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Satire and Religious Tolerance: How Acceptance/ Rejection of Satire is Determined by the Capacity of Religious and Political Forces to Agree on a Modern Civic Contract

Remi Piet Gulf Studies Centre, Qatar University, Qatar

[email protected]

Abstract

The January 2015 assassination at the Charlie Hebdo offices and the dozen ensuing terrorist attacks in France over the last eighteen months are the manifestation of a structural opposition between a civic identity whose most controversial manifestati on is political satire and a religious identity hijacked by radicals. This paper explains how political satire is deeply entrenched in French culture and how it has been used as a democratization and liberating tool by a society eager to counterbalance the exist- ing religious establishment. Similarly, it then addresses satire in the Muslim world and underlines that, instead of being considered a tool of the weak against the powerful, it is perceived as a neo-colonial manifestation of an exogenously imposed political order that ostracizes the citizen from his legitimate religious belief. Instead of a liberating instrument, it is perceived as attacking the foundation of a religion that many see as their refuge against authoritarian elites. This paper then analyses the historical evolu- tion of Islamic political activism. After highlighting the existence of satire and religious representation in Islam in some of its earliest societal orders, this paper argues that the Muslim community under the leadership of its Ulema has been fractured into a range of different scholastic interpretations of Islam resulting into different accepta- tion of liberal civic orders. The reaction towards Charlie Hebdo and the strong/weak condemning or silent/vocal approbation are representative of their contamination by radicalism. This paper finally demonstrates that the rejection of satire is symptomatic of the incomplete evolution of the state and the weakness of national and transnational

*  The author would like to acknowledge the outstanding preliminary research work carried out by Souzan Krdli, a graduate research assistant at the Gulf Studies Center at Qatar University.

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institutions. Addressing the reforming of Muslim institutions in France itself, this paper argues that there is no incompatibility between Islam and a liberal republican order guaranteeing freedom of expression and satire.

Keywords

French republicanism – satire – political Islam – identity – institutions

Introduction: Charlie Hebdo as the Heir of an Historical French Tradition of Irreverence and Freedom of Expression for Individual Citizens against Established Elites

After the assassination of the editorial team of Charlie Hebdo in January 2015, the French reacted through the organization of massive demonstrations all across the country, gathering almost 4 million people in support of the French satirical magazine and freedom of speech. Those rallies can be considered as a major event in French modern history and a reaffirmation of the country’s Republican values of ‘Freedom, Equality and Solidarity’ despite necessary societal reforms to integrate better cosmopolitan minorities.1 Yet, this show of strength has been regularly misunderstood outside of Europe and especially in the Middle East. In some part of the ulema, this reaction has been used to support claims that France in particular, but also many countries in the ‘West’, were vigorously anti-Islam.2 If certain irresponsible, and politically motivated, declarations from a presidential candidate in the United States as well as from xenophobic parties in Europe have been nourishing an anti-Islam campaign, they should not be associated with the popular uprising in January 2015 or other similar demonstrations since.

When the streets of Paris were overtaken by ‘Charlies’, all of them brandish- ing ‘Je Suis Charlie’ placards, it did not mean that the overwhelming majority of the population were diehard fans of the magazine and its often abusive and vulgar drawings. Nor were the hundreds of thousands of ‘Je Suis Ahmed’ plac- ard carriers, all Muslims because they were displaying the name of the French Muslim police officer who attempted to stop two barbarians from murdering

1  Jeremy Jennings, ‘Citizenship, republicanism and multiculturalism in contemporary France.’ British Journal of Political Science, 30:04 (2000), 575–598.

2  Sören Kierkegaard, ‘Fear and Trembling: The Vicissitudes of Global Terror.’ Crisis in the Global Mediasphere: Desire, Displeasure and Cultural Transformation (2016), 193.

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defenceless cartoonists in the name of his religion. In fact, many of them were agnostics, Christians and even Jews. They represented the very wealth of the secular republic established in France and that radicals abhor: this capacity to go beyond confessions and religious disagreement, define a common political project and create a civic identity that transcends religious beliefs.3

The French society is extremely diverse, enriched by the largest Muslim and Jewish communities in Europe. In January 2015, in all major French cit- ies, rabbis, priests and imams marched together in defence of freedom, and the right to express any opinion—however irreverent it may be—and chal- lenge all ideologies. Despite the imperfections of the French society includ- ing the recurrent and structural issue with the representation of minorities in politics, media and corporate establishments, the foundation of the French Republic are clear and based on the Universal Declaration of Human Rights in which all men and women are equal despite their different origins or religious background. These remain the guidelines infusing the policies aimed at the integration of minorities in the French society.4

The French Republic has been built on a unique relation between civic institutions and religious establishments with a clear separation between both spheres since the victory of the Tiers Etats over the joint forces of the clergy and the aristocrats during the French Revolution of 1789. The 1905 law pro- hibiting public financing of religious buildings and places of cult further rein- forced this separation.5 In many countries, religious figures and prophets are idealized and their words are used as guidance for both judicial and political decisions. In the United States even, political, judicial and financial institu- tions proclaim the transcendence of a religious order with the inclusion of the sentence “In God we Trust” on bank notes and official seals. France however proclaims the superiority of Reason and Law as roots of its social contract and political order. French institutions and decision-making processes are thus deeply entrenched into the teaching of the 17th and 18th century philosopher such as Rene Descartes, Denis Diderot, Jean Jacques Rousseau and François- Marie Arouet, better known by his nom de plume Voltaire.

These republican foundations do not negate the existence of God but enti- tles each individual citizen with the right to associate with a specific religion or

3  Eoin Daly, ‘Laïcité in the Private Sphere? French Religious Liberty After the Baby-Loup Affair.’ Oxford Journal of Law and Religion (2016), rwv065.

4  Matthias Koenig, ‘Incorporating Muslim migrants in Western nation states—a compari- son of the United Kingdom, France, and Germany.’ After Integration (Springer: Fachmedien Wiesbaden, 2015), pp. 43–58.

