Need to Write a Scholarly Article Discussion On topic Selection Prison Reentry and Rehabilitation

In the article, “Three Strikes and You’re Out: Enhanced Sentences for Repeat Offenders Research Pathfinder,” Lisa Eaton discusses the public’s concern with crime and the three strikes effectiveness on recidivism rates. She explains that the genesis of the three strike law began in Washington in 1993 and since then, more and more states began to adopt the legislation, but on their own terms. The intended criminal is the violent anti-social offender and states modified the law in their own way. The varied definitions include:

different sentencings lengths, parole eligibility, the number of strikes required to trigger a mandatory sentence, the nature of crimes that qualify as strikes, the time elapsed between strikes, the type of felony that triggers the sentencing enhancement, and the degree of discretion permitted in invoking and applying the law (Eaton, 2003).

Eaton’s methodology focuses on each state’s three strike variation and uses legal periodicals, books, reports, treatise and individual/state cases and other secondary sources in an attempt to locate the most accurate and reliable studies. The article explains the difficulty in establishing the effectiveness of the law because of the variations within each state and inconclusive data showing long-term results. Eaton suggests each state can affect the outcome of a study because there isn’t a cohesive definition of a strike. How a “‘strike zone’ is defined, how many strikes are required to be ‘out,’ and what it means to be ‘out,’ varies widely” (2003). By examining each state’s definition of the law and individual cases, the article further points to the difficulty in studying its effectiveness. Although Eaton’s article is filled with rich and reliable studies regarding the legislation, what seems to be lacking is the overall conclusion of how researchers can resolve these shortcomings in future research. Eaton does include “recent developments in three-strikes case law,” but the reader would need to make their own assertions of the article to draw a conclusion (2003).

In the article, “Symbol and Substance: Effects of California’s Three Strikes Law on Felony Sentencing,” John Sutton (2013) explains three schools of thought related to the three strike law. There are the governmental advocates who believe the law will help fight crime and reduce costs associated with public safety, the second school involves critics who believe the law will create injustices for those tried under it, overcrowding in jails and increased government costs to uphold it. The third school is one of neutrality as the law is viewed as a “symbolic accomplishment” in the fight towards crime, but neither wreaks havoc on the criminal justice system nor makes advancements in reduced recidivism rates (Sutton, 2013). In Sutton’s analysis, he tests the “severity, racial disparities, and individual- and jurisdiction-level variability in sentence outcomes using data on felony cases from the 12 most populous counties in California” (2013). Three factors are used in the analysis, the seriousness of the crime, the potential bias in the sentencing process, and the bias that occurs within the criminal justice system itself. The fact that there are many different stages within the justice system increases the potential bias in each stage. For example, pretrial detention for those who cannot afford bail may be viewed by officials as defendants who need to stay in jail because they are more dangerous, when in fact they don’t have the means to leave (Sutton, 2013).

A few hypotheses were used in the study. One involved “macro level-studies” that tended to be more conservative in nature because of the political climate and the second focused on the prosecution’s means and limitations. There are only so many cases that can be tried and the rest must be pled out. The sample consisted of all male subjects in felony cases in twelve California counties. Possible outcomes that affected the results included the prosecutor’s decision of what type of crime constituted a defendant’s third strike. Independent variables like race and ethnicity were binary and prison length and sentence were calculated separately.

For hypothesis one, Sutton (2013) found that the law was more punitive and increased the defendant’s sentencing length and increased the likelihood they would go to prison once tried. The effects of race and ethnicity were not as significant as expected. For example, black defendants were sentenced at the same rate before the law and after, the only change being longer sentence lengths in line with the legislation. Also, “legal factors” viewed to enhance sentences showed no real change between the seriousness of the crime or the “effect of a prior felony conviction” (Sutton, 2013). An important finding revealed zero evidence of prosecutors using their power unfairly to decide what qualifies as a third strike offense, thus manipulation was not at play in the legal process. In conclusion, it is much more difficult to quantify an individual offender into separate variables and the likelihood that they would be sentenced more severely depends on the cluster of attributes they have as a whole (Sutton, 2013).

