Week 15

Rape Camps as a Means of Ethnic Cleansing: Religious, Cultural, and Ethical Responses to Rape Victims in the Former Yugoslavia

Author(s): Todd A. Salzman

Source: Human Rights Quarterly , May, 1998, Vol. 20, No. 2 (May, 1998), pp. 348-378

Published by: The Johns Hopkins University Press

Stable URL: https://www.jstor.org/stable/762769

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Rape Camps as a Means of Ethnic Cleansing: Religious, Cultural, and Ethical Responses to Rape Victims in the Former Yugoslavia

Todd A. Salzman*

I. INTRODUCTION

Currently, the International War Crimes Tribunal in The Hague, Nether- lands, is trying indicted war criminals in the Bosnia-Herzegovina war. During this conflict an estimated 20,000 women endured sexual assaults in the form of torture and rape.' Although these atrocities were committed on all sides of the warring factions, by far the greatest number of assaults were

* Todd Salzman completed his doctorate in Moral Theology at the Katholieke Universiteit Leuven in 1994. He taught ethics at the University of San Diego for two years (1995-1997), and is currently an Assistant Professor at Creighton University, Omaha, NE. His interest is in ethical theory, how it pertains to contemporary social issues such as the atrocities committed in the former Yugoslavia, and what can be done to both prevent such atrocities in the future and to seek justice for the victims of those atrocities.

I dedicate this article to my wife, Katy Salzman, whose support and work in Geneva at UNHCR (United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees) were invaluable in providing the documentation for this article. I would like to thank Maarit Kohonen at the United Nations Centre for Human Rights for her assistance in bringing this article to fruition. 1. See Working Paper on the Situation of Systematic Rape, Sexual Slavery and Slavery-Like

Practices During Wartime, Including Internal Armed Conflict, Submitted by Ms. Linda Chavez in Accordance with Subcommission Decision 1994/109, U.N. ESCOR, Comm'n on Hum. Rts., 47th Sess., Agenda Item 16, I] 4, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1995/38 (1995) [hereinafter Working Paped; M. CHERIF BASSIOUNI & MARCA MCCORMICK, SEXUAL VIOLENCE: AN INVISIBLE WEAPON OF WAR IN THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA 3 (1996) (distinguishing between rape, sexual assault, and sexual violence).

Rape denotes vaginal, oral, or anal sexual intercourse without the consent of one of the people involved. Sexual assault is a broader term, which includes rape and other forced or coerced sexual acts, as well as mutilation of the genitals. Sexual violence is the most general term, used to describe any kind of violence carried out through sexual means or by targeting sexuality.

Id.

Human Rights Quarterly 20 (1998) 348-378 0 1998 by The Johns Hopkins University Press

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Rape Camps as Ethnic Cleansing

committed by the Serbs2 against Muslim women, though Catholic Croats were targeted as well.3 While in past conflicts rape was sometimes considered an inevitable byproduct of war, and thus largely ignored when it came to punishing the perpetrators, the Bosnian conflict brought the practice of rape with genocidal intent to a new level, causing an outcry among the international community. Evidence suggests that these violations were not random acts carried out by a few dissident soldiers.4 Rather, this was an assault against the female gender, violating her body and its reproductive capabilities as a "weapon of war." Serbian political and military leaders systematically planned and strategically executed this policy of ethnic cleansing or genocide with the support of the Serbian and Bosnian Serb armies and paramilitary groups to create a "Greater Serbia": a religiously, culturally, and linguistically homogenous Serbian nation.5 This article will examine two main issues. First, in section two the Serbs' systematic use of rape camps with the specific intent of impregnating their victims is investigated, along with the cultural, political, and religious foundations that support this usurpation of the female body. The third section will then analyze the "secondary victimization" of these women and the various responses implicitly supporting the Serbian practice and objec- tive.

II. THE SERBIAN USURPATION OF THE FEMALE BODY

In a traditionally patriarchal society, the Serbian government, military, and Orthodox church have explicitly formulated a perception of the female gender and its role and function within society. Essentially, the female is reduced to her reproductive capacities in order to fulfill the overall objective of Serbian nationalism by producing more citizens to populate the nation. Limiting womanhood to a single physiological quality in this way proves nondiscriminatory in that not only are Serbian women thus per- ceived, but non-Serbian women are as well. This attitude has certainly had an impact, conscious or unconscious, on the overall perception and treatment of women, playing a part in the establishment of rape camps and the usurpation of women's bodies to achieve ethnic cleansing.

2. Clearly many Serbs were appalled at the atrocities that took place during the Bosnian war. In this article, "Serbs" refers to those who were politically and militarily responsible for the policy of ethnic cleansing and the atrocities committed against non-Serbs.

3. See BASSIOUNI & MCCORMICK, supra note 1, at 10-11. 4. See id. at 8. 5. See id. at 5.

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A. Serbian Usurpation of the Serbian Female Body

Perhaps the traditional role of the Serbian woman is most clearly depicted by the Mother of the Jugovici, the epic heroine from the Battle of Kosovo in 1389, who, in spite of the death of her nine sons in the battle with the Turks, did not weep.6 Her courage, self-sacrifice, altruism, and, most of all, her fertility, have been utilized to inspire and serve as a paradigm for Serbian women and their responsibility as mothers of the nation. According to this twisted reasoning, the necessity of reproduction guarantees Serbian perse- verance against Her aggressors and establishes a greater Serbia, "Mother- Homeland." To shirk one's duty of reproduction amounts to antipatriotism and treason. The assertion of a Sarajevo woman who claimed that she planned to "fire off one baby every year to spite the aggressors" reflects the power of this myth and its message.7 Serbians have waged this propaganda campaign of women's national and social reproductive responsibility on both political and religious fronts with remarkable success, as is evidenced in legislation "encouraging" women's reproductive responsibilities.

1. Governmental Policy and Demography

In October 1992, powerful organs in Serbian society published a document entitled "Warning," focusing on demographic issues.8 Signed by the Serbian ruling party, the Serbian Socialist Party (SPS), the Serbian Academy of Arts and Sciences, and the Serbian Orthodox Church, this document highlighted the imbalance in terms of growth and renewal of various ethnic groups. In particular, "Albanians, Muslims and Romans [sic], with their high birth rate, are beyond rational and human reproduction."9 The SPS conference adopted this document, and the Serbian Parliament enacted a resolution promoting "population renewal," seeking to stimulate the birth rate in some areas while suppressing it in others.10 Perhaps it is by no means coincidental that those areas designated for an increase in birth rates were predominantly developed Serbian areas, whereas the suppression of birth rates was encouraged in predominantly undeveloped Albanian and Muslim areas. In fact, statistics in many areas of the Balkans do reveal higher reproduction rates among non-Serbs,11 but the reasons given for this difference vary depending on the source.

6. See Wendy Bracewell, Mothers of the Nation, 36 WARREPORT, Sept. 1995, at 28. 7. See id.

8. See Zarana Papic, How to Become a "Real" Serbian Woman?, 36 WARREPORT, Sept. 1995, at 41.

9. Id. 10. See id. 11. See VATRO MURVAR, NATION AND RELIGION IN CENTRAL EUROPE AND THE WESTERN BALKANS-THE

MUSLIMS IN BOSNIA-HERCEGOVINA AND SANDZAK: A SOCIOLOGICAL ANALYSIS (1989).

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Rape Camps as Ethnic Cleansing

While numerous sociological, cultural, and historical factors may account for the differences in population growth among the different cultural and religious groups, the Serbian government has focused on ideological and naturalist reasons. Ideologically, non-Serbs reproduce as a political strategy to outgrow the Serbian nation. The naturalist reason asserts that non-Serbs are intrinsically primitive in their ethnic reasoning, and will not adjust or adapt to the Serbian mentality.12 Such political rhetoric instills the fear that the subtle, though very real means of a shift in demography and population growth threatens the Serbian nation and thus promotes a nationalist sentiment. It singles out Serbian women and their responsibility to serve the nation through reproduction to insure population expansion and to provide future soldiers to defend the nation in times of war.13 Furthermore, governmental legislation supporting reproduction found ecclesiological support from the Serbian Orthodox Church.

2. The Serbian Orthodox Church:

Reproduction and Religious Sanctions

In December 1994, Patriarch Pavle, leader of the Serbian Orthodox Church, delivered a Christmas message denouncing the "White Plague," that is, the low birth rate among Serbian women.14 This plague results from infanticide "committed by women who choose not to give birth because of their 'contentment.'"15 The "disease" can only be cured by making Serbian women want to bear children. Accomplishing this objective mandates religious sanctions to stigmatize a woman for not wanting to procreate, and declare such an attitude to be a threefold sin: against themselves, the Serbian nation, and God himself.16 The women sin against themselves because "many mothers who did not want more than one child, today bitterly cry and pull their hair in despair over the loss of the only son in the war . . . why did they not give birth to more children and have them as consolation."17 They sin against the Serbian nation because "in twenty years, the Serbs will, if such a birth-rate remains, become an ethnic minority in their own country."18 Finally, they sin against God because "when they come to meet God, those mothers who never allowed their children to be born will meet their children who will sadly ask: why did you kill me? Why did you not let me live?"'9 In a passionate plea, Archbishop Pavle appealed

12. See Papic, supra note 8, at 41. 13. See NORMAN CIGAR, GENOCIDE IN BOSNIA: THE POLICY OF "ETHNIC CLEANSING" 78-80 (1995). 14. See Papic, supra note 8, at 40 (quoting Archbishop Pavle's speech). 15. Id. 16. See id. at 40-41. 17. Id. at 40. 18. Id. 19. Id.

