Depositor preference leaves, ceteris paribus, less assets to bondholders in a bankruptcy; a nega- tive, first-order effect. But, depositor preference also lowers optimal leverage, reducing the risk to senior bonds; a positive, counteracting, second-order effect. In the numerical base case, bond risk is unchanged, given that banks position themselves optimally.

Adopting depositor preference motivates banks to take on more capital, aligning private and social interests. The reduction in firm value from lower leverage is ultimately carried by the sharehold- ers, and the shareholder loss is the gain of the deposit insurer.

Asset encumbrance effectively subordinates depositors, but the risk insensitive depositors do not object to being subordinated. Less risk sensitive creditors, due to the collateral, work as an accel- erator on risk and increases optimal leverage.

An example of asset encumbrance is banks issuing covered bonds secured by a defined part of their loan portfolio. The final outcome of switching from senior bonds to covered bonds is not

2 A risk insensitive bank creditor stands to lose little given a bank failure, whereas a risk sensitive bank creditor stands to lose a lot.

3 See e.g. Schich and Kim (2012) in the OECD Journal: Financial Market Trend: ‘‘Depositor preference could however have adverse effects on banks’ overall funding conditions. Non-deposit creditors might take actions to better protect themselves through collateralizing their claims and shortening the terms of maturity of them so as to be able to exit earlier. These creditors might also impose additional charges to compensate for the lower expected recovery in case of default.’’

necessarily less risky bonds. True, ceteris paribus, the loss given default decreases by subordinating depositors; a positive, first-order effect to bondholders. Increased leverage, however, rep- resents a negative, second-order effect to bondholders. In the numerical base case, converting all senior bonds to covered bonds actually leaves bond debt risk unchanged. The loss given default is low, whereas the risk of default is high.

Optimal firm value increases when covered bonds subordinate depositors, representing a large wealth transfer from the deposit insurer to shareholders. This subsidy is even larger under depositor preference, like in the US. Allowing US banks to use secured financ- ing, like covered bonds, extensively will thus have especially high social costs. High deposit volume combined with secured financ- ing, two factors commonly attributed to a stable banking system, give an extreme motivation to high leverage among banks. Further, banks with high asset volatility gain more from using secured financing than banks with low asset volatility.

The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 offers a review of relevant literature. Section 3 describes six styl- ized structural and regulatory banking regimes. In Section 4 we present the economic set-up and we value claims in Section 5. We study optimal bank capital in Section 6. In Section 7 the model variables are tested on a small sample of banks, and on empirical findings in earlier large-sample studies of bank capital determi- nants. Finally, policy implications are outlined in Section 8.

2. Literature

This paper contributes to the literature by providing a theoret- ical model based on market discipline to quantify how banks’ debt structure and debt regulations influence bank capital, when capital requirements are non-binding. Our model treats several institu- tional settings in a unified framework and explains many empirical findings.

Traditionally, financials have been excluded from studies of capital structure and capital determinants because they are deemed ‘‘different’’ than other companies.4 Flannery (1994), Myers and Rajan (1998), Diamond and Rajan (2000), and Allen et al. (2009) develop theories of optimal capital structure specifically to banks.

Recent empirical studies, however, suggest that there are con- siderable similarities between banks’ and non-financial firms’ cap- ital structures, see e.g., Berger et al. (2008) and Gropp and Heider (2010). Bank capital requirements are found to be non-binding, and there are large variations in banks’ capital structure. Banks actively manage their capital ratios and they appear to have stable capital structures at levels that are specific to each individual bank.

Unlike other firms, financial institutions are governed by a com- bination of government and private forces. Flannery (2012) pro- vides an interesting discussion of corporate finance and financial institutions. He argues that corporate finance theory applies equally well to financial firms, although modifications are required. Market discipline may work, especially for large banks with substantial financing in the bond market. Flannery and Nikolova (2004) state that market discipline in the debt market can be manifested as a change in the cost of uninsured debt. The higher the perceived risk of a bank, the higher the required prom- ised return to compensate for higher expected losses. However,

4 In a highly cited paper on capital structure, Rajan and Zingales (1995) say that ‘‘We eliminate financial firms such as banks and insurance companies from the sample because their leverage is strongly influenced by explicit (or implicit) investor insurance schemes such as deposit insurance. Furthermore, their debt-like liabilities are not strictly comparable to the debt issued by non-financial firms. Finally, regulations such as minimum capital requirements may directly affect capital structure.’’

S. Helberg, S. Lindset / Journal of Banking & Finance 44 (2014) 39–54 41

they underline that since any firm’s default probability is a func- tion of both asset risk and leverage, a bank can keep its default probability constant if it balances changes in risk with changes in capital. The causality in the relationship between risk and capital can go in either direction. Flannery and Nikolova (2004) also pro- vide a survey of the market discipline literature.

These findings motivate us to use a standard corporate finance model and incorporate the idiosyncrasies of banking. Leland (1994) examines debt values and capital structure in a unified analytical framework. Leland’s contingent claim valuation approach includes an endogenous default barrier, and shows how firms optimally choose capital structure in order to maximize firm value. The Leland framework has been used previously analyzing banks, e.g., Harding et al. (2008) study the impact and interaction of deposit insurance, capital requirements, and tax benefits on a bank’s choice of optimal capital structure, Koziol and Lawrenz (2009) study a bank subject to regulation, which tries to optimize its capital struc- ture by readjusting the deposit volume over time. Both papers assume only one debt class; fully insured deposits. More complex debt structures have been used valuing bank contingent capital, e.g., Chen et al. (2013) and Hilscher and Raviv (2012). We also refer to the IMF Global Financial Stability Report of October 2013 where the impact of regulatory reforms on the pricing of bank liabilities is analyzed numerically using a Merton-based model. These papers do, however, not study implications for bank capital.

3. Structural and regulatory banking regimes

We form six stylized regimes to study strategic and regulatory features of banking. The regimes differ in which debt instruments the bank uses and/or what bank regulations are in force. The fun- damental difference between the regimes is how remaining assets in a bank failure are distributed among claimants. Although, the regimes represent extreme examples, they illustrate how a partic- ular development in banking affects optimal capital.

3.1. Regime I – No Deposits

The bank has no deposits and borrowing is done entirely with senior bonds. Clearly, this debt structure is uncommon as long as the standard definition of a ‘‘bank’’ is a company that takes depos- its.5 However, it forms our point of departure. Without insured deposits, we are left with the original model with unprotected debt from Leland (1994).

3.2. Regime II – Pari Passu6

Traditionally, bank borrowing in most European countries is done with unsecured debt instruments that have equal priority in bankruptcy. Deposits, senior bonds, interbank borrowing, etc. are all unsecured and rank pari passu. The notable European excep- tions are German and Danish banks that have a long history of secured, long term borrowing. Deposits are secured by a deposit insurance scheme, ultimately backed by the government.

In the model, the banks take insured deposits and issue senior bonds. In a bank failure the assets net of bankruptcy costs are dis- tributed at a pro rata basis among the depositors and the senior bondholders. If the insured depositors fall short of recovering their deposits, the insurer covers any shortcomings. The bank may hold

5 The Glass-Steagall Act prohibited any company or person from taking deposits if it was in the business of ‘‘issuing, underwriting, selling, or distributing’’ securities. Consequently, investment banks were not allowed to hold any deposits.

6 The Mozley and Whiteley’s Law Dictionary defines pari passu as ‘‘On an equal footing or proportionately. A phrase used especially of the creditors of an insolvent estate who (with certain exceptions) are entitled to payment of their debts in shares proportioned to their respective claims.’’

deposits that are not insured, e.g., deposits that exceed the individ- ual maximum amount insured. In the model, such deposits are priced as senior bonds.

3.3. Regime III – Implicit Guarantee

The expectation that the sovereign will provide a bailout of bondholders works as an implicit guarantee for bank bond debt. This perceived guarantee also covers uninsured deposits. The guar- antee is implicit because the state has not made any commitment to provide such support, but it is perceived by investors that they will do so based on experience. No fee is charged. The possibility of state intervention is typically explained by the bank being too- big-to-fail. See Schich and Kim (2012) and Noss and Sowerbutts (2012) for discussions on the value of implicit guarantees to banks.

We stick with the bank from the previous regime that borrows using insured deposits and senior bonds. In case of bank default, there is a chance that there will be a state bailout and, if so, the senior bondholders will not incur a loss from the default. The investors’ assessment of the likelihood of a bailout, conditional on default, influences the valuation of senior bonds.

3.4. Regime IV – Depositor Preference

Depositor preference covers different legislative actions. Com- mon is that they change the priority of depositors’ claims on the assets of failed banks by making other senior claimants subordinate to depositors. In 1993 the US created a national depositor preference law. According to consultancy firm Clifford Chance, eleven of the G20 countries have an existing regime for preferring depositors (or the deposit protection scheme) in liquidation. The scope and operation of the preference differs considerably across jurisdictions.

Protection of depositors in liquidation has attracted increasing interest the last years. For example, the UK Independent Commis- sion on Banking proposes amendments to the creditor hierarchy making some deposits rank senior to other unsecured claims. Sim- ilarly, the Financial Stability Board is considering if depositor pref- erence should be adopted on a coordinated international basis.

To analyze depositor preference, we continue to study a bank that borrows using insured deposits and senior bonds. There are no implicit guarantees present. The assets net of bankruptcy costs in a bank failure are first distributed to the insured depositors. Any remaining assets are distributed to the senior bondholders. If the assets are not sufficient to cover the depositors in the first place, the insurer pays up to the depositors.

3.5. Regime V – Asset Encumbrance

A trend in European banking is rising balance sheet encum- brance, the pledging or earmarking of assets to one group of cred- itors at the expense of another. When using collateralized financial instruments, the bank specifies assets that creditors or counterpar- ties can possess if the bank defaults on its commitments. Short term secured borrowing, like repos, and long term secured borrow- ing, like covered bonds, make fewer assets left over for unsecured lenders. In addition, derivatives and insurance claims may involve similar pledging. A bank’s level of asset encumbrance changes over time, and is both a function of deliberate borrowing decisions as well as market price fluctuations resulting in collateral calls or margin calls.7 See e.g., Juks (2012) for more on the sources and growth of asset encumbrance.

7 The level of encumbrance is controlled by the bank, but is strongly influenced by regulatory actions, e.g., favored regulatory treatment of covered bonds under the Capital Requirements Directive and Solvency II, and under (proposed) depositor preference – and bail-in regimes.

42 S. Helberg, S. Lindset / Journal of Banking & Finance 44 (2014) 39–54

To analyze asset encumbrance, we construct a regime where the bank is debt financed entirely with insured deposits and cov- ered bonds. Covered bonds offer the investor a dual recourse, both to a defined part of the bank’s loan portfolio (the cover pool) as well as a claim on the bank. If the issuer defaults on its outstanding covered bonds, the bondholders may take possession, and if neces- sary, sell the loans in the cover pool to cover their claims before other, unsecured lenders (like depositors) are repaid. In practice, the cover pool is larger than the principal amount of covered bonds outstanding. This overcollateralization secures covered bondhold- ers when there is a fall in cover pool asset values.

If there is a depositor preference regulation in force, we assume that their preference will not include assets that are pledged to covered bondholders. Consequently, covered bondholders have a de facto, although not de jure, first priority on assets in a bank fail- ure and the depositors will only receive what is left. As in the pre- vious regimes, the deposit insurer covers any shortcomings to the depositors. There are no implicit guarantees present.

3.6. Regime VI – Bail-In

Bail-in is a statutory power of a resolution authority. The inten- tion is to restructure the liabilities of a distressed bank, by writing down its senior debt and/or converting it to equity. The aim is to have an alternative to government-funded rescues of banks, and reduce investors’ expectations of a state bailout. In 2010, Denmark passed a law describing the handling of failed banks including the enforcement of losses on senior creditors. Following the 2012– 2013 Cypriot financial crisis, uninsured debtholders were forced to take write-offs. The latter crisis was, however, not handled according to a pre-defined bail-in framework.

The European Parliament reached a political agreement in December 2013 on the bank recovery and resolution directive. The directive establishes a bail-in system opting to ensure that tax- payers will be last in line to pay the bills of a failing bank. In a bail- in, creditors, according to a pre-defined hierarchy, forfeit some or all of their holdings to keep the bank alive. The bail-in system will apply from 2016.

To ensure restructuring as a going concern, each bank needs to prepare a full recovery plan that sets out the measures it will take in different scenarios where it is at risk. The recovery plan helps the resolution authority to plan how the essential functions of the bank may be isolated and continued. The resolution authority prepares a resolution plan describing how to apply the resolution tools and how to make sure the bank continues to provide critical functions.

Bail-in differs from private, contractual contingent capital instruments with write-off, like CoCo’s. Public bail-in and private convertibles can, however, be seen as a complementary approach, with contingent capital as the first line of defense and bail-in kick- ing into deal with the banks that remain distressed after the con- version of contingent capital.8 We do not extend our model to include CoCo’s. For more on CoCo’s in a structural model of default risk, see e.g., Chen et al. (2013).

To study bail-in we construct a regime that mimics the corner- stones of the EU-wide rules; pre-defined bail-in debt and restruc- turing of banks as going concerns. The bank finances its activities with insured deposits and senior bonds. All outstanding senior bonds are bail-in’able. If the original equity is lost, the bank is restructured. The insured depositors carry their claim to the restructured bank, whereas the original senior bondholders are given the ownership of the bank. Thus, the senior bondholders

8 For more on this relationship, see ‘‘From Bail-out to Bail-in: Mandatory Debt Restructuring of Systemic Financial Institutions’’, IMF Staff Discussion Note, 24 April 2012.

have to both take a loss and convert their remaining claim to equity. By the resolution authority, the senior bondholders are given the right to choose the leverage of the restructured bank. This is done by swapping a part of their equity to restructured senior bonds. These restructured senior bonds are sold in the open market. We assume that the original senior bondholders will choose the leverage that maximizes firm value of the restructured bank. However, the optimal leverage may be impossible to obtain if there are not enough senior bonds outstanding to be bailed in. If so, the capital structure of the re-organized bank consists only of equity and insured deposits. The restructured senior bonds are not bail-in’able and they rank pari passu with insured deposits.

3.7. Summary of regimes

The six regimes are summarized in Table 1 by showing how the relevant debt instruments rank or are treated in a bank failure.

4. Economic model

4.1. Firm asset value and endogenous default

We consider the balance sheet of a bank. The bank is financed by equity and two different types of debt; insured deposits and bonds. It can choose between senior bonds and covered bonds. The deposits, senior bonds, and covered bonds have coupon rates Cdp;Csb, and Ccb, respectively. The benefit for the owners of the bank of using debt financing is that the coupon payments can be deducted from taxable profits, reducing the overall tax burden. The cost of equity financing is not typically tax deductible. The bank pays deposit-insurance premiums and these premiums are tax deductible. We assume that the bank has a tax rate h. Further- more, as long as the bank is solvent, earnings before interest and taxes (EBIT) are assumed to be larger than the deductible coupon payments and deposit-insurance premiums. This EBIT secures that the bank can benefit from the tax-shield from the coupon pay- ments and the deposit-insurance premiums.

The value of the bank’s assets (V) follows the diffusion process

dVt ¼ lVtdt þ rVtdBt ; ð1Þ

where l and r are constants and B is a standard Brownian motion. Initial asset value is V0 > 0.

As is common in the literature (see e.g., Leland (1994)), we assume that the debt is perpetual and coupons are paid continu- ously in time. The funds needed to pay for the stream of coupon payments come from new stock issues. In our model a bank default is the result of equityholders’ unwillingness to buy new shares from the bank, i.e., to default is a decision made by equityholders. Formally, equityholders declare default at a stopping time that maximizes the value of equity. Leland (1994) argues that the opti- mal stopping time is given by the first-passage time s ¼ infft P 0 : Vt 6 VBg, where VB > 0 is a constant. Thus, the default barrier VB is a decision variable for the equityholders and they maximize, for a given coupon level, the value of equity with respect to this variable.9 Their second decision variable is the capital structure. We assume that the amount of deposits is given. To obtain the optimal capital structure, equityholders maximize total firm value with respect to the coupon rate on the bonds the bank issues.

The value of a ‘‘debt contract’’ (F) in our economy is (see e.g., Leland (1994))

FðVÞ ¼ A0 þ A1V þ A2V�X ; ð2Þ

9 In a closely related setting, Duffie and Lando (2001) verify that such a default policy is indeed optimal. A similar verification in an economy with incomplete information can be found in Lindset et al. (2014).

Table 1 Summary of banking regimes.

S. Helberg, S. Lindset / Journal of Banking & Finance 44 (2014) 39–54 43

where X ¼ 2r=r2 and we have omitted the time variable t. Note that the value at time t should be interpreted as FðVtÞ. Here r is the con- stant risk-free interest rate and the constants Ai; i ¼ 0;1;2, are to be determined in the following subsection.

4.2. Two basic securities

Let p1ðVtÞ be the time t value of the first basic security. For nota- tional simplicity we write this value as p1 ¼ p1ðVÞ. The security is constructed so that it pays 1 if V ¼ VB and zero in all other states. The second basic security with value p2 ¼ p2ðVÞ is constructed so that it pays a continuous coupon rate C ¼ 1 as long as V > VB and becomes worthless the first time V ¼ VB. We will use these two basic securities to analyze the capital structure of a bank. For- mally, we can think of the value of these two securities as the expected discounted cashflow from the securities.

The value of the basic securities must satisfy Eq. (2). Consider the first basic security. As V !1;p1 ! 0, implying that both A0 and A1 equal 0. Because p1ðVBÞ ¼ 1;A2 ¼ VXB . We then have that

p1ðVÞ ¼ V VB

� ��X :

As V !1;p2 ! 1=r. This fact implies that A1 ¼ 0 and that A0 ¼ 1=r. We also have that p2ðVBÞ ¼ 0, implying that A2 ¼ � 1r V

X B .

Thus,

p2ðVÞ ¼ 1 r ð1� p1ðVÞÞ:

4.3. Model discussion

The Leland (1994) model is tractable and incorporates the inter- action between the bank’s financial decision and the valuation of claims. The basic assumption is a causal, economically motivated reason for bankruptcy: The value of the assets falls below a barrier value. Moody’s Analytics, Zhang (2011), finds that 18 of the 20 largest commercial banks that failed or needed government bailout the last 20 years, had asset problems. Thus, asset risk is the funda- mental reason why commercial banks fail. The two remaining fail- ures, Fortis and Northern Rock, were caused by liquidity problems.

The value of the bank’s assets follows the diffusion process given by Eq. (1). A bank’s loan portfolio has little upside and signif- icant downside. However, the upside potential of a bank’s assets is given mainly by investment banking, loan origination, cash man- agement, advisory services, and mutual funds. Large banks have increased their reliance on the latter category over the last dec- ades. This fact is reflected in changes to the banks’ income distribu- tion. For example, Stiroh (2004) finds that non-interest income grew from 25% to 43% of total revenue at US commercial banks between 1984 and 2001. Similarly, Brunnermeier et al. (2012) find that the ten largest US bank holding companies raised their

average ratio of non-interest to interest revenue from 18% in 1989 to 59% in 2007. We study primarily too-big-to-fail institu- tions, i.e., large banks with an income distribution as described above. Note that the value process is less representative of more loan oriented financial institutions, like mortgage banks or smaller, regional banks.

The bankruptcy value is endogenous, in contrast to exogenous triggers like debt covenants, bank runs, or regulatory interventions. The relevance of an endogenous or an exogenous trigger depends on the likely scenario when a bank approaches bankruptcy, either individually or as part of a systemic crisis. The anatomy of a bank crisis varies. We argue that the shareholders’ unwillingness to inject more equity is a common denominator. Bond investors, depositors, and regulators are all part of the crisis narrative, pro- voking financial distress. However, access to the equity market drastically reduces the motivation for their actions. During 2008 and 2009, governments did intervene, but their intervention was sparked by the shareholders’ unwillingness to buy new shares. Thus, the endogenous bankruptcy trigger is relevant for banks.

The distribution of average debt maturity among banks is nar- row. Regularly, the Basel Committee and the European Banking Authority publish results of the Basel III monitoring exercise. The Net Stable Funding Ratio (NSFR) seeks to calculate the proportion of long-term assets which are financed by long term, stable financ- ing, and may work as a proxy for debt maturity. The tight range of banks’ NSFR indicates that large banks’ debt maturity do not differ materially. We do not study the effects of debt maturity structure. We therefore, for simplicity, assume infinite maturity debt in line with Leland (1994).

We identify asset encumbrance and debt regulations as drivers of optimal bank capital and study the implications. By using Leland (1994) as our base model, we keep attention on a novel idea with- out adding extra complexity. This view is supported by the fact that our numerical predictions on bank capital are in line with observed levels.

5. Firm value and claims valuation

5.1. Components of firm value

The value of the bank’s assets is the starting point when calcu- lating the firm value. We now value the different components constituting the total firm value.

The value of the tax benefits (TB) follows from the value of the second basic security. With a total rate of coupon payments CT , the rate of tax benefit is hCT . This benefit is only received as long as the bank has not defaulted. Thus, it follows that the value of the tax benefit is proportional to the value of the second basic security (see e.g., Leland (1994))

TBðVÞ ¼ hCTp2ðVÞ:

Table 2 Parameter values in base case.

Risk-free rate r 0.03 Asset volatility r 0.08 Bankruptcy costs a 0.2 Tax rate h 0.28 Deposit insurance premium u 0.0015

44 S. Helberg, S. Lindset / Journal of Banking & Finance 44 (2014) 39–54

Deposits are backed with an insurance. Let DI be the amount the insurer has to pay to the depositors in order for them to recover their deposits. This possible payment will constitute the only negative cashflow for the insurer and is payable at time s, i.e., when V ¼ VB. For t 6 s;DIV , the time t value of the payment is pro- portional to the value of the first basic security,

DIVðVÞ ¼ DIp1ðVÞ:

The actual size of DI will in general depend on the parameters of the model and for this model in particular, the amount of deposits and on whether the bank has issued senior bonds or covered bonds.10

The bank pays a premium to the deposit insurer. The fee is cal- culated as a fraction u of insured deposits (D). This premium may or may not be fairly priced, meaning it can be lower or higher than the value of the deposit insurance. The cost of the deposit insur- ance for the bank (DIC) is proportional to the value of the second basic security,

DICðVÞ ¼ uDp2ðVÞ:

The deposit insurance premium is tax deductible. Thus, in regimes with insured deposits, the value of tax benefits is given by TBðVÞ ¼ hðCT þuDÞp2ðVÞ.

A disadvantage of debt financing is that bank failure is a real possibility, imposing bankruptcy costs on the claim holders. We let the bankruptcy cost be proportional to the value of the assets. A bank failure gives bankruptcy costs aVs ¼ aVB;0 6 a 6 1, at the time of bankruptcy, leaving ð1� aÞVB for distribution among the claimants. The value of the bankruptcy cost (BC) is proportional to the value of the first basic security and is given by

BCðVÞ ¼ aVBp1ðVÞ:

A bail-in is done as a going concern and imposes restructuring costs instead. We assume that the fraction of value lost to restructuring costs is half of the fraction lost in a bankruptcy.

The presence of an implicit guarantee has a value to the firm. We study implicit guarantee in a pari passu-framework. If a bailout takes place, senior bondholders receive, from the sovereign, the debt face value (the initial amount the bank borrows from senior bondholders) minus bondholders’ share of net remaining assets. Let p be the probability of a bailout given that V ¼ VB, and assume that the face value of senior bonds, as a fraction of the sum of senior bonds’ face value and insured deposits is a. The senior bonds are issued at time 0 and have face value DsbðV0Þ. The value of the implicit guarantee (IGV) is proportional to the value of the first basic security,

IGVðVÞ ¼ DsbðV0Þ � að1� aÞVBð Þp1ðVÞp:

In a bail-in, the net remaining assets in a bankruptcy are substi- tuted with the value of the restructured firm, v�. The approach will always be value enhancing. We assume that the restructuring costs are given by a2 VB. The value of the bail-in procedure is proportional to the value of the first basic security and is given by

BIVðVÞ ¼ v� � 1� a 2

� � VB

� � p1ðVÞ:

We omit agency costs from our model. The idea that debt is advantageous to equity due to the disciplinary effect from having to pay a continuous coupon, has limited empirical evidence for banks. Potential explanations are explicit and implicit guarantees for deposits and senior bonds, and it is unclear whether the argu- ment requires such high leverage as is common among banks.

In all six cases, the total value of the bank reflects four terms: the asset value, plus the tax benefit of debt, less the bankruptcy costs, and the value and cost of deposit insurance, i.e.,

10 Note that in our model we can determine DI at time t ¼ 0.

vðVÞ ¼ V þ TBðVÞ � BCðVÞ þ DIVðVÞ � DICðVÞ:

In Regime III – Implicit Guarantee we add IGVðVÞ. In Regime VI – Bail-In we add BIVðVÞ.

5.2. Valuation of claims

5.2.1. Deposits Because the deposit insurance covers any losses the depositors

face in a bank failure, they are not exposed to credit risk and there- fore earn the risk-free rate of return (r) on the deposits. As long as the bank has not defaulted, depositors receive the continuous rate of coupon payments Cdp ¼ rD, and the value is proportional to the value of the second basic security. At default, depositors recover their deposit D, with a value proportional to the value of the first basic security. Thus, the value of the deposits is

DdpðVÞ ¼ D

and is the same in all regimes with deposits.

5.2.2. Bond debt The bond consists of two parts. The first part is the continuous

rate of coupon payments paid as long as the bank has not defaulted. The value of this part of the debt is proportional to the value of the second basic security. The second part is the value of the payment in case of bank failure, and, thus, dependent on the regime we are studying. The value of the second part is propor- tional to the value of the first basic security. We refer to Appendix A.1 for details on the valuations.

5.2.3. The claim on the deposit insurer In a bank failure, the claim on the deposit insurer after the

remaining net assets have been distributed among claimants, is dependent on the regime. We refer to Appendix A.2 for details on this claim.

6. Numerical examples and analysis

6.1. Base case parameters: numerical values

We use a numerical base case to analyze the bank’s capital structure decision under the six regimes. The base case intends to represent the present conditions for a typical, large commercial bank in an advanced economy. Table 2 summarizes the parameter values. We perform sensitivity analysis around these values. We refer to Appendix B for a justification of the choice of parameter values.

6.2. Regimes and optimal capital structure

Table 3 summarizes optimal capital structure for banks in Regime I–VI with the base case parameters, showing total firm value in its components and key figures.

Regime I follows Leland (1994) when analyzing unprotected debt. By introducing insured deposits, we move to Regime II – Pari Passu. Fig. 1 shows firm value as a function of leverage for the two

Deposits D 35 Initital asset value V0 100

Table 3 Optimal positioning under different regimes.

Regime I Regime II Regime III Regime IV Regime V Regime VI No deposits Pari passu Implicit guarantee Depositor preference Asset encumbrance Bail-in

Asset value V 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 Tax benefit TB 30.1 30.3 30.1 30.1 29.4 29.7 Bankruptcy costs BC 1.0 1.5 2.0 1.0 3.0 1.4 Deposit insurance DIV 1.5 2.1 0.0 6.3 0.0 Insurance premium DIC 1.6 1.5 1.6 1.4 1.5 Implicit guarantee IGV 1.2 Bail-in BIV 3.5

Total firm value v 129.1 128.7 129.8 127.5 131.3 130.4

Deposits Ddeposits 35.0 35.0 35.0 35.0 35.0 Bond debt Dbonds 111.4 79.2 82.6 75.0 86.9 85.2

Equity E 17.7 14.6 12.2 17.4 9.4 10.2

Leverage (per cent) L 86.3 88.7 90.6 86.3 92.9 92.2 Credit spread (bp) R� r 10 15 15 15 15 17 Bankruptcy value VB 74.8 77.9 80.3 75.1 83.3 82.5

Fig. 1. Firm value of a bank with insured deposits.

Fig. 2. Firm value of a bank when there is a possibility of a state bailout.

S. Helberg, S. Lindset / Journal of Banking & Finance 44 (2014) 39–54 45

regimes. Leverage (L) is defined as total debt value in relation to firm value (D=v). When insured deposits are a part of the debt structure, the optimal leverage is pushed upwards from 86.3% to 88.7%. The risk-insensitive pricing of the deposit insurance gives an incentive to take on more financial risk. Neither the insured depositors nor the insurer demand to be compensated for higher financial risk. The presence of bankruptcy costs prevents the bank from taking on arbitrarily large amounts of debt. The 2.4 percent- age points increase in leverage corresponds to a 4.8 percentage points decrease in the optimal capital ratio if we assume risk- weighted assets (RWA) at 50% of total assets. See Appendix C for a discussion on the definition of capital in the model and in the Basel framework.

In many jurisdictions the deposit insurance premiums are inde- pendent of leverage. For low leverage the value of the deposit insurance approaches zero, resulting in a lower firm value under the pari passu regime. The value of the deposit insurance increases as the leverage increases and eventually exceeds the cost of the insurance to the bank. The total firm value at optimal leverage is not materially different in the respective regimes. The deposit insurance is thus close to fairly11 priced in the numerical base case, and does not represent a transfer of value from the government to the private bank.

If we assume that bondholders expect a public sector bailout conditional on default with a 25% probability, less risk sensitive bondholders allow optimal leverage to be increased from 88.7% in Regime II to 90.6% in Regime III. Fig. 2 shows firm value for dif- ferent leverage in Regime III compared to Regime II – Pari Passu.

More leverage increases the tax benefit of debt and the value of the deposit insurance. The bank is not charged for the implicit guarantee and the deposit insurance premium is not dependent on leverage. Further, bankruptcy costs are lower compared to Regime II because they are covered by the government in case of a bailout. The ‘‘probability’’ of a bailout actually occurring is

V VB

� ��X p:

A 25% probability of bailout increase optimal firm value from 128.7 to 129.8 in the numerical base case. The increase is 0.9%. However, as the asset value is given and not controlled by the bank, the increase is 3.9% measured against firm value in excess of asset value.

11 We define fair as the premium where the cost of the insurance equals the value of the insurance to the bank.

Fig. 3 shows firm value dependent on leverage for Regime II, IV, and V. Adopting depositor preference (moving from Regime II to IV), shifts optimal leverage downwards. If depositors are served first in case of bankruptcy, the burden on the insurer reduces dras- tically. In fact, in the numerical base case it is optimal for the bank to choose a bankruptcy value where depositors always are covered by the remaining assets in the bank. Thus, with base case parame- ter values, deposit insurance has no value. Consequently, the deposit insurance represents no motivation to take on more lever- age. Optimal leverage at 86.3% is identical to Regime I – No Depos- its. Thus, in the numerical base case, depositor preference cancels out the risk incentives brought about by the deposit insurance.

Fig. 3. Firm value under depositor preference and asset encumbrance. Fig. 4. Firm value under a bail-in resolution framework.

12 We investigate the effects of an ex ante higher asset volatility, not the effects of asset substitution, i.e., changing the asset volatility after having issued debt.

46 S. Helberg, S. Lindset / Journal of Banking & Finance 44 (2014) 39–54

Due to the deposit insurance no longer having any value to the bank, firm value is lower under depositor preference than under pari passu.

This effect of depositor preference on deposit insurance, and ultimately bank capital, is in line with observed banking practices. As an example, the Berenberg Equity Research paper ‘‘Capital: misunderstood, misused and misplaced’’, Anderson and Chappell (2013), comments that following the launch of FDIC, capital ratios for US banks fell. The subsequent introduction of depositor preference, however, pushed the capital ratios upwards. Berenberg adds that the identical pattern was observed in Swit- zerland. In contrast, there has not been a similar, subsequent increase in capital ratios in the UK, a country that has no depos- itor preference scheme.

Introducing covered bonds (moving from Regime II to Regime IV) has a material impact on optimal capital. Covered bonds effec- tively subordinate depositors, thereby increasing the value of the deposit insurance to the bank. By putting a higher burden on the insurer, it is optimal for the bank to raise the leverage substantially. In Regime V – Asset Encumbrance the optimal leverage is 92.9%, a 4.2 percentage point increase in leverage from Regime II Pari Passu.

We assume that depositors have a preferential claim on the cover pool assets even under depositor preference. If the asset encumbrance takes place under depositor preference, the increase in optimal leverage is even larger, at 6.6 percentage point.

Higher leverage increases bankruptcy costs. For the bank, this cost is more than compensated for by the increased value of deposit insurance. The optimal base case leverage is at a level where covered bondholders claim all net remaining assets. The deposit insurer must cover all deposits in a bank failure. Compared to the pari passu regime, the value of the deposit insurance to the bank is more than four times as high when assets are encumbered, representing a large transfer of value from the public sector to the shareholders. The increase in value from replacing senior bonds with covered bonds is 9.1% measured against firm value in excess of asset value.

As discussed in Section 3, the model’s bail-in system is designed so that losses are pushed to the bondholders without the entire bank having to be liquidated. Senior bondholders now receive the value of the restructured bank minus depositors’ claim. The immediate benefits to bondholders are twofold. First, the restruc- turing costs are lower than the bankruptcy costs. Second, the restructured bank has tax benefits of debt and deposit insurance value, as any going concern bank, in addition to the net asset value.

In the numerical base case, a higher pay-off to bondholders than in a pari passu regime makes it optimal to increase leverage, see Fig. 4. Optimal leverage is even higher than in the implicit guaran- tee regime.

Depositors are secured in the bail-in framework. Their claim will always be carried over to the restructured bank. Thus, the value of the deposit insurance to the bank is not from any payment at time s1, but instead indirectly from the deposit insurance’s influ- ence on firm value of the restructured bank.

6.3. Sensitivity of leverage to parameter values

Table 4 summarizes the effect on optimal leverage and the cor- responding firm value for alternative parameter values. We change one parameter at a time. We double the parameter values com- pared to the base case, except for the tax rate which is increased ten percentage points.

6.3.1. Asset volatility With the deposit insurer picking up parts of the costs from a

failure, or the possibility of an outright bailout, it is tempting for the bank to take on more risk. Our discussion so far has been on financial risk, but risk can also be in the form of operational risk. Our model predicts that higher asset volatility reduces optimal leverage. This prediction finds empirical support. For example, Gropp and Heider (2010) find a negative coefficient of risk on leverage for 200 large banks from 1991 to 2004, Flannery and Rangan (2008) find a strong, positive cross-sectional relation between capitalization and asset risk in the US during the 1990s, and Adrian and Shin (2010) find a negative relationship between leverage and value-at-risk at investment banks. Our contribution is that the impact of asset volatility on leverage are materially dependent on what regime the bank operates under.12

Higher asset volatility increases the probability of asset value falling to a given bankruptcy value and thereby increasing the bankruptcy costs. Ceteris paribus, optimal leverage decreases, thereby reducing the tax benefit from debt. The deleveraging effect is countered by the increased value of the deposit insurance, except under depositor preference, where the deposit insurance still has no value. Thus, depositor preference is the regime where leverage is reduced the most. If we change the asset volatility parameter from the base case value of 8%, to 16%, optimal leverage is reduced by 11.0 percentage points to 75.3%. We find that depositor prefer- ence has strongest influence on the capital of high-risk banks.

For covered bondholders, high asset volatility is not of similar concern. First loss is taken by shareholders and second loss is taken by insured depositors. This priority ranking results in only a minor reaction from creditors to high volatility. Optimal leverage is down 3.0 percentage points to 89.9%. Bankruptcy costs increase and tax benefits decrease, but the effect on total firm value is small due

Table 4 Optimal leverage and firm value under alternative parameter values.

Regime I Regime II Regime III No Deposits Pari Passu Implicit Guarantee

New value Leverage Firm value Leverage Firm value Leverage Firm value

Base case 86.3 129.1 88.7 128.7 90.6 129.8 Risk-free rate 0.06 90.8 132.5 91.9 132.3 93.0 132.8 Asset volatility 0.16 74.9 120.4 82.1 124.0 86.6 127.4 Bankruptcy costs 0.4 84.4 128.3 86.9 127.9 88.7 128.8 Tax rate 0.38 88.6 146.5 90.3 146.4 91.8 148.0 Dep. ins. premium 0.003 88.8 127.1 90.7 128.2 Deposits 70 91.8 129.2 93.4 130.2 Bailout prob. 0.50 93.0 131.4

Regime IV Regime V Regime VI Depositor Preference Asset Encumbrance Bail-In

Base case 86.3 127.5 92.9 131.3 92.2 130.4 Risk-free rate 0.06 90.8 131.6 94.3 133.6 93.4 133.4 Asset volatility 0.16 75.3 119.0 89.9 130.1 88.9 125.4 Bankruptcy costs 0.4 84.4 126.6 89.0 129.1 89.4 128.9 Tax rate 0.38 88.6 144.8 92.3 148.4 94.4 149.7 Dep. ins. premium 0.003 86.4 125.8 93.1 129.8 92.2 128.6 Deposits 70 86.8 126.5 100.0 150.0 92.9 129.1

S. Helberg, S. Lindset / Journal of Banking & Finance 44 (2014) 39–54 47

to a strong increase in the value of the deposit insurance. A 2.4 times increase in the value of the deposit insurance, compared to the base case, brings the value to 15.1 and the corresponding cost of the deposit insurance is 1.0. We find that banks with high asset volatility gain more from using secured financing than banks with low asset volatility.

6.3.2. Deposits Under asset encumbrance, covered bonds can either be risk-free

or risky. If the bankruptcy level is set sufficiently high, covered bondholders know with certainty that net remaining assets cover their claims in a failure, consequently, the bonds are risk-free. A lower bankruptcy level makes bonds risky.

Fig. 5 shows optimal firm value under asset encumbrance for different deposit volumes. The solid line represents the situation where covered bonds are risky. The dotted line shows optimal firm value under the condition that covered bonds are risk-free (VBð1� aÞ > DcbðV0Þ). For low levels of deposits it is optimal to have risky bonds. When the deposit volume exceeds a certain level, the optimal positioning is having risk-free bonds. Then, both of the bank’s creditors, the bondholders and the depositors, face no risk of losing money, and it is optimal for the bank to have the highest possible leverage. With no minimum capital requirements, optimal leverage is 100%. If so, the bankruptcy level is equal to the initial asset value. Firm value equals asset value, minus bankruptcy costs, plus the value of the deposit insurance. The latter is identical to the

Fig. 5. Optimal firm value under asset encumbrance for different deposit volumes.

deposit volume because there are no assets left to the depositors in a failure and the insurer has to cover the full amount.

We find that a high deposit volume combined with secured financing, two factors commonly attributed to a stable banking system, are an extreme motivation to high leverage among banks.

To conclude, the numerical example indicates that these effects are so large that we could expect to find evidence of them in the data.

7. Testing the model on bank data

7.1. Determinants of bank capital

The exogenous capital requirement is generally set independent of the variables used in our model.13 Thus, if the regulatory capital requirement is binding, real-world capital ratios will be independent of the model’s private optimal capital.

However, the empirical work of Berger et al. (2008) document that the largest US banks desire to hold capital far in excess of even the most stringent regulatory requirements. They study all publicly traded US bank holding companies in the period 1992–2006, i.e., around 300 banks per year on average. The evidence suggest that banks actively manage their capital ratios, set target levels sub- stantially above requirements, and make rapid adjustments towards their targets. These findings are supported by Gropp and Heider (2010) who suggest that capital regulation and buffers may only be of second-order importance in determining the capital structure of most banks. They study the 100 largest banks in the US and the 100 largest banks in 15 countries of the EU over the period 1991–2004. Regulatory intervention may be non-binding, and the observed capital levels do not appear to be explained by buffers that banks hold to insure against falling below the minimum level.

Table 5 summarizes our model variables and predicted correla- tion with bank capital. Real-world banks have debt structures that include both insured deposits, senior bonds, and covered bonds, as well as other debt instruments. Banks have partial asset encum- brance and some operate under depositor preference. No bank is

13 The minimum capital requirements are based on credit risk, operational risk, and market risk. Pillar 2 of the Basel II framework allows supervisory authorities to deal with all other risks. For instance, this may include the level of asset encumbrance. There is, however, no disclosure of how such pillar 2 assessments affect the required capital level in excess of the minimum level.

Table 5 Variable overview and predicted correlation with the capital ratio.

Data level Predicted correlation Data available

General variables Asset volatility r Bank + Yes Bankruptcy costs a Country + Yes Tax rate h Country � Yes Risk-free rate r Country � Yes Insured deposits D Bank � No Deposit insurance premium u Country + Yesa

Regime variables Implicit guarantees p Bank � No Depositor preference Country + Yesb

Asset encumbrance STsec=LTsec Bank � Yes Bail-in Country � Yesb

a Not included. b No variation in sample.

Table 6 Parameter values for the 13 banks in the sample.

Bank Country Tier1 a h r r STsec LTsec

Lloyds UK 5.2 6 26 2.49 3.4 9.8 8.6 RBS UK 5.1 6 26 2.49 3.2 19.8 2.6 Barclays UK 4.3 6 26 2.49 2.7 27.4 2.0 HSBC UK 5.2 6 26 2.49 1.5 18.4 0.1 BNP France 4.7 9 33 2.45 3.4 24.8 3.9 Agricole France 2.9 9 33 2.45 1.8 15.9 2.6 SocGen France 4.0 9 33 2.45 3.3 27.2 3.4 Nordea Sweden 4.2 9 26 2.34 1.6 10.3 15.6 DNB Norway 5.2 1 28 3.54 2.2 0.0 19.8 Danske Denmark 4.3 4 25 2.25 2.0 17.3 27.4 Cmzbank Germany 4.6 8 29.5 2.45 3.4 14.0 15.5 BBVA Spain 6.3 11 30 2.45 3.1 15.7 8.2 Intesa Italy 7.3 22 31.4 2.45 6.7 14.1 3.7

Average 4.9 8.2 28.8 2.52 3.0 16.5 8.7

Tier1: Adjusted core tier 1 capital at year-end 2011 as reported by Morgan Stanley. Measured as % of group funding. The methodology for adjusting the public figures is described in the report. a: Cost of bankruptcy proceedings as % of the value of the debtor’s estate, as

estimated by the World Bank’s Doing Business Project (http://www.doingbusi- ness.org). The figure includes court fees and government levies; fees of insolvency administrators, auctioneers, assessors, and lawyers; and all other fees and costs. h: From the KPMG corporate tax rate table. r: 10 year interest rate swap rate at year-end 2011. r: Based on daily observations of the banks’ stock price during 2011. Calculated

using the Merton model. STsec and LTsec: As reported by Morgan Stanley. Measured as % of group funding.

The methodology is described in the report.

Table 7 Correlation between bank capital and model variables.

Repo and short-sales gross

Repo and short-sales net

Asset volatility r 0.69 0.71 Cost of estate a 0.53 0.52 Tax rate h �0.07 �0.05 Swap rate r 0.14 0.03 Short-term secured STsec �0.25 �0.55 Long-term secured LTsec �0.09 �0.21

14 Swap-rates are linked to currencies, meaning the euro risk-free rate applies to all banks in the euro area. Government bond rates are an alternative that designate an interest rate to each country. However, government bond rates around 2011 were substantially influenced by sovereign default risk.

48 S. Helberg, S. Lindset / Journal of Banking & Finance 44 (2014) 39–54

fully described by any of the six regimes. General variables are com- mon for all six regimes, whereas regime variables are variables used in the individual regimes.

7.2. Empirical evidence

Public information on insured deposits and asset encumbrance is poor. For most banks, financial statements do not distinguish between deposits that are covered by an insurance and deposits not covered. Data at country level are available, but not at individ- ual bank level. Moreover, publicly available data on variables dis- closed by individual banks are not comparable due to different accounting standards and disclosure requirements across jurisdic- tions. For instance, the level of asset encumbrance is not reported by banks in a uniform manner.

Further, the value of the implicit guarantee for banks’ debt is dif- ficult to measure. Attempts have been made to use the differential between the stand-alone credit rating of a bank and the corre- sponding all-in credit rating, the latter including external support like assumed government and central bank support. Likewise, attempts have been made to develop market based measures from observed credit spreads. Size has also been used as a proxy of too- big-to-fail when studying large samples.

Depositor preference in some form is baked into legislation in a number of European countries, including Germany and the UK. However, these are indirect versions compared to the US system where the FDIC takes over the claims of insured depositors and cover these before any other claimants. No country has introduced a full-fledged bail-in framework.

The Morgan Stanley Research paper, ‘‘European Banks: Deposi- tor Preference Is the Real Threat – Not Encumbrance’’ (Street et al., 2012), looks at the make-up of banks’ liability structure. The sam- ple consists of the main UK and French banks, three Scandinavians and a representative bank in Germany, Spain, and Italy. The Mor- gan Stanley report delivers high quality data where variables have similar content across banks. Short-term secured debt includes repo market financing (including the ECB LTROs). This definition may overestimate the volume of secured financing, as in reality an amount of netting of repos could take place. It is unclear to what extent netting takes place for each individual bank, and in a dis- tressed scenario, it is unclear what chance a bank has to unwind its repos and to what extent any netting could take place ahead of a decision to bail-in.

Table 6 summarizes variable values for the scenario with gross repos. Indeed, it is difficult to undertake a formal econometric analysis of our model predictions on this small sample. In Table 7 we present correlation coefficients to indicate the relevance of the model variables. We perform two calculations based on gross repo

figures without netting of reverse repos, and net repo figures. All coefficients have the predicted sign, except interest rates in both scenarios.14 The statistics indicate that our model is relevant to explain bank capital.

Table 8 Relationship between bank characteristics and bank capital in earlier studies.

Berger et al. (2008) Gropp and Heider (2010) Table 5 Table VII (Panel B)

Asset size � � Market-to-book ratio � + Retail deposits + Earnings volatility No evidence Acquisition plans No evidence Collateral � Asset volatility + Profits + Dividends +

S. Helberg, S. Lindset / Journal of Banking & Finance 44 (2014) 39–54 49

Table 8 summarizes the empirical evidence of Berger et al. (2008) and Gropp and Heider (2010) based on large samples of banks. The signs show the statistical significant relationships between variables and capital.15

Two variables are tested in both studies. Asset size is negatively related to capital. As mentioned, size can be seen as a measure of implicit guarantees, because large banks are considered too-big- to-fail. If so, this finding supports our model’s negative relationship between implicit guarantees and bank capital. The empirical find- ings on the market-to-book ratio are ambiguous. Our model has no attention on book values, and the market-to-book ratio is, thus, not part of our model.

Gropp and Heider find that more collateral decreases capital. Collateral is defined as liquid securities that can be used as collat- eral when borrowing from central banks. This definition is related to secured financing in our model, and thus support the model’s negative relationship between asset encumbrance and capital. Asset volatility is found to be positively related to capital, also in line with our model predictions.

Profits and dividends are not part of our model. The described empirical findings are in line with the pecking order theories of debt, showing that our model could be extended to factor in capital adjustment costs. We return to the empirical findings on retail deposits below.

7.3. Puzzles

Gropp and Heider find that unobserved time-invariant fixed effects are important in explaining capital structure. The stability of capital structures over time implies that the factors driving the cross-sectional variation in capital ratios are stable over long horizons as well. Our model suggest that observed differences in capital structure might stem from banks’ debt structure and debt regulations, both factors known to be quite stable over time. Fur- ther empirical investigation requires more extensive individual bank data and is outside the scope of this article.

Berger et al. find a negative and significant relationship between retail deposits and leverage. According to the authors, this finding support the hypothesis that more retail deposits increase the banks’ charter value, inducing the bank to hold more equity as protection. Gropp and Heider do not find a significant effect of deposit insurance on the capital structure. Both findings are in opposition to our model’s prediction that, ceteris paribus, more deposits increase leverage as banks seek to maximize the subsidy from deposit insurance. One possible explanation to the empirical findings can be our model’s prediction that depositor preference cancel out the effect on bank capital from deposit insurance. The banks in the Berger et al. study and half of the Gropp and

15 The two studies evaluate a very similar question, but the analyses differ in several aspects. Gropp and Heider investigate determinants of market-valued capital ratios, while Berger et al. study regulatory capital ratios.

Heider-sample are US banks operating under depositor preference. The empirical findings can also be a victim of the data issues regarding insured deposits at individual bank level described above.

7.4. Credit spreads

Credit spreads in the numerical base case are low compared to current bond market levels for large commercial banks. Two com- ments can be made to this observation.

First, the model assumption of infinite maturity debt compli- cates comparisons to current yield spreads on finite maturity bonds. Leland and Toft (1996) extend the Leland (1994) model by introducing finite maturity debt. They find that with high lever- age, the term structure of credit spreads decreases from a peak for very short maturities, but with a ‘‘humped’’ shape because short dated debt becomes close to risk-free. It is therefore not surprising that our model predicts lower credit spreads than the spread on bonds with 3–5 years to maturity.

Second, credit risk is only one of the factors behind observed spreads between risky and risk-free bonds. The model spread may be interpreted as the part of the observed spread attributable to credit risk. Other factors may include illiquidity, call and conver- sion features, and asymmetric tax treatment. See e.g., Huang and Huang (2012) for more.

7.5. Bond debt risk

Debt regulations change the expected pay-off to bondholders in a bankruptcy, thereby influencing bond debt risk (the first-order effect). Further, debt regulations alter optimal capital. More or less capital represents a second-order effect on bond debt risk. The first and second-order effects work in opposite directions. To study the combined effect, we split bond debt risk in two; loss given default and risk of default.

Loss given default is dependent on the bankruptcy value, bank- ruptcy costs, and the order of priority when distributing the remaining assets. Fig. 6 shows the loss given default to bondhold- ers for optimally positioned banks under the six regimes.

Compared to the pari passu regime, loss given default decreases due to government bailout (Regime III), collateral (Regime V), and the value of bail-in (Regime VI). In these three regimes, the bank- ruptcy value is higher than in the pari passu regime. A higher bank- ruptcy value means banks’ assets fall less in value before bankruptcy is declared, further reducing loss given default.

Depositor preference, on the other hand, materially increases bondholders’ loss given default. Bondholders rank after depositors in a failure, reducing the prospects of having their claims covered.

Fig. 6. Loss given default on bond debt.

Fig. 7. Risk of default on bond debt.

50 S. Helberg, S. Lindset / Journal of Banking & Finance 44 (2014) 39–54

In addition, a lower bankruptcy value means banks’ assets fall more in value before bankruptcy is declared.

The first basic security has the interpretation of the present value of 1 dollar contingent on future bankruptcy, i.e. V falling to

VB. Thus, p1ðVÞ ¼ VVB � ��X

, can be seen as a measure of the default

risk. Fig. 7 shows the numerical value of this measure for optimally positioned banks under the six regimes.

The risk of default is dependent on leverage. With implicit guar- antees, asset encumbrance, and bail-in, it is optimal with more leverage compared to the pari passu regime. Consequently, the risk of default increases under these three regimes. Depositor prefer- ence reduces the risk of default compared to the pari passu-regime. In contrast, letting banks position themselves optimally in an asset encumbrance regime increases the risk of default 2.7 times com- pared to the depositor preference regime.

Credit spreads are a function of the risk of default and the loss given default. The credit spread represents the compensation required by the bond investor to take on the risk of investing in the bond, a measure of bond debt risk. From Table 3 we find that credit spreads do not differ much between the regimes. Bond debt risk is stable between the regimes. We find that loss given default and risk of default work in opposite directions.

The result is contrary to the view that debt regulations have material impact on bond risk. Such a view is based on first-order effects from changes in the expected pay-off to bondholders. Our numerical examples show that there is an important counteract- ing, second-order effect to bond risk from changes in optimal leverage caused by the respective debt regulations.

We have shown that too-big-to-fail is a subsidy of bank share- holders, not of bondholders, and that the cost of depositor prefer- ence is carried by shareholders, not by bondholders. We have also

Fig. 8. Bank capital before and

shown that asset encumbrance represents a transfer of value from the public sector to shareholders, not to bondholders.

8. Policy implications

It is broadly recognized that the social optimal capital for banks is higher than the private optimal capital. The reason for this is twofold. First, as predicted by our model, deposit insurance and implicit guarantees drive private optimal capital downwards. Sec- ond, and not discussed in this article, high bank leverage imposes negative externalities from an increase in systemic risk in the financial markets, see e.g., Acharya et al. (2010a).

These factors justify regulation. In literature we often find that a materially higher capital requirement is the straightforward solu- tion, see e.g., Admati et al. (2011) and Miles et al. (2012). The Basel III framework demands substantially more bank capital. Then why should we continue to care about private optimal capital?

When we impose high capital requirements on banks, there is a gap between what the bank is exogenously required to do and what the bank endogenously would choose to do. The difference in firm value between these two cases represents a cost to share- holders. Our numerical exercise shows that this cost may be mate- rial, and motivates regulatory arbitrage. Thus, private optimal capital is still relevant and important.

We stress that this situation, as illustrated in Fig. 8, is not an argument to remove capital requirements. On the contrary, it is a motivation to improve capital regulations by making them harder to manipulate. Effective capital regulation and enforcement are essential to achieve a robust financial system. However, enhancing capital requirements, and at the same time introducing debt instruments or regulations that reduce the private optimal capital, is to gain some and lose some in terms of financial stability.

We find the increase in asset encumbrance significant in this aspect. As shown by our model, asset encumbrance increases financial instability from lower optimal capital, and transfers value from the deposit insurer to the shareholders. Under depositor pref- erence, as in the US, asset encumbrance is especially costly to the public sector. Large deposit volumes and unlimited use of secured financing strongly motivate bank leverage. In brief, this calls for regulation in the form of:

� Deposit insurance premiums related to either capital ratios or asset encumbrance. � Limits on asset encumbrance. � Depositor preference.

A flat rate makes the deposit insurance premium insensitive to risk. As is evident from our analysis, asset volatility is not the only relevant factor when determining fair premiums. Debt structure

after the financial crisis.

Fig. 9. Depositor preference motivates banks to have more capital.

S. Helberg, S. Lindset / Journal of Banking & Finance 44 (2014) 39–54 51

and regulations are important too. Regarding limits on asset encumbrance, we refer to Juks (2012) for a discussion on hard ver- sus soft limits.

Depositor preference makes senior bonds more responsive to financial risk, and more bank capital becomes privately optimal. The traditional view on depositor preference is making senior bondholders a more equal partner in the burden sharing, but as we have shown, the ultimate effect is lower shareholder value.

The left panel of Fig. 9 illustrates the introduction of a binding capital requirement given by the vertical line. The bank increases its capital to comply with the requirement. As a result, firm value falls and creates an incentive to regulatory arbitrage. The right panel of Fig. 9 shows a similar increase in the capital requirement, but this time accompanied by the introduction of depositor prefer- ence. The latter leads to an immediate reduction in firm value, and a subsequent increase in private optimal capital. The bank is moti- vated to increase capital, and the incentive to regulatory arbitrage is eliminated.

The driver for change in the optimal capital structure is investors’ reaction to changes in debt structure or regulations. When investors change their valuation of bank bonds, the shareholders are better off by adjusting the bank’s capital structure. For this mechanism to work, investors need insight into the type, amount, and ranking of debt instruments in case of bankruptcy and their ranking relative to other creditors. Today, this prerequisite is not satisfied. Due to lack of transparency, bond debt is not able to fulfil its role as a signal- ing device. Disclosure would also provide insight into determinants of bank capital and better understanding of bank behavior. Such insight facilitates more efficient and targeted regulations.

Bondholders have required increased compensation for holding senior bank bonds. This development is not a threat to bank financ- ing models, but rather evidence of market discipline at work. The transition to steady state may prove challenging, but it is vital to align private and social interests.

Acknowledgement

The authors would like to thank participants at faculty seminars at NTNU, Central Bank of Norway, Barcelona GSE Summer School 2013 including Robert DeYoung, and the national research school in business economics and administration NFB Conference 2013 including Siri Valseth for useful comments and discussions.

Appendix A. Valuation of claims

A.1. Bond debt

A.1.1. Senior bonds in Regime I – No Deposits The senior bond consists of two parts. The first part is the con-

tinuous rate of coupon payments Csb, paid as long as the bank has

not defaulted. The value of this part of the debt is proportional to the value of the second basic security. The second part is the value of the payment in case of bank failure. As bond debt is the only form of debt in this regime, the bondholders receive ð1� aÞVB the first time V ¼ VB. The value of this part is proportional to the value of the first basic security. The value of the senior bonds in Regime I is given by

DIsbðVÞ ¼ Csbp2ðVÞ þ ð1� aÞVBp1ðVÞ:

A.1.2. Senior bonds in Regime II – Pari Passu The face value of senior bonds, as a fraction of the sum of senior

bonds’ face value and insured deposits is a. Thus, in case of bank failure, a fraction a of the bank’s assets goes to cover the senior bondholders’ claims, while a fraction ð1� aÞ of the assets is distrib- uted to the depositors.

The value of continuous rate of coupon payments is propor- tional to the value of the second basic security, while the value of the payment in case of bank failure, að1� aÞVB, is proportional to the value of the first basic security. The value of the senior bonds in Regime II is given by

DIIsbðVÞ ¼ Csbp2ðVÞ þ að1� aÞVBp1ðVÞ:

Inserting for a and by letting V ¼ V0, we get an implicit expression for the initial value of the senior bonds:

DIIsbðVÞ ¼ Csbp2ðVÞ þ DIIsbðVÞ

DIIsbðVÞ þ D ð1� aÞVBp1ðVÞ:

Solving for DIIsbðVÞ, the initial value of the senior debt is

DIIsbðVÞ ¼ �H þ

ffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffi H2 þ 4J

q 2

;

where H ¼ D� Csbp2ðVÞ � ð1� aÞVBp1ðVÞ and J ¼ DCsbp2ðVÞ.

A.1.3. Senior bonds in Regime III – Implicit Guarantee At default there are two possible outcomes. In a bailout, bond-

holders receive the face value of senior bonds. If no bailout, bond- holders receive a fraction a of the bank’s assets net of bankruptcy costs. The face value of senior bonds in relation to the sum of senior bonds and insured deposits, is still given by a. Let the bondholders’ perceived probability of a state bailout at default be given by p. The value of the senior bonds in Regime III is

DIIIsbðVÞ ¼ Csbp2ðVÞ þ ð1� pÞað1� aÞVBp1ðVÞ þ pD III sbðV0Þp1ðVÞ:

With p ¼ 1 senior bonds are considered risk-free by investors. Inserting for p2ðVÞ ¼ 1r ð1� p1ðVÞÞ in the expression above for DIIIsbðVÞ, we get D

III sbðVÞ ¼

Csb r . With p ¼ 0 we are left with the identical

valuation of senior bonds as in Regime II.

Table A.9 Claim on the deposit insurer.

Regime I – No deposits 0 Regime II – Pari passu D� ð1� aÞð1� aÞVB Regime III – Implicit guarantee D� ð1� aÞð1� aÞVB Regime IV – Depositor preference maxðD� ð1� aÞVB;0Þ Regime V – Asset encumbrance D�maxðð1� aÞVB � DcbðV0Þ;0Þ Regime VI – Bail-in 0 (at time s1Þ

52 S. Helberg, S. Lindset / Journal of Banking & Finance 44 (2014) 39–54

A.1.4. Senior bonds in Regime IV – Depositor Preference In case of bank failure, senior bondholders receive what is left

after the depositors have received their claims on the bank. The payment to debtholders, given default, is K ¼maxðð1� aÞ VB � D;0Þ. The value of K is proportional to the value of the first basic security, while the value of the stream of coupon payments (the rate Csb paid until the time of default) is proportional to the value of the second basic security. The value of the senior debt is

DIVsbðVÞ ¼ Csbp2ðVÞ þ Kp1ðVÞ:

A.1.5. Covered bonds in Regime V – Asset Encumbrance Covered bondholders’ claims are covered before anything is dis-

tributed to depositors. If the asset value at bankruptcy is less than the principal amount of the covered bonds, the depositors are cov- ered by the insurer in full. The payment the bondholders receive at the default date is M ¼minðDcbðV0Þ; ð1� aÞVBÞ, where Dcbð�Þ is the value of the covered bonds. Whether DcbðV0Þ ? ð1� aÞVB, can be determined at time 0. The initial value of the covered bonds is therefore

DcbðVÞ ¼ Ccbp2ðVÞ 1� p1ðVÞ

or

DcbðVÞ ¼ Ccbp2ðVÞ þ ð1� aÞVBp1ðVÞ:

At any time t < s, the value of the covered bonds is

DcbðVÞ ¼ Ccbp2ðVÞ þMp1ðVÞ:

A.1.6. Senior bonds in Regime VI – Bail-In Fig. A.10 illustrates the bail-in-model. If V ¼ VB, the original equity is lost and the bank is restructured

at time s1. Senior bondholders receive the value of the restructured bank, v�, minus the depositors’ claim.

The value of the continuous coupon Csb is proportional to the value of the second basic security. The value of the payment in case of asset value falling below VB is proportional to the value of the first basic security. The value of senior bonds in Regime VI is

DVIsbðVÞ ¼ Csbp2ðVÞ þ ðv� � DÞp1ðVÞ:

Given the asset value at time s1 (Vs1 ¼ VB), we find the optimal cou- pon and bankruptcy level, C�sb and V

� B, for the restructured bank. This

calculation can be done at time 0, and it allows us to find v�, conditional on VB. Thus, for a given Csb, we find the value of VB that

Fig. A.10. The bail-in model.

maximizes firm value at time 0 and simultaneously the value of the bail-in’able senior bonds Dsb. If the optimal equity of the restruc- tured bank, E�, is higher than the face value of the original senior bonds, E� 6 Dsb, the capital structure of the restructured bank will consist of insured deposits and equity.

If the asset value later falls to V�B, shown at time s2 in Fig. A.10, the bank is bankrupt.

A.2. The claim on the deposit insurer

Table A.9 summarizes the claim on the deposit insurer, DI, after the remaining net assets have been distributed among the claimants.

In Regime VI – Bail-In the deposits insurance has no value to the bank at time s1. Bail-in will always take place at bankruptcy and depositors will have their claims covered. The deposit insurer will, however, have to pay if asset value falls to V�B and the restructured bank goes bankrupt. In that case the depositors will be short an amount DI ¼ D� ð1� bÞð1� aÞV�B, where b is the face value of the restructured senior bonds as a fraction of the sum of restruc- tured senior bonds face value and insured deposits. The value of

that payment is given by DI VV�B

� ��X and is included when calculating

firm value of the restructured bank.

Appendix B. Discussion of base case parameters

B.1. Risk-free rate (r)

We assume deterministic risk-free interest rates. In the absence of arbitrage, this assumption implies a flat term structure of inter- est rates. In line with the current US and German 30 year govern- ment bond rate, we set the risk-free interest rate at 3%.

B.2. Asset volatility (r)

Crosbie and Bohn (2003) use contingent claims analysis to cal- culate implied asset volatilities for several industries and asset sizes. They find that the banking industry has lower asset volatility than other industries. Bank asset volatility at end 2003 are 5–6% for small banks and somewhat lower for larger banks. In literature, Koziol and Lawrenz (2009) use 5% asset volatility, whereas Chen et al. (2013) use a total volatility of 20.6% combining diffusion (8%) and jumps. In our base case, we set the asset volatility param- eter to 8%.

B.3. Bankruptcy costs (a)

Default can lead to restructuring in or outside of bankruptcy proceedings, or to liquidation. While default need not lead to bank- ruptcy, we refer to the costs of restructuring or liquidation as ‘‘bankruptcy costs’’. In the model, this cost is defined as a fraction a of the asset value at default ðVBÞ. We use bankruptcy costs of 20% in the base case.

James (1991) examines the losses realized in 412 US bank failures during 1985 to 1988. Direct costs of resolution,

S. Helberg, S. Lindset / Journal of Banking & Finance 44 (2014) 39–54 53

i.e., administration and legal expenses associated with the fail- ures, are on average 10% of the assets of the failed bank. He also measures the loss as the difference between the book value of a bank’s assets at the time of its closure and the value of the assets in the receivership of the deposit insurer or the value of the assets to an acquirer. By this measure, the losses are on average 30% of the failed banks’ assets. This figure includes expenses incurred in the liquidation and sale of assets, losses associated with forced liquidation, including lost charter value, i.e., the value of the right to continue to operate, and past unrealized losses, i.e., losses on assets that occur prior to the bank’s failure, but that are not reported on the banks’ balance sheet at the time of the fail- ure. The latter is found to contribute significantly to the losses, but is not bankruptcy costs as defined in the model. Past realized losses, as defined by James (1991), arise because bank assets are not booked at market value, due to either accounting principles or uncertainty surrounding market prices. The model, however, assumes that market prices are observable at all times.

B.4. Tax rate (h)

We use a tax rate of 28%, which is the average corporate tax rate in a relevant sample of countries16 according to the KPMG corporate tax rates table.17

B.5. Deposit insurance premium (u)

We use a flat, annual rate of 0.15% of insured deposits in the base case. Demirgüç-Kunt et al. (2005) present cross-country deposit insurance premium information. For the majority of the relevant countries, the premium is a fraction of insured deposits. The base case rate is close to the observed average.

According to Demirgüç-Kunt et al. (2005), some countries have ‘‘risk-adjusted premiums’’. For example, in the US, the FDIC sets premiums based on bank characteristics, but it is unclear how this has affected banks’ capital decisions.18

B.6. Deposits (D)

Depending on national regulations, not all deposits are covered by a deposit insurance. Unfortunately, disclosure is poor regarding volume of insured deposits. The World Bank’s 2011–2012 Bank Regulation and Supervision Survey (BRSS),19 however, includes fig- ures both on deposit coverage in per cent of assets and on deposit insurance coverage. The product of these being the ratio of insured deposits to assets. The average ratio for banks in the relevant sample of countries is 35%. Insured deposits finance a smaller proportion of bank assets in Europe than in North America and Asia. We use an ini- tial deposit volume D ¼ 35, compared to an initial asset value V0 ¼ 100.

16 The sample of countries includes US, Canada, Western European countries, Japan, Australia, New Zealand, and South Africa.

17 http://www.kpmg.com/global/en/services/tax/tax-tools-and-resources/pages/ corporate-tax-rates-table.aspx.

18 See e.g., Acharya et al. (2010b): ‘‘This short discussion confirms our earlier assertion that deposit insurance premiums have either been risk-insensitive or relied only on individual bank failure risk and never on systemic risk. Furthermore, even when premiums have been risk-sensitive, the focus has been on maintaining reserves at an ‘‘appropriate’’ level. For example, when the deposit insurance fund’s reserves become sufficiently high relative to the size of insured deposits, the FDIC in effect returns premiums to banks. This type of approach to premiums is divorced from incentive properties’’.

19 This is the fourth iteration of the survey and provides information on bank regulation and supervision for 143 jurisdictions and includes close to 300 questions. The survey is presented and examined in Ĉihák et al. (2012).

Appendix C. Model capital versus Basel capital

There is a distinction between the definitions of assets, equity/ capital, and leverage used in our model and those used in the reg- ulatory capital framework. While the model is based on total assets, the current Basel Committee’s regulatory solvency mea- sures are all defined in terms of risk-weighted assets (RWA). Differ- ent classes of assets have different risk weights assigned to them. The risk weights are either set by the regulator (the standardized approach) or based on internal ratings, after supervisory validation (the IRB approach). On average, risk weighted asset values are materially lower than total asset values. At end 2010, RWA in relation to total assets for European, Asian, and North American banks were 36%, 51%, and 58%, respectively. Consequently, reported capital ratios are on average twice as high as equity in relation to total assets.

The regulatory framework distinguishes between Tier 1 capital and Tier 2 capital, with several types of financial instruments being eligible for the different categories.20 While shareholders’ invest- ments have been diluted or even wiped out during bank failures over the past years, there are examples of subordinated bondholders being exempt. Still, subordinated debt is part of Tier 2 capital.21

The model has one class of equity, which can be seen as truly loss- absorbing capital and is best compared to Tier 1 capital.

Growing concerns on the reliability both on the numerator and the denominator in the regulatory capital ratios has led Basel III to propose a complementary measure, a non-risk weighted leverage ratio.22 The specific definition and enforcement of the leverage ratio under Basel III is pending, but so far it has been proposed at 3%. The capital ratio in the model is best compared to this leverage ratio.

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Berger, A.N., DeYoung, R., Flannery, M.J., Lee, D., Özde, O., 2008. How do large banking organizations manage their capital ratios? Journal of Financial Services Research 34 (2–3), 123–149.

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Crosbie, P., Bohn, J., 2003. Modeling Default Risk. Moody’s KMV, December 18, 2003. Demirgüç-Kunt, A., Karacaovali, B., Laeven, L., 2005. Deposit Insurance around the

World: A Comprehensive Database. World Bank, Washington, DC, April 2005. Diamond, D.W., Rajan, R.G., 2000. A theory of bank capital. Journal of Finance 55 (6),

2431–2465.

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21 Schich and Kim (2012) provide a summary of losses for different types of financial instruments in selected cases of bank distress.

22 More correctly, a non-risk weighed capital ratio or an inverse leverage ratio.

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  • How do asset encumbrance and debt regulations affect bank capital and bond risk?
    • 1 Introduction
    • 2 Literature
    • 3 Structural and regulatory banking regimes
      • 3.1 Regime I – No Deposits
      • 3.2 Regime II – Pari Passu6
      • 3.3 Regime III – Implicit Guarantee
      • 3.4 Regime IV – Depositor Preference
      • 3.5 Regime V – Asset Encumbrance
      • 3.6 Regime VI – Bail-In
      • 3.7 Summary of regimes
    • 4 Economic model
      • 4.1 Firm asset value and endogenous default
      • 4.2 Two basic securities
      • 4.3 Model discussion
    • 5 Firm value and claims valuation
      • 5.1 Components of firm value
      • 5.2 Valuation of claims
        • 5.2.1 Deposits
        • 5.2.2 Bond debt
        • 5.2.3 The claim on the deposit insurer
    • 6 Numerical examples and analysis
      • 6.1 Base case parameters: numerical values
      • 6.2 Regimes and optimal capital structure
      • 6.3 Sensitivity of leverage to parameter values
        • 6.3.1 Asset volatility
        • 6.3.2 Deposits
    • 7 Testing the model on bank data
      • 7.1 Determinants of bank capital
      • 7.2 Empirical evidence
      • 7.3 Puzzles
      • 7.4 Credit spreads
      • 7.5 Bond debt risk
    • 8 Policy implications
    • Acknowledgement
    • Appendix A Valuation of claims
      • A.1 Bond debt
        • A.1.1 Senior bonds in Regime I – No Deposits
        • A.1.2 Senior bonds in Regime II – Pari Passu
        • A.1.3 Senior bonds in Regime III – Implicit Guarantee
        • A.1.4 Senior bonds in Regime IV – Depositor Preference
        • A.1.5 Covered bonds in Regime V – Asset Encumbrance
        • A.1.6 Senior bonds in Regime VI – Bail-In
      • A.2 The claim on the deposit insurer
    • Appendix B Discussion of base case parameters
      • B.1 Risk-free rate (r)
      • B.2 Asset volatility ( ? )
      • B.3 Bankruptcy costs ( ? )
      • B.4 Tax rate ( ? )
      • B.5 Deposit insurance premium ( ? )
      • B.6 Deposits (D)
    • Appendix C Model capital versus Basel capital
    • References

Subscribing-to-transparency_2014_Journal-of-Banking---Finance.pdf

Journal of Banking & Finance 44 (2014) 189–206

Contents lists available at ScienceDirect

Journal of Banking & Finance

journal homepage: www.elsevier .com/locate / jbf

Subscribing to transparency

http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jbankfin.2014.04.009 0378-4266/� 2014 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

⇑ Corresponding authors. Tel.: +45 38152969 (U. Nielsson), +33 561635739 (Y. He).

E-mail addresses: [email protected] (Y. He), [email protected] (U. Nielsson). 1 For example, the European Union finance ministers have agreed on an overhaul of

the financial system (endorsed by the European Parliament) and the European Commission has introduced rules that will force more disclosure on financial markets (The Economist, 2010; Wall Street Journal, 2010). In the U.S. the Dodd-Frank act was passed in July 2010, which aims to promote financial stability by e.g. increasing transparency of the financial system.

Yinghua He a,⇑, Ulf Nielsson b,⇑, Hong Guo c, Jiong Yang c a Toulouse School of Economics, France b Copenhagen Business School, Department of Finance, Denmark c Strategic Research Department, SSE InfoNet Co. Ltd., Shanghai Stock Exchange, China

a r t i c l e i n f o

Article history: Received 12 July 2012 Accepted 9 April 2014 Available online 19 April 2014

JEL classification: G14 G28

Keywords: Transparency Liquidity Market microstructure Market design

a b s t r a c t

The paper empirically explores how more trade transparency affects market liquidity. The analysis takes advantage of a unique setting in which the Shanghai Stock Exchange offered more trade transparency to market participants subscribing to a new software package. First, the results show that the additional data disclosure increased trading activity, but also increased transactions costs through wider bid–ask spreads. Thus, in contrast to popular policy belief, the paper finds that more transparency need not improve market liquidity. Second, the paper finds a particularly strong immediate liquidity impact accompanied by altered trading behavior, which suggests a significant impact on institutional traders subscribing relatively early. Lastly, since the effective level of market transparency is bound to depend on how many traders are subscribing to the data, the study can empirically establish the functional form between market-wide transparency and liquidity. The relationship is non-monotonic, which can explain the lack of consensus in the existing literature where each empirical study is naturally confined to specific parts of the transparency domain.

� 2014 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

1. Introduction

Transparency discussions have exacerbated following the financial crisis, making world leaders repeatedly call out for more transparency in financial markets.1 However, it has not yet been established that increased transparency necessarily improves mar- ket outcomes. This paper examines the extent to which increased pre- and post-trade transparency improves liquidity.

In August 2006 the Shanghai Stock Exchange introduced a pol- icy change that increased the pre- and post-trade information available to market participants. The additional market informa- tion was provided to any market participant who subscribed to a new computer software package named Level II. The paper inves- tigates the effects of this change on trading activity (measured by turnover) and trading costs (measured by bid–ask spreads).

First, the paper quantifies a significant liquidity impact of the one-time increase in pre- and post-trade disclosure. The results show that the additional data disclosure increased trading activity, but also increased transaction costs through wider bid–ask spreads. The detrimental effect directly contrasts the widespread policy view that ‘more is better’ when it comes to trade transpar- ency. Instead, the results conform to a more multivariate approach to transparency design, which ultimately depends on the level of transparency already in place in the individual setting.

Second, it is of specific interest to examine what impact the transparency change has had on major institutional traders, who not only have the most at stake but are presumably also the most responsive to any alterations in market conditions and day-to-day trading operations. As major traders are relatively more invested and active in the marketplace, it is reasonable to presume that institutional traders are among the first group of subscribers. Con- sistently, an empirical evaluation reveals that the bulk of the liquidity impact is immediate and accompanied by altered trading behavior, which conforms to major traders being relatively more affected and responding more strongly to the transparency change compared to other market players.

Third, the paper studies the overall liquidity dynamics as the software subscription level rises over the sample period. As the effective level of market transparency is bound to depend on

190 Y. He et al. / Journal of Banking & Finance 44 (2014) 189–206

how many traders can actually access the data, the number of trad- ers having access to the transparency enhancing information (a measure provided to us directly from the Shanghai Stock Exchange) acts as a time-varying proxy for the implicit level of market-wide transparency. Exploiting this time dimension creates a unique possibility to estimate the functional form between trade transparency and liquidity, which has not been possible in existing studies naturally constrained to only discrete one-time shifts in transparency. The results show that although the overall liquidity impact is clear-cut (higher turnover and wider spreads), the dynamics of such a change are non-monotonic. This means that the liquidity impact of additional software subscribers can change depending on how many market participants already have access. In other words, the same transparency change can have different – and even opposite – liquidity outcomes depending on effective transparency level already in place.

This has several implications. First, it reinforces the result that increased transparency may not be uniformly welfare improving across all settings, in sharp contrast to prevailing perceptions. Sec- ond, as markets in general differ in their level and access to market information, this implies that any wide reaching policy recommen- dations on trade transparency cannot be assumed to uniformly affect different markets. To take an example, a transparency policy implemented across all EU countries can have markedly different liquidity outcomes across member states – both in terms of sign and size. Finally, the result that liquidity outcomes vary across pre-existing transparency levels can help explain the contrasting results in the existing literature. Namely, as each empirical study is bound to evaluate the effect of a transparency change relative to pre-existing market conditions, the empirical results of the liter- ature may differ because the effective transparency level already in place differs across each market being studied – i.e. each study is naturally confined to specific parts of the non-monotonic transpar- ency domain.

Lastly, through a series of attractive features in both the data set and the empirical setting, this study improves upon the extent and accuracy to which these relationships can be examined. First, the study takes advantage of a ‘near-randomized’ treatment vs. control group allocation. Specifically, the transparency effect on Shanghai listed firms is evaluated in relation to a control group of Shenzhen listed firms, which were not subject to the policy change. The ran- domization comes from the fact that before September 2000 the Chinese authorities unilaterally allocated firms to list at either the Shanghai or Shenzhen stock exchange. This implies that firms cannot self-select onto the exchanges. Thus, after controlling for firm location, the absence of a systematic mechanism to prescribe firms to either exchange creates an ideal setting, which allows for a robust comparison of firm outcomes across exchanges. Second, the Shanghai policy change was directly targeted to increase pre- and post-trade transparency and as such it was not accompanied by any other market change. The study therefore naturally circumvents challenges faced by several existing studies, where numerous (potentially counteracting) policy changes occur simultaneously.2 As detailed further in the next section, this offers a ‘cleaner’ estimate of the increased transparency effect on liquidity.

The paper proceeds by providing some background information on the existing literature (Section 2.1), the exact transparency changes under study (Section 2.2) and the Chinese stock market structure (Section 2.3). Section 3 first introduces the data and sam- ple choice (Section 3.1), followed by a presentation of the empirical results showing the overall liquidity results (Section 3.2), the

2 As an example, Eom et al. (2007) study transparency increases on the Korean stock exchange that are accompanied by an event which reduces disclosure, which may contaminate any transparency estimates, as is openly acknowledged by the authors.

immediate impact associated with early subscribers (Section 3.3) and the liquidity dynamics as the subscription level gradually rises (Section 3.4). The paper finally establishes the robustness of the results (Section 3.5) and Section 4 concludes.

2. Background information

2.1. Literature review

The academic literature generally agrees that changed pre- or post-transparency will alter market outcomes by changing the behavior of market participants (e.g., Boehmer et al., 2005; Porter and Weaver, 1998; Bloomfield et al., 2011). However, there is less agreement on the direction of the effect, i.e. whether increased transparency improves or deteriorates market quality. For exam- ple, both positive and negative effects have been demonstrated theoretically in several transparency studies (see e.g. Madhavan, 1995, 1996; Naik et al., 1999; Baruch, 2005).

On the empirical side, a handful of studies document a positive link between increased transparency and market outcomes. Swan and Westerholm (2006) empirically study 33 major stock exchanges and analyze which transparency features and market designs are associated with desirable market outcomes, such as high liquidity. They conclude that market designs that favor greater (pre- or post-trade) transparency typically outperform more opaque market structures. This is in line with a series of recent papers concluding that increased trade transparency will increase liquidity (Boehmer et al., 2005; Zhao and Chung, 2007), improve price discovery (Hendershott and Jones, 2005), lower vol- atility (Chung and Chuwonganant, 2007) and ameliorate various other market outcomes (Eom et al., 2007).

But despite widespread belief – in particular among policy mak- ers3 – that increasing transparency leads to a fairer and informa- tively more efficient market, there are empirical studies that contrast this (see e.g. Madhavan et al., 2005). This is particularly true in the debate on broker anonymity, where the case against increased pre-trade transparency is prevalent (Foucault et al., 2007; Simaan et al., 2003; Comerton-Forde et al., 2005; Foucault and Degranges, 2005; Rindi, 2008). The benefits of increased post-trade transparency have similarly been questioned in several studies that do not find that changes in the data publication regime – such as changed tim- ing of reporting – leads to liquidity improvements (Gemmill, 1996; Saporta et al., 1999; Board and Sutcliffe, 1995).

In short, there is no clear consensus in the existing literature on the exact liquidity impact of increased pre- and post-trade trans- parency. However, it is possible that the lack of consensus results from strictly examining discrete events, which can produce differ- ent outcomes due to inevitably different transparency levels within each empirical setting. As previously described, this study addresses this issue by introducing a time-varying proxy for the effective level of transparency (number of data users), which allows for an evaluation of how liquidity improves or deteriorates for a range of different transparency levels.

2.2. Transparency changes

The Level II data package introduces five pre- and post-trade transparency changes on the Shanghai Stock Exchange. These are detailed in Table 1, where the most significant pre-transparency change is listed first (volume individually detailed) and the most notable post-transparency change is listed last (every transaction documented). More specifically, the primary Level II change in

3 For example, both the United States Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC, 1994) and the Office of Fair Trading in the UK (Carsberg, 1994) have repeatedly through time called for increases in transparency as a way to improve market quality.

Table 1 Transparency changes.

Pre-trade transparency increases 1. Volume of individual requests/offers is detailed, which helps infer trader characteristics 2. Best 10 bid–ask quotes openly reported, rather than merely the top 5 3. Bid/ask withdrawals shown for the 10 companies with most withdrawals (no withdrawals previously reported)

Post-trade transparency increases 4. Screen reporting transactions updated every 3 s instead of every 6 s 5. Every transaction in the past 3 s reported, not only total trading in the last 6 s

The table summarizes the pre- and post-trade transparency changes that took place with the introduction of the Level II data package on the Shanghai Stock Exchange. The Level II data and the accompanying software were introduced in August 2006 and could be obtained by any trader at a cost of approximately $200 p.a.

Y. He et al. / Journal of Banking & Finance 44 (2014) 189–206 191

pre-trade transparency is to break down the total volume available at the top bid and ask quotes. This means that rather than only dis- playing total volume (the depth of the order book at the best quote), now the total number and the average size of requests/offers at the best bid/ask are reported. Moreover, the individual volume of the first 50 requests/offers to arrive at the best bid/ask (which coincides with the execution order) are detailed with Level II. This level of vol- ume requested/offered by individual traders can be argued to reveal some of their characteristics; in particular, it helps to infer whether they are small (retail) or big (institutional) market participants. Thus, this implies a lower degree of anonymity.4 Second, the Level II software increases the number of bid and ask quotes reported to market participants. Instead of only the best 5 bid/ask quotes for- merly being available, the best 10 bid/ask quotes become visible to subscribers of the Level II data software. Thus the depth of reporting increases. Third, bid/ask withdrawals are now reported for the 10 stocks that experience the highest number of such withdrawals. Before Level II, no such cancellation data was reported.

The Level II data also introduces two post-trade transparency changes. First, trading information is now updated more fre- quently, i.e. trading data is now updated every 3 s instead of every 6 s. This lowers the time arrival uncertainty faced by traders on submitted orders. Specifically, when placing a market order at the prevailing price, this change reduces the time until the realized transaction price is revealed. In modern automated markets such changes may have considerable effects on market outcomes.5 Last but not least, with the Level II software every transaction that occurred in the last 3 s is now noted and reported (volume, price and parties involved), instead of only the last transaction price and total trading in the last 6 s. This last change, together with the indi- vidual pre-trade volume reporting described above (i.e. the combi- nation of changes listed first and last in Table 1), constitutes a considerable altercation, since this makes it in principle possible to integrate out information on both order placement and trading behavior of individual traders. Extracting such information could help to identify order placement and trading strategies of different market players, for example whether anyone may be building up positions in specific stocks.6 Whether the potential for extracting

4 This is explicitly argued by the suppliers of the software in their commercial leaflets for Level II, i.e. that one may use this detailed information on volume to infer if a trader is an institutional/big investor or an individual/small investor. In particular, small traders are typically thought of as relatively uninformed investors, whereas big (institutional) traders are classified as informed. Thus, although the Level II software does not explicitly provide traders’ identities, it nevertheless reduces the degree of anonymity. See for example the website of the largest Level II software retailer: <http://product.gw.com.cn/level2.html> (in Chinese). Partial information is also available on Level II in English: http://www.sse.com.cn/sseportal/en/c05/c03/c01/ c01/p1074/c1505030101_p1074.shtml. For the 2nd–10th best bid–ask quotes only the total volume is reported (which was also true at the best bid/ask quote before the introduction of Level II).

5 For example, in a recent study, Hendershott and Moulton (2011) show that reducing execution time by 10 s increases adverse selection and thereby results in wider bid–ask spreads, which is consistent with the results presented in Section 3.2.

6 We thank Joel Hasbrouck for sharpening our notion of these implications. Additionally, it can be argued that the Level II data allows for identifying the most profitable traders, but any such learning would inevitably take considerable time (say, at least 1–2 years).

such information has had a realized impact on market liquidity is the empirical question hand (Section 3.2). Also, the overall result of the introduction of Level II – that order and trading behavior is generally more difficult to conceal – is likely of most relevance for major traders. Thus, we also specifically study how these changes are likely to alter the behavior of major traders and the correspond- ing effect it has on market liquidity (Section 3.3).

Overall, the Level II data package therefore introduces pre- and post-trade transparency changes that considerably expand the information space. Additionally, two other aspects of the setting are worth mentioning. First, the analysis greatly benefits from the fact that all transparency changes go in the same direction, i.e. they are designed to increase transparency and are therefore very unlikely to counteract each other in any way. The Level II data package also does not replace any reported information in the existing transparency regime, but simply provides additional infor- mation beyond what was previously available. Thus, the introduc- tion of Level II provides a ‘clean’ event setting naturally circumventing the challenges faced by existing literature where counteracting events have been difficult to disentangle (see e.g. Eom et al., 2007). Second, as described above, the introduction of Level II includes both pre- and post-transparency changes. Although this has a clear advantage – since it implies that the study analyzes broad and overall transparency changes – it also comes with the shortcoming that it is not possible to separate the Level II effect into pre- vs. post-transparency implications.

Lastly, the data dissemination of the Level II data occurs through private software suppliers. More specifically, private soft- ware companies buy the Level II trading data from the Shanghai Stock Exchange, repackage it and supply it to investors through their own software program.7 Only those who buy such software can get access to the Level II data details. The Shanghai Stock Exchange charges each private software supplier a royalty for every additional user of their software – and thus the Shanghai Stock Exchange compiles the number of subscribers of all Level II software packages available (this number is provided to us directly for the purpose of this study). All in all this supply side of the Level II data package resembles a market of perfect competition. The fundamen- tal product is the same across all suppliers (same data) and in prin- ciple it can only differ in terms of packaging (in practice, however, the software interface across different suppliers looks very similar). These suppliers actively compete with each other to attract custom- ers, which makes it possible to gain access to the Level II data at a moderate price. The software price is about $200 per annum and thus it is affordable to both institutional and individual investors.

2.3. Stock market structure

There are two major trading venues in China, namely the Shang- hai and Shenzhen exchanges. The Shanghai Stock Exchange is China‘s largest exchange and at the end of the 2004–09 sample

7 This supply side fragmentation partially explains the gradual allocation of the software, since not all investors may be able to buy the software simultaneously. Similarly, on the demand side, there might be incomplete information with regards to the availability of Level II and its usefulness.

192 Y. He et al. / Journal of Banking & Finance 44 (2014) 189–206

period it listed 870 firms with a market capitalization of $2.7 trillion, compared to 830 firms listed in Shenzhen with a market capitalization of $0.9 trillion. Both exchanges play an important role in China’s modern and advanced financial system, e.g. the financial services in Shanghai provide 200,000 people with jobs (2.2% of city total) and contributes 8% towards the country’s GDP (The Economist, 2007).8 The Shanghai and Shenzhen stock exchanges are fully government operated with streamlined market and trading characteristics. This alignment applies to e.g. trading hours, market design and regulations. Table 2 illustrates this by outlining the key features of the market microstructure in both exchanges (Panel A). Moreover, Table 2 also shows that investors on the two venues face very similar trading costs (Panel B), which are broken down across the various fee categories. First, stamp duty imposed by the tax authorities has been at equal levels in both exchanges at any given time throughout the sample period (i.e. changes have occurred simul- taneously across venues). Second, this equality also applies to broker commissions during the sample period, which are capped at the same fixed level of transaction value on both stock exchanges. Lastly, the commissions include other levies (supervision, transfer and transac- tion fees) collected by brokers on behalf of the financial authorities and the stock exchanges. These levies are either equal across exchanges (the supervision fee) or remained unchanged throughout the sample period (e.g. transfer fee and transaction fee). Thus, to summarize, trading costs are nearly fully harmonized across the two exchanges – and the few documented simultaneous changes (cf. stamp duty) and minor differences in levels (cf. transfer and transac- tion fees) are fully captured and controlled for (differenced out) in the empirical methodology (difference-in-difference estimation), which is described in detail in the next section.

10 It should be noted that the exact distribution of Level II subscribers is

3. Empirical analysis

3.1. Data and sample specification

The Level II data service became available in August 2006 and covered all stocks listed on the Shanghai Stock Exchange. As no transparency change occurred for Shenzhen listed stocks at this time, those stocks constitute a natural control group. Thus, in order to measure the effect of Level II we obtain weekly data for all firms listed on both the Shanghai Stock Exchange and Shenzhen Stock Exchange between January 2004 and August 2009.9 The study focuses on securities listed on the A-market, which is open to trade by domestic and qualified foreign investors, making it both relatively liquid and representative of other global stock markets. Hence, the dataset includes all firms ever listed in both exchanges during the sample period, which amounts to 844 firms in Shanghai and 750 firms in Shenzhen with readily available data. The key variables for these firms are summarized in Table 3.

unfortunately a confidential variable with important business implications for the Shanghai Stock Exchange. Due to the competitive importance that this variable has to the exchange, its full details cannot be openly disclosed. However, the authors can assert that this variable offers rich variability, with the number of subscribers going from zero to well beyond 300,000 at the end of the sample period. Further statistics on this variable can be confidentially provided to referees of an academic journal.

11 These figures are based on information from the China Securities Registration (2009), where the number of active investors corresponds to the number of open trade accounts with at least one trade taking place during the year and having positive stock holdings of at least $20,000 at year end (note that this cutoff implies

3.1.1. Subscriber data As noted in the introduction, the setting of the paper offers the

possibility of not only measuring average effects of a transparency reform, but also to lay out the dynamics of such a change. To clarify this further, the paper studies two margins of transparency: (a) the extensive margin, i.e. new type of information being released (cor- responding to the introduction of Level II) and (b) the intensive

8 Statistics on employment and GDP contribution is on par with the financial sector in Tokyo, the leading financial hub in Asia in terms traded equity value (with Hong Kong and Shanghai as runners up). The ratio of financial employees to city population is also comparable to the greater metropolitan area of New York, Newark and Bridgeport (Nielsson and Wojcik, 2012).

9 The Level II subscriber data is available to the authors up until August 2009. A weekly data frequency is chosen rather than daily, or intra-day, as any transparency effects may otherwise be confounded by short-term noise and volatility.

margin, i.e. given a specific type of information, how many inves- tors are actually using it (corresponding to the number of Level II subscribers). Specifically, not only do we observe a discrete, one- time increase in the amount of released information but also a con- tinuous change in the number of subscribers of that information.10

Although the subscriber data is a novel way to capture the intensive margin of transparency, it should be acknowledged that it is inevitably not a perfect measure of market-wide transparency, but rather serves as a reasonable proxy. Specifically, the stake size of each individual subscriber cannot be accounted for, which implicitly results in equal weighting of each investor. Although this is admittedly simplistic and likely to add some noise to our mea- sure of transparency, it may not be unreasonable for Chinese data, which predominantly consists of investors with comparable wealth levels (China Securities Registration, 2009) and has an active presence of domestic, individual investors (The Economist, 2009). But more importantly, this issue merely effects the interpre- tation of the results, not their merit. More precisely, although one additional subscriber cannot be interpreted as an economically meaningful increase in market-wide transparency, an addition of 100,000 subscribers is more likely to constitute a real and repre- sentative change. Thus, the subsequent analysis will avoid inter- pretation of marginal effects and instead focus on larger and more intuitive ‘step increases’ in the number of subscribers. Also, an argument can be made that more influential traders (e.g. insti- tutional traders) are among the first group of subscribers, which may lead to relatively large liquidity reactions in the first months following the Level II introduction. Thus, with this caveat in mind, the subsequent empirical analysis separately studies the immedi- ate impact of the transparency increase (Section 3.3).

Lastly, it is worth noting is that the number of software subscribers represents a significant fraction of the investor base – and thereby a meaningful part of the transparency domain. Specif- ically, using aggregated annual data on stock market participation, we estimate that approximately 30% of active investors are sub- scribing to the software at the end of our sample, who moreover (assuming that larger investors subscribe first) can be estimated to hold approximately 64% of the stock market value.11 Also, since it is impossible to continuously measure the fraction of investors subscribing (as the number of active investors is only reported annu- ally), it is reassuring that the absolute weekly number of software subscribers will constitute a meaningful, large and economically sig- nificant area on the transparency domain.12

3.1.2. Outcome variables The liquidity effects of more pre- and post-trade transparency

are examined by quantifying changes in both turnover and

that the $200 annual fee represents at most 1% of wealth, which seems a reasonable upper bound on the number of potential subscribers to the software). Also, these estimates are likely to be quite conservative since further restrictions on the number of active investors can easily be justified, such as on the frequency of trading (e.g. strictly more than one trade per year) or by taking into account that one investor may control several trade accounts (or make trading decision for several other investors).

12 Furthermore, the total number of investors has remained quite stable in the sample period (China Securities Registration, 2009), which further justifies using the absolute number of subscribers as our measure (as calculating the fraction roughly corresponds to dividing by a constant).

Table 2 Market and trading characteristics.

Panel A: Trading structure Trading hours 9:30–11:30 & 13:00–15:00*

Trading mechanism Electronic, consolidated open limit order book (COLOB)**

Continuous auction Market opening: Call auction***

Market closing: No call auction

Priority rules Continuous trading: Price-time Call auction trading: Price-time

Tick size A shares: RMB 1c B shares: USD 0.001 or HKD 0.01

Price variation controls Stock prices may fluctuate within a range of ±10% of the previous closing price and in opening call auction orders can only be submitted within this range

Panel B: Trading costs

Fee Description Level and changes Online source

Stamp duty Imposed by tax authorities Stamp duty has ranged from 0.1% to 0.3% of transaction value in the sample period, but the level has been the same across venues at any given point in time. More specifically, stamp duty changed three times (in Jan. 2005, May 2007 and April 2008), where the change was always simultaneous and of equal size across the two stock exchanges

gov.cn csrc.gov.cn

Commissions Imposed and collected by broker

Maximum level of 0.3% of transaction value on both exchanges since May 2002. This level includes levies listed below and is collected via commissions

people.com.cn csrc.gov.cn

Other levies (coll. via commissions) – Supervision fee Imposed by China Securities

Regulatory Commission 0.004% of transaction value for both exchanges during 2003–2012 gov.gn

mofcom.gov.cn csrc.gov.cn

– Transfer fee Imposed by China Securities Depository and Clearing Corp.

