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Running head: THE ENTHYMEME IN ARISTOTLE'S RHETORIC 1

THE ENTHYMEME IN ARISTOTLE'S RHETORIC 2

Term Project: 1 JUDICIAL RHETORIC (THE ENTHYMEME IN ARISTOTLE'S

RHETORIC) YOLANDA MCNEIL

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ENGL 570 TERM PAPER

Liberty University

Introduction

The concept of enthymeme has been broadly discussed as a subject in argumentation theory

and informal logic. All contemporary theorists understand that the enthymeme concept date

back to Aristotle Rhetoric. They are convinced that the term ‘syllogism’ which ascribed to this

concept in introductions to logic diverges from original Aristotelian perception. But what few

individuals are not sure is that scholars of ancient philosophy and philologists are still

passionately debating the matter of detailed sense of this concept in Rhetoric (Conley, 1984). As

a result, there is just one point that all theorists agree: the enthymeme has changed since

Aristotle's original discussions of it. In overall, the approach of Aristotle to the enthymemes in

the Rhetoric seems to change from argumentative theory to logic.

Research Purpose

This research paper provides an analysis of how Aristotle ascribes to the enthymeme. That will

be achieved from the perception of argumentation theory in explaining how enthymeme has

presented in different perspectives. The advantages of argumentation theory include the

following: it supplements the dominant logical approach presented in 2 highly enlightened

researches by Burnyeat (1994) which emphasizes the question of logical validity of the link

between the premise and deduction. Secondly, that method is better calculated to outline

parallels in contemporary ‘enthymeme issues.

The research intends to use an argumentative theory which is the study of how deductions can

be arrived at through reasonable thinking, that is, soundly, claim based or not on-premises. It

comprises rules of logic and inference in speeches and premises. 1 IN COMBINATION

WITH RHETORIC THEORY THAT TRACES ITS ROOTS BACK TO ANTIQUE

GREECE, WHERE “RHETORIC” DENOTED THE ART OF PUBLIC SPEAKING AS

IT ADVANCED UNDER THE STATUTORY RÉGIME, ESPECIALLY IN THE 4TH

AND 5TH-CENTURY ATHENIAN DEMOCRACY.

THE ORDINARY CITIZEN LACKED THE WIDE-RANGING KNOWLEDGE OF THE

LAW AND ITS PROCEDURES THAT THE PROFESSIONAL LAWYER DID,

HOWEVER, IT WAS GREAT TO HIS ADVANTAGE TO HAVE WIDE-RANGING

KNOWLEDGE OF THE TACTICS OF DEFENSE AND PROSECUTION. AS A

RESULT, THE SCHOOLS OF RHETORIC DID A SUCCESSFUL BUSINESS IN

TRAINING THE LAYPERSON TO DEFEND HIMSELF IN COURT OR TO

PROSECUTE AN OFFENDING NEIGHBOR. AS SUCH, JUDICIAL RHETORIC

PROMOTES JUSTICE AND IDENTIFIES INJUSTICE BY APPEALING TO THE

LAW. 'FORENSIC SPEECH ACCEPTS AS GIVEN THE LAWS OF THE POLIS,' SO

THE SECTION ON JUDICIAL RHETORIC USES ENTHYMEMES TO ADJUST

'PARTICULAR CASES TO GENERAL LAWS.

Research Questions

This project seeks to answer the following questions · What is the implicit premise in the term

enthymeme?

This question can be examined by considering what can be seen as the clearest case that

enthymeme can be reduced to logical syllogism, as it happens in the context.

· To what degree can people attribute to the enthymeme a syllogistic framework, in the sense of

the previous analytics?

This question has been asked several times in the enthymeme’s works of literature in Aristotle's

Rhetoric. Currently, the answers to that query still play a critical role in determining one’s

stance in connection to Solmsen.

· How can one explicate the noteworthy monopoly place of the semeia (signs) and eikota

(probabilities) in programmatic passages of the Rhetoric?