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to the nationalistic sentiment of Serbian women to willfully reproduce for the betterment of the country. In his speech, Pavle drew certain parallels between women, their bodies, the survival of the nation, and the war effort. By not giving birth to more children, women have placed the survival of the nation in jeopardy. Therefore, Serbian women must heed the battle call and respond by offering their bodies as incubators, preferably to male children. This attitude is reflected in the frequently cited aphorism that "for every Serbian soldier dead in battle in Slovenia, Serbian mothers must bear 100 more fighters!"20

Serbian reproduction then has served two particular objectives: to create more Serbs to further the Serbian nationalist ideology, and to create more soldiers to defend the country. The obvious irony of the nationalistic appeal for Serbian women to reproduce so that their (male) children can die for the country is that it somewhat defeats the purpose of the first objective. This irony notwithstanding, the attitude limits women's potential as human beings to their reproductive faculties; they are a means of attaining the end of a greater Serbia. In a very real sense, Serbian women have served as a "weapon of war" for the military agenda of their own country. This attitude and perception of women and their bodies had much broader implications, however.

B. Serbian Usurpation of Non-Serbian Women: Rape Camps as a Weapon of War

1. Serbian Propaganda: Muslims Raping Serbian Women

Propaganda has played a major role in conflicts of the twentieth century both to instill feelings of compassion, sympathy, and solidarity among a people and to incite and justify violence toward a real or perceived enemy. Serbia is no exception. As early as 1981, the media reinforced and exploited Serbian nationalism in its depiction of the uprising of the Kosovo Albanians seeking autonomy from Serbia.21 Though Serbian forces immediately sup- pressed the uprising, the Serbian people heard of an Albanian genocidal plot against ethnic Serbs involving various atrocities, including mass rapes committed against the local Serbian population in Kosovo.22

20. Bracewell, supra note 6, at 28. 21. See Alexandra Stiglmayer, The War in the Former Yugoslavia, in MAss RAPE: THE WAR

AGAINST WOMEN IN BOSNIA-HERZEGOVINA 1, 14 (Alexandra Stiglmayer ed., 1994) [hereinafter MASS RAPE].

22. See Srdjan Vrcan, Faith Under Challenge, 40 WARREPORT, Apr. 1996, at 26. One of the leading papers spreading the alleged persecutions of Serbs in Kosovo was the religious Serbian newspaper Pravoslavlje. In 1982, twenty-one Orthodox priests openly appealed

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Even though these accusations were highly exaggerated, they accom- plished their objective by stirring nationalistic Serbian feelings, uniting the country in solidarity against Albanians initially and, later, against all non- Serbs, and bringing Slobodan Milosevid, the "most zealous advocate of the thesis of the 'genocidal Kosovo Albanians'" into power.23 MiloseviC rapidly developed the plan for a greater Serbia through the calculated use and manipulation of the media to foster popular support. In fact, MiloseviC immediately took over the press and national television.24 Already having successfully roused national Serbian sentiment against the Albanians, the Serbian propaganda machine went into full force when the Muslims and Croats of Bosnia-Herzegovina declared independence on 3 March 1992.

National television aired what appeared to be Muslims or Croats raping Serbian women when, in actuality, the scenes showed Serbs raping Muslim or Croat women.25 Roy Gutman, the Pulitzer Prize winning reporter on ethnic cleansing in Bosnia, depicted another case of the blatant use of propaganda to incite the Serbian people when he recounted an interview with Major Milovan Milutinovic.26 When Gutman met with him, Milutinovic was working on a text, "Lying [sic] Violent hands on the Serbian Woman."27 This document maintained that Muslims and Croats were committing genocide against the Serbian people.28 One of the most telling citations from this document deals with the alleged atrocities committed by Muslims against Serbian women:

By order of the Islamic fundamentalists from Sarajevo, healthy Serbian women from 17 to 40 years of age are being separated out and subjected to special treatment. According to their sick plans going back many years, these women have to be impregnated by orthodox Islamic seeds in order to raise a generation of janissaries [i.e., Turkish military elite composed of Christian youth forced to convert to Islam in the middle ages] on the territories they surely consider to be theirs, the Islamic republic. In other words, a fourfold crime is to be committed against the Serbian woman: to remove her from her own family, to impregnate her by undesirable seeds, to make her bear a stranger and then to take even him away from her.29

to Serbian political leaders for better protection of the remaining Serbs in Kosovo. This request religiously legitimated these accusations and gave almost unanimous support to the Serbian national political strategy. See id.

23. Stiglmayer, supra note 21, at 14. 24. See id. at 14-15. 25. See Catharine A. MacKinnon, Rape, Genocide, and Women's Human Rights, in MASS

RAPE, supra note 21, at 183, 190. 26. ROY GUTMAN, A WrmESS TO GENOCIDE at x (1993). 27. Id. at ix. 28. See id. 29. Id. at x.

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What Gutman, the UN Security Council, and the world have come to discover is that this is, indeed, an accurate portrayal of what was taking place, with one minor exception: the perpetrators were primarily Serbs, and the victims were primarily Muslim women and children.

2. Ethnic Cleansing and Genocide

Serbian governmental and military powers appear to have utilized system- atic rape as a weapon of war30 to serve their overall objective of "ethnic cleansing," a euphemism for genocide. According to a Commission of Experts appointed by former UN Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali, the expression "ethnic cleansing" is relatively new.31 "Considered in the context of the conflicts in the former Yugoslavia, 'ethnic cleansing' means rendering an area ethnically homogenous by using force or intimidation to remove persons of given groups from the area."32 Ethnic cleansing is accomplished through the use of "concentration camps, torture, sexual violence, mass killings, forced deportations, destruction of private and cultural property, pillage and theft, and the blocking of humanitarian aid."33

In 1944, Raphael Lemkin coined the term genocide, from the Greek word genos (race or tribe) and the Latin suffix cide (to kill), to depict the Nazi atrocities against the Jews.34 He described genocide as the destruction of a nation or ethnic group, although not its total extermination.35 The UN legal definition of genocide likewise reflects this qualification by declaring that genocide is the intent "to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group, as such."36 The early formulators of this definition included the phrase "in whole or in part" to emphasize the fact that genocide does not require the aim of killing all the members of a group.37 Some scholars have argued that the Serbian policy towards

30. See BAsSIoUNI & MCCORMICK, supra note 1, at 21. While the policy of systematic rape by the Serbian military remains to be proven definitively, there is substantial evidence supporting the existence of such a policy.

31. See id. at 7. On 6 October 1992, the UN Security Council adopted Resolution 780 establishing a Commission of Experts to investigate allegations of violations of international humanitarian law in the former Yugoslavia. Resolution 780 (1992), U.N. SCOR, 3119th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/780 (1992).

32. Final Report of the Commission of Experts Established Pursuant to Security Council Resolution 780 (1992), U.N. SCOR, Annex 1, ? 129, U.N. Doc. S/1994/674 (1994) Ihereinafter Final Reportl.

33. BASSIOUNI & MCCORMICK, supra note 1, at 5. 34. RAPHAEL LEMKIN, Axis RULE IN OCCUPIED EUROPE 79-80 (1944). 35. See id. at 79. 36. Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, adopted 9

Dec. 1948, 78 U.N.T.S. 277, 280 (entered into force 12 Jan. 1951) (entered into force for U.S. 23 Feb. 1989) Ihereinafter Genocide Convention] (emphasis added).

37. Final Report, supra note 32, 1 93.

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Muslims cannot be considered genocide because it was concerned prima- rily with control over territory rather than inhabitants, and the Serbian "intention was to get rid of the Moslems not to exterminate them."38 Nevertheless, several acts committed by the Serbian military constitute genocide as enumerated in Article II of the 1948 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide.39 These acts include

killing members of another group on the basis of their religion, physical and mental torture, using measures whose aim is to prevent births within the group, and forcibly transferring children from one group to another.40 Evidence suggests that all of these acts were committed according to a logistically coordinated policy that unequivocally constituted genocide.

In essence, genocide and ethnic cleansing coincided, the goal being the establishment of a greater Serbia-that is, a Serb-inhabited region purged of all non-Serbs throughout Serbia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, and Croatia. Within the Bosnian, Muslim, and Catholic communities, sexual assault and rape served as particularly effective means of achieving this goal.

