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e does point out that inter- a real possibility that may titutions. K1y point is that : derived from an approach es and interests as exoge-

,," see Barry Buzan ct al., )rder Recast (London: Pin-

ce John R,uggic, " lnterna- s, and Change: Embedded nomic Order," in Krasner, 5-232. nd the Limits of Coopera-

·eating cooperative security nterests, see Robert Jervis, ner, l11ternario11al Regimes, .on, " International Cooper- rity Affairs," \Vorld Politics

rid Society ....

ng," see Jon Eisler, Sour :rsion of Ratio11ality (Carn- y Press, 1983), p. 117 ... . New Thinking, see Mikhail , Tlri11ki11g for Our Cou11try -larper & Row, 1987); Ven- Cruickshank, T/ri11king New 1g" (Berkeley: Institute of •); and Allen Lynch, Gor- ok: Intellecwal Origins and lew York: Institute for 1989) .... 't hese factors, see Jack Sny- ution: A Waning of Soviet :cs 12 (Winter 1987-88), PP· "The Sources and Prospects :al Thinking on Security," 111988), pp. 124-63. al "Conflict Termination: is .,of International Cases," 1989) , pp. 233- 55. · · ·

i i Forces, States and V.:?rld nal Relations Theory, In Critics, pp. 204-55. See also

Y · Cornell ie11ce (Ithaca, N. ··

d " la Nurius, "Possible S v~ -ptember 1986), ~P· 95~ · ;entation of Self in Ev;')' ~ Paul Deutschberger, Som . " Sociometry 26 (December

I A /\1 ES , . RO S EN A L' / Turbulent Change 459

1963 ), pp. 45 4-66; and Walter Earle, " International Relations and the Psychology of Control: Alternat ive Control Strategies and Their Consequences," Political Psychology 7 (June 1986), pp. 369- 75. 83. See Volker Boge and Peter Wilke, "Peace Move- ment s and Unilateral Disarmament: Old Concepts in a New Light," Arms Control 7 (Septemb er 1986 ), pp. 156- 70; Zeev Maoz and Dan iel Felsenthal, "Self-Binding Commitments, the Inducement of Trust, Social Choice, and the Theory of Internation al Cooperation," l11tema- rio11al Studies Q11arterly 3 1 (June 1987), pp. 177-200; and V. Sakamoto, "Uni lateral Initiative as an Alternati ve Strategy," World F11t11res, vol. 24, nos. 1--4, 1987, pp. 107-3 4.

84. On rewards, see Thomas Milburn and Daniel Christie, " Rewarding in International Politics," Political Psychology IO (December 1989), pp. 625--45. 85. Yale Ferguson and Richard Mansbach, "Between Celebration and Despair: Constructive Suggestions for Futur e Internat ional Theory," International St11dies Quarterly 35 (December 199 1), 375. 86. For excellent discussions of this tension, see Walker, "Sovereignty, Identity, Communi ty"; and R. B. J. Walker, "Security, Sovereignty, and the Challenge of World Politics," Alternatives 15 (Winter 1990), pp. 3-27. On institutiona l path dependencies, see Stephen Kras- ner, "Sovereignty: An Institutional Perspective," Com- parative Political S111dies 21 (April I 988 ), pp. 66-94.

Turbulent Change

JAMES N. ROSENAU

In this article, excerpted from his book T urbul ence in World Politics, Professor Rosenau identifies two competing "worlds"- state-centric and multicentric. He focuses on both micro- and macro-level factors as he explores a world marked by the uncertainties associated with t11rb11lence. Change is being propelled by the dynami cs of technology, the emergence of complex issues, the reduced capacity of states to deal effectively with many conte111porary problems, a11d the emergence of "subgroupis111" (lltd individuals who are analytically ever 111ore capable and diverse in orientation.

Doubtless every e~a seems chaotic to the people who live through it, and the last decades of th e twentieth centu ry are ··no exception. It is as if Spaceship Earth daily encounters squalls, down - drafts, and wind shears as it careens into chang- ing and unchartered realms of experience. Sometimes th e tu rbulence is furiously evident as thunderclouds of war gatl1er or the lightning of a crisis streaks across the global sky; but often the turbulence is of a clear-air kind, the havoc it wreaks unrecognized until after its challenges have been met or its damage done.

