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General Douglas MacArthur’s Application of the Principles of The Art of War
Historiographical Essay
Douglas MacArthur served in the United States Army while the American military
emerged as a global power; he shaped much of the maturity of the forces. There are over twenty-
five biographies on this controvertial figure – known for his strategic brilliance as well is his
arrogant flair. He is studied prolifically in military institutions around the world, and hundreds of
books have been written on the various campaigns and battles he was direclty involved with.
Likewise, Chinese General Sun Tzu is a popular military figure. He captured his observed
lessons of warfare thousands of years ago, and they have been a topic of examination and
emulation by strategists (both military and political) world-wide for decades. MacArthur was an
avid reader and one of the texts he studied was The Art of War. The main question is, how did
General MacArthur effectively apply the principles of war in World War I, World War II, and
the Korean War to shape outcomes? Moreover, surveyors of history will want to discern in what
battles/conflicts did General MacArthur not effectively execute the principles of the art of war,
and what was the impact? To answer these and other related investigations, one needs to examine
the ancient laws of war as dovetailed with modern combat. Furthermore, it is essential to review
select instances of military activity to review the impact of applying a single principle of war in a
battle, versus multiple principles of war applied over the course of a prolonged conflict.
With General MacArthur’s role in three spectacular conflicts, there are a plethora of
military actions to choose from for exploration; nevertheless, seven instances stand out as
particularly significant for both MacArthur and for the United States: 1) the battle of Cote de
Chatillon, in France, in 1918; 2) the Japanese attack on U.S. assets at Clark Field, in the
Philippines, in 1941; 3) Move to, and defense of, Bataan and Corregidor, in the Philippines, from
1941 to 1942; 4) Operation Cartwheel’s island-hopping assaults around New Guinea, from 1942
to 1945; 5) the series of delaying maneuvers to stem North Korea’s advance at the onset of the
Korean War, in 1950; 6) the grisly combat at the Pusan Perimeter, on the southern tip of Korea,
1950; and 7) the Inchon amphibious landing, in South Korea, in 1950. Ultimately, after an
examination of General MacArthur’s methods, battles and strategies, as viewed through the
scope of Sun Tzu’s ancient principles of war, the reader will be able to understand what analysis
and implications can be drawn to inform current and future warfare.
In terms of the precepts of the art of war, there are a number of translations and
interpretations of Sun Tzu’s writing, The Art of War. As is often the case with ancient
manuscripts, there are corruptions in the text. Furthermore, as copies have been made over the
centuries, variations to the material inevitably resulted. This thesis extracts from the Song
Dynasty version, written between 960 – 1279 CE as this is the most widely accepted manuscript.
From a literature review perspective, it is also important to note that different translators took
varying degrees of liberty in selecting words in English to match the classical Chinese language.
The ancient Chinese language is written without any punctuation, which increases the number of
interpretations of the original text. Due to the aforementioned factors, no two translations of Sun
Tzu’s Art of War are identical. James Trapp’s translation of Sun Tzu’s The Art of War (2011)1
was chosen for use in this thesis because of its style; in this rendition Trapp allows the context
and balance of the prose to dictate his translation. The Art of War is divided into thirteen
1. Sun Tzu, The Art of War, trans. James Trapp (London: Chartwell Books, Inc., 2011).
chapters, each focusing on a particular aspect of battle, leadership or strategic planning; this
structure is generally undisputed among scholars.
In addition to the original text of The Art of War, several historians have written works
exploring Sun Tzu’s principles. In Mark McNielly’s book, Sun Tzu and the Art of Modern
Warfare (2001),2 he argues the need for reframing the 2,000-year-old theories within the
contemporary construct. Another esteemed author and student of Sun Tzu, Bevin Alexander,
wrote several books pertaining to the topic. In How Wars are Won: The 13 Rules of War from
Ancient Greece to the War on Terror (2002),3 Bevin helps to elucidate how the foundational
stratagems of warfare have been exacted by diverse adversaries and across continents. In How
Great General’s Win (1993),4 this same author draws connections between the timeless rules and
their effective application throughout military history. Each of these pieces contribute
explanatory analysis in relation to the principles of war, which is helpful in interpreting the
ancient material for modern use.
