The reasons why some Japanese and Indian people cooperated together during the Second World War.

SUBHAS CHANDRA BOSE, JAPAN AND BRITISH IMPERIALISM

Author(s): T.R. SAREEN

Source: European Journal of East Asian Studies , 2004, Vol. 3, No. 1 (2004), pp. 69-97

Published by: Brill

Stable URL: http://www.jstor.com/stable/23615169

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SUBHAS CHANDRA BOSE, JAPAN AND BRITISH IMPERIALISM

T.R. SAREEN

Abstract. This paper examines the strategic framework of action of Subhas Chandra Bose for the liberation of India and how his ideas about inter national collaboration for the overthrow of British imperialism took shape despite the constraints and limitations imposed by the existing framework of the national moment as conceived by Gandhi and the restrictions imposed by the colonial rulers. An attempt is made in this paper to analyse how his collaboration with Japan direcdy or indirecdy accelerated the pace of nation alism during and after the Second World War.

I

Historians are now beginning to consider that India's struggle for freedom was conducted on two fronts.1 One was within the coun

try, which tried to generate nationalist sentiments among the people by peaceful means under the leadership of Mahatma Gandhi. The other was through the efforts of Indian revolutionaries who wanted to weaken the British hold over India by violent means and with the help of some foreign power. For this purpose Indian revolutionary nation alists joined hands with Germany during the First World War, and forged an alliance with international communism after the Russian revolution. The objective was the same when in January 1941 Sub has Chandra Bose crossed the national boundaries of India to seek

the help of the Axis powers. He was not doing anything new, but it proved to be decisive for Indian nationalism (in the Indian context nationalism meant struggle for freedom from colonial rule).2

1 In the light of archival sources, the Gandhian and Congress perspective of the Indian liberation movement has been challenged by a number of historians. In this respect see R.C. Majumdar, History of the Freedom Movement in India, three volumes (Calcutta: Firma KLM, 1962-1964) and T.R. Sareen, Indian Revolutionary Movement Abroad, igoy-ig2i (New Delhi: Jullundur, 1979).

2 This paper is based on my earlier studies, especially Japan and the Indian National Army (New Delhi: Mounto Publishing House, 1996), S.C. Bose and Nazi Germany: A Documentary Study (New Delhi, 1996) and Reminiscences and Recollections of S.C. Bose (New

i Brill, Leiden, 2004 EJE AS 3.1 Also available online—www.brill.nl

' Brill, Leiden, 2004

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~]0 T.R. SAREEN

Few Indian political leaders have earned as much admiration and at the same time been the targets of as much condemnation as Bose. The history of the world is, however, replete with examples where a nation or a group of people, smarting under the tyranny of a foreign or despotic rule but unable to resist it alone, have sought help from enemies of that country to bring about its downfall. For instance, Garibaldi accepted help from the enemies of Austria to free and unify Italy; Sun Yat-sen operated from Japan to free China from the yoke of imperial rule; Irish revolutionaries conducted their fight for freedom from abroad and took American aid for the same purpose.3 Bose was aware of these historical antecedents and knew that the ideology of violence followed by them had been condemned by the leaders of the Indian National Congress, the main political organisation fighting against the British for the liberation of India. Still, after having been tied down to the Congress for more than twenty-five years, he decided to break away from it to follow in the footsteps of the Indian revolutionaries. This paper examines Bose's strategic framework of action for the

liberation of India and shows how his ideas about international col

laboration for the overthrow of British imperialism took shape, despite the constraints and limitations imposed by the existing framework of the national moment as conceived by Gandhi and the restrictions imposed by the colonial rulers. An attempt is made to analyse the way his collaboration with Japan direcdy or indirectly accelerated the pace of nationalism during and after the Second World War.

After his return from Britain, Bose entered politics in 1921 as a political apprentice of C.R. Das and plunged into Congress activ ities. Within a short time he moved from provincial politics to an all-India level and emerged as a young nationalist leader on his way up. Having worked with the Indian National Congress for more than

Delhi). The archival sources for the study of Bose before and during the war are widely scattered, with important records at the Public Record Office, London, the India Office Library and Records and many other repositories in the UK, and in the USA, Japan, Germany, Italy and India. The papers pertaining to his activities in South East Asia, classified under the series INA papers, which were collected by the British intelligence agencies after the war, were deposited with the Ministry of Defence, Historical Section. These papers, not available until recently, have now been declassified and deposited with the National Archives of India, New Delhi, where they are open for consultation by scholars. Even after more than fifty years some of the papers have still not been released, under the rules framed by each country. In view of these restrictions it will be difficult for any historian to give a final assessment of Bose.

3 Girija Mookerjee, Subhas Chandra Bose (New Delhi: Government of India, 1975), p. 64.

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SUBHAS CHANDRA BOSE, JAPAN AND BRITISH IMPERIALISM 71

twenty years, Bose had lost faith in the notion that Gandhian tech nique and ideology would bring about political change in India. It is very difficult to pinpoint just when Bose acquired a liking for the ideology of radical revolutionary nationalism and at what stage he started realising the limitations of the nationalist forces in India in its fight with Britain. Ayer is of the view that from the very begin ning of his political career he advocated that only by force and with armed aid from outside would it be possible to dislodge the alien rulers from Indian soil.4 On the other hand, his biographer has main tained that even though Bose considered the Gandhian policy of non violence not very effective, it took him ten years to come round to opposing it. Bose came to the conclusion that while passive resistance could hold up or paralyse foreign administration, it could not over throw or expel it.5 During this phase Bose believed that non-violence could only be effective when it was backed by international sympa thy. However, his ideas began to change and his international out look was conditioned by his enforced stay abroad during the crucial period of 1933 to 1936. Bose not only studied European politics but also travelled through each country. Everywhere, he watched political developments closely while experiencing the feeling of seething unrest emerging all over Europe. As Europe moved towards war in the late 1930s, Bose began to realise that India's great chance for indepen dence lay in seizing upon Britain's weakness and striking at the basis of the Indian Empire while Britain was involved elsewhere. Two per sons who shaped his ideas were Vithalbhai Patel, a former Speaker of the Legislative Assembly and eminent Congress leader who was in Europe at that time, and De Valera, the leader of the Irish revolution ary moment. The Sinn Fein movement inspired him as it had inspired earlier Indian revolutionaries.6 Bose came to the conclusion after long discussions with Patel that India would never be able to win freedom

without calling on foreign help. The manifesto which they issued indi cated the trend of their thinking. Both of them were convinced that unless India developed international contacts the Indian nationalist movement would not come out of its static position and would not become a factor in international affairs. Bose also started to believe

that the key to India's freedom could lie in an alliance with Britain's enemies. He was equally convinced that no country could win its independence without an armed struggle in which international sup

4 S.A. Ayer, Unto Him a Witness (Bombay, 1951), p. 257. 5 Hugh Toye, The Springing Tiger (London: Cassell, 1959), p. 163. 6 Leonard A. Gordon, Brothers Against the Raj; A Biography of Sarat Chandra Bose and

Subhas Chandra Bose (New Delhi, 1964), pp. 102-103.

