Politica Pshycology

IP1030 Coursework

OPTION 1 WORD COUNT: 1430 (NOT INCLUDING BIBLIOGRAPHY)

IP1030 Post-Coup Crackdown in Turkey Essay Tuesday, 7 November 2017

2

How does the role of the military effect the likelihood of a coup against a regime? Does a

coup attempt lead to a greater chance of democratisation in a country? Can anti-coup

methods and actions of the international community effect the circumstances around a coup?

Turkey has a long and turbulent history of coups over several decades, July 2016 being the

most recent attempt to overthrow President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan. Staged on the night of the

16th July 2016 (BBC News , 2016), more than 1,400 people were wounded when factions of

Turkey’s military attempted to seize control of Istanbul and Ankara. Academics such as

Clayton L. Thyne and Jonathan M. Powell, as well as Rollin F. Tusalem, have argued there

are many factors when considering the causes of and aftermaths of coups. In this essay, I will

explore how these theories can be applied to the contemporary example of Turkey,

supporting the thesis that highly politicised militaries lead to greater chance of coups; but

argue how, in this case, a military coup did not lead to greater democratisation.

The role of the military can be a highly significant factor in the start of a coup. Research

shows that a highly politicised military may have a ‘deleterious effect on the quality of

democracy’, especially amongst states that are transitioning towards democracy (Tusalem,

2014, p. 482). This can be applied to Turkey, which currently receives a 3 rating on the Polity

IV Data Series and is described as a ‘open anocracy’ (Centre for Systematic Peace , 2014); a

transitioning state with elements of democratic institutions. It is therefore vulnerable to the

effects that a highly politicised military may have on a new democracy and the success of

democracy. As an ex-authoritarian regime, Turkey has been subjected to the ‘threshold

problem’ on several occasions in recent history; the civilian government is monitored by the

military on matters of domestic policy and actions continuously (Schedler, 1998). This leads

to the likelihood that the military will intervene in domestic politics and is more likely to start

a coup. Equally, as an institutionalised military exists in Turkey, the chances of a ‘revolving

door policy’ of intervention is greater (Tusalem, 2014).

Turkey’s military has acted as, and become, a vanguard of the Turkish state. Since it’s ‘self-

appointment’ (Cizre, 2004, p. 109) it has continued to politicise Turkey’s domestic problems

in attempts to fight security threats such as Islamic and Kurdish nationalism. This

overbearing role poses a problem for the success of democracy in Turkey and explains the

recent coup in 2016, the lack of subordination to democratic control meant that intervention

was possible. This is partly related to the fact that the Turkish military, arguably, has not

transitioned towards democratic models as seen in the West – with civilian led Defence

IP1030 Post-Coup Crackdown in Turkey Essay Tuesday, 7 November 2017

3

Ministries respecting the democratic status quo. Outlined in the post-cold war consensus,

‘democratic control of armed forces’ (Decaf) has been applied to various regimes as a

condition towards democratising, behind this a clear principle of constitutional division

between the military and civil sectors. Turkey does not feature this divide, which ultimately

means it has become increasingly susceptible to coups (Cizre, 2004).

Since 2014, Turkey’s leader has been Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, known to be a ‘Islamist tinted

President, in a country where the military tries to harshly defend secularism’ (The Economist,

2016). Islamist extremism in nearby Syria and the rise of Kurdish nationalism has proven a

stubborn problem for Turkey’s elite, this has lent its hand to the mild Islamist direction that

President Erdoğan has been moving his country towards. Eventually, this culminated into

several unhappy members of the military, who utilised their institutionalised and politically

entrenched position to stage the 2016 coup. Since, Turkey has become increasingly

authoritarian under President Erdoğan – with allegations of human rights abuse, press

freedom violations and increased police brutality. The 2016 coup was led by factions of the

military opposed to Erdoğan’s increasingly authoritarian regime, which attempted to reinstate

democratic control under the banner of the ‘Peace at Home Council’. However, despite their

attempts, the coup was unsuccessful in ensuring greater democracy in Turkey; contrary to the

theories of academics such as Thyne and Powell, who note that coups may lead to greater

democracy within a country.

It has been shown that coups often don’t happen in democracies and that leaders who face a

coup therefore have motives to reform, improving economic and political stability;

nevertheless, this is not the case in Turkey. Coups may provide the stimulation needed for

democratic reform (Thyne & Powell, 2016); a regime may be considered to have

democratised if it moves beyond 5+ on the Polity IV Dataset (Marshall & Jaggers, 2000) and

as previously noted, Turkey currently only receives a 3 rating within this dataset (Centre for

Systematic Peace , 2014); hence not yet currently reaching the status of democracy. The 2016

coup follows the theory prescribed by Thyne and Powell, that the leaders of the coup must be

part of the elite apparatus of the regime, but that following the July 16th attempt, greater

democratisation did not emerge in Turkey. Even though a failure, the act of a Coup d'état

‘should increase the likelihood of democratisation’; despite this we have seen rising anti-

democratic features in Turkey and the destabilisation of relationships with democratic states.

