012111
obba1
SAMPLEPAPER.docxTerrorism Event Analysis Review
David B. Roberts
TERRORISM EVENT ANALYSIS REVIEW 6
Abstract
A Terrorism Event Analysis Review (TEAR) is summary analysis intended to describe a terrorism event and explain why it occurred. It attempts to understand the terrorist actor(s) that carried out the attack, their ideologies and what where their motivations and goals for doing so. It also attempts to typify the terrorism attack according to the types of terrorism discussed throughout the semester. Finally, it reviews the outcomes or results of the terrorist attack.
This analysis looks at three different terrorism events: the July 2018 suicide bombings in the Mastung District of Baluchistan Province, Pakistan; the March 2019 mosque shootings in Christchurch, New Zealand; and the October 2023 Hamas attack in Kfar Aza, Israel. Each of the three events were carried out by different terrorist actors with different motivations and goals. Similarly, each event represents a different type of terrorism and discusses how each type was derived. The government responses to each of the three terrorism events also vary widely, from ineffective displays of force to sweeping legislative changes on gun control to all-out war. Interestingly and unintentionally, all three terrorism events discussed in this TEAR involve Muslim participants. The Mastung District suicide bombing and the Hamas attack on Israel both involved Muslim terrorist actors, while the Christchurch mosque shooting involved Muslims as the targeted and primary victims.
Keywords: terrorist attack, TTP, Pakistan elections, Christchurch, mosque shooting, Hamas, Israel
Event 1 – 2018-July – Suicide Bombing and Other Terrorist Attacks Targeting Election Campaign Events – Mastung District, Baluchistan (also Balochistan) Province, Pakistan
Mastung District is in the northwest region of Baluchistan Province, Pakistan, close to its Afghanistan neighbor to the north and west. Baluchistan Province also borders southeastern Iran and is not far from its India neighbor to the east. It’s complex relationships and close proximity to its neighbors, as well as the sectarianism that fuels conflict in the region and the influences of numerous regional terror networks and militant groups all contribute to the volatility in this region of South Asia (Abbas, 2021).
In July 2018, it was reported that nearly 120 attacks occurred over a six-week period that appeared targeted at disrupting the election process in Pakistan (Al Jazeera, 2018). While reports vary, it is estimated that 230 people were killed and more than more than 400 were injured in the series of terrorist attacks. The Mastung District suicide bomber attack on July 13, 2018, was one of the more deadly attacks, killing more than 150 people, including Nawabzada Siraj Raisani, the Baluchistan Awami Party (BAP) candidate for the Provincial Assembly seat (PIPS, 2018). Claiming responsibility for the attack were two terrorist groups – the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL, also known as ISIS) and the Pakistan Taliban (also known as Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan or TTP [also Tehrik-e- or Tehrik-i-]).
ISIL, originally known as al-Qa’ida in Iraq and the Islamic State of Iraq until its disavowal in 2014, is designated by the U.S. as a foreign terrorist organization. The organization’s ultimate goal is the establishment of an Islamic caliphate – a successor to the Islamic prophet Muhammad and leader of the Muslim society according to the will of God (NCTC, 2024 & Hamid, 2016). The TTP is a byproduct of jihadist al-Qa’ida in Afghanistan and has strongholds in both Afghanistan and Pakistan. It is the largest militant group fighting in opposition to the State (government) in Pakistan. The goal the TTP is to establish an Islamic political system in Pakistan that is based on their interpretation of sharia, a goal which they claim was the foundation of the establishment of Pakistan in 1947 (Sayed, 2021).
The targets of 2018 Mastung attack, which specifically targeted political election campaign and polling sites and the state security forces throughout the region, appears to align with the motivations and goals of the TTP and their claim of responsibility, but it raises a question regarding why ISIL would also claim responsibility, as the two terrorist groups have historically operated independently (Sayed & Jadoon, 2022). One possible explanation is that the constant struggle for regional dominance and competition for members may have played a part in the dual claim for responsibility. In the months and years that followed the attacks in 2018, through numerous attacks on the Pakistan state, the TTP had managed to force themselves into a position of political strength in negotiating with Pakistani state (Sayed & Jahoon, 2022), further legitimizing their claim for the Mastung attack. This analysis will proceed with the presumption that the TTP is the terror organization with legitimate claim to the 2018 Mastung attack.