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72 T.R. SAREEN

port and foreign assistance were both essential. As he explained, his tory did not furnish a single instance where freedom had been won without help of some sort from abroad. Though a staunch nationalist, Bose expanded his ideas towards international brotherhood based on the principles of equality and justice. He explained that his whole life was one long persistent uncompromising struggle, not only against British imperialism but also against world imperialism, the former of which 'is the keystone'. Therefore he was not going to fight for narrow nationalist aspirations but was aware of the international per spective of Indian nationalism and what it could achieve for the rest of humanity. Bose began to work single-mindedly for the downfall of British imperialism because he was sure that with the weakening of the British hold over India the British empire would also come to an end.7

II

Before the war Bose was still tied down to the ideology of the Congress, whose leaders were opposed to acquiring any foreign help for Indian nationalism. However, even during this time, theoretically Bose had started looking for an international approach to the solution of India's problems. This becomes clear from the speech which he gave to the members of the League Against Imperialism in Paris, in which he explained that there was a growing feeling in India that the anti-imperialist movement should be linked with the anti imperialist movement in other parts of world. 'Therefore we believe that if we lay India's case before the world, we shall get sympathy from all over the world.'8 During his stay in Europe Bose did make contact with high officials in Germany and Italy and he did evolve a new strategy for achieving the goal of independence, but there is no evidence to show that he entered into pacts with either Germany or Italy. Yet by the time he came back to India he was fully convinced that all the efforts of the Indians themselves were not sufficient to

oust the British from India. As he recorded, 'History did not furnish

7 S.C. Bose, The Indian Struggle (Bombay: Netaji Research Bureau, 1964), pp. 321 322.

8 On Bose's stay in Europe see Asoke Bose, My Uncle Netaji (Calcutta, 1973). Lother Frank, who was with Bose in Germany, has given a detailed account in 'India's Ambassador Abroad 1933-1936' in S.K. Bose and Alexander Werth (eds), A Beacon Across Asia (New Delhi: Orient Longman, 1973), pp. 45-68. On his relations with Vithalbhai Patel in Europe and the copy of the manifesto, see Mookerjee, Subhas Chandra Bose, pp. 23-25, and Gordon, Brothers Against the Raj, pp. 306-307.

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SUBHAS CHANDRA BOSE, JAPAN AND BRITISH IMPERIALISM 73

a single instance where freedom had been won without help of some sort from abroad.' He was of the view that India must exploit the international situation at an opportune moment and seek foreign help to drive the British out of India. In spite of these ideas, Bose was still attached to the Congress. However, a change came after he became President of the Congress Party in 1938 at a very critical juncture, when the Axis powers were on the brink of their forward march. As a pragmatic politician Bose wanted the Congress to pursue a policy based not on idealism but on consideration of India's national interest. Bose was interested in neither Fascism nor Nazism; he even viewed them as dangers to the established order in Europe. But at the same time, Bose believed that war might be the only opportunity for overthrowing imperialist hegemony. As a staunch nationalist he was interested in exploiting the world situation in favour of India.9 Naturally, when the war broke out in September 1939 Bose began to advocate a policy of direct action. He pleaded that India would win her independence if she played her part in the war against Britain and collaborated with those powers that were fighting Britain. Bose vehemendy opposed Congress's passive stand and called upon it to give an ultimatum to the British government to quit India and to start a civil disobedience movement on a massive scale for complete independence. Bose was cold-shouldered by the Congress hierarchy, which had manifesdy adopted an anti-fascist stand and which, being strongly influenced by the views of Gandhi and Nehru in its foreign policy orientation, sought to negotiate with Britain, denouncing the Axis alliance. To weaken Bose's position, Gandhi even issued a public statement advocating unconditional cooperation with Britain in the prosecution of the war. Not only was Bose isolated, he was even expelled from the Congress for his radical views on the war issue and his attitude towards world affairs. Bose became more vocal and

advocated openly that Britain's difficulty was India's opportunity and that now was the time to launch an all-out struggle for independence.

9 British intelligence suspected that it was after Bose had given an undertaking to Gandhi to renounce the doctrine of violence that he was elected President of the Congress. There is no doubt that it was through the support of Gandhi that he became President, but there is no other available evidence to show that he ever gave such an undertaking. Rather, after his election Bose became more violent in his speeches and started advocating the use of the international situation to India's advantage. His uncompromising stand was evident from the letter he wrote to Nehru in which he stated that 'I feel that either we should take the international politics seriously and utilise the international situation to our benefit or not talk about it at all.' It was because of his aggressive brand of politics that Bose was forced to resign from the Congress.

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74 T.R. SAREEN

The Congress, however, remained impervious to these adjurations. For his uncompromising speeches and writings, Bose was put behind bars under the 'defence of India' laws. Bose knew what it meant to

be in a British prison. He had already been in their custody eleven times, but now he felt that it would be a gross political blunder to remain inactive in prison when history was being made elsewhere. Bose therefore decided to get out of the prison at any cost, to give what he called the final shape to the concept of militant nationalism against the British Raj started earlier by the Indian revolutionaries. His reasoning was quite pragmatic: 'To him it was so obvious that if the powerful British Empire could go round the world with the begging bowl, what objection could there be to an enslaved and disarmed people like ourselves taking help from abroad?'10

It appears from the above that Bose's expulsion from the Congress, his utter dissatisfaction with the refusal of the Congress to take up direct action against the British, as he advocated, and mobilising international support in favour of India's liberation all left him little option but to leave the country in order to gain the help of foreign powers in weakening the British hold over India.

We need not go into the details of his departure or what is called his escape, as these have been described elsewhere.11 Recent writings have also now disclosed that Bose wanted to go to the USSR and not Germany. Having a view of the Soviet Union as an anti-British and anti-imperialist power, Bose was persuaded by members of the Com munist Party to go to the Soviet Union as the only country which could help liberate India. Earlier, many Indian revolutionaries had also been drawn towards the mainstream of international commu nism, and by the 1920s Moscow had become their spiritual home.12 But by the time Bose reached Afghanistan the situation had changed. On account of their recent secret non-aggression alliance with the British, the Russians were not keen to give him any help. Following the negative message conveyed to Bose by Icher Singh Cheema, a

10 S.C. Bose, Indian Struggle, pp. 345-346. Bose also explained his stand when he was in Tokyo: he said that he escaped 'at the risk of my life. My journey was a dangerous one but it would have been the greatest shame in my life to remain in a British prison; that would have put an end to my political career. Death would have been preferable.'

11 I have given the details of Bose's stay in Germany after his escape in S.C. Bose and Nazi Germany: A Documentary Study. See also Girija Mookerjee, This Europe (Cal cutta, 1948), and N.G. Ganpuley, Netaji in Germany (Bombay: Bharatiya Vidya Bhavan, I959)

12 For the alliance of the Indian revolutionaries with Moscow see T.R. Sareen, Russian Revolution and the Indian National Movement (New Delhi, 1979).

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SUBHAS CHANDRA BOSE, JAPAN AND BRITISH IMPERIALISM 75

member of the Communist Party of India, that there was no possi bility of any help from the Soviet side, Bose decided to go Germany. An OSS report has now revealed that Bose was still hopeful of Soviet help in spite of the negative reply, and that he told Cheema that on his way to Germany he would stop in Moscow and meet Molotov; if he did not succeed he would return to Moscow after spending some time in Berlin. The fact remains that Bose was sidetracked in Moscow, and his hopes of coming back to Russia were dashed when Hitler marched on Russia in June 1941.13 Bose had been encouraged by the Russo-German pact of 1939 and looked 'upon Germany and Italy as forces which would bring about the end of British rule in India in friendship with the Soviet Union'.

Despite the setback Bose reformulated his political programme, which consisted of establishing a Government of Free India in Europe which would be recognised by Italy, Germany and Japan and would carry on the propaganda campaign, actually promoting revolution in India with financial help from the Axis powers. The question has often been raised as to why Bose went to Germany when he was aware of Hider's views about British rule in India and when, during his earlier visits, he had not received any appreciable response from German officials. He had few kind words for Fascist Italy or Nazi Germany, and the only explanation advanced is that his going to Berlin was dictated purely by tactical and practical needs and was consistent with the classical notion that 'the enemies of Britain in the context of the war were the friends of India and the defeat of Britain

in the war would definitely lead to the emancipation of India'. Bose's subsequent departure for Japan was also determined by the

changing war situation. As mentioned earlier, Bose never cultivated any secret or open alliance with these powers. His approach was prag matic and not idealist, as was the case with Nehru. Bose's association with Nazi Germany was purely motivated by his desire to exploit the war situation in favour of India. As Alexander Werth, who was with Bose during his stay in Germany, has recorded, Bose was a prag matic who looked at problems realistically. It appeared to him to be important to seek help from a country of greater political importance among the Axis powers, despite the fact that the Italians had been more cordial both during his visits and when he was in Kabul. Bose, however, preferred to go to Berlin.14

13 OSS record group no. 226, National Archives, Maryland, USA. For the interro gation reports of B.R. Talwar and others who were working with Bose in Kabul, see T.R. Sareen, Bose and Nazi Germany, pp. 180-232.

