Policy Analysis

School Choices, Rational and Otherwise: A Comment on Coleman Author(s): Scott Sernau Source: Sociology of Education, Vol. 66, No. 1 (Jan., 1993), pp. 88-90 Published by: American Sociological Association Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2112786 Accessed: 18-03-2018 02:27 UTC

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READ ER S' R E S P O N S E S

In the October 1992 issue, we initiated the Exchange section, in which researchers debate issues of social and policy significance. When pages and space permit, we will also publish short readers' responses to those debates. We present such a response here.

School Choices, Rational and Otherwise: A Comment on Coleman SCOTT SERNAU Indiana University-South Bend

The provocative exchange on school choice between Astin and Coleman (October 1992) is extremely impor- tant, since school choice is where much educational policy reform is being directed. Coleman, apparently writing second in this exchange, made several important critiques of Astin's cogent explanation of the link between school choice and greater educational stratification, but these critiques, in turn, glossed over sev- eral important issues. The substance of the debate centers first on the extent and nature of stratification that would result from a choice system and second, on the effect of this stratification system on the over- all performance of students and the quality of schools. Each issue is worth reexamining.

The first element in determining effects is the type of choice program under discussion. A key debate in the 1992 presidential election was over whether school choice should in- clude both private and public schools or be limited to public schools. This is a crucial distinction for both the nature and extent of the stratification that would result. The reward for

JULIA WRIGLEY, Editor-in-Chief KEVIN DOUGHERTY, Deputy Editor

excellent (or perceived excellent) in- struction in a private school is not endless expansion of the school, for expansion usually compromises the quality of the faculty and students who can be attracted, as well as the perceived availability of personal at- tention. Rather, the reward is justifi- cation for tuition increases. Indeed, many of the most highly rated private schools charge tuition on par with many liberal arts colleges. Entrance is selective, and the selection process is based largely on the ability to pay for preparatory programs to meet the schools' entrance qualifications and to pay the tuition.

Clearly, this is not the meritocratic system Coleman desires. At the same time, higher enrollments of middle- and upper-class students in private schools are tied to the declining willingness of voters from these classes to support public ,education. Even if funding for public education does not directly decline, all the resources-personal and financial- that wealthier parents invest in their children now indirectly benefit pri- vate, rather than public, schools. The children who grew up with books, computers, travel, educational day care, and a variety of "enrichment" programs now enrich the quality of the private, rather than the public, institution. The best schools get bet- ter, not by innovation, but by skim- ming the best-prepared off the top of other schools. Vouchers do not de- crease the role of money in making educational choices, for they are fixed, not tied to the quality and

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School Choices, Rational and Otherwise 89

expense of the chosen school, and are well below the tuition rates of exclusive schools.

The only way to prevent a two-tier private-public system is substantial coun- tervailing investment in public educa- tion, as is done at the university level. Public universities in a number of states match the reputation for quality of most private institutions because of substan- tial investment by the states in their programs, funded by legislators who are concerned for the states' reputations. Salaries and equipment, if not class size, are as good or better than their private competitors.

Even among public schools, however, the problem of aggravating existing ine- qualities is not slight. To return to the university example, the limits of state funding often mean that the two-tier system is shifted to within the public system, in which regional or community colleges operate without the advantages of the more selective flagship school. This is a "choice" system in that no one is required to attend the college or university in his or her community. Decisions, however, are likely to be based on family and financial consider- ations, rather than on educational "free market" considerations of matching abil- ity and interest.

Coleman revived Kingsley Davis's ar- gument emphasizing the benefits of strat- ification as long as the segregating prin- ciple is merit. Even if we grant that a meritocracy could prevail against the monopolistic tendencies of power and privilege that Weber delineated, such a system poses serious problems. Cer- tainly Coleman is as aware as anyone of the strong correlation between perceived ability and the socioeconomic back- grounds of students. Whenever divisions are created among or within schools, students from upper-class backgrounds are overrepresented in the upper levels and poorer students are overrepresented in the lower levels. The distinction is aggravated by race: Most minority stu- dents congregate in the lower groupings. The problem has moved many to ques- tion the merits of programs that track by ability in schools. Although the evi- dence on school tracking is still debated,

two general patterns emerge: Ability tracks improve the performance of higher- track students, depress the performance of lower-track students, and increase the social isolation of each from the other.' That is, stratification by ability increases, and differences become further en- trenched. Schools that are divided into an ability hierarchy are merely internal school tracks that are formalized and further separated by distance. The best students are further isolated from the rest.