Shanghai: Unchanged level of 0.1% in 1998–2012. Shenzhen: Collected as part of the transaction fee (0.00255%) and unchanged up until 2012.

chinaclear.cn sse.com.cn

– Transaction fee Imposed by stock exchanges Shanghai: Unchanged level of 0.011% in sample period. Shenzhen: Unchanged level of 0.01475% in sample period (0.0122% net of the transfer fee)

crsc.gov.cn szse.cn china.org.cn

The table summarizes the key market and trading characteristics of Shanghai and Shenzhen stock exchanges. A few additions should be noted to Panel A. Panel B shows the trading costs associated with trading in Shanghai and Shenzhen stock exchanges. All trading costs are a percentage of transaction value. Through the commissions the brokers collect all listed levies (supervision fee, transfer fee and transaction fee). The transfer fee is imposed by the depository and clearinghouse, which is 50/50 owned by the two exchanges. Source: Chan et al. (2007, 2008), Comerton-Forde and Rydge (2006), The Handbook of World Stock, Derivative and Commodity Exchanges (2004–2010), China Securities and Futures Statistical Yearbook (2002–2012), websites of the two stock exchanges, Ministry of Commerce and other Chinese government websites listed in Panel B. The direct website links to relevant subpages are readily available upon request (due to their length the short version is reported). * There is after hours trading. Block trades are permitted at 15:00–15:30, where trades are negotiated between brokers off market at prices which must be between the day’s high and low prices. Price, volume and trader identification are released to the market after the close of this trading session. ** Neither of the exchanges have designated market makers and they offer only limit orders for the continuous auction, which thereby are the only source of liquidity (no market-, stop market-, stop limit-, fill or kill-, IOC nor incomplete orders). The order validity period is at maximum 1 day. The same applies to the call auction (i.e. no market orders, market-on-open orders nor market-on-close orders). *** The call auction design is such that there is 10 min pre-open period reserved for the call auction. There is neither order non-cancellation period nor any volatility/ imbalance extension.

Y. He et al. / Journal of Banking & Finance 44 (2014) 189–206 193

spreads. These two outcome variables of interest capture different liquidity dimensions, namely the impact on (i) the amount of trad- ing activity and (ii) the cost of trading. Both variables are calcu- lated in a standard way, where turnover is defined as the ratio of the number of shares traded in a specific stock to the total number of shares outstanding in that stock. Likewise, quoted bid and ask prices are used to calculate spreads as the difference in ask and bid, divided by the midquote.13

3.1.3. Control group and identification In order for Shenzhen firms to be a reliable control group it

needs to be assumed that Shenzhen listed firms are inherently no different than Shanghai listed firms.14 This ensures that potential differences in liquidity do not merely reflect different characteristics

13 Another common and straightforward measure of trading activity is value of volume, which was also examined throughout the entire analysis. The results were in all cases the same as for turnover. Thus, since turnover and value of volume both capture trading activity and the all results hold for either measure, only turnover (which is not currency denominated) is included for brevity. Also, although many other (liquidity) measures may be of interest, we limit the analysis to these two major measures (trading activity and costs), in an effort to limit the multidimensionality – and thereby enhance the tractability – of the analysis.

14 This assumption only needs to hold true for (unobservable) time-variant characteristics, since time-constant characteristics are controlled for in the fixed effects regression methodology that is introduced in Section 3.2.

of the listed stocks. To safeguard against such issues we define a working sample that is subject to two restrictions.

First, in September 2000 the Chinese government announced a policy change where henceforth all new technology firms would be listed on the Shenzhen Stock Exchange. The aim was to create a NASDAQ-style exchange to complement the Shanghai (NYSE-style) exchange. However, before September 2000 no such policy existed and no systematic mechanism was in place that determined the listing location of firms. Thus, in order to ensure that stocks across the two exchanges are as compatible as possible, we restrict our sample to include only firms listed in China before September 2000. Thereby we alleviate the potential concern that (time vari- ant) firm characteristics may be contaminating the estimation results. This further improves on numerous existing studies that use NYSE and NASDAQ firms as treatment and control groups, despite possible inherent differences in (time-variant) firm characteristics.15

Second, before September 2000, firms that were located in either the city of Shanghai or Shenzhen may naturally be more likely to be listed at their local exchange (this is verified by

15 See e.g. Chung and Chuwonganant (2007), who attempt to address this issue by creating comparable stock samples across the two exchanges based on e.g. share price, trading volume, return volatility, etc.

Table 3 Summary statistics.

Original sample Working sample (pre-2000 and non-local)

All firms Shanghai Shenzhen All firms Shanghai Shenzhen

No. of firms 1594 844 750 767 370 397 Returns (%) 0.08 0.09 0.08 0.09 0.09 0.09

(1.99) (1.97) (2.02) (2.02) (2.01) (2.02) Volatility (%) 3.56 3.51 3.63 3.57 3.56 3.59

(1.73) (1.74) (1.72) (1.79) (1.78) (1.80) Spread (%) 0.24 0.25 0.23 0.26 0.26 0.25

(0.15) (0.15) (0.16) (0.16) (0.16) (0.16) Turnover (%) 1.40 1.38 1.44 1.43 1.42 1.43

(1.46) (1.46) (1.45) (1.51) (1.52) (1.50) Assets 256 305 180 201 214 188 (¥ millions) (543) (665) (240) (316) (377) (242) Employees 3263 3807 2415 2778 2865 2694

(17,279) (21,953) (3431) (4219) (4895) (3441)

This table reports total number of firms and means of firm variables (with standard deviations in parentheses) over the January 2004–August 2009 period. The table shows summary statistics separately for the original (total) sample and the subsample which is restricted on firms listed before September 2000 and originating from outside the two cities of Shanghai and Shenzhen. The reported returns are the average daily returns (all daily averages are reported on a weekly frequency in the dataset). Volatility is measured as the standard deviation in daily returns over the past 20 business days with non-missing observations (i.e. standard deviation over 20 observations). Spread is the difference between closing bid and ask prices divided by the midquote (and scaled by 100 to be interpreted in percentages). Turnover is the weekly average of the number of shares traded per day as a ratio of the total number of shares outstanding for each particular firm. Assets are the average value of total assets at the time of listing (time invariant). Similarly, employees are the average number of employees at time of listing.

194 Y. He et al. / Journal of Banking & Finance 44 (2014) 189–206

statistical tests, which are omitted for brevity). Since the two cities may differ in terms of which kind of businesses they attract, this can potentially create a systematic difference in (unobservable, time-variant) firm characteristics across the two exchanges. To fur- ther ensure that such differences do not influence the estimation results, the working sample – consisting of firms listed on either exchange before September 2000 – is further restricted to firms that originate from outside the two cities. Summary statistics for this working sample are reported in Table 3 – along with the origi- nal, unrestricted sample. It can be observed that once the sample is restricted on listing date and location, the difference in mean val- ues across the two exchanges becomes smaller for all variables. For example, once restricting on location and listing date, the average firm size – measured as either asset value or number of employees – converges across the two exchanges, which is consistent with more analogous firm characteristics in the treatment and the con- trol group. Also worth noting, the existing literature typically finds that price movements are very similar across the two markets for various data frequencies (see e.g. Girardin and Liu, 2005).

Finally, in order to safeguard completely that Shenzhen firms are a reliable control group, it would be advantageous to establish statistically that prior to the transparency change Shenzhen firms followed a similar trend in the outcome variables to Shanghai listed firms. If this is the case, any observed post-event change in trend can be attributed to the transparency policy change (given an adequate regression methodology and controls, to be detailed in Section 3.2). In order to verify this, each outcome variable is regressed on an exchange-specific, cubic time trend for the pre- event period (January 2004–July 2006) and the statistical differ- ence of these two non-linear trends is tested. Specifically, we esti- mate the following regression equation

yit ¼ aþ c1t � SHGi þ c2t2 � SHGi þ c3t3 � SHGi þ fi þwt þ eit ð1Þ

for both liquidity measures, y, where SHG indicates a dummy vari- able that takes the value of one for Shanghai listed firms and zero for Shenzhen firms. The term fi indicates the fixed effects regression methodology and the implicit capture of all time-constant firm char- acteristics. In addition to this, weekly dummies (week fixed effects, wt) are included to pick up the average weekly change in the out- come variables across all firms on both exchanges. Since all variation in outcomes variables that is common across exchanges is thereby filtered out, only exchange specific variation will remain. Hence,

the joint significance of coefficients c1, c2 and c3 will test the equality of the two non-linear, exchange-specific trends.

Table 4 reports the estimation results in two different panels. Panel A reports the results when all Shanghai and Shenzhen firms are included in the sample. As already noted, stock characteristics are likely to be inherently different across the two exchanges and therefore the joint significance of the three interaction terms is non-surprisingly rejected for both liquidity measures (see v2-sta- tistics and corresponding p-value in last row of Table 4). In other words, in Panel A the flexible time trend is significantly different across the two exchanges for both outcomes variables. Moreover, individual coefficients are even significantly different across exchanges in the case of spreads. In contrast, once restricting on firms that listed on either exchange before September 2000 and are located outside the two cities (Panel B), the pre-event time trends of the two firm groups are no longer statistically different. Also, the joint significance of the three time trend coefficients is rejected, as indicated by the v2-statistics. The fact that time trends are statistically the same across the two exchanges for both out- come variables in the pre-event period, verifies that Shenzhen listed firms are an appropriate control group for Shanghai listed firms, once restricting on firm location and listing date.

3.2. Overall effect (extensive margin)

Before applying a more technical regression methodology, it is useful to briefly present the raw data and gauge at long-term pat- terns. Fig. 1 plots the two liquidity measures for the working sam- ple over the full sample period. More precisely, the difference in liquidity measures across the two exchanges is plotted over time, thereby shedding light on whether the transparency change was effective. Since the effective amount of transparency is likely to depend on the number of subscribers to the transparency enhanc- ing software, the gradual long-run liquidity dynamics are likely vary with the different subscription intensity over time (as we study further in Section 3.4). Fig. 1 seems to confirm this variability, showing a gradually increasing level of trading activity (turnover) for Shanghai firms relative to Shenzhen firms in the post-Level II period. In contrast, bid–ask spreads seem to become relatively wider for Shanghai stocks in the post-level II period (although this trend is reversed at the end of the sample period). However, it is important to emphasize that no causation is yet

Fig. 1. Difference in liquidity across exchanges. The figure displays the difference in liquidity measures across the two exchanges over time. More precisely, the trend reflects the liquidity differences of Shanghai listed firms versus Shenzhen listed, where the sample is restricted on firms listed on either exchange before September 2000 and originating from outside the two cities. Turnover and spread are measured as defined in the summary statistics (Table 3). The vertical line represents the date the transparency enhancing software was introduced.

Table 4 Comparison of treatment and control group.

Panel A Panel B Shanghai vs. Shenzhen – all firms Shanghai vs. Shenzhen – firms listed before September 2000 & located outside the two cities

(1) (2) (3) (4) Turnover Spread Turnover Spread

t � Shanghai �0.017 0.018*** 0.052 0.012 (0.034) (0.007) (0.038) (0.009)

t2 � Shanghai 0.000 �0.000*** �0.000 �0.000 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)

t3 � Shanghai �0.000 0.000*** 0.000 0.000 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)

Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Week FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Observations 162,868 162,868 93,679 93,679 No. of firms 1346 1346 767 767 R-squared 0.328 0.163 0.360 0.178 v2-Statistics 8.09 7.19 2.06 3.54 (p-Value) (0.02) (0.03) (0.36) (0.17)

The regressions in this table fit an exchange specific flexible time trend (a 3rd order polynomial) to the dependent variable over the pre-event period (January 2004–July 2006). This allows the evaluation of whether the time trends are different for the two exchanges before the transparency changes are introduced. Panel A compares Shanghai listed firms to those listed in Shenzhen. Panel B repeats Panel A, but restricting on firms listed on either exchange before September 2000 and also on firms originating from outside the two cities. The regressions include firm and week fixed effects, where the latter controls for joint trends across the two markets. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses and are clustered by firm and week, i.e. taking into account that (i) the errors for the same firm may not be independent across time and (ii) that in any given week the errors may not be independent across firms. The exact coefficient (st. error) values on the 2nd and 3rd order terms in column (2) are �6.8E�5 (2.5E�5) and 8.2E�8 (3.1E�8). Also reported in the last row of the table is the v2-statistics (and the corresponding p-value) testing the joint significance of the three interaction terms, where the 5% critical value is 5.99 with two degrees of freedom. This v2 is approximately equivalent to the corresponding F distribution in large samples. ⁄ Significance is reported at the 10% level. ⁄⁄ Significance is reported at the 5% level. *** Significance is reported at the 1% level

Y. He et al. / Journal of Banking & Finance 44 (2014) 189–206 195

being established. Furthermore, the long-term pattern can natu- rally differ from the short-term impact that follows immediately after the software is becomes accessible (cf. Section 3.3). Now, however, we first turn to examining the overall and long-term average impact of the transparency increase.

To estimate more accurately the overall relationship between increased trade transparency and liquidity, we regress the two liquidity measures on an event dummy that takes the value of one in the post-Level II period and zero otherwise. As this event dummy only takes the value of one for Shanghai firms in the post-Level II period, the dummy coefficient will quantify the aver-

age effect of releasing new type of information (namely the infor- mation embedded in the Level II software) on liquidity in ‘treated’ Shanghai listed firms, relative to the liquidity levels of the ‘untreated’ Shenzhen firms. Stated differently, the ‘difference- in-difference’ estimate resulting from the pre- vs. post-period comparison (first difference) across the Shanghai vs. Shenzhen exchanges (second difference) captures the liquidity impact of events occurring in post-period Shanghai only (the Level II impact), while all other non-varying or common market features are differenced out. For example, the methodology differences out non-varying trading costs (cf. commissions and levies) and

Table 5 Overall liquidity effect of increased transparency (extensive margin).

Turnover Spread (1) (2)

DLevel II (subscribers > 0) 0.121** 0.017***

(0.058) (0.005)

Observations 198,297 198,297 Firm fixed effect Yes Yes Week fixed effect Yes Yes R-squared 0.519 0.386 Number of firms 767 767

The table shows the average level of change in liquidity for associated with the introduction of the Level II software. Specifically, the table reports estimates of Eq. (2) where the effect is averaged out for the entire range of Level II subscribers. The results reflect the differences of Shanghai listed firms versus Shenzhen listed, where the sample is restricted on firms listed on either exchange before September 2000 and originating from outside the two cities. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses and are clustered by firm and week, i.e. taking into account that (i) the errors for the same firm may not be independent across time and (ii) that in any given week the errors may not be independent across firms. ⁄ Significance is reported at the 10% level. ** Significance is reported at the 5% level. *** Significance is reported at the 1% level.

196 Y. He et al. / Journal of Banking & Finance 44 (2014) 189–206

common changes in costs (cf. stamp duty) as noted in Section 2.3. The panel analysis is also restricted on the sample of firms that listed before September 2000 and are located outside Shanghai and Shenzhen (cf. Section 3.1). Moreover, to further take into account any (unobserved) firm characteristics we employ a firm fixed effects regression methodology that captures all time- constant firm characteristics that might otherwise contaminate the regression results. Thus, the regression model is

yit ¼ aþ b � DSubscr:it>0 þ fi þwt þ cZit þ eit ð2Þ

where the dummy variable, DSubscr>0, is equal to one for Shanghai firms in the post-event period (which corresponds to the period where there is a positive number of software subscribers) and zero otherwise. The term fi indicates firm fixed effects and wt denotes weekly dummies (week fixed effects) that pick up the average weekly change in the outcome variables across all firms on both exchanges. Since all variation in outcome variables that is common across exchanges is thereby filtered out, the coefficient of interest, b, will only measure variation beyond the average variation in outcome variables in each week. For example, if a countrywide liquidity shock occurs in, say, week 1 of 2008, then the average impact thereof is caught by the corresponding weekly dummy and therefore b only reports liquidity variation beyond this average (i.e. the impact unas- sociated with the common shock). Hence the week fixed effect con- trols for any overall, unrelated events to the fullest extent possible. Furthermore, any change in liquidity (beyond the average variation in each week) is measured relatively to the Shenzhen control group that does not offer subscription to the transparency enhancing soft- ware. Thus the only assumption needed – in order to attribute changes in liquidity to the transparency change – is that prior to the new transparency policy Shenzhen firms followed a similar trend in the outcome variables as Shanghai listed firms, which is already established in Section 3.1 for the working sample.

The last term, Zit, represents any other time-variant control variables that in general capture exchange (or stock) specific events or trends. More specifically, these may include endogenous market factors (e.g. bid–ask spreads may help to determine turn- over, and vice versa) or other variables that may contribute to the liquidity variation (say, volatility). We return to such issues in Section 3.5, where a careful sensitivity analysis is carried out to verify the robustness of all reported results. In addition, this last term represents an extra safeguard included in all subsequent analysis, which involves carefully controlling for another policy change that introduced a transparency enhancing software in 2007. The effect of this change is filtered out by a binary dummy variable since there is no subscriber data available for this soft- ware. This data limitation implies that this software introduction provides a far less attractive setting than the Level II transparency change and therefore the subsequent presentation does not focus on this event.16 Instead, this discussion is left to the robustness Section 3.5, which confirms all key results.

16 To clarify briefly why this transparency change is not of interest, the lack of subscriber data for this software (named TopView) means that it is implausible to fully measure and interpret the effect of this change in a similar manner to the Level II analysis – thus it is excluded. Moreover, the software was relatively expensive ($3000 a year) and only provided static end-of-day snapshots (not dynamic real-time data) that were easily obtainable at on-line piracy websites at the end of each trading day. The illegal snapshots distributed daily among non-subscribers further makes it implausible to measure the effective, gradual increase in transparency due to this event. In other words, even if any subscriber data were available, it would not be reliable since illegal copies were distributed daily among non-subscribers. All this implies that it is unfortunately impossible to capture the effective, gradual increase in transparency from this event in a credible way – in contrast to the favorable setting that the Level II software provides. Due to these extensive drawbacks we choose to filter out any potential effect this policy change may have had and instead focus our analysis entirely on the transparency change we can more reliably measure and interpret in our dataset.

The estimation results from the model specification in Eq. (2) are reported in Table 5. The table shows the overall average change in liquidity associated with the one-time increase in transparency (pre- vs. post Level II introduction). First, turnover is positively and significantly affected by the transparency change. Specifically, col- umn (1) indicates that the one-time increase in transparency (going from no software users to some positive number of users) causes an average increase in daily turnover of 0.121 percentage points per stock. This is a considerable increase compared to the average daily turnover level of 1.42 percentage points for Shanghai listed stocks (cf. summary statistics in Table 3), i.e. it corresponds to an approximately 8.5% increase in turnover. In monetary terms, this translates into a sizeable increase in daily volume of 5 million Yuan per firm – or approximately 800 thousand U.S. dollars. This average firm increase is therefore quite large, in particular when keeping in mind that this increase is directly associated with a market-wide (not firm specific event) increase in transparency. Second, the transparency change is associated with a statistically significant increase in bid–ask spreads (column 2), implying that trading costs may have increased with more trade transparency. More specifically, spreads have widened by 0.017 percentage points, which represents a 6.5% increase compared to the average spread for Shanghai stocks (cf. summary statistics in Table 3). In other words, even though trading activity rises, there are higher costs associated with trading in the Shanghai stock market.

The widening of bid–ask spreads deserves clarification. Although generally it may be reasonable to expect more trading volume to be associated with narrower bid–ask spreads, this result is not predicted by papers specifically studying the effects of with- drawing broker anonymity on bid–ask spreads. For example, Foucault and Degranges (2005) present a theoretical model where allowing dealers to know the identity of traders can widen spreads. They argue that the existence of dealer-client relationships allows dealers to cream-skim for uninformed order-flow, i.e. primarily trade with those (uninformed) clients who tend to consistently provide the dealer with positive trading profits. This, on the other hand, increases the risk of informed trading for dealers without such relationships, which respond by raising their profit margin (widen bid–ask spreads) to counteract the higher probability of more informed (and thus less profitable) trades. These theoretical predictions are verified by empirical studies that find that average bid–ask spreads are wider in a less anonymous market structure (Simaan et al., 2003; Comerton-Forde et al., 2005; Foucault et al.,

Table 6 Immediate liquidity impact (early subscribers).

Pre-Level II Post-Level II Diff. t-Value

Panel A: Univariate liquidity analysis Turnover Shanghai 1.32 1.69 0.37 19.13 Shenzhen 1.46 1.71 0.25 12.94

0.12 4.25

Spread Shanghai 0.31 0.27 �0.04 �20.11 Shenzhen 0.31 0.25 �0.06 �29.16

0.02 4.71

Turnover Spread (1) (2)

Panel B: Multivariate liquidity analysis DLevel II (Subscribers > 0) 0.105** 0.014***

(0.041) (0.004)

Observations 32,774 32,774 Firm fixed effects Yes Yes Week fixed effects Yes Yes R-squared 0.502 0.632 Number of firms 764 764

Y. He et al. / Journal of Banking & Finance 44 (2014) 189–206 197

2007). As noted in Section 2.2, one of the major pre-trade transpar- ency changes brought about by the Level II software was to lower the degree of anonymity by enabling users to concentrate their trades with counterparties of certain characteristics (such as small/uninformed order flow). Thus, as this allows some dealers to cream-skim for uninformed order-flow, it simultaneously leaves other dealers (who lack this capacity) at a higher average risk of entering informed and less profitable trades – making them seek protection in wider profit margins (wider spreads). Thus, the posi- tive relationship between transparency and spread reported in Table 5 supports these findings of the literature.17

To summarize, Table 5 concludes that the market has benefitted from the increase in trade transparency in terms of more trading activity, while the downside is wider bid–ask spreads. This is infor- mative in itself and typically a transparency event study will end here, i.e. by revealing the average treatment effect. Here, however, we additionally observe the continuous changes in the number of subscribers after the date at which the transparency enhancing software is introduced, further allowing us to study the immediate effect resulting from early subscribers (Section 3.3) and the overall liquidity dynamics as more market players gradually subscribe (Section 3.4).

No. of trades

Trade size

Ln(No. of trades)

Ln(Trade size)

(1) (2) (3) (4)

Panel C: Multivariate analysis on trading behavior DLevel II

(Subscribers > 0) �59.4*** 9633*** �0.058** 0.150*** (19.4) (3161) (0.026) (0.031)

Observations 26,093 26,093 26,093 26,093 Firm fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Week fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes R-squared 0.759 0.231 0.780 0.820 Number of firms 763 763 763 763

The table shows the average level of change in liquidity (Panels A–B) and trading behavior (Panel C) associated with the introduction of the Level II software. In all panels the sample period is 6 months before and after the introduction of Level II. All reported results show the differences of Shanghai listed firms versus Shenzhen listed, where the sample is restricted on firms listed on either exchange before September 2000 and originating from outside the two cities. Panel A shows the results from a standard event-study, without controlling for other relevant vari- ables, using conventional t-tests. Each t-test is based on approximately 8–9 thou- sand observations. It should be noted that figures in Panel A do not always perfectly add up, which is due to rounding (not rounding errors). Significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level is established for a t-statistics of value 1.645, 1.960 and 2.576, respectively. Panels B and C report multivariate regression estimates of Eq. (2). In Panel C the number of trades is defined within a trading day for each stock. Trade size is the average value traded in Chinese Yuan (normalized to 2006 value) within a trading day for each stock. Both of these variables are averaged weekly to maintain consistency in the data frequency throughout paper. All other variables are defined as in the summary statistics in Table 3. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses and are clustered by firm and week, i.e. taking into account that (i) the errors for the same firm may not be independent across time and (ii) that in any given week the errors may not be independent across firms. ⁄ Significance is reported at the 10% level in Panels B and C. ** Significance is reported at the 5% level in Panels B and C. *** Significance is reported at the 1% level in Panels B and C.

3.3. Immediate impact (early subscribers)

Section 3.2 established the overall market effect on liquidity (increased turnover and widening spreads) over the full sample period. In addition to this, it is of specific interest to examine the impact the transparency change has had on different catego- ries of traders, in particular on major institutional traders that are arguably the ones most affected by such a change. Major trad- ers do not only have the most at stake, but they are presumably also the most responsive to any alteration in market conditions and trading operations, which makes them more likely to imme- diately exploit the increased transparency benefits of the Level II software. We do not directly observe the identity of traders, but since major traders are relatively more invested and active in the marketplace, it is reasonable to presume that institutional traders are among the first group of subscribers. Intuitively, this may lead to large liquidity reactions in the first few months of the Level II operation. Thus, we next empirically evaluate the immediate liquidity impact around the date of the software introduction.

To first examine this in a simple univariate setting, Panel A of Table 6 reports the results of an event-study that compares liquid- ity before and after the Level II introduction for both exchanges using standard t-tests. The analysis is restricted to the immediate 6 months before and after the Level II introduction. The results reveal that the liquidity measures have changed significantly on both exchanges, which reemphasizes one of the contributions of this paper, i.e. having a reliable control group and thereby avoiding to mistakenly associating countrywide changes in outcome vari- ables to a market-specific transparency change. Namely, the raw double differencing shows significant disparities across the two markets, suggesting that the Shanghai liquidity change following

17 Similarly, Madhavan et al. (2005) theoretically describe how increased transpar- ency allows informed traders to tap the liquidity offered by the limit order book more efficiently, which increases informed traders’ expected profits. This may make uninformed traders less willing to provide liquidity, represented by wider bid–ask spreads. Interestingly, Madhavan et al. (2005) also add an empirical analysis that establishes widening bid–ask spreads from a policy change increasing pre-trade transparency, which is consistent with their argument – as well as our results. Finally, on top of this, the widening of bid–ask spreads is also consistent with faster transactions data (cf. change no. 4 in Table 1). This is e.g. supported by Hendershott and Moulton (2011) who show that reducing execution time by 10 s increases adverse selection and thereby results in wider bid–ask spreads

Level II cannot be attributed entirely to countrywide changes. More specifically, comparing the pre- vs. post period, turnover has increased by 0.12 percentage points more for Shanghai vs. Shenz- hen firms. This is a large liquidity impact as the overall difference in turnover between all Shanghai vs. Shenzhen firms is only 0.06 percentage points across the whole sample (and 0.01 percentage points for the working sample – see summary statistics in Table 3). Moreover, this change is fully on par with the overall increase in turnover reported in Table 5 and discussed in Section 3.2 above. Hence, this indicates that the bulk of the Level II effect is attribut- able to the impact it has on early subscribers. In other words, the magnitude aligns with major traders being relatively more affected

19 On top of this, the effect could further amplify when relatively few people have access to the detailed transparency data, as this in principle gives rise to an adverse

198 Y. He et al. / Journal of Banking & Finance 44 (2014) 189–206

and responding more significantly to the transparency change compared to other market players. Additionally, Table 6 further reports that bid–ask spreads have narrowed less for Shanghai vs. Shenzhen firms over the year surrounding the Level II introduction. The relative change in spreads is sizeable (0.02 percentage points) since it reaches the same order of magnitude as the overall differ- ence in spreads across markets over the whole sample period (see Table 3) – and again it corresponds fully with the overall change reported in Table 5. Thus, this relative widening of bid–ask spreads on Shanghai implies a considerable negative impact on trading costs immediately following the introduction of the transparency enhancing software.

These raw univariate results are confirmed in Panel B, which shows the results of a more elaborate multivariate analysis follow- ing the previously described model in Section 3.2 and correspond- ing regression Eq. (2). Again focusing on the immediate impact surrounding the 6 months before and after the Level II transpar- ency change shows a strong and statistical significant relationship between liquidity and increased transparency. This more careful analysis leads to slightly lower magnitudes compared to Panel A, but the results still indicate that the immediate impact of the first subscribers (0.105 and 0.014) accounts for the vast majority of the overall effect reported in Table 5 (0.121 and 0.017). The impact on turnover translates into an increase in daily volume of 4.3 million Yuan ($690,000) per firm listed on the Shanghai Stock Exchange. This average firm increase is therefore of an economic magnitude that is significant for even the largest of traders. Similarly, the wid- ening of bid–ask spreads represents a 5.4% increase compared to the average spread for Shanghai stocks (cf. summary statistics in Table 3). This represents a considerable increase in trading costs, in particular for those traders who are the most active market participants.

Overall, the magnitude of the immediate liquidity impact fol- lows the established predictions. For example, the widening of bid–ask spreads conforms to earlier results and existing theories of the impact of less broker anonymity (cf. discussion in Sec- tion 3.2). But furthermore, when focusing solely on major (informed) traders, there may be additional mechanisms at work that widen spreads, resulting in the quantitatively large magni- tudes observed in Table 6. Specifically, Kryzanowski and Lazrak (2009) note that if the intensified trading (higher turnover) is due to increased informed trading then liquidity may be adversely affected (wider spreads). To elaborate, Chowdhry and Nanda (1991) model fragmented markets where there is a preference of informed traders to trade in the thickest market to better hide their trades. Thus, more trading activity – such as increased turnover in our setting – may simply hide more informed trading (Barclay and Warner, 1993; Chakravarty, 2001) and this can lead market makers to react by increasing their profit margin – i.e. widening spreads – to counteract higher probability of more informed (and thus less profitable) trades. This scenario is explicitly observed within the setting of this paper. More specifically, by the very nature of the event being studied – i.e. the introduction of an information enhancing software – the market participants become more informed overall about market statistics. Thus, as the pool of knowledgeable traders is larger, dealers become more likely to trade with such investors. The increased risk of trading with such counterparties can lead dealers to widen their bid–ask spreads.18

18 In the outlined literature traders are generally thought of as being informed about fundamentals, whereas in our setting traders obtain information on trade statistics. However, if trading behavior reflects (at least partly) information on fundamentals, then becoming more knowledgeable on trade statistics can result in a similar response by dealers. We thank Yakov Amihud for raising our awareness of this issue.

Arguably, this described effect is likely to be the strongest in the initial stages following the introduction of Level II. Namely, since big institutional traders – who are relatively more active in the market – are likely to be among the first subscribers to the trans- parency enhancing software, the probability of trading with a more informed partner (a Level II subscriber) increases the most initially. Thus the immediate widening of bid–ask spreads aligns with mar- ket makers adjusting their behavior (widening bid–ask spreads) in reaction to a higher risk of trading with more informed counterpar- ties. This immediate impact contrasts later stages when less active market participants (such as households) represent a larger share of additional subscribers. Then the probability of market makers trading with an informed counterparty does not rise to the same extent and thereby this effect gradually recedes (which is consis- tent with the dynamics reported in Section 3.4 below, which shows more moderate changes in bid–ask spreads at later stages).19

3.3.1. Other measures of trading behavior The immediate increase in turnover and widening of spreads is

likely to emerge from the impact the transparency change has on major institutional traders. To verify this, we deepen the analysis to consider other market variables that are likely to change from altered trading behavior of major traders. Most notably, major traders that carry relatively large volumes on a day-to-day basis are likely to attempt to lower their price impact by hiding their trading strategy (e.g. Comerton-Forde et al., 2011). A common strategy for informed traders to conceal their actions is to break up their large trades into several smaller pieces (Barclay and Warner, 1993; Chakravarty, 2001). However, this is likely to be less advantageous in markets so transparent that they offer limited space to hide, i.e. where such trading strategies can be identified and documented by other market participants. More specifically, as multiple trades are costly (in particular with wider spreads and costly small trades, cf. Chakravarty, 2001), major traders real- ize less value from breaking up their trades if such tactics are observable anyhow by other market players. This is exactly the predicted effect in the Shanghai setting where the high level of transparency comes from the two key changes that directly work to illuminate investors’ trading strategies. Specifically, as previ- ously described in Section 2.2, by revealing trader characteristics (trader size) and all individual transactions, any subscriber of the Level II software should in principle be able to identify the trading patterns of any major trader – for example, whether anyone is building up (or down) positions in specific stocks. In such a highly transparent market where costly attempts to hide one’s trades are not likely to be successful, traders are incentivized to enter rela- tively fewer transactions with higher average volumes per trade.

Hence, to examine whether the trading behavior of major trad- ers is truly affected by the Level II transparency change, we com- pile data on the number of trades and average trade size for every stock in our working sample covering the 6 months before and after the introduction of Level II.20 Panel C in Table 6 reports the results from the benchmark regression Eq. (2) that estimates

selection scenario that leads uninformed market participants to exit the market (cf. Chowdhry and Nanda, 1991). Thus, if small traders subtract from the market following Level II and thus it predominantly consists of major traders, then that will raise the probability of trading with an informed counter-party – which again may widen bid–ask spreads further.

20 This data is obtained from a private data vendor named SINA (http:// finance.sina.com.cn/money/), which is the only source known to us to provide this data for the Chinese market. The service offers daily documents for each listed stock, so obtaining this data involves downloading, processing and merging over 200,000 separate data files before merging it to an aggregate weekly level.

21 Moreover, as another example, it is frequently argued that even though more transparency is likely to be beneficial on average (e.g. increased turnover), it can nonetheless be detrimental to liquidity if it becomes too excessive. For example, Cespa and Foucault (2009) argue that although a higher level of transparency promotes informational efficiency, full transparency is not socially optimal. Relating this to our setting it might be possible that liquidity deteriorates as the transparency level surmounts above a specific threshold.

Y. He et al. / Journal of Banking & Finance 44 (2014) 189–206 199

the Level II impact on Shanghai listed firms relative to the Shenzhen control group. The estimates support the above predictions. There are on average 59 fewer trades per day for each Shanghai stock in the working sample, which translates into a 10.5% decrease (the pre-Level II daily average is 558 trades per stock). Consistently, the average size of each individual trade increases by 9633 Yuan ($1570) for every stock, which corresponds to a rise of 16.7% (the pre-Level II trade size is 57,800 Yuan per stock). Thus, the immediate impact on trading behavior is both statistically and economically significant.

Lastly, to verify the magnitudes of these percentage estimates – and to mitigate the effect of potential large numerical values/out- liers – the last two columns in Panel C report estimates of the same analysis carried out in logs. The results are quite robust, showing a 5.8% decline in the average daily number of trades per stock and a 15% increase in the average volume per trade.

Thus, to conclude, these auxiliary results support that the Level II transparency change has a considerable impact on major traders, leading them to alter their trading behavior. Moreover, these changes may not only be limited to trade size and frequency, but may further spill over to other market outcomes. For example, it can be argued that a higher price impact of larger trades can poten- tially work to raise market volatility (we return to volatility analy- sis in Section 3.5, verifying increased volatility). But keeping the focus on the liquidity impact of more trade transparency, we con- clude that there is a sharp immediate reaction in both liquidity and trading behavior as traders start subscribing to the transparency enhancing software. This conforms with the idea that the most active and invested market participants (i.e. major institutional investors) are among the first subscribers, and that they are both strongly affected and significantly responsive to the transparency change.

3.4. Gradual increase in transparency access (intensive margin)

Although the results in Section 3.3 show that the bulk of the overall liquidity impact of increased transparency is immediate, it still leaves room for evaluating the subsequent liquidity dynam- ics resulting from additional subscribers. Notably, even though later subscribers are associated with a relatively incremental cumulative effect, the associated liquidity dynamics of their partic- ipation can nonetheless shed light on the overall functional form between liquidity and the intensive margin of transparency. In other words, studying the evolution of liquidity outcomes over the entire sample period can reveal how the overall impact (studied in Section 3.2) gradually comes into effect, i.e. how the incremental benefits of more transparency differ depending on how many people have access to the transparency enhancing infor- mation at any point in time. For example, although the results above may suggest that liquidity outcomes of increased transpar- ency follow the law of diminishing returns on the intensive margin – implying a concave function between pre-existing levels of trans- parency and the marginal liquidity benefits thereof (cf. Eom et al., 2007) – such a relationship is not the only possible pattern. Instead, one could e.g. imagine that increased trade transparency may initially lead to worse market outcomes (e.g. wider spreads) when relatively few people have access to the detailed transpar- ency data, but that this trend is later reversed (i.e. temporary non-monotonicity in liquidity outcomes). To elaborate, this could occur in the presence of adverse selection where relatively few, early subscribers might use the detailed trading information for their own interests at the expense of the market as a whole. For example, Chowdhry and Nanda (1991) note that when information is asymmetrically allocated less informed traders may choose not to participate in the market. In our setting, any such adverse selection drawbacks could gradually recede as more traders would

subscribe to the transparency-enhancing data package, implying a non-monotonic relationship between liquidity and the intensive margin of transparency.21

To investigate such dynamics we estimate changes in liquidity as the number of Level II subscribers gradually increases. Specifi- cally, the two liquidity measures are regressed on a function of the number of Level II subscribers, in addition to the same set of controls as used previously (cf. Eq. (2)). Specifically, we estimate

yit ¼ aþ gðSubscr:itÞ þ fi þwt þ cZit þ eit ð3Þ

where g(�) can in principle be any function of the number of Level II subscribers and other variables are defined as before. In order to put minimal constraints on the function g(�), it is assumed to follow a flexible 5th order polynomial of the form

gðSubscr:itÞ ¼ b1ðSubscr:itÞ þ b2ðSubscr:itÞ 2 þ � � � þ b5ðSubscr:itÞ

5

ð4Þ

This semi-parametric framework allows us to estimate the coef- ficients b1–b5 and then use those estimates to plot the non-linear relationship between the liquidity measures, yit, and the number of subscribers. Fig. 2 displays the results. Due to the week fixed effects structure in Eq. (3), the figure displays the variation in liquidity for Shanghai firms beyond the average variation in liquid- ity across all firms (listed on either Shanghai or Shenzhen exchange). Values are initially bound at zero as the estimated value of liquidity is zero when no one subscribes to the transparency enhancing software (cf. Eqs. (3) and (4)). Turnover then depicts an upward trend as more and more traders subscribe to the soft- ware. Thus, Fig. 2 displays how the previously established result – of increased trading activity with more transparency – gradually comes into effect. The cumulative change adds up to around 0.18 percentage points, which can be compared to the average 0.12 per- centage point increase established in Table 5 (this average could intuitively be graphically represented as a horizontal line extend- ing through the entire range of software subscribers in Fig. 2). Also consistent with previous results, the overall effect of more trans- parency is to widen spreads. However, the dynamics are non- monotonic as the pattern of widening bid–ask spreads only holds initially. As more traders subscribe the effect gradually wears out and ultimately bid–ask spreads start to narrow, although they do not reach their pre-event levels (leaving the overall effect positive). Also notably, the figures resemble the overall post-Level II pattern observed when plotting the raw data in Fig. 1 (this similarity reflects the near-randomization of the treatment vs. control group, since otherwise a systematically different control group would imply significantly different firm fixed effects across the two firm groups, resulting in another pattern in Fig. 2).

Even though the model described in Eqs. (3) and (4) is informa- tive, it is unfortunately not very tractable for numerical analysis. Thus, in order to quantify numerically the general trends observed in Fig. 2, the pattern is summarized by breaking the polynomial into a three-step function. More specifically, although the flexible specification in Eq. (4) allows for an informative graphical repre- sentation, it has the disadvantage that it is difficult to numerically filter out the general trend in the relationship between transpar- ency and liquidity. Furthermore, a parsimonious step function also better allows for numerically testing the significance of the liquid- ity changes at different levels of transparency (rather than doing

daerpSrevonruT -.1

0 .1

.2 .3

C um

ul at

iv e

ch an

ge

0 100000 200000 300000 Level 2 users

0 .0

1 .0

2 .0

3 .0

4 C

um ul

at iv

e ch

an ge

0 100000 200000 300000

Level 2 users

Fig. 2. Relationship between transparency and liquidity. The figures show the liquidity benefit of increasing the degree of market-wide transparency (number of Level 2 subscribers). The figures are produced by estimating the non-linear relationships between each outcome variable and the number of Level 2 subscribers, which is fully described in Eqs. (3) and (4) in Section 3.4. The relationships are shown for Shanghai firms that are listed before September 2000 and located outside the two cities. More specifically, the figure shows the variation in liquidity on Shanghai beyond the average variation in liquidity across all firms on either Shanghai or Shenzhen exchange – which is achieved by applying firm and week fixed effects. Also plotted is the average level of liquidity for different ranges of transparency (ranges of software subscribers) in order to highlight the overall pattern of the flexible functional form (these averages are established from regression Eq. (5)). More precisely, the average level of liquidity is shown for 0 and 100,000 subscribers, then for 100,000–200,000 subscribers and lastly for more than 200,000 subscribers. The figures include 90% and 95% confidence intervals for these average levels of liquidity at different ranges of subscribers (different stages of transparency).

Table 7 Effect of gradually increasing transparency access (intensive margin).

Turnover Spread (1) (2)

D1 (0 < Subscribers < 100,000) 0.021 0.019***

(0.042) (0.005) D2 (100,000 < Subscribers < 200,000) 0.120* 0.022***

(0.062) (0.006) D3 (200,000 < Subscribers) 0.180** 0.016***

(0.082) (0.006)

Observations 198,297 198,297 Firm fixed effect Yes Yes Week fixed effect Yes Yes R-squared 0.520 0.386

Number of firms 767 767 D2 � D1 0.098 0.004

(0.073) (0.004) D3 � D2 0.060 �0.007

(0.089) (0.005) D3 � D1 0.159** �0.003

(0.081) (0.005)

The table shows the average level of liquidity for different ranges of transparency (ranges of software subscribers), as further illustrated in Fig. 2. More precisely, the average level of liquidity is shown for 0–100,000 subscribers, then for 100,000– 200,000 subscribers and lastly for more than 200,000 subscribers. The difference in the average level of liquidity between different intervals of subscribers (levels of transparency) is also reported. Specifically, the table reports dummy coefficient estimates of Eq. (5), along with the statistical difference of those estimates. The results reflect the differences of Shanghai listed firms versus Shenzhen listed, where the sample is restricted on firms listed on either exchange before September 2000 and originating from outside the two cities. Robust standard errors are reported in parenthesis and are clustered by firm and week, i.e. taking into account that (i) the errors for the same firm may not be independent across time and (ii) that in any given week the errors may not be independent across firms.

200 Y. He et al. / Journal of Banking & Finance 44 (2014) 189–206

this numerically for every point of the polynomial). Thus, in order to better quantify the relationship, the average levels of liquidity for different intervals of transparency (rather than at every single point) are established by simplifying Eqs. (3) and (4) into a three step function of the following form

yit ¼ aþ b1D1ð0<Subscr:it6100;000Þ þ b2D2ð100;000<Subscr:it6200;000Þ þ b3D3ð200;000>Subscr:it Þ þ fi þwt þ cZit þ eit ð5Þ

where the three dummy variables equal one if the number of sub- scribers is in the corresponding interval, and zero otherwise. The intervals are chosen such that the entire range of subscribers is divided into three equal parts.22 This three-step model intuitively summarizes the non-linear relationship established in Fig. 2 by fil- tering out the average level of transparency for three different inter- vals of software subscribers. The graphical representation of this model is added to Fig. 2, which highlights the general trend in the relationship between liquidity and transparency. The corresponding coefficient estimates and statistical tests are reported in Table 7.

Table 7 numerically reveals that the transparency impact on liquidity varies with the level of information usage. For turnover, the incremental liquidity effect is initially relatively modest (0.021) but as the number of subscribers increases the cumulative turnover effect becomes statistically positive and gradually reaches an increase of 0.18 percentage points (the resulting average increase in turnover over the whole subscriber range is 0.12 per- centage points, as previously reported in Table 5). This shows that the positive effect from more transparency (cf. Table 5) comes gradually into effect and accumulates as more traders enjoy access to the additional pre- and post-trade information.

* Significance is reported at the 10% level. ** Significance is reported at the 5% level. *** Significance is reported at the 1% level.

22 The highest number of subscribers in the dataset is just above 300,000 so natural cutoff points seem to be at 100,000 and 200,000 subscribers. The cutoffs remain virtually unchanged if they are determined such that the number of observations is equal in each of three intervals. Further, in principle it is of course possible to split the sample into a higher number of intervals, but here the analysis is restricted to three separate steps of transparency levels (number of subscribers) to better summarize the overall trend in the relationship between liquidity and transparency. More specifi- cally, to do this in a quantitatively meaningful manner, it is necessary to work with a parsimonious model where the numeric interpretation of estimated coefficients is both manageable and tractable.

The difference between the liquidity effects at various ranges of transparency is statistically verified at the bottom of Table 7. More precisely, the results show that the turnover effect of increased transparency is statistically greater (by 0.159 percentage points) with relatively many software subscribers, compared to the initial

Y. He et al. / Journal of Banking & Finance 44 (2014) 189–206 201

stage of relatively few users. In other words, this statistically veri- fies that the impact on liquidity statistically differs across the range of subscribers. Hence, this highlights the relevance of being able to identify gradual transparency impacts, relative to one-time changes in transparency that other studies have naturally been confined to. More specifically, the possibility to capture liquidity effects across a larger spectrum is valuable since the effect may very well differ across the various stages of the software usage – as is shown to be the case in Table 7.

Compared to turnover, bid–ask spreads are more responsive to the increase in transparency, i.e. the three-step function in Fig. 2 – and corresponding estimates in Table 7 – reveal an initial and rel- atively large increase in spreads that becomes relatively stable thereafter. In other words, the average impact on bid–ask spreads (reported to be 0.017 in Table 5) is reached at the initial stage of relatively few subscribers (increase of 0.019 in Table 7). With more subscribers to the transparency enhancing software the bid–ask spreads remain stable around this level (up to 0.022 and then down to 0.016), where the difference is not statistically different across the three subscriber levels. Overall, this implies that initially more transparency can be harmful to bid–ask spreads, but the det- rimental effect wears out once a critical mass has access to the transparency enhancing software (but does not fully reverse). Also, as with turnover, the average effect (0.017 from Table 5) differs considerably from the impact the transparency enhancing software has at different stages of transparency (initial change is 0.019, then 0.004 increase at second step, followed by a decrease of 0.007 – see Table 7). This again highlights how the ‘treatment effect’ differs across the intensive margin of transparency.

To summarize this section, it is apparent that the dynamic rela- tionship between trade transparency and liquidity is non-mono- tonic and therefore it cannot be bluntly stated that increasing transparency on the intensive margin will outright increase (or decrease) the level of liquidity. More specifically, although a trans- parency change on average raises turnover and widens spreads (as established in Section 3.2), this section has established that the dynamic incremental effect is likely to depend on the degree of transparency already in the system. This non-monotonic relation- ship – which is further tested and verified in the subsequent robustness section – is a noteworthy result for several reasons. Specifically, this result implies that on the intensive margin it cannot be assumed that the average treatment effect will necessar- ily apply across a wide spectrum of transparency levels. To create an intuitive analogy, it cannot be assumed that a transparency- increasing regime introduced across all EU countries will necessar- ily improve market outcomes for each member state – such a transparency change should rather be separately evaluated depending on the pre-existing level of transparency within each country. Furthermore, the variation in results across pre-existing transparency levels can help to explain the counter-acting conclu- sions of the existing, empirical literature. More precisely, each empirical study is bound to evaluate the effect of a transparency change relative to the pre-existing market conditions in each set- ting. Thus, results may differ since the transparency level already in place differs across each market being studied.

23 Also, although the economic magnitude may at first seem humble, it is important to keep in mind the underlying range of the explanatory variable (0–300,000 number of users). This implies that a 1% increase is initially a very moderate magnitude, which then steadily increases over time as the number of users rises. Therefore, as the log– log specification is silent on how many additional software subscribers a 1% increase represents, the estimated magnitudes naturally cannot be directly related to previous results. The log–log specification can at most relate to log-measures, i.e. the overall liquidity increase can be calculated to be [ln(300,000) � ln(1)]�0.012 = 15% in log- turnover and, similarly, 1.3% for log-spreads.

3.5. Robustness and further results

This section introduces several changes in methodology that underline the robustness of the results established in previous sections. In doing so, the motivation for employing previously presented models is better established and further justified. In addition to such a sensitivity analysis, this section adds a brief analysis of marginal (not level) effects of increased transparency and concludes by evaluating the Level II transparency change in

Shanghai relative to another (smaller) control sample, namely Shanghai stocks cross-listed in Hong Kong.

3.5.1. Different functional form: Linear relationship An argument can be made that perhaps the most natural place

to start the analysis is to model the relationship between transpar- ency and liquidity as a linear one. More specifically, the simplest modeling choice is likely to be

yit ¼ aþ bðSubscr:itÞ þ fi þwt þ cZit þ eit ð6Þ

where all variables are defined as before. Despite being statistically tractable and straightforward, this model has the immediate disad- vantage that it provides much less flexibility and offers less eco- nomic content than, e.g. the 5th order relationship expressed in Eq. (4). However, for completeness, this (1st order) specification is examined in Table 8, where the sample remains Shanghai and Shenzhen listed firms listed on either exchange before September 2000 and originating from outside the two cities. The results are in line with previously established conclusions – specifically, an increase in Level-II software subscribers is associated with higher turnover and wider bid–ask spreads. Also, although the change in functional form implies that the magnitudes of estimated coeffi- cients are not directly comparable to former specifications, the results are remarkably similar. To illustrate this, the number of sub- scribers is rescaled into hundreds of thousands, which implies that for 100,000 additional subscribers, turnover increases by 0.073 per- centage points. Thus, using the midpoint of subscribers (150,000) provides an average increase in turnover of 0.073 � 1.5 = 0.11 per- centage points, which is on par with the average effect reported in Table 5 (0.121). Similarly, the average effect on bid–ask spreads can be calculated to be 0.008 percentage points, which is not far off from the estimated value of 0.017 in Table 5.

3.5.2. Different functional form: Log–log specification Since there is no apparent reason to presume that the relation-

ship between transparency and liquidity is linear, a relatively simple log–log specification can be applied in order to allow for non-linear effects and mitigate the influence of potential outliers. Moreover, the argument that major traders subscribe earlier than other market participants implies that the marginal effect of each additional subscriber may decreases as the size of the marginal subscriber gradually becomes smaller. Statistically, this possible scenario is captured with a logarithm form that assumes decreas- ing marginal effects. Thus, the model now becomes

lnðyitÞ ¼ aþ b lnðSubscr:itÞ þ fi þwt þ cZit þ eit ð7Þ

quantifying the average liquidity effect (measured by b) that can be associated with the introduction of the Level II software. The log– log specification implies that the estimated regression coefficients have a direct economic interpretation in terms of elasticity – namely, a 1% increase in the number of software subscribers is asso- ciated with a 0.012% (0.001%) increase in turnover (bid–ask spreads). Thus, the qualitative results reassuringly remain unchanged from previous specifications, with increasing turnover and widening bid–ask spreads.23

Table 8 Robustness and further results.

Linear Log–log 3 Slopes Excl. 2007–08

Turnover Spread Ln(Turn.) Ln(Spr.) Turnover Spread Turnover Spread (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)

Panel A: Functional form and data restrictions Subscribers 0.073** 0.005**

(0.031) (0.002) Ln (Subscribers + 1) 0.012** 0.001***

(0.006) (0.000) D1 (0 < Subscribers < 1000) 0.046 0.017*** 0.031 0.019***

(0.046) (0.006) (0.040) (0.006) D2 (1000 < Subscribers < 2000) �0.283* 0.032**

(0.155) (0.013) D3 (2000 < Subscribers) 0.143 0.058*** 0.173** 0.016**

(0.313) (0.018) (0.084) (0.006) Subscribers�D1 (0 < Subscribers < 1000) �0.156* 0.015*

(0.088) (0.008) Subscribers�D2 (1000 < Subscribers < 2000) 0.210** �0.002

(0.107) (0.008) Subscribers�D3 (2000 < Subscribers) 0.013 �0.017**

(0.130) (0.007) Observations 198,297 198,297 198,297 198,297 198,297 198,297 164,221 164,221 Firm fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Week fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes R-squared 0.520 0.386 0.520 0.386 0.520 0.386 0.526 0.378 Number of firms 767 767 767 767 767 767 767 767

Market factors Volatility impact Hong Kong

Turnover Spread Extensive Immediate Intensive Turnover Spread (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15)

Panel B: Market factors and further results DLevel II (Subscribers > 0) 0.095** 0.217***

(0.042) (0.068) D1 (0 < Subscribers < 1000) 0.017 0.019*** 0.093* �0.003 0.181*

(0.038) (0.005) (0.054) (0.225) (0.098) D2 (1000 < Subscribers < 2000) 0.125** 0.024*** 0.063 �0.251 0.546***

(0.051) (0.006) (0.081) (0.370) (0.204) D3 (2000 < Subscribers) 0.172** 0.018*** 0.097* �0.370 0.256**

(0.079) (0.006) (0.050) (0.654) (0.126) Turnover �0.013***

(0.001) Spread �0.911***

(0.068) Volatility 0.233*** �0.004***

(0.011) (0.001)

Observations 197,881 197,881 197,881 32,774 197,881 9,395 9,393 Firm fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Week fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes R-squared 0.568 0.397 0.517 0.401 0.517 0.249 0.189 Number of firms 767 767 767 764 767 50 50

The table shows further tests and extensions of previously establish results. First (columns 1–2), the linear relationship between liquidity and transparency is estimated by running the regression yit = a + b(Subscribersit) + fit + wt + cZit + eit, using the standard notation, where the number of subscribers is measured in hundreds of thousands. Second (columns 3–4), a log–log regression model of the form ln(yit) = a + bln(Subscribersit) + fit + wt + cZit is evaluated. Third, (columns 5–6), the marginal effect of increased transparency is estimated separately for the three intervals of software subscribers (using three slope function, rather than a three step function – see details in Eq. (8)). Fourth (columns 7–8), the January 2007–December 2008 boom-bust period (also coinciding with the operation of another transparency enhancing software named TopView) is excluded from the analysis. Fifth (columns 9–10), potentially endogenous market variables are controlled for by adding them to the benchmark model of Eq. (5). Sixth (columns 11–13), the key analysis of the paper is repeated using volatility as the outcome variable, as defined in the summary statistics in Table 3. Finally (columns 14–15), the liquidity effect on stocks of firms listed both in Shanghai and Hong Kong is examined (relative to effect on stocks of firms listed both in Shenzhen and Hong Kong – i.e. triple differencing). In columns (1)–(13) the results reflect the differences of Shanghai listed firms versus Shenzhen listed, where the sample is restricted on firms listed on either exchange before September 2000 and originating from outside the two cities. In all columns, robust standard errors are reported in parenthesis and are clustered by firm and week, i.e. taking into account that (i) the errors for the same firm may not be independent across time and (ii) that in any given week the errors may not be independent across firms. * Significance is reported at the 10% level. ** Significance is reported at the 5% level. *** Significance is reported at the 1% level.

202 Y. He et al. / Journal of Banking & Finance 44 (2014) 189–206

3.5.3. Marginal effects within each subscriber interval The main results on the intensive margin of transparency also

deserve further scrutiny. Namely, the three-step Eq. (5) – with cor- responding estimates reported in Table 7 – can easily be general- ized to allow for more flexibility within each interval. As an example of that, the three-step model can be generalized to a three-slope model, where the marginal transparency effect on

liquidity is allowed to differ within each of the three subscriber intervals (no longer assumed to be constant). Graphically, this implies that the three horizontal lines in Fig. 2 are allowed to have non-zero slopes within each interval. Thus, the resulting function will be closer to the overall pattern of the 5th order polynomial, but a parsimonious three-slope function will still maintain the ability to numerically quantify general trends and test their

0

50

100

150

200

250

300

350

2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010

Shanghai SE Composite Shenzhen SE Composite

S&P 500

Fig. 3. Chinese stock prices vs. S&P500. The figure displays the evolution of stock price indexes in China and the U.S. in 2000–2010. The Chinese indexes are the Shanghai and Shenzhen all composite indexes, whereas the S&P500 represents the U.S. market. For comparison purposes, each index has been set to a value of 100 in January 2000. Source: Datastream.

Y. He et al. / Journal of Banking & Finance 44 (2014) 189–206 203

differences (which is practically infeasible for the polynomial, as discussed in Section 3.4). In other words, it is possible to test whether the three slopes are different across intervals, implying different marginal effects of increased transparency within each stage of Level II subscription (i.e. non-monotonicity). More pre- cisely, the following three-slope model is estimated

yit ¼ aþ d1D1ð0<Subscr:it6100;000Þ þ b1Subscr:itD1ð0<Subscr:it6100;000Þ þ d2D2ð100;000<Subscr:it6200;000Þ þ b2Subscr:itD2ð100;000<Subscr:it6200;000Þ þ d3D3ð200;000>Subscr:it Þ þ b3Subscr:itD3ð200;000>Subscr:it Þ þ fi þwt þ cZit þ eit ð8Þ

where the relationship between transparency and liquidity is allowed to vary linearly within each subscriber interval (the first three rows represent three linear equations). This model can also be thought of as a direct three-step extension of the linear model presented in Eq. (6). The estimates are reported in columns 5–6 in Table 8, where the coefficients of interest are naturally not compa- rable to earlier results as they are reporting marginal effects (slopes) at each interval, rather than levels (steps). As expected, the slope coefficients convey a similar pattern as depicted by the 5th order polynomial in Fig. 2 (thus graphics are excluded for brev- ity). For example, the marginal effect of increased transparency leads bid–ask spreads to initially widen (0.015), then spreads remain around the same level (non-significant �0.002), before again narrowing (�0.017). A test of whether all three slopes are equal is strongly rejected (not reported), which reinforces the pre- viously established result that the liquidity impact depends on the degree of transparency already in place – i.e. there is a non- monotonic relationship between transparency and liquidity. Fur- thermore, this non-monotonicity now becomes marginally present for turnover as well, where turnover initially decreases (�0.156) before increasing again (0.210). The equality of all three slopes is accordingly rejected for turnover as well (not reported).

3.5.4. Exclusion of the 2007–08 period The Chinese stock market was very turbulent in the last decade.

After a stock market slump in 2001–2005, the market rebounded in 2006. This contributed to an existing frenzy of stock market spec- ulation (Ma, 1996; Girardin and Liu, 2003), which fueled immense turnover and volatility in 2007. The stock price rally in China went far beyond the experiences of other world markets, as demon- strated in Fig. 3 where historically high fluctuations in the S&P500 index seem miniscule in comparison to the Chinese market. As in other world markets, stock prices in China reached historic highs in 2007 before plummeting in 2008.

The unusual boom-bust era of 2007–08 may potentially affect the estimated liquidity impact of Level II, although notably Fig. 3 reveals very similar patterns for the Shanghai and Shenzhen stock markets. Hence, because previously established results measure the liquidity impact on Shanghai listed firms relative to their Shenzhen counterparts, this period is not likely to drive the differ- ential results across the two markets. But to fully verify this we also explicitly exclude the 2007–08 calendar years from the analy- sis. The results are reported in columns 7–8 of Table 8, which reruns the three-step regression model of Eq. (5). As the 2007–08 period roughly coincides with the period in which Level II had 100,000–200,000 subscribers, the coefficient estimate at this inter- val is naturally dropped. The results show that excluding the boom-bust period has no effect at all on the remaining estimates. More precisely, the initial impact of Level II (going from 0 to 100,000 subscribers) is unchanged for both liquidity measures and the cumulative change (over 200,000 subscribers) is also the same (cf. Table 7). Also, repeating the analysis of the overall impact of Level II (i.e. the extensive margin reported in Table 5) similarly

produces unchanged results (not reported). Thus, in conclusion, a strict exclusion of this period reconfirms that previous results can be fully contributed to the transparency changes of the Level II software.

Finally, it is worth noting that the robustness of excluding the 2007–08 period further rules out the impact of other market changes in that period. For example, as noted in Section 3.2 – and detailed in footnote 16 – the analysis takes extra care to control for the introduction of another transparency enhancing software (named TopView) in January 2007. Specifically, distributed piracy versions of the software content and the non-availability of sub- scriber data prevents a meticulous analysis (as opposed to the Level II transparency change). Thus, any potential effect of this change is filtered out by a binary dummy throughout the paper. But more- over, as the controversy around the TopView software led it to be cancelled in January of 2009, the period in which the software was in place coincides exactly with the 2007–08 crisis period. Thus, the results in Table 8 (columns 7–8) also reconfirm the non-signif- icance of this change on the estimated Level II impact.

3.5.5. Market factors: Liquidity and volatility So far the analysis has set aside potential issues of endogeneity.

More precisely, the variation in liquidity measures may be partly explained by various market variables (such as volatility), which in return are determined by liquidity. Madhavan et al. (2005) give a concrete example of this by pointing out that observed changes in spreads may not be solely due to changes in transparency, but may also be a function of e.g. turnover and return volatility. This implies that if these factors are not controlled for the results could be biased. Despite this fact, Eom et al. (2007) note that many stud- ies have not bothered to control for such factors or done so using inapplicable procedures. Hence, here we follow the methodology of Madhavan et al. (2005) and Eom et al. (2007) by controlling for both liquidity and volatility in our regression equations. The key results are reported in columns 9–10 in Table 8, in which the three-step Eq. (5) is estimated with the added endogenous con- trols. As shown, spreads are a significant determinant of turnover, and vice versa. As expected, return volatility also affects both liquidity measures. However, all coefficient estimates of the Level II effect are virtually unchanged, implying that our previous infer- ences do not result from endogenous changes in liquidity or vola- tility. In other words, even after controlling for other factors that may affect liquidity in this period, the results remain unchanged and thereby confirm our uncontrolled finding that liquidity is affected by the transparency change.

25 Intuitively, the triple difference methodology can be thought of as measuring the

ðdiff : betw: Shanghai and HK after Level IIÞ � ðdiff : betw: Shenzhen and HK after Level IIÞ

minus

ðdiff : betw: Shanghai and HK before Level IIÞ � ðdiff : betw: Shenzhen and HK before Level IIÞ:

In technical terms, this can more precisely be written as the general regression equation

yeit ¼ aþ De¼SH � gðSubscr:itÞ þ f ei þwit þwet þ cZ e it þ eeit

for each stock exchange e e {SH,SZ,HK} where the dummy variable takes the value of one for Shanghai listed stocks. We can write the difference between Shanghai and Hong Kong observations as

dySHit ¼ ySHit � yHKit ¼ gðSubscr:itÞ þ ðf SHi � f HKi Þ þ ðwSHt �wHKt Þ þ cðZ

SH it � Z

HK it Þ þ ðeSHit � eHKit Þ

¼ gðSubscr:itÞ þ FEi þWt þ cðZSHit � Z HK it Þ þ l

and similarly for Shenzhen,

dySZit ¼ FEi þWt þ cðZ SZ it � Z

HK it Þ þ lit

where no subscription software is available. Writing these two equations in one, we get the regression equation

dyeit ¼ De¼SH � gðSubscr:itÞ þ FEi þWt þ cðZ e it � Z

HK it Þ þ leit

204 Y. He et al. / Journal of Banking & Finance 44 (2014) 189–206

Lastly, although the primary focus of this study is to measure the liquidity impact of Level II, it is of additional interest to exam- ine the accompanied volatility impact thereof. Thus, instead of only employing volatility as a control variable, Table 8 also reports key regressions equations with volatility as the outcome variable. In short, the results show overall increased volatility in the post-Level II period (column 11), where the immediate impact is particularly large (column 12). More specifically, there is an immediate 0.217 increase in average daily standard deviation of returns, which is a sizeable 6% increase compared to the average daily volatility level (3.56 as reported in Table 3). The results thereby align with the previously reported liquidity estimates, where the change in the information set has the strongest effect on the first subscribers to the transparency enhancing software. This is further verified when studying the intensive margin of the gradual transparency increase (column 13) that shows an immediate effect, followed by smaller and non-monotonic volatility changes.

3.5.6. Further results: Hong Kong cross-lists Lastly, it is of interest to push the analysis a step further by eval-

uating whether the Level II transparency-enhancing event had any influence on Chinese stocks that are cross-listed elsewhere. More specifically, a small sub sample of 42 Shanghai firms (and 8 Shenz- hen firms) that are cross-listed in Hong Kong, may or may not be affected by the Shanghai specific transparency change. This will depend on the fundamental nature of the transparency change and on how different liquidity measures (turnover and bid–ask spreads) are determined in the market. To clarify this point it is useful to discuss each liquidity measure separately.

It has been established in this paper that the increase in turnover on Shanghai is directly associated with the transparency enhancing event of Level II – an event which in contrast provides no additional trading information on the Hong Kong order book. This observation, however, does not necessarily imply that the volume of Hong Kong cross-listed stocks will be unaffected. Specifically, volume patterns are generally not exchange specific, so this increased turnover effect on Shanghai is likely to spread to other markets – even if those markets are not directly affected by the transparency change. For example, Chowdhry and Nanda (1991) present a model in which fragmented markets exist in equilibrium and informed trad- ers benefit by splitting orders across markets.24 Menkveld and Albert (2008) investigates this empirically for a sample of U.S. and U.K. cross-listed stocks and finds that traders indeed engage in order splitting across markets. Thus, if there is a market specific change that increases local trading activity, this increase should be transmitted to other markets as investors tend to trade in the same stock across multiple markets. This is likely to apply in the sample of cross-listed Chinese stocks, where the correlation of turnover across markets is found to be 0.91 over the sample period. In other words, the observed volume increase in Shanghai associated with greater transparency is likely to spill over to Hong Kong as well.

In contrast, there is no reason to presume this aligned pattern also holds true for bid–ask spreads, since those are determined quite differently across markets. As argued above, the widening of bid–ask spreads is consistent with the fact that Level II software allows subscribers to better identify traders. However, the Level II software only provides this information for the Shanghai order book, whereas it is not possible to infer the identity of traders on the Hong Kong exchange. Thus, there is no reason for market mak- ers to change bid–ask quotes in Hong Kong since the Level II soft- ware is silent on possible trader identities in the Hong Kong order book. This presumption is consistent with very low correlation of

24 See also related work on fragmented markets in Pagano (1989), Biais (1993), Bernhardt and Hughson (1997), Biais et al. (2000), de Frutos and Manzano (2002) and Yin (2005).

bid–ask spreads across markets, which is calculated to be only �0.02 (and not significantly different from zero) for cross-listed stocks over the sample period.In order to empirically investigate these relationships we revisit the regression framework of Eq. (5), but now employ a triple difference methodology. Namely, the effect of Level II (before-after difference) is compared across Shanghai and Shenzhen listed stocks (second difference), relative to their Hong Kong issues (third difference). More specifically, in the cross-listing sample each firm has two observations; one from either Shanghai or Shenzhen, the other one from Hong Kong. The difference between these two observations is taken for each pair of stocks and the effect of Level II is measured for the Shanghai group relative to the Shenzhen group. Compared to only examining Shanghai and Hong Kong stocks before and after the introduction to Level II (i.e. double differencing), the advantage of employing a triple difference methodology (i.e. Shanghai vs. Hong Kong differ- ences compared to Shenzhen vs. Hong Kong differences) is that this allows us to control for general trends in liquidity. More specifi- cally, this methodology controls for the general trend in the liquid- ity difference between Shanghai and Hong Kong stocks (by assuming this trend is the same for Shenzhen vs. Hong Kong stocks).25

The estimates are reported in columns 14–15 of Table 8. In short, the results are as expected. First, there is no statistical differ- ence in variation in turnover between the pair of stocks that are issued both in Shanghai and Hong Kong. The absence of statistical difference suggests that turnover has also increased for Hong Kong cross-listed stocks as a result of the transparency change. In other words, the increase in turnover for Shanghai listed firms (estab- lished in e.g. Section 3.2) has also spilled over to the Hong Kong

for exchanges e e {SH,SZ}. Thus, we regress the difference in liquidity measures on the number of subscribers (replacing g(�) with a three-step function), firm fixed effects, week fixed effects and other potential controls. As such, the model is intui- tively the same as before, except the liquidity for each stock is measured as the dif- ference between its Shanghai (or Shenzhen) value and its Hong Kong value.

Y. He et al. / Journal of Banking & Finance 44 (2014) 189–206 205

market among cross-listed firms, consistent with the predictions of existing literature. Also as expected, spreads react differently in the two markets. The previously established result of wider bid–ask spreads is only observed in the Shanghai market for cross-listed firms, as indicated by the significantly positive difference in col- umn 15. This conforms to the idea that bid–ask spreads widen in Shanghai as trader identification becomes feasible, in contrast to Hong Kong where no such transparency change takes place and thus there is no apparent reason for changed bid–ask quotes in Hong Kong.

4. Concluding remarks

It is established that an increase in trade transparency on the Shanghai Stock Exchange has led to increased trading activity among Shanghai (and Hong Kong cross-listed) stocks. Although increased trading activity is generally associated with narrower bid–ask spreads, the contrary holds true within the setting of this study. More precisely, broker anonymity and more informed trad- ing results in wider bid–ask spreads, which contradicts the fre- quent policy claim that ‘more is better’ when setting the level of trade transparency. In other words, the conclusion that more trans- parency can be detrimental to market quality has in fact been actively ignored by policy makers who have generally pushed for more transparency whenever markets have turned, in the honest belief that only in ‘‘exceptional circumstances . . . transparency sometimes hurts the customer’’ (Wall Street Journal, 2010).

These overall effects are the strongest immediately following the transparency change, suggesting a significant impact on insti- tutional traders subscribing relatively early. Additionally, there is evidence of changed trading behavior (fewer trades carrying more volume) and alterations in other market outcomes besides liquid- ity, such as increased volatility. Thus, the transparency impact is wide reaching and with counter-acting welfare implications. In other words, even if high transparency may generate a more just market and less opaqueness surrounding trading intentions, it can- not be concluded that it is necessarily welfare improving.

To further complicate policy intervention, it is established that liquidity does not react monotonically to increasing levels of trans- parency (cf. Fig. 2), implying that there may be no ‘one-size-fits-all’ policy available. More specifically, the incremental effect of increased transparency depends heavily on the degree of transpar- ency already in the system. This indicates that a policy recommen- dation beneficial in one country may be detrimental to another.

To summarize, the results provide noteworthy policy consider- ations by revealing that the effect of increased transparency (i) may be detrimental to the market and (ii) highly sensitive to the existing level of transparency. From a policy standpoint, these two results are of value given the seemingly unshaken and con- trasting policy expectation of better market outcomes with more trade transparency. Instead, the findings suggest that the merits of transparency altering policies must be evaluated in relation to pre-existing transparency levels within the each setting. Finally, the result that different outcomes are likely with different starting points of transparency has not been previously documented in the empirical literature – and can further reconcile its opposing results since every empirical analysis is bound to evaluate transparency effects relative to a regime already in place in the corresponding market.

Acknowledgements

We are grateful for valuable discussions and comments from Yakov Amihud, Joel Hasbrouck, Terry Hendershott, Søren Hvidkjær, Michael Paetz, Stefan Prigge, an anonymous referee

and participants at the INFINITI 2012 conference in Dublin and the 19th annual conference of Multinational Finance Society in Krakow. We also benefitted greatly from data support provided by Yingjun Daniel He, Jun Li, Shenqiang Lü, Dingshan Wan, Yan Wang (Great Wisdom Co.), Xiaohua Zhang and the Shanghai Stock Exchange. Yinghua He acknowledges financial supports from the European Union’s Seventh Framework Programme (FP7/2007– 2013) under the Grant agreement no. 295298 (Dysmoia). All remaining errors are our own.

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  • Subscribing to transparency
    • 1 Introduction
    • 2 Background information
      • 2.1 Literature review
      • 2.2 Transparency changes
      • 2.3 Stock market structure
    • 3 Empirical analysis
      • 3.1 Data and sample specification
        • 3.1.1 Subscriber data
        • 3.1.2 Outcome variables
        • 3.1.3 Control group and identification
      • 3.2 Overall effect (extensive margin)
      • 3.3 Immediate impact (early subscribers)
        • 3.3.1 Other measures of trading behavior
      • 3.4 Gradual increase in transparency access (intensive margin)
      • 3.5 Robustness and further results
        • 3.5.1 Different functional form: Linear relationship
        • 3.5.2 Different functional form: Log–log specification
        • 3.5.3 Marginal effects within each subscriber interval
        • 3.5.4 Exclusion of the 2007–08 period
        • 3.5.5 Market factors: Liquidity and volatility
        • 3.5.6 Further results: Hong Kong cross-lists
    • 4 Concluding remarks
    • Acknowledgements
    • References

The-choice-between-informal-and-formal-restructuring--T_2014_Journal-of-Bank.pdf

Journal of Banking & Finance 44 (2014) 248–263

Contents lists available at ScienceDirect

Journal of Banking & Finance

journal homepage: www.elsevier .com/locate / jbf

The choice between informal and formal restructuring: The case of French banks facing distressed SMEs q

http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jbankfin.2014.04.015 0378-4266/� 2014 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

q This study was financed by S&P Risk Solution and Fond National de la Recherche (Luxembourg). The authors thank Julian Franks, Oren Sussman, Seigeï Davydenko, Arnaud de Servigny, Michael Baker, Laurent Weill, Christophe Godlewski, Lorenzo Naranjo and an anonymous referee for their valuable comments, help, and advice. We are grateful to the five anonymous banks for granting us access to their data. Finally, we thank our research assistants for collecting the data. We remain accountable for any remaining errors. ⇑ Corresponding author. Tel.: +33 368852152.

E-mail addresses: [email protected] (R. Blazy), [email protected] (J. Martel), [email protected] (N. Nigam).

1 See La Porta et al. (1997, 1998) for a classification of bankruptcy systems around the world.

2 See Graph 1 in Appendix A1 for the distribution of corporate bankru France since 1990.

Régis Blazy a,⇑, Jocelyn Martel b, Nirjhar Nigam c a University of Strasbourg, EM Strasbourg Business School, IEP Strasbourg, LARGE, France b ESSEC Business School and THEMA, France c ICN Business School, France

a r t i c l e i n f o

Article history: Received 30 July 2012 Accepted 15 April 2014 Available online 24 April 2014

JEL classification: G33 K22

Keywords: Bankruptcy Renegotiation Banks SME Sequential LOGIT

a b s t r a c t

This empirical paper investigates the paths leading to the resolution of financial distress for a sample of small and medium-sized French firms in default, focusing in particular on their decisions between bank- ruptcy and informal (out-of-court) renegotiations. The procedure is depicted as a sequential game in which stakeholders first decide whether to engage in an informal renegotiation. Second, conditional on opting for renegotiation, the debtor and its creditors may succeed or fail in reaching an agreement to restructure the firm’s capital structure. We test different hypotheses that capture (i) coordination and bargaining power issues, (ii) informational problems, (iii) firm characteristics, and (iv) loan characteris- tics. The empirical implementation is based on sequential LOGIT regressions. First, we find that the like- lihood of informal renegotiations increases with loan size and the proportion of long-term debt. These two results support the argument that size matters when deciding whether to opt for informal renego- tiation. Second, the probability of a successful renegotiation decreases when (i) the bank in charge of han- dling the process is the debtor’s ‘‘main’’ creditor and when (ii) the firm is badly rated and its management is considered faulty. Third, the estimations show that collateral plays a significant role in the first stage of the renegotiation process. However, it does not impact the likelihood of success in reaching a renegoti- ated agreement. Finally, some banks are clearly better than others at leading successful renegotiation processes.

� 2014 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

1. Introduction

In their seminal work, La Porta et al. (1997, 1998) highlighted the main differences in bankruptcy procedures across countries. Although there have been harmonization attempts over the past two decades, important differences remain with respect to their structures and functioning.1 As one might expect, these differences are likely to affect the default process prior to bankruptcy. From a

conceptual perspective, default can be viewed as a two-stage mech- anism. In the first stage, a firm fails to repay its debt obligations or chooses to postpone its payments. At this point, the firm can either engage in informal (out-of-court) restructuring negotiations with its creditors or file for formal bankruptcy. In the second stage, condi- tional on having opted for out-of-court restructuring, the negotiation process may either succeed or fail. In the event of failure, the firm seeks protection from the bankruptcy court.

According to Haugen and Senbet (1978, 1988), firms in default and their creditors have incentives to opt for informal renegotia- tions because private restructuring is less costly than the formal bankruptcy process and because firms and their creditors can internalize the costs savings. However, the persistent use of bankruptcy procedures shows that although they are less costly, informal arrangements are not always feasible.2 Indeed, the trade- off between out-of-court and court solutions is not straightforward

ptcies in

3 This dataset is the French portion of a wider database (France, the United Kingdom, and Germany) examined by Davydenko and Franks (2008).

4 Note that there has been an increasing use of ‘‘pre-pack’’ proposals in recent years.

R. Blazy et al. / Journal of Banking & Finance 44 (2014) 248–263 249

and depends on a number of factors, such as the classic common- pool problem, the nature of the banking relationship, the presence of information asymmetry, the design of debt contracts, and the country-specific characteristics of the bankruptcy law.

Using firm-level data from Illinois (Cook County), Morrison (2008) documented the importance of non-bankruptcy procedures in the U.S. The author theoretically and empirically studied the conditions under which a firm chooses federal bankruptcy law over non-bankruptcy state procedures. In Europe, two recent studies (Franks and Sussman, 2005 in the UK and Jostarndt and Sautner, 2010 in Germany) examined the variables that influence creditors’ and debtors’ strategies after default. These studies covered two of the most important European legal systems, Common Law and German Civil Law. However, there are significant differences between the two systems, especially with respect to the designs of their respective bankruptcy codes. Surprisingly, no study to date has examined the functioning of French Civil Law, which has inspired other important legal systems in continental Europe, such as those in Belgium and Luxembourg.

This research contributes to bankruptcy literature by examining the decisions between informal (out-of-court) renegotiations and formal bankruptcy procedures for a sample of French firms in default. Unlike previous studies that model default resolution as a static process (simple LOGIT or PROBIT approaches), we model it as a two-stage dynamic process. First, the debtor and its creditors decide between engaging in an informal renegotiation aimed at reaching a new agreement on the firm’s capital structure and filing for a formal bankruptcy procedure. Second, conditional on opting for the informal procedure, the renegotiation process may either succeed (informal agreement) or fail (bankruptcy). Indeed, one can expect that the decision whether to undertake informal rene- gotiations is conditional on the expected outcome of the process. Thus, we propose a sequential LOGIT model that explicitly consid- ers the two transitional stages, thereby accounting for the accumu- lation of information during the renegotiation process.

We test for a number of hypotheses. The first hypothesis (H1) encompasses the coordination and bargaining problems that may arise after default. The ‘‘coordination’’ hypothesis suggests that the likelihood of reaching an informal agreement increases with creditors’ concentration, whereas the ‘‘bargaining power’’ hypoth- esis suggests the opposite. Consider a distressed firm with several creditors, one of which is the firm’s main creditor. Given its deci- sive role in the firm’s financing, one can expect the judge’s position to reflect the main creditor’s interests. Thus, from the main credi- tor’s perspective, formal bankruptcy may be a suitable solution because it provides a standardized and secure framework in which to implement its preferred solution. In addition, one can argue that if a firm is financed by one main creditor with strong bargaining power, this creditor may become too greedy during negotiations, thereby forcing the firm to opt for formal bankruptcy. Although there could be a tradeoff between the coordination and bargaining power hypotheses, we conjecture that the latter dominates the for- mer in the context of the French court-administered bankruptcy system.

The second hypothesis (H2) reflects the informational problems that abound in financial distress situations. These problems can be mitigated by the length of the relationship between the bank and the firm and by the use of collateral, which can act as a signaling device for the firm. We predict that the likelihood of an informal renegotiation increases with the length of the banking relationship and the level of collateral. The third hypothesis (H3) captures the impact of the firm’s characteristics. We predict that the likelihood of an informal renegotiation increases with the firm’s profitability and with the management’s competence and reliability. Finally, the fourth hypothesis (H4) examines the role of the loan character- istics in the type of procedure used to resolve financial distress.

This effect is captured by two variables: the size of the loan and the level of collateral. We predict that the probability of an infor- mal workout increases with the size of the loan, whereas the effect of collateral is undetermined and depends on two factors: (i) the strength of the bank’s liquidation bias and (ii) the severity with which the absolute priority rule (APR) is applied.

The analysis is based on an original data set collected from five French commercial banks located in the cities of Paris, Marseilles, and Reims.3 These five banks collectively represent approximately one-fourth of the French banking sector in terms of market share. Under the supervision of Standard & Poor’s Risk Solution, the data were manually collected from the banks’ recovery units. The sample includes 735 credit lines allocated to 386 distressed companies. A firm is considered in ‘‘default’’ when the repayment delay exceeds 90 days. Our variables cover the firms’ individual characteristics, including company profiles, the causes of default, and loan characteristics.

Our main findings are as follows. First, the likelihood of opting for an informal renegotiation over a formal bankruptcy procedure increases with the size of the loan authorized to the firm and with the percentage of long-term debt. This suggests that informal rene- gotiation is more likely when the amount at stake is significant and when the bank and the debtor are engaged in a strong long-term lending relationship. In addition, the presence of personal guaran- tees from individuals combined with the absence of a firm rating increases the probability of opting for an informal work-out. Sec- ond, the probability of a successful renegotiation decreases when the bank in charge of handling the default resolution process is also the firm’s main creditor. This suggests that the bargaining power argument dominates the coordination argument. In addition, badly rated firms whose managers are considered to be faulty have a sig- nificantly lower chance of reaching a final agreement in an infor- mal restructuring. However, these variables do not affect the decision whether to enter into a renegotiation. Finally, we find that some banks are better than others at reaching successful renegoti- ation agreements.

The article is organized as follows. Section 1 offers a brief review of the literature on the resolution of financial distress. Section 2 presents the different hypotheses to be tested. Section 3 discusses the data and presents some descriptive statistics. Section 4 presents the econometric implementation of the sequen- tial LOGIT estimation and the results. We conclude in Section 5.

2. The resolution of financial distress

Strictly speaking, a firm is considered in financial distress when it cannot meet its current obligations as they come due. According to the Basel II criteria, a firm is in ‘‘default’’ when its scheduled pay- ments are delayed for more than 90 days. In this situation, the debtor and its creditors must find a solution. There are basically two mechanisms for the resolution of financial distress. First, stakeholders can initiate negotiations aimed at arriving at an infor- mal (out-of-court) restructuring of the firm’s capital structure. Typically, this involves the reduction of current debt obligations or their postponement to a later date. Second, they can opt for a formal bankruptcy procedure pursuant to which the firm can file for either liquidation or reorganization under the supervision of a bankruptcy court. For example, in the U.S., a firm can file for Chap- ter 7 (liquidation) or Chapter 11 (reorganization). In the latter case, the firm files a plan of reorganization that must be approved by creditors and confirmed by the court.4 In the U.K, the bankruptcy

250 R. Blazy et al. / Journal of Banking & Finance 44 (2014) 248–263

procedure (administrative receivership, until 2003) is controlled by a secured creditor who appoints a receiver to take control of the firm to realize enough funds to repay the creditor. In France, a firm in financial distress can opt for redressement judiciaire, whereby an administrator is appointed to find a solution to the firm’s financial problems. His main objectives are to (i) preserve the firm as a going concern, (ii) save jobs and (iii) repay creditors. Following a detailed analysis of the firm’s financial health, a judge rules on the firm’s future. The judge’s ruling may require piecemeal liquidation, the sale of the firm as a going concern5 or the reorganization of the firm pur- suant to a continuation plan. Creditors have no say in the judge’s decision.

According to Haugen and Senbet (1978), Roe (1983) and Jensen (1989, 1991), because informal restructuring is less costly than a formal bankruptcy proceeding, both distressed firms and their creditors should opt for the former solution to internalize the cost savings, which could then be shared. There exists some empirical evidence to support this prediction. Gilson et al. (1990) examine 18 exchange offers of publicly traded firms and estimate that the costs of informal workouts represent 0.65% (median 0.32%) of the book value of the firms’ respective assets. Based on a sample of 29 exchange offers, Betker (1997) reports a mean direct cost of 2.5% (median 2%) for pre-restructuring total assets. These costs are lower than the direct costs typically associated with court- supervised bankruptcy procedures (Ang et al., 1982; White, 1989; Biais et al., 1995; Fisher and Martel, 2005). Finally, informal workouts are known to be faster than court-supervised proce- dures; therefore, informal workouts also involve lower indirect costs.6

There is still much to be learned regarding the structure of informal workouts and the extent to which they are used by firms in financial distress. Unlike formal bankruptcy procedures, negoti- ations leading to workouts are often confidential to maintain the company’s ongoing business activities and goodwill. Informal negotiations ensure confidential treatment of the financial difficul- ties encountered by the firm and preserve both creditors’ confi- dence and the firm’s image for investors and the public. For example, Chatterjee et al. (1995) find less negative abnormal returns for announcements of workouts than for Chapter 11 filings. Gilson et al. (1990) find that stock returns are more negative for firms that subsequently file for Chapter 11, indicating that the mar- ket is able to identify which firms will successfully renegotiate their debt. In addition, Franks and Torous (1994) report that firms that successfully reach workout agreements with their creditors are more solvent and liquid than firms that emerge from court- supervised restructuring. They also find evidence that senior cred- itors in private workouts are willing to forego some of their prior- ities to junior creditors, illustrating the importance of bargaining in the context of a workout agreement.

Nonetheless, a large number of firms end up in formal bank- ruptcy procedures. There are a number of reasons that explain this outcome, and they are linked to the impediments that can thwart successful conclusions to informal renegotiations. Indeed, there are well-known conditions under which a private workout is the effi- cient solution to financial distress: (i) perfect coordination, (ii) complete contracts, and (iii) symmetric information. However, in practice, these conditions may not be satisfied, which makes the prospect of a successful renegotiation less likely.

5 A going-concern sale can be viewed as a mix of the liquidation and reorganization procedures. First, the firm’s assets are sold as a whole to a buyer, and the mandate of existing managers is terminated. Second, the business continues, often on a smaller scale, and some jobs are preserved. Until 2005, going-concern sales were viewed as an alternative way to reorganize bankrupt firms. Since the 2005 reform, sales are assimilated to liquidation procedures.

6 See Hotchkiss et al. (2008) for a complete survey of bankruptcy costs in the U.S.

One impediment to an informal workout is the presence of coordination issues due to the dispersion of creditors. Studies by Bulow and Shoven (1978), Gertner and Scharfstein (1991), Franks and Torous (1991), Roe (1987) and White (1989) illustrate the problems that can arise in a multi-creditor context. First, it is prone to holdout problems. This is particularly important in the case of a public debt restructuring in which a new agreement on the interest rate, extension of maturity and principal requires unanimity. By holding out, a creditor hopes to increase the relative value of its own claims in the event that the agreement is accepted by all other parties. As noted by Grossman and Hart (1981), this effect might be stronger for lower-ranked creditors (individual bondholders and trade creditors) who may feel that their decisions to hold out have little impact on the outcome of the restructuring process. Thus, given that each creditor has the same incentives, negotiations may fail. According to Blazy and Chopard (2004), such free-riding incentives could be reduced if bankruptcy law allowed some devi- ation from the APR. These deviations could then be internalized through the private negotiation process (Frierman and Viswanath, 1994).7 Note that this coordination issue, strictly speak- ing, is not linked to the number of creditors involved in the bank- ruptcy process but to the bargaining power of a single creditor or a group of creditors. Indeed, even in the presence of numerous cred- itors, coordination issues may be solved easily if a large single cred- itor or a group of creditors has sufficient bargaining power to impose a settlement on the rest of the creditors.

The presence of many creditors may also lead to the formation of coalitions and conflicts of interest. For example, management, representing equity holders, may be incentivized to form a coali- tion with the banks to extract rents from bondholders (Bulow and Shoven, 1978). In addition, different classes of creditors may have different preferences regarding the outcome of the negotia- tion process, and this may lead to a common-pool problem and a race for the firm’s assets by individual creditors. In such a case, reaching an agreement that suits all parties may become impossible.

A second impediment to informal workouts is the incomplete- ness of contracts. As argued by Hart (1995), complete contracts are difficult and costly to enforce because assets and cash flows may vary over time, requiring contracts to be adjusted continu- ously to be complete. Given these difficulties, it may be impossible to design a contract that specifies the most appropriate procedure to follow in every possible set of circumstances. Hence, contracts are by definition incomplete. From that perspective, the implemen- tation of a centralized legal procedure, arbitrated and supervised by a judge, might facilitate the implementation of necessary adjustments when unexpected states of the world arise.

Finally, a third impediment to informal workouts is information asymmetry. The main issue in a restructuring is the firm’s value. It is generally accepted that managers are better informed about the value of firm assets and future cash flows than outside creditors and investors (Myers and Majluf, 1984). This informational advan- tage may be used by managers to extract a rent from creditors. In this context, Giammarino (1989) and Mooradian (1994) show that poorly informed creditors may prefer a formal and more costly court-supervised restructuring process to an informal workout. According to Carapeto (2005), the presence of information asym- metry can lead to extended bargaining, requiring several rounds of negotiations before any agreement can be reached. Hence, uncertainty about firm value might convince creditors to opt for a costly bankruptcy procedure in which they would receive better and more accurate information regarding the true value of the

7 See Weiss (1990) and Franks and Torous (1989, 1991) for evidence of APR deviations.

R. Blazy et al. / Journal of Banking & Finance 44 (2014) 248–263 251

firm. An alternative theory has been suggested by Hotchkiss and Mooradian (2003), who show that in the context of bankruptcy auctions, a combined bid for the firm by a coalition of management and creditors may convey positive information about the firm’s true value to outside investors.

In addition, there is some empirical evidence on the theoretical difficulties of reaching an agreement in an informal setting. Gilson et al. (1990) examine a sample of 169 financially distressed firms and find that 53% of them fail to restructure privately. Franks and Torous (1994) find similar results. According to Jensen (1991), the legal environment in which informal workouts are con- ducted may partially explain the relative decline in the use of pri- vate workouts. The author cites the LTV Corp. bankruptcy case as an example. In this case, the court held that the debt holders who had participated in the out-of-court restructuring could only be compensated for the reduced claims embodied in the restruc- turing agreement, whereas the debt holders who held out could receive the full amount of their original claim. This decision was expected to have a negative effect on creditors’ behavior and pos- sibly reinforce their incentives to hold out during informal workouts.

In sum, there are some significant impediments to informal workouts. However, there are also means by which these impedi- ments can be mitigated. Gilson et al. (1990) show that negotiations in the context of an informal workout are more likely to succeed when a firm has close relationships with its banks and addresses a smaller pool of banks. The authors also find that firms with larger proportions of intangible assets prefer informal workouts because these firms are more likely to lose value through fire sales or the loss of customers in formal bankruptcy procedures. In addition, they suggest that the likelihood of reaching an informal workout agreement increases when a firm has fewer categories of debt, especially if there is a high proportion of long-term bank debt. Indeed, a smaller number of debt categories and more debt owed to banks, which are assumed to be better informed, have a positive impact on the outcome of negotiations. James (1995) and Asquith et al. (1994) also claim that presence of public debt, as opposed to private bank debt, may hinder the workout process. Chatterjee et al. (1995) show that the choice of out-of-court restructuring depends on the firm’s debt level, its short-term liquidity and the likelihood of coordination problems among creditors. Finally, a number of studies examine cases in Japan, which is known for the significance of its banking relationships. According to Hoshi et al. (1990), the presence of strong ties (keiretsu) between a firm and its main bank reduces agency costs and allows the firm to sus- tain a higher bank debt to asset ratio. According to Kaplan and Minton (1994), the main bank plays a very important role in mon- itoring firms and thus serves as an alternative corporate gover- nance mechanism. This is especially valid in periods of financial distress (Kang and Shivdasani, 1995). However, as noted by Peek and Rosengren (2005), the strong banking relationships in Japan can also generate perverse incentives for banks to continue lending to weak firms.8

It is now clear that the choice between an informal negotiation (workout) and a formal bankruptcy procedure depends on a num- ber of factors and that there may be reasons why stakeholders might opt for the more costly formal procedure. The next section

8 There is some interesting literature that analyzes the debt restructuring of Japanese firms. For example, Inoue et al. (2008) analyze the existence of abnormal returns for Japanese-listed firms in debt restructurings that are led by banks as opposed to other third parties. Similarly, Inoue et al. (2010) focus on the post- restructuring performances of firms rescued in out-of-court settlements. Finally, Caballero et al. (2008) examine the role of banks in generating ‘‘zombie firms’’ and prolonging the Japanese crisis of the 1990’s. Although they are related to our research topic, these studies focus primarily on the outcomes rather than on the decision- making processes of debt restructuring.

develops a number of theoretical hypotheses proposed in the liter- ature that could explain this decision.

3. Hypotheses

This section reviews the main theoretical arguments and pro- poses a number of hypotheses relating to the determinants of financial distress resolution. These hypotheses highlight the roles played by firm characteristics, the type of debt contract(s), the par- ticulars of the relationship between the firm and the bank, and the laws governing corporate bankruptcy.

Hypothesis 1. Coordination vs. Bargaining Power

One common view in the bankruptcy literature is that formal bankruptcy can minimize the coordination problems that arise during debt restructuring. According to Jackson (1986), ‘‘The basic problem that bankruptcy law is designed to handle, both as a norma- tive matter and as a positive matter, is that the system of individual creditor remedies may be bad for the creditors as a group when there are not enough assets to go around. Because creditors have conflicting rights, there is a tendency in their debt-collection efforts to make a bad situation worse. Bankruptcy law responds to this problem.’’

By freezing creditors’ individual rights (with a ‘‘stay of claims’’) and by defining coordinated decision mechanisms (creditors’ votes, court judgments, etc.), a formal bankruptcy procedure offers a means to avoid the common-property problem and enables a fair assessment of both the firm’s assets and the creditors’ rights to maximize the value of the firm. In contrast, an informal negotiation does not require a similarly structured process and instead relies primarily on consensus or unanimity. Accordingly, an informal negotiation may give rise to conflicts of interest that can hinder the resolution of financial distress.

As previously mentioned, a number of studies have shown that informal workouts are more likely when there are fewer classes of creditors and when a large portion of the firm’s long-term debt is held by banks. These findings suggest that debt restructuring through a private workout is easier to attain when creditors are less dispersed. Thus, we expect coordination problems to be less acute when there are fewer categories of claimants covered by the APR. Note that we focus on the concentration of creditors rather than the number of creditors because the latter may be insufficient to capture the nature of the coordination issue. We can now state our first hypothesis (H1A).

H1A (Coordination). The probability of an informal renegotiation increases with the concentration of creditors.

A recent study in Belgium by Dewaelheyns and Van Hulle (2009) suggests a different view and claims that ‘‘the bank may be less supportive (. . .) if the chances that substantial value may be lost in the future are high. In practice, reorganization is unfeasi- ble without bank support’’.9 This argument underscores the bar- gaining power that some important creditors may have over the debtor’s fate. The question is whether this argument applies to the French insolvency system, in which bankruptcy procedures are han- dled mainly by a judge, and creditors do not vote on the final out- come.10 Consider a distressed firm with several creditors, one of which is the main creditor, i.e., the bank whose financial support represents a necessary condition for continuation. Given the main

9 Note that the authors of that study focus only on the period before reorganization terminates and that their sample is restricted to formal reorganization procedures.