In seeking here to account for this turbu- lence in world pol itics and the changes that it bo th reflects and promotes, the analysis will focus on th e un derlying and end uring dynamics out of which daily events and current issues flow. Some of the dynamics are located at micro levels, where individuals learn · and group s cohere; ot hers or iginate at macro levels, ·where new techno logies are operative and collectivities conflict; and still others derive from clashes between opposing forces at the two levels- between continuity and change, between the

460 J AM ES N . RO S E N A U / Turbulent Chang e

pulls of the past and the lures of th e future, between th e requir ements of int erd ependence and the dem ands for independence, between centralizing and decentralizing tendencies with- in and amon g nations.

While equat ing the turbu lence of world affairs to sto rmy weather captures well the cur- rent huma n condi tion, its use here as a metaphor may divert from my larger purp ose. The goal in ident ifying a hitherto unim aginable scheme is to facilitate empiri cal explanation rather than to provide poetic expression. What is needed is a concep tion of tur bulence that deno tes the ten- sions and changes that ensue when the structures and processes that normally sustain world poli- tics are unsettled and appear to be undergoing rearran gemen ts. Tu rbul ence is thu s more than the commotion that accompanies shifts in major variables. Such fluctuations make up the day-to- day life of any system , be it social or meteorolog- ical. Just as shifts from cloudiness to showers to sun shine constitute normal weather patterns, so do electoral shifts from right to center to left or ind ustrial shi fts from high to mo derate to low produ ctivity form standard political and eco- nom ic patterns, thereby allowing the analysis of such shifts to proceed by treating the system's boundaries as constant and the range within which the variables fluctuate as a measure of und erlying stability. When the system's bound- aries no longer contain the fluctuations of the variables, however, anomillies arise and irregu- larities set in as structures wav'er, new processes evolve, outcomes become transitory, and the sys- tem enters a period of prolonged disequiJibrium. These are the hallmarks of turbul ence. Meteoro- logically, it appears in the form of hur ricanes, tornadoes, tidal waves, droug hts, and other "abnormalities" of natur e that transform the ter- rain across which they sweep. Socially, it is man- ifested in technological breakthroughs, authority crises, consensus breakdowns, revolutionary up- heavals, generational conflicts, and other forces that restructur e tl1e hum an landscape in which they erup t.

It follows that uncertainty is a prime characterist ic of tu rbu lent polit ics. While the fluctu ations of variables usually adhere to recog- i1izable patterns, regularities disap pear when turbulence sets in. At such times, the struct ures and processes of world polit ics enter a realm without prior ru les or boundaries . Anything may happen, or so it seems, as dema nds are intensified, tensions exacerbated, relations hips transfor med, policymaki ng paralyzed, or out- comes otherwise rendered less certai n and the future more obscure.

Closely related to the uncertain ties associ- ated with political turbulence . is the pace at which it moves. Unlike conven tional dip lomatic or organizational situations, which evolve in the con text of formal procedures, cautious bargain- ing, and bur eaucrat ic iner t ia, those beset by turbu lent conditions develop rapidly as the re- percussions of the various participants' actions cascade through their networks of interdepen- dence . Sustained by the complexity and dy- namism of diverse actors whose goals and activities are inextricab ly linked to each otl1er, and facilitated by technologies that tra nsmit information almos t instantaneously, tu rbulent situatio ns tend to be marked by quick responses, insiste nt demands , temporary coalitions, and policy reversals, all of which propel t he course of events swiftly if erratically along the fault lin es of conflict and cooperation .

Viewed in th is contex t, it is not surprising that ... pro tests and uprisings [have] followed quickly upon each ot her in Soviet Armenia, the West Bank, Poland, Burma, and Yugoslavia, or that the same time span was marked by regimes being shaken up in the Soviet Un ion, Chile, Haiti, and Lebanon. Likewise, and no less con- spicuous, [ the world has] witnessed cascades of · cooperation: within weeks of each oth er, negoti- ations to end wars were initiated in Afghanistan, Angola, Central America, Cambodia, the West- ern Sahara, and the Persian Gul f.1 The winds of tur bulence, in short, can prop el postinterna- tional politics in many direct ions, thro ugh the

ncertainty is a prime lent politics. While the . usually adhere to recog- larities di~appear when Jch times, the stru ctures :I politics ent er a realm r boundaries. Anything seems, as demands are :acerbated, relationships .king paralyzed, or out- :red less certain and the

the uncertainties associ- rbulence is the pace at conventiona l diplomatic ·ions, which evolve in the !<lures, cautious bargain- inertia, tho se beset by

evelop rapidly as th e re- ous participants' actions networks of interdepen- the complexity and dy- .ctors whose goals and Jly linked to each other, hnologies that transmit .stantaneously, turbulent arked by quick responses, mporary coalitions, and ,hich propel the course of illy along the fault lines of ) 11.