This question explains the central place of the semeia and eikota in the rhetorical custom as

explained by Aristotle. That stance was mainly as a result of the virtually limited attention

initially preserved for the judicial speech where the evidence was presented as credible or

incredible.

The Enthymeme Explained

Aristotle explained that enthymeme occurs in an argument where certain premises or things

are not explicitly stated. The 3 properties that Aristotle ascribes to enthymeme include the

following: the first one is that enthymemes deal with mainly non-essential issues, namely

human actions and in this case are derived from signs and probabilities (Braet, 1999).

Secondly, an enthymeme is used because of the benefit of the uneducated audience, and this

makes a succinct formulation more suitable. Furthermore, as accustomed presumptions can be

left unexpressed, an enthymeme is usually derived from a few statements as compared to

premises (Pfister, & Woods, 2016). Lastly, just like dialectical sullogimoi, enthymemes are

considered to be the kind of sullogismoi whereby common and relatively formal topics as

contrary to material and special topics like idia; even though enthymemes from common topics

are perceived as more characteristic of rhetoric (McAdon, 2003).

As can be seen, the construal of the three properties has not been agreed by the scholars. This is

because of the uncertainty that surrounds the text passages discussed by the theorists. Based on

this, it might be valuable to supplement these with examples of enthymemes, although because

of those present problems it is not clear whether a specific example is essentially an enthymeme

(Walton, 2008). The examples that are explicitly designated as enthymemes by Aristotle are as

follows: “it is not right for the individual who is sharp to have kids taught to be intelligent, for

on top of idleness they incur hostile jealousy from fellow citizens”, taken from Medea; in case

the reason is omitted, this enthymeme becomes a maxim (Conley, 1984). “There is no person

who is free because he is a slave of chance or money”, taken from Hecuba; here the omission of

the reason leads to maxim. “It would be dreadful if in exile people fight to come home, but

when they are at home, they are forced into exile in order to cease from fighting,” taken from

Lysias speech; of all the examples it is only this one that is explicitly termed an enthymeme

(Walton & Reed, 2005). Lastly, if it is essential to seek conciliations whenever such changes are

more profitable and more advantageous, then it is essential to seek some of the changes if

someone is successful (Pfister, & Woods, 2016). All these examples demonstrate how the

enthymeme has been changing since Aristotle's original discussions of it.

Enthymeme as Dialectical Arguments

2 ARISTOTLE DEFINED THE ENTHYMEME AS A BODY OF PERSUASION,

SUGGESTING THAT EVERYTHING IS AN ACCIDENT OR AN ADDITION TO THE

CORE OF THE PERSUASION PROCEDURE. The rationale why the enthymeme, as

rhetorical demonstration or proof must be considered to be core to the rhetorical procedure of

persuasion is that people are easily convinced when they think that anything must be

demonstrated (Bitzer, 1959). Therefore, this rudimentary concept of rhetorical demonstration

appears to be like this: to create a target one has to believe that b, the speaker should in the first

place choose a sentence c or some sentences c1. cn that is previously adopted by the target

group. Secondly, Aristotle is supposed to show that c might be derivative of b or c1. bn, using b

or b1. bn as premises (Aristotle’s Rhetoric, 2010). Due to the fact that the target individuals

form their opinions according to rational standards, they will accept c as soon as they are able

to comprehend that c can be verified based on their own views.

Subsequently, the enthymeme's creation is principally the issue of inferring from accepted

views (endoxa) (Aristotle’s Rhetoric, 2010). In fact, it is similarly very probable to use premises

that might not be generally recognized by themselves, but maybe derived from usually

recognized views; other premises are only acknowledged because the orator is regarded

trustworthy; 2 STILL, OTHER ENTHYMEMES ARE CREATED FROM SIGNS

(BITZER, 1959). That the conclusion is formed from acknowledged views—contrary to

inferences from the original and correct principles or sentences—is the significant aspect of

dialectical argumentation in the sense of Aristotelian (Weidemann, 1989). 2 THEREFORE,