10 This rule prevails for the period under study. In 2005, a new voting procedure was introduced for large firms in reorganization. However, this vote is conducted under the supervision of a judge and applies only in large cases (i.e., firms with more than 150 employees and turnovers in excess of 20 M€).

12 According the first pillar of the Basel II agreement, the expected loss is the

252 R. Blazy et al. / Journal of Banking & Finance 44 (2014) 248–263

creditor’s decisive role in the firm’s financing and the absence of alternative sources of financing, one can expect the judge’s position to reflect the main creditor’s interests. In particular, the decision to keep the firm in business (continuation) can hardly be taken without the bank’s support. Thus, from the main creditor’s point of view, for- mal bankruptcy may be a suitable solution because it provides a standardized and secure framework in which to implement its pre- ferred solution. In addition, one can argue that if a firm is financed by one main creditor with strong bargaining power, this creditor may become too greedy during negotiations and thereby force the firm to opt for formal bankruptcy.11 These arguments provide an alternative hypothesis to H1A.

H1B (Bargaining:). The probability of informal renegotiation decreases with the concentration of creditors.

Based on our analysis of the French bankruptcy system, we conjecture that the bargaining argument (H1B) dominates the coordination argument (H1A). However, this remains a matter of empirical verification.

Hypothesis 2. Information

Most theoretical works in economics and finance are based on the assumption that banks and investors have less information than managers regarding a firm’s prospects, thereby generating adverse selection (Stiglitz and Weiss, 1981; Myers and Majluf, 1984) and moral hazard problems (De Meza and Webb, 1987). Adverse selection stems from the banks’ inability to observe the quality of the project to be financed, whereas moral hazard is associated with the debtor’s opportunistic behavior.

There are different means by which these two problems can be mitigated. First, information asymmetry is less severe when the firm and the bank have been involved in a long-term credit rela- tionship. Ceteris paribus, being more informed should increase the likelihood of an informal renegotiation because there is less need to trigger bankruptcy and pay the associated costs to discover information (Webb, 1987). In addition, reputation and trust are built over time in the context of a long and stable financial rela- tionship. Triggering bankruptcy may damage that trust and reputa- tion and destroy the accumulated value. Thus,

H2A. The probability of informal renegotiation increases with the duration of the banking relationship.

Second, collateral can be used as a signaling device by ‘‘high- quality’’ borrowers to distinguish themselves from ‘‘low-quality’’ borrowers. Indeed, the use of collateral is assumed to be more costly for ‘‘low-quality’’ borrowers who have a higher risk of default and hence are more likely to lose their collateral (Bester, 1985; Besanko and Thakor, 1987). In addition, collateral can be used to reduce moral hazard problems and align the respective interests of the firm and the bank, especially when managers have incentives to switch projects and consider riskier investments. In that context, a personal guarantee on a manager’s assets represents a convenient tool to control the risk-taking behavior of manage- ment because the higher value of collateral imposes a greater loss in the event of default. In addition, this incentive effect is expected to be stronger for outside collateral (Bester, 1994; Boot et al., 1991; Hainz, 2003). In a nutshell, the use of collateral is a powerful way to gather information when the bank is under-informed about the quality of its borrowers. Ceteris paribus, better information should ease the renegotiation process. Thus,

11 This argument is especially true for countries such as France, which have debtor- friendly bankruptcy laws.

H2B. The probability of informal renegotiation increases with the presence of collateral.

One should note that this argument has been challenged by Berger and Udell (1990) and Jiménez et al. (2006), who argue that banks have sufficient information (e.g., financial reports, bank account activity, and random audits) to sort their borrowers appro- priately. For example, banks use credit scoring to assess a firm’s default probability and screen prospective borrowers. This argu- ment is known as the ‘‘risk-observed hypothesis’’. More recently, in their study of Japanese SME loan market, Ono and Uesugi (2009) find no evidence of a relationship between a firm’s riskiness and the use of collateral. Finally, as discussed below, the use of col- lateral can generate conflicting incentives for banks considering whether to participate in a renegotiation.

Hypothesis 3. Firm characteristics

The likelihood of opting for an informal renegotiation also depends on certain firm-specific factors, such as (i) firm profitabil- ity and (ii) the managers’ competency and reliability. Both factors are expected to be key elements in a successful renegotiation. First, an increase in profitability is synonymous with higher cash flows and a lower probability of default if the firm is restructured. Sec- ond, competent and reliable managers are more likely to be in a position to successfully restructure the firm in the context of an informal workout. Therefore, we can make the following hypotheses:

H3A. The probability of informal renegotiation increases with the firm’s profitability.

H3B. The probability of informal renegotiation increases with the manager’s competency and reliability.

Hypothesis 4. Loan characteristics

In addition to the above factors, we conjecture that the likeli- hood of informal renegotiation may depend on the characteristics of the loan, in particular the amount of the loan (or maximum value of loan authorized) and the level of collateral granted by the firm. These two variables are related to the ‘‘expected loss’’ (EL) notion defined by the Basel II agreement.12

Let us first examine the impact of loan value. One can expect the bank’s behavior to depend on the size of the loan. Indeed, a bank may be more amenable to informal renegotiation if it has a large stake in the firm.13 There are two main reasons for this. First, given that bankruptcy costs are positively related to firm size, the cost sav- ings associated with informal renegotiation also increase with firm size. Second, formal bankruptcy provides a standardized way of resolving financial distress irrespective of firm size, whereas infor- mal negotiations may be more flexible and appropriate for large and complex cases. These arguments are captured in the following hypothesis.

H4A. The probability of informal renegotiation increases with the size of the loan.

One can also expect the likelihood of renegotiation to be linked with the bank’s involvement in the firm’s long-term financing. Thus,

combined product of three elements: (i) probability of default, (ii) exposure at default and (iii) loss given default.

13 A bank also has more incentive to invest time and money to gather information about the debtor as the size of the loan increases.

R. Blazy et al. / Journal of Banking & Finance 44 (2014) 248–263 253

H4B. The probability of informal renegotiation increases with the proportion of long-term debt in total debt.

Second, let us reconsider the role of collateral. As we have observed (H2B), the presence of collateral can mitigate information asymmetry problems between the bank and the firm. In addition, it provides protection for the bank in the event of bankruptcy. Given that all creditors cannot be repaid in full in bankruptcy, secured creditors tend to have a strong liquidation bias, especially if their loans are fully secured. Several theoretical and empirical works note this bias. For example, Blazy and Chopard (2012) find that the preference of secured creditors for reorganization over liquida- tion depends on a number of variables, including the level of collat- eralization. Other recent empirical works confirm that the likelihood of reorganization is negatively correlated with the importance of secured creditors (Ayotte and Morrison, 2009; Bergström et al., 2002; Fisher and Martel, 2009). As a consequence, the presence of secured creditors may reduce the collective effort to keep a distressed firm in business (Frouté, 2007).

However, this effect depends on the bank’s position in the rank- ing of creditors and how strictly APR is enforced. Indeed, a strict application of the APR that provides strong protection for secured (banking) claims may reduce the bank’s incentive to opt for an informal arrangement. In contrast, bankruptcy codes that permit deviations from the APR may reduce the attractiveness of bank- ruptcy procedures and force the parties to enter into informal negotiations to reach an out-of-court settlement. As noted by Davydenko and Franks (2008), the French bankruptcy laws offer greater protection for social claims at the expense of the rights of secured creditors. Thus, secured creditors may prefer to avoid bankruptcy if they anticipate strong competition from other cred- itors who are better protected by law. Depending on the relative strength of these factors, we can make two rival hypotheses:

H4C. The probability of informal renegotiation increases with collateralization if the bank has no liquidation bias and/or devia- tions from the APR are high.

H4D. The probability of informal renegotiation decreases with col- lateralization if the bank has a liquidation bias and/or deviations from the APR are moderate.

4. Data analysis

4.1. Presentation of the data

The data were hand collected from the recovery units of five French commercial banks.14 These five banks collectively account for one-fourth of the French banking market (in terms of market share). The French banking sector comprises large national banks and small regional banks. Our sample reflects this distribution with one major French bank (among the three largest banks in the coun- try at the time of data collection) and four smaller banks, all of which operate primarily in three geographical areas: Paris, south France (Marseille) and east France (Reims).15 The files were analyzed using

14 The data collection process was financed and supervised by Standard & Poors’ Risk Solution as a part of a wider research program on France, the United-Kingdom, and Germany (see Davydenko and Franks, 2008). Our sample excludes one French bank considered by Davydenko and Franks (due to the lack of information regarding several explanatory variables) but includes more precise data on the French regional banks. Our sample does not consider Credit Lyonnais, which was affected by certain unique issues during the period of analysis.

15 The data were collected between 2002 and 2004. Due to confidentiality commitments, the banks’ identity cannot be revealed. However, the distribution of default cases in our sample is as follows: 25% from bank N�1, 23% from bank N�2, 14% from bank N�3, 28% from bank N�4, and 10% from bank N�5.

a standardized template to record information on each firm and its credit lines. Cases were randomly selected from the population of closed files (i.e., files with definitive repayment regardless of the out- come) of firms in default between 1988 and 2004 for loans granted between 1984 and 2001 (see Appendix A2 for the time distribution of the sample). Given that a recovery process may take up to 10 years to complete, the length of the sample period allowed us to compute the actual recovery rates of creditors.

This sample period covers the 1985 and 1994 French bank- ruptcy laws, which are very similar to each other. Both laws offer a unified bankruptcy procedure with three primary outcomes that may be imposed by the Court. First, the firm may be liquidated piecemeal (‘‘liquidation judiciaire’’) either immediately or after an observation period. Second, the firm may be reorganized through a continuation plan. Third, the firm may be sold as a going concern. The latter two outcomes are part of a general procedure called ‘‘redressement judiciaire’’. In 2005, the French bankruptcy law was amended to introduce a new reorganization procedure (named ‘‘sauvegarde’’). This procedure is similar to the existing ‘‘redresse- ment judiciaire’’, except that the application of sauvegarde is restricted to solvent firms, that is, firms that are showing the first signs of financial distress but are still solvent. These firms are out- side the scope of this study; our sample does not cover the post- 2005 period and thus ‘‘sauvegarde’’ cases are not relevant for the purpose of this analysis.16

The Basel II criteria state that a firm is considered in ‘‘default’’ when the delays on its financial commitments exceed 90 days.17

Overall, our sample includes 735 credit lines allocated to 386 dis- tressed French firms (excluding agricultural and financial compa- nies). After eliminating files with incomplete or incoherent data, the sample contains 282 distressed SMEs.18 The descriptive statistics in Tables 1 and 2 are based on this sample. However, 49 observations are excluded from the econometric estimations because of missing information regarding some explanatory variables. Thus, the econo- metric analysis is based on a sample of 233 firms.

The information is derived from a systematic analysis of the files kept in each bank’s recovery unit and supplemented by indi- vidual interviews with the bank employees responsible for han- dling the individual files. Our data include the following:19

(i) Bank identification. A dummy variable is associated with each bank to capture differences in commercial policy, internal organization, risk and capitalization.

(ii) Firm profile. Age, industry sector, last financial accounts (bal- ance sheet and turnover, when available) at default, legal form (limited liability or not) and a dummy variable if the firm belongs to a business group.20 In addition, we have information on the firm’s last rating before default (either computed internally by the bank itself or provided by Banque de France). A dummy is used to capture the firm’s rating at the time of default, with three possibilities: good (i.e., the firm was rated as ‘‘safe’’), bad (i.e., the firm was rated as ‘‘doubtful’’ or ‘‘in a worrying state’’), and no rating (i.e., the bank had no available rating on the firm).

16 See Appendix A3 for a detailed description of the French bankruptcy system. 17 Our dataset contains firms that the banks had already recognized as being in

default. Thus, there might be some selection bias because the process of sending a firm to the recovery unit is a decision in itself. However, the notion of default was relatively standardized by Basel II; therefore, the decision to send a file to the recovery unit should not differ significantly from one bank to another.

18 Each firm in the sample has liabilities in excess of 100 K€. 19 See Appendix A4 for a complete description. 20 The term «business group» refers to a situation where the firm belongs to a larger

business entity.

22 ‘‘Duration’’ measures the time period (in years) from the date when the bank

254 R. Blazy et al. / Journal of Banking & Finance 44 (2014) 248–263

(iii) Faulty management. The internal reports provided by the recovery units contain a detailed description of the origin(s) of default. They are classified into six categories: (i) asset substitution, (ii) voluntary excessive risk taking, (iii) private abuse of company assets, (iv) tricky behavior and swindle, (v) account falsification, and (vi) financial fraud. This classi- fication is used to identify defaults caused by faulty manage- ment and to construct a dummy variable that is equal to 1 if default is associated with at least one of these reasons.

(iv) Banking relationship. Using the file information, we build a dummy variable defined as ‘‘bank main creditor’’, which is equal to 1 whenever the recovery unit of a bank considers itself the firm’s main creditor (in terms of sources of financ- ing and/or relative bargaining power) and equal to 0 other- wise. Note that this classification is based on the subjective determination of the employees handing the file. In addition, we include information on the duration of the banking relationship (in years).

(v) Types of credit lines. A firm may have several credit lines with the same bank. Thus, for each firm, we aggregate multiple credit lines to have a better picture of its loan structure, in particular with respect to long- and short-term loans, the overall authorized amounts, the level of recoveries, and the collateralization rate. Collateral is sorted into five categories: i) personal guarantees from individuals, ii) personal guaran- tees from firms, iii) pledges, iv) mortgages, and v) other collateral.21 For the purpose of the econometric analysis, we use three different measures for collateral: (i) a dummy variable indicating the presence of collateral, (ii) the value of collateral (in log) and (iii) the proportion of collateral calcu- lated as a percentage of the amount due.

Tables 1 and 2 provide some stylized facts regarding our sample.

4.2. Direct bankruptcies vs. renegotiation attempts

Table 1 compares the firms that opt for bankruptcy immedi- ately with firms that attempt informal renegotiations (successfully or not). Based on our full sample of 282 firms, 65% of the firms opt for formal bankruptcy, whereas 35% choose informal renegotia- tions. When looking at the table, the first striking feature is that although the two sub-samples of firms appear to differ from a financial perspective, none of the relevant variables are signifi- cantly different. For example, the mean values of total assets, total debt, turnover, and number of employees are two to three times larger for firms in informal renegotiation than for those in formal bankruptcy. However, a simple test of difference in means reveals that except for the number of employees, the means are not statis- tically significant. This is confirmed by looking at the median val- ues, which are similar across the two samples. Both types of firms logically exhibit negative net cash (i.e., cash minus short- term bank debt) at the time of default, although this problem seems a bit less severe for firms in renegotiation.

Notwithstanding this result, Table 1 exhibits some interesting stylized facts. Let us examine the variables related to loan charac- teristics and duration of the resolution process. First, the maximum authorized loan is significantly larger for informal renegotiations (mean of 1 M€) than for formal bankruptcies (426 K€). This sug- gests that the firms opting for renegotiation have access to more banking resources than those filing for bankruptcy. It also reflects the fact that stakeholders are more inclined to renegotiate when

21 Other types of collateral (e.g., ‘‘lettre d’intention’’, ‘‘subrogation dans le privilège’’, ‘‘retenue sur bordereau’’, and ‘‘privilège de prêteur de deniers immobilier’’) are case- specific and very heterogeneous. They are excluded from the econometric analysis.

the amounts at stake are high. This is consistent with hypothesis H4A. Second, firms opting for bankruptcy exhibit a significantly higher collateralization rate than those in renegotiations, which is consistent with hypothesis H4D, which states that banks may be more likely to opt for bankruptcy when their loans are more secured. This is also consistent with the argument that high collat- eralization may reduce the ex ante incentives to monitor the firm (Manove et al., 2001). Third, the recovery rate on loans for firms in informal renegotiations (63%) is significantly higher than on loans of bankrupt firms (44%).

This suggests that, on average, informal renegotiations mini- mize the bank’s loss in the event of default. This may also reflect the inefficiency of the French bankruptcy code in maximizing recovery by creditors (Blazy et al., 2013). Fourth, as could be expected, the resolution of financial distress takes significantly longer (6 months) for firms in informal renegotiation than for firms in bankruptcy.22

Table 1 also highlights other important features of the firms’ characteristics. Although a vast majority of all firms in the sample have limited liability status, the proportion is significantly higher for firms opting for bankruptcy (92%) than for firms opting for an informal renegotiation (82%). This is consistent with the fact that fully liable investors have stronger incentives to avoid bankruptcy because the legal procedure can be extended to their own assets. The proportion of firms operating in the ‘‘services’’ sector is signif- icantly higher (41% vs. 26%) for the renegotiation sub-sample, but the inverse holds true for the proportion of firms in the ‘‘industry’’ sector. More than 40% of firms in the sample belong to a business group, and the proportions are similar for firms in direct bank- ruptcy and firms in informal renegotiations. Almost one in five financial distress procedures involve faulty management. Consis- tent with expectations, over 40% of firms report a ‘‘bad’’ rating.

A majority of firms have one bank as a ‘‘main creditor’’, although the proportion is slightly lower for firms in renegotiation. This finding is consistent with the fact that SMEs have limited access to capital markets and rely heavily on a single bank to finance their operations. This is even more so in a bank-oriented country such as France, which has a highly concentrated banking sector. The average duration of the credit relationship between the debtor and its main bank is approximately 7 years, with little difference across the sub-samples. Note that this duration repre- sents almost half of the firm’s life (approximately 15 years), indi- cating that the firm’s main bank has been supporting the debtor’s activity for over half of the debtor’s lifetime. It also con- firms that the firms in our sample are not pure start-ups because they, on average, are 7 years old at the beginning of the relation- ship. This could be explained by two factors. First, there exists a positive correlation between age and loan size. Our sample is lim- ited to firms with liabilities in excess of 100 K€, thereby excluding younger firms with smaller loans. Second, in France, start-up busi- nesses less than 2 to 5 years old are financed primarily through specialized loans (in particular by OSEO, a public financial institu- tion) rather than through traditional loans.23

4.3. Successful vs. failed renegotiations

The next step in the data analysis focuses on the sample of firms engaged in informal renegotiations and examines whether there are differences in the characteristics of firms that fail in their

deems the firm to be in default and the date when the file is closed by the recovery unit (either because an agreement was reached or because the bankruptcy procedure was terminated). This does not include the extra time necessary to recover the claims due (i.e., when all the proceeds are recovered).

23 The OSEO’s updated website is: http://www.bpifrance.fr/.

Table 1 Characteristics of firms in bankruptcy and renegotiation.

Direct bankruptcy Renegotiation attempt

#obs. Mean Median #obs. Mean Median

Firm’s characteristics Nb. Employees* 138 59.4 21.5 48 201.5 16.5 Age (years) 183 15.0 9.8 99 17.0 8.1 Firm belongs to a group (%) 183 45.4% – 99 39.4% – Limited liability (%)*** 183 92.3% – 99 81.8% – Commerce (%) 183 36.1% – 99 34.3% – Industry (%)** 183 31.1% – 99 19.2% – Services (%)*** 183 26.2% – 99 41.4% – Other sectors (%) 183 6.6% – 99 5.1% –

Financial accounts Total assets (K €) 93 7,480 2,317 60 17,612 2,255 Total debt (K €) 91 5,744 2,118 60 11,889 2,060 Total assets / total debt 91 1.2 1.15 60 1.3 1.16 Long term debt (K €) 90 853 377 60 5,085 492 Short term bank debt (K €) 89 1,508 288 60 1,155 234 Trade debt (K €) 91 2,474 642 60 2,992 547 Long term debt / total debt (%) 90 26.4% 19.0% 60 30.1% 25.0% Short term debt / total debt (%) 90 73.5% 60.0% 60 69.8% 48.0% Cash (K €) 91 259 29 60 1,116 25 Net cash (K €) 91 �1,249 �176 60 �39 �125 Turnover (K €) 92 9,377 3,128 60 18,496 2,007 Turnover / total assets 91 1.7 1.32 60 1.3 1.05

Banking relation Bank is the main creditor (%) 165 57% – 99 52.7% – Duration of bank’s relationship (years) 183 6.7 4.3 99 7.4 4.6

Information on the origin of default Bad rating at time of default (%) 183 39.9% – 99 44.4% – Faulty management (%) 183 19.1% – 99 19.2% –

Loan’s characteristics and duration of the resolution of default Maximum loan authorized (K €)*** 183 426 275 99 1,005 381 Collateralization rate (%)* 183 171.6% 100.0% 99 104.5% 100.0% Recovery rate (%)*** 183 43.7% 30.2% 99 62.9% 76.2% Duration of default resolution (years)*** 183 1.0 0.8 99 1.5 1.0

Note: We also ran non-parametric Wilcoxon tests on these variables. The results are similar to the Fisher tests, except for the number of employees and collateralization rate, which are no longer significant. * Statistically significant difference in mean value at the 10% level (Fisher tests). ** Statistically significant difference in mean value at the 5% level (Fisher tests). *** Statistically significant difference in mean value at the 1% level (Fisher tests).

R. Blazy et al. / Journal of Banking & Finance 44 (2014) 248–263 255

renegotiation attempts compared with those that succeed. To our knowledge, little has been performed in this area; most of the research has looked only at the decisions between formal bank- ruptcy and informal renegotiations or between liquidation and reorganization (Fisher and Martel, 2009). The closest studies were conducted by Fisher and Martel (1995, 2012) and Martel (2003) who examine the determinants of creditors’ decisions in court- supervised reorganizations and the outcomes (success vs. failure) of reorganization plans in Canada. According to these studies, between 70% and 80% of court-supervised reorganization proce- dures are successful, i.e., the firm exits the bankruptcy process with a new capital structure. In addition, they find that the likelihood of success increases with both the proportion of secured claims and the proportion of short term payments to creditors, both of which are interpreted as a signal of the firm’s quality.

Table 2 focuses on the sample of renegotiation attempts and offers a comparative analysis between the firms that fail and those that succeed. According to our sample, 55% of the firms that enter informal renegotiations succeed in reaching agreements, and 45% fail. The results reported in Table 2 show that with the exception of the assets to liabilities ratio, there is no significant difference between the financial characteristics of firms that fail in renegoti- ations and firms that succeed. Nonetheless, the data suggest that size matters to the outcome of renegotiation. Although there is no significant difference in the total value of assets and liabilities, firms that successfully reorganize have almost 18 times more

employees than those that fail. The assets to liabilities ratios also indicate that successful firms are in better financial health than firms that fail.

Successful informal renegotiations, on average, offer a higher recovery rate on loans (75% vs. 48%) and have shorter negotiation processes (1 vs. 2 years) than those that fail. As suggested in the lit- erature (Wruck, 1990; Franks and Torous, 1989; Thornburn, 2000), the time spent in bankruptcy can be used as a proxy for indirect bankruptcy costs. Given that failed renegotiations are more costly than successful renegotiations, a bank has a strong incentive to accurately evaluate the likelihood of reaching an agreement with the debtor prior to opening up a negotiation. A low ex ante probability of success should thus favor formal bankruptcy to minimize the indirect costs. Finally, there are no significant differ- ences between maximum loan authorizations and collateralization rates.

Faulty management is significantly more prevalent in failing cases, but the percentage of badly rated firms is similar in both samples. Approximately 40% of firms in renegotiations belong to a business group, and the vast majority have limited liability, although this number is slightly higher for firms that fail. The pro- portion of firms in the ‘‘commercial’’ sector is significantly higher for failing firms, while successful firms have greater representation in the ‘‘services’’ sector. The proportion of failing firms that have a single bank as the main creditor is slightly higher than the propor- tion for successful firms.

Table 2 Characteristics of firms in renegotiation by outcome (success or failure).

Failed renegotiation Successful renegotiation

#obs. Mean Median #obs. Mean Median

Firm’s characteristics Nb. Employees⁄ 32 30.7 11.0 16 543.3 27.5 Age (years) 45 16.6 7.3 54 17.3 8.3 Firm belong to a group (%) 45 40.0% – 54 38.9% – Limited liability (%) 45 86.7% – 54 77.8% – Commerce (%)* 45 44.4% – 54 25.9% – Industry (%) 45 20.0% – 54 18.5% – Services (%)** 45 28.9% – 54 51.9% – Other sectors (%) 45 6.7% – 54 3.7% –

Financial accounts Total assets (K €) 23 3,044 1,856 37 26,273 2,248 Total debt (K €) 23 3,023 1,758 37 17,161 2,211 Total assets / total debt*** 23 1.0 1.05 37 1.4 1.3 Long term debt (K €) 23 581 311 37 7,763 617 Short term bank debt (K €) 23 527 200 37 1,528 268 Trade debt (K €) 23 1,215 447 37 4,048 637 Long term debt / total debt (%) 23 27.0% 25.0% 37 31.9% 21.6% Short term debt / total debt (%) 23 72.9% 56.0% 37 68.0% 46.8% Cash (K €) 23 136 10 37 1,699 37 Net cash (K €) 23 �391 �147 37 170 �90 Turnover (K €) 23 6,171 1,517 37 25,825 2,302 Turnover / total assets 23 1.4 1.18 37 1.2 0.99

Banking relation Bank is the main creditor (%) 44 59.1% – 49 46.9% – Duration of bank’s relationship (years) 45 7.5 4.4 54 7.3 5.0

Information on the origin of default Bad rating at time of default (%) 45 42.2% – 54 46.3% – Faulty management (%)* 45 26.7% – 54 13.0% –

Loan’s characteristics and duration of the resolution of default Maximum loan authorized (K €) 45 752 301 54 1,216 559 Collateralization rate (%) 45 108.1% 100.0% 54 101.5% 85.8% Recovery rate (%)*** 45 48.0% 51.1% 54 75.3% 85.8% Duration of default resolution (years)*** 45 2.1 1.3 54 1.0 0.83

* Statistically significant difference in mean value at 10% level. ** Statistically significant difference in mean value at 5% level. *** Statistically significant difference in mean value at 1% level.

24 There is a selection effect because their sample contains distressed German companies for which the assets’ value is high enough to cover the expected bankruptcy costs, and the sample on bankruptcy is restricted to ‘‘open’’ files.

25 In France, bankruptcy procedure can be triggered by either the debtor (‘‘décla- ration de cessation des paiements’’) or the creditors (‘‘assignation des créanciers’’).

256 R. Blazy et al. / Journal of Banking & Finance 44 (2014) 248–263

5. Econometric implementation and results

Two recent European studies have examined the determinants of financial distress resolution. Franks and Sussman (2005) study a sample of 542 distressed SMEs in the United Kingdom and cover the complete default resolution process. A financially distressed firm entering a bank’s ‘‘Business Support Unit’’ faces three possible outcomes: (i) the firm is successfully rescued (back to the branch), (ii) the firm is transferred to the ‘‘debt recovery unit’’ (formal bank- ruptcy procedure) or (iii) the firm repays its loan and enters into a new relationship with another bank. The authors analyze the links between the debtor’s financial structure and the manner in which financial distress is resolved. Using a PROBIT regression model, they examine the determinants of the likelihood that a firm will be placed in bankruptcy. Their analysis shows that liquidation rights are largely concentrated in the hands of the main bank, plac- ing it in a dominant position with respect to the decision whether the firm should be liquidated or restructured. However, this posi- tion may lead the bank to become ‘‘lazy’’ and rely too much on the collateral value of the firm’s assets. Overall, their study does not find any evidence of coordination failures and/or creditors’ runs.

More recently, Jostarndt and Sautner (2010) adopt a similar approach and focus on a sample of 116 listed German companies that had earnings before interests and taxes (EBIT) inferior to their interest charges for more than two consecutive years. Also using a PROBIT regression approach, they model the probability of

reaching a successful workout over formal bankruptcy. The authors find that approximately half of the firms in their sample succeed in restructuring their debt contracts whereas the other half files for bankruptcy.24 Overall, their results suggest that the probability of reaching a private agreement is greater for (i) highly leveraged companies and (ii) companies with higher going-concern values. Formal bankruptcy is more likely to happen in cases that show a lack of lenders’ coordination and/or a high fraction of collateralized debts.

These two studies model the resolution of financial distress as a one-step (static) game. We believe that this type of empirical implementation may not be appropriate in the bankruptcy context. In reality, the resolution of financial distress typically follows a sequential process that is characterized by a continuous flow of information. First, the creditors and/or the debtor decide between straight bankruptcy and an informal renegotiation.25 Second, conditional on renegotiation, the parties either fail or succeed in reaching an agreement. The two approaches are illustrated in Fig. 1, which considers three possible outcomes: (i) direct bank- ruptcy, (ii) failed renegotiation leading to bankruptcy, and (iii) pri- vate agreement.

Bankruptcy

Default

Renegotia- tion attempt

Bankruptcy

AgreementSuccess

Failure

Step 1: renegotiation attempt vs. direct

bankruptcy Step 2: successful renegotiation vs.

failed renegotiation

Bankruptcy

Default Failed

renegotiation

Agreement (sucessful)

(a) Static model (simple LOGIT) (b) Dynamic model (sequential LOGIT)

Fig. 1. Resolution of financial distress.

28 Following Bester’s approach, we find that it is more relevant to consider the presence of collateral rather than its magnitude. Indeed, the bank must use both moderately and highly collateralized debt contracts in order to screen prospective borrowers. Thus, collateralized contracts bring information to the bank regardless of the value of collateralization.

29

R. Blazy et al. / Journal of Banking & Finance 44 (2014) 248–263 257

Fig. 1a illustrates the simple multinomial LOGIT approach in which the choice between the three outcomes is modeled as a one-step process. Fig. 1b illustrates the sequential LOGIT approach, which consists of two transitional steps in which a separate LOGIT regression is applied for each decision, called a ‘‘transition’’.26 In this model, the first transition consists of a choice between ‘‘direct bankruptcy’’ and ‘‘renegotiation attempt’’, whereas the second tran- sition represents the outcome of renegotiation, which is either ‘‘fail- ure’’ (i.e., bankruptcy) or ‘‘success’’ (i.e., private agreement). Given that our data report the different outcomes, the sequential approach is better suited and allows for the accumulation of information dur- ing the renegotiation process. Nonetheless, we estimate both models to highlight the differences between the two approaches.

Our explanatory variables are separated into two categories: (i) the test variables and (ii) the control variables.27 The ‘‘test’’ variables aim at testing the validity of assumptions H1 through H4. The first variable, ‘‘bank is the company’s main creditor’’ (dummy), aims at determining which of the coordination (H1A) or bargaining (H1B) hypotheses dominates. This variable is equal to one if the bank in charge of the recovery process is the company’s main source of financing. This does not preclude other sources of financing (bank and/or trade creditors), but these sources are marginal relative to the main bank’s contribution.

Hypotheses H2A and H2B capture the importance of informa- tional problems in the context of a banking relationship. First, we use the variable ‘‘duration of the banking relationship’’ (measured in log) to test for hypothesis H2A, which predicts that the likeli- hood of renegotiation increases with the duration of the relation- ship between the debtor and its bank. Second, following Bester (1985, 1987), we consider that the use of collateral (either in a high or low proportion) is a good way to screen projects and to bring information to the bank. However, we believe that the role of col- lateral is reinforced in cases in which the bank has little or no infor- mation about the firm’s level of financial distress. For instance, if a firm is not rated, it is considered a case in which the bank has lim- ited information about the borrower. This covers many scenarios: lack of available data on the borrower, new customer and/or pro- ject, no available accountancy, bad information system, etc. Thus, for non-rated firms, the presence of collateral (irrespective of the level) makes the bank less under-informed. To test hypothesis H2B (informational role of collateral), we create an interaction term which captures two variables: (i) a dummy variable equal to 1 if the firm has collateralized loans and (ii) a dummy variable equal to 1 if there is ‘‘no rating of the firm at default time’’. Given the different types of collateral, we create an interaction term for

26 As mentioned by Buis (2011), this approach has several names: ‘‘continuation ratio LOGIT’’ (Agresti (2012)), ‘‘model for nested dichotomies’’ (Fox (2008)), ‘‘sequential response model’’ (Maddala (1986)), or ‘‘sequential LOGIT model’’ (Tutz (1991)). See also Martel (2003) for an application to a bankruptcy process.

27 See Appendix A5 for the correlation matrix

each of them.28 A value of one for this variable indicates that the bank has more information on the firm than it does in the absence of collateral, which, ceteris paribus, should facilitate renegotiation.

Hypothesis H3 addresses the impact of the firm’s characteristics on the decision between bankruptcy and informal renegotiation. This effect is captured by two variables: (i) firm profitability (H3A), measured by the dummy variable ‘‘bad rating at default’’ and (ii) managers’ competency and reliability (H3B), measured by the dummy variable ‘‘faulty management’’. We also include a variable that captures the interaction between faulty management and a bad rating. One would predict that a badly rated firm run by faulty management would have a lower chance of opting for rene- gotiation and/or reaching a private agreement.

Hypothesis H4 relates to loan characteristics. According to H4A, the manner of resolving financial distress depends on the size of the loan. This effect is captured by the variable ‘‘maximum loan authorized’’. Hypothesis H4B highlights the debt structure and is captured by the ‘‘proportion of long-term debt’’. Like H2B, hypoth- eses H4C and H4D relate the resolution of financial distress to the level of collateralization, except that now the effect depends on whether the bank has a liquidation bias and the extent to which the APR is enforced. The prevalence of deviations from the APR is virtually unpredictable without any information about the com- plete structure of the debtor’s claims. Nonetheless, we know that APR deviations are more likely to prevail when creditors are dis- persed. When a bank is the main creditor and when most secured claims are controlled by that bank, such deviations should be mit- igated. Under the French bankruptcy code, several classes of claim- ants (social claims, etc.29) outrank the secured ones. Thus, a bank in the French system should have a stronger incentive to favor formal bankruptcy when there is weak competition from other creditors and a low risk of APR deviations. To account for this, we create a var- iable that captures the interaction between the importance30 of each type of collateral (measured as a percentage of the amount due) and a dummy variable for ‘‘bank is the main creditor’’.

Finally, we control for other variables that may impact the res- olution of financial distress. We include a separate dummy variable for each bank (N� 1 to 4) dealing with the distressed firms.31 We also consider the value of collateral (in log)32 and separate dummy

This includes (i) employees (who benefit from higher priority than secured creditors) and (ii) trade creditors who may escape the procedure by withdrawing some pledged assets from the debtor’s assets.

30 Indeed, testing for the recovery power of collateral requires us to measure its weight relative to the total amount due. We thus compute the ratio between the value of collateral and the outstanding loan amount.

31 The fifth bank does not appear in our regressions to avoid multicolinearity. 32 Here, the value of the collateral is not combined with other variables.

Table 3 Determinants of the choice between renegotiation and bankruptcy.

Independent variables Model I: Simple Multinomial LOGIT Model II: Sequential LOGIT

Failed renegotiation vs. direct bankruptcy

Successful renegotiation vs. direct bankruptcy

Step 1 Renegotiation attempt vs. direct bankruptcy

Step 2 Successful vs. failed renegotiation

Test variables Estimate Pr > v2 Estimate Pr > v2 Estimate Pr > |z| Estimate Pr > |z|

H1 Bank is the main creditor 0.5243 0.103 �0.1913 0.546 0.3454 0.469 �2.6237** 0.030

H2A ln (duration of banking relationship) 0.3182 0.315 0.2746 0.377 0.2688 0.260 0.4653 0.440

H2B (Personal guarantees: indiv.) � (no rating at default time) 0.9498** 0.031 0.4349 0.350 1.4208** 0.046 �0.5797 0.669 (Personal guarantees: firm(s)) � (no rating at default time) �0.8405 0.218 0.4285 0.561 �0.4862 0.622 3.1761 0.222 (Pledges) � (no rating at default time) �0.3103 0.723 �1.4221 0.186 �0.8307 0.253 �2.2998 0.109 (Mortgages) � (no rating at default time) �0.9759 0.104 �0.7026 0.325 �1.3701 0.159 �1.5207 0.482

H3 Bad rating at default �0.0848 0.761 0.0974 0.706 0.0187 0.964 �0.4472 0.652 Faulty management �0.0016 0.997 0.3533 0.305 0.3775 0.490 1.3885 0.216 (Faulty management) � (bad rating at default time) 0.7000 0.212 �0.7491 0.306 0.3947 0.659 �4.4917** 0.039

H4A, H4B ln (max. loan authorized, K€) 0.3139 0.182 0.5833** 0.014 0.5148*** 0.005 0.0915 0.792 % long term debt (due amounts) 0.7152 0.191 0.9989* 0.063 0.9223** 0.028 �0.1655 0.850

H4C, H4D (% Personal guarantees: indiv.) � (bank is the main cred.) �1.0618* 0.076 �0.4645 0.258 �0.6376* 0.061 0.0030 0.997 (% Personal guarantees: firm(s)) � (bank is the main cred.) �0.0413 0.978 �0.2011 0.938 0.1396 0.912 2.9288 0.593 (% Pledges) � (bank is the main cred.) �1.5936* 0.093 �1.2904 0.177 �1.4727** 0.034 0.8530 0.663 (% Mortgages) � (bank is the main cred.) 1.3753 0.145 1.6707* 0.091 1.3050* 0.089 1.0236 0.482

Control variables File is managed by: bank n�1 0.2771 0.466 �0.1683 0.627 �0.0832 0.880 �2.5925** 0.043 File is managed by: bank n�2 0.4937 0.158 �0.3259 0.336 0.1863 0.711 �1.6569 0.164 File is managed by: bank n�3 1.0053*** 0.007 0.1596 0.638 1.0486* 0.057 �2.8206** 0.014 File is managed by: bank n�4 0.5895 0.200 �1.0997* 0.085 �0.2758 0.710 �5.0233** 0.012 ln (personal guarantees: individual, amount K€) 0.0831 0.439 0.1480 0.141 0.1009 0.199 0.0008 0.996 ln (personal guarantees: firm(s), amount K€) 0.0175 0.895 �0.2841 0.113 �0.0923 0.388 �0.3670 0.228 ln (pledges, amount K€) 0.1843* 0.086 �0.0033 0.975 0.0843 0.291 �0.1888 0.234 ln (mortgages, amount K€) 0.0019 0.989 �0.3241** 0.036 �0.1468 0.185 �0.2404 0.357 Debtor benefits from limited liability 0.1224 0.745 �0.4907 0.138 �0.3853 0.480 �2.3160* 0.062 Debtor belongs to a group �0.0422 0.856 �0.3260 0.171 �0.4294 0.241 �1.0765 0.185 Debtor’s sector: commerce 0.0594 0.829 �0.5417* 0.064 �0.4576 0.293 �2.2641** 0.021 Debtor’s sector: industry �0.2361 0.433 �0.6754** 0.030 �0.9101* 0.052 �2.0453* 0.054 GDP growth �10.7969 0.529 8.6233 0.625 �0.6381 0.962 9.6406 0.741 Constant �3.1648* 0.086 �7.1398*** <.001 �3.9260*** 0.005 6.5731** 0.032

Test statistics Stat Prob > Chi2 Stat Prob > Chi2

Nb. of observations 233 233 Likelihood ratio 100.93*** <.001 Score 84.25*** 0.008 Wald 64.16 0.212 Chi2 105.92*** <.001

* Statistical significance at the 10% level. ** Statistical significance at the 5% level. *** Statistical significance at the 1% level.

258 R

.Blazy et

al./Journal of

Banking &

Finance 44

(2014) 248–

263

35 Pledges’ owners may withdraw some pledged assets from the debtor’s assets and thus escape the collective repayment process; cf. ‘‘droit de revendication’’ and ‘‘droit de retention’’.

36

R. Blazy et al. / Journal of Banking & Finance 44 (2014) 248–263 259

variables for (i) the legal form of the debtor (‘‘limited liability’’), (ii) the economic organization (‘‘company belongs to a group’’), and (iii) the sector of activity (‘‘commerce’’ and ‘‘industry’’ relative to ‘‘ser- vices’’).33 Finally, we control for the macroeconomic environment by including GDP growth at the year of default.

Table 3 reports the regression results for the two models pre- sented in Fig. 1. Model I is a simple multinomial LOGIT regression; the dependent variable is the probability that informal renegotia- tion either fails (column 2) or succeeds (column 3) against the ref- erence alternative represented by direct bankruptcy. Model II is a sequential LOGIT regression. The first step captures the decision between informal renegotiation and direct bankruptcy. The dependent variable is equal to 1 if the stakeholders opt for renego- tiation. The second step models the outcome of renegotiation. The dependent variable equals 1 if renegotiation is successful and equals zero if it fails. Estimates of the first and second steps are reported in columns 4 and 5, respectively.

5.1. Static model

According to Table 3, the simple multinomial LOGIT estimation approach reveals that some explanatory variables have a statisti- cally significant impact on the likelihood of bankruptcy relative to either successful or failed renegotiations. However, the global signif- icance of the model is mixed. Although the Score test is significant (below 1%), a Wald test rejects the global significance of the model (the p-value is above 10%). At first glance, two main results seem to emerge. First, failed renegotiations (column 2) are largely explained by collateralization in interaction with either ‘‘no rating at default’’ or ‘‘bank is the main creditor’’. Personal guarantees from individuals and pledges both play significant roles, either positive or negative, depending on the nature of the combined effect (account- ing for either H2B or H4C/H4D). Second, the probability of successful renegotiation (column 3) increases with (i) the amount of loan authorization and (ii) the proportion of long-term debt.34 These results suggest that there may be a ‘‘size effect’’ behind successful renegotiations; that is, the renegotiation process may have a higher probability of success when (i) the financial stakes are high and (ii) the bank is financially involved in the long run. Finally, we observe some heterogeneity in the way the banks manage their respective recovery processes. Specifically, failed renegotiation attempts are more frequent with bank N�3, whereas bank N�4 is more often associated with direct bankruptcy filings (compared to successful agreements).

However, the results described in the preceding paragraph are likely to be misleading because the static approach does not account for the sequential nature of the events depicted in Fig. 1. Thus, the observed relationship between collateral (showing the opposite effect), loan size, and the structure of debt may be a simple artifact. Testing for hypotheses H1 through H4 requires distinguishing between, first, the variables explaining the choice between filing for bankruptcy immediately and engaging in an informal renegotia- tion and, second, the variables that affect the likelihood of a success- ful renegotiation. This can be performed in a sequential framework.

5.2. Dynamic model

In the previous section, renegotiation was modeled as a static process. We propose a richer and more realistic framework in which the resolution of financial distress follows a dynamic process (Model II, Table 3). The estimates of the first stage of a

33 In France, the bankruptcy procedure can be extended to other companies if they belong to the same group as the debtor and if their respective patrimonies are mingled together.

34 Collateral (mortgages) also seems to play a role in successful renegotiations but shows the opposite effect.

sequential LOGIT model (renegotiation attempt vs. direct bank- ruptcy) are reported in column 4, and column 5 reports the esti- mates of the second stage (successful workout agreement vs. failed renegotiation leading to bankruptcy). The v2 statistic con- firms that Model II is globally significant at the 1% level.

Let us consider the first stage of the resolution process: informal renegotiation attempt vs. direct bankruptcy. The results confirm the significance of some test variables that are also relevant in the static model. For example, in the static model, the value of loan authoriza- tion and the proportion of long-term debt both have positive impacts on the probability of successful renegotiation compared with formal bankruptcy. These two variables also impact the resolution process in the dynamic model but only in the first stage, comprising the initial decision between renegotiation and direct bankruptcy. They have no effect on the actual outcome of the renegotiation pro- cess (i.e., success or failure). This suggests that the probability of undertaking informal renegotiation increases when a large amount of money is involved and/or when the firm has more long-term debt, but the outcome of the renegotiation is unaffected by these vari- ables. Accordingly, one can expect small borrowers to be more likely to opt (voluntarily or not) for bankruptcy than renegotiation. These results are consistent with hypotheses H4A and H4B.

Collateral also plays a significant role in the dynamic setting, but only in the first stage of the game (column 4). This is not surprising. Indeed, even if one accepts the idea that collateral may influence the choice between bankruptcy and renegotiation, we believe that the outcome of the renegotiation process is driven by more fundamen- tal factors, such as the firm’s profitability or the manager’s reliabil- ity. Let us first consider the informational role of collateral (H2B). When considering the interaction term between each type of collat- eral and the dummy variable ‘‘no rating’’, we find that the likelihood of opting for renegotiation increases with the presence of personal guarantees from individuals and the absence of a rating for the firm. This result is consistent with prior theoretical results indicating that informational effects are likely to be stronger for outside collateral, such as personal guarantees (Bester, 1994; Boot et al., 1991; Hainz, 2003), especially in the absence of a firm rating. Hypothesis H2B is thus supported for personal guarantees.

We now consider the role of collateral when deviations from APR may occur (H4C vs. H4D). As reported in column 4, the prob- ability of opting for renegotiation over bankruptcy decreases when the bank is the main creditor and when there are personal guaran- tees (from individuals) or pledges. In other words, a (main) bank owning personal guarantees or pledges controls a significant por- tion of the secured claims and thus does not fear strong deviations from APR under bankruptcy due to (weak) competition from other claimholders; ceteris paribus, the likelihood of opting for renegoti- ation decreases. This result supports hypothesis H4D. Note that mortgages have the opposite effect. This may be explained by the fact that in France, mortgages are (more than other types of collat- eral) subject to deviations from the APR (cf. Davydenko and Franks, 2008). More specifically, mortgages may rank below social claims (‘‘superprivilège’’) and/or pledged claims.35

Overall, hypotheses H2B and H4D are both confirmed for a sub- set of collateral: personal guarantees and pledges. These effects are significant only for the first stage of the distress resolution game.36

Let us stress that our results may derive from the data selection process. Indeed, the firms in our sample are selected from the banks’ recovery units, indicating that the main bank has already recognized the firms’ financial distress and has decided to process these cases through their business recovery units. This process is a decision in itself, and it is possible that collateral plays a role at this early stage of the game rather than after the firm has been transferred to the recovery unit (see also Davydenko and Franks (2008), footnote 7, for a discussion of this possible selection issue).

260 R. Blazy et al. / Journal of Banking & Finance 44 (2014) 248–263

Column 5 reports the estimates for the second stage of the default resolution process, namely, the outcome of informal rene- gotiation (success vs. failure). Two test variables have a significant impact at this stage of the game. First, the probability of success in renegotiation is significantly lower when the bank handling the recovery process is the firm’s main creditor. This result rein- forces the argument that the bargaining effect dominates the coordination effect in financial distress (H1B). It is also consistent with the argument that the main bank may not wish to renegoti- ate and has a preference for bankruptcy when a firm is in finan- cial distress if (i) it expects that competition from other creditors will be weak under a formal bankruptcy procedure, and/or (ii) it expects that the debtor cannot survive without the (main) bank’s financial support. In these cases, bankruptcy may be the most desired outcome from the main bank’s perspective. Let us stress that this result applies to the second, and not the first, stage of the game. One possible explanation could lie in the fact that it takes time for the bank in charge of handling the renegotiation process to obtain information about other creditors and their rel- ative importance in the firm’s financing.37 Once the bank realizes that it is the dominant creditor, this may either (i) increase its appetite (which might put the renegotiation process at risk) or (ii) reinforce the bank’s incentive to opt for a court-supervised pro- cedure because the court’s decision is likely to reflect the main creditor’s interests. This result may be particularly likely in the French context, which is characterized by a court-administered bankruptcy procedure in which (i) creditors have no say in the out- come of the procedure, (ii) the decision lies in the hand of a judge and (iii) SMEs have limited access to capital markets and therefore rely strongly on intermediated financing. In such circumstances, the main bank may prefer a court-administered procedure in which the judge is expected to opt for a solution that benefits from the main bank’s support. This is even more likely to occur once the bank realizes that there is very little to be gained from extended informal negotiations.

The second significant test variable is the interaction term that combines ‘‘bad rating’’ and ‘‘faulty management’’. This variable sig- nificantly decreases the likelihood of successful renegotiation, con- firming both hypotheses H3A and H3B. Interestingly, these two variables are not significant when considered individually. One might wonder why a bank chooses to enter into a renegotiation process if it knows that the firm is badly rated and that its manag- ers are faulty. Again, this can be explained by the notion that the resolution of financial distress is a sequential information-gather- ing process. At the early stages of financial distress, the bank may have some information about the firm’s low profitability, based on its own internal rating system, but this information may be insufficient to influence the decision between informal renegotiation and bankruptcy. Indeed, the negative signal from the firm’s low profitability may be minimized if the managers are perceived as competent, reactive, and honest. However, discov- ering the managers’ ability to restructure the firm takes time, and this may only happen after the bank and the firm have commenced negotiations. This explains why the first step of the decision pro- cess (choosing between informal renegotiation and bankruptcy) does not depend on these variables, but once renegotiation is under way, the combined effect of both variables impacts the like- lihood of reaching a final agreement.

37 In practice, the main bank must expend time and effort to obtain a complete view of the firm’s creditors. Indeed, in France, banks do not have direct access to a national database that shows the extent of a firm’s debts and the identity of the firm’s creditors. This information is only gathered after default. The opening of the renegotiation process helps the bank to obtain more information about the firm’s other creditors, especially with the assistance of the Banque de France.

Our control variables are most significant at the second stage of renegotiation. Indeed (relative to bank N�5), the probability of successful renegotiation is significantly lower for banks N�1, 3, and 4. Nonetheless, except for bank N�3, these banks are not less likely to opt for renegotiation in the first stage of the game. This suggests that some banks are better than others at successfully finding an out-of-court solution.38 Finally, limited liability firms and firms operating in the commercial and industrial sectors have lower likelihoods of reaching a negotiated agreement.

6. Concluding remarks

This paper investigates the determinants of financial distress resolution for a sample of French SMEs in default. Recent studies have looked at this issue in the context of other legal regimes, but until now, no studies of the French legal regime have been conducted. In addition, previous studies have modeled the reso- lution of financial distress as a static game. We propose an alter- native approach whereby the resolution of financial distress is modeled as a sequential process in which a firm first decides between bankruptcy and informal renegotiation with its main bank and second, conditional on renegotiation, the process can either be a success (workout agreement) or a failure (bankruptcy).

One important result is that size matters when resolving financial distress. However, the size of the firm itself, as measured by the value of its assets, matters less than the size of the loan, indicating that the renegotiation process is not independent of the financial stakes. We then test for a number of hypotheses relating to the impact of the following variables on the likelihood of opting for renegotiation and on the chances of reaching a successful workout arrangement: (i) coordination problems and bargaining power, (ii) information asymmetry, (iii) firm charac- teristics and (iv) loan characteristics. Because renegotiation is a dynamic process, we find that the probability of successful rene- gotiation decreases if the bank handling the recovery process is the firm’s main creditor. This suggests that the bargaining power argument dominates the coordination argument. In addition, we find that the likelihood of informal renegotiation is positively related to the size of the loan and the proportion of long-term debt.

We also find that the informational value and recovery power of collateral both play a role in the first stage of the renegotiation pro- cess. On the one hand, collateral reduces information asymmetry and favors renegotiation between the bank and the debtor. On the other hand, it reduces the likelihood of renegotiation if the bank does not fear deviation from the APR in bankruptcy. However, collateral appears to be of little importance to the outcome of the renegotiation process.

Finally, we find that the firm’s profitability and the managers’ reliability and competency are two essential elements of a success- ful renegotiation. However, obtaining this information takes time and may explain why the initial decision between informal renego- tiation and formal bankruptcy does not depend on these two variables.

In 2005, French bankruptcy law was modified to introduce a new reorganization procedure called the ‘‘sauvegarde’’. We believe that our results are still valid after this legislative amendment.

38 Such heterogeneity between the banks may be explained in various ways; it may reflect differences in the banks’ commercial strategy or in their regional implemen- tation or even in the way the banks’ recovery units compensate their employees (cf. compensation packages). Unfortunately, the data do not allow us to sort out these various hypotheses.

R. Blazy et al. / Journal of Banking & Finance 44 (2014) 248–263 261

First, the two procedures that prevailed during our sample period, ‘‘redressement judiciaire’’ and ‘‘liquidation judiciaire’’, still prevail after the introduction of the new procedure in 2005. In addition, procedures before and after 2005 follow similar rules in terms of stay of claims, court supervision, and deviations of priority in favor of employees and bankruptcy practitioners. There are two significant differences between the two regimes (pre-2005 and post-2005), but we believe that they are unlikely to affect our conclusions. First, going-concern sales are now considered a form of liquidation (before 2005, sales were considered a specific way of reorganizing bankrupt firms because the businesses were likely to continue after the sale). However, this change in classification is neutral with respect to outcomes for creditors. For example, the sale price of the firm is still the main basis for calculating pay- ments to creditors. The second significant difference since 2005 is that creditors are entitled to vote under ‘‘redressement judici- aire’’ through the implementation of creditors’ committees. How- ever, this alternative is limited to the largest cases, i.e., cases involving firms that have more than 150 employees and generate turnovers greater than 20 M€. In all other cases, creditors do not vote on the reorganization plan, and the court remains the sole decision-maker.39 Our sample is primarily comprised of SMEs with the median number of employees ranging from 11 to 28 and the median turnover ranging from 1.5 to 3.1 M€. Those figures are far below the thresholds required to justify creditors’ commit- tees. Thus, the firms in our sample are not affected by the new voting procedure introduced by the 2005 reform. In conclusion, we believe that our results remain relevant in the new legal framework.

The next step in the empirical analysis of the resolution of financial distress entails the analysis of the efficiency properties of these procedures, in particular with respect to the allocation of resources in terms of possible filtering failures and the recovery by different types of creditors affected by firms’ distress.

A3. Evolution of the French bankruptcy laws

Source: Blazy et al. (2008).

39 In addition, even in the presence of creditors’ committees, the Court still has the power to impose a reorganization plan that is not supported by the creditors.

Appendix A. Appendices

A1. Evolution of corporate bankruptcies in France

A2. Time distribution of the sample

0%

2%

4%

6%

8%

10%

12%

14%

16% Distribution of the sample based on the year of default

A4. Variables and codifications

Description of explanatory variables

Variable Description

Origin of default: faulty management Dummy equals to 1 if default is related to faulty management (conscious acceptance of no-profitable markets, overinvestment, excessive speculation, private benefits, fraud)

Faulty management x bad rating at default

Dummy equals to 1 if one (or more) cause(s) of the default is related to faulty management and the debtor’s last known rating was bad (i.e. the bank classified the firm as ‘‘doubtful’’ or ‘‘in worrying state’’)

ln (duration of banking relationship) Log of the duration of the banking relationship, from the first lending date to the date of default (in years) Bank is the debtor’s main creditor Dummy equals to 1 if the bank handling the recovery process is the firm’s main creditor (based on the

recovery unit’s assessment) Bad rating at default Dummy equals to 1 if the debtor last known rating was bad (‘‘doubtful’’ or ‘‘in worrying state’’) ln (maximum authorized loan) Log of the maximum amount of authorized loan by the bank (defined by the debt contract) % long term debt % of long term debt due (>1 year) in total debt ln (personal guarantees: individual) Log of the value of personal guarantees offered by individuals (K€). ln (personal guarantees: firm) Log of the value of personal guarantees offered by the firm (K€) ln (pledges) Log of the value of pledges (K€) ln (mortgages) log of the value of mortgages (K€) (Personal guarantees: indiv.) � (no rating

at default time) Dummy equal to 1 if the loans are collateralized with personal guarantees (indiv.), multiplied by dummy equal to 1 if the bank has no rating on the firm

(Personal guarantees: firm(s)) � (no rating at default time)

Dummy equal to 1 if the loans are collateralized with personal guarantees (firm), multiplied by dummy equal to 1 if the bank has no rating on the firm

(Pledges) � (no rating at default time) Dummy equal to 1 if the loans are collateralized with pledges, multiplied by dummy equal to 1 if the bank has no rating on the firm

(Mortgages) � (no rating at default time) Dummy equal to 1 if the loans are collateralized with mortgages, multiplied by dummy equal to 1 if the bank has no rating on the firm

(% Personal guarantees: indiv.) � (bank is the main cred.)

% of the personal guarantees (indiv.) in the total due amounts, multiplied by the dummy variable ‘‘banks is the debtor’s main creditor’’

(% Personal guarantees: firm(s)) � (bank is the main cred.)

% of the personal guarantees (firm) in the total due amounts, multiplied by the dummy variable ‘‘banks is the debtor’s main creditor’’

(% Pledges) � (bank is the main cred.) % of the pledges in the total due amounts, multiplied by the dummy variable ‘‘banks is the debtor’s main creditor’’

(% Mortgages) � (bank is the main cred.) % of the mortgages in the total due amounts, multiplied by the dummy variable ‘‘banks is the debtor’s main creditor’’

Limited liability Dummy equals to 1 if the debtor is a limited liability firm Company belongs to a group Dummy equals to 1 if the firm belongs to a group Commerce Dummy equals to 1 if the firm operates in the ‘‘commerce’’ sector File is managed by bank N�. . . Dummy variable for each bank in the sample Service Dummy equals to 1 if the firm operates in the ‘‘service’’ sector Industry Dummy equals to 1 if the firm operates in the ‘‘industry’’ sector GDP growth Variation in GDP in the year of default

A5. Correlation matrix

Origin of

default:

faulty

management

Faulty

management � Bad rating at default

time

ln (duration

of the

banking

relationship,

in years)

Bank is

the

debtor’s

main

creditor

Bad

rating at

default

time

ln(due

amount,K€)

% of long

term

debt

ln(internal

collaterals)

ln(external

collaterals)

Limited

liability

The

company

belongs

to a

group

Commerce Industry GDP

growth

Origin of default: faulty

management

1

Faulty management � Bad rating at default time

0.52044 1

<.0001

ln(duration of the banking

relationship, in years)

�0.03696 0.12824 1 0.5365 0.0313

Bank is the debtor’s main

creditor

�0.00316 0.03659 0.04115 1 0.9597 0.5585 0.5105

Bad rating at default time �0.09885 0.30078 0.21976 �0.08399 1 0.0976 <.0001 0.0002 0.1787

ln(due amount,K€) �0.02858 �0.06182 0.13888 �0.10422 �0.07124 1 0.6328 0.3009 0.0196 0.0948 0.233

% of long term debt �0.00773 �0.00209 �0.07156 0.21034 �0.08632 0.10191 1 0.9022 0.9735 0.2549 0.0012 0.1694 0.1045

ln(internal collaterals) �0.04582 �0.0515 0.13159 0.09611 0.06035 0.29941 0.17041 1 0.4434 0.3889 0.0271 0.1236 0.3125 <.0001 0.0064

ln(external collaterals) 0.02512 0.13346 0.04384 0.08123 0.10881 0.07491 0.0315 0.08627 1

0.6745 0.025 0.4633 0.1934 0.0681 0.2098 0.6166 0.1485

Limited liability 0.00363 0.09062 0.00285 �0.1955 0.02897 �0.08747 �0.1963 �0.12007 0.02384 1 0.9516 0.129 0.9621 0.0016 0.6281 0.1429 0.0016 0.0439 0.6902

The company belongs to a

group

0.0298 0.01941 0.1431 �0.12854 �0.00896 0.16116 0.06884 0.00478 �0.10883 �0.02609 1 0.6182 0.7456 0.0162 0.0391 0.8809 0.0067 0.2735 0.9363 0.068 0.6627

Commerce 0.05371 0.09255 �0.0816 �0.04871 0.09795 �0.08854 �0.1248 �0.09551 0.0808 0.12497 �0.13858 1 0.3689 0.121 0.1718 0.4359 0.1007 0.138 0.0465 0.1095 0.176 0.0359 0.0199

Industry �0.03155 0.04763 0.15642 �0.11092 0.04003 0.07329 �0.17522 0.02007 �0.08109 0.16691 0.03421 �0.45023 1 0.5978 0.4256 0.0085 0.0753 0.5031 0.2198 0.005 0.7372 0.1745 0.005 0.5673 <.0001

GDP growth �0.03555 0.07046 0.08756 �0.03331 0.13791 �0.00169 �0.03358 0.05888 0.04418 �0.01038 �0.04264 �0.02012 0.10082 1 0.5522 0.2382 0.1424 0.5943 0.0205 0.9775 0.5935 0.3245 0.4599 0.8622 0.4757 0.7366 0.091

Note: The Table shows the Pearson correlation indexes for the variables included in our regressions. The numbers appearing below each correlation index is the p-value for the null hypothesis (a p-value less than 10% means the null hypothesis can be rejected so that the correlation index is significantly different from zero).

262 R. Blazy et al. / Journal of Banking & Finance 44 (2014) 248–263

R. Blazy et al. / Journal of Banking & Finance 44 (2014) 248–263 263

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  • The choice between informal and formal restructuring: The case of French banks facing distressed SMEs
    • 1 Introduction
    • 2 The resolution of financial distress
    • 3 Hypotheses
    • 4 Data analysis
      • 4.1 Presentation of the data
      • 4.2 Direct bankruptcies vs. renegotiation attempts
      • 4.3 Successful vs. failed renegotiations
    • 5 Econometric implementation and results
      • 5.1 Static model
      • 5.2 Dynamic model
    • 6 Concluding remarks
    • Appendix A Appendices
      • A1 Evolution of corporate bankruptcies in France
      • A2 Time distribution of the sample
    • References
    • A3 Evolution of the French bankruptcy laws
    • 1 Introduction
    • 2 The resolution of financial distress
    • References

Options-implied-variance-and-future-stock-ret_2014_Journal-of-Banking---Fina.pdf

Journal of Banking & Finance 44 (2014) 93–113

Contents lists available at ScienceDirect

Journal of Banking & Finance

journal homepage: www.elsevier .com/locate / jbf

Options-implied variance and future stock returns q

http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jbankfin.2014.04.002 0378-4266/� 2014 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

q We thank an anonymous referee, Turan Bali, Werner DeBondt, Ozgur Demirtas, Hao Jiang, David Lesmond, Mark H. Liu, Ike Mathur (the editor), Lin Peng, Melissa Porras Prado, Marta Szymanowska, and seminar participants at Baruch College, Depaul University, Erasmus University, Wuhan University, Xiamen University, and conference participants at the 2012 Financial Management Association annual meeting and 2011 Chicago Quantitative Alliance annual meeting for helpful comments. We acknowledge financial support from the Chicago Quantitative Alliance in the form of its 18th Annual Academic Competition Second Place Award. The usual disclaimer applies. ⇑ Corresponding author. Tel.: +31 10 4081450.

E-mail addresses: [email protected] (H. Guo), [email protected] (B. Qiu). 1 Address: Department of Finance, Carl H. Lindner College of Business, University of

Cincinnati, P.O. Box 210195, Cincinnati, OH 45221-0195, United States. 2 Address: Department of Finance, Rotterdam School of Management, Erasmus

University, Burgemeester Oudlaan 50, P.O. Box 1738, 3062 PA, Rotterdam, The Netherlands.

3 In cross-sectional studies, Lintner (1965), Lehmann (1990), Douglas Malkiel and Xu (2002), Fu (2009), and Chua et al. (2010), find a positive between idiosyncratic risk and future stock returns, while Ang et al. (20 subsequent studies, e.g., Chen et al. (2012b), George and Hwang (2013), and Loh (2012), uncover a negative relation. Bali and Cakici (2008), Guo et al. (20 and Lesmond (2011), and Huang et al. (2010) have conducted robustness c the results reported in previous studies. Similarly, in time-series studies, G Santa-Clara (2003) find a positive relation between aggregate idiosyncratic future excess market returns; Bali et al. (2005) and Wei and Zhang (2005) s the relation is rather weak; and Guo and Savickas (2008) document a relation in quarterly data but a weak relation in monthly data. While varian appropriate risk measure in Merton’s (1987) model, both variance and volat square root of variance) have been commonly used in existing studies. qualitatively similar results using either variance or volatility as a me idiosyncratic risk.

4 Armstrong et al. (2013) provide a rational mechanism that can gene seemingly ‘‘puzzling’’ negative relation between idiosyncratic volatility and returns documented by Ang et al. (2006) and others. Specifically, the auth that a firm’s stock price is a convex function of its future risk-factor Therefore, higher factor-loading uncertainty (and thus higher idiosyncratic since factor-loading uncertainty is positively related to idiosyncratic volatilit model) will be associated with higher stock price and hence lower expecte

Hui Guo a,1, Buhui Qiu b,⇑,2 a University of Cincinnati, United States b Erasmus University, The Netherlands

a r t i c l e i n f o a b s t r a c t

Article history: Received 10 July 2013 Accepted 2 April 2014 Available online 12 April 2014

JEL classification: G1

Keywords: Stock return predictability Implied variance Realized variance CAPM ICAPM

Using options-implied variance, a forward-looking measure of conditional variance, we revisit the debate on the idiosyncratic risk-return relation. In both cross-sectional (for individual stocks) and time-series (for the market index) regressions, we find a negative relation between options-implied variance and future stock returns. Consistent with Miller’s (1977) divergence of opinion hypothesis, the negative rela- tion gets stronger (1) for stocks with more stringent short-sale constraints or (2) when shorting stocks becomes more difficult. Moreover, the negative correlation of realized idiosyncratic variance or analyst forecast dispersion with future stock returns mainly reflects their close correlation with our conditional idiosyncratic variance measure.

� 2014 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

1. Introduction investors hold under-diversified portfolios (e.g., Blume and

(1969), relation 06) and Hou and

A positive risk-return tradeoff is a fundamental law of finance, and there is an ongoing debate about whether such a tradeoff applies for company-specific or idiosyncratic risk. In classical asset pricing theories, e.g., the capital asset pricing model (CAPM), inves- tors require a positive risk premium only for bearing systematic risk. This tenet, however, depends crucially on the assumption that investors can immunize themselves from idiosyncratic risk by holding diversified portfolios. When relaxing the perfect-diversifi- cation assumption, Merton (1987) and others (e.g., Levy, 1978; Malkiel and Xu, 2002) show that idiosyncratic risk is an important determinant of expected stock returns. Because many individual

Friend, 1975; Goetzmann and Kumar, 2008), Merton’s (1987) con- jecture is potentially important. For example, practitioners often argue that the premium associated with a company’s specific risk should be a part of the company’s cost of capital (e.g., Calvert and Smith, 2011). Existing empirical studies, however, have found mixed evidence on the relation between conditional idiosyncratic variance and future stock returns.3,4

14), Han hecks of oyal and risk and

how that negative ce is the ility (the We find asure of

rate the expected ors show

loading. volatility y in their d return.

94 H. Guo, B. Qiu / Journal of Banking & Finance 44 (2014) 93–113

We investigate whether the inconclusive evidence reflects mea- surement errors in conditional stock variance, which is unobservable and has been estimated using either the realized variance model or the GARCH model in existing studies. Because Ghysels et al. (2005) find that conditional variance is a function of long distributed lags of squared daily returns, the commonly used monthly realized variance can be a noisy measure of conditional variance. Moreover, Han and Lesmond (2011) emphasize that microstructure noise due to the bid-ask spread generates substantial measurement errors in realized variance constructed using closing prices. Similarly, while long time-series samples are needed to obtain reliable parameter estimates of the GARCH model, existing studies require a minimum of only 30–60 monthly stock return observations to estimate the GARCH model due to data limitations. In this paper, we use options-implied variance as a proxy for conditional variance because many authors, e.g., Christensen and Prabhala (1998), Fleming (1998), and Busch et al. (2011), show that this forward-looking measure sub- sumes the information content of both realized variance and GARCH variance in the forecast of future realized variance. Moreover, Guo and Whitelaw (2006) and others advocate for using options-implied variance instead of realized or GARCH variance adopted in previous studies (e.g., French et al., 1987) to uncover the positive stock market risk-return relation, as stipulated in Merton’s (1973) intertemporal capital asset pricing model (ICAPM).

There are some issues with using options-implied variance as a proxy for conditional variance. First, it is a measure of total vari- ance—the sum of variance due to (1) comovement with systematic risk and (2) idiosyncratic risk. To identify precisely the effects of idiosyncratic variance on expected stock returns, we explicitly control for its correlation with commonly used systematic risk measures. Second, because stock market variance may be priced (e.g., Bakshi and Kapadia, 2003; Ang et al., 2006), options-implied variance is an upward biased estimate of conditional variance. Moreover, the variance risk premium, the difference between options-implied vari- ance and realized variance, correlates positively with future stock returns in both time-series (e.g., Bollerslev et al., 2009; Drechsler and Yaron, 2011) and cross-sectional (e.g., Bali and Hovakimian, 2009; Han and Zhou, 2011) data. To address this issue, we control for the variance risk premium in our empirical analysis. Last, not all stocks are optionable, and there is a concern about sample selection biases. Specifically, optionable stocks tend to have a bigger market capitalization than do nonoptionable stocks, and big stocks are less susceptible to market friction such as information costs than are small stocks (e.g., Merton, 1987). In a similar vein, Danielsen and Sorescu (2001) and others show that options introduction substantially alle- viates short-sale constraints. Thus, as we confirm in this paper, by excluding nonoptionable stocks from the sample, we need to adopt powerful tests for the optionable stock data to uncover the idiosyn- cratic risk-return relation(s) associated with these market frictions.

In contrast with Merton’s (1987) under-diversification hypoth- esis, we document a negative albeit insignificant relation between options-implied variance and future stock returns in the cross-sec- tional analysis. Consistent with Miller’s (1977) divergence of opin- ions hypothesis, the negative relation becomes both statistically and economically significant when we include only stocks that are likely to have binding short-sale constraints.5 Similarly, our

5 The weak relation documented in the full optionable stock sample reflects the aforementioned sample selection bias: Options trading alleviates short-sale con- straints and thus makes it more difficult to detect the divergence of opinion effect for the full optionable stock sample. For example, over a common sample period, while we confirm Ang et al.’s (2006) finding of a significantly negative univariate relation between realized idiosyncratic volatility and future stock returns for all common stocks, the relation is insignificant when we restrict the sample to optionable stocks. In a similar vein, focusing on optionable stocks with binding short-sale constraints allows us to have a more powerful test of Miller’s (1977) divergence of opinion hypothesis.

measure of aggregate conditional idiosyncratic risk, aggregate options-implied variance orthogonalized by options-implied vari- ance of the S&P 500 index (VIX), correlates negatively and signifi- cantly with future stock market returns in the time-series analysis; and such a relation is stronger when shorting stocks becomes more difficult. Moreover, we find that realized variance (e.g., Ang et al., 2006; Guo and Savickas, 2008) or analyst earnings forecast disper- sion (e.g., Diether et al., 2002; Yu, 2011) predicts stock returns mainly because of their close correlation with our conditional idio- syncratic variance measure. Our novel empirical evidence provides strong support for Miller’s (1977) hypothesis as an explanation of the negative relation between conditional idiosyncratic risk and future stock returns.

Specifically, in the univariate Fama and MacBeth (1973) cross- sectional regression, the relation between options-implied vari- ance and one-month-ahead stock returns is negative but statisti- cally insignificant. When we control for the commonly used stock return predictors, the negative relation becomes significant at the 5% level. Interestingly, while small stocks are arguably more susceptible to the under-diversification problem than are big stocks (Merton, 1987), we find that the negative relation between options-implied variance and future stock returns is actually stron- ger for small stocks. These results are puzzling because they appear to contradict the fundamental law of a positive risk-return trade- off. However, the literature suggests a close relation between idio- syncratic variance and divergence of opinion (e.g., Shalen, 1993; Harris and Raviv, 1993; Beber et al., 2010). Thus, a possible expla- nation is that conditional variance (as proxied by options-implied variance) is a proxy for divergence of opinion, which, in the pres- ence of short-sale constraints, leads stocks to be overvalued ini- tially and to have low returns subsequently (Miller, 1977). Under this explanation, the negative relation between options-implied variance and future stock returns is more pronounced for small stocks than for big stocks possibly because small stocks are more susceptible to short-sale constraints.

We find strong support for Miller’s (1977) implication that divergence of opinion affects only stocks with binding short-sale constraints. In Fama and Macbeth (1973) regressions, the interac- tion term of options-implied variance with a measure of short-sale constraints correlates negatively and significantly with future stock returns at the 1% level, and the interaction term completely subsumes the information content of options-implied variance about future stock returns. We find qualitatively similar results by forming portfolios. The return difference between low and high options-implied variance stocks has a significantly positive alpha only for the tercile of stocks with most stringent short-sale con- straints, but is negligible for the other terciles. Moreover, we find that, consistent with Miller’s hypothesis, it is the binding short- sale constraints, rather than market capitalization, that drive the cross-sectional relation between options-implied variance and future stock returns.6 In an influential study, Ang et al. (2006) doc- ument a negative relation between realized idiosyncratic volatility and future stock returns. We find that options-implied variance, when interacting with short-sale constraints, drives out realized idi- osyncratic volatility from cross-sectional regressions, suggesting that the latter is also a proxy for divergence of opinion. Consistent with this conjecture, the interaction term of realized idiosyncratic volatility with short-sale constraints has a strong negative

6 For example, our three-way portfolio sort results show that the alpha of the hedge portfolio based on options-implied variance is insignificant for small stocks with non- binding short-sale constraints, while it is highly significant for bigger stocks with binding short-sale constraints. Similarly, the interaction term between options- implied variance and the proxy for short-sale constraints is highly significant even when we orthogonalize the short-sale constraints proxy by market capitalization to specifically filter out the size effect.

10 In contrast to our finding, Diavatopoulos et al. (2008) document a positive cross- sectional relation between options-implied idiosyncratic variance and future stock returns. Their results differ from ours for two important reasons. First, these authors use options-implied variance of the last business day in time t as a proxy for the

H. Guo, B. Qiu / Journal of Banking & Finance 44 (2014) 93–113 95

correlation with future stock returns and completely subsumes the information content of realized idiosyncratic volatility. By contrast, the alternative hypotheses advanced in the literature cannot fully explain our findings.

Results are qualitatively similar for the time-series analysis. Options-implied variance is a measure of total variance, e.g., it is the sum of market variance and idiosyncratic variance in the CAPM. To address this issue, we orthogonalize value-weighted aggregate options-implied variance by VIX, a proxy for conditional market variance, and find that the orthogonalized aggregate options-implied variance correlates negatively and significantly with future excess market returns at the 1% level. Moreover, con- sistent with Merton’s (1973) ICAPM, the relation between VIX and future excess market returns is significantly positive when we control for the value-weighted aggregate options-implied var- iance in the forecasting regression. Our results are robust for (1) equal-weighted aggregate options-implied variance; (2) weekly, quarterly, and annual data; (3) overlapping data; (4) correction of the small sample bias; (5) control of commonly used forecasting variables; (6) subsamples; and (7) out-of-sample forecasts. Fur- thermore, similar to the cross-sectional evidence, aggregate options-implied variance drives out aggregate realized variance in the time-series forecasting regression of excess market returns, indicating that realized variance forecasts stock market returns mainly because of its close correlation with conditional variance as proxied by options-implied variance.

Miller’s (1977) divergence of opinion argument applies to the market portfolio as well.7 Yu (2011) also advocates for a bottom- up approach to construct aggregate divergence of opinion mea- sures.8 We show in two ways that our time-series evidence of a strong negative relationship between the orthogonalized aggregate options-implied variance and future excess market returns is also consistent with Miller’s (1977) divergence of opinion hypothesis. First, Yu (2011) suggests that aggregate analyst earnings forecast dispersion is a measure of aggregate divergence of opinion, and finds that it correlates negatively with future stock market returns. We show that the orthogonalized aggregate options-implied variance drives out aggregate analyst earnings forecast dispersion in the fore- casting regression of market returns, suggesting that these two vari- ables have similar information content. Second, Securities and Exchange Commission’s (SEC) permanent ban on naked short selling in all U.S. stocks effective from September 18, 2008 provides a quasi- natural experiment to test Miller’s (1977) hypothesis in the time- series analysis. Specifically, because the ban makes it more difficult to short stocks, the negative relation between the orthogonalized aggregate options-implied variance and future stock market returns should be more pronounced following the ban, and we document strong empirical support for this conjecture.9 Our empirical results

7 Miller (1977) suggests that ‘‘even in a situation where there are a number of risky investments which may be held in variable quantities the basic (divergence of opinion) argument holds (p. 1160)’’. See also Yu (2011).

8 Yu (2011) suggests that ‘‘investors may agree on the future prospect of the market. In this case, there may appear to be little disagreement from the top-down measure. However, still waters run deep. Investors may disagree on which stocks will lead/lag the market; hence, strong disagreement may exist and can be discerned from the bottom up, which may make the bottom-up disagreement a better proxy of the belief dispersion within the market (p. 163)’’.

9 Doran et al. (2010) use the temporary short-sale ban on financial stocks to investigate the cross-sectional relation between idiosyncratic volatility and future stock returns and find support for Miller’s (1977) divergence of opinion hypothesis. Boehmer et al. (2013), however, caution that the cross-sectional evidence from the event study may reflect the Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP) and other initiatives announced on the same day as the short-sale ban. In contrast, our time- series analysis provides a cleaner test of Miller’s (1977) hypothesis because there is no compelling reason that TARP and other initiatives affect the intertemporal relation between the orthogonalized aggregate options-implied variance and future market returns.

hence suggest that orthogonalized aggregate options-implied vari- ance is a good proxy for aggregate divergence in opinion.

Several recent studies have investigated the information content of options-implied variance for future stock returns. Bali and Hovakimian (2009), Cremers and Weinbaum (2010), and Xing et al. (2010) find that the spread in options-implied volatilities between call and put options correlates positively with future stock returns. Bali and Hovakimian (2009) and Han and Zhou (2011) show that the difference between realized and options-implied vol- atilities correlates negatively with future stock returns. Ang et al. (2010) document that stocks with large increases in call-implied volatility tend to rise over the following month whereas increases in put implied volatility forecast decreases in next-month stock returns. Bollerslev et al. (2009) and Drechsler and Yaron (2011) show that the variance risk premium correlates positively with future stock market returns. Bali et al. (2011b) show that the differ- ence between out-of-the-money put and at-the-money call options written on the S&P 500 index correlates negatively with future stock market returns. We contribute to the literature by showing that, when in conjunction with binding short-sale constraints, the level of options-implied variance strongly forecasts stock returns in both cross-sectional and time-series regressions, and its forecast power is beyond that of the put-call options-implied volatility spread and the realized-implied volatility spread.10 These findings, which lend strong support for Miller’s (1977) divergence of opinion hypothesis, shed new light on the ongoing debate about the condi- tional idiosyncratic risk–return relation.

The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 describes the data. Section 3 investigates the cross-sectional rela- tion between options-implied variance and future stock returns. Section 4 examines the time-series relation between aggregate options-implied variance and future excess market returns. Sec- tion 5 concludes. Additional empirical evidences are provided in Appendix A.

2. Data

The OptionMetrics database provides daily options-implied stock volatility constructed using closing prices of stock options via Cox-Ross-Rubinstein binomial tree model (Cox et al. (1979)). We follow Merton’s (1987) model and use variance, i.e., the squared implied volatility, as the risk measure; and results are

conditional variance of time t + 1. Because cross-sectional stock returns have a positive skewness (e.g., Duffee (1995)), the different closing times in options and primary markets (e.g., Battalio and Schultz (2006)) may introduce a positive bias in their estimated relation between options-implied idiosyncratic variance and future stock returns. Second and, more importantly, Diavatopoulos et al. (2008) measure a stock’s idiosyncratic variance as the difference between the stock’s options-implied variance and options-implied market variance (VIX) multiplied by squared market beta. Table 2 shows a strong negative contemporaneous relation between VIX and excess market returns. Moreover, market beta correlates positively with options- implied variance, with a correlation coefficient of 48% in our sample. Together with the look-ahead bias in VIX (due to its 4:15 pm ET closing time), their measure generates a positive bias in the estimated relation between options-implied idiosyncratic variance and future stock returns. Our results, however, are consistent with a concurrent study by Conrad et al. (2013), who use a sample of option prices to estimate individual stocks’ risk neutral volatility and report a negative relation between options-implied volatility and the cross-section of expected stock returns. Unlike our paper, Conrad et al. (2013) focus mainly on asset pricing implications of skewness. Moreover, we add to their findings by showing that (1) orthogonalized aggregate options-implied variance correlates negatively and significantly with future excess market returns and (2) both the cross-sectional and time-series relations between options-implied variance and future stock returns are consistent with the divergence of opinion hypothesis.

96 H. Guo, B. Qiu / Journal of Banking & Finance 44 (2014) 93–113

qualitatively similar for volatility (untabulated).11 Over the January 4, 1996 to October 29, 2010 period, in each trading day and for each stock, we use the average of options-implied variances of (1) an at- the-money call options contract and (2) an at-the-money put options contract as the measure of the stock’s conditional variance. Specifically, we select the call or put options contract with (1) non-zero trading volume; (2) the strike price closest to the closing stock price of the day; and (3) the expiration closest to 30 days. We obtain qualitatively similar results using implied variance con- structed using either (1) at-the-money call options or (2) at-the- money put options (untabulated).

Because it is a forward-looking variable, options-implied vari- ance from the last business day of period t provides a sufficient summary of market participants’ expectations about the variance of period t + 1. This specification, however, is inappropriate due to different trading hours in options and primary markets (e.g., Battalio and Schultz (2006)). Prior to February 13, 2006, trading of equity options closed at 4:02 pm ET at the Chicago Board of Options Exchange (CBOE)—2 minutes after the close of equity trad- ing at the New York Stock Exchange, the American Stock Exchange, and NASDAQ. Different closing times generate an artificial lead-lag relation between closing options prices and closing equity prices. To avoid such a look-ahead bias, we use options-implied variance of the second-to-last business day of period t as the proxy for the conditional variance of period t + 1.12

For the cross-sectional analysis, we obtain stock return data of common stocks (codes 10 and 11) from CRSP and obtain account- ing data from COMPUSTAT. Following Jegadeesh and Titman (2001) and many others, to alleviate the influence of microstruc- ture noise, we exclude stocks with a closing price below $5. To mit- igate the effect of potential outliers on the regression results, we winsorize options-implied variance at the 1 and 99 percentiles each month, although winsorization does not change our main results in any qualitative manner. We follow Fama and French (1992) in the construction of market beta, market capitalization (a proxy for size), and the book-to-market equity ratio. Our illi- quidity measure is the same as that proposed by Amihud (2002). The leverage is book value of debt over the sum of book value of debt and market value of equity, as in Johnson (2004) and Ang et al. (2009). The institutional ownership is the fraction of a stock’s outstanding shares held by all institutional shareholders con- structed using the most recent 13f filings obtained from Thomson Financial 13f database. As in Cooper et al. (2008) and others, the asset growth is the year-over-year growth rate of total assets. Lastly, we follow Ang et al. (2006) in the construction of monthly realized idiosyncratic volatility using daily stock returns and daily Fama and French (1996) three factors with a minimum of 17 daily observations for each month.

After merging the OptionMetrics database with CRSP and COM- PUSTAT, we have on average 1556 stocks per month with valid options-implied variance and market capitalization information over the January 1996 to October 2010 period. The options sample is a fraction (40%) of the CRSP-COMPUSTAT universe, which on average has 3,969 stocks per month with valid realized idiosyn- cratic volatility and market capitalization information over the same sample period. In Table 1, we provide summary statistics of selected stock characteristics for both the options sample (panel A) and the CRSP-COMPUSTAT universe (panel B). Average (median) market capitalization of the options sample is about two (four) times as big as that of the CRSP-COMPUSTAT universe. Moreover, stocks with options trading are substantially more liquid and have lower book-to-market equity ratios. Big stocks are in general less

11 All untabulated results in this paper are available from the authors upon request. 12 Results are qualitatively similar for options-implied variance of the last business

day of period t (untabulated).

susceptible to market friction such as information costs (e.g., Merton (1987)). Moreover, Danielsen and Sorescu (2001) and oth- ers emphasize that options introduction substantially alleviates short-sale constraints. By excluding nonoptionable stocks, our sam- ple provides a stringent test for both Merton’s (1987) and Miller’s (1977) hypotheses. For the time-series analysis, we use the market capitalization at the end of the previous month (i.e., month t � 1) as the weight to construct the daily series of value-weighted aggregate options-implied variance, VWAOIV, from all optionable stocks. For comparison, we also construct the aggregate equal-weighted options-implied variance, EWAOIV. We obtain daily VIX data from CBOE and square it into a proxy for conditional market variance. Because VIX trading at CBOE closes at 4:15 pm ET—15 minutes after the close of equity trading, we similarly use VIX of the second-to-last business day in period t as the proxy for conditional market variance of period t + 1. For the time-series analysis, we obtain weekly and monthly market return and risk-free rate data ending in December 2010 from Kenneth French at Dartmouth College. We construct quarterly and annual returns by compounding monthly returns. We obtain stock market return predictors used in Welch and Goyal (2008) from Amit Goyal at Emory University and acquire variance risk premium data used in Bollerslev et al. (2009) from Hao Zhou at the Federal Reserve Board.

In Fig. 1, we plot monthly VWAOIV (solid line) along with EWAOIV (dashed line) over the January 1996 to October 2010 per- iod. Table 2 reports their summary statistics. Consistent with the finding reported in earlier studies (e.g., Goyal and Santa-Clara (2003)), EWAOIV is substantially larger than VWAOIV. The sample average is 2.6% for EWAOIV, about twice as large as the sample average of 1.4% for VWAOIV. The result indicates that small stocks are substantially more volatile than big stocks. The two variables tend to move closely to each other, with a correlation coefficient of 84%. Specifically, they increase sharply during the 2001 stock market meltdown and the 2008 financial crisis. Both variables appear to be quite persistent, with an autocorrelation coefficient of 84% and 92% for VWAOIV and EWAOIV, respectively. Neverthe- less, the augmented Dickey–Fuller test rejects the null hypothesis of a unit root at the 1% level for VWAOIV and at the 10% level for EWAOIV.

We plot monthly VIX (dashed line) along with VWAOIV (solid line) in Fig. 2. The two variables tend to move closely to each other, especially during the 2008 financial crisis. This is because options- implied variance is a measure of total variance, which is the sum of market variance and idiosyncratic variance in the CAPM. To illus- trate this point, we write the excess return on stock i as

Ri;t ¼ biRM;t þ ei;t; ð1Þ where bi is market beta, RM,t is the excess market return, and ei,t is the idiosyncratic return.13 Because by definition the idiosyncratic return is orthogonal to the excess market return, total variance of stock i is

r2i;t ¼ b 2 i r

2 M;t þ r2i;e;t; ð2Þ

where r2M;t is market variance and r2i;e;t is idiosyncratic variance. The aggregate total variance across N stocks isXN i¼1

xi;tr2i;t ¼ XN i¼1

xi;tb2i

! r2M;t þ

XN i¼1

xi;tr2i;e;t; ð3Þ

where the weight xi,t equals 1/N for the equal-weighted measure and equals stock i’s market capitalization share for the value- weighted measure. Eq. (3) demonstrates a close correlation of

13 For simplicity, we use the physical measure in our illustration, while we mainly use options-implied variance in the empirical analysis. As a robustness check, we show that controlling for variance risk premium in both cross-sectional and time- series regressions does not change our main findings in any qualitative manner.

Table 1 summary statistics of cross-sectional data: January 1996 to October 2010.

Average NOB Mean Median Lower quartile Upper quartile

Panel A: Merged OptionMetrics, CRSP, and COMPUSTAT IVAR 1556 2.406 1.560 0.832 3.014 BETA 1393 1.222 1.187 0.969 1.528 SIZE 1556 7.101 1.539 0.614 4.628 BM 1445 0.458 0.368 0.214 0.582 AMIHUD 1237 0.960 0.185 0.048 0.711

Panel B: Merged CRSP and COMPUSTAT BETA 3238 1.158 1.137 0.860 1.415 SIZE 3969 3.030 0.345 0.103 1.264 BM 3473 0.595 0.488 0.286 0.755 AMIHUD 3037 178.557 2.295 0.255 25.903

Note: The table reports summary statistics of selected stock characteristics of the cross-sectional data. For each stock and each month, we calculate the put-call average options-implied variance of the second-to-last business day of the month. IVAR (in percentage) is the average monthly options-implied variance of a call option with non-zero trading volume, (closest to) at the money, and (closest to) 30-day expiration and a put option with non-zero trading volume, (closest to) at the money, and (closest to) 30-day expiration. We require common stocks (codes 10 and 11) with closing prices being no less than $5. IVAR has been winsorized at 1% and 99% each month. BETA is the market beta. SIZE is the market capitalization in billion dollars. BM is the book-to-market equity ratio. AMIHUD is Amihud’s (2002) illiquidity measure multiplied by 100.

Monthly Value-Weighted (Solid Line) and Equal-Weighted (Dashed Line) Aggregate Options-Implied Variance

Fig. 1. Monthly value-weighted (solid line) and equal-weighted (dashed line) aggregate options-implied variance.

Table 2 Summary statistics of time-series data: January 1996 to October 2010.

ERET VIX VWAOIV EWAOIV

Panel A: Cross-correlation ERET 1.000 VIX �0.421 1.000 VWAOIV �0.441 0.836 1.000 EWAOIV �0.291 0.608 0.843 1.000

Panel B: Univariate statistics Mean 0.412 0.469 1.364 2.589 Standard Deviation 4.939 0.409 0.905 1.436 Autocorrelation 0.140 0.803 0.843 0.924 ADF Test �11.444*** �3.758*** �3.845*** �2.578*

Note: The table provides summary statistics of selected variables used in the monthly time-series regressions. The sample spans the January 1996 to October 2010 period. In each trading day and for each stock, we select an at-the-money call options contract (with non-zero trading volume, the strike price closest to the closing stock price of the day and the expiration closest to 30 days). We then use a stock’s market capitalization at the end of the previous month as the weight to construct the daily series of aggregate options-implied variance from all optionable stocks. We similarly construct the daily series of aggregate options-implied vari- ance using at-the-money put options contracts. We average across the two daily series to obtain the value-weighted aggregate options-implied variance, VWAOIV, for each trading day. We use VWAOIV of the second-to-last business day of period t as the proxy for aggregate conditional variance of period t + 1. We similarly con- struct the aggregate options-implied variance using the equal weight, EWAOIV. VIX is the options-implied variance of S&P 500 index, and we use VIX of the second-to- last business day of period t as the proxy for conditional market variance of period t + 1. ERET is the excess market return. We report Mean and Standard Deviation in percentage. �� Significance level at 5% level. * Significance level at 10% level. *** Significance level at the 1% level.

H. Guo, B. Qiu / Journal of Banking & Finance 44 (2014) 93–113 97

aggregate total variance with market variance. Consistent with this observation, the correlation coefficient between VIX and VWAOIV is 84% in the data (Table 2). Because Merton (1987) argues that, in the presence of market friction, both market risk and idiosyncratic risk affect expected stock returns, it is important to control for its com- ovement with market variance when we use aggregate options- implied variance to forecast excess market returns. In a similar vein, we should control for loadings on market risk in Fama and MacBeth (1973) cross-sectional regressions. Moreover, since there are addi- tional risk factors in Merton’s (1973) ICAPM, which also contribute to a stock’s total variance, it is important to control for loadings on these risk factors as well. We also investigate the relation between options-implied variance and future stock returns by forming port- folios. In this case, it is again important to control for the comove- ment of portfolio returns with commonly used risk factors. Fig. 2 shows that VWAOIV is substantially larger than VIX, indicating that idiosyncratic variance is an important component of total variance. VIX appears to be persistent, and Table 2 shows that it has an auto- correlation coefficient of 80%. Nevertheless, the augmented Dickey– Fuller test rejects the null hypothesis that VIX has a unit root at the 1% level.

3. Options-implied variance and future stock returns: cross- sectional evidence

Existing studies have investigated the relation between condi- tional idiosyncratic risk and future stock returns using either cross-sectional or time-series regressions. In this paper, we unify

these two strands of research by examining both cross-sectional (in this section) and time-series (in Section 4) relations. This approach alleviates the concern about data mining and helps dif- ferentiate alternative hypotheses advanced in existing literature. We show that, consistent with Miller’s (1977) hypothesis, when in conjunction with binding short-sale constraints, options- implied variance correlates negatively and significantly with future stock returns in both cross-sectional and time-series regressions.

3.1. Merton’s (1987) under-diversification hypothesis

In this subsection, we investigate Merton’s (1987) conjecture that conditional idiosyncratic variance correlates positively with future stock returns using the Fama and MacBeth (1973) cross-sec- tional regression:

Monthly Value-Weighted Aggregate Options-Implied Variance (Solid Line) and Options-Implied Market Variance (Dashed Line)

Fig. 2. Monthly value-weighted aggregate options-implied variance (solid line) and options-implied market variance (dashed line).

14 The short interest is a potential measure of short-sale constraints. Autore et al. (2011), however, find a U-shaped relation between the short interest and short-sale constraints.

98 H. Guo, B. Qiu / Journal of Banking & Finance 44 (2014) 93–113

ri;t ¼ aþ b1IVARi;t�1 þ b2Xi;t�1 þ ei;t; ð4Þ

where ri,t is the return on stock i in month t, IVARi,t�1 is the average monthly options-implied variance of stock i measured in month t � 1, Xi,t�1 is a vector of commonly used cross-sectional stock return predictors measured in month t � 1, and ei,t is the error term.

In contrast with Merton’s (1987) conjecture, Column 1 of Table 3 shows that the simple univariate relation between options-implied variance, IVAR, and future stock returns is negative but statistically insignificant. As we emphasized in the preceding section, the uni- variate regression result should be interpreted with caution because IVAR is a measure of total variance. To identify precisely the effect of conditional idiosyncratic variance on future stock returns, we control for commonly used stock return predictors. Our control variables includes market beta (BETA), the log of mar- ket capitalization (SIZE), the log of book-to-market equity ratio (BM), and past returns over the period t � 7 to t � 2 (Rt�7,t�2)—a proxy for the momentum effect documented by Jegadeesh and Titman (1993) and many subsequent studies. Column 2 shows that the negative effect of IVAR on future stock returns becomes signif- icant at the 5% level. Consistent with earlier studies (e.g., Fama and French (1992)), SIZE correlates negatively with future stock returns and the relation is significant at the 1% level, while BETA has neg- ligible explanatory power. The book-to-market equity effect and the momentum effect are both insignificant in the 1996 to 2010 period. As a robustness check, we form portfolios by IVAR and find qualitatively similar results. For the equal-weighted portfolios, the return difference between the quintiles of highest and lowest IVAR stocks has a Carhart (1997) 4-factor alpha of �0.73% per month, with a t-statistic of �2.26; for the value-weighted portfolios, the alpha is �0.67%, with a t-statistic of �1.54 (untabulated).