5  Herman T. Salton, ‘Unholy Union: History, Politics and the Relationship between Church and State in Modern France.’ Review of European Studies, 4:5 (2012), 135.

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not believe in any transcendental force. The language of the French Republic is based on reasoning and critical thinking, both compatible with religious belief, but preventing the ostracization of a minority or an individual because of his personal claims and faith. Descartes’ masterpiece, the Metaphysical Meditations, was subtitled ‘In which the existence of God and the immortality of the soul are demonstrated’.6 Its central principle, I think therefore I am, was a glorification of philosophy and reasoning as a tool and proof of existence. The primacy of critical thinking above the learning and repetition of the words of any prophet, hence desacralized, is the central structural of the French soci- ety and republican order. Hence the banner ‘I think therefore I am. . . . Charlie’ which was raised on the statue in the middle of the Place de la Republique in Paris after the assassination of the caricaturist in January 2015.

Satire as a Democratic Tool for the Weak against the ‘Establishments’, whether Religious or Political

Was Charlie Hebdo excessive? Absolutely. But political and social satire is by essence excessive and Charlie Hebdo’s cartoonists have proudly waved this excess as their coat of arms in the typical French tradition dating back to even before the French Revolution. Throughout the Middle Ages, French kings were accompanied by their buffoon, a comical character whose purpose was to amuse the courtesans and who had permission to mock the king himself.7 This tradition lasted throughout the Renaissance and up until the reign of Louis XIV. But it has its roots in the very cradle of European civilisation, from Greece to Rome, from Aristophanes to Seneca. Aristophanes in particular is still known for his acidic portrait of Socrates entitled ‘The Clouds’.

When the French kings banned the buffoons, French society replaced them with writers.8 Among the most adored and studied writers in French schools are Moliere and Jean de La Fontaine. Both authors mocked the powerful, the zealots as well as the bourgeoisie through comical plays or fables. Their work now makes up the very DNA of French literature. Jean de la Fontaine hid behind the familiar and sympathetic faces of animals to sharpen his criticism

6  René Descartes and John Cottingham, René Descartes: Meditations on first philosophy: With selections from the objections and replies (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013).

7  Vivien Lovejoy Rubin, Clowns in nineteenth century French literature: buffoons, pierrots, and saltimbanques (University of California, 1970).

8  John H.M. Salmon, ‘French satire in the late sixteenth Century.’ The Sixteenth Century Journal (1975), 57–88.

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of the French establishment and in particular the Clergy.9 Those short stories were often accompanied by drawings mimicking the physical characteristics of kings and the leading political and religious figures of the time. The French Revolution strengthened this tradition when satire fueled the rallying popu- lar forces and the mockeries against Marie Antoinette’s lavish lifestyle while Parisians died of hunger.10

The importance of satire has increased over the last 20 years through the emergence of the Guignol de l’Info, a daily puppet show screened on French TV channel Canal Plus, and considered nothing short of a cultural institution in France. During the 1995 and 2002 presidential elections, the satiric show was often cited as having influenced the election of Jacques Chirac, who was regularly portrayed as more sympathetic than his opponent Edouard Balladur, frequently represented with the traits of Louis XVI, the fat and dull king even- tually beheaded during the French revolution.11

Similarly, Le Canard Enchaine, a much-appreciated weekly newspaper, details the abuse and petty behaviour of the French political class, mocking them through puns and caricatures, regularly unveiling corruption scandals or illegal practices. Satire, whether portrayed by Charlie Hebdo, Le Canard Enchaine or the Guignols de l’Info, is perceived in France as an enjoyable and much-needed counter power. Through playful, simplistic drawings, they con- tribute to the democratic game and the healthiness of society, criticising mul- tinational corporations’ abuses and US foreign policy, and indiscriminately taunting all ideologies and religions.

This lack of oversight and ability to criticize and mock is what authori- tarian regimes, whether from religious inspiration or not, fear and would rather impede. The freedom of expression granted in the French Republican system is not without boundarie however. The limits to freedom of expres- sion and satire in France had been debated regularly and especially before the Paris attacks, in the context of the xenophobic comments regularly made by former stand-up comedian—now an advocate for the xenopho- bic National Front party Dieudonne M’Bala M’Bala, as well as in the context of open criticism towards different religions, in particular Semitism but

9  Serieys, Jacques. Jean de La Fontaine, poète engagé et libre, poète du peuple, 17 juillet 2016. Available at http://www.gauchemip.org/spip.php?article11207.

10  Ernest Flagg Henderson, Symbol and satire in the French Revolution (GP Putnam’s Sons, 1912).

11  Annie Collovald and Erik Neveu, ‘Les «Guignols» ou la caricature en abime.’ Mots, 48:1 (1996), 87–112.

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also at times Islam.12 The limits to satire are clearly stated by the freedom of the press law of 1881, prohibiting ‘defamatory or insulting [comments], that would encourage discrimination, hatred or violence against a person or group of persons because of their place of origin, ethnicity or absence of ethnicity, nationality, race or specific religion’.

Charlie Hebdo mostly treated all religions and ideologies alike. Every politi- cal party, minister or presidential candidate has regularly been a target of the publication but never did the publication call openly for any sort of violence. It is not anti-Islam as much as it is anti-religion and more broadly anti-establish- ment. As one of his author Bernard Verlhac, killed in the shootings, commonly said the magazine defended its ‘right to blasphemy’ against all.13 As a result the publication was sued 13 times by a range of Catholic organizations in com- parison with only once by a Muslim community. Therefore, if for the purpose of this paper, the analysis is focused on the compatibility of Political Islam with French Republican and secular values whose most extreme manifesta- tion is the historic satire pushed to its paroxysm by Charlie Hebdo, one should remember that a similar analysis could be made in regards to all religion alike. The reason why this paper focuses on Islam is the recent rise of more extreme forms of the religion and conservatism of societies in Islamic countries as opposed to a relative liberalization of other religions such as Catholicism.