THE ENTHYMEMES FORMULATION IS A DIALECTIC MATTER, AND SUCH A

DIALECTICIAN HAS THE CAPABILITY REQUIRED FOR THE CREATION OF

ENTHYMEMES (ALLEN, 2007). WHEN THE ENTHYMEMES ARE CONSIDERED

TO BE A SUBCLASS OF DIALECTICAL OPINIONS, THEN THAT SEEMS TO BE

ORDINARY OF NORMAL TO EXPECT AN EXPLICIT DIFFERENCE BY WHICH

ONE CAN TELL ENTHYMEMES APART FROM ALL OTHER KINDS OF

DIALECTICAL ARGUMENTS (ALLEN, 2007). Nonetheless, this expectancy is in some

way misinformed: The enthymeme is dissimilar from other categories of dialectical opinions, as

far as it is used in the rhetorical framework of public speaking (and rhetorical arguments are

termed ‘enthymemes’); therefore, no additional qualitative or formal dissimilarities are

required (Aristotle’s Rhetoric, 2010).

Nevertheless, in considering rhetorical framework there are 2 different aspects that the

dialectician should have in mind if he/she desires to be a rhetorician in the future, and if the

dialectical argument is to develop to be an effective enthymeme. Firstly, the distinctive themes

of public speeches do not—as a dialectic subject and theoretic viewpoint—belong to the stuff

that is essentially the case, but is amongst the stuff that is the goal of pragmatic discussion and

can as well as be otherwise (Braet, 1999). Secondly, as contrary to well-trained dialecticians the

readers of public speeches are categorized by a logical inadequacy; apart from that, the jury or

assembly members are not familiarized with subsequent a lengthier chain of interpretations.

Thus, enthymemes should not be as specific and detailed as a scientific justification and must

be brief as compared to a normal or usual dialectical argument (Aristotle’s Rhetoric, 2010).

This, nevertheless, is not to state that the enthymeme is described by brevity and

incompleteness. 2 INSTEAD, IT IS CONSIDERED TO BE AN INDICATION OF A

WELL-IMPLEMENTED ENTHYMEME THAT THE CONTENT AND THE NUMBER

OF ITS PREMISES ARE ATTUNED TO THE INTELLIGENCE OF THE AUDIENCE

IN PUBLIC; however, an enthymeme that fails to integrate these qualities is still considered to

be enthymeme.

The Concision of the Enthymeme

Aristotle explained that the enthymeme regularly has fewer premises than some other

inferences. Due to the fact that most translators refer the name ‘sullogismos’ to the syllogistic

theory, where an appropriate inference has two premises only, those sentences have resulted to

the common understanding that Aristotle describes the enthymeme as a sullogismos in where

two premises have been repressed, in other words as a shortened, unfinished syllogism

(Aristotle’s Rhetoric, 2010). But certainly, the cited passages do not try to provide the right

enthymeme’s definition, nor does the name ‘sullogismos’ essentially mean inferences with two

premises only (Weidemann, 1989). Correctly comprehended, both passages revolve around

choosing the right premise, not about intellectual incompleteness. The comment that

enthymeme regularly has fewer premises concludes the argument of 2 likely errors the speaker

could make. As such, one can draw deductions from stuff that has formerly been construed or

from stuff that is yet to be construed (Cronkhite, 1966). The last technique is not persuasive,

because the premises are yet to be accepted, or are yet to be introduced. The earlier technique is

challenging too: if the speaker is supposed to introduce the desired premises by the other

conclusion, and the premises of this pre-conclusion too, one shall come to an end with a longer

chain of conclusions (Cronkhite, 1966). Arguments that have many inferential phases are very

common in dialectical exercise, but it is impossible to expect the public speaking audience to

follow those longer arguments. That is the reason Aristotle explains that the enthymeme has

been and must be from a few premises.