14 Alexander Werth in S.K. Bose, pp. 111-119.

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76 T.R. SAREEN

But after the Japanese victories in Southeast Asia and the German invasion of Russia, Bose realised that it would be more appropriate to seek the help of Japan rather than carry on propaganda from Europe. His limited success in Germany was due to two factors. At the highest level, matters were impeded by Hitler's underlying admiration for British rule in India. Hitler was in reality an Anglophile, and the total destruction of the British Empire was to him a not at all desirable prospect for the future. At the operational level, the Soviet intelligence agencies worked closely with British intelligence against German schemes and provided a remarkable stream of timely information. Surprisingly, Bose's key agent in Kabul, Bhagat Ram Talwar, alias Rahmat Khan, was a double agent working for Soviet intelligence.15 But at the same time one must give credit to Hitler that he was willing to help Bose to go to Japan to achieve his goal of freeing India with Japanese help. It is generally argued that Bose was on the point of approaching the Japanese on the eve of the war. It is further argued that had Bose been in Southeast Asia in 1942, when the British defences were at their weakest and the Japanese were on the offensive, he might have persuaded them to push on.16 However, there is no evidence to show that Bose had ever thought of approaching the Japanese for help before the Pacific War. Bose held a neutral attitude towards Japan and appreciated her strong position in Asia. It is also very difficult to ascertain whether Bose was offered any help from the Japanese side. Of course, Bose was in touch with the Japanese representatives in India. He had met Öhashi Tadaichi, the former Japanese Foreign Minister, in 1940. Just before his arrest Bose was also in touch with Yoshida, the Japanese consul general in Calcutta, who requested him to be neutral in his attitude towards Japanese policy in China. Yoshida recorded subsequently that:

Bose's broadmindedness in being willing to listen to me in the midst of all that was indeed great. Whether my opinions had any influence on him or not, Mr Bose in his speech supported Japan by saying that the China affair is extremely complex and it is not for India to say that it will side with this nation or the other.17

15 Richard J. Aldrich, Intelligence and the War Against Japan: Britain, America and the Politics of Secret Service (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000). 16 Gordon, Brothers Against the Raj, p. 140. 17 For Bose's early contacts with Japan see Grant K. Goodman, 'Subhas Chandra

Bose and Japan before the Pacific War\ Japan Forum, Vol. 6, No. 2 (October 1994), pp. 212-220.

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SUBHAS CHANDRA BOSE, JAPAN AND BRITISH IMPERIALISM 77

III

Before the arrival of Bose in Japan, Indian revolutionary national ists had long been carrying on their anti- British propaganda from Tokyo, even before the First World War, and had been collaborat ing with the Japanese in their pan-Asiatic programme in the post war period. At that time Japan was an ally of Britain and therefore could not openly express sympathy for Indian nationalist aspirations; nevertheless, it unofficially supported Indian revolutionaries, instead of prosecuting them to please Britain as was done by Thailand and the USA. Despite the constraints of the Anglo-Japanese alliance, the British government in India was convinced that Japan was likely to assume the position of keeper of the peace in the Far East and cham pion of the Asiatic races against the exploitation by western nations. The fear that Japan might assist the revolutionary nationalists to over throw the British empire in India remained alive even after the termi nation of the Anglo-Japanese alliance. Under Japanese patronage the Indian nationalists intensified their propaganda against the British at the pan-Asiatic conferences held at Nagasaki and Shanghai.18

At these conferences, resolutions were passed for Asiatic unity with a view to achieving the resurgence of Asia. It is very difficult to say whether their propaganda had any impact on the Asian national ists. The British assessment was that the pan-Asiatic union was not likely to succeed as it was not possible for its members to put an end to Japanese imperialist abuses in Korea or to Japan's grip over China. They were still under the impression that the Asian national ists were more likely to look to their exiting colonial rulers for protec tion against Japanese conquest than they were to contemplate libera tion by the Japanese in pursuit of an Asian Monroe Doctrine.19 This assumption of the western powers was, of course, short-lived. As the political and economic friction increased, Japan became heaven for Asian nationalists struggling to be free. Japan started advocating that as an advanced nation she should assist the progress and prosperity of the countries of the region. This gave birth to the idea of estab lishing a co-prosperity sphere. The idea was immediately distorted

18 For details about the activities of the Indian nationalists in Japan before the arrival of Bose, see T.R. Sareen, Indian Revolutionaries: Japan and British Imperialism (New Delhi: Armol Publishers, 1985).

19 Don Dignan, The Indian Revolutionary Problem in British Diplomacy (New Delhi: Allied Publishers, 1983), pp. 206-207.

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78 T.R. SAREEN

by western powers in the light of Japanese domination of China, for notwithstanding the Japanese desire to oust the western powers from Asia, the general concept of Greater East Asia was one in which Japan itself stood forth as the leader. India was never considered seriously for inclusion in the co-prosperity sphere. Tokyo stipulated that, in accordance with the progress of the East Asiatic constitution, the aim would be to make India an independent country and a unit in the Asiatic union. This policy was the result of the belief that a new order in Greater East Asia could never be achieved without

the cooperation of the Indians, and that the only way to obtain it was to help them to win their freedom. Keeping this in view, the Imperial General Headquarters (IGH) in Japan issued orders to win the collaboration of the Indians all over East Asia and help them in their struggle for freedom.20

The credit for the cooperation in East Asia and for initial for mation of the Indian National Army goes to Sardar Pritam Singh, Captain Mohan Singh and Japanese intelligence officer Major Fuji wara Iwaichi. The Indian nationalist groups in Japan under Rash Behari Bose, Anand Mohan Sahey and Raja Mähender Pratap had been watching the deteriorating relations between Japan and Britain and the USA, and hoped that Japan's success in the conflict might help the struggle for India's freedom. In fact, Rash Behari Bose had approached the Japanese IGH for help in the event of war with Britain. His views on collaboration were listened to, but no promises were made. Independently of Indian nationalists in Tokyo, how ever, the Japanese high command decided to encourage other Indian groups in East Asia.

The Japanese had two basic aims while cultivating an alliance with the Indians. First, their cooperation was essential in the event of war with Britain; neither the local population nor the Chinese could be trusted as their sympathies were with the government of Chiang Kai-shek. Second, Indians could provide valuable information about the British Indian troops stationed on the Thai-Malay border. The task of negotiating with the Indian groups was assigned to Fujiwara and Colonel Tamura, the Japanese military attaché in Bangkok,

20 The collaboration of the Indian nationalists with Japan is based on my earlier studies, as already mentioned. For the Japanese point of view, see S.C. Bose and Japan, an official publication of the Foreign Ministry of Japan published in Tokyo in 1956. For the activities of Indian nationalists see the interrogation report of Major Fujiwara in F. Kikan—Japanese Army Intelligence Operation in South East Asia during World War II, translated into English by Akashi Yoji (Hong Kong: Heinemann Asia, 1983).

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SUBHAS CHANDRA BOSE, JAPAN AND BRITISH IMPERIALISM 79

who used the assurance of all-out Japanese help to the cause of Indian independence in order to win over Indian nationalist groups in Thailand and Malaya.

During the discussions the idea of forming a voluntary force from among the Indian prisoners of war was mooted, to be used for the liberation of India. It was further agreed that, in the event of war, Pritam Singh's organisation, the Indian Independence League (IIL), would march with the Japanese army and carry out propaganda among the Indian soldiers of the British. In fact, the ground under the feet of British power was to be cut by shaking the loyalty of British Indian soldiers in Malaya; if possible, they were to be won over and re-employed against the British.