Freedom of Speech and Satire in Political Islam

Yet satire, especially in its literary form, has also a long tradition in the Arabian Peninsula predating Islam. As a matter of fact, Souk Okaz, an annual market gathering in the 6th century is most known for its poetry festival and competi- tion held in modern day Saudi Arabia. Poems that were considered master- pieces were then hung on the walls of Al Ka’ba to commemorate them and their authors. The themes of these poems covered many subjects including political satire. This practice became so popular, that ‘poetic duels’ became a weapon of choice to settle disputes. Some of the most famous satirists of

12  Gholam Khiabany and Milly Williamson, ‘Free speech and the market state: Race, media and democracy in new liberal times.’ European Journal of Communication, 30:5 (2015), 571–586.

13  Jane Weston Vauclair, ‘Local Laughter, Global Polemics: Understanding Charlie Hebdo.’ European Comic Art, 8:1 (2015), 6–14.

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this era, whose poems are still taught in schools across Arab countries include Zuhair bin Abi Salma, Al Nabigha Al Dhubiani and others.14

The arrival of a new ideology that transcends tribal connections in the form of a novel religion, Islam, had naturally an indelible impact on the social and political practices as well as the literary scene in Arabia and beyond. But before delving into forms of expression in the ‘Muslim world’15, it is essential to under- stand two tenets of the Muslim psyche namely the ummah and the Prophet Mohamed. The word ‘Islam’ in Arabic is derived from the same root as the word ‘submission’. In this sense, Islam is a collectivist religion that requires the ego and personal desires of the individual to be transcended in favour of the community’s, or ummah’s, greater interest. Its teachings are based on regulating the lives of its followers in a manner that ensures earthly harmony while focusing on the afterlife, dedicating daily time and energy to achieve a higher place in ‘janna’ or heaven. The principle of submission is so entrenched among Muslims that teachings and fatwas by clergy oftentimes go unques- tioned in spite of the fact that Islam does not have an official clerical establish- ment, at least Sunni Islam, and each Muslim is tasked with responsibility of seeking knowledge.

It is, therefore, not surprising that a Muslim is also called ‘abd Allah’, which translates literally to “the slave of Allah”. Muslims are to pursue worldly inter- ests mainly for achieving the aforementioned objective on a personal level and to ensure the continuation of the message of Islam on a wider communal level. Therefore personal desires and worldly ambitions are irrelevant. Wealth is to be pursued and to be used mainly as a vehicle for funding Islamic purposes. Marriage and procreation are seen as a medium to expand the ummah and bring up potential soldiers of Islam. Hegghammer16 writes an excellent piece analysing a recent phenomenon he calls ‘Muslim foreign fighters’. According to the author, these are individuals who transcend traditional affiliations such as nationality, kinship, ethnicity, tribal, or organizational occupation (military, political parties or communities). Instead, they are connected by being part of a pan-Islamist insurgency.

14  Taha Hussain, On Jahiliya Poetry (Dar Al Nadwa: 1926) [in Arabic]. 15  Like any other broad term attempting to group numerous countries, races, ideologies

and sects of faith under one banner, the terms ‘Muslim world’ is decidedly vague and oftentimes controversial. The author uses it in this paper to denote the common meaning referring to the collective beliefs of a pan-Islamist population.

16  Thomas Hegghammer, ‘The Rise of Muslim Foreign Fighters’, International Security, 35:3 (Winter 2010/11), 53–94.

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Being part of a common ummah is hardly compatible with the perceived individualistic notion of freedom of speech. Religion is also the common link between all and is considered the belonging and right of even the poorest, not the exclusivity of an establishment. The place of religion is therefore diametri- cally opposite to the perception of a privileged and corrupted clergy during the French Revolution. Satire in France was built in reaction to these estab- lishments often legitimated by religious authority and therefore against the power of religion. Blasphemy became almost an act of revolution while for the common follower of political islam it is an attack to the very sacred link unifying individuals, often under the yoke of exogenous and colonial estab- lished authoritarian political regimes. Satire in the West criticizing Islam is thus interpreted as a further insult of neocolonial inspiration.

In addition to the revered position of the community over the individual, another central element to understanding Islam is the place accorded to its prophet Mohamed. The person, life and deeds of the Prophet represent a cor- ner stone of Islam. The majority of Muslims belong to the Sunni branch of Islam. The word ‘Sunni’ is derived from the word ‘sunnah’, which in Arabic means path or method. Accordingly Sunni Muslims follow the ‘sunnah’ of the Prophet. Therefore any attack or critique of his personality and/or deeds is seen as a direct attack on any and every Muslim who follows the prophet as a role model in their daily lives. Although many of these deeds are not consid- ered socially acceptable and downright illegal in some countries today, such as the marriage to a nine-year old girl, Muslims refrain from critiquing such actions relegating them to the exceptional circumstances and processes that the Prophet had to endure to ensure the dissemination of his message. Other persons that have acquired a revered position in Islam include the fam- ily of the Prophet, including his wives and daughters, his companions and contemporary supporters, and other prophets preceding Islam but who are considered to carry the same message such as Ibrahim, Mousa, Issa etc.

In light of this the caricatures published by Charlie Hebdo were deemed as highly offensive to Muslims not just because they mock the Prophet, which in itself is unimaginable to most Muslims, but it is more so because the majority of Muslims believe that their faith prohibits the personifica- tion of the Prophet Mohamed, in addition to all other prophets. Ulema have published several fatwas over the past century banning the depiction of the Prophet through drawings, personification in movies and other forms of media. These fatwas are based on a number of Sharia sources includ- ing consensus among Ulama and sayings of the prophets. The consensus is illustrated in some of the fatwas issued by prominent religious institu- tions such as Al Azhar 1968, Islamic Research Academy 1972, Dar Al Ifta in

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Egypt 1980.17 Moreover, the Prophet said ‘whoever deliberately lied using my name should anticipate a seat of fire’. Ulama use this Hadith (saying of the Prophet) to prohibit any depiction of the Prophet that is false and misleading. What’s noteworthy in the source of the ban is how recent the fatwa is, dating to less than 50 years ago. Additionally, there is no sacred text that explicitly bans the depiction of the Prophet or any other revered Islamic figure.