Additionally, several prominent authors have contributed comprehensive books which
catalogue Douglas MacArthur’s entire career, emphasizing his strengths and weaknesses shown
during all three of the aforementioned large-scale wars. Among those authors, is Dorris Clayton
James (better known as D. Clayton James), one of the most widely recognized scholars on
Douglas MacArthur and his campaigns in World War I, World War II and the Korean War. In
James’ three-volume set The Years of MacArthur – Volume I: 1880-1941,5 Volume II: 1941-
2. Mark McNeilly, Sun Tzu and the Art of Modern Warfare (New York: Oxford University Press, 2015). 3. Bevin Alexander, How Wars are Won: The 13 Rules of War from Ancient Greece to the War on Terror
(New York: Crown Publishers, 2002). 4. Bevin Alexander, How Great Generals Win (New York: W. W. Norton and Company, 1993). 5. Dorris Clayton James, The Years of MacArthur: Volume I, 1880-1941 (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1970).
1945,6 and Volume III: 1945-1964,7 published in 1970, 1975 and 1985 respectively – he
characterizes in extensive detail, each engagement that MacArthur was involved in during his
fifty-two-year service. The preponderance of MacArthur authors who have published historical
analyses on MacArthur buttress their assertions by referencing James’ authoritative publications.
Another broad work is MacArthur and the American Century: A Reader (2001),8 edited by
William M. Leary. This book is unique in that it presents essays and excerpts from several
MacArthur experts and historians, to include Stephen A. Ambrose and Stanley L. Falk, as well as
first hand narratives from Dwight D. Eisenhower and Douglas MacArthur. Furthermore, Leary
assembles a variety of perspectives, comprising diverse interpretations of MacArthur, to include,
but not limited to, Australian historian David Horner, naval historian Clark Reynolds, and
MacArthur’s military Secretary Faubion Bowers. The distinctive approach taken by Leary
provides the reader an insightful, well-balanced review of decisions made and actions taken by
MacArthur. It reflects supporter and critic perspectives, as well as vantage points from
individuals inside and outside of MacArthur’s close circle. William Manchester’s 1978 American
Caesar: Douglas MacArthur 1880 – 18649 is particularly helpful in understanding the context of
MacArthur’s battles within world affairs, to include the political machinations in Washington
which underpinned each military struggle. Douglas MacArthur: American Warrior (2016)10 by
6. Dorris Clayton James, The Years of MacArthur: Volume II, 1941-1945 (Boston: Houghton Mifflin,
1975). 7. Dorris Clayton James, The Years of MacArthur: Volume III, 1945-1964 (Boston: Houghton Mifflin,
1985). 8. William Leary, We Shall Return: MacArthur's Commanders and the Defeat of Japan 1942-1945
(Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 1988).
9. William Manchester, American Caesar: Douglas MacArthur, 1880-1964 (New York: Dell Publishing, 1978).
10. Arthur Herman, Douglas MacArthur: American Warrior (New York: Random House, 2016).
Arthur Herman strives to assess the dichotomy of the personage of MacArthur, explaining the
polarizing figure that stirs both unabashed adoration as well as unrestrained contempt. An
extremely well-researched biography of MacArthur, by Geoffrey Perret, is found in Old Soldiers
Never Die: The Life of Douglas MacArthur (1996).11 Drawing extensively from original sources
and expert historian and archival accounts of facts and assessments, Perret’s work places the
battle for Cote de Chatillon, his island hopping in the Pacific, and MacArthur’s fight during the
Korean battles, under the microscope, conveying each instance of victory or defeat in granular
detail. In The Most Dangerous Man in America (2014),12 Mark Perry takes a critical approach of
the general’s career, disparaging MacArthur’s disregard for political authority, and choosing to
highlight the talented men who worked for him as opposed to crediting MacArthur himself.
Perry’s work provides key insights as to the motivations and decision making of an often
enigmatic leader.
A myriad of books on the military exploits of MacArthur delve into the particulars of one
concentrated area or another – a specific war and MacArthur’s strategy contribution; his
character and leadership qualities; or the tactical-level fine points of a battle or operation. The
Coldest Winter: America and the Korean War (2007)13 by David Halberstam is one such piece.
To support his meticulous narrative, he leverages diaries and first-hand accounts of soldiers who
fought in the Korean War at various times and at different echelons. Particularly useful are the
11. Geoffrey Perret, Old Soldiers Never Die (New York: Random House, 1996). 12. Mark Perry, The Most Dangerous Man in America: The Making of Douglas MacArthur (Philadelphia:
Basic Books, 1996). 13. David Halberstam, The Coldest Winter: America and the Korean War (New York: The Amateurs,
2007).
included maps and tactical perspectives presented regarding specific skirmishes such as the stem
of North Korea’s advance, the Pusan perimeter engagement and the Inchon landing. Another
carefully researched study is James P. Duffy’s, War at the End of the World: Douglas
MacArthur and the Forgotten Fight for New Guinea, 1942 - 1945 (2016),14 which explores an
oft overlooked episode in World War II, during which MacArthur’s clever island-hopping
positioned the United States to effectively counter Japan’s Southeast Asia offensive. War veteran
and author Winston Groom, in The Generals: Patton, MacArthur, Marshall, and the Winning of
World War II (2015),15 analyzes the characteristics of great leaders, to comprehend the
battlefield instincts displayed by proven victors. His narrative equips the reader with clear
examples of exemplary intelligence and calculated combat risk displayed by several American
icons, including Douglas MacArthur.