The Pacific War broke out in December 1941. Japan smashed her way through Java, Malaya and Burma, right up to the eastern frontier of India. With the defeat of the British, the first batch of Indian army units under Captain Mohan Singh surrendered to the Japanese. As arranged earlier, they were given most cordial treatment by Sardar Pritam Singh and Fujiwara Kikan, a liaison agency under Fujiwara. Through his seeming sincerity, Fujiwara inspired Mohan Singh with the idea of liberating India with Japanese assistance. Mohan Singh pondered the idea and its implications over several days and then, as in a mystical revelation, grasped the significance of the suggestion and the urgency of his mission. He agreed to organise the Indian army units being abandoned by the British into a well-knit Indian National Army (INA) which would work with the Indian Independence League of Sardar Pritam Singh and eventually fight alongside the Japanese when they invaded India. For political decisions beyond that, he looked to the leadership of Subhas Chandra Bose. Bose was a man of destiny; for him they would shed their blood. Let the Japanese secure his support and leadership. Fujiwara promised to bring Bose from Germany, but had reservations over why Bose had gone to Germany instead of coming to Japan. However, as long as Fujiwara remained on the spot, he maintained the faith of Indian leaders in the sincerity of Japan and in her intentions to give help to the Indian liberation movement. Fujiwara was a sincere officer who advocated that Japanese and Indian interests in Asia were intertwined and common to a great extent, and that the Japanese aim of creating a co-prosperity sphere could be achieved only through helping India to be free from British domination. He knew that the Indians did not sympathise with his plans, that they saw interference as coercion and that they disliked Japanese policy in Manchuria, Korea and China. Therefore Japan, while supporting Indian independence, should not force upon India her own principles

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8o T.R. SAREEN

and methods. Lastly, Fujiwara emphasised that the Indians in East Asia had great respect for S.C. Bose, who should be brought to lead the movement. He further declared that the Indians would support the concept of a co-prosperity sphere only if they were under the leadership of Bose. Fujiwara was a genuine idealist who believed in the concept of a Greater East Asian Co-prosperity Sphere and wanted to link it with the question of Indian independence. India, in his view, was the key to the success or failure of this Japanese concept. Trust was an essential element. Fujiwara, however, was only an intelligence officer; he recorded that his suggestions were kept in view, so far as India was concerned, but that his successor could not inspire the confidence of Mohan Singh. The attitude of the Japanese was wavering, and they gave the impression that the INA was not meant for the liberation of India but was to be used for propaganda purposes. The crisis of confidence between Mohan Singh and the Japanese came to a head in December 1942 and led to the dismissal of the former. Mohan Singh was neither a statesman nor a politician, but a patriotic soldier. Though his task remained unfulfilled, he laid the foundations upon which Bose built up the Indian National Army and immortalised it.21

IV

By the time Bose was allowed to land in East Asia the war situation had taken a new turn and the Axis powers had suffered reverses in many places. Nevertheless, the conception of Indo-Japanese collabo ration changed after Bose assumed command of the INA. News of his long years of sacrifice for India's independence, his dynamic person ality and his international reputation had preceded him in Southeast Asia. Though the tide of Japanese victory in Southeast Asia seemed more attractive to Bose, a voyage to the Far East was not easy to arrange. After a great deal of negotiation and under Japanese pres sure, Bose was allowed to leave Germany on 8 February 1943. He reached Tokyo on 16 May 1943. He was welcomed by the Japanese, for they regarded him as a man whose record and life aims were such as to command the respect of all true Asians. He possessed an indomitable will and great organisational ability. While Mohan Singh had thought only of strengthening the INA as a military machine, Subhas had the wider vision of mobilising the entire Indian man

21 For Mohan Singh's version of the crisis of confidence between himself and the Japanese army, see his A Soldier's Contribution to Indian Independence (New Delhi, 1974).

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SUBHAS CHANDRA BOSE, JAPAN AND BRITISH IMPERIALISM 81

power in East Asia into an irresistible army of liberation and of hurl ing it against the British in India. After he had been assured of full support by the Japanese, he thoroughly reorganised the INA; there after he formed the Provisional Government of Free India and came

to an agreement with the Japanese military authorities with regard to the role of the INA. Bose convinced the Indians in East Asia of the

sincerity of Japan and boosted their morale by dispelling their doubts about the ultimate victory of Indian nationalist forces. He made them realise that Japanese military assistance to the INA against the British was as necessary for the Japanese, to ensure the security of their co prosperity sphere, as it was for the achievement of India's indepen dence. Bose further pointed out that the British were their common enemy and that they would like to fight together to end British domi nation of India. The Axis powers, Bose said, were doing no favours to India, as simple common sense should indicate that the most natural thing for an enemy of British imperialism would be to support India's demand for liberty.22 It seems from Bose's point of view that his efforts to secure the aid of the Axis powers for Indian independence were a part of his tactics. As such, this did not mean the acceptance of Fascism as a political ideology. Arguments aside, it was Bose's tremen dous confidence in his own capabilities which seemed to be the surest guarantee against any insincerity on Japan's part. The confirmation of these views was given by the government-controlled newspaper, which pointed out in an editorial that the success of the Indian inde pendence movement depended a great deal on the future develop ments of the war in Asia. In other words, Japan's success in the war was the only way to the speedy independence of India. It was fur ther stated that the presence of the British in India was detrimental to the stability of the Japanese co-prosperity sphere as well as to Indian nationalism.23

From the British point of view, Bose's arrival in East Asia meant the consolidation of India's national movement, which was falling apart after the dismissal of Mohan Singh. British intelligence warned that to the already existing Axis clamour aimed at corrupting Indian opinion was added the voice of Bose, an astute Indian agitator and a dangerous revolutionary with a lifelong hatred of anything British. British intelligence anticipated that Bose's presence would also add a new dimension to the danger to India posed by the Japanese. For the Japanese, Bose's presence, though delayed, could still lend dignity and credibility to their policy of a co-prosperity sphere, which was being

22 F. no 601-7378-Historical Section (H.S.). 23 Japan Times 20 June 1943.

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82 T.R. SAREEN

questioned by Asian leaders. They further added that Bose's great drive and political acumen, his prestige in Indian revolutionary circles and his understanding of both Indian and British character would be of real value to the Japanese.24 After his arrival in East Asia, Bose met the Japanese premier, Töjö

Hideki, on 10 June and subsequently on 14 June 1943. The latter was highly impressed by Bose's patriotic zeal. Here was an ardent revolutionary whose whole life had been devoted to the cause of India's independence and whose thinking was very close to that of Japan. Each saw in the other great qualities of leadership, charac ter, courage and statesmanship. Bose's charismatic personality also impressed the Chief of Staff, Sugiyama Hajime, and the Foreign Min ister, Shigemitsu Mamoru. Naturally, Töjö had no hesitation in con ceding Bose's demand for unconditional help for the Indian indepen dence movement. Two days after the meeting, Töjö declared in the Diet that Japan was determined to extend every possible assistance to the Indians to eliminate Anglo-Saxon domination in India and enable the country to achieve full independence. It was the first time, as Saitö says, that Töjö gave any indication of extendingjapanese mil itary operations into India, though he did not make any promise, with regard to Bose's quarry, as to whether he had considered the question of sending the Japanese army into India for the liberation campaign. This statement came at a time when the war was not going well for Japan. But Bose was optimistic; his patriotism and eagerness to liber ate India made him oblivious to the changing reality of the war, as he was convinced of the ultimate victory of the Axis powers. On 4 July 1943, Bose took over the leadership of the movement

from Rash Behari Bose and was overwhelmed by the reception he received. He told his audiences that he was absolutely sure of their victory, but reminded them that considerable effort and sacrifice were required to achieve the goal. With his magnetic personality and fine oratory, Bose soon created among his associates an acute awareness of their duty towards their country. Shay recalls that under Subhas' leadership the officers of the INA regained their self-confidence and the civilian population realised that they had found a leader in whom they could place their trust unreservedly. Indian merchants all over East Asia began contributing to the Azad Hind fund, and young men started pouring in to enrol as volunteers in the INA. The INA was galvanised into life and was publicised openly as 'India's Army of Liberation'. Subhas' fiery speeches inspired it with patriotism and a

Military Department, L-WS-2-45, India Office Library and Records, London.