3. Rape and Sexual Assault: Evidence of a Policy

According to Ruth Seifert, "[a] violent invasion into the interior of one's body represents the most severe attack imaginable upon the intimate self and the dignity of a human being: by any measure it is a mark of severe torture."41 This violent invasion has occurred against the women on all sides of the conflict in Bosnia: Serbs, Croats, and Muslims. What differentiates the Serbian practice of rape and sexual assault from other assaults is that it is a systematic military policy conceived and planned before the outbreak of the war to effect the ethnic cleansing of Muslims from Serbian territory. On the subject of rape and sexual assault, the United Nations Commission of Experts concluded that "the practices of 'ethnic cleansing,' sexual assault and rape have been carried out by some of the parties so systematically that they strongly appear to be the product of a policy."42 In a follow-up report, the United Nations General Assembly asserted that it was "[c]onvinced that this heinous practice [rape and abuse of women] constitutes a deliberate weapon of war in fulfilling the policy of ethnic cleansing carried out by

38. ALAIN DESTEXHE, R%WANDA AND GENOCIDE IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY 19 (1994). For a critique of his position see David Rieff, An Age of Genocide: The Far-Reaching Lessons of Rwanda, THE NEW REPUBLIC, 29 Jan. 1996, at 27, 34-36.

39. Genocide Convention, supra note 36, art. I1. 40. See Final Report, supra note 32, $ 98. 41. Ruth Seifert, War and Rape: A Preliminary Analysis, in MAss RAPE, supra note 21, at 54,

55.

42. Final Report, supra note 32, 1 313.

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Serbian forces in Bosnia and Herzegovina, and ... that the abhorrent policy of ethnic cleansing was a form of genocide."43 Several factors support this allegation of a Serbian rape policy.

a. The RAM Plan

First, and most importantly, documentation exists substantiating the claim of a Serbian military policy to ethnically cleanse Bosnia-Herzegovina, and designating rape as a specific means of attaining this goal. This policy is clearly spelled out in the so-called RAM plan written by Serb army officers around the end of August 1991.44

An Italian journalist and the Ljubljana newspaper DELO both confirm the existence of this plan and its policy to target "women, especially adolescents, and . .. children" in order to cause fear and panic among the Muslims and bring about a Muslim retreat from the designated territories.45 The DELO reports that the Yugoslav National Army UNA) Psychological Operations Department in Belgrade developed a plan to drive Muslims out of Bosnia based on an analysis of Muslim behavior which "showed that their morale, desire for battle, and will could be crushed more easily by raping women, especially minors and even children, and by killing members of the Muslim nationality inside their religious facilities."46 Concrete evidence accumulated by various humanitarian organizations, including the United Nations and Human Rights Watch, supports the existence of such a practice. These organizations' reports indicate that the research, planning, and coordination of rape camps was a systematic policy of the Serbian government and military forces with the explicit intention of creating an ethnically pure state.

b. Official Tolerance of Rape

In their final report, the Commission of Experts appointed by the United Nations to investigate allegations of rape and sexual assault in the former Yugoslavia speculated that camp commanders had direct control over those

43. Rape and Abuse of Women in the Areas of Armed Conflict in the Former Yugoslavia, G.A. Res. 49/205, U.N. GAOR, 49th Sess., at 2, U.N. Doc. A/RES/49/205 (1995). See also Preliminary Report Submitted by the Special Rapporteur on Violence Against Women, its Causes and Consequences, Ms. Radhika Coomaraswamy, Submitted in Accordance with Commission on Human Rights Resolution 1994/45, U.N. ESCOR, Comm'n on Hum. Rts., 50th Sess., Agenda Item 11 (a), 9I 268, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1995/ 42 (1995) [hereinafter Preliminary Report].

44. See BASSIOUNI & MCCORMICK, supra note 1, at 21 n.4; see also BEVERLY ALLEN, RAPE WARFARE: THE HIDDEN GENOCIDE IN BOSNIA-HERZEGOVINA AND CROATIA 56-60 (1996).

45. ALLEN, supra note 44, at 57. 46. BASSIOUNI & MCCORMICK, supra note 1, at 21 n.4.

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who committed rapes within these camps, indicating that the commanders could have halted the practice and punished the perpetrators if they chose.47 The Commission cited as evidence the fact that during the height of the reported rapes (April to November 1992) the media attention gradually grew from a few reports in March 1992 to a high of 535 stories in January 1993 and 529 in February 1993.48 In the months following these media reports, the number of reported cases dropped dramatically. The correlation between increased media attention and the decrease in reported cases of rape, the Commission speculated, "would indicate that commanders could control the alleged perpetrators if they wanted to. This could lead to the conclusion that there was an overriding policy advocating the use of rape as a method of 'ethnic cleansing,' rather than a policy of omission, tolerating the widespread commission of rape."49

c. Patterns of Rape and Sexual Assault

Perhaps the strongest indication of a Serbian systematic policy is reflected in the five patterns of rape documented by the United Nations Commission of

47. Final Report, supra note 32, I1 253. See also BASSIOUNI & MCCORMICK, supra note 1, at 21- 22.

48. Final Report, supra note 32, 1 237. 49. Id. The Commission's tentative conclusion, however, though it implicates those in

authority and points to an official policy of tolerating rape, does not necessarily reflect a decreased number of rapes after international media coverage. One needs only to consider, for example, the rampant spread of AIDS throughout the world, and the relatively sparse media coverage of this disease, to realize that the media by no means provides an accurate representation of what is occurring in reality. Beverly Allen notes that in October 1994, she spoke with Dr. Kozaric-Kovacic who reported that pregnant survivors from rape/death camps continued to arrive in Zagreb and yet there was nothing or next to nothing in the international media acknowledging these events. ALLEN, supra note 44, at 156-57 & n.6. The decline in reports of rapes, then, could be a result of the media's loss of infatuation with the topic. It could also be associated with a silencing of the victims by the perpetrators who feared that they would be called to justice as news of an International War Crimes Tribunal spread in early 1993. On 22 February 1993, the UN Security Council established an international tribunal for the prosecution of persons responsible for serious violations of international humanitarian law committed in the territory of the former Yugoslavia since 1991. Resolution 808 (1993), U.N. SCOR, 3175th mtg., at 2, U.N. Doc. S/RES/808 (1993), cited in Catherine N. Niarchos, Women, War, and Rape: Challenges Facing The International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, 17 HUM. RTS. Q. 651, 651n.9 (1995) [hereinafter Resolution 808]. The perpetrators frequently threatened women who were raped that if they told anyone of the incident, either they or their family members would be hunted down and murdered. Thus, a possible interpretation of the decline in rape cases reported by the media is that while the number of rapes did not decrease significantly in conjunction with increased media attention, the tendency for victims to publicly reveal such events decreased because of the perpetrators' threats of reprisal inspired by fear of being called to justice by the War Crimes Tribunal. These are tentative conclusions, the truth of which is difficult to establish.

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Experts.50 These patterns required logistical coordination, especially within rape camps where rape was used to impregnate Muslim and Catholic Croat women.

In the first pattern, sexual violence occurred with looting and intimida- tion before widespread fighting broke out in a particular region.51 As ethnic tensions grew, those in control of the local government would encourage paramilitaries, individuals, or gangs of men to initiate a policy of terrorizing local residents. These people would break into homes, steal property, and torture and sexually assault the inhabitants, oftentimes in front of other family members or in public.52

The second pattern of sexual violence occurred during fighting. In the process of attacking a town or village, the forces would rape or sexually assault some women in their homes.53 Once the town was secured, the forces would gather the surviving population and divide them according to sex and age, selecting some women for rape or sexual assaults.54 The forces then transported the remaining population to detention facilities. The psychological impact of these atrocities is evident. Through fear and intimidation, victims and witnesses would be hesitant to return to the scene of such events.

The third pattern of sexual violence occurred in detention facilities or other sites referred to as refugee "collection centers."55 After the population had been divided, men of fighting age were either tortured and executed or sent off to work camps while women were generally sent to separate camps. There, soldiers, camp guards, paramilitaries, and civilians raped or sexually assaulted many of the women.56 Generally, these sexual assaults occurred in one of two ways. The most common practice involved selecting women from crowded rooms, taking them to another location, raping them, and

50. Final Report, supra note 32, 91 244 ("Five patterns emerge from the reported cases, regardless of the ethnicity of the perpetrators or the victims."). This indicates that all sides utilized rape as a systematic policy. However, in a later paper, Professor Cherif Bassiouni, who chaired the Commission of Experts, emphasizes that the Serbs ran most of the detention camps where sexual violence occurred. BASSIOUNI & MCCORMICK, supra note 1, at 16. Furthermore, ethnic cleansing to create a "greater Serbia" was a specific political and military objective unique to the Serbs. While all sides may have utilized sexual violence to oppress the enemy, and in particular the women of the enemy, it was the Serbian overall objective which utilized sexual violence as a form of ethnic cleansing that has received the greatest attention and provoked the greatest outcry. See id.

51. Final Report, supra note 32, 1 245. 52. See id. 53. See id. 1 246. 54. See id. 55. See BASSIOUNI & MCCORMICK, supra note 1, at 17. 56. See Final Report, supra note 32, ? 247.