(Thyne & Powell, 2016, p. 198). Since the state of emergency in Turkey post-coup, 6,000

IP1030 Post-Coup Crackdown in Turkey Essay Tuesday, 7 November 2017

4

servicemen have been arrested, 8,000 policemen sacked and 3,000 judges detained (The

Economist, 2016). Erdoğan’s survival of the coup attempt doesn’t change the underlying

causes of the coup, which may lead to further unrest. In particular, regimes such as those in

Turkey may attempt another method to stave off further coups, rather than democratise.

These anti-coup methods come with varying degrees of success and can lead to a decline in

democratisation within a country.

As previously mentioned, the anti-coup methods taken by President Erdoğan have led to

increased criticism from the West and international organisations (IOs). In Turkey, we have

seen mass purges within the military and civil justice system, this arguably may lead to

greater friction and increased chances of a further coup according to Thyne and Powell

(2016). Within Turkey, the underlying causes of the coup have yet to be addressed – merely

the manipulation of ‘triggering causes, which are short- term factors that precipitate a coup’

has occurred (Bacik & Salur, 2010). However, Turkey has faced pressure from the

international community to act on some of the structural weaknesses that lead to coups;

including greater democratic legitimacy and human rights protections. Nevertheless, post

2016 Coup, these messages of democratisation have seemingly fallen on deaf ears.

From an outside perspective, the West and IOs have adopted policies than tend to prevent

coups from occurring within a country, questioning the thesis that coups promote democracy.

IOs can be seen to act against coups in order to protect democratic principles within a state;

but as previously mentioned, the likelihood of a coup in a democratic country is greatly

reduced compared with an authoritarian regime. IOs may implement mechanisms to suspend

members who undergo a coup or states may decide to cut aid and military support if a coup

takes place in a country (Thyne & Powell, 2016). Recently, the crackdown in Turkey has

drastically affected the accession of the country into the European Union. Most recently, a

break down in relations culminated in the European Parliament voting to suspend accession

talks with Turkey in November 2016 (The Guardian, 2016). Such actions by IOs therefore

discredit the theory that ‘that coups might promote or protect democratization in the long run’

and that in the case of Turkey they have had the opposite effect (Thyne & Powell, 2016, p.

193).

In conclusion, it could be argued that the theory of politicised and institutionalised militaries

within a regime leads to a greater likelihood of a coup taking place (Tusalem, 2014).We have

IP1030 Post-Coup Crackdown in Turkey Essay Tuesday, 7 November 2017

5

seen this in Turkey over several decades and most recently in 2016. Furthermore, the lack of

subordination to civilian authority means that the Turkish military possess increasing

influence on various policy issues. On the other hand, it should be noted that the fact a coup

takes place, successful or not, does not guarantee greater democratisation – contrary to the

writings by Thyne and Powell. Turkey’s position in the international community has been

adversely affected with the passing of the coup, international pressures grow on states to act

after such an event. Turkey has merely responded with increased authoritarianism and has

neglected the underlying causes of the coup. Consequently, we see Turkey as a state with an

increasingly turbulent political future, attempting to democratise but remaining vulnerable to

all the factors mentioned before.

Bibliography

Bacik, G. & Salur, S., 2010. Coup-Proofing in Turkey. European Journal of Economic and

Political Studies, 3(2).

BBC News , 2016. http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-36816045. [Online]

Available at: http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-36816045

[Accessed 7 December 2016].

Centre for Systematic Peace , 2014. Data Page. [Online]

Available at: http://www.systemicpeace.org/inscrdata.html

[Accessed 13 December 2016].

Cizre, U., 2004. Problems of democratic governance of civil-military relations in Turkey and

the European Union enlargement zone. European Journal of Political Research,

January.43(1).

Marshall, M. G. & Jaggers, K., 2000. Polity IV Dataset and Users’ Manual: Political Regime

Characteristics and Transitions, 1800–1999. [Online]

Available at: http://www.systemicpeace.org/polity/polity4.htm

[Accessed 13 December 2016].

Schedler, A., 1998. What is democratic consolidation?. Journal of Democracy, 9(1).

The Economist, 2016. After the coup, the counter-coup. The Economist, 23 July.

The Guardian, 2016. Turkey reacts angrily to symbolic EU parliament vote on its

membership. [Online]

Available at: https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/nov/24/eu-parliament-votes-freeze-

membership-talks-turkey

[Accessed 14 December 2016].

Thyne, C. L. & Powell, J., 2016. Coup d’e ́tat or Coup d’Autocracy? How Coups Impact

Democratization, 1950–2008. Foreign Policy Analysis.

Tusalem, R. F., 2014. Bringing the military back in: The politicisation of the military and its

effect on democratic consolidation. International Political Science Review , 34(4), p. 482.

IP1030 Post-Coup Crackdown in Turkey Essay Tuesday, 7 November 2017

6