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SUBHAS CHANDRA BOSE, JAPAN AND BRITISH IMPERIALISM 83

sense of sacrifice, and he outlined a twofold task for it: 'With the force of arms and at the cost of your blood you will have to organise the permanent army of free India, whose task will be to preserve our liberty for all time.' He further emphasised the need for aid from the Axis powers as, in his view, there was 'nothing wrong if we accept their sympathy or even their help, should we need it'. At the same time, he wanted the Indians in East Asia not to depend entirely on foreign aid and to achieve independence themselves.25

Bose had taken over what Lahiri describes as a 'made to order'

movement, but by throwing body and soul into the task he was able to expand it. His single-minded devotion to the cause of Indian nationalism did not fail to impress even those Japanese army officers who were still doubtful about his credentials. Both Mohan Singh and Subhas were very conscious of the need to bring harmony among the different religious groups in the INA and civilian Indians in East Asia. They achieved remarkable success in bringing the Sikhs, the Muslims and the Hindus into a common brotherhood. But whereas

Mohan Singh had conceived of INA only as a military movement, Subhas widened its scope so as to make it the vanguard of a people's movement in Southeast Asia and to raise it into a national campaign for freedom

Subhas was keen to set up a Provisional Government of Azad Hind and to fully reinforce the INA—with, of course, the consent and help of the Japanese government. The Hikari Kikan, the Japanese liaison agency, was hostile to the plan, which was likely to affect its power and importance adversely, but Bose could visualise that if the Azad Hind government was recognised by Tokyo, the INA would have to be recognised as an allied army of an allied government—a goal for which Indians had been striving since 1942. He hoped that the Azad Hind government would ultimately replace the British government when India became free, but he knew that at that early stage the Provisional Government had symbolic rather than real value. As he explained, it was not 'like a normal peace-time government': it had been set up to mobilise the forces of nationalism in East Asia and its objective was to conduct the final war against Anglo-American imperialism.

The announcement of the setting up of the Provisional Govern ment of Free India was made by Bose on 21 October in Singapore. The audience was captivated by Bose's fighting speech, which was

25 For Bose's wartime speeches and statements, see the Weekly Intelligence Sum mary by the Army Headquarters, New Delhi. These reports are available in file no. 601-7378- H.S.

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84 T.R. SAREEN

brimming with passion and sincerity. The Japanese press gave a lot of publicity to the formation of the Provisional Government, which was described as quite different in nature from the various refugee regimes established in London and other places during the war. The Provisional Government, it was believed, would win independence for India, and after this was achieved it would be superseded by a nationalist government to be created by the free will of the Indian people.26 Subsequently Bose asked Töjö to cede the Andaman and Nicobar Islands—the only Indian territory which the Japanese had taken, annexed in 1942—to the Provisional Government, so that it could qualify as a government in international law.27 From the day the Provisional Government was formed, the INA

had a will, a purpose and a mission: it was now to fight out India's last war of independence, with new war cry 'On to Delhi'. The British regarded it as a puppet government composed of a gang of Indian traitors and men of no calibre. Bose's performance was closely fol lowed by the Army General Headquarters in Delhi, and propaganda speeches were analysed. He was considered as a dangerous revolu tionary who possessed considerable talent for leadership. The reac tion of officials of the government of India to Subhas' slogan 'On to Delhi' was mixed. They were certainly perturbed by developments in East Asia, but had grave doubts about the prospects for the move ment. A British report on Subhas' activities ridiculed him, suggesting that during his tour of southern regions under Japanese occupation he had announced his intention of flinging his allegedly well-equipped Indian National Army across the India-Burma frontier before the end of 1943 'no less than five times'. To deflate the movement, the British presented Subhas as a traitor and spoke of the INA with dis dain.28 Nevertheless, the Commander-in-Chief of the British forces, in a secret dispatch to the Secretary of State for India, was constrained to report that Bose should not be dismissed as 'a mere loquacious tool of the Japanese', for his influence on Indian soldiers both in India and abroad—if not actually on the Indians—was a factor to be reck oned with.29 An official analysis of Subhas' position at this time fur ther stated forcefully that:

26 S.A. Ayer, Unto Him a Witness, pp. 155-160. 27 On the Japanese occupation of the Andamans and the Provisional Government

of Azad Hind, see T.R. Sareen, Sharing the Blame, Japanese Occupation of Andamans and S.C. Bose (New Delhi: SS Publishers, 2002). 28 For the British comments on Bose's speeches and statements, see file no. 601—

7378-H.S. 29 File no. 601-7553-H.S.

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SUBHAS CHANDRA BOSE, JAPAN AND BRITISH IMPERIALISM 85

Bose has now finally burned his boats with us by virtue of his asso ciation with Germany and Japan, his political future being entirely dependent upon the continued military success of the Japanese and the paralysis of British rule in India by internal revolt.

British officials, however, were convinced that internal revolt was not possible since public morale and internal security were fairly steady. They believed that 'his chances of whipping up a major revolt would appear to be small. Had he arrived in East Asia last August or even during Gandhi's fast his prospects would have been much better.' As the Director of Military Intelligence pointed out, one specific factor which stood in Bose's path was the uncooperative attitude of the Congress and its leaders, and since Bose had little chance of being recognised by Gandhi and the Congress high command, 'it seems unlikely that he would be able to win over the Congress to his plans for national revolution'. As such his chances of stirring up a major revolt appeared to be small.30

Subhas, however, hoped that the INA would have a tremendous psychological impact on the Indian people and would spark off a revolution inside the country once it stood on Indian soil. Mohan Singh was never given any indication about the role that the INA was to play with the Japanese in their march towards India, but Bose was determined that it should play a significant role in ousting the British. He believed that strategy rather than military strength would defeat the British. As the Supreme Commander of the INA, he knew that an outright victory against the superior British and American forces was impossible, but he firmly held that armed activity by the INA near the borders of India would provoke Indians to rise against the British. Bose's success in making an effective appeal to the patriotism of Indian officers and his powerful leadership, together with the freedom given to unwilling men and officers to leave the INA if they so desired, seemed to have changed the character of the army into a real, revolutionary force. Subhas reorganised the entire structure of the army, and his personal charisma and dynamic brand of nationalism also combined to effect a real revolution in the attitude

of the civilian population. They were no longer servile but were eager to fight for a cause.31

Before the INA could develop into an independent and strong force, however, it was necessary for Bose to settle the question of its relationship with the Japanese army. The Anglo-American block had spread word that the INA was a puppet army raised and equipped by

30 Military Department L-WS-1-1576, India Office Library and Records. 31 Amar Lahiri, Said Subhas Bose (Calcutta, 1947), p. 90.