Political Institutions and Islam

In spite of the widely accepted and cited fatwa banning the depiction of the Prophet, there is no official clerical order in Islam. Shiism is often cited as an exception to this, however it is important to remember that the concept of Wilayat al-Faqih, arguing that the Faqih has religious as well as political duties, was relatively recently conceived by Ruhollah Khomeini in the 70’s. Moroever, the majority of Shia, incuding those in Iran, follow the teachings of the Iraq- based Al-Sayyid Ali al-Husseini al-Sistani in terms of their daily religious activi- ties. To elaborate more on the elusive nature of the dynamics between political Islam and state institutions, this section will first review the different academic approaches to studying political Islam and then go over a brief history of the evolution of Islam tracing it back to the decline of the Ottoman Empire. It will finally end with a survey of case studies of Islamic political activism in the contemporary Muslim world.

Political activism in the name of Islam, or Islamism, within the context of media/journalism, has come to be associated with sensational political devel- opments such as the hawkish policies of Saudi Arabia and Iran. Even more contentious is the prominent coverage attracted by non-state actors such as ISIS, Al Shabab, Boko Haram, etc. However, the study of political Islam from an academic perspective is far from being definitive and conclusive. This is the case for two reasons. The first is because the study of political Islam as a distinct academic discipline is arguably a new field that arose over the last decades of the twentieth century. The second reason is closely linked to the first as the novelty of this field alongside the contentious natures and roles of religion and states, let alone the combination of both, have resulted in a plethora of literature on how to approach political Islam.

In an attempt to eschew vague concepts, Hirschkind18 states that the term political Islam has been used to distinguish between personal values and prac-

17  Fatwas against personification of Prophet. http://fatwa.islamweb.net/ramadan/index .php?page=ShowFatwa&lang=A&Id=44469&Option=FatwaId.

18  Charles Hirschkind, ‘What is political Islam?’, MERIP (1997).

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tices of Islam as a religion, and the seemingly conspicuous permeation of reli- gion into social and political sectors that have been dominated and regulated by institutions of modern states. This emerging form of activism has been stud- ied through the lens of various fields with varying levels of success. Al-Anani19 suggests that political Islam has been traditionally studied through three main approaches. The first one is the essentialist view, which sees Islamism as a rigid ideology intrinsically opposed to any form of modernity and inherently at odds with it. The second form is the contextualist view, which regards Islamism as a response to socio-economic crises such as increased urbaniza- tion, unemployment, poverty, corruption, etc. This school sees Islamism as mostly a reactionary and uninventive movement. It also fails to appreciate the ideological and institutional component of Islamism. The last approach makes use of the social movement theory, which considers Islamism as a multifac- eted phenomenon that has to be viewed through institutional and ideational lenses. This approach looks at the political process, political opportunity struc- ture, resource mobilization theory and identity cultural framing.

Ismail20 is particularly critical of two approaches, namely the historical master narratives of Islamism and the sociological and political economy approaches. The author argues that the problem with the first approach is its static and idealized view of Islam as a belief system; whereas, the second approach perceives Islamic activism as an expression of socio-economic frus- tration. According to the author, both approaches fail to acknowledge the importance of channels of action without which mobilization would not be possible. This gap is addressed by Wickham21 in her analysis of the expansion of the Muslim Brotherhood in the 1980’s and its subsequent fragmentation in the 1990’s as she extensively looks at the opportunities that led to the rise of the Muslim Brotherhood in that period. To achieve this, Wickham22 argues that the study of social movements, which developed in the West, can be valu- ably applied to studying Islam-inspired activism in the aforementioned context. Therefore, she views Islamism, as a social movement in Egypt, as a homogeneous expression of collective objectives that influences its external environment. However, the author overlooks the internal dynamics and the influence of external factors on Islamism as a social movement.

19  Khalil Al-Anani, What is political Islam? (Definition, Features and How to Study It), 2016, [lecture notes].

20  Salwa Ismail, Rethinking Islamist Politics (London: I.B. Tauris, 2006). 21  Carrie Rosfesky Wickham, Mobilizing Islam: Religion, Activism and Political Change in

Egypt (Columbia University Press, 2002). 22  Ibid.

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Bayat23 offers a more nuanced understanding of social movements and argues that the perception of the cohesive nature of social movements is deeply flawed as it fails to recognize temporal, geographical, cultural and indi- vidual changes in understanding social movements. He adds that objectives of social movements can often have a multitude of meanings to different par- ticipants. This particularly resonates under autocratic regimes where modes of communication are restricted. This leads to what the author dubs as ‘imagined solidarity’ where shared interests are constructed and used to mobilize masses as in the case of the Iranian Revolution of 1979.

While the the aforementioned literature prove that it would be difficult to limit political Islam to a particular approach, they also highlight the necessity to view it as an intertwined system that is composed of agents (both leaders and participants), ideologies, resources, and socio-economic and political con- texts. None of these components are static or passive. As a matter of fact, polit- ical Islam is a product of its environment as much as it is an agent of change in that same environment.

Emergence of Islamism as a Political Order

The emergence of Islamism can be traced back to March 1924 when Mustafa Kemal Ataturk announced the abolishment of the Ottoman caliphate. This event preceded the establishment of many nation states in the Middle East and coincided with the proliferation and dissemination of various intellectual waves attempting to marry the concept of a nation state with Islamic thought. Among these intellectuals, highly influential in the 20th century, is Sayyid Abul Ala Maududi who is considered as one of the earliest advocates of the creation of an Islamic state. Prior to this date, the notion of an Islamic state did not exist as common forms of government were caliphates and sultanates. Other influential scholars include Hassan al-Banna, founder of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, and Ruhollah Khomeini, founder of the Islamic Republic of Iran

The most notable element among these intellectual currents is arguably their diversity in terms of objectives and means of achieving those objectives, as well as the lack of a strict/clear political structure- at least within Sunni Islam. In other words, Islam has no political ethos. As a case in point, al-Banna sought to work within the existing political framework while promoting social values based on Islamic teachings through the creation of local associations

23  Asef Bayat, ‘Islamism and Social Movement Theory’, Third World Quarterly, 26:6, 891–908.

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aimed at the professional and educated Egyptian middle class. Khomeini, on the other hand, pursued a revolutionary track by mobilizing masses from across the country, overthrowing the government of the incumbent Shah, Mohammed Reza Pahlavi, and replacing it with an Islamic Republic. In addi- tion to diversity in manifestation of political Islam, these two examples point to the somewhat elusive and malleable nature of Islamism, which easily lends itself to different interpretations under various socio-political environments.