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either murdering them or returning them to the collection center. Another, though less frequent practice, entailed raping and sexually assaulting women in front of other detainees, or forcing detainees to rape and assault one another, thus humiliating the victims and instilling terror in the witnesses.57 In this setting, gang rapes were frequently reported as being accompanied by beatings, torture, and other forms of humiliation.58

A fourth pattern of sexual violence occurred in rape camps established in buildings such as hotels, schools, restaurants, hospitals, factories, peace- time brothels, or even animal stalls in barns, fenced pens, and auditori- ums.59 No one was exempt from the punishment in these camps. Frequently, the Serbian captors told women that they were trying to impregnate them. In so doing, they would create "Chetnik babies" who would kill Muslims when they grew up. Furthermore, "they repeatedly said their President had ordered them to do this."60 One woman, detained at a rape camp in the northern Bosnian town of Doboj, reported that women who became pregnant had to remain in the camp for seven or eight months.61 Gynecolo- gists examined the women and those women found pregnant were segre- gated from the rest and received meals and other "special privileges."62 Only after it was too late for these women to get an abortion were they released and usually taken to Serbia.63 The frequently reported intent of Serbian soldiers to impregnate Muslim and Catholic Croats, the presence of gynecologists to examine the women, and the intentional holding of pregnant women until it was too late to legally or safely procure an abortion all point to a systematic, planned policy to utilize rape and forced impregnation as a form of ethnic cleansing.

A fifth pattern of sexual violence occurred in "bordello" camps.6 Rather than a form of punishment, women were held in these camps to provide sex for men returning from the front lines. While many of the women in the other camps were eventually exchanged for other civilian prisoners, these women were generally killed.65

Through an analysis of these five patterns of rape as well as other data,

57. See id. ? 248. 58. See BASSIOUNI & MCCoRMICK, supra note 1, at 17-18. In male camps, this public form of

sexual assault took place as well. In one documented instance, a prisoner was forced to bite off the genitals of another. See id.

59. See ALLEN, supra note 44, at 65. 60. Final Report, supra note 32, 1 248. 61. See Alexandra Stiglmayer, The Rapes in Bosnia-Herzegovina, in Mss RAPE, supra note

21, at 82, 119. 62. See Niarchos, supra note 49, at 657. 63. See Stiglmayer, supra note 61, at 118-19. 64. See Final Report, supra note 32, ? 249. 65. See id.

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the Commission detected a number of characteristics indicating an overall Serbian systematic policy including: similar characteristics in the practice of sexual assault and rape in noncontiguous areas; concomitant acts of other international humanitarian law violations; simultaneous military activity; simultaneous activity to displace civilian populations; common characteris- tics in commissioning rape aimed at maximizing shame and humiliation of the victim, her family, and her community; and the timing of the rapes, with the majority of documented cases occurring from April to November 1992.66 Particularly significant is the large number of rapes, "approximately 600 of the 1,100 documented cases," that occurred in detention camps.67 "These rapes in detention do not appear to be random, and they indicate at least a policy of encouraging rape supported by the deliberate failure of camp commanders and local authorities to exercise command and control over the personnel under their authority."68

4. The Genocidal Purpose of Sexual Assault

Beverly Allen rightly points out that although the five patterns of rape delineated by the Commission exemplify various practices of sexual assault, they do not clearly indicate the genocidal nature and purpose of those assaults.69 Consequently, she labels as "genocidal rape" the Serbian military policy of rape for the purpose of genocide and ethnic cleansing, distinguish- ing three forms of this policy. First, prior to the arrival of the official Serbian military (Yugoslav Army or Bosnian Serb forces), Serb militias, civilians, or Chetniks would enter a village and terrorize the inhabitants, especially through the use of public rape and sexual assault.70 Frequently the women recognized their assailants as neighbors, law enforcement personnel, or other members of the community. Recognition seemed an important part of Serbian policy. The persecuted would be less likely to return to their towns and villages if their assailants were local inhabitants rather than from distant

66. See id. ? 252. 67. BAssIOUNI & MCCoRMICK, supra note 1, at 10. This figure differs from that of the Final

Reportwhich states that "out of 514 allegations which are included in the database, 327 occurred in places of detention." Final Report, supra note 32, ] 252 n.71. The discrepancy between these numbers is most likely due to the fact that the database in Geneva was not adequate to handle the immense amount of information accumulated by the Commission of Experts (about 65,000 pages of documents and 300 hours of videotape). The information could only be thoroughly processed subsequently when an adequate database was established at DePaul University under the direction of M. Cherif Bassiouni, the Commission's Rapporteur on the "Gathering and Analysis of Facts."

68. Final Report, supra note 32, 11 252. 69. ALLEN, supra note 44, at 155-56 & n.7. 70. See id. at vii, 62-63.

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territories. Consequently, invading Serbian military personnel would fre- quently employ local Serbs through force, threats, or psychological pressure to participate in the atrocities.71 Word of these atrocities would quickly spread throughout the town or village instilling fear in the inhabitants. Subsequently, official Serbian military forces would arrive offering safe passage for the townspeople out of the village if they agreed never to return.72 In this way, the goal of ethnically cleansing a particular town, village, or region was attained.

The second form of genocidal rape occurred in Serb concentration camps where Bosnian-Herzegovinan and Croatian women (and sometimes men)73 were randomly chosen to be raped. The victim was often murdered after the sexual assault.74

The third form of genocidal rape occurred in "rape/death camps." Bosnian-Herzegovinan women were arrested and imprisoned in these camps and systematically raped for an extended period of time by Serb, Bosnian Serb, and Croatian Serb soldiers, Bosnian Serb militias, and Chetniks.75 Either the women were raped as a form of torture preceding death or with the purpose of forced impregnation. As noted earlier, if a woman became pregnant, she would be held in the concentration camp until it was too late to procure an abortion safely.76 In cases where the victims were murdered following repeated rapes and sexual assaults, the genocidal intent is obvious. Not so obvious, however, is genocide in the form of forced impregnation. Is not the propagation of a species the antithesis of genocide? How would the forced impregnation of Muslim and Croat women serve the objective of creating a greater Serbia?

5. Number of Forced Pregnancies Due to Rape

Even though the exact number of Bosnian women raped by Serbs and the pregnancies resulting from those acts of violence will probably never be known, in January 1993 the United Nations sent a team of five people to investigate reports of the widespread occurrence of rape and, in particular, the systematic use of rape, especially in Bosnia-Herzegovina, for the goal of ethnic cleansing.77 Though limited by temporal, personnel, and financial constraints, the team's findings were revealing. The team of experts spent

71. See Stigimayer, supra note 61, at 160-61. 72. See ALLEN, supra note 44, at vii, 62. 73. See BASSIOUNI & MCCORMICK, supra note 1, at 17-18. 74. See ALLEN, supra note 44, at 63. 75. See id. 76. See BASSIOUNI & MCCORMICK, supra note 1, at 18. 77. See id. at 7-8.

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twelve days (12-23 January, 1993) interviewing physicians and reviewing medical records from six major medical centers in Zagreb, Sarajevo, ZeniCa, and Belgrade. Through their investigations, they identified 119 pregnancies as a result of rape during 1992.78 Of these pregnant women, eighty-eight received abortions.79 In Zenica, sixteen women between the ages of seventeen and twenty-two were more than twenty weeks pregnant and, therefore, could not receive abortions.80

Medical studies estimate that a single act of intercourse results in pregnancy between 1 and 4 percent of the time.81 Due to the trauma of rape, the lower percentage more accurately reflects these occurrences. Conse- quently, this suggests that the 119 pregnancies were a result of approxi- mately 11,900 cases of rape.

In analyzing these figures, there are several variables that must be taken into consideration. First, the majority of women were raped more than once, and, in the case of rape/death camps where some women reported being held for several months, women were raped hundreds of times. Such frequency of repeated rapes on an individual would lower the overall total of women raped.

Second, the team of experts only investigated six medical facilities throughout the former Yugoslavia. Countless other hospitals and clinics exist where women could have aborted pregnancies resulting from rape. In addition, many women did not have access to medical facilities and either tried to induce abortion themselves, gave birth to the baby and abandoned it, or acted as if the child belonged to their husbands to avoid the possibility of being ostracized and rejected. Thus, the number of impregnated women is most likely quite higher than the 119 discovered by the investigative team.

Third, even in the hospitals that the team of experts did visit and investigate, the policy of some personnel is not to inquire of women requesting abortions whether or not they had been raped. Indeed, it seems highly probable that women would not admit to being raped even if asked. Some women did not disclose having been raped until after their request for

78. Report on the Situation of Human Rights in the Territory of the Former Yugoslavia Submitted by Mr. Tadeusz Mazowiecki, Special Rapporteur of the Commission on Human Rights, Pursuant to Commission Resolution 1992/S-1/1 of 14 August 1992, U.N. ESCOR, Comm'n on Hum. Rts., 49th Sess., Agenda Item 27, Annex II, 9 9, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1993/50 (1993) [hereinafter Report on the Situationl.

79. See id. ? ?] 10-14. 80. See id. I 13 (stating that of the nineteen women, sixteen "were more than 20 weeks

pregnant as a result of rape and could not receive abortions."); see also Stiglmayer, supra note 61, at 134-35 (providing contrasting statistics). Stigimayer asserts that out of the 119 pregnancies, 104 women decided to abort the pregnancy. In her table, she lists nineteen abortions out of nineteen pregnancies in Zenita. Id.

81. See Shana Swiss & Joan E. Giller, Rape as a Crime of War: A Medical Perspective, 270 JAMA 612, 613; see also Report on the Situation, supra note 78, 9 3.