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86 T.R. SAREEN

the Japanese to serve their own ends. This impression had to be oblit erated from the minds of INA soldiers before they could be expected to play their rightful role in the war of India's liberation. Besides British propaganda, even some Japanese army commanders thought that the INA was fit only for intelligence work and could not be relied on in actual fighting. For instance, Field Marshal Terauchi Hisaichi, Commander of the Southern Expeditionary Force, told Bose that in the event of a Japanese advance towards India the main burden of fighting would be borne by the Japanese army and the INA would be utilised for propaganda purposes. This role was not acceptable to Bose or other INA commanders. Mohan Singh had raised his voice against the Japanese attitude and been ousted, but Bose was a stal wart, both physically and figuratively, and commanded the respect of the Japanese. He told Terauchi frankly that the only role accept able to the INA during their advance towards India was that of the vanguard; Indian freedom had to be won by Indians, for freedom secured through Japanese sacrifice would be worse than slavery. He declared that the first drop of blood shed on Indian soil should be that of a soldier of the INA.32 Though Terauchi's reaction was not very favourable, the Japanese Chief of the Army Staff, General Sugiyama, promised that in the ensuing Imphal campaign the INA would rank as an allied army under Japanese command.33

V

Bose was never oblivious to Japanese help. He made a point of acknowledging it at every opportunity, and he tried to convince other Asian leaders also to have faith in Japan. His best chance of doing this came at the Greater East Asia Nations Conference held in Tokyo on 5 November 1943. Besides the Japanese premier, Töjö, the conference was attended by representatives from Burma, Manchuria, China, Thailand and the Philippines. Töjö in his opening speech reminded the participants of the common culture and affinity of all the people of the East, on the basis of which the common union of economic cooperation for the prosperity of people was to be created. Bose attended the conference as an observer as in his view India did not yet come into the Greater East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere, and Japanese opinion concurred with his. Despite this limitation he was, as Louis Allen says, an outstanding politician among those who were attending

32 Shah Nawaz Khan, My Memoirs ofNetaji and IJV. A. (Delhi, 1945), p. 74. 33 Toye, The Springing Tiger, p. 107.

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SUBHAS CHANDRA BOSE, JAPAN AND BRITISH IMPERIALISM 87

the conference. The Times, on the other hand, described Bose as a quisling and head of the puppet government of free India when he arrived in Tokyo to attend the conference.

The fact remains that his presence lent dignity to the conference. In his address he wholeheartedly supported Japanese policy and said that the Greater East Asia Charter was a declaration of the liberation

of East Asia which would live for ever in world history. Bose was convinced that the establishment of the co-prosperity sphere would pave the way for a pan-Asiatic federation. He reiterated his faith in the ultimate victory of Japan and underlined how the fate of all Asia was linked with it.

One of the most important and interesting aspect of his speech related to his ideas about the relation of universalism and co-prosper ity. For him, internationalism was acceptable when it did not ignore nationalism but was rooted in it. He had no faith in the international

order created by the European nations: this had failed because its sponsor nations tried to use it 'for their selfish interests and for their own benefits'.

We are the wiser for this experience, and today we are convinced that the establishment or the creation of an international society of nations can be possible if we begin by setting up what I may call regional federations like this Greater East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere.

But at the same time there was a clear note of caution for Japan. As the sponsor nation she was warned not to repeat what western nations had done to undermine the influence of the League of Nations.

There is no doubt that Bose was a fine orator, and his speech inspired many Asian leaders to have faith in their destiny, which was now linked with Japan. They began to take seriously the Japanese aim of creating a new world order, replacing that being distorted by the western powers.

The conference ended with the enunciation of a joint declaration about mutual respect for each other's independence and cooperation. Bose regarded the declaration as the charter of freedom. On the other hand, the Anglo-American nations regarded it as mere propaganda and asserted that Japan had no intention whatsoever of carrying it into effect even partially, including Töjö's promise to hand over the Andaman and Nicobar Islands to the Provisional Government of Free India. Whether the conference was a major propaganda offensive or not, the fact remains that it marked the apogee of the goodwill effort of Japan's whole Southeast Asia programme.34

34 For the proceedings of the conference see file no. A-7-00-48, Foreign Office,

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88 T.R. SAREEN

After the conference Bose went on an extensive tour of the coun

tries in Southeast Asia which were under Japanese occupation. Every where he tried to convince the Asian leaders of Japan's sincerity in granting freedom to their countries either during or after the war. Whether he took these tours at the initiative of the Japanese govern ment or through his firm faith in the sincerity of Japan it is difficult to say. But it appears that his words were taken seriously everywhere. Ayer has recorded that Bose was, of course, sometimes asked by the Japanese to give radio speeches in their favour, both for propaganda value and for moral assistance, but he always took an objective stand towards China; others argue that it is hard to know whether to take his statements at face value or to see them as propaganda messages. It is also believed that many a time Bose blindly supported Japanese policies in order to win their backing for an offensive towards India. Balancing these assessments is difficult, but it appears that Bose was sincere in his faith in the aims and policy of Japan to liberate the Asians from the yoke of western powers.

Even the western powers themselves began to suspect that Bose might bring about reconciliation between China and Japan. Churchill was particularly apprehensive about this, suspecting that China might negotiate a separate peace with Japan and form part of the pan Asiatic movement. Under the circumstances he was in favour of safe

guarding China. The Allies were not wrong. In his discussions and speeches Bose advocated the adoption of a new policy towards China and the conclusion of a new treaty. But at the same time he warned the Japanese that delay in reaching a friendly settlement with the Chi ang Kai-shek regime would have disastrous consequences for the con duct of their war against the Anglo-American alliance. He referred to the restoration of peace between China and Japan and the with drawal of troops from the Chinese mainland. In favour of the real intentions of Japan, Bose cited the examples of the independence of Burma and the Philippines and the return of the Andamans to the Provisional Government of India. Perhaps Bose was only a pro Japanese spokesman and did not want to criticise the shortcomings of his allies or comment on what he regarded as their internal affairs.35 At the same time, however, it is argued that Bose was convinced that after passing through the crucible of war Japan had emerged as a chastened nation and that she had forsaken imperialism in favour

Tokyo. For details about Bose's propaganda in favour of Japan, see file no. 295 INA. The Greater Asia newspaper, published from Rangoon, also gave a great deal of publicity to Bose's pro Japanese speeches.

35 Gordon, Brothers Against the Raj, pp. 494-495.

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SUBHAS CHANDRA BOSE, JAPAN AND BRITISH IMPERIALISM 89

of cementing friendship and mutual reliance with her Asiatic neigh bours. Perhaps these words of a pro-Japanese Indian journalist should not be taken at face value, but surprisingly even British intelligence reported the change in Japanese policy, considering it due to 'the growing Allied offensive'. In their view the Japanese had changed their policy from domination to conciliation with all their occupied and satellite territories.36

Bose came back to these arguments in favour of Japan again and again. Apart from giving objective facts he also spoke from his subjective experience, which proved to be quite persuasive. Bose's theory was that China would only too gladly accept suggestions which would extract her from the convulsions of the long war. The Japanese controlled the press in all the countries of Southeast Asia, and gave a great deal of publicity to Bose's arguments in support of Japanese policy. Bose's line of argument was that since his arrival he had been closely working with the Japanese, and if he had had any doubts about their intentions it would have been absolutely impossible for a nationalist and revolutionary like him to cooperate with Japan. This conviction, he said, came from his personal experience and from studying Japanese foreign policy. Bose also put stress on the emergence of what he described as an Asiatic consciousness which had 'seized the souls of the people of Japan', declaring that Japanese policy towards Asian countries was not bluff but rooted in sincerity. The question has been raised as to whether Bose was only a pro Japanese spokesman or was trying to chalk out the future of a united Asia.37 Western powers considered Bose a stooge of the Japanese, but it is hard to accept this wartime assessment, and latest judgements consider Bose to have been an independent thinker in his own right. His participation in the war gave new hope to the Asian leaders, who began to believe that they were not alone in their fight against the colonial powers. 'For us,' as Ba Maw recalled, 'it was a sign that Asian resurgence and revolution were real and widening. This was what Bose and the three million people he brought into the war meant for us, and their impact over Asia was tremendous.'38

36 File no. F651-H.S. 37 File no. 601-7378 -H.S. 38 Ba Maw, Nelaji Oration, Mtaß Bhawan (Calcutta, 1964), published in The Oracle,

Vol. 11 (January 1980), p. 46.