ntext, it is not surprising

1prisings [have] fo~owed er in Soviet Armema, the urma, and Yugoslavia, or n was marke d by regimes :he Soviet Union, Chile, .ikewise, and no less con.- ias] witnessed cascades ~f eeks of each other, n~goll- e initiated in AfghaI11St3D•

di the West-ica, Cambo a, . f . Gulf i The w1.0ds o •rstan ·

-can propel postinter;- y directions, through e

I 1\ t-1 E ~ N . RO S I: N A U / Turbulent Change 461

world's diplomat ic an<l legislative chamber s, where compromi ses arc reached, no less than through its streets and battl efields, where con - flicts are joi ned.

But how to extend the analysis beyond a suggestive metaphor? How to emp loy turbu - lence as a serious and systematic analytic con- cept that helps to account for the emergence of postinternational politics? ... [A]n answer is found in the field of organizatio nal theo ry, where the concept of turbulence is well devel- oped and widely used. In particular, reliance is placed on a model of organizations that identi- fies turbul ence as the condition they face when their environme nts are marked by high degrees of complexit}' and dynamism. In this formula - tion, high complex ity is not a synonym for events and trends that arc difficult lo under- stand. It refers, rather , to such an inordinate number of actors in the environment , and such an extensive degree of interdependence among them, that the environ ment is dense (rath er than t hin ) with causal layers. This density is conceived to be so great as to enable any event to give rise to a restless commotion, which rever- berates in fast-paced and unexpected ways throughou t the environment and its diverse S)'S - tems. When the dynamism of the environment is also high- i.e., when great variability marks the cond uct of its ~ctors-t he interdep endence of its many part s is bound to be greatly affected by the volatility that ,~ccompanics large-scale social transformati ons. '

It cou ld be argued that high complexity and high dynamism are not new to world politics, that global war s, revolutions, and dep ressions reflect such co ndit ions, and accord ingly, that change has always been at work in world poli- tics. In order to differentiate the familiar and commonplace changes from the profound kind of transformations that seem to be occurrin g today, one other attribut e of political turbul ence needs to be noted- namely, it involves paramet- ric change. On ly when the basic parameters of World politics, those bounda ry constraints that

shape and confine the fluctuation s of its vari- ables, are engulfed by high complexity and high dynamism is turbu lence considered to have set in. Being boundaries, parameters are normally stab le. They make possible the continuiti es of political life, t he ability of individual and collec- tive actors to get from one day to the next and from one era to the next. Hence, when the ori- entations, skills, relat ionships, an d struct ures that have sustained the parameters of world pol- itics begin to crumble- i.e., when the complex- ity and the dynamism of the parameters reach a point where the existing rules of conduct no longer serve to constr.ain behavior and out- comes-t he course of events is bound to turn turbulent.

Three dimensio ns of world politics are con- ceptualized as its main parameters. One of these operates at the micro level of indiv iduals, one functio ns at the macro level of collectivities, and the third involves a mix of the two levels. The micro parameter consists of the or ientations~ skills by which citizens of states and members of nonstate organizations link them selves to the macro world of global politics. I refer to this set of boundary constrai nts as t he orientational or skill parameter. The macro parameter is here designated the structural parameter, and it refers to the co nstrai nts embedded in the distributi on of power among and within the collectivities of the global system. The mixed parameter is called the relational one; it focuses on th e nature of the autho rity relations that prevaiJ between individ- uals at the m icro level and their macro collectiv- ities.

All three of these parameters are judged to be unde rgoing such a thoroughgoi ng· transforma- tion today as to bring abou t the first turbulence in world politics since compa rable shifts culminated in the Treaty of Westp halia in 1648. 2 At first glance, it doubt less seems excessive to argue that the turbulen ce of the present era is the first in mo re than three hundred years. Clearly, the his- tory of most countries is marked by periods of turmoil. As already noted, however, the claim