Typifying the Mastung attack is challenging. The TTP’s origin is a product of al-Qa’ida in Afghanistan and receives continued support (recruitment and training) from al-Qa’ida in Afghanistan (Gul, 2024). Additionally, the UN has acknowledged that the TTP has thousands of members in strongholds located in both Afghanistan and Pakistan (Sayed, 2021). As such, it would also be appropriate to consider TTP as an international organization (Casserleigh, 2024). However, because TTP identifies as a Pakistani group and understanding that the TTPs is a militant group that fights in opposition to the Pakistan state with the goal to affect change in the established order, it seems more appropriate to characterize the organization as domestic dissident. Additionally, their actions are fundamentally motivated by the idea that Pakistan should be an Islamic nation governed by a political system founded on that religion’s beliefs, which suggests that the TTP could also be typified as a religious organization (Casserleigh, 2024 & Sayed, 2021). For this analysis, the TTP is best typified as a religious domestic dissident terror organization.
Despite Pakistani state security forces increasing security around polling and election sites, not much detail is available regarding the state’s response to the 2018 Mastung attack. PIPS (2018) reports that Pakistani security forces conducted at least two operations in Baluchistan targeting militant groups that killed five militants. Since the July 2018 attacks, there have been repeated attacks in Baluchistan province, again targeting political campaigns and elections. One attack took place in July 2023, for which an Afghan branch of ISIL claimed responsibility. The most recent attack occurred on February 7, 2024, for which a Pakistan branch of ISIL claimed responsibility. Interestingly, leading up to the 2024 attack, the TTP had recently pledged not to target election sites and political rallies prior to election day (Sattar & Ahmed, 2024). ISILs involvement in these more recent events might bring into question the previous presumption that the TTP was responsible for the 2018 Mastung attack but, at that time, it was the TTP that was more likely to be involved as they were still in need of posturing for political position and leverage with the Pakistani government (Sayed & Jahoon, 2022).
Event 2 - 2019-March 15 – Mosque Shootings - Christchurch, New Zealand
In response to the terrorist attack on March 15, 2019, the New Zealand Royal Commission of Inquiry (NZRCI) commissioned an investigation into the terrorist attack on Christchurch mosques titled Kō tō tātou kāinga tēnei: Report of the Royal Commission of Inquiry into the terrorist attack on Christchurch masjidain on 15 March 2019, hereafter called the Report. According to the Report, 28-year-old Brenton Harrison Tarrant, an individual representing extreme right-wing, ethno-nationalist and Islamophobic ideology undertook and executed a well-planned terrorist attack upon the Muslim congregations of two mosques, or masjidain (plural; masjid, singular ), in Christchurch, New Zealand. Moments before the attack, Tarrant posted a message to a white supremacist, anti-immigration discussion board announcing the imminent attack and provided a link to view a live-stream video feed of the attack on Facebook. He also sent emails to the New Zealand Prime Minister, the Leader of the Opposition, the Parliamentary Service and numerous media organizations announcing his intentions just moments before carrying out the attack. The terrorist actor then executed his assault on the congregations of Masjid an-Nur and, shortly thereafter, the Linwood Islamic Center, killing in total 51 people and injuring another 40 from ages 3 to 77 (NZRCI, 2020).
The Report describes Tarrant as an individual with a troubled youth, physically abused by his mother’s partner, who was an Australian Aborigine descendent. He had very few friends in school and was only interested in computers and video games, particularly role-playing games and first-person shooter games. He also presented a capability for intelligence, being well read in subjects of personal interest, such as World War II (NZRCI, 2020). His unrestricted access to computers and the internet allowed him access to extremist message boards and, from around the age of 14, he had begun outwardly expressing his racist views. Based on information acquired during the investigation, including interviews with the terrorist and others, the Report suggests that by the time he moved from Australia to New Zealand in 2017 he had already committed to planning and carrying out the terrorist attack (NZRCI, 2020).
Based on the terrorist’s own manifesto, his interviews with the police following the attacks, and the documents recovered during the investigation, the Report states that he was motivated by far right, white ethno-nationalist views. Specifically, the terrorist held a belief that Muslims were systematically replacing white European populations – a belief referred to as the Great Replacement Theory, as popularized by French author Renaud Camus in 2011. Despite the terrorist’s own statements and posts claiming that he rejected violence to resolve immigration issues, his actions and behaviors suggest otherwise (NZCRI, 2020).
