

EMPOWERED
POPULAR FEMINISM
AND POPULAR MISOGYNY

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they may be—that encourages and validates popular misogyny. The popularization is a kind of war cry—no longer confined to scholarly feminist enclaves or radical activism, popular feminism has opened up a debate among feminists and nonfeminists alike. But it has also generated uproar among misogynists, a call to arms fueled by fear and panic. There is something crucial at stake in popularizing feminism. The struggle, the response and call between and within popular feminism and popular misogyny that I have examined in this book, is a struggle over power, meaning, and identity.

CONCLUSION. RAGE

Rage. The most conventional definition of “rage” is powerful, extreme, sometimes violent anger. But “rage” is also used as a verb: one can rage *against* something one hates; or it can refer to something out of control, like a raging fire. And “rage” can also mean something very popular, the latest trend: it’s *all the rage*.

As I reflect on the years I spent researching and writing this book, I realize that one of the central logics of the relationship between popular feminism and popular misogyny is rage, in all its manifestations. These different meanings of “rage,” as violent anger, as a hateful or out-of-control action, or as something very popular, trace the dimensions of the mirroring of popular feminism and popular misogyny. The very *popularity* of popular feminism, as something that is all the rage in the contemporary moment, provokes the violent rage of misogyny. That is, the visibility of popular feminism, the way it occupies a spotlight in multiple media platforms, brings into bold relief gender asymmetries in culture, politics, and economics. This focus, in turn, incurs a misogynistic reaction, marshaling the tropes of injury and capacity emanating from feminism and transforming these into specific injuries felt by men. Indeed, the *transformation* between these senses of rage—from “all the rage” to angry rage—maps onto the funhouse mirror distortion that I have traced throughout this book.

While popular misogyny is not overtly celebrated in the mainstream in the way popular feminism has been for the past several years, misogynistic

expressions seem to more easily translate into actual *structural* changes. As I've traced in this book, at a time when there is a dramatic increase in organizations (both corporate and nonprofit) dedicated to empowerment and equality for girls and women, there is a similar increase in men's rights organizations and "meninism," a series of discourses and practices about the apparent difficulties of being a man in the twenty-first century, amid all this feminism. At a time when girls' self-esteem and sexual agency are the focus of new corporate industries, federal funding, and educational programs, there is also what seems to be an explosion of rape and sexual assault cases on college campuses and elsewhere, as well as the cultural and media trope of "the pickup artist," a set of guides on how to seduce women who would not otherwise be interested. At a time when women and girls are told to "lean in" and demand more for themselves in the workplace, there is a dramatic uptick in the number of reproductive rights that have been formally retracted. At a time when there is a robust consumer market for girls and women, emphasizing confidence and self-love, there is a growing market *in* girls, as we see in the harrowing increase in sexual and human trafficking around the globe. And at a time when girls are encouraged to become a central part of the world of technology, from coding to STEM fields, there are online misogynistic movements such as #GamerGate, where men threaten women with death and rape for their participation in the technological sphere. Feminist logics of confidence, competence, self-esteem, and sexual agency are rerouted by popular misogyny, which then uses these logics to center men as discriminated against and in need of recuperation and reparation. If successful, this rerouting works to *shore up*, rather than challenge, structural sexism and racism.

Both popular feminism and popular misogyny revolve around vulnerability and resistance—and often, resistance *to* vulnerability. Popular feminism recognizes the vulnerability of women (and thus is distinguished from the "girl power" of postfeminism), but it then turns to already established structures of paternalistic power to challenge that vulnerability, thus wanting women to be more "confident" in the economic and political spheres, with calls for female CEOs and for more girls and women to learn to code. As Judith Butler, Zeynep Gambetti, and Leticia Sabsay (2016, 3) ask, "How, then, is the political demand to address these issues to be directed towards those institutions that should be responding to those conditions, at the same time that we seek to resist the models of power represented

by those institutions? Are we stuck in the situation in which there are two opposing alternatives, paternalism and victimization? And in accepting those alternatives, do we not reinstate a gendered opposition?" This is a key point: this is why the refusal of popular feminism to challenge or even seriously critique patriarchy can potentially only reproduce those conditions that create and support gender asymmetry in the first place.