We fail to uncover a positive idiosyncratic risk-return relation. Merton (1987) predicts that the positive relation is stronger for stocks with higher information costs, and suggests that small stocks tend to have higher information costs than do big stocks. Therefore, we expect to observe a stronger positive idiosyncratic risk-return relation for small stocks than for big stocks. To investi- gate this implication, in Table 4, we first sort stocks equally into five portfolios by market capitalization; for each size quintile, we then sort stocks equally into five portfolios by IVAR. Panel A of Table 4 reports Carhart (1997) 4-factor alphas of equal-weighted portfolios. In contrast with Merton’s (1987) under-diversification hypothesis, we find a stronger negative relation between IVAR and future stock returns for small stocks than for big stocks. The alpha of the hedge portfolio that is long in the lowest IVAR quintile and short in the highest IVAR quintile decreases monotonically with market capitalization. The hedge portfolio alpha is statisti- cally significant (at least at the 10% level) for the first three size

quintiles and economically large (over 12% per year) for the first two size quintiles. When we aggregate across the size quintiles, the hedge portfolio alpha is economically large (over 7% per year) and statistically significant at the 10% level. Results are qualita- tively similar for the value-weighted portfolios (Panel B). To sum- marize, we do not find a positive relation between options-implied variance and future stock returns; in fact, contrary to Merton’s (1987) prediction, we document a negative relation for smaller stocks but not for bigger stocks. Below, we show that this seem- ingly puzzling result is consistent with Miller’s (1977) divergence of opinion hypothesis.

3.2. Miller’s (1977) divergence of opinion hypothesis

Miller (1977) and many others (e.g., Harrison and Kreps, 1978; Chen et al., 2002; Scheinkman and Xiong, 2003; Boehme et al., 2006, 2009) suggest that, in the presence of binding short-sale con- straints, divergence of opinion leads stocks to be overvalued ini- tially and to have low returns subsequently. Because the literature suggests that idiosyncratic variance is a proxy for diver- gence of opinion (e.g., Shalen, 1993; Harris and Raviv, 1993; Beber et al., 2010), Miller’s (1977) hypothesis implies a negative relation between IVAR and future stock returns when short-sale constraints bind. Therefore, the weak univariate relation between IVAR and future stock returns reported in column 1, Table 3 reflects the fact that options trading alleviates short-sale constraints. More impor- tantly, as we show below, the negative relation between IVAR and future stock returns becomes both statistically and economically significant when we use only stocks with binding short-sale constraints.

D’Avolio (2002) shows that lending fees on shorted shares are a good measure of short-sale constraints but we do not have access to these proprietary data. Moreover, these data, when available, typically cover a period of only several months to several years, which is too short for the purpose of our analysis. Alternatively, many authors (e.g., Chen et al., 2002; D’Avolio, 2002; Asquith et al., 2005; Nagel, 2005; Saffi and Sturgess, 2009) show that insti- tutional ownership is a good proxy for short-sale constraints.14

This is because increases in institutional ownership increase the sup- ply of equity shares that can be lent to short sellers and thus relieves short-sale constraints. Specifically, D’Avolio (2002) shows that stocks with a large fraction of institutional ownership tend to have low lending fees on shorted shares. Note that institutional owner- ship correlates negatively with the severity of short-sale constraints. We define our measure of short-sales constraints, INST, as one minus the fraction of institutional ownership so that short-sale constraints are more likely to bind as INST increases. We then include INST, IVAR, and their interaction term, INST � IVAR, in the Fama and MacBeth (1973) cross-sectional regression of forecasting one- month-ahead stock returns:

ri;t ¼ aþ b1IVARi;t�1 þ b2INSTi;t�1 þ b3IVARi;t�1 � INSTi;t�1 þ b4Xi;t�1 þ ei;t : ð5Þ

We expect that the interaction term in Eq. (5) should correlate neg- atively with future stock returns and subsume the information con- tent of IVAR for future stock returns. That is, there is a negative relation between divergence of opinion (as measured by IVAR) and future stock returns only when short-sale constraints bind.

In column 3 of Table 3, we use IVAR, INST, and their interaction term, INST � IVAR, to forecast the cross-section of stock returns. As expected, the interaction term correlates negatively and

Table 3 Cross-sectional relation between options-implied variance and future stock returns.

Variables 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12

IVAR �0.167 �0.198** �0.019 �0.024 �0.035 �0.044 0.035 �0.038 �0.060 0.049 �0.075 (0.124) (0.090) (0.145) (0.105) (0.116) (0.105) (0.145) (0.100) (0.099) (0.145) (0.149)

BETA 0.147 0.108 0.089 0.168 0.144 0.029 0.141 0.150 0.173 0.105 (0.343) (0.341) (0.336) (0.333) (0.321) (0.379) (0.327) (0.327) (0.323) (0.308)

SIZE �0.181*** �0.182*** �0.177*** �0.180*** �0.171** �0.127* �0.180*** �0.182*** �0.156** �0.157** (0.066) (0.065) (0.067) (0.066) (0.067) (0.070) (0.066) (0.065) (0.067) (0.067)

BM 0.013 0.006 0.009 0.023 0.042 0.088 0.031 0.030 0.020 0.078 (0.118) (0.118) (0.114) (0.120) (0.120) (0.133) (0.119) (0.119) (0.118) (0.088)

Rt�7,t�2 0.002 0.002 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)

Rt�1 �0.020*** �0.018** �0.017** �0.019*** �0.020*** �0.019** �0.020*** (0.007) (0.007) (0.008) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007)

ADISP 0.033 (0.074)

CALL-PUT 0.068*** 0.062*** 0.065***

(0.014) (0.014) (0.014) RVOL-IVOL 0.025 0.017 0.012

(0.041) (0.042) (0.041) INST 0.004 0.006** 0.010** 0.006** 0.005** 0.006** 0.008** 0.006** 0.006**

(0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) INST � IVAR �0.294*** �0.344*** �0.264 �0.321*** �0.317*** �0.330*** �0.221* �0.323*** �0.281**

(0.111) (0.114) (0.162) (0.115) (0.114) (0.116) (0.128) (0.113) (0.114) DASSET �0.275***

(0.076) LEV �0.004

(0.004) LEV � IVAR 0.304

(0.208) RVOL �0.122* �0.029 0.015

(0.073) (0.047) (0.069) INST � RVOL �0.226

(0.139)

Adjusted R2 0.047 0.078 0.051 0.081 0.084 0.087 0.090 0.078 0.088 0.089 0.091 0.098

Note: The table reports Fama and MacBeth (1973) cross-sectional regression results for monthly sample over the January 1996 to October 2010 period. The dependent variable is the one-month-ahead stock return (in percentage). We use merged OptionMetrics, CRSP, and COMPUSTAT data. For each stock and each month, we calculate the put-call average options-implied variance of the second-to-last business day of the month. IVAR (in percentage) is the average monthly options-implied variance of a call option with non-zero trading volume, (closest to) at the money, and (closest to) 30-day expiration and a put option with non-zero trading volume, (closest to) at the money, and (closest to) 30-day expiration. We require common stocks (codes 10 and 11) with closing prices being no less than $5. IVAR has been winsorized at 1% and 99% each month. BETA is the market beta according to Fama and French (1992). SIZE is the log of market capitalization. BM is the log of book-to-market equity ratio. Rt�7,t�2 is the return over the month t � 7 to the month t � 2. Rt�1 is the return of month t � 1. ADISP is the analyst forecast dispersion according to Diether et al. (2002). CALL-PUT is the call minus put monthly options-implied volatility spread. RVOL is realized idiosyncratic volatility according to Ang et al. (2006). IVOL is the put-call average monthly options- implied volatility. RVOL-IVOL is the realized minus implied volatility spread. INST is one minus the fraction of institutional ownership. INST � IVAR is the product of INST and IVAR. DASSET is the year-over-year growth rate of total assets. LEV is book value of debt over the sum of book value of debt and market value of equity. LEV � IVAR is the product of LEV and IVAR. Rt�7,t�2, Rt�1, CALL-PUT, RVOL-IVOL, RVOL, INST, INST � IVAR, INST � RVOL, LEV and LEV � IVAR are all in percentage. The interaction terms, INST � IVAR and LEV � IVAR, are constructed with winsorized IVAR. Newey and West (1987) corrected standard errors are reported in parentheses. * Significance at 10% level. ** Significance at 5% level. *** Significance at 1% level.

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significantly with future stock returns at the 1% level, while both IVAR and INST are statistically insignificant.15 In column 4, we con- trol for the commonly used cross-sectional stock return predictors, and find that the effect of INST � IVAR on expected stock returns remains significantly negative at the 1% level. Table 4 documents a significantly negative relation between IVAR and future stock returns for small stocks but not for big stocks, and INST correlates negatively with market capitalization (i.e., larger stocks tend to have higher institutional ownership and thus lower INST). To ensure that the INST effect is not a manifestation of the size effect, we orthogo- nalize INST by SIZE to filter out the size effect, and use the orthogo- nalized INST as an alternative measure of short-sale constraints. Results are qualitatively similar for the orthogonalized INST (Table A1). Therefore, the relation between options-implied variance and future stock returns is stronger for small stocks than for big stocks mainly because small stocks are more susceptible to

15 One alternative explanation is that retail investors are more likely to speculate in high idiosyncratic volatility stocks than are institutional investors (Han and Kumar (2013)). The hypothesis cannot fully account for our results because, as we discuss later, controlling for skewness does not change our results in any qualitative manner.

short-sale constraints. In addition, we perform the cross-sectional analysis for two half samples and find qualitatively similar results (untabulated).

We also investigate the interaction of IVAR with INST by forming portfolios. To specifically control for the correlation of INST with SIZE, we first sort stocks equally into three portfolios by market capitalization. For each size tercile, we then sort stocks equally into three portfolios by INST. Last, for each INST tercile, we sort stocks equally into three portfolios by IVAR. Panels A of Table 5 reports Carhart (1997) 4-factor alphas of equal-weighted portfolios. The results are consistent with those obtained from the Fama and MacBeth (1973) regressions. Within each SIZE tercile, the alpha of the hedge portfolio that is long in low IVAR stocks and short in high IVAR stocks increases with INST, the proxy for short-sale con- straints. Moreover, for the high INST tercile (i.e., the tercile with binding short-sale constraints), the hedge portfolio alpha is both economically large (over 12% per year) and statistically significant (at the 1% level) for both the small and median size terciles; for the big size tercile, the alpha is economically important (about 6% per year) albeit statistically insignificant. The effect is somewhat weaker for big stocks because they are less likely to have binding

Table 4 Portfolios sorted by size and options-implied variance.

IVAR Quintile

1(L) 2 3 4 5(H) Low–High T-stat

Panel A: 4-Factor alphas of equal-weighted portfolios Size quintile

1(S) 0.143 0.137 0.074 �0.156 �1.053 1.196*** 3.10 2 0.234 0.160 �0.044 �0.264 �0.800 1.034** 2.38 3 0.084 �0.001 �0.085 �0.156 �0.691 0.775* 1.85 4 0.267 0.180 0.076 0.036 �0.088 0.354 0.79 5(B) �0.106 0.106 0.073 0.074 0.000 �0.106 �0.26

Average 0.131 0.100 0.061 �0.086 �0.511 0.641* 1.84

Panel B: 4-Factor alphas of value-weighted portfolios Size quintile

1(S) 0.124 0.082 0.145 �0.049 �0.869 0.992*** 2.71 2 0.247 0.157 �0.032 �0.224 �0.781 1.028** 2.40 3 0.068 0.031 �0.076 �0.225 �0.677 0.745* 1.79 4 0.242 0.160 0.071 0.058 �0.087 0.329 0.75 5(B) �0.028 0.071 0.198 0.008 �0.139 0.111 0.30

Average 0.124 0.116 0.019 �0.093 �0.526 0.650* 1.81

Note: For each stock and each month, we calculate the put-call average options-implied variance of the second-to-last business day of the month. IVAR (in percentage) is the average monthly options-implied variance of a call option with non-zero trading volume, (closest to) at the money, and (closest to) 30-day expiration and a put option with non-zero trading volume, (closest to) at the money, and (closest to) 30-day expiration. The sample spans the January 1996 to October 2010 period. We require common stocks (codes 10 and 11) with closing prices being no less than $5. In each month, we first sort stocks equally into 5 portfolios by market capitalization. Within each size quintile, we sort stocks equally into 5 portfolios by IVAR, options-implied variance. We construct the equal-weighted and value-weighted monthly portfolio returns and use the Fama and French (1996) 3 factors and the momentum factor to control for systematic risk. ‘‘Low–High’’ is the alpha (in percentage) of the hedge portfolio that is long in stocks with the lowest IVAR and short in stocks with the highest IVAR. ‘‘T-stat’’ is the Newey–West (1987) t-statistic. * Significance at 10% level. ** Significance at 5% level. *** Significance at 1% level.

100 H. Guo, B. Qiu / Journal of Banking & Finance 44 (2014) 93–113

short-sale constraints than small stocks. The results are similar for value-weighted portfolios (Panel B of Table 5).

Diether et al. (2002) suggest that the standard deviation of ana- lyst earnings forecasts is a proxy for divergence of opinion and find that it correlates negatively with future stock returns. In column 5 of Table 3, we control for analyst earnings forecast dispersion, ADISP, in the cross-sectional regression. Interestingly, the negative relation between INST � IVAR and future stock returns attenuates substantially and becomes statistically insignificant; and the explanatory power of ADISP is negligible as well.16 This is again con- sistent with the conjecture that IVAR, like ADISP, is a proxy for diver- gence of opinion.17 Similarly, the next section shows that aggregate options-implied variance and aggregate analyst forecast dispersion have similar predictive power for future excess market returns.

Jegadeesh (1990) and others document strong short-term return reversals: Stocks with low returns in month t � 1 tend to have high returns in month t. Because there is a positive contem- poraneous relation between stock returns and realized variance (e.g., Duffee (1995)), Huang et al. (2010) argue that the negative relation between realized idiosyncratic volatility and future stock returns documented by Ang et al. (2006) mainly reflects short-term return reversals. To address this issue, we include the one-month lagged stock return, Rt�1, as a control for short-term return reversals. Column 6 of Table 3 shows that the effect of INST � IVAR on future stock returns remains significantly negative at the 1% level even when we control for Rt�1.

Bali and Hovakimian (2009), Cremers and Weinbaum (2010), and Xing et al. (2010) find that the difference in options-implied volatilities between call and put options correlates positively with

16 However, our results show that the negative relation between the interaction term and future stock returns remains statistically significant even when controlling for ADISP if we use (1) orthogonalized INST to interact with IVAR (Table A1); (2) implied volatility, IVOL, instead of IVAR (untabulated); or (3) volatility surface data (untabulated).

17 Chen et al. (2012a) present evidence suggesting that idiosyncratic volatility and analyst forecast dispersion may both be driven by managerial discretion in earnings disclosure.

the cross-section of expected stock returns. Bali and Hovakimian (2009) and Han and Zhou (2011) document a negative relation between the realized-implied volatility spread and future stock returns. To investigate whether IVAR, when interacting with INST, provides additional information about future stock returns beyond these spreads, we include the call-put options-implied volatility spread, CALL-PUT, and the realized-implied volatility spread, RVOL-IVOL, in the cross-sectional regression. Column 7 of Table 3 shows that the correlation of the interaction term, INST � IVAR, with future stock returns remains significantly negative at the 1% level when we control for these two spreads.

Ang et al. (2006) document a negative relation between realized idiosyncratic volatility, RVOL, and future stock returns. Similar to IVAR, we document a negative albeit insignificant univariate rela- tion between RVOL and future stock returns using only optionable stocks (untabulated). This result is specific to the optionable stock sample because optionable stocks are less susceptible to short-sale constraints than are nonoptionable stocks. The next subsection shows that, over the same period, the negative relation between RVOL and future stock returns is significant at the 5% level for the CRSP-COMPUSTAT universe, which also include nonoptionable stocks. Nevertheless, column 8 of Table 3 shows that again, similar to IVAR, the negative relation between RVOL and future stock returns becomes marginally significant at the 10% level when we control for the commonly used stock return predictors. IVAR fore- casts stock returns possibly because of its correlation with RVOL and vice versa. Column 9 of Table 3 shows that the regression coef- ficient on the interaction term INST � IVAR remains significantly negative at the 1% level, while the coefficient on RVOL is insignifi- cant. This result suggests that the predictive power of RVOL for stock returns mainly reflects its correlation with conditional idio- syncratic risk.

Amihud and Mendelson (1986) and others show that illiquid stocks tend to have higher future returns than do liquid stocks. Because there is a strong positive relation between conditional stock variance and standard illiquidity measures, Spiegel and Wang (2005) argue that stocks with larger idiosyncratic variance

Table 5 Portfolios sorted by size, institutional ownership, and options-implied variance.

Small Cap Median Cap Big Cap

Low INST Median INST High INST Low INST Median INST High INST Low INST Median INST High INST

Panel A: 4-Factor alphas of equal-weighted portfolios Low IVAR �0.112 0.403 0.153 0.051 0.355 �0.005 �0.012 0.150 0.070 Median IVAR 0.187 0.148 �0.138 0.014 0.218 �0.064 �0.044 0.358 0.056 High IVAR �0.147 �0.124 �1.004 �0.182 0.169 �1.246 0.082 0.106 �0.413 Low–High 0.035 0.527 1.157*** 0.233 0.187 1.241*** �0.094 0.044 0.483 T�stat 0.100 1.430 3.070 0.820 0.600 2.820 �0.290 0.160 1.110

Panel B: 4-Factor alphas of value-weighted portfolios Low IVAR �0.049 0.400 0.168 0.008 0.396 0.005 �0.222 �0.005 �0.041 Median IVAR 0.186 �0.022 �0.165 0.068 0.153 �0.042 �0.103 0.273 0.221 High IVAR �0.154 �0.299 �1.191 �0.101 0.231 �1.281 �0.015 0.127 �0.407 Low–High 0.105 0.699* 1.359*** 0.109 0.165 1.286*** �0.208 �0.132 0.366 T-stat 0.280 1.650 3.380 0.370 0.500 2.810 �0.550 �0.410 0.790

Note: For each stock and each month, we calculate the put-call average options-implied variance of the second-to-last business day of the month. IVAR (in percentage) is the average monthly options-implied variance of a call option with non-zero trading volume, (closest to) at the money, and (closest to) 30-day expiration and a put option with non-zero trading volume, (closest to) at the money, and (closest to) 30-day expiration. The sample spans the January 1996 to October 2010 period. We require common stocks (codes 10 and 11) with closing prices being no less than $5. In each month, we first sort stocks equally into 3 portfolios by market capitalization. Within each size tercile, we sort stocks equally into 3 portfolios by INST, one minus the fraction of institutional ownership. Within each INST tercile, we sort stocks equally into 3 portfolios by IVAR, options-implied variance. We construct the equal-weighted and value-weighted monthly portfolio returns and use the Fama and French (1996) 3 factors and the momentum factor to control for systematic risk. ‘‘Low–High’’ is the alpha (in percentage) of the hedge portfolio that is long in stocks with low IVAR and short in stocks with high IVAR, and ‘‘T-stat’’ is the Newey–West (1987) t-statistic. �� Significance at 5% level. * Significance at 10% level. *** Significance at 1% level.

H. Guo, B. Qiu / Journal of Banking & Finance 44 (2014) 93–113 101

should have higher expected returns. In a recent study, Bali et al. (2011a) show that, MAX, the maximum daily stock return in month t � 1 correlates negatively with the stock return of month t, suggesting a preference among investors for lottery-like stocks. As a robustness check, we control for Amihud’s (2002) illiquidity measure and Bali, Cakici, and Whitelaw’s (2011) MAX measure in cross-sectional regressions, and find that the correlation of INST � IVAR with future stock returns remains significantly nega- tive at the 1% level (untabulated).18

Cao et al. (2008) argue that stocks of firms with abundant investment opportunities tend to have high idiosyncratic variance. Similarly, Pastor and Veronesi (2003) and others show that stocks with a low book-to-market equity ratio tend to have high idiosyn- cratic variance. Thus, options-implied variance might be a proxy for growth/investment opportunities, which are found to correlate negatively with future stock returns (e.g., Cooper et al. (2008)). However, column 4 of Table 3 shows that INST � IVAR remains a significant predictor of cross-sectional stock returns when we con- trol for the log book-to-market equity ratio. As a robustness check, we consider the growth rate of total assets, DASSET, as an alterna- tive measure of growth opportunities. Cooper et al. (2008) and oth- ers find that DASSET is a strong predictor of cross-sectional stock returns even when controlling for other standard growth measures or when restricting the analysis to big stocks. Column 11 shows that the coefficient on INST � IVAR remains significantly negative at the 1% level with the control for DASSET. Thus, growth/invest- ment opportunities cannot be the main driver of our findings.

Johnson (2004) points out that, because a firm’s stocks are call options on its total assets, expected stock returns in general decrease with conditional stock variance for levered firms. Johnson (2004) uses this hypothesis to explain the negative rela- tion between analyst earnings forecast dispersion and future stock returns, as documented by Diether et al. (2002). This alternative hypothesis is directly relevant for our results because we use options-implied stock variance. Johnson (2004) proposes a straightforward test of his conjecture—the interaction term of con-

18 We also find that the coefficients of AMIHUD and MAX are statistically insignificant, possibly because our options sample includes mainly big stocks. Moreover, Ben-Rephael et al. (2008) show that the cross-sectional illiquidity effect has diminished substantially in recent periods.

ditional stock variance with leverage should dominate/drive out conditional stock variance in cross-sectional regressions. We inves- tigate this implication in column 12 of Table 3 by including both leverage, LEV, and its interaction term with IVAR, LEV � IVAR, in the cross-sectional regression. In contrast with Johnson’s (2004) conjecture, the interaction term of IVAR with LEV correlates posi- tively albeit insignificantly with future stock returns. Moreover, the coefficient on INST � IVAR remains significantly negative at the 5% level. Therefore, Johnson’s (2004) hypothesis cannot fully explain our findings either.

Lastly, many authors have measured idiosyncratic risk using volatility instead of variance. Because there is a monotonic albeit nonlinear relation between volatility and variance, portfolios sorted by volatility are identical to portfolios sorted by variance. Moreover, our main findings are qualitatively similar when we use options-implied volatility, IVOL, instead of options-implied variance, IVAR, in Fama–MacBeth (1973) cross-sectional regres- sions: The interaction term, INST � IVOL, correlates negatively and significantly with future stock returns (untabulated). As an additional robustness check, we construct options-implied variance or volatility using volatility surface data and again find qualitatively similar results using Fama–MacBeth (1973) regressions (untabulated). We also use volatility surface data to form (1) portfolios by SIZE and options-implied variance and (2) portfolios by SIZE, INST, and options-implied variance. Tables A2 and A3 in Appendix A show that results are qualitatively similar to their counterparts reported in Tables 4 and 5, respectively.

To summarize, the cross-sectional relation between options- implied variance and future stock returns is consistent with Miller’s (1977) divergence of opinion hypothesis: The relation is found to be significantly negative when short-sale constraints bind and is weak otherwise.

3.3. Testing Miller’s (1977) hypothesis using realized idiosyncratic volatility

Column 9 of Table 3 shows that realized idiosyncratic volatility, RVOL, correlates negatively with future stock returns mainly due to its comovement with options-implied variance. Because Miller’s (1977) divergence of opinion hypothesis helps explain the relation

20 Jiang et al. (2009) argue that firms with poor perspective of future earnings tend to disclose less (negative) information, resulting in a high realized idiosyncratic volatility. That is, the negative relation between realized idiosyncratic volatility and future stock returns reflects mainly the fact that stocks with high realized idiosyncratic volatility is more susceptible to negative earnings news than are stocks with low realized idiosyncratic volatility, especially for stocks with low institutional ownership. However, using options-implied variance as a measure of conditional idiosyncratic variance, we do not find that the negative relation between conditional

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between conditional idiosyncratic risk (as proxied by options- implied variance) and future stock returns, we expect the hypoth- esis should also help explain the finding by Ang et al. (2006) if the predictive power of RVOL for stock returns mainly reflects its cor- relation with conditional idiosyncratic risk.

In Table 6, we investigate this issue in two ways. First, because Danielsen and Sorescu (2001) and others show that options trading alleviates short-sale constraints, we expect that the negative rela- tion between RVOL and future stock returns is stronger for nonop- tionable stocks than for optionable stocks. Specifically, we run the following Fama and MacBeth (1973) cross-sectional regression:

ri;t ¼ aþ b1RVOLi;t�1 þ b2OPTIONi;t�1 þ b3RVOLi;t�1 � OPTIONi;t�1 þ b4Xi;t�1 þ ei;t : ð6Þ

In Eq. (6), RVOLi,t�1 is the realized volatility of stock i following Ang et al. (2006) measured in month t � 1, OPTIONi,t�1 is a dummy var- iable that equals 0 for optionable stocks and equals 1 otherwise measured in month t � 1, RVOLi,t�1 � OPTIONi,t�1 is the product of RVOLi,t�1 and OPTIONi,t�1, and Xi,t�1 is a vector of control variables. We expect that the interaction term in Eq. (6) should correlate neg- atively with one-month-ahead stock return, ri,t.

As conjectured, column 1 of Table 6 shows that, in contrast with the optionable stock sample, in the univariate regression the neg- ative relation between RVOL and future stock returns is significant at the 5% level over the January 1996 to October 2010 period for the CRSP-COMPUSTAT universe. Column 2 shows that the negative relation becomes statistically significant at the 1% level when we control for the commonly used cross-sectional stock return predic- tors. Column 3 conducts a formal test of the hypothesis that options trading alleviates the effect of divergence of opinion on asset prices. As conjectured, the interaction term, OPTION � RVOL, correlates negatively and significantly with future stock returns at the 1% level, while the effect of RVOL on expected stock returns becomes insignificant.19 These results again confirm that the weak relation between options-implied variance and future stock returns in the univariate regression (column 1 of Table 3) reflects the sample selection bias due to the lessening effect of options trading on short- sale constraints.

Second, we use INST as a proxy for short-sale constraints in the Fama and MacBeth (1973) cross-sectional regression:

ri;t ¼ aþ b1RVOLi;t�1 þ b2INSTi;t�1 þ b3RVOLi;t�1 � INSTi;t�1 þ b4Xi;t�1 þ ei;t : ð7Þ

In Eq. (7), RVOLi,t�1 is the realized volatility of stock i measured in month t � 1, INSTi,t�1 is one minus the fraction of the (most recently available) institutional ownership of stock i measured in month t � 1, and RVOLi,t�1 � INSTi,t�1 is the product of RVOLi,t�1 and INSTi,t- �1. Consistent with Nagel (2005), column 4 of Table 6 shows that the interaction term, INST � RVOL, subsumes completely the infor- mation content of RVOL about future stock returns. As a robustness check, we investigate the interaction of RVOL with INST using a much longer sample over the January 1980 to October 2010 period, during which we have institutional ownership data. Column 5 of Table 6 shows that, over this sample period of three decades, the negative relation between RVOL and future stock returns is even stronger at the 1% level. The result remains unchanged when we control for the commonly used return predictors (column 6). In col- umn 7, we include INST � RVOL in the cross-sectional regression, and find that the interaction term again drives out RVOL com- pletely. Moreover, controlling for other predictors does not change

19 Battalio and Schultz (2011) show that during the 2008 short-sale ban, because trading costs for options increased sharply, options trading became less attractive to investors. As a robustness check, we drop the ban period from the sample and find qualitatively similar results.

our main results in any qualitative manner (column 8). Therefore, Miller’s (1977) divergence of opinion hypothesis helps explain the negative relation between realized idiosyncratic volatility and future stock returns as well. These results corroborate our main findings for options-implied variance and suggest that RVOL is a proxy for conditional idiosyncratic risk and thus also a proxy for divergence of opinion.

Lastly, for comparison, column 10 of Table 3 includes both INST � IVAR and INST � RVOL in the cross-sectional regression and shows that INST � RVOL becomes insignificant while INST � IVAR is significantly negative at the 10% level. Similarly, we find that, for alternative measures of options-implied variance or volatility, their interaction terms with INST or with INST orthog- onalized by market capitalization tend to have stronger return pre- dictive power than do the corresponding interaction terms for RVOL (untabulated). These results indicate that options-implied variance is a better measure of conditional variance (and thus a better measure of divergence of opinion) than is realized idiosyn- cratic volatility. Similarly, the next section shows that aggregate options-implied variance has stronger predictive power for stock market returns than does aggregate realized idiosyncratic variance.

To summarize, consistent with the finding using options- implied variance, the cross-sectional relation between realized idi- osyncratic volatility and future stock returns is also consistent with Miller’s (1977) divergence of opinion hypothesis.20

4. Aggregate options-implied variance and future excess market returns

Miller’s (1977) hypothesis also implies a negative time-series relation between aggregate divergence of opinion and future stock market returns in the presence of short-sale constraints. Yu (2011) provides empirical support for this implication using aggregate analyst earnings forecast dispersion as a proxy for aggregate diver- gence of opinion. This section shows that, consistent with Miller’s (1977)hypothesis, aggregate options-implied variance orthogonal- ized by VIX, a forward-looking measure of conditional market var- iance, correlates negatively and significantly with future excess market returns. Moreover, the negative relation gets stronger when shorting stocks becomes more difficult. Interestingly, the forecast power of the orthogonalized aggregate options-implied variance for stock market returns is similar to, or stronger than, that of aggregate analyst earnings forecast dispersion.

4.1. Forecasting future excess market returns

Table 7 reports the ordinary least squares (OLS) regression results of forecasting excess market returns, ERET, using value- weighted aggregate options-implied variance, VWAOIV:

ERETt ¼ aþ b1VWAOIVt�1 þ et: ð8Þ

For robustness, we estimate the forecasting model using non- overlapping monthly, quarterly, and annual data.21 Results are

idiosyncratic variance and future earnings news is more pronounced for stocks with lower institutional ownership.

21 As a robustness check, we construct options-implied variances using volatility surface data with 30-, 91-, and 365-day expirations for monthly, quarterly, and annual regressions, respectively; and find qualitatively similar results (untabulated).

Table 6 Realized idiosyncratic variance and future stock returns: cross-sectional evidence.

Variables Models

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8

RVOL �0.229** �0.148*** �0.070 0.055 �0.291*** �0.204*** �0.088 �0.005 (0.097) (0.055) (0.076) (0.090) (0.057) (0.034) (0.096) (0.072)

BETA 0.287 �0.062 0.180 0.096 0.020 (0.372) (0.335) (0.357) (0.240) (0.231)

SIZE �0.051 �0.192*** �0.080⁄ �0.039 �0.065** (0.050) (0.052) (0.047) (0.034) (0.033)

BM 0.103 0.113 0.096 0.170** 0.161**

(0.115) (0.112) (0.113) (0.074) (0.074) Rt�7,t�2 0.005 0.005 0.005 0.008*** 0.009***

(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.003) (0.002) Rt�1 �0.023*** �0.022*** �0.022*** �0.027*** �0.027***

(0.007) (0.006) (0.007) (0.004) (0.004) OPTION �0.450**

(0.184) OPTION � RVOL �0.197***

(0.072) INST 0.004 0.004** 0.002

(0.003) (0.002) (0.002) INST � RVOL �0.317*** �0.274*** �0.271***

(0.097) (0.083) (0.082)

Adjusted R2 0.020 0.060 0.066 0.064 0.014 0.052 0.020 0.055

Note: The table reports the Fama and MacBeth (1973) cross-sectional regression results for monthly sample over the January 1996 to October 2010 period in rows 1 to 4 and January 1980 to October 2010 in rows 5–8. The dependent variable is the one-month-ahead stock return (in percentage). We use merged CRSP and COMPUSTAT data and require common stocks (codes 10 and 11) with closing prices being no less than $5. RVOL (in percentage) is the realized volatility following Ang et al. (2006). BETA is the market beta. SIZE is the log of market capitalization. BM is the log of book-to-market equity ratio. Rt�7,t�2 is the return over the month t � 7 to the month t � 2. Rt�1 is the return of month t�1. OPTION is a dummy variable, which is equal to one for stocks without options trading and is equal to zero otherwise. INST is one minus the fraction of institutional ownership. INST � RVOL is the product of INST and RVOL. OPTION � RVOL is the product of OPTION and RVOL. Rt�7,t�2, Rt�1, OPTION � RVOL, INST and INST � RVOL are all in percentage. Newey and West (1987) corrected standard errors are reported in parentheses. � Significance at 10% level. ** Significance at 5% level. *** Significance at 1% level.

22 VIX is insignificant in the univariate regression due to a classic omitted variables problem. Suppose VWAOIV is the omitted variable with the true parameter B1 and VIX is the included variable with the true parameter B2. The point estimate of the coefficient on VIX in the univariate regression is then cB2 ¼ B2þ CovðVIX;VWAOIVÞVarðVIXÞ B1. Because B1 is negative and the covariance of VIX with VWAOIV is positive, the point estimate of B2 is biased downward toward zero. In a similar vein, the omitted variables problem explains why VWAOIV is less significant in the univariate regression than in the bivariate regression.

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qualitatively similar for weekly data (untabulated). Panel A reports the results for monthly data. Row 2 shows that, in the univariate OLS regression, VWAOIV correlates negatively with one-month- ahead excess market returns but the relation is significant only at the 10% level. Note that VWAOIV is a measure of aggregate total var- iance, which, as we show in Eq. (3), is the sum of market variance and aggregate idiosyncratic variance in the CAPM. Because condi- tional market variance is an important determinant of conditional equity premium, the univariate regression result is thus susceptible to a serious measurement error problem.

We address this issue in two ways. First, we orthogonalize VWAOIV by VIX and use the residual, VWAOIVþVIX, as a cleaner mea- sure of aggregate conditional idiosyncratic variance:

ERETt ¼ aþ b1VWAOIV þ VIX;t�1 þ et : ð9Þ

Consistent with the conjecture that VWAOIVþVIX is a proxy for aggre- gate divergence of opinion, Row 3 of Table 7 shows that VWAOIVþVIX correlates negatively with one-month-ahead excess market returns, and the relation is statistically significant at the 1% level. A scatter plot of VWAOIVþVIX against future excess market returns shows that our findings are not due to any influential observations (untabulat- ed). The second way to correct for the measurement error in VWAOIV is to include the measure of conditional market variance, VIX, in the forecast regression along with VWAOIV:

ERETt ¼ aþ b1VIXt�1 þ b2VWAOIVt�1 þ et: ð10Þ

This specification is conceptually consistent with Eq. (24) in Merton (1987), who argues that conditional equity premium is a linear function of conditional market variance and conditional aggregate idiosyncratic variance. Again, in contrast with Merton’s (1987) con- jecture but consistent with Miller’s (1977) hypothesis, row 4 of Table 7 shows a significantly negative correlation of VWAOIV with one-month-ahead excess market returns at the 1% level when we

control for VIX. Consistent with Merton’s (1973) ICAPM, the relation between VIX and conditional excess market returns is positive and significant at the 1% level, although it is insignificant in the univar- iate regression (row 1 of Table 7).22 The Wald test further confirms that the joint explanatory power of VWAOIV and VIX for future excess market returns is highly significant at the 1% level.

Note that the multicollinearity problem does not explain our findings in Table 7 because it arises when closely correlated inde- pendent variables convey similar information about the dependent variable. Multicollinearity produces large standard errors in the correlated independent variables and thus deceases rather than increases their significance levels (e.g., Wooldridge (2006)). More- over, multicollinearity cannot explain following findings. First, the orthogonalized options-implied variance (VWAOIVþVIX) has strong predictive power for excess market returns (row 3). Second, the adjusted R2 is substantially higher in the multivariate regression (row 4) than are those in respective univariate regressions (rows 1 and 2). Last, VIX and VWAOIV jointly (but not individually) have substantial out-of-sample predictive power for future excess mar- ket returns (documented in Section 4.3).

Fig. 2 shows that both VWAOIV and VIX increase sharply during the 2008 financial crisis. To investigate whether influential obser- vations are the main driver of our findings, in row 5 of Table 7, we use their log transformations as the forecasting variables and find qualitatively similar results. As another robustness check, we

104 H. Guo, B. Qiu / Journal of Banking & Finance 44 (2014) 93–113

also investigate the relation between VWAOIV and future excess market returns using quarterly and annual data in panels B and C, respectively, of Table 7, and find qualitatively similar results. Moreover, consistent with the findings of Yu (2011) and others, the adjusted R2 tends to increase with forecast horizons. As Campbell et al. (1997) and Cochrane (2005) suggest, this result possibly reflects the fact that conditional equity premium is quite persistent. To partially address the issue that we have a relatively short time-series sample of options-implied variance (178 monthly observations or 58 quarterly observations), we use overlapping 4- week and 12-week returns as dependent variables and again find qualitatively similar results (untabulated).

Because small stocks are arguably more susceptible to idiosyn- cratic risk than are big stocks, many authors (e.g., Goyal and Santa- Clara (2003), Frazzini and Marsh (2003), Brown and Ferreira (2005), and Jiang and Lee (2006)) advocate for using equal- weighted aggregate idiosyncratic risk in the test of Merton’s (1987) conjecture. We address this issue in Table A4 in Appendix A. Consistent with the results in Table 7, the orthogonalized equal-weighted aggregate options-implied variance, EWAOIVþVIX, correlates negatively with future excess market returns at least at the 5% level in all data frequencies. Nevertheless, the adjusted R2 is noticeably smaller than that for VWAOIVþVIX, especially for the monthly forecast horizon. Consistent with these results, Yu (2011) also finds that the value-weighted aggregate analyst earn- ings forecast dispersion has substantially stronger predictive

Table 7 Value-weighted aggregate options-implied variance and expected market returns.

VIX VWAOIV VWAOIVþVIX LVIX

Panel A: Monthly data 1 �0.653

(1.665) 2 �1.073*

(0.555) 3 �2.743***

(0.750) 4 4.409*** �2.743***

(1.601) (0.746) 5 0.02

(0.0

Panel B: Quarterly data 6 0.440

(1.732) 7 �0.909**

(0.436) 8 �3.575***

(0.875) 9 7.802*** �3.575***

(1.783) (0.873) 10 0.12

(0.0

Panel C: Annual data 11 1.653**

(0.689) 12 �0.165

(0.552) 13 �2.027***

(0.571) 14 5.922*** �2.027***

(0.880) (0.428) 15 0.40

(0.0

Note: The table reports the OLS estimation results of forecasting excess market return difference between the value-weighted CRSP market return and the risk-free rate. The variance of S&P 500 index. VWAOIV is the value-weighted aggregate options-implied va constant. LVIX and LVWAOIV are the log transformations of VIX and VWAOIV, respectiv * Significance at 10% level. ** Significance at 5% level. *** Significance at 1% level.

power for stock market returns than does its equal-weighted coun- terpart. For brevity, unless otherwise indicated, we use VWAOIVþVIX (or VWAOIV when in conjunction with VIX) as the proxy for aggre- gate conditional idiosyncratic variance in the remainder of the paper.

Fig. 2 shows that both VIX and VWAOIV have big spikes during the 2008 financial crisis. To address whether this episode has sig- nificant effects on our main findings, in Table A5 in Appendix A, we run the time-series forecast regressions using two half samples. Panels A and B report the OLS regression results for the first half sample using levels and logs of options-implied variances, respec- tively. For monthly, quarterly, and annual data, VWAOIV correlates negatively with future excess market returns when in conjunction with VIX, and the relation is significant at the 1% level. Panel C and D show that the results are qualitatively similar for the second half sample. We also find qualitatively similar results when using VWAOIVþVIX, instead of VWAOIV and VIX, in the regressions (unta- bulated). Therefore, the predictive power of VWAOIV for excess market returns is quite stable across time.

4.2. Controlling for small sample bias

Table 2 shows that both VIX and VWAOIV correlate negatively with the contemporaneous excess market return. In addition, both VIX and VWAOIV are serially correlated. Therefore, the point esti- mates of their coefficients in the OLS regression of forecasting

LVWAOIV Wald test p-value Adjusted R2

�0.003

0.033

0.071

14.773 0.069 (0.001)

9*** �0.044*** 20.569 0.059 07) (0.011) (0.000)

�0.015

0.048

0.285

21.561 0.274 (0.000)

9*** �0.168*** 29.448 0.232 26) (0.033) (0.000)

0.021

�0.076

0.273

60.129 0.321 (0.000)

8*** �0.487*** 52.234 0.278 82) (0.069) (0.000)

s. The dependent variable is the one-period-ahead excess market return, i.e., the sample spans the January 1996 to October 2010 period. VIX is the options-implied riance. VWAOIVþVIX is the residual from the OLS regression of VWAOIV on VIX and a ely. Newey and West (1987) corrected standard errors are reported in parentheses.

H. Guo, B. Qiu / Journal of Banking & Finance 44 (2014) 93–113 105

excess market returns may suffer a small sample bias (e.g., Mankiw and Shapiro (1986), Stambaugh (1999), and Amihud et al. (2009)). Following Nelson and Kim (1993), we use simulations to investi- gate the effect of the small sample bias on our inference, and report the results in Table A6 in Appendix A.

We estimate the joint vector autoregressive (VAR) process of VIX, VWAOIV, and excess market returns with the restriction of the null hypothesis that conditional excess market returns are con- stant. We then use the estimated VAR model to generate 1000 sets of simulated data by drawing error terms from the saved residuals with replacements. We estimate the VAR model in two ways. In panel A, we estimate the VAR parameters using OLS. In panel B, we follow Amihud et al. (2009) and correct the small sample bias of OLS parameter estimates. Table A6 reports the empirical distribution of parameter estimates, adjusted R2, and t-statistics. For monthly data, the small sample bias in the OLS coefficient on VWAOIV obtained from simulated data is negligible (�0.093 in panel A and �0.091 in panel B), compared with the OLS estimate of �2.752 obtained using actual data.23 The bias is slightly larger—about 10% of the OLS estimate obtained from the actual data—for VIX. The results are qualitatively similar for t-statistics. It is worth noting that the bias in the adjusted R2 is close to zero, again suggesting that multicollinearity cannot explain the large adjusted R2 in multivariate regressions obtained using the actual data. There- fore, accounting for the small sample bias does not change our infer- ence in any quantitative manner. We reach the same conclusion for quarterly and annual data. Results are qualitatively similar when we use VWAOIVþVIX instead of VWAOIV and VIX (untabulated).

4.3. Out-of-sample forecast

Welch and Goyal (2008) cast serious doubt on existing evidence of stock market return predictability because commonly used stock market return predictors have negligible out-of-sample forecasting power. To address this issue, we conduct out-of-sample tests and report the results in Table 8. As in Lettau and Ludvigson (2001), we use the first third of the observations for initial in-sample regression and make out-of-sample forecast for the remaining per- iod recursively using an expanding sample. We compare the fore- casting model using both VIX and VWAOIV as the predictive variables of excess market returns with the benchmark model using historical sample average as the forecast of the one-period- ahead excess market return. We compare the performance of these forecasting models using two statistics—(1) the ratio of mean squared-forecast-error of the forecasting model to that of the benchmark model and (2) Clark and McCracken’s (2001) encom- passing test. To address the small sample problem, we follow Lettau and Ludvigson (2001) and use bootstrapped critical values obtained from 10,000 simulations for inferences.

Panel A of Table 8 reports the results for monthly data. The pro- posed forecasting model with both VIX and VWAOIV as the predic- tive variables has a smaller mean squared-forecast-error than does the benchmark model, and the encompassing test shows that the difference in out-of-sample predictive power is statistically signif- icant at the 10% level. The out-of-sample forecasting power is stronger for log transformations of VIX and VWAOIV: The ratio of mean squared-forecast-error becomes smaller and the encompass- ing test indicates that the difference between the two forecasting models is significant at the 5% level. Panel B shows that results are qualitatively similar or even stronger for quarterly data. We

23 The OLS estimates of the coefficients on VIX and VWAOIV in Table A6 are slightly different from those reported in Table 7. This is because, due to the estimation of the joint VAR process, the sample used in Table A6 is one-month shorter than is the sample used in Table 7.

do not conduct out-of-sample tests for annual data due to the small number of observations.

The documented out-of-sample stock market return predict- ability is economically important as well. When adopting a simple switching strategy, i.e., holding a market index when the predicted excess market return is positive and holding a Treasury bill other- wise, we can outperform the strategy of buying and holding the market index substantially. For example, when we use log VIX and log VWAOIV as the predictive variables, $100 initial invest- ment in January 2001 grows into $187 in October 2010 for the switching strategy, compared with $127 for the buy-and-hold strategy. The Sharpe ratio is 11.24% for the former and is 2.89% for the latter. Findings are qualitatively similar when we use VIX and VWAOIV as the predictive variables. For brevity, we do not tab- ulate these results but they are available upon request.

4.4. Controlling for aggregate analyst forecast dispersion and other forecasting variables

Yu (2011) argues that the value-weighted aggregate analyst earnings forecast dispersion, VWADISP, is a measure of aggregate divergence of opinion, and finds that it correlates negatively with future excess market returns, lending support to Miller’s (1977) divergence of opinion hypothesis at the market-portfolio level. In Table 9, we replicate his main findings; for comparison, we use the sample spanning the January 1996 to October 2010 period dur- ing which we have Options data. VWADISP correlates negatively with future excess market returns, and its predictive power, as measured by the t-statistic and adjusted R2, increases monotoni- cally with forecast horizons. Specifically, consistent with the results in Yu (2011), the negative relation between VWADISP and future excess market returns is significant at the 5% level for the 12-month horizon, while it is insignificant for the 1-month and 6-month horizons. Interestingly, when we add VWAOIVþVIX to the regression, the coefficient of VWADISP attenuates substantially in magnitude and becomes insignificant for all forecast horizons. In contrast, VWAOIVþVIX is always significant at the 1% level for all forecast horizons. The results are qualitatively similar when we use VWAOIV and VIX jointly as the forecasting variables instead. Therefore, (orthogonalized) aggregate options-implied variance appears to contain information about future excess market returns similar to that of aggregate analyst forecast dispersion, suggesting that it is also a proxy for aggregate divergence of opinion. This result lends further support to Miller’s (1977) hypothesis. More- over, our evidence implies that VWAOIVþVIX may be a better mea- sure of aggregate divergence of opinion than VWADISP.

In Table A7 in Appendix A, using monthly data, we investigate whether VWAOIV forecasts market returns because of its correla- tion with other commonly used predictive variables. There are three noteworthy findings. First, Guo and Savickas (2008) show that value-weighted aggregate realized idiosyncratic variance, VWARIV, correlates negatively with future excess market returns when in conjunction with proxies for conditional market variance. Row 3 shows that, when in conjunction with VIX, VWARIV indeed correlates negatively with future excess market returns. However, the predictive power of VWARIV becomes negligible when we con- trol for its options-implied counterpart, VWAOIV, in the forecast regression, while the effect of VWAOIV on future excess market returns remains significant at the 5% level (row 4). Recall that options-implied variance also drives out realized idiosyncratic vol- atility in cross-sectional regressions (Table 3). These results high- light the importance of using options-implied variance because it is a better measure of conditional variance (and thus a better mea- sure of divergence of opinion) than is realized variance.

Second, recent studies (e.g., Bollerslev et al., 2009; Drechsler and Yaron, 2011) show that the variance risk premium—the

Table 8 Out-of-sample forecast tests.

Models MSEA/MSEB ENC-NEW

Statistic 10% C.V. 5% C.V.

Panel A: Monthly options-implied variance data 1 C + VIX + VWAOIV vs. C 0.986 2.971 2.096 3.245 2 C + LVIX + LVWAOIV vs. C 0.966 4.660 2.109 3.307

Panel B: Quarterly options-implied variance data 3 C + VIX + VWAOIV vs. C 0.964 7.621 2.268 3.454 4 C + LVIX + LVWAOIV vs. C 0.898 8.975 2.271 3.539

Note: The table compares the out-of-sample performance of the proposed fore- casting model with that of the benchmark model using the historical average equity premium as the forecast of the one-period-ahead equity premium. Over the January 1996 to October 2010 period, we use one third of observations for initial in-sample estimations and make out-of-sample forecasts for the remaining observations using an expanding sample. We use two statistics to gauge the out-of-sample forecast power. First, MSEA/MSEB is the ratio of the mean squared-forecasting-error of the forecasting model to that of the benchmark model. Second, ENC-NEW is the encompassing test proposed by Clark and McCracken (2001). As in Lettau and Ludvigson (2001), we use bootstrapped critical values obtained from 10,000 simulations for inferences.

Table 9 Aggregate options-implied variance and aggregate analyst dispersion.

VWADISP VIX VWAOIV VWAOIVþVIX Adjusted R 2

1 Month 1 �0.487 �0.003

(0.689) 2 0.026 4.417** �2.750*** 0.063

(0.731) (1.893) (0.907) 3 �0.048 �2.730*** 0.066

(0.710) (0.903)

6 Months 4 �6.268 0.050

(4.529) 5 �2.748 31.108*** �13.759*** 0.304

(3.189) (5.813) (2.864) 6 �2.006 �13.995*** 0.278

(0.034) (2.939)

12 Months 7 �20.110** 0.191

(8.942) 8 �10.917 49.292*** �20.217*** 0.447

(7.237) (10.040) (4.830) 9 �8.545 �21.110*** 0.390

(7.593) (5.186)

Note: The table reports the OLS estimation results of forecasting excess market returns using monthly data. The dependent variable is the excess market return, i.e., the difference between the value-weighted CRSP market return and the risk-free rate. In panel A, the dependent variable is the one-month-ahead excess market return. In panel B, the dependent variable is the excess market return in the next 6 months. In panel C, the dependent variable is the excess market return in the next 12 months. The sample spans the January 1996 to October 2010 period. VWADISP is the value-weighted aggregate analyst earnings forecast dispersion as in Yu (2011). VIX is the options-implied variance of S&P 500 index. VWAOIV is the value- weighted aggregate options-implied variance. VWAOIVþVIX is the residual from the OLS regression of VWAOIV on VIX and a constant. Newey and West (1987) corrected standard errors are reported in parentheses. � Significance at 10% level. ** Significance at 5% level. *** Significance at 1% level.

Table 10 Value-weighted aggregate options-implied variance and expected market returns.

VWAOIVþVIX DUMBAN VWAOIV þ VIX � DUMBAN Adjusted R

2

Month �2.029*** �0.034** �10.133*** 0.138 (0.510) (0.015) (2.308)

Quarter �3.110*** �0.065*** �4.092*** 0.335 (0.676) (0.022) (0.975)

Note: The table reports the OLS estimation results of forecasting excess market returns. The dependent variable is the one-period-ahead excess market return, i.e., the difference between the value-weighted CRSP market return and the risk-free rate. The sample spans the January 1996 to October 2010 period. VWAOIVþVIX is the residual from the OLS regression of VWAOIV on VIX and a constant. DUMBAN is a dummy variable, which is equal to 1 for observations after the September 18, 2008 short-sale ban and is equal to zero otherwise. Newey and West (1987) corrected standard errors are reported in parentheses. � Significance at 10% level. ** Significance at 5% level. *** Significance at 1% level.

24 As a robustness check, we add the average realized correlation between daily individual stock returns proposed by Pollet and Wilson (2010) as an additional control and find that our main results do not change in any qualitative manner (untabulated).

25 Naked short selling is the practice of short selling a stock without first borrowing it or ensuring that it can be borrowed. The SEC’s ban on naked short selling was first introduced on September 18, 2008 and subsequently made permanent on July 27, 2009. Because the ban is a policy reaction to the 2008 financial crisis, it is not exactly an exogenous event. This paper investigates the effect of the ban on the relation between aggregate options-implied variance and future excess market returns. This forecast relation helps alleviate the endogeneity concern in the sense of Granger causality; and there is no compelling reason why the financial crisis (rather than the ban) can alter the time-series relation.

106 H. Guo, B. Qiu / Journal of Banking & Finance 44 (2014) 93–113

difference between options-implied market variance and expected future realized variance—has significant predictive power for excess market returns. Row 5 of Table A7 in Appendix A shows that the variance risk premium, VP, correlates positively with future excess market returns even when we control for VIX and VWAOIV. Both VIX and VWAOIV remain significant at the 1% level as well.

Therefore, the predictive power of VIX and VWAOIV is distinct from that of the variance risk premium. Last, we control for the predictive variables considered in Welch and Goyal (2008), includ- ing the default premium (DEF), the term premium (TERM), the div- idend yield (DP), the earnings-to-price ratio (EP), the aggregate book-to-market equity ratio (BM), and the equity share in new issuances (NTIS). Many of these control variables have negligible predictive power for market returns. In contrast, both VIX and VWAOIV always remain significant at least at the 5% level in mul- tivariate regressions. Results are qualitatively similar for quarterly data (Table A8 in Appendix A). Moreover, results are also qualita- tively similar when we use VWAOIVþVIX instead (untabulated).

24

To summarize, commonly used stock market return predictors do not subsume the information content of VWAOIV or VWAOIVþVIX about future stock market returns.

4.5. Testing Miller’s (1977) hypothesis using time-series data

In Section 3, we find strong support for Miller’s (1977) hypoth- esis as an explanation of the negative relation between conditional idiosyncratic risk and future stock returns in cross-sectional analyses. Miller’s (1977) hypothesis also implies a stronger nega- tive relation between aggregate divergence of opinion and future market returns when shorting stocks gets more difficult. The SEC’s permanent ban on naked short selling in all U.S. stocks effective from September 18, 2008 provides a quasi-natural experiment to test this time-series implication.25 Specifically, because the ban makes it more difficult to short stocks, we expect that the negative relation between aggregate options-implied variance and future market returns should become stronger following the ban.

To investigate this conjecture, we use the orthogonalized value- weighted aggregate options-implied variance, VWAOIVþVIX, as the predictive variable. Results are qualitatively similar if we use VWAOIV and VIX jointly or use EWAOIVþVIX (untabulated). We

Table A1 Cross-sectional relation between options-implied variance and future stock returns with the orthogonalized INST.

Variables 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12

IVAR �0.167 �0.198** �0.126 �0.166* �0.164* �0.174* �0.095 �0.174** �0.166** �0.088 �0.192 (0.124) (0.090) (0.126) (0.090) (0.094) (0.089) (0.138) (0.083) (0.083) (0.137) (0.141)

BETA 0.147 0.116 0.097 0.176 0.150 0.029 0.150 0.159 0.179 0.110 (0.343) (0.342) (0.337) (0.334) (0.322) (0.379) (0.328) (0.328) (0.324) (0.308)

SIZE �0.181*** �0.184*** �0.185*** �0.181*** �0.172** �0.127* �0.181*** �0.184*** �0.157** �0.157** (0.066) (0.066) (0.067) (0.067) (0.068) (0.070) (0.066) (0.066) (0.068) (0.068)

BM 0.013 0.004 0.008 0.021 0.040 0.088 0.029 0.028 0.018 0.076 (0.118) (0.118) (0.114) (0.120) (0.120) (0.133) (0.119) (0.119) (0.118) (0.088)

Rt�7,t�2 0.002 0.002 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)

Rt�1 �0.020*** �0.018** �0.017** �0.019*** �0.020*** �0.018** �0.020*** (0.007) (0.007) (0.008) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007)

ADISP 0.033 (0.074)

CALL-PUT 0.069*** 0.063*** 0.065***

(0.014) (0.014) (0.014) RVOL-IVOL 0.023 0.015 0.010

(0.041) (0.042) (0.041) OINST 0.004 0.007** 0.011*** 0.006** 0.006** 0.006** 0.009*** 0.006** 0.006**

(0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) OINST � IVAR �0.297*** �0.368*** �0.324* �0.343*** �0.341*** �0.352*** �0.244* �0.346*** �0.304***

(0.110) (0.116) (0.167) (0.116) (0.115) (0.117) (0.129) (0.115) (0.116) DASSET �0.273***

(0.076) LEV �0.004

(0.004) LEV � IVAR 0.302

(0.208) RVOL �0.122* �0.029 �0.047

(0.073) (0.047) (0.046) OINST � RVOL �0.224

(0.138)

Adjusted R2 0.047 0.078 0.051 0.081 0.084 0.087 0.090 0.078 0.088 0.089 0.091 0.098

Note: The table reports Fama and MacBeth (1973) cross-sectional regression results for monthly sample over the January 1996 to October 2010 period. The dependent variable is the one-month-ahead stock return (in percentage). We use merged OptionMetrics, CRSP, and COMPUSTAT data. For each stock and each month, we calculate the put-call average options-implied variance of the second-to-last business day of the month. IVAR (in percentage) is the average monthly options-implied variance of a call option with non-zero trading volume, (closest to) at the money, and (closest to) 30-day expiration and a put option with non-zero trading volume, (closest to) at the money, and (closest to) 30-day expiration. We require common stocks (codes 10 and 11) with closing prices being no less than $5. IVAR has been winsorized at 1% and 99% each month. BETA is the market beta according to Fama and French (1992). SIZE is the log of market capitalization. BM is the log of book-to-market equity ratio. Rt�7,t�2 is the return over the month t � 7 to the month t � 2. Rt�1 is the return of month t � 1. ADISP is the analyst forecast dispersion according to Diether et al. (2002). CALL-PUT is the call minus put monthly options-implied volatility spread. RVOL is realized idiosyncratic volatility according to Ang et al. (2006). IVOL is the put-call average monthly options-implied volatility. RVOL-IVOL is the realized minus implied volatility spread. OINST is the Orthogonalized INST with INST being orthogonalized on SIZE (i.e., log market cap) each month. OINST � IVAR is the product of OINST and IVAR. DASSET is the year-over-year growth rate of total assets. LEV is book value of debt over the sum of book value of debt and market value of equity. LEV � IVAR is the product of LEV and IVAR. Rt�7,t�2, Rt�1, CALL-PUT, RVOL-IVOL, RVOL, OINST, OINST � IVAR, OINST � RVOL, LEV and LEV � IVAR are all in percentage. The interaction terms, OINST � IVAR and LEV � IVAR, are constructed with winsorized IVAR. Newey and West (1987) corrected standard errors are reported in parentheses. * Significance at 10% level. ** Significance at 5% level. *** Significance at 1% level.

H. Guo, B. Qiu / Journal of Banking & Finance 44 (2014) 93–113 107

construct a dummy variable DUMBAN, which equals 0 for the obser- vations before the naked short-sale ban and equals 1 otherwise. Under Miller’s (1977) hypothesis, we expect that the interaction term of VWAOIVþVIX with DUMBAN should correlate negatively with future excess market returns:

26 Guo and Savickas (2008) argue that aggregate idiosyncratic variance forecasts excess market returns because it is a proxy for investment opportunities. In a similar vein, Chen and Petkova (2012) find that innovations in aggregate idiosyncratic variance are priced in the cross-section of stock returns. Consistent with this ICAPM interpretation, untabulated results show that the predictive power of VWAOIV for excess market returns is similar to that of the variance of the value premium— arguably an empirical ICAPM factor (e.g., Fama and French (1996)). This ICAPM interpretation has an important caveat, however. There is an ongoing debate about the underlying risk associated with the value premium, for which mispricing remains a viable alternative explanation. Thus, realized value-premium variance may reflect aggregate dispersion on the valuation of value versus growth stocks. A formal investigation of this hypothesis is beyond the scope of this paper and we leave it for future research.

ERETt ¼ aþ b1VWAOIV þ VIX;t�1 þ b2DUMBAN;t�1

þ b3VWAOIV þ VIX;t�1 � DUMBAN;t�1 þ et : ð11Þ

Table 10 shows that DUMBAN is negative and significant at the 5% level for monthly data and at the 1% level for quarterly data, capturing falling stock prices during the 2008 financial crisis. More importantly, the interaction term is negative and significant at the 1% level for both monthly and quarterly data, confirming that the negative relation between VWAOIVþVIX and future excess market returns indeed becomes stronger following the ban. Results are qualitatively similar for weekly data (untabulated).

To summarize, our time-series evidence suggests that aggregate options-implied variance orthogonalized by VIX is negatively

related to future excess stock market returns. Moreover, its fore- cast power is similar to or stronger than that of aggregate analyst forecast dispersion and becomes stronger when shorting stocks gets more difficult, lending further support to Miller’s (1977) hypothesis.26

108 H. Guo, B. Qiu / Journal of Banking & Finance 44 (2014) 93–113

5. Conclusion

Existing studies have provided mixed evidence on the notion that investors require a positive risk premium for bearing idiosyn- cratic risk. Employing options-implied variance as a measure of conditional variance, we shed new light on this debate by showing that there is little support for the under-diversification hypothesis advocated by Levy (1978), Merton (1987), Malkiel and Xu (2002), and others. Specifically, in both time-series and cross-sectional analyses, we do not find any evidence which suggests a positive

Table A2 Portfolios sorted by size and options-implied variance with volatility surface data.

IVAR Quintile

1(L) 2 3

Panel A: Equal-weighted portfolios Size quintile

1(S) 0.227 0.057 0.038 2 0.360 �0.032 0.216 3 0.129 0.019 �0.129 4 0.186 0.104 0.092 5(B) �0.027 0.090 0.233

Average across size 0.175 0.047 0.090

Panel B: Value-weighted portfolios Size quintile

1(S) 0.312 0.055 0.023 2 0.371 �0.003 0.209 3 0.139 0.011 �0.181 4 0.185 0.103 0.111 5(B) �0.083 0.072 0.034

Average across size 0.185 0.048 0.039

Note: In each month and for each stock, we use the put-call average options-implied expiration, delta = 50 for call and delta = �50 for put) from the volatility surface databas stocks (codes 10 and 11) with closing prices being no less than $5. In each month, we fi quintile, we sort stocks equally into 5 portfolios by IVAR, options-implied variance. We c the Fama and French (1996) 3 factors and the momentum factor to control for systemati stocks with the lowest IVAR and short in stocks with the highest IVAR. ‘‘T-stat’’ is the N � Significance at 10% level. *** Significance at 1% level. ** Significance at 5% level.

Table A3 Portfolios sorted by size, institutional ownership, and options-implied variance with volat

Small Cap Median Cap

Low INST Median INST High INST Low INST

Panel A: 4-Factor alphas of equal-weighted portfolios Low IVAR �0.126 0.393 0.155 0.140 Median IVAR 0.216 0.407 �0.211 �0.073 High IVAR 0.060 �0.236 �1.214 �0.162 Low–High �0.186 0.628* 1.369*** 0.302 T-stat �0.52 1.80 3.93 1.08

Panel B: 4-Factor alphas of value-weighted portfolios Low IVAR �0.106 0.359 0.159 0.126 Median IVAR 0.263 0.354 �0.258 �0.117 High IVAR �0.072 �0.272 �1.348 �0.170 Low–High �0.034 0.631 1.507*** 0.295 T-stat �0.09 1.63 4.06 1.02

Note: In each month and for each stock, we use the put-call average options-implied expiration, delta = 50 for call and delta = �50 for put) from the volatility surface databas stocks (codes 10 and 11) with closing prices being no less than $5. In each month, we fi tercile, we sort stocks equally into 3 portfolios by INST, one minus the fraction of instituti IVAR, options-implied variance. We construct the equal-weighted and value-weighted momentum factor to control for systematic risk. ‘‘Low–High’’ is the alpha (in percentage) high IVAR, and ‘‘T-stat’’ is the Newey–West (1987) t-statistic. * Significance at 10% level. ** Significance at 5% level. *** Significance at 1% level.

relation between options-implied variance and future stock returns.

Because optionable stocks are mainly big stocks, which tend to have low information costs and a broad investor base, empirical results based on optionable stocks are potentially biased against the under-diversification hypothesis. This bias, if exists, is unlikely to be the driver of our finding for two reasons. First, Ang et al. (2006) document a negative relation between realized idiosyncratic volatility and future stock returns using all CRSP stocks. We find that the predictive power of realized idiosyncratic volatility for

4 5(H) 1(L)–5(H) T-stat

�0.199 �1.062 1.288*** 3.43 0.008 �0.790 1.150** 2.54 �0.275 �0.699 0.828** 2.02

0.045 �0.118 0.304 0.79 �0.016 �0.185 0.158 0.41

�0.087 �0.571 0.746** 2.13

�0.361 �1.199 1.510*** 3.86 0.007 �0.805 1.176** 2.58 �0.185 �0.700 0.838** 2.01

0.044 �0.111 0.296 0.75 0.068 0.011 �0.094 �0.23

�0.086 �0.561 0.745** 2.09

variance of the second-to-last business day of the month (at the money, 30-day e. The sample spans the January 1996 to October 2010 period. We require common rst sort stocks equally into 5 portfolios by market capitalization. Within each size

onstruct the equal-weighted and value-weighted monthly portfolio returns and use c risk. ‘‘Low–High’’ is the alpha (in percentage) of the hedge portfolio that is long in ewey–West (1987) t-statistic.

ility surface data.

Big Cap

Median INST High INST Low INST Median INST High INST

0.288 0.056 �0.085 0.127 0.143 0.295 �0.073 0.042 0.422 �0.098 0.162 �1.086 0.069 0.042 �0.407 0.125 1.143*** �0.154 0.085 0.550 0.42 2.71 �0.48 0.30 1.28

0.267 0.037 �0.280 �0.001 �0.015 0.288 �0.083 �0.026 0.277 �0.032 0.247 �1.070 �0.071 0.122 �0.194 0.020 1.107** �0.210 �0.123 0.179 0.07 2.59 �0.57 �0.38 0.39

variance of the second-to-last business day of the month (at the money, 30-day e. The sample spans the January 1996 to October 2010 period. We require common rst sort stocks equally into 3 portfolios by market capitalization. Within each size

onal ownership. Within each INST tercile, we sort stocks equally into 3 portfolios by monthly portfolio returns and use the Fama and French (1996) 3 factors and the of the hedge portfolio that is long in stocks with low IVAR and short in stocks with

Table A4 Equal-weighted aggregate options-implied variance and expected market returns.

VIX EWAOIV EWAOIVþVIX LVIX LEWAOIV Wald test p-value Adjusted R 2

Panel A: Monthly data 1 �0.653 �0.003

(1.665) 2 �0.436 0.011

(0.298) 3 �0.514** 0.008

(0.232) 4 0.437 �0.514** 5.532 0.006

(1.869) (0.230) (0.063) 5 0.010 �0.021** 6.215 0.008

(0.009) (0.008) (0.044)

Panel B: Quarterly data 6 0.440 �0.015

(1.732) 7 �0.443* 0.022

(0.262) 8 �0.873*** 0.074

(0.185) 9 2.633 �0.873*** 18.159 0.060

(1.899) (0.205) (0.000) 10 0.062** �0.090*** 15.122 0.071

(0.026) (0.023) (0.001)

Panel C: Annual data 11 1.653 0.021

(0.689) 12 �0.167 �0.057

(0.246) 13 �0.586*** 0.122

(0.149) 14 3.428*** �0.586*** 37.557 0.156

(0.559) (0.142) (0.000) 15 0.226*** �0.268*** 9.624 0.060

(0.073) (0.096) (0.008)

Note: The table reports the OLS estimation results of forecasting excess market returns. The dependent variable is the one-period-ahead excess market return, i.e., the difference between the value-weighted CRSP market return and the risk-free rate. The sample spans the January 1996 to October 2010 period. VIX is the options-implied variance of S&P 500 index. EWAOIV is the equal-weighted aggregate options-implied variance. EWAOIVþVIX is the residual from the OLS regression of EWAOIV on VIX and a constant. LVIX and LEWAOIV are the log transformations of VIX and EWAOIV, respectively. Newey and West (1987) corrected standard errors are reported in parentheses. * Significance at 10% level. ** Significance at 5% level. *** Significance at 1% level.

Table A5 Value-weighted aggregate options-implied variance and expected market returns: subsamples.

VIX VWAOIV LVIX LVWAOIV Wald test p-value Adjusted R2

Panel A: Levels of variances and first half sample Month 5.910*** �1.895*** 13.969 0.044

(1.932) (0.573) (0.001) Quarter 11.470*** �3.152*** 48.188 0.363

(2.055) (0.574) (0.000) Annual 7.975*** �2.087*** 142.980 0.346

(2.625) (0.309) (0.000)

Panel B: Logs of variances and first half sample Month 0.034*** �0.037*** 11.660 0.044

(0.012) (0.011) (0.003) Quarter 0.202*** �0.178*** 40.637 0.378

(0.040) (0.030) (0.000) Annual 0.614*** �0.560*** 116.666 0.488

(0.156) (0.053) (0.000)

Panel C: Levels of variances and second half sample Month 11.702*** �7.254*** 10.970 0.217

(3.738) (2.115) (0.004) Quarter 11.741*** �6.146*** 66.382 0.451

(1.905) (0.823) (0.000) Annual 22.371*** �10.622*** 25.043 0.599

(7.136) (3.664) (0.000)

Panel D: Logs of variances and second half sample Month 0.038*** �0.065*** 10.237 0.094

(0.012) (0.023) (0.006)

(continued on next page)

H. Guo, B. Qiu / Journal of Banking & Finance 44 (2014) 93–113 109

Table A5 (continued)

VIX VWAOIV LVIX LVWAOIV Wald test p-value Adjusted R2

Quarter 0.111*** �0.180*** 6.936 0.163 (0.045) (0.069) (0.031)

Annual 0.323** �0.392* 5.563 0.258 (0.138) (0.207) (0.062)

Note: The table reports the OLS estimation results of forecasting excess market returns for two half samples of the January 1996 to October 2010 period. The dependent variable is the one-period-ahead excess market return, i.e., the difference between the value-weighted CRSP market return and the risk-free rate. VIX is the options-implied variance of S&P 500 index. VWAOIV is the value-weighted aggregate options-implied variance. LVIX and LVWAOIV are the log transformations of VIX and VWAOIV, respectively. Newey and West (1987) corrected standard errors are reported in parentheses. * Significance at 10% level. ** Significance at 5% level. *** Significance at 1% level.

Table A6 Small sample bias in OLS forecasting regressions.

Panel A: OLS VAR Panel B: Corrected VAR

Historical Mean 0.025 Fractile 0.975 Fractile One Tail p-Value Mean 0.025 Fractile 0.975 Fractile One Tail p-Value

Monthly Parameter

VIX 4.424 0.434 �3.127 4.204 0.020 0.401 �3.292 4.155 0.023 VWAOIV �2.752 �0.093 �1.899 1.486 0.001 �0.091 �1.795 1.447 0.001 Adjusted R2 0.069 0.001 �0.011 0.032 0.000 0.001 �0.011 0.032 0.000

t-Statistics VIX 2.695 0.245 �2.056 2.448 0.016 0.223 �2.051 2.474 0.017 VWAOIV �3.705 �0.106 �2.348 1.976 0.002 �0.109 �2.307 2.063 0.002

Quarterly Parameter

VIX 7.693 0.819 �3.318 5.739 0.004 0.829 �3.378 5.528 0.005 VWAOIV �3.520 �0.286 �2.374 1.496 0.002 �0.273 �2.264 1.305 0.002 Adjusted R2 0.262 0.003 �0.035 0.107 0.000 0.003 �0.035 0.107 0.000

t-Statistics VIX 4.372 0.363 �2.091 2.855 0.001 0.371 �2.099 2.813 0.001 VWAOIV �4.211 �0.300 �2.731 2.079 0.005 �0.298 �2.838 2.109 0.003

Annual Parameter

VIX 5.844 0.908 �5.182 7.332 0.060 0.704 �6.857 8.512 0.082 VWAOIV �1.974 �0.351 �2.830 2.126 0.082 �0.227 �3.628 2.306 0.117 Adjusted R2 0.207 0.002 �0.194 0.427 0.068 0.002 �0.194 0.427 0.068

t-Statistics VIX 5.268 0.429 �2.537 3.619 0.012 0.246 �3.482 3.697 0.007 VWAOIV �3.648 �0.439 �3.909 2.996 0.031 �0.126 �3.823 3.017 0.029

Note: The table reports the empirical distribution of parameter estimates, adjusted R-Squared and t-statistics. Column ‘‘Historical’’ reports the OLS statistics obtained from actual data. Column ‘‘Mean’’ reports the mean statistics from simulations. Columns ‘‘0.025 fractile’’ and ‘‘0.975 fractile’’ report the 2.5 percentile and the 97.5 percentile of the simulations, respectively. Column ‘‘One-Tail p-Value’’ reports the one-tail p-value of OLS statistics obtained from actual data. To generate simulated data, as in Nelson and Kim (1993), we first estimate the joint VAR process of VIX, VWAOIV, and excess market returns with the restriction of the null hypothesis that conditional excess market returns are constant. We then use the estimated VAR model to generate 1000 sets of simulated data by drawing error terms from the saved residuals with replacements. We estimate the VAR model in two ways. In panel A, we estimate the VAR parameters using OLS. In panel B, we follow Amihud et al. (2009) and correct the small sample bias of OLS estimates.

27 Note that a firm’s divergence of opinion is different from the firm’s covariance with (exposure to) aggregate uncertainty, which several recent studies (e.g., Anderson et al. (2009), Bekaert et al. (2009), and Bali and Zhou (2011)) have found to be positively priced in the cross-section of stock returns.

110 H. Guo, B. Qiu / Journal of Banking & Finance 44 (2014) 93–113

stock returns mainly reflects its correlation with conditional vari- ance as proxied by options-implied variance. Moreover, we find that the relation between realized idiosyncratic volatility and future stock returns is much stronger for nonoptionable stocks, which tend to be small stocks. Second, by contrast with the under-diversification hypothesis, we document a negative relation between options-implied variance and future stock returns for small stocks but not for big stocks.

The documented relation between conditional variance and future stock returns is puzzling if we interpret conditional variance as a measure of risk. However, we show that the finding is consis- tent with Miller’s (1977) divergence of opinion hypothesis. Specif- ically, conditional variance is a measure of divergence of opinion (e.g., Miller, 1977; Shalen, 1993; Harris and Raviv, 1993; Beber et al., 2010). When pessimistic investors cannot express their

negative opinions by short selling due to binding short-sale con- straints, stocks with large divergence of opinion can be overpriced initially but will have low returns subsequently.27 In cross-sec- tional regressions, we find a negative but insignificant relation between options-implied variance and future stock returns; and the negative relation becomes both statistically and economically significant when we include only stocks with binding short-sale con- straints. In time-series regressions, our measure of aggregate condi- tional idiosyncratic variance, aggregate options-implied variance orthogonalized by VIX, has similar information content as aggregate

Table A7 Controlling for commonly used forecasting variables: monthly data.

VIX VWAOIV VWARIV VP DEF TERM DP EP BM NTIS Adjusted R2

1 �1.073* 0.033 (0.555)

2 �1.182** 0.026 (0.552)

3 0.717 �1.425*** 0.022 (1.717) (0.507)

4 5.348*** �4.079** 1.399 0.070 (1.812) (1.639) (1.200)

5 3.557*** �2.281*** 0.041*** 0.101 (1.247) (0.728) (0.009)

6 4.599*** �2.428*** �2.739*** 0.098 (1.232) (0.649) (0.809)

7 3.699*** �2.655*** �0.352 0.076 (1.280) (0.694) (0.239)

8 4.481*** �2.926*** �1.767 0.080 (1.569) (0.866) (1.301)

9 3.021** �2.212** 0.361 0.071 (1.427) (0.817) (0.441)

10 3.911*** �2.906*** �0.100 0.081 (1.282) (0.668) (0.063)

11 2.696** �2.059*** 0.377** 0.092 (1.170) (0.585) (0.192)

Note: The table reports the OLS regression results of forecasting one-month-ahead excess market returns. The dependent variable is the one-month-ahead excess market return, i.e., the difference between the value-weighted CRSP market return and the risk-free rate. VIX is the options-implied variance of S&P 500 index. VWAOIV is the value- weighted aggregate options-implied variance. VWARIV is the value-weighed aggregate realized idiosyncratic variance. VP is the variance risk premium. DEF is the default premium. TERM is the term premium. DP is the dividend yield. EP is the earnings-price ratio. BM is the aggregate book-to-market equity ratio. NTIS is the share of equities in new issuances. VIX, VWAOIV, VWARIV, and VP are available over the January 1996 to October 2010 period, and the other variables are available over the January 1996 to December 2008 period. Newey and West (1987) corrected standard errors are reported in parentheses. * Significance at 10% level. ** Significance at 5% level. *** Significance at 1% level.

Table A8 Controlling for commonly used forecasting variables: quarterly data.

VIX VWAOIV VWARIV VP CAY DEF TERM DP EP BM NTIS Adjusted R2

1 �0.909** 0.048 (0.436)

2 �1.221*** 0.081 (0.282)

3 2.850 �2.016*** 0.134 (1.854) (4.543)

4 7.488*** �3.540*** 0.331 0.269 (1.667) (0.853) (0.772)

5 3.930*** �2.310*** 0.216*** 0.357 (1.367) (0.503) (0.072)

6 5.250* �2.818*** 0.679 0.240 (2.940) (0.670) (0.435)

7 8.576*** �2.699*** �6.412*** 0.341 (2.311) (0.815) (1.624)

8 7.507*** �3.358*** �1.479* 0.264 (2.826) (0.652) (0.842)

9 9.078*** �3.807*** �8.139** 0.302 (1.622) (0.494) (3.563)

10 6.814** �2.838*** 1.728 0.253 (2.945) (0.681) (1.260)

11 7.611*** �3.631*** �0.402** 0.288 (2.099) (0.601) (0.176)

12 5.597** �2.592*** 1.115** 0.282 (2.272) (0.610) (0.557)

Note: The table reports the OLS regression results of forecasting one-quarter-ahead excess market returns. The dependent variable is the one-quarter-ahead excess market return, i.e., the difference between the value-weighted CRSP market return and the risk-free rate. VIX is the options-implied variance of S&P 500 index. VWAOIV is the value- weighted aggregate options-implied variance. VWARIV is the value-weighed aggregate realized idiosyncratic variance. VP is the variance risk premium. DEF is the default premium. TERM is the term premium. DP is the dividend yield. EP is the earnings-price ratio. BM is the aggregate book-to-market equity ratio. NTIS is the share of equities in new issuances. VIX, VWAOIV, VWARIV, and VP are available over the January 1996 to October 2010 period, and the other variables are available over the January 1996 to December 2008 period. Newey and West (1987) corrected standard errors are reported in parentheses. * Significance at 10% level. ** Significance at 5% level. *** Significance at 1% level.

H. Guo, B. Qiu / Journal of Banking & Finance 44 (2014) 93–113 111

112 H. Guo, B. Qiu / Journal of Banking & Finance 44 (2014) 93–113

analyst forecast dispersion (a measure of aggregate divergence of opinion) and correlates negatively and significantly with future stock market returns; moreover, such a relation gets stronger when short- ing stocks becomes more difficult.

Appendix A

See Tables A1–A8.

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  • Options-implied variance and future stock returns
    • 1 Introduction
    • 2 Data
    • 3 Options-implied variance and future stock returns: cross-sectional evidence
      • 3.1 Merton’s (1987) under-diversification hypothesis
      • 3.2 Miller’s (1977) divergence of opinion hypothesis
      • 3.3 Testing Miller’s (1977) hypothesis using realized idiosyncratic volatility
    • 4 Aggregate options-implied variance and future excess market returns
      • 4.1 Forecasting future excess market returns
      • 4.2 Controlling for small sample bias
      • 4.3 Out-of-sample forecast
      • 4.4 Controlling for aggregate analyst forecast dispersion and other forecasting variables
      • 4.5 Testing Miller’s (1977) hypothesis using time-series data
    • 5 Conclusion
    • Appendix A
    • References

Do-small-businesses-still-prefer-community-ba_2014_Journal-of-Banking---Fina.pdf

Journal of Banking & Finance 44 (2014) 264–278

Contents lists available at ScienceDirect

Journal of Banking & Finance

journal homepage: www.elsevier .com/locate / jbf

Do small businesses still prefer community banks? q

http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jbankfin.2014.03.016 0378-4266/� 2014 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

q The views expressed in this paper are those of the authors only, and should not be interpreted as reflecting the views of the Federal Reserve Board of Governors, its staff, or the Federal Reserve System. ⇑ Corresponding author at: University of South Carolina, United States.

E-mail addresses: [email protected] (A.N. Berger), [email protected]. edu (W. Goulding), [email protected] (T. Rice).

1 Also consistent with the conventional paradigm, Gilje (2012) finds that local market share for small banks increases the number of establishm industries most dependent on external finance when local deposits increas

Allen N. Berger a,b,c,⇑, William Goulding d, Tara Rice e a University of South Carolina, United States b Wharton Financial Institutions Center, United States c European Banking Center, Netherlands d Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Sloan School of Management, United States e Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, United States

a r t i c l e i n f o a b s t r a c t

Article history: Received 19 June 2013 Accepted 10 March 2014 Available online 26 March 2014

JEL classification: G21 G28 G34

Keywords: Banks Relationships Small business Government policy

We formulate and test hypotheses about the role of bank type – small versus large, single-market versus multimarket, and local versus nonlocal banks – in banking relationships. The conventional paradigm sug- gests that ‘‘community banks’’ – small, single-market, local institutions – are better able to form strong relationships with informationally opaque small businesses, while ‘‘megabanks’’ – large, multimarket, nonlocal institutions – tend to serve more transparent firms. Using the 2003 Survey of Small Business Finance (SSBF), we conduct two sets of tests. First, we test for the type of bank serving as the ‘‘main’’ rela- tionship bank for small businesses with different firm and owner characteristics. Second, we test for the strength of these main relationships by examining the probability of an exclusive relationship and main bank relationship length as functions of main bank type and financial fragility, as well as firm and owner characteristics. The results are often not consistent with the conventional paradigm, perhaps because of changes in lending technologies and deregulation of the banking industry.

� 2014 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

1. Introduction involve costs associated with a hold up problem – extraction of

Banks are critical sources of funding for small firms, providing about 60% of debt financing to small businesses (Survey of Small Business Finance, 2003). Small business lending is also important to banks. Both small and large banks extend significant amounts of small business loans. Despite the importance of the banks to small businesses and vice versa, surprisingly little is known about the characteristics of banks and small businesses and their rela- tionships with each other. In this paper, we examine bank types and their relationships with small businesses.

Banks often extract proprietary information from strong relationships and use this information to set contract terms and make credit underwriting decisions. The extant research suggests that small businesses benefit from relationships in terms of credit availability, credit terms, and firm performance. Yet strong relationships, particularly when they are exclusive, may also

rents from a captured firm – or with the potential for premature withdrawal of services if the bank becomes financially distressed or fails. Exclusive relationships with certain types of banks may also be inherently more fragile if these types are more likely to sever small business relationships or withdraw credit than other types. Firms often bear the duplicative costs of multiple banking relationships to mitigate these problems.

Arguments in the literature suggest that small banks are better able to form strong relationships with informationally opaque small businesses, while large banks tend to serve more transparent firms because dealing with opaque firms requires the use of soft information and such information is difficult to quantify and trans- mit through the communication channels and layers of manage- ment of large organizations (e.g., Berger and Udell, 2002; Stein, 2002). Much of the early empirical literature provides support for this conventional paradigm (e.g., Haynes et al., 1999; Cole et al., 2004; Scott, 2004; Berger et al., 2005b).1 By extension, the argu- ments about the difficulties of large banks in dealing with the soft information of opaque small firms may apply to multimarket and

a higher ents in

e.

3 In a related paper, Durguner (2012) shows that the importance of small business lending relationships in determining loan contract terms has diminished over time.

A.N. Berger et al. / Journal of Banking & Finance 44 (2014) 264–278 265

nonlocal banks as well. Thus, it is expected under the conventional paradigm in the literature that opaque small businesses would be best served by small, single-market, local banks, while large, multi- market, nonlocal institutions would tend to serve more transparent firms.

If this conventional paradigm is correct, banking industry consolidation may have significant consequences for the effective- ness of banking relationships with small businesses. Small banks, single-market banks, and local banks may more often function as ‘‘community banks’’ that use soft information gathered from rela- tionships with the firm, its owner, and local community, while large banks, multimarket banks, nonlocal banks may act more as ‘‘megabanks’’ with weaker community ties that base their relation- ships primarily on hard information about the firm. Bank consoli- dation may also affect the competitiveness of local banking markets, which may alter the strength of relationships and the benefits and costs of these relationships to small businesses.

The large banks, multimarket banks, and nonlocal banks created by consolidation may be disadvantaged in relationships based on soft information and may be more likely to sever relationships or withdraw credit than the small, single-market, and local institu- tions they replace. During the financial crisis of 2007–2009, small businesses saw their bank borrowing contract precipitously. Numerous reports cite small business owners’ difficulty in obtain- ing access to credit over the crisis period, particularly from large banks.2

Recently, however, a number of articles challenge the conven- tional paradigm and allow for the possibility that technological progress and deregulation has made it easier for large, multimar- ket, and nonlocal banks to serve small, opaque firms. Berger and Udell (2006) suggest that large banks may be able to serve opaque firms well using hard-information technologies, such as credit scoring and lending against fixed asset collateral (real estate, motor vehicles, or equipment) with values that are relatively easy to assess. A number of empirical articles suggest that very large banks are able to increase their lending to opaque small businesses using credit scoring technology (e.g., Frame et al., 2001, 2004; Berger et al., 2005a) and two studies suggest that small business credit scoring is responsible for an increase in lending distance over time (Frame et al., 2004; DeYoung et al., 2011). Empirical results in Berger et al. (2007) do not suggest a significant net advantage or disadvantage for large banks in small business lending overall, or in lending to informationally opaque small businesses in particu- lar. Rather, the relative convenience of large banks, represented by their local market share of deposits, appears to be most impor- tant variable in determining lender size. Berger and Black (2011) find that large banks tend to lend more to both the smallest and the largest small businesses, with small banks specializing in lend- ing to medium-sized small firms. Canales and Nanda (2012) find that large banks with decentralized decision making lend more to small businesses and respond more to local market competition, consistent with behavior typically associated with small banks that make relationship loans. Berger and Black (2011) and Berger et al. (2011) find that small banks also use hard-information technolo- gies, fixed asset lending and credit scoring, respectively, in addition to relationship lending. de la Torre et al. (2010) find that both large and small banks cater to small firms. Finally, one paper finds that the conventional paradigm held for recent startups in the mid- 2000s – in that a higher local market share of offices owned by small banks resulted in more bank credit to startups – but did

2 Testimony of Governor Elizabeth A. Duke before the Committee on Financial Services and Committee on Small Business, U.S. House of Representatives, Washing- ton, DC, February 26, 2010 (http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/testimony/ duke20100226a.htm) and National Federation of Independent Businesses, Small Credit in a Deep Recession, February 2010.

not hold for these firms in the recent financial crisis (Berger et al., 2014).3

Despite these important issues and the recent controversy over the conventional paradigm, surprisingly little empirical effort has been devoted to investigating the type of bank that tends to serve as the main relationship bank with opaque small businesses and which types of main banks tend to be associated with stronger relationships with these firms. The objective of this paper is to expand the literature along these lines. For our purposes, we define a firm’s ‘‘main’’ relationship bank as the ‘‘primary’’ financial institution identified by the firm. We test hypotheses about the role of main bank type – small versus large, single-market versus multimarket, and local versus nonlocal banks – in banking rela- tionships. In effect, we expand the conventional paradigm about the roles of small banks to single-market and local banks and the roles of large banks to multimarket and nonlocal banks, and test the conventional paradigm. Specifically, we test whether ‘‘megabanks’’ (large, multimarket, nonlocal) less often serve as the main relationship bank than ‘‘community banks’’ (small, sin- gle-market, local) for opaque small businesses, and whether the main bank relationships of megabanks are weaker than those of ‘‘community banks.’’ Our application matches U.S. small business data from the 2003 Survey of Small Business Finance (SSBF) to the Consolidated Reports of Condition and Income for U.S. Banks (Call Reports) on the banks that provide them with credit and other services, and the Summary of Deposits data on the conditions in their local banking markets.

We conduct two sets of tests. First, we test for the type of bank serving as the main relationship bank identified by small busi- nesses. Prior analyses of U.S. data typically do not focus on main banking relationships – they usually examine the relationship for a single loan at a time, and often do not match the loan to the bank type.4 We include exogenous variables measuring firm characteris- tics (e.g., firm size and age, ownership type, and industry), principal owner characteristics (e.g., if owner is also manager, has majority share, has had personal financial problems), and local banking mar- ket conditions (e.g., concentration, market shares of large and multi- market banks, bank offices per capita, state banking restrictions). We test the hypothesis from the conventional paradigm that relatively opaque firms – measured by firm size, age, owner involvement, and several other characteristics – tend to have their main banking relationship with small, single-market, and local banks. Under the paradigm, these banks are expected to have advantages in soft-infor- mation-based relationships relative to large, multimarket, and non- local banks, respectively. More transparent small businesses that rely more on hard-information-based relationships are expected to have their main relationships more frequently at large, multimarket, and nonlocal banks. In contrast, based on the recent literature, it could be the case technological progress and deregulation have made it easier for large, multimarket, and nonlocal banks to serve small, opaque firms, and small, single-market, local banks no longer have a comparative advantage in serving as the main banks for these firms.

Second, we test for the strength of these main relationships by examining the probability of an exclusive relationship versus multiple banking relationships and the length of a relationship as functions of the main bank type and its financial fragility, as well

Consistent with this, van Ewijk and Arnold (2013) find that U.S. banks have shifted from relationship-oriented models towards transactions-oriented models over time.

4 Studies of German hausbanks are exceptions in which main banking relationships are examined. Hausbanks are found to provide liquidity insurance to their customers (e.g., Elsas and Krahnen, 1998). Hausbanks are also found to have better access to information, more influence on borrower management, and to provide relatively high shares of borrower debt (Elsas 2005).

266 A.N. Berger et al. / Journal of Banking & Finance 44 (2014) 264–278

as firm, owner, and market characteristics. Under the conventional paradigm, relatively small, young firms with more ‘‘important’’ principal owners (i.e., owner–managers with large stakes in their firms) and otherwise opaque small businesses tend to have stronger, more exclusive relationships to deal with their soft infor- mation problems, whereas larger, more mature, firms with less ‘‘important’’ principal owners may more often engage in multiple banking to reduce hold up and financial distress concerns. Larger firms may also more often have multiple banks because a single bank cannot provide all the financial services they need. In addi- tion, under the conventional paradigm, it is expected that – even after conditioning on firm and owner characteristics – relation- ships with small, single-market, and local banks or ‘‘community banks’’ are likely to be stronger and more exclusive than those with large, multimarket, and nonlocal banks or ‘‘megabanks’’ because the former relationships are more likely to be based significantly on soft information. In addition, firms may avoid single relation- ships with ‘‘megabanks’’ because of the fragility of these relation- ships. These banks may have weaker ties to the local community and may be more likely to sever small business relationships or withdraw soft-information-based credit than ‘‘community banks.’’ However, some of the recent literature suggests to the contrary that ‘‘megabanks’’ may be able to use hard information to have stronger and less fragile relationships with small, opaque businesses.

By way of preview, our empirical results are often not consis- tent with the predictions of the conventional paradigm. In the first test, we find that opaque small businesses are not more likely to have a community bank as their main bank. In the second test, we find mixed evidence on whether opaque small businesses have stronger relationships with their main banks, but the evidence is clearer that strength does not depend on the type of bank.

We conjecture that the conventional paradigm may not hold because of two important changes in the banking industry over time: (1) changes in lending technology, specifically the introduc- tion of credit scoring in small business lending, and (2) changes in bank regulation (such as the Riegle Neal Interstate Banking and Branching Efficiency Act of 1994 (IBBEA)) that allows large, multi- market, and nonlocal banks to integrate offices across state lines.

The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 briefly reviews the relevant literature on banking relationship strength and associated research and policy issues. Section 3 dis- cusses the data set and provides summary statistics. Section 4 pre- sents the empirical methodology. Section 5 presents the empirical results, and Section 6 concludes.

5 One study also documents some of the benefits to lenders from relationships in terms of increased future profitable lending opportunities (Bharath et al., 2007).

6 The extraction of rents may also make it profitable for banks to lend to some additional firms with marginal credit quality, improving the credit availability of these marginal firms (e.g., Petersen and Rajan, 1995).

7 A possible issue with these studies is that they typically do not measure the fragility of the main bank, but rather the fragility of one lending bank or all of the firm’s banks. We argue that the fragility of the main bank is the most logical choice, based on the assumption that the main bank is determined first.

2. Brief review of the relationship strength literature and associated issues

2.1. Relationship strength

Relationship strength is generally measured by the length or breadth of the relationship, or whether the bank is the exclusive provider of financial services. Strong relationships may often be needed to extract proprietary soft information and to lend to small firms without sufficient hard information on which to base credit decisions. Firms of all types may also benefit from strong banking relationships in which the bank is able to ‘‘reuse’’ hard and soft information garnered over the course of the relationship from loans, deposits, or other services to set contract terms or make credit underwriting decisions. As will become clear, the literature suggests that different types of banks – small versus large, sin- gle-market versus multimarket, and local versus nonlocal – may have different abilities to maintain strong relationships with small businesses.

2.2. Benefits from strong relationships

Most empirical studies find benefits to borrowers from strong relationships. The research often finds that stronger relationships are associated with better credit availability, as measured by a higher loan application acceptance rate, less dependence on expen- sive trade credit, or fewer collateral requirements (e.g., Petersen and Rajan, 1994, 1995; Berger and Udell, 1995; Cole, 1998; Elsas and Krahnen, 1998; Harhoff and Korting, 1998; Machauer and Weber, 2000; Moro and Fink, 2013). Studies of U.S. small busi- nesses typically also find lower loan interest rates when relation- ships are stronger (e.g., Berger and Udell, 1995; Bharath et al., 2011), although European studies often yield no significant effects of relationship strength on rates (e.g., Elsas and Krahnen, 1998; Harhoff and Korting, 1998; Machauer and Weber, 2000; Degryse and Van Cayseele, 2000). Some studies also discover favorable effects of strong relationships on firm performance. Specifically, one study of publicly traded U.S. companies finds that strong rela- tionships increase the likelihood of success of moderately finan- cially distressed firms (Rosenfeld, 2011), another study finds that relationships aid in resolution of Chapter 11 bankruptcy proceed- ings (Dahiya et al., 2003), and a study of Italian manufacturers yields a positive association between relationship strength and innovation by borrowing firms (Herrera and Minetti, 2007).5

2.3. Costs to strong relationships that may result in multiple banking

Strong relationships – particularly when they are exclusive – may also involve costs. The private information generated by an exclusive banking relationship may give the bank market power over the firm, yielding a hold up problem and extraction of rents from the firm (e.g., Sharpe, 1990; Rajan, 1992). Firms may bear additional costs to engage in multiple relationships to mitigate the rent extraction (e.g., Von Thadden, 1992; Boot, 2000; Farinha and Santos, 2002; Elsas et al., 2004).6

Firms may also bear the duplicative costs of multiple banking instead of a single strong banking relationship to protect them- selves from premature withdrawal of services if their main bank becomes financially distressed or fails. Thus, firms may be more likely to have multiple banking relationships when their main bank is financially fragile and likely to become distressed or fail. The empirical literature on this topic is mixed, with studies in some cases finding positive, negative, and/or no consistent effect of bank fragility on the probability of multiple banking (e.g., Detragiache et al., 2000; Ongena and Smith, 2000; Berger et al., 2001, 2008).7

The concept of relationship fragility may also be extended to apply to bank type if some types of banks are more likely to sever relationships or withdraw critical services, independent of the bank’s financial condition. In this regard, there is no literature on small versus large, single-market versus multimarket, or local ver- sus nonlocal banks on relationship severance. However, there are related studies on the effects of domestic versus foreign banks – an extreme form of local versus nonlocal banks. One study of Indian banking suggests that foreign banks have weaker ties to the country and may be more likely to sever relationships with local firms than state-owned banks with mandates to serve local firms (Berger et al., 2008). A related literature finds that foreign banks generally

A.N. Berger et al. / Journal of Banking & Finance 44 (2014) 264–278 267

reduced lending more than domestic banks during crisis periods (Klein et al., 2002; Claessens and Van Horen, 2011; de Haas and Van Lelyveld, 2011; Popov and Udell, 2012; Ongena et al., 2012).8

In the present context, it may be analogously expected that large, multimarket, and nonlocal banks have weaker ties to the local com- munity and may be more likely to sever small business relationships or cut off credit than small, single-market, and local institutions, respectively.