The motivations behind the attack are xenophobic, specifically targeting Muslims based on the individual’s fear that his white race was being systematically replaced, which suggests nativism. However, because the terrorist actor was native to Australia and he moved to New Zealand with the specific intent to carry out a terrorist attack, the event would be more appropriately characterized as international vigilant terrorism (Casserleigh & Merrick, 2013).
As a direct result of the mosque shootings in Christchurch, New Zealand on March 15, 2019, the Prime Minister Jacinda Ardern and her Cabinet had agreed to the principles of change to New Zealand gun laws within 72 hours of the attack. Within two weeks, proposed legislation amending the 1983 Arms Act had been presented to Parliament for consideration. On April 11, 2019, less than one month after the attack, Parliament had approved the amendment into law by a vote of 119-1. The new law prohibits military-style semi-automatic weapons and all assault rifles, as well as high-capacity magazines and parts to modify single-fire weapons into semi-automatic weapons (Kouchakji, n.d.). In June 2020, a little more than a year after the attack and the passage of the Arms Amendment Act, additional gun control legislation was proposed and passed. The new law specifically addressed that gun ownership is a privilege, not a right, and is limited to responsible gun owners. It established a reduced firearms license duration of five years, down from 10 years, for first-time license holders and those with previously revoked licenses. It also established tighter rules for gun dealers and regular updates to the firearms registry to help prevent firearms from falling into the wrong hands (Reuters, 2020).
Another important outcome of the terrorist attack was the establishment of the “Christchurch Call” initiative – a voluntary pledge to eradicate terrorist and violent extremist content online. The pledge was adopted initially by 18 countries and eight tech/social media companies including Google, YouTube, Amazon, Facebook and X (formerly Twitter) (Kouchakji, n.d.). While the U.S. did not participate in the pledge initially, it is now one of the 56 governments and 18 online service providers supporting the initiative (Supporters, n.d.).
Event 3 - 2023-October 7 – Hamas Attack on Israel – Kfar Aza, Israel
On the morning of October 7, 2023, a series of coordinated terrorist attacks upon Israeli civilians were instigated by Hamas, the ruling party for Palestinians in Gaza. Thousands of rockets were fired into Israel from Gaza while Hamas gunmen stormed across the Gaza border into Israel. The initial attack killed indiscriminately around 1,200 people, including at least 35 U.S. citizens in Israel at the time of the attack (BBC, 2024 & Zanotti & Sharp, 2024). Additionally, Hamas captured and detained more than 250 Israeli hostages, including young children and the elderly. There were also reports of rape and sexual violence perpetrated by Hamas militants against Israeli civilians (BBC, 2024).
Hamas claims that there are numerous Israeli crimes against the people of Palestine that justify its attack on Israel. These include, but are not limited to: the Israeli occupation and expansion of settlements of the West Bank; past Israeli attacks (2008 and 2014); the isolation and suppression of Gaza through the control of electricity, food and water supplied by Israel; Israeli security raids on Palestinian holy sites; increased Israeli rhetoric and violence towards Palestinians; the arrest of Hamas leaders; limiting economic concessions for Hamas controlled Gaza; and the Israeli Prime Minister’s denigration of Hamas’ legitimacy exemplified by tearing up the revised Hamas charter as a publicity stunt and statement of position against the regime (BBC, 2024 & Byman & Holtz, 2023).
So why the attack on October 7, 2023? Afterall, the adversarial relationship between Israel and Gaza has existed since Israel was first declared a state in 1948 and Gaza belonged to Egypt. The relationship was further stressed when Israel captured Gaza in the Six-Day War of 1967. Then there was the Palestinian uprising known as the First Intifada in 1987, followed by the Second Intifada in 2000 (Cohen et al, 2017). Byman & Holtz (2023) suggest that a couple of key factors combined may have been enough to trigger the attack. First, Hamas leaders were apparently losing the popular support of the Palestinian people in Gaza, who were spending many, if not most, of their days without electricity and with chronic food and water shortages, thanks to the suppression of resources by Israel. Similarly, the economic opportunities for Palestinians were grim, with most families being dependent on non-government organizations (NGO) and international aid to meet their basic needs. Lastly, Hamas’ moderated approach to governance over the last several years had not resulted in any economic concessions by or improved relations with Israel, possibly leaving Hamas in a position with no other viable options for survival (Byman & Holtz, 2023).
