PATHS TO PEACE: CONFLIT MANAGEMENT,CONFLIT RESOLUTION, RECONCILIATION AND PEACEBUILDING

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SalomonSummaryofourfindings.pdf

UNIVERSITY OF HAIFA

Recent Research Findings by the

Center for Research on Peace Education

Gavriel Salomon

July, 2009

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Cerpe's Mission

The mission of the Center for Research on Peace

Education (CERPE) is to advance the field of peace,

reconciliation and partnership education through

conceptual development and empirical research. CERPE

is supported by an initial grant by the Stronach family in

Canada and by grants from the Spencer Foundation,

United States Institute of Peace, the Slifka Foundation,

the Fohs Foundation, and private donations.

http://cerpe.haifa.ac.il

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Recent Research Findings by the

Center for Research on Peace Education

Gavriel Salomon

By way of an introduction:

This is an informal and brief description of recent studies

carried out by members of the Center for Research on

Peace Education at the University of Haifa, Israel. These

are not the only findings we have. There are more

elaborate and complex ones, but not everything can be

included in a brief summary. We want to share the

findings and the conclusions that follow such that

colleagues who are active in the field of peace education

or study it can, as we hope, benefit from the reported

studies. A more formal presentation of some of the

studies can already be found or will soon be found in the

professional literature. The descriptions are in English so

that Israelis, Palestinians and interested parties abroad

can read the material.

Comments and questions are most welcome.

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1. Peace education can prevent the detiriotation of

feelings and attitudes

A study by Yifat Biton (Biton & Salomon, 2006)

examined the effects of a school-based year-long peace

education program ("Pathways to reconciliation") carried

out in Israeli and in Palestinian schools with 818 Jewish

and Palestinian high school students, divided into

program participants and non-participant controls. The

program was administered during the 2002 Palestinian

uprising (The "El Aksa Intifada"). Despite the overall

belligerent atmosphere, the program had positive effects

mainly on the participants' conception of "peace" –

moving from a conception of "negative-" to "positive

peace". Interestingly, while the program did not

significantly affect attitudes it led to an increase in

Israelis' willingness to engage in negotiations, and to a

decrease in Palestinians' willingness to engage in war.

Most importantly, the participation in the program served

as a lid on the boiling pot of belligerence: While

willingness to engage in war increased among

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Palestinian non-participants it decreased among

participants (See Figure 1). These findings suggest that

participation in peace education can prevent further

deterioration of negative feelings towards the other side.

Figure 1: Percent of Palestinians who advocated war as a

way to make peace

Percent advocating war as a

strategy for peace (Biton, 2002)

0

10

20

30

40

50

60

PosttestPretest

Participants

Non-

Participants

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2. Friendships can generalize

What effects do friendships that develop during a 3-day

intergroup dialogue between Jewish and Palestinian

participants have on the way they relate to each other's

nation (the people) and to its collective narrative? Bar-

Natan (2005) examined this question with 216 Jewish

and Palestinian peace education participants and non-

participants. Measures taken right after the completion of

the encounter showed that friendships developed during

the encounter did indeed generalize in both groups to the

way the other side's members were perceived and to

willingness for contact with them; the Jewish group

manifested also increased legitimization of the

Palestinian collective narrative. Not so the Palestinian

group. For them, the collective narrative of the Jews is,

as they see it, the narrative of the majority that deprives

and discriminates them and thus cannot be given any

legitimacy (see also No. 6 below).

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3. Not all attitudes to be changed are born equal

A study by Yigal Rosen examined the possibility that

some conflict-related attidues and beliefs are more

amenable to the impact of peace education than others.

Some attitudes and beliefs occupy a more central place in

one's cognition ("convictions") while others are more

peripheral, and are held with less certitude and strength

("attitides"). A pilot study with items derived from the

Jewish and the Palestinian collective narratives,

repectively, were given to Jewish and Palestinian

university students to rank for importance an cenrality.

The top of the list for each group was defined as

conviction items. In a subsequent study it was found that

for both Jewish and Palestinian peace education program

participants the convictions were not affected while the

attitudes were significantly changed. The study suggests

that we should aim at what is possible, some sort of 'good

enough peace education', without aspiring to change

convictions which serve as the backbone of a group's

collective belief system (Rosen, in press).

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4. The short life of the effects of short peace education

programs

Peace education programs are all too often relatively

short – a few days, a weekend, a week-long seminar.

While such programs have a positive impact on many of

the participants, it is still an open question whether the

perceptual and attitudinal changes last over time given

the socio-political forces that negate them? For after all,

peace education programs are often carried out in a social

environment where an "ethos of conflict" and a

beligerent atmosphere appear to dominate. However, all

too often evaluators are satisfied with measures taken

"the morning after" the completion of a program.

Irit Bar-Natan in the study mentioned above (No.

2) in which the question of friendships' generalizations

was addressed, found that measures taken a few months

after the completion of the program showed that the

changes all but disappeared. The same finding emerged

in the study by Rosen (No. 3 above) and in a study by

Husseisi (2009). It needs to be said that the programs

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were indeed carried out in an overall social context of

fear, beligerence and distrust of the other side. The peace

education programs moved in this respect against the

grain of the general ethos and collective narrative.

