PATHS TO PEACE: CONFLIT MANAGEMENT,CONFLIT RESOLUTION, RECONCILIATION AND PEACEBUILDING
UNIVERSITY OF HAIFA
Recent Research Findings by the
Center for Research on Peace Education
Gavriel Salomon
July, 2009
1
Cerpe's Mission
The mission of the Center for Research on Peace
Education (CERPE) is to advance the field of peace,
reconciliation and partnership education through
conceptual development and empirical research. CERPE
is supported by an initial grant by the Stronach family in
Canada and by grants from the Spencer Foundation,
United States Institute of Peace, the Slifka Foundation,
the Fohs Foundation, and private donations.
http://cerpe.haifa.ac.il
2
Recent Research Findings by the
Center for Research on Peace Education
Gavriel Salomon
By way of an introduction:
This is an informal and brief description of recent studies
carried out by members of the Center for Research on
Peace Education at the University of Haifa, Israel. These
are not the only findings we have. There are more
elaborate and complex ones, but not everything can be
included in a brief summary. We want to share the
findings and the conclusions that follow such that
colleagues who are active in the field of peace education
or study it can, as we hope, benefit from the reported
studies. A more formal presentation of some of the
studies can already be found or will soon be found in the
professional literature. The descriptions are in English so
that Israelis, Palestinians and interested parties abroad
can read the material.
Comments and questions are most welcome.
3
1. Peace education can prevent the detiriotation of
feelings and attitudes
A study by Yifat Biton (Biton & Salomon, 2006)
examined the effects of a school-based year-long peace
education program ("Pathways to reconciliation") carried
out in Israeli and in Palestinian schools with 818 Jewish
and Palestinian high school students, divided into
program participants and non-participant controls. The
program was administered during the 2002 Palestinian
uprising (The "El Aksa Intifada"). Despite the overall
belligerent atmosphere, the program had positive effects
mainly on the participants' conception of "peace" –
moving from a conception of "negative-" to "positive
peace". Interestingly, while the program did not
significantly affect attitudes it led to an increase in
Israelis' willingness to engage in negotiations, and to a
decrease in Palestinians' willingness to engage in war.
Most importantly, the participation in the program served
as a lid on the boiling pot of belligerence: While
willingness to engage in war increased among
4
Palestinian non-participants it decreased among
participants (See Figure 1). These findings suggest that
participation in peace education can prevent further
deterioration of negative feelings towards the other side.
Figure 1: Percent of Palestinians who advocated war as a
way to make peace
Percent advocating war as a
strategy for peace (Biton, 2002)
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
PosttestPretest
Participants
Non-
Participants
5
2. Friendships can generalize
What effects do friendships that develop during a 3-day
intergroup dialogue between Jewish and Palestinian
participants have on the way they relate to each other's
nation (the people) and to its collective narrative? Bar-
Natan (2005) examined this question with 216 Jewish
and Palestinian peace education participants and non-
participants. Measures taken right after the completion of
the encounter showed that friendships developed during
the encounter did indeed generalize in both groups to the
way the other side's members were perceived and to
willingness for contact with them; the Jewish group
manifested also increased legitimization of the
Palestinian collective narrative. Not so the Palestinian
group. For them, the collective narrative of the Jews is,
as they see it, the narrative of the majority that deprives
and discriminates them and thus cannot be given any
legitimacy (see also No. 6 below).
6
3. Not all attitudes to be changed are born equal
A study by Yigal Rosen examined the possibility that
some conflict-related attidues and beliefs are more
amenable to the impact of peace education than others.
Some attitudes and beliefs occupy a more central place in
one's cognition ("convictions") while others are more
peripheral, and are held with less certitude and strength
("attitides"). A pilot study with items derived from the
Jewish and the Palestinian collective narratives,
repectively, were given to Jewish and Palestinian
university students to rank for importance an cenrality.
The top of the list for each group was defined as
conviction items. In a subsequent study it was found that
for both Jewish and Palestinian peace education program
participants the convictions were not affected while the
attitudes were significantly changed. The study suggests
that we should aim at what is possible, some sort of 'good
enough peace education', without aspiring to change
convictions which serve as the backbone of a group's
collective belief system (Rosen, in press).
7
4. The short life of the effects of short peace education
programs
Peace education programs are all too often relatively
short – a few days, a weekend, a week-long seminar.
While such programs have a positive impact on many of
the participants, it is still an open question whether the
perceptual and attitudinal changes last over time given
the socio-political forces that negate them? For after all,
peace education programs are often carried out in a social
environment where an "ethos of conflict" and a
beligerent atmosphere appear to dominate. However, all
too often evaluators are satisfied with measures taken
"the morning after" the completion of a program.
Irit Bar-Natan in the study mentioned above (No.
2) in which the question of friendships' generalizations
was addressed, found that measures taken a few months
after the completion of the program showed that the
changes all but disappeared. The same finding emerged
in the study by Rosen (No. 3 above) and in a study by
Husseisi (2009). It needs to be said that the programs
8
were indeed carried out in an overall social context of
fear, beligerence and distrust of the other side. The peace
education programs moved in this respect against the
grain of the general ethos and collective narrative.