Harakat al-Muqawwama al-Islamiyya, or Hamas, was established as a splinter group from the Muslim Brotherhood in Palestine and considers itself a resistance group (Margolin & Levitt, 2023). Internationally, Hamas is recognized as a terrorist organization by several key nations including, but not limited to Israel, the United States, the Untied Kingdom, and the European Union. As a group, Hamas fundamentally rejects Israel’s right to exist. Its goal has been to create a culture of resistance within Gaza to effectually liberate Palestine and establish a single Islamist, Palestine state in place of Israel through violence, specifically jihad (Margolin & Levitt, 2023). Since it took control over Gaza in 2007, Hamas has grown into a heavily armed faction through financial and material support from Iran and Syria and is believed to have had as many as 30,000 fighters before the attacks of October 7, 2023 (BBC, 2024).
To typify the Hamas terrorist attack on Israel requires a some thought of the geopolitical structure in the region. The Gaza Strip, like the West Bank, is a Palestinian territory within the country of Israel. The Gaza territory is theoretically subject to the Palestinian Authority (PA), but since the takeover in 2007, it remains under Hamas authority and control based on their interpretation of Islam and sharia (OIRF, n.d.). Because Hamas is a bottom-up organization within a boundary of a single nation with the goal of displacing the Israeli government with its own governance and religious ideologies, designating Hamas as a religious domestic dissident terror organization would seem appropriate. However, since the 1993 Oslo Accords that 1) created the PA as the governing body of the Palestine people and 2) acknowledged the existence of Israel; and, given that Israel, after 40 years of occupation, completely withdrew from Gaza in 2005, Israel and Gaza have effectually been operating as two independent states. Since 2007, Hamas has effectually served as the governance for Gaza in place of the PA. Therefore, it would be more appropriate to typify the terrorist events executed by Hamas upon Israel on October 7, 2023, as external state-sponsored terrorism.
Israel’s response to the Hamas attack has been swift and devastating, waging a full-scale war on Hamas in Gaza that continues to this day (April 9, 2024). Israel Defense Forces (IDF) have attacked Hamas targets from air, land and sea, starting in northern Gaza (Gaza City) and sweeping south, forcing fighters and an estimated 1.7 million Palestinian civilians to flee south towards Khan Younis and eventually to Rafah, the southernmost city bordering Egypt (BBC, 2024 & Zanotti & Sharp, 2024). As a result of the mass evacuations, there exists a dire humanitarian crisis for Palestinians, with severe shortages of essentials such as food, water and medicine (BBC, 2024). The BBC (2024) also reports that more than 13,000 Palestinian fighters and 250 Israeli soldiers have been killed in the conflict thus far. Civilian casualties are far greater, with estimates of more than 30,000 Palestinians killed and more than 70,000 wounded in the Israeli response to the Hamas attacks (Marsi et al, 2024 & Zanotti & Sharp, 2024). Additionally, there has extensive damage to infrastructure, buildings and homes throughout Gaza.
UN and humanitarian agencies have described the refugee situation in Gaza as a man-made famine, as Palestinian refugees are literally dying from starvation and dehydration (Marsi et al, 2024). Zanotti & Sharp (2024) reference a February 2024 U.N. assessment that claims 25 percent of the Gaza population were “one step away from famine.” Despite intense pressure from the UN to influence cease-fires so that humanitarian aid can be safely provided to Palestinians, the Israel Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has repeatedly denied such requests and remains committed to his cause – “total victory, the elimination of Hamas, and the return of all hostages” (Zanotti & Sharp, 2024).
The events chosen for this TEAR represent three different types of terrorism carried out by three different terrorist actors or organizations with different motivations and goals. The seemingly simple task of typifying terrorist events proved to be more challenging than expected for the events described above. This was particularly true for events in the Middle East (Gaza/Israel) and South Asia (Pakistan), as the strife in these regions seem to revolve around similar religious motivations and goals and conflict associated with territorial and political boundaries. Interestingly and unintentionally, all three terrorism events discussed in this TEAR involve Muslim participants. The Mastung District suicide bombing and the Hamas attack on Israel both involved Muslim terrorist actors, while the Christchurch mosque shooting involved Muslims as the targeted and primary victims (Casserleigh & Merrick, 2013).