462 J A ,\I ES N. ROSEN i\ L' I Turbul ent Chnni;c

being made here pertain s to turbulen ce in the internati onal system and not to the u pheaval experienced within nationa l systems, to the trans- formation of three specific parametri c pattern s and not to the commotion that attend s the wag- ing of wars or the Ouctuation of econo mies. In the case of the stru ctural parameter, the tran sfor- mation is marked by a bifurcation in which the state-centric system now coexists with an equally powerful, though more decentralized, multi -cen - tric system. Although these two worlds of world politics have overlapping clements and concerns, their norms, structures, and processes tend to be mutually exclusive, thus giving rise to a set o f global arrangements that are new and possibly enduring, as well as extremely complex and dynamic.3 In the case of the relational parameter , the long-standing pattern whereby compl iance with authority tend s to be unquestioning and automatic is conceived to have been replaced by a more elaborate set of norm s that make the successful exercise of autho rity much more prob - lematic, thus fostering leadership and follower- ship conflicts within and amo ng state and non state collectivities that can fairly be j udged as amountin g to a series of authority crises which, in both their pervasiveness and their scale, are new and global in scope. Lastly, at the micro level, the analytic skills of individuals have increased to a point where they now play a different and signif- icant role in world politics, a role which has intensified both th e processes of structural bifur- cation and the breakdown o f authh rity relations.

It is the sim ultaneity and interaction of these paramet ric changes that distingui sh the present period from the previou s th ree cen- tu ries. By virtue of their newly acquired skills, peopl e are more able and ready to question auth ori ty, and in turn the new aut hority rela- tionships have facilitated the development of new, more decentra lized global stru ctu res. But the causal Oows also move from the macro to the micr o level as the centrali zed struc tur es invite th e formation of new authority relation - ships, which then serve to refine furth er the

skills and orienta tions through which individu- als link them selves to their collectivities. Earlier eras have witnessed wars that shifted globa l structure s from multipolar to bipolar found a- tions and revoluti ons that und ermin ed the pre- vailing authority relationships; but not since the seventeenth century h a,·e circumsta nces ar isen in which the values of all thr ee of these funda- mental parameters underwent reinforcing realignment s.

Between Peace and War

The turbul ent cond itions of postin tern ational politics should not be equated to thos e of vio- lence. While uncertainty may promote the possi- bility of armed conflict in world politics, there is no one-to-one relationship between them. Tur- bulence can prevail withi n com munitie s, mar - kets, organizations, and alliances without their conflicts bringing on a resorl to armed force. To study turbu lence is to analyze responses to uncerta int y, to th e changes wrought by technol- ogy and an ever-expanding global interdepen - dence , and war is but one of those responses. What follows, therefore, is o nly incidentally an analysis of vio lence in world po litics. Indeed, ... there are good reasons to ant icipate that respon ses involving force will dim inish as world politics becomes more turbulent.

In some important respects, in fact, war is free of th e uncertain ties th at accompany turbu- lence. When war breaks out, adversarial rela- tionship s become clear , the goals of policy making self-evident , and the tasks ahead unmis- takable. Viewed in thi s way, turbulence may be more a prewar or po stwar condition than a mark of wartime. And of course it is no t a cfiar- acteristic of peacetime, if by the latter is meant stable circumstance in which parameters : remain essentially fixed.

In both pea~e and war, in other words, the day-to -d ay fluctuation s are familiar. They are with in the range of variat ions that have occurred before, that people know how to cope with and

g e

" C 0

b ti

p a, fc IV

ti- di 01

irough which individ_u- eir collectivities. Earlier ars that shifted global olar to bip olar found a- 1at und ermined th e pre - nships; but not since_ th e ve circumstances an sen all three of these fun~a- underwent reinforcing

ar of postinterna tional

ons f . equated to those o Vl~ -

ty may promote th e poss~- . in world politics, there is ~ship between t~~m-Tur - ~thin com munities, ma~- 1d alliances without their I resort to armed force. To to analyze responses to anges wrought by technol- mding global interdepen- 1t one of those responses. )re, is only incidentally an L world politics. Indeed, .. .

to anticipate that asons d . wi'll diminish as worl orce -e turbulent. . ' f IS ant respects, in act, war ties that accompany turbu- ;eaks out , adversarial re~a- clear, the goals of poll~ and the tasks ahead unm1s-

. be his way, turbulence may postwar condit ion than a nd of course it is not a char· me if by the latter is meant

, . h' 1 parameters :es tn w ic 1

ixed. d the md war, in other wor s,

il. They are tions are fam tar. d h ccurre variations that ave o . and

know how to cope with

J A .\I I:. S I\ . R OS EN A U / Turbulent Change 463

adjust to. Under turbul ent condit ions, on the othe r hand, even th e slightest fluctua tion can seem portentou s, with each shift confirmin g that change is the norm, that patterns are fragile, and that expectations can be frustrated.