Finally, firms may more often bear the duplicative costs of mul- tiple banking when one bank cannot provide all of their financial service needs. This is likely to occur for some of the largest of the small businesses studied here, which may be geographically dis- persed, requiring services in more markets than are served by the firm’s main bank. Multiple banks may similarly be needed if the firm requires international services or specialized investment products not provided by the firm’s main bank. Empirical research typically finds that larger firms are associated with multiple bank- ing (e.g., Houston and James, 1996; Machauer and Weber, 2000; Ongena and Smith, 2000; Berger et al., 2001,b; Berger et al., 2008).9

2.4. Strong relationships and bank consolidation issues

Some research and policy issues concern the effects of bank con- solidation on relationships. Much of the relationship lending litera- ture focuses on the effects of bank size, hypothesizing that larger banks are disadvantaged in relationships to small firms based on soft information due to difficulties in processing and transmitting soft information through the communication channels of large organizations (e.g., Stein, 2002), agency problems within large organizations with more layers of management because the loan officer is the main repository of soft information (e.g., Berger and Udell, 2002), and/or organizational diseconomies of dealing with using hard-information-based technologies for some firms along with soft-information-based technologies for other firms (e.g., Williamson, 1988). Large banks may have a comparative advantage in relationships with larger firms due to economies of scale in pro- cessing and transmitting hard information.

Some empirical research is consistent with these expectations that large banks are less likely than small banks to lend to or have strong relationships with small, young firms with little hard infor- mation available and conversely for relationships with large, mature firms with more hard information available (e.g., Haynes et al., 1999; Cole et al., 2004; Scott, 2004; Berger et al., 2005b). Thus, bank consolidation may have unfavorable implications for firms relying on relationships that make primary use of soft infor- mation and conversely for firms relying on relationships based pri- marily on hard information.10

Presumably, arguments similar to those based on bank size apply to the geography of banks – single-market and local banks are more likely to have a comparative advantage in relationships based on soft information, and multimarket and nonlocal banks are more likely to have a comparative advantage in hard-information-based relationships. Some industrial organization research on banking

8 However, it is possible that the major reason for the observed decrease in lending during the crisis is the decrease in firms’ demand for credit. For example, Kremp and Sevestre (2013) find that despite the stronger standards used by banks when granting credit, small businesses in France do not appear to have been strongly affected by credit rationing since 2008.

9 Other motives for multiple banking relationships are discussed in Berger et al. (2008).

10 However, some research finds that market reactions may offset some of these consequences. Some studies of bank mergers and acquisitions find that small business lending appears to decline at consolidating institutions, but may be offset by increased lending supplies by other banks in the market or through increased market entry of newly chartered banks (e.g., Berger et al., 1998; Avery and Samolyk 2004; Berger et al., 2004a).

focuses on differences in competitive behavior and efficiencies of multimarket versus single-market banks and their effects on small businesses and consumers, but does not examine the role of rela- tionships (e.g., Hannan and Prager, 2006; Berger et al., 2007; Cohen and Mazzeo, 2007; Berger and Ostromogolsky, 2009). Simi- larly, there has been research showing that lending distances have increased over time, with more small businesses borrowing from nonlocal lenders (e.g., Petersen and Rajan, 2002; Hannan, 2003; Brevoort and Hannan, 2006). This literature also usually does not focus on relationships, despite the likely role of soft information in local relationships and hard information in nonlocal relation- ships. Thus, the consolidation of the banking industry may be expected to shift resources from small, single-market, and local banks to large, multimarket, nonlocal institutions, with potentially significant consequences for banking relationships and their bene- fits to small businesses.

Consolidation may also affect the competitiveness of local banking markets. Mergers and acquisitions (M&As) within markets likely reduces competitiveness and M&As across markets likely increase competitiveness. Relationship strength and its conse- quences may be greater when banking markets are less competi- tive, because firms have fewer potential alternatives in the future event that their main bank tightens contract terms dramatically. Empirical studies of the effects of concentration and other restric- tions on competitiveness on measures of credit availability, activ- ity, and general economic performance find both favorable effects (e.g., Petersen and Rajan, 1995; Cetorelli and Gambera, 2001; Bonaccorsi di Patti and Dell’Ariccia, 2004; Cetorelli, 2004) and unfavorable effects (e.g., Black and Strahan, 2002; Berger et al., 2004c; Karceski et al., 2005; Cetorelli and Strahan, 2006; Chong et al., 2013).

3. Data and summary statistics

We combine data from the SSBF with the Call Reports. The SSBF is a survey by the Federal Reserve of the financial condition of firms with fewer than 500 full-time-equivalent employees. The survey was first conducted in 1987 and repeated in 1993, 1998, and 2003. It contains details on small businesses’ income, expenses, assets, liabilities, and characteristics of the firm, firm owners, and the small businesses’ financial relationships with financial service suppliers for a broad set of products and services. The sample is randomly drawn but stratified to ensure geographical representa- tion across all regions of the United States. The SSBF also oversam- ples relatively large firms (conditional on having fewer than 500 workers). Given the above data, we can measure assets, liabilities, profits, firm age, and the length of time firms have established rela- tionships with banks and other lenders. We also know the location of firms, so we can control for local market conditions.

Petersen and Rajan (1994) and Berger and Udell (1995) are among the first to use the data from the 1987 survey. These papers both find that banking relationships expand credit availability for small firms. Other authors also use later waves of these data to study whether bank size affects credit allocation decisions (e.g., Cole, 1998; Jayaratne and Wolken, 1999; Cole et al., 2004; Berger et al., 2005b; Berger and Black, 2011). Our paper is the first to use these data to test role of bank type – small versus large, sin- gle-market versus multimarket, and local versus nonlocal banks – in banking relationships.

The SSBF data contain information on up to 20 financial services firms with which a small business may have a relationship, including the firm’s ‘‘primary’’ or main bank.11 We match the small

11 Unfortunately, it is not possible to identify a ‘‘Second Main Bank Type,’’ as no priority is given to the other institutions that provide financial services.

12 Prior research finds that the local market share of large banks is a powerful predictor of lending bank size (e.g., Berger et al., 2005b; Berger et al., 2007).

13 The mean size of the main bank is quite large – over $140 billion in gross total assets – much larger than the mean bank in the nation. This is because the observations are by the small business relationships rather than by banks, and the largest banks tend to have many more small business relationships than the smallest banks. Similarly, mean number of markets of the main bank is very large at 129 because the banks with the most markets tend to have many more small business relationships than the banks with the fewest markets.

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businesses’ main banks with the Call Reports, which contain finan- cial statement and structure data on all U.S. commercial banks. We exclude a number of firms from the sample. Of the 4240 firms in the SSBF, 3350 are in metropolitan markets. We restrict our study to metropolitan markets because lending practices vary greatly between metropolitan and rural markets, and the sample of rural banks would be too small to analyze. DeYoung et al., 2012 find fun- damental differences between small rural and metropolitan business borrowers and conclude that divergent lending practices made necessary by these differences may result in a greater number of small rural commercial banks than would be expected.

Of the 3350 metropolitan firms, 2846 identified a commercial bank as their primary institution. We drop the other 504 firms from the sample that either did not have a commercial bank as a primary institution or provided an incomplete response to the question, leaving the identity of the main institution uncertain. Another 232 firms could not be matched to the Summary of Deposits data to gather information on their local market conditions, and another 4 firms were eliminated because their industry perfectly predicted whether it had its main bank relationship with a multimarket insti- tution, leaving 2610 observations that could be used in our regres- sions of main bank type (described below). We lose another 27 observations, leaving a total of 2583, for our regressions of relation- ship strength because we did not have the requisite 8 quarters of prior data to compute one of our bank risk measures, the Z-score.

Table 1 Panel A reports the definitions of the variables used in the analyses taken from the 2003 SSBF matched with the Call Reports. The firm characteristics include measures of firm size, minority ownership, age, risk, and industry, and if the firm has a bank loan. For firm size, we specify dummies for small, medium, and large firms, with total assets 6 $100,000, $100,000 – $1 mil- lion, and over $1 million, respectively, with small firms excluded as the base case in the regressions. Note that these are relative sizes within the broader category of small businesses that are in the SSBF, and do not include the largest firms in the nation. Prior research finds significant differences across these three size classes in the comparative advantages of large and small banks in using different lending technologies (Berger and Black, 2011). For firm age, we simply specify the natural log of age. Age is a measure of opacity and has been found to affect the likelihood of borrowing from large banks in prior research (e.g., Berger et al., 2005b, 2007). For firm risk, we include a measure of credit score, leverage, and a dummy that equals 1 if the business has been delinquent in the past three years. We also control for industry type with a set of dummies for one-digit SIC codes (not shown in tables for brevity).

The owner characteristics include measures of organizational form and the involvement or ‘‘importance’’ of the principal owner in the life of the firm. Organizational form includes dummies for whether the firm is a corporation, partnership, or proprietorship, as these forms offer the firm different protections of assets in the event that they do not repay their bank credit and may also reflect the need for soft information in their banking relationships. We include variables measuring whether the principal owner of the firm is also the manager, and whether the firm is owned exclu- sively by a single family. When the owner is also the manager and/or has a large stake in the firm, it is more likely that the main relationship with the firm will require significant collection of soft information about the owner. Thus, when the owner is more ‘‘important,’’ the firm may be more likely to have a main relation- ship with a small, single-market, or local bank to deal with the soft information under the conventional paradigm. Alternatively, when the owner is more ‘‘important,’’ large, multimarket, or nonlocal banks may be more likely to have the main relationship because credit scoring is mostly based on the consumer information on the owner, which may be more important when the owner is more important to the firm.

Turning to main bank characteristics, we use a size cutoff of $1 billion in gross total assets (GTA) to distinguish between small and large banks following prior research on the empirical definition of ‘‘community banks’’ (e.g., DeYoung et al., 2004). Also following prior research and anti-trust guidelines, we define a sin- gle-market bank as one in a single metropolitan market – a Metro- politan Statistical Area (MSA) or New England County Metropolitan Areas (NECMA) in which the small business is located. All banks with branch offices in two or more metropolitan or rural markets are defined as multimarket banks. Main banks that do not have a banking office in the firm’s local market are designated as nonlocal. In some specifications, we replace the main bank size dummy with the log of bank assets and the multimarket dummy with the num- ber or log of the number of markets in which the main bank has offices. In some specifications, we also account for the financial fra- gility of the main bank by including its equity to gross total assets (GTA) ratio, its ratio of nonperforming loans to total loans, a mea- sure of its illiquidity (liquidity creation to GTA ratio, taken from Berger and Bouwman, 2009), its ratio of fee income from deposits to total revenues as an inverse measure of nontraditional activities (similar to Lozano-Vivas and Pasiouras, 2010 and DeYoung and Torna, 2013), and its Z-score computed over the prior 12 quarters (or 8–11 quarters if 12 quarters are unavailable), similar to Laeven and Levine (2009) and Mercieca et al. (2007).

Banking relationship variables include a dummy for an exclu- sive bank-firm relationship. We also use a measure of length of the relationship with the main bank.

Turning to local market characteristics, in the small bank versus large main bank estimation (described more in Section 4), we also include a variable to measure the share of local market offices owned by large banks. This is included as a proxy for the relative convenience of large banks. It is expected that firms are more likely to have their main relationship at a large bank if the market pres- ence of this bank type is greater, all else equal.12 Similarly, we include multimarket bank share of local market offices in the sin- gle-market versus multimarket bank equation to account for the rel- ative convenience of multimarket banks. In the local versus nonlocal bank equation, we include local bank offices per capita as an indica- tor of the relative convenience of local banks. In all the regressions, we include a control for the Herfindahl–Hirschman Index of local banking market concentration (HHI), which may or may not be an inverse indicator of competition (Berger et al., 2004b). We also include an interstate branching index to control for regulatory and competitive conditions (Rice and Strahan, 2010).

Summary statistics on these variables are shown in Table 1 Panel B. We briefly discuss some of these here. On average, firms in our sample are about 17 years old, and 69% are organized as cor- porations. The leverage ratio debt-to-asset ratio of the average firm is 33%, and about half of the firms have a bank loan. Less than one percent of firms in our sample have declared bankruptcy in the past 7 years. These firms are largely family owned and operated – 81.5% of firms are family owned and 88% are owner-managed.

Over three-quarters of the firms in our sample have large banks as their main banks, and over 60% have multimarket or nonlocal banks as their main banks.13 The majority of firms (57%) in the sam- ple state that they have only one bank and the average main bank relationship is 11 years. The high proportion of firms that have large,

Table 1 Variable descriptions and summary statistics.

Variable Description

Panel A: Variable descriptions Firm characteristics

Indicator if small firm Equals one if firm has assets less than or equal to $100,000, zero otherwise Indicator if medium firm Equals one if firm has assets greater than $100,000 and less than or equal to $1 million, zero otherwise Indicator if large firm Equals one if firm has assets greater than $1 million, zero otherwise Percent minority owned Percentage of firm ownership that is non-white Indicator if firm is delinquent on payments Equals one if firm has been 60 or more days delinquent on business obligations at least once within the past three

years, zero otherwise Firm risk rating (6 is safest; 1 is riskiest) Firm’s credit score as obtained from Dun and Bradstreet Leverage ratio of firm Ratio of firm debt to equity Indicator if firm has a bank loan Equals one if firm has any type of bank loan, zero otherwise Firm age How many years ago was the firm established/purchased/acquired by the current owners Indicator if firm has declared bankruptcy Equals one if the firm has declared bankruptcy within the last seven years, zero otherwise

Owner characteristics Indicator if owner is manager Equals one if owner is responsible for day-to-day management of the business, zero otherwise Indicator if family owned Equals one if the firm was owned exclusively by members of the same family, zero otherwise Indicator if proprietorship Equals one if the firm is a sole proprietorship, zero otherwise Indicator if partnership Equals one if the firm is a partnership, zero otherwise Indicator if corporation Equals one if the firm is a S or C corporation, zero otherwise

Main bank characteristics Indicator if main bank is large Equal one if the main bank has assets greater than $1 billion, zero otherwise Indicator if main bank is multimarket Equals one if the main bank has offices in multiple (metropolitan or rural) markets, zero otherwise Indicator if main bank is nonlocal Equals one if the main bank does not have an office in the firm’s local market, zero otherwise Indicator if main bank is megabank Equals one if the main bank is large, multimarket, and nonlocal Gross total assets of main bank ($ thousands)

Shown here in levels but used in logs in regressions

Number of markets of main bank The number of Metropolitan Statistical Areas in which the main bank has operations Equity to asset ratio of main bank Ratio of equity to total assets of main bank NPL ratio of main bank Ratio of non-performing loans to total loans of main bank. Illiquidity of main bank Berger and Bouwman’s (2009) preferred liquidity creation measure divided by gross total assets of the main bank Fee income from deposits divided by total revenue of main bank

Ratio of service charges on deposit accounts to total revenue

Z-score of main bank [Average (ROA) + Average (Equity/Gross Total Assets)]/Standard deviation of ROA, where the means of ROA and Equity/ GTA as well as the standard deviation of ROA are computed over the previous 12 quarters. For banks with less than 12 consecutive quarters, we construct a Z-score using data using 8–11 quarters

Main banking relationship characteristics Indicator if firm has exclusive relationship with main bank

Equals one if firm has a relationship with only main bank, zero otherwise

Length of relationship with main bank (years)

Shown here in levels but used in logs in regressions

Market controls Large bank share of offices (percent) Percentage of offices with gross total assets greater than $1 billion in the market, where the market is the Metropolitan

Statistical Area (MSA) or New England County Metropolitan Areas (NECMA) Multimarket bank share of offices (percent) Percentage of offices in banks with offices in multiple (metropolitan and rural) markets Local bank offices per capita Offices per 1000 population in the local market Market concentration (HHI) Sum of the squared shares of deposits held by all banks in the firm’s local market Branching restriction index Rice and Strahan’s (2010) time-varying index capturing state-level differences in regulatory constraints between 1994

and 2005, which takes the values between 0 and 4, with 0 being the least restrictive (most open)

Variable Obs. Mean Std. dev.

Panel B: Summary statistics Firm characteristics

Indicator if small firm 2610 0.383 0.486 Indicator if large firm 2610 0.297 0.457 Indicator if medium firm 2610 0.321 0.467 Percent minority owned 2610 0.132 0.339 Indicator if firm is delinquent on payments 2610 0.165 0.371 Firm risk rating (6 is safest; 1 is riskiest) 2610 3.893 1.468 Leverage ratio of firm 2610 0.328 0.388 Indicator if firm has a bank loan 2610 0.505 0.500 Firm age 2610 16.645 12.250 Indicator if firm has declared bankruptcy 2610 0.008 0.091

Owner characteristics Indicator if owner is manager 2610 0.884 0.320 Indicator if family owned 2610 0.815 0.389 Indicator if proprietorship 2610 0.263 0.440 Indicator if partnership 2610 0.050 0.218 Indicator if corporation 2610 0.687 0.464

(continued on next page)

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Table 1 (continued)

Variable Obs. Mean Std. dev.

Main bank characteristics Indicator if main bank is large 2610 0.763 0.425 Indicator if main bank is multimarket 2610 0.634 0.482 Indicator if main bank is nonlocal 2610 0.606 0.489 Indicator if main bank is megabank 2583 0.456 0.498 Gross total assets of main bank ($ thousands) 2610 1.41E+08 2.04E+08 Number of markets of main bank 2610 129.445 161.119 Equity to asset ratio of main bank 2583 0.090 0.026 NPL ratio of main bank 2583 0.013 0.010 Illiquidity of main bank 2583 0.442 0.144 Fee income from deposits divided by total revenue of main bank 2583 0.086 0.038 Z-score of main bank 2583 42.809 32.818

Main banking relationship characteristics Indicator if firm has exclusive relationship with main bank 2583 0.570 0.495 Length of relationship with main bank (years) 2583 11.229 10.122

Market controls Large bank share of offices (percent) 2610 79.240 14.758 Multimarket share of offices (percent) 2610 0.492 0.238 Local bank offices per capita 2610 0.093 0.157 Market concentration (HHI) 2610 0.137 0.061 Branching restriction index 2610 2.093 1.298

Panel A reports variable names and descriptions. Panel B reports summary statistics. Data from most of the variables are from the 2003 Survey of Small Business Finance (SSBF) combined with the 2003:Q4 Bank Call Reports and June 2003 Summary of Deposits. The Z-score variable is from the 2001:Q1–2003:Q4 Bank Call Reports.

270 A.N. Berger et al. / Journal of Banking & Finance 44 (2014) 264–278

multimarket or nonlocal banks as their main bank suggests, at least at first blush, that the conventional paradigm does not strongly hold – most of our small-firm sample do not have community banks as their main banks.

4. Empirical methodology

4.1. Determinants of main bank type

Our first model examines the effects of firm, owner, and local market characteristics in determining the firm’s main bank type:

Main bank type ¼ ffFirm and owner characteristics; Local market characteristicsg ð1Þ

The dependent variables are dummies which equal 1 if the main bank is the given type and 0 otherwise. We distinguish between small and large banks, between single-market and multimarket banks, and between local and nonlocal banks. We estimate binomial logit models specifying the probability of the main bank being large, multimarket, or nonlocal, leaving small, single-market, or local as the excluded base case, respectively.

Our primary tests in Eq. (1) are based on the discussion above con- cerning the effects of firm size and age, and the ‘‘importance’’ of prin- cipal owner to the firm. We test the hypotheses under the conventional paradigm that ‘‘community banks’’ (small, single- market, and local banks) tend to serve as the main bank for more opaque firms – i.e., smaller, younger firms, with more ‘‘important’’ owners – and ‘‘megabanks’’ (large, multimarket, or nonlocal banks) tend to have their strongest relationship with more transparent firms – i.e., larger, more mature firms, with less ‘‘important’’ owners.

4.2. Determinants of relationship strength

Our second model investigates the determinants of relationship strength. We use logit estimations to study the probability that a firm has an exclusive banking relationship using a dummy for the dependent variable. We also estimate an OLS model using robust standard errors to test for the length of the relationship (where

length is defined as the log of (1 + length of firm-bank relationship in years)). We assume that relationship strength is a function of firm, local market, and main bank characteristics as shown in Eq. (2):

Relationship Strength ¼ gfFirm and owner characteristics; Local market characteristics; Main bank type and fragilityg ð2Þ

The firm, owner, and local market characteristics in Eq. (2) are iden- tical to those in Eq. (1), except that we include all three convenience variables – large bank branch share, multimarket bank branch share, and local market bank offices per capita together in each ver- sion of Eq. (2), whereas these entered in different versions of Eq. (1). The main bank characteristics include measures of the type and financial fragility of the main bank. For main bank type, we simply specify dummies for large bank, multimarket bank, and nonlocal bank, excluding dummies for small, single-market, and local banks as the base case. As discussed above, for financial fragility, we include the main bank’s equity to gross total assets (GTA) ratio, its nonperforming loan ratio, a measure of its illiquidity, an inverse measure of its nontraditional activities, and its Z-score.

Using Eq. (2), we first test the effects of firm size, age, and ‘‘impor- tance’’ of the principal owner on main bank relationship strength. Specifically, we test the hypotheses that smaller, younger firms, with more ‘‘important’’ principal owners are more likely to have exclusive relationships and longer relationships to deal with their soft information problems, while relatively large, more mature firms with less ‘‘important’’ principal owners may more often engage in multiple banking relationships and shorter relationships.

Second, we test hypotheses regarding the strength of the rela- tionship with the main bank type. Specifically, we test the hypoth- eses that large, multimarket, and nonlocal banks have weaker ties to the local community, and may be more likely to sever small business relationships or withdraw soft-information-based credit than small, single-market, and local institutions, respectively. Therefore, it is expected that firms that have these bank types are more likely to protect themselves against the fragility of their main banking relationship by engaging in multiple banking or hav- ing shorter relationships.

A.N. Berger et al. / Journal of Banking & Finance 44 (2014) 264–278 271

Third, we test the effects of main bank financial fragility on the probability that the firm has multiple banking relationships or short relationships to protect themselves from premature withdrawal of services if their main bank becomes financially dis- tressed or fails. Thus, conditional on the firm and owner character- istics, we expect that multiple relationships are more likely and relationships are shorter when the main bank has a low capital ratio, high nonperforming loan ratio, high illiquidity, low deposit fee income ratio, and low Z-score.14

5. Empirical results

Tables 2 and 3 show our regression results for the determinants of main bank type (Table 2), and relationship strength (Table 3). Each table shows multiple specifications of the equations to illus- trate the robustness of the findings. Most of the regressions have the logit form, so we present the estimates as odds ratios which are obtained by exponentiating the original logit coefficients. For example, in the logit regressions in Table 2 with the probability of a large, multimarket, or nonlocal bank as dependent variable, an odds ratio of one on a firm being medium-sized would indicate that being a medium firm does not affect the probability of having a ‘‘megabank’’ as its main bank. An odds ratio greater/less than one on a right-hand-side variable would indicate that an increase in the variable increases/decreases the probability of a main bank being a large, multimarket or nonlocal bank, as appropriate. We report the z-statistics for testing equality to one in parentheses under the odds ratios in all tables. For the relationship strength regressions and one of the robustness checks with the log of main bank assets as the dependent variable, we estimate by OLS and report standard coefficients and t-statistics for testing equality to zero in parenthe- ses under the coefficients.

5.1. Determinants of main bank type

Table 2 reports the results of our first set of tests that small, sin- gle-market, and local banks tend to serve as the main bank for more opaque firms – i.e., smaller, younger firms, with more ‘‘important’’ owners – and large, multimarket, and nonlocal banks tend to have their strongest relationship with more transparent firms – i.e., larger, more mature firms, with less ‘‘important’’ own- ers. Columns 1–3 of Panel A report these regressions for the main bank being a large bank, multimarket bank, or nonlocal bank, respectively. We find that most of the key exogenous variables have odds ratios that are statistically insignificantly different from one; that is, we do not find evidence that smaller, younger firms, with more ‘‘important’’ owners have their strongest relationships with small, single-market and local banks. In column 1, the odds ratios on three variables are statistically significantly different from one. Firms with a high percentage of minority ownership are more likely than others to have a large main bank. This is not one of the variables that we necessarily associate with firm opac- ity, but to the extent that minority-owned firms may be more informationally opaque, the result runs contrary to the conven- tional paradigm. The odds ratio on the large bank share of the mar- ket offices is also greater than one and statistically significant in the first regression in column 1, suggesting that small businesses’ choice of large banks is, in part, motivated by the convenience of having a large share of offices of that type of bank in the area. As well, the odds ratio on HHI is significantly greater than one. In

14 Some studies of multiple banking in other nations use two different models of choice: (1) to have multiple banks, and (2) the number of banks, given multiple banking (e.g., Detragiache et al., 2000; Berger et al., 2008). We argue that such an approach is not appropriate for our sample of U.S. small businesses, which rarely have many more than two relationships.

column 2, the odds ratio on minority ownership is again signifi- cantly greater than one, possibly inconsistent with the conven- tional paradigm. Analogous to column 1, the coefficient on multimarket share of offices in column 2 is significantly greater than one, indicating that convenience of these banks plays a role. The odds ratio on partnership is also significantly greater than one, but the odds ratio on corporation is not, yielding the mixed result that partnerships are more likely than proprietorships with have a multimarket main bank, but corporations are not. In the third regression in column 3, the odds ratio on the total number of bank offices in each market per capita, our proxy of local bank office presence, is less than one, suggesting that small businesses’ choice of a local bank is driven partly by the convenience of having more local offices in the market. Firms that have been bankrupt and firms in more concentrated banking markets are also less likely to have nonlocal main banks.

Panels B–E of Table 2 test the robustness of these results. In Panel B, we repeat the three logit regressions leaving out the con- trols for the banking market. Consistent with the main results in Panel A, the odds ratios for the variables measuring the effects of firm size, age, and the ‘‘importance’’ of the principal owner are all statistically insignificantly different from one, contrary to the predictions of the conventional paradigm.

In Panel C, we instead leaving out the controls for the owner characteristics. Again the odds ratios for firm size and age are insig- nificantly different from one (the ‘‘importance’’ of the principal owner cannot be determined in these regressions without the owner characteristics).

In Panel D, we add the other two dependent variables to each of the three main logit regressions. That is, in the Main bank is large bank regression, we add the indicators for multimarket and nonlocal, and so forth.15 Not surprisingly, the odds ratios on these additional variables are statistically significantly greater than one in all cases – these megabank properties often go together. More importantly, the odds ratios on the key right-hand-side variables are again generally not statistically significantly different from one. The only exception is Firm age in the large main bank regression, but the odds ratio of 1.014 is not economically significantly different from one.

In Panel E, we rerun the regressions for large main bank and multimarket main bank replacing the dummy indicators with con- tinuous variables. That is, we replace the dependent variable for large main bank with the log of bank gross total assets and the dependent variable for multimarket main bank with the number of main bank markets. In columns 1–3, we use OLS to regress log of main bank’s gross total assets on right-hand-side variables, both excluding and including variables for multimarket main bank and nonlocal main bank. In columns 2–3, we alternate the variable for multimarket main bank between the indicator dummy and the log of the number of main bank markets. In columns 4–6, we use ordered logit for the number of main bank markets using the cat- egories 1, 2–5, 6–20, and over 20 markets. We again run the regres- sions with and without variables for large and nonlocal main bank, and alternate between the large bank dummy and the log of large bank assets in columns 5–6.16 As in the earlier reported results, the measures of firm opacity and owner ‘‘importance’’ are nearly all sta- tistically insignificant or in the case of firm age, economically insig- nificant. Also as reported earlier, all the main bank size, multimarket, and nonlocal variables on the right-hand-side all indicate that the three megabank indicators are positively related. Thus, the main results are again found to be robust.

15 This is similar to the inclusion of distress in a regression model of bank failure in DeYoung and Torna (2013).

16 In unreported results, running OLS regressions for the log of main bank markets yields consistent findings.

Table 2 Determinants of main bank type.

(1) (2) (3) Main bank is large bank Main bank is multimarket bank Main bank is nonlocal bank

Panel A: Determinants of main bank type (main results) Firm characteristics

Indicator if medium firm 1.028 1.050 0.981 (0.180) (0.381) (�0.151)

Indicator if large firm 0.869 0.853 0.853 (�0.686) (�0.854) (�0.863)

Percent minority owned 1.781*** 1.619*** 1.237 (2.658) (2.929) (1.352)

Indicator if firm is delinquent on payments 0.896 1.000 1.141 (�0.601) (�0.000) (0.840)

Firm risk rating (6 is safest; 1 is riskiest) 1.007 1.054 1.026 (0.140) (1.300) (0.626)

Leverage ratio of firm 0.836 0.844 1.140 (�1.037) (�1.193) (0.918)

Firm age (log years) 1.009 1.001 1.002 (1.296) (0.153) (0.450)

Indicator if firm declared bankruptcy 0.540 0.674 0.331**

(�1.204) (�0.740) (�2.032)

Owner characteristics Indicator if owner is manager 1.076 1.371 0.732

(0.268) (1.296) (�1.270) Indicator if family owned 0.919 0.954 0.996

(�0.407) (�0.273) (�0.025) Indicator if partnership 1.280 1.998** 1.027

(0.715) (2.420) (0.099) Indicator if corporation 0.977 1.089 0.816

(�0.143) (0.642) (�1.535) Market controls

Large bank share of offices 1.059***

(11.998) Multimarket share of offices 3.676***

(5.287) Local bank offices per capita 0.065***

(�3.502) Market concentration (HHI) 17.053** 1.488 0.061***

(2.172) (0.416) (�2.834) Branching restriction index 1.000 0.946 1.025

(0.000) (�1.248) (0.571)

Observations 2610 2610 2610 Pseudo R2 0.1300 0.0299 0.0350

Panel B: Determinants of main bank type (no market controls) Firm characteristics

Indicator if medium firm 0.964 1.042 0.997 (�0.258) (0.331) (�0.022)

Indicator if large firm 0.852 0.873 0.892 (�0.814) (�0.746) (�0.631)

Percent minority owned 1.996*** 1.611*** 1.216 (3.238) (2.895) (1.257)

Indicator if firm is delinquent on payments 1.034 0.999 1.159 (0.195) (�0.009) (0.939)

Firm risk rating (6 is safest; 1 is riskiest) 1.027 1.057 1.033 (0.598) (1.359) (0.807)

Leverage ratio of firm 0.767* 0.856 1.157 (�1.685) (�1.125) (1.055)

Firm age (log years) 1.007 1.001 1.001 (1.049) (0.195) (0.161)

Indicator if firm declared bankruptcy 0.376* 0.669 0.379*

(�1.866) (�0.738) (�1.752)

Owner characteristics Indicator if owner is manager 0.934 1.333 0.745

(�0.262) (1.223) (�1.264) Indicator if family owned 0.963 0.973 1.029

(�0.194) (�0.165) (0.176) Indicator if partnership 1.427 2.055*** 0.940

(1.110) (2.600) (�0.226) Indicator if corporation 1.010 1.105 0.756**

(0.064) (0.759) (�2.141)

272 A.N. Berger et al. / Journal of Banking & Finance 44 (2014) 264–278

Observations 2610 2610 2610 Pseudo R2 0.0226 0.0149 0.0135

Panel C: Determinants of main bank type (no owner characteristics) Firm characteristics

Indicator if medium firm 1.030 1.057 0.960 (0.202) (0.449) (�0.339)

Indicator if large firm 0.877 0.851 0.853 (�0.715) (�0.950) (�0.962)

Percent minority owned 1.779*** 1.586*** 1.251 (2.646) (2.822) (1.408)

Indicator if firm is delinquent on payments 0.888 0.990 1.119 (�0.653) (�0.065) (0.722)

Firm risk rating (6 is safest; 1 is riskiest) 1.006 1.057 1.016 (0.123) (1.379) (0.392)

Leverage ratio of firm 0.838 0.864 1.101 (�1.062) (�1.053) (0.689)

Firm age (log years) 1.008 0.999 1.004 (1.260) (�0.122) (0.746)

Indicator if firm declared bankruptcy 0.554 0.693 0.339**

(�1.169) (�0.704) (�2.031)

Market controls Large bank share of offices 1.059***

(11.993) Multimarket share of offices 3.683***

(5.265) Local bank offices per capita 0.060***

(�3.640) Market concentration (HHI) 17.540** 1.601 0.063***

(2.198) (0.497) (�2.783) Branching restriction index 0.999 0.947 1.022

(�0.028) (�1.236) (0.498) Observations 2610 2610 2610

Pseudo R2 0.1300 0.0258 0.0326

Panel D: Determinants of main bank type (additional right hand side controls) Firm characteristics

Indicator if medium firm 0.924 1.079 0.986 (�0.400) (0.522) (�0.098)

Indicator if large firm 0.914 0.905 0.880 (�0.390) (�0.496) (�0.519)

Percent minority owned 1.865** 1.371* 0.854 (2.236) (1.893) (�0.832)

Indicator if firm is delinquent on payments 0.839 0.960 1.173 (�0.845) (�0.240) (0.827)

Firm risk rating (6 is safest; 1 is riskiest) 0.969 1.050 1.003 (�0.503) (1.073) (0.068)

Leverage ratio of firm 0.781 0.871 1.491**

(�1.149) (�0.877) (2.328) Firm age (log years) 1.014* 0.998 1.000

(1.748) (�0.293) (0.013) Indicator if firm declared bankruptcy 0.873 1.152 0.392*

(�0.257) (0.194) (�1.867)

Owner characteristics Indicator if owner is manager 1.204 1.581* 0.630*

(0.668) (1.776) (�1.699) Indicator if family owned 0.828 0.961 0.991

(�0.819) (�0.224) (�0.047) Indicator if partnership 1.295 2.152*** 0.765

(0.643) (2.807) (�0.855) Indicator if corporation 1.217 1.180 0.755*

(0.986) (1.134) (�1.762)

Market controls Large bank share of offices 1.069***

(10.740) Multimarket share of offices 2.073***

(2.650) Local bank offices per capita 0.007***

(�4.902) Market concentration (HHI) 144.435*** 0.472 0.004***

(3.000) (�0.771) (�5.007) Branching restriction index 1.010 0.982 1.078

(0.144) (�0.370) (1.429)

(continued on next page)

A.N. Berger et al. / Journal of Banking & Finance 44 (2014) 264–278 273

Table 2 (continued)

(1) (2) (3) Main bank is large bank Main bank is multimarket bank Main bank is nonlocal bank

Additional right hand side controls Indicator if main bank is large 5.977*** 14.560***

(11.025) (14.318) Indicator if main bank is multimarket 5.451*** 2.725***

(10.155) (6.959) Indicator if main bank is nonlocal 15.674*** 2.192***

(13.570) (5.561) Observations 2610 2610 2610 Pseudo R2 0.436 0.176 0.272

(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) Log of main bank’s total assets

Log of main bank’s total assets

Log of main bank’s total assets

Ordered logit of main bank’s number of markets of operation

Ordered logit of main bank’s number of markets of operation

Ordered logit of main bank’s number of markets of operation

Panel E: Determinants of main bank type (using bank assets instead of large bank dummy and number of markets instead of multimarket dummy) Firm characteristics

Indicator if medium firm

�0.098 �0.157 �0.082 0.996 1.037 1.185

(�0.609) (�1.322) (�0.970) (�0.035) (0.184) (0.714) Indicator if large firm �0.345 �0.221 �0.152 0.812 0.904 1.215

(�1.553) (�1.469) (�1.568) (�1.154) (�0.395) (0.802) Percent minority owned

0.752*** 0.470*** 0.328*** 1.430** 1.093 0.718

(4.085) (3.684) (3.373) (2.211) (0.470) (�1.378) Indicator if firm is delinquent on payments

0.019 �0.011 0.177 0.966 0.759 0.505**

(0.096) (�0.079) (1.548) (�0.216) (�1.133) (�2.108) Firm risk rating (6 is safest; 1 is riskiest)

�0.016 �0.049 �0.015 1.002 0.973 0.960

(�0.311) (�1.376) (�0.579) (0.042) (�0.473) (�0.548) Leverage ratio of firm �0.292 �0.314*** �0.130 0.793* 0.711* 0.894

(�1.613) (�2.633) (�1.516) (�1.654) (�1.781) (�0.446) Firm age (log years) 0.010 0.008** 0.007** 1.004 1.001 0.996

(1.459) (2.001) (2.424) (0.750) (0.136) (�0.467) Indicator if firm declared bankruptcy

�0.208 0.406 �0.356 0.892 6.797* 9.280*

(�0.278) (0.887) (�1.629) (�0.229) (1.933) (1.771)

Owner characteristics Indicator if owner is manager

0.069 0.029 0.203 0.649* 0.541* 0.500*

(0.243) (0.177) (1.549) (�1.710) (�1.939) (�1.824) Indicator if family owned

�0.187 �0.177 �0.119 1.012 1.039 1.590*

(�0.872) (�1.362) (�1.174) (0.071) (0.200) (1.841) Indicator if partnership

0.403 0.083 0.227 0.817 0.592* 0.283***

(1.127) (0.369) (1.333) (�0.727) (�1.706) (�2.771) Indicator if corporation

�0.141 �0.022 0.060 0.896 0.981 1.002

(�0.841) (�0.187) (0.761) (�0.823) (�0.097) (0.007)

Market controls Large bank share of offices

0.069*** 0.046*** 0.032***

(13.747) (12.899) (12.118) Multimarket share of offices

6.054*** 2.235** 2.715**

(7.310) (2.352) (2.313) Market concentration (HHI)

�0.512 1.389* �2.107*** 31.497*** 62.653*** 242.776***

(�0.440) (1.818) (�3.314) (3.181) (3.140) (3.671) Branching restriction index

0.159*** 0.109*** �0.075*** 1.022 1.159** 1.175**

(2.916) (2.798) (�3.077) (0.491) (2.361) (2.433)

Additional right hand side controls Main bank is large bank

38.600***

(12.366) Gross total assets of main bank (log $ thousands)

2.633***

(14.815)

274 A.N. Berger et al. / Journal of Banking & Finance 44 (2014) 264–278

Main bank is multimarket bank

2.523***

(21.784) Number of markets of main bank (log)

1.127***

(50.678) Main bank is nonlocal bank

2.435*** 0.220* 9.409*** 4.986***

(19.596) (1.877) (13.291) (7.221)

Observations 2610 2610 2610 2610 2610 2610 R2 0.144 0.593 0.798 Pseudo R2 0.0461 0.4549 0.6407

Regressions are weighted by survey weights to account for disproportionate sampling and nonresponse, and include a constant term and a set of one-digit SIC indicator variables to control for industry effects (not shown). In Panels A, B, C, and D, we present binomial logit estimates as odds ratios, which are obtained by exponentiating the original logit coefficients. An odds ratio of one would indicate that the regressor has no effect on the probability that the dependent variable takes a value of one. An odds ratio greater/less than one indicates that an increase in the regressor increases/decreases the probability that the dependent variable takes a value of one. The OLS regressions in columns 1–3 of Panel E present OLS estimates as coefficients. The regressions in columns 4–6 are ordered logit models of the main bank’s number of markets of operation using the categories 1, 2–5, 6–20, and over 20 markets. Robust z-statistics of the hypothesis that the odds ratios equal one are given in parentheses in all cases in Panels A, B, C, and D, and in columns 4–6 in Panel E. Robust z-statistics of the hypothesis that the coefficients equal zero are given in parentheses in columns 1–3 of Panel E. * p < 0.1. ** p < 0.05. *** p < 0.01.

Table 3 Determinants of main bank relationship strength.

Main results Megabank dummy replacing main bank type dummies

Log of assets replacing main bank dummy and log of number of markets replacing multimarket dummy

(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) Firm has exclusive relationship

Length of relationship

Firm has exclusive relationship

Length of relationship

Firm has exclusive relationship

Length of relationship

Firm characteristics Indicator if medium firm 0.480*** 0.042 0.482*** 0.046 0.483*** 0.049

(�5.726) (1.012) (�5.677) (1.102) (�5.655) (1.183) Indicator if large firm 0.346*** 0.048 0.347*** 0.050 0.348*** 0.052

(�5.954) (0.815) (�5.929) (0.846) (�5.950) (0.886) Percent minority owned 0.781 �0.029 0.786 �0.020 0.771 �0.041

(�1.549) (�0.671) (�1.517) (�0.460) (�1.627) (�0.945) Indicator if firm is delinquent on payments 0.809 0.016 0.804 0.008 0.806 0.014

(�1.312) (0.283) (�1.357) (0.141) (�1.342) (0.264) Firm risk rating (6 is safest; 1 is riskiest) 0.970 0.050*** 0.970 0.050*** 0.971 0.051***

(�0.737) (3.400) (�0.732) (3.378) (�0.706) (3.469) Leverage ratio of firm 0.371*** �0.058 0.369*** �0.066 0.373*** �0.050

(�6.910) (�1.239) (�6.947) (�1.403) (�6.851) (�1.057) Firm age (log years) 0.998 0.034*** 0.998 0.034*** 0.998 0.034***

(�0.363) (15.397) (�0.368) (15.403) (�0.391) (15.403) Indicator if firm declared bankruptcy 1.274 0.249 1.275 0.249 1.261 0.226

(0.460) (1.344) (0.462) (1.367) (0.437) (1.206)

Owner characteristics Indicator if owner is manager 0.885 0.059 0.889 0.068 0.884 0.061

(�0.560) (0.961) (�0.540) (1.085) (�0.565) (0.989) Indicator if family owned 0.796 0.089* 0.797 0.090* 0.800 0.095*

(�1.309) (1.697) (�1.304) (1.685) (�1.282) (1.801) Indicator if partnership 1.721* �0.082 1.722* �0.075 1.717* �0.082

(1.754) (�0.843) (1.759) (�0.766) (1.754) (�0.841) Indicator if corporation 1.296** �0.063 1.297** �0.061 1.300** �0.061

(1.968) (�1.462) (1.973) (�1.402) (1.989) (�1.414)

Main bank characteristics Indicator if main bank is large 1.149 0.158***

(0.804) (2.793) Indicator if main bank is multimarket 1.070 0.090**

(0.498) (2.050) Indicator if main bank is nonlocal 0.993 �0.042 0.965 �0.099**

(�0.048) (�0.932) (�0.228) (�2.050) Indicator if main bank is megabank 1.120 0.090**

(0.879) (2.189) Gross total assets of main bank (log $

thousands) 1.046 0.040***

(0.994) (2.794) Number of markets of main bank (log) 0.989 0.013

(�0.167) (0.652) Equity to asset ratio of main bank 0.003** 0.622 0.002** 0.338 0.006* 1.161*

(�2.200) (1.022) (�2.325) (0.556) (�1.916) (1.784)

(continued on next page)

A.N. Berger et al. / Journal of Banking & Finance 44 (2014) 264–278 275

Table 3 (continued)

Main results Megabank dummy replacing main bank type dummies

Log of assets replacing main bank dummy and log of number of markets replacing multimarket dummy

(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) Firm has exclusive relationship

Length of relationship

Firm has exclusive relationship

Length of relationship

Firm has exclusive relationship

Length of relationship

NPL ratio of main bank 0.034 �3.329 0.037 �3.224 0.022 �4.030 (�0.632) (�1.064) (�0.613) (�0.997) (�0.714) (�1.319)

Illiquidity of main bank 0.586 �0.113 0.600 �0.079 0.586 �0.114 (�1.404) (�0.872) (�1.354) (�0.609) (�1.425) (�0.885)

Fee income from deposits divided by total revenue of main bank

1.844 0.282 1.855 0.338 1.625 �0.051 (0.375) (0.515) (0.383) (0.641) (0.286) (�0.091)

Z-score of main bank 0.996** �0.000 0.996** �0.000 0.997* 0.000 (�2.061) (�0.257) (�2.044) (�0.346) (�1.906) (0.268)

Market controls Large bank share of offices 1.006 �0.002* 1.007* �0.001 1.005 �0.003**

(1.417) (�1.739) (1.806) (�0.640) (1.241) (�2.183) Multimarket share of offices 0.815 �0.108 0.790 �0.140 0.819 �0.112

(�0.792) (�1.207) (�0.908) (�1.562) (�0.771) (�1.247) Local bank offices per capita 0.590 �0.100 0.621 �0.036 0.593 �0.099

(�1.291) (�0.799) (�1.195) (�0.291) (�1.326) (�0.849) Market concentration (HHI) 0.678 0.200 0.740 0.300 0.722 0.214

(�0.357) (0.659) (�0.276) (0.976) (�0.293) (0.700) Branching restriction index 1.171*** 0.010 1.169*** 0.009 1.166*** 0.003

(3.501) (0.706) (3.466) (0.581) (3.393) (0.230)

Observations 2583 2583 2583 2583 2583 2583 R2 0.263 0.257 0.269 Pseudo R2 0.0743 0.0740 0.0746

The regressions in columns 1–2 are our main results for relationship strength; the regressions in columns 3–4 replace the three dummies for main bank type with a megabank dummy, which equals one if the main bank is large, multimarket, and nonlocal, and zero otherwise; and the regressions in columns 5–6 use the log of the main bank’s assets in place of the main bank large dummy and log of the main bank’s markets of operation in place of the main bank multimarket dummy. Regressions are weighted by survey weights to account for disproportionate sampling and nonresponse, and include constant term and a set of one-digit SIC indicator variables to control for industry effects (not shown). We present estimates of the logit specification in columns 1, 3 and 5 as odds ratios, which are obtained by exponentiating the original logit coefficients. An odds ratio of one would indicate that the regressor has no effect on the probability that the dependent variable takes a value of one. An odds ratio greater/less than one indicates that an increase in the regressor increases/decreases the probability that the dependent variable takes a value of one. We present estimates of the OLS specification in columns 2, 4 and 6 as coefficients. Robust z-statistics of the hypothesis that odds ratio equal one (columns 1, 3 and 5) or coefficients equal zero (columns 2, 4 and 6) are given in parentheses. * p < 0.1. ** p < 0.05. *** p < 0.01.

276 A.N. Berger et al. / Journal of Banking & Finance 44 (2014) 264–278

5.2. Determinants of relationship strength

Table 3 reports the results of our second set of regressions, which tests the effects of firm size, age, and ‘‘importance’’ of the principal owner, as well as the main bank type and financial fragility, on the strength of the main relationship. The main results are in columns 1–2. Column 1 reports the results of Eq. (2) estimated as a logit model using the exclusive relationship indicator as the endogenous variable, while column 2 reports the results of Eq. (2), estimated as an OLS model with robust standard errors and using the log of one plus the length of the relationship with the main bank as the endogenous variable. Col- umns 3–4 repeat these regressions using the megabank dummy on the right-hand-side in place of the our three main bank dum- mies. Columns 5–6 use the log of main bank gross total assets in place of the large main bank dummy and the log of the number of markets of the main bank in place of the multimarket main bank dummy.

We see in column 1 using the exclusive relationship dummy that the odds ratios for the medium and large firm indicators are below one and statistically significant, that is, these firms are less likely than small firms to have exclusive relationships with their main banks. This could indicate that small firms have stronger rela- tionships with their main banks. This is consistent with the predic- tions of the conventional paradigm, or it could reflect the fact that larger firms demand a larger array of financial services over a

greater geographic area, which may require multiple banks. We turn to the regression results for relationship length below to determine which of these explanations is more likely. Notably, the odds ratios on partnership and corporation are statistically sig- nificantly greater than one, indicating that proprietorships (in which the owner’s and firm’s finances are intertwined) are less likely to have exclusive relationships. This is inconsistent with the conventional paradigm in which more ‘‘important’’ principal owners are likely to have stronger relationships. The odds ratios on whether the main bank is large, multimarket, or nonlocal are all insignificantly different from one – inconsistent with the con- ventional paradigm, which would predict stronger relationships with ‘‘community banks.’’ The odds ratios on the equity to asset ratio and the Z-score of the main bank are statistically significantly less than one (although the Z-score is economically close to one), suggesting that firms with riskier main banks are more likely to have exclusive relationships, which runs counter to the prediction that firms choose multiple banks to avoid the risk of a fragile main bank.

The OLS regression in column 2 using the log of one plus the length of the relationship shows that small firms are no more likely than medium or large firms to have a longer relationship with their banks, inconsistent with the predictions of the conventional para- digm (recall that these are OLS coefficients that are tested against the null of zero). The estimated coefficients on the age and riski- ness of the firms indicate that older and safer firms are more likely

A.N. Berger et al. / Journal of Banking & Finance 44 (2014) 264–278 277

to have longer relationships with their banks. The age coefficient may reflect a mechanical association, given that older firms have more years available to have longer relationships, while the risk coefficient may suggest that banks prefer to keep relationships with safer firms. Finally, firms whose main bank is large or multi- market tend to have longer relationship with their banks, contrary to the predictions of the conventional paradigm.17

The regressions in columns 3–4 using the megabank dummy in place of the three indicator dummies are almost identical to those in columns 1–2. The same key variables are statistically significant and the megabank dummy has a positive, statisti- cally significant coefficient in column 4, consistent with the positive coefficients on the large and multimarket dummies in column 2.

The regressions in columns 5–6 with continuous indicators of main bank asset size and number of markets are virtually identical with the main results in columns 1–2, except that in column 6, the nonlocal coefficient is negative and statistically significant, consis- tent with the expectation that relationships with nonlocal banks are shorter.

18 To further address this issue, we tried to apply our analysis to the 1993 SSBF survey to compare to our main results, since 1993 was before the widespread use of small business credit scoring (the first FICO model for small business credit scoring was made available in 1995) and the passage of IBBEA in 1994 (which allowed large, multimarket and nonlocal banks to integrate offices across state lines). However, the quality of the data prevented us from doing so. In early survey years, a large number of firms were not matched or improperly matched to their main financial institutions.

6. Conclusions

Bank researchers have traditionally argued that ‘‘community banks’’ – institutions that are small and operate locally in a single market – tend to have the strongest relationships with the small- est, most informationally opaque small businesses. The argument frequently cited is that community bankers are superior at pro- cessing ‘‘soft’’ qualitative information about their customers and local communities that is difficult to quantify and transmit over distances and through the communication channels of other banks. ‘‘Megabanks’’ – institutions that are large, multimarket, and pro- vide services from outside the local market – in contrast are better at serving larger, more transparent firms using ‘‘hard’’ quantitative information and that may be more easily communicated within these organizations. There are reasons to believe that this conven- tional paradigm may have lost hold to some degree over time as technological progress and deregulation have made it easier for megabanks to serve small, opaque firms.

Some of the recent literature has challenged the conventional paradigm, finding that large banks do lend to small, opaque firms using hard-information technologies such as small business credit scoring and fixed-asset technologies. However, the literature has not to date spent much effort testing other predictions of the con- ventional paradigm regarding which type of bank serves as a small business’ ‘‘main’’ relationship bank and the strength of the main bank relationship.

In this paper, we test some of these predictions using data from the 2003 SSBF. Specifically, we conduct two sets of tests. First, we test for the type of bank serving as the ‘‘main’’ relationship bank. We find that opaque small businesses are not more likely to have a community bank as their main bank. Second, we test for the strength of these main relationships by examining the probability of multiple relationships and length of the relationship as func- tions of main bank type and financial fragility, as well as firm and owner characteristics. We find mixed evidence on whether opaque small businesses have stronger relationships with their

17 The coefficient on family owned is positive, consistent with the prediction of the conventional paradigm that more ‘‘important’’ owners are likely to have stronger relationships with their main bank, but the coefficient is relatively small and statistically significant only at the 10% level.

main banks, but the evidence is clearer that strength does not depend on the type of bank.18

Acknowledgements

The authors thank an anonymous referee, Rebel Cole, Bob DeYoung, Leora Klapper, Sole Martinez Peria, Paula Tkac, and par- ticipants in the Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta conference on Small Business, Entrepreneurship and Economic Recovery and the CEPR/ECB/Kelley School of Business/Review of Finance Confer- ence on Small Business Financing for helpful comments and sug- gestions and Michael Carlson, Michael Donnelly, Michael Levere, and Raluca Roman for valuable research assistance.

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  • Do small businesses still prefer community banks?
    • 1 Introduction
    • 2 Brief review of the relationship strength literature and associated issues
      • 2.1 Relationship strength
      • 2.2 Benefits from strong relationships
      • 2.3 Costs to strong relationships that may result in multiple banking
      • 2.4 Strong relationships and bank consolidation issues
    • 3 Data and summary statistics
    • 4 Empirical methodology
      • 4.1 Determinants of main bank type
      • 4.2 Determinants of relationship strength
    • 5 Empirical results
      • 5.1 Determinants of main bank type
      • 5.2 Determinants of relationship strength
    • 6 Conclusions
    • Acknowledgements
    • References

Is-the-investment-factor-a-proxy-for-time-varying-invest_2014_Journal-of-Ban.pdf

Journal of Banking & Finance 44 (2014) 219–232

Contents lists available at ScienceDirect

Journal of Banking & Finance

journal homepage: www.elsevier .com/locate / jbf

Is the investment factor a proxy for time-varying investment opportunities? The US and international evidence

http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jbankfin.2014.04.016 0378-4266/� 2014 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

⇑ Corresponding author at: Department of Finance, College of Business, Univer- sity of Texas at San Antonio, San Antonio, TX 78249, United States. Tel.: +1 979 845 4440; fax: +1 979 845 6636.

E-mail addresses: [email protected] (L. Huang), [email protected] (Z. Wang).

1 A partial list of recent contributions includes Anderson and Garcia-Feijoo (2006), Xing (2008), Cooper et al., 2008, Watanabe et al. (2013), and Titman et al. (2013).

2 Other recent contributions include Gomes et al. (2003); Fama and Frenc Anderson and Garcia-Feijoo (2006); Xing (2008); Belo and Lin (2012); Lin an (2013); Watanabe et al. (2013).

3 In an interesting study, Li et al. (2006) also show that sector-specific in growth rates can explain the cross-section of equity returns.

Lin Huang a, Zijun Wang b,⇑ a The Research Institute of Economics and Management, Southwestern University of Finance and Economics Chengdu, Sichuan 610074, PR China b Department of Finance, College of Business, University of Texas at San Antonio, San Antonio, TX 78249, United States

a r t i c l e i n f o

Article history: Received 27 July 2012 Accepted 15 April 2014 Available online 21 March 2014

JEL classification: G1

Keywords: Investment factor ICAPM Investment opportunities GARCH MIDAS

a b s t r a c t

Motivated from Fama’s (1991) conjecture of an explicit link between the cross-sectional and time-series stock return predictability, we investigate whether the investment factor constructed from the cross- section of stocks also has time-series predictive power for stock returns within Merton’s (1973) ICAPM framework. The evidence from both US and other G-7 countries (except Japan) suggests that the investment factor is a proxy for time-varying investment opportunities. We also find that the risk-return relation is positive and statistically significant after controlling for the covariance between the market factor and the investment factor.

� 2014 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

1. Introduction

Empirical studies have widely documented a significant nega- tive cross-sectional correlation between investment (or asset growth) and future stock returns in both US and many other mar- kets.1 However, researchers disagree on how to explain the invest- ment effect. Many cite this as evidence of market inefficiency and propose several mispricing-based explanations. For example, Stein (1996), Baker and Wurgler (2002), and Baker et al. (2003) all present models in which managers are timing the market and invest when their stocks are overpriced. Therefore, the subsequent negative returns reflect a correction for the overpricing of the stocks. Titman et al. (2004) interpret the negative investment-return rela- tion as being indicative of investors’ slow reaction to overinvestment by empire building managers. Cooper et al. (2008) argue that inves- tors overact to asset growth and a negative abnormal return follows as a result of a correction for the overreaction. Lipson et al. (2011)

show that the return effect is concentrated around earnings announcements because analyst forecasts are systematically higher than realized earnings for faster growing firms.

Alternative explanations of the investment-return relation have focused on rational asset pricing, and a growing number of studies provide empirical evidence consistent with a rational investment effect. In the real options models presented by Berk et al. (1999) and Carlson et al. (2004, 2006), firms undertaking investment pro- jects experience a fall in their systematic risk and expected returns. Cochrane (1991, 1996), Lyandres et al. (2008), Li et al. (2008) and Liu et al. (2009) argue that higher investments are often associated with lower discount rates and hence lower expected returns.2

Building on standard Q-theory, a set of recent papers augment the capital asset pricing model (CAPM) with an investment factor, the return on a portfolio that is long on low-investment stocks and short on high-investment stocks, to explain the cross-section of average returns. The evidence shows that such an investment model helps explain the value effect (Xing, 2008), the new issues puzzle (Lyandres et al., 2008), and the accrual anomaly (Wu et al., 2010).3

h (2006); d Zhang

vestment

220 L. Huang, Z. Wang / Journal of Banking & Finance 44 (2014) 219–232

Chen et al. (2011) find that their alternative three-factor model that includes the market factor, the investment factor, and a return-on- equity factor helps understand many CAPM-related anomalies.

Nevertheless, most of these authors stop short of explicitly invoking the risk interpretation for the investment effect, probably because of the Q-theory’s partial equilibrium nature. In essence, the debate about the properties of the investment effect and other accounting return anomalies is about distinguishing (1) the covari- ance between stock returns and a given attribute from (2) the returns attributable to the characteristic. And as Richardson et al. (2010) write concisely: ‘‘Finding evidence in support of (1) is con- sistent with a risk based explanation for the return relation, whereas finding (2) would suggest mispricing’’ (p. 430). Empiri- cally distinguishing between these two competing hypotheses has proven to be a challenging task because characteristics are associated with covariation in returns. Recently, there are two important studies that follow this insight and directly test the risk-based explanation against the (behavioral) mispricing expla- nation for the investment effect.4 By applying Daniel and Titman’s (1997) methodology, Hirshleifer et al. (2012) identify variation in their accrual-related factor loadings that is independent of the accrual characteristic and test whether this independent variation in factor loadings is associated with spreads in average returns. Their findings oppose the hypothesis that the accrual anomaly represents a premium for bearing risk within a standard factor pricing model and support the behavioral mispricing explanation of the anomaly. Prombutr et al. (2012) attain similar results by also applying Daniel and Titman’s (1997) method to study the investment growth anomaly. However, they show that the anomaly can be explained by a conditional Fama–French three-factor model that allows factor loadings to be time-varying and further linked to firm-level charac- teristics and the business cycle.

This paper extends Prombutr et al. (2012) and complements their work by directly modeling time-varying covariance risk as following a bivariate generalized autoregressive conditional heter- oskedasticity (GARCH) process. More specifically, motivated by Fama’s (1991) conjecture of an explicit link between the cross-sec- tional and time-series stock return predictability, we investigate in this paper whether return covariance with the investment factor constructed from the cross-section of stocks also has time-series predictive power for stock returns within Merton’s (1973) inter- temporal CAPM (ICAPM) framework. The premise here is that if the investment effect shows both cross-sectional and time-series predictive power for stock returns, it is more likely to be a reliable proxy for time-varying investment opportunities, rather than a result of spurious regressions or data mining.5 This will provide additional evidence consistent with risk-based explanations of the investment effect.

Our model can be summarized as follows. If the investment fac- tor is a proxy for time-varying investment opportunities, Merton’s (1973) ICAPM implies that the conditional excess stock market return, Et(MKTt+1), is determined by its conditional variance, r2M;t , and its conditional covariance with the investment factor (IA), rMI,t:

EtðMKTtþ1Þ ¼ cMr2M;t þ cIrMI;t ; ð1aÞ

where cM can be understood as the coefficient of relative risk aver- sion and should be positive. The coefficient cI is equal to �JWI/JW, where J(Wt, IAt) is the indirect utility function of the representative

4 Cooper and Priestley (2011) and Wang (2013) use a different approach. Briefly, by showing that the investment factor forecasts aggregate economic activities and moves closely with variables that describe investment opportunities, they conclude that risk plays an important role in explaining the investment effect.

5 See Daniel and Titman (2006), Lewellen et al. (2010), Nagel and Singleton (2011) for skepticism on test power in the cross-sectional asset pricing literature.

agent with subscripts W and WI denoting the first- and second- order (partial) derivatives, Wt is the agent’s wealth at time t. If IA proxies for investment opportunities and is a priced risk factor, then cI should also be positive. The ICAPM also implies that conditional investment factor return, Et(IAt+1), is determined by its conditional variance, r2I;t , and its conditional covariance with the market factor MKT, rMI,t:

EtðIAtþ1Þ ¼ cMrMI;t þ cIr2I;t : ð1bÞ

For our benchmark analysis, we follow the lead of Scruggs (1998), Scruggs and Glabadanidis (2003) and Guo et al. (2009) and jointly estimate the ICAPM (1a) and (1b) as a parsimonious bivariate GARCH-in-mean model.6 Note that Merton’s (1973) theoretical model is silent about the identities of the underlying state variables that can proxy for investment opportunities. Nor does it specify the number of such variables. As robustness checks, we extend the basic model in two ways. We first include a macro variable that tracks business cycles as a predictive variable in both (1a) and (1b). The inclusion of such a state variable will directly affect the estimation of risk premiums associated with the three (co-)variance terms. It is also likely to have an impact on the estimation of the covariances themselves because they are iteratively estimated within the model. This latter flexibility allows us to model covariances as both time- varying and potentially varying with business conditions (such as in Prombutr et al. (2012). Our second modification to the model (1) is to consider a three-factor ICAPM that also includes the value factor or the return-on-equity factor in addition to the two factors MKT and IA.

It is well known that consistent and efficient estimation of model (1) and study of the risk-return tradeoff critically depend on the estimates of the unobservable conditional market variance r2M;t , and conditional covariance rMI,t. However, empirical research- ers have often found that the estimation of high-dimension GARCH-in-mean models is difficult. This underlies our choice of the simple two-factor model as the benchmark as in Scruggs (1998), Scruggs and Glabadanidis (2003) and Guo et al. (2009). As a robustness check on our benchmark GARCH estimates, we extend Ghysels et al.’s (2005) mixed data sampling (MIDAS) method of estimating conditional variance from univariate to multivariate settings. We also use the new method to estimate more parameterized ICAPM specifications.7

Our main findings can be summarized as follows. First, both risk price estimates, cM and cI, are positive, statistically significant, and fall in reasonable ranges. This central finding remains robust to dif- ferent data frequencies, alternative estimates of the investment/ asset growth effect, different methods of estimating conditional variances, different sizes of stocks, and whether or not the return-on-equity factor is included in the model. We also find that if the investment factor IA is omitted from Eq. (1a) (i.e., cI = 0), the risk price estimate for the market factor cM becomes smaller because the investment factor and the market factor are negatively correlated. One interpretation of this result is that the stock market might act as a hedge against changes in investment opportunities.

Quantitatively, the benchmark model estimates for risk prices associated with the market and the investment factors are 4.32 and 13.47, respectively. The sample average market factor pre- mium is 0.98% on a monthly basis. The investment factor com- mands a negative premium of 0.43%, which is both statistically

6 In estimating ICAPM models similar to Eqs. (1a) and (1b), Scruggs, 1998; Scruggs and Glabadanidis, 2003; Guo et al., 2009 use the long-term interest rate and the value premium as proxies for investment opportunities, respectively.

7 An alternative method to reduce dimensionality in estimating multivariate GARCH models is to specify the conditional covariance matrix to be a vector diagonal model (e.g., Abhakorn et al., 2013).

L. Huang, Z. Wang / Journal of Banking & Finance 44 (2014) 219–232 221

and economically significant. The total risk premium is estimated to be 0.55%, comparable to the realized excess market returns.

Second, we document a new finding on a significantly positive relation between the expected investment factor return and its conditional variance in Eq. (1b), which also controls for its covari- ance with stock market returns. Because of the strongly countercy- clical movement in the conditional variance of IA (r2I;t), this positive relation generates a strongly cyclical investment effect. The investment factor return tends to be high during business recessions and low during business expansions. Therefore, low- investment stocks are riskier than high-investment stocks during economic downturns when the price of risk is high, a result consis- tent with the risk-based interpretations for the investment effect as cited in Footnote 2.8

Third, in two-factor ICAPMs that also control for market condi- tions, we find that the covariance between the investment factor and the market factor contains information similar to three popular predictive variables of stock returns: dividend yield, the default pre- mium and, to a lesser extent, the term premium. These economically motivated conditioning variables of stock returns are often consid- ered proxies for time-varying investment opportunities. For exam- ple, adding to existing portfolio-level evidence, Boons (2012) shows that both default spread and term spread are priced at the individual stock level. Similarly, when the investment factor IA and the value factor HML are modeled together in a three-factor ICAPM that also includes the market factor, risk price estimates for both IA and HML are smaller than their counterparts in models where they are modeled separately, suggesting a close relationship between the two factors. The impact is more significant on HML.

Finally, like many other studies on the investment effect, we concentrate on the US market. To mitigate the concerns of data mining and low power of time series tests, we follow Fama and French’s (1998) investigation of the value premium for major inter- national equity markets and conduct similar analysis on the mar- kets of Group of Seven (G-7) countries (Cooper and Priestley, 2011; Prombutr et al., 2012 study US data only). We find that the investment effect is pervasive in all major developed markets except Japan. IA also appears to be correlated among the markets. Although generally weaker, the results from the two-factor ICAPM regressions for the other G-7 countries are mostly in line with those of the US in that the investment factor is a proxy for invest- ment opportunities.

The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. We describe research methodology and the data in Sections 2 and 3, respec- tively. We present the empirical results of the US market in Sec- tion 4, and the international evidence in Section 5. Section 6 discusses and summarizes the main findings.

2. Research methodology

In this section, we first introduce the empirical specification of the theoretical ICAPM model. We then briefly describe the two methods we use to estimate the conditional variance and covari- ance: generalized autoregressive conditional heteroskedasticity (GARCH) regressions, and the mixed data sampling (MIDAS) estimator.

By rewriting Eqs. (1a) and (1b) in the realized return form, add- ing error terms and allowing the risk prices to vary across the two

8 This result also comes as no surprise. As shown in Zhang (2005b) and Xing (2008), there is a close relationship between the investment factor and the value factor; And previous studies have found that value stocks tend to be much riskier than growth stocks during economic downturns (Jagannathan and Wang, 1996; Lettau and Ludvigson, 2001b; Zhang, 2005a; Petkova and Zhang, 2005). Nevertheless, it is worth pointing out that Japan has a strong value effect (Daniel et al., 2001) but has no significant investment effect as we show later.

portfolios, we start with the following unrestricted two-factor ICAPM specification:

MKTtþ1 ¼ aM þ cMMr2M;t þ cMIrMI;t þ eM;tþ1; IAtþ1 ¼ aI þ cIMrMI;t þ cIIr2I;t þ eI;tþ1;

ð2Þ

where r2M;t and r2I;t are conditional variances of the market factor MKT and the investment factor IA, rMI,t is the conditional covariance between the two factors, and eM,t+1 and eI,t+1 are shocks to MKT and IA returns, respectively. Furthermore, eM,t+1 and eI,t+1 follow a bivar- iate normal distribution, (eM,t+1,eI,t+1)0 � N(0, Ht+1). Under the ICAPM of Merton (1973), we have parameter restrictions aM = aI = 0, cMM = cIM = cM, and cMI = cII = cI, which result in the following restricted model:

MKTtþ1 ¼ cMr2M;t þ cIrMI;t þ eM;tþ1; IAtþ1 ¼ cMrMI;t þ cIr2I;t þ eI;tþ1:

ð3Þ

The first set of restrictions simply mean that if the empirical model is correctly specified and there are no omitted factors, then the portfolio returns should not contain predictable components other than those associated with the market and the investment factors. The zero intercept restriction is also a requirement for portfolios to be mean–variance efficient. Two sets of cross-equation restric- tions have an intuitive economic interpretation that the (unit) price for a fundamental risk is unique in a complete market under equi- librium. Expected returns to portfolios vary only because different portfolios have different exposures to the risks, as measured here in Model (3) by their return covariances with the two factors.

With ICAPM model (2) or its restricted version (3) as two mean equations, we estimate a bivariate GARCH-in-mean model, where the second moments are specified as in the asymmetric version of the BEKK model proposed by Engle and Kroner (1995) (ABEKK). In the ABEKK model, the dynamics of variance and covariance are governed by the following equation:

rij;t ¼ xij þ b0iHt�1bj þ a0i eM;t�1 eI;t�1

� � eM;t�1 eI;t�1½ �aj

þ g0i gM;t�1 gI;t�1

" # gM;t�1 gI;t�1 � �

gj; i; j 2 ðM; IÞ; ð4Þ

where r2M;t ¼ rMM;t , r2I;t ¼ rII;t , and Ht is the conditional variance– covariance matrix:

Ht ¼ hMM;t hMI;t hMI;t hII;t

� � ¼

r2M;t rMI;t rMI;t r2I;t

" # : ð5Þ

To allow for the possibility that a negative return shock leads to a higher subsequent volatility than does a positive return shock of

the same magnitude, the term gM;t gH;t

� � ¼ max½0;�eM;t�max½0;�eH;t�

� � is included

in Eq. (4) to capture the asymmetric effect. The parameters in Eq. (4) can be written in the following matrix forms:

W ¼ fxM;xIg ¼ xMM xMI xMI xII

� � ; A ¼ faM; aIg ¼

aMM aMI aIM aII

� � ;

B ¼ fbM; bIg ¼ bMM bMI bMI bII

� � ; G ¼ fgM ; gIg ¼

gMM gMI gIM gII

� � ;

ð6Þ

Our notations in Eq. (6) reflect the fact that matrices W and B are symmetric but matrices A and G are not.

Given a sample of T observations, the parameters of the two- factor ICAPM-GARCH model (2)–(6) are estimated by maximizing the conditional log-likelihood function:

L ¼ XT t¼1

ltðhÞ ¼ XT t¼1

�1 2

n logð2pÞ � 1 2

log jHt j � 1 2 e0tH

�1 t et

� � ; ð7Þ

222 L. Huang, Z. Wang / Journal of Banking & Finance 44 (2014) 219–232

where n = 2 is the dimension of the bivariate GARCH model and h denotes the vector of all the parameters to be estimated.

The simplest way employed in the literature to estimate condi- tional second moments is to use the sum of the squared daily returns of asset i in the past three months (t, (t � 1) and (t � 2)) for variance r2i;t , and the sum of the cross-product of daily returns of asset i and j for covariance rij,t. This method is consistent but inefficient. An alternative realized variance estimator is Ghysels et al.’s (2005, 2006) mixed data sampling (MIDAS) estimator. Instead of assigning equal weights to all historical daily returns, MIDAS estimates conditional variance as the weighted average of the past returns. This univariate MIDAS estimator of conditional variance has been applied in several recent papers (e.g., Baele et al., 2010; Yu and Yuan, 2011; González et al., 2012). Following (Ghysels et al., 2005), we parameterize the weight given to squared return on day (t � d) with a flexible exponential function as

wdðj1;j2Þ ¼ expðj1dþ j2d2ÞPD i¼0 expðj1iþ j2i

2Þ ; ð8Þ

where j1 and j2 are two polynomial coefficients, and D is the max- imum lag length (we set D = 252, approximately the number of trading days in one year). The MIDAS estimator of conditional covariance between portfolios i and j is then

rij;t ¼ 22 XD d¼0

wdðj1;j2Þri;t�drj;t�d; i – j: ð9Þ

where ri,t�d and rj,t�d are the daily (excess) portfolio returns of port- folios i and j on day (t � d) of month t.

As before, we assume that the market and the investment factor returns follow a bivariate normal distribution, and jointly estimate the mean Eq. (2) (or (3)) and the conditional variance Eqs. (8) and (9) using the quasi-maximum likelihood method.

3. Data

Researchers have proposed various measures to capture the investment effect (or the investment growth effect and the (total) asset growth effect) (see Lipson et al., 2011 for a summary discus- sion on the matter). Here, closely following (Chen et al., 2011), we construct an investment factor that explicitly controls for the firm size effect and the return-on-equity effect because these latter two effects are likely to be intertwined with the investment effect in the data.9 We consider two main samples which use data on stocks traded in the US market and those in the other G-7 countries, respectively.

3.1. The US sample

To construct US sample, we rank all NYSE, Amex, and NASDAQ non-financial stocks as small, medium, and large using the median NYSE market equity computed as stock prices times shares out- standing from CRSP monthly master files. We define the invest- ment-to-assets ratio (I/A) as the annual change in gross property, plant, and equipment plus the annual change in inventories divided by the one-year lagged book value of assets. The measure of return-on-equity (R/E) is computed as the ratio of income before extraordinary items over one-quarter-lagged book equity.10 To control for the firm size effect and the return-on-equity effect, we

9 Nevertheless, as shown later in the paper, the intertemporal pricing role of the investment factor does not hinge on how the factor is measured.

10 See Chen et al. (2011) for a detailed description of measuring book equity using various items available in Compustat quarterly data files. We also strictly follow their choice of the other accounting variables. See the original paper for a discussion of these variables.

divide all stocks into 27 portfolios based on three independent sorts on size, the I/A ratio, and R/E, using the breakpoints for the low 30%, medium 40% and high 30% of the respective ranked values. We then measure the monthly and daily investment factor (IA) as the difference between the simple average returns of the nine low-I/A portfolios and the simple average returns of the nine high-I/A portfolios. The return-on-equity factor (ROE) is the differ- ence between the simple average returns of the nine high-R/E portfolios and the simple average returns of the nine low-R/E portfolios.

The US sample extends from January 1972 until December 2010, for a total of 468 observations. This period is considered because accounting data coverage is more balanced for both large- and small-cap stocks since the 1970s. We downloaded monthly and daily data on excess market returns (MKT), risk-free rates, and the value factor (HML) from Kenneth French’s website.

In investigating the robustness of results from the benchmark analysis, we also consider the impact of including in the ICAPM model some common macro variables that track business condi- tions. These seven variables are dividend yield (DY), the stochas- tically detrended risk-free rate (RREL), default premium (DEF), term premium (TERM), a measure of stock marketwide liquidity (LIQD) of Pástor and Stambaugh (2003), average idiosyncratic vol- atility (IVOL), and the consumption-wealth ratio (CAY) of Lettau and Ludvigson (2001a). We derive the monthly market average idiosyncratic volatility (IVOL) as the value-weighted average of sums of daily squared idiosyncratic shocks to excess returns on each stock included in the CRSP data. The daily idiosyncratic shocks for a stock are the residuals from the regression of its excess returns on Fama–French three factors on a monthly basis. Because CAY is available on a quarterly basis, we follow Duffee (2005) and use its quarter (t � 1) value for the first two months of quarter t. The effective sample period is January 1972–August 2010 for CAY and January 1972–December 2010 for the other six variables.

Table 1 provides descriptive statistics of the market factor MKT (i.e., excess returns on the market portfolio) and the investment fac- tor IA in the US market. Also included are the descriptive statistics of the return-on-equity factor ROE, the value premium HML, and the seven state variables. The average return of the investment factor IA is 0.49% per month, which is slightly higher than MKT (0.46%). The positive investment factor has a straightforward economic interpretation. As shown by Zhang (2005b) and Chen et al. (2011), the Q-explanations of various return anomalies are based on firms’ standard optimality conditions for value-maximization. Intuitively, given profitability, firms invest more when the cost of capital is low. Therefore, investment should be negatively correlated with expected returns and the low-minus-high investment strategy should earn positive average returns. Similarly, controlling for investment, profitability should be positively correlated with expected returns. This explains why a positive return is also expected from the return-on-equity factor that we use in Section 4.5 when we estimate an augmented three-factor ICAPM model.

IA shows quantitatively small but statistically significant posi- tive first-order serial correlation. In addition, the serial correlation in IA is only –0.048 but remains statistically significant 12 months apart. Panel C of Table 1 presents unconditional variance and covariance estimates for MKT and IA. MKT is more volatile than IA which is also clear in Fig. 1. And the two are negatively corre- lated with a coefficient of �0.32 (Panel B).

3.2. The G-7 samples

Our international data on stock and accounting variables are obtained from Thomson-Reuters Datastream and Worldscope for the G-7 countries, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the UK

Table 1 Summary statistics of the US data.

Mean Standard deviation Skewness Kurtosis AR(1) Ljung-Box statistics

Q(1) Q(3) Q(12)

Panel A. Summary statistics MKT 0.464 4.678 �0.576 5.049 0.086 3.468 4.970 10.70 IA 0.494 2.109 0.504 4.676 0.115 6.225 7.676 32.822 ROE 0.694 3.492 �0.344 8.121 0.155 3.468 4.970 10.702 HML 0.426 3.092 �0.034 5.232 0.145 6.225 7.670 32.822 DY 0.007 0.003 0.256 1.946 0.992 11.278 11.391 27.597 RREL �0.000 0.001 �0.014 5.356 0.770 9.885 11.092 17.176 DEF 0.011 0.005 1.670 6.305 0.965 >100 >100 >100 TERM 0.017 0.013 �0.550 2.725 0.953 >100 >100 >100 LIQD �0.032 0.065 �1.562 9.519 0.098 4.527 48.451 97.460 IVOL 3.250 4.083 0.870 2.253 �0.633 >100 >100 >100 CAY 0.001 0.017 0.038 2.269 0.968 >100 >100 >100

IA ROE HML DY RREL DEF TERM LIQD IVOL CAY

Panel B. Correlation MKT �0.32 �0.26 �0.33 �0.07 �0.12 0.04 0.09 0.29 0.01 0.09 IA 0.23 0.54 0.02 0.01 �0.02 �0.01 �0.06 �0.02 0.04 ROE 0.13 0.04 �0.01 �0.05 �0.06 �0.04 �0.09 0.01 HML 0.01 0.09 �0.05 0.00 �0.06 0.05 �0.08 DY 0.05 0.50 �0.06 �0.06 �0.02 0.12 RREL �0.32 �0.54 �0.07 �0.02 �0.13 DEF 0.18 �0.10 �0.04 �0.07 TERM 0.14 0.01 0.28 LIQD 0.03 0.17 IVOL �0.03

r2M rMI r2I

Panel C. Unconditional variances and covariance estimates 21.883 3.143 4.448

�r2M �rMI �r2I

Panel D. Mean of conditional variances and covariance estimates 22.771 3.180 4.354

The table reports summary statistics of the monthly excess stock market returns MKT, the investment factor IA, the return on equity factor ROE, the value premium (HML), dividend yield (DY), the stochastically detrended risk-free rate (RREL), the default premium (DEF), the term premium (TERM), a measure of stock marketwide liquidity (LIQD), average idiosyncratic volatility (IVOL), and the consumption-wealth ratio (CAY). The sample spans the period January 1972 to December 2010 except for CAY which is available through August 2010. Panel D reports the means of time-varying conditional variances and covariance estimates, which are based on parameter estimates of the benchmark two-factor ICAPM- GARCH model reported in Table 4. Subscripts M and I stands for MKT and IA, respectively. Q(p) is the Ljung-Box Q-statistic for the null hypothesis that there is no autocorrelation up to order p. Q(p) follows a v2 distribution with p degrees of freedom.

L. Huang, Z. Wang / Journal of Banking & Finance 44 (2014) 219–232 223

and the US11 Following convention, we exclude from the samples financial stocks based on Datastream four-digit industry codes. We include both active and dead stocks but delete observations with absolute values of annual asset growth or return on equity larger than 1000%. To further filter out potential data errors or outliers, we winsorize the remaining observations by 1% at the both ends of the return distributions within each month-country (including the US).

Following Watanabe et al. (2013), we use asset growth to proxy for firm-level investment. We also use at least six-month prior accounting values to ensure that the information is available to the market practitioners before the portfolios are formed. There- fore, the asset growth rate observed at the end of June of year t is defined as the percentage change in total assets from fiscal year (t � 2) to (t � 1). The return on equity is Worldscope item WC08301. We use Datastream variable MV (market value) to mea- sure the firm size.

11 Watanabe et al. (2013) provide a comprehensive examination of asset growth effects for 40 international equity markets. We differ from them in how we estimate the asset growth effect. Namely, we control for the size and return-on-equity effects in estimating the investment factor, consistent with our earlier analysis for the US using CRSP/Compustat data. Titman et al. (2013) also study International Evidence on the Asset Growth Effect and its relation to market development.

Each year at the end of June we divide all non-financial stocks into 27 portfolios based on three sequential sorts on size, the return-on-equity ratio, and the asset growth rate. Here we follow Liew and Vassalou (2000) and adopt the method of sequential sorts because the numbers of stocks meeting all the selection criteria are small for most countries, particularly in earlier years. Due to the large number of small stocks in the dataset, we use the low 40%, medium 30%, and high 30 % as breakpoints for ranking the firm size as small, medium, and large. The breakpoints for the latter two sorts are based on the low 30%, medium 40%, and high 30% of the corresponding ranked values. We compute value-weighted returns using the total return index of Datastream (RI).

Table 2 provides summary statistics for the excess market port- folio returns and the investment factors for the G-7 countries.12

The sample starting periods vary from July 1990 for Germany to July 1983 for the US. All samples end in December 2010. To derive excess market returns we subtract International Financial Statistics (IFS)

12 The estimates of ROE factors are not shown in the table. Briefly, the monthly sample averages are 0.72%, 0.12%, 0.29%, 0.22%, 0.10%, 0.22%, and 0.31% for Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the UK and the US, respectively. Caution should be exercised when these Datastream estimates of IA and ROE are compared with those based on Compustat files for the US stocks, because the definitions of the investment and the return-on-equity ratio are not identical in the two cases.

Panel A. The market factor

-30

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1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010

M KT

(% )

Date

Panel B. The investment factor

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IA (%

)

Date

Fig. 1. The market and the investment factors in the US market. The market factor (MKT) is the monthly excess stock market returns and the investment factor (IA) a return factor based on the portfolio strategy, low-minus-high investment-to-assets. It is estimated from returns to portfolios sorted independently on size, the investment/asset ratio, and the return on equity ratio of all NYSE, Amex, and NASDAQ non-financial stocks. The sources are CRSP/Compustat data files. The sample spans the period January 1972 to December 2010. The shaded areas indicate business recessions dated by NBER.

224 L. Huang, Z. Wang / Journal of Banking & Finance 44 (2014) 219–232

government treasury bill rates from Datastream value-weighted market portfolio returns, which are measured as the percentage change of total return indexes for the respective countries.13 Panel B shows that over the last two decades Japan’s equity market declined at an average monthly rate of 0.01%. Italy experienced a mediocre increase of 0.11% per month. The Datastream measure of average market returns for the US is 0.60%, which is a little higher than CRSP measure of 0.54% during the same period of July 1987– December 2010.

Panel C of Table 2 presents summary statistics of the invest- ment factors. The average IA factors are positive in all G-7 coun- tries, with Japan (0.01%) and the UK (0.63%) at the low and high ends, respectively. The IA estimates for the remaining five countries are similar in magnitudes (0.26–0.34%). Note that the US estimate is 0.26% which is significantly lower than that based on the CRSP/Compustat data during the overlapping sample period of July 1983–December 2010 (0.48%). Finally, Panel D suggests that individual country-specific IA estimates are positively correlated with each other. With the exception of Italy and Japan, the pairwise correlations between five other countries are reasonably high (0.37–0.59). In particular, Canada, France, Germany, and the UK commove with the US with a coefficient of 0.50, 0.51, 0.54, and

13 The German treasury bill rate series was discontinued in August 2007. For the remaining period we use daily average Frankfurt Interbank Offered Rate (FIBOR) (item FIBOR3M in Datastream). We further scale down the FIBOR series by a factor of 0.825, the ratio of FIBOR over the treasury bill rate in August 2007. The two series has a correlation of 0.986 during the overlapping period of January 1986 through August 2007.

0.37, respectively. This evidence of co-movement is similar to Fama and French’s (1998) finding that the country-specific value premium moves closely to its international market’s counterparts. Finally, it is worthwhile to note that the correlation between the Datastream IA estimate for the US and that based on the CRSP/ Compustat data is also relatively high at 0.58.

Finding an insignificant investment effect in the Japanese equity market is consistent with the evidence reported by Titman et al. (2009). One possible explanation for the discrepancy is that inves- tors’ behavior is affected by Japan’s distinctive industrial organiza- tion where a large number of firms belong to corporate business groups (known as keiretsu) (Berglof and Perotti, 1994; Ferris et al., 1995; Hoshi et al., 1991; Kang and Stulz, 2000). As argued by Titman et al. (2009), these Keiretsu firms have better access to capital than independent firms but are also closely monitored by Keiretsu main banks and member firms. Such a unique capital and debt structure of cross-holdings may be efficient in mitigating the potential overinvestment problems. Alternatively, the absence of the investment effect is a chance result.14 The Hotelling T2 test (not shown) of the null hypothesis that expected investor factor returns are equal across G-7 countries fails to reject at the 57% level for the overlapping sample period of 1990–2010. It is also worth not- ing that our estimate of the investor factor in Japan increases from �0.18% in the 1987–1999 sample to 2.4% in the more recent 2000–2010 sample period. This change coincides with Japan’s finan- cial deregulations in the 1980s and 1990s (Wu and Xu, 2005).

4. Empirical results for the US market

4.1. Empirical GARCH specifications

Confronted with limited numbers of observations, it is always desirable to work with a parsimonious data-determined model. This is especially important for the asset pricing tests using highly nonlinear GARCH specifications because they critically depend on the covariance matrix estimates (Kroner and Ng, 1998). Hence, we will impose restrictions on parameters implied by financial the- ory if the restrictions are not strongly rejected by data. In search for the most parsimonious yet statistically acceptable model, we adopt a general-to-specific approach. The model specification test results are summarized in Table 3. Following Scruggs (1998) and Scruggs and Glabadanidis (2003), we estimate all GARCH-in-mean models using the quasi-maximum likelihood (QML) method.15 In Panel A, the null hypothesis is the pooling of two univariate GARCH specifica- tions. And the alternative model is the bivariate ABEKK model as described by Eqs. (2), (4), (5), and (6). The first two columns of the table report the two intercept terms aM and aI from the two univar- iate models (the two risk price estimates cMM and cII are deferred to Panel A of Table 4). The point estimates are 0.23% and 0.28% for MKT and IA equations, respectively. They are about half of the uncondi- tional means of MKT and IA, hence economically significant. How- ever, both are statistically insignificant at the 5% level. The last four columns present the results of the likelihood ratio (LR) test of the pooling of one-factor univariate models vs. the two-factor bivar- iate GARCH. The null model is strongly rejected and the alternative two-factor model is preferred.

In Panels B and C, we separately test the two sets of ICAPM restrictions on the parameters in the two mean equations of the bivariate models. First, in Panel B, the p-value of the LR test

14 Fama and French (2012) adopt similar argument for the weak momentum returns in Japan.

15 For robustness, we also following Guo et al. (2009) and estimate the models using the maximum likelihood method under the assumption that the innovation terms follow normal and t-distributions. The main results reported in the paper do not change in any significant way.

Table 2 Summary statistics of the market and the investment factors in international markets.

Canada France Germany Italy Japan UK US

Panel A. Sample periods Starting date 07/1988 07/1989 07/1990 07/1989 07/1987 07/1989 07/1983 Ending date 12/2010 12/2010 12/2010 12/2010 12/2010 12/2010 12/2010

Panel B. Univariate statistics of the market portfolio returns (monthly, %) Mean 0.528 0.433 0.353 0.110 0.010 0.367 0.601 Std. dev. 4.176 5.350 5.539 6.431 5.711 4.370 4.515 Autocorrelation 0.145 0.130 0.085 0.032 0.112 0.088 0.074 Q(1) 5.763** 4.385** 1.784 0.273 3.682 2.029 1.837 Q(3) 8.080** 7.651 3.370 2.559 5.004 5.193 2.763 Q(12) 11.09 16.36 11.18 23.80** 9.424 13.19 8.259

Panel C. Univariate statistics of the investment factor (monthly, %) Mean 0.284 0.293 0.317 0.343 0.014 0.634 0.261 Std. dev. 3.197 2.471 2.986 2.502 2.458 1.937 2.550 Autocorrelation 0.106 0.103 0.144 -0.046 -0.181 0.185 0.100 Q(1) 3.095 2.766 5.193** 0.557 9.488*** 8.893*** 3.341 Q(3) 7.339 2.872 6.633 0.988 33.70*** 9.981** 5.023 Q(12) 19.03 11.60 24.88 8.777 64.30*** 18.411 13.161

Panel D. Correlations of the investment factor Canada 1 France 0.422 1 Germany 0.376 0.590 1 Italy 0.175 0.064 0.199 1 Japan 0.162 0.156 0.074 0.054 1 UK 0.385 0.368 0.373 0.141 0.040 1 US 0.501 0.514 0.539 0.172 0.033 0.366 1

Data are obtained from Thomson-Reuter Datastream and Worldscope. The investment factor is a return factor based on the portfolio strategy, low-minus-high asset growth. It is estimated from returns to portfolios sorted sequentially on size, the return-on-equity ratio, and the asset growth rate of all non-financial stocks from the respective markets. Q(p) is the Ljung-Box Q-statistic for the null hypothesis that there is no autocorrelation up to order p. Q(p) follows a v2 distribution with p degrees of freedom. ** Significant at 5% level. *** Significant at 1% level.

Table 3 Specification tests for the ICAPM-GARCH models.

aM aI Null hypothesis DF LR p-Value

Panel A. Pooling univariate GARCH models vs. bivariate GARCH model 0.229 0.276 H0: No Interaction Term 11 95.648 0.000 (0.460) (1.773) in 1st & 2nd moment eqns

Panel B. No constant terms in the two-factor ICAPM 0.183 0.204 H0: aM = aI = 0 2 6.213 0.045 (0.740) (2.675)

Panel C. Equal risk prices across assets in the ICAPM H0: cMM = cMI, cIM = cII 2 3.007 0.222

Panel D. No constant terms and equal risk prices in the ICAPM H0: aM = aI = 0 4 8.364 0.079 cMM = cMI, cIM = cII

This table reports the specification tests of the following two-factor ICAPM-GARCH-in-mean model (2) in the text:

MKTtþ1 ¼ aM þ cMMr2M;t þ cMIrMI;t þ eM;tþ1; IAtþ1 ¼ aI þ cIMrMI;t þ cIIr2I;t þ eI;tþ1;

whose conditional second moments, r2M;t , rMI,t, and r2I;t , follow a bivariate asymmetric version of the BEKK model proposed by Engle and Kroner (1995) as described in Eqs. (4)– (6) in the text. The two factors are US monthly excess stock market returns MKT, and the investment factor IA. IA is a return factor based on the portfolio strategy, low-minus-

high investment-to-assets. The sample spans the period January 1972 to December 2010. Note that the one-factor univariate models used in Panel A are formed by imposing the restriction of no interaction terms, namely cMI = 0 and cIM = 0 in MKT and IA equations, respectively. Correspondingly, the cross product terms in the conditional second moments also reduce to zero. The constants in Panel A are from the two univariate models, and those in Panel B from the unrestricted bivariate two-factor model. All models are estimated by the quasi-maximum likelihood (QML) method. Numbers in parentheses are t-statistics.

L. Huang, Z. Wang / Journal of Banking & Finance 44 (2014) 219–232 225

associated with the null hypothesis that the two intercepts are jointly zero in Eq. (2), aM = aI = 0, is 0.045. The t-statistics of the two intercepts further suggest that the small p-value on the perfor- mance of the overall bivariate system is driven by the model for IA where the intercept is significant at the 1% level. The result in Panel C provides stronger support for the other set of restrictions, that risk prices are equal across assets (cMM = cIM = cM and cMI = cII = cI).

The null model has a p-value of 0.222. Finally, in Panel D we jointly test the two sets of restrictions. The null model is Eq. (2) and the alternative is (3). We fail to reject the ICAPM restrictions at the conventional 5% significance level (the p-value is 0.079). Given the relatively small sample size used in the paper, these theoretical restrictions are imposed in the empirical analysis to gain efficiency in estimation. Therefore, throughout the paper, our benchmark is

Table 4 The estimation results of the ICAPM.

Parameter Estimate t-Statistic Parameter Estimate t-Statistic

Panel A. Mean equations: Univariate (with constants) Panel B. Mean equations: Univariate cMM 1.177 0.498 cMM 2.194** 2.125 cII 5.536 1.238 cII 10.392*** 4.910

Panel C. Mean equations: Bivariate cM 4.320*** 4.829 cI 13.469*** 4.963

Panel D. Variance equation of stock Panel E. Variance equation of investment wMM 1.232*** 3.833 wII 0.622*** 4.450 bMM 0.898*** 24.179 bII 0.835*** 15.044 aMM 0.286*** 3.004 aII 0.429*** 6.017 gMM �0.271*** �2.492 gII �0.025 �0.167

Panel F. Covariance equation of stock and investment wMI 0.105 0.734 bIM �0.006 �0.539 aMI �0.100 �1.123 aIM 0.019 0.653 gMI �0.025 �0.167 gIM 0.103 1.488 Log-likelihood of the Bivariate ICAPM: �2279.16

This table reports two risk price estimates from various restricted versions of the following two-factor ICAPM-GARCH-in-mean model (2) in the text:

MKTtþ1 ¼ aM þ cMMr2M;t þ cMIrMI;t þ eM;tþ1; IAtþ1 ¼ aI þ cIMrMI;t þ cIIr2I;t þ eI;tþ1;

whose conditional second moments,r2M;t , rMI,t, and r2I;t , follow a bivariate asymmetric version of the BEKK model proposed by Engle and Kroner (1995) as described in Eqs. (4)– (6) in the text. The two factors are US monthly excess stock market returns MKT, and the investment factor IA. IA is a return factor based on the portfolio strategy, low-minus- high investment-to-assets. The sample spans the period January 1972 to December 2010. Panel A reports the results of two one-factor ICAPM models which are formed by imposing the restriction of no interaction terms, namely cMI = 0 and cIM = 0 in MKT and IA mean equations, respectively. Correspondingly, the cross product terms in the conditional second moments also reduce to zero. Panel B further imposes the zero constants on the two univariate models. Panels C through E are the detailed parameter estimates for the benchmark two-factor model (3) in the text. Model (3) is formed by imposing the following ICAPM restrictions on parameters in the above model (2): aM = aI = 0, cMM = cIM = cM, and cMI = cII = cI. All models are estimated by the quasi-maximum likelihood (QML) method. We also report at the bottom of the table the log likelihood of the two-factor model. ** Significance at 5% level. *** Significance at 1% level.