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go T.R. SAREEN

VI

Towards the end of 1943, the Allies decided to start a counterattack against the Japanese. To check this the Commander of the Japanese Southern Army was sounded on 7 January 1944 that 'in order to strengthen the defence of Burma, the G.O.C. Southern Army is to attack the enemy when the conditions become favourable and occupy and consolidate the Imphal area and the strategically impor tant regions in Northeast India.' With the Imphal operation just around the corner, Bose had a

crucial meeting to discuss joint operations with General Mutaguchi Ren'ya at Maymyo, where a ceremonial photograph was taken. Ac cording to an eyewitness, after the photograph session and as they were going back into the house, Bose smiled and said to the Gen eral: 'This is the first time that I've been photographed with Your Excellency. I hope our next photograph will be in Imphal, before long.' The interpreter communicated this to Mutaguchi, who replied: 'Please wait for about fifty days, and I shall fulfil your desire'.39 Both Bose and Mutaguchi were very optimistic about the outcome of the campaign, and the latter believed sincerely that the Imphal campaign would reverse the whole course of Japan's deteriorating war situa tion everywhere. It is generally believed that Bose had advocated the advance of the Japanese forces through Chittagong. However, accord ing to Japanese sources, the army held the view that any large-scale army operation in the coastal area was impossible as this would immediately come under enemy naval and air attack. The supply line was also not very encouraging. Hence Bose's idea could not be accommodated, as Kawabe writes, 'out of strategic considerations'.40 The Japanese advance in the Imphal-Kohima area had been very

swift. However, their initial success was met with stiff resistance from

the British, who were able to keep up an almost continuous stream of air supplies. The INA and Japanese forces wanted to stop a British offensive before it could materialise or gather adequate strength, and operations had been taken up simultaneously in both the sectors. The INA halted within three miles of Imphal because it lacked air support, while the enemy, in a desperate last-minute stand, poured reinforcements into Imphal by air. Lord Mountbatten, the British

39 Takagi Jöshirö, Imphal (Tokyo, 1963). Relevant sections of this Japanese book have been translated by the Historical Section. 40 Memoirs of General S. Kawabe (English translation used).

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SUBHAS CHANDRA BOSE, JAPAN AND BRITISH IMPERIALISM 91

commander, was to defend Imphal at all costs. In the defensive battle he adopted a strategy which proved successful. He subsequendy recorded that:

The Japanese High Command played into our hands by staging an all-out offensive. It was most fortunate that at this stage the enemy should choose to fight us on our own ground near our own base, in the only areas where our existing lines of communication could adequately support us in a large-scale campaign, and when our air bases were sufficiendy near the front to enable our supply to be undertaken. The INA along with the Japanese were halted only three miles off Imphal; they lacked air supply while the British poured reinforcements into Imphal by air. Then the rain came and it became difficult for the army even to retreat properly.41

Its participants attributed the failure of the Imphal campaign to many causes. Count Terauchi ascribes the defeat to the Japanese lack of preparedness in getting supplies to the front and 'to the under estimation of the enemy's capacity of supply by air'. The British propounded the idea that the Japanese had made a fatal mistake in supposing that as soon as India was invaded there would be a nationalist revolution which would completely neutralise British and American military strength in India, thereby 'leaving the field open for Bose's puppet forces to fight for India'.42

It is easy to pick holes in any military operations in hindsight discussions. In relating history, however, it is important to take note of the psychology and mentality of the time. It is very important to judge events in a long perspective. From the Japanese point of view, the Imphal campaign was a decisive operation, and indeed it was. Success, as the Director of Military Intelligence recorded, would have jeopardised the use of India as a British base, while failure meant that the Japanese would 'probably never launch another offensive'.43 At the same time, Army Headquarters in India admitted in a secret dispatch that the results of the Japanese offensive might have been disastrous for the British had they been able to establish 'a solid foothold in the area' and finally in India; and that 'the conquest of even a single Indian State by the Japanese would have widespread repercussions upon morale and polities', as 'the plain of Imphal was a prize whose capture by the Japanese might have altered the whole course of the war in Eastern and Southern Asia and influenced

41 INA trial papers. 42 For British propaganda against the Japanese and Bose, see file no. 601-7378

H.S. See also Lord Mountbatten, Report to the Combined Chiefs of the Staff by the Supreme Allied Commander, South East Asia (London: HMSO, 1946), pp. 250-258.

43 War Office file no. 208-818, Public Record Office, London.

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92 T.R. SAREEN

deeply the history of India and China'. Even a post-war British military historian has recorded that if Imphal had fallen, one of the consequences would have been a revolt in Bengal and Bihar against British rule which might have been on a far larger scale than the riots of 1942.44

Bose regretted very much that he did not go to the front and, as Kawabe has recorded, he often cited this as one of the causes for the failure of Imphal operations. His presence could have improved the situation. But the Japanese military commanders did not agree to Bose's desire to be at the head of the INA, even though technically speaking he was the commander.45

In making an assessment of the INA as an ally of Japan, one should not overlook the different value system of each army. While for a Japanese to surrender was a disgrace, adverse circumstances encouraged many INA personnel to go over to the British. Bose did not expect it and even gave the option to withdraw to those 'who did not want to fight'. But in spite of warnings and his patriotic appeals to the INA, cases of surrender were reported from the front, while this was a rare phenomenon among the Japanese.46

VII

Perhaps neither Bose nor the Japanese were fully aware of the way the British war machine had kept the Indian public in the dark about the INA. Throughout the war, they had been depicting the Japanese as a barbaric and inhuman race whose advance had to be resisted at

any costs; the INA was characterised as a puppet army and Bose as a stooge of the Japanese. British counter-measures against Bose and the Japanese proved very successful.47 It was quite common for the British to ridicule Bose's pretensions to be the leader of the INA. The British depicted the INA as full of spies and those who would not hesitate to desert to the British at the first opportunity. At the same time, to create mistrust of the Japanese within the INA, it was propagated that the Japanese considered the INA unreliable and hence were using them merely as spies and stretcher-bearers. Anti-Japanese and

44 Military Department file no. L-WS-2- 45, India Office Library and Records, London. See also S. Woodburn Kirby, The War Against Japan, Vol. III (London: HMSO, 1961), p. 446.

45 S.C. Bose and Japan (Tokyo: Foreign Ministry, 1956). (English translation used.) 46 INA trial papers. 47 File no. 601-7378-H.S.

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SUBHAS CHANDRA BOSE, JAPAN AND BRITISH IMPERIALISM 93

anti-Bose propaganda was produced in Bengali, Punjabi, Hindustani, Tamil, Gujarati and English. The British depicted Bose as a dreamer who had degraded Indian self-respect by calling in Japan to secure the freedom of India.

The main thrust of the propaganda was to drive a wedge and create discord between civilians and military elements of the INA, between the Japanese and S.C. Bose, and vice versa. As one report commented, in the broadcast 'we suggested that S.C. Bose was merely a tool in the hands of Rash Behari Bose and the move of the

Headquarters of the Provisional Government of India to Burma was caused by its unpopularity in Malaya'.48

British psychological warfare contributed a lot towards the decline of morale within the INA. It is generally believed that on account of this propaganda a number of INA soldiers deserted. Inside the country, British propaganda also affected the thinking of the political leaders about Japan: they began to view her as a hustling aggressor to be resisted at all costs. According to Lahiri, the success of British propaganda nearly sandbagged the possible drive of the Azad Hind movement into India and prevented the Indian people from under standing the nature of the movement which had been started by Bose for ousting the British from India.49

VIII

Despite this defeat, Bose was not willing to give up the fight for the liberation of India. At a public meeting in Bangkok, he said that 'the march to Delhi will continue and it will be our last batde. We

may not march to Delhi via Imphal, but it must be borne in mind that like Rome there are many roads leading to India.' At the same time, following defeat, Bose also concentrated his efforts against the initiatives being taken by the Indian National Congress in India to reach an understanding with the Muslims and the British for the set tlement of the Indian question. However, it is very doubtful whether his propaganda drive had any impact on either the Congress or the British, who regarded Bose's broadcasts as a series of uncoordinated and slighdy hysterical outbursts of vituperation. News about desertion and surrender within the INA further depressed him. In this desper ate situation, Bose's mind began to search for an alternative future course of action. It is not clear why, after his bitter experience of