In sum, those change that can be brought

about by a relatively short-term intervention can as

easily be changed back by the prevailing socio-

political forces.

Figure2: The erosion of a legitimization effects:

0

0.5

1

1.5

2

2.5

PretestPosttest Delayed

Palestinians

Jew s

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5. Eroded changes can be restored

We called the the decline of measured changes "erosion"

assuming that they did not totally disappear but left at

least some cognitive or emotional residue. We tried out

three methods to restore the eroded changes. all of which

yielded the same positive results.

Rosen (2006) worked with 120 Jewish and

Palestinian high school students two months after their

paticipation in a year long peace education program in

which changed attitudes, stereotypes, social distance, and

feelings toward the other side were measured. However,

measures taken two months later showed a significant

decline of the changes observed earlier. At that point the

intervention was administered. It was based on the

activation of cognitive dissonance brought about by the

procedure of forced compliance: A person role-plays the

adversary's perspective in front of others. Half of the

program graduates were asked to present in front of their

classmates the Jewish (Palestinian) point of view and

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defend it. The other half served as a non-intervention

control group.

Measures of the study's dependent varialbes

taken three months after the intervention (that is, five

months after the program) showed that the eroded

measures were greatly restored (see Figure 3).

This finding was replicated in two additional

studies: Peer teaching whereby program graduates share

with their younger peers what they have learned in the

program (Jausi, 2009), and reflection on what was good

or bad in the program (Arnon, in preparation). In these

studies, very much like in the Rosen study, the

interventions led to the restoration of the changes, as

measured three months later.

Thus, attitudinal and perceptual changes

that become eroded by external socio-political forces

can be restored.

Yet, the resotared changes applied in all three

studies to only the Jewish participants, Forced

compliance, peer teaching and reflection did not restore

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any of the previously changed attitudes and perceptions.

Of the Palestinians. The reason may be the different

needs that each side arrives with. As found by Nadler and

Shnabel (2008), the Palestinians, for reasons of being and

feeling a discriminated minority in Israel, need to assert

themselves and be empowered. Not so the Jews who are

the majority that is perceived as the perpetrator and needs

others' moral justification. The Palestinians, it appears,

do not actually take the other side's position but rather

use either one of the three intervention methods to re-

assert their position (see also No. 2).

Figure 2: The impact of induced compliance on restoring

previous changes

The Impact of Induced-Compliance activity on the Importance of the

Peripheral Beliefs from the Palestinian Narrative - Jewish Participants

2.03

2.83

2.24 2.12

2.11 2.27

3.14

2.85

1.00

1.50

2.00

2.50

3.00

3.50

4.00

4.50

5.00

Pretest (before

the program)

Posttest1

(after the

program)

Posttest2

(after 2 month)

Posttest2 (3

month after the

IC)

Participated in PE program not participated in IC

Participated in PE program and participated in IC

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6. One size does not fit all: It appears as if one kind of

program ought to fit all sides in a conflict, particularly

when dialogues are based on one or another version of

the contact hypothesis ae involved. But different groups

have different conceptions about peace, co-existence and

such (see No. 1 above), understand and process peace

education activities very differently, and thus come out

with very different lessons and effects. For example, The

Palestinian minority tends to bolster its adherence to its

own collective narrative while the members of the

Jewish majority are more willing to change their attitudes

toward the minority (Husseisi, 2009). Maoz (2000), at

the Hebrew University in Jerualsem, found that while the

Jewish participants rely on formal power which emanates

from institutionally provided power, the Palestinians rely

on informal ones – their knowledge of the local history

of the conflict and their sense of deprivation and

injustice. As reported above, Rosen (2006), Jausi (2009)

and Arnon (in preparation) all found that while their

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interventions affected Jews, they did not affect the

Palestinians.

There are other findings that support the same

point. In the study by Biton & Salomon (2006),

involving about 800 Israeli-Jewish and Palestinian

youngsters, we found that while the former entered the

program with a conception of peace as absence of

violence ("negative peace"), the latter assumed that peace

means independence and freedom ("structural peace").

The effects of that year-long school-based program, were

far stronger on the Jews than on the Palestinians since it

dealt mainly with the psychological aspects of

reconciliation, not with any political solution. And as

other research shows, the Jews, being the majority, shun

the political and prefer the interpersonal (Suleiman,

2004). It becomes clear that one size definitely, does not

fit all.

The implication is that different sides in a conflict

need to participate in programs that are specifically

tailored to their needs, culture, political status and social

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background. The challenge is to find ways to implement

such a a differential approach, given the desire to also

have the participants meet each other and engage in

common activities.

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7. Contacts between members of conflicted sides require a

common and important goal:

Rsearch tells us that intergroup activities ought to be

rooted in a common goal towards which all participants

contribute, regardless of national or ethnic identity.

However, when the two sides come with different

agendas, needs and aspirations, having a common goal

may not be enough. As mentioned above, the

Palestinians, for example, tend to demad

acknowledgement of what they see as the evils done to

them, while the Jews, being the accused majority, would

rather turn to the cultivation of interpersonal relations.