Enthymeme in Legal Reasoning Structure

This type of reasoning is deductive which is through the use of rhetoric syllogism that Aristotle

termed enthymeme. An enthymeme is almost the same as legal reasoning structure: universal

rule or state general apply it to a specific circumstance (the facts) and then reach a deduction

(Braet, 1999). What differentiates an enthymeme from scientific or strictly logical syllogism

flows from the differences in their spheres. In science and math, the syllogism deals with

universally true conclusions (Conley, 1984). In rhetoric and in all fields applicable to rhetoric,

for example, politics and law, arguments are based on probabilities and likelihoods, not

certainties.

The kind of probability that Aristotle is discussing is not just frequency or commonness, but

instead, it is the probability where “whatever, among things that can be other than what they

are, therefore it is so linked to that in respect to which it is possible as universal is to a specific

(McAdon, 2003). According to Aristotle, something is possible when it is a specific example of a

general rule. To be certain, general rules are general since they mirror frequent or common

occurrences, but the enthymematic probability is, to Aristotle, predicated on frequency as such,

but instead on the link of the generally factual statement to specific example (McAdon, 2003).

The basic framework of a syllogism is the main premise, minor premise, and conclusion. The

easiest way to understand is through the popular example: all humans are mortal, Socrates is a

humanoid, thus Socrates is mortal. To put it in the right context, the main premise is an overall

statement about some condition or some set which is universally correct (within the set of all

human, all are considered mortal); the minor premise is an exact statement regarding a

particular thing within the general set (Pfister, & Woods, 2016). Socrates is considered to be a

member of the sets of the human); the deduction essentially follows if minor and major

premises are correct.

Kennedy (1991) explained in symbolic logic that syllogism is expressed as if all X is Y, and some

X is Z, then all Z is Y 68 “X” =humans; “Y” =mortal; “Z” = Socrates. The language in the formal

statement gets a bit odd, but that is how it works. Replace “Z” with “Greeks” and the “is” with

“are” in the last 2 clauses, and it sounds a bit better: “if all human beings are mortal, and some

members of the team of humans are Greeks, then all Greeks are considered to be mortal. In a

formal syllogism and logic all of the premises should be cited explicitly (Kennedy, 1991). In an

enthymeme or rhetorical syllogism, frequently several premises are unstated due to the fact

that Aristotle, “if a single premise is known, it does not have to be specified, because the hearer

purpose to supply it. This means there are often several premises where inferences rest and to

explain to them all should be nearly impossible or even truly impossible in some circumstances

(Kennedy, 1991). For the audience to supply the absent premise, the enthymeme ought to be

predicated on the premise that the audience believes or knows to be factual. Explained the

other way, the enthymeme shall be ineffective if the unexplained premise is part and parcel of

the basic understanding.

Even if it is possible to establish and express the information being depended on for inference,

it would tremendously tedious to do that. Some of the US citizens find it easy to understand the

statement such as “the marathoner won a silver medal” to denote that marathoner was the

second one in the race as specified by Burnyeat (1994). Unspecified is premises like the silver

medals are awarded for the second place; the marathoner was participating in the race; second

place denotes that the marathoner was beaten by the first marathoner in the race; the race had

other participants; it was an official competition and not just buddies competing for the sake of

leisure (Braet, 1999).

Hitchcock (1985) explains that in an enthymeme, the premises, statements as well as

conclusions are not normally absolute; they have the tendency of being couched in terms of

possibilities. Things such as “children who are hungry sometimes steal to get food” or “children

shall commonly be interrupted by thunder” are the stuff of enthymemes (Conley, 1984). This is

the actual abode of the enthymeme- drawing an inference that might be correct on the basis of

the strongest, most probable generalizations that a person can bring forth to construe the

circumstance.

Aristotle similarly identified deceptive enthymemes, premises which tend or seem to be

enthymemes, but aren’t (Conley, 1984). Since enthymeme deal with possibilities instead of the

certainties, what individuals find most convincing is an elucidation that comports most

strongly with their own experience and understanding (Hitchcock, 1985). This is the only way

connection is made. An enthymeme created outside the experience of the audience, irrespective

of how persuasive or strong or appropriate it might otherwise be, it shall not persuade.

