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CHAPTER 13 -=====~~==~ ~he Categorical Imperative

Immanuel Kant

. 'd d various challenges to morality, we turn next to Havmg cons1 ere . · 1 . f h t l·mportant moral theones, competing exp anations some o t e mos O f h

h · t'ons are right and others are wrong. ne o t e most ofw y certam ac 1 . . · fl t'al of all ethical systems 1s that developed by the German phi-in uen 1 • fi · h h' losopher Immanuel Kant (1724-1~04~, a dominant gure 1n t e 1story of modern philosophy. Because his views are not easy to grasp, I shall offer a brief overview of them.

Kant argues that the moral worth of an action is to be judged not by its consequences but by the nature of the maxim or principle that moti- vated the action. Thus right actions are not necessarily those with favor- able consequences but those performed in accordance with correct maxims. But which maxims are correct? According to Kant, the only corr~ct ones ~re those that can serve as universal laws because they are apphcable without exception to every person at any time. In other words, you should act only on a maxim that can be universalized with-out contradiction.

To see what Kant has in · d ·d . 1·11ust t h' . mm , consi er a specific example he uses to ra e is view Suppos d to you onl ·r · . e you nee to borrow money, but it will be lent Y 1 you promise to pa ·t b k ,, . will not be able to h h Y 1 _ac · xou realize, however, that you onor t e debt Is It . 'bl . repay the money kn . · perm1ss1 e for you to promise to ' owing you will k that doing so is not pe . 'b not eep the promise? Kant argues . rm1ssi le beca . f . h promises could be mad . h . use 1 It were a universal law t at . e wit no mt . practice of promising would b ention of keeping them, then the

Kant refers to h' e destroyed. impe t' " is supreme moral · · · I . ra ive -categorical becau . Principle as the "categonca

~cular desires, and an imper /e '~ does not depend on anyone's par· ant also claims that the catega •~e ~cause it is a command of reason.

oncal imp . erative can be reformulated as

From Immanuel Kant Copyright© 2002. Re~rin~~~dbwork for _the Metaphysics

Y permission of Oxford tJ0:als, ~ranslated by Arnulf Zweig. 102 niversity Press.

l

CHAPTER 13 THE CATEGORICAL IMPERATIVE 103

~ollows: So act that you treat humanity, whether in your own person or m any other_ person, always at the same time as an end, never merely as a means. Usmg this version, Kant argues that a deceitful promise is im- moral because a person making such a promise is using another person only as a means, not treating that individual as an end, a rational being worthy of respect.

It is impossible to imagine anything at all in the world, or even beyond it, that can be called good without qualification-except a good will. Intelligence, wit, judgement, and the other mental talents, whatever we may call them, or courage, decisiveness, and perseverance, are, as qualities of temperament, certainly good and desirable in many re- spects; but they can also be extremely bad and harmful when the will which makes use of these gifts of nature and whose specific quality we refer to as character, is not good. It is exactly the same with gifts of fortune. Power, wealth, honour, even health and that total well-being and contentment with one's condition which we call "happiness," can make a person bold but consequently often reckless as well, unless a good will is present to correct their influence on the mind, thus ad- justing the whole principle of one's action to render it conformable to universal ends. It goes without saying that the sight of a creature en- joying uninterrupted prosperity, but never feeling the slightest pull of a pure and good will, cannot excite approval in a rational and im- partial spectator. Consequently, a good will seems to constitute the indispensable condition even of our worthiness to be happy.

Some qualities, even though they are helpful to this good will and can make its task very much easier, nevertheless have no intrin- sic unconditional worth. Rather, they presuppose a good will which puts limits on the esteem in which they are rightly held and forbids us to regard them as absolutely good. Moderation in emotions and passions, self-control, and sober reflection are not only good in many respects: they may even seem to constitute part of the inner worth of a person. Yet they are far from being properly described as I good without qualification (however unconditionally they were prized by the ancients). For without the principles of a good will those qualities may become exceedingly bad; the passionless com- posure of a villain makes him not merely more dangerous but also directly more detestable in our eyes than we would have taken him to be without it.