48 War Office file no. 208-818. 49 Amar Lahiri, Said Sub has Bose, p. 37.

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94 t.r. sareen

i 941, he should want to seek help from the Soviet Union. Perhaps his reading of the international situation convinced him that after the war there was bound to be a clash between the Soviet Union

and the western powers which could be utilised for the achievement of India's freedom. He outlined a twofold task: first, to continue the armed struggle, and second, to agitate for Indian independence in the international field, making use of every conflict within the camp of the so-called United Nations and in particular the conflict between the Soviets and the Anglo-Americans. Towards the close of the war Bose's stand was that in order to destroy the common enemy, Britain, both Japan and the Provisional Government should try every possi ble means and should help each other. Therefore he requested that Tokyo act as a go-between and approach the Soviet Union on his behalf. But it appears that the response from the Japanese side was not very positive. Tokyo regarded it as unfair for Bose to approach the Soviet Union after receiving so much help from Japan.50

After the Japanese surrender on 15 August 1945, Bose was asked to come to Tokyo for further consultation. He was given a special plane by General Terauchi. The plane crashed on the way, and his tragic death and the surrender of the INA were considered the end of a

vibrant chapter in India's struggle for freedom. The British attempt to denigrate INA officers by putting them on trial for treason after the war was doomed to failure, as subsequent events proved. Wavell, the British viceroy, was undecided over this, as it was not known whether Bose was alive or dead. He wrote to the Secretary of State for India about the difficulties involved in handling the INA, as this was the first occasion in which an anti-British politician had acquired a hold over a substantial number of men in the Indian army and the consequences were likely to be incalculable. Many of the men of the INA, Wavell wrote, had a great regard for Bose, and he might yet become a national hero. He wanted the British Cabinet to consider

Bose's case carefully and observed that it would be a good thing if he was disposed of without being sent back to India.51

For the authorities in India, Bose's death no doubt solved the dif ficult problem of dealing with him, but his patriotism and achieve ments, even though from the wrong side of the fence, were in their view likely to hold an important place in the nationalist mind. The government of India had no alternative but to initiate proceedings against some of the INA officers under pressure from the British offi

50 Memoirs of General S. Kawabe.

51 Wavell to Pethick Lawrence, 20 August 1945, in Nicholas Mansergh (ed.]), Transfer of Power, Vol. VI (London: HMSO, 1976) p. 107.

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SUBHAS CHANDRA BOSE, JAPAN AND BRITISH IMPERIALISM 95

cers of the Indian Army, who were keen that the INA men should be declared traitors as they had joined the enemy of the Raj. Surpris ingly, when the Indian revolutionary nationalists were tried in various conspiracy cases for having collaborated with the German govern ment for the overthrow of the British, no Indian nationalist leader came forward to defend them, but when the INA soldiers were put on trial the leaders of the Congress seized the opportunity to challenge the British Raj by taking up their case. Mihir Bose writes that the Congress, otherwise dedicated to non-violence, was at last beginning to speak for those who had taken to the cult of violence.52 The British anticipated that by exposing the disloyalty of the INA and their col laboration with Japan they would win the favour of the public. For the first time the British miscalculated the strength of nationalism gener ated by Bose.

As soon as the trials opened, the whole country became indignant and saw them as a challenge to its honour. The trials had become, in the words of the Defence Secretary, 'a symbol of India's determina tion to manage her own affairs. In a wave of national emotions the INA were acclaimed as heroes who had fought for the freedom of India under Bose's leadership.'53 Different opinions have always been expressed about the outcome of the trials and about Bose's policy of achieving independence through foreign collaboration and its impact on Indian nationalism. Indian historians have claimed that Bose's

drive accelerated the pace of India's liberation. They have, of course, remained unconvinced about the sincerity of Japan. It has been diffi cult for them to believe that a ruthless and unscrupulous power like Japan could be prevailed upon to aid Bose to free India.54 At the same there were many intelligent persons who sincerely believed that Japan would have treated Indians much better than the British did, because of the common Asiatic origin of the Japanese and the Indians. Bose's image as the puppet of the Japanese was made popular by the British during the war, but in their secret assessment he was considered an astute Indian nationalist who was genuinely obsessed by his hatred towards the British. There was no basis for the British wartime pro paganda claim that if Japan had won she would have made India a part of her empire. Bose clarified this British charge by saying that in such an eventuality the INA would have changed their targets and rained their bullets on those who tried to snatch their independence. There is truth in what he said to a colleague: 'Can anybody think that

52 Mihir Bose, The Lost Hero (London: Quartet Books, 1982), p. 107. 53 Foreword by Philip Mason, the Defence Secretary, in Toye, The Springing Tiger. 54 Dilip Kumar Roy, The Subhas I Knew (Bombay: Nalanda, 1946), pp. 185-187.

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96 T.R. SAREEN

we are shedding the blood of our dear Indian soldiers on the battle field of Imphal simply for Japan to take over India?'55 The myth of the Japanese grabbing India was propagated by the British to malign Japan in order to win the support of the Indian people in winning the war. It has been testified by those who worked with him that Bose remained independent in his thinking even when he collaborated with the Japanese and the Germans. Moreover, there is hardly any docu mentary evidence to support the view that Japan had any territorial intentions towards India. Even the British conceded, after thorough interrogation of Japanese military officials, that the Japanese never contemplated the invasion of India and the conquest of India was not one of Japan's ambitions.56 Bose fought with all his might against the British, with Japanese

help. As Fujiwara says, his earnest and precise mind, his vigorous actions, his initiative and his love for the masses irrespective of their class won him the respect—later transformed into reverence—of all those who came into contact with him. Such a man could not be eas

ily be fooled by the Japanese.57 Notwithstanding the British wartime propaganda, the Commander-in-Chief of the British army had to report in a secret dispatch to London that it would be a mistake to dismiss Bose as 'a loquacious tool of the Japanese'; he was 'one of the most colourful Indian revolutionary leaders' and his personality was 'capable of infecting others with his own enthusiasm'.58 This secret wartime assessment has now been accepted by a few western histo rians, who also say that Bose was not a puppet of the Japanese. As Brian Lapping says, had the people joined him, the situation fac ing the British could have been desperate.59 Bose's misfortune was that the leaders of the Congress were misled by British wartime anti Japanese and anti-Bose propaganda. Had they supported him against the British, perhaps the history of South Asia would have been differ ent.60

55 In answer to his critics, Bose would always say that if the most cunning British rulers could not persuade him, nobody on earth could do so; file no. 249-INA.

56 The British investigations and interrogations of the Japanese commanders led them to concede that the Japanese had no designs towards India; War Office file no. 208-925.

57 South East Asia Translation and Interrogation Bulletin, No. 240. This contains many essays which Fujiwara wrote when he was in jail in Singapore.

58 File no. 601-7775-H.S. 59 Brian Lapping, End of Empire (London: St Martin's, 1985), p. 55. 60 Michael Edwardes, The Myth of the Mahatma: Gandhi, the British and the Raj

(London: Constable, 1986), p. 277.

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SUBHAS CHANDRA BOSE, JAPAN AND BRITISH IMPERIALISM 97

In the ultimate analysis it may be safe to say that, even after more than fifty years, judgement on Bose is determined by which side of the fence you are standing. For western historians, with very few exceptions, Bose has remained a traitor, a Fascist, a tool of the Japanese, an enemy agent. For some Indian historians he was a great nationalist, and for others his alliance with the Axis powers was a blunder. But what has prevented the emergence of impartial assessment has been the myth created by some of his followers that he did not die in the plane crash. Even at the time of writing this paper, another commission of inquiry is looking into the mystery of Bose's death.61 Different interpretations notwithstanding, one thing has remained undisputed: in all his activities Bose was inspired with the single aim of ousting the British from India. For him, the aim of India's freedom was more important than the means he adopted, which have been questioned by many.

Indian Council of Historical Research

[email protected]

61 Two commissions were set up by the Government of India, one under General Shah Nawaz Khan and the second under G.D. Khosla. Both these commissions agreed that Bose died in the air crash. But there are still people who have not accepted their findings, and a third commission is inquiring in this under Justice Mookerjee in Calcutta.

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