The bright scholar and shrewd observer, anthropologist Geertz Clifford offers a strong example

of the significance of linking up with the audience. Geertz criticizes anthropologist Evans-

Pritchard’s explanation of Azande witchery. Consider a Zande teenager, Evans-Pritchard states

“who has banged his foot on a tree stump and got poisoned.” The teenager responds it is

witchery. Nonsense, utters Evans-Pritchard, out of his common-sense habit: you were just

bloody uncaring; you must have keenly observed where you were heading. I looked where I was

heading; you have to be with so numerous stumps around, says the teenager - and if I had not

been witched, I would have been able to see it (Conley, 1984). Moreover, all wounds take a few

days to heal for that is the nature of wounds. But this one embittered, thus witchery should be

involved (Braet, 1999). Therefore, nevertheless “spiritual” the content of Zande witchery beliefs

might or might not be, they are actually employed by the Zande in a mysterious way - as an

explanation and defense of the actual claims of idiomatic reason. Behind the above reflections

upon stubbed foot, sour stomachs and spoiled pots lies a tissue of common-sense concepts that

the Zande ostensibly consider as being factual on their face: that minor cuts usually heal

quickly.

It is worthy to note how the Zande teenager’s elucidation for the witchery and infection makes

sense within the culture of Zande, although it doesn’t make sense under present western ideals

of common sense or from western perception of human activity and human nature (individuals

at some point stub their toes) and infection (some wounds get infected and never heal quickly)

(Kennedy, 1991). Knowing about the culture of Zande would affect how a person would go

about the issue of introducing some biology-based medicinal approaches to treat them.

The Enthymeme’s Content Focusing on Semeia and Eikota

Various authors have tried to explain enthymeme in the perspective of semeia and eikota.

Those authors particularly the ones who believe in the logical approach declined the concept of

implied premises explaining they are important stuff of enthymemes. Most of these authors

have maintained that it is only idiosyncratic aspects that can be found in the content of

enthymemes. These authors point to these issues as rhetoric and previous analytics where

enthymeme is sullogismos from semeia and eikota. This viewpoint was recently criticized from

within their own stances by Burnyeat (1994). He could be right, but his reasoning according to

Aristotle, this argument can only be found outside rhetoric and it is not strong than the

reflections which conclude that apart from semeia and eikota, rhetorical premises have other

signs (Burnyeat, 1996).

Semeion is also defined as a premise of enthymeme in his prior analytics and. This means

semeion is an event or situation which denotes accompanying event or circumstance

(Hitchcock, 1985). Aristotle uses illustrations that are principal although not solely concerned

with some signs. He differentiates between signs whereby signified and sign continuously go

together, this kind of semeion has a distinct term: the tekmerion (necessary signs) whereby

signified and sign frequently go together (there is no distinct term for this kind, but it is

denoted as semeion in the strict sense) (McAdon, 2003). Aristotle noted that the tekmeria takes

place only intermittently.

Aristotle mentioned semeia and eikota first time in the rhetoric when he explained that those

are premises where enthymemes are derived. In Aristotle’s opinion, this is due to the fact that

the inferences of enthymemes are issues that are rarely necessary for other words human

actions (Burnyeat, 1996). Seemingly these are considered to be actions with which the three

kinds of speech are concerned: intolerable or exemplary acts, policy measures and acts which

might be unfair (Walton, 2008). In his explanation, Aristotle explains that the fact that

inferences can only be reached based on premises that belong to similar classes (essential

inferences based on essential premises, and commonly non-necessary inferences based on

commonly non-essential premises), the premises should have a principally non-essential

content (Mailly, 2016). Based on this, Aristotle considers this kind of non-essential premise is

seemingly created by semeia and eikota.