As this paper shows, a modern political structure of the ummah has not been clearly defined and has, therefore, taken numerous shapes depending on case-specific factors. Islamic political activism has for the most part operated within modern political structures either by working directly with existing secular governments, such as Egypt and Turkey, or adopting a revolutionary approach by overthrowing the incumbent system but implementing mod- ern political elements. The latter is applicable to the Islamic republic of Iran which replaced the previous monarchy with an Islamic republic. The Islamic Republic’s constitution is based on the French Fifth Republic highlighting the fact that political Islam cannot claim to provide a comprehensive homog- enous political structure independent of modern nation states. Therefore, the ummah remains a fluid transnational concept undermining nation states yet being restricted by them. This oftentimes results in a conflict between the val- ues of the Islamic ummah and the nation state especially as far as some civil and political rights are concerned. The freedom of speech or expression is a case in point. While many governments, especially those belonging to liberal democracies, protect every citizen’s right to freedom of speech and expression as an integral part of their civil and human rights, this concept is oftentimes is at odds with Islamic values that prioritize respect and communal harmony. The freedom of speech for many observant Muslims ends where the absolute dogma of veneration of sacred figures begins. Some religious schools, such as Wahhabism, not only forbid the critique of religious figures, but also obligate Muslims to submit to their leaders even when the latter are deemed impious and repressive. This is justified to the populace by the need to maintain peace and unison. Needless to say, the indirect reason is to protect monarchies from other claimants to the throne. In such an environment, criticism of both the religious and political establishments are equated with heresy and are punish- able by sentences that include prison as well as capital punishment.

The incompatibility/tension between the ummah and the nation state do not only encroach on civil rights, but also challenge the authority of state insti- tutions and their claim to the monopoly of violence. In an ummah that tran- scends borders and sees only religious figures as having an ultimate authority,

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secular laws and institutions become irrelevant giving rise to extrajudicial punishment. This takes us back to Hegghammer’s Muslim foreign fighters who see themselves as divine agents and justify the use of violence by pledging allegiance to a transnational radical organization. It is important to note here that such radicalism has been widely condemned by moderate Islamic institu- tions. For example, the Organization of Islamic Cooperation24 has previously condemned various terrorist attacks under the banner of Islam. Moreover, over 200 American Muslim leaders25 signed a joint statement, in addition to more than 400,000 Muslim scholars from Bangladesh26 and 70,000 from India27 issued fatwas all condemning various acts of terrorism across the globe by dif- ferent violent Islamist groups. These statements and fatwas call for tolerance and peaceful coexistence, and express sympathy with families of victims. In spite of these condemnations, the appeal of radicalization remains very high among those seeking an alternative to the traditional nation state.

Islam as a Vehicle for Contemporary Political Expression

The manifestation of Islamism today covers an even broader array of politi- cal thought. While there is an inconclusive debate about the different types of Islamists, it is possible to categorize them according to several general streams including moderates i.e. groups that accept pluralism and tolerance, and work within the existing political system and fundamentalists i.e. those who value a literal interpretation of sacred texts and support an entirely Islamic system of governance. Tunisia’s Ennahda and Egypt’s Muslim Brotherhood are examples of the moderate group. The fundamentalist category can be further divided into nonviolent and violent radicalized groups. An example of the former is the Wahhabi clerics who advocate a ‘pure’ form of Islam as practiced in its early days. As for the latter, non-state violent actors have emerged in vari- ous majorly Muslim countries since the end of the 20th century until today following conflict and instability. A prime example would be the ISIS and Al Qaeda.

24  OIC Statements, http://www.oic-oci.org/oicv3/topic/?t_id=11295&t_ref=4439&lan=en. 25  A Joint Muslim Statement, http://orlandostatement.com. 26  Bangladesh Fatwa, http://www.firstpost.com/world/terrorism-is-haram-bangladesh-

islamic-scholars-clerics-issue-fatwa-2842758.html. 27  India Fatwa, http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/asia/70000-indian-muslim-

clerics-issue-fatwa-against-isis-the-taliban-al-qaida-and-other-terror-groups-a6768191 .html.

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The creation of a nation state governed by Sharia/Islamic principles argu- ably is the result of popular frustration among Muslims with existing political systems that have chronically hindered economic development and repressed civil and political rights. As Roy28 puts it, political Islam has not drastically altered the political map of the Muslim world, apart from the Iranian revolu- tion over three decades ago. This has resulted in the creation of a mystified alternative where a political system that applies Sharia would take Muslims back to the prosperous days of early caliphs. However the perception that governments of countries like Saudi Arabia and Iran who claim to rule accord- ing to Sharia but continue to be criticized by their constituency gave way to the rise of non-state actors who exploited conflict in countries such as Afghanistan, Iraq and Syria and attract followers by proclaiming to raise the true banner of Islam. In spite of this diversity and downright vagueness, no other ideol- ogy is as capable of galvanizing masses and stirring passionate activism in the Muslim world as a revolutionary message framed in Islamic wording.29 This is probably best exemplified by looking at what are often considered first exer- cise of democracy in the Arab world following the Arab Uprising when Islamist parties won sweeping votes in parliamentary election in Tunisia in 201130 and presidential election in Egypt in 2012.31

Against this tumultuous background, the use of satire as a self-reflective tool has been met defensively and rejected aggressively especially when the unify- ing identity and aspirational alternative for many Muslims is based on their faith. It is particularly problematic when trying to fit political Islam inside the republican structure due to different ontological and epistemological perspec- tives adopted by those groups. Liberal democracies value freedom of expres- sion and consider it as a manifestation of human rights while the ummah follows collectivist values that are prioritized over individual rights. The following sections examine how some moderate and fundamentalist political groups operate within the political order.