A good will is not good because of its effects or accomplishments, and not because of its adequacy to achieve any proposed end: it is good

104 PART II MORAL TH EORIES l . . h t • it is good in itself. Considered .

only by virtue of its w11lmdg-t. ac;~parably higher than anything!~ b t easure as m . . 1 · It itself it is to e r 1 . order to satisfy some inc Ination b . . bout mere y m 'f . or, could ever nng a 1 f 11 inclinations. Even 1 1t were to happe if you like, the sum tota

0 . a 1 rly unfortunate face or the miserly b n f me parucu a e.

that, because O

so 1 t e this will were completely powerless lo quest of a step-mot~er ~h na ur '•·ts utmost effort it still accomplished · · ms· 1f wit even carry out Its a, ' 1 d ill itself remained (not, of course, as a nothing, so

th at onh Y goo :ing of every means in our power), even ere wish, but as t e summ . . . h .

m . ld -11 l'ke aJ·ewel glisten m its own ng t, as something then It wou st1 , I ' that has its full worth in itself. • • · . . . .

h d l the concept of a will estimable m itself and We must t us eve op . . f further aim This concept 1s already present in good apart rom any · . . h l h lthy ml.nd which requires not so much mstruction as t e natura , ea , . merely clarification. It is this concept that always hold~ the h1_ghes1 place in estimating the total worth of our actions and 11 constitutes the condition ofall the rest. Let us then take up the concept of duty, which includes that of a good will, the latter however being here under certain subjective limitations and obstacles. These, so far from hiding a good will or disguising it, rather bring it out by contrast and make it shine forth more brightly . .. .

It is a duty to help others where one can, and besides this many souls are so compassionately disposed that, without any further motive of vanity or self-interest, they find an inner pleasure in spread- ing joy around them, taking delight in the contentment of others, so far as they have brought it about. Yet I maintain that, however dutiful and kind an action of this sort may be, it still has no genuinely moral worth. It is on a level with other inclinations-for example, the inclina- tion to pursue honour, which if fortunate enough to aim at something generally useful and consistent with duty, something consequently honourable, deserves praise and encouragement but not esteem. For its maxim lacks the moral merit of such actions done not out of inch· nation but out of duty. Suppose then that the mind of this humanitar· ian were overclouded by sorrows of his own which extinguished all compassion for the fate of others, but that he still had the power to assist others in distress; suppose though that their adversity no longer stirred him, because he is preoccupied with his own; and now imag· ine that, though no longer moved by any inclination, he nevertheless tears himself out of this deadly apathy and does the action withoul any inclination, solely out of duty. Then for the first time his action has its genuine moral worth. Furthermore, if nature had put little

CHAPTER 13 THE CATEGORICAL IMPERATIVE 105

sympathy into t~is or that person's heart; if he, though an honest man, were cold 1n temperament and indifferent to the sufferings of others-perhaps because he has the special gifts of patience and for- titude in his own sufferings and he assumes or even demands the same of others; if such a man (who would in truth not be the worst prod_uct_of nature) were not exactly fashioned by nature to be a hu- man1tanan, would he not still find in himself a source from which he might give himself a worth far higher than that of a good-natured temperament? Assuredly he would. It is precisely in this that the worth of character begins to show-a moral worth, and incompara- bly the highest-namely, that he does good, not out of inclination, but out of duty ....

The moral worth of an action done out of duty has its moral worth, not in the objective to be reached by that action, but in the maxim in accordance with which the action is decided upon; it de- pends, therefore, not on actualizing the object of the action, but solely on the principle of volition in accordance with which the action was done, without any regard for objects of the faculty of desire. It is clear from our previous discussion that the objectives we may have in acting, and also our actions' effects considered as ends and as what motivates our volition, can give to actions no unconditional or moral worth. Where then can this worth be found if not in the willing of the action's hoped for effect? It can be found nowhere but in the prin- ciple of the will, irrespective of the ends that can be brought about by such action ....