Even though Aristotle is connecting the nature of the premises and the nature of the

conclusions, what he explains about the nature of rhetorical premises and inferences is not

totally in keeping with the entire rhetoric (Hitchcock, 1985). Different from what is proposed,

Aristotle's conclusions and premises are not completely of expressive nature. In fact, the

content is usually considered to be more evaluative. Even though other authors have focused on

solving the problem of premises and conclusions by declaring eikos as a normative statement

and factual probability, this seems to be incredible based on Aristotle's descriptions (McAdon,

2003). Aristotle sticks to tradition in his eikos’ description by stating that it is mainly a

phenomenon in the whole globe, or at any rate of view of the real globe: “that which is

recognized to commonly take place or not happen, or mostly is not the case (Burnyeat, 1996).”

In eikos’ case, the are two types of semeion in the bigger sense are mentioned too in rhetoric as

rhetorical premises and in prior analytics, as protasis apodeiktike e anankaia e endoxos, this

means, a demonstrative premise which is either generally accepted or necessary (Braet 1999).

Based on this interpretation, there is just a single deduction possible: as premises, semeia and

eikota have descriptive content (Mailly, 2016). This means they would also appear to be

suitable for arguing the kind of rhetorical deductions which Aristotle originally had in mind

about Rhetoric- issues which unlike necessities only take place always, or are possible. But it is

pertinent to look at the four examples of enthymemes explained above to distinguish if Aristotle

did not regard either the premises or the conclusions of enthymemes as limited to descriptive

claims (Walton, 2001). Out of the four examples, only the second one has purely descriptive

assertions.

Some of the examples, which can probably also be perceived as instances enthymemes are in

normative nature. Moreover, in the several places where Aristotle mentions issues of rhetorical

(staseis and initially was referred to as amphosbiftiseis), he proves that he understands that it is

just incomparable instances that rhetorical inferences refer to descriptive queries (Mailly,

2016). Therefore, as regards the content of conclusions and premises, the rhetoric would also

seem to have no consistency. In this case, Aristotle explains that the orator ought to have

premises linked to the ends for conclusions to be reached of the 3 kinds of speech, on the other

hand, he reminds the audience that premises of enthymemes are semeia, eikota, tekmeria

(Smith, 2007). In the first place, no inferences can be attained concerning tell. In other words,

whether the proposal is not or is favorable, an individual’s behavior praiseworthy is an act

considered unfair, based on this kind of descriptive premises (Hitchcock, 1985). Furthermore,

in his premise’s treatment, Aristotle doesn’t limit to eikota tekmeria as well as semeia though

this is frequently maintained based on different viewpoints or perspectives.

There is similarly the likelihood that Aristotle has given much preference to semeia and eikota

as enthymemes from the category of the argument that seems to be the easiest way to decrease

to diagnostic syllogisms (Smith, 2007). In this case, current information actually gives the

audience a better concept of the several contents of rhetorical premises (Burnyeat, 1996).

Aristotle precisely states that the enthymeme from a non-necessary sign is the only one of the

numerous potentials. As a result, because of the random treatment, it is not possible to make a

thorough declaration on the scope of the contents of rhetorical premises. One is motivated to

state that: the kind of premise which could be utilized in the 3 categories of speeches, but the

simple fact that Aristotle is continually sharing fictional illustrations makes his stance hard to

determine.

A comprehensive argument or debate is far beyond the scope of the current prompt. It shall be

sufficient to explain the penchant principles like "the scarce is superior to the plentiful”. How

then can one explicate the noteworthy monopoly place of the semeia and eikota in

programmatic passages of the Rhetoric? Possibly it is because of the central place of the semeia

and eikota in the rhetorical custom. That stance was mainly as a result of the virtually limited

attention initially preserved for the judicial speech where the evidence was presented as

credible or incredible (Mailly, 2016). This might have induced Aristotle to use semeia and

eikota as a parity for the entire rhetorical premises. It is also remarkable that the eikota and

semeia are provided with limited rights in exactly those contexts of the Rhetoric where the

enthymeme is highly connected to the logical syllogism (Kennedy, 1991). Possibly this mainly

for the reason that it highlights the difference with the usually essential premises of the

Analytics.