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an abortion was denied.82 In some hospitals in Zagreb, doctors actively shielded rape survivors from public exposure.83

Fourth, the investigation took place in the early months of 1992 when the conflict in Bosnia-Herzegovina was only a year old. Some people maintain that such rape camps still existed as late as the spring of 1996. Thus, there are four additional years where women may have become pregnant due to rape.

The fifth variable to consider is that in 1992 the clinic in Sarajevo that the team of experts visited reported that the number of abortions performed had doubled in September, October, and November (400-500 per month) compared to prewar rates (approximately 200 per month).84 During this time, the number of patient visits decreased by half.85 This indicates a phenomenal increase in unwanted pregnancies. One could speculate that rape accounted for this increase. The report warns that such an analysis might not be accurate, however: "While this increase could reflect a rise in pregnancies due to rape, it could also reflect a more general response to economic and social instability created by war."86 Finally, coercion and intimidation from the fear of ostracism by a woman's family, society, or community, fear of reprisals by their attackers either on themselves or their families and communities, and a sense of futility among the women for any possibility of justice prevented many women from reporting these crimes.

All of these factors combined make it impossible to arrive at any accurate statistics on the number of rapes, the number of rape survivors, and the number of pregnancies that resulted from those rapes. Estimates vary anywhere from 20,000 rape survivors reported by the United Nations Special Rapporteur87 to as many as 50,000-70,000 reported by the Bosnian government.88 The Bosnian government estimated that some 35,000 women, primarily Muslim but also Croat, became pregnant from rape.89 Given medical estimates of the percentage of pregnancies from rape, this would indicate some 3,500,000 incidents! This shocking statistic reveals another shortcoming to obtaining accurate information on the number of rapes and pregnancies resulting from rape; namely, the use of statistics for propaganda to incite the masses. Though the statistics vary, sometimes radically depending on the source, what is undeniable is that the practice of rape,

82. See Report on the Situation, supra note 78, ? 8. 83. See WORLD COUNCIL OF CHURCHES, RAPE OF WOMEN IN WAR: REPORT OF THE ECUMENICAL WOMEN'S

TEAM VISrT-ZAGREB (DECEMBER 1992) 9 (1994) [hereinafter WCC REPORT]. 84. See Report on the Situation, supra note 78, 9 16. 85. See id. 86. Id. T 27. 87. See Working Paper, supra note 1, 9 4. 88. See WCC REPORT, supra note 83, at 9. 89. See ALLEN, supra note 44, at 96.

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and in particular rape with the intent to impregnate the victim, was both widespread and systematic among the Serbian forces, paramilitary groups,90 and civilians.

6. Reproduction as Genocide?

Beverly Allen's third form of genocidal rape,91 rape and forced impregna- tion, is one of the most heinous crimes targeting the female body. Allen is correct in questioning the Serbian logic that motivates this practice: How can it be that rape, enforced pregnancy, and enforced childbirth equal genocide?92

According to Allen, this equation becomes conceivable only if one denies both science and culture.93 Biologically, the fetus shares an equal amount of genetic material between the non-Serb mother and the Serbian father. Culturally, unless that child is raised by the father within a Serbian community, he or she will assimilate the cultural, ethnic, religious, and national identity of the mother. Allen summarizes: "Serb 'ethnic cleansing' by means of rape, enforced pregnancy, and childbirth is based on the uninformed, hallucinatory fantasy of ultranationalists whose most salient characteristic, after their violence, is their ignorance."94 We concur with Allen that this mentality, what we label the genetic and cultural patriarchal myth, is indeed ignorant. However, the acceptance of this myth is not limited to Serbs, but is supported by Muslim and Catholic men and women as well. The idea that the male determines a child's ethnic identity is crosscultural and common, though misinformed. No matter how much one argues against such a perspective, a person's (mis)perceptions often dictate both how he perceives reality and his concrete practices, regardless of the facts.

just as this genetic myth is based on a patriarchal system, so too is the ignorance that it cultivates. In the Balkans, a patriarchal society, the family name passes on through the male, regardless of religion or ethnicity. Even though biologically the child shares an equal amount of genetic material from the male and female, this fact does not overcome the sense that a child

90. These included traditional groups such as "Chetniks," known for their atrocities during WWII, as well as more recent groups such as "Arkan's Tigers" and the "White Eagles." See Mujeeb R. Kahn, From Hegel to Genocide in Bosnia, Some Moral and Philosophical Concerns, 15 INSr. MUSLIM MINORrnY AFF. 1, 6 (1994). Kahn points out that, it "is important to note .. that these professional killers were armed and directed in their 'cleansing operations' directly by the Belgrade government." Id.

91. See ALLEN, supra note 44, at 63; see supra text sec. II.B.4. 92. See ALLEN, supra note 44, at 95. 93. See id. at 96-97. 94. Id. at 97.

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born from rape by a Serb will always be considered Serbian. Culturally, where it is recognized that the baby's father is Serbian, if the child is brought up in the Muslim or Catholic culture he or she will oftentimes not be assimilated entirely within that culture given the circumstances of concep- tion.95 The very practice of rape and impregnation as a form of genocide depends not only upon the perpetrators buying into the genetic and cultural myth, but the victims, their families, and their communities accepting the myth as well. As demonstrated by the response of Catholic and Muslim women who refer to their fetuses as "filth" and "that thing," the Serbs are not the only group who accept this myth.96

A report by the World Council of Churches (WCC) maintained that

the use of rape as a weapon of war is perceived as having its roots in patriarchal systems. Destruction and violation of women can be one way of attacking male opponents who regard the women as "theirs" and whose male identity is therefore bound up with protection of "their" women.97

From the perpetrator's perspective, or the policy that he follows, the resultant child is considered Serbian, receiving its ethnic identity only from the Serbian father. In fact, many of the raped women interviewed reported that their assailants frequently claimed that they intended to impregnate them so that they would have a Serbian or "Chetnik baby."98 When asked about reports of the deliberate impregnation of women to create "Serbian babies," a typical response representative of a patriarchal society was that if the biological father was Serb, the child "would always be considered in some way Serb."99 In this way, Serbian seed becomes implanted and spread through non-Serbian women, even though the resulting baby is only half Serb genetically speaking.

From the victim's perspective, because of the humiliation and terror experienced, and the fact that the perpetrators were often neighbors or people from their community, they do not wish to return to their homeland. Also, many women sustained physical injuries to such an extent through the process of sexual assault, torture, and rape, that they are now unable to conceive. This fulfills one of the UN criteria that defines an act of genocide as one "intended to prevent births within the group."100 In cases where women did become pregnant, the children may serve as constant reminders of their experiences and prolong the intended trauma of this practice.

95. See Stacy Sullivan, Born Under a Bad Sign, NVESWEEK, 23 Sept. 1996, at 50. 96. Id. See also Stiglmayer, supra note 61, at 137. 97. WCC REPORT, supra note 83, at 22. 98. See Stiglmayer, supra note 61, at 92, 96, 104, 109, 118-19, 130, 132, 135. 99. WCC REPORT, supra note 83, at 20.

100. Genocide Convention, supra note 36, art. 2(d).

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Genocide is further accomplished through rejection of the victim by her husband because of the disgrace that the rape brings to him and his family. Often blamed for the rape, the woman faces ostracism from her family and community. Furthermore, those women impregnated as a result of rape are often viewed as tainted and unworthy for reproduction. All these compo- nents function to remove non-Serbs from Serbian territories and to break

down the very social fabric of non-Serbian cultures. Not only does the practice of rape and rape for impregnation ethnically cleanse Serbian territories, but it functions to kill, in whole or in part, the non-Serb culture and reproductive capabilities once people have fled Serbian territories. The impact of this practice is far-reaching, and its success is based on the unilateral acceptance of a patriarchal system.

III. THE SECONDARY VICTIMIZATION OF RAPE VICTIMS:

RELIGIOUS, CULTURAL, AND ETHICAL RESPONSES

The systematic rape of Muslim and Catholic Croat women with the explicit purpose of impregnation to create "Chetnik babies," to effect ethnic cleansing, and to attain a greater Serbia is an atrocious usurpation of the female body as a weapon of war. Perhaps the only atrocity that could compare to this is the treatment, perception, and exploitation of these women if and when their experiences become public knowledge. This section examines the religious and cultural responses to these women, the media's treatment of them, and the failure thus far of the international community to bring the perpetrators to justice. All of these elements have contributed to the secondary victimization of these women, thus prolonging their physical, emotional, and psychological healing processes.

A. Religious Responses

1. Islamic Responses

A traditional Muslim aphorism states: "As our women are, so also is our community."101 Islamic religious culture strongly emphasizes the protection of a woman's dignity and honor. Bosnian Muslims frequently recount the story of Emina, a young Muslim woman who attempted to defend her village against loyalist Serbian Chetniks during World War 11. Unable to hold off the advancing Serbs, when she fell into their hands her one request

101. Azra Zahihic-Kaurin, The Muslim Woman, in MAss RAPE, supra note 21, at 170-71.

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was, "[o]nly leave me my honor; I will forgive you my death."'02 To be raped, humiliated, and defiled was a fate worse than death for this Muslim woman, so high is the virtue of "honor" held within Islam. The point of the story is that a woman's purity in Islam and the Muslim patriarchal culture is not only held sacred, but is seen as an essential element to insure the stability of the society and culture. This is true even though this concept of female honor has come under increasing and justifiable scrutiny.'03 Also relevant is that there is a vast chasm, not always recognized in Islamic sexual ethical mores, between a woman who is violated through rape and a woman who freely engages in a premarital or extramarital sexual relation- ship. The violation of a woman's honor, as is the case for raped Muslim women in Bosnia, produces various, often contradictory, religious and cultural responses.