226 L. Huang, Z. Wang / Journal of Banking & Finance 44 (2014) 219–232

ICAPM model (3) whose conditional (co-)variances are described in Eqs. (4)–(6).16

17 Our sample is admittedly small to fit a bivariate GARCH-in-mean model. To partially address the small-sample issue, we conduct a small-scale simulation to

4.2. Estimation results of the benchmark model

Table 4 presents the detailed results of our benchmark two-fac- tor ICAPM-GARCH model. For comparison, we first report in Panel A the estimation results of the two one-factor univariate GARCH models, each with one explanatory variable, r2M;t and r2I;t , respec- tively. For brevity, only results of the mean equations are tabu- lated. When constants are included in the univariate models (which are reported in Panel A of Table 3), the risk price estimate is 1.18 for the market factor MKT (cMM), and 5.54 for the invest- ment factor IA (cII). Both are insignificant, consistent with findings of an insignificant risk-return relationship in many earlier studies that use models similar to the ones in Panel A. Therefore, Panel B imposes the zero-constant restriction on the two univariate mod- els. The new risk price estimates are larger in magnitudes and, more importantly, become statistically significant.

Panels C–E show the parameter estimates of both mean and conditional variance equations for the benchmark two-factor

16 Lanne and Saikkonen (2006) argue that in many empirical studies the intercepts (as) are included in the mean Eq. (2) although, based on the ICAPM, it is not theoretically justified. They find that the inclusion of the unnecessary terms makes the estimated risk aversion coefficients (cs) unstable and statistically insignificant. For recent empirical evidence see Nyberg (2012). Relatedly, Bali (2008) also finds that restricting the slope to be the same across assets in one-factor ICAPMs causes the risk-aversion coefficient to be statistically significant in the range of one to five. In contrast, using both empirical data and Monte Carlo analysis, Lundblad (2007) shows that even within the univariate GARCH-in-mean framework, one requires an extremely large amount of data in order to successfully detect the risk return tradeoff when an intercept is included in the DGP.

model (3)-(6). In Panel C, we see that the two risk price estimates are larger than those in the one-factor models in Panels A and B and are estimated with more precision, especially for the market factor. Specifically, cM has a point estimate of 4.32 and an associ- ated t-statistic of 4.83. The point estimate and the t-statistic for cI are 13.47 and 4.96, respectively. These results suggest that both factors are priced in the market, consistent with the theoretical prediction of the positive signs of cM and cI from Eqs. (1a) and (1b). Omitting either one from the ICAPM model would generate downward bias for the price estimate of the other, because the two factors are negatively correlated. The results in Panel C also show that the expected IA return is positively related to its condi- tional variance as well as its conditional covariance with the mar- ket factor, which is consistent with the risk-based interpretation of the investment factor.17

Panels D, E, and F of Table 4 present the parameter estimates in the conditional variance and covariance Eqs. (4)–(6) for the bench- mark two-factor model. Most parameters in the two variance

investigate if the risk price estimates from this two-factor bivariate GARCH-in-mean model are really different from zero. Briefly, we draw 1000 random samples of (excess) market returns and the investor factor returns using a data generating process (DGP) as described in models (3)–(6). The DGP’s parameters are estimated from the real data used for Panel C. Each pseudo-sample has the same size as the actual data. We find that the risk price associated with the market factor cM is positive 95.4% of the time. And the score is somewhat lower at 82.4% for investment factor cI. The averages of cM and cI estimates from the simulated samples are 6.04 and 12.26. And the median estimates are 5.63 and 11.14, respectively, reasonably close to our sample point estimates of 4.32 and 13.47. In another simulation we use the same DGP as before but restrict the two risk prices to be zero. We find that the averages of cM andcI estimates are 0.67 and 0.45, respectively. Their 2.5th and 97.5th percentiles are �4.26 and 1.93 for cM, and �5.15 and 3.10 for cI, respectively.

Panel A. Conditional variances and covariance

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20

40

60

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co va

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Panel B. Conditional correlation

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-0.8

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-0.4

-0.2

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1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 Date

C on

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n

Fig. 2. Conditional variances, covariance and correlation from the benchmark model. Conditional variances and covariance are estimated from the benchmark two-factor ICAPM-GARCH models (3)–(6) in the text using the sample spanning the period January 1972 to December 2010. The mean equations take the form: MKTtþ1 ¼ cMr2M;t þ cIrMI;t þ eM;tþ1; IAtþ1 ¼ cMrMI;t þ cIr2I;t þ eI;tþ1;

where r2M;t , rMI,t, and r2I;t are conditional second

moments following a bivariate asymmetric version of the BEKK model proposed by Engle and Kroner (1995). All model parameter estimates are reported in Panels C–E of Table 3. The two factors are monthly US excess stock market returns MKT, and the investment factor IA. IA is a return factor based on the portfolio strategy, low- minus-high investment-to-assets. In Panel A, the long-dashed line is conditional stock market variance, r2M;t; the middle solid line is conditional IA variance, r2I;t; and the short-dashed line is conditional covariance of the market return with the IA factor, rMI,t. The shaded areas indicate business recessions dated by NBER. For ease of reading, conditional stock market variance is trimmed from above at 60 � 10�4.

18 Because we assume constant cM and cI in model (3), the cyclical behavior of predicted investment factor returns comes exclusively from the cyclical behavior of r2MI;t and r2I;t . Alternatively/additionally, it can also arise from countercyclical risk price cM (Zhang, 2005a; Nyberg, 2012) in a one-factor CAPM.

L. Huang, Z. Wang / Journal of Banking & Finance 44 (2014) 219–232 227

equations are highly significant, implying that stock market vola- tility is indeed time-varying. In contrast, most parameters in the conditional covariance equation are estimated with large errors. For example, unlike gMM, gII has a negligible t-statistic of �0.167, meaning that positive and negative shocks to the investment factor have symmetric impacts on the subsequent volatility of the invest- ment factor. However, the hypothesis that all parameters in the covariance equation are jointly zero is strongly rejected (not reported in the table). Panel D of Table 1 presents the means of time-varying variance and covariance estimates based on the benchmark specification. They are very close to the unconditional variance and covariance matrix of MKT and IA in Panel C of Table 1, indicating that the bivariate GARCH model is able to capture some important aspects of the data.

To gain more insights on the dynamics of the conditional sec- ond moments, in Fig. 2 we plot the fitted values of conditional excess market return variance (long-dashed line), conditional investment factor variance (solid line) and conditional covariance between the two factors (short-dashed line). For readability, condi- tional variances larger than 60 � 10�4 are not shown. With the exceptions of the October 1987 market crash and the peak period of high-tech bubbles, large conditional variances of MKT and IA are evident around the NBER-dated recessions, suggesting that both volatilities are countercyclical. The smoothness of the graph in the intervening periods reflects the persistence of conditional variance. Panel A of Fig. 2 also documents significant variation in

conditional covariance between MKT and IA. The mostly negative covariance estimates suggest that the market provides a hedge for changes in investment opportunities, which are proxied here by the investment factor. The cyclical pattern in the relation between MKT and IA is clearer in terms of the corresponding con- ditional correlation coefficient as shown in Panel B. MKT and IA are more negatively correlated during the downturns (with an average correlation coefficient of 0.45). The correlation generally is smaller and close to zero in the other stages of business cycles, with an average of only 0.20.

We also calculate the expected IA factor return based on the benchmark model (3)–(6). The fitted return varies over time and tends to increase sharply just before or during the business reces- sions. The average premium is 0.59 in the recessions and 0.42 in the remaining periods. This countercyclical behavior is driven by countercyclical conditional variance of IA and the associated large risk price (13.47), which more than offsets the mostly negative pre- mium induced by its covariance with the market factor.18 We also regress the predicted IA on a constant and a business cycle dummy variable which takes the value of one if the economy is in recessions and zero otherwise. The slope associated with the dummy variable has a point estimate of 0.17 and a large t-value of 5.17. Therefore, the difference between the expected investment effect in recessions and in expansions is significant in both economic and statistical senses.

4.3. Robustness checks

In this subsection, we conduct a few robustness checks on our basic findings in Table 4. We first re-estimate the benchmark two-factor ICAPM-GARCH model (3)–(6) using the market and the investment factors measured at the quarterly frequency. The sample period is 1972Q1–2010Q4. The result is reported in Row 1 of Table 5 under the ‘‘restricted models’’ column. It shows that the risk price of MKT (4.19) is virtually the same as the estimate based on the monthly data (4.32). The risk price of IA (cI) is 10.90, which is lower than the monthly estimate of 13.47. Impor- tantly, both quarterly estimates are highly significant.

In the current debate on the investment effect, some authors report that the effect is observed only among small firms (Lipson et al., 2011). Nevertheless, if the investment effect reflects inter- temporal pricing, we should expect to find similar results using investment factors constructed from both small and large stocks. To investigate this issue, we derive the small-stock investment fac- tor as the difference between the simple average returns of the three small-size and low-I/A portfolios and the simple average returns of the three small-size and high-I/A portfolios. The large- stock investment factor is similarly estimated. Based on the same sample as the one used for the benchmark analysis, we find that the average monthly values of the small-stock and big-stock IA fac- tors are 0.64% and 0.35%, respectively. Consistent with (Cooper et al., 2008), these estimates suggest that the investment effect is present in both small and large cap firms, although it is more sig- nificant in small firms. Rows 2 and 3 of Table 5 present the ICAPM estimation results, which confirm that the IA factor is a priced fac- tor regardless of how it is measured. Noticeably, the risk price esti- mates of MKT for small-stocks and big-stocks are both close to the estimate for all the stocks. By contrast, the price of IA based on small stocks is 16.47, which is higher than the estimate of 5.24 using IA based on big stocks. Both estimates are again statistically significant at the 1% level.

Table 5 Further estimation results of the ICAPM .

Row From unrestricted models From restricted models

aM aI cM cI j1 j2 Log-likelihood

1 �0.939 0.619 4.187*** 10.900*** �947.55 (�0.443) (1.577) (4.330) (2.889)

2 �0.127 0.313*** 5.794*** 16.470*** �2282.93 (�0.217) (4.088) (4.998) (6.675)

3 �0.036 0.255** 4.688*** 5.239*** �2463.23 (�0.061) (1.990) (3.684) (2.761)

4 0.071 0.118 4.063*** 10.592*** �2292.57 (0.123) (0.692) (4.382) (4.363)

5 0.269** 0.196*** 4.197*** 16.116*** �0.019 0.22E�4 �2271.34 (2.011) (3.203) (4.130) (5.932) (�1.839) (0.404)

6 0.274** 0.195*** 4.190*** 15.873*** �2333.13 (2.188) (3.374) (4.105) (5.835)

This table reports parameter estimates for the following two-factor ICAPM-GARCH-in-mean model (2) in the text:

MKTtþ1 ¼ aM þ cMMr2M;t þ cMIrMI;t þ eM;tþ1; IAtþ1 ¼ aI þ cIMrMI;t þ cIIr2I;t þ eI;tþ1;

where the two factors MKT and IA are US excess stock market returns and the investment factor. The investment factor is based on the portfolio strategy, low-minus-high investment-to-assets. Conditional covariances,r2M;t , rMI,t, and r2I;t in rows 1 through 4 are specified as following the GARCH process described by Eqs. (4)–(6) in the text. In rows 5 and 6 conditional covariances are estimated using the MIDAS method (Eqs. (8), (9)) and a three-month rolling window method, respectively. j1 and j2 are two polynomial coefficients determining the weights of past (squared) daily returns in estimating the conditional covariances. Columns 2 and 3 of the table are the results from the above model without any restriction on the model parameters. The rest columns contain the estimation results from models with the following ICAPM restrictions imposed: aM = aI = 0, cMM = cIM = cM, and cMI = cII = cI. Row 1 uses quarterly data spanning the period of 1972Q1 through 2010Q4. Monthly data from January 1972 to December 2010 are used in the remaining rows. Rows 2 and 3 use small-stock IA and large-stock IA, respectively. All other rows use IA estimates based on all stocks. In Row 4, IA is based on two independent sorts on size and the investment/assets (I/A) ratio. In all other rows, it is based on three independent sorts on size, return-on-equity, and the I/A ratios. All models are estimated by the quasi-maximum likelihood (QML) method. Numbers in parentheses are t-statistics. ** Significance at 5% level. *** Significance at 1% level.

228 L. Huang, Z. Wang / Journal of Banking & Finance 44 (2014) 219–232

As we pointed out earlier, many authors estimate the invest- ment factor based on two independent sorts on size and invest- ment (or asset growth). Following this alternative portfolio- forming strategy, we find that the monthly average value of the IA is 0.35%, smaller than the above estimate derived from three independent sorts on size, return-on-equity, and invest- ment. However, the two IA estimates are closely correlated with a coefficient of 0.87. Not surprisingly, as shown in Row 4, the ICAPM estimation results based on this alternative measure of IA are consistent with those of the benchmark specification in Table 4. With a large t-value of 4.36, the IA risk price also has a point estimate of 10.59, largely comparable to the benchmark model estimate of 13.47.

In Row 5 of Table 5 we summarize the estimation results of the ICAPM using MIDAS estimators of the conditional covariances. Note that the effective sample starts in January 1973 because the daily observations of year 1972 are used to estimate the first con- ditional variance dated January 1973. Both risk price estimates are strongly significant. The estimate of cM is 4.20, again very close to the benchmark estimate. The point estimate of cI is 16.12. The averages of MIDAS estimators of the conditional variances and covariance are 24.32, 3.55, and 4.08. They deviate a little more from the unconditional estimates than the benchmark estimates (Table 1, Panels C and D). Neither of the two polynomial parame- ters in the weight function (8) is precisely estimated. The p-values for j1 and j2 are 0.07 and 0.67, respectively.19

19 Although not reported here, we find that j1 and j2 are also statistically insignificant in the two one-factor ICAPM models for MKT and IA, respectively, whether or not a constant is included in the estimation. This is different from the estimates in Ghysels et al. (2005), which are based on quite different sample periods (e.g., 1964–2000) than ours. In fact, when we estimate the market returns using longer sample period 1963–2010, both j1 and j2 are estimated with much smaller errors and j1 is statistically significant.

Finally, we estimate the benchmark ICAPM (3) using the simple three-month rolling window estimators of realized variance. Unlike the GARCH and MIDAS conditional variance estimators which are estimated using the full sample, the rolling realized vari- ances are not subject to the criticism of potential look-ahead bias. The effective sample period is April 1972–December 2010. The last row of Table 5 shows that the two risk price estimates based on the three-month rolling window estimator are very similar to those in Row 5 using the MIDAS estimator in terms of both the magnitude and the t-statistic.

Note that in all above cases we have estimated model (3) which imposes all ICAPM restrictions on the parameters in accordance with the evidence from the benchmark analysis in Section 4.2. However, it remains unclear whether or not these theory-implied parameter restrictions actually hold in the data. To address this issue, we also estimate the ICAPM model without any restriction on the parameters (namely model (2)). The intercept estimates aM and aI of these models are reported under the column of ‘‘unre- stricted models’’ in Table 5. The intercept in the mean equation for the market factor is insignificant in rows 1–4 using the GARCH estimators of conditional (co)variance. The model is less fit for the investment factor as its intercept is statistically insignificant only in rows 1 and 4. The results in the bottom two panels (rows 5 and 6) indicate that the restricted model is unfit when the two realized variance estimators are used in the regressions. Recall from Panel B of Table 3 that aM is insignificant although aI is signif- icant when the GARCH estimator is used. One possible explanation for the difference between the two estimators is that realized var- iance is not an efficient measure of conditional variance, which has been found by many authors including Christensen and Prabhala (1998), Fleming (1998) and Guo and Whitelaw (2006).

Overall, our main finding that the loadings on the market and the investment factors carry positive and statistically significant risk premiums holds well in various settings. It is robust to the

Table 6 Estimation of the ICAPM with control for market conditions.

Predictive variable Parameters LLK

cM cI k

DY 1.736 4.660 0.119*** �2276.22 (1.738) (1.098) (3.080)

RREL 4.328*** 13.436*** �0.001 �2278.42 (4.705) (5.005) (�0.017)

DEF 1.960 5.261 0.125** �2277.80 (1.821) (1.218) (2.510)

TERM 2.943*** 8.553** 0.139** �2277.80 (2.916) (2.491) (2.159)

LIQD 4.292*** 13.545*** �0.000 �2278.98 (4.249) (4.393) (�0.710)

IVOL 3.838*** 11.862*** 0.067 �2279.04 (4.344) (4.095) (0.673)

CAY 4.144*** 12.724*** 0.185*** �2262.32 (4.546) (4.730) (3.247)

This table reports parameter estimates of the augmented two-factor ICAPM model (10) in the text:

MKTtþ1 ¼ cMr2M;t þ cIrMI;t þ kXt þ eM;tþ1; IAtþ1 ¼ cMrMI;t þ cIr2I;t þ kXt þ eI;tþ1;

where the two factors MKT and IA are US excess stock market returns and the invest- ment factor. The investment factor is based on the portfolio strategy, low-minus- high investment-to-assets. Xt is one of seven predictive variables: dividend yield (DY), the stochastically detrended risk-free rate (RREL), the default premium (DEF), the term premium (TERM), a measure of stock marketwide liquidity (LIQD), average idiosyncratic volatility (IVOL), and the consumption-wealth ratio (CAY). Each variable has been normalized to have a unit variance so that the coefficients are comparable across models. Conditional covariances, r2M;t , rMI,t, and r2I;t are estimated by GARCH regression as described in Eqs. (4)–(6). All models are estimated by the quasi-maximum likelihood (QML) method. Num- bers in parentheses are t-statistics. LLK is the log-likelihood. The sample period is January 1972 to December 2010 except for CAY which is available through August 2010. ** Significance at 5% level. *** Significance at 1% level.

L. Huang, Z. Wang / Journal of Banking & Finance 44 (2014) 219–232 229

alternative definitions of the investment factor, alternative estima- tion approaches, and different data frequencies.

4.4. The investment factor and other proxies for investment opportunities

Because our focus is on the pricing effect of the investment fac- tor, we have so far concentrated on the parsimonious two-factor ICAPM model (3). As discussed in the Introduction, other factors or state variables may also help explain risk premiums. And previ- ous studies have found a number of economic and financial vari- ables to have predictive power for stock market returns.20 Some authors further interpret the predictive power as evidence that these variables are proxies for investment opportunities. For example, Cooper and Priestley (2011) show that the average returns spread between low and high asset growth and investment portfolios is lar- gely accounted for by their spread in systematic risk, as measured by loadings on the macroeconomic variables. It is thus natural to ask to what extent the pricing effect of the investment factor in the ICAPM model (3) remains after these conditioning (state) variables are included as extra predictive variables.

To this end, we estimate the following modified ICAPM:

MKTtþ1 ¼ cMr2M;t þ cIrMI;t þ kXt þ eM;tþ1; IAtþ1 ¼ cMrMI;t þ cIr2I;t þ kXt þ eI;tþ1;

ð10Þ

where Xt is one of seven commonly used state variables we described in the data section. A priori, we expect that the pricing effect of IA remains unaffected if IA and the market condition vari- ables capture different fundamental risks, or are both a proxy for the same fundamental risks but IA is better measured. If, on the other hand, IA is a noisier measure than the other proxies, its pric- ing effect can be weakened after the inclusion of these variables in the model. Alternatively, when these conditioning variables indeed describe business cycles with which covariance risks vary/interact, the inclusion of them should help identify the risk components in model (10).

Table 6 summarizes the parameter estimates of the ICAPM (10) using the GARCH estimator of conditional variances. Note that because the predictive variables are in general correlated with each other (Panel B of Table 1), we include only one of them in each regression. It can be seen that the inclusion of these variables into the ICAPM model have quite different impacts on the risk price estimates associated with the market and investment factors. First, both price estimates, cM and cI, become smaller and statistically insignificant at the 5% level when either the dividend yield (DY) or the default premium (DEF) is added to the model. In contrast, DY and DEF retain significant predictive power in the regressions. This result suggests that covariance between IA and MKT probably captures information similar to that of DY and DEF in proxying for future investment opportunities. When used together, DY and DEF subsume the pricing power of IA.21

Second, the relative movement in the short-term interest rate (RREL), the market liquidity (LIQD), and the average idiosyncratic volatility (IVOL) do not have any additional predictive power beyond what is captured by the market and IA factors. The inclusion of these three variables has no significant impact on the estimates of cM and cI. Third, the coefficients for the term premium (TERM) and the consumption-wealth ratio (CAY) are both

20 See, for example, Campbell (1987), Fama and French (1989), Ferson and Harvey (1999), Pástor and Stambaugh (2003), Campbell and Vuolteenaho (2004), Petkova and Zhang (2005), Guo and Whitelaw (2006) and Boons (2012).

21 Bekaert et al. (2009), and Cochrane (2011) recently also find that, compared to other conditioning variables, dividend yield is a strong predictor of stock returns. Prombutr et al. (2012) use DEF as the business cycle indicator to which factor loadings are linked.

significant, suggesting that they have additional predictive power for market returns and the investment effect. With TERM in the augmented model, the point estimates of the two risk price esti- mates are smaller than they are in the original model (Panel C, Table 4), although both estimates remain statistically significant. The change also appears to be more evident for IA. Finally, CAY seems to contain information that is not captured by either MKT or IA because both price estimates of the two factors remain essen- tially unchanged in the modified ICAPM model.

Overall, our results suggest that the investment effect reflects intertemporal pricing, although it might be a noisier measure of investment opportunities than some other stock return predictors such as DY and DEF. These results also hold if we use the alterna- tive MIDAS estimator for the conditional variances. Finally, note from Table 6 that we assume the same coefficient on Xt(k) for both market and IA portfolios in model (10). We also estimate (but do not report in the table) the modified ICAPM model allowing the coefficient of Xt to vary across the two portfolio equations. The main difference is that when the predictive variable is TREM, the risk price estimate for MKT (cM) becomes even smaller (1.52) and insignificant with a t-statistic of 1.26.

4.5. ICAPM with three factors

Given the increasing attention paid to the investment factor IA and its intuitive link with the value premium and to keep the model simple, we have concentrated on IA. However, based on the standard Q-theory with quadratic investment adjustment costs and linear profit functions, Zhang (2005b) and Lin and Zhang

Table 7 The estimation results of ICAPM with three factors.

cM cI cE(cH) j1 j2 Log-likelihood

Panel A. Three factors: MKT, IA and ROE 5.077*** 13.578*** 10.273*** �0.030*** 0.87E�4*** �3430.66 (4.944) (4.903) (3.765) (�4.364) (2.788)

Panel B. Three factors: MKT, IA and HML 4.761*** 13.960*** 5.751** �0.028*** 0.87E�4** �3452.68 (4.372) (5.373) (2.168) (�3.263) (2.216)

Panel C. Two factors: MKT and IA 4.197*** 16.116*** �0.019 0.22E�4 �2271.34 (4.130) (5.932) (�1.839) (0.404)

Panel D. Two factors: MKT and HML 3.243*** 9.284*** �0.035*** 1.24E�4 �2582.36 (3.073) (3.421) (�3.242) (2.596)

Panels A and B report the estimation results of the following three-factor ICAPM model with all theoretical restrictions imposed:

MKTtþ1 ¼ cMr2M;t þ cIrMI;t þ c3rM3;t þ eM;tþ1; IAtþ1 ¼ cMrMI;t þ cIr2I;t þ c3rI3;t þ eI;tþ1;

FCTR3tþ1 ¼ cMrM3;t þ cIrI3;t þ c3r23;t þ e3;tþ1:

where MKT is US excess stock market returns, IA is the investment factor, and the third factor FCTR3 is either the return-on-equity factor ROE in Panel A or the value factor HML in Panel B. IA and ROE are two return factors based on the portfolio strat- egies, low-minus-high investment-to-assets and high-minus-low return-on-equity, respectively. cM, cI, cE, and cHare risk prices associated with factors MKT, IA, ROE, and HML. Conditional covariances r2M;t , rMI,t, rM3,t, r2I;t ;rI3,t, and r23;t are estimated via the MIDAS method as described in Eqs. (8), (9) in the text. j1 and j2 are two polynomial coefficients determining the weights of past (squared) daily returns in estimating the conditional covariances. Panels C and D report the estimation results for two two-factor ICAPM models, which are structurally the same as the above three-factor version with one fewer factor. All models are estimated by the quasi-maximum likelihood (QML) method. Num- bers in parentheses are t-statistics. The sample period is January 1972 to December 2010. ** Significant at 5% level. *** Significant at 1% level.

230 L. Huang, Z. Wang / Journal of Banking & Finance 44 (2014) 219–232

(2013) show that a firm’s stock return increases with its average operating cash flow (the marginal benefit of investment), but decreases with the investment-to-asset ratio (the marginal cost of investment). Therefore, Chen et al. (2011) include both the investment factor IA and the return-on-equity factor ROE in their alternative three-factor model. Similarly, Xing (2008) also controls for the marginal product of capital in one of her model specifica- tions in studying the investment factor. To investigate whether the omission of the ROE factor from the two-factor ICAPM model (3) has significantly biased our estimates of risk prices of MKT and IA, we estimate a three-factor ICAPM of MKT, IA, and ROE by exploiting the MIDAS capacity for higher dimension estimation.

Panel A of Table 7 reports the risk price estimates and the two parameters in the weight function (8) for the conditional variance equations. Both cM and cI remain highly significant in the three- factor model. The risk price of MKT increases from the two-factor ICAPM estimate of 4.20 (Row 5 of Table 5) to 5.08, and that of IA decreases from 16.12 to 13.58. These changes are consistent with the unconditional correlation patterns between the three variables in Pane B of Table 1: both IA and ROE are negatively correlated with MKT (the corresponding correlation coefficients are 0.32 and 0.26, respectively). The correlation between IA and ROE is posi- tive (0.23), which somewhat mitigates the pricing power of IA when the two factors are now modeled together. Nevertheless, the biases in the two-factor ICAPM parameter estimates caused by the omission of ROE appear moderate.

We can also see from Panel A that the ROE is indeed a priced factor with a coefficient cE = 10.3, which is highly significant. Similar to IA, the predicted risk premium for ROE is also countercy- clical: the average premium is 1.03% during recessions and 0.63% during expansions. Panel A also shows that as more information (ROE) is included in the estimation, the two polynomial coefficients, j1 and j2, are estimated with more precision than in the two-factor models. Both are now significant at the 1% level.

Based on the standard Q-theory, Zhang (2005b) shows that, under the assumption of linear homogeneity, the relationship between the value effect and the investment effect is theoretically one-to-one. Xing (2008) provides empirical evidence that there is a close relationship between the two. In a recent paper, Abhakorn et al. (2013) also argue that HML helps explain stock returns prob- ably because it is associated with the investment growth prospects of firms. In our sample the correlation between the investment factor IA and HML is high at 0.54. What is the implication of this close relation for their explanatory power for stock returns in the time series setting? We hypothesize that, when modeled together, the explanatory power of one or both of the two factors becomes less significant due to co-linearity. Empirically, we esti- mate a trivariate ICAPM model with three factors, MKT, IA, and HML. The results are summarized in Panel B of Table 7. For the purpose of comparison, we reproduce the estimation results of the two-factor ICAPM for MKT and IA in Panel C (originally in Row 5 of Table 5), and also estimate a two-factor model for MKT and HML in Panel D.

Both IA and HML are still significant at the 5% level in the three- factor ICAPM. However, their point estimates indeed become smal- ler. cI decreases by 13% from 16.12 in the two-factor model to 13.96, although the new estimate remains more than five standard errors from zero. The impact is more noticeable for HML, whose coefficient cH decreases by 38% from 9.28 in Panel D to 5.75 in Panel B. The associated t-statistic also declines from 3.42 to 2.17.

5. International evidence

As shown in the data section, the investment effect exists in many developed markets. The goal of this section is to extend

our analysis on the US equity market to the international markets. We are interested in how well the market and the investment fac- tors explain future stock returns in each market using the bench- mark two-factor ICAPM models (3)–(6).

Table 8 presents key estimation results for both the unrestricted two-factor ICAPM (2) and the benchmark specification (3). As before, the conditional second moments are modeled as following the bivariate GARCH process (4)–(6); but their results are not reported to save space. The international evidence is largely consis- tent with that documented in the earlier sections for the US using CRSP/Compustat data. More specifically, columns two and three of the table are point estimates and their t-statistics for the intercepts (aM and aI) in the unrestricted models. The intercepts are large in the market return equations for markets in Canada, France, the UK, and the US They are small in Italy, Japan, and Germany, where the unconditional means of the market returns are themselves small. Noticeably, none of these estimates and those intercepts from the investment factor models are statistically significant. Nevertheless, the generally small t-values associated with these estimates should be interpreted with caution. Compared to the US results in Table 3 using CRSP data, the shorter samples used here might explain why the intercepts are estimated with large errors.

Columns 4 and 5 report estimates of the risk prices for the mar- ket factor cM and the investment factor cI from the benchmark model (3). They suggest that cM is significantly positive at the 5% level for all seven equity markets except Japan. The point estimates range from 1.96 in Italy to 5.83 in the US Similarly, the risk price for

Table 8 The estimation results of the ICAPM for international markets.

Market No. of obs. (month) From unrestricted models From restricted models

aM aI cM cI Log-likelihood

Canada 270 �0.354 �0.094 5.097*** 6.207** �1396.548 (�0.859) (�0.816) (3.290) (2.557)

France 258 �0.235 0.238 3.721*** 5.306** �1288.909 (�0.256) (1.497) (3.045) (2.074)

Germany 246 �0.039 �0.155 3.363*** 6.059*** �1262.949 (�0.027) (�0.354) (2.826) (2.916)

Italy 258 �0.006 �0.021 1.958** 6.389** �1400.793 (�0.007) (�0.049) (2.181) (2.356)

Japan 282 �0.175 0.081 0.333 �0.410 �1429.760 (�1.690) (0.798) (0.559) (�0.226)

UK 258 0.331 �0.294 4.917*** 18.855*** �1211.972 (1.285) (�1.419) (2.919) (3.947)

US 330 0.343 �0.203 5.829*** 8.504*** �1601.946 (0.568) (�1.162) (4.378) (3.159)

This table reports for the G-7 countries the estimation results of the following two-factor ICAPM-GARCH-in-mean model (2) in the text:

MKTtþ1 ¼ aM þ cMMr2M;t þ cMIrMI;t þ eM;tþ1; IAtþ1 ¼ aI þ cIMrMI;t þ cIIr2I;t þ eI;tþ1;

whose conditional second moments, r2M;t , rMI,t, and r2I;t , follow a bivariate asymmetric version of the BEKK model proposed by Engle and Kroner (1995) as described in Eqs. (4)– (6) in the text. The two factors are monthly excess stock market returns MKT, and the investment factor IA which is a return to the portfolio strategy, low-minus-high asset growth. They are estimated using firm-level data obtained from Thomson–Reuter Datastream and Worldscope. The monthly sample periods are detailed in Panel A of Table 7 for each market. The central part of the table is the results from the above model without any restriction on the model parameters. The right three columns contain the estimation results from the model with the following ICAPM restrictions imposed: aM = aI = 0, cMM = cIM = cM, and cMI = cII = cI. All models are estimated by the quasi-maximum likelihood (QML) method. We also report the log likelihood of the restricted model which is our benchmark. ** Significance at 5% level. *** Significance at 1%level.

L. Huang, Z. Wang / Journal of Banking & Finance 44 (2014) 219–232 231

the investment factor (cI) is significantly positive at the 1% level for Germany, UK, and the US, and at the 5% level for Canada, Italy, and France. The magnitudes of the price estimates (5.31–18.85) also appear to be reasonable relative to that of the US based on the alternative data sources. The noticeable exception again is Japan. Our model fails to find any pricing power for either the market or the investment factor. Both estimates of cM and cI are negligible in terms of the point estimate and the t-statistic.

22 Starting with a general equilibrium production economy, Lin and Zhang (2013) recently show that the covariances-based consumption approach and the character- istics-based investment approach are two parallel ways of doing asset pricing. While Lin and Zhang’s (2013) results help reconcile some seemingly contradictory claims in the literature, we do not see them as excluding a risk-based explanation for the investment effect. It seems to us that, if a return ‘anomaly’ rooted in the production/ investment side of the economy can also be rationalized using the consumption approach, the argument for Lin and Zhang’s (2013) general equilibrium approach to asset pricing is strengthened rather than weakened.

6. Concluding remarks

The aim of this paper was to evaluate the conjecture that the investment factor is a proxy for time-varying investment opportu- nities. The central framework is a variant of Merton’s (1973) inter- temporal asset pricing model that relates the expected stock return to its conditional variance and its covariance with the investment factor. We found that the positive risk-return tradeoff becomes more significant after controlling for the covariance and that the expected investment factor return is also positively and statisti- cally significantly related to its countercyclical conditional vari- ance. We further found that the investment factor’s stock return predictability is similar to that of three popular business cycle vari- ables, dividend yield, the default premium, and the term premium. Our empirical analysis on other developed markets also confirms the basic finding based on the US market.

Our results complement the existing cross-sectional studies and provide time-series evidence in support of a rational investment effect. Our finding is also consistent with the conjecture that the investment factor is a proxy for time-varying investment opportu- nities, which reinforces the risk-interpretation of the investment effect by Cooper and Priestley (2011) and Prombutr et al. (2012). Overall our evidence, together with the economic intuition of the investment factor based on Q-theory, raises the bar for the alterna- tive mispricing hypotheses by establishing a close link between

time-series and cross-sectional stock return predictability.22 A risk-based explanation for the investment effect is plausible.

That being said, completely distinguishing between mispricing- and risk-based explanations for the investment effect and other characteristic-based return anomalies remains, admittedly, diffi- cult. From the empirical point of view, there might be many vari- ables which have common movements in returns yet do not carry risk prices. In our study, we impose theoretical restrictions in estimating the ICAPM model even though the empirical evi- dence is only marginal. The ICAPM model also fails the important Japanese market. These issues certainly warrant much further research.

Acknowledgements

We want to thank Ike Mathur (the Editor) and an anonymous referee for many helpful comments and suggestions. The paper was finished while Zijun Wang was a research scientist with Pri- vate Enterprise Research Center at Texas A&M University.

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  • Is the investment factor a proxy for time-varying investment opportunities? The US and international evidence
    • 1 Introduction
    • 2 Research methodology
    • 3 Data
      • 3.1 The US sample
      • 3.2 The G-7 samples
    • 4 Empirical results for the US market
      • 4.1 Empirical GARCH specifications
      • 4.2 Estimation results of the benchmark model
      • 4.3 Robustness checks
      • 4.4 The investment factor and other proxies for investment opportunities
      • 4.5 ICAPM with three factors
    • 5 International evidence
    • 6 Concluding remarks
    • Acknowledgements
    • References

Macro-financial-determinants-of-the-great-financial-cri_2014_Journal-of-Bank.pdf

Journal of Banking & Finance 44 (2014) 114–129

Contents lists available at ScienceDirect

Journal of Banking & Finance

journal homepage: www.elsevier .com/locate / jbf

Macro-financial determinants of the great financial crisis: Implications for financial regulation q

http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jbankfin.2014.03.001 0378-4266/� 2014 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

q We would like to thank the Editor, an anonymous referee, Luc Laeven, Ross Levine, Marco Pagano, Andrea Sironi, Randy Stevenson, Gianfranco Torriero, Giuseppe Zadra and seminar participants at IFABS Conference and ISTEIN seminar for helpful comments. This paper’s findings, interpretations, and conclusions are entirely those of the authors and do not necessarily represent the views of the World Bank and the Italian Banking Association. ⇑ Corresponding author. Tel.: +39 02 58362725.

E-mail addresses: [email protected] (G. Caprio Jr.), [email protected] (V. D’Apice), [email protected] (G. Ferri), [email protected] (G.W. Puopolo).

Gerard Caprio Jr. a, Vincenzo D’Apice b,c, Giovanni Ferri d,e, Giovanni Walter Puopolo f,⇑ a Williams College, United States b Economic Research Department of Italian Banking Association, Italy c Istituto Einaudi (IstEin), Italy d LUMSA University of Rome, Italy e Center for Relationship Banking & Economics – CERBE, Italy f Bocconi University, CSEF and P. Baffi Center, Italy

a r t i c l e i n f o

Article history: Received 15 April 2012 Accepted 4 March 2014 Available online 29 March 2014

JEL classification: G01 G15 G18 G21

Keywords: Banking crisis Government intervention Regulation

a b s t r a c t

We provide a cross-country and cross-bank analysis of the financial determinants of the Great Financial Crisis using data on 83 countries from the period 1998 to 2006. First, our cross-country results show that the probability of suffering the crisis in 2008 was larger for countries having higher levels of credit deposit ratio whereas it was lower for countries characterized by higher levels of: (i) net interest margin, (ii) concentration in the banking sector, (iii) restrictions to bank activities, (iv) private monitoring. The bank-level analysis reinforces these results and shows that the latter factors are also key determinants across banks, thus explaining the probability of bank crisis. Our findings contribute to extend the analyt- ical toolkit available for macro and micro-prudential regulation.

� 2014 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

1. Introduction ment (BCBS, 2010a), has focused more on the stability of the finan-

As much as it was known that the Great Depression of the 1930s was the acid test for any reputable macroeconomic theory, the out- break of the Great Financial crisis in 2008 has shaken not only financial institutions, but also long-held beliefs and theories on how the regulation of the financial system should be structured, with renewed emphasis on macro-prudential supervision and reforming micro-prudential regulation.

In turn, the financial regulatory reforms have sparked a vibrant debate among institutions, academics and practitioners. On the one hand, the Basel Committee, starting with its consultative docu-

cial system, arguing that the costs of the new regulation will be much lower than the relative benefits (see BCBS, 2010b; MAG, 2010). On the other hand, the banking industry argues that the new measures could put economic growth at risk imposing high costs on the financial intermediaries and, in turn, on economic sys- tems (IIF, 2010). In the middle, some academics argue that the prin- ciples implicitly or explicitly subscribed by the Basel Committee may be questionable to secure more resilient financial systems (see among others Ferri, 2001; Barth et al., 2004, 2006; Caprio, 2010).

In this debate, we study whether a wide set of banking indica- tors, such as business model, funding strategy, market structure, efficiency, stability, profitability, regulation, the quality of gover- nance and a measure of financial globalization could explain the ex-post incidence of the crisis both across countries (that is, at the macro-level) and across banks (that is, at the micro-level), and be added to the analytical toolkit available for prudential supervision. Specifically, in the cross-country analysis we investi- gate the (macro) financial determinants of the probability that a country experienced the crisis in 2008, as reported by Laeven and Valencia (2010), using data on 83 countries from 1998 to 2006. In the cross-bank analysis, by contrast, we pursue a twofold

G. Caprio Jr. et al. / Journal of Banking & Finance 44 (2014) 114–129 115

objective: first, using the information on the 10 largest banks by average total asset during 1998–2006 for all the countries consid- ered in our sample we focus on the determinants of the probability that a bank experienced some form of distress during the Great Financial crisis, to understand whether the main results obtained in the cross-country analysis hold also with bank-level data. Sec- ond, we can address the potential problem of omitted variables arising from the cross-country analysis.

A novel feature of our approach with respect to the related lit- erature1 consists in measuring the financial indicators used as explanatory variables taking into account all the information relative to the 9 years that preceded the Great Financial crisis and not just to the most recent years before its outbreak. In fact, we firmly believe that the early signals of what happened, starting from 2008, were already embedded in the financial characteristics of the countries and their banks several years before the crisis erupted. Then, the use of such ‘‘back-in-time variables’’ is justified by the fact that these contain information about (i) the health of the financial system in the past and (ii) how this evolves over time. As a consequence, they may be useful in understanding the genesis of the crisis.

Our cross-country analysis shows that, first, countries with a higher credit/deposit ratio had higher probability to be in crisis in 2008. Next, a few determinants negatively impinged on the probability of crisis. Specifically, such probability was lower for countries with a higher level of net interest margin, higher level of concentration in the banking sector, higher level of private mon- itoring, and more restrictions on bank activities. Moving to the cross-bank analysis, it is important to underline that our micro- level evidence contributes to reinforce these results by showing that they hold not only across countries, but also across banks. In other words, we find that the financial factors found at the coun- try-level are also key determinants at the bank-level, thus explain- ing the probability of bank crisis as well.

In particular, among the various determinants of the crisis, a crucial role is played by the net interest margin indicator. This factor tends to be more significant the greater the importance of deposits. In fact, banks that had a large and stable deposit base likely paid less for funds (thus reaching a higher level of net inter- est margin) than the ones who had to rely on wholesale markets, which proved to be more volatile. At the same time, net interest margin also tends to be lower in banking systems more extensively engaged in securitization, both directly as securitization fees dis- place interest earnings (and interest on the securities is accruing to off-balance sheet entities), and indirectly as securitization boosts the supply of credit from non-bank entities which leads, other things equal, to a decrease in the lending rates.

The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 provides a review of the literature. Section 3 describes the data and the dif- ferent models employed in the econometric specifications, focus- ing first on the analysis across countries and then across banks. Section 4 looks at the empirical results, while Section 5 offers some robustness checks. Finally, Section 6 concludes discussing some lessons and policy implications.

2. Literature review

Over the years, several scholars have studied financial crises, focusing on their possible causes and above all on predicting their time of occurrence. Historically, however, the economic analysis showed more success at identifying the incidence of the crises across firms, banks or countries (i.e. cross-sectional) rather than at forecasting the timing of crises (i.e. in time-series analysis). For instance, focusing on the financial crisis of 2008, Rose and Spiegel

1 See among the others Rose and Spiegel (2009), Claessens et al. (2010), Barth et al (2004) and Beck et al. (2006).

.

(2009) use a latent variable approach to investigate whether a wide number of factors could have predicted the incidence and the sever- ity of the crisis for many countries. They find few clear reliable indi- cators of the incidence of the great recession in the pre-crisis data: more precisely, only the natural logarithm of 2006 real GDP per capita and the size of the equity market run-up prior to the crisis result in a significant causality with the severity of the crisis.

In this regard, the closest paper to our cross-country analysis is Barth et al. (2004). Using their database on bank regulation and supervision in 107 countries to assess the relationship between specific regulatory and supervisory practices and banking-sector development, efficiency, and stability, they show that the likeli- hood of suffering a major crisis is greater the more countries: (1) restrict bank activities (or prevent or discourage diversification of income through non-traditional activities); (2) put limits on for- eign bank entry/ownership; (3) exacerbate moral hazard via a more generous deposit insurance scheme. On the other hand, nei- ther capital stringency nor official supervisory powers – which approximate respectively pillars one and two of Basel II – are robustly linked to banking crises when controlling for other super- visory/regulatory policies. Similarly, there is no significant associa- tion between private-sector monitoring and the likelihood of a banking crisis and only a weak positive relationship between gov- ernment ownership and the likelihood of a crisis.

Our macro-level analysis differs from theirs along several dimensions. First, we focus on a different crisis episode, that is the Great Financial crisis started in 2008. Second, we use a different set of macro-financial indicators as possible explanatory variables of the probability for a country to be in crisis in 2008. Third, we do not restrict the observations to a precise year (for example 1999 as done by the already cited authors), but rather we take the annual mean of these financial factors from 1998 to 2006, to take into account the long-term evolution of the financial sector before the crisis broke out internationally. Finally, we reinforce our cross- country results by also investigating the determinants of the crisis at the bank-level.

Before the great financial crisis broke out in 2008, Demirguc- Kunt and Detragiache (1998) investigate the relationship between banking crises and measures aimed at increasing the level of finan- cial liberalization in 53 countries during the period 1980–1995. They find that banking crises are more likely to occur in liberalized financial systems. However, they do not consider data on regula- tion and supervision. Mehrez and Kaufman (2000) employ a mul- tivariate probit model for 56 countries from 1977 to 1997 to examine how the level of corruption (i.e. transparency) affects the likelihood of financial crises. They report that, in countries where the government policy is characterized by lack of transpar- ency, banks have incentives to raise credit above the optimal level, thus increasing the probability of a banking crisis.

Using data on 69 countries from 1980 to 1997, Beck et al. (2006) study the impact of bank concentration, bank regulation, and national institutions on the probability that a country can experi- ence a systemic banking crisis. They also examine the international differences in bank capital regulations, rules restricting bank entry, regulatory restrictions on bank activities and the overall institu- tional environment. They show that crises are less likely to occur in economies characterized by: (1) more concentrated banking sys- tems; (2) fewer regulatory restrictions on banks (i.e. lower barriers to bank entry and fewer restrictions on bank activities); (3) national institutions that facilitate competition. In addition, Shehzad and De Hann (2009) analyze the impact of financial reform on systemic and non systemic banking crises in 85 coun- tries, from 1973 to 2002, finding that certain types of financial reform reduce the likelihood of crisis.

Focusing on the Great Financial crisis, Giannone et al. (2011) study cross-country differences in output loss between 2008 and

116 G. Caprio Jr. et al. / Journal of Banking & Finance 44 (2014) 114–129

2009 using indices of country risk for more than one hundred countries. They find that the set of policies that favour liberaliza- tion in credit markets are negatively correlated with the output growth in 2008 and 2009.

Moreover, Claessens et al. (2010) investigate the causes of a broader set of financial crises finding that the recent crisis has four major features similar to earlier episodes. First, in most countries, asset prices rapidly increased before the crisis. Second, several key economies experienced episodes of credit booms ahead of the cri- sis. Third, there was a dramatic expansion in a variety of marginal loans. Fourth, the regulation and the supervision of financial insti- tutions failed to keep up with developments. They also find that the recent crisis was different from the previous ones in, at least, four new aspects. First, there was a widespread use of complex and opaque financial instruments. Second, the interconnectedness among financial markets, nationally and internationally, with the United States at the core, had increased in a short time period. Third, the degree of leverage of financial institutions accelerated sharply. Fourth, the household sector played a central role.

Moving to bank-level data, Beltratti and Stulz (2012) analyze 98 large banks from 20 countries and investigate whether bank per- formance is related to bank-level governance, country-level gover- nance, bank balance sheet and profitability characteristics before the crisis, and country-level regulation. Their key results are: (1) banks that the market favored in 2006 showed especially poor returns during the crisis; (2) banks with more shareholder-friendly boards performed worse during the crisis; (3) banks in countries with stricter capital requirement regulations and with more inde- pendent supervisors performed better; (4) banks in countries with more powerful supervisors experienced worse stock returns; (5) large banks with more Tier 1 capital and more deposit financing at the end of 2006 showed significantly higher returns during the crisis.

Moreover, also focusing on micro-level data, De Jonghe (2010) analyzes the impact of revenue diversity of financial corporations on the banking system stability and investigates why some banks are better able to shelter themselves from the storm. He shows that the shift to non-traditional banking activities, which generate com- missions, trading and other non-interest income, increases individ- ual banks risks and thus reduces the stability of the financial system. Finally, DeYoung and Torna (2013) investigate whether and how banks’ shift from traditional to nontraditional income sources contributed to the failure of hundreds of US depository institutions between 2008 and 2010.

3. Data and methodology

In this section we describe the data and the econometric models we employ in the analysis (i) across countries and (ii) across banks, whereas in Section 4 we show the corresponding results. We start from the cross-country analysis.

4 For four countries, and more precisely Macau, Malta, Bahrein and Oman, we had to determine the status crisis/no crisis on our own by analyzing the financial stability review provided by their central banks. In fact, all the information corresponding to the independent variables is available whereas the information about the dependent variable is not available in Laeven and Valencia (2010).

5 We give here the synthetic description of the variables. For more details, see Appendix B.

6 This variable only includes customer deposits and does not include interbank

3.1. Cross-country analysis

In the macro-level analysis we employ aggregate (that is, coun- try-level) information on the country’s financial system from the period 1998 to 2008 for 83 countries, including OECD as well as non-OECD and developing countries.2,3

2 See Appendix A for the list of countries included in the sample. 3 We select 1998 as starting year because the measurement of our regulation

variables begins in that year. In fact, we borrow these variables from the three surveys conducted by Barth et al. (2004). Specifically, survey I was conducted to assess the state of regulation in 1998, survey II to assess the state of regulation in 2002, and finally, survey III to assess the state of regulation in 2005.

In order to identify the macro and financial structure factors contributing to the Great Financial crisis, we run cross-country regressions on the determinants of the probability that a country experienced the crisis in 2008. Specifically, for 83 countries, we estimate several probit models in which the dependent variable, that is CRISIS, is a dummy equal to one if the country is classified as either borderline crisis or systemic crisis according to the definition introduced by Laeven and Valencia (2010),4 and zero otherwise. Moreover, we investigate the impact of the degree of financial globalization on the probability of crisis by estimating an instrumental-variables probit model accounting for this variable’s potential endogeneity. Finally, we also test the role of the country’s governance quality as explanatory variable of the probability of crisis through the indices provided by Kaufman et al. (2010).

Here are the variables employed in the cross-country specifications.

As independent variables we employ a wide set of country indicators to take into account the various characteristics of the national financial systems, such as, e.g., banking efficiency, stability, profitability, market structure, quality of governance and regulation. In particular, we use the following banking indica- tors, all measured as means over the period 1998–20065:

(i) NET_INTEREST_MARGIN, measuring the country bank’s net interest revenue, as a share of its interest-bearing assets, to proxy the banking system orientation towards traditional activity;

(ii) ROA, return on assets (net income to total assets); (iii) ROE, the country return on equity (net income to total

equity); (iv) COST_INCOME, total costs as a share of total income of all the

country’s banks, proxying bank efficiency; (v) Z-SCORE, the aggregate bank z-score;

(vi) CREDIT_DEPOSIT, the country’s loan/deposit ratio.6 While a high ratio indicates high intermediation efficiency, a ratio sig- nificantly above one suggests reliance on possibly unstable non-deposit funding (see Beck et al., 2000; Beck et al., 2010; Merrouche and Nier, 2010)7;

(vii) CONCENTRATION, the share of the country’s three largest banks in all country’s banks assets. While big banks could reduce risk via enhanced asset diversification, they could raise risk if managers and shareholders anticipate ‘‘too-big- to-fail’’ policies by regulators;

(viii) BANK_ASSETS_GDP, the ratio between the country’s deposit money bank assets and its GDP.

We also take into account the degree of financial globalization with the following variable:

INT_DEBT_ISS_GROSS_GDP, the gross flow of international bond issues by the country scaled by its GDP, proxying the degree to

deposits. 7 The ratio of credit to deposit measures how much non-deposit funding are used

to increase domestic credit. These alternative sources of funding include short-term debt (e.g. commercial paper and asset-backed commercial paper) and long-term debt (e.g. bonds). Though desirable, a breakdown of funding into short-term and long-term instruments is not available either from International Monetary Fund, such as International Financial Statistics, or from international bank-level databases, such as Bankscope (see Huang and Ratnovski, 2009).

Table 1 Summary statistics.

Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. Observations Annual Average Change

Dependent variables CRISIS (Probit Models) 0.23 0.42 0 1 83 CRISIS ORDERED (Ordered Probit Model) 0.36 0.71 0 2 83 CRISIS_COST_GDP (Tobit Model) 1.11 3.2 0 18.5 83

Independent variables Banking variables NET_INTEREST_MARGIN 4.31 2.35 0.88 12.78 83 �0.07 ROA 1.03 1.13 �1.82 4.38 83 0.13 ROE 10.73 10.09 �26.57 50.08 83 1.17 COST_INCOME 67.74 14.91 29.78 108.45 83 �1.28 Z-SCORE 11.25 6.63 4.2 39.17 81 �0.8 CREDIT_DEPOSIT 102.19 38.6 35.83 248.78 83 0.51 CONCENTRATION 67.42 18.95 24.8 100 83 �0.63 BANK_ASSETS_GDP 70.25 43.15 15.99 185.11 83 1.63 INT_DEBT_ISS_GROSS_GDP 21.44 25.62 0.04 145.98 73 2.26

Banking regulation variables RESTRICTION 7.43 1.74 3.33 12 83 PRIVATE MONITORING 8.23 1.29 5.5 11 83 CAPITAL 6.15 1.49 3 10 83 ENTRY 7.41 0.87 3.67 8 83 SUPERVISION 10.94 2.31 5 14.25 82

Governance quality variables KKZ_MEAN 0.45 0.86 �1.4 1.93 83 KKZ_RULELAW 0.45 0.93 �1.39 1.95 83 KKZ_REGQUAL 0.57 0.81 �1.3 1.92 83 KKZ_VOICE 0.42 0.86 �1.56 1.63 83 KKZ_POLSTAB 0.2 0.9 �2.1 1.58 83 KKZ_GOVEFF 0.55 0.94 �1.4 2.16 83 KKZ_CONCORR 0.48 1.04 �1.17 2.48 83

Table describes the summary statistics of the variables used in our cross-country analysis. For each country, the independent variables are computed as the annual average over the period 1998–2006. For the Independent variables ‘‘Banking variables’’ we also computed the Annual average change, defined as the average change of the variables between two consecutive years. Detailed definitions of the variables are given in Appendix B.

8 All the models are estimated with heteroschedasticity-robust standard errors.

G. Caprio Jr. et al. / Journal of Banking & Finance 44 (2014) 114–129 117

which a country’s financial system is interlinked with international financial markets.

We also use five measures of bank regulation, taken from Barth et al. (2004), and computed as mean of their three surveys:

(i) RESTRICTION, the value of the ‘‘Overall Restrictions’’ index, measuring the extent of regulatory restrictions on bank activities in securities markets, insurance, real-estate, and owning shares in non-financial firms;

(ii) PRIVATE MONITORING, the ‘‘Private Monitoring’’ index, mea- suring the degree to which regulations empower, facilitate, and encourage the private sector to monitor banks;

(iii) CAPITAL, the ‘‘Capital Regulation’’ index, which can be con- sidered as a proxy of Basel Pillar 1;

(iv) ENTRY, the ‘‘Entry Requirements’’ index, proxying the hur- dles for entrants to get a bank license;

(v) SUPERVISION, the ‘‘Official Supervisory’’ index, measuring the degree to which the country’s bank supervisor has the authority to take specific actions. It can be seen as a measure of Basel Pillar 2.

Regarding the institutional quality of the country we use the indices of governance quality provided by Kaufman et al. (2010): ‘‘Voice and Accountability’’, ‘‘Political Stability and Absence of Vio- lence’’, ‘‘Government Effectiveness’’, ‘‘Regulatory Quality’’, ‘‘Rule of Law’’ and ‘‘Control of Corruption’’.

Table 1 reports the summary statistics (together with their clas- sification group) of all the variables we just described. Only in the case of the Independent Variables ‘‘Banking Variables’’ we also compute the annual average change, defined as the average change

of the variables between two consecutive years. In particular, the latter statistics provides some information about the (average) evolution of the variables over 1998–2006, i.e. if they have increased or diminished and the extent of this change.

We start our investigation of the determinants of the probabil- ity that a country experienced the crisis in 2008 by estimating the following probit model8:

ProbðCRISISc ¼ 1jXÞ ¼ Uðaþ b1NET INTEREST MARGINc þ b2CREDIT DEPOSITc þ b3CONCENTRATIONc þ b4RESTRICTIONc þ b5PRIVATE MONITORINGcÞ; ð1Þ

where the dependent variable, CRISISc, is a dummy equal to 1 if the country c is classified as crisis and 0 otherwise, U is the standard normal cumulative distribution function, and X is the set of explan- atory variables.

The choice of the explanatory variables is motivated by several reasons. First, we believe that one of the most important banking causes of the recent crisis is the shift from the ‘‘originate to hold (OTH)’’ model to the ‘‘originate to distribute (OTD)’’ model (see for example Berndt and Gupta, 2009; Mian and Sufi, 2009; Stiglitz, 2010; FSA, 2009; D’Apice and Ferri, 2010; Trichet, 2009). Therefore, the variable NET_INTEREST_MARGIN allows testing whether higher incentives to perform traditional banking activities could be a deterrent against the crisis. In fact, a lower net interest margin implies higher incentives for traditional banks to look for other income sources (that is, ‘‘searching for yield’’) and to shift

118 G. Caprio Jr. et al. / Journal of Banking & Finance 44 (2014) 114–129

to new business models (Beck et al., 2000, 2010; Gambacorta and Marques-Ibanez, 2011).

Moreover, one of the most striking features of the great finan- cial crisis was the impact on the money markets and global liquid- ity (Cecchetti, 2009; Allen and Carletti, 2008; Brunnermeier, 2009). Thus, we use the variable CREDIT_DEPOSIT to account for the role of maturity mismatching. In fact, a ratio significantly above one suggests that private sector lending is funded with non-deposit sources, which could result in funding instability (Beck et al., 2000, 2010).

Another important aspect of the country’s resilience to the crisis concerns the structure of the banking system, and in particular the degree of bank concentration (Carletti, 2010). In truth, economic theory provides two conflicting predictions on the relationship between concentration and stability. On the one hand, for the char- ter value hypothesis (Allen and Gale, 2000a, 2000b, 2004) concen- tration enhances stability, whereas, on the other hand, the optimal contracting hypothesis (Boyd et al., 2005) argues exactly the oppo- site. In our empirical work, the use of the variable CONCENTRA- TION is meant to capture the structure of the banking system.

Finally, many analyses argue that the flaws in the regulatory framework played a very important role in leading to the crisis (Demirguc-Kunt and Serven, 2009; Coval et al., 2009; Buiter, 2007; De Michelis, 2009). To account for the country’s regulatory regime, we use the corresponding indices provided by Barth et al. (2004). In our base model (1), RESTRICTION proxies the regulatory restrictions on banking activities, whereas PRIVATE MONITORING proxies Basel Pillar 3.

We present the results of cross-country model (1) in Section 4.1.

3.1.1. The link with the financial globalization In the previous analysis of the macro-financial determinants of

the crisis we disregarded the role played by the degree to which a country’s financial system is interlinked with international financial markets. Of course, this could be a primary factor, especially considering that international contagion was one of the chief channels to spread the crisis worldwide. Thus, here, we extend our cross-country analysis and include this indicator together with the other determinants of the crisis. Specifically, we follow the related literature and measure the country’s degree of financial globalization using the gross flow of international bond issues as percentage of its GDP, that is the variable INT_DEBT_ISS_GROSS_GDP.

In any case, the inclusion of this independent variable may raise problems of endogeneity. On the one hand, indeed, an extensive literature underlined the possibility that the extent of financial globalization of a country depends not only on its level of develop- ment and its policies, but is also influenced by deeper fundamental factors.9 On the other hand, however, it is also true that, in our mod- els, the explanatory variables are measured as the average of the annual observations from 1998 to 2006, a circumstance which could attenuate (or even eliminate) the inverse causality effect of the prob- ability of crisis on the independent variables (measured much before 2008). To better understand this issue, we compute the cross-coun- try correlation between the variable INT_DEBT_ISS_GROSS_GDP observed in 2008 and its annual mean from 1998 to 2006. We find that the resulting correlation is very high (about 0.95), indicating a strong persistence of these fundamental factors cited by the litera- ture,10 and thus suggesting that the inclusion of this variable could indeed raise problems of endogeneity.

9 See for example Acemoglu and Johnson (2005), Collins (2005), Faria and Mauro (2005), Kose et al. (2006), Spiegel (2008), Tytell and Wei (2005), and Wei (2006).

10 Actually, the variable INT_DEBT_ISS_GROSS_GDP is quite persistent over time. In fact, all cross-country correlations between any two years of this variable within the period 1998–2006 are higher than 0.7. Results are available upon request.

In order to avoid biased estimates when measuring the proba- bility of crisis in 2008, we control for the endogeneity issue by introducing several instrumental variables denoting the various characteristics of the countries. In our setting, this translates into using an instrumental variables probit model, which is practically equivalent to estimating simultaneously the following two equations:

INT DEBT ISS GROSS GDPc ¼ aþ c1NET INTEREST MARGINc þ c2CREDIT DEPOSITc þ c3CONCENTRATIONc þ c4RESTRICTIONc þ c5PRIVATE MONITORINGc þ c6LEGAL ORIGIN � SOCIALISTc þ c7ETHNIC FRACTIONALIZATIONc þ c8SCALED CAPITAL DISTANCEc þ ec;

ð2Þ

ProbðCRISISc ¼ 1jXÞ ¼ Uðaþ b1INT DEBT ISS GROSS GDPc þ b2NET INTEREST MARGINc þ b3CREDIT DEPOSITc þ b4CONCENTRATIONc þ b5RESTRICTIONc þ b6PRIVATE MONITORINGcÞ: ð3Þ

In Eq. (2), we linearly estimate INT_DEBT_ISS_GROSS_GDP using as control variables all the regressors of the base model (1) plus the variables: (i) LEGAL ORIGINS – SOCIALIST taken from La Porta et al. (1997 and following updates), capturing the legal characteris- tics of former-socialist countries, (ii) ETHNIC FRACTIONALIZATION taken from Alesina et al. (2003), measuring the degree of ethnic het- erogeneity in the countries, and (iii) SCALED_CAPITAL_DISTANCE. The latter variable is computed as the distance between the capital of each country and the USA capital divided by the highest distance from Washington available in our sample, to guarantee the homo- geneity of this measure with the other variables of our setting. In our framework, this ratio captures the distance of the country from the origin of the recent crisis (scaled by the maximal distance from the USA).

In Eq. (3), the probit model uses the value of INT_DEBT_ISS_ GROSS_GDP from Eq. (2) together with the major cross-country determinants of the crisis found in the previous section, whereas the dependent variable does not change.

The aforementioned variables prove good instruments in our regression.11 In fact, to avoid endogeneity, it is crucial that the instruments are at the same time: (1) VALID (i.e., correlated with the financial globalization proxy), and (2) EXOGENOUS (i.e., uncorre- lated with the probability of the crisis).

We control that our instrumental variables satisfy both condi- tions, and find that they are: (1) related to financial globalization (that is, they are valid), and (2) uncorrelated with the error term (that is, they are exogenous),12 thus supporting the view that, in our framework, they are indeed good instruments.

We report the cross-country results of the link with the degree of financial globalization in Section 4.1.1.

3.1.2. The link with the quality of governance Another important macro-variable in determining the probabil-

ity that a country experienced the crisis in 2008 could be the

11 They are also among the most widely used in the related literature (see Beck et al., 2006; Ponczek and Mattos, 2009; Glaeser et al., 2004).

12 Results are not reported and are available upon request.

15 In fact, it is not suitable to assign an identical value to all banks belonging to the same country independently of the financial situation associated to the individual banks (that is, independently of whether each bank is in distress or not).

16 In other words, the dependent variable would exactly be a linear combination of such explanatory variables.

17 The ‘‘random-intercept model’’, also called ‘‘mixed-effects model’’, contains both

G. Caprio Jr. et al. / Journal of Banking & Finance 44 (2014) 114–129 119

quality of governance. In this section we precisely address this issue by investigating the role of this factor as possible cross- country determinant of the crisis, using as a proxy the governance indices provided by Kaufman et al. (2010).

We start by testing the explanatory power of the variable KKZ_MEAN (which is the simple average of the six indicators pro- vided by Kaufman et al. (2010)13 when added to our cross-country model (Eq. (1)). However, since the correlation between this indica- tor and the variable NET_INTEREST_MARGIN is very high (i.e. �0.60), we follow a standard two-step procedure to deal with the issue of multicollinearity among the two variables. Namely, we first regress KKZ_MEAN on NET_INTEREST_MARGIN and a constant, that is:

KKZ MEANc ¼ c0 þ c1NET INTEREST MARGINc þ nc; ð4Þ

then, we use the estimated residual nc from (4) as explanatory var- iable in the following probit model:

ProbðCRISISc ¼ 1jXÞ ¼ Uðaþ b1NET INTEREST MARGINc þ b2CREDIT DEPOSITc þ b3CONCENTRATIONc þ b4RESTRICTIONc þ b5PRIVATE MONITORINGc þ b6KKZ MEAN RESIDUALcÞ; ð5Þ

where the variable KKZ_MEAN_RESIDUAL is indeed the estimated residual nc from (4). In this way, KKZ_MEAN_RESIDUAL captures the effect of governance quality that is not explained by the variable NET_INTEREST_MARGIN.

After controlling for multicollinearity, we can properly investi- gate the explanatory power of the quality of governance as possi- ble cross-country determinant of the crisis. Section 4.1.2 reports the results.

3.2. Cross-bank analysis

The analysis across banks has a twofold objective: first, by investigating the determinants of the probability that a bank expe- rienced some form of distress during the crisis, it allows us to understand whether the results obtained in the cross-country anal- ysis hold also with bank-level data, that is whether the main deter- minants identified above are also ‘‘micro-founded’’; second, it also allows us to address the potential problem of omitted variables arising from the cross-country analysis.

In fact, one of the main drawbacks of the cross-country analysis developed so far is exactly the potential problem of omitted vari- ables, since our macro-approach does not allow the inclusion of dummy variables identifying each country. Therefore, the effects attributed to the variables explicitly considered in the previous sections could instead be originated by other country characteristics.

In this section we follow Laeven and Levine (2009) and collect information on the 10 largest banks by average total asset during 1998–2006 for all the countries considered in our sample. Because some countries have data on fewer than 10 banks, our final sample consists of 755 banks across 83 countries.14 Using the same defini- tions provided in the cross-country analysis (see Section 3.1 and Appendix B) but obviously referring to each bank in the sample, we compute the variables ROA_BL, ROE_BL, COST_INCOME_BL, Z-SCORE_BL, NET_INTEREST_MARGIN_BL and CREDIT_DEPOSIT_BL.

13 See Appendix B for further details. 14 Focusing on the 10 largest banks enhances comparability among countries, as in

Laeven and Levine (2009), and at the same time avoids an unbalanced distribution of tail events. Moreover, our sample accounts for a huge portion of the total banking system assets in each country.

On the contrary, the variables CONCENTRATION, RESTRICTION, PRI- VATE MONITORING, CAPITAL, ENTRY and SUPERVISION cannot be computed for each bank, since they are defined only at the country level. Thus, in the latter case, we assign the same value to all banks belonging to the same country. Consistently with the methodology described in the cross-country analysis, all the bank-level variables are computed as the annual mean over the period 1998–2006.

In the cross-bank analysis, however, we cannot use the same dependent variable employed so far, i.e. CRISIS, because first, that variable is defined only at the country level,15 and second, regress- ing CRISIS on regressors like country dummies, RESTRICTION and MONITORING is not statistically feasible since the corresponding model would generate perfect (or deterministic) dependence between CRISIS and such regressors.16

For these reasons, here we use as dependent variable CRISIS_BL, a dummy variable being 1 if the bank failed or received a govern- ment recapitalization during the crisis and 0 otherwise. In fact, such variable not only is defined at the bank-level but, certifying that the bank experienced some form of distress during the crisis, it is very much in line with the dependent variable used in the cross-country analysis.

In order to investigate whether the results obtained in the macro-level analysis hold also with bank-level data, we estimate the following cross-bank probit model:

ProbðCRISIS BLi ¼ 1jXÞ ¼Uðaþb1NET INTEREST MARGIN BLi þb2CONCENTRATIONiþb3CREDIT DEPOSIT BLi þb4RESTRICTIONiþb5PRIVATE MONITORINGiÞ; ð6Þ

presenting the corresponding results in Section 4.2. Next, we address the omitted variable problem and run a bank-

level random-intercept model17 that allows controlling for all the unmeasured factors associated with each country. In our setting, by allowing each country to have a different intercept, such model is essentially equivalent to the approaches based on the introduction of country dummies.

In practice, we estimate the following (random-intercept) pro- bit model:

ProbðYb;c ¼ 1jXb;c;ucÞ ¼ Uðaþ bXb;c þ zb;cucÞ; ð7Þ

where c is the index identifying the country, b is the index identify- ing the bank, Yb,c corresponds to the dummy variable CRISIS_BL, Xb,c is the set of bank-level variables described above together with the country-level regulatory variables defined in Section 3.1, and zb,c are the covariates corresponding to the random effects and can be used to represent the random intercept in each country. Specifically, in random-intercept models, zb,c is simply the scalar 1.

In our bank-level setting, the term uc � N(0, r2u) is the error related to the specific country, it has zero mean and is common to all banks from the same country. In other words, it identifies all the unmeasured factors associated with country c that affect the probability for a bank of that country to be in crisis. On the con- trary, eb,c � N(0, r2e) concerns the error related to bank b in country

fixed effects and random effects. The fixed effects are analogous to the standard regression coefficients and are estimated directly, whereas the random effects are not directly estimated but are summarized according to their estimated variances. Specifically, random effects may take the form of random intercepts. In a cross- section model, random effects are useful for modelling intra-group correlation; that is, observations in the same panel are correlated because they share common panel- level random effects.

19 The reader should bear in mind that our results pertain to the financial crisis reaching its climax in 2008 and generalizing them to less extreme crises cases may be inappropriate.

20 We also try to interact this variable with CONCENTRATION to test whether bigger

120 G. Caprio Jr. et al. / Journal of Banking & Finance 44 (2014) 114–129

c, it has zero mean and identifies all the unmeasured bank-specific factors which affect the probability of bank crisis.18

Moreover, compared to a standard probit model, in random- intercept models there is just one additional parameter to esti- mate, that is r2u. Specifically, if the estimation of r2u turns out to be significant, it implies that each country would have a different intercept (more precisely, the intercept of country c would be a + uc), meaning that all the unmeasured factors associated with each country, thus captured by its intercept, would indeed affect the probability for a bank to be in crisis. On the contrary, if the esti- mation of r2u turns out to be insignificant, then all unmeasured factors associated with each country do not influence the probabil- ity of bank crisis.

All the results regarding the cross-bank analysis are described in Section 4.2.

4. Results

In this section we report the results of the various models described in the previous sections. We start from the cross-country results.

4.1. Cross-country determinants of the crisis

The evidence corresponding to the probit model (1) is reported in column Probit 1 of Table 2. First, the coefficient of NET_INTER- EST_MARGIN is negative and statistically significant. This indicates that countries with a higher level of net interest margin had a lower probability to be in crisis in 2008. A higher net interest income is associated with less securitization, and might also be picking up the impact of competition (e.g. less competitive systems such as Australia and Canada survived the crisis quite well, even though this evidence might be related to other features of their regulatory or institutional settings as well). Indeed, a higher level of net interest margin represents a strong incentive for banks to undertake traditional activities, such as loans, instead of riskier non-traditional activities such as securities trading (IMF, 2012; Gambacorta and Marques-Ibanez, 2011).

Second, the coefficient of CREDIT_DEPOSIT is positive and statis- tically significant, meaning that countries with a higher credit/ deposit ratio had a higher probability to be in crisis in 2008. As a matter of fact, a ratio significantly above one suggests reliance on possibly unstable non-deposit funding. While some of these alter- native sources may be as stable as customer deposits, i.e. retail bonds funding, many other can prove highly volatile, such as in the case of interbank or money market loans. Thus, considering that the crisis featured a dramatic drop in the availability of whole- sale funding, our evidence suggests that in most countries the alternative funding sources were of the volatile type.

Third, the coefficient of CONCENTRATION is negative and statisti- cally significant, indicating that countries with a higher level of con- centration in the banking sector had a lower probability to be in crisis in 2008, a finding consistent with the absence of crisis, for example, in Australia or Canada. This result seems in line with the empirical evidence provided by Beck et al. (2006) who find that cri- ses are less likely to occur in economies with more concentrated banking systems. Indeed, a more concentrated banking system implies that the bank’s charter value is higher and, as a conse- quence, the incentives for bank owners and managers to take exces- sive risk are lower. Apparently, the beneficial bank’s charter value effect on risk taking seems to have prevailed – in our sample of countries – on the possible additional detrimental effect passing

18 In fact, the random-intercept probit model (7) may also be stated in terms of the latent linear response Y⁄b,c = a + bXb,c + uc + eb,c, with Yb,c = 1 if Y⁄b,c > 0 and Yb,c = 0 otherwise, where Y⁄b,c denotes the latent variable.

through the impact of the level of competition on manager compen- sation schemes. Compensation policy seemed, in fact, to be a crucial factor during the crisis: countries with a lot of merger activity in banking tended to have compensation systems that favored growth of banks’ balance sheets, i.e. rewarding return without much atten- tion, if any, to the risk, and these countries seemed to have the most severe problems during the crisis (see Barth et al., 2012).

Fourth, the coefficient of RESTRICTION is negative and statisti- cally significant. This suggests that more restrictions on bank activ- ities lowered the probability for the country to be in crisis in 2008. In other words, the regulatory-induced specialization in the bank- ing sector enhances financial stability.19 However, it is important to notice that this result contrasts with earlier studies (Barth et al., 2006), and might in fact be a proxy for enforcement, that is countries that cared about imposing activity restrictions might have been enforcing other regulations, and thus it might be the enforcement rather than the restrictions per se that matters. Indeed, Barth et al. (2012) cite numerous breakdowns in enforcement of regulation as major causes of the recent crisis. Unfortunately, we do not have good direct measures of such enforcement to test this interpretation.

Fifth, the coefficient of PRIVATE MONITORING is negative and statistically significant, meaning that countries with a higher level of private monitoring had a lower probability to be in crisis in 2008. This result appears in contrast with the previous literature, which found private monitoring important in a variety of areas but practically with no influence on the stability of financial sys- tems (see Barth et al., 2006). However, we should recall that earlier research did not pertain to the evidence related to the recent crisis. Yet, this finding is in line with the goal of the third pillar of the Basel II Capital Accord.

In addition to the baseline model (1) discussed above, we esti- mate 9 cross-country probit models to investigate whether the other variables described in Section 3.1 have a role in explaining the probability of country crisis. Specifically, in each model we add to the five determinants of Eq. (1), in turn and one per time, one of the following variables: COST_INCOME, Z_SCORE, ROA, ROE, BANK_ASSET_GDP, CAPITAL, ENTRY, SUPERVISION, GDP_L and POP_L. The latter macro-variables GDP_L and POP_L are respectively the logarithm of country’s GDP and the logarithm of country’s population. Columns Probit 2 to Probit 10 of Table 2 show interesting evidence. First, the results of the baseline model are robust to the inclusion of these other regressors. Second, macro-variables like measures of bank efficiency (COST-INCOME), stability (Z-SCORE), profitability (ROA and ROE), bank size (BANK_ASSETS_GDP),20 the logarithm of GDP and the logarithm of population are never significant at the conventional levels. More- over, controlling for the five determinants characterizing the probit model (1), the coefficients of the variables CAPITAL and ENTRY turn out to be positive and significant.21 In particular, with regard to CAP- ITAL, this suggests that higher levels of initial capital restriction increased the probability for the country to be in crisis in 2008.

Indeed, one lesson we learnt from the great financial crisis is that capital adequacy was almost irrelevant in determining the occurrence of the crisis. For example, Northern Rock got in trouble just few weeks after the bank had announced plans to return excess capital to shareholders. On the other hand, the importance of capital in lowering the risk-taking approach followed by banks

and more concentrated banking systems can explain the probability of the crisis. However, also the interaction variable is not significant. The result is not reported in the tables but it is available upon request.

21 However, none of these two variables showed a significant coefficient if regressed individually against the dependent variable.

Table 2 Cross-country analysis.

Variables Probit 1 Probit 2 Probit 3 Probit 4 Probit 5

NET_INTEREST_MARGIN �0.2414** �0.2316** �0.2506** �0.2704** �0.2402** (0.1117) (0.1175) (0.1145) (0.116) (0.1107)

CREDIT_DEPOSIT 0.0174*** 0.0174*** 0.0167*** 0.0180*** 0.0173***

(0.0045) (0.0046) (0.005) (0.0047) (0.0046) CONCENTRATION �0.0235** �0.0231** �0.0239** �0.0244** �0.0232*

(0.0115) (0.0112) (0.0114) (0.0119) (0.0119) RESTRICTION �0.4298*** �0.4343*** �0.4611*** �0.4125*** �0.4355***

(0.1252) (0.1264) (0.1239) (0.1247) (0.1275) PRIVATE MONITORING �0.3858** �0.3766** �0.4079** �0.3605** �0.3886**

(0.1734) (0.1662) (0.1759) (0.1649) (0.1807) COST-INCOME �0.004

(0.0109) Z-SCORE �0.0193

(0.0238) ROA 0.2215

(0.1851) ROE �0.0037

(0.0203) Constant 5.9711*** 6.1322*** 6.7117*** 5.5357*** 6.0496***

(2.0933) (2.2314) (2.0606) (1.9792) (2.2514) Observations 83 83 81 83 83 Pseudo R-squared 0.4176 0.4184 0.4023 0.4258 0.418

Probit 6 Probit 7 Probit 8 Probit 9 Probit 10

NET_INTEREST_MARGIN �0.2465* �0.2567** �0.2476** �0.2543** �0.2434** (0.1311) (0.1199) (0.1195) (0.1203) (0.1059)

CREDIT_DEPOSIT 0.0174*** 0.0184*** 0.0164*** 0.0208*** 0.0172***

(0.0048) (0.0052) (0.0045) (0.0051) (0.0053) CONCENTRATION �0.0237** �0.0251** �0.0225* �0.0235** �0.0217*

(0.0118) (0.0122) (0.0118) (0.0119) (0.0111) RESTRICTION �0.4338*** �0.4658*** �0.4575*** �0.4983*** �0.4480***

(0.1255) (0.1211) (0.1191) (0.1304) (0.1344) PRIVATE MONITORING �0.3867** �0.3898** �0.3899** �0.3871** �0.4189**

(0.1724) (0.1838) (0.1779) (0.1709) (0.1731) BANK ASSETS_GDP �0.0003

(0.0052) CAPITAL 0.2319*

(0.129) ENTRY 0.3645*

(0.2059) SUPERVISION 0.1576

(0.1007) GDP_L 0.0213

(0.1085) POP_L 0.0504

(0.1802) Constant 6.0551*** 4.8571** 3.5369 4.3758* 5.3179*

(2.1986) (2.3979) (2.5927) (2.5379) (2.9828) Observations 83 83 83 82 82 Pseudo R-squared 0.4176 0.4536 0.4376 0.4407 0.418

Table shows the estimation of several cross-country probit models, starting from our baseline model (Eq. (1)) shown in Column Probit 1. In all these models, the dependent variable is CRISIS (which is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the country is classified as either borderline crisis or systemic crisis by Laeven and Valencia and 0 otherwise). Robust standard errors are reported in parenthesis. Summary statistics are given in Table 1 and the definitions of explanatory variables are provided in Appendix B. * Statistical significance of the parameter at 10% significance level. ** Statistical significance of the parameter at 5% significance level. *** Statistical significance of the parameter at 1% significance level.

G. Caprio Jr. et al. / Journal of Banking & Finance 44 (2014) 114–129 121

works only in specific circumstances. In fact, Laeven and Levine (2009), combining the Bankscope data with the regulatory data- base, show that higher capital does lead to safer banks when there is a strategic owner, but when ownership is highly diversified, higher capital is associated with more risk taking. In other words, when there is no strategic (that is large) owner, everyone free rides and looks for higher returns. On the contrary, banks keep a more conservative approach when a strategic owner has control rights, which is like having a high franchise value, just as some concen- trated-ownership banks adopted the practice of plowing more bonuses into deferred equity to keep managers more risk averse.

The evidence relative to ENTRY indicates that a higher level of entry restriction increased the probability for the country to be in crisis in 2008. This result is in accordance with the mainstream

view that entry restrictions build inefficiencies and, hence, contrib- ute to instability. It should also be noticed that our result is not in contrast with the role of concentration. In fact, as shown by Beck et al. (2006), competition reduces fragility when controlling for concentration. Finally, the regulatory variable SUPERVISION is not significant at the conventional levels.

Before closing this section, it is worthwhile assessing the quan- titative importance of the cross-country determinants of the crisis within our base model (1). In this regard, we computed the mar- ginal effect, that is the change in the probability of country’s crisis for an infinitesimal change of the independent variables, obtaining that NET_INTEREST_MARGIN and CREDIT_DEPOSIT are the two most important regressors among the banking variables, whereas RESTRICTION is the most important one among the regulatory

Table 3 Cross-country analysis: financial globalization and governance quality.

Variables Probit IV Probit All Probit 11 Probit 12 Probit 13

NT_DEBT_ISS_GROSS_GDP �0.0163 0.017 (0.023) (0.0667)

NET_INTEREST_MARGIN �0.1774** �0.4399** �0.2393** �0.2309** �0.2660** (0.0789) (0.1934) (0.1075) (0.1051) (0.122)

CREDIT_DEPOSIT 0.0175*** 0.0207* 0.0140** 0.0147** 0.0153***

(0.0051) (0.0106) (0.006) (0.0059) (0.0056) CONCENTRATION �0.0189 �0.0336** �0.0308** �0.0297** �0.0277**

(0.0119) (0.0165) (0.0125) (0.012) (0.0119) RESTRICTION �0.3730*** �0.8098*** �0.3096* �0.3448** �0.2896*

(0.123) (0.2629) (0.1636) (0.1573) (0.1691) PRIVATE MONITORING �0.3491** �0.5210** �0.5440*** �0.5494*** �0.5171***

(0.1396) (0.2115) (0.1629) (0.1674) (0.1615) COST-INCOME 0.0083

(0.0222) Z-SCORE �0.0192

(0.0404) ROA 0.4895

(0.35) ROE 0.0135

(0.0338) BANK_ASSETS_GDP �0.0115

(0.0163) CAPITAL 0.2643

(0.2017) ENTRY 0.1152

(0.2516) SUPERVISION 0.2147

(0.2681) GDP_L 0.081

(0.1488) POP_L 0.1306

(0.2943) KKZ_MEAN_RESIDUAL 1.0833**

(0.5033) KKZ_RULELAW_RESIDUAL 0.8967**

(0.4453) KKZ_REGQUAL_RESIDUAL 0.9282*

(0.5123) Constant 5.5077** 2.7754 6.9808*** 7.1977*** 6.3805**

(2.3141) (7.8998) (2.3426) (2.3833) (2.3569) Observations 73 70 83 83 83 Pseudo R-squared 0.4821 0.4728 0.4673

Column Probit IV shows the results of the instrumental variables probit model (3) taking also into account the endogeneity issue due to the inclusion of the variable INT_DEBT_ISS_GROSS_GDP among the main determinants of the crisis, i.e. Eq. (2). In columns Probit 11–13 we report the results corresponding to the role of the quality of governance as possible cross-country determinant of the crisis. Finally, in column Probit All we test whether all the macro-variables belonging to the categories ‘‘Banking Variables’’ and ‘‘Banking Regulation Variables’’ shown in Table 1 have a role in determining the probability for a country to be in crisis in 2008 when considered jointly, that is all together as explanatory variables. In all these probit models the dependent variable is a dummy equals to 1 if the country is classified as crisis and 0 otherwise. Robust standard errors are reported in parenthesis. Summary statistics are given in Table 1 and the definitions of the explanatory variables are provided in Appendix B. * Statistical significance of the parameter at 10% significance level. ** Statistical significance of the parameter at 5% significance level. *** Statistical significance of the parameter at 1% significance level.

122 G. Caprio Jr. et al. / Journal of Banking & Finance 44 (2014) 114–129

variables. Column D Probit of Table 4 shows the results and high- lights that a marginal increase of NET_INTEREST_MARGIN deter- mines a 4.4% reduction in the probability of crisis, whereas a marginal increase of CREDIT_DEPOSIT determines a 0.3% increase in such probability. Moreover, a change of NET_INTEREST_MAR- GIN, CREDIT_DEPOSIT and RESTRICTION in the range of �0.5 to +0.5 standard deviations from the mean implies, respectively, a change of 10.5%, 12.4% and 13.9% in the probability of crisis.

4.1.1. The degree of financial globalization: empirical evidence In this section we show the empirical evidence corresponding

to the instrumental variable probit model, i.e. Eqs. (2) and (3), employed in Section 3.1.1 to investigate the degree to which a country’s financial system is interlinked with international finan- cial markets.

As highlighted in column Probit IV of Table 3, we find that the results of the baseline model (1) remain almost unchanged since the variable INT_DEBT_ISS_GROSS_GDP is insignificant. This sug-

gests that the probability for a country to be in crisis in 2008 is not influenced by the degree to which the country’s financial sys- tem is interlinked with international financial markets, after con- trolling for the relevant macro-determinants of the crisis. The only difference with the model outlined in Eq. (1) is that the vari- able CONCENTRATION becomes insignificant in this specification. For what concerns the instrumental variable approach, we find that the correlation coefficient between the Eqs. (2) and (3), i.e. rho, is equal to 0.85 while the likelihood ratio test of whether such coefficient is significantly different from zero gives a p-value of 0.09, thus confirming our suspect that the variable INT_DEBT_ISS_ GROSS_GDP is indeed endogenous.

Before closing this paragraph, and in view of the cross-country results highlighted in the previous section, we also test whether all the macro-variables discussed so far (and more precisely, those belonging to the categories ‘‘Banking Variables’’ and ‘‘Banking Reg- ulation Variables’’ shown in Table 1), when considered jointly, that is all together as explanatory variables, have a role in determining

Table 4 Marginal effects, ordered probit and tobit specifications.

Variables D Probit Ord. Probit Tobit M_Coll

NET_INTEREST_MARGIN �0.0442** �0.2526** �1.4939** (0.0196) (0.1033) (0.7019)

CREDIT_DEPOSIT .0031*** 0.0185*** 0.1076*** 0.0174***

(0.001) (0.0048) (0.0369) (0.0045) CONCENTRATION �.0043** �0.0320*** �0.1958** �0.0235*

(0.0022) (0.0121) (0.096) (0.0115) RESTRICTION �.0786*** �0.4720*** �2.7722*** �0.556***

G. Caprio Jr. et al. / Journal of Banking & Finance 44 (2014) 114–129 123

the probability for a country to be in crisis in 2008. Therefore, we estimate a cross-country probit model which includes all the afore- mentioned variables at the same time (including as well the instru- mented measure of financial globalization) and show the results in column Probit All of Table 3. We notice that, in such a specification, the implications of our base model (Eq. (1)) still hold. In fact, the five variables characterizing our cross-country analysis are confirmed as major determinants of the crisis, whereas on the con- trary, all the other variables, as suspected, are insignificant.

(0.0269) (0.1243) (0.9715) (0.133) PRIVATE MONITORING �.0705** �0.3248** �1.565 �0.386*

(0.0287) (0.1569) (0.9675) (0.1734) NIM_RESIDUAL �0.241*

(0.1117) Constant 32.0186*** 5.8697**

(10.3615) (2.0716) Observations 83 83 83 83 Pseudo R-squared 0.4176 0.3682 0.1893 0.4176

Column D Probit shows the marginal effects of the cross-country variables char- acterizing the baseline model (1), that is the change in the probability of country crisis for an infinitesimal change of the independent variables. Column Ord. Probit shows the results of the ordered probit model in which the dependent variable is ORDERED_CRISIS, i.e. a dummy equal to 1 if the country is classified as borderline crisis, 2 if the country is classified as systemic crisis by Laeven and Valencia (2010) and 0 otherwise. Column Tobit reports the results of the cross-country Tobit model with left-censoring limit equal to 0 and dependent variable corresponding to CRISIS_COST_GDP (the variable is provided by Laeven and Valencia (2010), and measures the country’s cost of public support to the financial system in terms of its GDP). See section 5.2 for more information about this variable. Finally, Column M_Coll reports the results of the probit model (9) employed to resolve the potential multicollinearity among the explanatory variables of our baseline model. Robust standard errors are reported in parenthesis. Summary statistics are given in Table 1 and the definitions of the explanatory variables are provided in Appendix B. * Statistical significance of the parameter at 10% significance level. ** Statistical significance of the parameter at 5% significance level. *** Statistical significance of the parameter at 1% significance level.

4.1.2. The quality of governance: empirical evidence In this section we report the results characterizing the use of

the quality of governance as possible cross-country determinant of the crisis, as discussed in Section 3.1.2. We start by showing the empirical evidence corresponding to Eq. (5).

As highlighted in column Probit 11 of Table 3, we find that the coefficient of the variable KKZ_MEAN_RESIDUAL is positive and significant, implying that countries with stronger governance had a higher probability to be in crisis. This result is in line with the nature of the recent financial crisis, as it was mostly a developed countries crisis. For what concerns the other macro-variables, most importantly, the results of our base specification do not change.

We also investigate whether a more appropriate index with respect to KKZ_MEAN provides different results from the ones just discussed. In particular, given the financial nature of our study, we believe that the most appropriate indices among the ones provided by Kaufman et al. (2010) are the variables KKZ_REGQUAL and KKZ_RULELAW.22 Thus, we test their role in explaining the probabil- ity of country crisis using the same methodology employed in the case of the variable KKZ_MEAN. More precisely, since the correlation between these two indices and NET_INTEREST_MARGIN is, respec- tively, �0.56 and �0.66, we apply the same two-step procedure described in Eqs. (4) and (5). Columns Probit 12 and 13 of Table 3 show the corresponding results. We notice that, first, these two indi- ces exhibit positive and significant coefficients, in line with the results characterizing the variable KKZ_MEAN, and second, the main implications of our baseline model (1) do not change.

23 In light of this result, we also tried to identify four possible country characteristics and investigated whether they had an impact on the probability for a bank to be in crisis. More precisely: (i) We selected four possible country characteristics based on: (1) the legal origin, (2) the degree of economic freedom, (3) the degree of political freedom and (4) our cluster analysis. (ii) For each characteristic, we formed groups of countries and allocated each country to a specific group according to the value of the characteristics chosen. (iii) Finally, we included dummies representing the groups of countries (and thus the common characteristics) in our bank-level base model (Eq.

4.2. Cross-bank results

In this section we present the empirical evidence corresponding to the cross-bank analysis described in Section 3.2.

We start by showing the results of the bank-level model (6). Interestingly, in column BL1 of Table 5 we notice that all the vari- ables used in the cross-country model (1), except CONCENTRATION, are also significant when measured using individual bank data. It is worth mentioning that CONCENTRATION was already weakly sig- nificant or insignificant at all in some of the cross-country estimates seen in the previous sections. In addition, consistently with the analysis provided by the cross-country models 2–9 (see Table 2), we estimate other seven bank-level probit models in which, in turn and one per time, we add to the five explanatory variables of Eq. (6) one of the following variables: COST_INCOME_BL, ROA_BL, ROE_BL, Z_SCORE_BL, CAPITAL, ENTRY, and SUPERVISION. Columns BL2-BL8 of Table 5 highlight that our micro-results are robust to the inclu- sion of such bank-level regressors as control variables, confirming also that the macro-financial factors we have identified above are indeed key determinants at micro-level as well.

The results of the random-intercept model described in Eq. (7) are instead shown in Table 6. We notice that the estimated stan- dard deviation ru (shown in the second part of the table labeled ‘‘Random-effects’’) is significant, being equal to 1.93 with a stan- dard error of 0.49, and represents the estimated standard deviation

22 See the definition of the two variables in Appendix B.

in the intercept. This result, together with the evidence provided by the likelihood-ratio test, highlights the presence of random effects at the country-level and suggests that all the unmeasured factors associated with each country affect the probability of bank crisis. Moreover, the first part of the table shows the estimated coefficients of the cross-bank variables we identified. Except CON- CENTRATION, they are all significant, meaning that our results are robust when considering unmeasured effects at the country level. In other words, on the one hand we showed that there exist unmeasured factors associated to each country that affect the probability for a bank to be in crisis. Nevertheless, when we take into account such factors, thus allowing each country to have a dif- ferent intercept, our results do not change qualitatively.23

5. Robustness checks

In this section we investigate whether our macro-results are sensitive to different definitions of the country crisis. Therefore, we perform two model specifications as robustness checks: an ordered probit model (in which the dependent variable is a dummy valued zero in case of no country crisis, one in case of borderline crisis, and two in case of systematic crisis), and a tobit model (in

(6)). Unfortunately, none of the proposed country-characteristics turned out to be significant. The corresponding analysis and results are not reported in the paper and are available upon request.

Table 5 Bank-level probit.

Variables Probit BL1 Probit BL2 Probit BL3 Probit BL4 Probit BL5 Probit BL6 Probit BL7 Probit BL8

NET_INTEREST_MARGIN_BL �0.1644*** �0.1582*** �0.1667*** �0.1691*** �0.1718*** �0.1627*** �0.1707*** �0.1658*** (0.0369) (0.0366) (0.0427) (0.0379) (0.0384) (0.0379) (0.0369) (0.037)

CREDIT_DEPOSIT_BL 0.0047*** 0.0039*** 0.0047*** 0.0047*** 0.0044*** 0.0046*** 0.0047*** 0.0045***

(0.0012) (0.0013) (0.0012) (0.0012) (0.0012) (0.0012) (0.0012) (0.0012) CONCENTRATION 0.0056 0.0054 0.0055 0.0051 0.0087* 0.0057 0.0059 0.0045

(0.0046) (0.0046) (0.0047) (0.0046) (0.0048) (0.0045) (0.0046) (0.0042) RESTRICTION �0.2064*** �0.2014*** �0.2067*** �0.2116*** �0.2290*** �0.2046*** �0.2106*** �0.2000***

(0.0431) (0.0442) (0.0429) (0.0433) (0.0482) (0.0432) (0.045) (0.042) PRIVATE MONITORING �0.1871*** �0.2037*** �0.1871*** �0.1901*** �0.1661*** �0.1801*** �0.1827*** �0.2114***

(0.0619) (0.0628) (0.0619) (0.0614) (0.0629) (0.0651) (0.0621) (0.0689) COST/INCOME_BL �0.0021

(0.0035) ROA_BL 0.0118

(0.0724) ROE_BL 0.0069

(0.007) ZSCORE_BL �0.0018

(0.0013) CAPITAL 0.0234

(0.0471) ENTRY 0.1726*

(0.093) SUPERVISION �0.0438

(0.0328) Constant 0.9948* 1.3006** 1.0006* 1.0142* 0.9886 0.7705 �0.3115 1.7138**

(0.5951) (0.6258) (0.5898) (0.6035) (0.6555) (0.7426) (0.9375) (0.799) Observations 755 744 755 754 684 755 755 755 Pseudo R-squared 0.2108 0.1911 0.2108 0.2148 0.2287 0.2113 0.2178 0.2147

Table shows, using information on individual data of the banks (micro-level analysis), the estimation of several probit models, starting from the baseline bank-level model (Eq. (6)) shown in Column Probit BL1. In all these models, the dependent variable is CRISIS_BL which is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the bank failed or received a recapitalization by the government during the crisis and 0 otherwise. Robust standard errors are reported in parenthesis. The corresponding methodology and variables are described in Section 3.2. * Statistical significance of the parameter at 10% significance level. ** Statistical significance of the parameter at 5% significance level. *** Statistical significance of the parameter at 1% significance level.