References
BBC. (2024, February 13). What is Hamas and why is it fighting with Israel in Gaza? https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-67039975
Byman, D. & Holtz, M. (2023-Decmber 6). Why Hamas attacked when it did. Center for Strategic and International Studies. https://www.csis.org/analysis/why-hamas-attacked-when-it-did
Casserleigh, A.H. (2024). Defining terrorism – Week 2 [Slides]. Askew School of Public Administration, Florida State University.
Casserleigh, A.H., & Merrick, D. (2013). Terrrorism: WTF?: weapons, tactics & the future. Kendall Hunt Publishing Co.
Cohen, R.S., Johnson, D.E., Thaler, D.E., Allen, B., Bartels, E.M. Cahill, J., & Efron, S. (2017). Lessons from Israel's Wars in Gaza. RAND Corporation. https://doi.org/10.7249/RB9975
Gul, A. (2024). UN: Al-Qaida, Afghan Taliban assist TTP with attacks in Pakistan. Voice of America (VOA) News. https://www.voanews.com/a/un-al-qaida-afghan-taliban-assist-ttp-with-attacks-in-pakistan-/7466250.html
Hamid, S. (2016). What a caliphate really is – and how the Islamic State is not one. The Brookings Institution. https://www.brookings.edu/articles/what-a-caliphate-really-is-and-how-the-islamic-state-is-not-one/
Kouchakji, K. (n.d.). Gun control: New Zealand shows the way. International Bar Association. https://www.ibanet.org/article/3E4700A8-8A7B-4766-B7CC-F59474F4A894
Margolin, D. & Levitt, M. (2023). The Road to October 7: Hamas’ long game, clarified. CTC Sentinel, 16(10), 1-10. Combating Terrorism Center at West Point. https://ctc.westpoint.edu/the-road-to-october-7-hamas-long-game-clarified/
Marsi, F. Harb, A. & Osgood, B. (2024-February 27). Israel’s war on Gaza live: Worsening famine could ‘kill thousands’ in days. Al Jazeera. https://www.aljazeera.com/news/liveblog/2024/2/27/israels-war-on-gaza-live-biden-comments-turn-focus-back-to-gaza-ceasefire
National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC). (2024). Terrorist groups – Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL). Counter-terrorism guide, Office of the Director of National Intelligence. https://www.dni.gov/nctc/groups/isil.html
New Zealand Royal Commission of Inquiry (NZRCI) (2020). Kō tō tātou kāinga tēnei: report of the Royal Commission of Inquiry into the terrorist attack on Christchurch masjidain on 15 March 2019. Author. https://christchurchattack.royalcommission.nz/the-report/
Office of International Religious Freedom (OIRF). (n.d.). 2022 Report on international religious freedom: Israel, West Bank and Gaza. U.S. Department of State. https://www.state.gov/reports/2022-report-on-international-religious-freedom/israel-west-bank-and-gaza/west-bank-and-gaza/
Pak Institute for Peace Studies (PIPS). (2018). Terrorist violence in election month claimed 230 lives in Pakistan. https://www.pakpips.com/article/3496
Reuters. (2020, June 18). New Zealand tightens gun laws further in response to mass shooting. https://www.reuters.com/article/idUSKBN23P0TD/
Sattar, A. & Ahmed, M. (2024). Bombings at Pakistani political offices kill at least 30 a day before parliamentary elections. Associated Press. https://apnews.com/article/pakistan-bombing-baluchistan-killed-election-471783e425dcfc0e63c235da23c52a73
Sayed, A. (2021, December 21). The evolution and future of Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan. Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. https://carnegieendowment.org/2021/12/21/evolution-and-future-of-tehrik-e-taliban-pakistan-pub-86051
Sayed, A., & Jadoon, A. (2022, August 16). Understanding Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan's unrelenting posture. Nexus, The Program on Extremism at George Washington University. https://extremism.gwu.edu/tehrik-e-taliban-pakistan-posture
Supporters. (2024, April 08). Christchurch Call. Retrieved April 8, 2024, from https://www.christchurchcall.com/our-community/countries-and-states
Zanotti, J., & Sharp, J.M. (2024, March 13). Israel and Hamas conflict in brief: overview, U.S. policy, and options for Congress (Document No.: R47828). Congressional Research Service. https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/R/R47828