28  Olivier Roy, The Failure of Political Islam, (Harvard University Press: 1994). 29  Graham Fuller, ‘Future of Political Islam’, Foreign Affairs, 81:2 (Mar/Apr2002), 48 60. 30  BBC, Tunisia’s Islamist Ennahda party wins historic poll, 2011, http://www.bbc.com/news/

world-africa-15487647. 31  BBC, Profile: Egypt’s Mohammed Morsi, 2015, http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-

east-18371427.

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The Emergence of Moderate Islamic Order Compatible with Political Structure

Egypt and the Muslim Brotherhood In spite of occasional run-ins with the government, the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt has participated in the political system by running for parliamentary positions and seeking to increase its political influence without seeking a revo- lutionary track towards change.32 This stems from its founding father’s belief in a reformist moderate approach as opposed to radically ousting the regime.33 After the fall of Mubarak’s regime, Morsi, the Muslim Brotherhood candidate, fared marginally better than his opponents securing the presidency, albeit briefly. About a year into his presidency, Morsi was ousted by a military coup and forced out of power, an event perceived by many Egyptian as a return to dictatorship. Al-Anani34 argues that Morsi’s failure was the result of a number of shortcomings on the side of the party including the absence of a political program that would have appeased the prevalent revolutionary zeitgeist. The nature of this regime forced the co-optation of moderate Islamist parties such as the Brotherhood, who were later expelled when they attempted to replace the existing repressive system. The party remains banned in Egypt today, in addition to many other Arab countries.

Muslim Brotherhood in Qatar and Kuwait Islamism in the Arab Gulf has unique characteristics differentiating it from other movements in the Mashreq or Maghreb. This could be attributed to a variety of reasons. First, the peculiar structure of a rentier state means that the royal family has almost undisputed authority in decision-making including domestic and foreign policies, and wealth distribution. This means that deci- sion makers in the Gulf can unequivocally support or repress Islamist move- ments by funding them and/or providing them with a platform to spread their ideas. Moreover, as the Arabian Peninsula is the birthplace of Islam, the con- cept of applying Islamic teachings to all aspects of life, including the political sphere, is almost inevitable. This can be seen by the emergence of indigenous Islamist ideologies such as Wahhabism and the popular support, depend- ing on political and historical contexts, of other regional movements such as the Brotherhood. This idea, however, could give the flawed perception that

32  Khalil al-Anani, ‘Upended Path: The Rise and Fall of Muslim Brotherhood’, Middle East Journal, 69:4 (Autumn 2015), 527–543.

33  Ibid. 34  Ibid.

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Islamism is homogenous across the Arabian Peninsula. This is far from true as each country has its own unique political, economic and social structures, in spite of the apparent similarities.

The accounts of the emergence of the Brotherhood in Qatar and Kuwait show how branches of the same organization underwent different experiences resulting in different outcomes. In the example of Qatar, Brotherhood mem- bers from the country itself and form neighbouring countries are still present and enjoy unprecedented communication privileges such as Qaradawi, who has been able to vocally support protesting Arabs against secular regimes. In spite of that, the Brotherhood does not have a formal or legal presence in Qatar. The case of Kuwait is different in the sense that the Brotherhood move- ment, namely the Islamic Constitutional Movement (ICM), is trying to dodge government wrath by working with other non-Islamist movements through state-legitimized channels such as the parliament.

The second difference that could be drawn from both cases is that the Brotherhood didn’t seem to flourish among the local population of Qatar as the prominent figures are mostly political refugees and dissidents from other Arab countries. As a matter of fact the movement found itself so irrelevant that it decided to dissolve itself. The Brotherhood in Kuwait, on the other hand, can be said to be home-grown because of the social space that allowed the Social Reform Society to exist and the Iraqi invasion which mobilized Kuwaiti youth politically. This, again, resulted in different features of the Brotherhood in both countries. What is notable in both cases is that both organizations share simi- lar strategies of not antagonizing the political leadership and working with them either to institute reforms or to convey popular messages through vari- ous media channels. This is also similar to other Brotherhood approaches in the region.

Turkey’s Justice and Development Party Turkey’s Justice and Development Party ( JDP) is the country’s main Islamist party founded in 2001 and has been in government since 2002.35 The success of the party’s Islamic politics is noteworthy in the state founded by Ataturk, who announced about a century ago the end of the Ottoman caliphate in lieu of a secular republic. The ability of the JDP to form a successful reformist narrative is partly attributed to the competitive nature of politics in Turkey, unlike Middle Eastern countries that have been more prone to conflict and

35  Günes Murat Tezcür, ‘The Moderation Theory Revisited: The Case of Islamic Political Actors’, Party Politics, 16:1 (2010), 69–88.

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tension.36 The JDP has evolved from a more exclusionary Islamist party that was established in 1970 in order to succeed politically and win a broader base of support.37 After facing state repression and fearing the alienation of key state institutions, such as the military and the judiciary, the JDP adopted more centrist policies, worked closer with secular groups and espoused more liberal and market-driven values in lieu of the implementation of Sharia. The party’s objective was to establish a popular base for moderate change while working with the regime. This is in a sense similar to the Muslim Brotherhood, who never sought to radically overthrow the government. Based on this, Tezcur reaches three conclusions.38 First, inclusion into the political system helps more radical groups to lean towards reformism. Second, moderation does not always have a positive effect as it could backfire within the context of repres- sive regimes that are ultimately maintained rather than challenged by moder- ate groups. Third, change in a party’s ideology is directly linked to changes in its political behavior.

Tunisia’s Ennahda The epitome of moderate Islamist politics and pragmatism is probably Tunisia’s main Islamist party Ennahda. The party emerged to the political scene in the early 80’s in reaction to the repressive and exclusive politics of the secular government.39 Similar to other authoritarian leaders in the Middle East, then President Ben Ali severely restricted the movement members’ access to politi- cal office and other public life opportunities.