In sum, those change that can be brought
about by a relatively short-term intervention can as
easily be changed back by the prevailing socio-
political forces.
Figure2: The erosion of a legitimization effects:
0
0.5
1
1.5
2
2.5
PretestPosttest Delayed
Palestinians
Jew s
9
5. Eroded changes can be restored
We called the the decline of measured changes "erosion"
assuming that they did not totally disappear but left at
least some cognitive or emotional residue. We tried out
three methods to restore the eroded changes. all of which
yielded the same positive results.
Rosen (2006) worked with 120 Jewish and
Palestinian high school students two months after their
paticipation in a year long peace education program in
which changed attitudes, stereotypes, social distance, and
feelings toward the other side were measured. However,
measures taken two months later showed a significant
decline of the changes observed earlier. At that point the
intervention was administered. It was based on the
activation of cognitive dissonance brought about by the
procedure of forced compliance: A person role-plays the
adversary's perspective in front of others. Half of the
program graduates were asked to present in front of their
classmates the Jewish (Palestinian) point of view and
10
defend it. The other half served as a non-intervention
control group.
Measures of the study's dependent varialbes
taken three months after the intervention (that is, five
months after the program) showed that the eroded
measures were greatly restored (see Figure 3).
This finding was replicated in two additional
studies: Peer teaching whereby program graduates share
with their younger peers what they have learned in the
program (Jausi, 2009), and reflection on what was good
or bad in the program (Arnon, in preparation). In these
studies, very much like in the Rosen study, the
interventions led to the restoration of the changes, as
measured three months later.
Thus, attitudinal and perceptual changes
that become eroded by external socio-political forces
can be restored.
Yet, the resotared changes applied in all three
studies to only the Jewish participants, Forced
compliance, peer teaching and reflection did not restore
11
any of the previously changed attitudes and perceptions.
Of the Palestinians. The reason may be the different
needs that each side arrives with. As found by Nadler and
Shnabel (2008), the Palestinians, for reasons of being and
feeling a discriminated minority in Israel, need to assert
themselves and be empowered. Not so the Jews who are
the majority that is perceived as the perpetrator and needs
others' moral justification. The Palestinians, it appears,
do not actually take the other side's position but rather
use either one of the three intervention methods to re-
assert their position (see also No. 2).
Figure 2: The impact of induced compliance on restoring
previous changes
The Impact of Induced-Compliance activity on the Importance of the
Peripheral Beliefs from the Palestinian Narrative - Jewish Participants
2.03
2.83
2.24 2.12
2.11 2.27
3.14
2.85
1.00
1.50
2.00
2.50
3.00
3.50
4.00
4.50
5.00
Pretest (before
the program)
Posttest1
(after the
program)
Posttest2
(after 2 month)
Posttest2 (3
month after the
IC)
Participated in PE program not participated in IC
Participated in PE program and participated in IC
12
6. One size does not fit all: It appears as if one kind of
program ought to fit all sides in a conflict, particularly
when dialogues are based on one or another version of
the contact hypothesis ae involved. But different groups
have different conceptions about peace, co-existence and
such (see No. 1 above), understand and process peace
education activities very differently, and thus come out
with very different lessons and effects. For example, The
Palestinian minority tends to bolster its adherence to its
own collective narrative while the members of the
Jewish majority are more willing to change their attitudes
toward the minority (Husseisi, 2009). Maoz (2000), at
the Hebrew University in Jerualsem, found that while the
Jewish participants rely on formal power which emanates
from institutionally provided power, the Palestinians rely
on informal ones – their knowledge of the local history
of the conflict and their sense of deprivation and
injustice. As reported above, Rosen (2006), Jausi (2009)
and Arnon (in preparation) all found that while their
13
interventions affected Jews, they did not affect the
Palestinians.
There are other findings that support the same
point. In the study by Biton & Salomon (2006),
involving about 800 Israeli-Jewish and Palestinian
youngsters, we found that while the former entered the
program with a conception of peace as absence of
violence ("negative peace"), the latter assumed that peace
means independence and freedom ("structural peace").
The effects of that year-long school-based program, were
far stronger on the Jews than on the Palestinians since it
dealt mainly with the psychological aspects of
reconciliation, not with any political solution. And as
other research shows, the Jews, being the majority, shun
the political and prefer the interpersonal (Suleiman,
2004). It becomes clear that one size definitely, does not
fit all.
The implication is that different sides in a conflict
need to participate in programs that are specifically
tailored to their needs, culture, political status and social
14
background. The challenge is to find ways to implement
such a a differential approach, given the desire to also
have the participants meet each other and engage in
common activities.
15
7. Contacts between members of conflicted sides require a
common and important goal:
Rsearch tells us that intergroup activities ought to be
rooted in a common goal towards which all participants
contribute, regardless of national or ethnic identity.
However, when the two sides come with different
agendas, needs and aspirations, having a common goal
may not be enough. As mentioned above, the
Palestinians, for example, tend to demad
acknowledgement of what they see as the evils done to
them, while the Jews, being the accused majority, would
rather turn to the cultivation of interpersonal relations.