The So urces of Chan ge

What are the forces at work toward the end of the twentieth centur y that drive these paramet- ric tran sformations? Five seem parti cularly rele- vant. One involves the shift from an industrial to a post industria l order and focuses on th e dynamics of techno logy, particul arly on tho se technologies associated with the microelect ronic revolut ion that have made social, economi c, and political distances so much shorter, the move- ment of ideas, pictures, curr encies, and in- formatio n so much faster , and thus the interdep endence of people and events so mu ch greater.·1 A second engine of global change is the emergence of issues-s uch as atmo spheric pol- lution, terrorism, the drug trade, curr ency crises, and AIDS-that are the direct product s of new technologies or of the world 's greater interd ependence and are distingui shed from tradit iona l pol itical issues by virtue of being transnational rat her than natio nal or local in scope. A third dynamic is the reduced capability of states and governme nts to provide satisfac- tory solutions to the major issues on their polit- ical agendas, partly because the new issues are not wholly within their jur isdiction, partly because the old issues ar.e also increasingly inter- twined with significant international compo- nents (e.g., agricultural markets and labor productivity), and partly because the compli- ance of their citizenries can no longer be taken for granted. Fourth , with the weakening of whole systems, subsystems have acquir ed a correspond ingly greater coherence and effec- tiveness, thereby fostering tenden cies toward decentralization (what I call subgroupism) at all organizational levels that are in stark contrast to the centralizing tendencies (her e regarded as

11atio11-statis111 or transnationalism) that marked the early decades of this century and th ose that preceded it. Finally, th ere is the feedback of the consequences of all the foregoing for the skills and orientation s of the world's adu lts who com- pr ise the groups , states, a1:d ot her collectivities th at have had to cope with the new issues of int erdependen ce and adjust to the new tech- nologies of the post industrial order; with their analytic skills enlarged an d their orienta t ions toward aut hor ity more self-conscious, today's persons-in -the- street are no longer as unin- volved, ignorant , and manipulable with respect to world affairs as were,their forebears.

Th e hypot hesized in teractions among these ftve source s of change, and an indication of the histor ical setting in which they accelerated, are pr esented diagrammatically in Figure I. Th is causal model involves mo re than a simple iden- tification of five prime sources of global turbu - lence and a presumption that they are highly interactive. One of the five dynam ics, the shift in micro capabilities and orientation s, is deemed to be mor e powerful than the other four, so mu ch so as to be a requis ite to the expansivity and intensity of the ot her four. That is, althou gh world politic s would not be on a new course toda y if th e microelectronic and ot her techno- logical revolutions had not occurr ed, if th e new interd ependenc e issues had not arisen, if states and governm ents had not become weaker, and if subgroupism had not mu shro omed, no ne of these dyna m ics would have prod uced parame t- ric change if adults in every coun try and in all walks of life had remained essentially unskiU_ed and detached with respect to global affairs. To be sure, th ese shifts in skills and ·.orientation s have been hastened and refined by the oth er dynamics, and in th is sense the latter can also be viewed as necessary determinants of the tu rbu - lence. Without the micro transformations , how- ever, none of the other s could have emerged on a worldwide scale, and in this sense the enlarge- ments of the capacit ies of citizens is the primary prerequisite for global turbulence.