After its resurgence to politics after 2011, Ennahda has sought to merge dem- ocratic principles while promoting Islam at a grassroots level by creating jobs, providing educational access and allowing freedom of expression40. According to the party’s President, Rached Ghannouchi, the party looks up to the Turkish JDP model as an inspiration while realizing the particularity of the Tunisian case. Probably going a step further, Ennahda announced recently in May 2016 that it was separating religious activities from politics and reintroducing it as a civil democratic party.41 Supporters of this move cite is an example of how Islam, democracy and civil values are compatible.

36  Ibid. 37  Ibid. 38  Ibid. 39  Monica Marks, Tunisia’s Ennahda: Rethinking Islamism in the context of ISIS and the

Egyptian coup, Brookings, (2015). 40  Ibid. 41  Sarah Souli, Why Tunisia’s top Islamist party rebranded itself, Al Monito (2016).

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The Emergence of Fundamental Political Groups Incompatible with Civic Institutions

Wahhabism in Saudi Arabia The establishment of Wahhabism in the Arabian Peninsula precedes the Saudi Kingdom, as a modern state, by a couple of decades. The ideology was intro- duced through the thoughts of Muhammad ibn Abd al-Wahhab in the 18th century.42 The ideals of ibn Abd al-Wahhab are based on the stricter Hanbali school of thought, which promotes rejection of innovation in favor of a purist doctrine derived from the sacred texts, the Quran and Hadith, and deeds of the Prophet Muhammad and his contemporaries. Long43 differentiates between Wahhabism as a religious ideology and Wahhabism as a political doctrine. He argues that ibn Abd al-Wahhab was essentially a figure with a religious mes- sage based on monotheism and rejection of innovation. Nonetheless, the polit- ical implications were evident starting from the ideology’s early days as it had a unifying effect on the warring tribes of Najd in the 18th century when the ideol- ogy was adopted by the Saud family as a means of reconciling their rule over a larger territory. Even after the Al Saud family had militarily consolidated their power over Saudi Arabia, Wahhabism remained the official state ideology. The advent of oil in the 20th century a few years later helped further cementing Al Saud’s authority and by extension Wahhabism. Only after the end of the cold war did concerns start to rise about the militant aspect of Wahhabism in the form of potential radical violence.

Wahhabi ideology is distinct from other Sunni Islamic schools in the sense that it promotes quietism and support of political leadership. Al-Rasheed44 notes that obedience to the ruler is seen as a fundamental obligation of the pop- ulace. This obedience is earned regardless of the method of power acquirement. This teaching is key in maintaining regime stability against opposing factions who challenged the legitimacy of the Saud rule. The author adds that the only legitimizing factor in the eyes of the religious establishment was the leader’s will- ingness to support the strict Wahhabi doctrine. Moreover, the mutawwa’a, seen as the ultimate Wahhabi agents, emphasized the need to display obedience to the ruler by willingness to pay zakat and conduct jihad in the name of the ruler

42  David Long, ‘Tawhid or Jihad: What Wahhabism Is and Is Not’, Middle East Institute (2009), http://www.mei.edu/sites/default/files/publications/2009.10. The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia Full PDF.pdf.

43  Ibid. 44  Madawi Al-Rasheed, A History of Saudi Arabia, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,

2010).

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as required. Zakat and Jihad are generally considered religious duties for many Muslims. But when these duties are directly connected to the political interests of the state, they surpass the religious connotations and become tools for the government to ensure continuity. It also become more challenging to oppose the calls of both the state and the Wahhabi establishment when their needs are portrayed as an extension to religious duties. The author argues that the ‘Islamic police’ that publicly oversaw the implementation of perceived Islamic code did not just work to reinforce the Wahhabi thought but also tamed the population on behalf of the state emphasizing its legitimacy based on reli- gious factors. The mutwwa’a focused on limited ideology revolving around the Hanbali tradition and emphasized rituals at the expense of theology. In this sense, critical thinking was discouraged in favor of ritual imitation and rep- etition. Moreover, the public authority wielded by the mutawwa’a became an extension to state authority.

The Saud family provided the political and military tools for Wahhabi clerics to prevail over other schools and sects then prevalent in the Arabian Peninsula. Likewise, the Wahhabi clerics provided the Saud dynasty with the religious cloak needed to weed out other political competitors, and helped it consoli- date its place socially by creating a national identity centered around Wahhabi Islam transcending former tribal affiliations and uniting various regions and tribes under the rule of the Saud family.45

In order to present a more comprehensive portrait of Islamism in Saudi Arabia, it is important to note that Wahhabism is by no means the only ideol- ogy present. Matthiesen46 argues that in spite of the dominance of the con- servative Hanbali tradition, which Wahhabism is based on, there are other numerous Islamic schools of thoughts and sects including Ismailis and Shia populations across the Kingdom. These minority groups vary in their levels of quietism or political activism and opposition towards the government. But overall they remain largely excluded from the political life and have at times faced social and economic discrimination. With particular reference to the Shia community, Wahhabism has always been strongly opposed to them view- ing them as adversaries while the Shia-state relation varied from time to time. The author adds that to appease the Wahhabi clergy, which is disproportion- ately more influential than the Shia community, the state has to ensure that the Shia social and political presence is limited as much as possible.

45  Joseph Nevo, Religion and National Identity in Saudi Arabia, Middle Eastern Studies, 34:3 (2006), 34–53.

46  Toby Matthiesen, Sectarian Gulf: Bahrain, Saudi Arabia, and the Arab Spring That Wasn’t, (Stanford University Press, 2013).

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Iran and the Islamic Revolution The Islamic Revolution of 1979 is viewed either as a turning point for Iranian history and a departure from a culture of secular modernization, or as a mani- festation of centuries-old Shii ideology. Khomeini, who descended from family of Mullas, developed a theory of Islamic governance, which would later form the foundation for velayat-e faqih. This theory is based on the illegitimacy of a secular government and the Ulamas’ role in interpreting the will of the Hidden Mehdi until his appearance. In his ideology, Khomeini delineated the respon- sibly of the Ulama towards the rest of the ummah in guiding and planning on their behalf. However, what was notably missing from his theory was an insti- tutional element that executes these roles. He also excluded the public from the decision making process by declaring that only the elite educated clergy could provide both spiritual and political guidance.