Although nominally theymay have a common goal,
satisfying their differential needs may be far more
important to them.
Baha Zuabi (2008) studied the interactions
between (N=76) Jewish and Palestinian youths playing in
bi-national soccer clubs as compared to those playing in
uni-national ones (N=114), in terms of changed attitudes,
16
perceptions, desires for contact, stereotypes and negative
feelings. (Youngsters went to one or another club meerly
on the basis of the club's accessibility). Very large
changes took place in the bi-national clubs and none in
the uni-national ones. There was of course much
interdependence among the bi-national players, much
parental support, and a common goal of winning. But the
crucial element was the importance of that goal – to
jointly win games. It was not just a common activity
demanding cooperation; winning a game was the most
important goal relative to which national identity was
totally insignificant.
The challenge then is to design activities –
jointly playing music, staging plays, scouting – that not
only demand cooperation and interdependence but that
set goals which in the eyes of the participants are of
utmost importance. It may well be the case that joint
activities that set such important common goals are an
interesting and possibly effective alternative to dialogue
groups for younger age groups (Zuabi, 2008).
17
Baha
0
0.5
1
1.5
2
2.5
3
3.5
4
4.5
PrePostDelayed
Bi-National Jews
Bi-National Arabs
Uni-national Jews
Uni-national Arabs
Figure 3: Changes of negative feelings by bi- and uni-
national soccer club participants
8. Storng negative emotions may interfer with peace
education
Ayelet Roth (2004) had a number of Israeli and
Palestinian pairs of volunteers, all experienced teachers,
communicate with each other via the Internet. The pair-
wise communication consisted of a version of induced
compliance: Each pair of teachers wrote a chapter of the
other side's collective narrative as the other side sees it,
18
submit it via the Internet to the other pair for their
scrutiny, and receive feedback and corrections. The
beginnings of the exchanges worked well, but then began
the Israeli military operation against the Palestinian town
of Jenin (the "Defensive Wall" operation). It was an
emotionally wrenching operation and exterme feelings of
anger, frustration, shame, despair, even hatred emerged
full force. The teachers involved in the project started to
stall, and grdually ceased to carry on with the project. No
urging, tempting, or pursuasion res tored the intercations;
the two sides, each for its own strong feelings, refused to
continue. The project came to its sad end.
It became evident that peace education and strong
negative feelings of fear, anger, hatred and hopelessness
do not go well together. Political events such as the Jenin
bloody incursion may well arouse in each side its own
painful historical memories which intensify the negative
feelings and reduce (for the time being) the chances for
any mutual understanding, mutual legitimization and
19
reconciliation. The negative feelings need to be alliviated
first.
20
References
Arnon, M. (in preparation). Reflection on the contents of a
peace Education program to retore the effects of the
program. PhD Dissertation. University of Haifa.
Bar-Natan, I. (2005). Meeting between adversaries: Does
liking the other individuals generalize to their groups?
PhD Dissertation. University of Haifa. (Hebrew).
Biton, Y., & Salomon, G. (2006). Peace in the Eyes of Israeli
and Palestinian Youths as Function of Collective
Narratives and Participation in a Peace Education
Program. Journal of Peace Research, 43, (2), 167-180).
Husseisi, R. (2009). The relationshp between legitimizing the
adversary's collective narrative and adherence to one's
own narrative as a function of participation in a peace
education program. PhD Dissertation, University of
Haifa (Hebrew).
Jausi, W. (2009). Restoring the attitudes of peace education
participats through Peer-Tutoring. PhD Dissertatation,
University of Haifa (Hebrew).
21
Maoz, I. (2000). Power relations in intergroup encounters: A
case study of Jewish-Arab encounters in Israel.
International Journal of intercultural Relations. 24, 259-
277.
Nadler, A., & Shanable, N. (2008). Instrumental and
socioemotional pathes to intergoup reconciliation and the
needs-based model of socioemotional reconciliation. In
A. Nadler, T.E. Malloy & J.D. Fisher (Eds.). The social
psychology of intergroup reconciliation. (pp. 37-56). NY:
Oxford University Press.
Rosen, Y. (in press). Transformation of central and peripheral
beliefs in the context of educational programs. Journal of
Transformative Education.
Rosen, Y. (2006). The effects of peace education programs on
changing central versus peripheral attitudes and beliefs.
PhD Dissertation. University of Haifa (Hebrew).
Roth, A. (2004). Reconstructing the opponent's narrtive in the
intractable conflilct as a way of peace education by
Internet-based communication. Maters thesis, University
of Haifa (Hebrew).
22
Suleiman, R. (2004). Jewish-Palestinian relations in Israel: The
planned encounter as a microcosm. In R. Halabi (Ed.).
Israeli and Palestinian identities in dialogue. NJ: Rudgers
University Press.
Zuabi, B. (2008). The influence of participation in bi-national
soccer clubs on the perception of "the other side" among
Jewish and Arab youth in Israel. MA thesis, University
of Haifa Faculty of Education.
Center for Research on Peace Education
http://cerpe.haifa.ac.il