Duty is the necessity of an act done out of respect for the law. While I can certainly have an inclination for an object that results from my pro- posed action, I can never respect it, precisely because it is nothing but an effect of a will and not its activity. Similarly I cannot respect any inclination whatsoever, whether it -be my own inclination or that of another. At most I can approve of that towards which I feel an inclina- tion, and occasionally I can like the object of somebody else's inclina- tion myself-that is, see it as conducive to my own advantage. But the only thing that could be an object of respect (and thus a command- ment) for me is something that is conjoined with my will purely as a ground and never as a consequence, something that does not serve my inclination but overpowers it or at least excludes it e~tirely fro~ my decision-making-consequently, nothing but the law itself. ~ow 1f an action done out of duty is supposed to exclude totall~ the mfl~- ence of inclination, and, along with inclination, every obJect of voli- tion, then nothing remains that could determine the will except

t-t.EORJ t;;S MORAL 'f

pAJfT' JI • • I 106 pect for this practtca law d subjectively pureb. res this sort of Jaw even whe~

t,he ta1.11 an . to o ey biectivelY · . . · the rnaxun, . o :.i • l ft therefot e is . ciinations. What ,s re·udicial to all rny 10 . . depends neither on the result

doing so is P ~ral worth of an acuon . nciple of action that has to Thus the Jll . · on any prt

d from that acuon ~01 d result. For all these results

expecte f this expecte . its motive rom d't' on or even the promotion of borrow 1 surable con

1 1 b (such as one's own Pea Id h ve been brought about y other the happiness of others) cou _a the will of a rational being to

ll I uld not require . causes as we • t w~ .

1 . h a will that the highest and un-

d h m but 1t 1s on Yin sue d h' h pro uce t e , b c d That pre-eminent goo w 1c we

con 1uon . c . thing but the idea of the law in d

. . al good can e ioun . call "moral" consists there1ore in no . . . lf h'ch certainly is present only in a rational being-so far as that 1tse , w 1 • • d f h idea, and not an expected result, is the deterrnm'.ng groun o t e will. And this pre-eminent good is already present '.n the person who acts in accordance with this idea; we need not await the result of the

action in order to find it. ... Everything in nature works in accordance with laws. Only a ratio- nal being has the power to act in accordance with the idea of laws- that is, in accordance with principles-and thus has a will ....

The idea of an objective principle, in so far as it constrains a will, is called a commandment (of reason), and the formulation of this commandment is called an Imperative .... Hypothetical

1 ·mp t' d

1 er ypot eucally or categorically. All imperatives command eith h h .

era 1ves ec are a p 'bl . necessary as a means to th . ?SSI e action to be practically e attamment of s h. I

wants (or that one may want) A cate . . omet mg e se that one that represented an a t' · . goncal imperative would be one

c mn as itself b' · re~rd to any further end. 0 ~ectively necessary, without Smee every practical 1 therefore aw presents a p 'bl . as necessary for a s b' ossi e action as good and

reason, all im . u ~ect whose • t' . perattves are th fi actions are determined by ac ion which is n ere ore form 1 fi way good. If the :cessary according to the u. ae. or determining an else, the impe . ct~on would be good 1 prmciple of a will in some . . rat1ve is hy h on y as a . m itself and th c pot etical. if th . means to somethmg

ere1ore a ' e act10 · h to reason as its p . . s necessary for . 0 is t ought of as good There is, how nnciple, then the im a wi~l which of itself conforms · ever one d perative · rational beings (s f' en that we is categorical · o ara h may · · · ·

b

t1ves apply); and thus ths t ~y are depend pres~ppose as actual in all ut whi h ere 1s O . ent bem c we can a ne aim wh' h gs to whom impera-

ssume . h 1c the wit certaint Y not only might have, y that they all do have

CHAPTER 13 THE CATEGORICAL IMPERATIVE 107

by a necessity of nature and that aim is perfect happiness. The hypo- thetical imperative which affirms the practical necessity of an action as a means to the promotion of perfect happiness is an assertoric imperative. We must not characterize it as necessary merely for some uncertain, merely possible purpose, but as necessary for a purpose that we can presuppose a priori and with certainty to be present in everyone because it belongs to the essence of human beings. Now we can call skill in the choice of the means to one's own greatest well- being "prudence" in the narrowest sense of the word. So the impera- tive concerning the choice of means to one's own happiness-that is, the precept of prudence-still remains hypothetical; the action is commanded not absolutely but only as a means to a further end.

Finally, there is one imperative which commands a certain line of conduct directly, without assuming or being conditional on any fur- ther goal to be reached by that conduct. This imperative is categori- cal. It is concerned not with the material of the action and its anticipated result, but with its form and with the principle from which the action itself results. And what is essentially good in the action consists in the [agent's] disposition, whatever the result may be. This imperative may be called the imperative of morality ....