The Enthymeme’s Formulation Focusing on Implicit Premise

In considering the issue of an implicit premise, there are several views that can be summed up

as follows. According to Aristotle, an enthymeme is considered to be a syllogism that has an

indirect or implied premise. This would later become the standard definition. However, this

definition and interpretation are not taken seriously (Kennedy, 1991). Secondly, Aristotle

explained that an Enthymeme might contain the premise that that has not been expressed,

which is not so essential. Furthermore, where Aristotle is concerned, it is improper to speak

about implicit premises: the several enthymemes with just a single premise in Rhetoric must

not be supplemented by the addition of an unexpected premise (McAdon, 2003).

There are 4 different examples which presented as correct enthymemes. However, these

differences are related to the sources and they are resultants of existing, in most cases fictional

sources, contrary to the ones that have ostensibly been invented (Hitchcock, 1985). Firstly, the

formulation difference lies in the enthymeme’s style. This is where some of these examples are

formulated in a factual way. Thus, the audience is able to understand that the impact of some of

the enthymemes is not even primarily to the structure and content of the argument, but instead

to the arresting devising (Walton, 2001). With concern to this literary feature, it can be

concluded that the outcomes of the enthymeme’s description-both after and before Aristotle is

a striking devising.

Secondly, the formulation difference lies in the comprehensive intricacy of the sentences that

make up the enthymemes in the examples. Aristotle presents enthymemes that comprise

multifaceted speeches or statements. As a result, there are four examples, which were derived

from the existing manuscripts and designed as enthymemes by Aristotle (Mailly, 2016).

Conversely, Aristotle also uses simpler illustrations like “he is sick, due to the fact that he has

infection” which are mainly presented as signs and were seemingly invented to serve as an

example (McAdon, 2003). This difference in intricacy has the main repercussions for the

reducibility of the instances to reasonable forms of argument. The sign enthymemes, with their

terms, can be reduced to invalid or valid syllogisms from the previous analytics which Aristotle

did in his last work, a procedure to which he referred in his rhetoric (Walton, 2001).

Nevertheless, this is impossible where most complicated examples are concerned about just

because they comprise many terms.

Generally, Aristotle used enthymeme in only two senses. Aristotle employed the word for

arguments that exist in all authentic manuscripts, and which are affected by stylistic formula

(Hitchcock, 1985). This means it is impossible to decrease the examples to syllogistic formulae

of arguments based on Aristotle’s reasoning. In the framework of the interpreted examples,

there is no reference to any pushy literary effect. As the initial logic according to pre-

Aristotelian tradition and the second one with syllogistic of Aristotle, which was established

comparatively late, a reader gets the impression that what people see in that context is an old

and recent case (Mailly, 2016).

Structuring Enthymemes in Terms of Syllogistic and Topical

The question of ‘to what degree can people attribute to the enthymeme a syllogistic

framework?’ has been asked several times in the enthymeme’s works of literature in Aristotle's

Rhetoric. Currently, the answers to that query still play a critical role in determining one’s

stance in connection to Solmsen (Raphael, 1974). Some authors have tried to answer explaining

the enthymeme model in post-analytic rhetoric with the exemption of the strange pre-analytic

artifact- this interpretation is shared (Smith, 2007). Other authors believe that such Rhetoric

has a double enthymeme model, and believes an enthymeme is contemporary; this is the

position espoused by Ryan (1984). All these resulted in argumentation theory. Therefore, in the

modern argumentation theory, the most interesting feature is that many disputants are

attempting to resolve what seems like a wrong dilemma. They thus share the supposition of

Solmsen that an enthymeme ought to be predicated on syllogistic or topical framework

(Raphael, 1974). Nevertheless, those are in fact two contrasting structures: a logical and

practical framework that is concerned with the logical structure and argumentation scheme,

which focusses on the form of argument (Hitchcock, 1985). In this case, there are two

categories of the framework that are not jointly high-class but instead, combine into one

argumentation. This is not to explain that the knowledge that the 2 are dissimilar and might be

merged is completely absent, but instead that no systematic and explicit dissimilarity is made

between all the structural levels.