24 As reported in Laeven and Valencia (2010), there are three types of support: (i) liquidity support, (ii) gross restructuring costs, and (iii) asset purchases and guarantees. We disregard liquidity support for three reasons. First, strictly speaking, it is provided by the Central Bank and not by the Government. Second, as such, it is impossible to break it down by country across the Euro zone. Third, more importantly, liquidity support may be a really transient measure whose cost could be inherently limited. Thus, we use the conservative measure of Government support given by the sum of restructuring costs and asset purchases (we also disregard the entity of the guarantees as it is difficult to quantify what their real ex-post cost would actually be).

124 G. Caprio Jr. et al. / Journal of Banking & Finance 44 (2014) 114–129

which the proxy of country crisis is the ratio of financial support offered by the government to the country’s GDP).

5.1. Borderline versus systemic country crisis

As with most situations in life, there is black and white but there is also grey. In fact, some countries crossed the Great Financial crisis quite well, while, among those bowing down, some suffered more. In this section we account for the different degree of intensity of the country crisis and distinguish between countries experiencing a borderline crisis and countries truly subject to a systemic crisis, as reported by Laeven and Valencia (2010). To accomplish this task, we estimate the same cross-country probit model (1) using a differ- ent dependent variable, i.e. ORDERED_CRISIS, which is a dummy equal to 1 if the country is classified as borderline crisis, 2 if the country is classified as systemic crisis and 0 otherwise.

Column Ord. Probit of Table 4 shows that the main results char- acterizing our cross-country analysis of the crisis are not sensitive to the distinction between borderline versus systemic crisis, thus reinforcing the role of our financial determinants. In other words, the important characteristics of the financial systems outlined in Sections 3.1 and 4.1 (maturity mismatch, business model, etc.) keep playing a crucial role also on countries not so severely affected by the crisis.

5.2. The cost of the crisis

As second robustness check, we consider an alternative proxy of the country crisis based on the extent to which the Government had to employ public finances to avoid the meltdown of the national banking system. This indicator reflects a certain type of costs associated with the crisis and captures the willingness of

the governments to help the private banking system overcoming the financial turmoil. We measure the country’s cost of the crisis as the sum of the various forms of support provided by the Govern- ment to the national banking system expressed in terms of the country GDP.24 By definition, this variable has a lower bound of zero in case of countries either not in crisis, or, alternatively, giving no financial support.

From an econometric standpoint, the lower bound on the range of the dependent variable suggests using a Tobit rather than an OLS specification. We follow this approach and estimate a Tobit model in which the dependent variable is CRISIS_COST_GDP, i.e. the coun- try’s cost of public support to the financial system as a ratio to its GDP, whereas the explanatory variables are the five determinants of the crisis shown in Eq. (1).

Column Tobit of Table 4 highlights that the results obtained with the baseline model (1) remain almost unchanged. The only difference is that PRIVATE MONITORING is no longer significant at the conventional levels (however, it has a p-value of 11%).

5.3. Multicollinearity

Our independent variables characterizing the cross-country model (1) draw on a quite heterogeneous set of financial

Table 6 Cross-bank analysis: random-intercept probit model.

Mixed- effects 1

Mixed- effects 2

Mixed- effects 3

Mixed- effects 4

Mixed- effects 5

Mixed- effects 6

Mixed- effects 7

Mixed- effects 8

Fixed-effects variables NET_INTEREST_MARGIN_BL �0.3813** �0.3631** �0.3793** �0.3983** �0.3994** �0.3781** �0.3969** �0.3840**

(0.1636) (0.163) (0.1664) (0.1643) (0.1662) (0.165) (0.1641) (0.1634) CREDIT_DEPOSIT_BL 0.0084*** 0.0076** 0.0084*** 0.0085*** 0.0078** 0.0084*** 0.0085*** 0.0084***

(0.003) (0.0033) (0.0031) (0.003) (0.0031) (0.0031) (0.003) (0.003) CONCENTRATION 0.0036 0.003 0.0037 0.0022 0.009 0.0043 0.0052 0.0013

(0.0203) (0.02) (0.0204) (0.0203) (0.0196) (0.0205) (0.0202) (0.0206) RESTRICTION �0.7790*** �0.7565*** �0.7791*** �0.7874*** �0.7758*** �0.7709*** �0.7851*** �0.7548***

(0.2907) (0.2865) (0.2909) (0.2895) (0.2797) (0.2933) (0.293) (0.2881) PRIVATE MONITORING �0.5702* �0.5873* �0.5710* �0.5710* �0.5279* �0.5288* �0.5595* �0.6012*

(0.3096) (0.3048) (0.3102) (0.3072) (0.2979) (0.3162) (0.3066) (0.3139) COST/INCOME_BL �0.0002

(0.0115) ROA_BL �0.0123

(0.1914) ROE_BL 0.0231

(0.0217) ZSCORE_BL �0.0022

(0.0029) CAPITAL 0.195

(0.2403) ENTRY 0.7781

(0.564) SUPERVISION �0.0836

(0.1616) Constant 5.6642 5.7775 5.6683 5.582 5.4415 3.9669 �0.259 6.8461

(4.0077) (3.9826) (4.0123) (3.9857) (3.8831) (4.4391) (5.5221) (4.6632) Random-effects

std. dev. ru 1.948869*** 1.899072*** 1.950832*** 1.937124*** 1.841586*** 1.969257*** 1.901419*** 1.920985***

(0.4933981) (0.4834884) (0.4948426) (0.4905849) (0.4739024) (0.4976826) (0.4789264) (0.4910517) LR test vs. base regression

(Prob>=chibar2) 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000

Observations 755 744 755 754 684 755 755 755

Table shows the estimation of several random-intercept probit models based on the following: Prob(Yb,c = 1|Xb,c,uc) = H (a + bXb,c + zb,cuc), where c is the index identifying the country, b identifies the bank, Yb,c corresponds to the dummy variable CRISIS_BL, Xb,c is the set of bank-level variables described in Section 3.2 together with the country-level regulatory variables defined in Section 3.1, zb,c are the covariates corresponding to the random effects. Finally, the country error term is uc � N(0, r2u). Robust standard errors are reported in parenthesis. The corresponding methodology and variables are described in Section 3.2. * Statistical significance of the parameter at 10% significance level. ** Statistical significance of the parameter at 5% significance level. *** Statistical significance of the parameter at 1% significance level.

G. Caprio Jr. et al. / Journal of Banking & Finance 44 (2014) 114–129 125

indicators. For example, on one side we have country-level banking variables like NET_INTEREST_MARGIN, COST_INCOME, ROA and ROE, observed annually and related to the aggregate balance sheet of the banks, so belonging to the category of financial performance indicators. On the contrary, the regulatory variables RESTRICTION, PRIVATE MONITORING, CAPITAL, ENTRY and SUPERVISION are the indices reported in the three surveys by Barth et al. (2004), and somehow reflect the countries’ financial background (structure). Given the different nature of our independent variables, one may suspect that, at the country level, the latter variables (‘‘i.e. struc- ture variables’’) could not only have a direct impact on the proba- bility for a country to be in crisis in 2008, but might also affect some of the ‘‘performance variables’’, giving rise to a problem of multicollinearity.

In this section, we investigate the issue of potentially-correlated regressors at the macro-level and show that, once multicollinearity is taken into account, our cross-country results still hold.

In order to detect the presence of multicollinearity, we start by computing the cross-country correlation between the independent variables used in the probit model (1). We find that all the correla- tion coefficients are smaller than |0.3| except that between the variables RESTRICTION and NET_INTEREST_MARGIN which is 0.38.25 This evidence suggests that, in general, the linear relationship between any pair of these macro-variables is quite weak, and most

25 Results are not reported in the paper but are available upon request.

importantly, that the ‘‘structure variables’’ do not have a big influ- ence on the ‘‘performance variables’’. However, the presence of a cor- relation coefficient close to 0.4 might induce a minimum suspect of multicollinearity between the variables NET_INTEREST_MARGIN and RESTRICTION.

To check whether this suspect is justified, we estimate a slightly different cross-country model based on a two-step procedure. We first regress NET_INTEREST_MARGIN on RESTRICTION and a con- stant, that is:

NET INTEREST MARGINc ¼ c0 þ c1RESTRICTIONc þ nc; ð8Þ

then, we use the estimated residual n from (8) as explanatory vari- able in the following cross-country probit model:

ProbðCRISISc ¼ 1jXÞ ¼Uðaþb1NIM RESIDUALc þb2CREDIT DEPOSITc þb3CONCENTRATIONc þb4RESTRICTIONc þb5PRIVATE MONITORINGcÞ; ð9Þ

where the variable NIM_RESIDUAL is indeed the estimated residual n from regression (8).26

The rationale of this two-step procedure is quite intuitive. By regressing NET_INTEREST_MARGIN on RESTRICTION, in fact, we are isolating the effects of regulatory restrictions on the interest

26 Both Eqs. (8) and (9) are estimated with heteroskedasticity robust standard errors.

126 G. Caprio Jr. et al. / Journal of Banking & Finance 44 (2014) 114–129

margin, and let the residual capture all the other factors affecting the dependent variable.

Column M_Coll of Table 4 shows that substituting the variable NIM_RESIDUAL in lieu of NET_INTEREST_MARGIN in Eq. (9) does not alter the validity of our cross-country base specification. In fact, the estimated coefficient of NIM_RESIDUAL is negative and significant, while all the other regressors remain qualitatively unchanged.

6. Conclusions

Although there is a growing consensus on the principle that regaining stability – today as much as it did in the 1930s – requires better regulation of the marketplace (see D’Apice and Ferri, 2010), the agreement as to what ‘better’ might entail is far from being established. More of the same seems hardly a satisfactory response. In previous decades, banking systems underwent a deep transformation progressively moving away from a type of banking centered on personal relationships to hinge on more standardized and impersonal approaches. The change, theorized by some con- sultants and academics, and designed to reach unprecedented high returns, prescribed gearing the banks with financial markets and modifying the bank business model. This had a notable impact on the transformation of some banking systems, in particular those that shifted toward a new business model (that is originate-to-dis- tribute, OTD), while others remained fastened to the traditional business model (that is originate-to-hold, OTH). Our evidence sug- gests that a more traditional banking system had a lower probabil- ity to be in crisis in 2008. Thus, a return to an old style banking, like the one prevailing during the Quiet Period in the US after the Great Depression (Gorton, 2009), is being considered in some quarters.

Furthermore, the results stated in this paper, both at the coun- try-level and at the bank-level, provide additional fuel to that dis- cussion and can help policymakers calibrate new regulations, by achieving a reasonable trade-off between financial stability and economic growth, and contribute to extend the analytical toolkit available for macro-prudential supervision and reforming micro- prudential regulation. In fact, the traditional banking business model, that is banks with higher net interest margin, has proved resilient through the crisis. At the same time, the higher capital levels prescribed by Basel III will penalize commercial banks. The need for traditional banks to increase their own funds will have two consequences. First, since capital is costly and there is a race for deposits, banks will have to increase the price of their loans, making credit more expensive with negative consequences on growth and no additional positive effects on stability. Second, there will be a tendency to reduce lending in order to shrink the denom- inator of capital ratios (de Larosière, 2011). Also, higher capital requirements, in response to the vulnerabilities highlighted in the paper, require some care. In recent years, both countries featur- ing traditional approaches to banking, such as in Ireland, Spain, and

CRISIS dummy equal to 1 if the country is clas Valencia (2010) and 0 otherwise.

NET_INTEREST_MARGIN annual mean from 1998 to 2006 of the its interest-bearing assets (source: Beck

ROA and ROE ROA = annual mean of return on assets mean of return on equity (net income

COST_INCOME annual mean value of total costs as a s (Source: Beck et al. (2010))

Z-SCORE annual mean of aggregate bank z-score ratio of return on assets plus capital-as

CREDIT_DEPOSIT annual mean from 1998 to 2006 of priva saving deposits in deposit money bank

Eastern Europe, and those which moved to a more securitized approach, as the US, plunged into serious crises. The fact that cap- ital was mostly not significant should give regulators pause: like doctors who used leeches (and thought that they were helping patients), or econometricians who go into a dark room looking for a black cat that is not there and scream ‘I’ve got it’, they may be settling for a popular cure in lieu of the one that actually works. And as Laeven and Levine (2009) find, the impact of capital requirements might vary with the ownership structure of banks.

Finally, low interest rate contexts, for instance after the bust of the dotcom and subprime bubbles, could lead banks to search for yields in more complex non-traditional activities that increase their exposure to new risks. Regulators should also consider that, compared to traditional credit risks, evaluating these new risks is more difficult, especially those related to the complex financial contracts so deeply entrenched in the OTD model, which played a major role in the recent crisis. This suggests ending or reversing prolonged periods of low interest rates, the typical background of the broader regulatory framework artificially boosting securitiza- tion, and that measures to divulge and verify more information about risk taking in banking (so that market monitoring might finally work) are desiderable.

To conclude, the Authorities should carefully ponder the finan- cial determinants of the Great Crisis, especially now that a major increase in minimum bank capital is being enforced within the framework of Basel 3 and micro-and-macro-prudential regulation is to be implemented in most countries.

Appendix A. Sample information

Countries that experienced a Systemic Crisis are: Austria, Bel- gium, Denmark, Germany, Iceland, Ireland, Latvia, Luxembourg, Netherlands, United Kingdom, USA.

Countries that experienced a Borderline Crisis: Greece, Hun- gary, Kazakhstan, Portugal, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland.

Other countries in the sample are: Argentina, Australia, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Belize, Bolivia, Botswana, Brazil, Bulgaria, Burundi, Canada, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Croatia, Czech Republic, Egypt, El Salvador, Estonia, Finland, Guatemala, Guyana, Honduras, Hong Kong, India, Indonesia, Israel, Italy, Japan, Jordan, Kenya, Korea, Kuwait, Lithuania, Macau, Macedonia, Malaysia, Mali, Malta, Mau- ritius, Moldova, Morocco, New Zealand, Norway, Oman, Pakistan, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Singapore, Slovakia, South Africa, Sri Lanka, Swazi- land, Thailand, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey, Uruguay.

Appendix B

Definition of the variables used in the cross-country analysis.

sified as either borderline crisis or systemic crisis by Laeven and

accounting value of the bank’s net interest revenue, as a share of et al., 2010) (net income to total assets) from 1998 to 2006. ROE = annual

to total equity) from 1998 to 2006 (Source: Beck et al. (2010)) hare of total income of all country’s banks from 1998 to 2006

from 1998 to 2006 (Source: Beck et al. (2010)). The z-score is the set-ratio to the 5-years standard deviation of return on assets te credit by deposit money banks as a share of demand, time and

s (Source: Beck et al. (2010))

CONCENTRATION annual mean from 1998 to 2006 of the share of the country’s three largest banks in all country’s bank assets (Source: Beck et al. (2010))

BANK_ASSETS_GDP annual mean of the ratio between the country’s deposit money bank assets and its GDP from 1998 to 2006 (Source: Beck et al. (2010))

INT_DEBT_ISS_GROSS_GDP annual mean from 1998 to 2006 of the gross flow of international bond issues by the country scaled by its GDP (Source: Beck et al. (2010))

RESTRICTION mean value of the ‘‘Overall Restrictions’’ index reported in the three surveys by Barth et al. (2004). This index measures the degree to which banks face regulatory restrictions on their activities in: (a) securities markets, (b) insurance, (c) real-estate, and (d) owning shares in non-financial firms. The index can take values from 0 to 4 for each of these four sub-categories, where 4 indicates the most restrictive regulations on this sub-category of bank activity. Thus, the index of overall restrictions can potentially range from 0 to 16

PRIVATE MONITORING Mean value of the ‘‘Private Monitoring’’ index reported in the three surveys by Barth et al. (2004). The index measures the degree to which regulations empower, facilitate, and encourage the private sector to monitor banks. It reflects the information on whether: (1) bank directors and officials are legally liable for the accuracy of information disclosed to the public, (2) banks must publish consolidated accounts, (3) banks must be audited by certified international auditors, (4) 100% of the largest 10 banks are rated by international rating agencies, (5) off-balance sheet items are disclosed to the public, (6) banks must disclose their risk management procedures to the public, (7) accrued interest/principal, though unpaid, enter the income statement while the loan is still non-performing, (8) subordinated debt is allowable as part of capital, and (9) there is no explicit deposit insurance system and no insurance was paid the last time a bank failed. The private monitoring index has a minimum value of 0 and a maximum value of 9, where larger numbers are associated with a greater regulatory empowerment of private monitoring of banks

CA PITAL Mean value of the ‘‘Capital Regulation’’ index reported in the three surveys by Barth et al. (2004). This index includes information on (1) the extent of regulatory requirements regarding the amount of capital banks must hold and (2) the stringency of regulations on the extent to which the source of funds that count as regulatory capital can include assets other than cash or government securities, borrowed funds, and on whether the regulatory/supervisory authorities verify the sources of capital. Large values indicate more stringent capital regulations

ENTRY Mean value of the ‘‘Entry Requirements’’ index reported in the three surveys by Barth et al. (2004). The index essentially counts the number of requirements for obtaining a banking license: (1) draft by-laws; (2) intended organizational chart; (3) financial projections for first 3 years; (4) financial information on main potential shareholders; (5) background/experience of future directors; (6) background/experience of future managers; (7) sources of funds to be used to capitalize the new bank; and (8) market differentiation intended for the new bank

SUPERVISION Mean value of the ‘‘Official Supervisory’’ index reported in the three surveys by Barth et al. (2004). This index measures the degree to which the country’s commercial bank supervisory agency has the authority to take specific actions. It is determined by the information provided on the following features of official supervision: (1) does the supervisory agency have the right to meet with external auditors about banks? (2) are auditors required to communicate directly to the supervisory agency about elicit activities, fraud, or insider abuse? (3) can supervisors take legal action against external auditors for negligence? (4) can the supervisory authority force a bank to change its internal organizational structure? (5) are off-balance sheet items disclosed to supervisors? (6) can the supervisory agency order the bank’s directors or management to constitute provisions to cover actual or potential losses? (7) can the supervisory agency suspend the directors’ decision to distribute: a) dividends? b) bonuses? c) management fees? (8) can the supervisory agency supersede the rights of bank shareholders-and declare a bank insolvent? (9) can the supervisory agency suspend some or all ownership rights? (10) can the supervisory agency: a) supersede shareholder rights? b) remove and replace management? c) remove and replace directors? The official supervisory index has a minimum value of 0 and a maximum value of 14, where larger numbers indicate a greater power

KKZ_VOICE Mean value of ‘‘Voice and Accountability’’ index from 1998 to 2006. This index reflects perceptions of the extent to which a country’s citizens are able to participate in selecting their government, as well as freedom of expression, freedom of association, and a free media. This index ranges from �2.5 (weak) to 2.5 (strong) governance performance.

KKZ_POLSTAB mean value of ‘‘Political Stability and Absence of Violence’’ index from 1998 to 2006. This index reflects perceptions of the likelihood that the government will be destabilized or overthrown by unconstitutional or violent means, including politically-motivated violence and terrorism. This index ranges from �2.5 (weak) to 2.5 (strong) governance performance

KKZ_GOVEFF mean value of ‘‘Government Effectiveness’’ index from 1998 to 2006. This index reflects perceptions of the quality of public services, the quality of the civil service and the degree of its independence from political pressures, the quality of policy formulation and implementation, and the credibility of the

(continued on next page)

G. Caprio Jr. et al. / Journal of Banking & Finance 44 (2014) 114–129 127

government’s commitment to such policies. This index ranges from �2.5 (weak) to 2.5 (strong) governance performance.

KKZ_REGQUAL Mean value of ‘‘Regulatory Quality’’ index from 1998 to 2006. This index reflects perceptions of the ability of the government to formulate and implement sound policies and regulations that permit and promote private sector development. This index ranges from �2.5 (weak) to 2.5 (strong) governance performance

KKZ_RULELAW Mean value of ‘‘Rule of Law’’ index from 1998 to 2006. This index reflects perceptions of the extent to which agents have confidence in and abide by the rules of society, and in particular the quality of contract enforcement, property rights, the police, and the courts, as well as the likelihood of crime and violence. This index ranges from �2.5 (weak) to 2.5 (strong) governance performance

KKZ_CONCORR mean value of ‘‘Control of Corruption’’ index from 1998 to 2006. This index reflects perceptions of the extent to which public power is exercised for private gain, including both petty and grand forms of corruption, as well as ‘‘capture’’ of the state by elites and private interests. This index ranges from �2.5 (weak) to 2.5 (strong) governance performance

KKZ_MEAN Mean value of the six measures provided by Kaufman et al. (2010) from 1998 to 2006

128 G. Caprio Jr. et al. / Journal of Banking & Finance 44 (2014) 114–129

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  • Macro-financial determinants of the great financial crisis: Implications for financial regulation
    • 1 Introduction
    • 2 Literature review
    • 3 Data and methodology
      • 3.1 Cross-country analysis
        • 3.1.1 The link with the financial globalization
        • 3.1.2 The link with the quality of governance
      • 3.2 Cross-bank analysis
    • 4 Results
      • 4.1 Cross-country determinants of the crisis
        • 4.1.1 The degree of financial globalization: empirical evidence
        • 4.1.2 The quality of governance: empirical evidence
      • 4.2 Cross-bank results
    • 5 Robustness checks
      • 5.1 Borderline versus systemic country crisis
      • 5.2 The cost of the crisis
      • 5.3 Multicollinearity
    • 6 Conclusions
    • Appendix A Sample information
    • Appendix B
    • References

Firm-quality-or-market-sentiment--What-matters-mor_2014_Journal-of-Banking--.pdf

Journal of Banking & Finance 44 (2014) 207–218

Contents lists available at ScienceDirect

Journal of Banking & Finance

journal homepage: www.elsevier .com/locate / jbf

Firm quality or market sentiment: What matters more for IPO investors?

http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jbankfin.2014.04.010 0378-4266/� 2014 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

⇑ Corresponding author. Tel.: +61 (0) 737353500. E-mail addresses: [email protected] (S. Neupane), krishna.paudyal@

strath.ac.uk (K. Paudyal), [email protected] (C. Thapa). 1 Tel.: +44 (0)141 548 2894; fax: +44 (0)141 552 3547. 2 Tel.: +44 (0)141 548 3891; fax: +44 (0)141 552 3547.

3 We provide a detailed discussion of the IPO process in India in Sectio salient features of the Indian IPO market’’.

Suman Neupane a,⇑, Krishna Paudyal b,1, Chandra Thapa b,2 a Department of Accounting, Finance and Economics, Griffith Business School, Griffith University, Nathan 4111, Queensland, Australia b Department of Accounting and Finance, University of Strathclyde, Scotland G4 0LN, United Kingdom

a r t i c l e i n f o

Article history: Received 2 November 2012 Accepted 9 April 2014 Available online 18 April 2014

JEL classification: G14 G24 G32

Keywords: Initial public offerings Transparency IPO grade Grey market Retail investors Institutional investors Indian IPOs

a b s t r a c t

This paper investigates the investment decisions of IPO investors when equipped with information on both the quality of the firm and the market sentiment. Unique regulatory provisions allow IPO investors in India to have access to the independent assessment of firm quality and information on the participa- tion of other investors, including institutional investors. At the same time, an active grey market reveals market sentiment before the application for subscription is closed. The results, which are robust to alter- native model specifications, suggest that the institutional investors’ decision is guided almost exclusively by firm quality while the retail investors’ decision to participate in IPOs is strongly influenced by market sentiment, even in a highly transparent market where both sets of information are freely available.

� 2014 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

1. Introduction the IPO firm. Retail investors, on the other hand, lack access to such

Although the return maximizing objective of investment strate- gies implies that investors’ decisions to subscribe to IPO shares should depend more on the quality of the firm than on market sen- timent, prior empirical evidence is mixed. Earlier studies show that institutional investors exhibit stock picking ability and their partic- ipation is positively associated with IPO performance (Field and Lowry, 2009; Chiang et al., 2010). The participation of retail inves- tors, on the other hand, is consistent with the notion of sentiment and/or return chasing behaviour (Chiang et al., 2010), and that their sentiment is positively related to offer price (Derrien, 2005) and poor long term performance (Cornelli et al., 2006; Dorn, 2009). A reason that is often attributed to such a diverse selection is the difference in information set that the two groups of investors possess with respect to the fundamental quality of the IPO firm.

Institutional investors are considered to possess the necessary resources and benefit from economies of scale in gathering and analyzing information pertinent to the fundamental quality of

analytical skills, especially due to a lack of economies of scale. Therefore, the sentiment motivated trading behaviour of retail investors is attributed to their lack of information on firm quality. However, what we do not know yet is how different investors will behave if they have simultaneous access to information that reflects the fundamental quality of the firm as well as information on indicators of market sentiment at the time of making an invest- ment decision. We examine this issue in the unique setting of the Indian IPO market where all potential investors have access to mandatory independent reports on the fundamental quality of IPO firms, information on the participation of other investors, and the indicators of market sentiment.

As Neupane and Poshakwale (2012) note, the Indian IPO market is uniquely transparent.3 Three main features of the market are of particular relevance here. First, unlike in other countries, the IPO reg- ulating body in India, the Securities and Exchange Board of India (hereafter SEBI), requires all IPO firms to reveal the quality of their company fundamentals through a formal and independent grading process. The quality of the IPO firm is assessed and graded by an approved credit rating agency on a scale of 1 (poor fundamentals)

n 2 ‘‘The

208 S. Neupane et al. / Journal of Banking & Finance 44 (2014) 207–218

to 5 (strong fundamentals) and the information is made available to the investing public. Deb and Marisetty (2010) confirm that independent grading captures the IPO firm’s fundamental quality including its corporate governance.4 Hence, the need to reveal the grade assigned by an independent body should help reduce the information differential between institutional and retail investors.

Second, information on the participation of investors by cate- gory (institutional, non-institutional, and retail investors), who are allocated separate quotas of IPO shares, is publicly available on the website of the stock exchanges during the offer period (i.e. between the opening and closing dates for applications). This information should provide further signals to retail investors on how the institutional investors, who are likely to be better informed due to their access to analytical expertise, are viewing the offer. Therefore, the provision of the grading of IPOs, combined with the information on the level of participation of all parties, should help minimize the information differential between institu- tional and other IPO investors in India. In other words, if retail investors prefer to participate on the basis of firm quality, then they are equipped with such information.

Finally, the Indian IPO market features a very active grey market. It begins with the disclosure of offer price range and remains active up until the day of listing (i.e. the 1st day of trading on the stock exchange). Although the grey market is an informal (unofficial) market, the quotes (premium/discount) are reported widely in the media and are publicly available for several days before the closing of applications for subscription. The grey market premium, com- bined with the information on the subscription by various catego- ries of investors, should help potential IPO subscribers to assess the demand for IPO shares and gauge market sentiment prior to submitting their own bids. Given these salient features of the Indian IPO market, the effect of information differential between institu- tional and retail investors on their participation should be very low compared to other IPO markets around the world. Conse- quently, retail investors have a strong opportunity to make their investment decisions based on firm quality rather than on senti- ment and institutional investors have opportunities to assess the market demand for the IPO prior to making a decision to participate.

Using the opportunity offered by the above unique settings of the Indian IPO process and the prior evidence on the participa- tion/performance of institutional and retail investors, we address an important issue: how the subscription levels of institutional and retail investors are affected when both types of investors have access to information on the firm’s fundamental quality and market sentiment. Using a sample of 172 IPOs issued during the 2007–2011 period, we run a two horse race between proxies of fundamental quality and market sentiment to examine which has a greater influ- ence on the participation of institutional and retail investors. We follow this up with analyses of the effects of the two sets of infor- mation (fundamental quality and investors’ sentiment) on offer price, initial return, and aftermarket performance of IPOs.5

Several important findings are uncovered. First, our evidence suggests a disparate participation of institutional and retail inves- tors, even when both categories have access to identical sets of information on indicators of firm quality and market sentiment. Retail investors seem to provide greater weight to market senti-

4 Our univariate (Section 4, Table 1, Panel C) and multivariate (Section 5.5, Table 5) analyses reconfirm that IPOs with higher quality ratings are associated with superior performance.

5 Although Dorn (2009) reports that the purchases made by German retail investors on the first day of trading are highly correlated with their purchases in the grey market, the IPO setting in Germany does not allow isolating the effects of the sentiment related factors from the effects of the fundamental quality of the firm. Since investors in India have access to information on both the fundamental quality of the IPO firm and the indicators of market sentiment, the implications for investors’ decisions to subscribe to IPOs can be assessed separately.

ment, while institutional investors’ decisions appear to be driven by firm quality. Specifically, we find that retail investors’ participa- tion is not correlated with IPO grades but influenced by investor sentiment – as proxied by the grey market premium.6 Further, retail investors’ participation shows a strong correlation with institutional investors’ participation only when the latter participate well, but the relationship weakens when institutional participation declines. The participation of institutional investors, on the other hand, is consis- tent with the notion of informed investors – their involvement is pos- itively associated with IPO grades. Although institutional investors’ participation is positively associated with the grey market premium, the relationship is not symmetric as a low grey market premium does not seem to deter them from subscribing to IPOs.

A second important finding of the paper is the relationship of aftermarket IPO performance with IPO grades and grey market pre- mium. We find that IPO grade is positively associated with after- market performance. The grey market premium, on the other hand, has a negative relationship with aftermarket performance in the six months following the listing but loses its significance by the end of the first year. Finally, we also find that while IPO grade is unrelated to IPO price, the grey market premium has a positive influence on offer prices. Further, confirming the results of prior studies, we find that the grey market premium is a strong determinant of the returns on the IPO listing day.

By addressing the above issues, the paper makes two important contributions to the literature. First, to the best of our knowledge, no study to date has examined the participation of institutional and retail investors in a setting where both proxies of firm fundamentals and market sentiment are freely available to investors. This compre- hensive study shows the influence of sentiment and firm quality on the participation of various investor categories in a single unified framework which has been made possible by the unique regulatory settings of the Indian IPO market. Although some earlier studies (Hanley and Wilhelm, 1995; Aggarwal et al., 2002; Chiang et al., 2010; Degeorge et al., 2010) have examined the participation of institutional and retail investors in IPOs, none of them has accounted for both the sentiment and fundamental factors simulta- neously. Second, our study also contributes to the sparse literature on grey markets. However, unlike earlier studies on IPO grey mar- kets (Cornelli et al., 2006; Dorn, 2009) we provide evidence on the effects of sentiment motivated traders on the IPO pricing (setting of offer price) and returns (initial and aftermarket) after controlling for the effect of firm quality based on company fundamentals.

The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 summarizes some of the key features of the Indian IPO market. Sec- tion 3 discusses the related literature and develops hypotheses. Section 4 describes the samples and their key features. Section 5 presents and discusses the empirical evidence followed by the con- clusions in Section 6.

2. The salient features of the Indian IPO market

This section briefly describes the prominent institutional set- tings of the Indian IPO process and the grey market on which the analytical theme of the paper rests.

2.1. Transparency, allocation, and grading7

There are a number of unique features of the Indian IPO process that make it distinct and transparent when compared to other IPO

6 The observed (raw) grey market premium may be influenced by both firm’s grade and market sentiment; we use a residual grey market premium by regressing grey market premium on grade. We thank an anonymous reviewer for this suggestion.

7 For further discussion on the institutional features of the Indian IPO market, please refer to Bubna and Prabhala (2010) and Neupane and Poshakwale (2012).

S. Neupane et al. / Journal of Banking & Finance 44 (2014) 207–218 209

markets around the world. Indian IPO firms are required to reserve and allocate separate quotas of shares for three primary investor categories: institutional investors, referred to as qualified institu- tional buyers (QIBs), non-institutional investors (NIIs) and retail individual investors (RIIs). The current IPO guidelines define QIBs as large institutional investors such as commercial banks, mutual funds, venture capital funds, and insurance companies who are reg- istered with the SEBI; RIIs are those whose total bidding value does not exceed Indian Rupees (INR) 200,000.8 All other investors whose bidding value exceeds the RIIs’ threshold, but are not registered as QIBs, are considered to be NIIs. The regulations require that QIBs, NIIs and RIIs are allocated about 50%, 15%, and 35% of total shares on offer respectively. Importantly, information on the level of participation (i.e. the number of applications as well as the total number of shares applied for) by these different investor categories is made available on the website of stock exchanges throughout the offer period.

Until 2006, Indian IPO firms were primarily using a modified form of US style book-building mechanism. Since then, however, although the term book-building is still used, the mechanism resembles a uniform auction price that is similar to ‘OpenIPO’ used by WR Hambrecht in the US. This mechanism allows the underwrit- ers to set the offer price within the advertised price range and sub- scribers receive their allocation on a pro rata basis. It does not, however, allow for any further discretion in allocation, which is a common feature in the US style IPO process. In the event of a less than full subscription in any investor category, the unsubscribed shares are re-allocated to other categories that are oversubscribed.

Another major feature of the Indian IPO market is the require- ment of mandatory grading based on the fundamental quality of the IPO firm.9 Mandatory grading, which began on May 1, 2007, requires IPO firms to undergo quality grading by designated rating agencies.10 The primary purpose of the grading, as set out by the SEBI, is to provide investors with an independent, reliable and con- sistent assessment of the fundamentals of the IPO firms. The grading is usually done at the time of the IPO filing (i.e. long before the issue price and issue dates are finalized) and is based on six company fun- damental factors.11 The IPO firms are graded on a scale of 1 (poor fundamentals) to 5 (strong fundamentals) with a rating of 3 or more (2 or less) considered as firms with above average (below average) fundamentals. If the management of an IPO firm is not happy with the grade provided by an agency it can approach another agency for grading but is obliged to disclose all grades in the offer document.

2.2. The grey market

The Indian IPO setting also features an active grey (when-issued) market. The operation of the Indian grey market resembles the fea- tures summarized in Cornelli et al. (2006) and Dorn (2009) for Euro- pean markets and involves unofficial (unregulated) buying and selling of shares of IPO firms in over-the-counter markets before the official trading of IPO shares begins on the stock exchanges (see Appendix A for an example of an active grey market period). While the opportunities to trade in the grey market (and premiums)

8 This limit was initially set at INR 25,000 in 1995 and has increased gradually over the years.

9 Further information on Indian IPO grading can be found at http://www.sebi.go- v.in/faq/ipograding.html (accessed on November 25, 2013). See Deb and Marisetty (2010) for further discussion on IPO grading in India.

10 At the time of writing this paper, only six rating agencies are registered with the SEBI and allowed to provide IPO grading: Credit Analysis and Research Ltd. (CARE), ICRA Ltd., CRISIL House, FITCH Ratings, Brickwork Ratings India Private Ltd., and SME Rating Agency of India Ltd. (SMERA).

11 The six fundamental factors noted by the SEBI (http://www.sebi.gov.in/faq/ ipograding.html) are: (i) business prospects and competitive position of the company, (ii) risks and prospects of new projects, (iii) company’s financial position, (iv) quality of management, (v) corporate governance practices, and (vi) compliance and litigation history.

are usually available for stocks a few days before the opening of the issue (application for subscription), there have been instances of trading in grey markets many weeks prior to the issue opening date. This is generally the case with high profile IPO offerings.12 The grey market price and premium are widely available on specialist websites (e.g. http://www.chittorgarh.com) and in the financial press.13

Two types of quotes are available for IPO firms in grey markets. The first is grey market premium per share which is quoted in rupees and indicates the bid/ask grey market premium that bro- kers are willing to pay/accept over and above the issue price. This is a share deal where the seller (i.e. the IPO applicant) promises to sell the shares to the buyer should he/she receive any allocation from the IPO firm. The second quote is ‘Kostak’ in which the pre- mium is quoted in rupees for a lot of retail applications. Essentially, it is a trading of IPO applications rather than the shares of the IPO firm. Appendix B illustrates the two types of grey market quotes available for Indian IPOs. Since Kostak data are only available for a small number of IPOs, we use the grey market premium in all our analyses. For the purpose of this study, the proportionate grey market premium (Grey) is calculated as in Eq. (1).14

Grey Market Premium ðGreyÞ ¼ Grey Market Price�Mid� Point of the offer price range

Mid� Point of the offer price range

� �

ð1Þ

For the purpose of our analysis we use the grey market price available after the close of the offer period.

3. Prior studies and hypotheses development

The central theme of the paper is related to studies on the par- ticipation of institutional and retail investors in IPOs when they have information on the quality of the firm and market sentiments. Both Rock (1986) and Benveniste and Spindt (1989) accord signif- icant importance to the varied participation of institutional and retail investors in their theoretical models explaining the need for underpricing. The informed participation of institutional inves- tors is also at the heart of several studies which support book- building over other placement mechanisms (Sherman, 2000, 2005; Jagannathan et al., 2010). Past studies on US IPOs provide evidence that institutional investors receive a larger fraction of the shares in IPOs with better initial and long term performance (Hanley and Wilhelm, 1995; Aggarwal et al., 2002).

In a related study, Field and Lowry (2009) find that IPO firms with the highest levels of institutional investment significantly out- perform those with the lowest levels of institutional involvement. Individual participation, on the other hand, is significantly higher in firms with poor long term performance. They further argue that the basis of superior institutional participation is due to the proper interpretation of information that is available at the time of the IPO. In the context of auction IPOs, Chiang et al. (2010) for Taiwanese and Degeorge et al. (2010) for US IPOs, find evidence of informed participation by institutional investors and return chasing

12 For example, grey market premiums of Reliance IPOs were available many weeks prior to the issue opening date.

13 The nature of the grey market operation and information from specialized grey market premium websites indicate that grey market trades are carried out by retail investors.

14 Since our data on the grey market premium come from publicly accessible sources (the Internet), we believe that we have the same set of information that retail and other investors participating in IPOs would have. We also scanned the message boards for a number of IPOs in a major IPO portal (www.chittorgarh.com) and found that the grey market premium features prominently in the discussions on IPO investing. Therefore, we believe that the data we have used in this paper, in spite of limited details, truly reflect the operation of the grey market in India.

15 Some stocks are listed simultaneously in both markets.

210 S. Neupane et al. / Journal of Banking & Finance 44 (2014) 207–218

behaviour of retail investors. Chiang et al. (2010) report that higher participation of institutional investors or larger institutional bids are positively associated with higher initial returns. They also argue that while institutional investors’ decisions to participate are based on the value of the issue, retail investors’ decisions are influenced by the returns on recent IPOs – a pattern that is consistent with the return chasing behaviour of investors. Degeorge et al. (2010) find that issuers and underwriters extract useful pricing informa- tion from investors’ bids in setting the offer price.

In the context of Indian IPOs, Neupane and Poshakwale (2012) analyse the participation of retail and institutional investors in the transparent Indian IPO mechanism and find that while retail inves- tors follow institutional investors they are unable to earn superior allocation adjusted returns. Their study, however, does not consider IPO grades and grey market returns. Deb and Marisetty (2010) examine the influence of IPO grades on a number of issues including underpricing, participation of retail and institutional investors and post listing performance. They report that IPO grades successfully capture several firm characteristics including the corporate gover- nance of the firm. However, our study differs from theirs on several grounds. First, unlike Deb and Marisetty (2010), we control for the grey market information; second, we use a substantially larger sam- ple (48 vs. 172 IPOs) adding to the reliability of estimates; and finally, we extend the model to account for the potential effects of other factors, including the level of participation of various types of investors. Our study also differs from other prior studies in that we simultaneously analyse the effects of indicators of both company fundamentals-based grading and the indicators of market sentiment that are available to investors at the time of the application for sub- scription. In particular, we examine which of the two factors (com- pany fundamentals or market sentiment) has a stronger effect on institutional and retail investors’ participation in IPOs.

The view that institutional investors, compared to retail inves- tors, hold superior information on the fundamental quality of the firm and that their participation decision is guided by such infor- mation, is based on the premise that they are able to invest sub- stantial resources in investigating the quality of the firm due to economies of scale while this is not the case for retail investors. As noted in the previous section, however, Indian IPO investors (both institutional as well as retail) have access to information on firm quality through IPO grades as well as market sentiment. This implies that the level of information asymmetry between institutional and retail investors should be negligible in the Indian IPO market. This should lead to similar levels of participation by retail and institutional investors. Neupane and Poshakwale (2012), however, find that retail investors do not always follow institutional investors and suffer poor allocation adjusted IPO returns. Field and Lowry (2009) also show that while institutional investors better interpret readily available public information, individual investors either disregard or misinterpret such informa- tion. Therefore, it is still possible that retail investors are more influenced by market sentiment than by firm quality. The discus- sion above leads to two testable hypotheses:

H1. Retail investors are more influenced by market sentiment than institutional investors.

H2. Institutional investors are more influenced by firm quality than retail investors.

Our paper is also related to a strand of literature that examines the influence of grey market prices on IPO pricing, initial returns, and aftermarket (post IPO) share price performance. Cornelli et al. (2006) develop a theoretical model and, using data from 12 European markets, provide empirical evidence on the influence of

grey market prices on offer price, initial returns, and aftermarket performance where sophisticated institutional investors can observe the participation of the sentiment driven investors. They report a positive relation between grey market price and final offer price, and initial returns, and a negative relation between grey market price and aftermarket performance only when the grey market price is high relative to the offer price. The associations are much weaker when grey market prices are relatively low. They further argue that the asymmetric relation is because of sophisti- cated institutional investors taking advantage of irrational (senti- ment driven) investors when they are optimistic, but choosing to ignore them when they are pessimistic. Similarly, Derrien (2005) attributes the participation of retail investors, who are primarily driven by sentiment, to the observed positive effect of market sen- timent on the offer price, initial returns and negative effect on the long term performance of IPOs.

Aussenegg et al. (2006) explore the level of information revealed in the German grey market in relation to the information provided by book-building investors. They find that while grey market trading provides useful information for offer price setting, the information obtained from informed book-building investors cannot be over- looked either. Dorn (2009) finds a positive relation between grey market trading volume and initial returns, and a negative relation- ship between grey market trading volume and post-IPO returns in Germany. Together, these studies suggest the presence of significant relations among grey market valuation, offer price, initial returns, and post-IPO share price performance of the firm going public.

Derrien (2005) shows positive effects of retail investors’ partic- ipation on offer price and initial returns but a reversion in market performance of IPO firms in the long term. In spite of the lack of information asymmetry between retail and institutional investors in the Indian IPO market, as noted earlier, the participation of retail investors is likely to be more influenced by market sentiment while that of institutional investors is likely to be guided by firm quality. Further, the impact of strong market sentiment is likely to obscure the influence of firm quality in the short-run, leading to a positive effect on offer price and initial returns of IPOs. How- ever, in the long-run, the effect of sentiment should wear out and the price corrected, resulting in underperformance. On the other hand, if information on firm quality is under-appreciated by the market at the time of the offer, the quality of the firm should be revealed in the long run and hence firm quality and the long term performance of IPOs should be positively related. Hence, we posit the following two hypotheses on the impact of sentiment and firm quality on offer price, and initial and after market performance:

H3. The market sentiment has a positive effect on offer price and initial returns and a negative effect on long term performance.

H4. Firm quality has limited influence on offer price and initial returns but has a positive influence on the long term performance of IPO firms.

4. The sample

Guided by the availability of IPO grades and grey market premi- ums at the time of data collection, our sample is comprised of 172 IPOs of common stocks between June 2007 and December 2011, as reported by the Bombay Stock Exchange (BSE) and/or the National Stock Exchange (NSE).15 Data on IPO firm and issue characteristics were hand collected from company prospectuses which were obtained from the Perfect Filings database. Data on IPO demand

S. Neupane et al. / Journal of Banking & Finance 44 (2014) 207–218 211

were obtained from the websites of BSE/NSE and some other finance portals, including the website of ICICI Bank (http://www.icici- bank.com, one of the leading commercial and investment banks in India), Money Control (http://www.moneycontrol.com, considered to be the top finance portal in India) and Chittorgarh (http:// www.chittorgarh.com, considered to be India’s main IPO investment portal). Data on grey market prices were collected from Chittorgarh and GreyMarket (http://www.greymarket.co.in).

Table 1 presents the major summary statistics of the sample IPOs, the grey market premium, the participation of various investor categories and univariate analyses of post IPO performance by IPO grades and grey market premium. As shown in Panel A, the average age of the IPO firms is about 14 years, ranging between 2 and 92 years. The mean book value of total assets at the time of IPOs is about INR 7169 million while the median value of total assets is only about INR 1702 million. Further, the mean proceeds raised by IPO firms are about INR 3456 million while the median is about INR 1115 million. The distribution of both measures of the size of the IPOs (total assets and amount raised) suggests that there are more smaller IPO firms than larger ones in the sample. The mean (median) raw first day return (i.e. underpricing/initial return) for the period is 17% (9%). The returns decline considerably over the first month of trading with the mean (median) raw return falling to 7% (-2%). The average market return prior to IPO (Mkt3Mw) and average mar- ket volatility prior to IPO (MktVol) are 3% and 1% respectively.

The statistics on oversubscription suggest that demand for IPO shares is highly variable, ranging from undersubscription to extre- mely high oversubscription (159.4 times) with a mean of about 17 times the amount offered. The average (median) offer price relative to the offer price range is 0.83 (1.00) which suggests that most of the issues are priced at or near the upper cap of the offer price range. The average (median) initial return of IPOs listed during the two months prior to the offer period (PriorIR) is about 22% (19%). The average (median) underwriter reputation (LbmRep) is 0.45 (0.00) which suggests that most IPOs in our sample are man- aged by less reputed underwriters. The average (median) grey mar- ket premium (Grey), for our sample, measured as in Eq. (1), is 18% (7%). Although there are some IPOs with the highest quality rating (4 or 5), the mean (median) IPO grade is 2.57 (2), indicating that most sample IPO firms have weak to average fundamentals.

Panel B (Table 1) shows the participation of investors by their categories. The median IPO is oversubscribed by about 3 times in all three categories of investors. Nevertheless, there is a significant variation in participation across the IPOs and by investor catego- ries; the oversubscription rate of institutional investors (2.08 times) was modest compared to those of non-institutional and retail investors (more than 3 times). The institutional investors’ quota was undersubscribed in 30% of cases while only 1 in 8 IPOs were undersubscribed by non-institutional investors and less than 25% of the IPOs were undersubscribed by retail investors. More impor- tantly, however, investors from different categories do not appear to undersubscribe the same set of IPOs. Retail investors undersub- scribe only 13 of the 56 IPOs that were undersubscribed by the institutional investors, implying that the retail investors do not always follow the institutional investors when it comes to subscrip- tion to IPOs. From the rate of over/undersubscriptions, it appears that institutional investors are more cautious than other investors.

Panel C (Table 1) documents the post listing market adjusted16

performance of IPOs by grade and residual grey market premium. To

16 The first day and first month returns are adjusted using the BSE Sensex index, while the 3 month, 6 month and 12 month returns are adjusted using both the BSE Sensex and the broader BSE 500 index. BSE Sensex is an index representing 30 well- established companies listed on the Bombay Stock Exchange. BSE 500 is an index of 500 stocks representing nearly 95% of the total market capitalization of the Bombay Stock Exchange.

avoid the joint effect of IPO grade and market sentiment on the magnitude of grey market premium, we regress the observed grey market premium (Grey) on IPO grade and use the residuals (Grey- Res) as the measure of market sentiment. For analysis of the post listing performance by grades, we segregate the IPOs into two groups: IPOs with below median grades (below 3) and IPOs with equal to or above median grades (3 or above). Of the 172 sample IPOs for which we have grades, 88 are rated below median while the rest (84) are rated equal to or above median. The below median IPOs are smaller in size measured by both total assets and the amount raised. Consistent with Hypothesis 4, the normalized offer prices of the two IPO groups are not significantly different.

We calculate the first day and first month returns from the offer price, while the 3 month, 6 month and 12 month returns are calculated from the price at the end of the first month of listing. While the first day and first month returns are significantly posi- tive for the overall sample, the post listing performance of the overall sample is significantly negative. Three, 6 and 12 months’ market adjusted returns (using BSE 500), calculated from the price at the end of the first month of listing, are �7%, �8% and �14% respectively, all significant at the less than 1% significance level. Although there are some differences in the initial returns of lower and higher grade IPO firms, the difference is not statistically signif- icant. In the post listing period, however, issues with superior grades significantly outperform those with inferior grades. For instance, the median 3 month, 6 month and 12 month post listing BSE 500 adjusted excess returns of IPOs with above average grades are significantly higher by about 11%, 18% and 15% respectively compared to those of IPOs with below average grades. Overall, con- sistent with our hypothesis, the analysis of IPO performance by their grades suggests that the grading of IPOs in India appears to be a reasonable proxy of the quality of the IPO firm, even before other features of the IPO are controlled for.

In Panel C we also categorize 172 sample IPOs into two groups by median residual grey market premium. Accordingly, we have 86 IPOs with below median and 86 IPOs with equal to or above med- ian residual grey market premiums. We do not find any difference in total assets and proceeds raised between the two IPO categories. Further, consistent with Hypothesis 3, the normalized offer price of IPOs with equal to or above median grey market premium is signif- icantly higher than that of IPOs with below median grey market premium. We find that while IPOs with equal to or above median residual grey market premiums perform significantly better than those with below median premiums on the first day and in the first month of listing, the difference reverses significantly within the first six months and becomes insignificant within the first year of listing. Overall, the univariate analysis suggests that while high IPOs’ grades are associated with superior aftermarket performance, the same cannot be said about grey market premiums, indicating that grey market premiums are possibly driven by investors’ senti- ments rather than company fundamentals. We return to this issue in Section 5.5 where we examine their effects on the post listing performance of IPOs in a multivariate framework after controlling for the effects of other variables that are known to affect IPO returns.

5. Empirical results

5.1. Retail investors’ participation

Earlier studies (e.g. Derrien, 2005) provide evidence consistent with the notion that the decisions of retail investors to participate in IPOs are guided by sentiment. However, unlike in other markets, the Indian IPOs’ investors have access to information that proxy both company fundamentals and market sentiment, which can

Table 1 Descriptive statistics.

Panel A: Summary statistics of the main variables

Variable Mean Median 25th Pctl 75th Pctl Std dev Minimum Maximum

Age 14.26 12.50 8.00 17.02 10.59 2.02 92.06 Total assets 7,169 1,702 712.5 6,641 16,231 95 108,000 Gross proceeds (Gpcds) 3,456 1,115 512 2,791 9,629 140 100,000 Raw first day return (IR1) 0.17 0.09 �0.11 0.33 0.45 �0.69 2.41 Market adjusted first day return (MIR1) 0.17 0.06 �0.10 0.33 0.45 �0.93 2.41 Raw first month return (IR30) 0.07 0.03 �0.32 0.30 0.59 �0.87 3.52 Market adjusted first month return (MIR30) 0.07 �0.02 �0.28 0.29 0.58 �0.88 3.51 Market returns prior to IPO (Mkt3Mw) 0.03 0.04 �0.01 0.08 0.07 �0.23 0.29 Market volatility prior to IPO (MktVol) 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.04 Oversubscription 16.96 3.50 1.45 15.15 30.34 0.91 159.40 Offer price relative to price range (OfferPrice) 0.83 1.00 0.98 1.00 0.35 0.00 1.00 Prior initial returns (PriorIR) 0.22 0.19 0.08 0.36 0.18 �0.17 0.60 Underwriter reputation (LbmRep) 0.45 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.50 0.00 1.00 Grey market premium (Grey) 0.18 0.07 0.03 0.17 0.35 0.00 3.23 IPO grade (Grade) 2.58 2.00 2.00 3.00 0.82 1.00 5.00

Panel B: Investors’ participation

Investors’ oversubscription Mean Median 25th Pctl 75th Pctl Std dev Minimum Maximum No. of undersubscribed IPOs

Institutional investors (QIB) 19.33 2.08 0.70 18.35 37.23 0.00 185.09 56 Non-institutional investors (NII) 26.89 3.67 1.50 25.96 50.79 0.02 306.63 23 Retail investors (RII) 8.58 3.03 1.08 9.15 16.10 0.08 136.82 45

Panel C: IPO grades, grey market premium and IPO performance

IPO Grades Mean (median) Difference in mean (p-value) Difference in median (p-value)

Below median Equal to or above median

No. of IPOs 88 84 – – Total assets 3,206 (999) 10,407 (4,495) �7,201 (0.000) �3,496 (0.000) Gross proceeds (Gpcds) 1,817 (688) 4,988 (2,005) �3,171 (0.004) �1,317 (0.000) Offer price relative to price range (OfferPrice) 0.84 (1.00) 0.79 (1.00) 0.13 (0.129) 0.00 (0.196) Market adjusted return (1st day, Sensex) 0.19 (0.09) 0.12 (0.06) 0.07 (0.323) 0.03 (0.458) Market adjusted return (1st month Sensex) 0.07 (�0.07) 0.04 (�0.03) 0.03 (0.730) �0.04 (0.569) Market adjusted return (3 month, Sensex) �0.09 (�0.14) �0.05 (�0.05) �0.04 (0.112) �0.09 (0.009) Market adjusted return (6 month, Sensex) �0.15 (�0.24) �0.04 (�0.08) �0.11 (0.038) �0.11 (0.001) Market adjusted return (12 month, Sensex) �0.24 (�0.35) �0.09 (�0.19) �0.15 (0.017) �0.16 (0.000) Market adjusted return (3 month, B500) �0.09 (�0.15) �0.05 (�0.04) �0.04 (0.164) �0.11 (0.032) Market adjusted return (6 month, B500) �0.14 (�0.23) �0.03 (�0.05) �0.11 (0.026) �0.18 (0.000) Market adjusted return (12 month, B500) �0.22 (�0.32) �0.07 (�0.17) �0.15 (0.015) �0.15 (0.000)

Residual grey market premium Below median Equal to or above median

No. of IPOs 86 86 – – Totals assets 7,102 (1,946) 6,103 (1,901) 919 (0.619) 45 (0.551) Gross proceeds (Gpcds) 3,059 (1,013) 3,512 (1,318) �453 (0.779) �305 (0.818) Offer price relative to price range (OfferPrice) 0.71 (1.00) 0.95 (1.00) �0.15 (0.000) 0.00 (0.000) Market adjusted return (1st day, Sensex) 0.07 (0.01) 0.26 (0.17) �0.19 (0.002) �0.16 (0.031) Market adjusted return (1st month Sensex) �0.06 (�0.10) 0.19 (0.10) �0.25 (0.008) �0.20 (0.014) Market adjusted return (3 month, Sensex) �0.06 (�0.03) �0.10 (�0.09) 0.04 (0.186) 0.06 (0.122) Market adjusted return (6 month, Sensex) �0.07 (�0.09) �0.12 (�0.20) 0.05 (0.144) 0.11 (0.059) Market adjusted return (12 month, Sensex) �0.13 (�0.22) �0.16 (�0.28) 0.03 (0.416) 0.06 (0.251) Market adjusted return (3 month, B500) �0.04 (�0.04) �0.09 (�0.09) 0.05 (0.216) 0.05 (0.147) Market adjusted return (6 month, B500) �0.06 (�0.11) �0.10 (�0.19) 0.04 (0.194) 0.08 (0.112) Market adjusted return (12 month, B500) �0.11 (�0.20) �0.15 (�0.24) 0.04 (0.594) 0.04 (0.567)

Panel A reports the summary statistics of firm and issue-specific variables of 172 Indian IPOs listed on the Bombay Stock Exchange (BSE) and/or National Stock Exchange (NSE) between 2007 and December 2011. Age is measured as the difference between the IPO year and the founding year of the sample firm (in years). Total assets is the total value of assets of the firm at the time of the IPO (in millions INR). Gross proceeds is the intended gross proceeds of the offer (in millions INR). Raw first day (month) return (IR1 & IR30) is the return calculated between the offer price and the closing price at the end of the first day (first month) of trading. Market-adjusted first day (month) return (MIR1 & MIR30) is the difference between raw first day return and market return, where the market return is the return on the BSE Sensex index over the same period. Market returns prior to IPO (Mkt3Mw) is the weighted average of the buy-and-hold returns on the BSE Sensex index in the three months prior to the IPO issue opening date t, weights being 3 for the month before the IPO date (Mt�1), 2 for the one before (Mt�2), and 1 for the third month before the offering (Mt�3). Market volatility prior to IPO (MktVol) is the standard deviation of the market returns one month prior to the issue opening date. Oversubscription is the ratio of the investors’ demand for shares to the total number of shares offered. Offer price relative to price range (OfferPrice) is the actual offer price normalized by the offer price range. Since Indian regulations do not allow underwriters to price the IPO outside the offer price range, the normalized offer price is always between 0 and 1. Prior initial returns (PriorIR) is the average initial return for IPOs listed in the two months prior to the issue opening date of the IPO. Underwriter reputation (LbmRep) is a dummy variable which takes the value of 1 for IPOs managed by reputed underwriters and 0 otherwise. Grey market premium (Grey) is the ratio of grey market premium to mid-point of the offer price range. Grey market premium is the difference between grey market price and the mid-point of the offer price range. We use grey market price available after the close of the offer period in our analysis. Grade is the IPO grade reflecting the quality of company fundamentals assigned by a registered credit rating agency. Grades are issued on a scale of 1-5 with 1 indicating poor and 5 indicating strong fundamentals. (1 US$ is approximately equal to INR 62). Panel B documents the descriptive statistics of investors’ participation in 172 Indian IPOs listed on the BSE and/or NSE stock exchanges between June 2007 and December 2011, which are presented by investors’ category. Oversubscription is the ratio of the investors’ demand for shares to the total number of shares offered. Of the 56 IPOs in which QIBs undersubscribe, retail investors undersubscribe in only 13. Panel C shows the post listing performance of IPOs by their grade and residual grey market premium. Regulations require IPO firms to be graded on a scale of 1 (poor fundamentals) to 5 (strong fundamentals). IPO firms with a grade of 3 or more are considered equal to or above median and firms with a grade of 2 or less are regarded as below median. For analyzing the post listing performance of IPOs by grey market premium, we categorize IPOs by grouping them into below and equal to or above the residual median grey market premium. We regress grey market premium (as defined in Table 1) on IPO grade and use the residuals as the measure of grey market premium. The 1st day and 1st month market adjusted returns are calculated from the offer price. The 3, 6 and 12 month buy-and-hold market adjusted returns are calculated from the price at the end of the first month of listing (after 30 calendar days). Sensex refers to the BSE Sensex index comprised of the most liquid 30 stocks and B500 refers to the broader BSE 500 stock index comprised of 500 stocks. All other variables are defined in Table 1 (Panel A). The statistical significance of the differences in mean (below median – equal to or above median) is tested using the t-test and the significance of the difference in the median (below median – equal to or above median) of the two groups of IPOs is tested using the Mann-Whitney test. p-values are reported in parentheses.

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be used in investment decisions. Under the pretext of enhanced transparency of the Indian IPO market, this sub-section tests our first hypothesis that ‘retail investors are more influenced by mar- ket sentiment’, examines the determinants of retail investors’ par- ticipation and identifies the source of information (company fundamental versus market sentiment) that has a stronger impact on the decision of retail investors. To this end, retail investors’ par- ticipation is modelled as a function of the two sets of information and a host of control factors that are known to affect investor par- ticipation on IPOs, as shown in Eq. (2).

RIIclosing;j ¼ b0 þ b1Gradej þ b3QIBpenulj þ b3GreyResj þ b4Mkt3Mwj þ b5MktVolj þ b6PriorIRj þ b7LbmRepj þ b8LnGpcdsj

þ b9LnAgej þ X11 k¼1

bkIndustryþ ej ð2Þ

The dependent variable RIIclosing, is the natural log of 1 plus the oversubscription of retail investors at the end of the offer period. Among the explanatory variables, the quality of the firm (j) is rep- resented by two variables: the rating (Grade) of the firm given by the independent credit rating agency, and the institutional inves- tors’ participation (QIBpenul) measured as the natural log of 1 plus the institutional investors’ oversubscription on the penultimate day of the offer period. We use the penultimate day’s subscription to capture the impact of institutional participation on retail sub- scription.17 The sentiment of other market participants that can affect the retail investor’s confidence and sentiment is represented by the residual grey market premium (GreyRes). As discussed earlier, to avoid the joint effect of IPO grade and market sentiment on the magnitude of grey market premium, we use residual grey market premium (GreyRes) as the measure of market sentiment. Other explanatory variables in the equation are recent market return (Mkt3Mw), recent market volatility (MktVol), average initial return of IPOs listed during the two months prior to the offer period (Prior- IR), the underwriters’ reputation (LbmRep), the size of the issue (LnGpcds, i.e. natural log of gross proceeds) and the age of the firm (LnAge, i.e. natural log of 1 plus the age of the firm in years).

To examine whether the relationship between the participation of retail investors and the institutional investors in IPO and the sentiment investors in the grey market is symmetric, we extend Eq. (2) to include interactive variables, as in Cornelli et al. (2006). First, institutional investors’ participation is interacted with an indicator function that equals 1 if the penultimate day’s institu- tional investors subscription is equal to or above its median over the entire sample and 0 otherwise (QIBpenul � Indicator).18 Second, the variable ‘GreyRes � Indicator’ represents the interaction between the residual grey market premium and an indicator variable that takes the value of 1 when the residual grey market premium is equal to or above its median (grade of 3 and above) over the entire sample and 0 otherwise. Eq. (3) is estimated in a nested regression form using OLS after controlling for the industry fixed effects (11 industry groups) and the estimates are presented in Table 2.

Specification (1) shows that while the coefficient of ‘Grade’ is positive, it is not statistically significant, indicating that the retail investors’ participation is not dependent on the quality of company fundamentals. Next, we introduce the grey market premium (Grey- Res) in specification (2), the participation of institutional investors (QIBpenul) in specification (3) and both in specification (4) to assess how the retail investors are affected by other parties’ views on the IPO. The coefficients of both variables in all three specifications are

17 As a robustness test we also used the final overall institutional subscription instead of the penultimate day’s subscription. Results remain qualitatively similar.

18 The median value of institutional investors’ penultimate day’s subscription is 0.995 which means our sample is neatly categorised into two groups of over and undersubscribed IPOs.

positive and highly significant, depicting their strong influence on the participation of retail investors. Moreover, the size of the effect of the grey market premium (GreyRes) is much higher than that of institutional investors. This result is consistent with our hypothesis that despite the presence of some measure of firm quality, retail investor participation will be influenced by the sentiment of the market.

To test whether the two variables (grey market premium and institutional investors’ participation) have a symmetric relation- ship with retail investors’ participation, we introduce the aforementioned interactive terms in specification (5). While the coefficients of both the grey market premium and institutional participation remain positive and statistically significant, the coefficients of the interactive terms suggest a different story. The coefficient of the grey market premium indicator (GreyRes � Indi- cator) is insignificant, implying a symmetric relationship between the grey market premium and retail investors’ participation. The institutional investors’ participation indicator (QIBpenul � Indica- tor), however, is positive and statistically significant, suggesting that the relationship is asymmetric. This means the impact of insti- tutional participation is not as strong on retail participation when institutional investors undersubscribe.

Although the participation of institutional investors is expected to signal the quality of the firm, the estimates suggest that retail investors appear to pick and choose between the information content in the grey market premium and institutional investors’ participation. More precisely, when institutional investors partici- pate extensively, retail investors tend to follow them, but when the former participate less, retail investors over-weight the informa- tion content in the grey market premium and under-weight the information content in the institutional investors’ participation. These patterns imply that retail investors are generally driven by indicators that signal optimism. To examine the robustness of the results, in specification (6) the dependent variable, oversub- scription (the measure of retail investors’ participation), is replaced with the number of bids made by retail investors (natural log of 1 plus the number of bids). The quality of the results remains the same as in specification (5), reconfirming the asymmetric influence of institutional investors’ participation on the retail investors’ deci- sion to subscribe to the IPOs.

Among the factors that can shape the confidence of retail inves- tors, pre-IPO market returns (Mkt3Mw) and prior IPO returns (Pri- orIR) have positive and statistically significant relationships with retail investors’ participation, indicating that retail investors tend to extract signals from historical returns. However, retail investors do not seem to be influenced by the underwriters’ reputation. In all specifications, the coefficients of most other control variables have expected signs and significance. The negative coefficient of the size of the issue implies that retail investors’ oversubscription rate declines with the increase in the size of the issue, possibly due to the limited absorption capacity of the retail investors to subscribe to all the shares allocated to them. The negative and significant coefficient of the volatility of pre-IPO market returns suggests that retail investors are reluctant to participate in IPO subscription when the market is experiencing high volatility. Overall, the esti- mates suggest that the retail investors’ decision to participate in an IPO depends more heavily on the indicators of sentiment than on the indicators of the fundamental quality of the firm.

5.2. Institutional investors’ participation

To test our second hypothesis that the institutional investors’ decision to participate in an IPO is influenced more by firm quality than by market sentiment, institutional investors’ oversubscription is regressed against the measure of firm quality (Grade) and sev- eral indicators of market sentiment, as described in Eq. (2) (see

Table 2 The determinants of retail investors’ participation in IPOs.

Rate of Oversubscription No. of bids

(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)

Grade 0.152 0.113 �0.064 �0.012 �0.006 0.098 (1.26) (1.05) (�0.71) (�0.15) (�0.10) (0.91)

GreyRes 1.717*** 1.285*** 1.108*** 0.868***

(3.86) (2.96) (2.85) (3.04) QIBpenul 0.610*** 0.450*** 0.396*** 0.591***

(7.13) (4.20) (4.53) (5.95) GreyRes � indicator 0.231 �0.013

(0.25) (�0.02) QIBpenul � indicator 0.618*** 0.911***

(3.06) (2.96) LnGpcds �0.367*** �0.329*** �0.469*** �0.393*** �0.377*** 0.334***

(�3.08) (�4.19) (�6.14) (�5.68) (�5.53) (3.44) LnAge 0.009 0.013 0.354 0.057 0.052 0.148

(0.06) (0.12) (0.38) (0.68) (0.66) (1.42) LbmRep 0.126 0.092 0.178 �0.063 �0.111 �0.066

(0.56) (0.56) (0.88) (�0.38) (�0.62) (�0.32) Mkt3Mw 5.193*** 2.522** 2.917*** 2.122** 2.109*** 3.394***

(4.34) (2.42) (4.18) (2.59) (2.61) (3.82) MktVol �15.67* �24.58** �19.32*** �26.82*** �27.77*** �17.64*

(�1.71) (�2.59) (�2.05) (�3.54) (�3.74) (�1.88) PriorIR 1.797*** 0.793** 1.262*** 0.736** 0.692** 1.473***

(4.82) (2.40) (3.89) (2.50) (2.41) (4.83) Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Constant 3.413** 3.002*** 4.345*** 3.973*** 4.131*** 6.488***

(3.27) (4.03) (6.84) (6.14) (6.82) (8.63)

Observations 172 172 172 172 172 172 Adjusted R2 0.269 0.563 0.555 0.654 0.668 0.773

The retail investors’ oversubscription is regressed against a set of explanatory variables as noted in Eq. (2) using an OLS regression framework. The dependent variable in specifications (1–5) is the natural log of 1 plus the retail investors’ closing oversubscription (defined as the ratio of retail investors’ demand for shares to the total number of shares offered to retail investors). The dependent variable in specification (6) is the natural log of 1 plus the number of bids submitted by retail investors. GreyRes is the residual grey market premium obtained by regressing the grey market premium (Grey) (as defined in Table 1) on IPO grades. QIBpenul is the natural log of 1 plus the institutional investors’ oversubscription on the penultimate day of the offer period. GreyRes � Indicator is an interaction term to test the symmetric relationship of grey market premiums. The indicator function is set to 1 when the residual grey market premium is above median and 0 otherwise. QIBpenul � Indicator is an interaction term to test the symmetric relationship of the participation of institutional investors. The indicator function is set to 1 when the institutional subscription is greater than 1 by the penultimate day of the offer and 0 otherwise. LnGpcds is the natural log of gross proceeds. LnAge is the natural log of 1 plus the age of the firm at the time of the IPO. LbmRep is a dummy variable which takes the value of 1 for IPOs managed by reputed underwriters and 0 otherwise. PriorIR is the average initial return for IPOs listed in the two months prior to the issue opening date of the IPO. All other variables are defined in Table 1. White heteroscedasticity-consistent t-statistics are in parentheses. *** Statistically significant at 1%. ** Statistically significant at 5%. * Statistically significant at 10%.

214 S. Neupane et al. / Journal of Banking & Finance 44 (2014) 207–218

Sub-section 5.1). The estimates are presented in Table 3. In speci- fications (1) and (2) the dependent variable (QIBclosing) is the natu- ral log of 1 plus institutional investors’ oversubscription as on the final day of the offer period and in specification (3) we replace the dependent variable, oversubscription, with the number of bids made by institutional investors (the natural log of 1 plus the num- ber of bids) at the end of the offer period.

The results (Table 3, all specifications) show that, unlike retail investors (Table 2), institutional investors’ participation is signifi- cantly and positively affected by the fundamental quality of the IPO firm (Grade). The evidence that institutional investors partici- pate well in good quality IPOs is consistent with the previous find- ings (Aggarwal et al., 2002; Chiang et al., 2010) and supports the view that institutional investors are better informed than retail investors, possibly due to their access to analytical expertise.

The positive and significant coefficients of the measures of the grey market premium (GreyRes) suggest that institutional inves- tors extract signals from the grey market and use these in their participation decision. This is consistent with the view of Cornelli et al. (2006) that when the grey market premium is high, institu- tional investors would find it easy to offload their subscription to investors who are driven by their optimism. Moreover, the coeffi- cient of the measure of firm quality (Grade) continues to remain positive and significant even after controlling for the effects of the grey market premium, suggesting that even when the high grey market premium is indicating the presence of optimistic trad-

ers in the markets, the institutional investors do not undermine the importance of firm quality while deciding to participate.

To examine whether the effects of firm quality (Grade) and the grey market premium on institutional investors’ participation is symmetric, we include additional interactive terms in the specifica- tion. First, an indicator variable that takes the value of 1 for IPOs with a grade equal to or above the median grade (3 or higher) and 0 otherwise is created and interacted with the IPO grade vari- able (Grade x Indicator). Second, a residual grey market premium indicator that takes the value of 1 for the IPOs with a residual grey market premium equal to or higher than the median premium and 0 otherwise is created and interacted with the residual premium (GreyRes � Indicator). The estimates in specification (2) show that the coefficients of grade indicator (Grade � Indicator) are insignifi- cant, suggesting that the effect of IPO quality on institutional partic- ipation is symmetric. The coefficient of the residual grey market premium indicator, however, is positive and statistically significant, which suggests an asymmetric influence of the grey market pre- mium on institutional investors’ decision to participate.

More specifically, while a high grey market premium leads to higher participation of institutional investors, low grey market pre- miums do not necessarily deter them from subscribing to the high quality IPOs. Further, the insignificant effects of initial returns of prior IPOs and market volatility on institutional investors’ partici- pation reassures us that institutional investors are not driven by historical factors in the market. In specification (3), the dependent

Table 3 The determinants of institutional investors’ participation in IPOs.

Rate of oversubscription No. of bids

1 2 3

Grade 0.339*** 0.325*** 0.351**

(3.00) (3.13) (2.61) Grade � indicator 0.0397 -0.0292

(0.56) (�0.41) GreyRes 1.836*** �4.169 �5.618**

(3.62) (�1.27) (�2.12) GreyRes � indicator 5.867** 7.124***

(2.23) (2.82) LnGpcds 0.092 0.031 0.409***

(0.28) (0.33) (3.99) LnAge �0.042 �0.083 �0.028

(�0.27) (�0.78) (�0.22) LbmRep 1.175*** 1.149*** 1.172***

(4.33) (4.87) (5.82) Mkt3Mw 3.176*** 3.363*** 2.572**

(3.06) (3.00) (2.29) MktVol 8.452 7.206 1.276

(0.97) (0.73) (0.13) PriorIR 0.785 0.591 0.389

(1.54) (1.11) (1.04) Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Constant �0.048 �0.215 �1.513*

(�0.06) (�0.25) (�1.96) Observations 172 172 172 Adjusted R2 0.641 0.640 0.736

The institutional investors’ oversubscription is regressed against a set of explana- tory variables as noted in Eq. (2) using an OLS regression framework. In specifica- tions (1–2) the dependent variable is natural log of 1 plus the institutional investors’ closing oversubscription (defined as the ratio of institutional investors’ demand for shares to the total number of shares offered to institutional investors). In specification (3) the dependent variable is the natural log of 1 plus the number of bids submitted by institutional investors. Grade � Indicator is an interaction term to test the symmetric relationship of IPO grades. The indicator function is set to 1 for firms with grades of 3 or greater and 0 otherwise. All other variables are defined in Tables 1 and 2. White heteroscedasticity-consistent t-statistics are in parentheses. *** Statistically significant at 1%. ** Statistically significant at 5%. * Statistically significant at 10%.

S. Neupane et al. / Journal of Banking & Finance 44 (2014) 207–218 215

variable is replaced by the natural log of 1 plus the number of bids on the final day of application for subscription. The quality of the results remains robust. Among other variables, the size of the issue, underwriter’s reputation and the recent trend in market returns generally appear to influence the participation of institutional investors.

Overall, the symmetric effect of the quality of the firm, the asym- metric effect of the grey market premium and a lack of significant effects of prior returns on IPOs, confirm that the institutional inves- tors’ decision to participate is not driven by market sentiment while the sound fundamental value of the firm is critically important. Fur- ther, since the economic significance of ‘grade’ is almost twice that of the grey market premium in explaining institutional participa- tion, the results are consistent with the second hypothesis and with the notion that the sound fundamental value of the IPO firm is crit- ically important in order to attract institutional investors.19

5.3. The setting of IPO offer price

The discussions above establish that both the retail and institu- tional investors extract signals from the grey market premium. Since IPO firms are required to set the offer price while the grey market is active, it is likely that the IPO firm also accounts for the signals from the grey market in setting the offer price.

19 A 10% change in the median value of grade is associated with a 5.91% change in institutional investors’ participation but a 10% change in the median value of the residual grey market premium is only associated with a 2.68% change in institutional participation.

Cornelli et al. (2006) show that grey market prices have a signifi- cant influence on the offer price setting of European IPOs. The European grey market traders, however, do not have access to information on the participation of other traders. Consequently, the grey market price, which remains independent of information on participation, could be an additional (independent) source of information for IPO firms. In this sub-section, we examine part of our Hypotheses 3 and 4 which predict a positive relation between market sentiment (grey market premium) and offer price and an insignificant relationship between firm quality (IPO grades) and offer price. We do so by regressing the offer price normalized by the offer price range, as in Cornelli and Goldreich (2003),20 against a set of explanatory variables including grey market premium (Grey- Res), IPO grades (Grade) and the participation of the three investor groups (the natural log of 1 plus oversubscription) as in Eq. (3).

OfferPricej¼ b0þb1GreyResjþb2Gradejþb3QIBclosingj þb4NIIclosingj þb5RIIclosingj þb6Mkt3Mwjþb7MktVolj þb8LnGpcdsjþb9LnAgejþb10LbmRepjþb11PriorIRj

þ X11 k¼1

bkIndustryþej ð3Þ

Since the offer price has to be set within the original offer price range, Eq. (3) is estimated using Tobit regression with censoring from above and below. QIBclosing, NIIclosing and RIIclosing are the nat- ural log of 1 plus the institutional, non-institutional and retail investors’ oversubscription respectively as on the final day of the offer period. The estimations also account for the quality of the firm (Grade), reputation of the underwriters (LbmRep), the size of the issue (LnGpcds), age of the firm (LnAge), recent market returns (Mkt3Mw), recent market volatility (MktVol), prior initial returns (PriorIR) and industry fixed effects (11 industry groups).

The estimates of the determinants of offer price setting (Eq. (3)) are presented in Table 4 (specifications 1 and 2). Specification (1) examines the effect of the grey market premium on offer price without accounting for investors’ subscription. The estimates show that, as in European markets (see Cornelli et al., 2006), the grey market premium exerts a positive and significant effect on the offer price of Indian IPOs. The effect of firm quality (Grade), how- ever, is insignificant. Specification (2) is extended to include the variables representing the oversubscription level of all three cate- gories of investor. While the coefficients of the variables represent- ing the subscriptions of retail and institutional investors are positive and significant, the coefficient of the grey market pre- mium retains its significance. This is consistent with Cornelli et al. (2006) as well as our hypothesis on the impact of grey market premium on offer price. As hypothesized earlier, the coefficient of ‘Grade’ remains insignificant, indicating that in the presence of market sentiment firm quality has a limited effect on offer price. Overall, the estimates in Table 4 suggest that, as in European IPO markets, the grey market premium has a significant impact on set- ting the offer price of Indian IPOs.

5.4. IPO initial returns

In equilibrium, the grey market premium should be the differ- ence between the offer price and the equilibrium price of the shares on offer. If the market is able to assess the quality of the firm then the initial returns (underpricing) and grey market premium, as predicted by Hypothesis 3, should be positively associated. To examine Hypotheses 3 and 4 on the relationship between firm

20 Normalization of the offer price converts it to a scale of 0 to 1; 0 if the offer price is set at the lower bound of the price range and 1 if the offer price is set at the upper bound.

Table 4 The determinants of IPO offer price and initial returns.

Offer price Initial returns

(1) (2) (3)

Grade 0.139 �0.154 �0.049 (0.78) (�0.83) (�0.90)

GreyRes 11.17*** 3.237** 0.739***

(3.75) (2.45) (7.47) QIBclosing 0.541*** 0.065

(2.91) (1.46) NIIclosing 0.189 0.026

(1.14) (0.63) RIIclosing 1.203** 0.033

(2.31) (0.55) LbmRep �0.616 �1.219** �0.088

(�1.61) (�2.86) (�0.82) LnGpcds �0.473** �0.532*** �0.034

(�2.48) (�2.93) (�0.99) LnAge 0.154 0.264 �0.008

(0.75) (1.33) (�0.72) Mkt3Mw 5.519** 4.323* �0.303

(2.18) (1.82) (�0.58) MktVol �4.472 �13.67 7.886

(�0.21) (�0.67) (1.41) PriorIR �0.612 �0.301 0.342**

(�0.88) (�0.46) (2.26) Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Constant 6.310*** 2.544* 0.412

(3.88) (1.72) (1.42) Observations 172 172 172

No of left censored observation 24 24 No of right censored observations 119 119 LR Test: All Coeff. = 0 (X2) 108.82*** 128.59***

Pseudo R2/adjusted R2 0.417 0.497 0.390

In specifications (1) and (2) the offer price, normalized by the initial offer price range, is regressed against a set of explanatory variables as noted in Eq. (3) using a Tobit regression framework. In specification (3) market adjusted first day returns (initial returns) (MIR1) are regressed against a set of determinants as stated in Eq. (3) using OLS. QIBclosing, NIIclosing and RIIclosing are the natural log of 1 plus the insti- tutional, non-institutional and retail investors’ oversubscription as on the final day of the offer period. All other variables are defined in Tables 1 and 2. White heter- oscedasticity-consistent t- statistics are in parentheses for specification (3). *** Statistically significant at 1%. ** Statistically significant at 5%. * Statistically significant at 10%.

216 S. Neupane et al. / Journal of Banking & Finance 44 (2014) 207–218

quality and market sentiment with initials returns, we regress market-adjusted first day IPO returns (MIR1) against a set of explanatory variables (Eq. (3)) using OLS. The dependent variable, MIR1, is the excess initial return measured as the first day return (1st day closing price minus offer price divided by the offer price) less market return (i.e. change in BSE Sensex) during the same per- iod. The explanatory variables include final residual grey market premium (GreyRes), three variables (QIBclosing, NIIclosing and RIIclos- ing) representing the oversubscription by institutional, non-institu- tional, and retail investors, the fundamental quality of the firm (Grade), the offer size (LnGpcds), age of the firm (LnAge), under- writer reputation (LbmRep), recent market return (Mkt3Mw), recent market volatility (MktVol) and prior initial returns (PriorIR). The estimates are reported in specification (3) in Table 4.

Consistent with the prediction of our Hypothesis 3 and the find- ings of prior studies (Aussenegg et al., 2006; Cornelli et al., 2006; Dorn, 2009) the estimates reveal a positive and significant relation between the grey market premium and initial returns. The esti- mates also show that neither IPO grades nor the participation of any type of investor have any significant effect on initial returns. Consistent with earlier studies, we find a positive relationship between initial returns of prior IPOs (PriorIR) and initial returns. The coefficients of other control variables such as the offer size, recent market returns (Mkt3Mw) and volatility (MktVol) are insignificant.

5.5. Aftermarket returns

If the traders in the grey market were to be guided by unsus- tainable optimism rather than by the equilibrium value of the shares, then the positive relation between the grey market pre- mium and excess return should be short-lived. Consequently, as predicted in Hypothesis 3, the grey market premium and aftermar- ket returns should be inversely related as the market corrects for its initial optimism. Moreover, if IPO grade truly reflects the quality of the firm, there should be a positive relationship between the grade and aftermarket returns (Hypothesis 4). To examine these issues, we regress aftermarket returns against the residual grey market premium and IPO grades with other possible determinants of the long term performance of IPOs as in Eq. (4).

After market returnsj ¼ b0 þ b1GreyResj þ b2Gradej þ b3QIBclosingj þ b4RIIclosingj þ b5LnGpcdsþ b6LnAgej þ b7LbmRepj þ b8PriorIRj

þ X11

k¼1 bkIndustryþ ej ð4Þ

To measure the aftermarket performance we compute the mar- ket adjusted buy and hold returns (as in Dorn, 2009) for 3 month, 6 month and 12 month holding periods starting at the one month anniversary of the IPO. Two alternative market indices (BSE Sensex index, BSE 500 index) are used to measure the market return. BSE Sensex is the most popular and widely followed index representing almost 30 liquid stocks while BSE 500 is a broad-based index that comprises 500 stocks on the BSE. The two main variables of inter- est are the fundamental quality of the firm (Grade) and the residual grey market premium (GreyRes). The model also controls for par- ticipation of institutional investors (QIBclosing), underwriter reputa- tion (LbmRep), offer size (LnGpcds), age of the firm (LnAge), prior initial returns (PriorIR) and fixed effect of 11 industry sectors. The results are presented in Table 5.

Consistent with the findings of previous studies (Cornelli et al., 2006; Dorn, 2009) and the prediction of our Hypothesis 3, the esti- mates in Table 5 reveal an inverse relationship between the grey market premium and aftermarket performance of IPOs in the six months after listing. The relationship loses its significance in the 12 months’ aftermarket regressions. The results presented in Table 5, combined with those in specification (3) of Table 4, sug- gest that IPOs with a high grey market premium exhibit extremely volatile price performance in the post listing period. Driven by sen- timent, these IPOs exhibit prices above the fundamental value in the first month of listing and then crash dramatically in the follow- ing six months. These estimates suggest that investors who invest in IPOs with a higher grey market premium are likely to suffer sig- nificant losses within the first six months. However, the insignifi- cant coefficient of the grey market premium on 12 month returns, when controlled for firm quality, indicates that the influ- ence of market sentiment fades away as the quality of the firm becomes more visible.

On the other hand, consistent with the predictions of Hypothe- sis 4, the coefficient of IPO grade is positive and statistically signif- icant in all specifications. In the model of 3 month post IPO- returns, the coefficient is only marginally significant but becomes stronger for 6 month and 12 month holding period returns. The coefficient of institutional investors’ participation is not significant at any conventional level. Since IPO grade and institutional partic- ipation are highly correlated, the effect of institutional participa- tion is possibly captured by IPO grades. Moreover, since institutional participation is influenced by both investor sentiment and firm quality (as shown in Table 3), and the sentiment and firm quality have opposing effects on long-run performance, it is not surprising that institutional participation does not have a signifi-

Table 5 The determinants of aftermarket returns.

Sensex adjusted BSE 500 adjusted

3 m (1) 6 m (2) 12 m (3) 3 m (4) 6 m (5) 12 m (6)

Grade 0.033* 0.085** 0.087** 0.033* 0.098** 0.087**

(1.94) (2.01) (2.08) (1.87) (2.15) (2.09) GreyRes �0.101** �0.049* �0.037 �0.127** �0.048* �0.036

(�2.40) (�1.93) (�0.42) (�2.02) (�1.86) (�0.44) QIBclosing 0.019 0.019 0.014 0.013 0.015 0.014

(0.54) (0.71) (0.31) (0.46) (0.56) (0.40) RIIclosing �0.033 �0.047 �0.006 �0.028 �0.049 �0.006

(�0.69) (�0.71) (�0.09) (�0.59) (�0.63) (�0.09) LbmRep �0.007 0.042 �0.033 �0.009 0.037 �0.031

(�0.15) (0.50) (�0.32) (�0.15) (0.45) (�0.30) LnGpcds �0.031 �0.074* �0.078 �0.034 �0.076* �0.069

(�1.27) (�1.97) (�1.26) (�1.33) (�1.92) (�1.41) LnAge 0.018 0.074 0.083 0.022 0.078 0.088

(0.24) (1.22) (1.13) (0.56) (1.14) (1.21) PriorIR �0.101 �0.217 �0.362 �0.112 �0.197 �0.326

(�0.80) (�1.31) (�1.27) (�0.88) (�1.18) (�1.14) Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Constant 0.017 0.023 0.026 0.061 0.040 0.022

(0.64) (0.39) (0.07) (0.53) (0.36) (0.06) Observations 172 172 172 172 172 172 Adjusted R2 0.015 0.023 0.027 0.019 0.024 0.023

The market adjusted buy-and-hold 3, 6 and 12 months returns are regressed against a set of explanatory variables as described in Eq. (5) using OLS regression. The returns are calculated from the price at the end of the first month of listing (after 30 calendar days). The Sensex is the market index representing 30 most liquid stocks and the BSE 500 is the index of the 500 stocks listed on the Bombay Stock Exchange. All variables are defined in Tables 1, 2 and 4. White heteroscedasticity-consistent t-statistics are in parentheses. ��� Statistically significant at 1%. ** Statistically significant at 5%. * Statistically significant at 10%.

S. Neupane et al. / Journal of Banking & Finance 44 (2014) 207–218 217

cant effect on long-run performance. The coefficient of retail inves- tors’ participation is not statistically significant at any meaningful level. It is likely that the grey market premium in the equation, the main proxy for sentiment, reduces the significance of the impact of retail investors’ participation in the long-run return regressions.21

Overall, the estimates support the predictions of our Hypotheses 3 and 4. Further, the observed positive association between IPO grade and aftermarket returns and the negative relationship between grey market premium and aftermarket returns suggest that retail inves- tors can increase their returns by switching their IPO participation strategy in favour of IPO grades instead of the signals derived from market sentiment (grey market premium).

6. Conclusions

Extant literature suggests that institutional investors’ decision to participate in the IPO process is guided by firm quality while that of retail investors is driven by market sentiment. This discrep- ancy is often attributed to the ability of the institutional investors to analyse the firm quality while it is not cost effective for retail investors to follow suit. Hence, they follow the market sentiment often with adverse post listing performance. The regulatory provi- sions and presence of an active grey market make the Indian IPO market uniquely transparent and provide a base for natural exper- iments to test whether retail investors’ market sentiment driven decision is actually caused by their inability to analyse the com- pany fundamentals and assess the firm quality. Unlike in other countries, all IPO investors in India have access to firm quality grade provided by independent assessors and indicators of market sentiment before lodging an application for subscription. This unique setting offers an opportunity to test whether retail inves- tors attach greater weight to firm quality than to market sentiment

21 It is noteworthy that when grey market premium (GreyRes) is excluded, the coefficient of retail investors’ participation becomes negative and statistically significant in most of the specifications.

when faced with both sets of information. Using the information contained in independent grading of IPO firms, the level of partic- ipation of institutional investors, premiums in the grey market, and aggregate market performance around the issue, this paper examines the relative strength of the sentiment and company fundamentals-based grading on the participation of retail and institutional investors.

Several conclusions emerge. First, in deciding their participa- tion, retail investors seem to attach greater weight to market sentiment than to the fundamental quality of the firm. Retail investors’ participation is strongly correlated with institutional participation when the latter participate well but the relationship weakens when institutions do not participate so well. Retail investors’ participation also remains independent of IPO grades. These findings challenge the view that retail investors decide on sentiment because of the lack of information on firm quality. Second, the participation of institutional investors is positively associated with the fundamental quality of the firm. Although the institutional investors’ subscription is positively associated with grey market premium, the relationship is asymmetric; they tend to participate more when the premium is high but the low premium does not appear to deter them. Third, consistent with the evidence in the literature, the grey market premium has a positive effect on both offer price and initial returns. Fourth, the participations of institutional and retail investors appear to positively influence the offer price (within the regulatory constraints) but their ability to explain the initial returns remains limited. Finally, the aftermarket performance of IPOs is inversely related to the grey market premium while it is positively associ- ated with IPO grades, indicating the market tends to overreact to investor sentiment but underreact to IPO quality at the time of the offer. Overall, the evidence suggests that institutional investors’ decisions are influenced by firm quality while those of retail investors are driven by market sentiment, even when all of them have access to indicators of both firm quality and market sentiment.

218 S. Neupane et al. / Journal of Banking & Finance 44 (2014) 207–218

Appendix A

The timeline of an Indian IPO (Orient Green Power Company Ltd.)

Appendix B

This appendix illustrates the two types of grey market quotes available in the Indian IPO market for Ashoka Buildcon Limited.

Date Offer period Offer price range Grey market premium Kostak rate 25 September 2010 September 24 – September 28 2010 INR 297-324 INR 42-45 INR 1900–2000

The grey market premium of INR 42-45 suggests that the broker is willing to buy the stock at a premium of INR 42 at whatever the offer price is set while they are willing to sell the stock at a pre- mium of INR 45. Following Eq. (1), the grey market premium in this case is 13.5% (42–310.5). The Kostak rate is the premium that grey market investors are willing to pay for each retail investor applica- tion which can be up to a value of INR 100,000. The Kostak rate in this case indicates that brokers are willing to buy a retail investor application for INR 1,900 and willing to sell the application for INR 2,000.

References

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Derrien, F., 2005. IPO pricing in ‘‘hot’’ market conditions: who leaves money on the table? J. Finance 60, 487–521.

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importance of firm fundamentals. J. Financ. Quant. Anal. 44, 489–516. Hanley, K.W., Wilhelm, W.J., 1995. Evidence on the strategic allocation of initial

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  • Firm quality or market sentiment: What matters more for IPO investors?
    • 1 Introduction
    • 2 The salient features of the Indian IPO market
      • 2.1 Transparency, allocation, and grading7
      • 2.2 The grey market
    • 3 Prior studies and hypotheses development
    • 4 The sample
    • 5 Empirical results
      • 5.1 Retail investors’ participation
      • 5.2 Institutional investors’ participation
      • 5.3 The setting of IPO offer price
      • 5.4 IPO initial returns
      • 5.5 Aftermarket returns
    • 6 Conclusions
    • Appendix A
    • Appendix B
    • References

Competition-of-socially-responsible-and-conventional-mu_2014_Journal-of-Bank.pdf

Journal of Banking & Finance 44 (2014) 160–176

Contents lists available at ScienceDirect

Journal of Banking & Finance

journal homepage: www.elsevier .com/locate / jbf

Competition of socially responsible and conventional mutual funds and its impact on fund performance q

http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jbankfin.2014.03.030 0378-4266/� 2014 Published by Elsevier B.V.

q All authors are grateful to an anonymous referee for helpful comments, as well as to Korea Research Foundation for financially supporting this project. ⇑ Corresponding author. Tel.: +61 3 9905 1561; fax: +61 3 9905 5475.

E-mail addresses: [email protected] (F. In), [email protected] (M. Kim), [email protected] (R.J. Park), [email protected] (S. Kim), tskim@ business.kaist.ac.kr (T.S. Kim).

1 Tel.: +61 3 9905 1561; fax: +61 3 9905 5475. 2 Tel.: +82 53 950 7413; fax: +82 53 950 6247.

3 For example, certain countries in the Organisation for Economic Co-oper Development have numerous SR investment laws for public pension funds. In large pension funds are required to consider social responsibility issues. I pension funds’ investment policies must describe how they account fo environmental, and ethical issues. In Norway, government pension funds re negative screening of companies producing certain categories of weap exclusion of companies responsible for human rights violations, gross corru environmental degradation; and a corporate governance policy targeting l financial returns.

Francis In a,⇑, Martin Kim a,1, Raphael Jonghyeon Park a,1, Sangbae Kim b,2, Tong Suk Kim c a Department of Banking and Finance, Monash University, Clayton, Victoria 3168, Australia b School of Business Administration, Kyungpook National University, Sankyuk-dong, Puk-ku, Daegu 702-701, Republic of Korea c KAIST College of Business, KAIST, 87 Hoegiro, Dongdaemoon-gu, Seoul 130-722, Republic of Korea

a r t i c l e i n f o a b s t r a c t

Article history: Received 21 March 2013 Accepted 20 March 2014 Available online 2 April 2014

JEL classification: G11 G23

Keywords: Mutual funds Competition Socially responsible investing

This paper examines the impact of both socially responsible (SR) and conventional entrant funds on SR incumbent funds using an overlap in portfolio holdings to measure the impact of competition in the US mutual fund industry. This paper’s findings indicate that over the past decade the increase in compe- tition from SR entrants has been associated with an increase in fees but not in capital flow. Moreover, our results show that the increase in the number of SR fund entrants does not have a negative impact on fund performance. This finding implies that despite the significant increase in the number of SR funds entering the market, open and free competition fosters the performance of SR fund participants. Our study con- cludes that despite the recent growth in the number of SR funds, the SR mutual fund market does not exhibit the key features of a competitive market.

� 2014 Published by Elsevier B.V.

1. Introduction

The mutual fund industry can be portrayed as a competitive market that has experienced significant growth over the past 20 years. According to the 2009 Investment Company Fact Book (Investment Company Institute, 2009), the assets of active domes- tic equity mutual funds grew at a compounded annual growth rate of 16% per year between 1980 and 2008. However, recent data have suggested that the growth of mutual funds has slowed and started to decline (Investment Company Institute, 2011). In com- parison to the decline in the overall number of mutual funds in recent years, socially responsible (SR) funds have grown signifi- cantly in size and numbers over the same time period. According to the Social Investment Forum’s (SIF) 2010 Trend Report, the number of funds that incorporate environment, social, and gover- nance (ESG) factors increased by 90% between 2007 and 2010,

from 260 to 493. Recent growth in SR funds can be attributed to a number of factors, from an increase in social awareness to changes in legislation.3 In addition, the growth of the SR mutual fund market was fostered by funds that integrate ethical factors by differentiating themselves from conventional funds through screen- ing strategies to filter out investment opportunities deemed unethi- cal or those failing to incorporate ESG factors and, as a result, cater to a growing niche market of socially conscious investors.