The question now arises "How are all these imperatives possible?" This question does not ask how an action commanded by the impera- tive can be performed, but merely how we can understand the con- straining of the will, which imperatives express in setting us a task. How an imperative of skill is possible requires no special discussion. Whoever wills the end also wills (so far as reason has decisive influ- ence on his actions) the means which are indispensably necessary and in his power ....

By contrast, "How is the imperative of morality possible?" is beyond all doubt the one question in need of solution. For the moral imperative is in no way hypothetical, and consequently the objective necessity, which it affirms, cannot be supported by any presupposition, as was the case with hypothetical imperatives. But we must never forget that it is impossible to settle by any exam- ple, i.e., empirically, whether there is any imperative of this kind at all; we should rather worry that all imperatives that seem to be categorical may yet be hypothetical in some hidden way. For example, when it is said, "You must abstain from making deceit- ful promises," one assumes that the necessity for this abstention is not mere advice so as to avoid some further evil-as though the meaning of what was said was, You ought not to make a deceitful

108 PART 11 MORAL THEORIES

promise test, when it comes to light, you destroy your credit. 0 the contrary, an action of this kind would h~v~ _to be considered ari.

b ad in itself and the imperative of the proh1b1t1on would be th s ' . . er, fore categorical. Even so, no example can show with certainty th -

the will would be determined here solely by the law without a at further motivation, although it may appear to be so; for it is alw ny

· · · 1 h"dd d ays possible that fear of disgrace, perhaps a ~o i en read of Other risks, may unconsciously influence the will. Who _can prove by ex, perience the non-existence of a cause? For experience shows on} that we do not perceive it. In such a case, however, the so-caueJ moral imperative, which as such appears to be categorical and un. conditional, would in fact be only a pragmati_c prescr_iption calling attention to our own advantage and merely instructing us to take this into account ....

If I think of a hypothetical imperative as such, I do not know before- hand what it will contain-not until I am given its condition. But if I think of a categorical imperative, I know right away what it contains. For since this imperative contains, besides the law, only the necessity that the maxim conform to this law, while the law, as we have seen, contains no condition limiting it, there is nothing left over to which the maxim of action should conform except the universality of a law as such; and it is only this conformity that the imperative asserts to be necessary.

There is therefore only one categorical imperative and it is this: "Act only on that maxim by which you can at the same time will that it should become a universal law." ...

We shall now enumerate some duties .. . . I. A man feels sick of life as the result of a mounting series of mis-

fortunes that has reduced hiin to hopelessness, but he still possesses enough of his reason to ask himself whether it would not be contrary to his duty to himself to take his own life. Now he tests whether the maxim of his action could really become a universal law of nature. His maxim, however, is: "I make it my principle out of self-lov~ to shorten my life if its continuance threatens more evil than it promise; advantage." The only further question is whether this principle 0 self-love can become a universal law of nature. But one sees at once

ro-that a nature whose law was that the very same feeling meant to P d mote life should actually destroy life would contradict itself, an t hence would not endure as nature. The maxim therefore could nho

d'cts t e possibly be a general law of nature and thus it wholly contra 1 supreme principle of all duty.

CHAPT ER 13 THE CAT EGORICAL IMPERATIVE 109

2. Another finds himself driven by need to borrow money. He knows very wel_I that he ~ill not be able to pay it back, but he sees too ~hat nob~d~ will lend ~•m anything unless he firmly promises to pay 1t _back within a fixed ~•me. He wants to make such a promise, but he still has enough conscience to ask himself, "Isn't it impermissible and contrary to duty to get out of one's difficulties this way?" Suppose, however, that he did decide to do it. The maxim of his action would run thus: "When I believe myself short of money, I will borrow money and promise to pay it back, even though I know that this will never be done." Now this principle of self-love or personal advantage is per- haps quite compatible with my own entire future welfare; only there remains the question "Is it right?" I therefore transform the unfair demand of self-love into a universal law and frame my question thus: "How would things stand if my maxim became a universal law?" I then see immediately that this maxim can never qualify as a self- consistent universal law of nature, but must necessarily contradict itself. For the universality of a law that permits anyone who believes himself to be in need to make any promise he pleases with the inten- tion of not keeping it would make promising, and the very purpose one has in promising, itself impossible. For no one would believe he was being promised anything, but would laugh at any such utterance as hollow pretence.