Vulnerability is the central logic to the tropes of injury and capacity I trace in this book, those tropes that amplify and mobilize both popular feminism and popular misogyny in an economy of visibility. As Butler, Gambetti, and Sabsay point out, claims of vulnerability can shore up power for those without it, but vulnerability can also "be claimed by those who seek to rationalize the subjugation of minorities," such as when "feminism is figured as a castrating 'threat' to ostensibly vulnerable men" (2016, 9; see also Gilson 2014). Injury, or vulnerability to injury, is recast in the relationship between popular feminism and popular misogyny as fragility, thus defanging it as a condition of possibility for politics, social change, and racial justice.

But while the politics of popular feminism may be attenuated through a discourse of vulnerability, the stakes of misogynistic rage and vulnerability are high. Misogyny has been weaponized in the political institutions of the US state, as well as in other state institutions around the world. I therefore turn now to where I started this book, with the campaign and subsequent election of Donald Trump as the president of the United States. The election of this unapologetically racist, misogynist candidate at a time when feminism is supposedly more popular than ever only makes sense when understood in the framework of the funhouse mirror of popular feminism and popular misogyny.

"I'm With Her": Hillary Clinton and Popular Feminism

Despite the high visibility of popular feminism's aspirational messages of self-confidence, high self-esteem, and empowerment, the US presidential race in 2016 often rendered these messages meaningless. When Trump consistently remarked upon women's appearances during his campaign and after his election, comparing them with animals ("dogs" and "pigs"), fat shaming, and generally criticizing all women who did not follow a conventional, highly idealized definition of feminine beauty, it was difficult to

reconcile with the popular feminist exhortation for women and girls to accept themselves as “beautiful the way they are.” This struggle manifested in the campaign of US presidential candidate Hillary Clinton, which broadly adopted a popular feminist mantle as a way to appeal to voters.

As I’ve argued throughout this book, the messages and practices of popular feminism are those that circulate within an economy of visibility, and we were certainly witness to this circulation with the campaign of Clinton. As the first woman from a mainstream party to have a chance at becoming US president, Clinton’s *femaleness* stood in for *feminism*. Fifteen years ago, in 2003, the satirical news site the *Onion* featured an article titled “Women Now Empowered by Everything a Woman Does,” mocking the overuse of the word “empowerment” and implying that this overuse vacates the concept of any real meaning because if women are empowered by *everything*, they are empowered by *nothing*. In some ways, Hillary Clinton’s feminism operated under the same logic.

Clinton’s political history of continuing the dismantling of welfare that Bill Clinton initiated when president, her ties to Wall Street, and her varied relationships with corporate culture were hardly feminist achievements. She did not adequately fight against economic inequalities in the United States, a context in which women and children, and especially women and children of color, suffer disproportionately. In 1994 she lobbied for the Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act, which encouraged stricter sentences on crime and mass incarceration, also disproportionately affecting people of color to a tragic extent (Featherstone 2016; Savali 2017).

Yet despite (or perhaps because of) this, Clinton was a very good representative for popular feminism—she clearly knew how to lean in, and she was a stellar example of an entrepreneurial woman. There were many examples of popular feminist framing in the Clinton presidential campaign, from her slogan “I’m With Her” to the reappropriation of Trump’s campaign trail insults, such as “the woman card” and “nasty woman,” as empowering messages. The Facebook group Pantsuit Nation was created by Clinton supporters, and by Election Day had more than 2.5 million members. Clinton thus fit well within popular feminism’s relationship with corporate capitalism, a relationship that circulates with relative ease within an economy of visibility.