Although nominally theymay have a common goal,

satisfying their differential needs may be far more

important to them.

Baha Zuabi (2008) studied the interactions

between (N=76) Jewish and Palestinian youths playing in

bi-national soccer clubs as compared to those playing in

uni-national ones (N=114), in terms of changed attitudes,

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perceptions, desires for contact, stereotypes and negative

feelings. (Youngsters went to one or another club meerly

on the basis of the club's accessibility). Very large

changes took place in the bi-national clubs and none in

the uni-national ones. There was of course much

interdependence among the bi-national players, much

parental support, and a common goal of winning. But the

crucial element was the importance of that goal – to

jointly win games. It was not just a common activity

demanding cooperation; winning a game was the most

important goal relative to which national identity was

totally insignificant.

The challenge then is to design activities –

jointly playing music, staging plays, scouting – that not

only demand cooperation and interdependence but that

set goals which in the eyes of the participants are of

utmost importance. It may well be the case that joint

activities that set such important common goals are an

interesting and possibly effective alternative to dialogue

groups for younger age groups (Zuabi, 2008).

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Baha

0

0.5

1

1.5

2

2.5

3

3.5

4

4.5

PrePostDelayed

Bi-National Jews

Bi-National Arabs

Uni-national Jews

Uni-national Arabs

Figure 3: Changes of negative feelings by bi- and uni-

national soccer club participants

8. Storng negative emotions may interfer with peace

education

Ayelet Roth (2004) had a number of Israeli and

Palestinian pairs of volunteers, all experienced teachers,

communicate with each other via the Internet. The pair-

wise communication consisted of a version of induced

compliance: Each pair of teachers wrote a chapter of the

other side's collective narrative as the other side sees it,

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submit it via the Internet to the other pair for their

scrutiny, and receive feedback and corrections. The

beginnings of the exchanges worked well, but then began

the Israeli military operation against the Palestinian town

of Jenin (the "Defensive Wall" operation). It was an

emotionally wrenching operation and exterme feelings of

anger, frustration, shame, despair, even hatred emerged

full force. The teachers involved in the project started to

stall, and grdually ceased to carry on with the project. No

urging, tempting, or pursuasion res tored the intercations;

the two sides, each for its own strong feelings, refused to

continue. The project came to its sad end.

It became evident that peace education and strong

negative feelings of fear, anger, hatred and hopelessness

do not go well together. Political events such as the Jenin

bloody incursion may well arouse in each side its own

painful historical memories which intensify the negative

feelings and reduce (for the time being) the chances for

any mutual understanding, mutual legitimization and

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reconciliation. The negative feelings need to be alliviated

first.

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References

Arnon, M. (in preparation). Reflection on the contents of a

peace Education program to retore the effects of the

program. PhD Dissertation. University of Haifa.

Bar-Natan, I. (2005). Meeting between adversaries: Does

liking the other individuals generalize to their groups?

PhD Dissertation. University of Haifa. (Hebrew).

Biton, Y., & Salomon, G. (2006). Peace in the Eyes of Israeli

and Palestinian Youths as Function of Collective

Narratives and Participation in a Peace Education

Program. Journal of Peace Research, 43, (2), 167-180).

Husseisi, R. (2009). The relationshp between legitimizing the

adversary's collective narrative and adherence to one's

own narrative as a function of participation in a peace

education program. PhD Dissertation, University of

Haifa (Hebrew).

Jausi, W. (2009). Restoring the attitudes of peace education

participats through Peer-Tutoring. PhD Dissertatation,

University of Haifa (Hebrew).

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Maoz, I. (2000). Power relations in intergroup encounters: A

case study of Jewish-Arab encounters in Israel.

International Journal of intercultural Relations. 24, 259-

277.

Nadler, A., & Shanable, N. (2008). Instrumental and

socioemotional pathes to intergoup reconciliation and the

needs-based model of socioemotional reconciliation. In

A. Nadler, T.E. Malloy & J.D. Fisher (Eds.). The social

psychology of intergroup reconciliation. (pp. 37-56). NY:

Oxford University Press.

Rosen, Y. (in press). Transformation of central and peripheral

beliefs in the context of educational programs. Journal of

Transformative Education.

Rosen, Y. (2006). The effects of peace education programs on

changing central versus peripheral attitudes and beliefs.

PhD Dissertation. University of Haifa (Hebrew).

Roth, A. (2004). Reconstructing the opponent's narrtive in the

intractable conflilct as a way of peace education by

Internet-based communication. Maters thesis, University

of Haifa (Hebrew).

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Suleiman, R. (2004). Jewish-Palestinian relations in Israel: The

planned encounter as a microcosm. In R. Halabi (Ed.).

Israeli and Palestinian identities in dialogue. NJ: Rudgers

University Press.

Zuabi, B. (2008). The influence of participation in bi-national

soccer clubs on the perception of "the other side" among

Jewish and Arab youth in Israel. MA thesis, University

of Haifa Faculty of Education.

Center for Research on Peace Education

http://cerpe.haifa.ac.il