Marvell & Moody describe in “The Lethal Effects of Three‐Strikes Laws” how deterrence is affected, specifically in homicides (2001). They focus on how deterrence affects a criminal with two strikes against them and their decision to engage in a felony. Marvell & Moody (2001) surmise that the “cost” is what the criminal takes into account when they make the choice to commit a crime. Even if the cost is too high, deterrence might not be the outcome. Suppose for example a second strike individual commits a robbery and realizes that if he or she gets caught, they would receive a minimum of 25 years to life. They murder the victims they robbed in order to eradicate the possibility any witnesses can identify them as suspects. Marvell & Moody hypothesize that the opposite effect of deterrence occurs and there is an actual increase that a criminal will murder their victim (s) to escape capture (2001). “The difference between three-strikes states and other states is roughly 10 percentage points, which translates to some 1,400 extra murders per year in the three-strikes states” (Marvell & Moody, 2001).

The research design used during the 29-year study in all fifty states is a fixed-effect model. The dependent variable is crime rate and a dummy rate variable is used for the three strike law. Their findings revealed that homicide rates increased short-term (and also long-term) averaging “60 additional homicides occurred” short-term, and for states who have not enacted the law, those states saved lives yearly (Marvell & Moody, 2001).

A shortcoming of the study indicated that perhaps the increase in homicides for violent crimes is because of an overall trend and not necessarily connected with the law. Also noteworthy, states with the most severe three strike law, had the least increase in homicide rates. Although more studies need to be done, Marvell and Moody (2001) concluded that the three strike law has no overall reduction in crime, although incapacitation was not taken into account. They surmise that the cost is too high to continue to keep the three strike law in effect.

In the article, “Does Three Strikes Deter?” Helland & Tabarrok (2007) compare deterrence in criminals with two strikes and in criminals with one or two strikes, but who underwent two separate trials to create a stronger causal relationship. They claim that there is a detriment for those who study deterrence because researchers cannot discern the difference between incapacitation and those truly deterred, which significantly skews results. Their study is limited by the fact that bias does occur because the profile of the criminal’s arrests focuses on a marginal effect and not the total outcome. The data was a random sample of prisoners released in California and the study was conducted as a quasi-experiment (Helland & Tabarrok, 2007).

There are two important values used in the study. One being the number of arrests and the risk involved for released prisoners. The findings showed in some states that criminals with two strikes against them had an increased chance of a new felony conviction. For those who were tried twice for separate felonies, but only convicted of one or two strikes, the findings revealed a significant reduction in the chance of committing another strike, although the findings varied in each state. In California, the three strike legislation has reduced “felony arrest rates among the class of criminals with two strikes by 17 to 20 percent” (Helland & Tabarrok, 2007).

In the article, “Officer Down: Implications of Three Strikes for Public Safety” Johnson & Saint-Germain investigate the impact that the three strike law has on suspects and law enforcement officers and whether there was an increase in violent confrontations (2005). The study was longitudinal in nature using a time series analysis from 1990-2001. Questionnaires were mailed to six large police departments in California and one in Arizona where the three strike law has not been implemented. The data included the number of arrests, whether those arrests involved threat or harm to a police officer and whether use of force was used by the police officer (Johnson & Saint-Germain, 2005).

The findings showed a statistically significant increase in arrests made after the three strike policy was implemented, despite lower crime rates. The study did not discern between felony and misdemeanor arrests. The use of force by a police officer became more unpredictable after the three strike law and did not correlate to the number of arrests made. The same results were found with officer-related shootings after 1994. In order for this study to become more reliable, the number of arrests versus the number of officer-related harm must increase over time to show a valid correlation. The three strike law might be dangerous for officers, but no evidence was significant enough to support that conclusion (Johnson & Saint-Germain, 2005).

References

Eaton, L. (2003). Three strikes and you're out: Enhanced sentences for repeat offenders

research pathfinder. Legal Reference Services Quarterly, 22(4), 55-85. doi:10.1300/j113v22n04_0

Helland, E., & Tabarrok, A. (2007). Does three strikes deter? Journal of Human

Resources,XLII(2), 309-330. doi:10.3368/jhr.xlii.2.309

John R., S. (2013). Symbol and substance: Effects of California's three strikes law on felony

sentencing. Law & Society Review, (1), 37. doi:10.1111/lasr.12001

Johnson, J. L., & Saint-Germain, M. A. (2005). Officer down: Implications of three strikes for

public safety. Criminal Justice Policy Review, 16(4), 443-460. doi:10.1177/0887403405277001

Marvell, T. B., & Moody, C. E. (2001). The lethal effects of three‐strikes

laws. The Journal of Legal Studies, (1), 89. doi:10.1086/468112

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