3. A third finds in himself a talent that, with a certain amount of cultivation, could make him a useful man for all sorts of purposes. But he sees himself in comfortable circumstances, and he prefers to give himself up to pleasure rather than to bother about increasing and improving his fortunate natural ~ptitudes. Yet he ~sks hi~self further "Does my maxim of neglectmg my natu~al gifts, . besides

· 'th taste £or amusement agree also with what 1s called agreeing wi my , duty?" He then sees that a nature could indeed endure under such a

. 11 n i'f (l1'ke the South Sea Islanders) every man should umversa aw, eve . . . let his talents rust and should be bent on devotm~ his hfe solely to

• · a word to en1oyment. Only he idleness, amusement, procreat1on-1n , . :.i 'bl "ll that this should become a umversal law of nature cannot poss1 y wi 1 instinct For

or should be implanted in us as such a law by a ~atura h l.d b ·1 ·n that all his powers s ou e as a rational being he necessan Y WI s . h' £

11 f I t him and given to 1m or developed, since they are after a use u 0

all sorts of possible purposes.. fl . h' but sees others who h is himself ouns mg 4. A fourth man, w O h' ( d whom he could easily

h I · th great hards 1ps an ave to strugg e WI ? L t every one be as happy as help) thinks to himself: "What do I care. e

110 PA RT JI MORAL TH EORI ES

h Can make himself; I won't deprive him f H n intends or as e l'k o eave 'y. him· but I don't feel 1 e contributin thing· I wont even env , . h' . g

any ' . 11 b . ng or to helping him m 1s distress!" No anythingdlto'f his whe a.n e;ttitude were a universal law of nature th: admitte Y 1 sue d d b I '

uld survive perfectly well an ou t ess even better human race co h d d - 11 than when everybody chatters about sympat an goo w1 ' and k fcort now and then, to practise them, but, when even ma es an e 1, , • •

one can get away with it, swindles, traf~~s m h~man rights, ?r vio. 1 t them in other ways. But although 1t is possible that a universal a es Id . . .. law of nature in accord with this maxim cou exist, It is impossible to will that such a principle should hold everywhere as a law of nature. For a will that intended this would be in conflict with itself, since many situations might arise in which the man needs love and sympathy from others, and in which, by such a law of nature gener- ated by his own will, he would rob himself of all hope of the help he wants.

, These are some of the many actual duties-or at least of what we take to be actual-whose derivation from the single principle cited above is perspicuous. We must be able to will that a maxim of our action should become a universal law-this is the authoritative model for moral judging of action generally. Some actions are so constituted that we cannot even conceive without contradiction that their maxim be a universal law of nature, let alone that we could will that it ought to become one. In the case of other actions, we do not find this inner impossibility, but it is still impossible to will that their maxim should be raised to the universality of a law of nature, because such a will would contradict itself. ...

If we now look at ourselves whenever we transgress a duty, we find that we in fact do not intend that our maxim should become a uni- versal law. For this is impossible for us. What we really intend is rath~r that its opp?site should remain a law generally; we only take th

e hberty of makmg an exception to it, for ourselves or (of course Just this once) to satisfy our inclination. Consequently if we weighed it all up from one and the same perspective-that of reason-we should find a contradiction in our own will the contradiction that a certain principle should be objectively nec~ssary as a universal law and yet subjectively should not hold universally hut should admit of exceptions . . . .

Suppose, however, there were something whose existence in itself had an absolute worth, something that, as an end in itself, could be '

CHAPT ER 13 THE CATEGORICAL IMPERATIVE 111

ground ~f definite laws. Then in it and in it alone, would the ground of a possible categorical imperative, that is, of a practical law, reside.