464 I A .\1 ES ~ . R O ~ E N A U / T urbul ent Changt'

Th e anal ysis, then, is no t based o n a single- cause mod el. Nor doe s i1 presum e that the micro change s preceded the others in lim e. O n the contrar y, all of them are seen as bein g ini- tially respo nses to the techn ological u pheavals that ur~derlay the ever-growin g interdepend en- cies of economi c, political, and social life. On ce the micro level shifts began, however, alteratio ns in th e status of states, governm ents, and sub - grou ps were bound to follow, as peop le became receptive to the decent ralizing conseq uences inher ent in their growing capacity to locate their own in terests more clearly in the flow of events. Th e subt lety of these inter active processes is per- hap s most clearly evident in the links between the expans ion of citizen skills and the tech- nolo gies mad e available by the microe lectron ic revolu tion. If one asks what th e ad vent of in- stantaneo us communicat ions and inform ation retri eval-o f satellites b rin ging pict ures of o ngoing even ts in to hom es everywhere and o f comput ers storing , processing, and d isseminat - ing in formati on heretofor e un known and ungat herable-ma y be doin g to indi vidu als as actor s on the global stage, the answer seems inescapable that the new techno logies have had a pr ofo und , if not always desirable, imp act upo n how indi viduals perceive, comprehend , jud ge, ent er, avoid, or o therwise interact with the world beyond their workp lace and ho me. For exampl e, t he n ew electro n ic techn o logies have so great ly collapsed the time in wh ich organ iza- tion s and moveme nts can be mobilized that the comp etence o f citizens feeds on itself, in the sense that they can virtual!}' "see" their skills and orien tat ions b eing cumul ated into larger aggre- gates that have conseque nce for the cou rse of events. No longer does the t ranslatio n of com - mitment int o act ion await word brought by stagecoach that like-minded citizens are band- ing toget her or that leaders discern an oppo rt u- nit y for effective part icipatio n . To day, even ts and the words abo ut them are, in effect, sim ul- tan eous occurr ences. Unlike any prior time in histor y, th erefore, citizens are now able to in-

tru ck thcmse l\'CS read ily into d situation any- where in the wo rld , bec<1use info rm at io n abo ut its latest twist and turn s is immediately at hand.

lmk..:d, even if th e ensui ng analysi exag- gerates the extent to wh ich the skills and ori en - tati ons of citizens have enlarged, the ability to mobilize those skills and orienta tio ns is so mu ch greater and speedier tlu n in t he past that the pr actical effect is an expanded capac ity for iden - tify ing and articu lating self-int erests and parti c- ipating effect ively in collective actio n. And if, as seems likely, those who head organ izatio ns rec- ognize t he effects of this capaci ty on their lead - ersh ip circums tances, then their sensit ivities to the wishes and demand!> of their followers will intens ify and lend further credence to the per- ception ol cit izens as und ergo ing an expa nsion and redirection o f their skills and or ienta tions.

The Technologica l Dynamic

Gi,·cn the concept ion of tur bu lence as a process of paramet er realignm ent , a furth er qu estion arises as to th e sour ces of t urbu lence. Except for the dyn am ics u nlc.::ashcd by tech nological inno- vation s, those noted !, O far are embrace d by the three pa ramet ers of th e global political system and arc thu s endo genou s to it. But th ere may be exogen ous sour ces in addition to those that deri\'e from techn o logical developme nt s. That is, \\'hilc tur bu lence pa rtly feeds on itself, as each para metric alteratio n gives rise to circum stances tha t exert pressur e for furth er alteratio ns, polit- ical systems arc also subject to a broad array of changes or iginating in th e economy and society, all of which MC also ·ufficicn tly dyna mic to spur till further change once they have been ab-

sorbed b y the polity. Following the insightful formulation of ·

Cho ucri and ort h, thr ee dynamics are coJ)- ceived to be especially relevan t as exogenous sou rces of glob al turbu lence.5 As indicated in Figur e l , one i th e pressures created by exten- sive changes in the stru ctu re and size of popula- tio n in recen t d ecades. A second involves the

into a situation any- ,se information about . immediately at hand. nsuing analysis exag- h the skills and orien- nlarged, the ability to rientations is so much 1 in the past that the 1ded capacity for iden- lf-interests and partic- ctive action. And if, as ead organizations rec- :apacity on their lead- ·n their sensitivities to of their followers will r credence to the per- lergoing an expansion ;kills and orientations.

1mic

:urbulence as a process 1t, a further question turbulence. Except for by technological inno- ir are embraced by the global political system to it. But there may be ddition to those that al developments. That y feeds on itself, as each es rise to circumstances rther alterations, polit- ject to a broad array of e economy and society, : iently dynamic to spur ce they have been ab-

ghtful formulation of ree dynamics are con- relevant as exogeno~s lence.s As indicated lll sures created by exten- ture and size of popula- A second involves the

I i\ M E S N . ROS EN 1\ U I Turbulent Chan ge 465

shifting availability and distribution of natural resources, especially those related to the genera- tion of energy. The third derives from the previ- ously mentioned consequences of technologies in all fields of hum an endeavor, from informa - tion processing to medicine, biogenetics and agriculture.