It is possible to discover that Aristotle does not seem to have made this dissimilarity concerning

structural levels so that knowing this difference involves a relic. However, according to McAdon

(2003), this is not supposed to be the case if one uses the difference as a logical or diagnostic

tool, without explicitly accrediting it to Aristotle. In the re-interpretation of the passages as

either syllogistic or contemporary enthymemes are overriding (Raphael, 1974). In the first

passage argumentation, structures play a critical role, but direct kinds of discussions are

similarly mentioned. In the subsequent passage, the converse is the instance.

A topical structure, just like its contemporary concept and as argumentation structure is

different from a logical framework. What needs to be made clear is that that the two categories

of the structure are not substitutes, but instead deal with dissimilar features of discussion

(Raphael, 1974). Then, from the perspective of contemporary argumentation philosophers, it is

easy to explain how topical as well as logical structure plays a critical role in the topical

enthymemes.

The Enthymemes Underpinning Brown V Board of Education

The issue in Brown’s case was whether the argument of the plaintiff was correct and fourteenth

amendment followed about “separated public learning institutions are not 'equal’ and it is

impossible to make them 'equal,' and that thus they are denied the equal protection of the rules

and regulations.” Several premises surround this claim, and it is exciting to tease most of them

out. The enthymeme explains 3 of its premises: separated public learning institutions aren’t

equal, segregated learning institutions can’t be made equal and the fourteenth amendment

demands that the entire public get equal protection of the rules and regulations (Raphael,

1974). The inference that is emphasized to be followed in these premises is that having

segregated schools breaches the equivalent protection act.

Unspecified, but comprehended premises consist of the following: the public learning

institutions are created by rules and regulations; the rules and regulations relating to education

are encompassed within the concept of protection of people (in fact this was broadly argued,

but in this paper, only one unstated premise is quoted) (Mailly, 2016). In this case, it was

overtly addressed by Brown Court that fourteenth Amendment’s protections apply to the

countries; that there is “race”; that some learning institutions were isolated by race; that the

past settled cases allowing segregation but equivalent education was incorrectly decided; that

the so-called separation is a malicious; that parity or equivalence is an issue of mind and heart,

not just factually quantifiable criteria (Raphael, 1974).

Conclusion

In discussing the enthymeme in Aristotle's Rhetoric one can see a change of pronunciation

from argumentation concept to logic. Originally the attention of Aristotle seems to be focused

on categories of the considerable relationship between a premise and conclusion. His

arguments or ideas of departure were ideas and points that he discovered in practice. This

consists of a topical approach that is explained by quoted illustrations. In the last marginal---

ease, there is an effort to construe the enthymeme in terms of prescribed syllogistic figures. As a

result, the variety of definite arguments are laid on the Procrustean bed of definite syllogistics:

the syllogistic method, demonstrated with devised illustrations from the syllogistic. While it is

logical that Aristotle wanted to make his clear findings of syllogistics appropriate for the

evaluation and analysis of rhetorical argumentation, from the perspective of argumentation

concept, that was an exceptionally doubtful initiative.

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Citations (9/9)

Matched Text

1 Another student's paper

2 https://seop.illc.uva.nl/archives/sum2010/entries/aristotle-rhetoric/

3 Another student's paper

4 https://seop.illc.uva.nl/archives/sum2003/entries/aristotle-rhetoric/

5 http://rozenbergquarterly.com/issa-proceedings-2002-religious-argument-as-enthymeme-aristotle-paul- and-anselm/

6 http://rozenbergquarterly.com/issa-proceedings-2002-charles-s-peirces-theory-of-abduction-and-the- aristotelian-enthymeme-from-signs/

7 Another student's paper

8 http://capone.mtsu.edu/jcomas/rhetoric/aristotle_dialectic.html

9 https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki?curid=515973

Suspected Entry: 69% match