Clinton’s actual politics did not stray far from those of some of the more conservative politicians. But her gender did. As Peter Beinart pointed out

in the pages of the *Atlantic* just prior to the election, Clinton’s gender was relevant because “the Americans who dislike her most are those who most fear emasculation. According to the Public Religion Research Institute, Americans who ‘completely agree’ that society is becoming ‘too soft and feminine’ were more than four times as likely to have a ‘very unfavorable’ view of Clinton as those who ‘completely disagree.’ And the presidential-primary candidate whose supporters were most likely to believe that America is becoming feminized—more likely by double digits than supporters of Ted Cruz—was Donald Trump” (Beinart 2016, para. 2). Clinton’s political experience, her foreign policy background, her position as secretary of state in the Obama administration—none of that mattered to those who thought that a female president would necessarily mean a feminized nation.

The attacks on Clinton by politicians on the left and on the right and by pundits, the mainstream media, and individuals on social media were vicious and full of misogynistic rage. Clinton was routinely labeled a bitch or a witch; her appearance was ridiculed in the media; at Trump rallies political buttons were sold that read: “KFC Hillary Special: Two fat thighs, two small breasts, one left wing”; and Trump agitated his followers to “Lock her up!” at rallies across the United States. Many of us watched the televised debates in horror as Trump called Clinton a “nasty woman” and menacingly hovered over her. However one felt about Clinton as a possible president, it was absolutely clear that the vitriolic rage directed against her during the campaign (and indeed, like most female politicians, throughout most of her career) was a rage of misogyny, a hatred of her because she was a woman who dared to let herself be positioned as a feminist. This misogyny had the uncomfortable effect of turning Clinton into a feminist icon just for being the target of it, as Liza Featherstone (2016) and others in the book *False Choices: The Faux Feminism of Hillary Rodham Clinton* argue. Voters and the media could then interpret electing a woman as president—whatever her politics were—as the ultimate feminist act.

We Are Losing So Much

There have been literally thousands of articles, think pieces, rants, interviews, and other forms of communication about the election of Donald Trump as the president of the United States. Needless to say, Trump’s shortcomings as leader of arguably the most powerful country in the

world are both legion and obvious: he has no political experience; he lies routinely about just about everything; he is racist; and he has no respect for the free press. Yet perhaps his most distinctive trait is his aggressive misogyny. In an opinion piece in the *Guardian*, columnist Jonathan Freedman listed some of Trump's many offenses:

His serial outrages are well known. He has called women dogs and pigs; he humiliated the winner of his Miss Universe beauty pageant for gaining weight, forcing her to exercise in front of the cameras; he rates women's bodies out of 10; he dismissed Republican rival Carly Fiorina on the grounds that no one would vote for "that face"; he suggested TV anchor Megyn Kelly was hostile because "she had blood coming out of her wherever." Even when seeking to rebut the charges of sexual assault, he couldn't help himself. His defence amounted to: "Have you seen what these women look like? I don't think so." This is such a swift degeneration from the public mores that America and the wider world had arrived at—and which had seemed steady and settled—that it can be hard to take in. (2016, paras. 3–4)

Hard to take in, indeed. That violent misogyny is continually expressed by the president of the United States is enough of a travesty; the fact that Trump uses the social media site Twitter for this expression so that the reach of his misogyny is even broader makes it worse. Trump's misogynistic ways of not only characterizing but also treating women as a means to an end (the end being the restoration of patriarchy) circulate in the economy of visibility, but often without acknowledgment that these expressions and practices are misogyny. The relentless coverage of his words and actions by virtually all media channels enables the routine dismissal of Trump's misogyny by his supporters and even by more moderate Republicans as "locker room talk" or as "boys being boys." Just as damaging, Trump's tweets and behaviors are often covered with the façade of journalistic objectivity; his words and actions are thus not challenged but rather validated through their visibility.

Trump's misogyny has been met with outrage by many in the Democratic Party, by feminists, and by women in general. It has been interpreted by many of Trump's supporters as a crucial kind of authenticity, a glorious refusal to play the game of politics, finally a moment when a person in power says what the rest of us are apparently thinking. Misogyny here is folded into state structure *because* of its apparent authenticity,

its "realness" in a context of "fake news," "alternative facts," and post-truth society. Indeed, it was clear that in the months leading up to the election—especially after the release of the *Access Hollywood* video in which Trump excused sexual assault by saying that men in power "can do anything" to women, even "grab 'em by the pussy"—that misogyny didn't hurt his campaign. It *bolstered* it, because it was seen not as misogyny but as telling it like it is.