Now, I say, a human being, and in general every rational being, does exist ~s an _end in himself, not merely as a means to be used by this or that will as It pleases. In all his actions, whether they are directed to himself or to other rational beings, a human being must always be viewed at the same time as an end. . . . Beings whose existence de- pends not on our will but on nature still have only a relative value as means and are therefore called things, if they lack reason. Rational beings, on the other hand, are called persons because, their nature already marks them out as ends in themselves-that is, as some- thing which ought not to be used merely as a means-and conse- quently imposes restrictions on all choice making (and is an object of respect). Persons, therefore, are not merely subjective ends whose existence as an effect of our actions has a value for us. They are objec- tive ends-that is, things whose existence is in itself an end, and indeed an end such that no other end can be substituted for it, no end to which they should serve merely as a means. For if this were not so, there would be nothing at all having absolute value anywhere. But if all value were conditional, and thus contingent, then no supreme principle could be found for reason at all.

If then there is to be a supreme practical principle and a categori- cal imperative for the human will, it must be such that it forms an objective principle of the will from the idea of something which is necessarily an end for everyone because it is an end in itself, a principle that can therefore serve as a universal practical law. The ground of this principle is: Rational nature exists as an end in itself. This is the way in which a human being necessarily conceives his own existence, and it is therefore a subjective principle of human actions. But it is also the way in which every other rational being conceives his existence, on the same rational ground which holds also for me; hence it is at the same time an objective principle from which, since it is a supre~e prac- tical ground, it must be possible to derive all laws of the will. The practical imperative will therefore be the following: Act in such a way that you treat humanity, whether in your own person or in any o~her person, always at the same time as an end, never merely as a means. We will now see whether this can be carried out in practice.

Let us keep to our previous examples. . First, . .. the man who contemplates suicide will ask himself whether

his action could be compatible with the Idea of humanity as an end

1}2 PART II MORAL THEORIES

. . der to escape from a painful situ. himself in or . . . ., elf. If he damages O merel'\l as a means to maintain a in i s • . . of a perso .., ation he is makmg ~se ·11 h end of his life. But a human being is ' f ffa1rs tt t e h tolerable state o a . t be used merely as a means: e rnust not a thing-not so_methbmg o arded as an end in himself. Hence I

. . 11 h. s acuons e reg . b . . always m a

1 h being in my· own person, y maiming . d' se of a uman . . ,

cannot tspo . . h' (I must here forego a more precise defini-. t'ng or k1llmg im. • d' corrup I • ' . . 1 h t uld forestall any m1sunderstan ing-for · of this prmc1p e t a wo • uon h . r mbs amputated to save myself or exposing my example, as to avmg I • h' d' . life to anger m or , d · der to preserve 1t and so on-t 1s 1scussion be. longs to ethics proper.) . · .

econ y, . .. S dl the man who has in mind making a false promise to others will see at once that he is intending to make use of another person merely as a means to an end which that person does not share. For the person whom I seek to use for my own purposes by such a promise cannot possibly agree with my way of treating him, and so cannot himself share the end of the action. This incompatibility with the principle of duty to others can be seen more distinctly when we bring in examples of attacks on the freedom and property of others. For then it is manifest that a violator of the rights of h~man bei~gs i_ntends to use the person of others merely as a means Without takmg mto ~onsideration that, as rational beings, they must al"'.ays at the same time be valued as ends-that is, treated only as beings who must themselves be able to share in the end of the very same action.

Thirdly it is n t h h . . . ' · · ·

0 enoug t at an action not conflict with human-ity m our own person d • . .

end N h . as an en m itself: it must also harmonize with this . ow t ere are m huma · t . . form part of nat , lll Y capacities for greater perfection that ure s purpose for h . . .,.. neglect these can perh b umanity 1n our own person . .10 ity as an end in itself bapts e c~mpatible With the survival of human-

, u not with th p • Fourthly, . . . the natural d e romotion of that end. .

own perfect happiness N enh that all human beings seek is their · ow t e hu • · ·f everybody contributed n th' man race might indeed exist 1

· 0 mg to the h · h ~ame _time refrained from deliber _app1~~ss of others but at t. e

mg with humanity as an end . . ately 1mpa1nng it. This harmomz- . d in ztselfw ld h tive an not positive unl ou , owever be merely nega-' ess everyon 1 ' can, to further the ends of h e a so endeavours, as far as he d . h. ot ers For th . an en m imself must if th' . . . e ends of any person who is , is idea is t h also, as far as possible, my ends. 0 ave its full effect in me, be