First of all, the Koran does not extensively address the issue of rape among Muslims, let alone between Muslims and non-Muslims. This may be a result of its rather explicit view of the social roles of women in Islamic culture and the requirement that men accompany women in public.104 This being the case, rape is considered to be a relatively infrequent occurrence. When a rape does occur, society generally concludes that, since the woman was unaccompanied by a male guardian (husband, father, brother), she was "on the make" and perhaps looking for a sexual encounter; in such a case, sexual intercourse, even if violent, could be warranted given the woman's violation of religious customs.105 In the event that a woman accuses a man of rape, the case goes before the religious court. If found guilty, the man faces a penalty of death by stoning or a lengthy jail term. In order to be found guilty, however, four respectable Muslims must have witnessed the event.106 In the unlikely event of producing such witnesses, the woman must further prove that she has lived an exemplary or chaste life.'07 Even though the Muslim jurists who interpret the Koran address the issue of rape and sanction severe penalties for perpetrators of this crime, prosecution of rapists in Muslim society occurs rather infrequently. More likely, the women

102. Id. at 173. 103. See Niarchos, supra note 49, at 672-76; see also ANNE TIERNEY GOLDSTEIN, RECOGNIZING

FORCED IMPREGNATION AS A WAR CRIME UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW 20-22 (1993). 104. See JAN GOODWIN, PRICE OF HONOR: MUSLIM WOMEN LIFT THE VEIL OF SILENCE ON THE ISLAMIC WORLD

56 (1994). In some conservative areas of Pakistan, the traditional chador and chardiwari, "the veil and four walls," is still practiced. According to this custom, a woman should only go out of the house three times in her life: when she is born; when she leaves for her husband's home after marriage; and when she dies and is taken to be buried. See id.

105. See id. 106. See id.at 51.

107. See Women Jailed for Being Raped, MARIE CLAIRE, OCt. 1996, at 74, 75.

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will be accused of zina-sex outside marriage including adultery, fornica- tion, and rape-by her assailant and will herself be sent to jail.108 (This has happened in many rape cases in Pakistan.) This travesty of justice is not unlike the difference between the religious ideals of the Bosnian Muslim community and the actual practices of that community when Muslim women are raped by non-Muslims.

In interviews with Bosnian Muslim religious leaders, the WCC reported that leaders have taken measures to insure that victims of rape will be treated compassionately on several accounts.109 Within the religious com- munity itself, according to Aruna Gnanadason, a member of the WCC commission, religious leaders consider raped women heroines and receive them unconditionally into the communities.110 Her claim, however, con- flicts with reports asserting that raped women are frequently stigmatized and ostracized within these communities. The international community fre- quently voices its concern that, if her experience becomes public knowl- edge, a raped woman will be considered an outcast in certain cultures; her husband will abandon her or, in the case of an unmarried woman, she will be unable to marry if she so desires because of the stigma associated with the event. Muslim leaders, however, assured the WCC commission that "young men of the community have been pledged to marry women victims."111 In the case of impregnation, religious leaders have sympathized with the situation of these women and have condoned abortions up until the 120 day legal limit.112 For those women held past the limit, or those who chose not to abort, there were offers of adoption by international Muslim communities.13 The official WCC report substantiated Gnanadason's claim from a religious perspective. It added, however, that practically and culturally speaking, this openness and receptivity is not always evident.114

108. See GOODWIN, supra note 104, at 51. 109. WCC REPORT, supra note 83, at 9, 20. 110. Interview by World Council of Churches with Aruna Gnanadason, Geneva, Switzerland

(16 July 1996). 111. WCC REPORT, supra note 83, at 9. 112. See id. According to the Hanafi Jurists' interpretation of the hadith (sayings, practices,

judgments, and attitudes of Muhammad), ensoulment takes place 120 days after conception. They allow for abortion during this time "only for juridically valid reason[s]." Abortion, in 1 THE OXFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE MODERN ISLAMIC WORLD 17, 17-18 Uohn L. Esposito ed., 1995). See also Mirjana Rasevic, Abortion as a Method of Birth Control, 31 YUGOSLAV SURVEY 103 (1990) (asserting that abortion is regularly used and accepted as a predominant form of birth control in the former Yugoslavia without any social stigma attached to it); Ivana Filice et al., Bosnia-Herzegovina: Cultural Profile, 6 IN'L J. REFUGEE L. 425, 435 (1994).

113. See WCC REPORT, supra note 83, at 20. 114. See id. at 20, 23.

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2. Catholic Response

The Croatian Catholic response to victims of rape suffers from similar tensions between religious ideology and cultural practice. In an address by Pope John Paul II to Archbishop Vinko Pulijic of Sarajevo, the Pope called for the entire community to "be close to these women who have been so tragically offended and to their families, in order to help them transform the act of violence into an act of love and acceptance.""1 The terms "rape" and "abortion" are noticeably absent from this document. For rape, the Pope substituted phrases such as "mothers, wives and young women who have been subjected to violence because of an outburst of racial hatred and brutal lust;" for abortion he used the phrase "since the unborn child is in no way responsible for the disgraceful acts accomplished, he or she is innocent and therefore cannot be treated as the aggressor.""6 The omission of these terms seems somewhat curious. One could speculate that because of the political and religious tensions between the various groups in the former Yugoslavia, the Pope consciously attempted to remain diplomatic in his address and avoided terms that would highlight the atrocities committed (rape) and the potential outcome of those atrocities (abortion). Instead, he focused on the need for reconciliation. The call for support and solidarity from the community and the assertion of the sanctity of the family and its role in bringing about healing prove noteworthy. This challenge of solidar- ity, so key to overcoming the factions within families and the social and cultural genocide that rape causes, can also serve to remove the power and genocidal motivation from this practice. If the culture, society, and family do not react according to the Serb's projections, but instead stand by these women and support them in solidarity, an impetus for the practice is removed. The Serbian policy of rape for the purpose of ethnic cleansing is dependent not only upon the complicity of Serbs as perpetrators, but also on the Muslims and Catholics as the victims and the anticipated cultural responses towards those victims. If met with love and acceptance instead of fear and hatred, a link in the chain of genocide is removed.

The major difference between Catholicism and Islam is the possibility of obtaining an abortion in the case of rape. While Muslim religious leaders allow abortion up to the 120 day legal limit in the case of rape, officially, the Catholic church condemns abortion even in the case of rape, and, according to some Croatian women's groups, many Catholic hospitals will not perform this operation. This claim, however, has been disputed by

115. Pope John Paul II, Change Violence into Acceptance, THE POPE SPEAKS, 2 Feb. 1993, at 220.

116. Id. at219-20.

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Croatian doctors who maintain that they will perform abortions in cases of rape unless serious medical reasons mitigate against it.17 As mentioned above, of the 119 pregnancies from rape documented by the UN special commission, eighty-eight were terminated by abortions. Thus, while in theory the religious position may dictate against abortion, it is commonly practiced, even in Catholic Croatia.

B. Cultural and Social Practice

Frequently a stark contrast develops between religious ideologies and the actual responses of Muslims and Catholics to rape survivors. Within Muslim, Catholic, and Serbian cultures, victims of rape tend to experience alienation in varying degrees. First of all, many women refuse to discuss the rape because of the shame and humiliation associated with it, as well as the stigmatization from family, friends, and the community. These attitudes do not facilitate an openness to sharing experiences and often hamper the ability to heal emotionally, physically, and psychologically. Also, women sometimes feel responsible in some way for the rape, and this misconcep- tion can be reinforced by attitudes and comments from peers.18 Especially in cultures where women raped in peacetime are frequently blamed for the attack, whether because of the clothes they were wearing or being out alone in public, in a wartime situation women may internalize these specula- tions.119 Often, even other women who have been raped do not encourage peers to talk about the incident for fear that they themselves will be implicated as rape victims and stigmatized and ostracized by their families, husbands, or communities. Fear of reprisals towards detained family members or other women being detained poses another very real threat to these women if they speak about the event.120 Finally, society has developed suspicions as to whether or not women fabricate these events, especially in the Bosnian conflict where propaganda has played a major role on all sides. All of these factors tend to dissuade women from talking about their experiences with friends and family as well as seeking psychological counseling.

117. See Stigimayer, supra note 61, at 135-36. 118. See Ivana Filice et al., Women Refugees from Bosnia-Herzogovina: Developing a

Culturally Sensitive Counselling Framework, 6 INT'L J. REFUGEE L. 207, 213 (1994). 119. The UN Special Rapporteur for the Former Yugoslavia points out that "women's

experience of rape can be intensified by cultural and religious views which often blame the victim." Rape and Abuse of Women in the Territory of the Former Yugoslavia: Report of the Secretary-General, U.N. ESCOR, Comm'n on Hum. Rts., 50th Sess., Agenda Item 12, at 60, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1994/5 (1993) Ihereinafter Rape and Abuse].