The major historiographical issues surrounding the topic of Douglas MacArthur are
three-fold. First, while each scholarly writing investigates primary sources which are available
by the millions in archives around the United States, because of the sheer volume of archives,
there is no one comprehensive book which could possibly address all relevant aspects of
MacArthur’s service on over a hundred battlefields. Secondly, because war is dynamic and
asymmetric the accounts vary widely: perspectives change day-to-day as conditions on the
battlefield shift; and war is actioned by different nations, at dissimilar echelons of the military
(national, operational, tactical), as well as by various branches of service (Army, Navy, Air
Force). It is not likely that a review of any particular operation takes fully into account the
14. James P. Duffy, War at the End of the World: Douglas MacArthur and the Forgotten Fight for New
Guinea, 1942-1945 (New York: New American Library, 2016). 15. Winston Groom, The Generals: Patton, MacArthur, Marshall and the Winning of World War II
(Washington, DC: National Geographic Society, 2015).
hundreds of thousands of data points which contribute to the total understanding of that event.
For instance, the four year struggle in WWII’s island hopping from Australia, through New
Guinea, to the Philippines contained over a thousand days of activity; moreover, there are
hundreds of accounts of that activity – whether it is from a perspective of a leader in
Washington, from MacArthur himself, from a naval officer, from an Australian, American,
Philippine or Japanese soldier. These factors contribute to the numerous viewpoints within the
body of literature available on MacArthur’s WWI, WWII and Korean War engagements.
Thirdly, MacArthur is a figure who evokes powerful emotions and opinions; he is both
passionately admired for his distinctive courage and battlefield genius, and vehemently
villainized for his arrogance and failures. Though there are authors who strive to present a
balanced view, published works are generally polarized in one of two groups: supporters or
critics. Therefore, in studying MacArthur, the examiner needs to assimilate the aforementioned
historiographical concerns, survey the material of most significant value, and present an
accurate, focused analysis.
Journal articles provide an even wider repository of critique, expertise and perspective for
reviewing General MacArthur’s contribution in warfare. One article in the Royal Geographic
Society, proves quite enlightening in the sense of understanding the cultural climate surrounding
MacArthur during World War II; that is “The Pacific Theatre of Operations,”16 by William
Courtenay, written ominously during the height of Japanese aggression and merely six months
prior to the U.S. dropping of the atomic bomb. In this February 1945 piece, Courtenay, a war
correspondent for several years in MacArthur’s headquarters, discusses his journalistic
16. William Courtenay, “The Pacific Theatre of Operations,” The Geographical Journal Vol 105, no. 3/4
(Mar-Apr 1945): 112-20, accessed August 1, 2016, http://www.jstor.org/stable/1789562.
impressions of the day-to-day ebb and flow of military operations. In contrast, is a particularly
insightful article by Peter Lowe, titled, “An Ally and a Recalcitrant General: Great Britain,
Douglas MacArthur and the Korean War, 1950-1.”17 Lowe emphasizes the general’s perception
of Europe, including Great Britain, and how that perception influenced his military actions in the
twilight of his career. Additionally, MacArthur expert and former chief historian for the Air
Force, Stanley Falk, streamlines the narrative on the general, by crafting a pithy piece describing
major milestones and characterizations for the Journal of American History: “The Nation and
Beyond: Transnational Perspectives on United States History.”18
In addition to the wide-ranging scholarly work on applied warfare concepts and Douglas
MacArthur’s career, there is a vast array of original source material. In regard to MacArthur’s
five-decade military career, there are millions of archival records maintained in various
locations, such as the National Archives in Maryland and the MacArthur Memorial Archives in
Virginia. Included in these archives are photographs, film reels, declassified intelligence reports,
personal letters, newsprint and journals. One of the most informative and revealing primary
sources in terms of MacArthur’s psychology of war is his personal memoir, Reminiscences
(1964).19 It was completed only weeks before his death, and therefore was presented from a
comprehensive, reflective and hindsight perspective. Extremely valuable in decomposing the
Cote de Chatillon Battle in World War I are the numerous letters from operaters, collected by the
17. Peter Lowe, “An Ally and a Recalcitrant General: Great Britain, Douglas MacArthur and the Korean
War, 1950-1,” The English Historical Review 105, no. 416 (1990): 624-53, accessed August 3, 2016, http://www.jstor.org/stable/570755.