In many ways, this makes perfect sense. After at least a decade of an increasingly visible—and increasingly normative—popular misogynistic culture, the United States elected a man for president who is openly and unrepentantly racist and misogynistic.

Trump is not only faithful to the logics of popular misogyny but perpetuates and fortifies them. Misogynists like Trump see everything within the frame of a zero-sum game: for them, politics, like other practices of popular misogyny, is just about winning. In familiar heteronormative hypermasculine logic, to win means to affirm male superiority over women, at women's expense. Just as popular misogynists do, Trump presents himself (and his supporters see him) as being on a recuperative mission, a pursuit to restore patriarchy, to repair injuries caused by women, to return capacity to men.

Trump has weaponized white rage specifically by emphasizing voters' hopelessness and fear—a fear of being emasculated by a woman leader. Trump's success is contingent on this rage, this popular misogyny, a success that validates a reactionary response, a structural violence. As Daniel HoSang and Joseph Lowndes write,

The unabashed language of white supremacy and misogyny, rage and even violence at Trump rallies was like nothing seen in decades. It was a rage also undergirded with references to permanent loss and mourning. While Trump's campaign slogan was "Make America Great Again" he foregrounded themes of a fully realized and even irreversible loss, defeat and abandonment. Throughout his campaign, Trump told crowds: "We don't win any more." "We don't make anything." "We are losing so much." Unlike the leaders of past populist revolts, Trump seemed less a champion of working people than a figure who confirmed their debased status, reveling in such terms as "disgust," "weakness," "losing," and "pathetic." (HoSang and Lowndes, forthcoming)

This defensive posture from the Trump campaign mirrors the defensiveness of popular misogyny. But this defensiveness is not simply a posture; it manifests in the actual use of “violence and intimidation as ordinary practices of politics” (HoSang and Lowndes forthcoming). The “popular” of popular misogyny both validates and trivializes its violence; in a historical moment and political economic context in which white men feel vulnerable and threatened, popular misogyny becomes both reaffirmed as a norm and simultaneously newly weaponized as a call to arms. This is, in other words, not just about online harassment, or revenge porn, or the other forms of misogyny I detail in this book. It *is* about those forms of popular misogyny, and how they work to normalize this misogyny so that it becomes the backdrop, the justification, for eruptions of violence. As Carol Anderson eloquently writes, white rage “is not about visible violence, but rather it works its way through the courts, the legislatures, and a range of government bureaucracies. It wreaks havoc subtly, almost imperceptibly. Too imperceptibly, certainly, for a nation consistently drawn to the spectacular, to what it can *see*” (2016, 3). The economy of visibility I have discussed throughout this book works to render the spectacular visible, but it is just as important to attend to what is eclipsed by that spectacle, what is authorized to continue as a norm. And when rage becomes the norm, it is also inevitable that there will be moments when it will erupt into violence, as we witnessed in August 2017, in Charlottesville, Virginia, where hundreds of neo-Nazis, white supremacists, and misogynists openly gathered to “Unite the Right.” It was clear that they came to commit violence; armed with bats, clubs, mace, and other weapons, they attacked the counterprotestors, and one man, in an act of terrorism, drove a car into a group of people, killing a woman. The rage of white supremacy and misogyny manifests in violence as an ordinary act; the normalization of racism and misogyny combine to form what Roxane Gay has called the “hate that doesn’t hide” (2017, n.p.).

Nevertheless, She Persisted

The Clinton/Trump presidential campaign was, in many ways, a perfect symbol of the funhouse mirror of popular feminism and popular misogyny that I’ve traced in this book. As I’ve argued, misogyny has been more efficiently folded into the institutions of the state over the past decade, while popular feminism has importantly stoked public awareness but has for the most part remained in the realm of visibility rather than structure.