Since it has also contributed to the shifts in popu lation and natural resources, technology is perhaps the most powerful of the exogenous dynamics. For it is technological developments, those combinations of human ingenuity and material nature, that have transformed the indu strial order and brought into being the age of information, the post-industrial society, the technocratic era, the microelectronic revolu- tion-w hatever one may wish to call the emer- gent arrangements by which people move toward goals, satisfy needs, and othenvise con- duct their affairs. Technology has expanded the capacity to generate and manipulate information and knowledge even more than the ability to produce material goods, leading to a situation in which the service industries have come to replace the manu facturing industries as the cutting edge of societal life. It is technology, too, that has so greatly diminished geographic and social dis- tances thr ough the jet-powered airliner, th e computer, the orbiting satellite, and the man y other innovation s that now move people, ideas, and goods more rapidly and surely across space and time than ever before. It is technology that has profoundly altered' the scale on which human affairs take place, allowing more people to do more things in less time and with wider repercussions than could have been imagined in earlier eras. It is technology, in short , that has fostered an interdependence of local, national, and internation al communiti es that is far greater than any previously experienced.6

The impact of these technology-driven exo- genous dynami cs on societies, econom ies, and polities has been imaginatively and fully re- corded by students of national systems. One needs only read the works of Daniel Bell, Peter

Drucker, John Naisbitt, and Daniel Yankelovich - to ment ion a few of the many observers who have focused on the social consequences of mod- ern technology- to appreciate the extraordinary transformations through which the world is passing.7 They convincingly demonstrate that families, marriages, acquaintanceships, work, unions, businesses, leisure, agriculture, produc - tivity, housing, travel, electoral politics, and every other aspect of life have recently under- gone, and still continue to undergo, changes of great magnitude.

Yet somehow, studen ts .of global politics have not begun to take qCcount of the transfor- mations at work within societies. While they do not ignore the domestic sources of international relationships when internal conflicts, consen- suses, or stalemates pre dominate, the dynamics of the postindustrial society tend to be taken for gran ted. T hat the world is considerab ly more int erdepe ndent is widely recognized, but the ways in which the sources of expanding interde- pendence sustain or alter the structures and processes of world pol itics have not been foci of intensive investigation.8 The prevailing orienta- tion seems, rat her, to presume that the basic structure s and processes of internat ional politics remain intact even as change swirls thro ugh its compo nent parts.

Likewise, sllldents of th e post indus trial society have not been especially concerned with the implicat ions of their find ings and insights for global politics. While Drucker, for example, does explore these implications for internationa l economics, his analysis is limited to the pro~- lems of poli ticaUy managing the world economy and does not get into the even larger question of management in world politics itself. Similarly, Bell an ticipates "that the post-i ndu strial society wiU involve more politics than ever before, for the very reason that choice becomes conscious and the decision-centers more visible,"9 but his inquiry does not extend beyond the polit ics of who rules the commu nity and society. The pos- sibility that the global effects of the relatively few

1945 -- - ----> 1950s 1960s and 1970s

DEMO GRAPHI C AND RESOURCE CHAN GES

MICROE LECTRONIC REVOLUT ION

POSTINDUSTRIAL ORDER ADVENT OF NEW TRANSNATIONAL ISSUES

PRESENT

NE\V INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTIONS , REGIMES

FUTURE

State-Centric Wor ld

US ~ USSR

t' /t t

State -Centric World

US ~USS R

bloc bloc '

CEN TRA LIZ ING

DYNAMICS

DECENTRALI ZING

OYNAl'.1ICS

. State-Centric

World

us ~ USSR

\I 3rd WORLD

,,/\,. IGOs · INGOs ..

-- global structures ---> global processes - global structure s

• IGOs - Internat ional Governmenta l Organiz ations • 'IN GOs - Interna tional Non-governmen tal Orga nizations

FIGURE 1 Evolution of th e Two Worlds of World Politic s

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CAPACITIES OTHER ...,_ WHOLE SYSTEMS MICROCHANGES IN STREN GTHENED

SKILLS, CATHECTIC W EAKENED I '"'"'oo""~ / "'m'"' ____ ?