18. Stanley L. Falk, “The Nation and Beyond: Transnational Perspectives on United States History,”
Oxford Journals, Organization for American Historians (Dec. 1999): 1432, accessed August 2, 2016, http://www.jstor.org/stable/2568739.
19. Douglas MacArthur, Reminiscences: Douglas McArthur, General of the Army, New York: McGraw-
Hill Book Company, 1964.
American Battle Commission in the early 1920’s. The Commission sent a report of the U.S.
fight, complete with maps to a number of veterans; over eight commanders of units at several
echelons sent back their recollection of the events that took place in October of 1918. The
accounts, like that of Lloyd Ross, are archived as part of the “Meuse Argonne Collection”20 at
the MacArthur Memorial Archives. Also, the National Security Agency cryptologic documents
contain declassified reports by U.S. Army Ultra representatives, demonstrating the
breakthroughs in information collection that was made possible with radio intelligence and
MacArthur’s code breaking units. Advancements in this discipline equipped field commands in
several theatres of operations, to include the Pacific, from 1944 to 1945. Maps, photographs,
planning documents, letters and military reports pertaining to relevant battles and operations
reveal the tactical information needed for rigorous analysis. Those include material in the
MacArthur Archives on the following activities which took place under Douglas MacArthur’s
command: 1918 Battle of Cote de Chatillon; the 1941 Japanese attack on US assets at Clark
Field; the 1941 to 1942 Bataan and Corregidor operations; the 1943 to 1944 New Guinea island-
hopping assaults; and the Korean War fighting, to include the 1950 Inchon amphibious landing.
The aggregate works and archival material deconstruct in considerable detail
MacArthur’s military engagements. Additionally, in the aforementioned analyzed works on Sun
Tzu’s The Art of War, such as those by Bevin Alexander, conclusions are drawn on how the
ancient principles of war have been effectively employed in the 2,000 years since they were
written. Insight presented aids in correlating abstract and broad concepts, such as Sun Tzu’s
teaching on gaining momentum, into modern warfare. Regarding the published books on
20. Lloyd D. Ross, “Letter to the American Battle Monuments Commission,” Meuse Argonne Collection
(Norfolk, Virginia: MacArthur Memorial Archives, 2 December 1926).
Douglas MacArthur, Dorris Clayton James’ three-volume series concludes that MacArthur,
despite some significant character flaws and lapses in judgment, monumentally influenced the
success of several U.S. endeavors in the first part of the 20th century. His all-inclusive books
support both a deep and wide-ranging study of MacArthur’s actions leading up to, during, and
following each of the wars: WWI, WWII and the Korean War. Other prominent authors as noted
– William Manchester and Arthur Herman – uncover the complex personality of MacArthur,
describing potential motivations behind decisions he made at various stages of war. This is
particularly beneficial because it acts as a counter-balance to MacArthur’s own original work,
Reminiscences, which is in some ways lofty, embellished and one-sided in its perspective. The
compiled narrative of William Leary, which includes excerpts from acclaimed MacArthur
historians, former U.S. presidents, foreign parties, military experts and naval historians, are
particularly useful in providing perspective in this thesis. The diverse array of writers provides
differing opinions of events, which support contextualization, while the expert analyses reflect
rigorous examination and vetted conclusions. When analyzed in the context of Sun Tzu’s
foundational precepts, the body of literature on Douglas MacArthur reveals warfare insights that
transcend time, geography and foe. Synthesized, they assist in examining the most effective
methods and tactics for battlefield success.
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Philippines, Invasion, 1953.” Office of the Chief of Military History, US Army. Accessed June 18, 2016. http://www.ibiblio.org/hyperwar/USA/USA-P-Return.
Chen, Jian. The New Cold War History: Mao’s China and the Cold War. Chapel Hill: University
of North Carolina Press, 2010. Colley, Rupert, World War I: History in an Hour. Boston: Harper Collins, 2012. Colley, Rupert, World War II: History in an Hour. Boston: Harper Collins, 2011. Courtenay, William. “The Pacific Theatre of Operations.” The Geographical Journal Vol 105,
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University of Missouri, 2008. Gilmore, Allison B. You Can’t Fight Tanks with Bayonets: Psychological Warfare against the
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