Feminism may be popular, but it is not always powerful. In fact, it is poetically fitting that Hillary Clinton actually won the *popular* vote in the United States, while Trump won the electoral vote—and the power of the presidency.

Postelection, one of the most visible examples of contemporary popular feminism was the Women’s March of 2017. The march was a popular feminist reaction to the election of Trump as president, although it expanded from that specific issue in the United States to a global demonstration about women’s rights, economic disparities, rape culture, and other gendered forms of violence. The Women’s March originated in Washington, DC, from a Facebook post, and quickly expanded its reach through “sister” marches all over the world. Indeed, with its social media origins and wide circulation on all media platforms, the march was an important illustration of the *potential* of the circulation of popular feminism within an economy of visibility to have a broader reach, to push back against the limitations of visibility.

Hundreds of thousands of demonstrators participated in the march, a positive sign for the organizers’ hope of “a sustained campaign of protest in a polarized America, unifying demonstrators around issues like reproductive rights, immigration and civil rights” (Hartocollis and Alcindor 2017, n.p.). The march was visible in many forms, with news media publishing images of huge crowds in Washington, DC, New York, Chicago, and Los Angeles, images of protest signs making the social media rounds, and, perhaps most widely shared, the image of the “pink pussy hat” circulated in all forms of media. (The “pink pussy hat” was a knitted pink cap with cat ears designed to challenge Trump’s “grab ‘em by the pussy” remark.) Thousands of photos depicting seas of pink pussy hats were circulated, giving clear visual evidence of a gendered collectivity. The hundreds of “sister marches” should not be underestimated; this was clearly a profound statement about gender inequality around the globe.

I participated in the march in Los Angeles, and was truly bolstered by the feelings of solidarity, not just with fellow demonstrators around me but also with the constant texting of images from my friends and family. The sheer numbers of people demonstrating were important politically, and I hope that the march really was the start of a “sustained campaign of protest in a polarized America.” Again, the march was an example of the potential of popular feminism to bring attention to issues about gender discrimination to a wide swath of the population. But I also think that the

march was an example of precisely the limitations of visibility, the way it works as an end in itself.

For one thing, the march was an example of a primarily popular white feminism, with many of its stated goals intended to empower white middle-class women, especially in the capitalist workplace. Indeed, many called out the march for its lack of intersectionality, and its refusal to recognize that vectors of power work differently if one is a woman of color. As Kirsten West Savali noted, “Cocooned in the white privilege that many of them deny, this type of white feminist expects black feminists with legitimate concerns to push those concerns aside for the so-called greater good—a good, to paraphrase both Harriet Tubman and Viola Davis, that exists over a line where there are ‘green fields and lovely flowers and beautiful white women with their arms stretched out to us . . . but we can’t seem to get there no-how. We can’t seem to get over that line’” (2017, 37).

We can see this expectation for women of color to put aside race for the “greater good” of gender in the Women’s March. When Brooklyn blogger and activist ShiShi Rose wrote to white women about the march that “now is the time for you to be listening more, talking less,” some white women reportedly canceled their trips to the march (Rose, quoted in Valentine 2017, n.p.). As one woman quoted in the *New York Times* said: “This is a women’s march. . . . We’re supposed to be allies in equal pay, marriage, adoption. Why is it now about, ‘White women don’t understand black women?’” (Stockman 2017, n.p.). Of course, it isn’t “now” that white women don’t understand black women; this is the historical legacy of much of feminism, in which gender has been prioritized as the central identity category, and race has been marginalized. Mainstream feminist movements in the United States since the suffragettes have lacked an intersectional approach, often ignoring the ways in which racism discriminates against women of color. The demands of middle-class white women have long been prioritized over those of women of color in mainstream feminist movements. This is the line women of color “can’t get over.”