While attempts to ‘do good by doing good’ have their advanta- ges, academic studies that examine the performance of SR funds relative to conventional funds have provided mixed results. Derwall et al. (2005) used eco-efficiency scores to construct portfo- lios and examined the performance of portfolios with high eco- efficiency scores. The portfolios of companies with high scores outperformed those with lower scores by 6% per annum during 1997–2003. On the other hand, Bauer et al. (2005) examined the

ation and Canada,

n France, r social,

quire the ons; the ption, or

ong-term

F. In et al. / Journal of Banking & Finance 44 (2014) 160–176 161

performance of German, UK, and US SR funds and empirically showed that after controlling for investment style, there were no statistical differences in performance between SR and conventional funds during 1990–2001. Moreover, Renneboog et al. (2008b) examined SR funds across 17 countries across Europe, North Amer- ica, and Asia and found that investors do in fact pay for the price of ethics, with SR funds underperforming relative to their domestic benchmarks by �2.2% to �6.5% within the sample period 1991– 2003. Similarly, using a multifactor capital asset pricing model, Jones et al. (2008) found that SR funds underperformed relative to the Australia market, particularly during 2000–2005. Finally, in an attempt to explain the statistical difference between the per- formance of SR and conventional funds, Gil-Bazo et al. (2010) examined factors such as fees and loadings and concluded that, even after adjusting for fees, the difference in the performance of SR and conventional funds was statistically insignificant.

To further identify factors that may contribute to the perfor- mance of SR funds, this study examines competition between SR funds and between SR and conventional funds by using an overlap in portfolio holdings as a proxy for competition. By framing our study using the basic properties of a competitive market, this study provides us unique insight into the functionality of the SR fund market. Through understanding the competition faced by SR funds in the mutual fund industry, this study provides a better under- standing of factors that contribute to the performance of SR funds and, to some degree, additional insight into the dynamics of an SR mutual fund market.

2. Hypothesis development

2.1. The mutual fund industry as a competitive market

The mutual fund industry can be described as a competitive market due to similarities in its characteristics with the economic concept of a competitive market.4 First, due to the strong growth in the number of mutual funds since the 1990s, large numbers of mutual funds are currently competing for capital not only in the Uni- ted States, but also around the world. While mutual funds differen- tiate among themselves in terms of investment style, size, types of securities invested, and especially fees (Hortaçsu and Syverson, 2004), investors as consumers of the mutual fund market can now- adays easily choose and switch between mutual funds, depending on their financial objectives.5 Second, the barriers to entry seem to be low, such that mutual funds can easily enter the market to cater to changes in investor preferences over time. This low entry barrier incentivizes current funds within the market to be more efficient and effective in response to an increase in competition. As a result, strong evidence of the ease of entry in the mutual fund setting can be represented by the number of entries in the form of new funds. Third, because numerous mutual funds offer portfolios of investment securities and products, it is difficult for a single mutual fund to hold a unique investment portfolio that significantly outperforms its rel- ative benchmark. This is one of the key features of a competitive market: No one seller can earn abnormal profits (or, in our case, returns) due to a number of factors, including an increase in the number of competitors in the market offering to produce or sell a similar product, thereby leading to an increase in the supply of equally performing portfolios. This finding is not surprising, given that, due to the significant growth of the mutual fund market, most

4 In economics, the term competitive market refers to a market with a large number of buyers and sellers such that no single buyer or seller can influence the price or any other aspect of the market.

5 For example, Bodie et al. (1992) provided theoretical justification for investors to reduce investments in stocks as they grow older. This suggests that investors’ needs change as they age.

6 Types of screenings can include avoiding investments in companies that are associated with tobacco, gambling, defence/weapons, animal testing, and alcohol Alternatively, types of ESG screenings include investments in companies that properly address issues such as clean technology, environment, community development workplace diversity, human rights, labour relations, board issues, and executive pay

7 It is important to note that these differences between SR and conventional funds are significantly dependent upon the matched sampling procedure.

likely some form of product standardization (in this case, mutual funds as an investment vehicle) exists for which there is overlap in information about investment opportunities (and, by effect, portfolio holdings). Therefore, under the assumption of product standardiza- tion, if investors hold sufficient information about mutual funds, they would be able, to some extent, to compare mutual funds and determine their relative worth. Finally, some degree of entrepre- neurial activities aimed at improving performance further increases mutual fund competition. For example, using a structural model, Li and Qiu (2010) examined funds that increase fees through product differentiation. Interestingly, their results indicated that funds can increase their profits by almost 30% through differentiation. Given these similarities, we can therefore conclude that the mutual fund industry was always or is already a competitive market.

2.2. Different levels of competition within the mutual fund market

One of the key differences between SR and conventional funds is the screening process used in selecting investments. Screening can be a mix of different types of screens and total numbers of screen- ings.6 Therefore, given a degree of differentiation between SR and conventional funds, it is difficult to determine how these two types of funds interact in a same competitive mutual fund market. In other words, if we assume the products offered by these two funds are not identical, it is possible for two different types of funds to exist in the same market with no significant negative impact on market share from an increase in the number of mutual funds. On the other hand, since both funds compete within the same market in terms of mutual fund space, investment opportunities, and investor pool, if investors cannot differentiate between the two types of funds other than by generated returns, then SR funds may no longer be considered a dif- ferentiated product. Therefore, if we assume SR and conventional funds to be homogeneous, then the impact of competition can be measured since two similar products can be compared. As stated, because the competition between SR and conventional funds has not been examined, it is uncertain how an increase in the number of SR funds affects conventional funds and vice versa. Therefore this section builds upon the assumption that different levels of competi- tions exist between SR and conventional funds.

We hypothesise two levels of competition: between SR and conventional funds and only between SR funds. On one level, regarding the competition between SR and conventional funds, common factors that may have an impact on competition include fund size, age, expense ratios, and the total number of funds. How- ever, no studies to date have examined the effects of competition between SR and conventional funds. Despite this uncertainty, the literature has provided evidence that SR funds differ from conven- tional funds in terms of size and age (Bauer et al., 2005; Benson and Humphrey, 2008) but not expense ratios (Benson and Humphrey, 2008; Gil-Bazo et al., 2010).7 Furthermore, despite the unique nat- ure of SR funds, the prior literature examining the performance of SR funds has failed to find statistical differences in performance between SR and conventional funds (Bauer et al., 2005; Jones et al., 2008).

Even though the relation between the characteristics of SR and conventional funds may not be clear, the impact on competition can also stem from the way investors perceive and differentiate SR funds. For example, from an investor’s perspective, one of the

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162 F. In et al. / Journal of Banking & Finance 44 (2014) 160–176

determining factors in selecting a fund is likely to be historical per- formance. If so, investors examine the performance of a range of funds over a selected period and invest in a fund that will most likely maintain its performance in the future. Therefore, if differen- tiating ranges of funds and types by historical performance alone, then the investors (or the market) do not differentiate SR funds and the competition such funds face increases with every new fund entrant, regardless of type. Therefore, if the market does not differ- entiate SR funds, SR funds face competition from both SR and con- ventional funds.

On the other level, regarding competition between SR funds, it is difficult to distinguish between SR funds other than the types and total number of screenings used when selecting investments.8

Nonetheless, Bollen’s (2007) study suggests that investors in SR funds differ from ordinary investors in terms of utility function, in that they derive utility from exposure to the SR attribute and are less sensitive to negative performance. If this is the case, competition between SR funds is assumed to be lower than the competition between SR and conventional funds. In addition, if we define the util- ity function of SR investors as an additive utility function in which the preferences for one attribute are unaffected by the levels of the other attributes (Keeney and Raiffa, 1993), then the assumption can be made that SR investors can derive separate utilities from the SR attribute and investment risk and return (Bollen, 2007). Therefore, if investors derive utility from the SR attribute alone, there could be a different market for SR funds that maximises the utility of SR investors. In terms of maximising utility on the SR attri- bute, since SR funds differentiate themselves from other SR funds mainly in terms of types of screenings used, it is reasonable to assume that one of the determining factors for investing in SR funds is how well the fund reflects values or issues that are important to investors. Given sets of values and issues that are important to a par- ticular investor, he or she will selectively choose to invest in SR funds that are greatly weighted towards screening investments asso- ciated or affiliated with these values or issues. However, with only a finite number of screening types available, the majority of SR funds employ more than five screens to appeal to a wider range of investors.9

With relatively fixed number of screens available and a ten- dency for SR funds to employ multiple screens, it is likely that an increase in the number of new SR entrants will increase competi- tion among SR funds due to greater overlap in target investors, val- ues and issues, and screened investments. In other words, since different types of screens appeal to certain types of investors, an increase in the number of screens used by SR funds will create an overlap in the targets of investors. In this sense, conventional entrants will have minimal or no impact on competition between existing SR funds since conventional funds do not use screening processes. For example, if we measure the impact of competition using capital flows, then an increase in the total number of SR funds will likely have a negative impact on capital flows but con- ventional funds will, at best, have only a minor effect on capital flows since they do not provide the additional SR attribute from which certain investors derive their utility. However, since no prior research has examined competition between SR funds, it is difficult

8 To be more specific, screening processes can be generally divided into negative and positive screenings. Negative screenings involve excluding investments in companies associated with tobacco, defence/weapons, and alcohol. Alternatively, positive screenings have additional exclusions, depending on the types of positive screenings used by the fund (e.g., investments in companies with strong workplace diversity and concern for the environment). In regards to the impact of these two types of screens, Statman (2000) looked at 29 SR equity funds over the period 1981– 1997 and found that funds using positive screens outperform those using only negative screens by 70 basis points per month.

9 According to the 2010 SIF Trend Report, regarding the criteria of SR funds, 27% use a single screen, 19% use two to four screens, and 54% use more than five screens.

to determine the impact competition will have on fund perfor- mance. Therefore, given that investors can derive utility from the SR attribute alone and competition increases as more SR funds enter the mutual fund market, our assumption that an additional level of competition exists between SR funds is valid.

2.3. Fund performance in a competitive market

One of the hallmarks of a competitive market is that each seller is unable to earn abnormal profits. Therefore, within a competitive mutual fund market, our basic assumption is that an increase in competition due to new fund entrants will result in lower manage- ment fees, lower capital flow, higher expense ratios, and ultimately lower fund performance.

Extending our basic assumption that higher competition results in lower fund performance, we believe numerous factors are asso- ciated with competition impact fund performance. Since the iden- tification of individual competition factors is not within the scope of this study, we only briefly mention the factors that were consid- ered. First, as a financial intermediary of the stock market, mutual funds play a critical role by increasing the completeness of infor- mation in the marketplace (Allen and Gale, 2000). A decrease in market friction due to an increase in the availability of information leads to fewer arbitrage opportunities. Since mutual funds are known for their informational advantage, an increase in the num- ber of mutual funds is associated with lower abnormal profits or fewer and smaller arbitrage opportunities.10

Most theoretical studies conclude that the relation between SR stocks and expected returns can be explained by differences in demand for different types of stocks (Galema et al., 2008). There- fore with an increase in the number of SR funds, demand for SR stocks could lead to overpricing all available SR stocks that could affect the fund’s overall performance. However, recent studies have failed to find superior returns on environmentally responsible portfolios (Derwall et al., 2011), which suggests that performance is also determined by factors other than the demand for SR stocks. Second, since this study considers only domestic equity mutual funds, there is strong evidence that relates stock returns to liquid- ity costs (Brennan and Subrahmanyam, 1996). In other words, illiq- uid stocks generally earn higher rates of return in compensation for additional costs or the risk of illiquidity. With the increase in com- petition and overlap in securities holdings, the liquidity of stocks held by mutual funds will increase and the additional rate of return for holding illiquid stock will subsequently diminish. Finally and more relevant to SR funds, mutual funds typically operate in a decreasing return to scale environment, in which fund flows harm rather than improve subsequent fund performance (Berk and Green, 2004). With the increase in demand for SR investment prod- ucts over the past decade, there has been a significant increase in capital invested in SR funds. An increase in capital with greater competition among SR funds to attract new investors can also have an impact on persistence in the performance of SR funds.

To narrow the scope of the study, we examine two basic factors that determine performance within any competitive market: price and the supply of capital. Within a mutual fund context, the price of an investment portfolio can be regarded as the fees investors pay for services supplied by the fund. With the increase in competition over the years, mutual funds that do not consistently outperform their benchmark would have likely reduced their fees to remain competitive. Given the mixed results regarding SR fund performance relative to benchmarks, it is expected that higher

0 If we consider less friction as a decrease in idiosyncratic risk, it is possible for ture returns to be influenced by changes in idiosyncratic risk. Prior studies (e.g., alkiel and Xu, 2006) have provided evidence that portfolio idiosyncratic risk and ture returns are positively related.

1

fu M fu

F. In et al. / Journal of Banking & Finance 44 (2014) 160–176 163

competition among mutual funds (both SR and conventional) will be associated with a decrease in fees. This leads to our first hypothesis.

H1. Greater overlap in portfolio holdings among SR funds and between SR and conventional funds will have a negative impact on mutual fund fees.

Another important factor determining the performance of SR funds is the supply of capital or investor demand for SR funds. Cap- ital flow has an impact on the performance of mutual funds by reducing their portfolio liquidity risk. Dong et al. (2012) provided evidence that funds with high returns in year t tend to outperform their peers in year t + 1 and, by controlling for momentum effects, concluded that year t returns are driven by liquidity risk. In terms of competition, unless investor appetite for SR products is less than the actual increase in the number of SR funds, then an increase in the number of mutual funds would likely reduce capital inflow across individual SR funds under the assumption that SR funds do not significantly differ from each other. Given the option to switch between SR funds, investors will do so depending on histor- ical performance, differences in fees, fund sizes, and even changes in personal values or goals. Moreover, the impact of competition can be extended to increase the number of conventional funds if investors derive no additional utility from the SR attribute. There- fore, an increase in competition is likely to be associated with lower capital flow. Our second hypothesis is then as follows.

H2. Greater overlap in portfolio holdings among SR funds and between SR and conventional funds will have a negative impact on mutual fund capital flow.

In line with competitive market theory, since the market is assumed to be efficient in the long run, opportunity to earn abnor- mal profits will attract new SR funds (and even conventional funds), which will eventually decrease all SR fund profit margins to a more competitive level. If so, then we hypothesise that one of the key factors in determining performance is the competitive- ness of the mutual fund market in terms of the number of funds in the market, since that likely has an impact on the prices and supply of SR products. However, it might just be the case that SR funds systematically generate alpha collectively by exploiting arbi- trage opportunities. In the short run, competition between SR funds might result in SRI stocks becoming overpriced and driving up the stock prices. In turn, this would improve performance. Therefore this study’s main hypothesis is as follows.11

H3a. Greater overlap in portfolio holdings between SR funds has a positive impact on fund performance in the short run because it increases the demand for SRI stocks.

It is important note that this hypothesis is only valid under the assumption that the SR and conventional fund markets are mutually exclusive. In other words, SR funds products are not sub- stitutable by conventional entrants and the competition SR funds face is not influenced by them either. Therefore, in extending our initial hypothesis to examine the impact of competition on SR fund performance, we relax the assumption of mutually exclusive mar- kets for SR funds and treat SR and conventional portfolio holdings as substitutable products.

H3b. Greater overlap in portfolio holdings between SR and con- ventional funds has a positive impact on fund performance in the short run because it increases the demand for SRI stocks.

11 We thank an anonymous reviewer for these comments.

Despite the rapid development of SR investment products in the market, the academic community is largely uncertain as to whether the financial markets value the ethical dimensions of businesses. Nevertheless, the concept is beginning to take hold in the market, with organizations such as the United Nations, the World Bank, and the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development promoting ethical investments. By addressing the ethical aspect of investing, SR investment provides investors with an opportunity to invest in a way that reflects their views on ESG issues while allowing investors to fulfil their fiduciary duty.12

While the idea of doing well by doing good is certainly tempting, it is currently uncertain as to whether investors value ethics suffi- ciently and whether these factors are accounted for in the marketplace.

With the financial service sector changing continuously, it is of particular interest to see how the mutual fund industry has chan- ged with the emergence of SR funds. In this sense, our study serves to evaluate the extent to which SR investments have influenced the mutual fund industry. By addressing the competition SR funds face within a mutual fund setting, this study also aims to provide empirical evidence of how competition among SR funds and between SR and conventional funds impacts fund performance. Identifying factors associated with fund performance, our study contributes to the literature on SR mutual funds. To date, both the academic and business communities have failed to provide conclusive evidence of whether SR funds outperform their respec- tive benchmarks. In this sense, our study contributes to the litera- ture by identifying an additional factor, competition measured by overlap in portfolio holdings, that may need to be considered when evaluating SR fund performance.

The significance of this study is its use of mutual fund portfolio holdings as products, fees as prices, and capital flow as the supply of capital to examine SR funds in a competitive economic market setting. The innovation of this study is as follows. If we assume that SR and conventional funds are non-identical products, then an increase in competition from the entrance of new SR or conven- tional funds will not have any impact on the performance of exist- ing SR funds. However, if SR and conventional funds are identical, an increase in competition will affect performance due to market pressures. In addition, this study provides unique insight into how SR funds can behave differently from conventional funds. Finally, rather than focusing on differences in the performance of SR and conventional funds, our study takes an indirect but innova- tive approach in an attempt to explain whether differences in fund performance can be attributed to competitiveness between the two types of mutual fund participants. Rather than simply segre- gating SR from conventional funds, our study assumes two scenar- ios: one in which the markets for SR and conventional funds are mutually exclusive and one in which they are not. With this approach, we can examine the competition existing SR funds face from new SR funds as well as from new conventional funds.

The remainder of this paper is organised as follows. Section 3 describes the data and variable construction. Section 4 discusses the results of this study and robustness tests. Section 5 provides a summary of our results and concluding remarks.

3. Data and variables

3.1. Data

To obtain our sample, we first gather data on all active equity mutual funds from the Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP) Mutual Fund Database. We define equity mutual funds as

12 See the Principles of Responsible Investment, www.unpri.org/about.

5 In the 2003 SIF Trend Report, the total number of SR funds available to the public

164 F. In et al. / Journal of Banking & Finance 44 (2014) 160–176

mutual funds with more than 50% of holdings in domestic equi- ties.13 Furthermore, we exclude balanced, bond, money market, stock index, and international equity funds. Due to the relatively lax nature of mutual fund reporting, we filter out funds that do not report their weight in asset classes and fund names containing keywords such as global, international, bond, money market, fixed income, Asia, Pacific, Latin, Europe, Africa, and China. To create a sam- ple of SR funds, we obtain a list of SR funds from the 2003, 2005, 2007, and 2010 SIF Trend Reports. Finally, we obtain data on portfo- lio holdings from the CRSP’s Mutual Fund Database. We start our sample in 2003 because this is the date the CRSP Mutual Fund Data- base began reporting portfolio holdings data.14 Moreover, we end our sample period in 2010 because, based on our preliminary obser- vation, after 2010 significantly fewer mutual fund holdings data were reported.

To create a sample of SR incumbent and entrant funds, we iden- tify the date each fund begun reporting to the CRSP Mutual Fund Database. For the sample of SR entrants we sort funds by the date they began reporting and for SR incumbents we compile samples every quarter after overlap measure is calculated so that the SR entrants in the current quarter will belong to the SR incumbent sample the next quarter. For example, if SR fund X is a new entrant in the first quarter of 2003, then it will be classified as an SR incumbent starting from the second quarter of 2003 until the end of our sample period.

Most of the data (including returns, expenses, assets, fees, and turnover) required for our study are provided by the CRSP Mutual Fund Database. However, when the market value of a security holding was not available, we cross-referenced the price of the security to closing prices reported in the CRSP stock database on the closest date possible (since the reporting date of the security holdings may not coincide with trading days reported in the CRSP stock database – in such cases, we use the price of the security the day before the reported date in the CRSP Mutual Fund Holdings Database). By cross-referencing all our data, we arrive at a final sample consisting of 227 SR funds (including both incumbent and entrant funds) and 1395 conventional entrants funds from 2003 to 2010.

3.2. Measuring the impact of competition

To measure competition between entrant and incumbent funds (hereafter entrants and incumbents, for the sake of simplicity), we examine the portfolio holdings of funds. In other words, we are interested in competition between products available within the SR marketplace and measure the overlap in their portfolio hold- ings. To measure overlap, we follow Wahal and Wang (2011). Assume there are i incumbent funds at the beginning of quarter t, i = 1, . . .,M, and j new funds enter during the quarter, where j = 1, . . .,N. Let s represent an overlapping security that appears in both the incumbent and entrant portfolios, where s = 1, . . .,hi,j,t. In addition, c represents all (overlapping and non-overlapping) securities in an incumbent portfolio, where c = 1, . . .,NSi,t. For each overlapping security within an incumbent–entrant pair, we define a pseudo-portfolio weight

xs;t ¼ ps;ts

E s;t

ps;t�1sIs;t�1

! ps;t�1s

I s;t�1PNSi:t

c¼1 pc;t�1s I c;t�1

! ð1Þ

13 Academic studies of SR fund performance generally set their benchmarks to what constitutes an equity fund. However, because our study uses additional portfolio holdings data, increasing this benchmark for equity funds can significantly reduce our sample of SR funds.

14 See p.14 of the CRSP Survivorship-Bias–Free US Mutual Fund Guide, which can be found at http://www.crsp.com/documentation/pdfs/mfdb_guide.pdf.

where ps,t�1(ps,t) is the price of the overlapping security s at the beginning (end) of quarter t, sEs;tðsIs;t�1Þ is the number of shares of that security in the entrant (incumbent) portfolio, pc,t�1 is the price of security c in the incumbent portfolio, and sIc;t�1 is the number of shares of security c in the incumbent portfolio. After xs,t is defined for each overlapping security in an entrant–incumbent pair, we cre- ate a measure of overlap (MVOi,t), by summing these weights across all overlapping securities and then average across entrant–incum- bents pairs. The following measures the aggregate effect of all entrants on each incumbent:

MVOi;t ¼ 1 N

XN j¼1

Xhi;j;t s¼1

xs;t ð2Þ

As mentioned by Wahal and Wang (2011), this overlap measure suffers from one drawback: When there are numerous entrants (most likely for cases involving conventional entrants), our overlap measures will calculate the average overlap measure across all entrants rather than only entrants with non-zero overlap. There- fore we include a truncated overlap measure TVOi,t that will obtain the average measure of overlap only for entrants with non-zero overlap in holdings:

TVOi;t ¼ 1 K

XN j¼1

Xhi;j;t s¼1

xs;t ð3Þ

where K is the number of entrant funds with non-zero overlap hold- ings. In comparison to MVOi,t, this overlap measure is larger but with the same basic properties. For the remainder of this study, we adopt both measures of overlap.

4. Empirical findings

4.1. Pattern of fund entrants

Table 1 shows the pattern of SR incumbents and both SR and conventional entrants over our sample period. Despite the growth in the size of SR funds over the last decade, the total number of SR funds is only moderate after restricting our sample to domestic equity mutual funds.15 The total number of SR incumbents increases until year 2008, after which the number of SR incumbents stabi- lizes.16 It is possible that with increases in social awareness over the past decade, competition within the mutual fund space may have peaked in 2008 and led to more vehicles in other areas, such as SR alternative investment funds.17 According to the 2010 SIF Trend Report, the number of alternative investment vehicles incor- porating ESG criteria increased by 285% since 2007, a much higher growth rate than for any other investment vehicle incorporating ESG criteria. With the exception of a high number of entrants in the beginning of our sample period, the number of SR entrants was higher during the later years of our sample period from 2007.

As highlighted in the 2007 SIF Trend Report, the major forces behind growth are an increased demand for social products and services from institutional and high net worth investors. In regards to the types of SR entrants, it is evident that the majority of them are growth funds that focus on long-term performance, which

as 178. However, the lower number of funds in our sample indicates that while omestic equity funds represent a majority of SR funds in the United States, SR funds re well diversified in many areas, including bonds, money markets, and international nds. 6 While the total number of incumbents decreases after 2008, it is not certain hether SR funds stopped reporting or dissolved. 7 Alternative investment funds include hedge funds, social venture capital, private

quity, and property funds. It is no surprise that increased attention to the nvironment and social impact have led to a growth in investment in clean chnology and microfinance investment vehicles.

1

w d a fu

1

w 1

e e te

Table 1 Time series for the entry of SR and conventional mutual funds.

Year #Incumb. Fund type #Entrants #Entrants in Lipper class fund styles Rvw Entrants/incumbents

Growth Income Growth and income Small Mid Other

2003 77 SR 8 5 0 0 0 0 3 1.31 0.26 Conv. 61 24 2 5 17 10 3 0.40

2004 75 SR 3 0 0 0 1 2 0 1.45 0.04 Conv. 59 24 8 6 11 4 6 0.06

2005 79 SR 7 4 1 0 1 1 0 1.53 0.09 Conv. 62 21 2 7 11 6 15 0.19

2006 64 SR 7 4 0 1 0 2 0 1.74 0.03 Conv. 152 59 13 13 33 24 10 0.30

2007 107 SR 10 2 0 2 1 2 3 1.83 0.13 Conv. 251 96 17 42 50 28 18 0.15

2008 132 SR 13 5 0 2 0 0 6 1.11 0.14 Conv. 160 86 6 19 18 18 13 0.06

2009 126 SR 12 5 0 2 1 1 3 1.42 0.05 Conv. 216 86 14 48 32 21 15 0.07

2010 114 SR 8 5 1 0 0 0 2 1.63 0.05 Conv. 434 185 23 81 60 45 40 0.38

Table 1 shows the number of incumbent SR funds at the end of each calendar year (#Incumbents) and the number of new mutual fund entrants during the year (#Entrants). The data are obtained from the CRSP Mutual Fund Database. The entrant funds are classified based on Lipper class fund styles provided by the CRSP database. Growth funds refer to funds that normally invest in companies with long-term earnings that are expected to grow significantly faster than the earnings of stocks represented in the major unmanaged stock indices. Income funds refer to funds that seek relatively high current income and income growth through investing 65% or more of their portfolios in equities. Growth and income funds refer to funds that combine a growth-of-earnings orientation and an income requirement for level and/or rising dividends. Small funds, by prospectus or portfolio practice, invest primarily in companies with market capitalisation less than one billion USD at the time of purchase. Mid-cap funds refer to those that, by prospectus or portfolio practice, invest primarily in companies with market capitalisation less than $5 billion at the time of purchase. Other funds include those with unclassified class fund styles or specialised class fund styles such as energy, technology, and the financial sector. The variable Rvw is the compounded value-weighted market return from January 2003. The ratio of the number of entrants to incumbents is reported in percent.

F. In et al. / Journal of Banking & Finance 44 (2014) 160–176 165

most likely reflects the goals and objectives of SR investors. For conventional entrants, there does not seem to be any particular pattern in terms of entry. However, as stated by Wahal and Wang (2011), the number of mutual fund entrants started declin- ing after the late 1990s. This suggests that the driving forces behind conventional entrants most likely depend on market fac- tors. For example, as shown in Table 1, a substantial increase in the compounded value weight return is normally paired with high numbers of conventional entrants.18

4.2. Overlap statistics

Panel A of Table 2 shows the descriptive statistics of the overlap measures among SR incumbents and between SR and conventional entrants. For the overlap measure, based on our measure at the 10th percentile, there seem to be few cases in which only a small overlap in portfolio holdings occurs between SR incumbents and entrants. This could be due to two reasons. First, since few SR funds employ high numbers of screening processes, their selection of securities may be limited to smaller investment securities that strongly adopt ESG factors.19 Second, based upon their characteris- tics, SR funds are more likely to invest in industries or companies that specialise in areas such as renewable energy and, as a result, there is a likelihood of only a small overlap in holdings with conven- tional funds, which are more diversified. Nevertheless, by looking at other measures, such as the median and the 90th percentile, it is evi- dent that funds that employ strict or specialised investment strate- gies represent only a small portion of the sample.

Another interesting difference can be observed when compar- ing the mean and median measures of overlap. A higher mean for our overlap measure indicates that there were extreme over- laps in holdings for some funds, which is likely to be influenced

18 As evident from Table 1, many conventional funds entered the market prior to the global financial crisis in 2008 and again after 2010, when market returns started increasing.

19 Lee et al. (2010) modelled the relation between screening intensity and firm risk and found that total risk is highest when funds use only a couple of screens (one or two) or many of them (10 or more). This indicates that funds are unlikely to employ high screening intensity.

20 Unlike Wahal and Wang (2011), we report our descriptive statistics in quintiles rather than deciles due to data limitations. This issue is further discussed later in the paper.

by factors such as size. For example, we expect that the greater the size of assets under management, the more security the fund will likely hold, thereby increasing overlap and significance in holdings with entrants. Nevertheless, by comparing the average measure of overlap between SR and conventional entrants, we find the two overlap measures to have two different patterns.

When MVOi,t is used as an overlap measure, there is greater overlap between SR incumbents and conventional entrants, which is likely due to the greater frequency and number of conventional funds entering the market. Therefore, the likelihood of overlap is higher for conventional entrants, given their higher rate of entry. In comparison, when TVOi,t is used as the overlap measure, the overlap between SR incumbents and conventional entrants is sig- nificantly greater. Contrary to our expectations, this result suggests the possibility that the high overlap between SR and conventional funds is not entirely due to differences in the frequency and num- ber of conventional entrants but, rather, to the similarities in port- folio holdings between existing SR funds and new conventional funds. However, we believe the higher overlap between SR incum- bents and conventional entrants using TVOi,t is mainly due to dif- ferences in the sizes of conventional and SR funds in general. Since our overlap measures uses the market value of security hold- ings in portfolios, a large difference in the size of funds and their ability to hold significantly larger portions of their portfolios in securities can lead to higher overlap between SR incumbents and conventional entrants. Despite the difference in our overlap mea- sures, our study employs two measures to further test the effect of overlap on SR fund performance. Finally, the last column of Table 1 shows the (time-series) median of the cross-sectional stan- dard deviation for our overlap measures each quarter. The remain- der of this paper uses the median standard deviations of MVOi,t and TVOi,t to highlight the economic significance of the regression coefficients.

Panel B of Table 2 shows the descriptive statistics of fund char- acteristics when we sort SR funds into quintiles.20 There seems to

Table 2 Descriptive statistics of incumbent–entrant overlap.

10th percentile Mean Median 90th percentile Median r

Panel A: Distribution of the overlap measure MVOi,t SR 0.0020 0.0461 0.0281 0.1134 0.0361

Conv. 0.0027 0.0598 0.0428 0.1376 0.0263

TVOi,t SR 0.0060 0.1371 0.0903 0.3287 0.1213 Conv. 0.0278 0.3008 0.2525 0.6561 0.1129

MVOi,t Fund TNA Return Flow Exp Turnover Age

Panel B:MVOi,t quintiles 1 (Low) SR 703 0.41 8.61 �2.93 0.32 9.11

Conv. 1056 0.88 0.85 1.35 0.70 9.34 2 SR 373 2.12 2.78 1.38 0.75 8.97

Conv. 246 0.13 5.97 1.41 0.26 9.47 3 SR 175 1.06 6.52 1.35 0.23 8.45

Conv. 141 �2.03 �2.25 1.39 0.55 9.80 4 SR 85 0.09 0.82 1.34 0.63 9.06

Conv. 66 �0.10 1.45 1.35 �1.70 7.06 5 (High) SR 36 2.92 0.09 1.38 0.05 5.38

Conv. 36 0.89 2.28 1.30 0.09 5.75

TVOi,t Fund TNA Return Flow Exp Turnover Age

Panel C: TVOi,t quintiles 1 (Low) SR 705 2.61 7.76 �9.07 0.28 9.47

Conv. 1155 0.37 22.49 1.27 0.65 10.84 2 SR 344 �0.26 1.80 1.38 0.82 8.84

Conv. 178 0.82 �18.10 1.53 0.77 9.97 3 SR 184 2.23 5.96 1.42 0.20 9.22

Conv. 130 1.27 3.17 13.55 0.08 9.02 4 SR 87 0.16 2.12 1.28 0.60 8.47

Conv. 66 �1.10 0.70 1.33 �1.80 6.95 5 (High) SR 53 1.83 1.19 1.36 0.04 4.94

Conv. 18 �1.59 0.66 1.33 0.08 4.64

The sample includes 111 SR funds over 2003–2010 after matching funds with their portfolio holdings data. Panel A shows the descriptive statistics of MVOi,t and TVOi,t for SR and conventional entrants. Panels B and C show the descriptive statistics of the control variables when SR incumbent funds are sorted into quintiles based on their average overlap measure. Here TNA is total net assets in millions of dollars, return is quarterly net return in percentage, Flow is quarterly capital flow in millions of dollars, Exp is the expense ratio as a percentage, Turnover is the minimum of aggregate sales purchases divided by TNA during the year of entry, and Age is in years.

166 F. In et al. / Journal of Banking & Finance 44 (2014) 160–176

be a negative relation between size and overlap in which overlap is higher for smaller funds. This effect seems to be consistent with other related measures such as age and capital flow to a lesser degree. In other words, funds that are younger, smaller, and experi- ence lower capital inflow seem to have greater overlap in holdings with entrants over our sample period. In regards to other measures, such as expense ratios and quarterly returns, there seems to be no obvious pattern. In summary, our descriptive statistics highlight the need to control for several measures that we defined earlier using our overlap measure in an empirical framework.

4.3. The impact of competition on costs

Table 3 shows the impact of competition on changes in the fees of SR funds. We want to examine whether an increase in competi- tion from greater overlap in portfolio holdings is associated with changes in fees over a predetermined period. A key difference between SR and conventional mutual funds is that SR funds employ a screening process when selecting investments. In other words, to be considered an SR fund, a mutual fund must employ at least one screening type.21,22 Therefore, based on the use of screening, it is reasonable to assume that SR funds are likely to incur additional costs for screening out investment opportunities, such as

21 The SIF uses this methodology when including funds in its trend reports. For more information, see p. 70 of the 2010 SIF Trend Report or the methodology sections of previous SIF trend reports.

22 According to Renneboog et al. (2008a), in addition to positive and negative screens (often referred to as first- and second-generation SR investment screens), SR funds also use screens that integrate both positive and negative screens (third generation) and screens that integrate positive, negative, and shareholder activism (fourth generation).

costs associated with extensive research. In a related study, Gil-Bazo et al. (2010) examined performance of SR and conventional funds before and after taking into account fees and concluded that there were no significant differences in fees between SR and conventional funds. In comparison, our study examines how overlap in portfolio holdings is associated with changes in fees. It is expected that an increase in competition will lead to higher operational costs due to (1) the need for funds to remain competitive through differentiation and (2) the greater amount of research required to continuously identify new investment opportunities to outperform benchmarks. We, therefore, examine changes in our measure of fees on lagged overlap measures and control variables. We estimate our results using a Fama–MacBeth approach each quarter and calculate the time-series averages of the coefficients and t-statistics adjusted for serial correlation.

We use changes in fees over the two years (eight quarters) since fund entry for changes in 12b-1 fees and our results show that the effect of overlap is much greater and statistically significant for SR entrants relative to conventional entrants.

The coefficient values indicate that a one standard deviation change in MVOi,t (TVOi,t) with SR entrants is associated with a 2.78% (1.77%) increase in 12b-1 fees. However, for conventional entrants, a one standard deviation change in MVOi,t (TVOi,t) is asso- ciated with a 1.05% (0.18%) increase in 12b-1 fees. Since 12b-1 fees can be regarded as the marketing costs of mutual funds, our results indicate that greater overlap between SR entrants and incumbents increases marketing costs, probably in an attempt to attract more investors. Given that the main differentiating factor among other SR funds is the screening process in selecting investment portfolios, since there are only a limited number of screening pro- cesses, it is possible for SR fund entrants to offer similar screening

Table 3 The effect of entry on changes in incumbent mutual fund fees.

SR Conventional

D12b-1 fees Dexpense ratio Dmgmt fees D12b-1 fees Dexpense ratio Dmgmt fees

Intercept �0.029 �0.030 �0.312 �0.287 0.289 0.248 �0.033 �0.017 �0.372 �0.363 0.208 �0.211 (�2.00) (�2.00) (�3.37) (�3.30) (2.12) (2.49) (�0.71) (�0.44) (�6.45) (�4.08) (2.93) (�1.14)

MVOi,t 0.769 �0.514 3.758 0.292 1.845 �0.179 (1.74) (�0.45) (1.03) (1.13) (2.25) (�0.27)

TVOi,t 0.491 0.151 1.046 0.050 0.365 0.774 (1.61) (0.22) (0.62) (0.88) (1.76) (1.85)

Log(TNA)i,t 0.005 0.005 0.045 0.039 0.019 0.025 0.004 0.004 0.061 0.060 �0.004 0.052 (0.96) (1.00) (2.43) (1.99) (1.52) (1.99) (1.11) (0.89) (9.01) (3.89) (�0.21) �1.29

Log(age)i,t 0.001 0.001 �0.088 �0.080 �0.126 �0.131 �0.002 �0.003 �0.095 �0.096 �0.138 �0.138 (0.01) (0.03) (�2.03) (�1.80) (�4.21) (�3.61) (�0.16) (�0.34) (�3.29) (�3.54) (�2.10) (�1.78)

Turnoveri,t �0.009 �0.009 0.223 0.224 0.274 0.275 0.002 0.001 0.101 0.095 0.415 0.42 (�1.07) (�1.11) (6.56) (6.85) (1.26) (1.25) (0.16) (0.14) (2.79) (3.00) (2.21) (2.41)

Std.returnsi,t �0.030 �0.027 0.473 0.041 �1.366 �0.510 0.925 0.745 2.322 2.188 5.130 6.843 (�0.25) (�0.25) (0.36) (0.03) (�0.61) (�0.26) (1.92) (1.88) (1.72) (1.90) (1.31) (1.51)

Log(family)i,t 0.001 0.001 0.021 0.021 �0.024 �0.025 �0.001 �0.001 0.007 0.006 �0.014 �0.026 (0.13) (0.11) (2.73) (2.72) (�3.21) (�2.97) (�0.40) (�0.59) (�0.88) (�0.73) (�1.05) (�1.27)

Adjusted R2 0.120 0.120 0.318 0.308 0.433 0.424 �0.034 �0.052 0.236 0.248 0.206 0.189

The dependent variables D12b-1 fees, Dexpense ratio, and Dmgmt fees (in percentage) are calculated from the quarter t + 1 to quarter t + 8 after entry in quarter t. Here MVOi,t is the market value of overlap, TVOi,t is the truncated market value of overlap, Log(TNA)i,t is the logarithm of the value of total assets, Log(age)i,t is the logarithm of fund age measured in years, Turnoveri,t is the turnover ratio, Std.returnsi,t is the standard deviation of the monthly returns in the last quarter, and Log(family)i,t is the logarithm of the size of the family to which the fund belongs. Regressions were estimated using a Fama–MacBeth procedure and t-statistics were corrected for serial correlation in time-series estimates (up to four lags) and are reported in parentheses below the estimates.

F. In et al. / Journal of Banking & Finance 44 (2014) 160–176 167

processes as SR incumbents. For example, in the 2010 SIF Trend Report, the most prevalent screening processes used by SR funds concerned Sudan-related investments ($446 billion), tobacco ($235 billion), alcohol ($161 billion), and the environment ($101 billion). Even though the vast majority of SR funds apply a variety of screening processes,23 the ESG criteria that investors want inte- grated in their investments are likely prevailing issues that will also be implemented by the majority of funds to meet similar investor demand. As a result, it is difficult for new and existing SR funds to continuously differentiate themselves. If so, we expect the marketing costs of existing SR funds to increase to maintain their market pres- ence and share in the SR mutual fund market. In terms of broader mutual fund market, the difference in the magnitudes and statistical insignificance of the coefficients between SR and conventional entrants suggest that conventional funds have no significant impact in terms of 12b-1 fees, since SR fund investors are unlikely to chase conventional funds with lower fees over investing ethically.

In contrast to the greater marketing costs incurred due to SR fund entrants, our results for changes in expense ratio indicate that, in terms of operational costs, conventional entrants have a greater significant effect on existing SR funds. Our results indicate that one standard deviation change in MVOi,t (TVOi,t) is associated with a �1.86% (1.83%) change in the expense ratio for SR entrants and a 4.85% (4.12%) increase in the expense ratio for conventional entrants. A greater magnitude and statistical significance of con- ventional entrants on the expense ratios of SR funds indicate that SR funds face competition from conventional funds in terms of fund expenses such as management fees, operating costs, and all other asset-based costs. Because we can only interpret expense ratios as a fund’s total operational costs,24 we can speculate two possible reasons for the greater significant effect of conventional entrants on the costs of SR funds. First, greater competition from higher overlap in portfolio holdings from even conventional entrants may require SR funds to further differentiate themselves by increas- ing research and the selection of their investment holdings. Attempts

23 According to the 2010 SIF Trend Report, when ESG criteria frequency were measured as a percentage of the total number of ESG investment vehicles, measured by total assets affected by the application, 19% of funds used two to four screenings and 54% of funds used more than five screenings.

24 Typically, expense ratios include expenses such as management fees, custodia fees, taxes, legal fees, accounting and auditing fees, and marketing fees.

l

by SR funds to further differentiate themselves would inevitably result in greater management fees, transaction fees, and other asso- ciated fees. This effect would be less prominent for SR funds – since many similar funds are offered by existing management companies in an attempt to increase their product ranges – and also less likely due to their less frequent market entry. For example, if a manage- ment company offers several SR investment products, then it can diversify its costs across funds and gain greater control over its oper- ational costs, including research. Second, one of the key features of a competitive market is that as the total number of suppliers increases, they become more operationally efficient. Therefore, if the products offered by SR and conventional funds are to some degree identical, associated costs would decrease with an increase in the number of fund entrants. However, the increase in the expense ratios of SR funds due to conventional entrants suggests that the two products are not identical and we can further speculate that SR and conventional funds do not compete in the same mutual fund market. In other words, regardless of the increase in the num- ber of conventional entrants and the overlap in portfolio holdings between SR funds, SR funds do not have to become more efficient because their products are differentiated. If investors wish to invest ethically, given the limited number of SR funds relative to the gen- eral mutual fund market, they have no choice but to invest in SR funds for SR attributes despite the higher costs.

Similarly, in regards to changes in management fees, our results indicate that when the TVOi,t overlap measure is used, both overlap with SR entrants and overlap with conventional entrants are asso- ciated with higher management fees for SR funds. This result fur- ther provides some degree of differentiation between the SR and conventional mutual fund markets where an increase in competi- tion due to SR funds is not associated with lower fees. In summary, our regression results indicate that competition due to SR funds and that due to conventional funds have different impacts on fees.

4.4. The impact of competition on flows

Our study uses Bollen’s (2007) measure of capital flow divided by the value of total net assets:

Flowi;t ¼ Total Net Assetsi;t � Total Net Assetsi;t�1ð1þ Ri;tÞ

Total Net Assetsi;t ð4Þ

168 F. In et al. / Journal of Banking & Finance 44 (2014) 160–176

Similar to our previous analysis, we estimate regressions of net cap- ital flow on our measure of overlap and control variables each quar- ter and report the time-series average of the coefficients. Table 4 shows the effect of capital flow is dependent on the overlap of hold- ings from SR and conventional entrants. In this analysis, we want to examine whether portfolio overlap is associated with change in the capital flows of SR funds. Based on our results, the differences in the effect and magnitude of coefficients for our overlap measure between SR and conventional entrants raises two interesting points. First, an increase in competition between SR funds is associated with negative capital flow, but an increase in competition between SR and conventional funds shows both positive and negative capital flows. Therefore, while overlap in portfolio holdings does explain the impact of competition on capital flow from SR entrants, it does not explain the inconsistency in capital flow from conventional entrants so well. Second, despite statistical insignificance, the mag- nitude of the estimated coefficients indicates that greater overlap between SR incumbents and SR entrants is likely to have a greater effect on capital flow compared to overlap with conventional entrants.

Overall, our results provide evidence that, within the mutual fund market, competition for capital seems to be segregated to some degree. This could be due to SR investors choosing to invest only in SR funds for ethical reasons. This result is consistent with our initial assumption that SR investors obtain additional utility from the SR attribute by investing in SR funds. However, it is not clear from our results whether SR investors are loyal because of ethical reasons or because they can differentiate SR funds from conventional funds other than by the securities in their portfolio. Nevertheless, the greater impact of SR entrants relative to conven- tional entrants on capital flows suggests that within the mutual

Table 4 The impact of competition on mutual fund flows.

SR Conventional Flowi,t Flowi,t

Intercept 0.228 0.212 0.413 0.325 (1.14) (1.05) (2.06) (1.73)

MVOi,t �0.792 �0.573 (�0.10) (�0.39)

Ranki,t 0.192 0.195 0.150 0.154 (3.30) (3.55) (3.49) (3.62)

MVOi,t � Ranki,t 10.456 0.437 (0.94) (0.54)

TVOi,t �4.516 0.165 (�0.67) (0.87)

TVOi,t � Ranki,t 10.717 �0.038 (0.98) (�0.41)

Log(TNA)i,t 0.019 0.022 �0.015 �0.005 (1.03) (1.13) (�1.21) (�0.45)

Log(age)i,t �0.214 �0.216 �0.119 �0.128 (�5.06) (�5.02) (�5.57) (�5.50)

Expense ratioi,t �1.294 �1.298 �7.193 �5.881 (�0.12) (�0.12) (�2.77) (�2.54)

Turnoveri,t �0.157 �0.155 �0.122 �0.127 (�1.36) (�1.35) (�3.77) (�3.76)

Std.returnsi,t 0.309 0.132 0.675 0.832 (0.10) (0.04) (0.41) (0.47)

Adjusted R2 0.212 0.212 0.213 0.195

The dependent variable is the SR incumbent fund’s mutual fund flow the year after entry. Regressions are estimated quarterly and this table presents the time-series averages of the coefficients. Here Flowi,t is calculated using Eq. (4.1). Rank is equal to zero for funds in the bottom 20% of performance (over the prior 12 months), one for funds in the middle 60%, and two for funds in the top 20%. The variable MVOi,t is the market value of the overlap, TVOi,t is the truncated market value of the overlap, Log(TNA)i,t is the logarithm of the value of total net assets, Log(age)i,t is the logarithm of fund age measured in years, Expense ratioi,t is the expense ratio, Turnoveri,t is the turnover ratio, and Std.returnsi,t is the standard deviation of monthly returns in the last quarter. Similarly, the Fama–MacBeth t-statistics corrected for serial correlation (up to four lags) are reported in parentheses below the estimates.

fund market there appears to be a separate demand for SR products that is relatively inelastic to the returns they generate. In summary, our results indicate that even though the coefficients for our over- lap measure were statistically insignificant, there is some evidence that competition for capital seems to be limited to new SR funds entering the mutual fund market.

4.5. The impact of competition on fund performance

To determine whether our overlap measure as a proxy for com- petition has an impact on fund performance relative to the market and conventional funds,25 we calculate alpha for each SR incumbent in the three-year period after the entry quarter using the Carhart (1997) four-factor model26:

Ri;t � Rm;t ¼ ai þ b0;iðRm;t � Rf ;tÞ þ b1;iSMBþ b2;iHML þ b3;iMOM þ ei;t ð5Þ

Ri;t � Rj;t ¼ ai þ b0;iðRm;t � Rf ;tÞ þ b1;iSMBþ b2;iHMLþ b3;iMOM þ ei;t ð6Þ

where m refers to the value-weighted Standard & Poor’s (S&P) 500 and j refers to a portfolio of conventional funds matched by age and size.

Consistent with the economic concept of a competitive market, our hypothesis is that an increase in competition would be associ- ated with lower fund performance due to a decrease in arbitrage opportunities, lower risk premiums, and a diminishing marginal rate of return. As before, we estimate the regressions quarterly and calculate the time-series average of the coefficients. Panel A of Table 5 shows the regression results when our overlap measure and control variables are regressed on a four-factor alpha. In this analysis, we want to examine whether a higher overlap in portfolio holdings has any impact on fund performance. Examining fund performance relative to market returns, a one standard deviation change in MVOi,t (TVOi,t) increases subsequent fund performance by 0.08% (0.11%) per quarter for SR entrants. For conventional entrants, the regression results indicate that a one standard devia- tion change in MVOi,t (TVOi,t) increases fund performance by 0.01% (0.01%) per quarter. Consistent with our expectations, our regres- sion results show that competition between both SR and conven- tional funds has a positive impact on fund performance, but the coefficients for our overlap measures are statistically insignificant.

For alpha using matched pair sampling, we first determine whether there are any significant differences in returns between SR and conventional funds. Although we do not display our results in a separate table,27 consistent with prior literature (Derwall et al., 2005), SR funds over the past decade have, on average, statistically significantly outperformed conventional funds by 0.11% per quarter over three-year intervals, with a t-statistic equal to 1.83. To further determine whether differences in performance can be attributed to our overlap measures, our regression results also indicate that com- petition has a significant positive impact on fund performance. As shown in Panel B of Table 5, our regression results indicate that a one standard deviation change in MVOi,t (TVOi,t) increases SR fund performance by 0.13% (0.17%) per quarter for SR entrants. Similarly, a one standard deviation change in MVOi,t (TVOi,t) increases SR fund performance by 0.03% (0.03%) per quarter for conventional entrants.

5 To create a sample of conventional funds for benchmark returns, we use matched mpling and allocate five conventional funds for each SR incumbent by age and size. 6 Since the four-factor alpha is a widely used and accepted metric when measuring utual fund performance, our results and interpretation will be based only on the

arhart four-factor alpha (1997). However, results using a capital asset pricing model nd the Fama–French (1993) three-factor model can be provided upon request. 7 These results are available upon request.

2

sa 2

m C a

2

Table 5 Regression of post-entry SR incumbent alphas.

Panel A Panel B Benchmark = S&P 500 Benchmark = matched funds

SR Conventional SR Conventional

Intercept �0.083 �0.081 0.121 0.064 �0.482 �0.477 �0.281 �0.347 (�0.44) (�0.42) (0.43) (0.20) (�1.47) (�1.45) (�0.57) (�0.68)

MVOi,t 2.203 0.193 3.608 0.956 (1.05) (0.32) (1.88) (2.17)

TVOi,t 0.936 0.126 1.423 0.285 (1.48) (0.87) (2.56) (2.31)

Flowi,t 0.323 0.320 0.270 0.273 0.339 0.337 0.297 0.294 (6.13) (5.98) (3.85) (3.85) (6.33) (6.17) (4.09) (3.99)

Log(TNA)i,t �0.003 �0.002 �0.017 �0.011 �0.006 �0.006 �0.010 �0.003 (�0.34) (�0.27) (�0.90) (�0.46) (�0.88) (�0.80) (�0.60) (�0.12)

Log(age)i,t 0.023 0.023 0.045 0.041 0.039 0.038 0.057 0.055 (1.09) (1.05) (3.17) (3.42) (1.79) (1.77) (3.65) (4.43)

Expense ratioi,t �1.870 �2.071 �0.361 0.438 �3.152 �3.463 1.929 1.724 (�0.30) (�0.33) (�0.06) (0.08) (�0.48) (�0.52) (0.32) (0.31)

Turnoveri,t �0.079 �0.082 �0.119 �0.111 �0.094 �0.097 �0.128 �0.123 (�1.38) (�1.42) (�1.57) (�1.49) (�1.72) (�1.74) (�1.68) (�1.61)

Adjusted R2 0.197 0.197 0.052 0.057 0.223 0.223 0.085 0.095

We estimate the alpha of each SR incumbent in the 36-month period after entry using the Carhart (1997) four-factor model. Estimated alphas (in percent) are then regressed on our measures of overlap between SR incumbents and between SR and conventional entrants. Here MVOi,t is the market value of overlap, TVOi,t is the truncated market value of overlap, Flowi,t is capital flow, Log(TNA)i,t is the logarithm of the value of total net assets, Log(age)i,t is the logarithm of fund age measured in years, Expense ratioi,t is the expense ratio, and Turnoveri,t is the turnover ratio. Regressions are estimated quarterly and this table presents the time-series average of the coefficients. Fama–MacBeth t- statistics are corrected for time-series correlation (up to four lags) and are reported in parentheses below the estimates.

F. In et al. / Journal of Banking & Finance 44 (2014) 160–176 169

In contrast to our previous regression, overlap in portfolio holdings has a positive and statistical significance impact on performance after matching the benchmark returns of funds by size and age. Nev- ertheless, positive coefficient values indicate that, in some aspects, both new SR and conventional entrants have a positive impact on SR funds in terms of performance. A plausible explanation for the increase in the performance of SR funds with new funds entering the market is the increase in the price of securities in the portfolios of SR incumbents driven by SR product demand.28

With the recent growth in and awareness of SR investments, particularly among institutional investors, demand has increased for securities of companies that strongly adhere to the ethical con- cerns of investors. Due to changes in investor preference, with a greater emphasis on ESG factors, a significant increase in the demand for SR securities has increased their market value. As a result, SR funds that initially screened investments based on ESG factors will likely show relatively strong performance. As sug- gested by Galema et al. (2008), the key difference in the returns of SR stocks relative to other stocks is the difference in demand.29

Therefore it is expected that the recent growth in SR investments over the past decade has significantly contributed to SR fund perfor- mance. Furthermore, given some degree of overlap in the securities by conventional entrants, which have greater impact in terms of size and frequency of entry, there is likely to be additional upward pres- sure on the prices of securities that are deemed ethical. It is possible that, given the increase in transparency of the mutual fund industry over the years and the unique investment strategy of SR funds that focus on long-term sustainable growth, other competing funds adopting a similar growth strategy will attempt to mimic the hold- ings of existing SR funds. While this method allows new entrants

28 We investigate the relation between a fund’s competition measure and its book- to-market ratio using correlation analysis. The correlations between MVO and a value-weighted book-to-market ratio for SR funds were �0.26 and �0.31 between SR and non-SR funds, respectively. The negative sign of the correlations indicates that the competition is positively related to stock prices to some extent.

29 We employ annualized alpha by multiplying four to quarterly alpha to account for demand pressure on SR stocks since high demand pressure is expected to a decrease the book-to-market ratio. The results are presented in the Appendix. The outcome demonstrates that the significant effect of competition measures in Table 5 is partly due to SR stock demand.

to avoid incurring additional costs associated with screening out investments, it may place upward pressure on the prices of securities.

Up to this point, our analysis indicates that when the effect of competition is considered, SR entrants have a greater and positive impact on the fees of SR incumbents but not their capital flow. Therefore our previous analysis indicates that, at least in terms of prices, the SR mutual fund market does not face major competition from conventional fund market entrants. Furthermore, despite some degree of overlap in portfolio holdings between SR and con- ventional funds, conventional funds do not appear to have a signif- icant impact on SR funds in terms of performance relative to SR entrants. This supports our hypothesis that SR and conventional funds, as products, are not identical and that, based on the impact of competition on fees, capital, and performance, the SR mutual fund market serves different segments of investors, who derive utility from other than fund performance alone. In terms of overall fund performance, while an increase in the overlap of portfolio holdings from both SR and conventional entrants has a positive impact, given the difference in magnitude of the coefficients, the significant positive impact from competition is believed to be due to an increase in the demand for responsible securities of new SR funds entering the market. Within the domestic equity market, investment opportunities that strongly incorporate ESG factors are limited. Therefore, if numerous funds, both SR and con- ventional, invest in securities with the highest ESG ratings, it is rea- sonable to assume a degree of overlap. We expect this effect is likely to be greater given the numerous SR funds around the world that invest globally, including those in the United States.

In summary, even though the mutual fund industry has been a competitive market (Wahal and Wang, 2011) for years, our study indicates that the SR mutual fund market does not exhibit the key features of a competitive market in terms of fees and capital. Recent growth, limited numbers of funds, and lack of differentia- tion, even among SR products offered by SR funds, are likely rea- sons for the lack of competition in the SR mutual fund market and therefore competition has had no negative impact. However, if the SR mutual fund market behaves similarly to an ordinary eco- nomically competitive market, then we can expect competition

Table 6 The effect of entry on changes in incumbent mutual fund fees.

SR Conventional

D12b-1 fees Dexpense ratio Dmgmt fees D12b-1 fees Dexpense ratio Dmgmt fees

Intercept �0.021 �0.016 �0.096 �0.081 0.515 0.367 0.014 0.005 �0.081 �0.074 0.299 0.289 (�1.49) (�1.13) (�2.29) (�2.20) �1.500 �1.440 �0.600 �0.250 (�1.38) (�1.26) �2.040 �1.360

MVOi,t 0.127 �1.030 2.557 �0.055 �0.268 1.387 (0.36) (�1.13) (1.57) (�0.36) (�0.48) (1.01)

TVOi,t 0.050 �0.351 0.249 �0.003 �0.022 0.470 (0.52) (�1.79) (0.32) (�0.22) (�0.24) (1.74)

Log(TNA)i,t 0.001 0.001 0.007 0.003 0.012 0.024 �0.002 �0.001 0.005 0.006 �0.033 �0.026 (0.68) (0.02) (0.70) (0.29) (1.06) (1.71) (�0.49) (�0.09) (0.29) (0.36) (�1.28) (�0.69)

Log(age)i,t �0.002 0.001 �0.037 �0.032 �0.210 �0.219 �0.002 �0.002 �0.030 �0.030 �0.160 �0.173 (�0.33) (0.03) (�1.40) (�1.26) (�1.82) (�1.80) (�0.33) (�0.24) (�2.63) (�2.68) (�2.06) (�1.97)

Turnoveri,t �0.015 �0.017 0.024 0.022 0.122 0.125 �0.004 �0.003 0.014 0.012 0.228 0.213 (�2.42) (�2.55) (0.65) (0.59) (1.23) (1.29) (�2.20) (�1.22) (0.36) (0.32) (2.70) (2.70)

Std.returnsi,t 0.448 0.373 1.250 1.048 2.433 2.951 0.420 0.360 2.043 1.620 1.330 0.471 (2.29) (1.87) (1.20) (1.07) (1.55) (1.92) (0.97) (1.02) (1.13) (1.07) (0.49) (0.18)

Log(family)i,t 0.001 0.001 0.010 0.011 �0.028 �0.026 0.001 0.001 0.008 0.007 0.016 0.015 (2.02) (2.07) (2.03) (2.17) (�2.48) (�2.37) (0.30) (0.09) (1.18) (1.23) (0.45) (0.41)

Adjusted R2 0.082 0.092 0.083 0.091 0.263 0.279 0.045 �0.006 0.073 0.045 0.294 0.270

The dependent variables D12b-1 fees, Dexpense ratio, and Dmgmt fees (in percentage) are calculated from quarter t + 1 to quarter t + 4 after entry in quarter t. Here MVOi,t is the market value of overlap, TVOi,t is the truncated market value of the overlap, Log(TNA)i,t is the logarithm of the value of total assets, Log(age)i,t is the logarithm of fund age measured in years, Turnoveri,t is the turnover ratio, Std.returnsi,t is the standard deviation of the monthly returns in the last quarter, and Log(family)i,t is the logarithm of the size of the family to which the fund belongs. Regressions are estimated using a Fama–MacBeth procedure and the t-statistics are corrected for serial correlation in time-series estimates (up to four lags) and reported in parentheses below the estimates.

170 F. In et al. / Journal of Banking & Finance 44 (2014) 160–176

will have a negative impact on SR funds, including fees and capital flow, but a positive impact on performance, at least in the short run. With the growth in interest in SR investments, the number of SR funds, and the complexities in SR investment products, we expect competition to intensify for all SR funds in the future. In such a case, SR funds may experience difficulty outperforming their conventional benchmarks by simply holding portfolios of SR securities.

30 Due to similarity in results when regressions were estimated annually, regression results were excluded from this study. However, results can be provided upon request.

31 The HHI is widely adopted by the US Department of Justice, the Federal Reserve Board, the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, the Department of Transportation, and academic research.

4.6. Robustness tests

Several issues need to be discussed. First, one of our primary concerns is data constraints, specifically, the limited availability of SR fund data. Since SR funds have only experienced significant growth in numbers over the past decade, our initial sample is rel- atively small compared to other mutual fund studies. Although this issue cannot be avoided when conducting research on SR funds, we believe it nevertheless needs to be mentioned. Second, since this study measures the effect of competition after entry, we use regressions to examine the changes in fees and capital flow with our overlap measure. However, to best of our knowledge, no empirical studies have examined these relations and, as a result, this study cannot precisely determine the horizon over which the effect of competition takes place. Therefore, we conduct several robustness tests using different time horizons to determine whether our results are consistent.

As shown in Table 6, when our dependent variable is change in fees over one year after entry, the results are relatively consistent with an increase in fees with an increase in overlap of portfolio holdings. However, the lower statistical significance of the overlap coefficients for both SR and conventional entrants suggests that overlap in portfolio holdings as a measure for competition is not strongly associated with change in fees over the short term. As shown in Table 7, when our dependent variable is capital flow two quarters after entry, the results are slightly different but still consistent with our previous analysis. In contrast to our previous analysis, conventional entrants had a similar effect on capital flow as SR entrants, but the coefficients for our overlap measures with SR entrants were larger. The greater statistical significance of the overlap coefficients for SR entrants provides further evidence of a

less competitive market in which greater competition from new conventional fund entrants does not have a negative impact on the capital flow of existing SR funds.

The third issue is that since we measure overlap in portfolio holdings on a quarterly basis, our regression analysis is estimated quarterly using a Fama–MacBeth approach. However, since some of our dependent variables are measured on a non-quarterly basis, it is possible that our results are driven by the difference in timing. Therefore, we re-estimate our regressions annually to ensure the robustness of our results.30 In terms of fees, when regressions are estimated annually, the results are consistent, except that the coef- ficients of SR and conventional entrants are similar in magnitude. For capital flow, the results indicate that an increase in the overlap of portfolio holdings from SR entrants has a negative impact, but an increase in the overlap in portfolio holdings from conventional entrants has a positive impact. However, consistent with our previ- ous analysis in measuring capital flow over a one-year time horizon, overlap in portfolio holdings is not strongly associated with change in annual capital flow. Finally, when the regressions using matched alpha are estimated annually, the results are consistent with our pre- vious analysis. Overall, our robustness tests indicate that our main results are robust, despite different time horizons and estimation procedures.

The fourth issue is that we measure the degree of competition in mutual fund market by using overlap in portfolio holdings according to Wahal and Wang (2011). However, given the weak statistical significance in measuring change in fees and capital flow relative to overlap in the portfolio holdings of SR funds, our study uses an additional proxy measure to determine the impact of competition.

The Herfindahl–Hirschman Index (HHI) is often used to deter- mine how concentrated a market is based on a company’s market size relative to the overall market size. Regulators31 often use this measure of competition to measure market concentration in

Table 7 The impact of competition on mutual fund flows.

SR Conventional Flowi,t Flowi,t

Intercept 0.029 �0.005 0.161 0.131 (0.11) (�0.02) (1.35) (1.13)

MVOi,t 5.740 1.399 (1.41) (1.17)

Ranki,t 0.078 0.083 0.064 0.062 (2.39) (2.70) (3.19) (3.17)

MVOi,t � Ranki,t �0.060 �0.719 (�0.05) (�1.06)

TVOi,t 2.338 0.537 (1.95) (1.33)

TVOi,t � Ranki,t �0.659 �0.273 (�1.23) (�1.11)

Log(TNA)i,t 0.073 0.077 0.009 0.012 (1.55) (1.61) (1.11) (1.60)

Log(age)i,t �0.177 �0.180 �0.093 �0.095 (�4.69) (�4.61) (�7.70) (�7.13)

Expense ratioi,t �6.408 �5.776 �4.198 �4.082 (�1.12) (�0.98) (�2.40) (�2.31)

Turnoveri,t �0.026 �0.027 �0.054 �0.057 (�0.50) (�0.52) (�2.79) (�2.77)

Std.returnsi,t 0.509 0.478 1.464 1.655 (0.40) (0.37) (1.84) (2.04)

Adjusted R2 0.156 0.165 0.166 0.163

The dependent variable is the SR incumbent fund’s mutual fund flow the year after entry. Regressions are estimated quarterly and this table presents the time-series averages of the coefficients. Here Flowi,t is calculated using Eq. (4.1). Rank is equal to zero for funds in the bottom 20% of performance (over the prior 12 months), one for funds in the middle 60%, and two for funds in the top 20%. The variable MVOi,t is the market value of the overlap, TVOi,t is the truncated market value of the overlap, Log(TNA)i,t is the logarithm of the value of total net assets, Log(age)i,t is the logarithm of fund age measured in years, Expense ratioi,t is the expense ratio, Turnoveri,t is the turnover ratio, and Std.returnsi,t is the standard deviation of monthly returns in the last quarter. Similarly, the Fama–MacBeth t-statistics corrected for serial correlation (up to four lags) are reported in parentheses below the estimates.

Table 9 The effect of entry on changes in SR fund fees.

D12b-1 fees Dexpense ratio Dmgmt fees

Intercept �0.062 �0.159 �0.659 1.179 �0.215 �0.879 (�0.67) (�0.48) (�2.72) (1.21) (�0.41) (�0.36)

SR_HHIt 0.064 0.583 1.266 (0.46) (1.74) (1.53)

Total_HHIt 2.166 �23.006 21.532 (0.43) (�1.53) (0.59)

Log(TNA)i,t 0.015 0.016 0.076 0.066 �0.015 �0.019 (2.17) (2.16) (3.71) (3.61) (�0.38) (�0.45)

Log(age)i,t �0.023 �0.028 �0.088 �0.092 �0.091 �0.121 (�1.51) (�1.79) (�1.98) (�2.36) (�1.13) (�1.44)

Turnoveri,t �0.001 0.001 0.127 0.108 0.458 0.481 (�0.01) (0.07) (2.87) (2.55) (4.26) (4.30)

Std.returnsi,t 0.290 0.277 1.689 2.010 0.293 0.010 (1.47) (1.38) (3.10) (3.60) (0.17) (0.01)

Log(family)i,t �0.001 �0.001 0.004 0.001 �0.043 �0.043 (�0.01) (�0.08) (0.04) (0.06) (�1.90) (�1.77)

Adjusted R2 0.107 0.034 0.112 0.118 0.138 0.132

The dependent variables D12b-1 fees, Dexpense ratio, and Dmgmt fees (in percent- age) are calculated from quarter t + 1 to quarter t + 8 after entry in quarter t. Here SR_HHIt is the HHI using only SR funds, Total_HHIt is the HHI using all funds, Log(TNA)i,t is the logarithm of the value of total assets, Log(age)i,t is the logarithm of fund age measured in years, Turnoveri,t is the turnover ratio, Std.returnsi,t is the standard deviation of the monthly returns in the last quarter, and Log(family)i,t is the logarithm of the size of the family to which the fund belongs. The regressions are estimated using a random two-way panel regression and the t-statistics are reported in parentheses below the estimates.

Table 8 Descriptive statistics of competitive measures using the HHI.

10th percentile Mean Median 90th percentile

HHIt SR 0.3228 0.4469 0.4685 0.5537 Total 0.0604 0.0633 0.0642 0.0656

F. In et al. / Journal of Banking & Finance 44 (2014) 160–176 171

granting mergers and acquisitions and it provides a good indication of competition or asset concentration in the market. The HHI mea- sures the size and number of firms in relation to an industry or sec- tor and can thus indicate the amount of competition among existing SR funds. By determining asset concentration in the market, we can determine the market power32 of market participants and measure the degree of competition. For example, if the market is highly com- petitive, where no single fund has significant control of the market, then asset concentration is low and vice versa. A related study by Keswani and Stolin (2006) examined fund persistence and competi- tion and found that persistence is higher when the concentration of assets under management is higher (lower competition). The HHI is calculated as

HHIt ¼ XN i¼1

s2i ð7Þ

where si is the market share of the management company, calcu- lated by the sum of assets across fund family i divided by the total sum of assets across all domestic equity funds in the market, and N is the number of funds. For example, if 10 funds each have a 10% market share, the HHI equals 10 � (0.1)2 = 0.1. The HHI ranges from 1/N to one and a small HHI indicates market competition with lower asset concentration.

As shown in Table 8, when the HHI measure is used as a proxy for competition, it is evident that when SR funds are grouped by

32 One of the criticisms of the HHI is stressed by Tirole (1988), who mentions that the concentration measure generally ignores other important factors associated with market power, such as costs of entry and asymmetries in costs or demand. However, we believe that these criticisms are invalid within the study of mutual fund markets, where the cost of entry is uniform among all mutual fund participants due to regulations and the market’s maturity.

their respective management companies, asset concentration is relatively high in the SR mutual fund market.33 The high concentra- tion of assets indicates that, despite the increase in the total number of SR funds, there exists a lack of competition based on market share. On the other hand, it is evident that asset concentration in the total mutual fund market is very low and the consistency of the HHI indi- cates that the total mutual fund market exhibits the features of a competitive market. The rest of our analysis uses two measures of the HHI: Total_HHI measures asset concentration in the domestic equity mutual fund market (under the assumption that SR and con- ventional funds are identical) and SR_HHI measures asset concentra- tion in the domestic equity SR mutual fund market (under the assumption that SR and conventional funds are not identical).

As shown in Table 9, our results indicate that an increase in asset concentration (lower competition) within the SR fund market is associated with an increase in the expense ratio. This result dif- fers little from that of our previous analysis, where an increase in competition using portfolio holdings is associated with an increase in fees. However, when competition is measured using asset con- centration, our results indicate that an increase in asset concentra- tion within the SR mutual fund market is associated with a decrease in fees. While this measure of competition yields different findings from those of our previous analysis, it provides a consis- tent result, which we would expect from a rational, economically competitive market, where an increase in the number of suppliers of SR products will lead to SR funds becoming more efficient.

33 The Department of Justice has attached threshold values to the HHI, for practical use. A market with HHI below 0.10 is considered not to be concentrated. A value between 0.10 and 0.19 is a moderately concentrated market, whereas a market with an HHI above 0.18 is considered to be highly concentrated.

Table 11 Regression of post-entry differences in SR and conventional fund performance.

Carhart

Intercept 0.053 0.260 (6.19) (8.26)

SR_HHIt �0.116 (�7.38)

Total_HHIt �4.008 (�8.30)

Flowi,t 0.001 0.002 (0.42) (0.71)

Log(TNA)i,t 0.001 0.001 (1.86) (0.51)

Log(age)i,t �0.006 �0.004 (�4.14) (�3.25)

Expense ratioi,t 0.356 0.210 (1.87) (1.24)

Turnoveri,t �0.001 �0.001 (�0.34) (�0.55)

Adjusted R2 0.157 0.192

We estimate the alpha of each SR incumbent in the 36-month period after entry using Carhart’s (1997) four-factor model. Estimated alphas (in percent) are then regressed on our measures of overlap among SR incumbents and between SR and conventional entrants. Conventional portfolios are matched with SR incumbents based on age and size. Regressions are estimated quarterly and the table presents the time-series average of coefficients. Here SR_HHIt is the HHI using only SR funds, Total_HHIt is the HHI using all funds, Flowi,t is capital flow, Log(TNA)i,t is the logarithm of the value of total net assets, Log(age)i,t is the logarithm of fund age measured in years, Expense ratioi,t is the expense ratio, and Turnoveri,t is the turnover ratio. Regressions are estimated quarterly and this table presents the time-series average of the coefficients. Regressions are estimated using a random two-way panel regression and the t-statistics are reported in parentheses below the estimates.

172 F. In et al. / Journal of Banking & Finance 44 (2014) 160–176

However, given the lack of statistical significance of other associ- ated fees and a higher asset concentration within the SR mutual fund market, our study concludes that the impact of competition using the HHI measure on fees is weak.

For the impact of competition on capital flow, as shown in Table 10, our results indicate that an increase in asset concentra- tion is associated with negative capital flow. Given the greater statistical significance of our competitive coefficient measures rel- ative to the overlap coefficient measures in our previous analysis, the impact of competition on capital flow is better explained by asset concentration within the SR mutual fund market than by overlap in portfolio holdings.

Finally, for fund performance, as shown in Table 11, our results indicate that, despite the decrease in fees and capital flow due to an increase in asset concentration, the effect of competition on fund performance is consistent with our previous analysis using overlap in portfolio holdings. Similar to our previous analysis, it is likely that the increase in demand for SR investment products is the underlying reason for the increase in fund performance. Our results indicate that total asset concentration has a greater impact on fund performance in terms of the magnitude of the coef- ficients. It is important to note that, given numerous management companies within the mutual fund market with low levels of asset concentration, we can expect the value of total asset concentration in the mutual fund market to remain consistent. On the other hand, given the current limited number of SR funds, high levels of asset concentration, and decreasing trend of asset concentration among major SR funds, we can expect asset concentration in the SR mutual fund market to change over time.

The final issue is that the key performance measure used in this study is Carhart’s (1997) four-factor model. To measure the robustness of our results, we also use an alternative performance

Table 10 The impact of competition on mutual fund flows.

Flowi,t

Intercept 0.006 �0.363 (0.02) (�0.29)

SR_HHIt 1.516 (2.25)

Ranki,t 0.493 1.286 (2.20) (1.48)

SR_HHIt � Rank,t �0.795 (�1.61)

Total_HHIt 17.346 (0.91)

Total_HHIt � Rankt �18.300 (�1.32)

Log(TNA)i,t �0.060 �0.053 (�1.80) (�1.61)

Log(age)i,t �0.253 �0.306 (�3.14) (�4.02)

Expense ratioi,t �4.299 1.411 (�0.39) (0.14)

Turnoveri,t �0.102 �0.106 (�1.48) (�1.55)

Std.returnsi,t 2.327 1.733 (2.56) (1.68)

Adjusted R2 0.054 0.051

The dependent variable is the SR incumbent fund mutual fund flow one year after entry. Here Flowi,t is calculated using Eq. (4.1). Rank is equal to zero for funds in the bottom 20% of performance (over the prior 12 months), one for funds in the middle 60%, and two for funds in the top 20%. The variable MVOi,t is the market value of the overlap, TVOi,t is the truncated market value of the overlap, Log(TNA)i,t is the loga- rithm of the value of total net assets, Log(age)i,t is the logarithm of fund age mea- sured in years, Expense ratioi,t is the expense ratio, Turnoveri,t is the turnover ratio, and Std.returnsi,t is the standard deviation of monthly returns in the last quarter. Regressions are estimated using a random two-way panel regression and t-statistics are reported in parentheses below the estimates.

measure by Daniel et al. (1997), hereafter DGTW, to calculate the excess returns of securities in a portfolio matched with a passive or benchmark portfolio based on size, book-to-market ratio, and momentum.34 As mentioned previously, one of the key issues of this study is the limitation of the availability of SR fund data. Therefore, in comparison to Carhart’s four-factor model, which requires at least 36 months of return data, DGTW’s performance requires 12 months of return data, thereby enabling better estimates of performance over a shorter horizon.

To calculate the DGTW measure for each fund, we first calculate the hypothetical monthly returns that would be generated by buy- ing a number of shares of each security held by the fund on the first day of each quarter and holding the portfolio until the first day of the following quarter. We then subtract the returns of a benchmark portfolio from these hypothetical fund returns. The DGTW measure can be decomposed into three components – CSt, CTt, and ASt – and these three measures capture three separate aspects of perfor- mance: CSt measures the selective ability of fund managers, where a CSt measure of zero indicates that the fund’s performance can be replicated; CTt measures the fund manager’s success at timing dif- ferent investment styles, and ASt measures returns generated by a fund’s tendency to hold stocks with certain characteristics.35 Con- sistent with the holding returns of Wahal and Wang (2011), we define excess returns as

HRt ¼ CSt þ CTt þ ASt ð8Þ

As shown in Panel A of Table 12, when the impact of competition on performance is examined, a one standard deviation increase in MVOi,t (TVOi,t) increases fund performance by 0.74% (1.13%) per year. Similarly for conventional entrants, as shown in Panel B of Table 12, when the impact of competition on performance between

4 The DGTW benchmarks are available at http://www.smith.umd.edu/faculty/ ermers/ftpsite/Dgtw/coverpage.htm.

5 For the calculation of CSt, CTt, and ASt, see DGTW (1997).

3

rw 3

Table 12 Regression of post-entry differences in SR and conventional fund performance.

SR

HRt+1 CSt+1 CTt+1 ASt+1

Panel A: Impact of competition within SR funds Intercept 0.048 0.072 �0.482 �0.366 �0.107 �0.364 0.637 0.802

(0.04) (0.05) (�0.27) (�0.20) (�0.07) (�0.23) (0.64) (0.81) MVOi,t 20.402 30.385 6.008 �15.991

(1.10) (1.13) (0.27) (�0.72) TVOi,t 9.292 14.586 4.782 �10.076

(1.64) (1.89) (0.39) (�0.79) Flowi,t �1.680 �1.693 �5.573 �5.641 4.478 4.435 �0.585 �0.487

(�0.98) (�1.02) (�2.02) (�2.10) (2.11) (2.12) (�0.55) (�0.47) Log(TNA)i,t �0.104 �0.103 �0.094 �0.106 0.031 0.068 �0.041 �0.065

(�1.54) (�1.42) (�1.24) (�1.31) (0.58) (1.28) (�0.68) (�1.00) Log(age)i,t 0.044 0.022 �0.097 �0.096 0.451 0.412 �0.311 �0.293

(0.42) (0.23) (�0.93) (�0.94) (1.61) (1.49) (�0.94) (�0.90) Expense ratioi,t 19.608 19.159 9.022 5.647 30.505 36.487 �19.919 �22.975

(0.61) (0.61) (0.28) (0.17) (0.99) (1.20) (�0.79) (�0.90) Turnoveri,t �0.060 �0.060 �0.038 �0.090 0.016 0.075 �0.039 �0.045

(�0.19) (�0.19) (�0.10) (�0.25) (0.03) (0.16) (�0.10) (�0.12)

Adjusted R2 0.145 0.141 0.182 0.175 0.128 0.121 0.079 0.078

Conventional

HRt+1 CSt+1 CTt+1 ASt+1

Panel B: Impact of competition between SR and conventional funds Intercept 0.176 0.939 �0.060 0.312 0.356 0.482 �0.121 0.145

(0.11) (0.53) (�0.03) (0.16) (0.17) (0.20) (�0.28) (0.43) MVOi,t 7.708 7.885 �1.241 1.064

(0.61) (0.49) (�0.13) (0.32) TVOi,t 0.718 0.993 0.555 �0.829

(0.35) (0.45) (0.20) (�0.71) Flowi,t 1.055 0.671 0.216 �0.547 0.115 0.481 0.725 0.737

(0.57) (0.34) (0.17) (�0.42) (0.07) (0.29) (1.51) (1.47) Log(TNA)i,t �0.063 �0.126 �0.069 �0.078 �0.068 �0.102 0.073 0.053

(�0.59) (�0.96) (�1.16) (�0.73) (�0.65) (�0.63) (1.64) (1.31) Log(age)i,t 0.152 0.103 0.066 �0.072 0.133 0.193 �0.046 �0.019

(1.22) (0.76) (0.77) (�0.76) (1.22) (1.55) (�0.63) (�0.24) Expense ratioi,t �5.276 �12.886 11.274 20.949 12.407 7.530 �28.957 �41.365

(�0.14) (�0.33) (0.33) (0.45) (0.29) (0.14) (�1.80) (�3.09) Turnoveri,t 0.651 0.583 0.752 0.711 �0.220 �0.209 0.118 0.081

(2.88) (2.72) (3.40) (3.48) (�1.03) (�0.94) (0.56) (0.36)

Adjusted R2 0.081 0.115 0.101 0.121 0.194 0.188 0.253 0.237

We estimate the alpha of each SR incumbent in the 12-month period after entry using the DGTW measure. Estimated DGTW measures (in percent) are then regressed on our measures of overlap among SR incumbents and between SR and conventional entrants. Conventional portfolios are matched with SR incumbents based on age and size. Regressions are estimated quarterly and the table presents the time-series average of the coefficients Here MVOi,t is the market value of overlap, TVOi,t is the truncated market value of overlap, Flowi,t is capital flow, Log(TNA)i,t is the logarithm of the value of total net assets, Log(age)i,t is the logarithm of fund age measured in years, Expense ratioi,t is the expense ratio, and Turnoveri,t is the turnover ratio. Regressions are estimated quarterly using a Fama–MacBeth procedure and t-statistics are reported in parentheses below the estimates.

F. In et al. / Journal of Banking & Finance 44 (2014) 160–176 173

SR and conventional funds is examined, a one standard deviation change in MVOi,t (TVOi,t) increases fund returns by 0.20% (0.08%) per year. In contrast to our regression analysis using Carhart’s four-factor model, the magnitude of the coefficients is greater for our overlap measures but, consistent with our previous analysis, the overlap in holdings between SR incumbents and conventional entrants has a greater impact on SR fund performance. However, despite the greater impact on fund performance with the DGTW measure, our regression results are less statistically significant.

Still, one advantage of using an HRt performance measure is that it allows us to better determine specific factors that may explain the positive impact of competition on fund performance. For exam- ple, in examining the components of DGTW measure, CSt is evi- dently the most significant component in terms of magnitude. Since the CSt variable reflects the stock picking ability of funds, positive coefficient values for our overlap measures indicate that a higher overlap in portfolio holdings for both SR and conventional entrants increases the ability and likelihood of SR funds selecting securities with return potential. Building upon our earlier conclu- sion that an increase in the demand for SR stocks allows SR funds

to achieve higher returns despite an increase in competition from overlap in portfolio holdings, the prevalence of stock picking ability in determining fund performance indicates the possibility of herd- ing behaviour among SR funds. Simply put, SR funds may trade securities according to the actions of other SR funds.

While this phenomenon has been discussed extensively in pre- vious studies (Barberis and Shleifer, 2003; Elton et al., 2010), many SR funds could be trading securities based on similar sets or sources of information. It is believed that with the currently lim- ited SR securities available in the market, numerous SR funds would be following similar sets of securities that are highly ranked on ESG factors. If so, with numerous SR funds following similar investment opportunities, SR funds will be more likely to hold sim- ilar information regarding SR securities. Due to overlap in informa- tion among SR funds, any trades initiated by an SR fund could induce other SR (and conventional) funds to follow without any foundation and, if so, series of trades based on the actions of com- peting SR funds could drive the value of securities away from their fundamental value. This is possible, given the relatively high asset concentration within the SR mutual fund market among large

174 F. In et al. / Journal of Banking & Finance 44 (2014) 160–176

management companies and their strategy in offering numerous SR investment products to cater to a diversified market of SR inves- tors. Whether the herding behaviour is due to reputational con- cerns or the correlation of private information held by funds (Hirshleifer et al., 1994; Scharfstein and Stein, 1990), our results indicate that the likelihood of herding behaviour may have a posi- tive impact on SR fund performance. If the performance of SR funds is attributable to herding behaviour and not to a fundamental investing approach based on the consideration of ESG factors, then SR fund performance is likely to fade as the values of securities revert to their fundamental values. Given the inconsistency of our results relative to our initial hypothesis based on an economi-

Table 13 The effect of entry on changes in incumbent mutual fund fees.

SR

D12b-1 fees Dexpense ratio Dmgmt fees

Intercept �0.004 �0.001 �0.034 �0.287 0.341 0.367 (�0.210) (�0.380) (�0.555) (�3.30) (1.033) (1.10

WACorri,t �0.121 0.064 �0.525 (�0.330) (0.203) (�0.244)

ACorri,t �0.022 �0.151 �1.19 (�0.757) (�0.22 (�0.6

Log(TNA)i,t 0.000 0.000 0.011 0.039 �0.070 �0.07 (�0.430) (�0.276) (1.530) (1.99) (�1.280) (�1.3

Log(age)i,t 0.000 0.000 �0.005 �0.08 �0.011 �0.01 (0.629) (0.686) (�2.162) (�1.80) (�0.671) (�0.6

Turnoveri,t 0.001 0.002 0.111 0.224 0.610 0.612 (0.457) (0.480) (1.976) (6.85) (3.153) (3.18

Std.returnsi,t 0.016 0.012 0.612 0.041 �1.589 �1.42 (0.854) (0.589) (0.566) (0.03) (�0.279) (�0.2

Log(family)i,t �0.008 �0.007 �0.001 �0.001 �0.004 �0.00 (�1.892) (�0.110) (�1.897) (�1.931) (�2.15) (�2.0

Adjusted R2 0.191 0.213 0.267 0.251 0.237 0.242

The dependent variables D12b-1 fees, Dexpense ratio, and Dmgmt fees (in percentage) WACorri,t is the value-weighted correation, ACorr,t is equally-wighted correlation, Log(TNA measured in years, Turnoveri,t is the turnover ratio, Std.returnsi,t is the standard deviation size of the family to which the fund belongs. Regressions were estimated using a Fama–M estimates (up to four lags) and are reported in parentheses below the estimates.

Table 14 Regression of post-entry differences in SR and conventional fund performance.

Panel A Benchmark = S&P 500

SR Conventional

Intercept 0.161 0.031 0.042 0.05 (�0.72) (�0.12) (�0.28) (�0

WACorri,t �0.188 �2.915 (�0.37) (�0.81)

ACorri,t 0.05 �0.2 (�0.45) (�0

Log(TNA)i,t 0.333 0.331 0.309 0.30 (�5.57) (�5.81) (�8.88) (�8

Log(age)i,t �0.036 �0.024 �0.018 �0.0 (�2.95) (�1.37) (�1.53) (�1

Turnoveri,t 0.059 0.052 0.028 0.02 (�3.08) (�2.59) (�1.43) (�1

Std.returnsi,t 5.373 9.298 8.188 7.60 (�0.90) (�1.39) (�1.71) (�1

Log(family)i,t �0.094 �0.091 �0.041 �0.0 (�1.14) (�1.11) (�0.49) (�0

Adjusted R2 0.213 0.202 0.174 0.17

We estimate the alpha of each SR incumbent in the 36-month period after entry using th on our measures of overlap between SR incumbents and between SR and conventional e correlation, Log(TNA)i,t is the logarithm of the value of total net assets, Log(age)i,t is the Turnoveri,t is the turnover ratio. Regressions are estimated quarterly and this table pr corrected for time-series correlation (up to four lags) and are reported in parentheses b

cally competitive market, the herding behaviour of SR funds could explain the positive impact of competition on SR fund performance.

For further robustness check purpose, we employ a return- based competition measure, correlation, to confirm our results. Suppose that we have two portfolios that have significant amount of same assets. Then, the correlation between the portfolios can be used a competition measure since it represents the degree of similarity in portfolio holdings. However, there is also a possibility that two portfolios have totally different assets that have high cor- relations. In this case, the correlation between two funds is not likely to correctly measure the degree of competition between

Conventional

D12b-1 fees Dexpense ratio Dmgmt fees

�0.014 �0.036 �0.442 �0.498 0.210 0.079 8) (�0.416) (�0.966) (�3.623) (�3.699) (0.574) (0.194)

0.475 2.223 �3.670 (1.314) (1.515) (�1.385)

9 0.131 0.503 �0.287 07) (2.358) (1.501) (�0.468) 3 0.003 0.007 0.071 0.083 �0.099 �0.089 36) (0.609) (1.269) (4.272) (4.382) (�1.983) (�1.547) 1 0.000 �0.001 �0.015 �0.016 �0.016 �0.015 80) (�0.377) (�0.608) (�3.220) (�3.482) (�1.176) (�1.060)

�0.016 �0.019 0.148 0.137 0.900 0.907 7) (�0.952) (�1.137) (2.404) (2.214) (4.883) (4.835) 3 0.046 �0.086 1.440 0.943 12.994 13.210 53) (0.089) (�0.168) (0.783) (0.509) (2.358) (2.343) 5 �0.004 �0.001 0.008 0.005 �0.033 �0.052 3) (�0.23) (�0.59) (�0.210) (�0.33) (�1.86) (�1.94)

0.003 0.034 0.253 0.248 0.506 0.491

are calculated from the quarter t + 1 to quarter t + 8 after entry in quarter t. Here )i,t is the logarithm of the value of total assets, Log(age)i,t is the logarithm of fund age of the monthly returns in the last quarter, and Log(family)i,t is the logarithm of the

acBeth procedure and t-statistics were corrected for serial correlation in time-series

Panel B Benchmark = matched funds

SR Conventional

5 0.275 0.217 0.069 0.073 .37) (�1.22) (�0.84) (�0.44) (�0.47)

�0.343 �0.439 (�0.80) (�0.17)

34 0.004 0.008 .32) (�0.04) (�0.01) 3 0.28 0.281 0.306 0.302 .1) (�3.32) (�3.3) (�5.6) (�5.49) 19 �0.024 �0.018 �0.008 �0.008

.57) (�1.17) (�0.71) (�0.57) (�0.56) 5 0.027 0.025 0.001 �0.001 .2) (�1.6) (�1.41) (�0.02) (�0.01) 5 1.79 2.835 2.152 1.94 .63) (�0.32) (�0.57) (�0.46) (�0.41) 49 �0.093 �0.087 �0.056 �0.06

.62) (�1.31) (�1.24) (�0.92) (�1.01)

2 0.102 0.091 0.048 0.047

e Carhart (1997) four-factor model. Estimated alphas (in percent) are then regressed ntrants. Here WACorri,t is the value-weighted correlation, ACorr,t is equally-wighted logarithm of fund age measured in years, Expense ratioi,t is the expense ratio, and esents the time-series average of the coefficients. Fama–MacBeth t-statistics are elow the estimates.

F. In et al. / Journal of Banking & Finance 44 (2014) 160–176 175

the funds. The correlation might indicate ‘‘virtual’’ or ‘‘false’’ competition between two funds. Hence, if the degree of portfolio holding overlap between funds is high, the correlation measure might be a reasonable measure of the competition, otherwise, it could be used to confirm that the competition between the funds is not actual phenomenon. When we look at the values of MVO in Table 2, the mean values of SR and conventional funds are around 5% and 6%. Even for 90th percentile, the values are 11% and 13%. This would suggest that our competition measure can be used a counterintuitive measure for the competition. The advantage of this measure is that we can evaluate the effects of competition for longer period than our initial research. Since the CRSP data provides fees data from 1998, our robustness test sam- ple period is between 1998 and 2011.

To construct our correlation measure, we employ Dynamic Con- ditional Correlation (DCC) model to obtain then correlations between entrant and incumbent funds and then calculate both weighted and equally-weighted average correlation for each entrant fund. The results show that most of the correlation mea- sures appear to have insignificant impact on fees, flows and perfor- mance. This suggests that our previous results (Tables 3–5) are not driven by coincidence, but by the actual informational competition between funds. The estimation results are reported in Tables 13 and 14.

5. Conclusion

This study examines the effect of competition using measures of overlap in an attempt to explain variations in SR fund performance. Using data over the past decade, our study provides evidence that 12b-1 fees are influenced by an increase in competition due to new SR entrants and expense ratios are influenced by an increase in competition due to new conventional entrants. For 12b-1 fees, we believe that with an increase in the number of SR funds and the availability of information, it is difficult for SR funds to attract new investors and further differentiate themselves without incur- ring additional costs. For expense ratios, it is assumed that because SR funds can differentiate themselves from conventional funds, SR funds can operate at less than optimal operational efficiency. In turn, for the capital flow of SR funds, our analysis shows that over- lap in portfolio holdings has no impact on capital flow but an increase in asset concentration is associated with lower capital. We believe that in the short-run investors still differentiate between SR and conventional funds and are more likely to invest in SR funds for SR attributes. Our initial hypothesis was that, given their unique nature, competition among SR funds is limited to other SR funds and that an increase in competition positively impacts SR fund performance. However, our study provides evi- dence that the impact of competition on performance is mainly limited to other SR funds and an increase in competition has a positive impact on SR fund performance. Moreover, using an alter- native measure of performance and considering the significant positive impact of the stock selecting ability of SR funds, our results indicate the possibility of herding behaviour among SR funds, given the high levels of asset concentration in the SR mutual fund market.

In conclusion, our findings suggest that, despite the increase in the number of both SR and conventional funds over the past decade, increase in competition has had a positive impact on fund performance. However, based on an indication of herding behav- iour, future research should investigate whether SR fund perfor- mance is due to fundamental investing in securities based on rigorous ESG criteria or whether it is due to following a social or environmental trend or simply a market trend.

Appendix A

Regression of post-entry SR incumbent alphas.

Panel A

Panel B

Benchmark=S&P 500

Benchmark= matched

funds

SR

Conventional

SR

Conventional

Intercept

�0.261

�0.124

�0.165

�0.035

(�0.440)

�(1.220)

(�0.83)

(�0.29)

MVOi,t

6.765

4.086

3.777

2.139

(0.170)

(0.800)

(1.560)

(2.460)

BE/MEi,t

�4.948

�3.512

�6.733

�5.715

(�1.357)

(�0.219)

(�2.601)

(�1.967)

Log(TNA)i,t

1.096

�0.004

0.964

0.000

(5.600)

(3.320)

(10.650)

(1.460)

Log(age)i,t

�0.034

�0.040

�0.040

�0.038

(�0.57)

(�1.17)

(�2.06)

(�0.93)

Turnoveri,t

0.009

0.005

0.006

0.003

(0.020)

(1.600)

(2.330)

(2.460)

Std.returnsi,t

0.287

�4.463

6.108

�0.361

(0.460)

(�0.320)

(1.490)

(0.750)

Log(family)i,t

�0.151

�0.119

�0.125

�0.093

(�0.92)

(�1.31)

(�0.69)

(�1.43)

2

Adjusted R

0.205

0.140

0.188

0.119

We estimate the annualized alpha of each SR incumbent in the 36-month period after entry using the Carhart (1997) four-factor model. Estimated alphas (in percent) are then regressed on our measures of overlap between SR incumbents and between SR and conventional entrants. Here MVOi,t is the market value of over- lap, BE/MEi,t is the value weighted book-to-market ratio, TVOi,t is the truncated market value of overlap, Flowi,t is capital flow, Log(TNA)i,t is the logarithm of the value of total net assets, Log(age)i,t is the logarithm of fund age measured in years, Expense ratioi,t is the expense ratio, and Turnoveri,t is the turnover ratio. Regressions are estimated quarterly and this table presents the time-series average of the coefficients. Fama–MacBeth t-statistics are corrected for time-series correlation (up to four lags) and are reported in parentheses below the estimates.

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  • Competition of socially responsible and conventional mutual funds and its impact on fund performance
    • 1 Introduction
    • 2 Hypothesis development
      • 2.1 The mutual fund industry as a competitive market
      • 2.2 Different levels of competition within the mutual fund market
      • 2.3 Fund performance in a competitive market
    • 3 Data and variables
      • 3.1 Data
      • 3.2 Measuring the impact of competition
    • 4 Empirical findings
      • 4.1 Pattern of fund entrants
      • 4.2 Overlap statistics
      • 4.3 The impact of competition on costs
      • 4.4 The impact of competition on flows
      • 4.5 The impact of competition on fund performance
      • 4.6 Robustness tests
    • 5 Conclusion
    • Appendix A
    • References