AUTHORITY CR ISES. SHIFTS IN LOCUS OF

LEGIT IMACY, FOCI OF LOYAL TV

GROWTH OF SUBGROU PISM

I INCREASED RELEVANCE , COM PETENCE , AND

DEMANDS OF SUBGROUPS

global process es ----•

- :E .., ,... "O n, 2 - n 0,) 0,) V, 0,) ::,- ::,- 0 3 0 '

::, .:;- ~ ::, < "'O

2 ~ ~ a- 00 £. ~ ::!.. ::, V, Cl.. n, r, ::,- -=' n, ~

Multi-Centric World

subg1oups ~ IGOs" & INGO "" s

t Xt stale

bureaucracies

trans· na1ional aetors

globa l structur es

5'° V, Cl.. < 0 n, n < 0.:

n n· r, n, -0 0 ~

II) C 0 -~

Ill N C ·- 0 C .-::[g, ell ~ .t:! 0 c _ ell ca C) - ~ C 0 (I) -E ca C C a, Q) > E o C Cl Q) C: > 0 o z (.') io io g C · -o -·;: :g ca ~ C Ql CDC £1 I Ill lll O 0(.')

....

1 A ~I ES N . ROS EN A U / Turbulent Change 467

postindu stria l societies might give rise to world- wide norm s and practices that influence the development of preindustrial and indu strial societies is not entertained.

An Overview

Political turbulence is not so powerful as to sweep away existing institutional arrangement s and cultural patterns without resista nce. If we are to compre hend the tensions inherent in the clash between the forces that sustain the p revail- ing order and those that promote transforma- tion, we need to be clear about the concepts o f tur bu lence and change as well as the procedures employed to ana lyze them ....

In sum, by exploring turbul ence in world politics we are investigating a major ana lytic gap that needs to be filled. The gap is that nexus wherein politics o n a global scale have been tran sformed by th e diverse dynamics that have taken modern life beyond the rules and arrange- ments that prevailed throughout the industrial era. The need to fill the gap stems from th e premise that it is inco nceivable that so many great changes could occu r within societies with - out major consequences for the conduct of affairs among them.

Notes

1. For an analysis of these developments, sec James N. Rosenau, " lnterdependente and the Simultaneity Puz- zle: Notes on t.he Outbreak of Peace," in Charles W. Keg- ley, Jr., ed., Tire Long Post~var Peace: Tire Sources of Great Power Stability (forth coming), chapter 15.

2. The Treaty of Westphalia is generaUy recognized as the beginning of the modern system of nation-state s. However, this is not a unanimou s view. Wight, for example, argues that the start of the French-Span ish

struggle over Italy in 1494 marked th e origin of the mod- ern system, noting that "at Westphalia the state system docs not come into existence; it comes of age." M. Wight, Systems of States (Leicester: Leicester University Press, l 977), p. 152.

3. . - . It seems approp riate to treat the state- and mul- ticcntric systems as separate "worlds," a formulation not to be confused with the generic label "world politics" that is used throughout to designate structures and processes of global scope. The frequent references to the "two worlds of world po litics" (or, occasionaUy, to the "two-world political universe") are intended to serve as a contin ual reminder that the global system has structu re even though it lacks unity, having entered a period of far-reaching (and possibly irreversible) bifurcatio n.

4. For a thorough exploration of the diverse d imen- sions of the microelectronic revolution, see Rob van Tul- der and Gerd Junne, European Multinati onals in Core Technologies (Chichester: John Wiley, 1988).

5. Nazli Chouc ri and Robert C. North, Nations i11 Conflict: National Growth and International Violence (San Francisco: W. H. Freeman, 1975).

6. For a succinct and cogent discussion of d1e diverse ways in which new electronic technologies have changed the face of politics at ail levels, see Walter B. Wriston , "Technology and Sovereignty," Foreig11 Affairs 67 (Win- ter 1988/89): 63-75.

7. These authors have each written more than one work on the dynamics of change in the late twentieth century, but their views can be readily grasped in Bell, Co111ing of Post-illdustrial Society; Peter Drucker, Man- aging in T11rb11le11t Times (New York: Harpe r & Row, 1980); John Naisbitt, Megarrends: Ten New Directions Transforming Our Lives (New York: Warner Books, 1982); and Daniel Yankelovich, New Rules: Searc/1ingfor Self-Fuljil/111en1 in A World Turned Upside Down (New York: Random House, 1981).

8. Exceptions to this generalization can be found in James N. Danziger, "Co mputin g and the Political World," Co111p11ters and the Social Sciences 2 ( 1986): 183-200, and Robert Gilpin, "The Comput er and World Affairs," in M. L. Dertouzos and J. Moses, eds., The Co111p111er Age: A Twenty-Year View (Cambridge, Mass.: I\IIT Press, 1979), pp . 229-53 .

9. Bell, Co111ing of Post-Industrial Society, p. 263 ( ital- ics in original).