Another way that the Women’s March demonstrated the limits of visibility was through its focus on individual women rather than on a more collective feminist politics. This was brilliantly demonstrated in a photo from the march in Washington, DC, that went viral, featuring Angela Peoples, an African American woman and director of the LGBT equality organization GetEqual, standing in front of three white women wearing pink pussy hats, all on their cell phones, texting and taking selfies. Peoples



FIGURE CONC.1.
Angela Peoples,
Women’s March,
2017. Photo by
Keven Banatte.

stands in front of them, nonchalantly sucking on a lollipop, wearing a cap that says “Stop Killing Black People” and holding a sign that reads “Don’t Forget: White Women Voted for Trump.” While clearly this photo captures just one moment of the Women’s March, it is also emblematic of popular feminism itself: a politics that both includes and affects mainly white women; a politics that focuses on individualism over the collective, symbolized in the taking of a selfie at the march; and a reminder that the messages of popular feminism for girls and women to be self-confident and have body positivity have little to do with the continued racial violence that affects black people in the United States.

Despite the spectacular visibility of millions of marchers in January 2017, a number of events soon occurred at the level of policy and legislation that have worked to bolster, not challenge, gender discrimination in the United States. Popular feminism, as I have argued throughout this book, poses a threat to those who are insecure, who feel injured by women and feminists, who see the “gender wars” only within a binary frame, a zero-sum game. This injury is explicitly about gender—it is about the threat of imagined emasculation. While the march worked to bring to the fore the gendered injuries of women, since that time we have witnessed the silencing, interrupting, and trivializing of these very injuries, as well as of the women who have articulated them. In perhaps one of the most blatant examples,

Massachusetts senator Elizabeth Warren was interrupted while reading a letter from civil rights activist Coretta Scott King written in 1986 during a US Senate debate over the appointment of Jefferson Sessions, Trump's nominee for attorney general of the United States.

The office of attorney general is the highest law enforcement post in the United States and heads the Department of Justice. As such, the attorney general is charged with enforcing federal law and antidiscrimination statutes. Many of these laws are crucially important to women, such as the Violence Against Women Act and the Freedom of Access to Clinic Entrances Act, as well as others that were created to protect women at school, at work, when voting, and so on. Sessions was a particularly poor candidate for attorney general because of his political history of attempting to retract rights for women. He voted against the reauthorization of the Violence Against Women Act; he has repeatedly voted to limit women's access to reproductive care; and he has a long history of hostility toward civil rights (Matsui 2016). When the *Access Hollywood* video featuring Trump's validation of sexual assault emerged, Sessions said it would be a "stretch" to consider grabbing a woman by her genitals sexual assault (Paquette 2016).

Warren, in an act challenging Trump's nomination of Sessions for attorney general, read the letter by King, and was interrupted and silenced by Senate majority leader Mitch McConnell in the middle of the reading. Citing a little-applied rule prohibiting speech portraying a sitting senator (which Sessions was at the time) in an "unbecoming" light, McConnell stated of Warren, "She was warned. She was given an explanation. Nevertheless, she persisted" (Wang 2017, n.p.). The incident, captured on video, instantly went viral, and McConnell's words became a rallying cry for popular feminism, appearing on signs at marches, T-shirts, and hundreds of memes and videos on social media platforms. Hashtags such as #letlizzspeak and #shepersisted flourished on Twitter. "Nevertheless, she persisted" became another highly visible (and commodified) moment for popular feminism, and many reacted with appropriate outrage at the silencing of Warren. But ultimately, Warren (along with Coretta Scott King) was silenced in the halls of power, and Sessions was confirmed.

Aside from Sessions's confirmation, a number of other antiwoman measures passed in the wake of the Women's March of January 2017. Trump pushed to defund Planned Parenthood, and he nominated a Supreme Court justice who he promised would overturn *Roe v. Wade* (the ruling that made abortion legal in the United States). Over a thousand antiabor-

tion measures have been introduced at the state level. Trump and the GOP congress have also repeatedly tried to repeal the Affordable Care Act, the health care plan Obama put in place while he was president. The repeal of this act would certainly make things much worse for all women, but especially poor women and women of color.