Abrahamian47 examines the weakness that permeated the Iranian State during Mohamed Reza Shah’s rule. Among these factors are the simmering ten- sion due to the Shah’s perceived staunch pro-Western government. Following the Revolution of 1979, the task at hand was drafting a new constitution, which after struggle between Khomeini and Bazargan, the Prime Minister at the time, resulted in a hybrid combining Islamic principles with the French Fifth Republic. The final document gave sweeping powers to the Supreme Leader as his authority overrode the executive, judicial and legislative institutions. The resulting government is totalitarian in nature as it ascribes broad authorities to the faqih. These include the religious duty of issuing fatwas that cover every- thing from foreign affairs to domestic issues. The second role is purely political entailing direct management of public affairs. Khomeini’s theory was criticized by numerous of Shia scholars especially in Najaf, who argue for a religious role for the faqih, not political. In light of this, religious figures as well as the old generation of revolutionary guards—the Pasdaran—tightly monopolize state institutions in the Islamic Republic of Iran and prevent the emergence of any civic order.

Compatibility of Islam with French Republicanism

The in depth analysis of the different branches of political Islam above is important to understand the complexity of integrating Muslim communities within a societal pact such as the one protected by a French liberal democracy

47  Ervand Abrahamian, A History of Modern Iran, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008).

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infused by a strict form of secularism (laicite) and freedom of speech. Each of the movements detailed above have seen their influence grow over the last decade within the French Muslim population. If an extremely large majority of French Muslims are fundamentally supportive of the French Republican laws, advocates of a more rigorous form of Islam have enjoyed growing support over the last few years. They have gone from a handful of supporters decades ago to a minority of adepts that has to be accounted for today. This phenomenon should not be overstated however. Out of the 4 to 5 million French inhabitants of Muslim origin, only 41% claim to be practicing their faith regularly.48 An overwhelming majority of them is adept of a very moderate form of Islam and strongly condemned the Charlie Hebdo assassination as well as the dozen ter- rorist acts that have occurred from January 2015 to the attacks in Nice and the assassination of a catholic priest in his church in Normandy in July 2016 (no 14).

This peaceful religious coexistence in France—a country that gathers is home to the largest Muslim and Jewish communities in Europe—is the main target of ISIL, as the terrorist group regularly called for eliminating what they refer to as a “grey zone” incompatible with their Manichean religious dualistic vision of a world divided in two sides: the Muslim and the unfaithful. By replac- ing religion as the centrality of their coward attacks, Islamic terrorists hope to create a stiffening of security policies and public opinions against the Muslim minorities to convince them that they should turn against Europe. In their pro- paganda media, the narrative mentions the Bush dichotomy of “for or against us” to encourage weak-minded Muslims to do their hijra and join Syria. French secularism and the constant reaffirmation of the impartiality of the state towards religions—all equal in the constitution and circumvented to the pri- vate and individual sphere—becomes thus the strongest wall against religious division. In particular, the absolute separation between state institutions and any form of religiosity and the freedom to express belief and the absence of belief even in the sharpest form of satire are essential to ensure equal rights for the Muslim minority itself. The very large majority of French Muslims either born in France or immigrants, mostly from North and Western Africa where political Islam is less developed than in countries of the Commonwealth or the Gulf, are well aware of the importance to maintain the very rules that ensure them an equal place in the society they live in. The unanimous condemnation of regular terrorist attacks by representatives of the Faith confirm this attach- ment to the French Republican values, secularism and freedom of expression.

48  IFOP (2011), Enquête sur l’implantation et l’évolution de l’Islam de France. Available at http://www.ifop.com/media/pressdocument/343-1-document_file.pdf.

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Yet one must acknowledge that the ideologies of the Muslim Brotherhood or of Wahhabism have now found their supporters in France while they were almost absent of the country’s religious scene a decade ago. This evolution is mainly due to the increased impact of new information technologies and to a lesser extent to the need to resort to foreign financers for newly built mosques, not from Saudi Arabia as commonly thought but rather from Algeria, Tunisia and Morocco. The foreign influence is often overstated by representatives of the populist parties from the right and extreme right of the political scene. In reality, only twenty mosques were funded by foreign funds as the local pop- ulations have financed the very large majority of the 2500 places of worship for the Muslim community.49

The potential issue with the coexistence of Muslim communities in France under the Republican order is therefore grossly overstated often with ulterior political motives. The influence of radical Islam, although existent today, is limited to a very small minority. In order however to prevent its development, a certain number of problem have to be addressed. The first is the forma- tion of imams in France. A large number of imams professing in France are hired directly from Turkey, Tunisia or Algeria as no adequate seminar exists in France. Only 20% to 30% of imams are French nationals and some do not even speak French.50 It is imperative to train local imams to ensure that French Republicanism is mainstreamed inside preaches. The same reform approach should be implemented in regards to representative institutions. The French High Council of the Muslim Cult has been regularly criticized for its incapacity to regulate and organize Islamic teaching in France. The organisation is para- lyzed by political interest from both the French government and foreign con- sulates who want to keep control over their diaspora in France.

The resulting cacophony and ineffectiveness is the main reason why radi- cal Islam is able to take roots in the country. Addressing these shortcomings would go a long way towards preventing the development of terrorist groups whose activity take hostage the extreme majority of peaceful French Muslims. As this paper has tried to demonstrate, there is no inherent and unresolvable incompatibility between non-radical political Islam movements and the rules of French Republicanism. Moreover, a very large majority of French Muslims do not even associate with exogenous political Islam movements and adequate representative structure should therefore allow to limit both the amalgams and the development of radicalism.

49  Senat (2016): De l’Islam en France à un Islam de France, établir la transparence et lever les ambiguïtés. Available at : https://www.senat.fr/rap/r15-757/r15-7577.html.

50  Ibid.