120. See Report on the Situation, supra note 78, ? 24.

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Research shows, however, that if supported emotionally by family and friends or peers in refugee camps, the psychological disorders of raped women do not persist as long as those who keep the rape a secret or speak only to a therapist.121 Rape is just one of the many layers of trauma that these women have experienced. They are still attempting to cope with witnessing the torture and execution of fathers, husbands, or sons, the rape of their own daughters or mothers, being detained in a camp, or losing their homes and personal belongings. To heal from these traumas takes love, support, compassion, and acceptance from one's family, friends, and community. Unfortunately, this support does not always exist.

A second consideration that can aggravate the trauma and suffering of the victim is the husband's response to the event. In interviews conducted with rape survivors, one of the recurring concerns is that if their husbands found out about the rape, their husbands would not take them back, or they might be violently abused, or in some cases even killed.122 What causes such responses from the one to whom she should be able to turn for love, comfort, support, and understanding? Although the psychological reasons are complex and beyond full comprehension by this author, some justifica- tions are rooted in the masculine myth perpetrated by a patriarchal ideal that men are responsible for "their" women. This myth, which is not limited to a particular religion, culture, or sociological stratus, demonstrates a model of masculine-feminine relations where men possess, rather than relate with, women. According to this myth, when a "man's woman" is violated through rape, it is often very difficult for him to accept the humiliation of such an event. He has failed to live up to his masculine duty and the obligation to defend "his woman," regardless of the circumstances. Frequently, though illogically, this belief translates into alienation or violence directed toward the only one whom he can punish, the woman. Empathy and compassion for the woman sometimes become displaced by masculine self-pity, humiliation, and suffering as a result of her rape.

The cultural and social practices of alienation and expulsion all too frequently oppose the religious ideology calling for compassion, love, and acceptance of rape victims. The phenomena of secondary victimization caused by this occurrence merely prolongs the recuperation process of victims and implicitly supports the very goal of rape and forced impregna- tion for the sake of genocide. Not only does this violation destroy the

121. See Vera Folnegovic-Smalc, Psychiatric Aspects of the Rapes in the War against the Republics of Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina, in MAss RAPE, supra note 21, at 174, 177.

122. See id. at 179 n.2; LAUREL FLETCHER ET AL., No JUSICE, No PEACE: ACCOUNTABILITY FOR RAPE AND GENDER-BASED VIOLENCE IN THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA 27 (1993); Stiglmayer, supra note 61, at 137; Seifert, supra note 41, at 61; Lance Morrow, Unspeakable: Rape in Former Yugoslavia's Civil War, TIE, 22 Feb. 1993, at 48.

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women physically, psychologically, and emotionally, but because of the masculine images that prevail in a patriarchal society, it destroys the very fabric of that society. Although patriarchal attitudes typify the Muslim culture, frequently singling out its inability to accept raped women back into its familial and social structure, Catholic Croats and Orthodox Serbs are no less plagued by this phenomenon.123

C. Media, Propaganda, and Exploitation

The media has played a significant role in the Bosnian war. Milosevic used the media for a blatant propaganda campaign to instill fear and hatred and to incite Serbian nationalism, manifested as genocide toward non-Serbs. Not so blatant is the sometimes harmful effect of the media, even by the most well intentioned humanitarian groups, on the very people whom they hope to help.124 The WCC report on raped women in Bosnia, for example, contained as an appendix a letter issued by the Zagreb Women's Lobby entitled, "Letter of Intentions to Women's and Peace Organizations all over the World."125 While praising the support of international women's groups and peace organizations, the involvement of some of these groups with the actual victims has caused some concerns. First, concern exists that the process of helping raped women is being taken over by governmental institutions, and that the occurrence of rape thus will be used in political propaganda to spread hatred and call for revenge against the enemy, thereby encouraging further violence against women.'26 The second con- cern addresses those groups who have encouraged women to share their experiences publicly with promises of help and support, yet do not provide that support to the victims in the long term. The letter criticized this "sensationalistic journalist" approach which has frightened and upset raped women, prolonging their recuperation.'27 The letter continued, "the devel- opment of serious women's support projects needs understanding of the problem, patience and time. Otherwise, the good intentions could turn out to be useless or even harmful, bringing some relief only to the conscience of the support-givers."'28 Tadeusz Mazowiecki of the United Nations and his team of investigators also voiced such concern, reporting that some of the women "felt exploited by the media and the many missions 'studying' rape

123. See FLETCHER ET AL., supra note 122, at 23 n.38; ALLEN, supra note 44, at 92. 124. See Stiglmayer, supra note 61, at 162-63. 125. WCC REPORT, supra note 83, app. VI. 126. See id. 127. Id. 128. Id.

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in the former Yugoslavia .... There have been reports of women attempting suicide after being interviewed by the media and well-meaning delega- tions."129

An employee of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) reported that when news of the widespread, systematic rape of Muslim and Croat women and children by Serbs reached the world, women's groups flocked to Zagreb to obtain information and interviews from women who had suffered these atrocities.30 Often, the presence of these groups left the women feeling exploited and used, without providing extensive care to the victims themselves and without empowering them to regain a sense of human dignity. Physical rape is an atrocity in itself, but the psychological and emotional consequences can be prolonged and exacer- bated through insensitivity toward the victims.13

The point here is not to cast blame on the media and well-intentioned humanitarian or women's groups. It is merely to sensitize them to the delicate nature of the situation and the need for prolonged support and care in the psychological and emotional recuperation of the traumatized women. This recuperation requires limiting the occurrences of secondary victimiza- tion.

While the media and propaganda have had a negative impact on women rape survivors in some respects, they also have had a positive impact by alerting the international community to the atrocities committed, and, in effect, mobilizing aid efforts from the international community on behalf of the victims to try to stop the violence and bring the perpetrators to justice.132

D. No Justice?: International Humanitarian Law and the War Crimes Tribunal

Not only is rape one of the most underreported crimes worldwide, but it is also one of the least punished in the aftermath of a war. Occurrences of rape are frequently considered an inevitable byproduct of war with the non- sequitur, "boys will be boys." As a result, rape as a gender specific war crime often has been ignored or considered under the auspices of human rights violations. In the former Yugoslavia where the woman's body was not

129. Rape and Abuse, supra note 119, I 13. 130. Interview with Anonymous, UNHCR Headquarters, Geneva, Switzerland (15 Aug.

1996). 131. See ALLEN, supra note 44, at 92-94. 132. See, e.g., GUTMAN, supra note 26.

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only targeted through rape, but also through forced impregnation as a form of genocide, it is important to recognize this offense as a gender specific crime directed against women for at least two reasons. First, this practice demonstrates a novel and demented form of warfare directly targeting noncombatants on the basis of their gender and reproductive capabilities. International legislation needs to recognize this as a unique and novel weapon of war and a distinct violation of human rights that incorporates rape and genocide into a single practice.

Second, establishing laws that will specifically punish this crime may bring a sense of justice to those who have been violated. Part of the recuperation process of these women, especially to restore their faith in the moral and political order, is that the perpetrators be held accountable.133 To send a clear message that the systematic usurpation of the female body to further one's military objective is morally reprehensible and will not be tolerated, the international community must recognize the unique nature and severity of this crime and prosecute the perpetrators accordingly. There has been an internationally supported move to indict, try, and punish those responsible for these atrocities. The UN Security Council's establishment of a research team in 1991 and an international war crimes tribunal in

February 1993 to investigate these reports and bring the perpetrators to justice, respectively, are steps to correct this void in international law and justice.

1. Rape, Forced Impregnation, and International Humanitarian Law

Several international laws exist under which those responsible for rape in the Bosnian war can be held accountable. The Fourth Geneva Convention

of 1949,134 although it had an implicit precedent from previous codes and declarations, provided the first clearly articulated prohibition of rape as a crime against women in Article 27. While calling for the humane treatment and protection of all people against any act of violence, it specifically states that "[w]omen shall be especially protected against any attack on their honour, in particular against rape, enforced prostitution, or any form of indecent assault."'35 In Article 147, the Convention refers to the violations described within Article 27 as war crimes, though it does not specifically

133. See FLETCHER ET AL., supra note 122, at 14. 134. Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War

(Geneva IV), adopted 12 Aug. 1948, 6 U.S.T. 3516, T.I.A.S. No. 3365, 75 U.N.T.S. 287 (entered into force 21 Oct. 1950) (entered into force for U.S. 2 Feb. 1956) [hereinafter Geneva IV].

135. Niarchos, supra note 49, at 673 (citing Geneva IV, supra note 134).

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mention rape.136 In addition, Protocol II of the Geneva Convention'37 contains specific legal sanctions protecting victims of internal armed conflicts while Protocol I protects victims of international armed conflicts from rape.138

Given the genocidal motivation of the rapes, the perpetrators are also subject to prosecution under the Genocide Convention of 1948, in particular, Article II: "Killing members of a [national, ethnical, racial or religious] group; [c]ausing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group; [d]eliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part; [i]mposing measures intended to prevent births within the group; [and] [florcibly transferring children of the group to another group"'39 are all considered forms of genocide and are punishable under international law. The psychological trauma and physical torture of rape, which sometimes has included foreign objects such as gun barrels, constitute aspects of genocide as well.