At the time of writing, the Women's March had occurred a mere six months earlier, hardly enough time to understand its lasting impact. But still, I think it is worth noting that in January 2017 we had a highly visible worldwide expression of the power of women, and it hasn't deterred politicians around the world from carrying out their misogynistic agenda. I opened this book with the sentiment that this is, in many ways, a remarkable moment to be a feminist. Feminism has become popular; it is embraced by more women—and men—than ever before, its expressions to be found not only at a radical bookstore or an activist gathering but now on T-shirts at a Target store and on Instagram, Facebook, Twitter, and other mainstream social media sites. The #MeToo movement, which emerged in force in 2017 after a flood of stories from women who had been sexually harassed in the workplace were finally heard, puts into bold relief widespread and normative misogyny and sexism. Feminism is visible like never before—although particular versions of feminism are more visible than others. These popular feminisms circulate with ever-greater ease within an economy of visibility.

As a scholar, I have found it hard to make coherent sense of the circulation of mediated popular feminisms and the subsequent reactions to these iterations. Trying to rein in this beast has been difficult, not simply because of information glut but also because there are many overlaps and convergences between popular feminism and feminist movements, and there are also clear ways in which feminisms differ in their circulation, response, and political practice. While popular awareness of feminist issues such as equality, rights, and agency is necessary for political practice, in an economy of visibility, popular awareness can become the goal rather than the route to activism. That is, while there are similarities, there are also differences between a feminist political practice that insists upon a structural critique of patriarchy and gender discrimination, and what Roxane Gay calls "the popular media feminist flavor of the week" (2014, x). I've tried to address the cultural, political, and economic conditions that amplify popular feminism, and the ways that they are different from the conditions that support other modes of feminist political practice,

such as collective challenges to threats like the rollback of reproductive rights, the forced sterilization of women of color, or laws that fail to protect women from domestic and sexual abuse.

This moment is also, as I've detailed throughout this book, a remarkable one for the heightened presence of popular misogyny. Between 2012 and 2017, while I was researching and writing this book, popular misogyny became more and more normalized within social media and everyday life, often expressed in violent and vicious ways. No longer at the fringe, it seems that every day there is new violence directed at women, especially women of color, though it is rarely acknowledged *as* misogyny. These acts of violence are often justified by their perpetrators because they feel "injured" by women in general and by feminism in particular. As conservative reporter Matt Lewis has argued, "Rejection by women, it seems, has radicalized some men and made them bitter. The conservative instinct would be to work harder and succeed. Instead, these men have chosen to embrace their victim status" (2017, para. 10). Indeed, embracing victim status has fueled popular misogyny in a very specific way; deep gendered insecurity, the fear of being humiliated by women—or portrayed by them in an "unbecoming" light—is the impetus for a heightened misogyny, one easily circulated and exchanged in the media outlets that are created for its expression: subreddits, men's rights activist blogs, and seduction communities.

My argument in this book has been about this *relationship* between popular feminism and popular misogyny, and the fact that we need to give our attention to this relationship because it has structural consequences. Within an economy of visibility, popular feminist expressions and practices are important for public knowledge, but when their visibility *becomes* their politics, and this visibility hails us, asks us to pay attention to its spectacular expression, it also distracts us from the structural costs of popular misogyny's response, the aftermaths of this relationship, the violent effects of its rage.

To be "all the rage" is to have a feminism that is mainly concerned with individual women, not a collective politics. It is the feminism of neoliberalism, in a context in which gender equality is assumed to be possible, with only a few obstacles standing in its way, easily resolved through corporate and commercial intervention. It is a feminism that says "I'm with her," not "We're with each other." It is a feminism that is bounded by an antisocial neoliberalism, which not only tolerates but also expects individual women to be the targets of individual men's sexual manipulation

and violence. It is in this neoliberal context that we are witnessing the transformation of popular feminism, feminism that is "all the rage," into the hateful rage of misogyny. What we need is a different sort of transformation, one that transfigures the rage of popularity into a powerful rage, an intersectional, collective rage, directed at a racist and sexist structure. We need a lasting feminist rage.