Schools, such as Bronx High School of Science, work, and work well, but they do so by skimming from the top of other institutions. Bronx High School of Sci- ence has a good racial mix because it draws on exceptional students from throughout the area and has a well- supported program that can match its suburban and private counterparts. The real question is what happens to the remainder of the public schools in the Bronx. The answer is that many could borrow an inscription from Dante's In- ferno for their neogothic entrances: "Abandon all hope ye who enter here."

School choice is a misleading concept in a system filled with constraints: on students who must attend somewhere; on schools that must accommodate, if not educate, all comers; and on all who lack the resources to make meaningful choices. Competition only raises mean levels of achievement when all schools and all students have the resources to compete and when first-round losers are not left to die of their wounds.

The flight of workable institutions from the inner cities has been well documented by William Wilson and others. In many urban areas, the public school, besieged as it is, is the one remaining well-established institution. Under a wide-ranging school-choice

Space does not permit an extended dis- cussion of research on tracking, much of which is likely to be familiar to regular readers of this journal. For a concise review of the literature, which draws the conclusion presented here, see Maureen T. Hallinan, "The Organization of Students for Instruc- tion in the Middle School," Sociology of Education 65:114-127.

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90 Sernau

system, this last institution will also be forced to abandon the inner city, and the opportunities for community education and identity will be lost. If compelled by political pressure to remain, these trou- bled schools will consist only of the troubled students who are unable to escape. Poor schools will not disappear from the "market," but poor students will continue to disappear from the competitive labor market.

There is more than just an equity problem with this unutopian meritoc- racy. The practical problem facing the nation is not the need to educate the best better, but how to cope with the needs of the rest. The United States invests more heavily in higher education than does any other nation and has more outstand- ing universities, more exceptional grad- uate programs, and probably more excep- tional university graduates than any other. In many fields the Nobel Prize is rapidly becoming a perpetual America's Cup. Where the nation lags is in the verbal and quantitative abilities of its production and infrastructure workers. The much-touted advantages of Western Europe and Japan are at these levels- not at the highest educational levels. A system that widens the ability gap can only worsen this situation and hinder, rather than heighten, national productiv- ity.

These considerations do not negate choice, but they do point to the need to create meaningful choices for individu- als at all preparation, ability, and socio- economic levels. In particular, choice can be brought into the schools them- selves with innovative and cooperative programs. Schools from a range of loca- tions can jointly sponsor special pro- grams in the arts and sciences and hence bring together a racial and economic mix of students with common interests. Such programs generate horizontal, not verti- cal, distinctions: a well-integrated (edu- cationally as well as socially) array of high-quality options to incorporate, in- volve, and interest as many students as possible, rather than an array of levels in a prestige hierarchy. Good schools can be rewarded with resources for proved programs: equipment, release time, and salary incentives. The incentives should be awarded, however, on a "value- added" basis, in which schools are rewarded for the amount of improve- ment their students show, not for the sum of the advantages their students bring with them. Such programs, of course, require the provision of re- sources and the creation of opportuni- ties throughout the system. This commit- ment must be the first choice. It is the only one that is rational.

Scott Sernau, Ph.D., is Assistant Professor of Sociology, Department of Sociology, Indiana University at South Bend, 1700 Mishawaka Avenue, P.O. Box 7111, South Bend, IN 46634. His main fields of interest are stratification, racial and ethnic relations, sociology of education, and sociology of the family. His current work is a comparison of the stratification effects of change in the labor market in Latin America and the United States.

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