Further genocidal consequences of the rapes arise through the reduc- tion of birth rates in non-Serbian societies. For example, the cultural response to women who have been raped could result in the prevention of births: unmarried women will not be married within the community, or those who are married may be rejected by their husbands. In either case, reproduction is impaired within a specific community. In cases where women have suffered physical damage and are thus incapable of reproduc- ing, the genocidal objective is clearly accomplished. Where forced impreg- nation was the goal, children have been considered by both Serbs and non- Serbs to carry the father's genealogy, thus allowing the Serbs to transfer what they perceive as "their children" to the Muslim or Catholic group. Cultural genocide therefore results because the presence of these children and the knowledge of the circumstances under which they were conceived causes strife and resentment within the community and serves as a constant reminder of Serbian oppression and violence. Reports that pregnant Muslim and Catholic women were released from detention camps and sent to Serbia

136. Geneva IV, supra note 134, art. 147, at 388. See Niarchos, supra note 49, at 672-79. See generally GOLDSTEIN, supra note 103 (describing the historical development of international humanitarian law).

137. Protocol II Additional to the Geneva Convention of 12 Aug. 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts, adopted 8 June 1977, U.N. Doc. A/32/144, Annex II, art. 4, 1125 U.N.T.S. No. 17513 (entered into force 7 Dec. 1978), reprinted in 16 I.L.M. 1442 (1977).

138. Protocol I Additional to the Geneva Convention of 12 Aug. 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts, adopted 8 June 1977, U.N. Doc. A/32/144, Annex I, art. 76, 1125 U.N.T.S. No. 17 (entered into force 7 Dec. 1978), reprinted in 16 I.L.M. 1391 (1977).

139. Genocide Convention, supra note 36, art. II.

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to give birth to "Serbian children" further helps to propagate the Serbian population, as the "Serbian child" is not considered tarnished by the mother's genes in Serbia as it is with the father's genes in Catholic or Muslim Croatia. Although international law has clear guidelines for prosecuting those guilty of rape, the intention to rape for the purpose of impregnation, though implicit under genocide, is not explicitly stated as a separate crime under international law. This is a gap that requires an amendment given the atrocities in Bosnia: rape, forced impregnation, and genocide.140

Finally, rape also constitutes a crime against humanity that entails the intention to systematically persecute a particular group. Even though there are numerous stipulations under international humanitarian law to pros- ecute those responsible for rape and even rape for the purpose of impregnation,41 the question is whether or not such prosecutions will come to fruition.

2. Rape and the International Criminal Tribunal

To insure that perpetrators are brought to trial and prosecuted, the UN Security Council passed Resolution 808142 in February 1993, establishing the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia. The Tribunal's mandate is to prosecute those people responsible for serious humanitarian law violations committed in the former Yugoslavia since January 1991. Articles 2 through 5 stipulate prosecution for sexual assault, including rape.'43 However, the Tribunal has no specific statute condemning forced impregnation, despite the fact that the UN Commission of Experts docu- mented five patterns of rape, one of which explicitly addresses this practice, and several of the women victims interviewed recounted the perpetrators' intent to impregnate them.'44 Notwithstanding any clear prohibition of forced impregnation in international law, the UN Commission of Experts responsible for analyzing the data and considering human rights violations

140. See GOLDSTEIN, supra note 103, at 13 n.32 (noting that a Task Force of the American Bar Association has recently recommended that Article 5(g) of the International Tribunal's statute on rape should read: "rape including enforced prostitution and enforced pregnancy, and other forms of sexual assault") (addition in italics). See also AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION SPECIAL TASK FORCE OF THE SECnoN OF INTERNATIONAL LAW AND PRACTICE, REPORT ON THE INTERNATIONAL TRIBUNAL TO ADJUDICATE WAR CRIMES COMMITED IN THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA 15 (1993).

141. See GOLDSTEIN, supra note 103, at 14-28 (discussing extensively the categorization of forced impregnation under numerous violations of international law).

142. See Resolution 808, supra note 49. 143. Statute of the International Tribunal, arts. 2-5, available on <http-/www.un.org/icty/i-

b-ens.htm#2>.

144. See Final Report, supra note 32, 1 248; supra text sec. I1.B.3.c.

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of the Geneva Conventions and other humanitarian laws in the former

Yugoslavia concluded that:

[T]here is no doubt about the prohibition of rape and sexual assault in the Geneva Conventions and other applicable sources of the international humani- tarian law. Furthermore, the Commission finds that the relevant provisions of the statute of the International Tribunal adequately and correctly state the applicable law to this crime.'45

Thus, the Commission did not see a need to amend the law to include forced impregnation as a particular violation distinct from rape.

In an address to the New England School of Law on 14 January 1998, David Scheffer, Ambassador at Large for War Crimes Issues, gave an update on the proceedings of the War Crimes Tribunal.146 As of mid-January 1998, seventy-nine individuals have been publicly indicted by the Tribunal: fifty- seven are ethnic Serb, nineteen are ethnic Croat, and three are ethnic Bosniak. Three indictees have died, meaning that there are currently seventy-six known indictees now living. Fifty-four remain at large, and nineteen are in custody at The Hague. The indictments against three ethnic Croats were withdrawn last month and they were released from custody. Of those indictees at large, fifty-two are ethnic Serbs and two are ethnic Croats. Furthermore, only three ethnic Serbs, thirteen ethnic Croats, and three ethnic Bosniaks remain in custody.'47

From the number of indictments, it is impossible to ascertain the indictees accused of rape for the purpose of forced impregnation, as this is not a specific violation under international humanitarian law. Consequently, the numbers of those who committed this crime will probably never be

145. Final Report, supra note 32, q 109. 146. As of May 1995, three indictments had been issued by the Tribunal. Of these, two were

charged with sexual assault. See Rape and Abuse of Women in the Areas of Armed Conflict in the Former Yugoslavia: Report of the Secretary General, U.N. General Assembly, 50th Sess., Agenda Item 114(c) of the Provisional Agenda, at 1 28, U.N. Doc. A/50/329 (1995).

147. See David J. Scheffer, Challenges Confronting International Justice, Address at the New England School of Law (14 Jan. 1998) (on file with author). From these numbers, it is clear that ethnic Serbs, while having the greatest number of indictments, have been the least cooperative with the International War Crimes Tribunal. Scheffer notes that what has bedeviled the Tribunal from its creation is "state cooperation." The worst offenders are Republika Srpska and Serbia-Montenegro. Neither has apprehended or orchestrated the voluntary surrender of a single indictee." Id. Thus, while the Tribunal has improved on its number of indictments, as the number of known perpetrators of rape indicates, it still has a long way to go before there is any semblance of justice for the women who suffered atrocities during the conflict in the former Yugoslavia. This task is especially difficult given the lack of cooperation among the states harboring these suspected criminals. For information on those indicted and the specific indictments against them, visit the website: <http//www.un.org/icty/i-b-ens.htm#2>.

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known. Nonetheless, given the prevalence of reported rapes and the United Nations' own task force that interviewed victims, collected data and testimonies from eyewitnesses and medical professionals, and identified nearly 800 victims and 600 alleged perpetrators by name, one could question the seriousness of the international effort to bring the perpetrators to justice. No wonder many women have an attitude of "what's the use?" and refuse to come forward to testify. The fear of exposing themselves and reliving the nightmare as well as the risk of reprisals, given the slim possibility of an indictment, let alone the prosecution of the perpetrator, is cause for despair. Not only does this hinder the recuperation process of rape victims, but it also sends a message to the world that women are second class citizens, and sexual crimes against them are not taken seriously by the international justice system. Although the War Crimes Tribunal conducted in The Hague thus far has not given much cause for hope that justice will be served, it is certainly a step forward in recognizing the severity of the crime.

IV. CONCLUSION

The war in the former Yugoslavia has provided documented evidence of rape and forced impregnation used as a weapon of war for achieving ethnic cleansing, and has raised international awareness concerning the usurpa- tion of the female body and her reproductive capacities to fulfill political and military objectives. This evidence proves that not only were women caught up in a circle of violence waged and executed by men in power, but that they were specifically targeted as a means of attaining a military end. This frightening occurrence in war tactics and military strategy has caused the international community grave concern, but much remains to be accomplished to put an end to present violations, to punish the perpetrators, and to prevent these acts from occurring in future conflicts. Man's inhuman- ity to man and woman knows no bounds. To remain passive in light of such injustice is a moral abomination and betrays those who have suffered, and will suffer, from this treatment. Protection against rape and rape for the purpose of impregnation must be insured under international humanitarian law as well as guarantees providing for swift punishment of the perpetrators.

In addition, to reduce the disparity between religious ideology and cultural practice, communities should be sensitized to receive rape victims and their children in love, compassion, and empathy to foster healing not only among the women, but within the community as a whole. The success of genocide in the form of rape and forced impregnation is dependent upon the patriarchal myth that supports its very practice. As is evident from the responses towards many of the women who have suffered this tragedy, this myth is still very much alive.

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